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Volume II

Personalist Ethics and Human Subjectivity

Edited by
George F. McLean

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

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Introduction

George F. McLean

The first volume of this study was focused upon the objective dimension of ethics. The introduction to that volume noted that to understand and direct human action it is necessary to comprehend the human person as part of nature and as being-in-the-world. One's powers of knowledge and feeling are sensitive to changes in one's surroundings and respond to these as promotive or destructive, that is, as good or bad. But an intensively self-centered, self-enclosed, and solipsistic human life would be inert and meaningless, insufficiently alive to be ethically engaged. We are social beings, born of others, developing with others, and depending upon our community for life, sustenance, learning and expression. Indeed, one might initially summarize the content of ethics as the project of emerging out of the self as the center and unique object of one's concern.

Nonetheless, in order to be ethical it is not enough to be other-directed. The tornado that is about to devour a house in the prairie, the avalanche crashing down upon a mountain chalet are, in a sense, other-directed, but the relation is not ethical. As a member of a family or larger community, the person must also decide and will freely but responsibly. This is precisely where ethics, as the correct direction of one's free action, is focused. It is the reason why the person has always been the subject of prolonged and careful education.

Basically, this is to recognize that one's internal character or subjectivity has always been at the heart of the objective orientation of ethics discussed in volume I, *Normative Ethics and Objective Reason*. This was central to Plato's project for educating future leaders for the *polis*. It was the essential principle for the division of the material and spiritual levels of life in Aristotle's *De Anima*. It was the key to the notion of *synderesis*, which was intensified in the schools of Western Christian spirituality and it has received predominant attention in modern times, especially the last half century. Subjectivity, as that which enables the object to be, not merely the result of action, but consciously known and responsibly willed always has been at the heart of the project of ethics and, indeed, of mankind.

From this it can be seen that any development in the appreciation of subjectivity, as well as any advance in the quality of the self-awareness this implies, would radically transform the character of ethics. This can be sensed in the shift in sensibilities from one generation to another, but it stands out at those points at which a radically new level of self-awareness is achieved. One of these was the advent of Christianity as a call to resurrection and new life; it was the task of each person and community to internalize and realize this in his or her lifetime. This not only brought out the eternal implications of the ethical. Correlatively, it radically heightened the intensity of drama of the internal struggle to overcome selfishness in order to live more fully one's personal relations in the image of the relation of Christ to the Father in the Spirit of love. The direction: to be holy as the heavenly Father is holy, moved the emphasis beyond the Greek attention to *polis* and law and focused it upon person and love.

The modern age has been marked by an intensification of this sense of the subject as the source of knowledge. By attending carefully to ideas and their upon the sensible origins through Lock's "historical plain method" or upon the order of clear and distinct ideas through Descartes' mathematical method, the search for a unified science pushed forward with remarkable success. Inevitably, this caused and reflected a new and ever more intense attention to the role of the subject.

As enriched by Kantian formalism and Hegel's idealistic dialectic, this became an intricately detailed articulation of reality.

Nevertheless, this notion of the subject was restricted to being the source of the epistemological object. The concern with what is known hid, or distracted attention from, the subject; proposals by Pascal and Kierkegaard that one attend to what is proper to the subject were submerged by the concern to construct a clear and certain system of knowledge, a science. Hence, it was of great moment when, in this century, Edmund Husserl developed a method focused upon intentionality itself as the core orientation of the person to meaning and the good. This is to be made manifest or brought into the light; as 'phen' expresses light, this would be termed 'phenomenology'. Through the application of this method access was opened to the uniquely self-conscious, free and responsible life of the subject.

Gabriel Marcel helps to bring out the character of this step. To restrict knowledge to objects leaves unattended the life proper to the subject. But to attempt to correct this by making the proper life of the subject itself into an object of knowledge would once again miss the distinctive subjectivity of knowledge, and so on. This can be remedied only by moving beyond the subject-object structure of objective knowledge in order to attend to the subject not as the termination of an act of knowing, but as its distinctive point of origin. This is the subject as the point at which being emerges as intentional and evolves as self-conscious, and thus as self-directive and free.

This new sensitivity to the being of the subject has been brought out particularly in this century; its implications are immense. Subjects treated as scientific and technological objects can be written into laws and structures, state policies, production systems and educational objectives. But such treatment is not appropriate for human persons taken precisely as subjects; indeed, they would be oppressed by it. Hence, the more the technological structuring of our life succeeds, the more it generates a sense of being threatened on the part of persons. This is not a matter of mere external reaction against systems; if the subject as such is not alive, alert, free and creative, the genius needed to develop the various economic, political and social systems and to adjust their structures begins to fail from within. Systems in which success is measured only in terms of efficiency become wasteful.

Moreover, stagnant structures, which as such oppress freedom and creativity, generate dissatisfaction in proportion to the rise in the degree of sensitivity to personal subjectivity. Hence, in retrospect, it is possible now to see how scientific Marxism could be designed as a total objective philosophy of life in the last century, and why it was doomed to fail in this century precisely to the degree that it was applied with its own objective scientific rigor.

What emerges from recognition of this new dimension of human sensibility, namely, attention to subjectivity, is a project for the development of ethics. Its task will not be to supplant the objective reference of human action or its evaluation: hence, the work done in volume I, *Normative Ethics and Objective Reason*, remains essential, indeed foundational. In that volume the need, extent and distinctive nature of objective reasoning in ethics was sounded out. Its ability to provide ideals and general norms was examined, as was its ability to remain open and developmental in relation to the ever evolving pattern of human life.

Now, however, it is possible and necessary to look more penetratingly into the life of the subject as free and as searching responsibly to realize the good through personal and community action and interaction. To do this thoroughly would be to write a comprehensive ethics for each sector of human life. That is not possible here, and not merely due to lack of space. For in terms of what has just been said its formulation as an objective system would omit, and in time suppress, the creative center of the life of the human subject.

At this point, what is needed is a concerted effort to bring into the light the distinctive character of human intentionality and subjectivity. This effort has three major steps: the first is to clarify the presence of intentionality and subjectivity in the long history of ethics and its special emergence in the contemporary consciousness. The second is to search for the ultimate religious horizon which this provides for ethics. Both of these are the burden of this second volume. The third, to be treated in a subsequent volume, is to follow out the ways in which the cumulative exercise of subjectivity constitutes cultures. In their plurality, these cultures manifest the multiple ways in which the human project has been carried out and in their interrelation through time promises to manifest ever more richly men and women as true images of God.

Concretely then the present volume explores the issue of subjectivity in ethics along two axes: from the personal to the social, and from the human to the religious: the first concerns human subjectivity, while the second concerns its religious context and that of ethics generally.

In Part I S. Samay takes the decisive step, showing that the classical dichotomy of subject and object reflects past limitations of our appreciation of what it means to be. This awareness directs us to enrich that sense by an appreciation of the radical character of intentionality. Being is not simply what is, such that all meaning and purpose is fixed and external; on the contrary, being is inherently intentional and directional. Within it emerge both knowledge and love, not in isolation and opposition, but as a paired implementation of the basic thrust of being. This sets a framework within which the normative is not the limitation, but the articulation and implementation, of freedom.

This is taken up by John Caputo in his chapter on moral sensibility and moral emotion as the primordial disclosures of values for ethics. Austin Fagothy advances the study of subjectivity in ethics by tracing it from the notion of conscience in Greek and Medieval thought to the modern passion for freedom. This serves as the key to bringing into a mutually reinforcing synergy the twin elements of law and love. This direction is carried further by G.F. McLean in distinguishing three levels of freedom ranging from that of choosing between contrary things, through the Kantian imperative, to the existential order of self realization. This points to the importance of the aesthetic mode of awareness in order to integrate creative freedom and an objective world.

The dynamics of this is addressed in Part II. The chapter of L. Kelly investigates this psychologically as an emerging capability in the process of the development of the person. E. Baltazar takes a broader process view and examines its implications for a reconstitution of objective natural law theory in terms of the dynamism of love based on the evolutionary perspective of Teilhard de Chardin. Does this result in a relativism? John Cobb in his "Process and Normative Ethics" would admit to some relativization of objectivity, but would argue that objectivity remains.

The import of this is studied by R. Sweeney and J. Kockelmans who proceed to analyze in depth how this faces respectively the value and existential issues of meaning in the life of our times. In this context one can obtain a renewed appreciation of the value philosophy of Scheler and begin to draw upon the work of Ricoeur on value and symbol. Indeed Van Buren could see this as constituting a self-sufficient field for human life and identifying religion therewith as a secular Christianity. It might seem that the work of Kockelmans, which traces Sartre's inexorable journey into the ambiguity (not absurdity) of human freedom, would come to a similar conclusion. Instead, it argues in the end that his position does not logically exclude a religious context for the ethical life, and leads thereby into Part III.

As was noted periodically in Parts I and II, the ultimate interpretation of the meaning and goal of life and the basis for motivation in the ethical order generally are grounded in the religious

context of the life of a person or people. Part III examines the relation of ethics to religion. It does not lead away from the human, but through the person to its foundation in an Absolute source which, out of love, created all things and guides human freedom suavely by the attractive power of the good. M. Nédoncelle illustrates how this can be discovered through phenomenological reflection and D. Schindler argues to the need for such a religious foundation.

The chapters of J. Gustafson and B. Cobb move the discussion to the properly Christian horizon by asking how religious faith and human ethics interact. Does faith add new content to ethics or deeper meaning and motivation to human action--or could it be both? Finally, this is applied to moral theology by C. Curran and B. Häring who discuss respectively the impact of the evolving sense of the person upon ethics and Christianity, and conversely the impact of Christianity upon moral values, their order and application.

The appendix by G. Stanley goes to the heart of the relation between a philosophical ethics based on reason and oriented to the natural end of mankind and a moral theology based on faith and oriented to eternal life face to face with God. Do these two ends divide the life projects of people, are they compatible, could the second be an amazingly magnanimous fulfillment of the first? Stanley's appendix, which studies Aquinas' penetrating work on this question, relates the end of humankind as considered by Aristotle with the vision of God as presented in the Christian and other faiths, East and West.

This volume is not a new moral summa, a survey of the many ethical issues and of the conclusions to be drawn. It is rather an analysis of how the appreciation of subjectivity is transforming ethics in our times. Our task is to understand and shape these forces in ways that implement human freedom as we enter upon the XXIst century. The following, third, volume, on ethics and culture will address this task with a view to integrating objectivity and subjectivity in ethics in terms of culture. This should not only contribute to overcoming the great tensions of our times between objectivity and subjectivity, but make it possible to draw from the rich diversity of the human efforts to live morally by peoples through time and in all parts of the world.

Chapter I

Affectivity: The Power Base of Moral Behavior

Sebastian A. Samay, O.S.B.

Executive Knowledge or Socratic Fallacy?

Whatever else might be said about the relationship between science and morality one thing is fairly clear: the two are aimed at different ends. Science is undertaken with a view to gaining awareness, knowledge, information about the world, while the aim of morality is to develop dispositions for right action, right behavior in the agent. To be sure, science too involves action, but only as a means of attaining its end. All the methodical probing, measuring, testing merely serve as preparatory steps toward what is really intended by the scientific enterprise. That end is knowledge. By contrast, morality makes use of knowledge and turns it into a means for its own end. As a preparatory step toward deliberate and righteous action, knowledge is undoubtedly a guide to morality, but not the whole of it; nor is knowledge the goal or final end of morality. That end is action which transmutes knowledge into concrete performance and thereby actualizes what knowledge merely represents. Through this actualization, a certain power or perfection, a surplus-being or reality accrues to the moral agent. Traditional wisdom calls this increase virtue.

One would expect from this that moral philosophies, especially theories of moral education, would have a great deal to say about how to foster virtue in people. At the very least, one would expect that, along with analyzing the sources, principles, objects and methods of moral knowledge, ethics would also explain to us the dynamics which turns our moral representations into performative skills. Besides enumerating the reasons for which people act or should act, ethics must call attention also to the energies through which people are enabled to act for those reasons. After all, the reality which moral philosophy studies can be said to exist only after people acquired the ability and disposition, not only to think according to a certain set of principles, but also to act on them. To understand morality, therefore, requires that we investigate not only the processes of moral discourse, but also the root of the dynamism of moral life.

Alas, most moral theories traditional and current alike, are rather thin on the latter score. Preoccupied with the problems of moral reasoning and moral discourse, many of them quickly gloss over the dynamics of moral action as virtually unproblematic. But there are problems, many of them, that cannot be resolved in terms of knowledge alone: How is it that certain moral judgments are implemented while others are not? Is it the truth or falsity of these judgments that decides their implementation or the lack of it? What initiates the action of implementation? Is the initiative causal or merely directional? What exactly is the connection between knowledge and behavior, between judgment and action, between theory and practice?

Finding few or scant answers to problems such as these slowly gives rise to the nagging impression that most moral theories, in spite of their verbal protestation to the contrary, are content with being theories about moral thinking rather than theories about moral life and moral action. Regardless of what they intend to be, they can be correctly labelled as "spectator ethics" to one degree or another.

It would be difficult to account adequately for this persistent neglect of the dynamic dimensions of morality, but one reason for it may be found in the particular kind of intellectualism which is never very far from the center of Western philosophy.¹ The kind in question is the ethical intellectualism of Socratic origin, which has the tendency of absorbing the dynamic components

of moral life into knowledge by simply assuming that agents, when they are involved in a concrete situation,² will necessarily and automatically perform according to the principles which they uphold as uninvolved spectators of similar situations. All commentators seem to agree that Socrates credited knowledge with a kind of executive efficacy with regard to moral action: "knowing what is good is not only a necessary but also the sufficient condition of possessing goodness and hence of doing what is good."³ This means, of course, that knowledge is not only an informing factor but also the enabling factor of moral behavior. Moreover, it also follows that, if knowledge is ability, a man with the ability of doing the good could not knowingly do what is wrong; his wrong-doing could only be inadvertent, a matter of ignorance. Based on the belief that knowledge is virtue, intellectualists of all ages could always appeal to a ready-made solution to the central problem of moral education, which is the problem of how to teach virtue. Right action, in the learners of virtue, says this silent creed is best elicited by improving their knack of making the right moral judgments. Pointing out to them what is good and what is evil, or demonstrating with logical stringency the advantages of the "real" good over mere "apparent" good is the best way of turning them away from the latter and making them pursue the former.

The hope of this essay is to point out that belief, even when better stated and accompanied by cautious qualifications, is illusory and inconsistent with the structures of human behavior. The intellectualist conception not only does not give an adequate account of the dynamic determinants of moral action, it also puts the cart before the horse when it attributes primacy to cognition among those determinants. That primacy belongs to a striving or conative force which shall be designated here by the term "affectivity". As an all-pervasive propensity of living nature, affectivity will be seen as the general power supply of all behavior, the igniting spark of all activity, the integrating force of all knowledge and valuation, the parent rapport between life and reality. The principal thrust of this essay will be to show that moral behavior is only half understood as a consequence of moral judgments. Without the executive propensity of the affective or striving impulse, such judgments would not be made in the first place, or if made, would remain forever in the domain of mere knowledge or pure representation.

Identifying affectivity rather than the intellect as the dynamic source of moral life is based on the firm conviction that the essential perfection and final end of human development is not to be an epistemic or knowing subject, but to become an autonomous person, a self-regulating agent, who not only has life but also freely and resolutely leads it. While the beginnings of this self-regulating existence may coincide with the primitive strivings of life's self-movement, its peak is reached only in that affective exchange among sovereign individuals which we call love. It is love rather than contemplation that constitutes man's ultimate relation to reality and even provides the obediential disposition into which an invitation to supernatural destiny can be projected.

This conviction is in marked contrast with some aspects of the hallowed Greek tradition, according to which the highest, most divine element in man is his participation in the imperishable Intelligence (*Nous*), whose final perfection consists in a beatifying contemplation of the Supreme Idea or Form. Totally separated from matter, simple and incorruptible, the Intelligence was held to be the standard of excellence in being and its contemplative mirroring of spiritual reality an end in itself. The rank or worth of all other kinds of reality was measured against this ideal degree of being, and all other activities were judged by how closely they resembled the restful awareness of contemplation or how closely they contributed to it.

The irresistible pull of this intellectualistic bias is detectable even in the otherwise balanced philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas. It is not that he was an intellectual determinist,⁴ according to whom knowledge exercised not only a guiding influence over the freedom of the will but also a

causal determination. He was, nevertheless, an intellectualist when it came to evaluating the position of the will in relation to the intellect. According to Thomas, even in those cases where will and intellect cooperate, they can be distinguished by their respective objects: the object of the intellect is the abstract meaning of the good (*ratio boni*), while the object of the will is the concrete good itself (*bonum ipsum*). Ordinary readers would imply from this that, as an appetite for the concrete good, the will excels the intellect. But then came the surprising conclusion which illustrated how deeply Aquinas was committed to intellectualism. Precisely because its object is "simpler and more abstract," the intellect is, absolutely speaking, "higher and nobler" than the will.⁵

Although Thomas admitted that accidentally the will and its chief activity of love could be considered higher than the intellect, he attributed this superior ranking to the provisional imperfection under which the intellect is forced to operate in the present pilgrim state of man. That imperfection, however, was expected to be lifted in man's definitive state, heaven, where the intellectual vision of the supreme good would secure the possession of that good all by itself:

. . . Human values, identically intellectual ones in the definitive state of our final destiny, [undergo] a certain reversal in man's present state where values belong essentially to the order of the will. In heaven the perfection of the blessed is measured by the clarity of each one's Beatific Vision; but on earth the only criterion of moral rectitude we possess is to be found in each one's capacity for love.⁶

I simply do not hold with such reversals of priorities. I hold instead that on any level, experiential as well as metaphysical, natural as well as supernatural, man's primary relation to the real is always of the affective order, an order of love, *ordo amoris*, as Max Scheler called it. I coined the term pretention to characterize this relation. The elements of this coined word for man's primary relation to the real suggest that the original thrust of affectivity includes both the energetic aspect of launching oneself toward something (a project) and the knowing aspect of directing one's attention toward it (an intention). Of the two aspects, I consider the first more basic. In other words, I hold that the real is primarily that with which living beings are affectively involved, and only secondarily that which is offered to human inspection. Knowledge, inspection, representation are merely cognitive expressions of peoples' spontaneous attachment to, and appetite for the real.⁷ True, sometimes this attachment must be suspended, delayed and critically examined by reflective thought so that our allegiance may be bestowed not necessarily on the nearest good but on the greatest good available at the moment; nevertheless, the whole process of inspection is carried out for the sake of subsequent involvement. (See Chapter VIII on the objective human good). This is eminently true in the moral domain where the perennial problem is how to carry our best judgments into action. Any theory of morality or moral development that neglects this problem or deals with it but sparingly, is not very helpful.

Affectivity as Pretention: Attentive Dynamism or Dynamic Awareness

The problem of how to carry our moral thoughts into action seems to be no problem at all for thinkers of the intellectualist persuasion because, as suggested above, the very tendency of intellectualism is to invest thought with a sort of causal efficacy with regard to action. This is not to say that all intellectualist theories always attribute this efficacy directly to thought itself, although some expressions of Spinoza's *Ethics*, for instance, could be interpreted in that sense.

Instead, most theories hold that causal influence is exercised through a separate intellectual faculty, the will. The will is seen by them as an intermediary between pure thought and physical action. Inhabiting a sort of spiritual command post and prompted by representations of the intelligible good, the will is portrayed as dispatching summons to the other faculties to spring into action and execute the movements necessary for the attainment of that good. Sometimes thought and volition are fused, and the will is regarded merely as the energetic aspect of reason itself. Kant, for instance, defined will as the efficacy of the intellect,⁸ and as such, "nothing else than practical reason."⁹

Whether operating directly or mediated through other faculties, thought is seen by most intellectualists as the ultimate force behind moral action, moving us to actualize the objects of our moral representations. For reasons already hinted at and reasons that will become clear later on, I wish to attribute that kind of motive force to affectivity instead. But in order to do so without creating a whole series of misunderstandings, it is necessary first to cut away some of the habitual connotations attached to the concept of affectivity and redefine it in a more comprehensive and radical way. It is hoped that, as a result of this severe pruning, a fresh understanding of moral development can be grafted on to the stock of affectivity by the other contributors.

To begin with, affectivity, as intended by this essay, must be rigorously distinguished in many respects from the psychological constructs called "emotions," "affects" or "passions". A few maverick views apart, emotions are considered by the behavioral sciences as temporary disturbances in a person's normal state of mind and body, induced by the representation of particular situations as desirable or undesirable, and accompanied by a certain tendency either to seek or to avoid those situations through appropriate action.¹⁰ Theories of emotion based on this general understanding differ, and differ considerably, depending on which of these component aspects are thought to constitute the defining feature of emotion. "Bodily upset" theories emphasize the agitation of the organism and consider emotions to consist in the very awareness of that agitated state, its "psychic shadow"; "motivational" theories view emotions as prompters of action based on some kind of value estimation or calculation of utility; "feeling" theories emphasize the immediacy and spontaneity of emotions; and so on. The great diversity and sometimes sharp contrast between these theories do not, however, exclude a certain convergence on several points.

Influenced by a certain organic interpretation of system balance or equilibrium (*homeostasis*), most psychological theories consider emotions to be impermanent, transient affairs, as opposed to attitudinal or dispositional states which are more stable and permanent. As a feature of living systems, equilibrium requires the maintenance of a steady state of balance between organism and environment. When this steady state is upset, some mechanism within the system itself springs into action in order to reestablish the equilibrium. According to most theories, emotions are typically human ways of responding to temporary disequilibrium and of triggering the process of return to a steady state.

Secondly, most theories consider emotions to be particular and specific reactions to imbalance, even when overt behavior or physiological research can disclose no pattern that would be characteristic of, say, "embarrassment" as distinct from "shame". In other words, both ordinary language and psychology operate with many more terms designating emotional mental states than there are behavioral or bodily symptoms manifesting these (supposedly) distinct states.

Thirdly, all of them agree that emotions are conditioned, or at least triggered, by some form of perception, idea or intuition, in short, by some type of representation. Perception is seen as the cause of emotion--"cause" being understood here in the sense that most positive sciences use the term, namely, as an "antecedent state" which strictly determines the subsequent event in question. In fact, it has been suggested by some experimenters that "the same state of physiological arousal

could be labeled `joy' or `fury' or `jealousy' or any of a great diversity of emotional labels depending on the cognitive aspect of the situation."¹¹ This, of course, would mean that knowledge or cognition not only occasions the occurrence of an emotion, but also determines its identity and meaning.

Finally, in spite of this strongly mentalistic and cognitive interpretation, the most consistent connotation attached to emotions is "irrationality", "turbulence", "frenzy".¹² This is especially true when emotion is equated with the singularly ambiguous term "passion". Emotion in this sense is a sheer liability to be avoided, or at least kept in strict control, for the sake of rational action. There are very few theories that consider emotions to be of service in revealing the real nature or real value of things. (See Chapter VII on moral sensibility.)

Without contesting the right of the positive sciences to define and elaborate their theoretical constructs in a way most suitable to their particular purposes and most in harmony with the explanatory models they have chosen, I claim that "affectivity" has very little in common with the psychological acceptance of "emotion" and other cognate terms. In fact, as referred to here, affectivity is characterizable by features that are very nearly the opposite of those applied to emotion.

First of all, the term affectivity designates that enduring orientation and universal propensity, adherence or tendency by virtue of which living individuals are bonded to their environment and interact with it, both by fitting themselves to it and rearranging it to their own advantage or to the advantage of their kind. In this sense, affectivity is immeasurably wider, older, more basic than particular human emotions. As a fundamental orientation (an ontological intentionality), affectivity is found in various forms in all sentient beings and perhaps even in some higher forms of plant life. It would be an unwarranted extrapolation, however, to conclude from this that people, beasts and vegetation are ontologically the same, just because they share in the propensity of all life for spontaneity and self-actualization. Affective intentionality is called ontological not in order to designate sameness of nature in all its bearers, but in order to indicate that affectivity is not deployed through a special faculty, but involves the individual in its totality and imparts directedness to its life as a whole. By contrast, noetic intentionality is an act mediated through conscious representation or appetite, an act of the mind by which it tends toward the object. Moreover, the global aim of affective propensity is not the mere maintenance of being, but the promotion of increase in being. In other words, affectivity is the basic dynamism of life that can reach beyond the factual towards the possible and, at a certain level of development, can even represent the possible as a "purpose to be actualized". As such, affectivity is the energy source of all growth, progress, striving, desiring, planning and willing. Simply stated, affectivity is rooted in the fact that, for life, being is not merely an object already given but also a cradle of further reality that makes the creative evolution of life possible.

Secondly, as a basic and permanent orientation of life, affectivity has no object, aim or intention other than the general one of life's self-enhancement. However, this generality implies neither invariance nor fixity on the part of affectivity. On the contrary, affectivity is the conative or dynamic matrix of the whole unsurveyable range of drives, instincts and appetites that constantly appear along the process whereby life intrudes into the domain of inertia. It is unspecific and undifferentiated only in the sense that, in itself, it represents the global impact of cumulative living on the individual's general orientation. As such, it is not the work of any particular faculty.¹³ It is not tied to any particular function or organic pattern, even though it can operate through all of them and, in so doing, acquire the specificity proper to the occasion.

Thirdly, the relationship between affectivity and knowledge is in reality the inverse of the one usually posited by philosophers between the emotional and cognitive factors of experience: it is the growth, the refinement, the evolution of affectivity that makes possible and gives rise to the different kinds and degrees of cognitive representation, and not the other way around. (This point finds a more extensive development in Chapter VII.) This means that the kind of knowledge available to a subject is directly related to the kind of attitudinal posture he or she is capable of assuming; that the process of objectification required for cognitive development depends on a process of affective dissociation or diffusion.

Some aspects of this process will be indicated presently, but first a remark or two about the inversion itself. The heterodoxy of this position should not be hidden from view, on the contrary, it should be emphasized from the start in order to signal that this essay is slightly off the beaten path in the sense that it does not endorse the long-standing Greek bias of unquestioned primacy of speculative knowledge over conation in every respect, though it goes to the heart of many recent developments in the understanding of the person and of personal life. One need not be a wholesale pragmatist, in fact one need not be a pragmatist at all, to agree with Dewey's analysis that pure thought has a certain colonizing bent which tends to absorb the whole of experience into reflection. Like a typical colonial settler, reflection soon claims the whole territory of experience, so that after a while even the native occupants are believed to exist at its sufferance alone:

What is known, what is true for cognition, is what is real in being. The objects of knowledge form the standards of measures of the reality of all other objects of experience. Are the objects of affections, of desire, effort, choice, that is to say everything to which we attach value, real? Yes, if they can be warranted by knowledge; if we can know objects having these value properties, we are justified in thinking them real. But as objects of desire and purpose they have no sure place in being until they are approached and validated through knowledge.¹⁴

It is against just this sort of familiar but usually unexpressed encroachment that these few pages wish to defend the rights not of action, as Dewey tried to do, but of affectivity and life in general. This wish is motivated by the firm conviction that the human world is originally and throughout a lived world of involvement rather than a spectacle provided for the dispassionate gaze of speculative thought.

Finally, if affectivity cannot be justly regarded as a ward of knowledge, neither can it be considered its rival. Knowledge is merely a later and more developed form of that affective discernment through which all living things endeavor to sort out the value and meaning of their environment. Long before the appearance or even the possibility of explicit representation of goals by individual organisms, life already has an intrinsic directedness through genotypically shaped processes, such as the instinctual acts of animals. Thanks to their value-orientation and affective interchange with the environment, living beings can feel "at home" in the world, even though they can only enact, but not yet represent, that feeling. This ability of life as it forms in order to be selective of value without the benefit of separate and antecedent representation of ends and means suggests that life as a whole cannot be regarded either as an entirely mechanical process or as a properly purposive one. On some levels at least, life seems to "know" reality by its mere attitudinal involvement with the real, and is able to accomplish its "purposes" almost automatically and unconsciously.

Even on the properly human level, it is affectivity that provides the field of force from which the initial meaning of the "lived world" (*Lebenswelt*) is progressively precipitated, drawn out. That original world is not so much a network of objects as a forge of actual goods and ideal values, and the rapport through which these values are disclosed is not so much an intellectual grasp as an affective grasp or protention. In other words, it is significant and decisive that the process through which the world is gradually invested with meaning takes its origin in valuation rather than in contemplation. Likewise, at the end of this process of meaning-production we discover love, the noblest expression of affectivity as well as a principle of knowledge par excellence, which alone permits us to understand others in their uniqueness, a dimension forever inaccessible to the attitude of detached spectatorship.

Therefore, the fear that granting affectivity its rightful place in human experience might somehow lead to emotionalism, irrationality or blind voluntarism is a needless fear. Affectivity does not detract from knowledge because it is the parent source of knowledge, man's dynamic attachment to being. Ideas that not only inform us but also move us derive their energy to do so from the fact that, by virtue of their affective residue, they are able to address themselves to the center of dynamic striving in our being, where goals, resolutions and actions are forged. Fact and value, knowledge and action can indeed be reconciled through the mediating role of affectivity which forms an actual bridge between the true and the good.

Life and Knowledge

The altered meaning of "affectivity", its contrast to the customary psychological acceptations, necessitates a few adjustments in the understanding of the terms "knowledge" and, by extension, of "reason" as well. In order to introduce these modifications, one must first outline some salient points of the dominant view concerning knowledge in general.

By and large, most current theories recognize that knowledge is an emergent process, rooted in such precognitive and even preconscious phenomena as adaptive action, habit formation or patterned response. The recognition of this link does not mean, however, that continuity between preconscious and conscious life is admitted as a matter of course by most theories. On the contrary, conscious life is usually posited in direct opposition to mere organic reaction to stimuli. Consciousness is regarded as the sole, or at least the principal, producer and purveyor of meanings, and as such, the first of a series of qualitative breaks in the order of life forms. Similar breaks are said to exist also between the various forms of consciousness and the various degrees of knowledge. These degrees are believed to constitute a structural hierarchy of distinct forms of meaning-giving, culminating in the construction or discovery of purely abstract intelligibilities represented by conceptual symbols and expressed in assertive judgments. This is the familiar Greek ideal of speculative knowledge (*theoria*). The tendency to regard only this final degree as "real" knowledge is so addictive that even so-called genetic epistemologists, who admit a linear continuity between the various stages of knowing, end up considering this stage as normative for all the rest. In other words, all other forms and degrees of knowing are allotted intelligibility only to the extent that they approximate or somehow imitate this ideal degree.

It seldom occurs to knowledge-theorists or to genetic epistemologists to surmise that the development of consciousness ("the meaning-giver") may not be single-valued or linear at all; that, starting with some primitive datum that is both value and knowledge laden (axiological and noetic), development may fan out in several directions and tend towards not one but several ideal goals. Many theorists and philosophers simply disregard the fact that there is more than one mode

of judging, more than one way of expressing and communicating the various meanings constructed or discovered by consciousness, and that there are in fact distinct forms of consciousness, many of which are not primarily cognitive. As Sartre once said, "all consciousness is not knowledge" (*toute conscience n'est pas connaissance*).¹⁵

What is needed, therefore, is a new theory of knowledge, one that is not boxed into a single-model explanation and can resist the pull of reductionism. What is needed is a perspective which can reveal not only the external complementarity of life and knowledge but also their internal, genetic connection which founds that complementarity. What is needed is an explanation of the life of knowledge. The limits of this essay, and even more the limitations of its author, make the appearance of such a theory at best a faraway possibility. The most that can be done for the time being is to propose a few theses which, when properly validated, could coalesce into a theory capable of presenting knowledge as a polyvalent and cumulative process that enables an organism to learn from its continued living, not only by storing and repeating crucial aspects of past experience, but also by inventing new and unprecedented ways of experiencing.

A. *The first thesis* about knowledge as a basic phenomenon of life in general has been suggested earlier. Here it could be recapitulated in the following manner: Originally, knowledge is a purely symbiotic function of life's spontaneous self-differentiation and self-actualization, totally indistinguishable in scope from that spontaneous urge itself. It is crucial that this first thesis be understood in the exact sense it was intended.

First of all, the statement refers to what knowledge is thought to be in its roots or "originally" in the double sense of the German term *urspruenglich*. In one sense, origin signifies a "primordial leap," an act of emergence and novelty, a process of departure from what was there before; in another sense, it signifies the ancestral resemblance, the permanent stamp left on the process by its parentage. Therefore, in its originality, knowledge both transcends the processes of life and is branded by them. In one sense, knowledge is an original departure from mere life, in another, it is continuous with it. This means that, no matter how far knowledge evolves "beyond" its origins, it never ceases to be recognizable as a vital function, serving some higher interest of life; inversely, no matter how primitive a life form may be, it can never lack that minimal degree of interiority (*Innesein*) through which living things are for themselves (*Fuersichsein*) and which also constitutes the embryonic meaning of consciousness.

Nevertheless, on this original level, knowledge is not yet undergirded by consciousness in the explicit sense of that word because, on that level, knowledge itself is only an operational aspect of an undifferentiated vital impulse towards self-differentiation. This is the lowest form of psychic life which Max Scheler used to call a *Gefuehlsdrang*. As an original form, this "feeling-impulse" cannot be defined by reference to something more original; it can only be circumscribed:

As the term implies, "feeling" and "impulse" are not yet separated. Impulse always has a specific direction, a goal-orientation "towards something", for example nourishment or sexual satisfaction. A bare movement "toward", as toward light, or "away from", as a state of pleasure or suffering devoid of object, are the only two modes of this primitive feeling. Yet this impulse is quite different from the centers and fields of energy that we associate with the images of inorganic bodies without consciousness. They do not have an inner life in any sense.¹⁶

Primitive as it may be, this impulse is not chaotic. In the first place, it already has a protendency "towards" or "away from". But more importantly, as it pushes against the resistance of

the environment, the vital impulse communicates to the living organism that first sense of "reality" or "objectivity" which, in the later reaches of development, becomes the guiding motivation of all search for knowledge.¹⁷ The very same push also sets into motion the processes by means of which the primitive *Gefuehlsdrang* develops into conscious representation, knowledge, appetite, will and all the other higher functions of life. As Scheler pointed out, one of those processes is, at least in its over-all design, dissociative.¹⁸ As we shall have occasion to show, it is through the dissociation of the representational and striving or conative elements of experience that intentional consciousness, the locus of cognition proper, begins to emerge. The other process, complementary to dissociation, is what more recently came to be called equilibration. This theoretical construct of Piaget is a sort of integrating principle, defined as "a general biological tendency to organize isolated elements into structured wholes."¹⁹ This tendency comes into play in the interest of associative learning and practical intelligence, both of which represent further degrees of vital development through which behavior is gradually set free from the relative fixity of instinctual response and turned into a self-regulating process that is increasingly open to modification by individual invention and control.

However, the point to note in all this is that both dissociations and reintegrations are possible only because the dissociated elements are first delivered in an original unity of experience prior to knowledge proper. Cognitive development takes place as a series of polarizations in that experience. In itself, however, before the onset of polarizations, that basic experience is more of an affective adherence than a cognitive confrontation between organism and nature; it is more a matter of *eros* than of *logos*. In fact, even after the emergence of consciousness, certain initial stages of cognition derive their cognitive value from the affective side of reactive behavior to which they are linked and which they serve. To a certain extent, most animal knowledge falls into this category. Animal knowledge is economical: each animal has only as much knowledge as it needs to live by. As J.J. von Uexkull so ably pointed out, most animals are allowed to be aware only of those segments and qualities of their environment to which they can respond by adaptive behavior.²⁰ The rest is not merely dismissed or ignored, it simply does not exist for the animal. Only need-related qualities compose the "objects" of animal awareness; life-neutral qualities are absent. Whether the ideal of complete neutrality is ever reached at all even by man is a further question; it certainly is not an original datum of cognition.

B. *The second thesis* refers directly to knowledge as it appears on the properly human level. Without defining first what makes certain types of knowledge properly human, a summary statement could be framed in the following words: Any effort at understanding human understanding must include a framework which is not that of a self-reflective, entirely translucent consciousness but rather that of a consciousness engaged in a multiple dialogue with the world. Such a consciousness is only partially understood as a polar relationship between a knowing subject and objects known (noesis-noema structure), and its dialogue with the world is poorly grasped as a production of speculative meanings expressible in universally valid, propositional judgments. A great deal of explanation would be needed to elucidate adequately the precise meaning of this thesis, but the following remarks should at least help to clarify its general import.

The first remark is merely a reminder that theories about knowledge are particularly vulnerable to what Whitehead termed the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness", and that this fallacy can be committed in more ways than one. The usual way of committing it consists in first reifying the theoretical constructs of an explanatory schema and then treating them as concrete things or entities. Many of the theoretical objects of modern science, such as models of the atom and atomic particles, are accorded reality at the expense of the objects of ordinary experience on such mistaken

grounds.²¹ Placing concreteness where it does not belong can also be done in the paradoxical way of judging and validating the reality of existing, concrete phenomena by their approximation to an unrealizable ideal case. Here "an entity is considered merely so far as it exemplifies certain categories of thought."²² This gives rise to the curious view that the real is really the ideal but does not exist, while concrete existence is only an imperfect illustration of reality. Finally, concreteness can be misplaced when it is sought among the constructs of explicit consciousness rather than in the operations of lived experience. Knowledge as a concrete phenomenon of human life is thus diluted every time it is measured against the imaginary standards of absolute knowledge, born of a pure and transcendental mind.

Warning against the danger of such dilution, Professor Calvin Schrag of Purdue University recently attempted to establish a sort of "archeology of knowledge" that could serve as a protophilosophical anchor point for the human sciences. In a book-length critique of traditional theories of consciousness, he is calling for a "radical reflection" that would avoid the fallacy of misplaced concreteness by refusing to identify knowledge with the work of pure consciousness.²³ Drawing on the Marxian critiques of theoretical knowledge as well as on some general lessons of phenomenology, Schrag attempted to get to the roots of knowledge by tracing it back in the direction of pre-reflective comprehension of experience, where "reflection is no longer separable from the order of things into which man is inserted and in which he moves about as perceiver, speaker, and actor."²⁴

The original world of experience is not a construct of pure consciousness, but a matrix of things, facts and values offered to the use, knowledge and appreciation of people. Instead of being an object of contemplation by an all-seeing eye, the world of experience is an arena for human action of *praxis*, as Marx used to point out. Perhaps the profound philosophical meaning of the Marxian notion of *praxis* is that it "reorients the classical concept of consciousness in such a manner that it no longer simply serves the function of a theoretic-epistemological grounding of human thought."²⁵ The consciousness underlying human action is only secondarily a cognitive subject: in its immediacy it is an affective openness. Likewise, the world of action is only secondarily a collection of objects to be known: in its immediacy it is an object of exchange, utility and delight. Even Husserl recognized this at the beginning of his phenomenology:

Therefore this world is not there for me as a mere world of facts and affairs, but, with the same immediacy, as a world of goods, a practical world. Without further effort on my part I find the things before me furnished not only with the qualities that befit their positive nature, but with value-characters such as beautiful or ugly, agreeable or disagreeable, pleasant or unpleasant, and so forth.²⁶

The fact that his later philosophy, in particular, his transcendental reduction was able to recover only a diluted version of this lived world does not detract from Husserl's initial recognition of it.

The injunction against equating consciousness with the ideal of epistemic consciousness does not mean, of course, that the very idea of transcendental consciousness is without merit. As the capacity for knowledge with general, impersonal validity, the notion of transcendental consciousness correctly identifies one of the ideal goals of human knowledge. Humans and humans alone are capable of positing and approximating such an ideal. While an animal recognizes and reacts to whatever corresponds to its subjective interests, man can know more or less disinterestedly. Man's advantage over the animal resides in his ability to judge and evaluate the

world objectively, that is, in relative independence from his immediate needs. An animal does not, properly speaking, confront its environment: its organism is an integrated circuitry, where the input of environmental stimuli are immediately turned into reactive output. Here organism and environment are continuous. In man, the circuitry can be interrupted. What man knows and perceives need not spill over into immediate action: between external stimulation and internal leaning to action there is a possible break. The possibility of that interruption is what we ordinarily call thinking or reflection, and the relative distance from immediate interests we call the objectivity of human knowledge. The world for man ceases to be a mere vital correlative and becomes an object, a *Gegenstand* in German. Rather than always fading and melting into the environment, man sometimes "stands opposite" to it, and it stands opposite to him. By virtue of this confrontation, man can emerge as a "self" against the resistant "non-self" of the world. All this is quite true as long as we keep in mind that impersonal validity is only one possible direction in which human awareness can develop; that objectivity in the sense of complete detachment from subjective interest is more a matter of ideal task than actual fact;²⁷ and that the concrete human knower is and remains a body-consciousness and not a disembodied speculative reason.

Beside its speculative orientation, human consciousness is constantly scanning the world through a whole series of distinct intentionalities in search of a range of distinctive meanings. Not only in thought and speech, but by every act of looking, listening, molding, arranging, moving, contriving, in bustle as well as in repose man is continuously taking up positions towards the world, he is making pronouncements about himself and the environment around him. To say this is not to imply that all these ways are incipient or abortive thoughts, which, had they been given a sufficient period for gestation, would have emerged as mental propositions or would have converted into verbal assertions. Rather, the point is simply that these are nonspeculative ways of getting meaning out of our relations and exchange with the world, non-verbal appraisals and pronouncements about reality and its value, for which speculative meanings and verbal judgments are no substitutes.

It is evident that in the experience of every individual certain actions and certain works of art are best left untranslated into statements, not because of hidden antipathy to the promotion of knowledge, but because, on the contrary, verbal translation is inadequate, irrelevant, or anticlimactic to knowledge already felt to be gained.²⁸

A full-blown theory of meaning would have to inventory all the possible intentionalities by means of which meaning is generated. For our limited purposes, however, it is sufficient to refer to Buchler's theory, which distinguishes three generic classes of producing meaning out of our relations with the world: doing, making and saying. To each of these corresponds a type of judgment that is designated respectively as active judgment, exhibitiv judgment and assertive judgment. The merit of Buchler's theory lies precisely in its ability to argue convincingly that active and exhibitiv judgments are cognitive, but not in the sense of being inchoative assertions; they are cognitive in different respects, not in differing degrees.²⁹

C. *A final and brief statement*, linking cognition and affectivity in the very idea of reason, could be framed in the following words: Human consciousness is possessed of a dynamism that demands an unqualified receptivity for the presence and meaning of being, no matter how that meaning reveals itself and regardless of the road that leads to it. That passion of consciousness for openness, that global effort to confer sense on everything it encounters and to let nothing stand unrelated and meaningless, that universal appetite of the human mind is the essence of reason itself.

This means, in the first place, that any definition of reason that does not take into account this multidimensionality and dynamic character of human consciousness is going to be defective and

misleading. For example, reason defined as a timeless structure of universally valid meanings is an impoverished idea, because it limits the meaning of meaning to one of its manifestations, the one accessible to the impersonal intellect of scientific understanding. Such a constriction of reason is contrary to the most fundamental attitude of reason itself, which, as Karl Jaspers pointed out, is one of sympathy, unlimited attentiveness and accommodating receptivity.³⁰

Thanks to that accommodating attitude, reason can give meaning to all human endeavors. "If it is insufficiently decisive to regard man as an animal that judges, it may be sufficient to regard him as an animal that cannot help judging in more than one mode."³¹ Not only man's science, but also his industry, art, philosophy, moral life and religion are taken up in the unity and unifying recollection of reason. In other words, the unity of reason includes more than a system of ideas: it shepherds all the efforts of human life towards a harmony of meaning and action. The grotesque option that man must be engaged either in unfeeling science or drowning in the swamp of mindless feelings is unmasked as a pseudo-option (see Chapter IX on the objectivity of moral judgments) by the original living unity or symbiosis (*Mitleben*) of knowledge and affectivity in reason.

Moreover, the development of reason, the universal giver and interpreter of meaning, receives its impetus from the direction of its affective component. Degrees, stages and modes of evolving understanding result from the progressive maturation and refinement of the affective side of reason. Stimulation for the growth of knowledge comes from man's love of truth, not only because truth has "cash value" for him, but primarily because he senses that it is truth that will make him free. Knowledge for him is a means of emerging as a sovereign subject in the world, and even more as a free partner in a dialogue of love.

Toward a Theory of Dynamic Consciousness

To represent the original symbiosis of action, love and knowledge in the ancient layers of reason calls for a theory of dynamic consciousness, a theory that would enable us to understand how consciousness can be a kind of interiority as well as a project at the same time. Such a theory would avoid the twin danger of either reducing consciousness to the "nothingness" of pure intentionality (e.g., Sartre), or of inflating it into a spontaneous activity of an ideal or "transcendental ego" producing ideal or pure objects (e.g., Kant, Hegel, Husserl). Finally, as an alternative also to behaviorism, which banishes consciousness altogether by insisting that behavior is merely a set of glandular and muscular reactions to stimuli, this theory would also show that behavior as an aggregate of unit reflexes is no more intelligible than behavior as a pantomime for pure thought. Behavior is the manifestation of a conscience engagée, exhibiting the primarily affective character of consciousness. Presenting affectivity as the anchor point of consciousness in real life could provide the mediating link between the energetic and directional aspects of all behavior, including moral life. The building of such a theory with all the attendant laws and models belongs to psychological research.

In the meantime, however, philosophy can be of some help to psychological research by suggesting either the possible shape of such theories or the areas of research in which they are most likely to be found. The present essay wishes merely to highlight a few broad concepts from which an affectivity-based theory of consciousness in general and of moral behavior in particular could be constructed by empirical researchers.

Without prejudice to Freud and his pioneering work on the role of instinctual energy in the psychological development of the individual, the insights of three other authors, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Kurt Goldstein and Max Scheler, seem particularly promising for laying the foundations of

a science of affective consciousness. From different starting points and for different reasons the thoughts of all three appear to converge on the central thesis of this paper, namely, that the energetic component of any form of human behavior, including moral life, is an affective impetus which drives the mind to recognize the "worth of things" and drives the somatic and other processes to pursue that worth. A brief sketch of the relevant points of each of these thinkers is in order here.

The Pivotal Role of Body-Consciousness: Maurice Merleau-Ponty

In the beginning of Chapter Five of his *Phenomenology of Perception*, Maurice Merleau-Ponty points out why analyzing our experience in terms of a preponderantly cognitive consciousness can never recapture the organic relationship between the living subject and its world. It cannot do so because such an analysis "is transformed by its own activity into an intercourse between the epistemological subject and the object."³³ While perfectly illuminating in other respects, this cognitive approach cannot reveal the world as value-charged, because the ideal goal of cognition is precisely value-free objectivity. If we want to see then how values are brought to birth in the exchange between subject and the world, "we must look at the area of our experience which clearly has significance and reality for us, and that is our affective life."³⁴

Even more significantly, Merleau-Ponty recognized affective life not merely as "a mosaic of emotional states of pleasures and pains," but as a distinct form of consciousness through which the world is invested with values.³⁵ Using sexuality as a particular example, he shows that it is consciousness as affection rather than consciousness as knowledge that projects a human world around the body-subject. Although his rich analyses cannot even be outlined here, a few points must be noted in passing.

It is in the context of affectivity that Merleau-Ponty argues for the existence of an erotic mode of perception supporting objective perception but "distinct from objective perception and intellectual significance."³⁶ This perception is not a form of knowledge (*cogitatio*), but the protention of a body-subject towards the world. Disturbances in that affective substratum always result in disturbed behavior, even when no impairment of knowledge can be detected to accompany the affective trauma.

Certain forms of these disturbances, like the famous Schneider case,³⁷ are particularly instructive by their broad implications. The very structure of Schneider's mode of perceiving the world has undergone a change because that secret connivance with the world that constitutes normal affectivity is impaired: because he no longer addresses the world about certain subjective values, the objective stimuli coming from the environment no longer speak to his body and, consequently, confuse rather than inform him. For instance, he has difficulty pointing to his nose or the middle knuckle of his left hand on command. Similarly, he cannot carry out the movements of his trade (sewing of leather goods) in the abstract. His movements appear hesitant as though he were trying to "locate" his limbs in objective space.³⁸ No such hesitation occurs however, when his body is involved in a network of familiar needs, such as blowing his nose or scratching his knuckle where a mosquito is stinging him.³⁹ It is as if his consciousness functioned intermittently.

But how is this possible, Merleau-Ponty asks? "If I know where my nose is when it is a question of holding it, how can I not know where it is when it is a matter of pointing to it?"⁴⁰ His answer is very simple and very much to the point of this essay: for the disturbed patient the "nose-to-be-pointed-to" and the "nose-to-be-blown" are not the same value objects; they do not belong to the same phenomenal world. The former belongs to the world of knowledge as an object of

abstract inquiry; the latter is not an object at all because it belongs to the integrated dynamism of a living, acting body-consciousness. As his nose, the latter is a functioning aspect of his subjectivity. Something can be given to this consciousness, to this subjectivity, without being given as an object of representation and vice-versa. Schneider's trouble consists precisely in his inability of making the transition from one to the other. Therefore his impairment could be described from either side. On the one hand, it could be said that he is "lost" and cannot "find" himself in the objective world precisely because that world is only objective, without subjectively meaningful qualities. "Faces for him are neither attractive nor repulsive. . . . Sun and rain are neither gay nor sad . . . and the world is emotionally neutral."⁴¹ On the other hand, it could be said that it is his abstract attitude that is disturbed and that his "knowledge" is restricted to the comprehension of those situations which represent familiar problems to be solved by the mobilization of his body. In either case, the uncoupling of the normal link between representational and dynamic consciousness is attributed to an affective disturbance, and not the other way around. It is not the weakening of representations that causes reduction in desire or importance in action, because "absent-mindedness and inappropriate representations are not causes but effects."⁴² Both action and representation are diminished in the patient because of his loss of affective attachment to the world.

That is why, according to Merleau-Ponty, the role of body is so pivotal in all this. Ideas and representations do not come first in life. They come later as "expressions" of our gathering existential momentum, as mental symbols of our concrete striving for greater life and greater values. Because ours is an incarnate existence, we do not start with "inner phenomena", which we subsequently translate into bodily pantomime, but with real situations or value-orientations that have to be changed into actual values. It is the "body's role to ensure this metamorphosis."⁴³ The body is precisely that two-way gate which can either open or bar the way of the forward project of existence. Insofar as I have a body, I have the power to withdraw from existence and "shut myself up in an anonymous life which subtends my personal one. But precisely because my body can shut itself off from the world, it is also what opens me out upon the world and places me in a situation there."⁴⁴ It is bodily existence as projective that "continually sets the prospect of living before me . . . and establishes my first consonance with the world."⁴⁵

This consonance is the concrete "expression" of that bonding between organism and environment mentioned above as a defining element of affectivity. However, the term "expression" is not to be understood here in the ordinary sense of an arbitrary sign to which a signification is attached by conventional predication.

Anterior to conventional means of expression, . . . we must recognize a primary process of signification in which the thing expressed does not exist apart from the expression, and in which the signs themselves induce their significance. In this way body expresses total existence, not because it is an external accompaniment to that existence, but because existence comes into its own in the body. This incarnate significance is the central phenomenon of which body and mind, sign and significance are abstract moments.⁴⁶

In the same way, one might say that the affective propensity which breathes life into our original world is the central phenomenon in which one can discern the germs of development both in a cognitive as well as in an axiological direction.

The Drive Toward Self-Actualization: Kurt Goldstein

An interesting side-light with regard to the nature of this development can be gained from the writings of Kurt Goldstein. In cooperation with Adhemar Gelb, a psychologist, Goldstein's initial researches were about the after-effects of brain injuries on German soldiers in the First World War. His work yielded many practical results for medicine and psychology, but it also led him to interesting theoretical concepts. Among others, Goldstein soon adopted a holistic approach to human nature. He believed that every human phenomenon, normal as well as pathological, was the activity of the whole organism.⁴⁷ This was already evident to him from the facts gathered through studies of the nervous system. "The nervous system," he wrote, "is an apparatus which always functions as a whole. It is always in a state of excitation, never at rest."⁴⁸ All behavior is an expression of this condition of perpetual protention of the nervous system in particular and, through it, of the organism in general. Although not all points of the organism are affected the same way by this energetic state, all excitation concerns the entire system.

This is so because the organism as a whole is motivated by one drive only: self-actualization. Goldstein insisted that this drive was not to be confused with what is frequently regarded as "a tendency to maintain the existent state, to preserve oneself."⁴⁹ Self-preservation is characteristic of life at the stage of incipient decay: the only form of actualization that remains for a person in an impaired condition is to hang on to his existent state. "This is not the tendency of a normal person. . . . Under adequate conditions the tendency of normal life is toward activity and progress."⁵⁰

The drive to actualize one's capacities as fully as possible obviously has to have a built-in cognitive component. To be successful in discovering one's possibilities one has to go beyond tried ways of reacting; one must develop what Goldstein calls an abstract attitude. This involves the capacity of "approaching things that are only imagined, 'possible' things, things which are not given in the concrete situation."⁵¹ Thus abstraction is not so much an action, for all action is concrete, but an attitude and an evaluation of action before it takes place.

The ability to approach things abstractly forms an integrated part of the behavioral circuitry of healthy and developed individuals. It helps them to relate to their environment creatively by leading them beyond the beckonings of the immediate situation outlined by a present perception and preparing them for new and unprecedented ways of dealing with the familiar. The break-down of this circuitry results in the most fascinating and, from certain perspectives, the most puzzling behavioral disorders. Goldstein's works⁵² are replete with the study and explanation of just such disorders. The case histories of these disorders make for fascinating psychological reading. Philosophically, there are two general conclusions worth noting here.

First, Goldstein's descriptions show that abstraction is a relative late-comer on the scene of human development. Long before the appearance of this behavioral skill, and often long after its disappearance in patients suffering from amnesic aphasia, meanings are organized by the more ancient and durable scheme of affective exchange between the subject and the world. Secondly, even though Goldstein insists on the decisive advantage that comes with the ability to grasp things abstractly, he nevertheless agrees with those who claim that "the formation of abstract concepts is usually not an end deliberately sought for itself. It has always been a means to an end."⁵³ For Goldstein that end is self-actualization, though not in the obviously utilitarian or hedonistic sense: abstraction is an instrument of self-actualization and, as such, affectively based.

Before leaving the writings of Goldstein, there is one final point that must be made. Goldstein's persistent claim that "there is only one motive by which human activity is set going, the tendency to actualize oneself,"⁵⁴ may easily lead to the impression that his studies were merely

justifications for individualism and egotism based on biology. Nothing could be further from the truth. He rarely missed an opportunity to emphasize that "self-realization, i.e., human existence, is possible only in relation to the self-realization of the `other'."⁵⁵ Moreover, the discovery of the presence of other persons takes place not in an impersonal act of object-consciousness, but in a more intimate act of bonding called "encounter". Encounter is an original mode of consciousness, signaling the affective significance of another ego. "The experience in encounter," wrote Goldstein, "brings to the fore something that is profoundly characteristic of human nature, namely, that my existence is bound to the self-realization of the `other one'."⁵⁶

The experience of the presence of others is in fact composed of several elements:

1. First of all, it contains an immediate recognition that others are necessary for my self-actualization. Here others are revealed in their relative value for me: my self-actualization requires a corresponding self-restriction on their part.

2. On the other hand, the presence of others is also recognized as a limiting factor on my self-actualization. Inasmuch as their presence encroaches on my freedom, the others represent a relative disvalue for me. Their claim to self-realization relativizes mine, and calls for self-restriction on my part.

3. This means that, while the recognition of the relative value or relative disvalue of others is an immediate datum of my experience, the reconciliation between them is not. In the words of Goldstein, "there is not a pre-established harmony between human beings . . . they must seek it in an active way."⁵⁷ Harmony can be achieved only through a deliberate adjustment of attitudes. It comes about when individuals can accept self-restriction for the sake of others without resentment, and when they can lay claim to the affection of others without self-accusation.

4. Finally, the experience of encountering the presence of others leads to the derivative awareness that self-actualization demands an active balancing of compliant and encroaching behavior.

Only then can the individual realize himself, and assist others in their self-realization. Furthermore, the highest forms of human relationship, such as love and friendship, are dependent on the individual's ability and opportunity to realize both of these aspects of human behavior. . . . Love is not merely a mutual gratification and compliance; it is a higher form of self-actualization; a challenge to develop both oneself and another in this respect. . . . Self-restriction is experienced as inherent in human nature; it corresponds to what we call the ethical, to the norms.⁵⁸

The Primacy of Value-Orientation: Max Scheler

An even richer source of insight into the affective substructures of consciousness can be found in the philosophy of our third author, Max Scheler. Consciousness as an axiological protention towards reality comes especially to the fore in his *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*,⁵⁹ which argues that value-qualities grasped by affective acts have the same objective status in nature as sensory qualities grasped by perception. *Man's Place in Nature*,⁶⁰ Scheler's last published work, goes even further to identify the deepest stratum of life with a consciousnessless "forward-urge" (*Drang*), which provides the "steam" (*Dampf*) for life's perpetual self-transcendence, including the ultimate sublimation of life by the "spirit".

In the introductory remarks to *Formalism*, Scheler notes that he wanted to present later a work on philosophical ethics based on phenomenological experience, but saw as an obstacle Kant's

moral philosophy, "that colossus of steel and bronze"⁶¹ still generally accepted as valid. This meant that first he had to get around the formalism of Kant without, at the same time, lapsing into the errors of all non-formal⁶² ethics of goods and purposes, the ultimate rejection of which Scheler considered "the sole merit of Kant's practical philosophy."⁶³ Ethics of goods and purposes (*Gueter und Zweckethik*) are all those inquiries which start with the question, What is the highest good or what is the highest purpose of all volitional conations? Scheler's acceptance of Kant's general critique of all such ethics while rejecting some presuppositions of that critique⁶⁴ resulted in a highly original value-ethics, which tries to steer a middle-course between material ethics and Kantian formalism.

From Scheler's complex theory of values, two major points are of special interest here: first, his insistence that conation plays a decisive role in the apprehension of values (Cf. Chapter VII below on the revelatory aspect of passion); and secondly, his belief that in all goal-directed action the value-component or affective aspect precedes and founds the picture-component or representational aspect. Considering these two points briefly will illustrate for us how he regarded value-feelings as "an original relation towards objects," and how he attributed categorical priority to affectivity, and ultimately to love, "as pure attraction and pure interest in the world."⁶⁵

Scheler speaks of striving or conation (*Streben*) in the context of goals and purposes, yet his point is precisely to show that striving and purpose are not logically connected.⁶⁶ While conation "possesses its own intrinsic phenomenal differences of directedness"⁶⁷ by itself and on all levels, "it is only and exclusively at a definite level of our conation that purpose makes its appearance."⁶⁸ Conation, which begins as an impersonal and unconscious inner stirring (*Regung*), reaches the level of purposiveness when it becomes the act of a central ego. It is in purposive conation that the value-component and picture-component of striving really become distinguishable and the latter achieves prominence, because purpose, for Scheler, signifies precisely "represented contents of goals of conation."⁶⁹ What takes place at this level is the emergence of the consciousness of conation from conative consciousness. The confluence of the two is called the will in traditional terms; that is why purposes are often mentioned by Scheler as "purposes of the will".

How the value-component and picture-component of an act of will are related to each other is pivotal not only for understanding Scheler, but also for the general drift of this essay. It is a matter of quite ordinary experience that the value-control of our conations are often independent of our ability to represent those values. For instance, we may at times experience a great readiness to make sacrifices or to be kind to people without having any clear idea of the objects we are going to give up or of the benevolent deeds we are going to perform. Here, the resoluteness with regard to the value of sacrifice or kindness contrasts sharply with the irresoluteness of the idea or picture-content of their representation. However, the significance of such experiences for Scheler is not simply the fact that value-contents are distinct and even separable from representations, but the more radical claim that values are in fact the foundations and first messengers of representational meaning. To quote him: "The ontic relation between them is such that the value-component founds the picture-component; that is, the picture-component is differentiated according to its possible suitability to the realization of the value-component."⁷⁰

The last part of the statement just quoted directs our attention to another work of Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature*, where he outlined the stages of differentiation, through which the picture-component or representational aspect of behavior emerges from life's basic value-orientation. From plant to person, the primary orientation of life is toward value, according to Scheler, not the same value, to be sure, but a whole hierarchy of values.⁷¹ In fact, personhood itself

is a value, in deference to which life yields up its innate direction (see Chapter XII on personhood). As a result of this yielding, personal life gains a new guiding principle: spiritual knowledge.⁷²

As we shall see, this does not mean that Scheler considered the spirit an outgrowth of life's natural evolution or that he tried to reduce human knowledge to a need-related function of vital drives. Quite the contrary: if anything, he is guilty of a sort of metaphysical dualism that pitches spirit against life, presenting it as "a principle opposed to life as such, even to life in man."⁷³ In its origin and according to its essence, Scheler saw spirit as independent from, and even antagonistic to, life, a perpetual naysayer to life's libidinal impulses. Nevertheless, he was careful in pointing out that the autonomy of the spirit is in reality a borrowed one, for in actual operation, the spirit is completely dependent on the energies withdrawn from life, having none on its own. Scheler thought it was a "fallacy to assume that the world in which we live is so ordered that, with the superior meaning and values revealed in higher forms of being, there goes a corresponding increase in power and energy."⁷⁴ In other words, spirit is superior to life and supersedes it only as a navigational device, not as a power source: "Spirit and will never mean anything else but guidance and direction."⁷⁵

Our point, however, is not to present Scheler's metaphysics, the acceptance or rejection of which leaves our concern relatively untouched. Our concern is to show how, through successive polarizations of its value-orientation, life can refine and redefine the goals toward which it strains, until it gives way to that non-objectifiable (but objectifying) process of self-ordered acts which we call personal life. Scheler has a great deal to teach us about the life of persons and their interpersonal exchange, independently of his ultimate metaphysical doctrines. The following outline provides a few hints about life's development towards the stage and value of emerging personhood.

1. *Vital Urge*. The first modality of life, already noted as the point of departure also for a theory of cognition, consists in a non-specific vital push (*Gefuehlsdrang*) of the organism against its environment. This primitive push is non-specific precisely because, in it, innerliness and protention are as yet undifferentiated, knowing and tending coincide. Found in all life, including plant life, this original urge lacks all means of reporting back the events that take place inside or outside the organism. Life at this level is completely consciousnessless, without any sensomotor equipment and, consequently, without active purposiveness of any kind. It fulfills itself in a blind protention of nourishment, growth and reproduction.

Vital feeling or urge is characteristic of plant life, but it is present in animal and human life also. Mixed in with more complex functions and largely subsumed by them, the vital urge nevertheless retains a certain archaic independence from them. Even when energy is withdrawn from more specific drives and functions, as in states of sleep, hibernation, fainting or coma, the vital urge burns on. On the other hand, "there is no sensation, no perception, no representation behind which is not the dark impulse burning continuously through periods of sleeping and waking. Even the simplest sensation is not merely the response to a stimulus, but always the function of a drive-motivated attention."⁷⁶

2. *Instinct*. Life's value-orientation begins to give rise to representational content in instinctual behavior, because it is on this level that the drive-motivated attention just mentioned brings about sensation. Sensation, in turn, as a reporting back of an organ to a nerve-center, modifies the subsequent deployment of the drive. Thus begins a dialectic process within the vital urge between action and representation, leading to repeated "disintegrations" (in the non-pejorative sense) and

reintegrations of the initially undifferentiated protention of life. It is in instinct that the "undifferentiated energy of growth, reaching out ecstatically into a neutral, unspecified environment, is modified by sensation and spontaneous locomotion . . . which begin to untie the living being from its vegetative level."⁷⁷

Scheler calls behavior instinctive when it exhibits the following five characteristics: it must be meaningful for the whole of the organism or for the whole of another organism; it must have a set rhythm; it must be typical for the species; it must be innate; it must be complete rather than tentative. The first feature refers to the quasi-purposive or end-directed nature of instinct. Scheler coined the word "teleoclitic" for this kind of purposiveness which does not depend on individual representation. The second feature emphasizes the fact that instinct is not constructed by imitation or learning from others. Thirdly, instinct is typical behavior, typical of the species rather than of the individual. Fourthly, instinct is not acquired but hereditary. This does not mean, however, that "instinctive behavior must be present at the time of birth. It means only that it is coordinated with fixed stages of growth and maturation, and possibly even (in the case of polymorphism) with different developmental stages in animals."⁷⁸ Finally, instinct does not come about through the stringing together of partial movements that proved successful before. Its essential pattern is mounted ready-made, so to speak, before the processes of trial and error.

The really intriguing thing for us, however, is what Scheler has to say about the function of knowledge in relation to instinctual behavior. There is in instinct, as noted above, a beginning of the separation between sensation and drive, but there is also a very close functional connection. In a biologically shaped behavior, such as instinct, knowledge can serve only an instrumental function to action: "What an animal can imagine or perceive is controlled by the a priori relation of its instincts to the structure of the environment. . . . An animal sees and hears what is significant for its instinctive behavior."⁷⁹

Moreover, the knowledge operative in instinct is not the property of individuals; it is the atavistic wit of the whole species, so to speak. That is why instinctual knowledge is as much a filter as it is a mirror with regard to the environment. It admits only as much of it as the wisdom of the species allows the individual to perceive.

Finally, Scheler indicates that instinctual knowledge is predominantly and by nature affective. "Knowledge inherent in the instinct is not a knowledge by means of representations, images or even ideas. It is rather a feeling of value-charged resistances which are differentiated as attractive or repulsive according to these value-impressions."⁸⁰

3. *Associative Memory*. The next stage in the "disintegration" of the vital urge is the vast domain of learning, that is, the domain of behavior modification on the basis of previous experience. The possibility of learning from previous experience implies that the past has not entirely passed, but left some traces of itself behind which can be recalled and combined with a new experience. The ability of retaining the past and linking parts of it with the present is called associative memory.

The appearance of the associative principle is significant for our essay from two points of view. First, the affectivity underlying associative learning is quite manifest here. Progress in learning, fixation of habit, strength of conditioning are directly proportionate to the number of trial movements on the one hand, and to the affective meaning ("satisfying," "frustrating") or value-quality of those trials, on the other. In other words, the twin engines of behavior modification, i.e., reinforcement and inhibition, are obviously value-driven. Associative learning is significant, secondly, because it initiates the emergence of the individual qua individual. Insofar as an animal

begins to manifest behavior learned through association, it also begins a process of emancipation from its bondage to the species. It begins to be more and more a center of its own behavior rather than a mere arena for it. "For only with the operation of this principle can the individual adapt himself to new situations, to situations not typical of the species. Thus the individual ceases to be no more than a point of transition in the reproductive process of the species."⁸¹

4. *Practical Intelligence or Cunning.* The liberation and centralization of individual behavior resulting from associative learning is counterbalanced by the attendant perils of mechanization of learned behavior. No sooner freed from the rigidity of species-bound instinct, behavior is in danger of lapsing into routine and stereotypy. As a corrective for such dangers, further differentiation brings forth cleverness or practical intelligence.

This type of intelligence is called "practical" because it deals with action and the choice of action by means of which the animal seeks to attain some goal set by its drives. This does not mean, however, that animal intelligence is a mere motor skill, for in fact it contains a great deal of independent imagination and even some hints of proto-abstraction. Indeed, intelligence is the faculty of "a sudden insight into a connected context of facts and values within the environment that is not perceived now nor was ever perceived previously."⁸²

The newness of the situation acts as an obstacle to the attainment of the need-determined goal. To overcome this obstacle, to master the unprecedented situation, the experiential field of the animal has to be actively restructured for possible clues. Hitherto neutral elements or elements corresponding to other needs must assume an instrumental relationship to the goal in question. This means, however, that those elements must be drawn into a relatively "abstract" and "objective" perspective by the animal. Commenting on Kohler's experiments with chimpanzees, Scheler called special attention to the degree of abstraction involved here. To reach the fruit lying outside the cage, these clever beasts used not only sticks which, after all, resemble branches on which the fruit normally hangs, but also pieces of wire, the brim of a straw hat, a blanket, anything that satisfied the abstract representation of "movable and elongated".

Nevertheless, Scheler also noted that this kind of *ad hoc* abstraction is not yet the reflective and universal abstraction usually associated with human inventiveness. Rather, "it is the dynamic energy of the drive itself that is here objectified and projected into constituents of the environment."⁸³ The objectivity discovered here is still only the instrumental aptness of some environmental feature to satisfy a particular end.

5. *Spirit.* Fully abstract knowledge, which can represent the qualities and values of things objectively, i.e., not just in particular circumstances but universally and independently of subjective need, is reached only by the properly human capacity called spirit. While the concept of spirit for Scheler includes the capacity for such acts as volition, love, remorse, reverence, despair and so on,⁸⁴ we shall concentrate on it exclusively as a special function of knowledge.

Whatever the ontological status of the spirit may be, the importance of its cognitive function is fairly clear. It is in spiritual knowledge that the drive toward objectification, which was merely begun and foreshadowed by instinct, memory and intelligence, finally succeeds. The consequences of this breakthrough are far-reaching and decisive for the understanding of the proper relationship between the cognitive and affective components of moral behavior.

Scheler correctly presents objectification as an act of emancipation of spiritual knowledge from narrow environmental pressures and interests, but he is mistaken when he perceives this emancipation as a form of detachment pure and simple. He is more correct when he emphasizes

that detachment from the environment in human knowledge actually means the unlimited expansion of man's interests to the point of his being open to the world (*weltoffen*). "To become human is to acquire this openness to the world by virtue of the spirit."⁸⁵ Instead of being tied to a limited field of interaction, as is animal life, human interest extends to the most remote aspects of the world at large. Spirit is the ability of placing one's living space with its select centers of attraction and resistance into an extended context that objectifies that space and transforms one's "environment" into a "world."

This transformation is in reality a transvaluation. Objectification and objectivity is sought, first and foremost, as a value for man. It is sought as a condition for inventiveness, as a means of creative diversification of behavior. Instead of seeing things and relating to them only in the light of determined needs, man can see them and interact with them multifacetedly. Objective knowledge is so far from being a form of detachment from reality that it could be properly described as a universalization of attachment, for it expresses man's unbounded appetite for being that reaches beyond the points of interest given in animal knowledge.

But above all, objectification is sought as an access to self-consciousness, that is, "consciousness that the spiritual center of action has of itself."⁸⁶ Simultaneously with the objectification of the world, but logically consequent upon it, man's consciousness can objectify even his own inner states and vital drives and thus emerge as a substantial "self" against the "non-self" of the world.

All this is in marked contrast to animal knowledge which has no object, has no center, has no world. The animal inhabits a limited environment, "which it carries along as a snail carries its shell."⁸⁷ Its knowledge is a more or less dependent function of that environment in which things are given only as centers of resistance to attraction or repulsion. Anything that falls outside those centers is not given at all. "Animals only notice and grasp those things which fall into the secure borders of their environmental structure."⁸⁸ This environmental structure itself, forming a functional circle with the animal organism that is fitted into it,⁸⁹ guides both animal knowledge and animal behavior.

Man, on the other hand, has a new and largely independent method for guiding his behavior. Inasmuch as he is able to objectify even his vital impulses, he can evaluate them, coordinate their several goals under an overarching representation, and rechannel their energies toward a freely chosen project. In psychological terminology, the ability to call upon natural energy complexes to accomplish goals not necessarily native to those complexes is usually referred to as sublimation, and the agent behind sublimation as the will. Both of these terms are useful, but both are liable to be misinterpreted.

Sublimation is a useful concept if it throws light on the change that takes place in the transition from sensory striving or drive-directed behavior to voluntary striving or mind-directed behavior. The essential difference is usually and mistakenly seen by philosophers as a difference in the kind of goal or object pursued by each: the object of sensory striving is said to be some "particular" good, while the object of the will is supposed to be the "universal" good. The same difference is sometimes expressed in terms of the contrast between the "concrete" and the "abstract". However, these distinctions confuse the object of striving with the manner of representing that object. While it is true that the object of a voluntary act is represented generally and abstractly, that does not mean that its object is a "good in general", and much less that it is an "abstract good". There might be abstract intelligibilities and general meanings, objects for pure thought, but as the object of appetite, the good can only be concrete and particular. All affective propensities--love, volition, desire, even instinctual drive--seek the concrete reality rather than the abstract representation of

their object. To be sure, some of them, like love and volition, seek their goal by the light of abstract representation, but what they seek is not abstract. The theory of sublimation is a refined way of saying all this. It is a way of suggesting that some of man's goal-directed actions are indeed objective and spiritual in the sense that, in them, the basic value-orientation of life finally gives rise to a separate picture-component that can function as an independent guidance system for those actions. By virtue of this guidance, the initially stereotyped operations of libidinal energies are freed and redirected towards the accomplishment of cultural projects. Needless to say, the production of culture itself is only a means for producing the very maker of culture: man himself.

Epilogue: The Formation of Trends and Attitudes

This essay began by hinting at the inadequacy of studying morality and moral education under the heading of cognition. Treating morality as one more instance of applied knowledge, it was noted, tends to overlook the problems connected precisely with the application of such knowledge in action. The tendency is to assume that the very cogency of the reasons offered by the various moral theories for acting in a certain way is sufficient to trigger the process of appropriate application. At the very least, all cognitive moral theories are haunted by the ghosts of ideomotorism, that is, the belief that the picturing of appropriate ends and means can somehow overflow into purposive action all by itself.

The thrust of this essay has been to exorcise that ghost once and for all and to argue that ideation cannot be both the informing and the enabling factor of moral action, that knowledge, while indispensable to morality as a directional device, cannot at the same time be its energetic component. That component, it was argued, derives from life's fundamental value-orientation, called affectivity. This power to act morally is furnished by a goal-directed disposition which all living beings possess, but which in man is elevated to the rank of a conscious striving toward self-realization.

But introducing affectivity as a second major component of moral behavior is liable to give rise to some unintended and potentially misleading implications. For instance, to the extent that philosophers and psychologists make use of the concept of affectivity at all, they usually take it to mean the same thing as emotion, some kind of strong visceral agitation which signals the upset of the normal balance between organism and environment, but which also initiates the process of return to that normal state. Other, more untoward acceptations equate affectivity with unruly passions and chaotic arousals, with the moods and urges of a turbulent id. In either case, affectivity is usually seen as an interloper in human affairs. Under the first perspective, it appears as a momentary departure from a preset norm which, however, soon rights itself; under the second, it is seen as a violent counterforce to reason that has to be kept in constant check by commensurate rational resistance. But even without such sinister connotations, to say that moral behavior has an affective as well as a cognitive component is liable to make morality appear a dual phenomenon, the work of two separate faculties existing side by side and working either in tandem or against one another. It could be interpreted to mean that in moral questions the "heart" too has its say, after reason has spoken. In order to preclude such a dualistic interpretation, on one hand, and to make sure that it is not taken for a cybernetic theory of behavior, on the other, this essay tried to describe affectivity as life's fundamental value-orientation from which both knowledge and the particular acts of emotion, desire, will and striving take their origin. In other words, the essay does not merely complement other, cognitive considerations, it ascribes primacy to the affective processes, because it considers these to be the actual movers of moral life.

This last point may strike one either as momentous or as trifling, depending on what one considers the goal of moral education to be. If the goal is simply to teach students how to discover higher and broader moral purposes, their affectivity need not be stimulated beyond the point of awakening in them a curiosity to learn about such topics. But if the task is to form in them a steady skill and disposition to strive toward these purposes, then something more primordial than their intellectual curiosity must be touched (see Chapter V below on character formation). Their dynamic value-orientation must be stirred up, their love of probity must be set in motion, for that alone transforms them into moral agents.

In order to intimate that purposiveness and value-orientation are indeed non-derivative dimensions of human consciousness, the essay next presented a sampling of the pertinent ideas of three authors, two philosophers and one psychologist, which point to the possibility of reconstructing the theory of consciousness on an affective basis. The actual reconstruction, should it ever be attempted, will require a great deal of programmatic research and model building on the part of educational psychologists. That is obviously no longer a philosophic task.

Before leaving the scene, however, philosophy can perform one last service for the researcher by warning him about one more fruitless attempt of representing affectivity through concepts which are unsuitable to the task. The recurrent emphasis of these pages on the importance of affectivity in moral behavior might have led to the idea that the matter must, therefore, be restated in terms of "motivation"; that the dynamic component so often mentioned is to be read as the "motivational" component of behavior; especially, that the question of moral education may now appear as a question of how to "motivate" people to act righteously. But the point of the warning is that theories of motivation, while enormously relevant in explaining other things, tell us very little about how to think and what to do about the properly affective structure of purposive behavior.

A relative late-comer on the intellectual scene, the concept of "motive" or "motivation" betrays its philosophical ancestry by the manner in which it was made to function in the behavioral sciences. The psychological and sociological usage of "motive" designates what in the older context used to be called either the "final cause" or the "efficient cause" of conduct. One set of theories identifies motives with the "reasons" for which an action is performed.⁹⁰ By "reasons" here is meant the anticipatory representation of an end-state to be brought about by means of a certain course of action. In ordinary language usage we call that the "purpose" or "point" of an action. The representation of the end itself is thought to be the full explanation of why the action was undertaken. Here motive functions as a final cause.

However, since it is at least arguable that the "real" reason for an action was not what the agent himself "thought" it was, another set of theories dispenses with the representation of purposes altogether, and rebuts the belief that reasons are necessary at all for the understanding of regulated acts. A motive, according to this view, is not the intent for the sake of which or in view of which something is done, but a certain tropism, an unconscious drive or a tissue condition, which is already programmed to bring on self-regulatory behavior.⁹¹ Theories which regard the underlying mechanism of motivation to reside in brain stimulation or endocrine processes, theories of drive reduction, libidinal theories, social learning theories, all belong to this second group. Their explanations are modelled on efficient causality.

Thus alternating between ideas and drives, between final and efficient causality, motivational theories lack the integrated view necessary to understand the value-orientation of moral behavior. On one hand, they can give no adequate description of the dynamics of moral pursuit, on the other, they can explain what happens to man, but not what he does (see the concept of agent causality in

Chapter IV). While each of them can bring to light some valid aspect of purposive behavior, theories of motivation fall short of providing a theory of affectivity or a conceptual model for moral education. That theory and that model must be looked for along different lines of approach.

To find them, empirical research must turn from focusing on the reasons or compulsions of human behavior to exploring the deep-dynamic structures of consciousness. For it is the activation of these structures, rather than thought or duress, that underline the formation of such positive trends of character disposition as courage, persistence, trust, confidence, interest, respect, rectitude, kindness and love. It should be fairly clear that these dispositions are not motives either in the sense of reasons for which one acts or as causes that make one act. Nor are they agitations and emotions in any meaningful sense of the word. They are, instead, relatively stable modifications in the general value-orientation of affectivity. As such, their influence on action and the quality of action is undeniable. Even though their influence is not causal, their presence imparts a particular cast to the acts whereby values are actualized.

One might say that the remaining task consists essentially in answering two fundamental questions: "How is human affectivity organized"? and "What pedagogic measures are likely to promote the positive development of affectivity"? The accent here is on the word "positive," for it seems that there can also be a negative development of value-orientation. This happens whenever the natural impulse of affectivity towards self-actualization is either arrested, repressed or misdirected. It is then that the foundations of immoral or criminal behavior are laid in such negative character dispositions as fear, mistrust, isolation, diffidence, apathy, cynicism, deviousness, meanness and hatred. In other words, the goodness or badness of affectivity appears to depend on the direction of its development. Four of Scheler's value-axioms are quite pertinent here:

1. Good is the value that is attached to the realization of a positive value in the sphere of willing.
2. Evil is the value that is attached to the realization of a negative value in the sphere of willing.
3. Good is the value that is attached to the realization of a higher (or the highest) value in the sphere of willing.
4. Evil is the value that is attached to the realization of a lower (or the lowest) value in the sphere of willing.⁹²

Thus, education in goodness must mean education in value-realization and not merely value-recognition. At the very least, moral education must involve the removal of all inertial obstacles which tend to block or deflect the positive direction of the affective impulse. But more than that, it also requires the strengthening of the will and the imparting of such positive attitudes to affectivity as were mentioned above. Only a person with positive moral inclinations is really a mature moral subject. How can such positive attitudes be imparted? Must they be "caught" from the teacher by way of role-modelling or merely elicited from the native powers of the student himself? What are the concrete lines of communication between the directional and energetic components of behavior? How is a commitment to recognized values made and maintained? All these problems are so many aspects of one and the same essential problem, "What is moral education"? This is the issue! *Hic labor, hic opus est!*

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Notes

1. For the various meanings and implications of intellectualism see Andre Lalande's *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960), pp. 522-25. See also the introduction of Pierre Rousselot's book, *The Intellectualism of Saint Thomas* (London: Sheed & Ward, 1935), an apology for intellectualism.

2. Note that it is only by virtue of that involvement, and not apart from it, that a person is constituted an agent.

3. Norman Gulley, *The Philosophy of Socrates* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1968), p. 83.

4. Even though some careless expressions of his could be so interpreted. For instance: "quia enim intellectus movet voluntatem, *velle est effectus eius* (italics mine)." In *Rom.*, 7, 3.

5. Si ergo intellectus et voluntas considerentur secundum se, sic intellectus eminentior invenitur. Et hoc apparet ex comparatione obiectorum ad invicem. . . . Nam obiectum intellectus est ipsa ratio boni appetibilis; bonum autem ipsum appetibile, cuius ratio est in intellectu, est obiectum voluntatis. *Quanto autem aliquid est simplicius et abstractius, tanto secundum se est nobilius et altius* (italics mine). S.T. I, q. 82, a. 3.

6. Rousselot, *The Intellectualism of Saint Thomas*, p. 199.

7. In the classic words of M. Blondel, "au fond de mon etre, il y a un vouloir et un amour de l'être, ou il n'y a rien." *L'Action*(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1950), p. xxiii.

8. "Wirksamkeit des Verstandes," see *Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten* in *Kant's Werke*, herausgegeben von der Koeniglich Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Band IV (Berlin: Georg Reimer Verlag, 1911), p. 412.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 446. It must be noted, however, that Kant is not always consistent in fusing will with practical reason: there are times when he talks of practical reason only as a representational faculty and the will as the real source of motive force.

10. Cf. Benjamin Wolman (ed.), *Dictionary of Behavioral Sciences* (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1973), p. 118; also William P. Alston, "Emotion and Feeling" in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), vol. 2, pp. 479-486.

11. Stanley Schachter and Jerome E. Singer, "Cognitive, Social, and Physiological Determinants of Emotional State", *Psychological Review*, 69, (1962), pp. 381-82.

12. Philip L. Harriman in the *Handbook of Psychological Terms* (Totawa: Littlefields, Adams & Co., 1975, p. 57, defines "emotional" as "prone to strong reactions rather than cognitive responses". The same is repeated by the *Dictionary of Behavioral Sciences*, p. 118. In an essay "In Praise of Cognitive Emotions". *Teachers College Record*, 79, (1977), pp. 171-186, Israel Scheffler of Harvard finds it necessary to apologize for coupling these two terms, "for cognition and emotion, as everyone knows, are hostile worlds apart. Cognition is sober inspection; it is the scientist's calm apprehension of fact after fact in his relentless pursuit of truth. Emotion, on the other hand, is commotion and unruly inner turbulence fatal to such pursuit but finding its own constructive outlets in aesthetic experience and moral or religious commitment." The rest of the essay, however, challenges this entrenched opinion by arguing that there are some emotions "in service of cognition" and some that are positively "cognitive emotions".

13. That is why the term "will" was not chosen. Will is regarded by most traditions as a separate faculty of rational appetite. It is called rational not because it is considered as a form of discernment in itself, but because--lacking any discernment--it must follow the judgments of the intellect. Whenever the will is not considered this kind of dependent function of intellectual representation, it is usually inflated into an altogether blind force of cosmic dimensions.

Schopenhauer's "will-to-live" is a case in point (cf. *The World as Will and Representation*, transl. by E. F. J. Payne [Indian Hills: The Falcon's Wing Press, 1958], pp. 275ff). Neither will as an appendage of the intellect, nor will as an irrational thing-in-itself can do justice to the concept of affectivity as a cumulative directedness or protention of life.

14. John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action* (New York: Minton, Black & Company, 1929), p. 21.

15. Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'Être et le Néant* (Paris: Gallimard, 1943), p. 18.

16. Max Scheler, *Man's Place in Nature* (New York: Noonday Press, 1962), p. 9; italics added.

17. ". . . this vital feeling is also the subject of that primary experience of *resistance* which is the root of experiencing what is called 'reality', especially the unity and the impression of 'reality' which precedes any specific representation." *Ibid.*, p. 14.

18. "This creative dissociation, not association or the synthesis of single pieces, is the basic process of psychic evolution. The same is true in physiological terms." *Ibid.*, p. 20. This may give the impression that Scheler considered the nature of intelligence purely analytical. His treatment of instinctual behavior, the second stage of psychic life, may indeed reinforce this impression. According to him, instinct can operate without previous learning because instinctual behavior does not have to construct a meaningful whole out of disjointed bits of experience (the *blasse Mannigfaltigkeit* of Kant); instinct and environment form a single organic configuration, a value-laden whole or *Gestalt* to start with. Intelligence is needed only for the "disintegration" of such wholes into their component parts. Nevertheless, even Scheler admits that every disjunction of experience is done in order to permit new associations and creative recombinations of the dissociated elements. The twin ability to do both is at the basis of further evolution that results in associative memory (= learning), imagination, problem solving (= practical intelligence) and abstract thought.

19. Peter H. Wolff, "The Biology of Morals from a Psychological Perspective", in *Morality as a Biological Phenomenon*, ed. G. S. Stent (Berlin: Dahlem Konferenzen, 1978), p. 96.

20. Baron Jacob J. von Uexkull, *Streifzuege durch die Umwelten der Tieren und Menschen* (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1934), p. 6ff. See also p. 61: "Wir werden sagen duerfen, soviel Leistungen ein Tier ausfuehren kann, soviel Gegenstaende vermag es in seiner Umwelt zu unterscheiden. Besitzt es bei wenigen Leistungen wenig Wirkbilder, so besteht auch seine Umwelt aus wenigen Gegenstaenden."

21. See Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925), p. 82.

22. See Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: The Free Press, 1929), pp. 7-8.

23. *Radical Reflection and the Origin of the Human Sciences* (West Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1980), p. 35.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 72.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

26. *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1931), p. 103.

27. That "the distinction between subjective and objective is relative" has been brilliantly argued by Thomas Nagel of Princeton in one of the essays of his recent book *Mortal Questions* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979). In the same essay, he has the following to say: "We flee the subjective under the pressure of an assumption that everything must be

something not to any point of view, but in itself. To grasp this by detaching more and more from our own point of view is the *unreachable ideal* at which the pursuit of objectivity aims" (p. 208, italics added). The reason objectivity is said to be unattainable is that the very attainment of it requires a subjective acceptance and incorporation of it into one's personal world-view: "Since an agent lives his life from where he is, even if he manages to achieve an impersonal view of his situation, whatever insights result from this detachment need not be made part of a personal view before they can influence decision and action. The pursuit of what seems impersonally best may be an important aspect of individual life, but its place in that life must be determined from a personal standpoint, because life is always the life of a particular person, and cannot be lived *sub specie aeternitatis*. . . . The impersonal standpoint takes in a world that includes the individual and his personal views. The personal standpoint, on the other hand, regards the deliverance of impersonal reflection as only a part of any individual's total view of the world" (pp. 205-206).

28. Justus Buchler, *Nature and Judgment* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955), p. 35.

29. ". . . the fact that history is more particularistic than physics does not make it less truly knowledge. And if poetry is, as Aristotle says, more universal than history, . . . that does not make it more truly knowledge. Physics, history, and poetry are cognitive in different respects, not in different degrees. The cognitive values of the three modes of judgment are not easily comparable, and perhaps not comparable at all; and this may be a part of what has to be meant by the view that there are three modes of judgment." *Ibid.*, p. 39.

30. There is an absolutely resonant passage in Jaspers' *Von der Wahrheit* (Muenchen: Piper Verlag, 1947), p. 115, which is here quoted in the original to show the compenetration of active and passive aspects of sympathy and assistance: "Grundhaltung der Vernunft ist universelles Mitleben. Vernunft als das staendige Vordringen zum Anderen ist die Moeglichkeit des universellen Mitlebens, Dabeiseins, des allgegenwaertigen Hoerens dessen, was spricht, und dessen, was sie selbst erst sprechen macht. Vernunft ist Vernehmen, aber das uneingeschraenkte von allem, was ist und sein kann."

31. Buchler, *Nature and Judgment*, p. 194.

32. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962; hereafter cited as *Phenomenology*.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 154. Proving the inadequacy of analyzing experience and behavior either in causal or in cognitive terms was the burden of Merleau-Ponty's earlier work, *The Structure of Behavior* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1962), cf. "Behavior is not a thing, but neither is it an idea" (p. 127).

34. *Phenomenology*, p. 154.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.*, p. 156.

37. First analyzed in the works of Adhemar Gelb and Kurt Goldstein.

38. J. Steinfeld, "Ein Beitrag zur Analyse der Sexualfunktion" in *Zeitschrift fuer die ges. Neurologie und Psychiatrie*, 1927, p. 174: "Da er [= Schneider] keine Vorstellungen von der raumlichen Lage seiner Glieder hat, muss er . . . zunaechst das betreffende Glied `finden'."

39. *Phenomenology*, p. 103.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 104.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 157.

42. *Ibid.*, p. 156.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 164.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 165.

45. *Ibid.*
46. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
47. Kurt Goldstein, *The Organism; A Holistic Approach Derived from Pathological Data in Man* (New York: American Book Co., 1939).
48. Kurt Goldstein, *Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1951), p. 11.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 141-42.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 54. The same ability is sometimes referred to as "categorical attitude."
52. A complete bibliography of Goldstein's works was put together by Joseph Meiers in *The Reach of Mind; Essays in Memory of Kurt Goldstein* (New York: Springer Publishing Co., 1968), pp. 271-295.
53. Kurt Goldstein, "Abstract and Concrete Behavior", in *Selected Papers/Ausgewaehlte Schriften* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1971), p. 391.
54. *Human Nature*, p. 201.
55. "The Smiling of the Infant", *Selected Papers*, p. 481. Italics are in the original).
56. *Ibid.*, p. 483.
57. *Human Nature*, pp. 203-4.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 207-8. Italics added.
59. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973, hereafter cited as *Formalism*.
60. See note 16, hereafter cited as *Man's Place*.
61. *Formalism*, p. 6.
62. This term is used here as an equivalent of "contentual" or "material".
63. *Formalism*, p. 5.
64. For a pertinent reference, consult Farrelly's distinction between teleological and deontological ethics in this volume.
65. Manfred Frings, *Max Scheler* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965), p. 111.
66. E.g., the color and fragrance of flowers serve the "purpose" of attracting pollinating insects, but this does not mean that flowers are "striving" to achieve pollination by these means.
67. *Formalism*, p. 33.
68. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
70. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
71. Scheler noted four distinct ranks in that hierarchy: 1. sensible values; 2. vital values; 3. spiritual values; 4. values of holiness. Cf. *Formalism*, pp. 104-110.
72. Scheler understands by *spirit* "a term which includes the intuition of essences and a class of voluntary and emotional acts such as kindness, love, remorse, reverence, wonder, bliss, despair and free decision." *Man's Place*, p. 36.
73. *Ibid.*
74. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
76. *Man's Place*, p. 13. Italics added.
77. Frings, *Max Scheler*, p. 34.
78. *Man's Place*, p. 17.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 18. The last sentence suggests that even developmentally the receptor system, what the Germans call *Merknetz*, is tailored to the capacities of the effector system, the *Wirknetz*.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 21.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 27.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
84. See note 72.
85. *Man's Place*, p. 39.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
87. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
89. Cf. Ernst Cassirer, *An Essay on Man* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 24.
90. Cf. William McDougall, *The Energies of Men* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933); Richard S. Peters, *The Concept of Motivation* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1958).
91. Cf. John Atkinson, *An Introduction to Motivation* (Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1964); Leonard Berkowitz, *Aggression* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1962); Sigmund Freud, *The Psychopathology of Everyday Life* (London: Ernest Benn, 1914); Gilbert Ryle, *The Concept of Mind* (London: Hutchinson, 1969).
92. *Formalism*, p. 26.

Chapter II

A Phenomenology of Moral Sensibility: Moral Emotion

John D. Caputo

The fully moral act has often been located in the purely rational element--in clear knowledge and unimpeded willing. Passion, moods and feelings are taken to be somehow *external* to the inner workings of the true man. Passion is at best a matter over which the rational principle rules, and its proper role is to be submissive to the leadership of the rational principle. At worst, the impulses of our so-called sensible nature are taken as a positive threat to reason, threatening to usurp its free, rational direction of human life and to turn life over to whim, caprice, and self-seeking--in a word to "feeling."

The position which I will defend in this paper, however, is predicated upon a unitary conception of man, a conception which was best defended in the classical world by Aristotle, and which receives its sharpest contemporary formulation in the writings of the phenomenologists. Phenomenologists, and foremost among them Heidegger himself, have always recognized in Aristotle a precedent and antecedent, for it was he who wanted to return to the "things themselves," to hew the work of reflection as closely as possible to concrete experience. Whence the direction of the present inquiry is at once Aristotelian, phenomenological, and experiential. In such a view man is understood to be an essentially embodied agent so that feeling and affectivity enter into the very structure of the moral act. Hence, moral life is not conceived as a battle waged between warring metaphysical principles.

The pages which follow strive to set forth the positive role of feelings in a sound moral theory.¹ I shall do this in the name of what is termed here "moral sensibility," by which is meant the harmony between our sensible nature and moral values. The chapter will unfold in the following sequence: (1) I will show that, far from being external to the moral act, passion enters into its very fabric, so that failing passion no act is of any moral worth at all. This point will be established by following the Kierkegaardian analysis of passion. (2) Next I will show that, far from "blinding reason," passion or mood plays an essential role in the *disclosure* of our world, and that means the world of moral values. That point will be established in connection with a study of Heidegger's notion of mood and disposition. (3) Having secured our ontological bearings in the opening sections of the paper, I shall then shift to the specifics of a properly moral sensibility. The point of departure for this argument will be found in Kant's analysis of the "feeling of respect," a theory whose phenomenological implications have to be disengaged from its dualist moorings in Kant's metaphysics. (4) The feeling of respect will lead into a concrete phenomenology of the human person as the place of value or, one can say, as incarnate value. (5) And this will make it possible to formulate what is in fact the principal thesis of this paper, which is that our bodily and affective relationship to the other constitutes a "proto-ethics" upon which all moral reflection is based. Whence, instead of excluding the affective from moral life, it shall be argued that it is the spring by which all ethics is nourished.

Kierkegaard's Concept of Pathos

It was Kierkegaard more than anyone else who broke through the heavily encrusted structures of dualist ontology--who "deconstructed" them, to use a word whose day has come--and who cleared the way for a new ontology of the emotions. Kierkegaard saw that the fundamental

distinction in human affairs is not between reason and the passions, but between the committed and the uncommitted, the engaged and the detached.

He considered the distinction between the rational and the emotive, soul and body, to be pagan and Platonic. Christianity was to draw a line between those whose faith is living, a vital and operative commitment permeating their whole lives, and those whom the Scriptures call "lukewarm" (CUP, 206).² In the New Testament, Kierkegaard thinks, the crucial distinction which emerges is that between those who are fully involved or "engaged" and the apathetic, between the *pathos* of a living faith and the apathy or non-*pathos*, of those who drift along in a comfortable, bourgeois Christianity. "I do not deny," he writes in bitter satire, "that it is comfortable to be a Christian, and at the same time be exempted from the martyrdom which is always present"³ The essential distinction is thus between passion or *pathos* and a-*pathos*. This discrimination flies in the face of the Greek distinction between the rational principle and the irrational principle which has dominated the history of metaphysics from Plato to Husserl.

On Kierkegaard's terms a genuine Christian is one who is passionately committed to his faith, whose passion so informs his actions that, lacking passion, they are lifeless and rote.⁴ Everything thereby is reversed: the informing principle is the *pathos*, which Kierkegaard also calls the "how," whereas the "what," the belief or creed or article (proposition) of faith, is but the content or matter. The creed is just a list of propositions, an external and lifeless content which comes to life only in the passion of an existing and believing Christian faith. To know that I am going to die and that I am promised in faith a life after death, is not a thought, Kierkegaard says, but a deed. It is not accomplished by pronouncing the words, but by an act of faith that sends a shock throughout our entire being.

If Kierkegaard does not distinguish passion and reason, he does distinguish a merely aesthetic *pathos* or passion from true, ethico-religious *pathos*.⁵ In aesthetic *pathos* or aesthetic sensibility we are only partially transformed, and the transformation issues only in words, perhaps in verse. Our "taste" is struck by a thing of beauty, but our lives are not changed. Aesthetic *pathos* remains disinterested, looking on from afar.⁶ But ethico-religious *pathos* means a total transformation of our whole life so that we are made over into a new man, reborn in the image of God. It issues not in words but in deeds, and it signifies that one has entered into an absolute relationship to the absolute goal or *telos*. One is wholly committed to the absolute, committed even unto the end, unto death.

This is not to say that Kierkegaard's religious man is continually heaving and sighing with religious fervor, or that he is uninterrupted in the performance of great and heroic deeds: continually exposed to the lion, always on the verge of martyrdom. On the contrary, he tends to keep his absolute commitment under wraps and to bear it unseen (incognito). He hides it under the mask of humor and irony⁷ so that outwardly, as he says in *Fear and Trembling*, the knight of faith may lead so uneventful a life that if we met him we would find that he looks like a tax collector. The real meaning of this absolute religious *pathos* is that it is an abiding, constant passion:

To relate oneself with existential *pathos* to an eternal happiness is never expressed by once in a while making a great effort, but by persistence in the relationship. . . . What holy vows a man knows how to make at the instant of mortal danger! But when that is passed, the vow is so promptly and so completely forgotten.⁸

Hence, the distinction between the resolute and the irresolute, which is often mistaken as a distinction between a pure, steadfast "will" and transitory passions, is rearticulated by Kierkegaard

in a revolutionary way. Instead of opposing the pure will to the passion of the moment, Kierkegaard distinguishes a deep and abiding existential pathos--a totally self-transforming pathos--from a fleeting, transient pathos.

There is thus a difference in temporality between these two forms of pathos. The one is abiding, constant, sustained from day to day even under the most undramatic circumstances. The other is momentary and awakened only on great occasions:

When the earth quakes . . . how swiftly then and how thoroughly does even the dullest scholar . . . comprehend the uncertainty of everything.⁹

When the great occasion passes this pathos slips back into its customary complacency. Some men are moved by the thought of God only on solemn occasions, at weddings and funerals, say, or at official oath-takings; but others know how to bring the thought of God together with the task of taking a trip to the park. It is all a matter of the abiding *depth* of one's passion. Kierkegaard does not oppose pure will to bodily impulse, but deep passion to shallow passion, abiding, transforming passion to transient, momentary passions which merely result in occasional disturbances on a mostly placid surface. There is no question of getting outside or above passion, no question of standing on a higher, supersensible ground from which to control passion. That is the framework of Platonism and Greek metaphysics, of "recollection," not of "repetition."¹⁰ In the categories of Christianity, it is a question of separating the wheat from the chaff, the fervent from the lukewarm, those who are with Christ from those who are against, the total pathos from the occasional and transient one, the deep from the shallow passion.

There is, I might add, a good deal of confirmation for what Kierkegaard says in the sorts of distinctions we habitually make in ordinary language without falling into Platonism. We speak of a "cold anger," which is not the passing anger of the moment, an angry outburst, but a deep, even, life-long anger such as the patriot's profound, implacable anger against the colonial power. The same can be said of a "mortal" hatred, revenge, envy, or any other destructive passion which is deep-seated and abiding; it is too cunning and deadly serious to give itself over to mercurial and passing expressions. By the same token the love of a man and a woman, of a country doctor for his patients, of the farmer for the soil, has the same quality of quiet depth and surface calm. Still water runs deep, we say, meaning that the essential thing is the depth of a passion and not its surface stirrings.

By taking his point of departure in the categories of religious and Christian life, Kierkegaard redrew the map that Platonic metaphysics had given us: contrary to the Platonic view, there is no moral action at all outside of passion. The lack of passion in moral life means the perfunctory performance of acts which lack conviction and dedication. Indeed it is passion which brings the agent into the moral sphere, which makes his actions committed and decisive. The lack of pathos does not mean that the way has been cleared for the pure rational will. It means that we are not acting at all, but merely thinking about acting, or else that our actions are performed by rote, that they lack the moral quality of decisiveness, that they are neither heartfelt nor committed.

Heidegger's Ontology of Moods

But if Kierkegaard placed Platonic ontology into question, the task fell to Heidegger to formalize Kierkegaard's revolution. Heidegger proposed an ontological account of man in which affectivity was considered to be a primordial and irreducible structure of human

existence.¹¹ Existence, he held, is constituted of three co-equal and equally radical structures which he called projection, disposition and fallenness. Inasmuch as he is "projected" man is always ahead of himself, cast forth into one course of action or another; by "disposition," the being which is cast forth is at the same time already situated within pre-given circumstances; and inasmuch as he is "fallen," the being which projects himself ahead, from out of a given situation, is ever liable to give up his project and to sink back into complacency with present actuality. The three structures are transparently temporal in character, describing the way in which man runs forth into future possibilities in the midst of an oppressing actuality into which he has already been delivered (having been) which tempts him to remain content with the present. The ontology or understanding of reality which Heidegger developed in *Being and Time* completed the revolution which Kierkegaard had set in motion. For here was an ontology which drew the decisive distinction in human nature, not between "reason" and "feelings," but between the various temporal structures of man so that the problem of an act which is "free" of feeling, or "above" feeling does not arise.

To describe affectivity Heidegger used the word "*Befindlichkeit*", whose sense for him is drawn from the colloquial expression "how are you?" ("*Wie befinden-Sie sich?*"), "how are you found?", "how do things sit with you?" "how are you situated?"¹² It is probably best translated as "disposition." If disposition represents an ontological structure, then moods are the particular entities (or "ontic" structures) through which the basic ontological structure is *disclosed*. In contrast, the intellectualist tradition speaks of the "light of reason," but regards moods as blind and subjective. Brooks do not brood; we do. Grey afternoons are not sombre, we are. But Heidegger rejects the idea that there is a subject here and an object there and focuses instead upon the interaction "between" subject and object. In that case, moods play an essential role in disclosing the structure of our world and of our experience.

Heidegger thus puts forward two basic theses about affectivity: the first concerns its *necessity*, and the second concerns its *disclosive* power. Let us examine each in turn.

The tradition treats moods as transient, mutable states which come and go and which do not enter into the stable, permanent essence of man. In contrast, Heidegger, following Kierkegaard, gives moods an ontological role and makes them essential structures of our Being. That means that everything in man is, as it were, "mooded." Moods are the way man is "tuned" to the world, and he is always in one state of attunement or another;¹³ it is a mistake to think that we are or can ever get free of moods. It is indeed necessary at times not to be disturbed, but that means simply that at times we require undisturbing moods such as peace and tranquility. When Descartes speaks of getting free of his passions in order to undertake his meditations, he is mistaking the mood of tranquility with being in a mood-free state. And when Kant speaks of countering inclinations with pure will, that can only mean countering bad inclinations with good ones.

Secondly, Heidegger assigns to moods a disclosive role; this is a phenomenological point not brought out explicitly by Kierkegaard. On the phenomenological account, a feeling is not some kind of "subjective response" to an "objective stimulus," but is possessed instead of an *intentional* structure,¹⁴ that is, it is a way of intending or turning to the world, of disclosing its make-up and the structure of our experience. It is nothing "inner" and subjective, but rather an intentional transcendence, a stepping outside (or ek-stasis), which reaches out to the world. According to Heidegger moods have a three-fold power of disclosure.

To begin with, and this is their most important function, moods disclose what Heidegger calls the "facticity," the givenness, of our Being. For Heidegger man finds himself situated within the world--within a society, a tradition, a family, etc.--prior to any possible consent on his part: that is, he is always "delivered over" (*ueberantwortet*) to his Being. Moods disclose how that being-

delivered-over is experienced, whether as a burden or a weight pushing us down (de-pression), or as the lifting of a burden (e-lation). Whence they disclose the naked "fact" of being-in-the-world, which is what Heidegger means by "facticity," the naked "that-he-is-there" of man. Facticity is thus not a mere "matter of fact" in the manner of seventeenth- and eighteenth- century philosophy; it is rather a lived or existential fact, a disclosed or phenomenological fact: it is the lived through experience of being factically situated in the world.

Thus, it is not to be confused with the standard idea of "contingency," which is an objectivistic notion, referring to something which a disinterested speculative gaze observes to be there rather than not. Because facticity is something lived-through, it can be apprehended or disclosed only by mood. One can consider matters of fact with what the tradition calls intellect (*nous*) for as long as one wishes and never experience facticity. Facticity is disclosed only in that "tuning" which belongs to a being who is "thrown." Contingency is at best a distillate of lived facticity, its objectivistic correlate. One may thus give theoretical assent to the contingency of one's being without ever opening one's eyes moodfully to facticity. It would take an earthquake, Kierkegaard said, to bring some sleepy scholars to admit the uncertainty of things!¹⁵

Moods also disclose the world as a "totality." This is explained in *What is Metaphysics?* which treats of the disclosure of the world in anxiety.¹⁶ Through anxiety the world as a totality fades into meaninglessness, even as in joy it glows with charm. One is exposed to this anxiety even if one has an optimistic, theoretical account of things; contrariwise, one can experience Being in positive tones even if one has a pessimistic metaphysics (as seems to have been the case with Eduard von Hartmann, a Schopenhauerian pessimist who was happily married and professionally successful).

Finally, moods not only disclose the facticity of our Being and the Being of the world as a whole, they also disclose particular entities within the world in such a way as to let these entities "matter" to us, to let them be of concern to us (*angegangen werden sein*). Whence it is only in the mood of fear that something can matter to man as threatening:

Pure beholding, even if it were to penetrate to the innermost core of the Being of something present-at-hand could never discover anything like that which is threatening. . . . By looking at the world theoretically, we have already dimmed it down to the uniformity of what is purely present-at- hand.¹⁷

The fearsomeness of a fearsome object cannot be disclosed by pure beholding; fear indeed *is* this disclosure of the fearsome object as such. The mood of fear, like every other mood, discloses the world in a way which cannot be substituted for or improved upon. Thus, moods are not "blind," but insightful and disclosive. They tell us about ourselves and others in a way to which we otherwise have no access. They tell us long before reason has noticed that we are on the wrong track, that we have no business here, that so and so is not to be trusted, that we are being untrue to what we have all along believed. Socrates' celebrated "voice" was precisely such a preconceptual, moodful power of insight, a way of disclosing things long before his dialectic could summon up arguments one way or the other. If this be so then in Socrates, at the very birth of philosophy, we find moral affectivity or the mooded disclosure of value. This is the point we want to make in the following pages.

But before taking up this issue let us summarize briefly the results achieved thus far. From Kierkegaard we learned that, far from being something external or outside the properly human, passion is precisely what renders an act decisive, committed and authentic: outside of passion there is only the lukewarm, the apathetic. In terms of morality this means that it is passion which makes

a moral agent an agent, someone who truly *does* something, who acts and who stands by his action. From Heidegger, we learned that the ontological structure of passion and mood is to disclose; and that moods, far from being blind or subjective, reveal the world to us in a way to which reason has no access. This means that they play a disclosive role in moral matters as well. In the same way that fear discloses the fearsome object, moral affectivity discloses moral value, or what the tradition would call the "good." We are thus at an extreme removed from the dualism of is and ought, a point which is made also by David Schindler in Chapter X below. On this account value belongs integrally to the structure of what "is," so long as "is" is understood in all its amplitude as a self-manifesting or self-revealing phenomenon, (*phainomenon*), rather than being reduced to a mere matter of fact in the manner of seventeenth-century philosophy. The task now is to show how that is possible.

The Feeling of Respect in Kant's Ethics

To carry on Heidegger's metaphor, moral sensibility is the attunement of the moral agent to moral value, his sensitivity and responsiveness to value: moral sensibility is affective moral life. In search of help for a theory of moral sensibility, I shall turn to Kant, although he represents an extreme case of moral and metaphysical dualism. Kant wrestled with the question of moral feeling throughout his writings, and it is worth noting that in his earlier, pre-critical writings, he actually defended a theory of "moral sense."¹⁸ His mature ethical position was, in fact, a reaction against a view that he himself once defended. Indeed, even after he had formulated his rigorous separation of pure will and empirical inclination, Kant himself concluded that the view as it stood was dualistic and needed to be reconciled with the sensibility.¹⁹

The metaphysical setting of this moral feeling in Kant is, in my view, beyond redemption. In Kant's theory this feeling is the sole feeling which arises, not from antecedent phenomenal causes, but from the will itself, pure noumenal will.²⁰ It is in a sense the inscription left by pure reason upon our sensible nature. But Kant can hardly defend such a view if the moral feeling is indeed a feeling and not a metaphor. For if it truly belongs to our sensible nature then it is as rigidly predictable as the movements of the heavenly bodies and has nothing to do with the freedom of the will; Kant could deny this only by denying the uniformity of nature. Moreover, on Kant's own terms, it must be fully explicable in terms of our neuro-physiological make-up and the physical stimuli which cause one neuro-physiological reaction rather than another; it can have no more to do with moral value than does feeling pain in the presence of excessive heat. It is a piece of nature which has nothing to do with the intelligible world; it has to do with facts and not values. The whole notion of moral feeling is a futile attempt to back out of the worst implications of his own theory. What he needed was a wholly new theory of experience and affectivity, one which would break with the fundamental presuppositions of eighteenth century philosophy.

Although this was not possible for Kant himself, the importance of Kant's analysis did not go unnoticed by Heidegger a century and a half later when he wrote: "Kant's interpretation of the phenomenon of respect is probably the most brilliant phenomenological analysis of the phenomenon of morality that we have from him."²¹ This suggests that, with the help of phenomenology, we can rescue Kant's theory from its dualist moorings and achieve thereby precisely what our argument requires, viz., a phenomenological analysis of the moral phenomenon which centers on an affective moral intentionality.

Kant was grappling with the notion which Kierkegaard would later make abundantly clear, that the will is not moved except through passion. The purely "impassive" will is motionless and

never achieves the status of being an agent at all. But Kant's metaphysics makes it strictly impossible that anything other than the moral law itself should be the "incentive" or driving force (*Triebfeder*) of the will, lest the will be moved to act by non-moral motives. As the law alone must be the sole incentive, the cause of our action could not be the moral feeling of respect, but rather the effect upon our sensible nature which the law brings about. We do not obey the law because of the feeling of respect, but we feel respect because we are subject to the law. We are moved to act by the law, and insofar as the law is moving as an incentive it effects in us this moral feeling.

Now there are two moments to the feeling of respect. In the first place, the effect of the law upon our pathological nature is to thwart our inclinations which tend away from the law. The law checks the feeling of pleasure in something forbidden:

Thus far, the effect of the moral law as an incentive is only negative, and as such this incentive can be known a priori. For all inclination and every sensuous impulse is based on feeling, and the negative effect on feeling (through the check on the inclinations) is itself a feeling. Consequently we can see a priori that the moral law as a ground of determination of the will, by thwarting all our inclinations, must produce a feeling which can be called pain.²²

The law holds in check self-love, our selfish urge for self-gratification, and self-conceit, our misled tendency to think ourselves of worth independently of our conformity to the law.

But the law is not merely negative, it does not merely forbid, it is also a positive, an ideal of freedom and moral excellence. Accordingly the feeling it induces cannot be merely negative; its positive grandeur is thus a function of its negative power to humble our sensible nature.²³ The law subdues our pathological nature; it brings us into submission to reason; it asserts its priority over us and implants in us a sense of being a "subject" of the law. The law itself then emerges in its positive power, in its majesty, kingship and regal authority and overpowers us. The law has a power and might like the starry heavens above, a majestic sweep, a show not of physical but of moral force.

Heidegger recasts the analysis in phenomenological terms.²⁴ Respect is always "respect for," that is, it has an intentional structure in virtue of which it intends the moral law. For Kant the law is the ground of the feeling, not the feeling of the law; the feeling is simply the way in which the law is disclosed or made manifest to me as intentional object. For Heidegger the feeling of respect is not only a feeling for the law, but also a certain self-feeling in which I am disclosed to myself. For I experience myself as subject to the law and so as free and responsible before the law. Hence I experience myself as a being of worth or dignity (*Wuerde*). If I feel subordination or subjection to the law, the law also raises me up by disclosing my true dignity as a moral personality (*personalitas moralis*), a member of the intelligible world.

The feeling of respect is at the same time both an inclination or tendency towards it as the source of our true dignity. The feeling of respect thus resembles anxiety, which Heidegger explains elsewhere. Anxiety, too, is a shrinking back before the nullity which it discloses and at the same time a being drawn towards, inasmuch as anxiety breaks the spell in which we are held by beings and enables us to experience the upsurge of Being itself as against this nothingness.²⁵

The moral feeling of respect is then precisely this affective attunement of feeling and the law whose possibility we projected in the first two sections of this paper. We are attuned to the majesty of the law the way our aesthetic sensibility is attuned to the majesty of the starry heavens; we respond as deeply to the worth of a moral deed as to the beauty of a work of art. Kant's metaphysics

made it impossible for him to defend his theory of the moral feeling, but the soundness of his phenomenological account of this feeling belied the metaphysics it was meant to defend.

I have not yet discussed, however, the most important feature of Kant's analysis. "Respect," Kant says, "always applies to persons only, never to things."²⁶ That is a decisive qualification, for Kant's rationalist metaphysics often leads him to speak in terms of a hypostasized law or reason. But now Kant adds that respect is directed not at material objects, and by extension not at an abstract law, but always at a concrete person who embodies the law. I respect a person, not a thing, and I respect a person not insofar as he holds high office or exerts great power, but precisely inasmuch as he embodies the law. Whence Kant writes:

Fontanelle says, 'I bow to a great man, but my mind does not bow.' I can add: to a humble plain man in whom I perceive righteousness in a higher degree than I am conscious of in myself, my mind bows whether I choose or not, however high I carry my head that he may not forget my superior position. Why? His example holds before me a law which strikes down my self-conceit when I compare my own conduct with it. . . .²⁷

When we witness an example of virtue which surpasses our own, our own shortcomings are exposed and our self-love and self-conceit are struck down.

Now the person bears a two-fold relation to the law. The person is both the alpha and the omega of the law, the origin and the sphere in which it is applied. The dignity of a man of concrete virtue is not only that he holds his sensuous impulses in check and responds to a supersensible principle. It is found also--and even more primordially--in that he is the author of this law, that the law arises autonomously from his own rationality and is not imposed upon him from without. Hence the *law* as a purely formal principle is convertible with the *person* as the bearer of the law (as subject and legislator). This, of course, is the basis of the alternate formulations which Kant gives of categorical imperative in his *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*: the first expressing the law as a purely formal principle, the second addressing its content or matter, and the last announcing the kingdom of ends as the synthesis of the first two. Without the person, the law would be a nonexistent abstraction. It would not "hold" because it would have no one to hold *for* and no one to be held *by*. But without the law the person would lack all dignity and would remain a piece of nature, a merely phenomenal being no better than a Cartesian automaton. Whence the law insures the dignity of the person inasmuch as it is in virtue of the law that the person rises above the sphere of nature; while the person gives substance to the law, rendering it real and effective.

Now I maintain that Kant gives expression here, in the categories of a dualistic metaphysics, to a profound and genuine experience. In my view it is possible to rid this theory of its sensible-supersensible dualism and to give it the stamp of genuine phenomenological coin. This I would do in two steps. In the first place the categorical imperative is no dictum of "pure reason" over and above our "sensible" nature. As an "imperative" it is a mode of discourse, a linguistic formation in the form of a command. It takes shape in, and is possible only within the framework of, language and grammar. Hence it belongs to the sphere of "discourse" or the Being of man insofar as man speaks, what Heidegger calls *Rede*, in Greek *logos*. As a mode of discourse it is a call, indeed a call which issues from man himself, from the depths of his Being, and bids him to be the being which it is up to him to be. The categorical imperative is no supersensible law, but a call which

only a being who speaks can utter--and hear. It belongs to the Being of man as incarnate, as speaking, as calling and hearing.²⁸

The same result is even more forcibly visited upon us when we turn from the "form" to the "content" of the laws, from the mere form of an imperative to the moral person (an issue which is also discussed in Chapter IX below). What is the moral person? As Heidegger asks: "What is the ontological concept of the moral person, which is thus revealed in respect, of the *personalitas moralis*?"²⁹ The answer is found in what Kant's *Foundations* calls the person as an end-in-himself and not merely as a means.³⁰ Man is not good because he is good *for* something--he is not merely a commodity in the labor force, a purveyor of services--but a good *in* himself, *for* himself. He is not good because of what he can *do*--for himself or for others--but because of what he *is*, in his Being. The Being of this being is to be of worth, and the worth of this being is ontologically secured against anything which may be ontically disagreeable about him.

Now Kant expressed the dignity of man in the dualistic terms of the ability of our supersensible will to subdue our sensible appetites. I see this as an alienated formulation of a more profound phenomenological experience of the dignity of the person. Let us listen again to Kant's adaptation of Fontanelle's words:

"I can bow to a great man, but my mind does not bow." I can add: to a humble plain man in whom I perceive righteousness in a higher degree than I am conscious of in myself, my mind bows whether I choose or not, however high I carry my head that he may not forget my superior position.

That, I suggest, is the phenomenological origin of Kant's moral philosophy. What animated Kant's thought from the start was his experience of the dignity of the person, his concrete encounter with men and women of simple nature who understood better than generations of philosophers Socrates' statement that it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it. Kant was moved to deny reason in order to make room for faith because of a profound and animating experience of the dignity of the human person, an experience so deep and heartfelt that it has all the characteristics of the "passionate inwardness" of which Kierkegaard spoke. It was no shallow passion brought on by a great occasion, but a deep and lasting reverence which animated the whole critical philosophy.

We are thus led by Kant to a formulation of the fundamental principle of moral sensibility: that the person is given to us in the feeling of respect as a being of intrinsic worth and dignity. The moral feeling of respect discloses the concretely given person as an object of moral worth. The person is disclosed in moral affectivity as a being of dignity and worthy of respect. Lack of this moral sensibility, failure in this moral affectivity, would render us morally monstrous, coldly indifferent to the worth of others, perhaps even pathologically ill. One imagines the cold executioners of whom history provides an unfortunate list of examples precisely in these terms--as moral monsters, repugnant, repulsive, sickening. Here all the chords of our moral attunement are in discord. Our moral sensibility is in sensible, not mere metaphoric pain.

The Phenomenology of the Person as a Primordial Disclosure of Value

I have claimed that the Kantian thesis of the person as an end-in-himself is a metaphysical theory which can be converted directly into phenomenological coin. I want now to make good on that claim and to offer a phenomenological account of our experience of the person, the point of which will be to show that value is disclosed to us prereflectively, in the sphere of affectivity, long

"before" reflective reason has a chance to put in a word of its own. There is a prepredicative moral experience which lies at the base of moral reflection, even as there is a prepredicative perceptual experience which lies at the base of theoretical assertions. We are claiming thus that the life of the moral agent is prepredicatively shaped and formed, and that the reflection of the moral philosopher must be directed at unpacking or explicating this prepredicative experience. In the present section I wish to unfold this prepredicative experience of the person as an affective disclosure of value, and then in the concluding section to discuss how this constitutes a "proto-ethics."

Phenomenologists like Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty have argued long and persuasively that the "world" is not *my* world but a shared world, a world with others ("with-world"); and hence that the other is not only an object on my screen, a being-for-me which can be situated on my horizons, but a being-for-himself, irreducible to me. Such a phenomenologically construed world is at the far remove from the Cartesian illusion of an *ego cogito* on the one side and a totality of objects outside me. For I am from the start "outside," drawn into the world and subject to its innumerable influences. I am from the start in a world which is not of my own making, but shaped and formed by historical and linguistic structures which are thousands of years old, which were created with imperceptible slowness by long forgotten generations. These structures are not, as in Sartre's neo-Cartesianism, threats to my freedom; rather they nourish and give shape to my world (see Chapter XI below). My world is filled with others, shaped by their contributions. I am indebted to their generosity and filled with their presence. My family, friends and colleagues, my tradition at large, is a constellation of benefactors who hand over to me the possibilities of my Being.

Now I want to show how my debt to the others reaches down to the depths of my Being, of my prereflective relationship to them. Long before I reach the stage of reflective thought I am already in a relationship to others; my Being is from the start Being-with. I owe my origin to others, my nurturing and growth. From its first moments my life develops in rhythm with others, at first in tune with the rhythm of the maternal heart-beat, and then in tune with the rhythm of the home with its cluster of smiling faces and noises and lights and aromas. The world to which I belong from the start is not a world of material objects with various sizes, shapes, and velocities. It is a profoundly personal world focussed on other persons as on radiant points of energy or light, the way the evening sky is filled with stars. From these centers of energy are radiated influences which surround and envelope me so that, when they are present I am filled with them, and when they withdraw I feel their absence. Their very absence testifies to their presence. This enveloping personal world is constantly given to us, always and already pre-given. So true is this that Heidegger says that the so called "problem of other persons" is not the Cartesian pseudo-problem of proving that others are there--that we are not alone in the universe, as Descartes puts it so astonishingly--but rather of finding ourselves in the midst of their encompassing presence. Others, Heidegger argues, are not those whom I am *not*, as if the ego came first and others afterwards as the negation of the ego, but rather those among whom I *too* am.³¹ And this relationship to others, which could not be more profound, is borne witness to throughout the length and breadth of our intentional life. The whole range of our intentional acts stands under the influence of the presence of others.

Here I am concerned chiefly with the bodily and affective resonance of this relationship to others, with that affective intentionality which discloses the other to us as a being worthy of respect, and which is already at work before the *ego cogito* arrives on the scene. I wish to argue that bodily intentionality is already ec-static, that is, already extended beyond itself, stretched out to others, responsive to others. Long before the child enters the universe of words he already intends the parents' look and touch. He has already grown accustomed to the cadence of their

voices, the style of their gestures, the feel of their grip, the aroma of their bodies; to the colors and patterns of the nursery, the home; to the bustle and noise of his siblings.

Long before reflective life intervenes we are tied by our bodies and bodily life and the network of its passions, feelings and moods, to the personal world around us. As intentional life matures, as the intentional moves I make become more refined and differentiated, I learn to sort out the persons themselves from the array of objects over which their influence spreads. I learn to lead a distinctively different intentional life towards other persons than I lead toward things, that is, the objects which we together share and use, accumulate and discard. Such things lead out from, and then back to others. They are made by others, sold by others, given to us by others, belong to others or to us: they are there for others or for us. I can grasp, push, pull and otherwise manipulate material objects, but my actions towards others are inscribed with caution, care and courtesy. When they are not, this is understood immediately and by everyone as offensive in the highest degree.

I can stare steadfastly at a material object in order to determine what it is, but it would be unspeakably rude to treat a person likewise. I lean against walls and furniture, but I keep a careful distance between myself and others, and an inner alarm sounds as soon as someone without an invitation approaches too close to us or touches us. I can feel a material object with curiosity about its texture, listen to a noise to discern exactly what it is, sniff about to isolate an aroma, but my bodily intentionality towards others is held strictly in check. I do not stare, poke, or sniff. I am aware, in a prereflective, bodily way, of the life which streams out from the other, of the subjectivity which makes its seat there, of the horizons which the other is constantly throwing out around himself. I do not lightly intrude into that circle. My bodily life takes heed of the autonomy which is exercised there, that the other is no being-for-me, no object reducible to my proportions and locatable on my horizon. I have from the start a bodily recognition that the other is something in itself and not merely for me.

Here then is the phenomenological equivalent of the beings which populate Kant's metaphysical world. Long before philosophical reflection arrives, there is a bodily disclosure of the other as worthy of respect, an end in himself, as a being not to be reduced to the sphere of objects available for my use. Long before philosophical reflection erects a distinction between subject and object, I am already tied to others, and they to me: together we carry out our mutual duties towards one another. Our bodily and affective life already apprehends the eye and hand of the other as the mediation of a personal life which commands our respect.

We have now been brought, I believe, to the point for which we have been striving. The world in which we live does not decompose into real facts on the one side and ideal objects on the other. What is primarily given is instead the inter-personal world, the world of other persons, their words and deeds and the things which they have made. In this world everything centers on the bodily presence of the incarnate other. The incarnate other is value incarnate, the concretely given embodiment of worth and value. The centers of energy, as we described other persons, are centers of value, commanding our respect.

Long before the debates of moral philosophers arise it is already clear that we are all, always and already, tied into a life of moral interaction and that we intend others--pre-reflectively--in a profoundly different way than we intend objects. The value of the other is not discovered by reflective thought, but only articulated in the language of concepts and judgments, for it is already prereflectively manifest in a more primordial way to our bodily affectivity. We are always and all along mooded and tuned to the other, whether in harmony (syn-pathos), or in discord (anti-pathos), or even when we treat him with callous disregard (a-pathos) which is not mood-lessness but the mood of indifference. We live all along in a charged environment of affective being-with, a field

of affective impulses, a field of pathos. Were the life of pathos to give out on us, were the energy of our passionate involvement with one another to go dead on us, were we indeed ever to attain a pure reason free of the affective substructure which sustains our life, then moral reflection would become as meaningless as a treatise on the psychological effects of colors to a person born blind.

The task of reflection is to articulate a moral life in which we are already enmeshed, to which we are all pre-committed, not to hold court over it. Moral life and moral values are primordially disclosed to us prereflectively, affectively. Our prereflective attunement with one another is the spring by which moral reflection is nourished. Moral reflection simply gives conceptual shape to the prereflective moral life in which we are all along caught up.³²

Conclusion: Affectivity as Proto-Ethics

I have argued throughout this chapter that the moral struggle is misconceived as a struggle of reason with inclinations, of the rational principle with the irrational principle. I have said in effect that moral strife must be reconceived as a discord within a single nature. It is a dissonance within our affectivity which is reflected in a tossing to and fro between competing reasons on the reflective level: we are affectively drawn in opposite directions, and we can give reasons on either side. By the same token, moral reform does not take the form of bringing the passions back into subjection to reason, but rather of reestablishing harmony and consonance. As moral strife is not a tug of war between opposing metaphysical principles but a discord within a single nature, we should reorganize the totality of our existential forces, both reflective and prereflective, and redirect them to new and fruitful ends. It is a matter of "retuning," of a tune-up of our affective life.

In my view acquiring moral character is not unlike acquiring aesthetic taste, and I do not reject the proximity of morals and aesthetics which the expression "moral sensibility" suggests. Moral life seems to me a matter of being properly sensitized morally, and moral education a matter of seeing to it that our children grow up properly sensitized in moral matters. That means that we want them to feel for the poor and the oppressed--and that is no metaphor: they must in fact feel for the poor. If they do not, they lack moral sensibility as surely as their taste for the standard fare offered on television represents a failure in aesthetic sensibility. We want them to feel more strongly for justice than for acquisitiveness or the amassing of more and more material possessions of their own; we want them to be truly repulsed by brutality, to be horrified by war and inhumanity; we want them to feel a sense of reverence for the physical world and to abhor the technological desecration of the environment and of biological life; we want them to feel pain at violence and injustice. In short we want them to feel the right things: to take pleasure in the right things, and to feel pain at the sight of evil, as Plato and Aristotle both insist.³³ If they are taught to feel well, if they are morally sensitized, then the reasons will come of their own, just as when they are taught to feel the wrong things they do not lack for reasons to rationalize their ill-feeling and ill-will. If they do not feel these things in their marrow, then they are merely paying lip service to what we teach and will throw it over at the first opportunity, for the rationales we make them learn will be a veneer over a hollow, a shell without a kernel. If they do not respond to virtue and vice from the marrow of their bones, if they do not resonate from the depths of their sensibility to these values, if they have not been affectively turned to moral matters, then our words of moral wisdom will be to them only so many tinkling cymbals.

But by reinstating affectivity to a central role in moral life, by insisting upon the centrality of moral affectivity, do we not turn everything over to whim and fancy and make everything a matter

of taste? Do we not reduce the choice between justice and injustice to the level of the choice of our favorite color? That at least is the rejoinder of those who make everything turn on the old dichotomy between fact and value, is and ought, real and ideal, sensible and supersensible. The senses tell us what is, but reason must decide what ought to be. Our tastes tell us what we like, but reason tells us what we ought to choose. The old dualism does not give up easily; its death is painfully slow. Such an objection proceeds from a grossly inadequate analysis of the nature of human experience, one whose roots are in Platonism but which extend well into modern philosophy. The one lasting achievement of phenomenology, in my view, is to have corrected this abstract and contrived idea of experience, and to have replaced it with a sound and holistic account of experience as it is really *lived*. That is what I have attempted by means of my presentation of a phenomenology of the person.³⁴

I have argued that experience is value-laden from the start, that we meet up with value from the first moments of waking life, and even before that. Human experience, properly conceived in all its amplitude, is from the start an experience of value, in particular of the value of the human person. Values are not something which reason discerns while the senses stand about, stupefied, awaiting its deliberations, though metaphysics has always favored such juridical metaphors. On the contrary, human affectivity is already sensitive to the value of the other, already discloses it, long before reason can set up court. We are always and from the start attuned to the other. We do not need to reach the age of reason, to achieve the *cogito*, or to undertake transcendental reflection, to know that: it is already inscribed in our prereflective being. We have already learned it, have all along been learning it, from the first moments of our life. Our being is a being-with, and our being-with is an attunement to the other. The other's presence is an omnipresence to which our whole affective life is attuned.

Hence, by turning things over to affective and prereflective life, we have not turned everything over to whim and caprice; we have not surrendered "reason" to "feeling." On the contrary we have found there the prereflective moorings of the principle to which Kant gave a famous conceptual formulation when he told us always to treat humanity, whether in our person or that of another, as an end and never merely as a means.³⁵ Here is a principle which is already inscribed in our prereflective and affective intentionality, a principle which makes its presence felt from the start.

Now everything depends upon seeing that the relationship between affectivity and thought is not, as in dualist philosophers, a matter of having a blind feeling on the one side and pure reason on the other, the former lacking insight as the latter lacks incentive. On the contrary, in our scheme, affectivity and thought are related as the implicit to the explicit, so that the work of thought always consists in unpacking our prereflective life, explicating it, and giving it explicit formulation.³⁶ Hence when Kant announced this principle, it is not as if this were something he had devised, a theory of his, some construction which he wanted to test out. As he himself argues, this law is exceedingly well known to the simplest man and the task of the moral philosopher is to say and to defend what everybody already knows. Kant misconceived this task when he took it to mean that the philosopher must "purify" this principle of any empirical origin. I have argued in the opposite direction, viz., to show as clearly as possible the experiential-affective *base* of any such principle, to show its birth certificate in experience adequately conceived.

This means that we must set aside the wooden and atomistic counterfeit for experience which empiricism offers us. For the texture of experience is complex, rich with meaning, a ripe fruit about to burst. The philosopher is one who stations himself at that critical juncture where this explosion of experience into meaning, of the prereflective into thought, will take place, so that he will be sure to be there. He must be ready, on the spot, and hence able to report everything just as it

happens. This work of reporting the most intimate movements of our prereflective life is precisely what philosophy is.

Hence, when we turn to the prereflective, the affective, we do not turn to chaos and the irrational, but rather to that origin by which any principle is nourished. *Our moral affectivity is already a proto-ethics*. It is already possessed of proto-principles which are there, waiting to become explicit sense and meaning under the hand of reflective thought.

The moral agent is not a being of reason whose inclinations have been subdued, but a being of delicate moral sensibility who is attuned to the right things. Moral philosophy is not a metaphysics of morals which wants to preserve the rational purity of moral principles, but rather a phenomenology of moral sensibility which gives conceptual expression to that proto-ethics which is always and all along at work in affective life.

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Notes

1. I have found Robert Solomon, *The Passions* (Garden City: Doubleday Anchor, 1977) to be especially helpful in formulating the present argument.

2. Kierkegaard's "*Concluding Unscientific Postscript*" (hereafter referred to as CUP), trans. D. Swenson and W. Lowrie (Princeton: University Press, 1941), p. 206.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 208.

4. Because of his Ockhamistic metaphysics, according to which each moment is absolutely contingent, Kierkegaard rejected the Aristotelian notion of a habit (*hexis*). See George Stack, *Kierkegaard's Existential Ethics* (University, Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1977), pp. 133-34.

5. CUP, pp. 347-50.

6. Soren Kierkegaard, *The Concept of Dread*, trans. W. Lowrie (Princeton: University Press, 1957), pp. 16-17, note. Kierkegaard is referring to the disinterestedness of the aesthetic judgment in Kant's *Critique*.

7. *Ibid.*, 446.

8. *Ibid.*, 476.

9. *Ibid.*

10. Soren Kierkegaard, *Repetition*, trans. W. Lowrie (Princeton: University Press, 1946), pp. 3-7.

11. In Ch. 3 above Sebastian Samay uses the term "affectivity" in the same ontological sense in which Heidegger uses the term "Befindlichkeit."

12. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (hereafter referred to as BT), trans. J. MacQuarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 29.

13. The word that Heidegger uses for mood is "*Stimmung*," which means the way we are "tuned," *gestimmt*, to things.

14. Husserl already established this point in *Logical Investigations*, vol. 2, trans. John Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), Inv .V, 15, where he develops the position first put forward by Brentano.

15. CUP, 476.

16. See "What is Metaphysics?" in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. David Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), pp. 91-112.

17. BT, 177.
18. Lewis White Beck, *A Commentary on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), pp. 213-14.
19. Hence the second Critique contained an "incentive" of practical reason whose function was architectonically parallel to the "Transcendental Aesthetic" in the first Critique, namely to provide the element of sensibility in transcendental synthesis. And it was for this reason that Kant proposed what he called the moral feeling of "respect" (Achtung).
20. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason* (hereafter referred to as CPrR), trans. Lewis White Beck, (Library of Liberal Arts; Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956, 77.
21. Martin Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. A. Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 133.
22. CPrR, 75.
23. The moral law . . . completely excludes the influence of self-love from the highest practical principle and forever checks self-conceit, which decrees the subjective conditions of self-love as laws. If anything checks our self-conceit in our own judgment, it humiliates. Therefore the moral law inevitably humbles every man when he compares the sensuous propensity of his nature with the law. Now if the idea of something as the determining ground of the will humiliates us in our self-consciousness, it awakens respect for itself so far as it is positive and the ground of determination. (CPrR, 77)
24. *Ibid.*, pp. 133-7.
25. Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?" p. 106.
26. CPrP, 79.
27. *Ibid.*, 79-80.
28. Cf. BT para. 34, 55-56.
29. Heidegger, *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 137.
30. Immanuel Kant, *Foundation of the Metaphysics of Morals; Text and Critical Essays*, ed. Robert P. Wolff (Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1969), pp. 52-60.
31. BT paras. 25-26.
32. Accordingly, one can ask how critical reflection is possible in such a standpoint. For if reason is bound to explicating a prereflective given, how is it ever possible for it to disengage itself sufficiently to put into question a particular pre-reflective structure in which it may have grown up? The answer to this is provided, I think, by Gadamer's notion of the fusion of horizons, which belongs to the heart of what he calls hermeneutics. In that view, critical reflection is awakened by the collision of my horizon, within which I have been nurtured and whose validity I have always assumed, with the horizon of the other. The collision awakens me to my horizon, which prior to this collision may well have been at work on me without my knowing it, and furthermore puts it into question by exposing its contingency. The ensuing dialogue between diverse horizontal understandings is thus at the same time a process of critical reflection upon the relative merits of each. It is our view that it would always be possible for such a dialogue to reach agreement about the principle of the worth of the person which we have expounded here, given the appropriate conditions of a dialogue. See Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), pp. 258-74.
33. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, II, 3 (1104b10-15); and Plato, *Republic*, 401 E-402A.
34. For more on this question, see my "The Presence of Others: A Phenomenology of the Human Person," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 53 (1979), pp.

45-58; and Emmanuel Levinas, *Totality and Infinity*, trans. A. Lingis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969).

35. Kant, *Foundations*, p. 54.

36. The prereflective is not reducible to the affective, for there is also a cognitive pre-reflective--as when I am buried in the complexities of a mathematical problem without adverting to the fact that now I am doing mathematical work. Whence there is both a cognitive and an affective pre-reflective which it is the task of reflective thought to explicate.

Chapter III
Conscience as Principle of Moral Action
Austin Fagothey

The Revolt in Morals

There is a certain irony in the revolt of the masses¹ against being a mass. It makes sense for an individual to revolt against his submersion as an undistinguishable atom in the global homogeneity of the crowd, against his loss of the feeling of personality and of everything that makes him unique. But when the revolt becomes a mass revolt, the mass does not cease being a mass. It can only become a mass of a different kind, and this is not what they are revolting for.

Yet this is the phenomenon we are seeing these days. It is by no means confined to young people, though it shows itself among them in a more eruptive form. Everyone wants to be different. This should be easy, we might hastily assume, for there is only one way of conforming and the modes of nonconformity are indefinitely variable. But human limitations curtail an existential expression of this theoretical possibility.

Since only a few are gifted with productive originality, people begin to copy others' ways of being different and thereby destroy the differences the positively original people have created. Those who sense this but are insufficiently creative to be original in a constructive way content themselves with eccentricity and exhibitionism. Thus they can at least give some flattery to their ego and can make a passing flash for a week or two, until they sink back again into the undifferentiated mass. The really original ones have to wait until they are winnowed out by history, which alone can pass judgment on the permanent value of their works. But the judgment of history is hard to anticipate. Those most influential in shaping the character of the next age are as often as not the least noisy in their own age.

The revolt in morals seems to be following the general pattern. Morals used to mean customary human behavior and therefore something public. Where customs differed, there was an endeavor to criticize the customs of various groups by reference to some wider norm that would be valid for the whole race of men. Antigone's² famous refusal to obey the law of her uncle, King Creon, was not grounded on an appeal to her own personal judgment of what is right and wrong, but on an appeal to a higher law, the unchangeable ordinances of the gods. Her personal conscience did not make up morality, but merely discovered the discrepancy between what the king commanded and what the gods commanded. But it shows the beginning of a consciousness of a conscience in us, inasmuch as she had to decide which of the two laws to obey. The problem is still with us. There are public norms according to which we may decide moral matters, but in every case the decision must be made by oneself.

The distinction between objective and subjective morality does more than provide us with a glib linguistic answer to many moral difficulties. Like most such distinctions, it can be overdone, but it rests on the inescapable fact that error exists in the world and that some error is unavoidable even in the best of minds. Theoretically, no one ever need make a mistake, since where evidence is unattainable one can and should withhold judgment. But in the practical order decisions must be made, and often they must be made quickly, before the evident truth can be ascertained. As early as men reflected on their acts, they must have said to themselves: "I made a mistake, but I made it in good faith. Others have told me that I was wrong, and now I myself see how wrong I was; but at the time I judged that I was right. Can both judgments be true? They must be, each for

its own time and in its own way." So conscience was born and a distinction between objective and subjective morals.

The Greeks and Medievals

As for so many things, the Greeks gave us the word for conscience. They called it *syneidesis*, from the verb *syneidenai*, to know with.³ It meant the sharing of an awareness with someone else, of being privy to a secret, of "being in the know". But *syneidenai heauto* means being privy to one's own secret and not sharing it with another, a "knowing with" in the sense of knowing oneself and the state of one's mind together with the external object of knowledge. The Greek word and its Latin translation *conscientia* are not necessarily reserved for moral meanings and may signify mere psychological awareness. In English we have split the word into consciousness and conscience, which makes for clarity but leaves us without a common word covering both.

When used in the moral sense, conscience seems originally to have expressed a judgment that we make on ourselves, especially a condemnatory judgment resulting from the awareness of something shameful in our life. It soon came to include excusing judgments also. No matter how our actions may appear before the world, we know what we have actually done, how the act appeared to us when we did choose it, the good or bad motives which prompted us, the amount of self-control we had at the moment, and the judgment we ourselves who are "in the know" cannot help passing on our conduct.

With St. Paul,⁴ though the old meaning is kept, a new application comes in. If we cannot help judging our conduct after the act, why not make the judgment before the act and use it as a directing norm? Conscience thus assumes not only the role of a judge but also that of a legislator. It is a guide to future conduct as well as a judge of past conduct. It not only condemns or approves what we have done, but it also commands or forbids, persuades or permits what we are contemplating doing. Thus we can find some further use for conscience than merely to stand helpless before its inexorable verdict. We can use conscience as a light to guide our steps in the moral life.

It is no wonder that confusion began to appear in the notion of conscience. Past acts are over and done with. Even when we make the most condemnatory judgment against ourselves, all we can do is to acknowledge our guilt and do what we can to repair our mischief. But when we seek the guidance of conscience regarding the future, we do not always find that it speaks with a clear voice. In fact, we ask whose voice it is, and reflection on ourselves shows that it is no voice but our own. What is the point of consulting conscience if it shall say to us whatever we make it say? Can we discover something in conscience that shall speak to us authoritatively and with some assurance of objectivity? How can we make sure that the antecedent judgment of conscience guiding us before the act will correspond with the consequent judgment of conscience we know we shall have to pass on ourselves after the act?

A remark of St. Jerome⁵ introduces this new element. What may be only a copyist's error for *syneidesis* gives us the medieval word *synderesis*, which does not exist in Greek. The closest to it would be *synteresis*, which we can manufacture from *synterein*, a verb meaning to watch carefully. St. Jerome suggests that *synderesis* may be a fourth part of the soul in addition to the three Platonic elements of reason (*nous*), spirit (*thymos*), and desire (*epithymia*).⁶ If so, is he suggesting that we have a special faculty of perceiving right and wrong? Is this *synderesis* another name for conscience, or is it a part of conscience, or is it something else in us which governs conscience? Medieval speculation spent much effort on trying to solve this problem.

It was to be expected that the medievals would approach conscience from the standpoint of deductive logic, the instrument they applied to the solution of all problems involving a passage from the known to the unknown. Conscience is not regarded as a special faculty in man but is merely a name for the practical intellect reasoning on moral matters and arriving at a judgment of what has been done or is to be done in a particular instance. The major premise states the general moral rule, the minor premise subsumes the present case under the rule, and the conclusion asserts whether the act is allowed or not according to the rule. It is quite clear that we do engage in this type of moral reasoning, but it is a very superficial view of conscience. Even the medievals recognized that there is something more to conscience than mere logic. Where does one find the premises? The minor premise, usually factual, is not always beyond dispute. The major premise, announcing the general rule, can often be derived from still more general rules, but there comes the point of the most basic moral principles that have to be accepted on their own recognizance. Where do they come from and how do we know them? This is the function the medievals assigned to *synderesis*, reinterpreting St. Jerome's term so that it came to mean the habit of general moral principles.⁷

There should be no difficulty with the notion of *synderesis* if it means no more than a recognition that people do have moral principles and apply them to particular cases. They may gather these principles from varied sources, from home training, from schoolmates, from the customs of their society, from civil law, from personal insight, from connatural knowledge of every type. That people habitually possess such principles and have a certain ease in applying them is evident. The difficulty concerns the truth of such principles, for a correct as opposed to an erroneous conscience depends, not only on the validity of the reasoning from the principles, but also on the rightness of the principles themselves. And *synderesis* is the habit of right moral principles only.

In the last analysis appeal must be made to self-evidence. But who is to judge what is self-evident and what is not? In matters of fact there is nothing to do but to point to the fact itself staring one in the face. Even in such cases, there may be some few who cannot or will not see it. In matters of morals, and especially when there is question of an abstract moral principle that is not so general as to be tautologous, the number of dissenters is usually larger. We should note here that self-evidence does not mean the ability to convince others, only the ability to see and grasp the evident truth oneself. If the other person cannot see it despite the clearest of explanations, there is no use arguing. Because it is self-evident, it is not possible for it to be proved.

Consequently, the judgment of self-evidence is one's own judgment, where the clearness of the known truth forces the mind to acceptance. Minds are more or less open to the truth, more or less unclouded by prejudice, more or less free from disturbing emotions, more or less quick in grasping relationships. What is self-evident to one may not be so to another. Since not all share the same moral principles, and not all interpret facts in the same way, and not all are equally expert in logical reasoning, not all are going to draw the same conclusions of conscience.

The medievals did not immediately subscribe to the view that each one must follow his own conscience, even if it was different from what others saw as the objective rule of right reason. How could one be obliged to do the wrong? How could moral evil ever be morally mandatory? An early opinion stated that one is obliged to correct the error, which he can always do by acting against his conscience and submitting to authority.⁸ A mitigation of this opinion declared that conscience is our guide in matters that are morally neutral, but not in those which involve the possibility of transgressing God's law, which obviously has precedence over any human judgment, such as conscience is.⁹ But neither of these answers touches the crucial point of the problem: how do I

know what is God's law? We have to wait for St. Thomas,¹⁰ who finally in his later works distinguishes between voluntary and involuntary, vincible and invincible, culpable and inculpable error, and announces that involuntary or invincible or inculpable error always excuses from fault. Even he will not go so far as to say that an act proceeding from an erroneous conscience is good, only that it is not bad. But his later followers completed the logic of the argument.¹¹

The undeveloped conclusion from this contest between objective and subjective morality is that the subjective should be conformed to the objective in every way possible, but in the ultimate show-down between the two, when the person is thoroughly convinced that he is right, the subjective decision of his conscience is paramount.

The medievals did not know it, but they were laying down here the basis of the philosophy of the person. They had inherited from Boethius a definition of person: "an individual substance of a rational nature",¹² which merely classified person as a species under the genus substance. They distinguished the concepts of person and nature in their discussions on the Trinity and Incarnation. But they treated the concept of person in the same detached and impersonal style in which they treated all other concepts. It is always about "person-as-such", but never delves into that hidden core of each person's being which makes him so utterly unique that he is not universalizable and therefore not conceptualizable. To refer to the person as the noblest variety of Aristotelian "first substance",¹³ which can be subject but not predicate, is merely to notice a rule of logic; and to adduce "incommunicability"¹⁴ as the chief property of person is to express uniqueness without in any way saying how that uniqueness is unique. Perhaps it is not possible to go further by these methods.

We should not think it to be incongruous, therefore, to see schools of mysticism¹⁵ flourishing alongside this rationalism. A pale conceptualization of personality is no substitute for vivid personal experience. Though in mysticism one pole of that experience is God, the other pole is the individual personal self. Mystical experience may seek not only what God is like, but also what I should do and how I should live. God may give me a message not only about Him but also about me. The real danger of mysticism comes when this unique human soul becomes convinced that the will of God for him conflicts with the laws of society or of the Church or even with the natural law as expounded by the prevailing philosophers of the period. Then, what is the dictate of conscience? Should Joan of Arc obey her voices or her ecclesiastical examiners? She has to make the choice and thus obeys herself, but which of the two should she choose to follow?

Thus the subjective aspect of moral living had been acquiring prominence until the Reformation theology accentuated the movement.¹⁶ The picture of the human soul standing naked before its God and answerable to Him alone, apart from the mediation of an institutional Church, transferred responsibility from the Church to the individual person himself, who had to act solely in accordance with his own interior light without the assistance of an official interpreter. It took some time for this picture to develop, but it finally did in the evangelical sects.¹⁷ It had enormous influence, even among those who did not accept the Reformation. One did not need to deny the institutional Church or flout its authority to come to the realization that being a member of it did not at all extinguish the human personality that membership in it was supposed to enhance. In no case is the person lost in the mass, but is meant to find therein his supreme fulfillment.

Modern Philosophers

Among philosophers the emphasis on the subjective stems from the founder of modern philosophy, Descartes,¹⁸ with his doubts about the external world and his discovery of himself as

a thinking thing. The ethical tinge in Descartes' philosophy is faint and his discourse on conscience as distinct from consciousness is slight, but he set the stage. The tendency to look within, however disastrous it may be for a realistic epistemology and deleterious in its issuance in an ultra-dualistic psychology, began the period of self-examination and introspection that would culminate in our present preoccupation with such questions as "What am I?" and more significantly "Who am I?"

Looking within seems to be more amenable to an empiricist than to a rationalist approach. Locke's reduction of personality to the identity of consciousness¹⁹ is interesting because of the common root of consciousness and conscience. If personal identity does not consist in the body which is constantly changing its microscopic constituents, it can consist only in the unity of a train of memory of which we are conscious. Should that memory train be split or broken up, what remains of the person? Can he now be guilty of the acts he is no longer conscious of and for which his conscience no longer upbraids him? If his consciousness is somehow restored and his personality reintegrated, does his conscience then also revive? Locke admitted substance,²⁰ but his hold on it is slipping. If, as he suggests,²¹ matter might be able to think, if the matter of the living body is constantly being replaced, if there is no substantial principle such as an Aristotelian form to govern the arrangement of its parts, and if the mind is consciousness, which might be intermittent, then what happens to the continuity of the human person? The difficulty about personality here is metaphysical rather than ethical, but it is hard to see how there can be an ethical personality without a foundation of personality in metaphysics.

Hume's attack on the concept of substance in the sense of a permanent and lasting self reduced whatever meaning there is to self to a bundle of perceptions loosely united by bonds of association.²² So, if I am no more than a series or stream of mental phenomena, as Mill²³ and James²⁴ were later to make of it, then the acts which I call my own assume a proportionately greater importance with the disappearance of any permanent bearer of these acts. Conscience is reduced to an associative link between the thought of an act done or to be done and the emotional feeling of approval or blame. Adam Smith's²⁵ impartial observer is a dramatization of this view.

Nor could Kant's distinction of a phenomenal ego and a noumenal ego solve the problem, since the latter is unattainable by pure reason or speculative knowledge.²⁶ It is his use of practical reason that brought to the fore his emphasis on the human person and had repercussions on the use of conscience.²⁷ It is in the act of free choice that I experience myself as I really am, that I actually find myself exerting the only exercise of myself that I can truly call my own, and that I discover my personality myself in an act, not of intellect, but of will. This insight is of the greatest consequence in the study of the modern development of personality. That Kant saw this appears in his reemphasis on the distinction between person and thing, and his glorification of the person as that which must always be respected as an end and never used as a mere means.²⁸ Kant tries to unite an ethics of law and an ethics of person by having each person be his own legislator in morals, though one may wonder how strong is his law and how real is his person. Conscience speaks to us with the stern voice of duty, allowing no exception against her inexorable demands, which I myself lay on my own person by the categorical imperative. Freedom from external law is obtained only by becoming the legislator as well as the subject. Conscience is consciousness of acting out of the motive of duty. It seems to be peculiarly ineffective in determining what is the content of that duty, though this is usually what we are looking for in our appeal to conscience.

It is in the twentieth century that the subjective has come into its own. Since Freud²⁹ the term conscience has gathered a connotation it may never lose. We are back again in the days of myth when furies and erinys pursue man and submerged dreads rise to haunt us. Man's true self, his ego, is overlaid with a superego of totems and taboos derived from his parents and other influences of

his childhood, serving the good purpose of making him superficially acceptable to the society in which he must live, but also having the bad effect of stifling and dwarfing his true personality. How to make himself the proper combination of conformist and rebel, how to act against the false conscience of the superego when it cramps him and to express the true conscience of the ego when it demands freedom, this is the problem of developing maturity. Freud sees conscience almost wholly in the light of the superego, of those irrational prejudices which his reason is constantly criticizing but which he feels guilty in transgressing. Conscience is therefore not seen as a function of reason, which would be the ego, but as an irrational psychological force we ought to escape from but often cannot. In this view consequent conscience does not usually give us a true judgment of actual guilt for wrongdoing, but rather a disturbing picture of false guilt for we know not what; and antecedent conscience can hardly be a guide for satisfactory living. One gets the impression that for Freud the ethical is quite submerged in the psychological, and that what is worse than living immorally is the inability to tolerate immorality in oneself. In such a view, it is better not to have a conscience. If such an interpretation is unjust to Freud, it seems to be deserved by some who use his methods and in the admittedly inadequate popular understanding of his theory.

The attitude of overcoming conscience rather than being guided by it, the glorification of rebellion against conscience in the name of freedom as the center of personality, is a feature of the existentialist outlook. Nietzsche,³⁰ acknowledged as a forerunner of existentialism, considers conscience as a sort of creative sickness of mankind, a sickness insofar as the ruling classes had to suppress the will-to-power and the aggressive instincts of the masses in order to keep their own place of superiority, and creative insofar as this suppression is only partial, not rooting out these instincts but driving them within where they boil and fester until they erupt in historically creative revolution. Conscience is man's self-condemnation for his natural cruelty and destructiveness and aggressiveness, which are the remains of the animal in him and which he has been taught to believe are bad. In this sense "conscience makes cowards of us all."³¹ Man will never amount to anything if he remains submissive to this voice of the moral conscience and follows the values of the herd. If he is to follow a true conscience, it must be a transmoral conscience. He must become a creative spirit, one who needs conquest, adventure, and danger.³² He must not scruple to throw himself into the fray, to express his zest for life, his joy in freedom, come what may either to himself or others. Thus he passes beyond good and evil. Conscience as we know it is to be suppressed and, if the word conscience is to be used, it must conform to the transvaluation of all values.

There are varied ways of embracing moral evil as an essential ingredient in human life, either by denying as in Nietzsche that it really is evil, or by sanctifying it with theological faith in admitting man's essential sinfulness from which he is redeemed by God's grace. Those who refuse to admit a distinction between subjective and objective morality, and between the direct willing of an evil and the indirect permitting of unavoidable evil consequences as smacking too strongly of scholastic legalism and casuistry, must conclude that we are simply forced to accept moral evil into our lives and learn to live with our own sinfulness. This desperately pessimistic view of man's nature leads to despair; it becomes the source of all the anxieties and dreads bred by our guilty conscience. There would be no remedy, were not the despair overcome by the heroic commitment of my helpless being into the hands of God by the act of faith, by a blind trust in His goodness and mercy, who has willed to overlook the evil I cannot avoid and has extended to me a helping hand out of the morass of iniquity in which I am naturally sunk. Thus human reason has no answer to the mystery of evil, nor has been conscience conceived as a function of reason; the ethical must be transcended by a nonrational act of religious faith.³³

Nontheistic existentialists cannot make an appeal to faith. All they can do in the face of moral evil is to defy it. The most outspoken expression of such defiance is found in the philosophers of the absurd, such as Sartre³⁴ and Camus,³⁵ who find that they can save their self-respect only by the vigorous assertion of their freedom, which consists in saying No to the evils of life, even though they can find nothing to say Yes to, except to their own personal freedom, which consists in saying No.

One of the deepest treatments of conscience in this century has come, as we might expect, from Heidegger.³⁶ He dismisses the ordinary interpretation of conscience, with its distinction into good and bad, as superficial. His own existential interpretation identifies conscience with a call, the call of care, summoning the self away from conventional demands. It speaks to us in silence and what it says is: "guilty!" This is no ordinary guilt for some recognized misdeed, but the guilt of existence itself. It is the recognition of the nothing in the center of our being, our authentic possibilities for being, and the demand on us to realize those possibilities by the authentic use of our freedom. So our attitude must be one of resoluteness in the pursuit of authenticity. Heidegger's use of conscience and guilt has little in common with the traditional use of these terms, as he admits, but what he says opens up vistas for our following discussion.

The Possibilities of Freedom

It can be seen from this inadequate historical review that whereas the trend of philosophy in general and of ethics in particular has been from an objective emphasis in the ancients to a subjective emphasis in the moderns, the concept of conscience has been pursuing an opposite direction. Conscience traditionally meant my own subjective application of general objective laws to my own individual act in my own personal situation. It has become a judgment on the general evilness of mankind, in which we all share even against our will, and toward which we must all adopt some attitude of release or resistance by the supreme use of our freedom. Freedom is indeed a subjective and personal matter, but the modern tendency is to affirm that we have it and to exhort us to use it, without giving any guide as to its proper use in a given case. Perhaps it is intrinsic to freedom that it must be left free to decide on its own exercise, not only without being forced but even without being led. Here we run against a paradox: Freedom without a guide does not know what to do and is therefore not free to do it.

Among the young people today--and others not so young--the view is current that anything I do is good so long as I freely choose to do it.³⁷ I may even have a moral code, but it must be one I myself have freely chosen. To myself I must be true, but what I am I must discover for myself and I am the sole judge of what truth to myself shall mean. My life must be the expression of my personality, the authentic outflowing from the root of my being, not some foreign bud grafted onto me. No one else must try to mold me into what he thinks I ought to be. That might be an authentic expression of himself but not of myself, and I am myself and not he. So laws, rules, regulations, and restrictions should have no place in my life, unless they are ones I myself have made and the fewer of these I have the better. Thus I can "do my own thing". This is no call to solitude. Indeed, it is necessary to live in society and to have consideration for other people. In fact, the social aspect of man's life is as important as the individual aspect, and in some respects more important since I can find fulfillment only in others. But my life with others is not to be structured by the traditional forms of social living embodied in laws and statutes and customs and public institutions, but in that bond which authentically and personally unites me with others, the

bond of love. So, with regard to others I must do the loving thing, and, since I am a partner in the relation of love, doing the loving thing is also doing my own thing.

One senses here the pathetic cry of youthful idealism. The shams and hypocrisies of the social structure are transparent to the most unpracticed eye, revealing the latent hatreds and injustices in all their hideousness. Why should one tolerate them in society any more than one would tolerate them in oneself? Why should I not require that society come up at least to the standard I require of myself? Since it demands that I conform to it, it should embody in itself still higher standards, setting me a pattern of better living. If society, then, fails to meet with my approval, I should use every means to make it more what I think it ought to be or else remove myself from its influence and live my life apart as I see fit.³⁸

Thus there is a contest between private conscience and public conscience, and in the view we have been describing private conscience wins. But what does it have to offer? Sincerity is not enough.³⁹ It is not sufficient to mean well. One must also do well, insofar as that is possible, otherwise one does not even mean well. This doing requires the setting up of objective standards, which can be tested for their own worth independently of the shifting subjective preferences of individuals. "We have no idea of what we want except that it must be different from what we have" is too childish an attitude to be set up as the goal of intelligent and mature persons.

Can we salvage the good in this view, its idealism and sincerity, its freedom and love, its personality and authenticity, while at the same time giving some body to it and making it a usable guide to practical living? Is there an irreconcilable contradiction between the old idea of conscience as the practical application of objective law and the new idea of conscience as the expression of personal freedom? No contradiction, it seems, if we have the correct idea of law and of freedom.

We, as human beings, must first recognize both our commonness and our uniqueness. Whatever be our philosophical solution to the perennial problem of the one and the many, there is no doubt of the experienced fact that human beings form a many, of which each of us is one. The term human nature indicates only those aspects of our being which we have in common and which differentiate us from those beings which are not human. But the kind of nature man has is such that it is a personal nature, so that to be human is also to be a person.⁴⁰ Each member of the human race is a unique, unrepeatable, and irreplaceable unit that we call a self. We exaggerate nature and falsify it if we think that human nature will manifest itself always in exactly the same way and that we can make laws for it with no regard for the uniqueness of the person. We exaggerate person and falsify it, if we think that each person is so unique a center of consciousness that human persons have nothing in common and that no laws can be made for them at all.

The requirements of his nature necessarily restrict the freedom of man. He cannot be anything else but human, and the first lesson he has to learn in life is how to act in such a way as to express his humanity.⁴¹ Any choice of behavior that is destructive or subversive of his nature cannot be authentic, for it is an endeavor to be some other kind of thing than he necessarily is. It matters little whether one wants to call such a perception of the general requirements of human living by the term natural law. If the word law has acquired such a restrictive connotation as always to suggest coercive decrees of external authority, it has no place here. That was not its meaning before self-appointed authorities and interpreters turned genuine legality into formalistic legalism. The words genuineness, sincerity, and authenticity, though usually reserved for the personal aspect of man, apply just as well to his natural aspect, for a man must be as truly a man as he must be authentically the person he is.⁴²

If a person's freedom is restricted by his nature as a human, it is still more restricted by his unique personality. Not only is one unable to be anything else, but a humanly one is also unable

to be any other person than the one they are. Human nature is noted for its plasticity, for the almost infinite possibilities open to it, which are developed in a different way by each one, resulting in the bewilderingly rich variety of human characters the race has produced. But I am not able to produce in myself any of those other characters. All those other possibilities are cut off from me from the beginning by the fact that I am myself and not those others. I can imitate others, but even when I do so, I do it in my own style, which I cannot wholly put off, and if the imitation is more than play it can be seriously damaging to my own distinctiveness.

If my possibilities are curtailed by the fact that I am myself and no one else, how many possibilities remain to me? Even here the number is infinite, for the many versions of myself that might have been but never will be had an equal chance of existing as the one version of myself which I brought into existence by the choices that I actually did make. As there is an infinite number of numbers and an infinite number of fractions between any two numbers, so there are an infinite number of possibly different persons in the human race, and an infinite number of possible histories of this particular person. The actual history of this person resulted from the exercise of his own free choice within the limits set for him by conditions over which he had no control, but the possibilities of choice within those limits are also infinite. It is true that some of those possibilities may make little significant difference, but each possibility realized opens up a whole vista of choices that would not be offered were the first choice other than it was. So one may ask whether the uniqueness of my personality really does restrict my freedom after all. In a way it does, but in another way it opens up before me all that freedom is meant to be for, besides being the actual use of freedom. Each exercise of freedom leaves me unfree to do the alternative I did not choose, but presents me with a new possibility of choice I would not now have unless I chose the way I did.⁴³

The Meeting of Law and Love

We must bring our reflections back to conscience. There is no doubt that our freedom is and should be curtailed by our nature, that certain modes of behavior are worthy of us and that others are unworthy, that our reason is able to perceive these modes, to express them in general form as the norms of human conduct, and to apply them to various situations in which we find ourselves. Conscience testifies to what we have done and conscience passes judgment on the moral worth of these deeds. Conscience remains as our guide, the only one we have, regarding particular actions we are contemplating doing. No amount of discourse on love and openness can eliminate this highly rational use of conscience, which is its traditional meaning, unless we are prepared to forego our intelligence, sink down to the animal level, and lose even the personality which is the ground of our freedom.

Thus conscience commands what ought to be done, forbids what ought not to be done, and permits what may be done. This is as far as law, even moral law, extends. But when it comes to persuading us to follow the better path of two that are both permitted, then law ceases to speak to us. We enter into the realm of love. The man who loves himself, in the true and legitimate sense of self-love, will want to do the best he can for himself. He will want to give his personality its fullest possible expression, so that his life will represent his person as the utmost attainment of the highest moral ideal his mind can conceive. He knows that such perfection is beyond his reach, but he wants as close an approximation to it as he can achieve. Likewise, the man who loves others will do for them all that he possibly can. He wills for them all the good that he desires for himself, and he spends himself in helping them to reach their ideal as fully as he hopes to reach his own. If

he does not do so his conscience will reproach him, not for having done anything wrong or immoral or sinful, but for having been less good than he might have been, for having disappointed his promise, for having turned in a fairly satisfactory but rather mediocre and second-rate performance. If those who hold that evil is inevitable in life mean nothing more than that we must always fall short of utter perfection, we shall have to admit that such evil is inevitable, but it is evil in quite a different sense from the deliberate choosing of what we know to be wrong. This latter evil is avoidable and it is our responsibility to avoid it, whereas the recognition of our shortcomings along the path to perfection is a virtue, the virtue of humility, by which we accept, without excusing them, the weaknesses that are part of our limited being.

Conscience in its function of a rational application of the moral law to a particular case can speak with a clear and distinct voice. It does not always do so, and the problem of solving a doubtful conscience will always remain a part of the business of moral science. Casuistry⁴⁴ cannot be wholly eliminated so long as laws are general and actions are particular, but any rigidly legalistic use of casuistry must be tempered by loving concern for the persons involved, by an understanding of what is the purpose of law, by a correct hierarchy of values, and by a recognition of the fact that law is for man rather than man for the law.

Conscience in its function of urging man forward toward the perfection of love and the highest use of his freedom in the expression of his unique personality can hardly speak with any clearness at all. It shouts no commands, it thunders no accusations, it does not even wave us on with a gesture of permission. All this belongs to its legal aspect. The conscience of love can only hint and beckon. This should not be surprising. If conscience is to suggest what we should do with our freedom, it must leave us free. Therefore the guidance of conscience in any positive use of our freedom is bound to be as indefinite as following the direction of our own echoing voice. Conscience can only say, "You decide". Because in this function conscience is nothing else but you.

The search for the real self beneath all the masks and disguises one can put on is a problem for the psychologist. Self-deception is so common a phenomenon that we must admit that the problem is there. On the other hand, the finding of the true self should not be so difficult as to be practically impossible for a normal person.⁴⁵ To suppose that there always lurks beneath the surface a person that I have never met and that this is the person that I really am, that only the acts that stem from this elusive me are my authentic acts and all others are the deceptive play-acting of a fake character I unconsciously assume, and that since I have never yet met my real self I cannot tell which acts represent the genuine me and which do not: all this is merely to state that authentic living is impossible. It would be as if the painter were trying to find the real picture already on the canvas, which he has only to bring out or express visibly. No, there is no painting on the canvas until the painter puts it there. What shall he paint? That is precisely where he must exercise his own free choice.

Likewise, conscience does not hold up to me a mirror picturing my true self already delineated, so that all I have to do is to make my acts expressive of the picture. Human freedom is such that life is not a mere copy of a foreordained series of acts according to a pattern set for me by something that is not myself, and yet that something is what I must call my true self. No, I set the pattern and, within limits, it is whatever pattern I choose. To pursue the previous analogy, the painter is limited by the size and texture of his canvas, by the quality and variety of his paints, by the extent of his training, and by the character of his genius. Likewise each individual person is limited by the general properties of human nature, by his unique inherited endowments, by the accidental circumstances of his life, and by his own history of personal choices now irrevocably congealed into his past. He can operate only within this framework. But, just as the painter, given

his limitations, freely paints what he chooses both as to subject and manner, so the individual person, given likewise his limitations, freely acts out his life as he chooses and is responsible for what he makes of himself. Conscience as legislative can only point out to him the futility of evil living in the same way that the canons of art point out to the artist the unesthetic results of misusing his materials and prostituting his design. Conscience as a guide to the free use of the open future no more decides what that use shall be than a faithful observance of the canons of art will automatically guarantee the production of a masterpiece. Conscience can say: "I can guide you in arriving where you want to go, but I cannot tell you where to go; that is the decision of the part in you which is free, your own free will, which is simply yourself as free."

Dostoevski⁴⁶ has the Grand Inquisitor describe how frightened man is of his freedom and to what lengths he will go in order to shift off his responsibility onto somebody or something else. Fatalism has always been popular because it is easier to resign oneself to accepting evils that happen to us than to acknowledge evils as the freely chosen offspring of our own willful folly.⁴⁷ Various forms of determinism try to have their cake and eat it too, by denying free will but accepting responsibility, though it is known all along that it is a responsibility for which we are not really responsible, a letting ourselves be called to account and an assumption of seeming guilt for what the theory says we could not help doing.⁴⁸

Religion can also be misused in this manner, if God is conceived as so overwhelming in His omnipotence and so predetermining in His providence that our little wills are wholly absorbed in His and can only futilely struggle against His eternal decrees. Then He becomes the father-figure on whom we can cast all our responsibility. The same result occurs when God is made so kindly and loving and compassionate that He could not possibly hold us to account for the petty peccadillos with which we in our weakness and inevitable folly strew the path of our life. God, it is thought, has too much wisdom to expect much of us and overlooks our vices as we do the trifling awkwardnesses of a child.

But if religion can be thus misused, so can its opposite. We can vigorously assert our freedom of choice and willingly accept full responsibility for what we make of ourselves in life, not throwing it off on any other person or thing; yet, if that responsibility is only to ourselves, we find among us hardened souls who can make a shift toward accepting that responsibility and laughing it off without too serious a qualm. "If I have made a mess of my life, it is after all my life and who is to tell me that I may not mess it up as I please?" Does conscience answer? Yes, and with a sharp blast of reproof. Conscience can never be satisfied with a mess, and we know it. In these instances she speaks up clear and loud, even when not heeded, for here she resumes her legislative and judicial mantle.

In all ethics there is the tension between law and love. Neither can do without the other. Conscience tries to embrace both, but cannot do so in the same way.

Conscience began with law and reason and nature, and became the means by which one could reasonably settle the application of the law of nature to the particular case at hand. This use of conscience is as necessary now as it ever was. The social ills of our day, nuclear war, military intervention, minority rights, race prejudice, ghetto living, slum cities, popular demonstrations, civil disobedience, conflict of interests, the waste of the rich and the hopelessness of the poor, the rights of authority and the rights against authority, the revolt of youth and the education of youth, all these and many more require the formation and use of a right conscience in its legislative and judicial aspects. They cannot be settled by some vague appeal to love, when the love for one group necessarily entails hatred for another, nor by an irresponsible use of freedom which tramples on the freedom of others, nor by a proclamation of the grandeur of the person while ruining the society

in which alone the person can find peace with justice. Here we need rational moral principles rationally examined, proved, and applied, even if we do not find the answer tomorrow.

But conscience does not end here. Supposing limits laid down by the moral law, it does stretch out beyond to love and freedom and person. Within the wide moral possibilities left open to us, it urges us on to the best and fullest use of our unique personality, which we find in the central core of our being and develop by every act of free choice by which we fashion our life. Here there are no rules, for no two personalities are alike and each one's history is his own. Here, for better or for worse, I am the person I have made, and will continue as long as life lasts in the creation of my own self until it achieves as high a fulfillment as I can give it in this world, while leaving it open for greater fulfillment in a world to come.

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Notes

1. José Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1932). The last chapter might have been written today instead of over sixty years ago.
2. Sophocles, *Antigone* lines 450-461. Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, bk. I, ch. 13, 1373b 4.
3. Liddell and Scott, *Greek-English Lexicon*, abridged edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953). Democritus, in H. Diels, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (Berlin: Wiedmannsche, 1960), vol. ii, 68 Demokritos, B fragm. 297. Eric D'Arcy, *Conscience and Its Right to Freedom* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1961), pp. 5-8.
4. St. Paul, Rom. 13:3,5; 1 Cor. 4:4, 8:7-12, 10:25-29.
5. St. Jerome, *Commentarium in Ezechielem*, I, 1, in Migne, PL, vol. 25, col. 22. D'Arcy, *op. cit.*, pp. 16-19.
6. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 79, aa. 12-13.
7. St. Thomas, *ibid.*
8. D'Arcy., *op. cit.*, pp. 78-81.
9. D'Arcy., *op. cit.*, pp. 81-84.
10. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, I-II, q. 6, aa. 1, 8; q. 19, aa. 1-8. D'Arcy, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-120.
11. D'Arcy, *op. cit.*, pp. 120-141.
12. Boethius, *De Duabus Naturis, seu Contra Eutychem et Nestorium*, III (Loeb Classics). St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 29, a. 1.
13. Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 5, 2a 11.
14. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 29, a. 1; more explicitly in III, q. 3, a. 1.
15. Paul Tillich, *Morality and Beyond* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 72-73. Etienne Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1937), pp. 93-95, 104-105.
16. *Erasmus-Luther Discourse on Free Will*, tr. and ed. by Ernest F. Winter, (New York: Frederick Ungar Pub. Co., Inc., 1961). John Calvin, *The Institutes of the Christian Religion*, bk. III, ch. 12. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *Ethics* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1965).
17. Tillich., *op. cit.*, pp. 54-56.
18. René Descartes, *Meditations*, passim.
19. John Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, bk. II, ch. 27, sec. 7-20.
20. Locke, *op. cit.*, bk. II, ch. 23.

21. Locke, *op. cit.*, bk. IV, ch. 3, sec. 6.
22. David Hume, *Treatise on Human Nature*, bk. I, pt. 4, sec. 6.
23. John Stuart Mill, *System of Logic*, bk. I, ch. 3, sec. 8, 14.
24. William James, *Principles of Psychology* (New York: H. Holt & Co., 1890), vol. I, ch. 9-10.
25. Adam Smith, *Theory of Moral Sentiments*, pt. III, ch. 1.
26. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 381-405, B 414-432, A 682-684.
27. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, bk. I, ch. 1, sec. 1-2. *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, sec. 3.
28. Kant, *Critique of Practical Reason*, bk. II, ch. 2, sec. 5; *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, sec. 2.
29. Sigmund Freud, *The Ego and the Id* (London: Standard Edition, vol. XIX, Hogarth Press, 1961). *Civilization and its Discontents* (London: Standard Edition, vol. XIX, Hogarth Press, 1961), sec. 7-8.
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31. William Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, act. III, sc. 1. See also *Richard III*, act. V, sc. 3.
32. Tillich, *op. cit.*, pp. 78-80.
33. Soren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling & Sickness unto Death*, tr. by Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941); *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, tr. by David F. Swanson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941). Dietrich Bonhoeffer, *op. cit.*, pp. 24-26, 66-70, 240-248, 263-276.
34. Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, tr. by Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1953), pt. I, ch. 1; Conclusion II. *Existentialism*, tr. by Bernard Frechtman (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1957).
35. Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, tr. by Justin O'Brien (New York: Random House, 1959); *The Rebel*, tr. by Anthony Bower (New York: Random House, 1956).
36. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. by John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), II, 2, pp. 312-348.
37. From conversations with students. See Ortega y Gasset, *op. cit.* Pertinent from here to the end are: Ignace Lepp, *The Authentic Morality* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1965) and Rollo May, *Man's Search for Himself* (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., Inc., 1953).
38. Louis Monden, *Sin, Liberty and Law* (New York: Sheed & Ward, Inc., 1965), p. 107.
39. The theological teaching on the Incarnation that in Christ there are two natures, human and divine, but only one person, and that divine, does not deny personality in Christ, but only that He is not two persons at once.
40. Abraham Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being* (Princeton: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1962), pp. 157-161.
41. Monden, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-111.
42. This is opposed to the peculiar view of Leibniz, *Discourse on Metaphysics*, sec. 13, that, if the slightest detail of my life were changed, it would be the life of somebody else, not me.
43. Joseph Fletcher, *Situation Ethics* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966) pp. 19, 29, 52-55, 146-150. Even Fletcher needs casuistry, though he wants no law.
44. Lepp, *op. cit.* Maslow, *op. cit.* May, *op. cit.*
45. Feodor Dostoevski, *The Brothers Karamazov*, bk. V, ch. 5.
46. Omar Khayyam, *Rubaiyat* expresses this view with great poetic beauty.

47. Sidney Hook (ed.), *Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science* (New York: New York University Press, 1958).

Chapter IV
Aesthetic Sensitivity as Completion of Ethical Freedom
George F. McLean

Two great campaigns appear to have marked the history of the last century. The first, in the 19th century, can be termed the age of science and industrialization as the new command of man over energy and electricity led to vast expansions of the industrial base and communications. There was hope that this alone would usher in a new and more humane world, but by the first third of this century Hitler and Goebbels had proved that these powers could be used in an opposite sense.

There followed a vast project of liberation from totalitarianism, colonialism, and prejudice of many sorts with a view to recognizing and realizing the freedom of all persons. The last half century might be said to have been marked especially by the march of mankind toward freedom. From the famous "Long March" of Chinese lore in the thirties, to the "march on Washington" by Martin Luther King in the sixties, to the world wide social reforms in the eighties, the aspiration of freedom has electrified hearts, evoked great sacrifices and defined human progress in our age.

Science and democracy have been the watchwords of modern history; now both are well within our reach. But wherever there are two the problem of their unity and harmony becomes central to the realization and value of both. So it is at the present moment that we are in search of an adequate context which will enable both science and human freedom to be realized under the title of democracy in our day. If this can be found it will enable scientific capabilities truly to implement a humane and free life and our democracy to become, not merely a well ordered tyranny of the majority, but a context for personal and social realization.

This suggests that we might helpfully reflect upon life in our century by considering science and freedom and the conditions for their realization. I must leave the direct consideration of Confucian thought to those sufficiently steeped in that tradition to be able to speak to it with the enthusiasm and insight it richly deserves. Rather, the present Chapter will concern key points in the philosophy of Kant in the hope that this will suggest ways in which the Confucian tradition can make a substantive contribution to the conjoint realization of science and democracy in our day.

Descartes' requirements of clarity and distinctness for the human mind pointed modern philosophy toward what is fixed and necessary. Generally was below man, however, human life and relationships transcend neat categorization. Freedom is by definition not necessitated and love as self-giving is essentially unique and spontaneous. If freedom and love are the highest of human realities then the search for what is required for them (and hence manifest by them) promises an especially penetrating exploration into the heart of being itself.

What is of special interest here is not only that after Descartes this search was taken up by Kant, but that in this process Kant came inexorably to an aesthetic context for reality and for thought which is reminiscent of Confucius' notion of harmony. If the two be truly related in this, then an investigation of Kant may be a way of discovering both the central place in the thought of Confucius for modern notions of freedom and the special place of the Confucian culture and its peoples in the modern world.

Further, as Kant's path was through freedom, following his trajectory may enable one of discover a sense in which Confucian harmony is a philosophy of freedom. If so this could be a significant route to the modernization of the Confucian tradition itself.

The paper will do this by (1) surveying philosophical notions of freedom in order to search out the common area of autonomy in contrast to the necessary and universal realm of scientific laws; (2) seeing how the inadequacies of the minimal sense of freedom as choice found in classical British philosophies of the liberal tradition and common in our day point to the principled sense of freedom in Kant; (3) analyzing the structure of Kant's Critiques as it leads the mind to an aesthetic context for realizing conjointly science and freedom; and (4) identifying the corresponding metaphysical Transcendent and its contributions to the sense of life in our day.

Theories of Freedom

Every encyclopedia--especially philosophical ones--must contain a survey of the number of notions of freedom. What is of interest here, however, is not only to list the multiple notions of freedom, but to identify their range and inter-relations in order to arrive at some sense of the essence of freedom. In this there have been a number of basically convergent efforts. One is that of L.-B. Geiger to winnow through the senses of freedom identified in Lalande's *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie* (pp. 542-551). Geiger's study, done as part of a project for the *Dictionnaire des termes fondamentaux de la philosophie et de la pensée politique*, is limited to the seven definitions of Lalande and to their context in French philosophy.¹

Here we shall draw especially upon the survey carried out by of Mortimer J. Adler and the team of The Institute for Philosophical Research, published as *The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical Examination of the Conceptions of Freedom*.² Their corporate examination of the main philosophical writings identified three correlated modes in which freedom has been understood, namely, circumstantial, acquired and natural, and the corresponding modes of self, i.e., "the ability or power of the self in virtue of which freedom is possessed," namely, self-realization, self-perfection and self-determination."³ This yields the following scheme:

<i>Mode of Possession</i>	Mode of Self ⁴
1. Circumstantial	<> 1. Self-realization
2. Acquired	<> 2. Self-perfection
3. Natural	<> 3. Self-determination

To this schema political liberty could be added as a variant of circumstantial self-realization and collective freedom as a variant of acquired self-perfection. The modes of self correspond to the modes of possession, thereby constituting a class; e.g., self-realization (as permitting an individual to act as he wishes for his own good as he sees it) will always relate to circumstantial mode of possession. It is possible, however, that a mode of self might correspond as well to an additional mode of possession. Thus, the circumstantial mode of possession is significant not only for self-realization, but also for self-perfection and self-determination.

Using the above scheme the Institute team categorized as follows the positions on freedom of the main body of philosophers.⁵

This categorization has a number of uses. First it enables one at a glance to identify something of the understanding and concerns regarding freedom of a particular thinker. Second, it enables one to gauge what comparisons between which philosophers might be possible and potentially helpful on a specific issue.

For our purpose of discovering not only the divisions but the nature of freedom this categorization might serve a third purpose, namely, it can provide the material for an initial search

for the common and hence the foundational notion of freedom. This will not be that same as a basic understanding of the ontology or psychology of politics of freedom--that must be the search of the particular theoreticians. However, if an area of convergence in the multiple understandings of freedom can be determined this can orient the attention of our historical and theoretical search toward answering the question: what is freedom?

The team of the institute for Philosophical Research began their dialectical search for the answer to the question what is freedom by dividing theories of freedom among three categories, namely:⁶

(A) *Circumstantial freedom of self-realization*: "To be free is to be able, under favorable circumstances, to act as one wishes for one's own individual good as one sees it";

(B) *Acquired freedom of self-perfection*: "To be free is to be able, through acquired virtue or wisdom, to will or live as one ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human nature"; and

(C) *Natural freedom of self-determination*: "To be free is to be able, by a power inherent in human nature, to change one's own character creatively by deciding for oneself what one shall do or shall become"; to which can be added:

(D) Political liberty; and

(E) Collective freedom.

Note that each of these statements is not a generic statement over and above which the particular theories in the category add specific difference. Rather, they are analogous statements of the common content of the theories in that category. They are sufficiently open to embrace the different instances in the category and yet sufficiently distinct to enable these to be contrasted to the theories in another category. For example, (B) "To be free is to be able, through acquired virtue or wisdom, to will or live as one ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human nature" states a common understanding, which is diversely realized by:

(B¹) Augustine: To be free is to be able, through receiving God's grace, to escape from bondage to sin and to live in accordance with the divine law, expressing the love of God in everything one wills;

(B²) Spinoza: To be free is to be able, through the achievement of adequate knowledge of the eternal necessities, to conquer one's passions and live in accordance with reason or the laws of one's own nature; and

(B³) Freud: To be free is to be able, through acquiring insight, to resolve the conflicts within oneself and live with some approximation to the ideal of healthy or integrated personality.⁷

All of these differ from A and C in that none of those thinkers would say that these are instances of the freedom which they propose, namely, that to be free is: (A) "to be able under favorable circumstances to act as one wishes," or (C) "by a power inherent in human nature to change one's own character creatively by deciding for oneself what one shall do or shall become."

If now we wish to use these three major types of freedom to look, at a still further (X) level of generalization for a single analogous notion of freedom then we could formulate this search in the following manner:⁸

A man who is able

- (A) under favorable circumstances, to act as he wishes for his own individual good as he sees it
- or
- B) through acquired virtue or wisdom, to will or live as he ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human nature
- or
- (C) by a power inherent in human nature, to change his own character creatively by deciding for himself what he shall or shall not become
- is free in the sense that he
- (X)

In carrying out this process of generalization in order to determine what is common to A and C attention to these points will be helpful:

a. *Ability to Act*: the power to act appears in A, B and C. It should be taken as open not only to actuation, but to the possibility of acting or not acting, even if that ability not be exercised or be related to different goals. Thus it is:

A. "the circumstantial ability to perform the movements called for by one's own desires and purposes," i.e., the good as one sees it for oneself,

B. "the acquired ability to will or live as one ought," i.e. for a goal that is set for and attracts all men, and

C. "the natural ability to decide creatively the course of one's life or action" with a view to formative changes in one's own character.⁹

b. *Analogous Concept*: A general notion of freedom must be open to all of these as regards actuation or at least the power to act, the nature of the ability as well as its goal. This openness, however, is not one of limitation achieved by simply omitting the difference; it is rather that of being broad enough to include all of these actually, though not explicitly.

c. *Self and Other*: Note that all these concern the self, whether as "self realization," "self-perfection" or "self-determination," and that all do this with some implied contrast to an "other." In the vast survey of related philosophic literature this contrast to the "other" appears in terms of freedom as arising from within, or from my own will in contrast to something or someone outside of myself, or even to the lower and morally intransigent side of man's nature if it opposes one's freedom. One's decisions and plans are one's own only if made by this present active self, and not merely to and for him.

In addition to an ability to act in a certain way, which is present in all conceptions of freedom, we now see that such ability or power is that whereby the self is exempt from the power of another. Through the exercise of such ability or power, what a man does is his own act. It proceeds from his self, and the result it achieves is a property of his self--the realization of his self, the perfection of his self, the determination or creation of his self. It is not something which happens in him, not something which is imposed on him, not something which is done to him or for him.¹⁰

The self then is the principle or source of freedom, of the acts he performs which manifest freedom. As the person is not free when subject to an alien power rather than to his own, the terms "independence" and "autonomy" are generally synonymous for "freedom" and "liberty." This is

reflected in the treatment of freedom as liberation in ancient as well as contemporary times, of being one's own master (Aquinas, Spinoza) or of autonomy (Kant).

From these three general notions of freedom Adler and his team drew the following most general statement of freedom: "A man is free who has in himself the ability or power whereby he can make what he does his own action and what he achieves his own property."¹¹ This has two implications. First, freedom consists in being the active source of what one does or becomes, not, the passive object of what others do. Thus, what one becomes is the result of one's own making, and what one achieves is proper to oneself, i.e., his own or his property. Conversely, unfreedom consists in either lacking the power to make what one does one's own or being overpowered by another so that what happens to one is the work of another.¹²

Thence arises the following composite statement of freedom in its three modalities (A-C) and in its most general form (X).

A man who is able
(A) under favorable circumstances, to act as he wishes for his own individual good as he sees it
or
B) through acquired virtue or wisdom, to will or live as he ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human nature
or
(C) by a power inherent in human nature, to change his own character creatively by deciding for himself what he shall or shall not become
is free in the sense that he
(X) has in himself the ability or power whereby he can make what he does his own action and what he achieves his property.¹³

What has been done thus far is to follow Adler's team at the Institute for Philosophical Research as it winnowed the breadth of philosophical literature to identify certain basic categories of freedom and then to draw out a general analogous statement of freedom. This has not been a theoretical or deductive procedure but a dialectical one. It looked historically for the various human understandings of freedom and drew from them a sufficiently open description of freedom to include--though not in explicit detail--the positive content of this basic and a shared human project and experience.

Now we shall reverse the field, that is, we shall look into the philosophical basis from which have arisen the various theories of freedom identified in the above process of generalization. Our goal here will be to bring to explicit detail the bases, modes and goals of freedom.

What appears striking is that if one takes not the ways in which some theories overlap and include a number of types of freedom, but the pattern of those which are focused upon only one type of freedom, or if one looks to the highest type of freedom which a theory can take into account then one finds that each of the three types of freedom delineated by the Institute of Philosophical Research corresponds to an epistemology and metaphysics. Circumstantial freedom of self-realization is the only type of freedom recognized by many empirically oriented philosophers; acquired freedom of self-perfection is characteristic of more rational, formalist and essentialist philosophers; natural freedom of self-determination is developed by philosophers who attend also to the existential dimension of being. This suggests that the metaphysical underpinnings of a philosophy control its epistemology and that especially in modern times this controls its

philosophical anthropology and ethics. With this in mind the following review of the three types of freedom will begin from their respective metaphysical and epistemological contexts and in that light proceed to its notion of freedom.

Empirical Choice: Circumstantial Freedom of Self-Realization

At the beginning of the modern stirrings for democracy John Locke perceived a crucial need. If decisions were to be made not by the king but by the people, the basis for these decisions had to be equally available to all. To achieve this Locke proposed that we suppose the mind to be a white paper void of characters and ideas, and then follow the way in which it comes to be furnished. To keep this public he insisted that it be done exclusively via experience, that is, either by sensation or by reflection upon the mind's work on the materials derived from the senses.¹⁴ From this David Hume concluded that all objects of knowledge which are not formal tautologies must be matters of fact. Such "matters of fact" are neither the existence or actuality of a thing nor its essence, but simply the determination of one from a pair of sensible contraries, e.g. white rather than black, sweet rather than sour.¹⁵

The restrictions implicit in this appear starkly in Rudolf Carnap's "Vienna Manifesto" which shrinks the scope of meaningful knowledge and significant discourse to describing "some state of affairs" in terms of empirical "sets of facts." This excludes speech about wholes, God, the unconscious or entelechies; the grounds of meaning as well as all that transcends the immediate content of sense experience are excluded.

As noted by Adler and his team above, the decision in metaphysics concerning the nature of reality and the corresponding decision in epistemology determines our understanding of the nature and meaning of freedom and indeed of human life. The results of the exclusions made by the empiricists are devastating for human life and meaning: there can be no sense of human nature and hence no freedom of self-perfection; there can be no sense of human existence and hence no natural freedom of self-determination.

In empirical terms it is not possible to speak of appropriate or inappropriate goals or even to evaluate choices in relation to self-fulfillment. The only concern is which objects among the sets of contraries I will choose by brute, changeable and even arbitrary will power, and whether circumstances will allow me to carry out that choice. Such choices, of course, may not only differ from, but even contradict the immediate and long range objectives of other persons. This will require compromises and social contracts in the sense of Hobbes; John Rawles will even work out a formal set of such compromises.¹⁶ Throughout it all, however, the basic concern remains the ability to do as one pleases.

This includes two factors. The first is execution by which my will is translated into action. Thus, John Locke sees freedom as "being able to act or not act, according as we shall choose or will";¹⁷ Bertrand Russell sees it as "the absence of external obstacles to the realization of our desires."¹⁸ The second factor is individual self-realization understood simply as the accomplishment of one's good as one sees it. This reflects one's personal idiosyncracies and temperament, which in turn reflect each person's individual character.

In these terms one's goal can be only what appeals to one, with no necessary relation to real goods or to duties which one ought to perform.¹⁹ "Liberty consists in doing what one desires,"²⁰ and the freedom of a society is measured by the latitude it provides for the cultivation of individual patterns of life.²¹ If there is any ethical theory in this it can be only utilitarian, hopefully with enough breadth to recognize other people and their good as well as my own. In

practice, over time this comes to constitute a black-hole of self centered consumption of physical goods in which both nature and the person are consumed; it is the essence of consumerism.

This first level of freedom is reflected in the contemporary sense of "choice" in North America. As a theory this is underwritten by a pervasive series of legal precedents following Justice Brandeis' notion of privacy, which now has come to be recognized as a constitutional right. In the American legal system the meaning of freedom has been reduced to this. It should be noted that this derived from Locke's politically motivated decision (itself an exercise of freedom) not merely to focus upon empirical meaning, but to eliminate from public discourse any other knowledge. Its progressively rigorous implementation which we have but sampled in the references to Hume and Carnap, constitute an ideology in the sense of a selected and restrictive vision which controls minds and reduces freedom to willfulness. In this perspective liberalism is grossly misnamed, and itself calls for a process of liberation and enrichment.

Freedom of Law and Essence; Acquired Freedom of Self-Perfection

Kant provides the basis for another, much richer notion of freedom, which Mortimer Adler in his study of freedom at the Institute for Philosophical Research has called, "acquired freedom of self-perfection." It acknowledges the ability of man to transcend the empirical order and to envisage moral laws and ideals. Here "to be free is to be able, through acquired virtue or wisdom, to will or lives one ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human nature." This direction has been taken by such philosophers as Plotinus, Spinoza and Bradley who understood all in terms of ideal patterns of reason and of nature. For Kant freedom consists not in acting merely as one pleases, but in willing as one ought, whether or not this can be enacted.²² Moral standards are absolute and objective, not relative to individual or group preferences.²³

But then we face the dilemma of freedom. If to be of value it must be ordered, can freedom be truly autonomous and hence free; conversely, if to be free is to be autonomous will it be surely a value: in both cases, can freedom be free? The dilemma is how persons can retain both meaning and value, on the one hand, and autonomy or freedom, on the other. One without the other--meaning without freedom, or freedom without meaning--would be a contradiction. This is the kind of question that takes us to the intimate nature of reality and makes possible new discovery. I would suggest that it may even allow us to appreciate from within the more intuitive insight of Confucius and thereby to engage this in new ways particularly adapted to present times. To see this we must look at the structure of the three critiques which Kant wrote between 1781 and 1790: The Critical Decade.

The Critique of Pure Reason

It is unfortunate that the range of Kant's work has been so little appreciated. Until recently the rationalist impact of Descartes directed almost exclusive attention to the first of Kant's critiques, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which concerned the conditions of possibility of the physical sciences. Its rejection of metaphysics as a science was warmly greeted in empiricist, positivist and, hence materialist circles as a dispensation from any search beyond what was reductively sensible and hence phenomenal in the sense of inherently spatial and/or temporal.

Kant himself, however, quite insisted upon going further. If the terms of the sciences were inherently phenomenal, then his justification of the sciences was precisely to identify and to justify, through metaphysical and transcendental deductions respectively, the sets of categories which

enable the phenomenal world to have intelligibility and scientific meaning. Since sense experience is always limited and partial, the universality and necessity of the laws of science must come from the human mind. Such *a priori* categories belong properly to the subject inasmuch as it is not material.

We are here at the essential turning point for the modern mind where Kant takes a definitive step in identifying the subject as more than a wayfarer in a world encountered as a given to which one can but react. Rather, he shows the subject to be an active force engaged in the creation even of the empirical world in which one lives. The meaning or intelligible order of things is due not only to their creation according to a divine intellect, but also to the work of the human intellect and its categories. If, however, man is to have such a central role in the constitution of his world, then certain elements will be required, and this requirement itself will be their justification.

First there must be an imagination which can bring together the flow of disparate sensations. This plays a reproductive role which consists in the empirical and psychological activity by which it reproduces within the mind the amorphous data received from without according to the forms of space and time. This merely reproductive role is by no means sufficient, however, for since the received data is amorphous, any mere reproduction would lack coherence and generate a chaotic world: "a blind play of representations less even than a dream".²⁴ Hence, the imagination must have also a productive dimension which enables the multiple empirical intuitions to achieve some unity. This is ruled by "the principle of the unity of apperception" (understanding or intellection), namely, "that all appearances without exception, must so enter the mind or be apprehended, that they conform to the unity of apperception."²⁵ This is done according to the abstract categories and concepts of the intellect such as cause, substance and the like which rule the work of the imagination at this level in accord with the principle of the unity of apperception.

Second, this process of association must have some foundation in order that the multiple sensations be related or even relatable one to another, and hence enter into the same unity of apperception. There must be some objective affinity of the multiple found in past experience--an "affinity of appearances"--in order for the reproductive or associative work of the imagination to be possible. However, this unity does not exist as such in past experiences. Rather, the unitive rule or principle of the reproductive activity of the imagination is its reproductive or transcendental work as "a spontaneous faculty not dependent upon empirical laws but rather constitutive of them and hence constitutive of empirical objects."²⁶ That is, though the unity is not in the disparate phenomena, nevertheless they can be brought together by the imagination to form a unity only in certain manners if they are to be informed by the categories of the intellect.

Kant illustrates this by comparing the examples of perceiving a house and of a boat receding down stream.²⁷ The parts of the house can be intuited successively in any order (door-roof-stairs or stairs-door-roof), but my judgment must be of the house as having all of its parts simultaneously. Similarly, the boat is intuited successively as moving down stream. However, though I must judge its actual motion in that order, I could imagine the contrary. Hence the imagination in bringing together the many intuitions goes beyond the simple order of appearances and unifies phenomenal objects in an order to which concepts can be applied. "Objectivity is a product of cognition, not of apprehension,"²⁸ for though we can observe appearances in any sequence, they can be unified and hence thought only in certain orders as ruled by the categories of the mind.

In sum, it is the task of the reproductive imagination to bring together the multiple elements of sense intuition in some unity or order capable of being informed by a concept or category of the intellect with a view to making a judgment. On the part of the subject the imagination here is active, authentically one's own and creative. Ultimately, however, its work is not free, but

necessitated by the categories or concepts as integral to the work of sciences which are characterized by necessity and universality.

How realistic is this talk about freedom; do we really have the choice of which so much is said in the West? On the one hand, we are structured in a set of circumstances which circumscribe, develop and direct our actions. This is the actual experience of people which Marx and Hegel articulate when they note the importance of knowledge of the underlying pattern of necessity and make freedom consist in conforming thereto.

On the other hand, we learn also from our experience that we do have a special responsibility in this world to work with the circumstances of nature, to harness and channel these forces toward greater harmony and human goals. A flood which kills thousands is not an occasion for murdering more, but for mobilizing to protect as many as possible, for determining what flood control projects need to be instituted for the future, and even for learning how to so construct them that they can generate electricity for power and irrigation for crops. All of this is properly the work of the human spirit which emerges therein. Similarly, in facing a trying day, I eat a larger breakfast rather than cut out part of my schedule; rather than ignoring the circumstances and laws of my physical being, I coordinate these and direct them for my human purposes.

This much can be said by pragmatism. But it leaves unclear whether man remains merely an instrument of physical progress and hence whether his powers remain a function of matter. This is where Kant takes a decisive step in his second *Critique*.

The Critique of Practical Reason and The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals

Beyond the set of universal, necessary and ultimately material relations upon which he focuses in his first *Critique*, Kant points out that the fact of human responsibility in the realm of practical reason. If man is responsible then there is about him a distinctive level of reality irreducible to the laws of physical nature. This is the reality of freedom and spirit; it is what characterizes and distinguishes the person. It is here that the bonds of matter are broken, that transcendence is affirmed, and that creativity is founded. Without this nature itself would remain a repetitive machine, peoples would prove incapable of sustaining their burgeoning populations and the dynamic spirit required for modern life would die.

Once one crosses this divide, however, life unfolds a new set of requirements for reality. The definitiveness of human commitments and the unlimitedness required for its free creativity reflect characteristics of being which soar far beyond the limited, fixed and hypothetical relations of the physical order. They reflect rather the characteristics of knowledge and love: infinity, absoluteness and commitment. To understand the personal characteristics experienced in our own life we need to understand ourselves not as functions of matter, but as loving expressions of unlimited wisdom and creative generosity.

Locke had tried too hard to make all public by reducing everything to the physical dimensions and concrete circumstances of human life. Instead, in order to understand the proper place of man in the universe we must read ourselves and our situation from the opposite end, as expressions of conscious life progressively unfolding and refined.

Many materialist philosophies of a reductionist character, such as positivism and the materialistic dialectic, would have been at the level of Kant's first *Critique*. The necessity of the sciences provides control over one's life, while their universality extends this control to others. Once, by means of Kant's categories, the concrete Humean facts have been suffused with a clarity

corresponding to the rationalist's simple natures, the positivist hopes to achieve Descartes' goal of walking with confidence in the world.

For Kant, however, this simply will not do. Clarity which comes at the price of necessity may be acceptable and even desirable for works of nature, but is an appalling way to envisage human life. Hence, in his *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, Kant proceeds to identify that which is distinctive of the moral order. His analysis pushes forcefully beyond utilitarian goals, inner instincts and rational (scientific) relationships--precisely beyond the necessitated order which can be constructed in terms of his first *Critique*. None of these recognizes that which is distinctive of the human person, namely, freedom. For Kant, in order for an act to be moral it must be based upon the will of the person as autonomous, not heteronomous or subject to others or to necessary external laws.

This becomes the basic touchstone of his philosophy; everything he writes thence forward will be adapted thereto, and what had been written before will be recontextualized in this new light. The remainder of his *Foundations* and his second *Critique of Practical Reason* will be composed in terms of freedom; in the following two years he would write a third *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment* in order to provide a context that enables the previous two critiques to be read in a way that protects human freedom.

In the *Foundations* he recasts the whole notion of law or moral rule in terms of freedom. If all must be ruled or under law, and yet in order to be free the moral act must be autonomous, then my maxim must be something which as a moral agent I--and no other--give to myself. This, in turn, has surprising implications, for if the moral order must be universal, then my maxim which I dictate must be fit to be also universal law for all persons.²⁹ On this basis freedom emerges in a clearer light. It is not the self-centered whimsy of the circumstantial freedom of self-realization described above; but neither is it a despotic exercise of the power of the will; finally, it is not the clever self-serving eye of Plato's rogue who can manipulate and cheat others.³⁰ This would degrade that which is the highest reality in all creation. Rather, freedom is power that is wise and caring, open to all and bent upon the realization of "the glorious ideal of a universal realm of ends-in-themselves." It is, in sum, free men living together in righteous harmony.³¹

The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement

Despite its central importance, I will not remain on practical reason because it is rather in the third *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment* that Kant provides the needed context for such harmony,³² and thus approaches the aesthetic sensibility of Confucius in articulating the cosmic significance of freedom. Kant is intent not merely upon uncovering the fact of freedom but upon protecting and promoting it. He faces squarely modern man's most urgent question, how can this newly uncovered freedom survive when confronted with the necessity and universality of the realm of science as understood in the *Critique of Pure Reason*? Will the scientific interpretation of nature restrict freedom to the inner realm of each person's heart, where it is reduced at best to good intentions or to feelings towards others?

When we attempt to act in this world or to reach out to others must all our categories be universal and hence insensitive to that which marks others as unique and personal? Must they be necessary, and hence leave no room for creative freedom, which would be entrapped and then entombed in the human mind? If so then public life can be only impersonal, necessitated, repetitive and stagnant. Must the human spirit be reduced to the sterile content of empirical facts or to the necessitated modes of scientific laws? If so then philosophers cannot escape forcing upon wisdom

a suicidal choice between either being traffic directors in the jungle of unfettered competition or being tragically complicit in setting a predetermined order for the human spirit. Freedom would indeed have been killed; it would pulse no more as the heart of mankind.

Before this Kant's answer is a resounding No! Taking as his basis the reality of freedom--so passionately and often tragically affirmed in our lifetime by Ghandi and Martin Luther King--Kant proceeded to develop his third *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment* as a context within which freedom and scientific necessity could coexist, indeed in which necessity would be the support and instrument of freedom. Recently, this has become the more manifest as human sensibilities have opened to the significance of culture and to awareness that being itself is emergent in time through the human spirit (see chapter I).

To provide for this context Kant found it necessary to distinguish two issues as reflected in the two parts of his third *Critique*. In the "Critique of Teleological Judgment"³³ he acknowledges that nature and all reality must be teleological, for if there is to be room for human freedom in a cosmos in which man can make use of necessary laws, if science is to contribute to the exercise of human freedom, then nature too must be directed toward a transcendent goal and manifest throughout a teleology within which free human purpose can be integrated. In these terms nature, even in its necessary and universal laws, is no longer alien to freedom, but expresses divine freedom and is conciliable with human freedom. The structure of his first *Critique* will not allow Kant to affirm this teleological character as an absolute and self-sufficient metaphysical reality, but he recognizes that we must proceed "as if" all reality is teleological precisely because of the undeniable reality of human freedom in an ordered universe.

If, however, teleology in principle provides the needed space, there remains a second issue of how freedom is exercised, namely, what mediates it to the necessary and universal laws of science? This is the task of his "Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment"³⁴ and it is here that the imagination reemerges to play its key integrating role in human life. From the point of view of the human person, its task is to explain how one can live in freedom with nature for which the first critique had discovered only laws of universality and necessity. How can a free person relate to an order of nature and to structures of society in a way that is neither necessitated nor necessitating?

There is something similar here to the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In both, the work of the imagination in assembling the phenomena is not simply to register, but to produce the objective order. As in the first critique the approach is not from a set of a priori principles which are clear all by themselves and used in order to bind the multiple phenomena into a unity. On the contrary, under the rule of unity the imagination orders and reorders the multiple phenomena until they are ready to be informed by a unifying principle whose appropriateness emerges from the reordering carried out by the productive imagination.

In the first *Critique*, however, the productive work was done in relation to the abstract and universal categories of the intellect and carried out under a law which dictated that phenomena must form a unity. The *Critique of Pure Reason* saw the work of the imagination in assembling the phenomena as not simply registering, but producing the objective order. The approach was not from a priori principles which are clear all by themselves and are used to bind the multiple phenomena into a unity. On the contrary, in the first Critique under the rule of unity the imagination moves to order and reorder the multiple phenomena until they are ready to be informed by a unifying principle on the part of the intellect, the appropriateness of which emerges from the reordering carried out by the reproductive imagination.

However, this reproductive work took place in relation to the abstract and universal categories of the intellect and was carried out under a law of unity which dictated that such phenomena as a

house or a receding boat must form a unity--which they could do only if assembled in a certain order. Hence, although it was a human product, the objective order was universal and necessary and the related sciences were valid both for all things and for all people.³⁵

Here in *The Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment* the imagination has a similar task of constructing the object, but not in a manner necessitated by universal categories or concepts. In contrast, here the imagination in working toward an integrating unity is not confined by the necessitating structures of categories and concepts, but ranges freely over the full sweep of reality in all its dimensions to see whether and wherein relatedness and purposiveness or teleology can emerge and the world and our personal and social life can achieve its meaning and value. Hence, in standing before a work of nature or of art the imagination might focus upon light or form, sound or word, economic or interpersonal relations--or, indeed, upon any combination of these in a natural environment or a society, whether encountered concretely or expressed in symbols.

Throughout all of this the ordering and reordering by the imagination can bring about numberless unities. Unrestricted by any *a priori* categories, it can nevertheless integrate necessary dialectical patterns within its own free and therefore creative production, and scientific universals within its unique concrete harmonies. This is properly creative work. More than merely evaluating all according to a set pattern in one's culture, it chooses the values and orders reality accordingly. This is the very constitution of the culture itself.

It is the productive rather than merely reproductive work of the human person as living in his physical world. Here I use the possessive form advisedly. Without this capacity man would exist in the physical universe as another object, not only subject to its laws but restricted and possessed by them. He would be not a free citizen of the material world, but a mere function or servant. In his third Critique Kant unfolds how man can truly be master of his life in this world, not in an arbitrary and destructive manner, but precisely as creative artists bring being to new realization in ways which make possible new growth in freedom.

In the third critique the productive imagination constructs a true unity by bringing the elements into an authentic harmony. This cannot be identified through reference to a category, because freedom then would be restricted within the laws of necessity of the first critique, but must be recognizable by something free. In order for the realm of human freedom to be extended to the whole of reality this harmony must be able to be appreciated, not purely intellectually in relation to a concept, for then we would be reduced to the universal and necessary as in the first critique, but aesthetically by the pleasure or displeasure of the free response it generates. It is our contemplation or reflection upon this which shows whether a proper and authentic ordering has or has not been achieved. What shows whether a proper and authentic ordering has or has not been achieved is not a concept,³⁶ but the pleasure or displeasure, the elation at the beautiful and sublime or the disgust at the ugly and revolting, which flows from our contemplation or reflection.

One could miss the integrating character of this pleasure or displeasure and its related judgment of taste³⁷ by looking at it ideologically as simply a repetition of past tastes in order to promote stability. Or one might see it reductively as a merely interior and purely private matter at a level of consciousness available only to an elite class and related only to an esoteric band of reality. That would ignore the structure which Kant laid out at length in his first "Introduction" to his third critique³⁸ which he conceived not as merely juxtaposed to the first two critiques of pure and practical reason, but as integrating both in a richer whole.

Developing the level of aesthetic sensitivity enables one to take into account ever greater dimensions of reality and creativity and to imagine responses which are more rich in purpose, more adapted to present circumstances and more creative in promise for the future. This is manifest in a

good leader such as a Churchill or Roosevelt--and supereminently in a Confucius or Christ. Their power to mobilize a people lies especially in their rare ability to assess the overall situation, to express it in a manner which rings true to the great variety of persons, and thereby to evoke appropriate and varied responses from each according to his or her capabilities. The danger is that the example of such genius will be reduced to formulae, become an ideology and exclude innovation. In reality, as personable, free and creative, and understood as the work of the aesthetic judgment, their example is inclusive in content and application as well as in the new responses it continually evokes from others.

When aesthetic experiences are passed on as part of a tradition, they gradually constitute a culture. Some thinkers such as William James and Jürgen Habermas,³⁹ fearing that attending to these free creations of a cultural tradition might distract from the concrete needs of the people, have urged a turn rather to the social sciences for social analysis and critique as a means to identify pragmatic responses. But these point back to the necessary laws of the first *Critique*; in many countries now engaging in reforms such "scientific" laws of history have come to be seen as having stifled creativity and paralyzed the populace.

Kant's third critique points in another direction. Though it integrates scientifically universal and necessary social relations, it does not focus upon them, nor does it focus directly upon the beauty or ugliness of concrete relations, or even directly upon the beauty or ugliness as things in themselves. Its focus is rather upon our contemplation of the integrating images of these which we imaginatively create, that is, our culture as manifesting the many facets of beauty and ugliness, actual and potential. In turn, we evaluate these in terms of the free and integrating response of pleasure or displeasure, enjoyment or revulsion they generate most deeply within our whole person.

Confucius probably would feel very comfortable with this if structured in terms of an appreciation or feeling of harmony. In this way he could see freedom itself at the height of its sensibility, not merely as an instrument of a moral life, but as serving through the imagination as a lens or means for presenting the richness of reality in varied and intensified ways. Freedom, thus understood, is both spectroscopy and kaleidoscope of being. As spectroscopy it unfolds the full range of the possibilities of human freedom so that all can be examined, evaluated and admired. As kaleidoscope it continually works out the endless combinations and patterns of reality so that the beauty of each can be examined, reflected upon and chosen when desired. Freely, purposively and creatively, imagination weaves through reality focusing now upon certain dimensions, now reversing its flow, now making new connections and interrelations. In the process reality manifests not only scientific forms and their potential interrelations, but its power to evoke our free response of love and admiration or of hate and disgust.

In this manner freedom becomes at once the creative source, the manifestation, the evaluation and the arbiter of all that imaginatively we can propose. It is goal, namely to realize life as rational and free in this world; it is creative source for with the imagination it unfolds the endless possibilities for human expression; it is manifestation because it presents these to our consciousness in ways appropriate to our capabilities for knowledge of limited realities and relates these to the circumstances of our life; it is criterion because its response manifests a possible mode of action to be variously desirable or not in terms of a total personal response of pleasure or displeasure, enjoyment or revulsion; and it is arbiter because it provides the basis upon which our freedom chooses to affirm or reject, realize or avoid this way of self-realization. In this way freedom emerges as the dynamic center of our human existence.

There is much in the above which evokes the deep Confucian sense of the harmony and the role of the gentleman in unfolding its implications for daily life. This uncovers new significance in the thought of Confucius for the work of implementing in a mutually fruitful manner science and democracy in our times. Looking to the aesthetic sense of harmony as a context for uniting both ancient capabilities in agriculture with new powers of industrialization and for applying these to the work of freedom is a task, not only for an isolated individual, but for an entire people. Over time a people develops its own specific sensibilities and through the ages forms a tradition and a culture, which is the humane capital for such a project. In this sense one can look to the Confucian cultural heritage for its aesthetic sense of harmony as a way to carry forward the work of freedom in our day.

The Confucian sense of harmony is not a rationalist law whose unfolding would suggest an attempt to read all in an a priori and necessitarian manner. Its sense of life and progress is not that of a scientific view of history after the dialectic of Hegel and Marx. Rather, Confucianism is a way of understanding humans as bringing their life together in relation to other persons and in the concrete circumstances of everyday life. In this sense it is not massively programmatic in the sense of a rationalist scientific theory of history. This may be very much to the good, for it protects against efforts to define and delimit all beforehand after the manner of an ideology.

Further, one must not underestimate the cumulative power which the Confucian sense of harmony and resonance can have when it brings together creatively the many persons with knowledge of their circumstances and in an effort to provide for life in its many modes. This extends from those farmers who know and love their land intimately and are committed to its rich potentialities (and analogously from all phases of productive economic life), to family members and villagers who love their kin and neighbors, to citizens who are willing to work ardently for the welfare of their people and nation. If the exercise of freedom is a concrete and unique expression of the distinctive reality of its authors, then the task is not how to define these by abstractive and personally stifling universal laws, but how to enliven all persons to engage actively in the multiple dimensions of their life.

Philosophically, the Confucian attitude is of no less importance. For if harmony and resonance enable a more adapted and fruitful mode of the realization of being, then the identity and truth, dynamism and goodness of being are thereby manifest and proclaimed. In this light the laws of nature emerge, not as desiccated universals best read technically and negatively as prohibitions, but as rich and unfolding modes of being and actualization best read through an appreciation of the concrete harmony and beauty of their active development. This, rather than the details of etiquette, is the deeper Confucian sense of the gentleman and sage; it can be grasped and exercised only with a corresponding aesthetic, rather than merely pragmatic, sensibility.

Nor is this beyond people's experience. Few can carry out the precise process of conceptualization and definition required for the technical dialectics of Platonic and Aristotelian reasoning. But, all share an overall sensibility to situations as pleasing and attractive or as generating unease or even revulsion. Inevitably, in earlier times the aesthetic Confucian mode lacked in technical precision now available regarding surface characteristics of physical phenomena. But in its sense of harmony it possessed the deep human sensibility and ability to take into account and integrate all aspects of its object. This is essential for the contemporary humanization of our technical capabilities for the physical and social mobilization of our world.

Existential Freedom: Natural Freedom of Self-Determination

Thus far, this paper has looked at three notions of freedom which in their difference can compliment and unfold one another in mankind's modern effort to achieve maturity and play an increasingly responsible role in directing social life in our times.

First, we saw how, in the context of the Enlightenment and in order to make possible universal participation in social life, Locke limited the range of meaning to what was empirically available. This assured one sense of freedom, but limited it to choices between contrary qualities. The effort was well intentioned, but he would seem to have tried too hard and compromised too much in single minded pursuit of freedom of choice. As a result, the very notion of freedom has not been able to sustain itself, but over time has turned gradually into a consumerist black hole.

Second, we saw how Kant in his second Critique opened a new and much needed dimension of freedom based upon our nature or essence as free beings. This was based upon law precisely as I assert for myself (autonomous) a law which is fit for all men (universal). It generates a sense of acquired freedom of self-perfection according to which I am able, through the acquired virtue or wisdom, to will or live as I ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human nature.

The aesthetic sense of Kant and, I believe, at the root of the Confucian insight dramatically enriches the pursuit of this freedom. The aesthetic integrates body and spirit, opens all to high ideals and locates in one's free response to the beauty and harmony of the whole the norm of creative human engagement in reality. Kant's work may suggest ways of rearticulating Confucius' potential for contributing to the modern aspirations for freedom, while the Confucian culture can flesh out with centuries of lived experience the abstract model which Kant could only sketch during the decade in which he wrote his three Critiques. Together they greatly enrich the Enlightenment effort at constructing freedom by raising its goals and locating the exercise of human freedom, not only in terms of the human essence as autonomous, but within our aesthetic response to a sense of beauty and harmony which transcends us and inspires awe and delight.

This is progress indeed, but in his own philosophy Hegel both pointed out in theory and illustrated in practice the potential this opens for a serious undermining of the sense of freedom. For if the required context for freedom is based upon proceeding hypothetically `as if' all is teleological then its very reality is compromised. If its exercise is restricted to the confines the human imagination then freedom becomes not only self-determining but self-constituting. Again we have tried too hard and become trapped within what we can make or do.

We need to go beyond issues of nature and essence. Freedom is not only the articulation of a law, however autonomous and universal this might be (indeed, precisely to the degree that it is autonomous and universal) in the pattern of Kant's second critique, nor at whatever stage of universalization of the sense of justice in the pattern of Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning. Freedom is not merely a nature reflected in moral judgements, it is human life and action. It is to be humanly, that is, to live fully; this is of the order, not of essence, but of existence.

Progress in being human corresponds to the sense of being. Thought moved from forms and structures, essences and ideas in Plato, to act in Aristotle and especially to existence in Christian philosophy (see Chapter IV). This definitively deepened the sense of human life with its triumphs and tragedies and sets the drama we are living in our day. For it calls insistently for a humanization of the application of our technological abilities and indeed of life itself. This must be not simply in terms of essence, that is of a moral law or an ideal befitting human nature. Rather, it must be in terms of existence, that is of deciding for oneself in virtue of the power inherent in human nature

to change one's own character creatively and to determine what one shall do or shall become. This is the most radical freedom, namely, our natural freedom of self-determination.

This then is the real issue, indeed it is the issue of the foundation, nature and extent of reality itself. As the deepest active striving of the human spirit, freedom is of the order of existence, indeed it is the very meaning of human existence. This is the true reality of human freedom; it gives in turn human meaning to the lesser freedoms, namely, to the ability to choose between contraries and to decree universal laws, which are but shadows of the freedom of self-determination.

But if basic freedom is in the existential order, then the transcendent principle it requires must not be merely hypothetical ('as if'), but really existent. If freedom presents us with a limitless range of possibilities, then its principle must be the Infinite and Eternal, the one actual composite Source and Goal of all possibility. The transcendent is the key to real liberation: it frees the human spirit from limitation to the restricted field of one's own slow, halting and even partial creative activity; it grounds one's reality in the Absolute; it certifies one's right to be respected; and it evokes the creative powers of one's heart.

The source of the beauty imaged, progressively revealed and resoundingly reaffirmed by men at their deepest levels of heart and mind must be actual as are the struggles of human life. It must also be infinite as the basis for human freedom and creativity. As such these are ever open to new affirmation, rather than being exhausted, shut, delimited or predetermined. Finally, it must be personal as the principle of life lived in knowledge of truth rather than in falsehood and deception, in love and goodness rather than in hate and evil.

This actual, infinite and personal absolute is what Christians mean by God, and what they go on to unfold in terms of a Trinity of persons as Father, as Word, Logos or Son, and as Holy Spirit. It is what Hindus express so richly in the living terms of existence (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*) and bliss (*ananda*). It is what the Daoists suggest as the Spirit of all spirits and attempt to protect especially through negative terms which are echoed in Christian and Hindu negative philosophy and theology. For precisely as Absolute it must transcend the richest efforts of each people to articulate it, while yet inspiring every person and all peoples in their own histories and cultures. This will be the burden of the fourth chapter.

This takes us far beyond freedom as external choice between objects in our world and beyond internal selection of universal principles for the direction of our action. It is rather self-affirmation in terms of our orientation or teleology to perfection or full realization. It implied seeking when perfection is lacking and enjoying or celebrating it as attained. In this sense, it is that stability in one's orientation to the good which classically has been termed holiness. One might say that it is life as practiced by the saints, but it would be more correct to say that it is because they lived in such a manner that they are called holy.

Thinking in these terms, it would be radically insufficient to reduce one's horizons to the human person in isolation from others, merely self-centered and self-concerned, for then life would be stymied at the confines of but one person. Indeed, such a person would have closed off his or her realization of being, which rather should be open to all of nature and especially to other persons. My concern for perfection should extend to other persons, not only as regards what I determine as my participation in being or even what I determine for them as their participation in being, for such an exercise of freedom on my part would return to me and remain limited within the confines of my being. Instead, by opening to others as free, that is as they uniquely determine themselves, my engagement in being extends definitively beyond myself to their life and realization.

But persons are still limited, whereas my mind and heart are open to being without end. Situated in an existential context the pointer of Kant's third Critique toward an infinite telos takes on further meaning. For it directs us toward the infinite, self-sufficient and properly creative source of our being. Corresponding to that act of infinite freedom by which we live and breath and have our being, we unite with the act of being by which we are made to be, the act of love by which we have first been loved. Human growth in freedom is the process of self-correction and self-perfection to the point at which we are fully opened to that infinite act of freedom from which we come and to which we tend. The achievement of this openness is the state of Hindu and Buddhist enlightenment and of Christian mystical union in the divine. There God loves himself in me: "I live now not I," says St. Paul, "but Christ liveth in me." This indeed is freedom writ large and the reason why such a person must be at the dynamic center of every human effort that is good and constructive. This is the real key to civic virtue. It is a transforming presence in the heart of everyone who suffers injustice, and hence the source of new life for person and society.

However, it is possible for man to fall away from the ideal. Human self-consciousness is not only limited, but can be degraded; it can sink from being creative in sharing of self to a self-centered grasping for being which withholds it from others. In responsible human beings such defective modes reflect not merely their limitations as finite beings, but their refusal to open to others and their choice to close in upon self. In so doing they abuse their freedom, which thus becomes at once not only their glory but their exposure to moral evil and collapse; its redemption will be studied in the fourth chapter.

The struggle to realize freedom and overcome moral collapse is the content of the basic moral norm: do good and avoid evil. Christianity is centered upon this definitive human struggle in which Christ joins mankind, takes evil upon himself on the Cross, and rises victorious to new life. Its sense then is not to deny, but to conquer evil. This is the challenge it extends and the hope it generates.

In the Protestant Christian tradition that sin has corrupted human nature, Hegel would say that truth content regarding the transcendent must first be revealed and then perfected by philosophy. The Catholic-Christian tradition, which sees the effect of sin not as corrupting but as weakening human nature, would consider this insight regarding the transcendent source to be within the proper capabilities of philosophical reason. In either case, however, it is not a matter of abstract theory but of discovering that the foundations of freedom as lived and experienced existentially can be only in a living God who created us out of love. Christianity brings further 'good news', namely that God sent his Son to proclaim through the Resurrection that our freedom cannot be defeated by evil, but is resurgent and in the end will triumph. This is the full truth about mankind seen in relation to the transcendent Lord of Heaven.⁴⁰

To the Enlightenment sense of freedom as choice, awareness of the transcendent Creator adds that life is not only a matter of having, that is, of selecting between which physical realities we will consume, but of being, with its characteristics of self-identity, communication, justice and sharing. Beyond this, awareness of salvation through the Cross adds that even suffering can be redemptive and lead to resurrection in a new birth in freedom.

To the aesthetic awareness of Kant (and Confucius) as described above, awareness of the transcendent as the context of human life adds a sense of human meaning, dignity and rights beyond anything that man can construct. It grounds the intuition of human meaning, dignity and rights. This, in turn, evokes a dynamic and creative response from mankind to the gifts of which its very reality is constituted. Historically as well as philosophically this not only reflects the search of mankind for freedom in our day, but is its source and inspiration as well as its bulwark against

ideological reduction to anything constructed by man, including the community itself. This, indeed, may be one reason for the paradox that while the main Christian Churches today are sending fewer missionaries, Christianity is more sought by peoples engaged in nation building.

Conversely, the Enlightenment and Kantian (and Confucian) aesthetic sense are important for the unfolding of the Christian vision. The Enlightenment has given egalitarian form to the modern sense of freedom and hence to the search for universal participation in social decision making. The aesthetic sense can do much to temper the aggressive excesses of a fallen and hence self-centered sense of personal identity by a broad sense of harmony both with man and with nature. This is needed in our ever more complex and crowded world.

Confucianism as a sense of harmony seems exceptionally suited to providing the space for freedom and creativity in an increasingly technical world, particularly if grounded in an open and unlimited sense of being. If so it can point the way to a life in which freedom is protected by justice and exercised as creative love.

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Notes

1. "De la liberté, les conceptions fondamentales et leur retentissement dans la philosophie pratique," *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, 41 (1957), 601-631. See also Daniel Christoff, *Recherches de la liberté* (Paris: Bibliothèque de philosophie contemporaine, 1975).

2. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1958), 2 vols.

3. Adler, I, 586.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 587.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 592-594.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 606.

7. *Ibid.*, pp. 606-607.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 608.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 609.

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 612-613.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 614.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 615.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 116.

14. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (New York: Dover, 1959), Book, Chap. I, Vol. I, 121-124.

15. David Hume, *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (Chicago: Regnery, 1960).

16. *The Theory of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1971).

17. *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, A.C. Fraser, ed. (New York: Dover, 1959), II, ch. 21, sec 27; vol. I, p. 329.

18. *Skeptical Essays* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1952), p. 169.

19. Mortimer J. Adler, *The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical Examination of the Conceptions of Freedom* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1958), p. 187.

20. J.S. Mill, *On Liberty*, ch. 5, p. 15.

21. Adler, p. 193.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 253.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 257.
24. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), A 112; cf. A 121.
25. *Ibid.*, A 121.
26. Donald W. Crawford, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 87-90.
27. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 192-93.
28. Crawford, pp. 83-84.
29. Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. R.W. Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), Part II, pp. 38-58 [421-441].
30. Plato, *Republic*, 519.
31. *Foundations*, III, p. 82 [463].
32. Cf. Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroads, 1982), Part I, pp. 1-2, pp. 39-73; and W. Crawford, espec. Ch. 4.
33. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. J.H. Bernard (New York: Hafner, 1968), pp.205-339.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-200.
35. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), A112, 121, 192-193. Crawford, pp. 83-84, 87-90.
36. See Kant's development and solution to the autonomy of taste, *Critique of Judgment*, nn. 57-58, pp. 182-192, where he treats the need for a concept; Crawford, pp. 63-66.
37. See the paper of Wilhelm S. Wurzer "On the Art of Moral Imagination" in G. McLean, ed., *Moral Imagination and Character Development* (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992) for an elaboration of the essential notions of the beautiful, the sublime and taste in Kant's aesthetic theory.
38. Immanuel Kant, *First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment*, trans. J. Haden (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).
39. William James, *Pragmatism* (New York: Washington Square, 1963), Ch. I, pp. 3-40. For notes on the critical hermeneutics of J. Habermas see G. McLean, "Cultural Heritage, Social Critique and Future Construction" in *Culture, Human Rights and Peace in Central America*, R. Molina, T. Readdy and G. McLean, eds. (Washington: Council for Research in Values, 1988), Ch. I. Critical distance is an essential element and requires analysis by the social sciences of the historical social structures as a basis for liberation from determination and dependence upon unjust interests. The concrete psycho- and socio-pathology deriving from such dependencies and the corresponding steps toward liberation are the subject of the chapters by J. Loiacono and H. Ferrand de Piazza in *The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas*, G. McLean and O. Pegoraro, eds. (Washington: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1988), Chs. III and IV.
40. Matteo Ricci, *The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven (T'ien-chu Shih-i)*, trans. J. Lancashire and Peter Hu Kuo-chen (St. Louis: The Institute of Jesuit Sources, 1985).

Chapter V

Psychological and Psychosocial Factors in Ethical Commitment

William L. Kelly

Introduction

During recent years it has become more and more appropriate to investigate the inter-relations of distinct disciplines concerned with human behavior and the meaning of man. Inquiry into psychological and psychosocial factors of ethical commitment is an area of concern which involves the relation of ethics to psychology. In our discussion here, we are not concerned with more general considerations of that relation, but have phrased our question concretely. We are more concerned with ethics as that domain of human behavior which is concerned with man's response to what he ought to do, in the light of what he knows is right or wrong. With this broad definition, we wish to excuse ourselves from the more general question of the place of psychology and ethics in the context of the broader question of the science of man.

Erich Fromm in his book, *Man for Himself*, takes the position that psychology and such other disciplines as Economics, Sociology and Anthropology provide the basic factual data on human behavior to which philosophical reflection should be added in order to realize a humanistic ethics. For our discussion, ethical commitment means simply a commitment to what man feels and knows he ought to do or not to do, ought to have done or not have done. Hence, the content of the ethical judgement may have had its origin in a purely humanistic ethics, such as is proposed by Fromm, or it may have its origin in some form of religious belief. The theoretical implications of this more general question, which we are hereby passing over, are of great significance, but are not the object of our study.

It should however be clearly indicated that we agree with Erich Fromm when he states:

My experience as a practicing psychoanalyst has confirmed my conviction that problems of ethics cannot be omitted from the study of personality, either theoretically or therapeutically. The value judgements we make determine our actions, and upon their validity rests our mental health and happiness... Neurosis itself is, in the last analysis, a symptom of moral failure (although 'adjustment' is by no means a symptom of moral achievement).¹

The subject of the science of man is human nature. But this science does not start out with a full and adequate picture of what human nature is; a satisfactory definition of its subject matter is its aim, and its premise. Its method is to observe the reactions of man to various individual and social conditions and from observation of these reactions to make inferences about man's nature.²

As a specific instance of how the psychological study of man may be of assistance to the scholar concerned with the ethics of human behavior, Fromm states:

No less significant for ethics is the psychoanalytic concept of unconscious motivation... The evolution of ethical thought is characterized by the fact that valid judgements concerning human conduct were made in reference to the motivation

underlying the act rather than to the act itself. Hence, the understanding of the unconscious motivation opens up a new dimension for ethical inquiry.³

At this point it may also be well to note that we are excluding distinctions between ethical behavior and morality as made, for example, by Hurlock:

Morality is conformity to the moral code of the social group.... Ethical behavior, which is often confused with moral behavior, is a more inclusive concept. It applies to human conduct generally, rather than to that of any particular cultural group. An ethical person is usually moral, but a moral one may not always be ethical. A moral person may conform to the standards of his particular group, but these standards may not be the accepted standards of the people in other groups.... Immorality is failure to conform to the expectations of the group; it consists of behavior directed against the interests and welfare of the group.⁴

We are not concerned in our present discussion with sociological aspects of morality or immorality as defined by Hurlock in the above passages. Having stated the area of the relation of ethics of psychology in which we are not interested, let us go now to our specific concern.

Our purpose in this paper is to report on the typical experimental research of psychologists and sociologists in the areas of character development and moral behavior. This research, which is unlikely to be in the foreground of the thinking of the philosopher of ethics, may occasion further reflective dialogue between the philosopher of ethics and the psychologist so that each may contribute more to the understanding of man, especially in the area of ethical commitment. The chapter will present, first, three basic and typical theoretical perspectives; second, a typology of character based upon empirical research; third, some studies about the influence on character development; fourth, learning approaches to ethical commitment; fifth, psychopathic deviation; and finally, a few remarks concerning the implications of the psychological findings we have reported.

Three Theoretical Perspectives

The Psychoanalytic Perspective

Clearly the most popular theoretical psychological perspective in child development is that of psychoanalysis. The concern of Freud and his followers with emotional development contributed much, at least as a start, to understanding factors involved in ethical commitment. A good introduction can be had through Freud's articles: "The Interpretation of Dreams" (1900) dealing with conscience and the censor; "Mourning and Melancholia" (1917) dealing with guilt as the experience of tension between the ego and the ego ideal; "The Ego and the Id" (1923) dealing with the question again of identification; "The Dissolution of the Oedipus Complex" (1924) dealing with the question of the transition of instinctive motivational factors to those of a value system related to the father and the environment; "An Outline of Psychoanalysis" (1940) dealing with personality structure.

A very succinct presentation of Freud's position is offered by Roger Brown in his excellent discussion on the acquisition of morality.⁵ Brown presents the essential facts of the classical case which Freud related to "Analysis of a Phobia in a Five-year-old Boy" (1909). Through the concept

of identification Freud attempted to solve the question of the continuity of conscience from generation to generation, that is, how children came to manifest the values of their parents; and how children appropriated biologically sexual identities so that they had the same values, desires and mannerisms as others of their own sex. Obviously we are dealing with Freud's concept of superego.⁶ Let us now consider how he treated questions analogous to ethical commitment in terms of his concepts of identification and of the superego.

Freud closely related the question of the origin of conscience with that of the origin of sexual identity. Both were in great measure learned, in contrast to those theories which held conscience to be 'a small voice' somehow implanted in man by God or nature for the guidance of his conduct. Rather than speak specifically of conscience, Freud speaks in later writings of the superego which, in addition to the ego and the id, is one of the main factors determining the dynamics within the personality. The function of the superego is to act as a censor and hence to cause resistance to temptation, guilt for wrong-doing, shame for inadequacy and a feeling of well-being for virtue or capability. Concerning the source of the superego, Freud wrote in *An Outline of Psychoanalysis*:

The long period of childhood, during which the growing human being lives in dependence upon his parents, leaves behind it a precipitate, which forms within his ego a special agency in which this parental influence is prolonged. The parents' influence actually includes not merely the personalities of the parents themselves, but also the racial, national, and family traditions handed on through them, as well as the demands of the immediate social milieu, which they represent. In the same way an individual's superego in the course of his development takes over contributions from later successors and substitutes of his parents, such as teachers, and marked figures in public life, or high social ideals.⁷

The manner in which the superego arises is determined by the mode of identification, which occurs with the resolution of the Oedipus complex: the superego is the "heir of the Oedipus complex." When the young boy gives up love for his mother he ceases to see his father as a threatening rival and begins to internalize his values. Freud considered the development of superego in girls to be much more obscure, indeed women seem not to have as exacting and objective a superego as men. The development of the superego, which Freud would have us believe is completely learned, is intimately related to sexual identity and would hence seem to be biologically determined. Hence, he may not be as far from a nativistic position as he would like. However, the emphasis on the learned aspect of the superego can be very helpful in understanding the development of conscience and ethical commitment.

In discussing the quality of the superegos of different children, even within the same family, Freud analyzes the intensity or strength of conscience. He remarks that:

The more righteous a man is, the stricter and more suspicious will his conscience be, so that ultimately it is precisely those people who have carried holiness farthest who reproach themselves with the deepest sinfulness.⁸

In the beginning conscience (more correctly, anxiety which later became conscience) was the cause of instinctual renunciation, but later this relation was reversed. Every renunciation then becomes a dynamic font of conscience; every fresh abandonment of gratification increases its severity and intolerance.⁹

Hence, in some people the severity of the superego and the intensity of the guilt is proportionate to the aggression which has been renounced, the energy of which becomes available to the superego. The aggression which one does not express against others is expressed by the superego against the self. Freud would hold the same for externally imposed deprivation and frustration. "As long as things go well with man, his conscience is lenient, and lets the ego do all kinds of things; when some calamity befalls, he holds an inquisition within, discovers his sin, heightens the standards of his conscience, imposes abstinences on himself and punishes himself with penances."¹⁰

Though the superego of a boy is derived from his father, its severity is not necessarily directly proportionate to the severity of the father's treatment of the child. "Experience has shown, however, that the severity which a child's superego develops in no way corresponds to the severity of the treatment it had itself experienced. It seems to be independent of the latter; a child which has been very leniently treated can acquire a very strict conscience."¹¹ Inquiring as to which aspects of the parents it is that become constitutive of the child's superego, Brown makes the following interesting comment: "Not primarily their actions, Freud held, but their standards, in fact their superegos. Standards can be preserved from generation to generation without being very adequately realized in any one's behavior."¹² We shall see how this theoretical point has held up under empirical investigation.

The Cognitive Perspective

The emphasis of Freud and of his followers in studying superego formation centered largely around basic emotional constituents of personality; judged mental and behavioral facets were less emphasized. But in the study of the development of conscience, the cognitive perspective cannot be neglected. The studies of Piaget would be typical of this aspect as expressed in the title of his book, *The Moral Judgement of the Child*.¹³ Piaget told children stories in order to investigate their understanding of moral concepts. Piaget found through his studies what might be called two moralities. The one found in the younger child from four years to about eight years is called heteronomous, that is, subject to another's authority. Hence, for the child at this age what is right and wrong morally is determined by authority and understood as obedience to that authority. Intellectual limitations of the child at this age reinforce this interpretation, so that morality is simply imposed from without and moral values are considered absolute and universal. After eight years of age, there comes another morality called autonomous, that is subject to one's own authority. This morality develops out of the mutual respect that peers show one another, and out of the growth of the intellectual dimension. Moral principles are related to group agreements; moral conceptions are more psychological than objective, more relative than absolute, and subject to change by group agreement. Though the conceptual framework of Piaget's work is not that of psychoanalysis, there do seem to be similar points in connection with the learning of moral principles and the commitment related to them. Perhaps this dimension of "externalized" versus "internalized" morality is the closest similarity that these two systems share. Piaget's two-morality theory has met with varying degrees of empirical support from other researchers. No certain acceptance of the construct can be justified by the empirical evidence presently in hand.

Kohlberg (1963) would stretch out the development of the moral sense from seven years of age to seventeen years in six stages. He sees this development not as a single step from heteronomous to autonomous morality, but rather as a development through complex stages.

Kohlberg found that the child in the last stage, which he studied in seventeen year old youths, judges conduct from his own internal standards, independently of his immediate social environment and from the viewpoint of satisfying his own conscience, that is, to avoid self-condemnation. It would seem that Kohlberg sees the acquisition of morality much like scholars see the acquisition of language by children, where basic structures and elements are present and are articulated with the intellectual and experimental growth of the child.

The Behavioral Perspective

Behavior is a third general area in which morality and ethical commitment have been studied. Psychologists and sociologists not only have been concerned with the internal and external forces which contribute to the acquisition of a sense of morality, but also have asked such questions as whether the emotional character or the moral knowledge of children would be adequate to answer questions concerning the prediction of moral conduct. Scientific research in this area goes back to the work of Hartshorne and May (1928-30), Bandura and Walters (1963), Sears (1960) and a good number of others who have emphasized the aspect of conduct in children's moral behavior. Here it would be worthwhile to consider the theoretical implications of operant conditioning as proposed by Wolpe (1964) and others. A large body of literature on various techniques in operant conditioning therapy and the use of these methods certainly deserve theoretical discussion in terms of the guidance and development of the child's conscience.

The empirical studies which we shall quote in the following section are not methodologically behavioral in the strict sense, but they are concerned with the behavioral aspect of ethical commitment. However, conditioning therapies such as desensitization, operant conditioning, reciprocal inhibition and the like, as reported by such authors as Wolpe (1958), Krasner and Ullmann (1966), and others, which are 'behavioral' in the strict sense, have raised serious questions concerning the manipulation of human behavior and personality. The writings of Eysenck (1966) and of analytically oriented psychiatrists who have opposed him, are germane to our concern for the theoretical aspects of character development guidance. If operant conditioning can be used in the therapy of schizophrenic infants, as shown by the work of Ferster (1966) in the Lynwood project, then such principles may well be of great significance in teaching parents guidelines for the education of the conscience of their children. Possible uses of such psychological principles as operant conditioning, desensitization, reciprocal inhibition and others may be relevant in dealing with the problem of delinquency. However, these matters must be treated elsewhere.

The study of ethical commitment is difficult because of methodological problems ranging from data collection to such philosophical questions as the definition of ethics, moral sense, conscience, guilt, and the like. However, a few studies can give the reader an insight into the ways in which the problem is being approached. Here specific psychological factors which are relevant to the development of the moral sense or the sense of ethical commitment will be mentioned as we move from the general considerations of the first part of this paper to the empirical consideration in the second part.

Empirical Studies

Character Typologies

R.F. Peck and R.J. Havighurst, in their 1964 research on ethical development, produced a typology of moral character which brings into better focus many facets which had been suspected about character and personality development from clinical observation and from piecemeal research. The significance of these types will scarcely escape the scholar concerned with the problem of ethical commitment.

Peck and Havighurst (1964) begin their summary chapter by stating:

There does seem to be such a thing as individual character: a persisting pattern of attitudes and motives which produce a rather predictable kind and quality of moral behavior....The pattern of motives and typical actions each individual shows by age ten, moreover, tends to persist through adolescence....While almost all children learn to exercise some increasing degree of self-control, for example, from ten to sixteen the ones who have relatively best self-control at ten are likely to have the best self-control in their age group at sixteen, in terms of the behavioral norms of the sixteen year olds....Quite apart from the matter of relative standing, it has been found that most individuals tend to maintain the same attitudes and motives through the years, in major aspects of morality....Indeed, in the majority of cases there seems to be very little alteration in basic character structure, regardless of developmental changes in the surface details of behavior.¹⁴

The authors then state that “character” can be regarded as a special aspect of personality, or as a function of certain personality characteristics. They found six aspects of personality to be relevant to character development: moral stability, ego strength, superego strength, spontaneity, friendliness, and hostility-guilt complex. The authors further found that there were five basic character types which emerged out of their analysis of the data. These five types are the “Amoral,” the “Expedient,” the “Conforming,” the “Irrational-Conscientious,” and the “Rational-Altruistic.”

The first character type is called Amoral and is characterized by “extremely low moral stability, ego strength, and superego strength with high hostility-guilt conflict.”¹⁵ This type is composed of individuals who hate life and are described as follows:

They have chaotic perception, extreme, inappropriate emotionally, ineffective superegos, and generally disorganized, internally contradictory, often impulse-ridden personalities. They have neither the internal incentive nor the capacity to conduct themselves in a stably ethical manner....These adolescents with a large amoral component in their characters might be described in neo-analytical terms as heavily fixated at the early ‘oral’ stage of psychological development. They demonstrate a profound lack of what Erickson has called ‘basic trust’ (Erickson, 1950), and also lack the perceptual and judgemental ego powers which are necessary to achieve what both Erickson and Piaget have referred to as psychological autonomy. It is not much use appealing to their ‘reason’, for they are largely incapable of ruling their own behavior according to intelligent reasoning. They are very much at the mercy, too often, of violent hungers, hates, and other passive passions which can overwhelm what ‘good sense’ they may at other times demonstrate. Remedial treatment for such children requires firm outside control and guidance, at the start, as Bettelheim (1950) and Redl (Redl and Winman, 1952) have empirically demonstrated.¹⁶

Startlingly as this description of the amoral character may be for any educationalist, a recognition of such facts is a necessity if proper pedagogic methods are to be instituted at home, in school and in the community.

A second and similar character type was found in their studies of adolescence, namely, the *Expedient*.

The subjects with dominant or near-dominant Expedient motives show low to very low stability, and below average to very weak ego strength. They range from a little above average to very weak in superego-strength, and also in spontaneity. These self-centered 'operators' act by no means just on impulse. On the contrary,...these adolescents show a good deal of strained self-control....The expedient subjects are actively hostile in their underlying attitude toward life, most of them to an extreme degree.¹⁷

The attitude of these subjects is "look out for yourself." The authors state that psychogenically the orientation of this group is not much past the "late oral" stage. They describe them as "self-centeredly" preoccupied with "getting."

At the same time, they show a chronic sense of frustration; they can never get enough or not enough to make them view the world as a trustworthy, rewarding place. They have developed sufficient ego-identity and enough realism to recognize the need to go along with society's rules, when they have to. But they have not internalized these rules very much; not to the point where any of them could be said to have strong moral convictions or principles....The subjects at this level show a narcissistic child-like orientation toward life that years of experience through childhood and adolescence have not appreciably altered.¹⁸

The third of the five character types is specified as the Conforming group. This group definitely has moral stability,

which is produced much more by habituated superego dictates than by reasoned use of ego powers. Indeed, the subjects tend to have below average ego strength. They show a built-in, restrictive inner control, however, which keeps them firmly in line with conventions of their world....How they feel personally, influences their behavior much less than what they believe others expect of them and, indeed, what they rather blindly expect of themselves, in terms of the social rules they have unquestioningly incorporated. Even at seventeen, these are 'good children' of the unthinkingly submissive kind, little more developed in their psychological autonomy or use of reason than in middle childhood. They have mastered and passed the developmental tasks of 'anal' stage except, perhaps for their undeveloped autonomy, but they have not met and resolved the issues of 'genital' stage. They may consciously rebel sometimes, at direct dictation by adults; but they need to seek and be surrounded by a familiar world that reinforces their belief in the rightness of the authoritative 'answers' that have been trained into them without their own participating thought.¹⁹

The conservative conformer is well known to those who make efforts to initiate social change. It is perhaps because such conservatism is not simply a superficial state of mind or habitual attitude, but something built deep into the core of personality, that it is considered by these theoretical psychologists as a dimension of character and not prone to change.

The fourth character type found by the authors is called the Irrational-Conscientious. This group differs only in degree from the conformers. The authors assert that this group has relatively undeveloped ego powers, but they have even more powerful dominant superegos. "They are covertly hostile, but too restrained to allow themselves to show it in any way that would violate the moral conventions they have learned to observe."²⁰

The fifth and last character type, the Rational-Altruistic group, shows the highest degree of moral stability, but neither by virtue of unreasoned imitation as in Freudian theory nor by learned habituation. They have developed ego powers by which they

probe and solve ethical problems and show the greatest degree of moral stability. Often their reasoning is not made conscious nor is it always verbalized; but that does not necessarily decrease the quality of their judgement. They have moderate to strong superego principles. These are not compartmentalized from their reasoning, however, and they do not blindly dictate stereotyped behavior. These principles of conscience are held open to examination and redirection, to suit changing circumstances.²¹

This fifth group is noted for its friendliness of outlook, lack of hostility and a good degree of spontaneity. Compared to all adolescent groups which were studied, this is the only one that is still growing psychologically; the others seem to be fixed at immature levels of development.

When we reflect that we are dealing here with more or less permanent structures of personality and principles which determine the conduct and behavior of the individual, it is not difficult to assume that certain character types. The authors actually do report four qualitatively different kinds of conscience. One is most primitive, least effectual and consists simply of a collection of crude prohibitions; it is externally inconsistent and hence difficult to follow. Such a conscience is found in the amoral and expedient types.

A second type of conscience is basically concerned with conformity, and manifests a strong dependence on the opinions of people about them. As has been said of this type of person in clinical settings, their superego is such that it is "incorporated from outside authority figures, but without severing the 'umbilical cord'."²² There is a personal conviction about the belief in the rules, but this is still in the service of the good opinion of others.

The third type of conscience has a:

[a] firmly organized body of internalized moral rules, which maintain their own autonomy. They are not much affected by what other people say; but neither do they permit themselves to be questioned or tested by rational inquiry. Together, they form the tyrannical neurotic superego first described by Freud. This kind of conscience is largely walled-off from influence by ego functions.²³

The fourth kind of conscience is found in Rational-Altruistic subjects:

It is a firm set of internalized moral principles which are accessible to rational questioning and testing. Such a conscience is not a compartmentalized fragment of the personality. On the contrary it tends to interact rather freely both with the ego functions and the impulse life.²⁴

The capacity-to-love is differentiated according to these various character types. For example, Amoral and Expedient subjects feel that they are unloved and seem to be incapable of unselfish affection for others: other people serve strictly as sources of gratification, but are not trusted. Conformers, however, feel loved and give love to others. They do not seem to have a high capacity for perceiving what other individuals really want or need. Being the conventional type of person who depends on social approval, they may set up unrealistic goals in terms of what they expect in the other of satisfaction. The Irrational-Conscientious subjects feel unloved and are covertly hostile toward others. They seem to lack real warmth and are more devoted to the 'letter of the law' than to its spirit. The Rational-Altruistic type is "the only one that combines ethical desire with ethical intelligence, and thus insures that real love will be effectively expressed."²⁵

However, in pointing out that a great many selfish, primitive 'id' impulses remain active in all of us throughout life, Freud and some of his followers either minimized or overlooked the fact that in people whose psychological development is healthy, there is also a maturing of at least some part of the impulse life into desires which are inherently socialized and ethical by nature....In short, the id grows up, too, in the healthy person....This kind of development occurs little, if any, among predominately amoral and expedient groups. It seems to be a minor rather infrequent feature of the development of the conforming and Irrational-Conscientious groups. Even among those who came closer to the standard of rational altruism, many powerful selfish impulses exist alternately, or side by side, with the socialized impulses....This kind of maturation, indeed, would seem to provide the only solid, trustworthy foundation for dependably ethical dominant superego, neither of which is as effective or desirable a way to maintain morality....This phenomena does not occur in any noteworthy degree in the development of severely psychopathic, neurotic, or psychotic people.²⁶

These findings raise important concerns regarding moral guidance and realistic expectancies in the areas of ethical commitment, for they contradict in some respects the pedagogical principles which are employed in many instances in the family, school and community. Indeed, they are unlikely to receive a substantial hearing, because the preconditioning of those who would be asked to listen in a sense perpetuates itself so that they reject the very theoretical possibility of changing methods which might produce more of the rational-altruistic character types. The authors do imply, as do other researchers, that personalities with severe moral impairment are not hopeless, but require long, patient and devoted treatment in the hands of skilled professional personnel. Hence, we are not suggesting that a moral determinism is the conclusion of these studies, but that hope for improvement in moral maturity, character development and ethical commitment lies in the earliest educative efforts of the parents with the neonate. The longer one waits to apply suitable psychological pedagogy in guiding children, so much the more difficult or even impossible become remedial efforts.

Erich Fromm in his book, *Man for Himself*, discusses what he understands by personality. Some of the typologies in his psychoanalytically oriented discussion show similarities to the types which we have just indicated from the study of Peck and Havighurst. Basically there are two character types in Fromm's analysis, the productive and the non-productive, the latter of which is of four types: the Receptive, the Exploitive, the Hoarding, the Marketing.

1. The Receptive type finds "the source of all good" to be outside himself; the only way he can receive anything he wants is to receive it from without. Hence, his orientation in questions such as love, material welfare, or achievement would be simply to receive it from without—to have it given to him. Such a person would be quite apt to "fall for" anyone who would satisfy him/her. This type is also fond of food and drink, and by strong reliance on these, attempts to overcome anxiety and depression.

2. The Exploitive type, like the receptive type, also sees the source of good as outside, and not as gifts, but as things to be taken by force or cunning: "Stolen Fruits are Sweetest."²⁷ Fromm continues:

Because they want to use and exploit people, they 'love' those who, explicitly or implicitly, are promising objects of exploitation, and get 'fed up' with persons whom they have squeezed out. An extreme example is the kleptomaniac, who enjoys things only if he can steal them, although he has the money to buy them.²⁸

3. The Hoarding type has qualities of miserliness, is closed to change, finds security in saving and feels spending a threat, attempts to build a protecting wall by storing up possessions. He/she relates interpersonally by possessing the beloved, and is concerned compulsively about having things in order. Social interaction is summed up in the phrase: "Mine is mine, and yours is yours."²⁹

4. The Marketing type are those who have experienced themselves as a commodity and see themselves in terms of exchange value.

In contrast, Fromm sees the productive character as one which is primarily concerned with care, responsibility, respect, and knowledge. These qualities will be found in relations with things and with people. In discussing the three types of interpersonal relatedness, Fromm speaks of the symbiotic, withdrawal-destructiveness, and love relations. It is not our purpose here to present these traits in detail but to suggest that whether one starts from the psychoanalytical orientation (Fromm) or from that of empirical personality research (Peck and Havighurst), there are similarities, which are essential to ethical commitment, and must necessarily be recognized in planning any guidance relating to the development of character in youth.

Let us turn now from research concerning character to some of the empirical studies about influences on character development in the area of family, peer relationships, and community.

Influences on Character Development

The influences on character development are myriad and extremely complex. One of the most complex is the family whose influence Peck and Havighurst describe as follows:

Character, as defined in this study, appears to be predominantly shaped by the intimate, emotionally powerful relationship between child and parents within the family....Four aspects of family interaction were assessed: Mutual trust and approval, consistency of family life, democratic control, and severity of parental punishment....There were highly significant relationships between family experience and the adolescent's personality. Ego strength and moral stability prove to be closely associated with (probably produced by) mutual trust and consistency. Friendliness was most closely related to familial trust and democracy. the hostility-guilt complex, conversely, was associated with severity of discipline, a lack of trust and a lack of democracy....The amoral adolescent had familial relationships that were chaotically inconsistent, and so lacking in mutual trust or affection as to deserve to be called actively rejecting...Most of the expedient subjects were reared with a good deal of lenient, indiscriminate freedom by parents who tended to approve of them, but in an unthinking and inconsistent way....The most representative conformers came from consistent autocratic families where punishment was severe....The irrational-conscientious subjects all came from very severe families which otherwise differed somewhat....Indeed, it seems reasonable to say that, to an almost startling degree, each child learns to feel and act, psychologically and morally, as just the kind of person his father and mother have been in their relationship with him....It appears that disorganized parents breed a disorganized child with weak ego functions. Hostile, rejecting parents create a child who is hostile and rejecting of others. Undisciplined, uncaring parents create a child who has little incentive to internalize an effective conscience, and who has very poor models to learn any organized moral principles....The only kind of adolescent who shows a capacity for mature love for others, affectively expressed, is the child of parents who show him maturely unselfish love in a kindly yet reasoned, predictably consistent way....The general conclusion seems inescapable, that a child's character is the direct product, almost a direct production of the way his parents treat him. As they are to him, so he is to all others.³⁰

There have been sufficient studies to indicate that the development of the child's moral sense is influenced by peer relations according to the laws of group dynamics. These influences are secondary to the family, but where the family influence is weak peer relations may significantly fill the vacuum. Such influences are most active as long as the child is within the group but, unless they have led to delinquency, are less strong once the child has moved into other circumstances.

Influences from the community come from such sources as the school, religious instruction, recreational activities and community life. These can be positive for the development of the moral sense provided the family environment has been suitable. The socio-economic environment is also a significant factor in the development of the moral sense. Studies such as Hartshorne's (1928-1930) indicate that children from a higher economic group become more honest, and more consistently honest, with age; children from the underprivileged group become more deceptive, and more consistently deceptive, with age.

Studies on the effect of religious instruction as reported by Hurlock (1964) indicate that:

Religious instruction helps to internalize controls of the child's conduct. Children who have wholesome religious experiences without too much emphasis on

punishment after death, have moral values and standards of behavior more in keeping with those approved by the social group than children whose religious instruction has been more limited or of an unwholesome type....Delinquents on the other hand have generally been found to have a limited religious education with excessive emphasis on punishment after death.³¹

Regarding child raising techniques, Seers, Maccoby and Levin (1957) found that those children had a higher conscience whose mother used love and acceptance in disciplining them, rather than material or physical means. The importance of “mothering” as studied in Harlow’s (1958) experiments with infant monkeys lends support to these findings.

Studies of other researchers have indicated that the role of the mother is the most important factor in the earliest months and years of life for character development—more profound and direct than that of the father. We have already indicated that mature parental love and rational discipline are both essential for the development of good character. Guilt arising out of punishment in the question of character formation seems also related to the type of character and strength of conscience that results in the child. MacKinnon (1938) found that people with strong consciences were more disciplined in a psychological than in a physical way. In general, research has shown that warmth as the rule, combined with the withdrawal of love for wrong doing, seems to create a viable and healthy conscience. Sear’s (1957) study shows that the more severe the punishment, the more aggression the child showed. In their studies on delinquency, Gleuck and Gleuck (1950) found that one of the major factors associated with delinquency in adolescents was severe physical punishment. Further, Bandura and Walters (1963) found that aggressive boys experience less guilt than do normal boys, and their parents use physical punishment in contrast to the parents of normal boys who favor psychological sanctions. As findings by Bandura, Ross and Ross (1938) show that children very readily imitate the aggressive actions of others, parents who punish can be expected to have aggressive children.

Learning Approaches to Ethical Commitment

One of the serious concerns of the psychological and psychosocial factors of ethical commitments is the question of how one may guide the development of the child’s moral sense, and how one may introduce remedial methods in cases of delinquency or psychopathic personalities. *De facto*, four methods are generally employed.

1. The first is the cognitive method which is more concerned with the concepts, judgements, rules, principles and critical factors pertinent to the acquisition of a sense of morality. Here emphasis rests upon the noetic, while the essential emotional factor is absent.

2. The second method of learning is instrumental, or operant conditioning, in which behavior is shaped by selective reinforcement. When the child performs something which is in accordance with the norms of good character and good moral sense, that behavior is rewarded, reinforced, and supported. When the behavior is not in accord, a withdrawal of loving attention by the parents is in order. This method seems to have very much to recommend it, provided that the aspects of moral knowledge and moral thought are not isolated from the behavioral patterns of the child. That is to say, there is need for a process of internalizing what is being rewarded, rather than simply an external pattern of habituated actions.

3. The third learning method is imitation or learning by identification, in which the child injects the values and norms of behavior belonging to those of its hero object of identification. This certainly is necessary for internalization, since emotional factors of a personal nature must be related to the development and growth of the moral sense. However, where the learning of the moral sense is simply emotional, should the object of identity (hero) ever be rejected, one would run the risk of losing also the moral values injected. Moreover, with identity diffusion in the child, as his heroes change from phase to phase, a passivity may be evoked at the cost of the expected internalization of a moral sense or the development of a Rational-Altruistic type of character.

4. The fourth type of learning would be the classical or respondent type of conditioning, which is fairly automatic. This is the type of moral conditioning which grows out of a simple punishment-reward system, particularly where physical punishment and little rewarding warmth and love were present, along with an inconsistent pattern of parental behavior. This method is least desirable and seems from the research reported to have completely failed as a method of learning to acquire a moral sense. Nevertheless, it seems it is the one most readily used by immature and non-understanding parents and teachers. This method, whether in the family, in the school, or in the church, seems in the studies available to be consistently the least effective or most harmful to the acquisition of a moral sense.

Need for Integrative Theory

Given the thousands of articles and books that the sources we have cited represent, it is clear to anyone familiar with the diversity and multiplicity of the literature on developmental theory and its relation to moral development and commitment, that an integrative theory is needed which can pull together the many contributions to theory and empirical research on the topic of moral commitment. A theory which will orient the reader, educator and parent to the many sources and guidelines of moral development has been sorely needed in the fairly new discipline of developmental psychology and integrative (with respect to other disciplines) ethics.

Fortunately such an effort has recently been published by Richard T. Knowles in his article "The Acting Person as Moral Agent: Erikson as the Starting Point for an Integrated Psychological Theory of Moral Development" in *Psychological Foundation of Moral Education and Character Development*.³²

Knowles asserts his interest in a theory of moral "action" rather than of moral "thought." He thus states that "...The most fundamental level of the paradigm is the person in interaction with the world and/or others. This interaction may be called an encounter, an involvement or a dialogue and the social aspect of moral life can be located here" (p. 243).

By making "person" the foundation of his theory, Knowles can then use three aspects of this paradigm to order much of the research on moral development, namely: the bodily, the cognitive and the self aspects essential to an adequate theory of moral development.

As a starting point for the paradigm, Knowles chooses Erikson's theory of development, which with modifications lends itself to "integrating the bodily, the cognitive and the social aspects of life in a developmental scheme of moral virtue" (p. 243). Thus while accepting the psychoanalytic insights of Erikson, Knowles develops his paradigm in a broader perspective, so as to stress moral actions as an expression of the self. Thus he offers an excellent alternative "to the more specialized psychological models which either exclude the freedom of the moral agent or reduce the agent to one aspect of his/her moral life" (p. 272).

Ordering the Research on Moral Development

As Knowles has presented the framework, the architecture for the integration of research on moral development, Margaret Gorman in her article "Life-Long Development" (in the same volume edited by Knowles and McLean noted above) has filled in the details of the most significant research in psychology on moral development.

She has divided the process into seven periods of the person's life from early childhood to late adulthood and presents seven charts which summarize the many concepts which are relevant to the phase under consideration. She follows the paradigm of Knowles by ordering the findings of research into the vital/bodily, cognitive-affective ego, and self aspects of the personal, moral development. The charts show three columns which express the developmental nature of the process under the headings "where they are," "where they can go," and "what adults do." Such a compilation of the research on moral development is a mammoth service to parents, educators, counselors and any others interested in understanding moral development. The bibliography to this article has over eighty-five entries selectively representing the most significant scholarship in psychology on moral development. Gorman has also done a significant service to fellow researchers, teachers and other scholars who are often overwhelmed by the vast literature in this field.

Psychopathy

Before going on to the last part of this paper, it might be appropriate to discuss briefly the case of the psychopath who manifests the amoral or expedient character-types. The term "psychopathy" is one which is frequently used in psychodiagnostic terminology to indicate some form of character or behavior disorder. Specific to this type of person is the undevelopment of conscience. Such individuals are without guilt or remorse, have no ethical code or righteousness, have a blunted capacity for love, are incapable of sustaining a long term goal, are impulsive, and suffer basically from "moral insanity." Contrary to what people may think about this type of person, they do not lack a knowledge of what is right or wrong. In general their behavior is not like that of a neurotic or psychotic; but is usually considered normal. At times the psychopath may even be gracious and show elegance in his/her behavior. But they can steal, kill and rape without the slightest remorse when they do desire.

Studies such as those of McCord and McCord (1956) have sought to determine the nature of this personality deviation. The general consensus seems to be that the psychopath is such because he was severely rejected by his parents, and in many cases even beaten brutally. In this type of character development, as in others, it is difficult to say what is cause and what is effect in parental interaction with children during the time of character development. Many studies and many efforts have been made in the past two decades to remedy the delinquency problem. Efforts such as those made at the Wilwyck School in New York in which principles of friendship, permissiveness, understanding and definition of boundaries of behavior were used have had a certain degree of success. However, the psychopathic, amoral and expedient character types still persist as the most difficult psychotherapeutic problems both individually and socially.

The psychopath/sociopath has been a known character type for a long time. What makes this type of more interest in the considerations of ethics today, are the findings of more recent studies, particularly those of the seventies.

Cloninger³³ reports on the studies done in Denmark on alcoholism and criminality, and “because of the overlap between such criminals and sociopaths,” the results seem relevant to the origins of psychopathy.

These results, while not denying the environmental influences, point “almost certainly” to genetic factors. Representative of these studies are those of D.W. Goodwin.³⁴

Cloninger states: “The findings for antisocial personality are much the same as for schizophrenia and alcoholism” (p. 100). When scholars of ethics review these studies, they will see perhaps the need to add to the considerations of diminished responsibility (as has long been the case with mental retardation) the effects of heredity in the antisocial (psychopathic) personality. “...the children of criminal or sociopathic parents show a relatively high incidence of the trait even when raised from infancy by normal adoptive parents” (*ibid.*).

The statistics which have come out of the Danish and Goodwin studies, are shocking. When neither biologic or adoptive fathers are criminal, the adopted son is criminal 10% of the time; when the adoptive father only is criminal, the son is 11% of the time; when the biological father only is criminal, the adopted son is 21% of the time and when the biological and adoptive father is criminal, the adopted son is criminal 36% of the time. This implies that the “ethics” of the father can be inherited.³⁵

Further findings introduce the element of gender. Male sociopaths outnumber females by seven to one and female sociopaths tend to have more sociopathic relatives than do male sociopaths.

Samples in the study of psychopathy have been cited to ask the question of how ethics related to the problem of such unusual character distortion, one which usually occurs by the fifteenth year in four percent of the population and which is usually resistant to any form of therapy. What kind of ethic does one construct for this population where all the cognitive factors are present but moral formation is absent. One of the important clues that the psychopathic/sociopathic conditions points to is the role of emotion in character development. Difficulty in interpersonal relationships that begin no later than early adolescence and generally an “unusually early, aggressive, sexual and promiscuous behavior with ongoing conflict with the law, educators and the community” bespeak an emotional privation that must be profoundly researched in the study of the foundations of moral commitment. In some areas, research and scholarship have conspicuously noted the relevance of emotional development to moral development. We shall note this long due trend in the final remarks of this chapter.³⁶

Psychopathology and Moral Commitment

It has long been a part of traditional ethics that the “use of reason” was a prerequisite for morally responsible behavior and moral commitment. Hence, those deprived of this faculty as in the case of the retarded person, one overtaken by blind passion, or in general the psychotic (severely mentally disturbed) person were viewed as not responsible or not fully responsible for her/his behavior at least to the extent that the behavior is influenced by the mentally deficient condition. The issue of moral responsibility and legal responsibility fills many pages of research in the history of ethics, psychology and the law.

Psychopathology or deviation from “the normal condition” of mental and emotional functioning has become more and more, since the days of Freud, an area of specialization in psychology and psychiatry. Consequently, new and deepening insight into the human condition and human behavior has developed and with it a new area for the scholar of ethics who is concerned

with an ethic of moral action rather than an ethic of moral thought as suggested in the model proposed by Knowles.

Early studies of psychopathology were largely the work of Professors like Eugon Beluler in Zurich, or Emil Kraepelin in Munich, or R. von Kraft-Ebing in Vienna who studied psychotic patients suffering from schizophrenia, depression and similar psychotic disorders in the hospitals.

Their students, like Freud and Jung largely thought not exclusively, focused on the neurotic condition. Conversion reactions, phobias, lesser depressions, hypochondria and other conditions were studied mostly in terms of the unconscious mental conflicts which manifested themselves in these conditions/symptoms.

The notion of the unconscious has dominated large segments of mental health experts and it has been ignored by large segments of mental health experts. But the clinical and research efforts in such divergent fields as psychoanalysis, parapsychology, hypnosis and dream study, to name a few, give such credence to the notion of a dynamic, functional unconscious that is beyond question. The unconscious is not only of concern to mental health specialists but also to the scholar of ethics.

The notion of neurosis forced therapists and later researchers to grapple with subtle irrational forces, sometimes known but usually not--at least to the individual with the neurosis--which influenced the behavior of the patient in some handicapping way. The handicap might be mental like an obsession or phobia or it might be somatic like an ulcer, but the cause could not be found in obvious, sensible, rational facts known to the patient or to the therapist.

After rational efforts so often proved useless in the search for a cause of the disorder, psychoanalysis of some kind often found the underlying, unconscious cause, and constructs such as the Oedipal Complex and others were found to organize these findings. Since the days of Freud, there have been many developments to explain influences on the unconscious which in not-so-obvious ways effect the way in which personality develops and interacts with people in the world about it.

Many of these constructs are treated in social learning theories such as teaching, modeling, punishing, identifying, etc. (cf. Musser and Leone in Knowles and McLean, note 32 above, p. 153f). Though Freud had pointed out in different writings the reality of projecting roles, it has not been till more recent times that the effect of projecting, say, the image of one's father or mother onto one's spouse can lead and has led to disaster in marital relations. When the expectations of one's spouse are in reality those fulfilled by one's parent and these expectations unconsciously influence or determine the course of the marriage, chances are that dissatisfaction, disappointment and marital disaster are often the result. The many issues related to self-image and image of others underlie the problems which arise in living around the pseudovirtuous notion of "perfect" in the unrealistic sense of childlike expectations which have little or no place in the adult world.

Here again the notion of unconscious has effects which generally are not understood and which indeed effect the interactional patterns of individuals and thus are relevant to one's code of ethics.

One of the more recent areas of mental disorder that has increased in research is that of Childhood Psychopathology. The findings of research in this area are what one would expect, particularly in the relations of parents and family to the psychopathological child. Deviant parents tend to have deviant children.³⁷ Delinquent and antisocial children tend to have rejecting, power-assertive, punishing parents.³⁸ There have been many studies of acting-out-behavior and anxiety-withdrawal in children of conflicted or divorced parents.³⁹ Along with conduct disorders, anxiety and withdrawal reactions, there is a wide range of psychopathology in children ranging from schizophrenia, autism, depression, phobia and in general the mental disorders to which adults are

prone, now being studied. These studies may be of significance in understanding the factors which contribute to normal or abnormal moral development in children.

Concluding Questions

When we ask ourselves what is the meaning and significance of these beginnings of empirical understanding of the factors which contribute to the development of character it would seem that some of the following points may provoke further inquiry. Peck and Havighurst comment on their findings as a contribution to the scientific basis of ethics.

This present state in which most of us find ourselves is itself the chief obstacle to be overcome. The problem of achieving ethical rationality is this: the aligning and harmonizing of violently powerful emotional forces is a necessary precondition for rational thought. This harmonizing can only be accomplished through the intrinsically non-rational (not antirational) means of harmonious experience with other people who have great emotional importance for one's self....The intellect can be used to select and arrange such an experience, but the crux of the interaction is an emotional experience which has little to do with rational thought. Thus we come to the paradox which points to a solution: not either intellect or emotion, but intellect and emotion are essential components of rationality. As a corollary, non-rational symbols and action systems, such as are a nexial part of most religions, may be essential to all of us, if we are to experience the sensations and emotions that represent and embody the ethical interaction. A rational theory of ethics would therefore have to provide for these kinds of non-rational experiences, while at the same time provide for regular, rational examination of the course and the moral consequences of one's actions. Perhaps this is one of the reasons why ethics and religion have always been intertwined. This is decidedly not a recommendation for a surrender to irrational experience. It may point, however, to the serious dangers inherent in an arid intellectualism which is sterilized of affective experience; if we do not provide, indeed urge, participation in interactional experiences which provide expression and fulfillment for these non-rational aspects of our natures, they can build up growing tension and frustration until they explosively erupt and overwhelm our reason.⁴⁰

The findings of these and other authors quoted throughout this paper, as well as those of many others in recent years, suggest a continued examination of the relation between psychology and ethics. Moreover, it is strongly suggested that the tendency to separate religion with its symbolic and emotional components of belief, from ethics with its proneness to rationalism and intellectualism, be closely evaluated.

It would seem also that running through all empirical studies is a strong recommendation concerning the relation of psychological findings to the pedagogical aspects of character development. Instruction in character guidance for parents seems essential. That courses in such matters are developing not only in the university, but even in the high schools, seems a good sign.

The motivational systems of law enforcement, of mass education, of mob and mass movements, of opinion-influence and the like should be assessed not simply in terms of

sociological parameters, but also in terms of the actual developmental factors of the individual outlined in this paper.

Basically, ethical commitment seems to be in relation to oneself, the other, the family, society, the nation or the world. Recent events evoke comment about the need of love for man, which is not simply 'an altruistic' type of schematic, empty love, but a love which is built on genuine commitment of the self to other humans simply because they are human.

Problems which besiege leaders in society today raise serious questions of prejudice and its modification. This is a basic issue regarding the character of people as adults and the development of character in youths. To what extent can one go; what measures can one undertake in modeling within the public domain the character and prejudices of the members of a given country, or society? To what extent can any group in society, government, or politics employ information-control and social, economic and political power in the pursuit of national goals? The relevance of ethics in these questions is inescapable.

At the heart of character-development and the guidance necessary thereto is the essential role that feelings and emotions play in human development and particularly in the development of character and personality. Such theories in personality as that of Felix Krueger (1918-1940), and Albert Weellek (1966) have indicated this. Emotions and their relevance to such things as symbolism and the role of symbolism in specifying and activating human behavior have been little researched in American psychology. The monumental work of Arnold (1960) was an excellent start in the systematic study of emotion, but because of the difficulty of quantification in this most important area of human existence it has not been a popular subject for direct psychological investigation.

Two significant exceptions to the lack of research and scholarship concerning the relevance of emotions to morality and moral commitment are the following volumes. In *Philosophical Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development, Act and Agent*⁴¹ philosophical arguments are offered for the promotion of the role that affectivity and subjectivity must play in an adequate theory of morality.

The second volume is that referred to above and edited by Knowles and McLean (fn. 32) in which authors Brabeck and Gorman present a chapter on "Emotions and Morality" (p. 91 ff.). They, too, note how few attempts are found in the psychological literature about efforts to study the linkage of emotions with morality.

The authors begin the chapter appealing to recent works by Rest⁴² who argues that emotions must be an essential component in psychological theory of morality. Averill⁴³ is quoted very aptly: "The hallmark of a well socialized child is not only that his behavior conforms to the appropriate rules; even more important is that his feelings also conform." That says it clearly.

Brabeck and Gorman then basically review the psychological literature and integrate their findings on the emotions of 1. Anxiety and fear; 2. Shame and guilt; 3.. anger; 4. Love and empathy, and how these emotions "viewed as the interaction of physiological arousal and cognitive appraisal of a situation affect morality" (p. 95). The authors present various perspectives of the different leading theories. There are over one hundred and sixty entries in the bibliography selected from the best in psychological literature on emotions a great service to a scholar of ethics who would acquainted himself with the psychological literature relevant to emotions and morality.

The need to study human emotion in terms of ethical commitment is becoming more obvious in relation to questions of social reform, urban renewal, education of the underprivileged and undeveloped. It is the conviction of some that if these problems and the broader ones regarding the family are not resolved, corrosive forces will rapidly erode our society. the need of

communication and identity are basic to the complex development of character. For young citizens to be dedicated to the ideas of a country in its growth and change requires at the same time, in the family, a dedication anchored in emotional commitment, as well as in an intellectual assent to the ideals and moral goals of that society. When emotional commitment, along with the reasoned understanding of this commitment, is void in massive areas of the population, one can expect not only deterioration in individual morals, but a situation ripe for upheaval, chaos, and genocide. The reason for repetitive cycles of war in our own history may be that the principles outlined here have been given only lip-service. We hope that we are coming to a gradual understanding of the universal force that emotion, reason and genuine love must play in the life of man seen individually as a member of a family, as a citizen of society, as a patriot of the nation, or as a fellow pilgrim in this world.

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Notes

1. Erich Fromm, *Man for Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics* (New York: Fawcett Publishing Co., 1947), p. 8.
2. Fromm, *op.cit.*, p. 23.
3. Fromm, *op.cit.*, p. 33.
4. Elizabeth Hurlock, *Child Development* (New York: McGraw Publishing Co., 1964), p. 543.
5. Roger Brown, *Social Psychology* (New York: Free Press, 1965).
6. A fine discussion of the differences between conscience and the superego may be found in the report of a workshop held at Catholic University and published in 1963. Raymond Steimel, *Adolescence, Special Cases and Special Problems*.
7. Sigmund Freud, *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* (New York: Norton Publishing Co., 1949), p. 17.
8. Sigmund Freud, *Civilization and its Discontents* (London: Norton Publishing Co., 1949), p. 114.
9. *Ibid.*
10. Freud, *op.cit.*, p. 110.
11. Freud, *op.cit.*, p. 117.
12. Brown, *op.cit.*, p. 377.
13. J. Piaget, *The Moral Judgement of the Child* (New York: Free Press, 1948).
14. R. Peck and R. Havighurst, *et.al.*, *The Psychology of Character Development* (New York: Wiley, 1960), p. 165.
15. Peck, et al, *op.cit.*, p. 167.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 168.
17. *Ibid.*
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*, p. 169.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *Ibid.*
22. *Ibid.*, p. 170.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 171.
24. *Ibid.*

25. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 173-74.
27. Fromm, *op.cit.*, p. 67.
28. *Ibid.*
29. Fromm, *op.cit.*, p. 67.
30. Peck, et al., *op.cit.*, pp. 175-76.
31. Hurlock, *op.cit.*, p. 556.
32. R.T. Knowles and G.F. McLean, *Psychological Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development* (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992).
33. C.R. Cloninger, "The Antisocial Personality," *Hospital Practice* (1978), p. 92ff.
34. D.W. Goodwin, "Alcoholism and Heredity," *Archives of General Psychiatry*, 36 (1979), 57-61.
35. D.W. Goodwin, F. Schulsinger, L. Hermansen, S.B. Guze, and G. Winokur, "Alcohol Problems in Adoptees Raised Apart from Alcoholic Parents," *Archives of General Psychiatry*, 28 (1973), 238-243.
36. *Ibid.*, 31 (1974), 164-169.
37. M. Rutter, *Children of Sick Parents: An Environmental and Psychiatric Study* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966).
38. G.R. Paterson, *Coercive Family Process* (Eugene, Or.: Castalia Publishing, 1982).
39. J. Guidubaldi, J.D. Perry and H.K. Cleminshaw, "The Legacy of Parental Divorce," *School Psychology Review* (1983).
40. Peck, et al., *op.cit.*, p. 202.
41. F.E. Ellrod and G.F. McLean, *Philosophical Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development, Act and Agent* (Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992).
42. J. Rest, "Morality," in J. Flavell and E. Markham, eds., *Cognitive Development*, in P.H. Mussen, gen. ed., *Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychology* (New York: Wiley, 1983).
43. J.R. Averill, *Anger and Aggression: An Essay on Emotion* (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1982), p. 355.

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Chapter VI

Process Thought in Ethics

Eulalio R. Baltazar

Introduction

This chapter will try to show how process thinking may provide a basis for ethical insight. Most, if not all, ethical theories are dependent on the philosophical pattern of thought employed. Thus, metaphysical thinking which employs the categories of substance and accident, act and potency, matter and form, etc., as in Aristotle and Aquinas, leads to an objectivist and absolutistic theory of ethics. An empirical mode of thinking as in the utilitarian theory of Bentham and Mills leads to relativism and subjectivism and so does the existentialist pattern of Sartre. Each of these patterns of thinking gives ethical insight by emphasizing some aspect of moral experience which other conceptual models may fail to do. The justification for the processive pattern of thinking is its conformity with our modern view of reality as evolving.

Process thought is not a homogeneous system of thought, any more than is scholasticism or empiricism. But one may safely characterize process thought in contrast to other philosophical modes of thought as based on the assumption or insight, if you will, that reality is dynamic and open-ended and, further, that there is more at the end of a process than at the beginning. In other words, growth or evolution is an essential characteristic of process thinking. Since there is no one process philosophy, my approach to process thought is largely influenced by Teilhard de Chardin.

In this study we will apply the process mode of thinking to the question of the nature and function of moral action and to the problem of relativity of morals and change in values.

The Natural Law Ethics of Aquinas

As the Metaphysics so the Ethics

We will begin our study by a consideration of the metaphysical approach as exemplified in the natural law ethics of Aquinas.¹

Western thought in its rationalistic, as opposed to its mystical tradition followed the static world-view of Parmenides, Plato and Aristotle. This is not to imply that the static world-view denied the fact of change but that change and becoming were relativized and absorbed within the principal and all-embracing category of being. For Aristotle, science was a study and classification of "natures" or essences, hence of the immutable and the universal (*Scientia est de universalibus*) with the result that concern for phenomena was merely peripheral to the principal pursuit of arriving at immutable and universal truth. Paralleling the Aristotelian conception of species as eternal in contrast to which individuals or "particulars" of a species were mutable, was the classic conception of metaphysics in which the category of substance was central while the nine accidental categories of being were considered peripheral. This static view of biology and philosophy could best be represented by the cosmological view of Ptolemy in which the earth was the stationary center around which revolved the planets.

In the Middle Ages, the medieval theologians appropriated Aristotelian metaphysics, which had already integrated the sciences and added theology in order to obtain a harmonious and coherent view of the universe. This view may properly be described as Ptolemaic, for in it the

truths of the Faith were labelled the "substance of the Faith" (*substantia Fidei*) and consequently occupied a central location in the map of knowledge, while at the outer edges were the contingent and particular truths of the empirical sciences.

In accord with this static metaphysics of being, a static character also pervaded ethics. The dictum, "as the metaphysics, so the ethics," may be seen to be the case by looking at the ethics of Thomas Aquinas in the *Summa*. To quote the pertinent passage from Aquinas:

That which first falls under apprehension is being, the understanding of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Therefore the first indemonstrable principle is that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time, which is based on the notion of being and not-being: and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in *Metaphysics* iv. Now as being is the first thing that falls under the apprehension absolutely, so good is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action (since every agent acts for an end, which has the nature of good). Consequently, the first principle in the practical reason is one founded on the nature of the good, namely, that good is that which all things seek after. Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this; so that all things which the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good belongs to the precepts of the natural law under the form of things to be done or avoided.²

Being which serves as the foundation for the good is human nature. The metaphysical approach to human nature is by theoretical reason seeing that at the center of human nature is the immutable and fixed essence (matter and form) and at the periphery are the nine accidents. Similarly, in ethics, practical reason sees at the center corresponding to the essence, the absolute and fixed first moral principle of the natural law: good is to be done and evil avoided. Next come the common general principle or moral axioms, then reasoned conclusions and, lastly, at the outermost periphery are the particular applications of the first moral principle. We can verify this Ptolemaic character of medieval ethics from the following passage of the *Summa*:

There belongs to the natural law, first, certain most common precepts that are known to all; and secondly, certain secondary and more particular precepts, which are, as it were, conclusions following closely from first principles. As to the common principles, the natural law, in its universal meaning, cannot in any way be blotted out from men's hearts. But it is blotted out in the case of a particular action, in so far as reason is hindered from applying the common principles to the particular action because of concupiscence or some other passion.³

The ethicist's task corresponded with the classical scientist's task. Thus, just as the latter tried to discover the physical laws of nature imprinted in things, so the ethicist tried to discover the natural moral law imprinted in the nature of man by the Creator. Just as the essences were fixed, so the natural law was fixed and absolute. As a result, ethics assumed a static and authoritarian character and became legalistic.

Explaining Change and Relativity Within Natural Law

The explanation of change of values within metaphysical ethics follows the explanation of change in metaphysics. In metaphysics, there are two types of change, namely, substantial and accidental. Substantial change is a change in substantial form as would happen when wood is burned and turns to ashes. Here, prime matter receives a new substantial form, 'ashness.' Accidental change is a change in the accidental properties of a given thing, while its substance (matter and form) remains intact. Now, how does this metaphysical theory of change apply to natural law?

Natural law is founded on human nature, therefore, natural law is "as absolute and as relative as human nature".⁴ Human nature, according to scholastic philosophy, is composed of matter and form, that is, animality and rationality, respectively. Barring substantial change as in death, variability in human nature can only be accidental. As one Thomist ethicist puts it, "man's essence is unchangeable, but some properties flowing from his essence are adjustable to circumstances and capable of growth in the course of history."⁵ In line with this view of change in human nature is a corresponding change in natural law: "While the core of the natural law has absolute moral necessity, there are peripheral areas that have a conditional moral necessity."⁶ As Thomas Aquinas notes, while there is necessity with common principles, "the more we descend toward the particular, the more frequently we encounter defects" and these defects are explained as a matter of deficient knowledge, not a change in the law itself, where the reasoned conclusions and particular applications of the natural law are "not equally known to all".⁷ Fagothey elucidates this passage of Aquinas by observing that "since society itself, though natural, develops its institutions gradually, some conclusions of the natural law will not have application until a certain degree of cultural sophistication has been reached."⁸ Thus, in a primitive society the natural law may permit to savages some forms of seizure and violence that could be only brutality or revenge in a civilized man.⁹

It would seem then that relativity in morals is explained by metaphysical ethicists as due to deficient knowledge of the natural law. Yet, is it not patronizing to consider some societies primitive by using one's own society's value as standard for interpreting the contents of natural law? And are there not intelligent ethicists not only today but in the past who doubt not only the contents of the natural law but even its existence?

It was not only the difficulty of explaining relativity in morals that served to eclipse the natural law tradition but other reasons noted by Bernice Hamilton:

The change of emphasis to individual conscience after the Reformation (prepared by the fourteenth and fifteenth century nominalists' stress on the uniqueness of every person), and the verbal confusion between natural law and natural rights--now becoming the more important of the two--all served to weaken the natural law tradition. In the seventeenth century, Locke's attack on innate ideas, and in the eighteenth century, Hume's criticism of the confusion between is and ought, served to undermine the age-old notion of law 'written in men's hearts' or minds, and confirm doubts about the natural law's validity as a law in any modern sense of the word. In the twentieth century we have had the further flight from metaphysics which has proved a second Occam's razor.¹⁰

We believe that the concept of natural law can be revived as a better alternative to the shallow and parochial modern ethical theories. But we need to give up tired arguments that have been used to support it such as the accusation of bad faith on those who are not convinced by it. The root of the problem, in my view, is the metaphysical underpinning that is no longer adequate and effective. One need not be metaphysical to accept the natural law concept.

We will now look at human nature and natural law in the light of process thought.

Reconstruction of Natural Law

Teilhard de Chardin's Evolutionary World-View

Let us briefly sketch Teilhard de Chardin's evolutionary world-view, for it is within this ontological frame of reference that our reconstruction of the natural law concept is to be done.

In contrast to the Platonic and medieval view of a static cosmos, Teilhard's view is of a universe that is born and continues to grow to its fullness. Instead of fixed and finished species so that the ones that exist today are the same ones that existed since the beginning, we have the evolutionary view of species that at one time did not exist but have emerged from lower forms.

The processive view sees reality as an unfolding rather than as one fully given at the beginning. Scientifically, we can see three major stages of this unfolding: the evolution of matter (cosmogogenesis), the evolution of life (biogenesis), and the evolution of culture or mind (noogenesis). This third stage is not seen by some biologists as a new and separate stage. Culture is seen merely as an epi phenomenon of biological evolution. Accordingly, moral values that appear within culture are understood by sociobiologists, like E.O. Wilson, in terms of biological categories. But as T. Dobzhansky has observed: "Culture is not inherited through genes, it is acquired by learning from other human beings . . . In a sense, human genes have surrendered their primacy in human evolution to an entirely new, nonbiological or superorganic agent, culture."¹¹

Teilhard sees the evolution of culture or of mind as a new stage of transformation. Instead of biological transformation: the development of the nervous system and of bigger and bigger brains, we now have primarily psychical transformation.¹² Let us consider this transition from biogenesis to noogenesis in greater detail.

The Evolution of Human Nature

The emergence of *homo sapiens* is a process of transformation of purely animal life which is instinctual into a reflective and self-conscious one. The animal in biogenesis has become an ex-animal which now inhabits the noosphere. The new human zoological type has attained a degree of stability such that we can speak of it as having a "fixed" nature so that we can define it as an animal that is rational. But this fixity is to be understood only in relation to the biosphere. While evolution of the human brain is more or less finished, the evolution of human consciousness is not. Just as biogenesis resulted in a transformation of animal life into human life, so noogenesis will result in a transformation into a superior state of humanity, the ultrahuman.¹³ Thus, Teilhard distinguishes two levels of hominization. As he says: "Above the elementary hominization that culminates in each individual, there is really developing above us another hominization, a collective one of the whole species."¹⁴ At present, the present human "nature of Man is in the full flood of entitative change".¹⁵ We can properly speak of this final form of humanity as the real and definitive human nature.

Traditional philosophers and theologians of the metaphysical dualist mold deny that the whole man, body and soul, is a product of biogenesis. This is because they see reality dualistically as consisting of two distinct realities, matter and spirit. For them evolution is nothing but the evolution of matter. Spirit comes from without the evolutionary process. But for Teilhard, matter and spirit are two aspects of one and the same evolving reality. Matter in the beginning was already pre-conscious, that is, it already contained in inchoate form a psychic element or energy. Accordingly, "man was born entirely from the world; not only his flesh and bones but his incredible power of thought."¹⁶

For metaphysical thinkers who employ the categories of matter and form, a human being already has a substantial form. Any form that he may acquire in the future can only be an accidental one. Consequently, the second form that man acquires as a result of noogenesis can only be considered accidental. It is impossible in a metaphysical frame of reference for a thing to have two substantial forms. But in process thought it is possible to have two natures for the first one is unfinished and evolving, hence, it is not definitive; nor do they exist contemporaneously, for one is intermediate and the other ultimate. In other words, humanity is seen as a process, hence is in the category of becoming, while the definitive human nature which is the culmination of the process is in the category of being.

Having made the distinction between the two processes of hominization and the two forms of human nature resulting therefrom, we can now try to rethink the concept of natural law by relating it, not to the first form but to the second. Our first step is to locate "oughtness" within reality as process.

The Ontological Foundation of the Moral Ought

Morality as ethicists tell us has to do with oughtness. Morality makes prescriptive statements as opposed to the descriptive statements of science. The fundamental problem for ethicists is the determination of the foundation of oughtness. Deontological ethicists believe that there is an objective foundation. The tradition of natural law assumes that there is a fixed common human nature which serves as the objective foundation for moral oughtness. From this, human nature is derived the natural law and natural rights.

The modern objection to this deontological and naturalist theory, even if we grant that there is a fixed human nature, is the possibility of drawing moral conclusions which are value statements from a human nature whose properties are factual and therefore describable. In other words, can one draw an "ought" from an "is"? To claim that one can is considered by Hume and G.E. Moore invalid and this invalid process is called by the latter the naturalistic fallacy. The response of naturalistic theories is to meet the objection head-on and state flatly that it is "possible to derive an 'ought' or value statement from an 'is', or factual statement, for 'ought' can be defined in terms of 'is'.¹⁷ Whatever be the merit of this counter-argument, we believe it more fruitful to follow a different procedure by founding moral oughtness not on "is" but on "will be," in other words, not on "being" but "becoming."

We find the possibility for the above procedure in the philosophy of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Thus, we can base moral oughtness on the notion of potentiality (not-yet-being) rather than on actuality (being). One is therefore not deriving the "ought" from the "is" but from the "will be" or "not-yet-being". There are observable natural potentialities in human nature which need to be actualized. This need is an ontological ought and on it is founded moral oughtness. This teleological aspect of Aristotelian and Thomistic ethics in which moral action is related to the

actualization of potentialities (formation of character and the virtues) is their greatest strength. In my view, no modern theory, whether that of Kant or Utilitarianism or even the theory of justice of John Rawls in which basic rights are founded on a mutual agreement of absolute fairness, has provided a better alternative or answer.

Having accorded this praise to Aristotelian and Thomistic ethics, we hasten to add a reservation, namely, that while moral oughtness is rightly founded on potentiality, this potentiality is merely accidental and hence does not give sufficient force to the moral ought. In order for us to be convinced to pursue good and avoid evil, the good must be sufficiently important for us to expend moral energy. But if it is merely an accidental good, even if we call it an "essential" accidental good, still it is accidental and its loss does not lessen the substantial perfection of my human nature (matter and form). Thus there is no sufficient internal basis for being moral. To give sufficient force to the imperative of natural law, Thomists invoke an external source of authority, namely, God's will expressed in the Eternal Law in whose participation the natural law receives its compelling power.¹⁸

In an age in which theological assumptions have lost their power to persuade, the notion of an eternal Law does not carry much influence on secular reason. Grotius' attempt to found moral obligation or oughtness independent of theological presuppositions (*etiamsi daremus non esse Deum*) while remaining within the scholastic philosophical framework, is bound to fail.

Let us turn instead to a process view of human nature to show the ontological foundation for moral oughtness. We can state at the outset that for Teilhard, the potentiality in man is much more than accidental, for as he notes, "the nature of man is in the full flood of entitative change."¹⁹ The entitative change Teilhard is talking about here is the very constitution or creation of a new nature which is the culmination of the second level of hominization we discussed earlier. Thus, the ontological need or ought comes from a void in the very depths of one's existence. The existentialist, Sartre, has perceptively noted the Nothingness at the heart of human existence. There is no form there. And rightly did he say that essence or form follows on existence. Man is in search of selfhood and identity.

Let us further analyze the various dimensions of the ontological ought which is man's need to become, to evolve. First, there is the individual level, in which the failure to evolve is to be aborted. Without the achievement of the new man, the individual is nothing and this nothingness is the nothingness of despair, not the nothingness that has a future hope. But there is a deeper level to the ontological obligation and responsibility to become, to evolve. It is not just an obligation to myself, it is an obligation to the whole of humanity, for my individual destiny is tied up with the destiny of humanity. But this already awesome ontological obligation that I evolve for the sake of all humanity does not go far enough. I must also evolve for the sake of the cosmos. Here is where Sartre fell short for he divorced human historical existence from its roots in the infrahistorical--the level of matter and the level of biological life. For process thought, man is revealed as having been born from the womb of the infrahuman levels of reality. Man is now evolution conscious of itself. In man lies the hopes of all reality-in-process. Man's action is thus fraught with cosmic significance for he can either lead the cosmos to its maturation point in a new earth or abort it. From the ontological depths of reality-as-process comes a cry for completion. In the poetic words of St. Paul, "all creation is groaning until now to be delivered."

Let us digress at this point to consider an objection that we are guilty of the naturalistic fallacy in imputing value on the world. The assumption of the naturalistic fallacy is that the world is factual and objective while values are subjective. But this assumption is a fallacy--and if so the naturalistic fallacy is founded on a fallacy. Process thought shows that man is evolution conscious

of itself. In other words, what we call the world is for process thought the material and biological worlds. But matter and life are the early stages of man's evolution. Therefore if value appears at the level of man, it must have been present in undeveloped and inchoate form at the lower stages. It follows that there is an ontological basis for seeing value at these lower stages and we cannot be accused of anthropomorphism or emotivism. From an evolutionary perspective, the world is not just factual nor neutral; it is value-filled. It is not just objective; it is also subjective, for if subjectivity arises in man, then it must have been present in germinal form at the lower levels.

To summarize this discussion on the processive view of the foundation of moral obligation, perhaps we can do no better than quote Teilhard at length on the matter:

Act we must--but why and how?²⁰

So long as our conception of the Universe remained static, the basis of duty remained extremely obscure. To account for this mysterious law which weighs fundamentally on our liberty, men had recourse to all sorts of explanation, from that of an explicit command issued from outside to that of an irrational but categorical instinct. In a spiritually evolutionary scheme of the Universe, such as we have here accepted, the answer is quite simple. For the human unity, the initial basis of obligation is the fact of being born and developing as a function of a cosmic stream. We must act, and in a certain way, because our individual destinies are dependent on a universal destiny. Duty, in its origin, is nothing but the reflection of the universe in the atom.²¹

Thus, for Teilhard the ontological foundation for moral obligation is the radical incompleteness of finite man and the tendency found in one's being toward a dissolution or entropy.²²

The ontological obligation for man to complete himself is noted by Teilhard as having cosmic significance:

Man would see in the first place the greatness of his responsibilities increasing almost to infinity before him. Hitherto he could think of himself in nature as a bird of passage, local, accidental, free to waste the spark of life that is given him, with no loss to anyone but himself. Suddenly he finds in his heart the fearful task of conserving, increasing and transmitting the fortunes of a whole world. His life, in a true sense, has ceased to be private to him. Body and soul, he is the product of a huge creative work with which the totality of things has collaborated from the beginning; if he refuses the task assigned to him, some part of that effort will be lost forever and lacking throughout the whole future. . . .

When each man, . . . will admit that his true being is not limited to the narrow boundaries of his limbs and his historical existence but that he forms part, body and soul, of the process that drives the universe, then he will understand that, in order to remain faithful to himself he must devote himself to the task demanded of him by life as to a personal and sacred duty.²³

The Moral Ought as Love

If man is conscious that he is the highest product so far of a gigantic creative work in which the whole universe collaborated since the beginning and conscious that the success of this unfinished evolution of cosmic energy concentrated in him depends on the proper use of his knowledge and freedom: there arises in his consciousness a 'should' or moral ought. This moral ought is not just a command for his own personal fulfillment, hence, not just a personal ought, but a cosmic ought and duty to fulfill himself for the sake of the universe.

The problem for process ethics is how to direct cosmic energy for the transformation of humanity and in the process the transformation of the earth. Before ethics can prescribe particular rules and precepts, it must discover an over-all principle or spirit that must animate these precepts. What is the universal form of the 'good'? The answer is that human actions are good insofar as they are directed towards the transformation of the human person. The function of morality is to guide the cosmic stream of energy forward and upward towards its maturation. Therefore, 'good' means right direction and bad means wrong direction.²⁴

It might be interesting to point out here the similarity between process ethics and the Biblical view on the function of morality as rules and precepts. The Biblical view sees all creation with man at its head on a journey whose termination is variously called the new heaven and the new earth, the new Jerusalem (Jn 21:1-3), the new creation (2 Cor 5:17) or the new creature (Gal 6:15), the new Man (Eph 2:15), the second-Adam (Rom 5), etc. Commandments are meant to lead the people of God to the end of their journey. To disobey the commandments, that is, to sin, is to go off the road, to stray, to take the wrong direction.

If the function of morality is towards point to man the right direction, then it is man's task to direct the cosmic energy of the universe towards the future where transformation into the new man and the new earth is achieved. In man cosmic energy appears as both physical and psychical. Physical energy presents itself as tangential energy. Tangential energy tends towards multiplicity, inertia, dissociation and entropy.²⁵ Tangential energy in its highest form is animality and of course man is rooted in it. In Freudian terms, tangential energy is instinctual energy, the libido. The mistake of Freud is to see libido as the essence of the psyche. He fails to see a deeper dimension which is spiritual or as Teilhard calls it, radial energy. This energy is unitive, creative and convergent. Another name for this energy is love. This love is unselfish, benevolent as opposed to love of desire or concupiscence. In Christian terms, this unselfish love is *agape*.

The direction of evolution is towards personalization.²⁶ The fulfillment of personality is in a gift of itself to the other, hence, through unselfish love. In giving itself to the other, personality is not lost in the sense of being dissolved like a drop of water merging into the ocean. Rather, loving union differentiates.²⁷ This is the paradox of love. Love not only heightens personality, it heightens conscious awareness. As Teilhard notes, "love alone is capable of uniting living beings in such a way as to complete and fulfill them, for it alone takes them and joins them by what is deepest in them."²⁸

It is the task of process ethics to see to it that love is the ruling principle of human action instead of hate which derives from the death instinct and surfaces from the depths of the unconscious as suicidal or murderous. All moral rules and precepts must be informed by the supreme principle of love. For process ethics, the reconstructed natural law is simply love as an imperative. To give it more specification, it is love of neighbor and one's fellowman. For a process moral theology which is based on Faith, besides love of neighbor, love also means love of God,

on the supposition that the Omega point is a Divine Center of convergence of all personal centers of consciousness.

We noted earlier that in man there are two energies, one tangential and egocentric, the other radial or altruistic. It is this task of both psychology and ethics to control these energies. Psychology uses the method of psychoanalysis, analytic psychology, etc. to attain the roots of these energies in the unconscious. Ethics uses moral rules and precepts to prohibit selfish and hateful acts and prescribe loving, compassionate and generous acts. Process ethics justifies the Aristotelian ethics of virtue whose goal is the formation of character, for a man of character is one who is self-controlled. Virtues are habitual dispositions that facilitate human acts that are informed by love. But process ethics deepens the importance of virtues. In Aristotelian ethics, virtues are accidental perfections of an already substantially perfect nature. In process ethics, virtues are for the constitution and creation of a new man, new nature. Love energy is the energy that causes transformation by creative union. The virtues predispose human acts to proceed from the principle of love.

Process ethics considers faith, hope and love as the most important of the virtues. Traditionally, these are called theological virtues, but in a process universe, these are natural virtues, for they are natural features that are found in those who are advancing towards future transformation. In order to have the drive and enthusiasm to work for the completion of the cosmic process, I must believe that there is a future to it, have hope that it is attainable, and be united with it by love. The opposite of these virtues are skepticism, despair and hate.

Not only is there room for Aristotelian virtue ethics within process ethics, but modern rights-and-duties ethics can be accommodated, except that the foundation for rights and duties are different. In modern ethics, the foundation is having; in process ethics, it is being. In the former, the individual fulfills himself by possessing, acquiring, preserving life, liberty, property and or happiness. Because of a conflict in acquisition and possession motivated by self-interest, rules (legal and moral) must be provided that will limit these acquisitive forces in order to maintain balance and harmony in society. The model used here is contractual, adversarial and conflictual. Such a relationship is really alienating as Marx has noted.

In process ethics, we use the cooperative model or interpersonal one. Being is being-with. To be is to love and in the gift of self, one attains a higher level of existence and awareness in the union. If to love is the cosmic duty for man, then he has the right to love. But to love one must be free. There cannot be a loving relation where there is a Master-Slave relationship. Love demands equality, hence from love is derived the right to equality and justice. Love also demands giving and material gifts are a symbol of love. Therefore man must have the wherewithal to express his love, hence, the right to property. But property we must hasten to add is ultimately not for having but for being which is achieved in giving. The right to life is quite evident. One cannot love unless one exists. To love I must have worth, dignity, and liberty.

Teilhard de Chardin contrasts the ethics of individualism with the ethics of love thus:

Morality has till now been principally understood as a fixed system of rights and duties intended to establish a static equilibrium between individuals, and at pains to maintain it by a limitation of energies, that is to say, force. This conception rested in the last resort on the idea that every human being represented a sort of absolute term in the world, whose existence had to be protected from all encroachment from without.²⁹

This ethics can be transformed, says Teilhard, only if we recognized that:

Man on earth is no more than an element destined to complete himself cosmically in a higher consciousness in process of formation. Now the problem confronting morality is no longer how to preserve and protect the individual but how to guide him so effectively in the direction of his anticipated fulfillment.³⁰

Just as the task of ethics is transformed, so the job of ethicians:

The moralist was up to now a jurist, or a tight-rope walker. He becomes the technician and engineer of the spiritual energies of the world. The highest morality is, henceforth that which will best develop the phenomenon of nature to its upper limits. No longer to protect but to develop, by awakening and convergence, the individual riches of the earth.³¹

To the morality of balance ('closed morality') the moral world might seem a definitely bounded realm. To the morality of movement ('open morality') the same world appears as a higher sphere of the universe, much richer than the lower spheres of matter in unknown powers and unsuspected combinations. The boldest mariners of tomorrow will sail out to explore and humanize the mysterious ocean of moral energies.³²

Changing Values

It remains now to describe the mechanics, so to speak, of change in values and morals. That values have changed historically is an undisputed fact. It is the nature and depth of these changes that is the point at issue here. All theories of ethics attempt to show some type of change. The degree of change ranges from the minimal as in metaphysical ethics to the maximum as in situation ethics. Metaphysical ethicists believe that there is an objective natural moral law that is absolute and unchanging based on a fixed and timeless human nature. Changes in morals are therefore accidental merely, affecting the application of the natural moral law rather than the law itself. At the other extreme, the existentialist ethicists deny the *a priori* existence of a human nature, and consider ethical values to be determined purely by the unique situation of each individual at each given time. Ethics thus becomes very relativistic and subjective. Our processive ethics takes the middle ground in opting for an evolving human nature.

The individual in process thought cannot be humanized in isolation from the rest of humanity. Humanization is in personalization and personalization implies community. The constitution of community is synonymous in practice to the ongoing constitution of human nature. We postulate therefore a human nature, not as given antecedently, but as a goal to be achieved. Consequently, we differ from traditional metaphysical ethicists who postulate an antecedent human nature and also from situation ethicists who do not accept a common human nature to be cooperatively and freely achieved and constituted. Human reality for us as an evolving reality is not like a fireworks display that shoots off in all directions, but like a cone that reaches a summit as the point of convergence.

Morality for process thought is a function of this common and objective human nature to be constituted. Morality is a creative force for union in the building of a higher unity than the purely biological. The basis then for the evolution of values and morals is the need for the evolution of

authentic human nature. Since authentic human nature is a community achieved through union, morality prescribes values that are needed to achieve this community. That is moral which unifies and consolidates the members; immoral which alienates them. But what actions precisely unify and alienate can only be determined in the context of a given historical community. Just as the notion of community evolves by the interaction of the members of the group, so also does the notion of morality. Consequently, no community in the past, present or future can lay claim to knowing what the essence of community is from which it can derive absolute norms of moral behavior. No "instant" community can claim to lay down moral rules binding for all times on succeeding generations. This does not imply complete relativism or the absence of objective morality, for in our view there is a convergent point for the noosphere. Does this mean that before that maturation point there is no objective morality? No, first, because morality is not based on individuality but on community and second, because communities are not isolated units but form an evolutionary continuity. The present notion of community is a product of the past. For example, the formation of groups has evolved from the purely biological--the family, the clan, the tribe, etc., based on blood, race, color--to town, city and nation, groups based on economic and political bonds. At present, the notion of community is evolving from national groupings to that of a world community as the result of an evolution that embraces all historical communities. The morality emerging from the concurrence of these communities can be considered an objective and universal moral norm insofar as it applies to all people of a given age and not to all people of all times. If, as we noted above, the objective foundation of morality is an evolving human nature, then as human nature evolves toward the fullness of form and objectivity, so do morals evolve toward greater objectivity.

Conclusion

If we may be permitted to assess the possible contribution of process ethics to contemporary moral philosophy, perhaps we can measure it by considering how it has met the deficiencies of contemporary ethics as noted by Iris Murdoch:

It seems that there is a void in present-day moral philosophy. Areas peripheral to philosophy expand (psychology, political and social theory) or collapse (religion) without philosophy being able in the one case to encounter, and in the other case to rescue, the values involved. A working philosophical psychology is needed with a terminology concerned with virtue. We need a moral philosophy which can speak significantly of Freud and Marx, and out of which aesthetic and political views can be generated. We need a moral philosophy in which the concept of love, so rarely mentioned now by philosophers, can once again be made central.

After this paper was written, I came across a passage which aptly summarizes what process ethics as presented here has tried to accomplish:

Ontology as the ground of ethics was the original tenet of philosophy. Their divorce, which is the divorce of the `objective' and `subjective' realms, is the modern destiny. Their reunion can be effected, if at all, only from the `objective' end, that is to say, through a revision of the idea of nature. And it is becoming rather than abiding nature which would hold out any such promise. From the immanent

direction of its total evolution there may be elicited a destination of man by whose terms the person, in the act of fulfilling himself, would at the same time realize a concern of universal substance. Hence would result a principle of ethics which is ultimately grounded neither in the autonomy of the self nor in the needs of the community, but in an objective assignment by the nature of things.³⁴

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Notes

1. Modern writers of ethics because of their anti-metaphysical stance have largely abandoned natural law ethics. Yet, as we hope to show, one does not have to be metaphysical in order to support the natural law theory.

2. *Summa Theologica*, I-II, q. 94, a. 2 (emphasis added).

3. *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 94, a. 6. It is highly unlikely that Thomas was Ptolemaic in his personal life. While his theoretical formulation of ethics is, in my view, Ptolemaic, his mystical life was dynamic and processive in orientation.

4. Austin Fagothey, S.J., *Right and Reason* (Saint Louis: Mosby, 1963), p. 136.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 137.

6. *Loc. cit.*

7. *Summa Theologica*, I-II, q. 94, a. 4.

8. Fagothey, *op. cit.* p. 137.

9. *Loc. cit.*

10. Bernice Hamilton, "Some Arguments Against Natural Law Theories", *Light on the Natural Law*, ed. Iltyd Evans, O.P. (Baltimore: Challenge, 1965), pp. 40-41.

11. See his article, "Anthropology and the Natural Sciences--The Problem of Human Evolution", *Current Anthropology* 4 (1963), 146-48.

12. Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man* (New York: Harper and Row, 1959), p. 167.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 284.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 305.

15. Teilhard de Chardin, *The Future of Man* (New York: Harper, 1964), p. 15.

16. Teilhard de Chardin, *Human Energy* (London: Collins, 1969), p. 20.

17. Tom L. Beauchamp, *Philosophical Ethics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1982), p. 340.

18. *Summa Theologica*, 1ae 2ae, q.91, a. 1 and 2.

19. *The Future of Man*, p. 15.

20. Cf. The cosmic problem of action. Cited from Jean-Pierre Demoulin, *Let Me Explain Pierre Teilhard de Chardin* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 111.

21. *Human Energy*, p. 57. Cited from Demoulin, *op. cit.*, pp. 111-12.

22. Emile Rideau, *The Thought of Teilhard de Chardin*, trans. René Hague (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 135.

23. Teilhard de Chardin, *The Vision of the Past*, trans. J. Cohen (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 137, 140-41.

24. Rideau, *op. cit.*, p. 138.

25. *The Phenomenon of Man*, p. 256.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 260.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 262.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 265.
29. *Human Energy*, p. 106.
30. *Loc. cit.*
31. *Loc. cit.*
32. *Ibid.*, p. 108.
33. Iris Murdoch, "On 'God' and 'Good'", in *Revisions*, ed. Stanley Hauerwas and Alasdair MacIntyre (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), p. 68.
34. Hans Jonas, *The Phenomenon of Life* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 283. Emphasis added.

Chapter VII

Process and Normative Ethics

John B. Cobb, Jr.

Introduction

The title correctly suggests that there is some tension between the view that all actuality is process and that ethical norms can be stable. However, although I am committed to the process view, in the present state of discussion about ethics I want to emphasize elements of objectivity and stability in ethics, rather than simply make the obvious point that moral rules change. Before attempting to discern stable aspects of normative ethics, however, the grounds of tension between process and stability need to be noted.

The process thinker must stress that no two situations are the same. Heraclitus' doctrine that we never set foot in the same river twice still holds. Of course generalizations can be made about situations, but any categorization of them is ultimately determined by judgments which themselves cannot be final. An approach to ethics which tries to predetermine right responses to situations by classifying these situations has provisional usefulness at an elementary level; but when it claims more than that, it reflects a misunderstanding of the human condition and in the long run will do more harm than good.

The process thinker must also reject any appeal to human nature as the ground of ethical principles. There are some characteristics of all members of the human species not shared by members of other species, but from this fact alone no normative conclusions can be drawn. To recognize this requires the rejection not only of traditional forms of natural law theory, but also of the currently popular notion that ethical action gains direction from the ideal of making human life more human. As a slogan this is useful, but as a serious program it depends on the judgment that human nature provides the ground for a judgment as to what ideal humanity is. The process thinker cannot find a human nature that can function in this way.

Since normative ethics for the process thinker cannot be derived from human nature, it must be oriented to human values. These in turn are related to human desire, for to speak of something as valuable which is in no way related to desires is nonsensical. This means that values are relative to a rapidly changing aspect of reality. If we understood values as simply the function of desires, they would be the least stable of grounds for ethical principles.

Valuable and Valued

However, we can and do distinguish among values, between what is really valuable in itself and what someone happens at any moment to value. I may happen to want people to fail in an undertaking because of my jealousy, while at the same time realizing that it would be far better for them to succeed. We could analyze this simply in terms of levels of wanting, but that would be confusing. Instead, I suggest that we can distinguish what is desirable from what we in fact desire by considering what we would desire on disinterested or dispassionate reflection. At the moment when I want the others to fail I know that, insofar as I could or would consider the matter disinterestedly, I would want them to succeed. Thus values, as what is *valuable* rather than simply valued, have a measure of transcendence over my fluctuating feelings of liking and disliking. The term value will be used hereafter in this more objective sense.

This way of understanding values by no means excludes them from change. What I find desirable on disinterested reflection today is different from what I found desirable ten years ago. What most of us find desirable differs from what most traditional Buddhists find desirable. What most men today find desirable differs from what primal peoples found desirable.

Nevertheless I want to emphasize here, not the relativity of values, but their element of objectivity to and for the individual. I do not find world peace less desirable because I know that there have been those who have preferred war. I do not find responsible existence less desirable because I know that there are those who prefer a state of affairs in which human beings are released from the burden of responsibility. Furthermore, my judgment of desirability in these cases is not identical with my fluctuating desire. Even when I am so angry that I desire to see some group destroyed, I remain aware of the preferability of peace. And even when I personally long to escape responsibility, I judge responsible existence better. Thus my values have much greater stability than do my desires.

This objectivity of values is the first basis for normative ethics. The recognition of a value is the recognition of an obligation. When I perceive something as intrinsically valuable, and I see that my action will tend to further or hinder it, my sense of obligation attaches to that action which will further it. This means that I can formulate an ethical principle that has greater stability than the particular values. I ought so to act as to further rather than hinder the realization of whatever I recognize as a value. That is true regardless of whether I value aristocracy or communism. It remains true if my values change. Thus, just as what I find valuable is more objective and stable than what I desire, so also my obligation to promote values is more objective and stable than what I find valuable.

The principle above was formulated with regard to a single value and must be refined in the light of the fact that, in a given situation, the choice is rarely between the simple increase or decrease of a single value. Usually a variety of values are involved. One can to some extent calculate the relative importance of values in abstraction. For example, one may judge that health is more important than comfort or that love is more important than the possession of information. But one cannot from such judgments conclude that in a given situation, in which both values in such a pair are relevant, the more important value should be chosen at the expense of the other. This would depend on the amount of the lower value to be sacrificed for any given amount of the higher value. And no objective calculus will solve such questions. The judgment of value must be directed to the total situations expected to result from the alternative actions. One can then reformulate the ethical principle to the effect that in any choice one ought to choose to produce the situation one values more highly.

At this high level of abstraction we have a normative principle which is relatively untouched by the changing character of the actual world. Of course, by the same token, it is quite inadequate as a guide to action. What one really values is what one prefers on disinterested reflection, but disinterested reflection is not easy. Many do not know what they would prefer on disinterested reflection. People need to be assisted in learning about values as in every other area of life.

Such assistance comes in many forms. Parents and teachers recommend what they find preferable to their children. If they are wise, they also teach their children how to arrive critically at their own values. Those who have had more experience or who have wider knowledge of the cumulative experience of the race can teach others a great deal about the relationship of acts to consequences, and make them aware of dimensions of the consequences to which they would otherwise be blind. Since so often we can know very little about probable consequences, we must learn quite specific rules of action which have been found generally to have preferable results. At

a higher level of abstraction our attention can be called to maxims which, while they may at times be in tension with each other, are never lacking in ethical normativeness when they are relevant. For example, other things being equal, one should treat equals equally. That means, one should not treat equals unequally without overriding ethical reasons.

Commitment

Thus far I have proposed as a normative principle that one ought to act so as to maximize value and that this norm has much more objectivity in relation to the flux of things than do the values which are to be maximized. Yet even at the high level of abstraction at which this is formulated, it too requires relativization. There is another principle which stands in tension with it and which cannot be subsumed under it. The principle discussed thus far relates the rightness of an act to its anticipated future. Utilitarian and pragmatic ethics operate on this horizon. But the rightness of an act is also affected by its relation to the past. Consequences being equal, one ought to act as one has committed oneself to act. One ought to fulfill expectations rightfully aroused in others whether by explicit promises or by accepting a role in society. One ought to respond to the kindness and generosity of others in kind.

I have said that, consequences being equal, one should fulfill one's commitments. Advocates of the utilitarian view sometimes argue that the reason we should fulfill commitments is that the best consequences are thereby secured. Fortunately this is usually the case, so that theoretical questions need not be settled before recommending action in conformity with this principle. However, I am convinced that there is an intrinsic rightness about fulfilling commitments as well as a utilitarian value. This means that in the theoretical case in which consequences may be judged slightly worse if I fulfill my commitments than if I do not, if the commitment is clear and responsible, I should fulfill it anyway.

Consider, for example, a case in which in my considered judgment the total consequences would be slightly better if I failed a student who objectively passed a course or passed one who objectively failed. Am I ethically bound to do so? Or does the fact that I have accepted a role in society which commits me to objectivity in grading have some ethically normative implications for my conduct? Surely it does! Granted, this must not be absolutized. If I were convinced that honest grading would have extremely serious results--let us say the suicide of a gifted but temporarily unbalanced youth--I trust that I would not be such a legalist as to ignore this in my grading. My point is not that I should ignore consequences. It is only that I should not ignore commitments. Each requirement relativizes the other.

One of the ways in which I can make clear the necessity to consider commitments even when they conflict with the dictates of utilitarianism is by pointing out the disastrous consequences from a utilitarian point of view which would follow if the utilitarian principle alone were applied. Let us suppose that we really persuaded each other that one should fulfill commitments only to that extent to which in each individual case we judged that the total consequences of doing so would be better than the total consequences of not doing so. How then would this affect grading? Would it not quickly undermine the whole grading system? Granted, in a considerable number of cases a wise person would judge that objectivity in grading would lead to the best results for all concerned, but would there not be also a considerable number of cases in which--on the assumption that there is no intrinsic value in such objectivity--teachers would find themselves obligated not to be objective? And would this not mean that no one would have any basis for confidence that grades received were a useful measure of the quality of the work done? One would never know whether

an A represented the judgment of the professor as to the quality of the work done or as to the student's need for reassurance.

The point is that one must distinguish between the judgment as to the comparative value of the probable outcomes of alternative individual action and the judgment as to the comparative value of the situations which would result if people in general followed a given mode of making decisions. Here the importance and truth of the Kantian maxim is clear. To act ethically is to act in accord with principles I could will to be followed by others as well. Since I cannot will that others ignore their commitments in making decisions, I cannot ignore mine either. Of course I can will that under certain circumstances others allow their judgments of probable consequences to overrule the ethical weight of their commitments, and hence there are circumstances in which it is immoral to conform to such commitments. In this respect Kant is not a good guide.

Ethics of Logic and Faith

Here I have come to what I regard as an ethical absolute. I should always act in a way the generalization of which would lead to the most valuable outcome. I believe that in the process of generalization I must consider both relevant commitments and the probable consequences of the individual act. The generalization should be as specific as possible. Would it be best if people generally, in circumstances that in terms of commitments and values paralleled mine exactly, acted in a particular way? If I judge that it would, then the ethical question is settled. There remains the question of whether I will act ethically.

Needless to say, there is immense relativity in the application of this principle to particular situations. In different cultures the manner in which commitments are entered into and their weight varies. We have already noted the relativity of values. The judgments about probable consequences are never much more than guesses. The features of these consequences to which one attends vary. And one is never sure how disinterested is one's consideration, and hence whether one has distinguished what one finds desirable from what one happens at that moment to desire.

The objectivity of ethics resembles the objectivity of logic. In and of itself logic has a high degree of objectivity. Given certain premises, logic requires that certain conclusions be excluded. The premises dictate the conclusions if one intends to draw logical conclusions. But nothing about the actual world can be learned by logic alone. Logicians as logicians can discuss only the validity or the invalidity of the course of the argument. They can judge the truth neither of premises nor of conclusions. Yet the central importance of logic lies in its application to the actual world, an application which always depends on judgments of fact.

As the logician can describe patterns of relations among terms which are valid universally for anyone who intends to think logically; so the ethicist can describe abstract principles binding on all who intend to be ethical. But just as the logician cannot as logician judge the truth of the propositions which are employed in the arguments; so the ethicist has no unique capacity to judge among values and commitments or as to the probable consequences of given actions.

The analogy with logic illumines also the final element of relativity of which I want to speak. After we have studied logic we may decide that we prefer not to think logically. I am not speaking of a decision to be systematically illogical. Rather, I am speaking of a decision to be unconcerned about logic. This decision may be made out of laziness, or it may be a highly sophisticated judgment that reality does not conform to logic, that it is grasped intuitively or mystically or not at all. One may decide that disciplining one's thinking logically, whatever values that might have,

would inhibit spontaneous creativity. This does not derogate from the objectivity of logic, but it indicates that the place of logic as a whole in human life is relative.

In a similar way, the ethicist can describe what is involved in being ethical, but a person may decide for or against assigning ethics a prominent role in life. One may decide that one prefers the life of spontaneous and unreflective expression of feeling. Such a decision might even be made on ethical grounds, that is, on the grounds that if everyone would live in this fashion more value would be achieved. If so, it is subject to debate in terms of ethical considerations. But it may also be made out of indifference, or one may just drift into it.

Ethics as a whole may also be relativized in another way, by religious faith. One may believe that one can be sensitive to the guidance of God, and that openness to God's direction supersedes all the requirements of ethics. Or more commonly one may believe that the spirit of love in one stroke fulfills all ethical requirements and makes ethics as such unnecessary or irrelevant. The choice of this way of life, too, may be adopted on ethical grounds, and when challenged it is almost always justified on ethical grounds. But here ethics is used to justify its own transcendence.

These comments allow a transition to brief consideration of the problem of "Christian ethics." If my analysis is correct, then ethics is the same whether Marxist, Buddhist, Nazi, or Christian. Insofar as ethics functions, what functions is self-identical. But Marxist, Buddhist, Nazi, and Christian differ in several important respects. First, they differ in their judgments as to the place of ethics in the life they recommend. Second, they differ in their judgments about the nature of things and the kinds of consequences to be expected from certain types of actions. Third, they differ in their judgments of value.

Hence, if ethics were understood not as a set of formal principles but as the recommendation of a total way of life, Marxist, Buddhist, Nazi, and Christian "ethics" would differ greatly. Understood in this sense "ethics" is relative through and through. If, then, we ask not for the distinctiveness of Christian ethics when ethics is strictly understood, but for the distinctive place of ethics in Christianity, the distinctive Christian understanding of the nature of things and the distinctive Christian judgments of value, we will have a rich field for discussion.

Relative Objectivity

Thus far I have concentrated on distinguishing the element of stability and objectivity in ethics from the element of relativity. The emphasis has been that ethics as a formal discipline has objectivity but that its place in life and its application to practical issues are highly relative. I want now in conclusion to turn to the relative aspect and note that even within it relatively objective judgments of better and worse can be made.

This possibility depends upon an understanding of process not only as change but also as discriminable into growth and decay. The claim is to be considered that some ways in which ethics is viewed, some judgments as to the nature of reality, and some values are superior to others. There is, of course, an element of circularity in any such claim, for when some values are judged superior to others, some value is presupposed as the basis of the judgment. Yet other things can be said which transcend simple relativity, notably in respect to judgments of value.

Values may be defined as what is disinterestedly preferred, recognizing that different people prefer different things even when they consider them disinterestedly. There are a variety of grounds for the diversity of values: differences of temperament rooted in turn in differences of body-type, cultural and religious conditioning and the individual conditioning of personal experience.

Another factor affecting values is the richness and variety of experience which an individual has enjoyed. In distinction from the other factors noted, this provides a basis for judging among values. If I realize that the difference between my values and those of another person is decisively determined by the inferiority of the relevant experience I have had, then I recognize also that the other's values are better than mine. Even if, on disinterested reflection, I continue to find preferable something different from what the other person values, I will recognize that the other's preference is in fact preferable.

The difference may not be one simply of quantity of relevant experience. I may recognize another person as peculiarly gifted, perceptive, and sensitive in discriminations of value in some particular areas. Aristotle's ethics is profoundly correct in pointing out that we have the capacity to judge the judges of value beyond the capacity to judge of the values judged. Thus we judge our private values inferior to values we know as values only indirectly, that is, on the authority of others. In the fine arts most of us accept some kind of consensus of artists and critics as more reliable than our private judgments.

If we could regard the total historical development of humanity as a single movement of growth, then we could largely overcome relativism in the judgment of values. Our task would be simply to identify the most advanced representatives of the species and assert their values as objectively the best. We would not thereby imply that these in their turn would not be superseded, but they would be normative until the supersession occurred.

Against those who would reduce us to complete cultural relativism or even to an individual relativism of taste, it is well to stress the extent to which the development of mankind from its animal ancestry should be recognized as a continuous growth process. One can judge that much of this process has been also progress. But against those who would take this view too seriously or too simply, one must stress that not all change, even over long stretches of time, should be thought of as progress, and also that diverse lines of development may parallel each other and produce conflicting values. By introducing the notions of growth and progress, and affirming as more truly valuable what is valued by more mature or advanced people, one reduces but does not overcome the relativism of value.

NOTE. In receiving this essay to review for publication I was struck by how differently I would approach it now. When I wrote it I was preoccupied with the question of ethical norms. The issue in my mind was that of ethical relativism. Process thought supports much relativism but does not exclude objective normativity. I continue to believe that, and I do not repudiate what I wrote. But focusing on that one formal question led me to neglect the much more important questions of the positive contributions that process thought can make to the great ethical issues of our time. Today I would begin with economics and ecology rather than with technical problems in the discipline of philosophical ethics. Further, even if I limited myself to more technical philosophical problems, I would stress the distinctive implications of the process doctrine of the social self in contrast both to essentialism and to individualistic existentialism.

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Chapter VIII

Ethics and Social Values: Scheler and Ricoeur

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Introduction

The purpose of this paper is to explore the meaning of "social values", their different forms and interrelations, and their implications for ethics. These reflections will begin with some of the main trends of phenomenological value-theory, and then attempt to extend these trends in the new directions stimulated by contemporary linguistic thought. This choice of the phenomenological approach is prompted, first, by the realization that the phenomenology of value theory is a rich vein which as yet has not been worked very actively, at least in the area of social values. Beyond that, phenomenology has an openness and adaptability to other traditions, such as existentialism and personalism, that enables it to maximize its fundamental sensitivity to the richness of descriptive data. Most important, perhaps, phenomenology focuses equally upon both the modes of givenness and the "given" itself. Based directly on the thesis of intentionality or act-object correlation, it strives in all its considerations to incorporate the "subjective" along with the "objective". This sensitivity to the subject is especially important in value-theory, particularly when the social is being challenged in the name of anxiety over the fate of the individual.

Were we to attempt anything like a comprehensive survey of value-theory in early phenomenology, it would be necessary to treat such seminal figures as Brentano and Husserl, as well as such ancillary philosophers as Pfander, Reinach, and von Hildebrand.¹ Max Scheler, however, seems to have epitomized the phenomenological approach in the area of values and ethics.² In addition, more than others at that time he stressed the social dimension of ethics. It seems appropriate in the first part of our essay, therefore, to trace the broad outlines of Scheler's axiology and then to detail some of the specific factors of his approach to social values. In the second part, we will do the same with Paul Ricoeur's philosophy of value.

Scheler's Approach to Value

It might be worth noting, at the beginning, that many consider Scheler to have been only a "quasi-phenomenologist". His ethical theories were already well developed before 1900, that is, before he came under the influence of phenomenology. Written under his neo-Kantian master, Rudolf Eucken, his doctoral dissertation had stressed the themes of the primacy of value and the centrality of the emotions. Then, reacting against Kantianism in favor of intuitionism, and enthusiastically espousing the phenomenological method, his philosophy took on a scope and cogency that made his main book, *Formalism in Ethics*, a seminal work for the times.³

Scheler derived his notion of phenomenology from Husserl's early work, *Logical Investigations*. To this he gave a realistic emphasis, openly rejecting Husserl's later developments, particularly the transcendental reduction and the trend toward idealism. Consequently, he stressed the two major themes of intentionality and the intuition of essences. With respect to the former, he did not follow Husserl's noesis-noema doctrine or theory of constitution. Instead, he simply stressed the idea of a "correlation between the essence of the object and the essence of the intentional experience".

Particularly as a tactic in his struggle against Kantian formalism, Scheler's basic strategy in ethics was to discover intentional acts that would have as their correlates objective, material (non-formal) values that are or can be given in full phenomenological self-evidence. Since he had already committed himself to an emphasis upon affectivity, he directed his attention to acts in the area of feelings: to "feelings of . . ." (*Fühlen von . . .*). Specifically, he was concerned with acts or functions that are neither representational, conceptual, or propositional, but cognitive intuitions of particular values, regularly coupled with allied acts of "preference" or "subordination" which reveal the hierarchy of values. These "feelings of" are best seen in contrast with "feeling states" (*Gefühlzustände*); these are static contents or phenomena only indirectly and causally connected with their objects through the mediation of representations, associations, or symptoms. Anger would be an extreme example of a non-intentional "feeling-state" that has only an indirect relation with a value. We get angry "about" something but only by dwelling on values or disvalues already perceived. Other examples of "feeling-states", *viz.*, "response-reactions", are more closely connected with the "feelings of" because they share the orientation of the latter and are "called for", so that, indeed, we are saddened if the response is not forthcoming. They are thus referred to as "correlated", even though they are not intentional, that is, as such they do not "mean an object and in their effectuation make an object appear".⁴ It might be noted here that Scheler gives no precise examples of "feeling of", except perhaps for the aesthetic instance of "feeling the beauty of a snow-covered mountain".⁵ In all other instances, he speaks rather of the correlated "response-reactions", which, unlike the "feelings of", can be objectivated. This leads one to suspect that, in the absence of phenomenological description, the "feelings of" are more postulated than exhibited.

Although they are secondary, the importance attached by Scheler to the response-reaction forms of feeling-states is manifest from the fact that he devoted a separate discussion to them in the section entitled the "stratification of the emotional life", considered a model of his use of the phenomenological method.⁶ Here, the aim is to show why any attempt to "manage" happiness--which Scheler considers the real meaning of eudaemonism--is self-defeating and leads inevitably to hedonism. To do this he distinguishes four levels of feelings: sensible, vital, spiritual, and absolute which is the level of bliss and despair. Though given *a priori* in our experience, these levels also are detectable by several criteria: localization, duration, the degree of controllability by the will (sensible feelings are controllable whereas bliss is not), and, of special interest here, the aspect of intentionality which distinguishes the higher two levels from the lower two (joy is "about" something whereas pain is not).⁷ In effect, Scheler is here extending the role of intentionality to non-cognitive feelings and suggesting that there is a new dimension of intentionality involved with responses. He does not highlight this response intentionality, though he does develop concerning it such rich insights as his nuanced distinction between happiness and bliss.⁸ However, the exploitation of response-intentionality in a specifically ethical direction was the work of von Hildebrand.⁹

Love

Another instance of Scheler's extension of affective intentionality beyond its original role in the cognition of values can be found in his discussion of love and its opposite, hate. At least in his earlier period, love is the capstone of his whole system. Since it plays a crucial role not only in his ethics, but in his theory of community, it is of necessity a highly complex, stratified, and many-faceted reality. Some salient aspects stand out: although intentional, love is non-cognitive; and

while it is directed to such goods as persons and things, it is a presupposition for the cognition of values. Thus, it is both "pioneer and guide" for the "feelings of", that is, for value-perception.

Love also has movement as a distinctive characteristic, which Scheler considered to be derived from Plato and which he emphasized in some contexts. "Love is that movement of intention whereby, from a given value "A" in an object, its higher value is visualized, and this vision is the essence of love."¹⁰ Here, the notion of value "B" raises some questions, for Scheler never really explains the precise relation between values "A" and "B". It is not sheer discovery of a new value for that would be simply a case of greater attention to "feelings-of"; nor is it a case of improving the beloved for this would be pedagogy, not love; nor finally is it a matter of sheer creation of higher values, since this would make of love an illusion, whereas he insists that only the distortions of love are blind. Rather, resorting to a heavy-handed simile, Scheler speaks of "love itself . . . bringing about the continuous emergence of ever-higher value in the object--just as if it were streaming out from the object of its own accord, without any sort of exertion (even of wishing) on the part of the lover."¹¹ It is hard to avoid some degree of a "creationist" interpretation with respect to this passage and others like it, but I think Dupuy is correct in insisting that creativity in these cases is confined to the improvement of the conditions that favor this function of love.¹² The person is basically passive before values, even in the case of love in which man most closely participates in the outpouring of creative spirit.

Values and Their Hierarchy

By insisting that there is a structure to our life of feelings, organized and energized by love, Scheler has expressed one side of his thesis that ethics is basically an *ordo amoris*. The other side is that the intentional correlates intuited in our feelings are also structured, in this case in the form of values and the hierarchy of their modalities. Individual values are referred to as essences, qualities, and ideal entities. They are independent of goods, purposes and tendencies inasmuch as they are presupposed by these latter as their foundation, but they require "bearers" in order to be "realized". Thus they are "*a priori*" in the material or nonformal sense, which Husserl had already specified, of being necessary, universal, and, though given in experience, prior to "inductive" experience and causal explanation. Consequently they are presupposed for any understanding of their respective regions of experience.

For example, the value of "the just" is presupposed for all awareness of just deeds and laws, but it is experienced only in some embodiment or "good", Goods, composed of things and values together, can change, but not values themselves at least not on the higher levels.¹³ The question of the ontic status of these values, beyond their "free-floating" status as intentional objects, is a problematic issue which is complicated by the shifts in Scheler's never-completed metaphysical views. Interpretations range from attributing to them a minimal sheer validity, compatible in some respects with a relational view of value, to a virtually fideistic metaphysics of values as correlates of the divine mind.¹⁴ A solution to this issue is not within the scope of this essay, but it should be pointed out that Scheler repudiates "an ontologism of the real and an objectivism of value-essence" which he finds in Hartmann's interpretation, and which many have attributed to Scheler himself.

The correlations between values are also *a priori*. The most basic of these is the hierarchy of value-modalities, which is given intuitively but with confirmatory criteria. This is structured on four levels, running from the lowest to the highest: the pleasant, the vital (e.g., the "noble", the "healthy", etc.); the spiritual including aesthetic and scientific values, and the sacred involving primarily personal value.¹⁵ On each of these levels there are additional correlations involving the

"derivative" values of feeling-states and responses and a variety of further interrelations, such as the superiority of personal values over thing-values, of values of the other over one's own values, of acts over functions, and of spontaneity over response.¹⁶ The basic value hierarchy is referred to as absolute, but it still involves two types of "relativity": first, the internal dependence of the vital and sensible levels on the higher levels, and second, the external dependence of values on historically changing goods.¹⁷ In this context Scheler partially dissociates objectivity from generality. An intuition of value may be revealed to one person alone or it may be a single value (*Eigenwert*) pertaining only to an individual (a good for me). In each case, however, the value would still be objective in the sense of being independent of subjective conditions. Indeed, the knowledge of such values represents a "higher wisdom" and is rooted in individual conscience.¹⁸ Scheler's intent here is to undercut Kantian formalism which identifies objectivity and generality, though he considers this view of their coincidence to be correct in the case of the basic values.

Moral Values and Obligation

Moral values, as such, do not appear in the hierarchy of values, but are found generally in persons and their will-orientation. Specifically they exist "on the back" of those acts which follow the order of objective preference, that is, which realize higher values over lower (*ceteris paribus*, Scheler occasionally adds). The reasoning here is that it would be phariseeism to will the moral good directly, e.g., being "benevolent" in order to become good rather than primarily to help the other person.¹⁹

In Scheler's theory, obligation is based directly on values. Although neutral in itself with respect to existence, every value carries with it an ideal obligation, an "ought-to-be" (*Seinsollen*), according to which every value should be. Normative obligation or duty, however, is found only in the form of an "ought-to-do" (*Tunsollen*). In order to justify the step from value to ideal obligation, Scheler invokes such axioms as "the existence of a positive value is itself a positive value", implying thereby that some values at least are not indifferent to existence.²⁰ To explain the step from the ideal ought to the normative ought, he specifies three conditions: 1) a volition, 2) an imperative or tradition, whether explicit or implicit, and 3) a reference to a tendency, particularly any tendential opposition or resistance to the value concerned.²¹

Clearly, these conditions all have to do with the meaning of the ethical situation. Scheler says very little about this, except to insist on the role played by the personal "disposition" (*Gesinnung*) or general attitude in delineating the field of projects to be considered and undertaken by the will.²²

Thus, according to Scheler, all obligation is essentially negative. This is so, first of all, in the case of the ideal ought-to-be simply by reason of the presupposed inexistence of the value involved. It is also the case with normative obligation, since one value may have different normative expressions and thus each normative statement is inadequate to the value expressed. Moreover, in every case of normative obligation or duty there is a negative element of repression or constraint. Finally, this negativity is compounded both because every sense of duty implies a self-regard rather than a full awareness of value; and because in obligation there is always a certain depersonalization that resembles a flight from responsibility or a hiding in necessity. To the negativity of any ethics based primarily on obligation, therefore, Scheler opposes his own approach as an ethics of "discernment of the good", while still allowing the need for a sense of duty to cover cases where value-perception is feeble.²³

Social Values

Social values, as such, are not given a formal treatment by Scheler, but are referred to only in passing and usually by way of an example of the general theory. For example, the values of the "just and unjust" are illustrations of the "spiritual" as a "third modality" of values, and are described as constituting "the ultimate phenomenal basis for the idea of an objective order of justice which is independent of the idea of 'law' and the state and also from the idea of a life-community which grounds the state."²⁴ Law, Scheler explains in a footnote, is "solely a derived value from the primary value of the 'order of justice'; the positive law (of a state, for example) is the derived value from the 'order of justice' valid (objective) for him, which lawgivers and judges must attempt to realize."²⁵ Apart from such examples, it would seem that values are "psycho-socially indifferent". They do not participate in the social order but, as in the instance just given, are its foundation. At the same time, since they are absolute, all values for Scheler are "universal", with the exception of the "*Eigenwert*" which designates the unique value of the person and his special vocation.

Value Perspectivism

Because Scheler was also concerned with the realities of social change, his problem was to reconcile the absolutism of universal values with the varieties of value attitudes and conduct, while avoiding any suspicion of relativism. He did this by means of what he called "emotional perspectivism". According to this theory, all value awareness is "mediated", "filtered", or "refracted" through five levels of social existence which provide the parameters of social relativity. These five levels are ranked according to their proximity to the absolute values, that is, their degree of variation which increases as we go from higher to lower. These levels are: 1) the ethos or variations of the feelings of values (value-cognition) along with the structure of preference and of love and hate; 2) "ethics" in the widest sense ("of a time") or variations in value judgments; 3) variations of types of institutions, conducts, and goods; 4) variations of practical morality or actual behavior; and 5) variations of customs and habits, whose execution is rooted in the tradition, and whose changes require will-acts (e.g., fashions).²⁶ Concerning the world of values, each historical period represents one "viewpoint", that is, stratified perspective which can be improved, replaced by another "closer" to the world of values, or debased; but no single period can ever exhaust the world of values. This is not "relativism", Scheler argues, but an essential requirement of an absolute ethics that attempts to reconcile the changing with the unchanging. In fact, he argues, relativism is an absolutism in disguise, since it fixes on the ethos of one period and dismisses all others.²⁷ Nor is his perspectivism some kind of simplistic meliorism, Scheler insists, since it recognizes the possibility of retrogression. Indeed, in his *Ressentiment* and other writings, he proffers a strong indictment of the deformations contained in the modern ethos.²⁸

While not proposed as such, Scheler's perspectivism can be considered a theory of social values. In the category of *ethos*, particularly, a wide variety of value-phenomena can be delineated. For example, if the ancient Romans considered usury to be worse, whereas the ancient Germans thought rape morally better than theft, such judgments correspond to fundamentally different rules of preference with respect to such vital values as courage and virility and to utility values.²⁹ These differences are not to be confused with differences in the definitions of the acts involved, that is, of what theft, or usury, or rape are, for these questions are on the level of types. Nor should the changes involved in the growth of an *ethos* be confused with the different forms of illusion

revealed in history, or with forms of falsification and subversion founded on such illusions (as, for example, in "ressentiment").³⁰

As a close corollary of the *ethos*, the ethics (of a time) depends upon and cannot transcend it. However, a distinction must be made here between the applied "ethics of practico-natural intuition" as it is expressed in a natural language, for example, and a "scientific" or philosophical ethics. The latter compares applied ethics with the *ethos* in order to refine and correct it accordingly, but it cannot transcend the *ethos*. In fact, the *ethos* can be transcended only by the "moral genius".

The third level of variations or of types, Scheler explains, covers those forms of behavior usually emphasized by ethical relativists to make their case. For example, theft, adultery, and murder have been regularly cited as categories marked by constant change by virtue of which the same conduct can be good, and then evil, or vice versa. Sufficient attention is not paid to the fact that the change here is in the institutions, not the values. The essence of murder, that is, what gives a unity to all the different possible definitions of murder remains a disvalue and therefore evil, despite the long history of human sacrifice, infanticide, and abortion.³¹ Murder was not predicated of these acts because no personal life was recognized as given. Either it was felt that personhood was found only in the tribe as a whole rather than in its members, or in the members of one tribe rather than of another; or else with respect to abortion, the fetus was not considered a person but simply part of the mother's body and subject to her disposition.³²

The underlying assumption of this "perspectivism" is that an intuition of absolute value yields the point of reference with respect to which all the variations can be judged as perspectives. In turn, this assumption raises the question of whether the "perception" or feeling of value can really be an intuition in Scheler's sense of a "phenomenological experience" in which there is a "coinciding of the `meant' and the `given'". Such an intuition implies overcoming a perspective or transcending one's historical condition, which possibility is denied by the theory of perspectivism itself.

Theory of `Models'

A partial solution of this difficulty appears to be available in Scheler's theory of "models" or "value-person-types". It is the model who has access to the world of values, and who effects changes in the *ethos* and the other perspectival levels. "The law of all axiological progress or decline is not obedience to a norm, but the action of personal models (or counter-models)."³³ Ontically considered, Scheler explains, the model is "a determinate and structured value-quality". The efficacy of the model is found in its exemplarity; that is, the model is the "unity of a requirement of duty founded on its constituents".³⁴ This efficacy is actually experienced not as a duty but as a powerful attraction-models draw the person. We do not go toward them by our own volition; rather, our response is pre-logical and precedes choice. The attraction of the model is not a blind constraint, like "the power of suggestion"; rather, it carries with it a fundamental awareness of being obligatory and right. Thus, the relation of "discipleship" or of the follower to the model is one of fidelity "founded on love for the constituents experienced in the formation of his being as a moral person": we do not imitate the model but respond to its "creative power".³⁵

Active in all Scheler's discussions of this question, though not always explicit, is a distinction between the model as ideal and as concrete: to remain a model it must be ideal, but to be efficacious it must be concretized. "The model is contemplated more or less adequately . . . through the person who is supposed to fulfill the function of exemplar."³⁶ A hierarchy of such value-person-types deduced from the hierarchy of value-modalities runs as follows: saint, genius, hero, leader, and

connoisseur or artist of the sensual. Historical figures illustrate the different levels: St. Francis, that of a saint; Augustine, a combination of saint and hero; Frederick II, a melange of hero and genius, etc. Scheler warns, however, that we must be careful not to hypostatize these value-person-types into historical figures, since this is a source for rigid and false traditionalism which places the values of the past above those of the present or future.³⁷

Is Scheler, then, displacing all other forms of influence upon value formation by his emphasis on the theory of models? Strictly speaking he is not, since he discusses other factors such as education and authority. However, these are basically different forms and vehicles of exemplarity; their real efficacy is based on that of the model, which alone ethically transforms a person or society. Scheler finds a particular and practical ethical meaning in this theory, in that it enables each person "to be authentic in his situation" and develop his own ethical life, not by attempting the impossible ideal of possessing all virtues and avoiding all vices, but by finding (insofar as that term is applicable here) his own adequate model.³⁸

Scheler's Social Philosophy and Sympathy

Presupposed by much of the foregoing, although not strictly part of his value theory, is Scheler's approach to society and community. A general "sociality" is constitutive of every person; man is not just a part of society, society is a part of man.³⁹ There are four fundamental or *a priori* levels of this sociality, beginning at the lower limit with the "mass"; this corresponds to the "herd" on the animal level. Next in order is the "life-community" (*Lebensgemeinschaft*) which combines individuals into deep and long-lasting solidarities in stages from family, to tribe, to nation. This is the first consciously experienced social group and the first instance of a collective person (*Gesamtperson*), as contrasted with the individual person (*Einzelperson*). It is unreflective in its choice of values, which are basically "thing-values" rather than personal values.⁴⁰ The third form of sociality is "society" (*Gesellschaft*). This presupposes community and is a planned or artificial unity, organized by rules, laws, and constructs in order to promote certain ends. As these ends are based on such sub-personal values as the pleasant and the useful, there is no personal realization in society as such.⁴¹

The person-community (*Persongemeinschaft*) is the highest form of community--the "kingdom of solidarity in love". Here, solidarity implies both the co-responsibility or collective guilt and salvation, as well as the irreplaceability of its members. It also presupposes the "formal principles" of "essential reciprocity" (*Gegenseitigkeit*) and of "value-reciprocity" (*Gegenwertigkeit*). These principles are found to belong to the essence of certain communal acts, such as consideration, love, and promising. When another is considerate or promises something I can refuse to respond, but I cannot fail to recognize the call for a response or act as if no such call existed. Such forms of reciprocity must not be mistaken for some kind of "*quid pro quo*" bargaining arrangement; rather, they require a genuine self-giving or self-transcending mode of response.⁴²

This self-transcending mode of response is designated as "sympathy" by Scheler, and it represents a fundamental presupposition of his theory of community. Sympathy comes to the fore as the overcoming of our "natural egocentrism". Although we are born into an undifferentiated life-stream, we gradually separate ourselves from others in the direction of a quasi-solipsism which can be overcome only by deliberate acts of sympathy.⁴³ Sympathy is oriented to the essence of the person of the other; it institutes in us both a recognition of his point of view and of a value in him that is comparable to our own. By sympathy we accept the feelings of others. Though we

understand them, we do not really live them, and hence we maintain a strong sense of our own existence as well as of that of the other. This "psychic distance," which distinguishes sympathy from "psychic and emotional identification contagion," is crucial.⁴⁴ In addition to being a foundation of community, sympathy has different levels of moral value, depending both on the other emotions involved and on the values of the persons so related. Its greatest importance, however, is in being a step to the higher act of love, which in addition to having a special role in value-cognition, is more profound, more stable, and a more individualized and spontaneous mode of participation in the other.⁴⁵

The overall moral thrust of Scheler's philosophy of society and community is to encourage the promotion of "person-community" as the aim of our social efforts. We cannot live without life-communities of different forms, and we need the organization and continuity provided by society and its rules. The full realization of ourselves and others, however, is achieved only in person-community.⁴⁶

Phenomenology of Values and Existentialism

Though it is not our purpose here to review the critical response to Scheler's axiology, it is noteworthy that this criticism covered a broad spectrum of endorsements and rejections. The most crucial reaction for the future of Scheler's theories came, perhaps, in the context of the existentialist movement, which in joining with phenomenology absorbed, transformed, or rejected many of its theses. Rejection is perhaps most evident in the case of value-theory, for with Heidegger and Sartre the notion of "objective value" becomes a serious deterrent to authentic existence. In other cases, however, the reactions of existentially oriented thinkers have been rather mixed, if not ambivalent.

Here, Marcel is particularly instructive. He does not, of course, accept any of the standard labels. He is not an "existentialist" but a "neo-Socratic," yet he has worked insightfully on the meaning and quality of human existence. He is not a phenomenologist in the technical sense, yet his careful and nuanced descriptions have given him a distinct rapport with that movement.⁴⁷ He is actively interested in the question of value, but his dread of the "spirit of abstraction" makes him equally suspect of it. In *Homo Viator*, ethical value is taken as the equivalent of "absolute transcendence"; value operates as a "promise of immortality" and "puts the seal on life".⁴⁸ In the later work, *Man Against Mass Society*, however, Marcel emphasizes the dangers which are inherent in the fact that philosophies of value draw the term value from an economic and utilitarian context where it functions primarily as modes of instrumentalization and depersonalization.⁴⁹ It is true that in *Homo Viator* values in an honorific sense are contrasted with "pseudo-values", and one might therefore conclude that, in the later work, "value" is simply substituted for "pseudo-value". But the difference is still more fundamental, as can be seen from the fact that his remedy for "value-judgments" in *Man Against Mass Society* omits the notion of value altogether, stressing instead the notions of "intersubjectivity", presence, openness, and freedom.⁵⁰

Ricoeur's Philosophy of Value

Paul Ricoeur continues the work of Husserl, Scheler, and others in the phenomenological movement, but he also shows the influence of existentialists such as Heidegger, Marcel, Merleau-Ponty, and Nabert, and of such historical figures as Plato, Kant, and Hegel. His own work has not focused at length on value-theory as such, since his major undertaking has been a philosophy of the will, including questions of freedom, fallibility, and the meaning of man. The projected final

volume of the philosophy of the will deal with the questions of value and ethics in a "poetics of the good". In the interval, however, it is possible to pick out some of his views on values and ethics while recognizing the incomplete, tentative and possibly temporary nature of these views.

In the context of his discussion of motivation, Ricoeur expresses partial agreement with Scheler's notion of a material *a priori* of values connected with individual affectivity. However, values are "historialized" according to Scheler's term, that is, they reveal themselves only in terms of the unfolding of history in the sense that "there are no moral constants, alongside of or above various judgments, feelings, and mores, but that, rather, varying history is a mode of appearance of a moral *a priori*."⁵¹ In other words, values are not "contemplative essences" but are recognized only through the mediation of action and history. For this reason, Ricoeur does not totally oppose Sartre's conception of value as deriving totally from individual choice. "It is no exaggeration to say that we decipher the good by our own devotion: an *a prioristic* interpretation of values will stretch that far."⁵²

Ricoeur's initial concern is to show how values are derived from motives within the basic project that embodies man's freedom. A project is "an opening of possibilities in the world and especially the possibilities of imputation of myself as self-determination". Motives are these possibilities, provided they are distinguished from causes (as determinists and Sartre do not do): a cause is "knowable and understood prior to its effects", but a motive does "not have a complete meaning apart from the decision which refers to it".⁵³ Like causes, motives include an element of force or receptivity. Nevertheless, they are not received in a merely passive stance, since in being motivated the will also finds "meaning" or reasons "because of" which it can act, which provide it with "an impulsion and a legitimization".⁵⁴ Thus motives are the "lived reasons" that solicit my action in the context of the project; as such, they also represent as the object of implicit evaluation a "feeling contained in the project itself." Consequently, "it is the project which has a value", though only implicitly. When I question the legitimacy of my project, "and thus my own value, because the project is myself," the moment of reflection arises in a "dialectic of thrust and reflection". This is the explicit moment of formal valuation or value judgment when values emerge "as such". If there is no immediate return to the project, that is, if the project and its action are suspended for further reflection, value judgments lose the future orientation of the project that characterizes motives and, instead, "express present value, as 'this is good'."⁵⁵

Value and Ethics

At this point of reflection, according to Ricoeur, ethics begins, but first of all only in the negative sense of "abstracting away the thrust of the project in which prereflexive valuation is embedded". Ethics then takes the positive form of value judgments of comparison which, in turn, as the basis of comparison, presuppose a horizon of "non-revaluated values as a constellation of fixed stars".⁵⁶ The anguish involved in this on-going questioning eventually pushes reflection to question the ultimate values themselves, and hence also the project within which they have meaning. This anxiety is a symptom of the truth in Scheler's "emotional revelation of values", though not in the specific sense in which Scheler makes this revelation independent of the individual's project, dedication, and loyalty. That is, if we encounter values in "motivating a project", it is "of the essence of value not to appear except as a possible motive of decision". Hence, the "emotional *a priori*" has a meaning only if it is not expelled from history, but replaced in its "context of dedication".⁵⁷ In this context the *a priori* will be manifest in the interrelationships of values, but certain values will predominate in particular historical epochs (honor is feudal,

tolerance is 18th century, etc.). These retain the quality of that period, so that we must properly speak of *a prioris* in the plural. Thus, "with Royce and Marcel", Ricoeur will say that values are not "timeless ideas", but "supra-personal existences" whose appearance is "tied to a certain history".⁵⁸ Paradoxically, Ricoeur insists, in this view value is not invented but recognized, respected, and discovered. Yet ethics will "founder in bottomless anxiety" unless it returns constantly to the thrust of the project, and the "generosity of freedom".⁵⁹

Organic Values and Social Values

Some of the further implications of Ricoeur's remarks about value in general and its relation to ethics are brought out in his development of the organic (bodily) and social dimensions of value. The body is described by Ricoeur as "the most basic source of motives, revealing a primordial stratum of values: organic values. All other values assume a serious, dramatic significance through a comparison with the values that enter history through my body."⁶⁰ Here, the body is the existential or lived involuntary that calls for and bodies forth the voluntary. Ricoeur's analysis is especially intricate here: the body generates the need for pleasure, which lack characterizes the content or "matter" of desire. Desire, in turn, has a form, which is the imaginary anticipation of pleasure that adds "overtones of value" to what would otherwise be sheer representation of absence.⁶¹ Then, on its own, so to speak, imagination builds on instances of satisfaction of need already experienced, thus taking on the role of "virtual knowledge of value", which is "latent valuation at the fringe of judgment".⁶² But pleasure and pain, though central, are not the only motivations on the organic level; they set the pattern for motivation, but do not exhaust it. For example, the "useful" which is not as such organic can "enter into conflict with pleasure and pain, on the same level of life, for the sake of pleasure and pain". In this way "the difficult" can take on the aspect of "good".⁶³ Consequently, there is no such value as "life" itself, Ricoeur argues, except insofar as it is unified under the threat of death or in relation to other values which are chosen through "sacrifice".⁶⁴

The real advantage of a consideration of organic values, however, is that it opens up the "total field of motivation". Specifically, the level of the body must be compared with the "level of history", i.e., social values. The body is the "affective medium of all values; a value can reach me only as dignifying a motive, and no motive can incline me if it does not impress my sensibility".⁶⁵ This point is only reinforced by the various attempts of the sociological school to show that collective representations penetrate into the individual through effects, feelings, etc., which showed at least that social values enter into competition with vital need. Unfortunately, the tendency of the sociological school has been to see this influence of social values as a mechanical imposition or causation, thereby losing sight of the crucial role played by the will and its freedom. In actuality, Ricoeur argues, the role of the social can be understood by analogy with the organic, but in neither of these is the motive a cause: "just as I have not chosen my body, I have not chosen my historical situation, but both the one and the other are the locus of my responsibility." Furthermore, neither the body nor history is an object, except for an unsituated spectator.⁶⁶

What primarily differentiates the social from the organic is the encounter with "something superior, with a transcendence", viz., an authority above me. This is the "specific appeal [prestige] which presents the good of the community in which I participate to my sensibility".⁶⁷ This prestige is experienced as a "decentering", which can be exemplified by his example of the demand of justice which "consists in principle of a decentering of perspective by which the perspective of the other--the need, the claim of the other--balances my perspective."⁶⁸

Prestige has two contrary aspects: obligation and attraction. In obligation my "own life is humbled by the values put into action by institutions and structures jointly constituted by the diverse demands of individual men". The lower limit of obligation is constraint, which is experienced as an anonymous dead weight, and is a sign of the dehumanization of values. Obligation ceases to be constraint "when the values illustrated by mores assume someone's face, . . . are embodied by genuine persons."⁶⁹ True justice is a form of this level of obligation.

Attraction is more basic than obligation because it is more concrete or real. It has an upper limit in the form of "appeal", which is a fundamental structure of intersubjectivity. Community does not merely fulfill my need nor does it constitute an ideal value; "in community it is the other as a thou, as an alter ego, to whom and whose welfare I respond and with whom I become a whole within a `we'."⁷⁰ Appeal or vocation, notes Ricoeur, actually transcends the order of motivation (just as constraint falls short of it):

There are some encounters which do not simply present me with reasons for living which I can evaluate and approve but which truly function as a conversion of the heart of willing and have the force of genuine spiritual rebirth. Such encounters create freedom. They set me free.⁷¹

As creative, such encounters belong to the order of "poetics" which will be dealt with in Ricoeur's final volume of the philosophy of the will. They include certain instances of friendship or love which are not public or social, but essentially private relations that transcend the rule of justice.

Consequently, we must say that the range of social values is restricted to a "middle zone" between the upper limit of appeal or vocation, and the lower limit of constraint. In this middle zone, the other is not the "thou" of friendship but a "*socius*," a fellow citizen, the subject of right. The value of the other here is always seen indirectly, "through a labyrinth of social situations in which it becomes fragmented into incommensurable values: equality and hierarchy, justice and order, etc."⁷² Thus, the "thou" or "neighbor" is reached only in the interstices of the relationships to the *socius*, so that the institution would often seem to be an obstacle to the "neighborly" by reason of its "objectifications", depersonalizations, subtle exploitations, and inertia.

This opposition between community (I-Thou) and society should not be taken in an ultimately antinomic sense, for the two are mutually dependent. They are dialectically related and require one another to such a degree that they cannot be extricated or ultimately judged in history:

The ultimate meaning of institutions is the service they render to persons . . . [but] no one can evaluate the personal benefit produced by institutions . . . [charity] is hidden in the humble, abstract services performed by post offices and social security officials; quite often it is the hidden meaning of the social realm.⁷³

The Scientific and the Technological

As fundamental forms of the "utilitarian" or instrumental dimension of social values, the technological and scientific as such cannot be a threat to the personal, for, in the mind of Ricoeur, they share the "innocence" of means. By the same token, however, they are not and should not be made the controlling values in the social. Nevertheless, in an essay on the survival of national cultures Ricoeur observes that they have a special importance today. Such cultures are built around

an "ethical-mythical nucleus" which is a system of social values embodied in a set of attitudes toward life that "valorize tools" (values are goals, tools are means).⁷⁴ This concept resembles Scheler's notion of the *ethos* and the other levels of variations; but for Ricoeur, there are only four levels of attitudes forming the "deposit of values". The most superficial of these is that of customs, which share in the inertia of tools. Less superficial is the second level, that of institutions which are the reflections of the attitudes represented by the images and symbols constituting the basic ideals of a nation, the "awakened dream" of a historical group (the third level). But these ideals must always be interpreted in terms of a fourth level, that of a fundamental creativity, found, e.g., in the artist, which shares a different temporality than that of tools since it is not a matter of "accumulation and progress" but of innovation and renewal.⁷⁵ Ricoeur's question is, "under what conditions can the cultural creativity of a nation continue" in the face of the erosive influence of the universal, scientific, and economic civilization? His answer is, survival can be achieved only by "a culture capable of assimilating scientific rationality". This, in turn, depends upon a faith that "integrates a desacralization of nature and brings the sacred back to man" in order for a nation to take up the technical exploitation of nature.⁷⁶

Formalism and Ethical Rules

Though the above references to cultural levels and to the importance of the sacred indicate a resemblance between Scheler and Ricoeur, they should not blind us to the important differences which focus around the term "creativity" and the incommensurability of values revealed in "the affective indistinctness of motives". Does the consideration of regions of value and cultural levels yield some device for ordering the ethical--some simple, formal ethical rule such as Scheler's prescription that *ceteris paribus* one should always act to realize the higher over the lower? Ricoeur's answer would seem to be negative, even if a hierarchy does stand out in affectivity, it is not necessarily an absolute hierarchy. Because choice is concerned with an evident good, an *a priori* value has to be tested as the actual meaning of an affect in order to become this specific value. In turn, this means that any comparisons of better or worse are always shifting, incomplete, and subject to replacement. Hence, any hierarchy is at best precarious.⁷⁷

In addition, we must always be concerned with the gap between the rule we accept based on a value and our concrete decision--for bridging this gap requires an element of invention with its concomitant inexactness. In addition, the urgency of many situations imposes improvisations and cruel options. Finally, some values simply resist systematization. While, abstractly considered, "life" is subordinated to other values in a hierarchical scale, the value of "my life", to which I am primordially attached and which is the condition for the realization of higher values, is "extra-systematic" in the concrete situation.⁷⁸

This same "disorder" is even more active in the area of social values. As Ricoeur describes it, values tried out by others and illustrated by different historical epochs "accumulate within us in sedimentary levels":

There is within us a feudal conscience, gravitating around honor and knightly heroism, a Christian conscience centered on love and forgiveness, a bourgeois conscience whose tone is set by ideas of liberty and toleration, a modern conscience, enamored of justice and equality.⁷⁹

The individual conscience reflects this "disorder". From the outside society seems to be a homogeneous milieu in the form of concentric circles of humanity, nation, profession, and family, with the individual at the center. As lived, however, "these multiple circles represent claims, obligations, pressures and appeals which infringe upon one another and demand from us incompatible actions." The most anguishing of these conflicts, Ricoeur points out, is the conflict of love and justice which arises when the "intransigence of our principles encounters tact, the consideration we owe those we love." It is precisely from this conflict of duties that the person emerges. "A person has to create his own unity, his independence, his originality, and to dare his own style of life."⁸⁰

Does the Kantian categorical imperative, the rule of the universalization of our maxims, resolve the problem of the disorder of values and the conflict of duties? Though Kantian formalism has much more value for Ricoeur than for Scheler, the formal principle remains secondary and derivative, its prestige being "purloined from the 'material' value of the other". Nevertheless, it still has the basic but subordinate function of submitting the authenticity of our feelings to the critical test. "A project cannot be noxious to the other if it is universalizable". This formal criterion is one of control in that it is "subordinate to the eruption of the concern for the other as other into my life, . . . it presupposes a surge of *Mitsein* into *Selbstsein*".⁸¹ In addition to the controlling function it also has a function of being a substitute, a temporary expedient, whenever I cease to live spontaneously, "passionately", the "material" values of social life. "Lacking fidelity to another, I content myself with remaining constant, with living in harmony with myself." Yet, the formal principle is still irreducible to collective imperatives or material values. It does not produce a motive, at least not a reason for doing something, but simply a "reason for reasoning". Ultimately, this means to "create a zone of silence so that the respect for the other can speak as strongly as the devotion to my life".⁸²

Respect

It is in this notion of "respect" that Ricoeur finds the most fruitful contribution from Kant, and he uses it to criticize Scheler's emphasis on sympathy.⁸³ Ricoeur argues that respect more effectively accomplishes the function Scheler assigned to sympathy of discovering the other and his value. Scheler's approach involved not only an unwarranted privileging of sympathy, but also a series of equivocations that spoiled its hoped-for "revelatory clarity". Respect is more adequate to the sense for the other because it includes a more marked sense of "phenomenological distance" required for the recognition of otherness. This is done by including a moment of "negativity"--the opposition of consciousnesses as irreducible to a means. Furthermore, in contrast to sympathy which proceeds by steps, in respect both the value ("ought-to-be") and the existence of the other are posited simultaneously. These are summed up in the notion of "humanity" or "objective end" considered as the "supreme restrictive condition of all subjective ends".⁸⁴

Because it is both affective and historical (social), respect can both subsume and correct sympathy by integrating it into the practical or ethical. Indeed, in so doing, respect coordinates sympathy with its opposite, "struggle". Where sympathy is private, intimate, and emotive, struggle energizes those human relationships which are less vital and more marked by work, the appropriation of things, and the "brick of power", that is, the forces that move history.⁸⁵ Struggle therefore historicizes sympathy, while sympathy "intimizes" interhuman relations. By its critique respect corrects one by the other.

The moment of recognition of the other is not speculative but practical; it is a consenting of the will and positing of the existence-value of the other. As Ricoeur interprets the implications of the Kantian notion of respect, the person is neither an experienced plenitude nor a substance, but a projected self or "is-to-be": "the person is a way of treating others and of treating oneself".⁸⁶ This places respect at the "moment of adhesion" (Camus) as "the testimonial of an I am beyond factual being". In this light my dignity is in reciprocity with the being and dignity--the existence-value--of the other.⁸⁷ Dignity thus gives one's sense of value a firm integration with being. This point is particularly important for Ricoeur since he has taken a position in very strong opposition to any hypostatization of Value or "the idols of Value" and in very firm support of the Heideggerian "obedience to Being" in which value and fact are unified. Only such a position, he feels, will enable one to surpass the "ethics of prohibition and punishment" and reach an "ethics of the desire to be or the effort to exist".⁸⁸

Values and Symbols

We must ask ourselves now whether it is possible to extend the phenomenological approach to values and ethics beyond the point it has reached in Ricoeur. More specifically, we must ask whether the light of his tentative and unfinished reflections might illumine indications for further development from other dimensions of his thought.⁸⁹ Two such indicators suggest themselves: the closely connected concepts of symbol and language.

We might pose our question this way: Ricoeur has not developed a very specific notion of the ontic status of values beyond his objections to assertions such as those of Scheler which understand value as objective essences or qualities. Certainly, in the context of motivation, we can say that values are "meaningful possibilities", or simply "meanings", but beyond that context what is the status of these meanings? Ricoeur has given extensive consideration to the notion of meanings as symbols, but in a way that diverges from much contemporary theory on symbols. For many today, symbol is simply another word for "sign" understood as a one-dimensional reference or a single intentionality. For Ricoeur this simple and transparent aiming-beyond-itself as in the symbols of mathematics and logic is characteristic of "technical signs". But the symbol, for Ricoeur, conceals in its aim a "double intentionality": a first or literal one, and a second or analogous one that is built upon the first. Thus the literal meaning of the symbol "defilement" or "impurity" is stain. But upon this first intentionality there is erected a second, which, through the physically "unclean", points to a certain situation of man in the sacred which is precisely that of being defiled or impure. Furthermore, the second meaning is given only through the first.

This capacity or depth of the symbol is crucial for Ricoeur's theory since it distinguishes the symbol from the allegory with which it is readily confused. In the allegory the secondary meaning is external enough to the primary to be directly accessible. Hence, the relation between the two is not one of interpretation, but of translation, and the allegory can be dropped as useless once the translation is made. With symbols the two levels of meaning cannot be separated: "it is by living in the first meaning that I am led by it beyond itself".⁹⁰ An important implication of this "plurivocity" of the symbol is that, unlike a comparison which we "consider from the outside", the symbol "is the movement of the primary meaning which makes us participate in the latent meaning and thus assimilates us to that which is symbolized without our being able to master the similitude intellectually". Thus, the symbol is "donative" inasmuch as it gives its analogical meaning.⁹¹ This is also why the reading of symbols is hermeneutics, rather than translation or explanation.

Ricoeur devoted his main reflections on symbols to the "symbolism of evil" which is a species of "cosmic" symbol and to oneiric or dream symbols. The first of these analyses is so rich in ethical implications that one might be tempted to read off a theory of the symbolism of value as the "reverse side" of the symbolism of evil or disvalue. However, Ricoeur's reflections on the "figure of the prophet" seem to suggest a more direct route. These reflections occur in a lecture, "Modern Criticism of the Sense of Guilt",⁹² whose purpose is to show that the "most virulent" of modern criticisms of the feeling of individual guilt--those of Freud, Marx, and the existentialism of Nietzsche and Sartre--are also, when read correctly, the most helpful instruments for the transformation of guilt-feeling from the inauthentic and neurotic to the adult and authentic. The thrust of this critique is summed up and embodied in the figure of the prophet, who consequently is the most efficacious "face" of the good--who not only condemns me but "personalizes" me as well. There are many possible biblical and non-biblical examples of this figure, but they all have the character of being both "far and near"--of speaking from a "distance, of being the absolute stranger", as well as appealing to my most interior motivation, "my love for the other". In this figure we find a central symbol of social value as concretized in affective personal response. It is analogous to Scheler's notion of "models", though with important differences, for Scheler's models are instrumental in implementing growth that reflects the already constituted "world of values", whereas the prophet for Ricoeur inspires personal response in such a way as to promote new value-awareness based on the creation of new possibilities. The "prophet" fits into the category Ricoeur has called the "prospective symbol"--"creations of meaning, which, taking over traditional symbols with their available polysomy, convey new meanings".⁹³ The special helpfulness of Ricoeur's approach is that, in a few sentences, he gives us "criteria" for distinguishing the "true" prophet from the "false", for the prophet not only challenges the institutional frameworks but is "recognized as a word that comes from the 'law written in men's hearts'".⁹⁴ We might also note the "double intentionality" of Ricoeur's prophet: he not only addresses current ills in the "patent" meaning of his message, but evokes a generalized concern for future problems and possible solutions in the "latent" meaning. The prophet Nathan, Ricoeur tells us, challenged not only David's mistreatment of Uriah and Bathsheeba, but also the general pattern of injustice found in sexual relations at that time, thereby helping to sensitize against future exploitation.⁹⁵ Or we may think of a Martin Luther King who, in attacking the specific evil of bus discrimination, mobilized a whole pattern of concern that (hopefully) continues to revolutionize national attitudes on racism.

Social Values and Language

If values are "symbols" in Ricoeur's sense, we can readily note that they are usually not approached that way in ordinary discourse. Rather, they have very often become what Ricoeur has called "sedimented symbols"--"the debris of symbols, stereotyped and fragmented, less usual than used, which have only a past." At other times, however, we can say that they are "symbols in their ordinary function": "symbols in use, useful and utilized, which have a past and a present and which in the synchrony of a given society, serve as the gauge of the group of social pacts."⁹⁶ But values are not often understood in the "prospective" or creative sense mentioned above. Hence our present question is how these different levels of value-meanings/symbols can be integrated or at least reconciled.

Ricoeur's reflections on philosophy of language approach the question of levels of meaning by beginning with the deliverances of contemporary linguistic science, primarily the complex and powerful structural analyses on the phonological and semiological levels from de Saussure,

Hjelmslev and others. On the semiological level, the structural model entails a radical rethinking of the basic semantic unit, the word, in terms of its "oppositive" relations to other words. Within these interrelations, the word is not a "sign" or a "pointer", but an element in a system defined by its differences from other elements. In essence this is a refined version of the "lexical" meaning of a word as it is defined by contrast with other words.

The crucial question posed by Ricoeur is how this semiological entity leaves the system and becomes a component of the speech act. This occurs through the intermediary of the sentence or "speech event". The sentence gives the word a semantic function, by referring it to its object in the world. Enriched by this moment of "use", the word returns to the system, and "restructures" it by adjusting it to its newly acquired nuance of meaning.⁹⁷ Of course, this "restructuring" is imperceptible, except in the broad picture formed by the diachronic "drift" of a language of which it is the source.

If we continue the analogy here, we can say that values are "available meanings" that light up a region of action and provide the possibilities among which motivation will make its path. As such, they are structured in a lexical sense, that is, each value is defined in terms of other values and in levels of generality. They might even be said to form a hierarchical pattern by reason of their greater or less power to combine or reconcile other values. In this system, they have a "factuality" that can be described, they are in the "indicative mood" and they are susceptible of a "contemplative" attitude and of appraisal. During the course of action, however, they leave the system and become concrete motives, thus submitting to the governance of decision, the thrust of the project, and the "irruption of the subject". Action in the area of values, then, is like the sentence in speech: it involves choice, reference to the object (motives), new combinations, and self-expression of the subject.

This implies the question of what it is that keeps our actions from becoming arbitrary and inconsistent. Pursuing the analogy between word and value further with Ricoeur, we can note that every word is "polysemic", that is, that "at a given moment a word has more than one meaning, that its multiple meanings belong to the same state of system." Every word is, in principle, analogous, metaphorical, plurivocal. How then do we achieve univocity (or plurivocity)? This is accomplished by the context: in univocal discourse, the context "hides the semantic richness of words . . . by establishing an 'isotopie,' a frame of reference, a theme, an identical topic for all the words of a sentence." If the context "sustains several isotopies at the same time, we will be dealing with an actually symbolic language, which in saying one thing, says something else." The full scope of symbolic language is found in the poem in which "the polysemy of our words is then liberated", and "allows all the semantic values to be mutually reinforced".⁹⁸

We would suggest that in the context of value-activity, commitment is analogous to what has just been said concerning the context of speaking. This will be a lived commitment, embodied in a communal or individual "style" of life and at times virtually on the level of passive acceptance. Ordinarily, commitment establishes a context in which values are seen univocally, with clearly defined "parameters", where conformity and consistency are general norms. At other times, when no one is really living these commitments, the values involved become "sedimented symbols"--ossified and stereotyped remnants of the past. Normally, however, they will be lived. In the course of action they will take on accumulated use-values and manifest gradual alterations similar to the "drift" of a language, with efficiency, utility, and economy as guiding rules. Here there will be a definite predictability of value-change and even a "science of values" would be possible.⁹⁹

There are also times when our commitments have to be questioned, and when a social, political, or marital bond would be loosened--at least enough to allow the consideration of the

possibility of new loyalties, allegiances, and fidelities, or some deepening of the old. In such cases, the context allows the polysemy of our values to come to the fore, and we are seriously and anxiously searching out new possibilities, new meanings by way of the old. These "crisis-situations" may or may not come up against the sanctioned institutions of our society, but when they do, there result the various forms of ethical social conflict and disputes, as distinguished from the varieties of unreasoned and compulsive deviation from social values. On this second level, there would appear to be a certain continuity and stability, but also more contingency and unpredictability than are found on the first level and therefore less likelihood of a "science of values". But radical social change on a broad scale--revolutions or fundamental renewals in social values--would seem to presuppose something more profound and dramatic--something in the order of "creation", of the "poetic". This third or highest level of symbolic awareness would correspond to a case where the fuller implications of an action are examined, accompanied by a deeper sense of self-origination or spontaneity in the reexamining and revising of prevailing value-patterns. But it would also seem to require a greater power of communication, authenticity of expression, and force of conviction--in a word, "charisma". Thus, here again we encounter the figure of the prophet "who speaks to my inmost being". Moreover, this level would also seem to include the moment of "adhesion to being" referred to above, wherein the "ontological weight" of values is felt most fully, and thus represents a singular "openness to the absolute"--a rare but important moment in human events.

Some ethical implications of this symbolic-linguistic model are discernible. In ordinary life situations, we are justified in conforming to the pattern of social values prevailing in the culture of our birth or loyalty, just as we conform to its language, so long as we do not debase its value system by hypocritical and slavish "conformism". However, we should also be constantly alert to the possible relevance of symbolic dimensions revealing new or unexpected aspects of meaning in our accepted social values. This is the traditional moment of conversion or readiness for change. In addition we should be listening for the prophetic principle in whatever way it might announce itself, and for the enlightenment and energy that come only from this highest of personal dimensions.

In order to illustrate this ethical approach, we might instance Ricoeur's analysis of the ethical dimension of sexuality. Sexuality was born under the sign of the sacred in human experience. Perhaps its most fundamental change has been the diminishing of this sense of the sacred, or rather its transmutation into a new ideal of marital sex as interpersonal expression--the "ethic of tenderness." Because the impulse behind sexuality, i.e., eros, is ambivalent, this ethic of tenderness is constantly threatened by "the restless desire for pleasure" which is eroticism. Consequently marriage is not primarily a norm or an ideal, but a task, the "cardinal wager of our culture in regard to sex".¹⁰⁰ Because this wager is never entirely won, especially today marriage as a value--or as a valued institution embodying a constellation of values--must be reexamined, and transformed by tenderness in order to amplify its promotion of the interpersonal.

At this point of our civilization, therefore, it should be part of our personal project to respect the past without simply repeating it, to accept the possibility of change, and to undertake this reexamination and "wager" as part of our commitment. Although Ricoeur does not speak of this, it may well be that only a new manifestation of the prophetic principle, a new cultural dramatization of the importance of marriage, can enable us successfully to navigate the present crisis.

Conclusion

Our review of two approaches in the phenomenological tradition to the question of social values and ethics has inevitably been compendious and incomplete. All the parts have not fitted neatly together, for there is no smooth continuity from Scheler to Ricoeur. Nevertheless, the differences between them are not always as sharp as the varying styles and terminology would seem to indicate. We could say that Scheler puts much more emphasis on value as object and Ricoeur on the evaluating subject; yet Ricoeur does not deny the "objectivity" of value, and Scheler tries to bring out the role of the personal subject in his individual and social perspectives. By grounding our evaluations in the matrix of action and motivation, however, Ricoeur has given the phenomenological approach a greater sensitivity to both the spontaneity and the receptivity of our value-experience, and to the dynamic character of its articulations with the historical context. He has, in short, made us more aware of how our individual project is integral with the social project of our world. It has been our overall intention to indicate how phenomenology can do justice both to the broad sweep of the value-ethics question and to its particular complexities, and to suggest some further directions in which it might be developed. In so doing it has been implied that phenomenology can make its contribution to avoiding the dead-end that Ricoeur has detected in modern philosophy of value by which we are condemned to oscillate between an "impossible fabrication of values and an impossible intuition of values".¹⁰¹

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Notes

1. For a survey of figures in the phenomenological movement, see H. Spiegelberg, *The Phenomenological Movement*, 2 vol. (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960).
2. *Ibid.*, p. 232. See also, F. Olafson, *Principles and Persons* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), p. 65.
3. M. Frings and R. Funk (trans.), *Formalism in Ethics* (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1973).
4. *Ibid.*, pp. (Eng: 255-259)
5. *Ibid.*, p. (Eng: 259).
6. *Ibid.*, pp. (Eng: pp. 328-369).
7. *Ibid.*, p. (Eng: 342).
8. *Ibid.*, p. (Eng: 343).
9. D. von Hildebrand, *Christian Ethics* (New York: McKay, 1953), ch. XVII.
10. M. Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, trans. by P. Heath (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1954), p. 153.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 157.
12. M. Dupuy, *La Philosophie de Max Scheler*, Vol. II (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1959), pp. 487-89.
13. *Form.*, pp. (Eng: 19-20).
14. *Ibid.*, p. (Eng: xxix).
15. *Ibid.*, pp. (Eng: 86-100).
16. *Ibid.*, pp. (Eng: 100-104).
17. *Ibid.*, pp. (Eng: 97-100).

18. *Ibid.*, pp. (Eng: 508-512).
19. *Ibid.*, p. (Eng: 27).
20. *Ibid.*, p. (Eng: 203).
21. *Ibid.*, pp. (Eng: 210-232).
22. *Ibid.*, pp. (Eng: 138ff).
23. *Ibid.*, pp. (Eng: 186-188).
24. *Ibid.*, p. (Eng: 108).
25. *Ibid.*, (Eng: n. 85).
26. *Ibid.*, pp. (Eng: 295-317).
27. *Ibid.*, p. (Eng: 302).
28. *Ressentiment*, trans. by W. Holdheim (New York: Free Press, 1961).
29. *Form.*, p. (Eng: 299).
30. *Ibid.*, p. (Eng: 301).
31. *Ibid.*, p. (Eng: 309).
32. *Ibid.*, p. (Eng: 314).
33. *Ibid.*, p. (Eng: 572).
34. *Ibid.*, p. (Eng: 578).
35. *Ibid.*, p. (Eng: 578).
36. Cf. M. Dupuy, *op. cit.*, pp. 558-61.
37. *Form.*, pp. 129-30. The "deduction" might not seem to be very exact, since there are four value-modalities but five types of "models". The explanation is that a fifth modality is introduced in Part II of the *Formalismus*, viz., the "useful" to which the "leader" corresponds as "spiritual pioneer of civilization". Cf. Dupuy, *op. cit.*, p. 559n.
38. M. Scheler, "Vorbilder und Fuhrer", *Schriften Aus Dem Nachlass*, Band I, Collected Works, Vol. X (Bern: Francke, 1957), pp. 262-63.
39. *Form.*, pp. (Eng: 519-524).
40. *Ibid.*, pp. (Eng: 525-527).
41. *Ibid.* pp. (Eng: 527-532).
42. *Ibid.*, pp. (Eng: 532-586).
43. M. Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, trans. by P. Heath (New Haven: Yale, 1954), pp. 8-36; 243-64.
44. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-26.
45. M. Dupuy, *op. cit.*, pp. 428-29.
46. Cf. E. Ranly, "Ethics of Community", *Proceedings of American Catholic Philosophical Association*, XLII (1968), 152-57. It is quite understandable, therefore, that Scheler would see a specifically religious dimension in "person-community", even equating it, at its highest, with the Christian notion of "mystical body". But in referring to it as a "collective person" (*Gesamtperson*) he raised the spectre of an overarching collectivity that would absorb its individual members in a way that goes contrary to his personalistic intentions. This may well be why he appears to have discarded the notion of collective person in his later works. Cf. E. Ranly, Scheler's *Phenomenology of Community* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966), p. 101.
47. Cf. Spiegelberg, *op. cit.*, p. 423.
48. G. Marcel, *Homo Viator* (Chicago: Regnery, 1951), p. 141.
49. G. Marcel, *Man Against Mass Society* (Chicago: Regnery, 1962) pp. 168-72.
50. *Ibid.*, pp. 184-92.

51. P. Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary*, trans. by E. Kohak (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1966) p. 72n.
52. *Ibid.*
53. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
54. *Ibid.*, p. 68.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
56. *Ibid.*, p. 74.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.
59. *Ibid.*, p. 79.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 85.
61. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 104.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 110.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 121.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 122.
66. *Ibid.*, pp. 122-25.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 126. The French text has "*prestige*" which the translator, otherwise generally judicious, has rendered "appeal" and thus made it difficult to distinguish the use here from the more specific meaning occurring below.
68. *Ibid.*
69. *Ibid.*
70. *Ibid.*, pp. 127-28.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
72. *Ibid.*, p. 129.
73. P. Ricoeur, "The *Socius* and the Neighbor," *History and Truth* (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press), p. 109.
74. P. Ricoeur, "Universal Civilization and National Cultures," *History and Truth*, p. 276.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 278.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 282.
77. P. Ricoeur, *Freedom and Nature*, p. 146.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 147.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
80. *Ibid.*
81. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 133.
83. "Sympathie et Respect," *Revue de metaphysique et de morale*, LIX (1954), 391.
84. *Ibid.*, p. 389.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 394.
86. P. Ricoeur, *Fallible Man*, trans. by C. Kelbley (Chicago: Regnery, 1965), p. 110.
87. P. Ricoeur, "Negativity and Primary Affirmation," *History and Truth*, p. 323.
88. P. Ricoeur (and Alasdair MacIntyre), *The Religious Significance of Atheism* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 71-75. These basic points in Ricoeur's ethics have received development but not radical alteration in his article, "The Problem of the Foundation of Moral Philosophy", (*Philosophy Today*, Fall, 1978, pp. 175-192). Here there is a sharpening of the critique of legalism (norms, rules, imperatives), an amplification of the intersubjectivity stage of

moral experience, and a greater emphasis on the "institutional" character of value. The critique of Scheler is sharper, yet the basic agreement is maintained: Just as no one begins language, Ricoeur says, so "no one has been able to demonstrate either that that someone ever invented a value, in the way that one creates a work of art through the free play of the imagination and understanding." (p. 180)

89. We do not wish to imply, in any way, that our suggestions here anticipate or parallel the further development of Ricoeur's concepts; they are simply made under his inspiration.

90. P. Ricoeur, *The Symbolism of Evil*, trans. by E. Buchanan (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 15.

91. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

92. Unpublished monograph.

93. P. Ricoeur, *De l'interpretation* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1965), p. 486.

94. "Modern Criticism of the Sense of Guilt".

95. *Ibid.*

96. P. Ricoeur, *De l'interpretation*, *loc. cit.*

97. P. Ricoeur, "Structure--Word--Event," trans. by R. Sweeney, *Philosophy Today*, XII (1968), 120.21. Ricoeur's hermeneutics has gone well beyond the theory of symbol and language into theories of metaphor and narrative. But there is no radical alteration in this development, it seems to me: it is still based on a structural construal of the elements of the "textual" system involved and an interpretative stance grounded in the existential spontaneity of the subject but guided by the distancing demands of the "world of the text". (Gadamer). To be sure, there are new metaphysical emphases, e.g., time, (cf. *Temps et recit* (3 vols.) (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1984-85). This work also includes new insights into the (valuing) subject, e.g., "narrative identity" and "horizon of expectation".

98. *Ibid.*, p. 127.

99. As proposed, for example, in K. Baier and N. Rescher (eds.), *Values and the Future* (New York: Free Press, 1969).

100. P. Ricoeur, "Wonder--Eroticism--Enigma", *Cross Currents* (1964), 136.

101. P. Ricoeur (and A. MacIntyre), *The Religious Significance of Atheism*, p. 71.

Chapter IX Ethics and a Secular Christianity

Paul M. Van Buren

The Possibility of a Secular Christianity

A secular Christianity does not in fact exist at present; it may exist sometime in the future. I do not wish to indulge in crystal-ball gazing on so important a topic as the future of Christianity, but there are moments in which I am inclined to think that unless a secular Christianity does emerge, the future of Christianity's possibilities for being of help to a secular world appears dim. I mention this in order to indicate for the reader the point of view from which this essay is written. It is that of one who is exploring the possibility of a secular Christianity, not simply as a game or as a hypothetical *tour de force*, but as an act of profound concern for the future of the human enterprise. This enterprise is in dire straits and desperately needs what I believe a secular Christianity might conceivably have to offer. The concern, then, is not for the survival of Christianity (Parkinson's Law will surely preserve the church), but for the survival of men and of our sick, secular world. With that concern, I ask about the possibility of a secular Christianity.

At the present time, a number of theologians and thinkers, both lay and professional, and of almost every branch of the Christian tradition, have been exploring the possibilities of a secular Christianity. Thus far, not all of these have been of one mind on the character or the features of secularity. Since I am particularly concerned with problems of thought and understanding which present themselves as problems of language, I should like to begin by indicating what I take to be some of the fundamental features of secular thought. This is the way in which men so think of, see, and shape their experienced world at the present time as to lead us to use the word "secular".

I would add that I find singularly artificial the distinction between secularization as a supposed process in history, and secularism as a supposed attitude of mind. That dichotomy assumes a separation of how we think from how we live that, in the light of present knowledge, seems quite indefensible. I take it that these ways of thinking (secularism?) are inseparably connected with how we experience, act in, and give shape to our world (secularization?), and that thinking of and seeing our world in this way, we shape it as we do. With our words or thoughts we carve up our experienced world, and our ability to do this carving in any particular way provides the occasion for that use of words which we come to acquire. Without drawing sharp lines, then, between the political, economic, and social processes of our life, and our thought or language, let me indicate what I take to be the distinguishing features of a time which some have come to call secular.

The character of secular thought appears more clearly when we contrast it with that other way of thought which we seem to be leaving behind.¹ It goes without saying that broad cultural changes such as the one that we are here trying to understand do not happen all at once or in an even manner. Secularity effects all to some degree and some to a high degree, but all remain in part also creatures of past culture. I wish, then, to indicate a tendency, which, although not clear-cut, is nonetheless of profound importance. Five features of this tendency come to mind, though not necessarily in order of their importance. Together they constitute a shift of emphasis or of relative valuation from permanence toward change, from the universal to the particular, from unity to plurality, from the absolute to the relative, and from passivity to activity.

Through most of recorded history men have feared change and longed for permanence. This is so evident in the pages of political, economic, philosophical and religious history that it needs

no exposition here. Once we reflect upon our own contemporary experience, it becomes equally evident, however, that change has begun to displace both stability and permanence as the higher good. In every area of life, we are coming more and more to admire that which can change, develop, and be improved, that which is flexible and open to the future, rather than settled for all time or fixed by the past. Again, I do not say that any of us have made this transposition of values without reservation, but the fact that we have made it to the degree we have sets us off from men in most of recorded history.

Not unrelated to this is an increasing concern with the particular and a certain lack of concern, if not outright distrust, for the universal. We seem to feel that generalizations must be tested against the concrete. In our own way we have become nominalists. The scientific method itself, the operations of modern industry, the standards of sound scholarship in almost any field, all these and much more reveal our priority of values to be different from most men in our past. In politics and economics, in historical and social studies, the answers that count as answers for us are answers to particular questions. The proof of the pudding, we are inclined to think, is in the eating.

No wonder, then, that we have found ourselves becoming pluralists to one degree or another. Our experienced world is a world for us in many different ways. Any unities we find in things are always unities for some particular purpose; they leave room for other unities or ways in which the world can be a world for us. Religious pluralism, so called, is but one of the minor manifestations of the extent to which we have come to recognize the plurality of our experience and thus the plurality of all our thinking and living. For us, an Archimedean point would remain the point for accomplishing Archimedes' objective, although, having other goals in mind, other points would have to be found.

The other side of the pluralist coin is a growing sense of the relativity of things. What is true is true always and only relative to some specific frame of reference. Absolutes come to be distrusted as only disguised relativities and it becomes increasingly difficult to disassociate the term 'dogmatic' from pejorative overtones. It may be necessary to point out that we are learning to live with relativity, that we are discovering that profound commitments can be held without absolute claims being made about that to which one finds oneself to be committed. There are many shades of grey and a world can be won or lost over the difference between these shades, but a change of no small importance has come about if we find we are willing to live or die for something we do not take to be absolute. This also is a change so pervasive as to need no documentation, but I could mention only the development of historiography in the last century or two as one obvious manifestation of the shift.²

Finally, and perhaps the most explosive and controversial of all the shifts is the change which is taking place slowly in human consciousness from ourselves as passive to active beings.³ Where we are going and what is to become of us is beginning to seem not a matter of fate, Providence, or luck, but of what we ourselves do. It is easy to overstate this shift and so make a parody of it. Never before have men been more sensitive to the ways in which they are shaped by their economic, social, psychological, and political environment. Yet it is interesting to notice the extent to which we seem to think that these are factors which we ought to change and at least theoretically can change. Whether we shall be as successful as we hope or as powerless as we fear, we seem to think that it is up to us, that we are responsible. If we pollute our world beyond the point of human survival, if we over-populate the world beyond the point of nourishing life, if we blow it up into atomic dust, we seem to think that it will be we who did it and that it will be our own fault. That is to say that we think we could have done otherwise. I am not discussing whether we can in fact do all that we want to do; the point is that we think of ourselves as the makers of our own future,

for better or for worse. In that sense, this age differs importantly from the way in which men have seen themselves from the beginnings of time until quite recently times in that we see ourselves the active makers of our lives and world. With fear and trembling we walk toward a future which we are becoming increasingly conscious of forming by our very way of walking.

These shifts in value and new tendencies in priorities, these new directions of the human consciousness so intimately associated with the scientific, technological, and educational explosions of our time are what I have in mind when I speak of secularity. If it should come to pass that a majority of those who called themselves Christians, or even an important minority of them, should find themselves sharing wholeheartedly in this new consciousness, then we would have a secular Christianity.

As things stand now, however, only a few individuals and small groups here and there, living as it were on the fringes of one or another of the Christian churches--and most of these to only a certain degree--share in the secular spirit that is taking shape in our age. The fact that Christians on the whole are lagging behind in this cultural shift is hardly surprising. Quite apart from the generally conservative attitude of the churches, it is clear that the shift that is taking place is not an easy one for Christians to make. No matter how one conceives it, a secular Christianity is going to be a different Christianity from that which has gone before, and thoughtful Christians are sure to wonder whether it will still properly be a form of Christianity at all.

The question is painful because of the fact that Christianity, throughout almost its entire history and all the changes and transformations it has undergone, has nonetheless lived within, accepted, and helped shape that older priority of values with which we contrasted the consciousness of secularity. In that older world, Christianity along with the rest of ancient and classical culture, valued the eternal over the temporal, permanence above change, unity over plurality, the universal above the particular, and the absolute above the relative. No wonder then that Christianity in its own way shared a view of man's proper role as passive, as adapting oneself to that which was immutably decreed from eternity, as coming to terms with that which was thought never to change. Of course, Christianity gave its own twist, coloration, and emphases to the picture, but, if the shift which I have described is at all accurately depicted, it leaves the balance of the history of Christianity on the same side as the balance of the long history of human consciousness. If indeed a change of the sort which I have indicated is going on, would it be possible for Christianity to change too, or must it remain forever wedded to a classic consciousness and set of priorities, and doomed to battle against the tendency that is at work among us all?

It has already been argued, of course, with that skill of adaptation so often making the history of theology, that the essential features of secularity can all be found in the origins of the Christian tradition. Surely a good deal of the appeal to Christians of Harvey Cox's *The Secular City* was the way in which he presented secularization as coming directly out of the biblical witness. Without having to swallow that *tour de force*, however, one can at least say that a modern historical study of the history of Christianity shows that Christianity has itself been changing all through its history. Indeed, as a historical religion it must perforce have been changing or it could hardly still be alive. When one thinks of the revolution set in motion by St. Paul to the horror of the Jerusalem establishment, or the NeoPlatonic transformation which we owe so largely to St. Augustine, or any of the later Aristotelian, Occamist, Renaissance, Kantian, Hegelian, or Existentialist transformations of Christian consciousness, it may be that a secular form of Christianity, though it may seem more radical, is at least not without some precedent when viewed in historical perspective. The shift is not an easy one to make, however, for none of these earlier shifts seems

to have called for changes of so fundamental a sort as those involved in developing a secular Christianity.

The possibility of a partially or selectively secular Christianity, that is, of a compromise with the secular tendencies described is of course already being explored. However, such a compromise simply will not do, and that for two reasons. In the first place, it rests upon a superficial and inadequate understanding of the sort of shift that is taking place. It either fails to see the way in which these various tendencies which we have enumerated hang together, or else sees them but fails to take them seriously. It intends to make the most of a few aspects of a process of secularization under the illusion that we can live in a new sort of way without this having consequences for the way in which we speak or think.

Beyond its naivety or fallaciousness there is the further point that any such compromise places one in intolerable logical confusion. A "death of a thousand qualifications" stands there to greet both a significant theism which suffers from insufficient warrants and an unfalsifiable theism bought at the price of vacuity. Either classical Christianity believed in a God who really did make a difference and we now simply do not have sufficient warrant to think that he still makes that difference, or else God does not depend on any warrants because in fact in our sort of world he doesn't make a difference at all. Sophisticated efforts to turn away the thrust of the argument only succeed to the extent that Christianity is willing and able simply to turn its back on the whole secular shift that is taking place. That option can be respected, even if one does not agree with it. What is quite unacceptable, however, is the compromise that attempts to go part of the way with the secular spirit. The revolving door between the museum of antiquities and the secular world may be passed through, but it will not do as a place to stand.

Secular Christianity and Ethics

Secularity, as I understand it and have presented it, does have a set of values, but only in the broadest sense of the word. It values particularity, change, plurality, relativity, and an active consciousness. These values or tendencies of thought, however, are so broad and open-ended that they will hardly do to set goals for us. Two men could well share a secular orientation and yet be at profound odds about what they ought to do in some particular case. As our society has become increasingly secular, there has been no detectable wane of injustice, racism, imperialism, self-interest, narrow-mindedness, and bigotry. Each day the secular city seems to be coming closer to total collapse. Political corruption and wooden institutionalism seem to be as much a part of a secular establishment as they ever were in the past. An acceptance of change is no guarantee that a man will work for change to benefit his neighbor rather than himself. The classical world had no monopoly on evil.

It would seem, then, that a secular world stands in every bit as great a need as did any pre-secular world of guides for conduct and of a social vision that can challenge the status quo and stir men to work for a world better than that which is at hand. Christianity, understood in terms of devotion to an unchanging, eternal, universal, and absolute unity, succeeded in calling man to a passive role of cooperation with that absolute unity in building a better world in a cultural context in which an unchanging, eternal, and absolute unity were highly valued. Hence, there would seem to be no *a priori* reason why a secular Christianity might not serve as a source of ethical insight and motivation in a secular age by calling men to actively shape a world of change, plurality, and relativity. If classical Christianity provided ethical insights for classical Christians in a classical

age, then it could be that a secular Christianity might be able to provide secular Christians with ethical insights in a secular age.

The place and logic of ethics in a secular Christianity are not difficult to find, for ethics has been central in most efforts to explore the character of a secular Christianity. This could be shown with any number of examples, but I should like to take as a case Professor R.B. Braithwaite's Eddington Memorial Lecture of 1955, "An Empiricist's View of Religious Belief", since I think it can be argued that this essay brings into focus the primary issues and the central direction of most of the important efforts to define a secular Christianity. I shall assume that any one who is the least interested in our topic would by now be thoroughly familiar with this essay and with the discussions to which it has given rise.⁴ To sum up his conclusion in barest fashion, Braithwaite argued that Christianity may be understood by a contemporary empiricist as a way of life. In this view, faith is seen as the serious intention of pursuing the moral policy of *agapé*, which intention is supported by association with the Christian and biblical story. The conclusion and, of course, its supporting argument are much more complex than that, but such a short summary as I have given will do for our purposes, since I do not intend to criticize the argument after the manner of most who have objected to it. Most have argued, in one way or another, that Braithwaite has reduced Christianity to morals, making the whole business of theology into an ethics which involves no claims whatsoever about the existence and activity of a personal creator God. Braithwaite, most objectors have said, has gone too far.

It has been objected that any "moral interpretation" of Christianity which analyzes the language of Christians as a sort of moral language neglects an important and evident characteristic of what believers are doing when they confess their faith. It is objected that in important ways Christian faith may be much like a moral commitment, but that it is something else as well. It is also an affirmation about what is so, about the state of affairs in this world and this universe; this is not brought out by simply comparing this language to the language of morals.⁵

In response to this objection, it must be granted that when Christians speak of God and his kingdom, at least indirectly they are expressing a belief as to what is so, as to what is the state of affairs in the world. It must be added at once, however, that this objection has not made much headway, even with this concession, and that for two reasons. In the first place, saying what is so is a complex matter which those presenting the objection have not cleared up. Saying what is so is complex, not because we do not know how to do it, but because we do it in so many different ways. For example, if a man says that he has acted in faithfulness to God, or that he is calling upon the name of God, or that the whole world has been laid claim to by Christ, one surely would not argue that such a man is saying or implying what is so in the same way as a natural scientist does. He is not saying what is so in a way that has the logic of any number of descriptive ways in which he says what is the case. In what sense, then, are Christian affirmations of what is so?

The objection also overlooks a second point which suggests a possible answer to our first question. It overlooks the fact that a man who takes a moral stand is almost inevitably committed thereby to certain beliefs about the world, about what is so. He is committed to some form of belief in regularity or order in the world and in language, such that it makes sense to speak of doing something for a reason. He is also committed to the belief that the world is so constituted that moral action is not an utterly vain pursuit. These beliefs may be of a very general sort, but that does not make them any less important. Morality as well as religion seems to commit men to beliefs about what is so. When we see this, it becomes apparent that the objection to what I have called a moral analysis of theological language no longer makes its point. If it makes any point, it

is that such an analysis calls for an exceedingly careful and subtle treatment of morality, or perhaps a broader view of the language of morals than that which Braithwaite seems to have had in mind.

I want to argue, therefore, that Braithwaite has not gone far enough. He has moved in what I take to be a most productive and constructive direction by focusing on the moral character of Christianity. I would conclude from his argument that if there is to be a secular Christianity that can be of any service to the world, it will be understood as a moral enterprise, a matter of how men shape their lives and their world, or it will be of no significant service at all. But I find his proposal for what I am calling a secular Christianity deficient on two counts: his views of both ethics and *agapé* are too narrow. By calling to mind both ethical and theological resources that can be used to correct Braithwaite's essay, I can make clear what I take to be the place and function of ethics in a secular Christianity.

The model of a moral issue which Braithwaite seems primarily to have had in mind in his essay was that sort of case in which I ask, within a specific set of circumstances, what it is that I ought to do. A moral principle in such a case is that to which I refer, along with all the relevant factual information, in order to arrive at the conclusion that in this case I should do thus and so. That this is an important type of moral situation is not to be denied, but I think that for the purpose of characterizing the moral character of Christianity, it is not broad enough. It has been pointed out that there are other sorts of moral judgments which ethics must attend to besides those which have to do with specific moral acts.⁶ There are also judgments which we make, not about this or that particular act, but about the shape of a man's life, about his life as a whole. There are judgments which we make about the character, or state, or style of a society. These too are moral judgments, and the achievement of clarity about such judgments is also the business of ethics. The judgment, for example, that our present American society is profoundly sick, that its priorities are in the wrong order, that we have as a society sold our birthright for a mess of porridge, is surely a moral judgment, whether one agrees with it or not. Surely, it is the business of ethics to help us to see such a matter more clearly and to help us to decide whether we ought to make such a judgment.

If we ask in what way Christianity is more adequately conceived of as a moral enterprise, or of what sort of moral judgment is the judgment of faith, then I should think that primary attention should be given this broader conception of moral judgments. Christianity has certainly given attention to the problem of answering specific questions about specific acts, but there is more to Christian ethics than casuistry. The primary judgment of which it has spoken, after all, is presented in the image of a total reckoning of all the nations, and of a judgment made on Good Friday and on Easter about the whole of the human situation. The moral judgment with which Christianity has been concerned has been painted with a big brush on a big canvas, and it is in the light of this that finer judgments are made about the details. It would seem, then, that both ethics and the Christian tradition encourage us to consider the moral character of Christianity more broadly than has Braithwaite in his essay. This is not to depart from what he has done, but only to push further in the direction which he has already indicated.

A second way in which Braithwaite's understanding of what a secular Christianity might be (which was not, at least in those terms, what he set out to show, but which expresses what we are concerned with here) may be developed and improved by the insights of modern theological scholarship, especially in the field of Old Testament studies.⁷ Though, at least in those terms, this is not what he set out to show, it expresses what we are concerned with here. Had Braithwaite been more versed in modern biblical scholarship, or even in aspects of modern theology, he might have seen "God is love" to be too narrow a center to pick for the Christian story. Or perhaps we could say that *agapé* has more of the character of an active, historical event than Braithwaite seemed to

realize. In any case, it is at this point that I should want to substitute some form or other of the New or Old Testament proclamation of the Kingdom of Jahweh as the central imagery for a secular Christianity. The imagery of the Kingdom could serve as a source for a social vision of what human life could be like and what the world could become. This would serve the desperate social and political needs of our secular society in a way parallel to that in which *agapé* serves in Braithwaite's essay as a moral principle for individual actions of individual Christians. The danger of a purely individualistic conception of the moral thrust of Christianity could be met by a center which would politicize and socialize the single theme of *agapé*. To put this in other words, unless *agapé* is understood in relationship to the Kingdom, it is less than Christianity can mean by this word.

The Image of the Kingdom of Yahweh as a Social Vision

We have now to ask about the place and function of ethics in a secular Christianity in the light of the foregoing considerations. It has been a custom of moral philosophy to use 'moral' as a word for certain sorts of questions and judgments about human action and life, and 'ethics' as the name for systematic reflection on and study of these moral questions and judgments: ethics being, in short, reflection upon moral issues. According to this usage, we may say that ethics would appear to displace theology as the central and indispensable reflective activity of secular Christianity. The central image for a secular Christianity would be that of the Kingdom, as an image of the unrealized and hoped for dream of what human life might yet be. In this light, the Christian life would consist in so living as to long for the realization of that social vision. The secular world would be measured by that vision and the challenge of that vision would be accepted as both a spur to action and a norm by which to measure alternative courses to be pursued in working to change society. Thus, a secular Christianity living with an image of the Kingdom as its social vision would be a frankly revolutionary movement. Social ethics would be its primary reflective activity, analyzing the existing state of society and the quality of human life against the vision in which it hopes, and studying possible strategies of action that would make for some degree of greater conformity of the world to the vision it seeks to realize. The character of that vision being what it is, each new state of affairs realized would itself become subject to new criticism in the light of that vision. As a result, the revolution in which a secular Christianity would be engaged would be permanent, constant, or ever-renewed. With its eye on the vision, the word of a secular Christianity about, for, and to the world would be *semper reformanda*, and it would rest at peace with nothing less.

It should be evident that a secular Christianity working for social change and seeking to transform the style of human life would be, as Christianity has always been, dependent upon the biblical story as the primary source of its social vision. Were it to forget that story with its constant reminder of the temptation to identify some modest accomplishment with the Kingdom itself, or were it to turn to some other story in order to find a vision more agreeable to the conditions of its society or the demands of its culture, then of course it would cease to be a form of Christianity at all. If there is to be a secular Christianity, then, we must assume that the telling and the retelling of that story, whether in more established forms of preaching and eucharist, or in newer forms of drama, guerrilla theater, or folk song, will be an indispensable activity which will go on whenever Christians meet together.

One can imagine, however, that the story will not always be told in just the ways in which it has been told in the past. A 'gentle Jesus, meek and mild,' will hardly be expected to figure in a Christianity that has accepted the shift from passive to active man. The privatized translation of

Luke 17:20 that places the Kingdom within us would no longer displace the translation that announces the Kingdom among us in the person who is faithful to its demands. The cross might become a symbol of political challenge and revolt against every establishment, and a call to political and social risk. The Kingdom itself will surely be a symbol or vision of a situation on earth, not a projection up in the clouds. A secular Christianity, no longer under the burden of trying to prove that its vision is true (what in the world would it mean to say that a vision was "true"?), could give up fighting for the existence of God and turn to the work of serving the Kingdom, as an ideal or vision, which if not necessarily the finest that men shall ever devise, is still the greatest that those who call themselves Christians have yet run across.

In contemplating the picture of a secular Christianity presented here, it would be well for us to consider the present situation of a society growing increasingly secular and to that extent unable to hear or understand the message of a pre-secular Christianity. Of course, a Christianity which understands man as passive and which, due to its loyalty to a supposed absolute, is unable to throw itself without reserve into the proximate struggles for relative gains in the particular issues which confront men, is hardly likely or even able to throw its weight on the side of change, much less revolution. Concern for the fundamental changes in our political, economic, and social life which would be needed to reverse the disastrous course of the arms race, racism, urban collapse, mass starvation, and pollution of our environment stands little chance in competition with its deeper concerns for personal salvation and other-worldly solutions.

There is, of course, no guarantee that the fatal course on which we are embarked in our secular society can be reversed. There is no guarantee that a renewal of social vision would be able to draw us into a new path. There is, further, no guarantee that a secular Christianity will win a better hearing from the secular world than does classic Christianity. But its message may at least be more comprehensible, and it would be easier for the secular hearer to understand what is at stake in being a Christian. The choice he would be asked to make, of throwing himself on the side of the revolution for the sake of a vision, however, would not be any easier to make just because of its comprehensibility.

On the other hand, a secular Christianity might offer to a secular society badly in need of direction the social vision of a world of righteousness, justice, and love, which depends on our active and imaginative efforts for its creation, and in which particulars in their full and unqualified relativity and diversity are esteemed--the vision of a world in which change and plurality are highly valued. The issues which confront us today are all of a moral sort: the style of contemporary life, the shape and functioning of our institutions, the direction of foreign affairs, and the priorities of our politics. A Christianity so changed as to understand itself essentially and fundamentally as a moral enterprise, the direction pointed to by Braithwaite fifteen years ago, might yet find that it had a saving service to perform in a sick world. "Where there is no vision, the people perish." The ethical issue of the decision concerning a secular Christianity is the choice for Christians between their own past and the people's future.

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Notes

1. The contrast is developed at length in John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1948).

2. The character of pluralism and relativity in our thought was extensively described by William James. See especially his *Pragmatism* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1907).

3. I wish to express my indebtedness on this point to an unpublished paper of my colleague John Baines, entitled "From Passive to Active Man."

4. Originally published by the Cambridge University Press, 1955, the essay has been reprinted in various places, most recently together with responses and a reply by Braithwaite in I.T. Ramsey, ed., *Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy* (London: S.C.M. Press, 1966).

5. Ronald Hepburn and Iris Murdoch, "Vision and Choice in Morality," in *Christian Ethics and Contemporary Philosophy*, op. cit., pp. 181-218.

6. Conversations with Professor James A. Wharton have been particularly helpful in this area. See his "The Occasion of the Word of God," *Austin Seminary Bulletin*, LXXXIV (1968), 3-54.

7. See especially John Wisdom, *Paradox and Discovery* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1966), pp. 43-56.

Chapter X
Absurdity versus Ambiguity:
Reflections on the Ethical Views of Sartre and Camus

Joseph J. Kockelmans

Introduction

In 1943, the same year in which appeared Albert Camus' *The Myth of Sisyphus*,¹ John Paul Sartre published his *Being and Nothingness*.² There is no doubt that both works were written independently of one another. This does not mean that one cannot point to certain common sources in which the authors have taken their points of departure. Nevertheless, Camus was relatively unfamiliar with the philosophical conception of Sartre, who, in turn, did not know much about the work of Camus. Even where the matter of common sources is concerned, a comparative study of the philosophical development of the two authors soon shows that their common sources were relatively small in number. To the best of my knowledge, Camus' philosophy shows little or no direct influence from Hegel, Heidegger, or Husserl, the very philosophers who are certainly among the major sources of Sartre's inspiration.

Although *The Myth of Sisyphus* and *Being and Nothingness* may be said to be relatively independent of one another, they do exhibit certain very striking ideas in common: atheism, a certain 'absurdist' theory, the importance of man's freedom, the fact that man is a 'stranger' in his world, the meaning of man's death, the idea of 'revolt', and the many ethical consequences of these basic ideas. On the other hand, there are equally striking differences: whereas Sartre denies that man has a 'nature', for Camus this fact is undeniable; where Sartre seems to allow room for suicide, Camus definitely rejects suicide as a permissible act regardless of the circumstances involved; finally, where Sartre defends a morality of ambiguity, Camus seems to allow for an unquestionable, and for that matter, 'absolute' value.³

In this essay I intend to examine the ethical views of Sartre and Camus for the dual purpose of delineating as clearly as possible both their points of agreement and their differences, and attempting to understand the basic conceptions in which they are ultimately founded. As the conclusion of the study I shall present some reflections which I hope will shed light on the basic issues with which every moral philosophy must cope before it is capable of formulating its point of view in regard to concrete issues.

Since I have previously dealt with Sartre's conception of ethics in another context⁴ I prefer to limit myself here to some basic ideas which in my view are vital to an understanding of the position which Sartre adopts toward ethics. Though some repetition is unavoidable, I shall try to keep it to a minimum.

Sartre's Ethics

In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre has given us an outline of his phenomenological ontology. At the end of the book⁵ he refers to the ethical implications of this new kind of ontology and explicitly promises to develop a systematic survey of an existentialist ethics in a later work. This work was never written because Sartre gradually came to the conclusion that the project of working out a systematic ethics was irrelevant, if not completely impossible. There is, however, a popular lecture which touches on ethical problems and there are some papers (to be found in *Situations*)

which deal with ethical issues.⁶ Since it is beyond the scope of this study to deal with questions connected with Sartre's later position, from 1950 on, I shall consider here only his conception of an 'existentialist ethics' as promised in *Being and Nothingness* and later touched upon in some of his publications appearing between 1943 and 1950. In doing so I shall be making extensive use of the commentaries of de Beauvoir⁷ and Jeanson,⁸ who have written at length on Sartre's basic conception and in many instances have made his view more explicit.

In the *Conclusion of Being and Nothingness* Sartre begins his reflections on "Ethical Implications" with the remark that ontology as such cannot formulate ethical norms. Ontology is merely concerned with what is, and it is impossible to derive moral imperatives from ontological indicatives. On the other hand, it is undeniably true that an ontological theory has moral implications, for it confronts us with a human reality in its situation, and it is able to show that a being which finds itself (*causa sui*), that is to say a consciousness which perfectly coincides with itself, is absolutely contradictory. This ontology also shows us that the various tasks of the For-itself (consciousness) can be made the object of an existential psychoanalysis, in that all of these tasks aim at producing the missing synthesis of consciousness and being in the form of value, that is of self-cause. Under these conditions existential psychoanalysis becomes moral description in that it communicates to us the ethical meaning of the various human projects.⁹

In the passage which follows¹⁰ Sartre states that ontology and existential psychoanalysis must show man that he himself as moral agent is the being by whom values exist. However, the moment that man realizes that he is the source of all values, he finds himself in anguish because he understands that under this condition there will not be any values unless man himself brings them about, and that before they are brought about they are just possibilities which continuously refer to other mere possibilities without ever finding a resting point in a definitive ground. Earlier philosophers obviously never denied that possibilities can either be chosen or rejected, but they were able to avoid pure chaos by admitting an ultimate value of some sort from which an order can be derived. In whatever concrete form it was proposed, this ultimate value had the ontological status of an *ens causa sui*, that is to say, of God.

But, one may ask, what becomes of human freedom, if it turns us back upon this value? Sartre answers this question with some provocative counter-questions: will freedom try to carry this ultimate value with it by attempting to materialize in itself the In-itself-for-itself; in other words, will man try to make himself God in order to be man? Or will man try to make himself man in order to be God; that is to say, will freedom by apprehending itself as a freedom merely in relation to itself try to rid itself of a supreme value outside itself? But how is it possible for freedom to take itself as the source of all values? Must not human freedom necessarily be defined in relation to a transcendent value which haunts it? Let us suppose that human freedom can will itself as its own determining value, what does this precisely mean? Is not a freedom which wills itself as freedom, necessarily and at the same time, both a being which is not what-it-is and a being which is what-it-is-not? Does not such a freedom necessarily choose as the ideal of all being that being which it is not, as well as that not-being which it is? Must not such a freedom necessarily keep fleeing itself and maintaining itself always at a distance from itself, in which case this freedom would continuously be in bad faith? Or is there perhaps another fundamental attitude than the one referred to here by the expression 'bad faith'? If freedom takes itself for an end, does it then escape all situations, or will it remain situated? Or will it perhaps situate itself so much the more exactly and individually as it projects itself further in anguish as a conditioned freedom, and accepts more fully its responsibility as a being by whom the entire world comes into being?¹¹

In *Being and Nothingness* Sartre does not explicitly answer any of these questions. He promises there, however, to return to the questions in a later work, though, as we have seen, this work has never appeared, mainly because his philosophy has considerably changed after 1950. In his popular essay *Existentialism is a Humanism*, however, he clearly indicates the direction in which he would have answered these questions had the book he promised in 1943 been written before the advent of a number of fundamental changes in his overall philosophical position. In addition, Simone de Beauvoir and Francis Jeanson have commented extensively on Sartre's view and developed it more systematically. It is particularly in their works that a clear insight into Sartre's view on ethics is to be found.

Since as I have already indicated that my interest here is directed toward an attempt to understand the precise meaning of the moral implications of Sartre's existentialism, and in view of the fact that I have commented on Sartre's popular essay on another occasion, at this point I shall present a brief outline of an existentialist ethics as explicated by Simone de Beauvoir. Jeanson's commentary will be introduced toward the end of this essay.

Simone de Beauvoir begins her explanation of an existentialist ethics by pointing to the fact that in every atheistic conception of existentialism man's death plays a role, which in many aspects is analogous to the role an absolute Being plays in a theistic conception of philosophy. Although the talk is very seldom explicitly about death, this nonetheless 'flavors' everything. In a theistic philosophy, in the final analysis, everything will work out well; whereas in an atheistic philosophy everything is spoiled and vitiated in advance by man's death which, more than anything else, points to the tragic ambiguity of his condition and the paralyzing paradox of his destiny. As a rational being man is able to escape from his natural condition, but his death makes it impossible for him to free himself from it.¹²

As long as men have lived, they have felt this tragic ambiguity of their condition; and as long as there have been men, they have tried to overcome this ambiguity by denying it, repressing it, revolting against it, or perhaps by living with it. Many philosophers of the past have tried to mask this basic ambiguity by reducing mind to matter, by reabsorbing matter into mind, by merging them into one substance, or by establishing a harmony between body and soul which then allows for considering as negligible that part of man which cannot be saved. The ethics which these philosophers have proposed has always tried to eliminate the basic ambiguity by making man either pure inwardness or pure externality. Although at the present time many philosophers still pursue the same course, many today feel more acutely than ever the paradox of their condition. Among others, Sartre in his philosophy faced this fundamental ambiguity and developed a philosophical view in which the basic paradox of man's condition is not denied. Sartre was convinced that it is in the clear knowledge of the genuine condition of his life that man must draw his strength to live and his reason for action.¹³

When in *Being and Nothingness* Sartre defined man as that being whose being is not to be, that subjectivity which can realize itself only as a presence in the world, and as freedom in that situation, he did so because he was convinced that man has to assume his fundamental ambiguity. For the same reason, existential philosophy must define itself as a philosophy of ambiguity.

It is true that in such a philosophy anguish and despair play a very important part in that they ultimately lead to the insight that man is a useless passion, that he tries in vain to materialize the synthesis of the For-itself and the In-itself and thereby to make himself God. One must realize, however, that even the most optimistic philosophy has to begin by emphasizing an element of failure in man, because without that element all ethics is impossible. It makes no sense to talk about having-to-be, except for a being who questions himself in his being, who is at a distance

from himself and, thus, continuously has to be his being. Obviously, one may make the remark here that an element of failure, which in principle cannot be overcome, makes ethics equally impossible. For why should man try to overcome his failure if he knows in advance that there is no hope, since that which he wishes to accomplish is contradictory. Man does not have the means to help himself become the being he is not.

Although this is true, it does not mean that man is without hope. Indeed, man is unable to bring about meaning which will then be established once and for all; he is unable to create values which are absolute and eternal or to do anything which has the character of a divine action. But to say this is not tantamount to saying that man's life is altogether meaningless; it merely means that man who originally found himself in a realm of ambiguity will always remain within this realm. Remaining within the realm of ambiguity, he is, nonetheless, a genuine source of meaning and value. When Sartre says that man is a useless passion, he means to say that man begins as a finite being and will end as a finite being; that although he wishes to transcend his finitude, he will never succeed. To say that man is a useless passion means, therefore, that man will never be able to bring about an absolute value and, on the other hand, that there is no absolute value toward which man can orientate his finite activities. In other words, when man for the first time chooses to be a being who makes himself a lack of being in order that there might be being, at that very first moment the expressions 'useful' and 'useless' still lack all meaning, because there is still no value in relation to which one might distinguish the useless from the useful.

However, once man himself has established a world by his project and by the ends he sets up, then his action can be meaningful or meaningless, either in regard to the order he himself has established or in regard to an ideal he has projected for himself. The fact that in the original helplessness from which man emerges nothing is useful and nothing useless means merely that man's passion does not have a justification outside itself. This does not mean, however, that this passion could not justify itself. The fact that man's freedom has no reason *a priori* to will itself, by no means entails that it cannot give itself reasons for being, and the fact that these reasons remain within the realm of ambiguity does not alter this. Simply because in man's life meaning is never found *a priori* and is always interwoven with lack of meaning, we are not given the right to speak of man's life as an absolutely meaningless passion and to defend the thesis of an absolute absurdity. If one wishes to respect the human condition as it is experienced by man himself, it is not possible to speak of eternal truths or eternal values, but it is equally impossible to defend a form of pure nihilism and to deny every truth and every value. Classical idealism and its radical negation, pure nihilism, defend both unacceptable forms of absolutism.¹⁴

Let us now assume for a moment that man, indeed, is free to choose for himself the conditions of the life he wishes to live. Does not this necessarily mean that in such a case man can choose whatever he likes? Is not everything then permitted, so that once again all ethics would be excluded? Existentialism answers this question in the negative. First of all, God's absence does not exclude ethics; rather, it is the necessary condition under which a genuine ethics is possible. If there were a God, then there would be absolute values. Everything would be determined in advance, and man would not be really free; but if man is not really free, then ethics is impossible. Furthermore, far from God's absence making everything permissible, the contrary is the case, because man alone is now completely responsible for what he is and for the world which he establishes. Existentialism, Sartre says, puts every man in possession of himself, and thus places the entire responsibility for his own existence as well as for his world squarely upon his own shoulders. Man is responsible not only for himself alone but for all men; every man must choose himself, but in choosing himself he chooses for all men. In creating himself, man projects an image

of man such as he believes it ought to be. To choose something is to affirm the value of that which is chosen, for I can choose only what is good for me and nothing can be good for me, unless it is somehow good for all of us. When a man commits himself to something, fully realizing that he is not only choosing what he will be but is thereby a legislature deciding for the whole of mankind, he cannot escape from the sense of complete and profound responsibility; at that moment man appears to himself as anguish.

Sartre is deeply aware here of the differences between his view and that defended by Kant. Kant did not realize the very essence of man's situation as we just have attempted to briefly describe it. Everyone who realizes the nature of man's situation knows at once that he is certainly not the proper person to impose, by his own free choice, his conception of man upon mankind. Nevertheless it remains true that as man I am obliged at every instant to perform actions which are examples: everything happens to every man as if the whole of mankind has its eyes fixed upon what he is doing and will regulate its conduct accordingly. At the same time I know that I do not have the right to act in such a way that humanity regulates itself by what I do. Finally, I know that even if the other is going to regulate his actions by what I am doing he still remains within the realm of inauthenticity, because he does not understand that he, too, is free and that values exist only insofar as they are freely chosen. In other words, he does not see that he, too, is left alone without excuse and condemned to be free. Purely formal advice in the manner of Kant's maxims is much too abstract to determine a person's concrete behavior in the ambiguous situations in which he continuously finds himself.¹⁵

One sees, therefore, that Simone de Beauvoir is quite correct in claiming that although Sartre's view shows some similarity to the Kantian approach to ethics, nonetheless it differs fundamentally from Kant's view. It attempts to transcend the subjectivist and solipsist points of view in ethics by means of an appeal not to an impersonal universal man, but to the plurality of concrete, particular men, who project themselves toward their ends on the basis of situations whose particularity is as radical as subjectivity itself. In other words, existentialist ethics is deeply aware of the fact that the plurality of autonomous men implies a very difficult problem for ethics: it has to explain somehow that separate beings can be bound to each other and that their individual freedom can forge laws which are universally valid for all. Seeing and admitting the problem, however, does not mean admitting that it cannot be solved. Existentialism is proud to stress this problem in such strong terms because it believes that in so doing it by far surpasses the philosophy of Hegel, who has attempted to efface the separation of men, thus to put us off with a quasi-solution.¹⁶

Marxism, which finds itself in the same position as existentialism, has tried to solve the problem by admitting, on the one hand, that the goal and meaning of action must be defined by human wills, and by positing, on the other hand, that these wills are not genuinely free, but merely reflect objective conditions by which the situation of a class or a nation is defined. Existentialism, however, maintains the freedom of man's will and tries to find in freedom itself a principle of action whose range is universal. All ethics must consider human life as a game that can be won or lost, then teach man how to win the game.

Previously we have stressed the basic ambiguity of man's situation: he wishes to be, and to the extent that he coincides with this wish he fails. All the plans in which this will-to-be tries to materialize itself are condemned in advance, and all goals circumscribed by these plans must remain phantoms. On the other hand, man wills himself to be the disclosure of being; to the extent that he coincides with this wish he wins, for then the world becomes present by his presence in it. In other words, to assert oneself as freedom and to wish for the disclosure of the world constitute

one and the same movement. In this sense it is true that freedom is the source from which all meaning and all value spring.

The man who seeks to justify his life must want freedom itself absolutely and above everything else. At the same time that it requires the realization of concrete ends, of particular projects, it requires itself universally. It is not a ready-made value which offers itself from the outside to my abstract adherence, but it appears . . . as a cause of itself. It is necessarily summoned up by the values which it sets up and through which it sets itself up. . . . To will oneself moral and to will oneself free are one and the same decision.¹⁷

Thus, in the final analysis, the universality of moral laws cannot rest upon the existence of an absolute Being, nor on the existence or validity of absolute values. This universality is the consequence of the universality of the human condition and thus, ultimately, is founded in the fact that man, in willing his own freedom, cannot not will the freedom of others.¹⁸

We have just seen that according to existentialism man, and man alone, is able to give meaning to the world and to his own life by means of an authentic, free attempt to conquer the absurdity of the world. He does this by concrete projects which are not guided by pre-existing values, but which precisely constitute meaning and bring values about. These projects are finite because they are essentially temporal, but each one of them opens up possibilities for further projects. The meaning which is brought to light in this way is, of course, precarious and ambiguous because of the essential finitude of man and the impossibility of radically transcending it. But man is able to disclose the meaning of the world, and in this disclosure there exists a human transcendence of absurdity and the salvation of man. However, such salvation is possible only if, despite obstacles and failures, a man preserves the command of his future, and if each time the situation keeps opening up additional possibilities to him. In the event his transcendence is cut off from its goal, or there is no longer any hold on objects which might give it a valid content, his spontaneity is paralyzed and he may no longer be able to justify his existence.¹⁹

There is no more untenable way to punish a man than to force him to perform acts which make no sense to him, as when one would be made to fill and empty the same ditch indefinitely. This mystification of useless effort is more intolerable than fatigue. Revolt, insofar as it is a purely negative movement, remains abstract; it is fulfilled as freedom only by returning to the positive, that is, by giving itself a content through action. By destroying the given situation human transcendence then seeks the whole future which will flow from its victory; it resumes its indefinite rapport with itself. There are limit situations, however, where this return to the positive is impossible and the future is radically blocked off. In these circumstances, revolt can be achieved only in the definitive rejection of the imposed situation, that is, in suicide.²⁰

It can be seen, therefore, that freedom can always save itself, for it is realized as a disclosure of meaning through its very failure, and it can again confirm itself by a death freely chosen. On the other hand, the situations which freedom discloses through its projects toward itself do not appear as equivalent. Freedom regards itself as indefinite movement, that is, freedom wishes to pass beyond everything which limits its power; and yet, this power is always limited. Thus, just as life is identified with the will-to-live, freedom always appears as movement toward liberation.²¹

If these ideas were to be developed in greater detail, a very concrete picture of an existentialist ethics would begin to show itself. But whatever the details may be, this ethics will never transcend the basic ambiguity in which it assumed its point of departure. This is why Simone de Beauvoir employs the expression 'the ethics of ambiguity' in referring to existentialist ethics. In explaining this expression she carefully points out that, as we have noted, ambiguity must not be confused with absurdity as understood in all nihilist philosophies. To say that man's existence is absurd is

to deny that it can ever be given any meaning; to say that it is ambiguous is to assert that its meaning is never determined, but must be constantly brought about in freedom. If man's life is absurd, then all ethics is impossible. Ethics would be impossible also if, with classical rationalism and idealism, one were to defend the thesis that the rationalization of the real, that is of the world and of man himself, could ever be completed and finished. It is precisely because man's condition is ambiguous that he seeks to save his existence, and in turn this implies that there will be failure as well as success.

Man's moral action, as is true for his artistic and scientific endeavors, is such that in any particular case human transcendence must always cope with the same problem: it has to found itself, though it is prohibited from ever fulfilling itself. In other words, man must in any event and under any circumstances assume his finitude: not by treating his existence as transitory, but by reflecting the 'infinite' within it and by treating it as absolute. There is a liberation of man only if, in aiming at itself, freedom is achieved absolutely in the very fact of aiming at itself. This requires that each action be considered as a finished form whose different moments, instead of fleeing toward the future in order to find there their justification, reflect and confirm each other so well that there is no longer a sharp separation between present and future, between means and end. If these moments are to constitute a unity, they cannot contradict one another. Since the liberation toward which man aims is a movement which tries to realize itself by tending to conquer, it cannot attain itself if it denies itself at the very start. In other words, no action can seek to fulfill itself by means which would destroy its very meaning. That is why in certain situations there will be no other possibility for man than rejection.²²

Camus' Absurdism

Differing fundamentally from Sartre, Camus explicitly admits that his philosophy has its origin in moral problems and that for this reason it is essentially ethical. In his first publication Camus attempts to defend man against himself, whereas in his later publications he tries to protect man against society. As he himself explains, in the age of negation it was of prime importance to examine one's position concerning suicide; in the age of ideologies it is necessary to examine our position in regard to murder. Before World War II people denied many things, to the point even of denying themselves by suicide. At that time many people felt that God, world, and they themselves were deceitful; for that reason they chose to die. Suicide was the problem then. After the war we have lived in an age of ideologies, which is concerned only with the denial of other human beings, who alone bear the responsibility of deceit. It is in this context that man kills; every day assassins in the robes of judges slip into some cell and kill. Murder is the problem today. In other words, Camus is convinced that in this age, for many people, the world is absurd; he himself subscribes to this view. But whereas many people have drawn from this fact the conclusion that suicide and murder are permissible, Camus hopes to prove that even, and precisely, in an absurdist point of view suicide as well as murder are to be eliminated radically from our human 'possibilities'.²³

In *The Myth of Sisyphus* Camus begins by asking the question whether man's life has meaning. Even at the very beginning of the book Camus makes it quite clear that he is inclined to answer this question in the negative: man's life is meaningless. As a reason for this view he refers explicitly to the fact that for him, as well as for many others, there is no God. In other words, Camus argues, for anyone who does not believe in God, the absurdist position is the only genuine alternative. However, Camus continues, although it is true that there is no God and that the world is absurd,

suicide is not legitimate; the absurdist position is the only sincere invitation to live and to be creative in the very midst of the desert.²⁴

For Camus there is but one serious philosophical problem, namely the question of whether man's life has meaning. Determining whether or not life is worth living is tantamount to answering philosophy's most fundamental question. Many people who believed they had to answer this basic question in the negative thought that for the same reason they had to face the problem of suicide. In Camus' view it is not difficult to justify that conclusion, for one could say, for instance, that anyone who kills himself confesses that life was not worth the trouble. People normally continue making the gestures demanded by the situation, and in their choice they are guided by custom and habit. One day, however, a man can realize the ridiculous character of such a habit, the insanity of that daily agitation, the uselessness of all suffering, and the absence of any profound reason for life. Once the world is deprived of every illusion and of all rights, man feels himself a stranger; finally, he understands that his exile is without remedy because there is left only the memory of a lost home and no hope whatsoever of a promised land. The moment this divorce between man and the world in which he was accustomed to living has come about man faces the absurd, and it is absurdity which seems to lead logically to suicide.²⁵

In *The Myth of Sisyphus* Camus wishes to examine the question whether or not such a view is right. What is the precise relationship between the absurd and the act of suicide? To what degree is suicide indeed a solution to the absurd? It is not easy to answer these questions. Many people argue that the questions are not properly formulated. For them it is obvious that life has meaning, and that consequently the suicide question need not be asked. Camus does not agree with such a view, for were one to ask these people to show us that life has meaning, they would not know what to say. They cannot show anything or prove any of the assertions they would like to make, but can point only to faith and hope in regard to another life, or to some great idea that gives man's life meaning. Camus is of the opinion that pointing to faith and hope is one, and even the most typical, way of evading the genuine philosophical problem. Other people admit the absurdity of the world and man's life, but refuse to reflect on these truths or to draw any conclusions from them. By continuously remaining in a sphere of inauthenticity they, too, evade the real problem.

Finally, most people who admit the absurdist thesis, and are willing to draw all the conclusions it entails, make the mistake of claiming that refusing to grant a meaning to life necessarily leads to declaring that it is not worth living. In other words, these people argue that once it is admitted that man's life does not have meaning, one must admit also that life is not worth living. In Camus' view, however, there is no necessary connection between these two statements, and the maintenance of such a connection is the main prejudice which prevents one from seeing a third solution. It is obviously true that people kill themselves because life is not worth living for them. The question, however, is whether people indeed kill themselves because life has no meaning. Could it not be the case that precisely because life has no meaning, life is worth living? In other words, could it not be the case that the absurdity of the world and of man's life is the only legitimate presupposition under which man's life can be creative and free? Camus is convinced that life's absurdity by no means logically requires one to escape it either through hope or through suicide.²⁶

Camus' view clearly rests upon two presuppositions: the absurdist thesis, and the conviction that there is no way to completely transcend the paradox of the absurd. Since the absurdist thesis has been defended by many philosophers, Camus feels that a few well-chosen remarks suffice to convince the reader of its truth. Anyone who seriously and consistently dares to ask 'why' things happen to him the way they do happen will touch upon the absurd. Anyone who thinks about his future will encounter the absurd. Anyone who reflects upon the density and strangeness of the

world he lives in will meet the absurd. Anyone who reflects upon the inhumanity of man comes across the absurd. Finally, anyone who dares to face his own death faces the absurd.

After this 'rapid classification of well-known and obvious themes', Camus focusses all of his attention on the consequences of this discovery of the absurd. He first shows that neither science, art, philosophy, or religion is able to show man the way to transcend this paradox of the absurd. A man who seriously and consistently reflects upon the conditions in which he finds himself must come to the conclusion that he really does not know whether this world and his life have a meaning that transcends the world as well as his life. Such a man, however, does know for certain that it is absolutely impossible for him to know something like that because a meaning outside his condition obviously means nothing to him. A man can understand only in human terms, and that is why he will always remain unable to reconcile these two certainties he is convinced of: his appetite for the absolute and for unity, and the impossibility of reducing world and life to one rational principle. What other truth can a man admit without lying, or bringing in hope to which he is not entitled, and which, furthermore, means nothing within the limits of his condition?²⁷

Nonetheless, many people seem to be quite reluctant to admit this simple truth. They feel that this is the point where the question becomes one of whether one is going to commit suicide or trying to escape via some kind of leap; they appear unable to see the third possibility, namely to take up the heart-rending and marvelous gamble of the absurd. Camus admits that the temptation to leap is certainly there for the absurd man: given the history of mankind with its religions and prophets, man is asked to leap. But if this man is serious and consistent he must also admit that he does not understand it, and that it is not wise to do something one does not fully understand. The various religions will try to convince him that his attitude is dictated by pride and that pride constitutes man's 'original sin'; but, again, if such a man is serious and consistent he must say to himself that he does not even understand the notion of sin. People tell him he will end up in hell, but his imagination is unable to picture such a bizarre future; they tell him that he will lose immortal life, but that seems to him an idle consideration for a finite man; people try to get him to admit his guilt, but he himself feels innocent and believes that this irreparable innocence allows him everything. That is why he demands to be permitted to live solely with what he knows and understands, to accommodate himself to what is obviously the case, and to bring in nothing that is not certain.²⁸

From this it becomes clear, Camus argues, that the genuine question is not one of ascertaining whether or not life has to have a meaning in order to be lived, but rather one of whether or not life will be better lived if it has no meaning at all. Anyone who adheres to the facts must admit that man's life has no meaning. Instead of trying to deny this fact, man must try to maintain the absurdity. Negating one of the terms of the opposition in which he finds himself, amounts to escaping his own destiny. To abolish revolt in advance is to sidestep the whole problem. For a man, living means precisely to keep the absurd alive in revolt; that is why revolt is the sole, coherent philosophical position.

Suicide, as well as the leap into religious faith, is a denial of the undeniable absurdity of man's life. Suicide is total negation, the acceptance of a limit beyond which everything is finished; suicide settles the absurd in that it engulfs it in the same death. The leap into hope and faith is total affirmation, making all genuine questioning impossible. In the realm of faith there are only answers which are given in the form of myths and their interpretation by theologians. These answers settle all problems in advance, such as the question concerning the meaning of life, of good and evil, of life and death, and of duty and right. Then all is known beforehand and the values referred to in these answers are absolute, divine, and thus unquestionable. The only thing man is

allowed to do is live a life of obedience, awe, and worship. For Camus it is clear that in order to remain true to the condition of absurdity in which man undeniably finds himself, he must reject both suicide and the leap into religion, and enter 'into that hopeless confrontation between man's questioning and the silence of the world'. The most fundamental human act and the first decisive revolt against the meaninglessness of life is to choose life and to establish it as the only necessary good. In other words, it is revolt alone which gives a man's life its meaning and value.²⁹

It is true, Camus summarizes, that the absurd cancels all our chances of eternal life, but we must realize also that it is the absurd which restores and even magnifies our freedom in action. Before encountering the absurd, man lives with aims, goals, and means; there is a constant concern for the future; and thus man becomes the slave of his own projects. After the absurd is realized, everything is upset. There is no goal and there is no future; thus, I must be indifferent to both. In turn, this means that there is freedom for my desire to expend everything given to me. "Do not aspire to immortal life; exhaust the limits of the possible".³⁰

Camus concludes *The Myth of Sisyphus* by stating that he feels the philosopher should take his starting point in the undeniable fact of the absurdity of man's life. From this he must draw three consequences: man's revolt, his freedom, and his passion for life. In so doing he transforms into a rule of life what at first sight seemed to be an invitation to death. A good philosopher refuses suicide as a genuine human possibility.³¹

In *The Rebel* Camus again takes his point of departure in the absurdist thesis, but this time he focusses his attention on the problem of murder as it has manifested itself in this century so tangibly in Russia, Germany, Spain, China, Korea, and so on. At first sight it seems again that the awareness of the absurd makes murder into a matter of indifference. One is tempted to say that if man believes in nothing, if nothing has any meaning for him, if he can affirm no values whatsoever, then everything seems to be possible, and nothing has any real importance. Then murder is neither right nor wrong. "We are free to stoke the crematory fires or to devote ourselves to the care of lepers; evil and virtue are mere chance and caprice."³²

Under the influence of this reflection, which at least *prima facie* seems to be true, one could say: let us then not act at all. But this obviously amounts to at least accepting the murders committed by others. One might decide to substitute a kind of tragic dilettantism for action; but this is tantamount to considering human lives as pieces in a game. Finally, one might decide to take some serious action. In this case, in view of the fact that there are no higher values to guide one's behavior, one could decide to aim at immediate efficacy. But since nothing is either true or false, good or evil, this guiding principle will lead one to believe that he has to demonstrate that he is the most efficient, that is, that he is the strongest. In this way the world is no longer divided into the just and unjust, but into masters and slaves. We must conclude from this, that whichever way man turns in this abyss of negation and nihilism, murder seems to occupy the privileged position.

But is it really true that in accepting the absurdist attitude one must be prepared to accept, and perhaps even to commit, murder? From what has been said about suicide, it will be clear that the absurdist philosopher has to condemn murder. We have seen already that the final conclusion of absurdist reasoning is the rejection of suicide and the acceptance of the hopeless encounter between man's inquiry and the stubborn silence of the universe. To commit suicide is to abruptly end the encounter, and for the absurdist reasoning this means the denial of its own premises. Camus explicitly admits here that the absurdist philosophy is consistent only provided one admits that man's life is the only necessary good. Once life is accepted as an unquestionable value, it becomes clear at once why the struggle and revolt are to be maintained, although there will never be any

definitive meaning. Man must protect his life, because life is good and for that reason must keep going on. While it goes on, however, this life consists in a never succeeding revolt against the absurdity which has its origin in the unbridgeable opposition between the finite man and the dense world. What is more, if one admits that life is good, then it is good for all men, and suicide as well as murder cannot be permitted.³³

Camus is deeply aware of the fact that his absurdist position comes very close to the viewpoint of absolute nihilism. Nevertheless, there is this striking difference, that, whereas for nihilism both suicide and murder are permitted, they are categorically to be excluded in absurdism. This obvious difference between nihilism and absurdism is free from contradiction, because nihilism defends an indifference to life, whereas for absurdism life is the only necessary good.

How then is it possible to defend the absurdist thesis and nonetheless claim that life is the only necessary good? Camus easily grants that the nihilist position at first sight is more coherent than the absurdist point of view in that it admits no value whatsoever. He also admits that, as far as the content is concerned, the absurdist position is indeed contradictory in that from this basic position one can derive all kinds of contradictory conclusions. It is contradictory, also, the moment that one translates it into action because then the absurdist philosophy has to exclude all value judgments while nonetheless upholding life, for to live is in itself a value judgment. It is contradictory, also, the moment one translates it into expression, because by expressing its view it gives a minimum of coherence to absolute incoherence and tries to point to consequences where, according to its own position, there cannot be any consequences. It is even contradictory the moment one considers it as a rule of life because one cannot found general rules of action on the emotion of despair if it is essential to every emotion to continuously transcend itself. Nevertheless, Camus claims, this is not the whole story. By talking about the absurdist position in this way one forgets and ignores the real nature of the absurd, namely that the absurd is an experience to be lived through. If this be so, then this experience can perhaps be taken as point of departure, which then is somehow equivalent in the realm of life to Descartes' methodical doubt in the realm of theoretical knowledge.

In elaborating this last point, Camus claims that absurdism and methodical doubt have in common the fact that both wipe the slate clean and thus leave us in a blind alley. But, like Descartes' doubt, absurdism can return upon itself, and then it opens up a new field of investigation. Indeed, I do proclaim that I believe nothing, that everything is absurd; but I cannot deny the validity of this proclamation, and I do believe in my own protest. This first and only evidence which is essential to the absurdist experience as such, is rebellion. Rebellion now is rooted in the spectacle of irrationality which I encounter when I realize that I am confronted with an unjust and incomprehensible condition. Rebellion itself derives its energy from a blind impulse which demands order in the midst of chaos, and unity in the very heart of the multiple and ephemeral. It, therefore, insists that the outrage be finally brought to an end, and that what has been up to now built on sand be henceforth founded on rock.

In making all these claims rebellion does not rely on any values or norms outside itself, because there are no values and norms; everything is just absurd. If rebellion is ever to find any reasons for its efforts, it is absolutely necessary that it find them within itself, just as the Cartesian doubt finds its ultimate criterion of truth in itself. This means that rebellion consents to examine itself in order to learn how to act. For rebellion to examine itself means that the absurdist philosophy carefully investigates the two centuries of rebellion which constitute our immediate past. Camus believes that in so doing one can perhaps discover in its achievements a certain rule of action which the absurd up until now has not been able to give us.

Man is the only creature who refuses to be what he is. The problem is to know whether this refusal can only lead to the destruction of himself and of others, whether all rebellion must end in the justification of universal murder, or whether, on the contrary, without laying claim to an innocence which is impossible, it can discover the principle of reasonable culpability.³⁴

In trying to more concretely specify the concept of rebellion Camus compares it with the attitude of a slave who revolts against his position. A slave who has accepted commands for a long time suddenly decides to say 'no' because he feels that there is a point beyond which one cannot go. This 'no' represents simultaneously both a categorical rejection of an intrusion that is considered intolerable, and a certain conviction of an absolute right. This right refers to something in him that is 'worthwhile' in an undeniable way, a value which he is prepared to support regardless of what the consequences may be. In other words, a certain aspect of himself which the slave wants to have respected receives a position above everything else, and its maintenance is proclaimed preferable even to life itself. In this way it is made into the supreme good for him on the basis of which he may say: All or nothing. If one reflects upon this, it becomes clear that if an individual is willing to accept death, and even dies as a consequence of his act of rebellion, he in fact sacrifices himself for the sake of a common good which he considers more important than his own destiny. The slave thus acts in the name of certain values which, although perhaps not yet determined, are at least common to himself and all men. In other words, every act of rebellion is oriented toward something which transcends the individual as such.

Many philosophers have claimed that it is nonsense to speak of values which are pre-existent to any kind of action; one can speak of value only after an action has been completed. Camus disagrees with this view and points out that in his opinion a careful analysis of the act of rebellion seems to show that, contrary to the belief of existentialist philosophy, a human nature does exist. That which the slave considers as something which under all circumstances is worth preserving is something permanent in himself, and this permanent element comes very close to what Greek philosophy called 'man's nature'. In other words, in his rebellion the slave tries to defend what he is as a man, and this he has in common with all men.³⁵

All the elements we have just briefly referred to in dealing with the rebellion of the slave are found in the rebel who revolts against the absurd with which he finds himself confronted. The rebel does not deny the absurdity by committing suicide or by leaping into a religion. On the subject of the latter alternative Camus says that

the rebel is a man who is on the point of accepting or rejecting the sacred, and determined to lay claim to a human situation in which all the answers are human. . . . From this moment every question, every word, is an act of rebellion. . . . The present interest in the problem of rebellion only springs from the fact that today whole societies want to discard the sacred. We live in an unsacrosanct moment in history. . . . History today . . . compels us to say that rebellion is one of the essential dimensions of man. It is our historic reality. Unless we choose to ignore reality, we must find our values in it. Is it possible to find a rule of conduct outside the realm of religion and its absolute values? This is the question.³⁶

As we have seen, Camus answers this question by referring to life and man's nature as the unquestionable values from which rules of conduct can be derived.

Absurdity versus Ambiguity

We began this investigation by stating that, at least at first sight, the views of Sartre and Camus have many things in common whereas, on the other hand, there are definitely basic differences. In the context of the brief surveys of their conceptions just given, it will be clear by now that in some cases where Camus and Sartre appear to agree there exists only a similarity in verbal expression, but certainly no agreement about what is finally meant. On the other hand, however, we must say also that some of the differences seem to be much less vital than they originally appeared to be.

In order to be able to demonstrate in greater detail that such is indeed the case, I shall take my point of departure in a reflection on one of the presuppositions on which both expressly agree, namely, the fact that there is no God. But before starting this consideration let us first try to establish as precisely as possible the ways in which both Sartre and Camus formulate this presupposition in relation to the ethical problems with which each wants to deal.

In *Existentialism Is a Humanism*, Sartre states explicitly that, in his view, God does not exist, and that it is necessary to draw the consequences of His absence to the end.³⁷ In another place he says that existentialism is nothing else but an attempt to draw the full conclusions from a consistently atheistic position.³⁸ On the last page of this essay he specifies his position in the following way:

Existentialism is not atheist in the sense that it would exhaust itself in demonstrations of the non-existence of God. It declares rather, that even if God existed that would make no difference from its point of view. Not that we believe that God exists, but we think that the real problem is not that of His existence; what man needs is to find himself again, and to understand that nothing can save him from himself, not even a valid proof of the existence of God.³⁹

From these statements it is clear that Sartre himself adopts an atheist point of view. He has even developed several arguments to illustrate the truth of this claim.⁴⁰ On the other hand, he says explicitly also that the question of the existence of God is not immediately relevant for his position in regard to ethics.

Camus seems, initially at least, to adopt a different point of view here. He never claims to be convinced that God does not exist; nor does he ever attempt to prove that there cannot be a God. He merely states that he himself, as well as many other people today, do not believe in God.⁴¹ He also says that he does not know whether this world has a meaning that transcends it, and then adds: "But I know that I do not know that meaning, and that it is impossible for me to know this. What could a meaning outside my condition mean to me?"⁴² In *The Rebel* he makes it quite clear that the position of the absurdist is and remains provisional.⁴³ Thus, Camus' position is more that of an agnostic than of an atheist.

Camus and Sartre adopt different points of view in regard to the question concerning God's existence. Sartre explicitly claims that the question of God's existence is not immediately relevant to his position in regard to ethical problems. Camus argues that he does not know anything about God, and that this lack of knowledge, which can never be filled up, precisely constitutes the absurdity he finds himself confronted with. Sartre justifies his view by pointing to the fact that the ambiguity which affects man's freedom and action, and which, indeed, is vital for his position in regard to ethics, does not follow from the non-existence of God, but is a necessary element of man's condition as such.

These obvious differences of opinion notwithstanding, I continue to maintain that both Sartre and Camus agree as far as the question of God's existence is concerned on the one and only point which is really vital for their convictions concerning ethics. Namely, regardless of the position one adopts in regard to God's existence (doubt, ignorance, or denial), where ethics is concerned everything depends upon the undeniable fact that for man it is impossible to appeal to a meaning outside the human condition.

In other words, it is my opinion that the conceptions concerning ethics held by Sartre and Camus take their points of departure in two different but nonetheless closely connected presuppositions, namely 1) in a negative attitude in regard to the question concerning God's existence, and 2) in a very special conception of man or 'the human reality in situation'. The first presupposition functions in a different way in both conceptions, in that Sartre claims that the question of God's existence is not relevant for an existentialist ethics, while Camus argues that his ignorance in regard to God's existence precisely constitutes the absurd condition in which man finds himself. This difference, however, is finally overcome in their agreement concerning the precise meaning and function of the second presupposition. I hope to justify my view in what follows, where I shall examine Sartre's conception with respect to ethics in the light of Jeanson's critical commentary on Sartre's position.⁴⁴

In order to clarify the issue, let us assume for a moment, as Jeanson suggests, what both Sartre and Camus deny, namely that God indeed does exist. In that case, because there are no valid arguments for His existence, one can be in contact with God merely through faith, that is to say, through an act which is not completely rationally justifiable. Since such a faith essentially includes a rupture with the laws of thought it cannot maintain itself on a purely speculative level; that is why faith comes to life only in action. In view of this the question becomes: from what does this action receive its orientation? The question is to be answered on the human level because it is only on that level that a human being acts. It does not seem to make sense to appeal to mysteries, if a man can act only by taking his point of departure in his own situation, that is to say if his mode of action keeps referring to the basic choice he has made in regard to himself, and if within the realm of a religious faith many choices are possible. In other words, in the choice of his way to God man is still left to himself; he has to make that choice himself, alone in freedom, and he will never find a rational justification for it. Obviously, one could say that many ways lead to God, and that for this reason each choice is a valid one. But the precise question is: how does a man know that the choice he made is an authentic one?

Finally, even the religious choice does not relieve man of a moral choice, whose only criterion consists in the degree of consciousness which this man has concerning his ideal goal. Regardless of what theologians say, and regardless of what I as a theologian may think, if I believe, then this is because I did it myself on the basis of a faith which is and remains my free choice of my ideal. One does not justify the acceptance of such an ideal by merely calling it God, but by the continuous concern for the authenticity with which one defines this ideal practically by serving it. The notion we have of God is a highly anthropomorphic one. Among other things, this means that the God of each man is the God this man has chosen to serve. But what certainty does this man have in regard to the value and authenticity of his own choice. If he is not allowed to question this choice with respect to its deepest meaning? If this questioning were not allowed, man's choice could never be free, nor could he ever bear any responsibility for it.

Freedom presupposes that I can and do question myself in each concrete form of behavior in regard to the world; moral freedom presupposes that I can and do question the value of my behavior for which I know I am responsible. This questioning cannot be sincere and authentic if there is no

room for genuine doubt and even for the rejection of all moral values. In turn, this means that the answer to a moral problem cannot be determined in advance. Now, if believing in God were to mean knowing for certain that there is an absolutely perfect Being which, as Descartes believed, guarantees the truth and certainty of all my knowledge, then the possibility of a moral attitude would be excluded because there would be no room for doubt and rejection. What has been said for Descartes is true for all religious and philosophical views in which the existence of an absolutely perfect Being is offered as a first truth and source of all subsequent certainty.

One must realize here that for man all value is valorization and, thus, that the 'perfect' offers itself to us only by withdrawing from us; its existence for us consists in its being to-be-realized by us. The idea of perfection does not contain any evidence in regard to an Absolute Being, but constitutes the experience of a vocation. The expression 'God is' meaningless as a proposition or as a theoretical presupposition; if the expression is ever going to mean anything it is because people actively posit it and practically invest it with value. To suppose that God is means something only for one who engages himself in it with his whole faith; but in that case it is he who makes God exist for himself. One does not have or possess the idea of God, but one has to give oneself this idea time and again in the choice he makes of a particular moral course. This means that the moral value of man's activities does not rest on his belief in God; but rather his belief in God is the consequence of a prior moral decision. For man morality consists then only in the attempt to keep this faith authentic. The point here is not to deny the existence of God, but to realize that God exists only insofar as my action witnesses his existence and makes Him be for me. When the believer one day has doubts about God, then he has really doubts about himself, namely about the power to maintain in himself this practical orientation, this intimate efficiency.⁴⁵

Obviously there are many people who do not believe in God. For them the situation is not substantially different from that of the believer as far as the morality of their options is concerned. The only difference which is relevant here is to be found in the completely different ideal they have chosen to materialize. They have chosen a form of existence in which the continuous self-transcendence is not polarized by any goal outside themselves. But this basic difference notwithstanding, they too can be authentic or inauthentic, in good faith or in bad faith. They, too, could go so far as to defend a view of absolute absurdism, and then they, too, would have excluded any genuine form of morality.⁴⁶

Regardless of what this basic option in regard to man's ideal may be, regardless of whether man chooses for a form of existence in which his perpetual self-transcendence is polarized by a goal outside himself or for a form of existence which understands its own freedom as its own value and goal, in both cases man either makes himself man in order to be God, or loses himself in order that the Self-cause may be; that is to say, in both cases man is an endless passion. In both cases it is true also that man is that being by whom values exist, that is to say, man's freedom reveals itself in anguish as the unique source of value.⁴⁷

The second presupposition of Sartre's moral view, already touched upon earlier, is his typical conception of man. The unique characteristic of man in Sartre's view is his ambiguity, the fact that man is that being who can and must question himself about himself. When man questions himself he does not question the reality of the world which is constitutive for his own being, nor does he question his own reality; man merely questions himself about what he is. But the moment man asks the question of what he is, he sees that the typical characteristic of his own being is: not to be what he is. For he calls himself precisely into question in regard to himself. In other words, although I am unable to question the fact that I am, I can and must ask the question of what I am; to have to ask this second question is precisely essential to man. To exist for man means to be a

problem for himself. Since man will remain a problem for himself until he dies, each attempt to stop being this problem for himself manifests his resignation in regard to himself. Thus, man's essence can not be found in something stable, determined, and determinable. Man's essence is found in the form of a task in regard to the problem he is for himself. Man is primarily projection. Before his project is brought about, he is nothing; once the project is brought about, he is merely what he has projected himself to be. In this sense one could say paradoxically that in man and in man alone existence precedes essence. However, one has to keep in mind here that if by 'essence' is understood that which defines me essentially as human subjectivity, that is to say the fact that I am my own problem, then it is clear that essence and existence are perfectly simultaneous in man.

It is of great importance, also, to notice here that by looking upon man from this point of view Sartre escapes the basic mistake made by almost every philosopher from Plato to Nietzsche. Classical philosophy has certainly seen a problem in man's essence, but it has conceived of this problem in the same manner as any other problem studied by theoretical knowledge. It has conceived of this simply as a problem to be solved, without realizing that this is a problem to be lived, and as such constitutes the root of all other problems. Philosophy has always held that its task consists in explaining the whole world, and that for that reason it must also explain man. In trying to explain man's essence it has used the same methods it employed to explain the world. Captured by its own attitude of objectifying things, it has tried to objectify this attitude itself. In so doing it has given up the genuine 'positive' in order to indulge in the imaginary; it has tried to adopt God's point of view, which, as point of view, is obviously contradictory for a man, because it excludes all situation and thus all viewpoints.

In classical philosophy, thus, in order to know himself man had to suppress himself. He formulated a fiction which allegedly completely expresses his essence as this manifests itself to a supra-existential being. But one ascribes to an absolute consciousness whose role and task are the foundation of oneself and the whole world, then he makes himself into a part of the world for this consciousness, and thus becomes an object among objects; his essence becomes mere passivity made that way in order to be known. In this way the human reality makes itself the slave of its own desire to know. From this it follows almost necessarily that one must adopt the viewpoint of psychological determinism, and mystify morality by making it into either a sterile idealism or a mere 'science of morals'.

In Sartre's view philosophy must, indeed, take its point of departure in the appearance of the world. But the appearance of the world is insolubly bound to man's appearance to himself. This presence to himself has the character not only of a fact, but also of a task or obligation. I am this presence to myself (this is the necessary condition in order to be capable of developing into a person), but I must say also that I have to be (that is why my self-personalization is not the effect of a natural evolution, but already a moral activity). In that sense it is true that I am responsible first and foremost for what I am.⁴⁸

Classical philosophy has tried to understand man by means of objectifying methods, and for this reason it had to change man into a thing with an invariable nature. The consequence of this way of doing things has been that the moral aspect of man's life had to be separated from 'what man is'; ontology and ethics became two different sciences, both attempting to lay bare invariable structures and invariable values and norms. In recognizing in the fact of the human reality itself the formulation of the basic moral problem, existentialism has overcome these forms of 'essentialism'. It fully realizes the consequences of this step: it has to deny itself any attempt to solve the problem because that would amount to suppressing the basic human fact. The moral attitude cannot consist in a total transition from the natural world to a universe of values, because

this again would seem to mean the denial of the genuine human condition. Existentialism is thus a genuine form of humanism when it lays down as its basic principle: One must try to maintain the ambiguous.⁴⁹

It seems to me that most of what Jeanson says here about the genuine meaning of Sartre's position in many instances comes close to the position adopted by Camus. It is and remains true that the tone and style of both philosophers are different, that their philosophical positions taken as a whole differ substantially and are rooted in different philosophical sources, and that, even if we limit ourselves to the question of God's existence and the way in which the ideas of the two authors on this subject function in their respective philosophical views on ethics, there are basic differences. Yet both views converge in a point of agreement, namely that in the realm of ethics one cannot use insights which transcend the human condition, regardless of how a negative attitude in regard to the question concerning the existence of God is specified.

This reflection serves to further elucidate certain other seeming differences between the conceptions of Sartre and Camus. First of all, as we have seen in *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre explicitly claims that there is a basic difference between ontology and ethics, that ontology cannot make any moral claims in that it merely describes what is, but that it nonetheless implies important moral consequences.⁵⁰ Camus, on the other hand, does not make a distinction between a study of what is and investigations of what ought to be. In the beginning of *The Myth of Sisyphus* he states that philosophy for him means that investigation which tries to answer the question of whether and under what conditions man's life is worth living;⁵¹ and this is said to be the basic ethical problem. Studying Sartre's position more carefully, however, we came to the conclusion that Sartre's ontology is inherently ethical, too, and that the distinction between ontology and ethics is certainly not as clear-cut as Sartre's explicit statement seems to suggest.

Secondly, Sartre states that there is no invariable human nature. As he formulates it: "Thus, there is no human nature, because there is no God to have a conception of it."⁵² Camus, on the other hand, perhaps explicitly referring here to Sartre, says in *The Rebel* that "analysis of rebellion leads at least to the suspicion that, contrary to the postulates of contemporary thought, a human nature does exist, as the Greeks believed. Why rebel if there is nothing Permanent in oneself worth preserving?"⁵³

Here again, as we noted earlier, it is clear that the difference is mainly verbal in nature, for what Sartre attempts to exclude in his statement is a merely essentialist conception of man. In *Existentialism is a Humanism* he explains that, although it is impossible to find in each man a universal essence which can be called human nature, there is nevertheless a universality of the human condition. There are universal limitations which *a priori* define man's fundamental situation in the universe. This is the reason why every purpose which a human being projects is not wholly foreign to me since it presents itself as an attempt, either to surpass these limitations, widen them, deny them, or accommodate oneself to them. Consequently, every purpose which man projects, however individual it may be, is of a universal meaning. The important point to realize here, however, is that such a meaning is never something given in advance. As meaning and value it can only be understood the moment it is brought about in an actual and free decision. It is this universal and, therefore, absolute character of the free commitment, by which every man realizes himself in realizing a type of humanity, which gives an absolute character to the existentialist ethics, by means of which, in turn, it can escape mere arbitrariness.⁵⁴

From this it is clear that Sartre certainly does admit a 'human nature', as Camus calls it. The only point Sartre stresses here is that one must understand by 'human nature' merely that which defines man essentially as human subjectivity. This is not something stable, eternal, invariable,

and determinable, but rather a kind of task which man must accomplish in regard to the problem he is for himself. If one understands what Camus means by absurdity and rebellion, it will be clear at once that he would certainly agree with Sartre in his basic conception of 'man's nature.'

Thirdly, Sartre as well as Simone de Beauvoir sometimes compare their ethical positions with an 'ethics of absurdity', claiming that their 'ethics of ambiguity' is fundamentally different from the absurdist position.⁵⁵ On the other hand, Camus sometimes compares his 'philosophy of absurdity' with nihilism and devotes a great number of pages to an explicit refutation of nihilism.⁵⁶ If one carefully examines the meanings which both Sartre and Camus attach to the expressions 'absurdity', 'ambiguity', and 'nihilism', it becomes apparent that for Sartre 'absurdity' stands for radical nihilism, and that this radical nihilism is precisely the one which Camus explicitly rejects. Notwithstanding minor differences, both Sartre and Camus try to avoid two positions which in their view are absolutely unacceptable, namely a philosophical view in which there are 'absolute values', and a philosophical position in which all 'values' are absolutely excluded.

Finally, Simone de Beauvoir in her 'ethics of ambiguity' explicitly makes room for suicide as a morally respectable act (under circumstances which she carefully specifies),⁵⁷ whereas Camus categorically denies such a possibility.⁵⁸ Their differences with respect to the suicide issue as such obviously do not necessarily point to a difference of opinion in regard to basic philosophical principles. On the other hand, however, it is precisely on this point that the real difference between Sartre and Camus begins to manifest itself. The reason why, in the final analysis, Camus rejects murder as well as suicide lies in the fact that he explicitly admits that for him there are values which are unquestionable, although they are not absolutes in a religious or even a Platonic sense. In *The Myth of Sisyphus* he refers to life as such a value, whereas in *The Rebel* he mentions man's nature as such a value. For Sartre, however, no value is *a priori* unquestionable.

If I am interpreting Camus here as he intended his ideas to be understood, then I would certainly opt for the point of view defended by Sartre, provided I am permitted to take his view as Jeanson has interpreted it. My reason for this choice is as follows.

I believe that every value theory in ethics is unacceptable, regardless of the concrete form in which such a theory may be proposed. Not only is it true historically that any value theory takes its point of departure in a position which is philosophically untenable, but it is true, also, that such a theory cannot be justified in principle. In *An Introduction to Metaphysics*⁵⁹ Heidegger has correctly shown that the distinction between 'what-is' and 'what-ought-to-be' is intimately connected with three other basic distinctions, namely those between 'what-is', on the one hand, and 'what-becomes', 'what-seems-to-be', and 'what-is-thought', or idea, on the other. As soon, therefore, as that-which-is defined as idea, and this idea, in turn, is understood as that which can be justified by science, it becomes clear that the predominance of scientifically objectified beings begins to endanger 'that-which-ought-to-be' in its role of standard and criterion. 'What-ought-to-be' itself is then compelled to look for its own ground and justification in itself. Obligation can then emanate only from something which in itself already possesses a claim on obligation, which has an intrinsic value, which itself is a value. In this way the values as such become the foundation of obligation and morality. But since values are opposed to the scientifically objectified things taken as 'facts', and since facts certainly 'are', values cannot be in the same way. Values are then either merely subjective, or they refer to a kind of Platonic world of ideas--both of which views are obviously not tenable. The point may be illustrated as follows.

When I say that a thing has value for me and then distinguish between 'that-which-is', the thing as ontic reality, and its value-for-us, it is obvious that such a distinction presupposes an

abstraction and separation of two components which for my experience constitute an insoluble unity. If in the same case, however, I take the thing not as ontic reality, but as 'unity of meaning', taken in such a way as to exclude that particular layer of meaning to which one refers with the term 'value', then I perform an abstraction and bring about a separation for which I cannot account on the basis of my own experience. In addition, I can make a distinction between the 'world' and the 'universe of values'. In that case I understand by 'world' either the sum total of all ontic things, or I understand by it the totality of all meaning with the exception of that realm of meaning called 'values'. Now it is obvious to me that one can make these distinctions and that the sciences invite us to make these distinctions the moment we approach human phenomena with empirical methods, but it is equally obvious to me that such a distinction does not mean a thing the moment I try to reflect upon my moral behavior. In this I deal not with things as ontic entities or with abstract entities such as, for instance, the objectivations of the sciences, but with things as I encounter them within a totality of meaning, taken now in the full sense of the term so as to include the realm of values. Here, I deal with things as they offer themselves to me not in my theoretical interest, but precisely in my 'practical concern'. In both cases the identification of world and realm of values on the one hand, and of 'what-is' and 'value' on the other, has obviously not yet been shattered.

Furthermore, once values are separated from 'that-which-is', they place us before an insoluble dilemma. On the one hand, I might attempt to find a way to explain how we can know values 'the way they are in themselves'; but then these values cannot have the ontological status which I would like them to have, because if I am able to know them 'the way they are', they themselves cannot transcend the realm of the human condition. In other words, in that case they are neither eternal nor absolute and, thus, are unable to account for the obligatory character of the act which they are supposed to invoke. On the other hand, I might give these values the ontological status I would like them to possess, that is to say I might make them into something absolute and unquestionable, or at least into something necessarily connected with an absolute; but then I am unable to know them 'the way they are', because then they do radically transcend the human condition.

Nonetheless, admitting that the position of Sartre as interpreted by Jeanson is in this as well as other aspects preferable to the point of view adopted by Camus, is not tantamount to subscribing wholeheartedly to this position. I agree with Jeanson that it does not make sense to separate ontology from ethics. Every sound ontology is basically 'ethical', and every good form of ontology is certainly and necessarily a humanism. I am in agreement, also, with the way in which Jeanson explains the obligatory character of man's moral decisions without having to appeal to *a priori* values, norms, standards, or even goals. My main difficulty in regard to his view is connected with the fact that he does not seem to allow for an 'ethical theory' on the basis of a religious view. Let me explain my position briefly.

I am willing to assume with Sartre and Camus that there are no valid arguments for the existence of God. I am willing to admit, also, that in principle there can be no valid arguments for God's existence. However, I feel strongly with Kant that one should also stress the other side of the issue, namely that there are no valid arguments for the thesis that God does not exist, and that in principle there can be no such argument here, either. This being the case, I do not see why it would be more unreasonable and 'inhuman' to believe in God, than it is to believe that God does not exist. Both points of view rest upon an option which in principle cannot be rationally justified. One chooses to be an atheist or one chooses to subscribe to a 'religious' view, regardless of whether this latter view involves a commitment in regard to any one of the 'institutionalized' forms of religion.

If this be true, then it is possible to point to an alternative which neither Sartre nor Jeanson seems to have seen. I do agree with them that any attempt to develop an ethical view either on the basis of values, or on the basis of eudaimonism, utilitarianism, hedonism, and so on, is excluded in principle. In other words all philosophically ethical theories developed in the past are views that presuppose an option which cannot be rationally justified, namely, the free choice to believe in God or to reject Him. The ethics of Plato and Aristotle, medieval philosophy, Kant, modern axiology, naturalism, utilitarianism, and so on, all of these views take their points of departure in a conviction which continuously remains at work as a necessary condition for the obligatory character of laws, norms, or standards. In principle this conviction cannot be rationally justified, regardless of whether it refers to a World of Ideas, a supreme Good, the God of Judaism and of Christianity, Life, Freedom, Equality, or even the human condition as such.

I feel, however, that all of this does not exclude the possibility of an ethical theory which is built upon a religious conviction. In other words, while I agree with Jeanson that it is impossible to develop a philosophical ethics independent of an ontology and, thus, that a philosophical ethics in the traditional sense of the term is excluded, I do not think that adopting such a view excludes a 'religious ethics'. Once a man asserts that he believes in God, the possibility of developing an ethical theory seems to be given at once. Jeanson is certainly right in claiming that even such an ethics has to respect the typical limitations of the human condition. Within a religious perspective a goal and the order which flows from it can be described as an ideal from which maxims or norms can be derived. Nevertheless, one must realize that this description has meaning if, and only if, the goal and order themselves are presented in a way which is meaningful within the limitations of the human condition.

An ethical theory, built upon an explicit religious commitment, is not without grave difficulties, as the many publications from Kierkegaard to Bonhoeffer which have been devoted to such a theory have clearly shown. I cannot deal with these difficulties in this essay, but I can indicate the direction which I would take if space permitted. First of all, I think that people who subscribe to a religious view should realize that the great majority of the moral standards, maxims, and laws the Western world has subscribed to for many centuries should be characterized as social 'guide-lines', established by a society for the well-being of its members and for the well-being of the whole. In establishing these guide-lines Western societies have been influenced mainly by the Greek conception of man and the neo-Platonist interpretation of the religious sources of Judaism and Christianity. For reasons which are historically understandable these guide-lines have gradually received the status of eternal and divine laws. Today we are able to understand that these norms are historical and therefore relative, and that the societies involved may very well wish to reformulate them in such a way that they again can genuinely guide the lives men actually are living in our contemporary, complex, and sometimes even chaotic world.

This does not mean that there cannot be any 'eternal' imperatives. These, however, will be very few, and they must be formulated and interpreted in such a way that they are worthy both of the God who promulgated them and of man for whom they are destined.⁶⁰ In my opinion, this means concretely that these imperatives should never suggest a fear on the part of God that a human being could ever be too human, that is, authentically rational, free and autonomous, but nonetheless unable to be perfect.

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Notes

1. Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*. trans. J. O'Brien (New York: Random House, 1955).
2. J.-P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. H. E. Barnes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956).
3. Cf. Albert Camus, *Theatre, Recits, Nouvelles*, ed. Roger Quilliot (Paris: Gallimard, 1962), pp. xxxiii-xxxiv. Joseph J. Kockelmans, "On Suicide: Reflections Upon Camus' View of the Problem", *The Psychoanalytic Review*, LIV (1967), 423-40, espec. 427 and 433-38.
4. Joseph J. Kockelmans, "Sartre on Humanism", in Joseph J. Kockelmans, ed., *Contemporary European Ethics* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1972), pp. 255-269.
5. J.-P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, pp. 625-28.
6. J.-P. Sartre, *Situations*, 6 vols. (Paris: Gallimard, 1947-1965); "Existentialism is a Humanism," trans. Philip Mairet, in Walter Kaufmann (ed.), *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre* (New York: The World Publishing Company, 1956), pp. 287-311. See also: Simone de Beauvoir, *Les forces des choses* (Paris: Gallimard, 1963), p. 218; Hazel E. Barnes, *An Existentialist Ethics* (New York: Knopf, 1967), p. 30.
7. Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity* (New York: The Citadel Press, 1967).
8. Francis Jeanson, *Le problème moral et la pensée de Sartre* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1965).
9. J.-P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, pp. 625-26.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 626-27.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 627-28.
12. Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, p. 7.
13. *Ibid.*, pp. 7-9.
14. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-15.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 15-17; J.-P. Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism", pp. 292-94, 306-309.
16. Simone de Beauvoir, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-18; J.-P. Sartre, *Ibid.*, pp. 303-309.
17. Simone de Beauvoir, *op. cit.*, p. 24; pp. 18-24.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-26.
19. *Ibid.*, pp. 26-30.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 30-32.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 32-34.
22. *Ibid.*, pp. 129-34.
23. Albert Camus, *The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt*, trans. Anthony Bower (New York: Random House, 1956), pp. 3-5.
24. Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, p. v.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-5.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-8.
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-12.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 39-41.
30. Pindar, *Pythian* iii, in Albert Camus, *op. cit.*, p. 2; *Ibid.*, pp. 41-44.
31. *Ibid.*, pp. 47-48.
32. Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, p. 5.
33. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-6.
34. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-11, espec. p. 11.

35. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-15.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 21; pp. 15-21.
37. J.-P. Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism", p. 294.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 310.
39. *Ibid.*, p. 311.
40. Norman N. Greene, *Jean-Paul Sartre: The Existentialist Ethic* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1966), pp. 60-79.
41. Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, pp. v and 21-37 (passim).
42. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
43. Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, p. 8.
44. Francis Jeanson, *op. cit.*, pp. 265-87.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 265-69.
46. *Ibid.*, pp. 271-72.
47. J.-P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, pp. 626-27.
48. Francis Jeanson, *op. cit.*, pp. 278-82.
49. *Ibid.*, pp. 284-85.
50. J.-P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, pp. 625-26.
51. Albert Camus, *The Myth*, p. 3.
52. J.-P. Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism," pp. 290-91.
53. Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, p. 16.
54. J.-P. Sartre, "Existentialism is a Humanism", pp. 303-304.
55. Simone de Beauvoir, *The Ethics of Ambiguity*, p. 129.
56. Albert Camus, *The Rebel*, pp. 23-105.
57. Simone de Beauvoir, *op. cit.*, pp. 30-34.
58. Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus*, pp. v and 39-41.
59. Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961), pp. 164-67.
60. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, "Grundfragen einer christlichen Ethik," *Theologie--Gemeinde* (München: Chr. Kaiser Verlag, 1960), pp. 48-58.

Chapter XI
The Ethical Person as Source of Religious Insight
Maurice Nédoncelle

From Sense Perception to Being and to the Divine

Sense Perception and One's Body

Sense perception, it would seem, should be spoken of only in the plural, for by it at any one moment my attention is diffused among many percepts. By them I grasp a number of pieces or partial factors, whether visible or tangible, audible or of smell, or of taste--and of muscular or visceral kind. Furthermore, even if in the process of receiving them, I seize and organize them, they remain a given that existed before I did. Hence, my information remains always posterior to their reality, and I can never dominate their multiplicity.

Nevertheless, as can be seen by the very fact that they manifest themselves to me in this manner, they constitute a world which differs from me much as would a spectacle that unfolds before me or a visual or non-visual drama of which I become a witness and even, in a sense, an accomplice. This world possesses a number of special characteristics.

1. The first is that the pieces or fragments perceived are only parts and do not of themselves suffice to constitute a whole or a world. In each perception there arises the conviction that what has been perceived is only a part of a whole which has not yet been perceived. The notion of extended reality as that which has "parts outside of parts" is verified not only within the boundaries of what has been perceived but extends beyond that series of given factors to a potentially unlimited field of things that are yet to be perceived. Consequently, the diversity of the sensible world is unified in space and time only imperfectly and in diverse manners. Reality thus presents not only a clear and defined image, but has an obscure and undefined side corresponding to my ignorance and to the limitations of my efforts.

2. The second characteristic of the sensible world is that it intrudes upon me to make me a part of it. The sign of this intrusion is my body, because this is an object of sense perception. My body appears to me in a paradox that is constitutive of perception, being simultaneously the instrument and part of the object of perception.¹ Because my body is a part of that object, and hence of the spectacle and the reality of the everyday world, I am a part of that world. Thus, to the degree that I am able to perceive, I am a part of the world because the common characteristic of objects is to be one part outside of another and related to a whole. And if I am a part of a whole, I am contained by that whole but am not that whole itself.

3. However, the parts are not simply juxtaposed; the very opposition by which they attain their individuality shows that they interact causally. Considering only the relations of absence or presence between two objects, A and B, four combinations are possible: A-B, not-A-B, A-not-B, and not A-not B. On the basis of the most simple forms of causal relations between these two elements, the causal relations can be defined as the fact that the presence or absence of one is the source of presence or absence for that or for the other term. This allows for sixteen possibilities (from A comes A or not-A, or B or not-B, etc. . .). The pattern becomes more complex if the possibility of a dual causality is introduced (from A proceeds AB or not-AB, etc. . .), or to a still greater degree if one inverts the order of the couples (from A proceeds BA or not-BA, etc. . .). It

is unnecessary here to develop this pattern of causality which already manifests a progressive complexity even when only two terms are used. However, it is already apparent that this pattern becomes a formalism by which one can conceive the individual and collective development of elements perceived. What should be noted here is that the world of perception is one of causally organized parts, and that as regards my bodily nature, I am a constituent part of that world.

4. In what sense am I part of this world and how am I to understand it? The immediate impression given by perception is that my body is a central and privileged part of the world in relation to which all the rest is organized or at least perceivable and comprehensible. As Pradines notes, the "senses of participation" (such as coenesthesia) suggest this more on an affective basis, while the "sense of distance" (such as sight) suggest it more on a cognitive basis. Vision especially, with its variation in the size of images depends upon their distance, shows the almost magic variability of the elements in the panorama related to one's body. More exactly, because we are able to extend or retract our limbs, this variability is related to a point from which we start and which continually falls back as we wish to seize it completely, since the eye does not see itself.

However, the understanding of the perceptive pattern can be reversed so that my body loses its central importance and is engulfed by the world. In fact, the basis for this inversion was laid in the previous perceptivity centering upon the body. That perspective could never be absolute. On the contrary, its relativity was manifest both by the continual motion of the parts of the non-corporeal world and by the continual recession of my body considered as the center when I wished to consider that center itself and place it entirely within the perceptive network. However, if the inversion of the body-centered view is indicated within that perceptive itself, it is realized there neither in sensation nor in imagination, that is, in neither the clear nor the obscure aspects of extended reality. Rather, it is realized in intellection by which we remove ourselves from constituting the center and interrelating the various elements so that they form the objective world as an ordered relationship between things.

Nevertheless, the world which is seen as engulfing me as just one point among many never completely succeeds in so doing, and this for two reasons. First of all because the world remains incomplete and enigmatic; it remains incapable of being formulated in laws which exhaustively express its cosmic elements. The cosmos remains open; it escapes the limitations of the objective factors discovered concerning it. Second, the paradox mentioned above is never able to be eliminated. My body, which is a part of the perceived or perceivable pattern, remains an instrument of the act which I perceive. What is more, it takes refuge in my subjectivity at the moment at which it would be about to evaporate into objectivity.

The above vacillation between the two interpretations of the network of perception is a strange one. Having begun in search of a circle with a center, I found an ellipse with two entrances. I can direct my attention by preference to one, but cannot make the other disappear. What makes this duality very special is that if I choose to relate everything to my body, I remain on the level of sense perception, whereas if I choose to relate all to an autonomous world of reciprocally related objects, I move to the intelligible level where the real becomes the result of a system of theoretical requirements. What is most disconcerting about this duality is that, though the two entrances of the ellipse are on different levels, they depend upon each other: sense perception contains the seeds of intelligence, and the intelligible world cannot indefinitely remain a pattern of theoretical exigencies. From time to time and indirectly it must be experimentally verified.

The Being of the World and the Divine

Certainly by beginning from sense perception, the world I discover can be affirmed to be real. Nevertheless, I cannot claim that it is complete in the strong sense of the term, though at first sight I would have spoken of it in this manner. There seems to be a radical insufficiency to the world in view of which it is not feasible to choose the world as a base on which to build immediately a proof for the existence of God. The indetermination of the world is too ambiguous to provide a sure foundation for the work of theology. At least as a mediating link, there is need for the idea of being. Though the world is not a whole, it is a reality. Even though I do not know whether it is substance or accident, contingent or necessary, and though I am not able to follow the path of being in itself to its end, the world follows this path far enough to enable me to say it exists. What is more, its form of being is sufficiently determined to enable me to ask if it implies a God.

This investigation of being-in-the-world or of the world-in-being requires a prior elucidation of the nature of being. If being were the existent or existent of the world, it is possible that these pieces would not be self-sufficient, but it would not be evident that this insufficiency required a God. However, being is not an existent or group of existents; rather it is the first and last relation of each existent with itself and with other existents. This relation is not arbitrarily applied from without; it is indispensable to every existent in order that the existent's distinctive reality be defined and be able to situate itself in the world. This relation is dynamic and constitutive, but because it transposes the existent or existents into itself, it remains anonymous and is constituted by this very act. Being, which traces out the world in all its senses and at all its levels, manifests itself in the beings of the world without their knowing it, like a language which does not come from its words but which conditions all their relations. By this very fact it is uniquely present at the root of all.

Can this Porphyrian being and universal mediator, without which existents--however dense they might be--would fall into nothing, be called God? If we abstracted from the person as much as possible, as we have until now, it would not be possible to say that the being on which the world rests is that act of the Being par excellence which is God. However, we can discern in this being a prefiguring of God, that is a divine. But it is necessary to justify this assertion.

1. One cannot say that being in the world, which to us appears as the being of the world, is the act of God. The reason for this is that we have no means of deciding directly whether or not the insufficiency of things which exist in the world requires a transcendent cause. Nor is it possible to say whether the idea of cause, such as was defined above, limits itself to meaning that one that one being is the determining condition for the presence or absence of another being. In brief, we cannot say whether causality extends above, within, or between beings. Beginning from things that exist in the world, one can merely pose this question.

2. Nevertheless, we can perceive in things existing in the world a divine or a prefiguring of God because being, of whatever sort, immediately reveals an intelligible order. The world has a fundamental harmony accompanied by power and wisdom, as is manifested in its presence in every existent, in its unlimited power of relating things, and in the very fact that, while penetrating all existents, it is able to express, transpose, and unite them, without appearing as anything separate or in its own right. Being insensible to evil, which neither touches the divine nor is touched by Him, the divine plans and orders all things; therefore it is always pure in that which is impure, the permanent beauty of the cosmos, giving the way which opens new ways and rewards those who follow them. The divine is nature both as giving birth to what is new and is itself unfolding, not by creation but in an endlessly reversible cycle.

True, some call this principle of harmony God; it is the divine of which philosophers speak. Others, however, refer to it as divine and still consider themselves atheists because they consider God to be more like a divine of which philosophers speak. I shall call it the precursor or prefiguration of God, for it is the most that one can achieve when he begins from sense perception with the ontological reflection based upon it. Using the ordinary meaning of second causes, one cannot consider the precursor to be the absolute source or goal of things that exist. That notion does not even arise out of the insufficiency of being, but is found within them at their very foundation. Whatever they may be, by the very fact that they are, the source is present as their breath, in their very atmosphere. Neither made like an inanimate thing or engendered as are living things, the divine is co-extensive with everything that is and with every living thing that is born. Although it can be called one, it is at the root of all multiplicity as the unspoken face in all faces, itself remaining unchanged throughout all the changes it makes possible. If one says that it is here, it can equally well be said to be there and to be between here and there; and if it is immutable in its nature, it is infinitely mobile in its presence. Thus, while retaining its own identity, the divine is the source of the identity of all others. These, however, do not become the divine, which divine is, rather, their basic identity with themselves and their relations with other beings. It is the Reason (*Logos*) of Nature, the supple mediator of the world, the first approximation of God, and the God before person.

From Person to God

Once I realize that I am not a part of the world of sense perception everything changes. From the fact that not all was reducible to the objectivising process which constituted the consciousness of my body within the pattern of this world, it was already clear that the world could not be a universe in the proper sense of that term. That universe lacked the subject which perceives it but which it itself cannot include.²

The feeling of existing in the world also is immediately transformed. Though this existence is still manifested by awareness of the body, there is no longer that strangeness by which one speaks of the body in the third person and which allows us to share images with the world. The new relation is manifested by that intimateness by which my body is me and I am that body. Nevertheless, this type of integration of the body with subjectivity is not the whole of subjectivity but only one particular act or mode. Subjectivity is not fully achieved unless it is personal, and it becomes fully extra-personal only by going beyond the corporeal feeling it includes and beyond the world of perception by which it is represented.

Here the thought process (*cogito*) is not limited to the mathematical model, but is a unique reality implying a location, a structure, and a history.³

I do not maintain that the proof of the existence of God becomes evident from the moment one recognizes this uniqueness of persons. However, I certainly would say that the proof which I am going to present not make any sense without a prior recognition of this principle. I would even add that I would not consider valid any proof that is separated from this principle.

*Person and Nature*⁴

The first stage of the reflection which leads toward a philosophical belief in God is God by an awareness that my reality and yours, as untouched, unique, and unlimited openings upon being, are out of any proportion to the resources of nature. By definition, a personal center escapes the

limitations, the similarities, and the contrasts which accompany beings on the levels of biology or animal psychology. The person judges the world and is capable of indefinite growth in his own identity. Even in hating himself, he cannot denounce himself. This alliance of a unique destiny and an unlimited openness is, without doubt, only a wish in us, but the orientation toward this goal rules out from the beginning any absolute break between appearance and reality in me. In this sense, from the beginning we are what we are to become, and this by an act which radically surpasses anything in the sensible world. Certainly we live in this world and make it exist in our bodily and psychic functions, but the principle which specifies these is not limited to them; it is that unique reality that we are by the very fact that we have being. For us sensible factors can only be aids or obstacles, not causes or goals.

A similar line of reasoning can be established concerning interpersonal relations. Even if men are destined to a total intercommunication, they do not create it, but receive it as a promise or as a task. The immense influence that men exert one upon the other can be real only if they have already been given their respective beings. Evidently, it is not procreation which explains this being, for that is only its context and occasion. That is why at times we can depersonalize ourselves so well when with others, and come closer to ourselves in solitude. The very idea of interpersonal relations is not ours; we receive and utilize it, whether for good or evil. The degree of our presence to others depends on us, but the presence itself is a gift which surpasses us and which, thus, always retains something undefinable that cannot be converted into concepts or analyzed into its particular characteristics.

Person and God

The second stage of the reflection that leads to God consists in recognizing that we do not understand or explain ourselves if there is no god who is closer to us than we are to ourselves. For the moment, I will use but a small 'g' or, if you wish, the term "*daimon*".

There is a strong temptation to protest that this is only a type of project image or auxiliary construct, rather than a being which makes me be for and by myself. But a projected image does not precede the being of a thing, whereas our appreciation of ourselves implies a source that is not simply derived as a shadow. We are aware of being immediately and perpetually dominated by the norm which imposes our phenomenal character and which we ratify by the very fact of affirming ourselves in the first act of our existence. In the same manner, an auxiliary construct made by us would only furnish a support, whereas the God of personal awareness is not a support produced by us, even when we ratify him. Our 'God' is antecedent to us. He surpasses us independently of ourselves or even when we violently opposed him, without ever ceasing either to affirm him or to be affirmed by him. The theme (the divine) is given; our existence is only a series of variations or responses unequal to themselves and amongst themselves. Whether faithful or not, even in the protests or the negligence of infidelity, they will be incapable of negating the theme since, in a word, they are slaves to their very identity.

Finally, neither a projected image nor an auxiliary structure can be a cause, whereas it is precisely a reality in the order of cause that experience manifests. I know that I am wanted, and I know this not in the repressive manner of a false belief resulting from a pathological projection, but in a sense that is both more radical and inevitable and more discreet and rational. Reflection certifies the initial experience which obliged me to recognize in myself someone other than myself, and it is only in this interior realization that I grasp the causality in its entirety. Elsewhere, I perceive causality only in its superficial forms of interpersonal action or of natural phenomena. It

is only in my being that I learn what it is to be totally produced, to be the living existence us of an infallible grace which wishes me to be free and on which even my revolt depends. Undeniably, my daimon places me in existence at each moment, but it situates me in a position that is open to both defeat and to progress. It divides me between an ideal and a factual self, and strangely interlaces the functions of the two. I perceive that I am the cause of my actions and of their adequacy or deficiency in relation to me; but this is not the most profound revelation of causality that I possess. The most profound revelation I have of causality is that of being a unique effect and of being dominated by a cause which absolutely envelops and specifies me.

The experience of the causality which I exercise is not the same as that of causality which makes me capable of exercising it. The latter is accessible to me only by looking, as it were, behind and above, since I cannot cause in the same way as the cause of my being, that is, by creating a thing in its totality. No doubt the being that is engendered is not by that very fact inferior to the one who engenders it, for there can be as much dignity in receiving as in giving. Thus, it is therefore not because I am wanted that I am inferior to the cause of my, but because I cannot respond equally or be the total source of any being.

Must one say that this cause or daimon is personal? I cannot reduce it to myself, even though I am rooted in it and identify myself with its creative will. Nevertheless, I must refer to it as a 'thou', though in a sense which surpasses all worldly analogy, for it is the only thou which constantly understands me and is continuous with all my acts and states. It would be contradictory to assimilate it to an impersonal principle since it is eminently what I am. In fact, it would be more probable to fear that in realizing myself completely I might dissolve my person into his, except that this new fear is overcome by the fact that his action is to make me to be. Furthermore, the elementary and worldly forms of causality already manifest a curve through the realm of the living and their levels of psyches towards a manner of influencing whereby the cause is conscious of itself and of the other. In human relations, personal consciousness is in no way definitively diminished by the fecundity of its operations, but is even increased by the slightest influence it exercises upon other consciousnesses. It would be strange for the convergence of act and of person suddenly to disappear at the summit after having been progressively affirmed at each degree leading up to it, for this would be to collapse abruptly at the very origin of human beings within whom person is realized most distinctly and without assignable limits.

God and gods

The third stage of our road toward God consists in asking ourselves if the Daimon is different for each consciousness or if it is the same for all: is my god (with a small 'g') God (with a capital 'G') shall refrain from ridiculing polytheism which, at the level at which we place ourselves, is a profound and elegant hypothesis and accounts so well for the plurality of nature and of humanity. However, it does so too easily and disregards at least two things. On the one hand, in all of our encounters there is another presence of God as an undivided unity appearing in the midst of our meetings while remaining perceptible in those states in which union is lacking. In short, the respective gods of each of our persons are the faces of the same God and we cannot hypostatize each of its reflections in our mirrors. On the other hand, to safeguard each aspect of the divine in its uniqueness, polytheism bypasses the problem of the (uncreated) uniqueness of all uniquenesses (personal identities) and is condemned to substituting for it either a general idea or a world soul. Thus we are led back to that earlier notion of a divine which is manifestly inadequate to the

legitimate and inevitable requirements for God which have become manifest at this point in our itinerary.

God is not only personal because he creates our persons; he is so by the intimate nature of his divinity and in a unique manner, without adding himself as an additional or even first link to the series of persons we form among men. He is suprapersonal, not infra-personal. His perfect immanence and our obvious weakness make the relationship we have with him unequal. Nevertheless, there is always a reciprocal relation between Him and us. The life of spirit, when it develops itself, shows that that relationship never tends to lessen. Thus, on that point, philosophical reflection confirms the testimony of religious invocation.

Is it possible to go further and to see something of the intimate life of God? Certainly, for God cannot give being to a person without. In a certain manner, giving himself as well. We have considered Him as the uncreated uniqueness of created uniqueness, but nothing excludes the possibility of a plurality of supra-personal centers in God.

Contrary to a frequently held thesis in the history of philosophy, we have been led to conclude that the person is not personal because he has limits, but that he is personal because he is an end or goal in himself. Thus the `other' is--for this person--not a limit, but a source of this very finality (or goal orientation). If it is true that the not-I is not necessary to the I to which it is associated in our experience, it is nevertheless impossible to identify and conceive the I without a thou. If God is suprapersonal, how could there be a kind of `I' eternally alone? In that case He could be saved from this solitude only by our creation and there would thus be two gods: the one impersonal, before creation, and, as it were, during creation; the personal, after creation, and dependent upon it. Even if the created persons were eternal, they would not make God as source personal.

In fact, our reflection has led us in an altogether different direction. We have established neither that there could be a change in God's nature, nor that divinity has only a surface personality. Duality enters not through God, but through ourselves. From God comes unity, and it is he who rescues us from being simply discontinuous phenomena. It does not seem possible to admit that we are co-eternal and necessary to God in a way which suffices to give him a thou equal to his own divine eminence. Thus, we can recognize him to be fully personal, as our reflection demands, only if he is multi-personal by an intimate disposition of his being. Only this hypothesis, before which philosophy falls silent, corresponds to the analyses and the thrust of philosophy.

Intuition of the Giver

Reflection overcomes poor relations and re-establishes contact between their elements; it proceeds from an intuition which it purifies and by which, once purified, it is replaced. In a similar way, the philosophical road to God ends with a religious experience, just as it usually starts out with one. As we are neither in the darkness, nor in the noonday sun, the ascetic and aesthetic must alternate on all levels of our existence. What is universally valid in a proof of God does not come from the generality possessed by species and genera, but from the fact that God is in each of us by the presence in each personal consciousness of a unique and supreme Being that reason seeks to verify and express. This presence, which at first is obscure to reflection, progressively disengages itself by means of a sacred contemplation when we consent to take off our shoes, as it were, in order to enter the sanctuary of our soul.

Personal Past

Many men are certain of the existence of God for motives related to their own intimate life. They believe in divine Providence because they see its operation in their life and perceive it at some turning point in their past that is known to them alone. Such a claim would be debatable if it were based on simple and profane advantages. However, it becomes much more respectable and even peremptory when the person who is testifying is capable of the kind of spiritual verification which results, not from frightened egoism, but from the desire to conform to an interior objectivity. I believe in God not because my neighbor was killed in an accident while I was spared: this raw fact can prove nothing but the absurdity of events. I believe in God because I see a will in the course of events, because I know that at certain moments I was gently but firmly led by Him where I did not want to go. There is no automatic union of God with the happiness or with the tragedy of this world; but there is a way in which God breaks in upon us and transforms events by the meaning with which he suffuses them. He acts sometimes as the conqueror who imposes himself upon our restive will and sometimes as a friend who summons forth our highest responses. When I look back over my past years, this is how I meet God. It is easy to dispute the value of such a conviction, and an individual alone with his love is always disarmed. Nonetheless, this conviction can be justified by replacing the immediate impression in its context and submitting it to a criticism which, though of a strictly private order, is nonetheless valid. One might not violate an axiom of logic by denying that such encounters possess the value evidence of the action of God, but in so doing one is aware of a lack of sensitivity. To go to God one must reason, but he must also reach out for all indications.

God as Present

It is not only reflection upon one's own past which makes one aware of the presence of God's action. This awareness can also arise from the intimations of the present and from the way in which they point toward the future. For man God is a guide; he is the Being which is eternally before (and leading) the world. He is the supreme final cause (or goal) and no doubt he is most commonly recognized as the sole adequate goal of a personal and even a cosmic order. Only he can sustain the spirit and enthusiasm he inspires, for only he can give us the strength and the means to go all the way to him, without falling back into ourselves or even lower than ourselves.

Such a God speaks to us by offering himself while we search for him and try to decipher his message in all that happens. Nevertheless, he remains at a distance while we grope for him, being more sensitive to his radiance than to himself. On one hand, the order of our relations with Him is free, as are those of a grown-up child with his Father. But, on the other hand, this noble religion is weak in its foundation, for it implies a kind of exile. The grown-up child addresses himself to a Father who is distant and this remoteness is due not only to the limitations of sensibility, which I understand here not as gross physical emotion but in its most refined significance beyond prosaic pleasures and sorrows. The distance from God is due also to the limitations of thought, which must always be transcending darkness, hesitating between two possibilities, and confronting the ambivalence of its condition and the equivocation of its reflection.

Mystical Presence

Could there be a still more sublime intuition of God, a mystical relation to Him, or an appreciation not only of his gifts but of the presence of God himself?

At first the one who comes from God is not aware of his source but of himself; he is absorbed in what he senses and in his own action and forgets the person (the Thou) which is his cause. Though this pattern of ingratitude is formed constantly throughout our career as human beings, there remains a marginal consciousness of being caused, which constitutes an invitation to metaphysical analysis and a certain perception of Being. However, this mystical illumination does not depend upon a long and technical metaphysical analysis. If one accepts grace, that is, if one responds to divine initiative, the reflexive method of the metaphysician normally should continue into a mystical illumination and arrive at the final phase of the human-divine relationship.

This final phase is still unclear. It would seem that the more penetrating the effect of the divine, the more likely one is to forget its source.

But this is true only in the first phase of the activity of an awakening personal consciousness. The supernatural presence of God is revealed with the greatest immediacy especially in the intuition of what theologians call actual grace, that is, in the initial indications of God's friendship and its transformation of our nature, as well as in the very fruitful contacts with God through the theological virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Thus, in many ways the whole of man is most intimately united with the Divine Being. Here, the gift is the very self of the Giver, who, in turn, is the fullness of love itself. In this way the interpersonal relation overcomes ungrateful nature, for there is no longer a separation between the gift and He who gives it.

To approach God mystically, one must not depend upon one's own works, the ego poietikon, but on God who is their source. For the mystic, the negation of self consists in his overcoming the usual natural ingratitude and relating himself personally to his source. In so doing his actions are purified, the essence of his soul is divinised, and in his essential being rather than merely in his peripheral powers his deviations and deficiencies are corrected. The ego is simultaneously affirmed in its own right and seen in relation to God so that, not God exists because I conceive him (*cogito ergo Deus est*), but I conceive of God conceiving of me (*cogito Deum me cogitantem*). In this way my existence is seen in a clearer light so that, without ceasing to be itself, it does cease being ungrateful to its source. At this point for the mystic the end becomes the beginning, he no longer searches for the support of his being, and, though mediation remains, distance disappears. His basic consciousness is open to the presence of God. If he could maintain himself in this heavenly state, he would come to appreciate everything and everyone, for his essence would adhere to that of God, and the whole limited pattern of his knowledge as well as of his operations would be transformed; his psychic trend would be reversed, that is, no more falling away upon its separate self but ever moving godwards.

In order to retain this intuition in its entirety while on earth, one must not attempt its total expression: what is essential is never said. To this idea, which in certain respects summarizes Plotinus' notion of hierarchical emanation, one might add another that is not accepted by Plotinus, but which is the law of the Cross and related to the Incarnation: by accepting in love its condition, the inferior order which comes from and expresses God paradoxically becomes capable of infinity and, so to speak, becomes God.

In this way there also takes place that interpersonal communion of created persons desired by God. Everything happens as if God had wanted to hide himself as much as possible. So that we could love him freely, he

hides our strongest bond to him so that we can discover it; he even proposes to us the being which he imposes upon us so that we can impose the being that he proposes. He might even invite mankind, which has risen to the idea of God in its philosophy, to give birth to God himself in its history.

The Recovery of the Divine in God

Returning now to our point of departure, it was noted there that the divine to which man has access through the sensible world manifested itself in terms of beings as the source of their harmony. On the basis of the traditional equivalence between being and transcendental values, being was synonymous to the true, the good, and the beautiful, though none of these notions on that level led to a personal God. This does not imply that God cannot be spoken of in terms of those values, but to do so demands that they be approached in a new manner.

Values in a Non-personal and a Personal Context

First of all, and hypothetically, these transcendentals would have to be considered on a metaphysical and a personal level. They would no longer be characteristics of nature alone but of personal subjects as such, that is, of existents who do not belong merely to the sensible world. The transcendentals did not prevent the beings in that world from fighting, tearing each other apart, decomposing, or dying. In that realm indifference regarding what happened to beings was the rule, tempered by a merely mathematical harmony which allowed for the most tragic developments and exchanges. The tragedy did not blemish this harmony because it did not contradict it.

However, values which directly concern persons acquire new content and status. They both determine and are determined, and this is done both in and by a consciousness. Their dynamism does not consist simply in being interiorly or exteriorly transmitted, but in giving rise to ideas within a free person who must respond either by ratifying or by rejecting them. In effect, it is characteristic of a person to appropriate the being he receives.⁵ The extension and the intensity of these values increase as they begin to suffuse the relations of persons with themselves and with others, for persons are centered who no longer open only to things outside themselves as do things that are mere parts of a larger whole. Each one virtually includes all else and escapes reduction to the status of a mere part in at least one essential point. In each, the coincidence of knowledge and reality in the one primitive act makes them responsible for their being, so that they create anew the relations into which they enter and thus become their values.⁶

Personal Values and the Manifestation of God

In the transcendental system as developed in terms of the personal, the primacy of the existent with regard to being is clearer than it was in the development in terms of the sensible world. Values now become the trustees of a message which emanates from the supreme existent, that is, from God. Through all the axiological stages which reflect the actions of human beings, through even the negations of value which hinder this act even while related to it, there remains invincibly manifest the relation of God to his creatures, that is, the being of God and the *cortège* of transcendental values, which is the hidden presence of the supreme Existent. In this sense, value is the anonymous communicability of God, identical to Him inasmuch as it originated with Him, but different from Him insofar as it is the mediating act of his presence to things other than himself.

As attributes of the divine, value is communicated to others according to their capacity to receive it. As the capacity of the sensible world for God was poor, the reflection of God in the divine, present in this world, could then only be as poor. However, the divine capacity of human persons for God is quite different being both boundless in its past realization and infinite in its promise for the future. Value fills the gap between the thinking thought and the thought, between the willing will and the willed will, just as it steeps persons in their vocation to perfect interrelationship. The divine attributes which we perceive in the anonymous multitude of values can also seek to return in their entirety to God himself who draws every being and the whole being back unto Himself: for the face of God, as the fulfillment of hope, is to be revealed to all existents.⁷

Atheism and Personal Values

In the present state in which the person is incarnate, Power and Glory, Truth and Justice, and all the other ultimate values remain providentially ambiguous. If they are sincere, atheists always set one ultimate value as absolute or unconditional, it is only Truth. But they cannot reduce the values to being mere determinations of natural being without denying their absolute character and, in so doing, contradicting their own position, for to consider a value as absolute is to recognize that it mysteriously goes beyond its explicit determination. To subordinate oneself unconditionally to a value, to be ready, for example, to sacrifice everything rather than betray truth or justice, is to restore to that value the character of being a divine attribute. More than that, it is affirmation of faith in a living synthesis of the attributes, the substitution of the idol by a glimpse of God, a passage from the divine to God.

This transition is especially remarkable when the value under consideration is interpersonal love, because this love unites Being and the existent in a privileged manner. Charity is the most synthetic in the series of values. It not only dominates and dialectically unifies the entire kingdom of anonymous values, it bridges the gap between the anonymous and the personal orders. It bridges even that between the forms of impersonal (which must not be confused with the anonymous) and personal realities (whose anonymity is either an expressive form or a mundane phase). Love opens a passage between ideas and things, on the one hand, and all consciousness on the other. However disheartening might have been the original experience of evil, love is the only hope of recovery. As love, God is that point at which the existent opens fully onto being in the personal act par excellence which is eternally simple and can adopt us for eternity.

If value is the veil of the divine attribute and if the passage from the attribute to God is possible, atheism has a positive content inasmuch as it adopts, without knowing it, a theistic perspective. It does this, first, by conforming itself to the unavoidable condition which obliges the believer to see God in the prism of the various attributes. By stressing one of these attributes (which might be at times neglected by the believer), atheists draw one's attention in such a direction that one is preserved from narrow-mindedness or habit. Thus there is a distinctive advantage to--not a confused theology of "the death of God"--but the traditional theology of the "hidden God." What is more, this verifies the thesis of many, from St. Anselm to Maurice Blondel, that to think is to think God and, consequently, that there are no real atheists, but only idolaters. So concludes I the philosophical analysis it is carried to the very completion of its term.

The unbeliever will perhaps be unhappy to be given this gift by the believer and will ask to be left alone. But the believer could well answer by pointing out that even in its name a-theist expresses a reference to God, and that the affirmation of God is thus prior to its negation. In reality, neither adversary can leave the other alone, for, whether they like it or not, they are indispensable

to each other. Destined to meet in human society, they are found together in the heart and mind of each man.

Final Remarks on the Argument of Causality

The road to God which we have followed was that of the final cause (or goal). There are possible misinterpretations on the subject.

1. We have not used the notion of cause as it is used ordinarily in the natural sciences, that is, as one phenomenon which is a condition determining another phenomenon (as in the following example: given the position and the speed of a body in motion at moment T^{-0} , what will be that position and that speed at moment T^{-1}).

2. Nor have we used a principle of causality which we would have first had to describe and justify with its sometimes massive presuppositions and corollaries (as, for example, the affirmation that the effect cannot be superior or equal to its cause, which is only an axiom and of merely limited scope). Our reading of the metaphysical facts shows that the sensible world does not account for the first appearance or the continuation in existence of the person; the interaction of inter-human powers indicates an analogous helplessness; and finally human egos are seen to depend not upon a purely formal and transcendental Ego, but from a divine Thou which gives them their reality and obliges them to affirm it themselves. In this entire progression, we have done nothing more than reflexively analyze experience, locate the different ontological, and determine their natures.

3. In the personal order causality explains the origin of consciousnesses, of which a partial source is found in interpersonal communication and whose total source is found in divine creation. The cause--efficient and final together--does not abandon the effect, nor can the effect be completely cut off from this cause. Rather than the effects being able to be detached from the cause, they are like rays continuous with the cause. The breaks in this continuity are only apparent and its obliteration is only superficial. What is more, the rays are coextensive with the persons they unite and whose images they retain as they manifest them either directly or indirectly. Whether the consciousness begins in a sequence in which one contributes to another or whether it is found in the creation of a person by God, the consciousnesses tend to become synchronized so that their reciprocal action is rendered immortal. In this sense, to recognize God is to allow oneself to be immortalized by Him and to desire that, if He consents, the response of the creature might even give birth to Him.

Notes

1. This approach to the problem of one's body is by way of perception, but it is related to an operational approach. For a less schematic study of this see the stimulating reflections by A.M. Tymieniecka "Den Wendepunkt der Phänomenologie entgegen", *Philosophische Rundschau*, XIV (1967) 182-208.

2. One might object that I grasp myself and other persons as persons only by means of the vehicle of sense perception. Though this might be disputed, I will not do so here. I admit without hesitation that, because the human person is incarnate, in order to grasp him one must proceed by way of something non-personal in the sensible order. Nevertheless, I maintain that this detour does not substantially modify the uniqueness of the person and of his intuition. For example, even if the thought (cogito) arises from sense knowledge, it immediately discards the alienation which

characterized sensible reality. The physical nature in which we are emerged threatens us with explosion at every instant and affords only the precarious shelter of a mortal life. In descending towards death however, we think and will in a light which is entirely different from nature. By imposing upon us a new type of reflection, based upon my openness to myself and upon the consequences which flow from this. The very axis of the world is reversed.

3. All of life and of philosophy depends on this uniqueness which we must personally discover and which requires that we treat ourselves as the very object of our thought processes. We are quite conscious of this. When, for example, we love in another his very self rather than simply certain of the particular characteristics he possesses, everything suddenly becomes very serious. Both the other person and we ourselves immediately know this, though we may refuse to admit the consequences which would take us much further than we think.

4. The following pages are drawn from my *Conscience et Logos* (Paris: Editions de l'Epi, 1961 J, pp. 128-38-38) by permission of the publisher.

5. To express this new order of things, it would be advisable to use a different vocabulary depending on whether it is a question of worldly being or of personal being: the first is a connection received in the existent or the existent that it concerns, the second is a relation that is both received and basically willed by the person or persons.

6. Being personal and interpersonal, they can no longer remain in the world of sense images without shattering it because of its violent contrast with their own exigencies. It is not that persons cannot work in terms of the sensible world even if they feel out of their element there, or that they cannot concentrate on the realm of nature, since the radical univocity of being allows them to enter everything. But the comparison of persons to nature manifests their difference from nature and the comparative poverty, in ontological terms, of the latter. The perpetual threat of bodily death manifests rather than compromising the originality of the person, for it shows that consciousness has no adequate rest home in a world that is for it neither sufficiently broad nor permanent.

7. From the ontological point of view, it would be necessary to expatiate on the following items: 1) The nature of the primordial connection or relation of each existent with itself and with the other existents. 2) The metaphysical status of being with regard to the uncreated Existent and the created existents. 3) The metaphysical status of being with regard to the surrounding ultimate values. 4) The bond of being with the Logos as mediator. 5) The way which being can be conceived as an aspect of the "we". This aspect begins in the reflection upon sensible data since this reflection cannot be severed from the personal order in which it must be explicitly acknowledged to lie, achieving Itself In God. 6) Lastly, condition of existents.

Chapter XII

On the Integrity of Morality in Relation to Religion

David L. Schindler

The several papers in this volume take up in turn various aspects of an integrated theory of the moral agent. Recognizing that cognitive factors are extremely important in moral action, these papers attempt at the same time to show the indispensable role of emotion, volition, character, social environment and the like in the making of a moral judgments. Within this context, then, the present paper considers the role of the religious factor in moral judgment. This issue is analogous to that running through many of the earlier papers. If it is the case that the existential factors of emotion, character, and the like are indeed integral to the development of adequate moral judgments, then these factors must be incorporated into one's theory of moral agent and subsequently attended to in one's program of moral education, if the latter is to have any chance for success. And so it would seem to be with respect to the religious factor in moral agency. Indeed in the instance of religion the issue would seem to be intensified. For if religion makes any claim on us at all it would seem to be a more comprehensive claim than that of other factors noted: the very nature of religion would seem to be such as to require recognition of its primacy in relation to morality.

But, of course, it is just the meaning of such a suggestion which must be examined here. For if an affirmation of a primacy of religion in relation to morality were seen to require making morality simply a function of religion, there would seem to result a direct challenge of the legitimacy in principle of any programs in value or moral education just so far as they are understood as distinct from programs in religious education. It is in this context that Lawrence Kohlberg, together with Clark Power, has seen it necessary, in order to carry through his program in moral education, particularly in public schools, to defend the autonomy of morality over against what he calls the "divine command theorists",¹ that is, those who hold that morality is simply a function of God's revelation as recorded in the Bible.

The thesis Kohlberg and Power advance is that development of moral thinking is necessary but not sufficient for development of religious thinking.² That is, their claim is that religion serves primarily to reassure one in one's moral judgments: it serves to support one in the face of the question as to why one should be moral, in a way proportionate to the form of that question as it emerges at any given stage of morality. Thus, while religion goes beyond morality, a certain stage of morality nonetheless precedes or is the necessary presupposition for a correlative stage of religion. In a word, then, morality is at once distinct from, but related to, religion: morality is autonomous but nonetheless in the limit needs religion. Kohlberg and Power are of course concerned to confirm their thesis with appropriate empirical studies, and in the course of their argument offer evidence which they take to testify to such confirmation. Nonetheless, they are also clear that their thesis involves distinctly philosophical-theological assumptions (*MD*, p. 227, and *passim*).

In what follows I shall be concerned to outline a theoretical position which defends the simultaneous distinctness and relatedness of religion and morality, but which does so by qualifying Kohlberg's and Power's philosophical/theological assumptions, particularly as those assumptions bear on the nature of religion. Kohlberg and Power seek to defend the autonomy of morality, and their intention is to do so precisely within the context of an authentic--non-reductionist--view of religion. To carry this through, they see it necessary to support the thesis that morality is logically

prior to religion in human experience, but that morality nonetheless does not replace religion. I shall argue that such a thesis is not necessary for the maintenance of a legitimate distinctness of morality in relation to religion. Indeed, my argument will be that it is logically possible to defend such distinctness in a way which is more faithful to the integrity of religion--more faithful, that is, to what is legitimate in the concerns of the "divine command" theorists regarding the centrality of God (or of whatever functions as ultimate) in human experience.

To this end I shall suggest a theoretical position which provides warrant for the converse of the thesis of Kohlberg and Power: namely, that there is a sense in which religion is prior to, but does not replace, morality.³ To carry through this suggestion we must make a number of important distinctions, and I therefore propose to begin by examining more carefully the warrants Kohlberg and Power advance in support of their thesis and indeed of the meaning they assign to its crucial terms.

Kohlberg and Power

Kohlberg and Power situate their understanding of the relation of morality and religion between what they regard as two extreme current views of that relation, namely, the fundamentalist or divine command theory on the one hand, and the Freudian atheistic emotivistic theory on the other (*MD*, pp. 203-208). Those who espouse the divine command theory hold that morality is ultimately defined by and rests upon revelation as recorded in the Bible or other texts taken to be sacred. Those who espouse the emotivistic theory regard morality and religion as cognitively empty. In its specifically Freudian formulation, this theory understands moral judgments as "expressions of the constellation of emotional structures termed the *superego*" (*MD*, p. 207). While "morality" in this sense is taken by the Freudian to have a necessary function in the maintenance of social order and survival, religion does not fare so well. Sharing with morality its irrational and relativistic character, religion has the additional quality of being an illusion, something akin to a collective neurosis. Kohlberg and Power take these two views of morality and religion, despite their vast differences in other respects, to be similar from the perspective of educational theory: for, in linking morality essentially with attitudes of respect for some authority figure, both hold a non-rational basis for morality (*MD*, p. 208) and indeed are guilty of the "naturalistic fallacy" which consists in making "ought" statements a function of "is" statements (see for example *MD*, p. 206). Both, therefore, regard religious thinking and scientific thinking as opposed to one another and see a rational and Socratic approach to moral and religious education as not viable (*MD*, p. 208).

In response to these alternatives, Kohlberg and Power propose a class of theories, which they term theories of natural law, which they understand as giving more adequate expression to the nature of morality and religion and their relation (*MD*, pp. 209-213). They term these theories natural law theories because they contend that the human conceptions of moral law are the "outcomes of universal human nature developing under universal aspects of the human condition" (*MD*, p. 210). That is, these conceptions, illustrated for example in the lives of Socrates and Martin Luther King, are not tied to any specific theology, creed, or divine command to which Socrates or King had privileged or private access. At the same time, Kohlberg and Power argue that their understanding of "natural law" theory escapes the naturalistic fallacy into which the divine command theory inevitably falls: for the "nature" which humans share in the moral order and which is thematized in moral philosophy is parallel with, but not derived from or reducible to, "nature" as thematized in science, metaphysics, and religion.

In considering the relationship between religious thinking and moral thinking, Kohlberg and Power, following Stephen Toulmin, take religion to be a form of reassurance (*MD*, p. 212f; *RM*, pp. 346-48). Religion addresses questions which arise at the boundary of moral reasoning, such as "Why be moral at all?," and thereby provides support proportionate to one's moral level for continued acceptance of one's duty to be moral. Thus Kohlberg and Power state in summary that

this essay's central claim is that religion is a conscious response to and an expression of, the quest for an ultimate meaning for moral judging and acting. As such, the main function of religion is not to supply moral prescriptions but to support moral judgment and action as purposeful human activities. If this is true, it implies that a given stage of solutions to moral problems is necessary, but not sufficient, for a parallel stage of solutions to religious problems (*MD*, p. 226).

There are, then, two philosophical assumptions which Kohlberg and Power single out as giving rise to their hypothesis (*MD*, p. 227). The first assumption is that morality is autonomous, that is, a realm logically independent of religion. This is consistent with the fact that only a small minority of persons explicitly appeals to religious concerns to justify its moral judgments and that persons in even the highest stage of moral development hold widely differing religious views. The second philosophical assumption is that the development of metaphysical reasoning presupposes the development of moral or practical reasoning. The point once again is that the metaethical question which religion and metaphysics seek to answer, such as why be moral at all, presupposes the existence of a normative moral structure which is being called into question. A certain stage of morality thus precedes a comparable stage of religion, and hence is necessary for religion: but religion in turn goes beyond morality, in that morality does not suffice to answer the question it (morality) raises.

It is important to note that, up to this point, Kohlberg and Power see their philosophic position as having affinities with Dewey and Kant (*MD*, pp. 227-228; 243-247). That is, Kohlberg and Power share with them the view that morality precedes religion, but that religion in turn goes beyond morality. But when one presses for the fuller meaning of this common claim, a crucial difference emerges. Dewey and Kant share an agnosticism regarding any speculative, metaphysical claims as proper to the religion which goes beyond morality, whereas Kohlberg and Power in their understanding of religion proceed on a "natural law" basis which they take to be properly metaphysical (*MD*, pp. 228 and 246).

Kohlberg and Power adopt a natural law theory because they take such a theory to be more adequate in terms of accounting for the experiences contained in the examples of persons who seem most mature religiously, that is, who have moved to the highest or sixth stage of religious development (*MD*, p. 228 and p. 246). Kohlberg terms this sixth stage of religious development a "seventh stage" in relation to his well-known six stages of moral reasoning. In accord with his general thesis that a given stage of moral maturity precedes a comparable level of religious maturity, his contention is that only at the sixth stage of moral maturity is one motivated to move to the highest (sixth) stage of religious reasoning. One is forced to move beyond the realities of the human social order to an ultimate stage of religious orientation only when one's experience presses one to seek justification for acting in accord with the universal ethical principles proper to Stage 6.

This new stage is genuinely a "seventh" stage in relation to Kohlberg's six moral stages because in it one's thinking goes beyond the sixth moral stage. Nonetheless, the term "seventh

stage" is at the same time properly to be taken as a metaphor because it does not add any new content or formal criterion to the formulation of specifically moral judgment. Rather, "Stage 7" provides support for the structure of morality already expressed in Stage 6, and does so by way of integrating that structure into an overarching perspective on life's ultimate meaning (*MD*, pp. 233-34). In a word, for Kohlberg and Power only one who is fully morally mature moves on to seek a mature solution to the question of the meaning of life in a properly religious context, and indeed in a religious context understood to involve properly ontological or metaphysical claims (*MD*, p. 234).

It is this demand for a cognitively or speculatively satisfying answer to the question of the meaning of life which arises out of the experience of the morally mature person, then, that both leads one into a "seventh stage" and does so in a way which seems to Kohlberg and Power to warrant distancing themselves from the agnostic philosophic positions of Dewey and Kant. That is, mature moral experience seems to demand a "realistic" or metaphysical, rather than an "idealistic" or "imaginative," kind of religion.⁴ But Kohlberg and Power nonetheless go on to note that the exact form which such a metaphysical religion must take is not unitary and definable (*MD*, p. 257). Indeed they offer Marcus Aurelius and Andrea Simpson as examples of persons who embody "seventh stage" reasoning but nonetheless do so while espousing different metaphysical/religious views (see *MD*, pp. 234-43). While Aurelius describes his experience in a way consistent with a pantheistic form of religion, Simpson does so in a manner more consonant with a theistic form.

In the final section of their argument, then, Kohlberg and Power describe how Spinoza and Teilhard de Chardin afford us examples of the kinds of religion/metaphysics which provide the required rational underpinnings for the experience of Aurelius (pantheistic) and Simpson (theistic Christian) (*MD*, pp. 246-55). And again the rational character of their accounts is crucial: however much Teilhard's position, for example, might draw its inspiration from Christian revelation, it nonetheless contains within it a theology of nature or creation which is offered as a way of accounting most adequately for the totality of experience (*MD*, p. 253). The point bears stressing: it is not at all the case for Kohlberg and Power that views such as Teilhard's, which are offered as "seventh stage" "foundations" for a Stage 6 morality, must not have explicitly "supernatural" sources; the point rather is simply that such views, even if "supernatural" in origin, contain within them claims which are also distinctly rational in the sense that they can be advanced as satisfying the demands of human intelligence for meaning.

It is just this final claim of Kohlberg and Power, then, which distances them from the emotivist on the one hand and the fundamentalists on the other, who would both, though with vastly different motivations, disallow any distinctly natural knowledge of the Ultimate Reality, God. But once again these "natural law" religious views offered by Kohlberg and Power are not to be understood as themselves directly generative of morality. Rather they are parallel with, and supportive of, what remains the distinctly moral reasoning of Stage 6. In a word, religion, in its most adequate stage, informs "a general natural law, ontological orientation and supports principles of justice" (*MD*, p. 212).

The views of Kohlberg and Power as described here seem to me to make an important contribution to the contemporary discussion regarding the theoretical foundations of programs in moral education. Kohlberg's non-reductionist account of the stages of morality, expanded now in the articles under discussion to include a more detailed description of how metaphysical and religious concerns with ultimacy function in moral judgment and action, serve to open for educators a whole range of questions which long have been taken as purely private matters. Both

the emotivists (positivists) and the "divine command" theorists, though in different ways and for vastly different reasons, have failed to challenge the private character of morality, precisely because they make morality a function of what is non-rational and thus not naturally accessible to all. More exactly, they construe morality as of a piece with a metaphysics or a religion taken to be essentially non-(or extra) rational, and hence non-natural and private. Kohlberg's position all along has served generally to challenge traditions which subscribe to the private character of morality. What he attempts to fill out in the more recent articles with Power is the sense in which it is possible to be genuinely religious while respecting the legitimate autonomy--the public character or cognitive status--of morality. He does this by assuming an analogous form of his earlier arguments regarding a parallelism between the structures of moral reasoning and scientific and (here) religious thinking, rather than a simple derivation of one from the other.⁵ But he does it also by showing us views of religion which allow us to affirm such autonomy on intrinsically religious grounds. That is, he shows that, if one wishes to be genuinely religious while nonetheless defending the public character of morality, one must develop an understanding of religion which allows, on inner-religious grounds, a metaphysics or natural theology. Put another way, one must espouse a form of religion which permits affirmation of the integrity of the distinctly "natural" structures of the world.

For present purposes, then, I shall assume with Kohlberg and Power the correctness of the thesis regarding the need for affirming a realistic metaphysics, a natural theology, as intrinsic to religion properly understood, if one is to sustain the public character of morality from within a religious context. At the same time, I should like to raise a question about the way in which they see this thesis as entailing an affirmation of the relative primacy of morality over religion. In granting an understanding of religion which affirms the integrity of the "natural" structures of things, is it not more adequate to situate that understanding within a context wherein religion is taken as having primacy over morality?

In what follows I shall argue for a sense in which this is the case on intrinsically religious and philosophical grounds. But I should nonetheless note at the outset what seems to me to be the importance *a priori* of facing up to the full implications of this issue. For what if it is the case that religion is needed, not only to support a level of moral judging and acting already reached, but rather, precisely, to generate that level of judging and acting in the first place? Or, put in a way similar to the broader form of the question raised by Tocqueville with respect to the political-cultural trends he saw developing in nineteenth century America: what if it is the case that we cannot successfully generate morality in our children without situating that morality explicitly in a context of religion?

The Distinctive of Faith and Religion

I should like to begin my discussion by returning to Kohlberg and Power and calling attention to an important ambiguity in their position which is directly pertinent to the thesis I should like to advance. In the context of their general argument regarding the primacy of morality over religion seen as emerging at the "limit" of morality (*RM*, p. 350), Kohlberg and Power identify another way of considering the relation of morality and religion, namely, from the perspective "of the psychological unity of the two provided by the ego" (*RM*, p. 350; see also *MD*, p. 226). They then go on to say

Insofar as religion serves to strengthen the self which makes moral decisions, it has an effect, not on the particular formulation of the moral judgment, but on whether any judgment is to be made at all and whether and how, if it is made, that judgment will be carried into action (*RM*, p. 251).

Drawing on the work of Fowler, Kohlberg and Power then offers three illustrations of ways in which the strengthening of the self on the part of religion can occur:

First, a religious interpretation of one's life as a vocation can renew one's sense of moral purpose and commitment (*RM*, p. 351).

Second, religion can serve to encourage the self confronted by the abyss between the moral ideals of the self and the injustice of the world (*RM*, p.351f).

Third, a religious perspective can heighten one's moral sensitivity by offering a vision of the self as intrinsically related in a familial bond with other selves. . . . Thinking of strangers as brothers and sisters [can have] the effect of making what [might be] construed as a non-obligatory situation, one in which moral action [is] obligatory. In addition, the motivation to act [can be] intensified (*RM*, p. 252).

Finally, in the same article from which these quotations are taken, we find the following statement:

The claim that moral stages are necessary but not sufficient for religious stages . . . is compatible with the theistic position that implicit, universal faith grounds the very possibility of making a moral judgment or acting morally. That is, in every moral judgment there is a tacit further judgment that the activity of moral judging is, in fact, necessary. Such a judgment is based not on the fulfillment of moral criteria for an ethically right act but on the fulfillment of "religious" criteria for an ultimately meaningful act (*RM*, p. 365).

I quote these passages because they seem to open up a way of defending a form of a primacy of religion over morality. Indeed they suggest a genuine tension with the more general thesis of Kohlberg and Power outlined above. But since Kohlberg and Power apparently do not see such a tension, we must sort further through their meaning.

The crucial distinction for Kohlberg and Power in founding the affirmations just cited is that between faith and religion. Faith, as Fowler understands it, is holistic; it is a basic stance, a system of loyalties and beliefs, which includes in its sweep both cognitive and affective factors (see for example *RM*, p. 347 and 355; *MD*, pp. 213-14; 223 and 226; Fowler, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-75). In contrast, Kohlberg and Power would restrict religion to "that part of faith in which there is a conscious reflection on that which provides ultimate reassurance and meaning for life. Through the symbols, concepts, and theologic of religion, the concerns of one's faith are openly addressed in a reasonable way" (*RM*, p. 347). As they put it elsewhere, they would distinguish within the broad matrix of faith what they take to be the partially separable domains of morality and religion, while in fact redefining this broad matrix as a matter of ethical rather than faith development (*MD*, p. 226). Thus, though there may indeed be a certain unity in a person's ethical development, of which Aristotle's *Ethics* provides a good picture, within this unity moral judgment or thinking remains clearly distinguishable logically from religious judgment or thinking (*MD*, p. 226).

Within the context of this distinction between faith and religion, then, the claims recorded in the quotations cited above would seem to fit as follows into Kohlberg's and Power's "necessary but not sufficient" hypothesis. First, insofar as one is speaking of faith, that is, of a fundamental though largely tacit system of loyalties and beliefs, it would seem to be permissible--logically possible and indeed necessary--to affirm such faith as anterior to morality. Such faith would seem to provide the initially necessary confidence in the very worthwhileness of acting morally at all (see *RM*, p. 365; *MD*, pp. 223 and 226). But secondly, insofar as one is speaking of religion (a) a certain level of morality or moral judgment must precede a parallel level of religion or religious judgment.⁶ (b) Insofar as religion in turn positively influences moral judgment, it does so by providing after-the-fact reassurance, namely, a proportionate measure of support for an already achieved level of morality which has been pressed to its limit. Finally, (c) religion provides such support, not by adding anything specific to the particular formulation of moral judgment, but by providing the person making the judgment with a general reason "for being and for purposeful human activity" (*RM*, p. 368).

Just what are Kohlberg's and Power's warrants for making the distinction between faith and religion which is central to the priority they accord morality over religion? I can discern two. First and generally, they seem to take some such understanding of religion as alone capable of protecting the autonomy of morality--that is, in the face of the challenge from divine command theorists. Secondly, a distinction between faith and religion makes possible a more careful and detailed empirical study of the relation of religion and morality (see for example *MD*, p. 226; *RM*, p. 355).

Now, I simply reject the second reason as an adequate warrant for making a theoretical distinction. Susceptibility to clearly delimited empirical study is not, of itself, a sufficient criterion for determining the intrinsic meaning of something. It would be such only on the basis of an assumed form of empiricism which I regard as indefensible and which I take it Kohlberg and Power themselves would not want to espouse. The question I wish to raise, then, is that connected with the first warrant: is there some broader understanding of religion which would allow us to affirm a priority of religion while permitting continued affirmation of the rational and hence public character of morality? In the remainder of this paper I shall be concerned to outline a form of an affirmative response to this question.

Religion and Morality

Ultimacy

First of all, it is important to recall that Kohlberg and Power do not deny the reality in human experience of a stance bearing on ultimacy, termed by them faith, which includes tacit and affective features. They simply do not wish to call such a stance religious, that is, except insofar as it gets expressed in a cognitively explicit way. But they have offered no adequate warrant for so restricting, *a priori* and as a matter of principle, the meaning of religion.⁷ Their argument, in other words, does not suffice to rule out the logical possibility of a broader notion of religion which can nonetheless maintain the integrity of morality. It is within just this context, then, that I shall begin by adopting such a broader notion of religion. Specifically, I shall begin by accepting an understanding of religion as a stance bearing on ultimacy which includes both tacit or implicit and explicit features, and which is at once cognitive and affective.⁸ To aid in explaining the meaning of the various elements of this understanding of religion, and the bearing of such understanding on

the question under consideration, I shall employ the classical terms of the philosopher-theologian Thomas Aquinas.⁹

To begin with, apropos of the affective-volitional factor in human cognition, Aquinas writes as follows:

From this we can easily understand why these powers include one another in their acts, because the intellect understands that the will wills, and the will wills the intellect to understand. In the same way, the good is contained under the true, inasmuch as it is a desired good.¹⁰

The will moves the intellect as to the exercise of its act, since even the true itself, which is the perfection of the intellect, is included in the universal good as a particular good. But as to the determination of the act, which the act derives from the object, the intellect moves the will; for the good itself is apprehended under a special aspect as contained in the universal true.¹¹

Of course Aquinas uses faculty-psychology terms which may be offensive to many contemporary ears, but I do not think we need engage that debate here. For Aquinas's point can easily be translated for our purposes here as meaning (a) that there are distinctly volitional/affective and cognitional factors in each human act, which (b) are nonetheless mutually internal to one another and hence unified in the exercise of each such act. Further, there is a sense in which the volitional/affective factors have priority as what moves one to know in the first place. That is, any given act of knowing presupposes as its anterior, immanent condition a distinct tendency (wanting-seeking-desiring) to know.

This distinctly affective/volitional factor does not destroy the integrity of the cognitional process: on the contrary, it in turn precisely presupposes that integrity. Volition and cognition are given simultaneously as distinct aspects of any one conscious act: they cause the act of consciousness efficiently. Cognitional factors on the other hand have priority in the order of specification: they cause the act or consciousness formally.¹²

The upshot of Aquinas' position here is that some form of love, that is, some form of tending or seeking or desiring, is always distinctly internal to each act of consciousness, and hence to each act of knowing and judging. It is just this position which founds Aquinas' general claim that love is the "form" of the virtues, in the sense, that is, that it is love which is the internal dynamism which moves a person to each of his or her specific human acts.¹³ It follows that any adequate account of cognition, and hence in turn of moral cognition, must incorporate this distinct but internal factor of love as a necessary condition for, and in this ontological (or logical--i.e., not temporal) sense prior to, any act of cognition.

The dimension of ultimacy proper to religion emerges when we press the above description of Aquinas' position to its fuller implications. That is, each human act, when pressed to its limit, discloses itself as carrying a dimension of ultimacy. As Aquinas puts it, "of necessity everything that one desires one desires for the sake of the ultimate end."¹⁴ Now such a drive for ultimacy, as a human drive, involves in principle both affective/volitional and cognitive factors in the way and for the reasons already described. This is exactly the import of Aquinas' referring to the drive here as a "desire" (hence involving affectivity/volition) "for the sake of" (hence involving awareness or cognition). His point, then, is that in each human act there is disclosed in the limit some volition and cognition which bears on ultimacy. This does not mean that one is always explicitly aware of ultimacy or of what is functioning as ultimate in one's conscious acts. It means rather that in one's conscious acts there is some at least implicit (but with the possibility of becoming explicit in

varying degrees) affirmation bearing on ultimacy which is at once cognitive and affective/volitional. In a word, each of our human acts in the limit discloses something which we value the most or ultimately, and such valuing is at once a matter of love and knowledge (cognition).¹⁵

Religion, then, as I understand the term, is a stance bearing on ultimacy which includes simultaneously both love and knowledge, and does so in both implicit and explicit ways. As the terms of this brief description suggest, this understanding of religion has roots in at least one major philosophical/theological tradition. But before considering the significance of this understanding of religion for the thesis of Kohlberg and Power, I think it is important here to record disclaimers in connection with two features which are commonly affirmed of religion, at least in its Christian form.

First of all, is it not the case that participation in community, or indeed affiliation with some institution, is integral to what we mean by religion, and hence that any adequate definition of religion ought to include this feature? My response to this question is this: (a) if one accepts, as I do, the ontological claim that the human being is essentially social and historical, it of course follows that a historical community is in principle involved in, internal to, each of one's acts. There is no such thing as an action by a human being--and hence in turn a specifically religious action--which is atomic or simply an act of an individual. (b) But the relevant point in the present context, in my judgment, is that what specifies particular actions, and hence communities organized around such actions as religious in the first place, is precisely the bearing of those actions or communities on ultimacy.

The point, in other words, is not that religion does not--that is, given the social-historical character of human being--entail participation in a historical community. Rather the point is that it is the bearing on ultimacy which originally specifies as religious any given instance of human participation in community, which is to say, any given historical community. In the present chapter I restrict myself to a consideration of the sense in which love and knowledge, both tacitly and explicitly, are in principle involved in this stance bearing on ultimacy which essentially characterizes religion. Clearly a more comprehensive and systematic treatment of religion would require a thematizing of the elements of participation in community--for example, such factors as particular rituals, symbols, stories, and the like--which, in light of the social-historical character of human being, are internal to one's basic love and knowledge. But I nonetheless abstract from these factors in the present chapter for the simple reason that their inclusion, however much it would enrich and amplify my thesis regarding the primacy of religion in relation to morality, is unnecessary in terms of establishing the basic sense of that thesis.

The second disclaimer I should like to make surfaces in connection with the possible charge that religion in the sense adopted here is defined in terms of the human relation to what is ultimate rather than, for example, in terms of the God who is ultimate. This objection will be addressed more fully later in connection with the challenge raised by the "divine command theorists". Nonetheless, I should like to stress in the present context that the understanding of religion as outlined here does not rule out the possibility that the proper way of understanding the human relation to God is in terms of a relation of a created being to its creator, that is, in the first instance in terms of gift to giver. It may well be the case that we are properly related to what is ultimate only when we see our actions as already in some fundamental way consequent upon the primary and gracious acting of an ultimate and personal agent. But the initial point of my definition here is exactly that it may turn out to be the case. That is, the definition does not preclude such a way finally of conceiving religion; it simply leaves the question open. In a word, my definition of

religion is concerned in the present context to express what is necessary for religion; it is not concerned to express what suffices finally for an adequate conception of the necessary features of religion.

The Priority of Religion over Morality

What follows, then, from an understanding of religion as I have formulated it, specifically in terms of the thesis advanced by Kohlberg and Power regarding a relative priority of morality over religion? First of all, insofar as religion involves a fundamental affectivity/volition, it is thereby anterior to, as immanent within, any given moral judgment; it is precisely a necessary ontological condition for such a judgment. That is, as a human act each moral judgment presupposes love as its immanent or "moving" condition, and in the limit some ultimate love (love bearing on ultimacy).

Further, such basic or ultimate love which characterizes religion carries within itself, however implicitly, some cognitive claim. It follows that the basic love which is a presupposition for moral judgment is not blind or simply irrational, but already carries within itself a cognitive direction. To put the point more sharply, it already carries within it, however implicitly, a cognitive claim about the nature of what is ultimate.

Does this sense of the priority of religion, then, destroy any possible integrity of the process of moral judging? I suggest that it does not. The key to defending this suggestion lies in making a number of distinctions: first, insofar as religion is a matter of love, one must recall that love was affirmed to be prior in its own order. That is, love never replaces the cognitive factors involved in any human act. On the contrary it presupposes them as given simultaneously. It follows that, while, on the one hand, the love bearing on ultimacy which characterizes religion does condition the knowing process in a real or internal way, it nonetheless always and as a matter of principle leaves that knowing process formally intact. It therefore follows further that it leaves morality, insofar as morality is a matter of knowing (that is, moral judgment), formally intact. To put the matter more precisely: however much one's basic love might impede or assist one's intelligent inquiry in matters of morality, that love can never specify what is true in such matters. What constitutes justice in the moral order, for example, remains distinctly a matter of the formal requirements of moral intelligence.

In sum, then: (1) insofar as religion, as basic love or love bearing on ultimacy, presupposes the distinctness of the cognitive factor in morality, and in this sense depends on it to specify what it is that is moral, one can legitimately affirm with Kohlberg and Power the "autonomy" of morality. For morality can never be simply or formally absorbed into religion; and religion, as basic love, adds no new content to the particular formulation of moral judgment. At the same time, the initial point I wish to stress here is that moral judgment already and always presupposes the immanent and hence anterior moving force of basic love. In this sense moral judgments are conditioned, indeed transformed: while not specifically or formally different, they are nonetheless still internally different in the sense that they are suffused with one's basic love. It is in this sense, then, that the function of religion is not only to reassure but, anteriorly, to assure.

(2) Secondly, as we have seen, the basic love which characterizes religion carries within it, however implicitly, a cognitive claim about the nature of what is ultimate. If this is true, it follows, in light of the preceding analysis, that such a cognitive claim also exercises some influence on moral judgment. One's implicit claim regarding the nature of the ultimate internally affects one's understanding of the nature of morality. To illustrate this point in relation to Kohlberg and Power,

I would suggest that their very conception of morality as prior to religion presupposes, precisely as an anterior, immanent condition, an implicit claim about the nature of ultimacy--that is, an implicit religious claim: namely, that whatever it is that is ultimate is such that its existence is compatible with the existence of the "natural" structures of the world as we know it. They already presuppose, as the necessary immanent condition for advancing their understanding of morality intelligently, a certain natural theology of a sort they eventually work out explicitly, but then only in the context of its providing support after the fact for their conception of morality.

My second point, then, is that there is already a fundamental metaphysical or natural theological claim built into the basic love which characterizes religion, and that this claim, as carried within that basic love, is itself already and always internal to, and hence presupposed by, any given moral judgment. As a matter of principle, then, the quality of such a claim has an internal bearing on the quality of one's conception of morality. Thus, in the case of Kohlberg and Power, their non-relativist conception of morality already presupposes as its anterior, immanent condition some non-relativist claim about the nature of ultimacy. Once again, religion not only reassures after the fact of moral judgment; it provides an anterior assurance--which in this case is cognitive--that is necessary in order to have a moral judgment at all.

(3) Finally, there is the difficult question of how the affirmation made in principle here regarding the relation between religion and morality works out in the detail of the several stages of religion and morality described by Kohlberg. Given the correctness of my general thesis, there should follow a correlation between the stages of religion and the stages of morality. That is, all along the way there should be some correlation between the quality of one's basic love and basic cognitive claims, on the one hand, and the quality of one's moral judgment, on the other. And it would seem that the particularities of such correlation can be determined only by relevant empirical studies.¹⁶ I would only suggest, apropos of such empirical studies that, if they are to be undertaken in critical fashion, they must face up to two theoretical issues which I believe are raised by my general thesis: first, if the relation between love and knowledge is in the first instance an ontological rather than temporal one, it would seem to follow that love and knowledge will always be found in mutual relation, that is, as simultaneously affecting each other in the unity of one act. This implies a problem for any empirical effort to ascertain clearly the priority of one factor over the other as these factors come to expression in the context of religion and morality. In what sense is it possible to engage an empirical study of the mutual relation of love and knowledge in the context of religion and morality without collapsing that relation into a simply temporal one? Secondly, religion as basic love or love bearing on ultimacy carries within it tacitly (but not only tacitly) affective/volitional and cognitive factors. What are the consequent systematic limitations involved in trying to assess the influence of religion on one's moral life, in terms of how explicitly a given person is able to formulate his or her basic love and knowledge? How does one measure or make explicit what essentially includes a tacit or implicit character?

But we must press on. As suggested in connection with my second disclaimer above, does not the priority of religion over morality in the sense in which I have outlined it precisely fail to meet the thrust of the challenge coming from the divine command theorists? That is, does not this defense of a certain priority of religion remain in the kind of human or "natural law" context which is exactly in question when one sees religion and morality as radically a function of God's gracious acting?

Resolution of the challenge arising from the divine command understanding of God seems to me to hinge on a proper grasp of the Christian understanding of God.¹⁷ I take the heart of that understanding to be a sense of God as creator of the world *ex nihilo*, and hence of the world as

created.¹⁸ The significance of this understanding in terms of the present context seems to me to be twofold: on the one hand, it establishes God as agapic love, and hence as an utterly gracious actor or agent. God, as the plenitude of being, has no inner lack or need, and hence acts gratuitously in creating the world. It thus follows further that the world and the things within it are, in their inner reality, gifts. To be, for anything in the world, is at once to be given.¹⁹ This leads to the second key feature of this understanding of God: namely, that the things of the world, all of which have their own nature and hence an excellence according to their kind, are seen at the same time to have those natures by virtue of the ongoing gracious activity of God.²⁰

The point, then, is twofold: on the one hand, the natural necessities structured into the things of the world are transformed by being placed in the context of God's agapic love; but, on the other hand, those natural necessities are maintained within that love. To put it another way, God's will is disclosed precisely through the intelligible structures of the natural world. In a word, this understanding of God in relation to the world allows one to cut through, by transforming its context, the classical dilemma set by Plato in the *Euthyphro* as to whether God commands something because it is inherently right, that is, right by virtue of its own natural necessity, or whether it becomes right by virtue of God's command. For the Christian understanding of God as creator implies affirmation of a coincidence of God's will and the natural necessities of things.²¹ It should be noted, then, that this understanding of God is at once a faithful and a reasonable claim. That is, the disclosure of God in revelation as loving Lord of the universe carries within it a certain metaphysical claim about the ways things are.²²

The upshot of this understanding of Christianity for the present discussion seems to be twofold: on the one hand, such an understanding affirms the radical primacy of God's gracious activity as interior to and immanent within, the activity of the things of the world. In so doing, there is affirmed a transformation of the context of the activity of the things of the world. At the same time, this inner transformation is not seen as destroying the integrity of the natural necessities involved in the activity of the things of the world: on the contrary such a "graced" transformation is seen to coincide with such natural necessities. It seems to me, therefore, that such an understanding suffices in principle to meet the legitimate sense of the concern of the divine command theorists regarding the primacy of God; and to do so while protecting the integrity of the "natural" world necessary to maintain the legitimate sense of the autonomy of the "natural law" morality sought by Kohlberg and Power.

To put the matter more specifically in terms of the context of the salient aspects of the relation between religion and morality as recorded above, I would note the following. First, the general primacy of religion in the sense recorded above is now understood in terms of the radical primacy of God's graciousness. That is, my loving activity, the distinctly moral specificity of that loving activity, and indeed the entire sweep of the activities which make up the world, are all now seen as founded upon, and sustained by, God's loving activity. Secondly, it remains the case that, while religion in its Christian form does not add any specific content to the particular formulation of moral judgment,²³ it nonetheless transforms the context of that formulation: (a) the love which internally transforms justice while maintaining its formal integrity is now seen in the first and founding instance to be God's love; and (b) the necessary condition regarding one's conception of ultimacy, that is, in terms of sustaining the integrity of the "natural" moral order is met in the understanding of God as creator *ex nihilo*, and hence of the world as creation. Finally, then, regarding the question of the correlation between one's stages of maturity as a Christian and one's stages of moral maturity, I should suggest that the comments made above regarding the correlation

between religious maturity generally and moral maturity, as well as the limitations involved in an empirical study of such correlation, hold in the present context.

Implications

It remains for us to say a word about the implications of the primacy of religion over morality as defended here in terms of programs in moral education projected for use in public schools. Though religion in some form (some set of ultimate convictions) is a necessary condition for morality, and thus must be incorporated into any program in moral development which would be complete, it does not follow that such a thesis has the practical effect of forcing programs in moral education out of public schools--to the would-be satisfaction of both the divine command theorists and the atheistic/agnostic emotivists. But this suggestion of course hinges on the correctness of the thesis whose meaning I have sketched above. I would reformulate that thesis for the present context as follows: there is a concern structured into every human being which bears on what is ultimate and which carries in principle, though in varying degrees of explicitness, a cognitive claim about the nature of what is ultimate. This concern, as fundamental, is thus operative (again in varying degrees of explicitness) in each of one's conscious activities. In the present context bearing on political life, it follows that this concern is operative in the conscious activities of constructing cultural (social-political) institutions.

What I wish to suggest here, then, is that, given the general ontological claim outlined in this paper, it follows that there can be no society or group of human beings which is simply without some set of convictions in matters of ultimacy and hence religion. No society can avoid reflecting such convictions, however implicitly, in its cultural--and hence educational-institutions.²⁴

This brief theoretical claim makes no pretense of solving the enormous difficulties involved in trying to spell out its exact implications for educational practice. The claim nonetheless does entail a transformation of the conventional context of the discussion of religion in public life as undertaken in light of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. By conventional here I mean the positivist context which assumes the possibility of simple neutrality in public life in matters of religion. If such neutrality is not possible, then it is a matter not of whether the institutions of society, including its educational institutions, will reflect such convictions regarding ultimacy, but rather of which sort of convictions they will reflect. The issue which should thus set the context for discussion of religion in public schools, specifically here that discussion as it emerges in the debate between the divine command theorists and Kohlberg and Power, is not whether but how religion in the sense affirmed in this paper, that is, some set of convictions bearing on ultimacy, should be incorporated into public schools and indeed integrated into programs of moral education in such schools. In light of the position sketched in this paper, the answer would seem to involve an effort by educators, first, to become self-conscious about the convictions bearing on ultimacy which are *de facto* operative in their current educational practice and, secondly, to assess the adequacy of those convictions. Such assessment should be careful to show how the religious convictions maintain the integrity, which is to say the public character, of morality.

In a word, then, though the understanding of religion outlined above provides some theoretical guidelines relevant to the problem of religion in public moral education, this paper makes no pretense of solving the profoundly difficult and complex issues bearing on educational practice which are involved in carrying through a solution to this problem. My minimal suggestion here is simply that Kohlberg and Power, in their legitimate concern to protect the autonomy of morality

in the face of the constitutional challenge, have too readily conceded the positivist understanding of the place of religion in public life--which is to say, the positivist assumption that it alone is without an "orthodoxy" in matters of religion. What is needed, in my judgment, is rather an approach which begins by recognizing the *de facto* presence of religion (a set of convictions bearing on ultimacy) in public life, and then, within this context, goes on to elaborate an understanding of religion which both retrieves an adequate sense of religion on its own terms, and secures the gains on behalf of the freedom of individuals made in the development of democracy in the modern West.

In conclusion, I should like to recall the limits of the argument I have sketched in relation to Kohlberg's and Power's understanding of the relation between morality and religion. In an effort to defend the autonomy of religion in the face of the challenge from fundamentalists, Kohlberg and Power consider it necessary to advance the thesis that morality is a necessary and prior, but not sufficient, condition for religion. In advancing this thesis, they make religion coextensive with the explicitly cognitive elements of faith. In response my argument has been, first, that they do not provide an adequate warrant for so restricting the meaning of religion and thus leave open the legitimate possibility of a broader understanding. Within this context, then, I have offered a form of a broader definition of religion and have attempted to show how such a broader definition would permit accommodation of Kohlberg's and Power's concern to protect the integrity of morality, while nonetheless entailing a form of the converse of their thesis regarding the relation between morality and religion: namely, that religion is a necessary and prior condition for, but does not simply replace, morality. As all of this suggests, the intention of my argument has not been to justify an alternative view of religion simply, but rather to show that it is possible to defend the integrity of the moral order from within a context of a primacy of religion. In so doing, my intention has been to suggest an alternative to the views of both Kohlberg and Power and the divine command theorists, which nonetheless would accommodate what is legitimate in the concerns of each. Finally, then, I have suggested a sense in which, given the understanding of religion developed in the paper, there follows a transformation of the conventional--positivist--context of the discussion of the place of religion in public life and hence education.

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Notes

1. Lawrence Kohlberg and Clark Power, "Moral Development, Religious Thinking, and the Question of a Seventh Stage," *Zygon*, 16 (1981), pp. 203-207. (Hereafter *MD*) This article also appeared in Kohlberg's *The Philosophy of Moral Development*, Vol. I of *Essays on Moral Development* (New York: Harper & Row, 1981).

2. *MD*, p. 255. See also F. Clark Power and Lawrence Kohlberg, "Religion, Morality, and Ego Development," in *Toward Moral and Religious Maturity*, ed. by J. Fowler and A. Vergote (Morristown, N.J.: Silver Burdett, 1980), p. 365. (Hereafter *RM*.)

3. See James Fowler's criticism of Kohlberg in Fowler's "Stages in Faith: The Structural-Developmental Approach," in *Values and Moral Development*, ed. by Thomas C. Hennessey, S.J. (New York: Paulist Press, 1976), pp. 207-211.

4. But, of course, in itself this precisely does not meet directly the challenge posed by Kant: namely, granted that the drive to understand things in their ultimate roots and foundations--which emerges in the experience of those who are most advanced morally--is a necessary feature of the

human spirit, how do we know that that drive is not profoundly misleading and even destructive if understood "realistically", that is, as leading to a disclosure of the way things ultimately are? In a word, Kohlberg and Power show that our experience leads us away from Kant's idealism, but Kant's challenge bears precisely on the ontological warrant for "giving in" to experience on this point. I do not raise this issue here in criticism of Kohlberg and Power; indeed, they clearly do not intend their argument as a "proof" of their suggested metaphysical turn (see for example *MD*, p. 246). I raise the issue only to note that, while such "proof" is a distinct task yet to be engaged, I will nonetheless assume, with Kohlberg and Power and for the purposes of this paper, the "correctness" of their metaphysical turn.

5. Kohlberg's understanding of the relation between moral reasoning and scientific reasoning is taken up in Ch. IX above.

6. Kohlberg and Power note that this claim is ambiguous at the lower stages (1-3) (*RM*, p. 359), but this is not crucial to my basic concern in this paper.

7. Indeed, it is not clear that Kohlberg's and Power's formulation, if interpreted literally, can itself legitimately disallow a broader understanding of religion which would include faith: for in distinguishing religion from faith, they nonetheless define religion as "*that part of faith . . .*" (*RM*, p. 347) (emphasis mine). But if that is what is meant, then religion would seem to be, on their own terms, a *specification* of faith. And since a specification (specific differentiation) occurs within, not outside, its appropriate genus, it would seem to follow, on Kohlberg's and Power's own terms, that religion must carry *within* it the element of faith.

8. My understanding of religion here, then, is similar to what Fowler means by faith. I would only note that I specify faith as religious in the first instance by virtue of its bearing on ultimacy, and not, as Fowler apparently does, by virtue of its connection with some particular institution taken to be religious. (Cf. J. Fowler, "Faith and the Structuring of Meaning," in Fowler and Vergote, *op. cit.*, p. 53.) But see my further qualification of this point in Section V below.

9. For an expansion of my argument as sketched here, see my "History, Objectivity, and Moral Conversion," *The Thomist*, 37 (1973), esp. pp. 578-588. For what I take to be an analogous form of this argument cast in a more contemporary idiom, see the effort of Michael Polanyi to retrieve, in the context of the modern Western tradition of critical thought, the Augustinian--hence fiduciary, volitional, affective--roots of knowledge: *Personal Knowledge* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), p. 266 and *passim*.

In connection with my claim outlined here in the context of religion, see the arguments developed elsewhere in this volume regarding the importance, for adequate moral judgment and action, of volitional and affective factors (cf. especially the chapters on choice, character, and emotion).

10. *Summa Theologiae*, 1, q. 82, a. 4 *ad primum*.

11. *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 9, a. 1 *ad tertium*.

12. See the following quotation from André Hayen, which I think captures the heart of Aquinas' position as I have tried to express it here: "Saint Thomas' perspective is . . . concrete; it is that of the actual exercise of human activity. The will is intrinsically constitutive of intellection, not as intellectual, but as *act* of intellection: the judgment finds its completion in a willed engagement, not as an act of intelligence, but as an *act* of knowledge" (my translation) "Le lien de la connaissance et du vouloir dans l'acte d'exister selon saint Tomas d'Aquin," *Doctor Communis*, 3 (1950), p. 88.

13. Strictly speaking, of course, Aquinas's claim is that charity, that is, love as a "supernatural" virtue, is the form of the virtues (See *S.T.* II-II, q. 23, a. 8; and *De Caritate*, a. III). The purpose of my suggestion here is merely to record one of the ontological foundations for such a claim.

14. *Summa Theologiae*, I-II, q. 1, a. 6.

15. See in this connection Karl Rahner, *Hearers of the Word* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969), p. 105 and *passim*.

16. See the various studies cited by Fowler and Kohlberg and Power in the articles noted above. I would stress here, however, that though the studies of Kohlberg and Power may seem to be at odds with the general thesis I have advanced in this paper, I take those studies to be inconclusive insofar as they presuppose the restricted understanding of religion which I have rejected.

17. The analysis that follows does not necessarily carry the implication that the Christian understanding of God is the only one that involves, or could involve, the type of resolution I propose regarding the relation between God's acting and the acting of the entities of the world. I simply abstract from this question in light of the theme of the present paper, which concerns the fundamentalist Christian challenge to Kohlberg's program. Secondly, it suffices for the purposes of this paper that the understanding of God offered here in the name of Christianity be one of the logically possible ways of understanding the Christian God. It is not necessary for my purposes to defend the stronger claim that it is the only possible way of understanding the Christian God.

18. By this statement I do not mean that a full-blown sense of God as a creator *ex nihilo* is explicit in the Christian scriptures, but only that this is the interpretation of scripture which retrieves the full and proper sense of the Lordship of God which is central to scripture. For a study of the meaning of creation, see Kenneth L. Schmitz, *The Gift: Creation* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1982). Cf. also in connection with my brief treatment of the Christian understanding of God here: Robert Sokolowski, *The God of Faith and Reason* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982); John Courtney Murray, *The Problem of God* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964); and Joseph Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity* (New York: Seabury Press, 1970). Perhaps I should note, in view of some current tendencies to oppose creation and evolution, that creation as I understand it here--and indeed in what I take to be its properly Christian understanding--is quite compatible with a theistic theory of evolution.

19. For a rich sense of the way the notion of creation *ex nihilo*, and hence of the world as gift, transforms the conventional meaning of "the given," see Schmitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 34ff and *passim*.

20. See Sokolowski, *op. cit.*, pp. 21-23.

21. A good illustration of this general claim here might be found in Aquinas' working out of the meaning of natural law in light of St. Paul's understanding of law (See his *Treatise on Law*).

22. See the works of Murray and Sokolowski cited above. The claim is put trenchantly by Murray: "How odd of God it would have been had he made man reasonable so that, by being reasonable, man would become godless" (*op. cit.*, p. 76).

23. A different context would require a fuller development of the sense of this assertion. Briefly, its basis is that God's will as creator is manifest in the natural necessities of the things created. On the one hand, this seems to transform the context of morality by personalizing it, though such a personalization does not seem to involve the addition of another *formal* content or criterion for moral judgment. On the other hand, religion in its Christian form may legitimately make, if not "natural", then "positive", additions to morality, provided that those additions be interpreted as fulfillments rather than destructions of the natural order of things. A detailed treatment of this issue is beyond the scope of the present paper.

24. In connection with my argument here see the following: Walter Berns, *Freedom, Virtue, and the First Amendment* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1957); Herbert Marcuse, "Repressive Tolerance", in *A Critique of Pure Tolerance*, edited by Robert Wolff, Barrington Moore, Jr., and Herbert Marcuse (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969); Glenn Olsen, "You Can't Legislate Morality: Reflections on a Bromide", *Communio: International Catholic Review*, 2 (1975), pp. 148-162; Walter Nicgorski, "Democracy and Moral-Religious Neutrality: American and Catholic Perspectives," *Communio*, 9 (1982), pp. 292-320; and my "On the Critical Study of Religion: Positivism, the First Amendment, and the *Roemer* Case," *Communio*, 3 (1976), pp. 300-317.

Chapter XIII

Is There a Christian Ethics?

James M. Gustafson

A discussion of the relations of religion and morality often becomes clouded simply by the fact that terms involved evoke different historical and contemporary responses from the parties engaged. The term ethics, for example, in the context of both Catholic and non-Catholic philosophy sometimes by definition rules out the possibility of "Christian ethics", on the grounds that ethics cannot have any private grounding which isolates any sphere of it from rational judgment and justification. To denominate ethics as "Christian" seems to bring it under the authority of "revelation", which is virtually by definition ultimately not subject to full rationalization. This, of course, would simply move the discussion to revelation, what it means, and how it is used. The term "Christian ethics" has been largely used in Protestant discourse, and has included theological developments as they pertain to morality, Biblical studies as they pertain to ethics, practical guidelines for moral action of Christians, and many other things. It has never functioned ecclesiastically. "Theological ethics" sometimes has been a special field within the broader Christian ethics; the latter might include "social ethics" (which is many things to many men, but always includes Christian thinking about the morality of social life, including state and other institutions), whereas the former focuses on the theological ideas and their implications for ethics. (In Catholic discourse a distinction is made between ethics as a philosophical discipline based upon reason and moral theology, based upon faith. In this terminology "Christian ethics" would be the philosophical discipline as set in the context of the Christian sense of human dignity and purpose.)

As we shall see, the discussion is sometimes further clouded by lack of consensus on what is included and excluded in the use of the term ethics. For some it has a highly restrictive use; it might be the logical analysis of imperative statements. For others it can be generously speculative, and permit within its scope developments of highly generalized principles about the moral order of the universe. For some it includes the questions of philosophical anthropology; for others these are ruled out as matters of psychology.

I shall attempt to get at some of the questions of the relations of religion and morality by proceeding to answer this question: in what senses might there be a Christian ethics? I shall attempt to alert the reader to the points at which others might for various reasons object to the answer I have given.

Christian Justifications for Morality

There is a Christian ethics in the sense that there are particular religious justifications for morality, and for persons being moral, which are part of the Christian faith. If one moves from the first orders of moral discourse, in which the agents and the observers are giving reasons for their intentions and actions, to other levels or discourse in which they are giving reasons for their reasons, one is likely to find Christians giving theological reasons for their ethical reasons and ultimately for their actions. There are stages in ethical discussions at which all justifications tend to become somewhat circular; if the reasons given for morality is that it contributes to the happiness and well-being of man, and the question is asked why one ought to be concerned for the happiness and well-being of man, the answer is likely to be simply an assertion, or to be circular in its

argumentation. One reaches such stages in ethical discourse within the arena of religious faith and life as well. The religious man might answer that he is concerned for the happiness and wellbeing of man out of gratitude to God the giver of life and well-being to all creation. Or he might answer that God has created man so that it is man's nature to be fulfilled in his being, and that in pursuing actions which bring human welfare he is acting in accord with nature as God created it. There are other ways in which Christians might answer questions at such a level.

In Protestant ethics the relationship between religious reasons and moral actions has sometimes become so intimate that an act is not morally good unless it is done for the right religious reasons. Thus the man who is not "in faith", cannot do anything which is morally good; the questions of faith and ethics are collapsed into each other in such a way that the question of ethics becomes the question of faith. There are passages in Luther and in Barth which are susceptible to this interpretation--to indicate the persistence of this possibility historically in Protestant theology. One need not collapse ethics into religion and faith as fully and immediately as such statements do in order to make the point that there are distinctively religious (Christian) justifications for morality. One is only indicating that at certain levels of justification Christians are likely to give an answer that is not persuasive to those who do not share the religious faith that they hold.

Objections can be raised to this point. One might be that ethics is one thing, and its justifications are another. One might have all sorts of metaphysical justifications for morality, and Christian religion could provide one of them. But these do not intrinsically affect the ethics itself. There one would find those justifications upon which rational men could agree, and these would not range into the more speculative questions of theology and metaphysics, or if they do it must be "natural" theology. It might also be asserted that differences in the metaphysical justifications for morality make no positive differences in moral acts themselves; whether a man attends to the needs of his neighbor because Christ met his deepest needs or whether he meets them to seek the greatest good of the greatest number, makes no difference in the moral action. There are moral principles agreed upon, but which each party adheres to for different reasons; these principles constitute the proper realm of ethics.

The issues developing from this objection are two. One is whether the discipline of ethics includes the justifications of morality. This is a point open to discussion, but the judgment made will have some degree of arbitrariness no matter where the line is drawn. If the justifications of the normative ethics are permitted to range to a level of generalization which might involve what appears to be speculation, another point of query would be whether religious "evidences" or arguments are too private to be permitted in the discussion. One need not reach this stage swiftly; the Christian might give reasons with which others might agree, that a certain action is right or its consequences good, before he justifies them at another level as God's will.

The second issue is whether the justifications given for morality in any way affect the moral action. Does it make any difference to what one does if he does it in obedience to God, or out of gratitude for God's love, and whether he does it because it is ultimately to his own interest to do it, or because it contributes to the general welfare? What kinds of difference might it make? We shall return to these questions subsequently.

Christian Faith and the Moral Self

The first point I have made could be developed under the heading "theology and ethics", that is, it would deal with theological ideas as justifications for ethics. The point I now wish to make

is more properly one of "religion" and morality. Thus: There is a Christian ethics in the sense that participation in the faith and life of the Christian religious community is in part formative of the kind of persons men become, the kind of perspective they have on life, the kind of dispositions they have toward others, the kind of affections which in part determine their responses, the kind of character that they have. The religious belief, for example, that the ultimate power wills man's well-being does not merely provide a kind of ultimate ideational justification for morality; for the person who trusts in that ultimate power as understood in that belief, it provides a basic posture or orientation toward the world and toward other persons. The internalization of such a belief so that it becomes part of one's "second nature", sets one's moral actions in a general, but specifiable moral course. It provides a fundamental directionality to the agent. It predisposes him to seek the good rather than the evil, to seek the well-being of the neighbor rather than his own good (as it is informed, e.g., by the meaning of sacrificial love).

The assumptions that are involved in speaking of a Christian ethics in this regard are many. It assumes, for one, that the moral actions of persons are in part determined by the persistencies and identities that they have. There are certain generalizations one makes about persons, based on inferences drawn from expressions and actions one has observed, which lead to the possibility of some degree of predictability in their actions. Perhaps it was these persistencies and identities that the notion of *habitus* sought to account for in classical Christian thought about ethics. The terms which can be used to talk about these persistencies are often unclear and ambiguous, but the ethicist accepts them as part of the data about which he reflects.

It assumes, secondly, that religious beliefs and practices, and that moral intentions and actions informed and governed in part by religious beliefs, have consequences for the kind of person one becomes. Indeed, the point could be made from a theological frame of reference in the following way: whatever God's grace does for human action uses as mediating causes their dispositions, affections, character, etc. Catholics will not be taken aback by such an assumption; some radical Protestant theology tends to denigrate it as the imposition of a position of philosophical or psychological anthropology which presumes to limit how God can work.

To handle the many queries that can be raised by this second general point about the sense in which one can speak of a Christian ethics would involve a book-length undertaking. There are important philosophical queries: it opts for a position within the determinism-libertarianism spectrum on the question of the freedom of the "will" which appears to be a soft-determinism. Such a position, that moral actions of Christians are in some sense "caused" by the kinds of persons which, in part, their religious faith has shaped them to become, opens the thorny problems of motivation, the conditioning of actions, etc. There are queries of how one can more precisely speak of the influences that might be exerted from, for example, the experience of adoration and worship of God upon the orientation of perspective that the self has toward the world.

There is also the question of whether matters such as this belong properly within ethical inquiry. If they are part of what some contemporary philosophers call "moral psychology", is that a legitimate part of the ethical inquiry? Obviously, I have judged that it is.

Just what is it about persons that affects their moral intentions and actions? When one uses words like character, virtue, disposition, affection, etc., to what is one referring? Or, if one chooses to make this second general point by saying that there are Christian "motives" for acting, how is that term to be used precisely and meaningfully?

These and many more issues require exploration to substantiate the contention that there is a Christian ethics in the sense that participation in the faith and life of the Christian community accents the kind of moral person one becomes.

Christian Norms for Particular Actions

There is Christian ethics in the sense that there are positive moral norms, values, and rules of life sanctioned by the faith and the tradition which are applicable on certain occasions to particular acts. The limits of this assertion must be made clear. It is not asserted that on each occasion of moral action the tradition or insight into God's will provides unique or even distinctive norms, values and rules of action. On most occasions Christians appeal to norms and rules which other persons appeal to as well. Even if the Christian might give a different (a religious) justification for them, at the level of discourse at which conduct is determined in particular circumstances, on the whole, he has no distinctive norms or rules. And, on the whole, the Christian will proceed to justify his actions with reference to principles and rules which he shares in most instances with other persons.

What is being asserted is that to belong to a particular community, in this case a Christian religious one, is to participate in its ethos, to be governed by its mores. This more general aspect of special Christian morality suggests that within that community one is likely to use its own language, its own justifications, its own accented ways of acting. There seem to be certain principles of conduct which not only historically adhere to the Christian community, but which are consistent with its religious beliefs. Again, to avoid misconstrual of what is being stated, it is not proper to infer from this that all actions of different members of this community are similar to each other, nor that the actions of members of this community can be readily distinguished on all occasions from the actions of members of other moral communities. Nor ought one to infer that the reason why there might be distinctive positive morality among Christians on some occasions is merely because they are subservient to a powerful institution which claims authority in matters of morals. The possibility of distinctively Christian positive morality is as great among sectarian groups with little institutionalization of authority as it is of the Catholic Church.

What the statement of a Christian ethic in this sense is saying is that on occasions the Christian might act in a way which he judges to be morally justifiable for him, but which he would not expect others to do (he would not apply the principle of universalizability), and in a way which others would not justify on the basis of other principles than theological ones. For example, he might on occasion deem a commandment to be morally right because God commanded it. There are a number of occasions on which he might judge the ultimate sanction for its rightness to be this, but be ready to give other ethical reasons in support of it (which is to say that God commanded it because it was right). I would contend however, that on certain occasions the only justification would be a particular religious one, and the way in which the religiously justified command is stated might require a particular moral judgment in particular circumstances. One can cite, for example, passages from Leviticus in which certain things are to be done because God is the Lord and he has commanded them; independent moral reasons are not given. Or in Christian ethics it is conceivable that the confessional Christian pacifist would claim that pacifism, with the restrictions of activities that it implies, is a special moral obligation he has by virtue of his faith in, and obedience to, Jesus Christ. He would not expect others to adopt the same principle because others do not have the same faith and object of obedience. He is likely to argue with other Christians that they ought to adopt it, since he would defend its normativeness as an inference drawn from the religious belief which they share. He might however, not even do that; he might claim only that his conscience is bound by his loyalty and his understanding of Christ.

The difficulties here bristle in conversations with philosophical ethicists. One might, for example, argue that if a principle has that private a justification, and if the connections between a

religious belief and a particular command are that close, the person has a religious, and not a moral principle, and his obligation is a religious and not a moral one. This opens the large question of the degree of autonomy of these two areas, and the ways in which they are or can be related to each other. I believe, however, that one's decision about the question of the degree of autonomy will determine whether the possibility I have developed in this section is warranted. Without defense of it in this presentation, I would suggest that most theological affirmations include moral values or moral imperatives, or that if they do not, one can infer that certain moral values and imperatives are consistent with certain theological affirmations. With reference to this section, there might be theological affirmations which determine in a strong sense that certain imperatives follow for the adherent to the religious belief. And, it must be added, for the exceptional case only the religious belief provides the authorization for the moral imperative. It is a moral imperative for several reasons--it involves a judgment of what is right conduct, it involves consequences which pertain to human well-being, and one's obedience to it involves one's personal integrity.

These brief, and in many respects cryptic remarks, represent the distillation of more elaborate work. I hope they do provide evidence that to ask the question, "Is there a distinctive Christian ethics?" is a productive way to explore the larger question, namely, the relations of religion and morality.

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Chapter XIV

Ethics, Religion and Christian Faith

John B. Cobb, Jr.

Ethics and Religion

In discussing the relation between ethics and religion, the terminological problem is acute. Both words are used in many ways, and it would be idle to deny the legitimacy of most of them. Yet the very nature of the questions raised varies with the uses.

Both terms can be somewhat illumined when viewed on a continuum from their narrowest to their most inclusive meanings. At the latter end of the continuum they virtually merge. Here, both ethics and religion refer to the totality of a style of life, a basic orientation, or a stance toward the world. At the extreme limit there may be an "ethics" which has no interest in norms and a "religion" unconcerned with the sacred. Yet to most ears this sounds paradoxical, and this fact suggests that it is difficult to dissociate the words entirely from their more restricted meanings.

In recent years the discussion of religion by Christian theologians has tended to stress the narrow use of the term, associating it especially with cult and the sacred. This has made it possible to bring to clearer consciousness the question of the relation of Christianity to religiousness. Is Christianity one expression of a universal religiousness, or is it a secularizing force? Since religion in the narrow sense is most fully and obviously embodied in the ancient mythical life and mentality, Christianity must be understood as at least in part a secularizing force. But Judaism, Buddhism, philosophical Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, and Confucianism, at least in their inception, have also been secularizing forces. This can lead to the extreme but intelligible statement that what are called the great religions of mankind are essentially non-religious! Since it is better to avoid the possibility of this paradoxical formulation, the need of a term other than religion to denominate these great movements has been recognized, and the term faith has come into use. However, the distinctively Christian connotations of "faith" create their own problems. The term Way, which is indigenous to most of these traditions, is more neutral, and it will be used in this paper to refer to that total style of life, basic orientation, or stance toward the world (together with the accompanying beliefs and practices) which has so often been called religion. Religious and secular Ways can then be distinguished without terminological confusion.

Even so, it would be odd to declare the great traditional Ways non-religious. These Ways may have been secularizing forces in relation to the ancient mythical mentality, but it is they that have largely shaped our understanding of the religious. Instead of understanding the religious simply in terms of the mythical mentality, we should consider what elements in postmythical existence are spontaneously deemed religious. Four factors come to mind: first, cultic observance whether public or private; second, the sense of the holy or sacred which is reflected in the sense of ultimacy or absoluteness; third, concern for that which is not accessible to sense experience God, demons, or the human soul, its feelings, images, and motivations; and fourth, the quest for salvation or wholeness.¹ All four factors played major roles in mythical life, and though the founders of the great Ways of mankind were critical of them in various respects, none advocated total secularization. Hence, all the traditional Ways of mankind have been religious to greater or lesser degrees.

The role of the religious in each Way can and should be examined without any *a priori* judgment as to how great or how small that role should be. New Ways are arising in our

own time, some of which, while not wholly devoid of religious elements, attempt to place the emphasis exclusively on the secular. The most fully secular Way would be one in which no interest is felt in worship, all values and meanings appear relative, there is no concern for what is not accessible to sense experience, and individual ills are dealt with without reference to an overall ideal of wholeness or salvation.

Just as a narrow use of the term religion makes possible consideration of the role of the religious in the great Ways of mankind, as well as the possibility of a secular Way, so also a narrow use of the term ethics would facilitate a discussion of the role of the ethical in the several Ways. Here too four factors can be identified whose presence leads us to speak of ethics: first, a focus on overt behavior; second, consideration of such behavior in terms of principles applicable to life broadly rather than to restricted areas;² third, attention to the normative rather than to the descriptive, i.e., what should be done rather than what is in fact done or will probably be done; and fourth, viewing what should be done as "unconditioned" in the sense that it is not determined by particular purposes which one is free to entertain or not as he pleases.³

All four factors are involved in mythical existence just as are all the factors constituting the religious. Indeed, in this mode of existence the ethical and the religious are inseparable and even indistinguishable. The criticism of myth and taboo in the rise of the great Ways created the possibility of the distinction and made possible the question of their mutual relations. In this paper "ethics" will refer to the shape received by these factors in post-mythical life and thought, rather than to their undifferentiated role in mythical existence.

The distinction between ethics and religion is clearest when they appear in tension or opposition. A Hebrew prophet could use ethical criteria in attacking cultic practices, and a modern Christian ethicist can condemn pietistic preoccupation with the inner life as a flight from social responsibility. On the other hand a Hindu may see the ethical life of the householder as of little value in comparison with the religious quest for release or salvation, and a Christian theologian may see preoccupation with ethical behavior as an obstacle to that openness toward God in which alone salvation is achieved.

However, in the great traditional Ways, ethics and religion on the whole have been much more positively related. Religious beliefs and practices have sanctioned ethical norms, and ethical teaching has included the recommendation of religious practices. Ethical action has been regarded as essential to the quest for salvation, and religious motivation has been deemed requisite for ethical action.

Enough has now been said to indicate both that the ethical and the religious elements of life are different and that they are interrelated in diverse and complex ways. The remainder of this paper will be devoted to a discussion of these interrelations. The primary focus, as in these volumes as a whole, is on ethics rather than on religion. The following sections will: (a) analyze the ethical into its elements, (b) treat the unique and autonomous element in the ethical, (c) show how the place of ethics in life depends on extra-ethical decisions, and (d) discuss the place assigned the ethical in the Christian Way.

Elements of the Ethical

Above, we have simply delineated the aspect of life to which the term ethical is appropriately applied. In this section the judgments that are made in the ethical sphere will be analyzed to determine how they are supported. This will make it possible to discriminate the several ways in

which the ethical has its own independent existence in terms of which it can criticize and influence religion.

The distinguishing characteristic of the ethical is that a particular mode of action is held to be required independently of particular purposes or desires. At this level honest disagreement among persons is not only possible but frequent. One person may believe that prior to marriage both man and woman should remain virgin. Another may be equally convinced that free expression of sexual desires is preferable. One person may believe that race should not be considered a relevant factor in the distribution of economic and political opportunity in South Africa. Another may be equally convinced that white dominance should be maintained. All such judgments belong to the sphere of the ethical, but in most instances their proponents recognize responsibility to support them. Such support usually consists chiefly in marshalling facts, making predictions, and appealing to authorities. It must always appeal as well to some more general principle, although this is not always--perhaps not even usually--expressed.

Proponents of pre-marital chastity might argue that the purpose of sexual intercourse is procreation and that marriage provides the only proper context for raising children. They would be appealing to the general principle that only what is according to nature (teleologically understood) is right. Their opponents might argue that there is more enjoyment and personal fulfillment where desires are freely satisfied. They would be appealing to a hedonist or utilitarian principle that only what maximizes happiness is right. It would also be possible, of course, that both parties to the dispute would appeal to the same principle. The proponent of pre-marital chastity might argue that in the long run greater pleasure and satisfaction are thereby achieved, or the proponent of free love before marriage might argue that nature intends the fullest expression of those drives it incorporates in men.

It might also be that both would agree that probable consequences are decisive and further agree as to what these are likely to be. They might agree, for example, that the general practice of free love before marriage would increase the total amount of physical and emotional pleasure in the world but decrease the overall strength of ego, self-transcendence, and intensity of consciousness. Yet both parties could regard these predictions as justifying their ethical conviction, if one regarded psycho-physical pleasure, the other, the development of the "higher" human faculties, as the greater value.

Similarly, in the debate about economic justice in South Africa, both might agree that negative social and economic consequences would follow from rapid moves toward equality. One might argue that such moves are nevertheless demanded because of the intrinsic rightness of justice, while the other, who views the maximization of enjoyment as the essential consideration, would regard the maintenance of white power as ethically requisite. Or both might accept a utilitarian principle and debate probable consequences of a redistribution of economic opportunity. In such a debate one might regard the sense that justice was being done as an important positive factor influencing the evaluation of the anticipated consequences, while the other might believe that people receive little or no satisfaction from the sense that justice in general is done, being interested only in their own economic advantages.

It is also possible that while both might agree on the primary importance of consequences, the kinds of consequences likely to follow, and the basis for evaluating those consequences, they still might draw opposite conclusions. They might agree that the results of surrendering power on the part of the whites would include an increase of happiness in the black majority and a decrease of happiness in the white minority. One side, following the utilitarian calculus, would then judge that the surrender of power is ethically required. The other, concerned only for the whites and seeing

no reason to concern themselves with the fate of the blacks, would be confirmed in the view that the status quo should be preserved.

The debate could move in quite different channels if both sides appealed to the principle of justice as ethically decisive. They might agree that justice entails giving each person his or her due, and then judge differently as to what constitutes deservingness of opportunity. One side might see humanness as such as the one crucial factor, whereas the other might view past achievement in the economic and political spheres as decisive in the measurement of what is due.

The possible lines of debate in either of these instances could be further elaborated, but five types of factors involved in ethical judgments have already appeared, and most additional considerations could be classified under these headings with little distortion. These factors are: first, judgments about present facts and about the probable factual consequences of alternative courses of action; second, judgments of the relative value of different types of situations; third, judgments as to the scope of consequences that are ethically relevant; fourth, judgments as to the factors relevant to estimation of worth or desert; fifth, formal principles. We will now treat these factors in order, considering especially the role of the religious at each point.

1) *Factual judgments*, although essential for concrete ethical decisions, are not ethical in themselves. The judgment that a person is hungry, for example, may be made on grounds that have nothing to do with ethics and in a context in which it has no ethical consequences. An SS doctor might have made such a judgment about the inmate of a concentration camp in a quite neutral way. Nevertheless, such facts are of immense importance for ethical judgments. If I believe that I ought to feed the hungry, this general ethical view can have no concrete application until I judge that a particular person is hungry and that a particular course of action on my part will tend to relieve that hunger.

In our complicated society those who agree generally on all other factors relevant to ethical judgment find great difficulty in agreeing on concrete actions because of disagreements that I am here calling factual. For example, agreement that we should seek a society that offers equal opportunity for all leaves open immense areas of disagreement as to what kinds of actions on the part of individuals, groups, and governments will promote this end. Psychological, sociological, economic, and political theories are all relevant to the determination of what the facts now are and what the probable factual consequences of alternative actions will be.

Religious people tend, more than most current theories, to stress the importance of certain of the facts such as those about the unpredictability of history, the freedom of the individual, and the presence and potency of religious beliefs and practices. They may also believe that there are certain relevant facts that are ignored by others. For example, those who believe that the spirits of the dead may work injury on the living if their bones are disturbed will introduce this factor into their estimate of the consequences of erecting a building on the site of an ancient cemetery. Nevertheless, for the most part (at least today), religion plays a minor role in the direct determination of what is judged factual. Its chief relevance in shaping factual judgments is in its usually unrecognized influence on the psychological, sociological, economic, and political theories that play so decisive a role in predictions of consequences.

2) *Judgments of Relative Value*. Although widespread agreement as to general goals is often possible in confrontation with massive evil, differences of ideals or values remain real and important. An earlier example mentioned a possible difference between prizing pleasure and prizing higher levels of consciousness. Today, some prophets call us toward an ideal of

overcoming all sense of duality between subject and object, all separateness between self and other. Others prize individuality, self-consciousness, privacy, and independence. Again there are some for whom the all-important consideration is the widest dispersion of economic well-being, while others regard this as a secondary consideration--valuable, if at all, only for its contribution to self-respect and participation in aesthetic enjoyment, emotional security, and personal creativity. Clearly in some instances such opposite evaluations of what is desirable will lead to diverging conclusions on concrete ethical decisions.

The role of religion in shaping valuations of this sort hardly needs mention. Secular valuations are possible, but most valuations are deeply rooted in the religious dimension of life. Indeed, insofar as there are genuinely ultimate valuations at work, they are religious.⁴ Almost by definition all determinative valuations are functions of some Way.

3) *Judgments of Consequences*. In our day humanism has sufficient official dominance to render rare the public admission that one does not include all human beings in the scope of consequences to be considered. Yet this situation is by no means to be taken for granted, and indeed there are boundary areas requiring constant theoretical reconsideration. Furthermore, vast numbers of people who give lip-service to this principle do not base their actual ethical judgments upon it.

For example, ethical judgments about the prosecution of a war rarely regard consequences to the "enemy" as having the same claim on consideration as consequences for our troops. Some may justify this selectivity on the ground that our military victory was in the best interest of all concerned, or at least of the majority. But if one points out that a statistical calculation of how many would benefit by our defeat or victory leads to no such clear cut conclusion, many defenders of military involvement might declare that their own national interest is their paramount ethical concern. This would justify the infliction of extreme disvalues, even on much larger populations, elsewhere.

That such reasoning is near the surface even in generally humanistic circles indicates that the question of the scope of consequences to be considered is a very serious one. Through most of history this scope has generally been restricted to an in-group. The frank espousal of such limits by the Nazis leading to the slaughter of Jews indicates how serious are the consequences for action that are entailed. There is also a continuing tendency for revolutionary groups devoted to humanistic goals to become contemptuous of those who oppose them and indifferent to the suffering their revolutionary activities inflict upon the defenders of the status quo.

Religion has an important influence on the scope of the consequences to be considered in ethical decisions, but for the most part this is mediated through the totality of the Way that includes both religious and ethical elements. These Ways constitute their own in-groups, tending to provide ultimate sanctions for concern for believers and relative indifference toward the fate of others. At the same time, all the great traditional Ways inculcate a concern for human beings as such, thus tending to overcome the indifference to the out-group. If we recognize that the in-group/out-group distinction is natural to human beings, then we must give credit to the great Ways for most of the influence universalistic humanism has in fact attained in ethical decisions.

The specific contribution of the religious to this movement toward universalization lies in its stress upon the unseen aspects of human beings. When the inner life is considered to be of chief importance, then in favor of a more basic unity, it becomes possible (although not inevitable) to depreciate the outward differences that alienate people from one another. It becomes possible also

to affirm an intrinsic importance of human beings as such, which outward appearances do not justify.

A slightly different type of question can be subjoined to this one. One may consider consequences not so much for individuals as for groups. That is, the welfare of a family, tribe, city-state, nation, race, or religious community may be considered in itself independently of calculations of consequences for the individuals who comprise it. Such views are also bound up with religious attitudes and are functions of one Way or another. On the whole, though with many exceptions, the great traditional Ways have tended to oppose these recurring tendencies.

4) *Judgments of Relevant Factors.* Agreement as to the scope of consideration does not determine the factors regarded as relevant. For example, if we value very highly a just society, we will desire that political and economic power be fairly distributed. But fairness cannot automatically be taken to mean that every individual must receive exactly the same rights as every other individual. Some consideration must be given to age, sex, intelligence, education, experience, moral character, and so forth. One may decide to ignore most of these factors (it would be hard to ignore age altogether), but one cannot regard this as self-evidently just in all cases. It is not self-evidently just that the children of an adult who works hard and effectively have no economic advantages in relation to those of a shiftless cheat. Even consideration of ancestry and race cannot be ruled out without examination. Today, for example, some believe that in the interest of justice American society should discriminate in favor of blacks because of past injustices to them and to their ancestors. The issues raised here are complex and difficult. For example, to what extent is a person to be understood in terms of family and racial solidarity rather than simply as an individual? In this whole sphere, basic valuations and beliefs, often religious in character and almost necessarily bound up with a total Way, determine the degree of relevance assigned to the several factors.

5) *Formal Principles.* That all of these factors are involved in concrete ethical decisions explains the tendency of ethics to define itself in an extremely inclusive way. Those who propose to give guidance in such decisions must concern themselves with all the disciplines that throw light on the human situation, especially the behavioral sciences. They must develop and justify a system of values. They must have an understanding of human beings that provides a grounding for their position as to the scope of the consequences that are to be considered. And they must reflect on the aspects of the human condition that have graded relevance to the question of desert. They will also inevitably concern themselves with the causes of ethical actions, including their motivations—a topic thus far avoided in this paper. Thus ethics becomes virtually identical with total life orientation.

The foregoing analysis, however, is designed to show that although ethicists are concerned with many topics, these are not all distinctively ethical. They must study sociology and economics, but these disciplines are not thereby reduced to branches of ethics. They must investigate value theory, but value theory is no more bound to ethics than to aesthetics, logic, or psychology. Similarly, they must study the great Ways of humankind, recognizing their dependence upon them and specifically upon the religious element within them, but the history of religions and cultures as such is not ethics.

The one point at which ethicists have a distinctively ethical subject matter is in respect to ethical principles. Without the application of some principle, no assemblage of positions on the preceding four points can generate any ethical decision. Wherever any statement is made as to

what should be done, an ethical principle is implicitly invoked, whether or not the speaker knows this or could articulate it if asked. Ethicists can and should point out this factor which is so widely present in ordinary (and extraordinary) deliberations, and they should raise it to consciousness. But their task goes beyond this. It is their role to evaluate critically the principles to which appeal is made, with a view to determining their relation to one another and their relative validity. Ideally, he could then bring ethical principles to bear on concrete decisions in such a way as to strengthen their effectiveness and reduce confusion. They should, of course, never suppose that the right decision could be determined from the side of the ethical principle alone.

Ethical Principles and Moral Rules

In examples given in the preceding section a variety of possible ethical principles were mentioned, but not discussed. Rather, the other factors that are involved in concrete ethical decisions were analyzed. A more systematic approach would have begun with ethical principles, since the adoption of certain ethical principles would have excluded some of these factors from relevance. For example, a rigorous self-interest theory of ethics would render much of this discussion irrelevant, as would, in quite a different way, a strict Kantianism. This section will sketch the theory of ethical principles implicit in the preceding section. To begin let us consider four examples of imperatives that are often taken as ultimate ethical principles.⁵

1. Obey God.
2. So act as to achieve your own happiness.
3. Maximize pleasure and minimize pain among all men.
4. So act that you can will that the maxim according to which you act be a universal law.

Of these the first is in a class by itself. It needs to be considered because of the obvious way in which it subordinates ethics to religion. In the arguments treated in the preceding section, one side might have directly appealed to the will of God as sufficient justification for their position, but as an autonomous ethical principle this is problematic in two ways.

First, the content of God's will is usually supposed to conform to "the right" in such a way that one can really decide what is God's will only by deciding independently what is ethically right. In this case, the fact that God wills the right may instill a motivation of love or fear, but it does not provide a distinct ethical principle.

Second, when this is not the case, and otherwise unjustified types of action are declared to be required by divine command, one may still ask whether one ought to obey. Perhaps it would be ethically right to disobey God! If the answer is that one must obey God on pain of punishment, then the principle of prudence is treated as ultimate. If it is asserted that we owe obedience to God out of gratitude for God's creation of us or because God's intrinsic excellence deserves our devotion, then the ultimate appeal is to what is fitting or appropriate. This in no way militates against the rightness, or importance, of obedience to God, but the ethical requirement that we obey God follows from the combination of an autonomous ethical principle with beliefs about God. Thus either the content of obedience to God is determined by some other principle, or the rightness of such obedience requires justification by such a principle. This means that belief in God does not remove the need for identifying an ultimate ethical principle that can be formulated without reference to God.⁶

The other three principles present themselves as candidates for this role. In conjunction with the relevant factors considered in the preceding section, they generate all kinds of concrete ethical decisions by which people govern their lives. They are also clearly different from each other and capable of leading to diverse practical judgments. Determining their relative merits is not a merely academic exercise.

How can this be done? To whatever extent each is an ultimate principle, it can be employed as a basis for criticizing the others. But is there any way of judging them that does not itself presuppose an unproven alternative principle?

The question here is whether an ethical principle can be established by any kind of factual judgment whatever. If not, then ultimate ethical principles can give no reason why they should be accepted. There could in principle be no adjudication among them.

This question must be sharply distinguished from that of how factual judgments are seen as determinative of ethical judgment within the context established by an ethical principle. If one is convinced of the ethical principle that one ought to maximize values (and if the values realized are clear), then factual information about the probable consequences of two courses of action determines which action is ethically right. But if one is asking whether this is the correct ethical principle, one cannot justify its adoption by appealing to its beneficial consequences.

Furthermore, the meaning of an ethical principle is not identical with that of any factual judgment, even if factual judgments include judgments of value. The assertion that people ought to pursue their happiness is not identical with the statement that they do so or with the statement that happiness is the supreme value. It is intelligible to ask whether people ought always to pursue what they do pursue or to seek their supreme value.

Nevertheless, there may be a relation between factual judgments and ethical principles such that the acceptance of certain factual judgments uniquely and decisively warrants certain ethical principles. These factual judgments cannot be about the world in which action is carried out, since the different principles judge differently as to the ethical relevance of that world. They should be sought instead in the sphere of distinctively ethical experience.⁷

The factual judgment that I regard a mode of action as right has an important relationship to my entertainment of the principle that declares its rightness. Yet the factual judgment does not by itself warrant the ethical principle. I know that I may be wrong. What does the recognition of the possibility of error with respect to my ultimate ethical principle entail? It will be best to explain by examples.

Suppose it to be factually true that I believe that I ought always to act according to nature. Suppose then that someone challenges me to explain this principle and I find I cannot do so, or can do so only by reference to notions of nature which on reflection I am not prepared to support. It turns out, then, that I was wrong in holding this to be an ultimate principle. Or suppose it to be factually true that I believe that I ought always to sacrifice my interests to others. Suppose then that through the suffering resulting from my partial obedience, and larger disobedience, to this principle, I come to ask myself why I hold it. If I discover that it was pounded into me as a child, and that there is no reason for holding it other than this conditioning, I then judge that the principle was in error. Contrariwise, if reflection and experience strengthen the hold of such principles over me, I tend to judge them to be correct. If I am convinced that wider experience, deeper insight, or further reflection will indefinitely support or strengthen my belief in an ethical principle, I view that principle as valid. Hence the factual judgment that wider experience, deeper insight, and further reflection will sustain and strengthen belief in an ethical principle warrants the ethical principle.

This mode of warranting ethical principles does not allow for any final or universal adjudication among them. Each person must judge for herself or himself. Yet it may be that this will not lead to extreme relativism. It may be rather that when the question is clearly raised, and the many confusions that attend the establishment of ethical principles are dissipated, an impressive consensus can be achieved.

Viewed in this perspective the proposed principle, "So act as to achieve your own happiness," proves inadequate. I find that I can at least conceive of having genuine concern for others as well as for myself. Where that concern exists, I do not find that reflection leads me to believe that I ought to suppress action that expresses it. On the contrary, I find that my ethical judgment approves the extension of the concern and encourages action in accordance with it, even when the concern is weak or absent.

If it is argued that action in accordance with this concern conduces to my happiness and hence is in accord with the principle, this is still unsatisfactory. I do not find that the attempt to help others find happiness is ethically right only because it conduces to my own happiness. There seem to be instances in which I ethically approve the sacrifice of my own happiness for the sake of the realization of another's. If my happiness is so defined as to render this impossible, as when my true happiness is identified with virtue in such a way that even the sacrifice of my life for the sake of another is seen as a mode of self-realization, then the original principle loses all its specificity and distinctiveness as an ethic of self-interest, and a different formulation is needed.

This criticism of a principle of self-interest indicates that my ethical experience is more adequately expressed by the utilitarian formula: maximize pleasure and minimize pain among all people. However, this has two major weaknesses. First, like the principle just rejected, it presupposes questionable judgments in the second, third, and fourth of the relevant aspects of ethics discussed in the preceding section. It judges pleasure the only value, the proper scope of consideration to be all human beings and nothing else, and the status of being human to be the only relevant factor in the distribution of goods. One may or may not agree, but clearly a principle which has such assumptions is not an autonomous one. However, this criticism could imply that the formula must be modified in a way which, while drastic, would not alter its teleological character, which is its most important difference from the fourth principle. The revised principle could be something like: So act as to maximize value for whomever and whatever you consider it appropriate that value be maximized. Such a formula would allow both the self-interest and the utilitarian positions as extreme cases.

The still more basic question about any teleological approach is whether in fact only anticipated consequences are relevant to judging the rightness of an act. A teleologist must judge that this is the case. The justification for usually telling the truth is that the consequences are usually better; but in any given instance should one judge that the consequences of lying are preferable (however slightly) one is not only permitted to lie, but ethically bound to do so. The same applies to murder, theft, rape, and the like. This does not mean, of course, that utilitarianism encourages such practices. They would stress how rarely they would lead to preferable consequences. Nevertheless, the judgment in each case depends entirely on one's anticipation of consequences. I find that my own judgment is very largely influenced by anticipated consequences, but I also find that the rightness of an act seems to have another referent as well. If I have promised to perform an act, I consider that the keeping of this promise has some intrinsic rightness independent of anticipated consequences, and this view seems to be sustained and strengthened by critical reflection.

This leads directly to consideration of Kant's famous categorical imperative. It is designed to express precisely this fact--that there is a rightness in an act independent of consequences. This rightness can be brought to light by formulating the maxim of which the particular action is an application. If one can will that everyone always abide by this maxim, the action is right. Otherwise, one is making an exception in one's own favor.

In its more general formulations Kant's statement is admirable. Unfortunately his own interpretation of his profound insight was such that few find it an accurate account of their ethical experience. Kant made two errors. He formulated his maxims in too general a way, and he minimized the role of consequences in testing their susceptibility to universalization.⁸ Neither mistake is required by his fundamental insight, which can be so interpreted as to constitute a needed correction of teleological ethics rather than its total rejection.

If I contemplate telling a lie, the teleologist tells me to consider only the probable consequences and to act so as to maximize values. Kant tells me to contemplate a universal law that all men should lie whenever it suits them. Both are unsatisfactory. What I need to do is to consider the consequences in the way the teleologist recommends, and then to ask the Kantian question. What would be the result if, whenever the anticipated consequences were balanced in just this way, men were to tell lies of just this seriousness? Surely I could then recognize the rightness of lying to a murderer to save a friend's life. But surely I would also recognize that usually, even if the foreseen consequences of lying seemed slightly better, I should stick to the truth. Otherwise I must expect of my most trusted friend that in every instance he would tell me what he thought it best for me to hear--that truth or falsity would play no independent role in guiding his decision. I could not will a world in which truth as such was no longer considered normative.

The reference in Kant's formula to all human beings raises the question of its dependence (like utilitarianism) on extra-ethical judgments determined by the Ways. The sense of mankind as constituting the relevant unit of consideration does indeed display this dependence. If one supposes that certain classes or races are incapable of distinctively ethical action or that certain non-human beings are, then the process of generalization would not be in terms of all human beings. Even among humanists who would draw the line with Kant between human and other animals, the question of young children arises. New born babies are surely not to be considered ethical agents, and it is arbitrary to set any definite age at which the transition to the status human being is made. Hence it is better to speak of "all ethical beings," understanding thereby all agents of action insofar as they are capable of reflecting on their actions in terms of right and wrong.

The principle I propose, based on these reflections, is as follows: Act as you will all ethical beings to act when the ethically relevant factors are balanced in just this way.⁹

This formulation of the categorical imperative leaves entirely open the important question of whether there are general ethical rules and how they are related to each other. It is conceivable that situations could vary so drastically from one another that no generalizations would be possible. However, in fact this is not the case. On the contrary, many generalizations are possible, and it is possible to draw up long lists of them. For example, acting as I will all ethical beings to act leads me to avoid murder, to pursue happiness, to seek the greatest good, to tell the truth, to pay debts, to keep promises, to obey laws, to work for a just society, to treat equals equally, to give to each what that person deserves, and so forth. All of these rules have their ethical weight whenever they have relevance to a decision.

As long as in any given situation only one of these rules is relevant to action, ethical decision is unproblematical. But in many instances more than one rule applies, and not all dictate the same

action. For example, truth telling may conflict with my pursuit of happiness. In that case, which rule shall I follow? The seriousness of the lie must be weighed against the seriousness of the harmful consequences truth telling will engender. The generalized rules help me to keep in mind the ethically relevant factors to which the categorical imperative refers, but that imperative must be directly invoked.

There can also be generalizations about the relative weight to be assigned rules. Thus we may generalize that the rule against destroying human life ordinarily takes precedence over the rule against the destruction of property. In many cases of conflict between these rules, this generalization will serve to solve this issue quickly and correctly. However, the correctness is always to be judged by reference back to the categorical imperative, and one can always find instances where from some point of view destruction of some human life is preferable to destruction of some property. (I would not have favored the destruction of the art treasures of the Louvre to save Hitler's life.)

It may be possible to formulate either a rule or a generalization about the relative weight of rules that will always be vindicated by the categorical imperative. Perhaps for example, "Seek the general good!" always takes precedence over "Obey the formal rules of courtesy!" Still, even that would have to be decided in extreme cases by reference to the categorical imperative.

Further, rules can be so formulated as to take exceptions into account, and therefore require no exceptions. In this questionable sense innumerable "absolute" rules can be provided. For example: Always obey the law when (1) this is relevant and (2) no other relevant moral rule opposes such action.

The moral rules mentioned above are for the most part relatively independent of the special beliefs and values of particular Ways. When the categorical imperative is brought into relation with the understanding of human beings and their fulfillment involved in such a Way, more specific rules and generalizations about their relative weight are possible. Thus even where both Christians and Hindus accept the categorical imperative and derive numerous rules in common, their ethics differ by virtue of their differing visions of reality.

There is immense practical importance in the working out of the rules and the ranking of rules by which daily life is lived. Only when many rules are taken for granted can one falsely suppose that rules are not needed. That they are not absolute does not reduce their value and validity. Nevertheless, no elaboration of rules will be attempted here. What was needed was a statement of the autonomous and ultimate ethical principle, and such a statement has been offered. I find that I can conceive of no experience, insight, or reflection that would count against this principle, and hence I hold it to be valid.

A concluding word is in order on the question of absoluteness and objectivity in ethics. Usually an absolutist ethics is understood as one that regards specifiable moral rules as absolute. Kant's doctrine of truth telling is an example. In this sense the position of this essay is totally opposed to absolutism. Unfortunately, the rejection of moral absolutes is too often regarded as entailing the denial (1) that there is any absolute principle and (2) that moral rules have any objectivity. Thus ethical reflection loses rational character and is reduced to arbitrariness and taste. The present argument is that an absolute ethical principle can be formulated and that many moral rules have objective validity.

An absolute ethical principle must be purely formal. It can prescribe only a universally valid way of reaching ethical decisions, not what those decisions will be. What they will be depends on judgments in the other four areas described in Section II. Hence it differs markedly from what is

usually understood by a moral absolute. Yet its existence as absolute is the essential ground of the objectivity of moral rules which are not absolute.

The objectivity of what is not absolute is difficult for some to grasp in the field of ethics,¹⁰ although it is easy to recognize elsewhere. An analogy may help. Suppose in a family council it appears that four members are eager to take a trip that will inconvenience a daughter significantly but not seriously. Suppose then that the family decides to take the trip. Though the interests of the daughter have been subordinated to those of the other four, this does not mean that her interests lack intrinsic importance for the decision. If it is a real family, interests have not been ignored; they have been recognized as objectively important. Full consideration has been given to compromises designed partially to satisfy them while also meeting the needs of the other members of the family. Even if in the end no such compromise was possible, no one should suppose that the decision to act contrary to her interests is a denial of her objective rights. It is a denial of the absoluteness of her rights. If her rights were absolute, no one else could have any rights at all. Her only "absolute" right is that her interests be taken into account, not that they be determinative of the action taken.

That truth telling is an objective but not absolute moral rule is analogous. Whenever the issue I face involves speaking truthfully or falsely, the obligation to speak truthfully demands a hearing. Its right to be taken into account is objective to my desires and my interests. But speaking truthfully is no absolute obligation, for then all other obligations would be denied (as Kant seems to deny that I have any obligation to preserve the life of my friend). To consider truth telling an objective rule entails that even when other objective rules are of greater relevance and weight, I seek compromises which avoid outright lying. But even if no such compromise is possible and the lie becomes ethically mandatory, that does not deny the objective validity of the moral rule.

Of course, neither the absoluteness of the principle nor the objectivity of the rules can be absolutely established. That is an entirely different question. How a principle is warranted has been explained above, but that view may be wrong. Even if it is the right method of warranting, it may be that neither the principle proposed nor any principle whatever can be warranted by it. If an absolute were something of which one could be absolutely certain, then even one's own existence would not be an absolute, and certainly there could be no absolute ethical principles.

Likewise, if objective were taken to mean accessible to sense experience or presence in the public world, obviously moral rules would not be objective. The objectivity here claimed for them is only that sufficient reflection along the appropriate lines leads to their recognition rather than to arbitrary choice. This objectivity is more analogous to that of mathematical objects than to that of physical ones.

The Role of the Ethical in Human Existence

Thus far the autonomy of ethics as a discipline, the absoluteness of the ultimate ethical principle, and the objectivity of moral rules have been asserted. These are bold claims in a time of relativism, but many of the legitimate demands of relativism have been taken into account at every point. Ethics as autonomous has a highly limited province; the ethical principle as absolute is purely formal; and moral rules as objective are not absolute. This section and the following one will present further respects in which the ethical is relativized as well as affirmed.

The autonomy of ethics from religion and the dependence of concrete ethical judgments on religion have thus far been discussed in intra-ethical terms. The question has been, given the

concern to be ethical, what is entailed? But there is also an extra-ethical question to be asked: Shall one concern oneself with ethics at all, and if so, why, and to what extent?

The possibility of asking this question does not indicate that concern with ethics is an entirely optional matter. One could avoid ethical considerations altogether only if one never reflected about the nature of the consequences of one's actions. The ethical question would not arise in a totally spontaneous life or in that of the totally other-directed person. But these approximate animals and automatons, and represent ideal limits rather than actual possibilities for normal human beings.

Persons whose life stance is essentially ethical would see the question in a quite opposite light. To them the question is absurd. It is tantamount to asking, Ought I do what I ought to do? They might recognize that there is a pre-ethical stage in life in which the young child acts unreflectively, but they would argue that once children raise the question of what they are to do, they are bound by the ethical demand.

However, those who identify themselves with their ethical will would be mistaken in supposing that this identification is simply universal or self-evidently preferable to all others. In their mode of existence the emotions, the imagination, and the appetites are alien forces to be controlled. But there are others whose selfhood is identified with emotional feeling and desire, and for whom it is the ethical will that is problematic. Among their feelings are those of ethical obligation, and they may be able to recognize that these feelings have a structure of their own. Nevertheless, these ethical feelings are experienced alongside feelings of love, anger, and desire, in relation to which they lack any evident primacy or superiority. If their violation causes painful feelings of guilt, one may seek to lessen the pain by weakening the role of ethical feelings as easily as by subordinating other feelings to them as determinants of action.

From the perspective of this Way or life style the question about ethics is a serious one, which must be respected. Two types of answers are possible. First one might accept the life style as given and discuss how best to deal with ethical feelings within it. One may show that criticism would help distinguish between irrational and rational feelings of obligation, and discuss the advantage of weakening the former and taking the latter seriously; one may show also that ignoring rational ethical feelings often leads to action that provokes undesirable reactions from others. In any case, one must also recognize that there are advantages in the more spontaneous life of feeling that too great attention to the ethical would destroy.

The second type of answer would be to criticize the life style as such. One might argue that, for all its advantages, it is self-defeating in the long run. Or one might argue that, however pleasant and successful it is for the one who adopts it, it is morally irresponsible and reprehensible. To be effective this latter argument must appeal to the existing ethical feelings and gain a decision in their behalf which alters the very structure of the existence of the one addressed.

It should not be supposed that such questioning can occur only from outside the ethical structuring of existence. A reverse movement is possible. People who have operated in terms of ethical structure may be persuaded that the rigidity and harshness of their personalities are due to this fact and that these characteristics render their ethical actions ineffective. They may be persuaded that spontaneous expressions of joy and anger, affection and hostility produce better consequences in the long run for all concerned than do controlled ethical actions. In that case the categorical imperative itself paradoxically requires that they assign the effort to obey it a subordinate role in their total stance toward life!

Thus the ethical is an inescapable element in most human lives, but its role in the totality of human existence is highly problematic. One ought, of course, to do what one ought, but that by no means determines the desirability or importance of raising this issue. Insofar as the question is

raised, formal answers are possible which do not depend on the life style or Way of the questioner. But the role or status assigned to the ethical in general clearly does depend on this life style.

The situation is analogous with respect to the logical, and since this is more often recognized, a brief discussion may clarify and reenforce the point of the preceding paragraphs. One may seriously ask the question: Shall one concern oneself with logic at all, and if so, why, and to what extent? In this case, too, it would be foolish to suppose that the possibility of the question implies that such concern is purely optional. If one wants to draw reliable conclusions from evidence, one must conform to logical principles; a life in which no such reasoning occurs is an extreme limit not possible for people in general. But the fact that logical reasoning must play some role in life by no means settles the question of how much attention is to be paid to it. Some may believe that they get along better by generally trusting their immediate intuitive judgments and perceptions in each individual instance than they would by attempting to relate these to each other in a logical way. Others, seeing how frequently people are led astray by intuitions and perceptions, urge the importance of logical reasoning. Conversions occur in both directions. In all cases, it is recognized that, whatever role in life is allotted to logical reasoning, in itself it has an autonomous structure.

Christianity and the Ethical

The role of non-ethical factors in the shaping of concrete ethical judgments was discussed specifically in the second section above. Everything stated there applies to any ethics. Hence, for the Christian, all concrete ethical judgments will be affected by one's faith as well as by the autonomous ethical principles one accepts.

This has been obscured by the fact that many persons who consciously reject or ignore the Christian faith make the same ethical decisions as Christians. They believe themselves to do so on neutral or rational grounds. For example, both Christians and other Western humanists judge human beings to be of intrinsically immeasurable worth. Both place the burden of proof on anyone who would assert that one person deserves greater opportunity than another. Hence when the ethical decisions of Christians are shaped by this judgment, they do not recognize them as Christian. However, in fact it remains so. The non-Christians who share the Christian judgment have probably derived it from Christianity. Even if they derived it from some other Way, such as Stoicism, whose judgments overlap those of Christianity, the Christian's judgment is no less Christian.

More important for the Christian's self-understanding is the question whether such judgments about the inherent importance of human beings have self-validating power once they are understood. If so, then Christians would recognize that what was once distinctively Christian is now independent of that historical origin. Their own setting of the judgment in the context of its origin would be essentially extraneous and irrelevant to the ethical decision. If not, then the failure of others to recognize the dependence of their judgments on a total Way renders them highly vulnerable to criticism.

The issue here is a subtle one. Rationality in the form of disinterested reflection has a universalizing tendency. To reflect disinterestedly about present enjoyment and the suffering likely to follow is to check the tendency to seize the proffered pleasure. To reflect disinterestedly about myself and another person involves considering us both from a perspective more neutral than my present emotions. To reflect disinterestedly about the in-group and the out-group is to perceive that their differences are not as drastic as had been supposed. For these very reasons, disinterested

reflection on such matters is rare. Nevertheless, humanists who no longer seek support for their universalism in a traditional Way, may support it by the cultivation of disinterested reflection.

However, disinterested reflection alone will not suffice to sustain all the commitments the humanist shares with the Christian. Disinterested reflection brings under judgment every in-group/out-group distinction, but it does not support egalitarianism. By virtually all standards of judgment some people are more deserving than others, and by most standards some deserve evil rather than good. The humanist's sense that persons as persons are immeasurably worthwhile is not based on disinterested reflection alone. A purely secular view of persons as they appear to the eyes and ears of others provides no grounds for this conviction. Only a view of human depths, or mystery, or inwardness can provide such a basis, and even that will fail if not touched by a sense of ultimacy. Perhaps some new vision of the human inwardness can arise that sustains the ethics of a genuinely post-Christian humanism. If so, it will be to that extent religious by the account given in the first section above. But thus far this has not happened, and as it distances itself from its Christian (and Stoic) roots Western humanism tends to lapse into thoroughgoing secularism.

There is, then, no distinctively Christian ethical principle, but there is a distinctively Christian ethic, which is little different from the popular Western humanist ethic for which it normally provides the context and grounding. It differs more dramatically from a traditional Hindu ethic, a tribal or racist ethic, or a Nietzschean ethic, but even with these there will be areas of agreement. The spelling out of the Christian ethic in its similarities and differences from other ethics is an important task in every generation.

The major concern in this section, however, is not with Christian ethics but with the role of the ethical in Christian existence. Concretely, the ethical in this instance can only take the form of Christian ethics, so the question may be rephrased as the place of Christian ethics in Christian existence. In this form the question has rarely been raised, chiefly because Christian ethics has been conceived as inclusive of the whole of Christian existence. For example, when Christian ethics is described as an ethics of love, it is difficult to discuss the relation of love to the more limited realm that I have called Christian ethics.¹¹

My topic is close to that traditionally treated as the place of law in Christian life, and one may regard my question as simply a reformulation of that one. There are, however, advantages in the reformulation in that the notion of law is negatively weighted in Christian theology, whereas ethics is not. Further, the change is not only terminological, since there are unfortunate connotations of "law", from some of which it would be almost impossible to rid the term.

First, the theological notion of law connotes an element of irrationality. This is partly because the Jewish law did contain irrational elements derived from ancient taboos. Especially in the areas of sex and religion such irrationality has continued to play a role in our Christian understanding of law. The Christian understanding of ethics, on the other hand, is neutral in this respect.

Second, in the theological context law tends to connote primary attention to personal habits, especially those connected with sexuality, indulgence in other pleasures, honesty, reciprocity, kindness, and the like, and to turn attention away from social and political action. Ethics encompasses the individual and the social equally, or perhaps favors attention to the larger concerns.

Third, even if the notion of law could be purified for Christians of its irrational and narrowly personal overtones, it would remain heteronomous in its connotation. I encounter a demand as law when I encounter it as coming to me from outside myself from parents, community, state, church, nature, or God. I may recognize that there are good reasons for the law and that its source is

justified in its claim to authority over me. Even so, I confront it as something alien and demanding. Again, ethics is neutral and open to interpretation in fully autonomous terms.

Fourth, law almost always refers to moral rules, and the adjective legalistic is bound up with the idea of their absolutization. It is often supposed that one has shown the weakness of a "legalistic" approach when one has shown that it is sometimes right to violate moral rules. It may be unfair to "legalists" to think that they have not generally recognized that laws conflict with each other in concrete application and that no rules are absolute, but it would be virtually impossible to rescue the notion of legalism from this taint. Ethics can refer to the formal principle as well as to moral rules, and an ethics can recognize that the rules are never absolute.

The ethics outlined in the preceding section (like many philosophical ethics) is free from irrationality, excessive individualism, heteronomy, and legalism. As such it offers a much more serious claim upon the Christian than does law as often understood. Only when these special and negative connotations of law are eliminated from the discussion can the deeper issues in the theological discussion of law and gospel be fully appreciated. What role, then, does Christian ethics have in the totality of the Christian Way? Nine points are offered below as being involved in an adequate answer to this question.

1. *Christianity Stresses the Importance of Ethics.* The Christian critique of law, both in its Jewish form and in the many new forms it has assumed in Christian history, has never meant indifference to the consequences of action. Antinomianism, insofar as it rejects not only the irrationality, heteronomy, and the absolutization of moral rules so often characteristic of law, but also ethical concerns as such, is a misunderstanding of the Christian intention which was vigorously repudiated already in the New Testament and by the church of all ages. Christianity accentuates the importance of right action in human relations (Mt. 25:31-46), sharpens the conscience, and cultivates ethical sensitivity. If it were necessary to choose between ethical action and intensification of the religious life, the weight of New Testament teaching would support the former. Even the attack on legalism is rooted as much in ethical passion as in any other source.

2. *Christianity Relativizes the Ethical.* This statement in no way contradicts the previous one. Indeed, if the importance of the ethical is not stressed, the relativization of the ethical is not understood or appreciated. When we read that if we give all we have to feed the poor, we may be none the better for it, that does not depreciate the ethical act. When others are hungry and I have food, I should feed them, and they will benefit regardless of my motives. It would be profoundly un-Christian to fail to help my needy neighbor until I had confidence that I was doing so from acceptable motives! Nevertheless, acting ethically in and of itself has only an indirect bearing on salvation. The hungry will gain from my gift, but I may not. If I give grudgingly or seek by giving to attain virtue, my spiritual condition is not improved. Only love heals my inner being, and no outer act insures its presence. I cannot be healed without ethical action, but ethical action in itself profits me nothing (I Cor. 13).

3. *Christianity Motivates Ethical Action.* Thus far there has been no discussion of why people do or do not act ethically. The distinction between the righteous and the unrighteous, which falls within the ethical sphere, has been neglected. But clearly this distinction is of immense importance especially in the Judeo-Christian tradition. My recognition that I ought to take account of the consequences for others of a contemplated act in no way insures that I will consider them, or having considered, will act as I judge right. I am quite capable of consciously violating my own ethical principles in favor of some immediate enjoyment or to avoid something I fear. What, after all, will cause me to do what I believe I should do, when I want to do something else?

The only purely ethical motivation for righteous action is the sense of obligation. The sense that I ought to do something motivates me to do it. The stress on the importance of the ethical in Christianity greatly enhances the power of this motivation. Nevertheless, if ethical action depended entirely on this one motivation, it would be relatively rare. Fortunately, this motive is reenforced by others that are closely allied to it: the dislike of feeling guilty, the enjoyment of the approval of others, and the preference for sustaining a self-image of oneself as righteous. One step further removed is the fear of punishment and the hope of reward based on the conviction that there is ultimate justice in the universe. All of these motives for ethical action have come in for unduly harsh criticism in recent times. This has been due partly to the confusion of ethical action with conformity to rules, which even centuries of Christian and humanist teaching have not erased. Ethical action, in distinction from legalism, is of such crucial importance that we should not despise those motives which support it even if they are not so pure as righteousness for righteousness' sake. Certainly Christianity has in practice appealed to all of them.

Nevertheless, there is nothing distinctively Christian about any of these supporting motives; in fact, they can easily support unrighteous as well as righteous actions. My guilt feelings may be irrational and operate as blocks to righteous behavior. The desire for the approval of others leads to conformity to established patterns, which are often unrighteous. My desire to regard myself as righteous can lead to conformity to taboos, to falsely universalized rules, and to avoidance of the ambiguous situations in which tough ethical decisions are made. Hence, the purely ethical motive often has to stand alone against all these others. Even the sense of obligation is prone to attach itself so absolutely to relative rules that it fails to conform to its fundamental principle.

Christian love enters the picture as a far less ambiguous motive to righteous action. It is directed toward God and neighbor indissolubly. To love God is to love the neighbor, and vice versa (I John 4:20-21). Insofar as one is really concerned about others, one will want to take that action which benefits them. One will also discern more accurately the actual consequences of one's acts in terms of their feelings and emotional reactions. Love of neighbors tends to overcome the false absolutization of rules which can otherwise inhibit truly righteous action toward them. Further, since Christian love is directed toward people as people, it undergirds and carries through the universalizing tendency of disinterested reflection.

4. *Christianity Frees People from the Need to be Righteous.* As in the relation of Point 2 to Point 1, Point 4 in no way contradicts Point 3. Christianity stresses the importance of ethics and it provides the most effective motivation for righteousness. At the same time, it relativizes ethics in relation to motivation and liberates us from the need to believe ourselves to be righteous.

This human desire was mentioned in the preceding section as one of the subsidiary motivations to righteousness. A danger was also mentioned, namely, that one falsely identify righteousness with freedom from violation of certain taboos or moral rules. But there are other and more fundamental problems.

The need to see oneself as righteous is a function of understanding oneself primarily ethically. Only then is one's ability to accept oneself primarily dependent on one's view of oneself as righteous. If one succeeds in so acting as to gain one's own approval (whether by self-deception or not), one recognizes one's own righteousness and rejoices in it; one is, inevitably, self-righteous. Implicitly, if not explicitly, one judges others who fall short of these standards to be fundamentally inferior human beings. Since one's righteousness is achieved at some sacrifice of gratification of spontaneous appetites and desires, it is almost impossible that there be lacking elements of resentment which are then directed toward those morally inferior persons who indulge their appetites more freely. The unattractiveness of the self-righteous person has been so much

emphasized that further elaboration is unnecessary. The point to be stressed is that for those who define themselves ethically, self-righteousness is the inevitable consequence of success.

Too often it is supposed that the problems of self-righteousness can be overcome by allowing oneself a few vices. For example, the social activists may indulge themselves sexually, and they may even be the more complacent about themselves because they do so. Indeed, they may self-righteously condemn those who do not so indulge themselves for their self-righteousness! But of course this is irrelevant to the real alternatives. If one defines oneself ethically, one needs to be righteous, however many "vices" such righteousness may include. If one fails to be righteous in one's own eyes, then one stands before oneself condemned. The alternative to self-righteousness is despair, and despair, too, breeds resentment and anger.

The problem can be somewhat alleviated if, for the purely ethical, there is substituted a code of laws. If these are modest in their demands, one may manage to obey them at less cost and hence with less likelihood of resentment. But such half-way measures do not alter the basic situation.

Christianity liberates us from this self-definition in ethical terms; our acceptance of ourselves no longer depends upon our righteousness. Hence, if we are not ethically righteous, we need not despair. We can recognize the unrighteousness of our actions without ultimate threat to our being, and hence we can more honestly appraise ourselves. Even if we should indeed find ourselves wholly righteous in our outward acts (an extreme possibility!), this will not lead to self-righteousness since we do not identify the value or merit of our selfhood with our ethical achievement. In the sphere that counts, those who are honest will not suppose that they have fulfilled the requirements of perfect love of God and neighbor, and to whatever extent they have approached this impossible possibility, they will have so lost interest in their own virtue that the phenomenon of self-righteousness cannot arise.

5. *Christian Love Partially Replaces Ethics.* When love is present in personal relations much of what ethical reflection would require is done in the absence of such reflection and without any feeling of obligation. This point differs from what was said above about love as a motivation of ethical action. In that capacity love inclines me to act as my ethical reflection leads me to believe I should act. The additional point is that in much day to day interpersonal interchange love can act spontaneously. One comforts the hurt child or reassures the troubled friend, not because reflection has led to the belief that this should be done, but because the obvious need of the other calls forth the spontaneous expression of love.

Of course, problems in interpersonal relations often arise in which ethical reflection is required. If the child's injury is serious, love's comforting is not enough and alternative courses of action must be reflectively evaluated. If such reflection is not consciously required, this is only because reliable habits of action have been established by past reflection. One may learn also that one's spontaneous expressions of love do not accomplish love's purpose, that the child or the friend is encouraged in excessive dependency by the loving acts in question. Then spontaneous love must learn to check itself and channel its energies in controlled and ethical ways.

Furthermore, as soon as we love beyond personal relations to the vast areas of our responsibility for political communities and social institutions, spontaneous expression of love is almost irrelevant. In these areas Christian love emphasizes the importance of the ethical, requires the acceptance of its informed calculations, and subordinates its spontaneity to the results.

Nevertheless, the spontaneity of love is not to be belittled. We are far more deeply supported, affirmed and reassured by spontaneous affection than by being dutifully assisted. Also we experience inner freedom and wholeness when we act spontaneously, whereas the concern to do what is right, even when it arises purely within us, is often felt as a pressure or burden. Love is a

deeply personalizing relation, whereas the self-conscious performance of ethical action tends to be impersonal, even if it is motivated in part by love. Love may accomplish what love and ethical reflection alike find needed, where ethical action alone is powerless.

6. *Christian Love Overcomes the Tension of Obligation and Desire.* This statement, even more than the preceding ones, speaks of a possibility that is only very fragmentarily realized in the experience of Christians. Genuine concern for others functions as a supporting motive for ethical action as indicated in 3. In this capacity it may increase the inner tensions involved in doing what one ought to do rather than what, with much of one's being, one wants to do. A man may, for example, give up a job he enjoys and which gains for him the respect of his associates, in order to engage in political action which his associates condemn, but which he believes right. He may be motivated both by genuine concern for the victims of injustice and by purely ethical feelings. But these motives, while victorious over his desire to enjoy the benefits of pleasant work and the admiration of acquaintances, will not displace them. Especially if his new activities are distasteful and unappreciated by those for whom he is making the sacrifice, the inner tension will be extremely painful.

We admire a man who perseveres in the face of such tension, and we rightly view him as a Christian of unusual stature. Nevertheless, we cannot regard him as having achieved the full measure of Christian sanctity. For that ideally involves the transformation of the total motivation by love. Insofar as love becomes not only determinative of action, but also of desires, the inner tension is reduced.

It is dangerous to speak of this goal of tension reduction in the Christian life. Adherence to the ideal all too easily leads to self-deception and repression from consciousness of unacceptable desires. Alternately it leads to the pursuit of freedom in the opposite direction, namely, by reducing concern with obligations and judging concern for others only in terms of its contribution to one's own self-realization. Over against this pursuit of equanimity, Christianity is to be understood much more as an intensification of tension than as a release from it. Nevertheless, the goal of serenity at the new level of concern for others remains--as a fragmentarily realizable ideal--important.

7. *Christian Love Is in Tension with Ethics.* Thus far Christian love has been presented as calling for conduct identical with ethical righteousness. This is and remains of primary importance for the relation of love and ethics. Nevertheless, there are three respects in which love is in tension with ethics.

First, although Christian love is concern for human beings as such and hence for every person, it is not impersonal as is ethics. The immediate presence of human suffering elicits a response of peculiar urgency from the Christian. Ordinarily the action that expresses that response is also the action that is ethically required, but it need not always be so. There are situations in which a larger total good might be served by ignoring the immediate claim and proceeding with established plans.

The opposition here is a very subtle one. Ethically I could not will that everyone, when confronted with such a choice, would always sacrifice the immediate for the wider claim. I would prefer a world in which people would make some sacrifice of the larger good for the sake of meeting present need. Hence I could approve of the deed of love. Even so, a tension remains between the spontaneity of love and the calculation of ethics, and we must expect that at times the expression of the former must appear wrong to the latter.

Second, although the loving Christian, like the ethical person, must learn to avoid squeamishness and to act vigorously in the midst of ambiguities, the question remains as to whether there are any limits to what love will do. Suppose, for example, that one is deeply committed to the liberation of a people from a hated oppressor, and fully convinced that mankind will be greatly

benefitted by victory in a revolution. Suppose one is then confronted with a situation in which the torturing of innocent children is required to further the revolutionary cause. Suppose that one's ethical calculation leads to the conclusion that such torture, for all its horrors, is justified and indeed ethically demanded. Can Christian love reconcile itself to such an act?

The question is not a rhetorical one. Perhaps love can reconcile itself even to this. Alternately, one might argue that one cannot ethically will such a deed regardless of the balance of calculated consequences. Nevertheless the questions of ethical rightness and of appropriateness to Christian love are distinct questions, and that means that there can be a tension between the expression of Christian love and the claim of ethical duty.

Third, the tension is clearest where one's own fate hangs in the balance. Normally the tension lies between too great consideration of my own benefit, on the one hand, and impartial concern for all, on the other. Here Christian love supports the ethical call for impartiality. But Christian love can go further and lead to the sacrifice of one's own interests for the sake of another.

Often this too can be ethically justified. Sometimes the self-sacrifice of the health or life of one person enables several others to live, and hence it may even be ethically required. But occasionally a woman with great capacities for helping others may give her life to save someone much less gifted. Here ethical calculations are likely to condemn the deed. Nevertheless, the uncalculating aspect of Christian love gains peculiarly vivid expression in such an act.

In all these instances love is not simply juxtaposed to ethics, for love is on both sides of the alternative. Love calls for ethical action at the same time that its spontaneity resists the constrictions of ethical calculation. Whatever love may do, it must recognize the ethical rightness of the ethical requirement. Though it may violate the ethical, it can never establish such violation as a new principle or higher law or judge its acts in any objective way superior to the ethical.

8. *Christianity Witnesses to a Possibility of Achieving Ethical or Supra-ethical Goals by Other than Ethical Means.* The sphere of the ethical is bounded by what we can perceive as our situation, our knowledge of causes and effects, and our existing judgments of value. In all of these areas we recognize our extreme fallibility. Our most righteous acts may turn out to have been wholly misguided, and the motivation of love is no protection against such results.

For these reasons we are often well-advised to seek advice from wiser and more experienced persons before reaching decisions. In some instances we may find it best to follow their advice even when they cannot explain to us why they judge as they do. Of course, here too, we may be led astray.

Henry Nelson Wieman has stressed that we can transcend our ethical limitations in another way. We can identify that process which makes for good, and we can commit ourselves wholeheartedly to it in trust. We will not attempt to foresee the outcome and calculate its desirability in terms of our existing judgments of value, for we will expect our very judgments of value to be progressively transformed by the process. He calls this process creative interchange, and he has devoted much time and thought to identifying and describing it.¹²

At times Wieman speaks of creative interchange as God, thus pointing to the more general question whether the Christian can know God's will in such a way as to transcend ethical calculation. If God is in the world working toward the realization of unforeseen and unforeseeable goods on the basis of a comprehensive perception of reality never accessible to us, then the ethical principle itself would support our aligning ourselves with God's work if we could.

The question is whether we have any other access to God's present purposes than our grasp of ethical principles and our reason. I believe the answer is that we do, that God in every moment offers us possibilities for our self-actualization which we can neither create nor judge. These

possibilities exercise an influence upon us such that apart from our willing even in spite of our willing, we participate more richly in life, in value, and even in goodness than we deserve. These ever new possibilities are in tension with desires and ambitions by which our past seeks to exercise rule over our present. To act spontaneously or to be guided by hunches is more often to subordinate our reason to unconscious pressures from the past than to fulfill more perfectly the possibilities offered us by God. Hence the attempt to transcend the ethical by the religious is profoundly dangerous.

Yet there are those who have developed deep sensitivity to God's work within them and who have progressively unified their lives around this sensitivity. This I call saintliness. To whatever extent saintliness is achieved, the ethical is transcended even in the sphere of action. For the saint, spontaneous response in each situation is that action which fulfills the possibilities there offered by God. The action may differ from that which rational ethical calculation would dictate, or it may not. In either case it transcends all sense of obligation by the grateful acceptance of grace. It is free from anxiety about consequences through the faith that its rightness is beyond human judgment.

9. *The Sphere of the Ethical Is but One Aspect of Christian Existence.* This section has dealt with Christianity in its relation to ethics. That relation is a many-sided one, and in a variety of ways, even in the sphere of behavior with which ethics is concerned, there is a transcendence of the ethical. Even so, the erroneous impression may be left that Christianity is focused upon action to a greater degree than is the case. Among the great Ways of the world, Christianity allots to action as high an importance as any, but it knows too that life is more than action and that the ethical must find its appropriate place in the whole.

Christian existence is a suffering as well as a doing. It is anguish and joy, bondage and release, despair and hope, doubting and believing, negating and affirming, turmoil and peace, dying and rising. It is a mode of appropriating the past and of facing the future. It is a terrifying acknowledgment of the power of evil and a passionate assurance that its victory is not ultimate. It is self-discipline and freedom, penitence and forgiveness, entering the depths of inwardness and moving outward to the structures of the world. It is a lonely pilgrimage and a communion of saints. It is an apprehension of life as meaningful yet mysterious. It is devotion and commitment, and it is spontaneity and grace. It is a total vision of history and nature from which God is absent, yet in which God is all in all.

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Notes

1. This understanding of religion is developed in Chapter V, "Christianity as a Religion," of my book, *God and the World* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), pp. 103-116.

2. The rules of safe driving as such are not normally considered part of ethics. The rule that we drive on the right side of the road, for example, is ethically arbitrary. However, the careful formulation and observation of rules, many of which are arbitrary, is required by the ethical requirement that we act so as to safeguard life, health, and property.

3. I do not mean to limit the ethical to what Kant calls the categorical. Discussions of what one must do to attain virtue, excellence, fulfillment, or happiness and how one may meet the needs of another individual or of society in general are ethical. On the other hand, treatments of what one must do to bake a cake, sell an automobile, or drive a competitor out of business are not. I suggest the line between these is that we hold the former ends to be proper to human beings as such whereas

the latter are "particular" purposes which one is free to entertain or not as one pleases. But the line is not a sharp one. On which side should we place a treatise on habits conducive to good health?

4. See the second factor in the account of the religious in the first section above.

5. This is by no means an exhaustive list. Among other claimants are: act as love requires; conform your life to Christ; do what is fitting; fulfill your highest potential; act in accordance with nature; live by reason. These and other principles are worthy of full discussion. In general, however, they seem to me either too specifically determined by the beliefs of one Way, too vague, or vulnerable to the criticisms directed below to the four principles selected for criticism. Where the vagueness is cleared up, several of them may be alternative (I think less satisfactory) accounts either of the ultimate principle proposed below in this section or of the Christian Way in its relation to the ethical as described in the last section.

6. This discussion is carried on from the perspective of rational reflection. It is quite possible that there are experiences in which some demand is felt to supersede rational reflection. In this essay such supra-rational demands are not treated as ethical.

7. A more precise development of this approach from a slightly different point of view is to be found in my book, *A Christian Natural Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966), pp. 113-125.

8. Kant states that if I tell a lie even to save a friend from a murderer, "so far as in me lies I cause that declarations should in general find no credence, and hence that all rights based on contracts should be void and lose their force." Lewis Beck, ed., *Critique of Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1949), p. 347. A lie thus under any circumstances "vitiates the source of law itself" (*Ibid.*). Kant's limited concern for consequences is seen in that he does not ask whether lying to save a friend from a murderer, either in this case or if it became a general practice, would have beneficial or harmful consequences. The only relevant consequence is that which would follow from the total abolition of the grounds of credence. Even here Kant seems to see the harm done to mankind more as the intrinsic evil of vitiating the source of law than as the imagined social chaos with its accompanying misery that would follow.

9. Fletcher may be criticizing this kind of formulation when he writes "and to say 'universal only for exactly similar conditions' is to run away from the variety of life" (*Situation Ethics*, [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966], p. 131). He does not elaborate his objection, and it strikes me as having no apparent force.

10. Fletcher's identification of "intrinsicness" with the legalism he rightly rejects is a major flaw in his book (*Situation Ethics*, pp. 74-75). He seems to see no way in which it is possible to say that truth-telling is, in and of itself, i.e., intrinsically, superior to lying while also saying that there are situations in which lying is called for by love. But I find no argument in his book against this (to me almost self-evident) point. Further, just as Fletcher allows no intrinsic rightness to truth-telling over lying, he also seems to allow no intrinsic value to the goods which love seeks to actualize for others. In a peculiarly confusing passage he states that he replaces the utilitarian "pleasure principle with *agape*" (p. 95). But of course the pleasure principle for utilitarianism has to do with the evaluation of the consequences expected from the act and not with the reason for its performance! In the next sentence it becomes clear that in fact he replaces "pleasure" by "welfare". But the vagueness of this term does not seem to bother him. Love or goodwill is held up as solving all the problems of relative value under the rubric of "welfare".

11. This is characteristic of "situation ethics" and "the new morality". Love is contrasted with law, which is identified with moral rules. Even when the need for such rules is recognized as in

the mediating work of Bishop John A. T. Robinson in *Christian Morals Today* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1964), it is clear that they cannot constitute ethics, which is what love as "a deep concern for persons as whole persons, in their entire social context, really requires" (p. 33). Fine, but then what does such concern require? Is it not the task of Christian ethics to think that through, in the light of the Christian vision of reality and stance toward life as well as the categorical imperative? And must we not then still ask how the Christian ethical life thus understood is to be related to the love taught by Jesus for which "not only all prudential calculation of consequences to fall upon the agent himself, but likewise all sober regard for family and friends, duties towards oneself and *fixed* duties to others, both alike were jettisoned from view." (Quoted from Paul Ramsey with approval by Robinson, *op. cit.*, p. 27.)

12. Wieman's finest formulations are in *The Source of Human Good* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946).

Chapter XV
Ethics and Moral Theology
Charles Curran

Social ethics raises important methodological questions for moral theology or Christian ethics. This paper will consider three such questions: 1) What is the source, or what are the sources, of ethical wisdom for the Christian ethicist? 2) How does the moral theologian use the Scriptures? 3) What questions does social ethics raise for the so-called traditional natural law theory in Catholic moral theology?

Sources of Christian Ethics

The question of the source or sources of ethical wisdom for the Christian ethicist has generally been phrased in this way: Is there a source of ethical wisdom existing apart from the explicit revelation of God in Christ in the Scriptures? Catholic moral theology has answered the question in the affirmative with its teaching on natural law. However, the distinction between nature and supernature as found in most Catholic theological manuals appears today to be woefully inadequate. Nature and supernature are not two layers that can be totally separated one from another. The inadequacy and misleading character of this distinction between nature and supernature calls for a theological recasting of the natural law theory. In this work of recasting it should be kept in mind that the natural law theory did have the merit of recognizing the existence of ethical wisdom apart from the explicit revelation of God in the Scriptures. Some forms of Protestant ethics have denied the existence of ethical wisdom and knowledge apart from the Scriptures, in fact, traditionally the emphasis in Protestant theology has been in that direction. The *sola Scriptura* notion, if pushed to an extreme, denies the existence of ethical wisdom apart from the Scriptures. Stress on sin and the corruption of sin leaves little or no room for a source of ethical wisdom existing outside the Scriptures. Without the saving intervention of God in Christ, man is totally under the corrupting force of sin. The Protestant emphasis on justification by faith alone also tends to play down the activity and the work of man.¹

These and other themes have led to such ethical teachings as the distinction between law and gospel, and the two realms or two kingdoms theory. Law has the primary function of revealing to man his own sinful state; it also has the function of trying to keep sin in check. The corruption of sin is ever present and law serves as a dike trying by coercion to keep sinful man in check. But law or justice in no way points out how the Christian is to act in his daily life.² The two realms or the two kingdoms theory separates man's inner relationship with God from all other political and social relationships in which he is involved. Man's relationship with God is a question of Gospel under the Church. All other social relationships are governed by the law and have no relationship to the gospel and God. The two realm theory thus separates man's daily life in the world from the gospel and from man's relationship to God in Christ.³

Reinhold Niebuhr has sharply criticized such an ethical approach. "By thus transposing an 'inner' ethic into a private one and making the 'outer' or 'earthly' ethic authoritative for government, Luther achieves a curiously perverse social morality. . . . He demands that the state maintain order, without too scrupulous a regard for justice; yet he asks suffering and nonresistant love of the individual, without allowing him to participate in the claims and counter-claims which constitute the stuff of social justice."⁴

Today the older Protestant positions are being abandoned, and there seems to be a growing consensus favoring the existence of what John C. Bennett has called "common ground morality."⁵ Both practical and theoretical reasons arising from social ethics have shown the need for a common ground morality existing apart from the explicit revelation of God in the Scriptures. In a pluralistic society, Christians must act with others for the good of society and of the entire human race, even though these others do not share the Christian beliefs. The race and the peace movements in the United States have shown that Christians and nonChristians share very similar viewpoints on many important social questions. The very fact that Christians constitute a minority of the world's population implies the need for cooperation with others if conditions in our modern world are to be changed. Christians share with many non-Christians identical views on the need to overcome world poverty, the elimination of discrimination, and the protection of the rights of individuals. Life in a pluralistic society shows both the need and the possibility of a source of ethical wisdom existing outside the explicit revelation of the Scriptures.

Theoretical reasons for the existence of a source of ethical wisdom outside the explicit revelation of God in the Scriptures stem from the insufficiencies of the Scriptures, the realization that Christianity must have positive meaning for man and the world, and the very complexity of modern social problems. The Scriptures themselves are limited in many ways. The historical and cultural circumstances reflected in the Scriptures differ considerably from contemporary circumstances. Occasionally, the Scriptural teaching is now seen to be merely the incorporation of a very culturally determined concept, e.g., the inferiority of women. The prohibitions of oath taking and of interest taking, and the relationship of master to slave all raise important questions about the understanding of these things in our contemporary society. The moral teaching of the scriptures frequently is seen primarily in the light of individual relationships.

Social ethics raises vexing problems of a very complicated nature which require more than general admonitions. The Scriptures give little concrete help for the contemporary problems of sharing the wealth of creation in a more equitable manner, creating a community of nations, controlling populations, providing adequate medical care for all men, evaluating the right of man to make genetic mutations, etc. The insufficiencies of the Scriptures in the area of social ethics are apparent. The Christian ethicist finds a theological basis for such ethical wisdom existing apart from the Scriptures, especially in the notions of creation and incarnation.

That there is a source of ethical wisdom which is shared by all men has important ramifications for methodology in moral theology. On the one hand, there are a plurality of ways into the ethical problem; on the other hand, not all of Christian morality can be reduced to merely a specifically Christian concept. In the terminology employed by William Frankena and followed by Paul Ramsey any form of mere agapism is not sufficient,⁶ that is, *agape* or whatever is chosen as the distinctive aspect of Christian ethics is not the only source of ethical wisdom for the Christian. Mixed agapism realizes the existence of ways into the ethical problem for the Christian which are other than the distinctively Christian aspects found in the Scriptures and referred to as *agape* or *koinonia*. Social ethics points up this insufficiency of any love monism, and underlines the fact that one cannot reduce all moral theology to one distinctively Christian aspect.

The complexity of problems in social ethics not only calls for a source of ethical wisdom apart from the revelation of the Scriptures, but also argues for the need of different starting points in ethics. In this context James Gustafson has pointed out the danger in speaking of principles vs. context, since Christian ethics embraces four different approaches: perceptive analysis of the social situation, theological affirmations, moral principles, and a conception of Christian existence.

Although different approaches to Christian ethics will emphasize one of these aspects more than the others, all four approaches need to be present in any adequate Christian ethical methodology.⁷

Today, the statement of the question is significantly shifting. Especially within the context of Protestant theology the question had been: Is there a source of ethical wisdom existing apart from the explicit revelation of the Scriptures? Now the emphasis is more on the secular and the human. Contemporary students of moral theology more often propose the following question: What distinctive element does Christian ethics bring to bear on the social problems facing contemporary man? The question becomes even more acute when one realizes from history that the Roman Catholic Church, for instance, has often seemed to impede true human development and growth.

Christians find themselves frequently agreeing with many non-Christians and disagreeing with fellow Christians on many of the major issues of the day. On particular issues and problems there may be no appreciably different Christian approach. The distinctively Christian aspect above all appears to be a viewpoint or horizon in relation to which the Christian views reality. Creation, sin, redemption, and resurrection destiny made proleptically present in the resurrection of Jesus characterize the Christian view of reality. Human history is viewed in some relationship with the reign of God in Christ. Human history derives its ultimate meaning from such a relationship.

The Christian vision sees present reality and the social structures of society in the light of the reality both of human sinfulness and of the resurrection destiny accomplished first in Christ Jesus. Contemporary theology again stresses eschatology, and realizes that the Christian is now striving to cooperate in the building of the new heaven and the new earth which is ultimately the gift of the Lord of history at the end of time. In the past, Christian theology has used eschatology and its view of the future in such a manner as to deserve the charge of "eschatological irresponsibility" inasmuch as, in the light of future existence, little or no attention was given to the present. However, the reign of God in terms of his eschatological activity is already operative in human existence and going forward to its final stage at the end of time.

A proper understanding of eschatology serves as a criterion by which the Christian realizes the insufficiencies and shortcomings of every human and social structure. Sin and lack of fullness will always mar any human structure. Thus, the Christian vision makes the Christian sensitive to the shortcomings and sinfulness of the present structures and urges him to change those structures. The Christian can never be content with the present, for it always manifests the sinfulness and the limitations of the times in between the two comings of Christ. Thus the Christian is constantly conscious of the need for social reform; he is never willing to absolutize any structure or institution existing in the present. The "eschaton" is here now and pressing forward to the new heaven and new earth, which is God's gift fully to be realized at the end of history.

Emphasis on eschatology has been accompanied by an emphasis on hope and a stress on the future. The God of Israel and the God of the Christians is an Advent God, that is, one who comes. The Christian God is the God of presence and promise. The Christian lives sustained by the hope and the promise of the resurrection. Christians involved in the struggle for social justice and the shaping of a better world will experience suffering, frustration, and perhaps even death itself, but Christ's resurrection is their hope. The Christian commitment to the world is sustained and carried forward by the hope that despite sin, suffering, and death itself, God will bring to completion the work of building the new heaven and the new earth.

The Christian should view the present social structures of society with an uneasy conscience and realize the need to work to reform them. In hope he commits himself to this task with all the problems inherent in it. Does the Christian vision exhaust itself in this form of negative criticism and in supplying a firm commitment to the work of renewal of social structures? Does Christian

ethics have any uniquely positive contribution to make in the constant reform of social structures? I believe that Christian ethics can in a positive way add to the content of social ethics. A Christian formulates social goals which differ from approaches of those who have a mechanistic view of man. Similarly, the Christian vision stresses certain fundamental dispositions which should characterize the person himself. Different norms and directives for action could result from such a different view of man and his goals in society. However, theory and practice indicate that very often the non-Christian and the Christian will come to the same ethical conclusions in questions of social morality. The Christian finds the basis of this similarity in his understanding of creation and the incarnation.

The realization that the Christian shares a great deal of ethical wisdom with all men raises questions not only for the methodology of Christian ethics but also for the approaches of Christian Churches to problems of social ethics. If the Christian Church merely adheres to the Biblical message, it can say nothing meaningful and relevant to a particular moral problem of great import. On the other hand, if the Christian Churches become too specific, too doctrinaire or authoritative on a particular approach to a moral question, they risk separating a member from the Christian community because of reasons that are not peculiarly Christian.⁸

It would seem then that the Christian Churches must speak out on particular moral problems facing society, but with the realization that a detailed approach is but one Christian approach to the question, and this appears to be the solution most in keeping with the contemporary understanding of the Christian message. The Christian Churches thus have a two-fold mission: to preach the basic moral message of change of heart and also to advocate those changes of structure in society which enable men to live a more human life in this world. In tension-filled times there is a danger that the Christian Church might forget one of the two functions that it should serve today. The central moral message of conversion embraces not only the need to change men's hearts, but also the need to change the structures of society.

Moral Theology and the Scriptures

Social ethics also raises for moral theology the methodological question of the role and function of the Scriptures. In general, Catholic theology has been criticized justly for not sufficiently emphasizing the Scriptural aspect in its moral theology. The Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World tries to give a specifically Christian approach to the various questions treated and constantly emphasizes cosmic redemption as well as creation. William Lazareth is grateful for such an attempt, but still faults the Pastoral Constitution for not always employing such an approach.⁹ However, the question is far from solved by merely saying that Catholic moral theology must be more biblically oriented.

One of the major theological problems today is the question of biblical hermeneutics.¹⁰ How does the Word of God in the Scriptures become meaningful and directive for contemporary man living in such diverse historical and cultural circumstances? In addition to the general hermeneutical problem, there is a specific hermeneutical problem in moral theology. How does the Christian ethicist look at the moral teaching of the Scriptures? In general, I believe that the ethical theory employed by the ethicist definitely colors his view of the moral teaching of the Scriptures.

Philosophical ethics has frequently been divided into the two categories of teleological and deontological ethics. H. Richard Niebuhr has employed the two symbols of man the maker and man the citizen which coincide somewhat with the more technical philosophical distinctions.¹¹ The

image of man the maker stresses the goal or the end which man strives to achieve by his actions. Man the maker discovers what is the good and then acts to achieve it. Some philosophers reject such an image precisely because man does not really have this control or the ability to dispose of the ends and means as he sees fit. Thus the political image of man the citizen is more accurate in their estimation than the technical image of man the artisan. The primary question for man is: To what laws should I assent and against which laws should I rebel? The image of man the maker emphasizes the good and what man must do to obtain it. The image of man the citizen emphasizes obedience, law, and duty, for the good is subordinate to the right.

Both models of ethical methodology have been used by Christian ethicists in their approach to the Scriptures. The model of man the maker tends to see in the Scriptures the plan of God for man and the world, and how man is to act in achieving his goal and destiny. The Sermon on the Mount, for example, becomes the plan that points out the good for the Christian who strives to incorporate the ethical directives of the Sermon into his daily life. The Social Gospel School employed such an approach; the same general theme is present in the Biblical ethic proposed by Reinhold Niebuhr.

The model of man the citizen adopts a more prescriptive form of ethics with emphasis on duty, right, and obligation. Existentialist ethics with an emphasis on decision furnishes a good example of an act-deontological theory.¹² The ethics of Rudolf Bultmann well illustrate the model of man the citizen or the deontological approach. Bultmann sees the Scriptures as calling the Christian to make a decision in radical obedience to God.¹³ Some of the neo-Orthodox approaches to ethics with their stress on the transcendence of God also emphasize man's obligation to obey the Divine imperative.¹⁴ However, the approach of some neo-Orthodox theologians also shows the presence of a different ethical model.

H. Richard Niebuhr argues for a third ethical model with emphasis on responsibility. Man the responder, man in dialogue with other men, with his environment, and with his world, corresponds to a more modern view of man as constantly in interaction with others and the world.¹⁵ This position has had a great impact upon Christian ethics in the United States.¹⁶ Niebuhr adopted the image of man the responder for philosophical reasons, but there are other reasons for adopting such an approach in interpreting the ethical teaching of the Scriptures.

The neo-Orthodox approach to the Scriptures contains important elements that favor the ethical image of man the responder. Karl Barth reacted against religion as a creation of man's own needs and desires. Christianity begins not from man's thoughts about God but rather from the revelation of God in the Scriptures. The Scriptures do not reveal a morality, but rather speak about the activity of God in Christ. The Scriptures are not a source book of moral propositions and rules, but the revelation of the activity of the living God. Thus the moral life of man is his response to the person of Jesus, and to the activity of the living God.¹⁷

Perhaps Paul Lehmann best illustrates the approach to the Scriptures in terms of the ethical model of man the responder. Lehmann begins his work by realizing the problem created by the hermeneutical question; he cannot accept a concept of the good as the starting point of Christian ethical reflection. "To put it somewhat too sharply: Christian ethics is not concerned with the good, but with what I as a believer in Jesus Christ and as a member of his Church, am to do. Christian ethics, in other words, is oriented toward revelation and not toward morality."¹⁸ The author of *Ethics in a Christian Context* also rejects the will of God as the starting point of Christian ethics. "In short, what God requires is meaningless apart from the dynamics of the divine activity, and the dynamics of the divine activity define the context within which 'all this commandment' is to 'be righteousness for us', indeed, is to be carefully done."¹⁹ The Scriptures tell us what God is doing

in the world to make and keep human life more human. The primary question is not: "What does God command?" but, "What does God do?" Again, Christian ethics is concerned with revelation rather than morality; it considers the indicative and not the imperative. In a Christological ethics of messianism it is in the *koinonia*, the fellowship of the Church, that the individual learns what God is doing to make and keep human life more human. Thus, Lehmann never develops a Biblical ethic as such.

How should moral theology approach the Scriptures? The model of man the responder does seem to be a more congenial approach. The complexity of social ethics argues against the seemingly more simplistic approach to man the maker or man the citizen. Since the cultural and historical circumstances of the Scriptures differ so much from the contemporary situation, it is difficult to see in the light of the Scriptures the good which man should strive for in contemporary social ethics, and how he can best achieve his goals today. The same complexity argues against the use of the model of man the citizen. In addition, a deontological approach tends to play down the creativity and initiative of man which is so characteristic of our ageric society.

There is a danger, however, in insisting upon the model of man the responder to the exclusion of many valuable insights contained in the other models. It seems to me that Paul Lehmann is guilty of such an exclusive emphasis. Man the responder tries to do what is fitting, but such an approach must also see the good and the right in terms of the fitting. Christian ethics is concerned with the imperative as well as the indicative, with morality as well as maturity. Perhaps in the past Christian ethicists did speak too easily and quickly about the good or the right as it was found in the Scriptures, but, on the other hand, ethical discourse cannot continue speaking always and only in the indicative. The Christian is under the imperative to continue in time and space the creating, redeeming, and reconciling activity of God in Christ. What is more, the Scriptures do point out the general characteristics that mark the response of man in all the evolving moments of history. The ethical thrusts of the Scriptural descriptions of the Christian life must be incorporated in any Christian ethic. The Christian ethicist seems justified in approaching the Scriptures in terms of the model of man the responder, provided he does not entirely neglect the elements present in the models of man the maker and man the citizen.

The Scriptures cannot be used as proof texts to show that a particular action is always to be done. The complexity of social ethics militates against such a simplistic approach. If the Scriptures and man's understanding of contemporary reality do sensitize him to what God is doing in the world and what response man should make, there still remains the question of how the contemporary Christian knows precisely what God is doing in the world today.

Lehmann emphasizes *koinonia* as the context in which the Christian comes to know what God is doing in the world. However, Lehmann does not seem to show adequately how the Christian determines what response is fitting in this situation. Perhaps his promised second volume treating of specific issues will shed light on this problem. Another possible approach might be to develop the traditional notion of the discernment of spirits. How does the Christian know what the Spirit is calling him to do in a given situation? Perhaps a fruitful ecumenical dialogue could be held on how the Christian discerns the call of the Spirit in moral judgments.

The model of responsibility and of man the responder also seems to emphasize properly the fact that Christian ethics is a religious ethic. Man acts in response to and through the loving kindness of God in Christ. In the other ethical models there is a danger of forgetting that Christian ethics is ultimately a religious ethic, rather than a mere pelagian effort at self improvement. However, the model of man the responder in interpreting the Biblical ethic will be insufficient if it does not also consider the good and the right. Within the horizon of man as responding to the

creative, redeeming, and recreating activity of God in Christ, the Christian tries to understand the good and the right, he tries to be more sensitized in his experience to the action of God in the world in the many complex ways in which such action takes place.

What are the criteria by which the Christian should judge his proper response in building the new heaven and the new earth? In establishing such criteria the ethicist needs the help of common ground morality and philosophical understandings of man and his world. This paper has already pointed out the impossibility of any love monism or of reducing the whole of the ethical question for the Christian to its distinctively Christian aspect. The Scriptures retain a primary place for the Christian ethicist, but the Scriptures without other human wisdom remain inadequate for construing an adequate methodological approach to Christian ethics or moral theology.

Induction, Relativity and Natural Law

Social ethics also forces the Catholic theologian to re-think the natural law approach of the manuals of theology. The natural law approach rightly emphasizes the goodness of all God's creation, and the existence of moral wisdom apart from the explicit revelation of the Scriptures, but its unreal distinction between nature and supernature cannot be maintained today.

Perhaps the most important point to recall is the fact that there has never been a coherent philosophical theory with an agreed-upon body of content called the natural law which was accepted by the majority of philosophers. It is a gross oversimplification to refer to the natural law as a coherent philosophical system acknowledged by most thinkers, for although many philosophers have employed the term natural law, they do not mean the same thing by the term. There exists a common ground morality which is shared by many men, but no one philosophical system upon whose ethical content most agreed. In general many could agree with the basic tenet of Thomistic natural law which identifies natural law with right reason. However, many would disagree with the philosophical development of that basic insight, and with the ethical conclusions reached by some proponents of Thomistic morality.²⁰

Christian social ethics does raise important methodological questions for the system of natural law as espoused in the manuals of Catholic theology. Perhaps the greatest criticism against natural law theory as proposed by Catholic theologians has centered on the absolute character of such a theory. Today there is a definite tendency to recognize a more relative character to what has been proposed in the name of natural law theory.

The first important aspect contributing to a realization of the more relative character of natural law is the emphasis on history rather than on nature. Nature tends to emphasize the static and unchanging. History emphasizes the dynamic, changing, and evolving. From a philosophical viewpoint, more attention is given to relationships and less to immutable essences. Catholic theology now realizes that many of its conclusions were historically and culturally conditioned realities, not abstract philosophical ideals valid for all times and in all circumstances. The changed approach to religious liberty and Church-State relations indicates this recognition of the historical and the changing. The older theory of Church and State was proposed as an abstract ideal which should be present in all circumstances. The separation of Church and State could be tolerated only in some circumstances. Today, however, Catholic theologians admit that the older teaching on Church and State was not an abstract and absolute philosophical ideal, but a very relative and historically conditioned conclusion. Once the concept of State changed with the modern constitutional governments, the older theory of Church and State was no longer true.²¹ Some Catholic apologetes argue that the prohibition of interest taking was tied to a concept of money

which was historically limited and later changed.²² The relativities of history must receive more attention than they do in the manuals of Catholic theology.

Another source of relativity not often considered by natural law theoreticians is the aspect of sin. The sinfulness of man might account for some things which otherwise would not be present. For example, some Catholics have tended to absolutize the notion of private property, but Thomas Aquinas maintained the necessity of private property primarily because of the existence of sin in the world. If there were no private property, then there would be constant unrest in society caused by people struggling to control the better things for themselves.²³ Although Protestant theology has frequently over-emphasized the corruption of sin, Catholic moral theology has generally forgotten human sinfulness. At times some accommodation has to be made because of sin. There is a two-fold danger in forgetting the aspect of sin. Either what was originally proposed as a necessary accommodation because of human sinfulness becomes an absolute in itself and stifles further growth or development as in the case of private property; or one fails to see the necessity for some accommodation here and now because of human sinfulness.

Elsewhere, I have developed the notion of compromise precisely because of the existence of sin in the human situation. This notion of compromise is most important in the area of social ethics.²⁴ Too often today there are no clear-cut alternatives between all good and all evil. Many times the Christian will be forced by circumstances to give his allegiance to movements and programs with which he does not entirely agree. Such compromise or accommodation is most important in our complex society. The Christian cannot afford the luxury of remaining aloof from the struggle precisely because he disagrees with some aspects of a particular program or movement. To be effective in many areas today, one must go along with approaches which seem somewhat deficient but with the hope of influencing and changing the movement or the program from within. To remain aloof and wait for a plan with which one perfectly agrees will only tend to keep the status quo. To change social structures, some accommodation and compromise is necessary. This is especially true in the area of racial inequality, poverty, peace, and inadequate cultural or societal structures.

A third source of relativity in any natural law theory is the Christian understanding of history. There is a connection between the reign of God in Christ and human history. Man is called upon to cooperate in the work of bringing about the new heaven and the new earth. There is some dispute among Christian theologians today about the part of man in bringing about the new heaven and the new earth, but the emphasis is increasingly on the side of man's active participation in building it. Any stage of historical growth is always relativized and transcended by the future destiny. Not only the philosophical emphasis on the importance of history, but the theological understanding of Jesus as the Lord of History, introduce a relativizing factor into natural law theory. The theological doctrines of redemption and resurrection destiny relativize whatever exists at the present moment. Some extreme forms of secular theology have fallen into the same error as the natural law theory of the theology manuals by failing to realize the relativities of the present moment in the light of the full Christian message.

The importance of history also calls for a more inductive methodological approach to ethical questions. *Gaudium et Spes*, the Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World, employs a more inductive methodology than any of the previous documents of the hierarchical magisterium on social ethics. The document usually begins its different sections with an analysis of the "signs of the times". Such an approach differs considerably from the textbook approach that generally began with a definition and then deduced conclusions from such an understanding. The

more inductive approach calls for a careful analysis of the historical situation before theology can begin to draw any conclusions.

This approach also illustrates the dialogical character of man's search for truth. Vatican II has issued a call for dialogue with many other groups in an attempt to arrive at a better understanding of truth. However, almost all previous statements of the hierarchical magisterium are deficient in this matter. If such statements do not follow the epistemological methodology proposed in some of the documents of Vatican II, then one can more easily question and even object to their conclusions. Too often in the past hierarchical documents have been guilty of most often citing their own predecessors. It would be naive to deny any value at all to past statements and teaching, but in evolving historical conditions a greater attention must be paid to the signs of the times. *Progressio Populorum* of Paul VI is the first time, to my knowledge, that a Papal encyclical makes specific references to experts writing in their respective fields of competency. Obviously even greater dialogue and exchange will be needed in the future. The theologian will have to be in greater contact with all the human and social sciences.

The more inductive methodology also results in a changed understanding of certitude. In a deductive approach the conclusion is just as certain as the premises, provided the logic is correct. An inductive approach tends to be more tentative and probing. The methodology of Christian ethics cannot be exclusively deductive; in the future, more emphasis must be given to the inductive. No ethical theory in general can ever again claim the great degree of certitude claimed by natural law theory in the past. The emphasis on an inductive approach is more in keeping with the historical and relational understanding of reality.

The complexity of social ethics and the rapidly changing sociological circumstances argue against the emphasis on order that characterizes natural law theory in the manuals of theology. Even the word law itself means above all an ordering. Such natural law theory betrays its Hellenistic roots. The Greek emphasis was on order, stability, and harmony. Today the emphasis is more on change, growth, and development. An emphasis on order frequently tends to perpetuate the status quo and argues against any type of change. The presumption always appears to be in favor of the present order, and there is a danger that such an ethical theory will tend to be reactionary. Order, stability, and harmony cannot become absolutes. In changing situations one may not be sure what precisely will follow, but one cannot wait for absolute certitude about what new order will be brought into existence.

In conclusion, Catholic theologians must acknowledge that there is no monolithic philosophical system called the natural law which is recognized by the majority of philosophers. The very term natural law tends to be misleading, and I would prefer dropping the term itself. Catholic theology can never be tied to any one philosophical understanding of man and his world. A vital Catholic theology will require a plurality of philosophical approaches in the future. This section has pointed out the most important criticisms against the concept of natural law found in the manuals of theology and some statements of the hierarchical magisterium which deal primarily with questions of social ethics. No mention has been made here of the criticisms of natural law thinking as applied in the area of more individual and personal morality, e.g., the identification of a moral action with its external, physical structure. Future approaches to social ethics will have to take cognizance of these criticisms.

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Notes

1. For a critique of such themes by a Protestant ethicist, see James Sellers, *Theological Ethics* (New York: Macmillan 1968).
2. Martin J. Heineken, "Law and Gospel," *Dictionary of Christian Ethics*, ed. John Macquarrie (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1967), pp. 193-195.
3. Roger Mehl, "The Basis of Christian Social Ethics," in *Christian Social Ethics in a Changing World*, ed. John C. Bennett (New York: Association Press, 1966), pp. 47-50.
4. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, II (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964), 194-195.
5. John C. Bennett, "Issues for the Ecumenical Dialogue," *Christian Social Ethics in a Changing World*, p. 337.
6. Paul Ramsey, *Deeds and Rules in Christian Ethics* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967), pp. 117-120. Ramsey maintains that natural law ethics or an ethics based on the orders of creation are the usual examples of mixed agapism although there may be other forms of mixed agapism in which some other type of revealed wisdom is joined with *agape*.
7. James M. Gustafson, "Context versus Principles: A Misplaced Debate in Christian Ethics," *Harvard Theological Review*, LVIII (1965), 171-202.
8. Paul Ramsey considers this problem confronting the Churches and their social teachings in: *Who Speaks for the Church?* (New York and Nashville: Abingdon, 1967).
9. John Reuman and William Lazareth, *Righteousness and Society: Ecumenical Dialog in a Revolutionary Age* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1967), p. 196.
10. For a fine summary of the debate in the present century on the hermeneutical problem, see Carl E. Braaten, *History and Hermeneutics, New Directions in Theology Today*, Vol. II (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1966).
11. H. Richard Niebuhr, *The Responsible Self* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 47-56.
12. William K. Frankena, *Ethics* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 21.
13. Thomas C. Oden, *Radical Obedience: The Ethics of Rudolf Bultmann* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1964).
14. Emil Brunner, *The Divine Imperative* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1947).
15. Niebuhr, *The Responsible Self*, pp. 55ff.
16. See *Faith and Ethics: The Theology of H. Richard Niebuhr*, ed. Paul Ramsey (New York: Harper and Row, 1957).
17. In the exposition of such an approach to the Scriptures, I am following closely the excellent study of James M. Gustafson, "Christian Ethics," in *Religion*, ed. Paul Ramsey (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 309-320. However, the criticisms mentioned in the following paragraphs are my own.
18. Paul L. Lehmann, *Ethics in a Christian Context* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 45.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
20. This paragraph summarizes conclusions reached in my article, "Absolute Norms in Moral Theology," in *Norm and Content in Christian Ethics*, ed. Paul Ramsey and Gene Outka (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1968), pp. 139-173.
21. John Courtney Murray, S.J., "The Declaration on Religious Freedom," *Concilium: Moral Theology*, V (1966), 3-10.

22. This argument is not entirely accurate according to the findings of an unpublished doctoral dissertation (Catholic University of America) on the origin and early development of the Christian teaching on usury by Robert Maloney, C.M. See also John T. Noonan, Jr., *The Scholastic Analysis of Usury* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957).

23. *Summa Theologiae*, IIa IIae, q. 66, a. 2.

24. "Dialogue with Joseph Fletcher," *Homiletic and Pastoral Review*, LXVII (1967), 827-829.

Chapter XVI
Christianity and Moral Values:
A Clarification of Their Status and Priority,
Hierarchy and Application
Bernard Häring, C.S.S.R.

In past ages, the individual was, in effect, restricted to one basic moral stance, that of the generally accepted ethical tradition. The practical moral life of an individual might indeed fall short of the generally accepted standard; but one never thought of questioning the principles themselves. The penalty would have been nothing less than social ostracism.

However, the emergence of the philosophical approach, with its systematic search for the ultimate foundations of values, has entailed an ever-increasing differentiation of various approaches to morality within one and the same cultural environment. This, in turn, has often occasioned a tension between individual moral standards. History also shows many instances of head-on encounter between divergent cultures and religions, each having its own ethics and moral code. Depending on the circumstances and the attitude of the outstanding thinkers of the day, this has led to a shattering of the traditional moral ideals, to a syncretistic merger of the divergent views or, on the contrary, to a deepening of moral awareness.

In this respect, our present-day situation is unique. For the first time in history, and thanks to the science of history and to modern mass media and transportation, the human race can compare and contrast the ethical systems of past ages and of the entire present-day world. This analytical encounter is not surely the privilege or the disconcerting duty of a small number of scholars; the spiritual antennae proclaiming the messages of the most divergent moral codes are to be found on almost every home, even in the remotest villages. The open and pluralistic society of our day faces every thinking man with the choice between moral codes and moral priorities which are partly contradictory and partly mutually enriching.

Unquestionably, we are threatened with a blurring of ethical issues or moral vision that could easily culminate in a complete loss of any ethical stance. But we are no less surely offered an altogether unique opportunity for enrichment and deepening of moral insight by the deliberate cultivation of dialogue between the various ethical systems. For those seriously participating in it, the ecumenical dialogue between the various individual Christian confessions has already proven itself to be an enrichment rather than a harbinger of indifferentism. So, too, the various outlooks of our day, with their divergent moral codes and ideals, ought surely to be able to enter into an exchange that will be fruitful for all. In any such exchange, what is of capital importance is a clear awareness on the part of all participants of their respective basic commitments and of the peculiar genius of their fundamental stance. It is this kind of awareness that is implied in speaking of a clarification of the status and hierarchy of moral values.

The Specific Difference of the Christian

The distinctive and differentiating feature of the Christian code of moral values is to be found neither in any particular commandment nor even in the priority accorded any particular values. The crucial feature is the angle of vision, the whole approach to moral questions. The exclusive author, inspiration and personification of this approach is Christ Himself.

Every great religious and moral code is animated in large measure by the genius of great leaders whose novel insights have revealed a code of moral priorities. The Christian approach, however, ranks Christ, not simply as a genius in the field of ethics, or as a mere pioneer of a new code of moral priorities, but as nothing less than the prototype of the good. In his own person he shows us man's true nature, origin, destiny, and disposition. It is true that Christ is the perfect image of the heavenly Father who alone is good; but in Christ we also discern the countenance of the "new Adam," the new man. In his person, preaching, and practice, he exposes all self-seeking by showing how a man finds his true self in self-forgetful service of his fellows. In Christ there is rendered palpable a new relationship to God, to one's fellowman, and to the whole of creation.

A juxtaposition of the Christian and the Buddhist approach will make this clearer. In Buddhism, the Christian discovers a number of familiar attitudes and value judgments. Closer inspection, however, reveals a difference that is both all-pervading and radical, because the ultimate fulcrum of the two positions, their notion of God and man, is entirely divergent (at least if one compares the Christian credo with that of classical Buddhism, rather than with that of the later development embodied in Bodhisattva). The Buddhism of the more ancient Hinayana persuasion cultivates asceticism and self-discipline, develops astonishing forms of meditation, and is even-tempered and gentle. But the radical significance of these virtues is far different from that of these same virtues in the case of the Christian. In addressing himself to similar or, in some instances, identical practices, the Christian is motivated by the desire for a purer love of God, fellowman, and all creation. He is motivated by the hope that detachment from secondary realities and struggle against disordered desire will lead to the discovery of God's true purpose for a human being like himself, and thereby to his own true self. Christian and Buddhist alike want to escape a restless and insatiable hunger for possession and enjoyment. But where, in the last analysis, for the Buddhist this means a flight from the hunger for existence itself, for the Christian it means a penetration to an unqualified Yes to life, that is, to life that is real and true.

Every code of moral priorities pivots on the question: What is man? But this question can be definitively answered only in terms of another question: What is the God of man? Christ, true man and true God, by telling His followers what they are in the sight of God, illumines the human significance of everything else.

Salvation History as Dynamic Fulcrum of the Christian

The Christian code of life cannot and must not be conceived as a ready-made system of rules and prescriptions. The light of Christ shows existence to be essentially an immensely dynamic and dramatic history which levies upon each and every individual two simultaneous demands: that he have the courage to dare and to accept responsibility; but likewise that he have the humility to hearken to the inner meaning of the enormous event. As the life of the individual is subject to the law of growth, of unceasing forward thrust and struggle, no sane judgment of moral responsibility can ever abstract from the level of development of the individual person or society in its evaluation of the particular moral act. At the same time, however, as the life of society and of the entire human race as a solidary whole is no whit less subject to that same law, society, too, belongs within the framework of universal history.

By his very nature, man is simultaneously a historically conditioned and a history-making being. If man attempts to exercise his freedom and autonomy in an a-historical fashion, he inevitably falls short of his own nature and misses the real point of his human freedom and responsibility. Further, it must be borne in mind that the historical evolution of individuals, of

peoples, and of mankind as a whole is not unilinear. Not everything is progress. There are temporary lapses from the accepted ideal, periods when moral insight is clouded, and succeeding periods of penance, purification, and enthusiastic forward thrust.

An attentive reading of the Scriptures cannot but reveal this historical dynamic. The Old Testament is the history of God's dealing with his people. Though a tumultuous one, the whole story is permeated with the patience and the sovereign power of a boundless love and manifests a limitless understanding of the heart of man.

The Church herself, as the pilgrim People of God, is subject to the law of historicity with its implied variations. What is distinctive is her clear knowledge of her origin and of her goal, together with an equally clear realization of the need to distinguish between the eternal and the mutable or transient in her life and activity.

Only a proper evaluation of the historical dimension of human existence can ensure a sound intuition of the fruitful, though often painful, tension between the relative status and the relative priority of values. For example, an a-historical approach would develop the law of priority exclusively in function of the law of status: In the event of a conflict of values, the higher value must be preferred in every case and the lower value sacrificed. The historically minded ethicist knows better. He realizes that certain higher values may not yet be entirely accessible to the individual and that the application or cultivation of radically lower values may take priority at this particular stage of evolution. Certainly, the historical approach also implies the demand for an unremitting thrust forward and upward toward an ever more perfect actualization of the ideal hierarchy of values, the ideal moral order. Hence, to the extent that he can recognize the ideal hierarchy here and now, man must always be disposed to prefer the higher values to the lower.

Neither health nor daily bread, for instance, are supreme values, though they may become such urgent necessities that the most idealistic man will attend to these basic needs before addressing himself to other higher aims and commitments. But a man who never matures beyond the level of the mere practical concern for health and sustenance is quite simply missing the vital thrust of the historical evolution of the human family.

Nor is the Christian's motivation ever restricted to the mere vital thrust of human evolution. His personal growth and transformation and his participation in the historical process which surrounds him have their ultimate and radical meaning imparted to them from salvation-history. The Christian is not merely faced by impersonal moral imperatives; he lives from the word of God that called him into existence. The Christian is a man personally called by Christ, the Incarnate Word, who provides universal history with its fulcrum, its ultimate meaning and its goal. The Christian sees his own life in the context of the great confrontation between the Prince of Peace and the "powers of darkness of this world", that is, between, on the one hand, the Incarnate love of God who wills to redeem and reconcile all things and, on the other hand, a self-seeking order of being, enslaved to death and judgment, which also embodies itself in historical powers.

Morality in the Light of an Ethic of Discipleship

One of the most incomprehensible misunderstandings is that prevailing both among some Christians and among those who call themselves enemies of Christianity, to the effect that Christianity is an ethic of mandatory, extrinsically imposed laws. In reality, Christianity is the religion of love, gratuitously received and spontaneously reciprocated. Consequently, as an ethic, it is one of personal responsibility in love; it is a value-ethic. Primarily, however, Christian life is not an ethic but a joyous faith, trust, hope, love, and fellowship. For this reason, the morality which

it implies must evince the same basic features. In his profound and penetrating insight into that which is distinctively Christian, St. Paul never tired of highlighting the essential feature of the Christian ethic as an ethic of love, and hence as a life dominated by a joyous faith in the Lord and by his redemptive and merciful love. Yet the ethic of gratuitous, merciful, and compassionate love is anything but non-committal. Who could possibly be so demanding as that infinite Lover Who reveals Himself in the gift of Himself?

In its innermost essence the Christian ethic can safely be called a personal value-ethic. The values in question are neither plucked out of the blue nor discovered by abstract philosophical speculation. Philosophy can reflect, after the fact, upon the nature of the practical moral process; but the fulcrum of that practical process for the Christian believer is Christ Himself. Christ not only manifests for the redeemed the love of God, but embodies the noblest ethical values, irradiating them all with the glow of his compassionate love.

Moral values are personal values. They are only realized and embodied in the disposition, action, and utterance of the human person. They are the real spiritual capital of the human person. Yet they are attained, not by an act aimed primarily at the enrichment of the self, but rather in the openness for the Thou that is the challenge of the love of God, in a response to the needs of one's neighbor, in joyful gratitude for all that God has created and that appears in one's fellowman, and in anguish at the need of one's neighbor and at all injustice. A moral value can only germinate, we may say with Max Scheler, "in the furrows of action". Thus a moral value becomes a possession of the individual person to the degree that he has opened himself to the rich significance of personal relations, to the language of persons, and to the derivative (or at least derivatively learned) language of things.

Herein lies likewise the secret of the power of attraction emanating from a moral giant. Christ is the great sign of God's openness in love to the race of man. His heart pierced on the cross and his arms flung wide are the prototype of the moral giant who enriches all who follow in his path by his outpouring of Himself in loving kindness, compassion, purity, and righteousness.

In the light of Christ it becomes painfully evident how poor is that person who relates everything else to himself and uses everything and everyone else as a means in his drive for self-enrichment. The more assiduously he casts his net, then the poorer and more meager is his catch. The more ostentatious his "good" deeds, always geared to his own advantage though apparently directed toward others, the more hopelessly vain is his attempt to pile up spiritual wealth.

One is stimulated to follow Christ by the sight of his personal worth as Love Incarnate. This love, which is truly directed to our own person, arouses in us a reciprocal love. This makes us perceptive of personal values and stimulates respect and care for others; it diffuses a warm light which makes all individual values glow. Love likewise guarantees that discipleship will not degenerate into slavish imitation, for in love every human person feels himself being taken seriously and discovers his own best potential.

In discipleship all values are inter-personal; everything is invested with the aura of a dialogue between persons. Christ's own admiration of the lilies of the field is prompted by his vision of them as a message from God, a symbol of his glory and paternal solicitude. The aesthetic value here is no mere sensible delight but rather the joy that derives from really seeing and seizing the beautiful. This joy is the more earnest and serene the more that beauty is integrated into the full symphony of the dialogue between persons.

Daily bread and clothing are, for the Christian, more than mere utilitarian values. Crass utilitarianism shatters the unity of the worlds of values and of persons. But when the useful is

recognized as a sign of an all-encompassing universal providential love, it arouses joyful gratitude and serves at the proper moment as a means and expression of love among men.

In this kind of inter-personal value-ethic, the lower values (if we are still to call them so) participate in the dignity and the transfigured splendor of the immediate personal relationships of love, righteousness, wisdom, temperance, and truth. If, on occasion, they are given preference over the higher values because of their special urgency, yet in the way in which they are cultivated there is evident an undeviating assent to the entire integral hierarchy of values.

Holistic Morality or Atomistic Ethical Chaos

An essential feature of the sciences dealing directly with man is that they always keep their eye on the organic whole, even as they rigorously specialize on the part. The reason for this is quite simple: the true wealth of a human life is manifest in the perfect harmony of part and whole. All life strives for holistic organic unity. The loss of the feel for that center or fulcrum guaranteeing such holistic unity is always a symptom of degeneration, of a faltering of the vital thrust.

The loss of equilibrium and of the feel for the fulcrum emerges in the realm of art as the slogan: Art for art's sake. Obviously art must not be demeaned to the status of a mere handmaid. It is more than an instrument for the mirroring of a nation's pride in itself, and more than the expression of the self-awareness of a cultural elite; nor can art be justly confined even to the assignment of stimulating religious feeling. In order to be genuinely true to itself, art must plunge into the mainstream of life; it must be sustained by that cosmic, all-encompassing thrust that is the hallmark of full-fledged living; and it must, in its themes and techniques, proclaim an unqualified affirmation of all values, their hierarchy, and their multiplicity.

Capitalistic liberalism embodied the loss of equilibrium in the realm of economics. Mankind is still suffering from an economic approach that has no clear picture of the whole man or even goes so far as to refuse consciously to put the economy at the service of the whole man. Certainly, the would-be humanitarian economist must have more than piety and good will. But the basic scheme of any sound economics must accord economic man a higher status than mere material values. It must take cognizance of the fact that even economic man has obligations as a social being, a member of a family and of various other societies, and ultimately as a member of the all-encompassing human family. Nor can economic and social man claim to be a good Christian if he is simply a decent Sunday Christian on the side as a one-day in seven holiday from his business concerns. As it is the same man who prays on Sunday and trades on Monday, his praying and his trading alike will be an adequate expression of his full humanity only if both praying and trading, each in its own way, stem from, and serve to strengthen, the whole man.

Now the holistic spirit can be embodied in quite divergent styles of life. The Benedictines with their motto: *Ora et labora*, aim quite deliberately at witnessing to the transcendent value-status of divine worship, and simultaneously to the organic unity between work and prayer. Quite different is the way of life of a businessman who makes a cool and meticulous calculation of present capabilities and aims at serving in each successive situation the best interests of investor, customer and, above all, employees and partners. He must be quite determined to forego a quick success if this can be achieved only at the expense of shareholder, customer, or plant personnel. If his honest and undeviating concern to serve all human values connected with his particular business is sustained by faith in God, the Father of all men, and if he is ready to preserve his ideal even at the cost of palpable sacrifices if necessary, in the spirit of Christ, the Redeemer of all, then he is just as much a witness to the holistic spirit as is the Benedictine monk. But the businessman

who looks only to profits, indifferent as to whether they are to the advantage or detriment of worker or customer, betrays a chaotic view of the world of values, even if he goes to Church every Sunday on the side and finances research with his excess profits.

It was an utterly chaotic world that spawned the political policy that subjected everything to a national thrust for power. Not only did that policy overlook the fact that every individual people can have a really honored place only as a member of the family of peoples. Often enough that policy even sacrificed the real temporal good of its own people.

Equally opposed to the holistic spirit is that moralism that has been prompted by an interest in the austere "purity" of the ethical imperative to misread the values of the beautiful, the primordial value of joy, the thrust of enthusiasm or to sacrifice these values to no purpose and even to the detriment of moral energies. So, too, those champions of religiosity are operating on the basis of a chaotic ethic who cultivate in unintegrated juxtaposition a vapid moral imperative and a religious sentimentality.

Nowhere is the holistic spirit more immediately indispensable than at the supreme level of religion itself. And this spirit is here equally foreign to a spineless secularist piety and to a haughty managing of the secular by religious imperatives. The holistic spirit hearkens to the voices of all things: it recognizes every individual value and the autonomy of the various realms precisely because it reverences in all things the Word of God, Creator of all, and cultivates everything in the service of the whole man, with all his manifold capacities and genuine potentials.

Divine Vocation in the Challenge of the Moment

Holism implies a hierarchy of values. In a mere agglomeration, each individual unit has a merely numerical status, its true destiny being frustrated by its lack of any proper integration. It is not enough to cultivate or accept a mere agglomeration of values. Each individual value can display its true beauty and deploy its compelling power only in an orchestrated symphony of values in which its own note can sound forth as a telling organic unit of a greater chord.

Yet such a radical (and radically accurate) view of the hierarchy of values is not adequate for a proper understanding of earthly life, precisely because our life is not sheerly static but always dynamic. The synthesis is to be found in the combination of an unswerving fix on the ideal hierarchy of values with an unflinching sensitivity to the shifting priority of individual values. Both attitudes emerge sharply in Scriptural ethics and religion. Christ's own words remind us of the hierarchy of values: "What doth it profit a man if he gain the whole world and lose his own soul?" (Lk. 9, 25). "Or what shall a man give in exchange for his soul?" (Mk. 8, 37). But the other element, sometimes well-nigh smothered in a legalistic misunderstanding of Christianity, is just as important: the call to constant vigilance, to a seizing of the hour of grace before it is past beyond recall,

to an attention to the signs of the times. Even the Old Testament preacher in his day insistently reminds us that each thing has its proper hour: "There is a time to tear down and a time to build . . . a time to embrace and a time to refrain from embracing. A time to keep silent and a time to speak." (Eccles. 3, 1-8). When his kinsmen urge him to the Temple pilgrimage enjoined by the Law, Christ tells them: "My hour is not yet come" (J. 7, 6-8). His whole life is a scrupulous attention to the hour appointed by the Father. Thus does he fulfill Isaias' prophecy concerning the

Servant of the Lord: "Morning by morning he wakens me, he wakens my ear to hear as those who are taught. The Lord has opened my ear" (Is. 50, 4f).

The ethic of the discipleship of Christ is neither a mindless copying of an external behavior, nor yet a slavish obedience to the dead letter of laws. It is rather a willing attention to the priority of the moment, a self-limitation to what is possible and feasible in any given situation. It is an ethic of vigilance, a sifting of the signs of the times, a discernment of spirits in the concrete challenge here and now.

This is true not only for individual morality. It holds in equal measure for community and society.

In this spirit Schema 13 of "The Church in the Modern World" of Vatican II enquires concerning the priority tasks of Christians in this exciting new world, in which many entirely new problems emerge and many more problems are posed in an unexpectedly new form.

In the face of the threat of modern atomic weapons, to a mankind split into ideological blocs, anyone repeating an eighteenth-century casuistic ethic on just war is simply not taking the present hour seriously, and thus has no chance of himself being taken seriously. Indeed, it would be bad for him and for the world if he were taken seriously. Today a more comprehensive and decisive contribution to world peace is demanded than ever before in the history of the world. Any Christian today who does not enlist in the service of peace with courageous willingness to make great sacrifices if necessary, and with dogged commitment to learning the art of reconciliation, simply loses his right to talk of salvation and peace in Christ. No one, for instance, should neglect the decisive importance for peace of the systematic, tenacious and confident consolidation of a peace-loving public opinion, calculated to promote mutual understanding. This public opinion must be fostered both by the proper use of the modern opinion-molding media and in man-to-man conversation.

For the first time in the history of the world, mankind disposes of all the technical means needed to solve the problem of world hunger. For the first time, the rich nations can form a graphic picture of the extent of the hunger, misery and impotence of whole classes and peoples, even as the hungry peoples, starving for food for body and mind alike, can for their part look right into the succulent sumptuous dishes of the rich. In such a context, the big powers are showing both a lack of appreciation of the hierarchy of values and a lack of sensitivity to the priority of values when they expend astronomical sums of money on their dangerous arms race without making any convincing exertions to arrive at a treaty-ensured disarmament; when they launch billions of dollars along the trajectory to Mars or to Venus; when they elaborate costly "culture programs" for lavish edifices while foisting in the first instance upon the peoples hungry for development and education nothing better than propaganda for birth control, sterilization and abortion; and when they compound these iniquities by pumping in no more development aid than can be sucked out again by manipulation of world market prices.

The human family has today drawn more closely together, at least to the extent that any thinking man can see and feel that the fate of all men is much more closely integrally interconnected than ever before in human history. At this moment of history, racism and discriminatory racial segregation is simultaneously a failure to recognize the hierarchy of values, specifically a failure to recognize the value of human dignity, and a blindness to the storm signals of the day.

It sounds fine when Christians today write sharp essays against the cruelties and slavery of past centuries. But the real question is whether the Christians of those days were at their posts when the challenge of the hour was to render the slave trade impossible and suppress it as quickly

as possible; and the still more important question will be whether they squarely face up here and now to all instances of a threat or injury to the dignity of the weaker portion of mankind and demonstrate a capacity for courageous words and convincing deeds, even at the cost of personal advantage. A genuine Christian value-ethic is anything but a cowardly flight from harsh reality into an idle contemplation of an ideal empyrean of values. A genuine awareness of the immutable hierarchy of values and a vigilant sensitivity to the challenge of the moment lead to an effective moral answer in terms of the value which at the moment holds top priority.

A hungry homeless man may make a present of a Bible to his neighbor who is as hungry as he, and may credibly interpret the Gospel to that neighbor. But if the rich well-fed neighbor does exactly the same thing, under the pretext that he wishes to give the more estimable gift in the hierarchy of values, he will not get through to the heart of his brother, whose spiritual distress he has recognized as little as his crying physical need. Only when he has shown compassion for his neighbor, and thus shared his own bread with him, may he and should he likewise interpret to that neighbor, as best he can, the word of eternal life. This is not to act as though man lives by bread alone. The appropriate response to the challenge of the moment, to the needs of one's neighbor, is an affirmation of the value holding top priority at the moment and therewith likewise a fundamental and apposite affirmation of the whole hierarchy of values.

Marital Problems: A Dynamic Hierarchy of Values

In the discussion of Schema 13 at Vatican II it was repeatedly stressed that the burning questions of marital ethics must be considered systematically in the light of the dynamic hierarchy of values. This was certainly not meant to be a magic key to provide ready-made solutions for all individual cases. But it was a courageous beginning at blazing a trail which can fruitfully be followed by men of good will deploying reason and intuition alike. If all marriages were contracted with a clear eye to the radical priority of the value of the human person and in a spirit of mutual respect, if the child were seen and loved as the infinitely precious person he is, then other values of lower priority would appear in their true light and acquire their proper compelling power.

No mother who adverts to the value of the human person as the image of God will imagine she has the right to sacrifice the life of the unborn child simply to protect herself against restrictions of her living standard. Even health hazards will yield unequivocally to the higher value of true motherhood and to the inviolable value and dignity of a child already brought into existence. However, the exalted value of marital love together with the value of justice will combine to persuade a responsible married person of the impermissibility of any surrender to blind instinct when a new maternity would endanger the future normal healthy growth of the family, the mental or physical health of the mother or the mandatory minimum outlay for the education of the children already born.

An ethic soundly based on the bulwarks of the hierarchy and priority of values demands a responsible choice of partner and responsible parenthood, which includes the willingness to make sacrifices in the interests of a proper education of one's children. And this implies an undeviating renunciation of less important values, unless these acquire such an urgency of priority as to threaten the very continued existence of the marriage as a love-union or other absolute marital values. First-rate living quarters, for instance, are not a supreme value in a marriage founded on genuine love. Yet the duty of looking urgently for better living quarters may acquire such a priority, in terms of family harmony and pedagogical considerations, as to override temporarily the noble desire for

more children. Here again it becomes evident that an appropriate positive response to the priority value is entirely consonant with a thoroughgoing affirmation of the hierarchy of values.

Progress

Human progress, in a drastically dynamic, forward-thrusting society, is today rendering especially urgent the problem of an operative synthesis between value-status and value-priority. It sometimes seems as if technological progress were the highest ideal, or at least the highest-priority value. Great nations are pouring millions and billions of dollars into the race for technological progress. Whose rockets will first reach a certain planet? The billions being spent on these breathtaking inventions and daring projects certainly do give evidence of more idealism than do the still greater sums squandered on alcohol and nicotine. But these two values or non-values, these two ways of spending money, are not the only entries in the competition. There is always a multitude of circumstances and intentions to be taken into account in any just judgment of a project of an individual nation or of mankind as a whole. A great number of claims and demands must be weighed against one another, always with an eye to the varying degrees of feasibility and urgency.

Thus, for instance, the dynamic economics of our technological age imperiously demands a constant striving for expansion, for ever greater technological progress, for continuing modernization of the economic institutions, for more and more new markets. But it cannot be denied that the danger does exist that this process may involve a neglect of the real possibilities of a much more comprehensive human progress in genuine culture, world-wide solidarity, international friendship and peaceful endeavor. Immense drives for progress in technology considered as the complex of means employed to provide objects necessary for human sustenance and comfort will entail a human catastrophe if they are not subordinated to and integrated with a sincere and unremitting drive for "anthropotechnology" considered as the integral development of man as a person.

Our age is dominated by the ideal of progress and to a certain extent by the ideal and the imperious necessity of international development aid. At this moment of world history, everything depends on mankind and especially the elite of the entire world acquiring a clear understanding of the real meaning and significance of integral, full-fledged human progress and the sort of development aid calculated to assure such progress. Obviously the problem of the status and priority of values is posed in ever new forms precisely in these areas.

Religious

In exactly the same way as a just judgment of what really constitutes progress, so too the many-layered problem of freedom of conscience (religious freedom) demands an overview of the whole man, and pre-eminently of his evolutionary dimension. An abstract value-system could certainly lead to the following "logical" conclusion: Since the supreme good for the human community is the full-fledged recognition of God Who is Perfect Truth, therefore Church and State must collaborate wherever possible in the interests of man, not only to demand unqualified submission to God's revelation and commandments but even, where necessary, to compel such submission. Unquestionably, holiness of life in full accord with the Will of Revealed Love is, for us, the supreme value. But holiness in free man can only consist in a free positive response to God's gift and call. Accordingly, reverence for faith and for man in his empirical reality demands the greatest possible freedom for the individual to make his own moral decisions in this area, to

pursue the unremitting quest for a fuller understanding of truth, and to live always in accord with the stage of understanding of truth to which he has attained.

Every aberration is an evil. The possible dishonest abuse of religious freedom from base motives is indeed one of the very greatest evils of the world. Nonetheless the common good and the dignity of each and every human individual demand that general atmosphere of freedom in which alone can flourish joyous faith, or at least a sincere quest for the truth. This does, of course, require that no one shall lay claim to religious freedom for himself and fail, at the same time, to respect the true freedom of others.

The demand for universal religious freedom presumes that man's conscience and his striving after veracity and truth are taken seriously. Such a demand for religious freedom would be senseless in the event of a denial of the value of truth as such, or of the unique dignity of a conscience oriented to truth and a hierarchy of values, a moral order.

Historically, many an unjust restriction of freedom of conscience can be explained by the fact that the men responsible were firmly convinced that malice alone could preclude a full awareness of truth and of the moral order. Freedom of conscience presumes both a belief in a mandatory truth and moral order and an awareness of the historical contingency and evolutionary character of the human individual and of human communities.

Here, once again, in the matter of freedom of conscience, varying historical circumstances inevitably entail variations in value-priorities. In the vicissitudes of human history, there may be ages or moments when the top priority will be the effective protection of those who are still naive or uneducated against the malicious seduction and exploitation of their ignorance by those who levy a dishonest claim to freedom of conscience to mask their own evil machinations. In such a situation, the measures required for this protection may be the lesser evil, even though they seem to obscure, for a brief historical moment, the principle of complete freedom-of-conscience. But if such measures were to be protracted any longer than absolutely necessary, or were they to be promulgated in such a way as to obscure the fact that they had been undertaken from honest motives of conscience, and in a spirit of profound respect for a well-formed conscience, then we would be faced not with a simple affirmation of a temporary value-priority but rather with a treason to the whole hierarchy of values, the entire moral order: Slavish obedience would be being exalted above the joyous obedience of faith and the sincere quest for truth.

Whoever believes sincerely and passionately in the true and the good, and serves the universal moral order to the best of his abilities, will reject all coercion of conscience, trusting in the radiant power of the good and of sincere convictions, without of course playing into the hands of evil by naivete or idle inaction.

Only a great love for humankind and for truth can unite an endorsement of the value holding temporary priority with a thorough affirmation of the hierarchy of values. For love alone is truly sensitive to moral values. "Love is patient and kind . . . It is not arrogant or rude. . . . It is not irritable or resentful" (I Cor. 13, 4f).

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Appendix

Contemplation as Fulfillment of the Human Person

Gerald F. Stanley

Introduction

In the second chapter of the first book of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* Thomas Aquinas wrote: "I have set myself the task of making known as far as my limited powers will allow, the truth that the Catholic faith professes, and of setting aside the errors that are opposed to it."¹ The *Summa Contra Gentiles*, which will serve as the chief source of this study, is quite simply a handbook of theology. This is not to say that it is concerned solely with what has been revealed by God. Rather, its contents cover the entire field of theology, both natural and revealed.² Its first three books are devoted to those truths which, while they may in part have been made known directly by God, are also able to be apprehended by the natural light of human reason, that is, philosophically. The final and fourth book of this *Summa* is concerned with an exposition of what can be called the precise content of divine Revelation.

Because the bulk of its contents are concerned with theological teachings which are likewise philosophically provable, the *Summa Contra Gentiles* is a fit source not only for theological study of the directly revealed, but also for work of a more philosophico-theological nature, and even for works totally philosophical in content. Indeed, in analyzing certain passages of the *Summa*, the philosopher or theologian, writing in his or her own field, could well be justified in completely prescind from the content of the other science.

Yet there are, a number of subjects, treated within this work, in which the theological and philosophical factors are so intertwined, that one finds it impossible to treat one field without becoming involved in the other. Such is the treatment of the question of happiness to be found in the third book of the *Summa*, from the twenty-fifth to the sixty-third chapters. This study of these chapters aims to establish philosophically that the activity of contemplation is a fulfillment of the nature of man.

The doctrine of faith, accepted by Thomas, that the total, historical, and natural fulfillment of man is to be found in the vision of the divine essence is so overpowering in this section that it prevents the author from stating explicitly that contemplation, as it was clearly understood by Aristotle before, is also an end or fulfillment of man. Further, it also prevents Aquinas from explicitly detailing the proper distinctions whereby, in an examination of the nature of man, both activities (contemplation and vision) can be seen as a total fulfillment each in its own proper sphere. However, this study maintains that both the above non-explicit opinions are implicit in the Thomistic treatment of happiness in these chapters.

Because the witness of Thomas Aquinas is to vision as the end of man,³ and because this witness, while dominant in the latter part of the chapters under discussion, permeates this entire section of the *Summa*, a philosophic presentation of contemplation as fulfillment must encounter some difficulties. Though the writer has chosen to guide the development of this study as closely as possible along the lines of the *Summa*, beginning with chapter twenty-five and progressing to chapter sixty-three, for the sake of clarity it has seemed useful to depart occasionally from the precise order of Thomas' thought omitting certain points pertaining formally to theology.

The outline here, following the progression of the *Summa*, is quite simple. In the first section, an attempt will be made to elaborate Thomas' philosophy of contemplation based upon a discussion

of happiness, natural ends, and the intellectual specification of that end. This will draw principally from chapters twenty-five through thirty-seven of the *Summa*. In the second section an historical and textual presentation will be made of Aquinas doctrine of vision as end of man, a doctrine clearly stated not only in this work but throughout his writings. The purpose of this presentation is not to offer a direct study of the theology of vision, but rather to point up the reasons given by Thomas for holding his position. This presentation will lead in the third and most important section to a comparison of vision and contemplation as natural fulfillments and then to the fundamental philosophical reasoning allowing one to posit two natural ends of man existing simultaneously. The source material for chapters two and three will be drawn chiefly from chapters thirty-eight to sixty-three of the *Summa*.

In the final and fourth section, an attempt will be made first to restate the teaching of Thomas Aquinas on contemplation as fulfillment of man, with emphasis not primarily on contemplation as an intellectual end, as in the first section, but as perfection of the total person. The discussion will integrate the views of other philosophers to establish and possibly elaborate upon the subject. In the closing pages the relation of contemplation to vision will be seen on a more dynamic level than Thomas Aquinas explicitly worked out or possibly penetrated at all. This will be done through a synthesis of two Thomistic teachings, the understanding of finality through activity as taken from Aristotle's doctrine of "entelecheia".⁴ The inspiration for this attempt is in the sixty-third chapter of the *Summa*, although its elaboration is derived from other sources. This is not explicitly theological, but involves a philosophic understanding natural activity which historically Thomas accepted as fact.

One final note is offered by way of introduction. The aim of this study, as stated in the title, is to prove that contemplation is fulfillment. But the real issue is hinted at and contained in another word in the title of describing contemplation as "a" fulfillment of the nature of man. Without the establishment of the possibility of two fulfillments for the nature of man, Thomas would need to understand contemplation as found in Aristotle to be a means to vision. Rejecting such a view, the study states that contemplation is truly a fulfillment or end in itself.⁵

Contemplation as Fulfillment: The Thomistic Teaching Stated

Natural End in All Beings

Contemplation as a fulfillment of man finds a radical foundation in Aquinas' teaching concerning natural end or, as he also referred to it, natural desire.⁶ The twenty-fifth chapter of the third book of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* begins his study of happiness with a consideration of natural desire.⁷ "All creatures, even those devoid of understanding, are ordered to God as to an ultimate end."⁸ Intrinsicly a part of every nature is a tendency or inclination, originating in the natural form and tending toward the end for which the possessor of that nature exists.⁹ It is in the study of the nature and finality of this inclination that Thomas establishes, through an argument of induction, man's contemplation of God as the fulfillment of his nature.

All creatures, rational or not, possess an inclination or desire within themselves which is directed by their very nature to a fulfillment of their being. It is vitally important that, although the characteristic qualities of this inclination must be founded upon the particular properties of the nature in which it resides, the inclination itself is in no way dependent upon those properties. The specific nature of this inclination as found in humans is dependent upon one's characteristic intellectuality. Nevertheless, it is not primarily because humankind is intellectual, but because one

is a being that one is directed by an inclination to an end. The inclination, or intrinsic tendency, spoken of by Thomas, is found in all intellectual and non-intellectual beings; of its very nature it precedes all knowledge and consequently all volition.¹⁰ While it will be granted later that for the rational creature, intellect must take a part in natural desire, it is necessary to establish here that intellect is not essential to the nature of natural inclination and that the desire said to be contained in this inclination is not to be rooted in the will of that rational creature in the same sense that elicited or ordered volitional acts are therein rooted. For these the principle always applies that nothing in them can be willed unless it is first of all known.¹¹ Natural intrinsic inclination in rational beings, on the contrary, is in no sense dependent upon the pre-cognition or prevolition for its activity.

For a full understanding of the notions at issue in Thomas' treatment of natural tendency in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, a number of principles drawn from that work should first be seen and grasped. The three statements to be presented here, taken together, provide an adequate first understanding of the context in which Thomas presents his doctrine and of the spirit with which he approaches this subject.¹² The principles are the following:

1. If one thing is to be the ultimate end of a being, it must be such that once it is attained, nothing more will be desired.¹³
2. That which fulfills a being must in some way be proper to that particular being.¹⁴
3. The ultimate end and fulfillment of a being consists in an operation.¹⁵

The dimensions of each of these three principles, found throughout the section of the *Summa* under discussion, are manifold and serve to deepen greatly the understanding of natural end and of contemplation as human end. This is particularly true of the third principle. The traditional understanding of human fulfillment, or happiness as it commonly is called, has been drawn from the classic definition by Boethius. Happiness according to Boethius is a state made perfect through the gathering together of all goods. In the almost forgotten understanding of Aristotle, natural fulfillment is not a state, but an activity, an inner dynamic movement toward an end. Because most discussions of fulfillment and happiness in Thomas have overlooked this dynamic, active element of the question, which Aquinas derived from Aristotle, heavy stress will be laid in this chapter upon this particular Aristotelian contribution to the question. In no sense is it to be thought that the Aristotelian understanding of intrinsic final causality is the only approach to a knowledge of human fulfillment. Certainly the more properly and originally Thomistic emphasis upon efficient causality, the action of the creator directing the creature to its created end, is equally to be prized as an approach to a comprehension of the subject. Yet in so far as the approach to the subject through Aristotle's understanding has been underplayed often in the past, and in so far as in the particular section of the *Summa* under discussion Thomas speaks more of finality than of efficiency, the more ancient understanding of human fulfillment, renewed by Thomas, will be given dominant place in this chapter.

Thomas' teaching on natural fulfillment in this section of the *Summa* is based largely upon his understanding of Aristotelian finality. More fundamental, indeed, is the teaching expounded by both Thomas and Aristotle and based upon a conception of physical locomotion as the analogical basis for an understanding of all motion, including that from potency to act and from cause to effect. The extremely vital and important relation which exists between Aristotle's understanding of motion and Thomas' conception of natural finality in both rational and non-rational beings is not, however, to be overplayed and thus misunderstood. The relationship to be explained here is

not to be taken as a statement that Thomas' doctrine of finality can be resolved into purely physical mechanism which can be applied all the way up the ladder of beings to separate substances with their finality. Rather the point is that Aristotle's, and subsequently Aquinas', understanding of natural finality finds its most illustrative example in the locomotion of physical bodies, just as the potency-act relationship finds its clearest explanation in an understanding of physical movement. Natural finality is an operation, a movement. Though it is not always a physical operation or a local movement, it will be understood with the greatest possible clarity if it is studied through its manifestations in physical operations and local movements.

In the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Thomas writes:

The nearer a thing comes to its end, the greater is the desire by which it tends to the end; thus we observe that the natural motion of bodies is increased toward the end. Now, the intellects of separate substances are nearer to the knowledge of God than our intellects are. So, they desire the knowledge of God more intensely than we do.¹⁶

The point made here is that Thomas is drawing an analogy in action between natural desire and movement to natural place in physical bodies, which somehow propels these bodies toward the place where by their nature they must be in order to find their fulfillment.

Motion and end, the object of motion, are essential to a correct understanding of nature in Thomas. Aristotle had spoken of nature not as an efficient cause, but rather as a "power of acting in a specific determinate way, an intelligible, teleological, or functional order of motion."¹⁷ Though Thomas speaks as well of efficient causality in the question of natural end, he has accepted in his understanding of nature this more intrinsically dynamic view as well. All finite nature is to be understood in the context of motion to an end, which ultimately offers fulfillment. As it is the nature of a stone in falling to move to the fulfillment of its fall, so it is the nature of the dog to bark and of the man to seek knowledge.¹⁸ One cannot fully understand nature and therefore natural end in any being, even in totally spiritual being, in the thought of Thomas, unless one understands finality in Aristotle's example of motion to natural place as well, and unless he sees the intimate connection between the two subjects.

To place the explanation of natural desire in the context of motion and finality is not to substitute chance for purposeful direction. Natural motion is determined in the very form of a being. Only extrinsic, accidental motion will lead a being to an end which is not consistent with the fulfillment of its nature. In this sense, properly understood, finality and final cause as regards natural desire can be explained also in the context of formal cause, provided one abstract from the finality of an extrinsic efficient causal force molding the form.¹⁹ It pertains to the intrinsic nature of every form to seek its own end. This search is not that of an intellectually specified will, but a tendency in the roots of the nature itself. In speaking of formal causality there is a distinct danger of confusing tendency with a specified act of willing, especially since Thomas uses the same Latin term of *desiderium* to denote both.

In this approach to reality, moreover, it is perfectly legitimate to speak of reciprocal causality between the end and the form. In so far as it is the form which of its nature tends to the end, the end determines the form (though not by chance). Finally, in the highest tradition of Aristotelianism, the activity of the form *is* itself the end.²⁰ Unless this understanding of natural end as an operation of a form directed towards, and yet in its operation somehow already participating, in the end is grasped, natural end cannot be understood in the Thomistic sense.

A further insight into the analogy between natural end and physical motion is to be found in this quotation:

Everything that is moved towards an end naturally desires to be stationed at, and at rest in, that end; consequently, a body does not move away from the place to which it is moved naturally, unless by virtue of a violent movement which runs counter to its appetite. Now, happiness is the ultimate end which man naturally desires.²¹

Once again, the tendency of man to happiness, a specific form, as will be seen later, of the tendency of all being to fulfillment, is understood through its analogical relationship with physical motion. The explanation of this comparison is the same offered above. The new note introduced in this passage is that of violence. Just as the downward inclination of a stone is compared with the movement of a being to its natural end, so also any thwarting of the achievement of that end must be made akin to physical violence. While for the sake of accuracy it cannot simply be said that violence differs from natural motion as external force differs from internal, it is extremely clear that Thomas views the attainment of fulfillment by a being in the order of motion as an activity or operation.²²

The above cited texts witness the connection between natural finality on the one hand, and physical motion to natural place, on the other. A third text from the *Summa Contra Gentiles* points to the foundation of this connection in the element they both possess in common. "The perfection of intelligible being is present when the intellect reaches its ultimate end, just as the perfection of natural being consists in the very establishment of things in actual being."²³ The attainment of fulfillment by a being is to be seen as the complete actualization of its natural potency. Again the Thomistic doctrine is based on an Aristotelian theory drawn fundamentally from Aristotle's writings in the *Physics*. After a discussion of the actualization of potential lightness in a light object, the Philosopher continues, "The process whereby what is of a certain quality changes to a condition of active existence is similar: thus the exercise of knowledge follows at once upon the possession of it unless something prevents it."²⁴ As is so common to Aristotle, a principle concerning the spiritual activity of a being is related to an experimental observation in the field of physics. Aristotelian physics is itself primarily founded on a study of motion²⁵ where the relationship between natural end and physical motion is evident. The effect of this point upon a knowledge of contemplation as fulfillment is great. Traditional philosophic thought has often assumed contemplation to be a state, not an operation, and forgotten the dynamic foundation upon which Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas constructed their teaching.²⁶

From the above, some notions concerning the nature of natural end or natural fulfillment can be derived. For our study of the nature of fulfillment on the intellectual level, this explanation of the basic nature of fulfillment is essential.

In attaining its natural end, every natural being, intellectual and nonintellectual, is said by Thomas to have a share or participation in God.²⁷ This participation is based upon the likeness which that being in its perfection bears to the perfection of the divine being. Further, on whatever

level or with whatever proximity to God that being in its fulfillment finds itself, if it truly has arrived at its natural end, it is at a definitive point beyond which it cannot proceed. Thomas is insistent in his opposition to a mathematically infinite progression of fulfillments.²⁸ The moment of fulfillment of every being must be in some sense a definite point to which that being has a definite tendency. In keeping with the above treatment of potency and act, this stage of fulfillment must be that of the most total possible actualization, one that completely satisfies the inner appetite of the being. Further, despite the clear emphasis placed on activity in Aquinas, fulfillment properly understood gives the being an unmoving stability in rest.²⁹ In brief, natural end is from the very outset of Thomas' treatment an encounter with and participation in God. Of its nature, it must imply a perfection which for each being will depend upon its proper nature,³⁰ and the characteristics of which will be discovered through an examination of its proper faculties. Thomas repeats again and again that the essential character of fulfillment to be found in any particular being must be drawn from a study of its distinctive proper faculties, from that which separates it from the rest of nature. The distinctive faculty which in the entire Thomistic-Aristotelian tradition sets off the human being from the rest of observable nature is intellect. Hence, it is in the intellect that the natural end and fulfillment of the human person is to be found. This is the next point to be treated here. Once established as the proper and distinctive human characteristic, a study of that intellectuality will reveal that in Thomas that faculty attains its perfection and fulfillment in the activity of contemplation.

Natural End in Intellectual Beings

As it is the intellect which is the proper and highest faculty of the human person, it will be in the intellect that human fulfillment of man will be found.³¹ In a sense, this is the entire burden of chapters twenty-six through thirty-six of the third book of the *Summa* which is here under discussion. This section of Thomas' work is concerned with an inductive elimination of all other possible objects of human fulfillment as either not proper to man, not concerned with his highest faculty, or not consonant with one or more of the principles of fulfillment cited above. The intellect is the noblest faculty, says Thomas early in his treatment, the only faculty which the human does not share with the rest of the animal kingdom. Thomas' analysis, strikingly enough, includes not only bodily and sense faculties, but the moral virtue of fortitude and the intellectual virtue of prudence as well.³² If the natural end of all beings is union with and participation in God, then surely the intellect must be the highest of all faculties, for while the unity achieved by all the other faculties consists solely in their similarity with God, the intellect attains an intentional union with His very substance.³³ Indeed, on the level of intentionality, the intellect becomes God according to its capacities.³⁴

This human faculty through which one comes by nature to know and thus further by nature to be fulfilled cannot be said in technical language to be directed by its intrinsic nature to any particular object of knowledge. While it is true to say that the intellectual fulfillment of man is to be found in contemplation of God, to say this without further explanation could imply that the natural being of man is directly determined to knowledge of a particular object. Rather it must be said that since the proper end of the intellect is to know,³⁵ the proper end of man must be knowledge of that which is the highest in the order of knowledge.³⁶ For knowledge is a spiritual activity which of its very nature entails the ability to understand every object capable of being known.³⁷ This is not to say that a particular being in possession of this spiritual faculty cannot be limited because of some extrinsic circumstance from grasping all reality. Indeed, the very dual

composition of the human being so limits one. But a consideration of the intellect in itself reveals that this faculty is directed by its nature to a knowledge of the highest possible object capable of being known, and, incidentally at this point in our study, to a knowledge of that which is known in the most perfect possible manner. Because the intellect stands as the proper faculty of man, this knowledge of the highest knowable is not only the fulfillment of the intellect, but also the fulfillment of the human person itself. By a process of induction, Thomas Aquinas establishes this highest knowledge possible to humankind to be the contemplation of God. In technical language, the end of the intellect is primarily to know. It is driven by nature to know more and more, to put off all possible ignorance and lack of knowledge,³⁸ so that it can come to a stage of such perfect knowledge that nothing will remain unknown to it.³⁹

Because this tendency is part of the nature of the human person, it is not necessary that the object of that tendency be known by a person.⁴⁰ By one's very nature and its natural weight, one is carried to fulfillment. Here also is found a reason for distinguishing the knowledge of the highest knowable as the fulfillment of the intellect from the more simply stated contemplation of God. The implication could be given in the latter formulation that one would have to know that contemplation of God was a possibility before one could tend towards it. This is far from the truth, yet historically it has been the source of much confusion of terms. What cannot be denied is that the intellect may discover its end (this is precisely what Thomas himself is doing in this context), but the desire for the end which comes from this discovery is of a different order than the natural tendency of man, notwithstanding the confusion caused in the Latin of Aquinas because of the word *desiderium*. If the object of human tendency had to be determined as an object of knowledge, few would tend to contemplation. This has been the witness of history. Augustine states in the *City of God* that the ancients held 288 different opinions concerning the end of man.⁴¹ Aristotle states that "even eminent persons" have held varying and contradictory views on the object of human fulfillment.⁴² Virtue, wisdom, pleasure, glory, riches, power, friends, and many other objects of fulfillment have been classic throughout philosophy.⁴³ The object of human happiness cannot therefore be determined by knowledge of it, but must be grounded deep in one's pre-cognitive and pre-volitional nature.

In speaking of this confusion, Thomas draws a distinction between natural appetite (the *desiderium* of this paper) and "animal" (as derived from *anima*) appetite, which the soul desires after it has been discovered.⁴⁴ Natural appetite follows the natural form and functions in intellectual beings, without specific knowledge; animal appetite, governed by the principle *nil volitum nisi praecognitum*, follows an apprehended form either through sense or intellect. One is an internal motion (in the analogical sense of motion), while the other is extrinsically determined. This again is not to say that an intellect cannot further strengthen its desire for fulfillment or specify it through knowing that its fulfillment is reached in contemplation. But with or without specific knowledge, it has no control over the basic fact that it has a natural tendency directed toward knowledge, and indeed toward the knowledge of the highest knowable.

In the *Summa Theologiae* Thomas summarizes this very important distinction with great clarity.

Every man desires happiness. For the general notion of happiness consists in the perfect good. . . . But since good is the object of the will, the perfect good of man is that which entirely satisfies his will. Consequently, to desire happiness is nothing else than to desire that one's will be satisfied. And this everyone desires. Secondly, we may speak of happiness according to its specific notion, as to that in which it

consists. And thus all do not know happiness; because they know not in what thing the general happiness is found. And consequently in this respect not all desire it ⁴⁵

Fulfillment in man is thus in the order of intellect; it is the tendency to know the best possible known, that is, God. As in the nature of all natural fulfillment, this knowledge must be for the human person perfect and ultimate, a total actualization satisfying the will and somehow giving rest. It must be the point of attainment beyond which there is no desire to proceed. As mentioned earlier, in many contexts this actualization is called by Thomas in many contexts happiness. It is not happiness because all men say that it is, or all men desire it by conscious appetite. History disproves this. It is happiness because it is the gravitational pole of human tendency, the knowledge of the highest knowable. We shall see that for Thomas such fulfillment is to be found in the activity of contemplation, as classically understood by Aristotle and as revived by Aquinas. This activity of contemplation will be described in Thomistic terms. The aim here will be not to shed light on all the facets of contemplation (an aim to be pursued later), but to point out those aspects of this intellectual activity which show it to be a true example of natural fulfillment.

Contemplation-Fulfillment of Intellectual Beings

Contemplation is therefore quite simply the natural fulfillment of the human person, the "highest act of man's highest faculty",⁴⁶ an operation which reaches its perfection when exercised upon the highest possible object, God himself. Far from establishing this position on an *a priori* basis, Thomas proceeds to it through eleven chapters of inductive reasoning, gradually eliminating all other possible ends as each, for one reason or another, is incapable of fulfilling the inner tendency of human nature. Aquinas concludes this section of his study with the following summary statement:

If the ultimate happiness of man does not consist in external things which are called the goods of fortune, nor in the goods of the body, nor in the goods of the soul according to its sensitive part, nor as regards the intellective part according to the activity of the moral virtues, nor according to the intellectual virtues that are concerned with action, that is, art and prudence--we are left with the conclusion that the ultimate happiness of man lies in the contemplation of truth.⁴⁷

The argument throughout this section is classically Aristotelian, the process of induction being almost an exact parallel of that used by Aristotle in the *Nicomachean Ethics*.⁴⁸

An analysis of the eleven chapters of the *Summa* referred to immediately above offers a selection of valuable insights. Unlike all other fulfillments or objects of happiness, contemplation is, first of all, sufficient unto itself, sought after for its own sake, and without reference to any other good beyond it: "contemplative acts are themselves ends".⁴⁹ Unlike pleasure and delight, which look to that which gives the delight for the explanation of their being, contemplation explains its own goodness.⁵⁰ Unlike power or the moral and intellectual virtues, contemplation is not ordered to something else for its fulfillment.⁵¹ Thomas' analysis of contemplation as sufficient to itself is completed with his statement that it above all else needs little external assistance for its

operation.⁵² All other operations of man are themselves ordered to something else and that something else is for all of them the knowledge of God.

For there is needed for the perfection of contemplation soundness of body, to which all the products of art that are necessary for life are directed. Also required are freedom from the disturbances of the passions--this is achieved through the moral virtues and prudence and freedom from external disorders, to which the whole program of government in civil life is directed. . . . All human functions may be seen to subserve the contemplation of truth.⁵³

Once again it must be stressed that this Thomistic contemplation, this use of man's highest faculty for understanding the highest object of knowledge, is not a state but an operation. In classical philosophy, from which Thomas drew his inspiration, Aristotle had referred to contemplation as *to theoresai*,⁵⁴ a verbal or action word, "to contemplate". Contemplation is not therefore in Thomas a stage at which one arrives and comes to a nonactive rest, but rather an activity in the doing of which one already is achieving his finality. To see contemplation in Thomas as a state could well be the most dangerous misunderstanding of his doctrine of happiness. Aristotle had said in his *Ethics* that in this process of contemplating man became involved in a divine activity. Thomas echoes that thought in calling the operation itself a participation in the likeness of God.⁵⁵ Through contemplation, the human person makes his or her most intimate approach to God--quite the opposite of those who seek fulfillment in the flesh and find themselves drawn progressively away from their true natural end.⁵⁶

Again in the spirit of Aristotle, contemplation is an enduring and unchanging activity, a constant operation which of its nature is endless and errorless, unable to be lost or taken away by the will of men.⁵⁷ In short, it offers man every element of fulfillment which his nature desires. It gives his seeking mind the perfect rest and stability of total achievement.⁵⁸ How Aquinas reconciles the notions of rest and activity is not contained in his treatment in the *Summa*; it has been the source of much valuable philosophical discussion.

As fulfillment of the entire human nature, which itself is involved in the paradox of seeking rest and yet finding its perfection in activity, contemplation must somehow involve both elements. It is an activity because the very essence of finite nature is to be involved in motion. But while totally involved in motion, simultaneously it must possess its perfect state with full stability. Aquinas discusses the nature of this rest of contemplation from two points of view. On the one hand, perfect rest consists in the contemplative knowledge of the highest cause of all the effects which the human mind observes.⁵⁹ This aspect of fulfillment, which derives from the relationship between efficient causality and ultimate end, is more distinctively Thomistic in origin, Aristotle having centered his discussion of fulfillment almost entirely in the order of final causality. On the other hand, more in the Aristotelian line of thought Thomas speaks of the restful fulfillment attained by the intellect in contemplation in terms of its analogical relationship with the motion of falling bodies and their attainment of their natural place.⁶⁰ Thomas once again calls upon the analogy of physical movement when he observes that motion in a straight line must end at a definite point and cannot proceed to infinity.⁶¹ Only unnatural violence can disturb this natural tendency, which incidentally increases in velocity the closer it approaches its final end until finally it attains its stability and rest. The happy person, Thomas states, is thus fixed in his happiness.⁶²

Thus the perfect fulfillment of man is to be found in the activity of contemplation. This is not simply an imperfect understanding of principles which contain potential knowledge of all, nor a scientific knowledge of "lower things". Rather, it is the understanding of the noblest objects of the intellect, truth and wisdom, and ultimately the "divine" participation which accrues to man in the contemplation of God himself.⁶³ Thus, by induction Thomas takes his place in the current of Plato,

Aristotle, and Plotinus, that it is in the intellect and its contemplation that ultimate human fulfillment is to be found.⁶⁴

Yet, true to his tradition, Thomas records the strange and mysterious fact, known also to Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus, that despite all the logic of this process of induction, something in reality and in the concrete person points to an area of fulfillment lying beyond contemplation. It is stated by Thomas that the human mind's contemplation of God is limited by the strength of its nature; in the words of Aristotle this is compared to the highest intelligible object "as the owl's eye is to the sunlight."⁶⁵

A Christian may think an easy solution to the mystery to be that man is now aware of the supernatural end destined for him and could not possibly be satisfied with a purely natural knowledge of God. But this answer is valueless for the discussion of this study, for the entire core of classical philosophy, Christian and non-Christian, is clouded with a strange dissatisfaction with its own analysis of fulfillment--a dissatisfaction which cannot be dispelled by a plea that man obviously is not God. In the nature of man, both as nature and as man, there is present a mysterious void. Aristotle hinted at this when he said that men were happy, but only as men,⁶⁶ a statement which in its poignancy seems to contain far more than a simple admission that there are happier beings elsewhere in the order of nature. Plotinus offers a brilliant description of man in contemplation, "radiant, filled with the intelligible light, or rather grown one with that light in its purity, without burden or any heaviness, transfigured to godhead . . . enkindled . . . being in essence God."⁶⁷ But somehow he is forced also to say that same man "will lapse again from the vision."⁶⁸

Further, the glorious description of contemplation given by Plato in the *Republic*, "And the soul is like the eye: when resting upon that on which truth and being shine, the soul perceives and understands and is radiant with intelligence,"⁶⁹ is also somehow tempered by the philosopher's rather different description of this activity of fulfillment in the *Phaedrus*, where he states that contemplation is the understanding of the "colorless, formless, intangible essence, visible only to mind, the pilot of the soul."⁷⁰ If this vision of the colorless be contemplation, one wonders how it could possibly fulfill the needs of man so keenly described by Plato in his classic picture of the inherent non-fulfillment of the human state in his account of the formation of the sexes found in the *Symposium*.⁷¹ Though not directly concerned with contemplation, this passage so emphasizes the internal frustrations of human nature that one is left with the conviction that no fulfillment on any level, short of the supernatural intervention of the gods themselves, could rectify this tragic human situation.

The intellectual optimism of the Greeks is unmistakable, but even in their optimism they cannot successfully hide the ever-present frustration of their real situation. There simply is no solution, and one is left to believe that if there were a solution it would have to be totally on the supernatural level. In the tradition of the classic philosophers, Thomas records this theme of frustration. Yet somehow he does not seem to share the classic view. And here it becomes clear that there is a great difference between Aquinas and his antecedents. To set up the difference in as clear a manner as possible, for it is founded on very complex grounds, it must be said that, in contrast to Aristotle, Thomas is totally optimistic concerning the natural fulfillment of man. He is optimistic because from the very outset of his treatment (and this point was heretofore prescinded from in this paper to allow for an unprejudiced discussion of contemplation as contemplation), his understanding of contemplation includes the eventual total realization of activity in the active seeing of the divine essence. This he knows from revelation to be the Beatific Vision.⁷² In the twenty-fifth chapter, in the introduction to his study of human fulfillment, he has written an amazing series of statements.

Now the ultimate end of man, and of every intellectual substance, is called felicity or happiness, because this is what every intellectual substance desires as an ultimate end, and for its own sake alone. Therefore, the ultimate happiness and felicity of every intellectual substance is to know God. And so it is said in Matthew (5:8): "Blessed are the clean of heart, for they shall see God;" and in John (17:3): "This is eternal life, that they may know Thee, the only true God." With this view, the judgment of Aristotle is also in agreement, in the last book of his *Ethics*, where he says that the ultimate felicity of man is "speculative, in accord with the contemplation of the best object of speculation."⁷³

If Thomas were without this Christian sense and held contemplation to be the fulfillment of man, though there were still some mysterious failing in that perfection, this study could end here: Thomas would have said what Aristotle said and no more. If Thomas, as a Christian, had held that, through the supernatural intervention of God, man was elevated to a supernatural end, and that vision totally superseded contemplation, again this study would be here at an end, for a treatment of vision so understood would be clearly theological. But the fact is that Thomas did what no other great classic or Christian philosopher has ever done. He stated that the vision of the divine essence was the natural end of man, the natural fulfillment of contemplation.

Again, if Thomas could be understood as saying that contemplation is the fulfillment of man in this life and vision the fulfillment in the next life, the study again could be concluded with the simple statement that whereas Aristotle did not know of the fact of an after-life Thomas simply considered vision to be contemplation as it would exist in this new state. But, though Thomas often uses the term "in this life" in his treatment, it becomes evident with the first serious analysis that this cannot be the distinction he is drawing between contemplation and vision.⁷⁴ He states that the contemplation which fulfills but does not fulfill in this life, fulfills but does not fulfill in the life to come. The only possible solution, and the one pointed to by this study, is that Thomas held that it was possible for the human intellect somehow simultaneously to have two objects of fulfillment, two natural ends.

Having established this possibility, and having separated these two ends according to their proper distinction (which is not the one given above), this study will proceed to the following conclusions: Thomas Aquinas, alone among the great Christian philosophers, holds that, even with the vision of the divine essence accepted as reality, contemplation is still a natural end and natural fulfillment of the human person. Further, contemplation as a natural end in itself has a definite role to play in leading to the attainment of one's other natural end, namely, the natural end of vision.

In conclusion, all things have a natural end. The natural end of substances endowed with intelligence must be found in some operation of the intellect. That operation must be the understanding of God, that is, the activity of contemplation directed upon its highest object. Contemplation is the fulfillment of intellectual creatures, and especially in this context the fulfillment of the human person. But in some sense, contemplation as understood by classic Greek philosophy, is seen to fail as fulfillment. The classic philosopher's answer to the failure was patience in frustration: there could be no answer to the problem. The Christian answer has historically been faith in the Beatific Vision, as superseding contemplation. Thomas Aquinas, writing in a Christian context but strongly attached to the classic tradition, holds a unique position, which will be described in the sections which follow.

Vision as Fulfillment: The Thomistic Teaching Challenged

The Influence of Christianity Upon The Philosophy of Human Finality: Augustine and Bonaventure

Thomas Aquinas has been called a Christian Aristotelian. Whatever particular objections may be raised against this title, there is in the phrase a great element of truth, which might be seen in a clearer light if the title were changed to Christian Classicist. The Thomistic teaching on contemplation as the fulfillment of man has been seen in the first chapter to be in the mainstream of the classic approach of philosophy to the subject of human finality. Along with Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus, Thomas Aquinas centered his analysis of human fulfillment upon the activity of the human intellect. Indeed, it can be further stated that Aquinas' entire study of contemplation is in large part inspired by the discussion of the same subject in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*.

Between Aristotle and Thomas, however, as is quite obvious, came Christianity, a teaching which extrinsically produced a radical change in the history of man and in the history of philosophy. Statements made by Paul of Tarsus, such as "Eye has not seen, nor ear heard, nor has it entered into the heart of man, what things God has prepared for those who love him,"⁷⁵ and "I shall know even as I have been known."⁷⁶ as well as by John the Evangelist, such as, "We shall see him (God) just as he is,"⁷⁷ had great effect upon philosophic thought in the Christian era. They caused philosophy to rethink its traditional understanding of the end and finality of man, to rethink, indeed, its entire conception of the nature of man and of nature in general. From the advent of Christ and the writings of the Scriptures, philosophy's understanding of nature is influenced unmistakably by an external force. Thus, to say that Thomas Aquinas is a Christian classicist is simply to point up the fact that he above all others philosophized in the tradition of the Greeks within the Christian context of his times. Thomas' classical views concerning contemplation already have been set forth. What must be explained now is the effect of his Christian faith upon the classical teaching as he formulated it.

The first point to be made is that for Thomas, the end of man simply and unquestionably is the vision of the divine essence.⁷⁸ For the sake of a clear understanding of the position of Aristotelian contemplation in Thomas Aquinas, no mention of vision as treated in the section of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* under discussion was made in the first chapter of this paper. The historical fact that Thomas held vision to be the final and total fulfillment of man is, however, unmistakable. In the very opening of his study of contemplation, Thomas makes clear that by contemplation he understands the notion of vision as well.⁷⁹ A great portion of Thomas' discussion of contemplation, from question thirty-eight to question fifty inclusively, is devoted to Aquinas' intricate and at times obscure transition from contemplation as understood by Aristotle to contemplation as embracing vision. Indeed, the concluding chapter of the entire treatment under discussion is a concise and literary exposition of vision as the fulfillment of all other possible fulfillments, even of the fulfillment that is Aristotelian contemplation.⁸⁰ There is no doubt that Thomas found in his analysis of man the answer that removed the problem of frustration faced by Aristotle and the classical age, and that he found that answer in vision as the fulfillment of human nature. In his concluding chapter Thomas says:

For there is in man, in so far as he is intellectual, one type of desire, concerned with the knowledge of truth; indeed, men seek to fulfill this desire by the effort of the contemplative life. And this will clearly be fulfilled in that vision, when, through the vision of the First Truth, all that the intellect naturally desires to know becomes known to it.⁸¹

Strongly influenced by classical philosophy, Thomas was also a man of his times, a Christian witness to twelve hundred years of faith. Nor was he the first to encase the object of his faith in the framework of philosophy. Others such as Augustine of Hippo and Bonaventure had preceded him in this task. Yet there is a difference in the approach of Thomas. Prior to Aquinas, the great Christian thinkers who had philosophized upon the content of their faith had been so overwhelmed by the marvels of the love of God they discovered therein, that they tended to throw aside the findings of pre-Christian learning as of little worth. Indeed, they no longer saw need for speculation into the purely natural order. They considered that order to have been superseded, or, further, never to have existed. In their view, the entire natural order had always been directed to the supernatural, though the revelation of this fact had not been made until the "fullness of time".

Thus it was that Christian thought, represented especially by Augustine, abandoned the abstract study of the nature of man, to involve itself in the historical study of his journey to union with God. The entire history of man, including his past, was reanalyzed in the light of the revelation. Man, nature, happiness, finality, indeed all philosophical concepts, were considered to have no meaning if they were not integrated into the fact of Christ and the Church.⁸² For Augustine, philosophy, all science and indeed all history became "progressive, meaningful, and intelligible only by the expectation of a final triumph, beyond historical time, of the City of God over the city of sinful men."⁸³ In Augustine, that city of sinful men was identified with pure nature; this was cast aside as of little value in relation to more lofty supernatural considerations.

Augustine's understanding of nature as therefore not a philosophical concept, but an historical one intimately bound up with supernatural grace for the fullness of its meaning, became the backbone of his establishment of vision as the fulfillment of man. This point is of great importance. As has so often been stated Augustine discarded a strict analysis of the nature of man to consider what he termed the supernatural end of supernatural man.⁸⁴

This approach to the question of finality, while it accepts the same end for man as Thomas accepted, places the entire argument on the level of grace. It is the originality of Thomas that he found the means to place the same argument on the level of nature. A modern scholar of Augustine has strikingly summarize the Augustinian view of nature.

To the best of our knowledge at least, a definition of what man's metaphysical essence could have implied as belonging by right to his nature is not to be found in Augustine. The point of view he takes is always, so to speak, historical and purely factual. God created man in a certain state of nature. If He had created him in another state, even a lower one, it would have been simply another state of nature, both states being in the long run but gratuitous gifts of God. We should not be surprised, then, to see St. Augustine attributing to grace all the gifts which constitute the original condition of man.⁸⁵

Put in another way, for Augustine there is no nature as Aristotle understood it. There never was. Historical nature is philosophical supernature; this supernature is the only state worth consideration.⁸⁶

If Aristotelian finality and locomotion in physics acted as a key in the understanding of natural end in Thomas, an understanding of "natural" end in Augustine finds as its point of departure the Augustinian doctrine of illumination. The presence of illumination in Augustinian psychology establishes the basis of the human supernatural orientation in the action of God deep within man's own nature. Yet it should not be thought that this doctrine was so naively supernatural as to involve an entire assimilation of human knowing into divine activity. Rather, illumination seems to be a metaphorical explanation of the necessary pre-dispositioning of the human mind by God the Creator, enabling it to understand, adhere to and indeed see the truth, the ideas of God.⁸⁷ Further,

and again in keeping with the entire outlook of Augustine, a supernatural aid from God is necessary not only for vision, the end of man, but for every step along the way. Once again, Augustine's commitment to the supernatural has obliterated the truly natural. With the necessity of illumination accepted, the arguments of Augustine for vision as the end of man are simply explained. In the first place, the transcendental truth in Augustine is equated with God.⁸⁸

God is actually in the soul as the truth that illumines the mind of every man. . . . Beatitude, however, consists in the possession of the truth, so that the soul is really tending towards God when it is tending towards the truth that beatifies.⁸⁹

The first argument is simple. Once again, as in Aristotle and Thomas, Augustine does not require man to know that precisely to which he tends, for the tendency to beatitude is too deeply ingrained in his nature to require such cognition and volition for its operation. Augustine might be considered traditionally Aristotelian were it not for the one fact that the truth tended towards does not find its roots solely in the nature of man. It is placed in every human person by divine illumination.

In a second argument, again strikingly like and unlike Thomas Aquinas' thought, Augustine argues that every person possesses in his or her nature an image of the creating Trinitarian God. Through self-consideration, not simply self-observation,⁹⁰ each person tends to His image and consequently tends to a likeness of God according to one's own capacity. In speaking of likeness and capacity, Augustine seems to prefigure the participation in, and acquisition of, God's likeness to be found in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*.⁹¹ But once again it must be remembered that in so far as this image of the Trinity is only to be found in nature as elevated by grace, and in so far as the consequence of this is that nature without such elevation is incapable of imaging God, the view of Augustine stands actually in opposition to the Thomistic approach. Thomas Aquinas, far more than Augustine, adopts a philosophically optimistic attitude towards the entire natural order.⁹²

Finally, in an argument that bears an even greater resemblance to the tradition of Aristotle, Augustine compares the tendency of each soul to the vision of God to the weight which pulls a physical body to its natural place. Expressing his understanding of human tendency in its relation to the motion of falling bodies, Augustine states, "My weight is my love; by it I am borne whithersoever I am borne."⁹³ In similar fashion, he compares this intrinsic desire to the hunger of the body for food.⁹⁴ Yet once again, though Augustine's understanding contains clear connotations of Aristotle's analogy between human desire and physical motion, one must not forget the radical difference which exists between the two philosophers' conception of the nature possessing this desire or hunger. The object of Augustine's study is at all times not pure human nature, but nature as determined to its end through the influence of an external supernatural force.

It is undoubtedly in Augustine that, prior to Thomas, the tradition of Christian philosophy in the question of natural fulfillment is most clearly expressed. It is in Augustine that the current of Christian thought assimilating the natural to the supernatural and leading therefore to the practical annihilation of nature, finds its source. Perhaps the second greatest influence in the study of the human person's natural end in Christian philosophy prior to Thomas is Bonaventure. Bonaventure's philosophy evidences strong Augustinian influences. His statement that the soul "naturally tends towards the one in whose image it has been made, in order that in Him it may be beatified," is fully consonant with Augustine's doctrine of illuminationism.⁹⁵ Yet Bonaventure also contributed personally to the history of the philosophy of human fulfillment. Unlike Augustine, he was acquainted with Aristotle. Like Thomas, therefore, he was faced with a necessary choice: whether to found his philosophy primarily upon Greek classicism or upon his Christian faith. Bonaventure chose faith, rejecting Aristotle's metaphysics for its very lack of faith.⁹⁶ Yet the influence of

Aristotle prevented him from ever achieving the totality and the simplicity of the faith-commitment of Augustine. While he accepted the supernaturalism of man's inner tendency to vision, he was faced on the other hand with his conviction of the necessity of some special force, totally separate from the nature of man, but necessary for his elevation to the vision of the divine essence. In order to save the truth on both sides of the question, Bonaventure produced what might be called a supernaturalization of the supernatural. He posited a special aid given by God which would bring the already supernatural tendency of nature to its perfect fulfillment. Unaided by this special gift, man's nature could not bring him to an intuition of God's essence, but to what Bonaventure called a "contuition" of God, a direct apprehension by thought of God, yet an apprehension which somehow always eluded man's total grasp.⁹⁷ Beyond this contuition, came the full intuition of God, the final stage of man's ascension to God, the ineffable joy lying "beyond the limit of what can be expressed in words."⁹⁸ This intuition according to Bonaventure could not be attained without God's special intervention.

The Thomistic Analysis of Vision as Fulfillment

Through the influence of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas came to the conclusion that the fulfillment of man was to be found in intellectual contemplation of God. Through the influence of his faith and the writings of Augustine and others, Thomas further held the belief that contemplation of God found its fulfillment in the vision of God's essence. But as with no other author, neither the forces of Aristotle nor those of Augustine could sway Aquinas to such a degree that he could be said to have taken a position in the school of either. The result was the Thomistic conclusion of two natural ends to be presented here. But before the discussion of a double end may begin, it is necessary to see what Thomas himself said concerning vision and to analyze the relationships between his discussion of vision and his exposition of contemplation.

As stated in the opening pages of this section, vision as fulfillment of human nature is evident in Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas' inductive study leading him to this position occupies a great part of his entire discussion of human fulfillment. Having established contemplation as the fulfillment of man in the thirty-seventh chapter of the third book of the *Summa*, Thomas then begins the complex work of detailing the precise nature of this contemplation in which amid the many acts of understanding fulfillment is totally realized. The work is one of great delicacy, being an attempt to balance the principles of Aristotle with the content of Christian faith. The difficulty of coordinating such divergent principles of knowledge renders Aquinas' thought often difficult and at times even obscure.

The reasoning first presented here, though not so situated by Thomas, contains little difficulty. Though vision is the object of faith, human fulfillment is not to be found in knowledge had through faith.⁹⁹ Indeed, the fulfillment or happiness which comes to one through knowledge by faith is to be found primarily, not in the intellect, but rather in the will. The act of faith is an act of the will, and though the contents of faith must be intellectually assented to as far as the truth of their existence is concerned, that assent is made to truth whose quiddity is essentially and necessarily absent from, and not yet grasped by, the intellect.¹⁰⁰ One cannot believe and know the same object in the same way at the same time. Thomas had said earlier in his treatment that one characteristic of intellectual fulfillment was union with the object known.¹⁰¹ In direct opposition, faith is founded not upon a principle of unity between knower and known, but upon a belief based on authority that what is now intellectually not grasped nor united to the intellect, at some future date will be totally possessed.¹⁰²

Nor on the level of direct intellectual knowledge is fulfillment to be found in an understanding or contemplation of God based solely upon the general and confused knowledge possessed by the majority of people. The knowledge here referred to is that understanding by which men, having grasped the presence of order in the universe, one comes to a rather nebulous intellectual conviction of the need for an orderer to explain what has been observed.¹⁰³ History has proved time and time again that those who achieved this stage of understanding often drifted hopelessly into error, attributing that principle of order either to celestial bodies, to the elements of the earth, or even to men themselves.¹⁰⁴ No knowledge which remains in such an underdeveloped state, which in relation to the heights of knowledge is in such a state of potency that it could almost be compared to prime matter, can justifiably be termed a fulfillment.¹⁰⁵ Further, this is but the beginning, the first step in human knowing, the very opposite of fulfillment or end.¹⁰⁶

Again, the fulfillment of human understanding of God is not to be had in findings through demonstration, no matter how noble that process of learning may be in itself.¹⁰⁷ The first argument employed by Thomas to eliminate this form of human knowledge is of a somewhat different order than any used previously. What is to be the fulfillment of a nature, the Thomistic analysis holds, must be attainable by at least the majority of species having that nature.

The things which pertain to a species extend to the end of that species, in most cases; in fact, things which are of a natural origin are so always, or in most cases, though they may fail in a few instances because of some corruption. . . . In fact, if there have been any men who have discovered the truth about divine things in such a way, by means of demonstration, that no falsity attaches to their judgment, it is clear that there have been few such.¹⁰⁸

The argument recalls one of the most widely-known opinions of Thomas: That few men have the physical disposition, the time amid temporal necessities, the energy, or the maturity to pursue questions in metaphysics, to arrive at the highest truths through the use of their reason in demonstration.¹⁰⁹ Further, knowledge acquired through demonstrative reasoning is never free from the shadows of error, deception, and ignorance.¹¹⁰ The person is ever driven to know more and more, to rid himself of all lack of understanding,¹¹¹ so much so, says Thomas, that even if perchance he should come to a knowledge of all truth through demonstration, he would still be driven to seek an understanding of that same truth according to a higher mode of intellection.¹¹²

This final part of the reasoning set forth to eliminate demonstration is singularly Thomistic, though its fundamental roots can be found in the writings of Aristotle. This is not to say that Aristotle specifically rejected the possibility of the immortality of the human soul, but to say that in fact he did not treat of the activity of the soul after death. In carrying the question of human fulfillment beyond death, though he used Aristotelian principles, Thomas was initiating a new consideration not formulated by the Philosopher. But, as will become clear later, even if Aristotle had chosen to consider human contemplation in the higher mode of existence possible to the separated soul, he would still have arrived at a point of frustration, in which man would once again have to be judged as possessing happiness solely as man.¹¹³

Having eliminated simple knowledge, faith, and demonstration as total fulfillments of the human being, Aquinas then for a rather lengthy part of his study suspends his direct movement into the area of vision. Though still in the context of the traditional Aristotelian analysis of human fulfillment, as found in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Thomas from the forty-first to the fiftieth question of his discussion makes a definite move away from the paths of investigation he had been following. In the forty-first question, he introduces a new perspective to his study, a perspective which is very much to the point of his discussion, but which may also in actual fact be a source of confusion in relation to the entire argument. From the twenty-fifth to the fortieth question, there

was but one subject under discussion, namely, the nature of the fulfillment of the human person. Thomas already accepted the answer to this question to be vision of the divine essence. Questions forty-one to fifty, with a brief interruption in question forty-eight, consider a somewhat different problem, one which in the context of Thomas' faith becomes a problem of almost purely theoretic value.¹¹⁴ In this section he attempts an exposition of the highest form of contemplation which would have been possible without vision. What this section offers therefore is a partial solution to the frustration faced by Aristotle in his analysis of human fulfillment. This solution is achieved through joining together Aristotle's understanding of happiness as found in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle's philosophy of separate substances, and Aquinas' belief in the after-life. The treatment is valuable for a fuller understanding of Thomistic contemplation.

The confusion produced by its position in the entire discussion is due to the fact that it follows upon the section devoted to the elimination of faith, simple knowledge, and demonstration. Hence, the conclusion often drawn has been that the knowledge presented by Thomas here is his understanding of man's ultimate fulfillment, offered in opposition to Aristotle's conception. The treatment is so lengthy and so centrally positioned that for many Thomas' brief statement at the end of it is lost or even misinterpreted. If one fails to take note of Thomas' concluding statement that even this lofty knowledge is infinitely inferior to vision, one can emerge from his or her study with the viewpoint that the radical difference between Aristotle's fulfillment and Thomas' interpretation of that same fulfillment is to be found in the immortality of the soul, rather than in the difference between the infinity of vision and the finite nature of contemplation, as Thomas actually holds.

For the sake of clarity in the discussion of this issue, it would be well here to include the entire first paragraph of the forty-first question of the section under discussion.

An intellectual substance has still another kind of knowledge of God. Indeed, it has been stated in *Book Two*¹¹⁵ that a separate substance, in knowing its own essence, knows both what is above and what is below itself, in a manner proper to its substance. This is especially necessary if what is above it is its cause, since the likeness of the cause must be found in the effects. And so, since God is the cause of all created intellectual substances, as is evident from the foregoing,¹¹⁶ then separate intellectual substances, in knowing their own essence, must know God Himself by way of a vision of some kind. For a thing whose likeness exists in the intellect is known through the intellect by way of vision, just as the likeness of a thing which is seen corporeally is present in the sense of the viewer. So, whatever intellect understands separate substance, by knowing what it is, sees God in a higher way than He is known by any of the previously created types of knowledge.¹¹⁷

The point made by Thomas in this entire section is as follows. Even though contemplation as understood by Aristotle offers a knowledge, indeed a perfecting knowledge of the highest knowable, it cannot give total fulfillment, for it is not the highest mode of knowledge within the natural capacities of an intellectual substance.¹¹⁸ There is another type of knowledge, proper to a separate substance, which leads through a reflective contemplation of the essence of that substance to an understanding of God so intimate it can be called a type of vision.¹¹⁹ Yet even this type of knowledge, this quasi-vision, is incapable of attaining to the direct vision of the divine essence. Therefore, neither in contemplation in this life nor in the knowledge of separate substances possible in the next is one's inner natural tendency totally fulfilled. In order that one be fulfilled, yet another higher mode of knowledge must somehow be possible.

The development of this section, now to be examined in greater detail, proceeds in the following manner. Some have claimed that since one can understand separate substances in this life,¹²⁰ there is a fulfillment possible to him in his present state more lofty than that provided by

contemplation as described by Aristotle.¹²¹ But since all human knowledge in this life is derived through phantasms, one is totally unable to understand, i. e., to have a quidditative knowledge, of separate substances in this present state.¹²² The reason for this conclusion is that even the most abstracted quiddity "includes matter and form within itself" and no separate substance can possess this particular form of dual composition.¹²³ Further, the human intellect cannot even know separate substances through their effects, through, for instance, the movement of the spheres, because in this case the agent is not of the same species as its effect and the "powers of separate substances exceed all the sensible effects which we may grasp intellectually, as a universal power surpasses a particular effect."¹²⁴

Finally, since all intelligible objects known by man are based upon some speculative science, and the essence of separated substances is included under no science of this type, separate substances cannot be known by man.¹²⁵ In a concluding remark on the question of man's understanding of separate substances, which takes the argument back to its basic consideration, Thomas argues *a fortiori*:

If we are not able to understand other separate substances in this life, because of the natural affinity of our intellect for phantasms, still less are we able in this life to see the divine essence which transcends all separate substances.¹²⁶

Having established man's inability to understand separate substances, his own essence, or the divine essence in this life, Thomas asks whether man can understand separate substances after death and answers in the affirmative. Once the soul is separated from the body, the possible intellect is enabled by the agent intellect, acting as a likeness of the light present in separate substances, to understand that which is intelligible in itself, i. e. separate substances.¹²⁷ Thomas asks whether the now liberated soul can in its new condition understand the divine essence in the knowledge of vision. As noted above, he answers in the negative, and for many reasons. In the first place, as the divine nature is not of the same species as the separate substance, "not even the same in genus,"¹²⁸ therefore it cannot be understood by the soul in any state of its existence. With or without the phantasm, understanding by a composite finite being always demands a certain comprehension and definition (in its etymological sense) of the understood. But the infinite cannot be defined or comprehended, and therefore the divine essence can in no wise be understood through this type of knowledge.¹²⁹ In conclusion to this question and to the whole treatment of bodiless soul and separate substance, Thomas says that the highest knowledge either can attain of the divine essence is the knowledge that it is. This knowledge lies far beneath the loftiness of knowing what God is. Thus, no nature possessing simply the knowledge that God is can be at rest, in perfect fulfillment.¹³⁰ Thomistic intellectual fulfillment is thus not to be distinguished from Aristotelian fulfillment simply on the grounds of the place in which it is enjoyed.

Joining this entire argument in so far as it concerns this life to his observations concerning faith and demonstration and to the traditional Aristotelian principles of fulfillment, Thomas concludes that total fulfillment is in no way to be found in man's present earthly state. Aside from any analysis of the knowledge process as given above, contemplation of God in this life, as an action in the same state, is subject to all the deficiencies intimately connected with earthly existence. Hunger, thirst, heat, cold, fundamental lacks in virtue, the constant presence of ignorance, interruptions in activity, lack of time, danger of loss, mental and physical sickness, and death itself, all render contemplation as engaged in this life fraught with frustrations.¹³¹ Man finds himself involved in an operation which is far from perfect, beset on all sides with misfortunes. The

optimist, even the optimistic naturalist, may say that his is a fulfillment which find its perfection somehow in its participation in some greater and unattainable activity.

A great philosopher of natural fulfillment, Thomas was realistic in saying that man's constantly threatened activity of contemplation was for him fulfillment, but fulfillment solely in the context of the human situation.¹³² The human person is happy as human. Only the man of faith knows that far beyond the highest manifestation of this activity of contemplation, either in this life or in the next, stands the loftiest and most perfect of all activities, the greatest source of finality and happiness, the vision of the divine essence. Only thus can the man of faith who can see clearly that the activity of contemplation is indeed a fulfillment greatly to be desired in its own order of being, see that the vision of God as an active preparation for a higher stage of perfection is a higher fulfillment.

For Aquinas the vision of the divine essence was total fulfillment. This had to be man's fulfillment for through a process of induction he had eliminated every other possible intellectual activity, including even the quasi-vision of separate substances as enjoyed by the soul after death. Every type of knowledge, whether based on an intuition of the substance of the known itself or on a mediation by a species, was not able of itself to provide finality for man. All pointed to a greater fulfillment somewhere beyond. That great fulfillment was vision, the only activity of the intellect that could satisfy the tendency of man and thus discredit the irrational possibility that there could be in the very nature of man an appetite which was essentially incapable of being fulfilled. Within the Thomistic perspective of the universe, it is simply impossible that such an irrational situation could exist. Thomas states it as follows:

Since it is impossible for a natural desire to be incapable of fulfillment, and since it would be so, if it were not possible to reach an understanding of divine substance such as all minds naturally desire, we must say that it is possible for the substance of God to be seen intellectually, both by separate intellectual substances, and by our souls.¹³³

That possibility is actualized in the vision of the divine essence.¹³⁴

Thomas had established early in his treatment that the fulfillment of any being was to be found in its participation in the likeness of God.¹³⁵ It is in vision that man's participation is perfected, for in contemplating the divine essence in a face-to-face encounter, one finds himself totally involved in what is also the highest fulfillment and greatest happiness of God Himself, the contemplation of His Being.¹³⁶ In this the satisfaction of the human tendency is made complete.¹³⁷ That vision is a participation in divine activity is but one of the aspects of this highest mode of contemplation which demonstrates it to be the perfect example of what Thomas, and Aristotle before him, analyzed fulfillment to be. In its own mysterious way, like contemplation, it is both an activity and a source of rest.¹³⁸ Perhaps more than all other fulfillments, vision provides an explanation for this puzzling combination of characteristics. As a participation in the divine activity, it is participation in the eternity of God, an endless operation, never wearisome and never boring. Yet because it totally transcends time and change, it never seems to be an activity, but rather an eternal act: one always accomplished, yet never accomplished; one always fulfilling, yet always fulfilled.¹³⁹ To continue the paradox, it is endless, for it is an activity which can never be lost, never be discontinued by the will of the contemplator, never snatched away by the violence of men. Yet, though seemingly always deepening in its richness, it is always at an end, always such that if it

were, *per impossibile*, isolated at any point for examination, it would at that point be totally fulfilling, a source of total happiness.¹⁴⁰

Thomas offers a further lengthy commentary on the nature of vision,¹⁴¹ which does not appear to have a vital influence on the question of natural end. The simple point to be made is that in Thomas Aquinas vision of the divine essence is the natural fulfillment of the fundamental tendency of the human person. It is the fulfillment of one's every desire, the perfection of every other possible source of completion and happiness. Not only in the intellectual order is vision the highest fulfillment, it is so of all other orders of perfection. It is the total perfection of the moral life, for the good perceived in the divine essence is of such compelling worth that the will is rendered unable to follow the diverse paths of evil. It is the culmination of human honor, for it offers to man union with God who is higher than all earthly powers. No one stands in higher renown than one blessed with the vision of God, for he or she stands not only in the renown of men, but is so honored in the eyes of God as well. Vision is the plenitude of wealth, for in vision one possesses Him who possesses all else. It fulfills man's bodily desires for pleasure, for it bestows on him an eternity of delight, unmixed with sorrows, undisturbed by threat of loss. Long before Thomas, Boethius had established a definition of happiness which Thomas saw actualized in his analysis of the vision of God. Truly, the vision of God is "a state of life (one might guess that Thomas would have preferred an 'activity of living') made perfect by the accumulation of all goods."¹⁴²

Contemplation in the thirty-seventh chapter of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* was declared to be the fulfillment of the inner natural tendency of human nature. Yet in the sixty-third chapter of the same book under discussion, vision is said to perform the same role, indeed to be the fulfillment of all fulfillments. It has been purpose of this second section to delineate the argumentation whereby Thomas arrived at his understanding of vision. The next section will set forth the reasons, drawn from Aquinas himself, which justify positing such a two-fold natural end.

Both Contemplation and Vision as Human Fulfillments: The Thomistic Problem Resolved

Introductory Notes

It is clear from the first and second sections that Thomas Aquinas somehow maintains the existence of two different, if not separate, ends or fulfillments of the natural inclination of the human person. Having already eliminated the distinction between this life and the after-life as an adequate explanation of this double fulfillment, it would be logical here to initiate immediately a study of the proper distinction, as found in the writings of Thomas. But before this study can be directly undertaken, a number of preliminary steps must be taken. The first is an analysis of the position of the supernatural in Thomas' understanding of vision. The second is to list some texts in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* in which the problem of the double end seems to lead Aquinas into difficulties.

It must be recalled that the divine nature cannot be located among sensible species, nor can it be grasped by a separate substance or separated soul through an analysis of its own essence. Rather, the divine essence can be understood by the human intellect only if that essence itself acts as its own intelligible species, not informing the human intellect to be sure, but rather enabling it through a contemplation of that species to see what it otherwise could not.¹⁴³ This is to strengthen a finite area of vision by an infinite power, extending that vision into a new area of understanding.¹⁴⁴ Because this is the strengthening of one power or nature by another higher power or nature, it cannot be effected by the lower power. "A lower nature cannot acquire a higher nature

except through the action of the higher nature to which the property belongs."¹⁴⁵ Thomas strengthens this point by drawing an analogy from natural fulfillment on the lowest, physical, level of nature: water cannot become hot by itself, but needs a higher "specification" by fire.

Four brief reasons justify this position. In the first place, it is "the special prerogative of any agent to perform its operation through its own form."¹⁴⁶ As the divine operation is the contemplation of the divine essence, should any nondivine agent participate in this operation it must act through the divine form. Secondly, "the form proper to any being does not come to be in another being unless the first being is the agent of this event."¹⁴⁷ God must act upon the human intellect in order that the latter come to the vision of the divine essence. Thirdly, "if any two factors are to be mutually united, so that one of them is formal and the other material, their union must be completed through action coming from the side of the formal factor."¹⁴⁸ Since the divine intelligence is the agent of the intellectual information, it must be the source of the action. Finally, "whatever exceeds the limitation of a nature cannot accrue to it except through the action of another being."¹⁴⁹ Again, using the physical example that water is unable to flow upward, Thomas makes it clear that, though vision is the natural end of man, it cannot be achieved by the natural action of man.¹⁵⁰ It is a natural end supernaturally achieved. While this factor of supernatural achievement is concerned solely with the way to the end, with the method of the attainment of fulfillment, and therefore cannot stand as a proper distinction between vision and contemplation, it does give an initial direction toward the final solution.

A second pointer to a solution to the problem of two natural ends existing simultaneously is the subtle shift of approach or point of view which occurs in the midst of Thomas' analysis of fulfillment. It has already been established that one cannot say that Thomas centers his discussion on Aristotelian contemplation from the twenty-fifth through the thirty-seventh chapters of his treatment, and then after the thirty-seventh chapter initiates a consideration of a totally new subject, that is, vision. It is clear from the opening paragraphs of his study that Thomas orientated his entire discussion to the conclusion of fulfillment in vision.¹⁵¹ Yet it seems odd that Thomas has no difficulty in accepting the entire Aristotelian corpus of principles when treating contemplation, but then immediately upon his first mention of vision as in opposition to other types of contemplation, begins a subtle, but unmistakable, reinterpretation of those principles. The change of emphasis cannot be attributed to the fact that vision is an object of revelation. In this context, where the entire discussion is encased in an Aristotelian framework, vision is being considered as a natural fulfillment of man. It would seem, therefore, that the principles of Aristotle should apply in their unaltered originality. Yet this is not the case.

In the beginning of his discussion, for instance, Thomas stated that the fulfillment of any being was to be found in the perfecting of that being and to the extent that it participated "somewhat" in God's likeness.¹⁵² In the spirit of Aristotle, Thomas saw perfection as limited by the ability of the particular being and did not promise any degree of absolute perfection for any being. As has been stated often, human beings were considered happy, but happy as humans. By a process of induction, human happiness was found to reside in contemplation of God. This was Aristotle's conclusion. It was necessarily a fallible one, not in so far as it stated that human fulfillment was to be found in the intellectual possession of the highest knowable, but rather in so far as Aristotle's personal interpretation of the particular and specific nature of that fulfillment was subject to error. The perfection of man is more technically stated not as knowledge by contemplation, but as knowledge of more and more, as the putting off of ignorance.¹⁵³

Yet it must be conceded that the arguments used by Thomas against simple knowledge and demonstration as fulfillments are not based upon an experience of a higher knowledge more

perfectly offering this fulfillment. Rather, he bases his new approach upon a direct analysis of simple knowledge and demonstration to show that in themselves, rather than by comparison with something else, they do not contain absolute perfection. But in the Aristotelian framework there had never been a necessity for absolute perfection. The very characteristics of these species of knowledge used as arguments for exclusion by Thomas are the ones considered by Aristotle as establishing human fulfillment precisely as human. The presence of error, potency, and imperfection in simple knowledge and demonstration render them non-fulfilling in the Thomistic understanding. According to Aristotle, who was also aware of these imperfections, these same forms of knowledge were declared to be the source of human fulfillment.¹⁵⁴

Briefly, therefore, whereas for Aristotle humans are happy as humans, for Thomas in their present state humans simply are not happy.¹⁵⁵ The requiring of ever-perfecting fulfillment in human happiness is quite obviously Aristotelian, but the demanding of perfect fulfillment for this happiness is a new addition to the argument. Some have interpreted Aquinas to hold that such a demand implies the rejection of contemplation, as Aristotle understood it, as able to fulfill human nature. Rather, this study will conclude that in some sense Aquinas must hold for more than one type of fulfillment on the natural level.

The Thomistic Teaching on the Duality of the Natural End

The object of the remainder of this section will be to justify the position that Aquinas maintains the philosophic possibility of a double natural end. His analysis of the inner tendency of human nature reveals that it is simultaneously directed to two different, but strongly interconnected, "natural places." The principle behind this position of Thomas is not stated in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, where that principle finds its application. Rather, it is drawn elsewhere from the writings of Aquinas, from the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*. In the fourteenth question's second article entitled, "What is Faith", Thomas states:

Man, however, has a twofold final good, which first moves the will as a final end. The first of these is proportionate to human nature since natural powers are capable of attaining it. This is the happiness about which the philosophers speak, either as contemplative, which consists in the act of wisdom, or active, which consists first of all in the act of prudence, and in the acts of the other moral virtues as they depend on prudence. The other is the good which is out of all proportion with man's nature because his natural powers are not enough to attain to it either in thought or desire. It is promised to man only through the divine liberality. "The eye hath not seen. . . . This is life everlasting."¹⁵⁶

The point of this text is that the ultimate finality or fulfillment of man is in some sense twofold. Somehow, in Thomas Aquinas, there are two ultimate ends of man, two natural ends, as has been implied elsewhere in the *Summa Contra Gentiles* itself. It should be noted in the text of the *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate* that Thomas' consideration of the supernatural is limited to the question of the required means of attaining to vision, and does not pass judgment on the nature of the tendency of that end itself. To justify how two separate, if somewhat connected, activities can both serve as ultimate ends is a difficult task, made more difficult because Thomas stands alone in the main stream of Christian thought as maintaining such a solution to the question of natural human finality. As seen above, great thinkers before him tended to transform the activity

of contemplation into at best a preparation for vision, considered as the sole ultimate end of man. After Thomas, many who follow his thought have concluded to a single end for man.

The famous Thomistic commentators, Thomas de Vio Cajetan and Dominic Bañez, for example, rejected Thomas' position that vision was a natural fulfillment of man. Faced with Thomas' own words, Cajetan accused Aquinas of being mistaken on the subject. Surely vision could be an object of the natural desire of man, if by natural desire was meant "an elicited yet determined operation of the intellectual appetite following cognition," which Cajetan referred to as *actus secundus*. But if by desire one meant *actus primus*, the natural tendency, Cajetan considered the Thomistic position to be untenable.¹⁵⁷ Cajetan admitted the presence in the nature of man of an obediencial capacity for vision, but placed this passive capacity far below the active drive of a tendency. This interpretation is definitely at variance with the Thomistic understanding, for Aquinas knew of the concept of obediencial capacity, had used it elsewhere in his works, but chose in this context to speak rather of natural tendency.

In the same tradition as Cajetan, holding that there exists only the one natural fulfillment of man, contemplation, Dominic Banez added to the view of Cajetan a reason for Thomas' treatment of vision in the context of natural desire. Placing natural desire on the level Cajetan termed *actus secundus*, Banez held that Thomas was simply presenting an argument *ex convenientia* or *contra repugnantiam*, stating that there was no contradiction involved in natural intellectual being desiring through the natural powers of its will what had been supernaturally revealed.

On the opposite side of the argument other philosophers have continued the Augustinian tradition of vision as the sole fulfillment of human tendency. Not only does Duns Scotus consider vision as the only end of man, but he seems to take the entire argument out of the Aristotelian-Thomistic, and possibly even the technically Augustinian context. The radical basis for an understanding of Thomas' double finality, as will be explained in detail later, is the teaching of Aristotle and Thomas that the fundamental tendency of man as an intellectual being is not to know in contemplation or to know in vision, but simply to know more and more, the most general formulation possible. The reason for the generality of the statement is that while the natural tendency is in itself an intellectual process, the human person being an intellectual being and acting according to this mode, the particular end of this tendency cannot be dependent upon one's knowledge. As was stated above, the witness of all philosophy is that the majority have been mistaken as to the particular object of their fulfillment.

For Scotus, however, the natural tendency of man is not this general drive, but rather a particular appetite, particularized by his historical, redeemed situation, whereby man "necessarily and perpetually and in the highest way tends to beatitude, and this in particular." The distinction drawn here is absolutely essential for an understanding of the issue. Whereas in Thomas the desire is general and is fulfilled upon attainment of an end, in Scotus it is particularized in the very nature of the will. (Immediately it should be apparent that the distinction of fulfillments is therefore not to be found in the desire itself, but in the level of being, natural or supernatural, upon which the being attains its end.) Placing vision as the particularized object of human desire, Scotus is, therefore, forced to reject contemplation as fulfillment in any way. If the will desires vision, it cannot be satisfied in any way, on any level, by something else. This is further corroborated by the fact that the mention of levels of being implies Thomistic analogy, a teaching again rejected by Scotus, who himself considered the object of human intellect as not *ens analogice consideratum*, but *ens universale*.¹⁶³

How then does Scotus explain the fact that the human intellect in this life cannot attain the object of its desire? Unable to speak of levels of being, Scotus is forced into the position of saying

that it is either the will of God, a higher voluntarism, or a defect existing in the human state, caused possibly by sin, preventing the intellect from seeing the divine essence, and forcing man now to see God as dimly as one in this life sees by the light of a candle.¹⁶⁴ Thus, the fact that man does not presently possess the fullness of his desired happiness is explained either through a voluntaristic principle or through a moral fault. The entire position, on the one hand, offers a confusing picture of the natural order, even implying the possibility of injustice on the part of the orderer himself.¹⁶⁵ On the other hand, the position seems to dispense entirely with the supernatural aid demanded by Thomas to elevate nature to the capacity of direct vision of God.¹⁶⁶

The explanation of natural end by Henri de Lubac is somewhat in the same line. Again in the Augustinian tradition, de Lubac considers man as he exists in his present historical situation, that is, (though the word is admittedly theological), redeemed. Man is "not a thing of nature", de Lubac states;¹⁶⁷ there is no order of pure nature. Further, given the will of God, such an order is inconceivable. Rather, there has always existed and exists now only one order, which is "supernatural", better called "superadded".¹⁶⁸ De Lubac is not stating that the natural has an exigency for its complementing supernatural. His position is that given the totally gratuitous will of God creating things as they are, man is of necessity directed to finality in vision. Once again, there appear a dominance of voluntarism and a weakening of absolute necessity as understood by Thomas. It is in no sense a question of presupposing natural beings upon which is bestowed a supernatural and gratuitous finality; the entire order, neither natural nor supernatural in the common understanding of those terms, is gratuitous. "The divine generosity does not presuppose receivers; it prepares them", a commentator of de Lubac explains.¹⁶⁹

Again, as with Scotus, difficulties emerge. If within the very nature of being--that whole nature being a univocally gratuitous establishment--there is a fundamental and necessary tendency to vision, how can de Lubac justify what he chooses to call superaddition?¹⁷⁰ One must credit the logic of de Lubac's thought. He cannot be challenged to justify the natural, as in the case of Scotus, for he has eliminated the natural; similarly he has eliminated the supernatural. But the philosophic mind, it would seem, would require his further rejection of the superadded to perfect the unity of his system. So long as he leaves some room for distinction, he must justify the passage of being from one level to the other, the question faced by Thomas and answered by the need for aid from the higher level of activity.¹⁷¹

Thus it is not in the elimination of either vision or contemplation as natural fulfillments that the correct understanding of natural end as conceived by Thomas Aquinas is to be found. For while Thomas' faith convinced him that the final end and consummation of all human desire is to be found in vision, a proper understanding of the very tendency directed to this vision, together with a proper distinction of the notions of nature and supernature, reveals that for man there must be a two-fold natural end, a two-fold fulfillment. The basis of the argument, as stated above, is found in the correct understanding of the object of natural desire, which is not contemplation or vision, but rather the knowledge of more and more until full knowledge is attained. It is this knowledge of more and more which, for the rationability of the entire natural order, must be attainable by every intellectual being according to its mode of action. "It is impossible for natural desire to be unfulfilled, since `nature does nothing in vain'."¹⁷² This knowledge of more and more is not to be interpreted as a mathematically infinite progression. Seen in itself, it could be considered infinite.¹⁷³ But if there existed no term, no point to end the process, the natural order would still be shrouded in unintelligibility, for the end of human desire would be an ever-receding mirage, never to be attained. Rather, there must be a term of the progression, a definite highest point, the most

knowable object, to which the desire to know more and more is directed and at which it is fulfilled. This point is God.

It must be stressed again that God as the end of the process of knowledge is not intrinsic in the process seen solely as process. The process is directed to knowing, and God is the most knowable.¹⁷⁴ Toward this most sublime point the intellect steadily progresses, ever accelerating its polarized movement, the closer it approaches the source of its fulfillment.¹⁷⁵ Thomas never abandons the fundamental physical analogue upon which his philosophy of fulfillment is based. Man's natural desire is thus a tendency to knowledge, which knowledge must be of God. Once one attains this knowledge of God, to the highest degree possible on the level of being on which one is acting, one is fulfilled.¹⁷⁶

The fact that there are two fulfillments of intellectual desire can in no way be derived from the nature of that desire, as Scotus tended to do. The fact of two sources of fulfillment, two natural ends, is based entirely upon the philosophic possibility and the theological fact that there are two levels of being in which man can attain the knowledge of God. On the level of being proper to himself, man finds his natural fulfillment, the perfection of his desire to know all possible, in contemplation of God, the highest possible activity proper to his state. On another level of being, not proper to him, but to which he has been supernaturally raised, he also finds in vision his natural fulfillment, the perfection of this same desire to know all possible. On this level, the human person's natural fulfillment acquires the unique quality of exceeding the capacity of his human nature, and therefore of being attainable solely through supernatural assistance.¹⁷⁷ Thomas states, "Although man is naturally inclined towards his final end, he cannot naturally attain it except through grace. This is because of the eminence of that end."¹⁷⁸

Thus it must be concluded that vision is the natural end of man, the fulfillment of all human fulfillments. It is the attainment of human finality upon the highest level of being which is possible to man. But because the absolutely necessary assistance needed for the elevation of man to this high level of being is totally supernatural and therefore not necessary to the proper functioning of the nature of man, to save the rationality of nature as nature, it must be concluded that some form of natural fulfillment must be present on the level of being proper and natural to man. That natural fulfillment is what in the Aristotelian and Thomistic perspectives has been called contemplation. There is no room for the Scotistic view that the human inability to see the divine essence in this present state of being is due to moral fault. If Thomas himself does at times speak of human nature as defective in relation to the vision of God's essence, he should be understood as speaking of nature in comparison with supernature and not as referring to any factor within nature itself impeding the attainment of one's natural end through natural means.¹⁷⁹

As the attainment of natural end is in Thomas intellectual, he has grounded his distinction between the levels of being in that category. On its naturally attainable level of being, human knowledge of all things, and therefore human knowledge of God, falls far short of the vision of the divine essence. In this life, all human knowledge must be mediated by the sensible phantasm and must possess some element of the potency-act relationship in order to be matter for abstraction from the phantasm. Certain elements concerning God, primarily the fact of his existence, can be so understood by the human mind, but the understanding of these elements is infinitely removed from and inferior to the understanding proper to vision. In no way can the essence or quiddity of God be "specified", i. e., reduced to a sensible species in order to be abstracted.¹⁸⁰ In the next life, moreover, in which man's knowledge does attain to a quasi-vision of separate substances, the divine essence again cannot be grasped. In no way can the infinity of God be comprehended and defined by the soul after death.¹⁸¹ Thus, if the limited mind of a separate substance or vision of

God is to be considered by Thomas as the perfect fulfillment of man, of his natural desire to know, a new power of knowledge must be communicated to man, this power being the unmediated divine essence itself. But introduction into human knowledge of this new specification is not to be understood as a rejection of the mode of knowing proper to the nature of man and due to him from his nature. This leads to fulfillment, to a knowledge of God that is perfect and perfecting in its own order of being.

Considering the object of knowledge in the context of being, this distinction between contemplation and vision as fulfillments can be drawn more clearly in the light of the analogy of being. The object of human knowledge is being, but not the univocal being posited by Scotus. All being known by man must be known according to the mode of his own being, and that mode is one of composition, infinitely below the simple being of God, yet proportioned to it by way of analogy. "Knowledge always takes place according to the way in which the knowing subject exists", a commentator explains.¹⁸² Even though with the removal of what Thomas has called the defect of human nature man can come to the fulfillment of vision, still on his own level of understanding, in the mode of composition, he also can attain his fulfillment.

However small the amount of divine knowledge that the intellect may be able to grasp, that will be for the intellect, in regard to its ultimate end, much more than the perfect knowledge of lower objects of understanding. . . . The ultimate end of man is to understand God, in some fashion (*quoquo modo*).¹⁸³

This *quoquo modo* fashion of understanding God is the ultimate human fulfillment of contemplation.

Undoubtedly the most striking passages of Aquinas in the particular section here under consideration are the ones which seem to draw a definite distinction between contemplation and vision and attack directly the view that vision is the complement of contemplation, or that contemplation is a means to vision. These are found in the fifty-seventh question of the discussion. A rather lengthy quotation is deemed necessary.

Since the created intellect is exalted to the vision of the divine substance by a certain supernatural light . . . there is no created intellect so low in its nature that it cannot be elevated to this vision. The gap between the intellect, at its highest natural level,¹⁸⁴ and God is infinite in perfection and goodness. But the distance from the highest to the lowest intellect is finite, for there cannot be an infinite distance between one finite being and another. So, the distance which lies between the lowest created intellect and the highest one is like nothing in comparison to the gap which lies between the highest created intellect and God. . . . Therefore, it makes no difference what level of intellect it is that is elevated to the vision of God by the aforementioned light: it may be highest, the lowest, or one in the middle.¹⁸⁵

Just as it requires no greater power to perform a miracle in curing a grave disease than it would to cure a simple one (Thomas' example from the same chapter), the elevation of the intellect to the wonder of vision is in no way dependent upon the stage of contemplation it presently enjoys. It may seem as if the text quoted above is entirely theological. Even with this granted, the point of Thomas' thought is unmistakable. The fulfillment of contemplation is not the same in species as the fulfillment of vision, and while in practice they may have strong connections, they are technically two separate activities, two separate approaches to fulfillment, functioning on two separate levels of being. If vision is the perfection of man's nature, his highest fulfillment, contemplation is also in its own right a perfecting activity of human nature, a fulfillment in its own order of being.

In conclusion, there is no doubt, from textual analysis, that Thomas Aquinas considered the vision of the divine essence to be the final and ultimate end of man. Vision totally and infinitely transcends the feeble and frustrating attempt of contemplation to understand God. In holding this position, Aquinas is simply taking his place as a believer living in the Christian era, and as a theologian echoing the great Christian minds before him. But there is no doubt as well that in searching for a philosophic understanding of his faith, under the influence of Aristotle Thomas pursued pathways of thought radically different from many of his antecedents, contemporaries, and followers. Though it was as evident to him as it was to Augustine and Scotus that man's natural inclination was directed to the vision of God, it was equally as evident that the truths of faith could not contradict the truths of wisdom, and that one could not simply speak of an inner drive of nature to be fulfilled solely in the state of supernature.

It was in his analysis of this inner drive of nature that Thomas found a reconciliation, a solution which showed that the object of human inclination was neither contemplation nor vision, but, as Aristotle had carefully expressed it before him and as Thomas repeated, the activity of knowledge in general, the non-specified knowing of more and more, grasped according to the capacities and limitations of each knowing intellect. Thus it was that Aristotle, who knew only of natural knowledge through abstraction, could posit contemplation as the fulfillment of man, the highest mode of knowledge possible to a being whose understanding comes ultimately and always through sense experience. Thomas, who knew of the after-life, could perfect that contemplation to the quasi-vision of separate substances. But knowing through faith that the total fulfillment of man was to be had on a higher level of being, Thomas could posit vision as the end and total perfection of man. Finally, relying on his basic analysis of human inclination, Thomas could conceive a double ultimate end of man, based upon the existence of two levels of being, in both of which fulfillment was possible.

Contemplation and vision may thus both be said to be fulfillments of the natural desire of man for a knowledge of more and more, for a putting away of all ignorance. What has been said in the preceding two sections concerning the qualities of vision as fulfillment has been said with the sole purpose of elaborating a clear understanding of the role contemplation, the direct subject of this study, plays in perfecting human nature. With contemplation now justified as an end of man, albeit not the most perfect end in the Thomistic framework, an opening has been created for a further study of this activity, no longer simply as the fulfillment of a natural tendency, but in the next section as the final perfection on the natural level of the entire human nature, the total human person.

Contemplation as Fulfillment: The Thomistic Teaching Re-Stated and Amplified

With the fact of a double end of man in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas established, this final section will return to a discussion of its central theme, the nature of contemplation as human fulfillment. In the first section above, the position of contemplation as natural end of man was set forth solely through a consideration of the nature of natural finality as understood by Thomas and as rooted in the physical and metaphysical principles of Aristotle. In this final chapter, an attempt will be made to understand contemplation as natural end, not through this skeletal development, but through a discussion of this "divine" activity as the total fulfillment and actualization of the entire and integrated human person in his present state of existence.

Technically speaking, the most fully developed understanding of contemplation would have to be seen in a study of this activity as it is engaged in by separate substances and by souls after

death.¹⁸⁶ But as the purpose of this study is to discuss contemplation as it exists in the human person as a composite of soul and body, a treatment of this activity in separate substances would not be to the point. This discussion of contemplation in man in his present state of existence will be two-fold. It will consist in the first place of a discussion of contemplation as fulfillment in itself, and secondly, of a philosophical exposition of those characteristics of this activity which serve to make it, though totally separate from vision, the most perfect analogue and associate of vision within the capabilities of man unaided by supernatural assistance. Finally it must be pointed out that though the central theme of this chapter will be a continuation of the discussion of contemplation as natural fulfillment, as found in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. However, the material in this section will be extended to include a study of man as fulfilled a total person, rather than simply as a natural being. Hence, a somewhat more diversified use of sources will be employed. The central source for this chapter will continue to be the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. Its contributions to the discussion will be amplified, however, by material drawn from other writings of Thomas Aquinas, as well as from the works of other philosophers who have addressed themselves to this subject.

First Thomas' contention should be reiterated that on the natural level contemplation is a fulfillment of man, and as such, a source of his happiness, albeit an imperfect source. "Imperfect beatitude, such as can be had here, consists primarily and principally in contemplation."¹⁸⁷ The very possibility of a fulfillment of any type, intellectual or not, on the earthly level of human existence has been a source of great discussion throughout the history of philosophy, both by those philosophers who, because of a lack of Revelation, could offer nothing else as source of greater fulfillment, and by those thinkers in the Christian era, who were faced with the challenge of reconciling the findings of natural philosophy with the content of supernatural Revelation. In the writings of Thomas, there are passages in which he states quite clearly that in no sense can man be called happy in his present state. Yet it is equally true that Thomas speaks of an earthly happiness, which is a participation in the divine beatitude, the only fully perfect state of fulfillment.¹⁸⁸ The basis for this difference of opinion expressed by the same writer seems to lie, as do so many other differences, in the two seemingly conflicting understandings or rather emphases that are possible in the question of the analogy of being. In one sense, all being which is not perfect being or supreme being can be said to be no being at all. This is the negative understanding of reality. Yet, on the other hand, in so far as all participated being derives its being from perfect being and in some sense possesses that being, in that sense it can be said indeed to have being. So also is the question of happiness to be understood. In one sense, no man is happy.¹⁸⁹ In another sense, given his position in life, with its necessary imperfections, man is happy. Through his participation in the beatitude of God, he is perfectly happy in accord with his own limited situation, and this happiness is achieved through the activity of contemplation.¹⁹⁰

It is interesting to note that a passage within the very section of the *Summa* under discussion here and commonly understood to state that only in vision is fulfillment to be found, is capable of more positive interpretation in the light of the analogy of being. For the sake of clarity in this distinction, the Latin text must be quoted. In the sixty-third question of the third book of the *Summa*, Thomas states:

Est enim quoddam desiderium hominis, in quantum intellectualis est, de cognitione veritatis; quod quidem homines consequuntur per studium contemplativae vitae. Et hoc quidem *manifeste* in illa visione consummabitur, quando per visionem primae

veritatis omnia quae intellectus naturaliter scire desiderat ei innotescent. (italics added by the writer)

In translation this passage reads as follows:

For there is in man, in so far as he is intellectual, one type of desire, concerned with the knowledge of truth; indeed, men seek to fulfill this desire by the effort of the contemplative life. And this will *clearly* be fulfilled in that vision, when, through the vision of the First Truth, all that the intellect naturally desires to know becomes known to it.

The point of this statement is that man's intellectual fulfillment is to be found clearly in vision, there being no provision established for any other type of perfecting activity.

There is, however, a variant reading for this passage, in which the words of Aquinas are as follows: "Est enim ... contemplativae vitae. Et hoc quidem *maxime* in illa visione consummabitur ... ei innotescent." The translation of this version would state that it is in vision that man's intellectual desire is "most *perfectly*" or "most *especially*" fulfilled, but would make no explicit exclusion of contemplation.¹⁹¹ Without passing judgment on which reading is correct, it would seem that the second version is more in line with Thomas' views on the double end of man. Whether or not the second reading is the one to be accepted, the point remains that in the light of the doctrine of analogy, as contemplation can be understood as fulfillment in its own order of being, so all that is predicated of vision as fulfillment in its higher order of perfection by analogy can be predicated of the state of contemplation.¹⁹²

This approach to an understanding of contemplation is not pursued without justification. It is precisely the approach adopted by Thomas in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. His entire discussion of contemplation found in the first part of the section under discussion and drawn from Aristotle's treatment of the same subject in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, has been used by Thomas as material in his discussion of vision as well. If the basic principle of the third section of this study be accepted, that the difference between man's tendency to contemplation and his tendency to vision is not to be found in the tendency itself, but in the level of being on which it is in operation, then it must be justifiable to apply what has been said of vision on one level of being to contemplation on another. Naturally, any element of vision which is not directly connected with this activity's position as a fulfillment of human understanding cannot be so transferred to the order of contemplation. With this approach justified, a final review of the position of contemplation as natural fulfillment of man now will be offered.

Contemplation as Fulfillment of Natural Tendency

"The end of man is to arrive at the contemplation of truth."¹⁹³ This was the position of Aristotle and Plato and it is the position as well of Thomas Aquinas.¹⁹⁴ On the level of being which can be entered into by man's natural powers, it is in contemplation that the total actualization or perfection

possible to man is attained. An activity perfect in its imperfection, contemplation is the most perfect source of human happiness, human delight and human pleasure possible to man in his present state. More surely than all other sources of human fulfillment, contemplation brings to man the joy that is necessarily connected with all perfection.¹⁹⁵ Of all human activities, it is the most self-sufficient, the one least in need of external aids. Once attained, it is not possessed as a means for the attainment of anything else, but entered into as an end in itself. It fulfills all else, and looks to nothing else for its own fulfillment.¹⁹⁶ In what might be termed a utopian flight of fancy, Thomas Aquinas saw in contemplation the consummation of the entire life of the state. "The whole of political life seems to be ordered with a view to attaining the happiness of contemplation."¹⁹⁷ Aquinas himself more fully expressed this view when he said that contemplation was the goal of man's whole life.¹⁹⁸

Again in the tradition of Aristotle and Thomas, and in perhaps the most obvious application of the analogue between natural desire and natural place, contemplation gives to man the peace of rest in fulfillment, true leisure in a sense that will be explained in a subsection to follow. It "brings to a termination man's natural appetite, in the sense that, once the end is acquired, nothing else will be sought."¹⁹⁹ Though source of total fulfillment and of rest from desire, contemplation also must be, and according to the potential of man in this life is, a continuous and unwearying activity, a permanent operation. Aristotle had stated centuries before Thomas that the permanency possessed by contemplation of its very nature was subject to all the inconsistencies and fortuitous circumstances of the total picture of human existence, that human happiness or human fulfillment was happiness and fulfillment only in a human manner, but of its nature the contemplative process, the process of knowing more and more until all is known, is endless. All can never be grasped by a finite being, because all includes the infinite, which the finite mind cannot comprehend. Yet of all human activity, contemplation represents by itself "the higher and more enduring part in the soul's life. . . . Even on earth, the contemplative moments are the highest and the most condensed."²⁰⁰

Contemplation has been called by both Aristotle and Thomas a divine activity. It is divine because through its operation man is united in an intentional union with God himself. Further, seen in itself, it is the most noble analogue of the proper activity of the divine, for it is the activity of knowing all things, of knowing the self, and in the highest order of cognition known to Aristotle, of knowing its own process of knowing.²⁰¹ In attaining to this reflexive intuition, it achieves the pinnacle of all knowledge, the supreme activity of God. Finally, in the hierarchical view of nature adopted by Thomas, as the highest operation proper to man, it unites him by way of likeness with the beings superior to him, with separate substances and, indeed again, with God Himself.²⁰²

Contemplation as Fulfillment of the Total Person

An analysis of the inner nature of this knowing activity shows it to be the perfection of the nature of the human person and the link joining one in the order of intentionality with the supreme contemplator, God. But there is far more to be understood concerning the fulfillment of contemplation than can be seen in an analysis of its own intrinsic nature. It is only when the effects of this activity upon the existing person in one's situation in life are seen that the full value of the activity can be appreciated, and that contemplation can be seen as the actualization of the total person, as the source of one's "rounded perfection."²⁰³ It is to these effects that this study now briefly turns. They may be described succinctly as, first, the intimate, wonder-filled presence of the contemplated to the contemplator, and, secondly, the a-temporality of the contemplative act.

Presence. The ramifications of contemplation seen in the light of this first effect are startling. Through contemplation, the knower assimilates to himself in the order of intentionality all nature, and indeed God himself. In this activity, one arrives at the highest and most intimate mode of possessing all reality, but also in a most intimate and personal way one becomes all reality.²⁰⁴ One's relation with all the world around and with God may be said to be "beyond all bounds."²⁰⁵ Giving expression to the boundless dimensions of the contemplative act, Thomas says that "it is possible that in a single being the whole comprehensiveness of the universe may dwell."²⁰⁶

In a society where separation and absence have been described and attacked so poignantly by modern philosophers, the very fact that contemplation renders all reality present to the knower shows this activity to be indeed fulfilling. The charge has been made that intellectual consideration of reality does not bring man into contact with that reality, but rather separates him hopelessly from the facts of true existence. Especially this criticism has been made regarding the understanding of the person: that intellectual consideration does not give one the reverence and honor due as a person, but rather objectifies one as a thing. This view greatly mistakes the truly unitive value of the knowledge process. Understanding or knowing a person does not separate one from the knower, but draws one into an intimate unity, an assimilation with the knower which in modern philosophy has come more and more to be referred to as intuition.²⁰⁷ Contemplative knowledge, as one author has put it, is "the intuitive penetration of the essence of a thing . . . the conscious 'dwelling' in a truth . . . a communing therewith in awareness of everything it means."²⁰⁸ Perhaps the union achieved between the known and the knower, the presence of the known to the knower, can be understood most vividly through a reference to the meaning of the word "to know" in the Hebrew language. Far from connoting an image of separation, the word "to know" in Hebrew bears strong connotations of intimate union, being applied even to the unity achieved by two persons with one another in the marital act. The marital act was for the Hebrew the vivid realization and actualization of the knowledge one person can possess of another. Far more intimate is the union achieved between persons in contemplation, where the knower and the known are not only physically joined to form one in the flesh, but spiritually are made one in the one being of the knower. Further, if the act of knowledge is entered into mutually, the union of the two persons becomes even more strongly knit, even more personal, and the presence of the two to each other even more total. In Augustinian terminology, while the most abstractive logic may see the known as solely a thing to be manipulated, to be used (*uti*), the intimate knowing of contemplation grasps the known as person. In this knowledge, the knower enters into the total enjoyment of the known dwelling within his very being, and comes to a joyful and fulfilling rest in its presence within him (*frui*).

Linked with the presence of the known face-to-face with the knower in the very depths of his nature is the ever deepening wonder and awe brought necessarily by this intimate knowledge. Thomas Aquinas said that the divine never ceases to amaze the contemplator.²⁰⁹ While he was speaking directly of vision, the knowledge of God possible to man here on this earth and the further contemplation by man of the wondrous works of God, though less perfect than vision, never leave him wearied or unwilling to come to a knowledge of more. Again, here is seen the paradox of being ever fulfilled, yet never filled; of being possessed with a total awe at the wonder of God, yet ever able to be further amazed, further filled with wonder.

A-Temporality. Although totally surrounded and penetrated by the wondrous presence of God, the human person in contemplation remains obviously always within the limits of one's finite nature. Yet, in the act of contemplation, more than in any other possible human operation, one is

able somehow to transcend the limits of one's state, to step beyond the bounds of time within which one's existence is restrained. Through this act of transcendence one becomes involved in an operation and activity of such intensity that it seems to be totally bound up in a single dynamic act. No longer progressing from one step to another in knowledge, the contemplator enters into a simple, unified act, in which one takes to oneself at one moment the entire reality existing about him. In its higher forms of operation contemplation has an aura of a standing still in the midst of the flux of all reality, yet of grasping at the same time that entire flux. Modern writers have called it "feeling unhistorically", a "restful attitude" which is an actualization of one's entire being. Contemplation is an operation or activity which, in one author's phrase, is a unique and express now, "a particularly momentous moment".²¹⁰

In this moment, one soars above the temporal and limiting time-experience to penetrate into the essence of the known, to take it totally to himself, be that known the totality of all being, God himself, or a single person contemplated in an act motivated by love. Aristotle had stated that in this life this divine activity is subject to every distraction pulling it back to the earth-boundness of the temporal. Yet in the fleeting moments of contemplation, when one finds oneself freed from the tension of passing from the past through the present to the future, one enters into the aeviternal mystery of the now, the present, the timeless possession of all reality in a single act.

It is in this timeless, restful, yet supremely active penetration into all reality and into God that true humanistic leisure is attained. Rest, and therefore leisure, can be acquired only when true fulfillment has been reached. The unfulfilling and false rest, the frantic, passing leisure which comes to man in attainment of pleasure, honor, or power is far removed from the truly humanizing fulfillment possible to, and destined for, man in this life by his very nature. The separation of man from the tension of the passing of time gives one through contemplation a control over one's own situation in life which the person seeking vainly for fulfillment in lower levels of reality can never attain. Aquinas saw the person in contemplation as master over all his or her affairs, as ordering them all into a unified pattern, enabling one to live one's entire life according to the order of virtue.²¹¹ It is in this sense that the contemplative person above all others can be seen as the true humanist.²¹² Seeing God everywhere and in all things, one approaches the world and all in it with the most profound respect, not as something to be used as a thing, but rather to be entered into as a living reality, almost as a person, in so far as it is the reflection of the person of God.²¹³

One cannot contemplate in any sense, according to the religious or Aristotelian understanding of the activity, without in the first place being recollected. Seen again in its timeless aspect, contemplation involves the total gathering together of all the faculties of the body and the soul, and their direction to the object of contemplation in a single act transcending all time, even the time necessary to the very functioning of the body and soul. In contemplation, one achieves total inner perfection, unification of all one's faculties, under the control of one's highest faculty in its highest operation. In the fullest sense possible, one becomes not only one with the other as described above, but one with oneself.²¹⁴

Contemplation Related to Other Human Faculties. Thus it can be concluded that contemplation is not only the elevating of the intellect to the highest operation possible to it, but also the perfecting of the operations of all the other faculties of the human person. It is the entire person who contemplates; and while the activity is rooted in the intellect, the recollection needed for the intellect to engage in its activity demands the ordering of the entire personality towards its one supreme end. In particular, both the will and the body are brought to the realization of their highest potential in this activity.

1. The Will. While the rest and the fulfillment spoken of above as essential to contemplation refers directly to rest and leisure for the intellect in so far as in contemplation the human person attains the highest good in the highest possible way to him, all the desire of one's other faculties must at the same time be fulfilled. It was established in the first section that the conscious choosing of the will was not essential to human fulfillment, for the drive of the person to know more and more does not need a specified act of the will to set it in motion.

While this is true, it is readily to be admitted that once the intellect has attained its highest good, the very possession of this good must offer to the will a total quenching of its every desire. In visualizing the human person as a totality, Hugh of St. Victor described happiness as the knowledge of the truth and the love of the good.²¹⁵ In the most accurate manner of speaking, this is not true. Happiness and fulfillment for man technically are rooted principally in the knowledge of the true, which knowledge must, nevertheless, be seen by the will of the person as good. In the practical order, the cooperation of the will seeking the good is essential to the intellect's attainment of the true. It was in this light that Thomas Aquinas said that one cannot attain to contemplation unless one is first possessed of virtue.²¹⁶ Throughout his discussion of contemplation as man's final end in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Thomas often established contemplation as the only source of human fulfillment on the grounds that it is the only species of fulfillment which can be possessed solely by good men.²¹⁷ It is true to say that in its most technical sense human fulfillment is to be rooted in intellectual possession, not in love.

But in so far as the highest intellectual possession is necessarily intuitive and of the intentional order, it must be added that that intellectual hold can not be simply of a thing, but must be rather of a loved thing, a person in the broadest sense of the term. One cannot take a thing into oneself and form with it such an intimate union that in a sense one becomes that thing, without having for that thing a deep love, without developing with it what Martin Buber in more recent philosophy has called an "I-Thou" relationship. Surely human fulfillment is not "love of what is possessed" in the most technical sense; but even speaking with technical language it is "possession of what is loved". It is in the expression of a modern Thomistic commentator, "a loving attainment of awareness, an intuition of the beloved object."²¹⁸

2. The Body and the Sense Faculties. As in the case of the will, so also in the act of contemplation the body is drawn into a share in the fulfillment of the unified human person. The human person properly and totally understood, Thomas Aquinas states, is not the bodiless soul, but rather the being composed of body and soul acting together for the perfection of one's nature.²¹⁹ Contemplation of God is the highest approximation of the perfect fulfillment the human person will achieve in the vision of God. Further, the sense knowledge received into the body by means of the faculties of the bodily organs is essential to any human understanding of God in this life. In the very nature of this highest of all actions, therefore, the body has an integral role to play.

In the question of external aids to the person in contemplation, the body plays an important role. Perfection of the body and its faculties, especially in the order of health, but possibly even in the order of beauty, aids the intellect in its pursuit of wisdom. For the entire body, as well as the will and the intellect, must be gathered into unity through the process of recollection, in order that one may enter fully into the operation of contemplation. Thus, the body is seen to play a necessary role as means to the attainment of this divine activity. It also, moreover, participates in the end of the contemplation itself, in particular, in the joy the entire human person experiences in the fulfillment of his or her nature.

Contemplation and Aesthetic Experience. A discussion of contemplation as fulfillment of the total person would not be complete without mention of that aspect of fulfillment which comes through one's knowledge of the truth in the light of its beauty. There exists a vital relationship in man between the contemplation of the truth and the aesthetic experience of the beautiful; this may be said to be more vital than the relationship between the contemplation of the truth and the love of the good. For while love and the fulfillment which accrues to man in that activity refer primarily to the operation of the will, already established as not being the focal point of human perfection, the aesthetic experience of the beautiful is ultimately related to the intellect and its understanding of the true, to that activity wherein fulfillment primarily is to be found. The fulfillment and perfection attained by the person when, with all faculties gathered together under the control of his or her intellect, one enters into an experiencing of the beautiful at times defies all description and analysis. At times it seems to offer a perfection higher and more noble than that offered by contemplation itself. But in so far as this experiencing brings the total man ultimately to a deeper, more intense, and more affective knowledge of the true, it can be said to find its basic meaning in the direction of man to the fulfillment of his intellectual activity.

An appreciation of the aesthetic experience casts a greater light of understanding upon the true dignity of one's intellectual encounter with reality. Just as the good is good and fulfilling because it is true, so also the truth found in the essence of the beautiful constitutes the beautiful as the true source of human fulfillment. Beauty is indeed according to Augustine *thesplendor veri*. The aesthetic experience is, therefore, one further dimension of the total fulfillment realized by the person in contemplation of truth. Taken in the abstract one's perfection must root one's fulfillment in the activity of his intellect. However, because man is a unified being of many faculties in the real order that perfection must be understood as fulfillment of the entire intellectual, volitional, spiritual, and physical nature by which one exists.²²⁰

Thus it can be seen that contemplation on the finite level of being is the source of the total fulfillment of one's inner natural tendencies. It offers a fulfillment completely attainable by natural human powers. If there were no higher possibility for man's natural desire to know more and more in order to be fulfilled on the level of being, contemplation would stand, as Aristotle first envisioned it, as the highest activity of human nature. Exercised upon the highest possible object, God himself, beyond any other activity within the capacity of man's nature, would fulfill the human intellect as well as the entire human person. Sufficient to itself, it would so fulfill the person that one would be led to seek nothing else. Yet once again, in the words of Aristotle, it would give to him a fulfillment that could be described only as human. Seen in itself, contemplation is fulfillment, but fulfillment always shrouded by the spectre of some inner imperfection, some possibility of a higher completion which is unattainable, yet in the most intimate depths of the human person intensely desired.

Contemplation and Vision: Possible Further Interconnections. There is no further naturally known mode of knowledge upon which this study can philosophize. Yet there is a truth, known by faith, that a higher perfection of man actually does exist, and that this perfection, achieved in the direct vision of the divine essence, is promised to man in the world to come. Some say that to philosophize upon this truth is simply to enter into another field of study, that of theology. Were one to base one's thought entirely upon a consideration of the facts of revelation, this objection would be valid. But Frederick Copleston notes that if one treats the object of his faith in its relation to the basic questions of all philosophic search, one cannot be eliminated from the category of philosophy simply because his faith prompts him to orientate his thought in a certain

direction.²²¹ The vision of God's essence is presented by Thomas as the fulfillment of the inner tendencies of human nature. Therefore it falls within the philosophic category of finality and can be analyzed in that category.

The purpose of this study is not to initiate a direct analysis of vision as fulfillment. All mention of vision in this concluding consideration will be directed to a deeper understanding of the position of contemplation as perfection of man on the finite level of being. The question to be answered in the subsequent paragraphs is, in particular, the following: granted that vision is to be considered as the most perfect fulfillment of the nature of man, is there any further philosophic understanding of contemplation to be derived from seeing it not only as an end, but as an end and a perfection somehow able to be outperformed by another state of completion? In other words, does a philosophic analysis of contemplation, considered in the light of the content of faith, reveal within the nature of this activity any aspects which might establish that, while it fulfills one in its own proper order, it also leaves one open to further fulfillment in another order of being?

Surely to the person of faith, contemplation can be seen in another light as a preparation or means to vision. If vision is to be merited by good works and by a virtuous life, there is no more certain method of achieving a unity of one's nature, a harmony of all one's faculties in the order of virtue under the control of the intellect and will, than through contemplation. Yet, for contemplation as an end in itself to be able to play a role in relation to vision as fulfillment on a different level of being, something more is required. One cannot, on the other hand, establish a connection between contemplation and vision in a certain exigency of the former for the latter, a certain complement between the two, making them but two stages of the same process. This they certainly are not, for although Thomas does admit that on this earth contemplation is the highest approximation of vision, he is equally insistent that one need not have attained any stage of contemplation in order to be elevated by God to the eternal enjoyment of the divine essence.²²²

There may be, however, a correct method of linking the two intellectual processes, so that, while they are not seen to be two parts of the same activity, contemplation is seen to be far more than an extrinsic preparation for, and means to, vision. The approach to a possibly acceptable solution to the problem will be made through two considerations: first, a further discussion of the nature of contemplation as an activity or operation, and, secondly, an attempt to deepen and enlarge the understanding of one aspect of the nature of human finality on the finite level.

1. *Unity of Activity.* At the risk of confusion, it is here stated that contemplation, fully understood, is more properly rendered by the verbal form "contemplating." It was in this manner that Aristotle referred to it, when he chose the Greek infinitive form to express his understanding of the activity. Just as the true finality of the activity of eating or drinking is not totally grasped by a study of the object of the process after it has been eaten or drunk, but also includes the very process itself; and just as the true finality of a ship is not to be understood or comprehended solely by an examination of its arrival at its port of destination, but rather must include the entire activity of its journey; so the true finality of contemplation should not be considered solely as the object of thought, for example God, residing in the mind of the contemplator, but must also include the very process of contemplating or understanding that object.²²³

As has been stressed above, the fulfillment of contemplation is not had at a particular moment, beyond which no further fulfillment can be attained. Rather, while at any moment the activity of contemplating may offer fulfillment in so far as the contemplator is involved in the fulfilling process of knowing more and more, at no moment is this fulfillment totally accomplished. Of its very nature, contemplation offers a fulfillment of such a type that it ever deepens in its perfection and ever grows in its richness. Man is a being in motion to perfection,²²⁴ and in the analogy of

motion to a natural place, the intensity of that motion increases the greater the degree of one's fulfillment.²²⁵

The result of this phenomenon is that in the finite order of earthly contemplation, while man is ever increasing his fulfillment he is intensifying his activity of contemplating.²²⁶ Thus it can be said that the higher the degree of contemplation, the higher the intensity of the operation.

Thus, contemplation can be seen not only as an end, but also as an endless activity, an ever greater fulfilling and fulfillment of the basic human tendency to know more and more. This aspect of contemplation would seem to throw light on the explanation of the basic reason for the frustration encountered by Aristotle and Thomas in the process of contemplation. While the tendency to fulfillment within the contemplator continually increases in intensity, the point of fulfillment seems as it were to recede from the contemplator with equal rapidity. Contemplation is, therefore, a dynamic but frustrated activity of knowing.

Vision too is an activity of knowing, an operation also dynamic and carried out on a level of being higher than, but analogically related to, the level of being upon which contemplation is exercised. In so far as vision is a total fulfillment and the only fulfillment which can satisfy without frustration the desire of man to know, it can in a sense be considered the completion of what was indeed fulfilled, but was still perpetually being rendered imperfect and unfulfilled by the spectre of its own inherent frustration. The operation of vision can be said to fulfill the operation of contemplation. The point is not that one operation is related to the other as two stages of the same process. Contemplation and vision are to be found on separate levels of activity. The point made is rather that the frustration encountered in the one activity is dispelled when the contemplator begins to carry on his fulfilling activity of knowing on another level of activity. Contemplation and vision are therefore to be seen as two activities of knowing on separate levels of being, yet related as fulfillment and fulfillment of fulfillment in the similarity of their operation. It is in this context that Aquinas can say that contemplation is the beginning of eternal life, when by eternal life he understands vision.²²⁷

What must remain perfectly clear in this discussion is that it is only through the necessarily gratuitous intervention of God himself that the fulfillment of contemplation is carried to a higher level and to a more perfect completion. Of its nature and even granting the will of God, it does not possess any exigency to be so directed. But granted that it is directed to the vision of the divine essence, as an activity of knowing more and more about being, it can be seen from one point of view to be similar to vision, to which it is linked in the order of activity just described.

2. *The Openness of Natural Being.* Early in the history of thought, the philosopher Plotinus realized the essential frustration of man's highest activity and sought a way out of that frustration through an appeal to a possible union with the One from which man had emanated. While it is obvious that the position of Plotinus has no connection with the doctrine of vision, it is interesting to note that this ancient philosopher found his answer through the postulation of a certain openness on the part of the nature of man to an area lying beyond him, an openness somehow also inherent in his very nature. With the awareness that there actually did exist a source of man's fulfillment lying beyond the reach of his natural capacities, yet still acting as a fulfillment of his natural tendencies, there has been a constant attempt among Christian thinkers to find a solution to the question of the relation of man to his higher natural end.

Thomas Aquinas based his understanding of man's approach to this more perfect fulfillment upon his teaching of a double natural end. Yet Thomas' commentators have been divided on the precise aspect of the nature of man which allows him to be open to this higher perfection. Some have established in human nature an obediencial capacity, a potency in the nature of man to be

elevated to a higher realm of being. Others, directing their analysis precisely upon the natural finality of man, have pointed out that there is nothing intrinsic to the nature of natural finality that would demand that the person or thing it finalizes be prevented from attaining further perfection on another level of being. This opinion has been clearly expressed by William O'Connor.

The capacity of the intellect for truth can never be filled naturally, and this condition belongs to the nature of a spiritual creature. It is purely an assumption that the natural end of man must be a terminative end, completely and perfectly satisfying his natural cravings for truth and for happiness on the natural plane.²²⁸

This is exactly the truth that Aristotle had seen, but for want of a knowledge of the supernatural could not explain. In the Christian context, the solution to Aristotle's frustration is discovered. Contemplation does fulfill man on the finite level, but the fulfillment does not prevent man from being further perfected on a higher level of being. Rather, in his very fulfillment man is left open to a further perfection which, while it has no intrinsic connection to contemplation, can be seen to be intimately related to that activity. In the beautiful expression of a modern writer:

To have achieved human happiness is to have discovered that the perfection of human nature is openness to absolute happiness. To be thoroughly human is to have cast aside homocentricity. For the perfection of the relative is precisely to be relatively to the absolute.²²⁹

Conclusion

In the progress of this study, it has been established that human nature finds its fulfillment in the highest operation of its highest faculty directed upon the highest possible object. Man's inner natural tendency is towards knowledge. He is driven to know more and more about all reality, and in particular about the highest reality, God, in a process which lasts his entire earthly life. Though he may never exhaust the object of his knowledge, and though he is always plagued with the frustrating realization that he is somehow unable to penetrate the inner nature of the reality upon which he is exercising his understanding, he is able to achieve a measure of happiness, sufficiently delightful and satisfying to give him the fullest measure of perfection and fulfillment possible in his present state. It is in the intellectual process or activity of contemplation that he achieves this perfection. Man's natural tendency to fulfillment is not based upon what he may happen to know concerning that which will fulfill him, but is a process as certain and as predictable as the path of a stone falling to the earth. This is not to say that man cannot impede his attainment of perfection. Rather, as through violence one can divert the falling body from its true finality, so one can divert himself from his natural end. But when one puts no obstacle in his or her path, but wills to function according to his or her nature, that is, through the operation of his or her intellect, one will attain the perfection and the finality determined by one's very nature.

Yet, as said before, the finality and perfection of man is in its most technical sense not to be equated with contemplation. Rather contemplation is the most perfect activity in man's present state of existence which can fulfill one's inner tendency, technically stated as the tendency to know more and more. The presence of another form of human fulfillment on an entirely different level of being, fulfilling the desire of man to know more and more in an entirely different way, is totally compatible with the philosophic principles of human nature and its finality. Given the fact of faith that there is on a totally different level of being from contemplation a fulfillment of man called vision, it is quite justifiable in the order of philosophy to admit the possibility, unknown to Aristotle but known to Thomas, the man of faith, that there can be two natural human finalities and fulfillments, each existing on different but analogically related levels of being.

There is no need for the existence of any connection between these two fulfillments, outside of the necessary similarities they possess by their very definitions, that is, that they both are fulfillments of the nature of man in the order of knowledge. Yet, an attempt can be made, and has been made in this study, to draw further connections between them on the grounds that they are both activities, and that there may be a philosophically analyzable connection between the presence of a higher form of fulfillment and the presence of an otherwise inexplicable frustration in the fulfillment known as contemplation.

The purpose of this study was to analyze the position of contemplation as fulfillment of man, seen first of all as a being possessed of natural finality, and secondly, as a total person existing in a life situation. All references to vision were made solely with the intention of clarifying the nature of contemplation. The interest of this paper was not with the total perfection of vision, but rather with the imperfect perfection of the activity of contemplation. Be there a vision of the divine essence or not, it is a fundamental teaching of Thomas Aquinas' philosophy of finality as it is found in the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, in the third book, from the twenty-fifth to the sixty-third chapters, that contemplation as practiced by man in this life (or also in the next life) is an activity capable of fulfilling his internal and natural tendency to perfection.

Notes

1. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, trans. Anton C. Pegis, James F. Anderson, Vernon J. Bourke, and Charles J. O'Neil (New York: Doubleday, 1956), Book I, Chapter 2. This translation of the *Summa* will be the text used throughout.

2. William R. O'Connor, "Some Historical Factors in the Development of the Concept of Human Finality", *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America, 1949), XXIII, p. 21.

3. Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit.*, Book III, Chapters 51, 52, 54, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63.

4. For a discussion of this doctrine, cf. Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle*, trans. Richard Robinson (London: Oxford University, 1962), p. 383 ff. and John Herman Randall, Jr., *Aristotle* (New York: Columbia University, 1960), pp. 64-65 and 172-178.

5. The following is a schema of the section of the third book of the *Summa Contra Gentiles* under discussion:

I. On Contemplation as Fulfillment

A. The Nature and Intellectuality of Natural End in Rational Beings--Chapter 25

B. Where Natural End is not Found--Chapters 26-36

C. Where Natural End is Found--Contemplation--Chapter 37

II. On Vision as Fulfillment

A. On the Inadequacies of Contemplation as Fulfillment

(1). The Inadequacies of Contemplation in This Life--Chapters 38-48

(2). The Inadequacies of Contemplation in the Afterlife--Chapters 49-50

B. On the Qualities of Vision as End of Man

(1). Vision as the End of Man--Chapter 51

(2). The Supernaturality of Vision--in What It Consists--Chapters 52-53

(3). The Possibility of Vision--Chapter 54

(4). The Nature of Vision--Chapters 55-62

(5). The Fulfillment of Man in Vision--Chapter 63

For the general structure of the argument of Thomas, the reader should consult the central chapters of this discussion, namely, chapters 25, 37, 44, 48, 50 and 63.

6. It is highly important to remember that what is being discussed here under the name of desire is not the movement of the will toward some specified object, after that object has been presented to it by the intellect, but rather the pre-cognitive, pre-volitional tendency which is present in every being, whether rational or not. William R. O'Connor, *The Eternal Quest* (New York: Longmans, Green, 1947), Chapter VI, especially pp. 96-112.

7. The entire treatment of these chapters is more properly a discussion of happiness. The particular subject of this study is natural fulfillment. The two terms are in reality synonymous in Thomas, who considers happiness the perfection of the intellectual tendency, or the state of fulfillment possessed by an intellectual creature. Thus for the sake of variety, the word "happiness" will be used occasionally here.

8. Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit.*, Book III, Chapter 25.

9. Cf. William R. O'Connor, Chapter V, for this point and for the general relationship of causality between Aristotle and Thomas in the question of finality and physics.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 126.

11. The principle does apply to "animal appetite", the appetite distinguished from natural desire by O'Connor, p. 109.

12. Though Thomas' establishment of contemplation as fulfillment of man in this section of the *Summa* is mainly inductive, it is felt that a familiarity with some of the basic principles employed by Thomas in the process of his induction will aid the reader in following the progression of Aquinas' thought.

13. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit.*, Book III, Chapter 25.

14. Cf. *Ibid.*, Chapters 25, 32-34, and 37.

15. *Ibid.*, Chapters 25 and 48.

16. *Ibid.*, Chapter 50.

17. John Herman Randall, *op. cit.*, pp. 174-175.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 175.

19. William R. O'Connor, p. 98.

20. John Herman Randall, *op. cit.*, pp. 129-133. This is a central theme in the entire book. Should it be objected that Randall's thesis is onesided~ cf. also Werner Jaeger, *Aristotle*, pp. 383-384.

21. Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit.*, Book III, Chapter 48.

22. Technically speaking, natural motion can come from without. The basic distinction is that in violence, there is never an inner impulse or tendency to go along with the movement. William R. O'Connor, pp. 79-80.

23. Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit.*, Book III, Chapter 59.

24. Aristotle, *Physics*, trans. R. P. Hardie and R. K. Gaye, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), Book VIII, Chapter 4, 255b21-23, P. 366.

25. John Herman Randall, *op. cit.*, pp. 172-173.

26. For a concise summary of this point, cf. William R. O'Connor, pp. 106-107: "The tendency towards the end that arises from the form is objectively true and real. It is a *motus* that arises from the principles of being, and it is as real as the metaphysical order itself. It may be analogous to the motion that is studied in physics or psychology, but it is not a metaphor. It is part and parcel of the constitution of an *ens naturae*."

27. Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit.*, Book III, Chapter 25.

28. William R. O'Connor, pp. 142-144.
29. To say that an actualization or fulfillment satisfies the appetite of an intellectual being is not to say that the will specifically desired that actualization because of the intellect's presentation of it to the will as source of fulfillment. Though the will necessarily desires happiness in general, it need not have desired a specific form of happiness in order to be fulfilled by it. See note 40.
30. Cf. note nine above.
31. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *op. cit.*, Book III, Chapters 25, 27, 34, and 37.
32. *Ibid.*, Chapters 27, 32, 34, and 35.
33. *Ibid.*, Chapter 25.
34. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, 14, 1, c.
35. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 50; and also Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 980a1.
36. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 37.
37. William R. O'Connor, pp. 261-262,
38. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 50.
39. This statement is a conclusion of the statement on note 8: "If one thing is to be the ultimate end of a being, it must be such that once it is attained, nothing more will be desired."
40. William R. O'Connor, p. 107.
41. Josef Pieper, *Happiness and Contemplation* (London: Faber, 1958), p. 36.
42. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. W. D. Ross, ed. Richard McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), Book I, Chapter 8, 1098b26.
43. *Ibid.*, Book I, Chapter 5; Book IX, Chapter 9; Book X.
44. William R. O'Connor, p. 109 ff.
45. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I II, 5, 8, c. The wording of this idea in the context of "will" and "good" should not obscure the central point. All men desire happiness in general, because all men desire by nature knowledge. For knowledge gives fulfillment, and fulfillment is happiness. This is a good for the will as well as for the intellect.
46. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *Beatitude* (St. Louis: Herder, 1956), p. 78.
47. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 37.
48. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book X, Chapters 6 and 7, 1176a30 to 1178a7.
49. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 2; also *ibid.*, Chapter 25; and also Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177a29-b4.
50. *Ibid.*, Chapter 26. Herein begins the inductive process whereby Thomas excludes all sources of fulfillment save contemplation from the position of ultimate end. His reasons are often given in extreme brevity.
51. *Ibid.*, Chapter 25, 31, 34-36.
52. *Ibid.*, Chapter 37.
53. *Ibid.*; cf. also *Ibid.*, Chapter 25.
54. Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* (New York: Doubleday 1962), Vol. I, Part II, p. 90.
55. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177b30 and Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 25. also Plato, *Thaetetus*, 176.
56. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 27.
57. *Ibid.*, Chapters 29-31. Also Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177a22-23.
58. *Ibid.*, Chapter 48.
59. *Ibid.*, Chapter 25.

60. *Ibid.*, Chapter 48.
61. *Ibid.*, Chapter 25. cf. also Aristotle, *On the Heavens*, Z77a1 3-33.
62. *Ibid.*, Chapter 48.
63. *Ibid.*, Chapter 37.
64. On contemplation as fulfillment in Plato: cf. *Symposium*, 211d-212a; *Thaetetus*, 176; *Republic*, 508; *Phaedrus*, 247; in Aristotle: cf. *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177a12-18, 1178b24-32, and passim; in Plotinus: cf. *III Ennead*, VI, Chapter V; *V Ennead*, III, Chapter IV; *V Ennead*, V, Chapter VII. Understood in one way, Plotinus' contemplation is actually a preview of vision, though he allows only a natural order and a natural process for the attainment of that vision. An excellent summary of the Plotinian process, through abstraction and intuition, to ecstasy can be found in F.J. Thonnard, *A Short History of Philosophy*, trans. Edward A. Maziarz (Paris: Desclée, 1955), pp. 197-202. Plotinus' treatment is strongly ethical.
65. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 25.
66. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1100b33-1101a20.
67. Plotinus, *VI Ennead*, IX, Chapter IX, 768f-769a, trans. E. R. Dodds, *Select Passages Illustrating Neoplatonism*(London: S. P. C. G., 1923).
68. *Ibid.*, IX, Chapter IX, 768f-769a.
69. Plato, *Republic*, trans. B. Jowett, *The Dialogues of Plato* (New York: Random House, 1937), 508.
70. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 247.
71. Plato, *Symposium*, 192c-d.
72. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 25. It is clear that whenever Thomas speaks of the culmination of knowledge of God, he is thinking in the context of this vision.
73. *Ibid.*, Chapter 25. Italics added by writer.
74. This is the point of chapters 49, 50, 52, and 53 of Book III.
75. First Corinthians 2:9.
76. *Ibid.*, 13:12. It is interesting to note that in this context Paul places fulfillment in the order of intellect.
77. I John 3:2.
78. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapters 51-52 54, 57, 59-60, 62-63.
79. Cf. *ibid.*, Chapter 25.
80. Cf. *ibid.*, Chapter 63.
81. *Ibid.*, Chapter 63.
82. For an interesting discussion of this phenomenon in Augustine, confer Karl Lowith, *Meaning in History* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1949), pp. 160-173.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 172.
84. "St. Augustine is uninterested in a purely natural end of man as was Aristotle, but he is deeply concerned with the only historical end man has ever had--the beatific vision of God." William R. O'Connor, *The Natural Desire for God*(Milwaukee: Marquette University, 1948), p. 18.
85. Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine* (New York: Random House, 1960), p. 149.
86. Cf. Augustine's own words: ". . . naturam, qualis sine vitio primitus condita est: ipsa enim vere ac proprie natura hominis dicitur." *Retractationum*, I, c. 10, n. 3. William R. O'Connor, *The Natural Desire*, p. 62.

87. Cf. Etienne Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 77-96.

88. In the history of ideas, this is one of the chief contributions of Augustine. The linking of the transcendental "true" with the existing "God" proved highly influential in the process of unifying the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Fulfillment according to Plato consisted in contemplating the Forms along with the Gods, a participation in their noble activity. Fulfillment according to Aristotle consisted in contemplating God directly. Augustine's linking of the Forms with God unified the two divergent views concerning contemplation. Augustine also linked "good" with "God", while Pseudo-Dionysius is credited with the conjunction of God and "One". William R. O'Connor, *The Natural Desire for God*, pp. 8 and 20.

89. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

90. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

91. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 25.

92. William R. O'Connor, *The Natural Desire*, p. 21.

93. Augustine, *Confessions*, XIII, 9, 10. also *De Civitate Dei*, XI, 28: "For the specific gravity of bodies is, as it were, their love, whether they are carried down towards by their weight, or upwards by their levity." Cf. also Etienne Gilson, *op. cit.*, pp. 134-136.

94. William R. O'Connor, *The Natural Desire*, p. 23.

95. *Ibid.*, pp. 24-26.

96. Frederick Copleston, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 276. Cf. also F.-J. Thonnard, *op. cit.*, p. 414.

97. F.J. Thonnard, *op. cit.*, p. 428. Thonnard in his description quotes from Etienne Gilson.

98. Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages* (New York: Random House, 1955), pp. 332 335.

99. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 40.

100. *Ibid.*, Chapter 40.

101. *Ibid.*, Chapter 25.

102. *Ibid.*, Chapter 40.

103. *Ibid.*, Chapter 38.

104. *Ibid.*, Chapter 38.

105. *Ibid.*, Chapter 38.

106. *Ibid.*, Chapter 38.

107. *Ibid.*, Chapter 39.

108. *Ibid.*, Chapter 39.

109. *Ibid.*, Book I, Chapter 4.

110. *Ibid.*, Book III, Chapter 39.

111. *Ibid.*, Chapter 50.

112. *Ibid.*, Chapter 38.

113. A basis in philosophy for a higher mode of intellection possible to man can be found in the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle, Book XII. In this book Aristotle discusses separate substance. Thomas Aquinas offers a discussion of Aristotle's treatment in his *Tractatus de Substantiis Separatis*, Chapter II. Writing outside of the context of faith, Aristotle found no reason for considering the soul and its activity after death in his discussion.

114. This theoretical point may be seen to have positive value in the field of theology in the question of the state of souls not yet ready for reward nor for punishment. It would seem that the knowledge of God possessed by separate substances in the philosophy of Aquinas would be equivalent to the knowledge possessed by those dwelling in this region.

115. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book II, Chapter 96.
116. *Ibid.*, Chapter 15.
117. *Ibid.*, Book III, Chapter 41. Thomas' mention of the separate substance's knowledge of God achieved through a knowledge of its own essence seems strikingly similar to the theory of illuminationism as presented by Augustine. It is interesting to note that Thomas later in his treatment, in Chapter 47, defends both himself and Augustine from any incorrect excesses in this connection.
118. Thomas Aquinas, Chapter 39.
119. *Ibid.*, Chapter 41.
120. Thomas' discussion of this point would have been more easy to understand had he chosen to center his consideration upon a man's understanding of his own soul in this life, as he does in chapter 46, rather than upon his understanding of separate substances in this present state.
121. *Ibid.*, Book III, Chapter 41.
122. *Ibid.*, Chapter 45.
123. *Ibid.*, Chapter 41.
124. *Ibid.*, Chapter 41. Thomas' absolute statement seems to imply that man in his present state can grasp nothing concerning separate substances, or further of God Himself. This opinion would seem to be one of Aquinas' strongest expressions of the *via negativa* approach to God. This interpretation is further strengthened by Thomas' statement in chapter 45 that Aristotle's metaphor of the owl in relation to the light of the sun signifies that man can know nothing, not that man has great difficulty in knowing, as held by Averroes .
125. *Ibid.*, Chapter 41.
126. *Ibid.*, Chapter 47.
127. *Ibid.*, Chapter 45.
128. *Ibid.*, Chapter 49.
129. *Ibid.*, Chapter 49.
130. *Ibid.*, Chapters 49-50.
131. *Ibid.*, Chapter 48.
132. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, Book I, Chapter 9, 1101a18-20.
133. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 51. Cf. also chapters 54 and 57 of the same book.
134. The quotation from the *Summa Contra Gentiles* is the strongest statement of Thomas on the necessity of vision for the fulfillment of man within the section under discussion and seems an open denial of his understanding developed throughout. It is definitely a problem; its resolution may lie in the fact that writing theologically Thomas is assuming the will of God. Yet, however it is understood in any way, the statement seems to attack the order of nature.
135. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 25.
136. *Ibid.*, Chapter 51. Cf. also Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Book XII, Chapters 8-9, 1074b9-1075all.
137. "Man's perfect happiness consists in the vision of the divine essence." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, II, 5, 4, c.
138. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 60.
139. *Ibid.*, Chapters 61 and 62. "Whoever has happiness has it altogether unchangeable: this is done by the Divine Power, which raises man to the participation of eternity which transcends all change." Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, II, 5, 4, ad 1.
140. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 62.

141. *Ibid.*, Chapters 55 to 60.
142. *Ibid.*, Chapter 63.
143. Cf. *Ibid.*, Chapter 51.
144. In modern terminology one might use the analogy, drawn from the world of visual electronics, of enabling a receiver naturally able to receive a "very high frequency" transmission, to receive "ultra high frequency" transmissions.
145. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 52. "Happiness is a good surpassing created nature. Therefore, it is impossible that it be bestowed through the action of any creature: but by God alone is man made happy--if we speak of perfect happiness." *Summa Theologiae*, I, II, 5, 6, c.
146. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 52.
147. *Ibid.*, Chapter 52.
148. *Ibid.*, Chapter 52.
149. *Ibid.*, Chapter 52.
150. "We have shown that man's happiness . . . consists in this divine vision, and we are said to attain it by God's Grace alone, because such a vision exceeds all the capacity of a creature and it is not possible to reach it without divine assistance." *Ibid.*, Chapter 52. How this assistance is given is a question to be answered in theology.
151. Cf. *Ibid.*, Chapter 25.
152. Cf. *Ibid.*
153. Cf. *Ibid.*, Chapter 50. It is interesting to note that Thomas is aware that he is carrying Aristotle's principles to a further development. He states, "Later men have endeavored to add something pertinent to divine knowledge to the things which they found in the heritage of their predecessors. Chapter 39.
154. Cf. *Ibid.*, Chapters 38-39.
155. Cf. *Ibid.*, Chapter 48. "No person is happy in this life."
156. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, 14, 2 c.
157. Cf. William R. O'Connor, *The Eternal Quest*, pp. 33-38.
158. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-38.
159. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 31-33.
160. Cf. *Ibid.*, pp. 126ff.
161. "De illo appetitu naturali patet, quod voluntas necessario et perpetuo et summe appetit beatitudinem, et hoc in particulari. " *Opera*, XXI, 318.
162. In this question, as in others, the voluntaristic tendencies of Scotus are apparent.
163. Cf. Etienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, pp. 455-457, for a brief discussion of the univocity of being in Scotus. Cf. also Patrick K. Bastable, *Desire for God* (London: Burns, Oates, and Washbourne, 1947), pp. 84-97; and William R. O'Connor, *The Natural Desire*, pp. 39ff.
164. Cf. John Duns Scotus, *In I Sent*, d. 3, n. 24. "Si quaeritur quae est ratio istius status, respondeo, status non videtur esse nisi stabilis permanentia legibus divinae sapientiae firmata. Stabilitum est autem illis legibus sapientiae, quod intellectus noster non intelligat pro statu isto, nisi illa quorum species relucet in phantasmate, et hoc sive propter poenam originalis peccati, sive propter naturalem concordiam potentiarum, animae in operando."
165. There is a possibility here for a position holding that God Himself prevents man from attaining the natural end divinely planted in his nature, in so far as a fault not proper to a man

would be understood to have deprived him of an end to which by his very nature he was entitled to attain.

166. Thomas Aquinas treated this question in Book III, Chapter 52 of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*. It should be noted here that this question is not theological. It is a philosophical principle of Thomas that for a nature to be elevated to a higher nature (granting the possibility of that higher nature), the assistance of that higher nature or of some other higher nature would be required.

167. Cf. Anton C. Pegis, "Nature and Spirit: Some Reflections on the Problem of the End of Man", *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America, 1949), p. 62.

168. Cf. Gerard Smith, "The Natural End of Man", *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association* (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University of America, 1949), p. 51.

169. Anton C. Pegis, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

170. One here wonders if de Lubacs superaddition is related to Bonaventure's "contuition" in the sense that Bonaventure would seem to require something of the nature of superaddition to bring his already supernatural vision of God to an even higher supernatural state.

171. Cf. again Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Ch. 52.

172. *Ibid.*, Chapter 48. Cf. also Chapters 51 and 57.

173. Cf. William R. O'Connor, *The Eternal Quest*, pp. 142-144.

174. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapters 25.

175. Cf. *Ibid.*, Chapter 50.

176. Again, in the sense that "nothing finite can fully satisfy intellectual desire" (*Ibid.*, Chapter 50), the difficulty of what Thomas means by fulfillment remains.

177. Cf. *Ibid.*, Book III, Chapter 52.

178. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius*, VI, 4, and 5.

179. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Fourth Book of the Sentences*, d. 49, q. 2, a. 1, ad 13: "As God by His nature is the greatest being, so in Himself He is most intelligible. The fact that, at times, He is not known by us arises from a defect in ourselves. "

180. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 41.

181. Cf. *Ibid.*, Chapter 49.

182. William R. O'Connor, *The Natural Desire*, p. 37.

183. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 25.

184. This level can be conceived to be either earthly contemplation or quasi intuition of separate substances.

185. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 57.

186. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Chapter 48.

187. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, II, 3, 5, c.

188. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 48 and Book I, Chapter 102 for these two opposing emphases.

189. Cf. Josef Pieper, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28. The axiom "Bonum ex integra causa; malum ex quocumque defectu" may be seen to apply here.

190. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, II, 2, 3, and 4.

191. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Opera-Omnia* (Paris: Ludovicum Vives, 1874), Vol. XII, p. 331, esp. n. 1.

192. Cf. Joseph Buckley, *Man's Last End* (St. Louis: Herder, 1949), pp. 23-24. Buckley seems to root the doctrine of a double natural end in a far more recent source than Thomas Aquinas. He

adds an interesting distinction to the discussion by calling happiness in vision happiness *simpliciter* and happiness in contemplation happiness *secundum quid*.

193. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book II, Chapter 83.

194. Cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1177a10-b25, and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

195. Cf. Josef Pieper, *op. cit.*, p. 46, and Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, II, 4, 1, c.

196. This is not to say that contemplation cannot be fulfilled in a certain sense on another level of being, as will be explained later.

197. Thomas Aquinas, *In decem Libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum Expositio*, X, 11, no. 2102.

198. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, II, II, 180, 4, c.

199. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapters 40 and 48.

200. Dietrich von Hildebrand, *Transformation in Christ* (Baltimore: Helicon, 1948), p. 111. Though this work is professedly theological, the author has many valuable insights which are purely philosophical.

201. Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1074 b15-34.

202. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 37.

203. Cf. Josef Pieper, *op. cit.*, pp. 56-57; and Etienne Gilson, *Moral Values and the Moral Life* (St. Louis: Herder, 1941), p. 40.

204. Cf. Josef Pieper, *op. cit.*, pp. 68-69.

205. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Expositio super Librum De Causis*, 18; and Josef Pieper, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-103.

206. Thomas Aquinas, *Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate*, 2, 2.

207. Cf. Josef Pieper, *op. cit.*, pp. 57-60.

208. Dietrich von Hildebrand, *op. cit.*, pp. 93 and 97.

209. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 62.

210. Cf. Josef Pieper, *op. cit.*, p. 105; and Dietrich von Hildebrand, *op. cit.*, p. 97 and 101.

211. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 63.

212. Cf. Etienne Gilson, *Moral Values and the Moral Life*, pp. 48-49.

213. Cf. Josef Pieper, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-84.

214. For a study of the relationship between contemplation and recollection, cf. Dietrich von Hildebrand, *op. cit.*, pp. 86-120.

215. Cf. Josef Pieper, *op. cit.*, p. 63. The quotation is from Migne's *Patrologia Latina*, 175, 1065.

216. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 58.

217. Cf. *Ibid.*, Chapters 28, 31, 32. Though it is generally conceded that only those who live according to the order of virtue can come to a true fulfillment, a survey of the history of philosophy with reference to the question of human finality shows that the ethical values and aspects have not always been given an equal amount of emphasis in this study. Werner Jaeger has done an extremely interesting study of this problem in reference to the development of the ideas of the one philosopher in his book entitled *Aristotle*, pp. 426-61. This particular problem is a subsection of the much wider question of the relationship between ethics and metaphysics in philosophy. Two other interesting studies in this field are Anton-Hermann Chroust, "Philosophy in the Hellenistic-Roman World", *Thomist*, XVII (1954), 197-253; and Cornelia J. de Vogel, "What Philosophy Meant to the Greeks", *International Philosophical Quarterly*, I (1961), 35-57.

218. Cf. Josef Pieper, *op. cit.*, p. 66 and 75.

219. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book II, Chapter 83. With reference to the participation of the will and the body in the fulfillment of man, it is well to point out that some Thomistic commentators prefer to speak of earthly happiness in the context of the perfection of the total person, without any direct reference to contemplation as the focal point of this fulfillment. This seems to be an entirely different tradition of interpretation, and is mentioned here simply to point out another possible approach to the problem of natural finality. For a further treatment of this approach, confer James Mullaney, "The Natural, Terrestrial End of Man", *Thomist*, XVIII (1955), 373-395.

220. For a further discussion of the relationship between contemplation of truth and aesthetic experience of the beautiful, cf. Charles A. Hart, *Thomistic Metaphysics* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1959), pp. 386-394. Further implications of the relation of the entire human person, body and soul, to his fulfillment can be derived from the theological consideration of the resurrection of the body. Such implications are beyond the scope of this paper.

221. Cf. Frederick Copleston, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, Part I, p. 273-274.

222. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 57.

223. An extremely interesting parallel view of the activity of understanding is offered by Martin Heidegger in his *Letter on Humanism*: "The essence of action is fulfillment. To fulfill is to unfold something in the fullness of its essence, to usher it forward into that fullness: *producere*."

224. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Chapter 48. 225. Cf. *Ibid.*, Chapter 50.

226. Cf. *Ibid.*, Chapter 50. The very fact that the finite order is unable to offer man perfect satisfaction renders his search for fulfillment on that order mathematically infinite. The process of greater fulfillment and greater intensity of search is interminable in the finite order.

227. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, II, II, 180, 4, c., and *Summa Contra Gentiles* Book III, Chapter 25.

228. William R. O'Connor, *The Natural Desire for God*, pp. 48-49.

229. James V. Mullaney, "The Natural, Terrestrial End of Man", *Thomist*, XVIII (July, 1955), p. 395.

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