The Role of the Sublime in Kant's Moral Metaphysics

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This work of Professor John Goodreau is topical, for the basic change of our times is its opening to the aesthetic dimension of human consciousness.

To see this it is necessary to return to the beginning of the modern period. At that time it was the fashion to remove from the mind all except the clear and distinct ideas of technical reason. Thus Bacon would smash the idols which bore the content of human wisdom, Descartes would put all under doubt, and Locke would erase all in order to begin with the mind as a blank tablet. The work of the mind would be to assemble the simple ideas received in order to construct the content of human understanding.

During the following four centuries the great potentialities of this method were sedulously explored. But with the Cold War it was seen to have reached the limits of its possibilities in not only distinct but conflicting systems. This situation indicated that there must be more to the human consciousness than had thus far been explored.

This directed the mind beyond the first critique of Kant focused on the methodology of the physical series and the second critique focused on ethics to his third critique, that of aesthetic judgement. The development of this new level of awareness is of the greatest moment for it opens new levels of human consciousness in ways of finding unity in multiplicity.

But for this to be properly an addition and evolution of human thought it is necessary that this be not contrary to science as developed in the first two critiques or even a simple addition thereto, but something that is implied therein.

To investigate this is the task of the present work by Professor Goodreau. Upon it depends the cohesive and creative character of the changes we are experiencing at this turn of the millennium. For this contribution to deep and lasting progress Professor Goodreau has our admiration, gratitude and sincere and congratulation.
When I heard John R. Goodreau suggesting that he would work on Kant's theory of the sublime as exposed in the *Critique of Judgment* taking into consideration Kant's *Lectures on Metaphysics* and *Lectures on Ethics*, which had then just been translated into English, I knew he was going to break new ground. The result is this study on *The Role of the Sublime in Kant's Moral Meta-physics* that Catholic University's George F. McLean has accepted for publication in the series "Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change" of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy in Washington, D.C. It is an innovative work from both the systematic and the historical point of view.

With regard to the systematic point of view, Goodreau's work is indeed insightful. It forces us to reconsider Kant's relation to metaphysics. It forces us to accept that Kant's philosophy is not a refutation but is rather a legitimation of metaphysics and that this metaphysics is primarily a moral metaphysics. His main thesis that the feeling of the sublime permits us to experience the noumenon is very well argued and will surely gain attention.

With regard to the historical point of view, Goodreau masters effectively all the fundamental methods of contemporary research in the history of philosophy. The history of Kant's development is enriched by a new line toward the *Critique of Judgment* starting from Herder's *Mitschriften* of Kant's lectures on ethics of 1762-4, through the *Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and the Sublime*, the *Nachschriften* of Kant's lectures on metaphysics and on ethics from the mid-seventies to the mid-eighties, taking into account both the *Critique of Pure Reason* and the *Critique of Practical Reason* and making special reference to the Reflection 988, which Goodreau considers pivotal because of the moral foundation of intellectual pleasure."

Texts by Hutcheson, Hume, Rousseau, Baumgarten, Meier, and Burke are analyzed by Goodreau and accounted for in the context of the history of Kant's sources. Of course, Goodreau also considers the dimension of the history of tradition by examining the eighteenth century reception of Longinus. Concerning the perspective of the history of the concepts, Goodreau's book is instrumental in explaining the differences between Kant's understanding of the sublime and that of his predecessors: with Kant the sublime is no longer merely a criterion for esthetics or a tool for poetics, it rather becomes a subject for metaphysical inquiry. The history of the problems is touched by Goodreau with regard to the question of, what is the role played by metaphysics in tying together aesthetics and ethics?

The answer provided by Goodreau could not be clearer: the sublime is the doorway connecting aesthetics and ethics to metaphysics.

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Introduction

Commentators on Kant's aesthetics generally seem to fall into two camps. The first group endeavors to interpret the third Critique in terms of consistency with the critical philosophy of the first two Critiques. The second group, while not ignoring the issue of consistency, is more open to an interpretation that is sympathetic to Kant's statements regarding a relationship between the aesthetic and the moral. The former group tends to dismiss Kant's explicit statements concerning the moral significance of his aesthetic theory as either irrelevant or inconsistent with the critical philosophy, if they do not ignore it altogether. This is especially true with respect to the sublime. As Robert Dostal writes, "Those sympathetic with the Kantian project have found [the sublime] exceedingly troublesome, while on very much the same grounds those, like the romantics, impatient with the strictures of the Kantian project find much to praise here."

The present work will argue that there is a continuity in Kant's thought on the sublime and its moral role that can be traced from his earliest writings to his last work, and that there is no inconsistency between imputing moral and metaphysical significance to Kant's description of the experience of the sublime and the first two Critiques. The sections on the sublime in the Critique of Judgment are not as anomalous as some have argued. A continuity of ideas can be discerned through a study of the Kantian corpus, particularly his lectures on Metaphysics and Ethics, which come down to us in a series of student notebooks dating from the mid-1760s to the mid-1790s. The notebooks are especially significant in that they provide important insights into Kant's position during the silent decade between the Inaugural Dissertation of 1770 and the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. A survey of these notebooks reveals the evolution of such themes as intellectual pleasure, communal sense and the relationship between freedom, pleasure, aesthetics and morality. The Kantian sublime has not been considered in this historical context until now. Moreover, a survey of the corpus reveals Kant's lifelong concern with the problem of moral motivation, which speaks to the significance of the aesthetic experience, particularly the experience of the sublime, in terms of his overall concern with morality. Here the sublime will be considered in the context of moral motivation, which constitutes a new approach. Hence the present work will side with those commentators who attempt to reach an understanding of the Kantian sublime that is sympathetic to Kant's own claims concerning the role of the aesthetic experience but from a different perspective. Let us now turn to some examples.

Paul Guyer is among the prominent writers who belong to the critical group. His detailed study of the Critique of Judgment, entitled Kant and the Claims of Taste, is focused on the problem of the intersubjective validity of the aesthetic judgment. Although the connection between aesthetic judgment and morality is not the focus of his book, Guyer does devote his last chapter to that topic. The feeling of the sublime, however, is conspicuous by its absence, and the focus of the chapter is on whether the analogous relationship between beauty and morality that Kant describes in §59 supports the intersubjective validity of the aesthetic judgment. Guyer explains in a footnote: "Although Kant's explanation of our response to sublimity might be taken to supplement and enrich his basic model of aesthetic response, it does seem something of an afterthought, or a concession to the standard topics of eighteenth-century aesthetics (or taste!)."

In a chapter of that work entitled "The Metaphysics of Taste," in a section in which Guyer is arguing that Kant's suggestion that the antinomy of taste can be resolved only by the use of transcendental idealism is unpersuasive, he writes:
Aesthetic judgment has never pretended to make a claim about the totality of persons except subject to these conditions [i.e., the conditions that one be correct in assigning one's pleasure to the harmony of the faculties, and that we in fact be capable of sharing knowledge with others, which is implicitly subject to the condition that the others whose agreement one claims themselves abstract from interest and material concerns], let alone a claim about persons as they are in themselves (emphasis added). Its claim is essentially a claim about human faculties of cognition and feeling as they are manifested in experience.5

Without taking up the issue of universal validity, which is the prism through which Guyer interprets the third Critique, one might ask, why is a claim about "human faculties of cognition and feeling as they are manifested in experience" not a claim about the totality of persons? The conditions Guyer notes are the claims that Kant's analysis of the aesthetic judgment makes about the totality of persons; in other words, Kant's analysis of the aesthetic judgment presupposes that all rational beings share the same mental faculties. His threefold classification of mental faculties into the cognitive power, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the power of desire in both Introductions to the third Critique is precisely a claim about the totality of persons." Kant has in mind the totality of persons generally when describing cognitive psychology, epistemology, moral philosophy or aesthetics. One of his fundamental premises is that "all rational beings" possess certain mental faculties and their given characteristics and limitations.7 Thus the claim that the beautiful is a feeling in the subject that results from the free play of imagination and understanding is a claim about the totality of persons.8 The second part of Guyer's statement is even more troubling; it completely discounts Kant's statements in §§28, and 29 (including the "General Comment") and elsewhere that the feeling of the sublime makes the mind aware of its supersensible" or "higher" or "moral" vocation.9 We will see that this claim of Kant's is clearly meant to describe the true nature of persons, and, given Kant's lifelong concern with morality and moral motivation, that these passages illustrate how far from an "afterthought" his treatment of the sublime in the third Critique is.

Guyer does take up §29 and its "General Comment" in his final chapter, under the heading Beauty and the Disposition to Morality," but he does not mention Kant's statement at AK 5:268 that the feeling of the sublime is based on a feeling that the mind has a vocation that wholly transcends the domain of nature.10 Guyer, concerned with the intersubjective validity of an aesthetic judgment, argues that "Aesthetic feeling is not a necessary condition of moral feeling, nor is the latter a necessary condition of the former; nor does the analogy imply any connection between the capabilities for experiencing these two different sorts of pleasure."11 Guyer's claim is that there is no obvious way that the intersubjective validity of moral feeling can be employed to defend the validity of the aesthetic response.12 Without taking up that particular claim, this study will argue that the importance of the aesthetic response to the sublime is that through it one feels the mind's supersensible vocation and hence in a way experiences the supersensible itself. Thus the aesthetic response awakens or promotes moral feeling rather than the reverse. Guyer seems to agree that this is a possible interpretation with respect to the aesthetic response and moral feeling, but he does not take up the possibility that the feeling of the sublime may be a doorway to the supersensible, as indicated by the passage quoted above (AK 5:268). His conclusion is that "If the experience of aesthetic response is anything short of a necessary condition for the disposition to moral feeling, then the legitimacy of demanding it of others because of its finality for moral feeling would be compromised. . . ." He concedes that if there is a reasonable expectation of moral
feeling in everyone, and if there is a connection between the aesthetic response and moral feeling, there would be an argument in favor of expecting an aesthetic response in others without a legitimate basis for demanding it of them.13 But Guyer's treatment of §29 and its "Comment" is almost entirely concerned with the problem of intersubjective validity in terms of the beautiful. The sublime is not dealt with in any substantive way at all.

Guyer's position is that the arguments of §§29 and 42 cannot accomplish what appears to be required of the link between aesthetics and morality.14 He argues further that

... it is only by a tenuous argument that the experience of aesthetic response itself may be interpreted as any sort of experience of a super-sensible, because it was only by exploiting the ambiguity of the notion of an indeterminate concept that the Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment was able to link aesthetic judgment to a supersensible. And even if the argument to the postulation of a supersensible substratum of subject and object were permissible, this would hardly entail that aesthetic response is an experience of the supersensible by means of which the intuition of beauty could become a symbol for the rational concept of morality, as a strict adherence to Kant's analysis of symbolism would require.15

The problem here seems to be the fact that Guyer has ruled out any consideration of the sublime. The passage just quoted comes from Guyer's treatment of §59, which describes beauty as the symbol of morality. Guyer goes on to say that it is questionable whether any knowledge of the existence of a supersensible ground of ourselves and our actions is actually required for morality on Kant's ethical theory.16 It is hard to see how one can interpret Kant's position on this issue without considering all that he says regarding the feeling of the sublime and through it the mind's awareness of its own supersensible vocation. This work will argue that the importance of such knowledge lies in its role as motivation. As will be shown below, Kant argues in the second Critique that one may be apodictically certain that the supersensible exists through the principles of pure practical reason, and nonetheless be aware that there remains a gap between this objectively conceived principle and subjective motivation. The aesthetic experience of the sublime provides an experience that helps fill this gap. We will adduce some passages that seem to indicate that there is a moral feeling that precedes the Categorical Imperative in spite of the argument Kant gives in the Critique of Practical Reason that the feeling of respect follows from awareness of the moral law. Kant doesn't demand moral feeling of us as a result of the Categorical Imperative; he thinks it is an innate human quality; a potential to be developed.17

More sympathetic to the view that the sublime has an important role to play in Kant's moral metaphysics is Paul Crowther. In his book The Kantian Sublime: From Morality to Art, he spends some time discussing the moral significance of Kant's aesthetic theory. His main project, though, is to "establish the aesthetic credentials" of sublimity and apply the theory so derived to the work of art.18 That is, Crowther's project is to argue that Kant's account of the sublime in the third Critique may be applied to art as opposed to the natural world.

Crowther is quite sensitive to the moral role of the sublime, however. In his discussion of Kant's account of the sublime in Observations on the Beautiful and the Sublime, Crowther points out that the sublime is implicitly construed by Kant as being occasioned by powers which transcend the self in some specifiable way. Kant's use of examples in which virtue transcends personal inclination provides an important clue as to the nature of this transcendence; and Crowther argues with reason that it is by grounding the sublime in such self-transcendence from
the sensuous level of our being to the universal that Kant arrives at the basis of his mature theory.19

Crowther argues that the first formulation of Kant's mature theory of the sublime is to be found in the *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals* (1785) and the *Critique of Practical Reason* (1788).20 We should note that the term sublime" is used only adjectivally in these works, however; Kant deals with the feeling of the sublime as an aesthetic experience in the *Observations and the third Critique*. Nevertheless, Crowther argues that Kant's use of the term sublime in the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* and the second *Critique* indicates that he has begun to develop the link between the sublime and morality broached in the *Observations*, with the difference that the sublime is at that point used as a predicate ascribed to wills determined by the moral law, or, in other words, wills that have transcended determination by any natural impulse. Moral consciousness is sublime because it manifests the ultimate authority and transcendence of our rational over our sensible being. Moral consciousness arises from our self-transcendence towards the universal. Moreover, the moral consciousness of the sublime embodies a kind of feeling, namely respect.21 Crowther's interpretation, then, insofar as it understands the sublime in connection with our self-transcendent moral consciousness and the feeling of respect, supports the interpretation presented in this work, namely, that the sublime is ultimately for Kant a doorway to the supersensible that is morally significant in that it helps to solve the problem of motivating the subject towards an objectively conceived goal. Crowther argues that morality, with its cosmological presupposition, gives a further dimension of completeness to our view of self and the world which theoretical reason strives towards but cannot itself demonstrate. Hence, Kant sees morality as ex-tending theoretical reason.22 This seems to be the case; in fact, as will be shown below, Kant argues in the second *Critique* that through pure practical reason the supersensible is given objective reality. But Kant goes even farther in the third *Critique*; there he argues that the aesthetic experience of the sublime allows the mind to feel its supersensible vocation.

Crowther's treatment of the sublime in the third *Critique* fulfills the task of bringing out the moral significance of Kant's aesthetic theory, as well as pointing out some misinterpretations of Guyer's. Crowther argues that in the context of the Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment* it is clear that taste serves to bridge the gulf between nature and freedom in such a way that it allows the former to promote the ends of the latter. From the *logical* viewpoint taste is independent of morality, but from the *metaphysical* viewpoint taste exists to serve morality. Crowther does not focus on the sublime itself as a manifestation of our supersensible being, rather, he argues more generally that the a priori principle of reflective judgment is a manifestation of our supersensible being. He goes on to say that in the critical philosophy generally, theoretical and moral principles are both manifestations of the supersensible, but in the third *Critique* Kant uses the term supersensible" to refer to the unity which links the theoretical and moral domains together so as to realize morality's status as the final end of all creation.23 A similar interpretation will be offered here, which will show that the unity Crowther refers to becomes even more evident upon consideration of the *Opus postumum*. However, our interpretation will go beyond Crowther, who is developing his own project of recovering the world of art for the Kantian sublime,24 in that it will develop more fully the feeling of the sublime as an experience of the supersensible, and the importance of this issue for the problem of moral motivation.

Eva Schaper's book *Studies in Kant's Aesthetics* does not deal with the sublime at length, nor does it consider the moral significance of Kant's aesthetic theory. In fact, that Kant's aesthetic theory is morally significant is a view that Schaper rejects. The reader is warned against accepting
. . . indulge in speculative metaphysics; or to delve into the murkier areas of equally speculative psychology; or even to weld these two improbable regions together in some species of transcendental philosophy. To accept any one of them is to adopt an approach to Kant on imagination that does not stand up to scrutiny.25

According to Shaper, the metaphysical interpretation is that in which imagination is somehow the basis of aesthetic and teleological judgments that bridge the gulf between nature and morality. Imagination provides a link between knowledge and freedom, so that Kant's epistemology and ethics become reconciled in his teleology which affords access to the supersensible.26 This study will show that Schaper is wrong to overlook the role of the sublime specifically and the moral component of Kant's aesthetic theory generally.

For Schaper, Kantian aesthetic judgments proceed "as if" the concepts used in them had objective validity and "as if" they described merely private feelings. In her view, ". . . aesthetic discourse uses any concepts available from other contexts for the description of objects, transposing them so that they function as if the objects had left all possible context behind and were in their own right."27 She admits, however, that "Kant himself suggested some much more extravagant directions for further thought."28 She writes that

. . . both the objective and subjective as-if of judgments of taste for Kant contain a reference to the supersensible. In purposiveness without a purpose' Kant had a principle for which no object in nature can be found, through which no objective knowledge can be gained. That he should therefore conclude that it leads us to the supersensible can only be regretted; but the fact must be admitted.29

Schaper goes on to say that the "subjective side of the puzzle" was seen by Kant as a "strong hint of the supersensible," in that his doctrine of purposiveness brings the mind to an awareness of its own power to transcend nature. Schaper only laments this as an unwarranted, but "natural," step by Kant. Her position is that one should not reject Kant's professed belief that his aesthetic theory in the third Critique bridged a gap between nature and morality in order to preserve "the fruitful implications of the Kantian As-if for aesthetics."30 One wonders how one can be so willing to simply dismiss Kant's own explicit claims. Be that as it may, the present study will show that, for Kant, it is precisely those aspects of his aesthetic theory (considered properly in terms of aesthetic judgment and the sublime) that trouble Schaper which were most important.

In his book on the third Critique, entitled The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment, John H. Zammito writes: "Disdaining teleology and even Kant's concern with the sublime, a good deal of contemporary Anglo-American interpretation chooses to neglect the unity of the work for the sake of a few currently interesting arguments about beauty."31 Zammito's study is devoted to proving that the true heart of the third Critique lies beyond the transcendental deduction of the judgment of taste.32 He distinguishes three phases in the composition of the third Critique: The first was the transcendental grounding of aesthetics, which occurred in the summer of 1787 while Kant was working on the second Critique; the second, which Zammito labels a cognitive turn," came with Kant's formulation of the idea of reflective judgment in early 1789; and finally the third, called an ethical turn" by Zammito, occurred in late summer or early fall 1789. Zammito argues
that this ethical turn resulted from Kant's struggle with pantheism, especially as propagated by Johann Gottfried Herder in the late 1780's. Zammito argues that the ethical turn introduced a much more metaphysical tone to the entire work, emphasizing the idea of the supersensible as the ground of both subjective freedom and natural order. It resulted in the inclusion of a discussion of the sublime (which for Guyer is an "afterthought"), a reformulation of the Dialectic of Aesthetic Judgment and an elaboration of the "Methodology of Teleological Judgment" in 1790, as well as a new Introduction.33 Zammito argues that the sublime is important to Kant because it illuminates metaphysics.34 This study will argue that Zammito is right to place the emphasis on the moral/metaphysical aspects of the sublime in particular and the third Critique as a whole, but it will attempt to show that Kant's views on the sublime are the result of long-held positions and a lifelong concern with the problem of moral motivation rather than a later addition as Zammito suggests.

Other commentators include Francis X. J. Coleman, whose commentary on Part I of the Critique of Judgment seeks to correct the view that Kant's aesthetics is an extreme example of aesthetic formalism.35 In Coleman's view, Kant does no more than "hint" at the possibility that in the sublime one might become aware of the supersensible faculty, by a kind of "religious or numinous experience." This experience might have analogical or metaphorical value in providing a "poetic bridge" to the noumenal. Coleman emphasizes that this can be no more than a hint, for although "...the feeling of the sublime and the elevation and awe that attend it are the highest feeling of which man is capable, they do not, however, afford any privileged access to the noumenal."36 One cannot articulate the noumenal any more than the mystic can articulate his visions. While this last statement is certainly true, to say that an experience cannot be articulated does not negate the possibility of the experience. The present work will attempt to demonstrate that the experience of the sublime for Kant does more than merely hint at our supersensible faculty. As Robert L. Zimmerman writes: "The Kantian aesthetic rests upon metaphysical principles. Primarily upon the notion that the aesthetic experience is not a second-rate phenomenon, but, rather a phenomenon of the utmost existential importance."37

Our task, then, will be do demonstrate that the experience of the sublime was important to Kant. We will not be concerned so much with criticizing or defending the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment," which is the project of so much of the extant literature on Kant's aesthetics, but, rather we will try to show that for Kant the aesthetic experience, and especially the experience of the sublime, was phenomenologically important to him as he pursued his lifelong moral project. Towards that end, a survey of the Kantian corpus will be presented, especially the notes from his lectures,38 highlighting his concern with the problem of moral motivation and his thought on feeling as a motive capable of moving the individual existing person to subordinate the fulfillment of the subjective feeling of desire (happiness) in favor of the objectively conceived universal law (morality). Once this concern is properly understood, the importance to Kant of the connection between the feeling of the sublime and our awareness of our own supersensible faculty becomes clear.

Notes

2. As Dostal says, attention to the systematic place of the sublime in Kant's larger project is essential. Ibid., 93.

3. G. Felicitas Munzel, in an article on Kant's statement in §59 of the Critique of Judgment that beauty is the symbol of morality, writes that Kant does not develop what Munzel describes as the positive exhibition or symbol (i.e., the feeling of pleasure that accompanies aesthetic reflective judgment) as a source of moral motivation. Munzel concludes, therefore, that "From the standpoint... of the view that for human beings such positive motivation for moral cultivation is absolutely essential, Kant's moral philosophy remains incomplete." G. Felicitas Munzel, "The Beautiful is the Symbol of the Morally-Good': Kant's Philosophical Basis of Proof for the Idea of the Morally-Good," Journal of the History of Philosophy 33:2 (April 1995): 301-330, 329. Munzel does not address the possibility that the experience of the sublime may be important in terms of moral motivation, although she does note that the feeling of the sublime is a state of mind similar to the feeling of respect evoked by the moral law (ibid., 321). This point will be developed below.

4. Paul Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Taste (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 1 n. 2. Guyer acknowledges the criticism this remark provoked in an introductory section he wrote for the article originally published as "Kant's Distinction between the Beautiful and the Sublime" when it was reprinted in Kant and the Experience of Freedom: Essays on Aesthetics and Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) The article is primarily concerned with Kant's description of the beautiful and the sublime under the headings of the categories, namely, quality, quantity, relation and modality, and does not take up in any detail the possibility of the moral and metaphysical importance of the sublime. In the introductory paragraph written for the reprint, Guyer says that his decision not to discuss the sublime in Kant and the Claims of Taste at least saved him from saying any nonsense about it, which he cannot say for everything else that has recently been written on the topic. Ibid., 187. Guyer still refers to the sublime as "this fashionable eighteenth-century idea," and says he hopes to "clip the wings of some of the wilder flights of speculation currently on offer." Guyer says that contemporary treatments of the Kantian sublime might be brought under the three headings of "deconstructionist," whose key idea seems to be that our experience of the sublime reveals how all discourse is limited yet we still have a sense of meaningfulness lying beyond the limits of whatever discourse we can find; "psychoanalytic," in which the sublime is interpreted as a symbol of the inevitable manifestation of the irrational forces suppressed by the superego of human rationality; and the "ideological" in which the awesome scope and power of the sublime is taken to be a tool to teach the individual fear and submission, the stick complementing the carrot of consolation offered by beauty. Ibid., 188-90. The interpretation that will be offered here does not fit under any of these three descriptions. In fact, we agree with Guyer's statement at the end of his survey: "It is crucial to realize that although for Kant the experience of the sublime may reveal the limits of the senses, imagination, and understanding, and in this regard be accompanied with an element of displeasure, the sublime is ultimately a satisfying experience which makes clear the vocation of reason." Ibid., 191. But Guyer does not pursue this avenue, which is key to understanding the Kantian sublime. The present work will side with those who are sympathetic to a moral interpretation of the sublime by exploring the sublime in the context of moral motivation, involving an historical survey of the Kantian corpus, which is an approach that has not been taken until now.

5. Ibid., 344-5. Guyer refers the reader to the Critique of Judgment §38 here.

6. A classification that is present in Kant's lectures on Metaphysics by the mid-1770's, and which depends at least in part on the 4th edition (1757) of Baumgarten's Metaphysica. Pleasure and displeasure are treated in §§655-62 (Sectio XV. Voluptas et tædium), the faculty of desire in

7. We need to clarify this point. Although Kant frequently uses the phrase "all rational beings" in the three Critiques and other published works, in the lectures on Metaphysics he mentions faculties that are not shared by human beings and all rational beings. Not all rational beings have a sensibility that is the same as human beings. Hence we read in Metaphysik Mrongrovius (1782-3) that "The general rules of taste hold only for the sensibility of human beings and for beings that have a sensibility the same as theirs. The general rules of the good stretch over all rational beings, even God, for they apply to cognition." "Die allgemeinen Regeln des Geschmacks gehören nur für die Sinnlichkeit des Menschen und für Wesen, die mit ihm gleiche Sinnlichkeit haben. Die allgemeinen Regeln des guten erstrecken sich auf alle vernünftigen Wesen, selbst auf Gott, denn sie gehen auf die Erkenntniß." Lectures on Metaphysics, 260 (AK 29:892). And in Metaphysik L2 (attributed by Ameriks and Naragon to the period 1790-1): "But all rational beings which also have sense can discriminate the beautiful, and we human beings are such beings. Thus the laws of sensibility must hold for all human beings, but not for merely rational beings. These discriminate merely the good." "Alle vernünftige Wesen die aber auch Sinne haben, können das Schöne unterscheiden; und solche Wesen sind wir Menschen. Also müssen die Gesetze der Sinnlichkeit für alle Menschen gelten, aber nicht für bloße vernünftige Wesen. Diese unterscheiden bloß das Gute." Ibid., 347 (AK 28:586). We are not told which rational beings these are; presumably they are spirits (Chapter 1 §3 below) and even God. But surely Kant does not want to say God does not recognize the beautiful! Perhaps God only recognizes the beautiful as an aspect of the good, which, if that is Kant's position, would be another evidence of Plato's influence on Kant, which would make a good topic for another work.

8. With the proviso that their taste has been adequately prepared by culture. Nevertheless, it seems clear that Kant bases his analysis on the supposition that all rational beings share the same mental characteristics at least potentially.

9. As noted above, in the later article "Kant's Distinction between the Beautiful and the Sublime" Guyer does say that the sublime is ultimately a satisfying experience which makes clear the vocation of reason. But he does not develop the theme.

10. "[I]t is this idea [of the supersensible] that is aroused in us when, as we judge an object aesthetically, this judging strains the imagination to its limit, whether of expansion (mathematically) or of its might over the mind (dynamically). The judging strains the imagination because it is based on a feeling that the mind has a vocation that wholly transcends the domain of nature (namely, moral feeling), and it is with regard to this feeling that we judge the presentation of the object subjectively purposive."

"Diese Idee des Übersinnlichen aber, die wir zwar nicht weiter bestimmen, mithin die Natur als Darstellung derselben nicht erkennen, sondern nur denken können, wird in uns durch einen Gegenstand erweckt, dessen ästhetische Beurtheilung die Einbildungskraft bis zu ihrer Gränze, es sei der Erweiterung (mathematische), oder ihrer Macht über das Gemüth (dynamisch), anspannt, indem sie sich auf dem Gefühl einer Bestimmung desselben gründet, welche das Gebiet der ersteren gänzlich überschreitet (dem moralischen Gefühl), in Ansehung dessen die Vorstellung des Gegenstandes als subjektiv-zweckmäßig beurtheilt wird."
11. Guyer, 358. Margaret Dell Jewett has written a dissertation on moral feeling, which intends to bring out the role of moral feeling as moral motivation in Kant. Although she does mention the relationship between moral feeling and the sublime in the *Critique of Judgment* she does not develop the possibility that the feeling of the *sublime* specifically and of the aesthetic judgment generally may be relevant to moral motivation in terms of providing a doorway to the supersensible. Margaret Dell Jewett, "The Role of Moral Feeling in Kantian Ethics" (Ph.D. diss., University of Southern California, 1986).


19. *Ibid.*, 15. In a footnote to this same page (#20), Crowther argues that the discussion of the sublime published in *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, which was based on Kant's lectures on Anthropology, must have been revised based on the mature exposition of the sublime published in the *Critique of Judgment*. Perhaps this is correct, but one must acknowledge that already the lectures on Metaphysics contain elements of Kant's mature aesthetic views (at least on beauty), from the mid-1770's on. In fact, the lectures on Anthropology were drawn from the sections of the lectures on Metaphysics given under the Baumgartenian heading Empirical Psychology." The latest edition of Kant's lectures on Anthropology (Academy edition volume 25) is *Vorlesungen über Anthropologie*, ed. Reinhard Brandt and Werner Stark (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1997).


26. *Ibid.* That this is in fact Kant's purpose will be argued in Chapter 3 below.

33. *Ibid.*, 7-8. Salim Kemal's book on Kant's aesthetics, entitled *Kant's Aesthetic Theory: An Introduction*, deals primarily with the Analytic of the Beautiful" and the deduction of judgments of taste. Kemal does not directly deal with the possibilities of the sublime, although in the Preface to the second edition of his book he takes Zammito to task for failing to adequately explain the

38. Many of which have been newly edited and translated into English by Cambridge University Press.
Chapter I

The Pre-Critical Years

The main point is always morality: this is the holy and unassailable, what we must protect, and this is also the ground and the purpose of all our speculations and investigations. All meta-physical speculations aim at it. God and the other world is the single goal of all our philosophical investigations, and if the concepts of God and of the other world did not hang together with morality, then they would be useless.

Metaphysik LI, Mid 1770's

Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime

Kant published two works that deal with the sublime directly, namely, Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime (Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen), which appeared in 1763, and Critique of Judgment (Kritik der Urtheilskraft), which was published in 1790. Although separated by a span of 27 years, and perhaps by an even greater distance in terms of Kant's philosophical development, one may nevertheless discern elements in the earlier work which foreshadow the attempt to bring aesthetics under the auspices of the critical philosophy in the third Critique. An examination of Kant's published works as well as the lecture notes we have from this period reveals Kant's belief that the aesthetic and the moral experiences are closely related. Hence the connection between the sublime and our rational vocation that Kant describes in the Analytic of the Sublime of the third Critique should be seen as Kant's attempt to articulate in terms of his critical system a strongly held position rather than an "afterthought" or a "concession to the standard topics of eighteenth century taste," as some would have it.

In the Observations Kant holds that the feeling of the sublime makes one conscious of one's moral worth, a position that will be reaffirmed using the language of the critical philosophy 27 years later in the third Critique. The position that the sublime is related to the moral, that the experience of the feeling of the sublime makes us aware of our moral (or, later, supersensible) role in nature, then, is one that Kant holds consistently over this period. The sublime is a doorway to the supersensible not only for Kant in 1763, but also in 1790. There is a continuity in Kant's thought.

This is not to say that Kant was ever a follower of the "moral sense" school. The feeling of the sublime is never meant to be the ground of morality. In the Prize Essay of 1764, Kant credits Francis Hutcheson with having provided a "...starting point from which to develop some excellent observations." But this comes at the end of the concluding section of the Essay, in which Kant is arguing that "The Fundamental Principles of Morality in their Present State are not Capable of all the Certainty Necessary to Produce Conviction." He is concerned with the problem of obligation; the problem is that unless the end is shown to be necessary, there can be no obligation to order one's actions to that end. This is a challenge that practical reason has not yet met, Kant writes, and here we see him articulating a problem that he will later attempt to solve formally through the principles of pure practical reason in the form of the Categorical Imperative. In the Essay, however, Kant concludes that the material principles of practical cognition required to show that the end is necessary and hence can be a ground of obligation are indemonstrable. In a remark that foreshadows Kant's account of the mind in terms of the three faculties of cognition,
desire and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Kant says that it is only recently that people have come to realise that the faculty of representing the true is cognition, while the faculty of representing the good is feeling. It is in this sense that Hutcheson is mentioned, and while Kant here perhaps holds out some hope that Hutcheson's work on moral feeling might shed some light on the problem of obligation, Kant's movement is always away from the moral sense school and towards a rationalist account of morality as to its ground. Later, in his lectures on ethics at Königsberg, Kant identified Shaftesbury and Hutcheson as the leading authors of the system of ethics that is grounded on a moral feeling whereby one can discriminate what is good or bad. Their system is rejected; what they mean by moral sense is not what moral feeling means for Kant, even in 1763. Throughout his career, when Kant uses the term moral feeling, he seems to mean an innate predisposition to moral action that is present in human beings; at any rate, that will be the interpretation defended in this work. Yet the problem of obligation remains; it becomes the problem of motivation, that is to say, how is the will subjectively motivated to subordinate itself to an objectively conceived moral principle? As we shall see, Kant calls this problem the "philosopher's stone," and it is in reference to this problem that the experience of the feeling of the sublime takes on its moral/metaphysical importance.

Let us turn now to Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. We note first of all from the title that the beautiful and the sublime are, for Kant, feelings. Hence, they are subjective rather than objective phenomena. The beautiful and the sublime are feelings that occur in the subject rather than qualities in objects which are then perceived by a moral sense or a sense of the beautiful as suggested by Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, Hume et al. This is the position that Kant will develop in the third Critique. In the Observations, Kant begins by distinguishing various feelings of enjoyment (Vergnügen) or of displeasure (Verdruß). These feelings depend primarily on each person's disposition to be moved by them rather than upon the nature of external things. This accounts for the differences in the reactions of various persons that one observes in everyday experience. Kant reminds us that he writes here primarily as an "observer" (Beobachter) rather than a philosopher, and then begins to describe a kind of gradation of feelings that runs from what might be called coarse or vulgar feeling to the thrill that only an exceptional soul fixed on "high intellectual insights" (hohe Verstandes-Einsichten) might experience. Kant tells us he will exclude this extraordinary feeling from his essay, and instead consider only the sensuous yet "finer" (feiner) feeling of which more ordinary souls are capable. The beautiful and the sublime are species of this finer feeling, which may be acquired as one's capacity for it is developed. We can learn to discern among pleasures. Finer feeling consists primarily of the feeling of the sublime and the feeling of the beautiful. Both the beautiful and the sublime are occasioned by some object in nature. The sight of a mountain peak towering above the clouds, the description of a raging storm or Milton's portrayal of the infernal kingdom in Paradise Lost are examples Kant gives of things that trigger the feeling of the sublime. Hence, although the sublime is a pleasant feeling, it arouses "enjoyment but with horror." The beautiful, on the other hand, is occasioned by calmer sights such as flower-strewn meadows, valleys with winding brooks and grazing flocks, or Vergil's description of Elysium. The beautiful is a feeling that is "joyous and smiling" (fröhlich und lächelnd). That the feeling of the sublime, at least in some of its aspects, includes fear is a position that Kant will develop under the heading of the dynamically sublime in the third Critique. There one finds that the dynamically sublime is described as a realization that, while we are powerless against the might of nature (hence the element of fear), we nevertheless have a
power within us, namely our capacity for moral choice that is superior to the might of nature; and in our awareness that we possess such a power, in the face of nature's might, we take pleasure.

The sublime moves, Kant tells us, while the beautiful charms. One who is undergoing the full feeling of the sublime displays an earnestness, perhaps even astonishment. One who is undergoing the feeling of the beautiful proclaims it through cheerful eyes and smiling features. (AK 2:209) These descriptions give us some sense of Kant's distinction between the beautiful and the sublime in the Observations. The sublime is connected to a sense of power; indeed Kant writes that the sublime must always be great, while the beautiful may remain small. The sublime must also be simple, while the beautiful can be adorned and decorated. (AK 2:210)

Kant distinguishes three kinds of sublime in the Observations. These are the "terrifying," the "noble" and the "splendid" sublime. The terrifying sublime is a feeling of the sublime accompanied by a certain dread or melancholy; the noble sublime is one accompanied by a quiet wonder; the splendid sublime is one accompanied by a beauty completely pervading a sublime plan." Both a great height and a great depth provoke a feeling of the sublime, but the latter is accompanied especially by a sensation of fear (of falling) while the former is accompanied by a feeling of wonder. Hence a great depth is an example of the feeling of the terrifying sublime while a great height provides an example of the noble sublime. Further examples include the design of an Egyptian pyramid, which is simple and noble, while St. Peter's in Rome has its simple frame bedecked with beauty in the form of gold decorations and mosaic work. The former occasions a feeling of the noble sublime; the latter a feeling of the splendid sublime. (AK 2:210)

Having given the reader a description of the beautiful and the sublime in the first section of the Observations, Kant describes the attributes of the feeling of the sublime and the beautiful as they occur in human beings in general in the second section. Here are the themes that are particularly relevant to the issue of this work. Tragedy is distinguished from comedy in that the former excites a feeling for the sublime while the latter excites a feeling for the beautiful. In tragedy, one observes the dignity of one's own nature as feelings of sympathy are stirred by the depictions of magnanimous sacrifices for another's welfare or of bold resolution in the face of peril and proven loyalty. One is moved by tragedy whereas one is only amused by comedy. Even deprivities and moral failings can occasion a feeling of the sublime, at least insofar as they appear to our sensory feeling "without being tested by reason." And so Achilles' wrath in the Iliad or some other Homeric hero is terrifyingly sublime while one of Vergil's heroes is nobly sublime. Open revenge or defiance even in a rogue may occasion a feeling of the sublime for all of their moral failings. (AK 2:212)

Kant gives us further examples: bold acceptance of danger for our own rights, the rights of our friends or of our country. (AK 2:214) Subduing one's passions through principles is sublime. Mathematical representation of the infinite magnitude of the universe is sublime, as is metaphysical meditation upon eternity, Providence, and the immortality of our souls. Virtue is sublime, although Kant holds that other moral qualities will be regarded as noble insofar as they harmonize with virtue. The distinction seems to be among actions done for the sake of virtue alone as opposed to actions which are in accordance with virtue but not done from a virtuous disposition, a position that foreshadows his later, formal grounding of morality. The judgment of virtue is "subtle and complex" (fein und verwickelt); one cannot know another's state of mind. (AK 2:215) The example Kant gives is illuminating. Sympathy, described as "beautiful and amiable" (schön und liebenswürdig), may correspond to principles of virtue in that it shows a charitable interest in the state of our fellow man. But this "good-natured passion" (gutartige Leidenschaft) is "weak and always blind" (schwach und jederzeit blind), in that sympathy may conflict with virtue,
e.g., when one's feeling of sympathy brings one to help a needy person at the expense of repaying a debt. In this case, the dictates of justice are subordinated to sympathy; virtue could not possibly induce one to sacrifice a higher obligation to this "blind fascination" (blinden Bezauberung). On the other hand, when universal affection towards the human species has become a principle to which one always subordinates one's actions, sympathy is raised to a higher standpoint and is placed in its true relation to one's total duty. Universal affection is now the ground of both sympathy and justice, and thus does sympathy become sublime. (AK 2:215-6) Virtue becomes sublime the more general the principles, and the most general principles come from a consciousness of a feeling that all human beings share. This is a feeling of the beauty and dignity of human nature, or, in other words, moral feeling. Hence the feeling of the sublime makes us aware of our moral dignity. Kant writes:

Accordingly, true virtue can be grafted only upon principles such that the more general they are, the more sublime and noble it [virtue] becomes. These principles are not speculative rules, but the consciousness of a feeling that lives in every human breast and extends itself much further than over the particular grounds of compassion and complaisance. I believe that I sum it all up when I say that it is the feeling of the beauty and the dignity of human nature.


At this point Kant looks at the feelings of the sublime and the beautiful insofar as they are moral under the aspect of the four classifications of human temperament still current at that time, namely, the melancholy, the sanguine, the choleric and the phlegmatic. The details of this classification need not detain us; suffice it to say that each of the four temperaments possesses a greater or lesser degree of these finer feelings. What is important for us is that the beautiful and the sublime are described in the context of moral feeling or moral sympathy. In addition, we are told that all men have a "love of honor" (Ehrliebe) to a greater or lesser extent which moves one to "take a standpoint outside himself in thought" (in Gedanken außer sich selbst einen Standpunkt zu nehmen) in order to judge the outward propriety of one's behavior as seen by an onlooker. Thus the different groups are united and the "whole of moral nature exhibits beauty and dignity" (das Ganze der moralischen Natur Schönheit und Würde an sich zeigt). (AK 2:227)

Kant describes the feelings of the beautiful and the sublime as they apply to the two sexes and their interrelations in the third section of the Observations. Again, the details of that study are not important in terms of this work except that to note that the differences Kant delineates are attributed to differences in taste and moral feeling that exist between the sexes. (AK 2:230-2) The fourth and final section of the Observations treats national characteristics insofar as they depend upon the feeling of the beautiful and the sublime. We need not trouble ourselves over Kant's opinions here except to note that he considers the various nation's different feelings with respect to the beautiful and the sublime from the moral point of view since "the mental characters of peoples are most discernible by whatever in them is moral." (AK 2:245) Finally, Kant observes that what is
needed is the as yet undiscovered secret of education that will elevate the moral feeling in every young world citizen to a "lively sensitivity" (thätigen Empfindung).28 (AK 2:256)

In conclusion, then, some important themes emerge from the Observations on the Feeling of the Beautiful and Sublime. The most important for our thesis is the affirmation that the feeling of the sublime makes us aware of the beauty and dignity of human nature that is to be found in our moral capacity. Put in the terms of the critical philosophy, the feeling of the sublime is a condition for making us aware of what is supersensible in us; through the feeling of the sublime we experience noumenon. As we shall see, this experience can serve as a subjective motivation able to give pure practical principles a compelling force.

Lectures on Ethics: Notebook Herder (1762-4)

J. G. Herder, who would become an influential critic of Kant and the Enlightenment, studied medicine and theology in Königsberg between 1762 and 1764 and attended several of Kant's courses. While Herder was an original thinker in his own right, and may have allowed some of his own thoughts to penetrate his lecture notes, his notebook on Kant's course on ethics may help us understand Kant's thinking at the time of the publication of the Observations.29

The Herder notes begin with some remarks about feeling. The question of the possibility of a disinterested (uneigen) feeling of concern for others in addition to our self-interested feeling is raised and answered affirmatively. This disinterested feeling of concern for others is said to be universal, although not everyone has it in the same degree. Both kinds of feeling are endowed by the Creator; as needy beings the Creator gave us self-interest in our own perfection, and as beings who have the power to be of service to others He gave us a disinterested concern for the perfection of others. The former can be subordinated to the latter, which is noble, but we despise those in whom the concern for others is subordinated to self-interest.30

To those who object that the pleasure one feels in the welfare of others is no more than a more refined self-interest, Kant replies, according to Herder, that the pleasure itself presupposes a power of having it, namely, the disinterested feeling of concern for the perfection of others. There follows a difficult passage in which Kant seems to want to draw a parallel between feeling and the physical world: The self-interested feeling presupposes our own imperfections (Unvollkommenheiten), which implies neediness on our part. A disinterested feeling presupposes our own perfections (Vollkommenheiten) -- our own perfections are the means by which perfections in others may be acquired. The disinterested feeling is like a force of attraction, and the self-interested feeling like a force of repulsion, and the two of them in conflict "constitute the world."31 Presumably Kant is thinking of perfection as an attractive force, and imperfection as a repulsive force. In any event, the passage is interesting in light of the dynamic account of nature Kant will develop in the Opus postumum,32 and in light of the distinction between intellectual feeling and sensible feeling that Kant will begin to make in his lectures on Metaphysics in the 1770's; it seems possible that we are seeing here the beginnings of Kant's later account of a disinterested pleasure that connects the noumenal realm of morality to the phenomenal realm of human experience.

Kant defines free actions as physically good with respect to their consequences and morally good with respect to the intention of the agent. We esteem moral acts for their own sake, even when they are self-interested.33 Morally free actions have a goodness which is assessed by the intent; they are directed towards some physical good but are not measured by these effects. Free actions, whose value is not to be measured by the results, yield a pleasure immediately and directly independently of consequences. Pleasure in free actions directly is called moral feeling. According
to Herder, Kant argued that human beings have a moral feeling that is universal (allgemein) and unequivocal (einstimig). The next few lines of the text describe the pleasure and displeasure associated with the fortune and misfortune of others, which seems, perhaps, to restrict moral feeling to the disinterested feeling of concern for others already described. But moral feeling is broader. Kant immediately describes moral feeling as unanalyzable, basic and the ground of conscience, and a few lines later moral feeling is compared to knowledge of truth and falsity: just as knowledge of the true and false is the "final yardstick" (letzte Maasstab) of the understanding, moral feeling is the final yardstick of morality. As Velkley points out, we see here the first appearance of an attempt to derive moral feeling from freedom, and therewith the abandonment of the central tenet (that moral feeling is ultimate and irreducible) of the moral sense philosophy of Shaftesbury, Hutcheson et al.

In the Observations, Kant describes properly moral actions as beautiful or sublime. Here, the feeling that results from free (moral) actions is described as beautiful or sublime. The pleasure we take in perfections in ourselves is noble (Kant equates the noble with the sublime at this point), and the satisfaction one derives from good will towards others is beautiful. A little later we are told that reverence presupposes the feeling for the sublime in moral perfections while love presupposes the intuition of "morally beautiful perfections" (Moralisch Schönen Vollkommenheiten). Thus, for Kant, even at this early stage in his career, morality, which for him is ultimately metaphysical, is related to human experience through feelings that are described in aesthetic terms. The antecedents of Kant's belief that aesthetic judgment concerning the beautiful and the sublime are somehow related to morality is apparent in Herder's notebook. Indeed, we read a few pages later that if we directly improve our moral feeling, we approach the divine presence in sensation.

According to Herder, Kant states the supreme law of morality as follows: Act according to your moral nature. The term moral nature is important; Kant means evidently moral feeling, and he distinguishes it from human nature generally. Reason can err, and moral feeling can also err when custom is upheld before natural feeling" (Natürliches Gefühl). The upholding of custom over natural feeling is described as a case of implicit reason, which is fallible, and our final yardstick of morality remains moral feeling, as we have seen. A few pages later we are told that the good man's feeling is more reliable in moral matters than the reason that makes palpable errors in its inferences. Here, moral feeling seems to be equated with the analogon rationis, i.e., good sense.

It seems that Kant is equating natural feeling and moral feeling, and this is confirmed in the next few lines as he takes up a distinction between natural feeling and "artificial" (künstlichen) feeling. Artificial feeling is feeling imposed by society; Kant's concern with this distinction shows the influence of Rousseau, who is mentioned explicitly. We want to distinguish the natural feeling from the artificial in our studies of ethics, we are told. As Velkley writes, "Kant discovers in Rousseau an account of how culture' arises out of and in opposition to nature, thereby producing the central problems of human life, as well as its true excellences." What is important in education is to awaken the moral feeling without which religion is prejudice and hypocrisy; the cultivation of moral feeling takes precedence over the cultivation of obedience. The goal should be to couple the idea of God with our morality; first of all with our natural moral feeling so that our "immediate" (unmittelbar) liking for the good becomes religion.

One may suspect that this moral feeling Kant has described is conscience, but this is not the case. As Kant takes up the subject of conscience it is immediately distinguished from moral feeling. Conscience, we are told, may be either cognitive (logica) or moral (moralis). Conscience
is cognitive in that we are aware of some property of an action, and so defects in action are logical when we lack consciousness of our actions. As an example Kant mentions the frivolous actions of the young. Conscience is moral when knowledge of our actions is coupled with moral feeling. Thus defects in action are moral when we lack moral feeling concerning our actions. Thus a corrupted conscience is errant when it is logically falsified; conscience goes astray by intellectual error. A corrupted conscience is depraved when it is morally falsified; conscience feels wrongly by an emotional defect. This distinction clearly indicates that moral feeling and conscience are not the same thing for Kant; indeed, we would not expect him to be guilty of an equivocal use of terms even at this relatively early stage of his career.

**Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics**

In his work of 176650 entitled *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics* (Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik) Kant expressly addressed for the first time his doubts concerning the possibility of metaphysics. Although the work as a whole is ostensibly concerned with the Swedish religious visionary Immanuel Swedenborg's alleged paranormal powers, the first part of it, which Kant calls "dogmatic" (dogmatisch), is about the intelligibility of certain kinds of metaphysical claims, such as the "philosophical theory" of spirits and spirit-nature.51 The writing is highly skeptical with regard to such claims, and it leads to the idea that human understanding is bounded by certain limits.52 It is to the first part of *Dreams* that we now turn our attention.

Our interest in this essay concerns remarks that Kant makes concerning the possibility of interaction between the physical world and a possible world of immaterial beings or natures. *Dreams* consists of two parts, the first "dogmatic" and the second "historical" (historisch). Kant addresses Swedenborg's visions in the second part, and while it may be the case that he engages in a satire there as Zammito suggests, we may safely regard the first part of the work at least as a statement of Kant's position. It consists of four chapters, the first of which contains an analysis of the concept of spirit. Kant argues that the only concept of spirit that can be maintained is one of simple, immaterial, rational substances that occupy space by virtue of activity but do not fill space or offer any resistance to material bodies. (AK 2:321) Kant describes the activity of the posited spirits as analogous to empirical representations, in which material bodies exhibit a force of repulsion (material bodies are impenetrable).53 Here the limit of human understanding is reached, for although experience enables us to perceive that those things existing in the world which we call material possess such a force, experience does not ever enable us to understand the possibility of such a force. If, then, we posit the existence of substances that are present in space but possess forces which differ in kind from the motive force or force of repulsion, the effect of which is that material objects are impenetrable, we cannot think of them concretely as displaying activity unless we do so by analogy to our own empirical representations. Since we have denied spirit the property of filling space, we have deprived ourselves of a concept by means of which things which present themselves to our senses are thinkable. We have reached a kind of unthinkability, Kant concludes, but this cannot be regarded as a known impossibility. If it were, we would have to concede that even though material beings are present to our senses they are impossible, given that the possibility of the force that results in the impenetrability of matter (upon which material beings depend) would thus be beyond the limits of our understanding. Kant's conclusion, then, is that we may safely accept the possibility of immaterial beings since we can
think them without contradiction and there is no hope that their existence will ever be established or refuted by rational argument.54 (AK 2:322-3)

Kant concludes the first chapter with a discussion of how the human soul, if it is such a spirit, has a place in the material world. He explicitly states that he is inclined to assert the existence of immaterial natures in the world, and to place his own soul in the class of these beings.55 (AK 2:327) This raises the question as to how there can be community between a spirit and a body, i.e., how can immaterial and material substances interact? Kant addresses this question in his second chapter. His answer involves moral feeling, and so it is of some interest to us.

Kant begins by distinguishing between dead matter and life.56 Dead matter fills the universe in accordance with its own nature; it has solidity, extension and shape. The manifestations of dead matter are based upon these grounds and permit a physical explanation which is also mathematical. This explanation is called mechanical when the physical and the mathematical are combined. On the other hand, there is a type of being which contains the ground of life in the universe. Such beings do not enlarge the mass of lifeless matter as constituents, or increase its extension. They are not affected by lifeless matter acting in accordance with the laws of contact and impact. On the contrary, these beings animate both themselves and dead matter by means of their inner activity. By turning one's attention to the ground of life, then, Kant concludes that one will find oneself persuaded, although admittedly without the force of demonstration, that immaterial beings exist. These immaterial beings are spontaneously active principles, and thus substances and natures existing in their own right. They operate in accordance with causal laws, which Kant calls "pneumatic" (pneumatisch). Corporeal beings are "organic" (organisch) insofar as they are the mediating causes of the effects of immaterial beings in the material world. If these immaterial beings are directly united they may constitute a great whole which could be called the immaterial or intelligible world (mundus intelligibilis). That such immaterial beings comprise such an intelligible world is at least as probable (if not more probable) than the proposition that they could stand in community with each other only as a result of the mediation of corporeal beings, which are of an entirely different constitution. (AK 2:329-30) While Kant has indicated to the reader through his use of conditional language and his explicit statements that all of this is hypothetical and cannot be demonstrated, he has also clearly indicated, as we have noted above, that he is "very much inclined to assert the existence of immaterial natures in the world."57 We may take this description, then, as a reasonably accurate portrait of his position in 1764-5.

A portrait emerges, then, of an immaterial world (immaterielle Welt) existing in its own right,58 the parts of which stand in a relation of reciprocal connection and community with each other, without the mediation of corporeal things. Such mediation is contingent, and there is nothing to prevent immaterial beings which act on each other through the mediation of matter from also remaining in communication with and connection to the rest of the immaterial world independently of matter. The result is an image of all the principles of life in nature existing as so many incorporeal substances standing in community with one another, in part united with matter, constituting an immeasurable, unknown hierarchy of immaterial, spontaneously active natures which alone animate the dead matter of the corporeal world. (AK 2:330)

The immaterial world would include all created intelligences, some (but not all) of them united with matter so as to form persons as well as the sensible subjects in all animal species and all the other principles of life wherever they may exist in nature, even though this life does not manifest itself by any of the characteristic marks of voluntary motion. According to this account, Kant writes, there would be a community among these immaterial beings which would not be limited by the conditions which limit the relationship of bodies. Distance in space and separation
in time would vanish; the immaterial world would transcend space and time. The human soul would therefore have to be regarded as being simultaneously linked to two worlds. As connected with a corporeal body it clearly senses only the material world. On the other hand, as a member of the spirit world (Geisterwelt), the human soul would receive and impart the pure influences of immaterial natures. Hence, as soon as its connection with the material world is dissolved, its community with spirit-natures" (geistige Naturen) would continue to exist on its own, and that community would reveal itself to the consciousness of the human soul in the form of a "clear intuition" (klare Anschauen). (AK 2:332) Although we recognize that Kant's account is hypothetical, and meant as a response to the question regarding the veracity or possibility of Swedenborg's claims, we nevertheless may here discern elements of his later sensible/supersensible distinction; indeed Kant asserts that it is "as good as proved" (so gut als demonstriert) that the human soul stands in an indissoluble communion with all the immaterial natures of the spirit world, which are able to exercise an influence on them, even though the soul qua human being is not directly conscious of this communion.59 (AK 2:333) In fact, one must consider the possibility that this description represents a view of reality that Kant never really abandons, and that the critical philosophy is his attempt to give a rational account of this traditional, almost scholastic world view.60

What kind of communion" (Gemeinschaft) can this be? Kant asks us to bear with him as he digresses for a moment and attempts to infer from some "real, generally accepted observation" (einer wirklichen und allgemein zugestandenen Beobachtung) the systematic constitution of the spirit world he has presented. He admits that the attempt will be "far enough removed from self-evidence" (von der Evidenz weit genug entfernt ist), but in spite of this it seems to give rise to conjectures which "are not dis-agreeable" (nicht zu unangenehmen). (AK 2:333-4) These "conjectures" (Vermuthungen) describe the systematic constitution of the spirit world as moral and explain the possibility of communion between the immaterial and material worlds in terms of moral feeling.61

Some of the most powerful forces which move the human heart, Kant reminds us, seem to come from external causes. That is to say, there are forces which seem not to relate solely to our own self-interest; on the contrary, they are related to the interest of others. In Kant's language, these forces "...cause the tendencies of our impulses to shift the focal point of their union outside ourselves and to locate it in other rational beings."62 Hence there is a conflict between the forces of egoism and altruism, and there seems to be a tendency to compare that which one knows for oneself to be good or true with the judgments of others. Kant is not as clear here as he might be in relating altruism (Gemeinnützigkeit), or a desire for the common good, to the desire to conform to the judgments of others, which may of course have nothing really to do with a desire for the common good, but it is the conclusion he draws that interests us. He concludes that all of this, perhaps, reveals that, when it comes to our own judgments, we sense our dependency on "the universal human understanding" (allgemeinen menschlichen Verstande). By universal human understanding" Kant has in mind a faculty of the mind that serves as a means of conferring a kind of unity of reason" (Vernunftseinheit) on the totality of thinking beings" (Ganzen denkender Wesen).63 (AK 2:334)

Even more illuminating, Kant continues, is the fact that when we relate external things to our own needs, we feel ourselves limited by the sensation that there is an alien will" (ein fremder Wille) operating within ourselves. Our will is directed towards the well-being of others or is regulated in accordance with the will of another even though it is contrary to our own desire to satisfy our selfish inclination. There are forces which move us and which are to be found in the
will of others outside ourselves. This is the source of the moral impulse, which often inclines us to act against the dictates of self-interest. Kant has in mind the strong law of obligation and the weaker law of benevolence. Although self-interest may overrule them both, these two laws never fail to assert their reality in human nature. The result of this, Kant argues, is that we recognize in our most secret motives that we are dependent upon the rule of the general will. It is this rule that confers upon the world of all thinking beings its moral unity and invests it with a systematic constitution drawn up in accordance with purely spiritual laws. The constraint that we sense in the desire to harmonize our will to the general will is called moral feeling.

Kant is careful to remind us that we may speak of moral feeling as a manifestation of that which takes place within us, but we have not established its cause. However, he calls Newton to his aid, who called the law governing the tendencies inherent in all particles of matter to draw closer to each other gravitation without being able to demonstrate the cause of the phenomenon. By analogy, then, if Newton can treat gravitation as a genuine effect produced by the universal activity of matter operating on itself, we should be able to represent the phenomenon of the moral impulse in thinking natures as the effect of a genuinely active force through which spirit-natures exercise an influence on each other. If the phenomenon of moral impulses were represented in this way, moral feeling is the sensed dependency of the private will on the general will; it would be an effect produced by a natural and universal reciprocal interaction, just as attraction is the effect of the natural and universal reciprocal interaction of matter. By virtue of this reciprocity the immaterial world would attain its moral unity. (AK 2:334-5)

In a passage that calls to mind the Canon of Pure Reason from the first Critique, Kant points out that the above description has the advantage of resolving the apparent contradiction between the moral and physical circumstances of human beings here on earth, in that while moral actions may not have full effect in the corporeal life of human beings according to the order of nature, they may well have full effect in the spirit world. Moral intentions which are frustrated in the corporeal world would be regarded as in themselves fruitful in the immaterial world. Since the moral character of an action concerns the grounds in accordance with which an action is chosen, i.e., the inner state of the spirit, it follows that it can only produce an effect consonant with the whole of morality in the immediate community of spirits. Hence, a person's soul would in this life occupy its place among the spirit-substances of the universe, and, upon the death of the body, would simply continue in the immaterial world the connection so established. All the consequences of morality practiced in this life would then be felt in the spirit world, and the apparent contradiction between the moral and physical circumstances of human beings in nature would be resolved; the present and the future would constitute a continuous whole. (AK 2:336-7)

This "conjecture" of Kant's, then, is useful to us because it shows that in 1764-5 he is at the very least thinking about a connection between a corporeal world of space and time and an immaterial, intelligible world transcending space and time in terms of moral feeling. This would seem to support an interpretation of Kant's account of the feeling of the sublime in terms of a close relationship to his account of moral feeling. If this interpretation is correct, and therefore the interpretation underlying the present work, the sublime is then properly understood as a doorway to the intelligible world, and the moral language Kant uses in the third Critique in connection with the sublime may be properly understood.
1. For example, see Paul Guyer's *Kant and the Claims of Taste* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 1 n.2.

2. As Richard Velkley argues, Kant's desire to provide a rational foundation for the highest good and to unite in one concept the modern anti-teleological notion of a limitlessly striving reason and the classical idea of a complete and sufficient good is at the heart of his rejection of the moral sense approach. Richard L. Velkley, *Freedom and the End of Reason: On the Moral Foundation of Kant's Critical Philosophy* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1989), 46-7.

3. In the *Critique of Practical Reason* Kant argues that the argument of those who would base morality on moral sense is fallacious in that the concept of morality and duty must precede any moral satisfaction and cannot be derived from it. AK 5:38.

4. *Inquiry concerning the distinctness of the principles of natural theology and morality*, being an answer to the question proposed for consideration by the Berlin Royal Academy of Sciences for the year 1763 (1764). (*Untersuchung über die Deutlichkeit der Grundsätze der natürlichen Theologie und der Moral. Zur Beantwortung der Frage, welche die Königl. Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin auf das Jahr 1763 aufgegeben hat [1764]).


7. As noted above, the classification follows the 4th edition (1757) of Baumgarten’s *Metaphysica*, and appears consistently in Kant's lectures on Metaphysics from the mid-1770's on. *Metaphysik L1*, AK 28:228; *Lectures on Metaphysics*, 47.


11. Edmund Burke's work *Enquiry into the Original of our Feelings of the Sublime and the Beautiful* appeared in English in 1757 but was not published in German until Lessing's translation of 1773 appeared. Kant eventually did read it, because he mentions Burke's work in the third *Critique* (AK 5:277), but the amount of influence, if any, it had on the *Observations* is a matter of some controversy. Kant probably knew of Burke's work by way of Mendelssohn's Über die Mischung der Schönheiten (1758), which summarized Burke, but Kant does not give any serious analysis of Burke's arguments in the *Observations*. See John H. Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993), 32. In 1674 the French critic and poet Boileau published his paraphrase and commentary on the treatise attributed
to the 3rd century Platonist literary critic Dionysius Longinus entitled *On the Sublime* (the authorship of the work has been a matter of scholarly controversy), but Burke's *Inquiry* constitutes the first important systematic presentation of the sublime in terms of the new and more profound concept of aesthetic subjectivity that was emerging in the eighteenth century. See Ernst Cassirer, *The Philosophy of The Enlightenment*, trans. Fritz C. A. Koelln and James P. Pettegrove (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951; reprint, Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), 328 (page numbers refer to the reprint edition).


14. Kant mentions Kepler, through a report by Bayle according to which Kepler "valued a production of the mind above a kingdom." AK 2:208; Goldthwait, 46 n. 2.

15. During the mid-1770's, in his lectures at Königsberg on Metaphysics, Kant began to make distinctions between animal pleasure," which consists in the feeling of the "private senses;" human pleasure," which is feeling cognized by sensibility through an idea; and spiritual pleasure," which is ideal and is cognized from pure concepts of the understanding. The spiritual pleasure is also called intellectual pleasure," which is to be found *only in* morality. This work will argue that Kant's finer feeling in 1763 becomes intellectual pleasure by the mid-1770's, and that the concept of intellectual pleasure is key to interpreting the importance of the feeling of the sublime. *Lectures on Metaphysics*, 64-5; AK 28:248-250.

16. Compare §VII of Burke's *Inquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful*: "Whatever is fitted in any sort to excite the ideas of pain and danger, that is to say, whatever is in any sort terrible, or is conversant about terrible objects, or operates in a manner analogous to terror, is a source of the *sublime*: that is, it is productive of the strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling." Edmund Burke, *On the Sublime and Beautiful*, in The Harvard Classics, ed. Charles W. Eliot (New York: P.F. Collier and Son, 1909; reprint, New York: P.F. Collier and Son Corporation, 1937), vol. 24, 35 (page references are to reprint edition). Kant's description of the sublime in the *Observations* includes the feeling of fear, but not everything fearful is sublime, nor is the sublime a feeling of *pain*; there is a pleasure involved that comes from our sense of our own dignity.

17. The theme of movement present in Kant's description of the sublime is relevant to the problem of *motivation*. Throughout Kant's career, he was concerned with the problem of motivating the subject towards an objectively conceived goal. That the sublime moves us, and that it moves us because of its capacity to make us aware of our moral vocation is why it is morally and metaphysically important to Kant. The idea that the sublime is an experience that somehow moves us goes back at least as far as Longinus who wrote in Chapter 1 of the work attributed to him entitled *On the Sublime* that "The effect of elevated language upon an audience is not persuasion but transport. At every time and in every way imposing speech, with the spell it throws over us, prevails over that which aims at persuasion and gratification. Our persuasions we can usually control, but the influences of the sublime bring power and irresistible might to bear, and reign supreme over every hearer." Longinus, *On The Sublime*: The Greek Text Edited after the
Paris Manuscript with Introduction, Translation, Facsimiles and Appendices, trans. W. Rhys Roberts, M.A. (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1899; reprint, Ancient Greek Literature Series, ed. Leonardo Tarán, New York: Garland Publishing, Inc. 1987), 43 (page references are to the reprint edition). The book is the earliest attempt to define the sublime extant (although it is a criticism of an earlier treatise on the sublime by Caecilius [Ibid., 41]). Briefly, the sublime is a term used in literature which refers to the product of a great and noble mind presenting its ideas in such a way that it is remarkable for its instantaneous appeal. It produces a range of emotions in the mind similar to that which inspire the object, the result of which is a valuable state of mind, necessarily inexplicable but referred to by means of a series of conventional terms. Part of the purpose of Longinus' treatise is to explain the rules of the art of the sublime and to explain why desired sublimity is not achieved. Henn, T.R., Longinus and English Criticism (Cambridge: At the University Press, 1934), 15 ff. Although the theme of the sublime can be traced back to the beginnings of philosophical aesthetics, as noted above in the present section, in the eighteenth century the problem of the sublime takes on a new significance.

18. As shall be shown below in Chapter 3, Kant's concept of the beautiful will change considerably by 1790, much more, perhaps, than his concept of the sublime; in the third Critique such adornments and ornamentation will be no part of the beautiful, which will concern only the form of the object. Adornments and so on are then what Kant will call charm."

19. The work is divided into four sections. The third section treats the beautiful and the sublime as they occur in the two sexes; the fourth the beautiful and the sublime as they are manifested in different national characteristics.


21. Kant provides the category of mathematically sublime in Critique of Judgment.

22. Here we see another foreshadowing of a position Kant will develop in his critical moral philosophy, for example, in Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, he affirms that since we know only appearances we can never judge the moral worth of another's actions. We cannot even know if our own motives are entirely free of self-interest; the best we can do is strive to choose our maxims purely from respect for the moral law (AK 4:406-8).

23. This study will argue that for Kant moral feeling (i.e., a sense that one should be moral) is an inherent human quality. Indeed, Kant uses the phrase universal moral feeling (allgemeines moralisches Gefühl) in the next paragraph in reference to the weakness of human nature. Although moral feeling oftentimes has little or no influence over an individual's choice, throughout his career Kant seems consistently to affirm that human beings have moral feeling, which may be developed to a greater or lesser degree. (AK 2:217).

24. Goldthwait, 60 (AK 2:217).

25. It was thought that these temperaments corresponded to the four humors of the blood - an hypothesis that Kant does not mention here.

26. Kant tells us that whenever one has no feeling for the beautiful or the sublime, whatever is called beautiful or sublime appears senseless and absurd. He remarks that we do an injustice to such persons when we say they do not understand, for it is not so much a matter of what the understanding comprehends as it is a matter of what the feeling senses. A strong feeling for the
true noble or beautiful is the proper motive for the employment of intellectual excellences. (AK 2:224-5).

27. "Die Gemüthscharaktere der Völkerschaften sind am kenntlichsten bei demjenigen, was an ihnen moralisch ist. . . ."

28. As Goldthwait remarks, this is an interesting conclusion to the work given that Kant had read Rousseau's Émile prior to writing it. Goldthwait, 11. It seems to indicate that Kant diverges from Rousseau, or at least that he did not consider Émile to have satisfied the requirements of the needed moral education. Lewis White Beck reports that Rousseau had an "immediate and profound impact" on Kant and that, according to legend, the publication of Émile made Kant miss his afternoon walk. Lewis White Beck, Early German Philosophy: Kant and his Predecessors (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of the Harvard University Press, 1969), 489. Velkley's study of the reflections made by Kant in the margins of his copy of the Observations, which were published by Lehmann in 1942 (Academy volume 20), concludes that they are unmistakenly the record of an intense encounter of Kant with Rousseau's writings in 1764-5. Velkley writes "It is established beyond doubt that Kant was reading the major works in French as they were becoming available in the early and middle 1760s." Velkley, The End of Reason, 49-50.

29. The precise dating of the various lecture notes that have come down to us is quite problematic. This is an issue that is not addressed in any detail by J.B. Schneewind in his introduction to the Lectures on Ethics. There is, however, an excellent description of the problems involved given by Karl Ameriks and Steve Naragon in their introduction to the Lectures on Metaphysics. Briefly the problem is that many of the manuscripts have dates on them, but these dates may not refer to the semester of origin. In some cases, they refer to the time that the notes were copied or acquired by students, or they might refer to when a student who had purchased a set of notes actually heard Kant's lectures. The contents of the notes may provide clues for dating, but these should not be taken at face value. The dates for the Herder notes are well established, however; and they are especially important given that they are the only notes that survive from the period before 1770. Herder matriculated at Königsberg on August 10, 1762, and during his time at the university Kant lectured on Metaphysics, Logic, Moral Philosophy, Physical Geography, Theoretical Physics and Mathematics; we have Herder's own notes from each of these courses. Lectures on Metaphysics, xxviii-xxix. The Herder notes on Moral Philosophy are in the Academy edition volume 27:3-78.

30. Lectures on Ethics, 3 (AK 27:3).


33. Ibid., 4 (AK 27:4). Kant makes this point as a point of departure from Hutcheson, who believed moral acts must be disinterested and is mentioned here by name.

34. Ibid., 4 (AK 27:5).

35. Ibid., 5 (AK 27:6).


37. Ibid., 4 (AK 27:5). At AK 27:14 Kant remarks that the "tender-hearted" (verzärtelnde) ethic makes for a beautiful morality; the "strict and serious" (ernsthafte strenge) ethic for a sublime one. Thus the charities of a rich man are morally beautiful as a consequence of kindliness, but as a consequence of principles and a sense of obligation they are sublime. Ibid., 9. As Kant develops his theme (AK 27:17), it seems that moral beauty is a stage that precedes moral nobility of actions. Moral nobility is the relationship of an action to "the greatest supreme rule, which is the ground of everything" (der grösten obersten Regel, die der Grund von allem ist); knowledge that this is the
case is noble. Moral beauty is "sensuous and vivid" (sinnlich und lebhaft); Kant seems to say that moral beauty is the result of concern for others through moral feeling. We start with moral beauty (which is also described as "weak morality" [schwache Moralität]), and progress to moral nobility by recognizing the goodness of our will in conformity to a rule - at this stage Kant has yet to formulate the rule with any vigor; he seems to have God as the author of natural law in mind. Kant is clear, however, that we do not derive morality from religion (a mistake he accuses Baumgarten of making "throughout his entire book" [im ganzen Buch]); the starting point is morality. We should use the divine will as a betterment of our own morality; Kant quotes Rousseau's La Nouvelle Héloïse to support his point. *Ibid.*, 10-11.

38. The sublime is a perfection" (Vollkommenheit) that is distinguished from the beautiful. Both perfections may move us morally or non-morally. *Ibid.*, 14 (AK 27:31).

39. *Ibid.*, 11 (AK 27:19). This is a most interesting statement in light of the position Kant will stake out in the third *Critique*.


41. Indeed, the rule is restated at AK 27:16: "The sole moral rule, therefore, is this: Act according to your moral feeling!" "Die einzige Moralische Regel ist also die: handle nach deinem moralischen Gefühl!" *Ibid.*, 10.


44. The only book length treatment of Rousseau's influence on Kant in English is Velkley's *Freedom and the End of Reason*. Velkley argues that the unpublished ethical reflections of the 1760's reveals a Rousseauian turn" in Kant's thinking that precedes and conditions the famous transcendental turn." Through Rousseau, Velkley argues, Kant comes to realize that the Enlightenment has failed to establish that reason is a beneficent force in human life and as a result Kant begins to think of both theoretical and moral reason in terms of an overarching moral project. *Ibid.*, 2. Lewis White Beck speaks of a Rousseauistic Revolution" in ethics that shows itself in Kant's conclusion that the moral law that commands me to do X must be a law legislated by reason and not drawn from experience or revelation. Beck, *Early German Philosophy*, 490-1. Velkley argues that Beck does not recognize the early influence of Rousseau on Kant. Velkley, *Freedom and the End of Reason*, 169-70 n. 6. That Kant thinks in terms of an overarching moral project is central to the thesis we are developing here.


47. *Lectures on Ethics*, 6-7, (AK 27:10-11). Kant is arguing here against voluntarism, thus the present context is one of obedience to the divine choice (arbitrium divinum). Morality must exist even in God; God commands actions because they are moral, actions are not moral because God
commands them. Here we see evidence of Kant's commitment to a position that he will maintain consistently throughout his career.


49. Ibid., 18 (AK 27:42). In the next few lines Kant addresses the problem of "acquired" vs. "natural" conscience. He says that much that is acquired is taken to be natural, but he does not agree with Voltaire's position that all conscience is acquired. The work of Voltaire that Kant has in mind is not specified.

50. Published in 1766. It was probably composed in the years 1764 and 1765. Theoretical Philosophy 1755-1770, xxxvii.

51. At the end of the first part of the Dreams Kant tells the reader that he will now put aside the whole matter of the theory of spirits as something settled and completed. (AK 2:352) The second part of the work is of an entirely different, satirical character. Kant mentioned Swedenborg in his lectures on metaphysics as late as the 1790's. Lectures on Metaphysics, 408 (AK 28:768).

52. John H. Zammito describes the work as the high point of Kant's empirical skepticism. He sees it as part of Kant's reaction to the emerging Schwärmerei (enthusiasm) which opposed the rationalism of the Enlightenment. Zammito argues that the subversion of Herder, one of Kant's best students, from Aufklärung to Schwärmerei by Johann Georg Hamann in the early 1760s has not been sufficiently considered as a contributing factor in the com-position of Kant's "ironic essay." The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment, 34. Zammito places a great deal of importance on Herder's defection and the tension between Aufklärung and Schwärmerei or Sturm und Drang generally in his treatment of the genesis of the third Critique, but we may nevertheless discern elements of Kant's own position in the first part of Dreams.

53. Again, we note that Kant's account foreshadows the dynamic account of nature he will develop in the Opus postumum.

54. A conclusion that foreshadows the solution to the Antinomies made possible by the discoveries of the Inaugural Dissertation (On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World [1770]), which was defended on August 21, 1770.

55. A position he consistently held, as evidenced by his lectures on Metaphysics into the mid-1790's. In addition, Kant seemed to hold that the soul was pre-formed before its union with the body, that it survives the death of the body (although it is not necessarily immortal) and that it is simple substance. See, for example, Metaphysik Vigilantius (K3),Lectures on Metaphysics, 492 (AK 29:1025) ff.

56. In his lectures on Metaphysics, Kant held that matter is a hindrance on the principle of life; his favorite example, apparently repeated often over the years, likened the union of soul and body to being attached to a cart; one is much more free without the cart. See, for example, Metaphysik K2, Lectures on Metaphysics, 402 (AK 28:762-3).

57. "Ich gestehe, daß ich sehr geneigt sei, das Dasein immaterieller Naturen in der Welt zu behaupten und meine Seele selbst in die Klasse dieser Wesen zu verstetzen." (AK 2:327)

58. As shall be argued below, the movement of Kant's thought seems to have ultimately been towards something like the idealism of Fichte, Schelling and Hegel. It seems clear that the phenomenon/noumenon distinction is a distinction between two aspects of one reality and not two ontologically distinct worlds.

59. Kant writes that it is likely that spirit natures are able to exercise an influence on the souls of human beings given that both are of the same (immaterial) nature. But the intuitive representations of immaterial things cannot be communicated to the "clear consciousness" of human beings, at least not in their specific form, since the materials of which ideas in the
immmaterial world are different in kind from the materials of which ideas in the material world are formed. (AK 2:333) Hence, if there is human consciousness of the immaterial world, it is indirect. By the same token, Kant remarks that it is also likely that spirit-natures qua immaterial beings cannot receive any conscious sensible impression of the corporeal world, since they are not linked with a portion of matter such as to form a person.

60. Indeed, as has been noted (notes 47 and 48 in the present section above), Kant's lectures on Metaphysics would seem to support this possibility.

61. A description that foreshadows the account of a super-sensible human faculty that is able to determine itself in accordance with the moral law in spite of the influences of the sensible world.

62. "... sondern welche machen, daß die Tendenzen unserer Regungen den Brennpunkt ihrer Vereinigung außer uns in andere vernünftige Wesen Versetzen..." Theoretical Philosophy, 321 (AK 2:334).

63. This passage seems to foreshadow Kant's later position regarding the intersubjective validity of the aesthetic judgment. In Kant's lectures on Metaphysics delivered in the mid-1770s, under the Baumgartenian heading Empirical Psychology" a further stage in the development of the position may be observed as the idea of a universal understanding or sense is connected to the aesthetic judgment. There we read "Out of the intercourse among human beings a communal sense arises which is valid for everyone. Thus whoever does not come into a community has no communal sense. - The beautiful and the ugly can be distinguished by human beings only so far as they are in a community. Thus whomever something pleases according to a communal and universally valid sense, he has taste. Taste is therefore a faculty for judging through satisfaction or dissatisfaction, according to the communal and universally valid sense." "Aus dem Umgange mit Menschen entsteht ein gemein-schaflicher Sinn, der für jedermann gilt. Wer also in keine Gemeinschaft kommt, hat keinen gemeinschaftlichen Sinn. - Das Schöne und Häßliche kann nur von Menschen unterschieden werden, so fern sie in der Gemeinschaft sind. Wem also etwas nach einem gemeinschaftlichen und allgemein gültigen Sinne gefällt; der hat Geschmack. Der Geschmack ist daher ein Vermögen der Beurtheilung durch Wohlgefallen oder Mißfallen, nach dem gemeinschaftlichen und allgemein gültigen Sinne." Lectures on Metaphysics, 65 (AK 28:249).

64. "We sense within ourselves a constraining of our will to harmonize with the general will. To call this sensed constraining moral feeling," is to speak of it merely as a manifestation of that which takes place within us, without establishing its causes." Will man diese in uns empfundene Nöthigung unseres Willens zur Einstimmung mit dem allgemeinen Willen das sittliche Gefühl nennen, so redet man davon nur als von einer Erscheinung dessen, was in uns wirklich vorgeht, ohne die Ursachen desselben auszumachen." Theoretical Philosophy, 322 (AK 2:335). Kant seems to use "sittliches Gefühl" interchangeably with "moralisches Gefühl," but Munzel offers an explanation. Moralität refers to the objective consideration of norms; its principles constitute moral science valid for all rational beings. Sittlichkeit entails in addition the subjective consideration of the adoption of these norms by the human agent, i.e., the processes whereby the moral norms are realized in space and time. The relation between Sittlichkeit and Moralität can be thought of in terms of a parallel between cognition (Erkenntniß) and pure thinking (reines Denken) (KrV B146). Munzel, "The Beautiful is the Symbol of the Morally-good," 316-7. If this is correct, then moralisches Gefühl involves the representation of the moral law while Sittliches Gefühl involves the pleasure that results (or should result) from moral action. Both terms will be translated moral feeling" in this work.
65. Compare this passage to the account of heaven and hell given in the sections under the Baumgartenian heading Rational Psychology" in the lectures on Metaphysics. Heaven is the soul's consciousness of intercourse with the blessed, hell is the soul's consciousness of intercourse with the non-blessed. *Metaphysik Dohna* (1792-3), *Metaphysik K2* (early 1790's); Lectures on Metaphysics, 390,409 (AK 28:689, 28:770). In the passage from the *Metaphysik K2* notebook we are told that heaven is understood to be an infinite progression to the good, and so the gradual enlargement of the evil principle is hell. An infinite progression in good can easily be thought, but not in evil. This is consistent with the Canon of Pure Reason, which implies that the moral world we are obligated to promote is an infinite progression towards the good; the highest good is achieved when there is perfect apportionment of happiness to worthiness to be happy. (KrV A808/B836 ff.) There would seem to be no room for eternal damnation in Kant's account.

66. Kant reminds us at the end of the fourth chapter, which completes the first part of his treatise, that he has made no mention of how the human spirit comes into the world, or of how an immaterial nature can exist in a body and how it can exercise an influence by means of the body. The reason for this, he tells us again, is that he is completely ignorant about these matters. In bringing his account of the theory of spirits to a conclusion, which, if properly used by the reader, will bring the whole of our philosophical understanding of such beings to a completion, Kant sums up with the opinion that, while it will be possible to have all sorts of opinions about such beings, it will not be possible to have *knowledge* of such beings. Kant's philosophical theory of spirit-beings is completed by establishing the limits of our understanding and by realizing that the various different appearances of life in nature, and the laws governing them, constitute the whole of what we can know about spirits. The principle of this life, i.e., spirit-nature, can only be supposed and not known. (AK 2:350-1) This disclaimer, which is meant to apply to the first "dogmatic" part of the work as a whole, highlights the importance of the digression we have examined.
Chapter II
The Emergence of the Critical Philosophy

Lectures on Metaphysics: Metaphysik L1 (Mid-1770's)

Kant, following Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* (4th ed. 1757), included Empirical and Rational Psychology as major divisions in his lecture course on Metaphysics. The sections from Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* (4th ed. 1757) on Empirical Psychology (§§504-739) also served as the textbook for Kant's Anthropology lectures. In these lectures one may observe Kant discussing elements of what will become his mature aesthetic theory, which, perhaps, is fitting given that it was Baumgarten who first gave the word "aesthetic" its modern sense. In any case, the lectures on Metaphysics are an invaluable supplement to Kant's published works generally, and to the project of this work specifically. Given the paucity of material we have from Kant during this silent decade," these student notes are important in themselves, and, as shall be shown below, they yield some helpful clues towards our interpretation of Kant's position on the aesthetic judgment, the sublime and morality.

Kant is composing the Critique of Pure Reason (*Kritik der reinen Vernunft*) at this time, and this is apparent when one reads the L1 notes. The familiar Kantian language is present as well as the familiar themes. To go into any detail on this point is to distract us from our primary purpose; the point is that these lectures were given at a time when Kant had begun to incorporate the accomplishment of his *Inaugural Dissertation* into his thought. Let us turn to the sections on Psychology, which will be directly relevant to the thesis we are developing.

As he does in the third *Critique*, Kant here classifies the mind in terms of three faculties (which he takes in part from Baumgarten's *Metaphysica* [4th ed. 1757]): Representations or cognitions, desires and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. These may be either higher faculties insofar as the mind is active, or lower faculties insofar as the mind is passive. The faculty of representations, which Kant also calls the faculty of cognition, is the lower faculty of cognition insofar as the mind is affected by objects; the higher faculty of cognition is the power to have representations from ourselves. The faculty of desire is the lower faculty of desire when we desire something as a result of being affected by objects. The higher faculty of desire is a power to desire some-thing from ourselves independently of objects. The faculty of pleasure and displeasure is either higher or lower depending upon whether we sense a pleasure or displeasure in ourselves independently of objects or whether the pleasure or displeasure is the result of being affected by an object respectively. All lower faculties, Kant tells us, constitute sensibility" (*Sinnlichkeit*); all higher faculties constitute intellectuality" (*Intellectualität*). Intellectuality is a faculty of representation, of desires, or of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure insofar as one is "wholly independent of objects" (*so fern man von den Gegenständen ganz unabhängig ist*). Intellectual cognitions are intellectual because they arise from ourselves. (AK 28:228-9) We now ask, how does this speak to our topic? By way of an answer, let us now focus on the faculty of pleasure and displeasure.

The faculty of pleasure and displeasure, Kant tells us, is wholly distinguished from the faculty of cognition. The determination of things with respect to which we manifest pleasure and displeasure are not determinations that belong simply to the objects; they are determinations that refer to the "constitution" (*Beschaffenheit*) of the subject. (AK 28:245) Here we see Kant foreshadowing the account of aesthetic judgment he will articulate in the third *Critique*. And,
indeed, a few paragraphs later we read, "The beautiful is thus not the relation of cognition to the object, but rather to the subject."7 The aesthetic perfection" (Vollkommenheit) occurs when cognition agrees with the subject; logical perfection" is the agreement of cognition with the object. More of this cannot be said here, Kant remarks; his full development of his account of the beautiful will not be published for some 15 years.8

We cannot have representations of things, Kant tells us, through the faculty of cognition in any other way than according to the determination of the thing independently of the representation. The example Kant gives is that of cognizing the round figure in a circle without the circle having been represented. That is to say, we cognize "round," a determination of the object, without abstracting "round" from the object and representing it as the concept "circle." The determination "round" is perceived in the object independently of any representation by the faculty of cognition, and the object cannot be cognized as "square;" i.e., the representation of the object through the faculty of cognition is determined by the characteristics of the object. (AK 28:245)

But, Kant tells us, not all determinations are perceived in things independently of representation. The determination of good and evil, of beautiful and ugly, of agreeable and disagreeable, are determinations that cannot at all be perceived in things without first being cognized through representation. (AK 28:245) That is to say, these qualities are not qualities that belong to objects independently of human knowing. Kant concludes from this that there must be a faculty of the mind that is distinct from the faculty of cognition, although cognition is its precondition (since there is no knowing at all without cognition). This faculty is the faculty of being affected by objects, the faculty of pleasure and displeasure.9 If we speak of an object as beautiful or ugly or agreeable or disagreeable, we speak not of the object in itself but of how it affects us. Kant remarks that if we take away the faculty of pleasure and displeasure from all rational beings, and increase their faculty of cognition however much, they would cognize all objects without being moved by them. Everything would be the same for such a being since they would lack the faculty for being affected by objects. (AK 28:246) This remark by Kant is not without relevance to the thesis of the present work; it shows Kant's awareness of the need for a human being to be moved as opposed to or in addition to attaining rational cognition. Hence, with respect to the moral realm, one might adduce this text in support of an interpretation of Kant's position wherein he is aware that the rational arguments of pure practical reason are not in themselves sufficient to move the human being towards embracing their moral feeling, and so the importance of the third Critique lies in its articulation of the phenomenon whereby we feel our moral vocation. Feeling our moral vocation, as any reader of Hume would know, constitutes a stronger motivation to action than merely conceiving it; and Kant, who did read Hume,10 was, as the present work shall demonstrate, very much concerned throughout his life with the problem of motivating human beings to moral action. Herein lies the importance of the feeling of the sublime; this interpretation is one that has been overlooked for the most part in the literature until now.

All pleasure and displeasure presupposes cognition of an object, Kant tells us, either in terms of sensation or intuition or of concepts; there is no desire for or satisfaction in the unknown. But pleasure is not in the cognition; pleasure is a feeling for which cognition is the precondition.11 (AK 28:246) But what is feeling? It is hard to determine, Kant says, but he offers this explanation: representations can be twofold, i.e., they may be representations of the object or of the subject. Our representations can be compared either to the objects or with the entire life of the subject" (gesammten Leben des Subjects). The subjective representations of the entire power of life" (gesammte Lebenskraft) for receiving or excluding objects is the relation of satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Hence feeling is the relation of the objects not to the representation, but rather to
the entire power of the mind" (gesammte Kraft des Gemüths), for either "most inwardly" (innigst) receiving them or excluding them. The receiving is the feeling of pleasure and the excluding is the feeling of displeasure. Or, in other words, what harmonizes with the principle of life is pleasure, and its contrary, displeasure. From this account arises the distinction between logical and aesthetic perfections cited above; as has been shown, logical perfection agrees with the object; aesthetic perfection occurs when the comparison of representations in cognition agrees with the entire power of life" or entire power of the mind" of the subject. (AK 28:246-7)

One may discern elements of Kant's later aesthetic theory here. Life, we are told, is the inner principle of self activity. Living beings acting according to this inner principle must act according to representations. Life may be promoted or hindered, Kant tells us, and the feeling of the promotion of life is pleasure while the feeling of the hindrance of life is displeasure.13 Pleasure is therefore a ground of activity and displeasure a hindrance of activity, and only subjects that are active according to representations have pleasure and displeasure. (AK 28:247-8) Kant's identification of pleasure with activity here foreshadows his account of the beautiful in terms of the free play" (freies Spiel) of imagination and understanding, and of the sublime in terms of activity of imagination in the Critique of Judgment.14

In a passage reminiscent of Plato's account of the soul, Kant distinguishes three kinds of pleasure according to three aspects of life.15 These are animal, human and spiritual life, all of which are aspects of the life of a rational being. There is thus a threefold pleasure: Animal pleasure" (thierische Lust), which consists in the feeling of the private senses; human pleasure" (menschliche Lust), which is feeling according to a "universal sense" (allgemeines Sinne), by means of the sensible power of judgment" (sinnliches Urtheilskraft); it is a "middle thing" (Mitteilung), cognized from sensibility through an idea; and finally spiritual pleasure" (geistige Lust), which is cognized from pure concepts of the understanding.16

Pleasure and displeasure may be either objective or subjective depending upon whether its ground agrees with a determined subject or (in a passage that calls to mind immediately the Critique of Judgment) with a universal judgment" (allgemeinen Urtheile) that has a universal validity" (allgemeine Gültigkeit) and is "valid for everyone" (für jedermann gilt) independently of the particular conditions of the subject. Objective satisfaction, Kant goes on, is twofold: something pleases or displeases either according to universal sensibility" (allgemeinen Sinnlichkeit) or according to the universal power of cognition" (allgemeinen Erkenntniskraft).17 The former is either beautiful or ugly; the latter is either good or evil. (AK 28:248) Kant immediately asks, how can a human being pass judgment according to the universal sense given that one may only consider the object according to one's private sense?18 His answer here is that out of the intercourse among human beings a communal sense arises which is valid for everyone. Hence whoever does not come into a community has no communal sense, and cannot distinguish the beautiful and the ugly.19 When one is pleased according to a communal and universally valid sense, one has taste. Taste depends, however, on the senses; hence it belongs to the lower faculty of pleasure and displeasure. The higher faculty of pleasure and displeasure judges objects according to "universally valid grounds of the power of cognition" (allgemein gültigen Gründen der Erkenntniskraft); this is the faculty of judging whether an object pleases or displeases from cognition of the understanding according to universally valid principles. If something is an object of intellectual satisfaction, Kant tells us, it is good; if it is an object of intellectual dissatisfaction it is evil. Now, Kant asks, how can the good please if it does not "awaken" (erwecken) any gratification?20 If virtues were agreeable, he remarks, everyone would be virtuous. The answer lies in freedom. Freedom is the greatest degree of activity and life, and if one feels that something
agrees with the highest degree of freedom, and thus with the spiritual life, one is pleased. This pleasure is intellectual pleasure. One derives satisfaction from it, we are told, without gratification. Such intellectual pleasure is *only in* morality. From where does morality get such pleasure, Kant asks? Morality is the harmony of freedom with itself, he answers. Whatever harmonizes with freedom agrees with the whole of life; whatever agrees with the whole of life pleases. But this pleasure is a "reflective" (*reflectirende*) pleasure; we are not gratified by it; we approve of it through reflection. Morality does not gratify, but through the exercise of virtue a human being feels his spiritual life and the highest degree of his freedom. (AK 28:249-250)

How does that which does not gratify motivate? Kant takes up the subject of motivation under the heading of the Faculty of Desire. There he tells us that if the cognition of the understanding has a power to move the subject to the action *merely because* the action is *in itself* good, then this motive power is an incentive we call moral feeling. There should be moral feeling, then, whereby a motive power arises through the motives of the understanding. But this incentive of the mind is not pathologically necessitating" (*pathologisch necessitiren*), that is, the principle of morality is *not* derived from the subjective grounds of our moral feeling. As has been noted above, moral feeling is a problematic term for Kant; he seems to hold that human beings have an innate moral feeling which may be nourished or suppressed and which motivates them towards moral behavior; here he says we should think of such a feeling in terms of moral motivation, wherein one is to "cognize the good through the understanding and yet have a feeling of it" (*Man soll das Gute durch den Verstand erkennen, und doch davon ein Gefühl haben*). He immediately remarks that this is obviously something that cannot be properly understood; how can one have a feeling of that which is cognized objectively through the understanding and is thus not an object of feeling? There is a contradiction here, Kant remarks; if we are supposed to do the good through a feeling, then we do it because it is agreeable. But this cannot be because the good cannot at all affect our senses. Yet we call the pleasure in the good a feeling because we cannot otherwise express the subjective driving power of objective practical necessitation. This situation is a misfortune for the human race, he remarks, in that moral laws, which are *objectively* necessitating, are not also subjectively necessitating. (AK 28:258) As shall be shown below, this is a problem the solution of which Kant hopes to find in the aesthetic judgment. Here we see how metaphysics provides the proper level for bridging together moral and aesthetic themes.

Kant's lectures on Metaphysics, then, are important to gaining a full appreciation of the significance of the sublime to his moral metaphysics. One discovers themes there that will gestate and be articulated under the rubric of the critical system in the third *Critique*, the most important of which, to our interpretation of the sublime, concern intellectual pleasure and its connection to freedom and morality. For in the *Critique of Judgment* (AK 5:192) Kant will write that some aesthetic judgments arise from an intellectual feeling and as such refer to the sublime. Given this relation, and Kant's concern with *motivation*, an interpretation of the feeling of the sublime in terms of its importance to Kant's moral metaphysics seems to be the correct approach. We shall develop Kant's concern with motivation in the next section as we return to Kant's lectures on Ethics.

**Lectures on Ethics: Notebook Collins (1784-5)**

The section in Collins' lecture notes entitled *Of the Supreme Principle of Morality* may be of some relevance to our thesis. Here Kant addresses the problem of motivation. The question is, what moves us to live according to the moral law? This question, which anticipates the famous
question about the interest of reason, is perhaps even more problematic than the question, what is 
or is not morally good? The latter question is in the domain of the understanding, and may be 
answered relatively straightforwardly once certain criteria are adopted. Even so, the problem still 
remains as to how the understanding moves the will, or in other words, how the cognitive faculty 
moves the faculty of desire. As we shall see, Kant's solution will involve the faculty of the feeling 
of pleasure and displeasure which connects these two faculties.26 Kant's answer here involves 
moral feeling, and the question speaks to the problem of access to noumenon which we are 
addressing through our examination of the role of the sublime in Kant's moral metaphysics.

Kant distinguishes here between the principle of appraisal of obligation and the principle of 
its performance or execution. Hence the "guideline" (Richtschnur) is distinguished from the 
"motive" (Triebfeder). Appraisal of the action, the guideline, is the objective ground but not yet 
the subjective ground. The subjective motive is that which impels us to do the thing that the 
understanding tells us to do, and this is moral feeling.27 Such a principle of motive cannot be 
confused with the principle of judgment, which lies in the understanding.28 The norm is the 
understanding, which contains the supreme principle of all moral judgment, but the motive is moral 
feeling. Motive does not take the place of the norm; when judgment is lacking, we have a 
thoretical fault; when motive is lacking we have a practical fault. (AK 27:274-5)

Kant is not entirely comfortable with this concept, however. He will have to give an account 
of moral feeling in such a way that it is not a pathological feeling. He begins by distinguishing 
two pathological principles, physical feeling, which aims at the satisfaction of all inclinations, and 
a pathological principle, which aims at the satisfaction of an inclination directed to morality. This 
second pathological principle would be called moral feeling, but we quickly discover that such a 
feeling is impossible. A pathological principle that aims at the satisfaction of an inclination 
directed to morality would be grounded on an intellectual inclination. But an intellectual 
inclination is a contradiction, because a feeling for objects of the understanding is an absurdity. 
Hence a moral feeling out of intellectual inclination is not possible. A feeling cannot be both 
intellectual and sensory; feeling cannot be ideal. And, perhaps more importantly for Kant, even if 
it were possible that we should have a sensation for morality, no rules could be established on that 
principle. Kant's next phrase is a bit confusing at first, for we read that a moral feeling says 
categorically what ought to happen, whether it pleases us or not; and hence is not satisfaction of 
our inclination. (AK 27:275) The confusion as to Kant's meaning, at least, will be cleared up as 
we find out what he has in mind by moral feeling in the positive sense.

Let us sum up. Kant has told us that the term intellectual inclination is contradictory.29 From 
this it follows that a feeling for objects of the understanding is absurd, and a moral feeling out of 
intellectual inclination is impossible. But Kant speaks of a moral feeling that says categorically 
what ought to happen; although we don't yet know what this is, perhaps we know what it is not. 
Kant tells us that the moral law commands categorically, and so morality cannot be based on a 
pathological principle, either of physical or moral feeling, because any feeling has only private 
validity and is not accessible to anyone else. Once anyone appeals to a feeling he gives up all 
grounds of reason; the method of appealing to feeling in a practical rule is wholly contrary to 
philosophy. (AK 27:275-6) In light of this strong condemnation, what could Kant have meant by 
a moral feeling that says categorically what ought to happen?30

Kant wants to give an account of a moral feeling that is free of all inclination except the desire 
to submit to a judgment of the understanding and so is not a pathological principle. Before 
returning to the subject of motivation, he establishes the role of the understanding in morality. The 
principle of morality cannot be pathological, and so there has to be a principle that is intellectual
insofar as it is "borrowed" (entlehnen) from the understanding. This principle consists in the rule given by the understanding either as a means of framing our actions to coincide with our inclinations or in a rule by which the ground of morality is immediately known through the understanding. The first is an intellectual principle, but because it is rooted in inclination, Kant calls it a pseudo-principle. This pseudo-principle is the pragmatic principle or the principle of prudence. Morality cannot be grounded on the pragmatic principle of prudence since morality is independent of all inclinations. If it were not, there could be no agreement among human beings in regard to morality, since everyone would seek happiness according to their own inclinations. The principle of morality is intellectual but not mediate (through inclination) as the pragmatic is, it is immediate insofar as the ground of morality is immediately known through the understanding. It is thus an utterly pure intellectual principle of pure reason.32 (AK 27:276) This principle cannot be external; we recognize the perfection of the divine will from the moral law, and to abide by the moral law out of fear of punishment is not to act from duty and obligation. The ground of morality must be an inner principle; it is intellectuale internum, internal to the mind. It must be sought through pure reason in the action itself. Although Kant does not yet formulate the categorical imperative as we have come to know it, he does articulate the basic principle: morality is the conformity of the action to a universally valid law of free choice. All morality is the relationship of the action to the universal rule. The essential part of morality is that our actions have their motivating ground in the universal rule. (AK 27:1425-633) But how can the universal rule motivate the will?

This problem presents Kant with some difficulty, as he himself admits. The understanding is the faculty of rules, and if our actions are consistent with the universal rule they are consistent with the understanding and they have motivating grounds in the understanding. If the action is done because it concurs with the universal rule of the understanding it comes from a pure principle of morality internal to the mind. Since the understanding is the faculty of rules and judgment, morality consists in the subordination of the action to the principle of the understanding. The problem lies in explaining how a rule of the understanding, conceived objectively, can motivate subjectively, i.e., become a principle of action. Kant attempts an explanation, but he is not satisfied with it:

Nobody can or ever will comprehend how the understanding should have a motivating power; it can admittedly judge, but to give this judgement power so that it becomes a motive able to impel the will to performance of an action - to understand this is the philosopher's stone.34

Das kann und wird auch niemand einsehen, daß der Verstand eine bewegende Kraft haben sollte, urtheilen kann der Verstand zwar freylich, allein diesem Urtheile Kraft zu geben, daß es eine Triebfeder, den Willen zur Ausübung einer Handlung zu bewegen, werde, dieses einzusehen ist der Stein der Weisen.35

Kant's explanation forces him back to the concept of moral feeling. He tries to explain moral feeling in such a way that it does not depend upon a subjective pathological principle. Recalling the distinction he has already made between the objective principle of the appraisal of the action and the subjective principle of its performance, Kant is faced again with moral feeling, which he rejected previously. The understanding provides the moral judgment, but the capacity to be moved by a moral judgment is moral feeling. (AK 27:1428) How this happens, or exactly why it is not a species of inclination is not explained - it is the "philosopher's stone." He does tell us that the
understanding by virtue of its nature opposes everything that is contrary to its rule; immoral actions are contrary to rules since they cannot be made into a universal law; the understanding therefore resists immoral actions and so there resides in the understanding a moving force. A sensibility in accordance with the motive power of the understanding would be moral feeling. (AK 27:1428-9) Presumably Kant wants to make a distinction between the capacity to be motivated by the objective principle of appraisal of the action and pathological principles, but, as we have seen, he has already described moral feeling as a species of pathological principle. The moving force of the understanding still has to motivate subjects, not all of whom demonstrate moral feeling.36 Kant does not solve this problem here; a solution will have to wait until the publication of the third Critique in 1790. There Kant will present a theory of aesthetic judgment (faculty of feeling pleasure and displeasure) which provides a link between objective moral principles (cognitive faculty) and subjective motivations (faculty of desire) through the feeling of the sublime.

**Reflection 988 (1783-4) and Metaphysik Mroongrovius (1782-3)**

In one of the reflections on Anthropology, dated by Erich Adickes to sometime during the period 1783-4, but which might as well have been written down by Kant anytime after 1775, on account of its subject matter, Kant considers the question of what was called intellectual pleasure in *Metaphysik LI*. Intellectual pleasure was the result of a judgment that something pleases according to a communal and universally valid sense. If something is an object of intellectual satisfaction it is good; if it is the object of intellectual dissatisfaction, it is bad. If something agrees with the highest degree of freedom it pleases; this pleasure is intellectual pleasure and is to be found only in morality. (AK 28:249-50) The question Kant turns to in this reflection is, how is an objectively valid judgment possible which is not determined by any concept of an object? (AK 15:432) In other words, how is a judgment that something agrees with the highest degree of freedom possible? There is no object that corresponds with freedom. Moreover, how can such a judgment be universally valid? These are questions that concern the possibility of aesthetic judgment.

The answer Kant gives is somewhat tentative, but it nevertheless foreshadows the arguments he will make in the Analytic of Aesthetic Judgment in the third Critique. He writes:

> If the judgment expresses the relation of all cognitive faculties [in general] in agreement with the cognition of the object, thus expressing only the reciprocal incrementation of the cognitive forces within themselves, [this is how] the relation is felt. In fact, at that point, no concept of whatever an object . . . can produce such a feeling, rather only concepts.


The answer, then, to the question, How is an objectively valid judgment that is not determined by an object possible? seems to lie in the relation of the cognitive forces within themselves, at
which point no concept of a particular object is needed, only concepts" (Begriffe). Here lies a probable precursor of the general form of a concept" that emerges in the third Critique.

Indeed, Kant goes on to say that if the judgment refers itself to no determinate concept of an object, or to a concept of relation to the subject determinable according to rules, it must refer itself to objects in general" (object überhaupt) through forces of the mind in general" (Gemüthskräfte der Erkenntnis überhaupt). In such a case there is no determinate concept, but merely the feeling of the movement of the forces of the mind. This feeling of movement is capable of being communicated through a "concept in general" (Begriffe überhaupt) which implies the ground of the judgment. (AK 15:432) But how is pleasure to be found where there is no object? Kant's answer is that the pleasure is in this judgment and not in the object of it (which is indeterminate). Repeating the position of Metaphysik L1 Kant says that pleasure is in general the incrementation of life, and the pleasure of the incrementation of life felt through the senses is pleasure simply (Vergnügen) while pleasure in the incrementation of life in the play of the cognitive forces in general is called taste. Pleasure in the incrementation of life in the forces of the understanding in particular is called approval. (AK 15:432) Through this transitional reflection the intellectual pleasure in morality of the mid-1770's is related to the pleasure resulting from the aesthetic judgment of 1790. The feature that ties them both together is freedom.

If we consider Metaphysik Mrongrovius, which is attributed to about the same time (1782-3) by Ameriks and Naragon, we see a similar account. The section on pleasure and displeasure in that notebook begins with an objection to Baumgarten's use of the words voluptas (pleasure; German Lust) and tædium (displeasure; German Unlust). Baumgarten is mistaken, because the words only apply to sensible satisfaction, and the understanding can frequently find dissatisfaction with that which satisfies the senses. Hence the faculty should be called the faculty of satisfaction and dissatisfaction (facultas complacentiae [Wohlgefallen] et displacentiae [Mißfallen]). This faculty could properly be called internal sense because it applies to our own state, although no one has yet properly developed the concept of it. (AK 29:890) Once this objection is made, however, and perhaps owing to the inaccuracy of the note taker, the distinction between satisfaction and dissatisfaction (Wohlgefallen und Mißfallen) versus pleasure and displeasure (Lust und Unlust) becomes obscure. Kant seems to use the terms interchangeably in the following pages, but this does not materially affect our interest in the passage.

The feeling of pleasure, we are told, is the "ability of my power of representation to become determined by a given representation to its maintenance or promotion or avoidance." Displeasure "summons up our entire faculty to prevent a representation from penetrating further into the mind."38 Whatever excites the feeling of the promotion of life arouses pleasure. Pleasure is the consciousness of the agreement of an object with the productive power of imagination of our soul.39 At this point the language changes from pleasure/displeasure (Lust/Unlust) to satisfaction/dissatisfaction (Wohlgefallen/Mißfallen); there is really no apparent distinction in the object of the terms. Satisfaction or dissatisfaction is either mediate or immediate. Mediate satisfaction is intellectual, immediate satisfaction is sensible. By "mediate" (mittelbar) satisfaction here, Kant apparently has in mind a means/end relationship. He uses money as an example of what he means; there is a mediate satisfaction in money, which does not please in itself but only because of the gratifications that can be purchased with it. This is an object of reason since reason is needed to recognize whether something is good as a means to an end. In this sense the mediate satisfaction is intellectual. (AK 29:890) Immediate satisfaction pleases in itself, and may be either subjective or objective. Subjective satisfaction concerns the alteration of the state of the subject and is called the agreeable or private satisfaction. Objective satisfaction rests on the object and must please all
who sense the object. If objective satisfaction pleases according to the laws of sensibility, it is beautiful. The beautiful pleases in the imagination. If objective satisfaction pleases according to the laws of the understanding and reason it is the good, which may be mediate or immediate. Mediate good is useful, for example the punishment of evil, which pleases not in itself but as a means to the attainment of a good end. Only morality is immediately good. (AK 29:891-3)

The faculty for judging the beautiful, we are told, is taste. The faculty for judging the agreeable has no name and needs none. Taste judges according to general rules while the agreeable is judged according to sensation. The general rules of taste hold only for the sensibility of human beings and for beings that have a sensibility the same as theirs. The general rules of the good stretch over all rational beings including God since they apply to cognition. Sensibility and understanding are connected in judging through taste. Whatever pleases in sensation or in the agreeable gratifies while whatever pleases by the sensible power of judging, namely the beautiful, pleases in the stricter sense. The beautiful pleases even when we are indifferent to its existence; Kant adduces the example of a beautiful plan that pleases although it is only imagined in thought. Taste has to do with the form of the composition of the manifold in sensation. (AK 29:893)

In his lectures on Metaphysics from this period, then, we see that the pleasure that comes from the beautiful lies in the judgment related to the form of the object and is possible even when accompanied by indifference to the existence of the object (gratification is not indifferent to the existence of the object). The goodness or good constitution of a thing is the object of satisfaction according to concepts of the understanding. While taste belongs to the beautiful which please on account of the form of the object, there is a manner of thinking Kant calls sentiment that belongs to the good. Virtue is a true inner good, we are told, but not something that is agreeable. But it still has something that comes close to the beautiful, Kant tells us, for if one represents an entire realm of the virtuous in thoughts, then the order and regularity of the conduct which would necessarily have to spring from it awakens in us a sensible satisfaction. (AK 29:893) The moral is related to the aesthetic, then, in that both pleasures are portrayed as being the result of the form of the object or of the conduct of the virtuous. This supports the thesis being developed here.

The Problem of Transcendental Freedom

Why is a doorway to the supersensible so important? The answer must begin with Hume, who woke Kant from his dogmatic slumber. Hume's empiricism, which denies free will, was at least partly responsible for Kant's turning to the problem of causality, for without free will there is no morality or human dignity for Kant.42 As he writes in a well known letter to Christian Garve dated September 21, 1798, it is the antinomies of reason, especially with regard to the possibility of freedom (and with that the possibility of morality as Kant understands it) that roused Kant from his dogmatic slumber.43 Velkley argues correctly that the problems of reason from which the critical philosophy arises are essentially problems concerning the end of reason, i.e., reason's moral and practical end. As noted above, Velkley argues that it was Kant's reading of Rousseau that led him to his critical project. As Velkley defines it, the crisis in reason that Rousseau and Kant confront can be defined by the following three questions:

(1) Is the modern account of reason able to justify itself through a rational and scientific discourse on its own purposes and thus establish its own goodness? (2) Is the relation of modern scientific reason to the practical world of custom, morality, and belief a healthy and salutary one? (3) Can modern philosophy maintain its
position as the dominant force in human affairs and continue to promote the emancipation and enlightenment of humanity? Rousseau convinces Kant that the answers to all three questions must be negative, unless modern rationality can in decisive respects be altered.44

In the first *Critique* transcendental freedom is understood as a causality that is spontaneous, i.e., not subject to the efficient causality of nature, that nevertheless begins a series of effects in the causally determined spatio-temporal empirical world of nature. In other words, transcendental freedom is a free will; practical freedom is based on this transcendental idea. (KrV A533/B561) But transcendental freedom is an idea of reason to which no object of experience can correspond. We can never infer from experience the existence of anything that cannot be thought in accordance with the laws of experience, which are the pure intuitions of space and time. In a famous formulation, Kant says that ideas of reason are always either too large or too small for a concept of the understanding.45 That is to say, there can be no *knowledge* of freedom (or any other idea of reason) because for Kant *knowledge* requires an intuition and a concept. Reason does not really generate concepts; the most it can do is free a concept of the understanding from the unavoidable limitations of a possible experience. (KrV A408/B435) Moreover, there is no freedom in the world of appearance. As Kant says, the Transcendental Analytic has established that there are no exceptions in the sensible world to the laws of efficient causality of nature. (KrV A536/B564) What, then, of morality? A dialectic of reason has arisen, and unless it is solved we have to give in to either Hume's empiricism or a metaphysical dogmatism; in either case there is no morality for Kant.46 Speculative philosophy cannot avoid this issue; it must clear the way for morality. (KrV A476/B504)

The solution is transcendental idealism.47 Transcendental idealism, simply put, holds that space and time and therefore appearances are not things in themselves and therefore do not exist outside of the mind. (KrV A492/B520) The purely intelligible *cause* of appearances in general is the transcendental object, or noumenon. (KrV A494/B522) Reality, then, may be considered from two points of view: the spatio-temporal world of appearances or the intelligible world of the noumenon.48 The former is subject to the conditions of space and time; the latter is not. If we hold that appearances are things in themselves, there is no freedom; nature will be the complete and determining cause of every event. If, on the other hand, appearances are not taken to be more than they are, if they are only representations, they must have a ground that is not appearance, i.e., an intelligible ground. The *effects* of such an intelligible cause *appear* and are then subject to the laws of appearances and can be determined through other appearances, but the *causality* of this intelligible cause is not determined according to the spatio-temporal laws of appearances. (KrV A536/B564) This is the definition of freedom. But Kant is careful to remind the reader that it is impossible for speculative reason to *demonstrate* the existence of transcendental freedom or even its possibility. The best we can do is to show that causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with the efficient causality of nature. (KrV A558/B586) But this is not nothing; Kant's argument at least clears the way for morality.49 As Velkley puts it, "At its most fundamental level, critical philosophy is a transcendental defense of a conception of reason as the supreme end-determining power."50

Freedom, then, and morality are ideas of reason. Ideas of reason cannot be known since they transcend space and time and so cannot be contained under a concept of the understanding. Yet transcendental freedom is of paramount importance to Kant's moral philosophy,51 and, although he is quite clear that transcendental freedom cannot be demonstrated through speculative
metaphysics, he does seem to want to say there are other doorways to transcendental freedom and experience of the supersensible. If such an experience exists, it would help to solve the problem of moral motivation, that "philosopher's stone" mentioned in the Collins notebook above. In the next section we shall show one avenue of Kant's approach to the problem.

The Critique of Practical Reason

The problem of an objectively conceived moral law motivating the subjective will is addressed again by Kant in the second Critique. There we learn that the idea of a moral feeling stemming from the understanding, which we encountered in the Collins lecture notes on Ethics, is properly called respect (Achtung). For Kant in 1787-8, respect is the "philosopher's stone."52

Only the moral law, which is a product of pure practical reason can determine the will.53 But as Kant develops his position in the Analytic the issue of whether and how the feeling of pleasure and displeasure are affected by judgments regarding the moral law arises. We are told that, while the will is determined by the moral law and since the feeling of pleasure and displeasure cannot be the basis of determining the will,54 it seems to be the case that frequent practice in conformity with the objectively determined moral law can produce subjectively a feeling of satisfaction with oneself. This feeling of self-satisfaction that results from conforming to the moral law Kant here calls moral feeling (moralische Gefühl). We have a duty to establish and cultivate this moral feeling, although Kant reminds us that the concept of duty is not derived from this feeling of self-satisfaction. (AK 5:38-9) This description of moral feeling follows the performance of the action, however, and so does not speak to the problem of subjective motivation.55

Chapter III of the Analytic of Pure Practical Reason is entitled "On the Incentives of Pure Practical Reason" (Von den Triebfedern der reinen praktischen Vernunft). Kant reminds the reader that what is essential to any moral worth of actions is that the moral law determine the will immediately. If we are to attribute moral worth to an action, it cannot be the case that the will conforms to the moral law through the mediation of some kind of feeling. If any kind of feeling whatsoever has to be presupposed in order for the moral law to become a sufficient determining ground of the will, the action is not done for the sake of the law. Such an action would conform to the moral law but it could only be said to be "legality" (Legalität), not morality, since the determination is mediated by a feeling. (AK 5:71-2) The determining ground of the will can only be the moral law; in this way Kant remains true to his well-known position that a morally valid law must carry with it absolute necessity, which is only possible if its principles can be derived a priori.56 Nevertheless, experience clearly shows that human beings are not always persuaded by reason, especially when reason opposes desire; Kant recognizes that a problem remains that must be addressed:

For, how a law can be of itself and immediately a determining ground of the will (though this is what is essential in all morality) is for human reason an insuble problem and identical with that of how a free will is possible. What we shall have to show a priori is, therefore, not the ground from which the moral law in itself supplies an incentive but rather what it effects (or, to put it better, must effect) in the mind insofar as it is an incentive.

Denn wie ein Gesetz für sich und unmittelbar Bestimmungsgrund des Willens sein könne (welches doch das Wesentliche aller Moralität ist), das ist ein für die
menschliche Vernunft unauflösliches Problem und mit dem einerlei: wie ein freier Wille möglich sei. Also werden wir nicht den Grund, woher das moralische Gesetz in sich eine Triebfeder abgege, sondern was, so fern es eine solche ist, sie im Gemüthe wirkt (besser zu sagen, wirken muß), a priori anzuzeigen haben.57

Kant defines an incentive" (Triebfeder) as the subjective determining ground of the will of a being whose reason does not by its nature necessarily conform with the objective law.58 From this it follows, according to Kant, that the incentive of the human will can never be anything other than the moral law. The objective determining ground must always be the sole subjectively sufficient determining ground of action if the action is to contain the spirit of the moral law and not merely fulfill its letter.59 For the sake of the law one must not look for some other incentive; it is even dangerous to let any other incentive "cooperate" (mitwirken) alongside the moral law. (AK 5:72) As shall be shown below, just as practical reason through its demonstration a priori of the moral law gives transcendental freedom objective reality,60 the moral law will be the ground of a feeling that has empirical effects without empirical causes, and so is not pathological. In other words, Kant will explain how the moral law becomes an incentive that can affect the human faculty of desire without basing the incentive on the feeling of pleasure and displeasure.

The first effect of the moral law as incentive on the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is negative. It is essential that every determination of the free will by the moral law be determined solely by that law. All inclinations (sensible impulses) must be rejected insofar as they oppose the moral law. Hence the effect of the moral law as incentive is in the first place negative. This negative incentive of the moral law can be cognized a priori (in the formulation of the moral law itself), and, since every sensible impulse and all inclination is based on feeling, the moral law as incentive has a negative effect upon feeling. This negative effect is itself a feeling, namely, a feeling of pain as a result of the infringement upon inclination. That is to say, the moral law as determining ground of the will must, by thwarting all our inclinations, produce a feeling that can be called pain.61 In this way, then, the relation of a cognition of pure practical reason to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is determined a priori from concepts.62 (AK 5:72-3)

The moral law as incentive also has a positive effect as it thwarts inclination. All inclinations together, the satisfaction of which is called happiness, constitute regard for oneself. This regard is either self-love or self-conceit. Pure practical reason only restricts the natural (and necessary) human characteristic of self-love; self-love brought under the constraints of the moral law is called "rational self-love" (vernünftige Selbstliebe). Pure practical reason strikes down self-conceit since any presumption to self-worth prior to the moral law is unwarranted and false since conformity to the moral law is the first legitimate condition of the worth of any person. The moral law is in itself positive, Kant tells us; it is the form of an intellectual causality we call freedom. As the moral law opposes its "subjective antagonists" (subjectiven Widerspiele) it becomes the object of respect. As it strikes down self-conceit it becomes the object of the greatest respect, and in so doing it becomes the ground of a positive feeling. Since this feeling is the result of the operation of the moral law, its ground is cognized a priori and so its origin is not empirical. Hence respect (Achtung) for the moral law is a feeling that is produced by an intellectual ground. It is the only feeling that is produced by an intellectual ground. It is the only feeling that we can see the necessity of and cognize a priori. (AK 5:73) Kant's solution to the problem of the incentives, then, is to derive a feeling from an intellectual ground.63 As a feeling it is subjective and empirical and so can motivate the individual will; as derived from an intellectual ground it escapes being labeled pathological.
Kant restates his argument: Anything which presents itself as an object of the will prior to the moral law is excluded from the determining grounds of an unconditionally good will. The mere practical form of the moral law, which is that maxims be capable of giving universal law, determines what is good in itself and grounds the maxims of a good will. But our nature as sensible beings is so constituted that the matter of the faculty of desire (objects of inclination) forces itself upon us and tries to make its claims valid, as if this pathologically determinable self constituted our entire self. This propensity to make these subjective determining grounds of choice into the objectively determining ground of the will can be called self-love. If self-love makes itself the unconditional practical principle it can be called self-conceit. The moral law, which alone is truly objective, excludes altogether the influence of self-love on the supreme practical principle, and so infringes without end on self-conceit. What in our own judgment infringes upon self-conceit humiliates, Kant tells us, and so the moral law unavoidably humiliates every human being when it is compared to the sensible property of our nature. If something represented as a determining ground of our will humiliates us in our self-consciousness, it awakens respect for itself insofar as it is positive and a determining ground. Therefore the moral law is subjectively a ground of respect. Since self-love belongs to inclination, and all inclination rests on feeling, what infringes upon all the inclinations of self-love has a necessary influence on feeling. Hence we see how it is possible to realize a priori that the moral law can exercise an effect on feeling, as it excludes the inclinations and the propensity to make them the supreme practical principle from all participation in the supreme lawgiving. This effect on feeling is both negative and positive; negative in that it rejects sensible impulses opposed to the moral law, and positive in that through this rejection it modifies the principle of self-love through respect for the law. The negative effect is the feeling of disagreeableness that a rational subject affected by inclinations experiences in realizing that pure practical reason is the supreme lawgiver. This negative effect is called humiliation and is pathological, as is every influence on feeling and every feeling in general. In relation to its positive ground, the moral law, the feeling of a rational subject affected by inclinations is called respect for the law. This is not feeling for the law, Kant tells us; but inasmuch as the feeling of respect moves resistance to the moral law out of the way, in the judgment of reason this removal of a hindrance is esteemed as a positive furthering of its causality. In this positive sense, the feeling can be called a feeling of respect for the moral law while on both grounds together it can be called a moral feeling. (AK 5:74-5) Thus Kant strives to give an account of a moral feeling (respect) that is free of any pathological element (at least in its positive sense), yet has an effect in the sensible world of the moral agent.

In this way, then, the moral law can be both the objective, formal, determining ground of action and a subjective determining ground. The moral law, conceived objectively through pure practical reason, constitutes objectively a material determining ground of the objects of action under the name of good and evil and provides an incentive, i.e., a subjective determining ground, inasmuch as it has influence on the sensibility of the subject through the feeling of respect. Respect effects a feeling conducive to the influence of the moral law upon the will. Here Kant tells us that there is no antecedent feeling in the subject that will be attuned to morality; such an antecedent feeling would be impossible given that all feeling is sensible (pathological) and the incentive of the moral disposition must be free from any sensible condition. The condition of that feeling we call respect is indeed sensible, but the cause which determines it lies in the pure practical reason. Hence the feeling of respect, on account of its origin, must be called practically effected (pathologisch gewirkt) and not pathologically effected (praktisch gewirkt). Respect for the law is not the incentive to morality; it is morality itself subjectively considered as an incentive. Pure
practical reason rejects all the claims of self-love that oppose it and supplies authority to the law which now alone has influence. Respect for the law is an effect on feeling, and this feeling, which we call moral feeling, is therefore produced solely by reason, and serves only to make the moral law its subjective ground of action (maxim). Respect, then, has an effect on the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. In a passage containing some elements that are strikingly similar to Kant's description of the feeling of the sublime both in the Observations and in the Critique of Judgment, we read that although we take very little pleasure in respect, given that it is the result of humiliation we feel as we compare ourselves to the moral law itself or to a person whose upright example highlights our own inadequacy, there is also little displeasure in it, and once self-conceit is laid aside, one can never get enough of contemplating the majesty of the moral law. The soul believes itself elevated (erheben) as it sees the holy elevated above itself and its "frail nature" (gebrechliche Natur). The feeling that arises from the consciousness of the necessity to determine one's actions in accordance with the moral law is called duty. Duty follows from respect, which Kant here defines as the consciousness of a free submission of the will to the moral law. As submission to the law, which is a constraint on the sensibly affected subject, the feeling of duty tends toward displeasure rather than pleasure, as does respect. But since the constraint is exercised solely by the lawgiving of the subject's own reason it contains something elevating. The subjective effect of duty on feeling, then, insofar as practical reason is its cause, can be called self-approbation. In cognizing oneself as determined to an action solely by the moral law and without any interest, the subject becomes conscious of an altogether different interest subjectively produced by the law, which is purely practical and free. This feature of respect foreshadows the role Kant will assign to the sublime in the third Critique. Indeed, in a passage in which Kant (of all people!) is so overcome that he lapses poetic, we are told that duty is nothing else than what elevates a human being above himself as a part of the sensible world and connects him with an order of things that only the understanding can think. Duty is nothing other than personality, Kant tells us, which is freedom and independence from the mechanism of the whole of nature. That is to say, through the capacity of being subject to the pure practical laws given by his own reason, a person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to his own personality insofar as he belongs to the intelligible world; one is made aware of a higher, supersensible, vocation and thus the sublimity of one's own nature. (AK 5:86-7) As Lewis White Beck points out:

The sublimity of the moral law is more than a metaphor for Kant. Not only does he use the language of the aesthetics of the sublime in describing the moral law, but he gives an analogous interpretation of the origins of the feelings of sublimity and respect. In both there is humiliation or thwarting of our sensuous nature (our perceptual faculty and imagination in the sublime, our feeling of worth in respect) which occasions a pain which, in turn, is transmuted into a kind of elation by the discovery in ourselves of a power superior to that which has humiliated us (in the sublime) and superior also to that power in us which has been humiliated (in feelings of both respect and of the sublime). But whereas a subreption necessarily occurs in the sublime feelings, so that we attribute to the object a sublimity which actually exists only in ourselves, the feeling of respect is directed to a law, which is a law of our own freedom, self-imposed and not imposed upon us from without, and to the persons, ourselves or others, who embody this law. Hence respect for the
law and respect for our personality are not distinct and even competing feelings, as are the two feelings which merge in our experience of the sublime.74

The Critique of Practical Reason, then, yields support for our argument that the sublime and the moral are closely related. The reader of the second Critique also discovers that the feeling of respect and its corollary duty provide a doorway to the supersensible world. In the second Critique, Kant argues that the moral law gives freedom (and so the supersensible) objective reality, and that the soul believes itself elevated as we recognize the majesty of the moral law. Hence there is a kind of cognitive doorway to the supersensible through the moral law.75 In the next chapter, the Critique of Judgment will be considered, in which another doorway to the supersensible will be opened through the faculty of pleasure and displeasure.

NOTES

1. We have already noted the difficulty that exists with regard to dating the various manuscripts on Kant's lectures. This particular set of notes is one of two compiled in one volume that was among several manuscripts purchased by the then famous scholar Karl Heinrich Ludwig Pölitz, who studied and taught at the university of Leipzig in 1794 and again in 1820, from the estate of Friedrich Theodor Rink, one of Kant's early biographers. The older of the two sets of notes is known is L1; the newer set as L2. Several dates have been proposed for L1; the consensus is that they are from lectures delivered at some point in the mid-1770's. Ameriks and Naragon conclude that the likelihood is that the notes are a copy (Nachschrift) for the use of many students and not a set of original notes (Mitschrift) taken from the lecture hall. Lectures on Metaphysics, xxx-xxxiii.


3. See Chapter 3 below.

4. Just to name one example, in the section headed "on the Leap and the Law of Continuity" (which is not discussed in Baumgarten), in which he is arguing that there can be nothing simple in appearance, Kant is represented as saying "Every appearance is, as representation in the mind, under the form of inner sense, which is time." "Jede Erscheinung ist, als Vorstellung im Gemüthe, unter der Form des innern Sinnes, das ist die Zeit." This is not the language of the Observations.Lectures on Metaphysics, 25; AK 28:202.

5. On the Form and Principles of the Sensible and the Intelligible World (1770). De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis forma et principiis (MDCCCLXX).

6. Although Baumgarten does not give an overview of the faculties as Kant does in Metaphysik LI and in later lectures, he does treat the same three classes of faculties: cognitive (Facultatas cognoscitiva [Vermögen zu erkennen]; §§519-533 - Sectio II. Facultas cognoscitiva inferior), Pleasure and displeasure (§§655-62 - Sectio XV. Voluptas et tedium) and desire (§§663-75 - Sectio XVI. Facultas appetitiva). See AK 15:5-45 ff.

8. Or perhaps the topic is too complicated for the student audience. Lewis White Beck attributes the following to Kant in his introduction to the reprint of Infield's translation of Menzer's edition of Kant's lectures on Ethics (although he does not give the source): "...while he did not teach what he did not believe, he did not teach all that he did believe, out of consideration for his hearers." The remark also speaks to the veracity of the positions attributed to Kant in the lecture notes. Immanuel Kant, *Lectures on Ethics*, trans. Louis Infield (London: Methuen, 1979; reprint Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company), xiii (page references are to the reprint edition).

9. Which, as we shall see, connects the faculty of desire to the faculty of cognition. *Metaphysik Mro ngrovius* (1782-3), AK 29:890. Given that the faculty of pleasure and displeasure is the link between the cognitive faculty (the home of practical reason) and the faculty of desire (the home of happiness) it would seem to be significant if an experience conducive to moral motivation, which necessarily involves the subordinating of the subjective principle of happiness (satisfaction of desire) in favor of the objective principle of morality (formulated by the cognitive faculty) could be found in the faculty of pleasure and displeasure which links the two. The thesis of the present study is that for Kant the aesthetic experience generally and the experience of the sublime specifically provides just such an experience.


11. This is an important point. As will be shown below, in the second Critique, and in the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals*, respect is a feeling that follows from the moral law. Kant will describe a kind of pleasure that is free of empirical content (as is the principle of morality) which he calls intellectual pleasure" (*intellectuelle Lust*). It is the feeling of pleasure that somehow provides subjective motivation, not the cognition of the objective moral principle alone.

12. One is aware here of the difference between lecture notes and a published Kantian work. Here the terms entire power of life" (*gesammte Lebenskraft*), "entire power of mind" (*gesammte Kraft des Gemüths*), inner principle for acting from representations" (*inneres Prinzip, aus Vorstellungen zu handeln*), and inner principle of self-activity" (*inneres Prinzip der Selbstthätigkeit*) all seem to be interchangeable with principle of life" (*Princip des Lebens*). Kant's meaning seems clear enough, though; his position is that pleasure occurs when a representation harmonizes with the principle of life while displeasure occurs when a representation is in disharmony with the principle of life. Kant's understanding of pleasure in terms of a principle of life, which is itself understood in terms of activity, is, as shall be shown below, significant to the interpretation of aesthetic judgment and the sublime being advanced by this work. As Rudolf A. Makkreel notes, that the idea of life informs the third *Critique*, is a theme that has been overlooked by most commentators. Rudolf A. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant: The Hermeneutical Import of the Critique of Judgment* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1990), 88.

13. The relation of the pleasant to the promotion of life is not a topic mentioned or discussed in Baumgarten. *Lectures on Metaphysics*, 546. In Reflection 988, written sometime during 1783-4 according to Adickes, Kant writes that pleasure is in general the feeling of the incrementation of life; the [feeling] of the incrementation of life through sensation is pleasure and its contrary pain. The pleasure in the incrementation of life in the play of the cognitive forces in general is called taste. (AK 15:433)

14. As we shall see below, Reflection 988 touches on this theme. Kant writes that no one can have any insight from the concept of the object whether a judgment or a representation in general would be accompanied by pleasure, but if freedom is there as a property of the will, it is analytically
certain that such a pleasure should be presupposed. That certain cognitive modes produce pleasure cannot be understood a priori, but if cognition has motives in itself, it is obvious that a pleasure in the movement of the cognitive powers may be aroused. (AK 15, 433)

15. Kant seems to have in mind a threefold account of human life (life being understood as the inner principle of self-activity, i.e., soul - he does in fact define soul in these terms when he takes up that topic under the heading of Rational Psychology, see e.g., AK 28:274–5). Indeed, Lehman's note to AK 28:2483, refers to Reflection 4237 (AK 17:4722–7), written sometime between the end of 1769 and fall 1770 according to Adickes (who notes that some of the Reflections from this period reflect the standpoint of the Inaugural Dissertation which Kant defended on August 12, 1770 - Reflection 4237 does not appear to, however) in which one reads that "A human being has two sorts of life: (1) animal, (2) spiritual." And later: "In the existence of the human soul (1) the existence of substance is to be considered; (2) life in general (animal) as a soul; (3) personality, i.e., life as a human spirit. . . ." Lectures on Metaphysics, 64 n. 16.

16. Kant's lecture departs from Baumgarten, who, in §656 of his Metaphysica, distinguishes between pleasure resulting from sensible intuitions and from the understanding (AK 15:42). Kant does not make this distinction between animal, human and spiritual life and pleasure in later lectures on Metaphysics. In Metaphysik Mongrovius (1782–3), he distinguishes between what pleases according to the laws of sensibility (the beautiful) and what pleases according to the laws of the understanding and reason (the good). Lectures on Metaphysics, 259 (AK 28:892). This is the basic distinction that Kant develops as time goes on.

17. Cf. the term universal human understanding" Kant used in Dreams, cited in Chapter 1 above.

18. This is the problem of the universal validity of aesthetic judgment" which is the focus of Paul Guyer's book on the third Critique entitled Kant and the Claims of Taste. Kant will, of course, devote much of Division I of the third Critique to precisely this problem.

19. Cf. Critique of Judgment AK 5:296-7. There we read that only in society is the beautiful of empirical interest; a person abandoned on a desolate island would not adorn himself or his hut; only in society does it occur to him to be not only a human being, but one that is refined in his own way. See Chapter 3 below. In the Blomberg Logic, from the early 1770's, we read "What is beautiful must please universally and please everyone. For passing judgment on beauty, experience is required, and the judgment of the beautiful and the ugly is made in consequence of common and healthy reason." "Was schön ist, muß allgemein, und jedermann gefallen. zu Beurtheilung der Schönheit wird Erfahrung Erforderet, und das urtheil vom schönen und Häßlichen wird zu Folge der gemeinen und gesunde Vernunft gefället." (AK 24:19) Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Logic, trans. and ed. J. Michael Young, The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, ed. Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 8.

20. And so we might ask, if the good does not in some way please us, how can we be subjectively motivated to subordinate our desires to what remains a concept?

21. Recall that we have already noted above that Kant holds matter to be a hindrance on life; it follows then, that the highest freedom would be associated with the spiritual life. Recall also Velkley's comment regarding the significance of Kant's derivation of moral feeling from freedom cited in Chapter 1 above.

22. It would seem that this passage sheds light on the apparent contradiction some commentators have found in the Analytic of the Beautiful in the third Critique regarding Kant's claim that the pleasure we take in the beautiful is disinterested and the interest implied in the connection Kant makes between aesthetic judgment and morality. The thesis being advanced in
this study is that there is no contradiction here; as shall be shown below, "disinterested" has to do with freedom from empirical interest in the existence an object; it does not rule out an intellectual interest or an intellectual pleasure. The present passage also speaks to the sense of freedom (and thus a sense of timelessness) that Kant says is present in the free play of the imagination and the understanding and which properly speaking constitutes the beautiful. See Chapter 3 below.

23. That is, the ground of morality cannot be pathological" (pathologisch). Kant uses the term pathologically" necessary or possible to mean necessary or possible according to the laws of the sensible power of choice. It is opposed to "practically" (praktisch) necessary or possible. Something is practically necessary or possible according to the laws of the power of free choice. (AK 28:258)

24. Interestingly (and problematically) Kant (bringing to the mind of the reader Descartes' Fourth Meditation, in which Descartes says the more he inclines in one direction, either because he understands reasons of truth and goodness point that way, or because of a divinely produced disposition of his inmost thoughts, the freer is his choice - AT 7:58) remarks that such subjective necessitation would still be freedom given that the subjective necessitation arises from the objective one.

25. On the general problem of dating the lecture notes, see Chapter 1 above. Collins attended the university in 1784, and the notebook that carries his name is nearly identical to the one Paul Menzer published in 1924, which was translated into English by Louis Infield in 1931. The date cited above is given by Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind in Lectures on Ethics; it is their opinion that one may at the least take it that the Collins notes represents the basics of Kant's teaching for the nine years from 1775-1784. Lectures on Ethics, xvi.

26. A solution consistent with Kant's passion for architectonics. See, for example, §1 of the first Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, "On Philosophy as a System." (AK 20:195-7)

27. As noted in Chapter 1 above, Kant rejects moral feeling as the ground of morality, mentioning Shaftesbury and Hutcheson as examples of authors who have posited moral feeling as the ground whereby we can discriminate what is good or bad. (AK 27:253) The text we are considering at present demonstrates Kant's clear distinction between the objective ground whereby we discriminate what is good and bad and the subjective ground which moves us to perform the action as determined by the understanding. Moral feeling cannot be the objective ground, but it is the subjective motive.

28. In the third Critique aesthetic judgment is located in the faculty of pleasure and displeasure. Aesthetic judgment will be central to Kant's solution to the problem of moral motivation, as shall be argued below.

29. Because of the Baumgartenian distinction between superior (active) and inferior (passive) cognitive faculties.

30. "And even if it were possible that we should have a sensation for morality, no rules could be established on this principle, for a moral feeling says categorically what ought to happen, whether it pleases us or not; and is hence no satisfaction of our inclination." "Und wenn es auch möglich wäre, daß wir eine Emp-fundung für die Moralität hätten, so könnten doch keine Regeln auf dieses principium etablirt werden, denn ein moralisch Gefühl sagt categorisch was geschehn soll, es mag gefallen oder nicht; und ist also keine Befriedigung unserer Neigung." Lectures on Ethics, 66 (AK 27:275); emphasis added.

31. Kant gives us his famous formulation "the understanding is the faculty of rules" (der Verstand ist das Vermögen der Regeln) a little further on. (AK 27:1428)
32. As was shown in *Metaphysik L1*, the elements of Kant's mature moral theory are obviously present in his lectures on Ethics of 1784-5 although he does not yet explicitly state the categorical imperative. The presence of these embryonic elements indicates Kant's ongoing concern with the problems brought out in Chapter 1 above.

33. The editors of the Cambridge Edition have supplemented Collins' notes with the notes of Mrongovius here; hence the break in the sequence of page numbers. A number of copies of lecture notes exist from this period under different names that are likely copies of one original compilation of notes put together by a number of Kant's students over a period of time. *Lectures on Ethics*, xv-xvi.

34. Dieter Henrich notices this concern of Kant's as well in his interpretation of Kant's "moral image of the world," in which he argues that Kant, ever since his encounter with Rousseau, remained convinced that without a moral image of the world, moral conduct itself must become unstable and be undermined by the materialist and the sophist. Dieter Henrich, *Aesthetic Judgment and the Moral Image of the World: Studies in Kant*, Stanford Series in Philosophy: Studies in Kant and German Idealism, ed. Eckart Förster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992), 19.


36. In spite of these difficulties, as we have noted above, Kant seems to regard moral feeling as an innate human characteristic. He often describes it as a "faculty" (e.g., AK 27:296), albeit one that can be developed to a greater or lesser extent. Moral feeling is clearly not the same as conscience, it is a manifestation of our moral predisposition. Conscience, the instinct to direct oneself according to moral laws, presupposes moral feeling. (AK 27:351-2)


38. "Gefühl der Lust ist die Fähigkeit meiner Vorstellungs- kraft, durch eine gegebene Vorstellung zur Erhaltung und Beförderung oder zur Vermeidung derselben bestimmt zu werden. Bei der Unlust Bieten wir unser ganzes Vermögen auf, die Vorstellung zu verhindern, weiter ins Gemüthe einzudringen." (AK 29:890-1)

39. A definition that we are told will be made clearer in knowing the will. (AK 28:291)

40. Ameriks and Naragon provide a note of Lehmann's appended to this passage explaining that this is Kant's reinterpretation of Augustine's *City of God* in Leibniz and Baumgarten. Cf. Baumgarten, §974 (AK 17:199): "the greatest is the despotic monarchy, of whom all created spirits are subjects (maxima monarchia despotica, satis omnes spiritus creati sunt subditi). Leibniz, *Causa Dei* §144 on the same issue as Baumgarten's. "The despot wants blind obedience, but God wants that we obey him because we comprehend that it is right and good." Quoted in *Lectures on Metaphysics*, 261 n. 206.

41. The heading of this section is perhaps misleading. It is not the purpose of the present section to explore the Third Antinomy or the Transcendental Dialectic, but rather to simply show that because transcendental freedom is an epistemological problem for Kant, any experience or other access we may have to its reality is important to Kant's moral metaphysics. Passages written by Kant in the 1790's will be adduced which, when compared to the passage quoted from *Metaphysik L1* at the beginning of Chapter 1, would seem to support the thesis that morality and its possibility are never far from Kant's mind.

42. See, for example, §VIII of Hume's *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, which argues that there is no "liberty" (free will).

43. Kant writes "It was not the investigation of the existence of God, immortality, and so on, but rather the antinomy of pure reason - the world has a beginning; it has no beginning, and so on,' right up to the 4th [*sic*]: 'There is freedom in man, versus there is no freedom, only the necessity
of nature' - that is what first aroused me from my dogmatic slumber and drove me to the critique of reason itself, in order to resolve the scandal of ostensible contradiction of reason with itself."

"Nicht die Untersuchung vom Daseyn Gottes, der Unsterblichkeit etc. ist der Punct gewesen von dem ich ausgegangen bin, sondern die Antinomie der r. V.: Die Welt hat einen Anfang: sie hat keinen Anfang etc. bis zur vierten: Es ist Freyheit im Menschen, - gegen den: es ist keine Freyheit, sondern alles ist in ihm Naturnothwendigkeit"; diese war es welche mich aus dem dogmatischen Schlummer zuerst aufweckte und zur Critik der Vernunft selbst hintrieb, um das Scandal des scheinbaren Widerspruchs der Vernunft mit ihr selbst zu heben." Immanuel Kant, *Philosophical Correspondence, 1759-99*, ed. and trans. Arnulf Zweig (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967; reprint, Chicago: Midway Reprints, 1986), 252 (page references are to the reprint edition); AK 12:257-8. Compare this passage to the one from the third *Critique* (AK 5:344) cited below in which Kant states that reason would never accept the noumenon/phenomenon distinction were it not for the Antinomies.


45. See, for example, KrV A422/B450; A486/514.

46. Empiricism bases the practical concepts of good and evil on empirical consequences, namely, happiness. Metaphysical dogmatism proposes to supply real yet nonsensuous intuitions of an invisible kingdom of God for the application of the moral law and so plunges into the transcendent. KpV AK 5:70-1.

47. Much has been written about the consistency of this solution. Henry Allison offers an interesting interpretation and philosophical defense of Kant's Transcendental Idealism based on the concept of an "epistemic condition." In short, he argues that Kant's formal, a priori conditions of human experience should be thought of as "epistemic" as opposed to ontological. Henry E. Allison, *Kant's Transcendental Idealism: An Interpretation and Defense*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1983). In the lectures on Metaphysics, under the Baumgartenian heading of Cosmology, Kant says that we should not understand by intelligible world another world, but rather this world as thought through the understanding, and so Allison's interpretation would seem to be close to the mark. *Metaphysik Mongrovius* (1782-83), *Lectures on Metaphysics*, 208 (AK 29:850). There is an interesting and revealing passage in the *Critique of Judgment*, however, in which Kant says that if there were no antinomies of pure reason forcing reason to regard things in the world as mere appearances based on a supersensible substrate, reason could never bring itself to accept such a principle that so greatly narrows the area in which it can speculate, or bring itself to make sacrifices that have to involve the complete destruction of so many hopes that were so brilliant otherwise. (AK 5:344) Christine Korsgaard also denies that the phenomenon/noumenon distinction carries with it any ontological or metaphysical theory involving two different worlds, one more real than the other. Christine M. Korsgaard, *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), x.

48. Bernard Carnois quotes Reflection 6344 (written sometime in May 1797 according to Adickes) on Metaphysics in which Kant writes "there are two cardinal principles of all metaphysics, the ideality of space and time and the reality of the concept of freedom." "Es gibt 2 Cardinalprincipien der gantzen Metaphysik: die Idealitaet [sic] des Raums und der Zeit und die realitaet [sic] des Freyheitsbegrifs." Bernard Carnois, *The Coherence of Kant's Doctrine of Freedom*, trans. David Booth (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1987), 42 (AK 18:669). Carnois (quoting Kant at KrV B657) argues that strictly speaking, the Kantian expression character" designates a law rather than a thing. Every efficient cause must have a character, which will be called empirical or intelligible depending on whether it involves an
empirical or intelligible causality. Man is the only being in nature to whom we have any ground for attributing an intelligible character. *Ibid.*, 33. The present work will develop the latter point in Chapter 4 below; for the moment it is sufficient to point out that the importance of the feeling of the sublime in terms of moral motivation lies in terms of its giving us access to noumenon with respect to our consciousness of our moral vocation. This work will argue that for Kant, noumenon and phenomenon are two aspects of one reality. Carnois' position would seem to support that view.

49. Zammito, citing A546-7/B574-75, argues there are passages even in the first *Critique* that seem to indicate there is real knowledge of the noumenal self not only practically (as the faculty of reason) but also cognitively (as the faculty of the understanding). Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant's* Critique of Judgment, 311. To sort this out would go beyond the scope of the present work, which does not want to argue that there is knowledge of noumenon through the understanding.


51. In Velkley's words, "... one could say that the principal concern of Kant's philosophy, and perhaps of all German idealist philosophy, is to reconcile the metaphysical 'demand' for the 'whole' with human freedom and autonomy, which reconciliation takes the form of a new doctrine of the end of reason. In at least Kant's case, this project assumes that moral freedom is (through the moral will) a 'given' and, in some sense, a dogmatic starting point. The project takes the form of disclosing 'transcendental' conditions for the coexistence of the facts of the demand for the whole and of human freedom. As moral freedom must have that foundational character, its internal soundness must be assured. Moral freedom becomes a touchstone against which one tests theoretical approaches for their soundness." *Ibid.*, 41.

52. That is, the solution to the problem of moral motivation.

53. In the *Grounding*, which in many ways is a synopsis of the arguments of the first two *Critiques*, we read "... there is nothing left which can determine the will except objectively the law and subjectively pure respect for this practical law." AK 4:400.

54. As Hutcheson and Shaftesbury had supposed. See AK 5:23 ff. John Andrew Bernstein sees Kant and Rousseau as representing two significant stages in the breakdown of the synthesis between moral and aesthetic values reached by the early phase of the Enlightenment. John Andrew Bernstein, *Shaftesbury, Rousseau, and Kant: An Introduction to the Conflict between Aesthetic and Moral Values in Modern Thought* (London and Toronto: Associated University Press, 1980), 10-11. Bernstein argues that Kant "...never modified the important doctrine of the Second *Critique* that moral emotion is essentially negative in character. ..." For Bernstein, the paradox of Kant's thought is that he began by separating obligation from fulfillment (i.e., duty from happiness) "in an unprecedentedly sweeping manner" and ended by attempting to reunite them with a faith in the idea of God (as a postulate of pure practical reason) with the result that "... the Kantian system culminates in an extraordinary and largely gratuitous artificiality." *Ibid.*, 158-9. The present section will attempt to bring out the positive aspect of moral emotion in the second *Critique*. Bernstein is too harsh.

55. As noted above, moral feeling is a problematic term in Kant. His use of the term here, however, is not entirely unrelated to an understanding of moral feeling in terms of an innate human quality. The potential to experience this self-satisfaction exists before the actual feeling of it.

56. This position is published for the first time in the *Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals* of 1785 (AK 4:389). The *Grounding* may be taken as the first articulation of Kant's mature moral philosophy. It has recently been re-edited and translated by Mary J. Gregor in Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy*, trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor, the Cambridge Edition of the Works of
57. Ibid., 198-199 (AK 5:72).
58. Recall Kant's regret that this is not the case.
59. If the incentive is to preserve the moral worth of an action, it can only be the objective determining ground (moral law). But it remains to be seen how the objectively determined moral law moves the subjective will; as has been shown above, the solution to this "insoluble problem" is the "philosopher's stone."
60. In the first Critique and in the Grounding (cf. "the objective reality of freedom is in itself questionable" at AK 4:455), Kant claims only to have established that reason's idea of transcendental freedom is not incompatible with the spatio-temporal world of appearances. In the second Critique, Kant asserts that the moral law gives freedom objective reality, although only for reason in its practical use and not in its speculative use. Speculative and practical reason are, of course, simply two different employments of the same faculty.
61. Recall Kant's description of pleasure and displeasure in terms of promoting or hindering life from his lectures on Metaphysics.
62. Kant remarks that this is the first and perhaps the only case where such a claim can be made. Recall Reflection 988, written some four or five years earlier, in which he writes that it cannot be understood a priori that certain cognitive modes produce pleasure. AK 15:433.
63. As was shown in Chapter 2 above, the lectures on Metaphysics and Ethics foreshadow this solution.
64. In this difficulty we see the tension that is the result of Kant's formal position that in order to be objective (in which lies the only hope of preserving morality) the determining ground of the will must be pure and a priori and his apparent lifelong conviction (perhaps confirmed by his reading of Rousseau) that human beings have an inherent predisposition to be moral (which is not to say that human beings are inherently good). This tension explains (at least in part) the difficulty Kant has with the term moral feeling throughout his career.
65. That is, any determination of the will on the grounds of feeling is pathological. Recall (Chapter 2 above) that Kant uses the term pathologically" (pathologisch) necessary or possible in his lectures on Metaphysics to mean being necessary of possible according to the laws of the sensible power of choice. It is opposed to that which is "practically" (praktisch) necessary or possible. Something is practically necessary or possible according to the laws of the power of free choice. (AK 28:258) Respect is therefore "practically" effected and not pathologically" effected.
66. The statement that there is no antecedent feeling in the subject that will be attuned to morality, while perhaps necessary from the standpoint of Kant's formal moral position, stands in apparent contrast to many passages in Kant's works, both antecedent and posterior to the period of the second Critique, in which Kant indicates that a moral feeling or a moral predisposition is inherently human. But as was noted in the present section, to say that there is no antecedent feeling attuned to morality does not exclude necessarily an antecedent predisposition towards a feeling attuned to morality (an inherent potential moral feeling). Nevertheless, Kant's problem with the term moral feeling (which he never abandons in favor of some other, more objective term) speaks to a question (about which more will be said below) concerning Kant's own predispositions: Does Kant strive to give a rational account of his unshakable belief in an inherent human moral quality, or does he truly believe that reason is primary and that morality is its epiphenomenon? The latter formulation is certainly too strong; in the Third Section of the Grounding, for example, Kant says freedom and self-legislation of the will (morality) are both autonomy and are
hence reciprocal concepts (AK 4:450). Freedom is there defined as that property of the causality belonging to living beings insofar as they are rational (will) that makes it (will) effective independently of alien causes (AK 4:446), and so freedom here implicitly means reason. Thus, at least implicitly, reason and morality are both autonomy and are reciprocal concepts. This, by the way, is a formal statement of the famous Kantian aphorisms "ought implies can" and "can implies ought." Nevertheless, given the lectures on Metaphysics and Ethics from the 1770's through the mid-1790's and the Opus postumum, there would seem to be considerable textual support in favor of the former interpretation.

67. There is perhaps some terminological confusion here. Recall that the moral law as incentive has initially a negative effect upon feeling (disagreeableness). There is also a positive effect, which is called respect. The effect of the moral law as incentive generally is moral feeling; moral feeling in its positive aspect Kant calls respect. The feeling of respect strictly speaking is moral feeling in its positive aspect (AK 5:75). The feeling of respect and moral feeling are closely related but not interchangeable terms; respect is a species of moral feeling.

68. A few pages later Kant remarks that "...one cannot wonder at finding this influence of a mere intellectual idea on feeling quite impenetrable for speculative reason and at having to be satisfied that one can yet see a priori this much: that such a feeling is inseparably connected with the representation of the moral law in every finite rational being. If this feeling of respect were pathological and hence a feeling of pleasure based on the inner sense, it would be futile to try to discover a priori a connection of it with any idea. But it is a feeling which is directed only to the practical and which depends on the representation of a law only as to its form and not on account of any object of the law; thus it cannot be reckoned either as enjoyment or as pain, and yet it produces an interest in compliance with the law which we call moral interest, just as the capacity to take such an interest in the law (or respect for the moral law itself) is the moral feeling properly speaking." . . . daß man sich nicht wundern darf, diesen Einfluß einer bloß intellectuellen Idee aufs Gefühl für speculative Vernunft unergrünlich zu finden und sich damit begnügen zu müssen, daß man a priori doch noch so viel einsehen kann: ein solches Gefühl sei unzertrennlich mit der Vorstellung des moralischen Gesetzes in jedem endlichen vernüftigen Wesen verbunden. Wäre dieses Gefühl der Achtung pathologisch und also ein auf dem inneren Sinne gegründetes Gefühl der Lust, so würde es vergeblich sein, eine Verbindung derselben mit irgend einer Idee a priori zu entdecken. Nun aber ist es ein Gefühl, was bloß aufs Praktische geht und zwar der Vorstellung eines Gesetzes lediglich seiner Form nach, nicht irgend eines Objects desselben wegen anhält, mithin weder zum Vergnügen, noch zum Schmerze gerechnet werden kann und dennoch ein Interesse an der Befolgung desselben hervorbringt, welches wir das moralische nennen; wie denn auch die Fähigkeit, ein solches Interesse am Gesetze zu nehmen, (oder die Achtung fürs moralische Gesetz selbst) eigentlich das moralische Gefühl ist." (AK 5:80) At AK 5:85 this is restated in terms of duty: Respect for duty is the only genuine moral feeling.

69. As was shown in Chapter 1 above, in the Observations Kant says that the feeling of the sublime makes aware of our moral dignity, and as shall be shown in Chapter 4 below, in the third Critique Kant says that the mind feels itself elevated through the experience of the sublime. Hence the language in the present passage indicates at the very least a strong resemblance between the moral and the aesthetic in Kant.

70. At AK 5:158 Kant says that when we pursue our duty we find our soul strengthened and elevated by our realization that human nature is capable of holding itself above everything nature can present as an incentive in opposition to it. We realize that we need not give in to inclination under any circumstances. This is strikingly similar to Kant's account of the dynamically sublime
in the third *Critique*, in the experience of which we realize that we need not give up our highest principles even in the face of nature's might. As shall be argued in Chapter 4 below, this experience allows us to *feel* our higher, supersensible vocation.

71. Kant calls this "moral interest." See note 39 above.

72. As Zammito writes, the parallels between the feeling of respect and the feeling of the sublime are obvious. Both are the result of intellectual pleasure, and both elevate the mind to an awareness of our moral vocation. Zammito, 299.

73. *Duty! Sublime and mighty name. . . ."* etc. (AK 5:86) The passage illustrates again the connection between morality and the sublime in Kant.


75. This view is developed in an article by Pierre Keller, "Making Sense of Noumenal Knowledge" *Akten des Siebenten Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*, Kurfürstliches Schloß zu Mainz, 1990. Band II.1: Sektionsbeiträge Sektionen A-F. Herausgegeben von Gerhard Funke (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1991): 205-214. Keller argues that "... Kant's transcendental idealism is only coherent on the assumption that practical knowledge of things in themselves (provided by the capacity to realize them through action) gives us epistemic warrant for regarding those things as they exist in themselves as real rather than merely logical possibilities." *Ibid.*, 206. Drawing on Reflections 6350 and 6358 from 1797, Keller argues that "The assumption of the existence of an intelligible or noumenal world is thus *nothing but* the demand that we think of reason as practical." *Ibid.*, 211. Leslie Mulholland agrees; see Leslie Mulholland, "Formalism in Kant's Ethical Theory," *ibid.*, 353-363. Mulholland argues that for Kant it must be possible to exhibit any universal law in the world of sense, and so Kant's formal ethical principle is a principle through which sensuous nature and supersensuous nature can be represented as a systematic unity. While Keller's statement may be too strong (consider passages such as the one at A537/B565 in which Kant speaks of an intelligible ground underlying appearances that is not itself appeance), there is the very interesting passage in the third *Critique* cited in the present work (AK 5:344; Chapter 2 above) which says that if it were not for the Antinomies, reason would never accept the restrictions placed on it by the phenomenon/noumenon distinction. In any event, both Keller and Mulholland support the position being argued here, namely, that we gain at least a kind of knowledge of noumenon through awareness of the moral law. However, the present work argues that *in addition* to this doorway to noumenon through the cognitive faculty, there is in Kant another doorway to the noumenal through the faculty of pleasure and displeasure.
Chapter III
The Critique of Judgment: The Beautiful

The Keystone of the Critical Arch

Kant saw his third Critique as the completion of his "entire critical enterprise" (ganzes kritisches Geschäft). As he writes in the "Introduction" to that work, the systematic division of the discipline of philosophy is according to the two possible kinds of concepts and their respective principles, namely, concepts of nature and concepts of freedom. Concepts of nature make possible a theoretical cognition governed by a priori principles; the concept of freedom by its very nature concerns principles for the determination of the will. (AK 5:171) The former is theoretical or natural philosophy and was the main theme of the first Critique; the latter is practical or moral philosophy and was the subject of the second Critique. The third Critique, the Critique of Judgment, is meant to provide a bridge between the realm of nature and the realm of freedom.

The psychology of the faculty of judgment is developed most fully in Kant's first version of the "Introduction" to the Critique of Judgment, which was revised before publication of the first edition in 1790 and was not published during Kant's lifetime. The power of judgment is a mediating link between understanding and reason in the order of our specific cognitive powers, and the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is the mediating link between our cognitive power in general and the power of desire. Kant explains that all the powers of the mind can be reduced to the by now familiar triad, namely the cognitive power, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the power of desire. These principal faculties are always based in their employment on the cognitive power, although not always on cognition, since cognition properly speaking requires both an intuition and a concept, and it is possible for the cognitive power to apprehend intuitions (pure or empirical) without concepts. When this occurs, as it does in aesthetic judgment, the presentations of the three faculties of the mind are apprehended by the cognitive power but are not cognized strictly speaking. The operation of all three principal mental powers is based on the cognitive power even though its own intuitions and the presentations of the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the power of desire do not suffice to yield cognition. Kant intends to conduct an inquiry into the general power of cognition, through which we find that each of the three principal mental faculties are referred to corresponding higher mental powers that operate according to formal (a priori) principles. These higher faculties are understanding, judgment and reason, and their formal principles are lawfulness, purposiveness, and obligation (i.e., purposiveness that is also a law) respectively. The operation of these higher mental faculties according to their respective a priori principles yields our knowledge of nature, art and morals. (AK 20:245-7) The first Critique dealt with the cognitive power, the second Critique dealt with the power of desire; finally, the Critique of Judgment will deal with the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, thus completing the critical enterprise.

We should take special notice of the fact that the mediating link between the cognitive power and the power of desire is a feeling. While a feeling cannot be knowledge in the strict sense, it does take place in the spatio-temporal empirical world. We experience feeling; it is phenomenal. So while transcendental freedom, for example, cannot be an object of any possible experience, we do feel the free play of our powers of imagination and understanding when we are in the presence of a beautiful object. We experience our transcendental freedom indirectly in the
presence of the beautiful. The feeling of the sublime is the result of the free play of the imagination and reason; in the sublime we get a feeling that we have within us a supersensible power.

Indeed, it is in this way that nature promotes the noumenal ends of freedom; the aesthetic experience gives us reason to believe that nature is supportive of our moral vocation. Kant holds that our investigation of the efficient causality of nature necessarily presupposes the concept of purposiveness (which is the formal principle of the faculty of judgment). We must assume a law governed unity in nature if our empirical cognition is to form a coherent experience. This transcendental principle of a purposiveness in nature is the transcendental concept which must guide us when reflecting on objects of nature if investigation of nature is to make sense. Purposiveness is either subjective or objective, and it is according to this distinction that the Critique of Judgment is divided into its two parts, the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment and the Critique of Teleological Judgment. Aesthetic judgment is the power to judge formal, or subjective, purposiveness through the feeling of pleasure and displeasure; teleological judgment is the power to judge the real or objective purposiveness of nature through understanding and reason. (AK 5:193)

In the first "Introduction," Kant explains a little more carefully. There he writes that in a teleological judgment, nature is regarded as purposive objectively, i.e., by reference to the possibility of the object itself. In an aesthetic judgment, nature is regarded as purposive subjectively, i.e., with reference to the subject's way of presenting something. All purposiveness, whether objective or subjective, is either intrinsic or relative. Intrinsic purposiveness has its basis in the presentation of the object itself; relative purposiveness has its basis in the contingent use of this presentation. As we shall see, in the case of a beautiful object, the purposiveness is attributed in the aesthetic judgment to the thing and to nature itself. But there is a different aesthetic judgment in the case of the sublime; the presentation of the sublime is applied to a purposiveness existing a priori in the subject, namely, the supersensible vocation of the subject's mental powers. The presentation of the sublime arouses a reflective feeling of purposiveness in the subject, which refers not to a purposiveness of nature concerning the subject, but rather to a possible purposive use we can make of the form of certain sensible intuitions. What matters in aesthetic judgments regarding the sublime is a contingent use we make of the presentation, not for the sake of cognizing the object as we do through the feeling associated with the beautiful, but for the sake of a feeling of the inner purposiveness in the predisposition of our mental powers. This is the basis of the division of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment into a critique of taste, which is the ability to judge the beautiful, and a critique of intellectual feeling (Geistesgefühl), which is the name Kant gives provisionally, as he tells us here, to the ability to present the sublimity in objects. (AK 20:249-50) By the time the Critique of Judgment is published, the "critique of intellectual feeling" has become the Analytic of the Sublime. Nevertheless, Kant maintains that the division of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment is according to the distinction between judgments of taste, which as such refer to the beautiful, and judgments of taste that arise from an intellectual feeling and as such refer to the sublime. (AK 5:194)

In the second, published "Introduction" to the third Critique, Kant's systematic concern regarding the explication of the mediating link between nature and freedom is more explicit.7 There is an immense gulf between the domain of the concept of nature, the sensible, and the domain of the concept of freedom, the super-sensible. No transition from the sensible to the supersensible through the use of theoretical reason is possible. And while the sensible world cannot have any influence on the supersensible world, the supersensible world must have influence on the sensible. The concept of freedom must be able to actualize its purpose in the world of sense,
and so it must be possible to think of nature as being such that the lawfulness in its form will harmonize at least with the possibility of achieving the purposes of the laws of freedom in nature. Nature must in some way support the noumenal ends of freedom; the laws of causality must be somehow compatible with the laws of freedom. There must be a basis uniting the supersensible that underlies nature and the supersensible contained practically in the concept of freedom even though this basis cannot be cognized theoretically or practically. The basis Kant has in mind is the basis of aesthetic judgment; it is aesthetic judgment that makes possible the transition from our way of thinking in terms of principles of nature to our way of thinking in terms of principles of freedom. (AK 5:175-6)

As we have seen, Kant will argue that the experience of the sublime is the feeling of the inner purposiveness in the predisposition of our mental powers, namely our supersensible moral vocation. That the vocation of the human being is to be the ultimate purpose of nature and that nature's ultimate purpose must be to prepare human beings for the achievement of that ultimate purpose is a topic Kant takes up in §83 of the Critique of Judgment. There he asks, what is the purpose human beings are to further through their connection with nature? Either it is one that can be fulfilled by nature itself in its beneficence, or it is a purpose achieved through human aptitude and skill in the use of nature, either outside or within oneself. On the first alternative the purpose of nature would be human happiness; on the second it is human culture. (AK 5:429-30)

Happiness is only an idea of the complete satisfaction under empirical conditions of all inclination; it is an idea that changes so frequently that even if nature were completely subjected to human choice, it could not possibly adopt a definite and fixed universal law that would keep it in harmony with that wavering concept of happiness that each person sets for him or herself.8 Even if nature outside us were utterly beneficent, its purpose would not be achieved if that purpose aimed at human happiness, because human nature is not receptive to it. In the chain of natural purposes man is never more than a link. (AK 5:430-31)

But human beings have understanding and therefore an ability to choose their own purposes. If nature is regarded as a teleological system, it is man's vocation to be the ultimate purpose of nature subject to the condition that he have the understanding and the will to give both nature and himself reference to a purpose that is self-sufficient, final and transcends natural causality. In order to discover this ultimate purpose of nature in mankind, Kant writes that we must discover what nature can accomplish in order to prepare human beings for what they must themselves do in order to be a final purpose, and then separate that from all other purposes whose achievability rests on conditions we can expect nature to fulfill by itself. This latter purpose is human happiness on earth, or the sum total of all purposes that can be achieved through nature both outside and inside oneself. If one makes happiness one's whole purpose, one is unable to set a final purpose for one's own existence and to harmonize oneself with this final purpose, which is a purpose in accordance with the concept of freedom. There remains only one purpose which nature can accomplish with a view to the final purpose outside of nature, and this is that of producing in a rational being an aptitude for purposes generally, without reference to natural causality, which Kant calls culture. Culture is the only ultimate purpose that can be attributed to nature with respect to human beings. (AK 5:431)

The formal condition under which nature can achieve this final purpose is civil society; only in civil society can the fine arts and sciences flourish. As we shall see, there is a universally communicable pleasure associated with these fine arts and sciences that undermines the tyranny of the senses and prepares us to embrace the ends of our reason under laws of freedom. Culture strives to give us an education that makes us receptive to purposes higher than those that nature itself can provide, namely, the purposes of morality.9 (AK 5:433-4) As Salim Kemal puts it, Kant
uses culture to try to understand the relation of nature to individuals possessing the capacity for rational freedom.10

The aesthetic experience, then, is for Kant that which mediates between the realm of nature and the realm of freedom through the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Moreover, especially through the experience of the sublime, it is a kind of doorway to the supersensible, giving us experiential evidence that we do in fact exist as both phenomenal and noumenal beings, and that the transcendental ideas of an immortal human soul, freedom (as the causality of a being insofar as the being belongs to the intelligible world), and God11 might be more for us than mere postulates of pure practical reason. If this interpretation is correct, we see that the experience of the feeling of the sublime, coming as it does through the feeling of pleasure and displeasure adds another, more immediate, level of moral motivation to the incentives of pure practical reason described in the second Critique.12

Analytic of the Beautiful: The Judgment of Taste

An aesthetic judgment that concerns the beautiful is a judgment of taste. In such a judgment the presentation of the object is not referred to the understanding so as to give rise to a cognition; rather, the presentation of the object is referred by the imagination to the subject and his or her feeling of pleasure or displeasure. In fact, the presentation of a beautiful object cannot be referred to any determinate concept of the understanding; it is precisely this indeterminacy that constitutes the quality of beauty. Hence the judgment of taste is reflective. Judgment in general is the ability to think the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal is given, the judgment that subsumes the particular under it is determinative. If only the particular is given and the universal must be found, the judgment is reflective.13 (AK 5:179) The judgment of taste is also a disinterested one;14 it is concerned with the mere contemplation of its object rather than its existence. Interest is liking connected with an object's existence, and such liking refers to our power of desire rather than to our feeling of pleasure and displeasure. (AK 5:204-5) What the senses like in sensation15 is the agreeable. When we find an object agreeable, we desire objects of that kind. The liking is more than a mere judgment about the form of the object; it means that the existence of the object has been referred to our state of being insofar as that state of being is affected by the agreeable object. The agreeable object arouses in us a pleasant feeling based on our relationship to its presence. We have an interest in its existence. (AK 5:205-7)

On the other hand, when we like a thing through its mere concept, by means of our reason, we call it good. If we like a thing we call good for its own sake it is intrinsically good. If we like it for the sake of something else it is good as a means. In both cases the concept "good" always contains the concept of a purpose (either it has worth in itself as an end or it is useful as a means to some other end). The concept of purpose involves a relation of reason to at least a possible volition, and so an interest in the existence of the object or action. When we call an object good, it becomes an object of the will through principles of reason under the concept of a purpose. (AK 5:207-8)16 Both the agreeable and the good then, are always connected with an interest in their object. This holds not only for goods that are means to ends but also for what is good absolutely, namely the moral good. In fact, the moral good should be our highest interest. (AK 5:209) But as shall be shown below, although the judgment of taste is disinterested, it leads us to that which is our highest interest, the moral good. This work will try to show that there is a clear and explicit connection in the third Critique between the beautiful and morality. How a disinterested judgment can be connected to our most vital interest is a problem we will have to take up later on.17
Taste is the ability to judge an object, or a way of presenting it, by means of a liking or disliking devoid of all interest. The object of such a liking is called beautiful."18 The fact that we like something without any interest (which is subjective) leads us to believe that our judging contains a basis for expecting the same judgment from everyone. Since the liking does not depend on subjective conditions, we regard it as based on what we presuppose in everyone, namely the basic nature of the human mind. We regard beauty as a characteristic of the object and expect others to agree with our judgment, even though the aesthetic judgment really refers to the mental state aroused in the subject by the presentation of the object. We presuppose the aesthetic judgment to be valid for everyone as if it were a judgment of logic. But this universality cannot arise from concepts since the feeling of pleasure and displeasure is not based on concepts.19 This claim to universality not based on concepts Kant calls subjective universality" (subjective Allgemeinheit).20 (AK 5:211-2)

While everyone has his or her own taste regarding what is agreeable, for Kant it is ridiculous to say that the beautiful depends on what is charming and agreeable in a given subject. The taste of sense is distinguished from the taste of reflection in that the former is subjective and the latter involves a claim to subjective universality. When we call something beautiful we mean something more than that we ourselves like it, and we expect the agreement (Einstimmung) of others. Why do we expect others to agree with us when we judge an object beautiful, especially given that the beautiful is not really a characteristic of the object?

If the judgment were based on a concept it would concern the good rather than the beautiful.21 The reflective judgment of taste is not based on a concept (judgments based on concepts are determinate). If we did not expect agreement when we judge an object beautiful, the beautiful would be no more than the agreeable (i.e., the fact that we expect agreement means that the beautiful is something more than the agreeable). Everything we like without a concept would be included under the taste of sense, since the agreeable is what we like without expecting universal agreement. But judgments regarding the beautiful involve taste of reflection wherein we expect universal agreement just as we do in judgments of logic. This universality, which does not rest on concepts of the object (be they formal or empirical), is not a logical universality but an aesthetic one. (AK 5:214)

Kant terms a universality that does not rest on concepts of the object general validity" (Gemeingültigkeit). This is the validity that a presentation referred to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure may have as opposed to the validity of a presentation referred to the cognitive power. Alternatively Kant uses the term subjective universal validity" (subjective Allgemeingültigkeit) for the aesthetic or general validity, and objective universal validity" (objective Allgemeingültigkeit) for the validity of a logical judgment. (AK 5:214-5) The aesthetic judgment does not rest on a concept and so cannot have logical universal validity which requires a concept. Hence the aesthetic judgment does not deal with the object itself. The subjective universal (aesthetic) validity attributed to a judgment of taste is not the result of a connection of the predicate beauty" with the concept of the object, it is the result of a connection of the predicate beauty" and the (mental) realm of judging persons (who encounter the object we call beautiful). (AK 5:215) Why is this so? Why do we expect agreement when we judge an object beautiful?

When we judge objects in terms of concepts, we can demand objective (logical) universal validity. But if we judge objects merely in terms of concepts we lose all presentation of beauty. There can be no rule by which we could demand the acknowledgment of another that an object is beautiful. The beautiful does not fall under a rule (the categories).
When we encounter the beautiful, we want to submit the object to our own eyes as if our liking of it as beautiful depended on the sensation. But when we say an object is beautiful we hear a universal voice" (allgemeine Stimme), and it is on that basis that we expect agreement from everyone. Hence Kant says at this point

. . . that nothing is postulated in a judgment of taste except such a universal voice about a liking unmediated by concepts. Hence all that is postulated is the possibility of a judgment that is aesthetic and yet can be considered valid for everyone. The judgment of taste itself does not postulate everyone's agreement (since only a logically universal judgment can do that, because it can adduce reasons); it merely requires this agreement from everyone, as an instance of the rule, an instance regarding which it expects confirmation not from concepts but from the agreement of others.

Hier ist nun zu sehen, daß in dem Urtheile des Geschmacks nichts postulirt wird, als eine solche allgemeine Stimme in Ansehung des Wohlgefallens ohne Vermittelung der Begriffe; mithin die Möglichkeit eines ästhetischen Urtheils, welches zugleich als für jedermann gültig betrachtet werden könne. Das Geschmacksurtheil selber postulirt nicht jedermanns Einstimmung (denn das kann nur ein logisch allgemeines, weil es Gründe anführen kann, thun); es sinnt nur jedermann diese Einstimmung an, als einen Fall der Regel, in Ansehung dessen es die Bestätigung nicht von Begriffen, sondern von anderer Beitritt erwartet.22

The universal voice is an idea (Idee) 23 to which we refer our judging when we make a judgment of taste regarding the beautiful. One can be certain in that one's judgment does in fact refer to this idea by being conscious that one's liking does not depend on the agreeable (sense liking) or the good (liking under a concept). Only then can one count on everyone's assent. Why we are justified in this claim remains to be seen.

It cannot be the case that the feeling of pleasure we associate with the beautiful object comes before the judgment that the object is beautiful. Such a case would be an example of agreeableness in sensation, which by its nature can have only private validity. As we have seen, the judgment that an object is beautiful does not lie in the sensation of it (the agreeable) or in its concept (the good). The judgment that a thing is beautiful is the result of a state of mind (Gemüthszustand). We are aware of this state of mind through the feeling that results from the free play (freies Spiel) of the imagination and the understanding occasioned by the presentation of the object. The subjective condition of the judgment of taste is the universal communicability of this mental state underlying the judgment of taste. Pleasure in the object must be the consequence of this subjective condition, not its antecedent. (AK 5:216-7) We still must ask how this mental state underlying the judgment of taste can be universally communicable.

Objective communication involves cognition. As Kant says here, nothing can be communicated universally except cognition, or a presentation that is referred to cognition as the universal reference point with which everyone's presentational power is compelled to harmonize. But we have been talking about an expected and required agreement from others regarding a judgment that we make without a concept. What is the basis for the universal communicability of the presentation we call beautiful? The presentation is subjectively determined; it does not involve a concept of the object. How can it be communicated universally if only cognitions are universally
communicable? The answer is that the subjectively determined basis of this presentation is nothing other than the mental state that we find in the relation between the presentational powers of imagination and understanding insofar as they refer a given presentation to cognition in general. (AK 5:217) In this way the presentation of the beautiful object is referred to cognition as a universal reference point, and we can therefore expect and require the agreement of all other similarly constituted (rational) minds.24

The judgment that a thing is beautiful is a state of mind occasioned by the presentation of the object. When in the presence of the beautiful, the mind's cognitive powers are brought into play, as they would be when in the presence of any object. Knowledge or cognition occurs when the manifold of intuition (das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung)25 is combined by the imagination (Einbildungskraft)26 under a concept given by the understanding (Verstand)27 through its unifying pure concepts of synthesis, the categories. But when the cognitive powers are brought into play by the presentation of a beautiful object, no determinate concept restricts them to a particular rule of cognition. The cognitive powers are in a free play (freies Spiel). The understanding and the imagination are in free play because there is no determinate concept to restrict them to a particular rule of cognition. This mental state must be a feeling (Gefühle); the mind is aware of the free play of the imagination and the understanding although it cannot subsume this awareness under a concept and obtain actual knowledge of it. Yet it is this free play of the cognitive powers accompanying the presentation of a beautiful object that must be universally communicable, since it is only by reference to cognition (in this case cognition in general) that a presentation can be made that holds for everyone. The cognitive powers in their free play harmonize as they refer the given presentation to cognition in general, and cognition in general provides the universal reference point around which we can expect the cognitive powers of any (similarly constituted) subject whatever to harmonize as well. (AK 5:217)

Two comments are in order at this point. First, we should take careful note that the mental state accompanying the presentation of an object we call beautiful is a feeling. We feel the free play of the imagination and the understanding. We feel the mind's freedom when we are in the presence of the beautiful, and, as we shall see, we get a sense of timelessness as well.28 Feeling is clearly something we experience in the spatio-temporal empirical world, yet we feel things that transcend space and time when in the presence of the beautiful. We experience the transcendent, noumenal world when we feel the free play of the cognitive powers, and so it would seem that we have access to the supersensible that does not depend upon the postulates of pure practical reason.

Secondly, we should note that Kant's argument here is perhaps not altogether persuasive; we should ask, is the free play of the cognitive powers in reference to cognition in general accompanying the presentation of the beautiful a universally communicable mental state that is valid for everyone or do we say that the free play of the cognitive powers in reference to cognition in general must be universally communicable because that is the only way of presenting that is valid for everyone? The language Kant uses actually suggests the latter. But this truly metaphysical question and the critique it leads to lie beyond the scope of the present chapter.29 What is important for us now are the implications of Kant's aesthetic theory as he presents it.

The Phenomenon Called Beauty

The presentation that occurs in a judgment of taste has subjective universal communicability without presupposing a determinate concept. This subjective universal communicability is the communication of the mental state (Gemüthszustand) that exists when the imagination and the
understanding are in free play, *insofar as they harmonize with each other as required for cognition in general.*30 The subjective relation (harmony) between the cognitive powers of imagination and understanding suitable for cognition in general must hold for everyone, i.e., for any other being sharing these cognitive powers. The mental state that is this subjective relation between the imagination and the understanding must be as universally communicable as any determinate cognition since the subjective condition of any cognition rests on the relation between the imagination and the understanding. (Ak 5:217-8)31

The ability to communicate one’s mental state (*Gemüthsztand*) generally, even if this is only the state of one’s cognitive powers, results in a feeling of pleasure. This can be established empirically and psychologically from our natural propensity to sociability. But the pleasure we feel when making a judgment of taste is something more than this pleasure; the pleasure we feel here we require as necessary when another is in the presence of the object we judge beautiful. It is as if beauty were a characteristic of the object, determined according to concepts, even though beauty is nothing in itself apart from a reference to the subject's feeling. (AK 5:218) How is it possible to communicate that which is nothing in itself apart from a feeling in a subject? Kant clearly thinks that such communication is possible, and the fact that he does supports our thesis that feeling, especially the feeling of the sublime, constitutes a way of knowing (although not "knowledge" in the strict sense) the supersensible.32 We shall return to this point shortly.

We are conscious of a reciprocal subjective harmony between the cognitive powers of the imagination and the understanding when we make a judgment of taste. We feel our mental state. Is this consciousness the result of mere inner sense and sensation, or is it the result of a consciousness of the intentional activity by which we bring these powers into play? That is to say, is the consciousness passive (aesthetic33) or active (intellectual34)? We might expect Kant to argue that the consciousness is the result of an active mental process rather than a passive being-acted-upon, but the feeling of pleasure and displeasure to which a judgment of taste is referred cannot be intellectual. If the presentation that prompts the judgment of taste were a concept, under which our judgment of the object would unite the imagination and the understanding giving rise to *cognition* of the object, the consciousness of this relation between the cognitive powers would be intellectual.35 Such a judgment is not made in reference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and cannot be a judgment of taste. A judgment of taste determines the object with regard to liking and the predicate of beauty, and so it is only through *sensation* that the mind can be aware of the unity of the relation in the subject between imagination and understanding (that results from the harmonizing of the two cognitive powers in reference to cognition in general). This sensation is the quickening or animating (*Belebung*) of the two powers (imagination and understanding) to an activity that is indeterminate but, through the prompting of the given presentation, is an accordant or unanimous activity (*einhellige Thätigkeit*). The activity is in accord with that required for cognition in general. An objective relation can only be thought, but insofar as it has subjective conditions it can be sensed in the effect it has on the mind. If the relation is not based on a concept, the *only* way we become conscious of it is through a sensation of this relation's effect. The relation that the presentational powers must have in order to give rise to a power of cognition in general is a relation that is not based on a concept. We can become aware of it through a sensation of this relation's effect, namely the facilitated play of the imagination and the understanding enlivened (*beleben*) by their reciprocal harmony (*wechselseitige Zusammens-timmung*). This reciprocal harmony is the harmony necessary for cognition in general. The presentation of this harmony accords with the conditions of universality that is the business of the understanding in general. The cognitive powers are brought into the proportioned attunement
(proportionale Stimmung) required for all cognition. This attunement is considered valid for any being so constituted as to judge by means of understanding combined with the senses, that is to say, for all human beings. Hence we can expect that any human being in the presence of an object which occasions the mental state we associate with the beautiful will experience the same sensation. The beautiful, then, is what is liked universally without a concept. (AK 5:218-20)

Beauty is a subjective mental state that is the felt effect of the free play of the imagination and the understanding, enlivened by their mutual harmony and occasioned by a given object. Although beauty is a subjective mental state, because it is the result of the free play of the cognitive faculties, we expect the same mental state to occur in any subject possessing the same faculties, and so the mental state is communicable (by presenting another subject with the object that occasioned the mental state). In this way, the experience of the beautiful is objective. Through the free play of the cognitive faculties the mind is aware of its freedom. Through the contemplation of the beautiful, over which we "linger" (weilen), the mind experiences a sense of timelessness.

What is it in the object that precipitates this free play of the cognitive powers? Nothing more than the way the object is presented, or what Kant calls the form of purposiveness. The judgment of taste is based on the form of purposiveness of an object. Purposiveness (Zweckmäßigkeit) or forma finalis (purposive form) is the causality that a concept has with regard to its object. A purpose (Zweck) is the object of a concept where the concept is regarded as the real basis of the object's possibility (the effect is brought about by some cause through a concept that this cause has of it). We think of a purpose when we think of the form or existence of the object itself as an effect that is only possible through a concept of that effect. That is to say, we think of a purpose when we think of the existence or form of a tree as being possible only through some cause having the concept of "tree." Thinking "tree" involves thinking what a tree is for. The causality that the concept "tree" has with regard to the object that is a tree is purposiveness, i.e., the existence of the tree is thought as being the result of some purpose contained in the concept "tree." The power of desire (Begehungsvermögen) insofar as it can be determined to act in conformity with the presentation of a purpose is the will. However, we sometimes call objects, states of mind (Gemüthszustand) or acts purposive even if their possibility does not necessarily presuppose the presentation of a purpose. We do this because we can explain them only if we assume that they are based on a causality that operates according to purposes. Hence there can be purposiveness without a purpose (Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck) in that we do not claim to know the causes of such purposive form in a will, but we cannot grasp the explanation of its possibility unless we assume a will. We can observe a purposiveness as to form and take note of this purposive form in objects without basing the purposiveness on a purpose (which would require knowledge of the concept). (AK 5:220)

A judgment of taste cannot be based on a subjective purpose, which is purpose regarded as the basis of a liking. Such a liking is based on agreeableness (Annehmlichkeit) and always involves an interest in the existence of the object of pleasure. Neither can the judgment of taste be determined by a presentation of an objective purpose, which is a presentation of the object itself as possible in terms of connection to some other purpose. Such an objective purpose involves a concept of the good. The aesthetic judgment of taste involves only the relation of the presentational powers to one another as they are determined by a presentation of an object the judgment determines as beautiful. This relation of the presentational powers is connected to the feeling of a pleasure which the judgment of taste declares to be valid for everyone, since we expect any other being with a similarly constituted mind to experience the same relation of the presentational powers and so the same feeling. Since the judgment of taste cannot be based on the
agreeableness accompanying the presentation, or a presentation of the object's perfection (which involves the concept of the good)40, it can only be the subjective purposiveness (subjective Zweckmäßigkeit) in the presentation of the object without any purpose (subjective or objective) that determines the judgment of taste. That is to say, the subject is conscious of a purposiveness that does not depend on agreeableness or a concept of the good. The subject is conscious of purposiveness without a purpose" and so of the "mere form of purposiveness" (bloße Form der Zweckmäßigkeit) in the presentation by which the object is given (gegeben) to us. (AK 5:221)

The feeling of pleasure accompanying this relation of the presentational powers is a merely contemplative pleasure. It is the consciousness of a merely formal purposiveness in the play of the subject's cognitive powers accompanying a presentation by which an object is given.41 This consciousness contains a basis for determining the subject's activity regarding the enlivening (Belebung) of his cognitive powers. The consciousness in an aesthetic judgment, then, provides an inner causality that is purposive with regard to cognition in general (it is not restricted to a determinate cognition). The consciousness contains the mere form of the subjective purposiveness of a presentation. The pleasure is not practical in any way, since there is no input from either a pathological basis (agreeableness) or an intellectual basis (the concept of the good). It has a causality in it, however; it keeps the cognitive powers engaged in their occupation without any further aim beyond the contemplation of the presentation itself. We linger (weilen) in our contemplation of the beautiful because this contemplation "reinforces and reproduces itself" (sich selbst stärkt und reproduziert). The mind is actively engaged in this contemplative pleasure, enjoying the free play of the cognitive powers. (AK 5:222) The interpretation being offered in this work holds that Kant's position is that the mind is aware of a sense of timelessness in this contemplation; it is this awareness, which is not cognitive, that makes the truly beautiful object endlessly fascinating. Hence the mental state we experience in the presence of an object we call beautiful is the result of the mind's awareness of its freedom and the possibility of a world that exists beyond the constraints of time. The aesthetic experience Kant describes is a consciousness, a non-cognitive awareness, of the supersensible.

How can we support this claim? In his General Comment on the First Division of the Analytic (of the beautiful), Kant defines taste as an ability to judge an object in reference to the "free lawfulness of the imagination" (freie Gesetzmäßigkeit der Einbildungskraft). In a judgment of taste the imagination must be considered in its freedom. Its power here is productive and spontaneous, as opposed to reproductive. In apprehending a given object of sense the imagination does not have free play, since it is tied to the determinate form of the sensed object. But the object may offer the imagination just the sort of form in the combination of its manifold as the imagination would design in harmony with the understanding's lawfulness if it were left to itself and free. To say that the imagination is free (autonomous) and lawful in itself is a contradiction, however. Only the understanding provides a law. When the imagination must proceed according to a determinate law (the categories) its product is determined by concepts. As we have seen, however, if the liking is determined by concepts, it is a liking for the good and not the beautiful. It is only a lawfulness without a law (the form of lawfulness itself) and a subjective harmony of the imagination and the understanding without an objective harmony (which would result in a cognition) that is compatible with the free lawfulness of the understanding and with the peculiarity of a judgment of taste. Here the form of lawfulness itself is compared to the form of purposiveness itself; the imagination is free and active in the judgment of taste. The mind is conscious of its freedom.
A presentation of freedom is the *sine qua non* of any beautiful object. If the free play of our presentational powers is to be sustained (*unterhalten*), any regularity that has an air of restraint is to be avoided as much as possible. Anything that shows stiff regularity runs counter to taste because it does not allow us to enjoy the contemplation of it for any length of time. It bores us. It lacks the elements of timelessness and freedom that bring about the state of mind we call beautiful. On the other hand, whatever lends itself to unstudied and purposive play by the imagination is always new to us. We never tire of looking at such an object; as we have seen, the merely contemplative pleasure reinforces and reproduces itself without limit. Through this state of mind we get a sense of timeless-ness and freedom. We become aware, through a consciousness, and so an experience, of the supersensible. Hence the interpretation advanced in this work is that for Kant the aesthetic experience is a doorway to the noumenal. And so the song of a bird offers more to our taste than human song or music precisely because it cannot be brought under a rule of music; it seems to contain freedom. And while the changing shapes of a fireplace or a brook can charm the imagination by sustaining its free play we do not say they are beautiful; the sense of freedom and timelessness that makes an object beautiful is absent. (AK 5:242-3)

Turning to Kant's discussion of art generally and fine art in particular, we see that freedom is also the *sine qua non* condition of art. We should not call anything art except a production through freedom, i.e., a production through a power of choice that bases its acts on reason. Nature, then, does not produce art. (Although if we posit God we could regard nature as a production of such a power of choice, and Kant will say in the *Opus postumum* that organized beings presuppose exactly this kind of rational choice, i.e., God.) Art is distinguished from science and craft; art is not something we are able to do as soon as we understand the rules. There is a need for some constraint (rules) in art, for example prosody and meter in poetry, but it is a free spirit (*Geist*) that animates a work of art. (AK 5:303-4) Considering art in general, Kant distinguishes mechanical art from aesthetic art. Mechanical art makes a possible object actual adequately to our cognition of the object. We recognize it, but get no pleasure from it. Art that intends to arouse in us a feeling of pleasure is aesthetic art, which comprises agreeable art and fine art. Art is agreeable if its purpose is that the pleasure should accompany presentations that are mere sensations; art is fine if its purpose is that the pleasure should accompany presentations that are ways of cognizing. Fine art is a way of presenting that is purposive (without a purpose) and furthers the culture of our mental powers to facilitate social communication. The standard of fine art is the reflective power of judgment rather than sensation proper. (AK 5:305-6)

Natural beauty is a beautiful thing; artistic beauty is a beautiful *presentation* of a thing. (AK 5:311) The beautiful presentation of an object is actually only the form of a concept's exhibition by which the concept is universally communicated. (AK 5:312) Although we are conscious that fine art is art and not a product of nature (since nature does not produce art), the purposiveness in its form must seem *free* from all constraint of chosen rules just as if it were a product of nature. This is necessary if the presentation is to evoke the feeling of freedom in the play of our cognitive powers that results from the mental state we call beautiful. Although the purposiveness in a product of fine art is intentional, it must not *seem* intentional; fine art must look like nature even though we know it is art. This is because it is nature that presents us with purposiveness without a purpose. Nature appears to be purposive but we cannot know if in fact it is purposive, much less what the purpose *is*. Purposiveness without a purpose (lawfulness without a law) presents the *form* of purposiveness that enlivens the cognitive powers in their free play and produces the feeling of pleasure we experience when in the presence of the beautiful. Genius (*Genie*) is the talent that can give a rule that looks like freedom to fine art. (AK 5:306-7)
Spirit (Geist) in the context of Kant's aesthetics is the ability to exhibit aesthetic ideas. (AK 5:313-4) Spirit is the ability that genius has in order to express aesthetic ideas in such a way that they may communicate the mental attunement the ideas produce. (AK 5:317) An aesthetic idea is a presentation of the imagination that prompts much thought, but to which no determinate thought or concept whatsoever can be adequate. An aesthetic idea strives towards something that lies beyond the bounds of experience; they are inner intuitions to which no concept can be completely adequate. In the process of creating aesthetic ideas we feel our freedom from the law of association (under which the imagination operates in its empirical use). (AK 5:314) An aesthetic idea is a presentation that makes us add to a concept the thoughts of much that is ineffable, but the feeling of which quickens (beleben) our cognitive powers, connecting language with spirit. (AK 5:316) Fine art exhibits aesthetic ideas; when it does so successfully, we say it is beautiful; we never tire of contemplating it; it give us a sense of the free and timeless aspects of our nature.

The Beautiful and the Moral

In addition to the experience of the supersensible that the mental state we experience in the presence of a beautiful object gives us in terms of a sense of timelessness and of our freedom, Kant connects the beautiful to the supersensible through the moral. Although the judgment of taste by means of which we declare something to be beautiful must not have any interest as its determining basis, after the judgment has been made on purely aesthetic grounds an interest can be connected with it, albeit indirectly. This interest can be empirical or intellectual. By "empirical" (empirisch) interest Kant means that the interest is based on some inherent inclination of human nature. By "intellectual" (intellectuell) interest he means that the interest is based on the will's property of being determinable a priori by reason, or, in other words, the will's moral property. (AK 5:296) As we shall see, beauty is a symbol of morality.

The beautiful can only be of empirical interest in society. The inherent inclination Kant has in mind is the urge to live in society. This natural inclination to society is furthered by "sociability" (Geselligkeit), which is enhanced by taste (Geschmack). Taste is an ability to judge whatever allows us to communicate our feeling to everyone else, and this ability enhances our fitness and propensity for society. Kant thinks that outside of society no one would seek to adorn himself or his dwelling; only in society does one seek such refinements. We judge someone refined if he has the inclination and the skill to communicate his pleasure to others, and one is not satisfied with an object unless one can feel one's liking for it in community with others. We enjoy a beautiful object much more when we are in the company of others who agree with us that the object is beautiful than we would if we were alone. And we expect a concern for universal communication on the basis of our very humanity. (AK 5:297) Taste is a kind of common sense (sensus communis) which is accomplished by our putting ourselves in the position of everyone else and comparing our judgments to the merely possible judgments of others. We do this by leaving out as much as possible of the material, or sensation, from the presentational state which precipitates our judgment, paying attention only to its formal features. When we do this we expect agreement from everyone, i.e., any being possessing similar mental faculties (any rational being). (AK 5:293-4) Initially, only charms" (Reiz) are important in societies, but as civilization evolves beautiful forms overtake charm in importance. When civilization reaches its peak, the universal communicability is the principle interest of refined taste, rather than charm. Sensations (charms) are valued only to the extent that they are universally communicable. This interest in universal
communication promotes sociability, and hence we have, Kant tells us, through our natural inclination to society, an indirect empirical interest in the beautiful.54 (AK 5:297)

Kant is looking for a transition from the agreeable to the good. Put another way, Kant seeks to find a transition from the sensible to the supersensible,55 which is the underlying problem of the third Critique. Since the attachment of the beautiful to our inclination to society is empirical, our interest in the beautiful based on this inclination can provide only a very ambiguous transition from the agreeable to the good. But if we consider a judgment of taste in its pure form, we may discover something that has reference to it a priori, if only indirectly. That is, we may discover an intellectual interest in the beautiful. If such an interest were to reveal itself, taste would reveal how our ability to make judgments of taste provides a transition from "sense enjoyment" (Sinnengenuß) to moral feeling" (Sittengefühl)56. We would then have better guidance in using taste purposively (to promote moral feeling), and we would also be able to show that judgment is a mediating link" (Mittelglied) in the chain of our a priori powers upon which all legislation must depend. (AK 5:297-8) By demonstrating an intellectual, i.e., an a priori57 interest in the beautiful, Kant finds a link between the agreeable and the good, or the sensible and the supersensible. This supports his case that judgment is the mediating link between the understanding, the proper application of which is the giving of rules to (our experience of) nature (the sensible), and reason, the application of which is to provide principles for the use of our freedom (the supersensible). In the judgment of taste we experience this link to the supersensible through feeling, rather than merely postulating the supersensible as a necessary consequence of pure practical reason.

The connection of the beautiful to the moral is not new to Kant. Previous thinkers58 have considered an interest in the beautiful generally a sign of good moral character. Others have pointed to virtuos of taste who are vain, obstinate, given to ruinous passions, and so can hardly be associated with good moral characters. Not only does this indicate to Kant that the feeling for the beautiful is distinct in kind from moral feeling (moralisches Gefühl), but that it is impossible to reconcile the beautiful with moral interest by an alleged intrinsic affinity between the two. (AK 5:298) Nevertheless, the feeling of the beautiful is connected to moral feeling. To take a direct interest in the beautiful forms of nature (not nature's charms, which are empirical) is always the mark of "a good soul" (einer guten Seele), and if this interest is readily associated with the contemplation of nature it indicates at least a mental attunement" (Gemüthstimmung) favorable to moral feeling. By "direct interest" Kant means a liking of nature's product for its form and its existence, even though no charm of sense is involved. Hence the interest is direct but remains intellectual. (AK 5:299)

We have in the aesthetic power of judgment an ability to judge forms without using concepts, in which we feel a liking that we also make a rule for everyone, even though the judgment is not based on an interest and does not in itself give rise to one. We also have an intellectual power of judgment, which is an ability for determining a priori the mere forms of practical maxims the liking of which59 we make a law for everyone. This judgment too is not based on any interest, but it gives rise to one (the moral interest). The pleasure or displeasure in the first judgment is that of taste; of the second judgment it is that of moral feeling. Moral feeling causes reason to have a direct interest in the objective reality of its ideas, in other words, moral feeling causes reason to have an interest that nature should at least show a trace or give a hint that it contains some basis for us to assume that there is a lawful harmony between the products of nature and that liking of ours that is independent of all interest, the judgment of taste.60 As was shown at the beginning of the present chapter, reason must take an interest in any manifestation in nature of such a harmony, and so the mind cannot contemplate the beauty of nature without having its interest aroused. This
interest in the beautiful in nature shares a kinship with the moral, hence whoever takes an interest in the beautiful in nature can only do so to the extent that he has already solidly established an interest in the morally good. If someone is directly interested in the beauty of nature we have reason to believe that he has at least a predisposition to a good moral attitude. Here the aesthetic judgment is described in terms of a kinship with moral feeling. Nature displays itself as art, i.e., nature seems (to us) to display itself in terms of a lawful arrangement and not merely as the result of chance; nature displays itself as purposiveness without a purpose (which is the form of the beautiful). Since we do not find this purpose anywhere outside us, we look for it in ourselves. We look for it in that which constitutes the ultimate purpose of our existence (was den letzten Zweck unseres Daseins ausmacht): our moral vocation (moralische Bestimmung).

Our liking for beautiful productions in a pure judgment of taste is not connected with a direct interest because art either achieves its effect by imitating nature and being regarded as natural beauty, or we see that it intentionally aimed at our liking, in which case it interests us only in its purpose and not in itself. We are only able to take direct interest in the beautiful as such if it is nature or if we consider it to be nature. This holds especially if we require others to take a direct interest, which we do. We consider someone's way of thinking coarse and ignoble if he has no feeling for the beautiful in nature.

The beautiful and the moral, then, are connected through the interest reason has in the reality of its ideas. While the empirical interest in the beautiful is indirect, the intellectual interest is direct. The link between the agreeable and the good is only ambiguously established through our empirical interest in the beautiful, but our intellectual interest in the beautiful shows that taste is able to directly establish a link between the agreeable and the good, the sensible and the supersensible, via its kinship with moral feeling.

Kant makes an even more explicit connection between the moral and the beautiful in §59, On Beauty as a Symbol of Morality. We must first ask what Kant means by symbol (Symbol). A symbol is analogous to what Kant called a schema in the first Critique. Intuitions are required to establish that our concepts have reality. If the concepts are empirical, the intuitions are called "examples" (Beispiele). If the concepts are pure concepts of the understanding, the intuitions conveyed by means of the imagination and which are therefore abstract are called schemata (Schemata). A schema is what mediates and so makes possible the subsumption of intuitions under concepts of the understanding, or, a schema is what makes possible the application of concepts of the understanding to intuitions. It does so by sharing features of both a concept and an intuition. But no intuition can be adequate to a rational concept (an idea of reason), and so we cannot establish their objective reality for the sake of theoretical cognition. All hypotyposis (exhibition, subiectio ad adspectum) consists in making a concept sensible and is either schematic or symbolic. In schematic hypotyposis a concept of the understanding is formed and the intuition corresponding to it is given a priori. In symbolic hypotyposis there is a concept which only reason can think, to which no sensible intuition can be adequate. This concept is supplied with an intuition that judgment treats in a way that is only analogous to the procedure it follows in schematizing. The treatment of this intuition agrees with the procedure of uniting a concept of the understanding with a sensible intuition merely in the rule followed rather than in terms of the intuition itself. The treatment agrees merely in terms of the form of the reflection rather than its content. (AK 5:351) In that part of the Opus postumum published in 1804 with the title What Real Progress has Metaphysics Made in Germany since the Time of Leibniz and Wolff?, under the heading "How to Provide Objective Reality for Pure Concepts of Understanding and
Reason," Kant explains more fully: When the concept cannot be represented immediately (as is the case with a rational concept), but only indirectly or immediately through its implications or consequences (Folgen) the act of exhibition may be called the symbolization of the concept. In fact, concepts of the sensible are schematized; concepts of the supersensible are symbolized. The latter is an aid or expedient (Nothülfe) we use for concepts of the supersensible (ideas of reason) which as such cannot be exhibited and given in any possible experience, but which necessarily belong to knowledge, even if only possible as practical knowledge. The symbol of an idea (or concept of reason) is a presentation of the object by analogy. We present the object of the idea (e.g., God) in terms of the relation which some other object (e.g., human being) has to its effects or consequences and which is the same relation that we consider the object itself as having to its consequences, even though the objects themselves are of wholly different orders. For example, we may present organized things in nature to their cause as we present a clock in relation to its human maker. The relation of each to causality in general as a category is the same in both cases. The intrinsic character of the subject that has this relation and these effects remains unknown; we cannot exhibit it, we can only exhibit the relation. (AK 20:279-80)

Symbolic presentation is a kind of intuitive presentation; it is not to be contrasted to intuitive presentation. Intuitive presentations are either schematic or symbolic; both are hypotyposes or exhibitions and not mere characterizations or designations of concepts by sensible signs. Hence all intuitions supplied for a priori concepts are either schemata or symbols. Schemata contain direct exhibitions of the object, symbols contain indirect exhibitions of the object. Schematic exhibition is demonstrative, symbolic exhibition uses an analogy (for which we use empirical intuitions as well). Judgment performs a double function in symbolic exhibition; it applies the concept to the object of a sensible intuition, and then it applies the rule by which it reflects on that intuition to an entirely different object, of which the former object is only the symbol. (AK 5:352) The symbolic exhibition (hypotyposis) expresses concepts not by means of a direct intuition but only according to an analogy with one. The symbolic exhibition is a transfer of our reflection on an object of intuition to an entirely different concept to which perhaps no intuition can ever directly correspond. If we may call a mere way of presenting a cognition, which is permissible for determining an object practically, then all our cognition of God is symbolic, i.e., cognition by analogy. Whoever regards our cognition of God as schematic falls into anthropomorphism.70 (AK 5:352-3)

With this understanding of symbol" in place, then, Kant asserts that the beautiful is the symbol of the morally good (das Schöne ist das Symbol des Sittlich-Guten), and that it is only because we refer (Rücksicht) the beautiful to the morally good (which we all do naturally, and require others to do as a duty) that our liking includes a claim to everyone else's assent. The mind is conscious of being ennobled by this reference to rise above a mere receptivity for pleasure derived from sense impressions. The morally good is the intelligible that taste has in view. (AK 5:353) In §57 Kant explains that pure reason falls into three kinds of antinomy corresponding to the three mental powers of cognition, the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and the power of desire. Each of the three higher cognitive powers (understanding, judgment and reason) to which the mental powers are referred must have its a priori principles (lawfulness, purposiveness and final purpose, respectively). When reason passes judgment on these a priori principles and their use, it demands the unconditioned for every given conditioned, which we can never find if we regard the sensible as representing things in themselves. Three antinomies arise: for the cognitive power, an antinomy of reason concerning the theoretical use of the understanding when this use is extended up to the unconditioned; for the feeling of pleasure and displeasure an antinomy of reason concerning the aesthetic use of judgment; and for the power of desire an antinomy of reason concerning the
practical use of our intrinsically legislative reason. All of these antinomies are alike in that they force (zwingen) reason to abandon the otherwise very natural presupposition that objects of sense are things in themselves. Reason is forced to regard objects of sense as mere appearances that are based on a supersensible substrate, the concept of which is only an idea and precludes cognition proper. The solution to all three antinomies is to rely on the assumption of a supersensible substrate for the given objects, taking the latter as appearances only. The sensible must be regarded as only the mere appearance of things based on an intelligible substrate of nature outside and within us. This intelligible (but not sensible) substrate should be taken as the thing itself. When we do this we are led to three ideas: first, the idea of the supersensible in general as the substrate of nature; second, the idea of the same supersensible considered as the principle of nature's subjective purposiveness for our cognitive power; and third, the idea of the same supersensible regarded as the principle of the purposes of freedom and of the harmony of these purposes in the moral sphere. (AK 5:345-6) The principle of nature's subjective purposiveness for our cognitive power is what Kant has in mind when he says that the morally good is the intelligible that taste has in view. It is with this intelligible, the morally good, that our higher cognitive powers harmonize, and without it contradictions would continually arise from the contrast between the nature of these powers and the claims that taste makes. Kant offers four points of the analogy between the beautiful and the morally good. First, we like the beautiful directly but not in its concept; rather we like the beautiful directly upon reflecting on the intuition. The morally good we like directly in its concept. Secondly, we like the beautiful without any interest, and while our liking for the morally good is necessarily connected with an interest, the interest does not precede our judgment about the liking; it is produced by the liking. Thirdly, in judging the beautiful we present the freedom of the imagination and hence the freedom of our power of sensibility as harmonizing with the lawfulness of the understanding. In a moral judgment we think the freedom of the will as the will's harmony with itself according to universal laws of reason. Finally, we present the subjective principle for judging the beautiful as universal, i.e., valid for everyone, but as unknowable through any universal concept. The morally good we also declare to be universally valid for all subjects through its objective principle, which we also declare to be knowable through a universal concept (the form of law as such). Moral judgments are capable of having determinate constitutive principles, and the possibility of a moral judgment depends on our basing moral maxims on those principles and their universality. (AK 5:354) The beautiful object becomes an indirect (analogous) presentation of a good will. Through this analogous presentation of the concept of a good will, the pleasure we experience in the presence of the beautiful becomes an experience of the intelligible moral world, a world which practical reason can only postulate. The aesthetic experience of the beautiful has metaphysical significance for Kant. The beautiful, then, is analogous to the morally good. Kant is not saying that the beautiful is morally good, only that the beautiful is like the morally good. It symbolizes the morally good. The experience of the beautiful is like the moral experience. Additional evidence of this is that the names that we use to describe beautiful objects seem to presuppose that we judge the objects morally. We use words like "majestic," "magnificent," "cheerful," even "innocent," "humble," or "tender" because beautiful objects arouse sensations in us (sensations which, as we have seen, are the result of a mental state) that are somehow analogous to the consciousness (Bewußtsein) we have in a mental state (Gemüthszzustand) produced by moral judgments. The judgment of taste, in reference to the beautiful, is significant to Kant's moral metaphysics in that
it provides us with a transition from the sensible to the supersensible realm of the morally good. Kant writes:

Taste enables us, as it were, to make the transition from sensible charm to a habitual moral interest without making too violent a leap; for taste presents the imagination as admitting, even in its freedom, of determination that is purposive for the understanding, and it teaches us to like even objects of sense freely, even apart from sensible charm.

Der Geschmack macht gleichsam den Übergang vom Sinnenreiz zum habituellen moralischen Interesse ohne einen zu gewaltsamen Sprung möglich, indem er die Einbildungskraft auch in ihrer Freiheit als zweckmäßig für den Verstand bestimmbar vorstellt und sogar an Gegenständen der Sinne auch ohne Sinnenreiz ein freies Wohlgemachte finden lehrt.77

Notes

1. As Dostal points out, those who object that Kant's notion of the sublime as evoking the supersensible and the moral illegitimately compromises the autonomy bestowed on aesthetic judgment in the exposition of the beautiful are mistaken in that they refuse to take seriously the systematic task that Kant sets for the Critique of Judgment within the critical project, thus ignoring Kant's larger project and context. Robert Dostal, "The Sublime and the Project of a Critique of Judgment," 94-5. As Kant himself says (KrV B673 ff., B765-6, B866-7), philosophy must be systematic. The present section is intended to bring out this systematic importance of the third Critique, while a core concern of the overall work is to show that the larger project and context of Kantian philosophy is always moral.

2. The first "Introduction" may be found on pages 193-251 in volume 20 of the Akademie edition. The "Introduction" in the published work is referred to as the second "Introduction." According to Zammito, the first "Introduction" was composed by May, 1789; the second in March, 1790. Zammito, 265. This second, shorter Introduction retains the same overview of the powers of the mind but lacks the detailed presentation of the first Introduction, and as we have shown, the threefold classification ultimately goes back to Baumgarten's Metaphysica (4th ed. 1757). As will be shown below, in the second "Introduction" Kant puts more explicit emphasis on the role that nature must play in supporting the end of freedom, a theme that is important to the thesis of the present work.

3. For an analysis of Kant's treatment of the human faculty of judgment as such and its link to feeling, cognition and the will, see Irmgard Scherer, The Crisis of Judgment in Kant's Three Critiques: In Search of a Science of Aesthetics, New Studies in Aesthetics, ed. Robert Ginsberg, vol. 16 (New York: Peter Lang, 1995). Judgment serves as the link between the sensible and supersensible realms in consciousness that require inclusion and a reconciliation in Kant's architectonic system in order to resolve the antinomic features of reason. Ibid., 10. As Scherer points out, the unknowable supersensible realm that is the result of reason's demand for absolute completeness of its system affects profoundly the possibility and status of philosophical discourse. Ibid., 30. Hence the importance of judgment to Kant's overall system and of the sublime as a possible doorway to the supersensible realm.
4. See §22 of the first Critique (KrV B146), and recall Kant's famous formulation: "Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind." "Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind." (KrV A51/B75)

5. We shall see now the conclusion of a key development that has been taking place in Kant's thought at least since the mid-1770's. Recall our account of Kant's lectures on Metaphysics in Chapter 2 above. In Reflection 988, Kant asks how an objectively valid judgment that is not determined by any concept of an object is possible. His answer, which seems to be consistent with his remarks during his lectures on Metaphysics, appears to be that such a judgment is possible because the judgment refers itself to objects in general through forces of the mind in general. There is no determinate concept, as we have seen above (Chapter 2), but only a feeling of the movement of the mind. This movement is capable of being communicated through a concept in general, which implies the ground of the judgment. The pleasure is in this judgment, not in the object of it. (AK 15:432) In the so-called Jäsche Logic, a manual pre-senting passages out of Kant's lectures on Logic edited by Gottlob Benjamin Jäsche, a student of Kant's, and published in 1800, we are told that logic differs essentially from aesthetics in that aesthetics, as a mere critique of taste has no "canon" (law) but only a "norm" (model or standard of judging) which consists in general agreement. Aesthetics contains the rules of the agreement of cognition with the laws of sensibility, while logic contains the rules of the agreement of cognition with the laws of the understanding and reason. (AK 9:15) Although the Jäsche Logic must be used with some caution, Jäsche did have Kant's own copy of Meier's Excerpts from the Doctrine of Reason containing Kant's handwritten notes (which is published in AK vol. 16). Lectures on Logic, 530.

6. Recall Kant's solution to the Third Antinomy in the first Critique. Transcendental freedom is an idea of reason, to which no object of experience can correspond. We can never infer from experience the existence of anything that cannot be thought in accordance with the laws of experience, which are the pure intuitions of space and time (to do so would be to hypostatize an idea of reason). But what freedom means is precisely the operation of a cause outside the spatio-temporal laws of our experience. Reason believes it can begin a series of conditions in the field of rule-governed spatio-temporal experience by means of a sensibly unconditioned, i.e., free, cause. Kant is careful to remind the reader that it is impossible to prove the existence of freedom, or indeed even its possibility. The best we can do is show that causality through freedom is at least not incompatible with nature. (KrV A558/B586)

7. Zammito considers this shift in emphasis between the first "Introduction" and the final, published version to be the best way to illuminate the nature of what he calls the ethical turn" in the genesis of the third Critique. Zammito, 265. Nevertheless, as we have seen, the moral role of the sublime is already explicit in the first "Introduction."

8. As Aristotle observes in Book I Chapter 4 (1095a20-25) of the Nicomachean Ethics, while everyone may agree that happiness is the good, hardly anyone agrees as to what happiness is, and even the same person identifies it with different things at different times.

9. G. Felicitas Munzel has written a new book on the role of culture in our moral development, entitled Kant's Concept of Moral Character: The Critical Link of Morality, Anthropology and Reflective Judgment (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1999), which seeks to develop the importance of culture in Kant's moral philosophy. One can only regret that the book has not yet emerged from the press.

11. See e.g. AK 5:132 on the postulates of pure practical reason.
12. Which depend on cognition (of the moral law).
13. Drawing on this definition, Makkreel offers an interpretation of reflective judgment in which it becomes the basis of a "reflective interpretation" whereby the interpretation of nature becomes hermeneutical rather than systematic. Makkreel, *Imagination and Interpretation in Kant*. 
14. "All interest ruins a judgment of taste and deprives it of its impartiality. . . . Any taste remains barbaric if its liking requires that *charms* and *emotions* be mingled in, let alone if it makes these the standard of its approval. . . . A pure judgment of taste is one that is not influenced by charm or emotion (though these may be connected with a liking for the beautiful), and whose determining basis is therefore merely the purposiveness of the form." "Alles Interesse verdirbt das Geschmacksurtheil und nimmt ihm seine Unpartheilichkeit. . . . Der Geschmack ist jederzeit noch barbarisch, wo er die Beimischung der Reize und Rührungen zum Wohlgesehnen bedarf, ja wohl gar diese zum Maßstabe seines Beifalls macht. . . . Ein Geschmacksurtheil, auf welches Reiz und Rührung keinen Einfluß haben (ob sie sich gleich mit dem Wohlgefallen am Schönen verbinden lassen), welches also bloß die Zweckmäßigkeit der Form zum Bestimmungsgrunde hat, ist ein reines Geschmacksurtheil." Pluhar, *Critique of Judgment*, 68-9 (AK 5:223).
15. Kant distinguishes here between sensation as the receptivity through the senses of the presentation of a thing, which belongs to the cognitive power and the sensation that occurs when something determines the feeling of pleasure or displeasure. In the former case, the presentation is referred to the object; in the latter case it is referred solely to the subject and is not used for cognition. The distinction is between sensation as an objective presentation of sense and the sensation that we call a feeling (of pleasure and displeasure). Kant wants to use the word "sensation" (*Empfindung*) for an objective sensation such as the green color of a meadow, and the word feeling" (*Gefühl*) for the subjective sensation that is the agreeableness that comes from the sight of the green meadow. (AK 5:206) He does not always maintain this distinction, however, as Pluhar points out (p. 48 n. 12).
16. We should note here that Kant remarks that in order to consider something good we have to know what sort of the thing the object is meant to be. We must have a determinate concept of it. Beauty, however, needs no determinate concept. The liking for the beautiful depends on a reflection regarding the object that leads to some concept, although which one it is is indeterminate. The agreeable depends entirely on sensation and does not involve reflection, nor does it involve the concept of a purpose.
17. As has already been noted, the solution will involve the idea of intellectual pleasure or intellectual feeling. See Chapter 2 above. In the *Metaphysik L2* notebook, tentatively assigned by Ameriks and Naragon to 1790-1, we read that pleasure and displeasure are not cognitions at all. the faculty of the "discrimination of representations" (which would seem to be judgment), insofar as the representations modify the subject, is the faculty of pleasure and displeasure. We also have an intellectual pleasure and displeasure, although we have no word for it. The discrimination of good and evil belongs to intellectual pleasure. With intellectual pleasure and displeasure we must view the feeling not as the ground but rather as the effect of the satisfaction. The feeling of the promotion of life is pleasure, and the feeling of the hindrance of life is displeasure. The beautiful pleases according to the laws of sensibility, the good pleases according to the laws of the understanding. But the discrimination of the beautiful belongs also under the understanding and not merely to the senses.*Lectures on Metaphysics*, 346 (AK 28:586). We see, then, that Kant's lectures on Metaphysics reveal essentially the same position in 1790 as was evident in 1782-2 in the *Metaphysik Mrongrovius* notebook cited above in Chapter 2, which seemed to reveal a
relationship between the beautiful and the good and a pleasure that is founded in the aesthetic judgment without reference to an object.


19. Except in the case of pure practical laws, i.e., moral laws. But, as moral, these carry an interest with them, while none is connected to pure judgments of taste. AK 5:211-2

20. As noted in the Introduction above, Kant's claim to the subjective universality of the aesthetic judgment is the focus of Paul Guyer's book, Kant and the Claims of Taste.

21. This would be a "rationalistic" (Rationalism) critique of taste. A judgment of taste given a posteriori through the senses would be an "empiricist" (Empirism) one. AK 5:346.

22. Pluhar, 60 (AK 5:216).

23. An idea of reason, presumably. Where does this universal voice come from? What kind of idea is it? An electronic search of a data base consisting of Kant's published works and of the epistolary Academy volumes 10-13 reveals that this (AK 5:216) is the only occurrence of the phrase allgemeine Stimme in Kant's published works. Kants gesammelte Schriften. Herausgegeben von der Königlich Prussianischen Akademie der Wissenschaften Volumes 1-9,10,11,12,13, floppy disk edition (Bonn: Institut für angwandte Kommunikation und Sprachforschung, 1988-94). Some light may be shed on the issue by considering the lectures on Metaphysics, in which Kant talks about a "universal sense" and a universal judgment" (Chapter 2 above) Hence the most likely interpretation would seem to be that the universal voice" here has its equivalent in the lectures on Metaphysics in terms of the universal or communal sense mentioned there that arises among human beings in community with each other and upon which the judgment of taste depends. See also Chapter 2 above. Guyer entitles the fourth chapter of his book Kant and the Claims of Taste "A Universal Voice" but does not focus on the term itself; he takes it to stand for Kant's claim that the judgment of taste is intersubjectively valid, the consistency of which claim is the focus of Guyer's book. This supports the interpretation offered here. The idea that aesthetic judgment somehow involves a universal goes back at least as far as Aristotle, who says in the Poetics that the poet's job is to make his plot plausible by relying on general psychological truths: "From what we have said it will be seen that the poet's function is to describe, not the thing that has happened, but a kind of thing that might happen, i.e., what is possible as being probable or necessary." Chapter 9, 1451a37-9. The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2322-3.

24. An important precursor of the idea that the perception of beauty involves a normative judgment is St. Augustine. We can perceive the ordered object as being what it ought to be, and that the disordered object falls short; and so the painter can make corrections as he goes along and the critic can judge (De Vera Religione xxxii, 60). But this rightness or wrongness cannot merely be sensed (De Musica VI, xii, 34); the spectator must bring with him a concept of ideal order, given to him by a "divine illumination" from which it follows that judgment of beauty is objectively valid and that there can be no relativity in it (De Trinitate IX, vi, 10; De Libero Arbitrio II, xvi, 41). Paul Edwards, ed. Encyclopedia of Philosophy(New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc. and The Free Press, 1967), s.v. Aesthetics, History of," by Monroe C. Beardsley. Augustine puts the question whether we have to call something beautiful because we like it or whether we like it because it is beautiful under the section headed "On the Agreeable and the Beautiful" in De Vera Religione lix, 166.

25. Intuition (Anschauung) is that through which the mind is in immediate contact or relation to a given object. The manifold of intuition simply means the total of all the "bits" of data that
together comprise the object (or more generally the empirical world). Sensibility alone yields intuitions. (KrV A19/B33) The pure forms of sensible intuition are the a priori intuitions of space and time. (KrV A39/B56)

26. Imagination (Einbildung, Einbildungs kraft) synthesizes the manifold given in pure intuition. (KrV A78/B104) It associates the discrete parts of the manifold with one another. Imagination brings the manifold of intuition into the form of an image. Imagination is also the faculty that (re)presents the image of an object in its absence. (KrV A115 ff.; B151)

27. Understanding (Verstand) is the faculty of rules. Although Kant defines the understanding in different ways, as a spontaneity of knowledge, as a power of thought, as a faculty of concepts and as a faculty of judgments, he states that once these definitions are adequately understood they are identical and so the understanding may be characterised as the faculty of rules. (KrV A126). In the A version of the Transcendental Deduction, Kant says that we ourselves introduce the order and regularity in the appearances which we call nature (KrV A125), and that, however exaggerated and absurd it may sound, the understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature and so the formal unity of nature. This assertion is in keeping with experience, which is the object of the understanding. While empirical laws (of nature) do not derive their origin from pure understanding, all empirical laws are only special determinations of the pure laws of understanding under which, and according to the norm of which, they first become possible. (KrV A127-8) The explicit claim that the understanding is the source of the laws of nature is abandoned when Kant reformulates the Transcendental Deduction in the B edition, but the understanding remains the faculty of rules or principles a priori of the possibility of experience. See e.g. B294, B359. In the third Critique Kant says that the understanding (in part) prescribes the laws that reason uses as a basis a priori to nature (AK 5:386), and we find similar language in the Opus postumum. In any event, it is the understanding that enables us to think the object of sensible intuition (KrV A51/B75) by giving unity to the pure synthesis of the imagination according to a priori rules. These a priori rules are the categories, which Kant believes constitute a complete list of all the original pure concepts of synthesis contained in the understanding. (KrV A78/B104 ff.) Underlying all of this of course are the a priori intuitions of space and time which ground (by giving a rule to) all sensible intuitions.

28. That is to say, we feel our freedom from the constraints of time, the condition of inner sense. This is not an awareness of a concept, which would have to be spatio-temporal; it is a feeling of freedom, and in that sense it is a feeling of timelessness. Recall that self-consciousness, orapperception, is not under the constraints of space and time. Allison takes up the issue of timelessness in his book Kant's Theory of Freedom. Given his interpretation of Transcendental Idealism in terms of "epistemic condition," he argues that the causal principle of freedom is epistemologically but not ontologically privileged. Timelessness is therefore understood as the independence from the conditions of time that allows for the possibility of the conception of a regulative function of an intelligible character and not actual timelessness. Henry E. Allison, Kant's Theory of Freedom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 52. The argument of the present work is that through the aesthetic experience we get a sense of timelessness in terms of our intelligible character as moral agents, and so it is not incompatible with Allison's view.

29. Kant's lectures on Metaphysics would seem to support this view. See Chapter 2 above.

30. Imagination and understanding do not always harmonize; the feeling of the sublime results from a tension between imagination and the other cognitive powers.
31. We recall that a determinate cognition is the result of the synthesis of intuition of the manifold by the imagination under a concept of the understanding. If we were engaged upon a critique of Kant's aesthetics, we might ask exactly how a mental state (Gemüthszustand) is communicable without a concept. Kant tries to get around this problem by referring the mental state to cognition in general" (Erkenntnß überhaupt) which he holds is somehow objective in the sense that the minds of more than one subject can refer to it. Kant will say that the ability to communicate one's mental state carries with it a pleasure, which can be established empirically and psychologically. But the explanation of the ability itself has yet to be given.

32. As we have noted, exactly how this communication is possible is not fully explained at this point; Kant must first establish "whether and how aesthetic judgments are possible a priori." (AK 5:218)

33. Here we understand "aesthetic" in its original meaning, as related to sense perception (from the Greek aisthésthai, to sense) as opposed to its modern use, coined by Baumgarten, as a "science of sensitive cognition." See AK 20:222, where Kant remarks that it has become customary to use the term to refer to a sensible presentation referred not to the cognitive power but to the power of pleasure and displeasure. Pluhar, 410.

34. Kant's description of the intellectual moment of the disjunction is active: ". . . through consciousness of the intentional activity by which we bring these powers into play." " . . . durch das Bewußtsein unserer absichtlichen Thätigkeit, womit wir jene ins Spiel setzen." (AK 5:218, emphasis added.)

35. It would be an "objective schematism of judgment;" the subject of the first Critique. See The Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding, A137/B176 ff.

36. That beauty is a subjective mental state is consistent with the position advanced by Kant in the lectures on Metaphysics at least since the mid-1770's. Recall Chapter 2 above.

37. This is best understood in light of Kant's position in the lectures on Metaphysics wherein pleasure and displeasure are understood in terms of promoting or hindering life, which is in turn understood as "activity." The highest degree of activity and life is freedom, which may be understood as freedom from the constraints of the spatio-temporal empirical world, or, in other words, timelessness. What agrees with the highest degree of freedom, and thus the spiritual life (which is also timeless) Kant tells us, is intellectual pleasure. Intellectual pleasure in the lectures on Metaphysics would seem to correspond to the disinterested pleasure connected to the experience of the beautiful in the third Critique. See Chapter 2 above.

38. Kant seems to use both presentational powers" (Vorstellungskräfte) and cognitive powers" (Erkenntnßvermögen) to refer to imagination and understanding, although we might expect understanding to be a cognitive rather than a presentational power. To assume that presentational powers refer to intuition and imagination, and that cognitive powers refer to imagination and understanding would be terminologically consistent but would be inconsistent with what Kant has been saying about the free play of the imagination and the understanding. Yet the use of the different terms indicates a subtlety that we may have overlooked; certainly one would not expect Kant to be simply careless in his use of the terms. He does not say explicitly what the presentational powers are (although Pluhar inserts imagination and understanding" after presentational powers" on p. 61 of his translation) while he does explicitly describe the cognitive powers as imagination and understanding, and he does use the phrase free play of the presentational powers" (freies Spiel der Vorstellungskräfte) (e.g. AK 5:242). It is most likely that the powers referred to are the imagination and the understanding in both cases, but that the different terms refer to their different
functions as presentational (Vorstellungskraft) or cognitive (Erkenntnissvermögen), depending on their employment.

39. The universal communicability of the feeling that accompanies the presentation of certain objects is the empirical criterion for what is beautiful. This criterion suggests that such a taste stems from a deeply hidden basis common to all human beings that underlies their agreement in judging the forms under which objects are given them. (AK 5:232)

40. An aesthetic judgment based on charm or the agreeable character of an object is empirical. An aesthetic judgment that asserts an object to be beautiful is pure. Only pure (formal) aesthetic judgments are properly judgments of taste. (AK 5:223-4) A judgment that an object is good is not an aesthetic judgment at all. Such a judgment involves a concept, and an aesthetic judgment is unique in that it provides "absolutely no cognition" of an object. Only a logical judgment provides cognition. (AK 5:228)

41. Note that here cognitive power" (Erkenntnissvermögen) is connected to presentation (Vorstellung).

42. "The free lawfulness of the understanding which has also been called purposiveness without a purpose." "... der freien Gesetzmäßigkeits des Verstandes (welche auch Zweckmäßigkeit ohne Zweck genannt worden)..." (AK 5:241)

43. freies Spiel der Vorstellungskräfte.

44. This is the sense of timelessness referred to above. See Chapter 3.

45. Kant does say we do sometimes judge nature as "superhuman" (übermenschlich) art when we take into account a thing's objective purposiveness, but such judgments are no longer purely aesthetic judgments of taste. (AK 5:311)

46. This point broaches an interesting topic that lies outside the scope of the present work, namely the cultivation of taste as a preparation for and promoter of moral feeling.

47. Not necessarily a beautiful thing. Fine art describes beautifully what we would find in nature to be disagreeable or ugly. The devastation of war, diseases and other harmful things can be described or presented in a painting very beautifully. (AK 5:312)

48. Kant remarks here that since genius is a natural endowment, we could say that genius is the innate mental predisposition (ingenium) through which nature gives the rule to art. (AK 5:307)

49. Aesthetic ideas may be called unexpoundable presentations (inexponible Vorstellung) of the imagination in its free play. (AK 5:343)

50. And in this way they are like ideas of reason.

51. As Dostal points out, one objection to an interpretation of the Kantian sublime as being important to his moral metaphysics is that §59, in which Kant explicitly takes up the topic of the relationship between aesthetics and morality and makes the beautiful the symbol of the morality, completely ignores the sublime. This is indicative of the way the sublime almost entirely disappears from consideration after those sections (§§23-29) that explicitly treat it. Nevertheless, one must be careful not to ignore Kant's notorious penchant for the architectonic. Dostal, "The Sublime and the Project of a Critique of Judgment," 95. §59 is effectively the last section of the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment (§60 is an Appendix); having dealt with the aesthetic judgment, Kant turns to teleological judgment, which is a topic for another work.

52. Kant will say that the empirical interest is indirect, but the intellectual interest is direct. What he means is that the interest is not directly connected to the judgment. Once the judgment of taste is made on the basis of the form of purposiveness without a purpose, the liking can then be connected to a pleasure in the existence of the object. He writes: "... it does not follow from [the
fact that a judgment of taste by which we declare something to be beautiful must not have an interest as its determining basis] that, after the judgment has been made as a pure aesthetic one, an interest cannot be connected with it. This connection, however, must always be only indirect." A few lines further we read ". . . and all interest consists in pleasure in the existence of an object." ". . . daraus folgt nicht [daß das Geschmacksurtheil, wodurch etwas für schön erklärt wird, kein Interesse zum Bestimmungsgrunde haben müsse], daß, nachdem es als reines ästhetisches Urtheil gegeben worden, kein Interesse damit verbunden werden könne." ". . . noch eine Lust an der Existenz desselben (als worin alles Interesse besteht). . . ." (AK 5:296) This supports the argument being advanced here that the aesthetic judgment is related to our moral interest, in that there is no contradiction between the disinterested aesthetic judgment and our moral interest. See Chapter 2 above.

53. Here Kant develops the theme we have noted in the lectures on Metaphysics in Chapter 2 above.

54. Compare Kant's remarks in his lectures on Metaphysics: "Taste is therefore a faculty for judging through satisfaction or dissatisfaction, according to the communal and universally valid sense. But taste is still always only a judging through the relation of the sense, and on that account this faculty is a faculty of pleasure and displeasure." "Der Geschmack ist daher ein Vermögen der Beurtheilung durch Wohlgefallen oder Mißfallen, nach dem gemeinschaftlichen und allgemein gültigen Sinne. Es ist aber doch der Geschmack immer nur eine Beurtheilung durchs Verhältniß der Sinne, und deßwegen ist dieses Vermögen ein Vermögen der Lust und Unlust." Lectures on Metaphysics, 65 (AK 28:249).

55. We will see that we are justified in equating the good with the supersensible here if we recall how Kant has defined the good in the third Critique. The good presupposes "objective purposiveness," which requires the concept of a purpose, either in terms of what the thing is meant to be (qualitative perfection), or the completeness any thing may have as a thing of its kind (quantitative perfection). (AK 5:226-7) Neither "purpose" in this sense nor perfection" are objects of any possible experience; they are "ideas of reason," which always concern the supersensible. (KrV A310/B367 ff.) A rational idea can never become cognition because it contains a concept of the supersensible to which no adequate intuition can ever be given. (AK 5:342)

56. As noted above, Kant apparently uses Sittengefühl (sittliche Gefühl) and moralische Gefühl interchangeably. Both terms are translated moral feeling" in this work.

57. A priori in the sense that the interest is free of all inclination, which must be empirical. Not, of course, a priori in the sense of coming before the judgment of taste, which remains disinterested. Kant will, however, describe a "direct" intellectual interest as well. See AK 5:299.

58. Kant probably has in mind here Plato, Shaftesbury, Wolff, Baumgarten and Meier.

59. Kant holds that there is a pleasure associated with a will that is determined. "The state of mind of a will determined by some-thing or other is in itself already a feeling of pleasure and is identical with it. . . ." "Der Gemüthszustand aber eines irgend wodurch bestimmten Willens ist an sich schon ein Gefühl der Lust und mit ihm identisch . . ." (AK 5:222)

60. A liking we recognize a priori as a law for everyone, although we cannot base this law on proofs. (AK 5:300)

61. Cf. Anthropology §69, AK 7:244. As Sidney Axinn points out, the section we are considering, §42 entitled "On Intellectual Interest in the Beautiful," is easily forgotten by critics who argue that the idea that there is a relationship between an interest in beauty in nature and the interest in the morally good described in §59 entitled "On Beauty as the Symbol of Morality" has no precursors and is an anamoly. Sidney Axinn, "On Beauty as the Symbol of Morality," Akten
The present study has shown that there is no conflict between moral interest and a disinterested liking for the beautiful.

62. Hence Kant rescues the sublime from enthusiasm, fanaticism, or mysticism by reestablishing in the sublime a purposiveness through the negative presentation of our moral vocation. Mankind's final purpose is not to fit in the world, but to realize a higher vocation. Dostal, "The Sublime and the Project of a Critique of Judgment," 98. Zammito does a good job pointing out Kant's lifelong concern with the dangers of mysticism in his book The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment. Kant will further develop the theme of purposiveness and of our moral purpose in nature in the Analytic of Teleological Judgment. See, for example, §84, in which we read that in the world there is only one kind of being whose causality is teleological, i.e., directed to purposes that are unconditioned by and independent of conditions in nature, and yet necessary. This being is the human being considered as noumenon. (AK 5:435) The final purpose of mankind is to bring morality to the world of nature. John Atwell, drawing on Lewis White Beck, develops this point in his article "Man as the Creator of the Value of Life." John Atwell, "Man as Creator of the Value of Life," Akten des Siebenten Internationalen Kant-Kongresses, Kurfürstliches Schloß zu Mainz, 1990. Band II.1: Sektionsbeiträge Sektionen A-F. Herausgegeben von Gerhard Funke (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1991): 491-499.

63. Both interests are only indirectly connected to the judgment of taste.

64. Axinn draws on a comment by Hannah Arendt (Lectures on Kant's Political Philosophy, ed. Ronald Beiner, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982; 76) to argue that the relationship between beauty and morality seems obvious. Arendt's comment was that both the aesthetic object and the human being have no obvious purpose, and Axinn uses this point to argue that in the Kantian account of the beautiful as the result of an object that has no purpose and yet has the form of a purpose, we find an analogy with ourselves. Axinn, "On Beauty as the Symbol of Morality," 621. The present work will have more to say about purposiveness without a purpose" below.

65. A cogent analysis of the term is offered by Munzel in her article "The Beautiful is the Symbol of the Morally-Good': Kant's Philosphical Basis of Proof for the Idea of the Morally-Good."


67. See AK 5:342

68. Submission to inspection.

69. See also Makkreel, Imagination and Interpretation in Kant, 123-5, on the difference between schema and symbol in Kant.

70. And whoever omits everything intuitive falls into deism, which allows us to cognize nothing whatsoever, not even from a practical point of view. (AK 5:353)

71. Purposiveness that is also law (obligation) in the first introduction. (AK 20:245-6)

72. Interestingly, Kant remarks here that if there were no such antinomy, reason could never bring itself to accept such a principle that so greatly narrows the area in which it can speculate. (AK 5:344)

73. As Zammito remarks, in the third Critique Kant does at times come close to sounding like a Hegelian Idealist. Zammito adduces the argument of Patrick Riley who argues that in the present discussion of the supersensible (§57 and Comments) Kant is approaching Hegel in recognizing the reality of reason. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment, 344. As will be shown in
Chapter 5 below these arguments are not without reason. The *Opus postumum* seems to indicate that Kant was moving in the direction of Fichte, Schelling and the later German Idealism.

74. In other words, the antinomy of taste will arise. The antinomy of taste and its solution is described in §56 and §57, AK 5:338 ff.

75. Ted Cohen shows that the logical form of Kant's account of the beautiful and a good will parallel each other in his essay "Why Beauty is a Symbol of Morality" in *Essays in Kant's Aesthetics*, ed. Ted Cohen and Paul Guyer (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 221-36.


Chapter IV
The Critique of Judgment: The Sublime

The Analytic f the Sublime: How the Sublime Differs from the Beautiful

The aesthetic judgment described under The Analytic of the Beautiful is relevant to Kant's moral metaphysics, but indirectly. That is, the relation between the mental state that we experience in the presence of the beautiful is only analogously like the morally good; beauty is a symbol of morality. As has been shown above, we get a sense of timelessness and of our freedom when we experience (through a mental state) the free play of the cognitive powers and the contemplative pleasure that reinforces and reproduces itself without limit when we are presented with an object we call beautiful. While the experiences are real, they provide only an indirect pathway to the noumenal. In The Analytic of the Sublime, however, the connection between the sensible and the supersensible is direct. The sublime (das Erhabene) is "what even the ability to think proves that the mind has a power surpassing any standard of sense."1 We now explore the significance of the sublime in Kant's moral metaphysics in the third Critique, keeping in mind that, as Zammito writes,

A correct estimation of the role of the Analytic of the Sublime in the Third Critique must find its function not simply in completing the architectonic articulation of aesthetic judgments but much more in demonstrating a connection between aesthetic experience in general and the ultimate nature of the self. Kant confirmed this point by terming his consideration of the sublime a Kritik des Geistesgefühls, a critique of spiritual feeling.2

The beautiful and the sublime are similar in that we like them both for their own sake, and they both presuppose that we make a judgment of reflection rather than a judgment of sense or a logically determinative one. Our liking of the sublime, as was the case in our liking of the beautiful, does not depend on a sensation such as that of the agreeable; nor does it depend on a determinate concept as does our liking of the good. We do refer the liking to concepts, although it is indeterminate which concepts they are, as we have seen. The liking in both the beautiful and the sublime is connected with the mere exhibition or power of exhibition, namely, the imagination. The result of this connection is that we regard the imagination as "harmonizing" (in Einstimmung betrachtet) with the power of concepts (Vermögen der Begriffe). Understanding and reason comprise the power of concepts, and this harmony between these faculties and the imagination (understanding in reference to the beautiful; reason in reference to the sublime) furthers their aims. This harmony is also the basis for the universal validity of the singular (subjective) judgments we make regarding the beautiful and the sublime. We expect the same feeling of pleasure from any being whose presentational powers and powers of concepts are the same as ours even though the judgment is not based on any (determinate) cognition of the object. In these ways the judging of the beautiful and the sublime are similar. (AK 5:244)

The beautiful concerns the form of the object (the beautiful object presents the form of purposiveness, without presenting a purpose). The form of the object we judge beautiful must be bounded (in der Begränzung) in some way; if it were boundless there would be no form, and hence no apparent purposiveness. The sublime, on the other hand, must found in a formless (formlos)
object. The sublime is a presentation of unboundedness" (Unbegränztheit), either as in the object or because the object prompts us to present unboundedness as we add to this unboundedness the thought of its totality. The beautiful is an exhibition (Darstellung) of an indeterminate concept of the understanding; the sublime is an exhibition of an indeterminate concept of reason. Our liking of the beautiful is connected to a presentation of quality; our liking of the sublime is connected to a presentation of quantity.3 The liking for the beautiful carries with it a direct feeling of life's being furthered, and so it is compatible with charms and with an imagination at play. The liking for the sublime, on the other hand, is a pleasure that arises only indirectly; it is produced by the feeling of a momentary inhibition of the vital forces followed immediately by an outpouring of them that is all the stronger. The liking of the sublime is an emotion (Rührung) which seems to be seriousness rather than play in the imagination's activity. In liking the sublime, the mind is always alternately attracted and repelled by the object at the same time. There is a tension between harmony and violence.4 The liking for the sublime is not so much a positive pleasure as it is a feeling of admiration and respect, and so it should be called a negative pleasure.5 In these ways the sublime departs from the beautiful. (AK 5:244-5)

The most important distinction between the beautiful and the sublime concerns the form of the object. Natural beauty (we recall that we call art beautiful only when it successfully reproduces natural beauty without an evident rule) carries with it a purposiveness in its form by which the object seems predetermined for our power of judgment. This beauty constitutes in itself an object of our liking. On the other hand, that which arouses in us a feeling of the sublime may appear in its form counterpurposive (zweckwidrig) for our power of judgment, incommensurate with our power of exhibition and violent to our imagination. Hence we cannot correctly call an object of nature sublime, since sublime" is a term of approval and such terms are not properly applied to objects we apprehend as in themselves contrapurposive. All we are entitled to say is that the object is suitable for exhibiting a sublimity that can be found in the mind. What is sublime properly speaking is not contained in any sensible form but only concerns ideas of reason. These ideas of reason cannot be exhibited adequately, and it is this very inadequacy of the mind to this task that constitutes the feeling of the sublime. The mind's inadequacy to its task can be exhibited in sensibility, i.e., sensible objects can cause the mind to confront this inadequacy through their force or magnitude. Hence the raging ocean is not properly called sublime, but the sight of it attunes the mind to a feeling that is sublime. The sublime, then, like the beautiful, is a state of mind. The mind is induced to abandon sensibility and occupy itself with ideas containing a higher purposiveness. (AK 5:245-6) The concept of the sublime in nature indicates nothing purposive in nature itself (as opposed to the concept of the beautiful which, as we have seen, does indicate purposiveness, involving as it does the very form of purposiveness). The concept of the sublime indicates to us that there is a purposive use to which we can put our intuitions of nature; we feel a purposiveness within ourselves entirely independent of nature. We seek a basis outside ourselves for the beautiful in nature, but for the sublime the basis is within ourselves. This "crucial preliminary remark" separates our ideas of the sublime completely from the idea of purposiveness in nature. Through the idea of the sublime we develop the purposive use that the imagination makes of the presentation of nature. (AK 5:246) The mind "abandons sensibility" (die Sinnlichkeit zu verlassen) and occupies itself with ideas of a "higher purposiveness" (höhere Zweckmäßig-keit). As we shall see, this "higher purposiveness" is our moral vocation.
The Nature of the Sublime

The state of mind we experience when presented with an object we call beautiful is one of restful contemplation. The feeling of the sublime, on the other hand, is one of mental agitation (Gemüthsbewegung). We like this mental agitation, however, and so it is judged to be subjectively purposive. The mental state is subjectively purposive because it is only with regard to our mental powers that the given presentation is judged to be purposive (without any purpose or interest). There are two kinds of mental agitation, and the imagination refers it to either the cognitive power or the power of desire, depending upon whether the agitation is a mathematical (mathematisch) or "dynamical" (dynamisch) attunement of the mind. And as we attribute the mental state we call the beautiful to the object that occasions it, so we attribute both kinds of mental agitation to the object, presenting it as either mathematically or dynamically sublime.6 (AK 5:247)

We call what is absolutely large sublime. To say that something is absolutely large is to say that it is large beyond all comparison. But terms such as large and small are not pure concepts of the understanding, or intuitions of sense, or even rational concepts. Terms such as large and small must either stand for a concept that belongs to the power of judgment or be derived from such a concept. We need a measure. A magnitude (we can cognize that a thing is a magnitude without any comparison) must be compared to another magnitude if we are to use terms such as large and small. Hence any determination of the magnitude of appearances can only yield a comparative concept of large or small and not an absolute one. (AK 5:248)

If we describe something as absolutely large, we imply that the magnitude of the object is superior to that of many other objects of the same kind, but without measuring this superiority determinately. We base our judgment on a standard we assume is the same for everyone, but it is one that serves only for an aesthetic (mere intuition, by the eye) and not a logical (mathematically determinate) judgment of magnitude.7 It is a subjective standard underlying our reflective judgment about magnitude, which may be either empirical (e.g., the average size of objects of the same kind in our experience) or a priori (e.g., the magnitude or degree of a certain virtue). (AK 5:249) We assume this subjective standard is the same for everyone because the mere magnitude of the object, even if it is considered formless, can carry with it a liking that is universally communicable. This liking involves consciousness of a subjective purposiveness in the use of our cognitive powers. Unlike our liking for the beautiful, in which reflective judgment, occasioned by the form of an object, is purposively attuned in relation to cognition in general, the liking associated with the feeling of the sublime is not a liking for the object (which may be formless); it is a liking for the expansion of the imagination itself. (AK 5:249)

When we call something large absolutely, no standard adequate to it can be found outside of it. Such a standard can only be found within it; it is a magnitude equal only to itself. Only an aesthetic estimation can exhibit absolute magnitude (to the extent that the mind can take it in in one intuition).8 From this it follows that the sublime must not be sought in things of nature.9 The sublime is to be found only in our ideas. The sublime is that in comparison with which everything else is small, and nothing in nature can be given such that it could not be considered in a different relation as infinitely small. Whatever is given in nature is judged large or small in comparison to some measure, and if the measure is changed the judgment of the magnitude changes with it. For example, the immense mountain shrinks to insignificance when compared to the magnitude of the universe revealed through the telescope, and a drop of water is revealed to be a universe through the microscope. Hence no object of the senses is to be called sublime. The sublime is a mental state that occurs when reason sets a task for the imagination that it cannot meet. Reason demands
absolute totality as a real idea while the imagination, which is the power of estimating the magnitude of things in the world of sense, can only strive to progress towards infinity. The imagination is inadequate to reason's idea of totality, and the mind is agitated as a result. But this inadequacy gives rise in us to a feeling that we have within us a supersensible power. What is absolutely large is the use that judgment naturally makes of certain objects so as to arouse in us this feeling that we have a supersensible power; in contrast to this any other use is small. It is not the object that is sublime, then, but the attunement of the mind through a certain presentation that occupies reflective judgment.

What is this presentation that occupies reflective judgment? It would seem that Kant understands the sublime, which he has described as a feeling accompanying a universally communicable mental state, as an experience of the noumenal. This is the interpretation being advanced in the present work. Indeed, he writes here that: "The sublime is what even to be able to think proves that the mind has a power surpassing any standard of sense."

How does Kant explain this universally communicable mental state? As we have seen in our exposition of his description of the beautiful, anything that our merely reflective power of judgment likes without an interest must carry with it a purposiveness that is subjective. Any objective purposiveness implies an interest, as explained above. This subjective purposiveness is nevertheless somehow universally valid. In the analytic of the beautiful, our judging was based on a form of purposiveness in the object - purposiveness without a purpose. Because the judging is based on the form of the object that occasions the mental state we call beautiful, we can expect any similarly constituted mind (the mind of any rational being) to experience the same mental state (the free play of the imagination and the understanding). But what of the sublime, which is based on the expansion of the imagination itself and not on the form of the object?

The imagination encounters no obstacles when it performs the combination required to present a magnitude. The imagination can progress on its own to infinity, guided by numerical concepts provided by the understanding. The imagination provides the schema which mediates and so makes possible the subsumption of the intuitions of the unit of measure under these numerical concepts. This procedure constitutes the logical estimation of magnitude. The latter is objectively (or intentionally) purposive, since any measuring is a purpose, but there is nothing in this measuring that is purposive for or liked by the aesthetic power of judging. Moreover, there is nothing in this measuring that requires us to comprehend the many successive elements involved in one intuition. The imagination is not pushed to its limits; the combination of each quantum is done progressively rather than comprehensively. This mathematical estimation of magnitude poses no problem for the understanding whether the imagination chooses for the unity (quantum) a magnitude that can be comprehended in one intuition (aesthetic comprehension) or through a numerical concept (logical comprehension). In either case, the logical estimation of magnitude progresses to infinity without difficulty. (AK 5:254)

On the other hand, reason demands totality for all given magnitudes. Reason demands comprehension in one intuition of all magnitudes; reason demands the exhibition of all of the members of the progressively increasing numerical series. Not even the infinite escapes this demand of reason; reason makes us try to think of the infinite as given in its entirety. An infinite given in its entirety can only be an idea of reason. But - and here Kant emphasizes the point by stating explicitly that it is the primary one - the ability to even think the infinite as a whole indicates a mental power that surpasses any standard of sense. To think the infinite as a whole using a standard of sense would mean comprehending as a unity some numerical standard to which the infinite could be compared, which is impossible. Thus the fact that the human mind is even able
to think of a given infinite without contradiction means that it must have within itself a power that is supersensible. This supersensible power yields an idea of a noumenon which cannot be intuited but which is regarded as the substrate underlying our intuitions of the world, which are only appearances. With this supersensible power we think of magnitude in terms of a "pure intellectual estimation" (reine intellektuelle Größenschätzung), which enables us to comprehend the infinite in the world of sense entirely under a concept in spite of the fact that we could never think an infinity in its entirety by means of numerical concepts. Kant speaks here of super-sensible intuition" (übersinnliche Anschauung); a power that enables us to think "the infinite of supersensible intuition" (das Unendliche der übersinnlichen Anschauung) as given in our intelligible substrate" (intelligible Substrat) surpasses any standard of sensibility. This thinking of the "infinite of supersensible intuition" is not for the sake of some theoretical aim on behalf of our cognitive power; rather, it is anexpansion of the mind through which we feel able to cross the barriers of sensibility with a different aim. (AK 5:254-5) The "different aim" Kant has in mind is the moral. Clearly, then, for Kant in the third Critique, the first and foremost aspect (das Vornehmste) of our experience of the sublime is that the very fact that we even have such an experience proves (beweist) that there is in us something supersensible. That is to say, the experience of the feeling of the sublime provides tangible evidence that we exist both as sensible and supersensible beings. Such a conclusion is tremendously important for Kant, because this supersensible power of ours is what makes morality possible. If we have no power to transcend the causally determined sensible world, our moral vocation is no more than a chimera. By pointing to an experience that allows us to feel our supersensible power, Kant adds another dimension to that connection to the supersensible provided by our awareness of the reality of the moral law.

The fact that the added dimension is constituted through feeling gives it further importance in terms of motivation and supports the thesis of this study, for, as has been shown, the problem of moral motivation in Kant is one of an objectively conceived principle subjectively motivating individual persons.

When the intuition of an appearance in nature carries with it the idea of infinity, we say that nature is sublime. The only way this can occur is when the imagination is unable to take in an object's magnitude. It is only in the aesthetic estimation of magnitude that we feel the strain of the imagination's effort to perform a comprehension that surpasses its ability to encompass (begreifen) the progressive apprehension that a mathematical estimation of magnitude accomplishes easily in a single intuition. The whole of nature includes the possibility of a progression extending to infinity (in space or time), and so the absolute whole of nature as appearance, which would be the proper basic measure of nature, is infinity comprehended. This is contradictory, however, because an absolute totality of an endless progression is impossible. When the magnitude of a natural object is such that the imagination cannot comprehend it in a single intuition, we are led to the concept of a supersensible substrate which underlies both nature and our ability to think. This supersensible substrate is large beyond any standard of sense and makes us judge as sublime not so much the object as the mental attunement in which we find ourselves when we estimate the object. (AK 5:255-6) In other words, it is the supersensible substrate (noumenon) that is absolutely large and not merely large by comparison, as anything that can be compared to some standard of sense must be. The object in nature that exceeds the imagination's ability to comprehend it in a single (as opposed to a progressive) intuition occasions in us the feeling of the sublime, which is a mental state (of agitation) resulting from the imagination's inadequacy to its task. But no object in nature can be truly sublime because if we change our perspective we can intuit any object in nature (as appearance) in a single intuition. As
Kant points out, for example, one must be the correct distance away from the pyramids to get a sense of the sublime. Too far away and they seem small; too close and the eye progresses from base to peak preventing comprehension of the whole. (AK 5:252) The only thing that can be absolutely large is the whole of nature, which, as we have seen, involves a contradiction unless we think of a supersensible substrate underlying nature as appearance. But only that which is absolutely large is properly called sublime, and so our experience of the feeling of the sublime must ultimately depend on the existence of the supersensible, although the mental state that is the sublime properly speaking is occasioned by nature as appearance.

**THE SUBLIME AND THE MORAL**

Just as the aesthetic power of judgment in judging the beautiful refers the imagination in its free play to the understanding, in judging a thing sublime the aesthetic power of judgment refers the imagination to reason. When judging the beautiful, imagination harmonizes with the understanding's concepts in general (just which concepts is left indeterminate); when judging the sublime, imagination harmonizes subjectively with reason's ideas (just which ideas is again left indeterminate). This harmony of the imagination with reason's ideas "... produces a mental attunement that conforms to and is compatible with the mental attunement that an influence by determinate (practical) ideas would produce on feeling." Kant has in mind here the influence of moral ideas on moral feeling. As we shall see, the sense of awe that we experience in the presence of the sublime is very much akin to the sense of awe we experience when we realize that we have a moral vocation.

True sublimity, then, must be sought only in the mind of the judging person, not in the natural object which prompts this mental attunement. The mind feels elevated in its own judgment of itself when it contemplates such an object. The mind abandons itself to the imagination and to reason, which has become connected to the imagination without a determinate purpose. This connection expands the mind as it discovers that all the power of the imagination remains inadequate to reason's ideas. (AK 5:256) We expect universal agreement in our judgment of the sublime, then, on the same basis as that of the beautiful. Since the sublime is a mental state, we expect that any other similarly constituted mind (any rational being) will experience a similar mental state when in the presence of the given object.

As has just been noted, the sense of awe that accompanies the feeling of the sublime is akin to the sense of awe that accompanies our realization that we have a moral vocation. Kant bases the liking we feel in judging the sublime on this awe (which is based on respect). He defines respect here as the feeling that it is beyond our ability to attain an idea that is a law for us. (AK 5:257) This is his familiar formulation of respect for the moral law. But something quite similar takes place when we judge the sublime. The thought of comprehending in a single intuition the whole of nature as appearance is an idea of reason, which demands the absolute whole. This demand is one that the imagination cannot meet. The imagination's inability to exhibit the idea of reason (in a determinate concept) proves its own limits and its inadequacy. Yet the fact that the imagination tries to obey the command of reason and make itself adequate to reason's idea "proves" (beweisen) its vocation to obey reason's law (that imagination, our greatest power of sensibility, should strive towards harmony with rational ideas). The feeling of the sublime in nature, then, is respect (Achtung) for our own vocation. Through this feeling of respect, which is sensible, the superiority of the rational vocation" (Vernunftbestimmung) of our cognitive powers over the greatest power of sensibility (the imagination), which is intelligible, is made
intuitable for us. (AK 5:257) This rational vocation” is of course our supersensible moral vocation, and we see again that in the third Critique the feeling of the sublime provides a doorway to the supersensible from the sensible.

The feeling of the sublime is a feeling of displeasure that arises from the imagination’s inadequacy, but it is at the same time a pleasure aroused by the fact that the judgment that this greatest power of sensibility is inadequate is itself in harmony with rational ideas. The judgment is in harmony with the law of reason that requires the imagination to strive to attain an intuition adequate to the idea of reason. (AK 5:257) The displeasure resulting from the imagination's inadequacy arouses in us the feeling of our supersensible vocation; realizing that every standard of sensibility is inadequate to the ideas of reason is purposive and hence pleasurable. (AK 5:258) This explains the agitation the mind feels when presenting the sublime in nature; the mind feels alternately a repulsion and an attraction to the same object. The judgment itself always remains aesthetic; it is not based on a determinate concept of the object. The judgment presents the subjective play of the mental powers themselves as harmonious by virtue of their contrast. Just as the imagination and the understanding give rise to a subjective purposiveness of the mental powers by their accordance when we judge the beautiful, the conflict or tension between imagination and reason gives rise to a subjective purposiveness when we judge the sublime in that this conflict originates a feeling that we have a power for estimating magnitude (reason) whose superiority cannot be made intuitable by anything other than that power (imagination) which is itself unbounded in exhibiting magnitudes of sensible objects (imagination can exhibit a numerical progression to infinity). (AK 5:258) This subjective purposiveness is universally communicable for any being with a similarly constituted mind.

When we judge the sublime mathematically, then, the tension arises as a result of the mind's inability to comprehend reason's idea of an absolute whole in a single intuition. The problem, as we have seen, is one of magnitude in terms of measure (and falls into mathematical antinomies). When we judge the sublime dynamically, the problem is one of magnitude in terms of force (and falls into dynamical antinomies). The tension is between fear and the realization that we are not really in any danger. When in an aesthetic judgment we consider nature as a might that has no power over us we say it is dynamically sublime. (AK 5:260)

Nature is regarded as dynamically sublime for aesthetic judgment only insofar as we consider it an object of fear. However, we can consider an object fearful without being afraid of it. An object is an object of fear if we find that our ability to resist its might is insufficient. However, if we judge the object in such a way that we merely think of the possibility of resisting its might, at the same time realizing that such resistance would be utterly futile, we consider the object fearful without being afraid of it. Kant adduces the example of a virtuous person who fears God without being afraid of him; the virtuous person does not think of resisting God and so has no reason to be afraid. Just as we cannot pass judgment on the beautiful when we have an interest in the object's existence, we cannot pass judgment on the sublime in nature if we are afraid. It is impossible to enjoy terror we take seriously. (AK 5:260-1)

Our ability to resist the might of nature is completely inadequate, and pales in comparison to the destructive power of hurricanes, tornadoes, tidal waves, and so on. Yet the sight of nature's power attracts us all the more when it is most fearful, provided we are in a safe place. We call these objects sublime because they allow us to discover in ourselves an ability to resist which gives us the courage to believe we could be a match for nature's apparent omnipotence. Just as we found in ourselves a power that surpasses any standard of sense when estimating aesthetically the magnitude of nature's domain, we now find, in our ability to judge ourselves independent of nature,
in spite of our physical impotence, a superiority over nature that is the basis of a self-preservation that is more important than the physical. Kant has in mind moral self-preservation, which keeps the humanity in our person from being degraded even though as human beings we would be destroyed by nature's might. We regard as small the objects of our natural concern, things like property, health and life; and so we regard nature's power as having no dominance over us as persons (who are capable of choosing maxims). Nature here is called sublime because it elevates our imagination, making it exhibit those cases where the mind can come to feel its own sublimity (as it realizes that we do not have to bow to nature when our highest principles are at stake). (AK 5:261-2) The mind's sublimity lies in its moral vocation, which elevates it even above nature, and when we experience of the feeling of the sublime we become aware of this higher vocation, and, perhaps, even the concepts or the images we make of God - the feeling of the sublime (we feel we find it stated in this argument) is a doorway to noumenon. Kant writes:

Hence sublimity is contained not in any thing of nature, but only in our mind, insofar as we can become conscious of our superiority to nature within us, and thereby also to nature outside us (as far as it influences us). Whatever arouses this feeling in us, and this includes the might of nature that challenges our forces, is then (although improperly) called sublime. And it is only by presupposing this idea within us, and by referring to it, that we can arrive at the idea of the sublimity of that being who arouses deep respect in us, not just by his might as demonstrated in nature, but even more by the ability, with which we have been endowed, to judge nature without fear and to think of our vocation as being sublimely above nature.

Also ist die Erhabenheit in keinem Dinge der Natur, sondern nur in unserm Gemüthe enthalten, sofern wir der Natur in uns und dadurch auch der Natur (sofern sie auf uns einfließt) außer uns überlegen zu sein uns bewußt werden können. Alles, was dieses Gefühl in uns erregt, wozu die Macht der Natur gehört, welche unsere Kräfte auffordert, heißt alsdann (obzwar uneigentlich) erhaben; und nur unter der Voraussetzung dieser Idee in uns und in Beziehung auf sie sind wir fähig, zur Idee der Erhabenheit desjenigen Wesens zu gelangen, welches nicht bloß durch seine Macht, die es in der Natur beweiset, innige Achtung in uns wirkt, sondern noch mehr durch das Vermögen, welches in uns gelegt ist, jene ohne Furcht zu beurtheilen und unsere Bestimmung als über dieselbe erhaben zu denken.

Yet, in order for the mind to be attuned to the feeling of the sublime, a certain cultivation is required. The mind must be receptive to ideas if it is to recognize that the imagination is inadequate to ideas of reason. The tension between imagination and reason that constitutes the sublime is the result of reason exerting a dominance (via its ideas) over sensibility for the sake of expanding sensibility commensurably with reason's own practical (i.e., moral) domain. Reason tries to expand and elevate sensibility by asking it to look out toward the infinite, which for sensibility can only be an abyss. But in order to experience this as a feeling of the sublime, the mind must be receptive to ideas, and it is culture" (Cultur), by which Kant means here the development of moral ideas, that cultivates this mental attunement. Hence what is called sublime by those of us who have been prepared through culture comes across as merely repellent to a person who is uncultured and lacking in the development of moral ideas, i.e., the development of moral feeling. Kant anticipates our objection that the foregoing implies that our judgment of the sublime is only a matter of convention; on the contrary, he hastens to add that the fact that a judgment about the sublime in nature requires culture in no way implies that it was initially produced by culture and then introduced into society by way of convention. The judgment about the sublime has its foundation in human nature, namely, the predisposition to the feeling for practical ideas, i.e., moral feeling. This predisposition to the feeling for practical ideas is something we may
require and demand of everyone, and so we see that the universal validity of the aesthetic judgment, which we have until now attributed to the various faculties of the mind, is ultimately grounded in our moral capacity - in the predisposition to the feeling for practical ideas, i.e., moral feeling. (AK 5:265)

Moral feeling, then, for Kant, is what underlies the necessity in our judgments about the sublime. When someone is indifferent when judging an object of nature that we find beautiful, we say he has no taste. When someone remains unmoved in the presence of something we judge sublime, we say he has no feeling. If a person has any culture at all, we presuppose that they will have taste and feeling. There is a difference between the expectations we have regarding taste and feeling, however. Reason, our power of ideas, is a higher faculty than the understanding, our power of concepts. The understanding, Kant implies here, is not subject to development; we expect any rational being to have the same power of concepts. And so we demand taste unhesitatingly from everyone, because in a judgment of taste the imagination is referred only to the understanding. Reason, on the other hand, which is our power of ideas, is subject to development, and so we demand the same feeling in others when we judge the sublime, in which judgment imagination is referred to reason, only under the presupposition of moral feeling. Even so, we believe we are justified in presupposing moral feeling in man; Kant believes this "predisposition to the feeling for practical ideas" (Anlage zum Gefühl für praktische Ideen) has its foundation in human nature at least as much as does common sense, which we also expect and demand of everyone. Hence we attribute necessity to aesthetic judgments regarding the sublime as well as to those regarding the beautiful. This necessity reveals an a priori principle in aesthetic judgments. Without it we could only discuss them in terms of empirical psychology; they would only be more refined feelings of gratification and pain (Hume). The presumed necessity of aesthetic judgments places them, and by means of them our power of judgment, into the class of those judgments that rest on a priori principles, and hence brings them into transcendental philosophy. (AK 5:266)

The sublime consists in a relation whereby we judge the sensible element in the presentation of nature to be suitable for a possible supersensible use. The object of moral feeling, as judged subjectively by the feeling it inspires, is the absolutely good. This is the ability of the subject's powers to be determined by the conception of a law that obligates absolutely. The absolutely good, as a concept, properly belongs to pure intellectual judgment rather than to aesthetic judgment. But the determinability of the subject by this idea, which is moral feeling, is akin to the aesthetic power of judgment and its formal conditions inasmuch as it allows us to present the lawfulness of an act done from duty as sublime, or even beautiful, without any loss in the feeling's purity, which would not be the case if the feeling were merely a variety of the agreeable. We can think of the determinability of the subject by the idea of the absolute good as sublime because we mean by this a subject who can sense within himself obstacles to meeting his obligations under the idea in sensibility, but at the same time his superiority (through moral principles) to these obstacles, i.e., a supersensible power within the subject. (AK 5:267)

The beautiful refers to subjective bases of sensibility as they are purposive for the benefit of the contemplative understanding. The sublime refers to subjective bases as they are purposive in relation to moral feeling. The beautiful prepares us for loving something, even nature, without interest. The sublime prepares us for esteeming something even against our sensible interest. Thus the sublime is an object of nature the presentation of which determines the mind to think of nature's inability to attain to an exhibition of ideas. When reason arouses the mind to an effort to make the presentation of the senses adequate to its idea of totality, the resulting feeling that the imagination is unequal to the task is itself an exhibition of the subjective purposiveness of our mind, in the use
of our imagination, for the mind's supersensible (moral) vocation. We soon come to realize that nature as phenomenon lacks the unconditioned, i.e., the totality, that even the commonest reason demands. This reminds us we are dealing only with nature as appearance which must be considered the mere exhibition of nature in itself of which reason has the idea. We cannot cognize this idea of the supersensible, but it is this idea that is aroused in us when our aesthetic judging strains the imagination to its limit. The judging strains the imagination because it is based on a feeling that the mind has a vocation that wholly transcends the domain of nature. It is with regard to this moral feeling that we judge the presentation of the object subjectively purposive. Indeed, Kant writes, it is in fact difficult to think of a feeling for the sublime in nature without connecting it with a mental attunement similar to that for moral feeling. (AK 5:267-9)

For Kant, then, in the third Critique, the aesthetic judgment, especially the judgment of the sublime, provides us, by way of feeling, experience of the supersensible world. And, as Zammito has argued, the viability of man's moral purpose in the world of sense is the most salient theme in Kant's third Critique.26 Through the experience of the sublime the ideas of reason, God, freedom and immortality become for us something more than heuristic principles. Although we cannot have cognitive knowledge of them, we can have something more than speculative or practical reasonings regarding the supersensible.27 We can experience it through the feeling of the sublime (if our moral feeling is sufficiently developed through culture). It is not the position of the present work that the feeling of the sublime is the only doorway to the supersensible, or even that it is primary, but rather that the feeling of the sublime, coming as it does under the faculty of pleasure and displeasure, constitutes for Kant an added dimension to the concept of respect and duty that follows from the rational awareness of the moral law through pure practical reason (which falls under the cognitive faculty). Moreover, the experience of the sublime, coming as it does through the faculty of pleasure and displeasure, would be a more immediate doorway to the supersensible than respect, which depends on cognition, and hence would facilitate the subjective moral motivation that the present work has shown to be a central concern of Kant's. Since the faculty of pleasure and displeasure connects the cognitive faculty with the faculty of desire, the motivation provided by the experience of the sublime would seem to be closer in kind to inclination, whose home is the faculty of desire, than the motivation provided by cognition of the moral law, and so it would perhaps be more effective in terms of subjectively motivating the individual to put aside the competing subjective motive of inclination in favor of the objectively conceived moral law. The next chapter will support this interpretation by showing that Kant continues to understand moral motivation in terms both of feeling and of the rational principles of pure practical reason right up until the end of his life. It is the thesis of this work that an element of moral motivation in terms of feeling is present in Kant throughout his philosophical career.

Notes

1. "Erhaben ist, was auch nur denken zu können ein Vermögen des Gemüths beweiset, das jeden Maßstab der Sinne übertrifft." AK 5:250.

2. Zammito, The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment, 278. The phrase Kritik des Geistesfühls is from §XII of the first introduction to the third Critique, which reads in Pluhar's translation "Accordingly, the critique of aesthetic judgment contains, first, the critique of taste (the ability to judge the beautiful); second, the critique of intellectual feeling, which is what I provisionally call the ability to present sublimity in objects." "Diesem gemäß enthält die Kritik der ästhetischen Urtheilskraft erstlich die Kritik des Geschmacks (Beurtheilungsvermögen des
Schönen), zweitens die Kritik des Geistesgefühls, denn so nenne ich vorläufig das Vermögen, an Ge-genständen eine Erhabenheit vorzustellen." Pluhar, 440 (AK 20:250).

3. Kant's analytics of the beautiful and the sublime follow the table of the categories presented in the first *Critique*, the four main divisions of which are quality, quantity, relation and modality. KrV A80/B106. For a careful analysis on the way in which Kant's explanation of the sublime is specifically differentiated from that of the beautiful while remaining in the common generic framework of the four moments of Quality, Quantity, Modality and Relation, see Paul Guyer, "Kant's Distinction Between the Beautiful and the Sublime," *Review of Metaphysics* 35.4 (June 1982): 753-783.

4. Kant's description of the sublime here shows its parentage in the *Observations*.
5. See KpV AK 5:71-89.


7. Ultimately, Kant argues, all estimation of the magnitude of objects in nature is aesthetic. Although we use numbers to arrive at determinate concepts of how large something is, the magnitude of the basic unit of measure must be assumed to be known by intuition. Without being able to estimate the magnitude of the basic measure by taking it in directly in one intuition, and then using it, by means of the imagination, to exhibit numerical concepts (through a numerical series extending to infinity), we could never estimate magnitude mathematically. We must have an idea of how big an inch is before we can say that a yard is thirty six inches long. (AK 5:251)

8. A mathematical estimation of magnitude can only exhibit a relative magnitude (relative to some measure). (AK 5:251)

9. As Zammito points out, the sublime is generally fruitless for our understanding of nature, as compared with the rich stimuli-ation the experience of beauty provided for our study and grasp of nature. What the sublime illuminates is metaphysics. Zammito, *The Genesis of Kant's Critique of Judgment*, 280.

10. Ideas of reason are always either too large or too small for any concept of the understanding. KrV A486/B514

11. As is the case with the beautiful, the aesthetic judgment of the sublime must be pure if it is to be a subject of a critique. That is to say, it must be free of any teleological and hence rational judgment. Consequently, we must not look for the sublime in products of art such as buildings or monuments, since both the form and magnitude of these are determined by a human purpose. Similarly, we must not look for the sublime in natural things, whose very concept carries with it a purpose (which we may not know - purposiveness without a purpose). On the contrary, we point to the sublime (remembering that the sublime is a mental state occasioned by some presentation) in "crude nature," and even then only when it carries with it no charm or emotion aroused by actual danger (the dynamically sublime involves only potential or threatened danger). (AK 5:252-3)

12. "Erhaben ist, was auch nur denken zu können ein Vermögen des Gemüths beweiset, das jeden Maßstab der Sinne übertrifft." (AK 5:250; emphasis added)

13. For Kant's explanation of schema see KrV A137-47/B176-87 and Chapter 3 above.

14. Of course, it is this demand of reason that results in the Antinomies. It is because we try to think of the infinite (either in space or time) or the unconditioned as given in its totality that we ask what is on the other side of it.
15. "Aber, was das Vormehmste ist, es als ein Ganzes auch nur denken zu können, zeigt ein Vermögen des Gemüths an, welches allen Maßstab der Sinne übertrifft." (AK 5:254; emphasis added)

16. As described in the second Critique. See Chapter 2 above.

17. See Chapter 2 above.

18. We must ask, does Kant mean our ability to think of infinity as a whole, or our ability to think in general? He has already said that our ability to think of the sublime proves there is a supersensible substrate, so the former interpretation is consistent with the present context.

19. Kant’s example, which calls to mind the ones he used in the Observations of 1763, is somewhat odd given that he is now arguing that the sublime is not found in artifacts. His point is clear, however.

20. "... eine Gemüthstimmung hervorzubringen, welche derjenigen gemäß und mit ihr verträglich ist, die der Einfluß bestimmter Ideen (praktischer) auf das Gefühl bewirken würde." (AK 5:256)

21. The passage shows a striking similarity to the role that awareness of the moral law plays in the second Critique, and thus supports the interpretation being advanced by this work.

22. This occurs through "a certain subreption." In the Inaugural Dissertation (1770) Kant describes subreption as the intellect's trick of slipping in a concept of sense as if it were the concept of an intellectual characteristic. (AK 2:412) Here respect for the object judged sublime (the concept of sense) is substituted for respect for the idea of humanity within ourselves (the intellectual concept). The "idea of humanity within ourselves" and the rational vocation of our cognitive powers are, of course, essentially equivalent formulations for Kant.

23. Another striking parallel to the second Critique, in which (as noted in Chapter 2 above) Kant says that through contemplating our duty to the moral law we realize that human nature can elevate itself above everything nature can present as an incentive. (AK 5:158)

24. Pluhar, 264 (AK 5:264)

25. While it is clear (from his lectures on ethics, for example) that Kant rejects moral feeling as a basis for morality (Hutcheson, Shaftesbury, Hume), it seems to be equally clear that he believes there is an inherent human "predisposition" (Anlage) towards morality, as he says here (and in, e.g., the Anthropology). This is something like conscience, but is distinguished from conscience in that it seems to be antecedent to it.


27. Patrick Hutchings argues that the Kantian sublime "... is at the leading edge of the Critical Problem. It is defined by concerns about the limits of knowledge, and with what lies beyond those limits." The third Critique renders God and immortality the "objects" of aesthetic ideas, if not the objects of cognition. For Hutchings, this is a solution to the problem of a deus absconditus in the Western tradition, a problem that in his view is at the core of most natural theology and virtually all theodicies. Patrick Hutchings, "The Old and the New Sublimes: Do they Signify? God?" Sophia 34.1 (1995): 49-64.
Chapter V

After the Critique of Judgment

Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View

First published in 1798 (first edition; second edition in 1800), Kant's Anthropology is relevant to the thesis of the present work because it contains a discussion of taste from the standpoint of empirical psychology, i.e., from the standpoint of the human being as a phenomenon in the empirical world. Hence it will be useful to compare Kant's treatment of taste with the formal treatment given in the third Critique, while recognizing that the Anthropology is a work of a very different character. Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, the last major work edited by Kant himself, is based on the lecture courses he presented at Königsberg beginning in 1772-3 commenting on the sections headed Empirical Psychology in Baumgarten's Metaphysics. As such, it is aimed at a much broader audience than the third Critique.

The Anthropology is divided into two parts, the Anthropological Didactic and the Anthropological Characterization. The didactic, which will be the focus of our concern, is divided by Baumgarten into three books or chapters, on the cognitive faculty, on the feeling of pleasure and displeasure and on the faculty of desire, respectively. Let us turn our attention to the second book, On the Feeling of Pleasure and Displeasure.

Kant begins by distinguishing between sensuous pleasure and intellectual pleasure. Sensuous pleasure may be conceived by sensation, in which case it is called gratification, or by the imagination, in which case it is called taste (Geschmack). Intellectual pleasure is conceived either by representable concepts or by ideas. (AK 7:230) Let us pass over his discussion of gratification, which is pleasure grounded in sensation alone, and turn to the discussion of taste, which is here described as a partly sensuous, partly intellectual pleasure. (AK 7:239)

Kant begins his treatment of taste with taste as it applies the properties of certain organs of our bodies to be affected by food or drink. This taste is understood to be used either as a differentiating taste alone or as a taste that distinguishes what is pleasant. Distinguishing taste, i.e., distinguishing the bitter from the sweet, can provide universal agreement as to how things should be labeled, but pleasant taste can never yield a universally valid judgment because pleasure and displeasure are ultimately subjective. They do not belong to the cognitive faculty concerning objects, we are told; rather pleasure and displeasure are determinations of the subject which cannot be attributed to external objects. Moreover, even pleasant taste contains a concept, namely, the concept of a distinction between satisfaction and dissatisfaction, which Kant tells us is related to the idea of the object in the perception or the imagination. (AK 7:239-40)

The word "taste" can also be used for a sensory faculty of judgment, which involves a rule believed to be valid for everybody. This rule may be either empirical or a priori. An empirical rule can never lay any claim to true universality or necessity since the judgment of everyone else about pleasant taste is subjective; we do not agree as to what kinds of food are pleasant. But there is a pleasant taste whose rule can be established a priori and is valid for everybody, which Kant tells us here could be classified as a rationalizing taste as opposed to sensuous taste. Rationalizing taste indicates how the "idea" (Vorstellung) of an object is to be judged in relation to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. Although the principles of the judgment of rationalizing taste cannot be derived from principles of reason and demonstrated, reason, we are told, is secretly at play nevertheless. (AK 7:240)
Kant defines taste (now understood to be a rationalizing taste) here in much the same way as he did in the *Critique of Judgment*: "Taste is the faculty of aesthetic judgment which makes universally valid discriminations."4 But in the present context of anthropology the social aspects of taste are treated more emphatically. One does not care about one's appearance or the appearance of one's house if one lives in complete solitude, and so every tasteful reference to oneself or one's own skills presupposes a social intention to express and present oneself in relation to others in a favorable light. But in an aesthetic judgment, the satisfaction in an object is the result of its form, i.e., the result of the way the free productive imagination combines through its creativity the material of the idea (*Vorstellung*) of an object in sensation. Only the form of the presentation of the object is capable of satisfying a general rule for the feeling of pleasure. (AK 7:240-1) Here we recognize the position Kant laid out in the third *Critique* regarding the beautiful, with some added emphasis on the social aspect of taste, which was present there but was perhaps not so explicitly connected to the definition of the aesthetic judgment.5 And when this is compared to the equivalent section in *Metaphysik L1* one discerns a continuity in Kant's thought stretching from the mid-1770's to the late 1790's.

Taste, then, is a faculty of the social judgment of external objects within the imagination.6 The mind feels its freedom in the play of images since sociability with other people presupposes freedom. The feeling that the mind feels in the freedom is pleasure. Kant notes here that freedom in the play of images involves sensibility, thus the mind feels its freedom through sensibility. (AK 7:241) For our purposes, the clear implication of this passage is that taste connects the supersensible world of freedom and the empirical world of sensation through a feeling.7

Kant has in mind the beautiful here; discrimination with taste is distinguished from discrimination through mere sense perception because the former, which is the discrimination of the beautiful, is held to be universally valid while the latter is only subjectively pleasing. Taste can be universally valid because it involves the concept of a law, and so the pleasure that results from discrimination with taste may be universally valid for everyone and not merely subjectively pleasing.8 Since the faculty of perceiving the universal is the understanding, the judgment of taste is both an aesthetic judgment and a judgment of the understanding (in combination). The judging of an object through taste is a judgment about the harmony or discord concerning the freedom of play between imagination and the law-abiding character of the understanding. That is to say, it is a judgment concerning the compatibility of the sense perceptions and the understanding's perception of the universal.9 The aesthetic judgment concerns the *form* of the object. (AK 7:241) This brief summary is consistent with the much more detailed Analytic of the Beautiful in the *Critique of Judgment*; here Kant is looking at taste anthropologically rather than critically,10 which leads him to remark that taste applies only to the form of judging aesthetically and not to the *generation* of the objects in which the form is perceived. If this were not the case, taste would apply to the genius whose passionate vitality often needs to be limited by the propriety of taste. (AK 7:241) In other words, if the producer of art were the arbiter of taste, any and all productions of genius would be beautiful, and, contrarily, genius would be limited to what taste has so far conceived to be "tasteful."11

While both the beautiful and the sublime are aesthetic judgments, only the beautiful belongs to taste. The idea of the sublime is not contrary to taste, however; Kant tells us that the idea of the sublime can and should be beautiful in itself. Even the portrayal of the evil or ugly can and must be beautiful whenever an object is to be aesthetically imagined, for example in a dramatic production, lest the portrayal arouses distaste or disgust. Such distaste or disgust would lead to the rejection of an idea that has been offered for the enjoyment of the audience. The beautiful, on the
other hand, contains in itself the concept of the invitation to the most intimate union with the object. That is to say, the concept of the beautiful involves immediate enjoyment. Kant remarks that the expression "beautiful soul" (schöne Seele) says all that can be said about the purpose of this "innermost union" (innerste Vereinigung) with the beautiful. Goodness of soul is the "pure form" (reine Form) under which all purposes must be united; it is the focal point around which the judgment of taste assembles all of its judgments of sensuous pleasure as long as they are compatible with the freedom of the understanding. (AK 7:241-2) Thus we see Kant relate the beautiful to the good anthropologically; this means that the aesthetic judgment continues to have moral import.

Kant describes the sublime here as awe-inspiring magnitude whether as extent or degree. The sublime invites approach in order to test how far one measures up to it. But at the same time, one fears a diminution of one's own self-estimation through this comparison, and in this there is a deterrent that comes with the invitation. A feeling of astonishment arises when one realizes that one's comprehension cannot measure up to the grandeur of the sublime phenomenon. Kant describes this feeling of astonishment as a pleasant feeling resulting from the continual overcoming of pain. (AK 7:243)

This effort to comprehend or measure up to the sublime Kant describes as an effort to elevate oneself. The effort to grasp (apprehendere) the sublime awakens in the subject a feeling of his or her own magnitude and strength. Yet the idea of the sublime in thought by description or presentation can and must always be beautiful, lest the veneration we feel becomes repugnance. The sublime is a feeling of emotion and not an object of taste, but the artistic presentation of the sublime should be beautiful and not contrary to taste. (AK 7:143)

In §69 Kant explains that taste has a tendency toward the external advancement of morality. Taste concerns the communication of one's feeling of pleasure or displeasure to another. As has been shown, there is a social element to taste. The satisfaction that results from the tasteful experience must be considered as generally valid not only for the experiencing subject, but also for anybody else. Satisfaction means contentment with the agreement between the pleasure of the subject and the feeling of any other person according to a general law which has to result from the general mental constitution of the feeling person. By "general mental constitution of the feeling person" Kant means reason. Hence there must be an a priori element of necessity to the satisfaction we consider generally valid, and Kant is able to say therefore that the choice of such satisfaction is subject in form to the principle of duty. Hence the ideal taste has a tendency toward the external advancement of morality.

Training in taste prepares one to please others in one's social position. But to be well-mannered and polished is only the negative condition of taste. The positive value in such training is that the representation of these qualities in the imagination can be an externally intuitive way of imagining one's own person. In this way Kant likens taste to morality in external appearance. (AK 7:244)

These passages would seem to shed some light on those sections in the Critique of Judgment that speak of the role of culture as a facilitator of moral feeling, and they support the argument of the present work that Kantian morality and aesthetics are related.

The Conflict of the Faculties

The three essays Kant published in the autumn of 1798 under the title The Conflict of the Faculties (Der Streit der Fakultäten) dealing with the conflict between the "lower" or philosophical faculty and the three "higher" academic faculties of theology, law and medicine are of some
interest to us insofar as they indicate further Kant's position regarding our supersensible moral vocation and our innate predisposition to morality. These themes are most prominent in the first of the three essays, on The Philosophy Faculty versus the Theology Faculty, but we may also find some helpful remarks in the second essay which concerns the conflict between philosophy and law.

Written in 1794, The Conflict of the Philosophy Faculty with the Theology Faculty was the result of the reaction of biblical theologians in Prussia to the publication of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone in 1793. The theme of the essay is that of the rights of the government and of the theological and philosophical faculties with respect to religious teachings. In short, Kant argues that genuine peace among the faculties can only occur if the ecclesiastical faith and the law of the land are consistent with the a priori principles of reason and so can be regarded as applications of those principles. Hence the philosophy faculty must be free to criticise the religion and the legal code of the state. This argument need not detain us, but as Kant develops it he does address some points that are relevant to the thesis of this work.

The conflict is between an empirical and a rational principle. Kant defines a biblical theologian as one who is versed in the Scriptures with regard to ecclesiastical faith" (Kirchenglauben) while a rational theologian is defined as one who is versed in reason with regard to religious faith" (Religionsglauben). Religious faith, Kant tells us, is one based on inner laws that can be developed from every person's own reason. Religion is not the sum of certain teachings regarded as divine revelations but rather the sum of all of our duties regarded as divine commands. Hence the object or matter of religion is no different than that of morality. The distinction between religion and morality is merely formal, Kant tells us; it consists in the fact that reason uses the Idea of God" (Idee von Gott) in its legislation, an Idea that is derived from morality itself in order to give morality influence on our will to perform our duties. Thus there is only one religion, religion within the limits of reason alone, i.e., religion in terms of the postulates of pure practical reason. The canon of religion (its moral content, based on pure reason) may be called pure religious faith; its vehicle (those statutes that need to be revealed in order to hold as sacred doctrines and precepts for conduct) may be called ecclesiastical faith. (AK 7:36)

Kant offers a guide for the exegesis of Scripture in light of this distinction, during which he discusses the concept of grace. In order to be moral, and thereby truly religious, human action must be represented as the product of the use of one's own moral powers and not as the effect of the influence of an external higher cause by whose activity human beings are passively healed. Thus the interpretation of those Scriptures that seem to contain a concept of divine grace in which the human agent is the passive recipient must be deliberately directed to make them consistent with the human agent as actively responsible for his moral condition. grace should be understood as nothing other than the nature of the human being insofar as human beings are determined to actions by a principle which is intrinsic to our own being, but remains supersensible, namely, duty. Here duty is represented as a stimulus to good produced in us by God. Grace is to be understood as the hope that good will develop in us, a hope awakened by the belief in our original moral predisposition to good, which we do not establish in ourselves. We ourselves must work at developing that moral predisposition, Kant tells us, but this predisposition does point to a divine source that theoretical reason can never reach. In this sense, our possession of a moral predisposition is not meritorious but rather the work of grace. (AK 7:43) Kant's position, then, is that we have an intrinsic moral predisposition which we develop but do not ourselves establish. Understood in terms of ecclesiastical religion, this original moral predisposition is called grace. Understood aesthetically, this predisposition is moral feeling; a feeling that inclines us towards a
supersensible vocation which Kant tells us is given objective reality through practical reason19 and which we feel through the experience of the sublime.20

This is, of course, not Kant's final word on the subject of grace;21 our purpose, however, is not to focus on Kant's views on grace, but to bring out Kant's firm belief in an innate human moral predisposition. As Kant develops his essay on grace, some interesting points are made. The specific question that concerns Kant is how Christianity, with its doctrine on grace, should be taught. The goal must be, for Kant, to teach Christianity in such a way that it is present in the hearts of men in order to make them more inclined towards moral behavior, or in other words, to incline us to regard our duties as divine commands. How can we achieve this end? Not by empirical means, since empirical means can only affect our actions but not our attitude or will; moral worth for Kant lies strictly in our attitude of respect for the law. If one thinks that the super-sensible must also be supernatural the question becomes, how is a conversion by which one becomes another, new person possible by God's direct influence, and what must one do to bring it about? Those who call in a supernatural cause for this natural effect (the change in the individual) must invariable divide into sects over this problem. Kant maintains that two different religious sects emerge from this division; the other religious sects being merely "church sects" (Kirchensecten) which do not concern the "core" (das Innere) of religion.22 (AK 7:53-4)

The two sects Kant identifies concerning the idea that a moral metamorphosis of persons could take place only by supernatural influence are Pietism and the Moravian Bretheren. (AK 7:55) According to the Pietist standpoint, the operation that separates good from the evil of which human nature is compounded is a super-natural one. Repentance can reach the necessary intensity only by the influence of a heavenly spirit. As Kant puts it, when the fire of repentance has reached its height, the amalgam of good and evil breaks up and the purer metal of the reborn gleams through the dross ready for service pleasing to God. Radical change begins with a miracle and ends with something we would normally consider natural since reason prescribes it, namely, morally good conduct. The supernatural effect (the grace of moral conversion) is the result of fervent and incessant prayer (i.e., a rigorous orthodoxy), but since prayer can only be heard if it is made in faith, and since faith itself is an effect of grace, not to be achieved by one's own powers, a vicious circle results. (AK 7:55-6)

The Moravian standpoint, as Kant describes it, holds that as one becomes aware of one's sinful state one takes the first step towards improvement naturally, helped by one's reason, since reason, by means of the moral law, enables one to see one's guilt. Reason leads the individual, using his or her moral disposition to the good, to decide from now on to make the moral law his or her maxim. But the carrying out of this resolution is a miracle, since one needs the feeling of supernatural communion and continuous awareness of intercourse with a heavenly spirit in order to do so. (AK 7:56) Hence we have two "mystical" (mystisch) theories offered as keys to moral conversion. The issue is not the object, which is conduct pleasing to God, but the subjective conditions that are necessary for us to achieve that end. The subjective condition in question is not virtue, but grace, since both sides agree that we cannot achieve the end naturally through our own efforts. One side holds that we can escape from evil only after a fearful struggle with it; the other side holds that this struggle is unnecessary and even hypocritical - what is needed is an alliance with the good spirit. (AK 7:56-7)

If one could prove that the supernatural aid described in the second, Moravian, standpoint actually happens, the problem of circularity posed by the Pietist account would be solved. But such a proof is impossible, because we would have to prove that we have had a supernatural experience, and for Kant this is a contradiction in terms.23 The most we could do is say that we have
experienced a change in ourselves which we do not know how to explain except by something supernatural. But such an experience, as supernatural, cannot be traced back to or be established by any rule of our understanding. It can only be an interpretation of certain sensations that we do not know what to make of, since we do not know whether they have real objects or whether they are mere fancies. To claim that we feel as such the immediate influence of God, Kant tells us, is self-contradictory, because the idea of God lies only in reason. Hence we can never make anything rational out of this dispute between religious sects regarding the subject of grace. (AK 7:57-8)

Kant invokes the Bible here in proposing his solution to the problem of the Pietists. There is a principle in the Bible which could replace the "unfruitful ecclesiastical principle of sheer orthodoxy" (Unfruchtbarkeit des kirchlichen Grundsatzes der bloßen Orthodoxie), namely the spirit of Christ" (Geist Christi), which he manifested in teachings and examples so that we might make it our own. This spirit of Christ" is already present in us by our moral predisposition; we need only make room for it. Kant's description here of our moral predisposition calls to mind the elevating effect of the feeling of the sublime. There is something in us, Kant tells us, that we cannot cease to wonder at once we have seen it. This "something in us" (etwas in uns) raises humanity in its idea to a dignity we could never have suspected in human beings insofar as they are objects of experience.24 Kant has in mind our ability to sacrifice our sensuous nature to a moral principle so that we can do what we quite readily and clearly conceive we ought to do. This ascendency of the supersensible man" (übersinnlichen Menschen) in us over the sensible, such that the sensible is nothing when it comes to a conflict between them, even though in its own eyes it is everything, is an object of the greatest wonder (Bewunderung). Our wonder at this moral predisposition in us, which is inseparable from our humanity, only increases the longer we contemplate this ideal. Kant insists that the ideal he has in mind is no anthropomorphism; it is true and not fabricated. But since the supersensible in us is inconceivable (i.e., it cannot be brought under a concept of the understanding) and at the same time practical, we can well excuse those who are led to consider it supernatural. Yet is it a great mistake to regard our ability to sacrifice our sensuous nature to our supersensible moral selves as the influence of another and higher spirit, something that is not in our power and does not belong to us as our own. The solution to the problem of moral conversion consists in using the Idea of this ability, which dwells in us in a way we do not understand, and impressing it on human beings from their earliest youth onwards through public instruction. (AK 7:58-9) Kant's position in the Conflict of the Faculties, then, is that human beings have a moral predisposition,25 and that it is this predisposition, conceived in an idea of reason, that dignifies human beings as such. It is this moral predisposition that Kant here identifies with the spirit of Christ," and his appeal to it as a solution to the problem of moral conversion, or, in other words, the problem of moral motivation, supports the thesis of this work in that it shows again that moral feeling is an important part of the Kantian solution to this problem, although it does not advance the issue of the sublime as such. If we accept that the moral predisposition described here is at least analogous to the moral vocation described in the third Critique, and given that Kant says that the feeling of the sublime makes us aware of our higher vocation (as has been shown in Chapter 3 above), it seems reasonable to conclude that the feeling of the sublime allows us to become aware of our supersensible nature (moral predisposition). Hence Kant's position in the Conflict of the Faculties supports the thesis of this work that the feeling of the sublime plays an important role in Kant's moral metaphysics in terms of moral motivation in that it adds another, more immediate dimension to the motivation resulting from the awareness of the moral law through pure practical reason.
Opus Postumum

Kant's last work, the *Opus postumum*, is of some interest to us even though it does not address the sublime or aesthetic judgment *per se*. We turn to it briefly in order to bring out its transitional and unifying character, indicating the movement in Kant's thought towards understanding reality as the unity of noumenon and phenomenon in the moral character of the human being.

A brief account of the *Opus postumum* is in order. The manuscript that has come down to us comprises 13 bundles of handwritten folio sheets. Three of these fascicles also contain some smaller leaves. Kant's working style was to write thoughts, notes, excerpts or even key words on whatever paper he might have available at the time and then later work these notes into drafts of a continuous text. He recommended to his students in his lectures on Logic the following: "First one writes down all thoughts as they come, without any order. Thereafter one begins to coordinate and then to subordinate." After writing the drafts these were revised and then incorporated into a clean copy (*Reinschrift*) which was then further revised. The next stage was for an amanuensis, usually a student, to copy the text (*Abschrift*). In this copy Kant would often make further changes in order to improve the text, and either this corrected version or a new, clean copy would be sent to the printer. Kant would then correct the printer's proofs himself or sometimes delegate the task to someone else. The *Opus postumum* shows Kant at work over a number of years, being in various stages of production from loose leaves and marginal notes to an amanuensis' copy of part of the manuscript. The last fascicle Kant wrote, mistakenly called the first fascicle because it lay on top of the pile of manuscripts, was ready to go to the amanuensis, whose name is recorded in the margin. It is this last fascicle, representing the summation of years of Kant's thought, that will be of most concern to us.

Kant had written in the preface to the *Critique of Judgment* that the completion of that work brought his critical undertaking to a close. But in a well known letter to Christian Garve dated September 21, 1798 Kant wrote "I see before me the unpaid bill of my uncompleted philosophy. . . The project on which I am now working concerns the 'Transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics.' It must be completed, or else a gap will remain in the critical philosophy." A month later, in a letter to his former student J.G.C.C. Keisewetter dated October 19, 1798, the 75 year old Kant wrote that in spite of the effects of age he nevertheless . . . der dennoch ein kleines Maas von Kräften in sich fühlt, um eine Arbeit, die er unter Händen hat, noch zu stande zu bringen; womit er das critische Geschäfte zu beschließen und eine noch übrige Lücke auszufüllen denckt; nämlich den Übergang von den metaph. A. Gr. der N. W. zur Physik", als einen eigenen Theil der *philosophia naturalis*, der im System nicht mangeln darf, auszuarbeiten.

Before turning to the last parts of the *Opus postumum*, let us briefly sketch Kant's argument. We shall see that what Kant has left us is concerned rather more with a general attempt to articulate the "highest standpoint of transcendental philosophy" than with providing a transition from the
metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics specifically. Kant had described the "pure" (reinen) part of natural science, upon which "the apodictic certainty sought by reason in such a science must be based" (die apodiktische Gewißheit, die die Vernunft in ihr sucht, gründen können), in his Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, published in 1786. In that work, he attempted to work out the a priori principles upon which natural science must depend if it is to be science properly speaking. (AK 4:468-9) Briefly, he argued that the pure rational cognition of determinate objects depends on mathematics, which in turn depend on the a priori intuitions of space and time. Kant defines mathematics here as pure rational cognition based solely on the construction of concepts by means of the presentation of an object in a priori intuition, but before the principles of mathematics can be applied to the doctrine of body, the principles of the construction of concepts belonging to the possibility of matter in general must be explained. A complete analysis of the concept of matter in general is required, which depends upon the pure intuitions of space and time. Hence the application of mathematics to the concept of body presupposes space and time, and a complete metaphysical system depends upon the categories. With the publication of Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant felt that he had completely exhausted the metaphysical doctrine of body. (AK 4:469-73)

In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant laid out a dynamical theory of matter according to which the filling of space is possible only as the product of the interplay between the two conflicting forces of attraction and repulsion. The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science had analyzed the concept of matter in general in accordance with the table of categories. But this treatment, while accounting for the apodictic certainty of the fundamental laws of physics, did not provide a guideline for the systematic investigation of the specific forces of nature. As Kant later wrote in the Opus postumum,

The transition to physics cannot be like in the Metaphysical Foundations (attraction and repulsion, etc.). For these furnish no specifically determined, empirical properties, and one can imagine no specific [forces], of which one could know whether they exist in nature, or whether their existence be demonstrable.

Der Übergang zur Physik kann nicht in den metaphysischen Anfangsgründen (der Anziehung u. Zurückstoßung etc.) liegen den die geben gar keine besonders bestimmte von der Erfahrung anzugehende Eigenschaften u. man kann keine spezifische ausdenken von denen man wissen könte ob sie auch in der Natur sind oder auch ob die Existenz von solchen erweislich sey sondern man kann nur empirisch oder hypothetisch in gewisser absicht Phänomene zu erklären dichten.31

The Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, then, failed to give an account of the systematic unity which, along with apodictic certainty, are the two features which, according to Kant, any doctrine of nature must exhibit in order to qualify as a science. But not only must philosophy provide a priori a means for the systematic investigation of the forces of nature, it must also provide a priori a reason to expect that nature permits such classification. As Kant wrote in the first introduction to the Critique of Judgment, "Now it is clear that reflective judgment, by its nature, cannot undertake to classify all of nature in terms of its empirical variety unless it presupposes that nature itself makes its transcendental laws specific in terms of some principle."32 Indeed, it is in the Critique of Judgment that Kant discovers a principle of nature's appropriateness to our cognition. The principle is purposiveness, and it emerges through the
aesthetic judgment. In §23, entitled "Transition from the Power of Judging the Beautiful to That of Judging the Sublime," which is the first section in the Analytic of The Sublime, Kant wrote, "Independent natural beauty reveals to us a technic of nature that allows us to present nature as a system in terms of laws whose principle we do not find anywhere in our understanding: the principle of a purposiveness directed to our use of judgment as regards appearances." As we saw in Chapter 3 above, the power of judgment emerges as a separate cognitive faculty with its own a priori principle. As Kant wrote in the first Introduction to the Critique of Judgment, "Hence judgment's own principle is: Nature, for the sake of the power of judgment, makes its universal laws specific [and] into empirical ones, according to the form of a logical system. This is where the concept of a purposiveness of nature arises." As Eckart Förster writes in his Introduction to the Opus postumum, "This principle allowed Kant to regard as purposive and hence systematic the part of nature that from the standpoint of the first Critique and the Metaphysical Foundations had to be regarded as contingent."

The principle yields the precondition under which a systematic empirical doctrine becomes a priori thinkable. When the principle of a formal purposiveness of nature is combined with Kant's general theory of matter, a transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics becomes possible, if not necessary, given that Kant's philosophy of nature has to be complete. As Kant writes in the first Introduction to the Critique of Judgment:

> . . . judgement first makes it possible, indeed necessary, for us to think of nature as having not only a mechanical necessity but also a purposive-ness; if we did not presuppose this purposiveness, there could not be systematic unity in the thoroughgoing classification of particular forms in terms of empirical laws.

Die Urteilskraft macht es . . . allererst möglich, ja nothwendig, außer der mechanischen naturnöth-wendigkeit sich an ihr auch eine Zweckmäßigkeit zu denken, ohne deren Voraussetzung die systematische Einheit in der durchgängigen Classification besonderer Formen nach empirischen Gesetzen nicht möglich seyn würde.

The principle of a formal purposiveness of nature explained in the Critique of Judgment is the principle of nature as art. This principle is not itself part of the "Transition" but it prepares the ground for it. It provides a principle by which we can proceed in terms of empirical laws, which makes the investigation of nature possible. (AK 20:204-5) The task of providing a basis for a theory in physics that would account for all objects of the outer senses remains. It is this task which Kant takes up initially in the Opus postumum.

Synopsis of Kant's Argument in the Opus Postumum

In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science Kant's dynamic theory of matter postulated two conflicting forces, attraction and repulsion. Both forces are equally necessary and fundamental; with only attraction all matter would coalesce into a single point, leaving space empty; and, if there were only repulsion, all matter would expand to infinity, again leaving space empty. In 1786 Kant was noncommittal as to the existence of a universally distributed ether or caloric; cohesion was treated as a physical, not a metaphysical property, which does not pertain to the possibility of matter in general. But in the early sheets of the Opus postumum, Kant argues that
the possibility of cohesion, and hence the possibility of matter in a particular form, depends on the living force (impact or pressure) of a universally distributed ether or caloric. Contrary to Kant's assertion that he had "exhausted the metaphysical doctrine of body" in the Metaphysical Foundations, that work turns out not to have been a "doctrine of body" but only a theory of matter in general.40

In these early sheets of the Opus postumum Kant also addresses some more specific problems concerning fluid matter and rigid matter the details of which need not detain us here. But his attempt to proceed according to the table of the categories repeatedly comes to a halt when the group of the categories of modality is reached. Quality, under which the aggregate states of matter are discussed, gives rise to the following problem. Caloric (Wärmestoff), which keeps all matter fluid and whose escape causes matter to rigidify, can itself be neither fluid or rigid; it is unintelligible, a "qualitas occulta." Eventually Kant hits on a new angle. The concept of ponderability (Wägbarkeit; ponderabilis) presupposes a gravitational force which makes a body heavy, and it also presupposes an instrument for the measurement of this moving force, such as scales and a lever arm that are rigid and exert a repulsive force to resist the pressure of the heavy body. Thus the moving force of cohesion underlies all mechanism and so every physical power requires the assumption of the ether or caloric. In describing ponderability in this way, Kant has found a concept that evidently pertains to the "Transition" he is thinking about since it is both a priori and physically conditioned. Ponderability requires the assumption of an imponderable matter responsible for the rigidity of the instrument of weighing. This thought leads to an expansion of the original project of a "transition from the metaphysical foundations of natural science to physics." Because any physical body can be regarded as a system of the moving forces of matter, there seems to be no reason to exclude living organisms, or natural machines" from the system forces in general, as Kant had done up to this point.41

Occupying a central position in the Opus postumum are Kant's a priori proofs of the existence of the ether or caloric, which would yield to the "principle" of the elementary system.42 Kant now argues that ether is not a hypothesis adopted to explain certain physical phenomena; on the contrary, it is a categorically given material because without it no outer experience would be possible. Because empty space per se cannot be an object of experience, space, in order to be sensible, must be thought of as filled with a continuum of forces extended through the entire cosmos. Ether is hypostatized space itself. Kant argues that the unity of possible experience, demanded by reason a priori, presupposes all moving forces of matter as combined in collective, not just distributive, unity. Ether is therefore the basis (first cause) of all the moving forces of matter and as such it is the material condition of possible experience. And because there can only be one experience, we must also presuppose a constant motion of all matter on the subject's sense organs if perception is to take place. Ether is thus identically contained for reason, as a categorically and a priori demonstrable material. Yet there remains a certain ambiguity as to whether Kant's proof really establishes the existence of ether in itself or merely as an idea, i.e., as a thought object.43

The ether proofs were meant to complete the elementary system of the moving forces of matter and to pave the way for the subsequent world-system. Physics is to be a system, but the question still remains, how is physics possible? We must first realize, according to Kant, that the aggregate of the moving forces of matter is subjectively only appearance. Appearances in the subject are given empirically, but the experience of an object is the product of the subject. The thing in itself that is the object of physics is constituted by the subject; it is indirect appearance, or the appearance of an appearance. If physics were to treat appearances in the subject, which are given empirically,
as experience of an object (the appearance of an appearance), which is made by the subject, an amphiboly would arise. But, Kant argues, physics is not constituted from experience; on the contrary, physics is constituted for experience. The objective element in appearance presupposes the subjective element in the moving forces in the form of universal principles of the possibility of experience. The moving forces of matter are what the moving subject itself does with its body to other bodies. The reactions corresponding to those forces are contained in the simple acts by which we perceive the bodies themselves. A transition to physics is possible if we focus our attention on the moving subject rather than the object that moves. It is because the subject is conscious of agitating its own moving forces that it can anticipate the counteracting forces of matter. A transition becomes possible insofar as the understanding presents its own acts, which are effects on the subject, in the concepts of attraction and repulsion and in the whole of experience thereby produced. The subject constitutes itself as an empirical object, becoming an appearance of an object for itself. Space and time also become sensible, because the positing of moving forces through which the subject is affected must precede the concept of the spatial and temporal relations in which they are posited. It is the subject's act of describing a space in a certain time that combines both and makes them into a sense object. This is self-intuition; the subject which makes the sensible representation of space and time for itself is likewise an object to itself in this act. Without this act there would be no self-consciousness of a substance.

Kant continues to develop the theory of the subject's original self-positing and to reexamine the idea of a thing in itself. Kant's theory of self-positing is known as the Selbsetzunglehre. In it, Kant argues that the positing subject is a thing in itself because it contains spontaneity, but the thing in itself = x, as opposed to, or corresponding to, the subject is not another object but a thought-entity without actuality. The thing in itself = x, or noumenon, is now merely a principle that serves to represent one's own activity. Here Kant gives an answer to the puzzling definition of noumenon = x he gives in the A edition of the first Critique (A250). As Förster explains, the thing in itself is the correlate of the pure understanding in the process of positing itself as an object. Its function is to designate a place for the subject; eventually it is only a concept of absolute position, an idea concerning relations. It is not itself a self-subsisting object. Self-consciousness is the "act" through which the subject makes itself into an object. At first the act is merely logical, thought without content. The first movement is from pure thought in general to pure intuition, the positing of space and time as pure manifolds. Space and time are products of our imagination; they are self-created intuitions. Space is determined by problematically inserting into it forces of attraction and repulsion, and by determining the laws according to which they act. These forces affect the subject and allow it to think of itself as receptive and determinable. As something that is affected, the subject can represent itself to itself as corporeal and thus an object of outer sense. The subject then progresses to knowledge of itself in the determination of appearances and their connection into a unified whole.

The subject does not just constitute itself as an object of outer sense, it also constitutes itself as a person. A person is a being who has rights and duties. By determining its will in accordance with the categorical imperative, the subject can raise itself above all merely sensuous beings. The subject does not only determine itself in space and time but in virtue of freedom of the will and the moral law which restricts it. We are subject to the necessitation of moral-practical reason. Kant's interest shifts to the idea of God as the highest moral being. The commands of the categorical imperative that unite all rational world-beings must be regarded as coming from a moral being which rules over all, namely God. So God exists. The idea of God lies at the basis of the categorical imperative; all human duties are prescribed as if they were divine commands.
Whether God exists as a substance different from man, as a world-being cannot be known, but the idea of God is indispensable for moral-practical reason. Just as there can only be one comprehensive nature in space and time, there can also be only one all-embracing, morally commanding original being, God. The subject determines itself by technical-practical reason and by moral-practical reason and is itself an object of both. The world and God are united in the human being.

The last fascicle Kant wrote will be of particular relevance to the thesis of this essay. In it the initial title of Kant's work in progress, "Transition from the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science to Physics" is abandoned in favor of "The Highest Standpoint of Transcendental Philosophy in the System of Ideas: God, the World, and Man in the World, Restricting Himself Through Laws of Duty," or, more simply, "System of Transcendental Philosophy in Three Sections." The initial project of a "transition" is now seen as being a part of a much larger work. Kant's account of theoretical and practical self-positing culminates in the heterogeneous ideas of the world and God. If philosophy is to be complete, these opposed ideas must be combined into a single whole. This whole is the human being, in whom the relation between the ideas of the world and God is accomplished. Man is a natural being and at the same time a personality; the principles of the senses are connected with the supersensible in the human being. The three ideals of God, the world and man belong together and form a system. Each idea is an ideal because each expresses a maximum and is unique; if God exists there is only one God; if there is a world in a metaphysical sense there is only one world; if there is a human being, it is the ideal of a human being adequate to duty. Kant now defines transcendental philosophy as the act of consciousness whereby the subject becomes the originator of itself and thereby also of the whole object of technical-practical and moral-practical reason in one system. Reason creates the ideas of God, world and duty in the process of positing itself, of becoming conscious of itself both as natural being and as a person.

We are now in a position to understand why a consideration of the Opus postumum is important to appreciating the importance of the sublime in Kant's moral metaphysics. Kant's last work argues that transcendental philosophy is the unity of the ideas of God and the world in the human being. It is the thesis of this work that Kant has this unity in mind when he described the sublime in the Critique of Judgment; the feeling of the sublime allows us to experience the unity of God (the supersensible) and the world (the sensible) that must be in us. Let us take a closer look at some of the last words Kant wrote.

The Last Fascicle: What Is Transcendental Philosophy?


As we have seen, the three ideas of God, the world and man are united in a system at the end of the Opus postumum. There we are told that transcendental philosophy is the principle that determines the whole of philosophy in one system: Transcendental philosophy is the act of consciousness whereby the subject becomes the origina-tor of itself and, thereby, also of the whole object of techni-cal-practical and moral-practical reason in one system. . . . Transcendental philosophy is the philosophical system of knowledge, which presents a priori all objects of pure reason necessarily combined in one system. These objects are God, the world, man in the world subject to the concept of duty."
Kant's final system, then, is an attempt to understand the whole of experience in terms of the ideals of God and the world united in the ideal of a rational being thinking in the world. Let us examine each of these three concepts.

The concept of God for Kant is in the first place that of a person, i.e., of a being who has rights (but against whom no other possesses right) and a will. (AK 21:9) In the concept of God one thinks a person, a rational being who restricts all other rational beings through commands of duty. (AK 21:10) God is a being who is originally universally law-giving for nature and freedom. (AK 21:14) This is consistent with the understanding of personhood presented in Kant's published works on practical philosophy. The question remains, however, does such a being exist, and if so, in what way? Kant here writes, "The mere idea of him is likewise proof of his existence."55 But we must be careful in interpreting this bit of text; on the next page he writes, "One cannot prove the existence of God, but one cannot avoid proceeding on the principle of such an idea, and assuming duties to be divine commands."56 Ultimately, the question of the existence of God remains unresolved unless we understand God as a necessary idea of moral-practical reason.57 This seems to be Kant's final position:

There is a God, not as a world-soul in nature, but as a personal principle of human reason (ens summum, summa intelligentia, summum bonum), which, as the idea of a holy being, combines complete freedom with the law of duty58 in the categorical imperative of duty; both technical-practical and moral-practical reason coincide in the idea of God and the world, as the synthetic unity of transcendental philosophy.59 The question: Is there a God? One cannot prove such an object of thought as substance outside the subject: [It is,] rather, thought.60


Under the heading cosmotheology," Kant unites the concept of God with the concept of the world. This is the highest standpoint of transcendental philosophy. God and the world are united synthetically under one principle. (AK 21:23) Kant calls this the highest level of progress in the system of pure reason, in which the whole of the supersensible and of the sensible object are represented in logical and real relation to each other. The representation of the whole of the supersensible and sensible objects are what grounds transcendental philosophy. These representations are more than mere concepts, they are ideas. At AK 21:29 Kant defines ideas as self-created subjective principles of the power of thought; here they are described as that which gives material to synthetic a priori laws (from concepts). Hence they do not merely emerge from meta-physics (which assumes a physics), but ground transcendental philosophy. (AK 21:20) Transcendental philosophy precedes metaphysics and provides the latter with principles. (AK 21:81).
Each of the ideas God" and "the world" contains a maximum, hence they are more properly thought of as ideals. There can only be one God and one world. (AK 21:20) To think of more than one God is self-contradictory (AK 21:10-1) and since there can be only one space and one time there can be only one world. The world is the complex of things in one space and one time, which the thinking subject creates for itself as the object of possible experience in space and time (AK 21:23-4), a being which includes the whole of all possible sense-objects. (AK 21:21) God and the world are ideas of moral-practical and technical-practical reason respectively, founded on sensible representation. (AK 21:21)

God and the world, then, are the ideas of two heterogeneous beings that can be thought in synthetic unity according to the principles of transcendental philosophy.61 (AK 21:22) How, then, does their combination acquire reality in the thinking subject? The answer depends on the dynamic account of nature that Kant has laid out in the earlier sections of the _Opus postumum_. He argues that the moving forces (of attraction and repulsion) are causal principles that contain the representations of God, the world, and the subject's intuition and feeling, as moving forces in the world. God and the world are united in one concept that contains the intuition of nature in space and time, the feeling and the spontaneity of connection of both of these into a system of technical-practical and moral-practical reason through freedom, in other words, the concept "man." In the thinking subject spontaneity and receptivity (understood as moving forces in the world) are combined in a system of intuition, feeling and desire. The rational subject connects God and the world through freedom.62 (AK 21:22)

Kant's system, then, comprises three principles: God, the world, and the concept of the subject that brings these concepts into a priori synthetic unity through reason. (AK 21:23) The first is the noumenon, the second the phenomenon and the third, the consciousness of my existence in the world in space and time, is the causality of the subject's self-determination into consciousness of its personality, in other words, the consciousness of freedom in relation to the totality of beings in general. (AK 21:24) Kant describes this consciousness as follows:

There is a being in me, which is different from me and which stands in an efficient causal relation (nexus effectivus) toward myself (agit, facit, operatur); itself free (that is, not being dependent upon the laws of nature in space and time) it judges me inwardly (justifies or condemns); and I, man, am this being myself - it is not some substance outside me. What is most surprising is that this causality is a determination [of my will] to action in freedom ([that is], not as a natural necessity).63

Es ist ein Wesen in mir was von mir unterschieden im Causal Verhältnisse der Wirksamkeit (nexus effectivus) auf mich steht (agit, facit, operatur) welches, selbst frey d. i. ohne vom Naturgesetze im Raum und der Zeit abhängig zu seyn mich innerlich richtet (rechtfertigt oder Verdammt) und ich der Mensch bin selbst dieses Wesen und dieses nicht etwa eine Substanz ausser mir und was das befremdlichste ist: die Caussalität ist doch eine Bestimmung zur That in Freyheit (nicht als Naturnothwendigkeit). (AK 21:25)

This is an odd way of talking, surely. Yet it seems clear that Kant is trying to articulate the unity of the principles world" and God" in the third principle, human consciousness. The being in me" is God understood as the ideal of morality. The thesis of this work aims at showing that Kant
had something like this in mind when describing the feeling of the sublime in the third *Critique* or when describing the spirit of Christ" in the *Conflict of the Faculties*. We feel this "being in us" when we are made aware of our supersensible vocation through the experience of the sublime. The experience of the sublime provides confirmation of Kant's moral metaphysics that goes beyond what is known through pure practical reason.

One must keep in mind that by the phrase "different from me" Kant does not mean a being that exists independently of the thinking subject. He has in mind rather the phenomenal relation of the subject as noumenon and phenomenon, the subject's noumenal moral being transcending phenomenal nature. He writes:

The concept of such a being is not that of substance - that is, of a being which exists independent[ly] of my thought - but the idea (one's own creation, thought object, *ens rationis*) of a reason which constitutes itself into a thought-object and establishes synthetic a priori propositions, according to principles of transcendental philosophy. It is an ideal: There is not and cannot be a question as to whether such an object exists, since the concept is transcendent.

Der Begriff von einem solchen Wesen ist nicht der von einer Substanz d. i. von einem Dinge das unabhängig von meinem Denken existire sondern Idee (Selbstgeschöpf Gedankending *ens rationis* einer sich selbst zu einem Gedankendinge constituiirenden Vernunft welch nach Principien der Transsc. Philosophie synthetische Sätze *a priori* aufstellt und ein Ideal von dem ob ein solcher Gegenstand existire nicht die Frage ist noch seyn kann weil der Begriff transsscentent ist.

We see then that for Kant the idea of God is inherently part of human existence. The idea of God is not the result of our experience of nature or of metaphysics; it is presented a priori as a principle of transcendental philosophy which provides its principles to metaphysics. Kant describes a logical relation: God and the world are the two objects of transcendental philosophy, while the thinking human being is the subject, predicate and copula who combines them in one proposition. These two logical relations are contained in a proposition that does not deal with the existence of objects, but merely brings what is formal in the relations of these objects to synthetic unity: God, the world, and I, man, a world-being myself, who combines the two." The idea of God is a correlate of the concept of duty, which presupposes the concept of freedom in terms of causality. Kant continues to hold that although such causality (through freedom) cannot be explained, it necessarily follows from the categorical imperative. Freedom and the ability to respect the categorical imperative constitute the ideal of the human being as person in which the concepts of God and the world are united: (AK 21:29) God, the world, and man as (*cosmopolita*) person (moral being), as sensible being (inhabitant of the world) conscious of its freedom, the rational sensible being in the world."70

Kant tells us that the final end of all knowledge is to know oneself in the highest practical reason, i.e., as noumenon. (AK 21:156) He holds that while it cannot be denied that God exists, it cannot be asserted that God exists outside rationally thinking human beings. In the person who thinks morally according to his or her own commands of duty we human beings live, move and have our being. (AK 22:550) The *Opus postumum* provides valuable insights into an interpretation of the moral-metaphysical significance of the feeling of the sublime for Kant. The higher vocation
of the mind" one feels through the experience of the sublime in the third Critique or the spirit of Christ" of the Conflict of the Faculties becomes the being in me" of the Opus postumum. While one can rationally argue to freedom and the other noumenal postulates of pure practical reason from the categorical imperative, it is quite a different thing to be able to actually experience the supersensible, and perhaps in the end such an experience is necessary if an individually existent human being is to sacrifice his or her subjective inclinations in favor of the objective principle of morality. Herein lies the significance of the sublime in Kant's moral metaphysics; through it one feels the noumenal world and may be subjectively motivated in favor of what is objectively conceived.

Notes


2. We have surveyed the evolution of this distinction from the animal, human and spiritual pleasure of the mid-1770's to the present classification of sensible and intellectual pleasure through the lectures on Metaphysics notebooksMetapsik L1, Metaphysik Mrongrovius of 1782-3 and Metaphysik L2 of 1790-1 above.

3. Except, perhaps, to note that in §63 Kant remarks that properly directed self-gratification (gratification applied to the sciences and the fine arts) can bring about cultivation, increasing the faculty of enjoying gratification of this kind. (AK 7:236) As has been shown above, this kind of cultivation enhances one's moral predisposition.

4. "Geschmack ist das Vermögen der ästhetischen Urtheilskraft, allgemeingültig zu wählen." (AK 7:241) Although the language here is similar to the third Critique, as Crowther suggests, compare it to the same passage from Metaphysik L1(mid-1770's) cited in Chapter 2 above. Kant speaks there about judgments of the faculty of pleasure and displeasure that have universal validity. The terms are not the same as in the third Critique, but the latent idea is present.

5. A possible explanation of the difference is the more popular character of the Anthropology as opposed to the Critique of Judgment.

6. Recall the definition given in Metaphysik L1 and cited in Chapter 2 above (AK 28:249).

7. Cf. Chapter 3 above.

8. Although we recognize Kant's argument from the Analytic of the Beautiful in the Critique of Judgment, there is a certain circularity to this passage in the Anthropology. The universal validity of the pleasure which distinguishes discrimination with taste from discrimination from mere sense perception contains the concept of a law because only in accordance with a law can the validity of satisfaction be universal for the person who makes the judgment. (AK 7:241) The distinction between two kinds of discriminations depends on universality which in turn depends on the concept of a law; that there is a law depends on the universality of the judgment.

9. A few paragraphs later, Kant describes taste succinctly as a feeling for a sensory, universally valid choice in general. In this way the judgment of taste takes its name from the function of the sense-organs of the mouth. (AK 7:242)

10. Recall Kant's classification of philosophy from the Preface to the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals: anthropology is the empirical part of moral philosophy. (AK 4:389)
11. Taste is a regulative faculty which judges form as to the uniting of the manifold in the imagination. Spirit creates ideas; the role of taste is to confine ideas to the proper form which fits the laws of the productive imagination. (AK 7:246)

12. Compare to finer feeling" in the Observations described in Chapter 1 above.

13. Kant remarks that goodness of soul, wherever it is encountered, is similar to Eros in the world of myth in that it is archetypically creative and also supernatural. (AK 7:242) One wonders if Kant has Diotima's speech in Plato's Symposium in mind.

14. Which shouldn't surprise us given that anthropology is the empirical part of moral philosophy, as was noted above.

15. Kant remarks that magnitude which runs "contrary to the purpose" (zweckwidrig) is monstrous. The example he give concerns writers who have used the word "monstrous" (Ungeheuere) to describe the vast extent of Russia. This is an error because it implies Russia is too big for a single ruler. (AK 7:243)


18. The conflict between philosophy and law is taken up in the second essay, The Philosophy Faculty versus the Faculty of Law. This essay was originally entitled "An Old Question Raised Again: Is the Human Race Constantly Progressing?" and appears to have been written in 1795. Ibid., xxiii.

19. See Chapter 2 above.

20. As Paton puts it, the problem of moral motivation is one of bringing reason's idea of a moral law to an intuition and then a feeling. H.J. Paton, The Categorical Imperative: A Study in Kant's Moral Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 186.


22. This formulation is important because it demonstrates that Kant does not hold that the supersensible (noumenon) is supernatural. Kant does not hold that there are two ontologically distinct worlds, although he often uses language that might mislead the casual reader (the Canon of Pure Reason at the end of the first Critique comes to mind); there is one reality which is noumenally grounded but only phenomenally known by us. We know one real world as it appears to us, although we can conceive this one world both as it appears to our sensuous experience and as it is in itself. See, for example, Paton, The Categorical Imperative, 226 ff. The sections under Cosmology and Ontology in the lectures on Metaphysics support this interpretation, as does the dynamic account of nature and the ether proofs in the Opus postumum, as shall be shown below.

23. Even if God really did speak to us, we could still never know that it was God speaking. It is impossible for a human being to apprehend the infinite by the senses, distinguish it from sensible beings and recognize it as such. (AK 7:63) For Kant, God speaks through our practical reason. (AK 7:67)

24. Morality, Kant tells us, not understanding, is what first makes us human. (AK 7:72)

25. Sermons should develop their lesson from the hearts of the listeners, i.e., the "natural moral predisposition" that is present "even in the most ignorant" person; only then will the attitude
of will it brings forth be pure. (AK 7:69) Kant also points to the sympathy felt by outsiders for those involved in the French revolution as evidence of a moral predisposition in the human race. (AK 7:85) These passages support the view of the present work that for Kant moral feeling is inherent and an important part of the Kantian solution to the problem of moral motivation.


28. Ibid., xliii. The chronology of the fascicles was established by Erich Adickes, the Prussian Academy's editor of Kant's Nachlaß, in 1916. Adickes also realized that the commencement of Kant's work on the "Transition" fell into a period (approximately 1786-96) when Kant's philosophical powers could not be in question. The so-called 1st fascicle is dated December 1800-1803 by Adickes, and the wrapper of the 1st fascicle is dated 1803. Ibid., xxi-xxvii. Eckart Förster narrows the dates to March 1801 to June 1802 for the sheets in the fascicle and April 1803 for the wrapper. Most of the sheets in this last fascicle are attributed to 1801, and so the Opus postumum was virtually completed by the middle of 1801, a time before Kant's physical and mental condition began to deteriorate. Ibid., xxviii.


30. Philosophical Correspondence, 252 (AK 12:258).


32. "Nun ist klar, daß die reflectirende Urtheilskraft es ihrer natur nach nicht unternehmen könne, die ganze Natur nach ihren empirischen Verschiedenheiten zu classificiren, wenn sie nicht voraussetzt, die Natur specificire selbst ihre transscendentale Gesetze nach irgend einem Princip." (AK 20:215)

33. Opus postumum, xxxiv-v. Förster does not mention the sublime in his Introduction, but it is our interpretation that through the experience of the feeling of the sublime we feel our own purposive role in nature as moral beings; hence it is not insignificant that Kant should begin to develop the principle of purposiveness at the very beginning of the Analytic of the Sublime.


35. "Das eigenthümliche Princip der Urtheilskraft ist also: die Natur specificirt ihre allgemeine Gesetze zu empirischen, gemäß der form eines logischen Systems, zum Behuf der Urtheilskraft." (AK 20:216)

36. Ibid., xxxv.


38. Ibid., xxxv.


40. Ibid., xxxviii.

41. Ibid., xl.
42. On the ether proofs, see Paul Guyer, "Kant's Ether Deduction and the Possibility of Experience," *Akten des Siebenten Internationalen Kant-Kongresses*. Kurfürstliches Schloß zu Mainz, 1990. Band II.1: Sektionsbeiträge Sektionen A-F. Herausgegeben von Gerhard Funke (Bonn: Bouvier Verlag, 1991): 119-132. Guyer argues that "... while the premises of Kant's ether deduction certainly go beyond the pure concept of experience, it would be equally misleading to think of them as mere empirical hypotheses. If anything, the premise of Kant's ether deduction may suggest that there is no completely hard-and-fast line between pure and empirical characterizations of experience." *Ibid.*, 121. This supports the interpretation of the present work, which is arguing that the *Opus Postumum* represents a bridging of the two apparently disparate worlds of noumenon and phenomenon that emerged in the critical philosophy (although it seems clear from the lectures on Metaphysics and other texts that Kant always meant to describe one reality approached from two different points of view - see, e.g., Chapter 2 above). Guyer says that the proper conclusion "... might be that Kant's arguments for the ether are really transcendental deductions but that transcendental deductions must always straddle the border between completely pure and empirical assumptions about the human experience." *Ibid.*, 121. See also Burkhard Tuschling, "Apperception and Ether: On the Idea of a Transcendental Deduction of Matter in Kant's Opus postumum," in *Kant's Transcendental Deductions: The Three 'Critiques' and the Opus postumum*, Stanford Series in Philosophy: Studies in Kant and German Idealism, ed. Eckart Förster (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989): 193-216.


45. One cannot help but think of Fichte when reading these sections of the *Opus postumum*, but to work out the parallels, influences, and differences between the *Opus postumum* and Fichte's *Wissenschaftslehre* would require a significant work solely devoted to that project. Nevertheless, the sections do support the position being argued by the present work that phenomenon and noumenon are two aspects of one reality in Kant.


47. *Opus postumum*, xii. Compare to Norman Kemp Smith's interpretation of the passage at A250 we have cited: "Otherwise stated, Kant's teaching is as follows. The thought of the thing in itself remains altogether indeterminate; it does not specify its object, and therefore yields no knowledge of it; none the less it is a necessary ingredient in the concept of objectivity as such. The object as specified in terms of sense is mere *representation*; the object as genuinely objective can only be thought. The correlate of the unity of apperception is the thought of the thing in itself." Kemp Smith remarks that this is what Kant is really asserting albeit in a hesitating manner which would seem to indicate Kant is himself already more or less conscious of its "unsatisfactory and un-Critical character. Norman Kemp Smith, *A Commentary to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, 2nd ed. (New York: The Humanities Press, 1923; reprint, New York: The Macmillan Company, 1950), 214 (page references are to the reprint edition).


49. Elsewhere in the *Opus postumum* Kant says that living (organized) beings must be attributed to an understanding. Thus spiritual forces are necessary for the sake of organic beings or systems. He calls this the demiurge" (*demiurgus*) or "universal world-spirit" (*allgemeinen Weltgeist*). *Ibid.*, 177 (AK 22:38). Although Kant here equates the two terms, it is unclear whether
demiurge" and world-spirit" mean the same thing. World-soul" is described as the immaterial moving principle of organic bodies (AK 22:97) and as the unifying principle of all life, distinguished from spirit" (Geist). (AK 22:100) The demiurge is described as a mechanically acting principle (AK 21:34). What seems to be clear is that both the demiurge and world-soul" are distinguished from God; God is conceived in a moral context from which both demiurge and world-soul are excluded. In §5 below we shall see that Kant has in mind three ideals - the world (demiurge, world-soul), God (morality) and Man (who unites God and the world through freedom.

50. Ibid., xliii.
51. Ibid., xliii-xliv.
52. Kant insists there must be a means of combining both of these ideas into an absolute whole. (AK 21:31)
55. "Die bloße Idee von ihm ist zugleich Beweis seiner Existenz." (AK 21:14)
56. "Man kann die Existenz Gottes nicht beweisen aber man kann nicht umhin nach dem Princip einer solchen Idee zu verfahren und Pflichten als Göttliche Gebote anzunehmen." (AK 21:15)
57. As we have seen, there is some confusion surrounding Kant's use of the terms world-soul," spirit" and demiurge" in the Opus postumum, but there is no confusion regarding Kant's concept of God as a necessary correlate of our moral-practical reason.
58. The concept of freedom emerges from the categorical imperative of duty. (AK 21:23) Kant is consistent on this point in the Opus postumum, and thereby consistent with the position he adopted in the second Critique.
59. Opus postumum, 225.
60. Ibid., 229.
61. "Synthetic unity" as opposed to "analytic unity" or identity.
62. Kant criticises Spinoza's transcendental idealism on the grounds that it conflates the subjective and the objective. It makes a synthetic unity merely analytic.
63. Opus postumum, 230.
64. "Man is, on the one hand, a world-being; on the other, however, man devoting himself to the law of duty: a noumenon." "Der Mensch ist einerseits ein Weltwesen: andererseits aber der dem Gesetz der Pflicht sich weihende Mensch ein noumenon." (AK 21:61)
66. "... Gott, die Welt, und Ich der Mensch ein Weltwesen selbst, beide verbindend." (AK 21:37)
67. "There is in man an active, but supersensible principle which, independently of nature and the causality of the world, determines nature's appearance, and is called freedom." (AK 21:50)
68. "The concept of freedom is founded on a fact: the categorical imperative." "The categorical imperative is only the principle of freedom." (AK 21:36)
69. Indeed, must be united. At AK 21:31 Kant wrote: "In this relation, there must, however, be a means of the combination of both [ideas] into an absolute whole - and that is man, who as a natural being, has at the same time personality - in order to connect the principle of the senses with
that of the supersensible." "Es muß aber in diesem Verhältnisse ein Verbindungsmittel beyder zu einem absoluten Ganzen geben und das ist der Mensch der als Naturwesen, doch zugleich Persönlichkeit hat um das Sinnen Princip mit dem Übersinnlichen zu verknüpfen."

70. "Gott: die Welt: und der Mensch als (Cosmopolita) Person (moralisches Wesen) sich seiner Freyheit bewust Sinnenwesen (Weltbewohner) das vernünftige Sinnenwesen in der Welt." (AK 21:31)
Conclusion

From the beginning of his career until the end of his life, Kant was concerned with the problem of morality generally and with the problem of moral motivation in particular. His earliest works link the sublime to morality; in the *Observations* as in the third *Critique*, the experience of the sublime promotes the consciousness of one's moral worth. Consciousness of one's moral worth is also conscious-ness of one's dignity, a dignity that is the result of our ability to transcend the spatio-temporal empirical world. This ability is our supersensible faculty, and it is this that we feel when we experience the sublime. In the *Opus postumum*, Kant unites the supersensible to the sensible in the human being, thus shedding light on the nature of the noumenal. This should not surprise us, for the lectures on Metaphysics show that Kant has always held that noumenon and phenomenon are one reality viewed from two different standpoints.

Kant's earlier writings show that he was concerned with the problem of motivating the subjective individual under the objectively conceived moral law; this is evident in the *Prize Essay* as well as in the lectures on ethics, where the as yet unknown solution to this problem is described as the "philosopher's stone." Kant's concern with this problem appears throughout his writings, turning up as the feeling of respect in the second *Critique*, as intellectual pleasure in the lectures on Metaphysics or as moral feeling in other writings. Clearly, Kant recognized that subjective motivation requires something more than an objective principle; this subjective motivation must be a feeling. And while it would perhaps go too far to say that Kant held that the feeling of the sublime constituted the *solution* to this problem of motivation, it is not too much to say that he held that this experience was an important *aid* to moral motivation. The access to noumenon available through the experience of the sublime, coming as it does through the faculty of pleasure and displeasure, provides an additional and perhaps more immediate doorway than the cognitive route to the supersensible available through practical reason. Being closer in kind, perhaps, to the third mental faculty of desire (the home of inclination) since it connects the cognitive faculty to the faculty of desire, it may be more effective in terms of subjectively motivating the individual to set aside the competing subjective motivation of inclination in favor of the objectively conceived Categorical Imperative, which is the *sine qua non* of moral action for Kant. In any event, it seems safe to say that through the experience of the sublime, which is the experience of our supersensible faculty, one may be motivated to embrace one's innate moral feeling.

The survey of Kant's works undertaken in the present work shows a continuity in Kant's thought from the 1760s through to the end of his life. In the *Dreams* moral feeling is the desire to harmonize the subjective will to the general will. The corporeal world is connected to the intelligible world by moral feeling. In the *Opus postumum*, at the end of his life, Kant writes God and the world outside me, the moral feeling within me." Moral feeling is described as an innate moral predisposition in the *Conflict of the Faculties* and the *Anthropology*. In the lectures on Metaphysics, Kant explains that pleasure is what harmonizes with the principle of life. Life is the principle of self-activity, which is hindered by the material body. Intellectual pleasure comes when one feels one's freedom, and this feeling can only be found in morality. The sublime is a presentation of nature that excites this same intellectual pleasure in us and thereby gives us reason to believe that nature is supportive of the ends of freedom. The theme of feeling one's freedom, of feeling the elevation of the soul seems to be present in Kant's thought throughout his life, and while he is careful not to make knowledge claims in this area, it does seem to be true that he always believed this is an accurate account of the human condition. An interpretation of the feeling
of the sublime as phenomenologically important to the problem of moral motivation, since it provides an additional doorway to the supersensible, would seem to be consistent with Kant's apparent belief as evidenced by the lectures and his other published works. Here lies, most probably, the significance of the sublime in Kant's moral metaphysics.

Notes

1. See, for example, *Metaphysik Mrongrovius* (1782-1783): "One cannot define pleasure or displeasure if one does not presuppose the faculty of desire. The cognitive faculty is connected with the faculty of desire by the feeling of pleasure and displeasure." *Lectures on Metaphysics*, 258 (AK 29:890).

2. Recall the remark of Lewis White Beck in his preface to the reprint of the Infield edition of Lectures on Ethics which was quoted in Chapter 2 above: "[Kant said] while he did not teach what he did not believe, he did not teach all that he did believe, out of consideration for his hearers." Beck does not give the source of this remark, but in any event, the comment speaks to the veracity of the positions attributed to Kant in the lecture notes.
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