Karol Wojtyla’s Philosophical Legacy

Edited by
Nancy Mardas Billias
Agnes B. Curry
George F. McLean

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy
# Table of Contents

**Introduction**  
Nancy Mardas Billias and Agnes B. Curry  

**Prologue: Karol Wojtyla’s Mutual Enrichment**  
of the Philosophies of Being and Consciousness  
George F. McLean, O.M.I.  

**Part I: Thomism, Phenomenology and Personalism**

Chapter 1. Philosophy and Anti-Philosophy:  
The Ambiguous Legacy of John Paul II  
John J. Conley, S.J.  

Chapter 2. Pope John Paul II’s ‘Participation’  
in the ‘Neighborhood’ of Phenomenology  
Peter Costello  

Chapter 3. The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and  
Thought of Karol Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II,  
with Emphasis on His Indebtedness to Max Scheler  
Peter J. Colosi  

Chapter 4. The Travels of Pope John Paul II:  
A Phenomenology of Place  
John E. Allard, O.P.  

Chapter 5. Pope John Paul II and the Natural Law  
Paul Kucharski  

Chapter 6. *Dives in Misericordia:*  
The Pivotal Significance of a Forgotten Encyclical  
Richard H. Bulzacchelli  

**Part II: Social Philosophy**

Chapter 7. Karol Wojtyla’s Notion of the Irreducible in  
Man and the Quest for a Just World Order  
Hans Köchler
Chapter 8. John Paul II: On the Solidarity of Praxis in His Political Philosophy
John C. Carney

Chapter 9. The Subjective Dimension of Human Work: The Conversion of the Acting Person in *Laborem Exercens*
Deborah Savage

Chapter 10. Person, Encounter, Communion: The Legacy and Vision of Pope John Paul
Stephen M. Matuszak

**Part III: On the Metaphysical Question: What Is a Human Being?**

Chapter 11. Action at the Moral Core of Personhood: Transcendence, Self-Determination and Integration in the Anthropology of John Paul II
Thomas Ryba

Chapter 12. Edith Stein and John Paul II on Women
Sarah Borden Sharkey

Chapter 13. A Mimetic Reading of *Veritatis Splendor*
Tyler Graham

Chapter 14. On the “Proper Weight of a Man”: Re-Examining the Poetic Foundations of Wojtyla’s Theory of Participation
Joseph Rice

Contributors

Index
Introduction

In August 2005 the World Phenomenology Institute held its 54th meeting in Nijmegen, Holland. Scholars from around the world met to discuss the problems of the day from a phenomenological standpoint. The theme of the conference was “Phenomenology of Life: From the Animal Soul to the Human Mind – The Sensible, Sentient, Felt, Intellective.” One evening, after a long day of thought-provoking papers, several of us were musing on the history of the Institute. Some who had been members for decades brought to mind the heady days of the 1970s, when the speakers had included such philosophical and theological luminaries as Hans Georg Gadamer, Emmanuel Levinas, and Paul Ricoeur. “And,” someone mentioned, “don’t forget John Paul II.” Karol Wojtyla never attended an Institute session – he had been scheduled to do so, but was precluded from attending by his elevation to the College of Cardinals. Nevertheless, he was well represented: the first (and to this date only) English translation of his doctoral dissertation – *The Acting Person* – was published by the Institute in 1979 as volume 10 of the *Analecta Husserliana*.

This raised the question: What might Wojtyla have continued to contribute to phenomenology in particular, and philosophy in general, had he not been elected Pope? What might his impact have been on our field? What, really, had been his place in the philosophical world? And what streams of phenomenological thinking might we discern in the writings of this philosopher-turned-pope?

That was the genesis of the present volume. A wide range of scholars were invited to the conference – from philosophy, theology, Catholic studies, and literature – people who were intimately knowledgeable with the thought of Wojtyla prior to his election as well as people who had no knowledge of his phenomenological background, but rather knew him primarily through his encyclicals.

We were fortunate to have two keynote speakers who had known Wojtyla personally, both before and after he became John Paul II. As you will read in the following essays, Hans Köchler had extensive correspondence with Cardinal Wojtyla prior to commenting on a paper of his at a gathering of the World Phenomenology Institute in Fribourg, Switzerland in 1974. Their collaboration on philosophical matters continued for a further five years, until Wojtyla’s election as pope. And Fr. George McLean, whose gracious guidance and support has made this volume possible, was a close friend and co-worker of Wojtyla. In a sign of the richness, as well as the difficulty, of assessing the relation between diverse philosophical streams running through the Pope’s work, it is interesting to note that Professors Köchler and McLean offer quite divergent readings of his key philosophical commitments.

The conference from which these papers were collected was entitled “The Philosophical Legacy of Karol Wojtyla.” It took place from March 21 – 23, 2006 under the auspices of Saint Joseph College, West Hartford,
Connecticut. Financial assistance was received from the Mary Munger Fund of Saint Joseph College. Mary Munger was a member of the first graduating class of Saint Joseph College, in 1939. She led an illustrious career in engineering and aeronautical acoustics, a pioneering woman in a primarily male profession. As a result of one of her many generous bequests to her alma mater, each year, the philosophy department is able to host a speaker on ethical issues. The conference on Karol Wojtyla was also underwritten by the Humanities Division of Saint Joseph College, which made available to us funds from a pre-existing National Endowment for the Humanities grant. We are grateful to our Humanities colleagues, in particular Division Chairs Wayne Steely and Susan Ahern, and past Chair Judith Perkins, who originally procured the grant. We also wish to thank our colleague Ewa Callahan for her gracious assistance to us in matters large and small during the crucial days just before the conference, and her correction of a Polish text that became scrambled en route to publication.

The papers in the present volume have been organized to reflect some of the conversations that ensued during the conference. It was somewhat challenging to group the papers, as the themes overlapped significantly. The question of freedom, for example, runs through all three groupings. Ultimately, the current structure emerged as most faithful to the spirit of the gathering. That spirit, as it was envisioned and as it took its own form through the two days of shared discussion, worship and meals, was one of conviviality, flexibility and shared purpose. We worked together to foster headway on the questions and sharpen each other’s thinking. Notably, too, there was an atmosphere of humility and appreciation for the vastness of the horizons and heart of Pope John Paul II, and the difficulty of the questions raised by his thought. It is in this same spirit that we collectively offer the papers – as pointers to further conversation on matters beyond the scope of each one of us.

Each section begins with a contribution by one of the keynote speakers. In the first section, divergent perspectives can be noted on the relationship between the two key influences on Wojtyla’s philosophical thought: Thomism, developed since the 13th century and offering a unified metaphysical purview stressing the common classification of all reality, including the human, under key categories; and phenomenology, a 20th century perspective stressing the open-endedness of reality, the uniqueness of human being and the centrality of questions of subjectivity. Each author in this collection offers a different interpretation of how these influences might or should be understood together.

The keynote speech for this section was delivered by George McLean, who worked with Pope John Paul II on a variety of scholarly projects. McLean makes an architectural analysis of Wojtyla’s philosophical writing through the lens of Heidegger’s understanding of such key concepts as being, subjectivity, and consciousness. Rather than seeing Wojtyla simplistic as neo-Scholastic or Platonic-Christian, McLean explores other important factors that contributed significantly to the texture of Wojtyla’s thought – most notably, the Existential movement of the 1950s and 60s, and the historical
backdrop of Marxism and the Second Vatican Council. McLean encourages us to situate Wojtyla’s thought in the development of the notions of \textit{esse} and participation by Cornelio Fabro at the time, as well as by the socio-historical movements of the period through which Wojtyla lived.

For McLean, the truth of the profound and penetrating insights of Aristotle, Augustine, and Aquinas was enriched for Wojtyla by means of the phenomenological philosophy of consciousness. Wojtyla’s greatest contribution to the philosophical understanding of the human person was to bring these two ways of thinking together, to show how they complemented and completed one another. Of course, for Wojtyla, this also meant attempting to reconcile the metaphysical split between subjectivity and objectivity. Wojtyla, McLean suggests, showed how this is not only possible but necessary, for the phenomenological study of consciousness is in fact an ontological exploration as well: consciousness is grounded in being; and through consciousness we participate in the absolute and its uniqueness, freedom, and transcendence. Thus, Wojtyla opened new ways for future metaphysics by providing an understanding of the person which takes in all that had gone before, and unfolds its new potential for the future of Catholic theology and social thought as became manifest in the Encyclicals of his Pontificate.

The next paper takes up the question of these challenges by looking at the ambiguous nature of Wojtyla’s philosophical legacy. Fr. John Conley, SJ, presents an examination of Wojtyla as both a Thomist and a phenomenologist, through the lens of the two encyclicals \textit{Veritatis Splendor} (1993) and \textit{Evangelium Vitae} (1995). These two encyclicals, Conley maintains, explore the late Pope’s attempts to merge phenomenological method with a Thomistic account of moral action. In \textit{Veritatis Splendor} John Paul II analyzes the crisis in moral theology in the context of 20th century Catholicism. While criticizing tendencies toward proportionalism and subjectivism in contemporary discourse, the pope defends the objectivity and universality of certain basic moral principles. \textit{Veritatis Splendor} opens with an extended meditation on the encounter between Jesus and the rich young man laid out in the Gospel of Matthew, in the course of which John Paul II employs a distinctively phenomenological method. John Paul’s reading discloses the moral essence of the question at the metaphysical plane.

\textit{Evangelium Vitae} exhibits the same complex philosophical logic as \textit{Veritatis Splendor}. In many ways a companion piece to the earlier encyclical, \textit{Evangelium Vitae}, applies the fundamental moral theology of John Paul II to the contemporary controversies concerning human life, especially in the area of abortion and euthanasia. In its method of argumentation it also witnesses to the dual philosophical traditions employed by John Paul II in his approach to ethics. Like \textit{Veritatis Splendor}, \textit{Evangelium Vitae} broaches its moral theme by opening with an extended meditation on a biblical encounter: in this case the conflict between Cain and Abel (Gen 4: 2-16). Again the Pope uses a phenomenological method to explore the moral essence of the question at
hand. As in the previous encyclical, John Paul takes a multi-layered approach to his topic, from the microcosmic to the universal, concluding with a critique of contemporary Western culture as fostering a nihilistic culture of death.

In distinction to McLean, who feels that Wojtyla successfully brings together the two methods of Thomism and phenomenology by an enriched or “intensive” notion of esse, Conley sees the two approaches not as complementing one another, but rather as juxtaposed in the service of a common project. Fr. Conley also calls attention to another, often overlooked feature of the late pope’s writing: the limits of philosophical investigation. As Conley reminds us, John Paul suggests that philosophy needs to maintain a modest stance, and may need at times to remain silent in the face of some mysteries, like the intractability of suffering.

The next essay in the collection takes yet another perspective on the question of Wojtyla’s phenomenological approach. Peter Costello argues that Wojtyla wrestles with and ultimately misreads Husserl and Scheler by virtue of his fidelity to the truths of the Catholic faith. Yet, Costello maintains, the misreading is something of a happy accident, since it enables Wojtyla to develop Husserl’s understanding of intersubjectivity more fully into the ontological concept of participation.

The structure of human being, according to Costello’s reading of Wojtyla, is fundamentally dynamic, focusing on the person in community, on morality in action, on transcendence in meaningful engagement. Given that humanity is developed via action, and via our efforts to clarify both individually and together the meanings of our actions, then the common good develops and shapes us. All aspects of this dynamic process need to be examined: not only solidarity, but also opposition; not only the given a priori of the human esse, but also the undetermined free movement of evolving social roles. Costello provides a complex analysis of Husserl’s insights into the ways in which subjects move together towards greater realization of their potentiality, and then shows how Wojtyla uses Husserl’s insights to construct his own, more theological definition of the other as neighbor, both in a community of perception and in concrete social interaction. Costello concludes by drawing out Wojtyla’s insights even further in the direction of participation as a moral activity.

The fourth essay in this section is a deep examination of another aspect of Wojtyla’s philosophical background examining the influences on his thought by the phenomenologist Max Scheler, the subject of Wojtyla’s post-doctoral Habilitationsschrift. Although Wojtyla stated explicitly that Scheler’s thought was incompatible with any Christian ethics, the lines of influence are clear, deep, and pervasive. Indeed, in The Acting Person Wojtyla notes that much of his thinking was founded on Scheler’s insights.

Peter J. Colosi focuses almost exclusively on the theme of the uniqueness of persons as understood by Scheler and reinterpreted by Wojtyla. Colosi brings out the fact that for Wojtyla (or one might even say, for John Paul II), far from being a mere abstraction, the notion of personal uniqueness was a lively consideration in all of his pastoral work, a concrete factor which
he continually strove to keep at the forefront of people’s minds. In his many travels and in his social teachings, Pope John Paul always emphasized the person: as recipient of grace and redemption, as moral agent, and as the one in whom the Christ was to be met and served. It is by virtue of one’s uniqueness that each person has dignity and moral worth. Colosi explores this concept in great detail, first in Scheler and then in Wojtyla, and shows how Wojtyla is indebted to Scheler’s original insights. Finally, Colosi applies his understanding of Wojtyla’s definition of uniqueness to the ethical problems in the field of health-care/bio-ethics.

Fr. John Allard, O.P., approaches Wojtyla’s emphasis on the individual from a very different perspective. Allard uses the legendary travels of Pope John Paul II as a text in which one can discover a phenomenological theory of place. According to Allard, the pope’s actions and speeches in this aspect of his pontificate elaborate the significance of personal presence, a concretization of expressive potentialities, a gesture of or towards relationship. Allard analyzes several of the pope’s speeches upon arrival in different countries, and explores the various roles which the pope thereby assumes: as guest, as pilgrim, as recipient of a vocation. By so doing, Allard argues, the pope used his own actions as a cipher of transcendence, pointing beyond the self to the universal meaning of his actions, while at the same time affirming the irreplaceability of the unique individual.

In the next essay, Paul Kucharski examines the implications of the personalistic attitude in yet another direction. Kucharski looks at the late Pope’s understanding of natural law and asks why Wojtyla might have wished to supplement natural law justifications of moral norms with what have come to be called personalistic justifications. Kucharski begins with an analysis of Wojtyla’s reflections on the natural law during his time at the Catholic University of Lublin, and John Paul’s later formulation of a personalistic ethics.

Kucharski sees Wojtyla’s understanding of natural law as thoroughly Thomistic, and as thoroughly grounded in the exigencies of social praxis. Thus, for Wojtyla, the human person must be understood metaphysically (as a unity of body and soul, of person and nature) and not merely in rationalist or physicalist terms. For Wojtyla, there is no conflict between the concepts of personhood and nature, and thus no conflict between personhood and natural law. Rather, personhood is the vehicle through which the natural law operates, through one’s free choice and active social participation. Thus, a positive, dynamic, and engaged interpretation of the natural law is promoted that both bolsters traditional Catholic moral teaching and encourages active and reflective social praxis.

Kucharski comprehensively details Aquinas’ account of personhood, and demonstrates John Paul’s efforts to enhance the Thomistic insights with the aid of phenomenological reflection. He then suggests some of the reasons which may have prompted John Paul to move in this direction, and offers, as supporting argument for his suggestions, a practical example from
contemporary Catholic ethics. Kucharski maintains that John Paul remains
truer to Thomism than to phenomenology.

The final paper in this first section takes the opposite view, and turns
to another encyclical for further understanding of Wojtyla as a philosopher.
Richard Bulzacchelli sees the encyclical Dives in Misericordia as key to
understanding Wojtyla’s philosophical oeuvre. In this encyclical, Bulzacchelli
argues, Wojtyla moves away from strict Thomism, particularly in his denial
of the concepts of ‘pure nature’ and limited election, and his espousal of the
notion of divine affectivity.

Bulzacchelli sees Dives in Misericordia as a document of the
‘ressourcement’ – the so-called ‘new theology’ championed by the Jesuit
Henri du Lubac in the early 1940s that proclaimed a new emphasis on the
personal nature of the relationship between God and each individual. The
call of Dives in Misericordia is for us to accept God’s self-revelation on
its own terms as a mystery of faith. This acceptance as mystery represents
not a leap into the irrational, but rather what Bulzacchelli characterizes as
a liberating challenge to reason. This ‘new theology’ emphasized love over
justice, freedom over necessity, and the movement of the spirit over rationality
– all of which was a perfect fit for Wojtyla’s personalistic philosophy. While
several of the other authors represented here attempt to explore the ways in
which Wojtyla used phenomenology to supplement Thomism, Bulzacchelli
argues that Wojtyla’s contribution to Catholic theology was his willingness
to go beyond the confines of the Thomistic tradition towards a renewal of
our understanding of the Christian philosophical enterprise. By reopening
questions once thought long-settled, Dives in Misericordia challenges us to
rethink the relation between revelation and human understanding.

The second section of the book explores the development of
Wojtyla’s pre-papal philosophy in, and into, his encyclicals. One of John
Paul’s most important legacies as pope is the resurgence of social philosophy
in Catholic thought. As the papers included here demonstrate, John Paul
contemplated all aspects of social philosophy: the question of women, the
struggles surrounding work, and the need to find equitable solutions for
matters of justice. In particular, he worked toward a precise understanding of
the nature of human relatedness and its implications for the struggles of social
life. Wojtyla’s phenomenological investigations and his reading of Thomism
ultimately coalesce in very practical ways with regard to the place of concrete
persons in the world of others and of God. How could it be otherwise? Karol
Wojtyla lived, worked, and wrote in Poland in the mid- to late-20th century. He
experienced the effects of Nazism, Marxism, and existentialism on the people
under his pastoral care. Later, as Pope, he surveyed for himself the effects of
free-market capitalism and globalization in all corners of the world. How, as a
Catholic thinker and leader, and most crucially, as pastor, could he respond?

With Hans Köchler’s paper we move away from metaphysical and
theological considerations, towards a broader consideration of Wojtyla’s
social theorizing. Dr. Köchler and Wojtyla corresponded on questions
of phenomenology and philosophical anthropology over the five years
immediately preceding Wojtyla’s ascension to the papacy. In 1975, Köchler presented a companion paper to a lecture that then-Cardinal Wojtyła was scheduled to give at an international colloquium in Fribourg. The Cardinal was unable to attend in person, so he provided Köchler with unpublished manuscripts on the basis of which the latter wrote the first introduction to and commentary on the later Pope’s phenomenological philosophy.

Köchler’s interest in Wojtyla’s thought is purely philosophical in nature. While Wojtyla went on to become pope, Köchler became a world-renowned philosopher of international law, founder of a non-governmental organization with consultative status to the United Nations (the International Progress Organization), and the originator of a hermeneutic system called civilizational dialogue, which attempts to facilitate and enhance cross-cultural understanding.

Köchler’s paper outlines the points of contact between his and Wojtyla’s philosophies. In Köchler’s philosophical understanding of the human person, as in Wojtyla’s, the emphasis is on the unique, irreducible quality of each person. Köchler examines the philosophical implications of this focus, especially for the person as moral subject, and explores the relationship that such a definition implies between the person and society, particularly in terms of interdependence and social justice.

John Carney carries forward the line of investigation prompted by Köchler, specifically examining the implications for political theory of John Paul’s concept of solidarity. Carney argues that two major factors characterize the Pope’s understanding of solidarity, both of which can serve as important correctives for many current political-theoretical discussions. First, rather than being an idea developed in abstraction and subsequently brought to bear on his political situations as Cardinal and, later, Pope John Paul’s concept of solidarity is itself a form of praxis. Arising from his lived political situation, his concept of solidarity never loses its moorings as a response to the challenges of the time, which Carney describes in some detail. Second, in contrast to both the Greek and Hebraic traditions, which situate solidarity as an ethical or political concept, John Paul II understands solidarity ontologically, as primarily demarcating an ontology of relations from which revolutionary practical implications flow. Thus for John Paul, solidarity is not a negation of universality in the name of a particular political identity; in this respect his understanding avoids contradictions that frequently plague both liberalism and communism. Nonetheless, solidarity flowers in the context of specific historical and communal relations. This ontology of relations (in which Carney discerns the influence of Neoplatonism, the spirituality of the Cappadocian Fathers, and Saint Augustine’s doctrine of intentionality) expands into an understanding of all human activity, including labor, as never merely brute or mechanical, but always human and thus inherently transformational.

In his analysis of John Paul’s understanding of solidarity as expressed in praxis, Carney employs the concept of ‘cognitive praxis’ from social movement theory. Carney foregrounds the transformational nature of solidarity – the fact that as praxis solidarity ushers in new interpretations of
community, self, identity and history. These interpretations, grounded in a new understanding of social reality, both give rise to new symbolic matrices and reanimate old ones based on historical memory. Carney analyzes the Pope’s at-once heartfelt and politically astute utilization of historical and religious symbols both to express his being-with the Polish people and to crystallize their unconscious hopes into transformative action. Carney then links John Paul’s model of solidarity to his social teachings, demonstrating the congruence between his understanding of human liberation and his theological discussions of particular ‘structures of sin’ (such as acquisitiveness, classism, and technology) that impede authentic global human development.

The significance of John Paul’s understanding of labor noted in Carney’s paper is the subject of more extensive explication and analysis in the next paper, by Deborah Savage. Savage argues that as developed in *Laborem Exercens* – a document whose insights are recognized as crucial even outside the Church – John Paul’s understanding of human work and its significance in the modern world must be seen as grounded in his philosophy of the acting person. In his personalist recognition of the subjective dimension of work and the impetus to both horizontal and vertical self-transcendence inherent in all labor, John Paul carries forward and reshapes the tradition of Catholic social teaching.

Savage understands John Paul’s project as an effort to synthesize an existential-Thomistic framework with phenomenological method in order to address the legitimate dimensions of modernity’s turn to the subject while continuing to affirm moral objectivity and a hierarchy of goods. Thus Savage’s framework for analysis dovetails with those of McLean and Kucharski. Savage discusses the personal structures of self-determination, self-possession, and self-governance in light of Wojtyla’s theory of consciousness, and also addresses his use of the categories of potency and act in light of an expanded understanding of the Aristotelian-Thomistic notion of *suppositum*. As human subjectivity, *suppositum* (like solidarity, as Carney describes) cannot be understood in abstraction, but instead refers to the concretely existing being. As such, the metaphysical substance of the human, and the identity of the subject – its personal existence and activity, its structure as someone rather than some-thing – must be accessed through the phenomenal. Firmly situating Wojtyla’s model of consciousness as more fundamentally constitutive of personhood than of items for cognition or will, Savage stresses that the conscious is thus not limited to ‘mental’ life but is instead reflected in all action. Most importantly for her purposes, consciousness mirrors the subject’s actions to herself in a way that furthers self-knowledge of her own nature as self-continuous person and, even more fundamentally, to experience her actions as her own.

We return thus to the structures of self-determination, self-possession and self-governance as they ground Wojtyla’s specific understanding of the freedom of a personal being. As Savage explains, a full understanding of freedom as vertical self-transcendence involves examining self-dependence: in acting on the basis of conscious decision about the objects of one’s acts, the
person is simultaneously deciding about herself and is thus the most immanent object of her own actions. As such, personal action reconstitutes the boundaries of the subject and *persona est sui iuris*. At the same time, self-transcendence is structured by the relation of the intellect and will to the objective order, i.e. the true and the good. Only those actions following from one’s recognition of the relation between action and the moral order are personal in the fullest sense, at once self-transcending and self-fulfilling. Savage’s extended discussion of the nature of personhood ties her inquiry to those in the volume’s third section, but her analysis is for the sake of heralding *Laborem Exercens* as a new and persuasive argument for the dignity of labor which foregrounds the significance of human personhood for understanding the theological meaning of the economic realm. As one of the major means by which a person realizes the relation of freedom and ultimate human destiny, work is an element in the process of salvation. Again, echoing the sorts of claims made by Carney about the ontological ramifications of John Paul’s understanding of solidarity, Savage notes that the normative claim that working conditions must respect human dignity is fully grasped only in terms of the concrete reality of human personhood. Principles such as participation, subsidiarity, and the priority of labor are ontologically grounded in John Paul’s theories of the person and the moral order. Choosing to embody these socially has major ramifications for poor and rich alike.

The theme of social transformation is linked with sacramental life in Stephen Matuszak’s paper on the Eucharist. Matuszak traces key developments of John Paul’s thinking about a social order based on the Eucharistic I-Thou encounter with Christ’s self-giving, tracing the trajectory of themes in Wojtyla’s lectures for students at the Catholic University of Lublin to later papal encyclicals including *Redemptor Hominis*, *Laborem Exercens*, *Centesimus Annus*, and *Evangelium Vitae*. Matuszak notes that Wojtyla’s emphasis on the Incarnation and Christ’s inter-personal encounter with each of us marks his departure from Kant’s understanding of personal dignity, and ensues in a model of subjectivity as inherently inter-personal—founded on the I-Thou encounter and grounding the community as inter-participatory. John Paul’s understanding of freedom turns on the “law of the gift”—the principle that “It is precisely when one becomes a gift for others that one most fully becomes oneself.” A culture responsive to the Eucharist’s graces and its call to self-gifting would cherish life at all its stages, recognize the significance of work for human freedom and dignity, respect the rhythm of worship and the need for a contemplative outlook, and promote space for dwelling in the mystery of love and nuptiality. These themes, first presented in the Lublin lectures, are mutually implicative and later develop in the magisterial texts that, for Matuszak, constitute the philosophical legacy of John Paul II. Matuszak reminds his reader, however, that their most important realization cannot be contained in any text, but must be rooted in human hearts. Thus to the World Youth Day participants John Paul posed simple, piercing questions: “Young people, where are you going? What are you looking for?” The answer can be found only in the Eucharist itself.
The analyses of social life featured in the second section all turn on John Paul’s understanding of personhood. The papers in the last section take up still more dimensions of this complex concept. As the title of his dissertation makes clear, Wojtyla’s fundamental concern was to define the meaning of personhood, and to understand how personhood can best be expressed through human action. This in turn demands an articulation of the meaning of human freedom in relation to human others and to God.

In the keynote address “Action at the Moral Core of Personhood,” Thomas Ryba argues that John Paul II is misinterpreted by scholars who overlook the extraordinary, life-long organic relation between all his works. To demonstrate this relation, Ryba offers another examination of Veritatis Splendor and John Paul’s critique of fundamental option theory, which was a concern for Bulzacchelli as well. Ryba uses John Paul II’s pastoral concerns about radical interpretations of a fundamental choice to shed light on the phenomenological formulation of freedom, transcendence, self-determination and integration offered in his pre-papal writings. In the Pope’s Scripturally-based objections to the interpretation of the fundamental option as transcendental and a-thematically prior to any concrete choice, one can also discern his pre-papal theoretical concern for retrieving the integral psycho-physical unity of the person who makes concrete deliberations in the light of ultimate finality. This connection, Ryba argues, is more typical than is generally recognized. In his earlier works, John Paul II addresses problems in contemporary moral-theological formulations in a manner that reveals sensitivity to both anthropological and transcendental concerns, always, however in strict adherence to Church teaching, and thus at times significantly at odds with the perspective of the chief proponents of the radical fundamental option. To continue his argument, Ryba turns to The Acting Person and offers a reading of Wojtyla’s description of self-determination as guided by cognition but not a function of consciousness alone, and always bearing reference to external or objective factors.

Thus, taken together with Savage’s analysis, this volume offers two detailed discussions of Wojtyla’s understanding of choice and self-determination. Freedom is not a matter of an idealistic transcendental postulate, but rather the concrete self-objectivation of one’s potentialities by the ego in light of a chosen end. It is not the impossible absence of all conditioning factors, but the dependence of action on an ego that makes it a free action. In light of this model of freedom, Ryba first turns to Wojtyla’s phenomenology of transcendence – particularly of a vertical transcendence that nonetheless remains connected to material reality and social life – and of fulfillment as the formation of personhood. Then he offers sensitive readings of both integration and disintegration in moral action before returning to the notion that John Paul’s ecclesiastical work has as its implicit horizon his philosophical work. Returning more specifically to the critique of fundamental option theory, it is crucial to see how John Paul offers a modern approach that is nonetheless not Kantian. Affirming, ultimately, the Thomist realist orientation in John Paul’s
thought, Ryba closes by reminding us that perhaps its most salient feature is its expression of the extraordinary phronesis of its author.

Examining John Paul’s thought regarding another crucial dimension of personhood, the fact that we are sexually differentiated, Sarah Borden-Sharkey offers a useful comparison between his thoughts on women and those of Edith Stein. The Pope’s work shows clear signs of the influence of Stein in its many similarities, including concern about promoting the dignity of women in light of a common humanity, and understanding male-female differences in terms of the divergent development of shared human abilities. Both Stein and Wojtyla stress the importance of recognizing that men and women have different general vocations, with women bearing a stronger orientation to the concrete and particular that should be brought into public life, not excluded therewith. Both attempt to balance the concern for women’s inclusion in social and economic life with emphasis on the pre-eminent role women have in parenting young children.

But it is perhaps their divergences which are most important for an evaluation of theories of gender complementarianism in general, and specific models in particular. Borden discusses the different emphases in Wojtyla and Stein, based in part on the differing audiences to whom they directed their thoughts. John Paul’s responsibility as global pastor led him to emphasize men’s and women’s equality in a way not paralleled by Stein, whereas Stein is more detailed on gender differences. These differences in emphasis, while motivated by differing contexts, also bear connections to differing metaphysical accounts of the origin of masculinity and femininity. Reading both as adhering to a broadly Thomistic metaphysical model, Borden argues that while John Paul does not put gender simply at the level of biology, he does think it arises from non-formal human elements. On the other hand, Stein places gender at the level of form such that our sexed bodies are not the cause of our gender, but instead are fitted to our gender.

The next essay examines the significance of *Veritatis Splendor* for an understanding of John Paul’s anthropology. Using René Girard’s theories of mimesis and mimetic desire to interpret the overall movement of the encyclical, Tyler Graham raises the question whether a literary philosophy may furnish new tools for elucidating some of the anthropological insights that have remained impervious to the methods of moral theology, and thus produce a unified reading of a document whose stylistic difficulties have already been discussed in this volume.

Graham first argues that the opening parable of the rich young man highlights John Paul’s own theory that human desire is imitative at its very depths and finds its ultimate fulfillment only in imitation of Christ’s own mimetic desire of, and loving obedience to, the Father. Graham then notes the parallels between Girard’s anthropology and that of John Paul, and turns his focus to Girard’s discussions of unhealthy mimesis. In order to explain how, for Girard, Christ’s teachings avoid the perils of mimetic envy and idolatry, Graham details how the New Testament employs the term *skandalon*, which can be understood as a ‘model which has become an obstacle.’ From this he
moves to considers Dostoyevsky’s portrayals of characters in the thrall of bad mimesis. Returning to *Veritatis Splendor*, Graham discusses how the call to follow the Commandments exemplifies a mimetic understanding of moral-spiritual development and is linked to the imitation of Christ. In Christ, law and desire are reconciled, as are freedom and God’s command. This provides a platform for interpreting moral issues addressed in subsequent parts of *Veritatis Splendor* in the light of a mimetic anthropology. Graham interposes John Paul II with Girard and Dostoyevsky to illumine the Pope’s discussions of freedom and nature, freedom and law, conscience, the fundamental option, and teleologism in the light of properly modern susceptibilities to mimetic envy.

While Graham’s paper discusses the pope’s work in light of literary theory, the final paper in the collection marks an important departure, insofar as no others investigate the philosophical significance of Wojtyła’s own literary output. Joseph Rice fills this gap admirably, providing a detailed explication of Wojtyła’s theory of interpersonal relations and its unique terminology. In contrast to the common phenomenological practice of describing these relations in terms of intersubjectivity, Wojtyła draws on the conceptual resources of the Polish term *uczestnictwo*, literally, ‘taking part in something with someone,’ and describes them as *participatory*. Likewise, drawing upon the Polish distinction between the abstract term for humanity, *ludzkość*, and *człowieczeństwo*, which captures the singular dimension of each person as unique, Wojtyła stresses how humanity has, in each person, a concrete, specific weight of personal being. These ideas culminate in a theory of interpersonal participation in light of an orientation toward the Absolute Person that is foundational for Wojtyła’s theories of human action, political response, and marriage.

Turning to Wojtyła’s literary works, Rice carefully situates them in the context of Polish intellectual movements and political challenges, and their author’s own development. He offers a number of possible hermeneutic keys. With respect to interpreting the significance of Wojtyła’s use of pseudonyms and his points of convergence with *avant garde* theories of emotional representation, Rice focuses on Wojtyła’s involvement with the Rhapsodic Theater movement. This movement pointed toward Wojtyła’s development of a theatrical experience that was ascetic as well as aesthetic, in which the human drama is pared to its essence and presented as an intimate encounter of response to a silent interpellation, on a stage devoid of setting or props. The Augustinian image of a sort of weight, marking the individual human as a center of gravity for participatory relations, is the thread binding the artistic works with the philosophical. Rice provides a detailed comparative exegesis of the three distinct but related Polish terms that are translated as ‘proper weight’ and ‘specific gravity’ throughout Wojtyła’s corpus, retrieving crucial pieces of poetry and showing their significance for understanding Wojtyła’s philosophical legacy. That we circle round to the notion of the unique person as ponderous but richly imponderable is a fitting development and a fertile ground for new investigations.
The editors wish again to thank all the conference participants for their thoughtful, energetic, and collegial responses to our invitation. The charism of Pope John Paul II was well represented and we look forward to the conversations that this collection will engender.

Nancy Mardas Billias and Agnes B. Curry

NOTES


2 George McLean notes that many Polish Marxists, with Januzs Kuczynski, consider *Laboram Exercens* to be the most important document in the modern Church. Personal communication, July 19, 2006.

This study joins many other investigations of the works of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla – later Pope John Paul II. Most have investigated specific aspects of his thought and together they constitute a rich mosaic of his insights regarding the human person and community.

Fewer studies concern the overall structure of his work and look, as it were, “under the hood” to see how his philosophy was crafted. This paper joins these from an historical perspective. Cardinal Wojtyla described this work as an individual, “groping” effort to return toward that which is objective in ethics (and above all in morality). He sought to reach these roots through a broadened discovery of the problem of the subject or the human being as seen through his actions. Externally, he describes his effort as owing “everything to the systems of metaphysics, of anthropology, and of Aristotelian-Thomistic ethics on the one hand, and to phenomenology, above all in Scheler’s interpretation, and through Scheler’s critique also to Kant, on the other hand.”¹ Here we will attempt to unveil the pioneering character of his work, particularly as regards the opening to human subjectivity and its foundation in being as its meaning was evolved in his time in terms of act or esse.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL SOURCES OF THOMAS AQUINAS

Martin Heidegger² provides a method for examining philosophical traditions in the history of philosophical thought. He notes that a time of crisis may call for a particular response. Subsequently, as this is developed in a consistent sequence, a philosophical tradition is evolved. This leaves undeveloped or underdeveloped alternate paths which had existed rudimentarily prior to the crisis, and which were left fallow in its aftermath. As a result, at a later crisis the way forward can well be a step back to take up the path less followed – or hardly attended to at all.

Heidegger applies this to the crisis in Greece. Upon finding that the rhetoric taught by the Sophists provided no adequate guidance when Athens killed its own Socrates, it was clear that external norms for human action were needed. The response is depicted in Michelangelo’s painting of the Agora. There Plato points upward to separated and unchanging ideas, while Aristotle points down to changing nature; both point not inward into the subject, but outward to an ‘ob-ject’; to something cast over against them.

Yet together they bring important alternatives regarding the objective
understanding of reality. Is the real to be seen as emerging from the multiple and changing, as with Aristotle, or with Plato as descending from the one and unchanging; does it come from matter or from spirit; is it in time or eternity? In Greek terms of 'form' these are irreducible alternatives, but as time moves on and new vision opens up, it may be that these alternatives become complementary enrichments of an ever-more sophisticated sense of being and person. It is in these latter terms that we would see the work of Aquinas and of Wojtyla.

**Being**

This is particularly important for the architecture of the thought of Cardinal Wojtyla. In the neo-scholastic interpretation of Thomas with its special sensitivity to late 19th century rationalism, Thomas was read as quite decidedly an Aristotelian: knowledge was primarily of objects as encountered through the senses. Anything else would undermine human self-transcendence, first to the external world and then to the transcendent cause of that world. This was the consistent frame of reference of the massive scholarship of Etienne Gilson during the first half of the 20th century. But was this the only possible reading of Thomas Aquinas?

Early in the 20th century the search for the key to the metaphysics of Thomas was carried out in simply Aristotelian terms. For the Greeks being was form and for Aristotle it was encountered as bound to matter as act is to its corresponding potency. Hence, the Aristotelian key to Thomas’ metaphysics would be act and potency, now broadened to esse and essence.

Soon, however, this began to appear not as untrue – and hence Thomas continued to be adjudged as most fundamentally an Aristotelian – but rather as somewhat one-sided. In the 1920s and 30s the master key to Thomas’ metaphysics began to be sought in the more relational terms of analogy and causality. Then in the 1930s an effort to determine the definitive statement of the principle of causality led Cornelio Fabro to the deeper and more inclusive notion of ‘participation.’ He elaborated this in his *La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d’Aquino,* which carried his search up to Thomas. Because of the onset of World War II, this was not able to be published till 1950. His later *Participation et Causalité selon S. Thomas d’Aquin* traced the related developments after Thomas.

The genius of Fabro’s work was that he did not simply take the notion of participation as it appeared in Plato and match Thomas thereto. Rather, he followed the progressive enrichment of the notion of being under the light of the experience of the early Church Fathers in their attempt to articulate the meaning of life and hence of being in the newly Christian era. By following this theme progressively through the following 1000 years, Fabro showed how the Greek notion of form was progressively enriched until, as it were, it exploded or divided into two terms: one was ‘form’ as related to matter; the other, as the proper effect of the creator, was ‘esse’ as related to essence.

This indeed was act, but not archetypically as for Aristotle the act
or form of matter. Instead it was the image (mimesis) or limited realization (methesis) – Plato’s terms for participation – of the absolute One as Being Itself or Subsistent Esse. Fabro showed how this transcendental participation constituted an intensive notion of being or esse, graded in the extent to which each being participated, imaged or shared the perfection of being itself. This reflected the Platonic imagery of light proceeding from the One source which is progressively diffused and diminished.

Yet in the end Fabro sees Thomas’ working out how this limitation was realized by his expansion of the sense of act and potency from form and matter in order to understand the relation of esse and essence. This extended development of act and potency at the very heart of being constituted Thomas as a certified Aristotelian. Thus, Fabro developed a strong sense of the Platonic heritage in Thomas’ thought, yet less than that of Arthur Little in his Platonic Heritage of Thomism, for he saw this as shedding important light on what remained ultimately an Aristotelian position.

It is important to note that Fabro’s work on the notion of esse – perhaps not coincidentally – was carried out at roughly the same time as the existentialism of Sartre and Marcel, Buber and Tillich. There was then a parallel existential movement within the Scholastic-Thomistic circles in Italy when Karol Wojtyla studied there after World War II. This participational perspective of being as participated from above through progressive limitation was the intellectual milieu in which he lived for some years. As in Michelangelo’s Agora, this contrasted to Gilson’s earlier Aristotelian Thomas which had been received in Poland (with some Marxist government censorship). In those terms, the studies in Lublin viewed being from below, in terms of act as first manifest in physical change (the prima via of Summa Theologica I, 2, 3).

The newer Thomas of Fabro in the 1950s and 60s read being in terms of a limited participation in the divine light. This was open to phenomenology and the philosophy of spirit and consciousness in a way that a Thomism based in matter and physical change was not. This was the basis for the intensive philosophical tension between the Christian philosophies of Krakow and Lublin in the 1970s. Only after ’78 and his election as Pope was Karol Wojtyla accepted as dean of the Lublin School as well. Even then, this came with an essential revisionism that attempted to reduce his philosophy to an Aristotelianism that stood against Platonism, rather than to one which sought to integrate an understanding of Thomas’ sense of esse as having evolved in the context of the Christian Fathers and a Christian Platonism. This evolved sense of esse was able both to be implemented by appreciating Thomas’ proper contribution in broadening the sense of act and potency to its proper mode in esse and essence, and now to be enriched further by phenomenology as a philosophy of consciousness.

Subjectivity and Christian Platonism

For this philosophy of consciousness it is important to note as well
that early in the Christian era Augustine had stepped notably beyond the Greek sense of objectivity, and particularly beyond that of Aristotle as grounded in sense knowledge. Rather, he pointed inward to human consciousness in search of the Spirit. He did so in ways more similar to the Eastern religious traditions than to Aristotle’s physics. This marked the character of Christian philosophy through the Middle Ages up to Thomas’ contemporary, Bonaventure.

Some thousand years after Augustine, Thomas took a special step in the heritage of this Christian philosophy by integrating the tradition of Augustinian Platonism with Aristotle. Agreement over whether form was to be understood from above or from below had not been possible in the Agora, but it became so in the evolved sense of being understood as existence as the proper effect of the divine creation. This is especially important for us today with the emerging need to attend to human subjectivity. While Thomas may in the end have come down with Aristotle, this was in no way in terms of Averroes’ ‘pure’ Aristotle. Rather he integrated within his thought the Platonic heritage of participation and the subjectivity of Augustine. This enables his thought today to be interpreted and extended – in the manner of a sensus plenior – so as to draw out its inherent subjectivity. This is not a rejection of Thomas or his Aristotelianism as some phenomenologists would too simplistically hold, nor an entirely external addition thereto, as some Scholastics of a particularly Aristotelian bent would protest.

Not long after Aquinas, nominalism put aside this inherent metaphysics of the subject to leave only single beings open to, and measured by, sense knowledge alone. The result was a radical renewal of objectivism and materialism, as typified by Hobbes, Lock and Hume; this was divorced from metaphysics and capable only of utilitarian manipulation. Even the Continental philosophical points of reference regarding subject and person, namely, Descartes and Kant, sought only what was clear and distinct, universal and necessary. Marcel notes that their subject remained in fact an epistemological object, the uniqueness and freedom of the person having been quite lost.

By the 1930s this objectivism had degenerated into a set of mega-ideologies: fascism, communism and colonial capitalism, devoid of human freedom and dignity. Thus modernity was doomed, and within the next 50 years all three had expired, whether through external war (WWII) at the cost of up to 100 million dead, the decolonialization of the 1960s, or the internal exhaustion of the Soviet Union in the early 90s. Now we speak now no longer of modernity, but of post-modernity.

This end of modernity is the context in which the work of Karol Wojtyla needs to be situated, for his thought consisted precisely in opening new horizons for human life. His thought must be understood not as an abstract systematizing, but as that of a spiritual craftsman or plastic artist – he described himself as “groping for his formulation of the concept of the ‘acting person’” – conceiving and molding his materials in order to lead and inspire his people – indeed all peoples, as could be perceived in the world assemblage at the time of his funeral.

Subjectivity

The post World War II decades were the years in which Wojtyla shaped his philosophical vision. I shared closely his experience at the time, both as a student in Rome and as a young professor of philosophy in a Catholic university. Later as Secretary of The World Union of Catholic Philosophical Societies I joined directly in his efforts in Poland for a renewal of philosophy that would liberate the peoples of Eastern Europe and reconstitute their humanity.

Two issues were central. One of these was phenomenology and the turn inward to the subject in order to complement the rationalism of modern times and even the realist objectivism of the Scholastic tradition. In the neo-scholastic revival of the 1880s there had been so great an emphasis upon reason that the movement felt obliged to show that Thomas was in fact more rational, or at least more solidly rational, than the rationalists themselves. This was brilliantly achieved, as illustrated by the works of Etienne Gilson and remained the focus of the work at the Catholic University of Lublin.

Wojtyla took up the challenge of enlivening and enriching this objectivism with the subjectivity which the tragedy of World War II showed to need to be appreciated in order to defend and promote the proper dignity of the human person. Thus, his two doctorates were on Scheler, but also on the interior, even mystical life of St. John of the Cross. Indeed, his director, Garrigou-Lagrange, the major Scholastic theologian in Rome at the time, while writing the key dogmatic treatises in a definitive post-Tridentine manner, wrote also on the mystical life of John of the cross and St. Theresa of Avila. This interest was reinforced by Wojtyla’s native pride in the Polish phenomenologist, Roman Ingarden, and by his interest in Buber’s I and Thou.

As noted, at that time the whole series of existential philosophers – Sartre and Buber, Marcel and Tillich – were drawing on the method of the phenomenology of Husserl and Heidegger. The issue in Rome in the mid- to late 50s was whether, after Sartre’s declaration that man had to deny God in order to be free, it was possible to follow his existential, phenomenological exploration of human consciousness and yet be religious. John XXIII convened the Second Vatican Council in response and, more positively, to explore how the new attention to subjectivity could promote, rather than exclude, the life of faith. The Council called upon and stimulated intensive reflection upon these issues and was a major and essential element in the development of Karol Wojtyla’s vision at that time.

Finally, being delegated for intellectual matters by the Polish Episcopacy, and hence responsible for the response of the Polish Church and people to the challenge of Marxism, gave the issue concrete urgency for Cardinal Wojtyla. He was convinced that the only real answer to Marxism
was a better philosophical anthropology on which, even when Cardinal of Krakow, he worked for some hours each morning. To dialectical materialism and its necessitating materialist dialectic of classes he responded with a focus upon the person as a unique and free image of God. This philosophy was elaborated most extensively in his *Acting Person*.

**Being**

As described above, the other strain of thought was the great effort by Catholic philosophers in the post World War II period to integrate into Scholastic philosophy the emergent awareness of existence precisely as this went beyond – but not without – essence.

To review:

1. If Thomas were to be interpreted reductively in objectivist and essentialist Aristotelian terms, then introducing the phenomenological elements of interior subjectivity would have done violence to his thought. Fabro and others, however, had just shown that Aquinas’ thought was in continuity with Augustinian subjectivity and Platonic participation – that it was indeed an enrichment of that Christian Platonism with the systematizing tools of Aristotle. Hence it contained, and might even be said to consist extensively in, those elements of existence and subjectivity which were strongly emergent in the continental existential phenomenologies of Wojtyła’s time. Moreover, Brentano had shown the young Husserl that this interior reflection could be grounded in Aristotle’s sense of intentionality. Thus subjectivity was not antithetic to the mind of Aristotle, though due to his concern for realism in contrast to Plato’s world of ideas, it was for him the path less followed.

The interior path of human consciousness, so brilliantly developed by Augustine as the archetype of Christian philosophy, was at the root of Thomas’ philosophy. If in times of modern objectivism, especially in a Marxist context, it was not helpful to point outward and upward as did Plato, there was a crying need to point inward to the life of the Spirit in humanity. In this project Husserl’s phenomenology of consciousness could help, provided it could escape idealist closure within the human spirit. Hence, the need to provide a foundation in being for this philosophy.

2. This pointed the young Wojtyła to the work on participation which, as seen above, had been begun by Cornelio Fabro prior to World War II. This renewed the study of Aquinas by identifying not only the much noted Aristotelian elements of form and essence which were especially relevant to rationalism, but also the key Platonic notion of participation (*mimesis* and *methesis*). What this ‘brought to light’ (the etymology of ‘phe-nomen-ology’) was not only the systematizing elements of the structures of form as key to the species of material substance, but even more the sharing in being or *esse* in imitation of the creator. Fabro had carefully traced the gradual evolution of this notion though the Church Fathers and early Scholastics as the term ‘form’ was gradually distinguished in order to express not only the form of matter, but, later, *esse* as distinct from form. Thomas finally related *esse* to
essence not merely as an accident, as had been the case with Avicenna, but as an expanded notion of act (esse) in relation to potency (essence). Thus, when Karol Wojtyla gives participation so central a notion in his philosophy he is at base speaking of the character of esse as formal effect of God’s creative activity and as this is realized in beings according to their essences.

3. In this way Fabro elaborated an intensive notion of esse, graded according to the various levels of being. The orders of inorganic, vegetative, organic and animal life are graded intensively, each at a higher level than its predecessors. And if, as Thomas states, esse for a living being is to live, the esse of a person is higher than the esse of a non living being. Most especially this means that the esse of the human being is to live consciously, reflectively, freely and responsibly – far from meaning merely “not nothing” – according to its properly human nature or essence.

Perhaps most astoundingly, this conscious life or action is not an accident adjoined to the substance, but is the very esse of that substance. Thus, if the subject or supposit is the substance as exercising its proper act of existence, then the very being of the person is most properly its self-conscious, and hence free and responsible, life. Thus, the Acting Person, seen in the light of the investigations at the time of esse in terms of participation, brings not merely a sense of the importance of action as a human activity and engagement, but a penetrating insight into the very being of the person. This is properly free, unable to be assumed by state or class, yet bound in solidarity with nature and all humankind as participants in the divine Unity, Truth and Justice, Goodness and Love.

Much of this could be found in the work of Cornelio Fabro and was the exciting new development in scholastic metaphysics at that time. What Cardinal Wojtyla was conscious of adding were insights from the phenomenology of Scheler, especially regarding values. Both of these were vastly enriching, but what was key was the combination of the two so that each transformed the contribution of the other. Together they constituted not only a reconciliation of opposites, but a decisive step ahead in the understanding of the human person. This was the proper philosophical contribution of Karol Wojtyla.

Hence, the notion of the human person – rather than being only formal, specific and abstracted from the uniqueness of the human person – is precisely that of a unique, irreplaceable and hence consciously free being. Moreover, this is not true only of a spirit which is somehow added to a body; rather it is the one person which is, or exists in a bodily manner. Conversely, all the physical characteristics of the body – whether DNA, sexual differentiation, or physical action – are personal and carry the dignity of a unique, free and responsible being. Both physical and spiritual dimensions point to the unique character of a human person.

Here the exploration of interior conscious life takes on its full significance as the way in which the person (a) lives, (b) reflects the creative act from which one comes, and (c) is oriented teleologically toward the goodness of God as subsistent love. Every human has this dignity, and not
only for human acts done consciously; but even as regards ‘acts of man’, where one’s freedom is not engaged, one must take this human dignity into account, whether in infancy, prison or senility.

In this light it can be seen how in Thomas’ times the realist objectivity based on essence provided what could then be known of the truth about man. But in the 1950s and 60s this truth was refounded in esse taken intensively according as the person consciously manifests the uniqueness and ineffability of the esse which it participates from the divine creator. Mystery, uniqueness and incommunicability, as inability to be simply assumed by class or category, are characteristics of the existing substance or “supposit” as existing not of itself, but in itself. In the face of Marx’s class conflict this now took on enriched meaning.

Yet paradoxically, with this comes the basis for communication with all existents with whom we deeply share. Friends are not only abstractions or “gifts we give ourselves,” but relationships in which we are immersed by the very fact of being created and creative participations in God as alpha and omega – the One at the summit of Plato’s levels.

This creative historical juncture of esse and consciousness which Karol Wojtyla elaborated suggests that we look at his thought not statically as a structure out of time, but rather as a constructive effort. His situation at the point of human crisis which was the collapse of modernity recalls Heidegger’s method of interpretation noted above. In this light Wojtyla’s thought is not a static work with fixed pieces to be deciphered, or even to be assembled, by external juxtaposition. Rather, it is an organic and creative process not merely choosing but forging a new path. In this respect it recalls more the plastic artist, creating by shaping and reshaping his materials to constitute a new and unique sense of being and of life.

It is not, then, that metaphysics can be recognized by contemporary man provided it be complemented or enriched, but instead, the enrichment of metaphysics by the Christian sense of being today provides the ground for recognizing the proper dignity and rights of the person as self-conscious, free and responsible being. Similarly, it is not that consciousness alone is now central, but rather, it is the founding of consciousness in being precisely as participation in the absolute Esse that gives consciousness the uniqueness, freedom and transcendence which characterizes the person.

CARDINAL WOJTYLA’S ASSESSMENT OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL TASK AHEAD

The Enrichment of the Philosophy of Being by that of Consciousness

To see this let us look at the page, reprinted below, with which Karol Wojtyla introduced his 1976 article “Person: Subject and Community.” As the first half of the article is a summary of the Acting Person, its publication in The Review of Metaphysics was held up until after that of the Acting Person. This page was separated from the article, however, and was published only
in the *Proceedings of the Catholic Philosophical Association*. Its unique importance lies in its succinct explanation by Wojtyla of the philosophical challenge to which his *Acting Person* attempted to respond and in the light of which Cardinal Wojtyla wanted his philosophy to be interpreted.

The problem of man’s subjectivity is today of paramount importance for philosophy. Multiple epistemological tendencies, principles, and orientations wrestle in this field and often give it a diametrically different shape and sense. The philosophy of consciousness seems to suggest that it was the first to discover the human subject. The philosophy of being is ready to demonstrate that, on the contrary, the analysis conducted on the basis of pure consciousness must lead in consequence to its annihilation. It is necessary to find the correct limits, according to which the phenomenological analyses, developed from the principles of the philosophy of consciousness, will begin to work to enrich the realistic image of the person. It is also necessary to establish the basis of such a philosophy of person.

Apart from this, the problem of the subjectivity of the person, and especially this problem in relation to the human community, imposes itself today as one of the central questions concerning the world outlook (*Weltanschaung*). This is at the basis of the human “praxis” and morality (and consequently ethics) and at the basis of culture, civilization and politics. Here, exercising its essential function, philosophy takes the floor as the expression of basic understanding and ultimate justification. Though the need for such understanding and justification always accompanies man in his earthly existence, this need becomes especially acute at moments, such as the present, of great crises and confrontations regarding man and the very sense of man’s existence, and in consequence regarding the nature and meaning of his being. It is not the first time that Christian philosophy is faced by a materialistic interpretation, but it is the first time that this interpretation has had at its disposal so many resources and expresses itself in so many currents.

It is well known that such situations in the course of history contribute to a deeper re-thinking of the whole Christian doctrine and of its particular elements. This is true in the present case in which the truth about man gains a distinctly privileged place. Twenty years of discussions on the world outlook have made it clear that it is not cosmology or philosophy of nature alone, but precisely philosophical anthropology and ethics which are at the center, contributing to the great and fundamental controversy on man.
From the point of view of Christian philosophy, and also of theology, such a turn of events, which has found its expression also in the teaching of the Second Vatican Council, and especially in the Constitution *Gaudium et Spes*, points to the need for study on the subject of the human person in its many aspects.26

The page begins by stating that he sees the issue of subjectivity or consciousness to be the paramount issue of the times. This entails a philosophy of subjectivity, of which phenomenology is a part, and to which he contrasts the philosophy of being. He proceeds to state both of these philosophies in their sharpest and most contrasting formulation.

Thus, he notes of phenomenology that the philosophy of consciousness “seems to suggest that it was the first to discover the human subject”. After all that had been done in this regard by the early Church Fathers, the medieval scholastics and Kant in modern times, this appears a bit tendentious and one must look carefully to see in just what way this can be true.

Equally tendentious is the balancing note that the philosophy of being, on the other hand, claims itself ready to show that pure consciousness leads to the very annihilation of the subject.

Both statements expressed the contrasting positions of the schools of Krakow and Lublin respectively in the philosophical debates of the time. Between these poles, Wojtyla sets the stage for his positive statement of what is needed in philosophy and what he attempted to provide in his *Acting Person*. The first is to find the correct limits in which the philosophy of consciousness or phenomenology will begin, not to replace, but to enrich the realistic image of the person. I take this term “enrich” to entail both that the work of Thomas is essential and that the earlier objectivist neo-Thomistic interpretation was inadequate and therefore needed to be enriched. He will attempt to do this, however, not simply by external additions, but organically, through a further elaboration of intellect and will under the inspiration of the interior investigations of phenomenology, especially those of Max Scheler which he had studied in depth for his dissertation.27

Conversely, in the same first paragraph of that page he proceeds to note that there is need to establish a foundation in being, for the philosophy of person concerns one who exists (being) and acts consciously.28 If this were pure Aristotelianism or Avicenna the action would be an accident of a substance; in the Christian philosophy of Thomas, understood in terms of Fabro’s discoveries regarding participation and intensive esse, this is the created existent participating in esse in the fully unique and creative manner proper to the human level as conscious life.

In sum, what he intends and promises to do in the article is to respond to the major philosophical needs of his time. He is to do this not by either a mere repetition of the objectivist neo-Scholastic reading of Thomas nor by the subjectivist philosophy of phenomenology. Rather, he will bring the two
into a complementary and mutually enriching position, so that being can be appreciated in its interior consciousness and consciousness can be grounded in the creative esse as it comes from, and returns to, God, *alpha* and *omega*. The human person is precisely the point of union, transformation and mutual enrichment of these two elements. It is neither simply one nor the other; nothing less then the integration of the two will suffice.

### Difficulties

Wojtyla’s project was too focal to the progress of philosophical insight to escape those who thought in terms merely of one or the other component, that is, of consciousness or of being as essence. Though some now suspect later interference by Vatican theologians in these matters, this article was written two years before Cardinal Wojtyla was named Pope, while the English edition of the *Acting Person* was in the process of being edited. In order to assure that the English translation of the original Polish would be effective for an English readership Cardinal Wojtyla had asked the help of the editor of the *Analecta Husserliana*, in which his previous articles had appeared. In the process some elements essential to the Scholastic notion of the person, such as “substance” and “supposit” (e.g., for Capreolus, *supposit* was substance precisely as with its corresponding esse) were removed from the *Acting Person* and replaced by phenomenological terms related to consciousness. As a result, rather than the objective notion of person being enriched by a philosophy of consciousness, it was replaced thereby. In turn, the replacement lacked the foundation in being which Wojtyla considered necessary for the philosophy of consciousness.

At the same time, Cardinal Wojtyla wrote an extensive summary of the *Acting Person* entitled “Person and Community” to be published in another channel, namely, *The Review of Metaphysics*. He had this translated by Sr. Emilia Ehrlich and passed it to me with the request that I assure its effectiveness for an English readership.

What seems especially notable is that in the first 14 pages of “Person and Community” which summarize the *Acting Person*, he used the technical terms ‘susbtance’ and ‘supposit’ (substance as exercising its proportioned esse) some 38 times. Without doubt he intended to insist with the greatest emphasis upon the importance of the very terms which were in the process of being removed from the English edition of the *Acting Person*. Indeed, John Paul II later requested that these terms be restored to the *Acting Person* when a second edition was being planned – which, however, never eventuated.

Conversely, the use of the term “enriched” at the end of the first paragraph of the summary was questioned, for if Thomas’ was a complete philosophy, then phenomenology could provide only helpful rhetoric for its expression, but no substantive enrichment. As a result the first page of the article was simply omitted. It reached publication only later in the *Proceedings*.
of the Catholic Philosophical Association (1979) as part of the dedication of the Aquinas medal, awarded that year to the, by then, Pope John Paul II.

If this example be indicative, the transmission of the thought of John Paul has not been easy and the documents must be verified with care. Nevertheless, it can be said with confidence:

(a) that Cardinal Wojtyla took up the development of the notion of being as esse in Thomas in the enriched manner of the new work on ‘participation’ at the time of his post-World War II studies in Rome; and

(b) that he enriched this with a philosophy of consciousness focused on an interior reading of the life, or esse, of the person, thereby enriching his Scholastic examination of the conscious acts of intellect and will.

(Thus, while holding fully to this Scholastic philosophy of the person as able to be more fully appreciated in the light of the post-World War II investigations of being and participation, he considered this in need of being further enriched by being unfolded in the light of a philosophy of consciousness. For this Karol Wojtyla drew upon the thought of Scheler and further grounded it in being.)

(c) that epistemologically he thereby went beyond the conceptual truth based on essence, to the truth of the person based on esse; and

(d) that this enabled him to recognize the mystery and utter uniqueness of the free creativity of the person, and to center there the sense of person which he saw as the crucial need of our times.

Implications for Cultures and Civilizations

The second paragraph of the original introduction to “Person and Community,” cited in full above, stated the implications of this notion of the person enriched by consciousness. It points to the sense of community which he recognized as having been inadequately developed in the Acting Person and which he promised to complement by the last half of that present article. To this he adjoined the significance for ethics of this enriched notion of the person.

Together, as an ethics of community, this engendered the vision of the Solidarity movement. In ten years, by insisting precisely on the recognition of the free consciousness of the person and hence of the people of Poland, this would require the “Round Table Conference.” There all Poles would participate as free and equally responsible subjects in determining their future. This was democracy, at last and in full. It decided to hold in 1989 the first free election in Eastern Europe in 40 years. Within six months this was followed by the liberation of all of Eastern Europe, and in two years by the demise of the Soviet Union itself.

But there was a more contemporary and no less dramatic implication of inner self-consciousness in this process, namely, the appreciation of the generation of the values and virtues which constitute cultures and civilizations. Given this awareness, Vatican II had needed to move on from the classical
position of ‘no salvation outside the Church’ to a recognition of multiple paths to the One and Holy.30 It therefore proposed a basic confraternity of religions upon which, and by which, relations between the corresponding civilizations become possible.

In these days marked by clashing civilizations and majority/minority cultural tensions, this counterposes a sense of person which exists in itself with dignity and rights that must be neither suppressed nor reduced. In turn, this gives special importance to the cultures which peoples create. Tolerance is not then an arbitrary choice or external construction, but the basic condition of persons; hence the brotherhood of all persons and communities in God and therefore with one another. This is essential for building harmony internally (within nations) and peace globally.

This was manifest in the advice given me by Cardinal Wojtyla in the deepest years of the Cold War. When most Polish philosophers rejected the very idea of dialogue with Marxists, Cardinal Wojtyla encouraged me to undertake it. Communication was the proper mode of relation with all persons as conscious subjects; the hope, philosophy and power of humanity was built on this being the state of every person: a better philosophical anthropology, he termed it.

On this advice was developed the world wide network of The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP), first in Eastern Europe, then with China and Africa, and now with Islam. At base, cultural traditions are the dialogues of the peoples with the Spirit. In responding to their challenges – whether environmental, economic, or political – the Spirit is the initiator to whom the people respond by their creative action. This is enlivened by the attraction of the Good in a unique, free and creative process. It is challenged today in the West (in some contrast to other civilizations) by a secularism which would close off the metaphysical dimension and leave only sensible phenomena for utilitarian or pragmatic manipulation for limited self-interests. The effort of the RVP is rather to encourage mining the cultural traditions for the resources with which to respond to the needs of the times. Thus the series “Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change”31 was initiated in collaboration with Cardinal Wojtyla and his vision of the person as consciously transcending self to communicate and engage with others in an expanding human solidarity.

Finally, the third paragraph of this introduction proposed restudying the whole of Christian doctrine in the light of this renewed sense of person. This does not have as its paradigm the physical process of Aristotle, for that would be to understand the person and community in terms of matter and change or process. Rather, Wojtyla would take the self-conscious and free person as paradigmatic. Moreover, the person in expressing being in its exercise of freedom goes beyond the economic and the political. It reaches for and expresses its metaphysical foundation, namely, the divine Being as participated in time through the self-conscious person as self-transcending toward others as community.
This is the philosophical legacy of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, Pope John Paul II.

NOTES

1 The Acting Person (Analecta Husserliana, V. 10; Dordrecht, Boston: D. Reidel, 1979), xiv.
4 La nozione metafisica di partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d’Aquino (Torino: Società editrice internazionale, 1950).
6 La nozione, 135-139, 338-362.
7 Ibid., 338-362.
13 La nozione, 338-362.
16 Acting Person, xiv.
19 (Edinburgh: Clark, 1957).
20 Aristotle and His World View, trans. by R. George and R. Chisholm (Berkeley: University of California, 1978); On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle, trans. by R. George (Berkeley: University of California, 1975;

21 _La nozione_, pp. 39-122; _Participation et causalité_, 179-244.
22 _Ibid._, 117.
23 _La nozione_, 135-139.
26 _Ibid._
27 Formalism in Ethics and Non-formal Ethics of Values: A New Attempt toward the Foundation of an Ethical Personalism, Translated by Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

28 E.g. “Person and Community,” pp. 283-84.
29 _The Acting Person_, xiii-xiv.
Part I

Thomism, Phenomenology and Personalism
Chapter 1

Philosophy and Anti-Philosophy: The Ambiguous Legacy of John Paul II

John J. Conley, S.J.

If there is widespread consensus that John Paul II was a philosophical Pope, there is little consensus as to what sort of philosopher he was and how this philosophy shaped his pontifical teaching.\(^1\) It is hardly surprising that a student of Garrigou-Lagrange\(^2\) and Max Scheler\(^3\) is recognized as both a Thomist and a phenomenologist, but what kind of Thomist or phenomenologist Wojtyla is and which philosophical tradition dominates his thought as Pope remain matters of dispute. Like any Christian, he recognizes the limits of philosophical reason and accepts certain truths based on God’s self-revelation, but just where John Paul II drew the line between the respective domains of philosophy and theology remains another disputed question.

In my remarks I would like to propose a reading of John Paul II’s more philosophical pontifical writings that could clarify his philosophical orientation and also highlight his theological suspicion of the very value of the philosophical enterprise. It is my contention that in several major encyclicals John Paul II combines a phenomenological method of analysis with a substantive Thomistic philosophy of action. It is also my contention that in several writings he undercuts the pretensions of the philosophical enterprise by placing philosophy under the judgment of the cross and by indicating that certain mysteries of human existence, preeminently the suffering of the innocent, remain impervious to philosophical resolution.

JOHN PAUL’S UNION OF PHENOMENOLOGY AND THOMAS ON MORAL ACTION

Two encyclicals dealing with moral problems illustrate John Paul II’s distinctive melding of phenomenological method with a Thomistic account of moral action. They are Veritatis Splendor (1993) and Evangelium Vitae (1995).

In Veritatis Splendor John Paul II analyzes the crisis in moral theology within the contemporary Catholic community.\(^4\) Criticizing tendencies toward proportionalism and subjectivism, the Pope defends the objectivity and universality of certain basic moral principles. The opening section of the encyclical is an extended meditation on the encounter between Jesus and the rich young man according to the Gospel of Saint Matthew. John Paul II employs a distinctively phenomenological method for probing the Matthean narrative. As he analyzes the encounter, he progressively unveils its moral essence by moving from the physical to the spiritual, from the external to the
psychological, and from the historical to the metaphysical. Using the onion-peeling method of analysis common to phenomenological studies of literary texts, the Pope evokes the moral truths implicit in the narrative by re-reading the biblical encounter at progressively deeper levels of ethical and theological analysis.

The first level simply states the bare facts of the biblical narrative (in *Veritatis Splendor* no.6). Moving beyond external details, the second level of interpretation is more psychological; the interior disposition behind the rich young man’s words is now disclosed. “For the young man, the question is not so much about rules to be followed, but about the full meaning of life” (in *Veritatis Splendor* no.7). The Pope immediately universalizes this quest for meaning. “This is in fact the aspiration at the heart of every human decision and action, the quiet searching and interior prompting which sets freedom in motion.”

Transcending the psychological, the third level is a religious one. The moral quest of the rich young man, indeed of humanity itself, is unveiled as a quest for God. “To ask about the good, in fact, ultimately means to turn toward God, the fullness of goodness. Jesus shows that the young man’s question is really a religious question, and that the goodness that attracts and at the same time obliges man has its source in God, and indeed is God himself.”

Going beyond the generically religious, the fourth level is explicitly theological, that is, it rests openly on the moral truths accessible through revelation and faith. Building on the Decalogue, Christ’s call to love summons the human person to an ethics of charity that transcends a simple ethic of respecting the moral law. “Jesus brings God’s commandments to fulfillment, particularly the command of love of neighbor, by interiorizing their demands and by bringing out their fullest meaning.”

The fifth and final level of analysis of the biblical encounter might be called that of discipleship and vocation. Strengthened by grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the disciple is freed to discover moral freedom in opposing the evils of the world. “This is not a matter of disposing oneself to hear a teaching and obediently accepting a commandment. More radically, it involves holding fast to the person of Jesus, partaking of his life and his destiny, sharing in his free and loving obedience to the will of the Father.”

In this phenomenological reading of the narrative of the rich young man, John Paul II does not refute false interpretations or give systematic justification for correct interpretations of the text or its moral implications. Rather, following a phenomenological tradition of analysis, he moves from the superficial to the deeper, from the empirical to the spiritual, as he progressively unveils the moral and theological essences of a brief conversation noted by Saint Matthew.

While this phenomenological approach dominates the opening of *Veritatis Splendor*, it does not dominate the middle section of the encyclical, where the Pope employs a Thomistic account of the moral act to refute what he considers the errors of proportionalism and to state what he believes to be
the correct objective and universal nature of moral norms. The poet Wojtyla now yields to the lawyer Wojtyla.

In surveying disputes in moral theology, John Paul II admits that considerations of intention, circumstance, and consequences are valid in the assessment of moral activity. He insists, however, that the primary consideration in moral judgment is the moral character of the act itself performed by a moral agent:

The morality of the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the object rationally chosen by the deliberate will, as is borne out by the insightful analysis, still valid today, made by Saint Thomas. In order to be able to grasp the object of an act that specifies that act morally, it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person. The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behavior.

The determination as to whether an act is objectively good is whether it is in conformity with the basic goods of human nature and especially in conformity with the ultimate good, which is God.

The reason why a good intention is not itself sufficient, but a correct choice of actions is also needed, is that the human act depends on its object, whether that object is capable or not of being ordered to God, to the One alone who is good, and thus brings about the perfection of the person. An act therefore is good if its object is in conformity with the good of the person with respect for the goods morally relevant for him.9

John Paul II’s insistence on the primacy and objectivity of the moral act provides the framework for the most controversial of his teachings in *Veritatis Splendor*: his claim that there exist intrinsically evil acts, that is, that certain actions may never be morally justified, regardless of the moral agent’s intentions, the act’s consequences, or the circumstances surrounding the act.

Reason attests that there are objects of the human act which are by their nature incapable of being ordered to God, because they radically contradict the good of the person made in his image. These are acts which, in the Church’s moral tradition, have been termed intrinsically evil (*intrinsece malum*): they are always such and *per se*, in other words, on account of their very object, and quite apart from the ulterior intentions of the one acting and the circumstances (*VS* no. 80).

Citing Vatican Council II, the Pope offers examples of such
intrinsically evil acts: suicide, slavery, prostitution, and the degradation of workers.

The Thomistic pedigree of this position on the moral act is indubitable. Aquinas is explicitly invoked as the patron of the proper position on the primacy and objectivity of the moral act. The discussion of intrinsically evil actions is clearly indebted to the neo-Thomistic manuals of natural law that dominated Catholic moral thought during the years of Wojtyla’s formation at the Angelicum. In his defense of the exceptionless nature of certain negative moral norms and of the primacy of the moral act against consequentialism and subjectivism, John Paul II draws upon a Thomistic tradition of precise legal reasoning, which privileges moral definition and detailed censure of opposing positions.

*Evangelium Vitae* exhibits the same complex philosophical logic as does *Veritatis Splendor*. In many ways a companion piece to the earlier encyclical, *Evangelium Vitae* applies the fundamental moral theology of John Paul II to the vexed controversies concerning human life, especially in the area of abortion and euthanasia. In its method of argumentation it also witnesses to the dual philosophical traditions, respectively the phenomenological and the Thomistic, employed by John Paul II in his approach to ethics.

Like *Veritatis Splendor*, *Evangelium Vitae* broaches its moral theme by opening with an extended meditation on a biblical encounter: in this case the conflict between Cain and Abel (Gen 4: 2-16). Again the Pope uses a phenomenological method to explore the moral essence of the homicidal violence represented by the fratricidal conflict.

At the first level the Pope simply recounts the bare facts of the fraternal confrontation which Scripture depicts as the original murder. On the second level the analysis becomes more psychological; it excavates the vices dominating Cain’s soul, which motivate the external act of Abel’s murder. “Envy and anger have the upper hand over the Lord’s warning, and so Cain attacks his own brother and kills him.” Again John Paul II quickly universalizes this insight into Cain’s particular vices. “Like the first fratricide, every murder is a violation of the spiritual kinship uniting mankind in one great family, in which all share the same fundamental good: equal personal dignity.”

The third level of analysis raises more general moral questions on the relationship between evil and homicidal violence. “The Lord’s question, ‘What have you done?,’ which Cain cannot escape, is addressed also to the people of today, to make them realize the extent and gravity of the attacks against life which continue to make human history; to make them discover what causes these attacks and feeds them; and to make them ponder seriously the consequences which derive from these attacks for the existence of individuals and peoples.”

The fourth and perhaps most original level of analysis constitutes a type of cultural critique. It describes the moral climate of contemporary Western society that has fostered a culture of death. “This reality is characterized by the emergence of a culture which denies solidarity and in many cases takes the form of a veritable ‘culture of death’…it is possible to speak in a certain sense
of a war of the powerful against the weak: a life which would require greater acceptance, love and care is considered useless, or held to be an intolerable burden, and is therefore rejected…” Building on this cultural critique, the next level of analysis is more ideological in nature. It attempts to determine the source of this Promethean cultural attitude that so cavalierly dismisses the rights of the innocent who are considered burdensome in contemporary society. Among other factors, it unveils a distorted notion of freedom as one of the justifying causes of the culture of death:

> Freedom negates and destroys itself, and becomes a factor leading to the destruction of others, when it no longer recognizes and respects its essential link with the truth. When freedom, out of a desire to emancipate itself from all forms of tradition and authority, shuts out even the most obvious evidence of an objective and universal truth, which is the foundation of personal and social life, then the person ends up by no longer taking the sole and indisputable point of reference for his own choices the truth about good and evil, but only the subjective and changeable opinion or, indeed, his selfish interest and whim.¹⁶

The final levels of the analysis of the narrative of Cain and Abel are explicitly religious. The original homicide not only reveals the essence of fallen humanity in its inclination toward lethal violence; it discloses something in the relationship of humanity to God and in the divine revelation of God to humanity in Christ. Contemporary humanity’s practice and justification of the homicide of the innocent discloses its loss of the sense of God, the sovereign author of life. This atrophy of the religious sense is allied to a materialism that perceives the death of the innocent as of little account. “The eclipse of the sense of God and of man inevitably leads to a practical materialism, which breeds individualism, utilitarianism, and hedonism.”¹⁷ In responding to the violence of humanity, Christ crucified reveals the infinite value of each human being and provides the grace to conquer the human tendency to destroy those who are perceived as a burden. In opposition to the blood shed by Cain and the despairing violence issuing from it, the blood of Christ overcomes the cycle of lethal violence through forgiveness. “It is from the blood of Christ that all draw strength to commit themselves to promoting life. It is precisely this blood that is the most powerful source of hope; indeed, it is the foundation of the absolute certitude that in God’s plan life will be victorious.”¹⁸ It is in revelation and faith that the origin and redemption of human violence is most deeply unveiled.

The elaborate opening phenomenology of violence, mediated by the interpretation of the narrative of Cain and Abel, is not sustained by the later sections of the encyclical, however. Once again, a Thomistic theory of the moral act becomes the central framework for the middle section’s defense of the inviolability of innocent human life. Even more striking than in
Veritatis Splendor is the precision and absoluteness with which Evangelium Vitae states key moral norms concerning the taking of human life. John Paul II categorically condemns every species of murder in a particularly solemn phrase: “By the authority which Christ conferred upon Peter and his Successors, and in communion with the Bishops of the Catholic Church, I confirm that direct and voluntary killing of an innocent human being is always gravely immoral. This doctrine, based upon that unwritten law which man, in the light of reason, finds in his own heart (cf. Rom 2: 14-15), is reaffirmed by Sacred Scripture, transmitted by the Tradition of the Church and taught by the ordinary and universal Magisterium.” 19 In supporting his position, the Pope clearly draws upon the neo-Thomistic theory of intrinsically evil acts and the universality of binding moral norms. “The deliberate decision to deprive an innocent human being of life is always morally evil and can never be licit either as an end in itself or as a means to a good end.” 20

To avoid any ambiguity, John Paul II uses the same precise legal language to condemn the practices of abortion and euthanasia. He censures abortion as follows: “By the authority which Christ conferred upon Peter and his Successors, in communion with the Bishops who on various occasions have condemned abortion and...have shown unanimous agreement concerning this doctrine - I declare that direct abortion, that is, abortion willed as an end or as a means, always constitutes a grave moral disorder, since it is the deliberate killing of an innocent human being. This doctrine is based upon the natural law and upon the written word of God, is transmitted by the Church’s Tradition and taught by the ordinary and universal Magisterium.” 21 Similarly, he condemns euthanasia: “In communion with the bishops of the Catholic Church, I confirm that euthanasia is a grave violation of the law of God, since it is the deliberate and morally unacceptable killing of a human person. This doctrine is based upon the written word of God, is transmitted by the Church’s Tradition and taught by the ordinary and universal Magisterium.” 22

These formulae of censure bear their own neo-Thomistic pedigree. The censured acts are defined with legal precision. John Paul II does not condemn all homicide. He condemns only the direct and voluntary killing of the innocent. Each of these qualifying terms has a long and complicated history in Thomistic casuistry. Similarly, it is only direct abortion that is condemned, and earlier in the encyclical the Pope clearly distinguished true euthanasia from heroic measures to prolong life, which he judged non-obligatory. These formulae also link reason and ecclesial authority in a manner typical of the neo-Thomist manuals. In theory, human reason alone can discover general and specific moral norms; in practice, however, given the concupiscent state of humanity, the Magisterium of the church has the right and the duty to draw humanity to respect for these norms by the exercise of its authority.

If these two seminal encyclicals on moral controversies richly illustrate both the phenomenological and Thomistic strands of John Paul II’s operative philosophy, they indicate the problem of finding a unified philosophical approach in John Paul II’s major writings. Rather than complementing or building on each other, these two approaches often appear simply juxtaposed
to each other. As many critics have argued, some major encyclicals appear to have several authors. In one section, the phenomenologist devotes himself to the leisurely description of the moral essences of a biblical narrative as he evokes the ethical attitudes of humanity and the moral implications of the various mysteries of Christ. The atmosphere is poetic, intuitive, ruminative. In the other section, the Thomistic lawyer lays down crisp definitions of terms, precise legal arguments for the correct position, and blunt dissections of erroneous positions. We are in a courtroom and there is no question who is winning the case. Despite differences in pedigree and style, however, the phenomenological and Thomistic strands in John Paul II’s philosophy serve a common anthropological project - the defense of the besieged human person in contemporary society - by showing that the person cannot be reduced to a material phenomenon and cannot be used a means toward a putative social end. The phenomenologist does this by insisting that every act of the person must be seen in a deeper context than the physical, economic, or historical. As the spiritual, metaphysical, and theological levels of the person’s action are unveiled, the transcendence of the person gradually imposes itself. With his emphasis on the objectivity of the moral act, the Thomistic moralist insists that no intention and no hoped-for consequence can justify the performance of an intrinsically evil act. The human person is transcendent here inasmuch as the basic goods of the human person remain inviolate.

RESERVATIONS REGARDING THE PHILOSOPHICAL ENTERPRISE

If the major writings of John Paul II manifest his debt to phenomenological and Thomistic philosophy, they also indicate his reservations concerning the scope and even the legitimacy of the philosophical enterprise. Less recognized in the Pope’s writings are passages where he addresses the limits and even the vices of the philosophical quest. The encyclical _Fides et Ratio_ (1998) witnesses his reservations concerning the pretensions of philosophical reason. The critique of philosophy pivots around the question of the suffering of the innocent and the mystery of the cross.

Upon its release in 1998, _Fides et Ratio_ was hailed as a _magna carta_ for the Christian practice of philosophy. It defends the capacity of reason to know certain basic logical and moral principles. It defends the science of metaphysics in its capacity to penetrate to being itself and not to limit itself to the mere appearances of being or subjective opinions concerning being. At length it celebrates Saint Thomas Aquinas as the model of the authentic Christian philosopher. In numerous passages, however, the encyclical provides a darker portrait of the philosophical enterprise and cautions against its more dangerous illusions.

John Paul II repeatedly warns that philosophy must recognize the mysterious nature of the reality it probes. Especially in terms of the mystery of God, philosophy must guard against a rationalistic and illusory reduction of mystery into a set of problems resolvable by human reason alone. “Our
vision of the face of God is always fragmentary and impaired by the limits of our understanding. Faith alone makes it possible to penetrate the mystery in a way that allows us to understand it coherently.\textsuperscript{25}

In its tendency to provide a global rational explanation of all phenomena, philosophy carries within it the typical vice of pride. John Paul II praises those Christian philosophers who have countered this pride by recognizing the radical limits of human reason and by insisting on the necessity of the truths of revelation to provide light for the central problems of philosophy itself. “As a theological virtue, faith liberates reason from presumption, the typical temptation of the philosopher. Saint Paul, the Fathers of the Church and, closer to our own time, philosophers such as Pascal and Kierkegaard reproached such presumption. The philosopher who learns humility will also find courage to tackle questions which are difficult to resolve if the data of Revelation are ignored - for example, the problem of evil and suffering, the personal nature of God and the question of the meaning of life, or more directly, the radical metaphysical question, ‘Why is there something rather than nothing?’\textsuperscript{26} Strikingly, the Christian anti-philosophers Pascal and Kierkegaard, severe in their critique of rationalism, emerge as the models of a properly chastened Christian philosophy.

Among the opaque mysteries of human existence that cannot be resolved by philosophical analysis is the problem of evil, especially the scandal of moral evil. “The problem of moral evil - the most tragic of evil’s forms - is also addressed in the Bible, which tells us that such evil stems not from any material deficiency, but is a wound inflicted by the disordered exercise of human freedom. In the end, the word of God poses the problem of the meaning of life and proffers its response in directing the human being to Jesus Christ, the Incarnate Word of God, who is the perfect realization of human existence.”\textsuperscript{27} In an earlier work, Salvifici Doloris (1984), John Paul II had criticized the pretensions of philosophical theodicy to justify God’s goodness in the face of the suffering of the innocent.\textsuperscript{28} It is only in the cross that the depth of both human evil and of God’s mercy receive their fullest manifestation. Rather than explaining evil or explaining away the scandal of the suffering of the innocent, the cross reveals the depth of divine love and frees the disciple to face the suffering other in a posture of charity.

Especially striking in Fides et Ratio is the opposition between the wisdom of the world and the wisdom of the cross studied by the Pope in Chapter 2. The cross stands in judgment on all the philosophical systems of the world by manifesting a redeeming love which human reason can neither deduce nor create by its philosophical reflection.

The wisdom of the Cross, therefore, breaks free of all cultural limitations which seek to contain it and insists upon an openness to the universality of the truth which it bears. What a challenge this is to our reason, and how great the gain for reason if it yields to this wisdom! Of itself, philosophy is able to recognize the human being’s ceaselessly self-transcendent
orientation towards the truth; and, with the assistance of faith, it is capable of accepting the ‘foolishness’ of the Cross as the authentic critique of those who delude themselves that they possess the truth, when in fact they run it aground on the shoals of a system of their own devising. The preaching of Christ crucified and risen is the reef upon which the link between faith and philosophy can break up…

The passage frankly recognizes that rather than acting as a prelude or a complement to revelation, philosophy can act as its opponent, especially when philosophy understands itself as a self-contained system capable of universal explanation, rather than as a humble quest for truth cognizant of the fragility of its own instruments.

Yet these sober cautions against the pretensions of the philosophical enterprise represent more than the traditional Catholic subordination of philosophy to theology as its handmaiden, or the subordination of nature to supernature. They reflect the central anthropological concerns of John Paul II. When philosophy hardens into a self-enclosed system, the uniqueness of the human person vanishes. The mystery of the human person, as well as the greater and foundational mystery of God, is no longer recognized. Such a systematic philosophy ignores the scandal of the suffering of the innocent or, worse, explains it away as the necessary byproduct of larger structural conflicts. If such a dismissal of the mystery of the human person or the depth of the suffering of the innocent always represents a betrayal of the real by philosophy, it is especially dangerous, as John Paul II frequently reminds his readers, in contemporary society where the annihilation of millions of innocent human beings has become a routine matter. Anti-philosophers like Pascal, and, on occasion, Wojtyla, reprimand philosophy for its characteristic pride and appeal to the mystery of the cross, not simply to witness to a fuller truth concerning God but also to witness to the mystery of freedom, sin, and redemption that reside at the heart of the human person, who is the origin and the central object of the philosophical quest itself.

NOTES


2 Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. (1877-1964) was a leading Thomist theologian at the Angelicum University in Rome. A staunch defender of traditional Thomist positions against certain theories of the *nouvelle théologie*. Garrigou-Lagrange devoted much of his published research to the
theology of the spiritual life. His *Christian Perfection and Contemplation according to St. Thomas Aquinas and St. John of the Cross* (1923) was especially influential. He served as Karol Wojtyla’s mentor for the latter’s theological dissertation on John of the Cross’s concept of faith (1948).

3 A prominent member of the Munich Circle of Phenomenology, Max Scheler (1874-1928) influenced phenomenological thought, especially in Catholic circles, on anthropological issues of value and sentiment. Wojtyla wrote his philosophical dissertation on *Evaluation of the Possibility of building a Catholic Ethics on the Ethical System of Max Scheler* (1953). Although Wojtyla was clearly influenced by Scheler, he also maintained a clear distance from certain of Scheler’s theses. For a discussion of this distance, see John H. Nota, “Max Scheler and Karol Wojtyla,” *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, vol. 60, 1986, 135-147.


5 *Veritatis Splendor*, 7.


11 *Evangelium Vitae*, 7.
13 *Loc. cit.*
14 *Evangelium Vitae*, 10.
20 *Loc. cit.*


26 *Ibid.*, 76.

28 See John Paul II, *Salvifici Doloris* (1984), www.vatican.va/holy-

29 *Fides et Ratio*, 23.
Chapter 2

Pope John Paul II’s ‘Participation’ in the ‘Neighborhood’ of Phenomenology

Peter Costello

In the seventh and final chapter of The Acting Person entitled “Intersubjectivity by Participation,” Karol Wojtyla investigates the experience of human action for what it reveals about the human person and the person’s relationships to other people. Drawing initially on the notion of intersubjectivity as described by Edmund Husserl, Wojtyla moves toward what he claims is a fuller, not merely cognitive grasp of the way in which the person acts with others through describing his own notion of ‘participation.’ It is this notion of participation, which forces people to acknowledge that they are fundamentally neighbors, which I would like to consider in this paper.

The paper has three parts. First, I will attempt to describe the notions of participation and neighbor as Wojtyla understands them. Second, I will briefly summarize Husserl’s descriptions of intersubjectivity and essential intuition, which I think Wojtyla misreads. And finally, I will clarify how Wojtyla’s concepts of participation and neighbor presuppose and rely upon these Husserlian terms. In short, though Wojtyla says explicitly that it was never his aim “to build a theory of the person as a being, to develop a metaphysical conception of man,” I will argue that it is only because his and Husserl’s phenomenological analyses both lead to the manifestation of certain ontological structures of humanness that the notions of participation and neighbors can be possible descriptive tools for the experience of human action and human personhood.1

PARTICIPATION AND NEIGHBORS

For Wojtyla, the person and the action that the person performs are correlatives. Like Husserl’s noema and noesis, “the person and his action are two poles: each strictly corresponds to the other; each displays and explains the other from its point of view.”2 This correlation is visible concretely even in this current situation: on the one hand, my delivery of the content of this paper reveals more to you about who I am and how I understand the Pope’s book. On the other hand, again as I read the paper aloud, who I am, the way I accentuate and pause, gives you to understand this material in a particular way. The paper reveals me; I reveal the paper. The two poles or two ‘points of view’ are correlates; that is, they are so intertwined that it is often hard to separate them.

This correlation between action and person is not, however, the same throughout the course of the experience. Rather, the correlation is “dynamic.”
Who I already am is revealed in the delivery of the paper, but who I am also changes or becomes concrete in that delivery, too. The action changes me. Even now I become the person who makes this delivery. Before, I had not been that person. Moreover, as I read out this paper, its meaning, the action of delivering that I had practiced in the mirror or in front of my friend, also changes in the course of its very enactment. Neither the person nor the action is simply given beforehand. Rather, their correlative relationship is realized and furthered in the very event of acting itself. Action as such then is always an upsurge of implicit meaning into new and explicit view, always the source of change as much as of simple explication.

This structure of the dynamic correlation of person and action, Wojtyla argues, is fundamental to any human. In fact it is “only on the basis of this fundamental relation [that] any fact of acting together with other people [can] assume its appropriate human significance.” Another way of saying the same thing is this: it is because each human person is always already this correlation within herself or himself, as a kind of transcendental actor before beginning to act in the world, that any of her concrete actions become possible. And likewise, it is because each person is always already a self-sustaining correlation of person and action that the relation of intersubjectivity or community is possible: “their social or communal nature is rooted in the nature of the person and not vice versa.”

This dynamic correlation of person and action that is in each case my own, this a priori structure that resides in my individual subjectivity, does not mean, however, that we are not always already intersubjective. Rather, by claiming that communal nature is rooted in the nature of the person, Wojtyla wants to call attention to the fact that this structure of correlation of act and person does not really begin in time, does not really begin after recognizing particular people, you and you, in the world. Instead, the way in which each of us is always already a person, an I, is as primordial as the “universal occurrence” of acting with others. Our own structures and our intersection with other persons are equiprimordial and intertwine in action.

Action thus requires two transcendental structures: on the one hand, action could not happen if its correlation with my personhood were not always already fleshed out in me prior to my becoming a member of a family, a profession, a state, a religion. On the other hand, action could not bring to notice that correlation that I am without my also always already being in connection with others, without my having ways of, and motivations for, demonstrating that correlation anew.

We can further the example of giving a paper with this intersubjectivity in mind: we entered this room today with all sorts of judgments ready to hand for a conference presentation such as this. But we need to see the presentation unfold in order to use those judgments well. We were looking, from our very entrance together, for a kind of style within the correlation of person to action. Will she present the material in such a way as to allow me to focus clearly on the material? Or will he end up reading and writing in such a way as to make the object, the material, disappear in favor of himself? What will the
correlation divulge - this question can only be answered within the action itself and within what Wojtyla calls our participation in the action (i.e., in this case the listening, reading, and questioning).

For Wojtyla, the correlation between action and person is shared when we participate. For him participation is not simply “having a share or a part in something.” Rather, participation is the kind of transcendence and integration that each of us displays in action with others. We transcend ourselves, we display who we are even when we bypass our own concerns in favor of the group. We show more than we realize as we read or listen, even as we merely sit with a particular kind of posture. But we do not just transcend. We also integrate; we make sense of what is shared, we take in the realm of action - both our own and the action of, say, a conference as a whole - and take a stand on how it matters (or does not matter) to us. This double movement of transcendence and integration that participation involves, however, means that the human person is fundamentally one that retains two competing meanings, two structures in tension with one another.

Participation, in other words, is the way one “retains in this acting the personalistic value of his own action and at the same time shares in the realization and the results of the communal acting.” We participate, that is, when we retain ourselves and the community simultaneously. We participate when we not only transcend the act of our own reading but also allow the community to respond. We participate when we also integrate their challenge or response to our reading.

As I read this paper, I am aware that I ought to leave time in order to let you comment at the end, to show how you take the Pope’s work or mine. Only with you can I gather more of what it means to speak of participation and neighbors. And I can do that kind of making room for you well or badly. I can do it suspiciously, nervously, or with a kind of secure, careful and vulnerable openness.

This, my awareness of the different possible attitudes of participation, is important since it notes that, even though participation is given as a structural reality and possibility, even though it is given as a kind of ontological fact, this does not mean that we cannot pervert it. We can participate, in short, in authentic and inauthentic ways. For Wojtyla, individualism and totalism are the inauthentic ways that we pretend to participate, that we subvert our ability to hold onto ourselves and the community at the same time. In individualism, we claim that the community has no reality at all, that it is only my own correlation of person and action that matters. In totalism, we claim that the correlation between person and action is only given by relinquishing my claims to independent confirmation of the meaning that is reflected in the community. Either way we are inauthentic, do not really participate in shared action, and do real injustice to the structure of human action as such.

Though he also writes about how individualism fails, Wojtyla sees, I would argue, that the greater danger to authentic intersubjectivity is that of totalism. Wojtyla works to overcome that by noting that the community is not itself another subject. Rather, the community has a “quasi-subjectiveness,”
and it is the “person who is always its proper subject.” Remaining aware of the fact that the community’s subjectivity is a quasi-subjectivity is possible when we see that it is not simply the goal or the aim of communal action that defines the community.

It is not, for example, the end goal of social wealth that defines the community that is the United States of America. Rather, equally important is “the subjective moment” of shared action, the recognition that each of us chooses some good (in this case, wealth) “as his own good and as the end of his own striving.” The way we overcome totalism is to pay attention to the ways in which people show themselves within this shared project, on the way to this shared goal. Currently, we tend to shut down the way that the poor, for example, are forced into a real passivity as we move towards greater social wealth. We tend to ignore the subjective moments of our individual accession into a shared process. But the fact that the poor, in this example, cannot themselves gain a better purchase on their situation, cannot grow in their awareness of social and economic forces and their own lives, shows that in Wojtyla’s sense, economic participation is not offered or even possible in any authentic way for many of the citizens in our nation as it stands now.

Participation, for Wojtyla, truly exists only when it is visible. Participation in communal action must be lived out in each person’s action – and each person involved must show herself or himself to be willingly involved and self-determining within that shared action. Participation, in other words, is only when it is as visible as the eagerness on the faces of the children that Jesus says to allow to come to Him. The subjective moment, the striving and self-recognition that communal acts that are participatory foster, are part of our phenomenological awareness. The despair and alienation that is on the faces of the poor, for example, are not just parts of the urban or rural landscape. Their alienation demonstrates in their faces the fundamental problem that we have yet to face squarely – namely, that participation is not occurring in some communities in the way that our ontological structure as human actors requires. Wojtyla summarizes this problem as follows: “Within the sphere of acting, just as within the sphere of existing, a community may remain at the objective level and never pass to the subjective level.” There is urgency here: how do we make our community become explicit for itself as a community of involved, engaged subjects? How do we allow all the members of a community to show themselves within and transcend themselves toward their action with us?

To these questions, Wojtyla offers an answer: the way that community can recognize both the objective and subjective moments of action is by getting a handle on the common good. In Wojtyla’s discussion, the common good “consists in that which conditions and somehow initiates in the persons acting together their participation, and thereby develops and shapes in them a subjective community of acting.” In other words, the common good is not given in advance to us as crystal clear, as fully developed. No. Rather, since the point of humanness is to act, to develop and become clearer about what our lives mean and about what our actions together mean, then the common
good ‘develops and shapes’ us. The common good is something fundamentally manifest and yet also fundamentally requiring further description. This given but yet-to-be explicated good is our condition of community, but it is a mysterious condition, since it initiates this community “somehow,” we know not how. It ‘somehow initiates’ participation; therefore, it becomes clear that even the common good itself (and not simply the person) is not given in advance to us in all its attendant meanings. We discover it, just as we discover the meaning of a Scriptural text or the meaning of our own relationships, i.e., hermeneutically, or by interacting with established tradition and blending our voices as one with others’.

When we get participation right, we are in ‘solidarity.’ Solidarity is the way in which our participation, our acting together as self-determining persons, “furthers [the common good’s] realization.” Solidarity “prevents trespass upon other people’s obligations and duties.”\(^{12}\) In other words, solidarity answers to the demands of subsidiarity. And yet this solidarity too can sometimes require the very overturning of subsidiarity: “Nevertheless there are situations in social and individual life that make [taking over a part of the duties and obligations that are not mine] necessary. In such a situation, to keep strictly to one’s own share would mean, in fact, lack of solidarity.”\(^{13}\) Participation, in other words, must reflect a kind of willingness to show solidarity with others, respecting their rights and obligations whenever possible, but participation must always take as a higher principle the phenomenological meaning of “complementarity” as given within the notion of communal action itself: “every member of a community has to be ready to ‘complement’ by his action what is done by the other members of the community. This mutual complementariness is in a way an intrinsic element in the very nature of participation.”\(^ {14}\) Complementarity in other words is the very heart of participation and the very fire of solidarity.

As Wojtyla moves through his description of the authentic attitudes that participation embraces, another attitude stands out as complementary to that of solidarity - the attitude of opposition. Participation is not simply the submergence of differences in favor of a community. That would be too much like totalism. Instead, participation must make possible, Wojtyla argues, the attitude of opposition at least in so far as opposition “aims at more adequate understanding and, to an even greater degree, the means employed to achieve the common good, especially from the point of view of the possibility of participation.”\(^{15}\) Wojtyla may have had in mind the movement within Poland when he was writing this, but the fact remains that such a development in his thought might also explain, for example, why he wagged his finger at the liberation theologians in Latin America, but did not excommunicate them wholesale from the Church.

Opposition is a possibility expressed within the essence of communal action. It is a necessary possibility given the fact that there is a simultaneous holding together of self and other, of one’s personal transcendence and the integration of other people’s transcendences. Moreover, it is only with the possibility of opposition that the common good can be fully described: “We
thus see that the common good has to be conceived of dynamically and not statically.”

Solidarity and opposition are thus two equally important authentic attitudes toward shared action, two attitudes of participation. However, what governs both of these is what Wojtyla calls “the righteous conscience.”

Without conscience guiding participation, solidarity may devolve into conformism; without conscience, opposition might descend into non-involvement. For Wojtyla, such passivity and withdrawal, conformism and non-involvement, are not what he considers participation and are certainly not choices a human person may legitimately and conscientiously make. Such choices work against the very nature of the person, against the very structure of action, and as such shut down the very realm of meaning and explication that is given as our task.

If coming to discover the meaning of what is given in the human person is in fact the task of that person, then the shutting down or covering over of meaning is in itself wrong. People must act and must act together. They must wrestle with a tradition and a future that is not given once and for all in all attendant meanings. Some of this wrestling may take the form of a conflict, an argument, a struggle. But such forms can be liberating. Within the attitude of opposition, people can and must continue to map out the common good through the very participation, the very opposition that they know to have been initiated by that common good. To whom much is given, Wojtyla seems to say, much remains to be explicatd.

But how do we gain the ability to determine what counts as legitimate solidarity or opposition? What hope is there for our ability to act together in the proper ways, ways that unfold who each one of us is, who we are as community, and the good that we strive for within the very power of action? We can discern authentic participation; we can succeed in our striving to make possible righteous actions, when we recognize that we are all neighbors. True participation for Wojtyla thus requires a certain kind of mutual recognition, a grasp of ourselves as committed to each other before and beyond all particular communities, before and beyond all solidarity and opposition.

What is given in human life, within the human person, is not simply a set of particular meanings or particular commitments - this family, that religion, this state. What is given in human life is also not simply a blank, essential slate on which particular personal and communal actions appear. Rather, what is given is also the being of each one of us, oneself and the others, as neighbors. As neighbors, we can enter particular communities and convert from one to another. As neighbors, we are always already bound in concrete ways to each other. The a priori structure of participation, then, is both essential and particular at the same time, just as being a neighbor means that universal and particular claims of justice and ethics are always already within our experience.

Behind each role, each situation, behind being a sister or a brother, a citizen or a member of a congregation, is a relation that we bear to each other
that founds and initiates all of those: “The notion of neighbor is strictly related to man as such and to the value itself of the person regardless of any of his relations to one or another community or to the society at large.” Participation, in other words, is possible – solidarity and opposition are possible – because authenticity is not simply transcendent, not simply about the possibility of action, process, and community. Authenticity is also personal, it is mine - it resides in my very being as a person.

I am authentic, and I act authentically, when I see myself as participating not simply in a family, a Church, a state. I am authentic when I see myself and the others around me as participating in an ongoing, continually unfolding mystery of our very humanness itself: “the person is capable not only of partaking in the life of a community, to be and to act together with others; he is also capable of participating in the very humanness of others. It is in this ability to participate in the humanness of every human being that all types of participation in a community are rooted, it is there that it receives its personal meaning.” To be a neighbor is to be able to move into any particular community because one already shares a common ground. To be a neighbor is to appeal to action as such because to be a neighbor is to appeal to the power of being a person and, more specifically, of witnessing that personhood, that personal being as such.

To be a neighbor is to act on the level of essence at the same time as one acts on the level of particularity. A neighbor acts for all to see, for the neighborhood to witness. To be a neighbor is to be individual and community at the same time and to grasp implicitly the link between action and those persons for whom action is new, interesting, painful, joyful or glorious—to grasp this link as the very meaning of being. It is on the basis of being this simultaneity, this person and community, this actor who can witness, that we can enact this simultaneity of neighborliness to all fellow humans and of membership of particular, limited communities.

Who is my neighbor? The Good Samaritan acted as if the answer were obvious. There was no doubt, no need for inference or analogy. He experienced the wounded person immediately as a neighbor, as immutably connected to him as his very being. The Good Samaritan’s actions were thus called forth not simply by explicating or understanding a meaning (i.e., his duty) but by his always already being a neighbor to that person (i.e., through humanness itself). And yet neighborliness, neighborhood, like the common good, like action as such, like the community as such, like his own personhood, is never given fully beforehand as the being that it is. Being a neighbor must be enacted in order to be understood and maintained as significant. Neighborhood must be witnessed, explicated. ‘Go and do likewise’ is a new command from Jesus - as much as an old one.

In my opinion, Wojtyla puts the link between being and manifestation, between being and action thus: “We have presented in this respect participation as a dynamic enactment of the person. Enactment, which is the person’s essential feature, is manifested in that performance of actions ‘together with others’ in that cooperation and coexistence which simultaneously serves the
fulfillment of that person." Participation as neighborliness must be enacted in order to remain part of our being. Goodness, personhood must be continually that which we move toward in order to claim with any real truth that we ‘are’ good or that we ‘are’ a person.

**HUSSELR ON INTERSUBJECTIVITY AND ESSENTIAL INTUITION**

Wojtyla comments in his notes on this chapter “Intersubjectivity by Participation” that Husserl “stresses primarily the cognitive dimension of intersubjectivity” in works such as the *Fifth Cartesian Meditation*, and that Wojtyla’s own project introduces a non-cognitive notion of participation. Wojtyla seems to imply in this remark and in others that Husserl’s notion of intersubjectivity is not full enough to account for this notion of participation. I would like to argue the contrary. The reason I would like to argue this has little to do with my wanting to prove Wojtyla wrong. Rather, I would like to show how Wojtyla’s arguments are correct. I argue, however, that Wojtyla’s claims are good precisely because Husserl is right about intersubjectivity and essential intuition, because both descriptions in Husserl imply a transcendental subject that is not simply cognitive but also embodied.

When Husserl takes up the experience of another alien person in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, he does so through the discovery of pairing, of a recognition of the most fundamental relation between persons as a relation that always contains a recognition of distance, of the impossibility of full identification.

For Husserl, pairing [*Paarung*] is the way that both oneself and the other experience a mutual reaching toward the other [*übergreifen*] to claim the other as one moment of a shared meaning. Just as to see a pair of dice is to see each die in terms of the other, the paired subjects or consciousnesses each experience his or her lived body [*Leib*] as summoning their consciousnesses into “a living mutual awakening [*Sich-Wecken*] and an overlaying of each [*überschiebendes Sich-Überdecken*] with the objective sense of the other.”

Husserl’s use of the word *Deckung* to describe the ‘overlaying’ or pairing of alien subjects is quite important to understanding the kind of unity between subjects that actually appears. The verb *decken* in German can signify the sexual act, a kind of draping, as one might sing ‘deck the halls,’ or a kind of overlay, as in transparencies placed on top of one another on a classroom projector. The word *Deckung* has often been rendered into English as ‘coincidence,’ but this translation conceals the bodily meaning not only in the word but in the experience of pairing itself as it is described by Husserl in the *Fifth Meditation*. For Husserl, we precisely do not coincide as separate bodies, separate consciousnesses. We do not coincide, since we are not simply abstract minds - we are embodied minds and these bodies always stand at an irreducible distance (or difference, as in the case of our orientations) from one another.

The experience of pairing is both a passive and active synthesis. To
experience the other as awakening me to a pairing with her is to experience myself as passive, as being made aware of the distance between us as something able to be crossed. To experience my ‘overlaying’ the other and the other’s overlaying me is to experience a mutual kind of activity, a kind of bridge that those involved make over their distance. But in both the awakening and the overlaying that I form with the other I have the experience of distance, of an absence, a gap at the heart of our unity, at the heart of our intimacy. Our pairing does not eradicate our individuality even as it surpasses it.

However, to say that there is a gap experienced between the persons that pair together is not to say that community is impossible. On the contrary, the givenness of the relation between persons as a pair is precisely a givenness of togetherness, a community. This pairing opens outward essentially into intersubjectivity, into a we: “In other words, the two [the sense of other’s body for me and the sense of the other’s body for himself] are so fused that they stand within the functional community of one perception.” Persons co-perceive each other, and together (in mutual co-perception) they co-perceive the world as one world and their correlated perceptions as one act of perceiving. It is the ‘functional community of perception’ that permits and encourages the mutual recognition of persons, the alien and the self.

However, such a functional community of perception is not a simple identification of subjectivities without a shared objective life-world, without paired lived bodies. Husserl’s most concise formulation of the functional community of one perception is as follows: one experiences the other person “as if I were standing over there, where the Other’s body [fremden Leibkörperß] is.” In this phrase it becomes clear that the alien noema [fremden Leibkörperß] has imposed the necessity of one’s being involved, of being in relationship. The relationship is neither something external nor an introjection. Rather, the relationship appears as a recognizable unity-through-distance. The “as if I were,” as a kind of subjunctive distance between oneself and the noema of the other person as alien lived body, is not collapsed. Rather, it is always maintained. The unity with others is a unity in which one always has work to do to understand what the situation is, what it has been, what it means for the future. The experience of the relationship is an ecstatic experience of standing outside of oneself, according to simultaneous but different modes of intuition that can always be taken up reflectively. And in this being outside oneself, at least in terms of the sense the other person has for oneself, one is given to oneself as this ego who, despite ecstasy, finds the value and meaning of its own perceptions only within the relationship itself.

It is not only Husserl’s description of Fremderfahrung that Wojtyla misreads, however. Wojtyla claims in an earlier note to his first chapter that “this study does not follow the principles of a strictly eidetic method” since Wojtyla thinks that for Husserl “the essence is distilled and separated from actual existence, so characteristic for Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological epoche.” To my ears, this sounds very much like a misreading of Husserl’s account of essential intuition.

Husserl, in Phenomenological Psychology, Experience and
Judgment, and Analyses of Passive Synthesis describes essential intuition in the same terms as he describes the experience of pairing with an alien. What we find in Husserl’s ongoing use of the terms awakening and overlaying [wecken, decken], I argue, is that it is because we are intersubjective that we are able to see essences. It is because we are always already overreaching, awakening, and overlaying ourselves with all other subjects that we can perform the activities whereby particular changes in our own perspective, particular movements of our own can yield to us the essential functions and intuitions that make experience possible and rich. In other words, it is because we already form a functional community of perception that we can grasp essences, which really are perceptions on behalf of that community. To see essences is to see together.

To put it another way: it is because we experience ourselves as being modifications of one another, as mutually enacting the essence intersubjectivity as our truth that we can generate modifications that point to essences as the objects’ truth. To be able to intuit essences is to participate together, at least in principle, in the formation of a communal object of experience. It is because I take on the perspective of others who are at least possible viewers of the same particular things from other places, from other variations, that together the essence is created in our mutual proximity.

In section 87 entitled “The Method of Essential Seeing” in Experience and Judgment, Husserl is concerned with the role of the pre-predicative sphere in the recognition of essences and their identification as unitary phenomenological objects. In that text, Husserl states that, with the multiplicity of variations that her imagination provides in the process of eidetic variation, the phenomenologist sees the following development:

in this transition [Übergang] from image to image…all the arbitrary particulars attain overlapping coincidence [überschiebender Deckung] in the order of their appearance and enter, in a purely passive way, into a synthetic unity in which they all appear as modifications of one another and then as arbitrary sequences of particulars in which the same universal is isolated as an eidos. Only in this continuous coincidence [Deckung] does something which is the same come to congruence, something which henceforth can be seen purely for itself.

What we notice here is that, in the transition of image to image, there emerges the same kind of motion, namely overlaying, that we ourselves perform with others, the same kind of synthesis that leads to the pairing of persons. Furthermore, it becomes apparent that we can make changes in our current, actual view of a table, for example, and fictively modify its number of legs, its shape, or its color because we are enacting the perspectives of other (possible, subjunctive) persons who would pair with us in seeing the world. We are enacting the others’ lived perspectives and taking them over ‘as if’ in a shared
way, ‘as if we were there.’ We grasp the essence, the universal, in other words, only because we grasp that our entire consciousness is already pulled into a universal pairing, into actual and ongoing encounters with real alien others. We grasp essences because we are participating with others even in the most fundamental acts of intuition of our own consciousness.

**HUSSERL AND WOJTYLA**

Given my reading of Husserl, however, it still remains to be demonstrated what this offers to Wojtyla. It is in this section of the paper that I take up that question.

First, I remarked earlier about the fact that for Wojtyla, simultaneity of self and community, of person and action is of the greatest importance. Early in the seventh chapter of *The Acting Person*, Wojtyla claims that participation requires that the person “retains…the personalistic value of his own action and *at the same time* shares in the realization and the results of communal acting.”

And at the end of the chapter, this notion of simultaneity reappears: “enactment…is manifested in that performance of actions ‘together with others,’ in that cooperation and coexistence which *simultaneously* serves the fulfillment of the person.”

I do not doubt Wojtyla on this point. But how is such simultaneity possible? If this is not simply to be a dogmatic assertion, this capacity should be located in the structure of the human being.

Simultaneity in experience, simultaneity as a *meaning* is possible, I would argue, because there is no real, certainly no radical separation between axiology and ontology, between how the person unfolds her *meaning* through her action and *what* the person *is*. The person discovers phenomenologically that she is given to herself as a body that pairs with others, with every other she is to meet. She experiences herself as embodied, and as such dwells within a public realm in which she is simultaneously herself and overlaid and overlapped by the bodies and persons of others. To perceive the other is immediately to have one’s view of the other matter to that other, to have one’s perspective caught in a web of views. But the fact that her perspectives are caught in that of actually existent others, the fact that the other, like one’s own transcendental ego, does not fall under the guillotine of the phenomenological reduction, means that she experiences her meanings as revealing her being, that she experiences her meanings as *evident* meanings because they unfold what she *is*.

Simultaneity, in other words, is lived constantly as the very state of being a person. The essence of human interaction is pairing, and we never escape from it since this essence is inextricable from our being a transcendental ego. Simultaneity is thus always already occurring, and this structure of human experience is what allows action to manifest its togetherness and distance in particular ways. A family, for example, shows the pairings that happen between parents, between parents and children, in a very different way than a state shows the pairings that occur between citizens. And yet it is in both cases the pairing that underlies ontologically each different type of relation, each
type of community. It is only because we are through and through the kind of being that pairs itself that we could recognize pairs.

What Husserl discovers in his description of pairing, in other words, is not simply a cognitive tool but rather an ontological structure that is enacted in concrete, different ways. Moreover, it is only such an essential structure that is both ontological and axiological that could support not only the notion of simultaneity within participation but the very notion of neighbor. Pairing, as an ontological structure, is not given in advance to us as fully determined in all of its particular unfoldings. We do not know in advance, in other words, everything about how the Church is called to develop in the Spirit. Tradition unfolds slowly, it is true, but not without the permeability to the Spirit that guides its development. To be the Church is not to be devoid of responsibility, not to be released from the paired duality of ontology and axiology that is the very life of the Church.

Wojtyla sees this intertwining of ontology and axiology, this intimacy of being and manifestation, when he claims that the notion of neighbor evinces “the mutual relation and subordination of all men according to their common humanness itself.”34 Such a description relies implicitly on pairing, on the structure of givenness of human persons to one another. We act ‘according to common humanness,’ according to our being. The neighbor is not a category of choice, but an essential necessity that is lived in the very meaning and being of one’s body.

Pairing, as Husserl says, is real and happens in degrees. This essence that is also a claim upon existence, the essence of pairing and the distance between those it constitutes at its heart, is not devoid of the particular occurrences that make it up. The essence of pairing unfolds itself in the particular communities that enact it. The being of pairing is inextricable from its manifestations. Rather, like the way in which our own perspective within the system of perspectives we employ in essential intuition, the essence of pairing, the essence of human relation, only is insofar as it manifests itself in constantly renewing ways. Pairing is not independent of the stances, the perspectives that make it up. Pairing just is particular persons coming to recognize their particularity through their essential interconnectedness.

Let us return, finally, to Wojtyla’s conception of the neighbor and move toward the story in Luke’s Gospel again. For Wojtyla, the discussion of the neighbor is inseparable from the fact that in action our essentiality and our particularity are given together. As he says in his postscript,

the theme of this study has been the person who reveals himself in and through the action, who reveals himself through all the psychosomatic conditionings that are simultaneously his wealth and his limitation….The person who manifests himself through the action, so to speak, permeates and simultaneously encompasses the whole psychosomatic structure of his own subject.35
The human person, in other words, acts with her or his whole body and soul. The person displays and must display everything, all psychosomatic conditionings, in each action. We are on display for ourselves and for each other as we act together. We come home to ourselves, we reflect on ourselves as we negotiate each other, as we build and sustain communities. The person, therefore, in his or her relation to neighbors, in action for those neighbors (for when is one free of acting for the neighbor, when is one ever really acting only for oneself by oneself even if one is alone in a room typing a paper, mourning a dead friend, praying the rosary?) ‘permeates and simultaneously encompasses’ his or her whole structure. My embodiment, in other words, and its involvement in action and participation is grasped as a whole. I encompass myself, am responsible for myself, enact myself with my body that I live and permeate. But I do so only insofar as I open my embodiment to others, pair with them. The gift of being a neighbor is the gift of self-governance and self-possession as much as it is the gift of being broken open to that other. Self-governance and self-sacrifice go hand in hand.

In the end, Wojtyła is not wrong in his phenomenology of action. He is not wrong in talking about the correlation of action and person. He is not wrong in speaking of participation as the main structure of simultaneous self-integration and self-transcendence toward the common good. Where he is wrong is only in thinking that his description of action did not both call for, and reveal, the metaphysical structure of human persons. We participate because we are always already given together, co-participants in the functional community of one perception. It is because we are simultaneity that we can take it up in particular ways.

To be a neighbor is, like the Samaritan, to realize that communities, and divisions such as those between communities, between Jews and Samaritans, do not have the ultimate say. What simultaneously transcends and grounds a community is the fact that along the road a wounded person pairs immediately and simultaneously with our own. The enactment of compassion, of love, is the recognition that the ‘neighborhood’ that is simultaneously my own and that of the other can overcome alienation, that goodness, common goodness, is an inherent possibility of our ontological structure.

The Good Samaritan did not consider himself as a Samaritan when he picked up the injured. He did not feel called in that way. Rather, he experienced himself as neighbor, as simultaneously the one in the ditch and the one walking past. And, as he gives his money to the innkeeper, this action demonstrates his personhood as such, as neighbor, and his neighborliness transcends him toward the others who witness. The innkeeper too, just as the audience to Jesus’ story, is made to recognize something not only about the Samaritan but about himself. Action permeates all who view it, all who participate. Action claims our already existent simultaneity in the form of witnessing. Action claims our very being in our recognition of its all-permeating meaning.

To be a witness is to have to recognize that one is there too. To walk by as if one did not witness is to refuse more than a possible action, it is to refuse to acknowledge our pairing, our being, and this is why such
ignoring is a sin. It is a moving from being to non-being. Indeed, this is why Wojtyła’s book is so important. By articulating participation in the way he does, Wojtyła shows that participation, real action together, is not simply the province of Jesus and the Samaritan. Rather, by virtue of action’s inherent intersubjectivity, participation enacts a claim on all who share in it by virtue of their neighborhood, by virtue of their being human and, as Edith Stein understood, having to act. In witnessing, as in acting, we must be what we behold. Whether that ‘must’ is obeyed depends on the communities we form and the way that witnessing is enacted.

NOTES

2 Ibid., 261.
3 Ibid., 263.
4 Loc.cit..
5 Ibid., 268.
6 Ibid., 269.
7 Ibid., 277.
8 Ibid., 280.
9 Ibid., 281.
10 Loc.cit..
11 Ibid., 283.
12 Ibid., 285.
13 Ibid., 286.
14 Ibid., 287.
15 Ibid., 288.
16 Ibid., 293.
17 Ibid., 294.
18 Ibid., 295.
19 Ibid., 296.
20 Ibid., 297.
21 Ibid., 315, note 75.
22 I am interested in the kind of solidarity and opposition that Paul Muscari represents. Muscari disagrees fundamentally with Wojtyła’s description of human consciousness in Muscari’s “On Human Nature: A Look at the Subject from Karol Wojtyła’s The Acting Person.” The non-conscious processes that are part of experience cause Wojtyła problems, according to Muscari: “if we are to respect Wojtyła’s plea for the integrity of the person then we must come to realize that the designs and purposes, feelings and experiences that run in the individual are components or subsystems of a more primitive self.” (Muscari, 24) However, I think that with a reinvigorated Husserlian notion of passive synthesis and intersubjectivity Wojtyła and Muscari can find more common ground than Muscari discovered. That ‘more primitive self’ sounds to me like a version or aspect of the transcendental ego...

23 This argument, using Husserl to help Wojtyla, works against other commentators, most notably Hans Köchler, who in “The Phenomenology of Karol Wojtyla” argues that Husserl “founds empirical on pure consciousness” while Wojtyla “holds that consciousness be not of an intentional nature, but that it consists rather in the mirroring of the processes occurring within the acting person” (Köchler, 328). As I read Husserl, consciousness and its embodiment and its relation with action are all reflected in transcendental subjectivity and essences. I do not see that Wojtyla has left the Husserlian neighborhood as much as Köchler does. See Hans Köchler, "The Phenomenology of Karol Wojtyla. On the Problem of the Phenomenological Foundation of Anthropology," in: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 42 (1982), 326-334.

24 My argument here about Husserl’s description of pairing and the use of the concept Deckung is forthcoming in my article “Towards a Phenomenology of Reading: Poulet, Husserl, and Woolf” in the upcoming volume of Analecta Husserliana. I reproduce those claims in an abbreviated form here. I find it interesting that this rather simple re-interpretation of Husserl’s terminology has implications for not only the phenomenology of reading a text but also the phenomenology of participation as Wojtyla understands it.

26 Ibid., 123.
31 Husserl, Experience and Judgment, 343 (my emphasis).
33 Ibid., 294-295.
34 Ibid., 296.
35 Ibid., 300.
Chapter 3

The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyła/Pope John Paul II, with Emphasis on His Indebtedness to Max Scheler

Peter J. Colosi

In a way, his [Pope John Paul II’s] undisputed contribution to Christian thought can be understood as a profound meditation on the person. He enriched and expanded the concept in his encyclicals and other writings. These texts represent a patrimony to be received, collected and assimilated with care.¹ - Pope Benedict XVI

INTRODUCTION

Throughout the writings of Karol Wojtyła, both before and after he became Pope John Paul II, one finds expressions of gratitude and indebtedness to the philosopher Max Scheler. It is also well known that in his Habilitationsschrift,² Wojtyła concluded that Max Scheler’s ethical system cannot cohere with Christian ethics. This state of affairs gives rise to the question: which of the ideas of Scheler did Wojtyła embrace and which did he reject? And also, what was Wojtyła’s overall attitude towards and assessment of Scheler?

A look through all the works of Wojtyła reveals numerous expressions of gratitude to Scheler for philosophical insights which Wojtyła embraced and built upon, among them this explanation of his sources for The Acting Person,

Granted the author’s acquaintance with traditional Aristotelian thought, it is however the work of Max Scheler that has been a major influence upon his reflection. In my overall conception of the person envisaged through the mechanisms of his operative systems and their variations, as presented here, may indeed be seen the Schelerian foundation studied in my previous work.³

I have listed many further examples in the appendix to this paper. It must, however, also be clearly stated that there are ideas in Scheler which Wojtyła rejected as false, for example, Scheler’s thesis that moral obligation dissolves when a person reaches the heights of love.⁴

In general, after looking through the texts where Wojtyła mentions Scheler or has clearly absorbed and/or developed his thought, it becomes
clear that his overall attitude is one of respect for a master from whom he learned much. And this fact is not contradicted by noting that he also rejected forcefully certain errors he perceived in Scheler’s thought. A thorough cataloguing of the Schelerian theses embraced by Wojtyła would be a helpful addition to scholarship on both authors. I have indicated some directions in which that work could proceed in my appendix, and some readers may wish to look there first.

My main goal here, however, will be to focus on one single theme in Scheler that Wojtyła embraced. That theme is the uniqueness of persons. I will begin by first pointing to a distinction between two dimensions of the being of persons which are the sources of their worth: their rational nature and their uniqueness. Then I will cite some texts of Wojtyła in which it becomes clear that he embraced the idea of the uniqueness of persons. My idea is not that Wojtyła wrote an explicit philosophical development of Scheler’s individual value essence. Rather, I mean to show that Scheler’s development of individual persons and love between persons so impressed itself on Wojtyła that it is expressed in striking ways in many of his writings and also when he describes his encounters with people.5

I base this conclusion on two premises. The first is the idea that personal uniqueness is a real dimension of personal being and a deep source of the dignity of persons, and thus a dimension of which a man whose life was spent meeting and serving people would have been keenly aware. Though often neglected in philosophy, two authors have developed this dimension in philosophically original ways: Max Scheler and John F. Crosby. One of my goals will be to express this aspect of persons. I will then point out that Wojtyła reveals a profound awareness of personal uniqueness in his pastoral and theological writings and in some metaphysical assertions in his philosophical texts, even if it was not a primary theme. My second premise is that if one author deeply absorbs another, this influence is lasting and can be detected in many ways. In Scheler’s thought the uniqueness of persons is a primary theme (though, as I shall show, he uses different terminology for “uniqueness”), and Wojtyła did deeply absorb Scheler’s thought. George Weigel has provided insightful and thorough historical evidence of the lasting influence of Scheler on Wojtyła.6 After discussing these premises, I will proceed to confront a Thomistic-based objection that was raised when I presented this paper. To conclude I will present an application to foundational ethical questions in the sphere of current debates in health care and bio-ethics. This last section will entail a consideration of the role of the affective sphere in gaining ethical knowledge, and suggest a Schelerian/Wojtylian contribution to this field of contemporary ethical debate.

RATIONAL NATURE AS A SOURCE OF THE WORTH OF PERSONS

Much of Western philosophy elevates human beings above all other entities that inhabit the earth. This lofty worth is presented as the foundation
of moral laws that forbid the violation of human beings, such as using them in various ways as if they were mere means to some end. Western philosophy has maintained that the metaphysical basis for this superior worth which grounds those laws is the rational nature of human beings: any being possessing a rational nature is deemed to be worthy of absolute respect. The exact nature of the rationality possessed by humans differs somewhat among the philosophers who have defended it, but perhaps a few key features could be identified. A rational nature includes the ability to transcend oneself in such a way as to relate meaningfully to the whole world; we perform these acts of self-transcendence through our intellect, will, and affections. Thus, of the beings on earth, only fellow humans can follow a lecture, make judgments about it and ask questions after it. Only humans participate in the moral life by bringing into being actions and states of soul that can be called morally good or evil, and only human beings can be moved and then respond with the deepest of emotions to, for example, beautiful works of art and nature. Animals cannot engage in discussion, they cannot be said to be morally virtuous or vicious and they do not have an aesthetic perception of the beauty of a sunset. Any being with these capabilities reveals itself to possess a rational nature, and is thus deemed to hold a higher rank than beings which lack these capabilities.

Another dimension of this account of the worth of persons that runs through the Western tradition is based on the Aristotelian distinctions of substance/accident and potency/act. Based on these distinctions is the view that a human being in a state of dreamless sleep retains in actual being its immaterial soul, along with its intellectual, volitional and affective faculties, while retaining consciousness in potency only. Not only does this line of thought maintain that humans in dreamless sleep still have their souls, but so do other living humans in various states of diminished/non-consciousness.

I think that Western philosophy is correct in its assertion that such a rational nature raises the worth of being to a level that grounds exceptionless moral norms to respect that being, and that Western philosophy has produced an accurate philosophical account of many features of that rational nature.

WOJTYŁA’S INDEBTEDNESS TO SCHELER’S PERSONALISM ABOVE ALL OTHER FORMS OF PERSONALISM

In the texts in the appendix, and in ones that will follow shortly, when Wojtyła speaks of his indebtedness to personalism, he either mentions only Scheler by name, or gives a list of names and always puts Scheler’s first. One might then be led to think that Wojtyła was drawn to some philosophical insights in Scheler which were not present in the other personalists. Indeed, there is more than one such idea, and the individuality of persons (what I am calling their “uniqueness”) is certainly a significant one. John Crosby has recently shown that none of the personalists who write about individuality mean by it what Scheler meant:

Scheler does not posit the antithesis of “person” and
“individual” that is found in many personalist authors, such as Maritain, Mournier, and (even if he is not usually reckoned to the personalists) Hans Urs von Balthasar. Maritain lets “individual” express the material extensive aspect of man, with the result that “person” expresses the spiritual aspect of man.11 Mounier lets “individual” express a meaning more distinctly moral, namely the grasping, acquisitive, self-assertive side of man, with the result that “person” expresses the generous self-giving side of man.12 Von Balthasar lets “individual” express man as an instance of human nature, with the result that “person” expresses man as incommunicable, unrepeatable.13 But in each case “individual” forms some kind of antithesis to “person” and it expresses something lower in human beings, something in contrast to what is highest and best in them, which receives the designation “person.” Now, as usual as this antithesis is among personalist authors, Scheler knows nothing of it: individuality for him is nothing but an aspect of personhood. When he entitles a section of his Formalismus “Person und Individuum,” he means to suggest no least antithesis; on the contrary, “Individuum” expresses for him the very heart of “Person.”14

Three questions arise from this reading. What exactly does it mean to assert that individuum is the very heart of person? Exactly how does one express the meaning of this view as distinct from all other personalists? Can it be seen from his writings that Wojtyła picked up on and embraced exactly this Schelerian understanding of personal individuality?

THE UNIQUENESS OF PERSONS15

I devote my very rare free moments to a work that is close to my heart and devoted to the metaphysical sense and mystery of the person. It seems to me that the debate today is being played on that level. The evil of our times consists in the first place in a kind of degradation, indeed a pulverization, of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person. This evil is even much more of the metaphysical order than of the moral order. To this disintegration, planned at times by atheistic ideologies, we must oppose, rather than sterile polemics, a kind of “recapitulation” of the inviolable mystery of the person. I firmly believe that the truths attacked compel with more urgency the recognition of those who are often the involuntary victims of it…16

This text of Wojtyła reveals his absorption of the idea of individual
persons from Scheler, and I will draw on it throughout the discussion which follows.

I would like to begin to answer the questions posed at the end of the last section by presenting a simple two-part definition of philosophy. The first part of philosophy consists in getting a good look at reality, a clear perception of some dimension of reality. Once that is achieved, the second part of philosophy consists in formulating assertions that accurately express that dimension of reality which one has clearly seen. This is what philosophers are supposed to do.

Following this schema, our first approach to the uniqueness of persons will be to notice, as Scheler does, that while this quality can be seen clearly, it is impossible to perform the second part of philosophy on it. That is to say, while one can see and know the uniqueness of another person, there are no words that can be spoken which would capture or express that uniqueness. Since I have just asserted that no words can express the uniqueness which is the main topic of my paper, you may be wondering how I will be able to continue; I am writing words, yet I just said that words cannot express that about which I intend to write.

I will begin, then, by pointing out exactly what this uniqueness is not. I can express using words that outline what the uniqueness is not, and then, by negating the definition thus outlined, lead the reader to see what uniqueness actually is. The uniqueness of persons is often designated by referring to it as their “incommunicability.” For the purposes of this paper the terms “uniqueness” and “incommunicability” may be considered interchangeable. Notice that ‘in-communicable’ is itself a word that points to something by negating its opposite. It functions in the same way that im-mortal does. For whatever reason, we have taken to pointing to “that intensity of life which is so strong that it can never be extinguished” by using a term that literally means “not-dead,” or “not able to be dead.” Incommunicability points to a certain profound dimension of being, uniqueness, with a word that simply means “not-common.” And indeed, Scheler’s definition of the individual value essence of a person is expressly set by him against the notion of a universal essence which is common in the sense that it can be instantiated in more than one exemplar:

It must be noted that the word “incommunicable” looks as though it could mean “unable to be communicated,” however, the incommunicable in persons is that in them which actually makes possible the deepest and most
meaningful forms of communication. For this reason, the choice of the term “incommunicable” could be seen as an unfortunate choice, since it leads so easily to such confusion. Therefore, I would like to give three possible meanings of the term and assert that two of the meanings of “incommunicable” are helpful in bringing us to an awareness of the uniqueness of persons, while the third leads to error:

**Meaning 1:** The incommunicable is that within a person which is *not common*, in the sense that other persons could not have this within their being also. I have a will and an intellect, and so do you, therefore those features are common. But you are unique in your person, and unrepeatable, in a way that no one else can ever be you. This meaning of incommunicable is helpful in understanding personal uniqueness because it gets at the idea of “not-common.”

**Meaning 2:** The incommunicable in persons cannot be expressed in words and sentences. While someone who loves you *is* able to grasp, know and love you in your very uniqueness, they could never utter a sentence which would capture or express that uniqueness. This meaning of incommunicable is also helpful in understanding personal uniqueness, because it gets at a narrow sense of “not able to be communicated,” namely, with words.

**Meaning 3:** The incommunicable is that which is unable to be known by anyone else or communicated to anyone else. This meaning leads straight to error. The mere fact that no words can express the uniqueness of a person whom you love in no way implies that you do not know and love their very uniqueness – it only means that that which you know and love in them is ineffable or unutterable. It would be absurd to conclude that just because words cannot be found to express something you know, that you therefore do not know it. This meaning leads to error because it takes the full and broadest meaning of “communication” and negates its possibility at all in interpersonal relating with respect to personal uniqueness.

As I have already suggested, love is the epistemological vehicle through which we know the uniqueness of others. In the realist phenomenology of Scheler and others, it was thematized that depending on the object known, a different faculty was needed. Thus, for colors, one needed the faculty of sight; for sounds, hearing; for mathematical principles, the intellect; and for values, Scheler would say, feelings. This means that Scheler holds the view that love has a cognitive dimension. Normally one conceives of love as a fullness of feeling welling up in the soul of a lover which is then expressed outwardly as a *response to* the beloved. While this is a correct characterization, love seems also to have a receptive dimension, in which knowledge comes to a person and deepens because of love. One normally thinks of the intellect as the faculty whose primary function it is to cognize reality. Not only the intellect,
however, but also the heart, or the feelings, have a cognitive dimension.\textsuperscript{24} And it is only through loving another person that his or her uniqueness is known or encountered by us. Joshua Miller describes this particular form of affective cognition in the following way:

In the first place, coming to know the unique person is at the same time a gaining of insight into her \textit{individual value essence}. This essence comes to us as a distinct feeling in the heart; the person impresses herself on our heart in a way that no one else does. It also often comes to us in our imagination; we literally picture the person, especially her face, as a kind of incarnation of this \textit{individual value essence}.\textsuperscript{25}

\textbf{THE DIFFICULTY OF GRASPING PERSONAL UNIQUENESS AS A SOURCE OF A PERSON’S WORTH}

In an insightful essay\textsuperscript{26} offered shortly after the death of John Paul II, George Weigel cites the line in the letter to de Lubac about the pulverization of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person, and lists the horrors of the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, many of which Wojtyła himself experienced or witnessed, as the grim realization of this pulverization. Yet, in the next paragraph Weigel misses the point of the line he quoted by passing right over the notion of “fundamental uniqueness”:

Wojtyła’s counter-proposal was…built on the conviction that God had made the human creature in His image and likeness, with intelligence and freewill, a creature capable of knowing the good and freely choosing it. That, John Paul insisted in a vast number of variations on one great theme, was the true measure of man – the human capacity, in cooperation with God’s grace, for heroic virtue.

I would first of all whole-heartedly agree that all of these features raise the worth of human persons to the level which grounds absolute respect. But none of the items named by Weigel seem to capture Wojtyła’s meaning with the term “fundamental uniqueness.” It is as if Weigel thinks that Wojtyła intends “unique” to refer to our entire species as unique over all other species of created things, because everyone in our unique species can do these acts, while animals, plants and rocks cannot. But Wojtyła referred to the fundamental uniqueness of \textit{each} person, i.e., from \textit{every other} person \textit{within} our species. And the features as such listed by Weigel are not the person, nor exactly that which we love in another. When a loved one dies, we do not mourn that an intellect or a free will is gone, which all other people have too, but that this unrepeatable person is gone. Crosby expresses it thus:
The loss of any person would not be a negligible loss on the grounds that so many persons remain, but would be an almost infinitely great loss, as if the only person in existence had been lost.27

This is why people who have lost a loved one are in a sense inconsolable for the rest of their lives. Of course we miss the intellect, will and laugh of this very person, and the reason for that is because these common features (intellect, will, risibility) of persons “appear in their full individuality…on the basis of being rooted in the person. We can say that it is this person who in a certain sense communicates full individuality to the qualities.”28 A laugh is unique because it is “informed” by the unique person who is laughing. And Scheler says that

[...] the love which has moral value is not that which pays loving regard to a person for having such and such qualities, pursuing such and such activities, or for possessing talents, beauty, or virtue; it is that love which incorporates these qualities, activities and gifts into its object, because they belong to that individual person.29

Wojtyła, it seems to me, has in mind this dimension of persons in his letter to Henri de Lubac, not the common features of our human personal nature.30

UNDERSTANDING PERSONAL UNIQUENESS BY EXAMINING A THOMISTIC-BASED OBJECTION31

After this paper was presented, two conference participants expressed an objection which I understood in the following way. They approved of the discussion of the uniqueness of persons, even in the way I presented it, but they insisted that I refer to that dimension of personal being as the esse of persons, and that I not refer to it as the essence of a person (Scheler, as already noted, calls it the “individual value essence”). They seemed to maintain the view that essence is always common and that existence is the sole source of uniqueness and individuality.

Introducing a collection of texts of St. Thomas on metaphysics, W. Norris Clark, S.J. encapsulates what I take to be the core Thomistic metaphysical assertion concerning esse represented in their objection:

“A being,” (used without qualification) means for him that which is, in the real order. The that which signifies what a thing is, its essence or nature, responding to the question, “What is it?” The is signifies the act of existing, or active presence, which posits the what in the real order…responding to the question, “Is it?”, or “Does it exist?”…This inner act
of existence – which St. Thomas calls the esse or “to-be” of a being, that which makes a being precisely to be a be-ing – is not a what, an essence or nature, making a being to be this kind of being. It is, rather, an active presence which posits the entire essence, with all its properties, in the real order of actual existence, making it actually to be what it is.\textsuperscript{32}

I do not disagree with this account of esse, and if one considers the case of multiple objects of the same type that seem identical in every way, then I would agree with the assertion that the esse of such beings also fully accounts for the uniqueness of those beings. Consider multiple schoolroom desk chairs, for example, all lined up next to each other in rows. They share everything in common besides their own instantiation; that is, all the chairs are stamped with the same general essence of chairness (simply put, each is stamped with the blueprint for that model of chair), but each chair actualizes that essence separately. Each chair has its own unique existence (esse). In this case it is true to say that the source of uniqueness is the esse of each chair which is making it be this real chair and not any of the other chairs.\textsuperscript{33} And while the essence or “plan/blueprint” for the chairs which is really present in each of them is “unique” in the sense that it is in that one there as concretely instantiated and in this other one here,\textsuperscript{34} ultimately we would not rightly insist on unique essences in the full sense, since they all look identical.\textsuperscript{35}

But notice that the bearer of the “worth”\textsuperscript{36} of a chair is not its uniqueness, but rather that about it which makes it the same as all the other chairs, namely its essence. Of course I mean the really existing essence of the chair which has “an active presence which posits the entire essence,” as Fr. Clark put it. However, the focal point of our interest is primarily those essential features of the real chair, and this can be shown by asking what we do with a broken chair? Toss it in the garbage and take one that works, despite its uniqueness as being this chair and no other. Why? Because the focal point of the “worth” of the chair is not what is unique about that chair, but rather what is common, its chairiness.

Consider another question about a schoolroom chair.\textsuperscript{37} If I want to sit and can see only one chair in the room, then that chair has a great deal of importance for me. If, however, upon entering the room I see 700 such chairs, then suddenly the particular one diminishes greatly from the point of view of “worth.” Beings whose “worth” comes primarily from their common traits are relativized in that worth when placed next to many more exemplars of the same type. While having esse is necessary if a person wants actually to sit in a chair, that is as far as it goes, and any existing chair will have the same “worth” in fulfilling that function.

But consider a person, and it is best to consider one whom you love dearly. If you place that person next to 700 or seven million other people, their worth does not drop to an insignificant level, like a chair next to 700 other chairs. It does not drop at all. Now someone may object in the following way, “ah, but the reason it does not drop is because you asked me to think of
a person I love, and their worth doesn’t seem to drop to me because I love
them.” I would agree in one sense and strongly disagree in another. If it is
meant that your love for that person is the complete source of their worth
such that if you did not love them, then they would be worthless, then I would
strongly disagree. If, on the other hand, it is only meant that since you love
this person you have a better insight into their worth than people who do not
love them, but that their worth is inside them regardless of your love, then I
would agree.

Your love makes you see that their worth is not relativized by
numerous instantiations of human nature put next to them. The reason for
this is that the focal point of another person’s worth, unlike the chairs, is
their uniqueness. Love is inspired by catching a glimpse of the uniqueness of
another person, and once so inspired, in turn allows for a deeper and clearer
vision of that person’s uniqueness, which in turn inspires more love, and so
on. But your love for them is not the foundational metaphysical cause of their
uniqueness, it just gives you a clear vision of their uniqueness. Once you see
it, then you also see that it is not diminished in its worth and preciousness
when that person is standing next to seven million other people. Chairs, on
the other hand, are so diminished. The deepest source of the “worth” of a
chair is precisely what it has exactly in common with all the other chairs,
while the deepest source of worth in a person is precisely what he or she does
not have in common with anyone else. For this reason all statements such as
“What is so important about uniqueness, every stone is unique?” utterly miss
the mark. The difference between unique persons and unique stones is so
radical that I would almost hesitate to use the term “analogy” to describe the
similarity.

Another way to get the same idea across is to ask why it is that you
love this person. The answer is not a common trait. You do not love a person
because they have the faculty of intellect, or will, or because they have five
senses. After making a new friend or falling in love, no one exclaims: “Guess
what? I met another functioning intellect today! I met another being with
a free will!” Rather, one says, “I met a new person today!” Of course, a
person expresses himself or herself to you through an intellect and a free
will, but the person is not reducible to those faculties, nor to those faculties
actualized through esse. There is something utterly unique about each person,
which is indeed expressed through traits that are common to all persons and
intimately united with those traits, but which is not accounted for by listing
those traits. This dimension of the person is individual in its very content, and
therefore cannot be duplicated in another person. It is in the strictest sense
unique. It is this unrepeatable, utterly unique, essential content of a person
that Crosby refers to with the term “incommunicable,” and Scheler refers to
as the individual value essence. Pope John Paul II was also clearly referring
to this uniqueness when he made the following statement wherein he credited
his awareness of uniqueness to his study of personalism (and we know that
the personalist he studied above all others is Max Scheler):
It is difficult to formulate a systematic theory on how to relate to people, yet I was greatly helped in this by the study of personalism during the years I devoted to philosophy. Every human being is an individual person and therefore I cannot program \textit{a priori} a certain type of relationship that could be applied to everyone, but I must, so to speak, learn it anew in every case...It is very important for a bishop to have a rapport with his people and to know how to relate to them well. In my own case, significantly, I never felt that I was meeting an excessive number of people. Nonetheless, I was always concerned to safeguard the personal quality of each relationship. Every person is a chapter to himself. I always acted with this conviction, but I realize that it is something you can’t learn. It is simply there, because it comes from within.\textsuperscript{42}

The Pope did not say here that we need to focus on the rational nature of each person we meet, nor did he say we ought to look with awe to their act of being which gives that nature reality - of course, we should do these things too - but that is not the import of this quote. Notice that he even utilizes the Schelerian language of “individual person.” And the last line reminds one of the ineffable uniqueness of each person: why couldn’t you “learn about” a will, or a will actualized through \textit{esse}? The point is, you \textit{can} learn about those, and even form a systematic theory about them, which has been done. But he says here that you cannot do that with persons.

We see that Scheler’s phrase “individual person” (noted in the text of Scheler quoted above\textsuperscript{43}) was taken over here by John Paul. In both texts there is the idea that love is not properly directed at what is common, but at what is unique, which is the individual person. This idea is exactly that which makes Scheler so very different from all other personalists: \textit{individuum}, as Crosby rightly pointed out, is the very heart of personhood, and John Paul II uses language which reveals his absorption of this Schelerian insight here. The quote above indicates that this was the guiding focus in his meetings with people.\textsuperscript{44}

There are more texts which confirm this very same Schelerian influence on Wojtyła’s approach to persons. Consider the following quote, especially its last two sentences:

...after my priestly ordination I was sent to Rome to complete my studies...These studies resulted in my doctorate on Saint John of the Cross and then the dissertation on Max Scheler which qualified me for University teaching: specifically I wrote on the contribution which Scheler’s phenomenological type of ethical system can make to the development of moral theology. This research benefited me greatly. My previous Aristotelian-Thomistic formation was enriched by the
phenomenological method, and this made it possible for me to undertake a number of creative studies. I am thinking above all of my book The Acting Person. In this way I took part in the contemporary movement of philosophical personalism, and my studies were able to bear fruit in my pastoral work. I have often noticed how many of the ideas developed in these studies have helped me in my meetings with individuals and with great numbers of the faithful during my apostolic visits. My formation within the cultural horizon of personalism also gave me a deeper awareness of how each individual is a unique person. I think that this awareness is very important for every priest.45

And consider this striking text as well:

If we celebrate so solemnly the birth of Jesus, we do it so as to bear witness to the fact that each person is someone, unique and unrepeatable. If humanity’s statistics and arrangement, its political, economic and social systems as well as its simple possibilities, do not come about to assure man that he can be born, exist and work as a unique and unrepeatable individual, then bid ‘farewell’ to all assurances. For Christ and because of Him, the individual is always unique and unrepeatable; someone eternally conceived and eternally chosen; someone called and given a special name.46

John Paul II speaks here of a unique and unrepeatable someone eternally conceived, chosen, called and named. He does not speak of a human nature given inner actuality and nothing more. He speaks of a unique individual given inner actuality.47

THE UNIQUENESS OF PERSONS AS INTRINSIC – THEOLOGICAL TEXTS OF JOHN PAUL II

Considering together the Pope’s Christmas reflections on the unique individuality of each person and his earlier letter to de Lubac stating that the evil of the pulverization of the fundamental uniqueness of each person is much more of the metaphysical than of the moral order, a call emerges to understand and to “recapitulate” the metaphysical status of this uniqueness. Let us, then, without discounting its mystery, attempt to probe it more deeply.

An all-powerful God could make all the skin cells and body cells of two people to be identical, and could make all of their experiences the same. Even if God did that, Scheler would still say that these two people are in the core of their being different one from the other. He would say this because external factors are not the primary reason for the differences between, or
the uniqueness of persons (although they do participate in our uniqueness in various ways). Scheler comments:

Supposing we could get rid of all physical differences between human beings (including their essential here-and-nowness), and could further eliminate all qualitative differences in regard to their private objects of consciousness (including the formal aspect of these objects – in short the whole of what they think, will, feel, etc.), the individual diversity of their central personalities would still remain, despite the fact that the idea of personality would be the same in each of them.⁴⁸

I would like to proceed by considering some theological texts of Pope John Paul II in which one detects the Schelerian understanding of the uniqueness of persons. It will be helpful first to consider the following formulation of personal uniqueness by Crosby, which expresses both that it is intrinsic to persons and that it is a really existing, one-time essential structure:

…it does not suffice to point to the unrepeatability of the genetic make up of a human being, that is, of those traits of race, temperament, intelligence, etc., which depend on the genetic make-up of an individual. These traits are indeed woven together in a given individual in a way that is not repeated by other individuals, but this is only a relative unrepeatability. There is after all no absurdity in exactly these traits being repeated in exactly these interconnections in a second and third individual – indeed this repeating is exactly what happens in the case of identical twins.⁴⁹ But there is an absurdity in there being two copies of one and the same person. The incommunicability that we found above in a certain existential form, and into which we now inquire in asking about a possible essential form of it, lies at a deeper level in a human being. It lies in the depths of personal being; it is not a relative but an absolute incommunicability...Each person has an essential something that only he or she can have, or rather can be, an essential something that would forever be lost to the world, leaving a kind of irreparable metaphysical hole in it, if the person embodying it would go out of existence altogether.⁵⁰

In theological terms, Crosby would seem to be implying here that in creating a new person, God is thinking of, and bringing into being, a specific someone, and not merely giving inner actuality to the form of human nature. Referring again to the Thomistic-based objection analyzed earlier, if someone
Peter J. Colosi

held the view that the moment of coming into being of a new human person could be fully accounted for by saying that inner actuality was given to the form of human nature, then one would be committed to the position that the source of the uniqueness we encounter in people was entirely extrinsic to that person. This would mean that as experiences started happening to this new human, those experiences would begin to shape that person’s personality, and since it is statistically practically impossible that the exact same experiences happen to two people, we end up with the uniqueness we encounter in others. Such a view would deny that at the moment of the creation of a new human person God also put the person’s uniqueness there, making it intrinsic to that person. But Scheler, as was demonstrated, does not agree with the idea that the exclusive source of the uniqueness of persons is extrinsic to them. He thinks there is a divinely determined uniqueness within each of us, as Joshua Miller has shown. In fact, Miller’s analysis reveals that there are two sources of the uniqueness of persons for Scheler. While it is the divinely determined one that can be perceived in the texts of John Paul II that I will provide and analyze in a moment, I would like to give Miller’s summary of both sources.

A key part of Scheler’s personalism is the idea that each person has an individual value essence, which he sometimes calls an ideal essence or ideal value image that permeates the person’s being. This individual value essence is determined by God and indicates an abiding ontological structure of personal uniqueness. A second dimension of personal uniqueness…emerges from the person’s nature as self-determining. Because the person is spiritual, like God, he is spontaneous, creative, and above all free so that each of his acts is something new and distinct in the world. I will not argue that a person can change his essence or operate outside its parameters, but I do mean to say that uniqueness is, in part, something indeterminate and fluid. The person, who is essentially unique, is also free and therefore can authentically actualize his individual value essence in a number of ways. In doing so he does not simply concretize what Scheler calls an ideal value image that God has of him. Rather, he co-creates this image; he self-determinatively fills in the lines that have been established for him.

In The Gospel of Life, paragraphs 44 and 68, John Paul II lists numerous lyrical scripture passages which point to God’s love for babies in the womb. He then asks a profound rhetorical question: “How can anyone think that even a single moment of this marvelous process of the unfolding of life could be separated from the wise and loving work of the Creator, and left prey to human caprice?” But wouldn’t it be the case that if the uniqueness of persons was constituted exclusively by events that happen to us, many of which are quite random, then this would be precisely that caprice which a
loving Creator would not choose as the ultimate source of our unique person? And he adds:

Human life is sacred and inviolable at every moment of existence, including the initial phase which precedes birth. All human beings, from their mothers’ womb, belong to God who searches them and knows them, who forms them and knits them together with his own hands, who gazes on them when they are tiny shapeless embryos and already sees in them the adults of tomorrow whose days are numbered… There too, when they are still in their mothers’ womb — as many passages of the Bible bear witness — they are the personal objects of God’s loving and fatherly providence.54

Do these texts not engender an image of a specific someone who, from the beginning, is present with an inner actuality not only of their human nature, but also of their very uniqueness in some way, and already loved by God as that person, as opposed to an instantiated human nature that will only later become unique due to external influences?

As was seen above, Scheler expressly rejected the notion that external factors such as the unique space that I occupy, time and experiences that happen to me, or acts that I perform could exhaustively account for my uniqueness. He argues instead, as Crosby has shown, for a radically intrinsic principle of uniqueness, finding a “particular strength of individuality in human persons, which he explains by saying that each person has an essence all his own, that is, an essence that could not be possibly repeated in a second person.”55

Crosby cites an interesting quote, where Richard Stith says, “Even if God were to promise me that he would immediately substitute an identical person…for my wife if I would let him take her away, I would refuse. I do not want someone like her, I want her.”56 Crosby uses this quote to criticize a remark that Stith makes a few pages later. He says that Stith is forced into referring to the dimension of his wife that he wants as her existence only because he has not yet conceived that some essences are not universal, such as the unique, ineffable, essential something of his wife that will never be again in any other person. I would like to extend the use of the Stith quote and ask: would not God, who also loves each of us, also have that same intensity of love expressed by Stith for his wife toward each of us from the first moment of our existence? It would be opposed to the principles of divine love and beauty for God not to be able to say from the very beginning to each one of us that we are not just repeatable instantiations of human rational nature; what kind of love would that be? This idea is contained within the core of the quotes from The Gospel of Life that I have given, and it was developed by Scheler in an unexpected way with unexpected clarity. Perhaps it impressed itself on the mind and heart of Wojtyła in the years he dedicated to poring over Scheler’s work.
It seems that Scheler’s position could not countenance the view that in God’s creation of a human person God only took some amount of raw esse and gave it human nature. For Scheler maintains, as Miller has shown, that there are two sources of our uniqueness, and one of them is divinely determined. And so, according to this account it would follow that God brings into being a human nature and also an individual person by giving the unity of these two an inner actuality, or esse. And while human nature can be instantiated more than once in billions of human persons, your unique “youness,” i.e., that which your mother sees and loves in you, is not able to be instantiated like that, since it only comes once.

Crosby provides one further helpful distinction for us here: the distinction between the existential incommunicability and the essential incommunicability of persons. He suggests the possibility that the dignity of persons belongs more to existential incommunicability, while the personal lovableness, on the other hand, belongs more to essential (but, of course, really existing) incommunicability.

There is the dignity of each person in virtue of which we owe respect to persons; but then there is the goodness or lovableness of a person which, once seen and experienced, awakens something like friendship, or perhaps a spousal love, for that person. This lovableness is perhaps even more deeply rooted in the incommunicable selfhood of each person than the dignity of the person, because every person has this dignity, whereas the lovableness of a person is possessed only by that person and by no other. I am capable of recognizing the dignity of every person whom I meet and of showing him or her respect, but I am capable of recognizing the unique personal lovableness of only a very few persons and I am capable of loving only these few. There is, strange to say, a certain communicability that remains in the dignity of the person, even though it is grounded precisely in the incommunicable selfhood of each person.

The interesting idea contained in this text is that there is a distinction between the fact of incommunicability and the very content of some specific person’s uniqueness. Every person is unique, thus uniqueness is a common trait, yet the very inner, essential and unrepeatable content of a person’s uniqueness is not found in any other. It is that very inner uniqueness of a specific person for which there are no words; it is that which once glimpsed inspires love and is then seen even more clearly because of the love. Yet this unique, unrepeatable lovableness of someone whom you love cannot be asserted in words, no matter how clearly your love lets you see it.
CONCLUSION: AN APPLICATION TO HEALTH-CARE AND BIO-ETHICS

It may be possible here to make a modest step in responding to the call of Karol Wojtyła to recapitulate the metaphysical sense and mystery of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person as the only response to the “disintegration planned at times by atheistic ideologies.” Crosby claims that when we awaken to the uniqueness of a person whom we love and thereby become aware of the mysterious concreteness of human persons, our value consciousness becomes immeasurably enlarged. 63

One famous atheist who, as shown above, currently plans out the pulverization of the fundamental uniqueness of each person is Professor Peter Singer of Princeton University. In a recent article 64 I discussed the reasons for Singer’s decision to hire a team of home health care professionals for his mother who at the time was suffering from severe dementia. 65 According to the theories that Singer has long espoused, Singer ought to have either let his mother die or have killed her. I pointed out that it was precisely when Singer got into the position of dealing with the suffering of a person whom he loved dearly that he reversed in his actions what he has insisted on for decades in his books. Many critics of Singer demanded an explanation for his behavior. Ultimately, he claimed that he committed a morally wrong act by caring for his mother. 66 But this answer, I pointed out, does not express the motive for his action, it only provides an excuse: moral weakness – if he had been stronger he would, it seems, have killed her. But there must have been a positive reason/motive for his actions. I suggested that he did not kill his mother because he loved her and that his love made him see the reasons within her being for which she should not have been killed. I found in Singer’s own words the basis of my assertion, when he said to Michael Specter (who pressed him on the point), “I think this has made me see how the issues of someone with these kinds of problems are really very difficult…. Perhaps it is more difficult than I thought before, because it is different when it’s your mother.” 67 In other words, the difference when it is your mother is that you love her, and this expands your awareness of the worth of the person exponentially because in love you become aware of precisely the ineffable, unrepeatable preciousness of that person. In uttering these words Singer revealed that he had exactly this awareness in the case of his mother, and that this is the reason he behaved so differently in that case: his value knowledge expanded to large proportions in the case of his mother through his love of her. While it caused Singer to behave towards his own mother in a way that John Paul II would approve of, and while it perplexed him enough to make this admission to Michael Specter, it did not cause him to undergo a great awakening to the incommunicable selfhood and mysterious concreteness of every person. 68

Jonathan Sanford concludes his important study of Scheler’s idea of cognition through feelings with the following point:

Scheler’s sensitivity to the emotional sphere of the human
being leads him to explore facets of our contact with the world that philosophers have but rarely considered. One reason that philosophers have shied away from discussing the emotional sphere, and our intuitive experience of the world, is that intuitive evidence cannot be demonstratively verified...Some things are simply given...the inability to prove evidence gleaned through intuition is no reason to reject that evidence. If in fact reflection on our experience of reality suggests that affective insights do occur, then we ought to theorize about the nature of such insights...and examine their content.69

Singer perceived this in the case of his mother and acted in a manner that follows from such awareness in her case, but he could not extend that awareness to other persons whom he does not love. Peter Berkowitz, upon hearing about Singer’s behavior towards his mother, wrote an excellent piece whose title aptly gets this point across: “Other People’s Mothers.”70

There is a raging debate in contemporary ethics which centers around the conflict between the intuition that killing innocents is wrong and the inability to demonstrably justify that intuition.71 Many utilitarians are conflicted within themselves because of this paradox. For example, J.J.C. Smart, after drawing the conclusion that it is ethically right to kill an innocent person when that action results in the avoidance of large scale suffering, asserted, “Even in my most utilitarian moods I am not happy about this consequence of utilitarianism.”72 Smart attempts but ultimately fails to find a satisfactory solution to his dilemma,73 because he rejects evidence that is obtained through intuition simply because it is so obtained. Another way to put this would be to say that he decides to hold the view that he does not know any dimension of reality that cannot be expressed in formulaic assertions, even if he knows that he knows such a dimension of reality (which I think his unhappiness proves).

Scheler and Wojtyła have an answer to this problem. Scheler describes the position manifested by thinkers like Smart as a philosophical prejudice.

Until recent times philosophy was inclined to a prejudice that has its historical origin in antiquity. This prejudice consists in upholding the division between “reason” and “sensibility,” which is completely inadequate in terms of the structure of the spiritual. This division demands that we assign everything that is not rational – that is not order, law, and the like – to sensibility. Thus our whole emotional life – and, for most modern philosophers, our conative life as well, even love and hate – must be assigned to “sensibility.” According to this division, everything, in the mind which is alogical, e.g., intuition, feeling, striving, loving, hating, is dependent on man’s psychophysical organization.74
Samuel Scheffler represents this way of thinking exactly as Scheler diagnosed it. We can see this in Scheffler’s thought experiment concerning what he calls the “Infallible Optimizer.”

Suppose that there was a machine, the Infallible Optimizer, which never made mistakes in its judgments about which of the actions available to an agent at a time would actually minimize total deaths overall. Suppose further that people were causally incapable of killing unless the Infallible Optimizer certified that a killing was necessary in order to minimize total deaths.75

After expressing this thought experiment, Scheffler considers how those who hold to absolute moral norms might feel if this situation were real, and concludes:

Defenders of agent-centered restrictions will presumably feel a residual intuition that, even in circumstances such as these, it would be wrong to kill a person in order to minimize deaths.76

The phrase “residual intuition” in this text reveals the bizarreness of what I will call the “hyper-rationalism” diagnosed by Scheler. Whether or not Scheffler is a defender of agent-centered restrictions, let us ask him this: if the Infallible Optimizer, which by definition cannot be mistaken, told him that of the actions available to him to torture one of his own loved ones would actually minimize total deaths overall, would his feeling concerning the possible wrongness of this act be, as he claims it would, nothing more than a mere “residual intuition”? Scheffler is the one who asked us to enter this thought experiment, so I am in his thought experiment now; does it obtain as he said it would? How would he reply? He might answer with a remark he makes a little later,

…it is only too easy to think of a psychological explanation for the commitment to agent-centered restrictions, an explanation that would provide a motivation of a kind for the restrictions, but not a motivation that would make them seem especially well-founded morally.77

In this response, a “psychological explanation” is put forward as an irrational one; but let us ask Scheffler why he would want to reduce his love for his own loved one to psychological nonsense. Perhaps it is because he adheres to the philosophical prejudice mentioned by Scheler that “everything…in the mind which is alogical, e.g., intuition, feeling, striving, loving, hating, is dependent on man’s psychophysical organization.” Why not grant that love is a genuine source of knowledge, especially if you know that it is? Why not
grant that it is only in a philosophy book that one can deny this knowledge, but not in real life? Why not ask whether it is philosophical prejudice that explains why one would be committed in a philosophy book to a position that one finds ridiculous in real life? Why not grant that love is not psychological nonsense, but rather the source of our knowledge of the unique, unrepeatable inner being of the people we know and love?\textsuperscript{78}

Scheffler is convinced that "[i]n the case of agent-centered restrictions…we have only surface intuitions; no underlying general rationale has as yet been identified."\textsuperscript{79} The reason why no “general” rationale has been identified is because persons are not general, they are individual, and their individuality is ineffable. Scheffler ponders further and says that even if no such general rationale exists, “many people would doubtless feel that the intuitions to which the restrictions respond are nevertheless so central that they cannot in the end be rejected, problematic though they may be.”\textsuperscript{80} While his awareness of the centrality of these intuitions goes in the right direction, I still find this series of thoughts stunning. Only a hyper-rationalist would apply the term “problematic” to one of the deepest dimensions of love. Again, if the Infallible Optimizer discovered that hundreds of people would be saved if Scheffler tortured one of his own loved ones, does he mean to assert that he would find it merely “problematic” and this problem, namely, his “psychological” love for his loved one, would most likely leave him some “residual moral intuitions?”

Ultimately Scheffler concludes that no underlying reasons have as yet been found for agent-centered restrictions,\textsuperscript{81} and he expresses his worry that “unless it is possible to identify an underlying rationale for the restrictions, I do think that those who accept them have serious cause for concern.”\textsuperscript{82} I agree that those who accept absolute moral norms have serious cause for concern, but not about the norms themselves; allow me to explain. Towards the end of his well-known essay defending utilitarianism, J.J.C. Smart makes the following unexpected remark:

One must not think of the utilitarian as the sort of person who you would not trust further than you could kick him. As a matter of untutored sociological observation…the sort of people who might do you down are rarely utilitarians.\textsuperscript{83}

He makes this remark in the context of expressing his unhappiness that the utilitarian “must admit…that he might find himself in circumstances where he ought to be unjust.”\textsuperscript{84} And in the next sentence, revealing again that he would rather act in accord with his intuitions, he says, “Let us hope that this is a logical possibility not a factual one.”

I submit that Scheffler has misdiagnosed the worry of those who hold to absolute moral norms. They have to worry not about the norms, but about the very hyper-rationalist outlook held by Scheffler and others. Singer thinks the debate is over, and once quipped that it is high time to realize that there is a good deal to be inferred from the inability to defend these intuitions.\textsuperscript{85}
Why has Peter Singer risen to fame? There are many reasons, but surely one of them is that, unlike Smart, he has no qualms about taking this logic of utilitarianism into reality; of the many examples, one could think perhaps of his endorsement of infanticide.

For those utilitarians or hyper-rationalists who have concerns about the moral conclusions of their more bold like-minded colleagues, Scheler and Wojtyła have a suggestion. Scheler, I think, would ask them to ponder his assertion that “A spirit limited to perception and thinking would be absolutely blind to values, no matter how much it might have the faculty of ‘inner perception.’” And Wojtyła would then encourage them to find a way to bring across “the metaphysical sense and mystery of the person.” This task is challenging and he grants that it is “difficult to formulate a systematic theory on how to relate to people,” since “[e]very human being is an individual person and therefore I cannot program a priori a certain type of relationship that could be applied to everyone.” But he also says, “I was greatly helped in this by the study of personalism during the years I devoted to philosophy.”

We know that he primarily studied Scheler during those years, and we see here that he chose the Schelerian formulation “individual person,” and so we may perceive a call, perhaps, to turn to Scheler for help to go beyond “sterile polemics” to a “recapitulation of the inviolable mystery of the person.”

APPENDIX

Below you will find a series of quotes by Wojtyła in which he expresses his indebtedness to Max Scheler. Above each quote, in italics, I have tried to formulate the exact senses in which each quote represents an indebtedness to Scheler. Some of the examples show this through unique ways of citing Scheler (e.g., naming a section of a book specifically according to Scheler’s book title, and citing Scheler’s name first in lists of philosophers to whom he is indebted). The other examples reveal a wide range of Schelerian philosophical content from which Wojtyła drew: self-donation, ressentiment, shame, suffering, the genius of woman, moral becoming, and a connection to the meaning of family.

This appendix represents only the tip of the iceberg. The depth with which Wojtyła absorbed Scheler could be revealed by a thorough cataloguing of the actual citations of Scheler by Wojtyła, a language analysis to show that he speaks on very many occasions exactly as Scheler spoke (see the ‘genius of woman’ entry below), and, of course, a deepening of awareness of the philosophical content in Scheler which informs Wojtyła’s work.

1. Prominence Given to Scheler

Theme:

a. Wojtyla often either names Scheler alone or in a list of philosophers places Scheler’s name first when he cites his contemporary sources. Here is another example of the prominence he gives to Scheler’s
name, above all the other contemporary thinkers he mentions, as important for his understanding of anthropology, moral philosophy, and redemption.

The whole argument developed thus far concerning the theory of good and evil belongs to moral philosophy. I devoted some years of work to these problems at the Catholic University of Lublin. I put together my ideas on the subject firstly in the book *Love and Responsibility*, then in *The Acting Person*, and finally in the Wednesday catecheses which were published under the title *Original Unity of Man and Woman*. On the basis of further reading and research undertaken during the ethics seminar at Lublin, I came to see how important these problems were for a number of contemporary thinkers: Max Scheler and other phenomenologists, Jean-Paul Sartre, Emmanuel Levinas and Paul Ricoeur, and also Vladimir Soloviev, not to mention Fyodor Dostoyevsky. Through these analyses of anthropological reality, various manifestations emerge of man’s desire for Redemption, and confirmation is given of the need for a Redeemer if man is to attain salvation.93

2. The Concept of Self-Donation

Theme:

a. Wojtyła commentators say that Gaudium et Spes 24,3 is the core text out of which he developed his idea of self-donation; in the text below John Paul II credits Max Scheler with holding a view similar to his own that self-gift is the antidote to a type of self-centered freedom.

Here we truly have an adequate interpretation of the commandment of love. Above all, the principle that a person has a value by the simple fact that he is a person finds very clear expression: man, it is said, “is the only creature on earth that God has wanted for his own sake.” At the same time the Council emphasizes that the most important thing about love is the sincere gift of self. In this sense the person is realized through love.

Therefore, these two aspects – the affirmation of the person as a person and the sincere gift of self – not only do not exclude each other, they mutually confirm and complete each other. Man affirms himself most completely by giving of himself. This is the fulfillment of the commandment of love. This is also the full truth about man, a truth that Christ taught us by His life, and that the tradition of Christian morality, no less than the tradition of saints and of the many heroes
of love of neighbor, took up and lived out in the course of history.

If we deprive human freedom of this possibility, if man does not commit himself to becoming a gift for others, then this freedom can become dangerous. It will become freedom to do what I myself consider as a good, what brings me profit or pleasure, even a sublimated pleasure. *If we cannot accept the prospect of giving ourselves as a gift, then the danger of a selfish freedom will always be present.* Kant fought against this danger, and along the same line so did Max Scheler and so many after him who shared his ethics of values. But a complete expression of all this is already found in the Gospel. For this very reason, *we can find in the Gospel a consistent declaration of all human rights,* even those that for various reasons can make us feel uneasy.94

3. **Ressentiment as a Development Beyond Acedia**

*Theme:*

* a. Here, as a way to cite his indebtedness to Scheler, Wojtyła chooses the title for a subheading in Love and Responsibility because of Scheler’s work.*

* b. Wojtyła also credits Scheler with the achievement of diagnosing an ailment of modern man with which Saint Thomas Aquinas was not familiar; Scheler’s ressentiment represents, according to Wojtyła, a philosophical development beyond St. Thomas’ notion of acedia.*

The title of this paragraph is borrowed from Max Scheler, who published a study called *The Rehabilitation of Virtue*… Scheler saw a need for the rehabilitation of virtue because he discerned in modern man a characteristic spiritual attitude which is inimical to sincere respect for it. He has called this attitude ‘resentment.’ Resentment arises from an erroneous and distorted sense of values. It is a lack of objectivity in judgment and evaluation, and it has its origin in weakness of will. The fact is that attaining or realizing a higher value demands a greater effort of will. So in order to spare ourselves the effort, to excuse our failure to obtain this value, we minimize its significance, deny it the respect which it deserves, even see it as in some way evil, although objectivity requires us to recognize that it is good. Resentment possesses as you see the distinctive characteristics of the cardinal sin called sloth. St. Thomas defines sloth (*acedia*) as “a sadness arising from the fact that the good is difficult.” This sadness, far from denying the good, indirectly helps to keep respect for it alive in the soul. Resentment, however,
does not stop at this: it not only distorts the features of the good but devalues that which rightly deserves respect, so that man need not struggle to raise himself to the level of the true good, but can “light-heartedly” recognize as good only what suits him, what is convenient and comfortable for him. Resentment is a feature of the subjective mentality: pleasure takes the place of superior values.\textsuperscript{95}

4. The Concept of Shame

Theme:

\begin{itemize}
\item a. I wrote my philosophy master’s thesis on the concept of shame in the thought of Scheler/Hildebrand/ Wojtyla,\textsuperscript{66} and there I showed numerous ways that Wojtyla was impressed by and indebted to Scheler’s essay on shame.\textsuperscript{97} Wojtyla opens the chapter in Love and Responsibility titled, “The Metaphysics of Shame” citing his sources, and Scheler’s name appears first:

The phenomenon of shame, and of sexual shame in particular, has attracted the attention of the phenomenologists (M. Scheler, F. Sawicki). It is a theme which opens up a broad field of observation and which lends itself to analysis in depth.\textsuperscript{98}

\end{itemize}

5. The Meaning of Suffering as Unleashing Love

Theme:

\begin{itemize}
\item a. In this letter, John Paul II uses the Schelerian idea that suffering exists in order to unleash love. He does not cite Scheler, but the language and ideas of the text reveal that he draws on him.\textsuperscript{99}
\item b. I have shown the similarity between Pope John Paul II and Scheler on the idea of the interior unleashing of love as the reason for suffering in, Peter J. Colosi, “John Paul II and Christian Personalism vs. Peter Singer and Utilitarianism: Two Radically Opposed Conceptions of the Nature and Meaning of Suffering.” 3rd Global Conference: Making Sense of: Health, Illness and Disease July 5 - July 9, 2004 St Catherine’s College, Oxford University. The full paper can be found at: http://www.inter-disciplinary.net/mso/hid/hid3/Colosi%20paper.pdf

“Suffering is…present in order to unleash love.”\textsuperscript{100}
\end{itemize}

6. The Genius of Woman

Theme:

\begin{itemize}
\item a. The core idea in John Paul II’s development of the genius of woman is
present in Scheler. Notice by comparing the texts below, that John Paul II speaks with the same language as Scheler:

Scheler: ...women...possess powers of intuition, which being based on the maternal instinct with its specialized aptitudes for identification, are found only rudimentarily in man...This capacity first develops, no doubt, in a woman’s own experience of maternity, but it is not confined to her own child, or to children generally, for it extends, when fully developed, to all the world.\textsuperscript{101}

John Paul II: “Motherhood involves a special communion with the mystery of life, as it develops in the woman’s womb. The mother is filled with wonder at this mystery of life, and “understands” with unique intuition what is happening inside her. In the light of the “beginning”, the mother accepts and loves as a person the child she is carrying in her womb. This unique contact with the new human being developing within her gives rise to an attitude towards human beings - not only towards her own child, but every human being - which profoundly marks the woman’s personality. It is commonly thought that women are more capable than men of paying attention to another person, and that motherhood develops this predisposition even more. The man - even with all his sharing in parenthood - always remains “outside” the process of pregnancy and the baby’s birth; in many ways he has to learn his own “fatherhood” from the mother.”\textsuperscript{102}

7. On the Relation Between Acting and Becoming

Theme:

a. The relation between personal acting and becoming a certain kind of person is a prominent theme of The Acting Person. Below are two quotes, one from Scheler the other from Wojtyła, which give evidence of the “Schelerian foundation” of The Acting Person.

Scheler: There is no act whose execution does not change the content of the person’s being, and no act-value that does not increase or decrease, enhance or diminish, or positively or negatively determine the value of the person. In every moral individual act of positive value the ability for acts of the kind increase; in other words, there is an increase in what we designated as the virtue of the person.... Thus mediated, every moral act effects changes in the being and value of the person himself.\textsuperscript{103}

Wojtyła: It is in man’s actions, his conscious acting,
that make of him what and who he actually is. This form of the human becoming thus presupposes the efficacy or causation proper to man...It is man’s actions, the way he consciously acts, that make of him a good or a bad man – good or bad in the moral sense. To be “morally good” means to be good as a man. To be “morally bad” means to be bad as a man. Whether a man, because of his actions, becomes morally better or morally worse depends on the nature and modalities of actions. The qualitative moments and virtualities of actions, inasmuch as they refer to the moral norm and ultimately to the dictates of the conscience, are imprinted upon man by his performing the actions.

The becoming of man in his moral aspect that is strictly connected with the person is the decisive factor in determining the concrete realistic character of goodness and badness, of the moral values themselves as concretized in human acting...Man not only concretizes them in action and experiences them but because of them he himself, as a being, actually becomes good or bad. Moral conduct partakes of the reality of human actions as expressing a specific type and line of becoming of the man-subject, the type of becoming that is most intrinsically related to his nature, that is, his humanness, and to the fact of his being a person.104

8. Family

In one of the preparatory regional conferences (Geneva, Switzerland) leading up to The Doha International Conference for the Family,105 I presented a paper in which I explored some of the Papal pronouncements of John Paul II on the family in an attempt to show their connections to the uniqueness of individual persons and love. For example, I said that John Paul’s statement that, “The “sovereignty” of the family is essential for the good of society,”106 can be explained in this way: “The family is the deepest source of achieving that grand goal of “a better world” because of its intimate inner side where the depth and preciousness of the family members are revealed to each other. That inspires a depth of love scarcely possible outside of this setting, which at the same time is able to serve as a rich inner resource in going out to help those outside of the inner family circle.”107 And this interpretation is perhaps confirmed by the Pope when he says, “If the family is so important for the civilization of love, it is because of the particular closeness and intensity of the bonds which come to be between persons and generations within the family.”108

NOTES

1 Pope Benedict XVI in his November 21, 2005 address to the


3 **Karol Wojtyła**, *The Acting Person* (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1979a), viii. Occasionally a line from Wojtyła’s *habilitation* which reads, “a theologian cannot be a phenomenologist,” (Wojtyła, 1980, 196) is interpreted to represent a sort of wholesale rejection by Wojtyła of the phenomenological/personalist project that he studied. The problem with drawing that conclusion from this line is that Wojtyła contradicts it time and again in practically every book he published after his dissertation. I provide many examples throughout this paper and in the appendix. Consider here this one, in which he expresses an equal debt to the two schools of philosophical thought he studied, “The author of the present study owes everything to the systems of metaphysics, of anthropology, and of Aristotelian-Thomistic ethics on the one hand, and to phenomenology, above all in Scheler’s interpretation...on the other.” From the second preface to *The Acting Person*, xiv.

4 For a thorough presentation of Wojtyła’s unremitting rejection of this Schelerian thesis see, John F. Crosby, “Person and Obligation: Critical Reflections on the Anti-Authoritarian Strain in Scheler’s Personalism,” *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 79.1, 2005, 110-113. Furthermore, I am fully aware that many negative assessments of Scheler occur in Wojtyła’s *Habilitation* thesis, yet beginning with *The Acting Person*, there is a clear shift away from that assessment. Thus it would not be wrong to speak of a developing appreciation for Scheler in the work of Wojtyła.

5 Hence the title of this paper: “The Uniqueness of Persons in the Life and Thought of Karol Wojtyla /Pope John Paul II”.

6 See George Weigel, *Witness to Hope, The Biography of Pope John Paul II* (New York: Harper Collins, 1999), 124-39. Weigel presents a concise retelling of the interesting way in which Wojtyła came to study Scheler, the reasons for which he translated Scheler’s *Formalism* into Polish, and numerous anecdotal stories gleaned from personal interviews with Wojtyła’s brightest students, fellow colleagues, and, of course, with the man himself. I take these pages as clear confirmation of the assertion that Wojtyła saw in Scheler a master from whom he learned much and whose influence on his thought was deep and lasting.

7 Scheler, held this view too: “[o]nly persons can (originally) be morally good or evil; everything else can be good or evil only *by reference to persons*, no matter how indirect this ‘reference’ *[Hinsehen]* may be.” Max Scheler, *Formalism in Ethics and Non-Formal Ethics of Values*, translated by Manfred S. Frings and Roger L. Funk (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973a), 85.
Consider Peter Jackson’s recent remake of the movie *King Kong*, in which Kong was moved deeply by a beautiful sunset on two occasions. I have no knowledge concerning whether elements of the animal rights movement had a role in the creation of those scenes, but whoever made those scenes reveals a clear acceptance of this basic premise of Western philosophy, namely, that having rational capabilities is a source of superior worth; by giving King Kong a dimension of that rational nature (feeling the beauty of a sunset) they mean to imply that he is equally worthy of respect as any human being.

See Josef Seifert, *What is Life?* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1997), Chapters 3 and 4 for a concise presentation of this view, including a contrast to the “actualism” which rules the day in many euthanasia debates, whereby it is asserted that humans with diminished consciousness no longer possess within them any quality that makes a moral claim on others not to kill them.

This view reached perhaps its most concise formulation in Immanuel Kant: “But suppose there were something the existence of which in itself has an absolute worth, something which as an end in itself could be a ground of determinate laws...Now I say that the human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will...Beings the existence of which rests not on our will but on nature, if they are beings without reason, still have only a relative worth, as means...whereas rational beings are called persons because their nature already marks them out as and [sic] end in itself, that is, as something that may not be used merely as a means, and hence so far limits all choice (and is an object of respect)...If, then, there is to be a supreme practical principle...The ground of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself.” Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor, in Immanuel Kant, *Practical Philosophy* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 78-80.


In this section I will give a sketch of the uniqueness of persons termed by Scheler their “individual value essence” and their “individual personhood.” Much of the work of drawing this idea out of Scheler’s work and expressing it further has already been accomplished by others, and as I proceed I will draw on this body of secondary literature. John F. Crosby has both expressed Scheler’s meaning as well as developed it further in his (2004), chapter 7, titled, “Max Scheler on Personal Individuality.” Recently a volume of the *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* dedicated to Max Scheler appeared, edited by John Crosby. The entire volume (79.1, Winter 2005) is to be recommended, but of particular importance for the theme of this paper


17 See Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, translated by Peter Heath. Hamden, (Connecticut: The Shoe String Press, 1973b), 122. There Scheler discusses how in coming to know another person we begin with a certain hypothesis, and “as such knowledge increases, so the content of this hypothesis becomes ever more individual, ever harder to put into words (individuum est ineffabile).”

19 Scheler, 1973a, 489.
21 Crosby has insightfully shown the many senses in which the deepest forms of interpersonal “communication” are grounded in persons relating to the uniqueness in each other. He has also shown that if such knowledge and love were not possible, then no true interpersonal relating would be possible. See Crosby, 1996, 54-58.


23 This is not to deny that we can, of course, also respond with the intellect to that which we have previously cognized through it, for example by believing or doubting what has been cognized.

24 In his work *Ethics* (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1953), chapter 17 (titled: “Value Response”), Dietrich von Hildebrand has with great concision summarized the concept of intentionality in phenomenology. He succeeds in this chapter in delineating and distinguishing clearly when persons, with the various faculties of the soul, perform acts of cognition and when, with those same faculties, they perform responses to that which they have cognized.

25 Miller, 167.
26 George Weigel, “Mourning and Remembrance,” *Wall Street
Journal, April 4, 2005. Weigel’s article has also been reprinted online at the Catholic Educator’s Resource Center at www.catholiceducation.org.

27 Crosby, 1996, 72.
29 Scheler, (1973b), 166.

30 Weigel rightly represents common features of human persons that John Paul held up as the source of our worth, but again in a way that overlooks the aspect of uniqueness, when he says, “John Paul II has insisted for a quarter-century that human rights are the moral core of the ‘universal common good’ …all thinking about society, even international society, must begin with an adequate philosophical anthropology of the person, which recognizes in the human quest for transcendent truth and love the defining characteristic of our humanity.” [italics original] George Weigel, “Moral Leadership and World Politics in the 21st Century, Thomas Merton Lecture, Columbia University, Oct. 30, 2003.

31 In my response to this objection I rely on many of the insights in Crosby, 1996, chapter 2. A different Thomistic-based critique of the idea of personal uniqueness can be found in Stephen L. Brock, “Is Uniqueness at the Root of Personal Dignity? John Crosby and Thomas Aquinas,” in The Thomist 69 (2005), 173-201. I have debated Brock on this very question, but it would go outside the bounds of this paper to deal with his article here.


33 According to Aristotle’s principle of identity which states that “each thing is itself and not another.”

34 See Crosby, 1996, 44-45. In his book Sein und Wesen, (Heidelberg: Universitaetsverlag C. Winter, 1996), Josef Seifert has sharply distinguished many senses of essence and existence, including the one I just mentioned between the general plan and the real concrete essence present in one of its instantiations, to which I am indebted for enabling me to make this point. An earlier English version of Seifert’s work is his “Essence and Existence.” Aletheia, 1977/78, Vol. 1.1 and 1.2. (Crosby also credits Seifert for clarifying these points to him. See Crosby, 1996, 43, n. 3).

35 It should be noted that an incidental scratch or imperfection on one chair would not justify a metaphysical claim to any profound essential uniqueness.

36 I put the word “worth” in parentheses because “worth” seems too lofty a title for the value of a chair.

37 For the following insight I am relying on Crosby, 1996, 50 ff.

38 That would also lead to the odd state of affairs of you having to say to the people whom you love: “I just want you to know how lucky you are right now because I am here, otherwise, you’d be worthless!”

39 Unfortunately for my purposes, Wojtyła makes just such a remark at Karol Wojtyła, Love and Responsibility (New York: Farrer, Strauss, Giroux, 1981), 24. It goes without saying that I disagree with his assertion there, but
I also think that it is flatly contradicted by other pastoral and theological texts of his that I analyze in this paper.

40 See Scheler, 1973b, 123, where he explains his idea that, “The spiritual substances inherent in persons or their acts are thus the only substances having a truly individual essence…”


43 Scheler, 1973b, 166: “The love which has moral value is not that which pays loving regard to a person for having such and such qualities, pursuing such and such activities, or for possessing talents, beauty, or virtue; it is that love which incorporates these qualities, activities and gifts into its object, because they belong to that individual person.”

44 I had a personal experience of his absorption of this insight. I was able to attend close to twenty Wednesday audiences and quite a few Holy Week Masses in Rome with Pope John Paul II, always with thousands of other people. I never had the opportunity to speak with him or to shake his hand. However, once I was leaning over a railing looking away from him as he was recessing at the end of Mass in St. Peter’s Basilica. Hundreds of people were present, but I was right on the aisle. I turned around, and to my surprise, he had been staring at the back of my head waiting for me to turn around. He looked at me, into my eyes and kept looking. It was quite moving, and the quotes I have given are true to his life - in that look I felt like he was saying, “who are you? I want to meet you.” I felt my uniqueness in that moment, me, being approached in love, just as it says in that quote; I felt in that look that he felt that he was encountering something utterly unique when he was meeting me – that he never met before and never would meet again (unless he met me again, which he did not).

It was a beautiful experience, and if I may indulge in one further reflection on it, I would say that what strikes me as philosophically highly interesting here is a similarity between John Paul II and Blessed Mother Teresa. We feel loved in our uniqueness more in the family than anywhere else, and being loved like that by parents is the source of many good things. And we are enabled, within the setting of the family, to love our siblings in this way too; next comes our relatives and dearest friends. But what a challenge it is to attempt to approach everyone like that. I believe, and I think my very brief encounter with the man (and its very brevity reinforces the point), that Pope John II wrote the text I quoted above out of his constant effort to never forget this truth as he continually met people. How exhausting it would be for me to be continually in the mode of remembering that each person I meet is unique and unrepeatable and that this is the most important dimension of this person and the one I need to be aware of in order to respect them in the way they truly deserve. It seems to me that John Paul II and Blessed Mother Teresa spent their lives trying to do exactly this. And there is plenty of evidence that Wojtyła learned this dimension of personal uniqueness from Max Scheler.


47 Of course, that individual is also given in that moment a human nature, but this is not the significance of the quote.

48 Scheler, 1973b, 34.

49 As Josef Seifert once observed in a conversation, this truism is not strictly accurate; if one looks closely at the faces of identical twins one sees that they are, in fact, not identical. Nonetheless, Crosby’s point about the non-absurdity of the duplication of such traits remains intact, despite its statistical improbability.

50 Crosby, 1996, 64-65.

51 Miller, 163-81.

52 Miller, 2005, 164.


54 Wojtyła, 1995, para., 61.

55 Crosby, 2004, 149.


57 Although it seems to me from Scheler’s notion of the divinely determined dimension of the individual value essence that this is a correct assertion, some other texts of Scheler are open to debate about whether or not he rejects the personhood of the embryo. The strongest of the texts in favor of the view that Scheler does reject the personhood of embryos are at 1973a, 476-78. Others can be found at 1973a, 313-15. However, it seems to me that on pages 313-15 and 476 Scheler is not making a point about the ontological status of the embryo as a non-person, but rather on the inability of us to perceive signs of its personhood. (I wonder if he would have been as moved as Tony Blair was by the new three-dimensional, color video clips of early fetuses ‘walking’, crying and smiling in the womb?) Manfred Frings does not, it seems to me, take the time to distinguish clearly these two questions (i.e., whether it is our inability to perceive signs of personhood or actual ontological non-personhood that is the reason for the killing/murder distinction discussed by Scheler), and Frings concludes too quickly in the ontological direction. See Manfred S. Frings, *The Mind of Max Scheler*, (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1997), 48-49. And while John Paul II in *The Gospel of Life*, para. 60 is arguing for the personhood of the embryo, he nonetheless begins by granting a certain empirical difficulty when he says, “Even if the presence of a spiritual soul cannot be ascertained by empirical data, the results themselves of scientific research on the human embryo provide a valuable indication for discerning by the use of reason a personal presence at the moment of the first appearance of a human life: how could a human individual not be a human person?” I grant that what Scheler says on 1973a, 478 sounds like a clear ontological statement taking full personhood away from younger children, “Only a child who has ‘come of age’ is a person in the full sense…The basic phenomenon of coming
of age consists in the ability to experience insight into the difference between one’s own and someone else’s acts, willing, feeling, thinking…”. However, I also think that further work along the lines of the textual analysis of Sanford, 2005, and further study about the exact sense in which the individual value essence is determined by the Divine Being could lead to a contradiction of Scheler against Scheler on this point. Whatever the final verdict is on Scheler’s position concerning the personhood of minimally or non-conscious humans – which is by no means decided as of yet – Philip Blosser has rightly stated that all of the thinkers after Scheler who belong to his school are clear that the being of persons is not reducible to their conscious awareness, “Yet while defending the irreducible subjectivity of persons, Crosby, Josef Seifert, and others like them in the realistic phenomenological tradition of Dietrich von Hildebrand, Karol Wojtyła and Edith Stein, insist no less on distinguishing ‘being’ from ‘subjectivity.’ While recognizing that personal being actualizes itself in subjectivity, they deny it exhausts itself in subjectivity. Thus, they typically maintain that a metaphysics of substance is capable of a personalist, phenomenological articulation.” Philip Blosser, “Scheler’s Concept of the Person Against Its Kantian Background.” In Max Scheler’s Acting Persons, New Perspective, edited by Stephen Schneck (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002), 59. For examples of this see, Seifert, 1997, chapters 3 and 4, and Crosby, 2004, chapter 6, titled, “Person and Consciousness.”

Crosby continues: “The principle of incommunicability asserts itself more strongly, so to say, in the unrepeatable lovableness of a person. This is why we lack any general terms to express the lovableness of a particular person; we keenly experience here the ineffability, the unutterability of the incommunicable. But our language and concepts do not fail us in the same way when it comes to the dignity of the person; after all ‘the dignity of the person’ is a general term. It is as if I recognize a human being as person as when I am mindful of his dignity and show him respect and abstain from all coercion and using, but recognize a human being as this particular person when I know him or her as friend or spouse.” 1996, 67.


This situation was described in a profile piece on Singer by Michael Specter entitled, “The Dangerous Philosopher,” on September 6, 1999 in The New Yorker, 46-55.

Here are his words, in full: “Suppose, however, that it were crystal clear that the money could do more good elsewhere. Then I would be doing
wrong in spending it on my mother, just as I do wrong when I spend, on myself
or my family, money that could do more good if donated to an organization
that helps people in much greater need than we are. I freely admit to not doing
all that I should; but I could do it, and the fact that I do not do it does not vitiate
the claim that it is what I should do.” Peter Singer, “Outsiders: our obligations
to those beyond our borders,” in *The Ethics of Assistance*, ed. Deen Chatterjee
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004) 29. One must also add that
this text is sophistical. Selecting concepts such as “spending money on my
mother,” “spending money on myself,” and “doing more good,” while leaving
out any reference to killing his mother serves as a rhetorical device to direct
the reader into focusing on the choice between giving money and not giving
money to the poor – when in fact it is a question of killing someone in order
to thereby give money to the poor. His critics want to know why he did not do
that, and sophistically evaded that question.

67 Specter, 55.
68 See Crosby, 2004, 23-24 for an expression of how this extension
of awareness is rightly applied to the moral life. See also Crosby, 1996, 66.
69 Sanford, 2002, 176.
71 I have outlined this view as it appears in several authors and
developed a response in Colosi, 2003, 11 ff.
72 J.J.C. Smart, “An Outline of a System of Morality,” In
*Utilitarianism: For and Against*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1973), 71.
74 Scheler, 1973a, 253-54.
75 Samuel Scheffler, *The Rejection of Consequentialism* (Oxford,
76 Scheffler, 111.
77 Scheffler, 112-13.
78 To those who would accuse me of doing nothing more than
appealing to emotions, I would answer that rather than appealing to emotions,
I am simply exploring an objective aspect of persons in the way we encounter
them. This dimension of personal being, when grasped accurately, tends to
cause a deep movement in one’s affections. But my writing about it, strictly
speaking, is not the cause of the emotions, except insofar as I am causing the
reader to think about a loved one. It is the unique inner being and preciousness
of that loved one that is the real cause of those feelings. If one demands a
rational proof for those feelings, and insists that nothing I have said will be
accepted until that proof is produced, then I can only answer that I cannot
help you, except to say the following. Please ponder the face of someone
you love, and realize that you are in touch with a real and ultimate reality for
which no words are adequate, but which you know that you know through
love. You have no reason to doubt this knowledge, and least of all because no
philosopher can construct a proof for you.
79 Scheffler, 112.
80 Scheffler, 112.
81 “...I hope these readers will also agree that there are reasons to be worried about agent-centered restrictions, and feel challenged to identify that rationale for the restrictions which has so far eluded our grasp.” Scheffler, 114.
82 Scheffler, 112.
83 Smart, 71.
84 Smart, 71. Despite Smart’s assertion on this page that he is not contradicting his utilitarianism, the very concept of injustice, exactly as he employs it, flies in the face of the non-cognitivism underlying his utilitarianism.
85 Richard J. Arneson attempted such a defense and admitted defeat in “What, if Anything, Renders all Humans Morally Equal?” In Singer and His Critics. Ed. Dale Jamieson (Oxford, UK: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), 123. Singer, in his response to Arneson in the same book on page 296, said that it is now high time to realize that “there is a good deal to be inferred from the failure of all this philosophical activity to find a sound defence of speciesism.” (By speciesism can be understood in this context the intuition that just since another person belongs to our species we feel an intuition not to kill that person.)
86 Scheler, 1973a, 68.
87 Cited in de Lubac, 172.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Cited in de Lubac, 172.
92 I am grateful to Angele Solis, Joshua Miller, and Maria Fedoryka for their comments on an earlier version of this paper.
93 Pope John Paul II, Memory and Identity (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 2005), 42.
95 Wojtyła, (1981), 143 - 144.

101 Scheler, 1973b, 32.

102 Pope John Paul II, *Mulieris Dignitatem*, (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 1988), para. 18. It seems to me that the quote above from *Rise, Let Us Be On Our Way*, 65-66 reveals that John Paul II conceives of himself in all of his relations with others in exactly this way that he claims is the fruit of the genius of *women*, but he is a *man*. And, I think, we would have to admit that in John Paul II we have one of the most striking examples of this ability - namely, to love the individual and to express this to the whole world - in the history of mankind. Thus, it would be interesting to investigate whether it could be shown that John Paul II is *not* saying that it is a female trait to focus on the individual, but that it is a personal trait required equally of men and women, but women are more in tune with this ability because of maternity. On that view men could learn from women, but it would not imply that love and awareness of each individual is a “female trait” in an ontological sense.

103 Scheler, 1973a, 537.

104 Wojtyła, 1979a, 98-99.

105 This conference was convened by the State of Qatar to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the UN’s International Year of the Family.


**Works Cited**


Bendern, Liechtenstein: The International Academy of Philosophy.


Chapter 4
The Travels of Pope John Paul II: A Phenomenology of Place

John E. Allard, O.P.

INTRODUCTION

The international travels of the late Pope John Paul II became legendary, at least in part, by reason of their sheer number. The Vatican website reports 104 pastoral visitations outside the borders of Italy from January 1979 until August 2004. On occasion, two or more visitations were conducted in immediate succession as part of the same journey; there were at least eighteen trips of this sort. For example, in 1981 the itinerary for one trip brought the Pope to Pakistan, the Philippine Islands, Guam, Japan, and Anchorage. Yet it was not the proliferation of excursions or the variety of destinations alone that made these events notable. Often displaying the marks of a pilgrimage, these journeys helped to define John Paul’s pontificate and establish a relationship with the world that transcended the membership of the Roman Catholic Church.

For the late Pope, travel was the occasion for exercising the act of presence and provided the opportunity for establishing a profound unity with others. The Pope’s speeches during his international visits exhibited a strong regard for the identity and character of a place, so much so that one observes in his remarks an implicit phenomenology of place. As such, they suggest that the phenomenological thinking of John Paul II extended even to this aspect of his pontificate. Rather than intending to set forth a theory of place distilled from the philosophical or the theological works of the late Pontiff, this study seeks to “read” and interpret John Paul’s practice of international pastoral visits for the light it can shed on the human experience of place.

PHENOMENOLOGY AND PLACE

The experience of being situated vis-à-vis something other than oneself is unavoidable: it is constitutive of experiencing and being. As Edward Casey notes in The Fate of Place, “we are immersed in [place] and could not do without it.” He continues: “To be at all – to exist in any way – is to be somewhere, and to be somewhere is to be in some kind of place.” To speak in this way is to suggest, with regard to the term place, the characteristics of specificity and particularity. By contrast, the related term space designates an extended volume or area of indefinite dimensions; it suggests abstraction or a generality that encompasses a range of possible instantiations. It is, nonetheless, inadequate to understand place as simply one’s surroundings,
or *space* as an indifferent container for the location of an object.\(^4\) Maurice Merleau-Ponty makes this point when speaking of space: space is not a pre-existing void in which objects occur; rather, space is a means of positing things. Within it lies power:

Space is not the setting (real or logical) in which things are arranged, but the means whereby the positing of things becomes possible. This means that instead of imagining it [space] as a sort of ether in which all things float, or conceiving it abstractly as a characteristic that they [things] have in common, we must think of it as the universal power enabling them to be connected.\(^5\)

Space and, by implication, place point to the connectedness of things. As such, space makes demands upon us. It summons us to notice ourselves in it, and it makes this summons by way of our physical senses. Thus, Merleau-Ponty argues that by perceiving space, the human subject accomplishes the establishment of oneself “in a setting” and, with that, one’s “inherence in a world.”\(^6\) To exercise an awareness of space (and, by extension, place) is a constructive act, one which establishes the presence of the self in that place.

For Elisabeth Ströker, the constructive aspect of being in a space offers the person expressive possibilities. She describes this in connection with her discussion of “attuned space,” i.e., the space in which the human subject and the place interact reciprocally. The person moves in a manner that is both expressive of oneself and in keeping with the nature of that space in which the movement occurs. Yet, as a person moves in attunement with a given space, the space becomes defined by the movement. The existence of the space as a holder of meaning depends upon this movement; it “becomes a space, in its specific attunement through my movement.”\(^7\) The gesture is suited to the space, and the space is suited to the gesture, and in this mutuality, creative expression can occur. Ströker illustrates this reciprocal, expressive relationship through a consideration of dance. Dance at once requires space and is the coming-to-be of the space in which the dance occurs.\(^8\) It need hardly be added that theatre and liturgy exhibit the same dynamics vis-à-vis the spaces in which they occur.

These reflections, however brief, suggest the following point: one’s interaction with a place offers opportunities for perceiving and making oneself present to a place; for creative expression; and for experiencing the connection with things or persons beyond oneself that a place empowers. Furthermore, movement and expressive activity bring about “attuned space;” they transform, as it were, generic space into identifiable place. The acts of perceiving and being present, not to mention acts of creative expression and the experience of being connected to realities beyond the boundaries of the self, constitute defining moments both for the human subject and for the place involved. Accordingly, the travels of John Paul II warrant examination with regard to three aspects: the identification of his own presence; the constructive
and expressive activity of acknowledging his surroundings; and the power of place to connect the subject with realities beyond oneself.

JOHN PAUL II AND PERSONAL PRESENCE

The speeches delivered in the course of John Paul’s journeys typically began with the recognition that he was situated in a place with others. Present in a locale that was foreign to him, he nonetheless spoke as one who already enjoyed a relationship with the people there. Consider, for instance, these words in Miami in 1987: “It is a great joy for me once again to be in your country, and I thank you for your warm welcome. I am deeply grateful to you all.” With the expression of both a personal feeling (“great joy”) and gratitude, he chose the status of a guest, rather than the more formal role of a visiting dignitary or diplomat, as his mode of being with others. Later on that same visit, he again sounded the themes of receiving a welcome and arriving as a guest: “It is a great joy for me to come to the Diocese of Charleston. I thank you for receiving me with such warmth and fraternal love. Your famous ‘southern hospitality’ makes me feel at home.” Praise in honor of a locale is not an unusual trope in such situations, but these were not the words of formality. They were, instead, the words of one who placed himself in a milieu and willingly received what came forth to him.

This insistence on the interaction of person with place is particularly striking in John Paul’s words upon being welcomed at Damascus in 2001. He stated:

I am deeply aware that I am visiting a very ancient land, which has played a vital role in the history of this part of the world. Syria’s literary, artistic and social contribution to the flourishing of culture and civilization is renowned.

The language in praise of the place is obvious, but so is the expression of a personal attitude, that of respect for the place. Again, John Paul made of himself an engaged, personal subject. And it is in terms of respect that one might interpret his characteristic kissing of the ground upon arrival in a country. Speaking of this gesture in his 2001 visit to Kazakhstan, the Pope remarked:

It is with affection that I kiss this Land, which has given rise to a multi-ethnic state, heir to numerous centuries-old spiritual and cultural traditions, and now on the move to new social and economic objectives.

The gesture was intended to take in and affirm a diverse set of realities: culture, religion, the current aspirations of the people, and the country’s multi-ethnic character. This last item, with its reference to the work of cooperation
and partnership among peoples of differing ethnic background, was a particularly valued feature of place, as the discussion below will indicate.

The role of guest was not, however, the only one that John Paul assigned to himself. He also defined himself as a pilgrim. An entire class of trips at the time of the millennial jubilee was billed as a set of pilgrimages. He verbalized this specifically in Damascus: “I come as a pilgrim of faith.” The meaning of his pilgrimage went beyond his presence in and attention to sites associated with the origins of the Christian faith. His purposes included an awareness of the human needs of his surroundings: “my pilgrimage is also an ardent prayer of hope: hope that among the peoples of the region fear will turn to trust; and contempt to mutual esteem; that force will give way to dialogue; and that a genuine desire to serve the common good will prevail.”

While an exhaustive identification and discussion of the roles by which John Paul made himself present to others is not possible here, at least one more deserves mention because of John Paul’s manner of associating the people he addressed with his pastoral role. The imagery invoked in the locution suggests the role of one who is a companion on a journey. Speaking upon his arrival in Mexico in 1999, John Paul thanked the people for their presence to him in his pontificate:

Since the time they welcomed me 20 years ago with open arms and filled with hope, the Mexican people have accompanied me on many of the paths I have taken. I have met Mexicans at the Wednesday General Audiences and at the great events which the Church has celebrated in Rome and elsewhere in America and throughout the world.

The images of paths taken and of accompaniment suggest a partnership of sorts, one that affords support at the same time that it occasions a shared experience. The exercise of the papacy, including the apostolic visitations, is thus described as a shared reality constituted by movement, place, and presence.

HUMAN HISTORY AND TRANSCENDENCE

Margaret Melady has noted the late Pope’s use of his apostolic journeys as a tool “to interpret the relationship between the sacred and the secular” for audiences unfamiliar with identifying the sacred in their lives. She maintains that by means of this strategy John Paul undertook the challenge of fashioning a new way of pointing out the sacred to those who lived in a largely secular milieu. Indeed, the speeches acknowledge past history and the current state of affairs, on the one hand, and introduce an opening to transcendence, on the other. For John Paul, the positing of things included not only pointing to and acknowledging a past or a tradition; it also included the articulation of transcendence, of going beyond history and the present, insofar
as there were additional realities to be recognized. Thus, during a visit to Al-
Maghtas (Jericho) in 2000, John Paul drew attention to both the history of the
place and the presence of the divine:

For many thousands of years, this area around Jericho has
been a human habitat. It is near here that we find the remains
of the oldest city yet discovered. But its memory becomes
still richer when we turn to Holy Scripture, which shows
Jericho as a place which bears the footprint not only of man
but of God himself. . . . I see Jesus passing on his way to
the Holy City where he would die and rise again; I see him
opening the eyes of the blind man as he passes by. 18

Both the historical, material record of human habitation and the
spiritual record of revelation are brought into the discussion of Jericho. Rather
than standing at odds with one another, the historical reality and transcendence
co-exist and even bear a relationship of mutuality to one another.

As presented by John Paul, a geographical place was capable of rooting
historical action and marking that action’s transcendental character. In 1997,
the millennial anniversary of the martyrdom of St. Adalbert, evangelizer to the
Polish people, occasioned John Paul’s visit to the shrine of the saint. The Pope
made mention of two instances in which the historical and the transcendent
coincided. The first of these pertained to Adalbert himself. As the location
of a saint’s relics, the shrine memorialized the historical event of the life and
martyrdom of St. Adalbert, who offered his life in the work of evangelizing
the Poles. This was also an ultimate act of self-transcendence, of passing
beyond oneself and indeed one’s physical existence in service to the Gospel.
Another moment of self-transcendence, of a different sort and pertaining to
the life and pastoral service of John Paul himself, was also associated with
this place. During a previous visit in 1979 to Gniezno, home to the relics of
St. Adalbert, John Paul articulated his intuition of the role he might play under
the direction of the Holy Spirit working within the Church. Looking back at
the event from his vantage point in 1997, John Paul recalled:

Today, eighteen years later, we should return to that homily
in Gniezno, which in a certain sense became the programme
of my pontificate. . . . I said then: Is it not Christ’s will, is it not
what the Holy Spirit disposes, that this Polish Pope, this Slav
Pope, should at this precise moment manifest the spiritual
unity of Christian Europe? We know that the Christian unity
of Europe is made up of two great traditions, of the West and
of the East. 19

This was a moment of transcending self by embracing one’s vocation
and thereby putting oneself at the disposal of God’s activity. Although pointing
to the transcendent, the place situated the experience in history.
PLACE AND WORLD UNITY

References to solidarity and the world-wide community in the papal speeches suggest a third aspect in the phenomenology of place, as sketched above: place as the power to draw things into connection. John Paul’s communication was not only with the persons in his immediate presence. It was also a communication, by way of mass media and word of mouth, with others who were outside of or beyond the locale of the gathering. More telling, however, was his practice of speaking of place and event in such a way as to identify a unity between his audience and others located at varying physical distances away. For instance, at the 46th Eucharistic Congress (Poland, 1997), John Paul described the city of Wroclaw as “the meeting point of three lands. . . It is, as it were, a city of encounter, a city that unites. Here there meet in a certain way the spiritual traditions of East and West.”

In this instance, the Pope recognized the city, in virtue of its specially situated geography, as offering an invitation to human encounter and a sharing of traditions that could promote unity. Place, in effect, held spiritual power.

Speaking of St. Adalbert during the same 1997 visit, John Paul suggested that the shrine at Gniezno was a cultural and spiritual anchor for all of Europe:

The baptism of the nation [Poland] in 966, at the time of Mieszko I, was confirmed by the blood of the Martyr. And not only this: with him Poland became part of the family of European countries. . . Adalbert is thus a great patron of our continent, then in the process of unification in the name of Christ. Both by his life and his death, the Holy Martyr laid the foundations of Europe’s identity and unity.

The significance of place and historical personage reached out beyond the locale and stood as efficacious fonts of unity and inclusion.

John Paul, however, was not averse to pointing to dislocations between places, and the absence of unity. Such was the case when he acknowledged, on the one hand, world hunger, and, on the other, the need for conscience and human solidarity. At the Eucharistic Congress mentioned above, he urged awareness of the dimensions of the problem and a careful evaluation of human responsibility. Referring to a “geography of hunger,” he pointedly stated: “In an age of unprecedented development, of advanced systems and technology, the tragedy of hunger is a great challenge and a great indictment!” He then urged “a serious and worldwide examination of conscience – an examination of conscience regarding social justice, elementary solidarity among human beings.”

Geographic places and the people inhabiting them do not exist in isolation from one another. Rather, John Paul regarded a geographic place and the accompanying culture as possessing a dynamism directed toward unity with a larger world beyond oneself and one’s group. To meditate upon the significance of a place was to notice its connection with other places, the
contribution it made to the world, and the human solidarity that it promoted. Unity among different peoples existed by reason of spiritual realities that connected them one to another. Although unseen, these realities existed at a human level, manifested in the gift of one’s culture, the human desire for freedom (acknowledged in other speeches) and the Christian patrimony of Europe. These same gifts could be placed in jeopardy by injustice, neglect and sin. To remedy such failings, John Paul recommended the development of human solidarity and the working of conscience, the conditions that would promote personal responsibility and action.

CONCLUSION: JOHN PAUL’S ACHIEVEMENT

John Paul’s manner of visitation was in keeping with his philosophical understanding of place as the inevitable accompaniment to human, bodily being. Place, to borrow Merleau-Ponty’s language, has the power to draw persons forth, to invite them to establish their presence and to participate in meaningful communication with one another. For the late Pontiff, travel was not simply transitus. Rather, when encountering a place, John Paul supplied a committed personal presence and the acknowledgement of a tradition or a past. In addition, he contributed an awareness of the ubiquitously transcendent character of human life. Taken together, these features of his comportment reflect a phenomenological understanding of place that supported the Pope’s meaning-making in the context of his pastoral visits.

At the same time, presence, acknowledgement and expressive awareness enabled the Pope to foster a sense of his own solidarity with others. By such means, John Paul went about establishing a personal relationship with those present for the gatherings that were part of a pastoral visitation. Furthermore, this relationship was consistently extended to other observers not physically present. By rooting itself in the specificity of place, his apostolic visitation expressed a sign of solidarity that was capable of extending into unmeasured space and embracing the human family at large.

NOTES


2 Edward S. Casey, The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), ix.

3 Ibid.

4 For a further discussion of the historical and philosophical distinction between the two terms see, e.g., Edward S. Casey, Getting Back into Place: Toward a Renewed Understanding of the Place-World (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), xiii-xv.


10 John Paul II, “Christ, Center of the Church,” Address to representatives of the Catholic Church in South Carolina – St. Peter’s Church, Columbia, September 11, 1987, in *ibid.*, 46. Emphasis as it appears in the text.


15 *Ibid.* Emphasis as it appears in the text.


Chapter 5

Pope John Paul II and the Natural Law

Paul Kucharski

Throughout his pontificate, Pope John Paul II brought his unique philosophical outlook to matters of Church doctrine, especially in the area of ethics and morality. Although a student and proponent of the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, he nonetheless attempted to assimilate in his philosophical outlook elements of modern philosophy which he saw as valuable for developing a complete philosophical understanding of the human person. Thus, one sees the influence of such philosophers as Max Scheler and Immanuel Kant in his writings, in addition to thinkers like Aristotle and Aquinas. Mindful of the considerable differences between the classical and modern approaches, one can raise the question as to how John Paul understands the philosophical defense of the principles of morality, especially the classical justification of moral norms through the natural law. What is his position on the status or efficacy of the natural law, especially in light of his attempts to defend the Church’s teachings on ethics through a different approach, namely, through a personalistic philosophy with a strong phenomenological influence? That is, in his own attempt to synthesize approaches that some see as irreconcilable, is he still committed to the lively metaphysical assumptions of natural law ethics, or has he replaced them with the new personalistic understanding as a better way to get to the traditional conclusions he seems intent on preserving? This paper will explore the Pope’s understanding of the natural law and suggest reasons for why he wishes to supplement natural law justifications of moral norms with personalistic justifications. We will proceed in this matter by first examining his reflections on the natural law and on Aquinas’s anthropology and notion of personhood; then we will move toward exploring John Paul’s own contributions to the discussion of personhood and the formulation of a personalistic ethics.

JOHN PAUL’S DEFENSE OF THE CLASSICAL NATURAL LAW THEORY

Before examining why John Paul apparently sees the need to supplement natural law justifications of moral norms with personalistic justifications, one must first recognize that he is a defender of classical natural law theory and an advocate of its application to ethical problems. We will establish this point in two ways: first, by examining a philosophical defense he gives for the natural law against those who posit a conflict between natural law and the human person; secondly, by observing his advocacy and use of natural law precepts in the encyclical *Veritatis Splendor*.

While at the Catholic University of Lublin, John Paul II, then Karol
Paul Wojtyła, presented a paper entitled “The Human Person and Natural Law,” his goal being to resolve an apparent conflict posed by certain thinkers between the person and natural law. In this paper, he begins by noting the likely motives of those against whose views he is writing: “I think that those who spontaneously reject natural law are spontaneously rising up in defense of the special character of human action, in defense of the reality of both the action of the person and the person as such. I say spontaneously, because they are not always justified in doing so.” His goal is to demonstrate that the alleged conflict between personhood and natural law is in fact illusory because it only arises when one rejects a “metaphysical” conception of nature in favor of a “phenomenological” conception (or, as he says in Veritatis Splendor, a “reductive” conception of nature).

This distinction (between a metaphysical and phenomenological conception of nature) might not be clear at first, so we shall take a few moments to outline exactly what John Paul means by this distinction before examining how these differing conceptions of nature impact one’s outlook on the compatibility between natural law and personhood. If one understands nature in a phenomenological sense, the term refers to the “subject of instinctive actualization.” From a phenomenological perspective, in other words, “when we say that something happens by nature, we are more immediately emphasizing that it happens, that it is actualized, and not that someone performs an action or that someone acts.” Such a conception of nature stems from observing the regular activities and processes that take place throughout the physical world, and from experiencing the psychic and somatic happenings that occur in a human being without one’s consent or creative participation. According to John Paul, the phenomenological understanding of nature leads to a conception of human nature which is completely reducible to the biological, to the human body and its make-up and processes. This understanding of nature (and specifically human nature) “excludes the person as an acting subject.” As John Paul observes: “A conflict between person and nature does arise here in a certain sense: nature as the source of such actualization excludes the person. The person, in turn, as the source of a particular kind of actualization, and, concretely, as the source of actions or deeds, stands above nature and is in a certain sense opposed to nature.” On this view, the freedom intrinsic to personhood is seen as something that must assert itself and overcome one’s biological nature, which merely serves as the “raw material for human activity and for its power.”

The alleged conflict between person and nature is sometimes extended into a conflict between person and natural law. John Paul states: “In this context, objections of physicalism and naturalism have been leveled against the traditional conception of the natural law, which is accused of presenting as moral laws what are in themselves mere biological laws. Consequently, in too superficial a way, a permanent and unchanging character would be attributed to certain kinds of human behavior, and, on the basis of this, an attempt would be made to formulate universally valid moral norms.” These objections arose especially in relation to the release of the encyclical
Humanae Vitae and to the Magisterium’s overall positions on sexual and conjugal ethics, the implication being that the Church forbids such acts as contraception, direct sterilization, homosexuality and artificial insemination solely on a naturalistic interpretation of the human body and its processes and impulses. Such critics argue that the rejection of these acts as legitimate moral options reflects a failure to acknowledge that the body merely serves as the “raw material” for human activity and the exercise of our rationality and freedom. In sum, those adhering to a phenomenological or reductive account of human nature see natural law as an attempt to generate moral norms from a system that excludes a human’s participation as a free and rational agent.

John Paul believes that the above conflict between natural law and personhood can be resolved if we adhere to a metaphysical account of nature, rather than a phenomenological or reductive account. He defines nature in the metaphysical sense as “the essence of a thing taken as the basis of all the actualization of the thing.” In other words, the nature of a thing is its essence, that which makes it what it is substantially (or that which allows it to be placed within a given species). Because of its nature or essence, we find in a thing intrinsic inclinations or tendencies that help guide it toward achieving its telos, the function or end proper to it as the kind of thing that it is. Given this understanding of nature, the concept of human nature refers to “the person himself in the unity of soul and body, in the unity of his spiritual and biological inclinations and of all the other specific characteristics necessary for the pursuit of his end.” In this view, human nature is not simply reducible to the body and the biological processes which occur without our creative activity; rather, human nature refers to all that can be found in a human being, including the spiritual capacities for rational thought and free will. This notion of nature (and specifically human nature), therefore, does not exclude the creative energy of the person as an acting subject because it is by virtue of one’s human nature that one is able to reflect rationally on the bodily and spiritual inclinations present in humanity and freely choose to actualize one’s potential for becoming a proper functioning human being. John Paul makes this point in a positive manner by speaking of the integration of personhood and nature: “Nature in the metaphysical sense is integrated in the person. Boethius, and the whole Thomistic school after him, defined the person in the following way: person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Nature in this sense is integrated in the person.”

If there is no real conflict between personhood and nature, John Paul thinks, then by extension we can be confident that there is no real conflict between personhood and the natural law. Following Aquinas, he observes that all creatures in the universe are subject to the eternal law, to Godrationally directing creatures toward their proper ends through natural inclinations and impulses, and in this respect, human persons are no different from other creatures. We have various inclinations at the biological and spiritual levels, and these inclinations are intended by God to guide us to our proper end as human beings. However, unlike all other creatures, human persons have the ability to acknowledge these inclinations and decide whether or not to pursue
them. In other words, in relation to human persons, the natural law operates through one’s free choice and active participation. Thus, John Paul concludes that despite the claims of some critics, the natural law is more than mere biological laws masquerading as moral laws: rather, as Aquinas says, natural law is the participation of human reason in the eternal law. As John Paul states in *Veritatis Splendor*, the natural law is the manner in which “God calls man to participate in his own providence, since he desires to guide the world - not only the world of nature but also the world of human persons - through man himself, through man’s reasonable and responsible care.”

**JOHN PAUL’S POSITIVE USE OF THE NATURAL LAW**

In his reflections on the natural law, John Paul not only defends its compatibility with the freedom and creative energy typically associated with personhood, but also makes positive use of the natural law in defending traditional Catholic moral teachings. This shows, I think, that for the Pope the natural law approach to ethics is not merely an acceptable but outdated or ineffective mode of moral reasoning; rather, it is still a relevant and effective way of discussing moral issues which should be promoted in the Church today. John Paul’s positive use of natural law reasoning is found especially in chapter two of the encyclical *Veritatis Splendor*. For our present purposes, I will focus on his use of the natural law to criticize those who deny the universality of moral norms and his confidence in the natural law’s ability to generate both negative and positive precepts.

Being an astute observer of current intellectual tendencies, John Paul notes in *Veritatis Splendor* that it is a popular trend to deny the universality and unchanging nature of the moral law; according to this view, the moral law is rather a by-product of particular societies or cultures. The problem with that position, John Paul contends, is that a human person becomes exhaustively defined by the society in which he lives. He combats this claim by stating that human nature transcends and measures culture; if this were not the case, we would have nothing by which to measure the progress of our culture or to criticize the morality of cultures that are not our own. By deriving moral laws from human nature, natural law theory safeguards the dignity and rights of the human person from the dangers inherent in a system of cultural moral relativism, John Paul expresses confidence that the natural law is sufficient for establishing the positive and negative precepts necessary for an ethical system. When discussing the negative precepts of the natural law, he
notes that they are universally valid, binding every human being in every circumstance, and he gives the following reason for doing so: “It is a matter of prohibitions which forbid a given action *semper et pro semper*, without exception, because the choice of this kind of behavior is in no case compatible with the goodness of the will of the acting person, with his vocation to life with God and to communion with his neighbor.” However, one should not conclude from the universal binding nature of the negative precepts that they are more important than the command to do good enjoined by the positive precepts. The positive precepts of the moral law are not universally binding only because circumstances can both adversely affect the moral goodness of an action (whereas circumstances can never justify the carrying out of an intrinsically evil action) and prevent a person from performing an intended good action.

What are the positive precepts of the natural law to which John Paul refers? These are the moral imperatives to action that result from reason’s reflection on the primary moral precept, “do good and avoid evil,” coupled with its reflection on the natural and good inclinations proper to human nature (inclinations which include those shared with all beings, those shared with animals, and those proper to rational beings alone). In *Veritatis Splendor*, we find such traditional examples as the precept to promote the transmission and preservation of life, to refine and develop the riches of the natural world, to cultivate social life, to seek truth, to practice good and to contemplate beauty.

According to John Paul, such positive precepts are unchanging and “unite in the same common good all people of every period of history, created for the same ‘divine calling and destiny.’”

**JOHN PAUL’S ANALYSIS OF THE THOMISTIC ACCOUNT OF PERSONHOOD**

Now that we have given a brief overview of John Paul’s defense and advocacy of the natural law, we can turn again to the question of why he believes it necessary or desirable to supplement the natural law with personalism. We begin to see an answer to this question upon reviewing his analysis and critique of the Thomistic concept of the person. This analysis and critique can be found in another paper delivered at the Catholic University of Lublin entitled “Thomistic Personalism.”

John Paul begins this paper by noting that Aquinas presents a clear and well-defined treatment of the person, but not a treatment of personalism, for the problem of personalism is an issue that surfaces much later in the history of philosophy. What is the meaning of personalism? According to John Paul: “Its meaning is largely practical and ethical: it is concerned with the person as a subject and an object of activity, as a subject of rights, etc.” Personalism, one might say, is the examination of personhood through human experience and personal subjectivity, and John Paul states as the goal of his paper the examination of St. Thomas’ notion of the person in an attempt to see if it allows for a doctrine of personalism.
Aquinas himself adopts Boethius’ definition of the person (person as an individual substance of a rational nature) but uses it mainly in his theological treatises dealing with the doctrine of the Trinity and the doctrine of the hypostatic union of Christ’s human and divine natures. In his *Treatise on Man*, St. Thomas focuses primarily on the nature common to all human beings as composites of form and matter. Nonetheless, the traditional definition of personhood is philosophical, and John Paul notes that Aquinas is able to use this definition to obtain “a philosophical access to the concept of a personal God, based upon an analysis of created reality.” Aquinas does this by first noting that what limited knowledge of God’s essence we are able to achieve comes from creatures, for what is good in the created world must exist most perfectly in God. He then states that the human person is the highest perfection in creation; therefore, we can have at least some access to a philosophical conception of a personal God because personhood must exist most perfectly in God if it exists in God’s creatures.

The human person has a rational nature because (based on a hylomorphic definition of man) a rational soul serves as the substantial form of the human being. John Paul points out that this rational soul is also the reason a human being is considered a person: “This [substantial form] is a rational soul (anima rationalis), the principle and source of the whole spirituality of the human being, and, therefore, also that by virtue of which the human being may properly be ascribed the character of a person.” The rational soul is the principle of life and activity for a human person; it fulfills this function by means of certain faculties. The two faculties which contribute the most to the development of a human being’s personality are reason and free will: “The faculties that express and actualize the soul’s spirituality, and thus the human being’s spirituality, are reason and free will. They are also the principal means, so to speak, whereby the human person is actualized; based on their activity, the whole psychological and moral personality takes shape.” The other faculties of the human soul, however, also contribute to the development of the psychological and moral personality; these are the sensory faculties which arise from the presence of matter in the human being. John Paul concludes his review of the Thomistic concept of personhood by stating that for St. Thomas, the perfection of the human being (and thus the development of the person or personality) depends on the proper use of all the faculties present.

After this appreciative beginning, he moves toward criticizing St. Thomas’s concept of the person. He does this in an indirect manner by first comparing it to the view of the person promulgated by modern, post-Cartesian philosophy. Modern philosophy tends to divide the human being into an extended substance (the body) and a thinking substance (the soul), which no longer form an undivided whole. This division leads to “a gradual process of a kind of hypostatization of consciousness: consciousness becomes an independent subject of activity, and indirectly of existence, occurring somehow alongside the body, which is a material structure subject to the laws of nature, to natural determinism.” On such a model of the human being, the
person becomes identified with consciousness and the lived experiences of which consciousness is a “permanent component.”

John Paul is not uncritical of this theoretical understanding. Rather, he attacks this view on several levels, primarily because it fails to include the body “within the structural whole of the person’s life and activity.” However, he also believes that modern philosophy, though positing an incomplete picture of the human person, emphasizes an important element of the human person when it talks of consciousness and self-consciousness. According to John Paul, consciousness refers to a person’s awareness of her inner self, to the human personality in the psychological sense, while self-consciousness, which is connected with freedom, refers to a person’s awareness of herself as a moral agent and efficient cause of action, to the human personality in the moral sense. Does St. Thomas give an account of consciousness and self-consciousness? Not directly. For St. Thomas, consciousness and self-consciousness are derivative from one’s rational nature. A human person acts consciously through the rational intellect, and acts self-consciously through the activity of the will. According to John Paul, Aquinas’s treatment of the person is almost strictly objectivistic and does not offer an explicit analysis of consciousness and self-consciousness as “totally unique manifestations of the person as subject.” In other words, St. Thomas can account for the presence of consciousness and self-consciousness, and he does this by revealing the faculties proper to man (spiritual and sensory) by which we have the disposition to consciousness and self-consciousness. However, an explicit analysis of these manifestations seems impossible in his objective view of reality. John Paul concludes: “Thus St. Thomas gives an excellent view of the objective existence and activity of the person, but it would be difficult to speak in his view of the lived experiences of the person.”

Finally we have come to the heart of the Pope’s criticism of St. Thomas’ anthropology and his concept of the person: Aquinas is unable to give an analysis of subjective lived experience (which the Pope considers to be a rich and essential part of the human person) because his discussion of the person is almost entirely objective. It seems John Paul believes that a Thomistic metaphysical account of the human person (though invaluable and necessary) only manages to understand personhood in terms of nature or the powers and faculties present in the human being. According to Rocco Buttiglione, “St. Thomas provided fundamental principles which allow us adequately to understand the human person and thus his personal relation with himself, with other human persons, with things, and with God. Nonetheless . . . St. Thomas was driven to develop these principles in a way which is above all objectivism. He did not adequately develop the subjective side of the life of the person.” Thus, Aquinas provides the foundation for a philosophical personalism through his articulation of a human being’s freedom, intelligence, moral perfectibility, and moral accountability; John Paul wishes to build upon this foundation by giving an account of the dynamic relationship between these categories, especially as viewed from the subjective lived experience of the human person.
JOHN PAUL’S ATTEMPT TO ENRICH THE THOMISTIC UNDERSTANDING OF PERSONHOOD

How does the Pope suggest achieving this enriched view of the human person? By analyzing the subjectivity or inwardness of the person with the aid of the phenomenological method. The following passage shows the importance of the interior life for the Pope in his concept and definition of the person: “A person is an objective entity, which as a definite subject has the closest contacts with the whole (external) world and is most intimately involved with it precisely because of its inwardness, its interior life.” As Peter Simpson notes, the Pope begins his examination of this interior life with the belief that “the objective reality of the self as a personal subject is an immediate given of that subject’s own experience.” A person experiences himself as a personal subject (unique among all the individuals of his species) and as a subject of knowing and choosing; he recognizes his uniqueness as a subject because, unlike the other subjects in the world (plants and animals), a human has an interior spiritual life revolving around truth and goodness. Because of his interior life, man experiences himself as always striving to answer two fundamental questions: “what is the ultimate cause of reality?” and “how can I be good or possess the fullness of goodness?”

In his analysis of a human being’s interior life, in order to further facilitate discussion and understanding, John Paul introduces the category of lived experience, which is “not just the metaphysical objectification of the human being as an acting subject, as the agent of acts, but the revelation of the person as a subject experiencing its acts and inner happenings, and with them its own subjectivity.” This lived experience is described by John Paul as irreducible, and I take him to mean by this that a person’s lived experience cannot be reduced to an analysis of the faculties and activities of humanity as a species. By irreducible, he does not mean that we cannot give an objective account of a person’s lived experience. His purpose in introducing this category is to focus on the fact that a human being is an unrepeatable person because of the uniqueness of her interior life.

The emphasis present in John Paul’s philosophy (and the manner in which he attempts to facilitate a Thomistic understanding of personhood) is the study of the interior life of the person through the phenomenological description and analysis of subjective lived experience. He proposes to focus especially on a human’s interior experience of herself as choosing goods and desiring to be good (especially in light of his concern with ethics). John Paul notes that this experience of being the subject of choice and actually choosing “includes the power of self-determination, based on reflection, and manifested in the fact that a man acts from choice. This power is called free will.” Because a person possesses free will and the power of self-determination (which can be described as the power to be co-author of one’s destiny), he is incommunicable: no person’s act of will can be substituted for another person’s act of will.
It is by analyzing the lived experience of choosing various goods that John Paul formulates the personalistic norm which is so essential to his philosophy and ethics. He notes that because of the inherent dignity of human beings and their ability to understand and reason, men and women are able to use the vast resources of the world for their desired ends, as long as they respect God’s creation and do not waste or misuse these resources. However, one human being’s relationship with another human being involves a different dynamic because of the inherent dignity of each person. The personalistic norm thus states that a person should never be used merely as a means to an end for another person; in fact, not even God can use a person merely as a means to an end. Why is this the case? Because God gives human beings an intellect and a free will and thereby ordains that they should determine the ends of their activity; God directs human beings only in so far as he makes known to them the goals that are due to their nature that they might integrate these goals into their own person.\(^{34}\)

The most precise formulation of the personalistic norm is found in *Love and Responsibility*: “whenever a person is the object of your activity, remember that you may not treat that person as only the means to an end, as an instrument, but must allow for the fact that he or she, too, has, or at least should have, distinct personal ends.”\(^{35}\) How, then, can one person make another person the object of his act (which common experience tell us is inevitable) without violating the personalistic norm? This occurs when the freedoms inherent in each person meet in the striving after a common good. For it to be common, the good of the act must be mutually desired by the agent acting and the agent being acted upon, and, as Buttiglione observes, “the meeting of the wills which are orientated toward the good is the ethical substance of love.”\(^{36}\)

Despite John Paul’s introduction of personalistic principles as a means of supplementing a traditional Thomistic account of the person, we must always keep in mind that he acknowledges Aquinas’s understanding of the person as valid and necessary. In fact, John Paul’s personalism relies on a metaphysics or philosophy of being so as not to fall into the same dualistic error as Descartes and other modern philosophers. Though John Paul wishes the point of departure for his philosophy to be human being, it must begin with the human as a being (and thus presuppose a philosophy of being); Buttiglione expresses this necessity when he says that “to keep faith with the legitimate claim of modern thought, which wants to begin with man, one needs to specify from the first that that man from which one begins is a being, that is to say a creature, and thus to set the anthropological problem within the philosophy of being.”\(^{37}\) If the starting point is simply human being and human consciousness, philosophy will never be able to escape subjectivity into an objective world or moral order. Thus, when John Paul begins his philosophy with the human subject as a specific kind of being, he acknowledges the need for, and his acceptance of, a metaphysics which posits an objective order and hierarchy of being in reality and, because being and good are transcendental, an objective order and hierarchy of goods.
JOHN PAUL’S REASONS FOR SUPPLEMENTING NATURAL LAW THEORY

As stated at the outset, the purpose of this paper is to suggest reasons why John Paul II supplements natural law justifications of moral norms with personalistic justifications. After reviewing his commentary on St. Thomas’s anthropology (and suggesting where it can be filled out in order to give a full account of the human person), we are now in a position to posit some possible reasons for John Paul’s doing so. One possible reason is that he believes that the natural law is inadequate for generating all of the moral norms necessary for humanity. Is this the case? Does he think that there are certain moral norms which personalism alone can discover? From my reading of the Pope’s writings, I would argue that this is not the case. At the very least, it is clear that he does not see the natural law as unable to generate any positive precepts (a common criticism of the natural law). In the passages we have examined from *Veritatis Splendor*, he goes so far as to list some of these positive norms (the development of natural resources, the cultivation of social life, the contemplation of and striving after truth). As we have seen, human beings are able to discover positive moral norms through natural law reasoning because we have the ability to distinguish natural inclinations from perverted inclinations and thus promote and pursue those inclinations ordered to the good of humanity.

If the natural law can sufficiently generate the positive and negative precepts necessary to effectively guide human beings in pursuing the moral life, why, again, the need for personalism? The reason why John Paul II promotes personalism in addition to the natural law is because it places a greater emphasizes on the role of the person in the ethical act, especially from the perspective of one’s subjective inner experience of choosing the good. John Paul is in full agreement with St. Thomas Aquinas that there exists in reality an objective hierarchy of goods (corresponding to the objective order of being) with God as the highest good (the highest being), and that to achieve perfection the human being must choose the goods proper to his nature and, ultimately, God as the highest good. However, John Paul II believes that this hierarchy of goods and man’s choosing of the good has a subjective aspect as well; and, as Buttiglione observes, the subjective aspect “takes priority because the good is accomplished in concrete existence. The construction of the subjective order of values begins from the question: Which value will achieve at this moment in this situation the concrete perfection of the person which I am?”

Thus, when a human person is acting morally and choosing a good which coincides with his dignity as a human being, he is choosing an objective good which fulfills and perfects his nature, but he also has the subjective experience of choosing the good as good for him.

To illustrate the difference between the objective and subjective aspects of choosing a good, let me use the good of marriage as an aid. It can be known through the natural law that marriage is natural and an objective good for humans. When dealing with the question of whether or not matrimony is
of the natural law, St. Thomas states: “The Philosopher (Ethic. viii. 12) says that man is an animal more inclined by nature to connubial than political society. But man is naturally a political and gregarious animal, as the same author asserts (Polit. i. 2). Therefore he is naturally inclined to connubial union, and thus the conjugal union or matrimony is natural.” Thus, human beings can know through reason that marriage and conjugal relations are of the natural order; they are objective goods which help perfect human nature and can lead a person to the highest good, God. John Paul II supplements this argument with his personalistic description of the lived experience one inwardly feels for the good of marriage and conjugal relations. For the Pope, the experience of the sexual urge leads one to an inner realization of one’s natural dependency and incompleteness, as well as an awareness of the need for a person of the opposite sex: “If man would look deeply enough into his own nature through the prism of that need it might help him to understand his own limitation and inadequacy, and even, indirectly, what philosophy calls the contingent character of existence (contingentia).” Thus, when a man chooses the objective good of marriage to a woman, he also experiences the subjective awareness of choosing another person who will help to bring about this completion he needs; moreover, he experiences the subjective awareness of choosing this particular person who is loved for her own sake and is also seen as being able to bring about his own completion.

From the previous examples, we see the Pope’s implicit dissatisfaction with a strictly natural law justification of moral norms. Natural law, because it considers man as a rational animal with certain inclinations that, when promoted, lead to his perfection, does not deal adequately with the subjective aspect of the person; it does not describe how obeying the moral precepts dignifies and fulfills the individual person who (through her inner life) experiences herself as a subject who chooses, it only describes how obeying moral precepts leads to the perfection of a human understood as a member of a particular species.

The above argument for why John Paul uses personalism in support of the natural law can be supported and observed in an essay he wrote entitled “Catholic Sexual Ethics.” When speaking of the Church’s teaching on the permissiveness (under certain circumstances) of natural family planning and the absolute proscription of artificial contraception, John Paul notes the difficulty in offering a philosophical defense of this position. He attempts to justify this norm by “appealing to the order of nature (natural law) and the personalistic norm.” From a natural law perspective, the husband and wife, upon experience of the sexual urge, can know from reason that it would go against the order of nature to violate the nature and purpose of this urge by using artificial means to frustrate the possibility of procreation. However, when “they adapt themselves to the mode of operation of the urge and have sexual intercourse at a time when the woman is infertile, then, although they exclude the possibility of procreation . . . they certainly do not violate the nature of this urge, but only exercise rational control over its purpose.” Thus, because one can know through reason that the inclination to marriage
and conjugal intercourse is good and that procreation is one of the proper ends of the marital act and should not be violated, the natural law is able to offer a defense of this position. The Pope summarizes his thoughts on the efficacy of the argument: “With regard to...the argument from the order of nature, expressed here in the mode of operation and purpose of the sexual urge, is itself transparent and convincing. The difficulty lies in the lack of a clear connection with the person: the urge appears as something that merely ‘happens’ in the human being.”

John Paul offers a personalistic defense of the Church’s teaching on this matter by arguing that when a husband and wife participate in the act of artificial contraception, the act becomes a case where the agent of the act is using the object of the act as a means and not as an end; there is no love involved in this act. He further notes: “Such a way of relating to another person tends to ricochet back on the subject. For if we do not love the person in another human being, we thereby also degrade the person in ourselves.”

When a man and a wife participate in natural family planning, the personalistic norm is not violated. Thus, John Paul’s defense of the Church’s teaching from personalism emphasizes the subjective decision on the part of the persons involved: whether or not one person (in his experience as a subject of choosing) will choose to use the other unique, individual person involved as a means to an end (and thus degrade that person and himself), or whether he will choose to love the other person as an end.

In conclusion, I will offer a final, practical suggestion for why John Paul makes use of both the natural law and personalistic justifications of moral norms. We have seen that the Pope’s personalism relies on a Thomistic metaphysical account of the person and the hierarchy of being, that he advocates the use of natural law, and that the main reason he supplements the natural law with personalism is because this allows for an analysis of the subjective lived experience of the human person in the ethical act (which he believes to be of great importance, and as yet underdeveloped). It is here that we see the practical wisdom of John Paul II, because he recognizes that most people have no familiarity with metaphysical concepts; thus, the descriptive language of phenomenology and personalism is beneficial because it seems to be more accessible to those who have no metaphysical training. In addition, the Pope recognizes that our age is steeped in the influence of modern philosophy. It is prudent, then, to assimilate some of those concepts (i.e. consciousness, self-consciousness) which are now so familiar and to seek to obtain a Christian understanding of their significance.

NOTES

2 Ibid., 182.
3 Ibid.
5 *Ibid.*, 64.
6 Wojtyla, “The Human Person and Natural Law,” 182.
8 Wojtyla, “The Human Person and Natural Law,” 182.
33 Buttiglione, 89.
36 Buttiglione, 91.

40 Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, 48.
42 Ibid., 293.
43 Ibid., 294.
44 Ibid.
Chapter 6

Dives in Misericordia:
The Pivotal Significance of a Forgotten Encyclical

Richard H. Bulzacchelli

Much has been made, over the years, of John Paul II’s Thomistic training; but one might suggest, too much has been made of it. Encyclicals, such as Fides et Ratio\(^1\) and Veritatis Splendor,\(^2\) are often read as mere renewals of previous magisterial pronouncements of the neo-scholastic period during the century prior to the Second Vatican Council. In many important ways, of course, they are renewals of previous statements; for Aquinas has been heralded in Magisterial documents, especially since the time of Leo XIII.\(^3\) Even before that, we felt his influence in the language and method employed in the articulation of the Church’s teaching - for example, at the Council of Trent,\(^4\) and in the catechism promulgated as one of its post-conciliar documents.\(^5\) Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II occupies, to be sure, a place within the context of this tradition;\(^6\) but it would be a mistake to suggest that all of this represents a wholesale equation of Aquinas’ teaching with the teaching of the Church. Indeed, Aquinas clearly does not, of himself, set the parameters of orthodoxy; for while the Church adopts much of Aquinas’ method and language, she has frequently adapted Aquinas in ways better suited to the validation and expression of the Church’s broader Tradition of thought and piety\(^7\) — and at times, has even contradicted Aquinas outright.\(^8\) John Paul II occupies a place in this tradition as well.

This is what we propose to explore, then, in the present paper: the fact that while John Paul II inherits much, indeed, from Aquinas and the Thomistic tradition, he deviates from that school in rather significant ways—not simply in the position he maintains with respect to capital punishment,\(^9\) nor the metaphysically active character of women in procreation,\(^10\) nor even in his adherence to the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, which Aquinas did not accept,\(^11\) but on still more pervasively fundamental points. How are we to understand love and mercy in God, given what is implied by the idea of Subsistent Being? What is the relationship between nature and grace, and is it really meaningful to speak of so-called pure nature and a dual end for the human person? Finally, what must we say about God’s eternal, omnipotent, infallible, and immutable will, with respect to his providential care of the universe, and the predestination and perseverance of the elect?

These are extraordinarily far-reaching questions—questions that threatened the peace of the Catholic Church in the decades (we might even say the centuries) preceding the Second Vatican Council. Much of the debate at the time of the Reformation, at the Congregatio de Auxiliis, and with the Jansenists, hinged upon these issues.\(^12\) In the twentieth century, the debate
between neo-Scholastic Thomism, as embodied by Fr. Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., on the one hand, and the so-called “nouvelle théologie” or “new theology” of the ressourcement, as embodied by Henri de Lubac, S.J., on the other, had precisely these sorts of questions at bottom—and Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II seems, as we will see, to side with the latter. The purpose of this paper, then, is not to provide systematic answers to these extraordinarily complicated and nuanced questions, where the greatest theologians in the history of the Church remain in debate even to the present day. This would be an impossible task. We rather intend to draw attention to a point of departure. It is the point of departure between the thinking of John Paul II and the neo-Thomistic tradition which he so clearly supports, and upon which he relies, in many ways. The end result is a rather different picture of John Paul II as a thinker, and thus, the reopening of age-old questions which must now challenge a new generation of the Church’s philosophers and theologians.

That being said, John Paul II’s Thomistic training is well known and well documented. He studied at the Angelicum in Rome. His dissertation director was none other than Garrigou-Lagrange himself, who saw neo-Scholastic Thomism as the alternative road around contemporary errors, and led the charge against the “new theologians,” whom he had named as such himself.

In short, this is where we locate the Thomistic pedigree of John Paul II. Indeed, many avowed Thomists saw ratified in his teachings such Thomistic theses as the primacy of being, the objective character of truth, the strong connection between the moral character of a human agent and the act he or she performs—the objective status, that is to say, of even the moral universe. All of these observations are more than fair interpretations; they are the only reasonable conclusions to be drawn in light of his pre-papal work in the Lublin project, in which he explicitly credits Aquinas for these philosophical contributions. In his magisterial work, of course, documents such as Fides et Ratio and Veritatis Splendor are, as we have already suggested, among those most commonly invoked in defense of John Paul II’s Thomistic view of the universe. Nothing from his magisterial work, however, places so strong an emphasis upon Aquinas as could be found in the body of his pre-papal writings, taken as a whole.

There is, however, much more to his intellectual formation than many are comfortable exploring; for, in the end, the true picture of Wojtyla’s thought is rather difficult to frame—he seems to defy any neatly-conceived philosophical or theological categorization. To be sure, John Paul II was, indeed, deeply influenced by the thinking of Aquinas, even if, according to his own testimony, he viewed himself as a rather poor student of the Common Doctor. He was, however, just as deeply influenced by modern and contemporary philosophers, crediting, for example, the phenomenologist, Max Scheler, with the foundation of his “overall conception of the person,” and thus with one of the core insights of his unique contribution to contemporary Catholic thought. Still, in spite of his clear and pervasive commitment to Scheler, Wojtyla criticized the great phenomenologist for being too much of
a *sentimentalist*—in the end, not so very different from Hume, who could not ground moral conduct in anything more than our ingrained, logically indefensible, *sensibilities*.\(^{18}\) Without adequate reference to a firm set of metaphysical building blocks, Scheler could not, according to Wojtyla, really succeed in constructing an ethical system that could satisfy the requirements of a truly Christian paradigm.\(^{19}\) Much of Wojtyla’s work, therefore, has dealt with offering the other view—namely that our sensibilities are grounded in our *nature*, well-realized in our moral habituation.\(^{20}\) On this point, again, Wojtyla/John Paul II, is quite solidly Thomistic; and both *Fides et Ratio* and *Veritatis Splendor* can be read, at least in part, as chapters in the promotion of this thesis.

In these encyclicals, moreover, John Paul II speaks out against certain relativizing currents in contemporary thinking, which have even found their respective ways into the minds of many within the Catholic fold. Popularized forms of *Pragmatism* are criticized for their failure to consider the absolute character of truth, as it exists irrespective of the concretely measurable outcome it may be perceived to yield in our lived experience.\(^{21}\) *Pragmatism*, so-conceived, would undermine any real claim to the equation of *Truth* with anything resembling the Judeo-Christian God, *Yahweh*, whose name means, “I will be as *I* will be, not as *you* would have me be.”\(^{22}\) If this is God, and God is Truth, then Truth pre-exists our experience of it, and cannot be measured relative to *us*; rather, we are to be measured against it—against *him*.\(^{23}\) Here, whatever particular slant one may take with respect to it, and whatever one may wish, in the end, to call it, some lively and defensible thesis of *Natural Law* is absolutely indispensable as the point of reference for any moral system we can rightly call *Catholic*.

Condemnations of positions such as *Consequentialism*, *Proportionalism*, and *Utilitarianism*, follow in *Veritatis Splendor*, as a consequence of the same sort of reasoning.\(^{24}\) Even the thesis of the so-called *fundamental option* faces reproach at the tip of John Paul II’s pen.\(^{25}\) According to this thesis, one’s moral condition is to be measured, not against any one particular act, but against the larger trajectory—the general orientation—of one’s actions considered as a collective. What do all these claims have in common? The answer, is found in our understanding of what a *human act* really is, and how, therefore, it comes to bear upon us in consequence of our having wrought it. All of the theses here condemned fail to consider the fact that a human act is, of its very nature, a *real thing* in its own right—that it has an *objective character* all its own, proceeding from a set of *real relations* that lend to it a kind of *substantiality*. The act proceeds from the human person as its *efficient cause*, consists of some concrete action as a *material cause*, is directed toward some future condition as to a *final cause*, and, in all of this, *is something very specific in its own right, as its formal cause*.

Reading all this in light of his personalist exposition of human action in his lectures collectively entitled *The Acting Person*, we can say that through our actions, we leave a kind of *ontic imprint* upon our environment. In so doing, we *manifest*, again in a quasi-substantial way, our own inner
character and identity, as a kind of **exemplary cause** for the totality of relations we have set in place by our willful and informed action. If that new set of relations is **perverse**, then the agent, understood as a **free and informed actor**, is implicated in that perversion.\(^{26}\) To put it in simpler terms, **Consequentialism**, **Proportionalism**, **Utilitarianism**, and the thesis of the **fundamental option**, all have in common one fatal philosophical flaw. Each and every one of these positions, though subtly different from the others, fails adequately to account for the fact that the **human act redounds upon the human agent**—that the human agent, by his or her actions, positively makes himself or herself either **morally good**, or **morally bad**.\(^{27}\) To be fair, these positions may, indeed, acknowledge a kind of **natural evil**—that suffering occurs, or that imbalance occurs, or that an undesirable outcome has been realized in the world—*out there*, somewhere, which the agent may have to suffer along with everyone else, but only *in precisely the same way as everyone else*. John Paul II insists, however, that the Catholic view cannot accommodate this truncated understanding of human action, which he sees as degrading the dignity of the human agent as a true **agent** and **person**, properly so-called.\(^{28}\) All of this, of course, is very soundly Thomistic.

In *Fides et Ratio*, finally, John Paul II reaffirms the inherent compatibility between **faith** and **reason**, insisting that the two can do more than simply **co-exist** peacefully in two distinct intellectual compartments, but that, in fact, they can and must be brought to bear upon one another—they must be **integrated**.\(^{29}\) Here, again, in the affirmation of this principle, John Paul II is decidedly Thomistic. He insists that no mere **syncretism** or **eclecticism** can suffice for the development of any properly philosophical system\(^{30}\)—that there are objective philosophical givens, or **first principles of reason**, which must be affirmed.\(^{31}\) These include, among others, the principle of **non-contradiction** (that a thing cannot both be and not-be in the same respect at the same moment), and the principle of **causality**, whereby we affirm that **being** cannot arise from **non-being**, but, if it does not exist of **necessity**, must be **brought** into existence through the agency or instrumentality of some **other** being or beings ontologically equal to or greater than the effect it brings about.\(^{32}\) We must not forget, moreover, the principle of **finality**, whereby we understand that a **movement** presupposes a **direction**, such that the ordered movement in unintelligent beings is discernable, and points to some intelligent cause.\(^{33}\) This is precisely the principle that drives the human mind to seek for a **purpose** in existence, and to hope for the attainability of his or her deepest aspirations. John Paul II insists, consistent with the Tradition, that **faith** enjoys no liberty to dispense with these truths, but must acknowledge them and propose nothing for belief that cannot stand upon them.\(^{34}\) The Faith has something to say to the philosopher, and philosophy has something to say to the person of faith. Condemned therefore are both **rationalism**, according to which the thinker would bracket whatever reason cannot, of its own power, demonstrate, and **fideism**, whereby the thinker would hold to faith in total intellectual blindness.\(^{35}\)

Again, all of this is profoundly Thomistic. The quest for an integration
of faith and reason must energize any authentically Christian intellectual endeavor, inasmuch as Christianity is, in the end, about integration, not fragmentation.\textsuperscript{36} The human person is a whole, not a mere composite of various faculties, functions, and responses;\textsuperscript{37} and as a whole, the human person must find a proper harmony in both the inner and outer life, which is really one and the same reality.\textsuperscript{38} We must remember, furthermore, that harmony is different from compromise.

Much more, of course, could be said than all this. But we have said enough to raise the next question. Do we tend to overstate the case for John Paul II as a Thomist, or as a neo-Thomist? Do we emphasize this dimension of his thinking to exclusion or mitigation of other important points of emphasis? Can we call him a Thomist without serious qualification? Are we making a mistake, for example, by reading \textit{Fides et Ratio} as a ratification of a neo-scholastic Thomistic understanding of precisely how faith and reason ought to find integration, and to use the document to oppose the ressourcement, or contemporary philosophical methods, on the basis of John Paul II’s pedigree? In short, we answer these questions thusly: if John Paul II is taken for a Thomist after the pattern of Garrigou-Lagrange, and \textit{Fides et Ratio} is read as a tacit condemnation, by way of implication, of the ressourcement, or even of contemporary philosophical methods as inherently ill-conceived, we have made a mistake—we have misunderstood John Paul II, and we have read him (and only part of him, at that) abstracted from his broader historical and intellectual context.\textsuperscript{39} John Paul II’s admiration for certain important figures of the ressourcement is well known, but the influence of these thinkers upon the magisterial legacy of John Paul II is, we suggest, underappreciated in the minds of many students of the great Pope. We wish to draw attention to one dimension of that influence representative of a key point of departure between John Paul II and the Thomistic and neo-Thomistic tradition.

It is true that \textit{Fides et Ratio} calls for a fully rational faith, but it also reminds us, repeatedly, that philosophy must respect the limits of natural reason unaided by faith.\textsuperscript{40} To be sure, the theologian has a responsibility to respect the contributions of natural knowledge—and especially philosophy, for its unique role in the order of human science, in challenging the very premises upon which human beings rely, isolating the properly knowable in the order of natural reason, and constructing, thereon, true systems of thought that point to the transcendent reality that “all human beings, by nature, desire to know.”\textsuperscript{41} But if the theologian must respect philosophy, the converse is also true. Philosophy must respect the theologian’s role in exploring the content of revelation. Let us be clear on this point. It certainly does not belong to theology to define dogma. That is the role of the \textit{Magisterium}. But the theologian is to explore the deeper implications of dogmas already revealed, as if exploring the horizons toward which the Church’s thought might yet move.\textsuperscript{42} Like that of philosophy, theology’s role is truly scientific; but, unlike philosophical science, theology’s task is to view its subject from a supernatural vantage point. Its first responsibility is not to the question of what the human mind could deduce, or reasonably infer, but what revelation broadly considered
proposes for belief in a systematic manner. God as interpersonal Trinity revealed in the Person of Jesus Christ, is the first point of knowledge from which theology must proceed. The question the theologian explores is not, what can I know about God, but who does God reveal himself to be? These are very different questions; and the latter represents a profound and unceasing challenge to philosophy; for theology’s certainty does not rest in the first instance in the human mind’s limited ability to apprehend the truth of things, but in the self-revelation of the God who is Truth itself.

Philosophy’s role, therefore, must, necessarily be a bold but no less modest one. In fact, John Paul II refers, in Fides et Ratio to the First Vatican Council’s Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith, Dei Filius, in which we are cautioned thusly:

Reason, indeed, enlightened by faith, when it seeks earnestly, piously and calmly, attains by a gift from God some, and that a very fruitful, understanding of mysteries; partly from the analogy of those things which it naturally knows, partly from the relations which the mysteries bear to one another and to the last end of man: but reason never becomes capable of apprehending mysteries as it does those truths which constitute its proper object. For the divine mysteries by their own nature so far transcend the created intelligence that, even when delivered by revelation and received by faith, they remain covered with a veil of faith itself, and shrouded in a certain degree of darkness, so long as we are pilgrims in this mortal life, not yet with God: for we walk by faith, and not by sight [2 Cor. 5:7].

Up to this point, John Paul II remains quite fully in line with the Thomistic tradition. The point of departure is really on the ground—in the assessing the precise moment at which reason must leave off and mystery must take flight. In the great debates between the neo-Scholastic Thomists and the “new theologians,” the mutual critique really centered, largely, upon this very sort of problem. For the Thomists insisted that Subsistent Being must be absolutely unaffective, unreceptive, immutable in every conceivable sense of the term; and that we know this by natural reason, which faith can never contradict. It is for this reason that the thesis of so-called pure nature—a later development within the Thomistic tradition—claimed, in the hands of Garrigou-Lagrange, the status of dogma, to the point of his opposing de Lubac and others among the Fourvière school (who were pioneers of the broader ressourcement movement) as heretics because they denied the thesis. In fact, de Lubac denied not only the thesis, but its claim to Thomistic authenticity; Aquinas himself, he argued, thought nothing of the sort.

That precise debate is certainly beyond the scope of the present study. But the argument for pure nature—authentic to Thomas or not—is a complex one, indeed. It is all designed around the need to preserve the gratuity of grace.
against a perceived threat whereby God would be, so it is suggested, bound by the creature to supply something for the creature’s good, which would, in turn, offend the notion, not only of God’s sovereignty, but of his radical immutability. According to the pure nature thesis, the human being can be adequately understood without any reference to grace. That is to say that, for the pure nature theorist, human nature, by itself, is possessed of its own proper end: its own, proper, naturally attainable, finality, sufficient for a complete understanding of what the human being actually is within the created order. This is because the principal of finality presupposes the attainability of the end for which the creature is made. For the pure nature theorist, this means that, at least in some cases, under ideal, but naturally realizable conditions, the creature can do what it is meant to do; for if that were not the case, the substantial constitution of the being would be fundamentally irrational. The being would be made inherently unfulfillable; it would be made for the purpose of achieving the unachievable. Such an arrangement, if it only went as far as that, would make God’s action itself irrational. Thus, the argument goes, if God had made man, properly, for a naturally unattainable end—namely, union with himself in eternal friendship—then God could only escape the charge of irrationality by providing the means for the attainment of the end as part of his natural design of the universe. He would be forced, again, as the argument goes, at pain of inconsistency, to provide this means; thus, grace would no longer be gratuitous at all, but necessary, such that the very distinction between nature and grace would collapse along with the sovereignty of God, who could no longer grant or withhold his favor at his own good pleasure.

For this reason, pure nature theorists also proposed the thesis of a dual end for the human being. By nature, human beings are oriented, per definitionem to a purely natural end—an end attainable through the exercise of our natural powers alone, irrespective of any personal relationship with a self-revealing God. But what would such an end look like? For Aquinas, the personal immortality of the human soul is naturally knowable. It is argued, therefore, that, since the human soul is naturally immortal, the human being could, by nature alone, theoretically, at least, attain a perpetual state of natural happiness, similar to the fabled isle of the blessed frequently referenced by the early Greek philosophers. The theological hypothesis of limbo came to be understood, in their minds, as precisely this sort of reality. In that state, God would be contemplated, not in his essence, but through his effects, in a continuous, fully satisfied, act of philosophical reflection. In this way, the human being has an attainable end, while yet God could, should he choose, supply a supernatural end, which he would make attainable through grace, at his own good pleasure. Thus, according to this thesis, God remains absolutely unaffective, and in no way beholden to his creature; his absolute sovereignty, and the utter gratuity of grace are preserved.

This view would seem, however, to suggest a two-tiered order of human worth by affirming that some human beings are ordered, if only by grace, to a higher end than others. Precisely because the ordination to eternal
beatitude is not seen, on this model, as a natural ordination or, that is to say, an ordination proper to the human person according to nature, only those human beings who receive sanctifying grace are ordered to eternal beatitude. When the logic of this model is taken to its final conclusions, moreover, we are left with the assertion that God might actually grant a person grace, ordering that person, thereby, to eternal beatitude, only to withhold the grace of perseverance in the end. Garrigou-Lagrange writes:

Is reprobation simply the denial of predestination? It implies the divine permission of the sin of final impenitence (negative reprobation), and the divine will to inflict the penalty of damnation for this sin (positive reprobation). If reprobation were simply the denial of predestination, it would not be an act of providence, and the penalty of damnation would not be inflicted by God. St. Thomas says: “As predestination includes the will to confer grace and glory; so also reprobation includes the will to permit a person to fall into sin, and to impose the punishment of damnation on account of that sin.”

The idea that God’s providential care for me, personally, could result in my damnation—an outcome that might have been avoided if God had simply refrained from governing my life—may seem cruel; but Garrigou-Lagrange has an answer. As a pure nature theorist, he argues that, even should God grant us grace only to withhold perseverance in our final moment of earthly life, leading inexorably to our eternal damnation, he would do no natural violence to the creature. Since neither grace nor the end toward which it orders us are proper to us by nature, withholding final perseverance leaves the creature naturally intact—possessed of everything he or she needs to be fully human.

Again, we cannot enter, here, into any discussion of whether the pure nature thesis is authentically ascribed to Aquinas, who nowhere actually speaks in those precise terms. We should, however, say that it is for these very sorts of reasons, in any event, that Aquinas—and not only his later interpreters—reads the Scriptural themes of election, providence, predestination, perseverance, and the Book of Life as references to God’s absolutely fixed plan for creation and each and every one of its components, conceived from the foundation of the world. The point is really to reconcile a rationally coherent notion of the divine with the paradoxical assertions of God’s universal salvific will, on the one hand, and Scripture’s clear warning that some may not attain heaven, on the other. Aquinas is not alone in the way he attempts to reconcile this paradox; but, nonetheless, this view is not a sufficient reflection of the broader received Tradition, grounded as it is in a Hebrew view of the universe. The ressourcement theologians were sensitive to that more Hebrew view, and thus sought to interpret these themes in their original light, in the company of a wider representation of the Tradition, inclusive of the Fathers and great
theologians of Eastern Christendom, considered not merely through the lens of later Thomism, but on their own terms.\textsuperscript{56}

As Ratzinger sees it, for example, the better theological opinion is that Christ would become incarnate even had there not been sin.\textsuperscript{57} Indeed, it would be saying too little to label this affirmation Eastern, although it does reflect theological sensibilities prevalent in Eastern Christian thought, especially as it concerns the question of humanity’s pre-lapsarian condition and thus the contrary condition of original sin. The fact is that this view is also affirmed by many of the great theologians of the West, including St. Bonaventure\textsuperscript{58} and Blessed Duns Scotus\textsuperscript{59}. We cannot, in this short space, begin to explore this question in great depth, but a few remarks concerning the broader implications of the view here mentioned would be of help.

If God intended to become incarnate, even had there not been sin, sin is not necessarily written, even by way of omission, into the cosmic plan of predestination. Leaving aside the question of divine foreknowledge (which, while we must affirm it, never seems to offer much real help in dealing with these sorts of mysteries) we no longer have to say that God intended to allow the sin of Adam in order to effect the Incarnation according to his eternal plan. We can maintain, rather, that God did not allow the sin of Adam to interrupt his plan, but allowed his plan to take on a redemptive character so as to overcome the sin of Adam, which he tolerated on account of Adam’s free-will—a free will which allowed the possibility of Adam’s free response to God’s self-outpouring. There is, here, in other words, a question of how we really understand human freedom and self-determinability in the face of our radical dependency upon God’s causal agency,\textsuperscript{60} and thus a question of how we understand the requirements of God’s self-subsistence. Our purpose, here, of course, is merely to make note of certain points of departure and the questions they raise, leaving systematic treatments of these questions for other venues.

That being said, the assertion that God would have become incarnate even had there not been sin, takes us further, for it seems to build into the created order itself the means for attaining a supernatural end, and thus to speak, at least implicitly, against the thesis of pure nature. The idea of predestination, in this view of the universe, refers, therefore, not to the respective fates of individuals as such but to God’s eternal choice to empty himself out for his creation. The Predestined One—the Elect—is Christ, who, as the New Adam, is the Cosmic Progenitor of all those who would enter into his self-offering—谁 would receive him, and in receiving him, accept the full, and fully liberating, truth about themselves and about the meaning of God’s creative agency, and thus about God himself.\textsuperscript{61} According to this view, election is not the fact of one’s belonging to a pre-defined set or sub-set of humanity, as in a sort of mathematical calculus, but instead, one’s entrance into the great election of humanity in Christ. Christ is the Incarnation of humanity’s divine election, and thus, of the election of each and every human person. Indeed, this is precisely Ratzinger’s view.\textsuperscript{62} With the advent of Christ, we are given a foothold on grace in this world,\textsuperscript{63} so that we can, indeed, walk
“in the path of peace.”

From this perspective, creation has an element of mystery—the mystery of freedom—built into it as well. We know by natural reason that human beings are meaningfully free, but natural reason can never fully understand how.

If, however, by contrast, we take the classically Thomistic line on these themes, we are forced to affirm a radically Predestinarian view of the universe. For the number of the elect, from a Thomistic frame of reference, is a fixed and limited quantity. If we number among them, we will infallibly reach heaven; but if we do not, we are doomed to failure, the price of which, for the vast majority, is hell—and all that to the service of his eternal plan.

This view has its obvious shortcomings. For example, one finds it difficult, from this perspective, to make sense of the Tradition in which Christ is seen as the very manifestation of God’s infinite mercy and sinners are exhorted to be responsible to the truth and convert to the Way that is Christ himself, since, according to this view, God’s mercy really is limited from within—it does not extend to all, because, from eternity, God has determined to save only a fixed and limited number. From this point of view, the dialogue of prophetic exhortation, evangelization, and repentance seems reduced to little more than a matter of self-serving theatrics; for unless in the final analysis I am really enabled by God to alter my destiny, I am only acting out a play scripted for me entirely by the divine hand.

What is more, Aquinas’ view requires us to reinterpret all the anthropomorphisms of the Scriptures as mere descriptions of human responses in the face of the utterly unaffective God. The appeal will be made, of course, to the well-founded principle of analogy, whereby we recognize that God is so wholly other than the human being that nothing we say about him ever adequately expresses the full truth about him, and the thing understood is understood according to the mode of our own understanding. But when the vast majority of God’s self-revelation is so radically qualified as to be stripped naked of the content that leads the sinner to a confident repentance, we must acknowledge Scotus’ forceful critique of what he saw as a disingenuous appeal to analogy in an effort to justify what really amounted to equivocation. If we say that God is love and by that we mean that God is something other than love, if we say that God is infinitely merciful and by that we mean that God is something other than infinitely merciful, if we say that God “wills everyone to be saved” and by that we mean something other than that God “wills everyone to be saved,” we might as well say that God is a stone and mean by that that he is something other than a stone.

Aquinas’ approach, in other words, requires the act of evangelization itself to include the under-the-breath qualification that the “good news” may not, in reality, apply to the one hearing it since, if the auditor is not actually among the eternally elect—which, either way, is already, as it were, a fait accompli—this news may turn out, in the end, to have been very bad indeed; for upon hearing it, the hearer becomes morally responsible for having rejected it in the absence of the grace to accept it. In the end, it would seem that the Thomistic reading here comes at the expense of
revelation’s most important content, such that revealed religion does no more to “deliver us from anxiety” than does purely natural religion since, in either form of religion, whether or not God’s favor rests upon us is entirely beyond the scope of our knowledge.73 A Predestinarian thesis, intended to preserve the purely philosophical concept of an unaffective God, ends by turning the gospel on its head. For the very point that the gospel is meant to reveal without qualification—i.e., the universality of God’s salvific will as a loving and provident Father—is so radically qualified as to find itself devoid of any kerygmatic power. If God wills, concretely, to save me, then my salvation is assured, but whether or not he does I cannot know, such that I lack any firm ground for true hope, I can only wish for my salvation.74

Indeed, Dives in Misericordia seems to address precisely this point—that God’s will for each and every individual involves a call to grace, holiness, and heaven, truly realizable with the help that God, in fact, supplies us all. John Paul II is confident that the category of election applies to all—God has chosen “every man and woman.”75 This thesis stands in clear contrast to that affirmed by Aquinas, and upon an approach to Scripture with which Aquinas would find himself at odds. Of course there can be no question, as we have already said, that John Paul II embraces firmly much of what Aquinas offers the Church and the world; but Dives in Misericordia, we must insist, is hardly a Thomistic text. If, that is to say, a “Thomistic text” is one that argues from Thomistic premises, along Thomistic lines, to conclusions Aquinas himself would accept, Dives in Misericordia cannot rightly be counted among them, for it simply does not do this—and the implications, in this case, are profound.

In Dives in Misericordia, John Paul II implicitly denies the thesis of pure nature,76 rejects the claim of limited election,77 and alludes, powerfully, to divine affectivity,78 building his whole exhortation upon an appeal to the anthropomorphic content of God’s self-revelation—a self-revelation radically and unequivocally confirmed in the Person of Jesus Christ.79 Dives in Misericordia is, it would seem, not a Thomistic, or neo-Thomistic, document at all, but a document of the ressourcement. It is, from beginning to end, a reminder to the Church of who the Father is—who he reveals himself to be.80 This is a God who loves his creature, who can despise nothing of what he has made,81 but truly—not only in a qualified sense—“wills everyone to be saved and to come to knowledge of the truth.”82 Indeed, in commenting on this passage, in his private pastoral contribution Crossing the Threshold of Hope,83 John Paul II suggests an unwillingness to qualify it away with a gloss such as “if they are among the predestined.” Instead, citing the passage, he goes on to identify, not simply some philosophical contemplation, but the beatific vision itself as a universal human aspiration, saying, further, that, “... the One who has created man with this fundamental desire cannot behave differently from what the revealed text indicates; He cannot but want ‘everyone to be saved and to come to knowledge of the truth.’”84 Ratzinger, of course, is still more emphatic. He says:
In the New Testament as a whole, and in the whole of the tradition of the Church, it has always been clear that God desires everyone to be saved . . . that God himself, as we were just saying, does not draw the line anywhere. He does not make any distinction between people he dislikes, people he does not want to have saved, and others whom he prefers; he loves everyone because he has created everyone.\textsuperscript{85}

There can be no doubt that Joseph Ratzinger was the most influential theologian in the Catholic world during the papacy of John Paul II, under whom he served as Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith from 1981–2006, when he was elected to succeed the late pontiff as Pope Benedict XVI. But Ratzinger, as we will see still more clearly in the present study, was unapologetically a \textit{ressourcement} theologian, not only at the time of his studies, nor only during the second Vatican Council which he attended as a \textit{peritus}, but throughout his ecclesiastical career, even during his tenure as Prefect. Ratzinger not only \textit{was}, but \textit{is}, a \textit{ressourcement} theologian. One can only believe that he escaped Garrigou-Lagrange’s inquisition on account of his age; he was too young and green to show up in the spotlight. But, by Garrigou-Lagrange’s criteria, he is every bit as threatening to orthodoxy as de Lubac, and would do more, concretely, in his academic and ecclesiastical career to undermine Garrigou-Lagrange’s theology than de Lubac ever did on his own.\textsuperscript{86} It is impossible, we suggest, to interpret John Paul II properly without a thoroughgoing acknowledgment of his theological debt to Joseph Ratzinger.

That being said, Ratzinger’s view concerning election—the view canonized by John Paul II in \textit{Dives in Misericordia}—is precisely opposite that of Garrigou-Lagrange, who maintains that some are saved and others not because God loves some more than others, and opts to give them more than he gives to those whom he loves less. According to Garrigou-Lagrange, God causes free assent to grace and final perseverance in those whom he loves more, but in those whom he loved less, he does \textit{not} cause that assent; and since the assent cannot occur unless God, as first cause of all, actually \textit{causes} it, those whom God loves \textit{less} do not give their assent, and thus perish.\textsuperscript{87} It is simply not possible to interpret Ratzinger, for his part, as saying anything at all like this. In fact, he suggests that such a thesis reduces God to a kind of \textit{magician}, who, somehow or another, can always “wheel out his happy ending.”\textsuperscript{88} For Ratzinger, such a view is not compatible with a real paternity on God’s part with respect to the human person. If God wishes to create a full \textit{person}, he must give that person the ability to actually alter his or her destiny. Ratzinger writes, “That is why God’s all-embracing desire to save people does not involve the actual salvation of all men. He allows us the power to refuse. God loves us; we need only to summon up the humility to allow ourselves to be loved.”\textsuperscript{89} Garrigou-Lagrange would agree with this claim, at a superficial level, but he would argue that “summoning up the humility to allow ourselves to be loved” is already a \textit{positive good} which can only come from grace,
and that God would not allow us to refuse final perseverance if he did not already will us, from all eternity, to number among the reprobate. But while Ratzinger does not typically provide the systematic explanations that tend to satisfy the Scholastic dispositions of many of his interlocutors, a systematic explanation, here, is really not so difficult to formulate. While it may, indeed, lie outside the power of the human person to reach beyond his or her nature to embrace the divine in love, it is wholly within the power of the human person not to try, but simply to let go of the forbidden fruit and allow himself to be lifted up in the life-giving flood of God’s redemptive self-outpouring.

These, indeed, are the sentiments of Dives in Misericordia, promulgated just one year before John Paul II named this ressourcement theologian to the prefecture of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. There can be no mistake about it; if we are really prepared to allow ourselves to be challenged to new—or perhaps to very old—ways of thinking and seeing, Dives in Misericordia calls us to accept God’s self-revelation on its own terms, recognizing that it is an inexhaustible mystery of faith which far from being irrational, represents a liberating challenge to human reason, offering to it the light by which all else more readily accessible to us might be seen in its undiminished splendor.

Ratzinger makes, it would seem, precisely this point when he writes:

But if the logos of all being, the being that bears up and encompasses everything, is consciousness, freedom and love, then it follows automatically that the supreme factor in the world is not cosmic necessity but freedom. The implications of this are very extensive. For this leads to the appearance of freedom and the necessary structure, as it were, of the world, and this again means that one can only comprehend the world as incomprehensible, that it must be incomprehensibility. For if the supreme point in the world’s design is a freedom which bears up, wills, knows and loves the whole world as freedom, then this means that together with freedom the incalculability implicit in it is an essential part of the world. Incalculability is an implication of freedom; the world can never—if this is the position—be completely reduced to mathematical logic. With the boldness and greatness of a world defined by the structure of freedom there comes also the somber mystery of the demonic, which emerges from it to meet us. A world created and willed on the risk of freedom and love is no longer just mathematics. As the arena of love it is also the playground of freedom and also incurs the risk of evil. It accepts the mystery of darkness for the sake of the great light constituted by freedom and love.
Richard H. Bulzacchelli

Ratzinger’s position, here, constitutes a rejection of the claim that divine providence cannot deviate from its pre-determined course in the realization of the great Predestination of God’s becoming “all-in-all” in Christ. God, in some mysterious sense, takes risks in creating a world upon the predicate of personal freedom. But for Ratzinger such vulnerability, even when abused by the creature, in no way diminishes God, who must be understood as, in a sense, infinitely agile. “Modern thinking,” he points out, “usually lets itself be guided by the idea that eternity is imprisoned, so to speak, in its unchangeableness; God appears as the prisoner of his eternal plan conceived ‘before all ages.’ ‘Being’ and ‘becoming’ do not mingle.” He goes on to say that such an understanding of Eternity rests in:

... a pre-Christian mentality which takes no account of a concept of God that finds utterance in a belief in creation and incarnation. ... For if one thinks that God cannot alter retroactively what he planned “before” eternity, then without noticing it one is again conceiving eternity in terms of time, with its distinction between “before” and “after.”

Again, Ratzinger does not go on to supply the sort of systematic explanation the neo-Scholastic interlocutor would like to see. Nonetheless, he insists that the significance of the Incarnation event is to be understood precisely on these terms. When he breaks into the cosmos as a human being, God does not simply take up our nature as if it already existed more perfectly in some Platonic abstraction wholly appropriate to the divine. Instead, he takes up our nature as lived and instantiated; he is not simply humanity, but a man—and, as a man, he is a temporal being. Ratzinger writes:

Christ is really, as St. John’s gospel says, the “door” between God and man (John 10.9), the “mediator” (1 Tim 2.5), in whom the Eternal One has time. In Jesus we temporal beings can speak to the temporal one, our con-temporary; but in him, who with us is time, we simultaneously make contact with the Eternal One, because with us Jesus is time and with God eternity.

For Ratzinger, this fact concerning the deeper implications of the Incarnation is the key to understanding the efficacy of human agency in grace—the key to embracing the real mystery of God’s universally salvific solicitude toward the human person, and, at the same time, the ability of the human person actually to change his or her own destiny. Drawing upon the thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar, he writes:

The humanity of Jesus, which placed him in the midst of that age, hits us in every line of the gospels. ... But this “standing in time” is not just an outward cultural and historical
framework, behind which could be found somewhere or other, untouched by it, the supratemporal essence of his real being; it is much rather an *anthropological state of affairs*, which profoundly affects the form of human existence itself.

But in what way does Christ’s *having time* affect the *form of human existence*? With Ratzinger, as with Balthasar, we encounter a real urgency to avoid a tacitly Nestorian separation between Christ’s human experience and life and the divine Person of the *Logos* who, in and through that humanity, is himself having those experiences and living that life.\(^\text{100}\) Quoting Balthasar directly, he says:

> Therefore the Son, who in the world has time for God, is the original place where God has time for the world. God has no other time for the world than in the Son; but in him he has all time.\(^\text{101}\) God is not the prisoner of his eternity: in Jesus he has time—for us, and Jesus is thus in actual fact “the throne of grace” to which at any time we can “draw near with confidence (Heb. 4.16).”\(^\text{102}\)

> Only in this way—only through the light of the God-man Christ who reveals the Father to the world—can the full *splendor of mercy* shine forth for the human race as the sure path to the eternal and infinitely abundant life in Spirit and in Truth.\(^\text{103}\) John Paul II is clearly indebted to this insight, with all of its most profound implications, and *Dives in Misericordia* is a confident confession of the fact. Indeed, the God of Mercy described throughout *Dives in Misericordia* is the Father of the Prodigal Son. John Paul II discourses upon this parable at great length;\(^\text{104}\) and it is easy to see that it characterizes, for him, the essence of God’s true disposition toward *each and every* human being—a disposition presented, on the basis of this parable, in explicitly *affective* terms. Quoting at length, but still too briefly, we read:

> Since this conduct [of the prodigal’s] had in his own eyes deprived him of his dignity as a son, it could not be a matter of indifference to his father. It was bound to make him suffer. It was also bound to implicate him in some way. And yet, after all, it was his own son who was involved, and such a relationship could never be altered or destroyed by any sort of behavior. The prodigal son is aware of this and it is precisely this awareness that shows him clearly the dignity which he has lost and which makes him honestly evaluate the position that he could still expect in his father’s house.

> This exact picture of the prodigal son’s state of mind enables us to understand exactly what the mercy of God consists in. There is no doubt that in this simple but
penetrating analogy the figure of the father in the parable reveals to us God as Father.

The father of the prodigal son is faithful to his fatherhood, faithful to the love that he had always lavished on his son. This fidelity is expressed in the parable not only by his immediate readiness to welcome him home when he returns after having squandered his inheritance; it is expressed even more fully by that joy, that merrymaking for the squanderer after his return, merrymaking that is so generous that it provokes the opposition and hatred of the elder brother, who had never gone far away from his father and had never abandoned the home.

The Father’s fidelity to himself—a trait already known by the Old Testament term hesed—is at the same time expressed in a manner particularly charged with affection. We read, in fact, that when the father saw the prodigal son returning home “he had compassion, ran to meet him, threw his arms around his neck and kissed him.” He certainly does this under the influence of a deep affection.

Although Dives in Misericordia is not intended directly to pronounce on specific points of theological disputation, it is certainly difficult to see how Aquinas’ view of predestination and election can withstand the sorts of interventions it presents. While much, certainly, from Aquinas can and must be saved, we are bound in the face of these interventions, to revisit a great deal of his overall system; for in the end, his understanding of subsistence, the causal dynamic of creation, what it means to be eternal, and thus his general eschatology, and later Thomistic developments concerning the precise relationship between nature and grace, are all called into question by the unceasing proclamations of Dives in Misericordia. But all of this is consistent with the call of Fides et Ratio; for the content of revelation places demands upon human reason. Already in Dives in Misericordia, John Paul II has completely retracted a Thomistic understanding of election in light of the authentically Scriptural concept. In Dives in Misericordia, we are told explicitly that each and every human being is elect by God’s original plan—a plan to which God remains faithful even when we are not, because he is faithful to himself. His own integrity is manifest in his fidelity to his covenant regardless of its nullification under law on the ground of our non-performance. That is the measure of his love—and it is the meaning of the Scriptural term hesed to which John Paul II refers so frequently in this document. Such an understanding of the Person of the Father, therefore, is utterly incompatible with any notion of perseverance as something that God might withhold from us in the end on account of some greater good of manifesting his glory in the form of vindictive justice; for that is to draw a false, and unscriptural, dichotomy between justice and mercy. To say this, of course, does not mean that we must affirm a universal guarantee of salvation,
or *apokatastasis*; for the whole tapestry of claims here is woven together around an unqualified understanding of human free will, which John Paul II places under the category of *mystery*. Somehow—and we are not permitted to qualify this fact away—God creates the human person *able* to accept *or* to reject his uncompromising, perpetually solicitous offer of undying love and freedom. We can *opt out* of our election. This claim, essential to a *personalist* understanding, and to any truly authentic reading of Scripture, in no way limits God’s power. On the contrary, it manifests his omnipotence, challenging us to peer into the incomprehensible horizons of its grandeur.

*Dives in Misericordia* also deepens our understanding of Matthew’s passage concerning the Judgment at 25:31–46, by suggesting that mercy shown to others is mercy shown to Christ, not merely in a symbolic sense, but in concrete actual fact. Christ suffers the consequences of sin—he is pained by the alienation our sins’ effects. Christ’s suffering—his passion—is first and foremost his standing in the way of our sins, holding on to us as we attempt to spurn the love of God, and to tear our way from God’s loving embrace. Communion in Christ is what God wants for the human person, and sin is resistance to that plan. By giving in to the love and mercy of Christ, the human person concretely diminishes the anguish Christ feels on account of the sinner’s struggle against him, so that, “in obtaining mercy he is in a sense the one who at the same time “shows mercy.” The Cross is thus to be understood as a revelation of what sin is to God. And thus, by ourselves bearing the offenses of others without demanding retribution, we again relieve Christ’s burden. We show solidarity with Christ upon the Cross so that, if nothing else, he does not have to suffer the effects of sin alone. This, John Paul II suggests, is the meaning of the fifth beatitude, “blessed are the merciful, for they will be shown mercy.”

In this way, as we have said, John Paul II has no further need for a predestination of a fixed number of *reprobates* as a way of manifesting the glory of God under the aspect of Justice, because he has restored the scriptural view, according to which Justice is most fully manifest in mercy. This view entails a fundamental recognition that administering justice involves the act of *setting things right*. Only in forgiveness, and thus in mercy, can an offense *truly* be overcome. For it is never really possible to undo the most important effects of sin, no matter what material payment is extracted or pain inflicted upon the offender, without forgiveness. This does not mean that some sort of recompense is not also an important element of justice, but it does mean that, in the end, we must seek the deeper purpose of distributive justice. That is the real key. Only forgiveness, and thus mercy, heals the alienation wrought by sin, and sets things right again by absorbing the blow that threatens to deprive the offended party of his neighbor’s friendship, and the sinner of his human dignity. This is what Christ does upon the Cross; and what makes the Cross the ultimate act of justice in the face of the sins of the human race. The Cross is *justice*, precisely because it is *mercy*. God is supremely just because his *mercy* knows no bounds. John Paul writes:
Mercy itself, as a perfection of the infinite God, is also infinite. Also infinite therefore and inexhaustible is the Father’s readiness to receive the prodigal children who return to his home. Infinite are the readiness and power of forgiveness which flow continually from the marvelous value of the sacrifice of the Son. No human sin can prevail over this power or even limit it. On the part of man only a lack of good will can limit it, a lack of readiness to be converted and to repent, in other words persistence in obstinacy, opposing grace and truth, especially in the face of the witness of the cross and resurrection of Christ.  

Indeed, it is easy, on the basis of *Fides et Ratio*, read in a vacuum, to condemn Balthasar and de Lubac, and, if we really want to be consistent, Ratzinger (imagining, here, that Benedict XVI were someone else), by suggesting that these thinkers do not properly integrate faith and reason—that they somehow make God *mutable*, dependent upon the creature, etc.—that they revert from a concept of God purified by philosophy to a pre-philosophical God of mythology who can *feel* or be *moved* in some way. We can say that they rely upon sentiment and sensibility rather than reason—that they too quickly appeal to mystery and the divine incomprehensibility, and thus reduce to *fideism*, and should be condemned. It is easy to say these things; but it is much more difficult to defend ourselves in saying them, when we understand the larger context within which *Fides et Ratio* comes to us. For those who insist upon reducing *Fides et Ratio* to a purely neo-Thomistic articulation of what it means to properly integrate faith and reason, will have to contend with *Dives in Misericordia*, which clearly breaks the rules. This seemingly forgotten encyclical, occurring early in his papacy, bears the stamp of John Paul II’s own richly original mind—original, that is, in the unique way in which he synthesizes the Church’s broader Tradition with the genuine contributions of his contemporaries, both within and without the visible bounds of the Catholic Church. However, it is, perhaps ironically, really in this sense, more than in any other—as it is with the so-called “new theologians” of the *ressourcement*, whom he so clearly admires, and whose theology he trusts above any contemporary alternatives—that we may rightly call John Paul II a Thomist.

Read in this light, *Dives in Misericordia* provides, to be sure, a hermeneutic according to which much of his later work can be interpreted. With *Dives in Misericordia* in the background, and with it, the theological emphases of the *ressourcement*, the encyclical *Fides et Ratio*, to take our example, suddenly appears a rather different sort of document. Some might see in the latter encyclical only the Thomistic categories and shifts of emphasis we considered earlier in our discussion of that text, and thus locate in *Fides et Ratio* a new opportunity for Garrigou-Lagrange. But the document also includes elements with which Garrigou-Lagrange would find it difficult to come to terms. The contributions of contemporary philosophy
are recognized as providing the Church with an opportunity to deepen her insights into the meaning of revelation by helping her sons and daughters to understand the human person more fully.\textsuperscript{121} What is more, John Paul II names particular individuals in a litany of “great Christian theologians who also distinguished themselves as great philosophers, bequeathing to us writings of such high speculative value as to warrant comparison with the masters of ancient philosophy;”\textsuperscript{122} but not all are Thomists, nor even tolerated by Thomists. Fr. Antonio Rosmini Serbati, for example, appears in this litany, along with John Henry Cardinal Newman, side-by-side with Jacques Maritain and Étienne Gilson, among still others. Rosmini’s appearance here did, in fact, create a stir. It prompted the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith to ask for a clarification\textsuperscript{123} in which the Church’s use of “Thomism as a philosophical and theoretical instrument, aimed at fostering a unifying synthesis of ecclesiastical studies . . . in order to oppose the risk of an eclectic philosophical approach,”\textsuperscript{124} is listed as a contributing factor in the misunderstanding of Rosmini’s thought, leading to the examination of his writings, and the condemnation of certain propositions now seen as wrongly ascribed to him. This clarification leaves the reader with a sense that the Church’s reliance upon Thomism in the nineteenth century and early twentieth century was a “historical-cultural and ecclesial factor of the time,”\textsuperscript{125} that, however useful, could certainly face re-evaluation by the Church. The inclusion of Vladimir N. Lossky in the aforementioned litany comes much to the point.\textsuperscript{126} We cannot ignore this reference; for it anticipates John Paul II’s later statement, much in keeping with Lossky’s own criticisms of western natural theology,\textsuperscript{127} that:

\begin{quote}
The mystery of the Incarnation will always remain the central point of reference for an understanding of the enigma of human existence, the created world, and God himself. The challenge of this mystery pushes philosophy to its limits, as reason is summoned to make its own a logic which brings down the walls within which it risks being confined.\textsuperscript{128}
\end{quote}

To be sure, Thomas has given the Church a venerable model of the Christian effort to integrate faith and reason. He articulated a whole worldview based upon the faith he received from the Fathers in fidelity to magisterial authority, doing the best a human being could with the gift of reason, open to truth wherever it could be found. He has thus inscribed himself indelibly into the patrimony of Catholic Tradition. There can be no question that Aquinas must and will always occupy a preeminent place in our Catholic intellectual heritage. The fact that even so great a master may need a few points of correction after the benefit of over seven centuries of meditation upon his writings will not alter this fact. That being said, Dives in Misericordia may yet prove to be John Paul II’s most important magisterial writing; for it sets the stage for a real and vital renewal of the Christian philosophical enterprise. Even on its own terms, but still more as the hermeneutical backdrop of Fides
et Ratio, Dives in Misericordia calls the Christian philosopher to reconsider questions once thought long-settled. The challenge it poses is not to interpret revelation in light of human understanding, but to stretch the human intellect in light of revelation. Christian philosophers are called not to explain away divine mercy as the good fortune of the few who profit from God’s eternal will, but rather to find new ways of understanding God’s eternal will in light of his self-revelation as Mercy Incarnate, for Divine Mercy is the very substance of the gospel. 129

NOTES

1 John Paul II, encyclical letter, Fides et Ratio (September 14, 1998). All citations are from the Vatican Translation.

2 John Paul II, encyclical letter, Veritatis Splendor (August 6, 1993).

3 We reference here, most notably, his August 4, 1879 encyclical letter, Aeterni Patris, in which the thought of Aquinas is recommended to the Church as a model for the integration of faith and reason, and a firm foundation for philosophical and theological training. See, here, especially §§ 17ff.

4 In Aeterni Patris, Leo XIII notes that, “the Fathers of Trent made it part of the order of conclave to lay upon the altar, together with sacred Scripture and the decrees of the supreme Pontiffs, the Summa of Thomas Aquinas, whence to seek counsel, reason, and inspiration.” (§ 22) He also includes, however, a brief catalogue of other instances in which Aquinas has been dignified by magisterial recognition in councils, synods, and magisterial documents from the fourteenth century onward (§§ 21–22). It is interesting, however, that Leo goes so far, here, as to include even the Second Council of Lyons as among those councils at which, “one might almost say that Thomas took part and presided over the deliberations and decrees of the Fathers. . .” (§ 22). All citations are from the Vatican Translation. As a point of history, the “happiest results” of this council are not likely attributable to Aquinas’ contribution in Contra Errores Graecorum, since Aquinas never made it to the Council chambers, dying on the way at the Cistercian monastery of Fossa Nuova. Rather, one might better suggest Bonaventure, who did live to see the Council, as the great hero of the day. His theological sensibilities more closely resemble those of Eastern Christendom, and his funeral Mass, held during the Council sessions, was celebrated by a unified Church (Chronica XXIV Generalium in, Analecta Franciscana, III, 356).

5 We refer, here, to the text prepared under St. Charles Borromeo and promulgated by Pope St. Pius V in 1566, known by a variety of names, such as The Catechism of the Council of Trent, The Catechism for Parish Priests, The Catechism of St. Pius V, or even, simply, The Roman Catechism. It would be, of course, quite wrong to suggest that this catechism is a Thomistic text, properly so-called, since the committee assembled to write it converged from diverse theological schools, and received the instruction to avoid any particular allegiance to one or another of them. Nonetheless, along with the influences
of other great theologians of the Church available to the committee at that time, the influence of Aquinas is felt in this catechism, in particular, where the issue of transubstantiation is discussed. See, The Catechism of the Council of Trent, John A. McHugh, O.P., S.T.M., Litt. D. and Charles J. Callan, O.P., S.T.M., Litt.D., trans. (Rockford, Illinois: TAN Books and Publishers, Inc., 1982), 238–241. We should note, however, that, in this instantiation of the Catechism of the Council of Trent, Aquinas himself is rarely cited directly, except in editorial footnotes, distinguished from those found in the original source by the use of letters rather than numbers as prefixes.

6 We can offer, here, only a few of the many examples that one might supply as evidence of this claim. In his work at the Catholic University of Lublin, Wojtyla had dedicated himself to a common project of locating in the “true Thomas” a fruitful starting point for the discernment of truth in the face of the most fundamental questions confronting contemporary society, and in particular, contemporary Polish society. For a discussion of this project, and evidence of Wojtyla’s extensive use of Thomas in his work at Lublin, see, Karol Wojtyla, Person and Community: Selected Essays, Theresa Sandok, O.S.M., trans., Catholic Thought from Lublin, vol. 4, Andrew N. Woznicki, gen. ed. (New York: Peter Lang, 1993). Also of note are John Paul II’s speech to the Pontifical University of the “Angelicum” (November 17, 1979), and his speech to the participants in the Eighth International Thomistic Congress (Castelgandolfo, September 13, 1980). These speeches are available in English translation in, The Whole Truth About Man: Addresses of John Paul II to University Faculties and Students, James V. Schull, S.J., ed. (Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1980), 209–227 and 262–280, respectively.

7 We note here the fact that the Catholic Church accepts Aquinas’ view that the human body must be suited to the operation of the form, but rejects Aquinas’ conclusion that, therefore, hominization is delayed in human gestation until the body is fit for sentient activity. Instead, the mind of the Church seems to rest with the view that, precisely because the body must be fit for the operation of the form, the body develops, beginning from the moment of conception, in a direction that culminates with a body in fact suited to sentient activity proper to the form that had been present all along. Through the process of nutrition, that is to say, the already-present soul gradually forms the body for the sake of sentient activity, over time, even from the moment of conception.

8 We note a few such points later in the present article, most notably, the fact that Aquinas rejected the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception of Mary, which Pius IX later defined ex cathedra as a revealed doctrine, in his December 8, 1854 apostolic constitution, Ineffable Deus. The English Dominicans attempt to reconcile Aquinas with Catholic doctrine on this point (Cf. “St. Thomas and the Immaculate Conception: Editorial Note” in St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica [3 vols.], Fathers of the English Dominican Province, trans., [New York: Benzinger Brothers, Inc., 1947], Vol. II, 2161–2162), but we must be honest about Aquinas’ actual stance. While Pius IX declares that the Immaculate Conception is revealed by God,
and thus, theoretically knowable by anyone “thinking with the faith” about this question (Cf. *Donum Veritatis* [Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, May 24, 1990], § 35; *Summa Theologiae* II-II.11.iii, 64.ii), Aquinas explicitly *denies* this claim, saying instead, that, “nothing is handed down in the canonical Scriptures concerning the sanctification of the Blessed Mary as to her being sanctified in the womb; indeed, they do not even mention her birth” (*Summa Theologiae* III.27.i).

9 Aquinas’ position on capital punishment is fundamentally incompatible with John Paul II’s Personalist philosophy. For Aquinas, the human being is understood to bear a relationship to society in quite the same respect that a *part* bears relative to the *whole*, or that a *member* bears relative to the *body*. These analogies are not wholly useless, but they can lead quickly to rather callous treatment of criminals if they are not clearly mitigated by the affirmation of the absolutely unique and unrepeatable value of the individual human person—what John Paul II describes in terms of the “irreducible in man,” which is the first principle of the so-called “personalistic norm.” Without this foundation, Aquinas finds himself able to speak of the criminal as a *diseased appendage*, which must be amputated in the interest of restoring health to the body as a whole (*Cf. Summa Theologiae* II-II.11.iii, 64.ii). From this perspective, the human person does not possess an absolutely inviolable dignity, but a dignity enjoyed only through the larger group, such that even the *forger* is justifiably put to death—amputated like a cancer of the body politic. In sin, which is a descent from rationality, the sinner loses, for Aquinas, the very fundament of his human dignity, which belongs to him, as Aquinas sees it, not by virtue of his *personal uniqueness* (as it does for John Paul II), but by virtue of his *reason* (*Summa Theologiae* II-II.64.ii.ad 3). Thus, Aquinas holds that capital punishment ought only to be withheld *reluctantly*, as in the event that executing the offender might endanger the innocent (*ibid.* ad 2). John Paul II explicitly rejects this position in favor of precisely the opposite view. In his encyclical letter, *Evangelium Vitae* (March 25, 1995), he declares that, in order both to achieve the restoration of public order and facilitate the rehabilitation of the offender, which is always to be understood as a positive value in the imposition of punishment (not only in the order of *grace* with which the Church is principally concerned, but also in the order of *nature*, which is the principle interest of the State), “*the nature and extent of punishment* . . . ought not go to the extreme of executing the offender except in cases of absolute necessity: in other words, when it would not be possible otherwise to defend society. . . . [a circumstance which is, today,] very rare, if not practically non-existent” (§ 56). We use here the Vatican translation.

10 *Indeed, there is little need for argument that, on this point, Duns Scotus is to be followed* (see ordinatio III, dist. 4, q. 1), and that with a breadth of implications consistent with contemporary Catholic thinking, from the doctrine of the Immaculate Conception, to the emphasis upon the dual ends of the sexual act as articulated in *Humanae Vitae*, to the fact that the Church regards rape as more profoundly evil than masturbation. For Aquinas’ view on the relative gravity of rape to masturbation, see *Summa Theologiae* II-II.154.
Aquinas’ view should be evaluated in light of Wojtyla’s insistence that a philosophico-naturalistic approach to human sexuality (one, that is, which considers only the physiological purpose of the sexual organs) can only take us so far, and will lead to distortions without a further orientation through the normative value of the person, with all that personhood in the fullest and richest sense, must mean. We are speaking here, again, of course, of the so-called personalistic norm. See Wojtyla’s essay, “The Problem of Catholic Sexual Ethics: Reflections and Postulates,” in *Person and Community*, 279–299.

11 *Cf. Scotus’ Ordinatio* III, dist. 3, q.1 and Aquinas’ *Summa Theologiae* III.27. Indeed, Aquinas’ view rests upon the thesis of delayed hominization, which the Church now rejects, while Scotus’ view allows for ensoulment at the moment of conception, and, in fact, seems to depend upon such a view. There can be no doubt, in any case, that the Immaculate Conception and immediate ensoulment go hand-in-hand in contemporary Catholic thought.


14 In his almost comical account of the politico-theological rivalries in which he claims to have found himself incessantly embroiled against all reasonable expectation, Henri de Lubac, S.J., attributes the use of this phrase to Réginald Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P. in his article, “The New Theology: Where Is It Going?” (*Angelicum*, 1946). See Henri de Lubac, *At the Service of the Church: Henri de Lubac Reflects on the Circumstances that Occasioned His Writings* (San Francisco: Communio Books/Ignatius Press, 1993), 60. Garrigou-Lagrange features prominently in these memoirs. We should mention, however, that, note 3 on page 60 reads as follows: “The expression ['new theology'] had already figured in an article by Msgr. Parente, aimed at the writings of Fathers Chenu and Charlier, O.P., *Osservatore romano* of February 9–10, 1942. Cf. *La Croix* of February 26, 1942.” We should add, of course, that the title, “new theologian” was, itself, nothing really new, even in the 1940’s. In fact, it does not actually belong to the twentieth century at all, but is at least as early as the Church’s devotion to St. Simeon the New Theologian (949–1022), with whom the “new theologians” of the twentieth century found, to be sure, a theological kinship.

While it is an excellent article, one is struck by the fact that *The Acting Person* is not cited in the article at all, nor is Scheler’s contribution to the thinking of John Paul II on the question of anthropology.


19 This, of course, is the fundamental argument of his habilitation thesis, *An Attempt to Develop a Christian Ethics Based on Max Scheler’s System* (Jagiellonian University Theology Department, 1953). *Person and Community* provides ready English-language access to Wojtyla’s thinking concerning Scheler. Of particular import here are the essays, “The Problem of the Will in the Analysis of the Ethical Act” (3–22), “The Problem of the Separation of Experience from the Act in Ethics in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant and Max Scheler” (23–44), and, especially, “On the Metaphysical and Phenomenological Basis of the Moral Norm in the Philosophy of Thomas Aquinas and Max Scheler” (73–94), but the whole collection should be consulted for a fuller picture.

20 When we speak, here, of nature, however, we must keep in mind that Wojtyla is critical of too naturalistic an ethical system, which he associates with Aquinas’ thought. In the end, he sees the appeal to nature as too clinical or mechanical for a fully mature science of ethics, given the findings of contemporary philosophy and psychology. He proposes instead a normative ethics, which he sees as the fruit of the phenomenological method. On this issue, see, Karol Wojtyla, “Ethics and Moral Theology,” in *Person and Community*, 101–106. There can be no mistake, however, that on this point Wojtyla is also critical of those who would move too far in the opposite direction, being ready wholly to divorce phenomenology from metaphysics. For Wojtyla, we must have both together—a metaphysics that sees itself as wholly responsible to the well-studied findings of contemporary science, guided by the compelling necessity for a more careful assessment of the evidence of lived experience as the key to developing a more thoroughly adequate account of personhood.

21 *Veritatis Splendor* § 74. Cf. also *Fides et Ratio* § 89.

22 A good, if brief, analysis of the implications of the name *Yahweh* can be found in Demetrius Dumm, O.S.B., *Flowers in the Desert: A Spirituality of the Bible* (New York, Paulist Press, 1987), 77–82. Father Demetrius notes, as a point of great relevance to our broader discussion, that the term is presented, in Hebrew, in the imperfect tense, which always connotes, in that linguistic tradition, an unfinished action (78). He goes on to note that the linguistic connotations of the Greek and Latin renderings are not as well-suited to communicate this nuance, but instead tend to obfuscate the dimensions of event and encounter by introducing the statically theoretical. Joseph Ratzinger makes a similar set of observations in his *Introduction to Christianity*, J. R. Foster, trans. (San Francisco: Communio Books/Ignatius Press, 1969, 1990),
77–93. That being said, as a system, Thomism has generally failed adequately to appreciate the broader implications of the biblical Name, or, for that matter, even to accept those implications fully. What Thomism has accepted, however, and emphasized with admirable clarity, is the fact that a God such as this one not only demands certain moral norms, but is, himself, the ontological guarantor of those norms as objective facts about human being-in-the-world.

23 This is, of course, the central issue in John’s use of the term λόγος (logos) to describe God the Son. This usage must be taken to represent, not simply the hellenization of the Hebrew covenant, but at once the semitization of the Hellenic world. The Greek λόγος implies, all at once, the highest truth, the rational account (in this case of the cosmos), the ultimate meaning (in this case, of life and human existence), the inner architecture (in this case, of God), that against which all else is measured as true or false, right or wrong, good or evil. We could, of course, say more about this important concept; but the most important point at issue for us here is that, in John’s Gospel, the concept is given over to an irrevocable transformation—the transformation from pure theory to the status of an event which comes to us as an encounter with the One True God at a personal and historical level—an encounter with Yahweh, the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

24 Ibid., §§ 74–75.
25 Ibid., §§ 65–70.
26 Cf. Acting Person, 3.6 (130–131), 3.9 (146–147).
27 Veritatis Splendor § 75, 78. Cf. The Acting Person, 3.2 (112–113), 3.3 (120).
28 Veritatis Splendor § 78–83.
30 Fides et Ratio, § 86.
31 Ibid., § 4.
32 Ibid. This principle lies at the basis of Aquinas’ second and third arguments for God’s existence, which proceed from efficient causality and possibility vs. necessity, respectively (Summa Theologiae I.2.iii).
33 Fides et Ratio, § 4. This principle, of course, is the basis of Aquinas’ fourth argument for God’s existence, which proceeds from cosmic order (Summa Theologiae I.2.iii).
34 Cf. Fides et Ratio, §§ 43, 73.
35 Ibid., § 55.
36 The Catechism of the Catholic Church speaks of original justice or original holiness in terms of a fourfold harmony between God and the human person, the human person and himself, the human person and other created persons, and the human person and the cosmos, respectively (§§ 371–376). This harmony is turned to alienation through sin (§§ 398–401); and it is grace that restores the harmony once again (§§ 1042–1050). In Christ, who draws all men to himself (Cf. John 12:34), and who is destined to be “all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28), this reintegration is brought to a superabundant fulfillment. This is a constant theme in the theology of Joseph Ratzinger/Benedict XVI.
37 This wholeness is clearly comported by the Greek term, σῶμα (soma)—the whole living organism. Indeed, the sacramental economy itself rests upon this understanding of the human person as an organic whole. The doctrine of bodily resurrection is the answer precisely to the problem of death, which even in the light of Christianity remains tragic, precisely because it destroys, if only for a time, the somatic integrity proper to human personhood. Indeed, Christ himself weeps in the face of death, even as he promises finally to overcome it (John 11:1–44).


39 Cf., for example, in addition to the whole of his pre-papal corpus, Fides et Ratio §§ 59–60, 72–74, 85, 97.


42 Donum Veritatis, § 21.


44 Ibid.


47 Most notably Rev. Henri Bouillard, S.J., who was among the founders of the project, and who received quite as much direct attention from Garrigou-Lagrange as did de Lubac.

48 See At the Service of the Church, where a letter from Rev. Charles Nicolet, S.J. to the Rev. Father Décisier, delegate from the Province of Lyons to the Congregation of Procurators, appears on p.339. Also, 250–257 provides a brief chronology of Garrigou-Lagrange’s efforts at persecution from September 9, 1946–April 18, 1947. A more detailed record of the controversy is evinced in de Lubac’s catalogue of the reports from the censors enlisted by the Father General of the Society of Jesus to examine Surnaturel (259–264), and some subsequent correspondence (264–276).

49 It is important, at this point, to draw a distinction between what we might call one’s ontological fitness for beatitude, which, of course, can only come through grace, and one’s fundamental telos, which comes through nature. The falsity of the pure nature thesis would seem to depend upon there being no logical contradiction in the claim that human beings have, by nature, a telos that lies beyond their natural capacities (that is, beyond their natural ontological fitness). Against the pure nature thesis, one might argue that there is no logical contradiction here because the condition upon which such a telos can be predicated does, in fact, exist—namely, creation at the hands of a generous and self-emptying God. Drawing a distinction between one’s fundamental telos and one’s ontological fitness, we can say that we have a natural ordination to eternal beatitude, but not a natural power for attaining it—we are not, by nature, ontologically fit for the end toward which we are
ordered. We are made, in the first place, to be lifted beyond ourselves—to submit to the generosity of the self-emptying God, and to allow ourselves to be carried up to him in spousal union. The pure nature theorist, however, would counter by saying that if we are not naturally fit for the attainment of our end, there can be no movement toward it on the part of the subject. To say that we have a natural ordination to an end is merely to say that this end, whatever it happens to be, is where we will end up in our natural movements, provided all natural causes operate unimpeded. But this line of argument must take account of the so-called “natural religions,” which seem ill-at-ease about the natural outcomes of our earthly movements. Even Plato seems to have seen that some divine intervention is necessary for the human being to attain real fulfillment, since the “divisions” of the proverbial line of intellection signify qualitatively differing intellectual activities that cannot simply lead to one another through any merely quantitative immersion in study (509d5–511e5). This is the point he goes on to make in his allegory about the cave, out of which humanity can only be led at the hands of one already, somehow, free—free insofar as he can behold the Good Itself (514e1–519e1), which is said to be . . . “not being, but something yet beyond being, superior to it in rank and power” (ibid. 509b7). The fact is that without revelation, cultures suspect that personal immortality cannot be a happy thing, because the character of the Transcendent Other is unknown to them. That being said, even the Catholic Church has never ratified the doctrine of limbo as some sort of state of natural happiness, even at the Council of Trent, in the age of Cajetan. This can only suggest that the Church, too, has reservations concerning the truth of the claim that, without grace, anything good—even naturally good—could await the dead. But for the Church to doubt this claim would be for the Church to suspect that the human person’s only natural end is a supernatural state, such that the absence of grace would necessarily mean some sort of misery deserving the name of hell. Cf. Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger with Vittorio Messori, The Ratzinger Report, Salvator Attanasio and Graham Harrison, trans. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1985), 145–148. For the present translation of Plato’s Republic, see, Plato, Republic, C. D. C. Reeve, trans. (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2004).


51 All orthodox Catholic theologians affirm a grace of perseverance, in some sense. But on Aquinas’ model, perseverance is regarded as a special grace at work upon human agency. It is certainly possible to understand the grace of perseverance in other ways, for example, as the sheer fact that God’s absolute fidelity, by which he pledges never to abandon his creature, is no contradiction to his equally absolute freedom, by which this pledge is made entirely at his own prerogative—since the divine freedom is really the central point of this mystery. That being said, Aquinas’ view of the matter has its difficulties. If perseverance is a grace at work upon human agency preventing the loss of sanctifying grace—which loss would occur only through the
commission of mortal sin—then concrete mortal sin is unavoidable without divine intervention. Aquinas’ view, therefore, requires either that we see mortal sin as less than fully voluntary, or else that we affirm the doctrine of total depravity—neither of which does Aquinas intend to suggest, nor Catholic teaching permit. See my criticism of this view in Judged by the Law of Freedom, 89–100, where alternative perspectives are entertained.

52 On this point, see Predestination, 209.

53 In Summa Theologiae, see Aquinas’ treatments of providence (I.22), predestination (I.23), perseverance (I-II.109.x; II-II.137.iv) and the Book of Life (I.24).

54 Indeed, even Garrigou-Lagrange admits this much, and humbly bows before the limits of human reason in the face of so great a paradox. Even for Garrigou-Lagrange’s most vehement detractors, his discourse on “The Clear and Obscure Points in Thomism” (Predestination, 177–182) must represent a kind of saving grace for him as he exhibits genuine theological humility in the face of mystery. We certainly do not fault Garrigou-Lagrange for any failure to resolve the issue; for in two millennia of Christianity it really remains the same enigma it has always been. What seems clear, however, is that his view of what reason demands over against the Scriptures and vice-versa is, to say the least, less clear than he seems to think, especially in light of magisterial interventions in the time since his treatise was published.

55 For its better informed approach to Scripture and the Fathers, among other reasons, William G. Most, Grace, Predestination, and the Salvific Will of God: New Answers to Old Questions (Front Royal, Virginia: Christendom Press, 1997), is a far sounder treatment than that offered by Garrigou-Lagrange. See especially Most’s treatment of explicit Scriptural texts (21–37) and the writings of the Fathers (103–109).

56 Ratzinger, for example, attributes a too radical segmentation of the order of grace from the order of nature in the Western theology of the second millennium to the influence of Anselm’s Cur Deus Homo. While many, of course, would suggest that this segmentation is really Augustinian, not Anselmian, we must remember that we inherit a tradition of reading Augustine largely through Anselm’s theological influence. Anselm’s mistake, according to Ratzinger, is to separate Christology from soteriology, considering what Christ is apart from what Christ comes to do (Introduction to Christianity 172–174). By separating these two questions, we separate Christ from what he reveals about God’s universally gratuitous solicitude for the human person, and end by making “…the image of God appear in sinister light” (Introduction to Christianity, 174). If we forget that Christ is, as Paul so carefully says at 1 Cor 15:45, the ἐσχατὸς Ἄδαμ, or last man, we lose sight of what God reveals to us concerning his real purpose in creating the world—namely, to enter into a spousal relationship with his creature, through the mystery of the sacramental life (Cf., for example, the themes presented in the Song of Songs and Hosea, as well as those suggested by John in his Gospel at 2:1–11, 4:4–42, and stated explicitly by him at 3:22–35, to name only a few passages). This means, for Ratzinger, that the human person is never fulfilled as human apart
from that spousal relationship with the divine. Indeed, Christ is the last man for this very reason; precisely insofar as he is, at once, both man and God, he is most fully human, and thus finally makes our own full humanity available to us (ibid., 175–176). It is only fair, however, to point out that Anselm does not hold otherwise, for his own part, but fully affirms that the beatific vision is the supernatural fulfillment of a natural orientation (Cf. Monologium, ch. LXVII–LXXV).


59 Ordinatio III, dist. 7, q. 3.

60 Precisely to the point, of course, is the fact that John Paul II’s views on this question are not yet fully worked out within the scholarly debate. The Acting Person is not his most lucid work, and restricts itself to the philosophical discussion, without really broaching the question of whether and to what extent human freedom can remain meaningful in the context of divine causality. It is, on the contrary, rather a phenomenology of freedom which can put the question to philosopher of God and theologians, “given what we must say about personal self-determinability and self-realization, what must we say about God and his causal action, which are more obscure realities, to the human mind, than human freedom?” But, Cf. Adrian J. Reimers, An Analysis of the Concepts of Self-Fulfillment and Self-Realization in the Thought of Karol Wojtyla, Pope John Paul II, Problems in Contemporary Philosophy, Volume 48 (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 2001); and Jarosław Kupczak, O.P., Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyla, John Paul II (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000). The significance of Scotus’ view of human self-determinability, of course, cannot be ignored as an interpretative to that ofAquinas and the dominant western philosophical tradition. See Richard H. Bulzacchelli, ‘Duns Scotus’s Third ‘Volitional Posture’ and a Critique of the Problem of Moral Indifference in Our Time, Franciscan Studies, Vol. 58 (2000): 77–109. Also, in my book Judged by the Law of Freedom I construct an alternative thesis of human cooperation with divine causality upon a Thomistic metaphysical apparatus.

61 This theme deserves a rather thorough treatment, but one, unfortunately, that we cannot even begin to provide in the present study. To treat this theme adequately, we would wish to consider the ideas of the New Adam (Cf., especially, Paul’s explicit parallel at Romans 5:12–21) and the Son of Man. Also of clear significance is Matthew’s emphasis upon the Sign of Jonah (12:38–42, 16:1–4) with Simon being called “son of Jonah” (16:17)
only later to be called a “son” with Christ (17:24–27). John’s typologies of birth from above (John 1:1–18, 3:3–21, 19:26–30), infused vitality and power (6:57, 14:9–21, 15:1–17, 17:20–26), and freedom in sonship (8:31–38) are all quite relevant. We suggest, in alluding to these passages, only a beginning to this profoundly rich dimension of the gospel of Christ.

62 Introduction to Christianity, 190–191.

63 Indeed, the agrarian metaphor employed by Christ in Matthew’s gospel (5:13) is applicable here. The “salt of the earth” is an amendment to the soil, making the soil fertile, so a crop can grow and yield an abundant harvest. The apostles are called to do this by sowing grace into the cosmic “soil”, in particular, through the sacramental life of the Church with which the apostles are entrusted. Without these “salts” the cosmos would remain devoid of the nutrients human beings require to thrive; but with them, the cosmos is changed—it is made rich with grace, and thus, the harvest grows ever more bountiful.

64 Cf. Luke 1:79b. The nature of Zechariah’s canticle here (1:68–79), in which he prophesies John the Baptist’s role in ushering in the age of the Messiah, seems to suggest this very thesis. The hermeneutic to be employed here, as also at Matthew 5:9 and John 14:27 and 16:32–33, must be Eucharistic.

65 Summa Theologiae I.22–24, I-II.

66 For Aquinas, the reprobate are used by God as an opportunity to manifest the fullness of his glory, by providing someone for him to punish with vengeance. Ratzinger sees this view as fundamentally unchristian—it is a failure to accept fully the precise nature of the chasm between the God of Christianity and any pagan conception of the divine, even that attributable to the great monotheistic philosophers of ancient Greece. Cf. Summa Theologiae I.23.v, Garrigou-Lagrange’s treatment of the divine motive for reprobation in his Predestination (106–212), and Ratzinger’s explicit condemnation of this view in his essay, “God’s Yes and His Love are Maintained Even in Death,” in, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, God is Near Us: The Eucharist, the Heart of Life, Stephan Otto Horn and Vinzenz Pfünér, eds., Henry Taylor, trans. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003), 35–36.

67 This, it seems, is the fundamental point of John Paul II’s encyclical letter, Dives in Misericordia (November 30, 1980), but it is also the central message of the themes of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and the Divine Mercy, which the Church has accepted as an authentic penetration into God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ.


69 Macbeth’s mournful anxiety rests precisely upon this sort of sentiment, where he discourses, “To-morrow, and to-morrow, and to-morrow, / Creeps in this petty pace from day to day / To the last syllable of recorded time, / And all our yesterdays have lighted fools / The way to dusty death. Out, out, brief candle! / Life’s but a walking shadow, a poor player, / That struts and frets his hour upon the stage, / And then is heard no more: it is a
tale / Told by an idiot, full of sound and fury, / Signifying nothing” (Act 5, Scene 5).

70 This view is well understood. God does not so much rage against evil as he remains eternally immutable and infinitely impassible such that evil, which is incompatible with his nature, cannot but end in ruin in coming against him. Of course, we must say something like this, for God is not pushed and pulled by his creature. Such claims, however, are taken, frequently, as wholly antithetical to any understanding of God as, in any respect, affective. God does not feel; he does not dialogue with his creature; Genesis 18:22–33 is mythology and nothing more. Yet a strong front of opposition seems to exist within the scope of what any faithful Catholic of our time would have to consider orthodoxy. The mystics have repeatedly brought before the Church’s consciousness powerful reminders of the Sacred Heart of Jesus, who, though God, is able to love us with a human heart—to feel and to suffer over our impenitence—and who longs to wash us clean of sin in a torrent of Divine Mercy. The ressourcement theologians, under the influence of Hans Urs von Balthasar, who held the mystical writings of Adrienne von Speyr in higher value than his own, have largely sought to rethink the question of divine affectivity. Balthasar, however, is frequently the object of criticism by traditional Thomists for proposing that some sort of affectivity or receptivity could be conceived, not as a defect but as a positive perfection—an active power. On this point, Ratzinger’s remarks at the occasion of Balthasar’s funeral ought really to be given due consideration. He suggests that, “. . . what the Pope [John Paul II] intended to express by this mark of distinction, and of honor, remains valid: No longer only private individuals but the Church itself, in its official responsibility, tells us that he is right in what he teaches of the Faith, that he points the way to the sources of living water—a witness to the world which teaches us Christ and which teaches us how to live” (Joseph Ratzinger, “Homily at the Funeral Liturgy of Hans Urs von Balthasar,” in Hans Urs von Balthasar: His Life and Work, ed. David L. Schindler [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1991], 295. My emphasis). Some might object that Ratzinger’s comments are too vague to suggest an explicit magisterial endorsement of Balthasar’s thesis of divine affectivity; but such an objection would have to offer some account of the fact that Ratzinger himself seems explicitly to side with Bathasar on this issue in many places, including, it would appear, in his first encyclical as Benedict XVI, Deus Caritas Est (25 December 2005), in which he describes God’s love for the human person in terms of Eros (§§ 3–15), and uses phrases like, “God’s passionate love for his people—for humanity” (§ 10, Cf. also § 9) and makes statements like, “In the foregoing reflections, we have been able to focus our attention on the Pierced one (cf. Jn 19:37, Zech 12:10), recognizing the plan of the Father who, moved by love (cf. Jn 3:16), sent his only-begotten Son into the world to redeem man” (§ 19). We use here the Vatican Translation. The challenge brought by this view, properly understood, is not, of course, directed against any claim of God’s eternality or his status as First Cause and Creator of all things. It is, instead, a call to rethink the ontological status of emotivity and other related
concepts on the basis of confident affirmation of God’s scriptural and Christic self-revelation.


72 Cf. *Ordinatio I*, dist. 3, pars 1, q. i, § 40.

73 Trent’s cautions concerning the grace of perseverance should not be taken as an endorsement of the Thomistic thesis (Cf. *The Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent*, Rev. H. J. Schroeder, O.P., trans. [Rockford, Illinois: TAN Books and Publishers, Inc., 1978], Sixth Session, chs. XII–XIII [38–39], and cans. 15–16 [44]). The Fathers were concerned, there, not with any particular theory of the operation of grace, but with the problem of presumption stemming from a view of eternal security that too sharply segregated faith from works and probity of life. Such a view takes personal salvation as a given so as to assure hope even without charity (Cf. 1 Corinthians 13:1–13, James 1:12–2:26). This “eternal security/sola fide” view is an opposite reaction against Pelagianism and semipelagianism, against which Trent also cautions the faithful. The Fathers of Trent were seeking nothing more than to avoid a wide spectrum of claims that could not be reconciled with the Faith of the Church. Perseverance requires the special help of God because perseverance is perseverance in grace, and grace, by its definition, cannot be understood apart from God’s intimate involvement. Indeed, the tendency to reduce grace to a mere mechanism of causality, rather than to view it as an operation of God’s solicitous personal self-disclosure (which, of course, carries with it certain causal implications), is we suggest, the general problem at the heart of most controversies over grace, on both sides of the spectrum, including the scholastic tendency to dissect grace and multiply categories to the point at which even sufficient grace is no longer efficacious.

74 We have in mind, here, the difference between a bride’s confidence in the fidelity of her husband (which is the analogy provided in the Scriptures) in contrast to the likelihood that one will fare well in a sweepstakes where the winning number has already been selected. In the former case, one trusts in the self-revelation of the other and his intentions. Scripture intends our hope to be sure, in that Christ the Bridegroom has made his own intentions for us clear, as well as the fact of his undying fidelity, elements unknowable through natural religion. We have a sure hope because the only real variable is our own often half-hearted initiative as “a bride given to infidelity” (Cf. Hosea 1:2). In the latter case, however, the issue is already decided from all eternity. In truth, we do not win or lose on account of how we respond to God’s grace, we respond to God’s grace as we do on account of whether or not we have won or lost. God creates in us the good acts he wishes to reward, and leaves uncreated the good acts he does not wish to reward, so that in their absence, we will “merit” final reprobation. We do not, properly speaking, hope for an outcome that is already decided; we wish for it.

75 “Connected with the mystery of creation is the mystery of election,
which in a special way shaped the history of the people whose spiritual father is Abraham by virtue of his faith. Nevertheless, through this people which journeys forward through the history both of the Old Covenant and of the New, that mystery of election refers to every man and woman, to the whole great human family” (Dives in Misericordia § 4). Emphasis added. Cf. also § 8.

76 “The words that I have quoted [from Gaudium et Spes, § 22] are clear testimony to the fact that man cannot be manifested in the full dignity of his nature without reference—not only on the level of concepts but also in an integrally existential way—to God. Man and man’s lofty calling are revealed in Christ through the revelation of the mystery of the Father and his love” (Dives in Misericordia, §§ 1, emphasis added). Cf. also § 7.

77 Ibid., §§ 4, 7.
78 Ibid., § 4, 6. See also n. 52.

80 Ratzinger affirms precisely this view when, in commenting upon the Greek implications of John 1:18, he reminds us that Christ is “the ‘exegesis’ of God for us” (Introduction to Christianity, 27).

81 Cf. Wisdom 11:24. Indeed, the whole passage seems a struggle to articulate this very mystery (11:17–12:22).

82 1 Tim 2:4.
84 Crossing the Threshold of Hope, 73.
85 “God’s Yes and His Love are Maintained Even in Death,” (God is Near Us, 27–41), 35.

86 A case in point, here, is made by Romanus Cessario, O.P., in his book symposium article, “Cardinal Cajetan and his Critics,” Nova et Vétera, (Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 2005): 109–118, written as a comment on Tracy Rowland, Culture and the Thomist Tradition: After Vatican II (London: Routledge, 2003). Cessario comments that one, “can embrace Gaudium et Spes 22 and still follow Cardinal Cajetan” (115). If we read the text in a vacuum, that may be so; but it is difficult to see how Gaudium et Spes 22 is really reconcilable with Cajetan if we accept the historical circumstances of its composition, and its subsequent appropriations in magisterial writings, as a hermeneutic within which to interpret the text. The role of Henri de Lubac in its composition seems relevant, as does the fact that his collaborator, Karol Wojtyła, would go on, in his later papacy, not only to validate many of the ressourcement theologians, but even to appoint one of them to be the very guardian of orthodoxy in his curia. The fact that Ratzinger was subsequently
elected Pope himself would seem to make Cessario’s thesis here still more difficult to defend.

**87 Indeed, this is really the** heart of the whole matter—the whole mystery cluster under discussion here; and Garrigou-Lagrange is clear about his stance. How we approach the questions of election, providence, predestination, and perseverance all has to do with what we have to say about the precise relationship between nature and grace, and even, in a certain way, with the question of divine affectivity. For Garrigou-Lagrange, God simply loves some more than others, and wanting those to be saved, saves them, leaving all the rest to perish. This idea of divine predilection, understood as a divine preference for some over others, is, for Garrigou-Lagrange, bound up with his understanding of the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace, and is the cornerstone of his view of predestination. Cf. his Predestination, in particular, on this point, 80–84, but the text should be read far more thoroughly to gain a complete picture of his system.

**88 “God’s Yes and His Love Are Maintained Even in Death” (God is Near Us, 37).**

**89 Ibid.**

**90 Cf., for example, Predestination, 87–89.**

**91 Indeed, this the way in which** Christ himself first opens the way of grace to humanity; for he “... did not regard equality with God something to be grasped. Rather he emptied himself, taking the form of a slave, coming in human likeness; and found human in appearance, he humbled himself, becoming obedient to death, even death on a cross. Because of this, God greatly exalted him and bestowed on him the name that is above every name. . .” (Philippians 26–9). Emphasis added.

**92 Of course, Garrigou-Lagrange rejects this line of reasoning. To examine his own comments on this question, however, would take us far beyond the bounds of the present article, where, again, our point is not to offer a full systematic treatment of the paradoxes at hand, but to call attention to important points of departure. For Garrigou-Lagrange’s views, the reader can begin with Predestination, 341–352.**

**93 Joseph Cardinal** Ratzinger was appointed Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith on November 25, 1981.

**94 Again, John’s theology is precisely to the point here. His clear emphasis upon the enfleshment and historicization of the Logos itself, for the purpose of joining us, eucharistically, to his own life-event, with a view toward raising us in unending somatic union with himself, that we might share in the very life of God without our ceasing to be bodily organisms, is clearly offensive to any self-respecting gnostic. Yet this Logos is the true “light of the human race,” the light that shines in a darkness that can never overpower it. It is this reality that teaches us the full truth about creation, about our own personal dignity, and about God himself—not simply in the abstract, but in the event itself, in our personal encounter with the living God. If we are really to take seriously John’s use of the term Logos in his Gospel, we must be prepared to accept its broader implications. John’s Gospel, properly
understood, makes the defense of the thesis of pure nature difficult indeed, since the underlying implication is clear: it is only through the Incarnation event that the full meaning of human life can be understood. Without this light, we are enshrouded in darkness, even about ourselves, about what it means to be human, and about the purpose of our existence in the cosmos. Yet the world has never really been without this light. Rather, the light of the world had shone in the darkness from the dawn of creation, and has been slowly breaking in upon us, like the rising sun, until now, when “the Logos became flesh and pitched his tent among us” (John 1:14, literally translated). This realization, it seems, provides the proper hermeneutical framework within which to read the often-repeated passage at Gaudium et Spes § 22, which bearing, clearly, the stamp of Wojtyła and de Lubac, offers little room for any more than an *ad hoc* response from Cajetan and Garrigou-Lagrange. John Paul II’s first encyclical, *Redemptor Hominis* (March 4, 1979) is revealing here, especially at §§ 8–10.

95 *Introduction to Christianity*, 112. Emphasis added.
96 Cf. 1 Corinthians 15:28.

99 *We cannot, of course, suggest that* Christ is temporal *qua* his divinity, but that in being temporal *qua* his humanity, *he* is truly temporal—since behind every *nature* is something of that nature, in this case, the divine Person, the Logos, who assumed the nature in question for his own.

100 *We should remember, at this point, that the debates over the thesis of patrapsassianism* did not primarily concern the question of whether, in any sense, God suffers, but had as their central concern, instead, the real distinction between the Logos and the Father. The suffering of the Logos in and through his assumed nature is truly and distinctly *his own suffering*—his own burden. To detach that suffering from even the Logos, assigning it to his human nature in such a way that his divine nature remains utterly uninvolved in it, is really to deny the fundamental content of the mystery of the hypostatic union and the passion of the Christ, since a *nature* cannot suffer as an abstraction. Only a *person* can suffer. Thus, either the Logos, who is a *divine Person*, really does suffer in and through his human nature, or else we are left with Nestorianism, in which we affirm a distinct *human person* in the Christ, capable of suffering, and thus deny the mystery of the hypostatic union by dividing Christ in two. On this point, see Raniero Cantalamessa, *Life in Christ: A Spiritual Commentary on the Letter to the Romans* (Collegeville, Minnesota: The Liturgical Press, 1997), 93–94. Ratzinger, for his own part, considers the denial of some meaningful notion of *passibility* in God as tacitly *Docetist*, and insists that this attribute lies firmly at the heart of God’s self-revelation in Jesus Christ, such that theology is today burdened with a kind of “technical rationalism” that equates emotion with irrationality, and thus trades a Biblical understanding of reality for that embraced by pagan philosophy. See, on this point, for example, “The Paschal Mystery as Core and Foundation of Devotion to the Sacred Heart,” *Towards a Civilization*
of Love, 145–165), especially 153–155. Mario Luigi Cardinal Ciappi, O.P. himself, however, in the same volume, insists upon the Thomistic approach, and upon the difficult task of reading Dives in Misericordia along those lines. See his essay, “From the Encyclical Haurietis Aquas to the Encyclical Dives in Misericordia: Confirmation and Development of Devotion to the Sacred Heart of Jesus,” 9–24.


102 Introduction to Christianity, 243.

103 These themes are all quite Johannine. Cf., for only a sampling of relevant passages, John 1:1–18, 4:23, 10:10, 12:44–50, 17:1–26.

104 Dives in Misericordia, §§ 5–6.

105 Ibid.


107 Dives in Misericordia, §§ 4, 7.

108 Ibid., § 6.

109 Of particular benefit is his discussion at §§ 4–6. His n. 52, in which he provides a broad philological survey of Old Testament themes pertaining to the image of the divine favor, is among the treasures of the document, and must not be overlooked.

110 Indeed, the idea is pervasive in his thinking, both in his magisterial pronouncements and his prepapal writings. This, we suggest, is a critical point of departure from Aquinas. Aquinas does not place the human person, or human free will in the realm of mystery, but in the realm of the naturally knowable, on the premise that the human mind is able to understand the human being, inasmuch as we are equal to ourselves. But this view does not take account of any inexhaustible dimension of human personhood and its utter uniqueness. For Aquinas, as we have already said, our uniqueness stems first from the fact that we are materially distinct from others of our kind. For John Paul II, it is the other way around. Our human uniqueness is founded in personhood itself, for the sake of which our material individuation comes about. In the end, this is a very different view with far-reaching implications.

111 Cf. Dives in Misericordia, §§ 8, 14.

112 Ibid., § 8.

113 Matthew 5:7.

114 This is Aquinas’ view, adopted by Garrigou-Lagrange. See Predestination, 206–210.


116 Ibid., § 13.

117 Ratzinger is no “process” theologian, but he certainly challenges us to reconsider much of what many Western theologians and philosophers have taken for settled matter. Even as late as his interview with Peter Seewald in 2000, about eighteen years into his tenure as Prefect of the Congregation of the Doctrine of the Faith, and a mere four years prior to his elevation to the papacy as Benedict XVI, he is explicit in his insistence that God’s will can
be “confounded,” in a very real sense, but that God is able to adapt his plans to our deviations. On this point, see Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, *God and the World: Believing and Living in Our Time*, Henry Taylor, trans. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2002) 57–59. We have already considered a few of his many comments concerning eternity, incomprehensibility and divine affectivity. In the persistent absence of any retraction with respect to these views, it would be difficult, indeed, to argue against this overall (“new”) theology standing as the proper hermeneutic within which to read *Deus Caritas Est*.

118 Cf. *Fides et Ratio*, § 36. Nowhere in this passage is the question of affectivity raised. Rather the issue here, as in Ratzinger’s *Introduction to Christianity* (67–114), has to do with the animistic polytheism of pre-philosophical cultures, in contrast to the philosophical intuition of Oneness as foundational to being, life, and consciousness—which came to be translated in the thinking of most schools of ancient Greek philosophy into monotheism. The suggestion, in fact, that the Old Testament God is infected with “mythological elements” that the Fathers were able to move beyond through the purifying light of philosophy is, in fact, tactily Marcian; for the Old Testament is truly a dimension of God’s self-revelation along with the New, fully realized in the Incarnation event itself. If, in the thinking of Ratzinger, we have thrown the Baby Jesus out with the dirty water of the Roman baths, *Dives in Misericordia* includes a call to retrieve him from the river Jordan.

119 In addition to the evidence we have already examined on this point, Weigel points out that, when he was created a cardinal by John Paul II, de Lubac was, “... assigned the Roman titular church once held by Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani, a man on the other side of the theological controversies in which de Lubac was embroiled in the late 1940’s.” (*Witness to Hope*, 446).


121 *Fides et Ratio*, § 59.


123 Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, *Note on the Force of the Doctrinal Decrees Concerning the Thought and Work of Fr. Antonio Rosmini Serbati*, 1 July 2001. Founder of the Institute of Charity, Rosmini was a highly influential philosopher and theologian who had been encouraged in his work by popes Leo XII and Pius VIII to pursue his academic work at the service of the Church. He served Pius IX as a consultant concerning the definability of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception of the Virgin Mary. Because he did not tend to speak in familiar philosophical categories, however, he found himself embroiled in controversy throughout the whole of his life, though he was never personally condemned, and died in the Church’s favor.


126 We ought, of course, to suggest a point of caution, here. John Paul II clearly states, at § 74, that he does not intend, in mentioning the many thinkers in his still brief litany, “to endorse every aspect of their thought.”
Nonetheless, it is reasonable to presume that since he mentions these thinkers in such reverential terms, referring to them as something like systematists (though Lossky, for one, would have resisted this characterization as a sort of epithet), he must at least hold that their overall perspectives, which are presented as internally consistent, are truly penetrating approaches to the faith and the world, from which students of their work are likely to benefit immensely. These thinkers should be seen as providing genuine aids to the discernment of the highest truths available to reason. This is an important suggestion for the purpose of the present study, since Lossky’s very Eastern view entails an approach to the question of the relationship between nature and grace that Garrigou-Lagrange would never have accepted—a view much closer to that embraced by de Lubac, Balthasar, or Ratzinger.

127 Lossky’s essay on “Faith and Theology” in, Vladimir Lossky, Orthodox Theology: An Introduction, Ian and Ihita Kesarcodi-Watson (Crestwood, NY: St, Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1989, 13–25), speaks precisely to the limits of natural theology. In this essay, Lossky sees philosophy’s task as setting the human mind against the limits of natural reason in the face of a God who is still more transcendent than any philosophical notion of the Absolute. In this way, philosophy points out the inherent incomprehensibility of Reality, on the basis of its grounding, not merely in a metaphysical principle, which he thinks can never really get us to the God of revelation at all, but a Trinitarian Personal God. See especially his comments on pp. 20–22.

128 Fides et Ratio § 80. Cf. Lossky, “Theology as sophia is connected at once to gnosis and to episteme. It reasons, but seeks always to go beyond concepts. Here a necessary moment of the failure of human thought breaks in before the mystery that it wants to make knowable. A theology that constitutes itself into a system is always dangerous. It imprisons in the enclosed sphere of thought the reality to which it must open thought” (Orthodox Theology, 15). It would seem that John Paul II is suggesting that philosophy ought to accept this element of theological thought, and recognize in it a limitation of its own authority in the field of natural theology, lest it deny theology proper the true God of revelation, and “replace the mystery lived in silence” (ibid.), which is the heart of true theology, “with mental schemata easily handled, certainly, and whose use can intoxicate, but which are ultimately empty” (ibid.). Lossky’s remarks here, much less our own, should not be taken as a repudiation of rationality, or the accessibility to natural reason of the truth that God exists. It is only a caution against a certain presumption of human reason to fit God into our own intellectual categories, rather than allowing him to inform them, and trusting him somehow to open them out to his infinite incomprehensibility without destroying them altogether.

129 Dives in Misericordia, § 6.
Part II

Social Philosophy
Chapter 7

Karol Wojtyła’s Notion of the Irreducible in Man and the Quest for a Just World Order

Hans Köchler

THE BEGINNINGS OF A CONVERSATION: PARTICIPATION AND DIALOGUE

In January 1975 I delivered a lecture on “The Dialectical Conception of Self-determination” at the University of Fribourg in Switzerland. In my presentation I tried to explain the specific form of philosophical anthropology which Karol Wojtyła had developed, using the phenomenological method for a creative re-interpretation of the traditional view of man which is based on the philosophy of Aristotle and the teachings of St. Thomas in particular.

The international colloquium where I introduced Karol Wojtyła’s philosophical approach was devoted to the theme “Soi et Autrui” (The Self and the Other) and organized by the International Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society in collaboration with the Swiss Philosophical Society. The session in which I made my presentation was presided over by Emmanuel Levinas. The Cardinal having been unable to attend in person, I had agreed to write a companion paper related to the contribution he had prepared for the colloquium under the title “Participation or Alienation?” For this purpose, he had furnished me, in December 1974, with the English text of his lecture on “The Personal Structure of Self-determination” which he had delivered at the international conference commemorating the 700th anniversary of the death of St. Thomas Aquinas, and with a typewritten French translation of the last two chapters of his book Osoba i czyn, an English version of which was published – after his accession to the See of Peter – as Volume X of the series Analecta Husserliana under the title The Acting Person. In 1975, the philosophical writings of Karol Wojtyla were not yet widely known outside of Poland. To my knowledge, the text of my lecture published in Volume VI of the Analecta Husserliana (1977) was the first secondary literature on the later Pope’s philosophy to appear outside of Poland.

I had consented to analyze and present the then-Cardinal’s ideas to a philosophical audience because of our joint adherence to the phenomenological school of thought. Both of us were active members of the World Phenomenology Institute headed by Professor Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, a former student of Roman Ingarden. (I had delivered my first-ever philosophical lecture in September 1972 at a conference organized by the International Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society, an affiliate organization of the Institute, at St. John’s University in New York. The topic of my presentation was “The ‘A Priori’ Moment of the Subject-Object Dialectic in Transcendental Phenomenology.”)
It is obvious from this brief chronology that my interest in Wojtyła’s approach predates his election as Pope. While most interpreters of his philosophy were interested in his philosophical conception because he was the head of the Roman Catholic Church, my motivation was merely philosophical. Having dealt with his ideas well before he acceded to a position of dogmatic teaching, I was mainly – understandably, I suppose – interested in how a man I knew as a genuine philosopher (and whose election I had never anticipated) would eventually redefine the office he had assumed and reinterpret traditional teachings of the Church along the lines of his philosophical convictions. In a certain sense, particularly as regards the general policies and positions of the Holy See, my hopes proved premature. I identified, however, a persistence of his original phenomenological approach – namely a consistent emphasis on the irreducible element in the human subject – in many of the pronouncements he made as head of the Roman Catholic Church, particularly those dealing with social responsibility, and in what I would like to call his “cosmopolitan reinterpretation” of the papal mission.

Having said this, I would like to state that, as an academic philosopher, I shall not make any comments on issues of theology or church politics. These are neither my fields of competence nor interest. I shall not deal with Pope John Paul II’s theological work and shall comment on the “political” and global aspects of his pontificate only insofar as those are related to his philosophical – and in particular anthropological – approach with which I was familiar long before his papacy.

The phenomenological method having been the common denominator of our philosophical endeavors, I had concentrated in my first commentary on Karol Wojtyła’s approach on what I called, at the time, the “dialectic nature of self-comprehension” – and, for that matter, self-determination. Interpreting Wojtyła’s approach in the chapter entitled “Le ‘membre de la communauté’ et l’ ‘autrui’” (The “member of the community” and the “other”) of his philosophical opus magnum (to date still unpublished in the English language), I characterized “the other” as “the indispensable counterpart of one’s own individuality,” emphasizing that the other “therefore constitutes the basis for a critical self-comprehension” that is at the roots of the autonomy (self-determination) of the human being in general. I related this to the dialectical structure of intentionality which Wojtyla had identified in human perception.

I was especially interested in the view of “participation” which he had outlined in his written contribution to the Fribourg colloquium and made available to me in advance. He distinguished between the mere sociological phenomenon of a group of human beings and a community in the sense of an interdependent relationship in which “the other” is part of my personal self-determination, i.e. not perceived as a mere “object,” but determinative and corrective of my self-experience and identity – was exactly what I had aspired to work out in my hermeneutical approach towards what we call today the “dialogue of civilizations.” In a lecture on “The Cultural-philosophical Aspects of International Co-operation” delivered in March 1974 before the Royal
Karol Wojtyła’s Notion of Man

Scientific Society in Amman (Jordan), I tried to explain the phenomenon of cultural identity in terms of the dialectical nature of consciousness as manifested in the interdependent relationship between the self and the other. Thus, what Wojtyła had called the “personal structure of self-determination,” had been identified in my system of cultural hermeneutics as the basis of a philosophy of “cultural self-comprehension,” i.e. a civilizational dialogue. This made me rather susceptible to an approach, such as Wojtyła’s, that was oriented towards a definition of subjectivity – or personal identity – in the sense of an interdependent relationship between ego and alter ego (which I had characterized as “dialectical” in the strict Hegelian sense).

In line with this common approach, it was understandable that the then-Cardinal of Kraków, in a letter dated 12 February 1975, had confirmed to me that the interpretation which I had advanced under the title “The Dialectical Conception of Self-Determination” fully expressed his own intentions as outlined in his paper on “Participation or Alienation?”

Another contribution by Karol Wojtyła to phenomenological anthropology – and the theory of mind in general – was of special interest to me; it can be summarized under the heading of “phenomenological realism.” As I outlined in an article written for Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (1982), by modifying Husserl’s notion of intentionality – or re-positioning it in the context of realistic phenomenology – he was able to avoid the kind of ontological idealism in which the later Husserl became entangled. In a treatise on Scheler’s phenomenological ethics, written for the Third Conference of the International Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society in Montreal (1974), Wojtyła had asked whether the notion of intentionality, being limited to the rational level of eidetic insight, can “do justice to man as a person” and had explained that, in turning “halfway back to Husserl” when applying the phenomenological method, he “went beyond him in the analysis of the person.”

In The Acting Person Wojtyła introduced an interesting conceptual distinction between “knowledge” and “consciousness.” While he defines knowledge in the sense of an intentional act directed towards real objects of perception, he characterizes consciousness as a mere “mirroring,” a passive “reflection” of the processes occurring within the acting person. This form of self-reflexivity, however, is identified as a fundamental condition of human self-realization. In his analysis, the mirroring function of consciousness is “closely related to self-knowledge,” allowing us “to gain an objective awareness of the good or evil that we are the agents of in any particular action ....” In a further creative transformation of Husserlian phenomenology, he distinguishes between “subjectivity” (as a phenomenon of reflexion) and “subjectiveness” (rooted in the pre-reflexive unity of life), thus acknowledging that “[c]onsciousness does not constitute the inner structure of the human dynamism itself.” These elements of a “realistic” anthropology, based on a concrete phenomenological approach – as distinct from the rather abstract
Husserlian theory of “reduction” that led the latter into a form of absolute idealism – have been, in my personal analysis, the focal point also of the later Pope’s philosophical identity and social teachings.

Allow me to look back one more time at the genesis of my hermeneutical approach towards civilizational dialogue, which had the same – phenomenological – roots as my interest in the philosophical foundations of anthropology, documented in Karol Wojtyła’s approach of the “acting person.” In both instances, human identity – and thus self-determination in the anthropological sense – is perceived in terms of a dialectical relationship between the self and the other, revealing the irreducible element of subjectivity as such. The notion of “self-determination” in the sense of the irreducibility of the human subject, linked with the subject’s dignity and inalienable rights in the individual as well as the collective sense, has been an essential element of my theory of cultural self-comprehension and later became the paramount feature of my efforts in the philosophy of democracy and the reflections on global justice following from it. In a two-month tour around the globe in March–April 1974, I set out to promote the idea of civilizational dialogue in the sense of what I called, at the time, the “dialectic of cultural consciousness.” I held preparatory consultations for an international conference on “The Cultural Self-comprehension of Nations” to be organized in Innsbruck in July 1974. For the first time in that post-colonial era, it evoked the theme of a “dialogue among civilizations” as a basis of global peace, laying out the hermeneutical framework of such a dialogue. In my analysis of this idea (which I discussed, in the course of that voyage, with, among others, the late Yussef El-Sebai, then Minister of Culture of Egypt, and the Founder President of Senegal, Léopold Sédar Senghor, the philosopher of “négritude”), cultural self-comprehension – and thus human identity in the broadest sense, including the human being’s social relations – was based on the dialectical structure of human consciousness (reflection).

I further built on this approach when devising the structure of an international symposium on “The Concept of Monotheism in Islam and Christianity” in 1981. On a personal note: For preparatory meetings on the symposium I arrived in Rome – in the early morning of 14 May 1981 – to the news of the attempt on the life of Pope John Paul II. The symposium was eventually held in Rome in November of that year with the participation of a representative of the Holy See and a special message from Cardinal Franz König of Vienna. The final document called for further dialogue among the two great monotheistic religions as basis of global peace.

My direct philosophical co-operation with Karol Wojtyła had ended before that date, however. It was based on our mutual participation in the international phenomenological movement (the International Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society and later the World Phenomenology Institute), in particular the academic colloquia and conferences organized during the 1970s. As indicated earlier, I did not deal with “the philosophy of the Pope” nor with his religious views or teachings; the co-operation
was exclusively situated within a philosophical context, namely that of the phenomenological school.

At that period of time (during the 1970s), I was concentrating on epistemological questions of phenomenology, trying to uncover contradictions and ontological inconsistencies in Husserl’s transcendental approach and advocating a realistic phenomenological concept as opposed to Husserl’s idealistic turn. I considered the ontological idealism of the later Husserl as a position that had fallen back behind the original achievements that had been yielded by the implementation of his slogan “zu den Sachen selbst” (or: “zurück zum Gegenstand”/ “back to the thing itself”).

In that regard, my efforts were in line with Karol Wojtyła, who identified, in the draft preface to the English edition of his work Osoba i czyn, the human being as subject as “the most interesting ‘thing itself’.” Subsequently, I had dealt with the phenomenological foundations of anthropology and the interdependent relationship between anthropology and ontology. Thus, the nexus between our two phenomenological approaches was the exploration of the transcendental status of the human subject beyond the paradigm of (ontological) idealism and outside the realm of mere “objectivization” of the human being as part of nature. This connection has been aptly described by Rocco Buttiglione in his authoritative philosophical biography of John Paul II. He summarizes my reading of Wojtyła’s position – in the sense of realist phenomenology – in the following terms:

Wojtyła accepts that the traditional, nonphenomenological point of departure of anthropology objectifies man; his own point of departure is a phenomenological description of experience. While Wojtyła objects to the cosmological point of departure as inadequate in anthropology, he does not limit anthropology to phenomenology, and points to a transphenomenological approach for a complete anthropology. Wojtyła rejects Husserl’s idealistic turn, which leads to a subjectivist reflection and absolutization of consciousness.

My first lecture on Karol Wojtyła’s phenomenological conception in Fribourg in 1975 was followed by another presentation entitled “La fenomenologia del Cardinale Karol Wojtyła. Sul problema d’un’antropologia a base fenomenologica” at the Annual Conference of the Italian Section of the International Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society in Viterbo, Italy, in February 1979. After that meeting, our group was received by John Paul II in the Vatican. In a personal conversation, he assured me that he would always remain committed to the phenomenological movement and consider himself a phenomenologist; but he also made clear that he would not be able to take an active part in the debates of the phenomenological community any longer. Irrespective of his disengagement from daily philosophical work due to the assumption of his high office in 1978, he remained loyal to the
personalistic philosophy of his phenomenological period – as I was able to observe during the long years of his pontificate and will explain later in more detail.

One of the most concise elaborations of his phenomenological anthropology can be found in his article on “Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man” which appeared in 1978.\textsuperscript{36} (The text was originally presented at the “Paris Colloquium” in June 1975.\textsuperscript{35}) In his analysis of the human subject, Wojtyła makes clear that in view of what has been achieved in phenomenology, “we can no longer treat man only as an objective being,”\textsuperscript{38} i.e. as a mere object. He critically refers to what he calls the “cosmological” understanding of man – which he identifies with the traditional “metaphysical” position of philosophy – as the key factor that has prevented philosophy from grasping the irreducible nature of the human being as subject. By stressing subjectivity as a “synonym of all that is irreducible in man,”\textsuperscript{39} he clearly challenges the predominance of the Aristotelian paradigm in traditional anthropology (in the sense of the definition “homo est animal rationale”), although he leaves open the question “whether the ‘cosmological’ type of understanding man and the ‘personalistic’ one ultimately exclude each other.”\textsuperscript{40} His personalistic position implies – as we explained in the 1982 article in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research – the “essential irreducibility of personal self-realization to constant factors of the world of objects, i.e., the world as described by the natural sciences.”\textsuperscript{41}

For me, as a philosopher who was interested in identifying new paradigms resulting from the phenomenological method in the sense of “transcendental realism,”\textsuperscript{42} this had far-reaching implications for philosophical thought within the realm of Aristotelian-Thomistic philosophy, the predominant orientation within the Roman Catholic church. Wojtyła himself addressed the issue rather directly in his article for the Paris Colloquium by stating that the thinker who seeks by philosophical methods the “ultimate truth” about the human being “does not limit himself to ‘purely metaphysical ground.’”\textsuperscript{43} In the handwritten draft of the author’s preface to the English edition of his main philosophical work The Acting Person, he elaborates further on the theme. He characterizes the personalistic-phenomenological approach as “completely new in relation to traditional philosophy,” making clear that he subsumes to that category “the pre-Cartesian philosophy and above all the heritage of Aristotle, and, among the Catholic schools of thought, of St. Thomas Aquinas.”\textsuperscript{44} He further characterizes his anthropological undertaking in The Acting Person as “an attempt at reinterpreting certain formulations proper to this whole philosophy,”\textsuperscript{45} while acknowledging that he “owes everything to the systems of metaphysics, of anthropology, and of Aristotelian-Thomistic ethics on the one hand, and to phenomenology, above all in Scheler’s interpretation, and through Scheler’s critique also to Kant, on the other hand.”\textsuperscript{46} In our analysis, it still cannot be clearly determined, as far as a strictly philosophical approach is concerned, how those competing schools of thought (with different, if not mutually exclusive notions of humanity) were reconciled in the Pope’s world view.
THE IRREDUCIBLE SUBJECT

In view of the positions Wojtyla adopted on the nature of the human being, it was not far-fetched for philosophical observers and intellectuals versed in Roman Catholic doctrine to expect – in the course of Karol Wojtyła’s election in 1978 – a modification or re-orientation of Church teaching away from Aristotelianism and Thomism with their “objectivistic” world view and anthropology, identified as such by the pontifex himself (albeit in his prepontifical philosophical life) towards an approach based on the irreducible character of the human subject. I am well aware of the dispute that followed Cardinal Wojtyła’s accession to the See of Peter about his philosophy’s phenomenological orientation and its possible impact on his interpretation – or re-interpretation – of Catholic doctrine, namely the teachings of Thomism.

I followed the controversy around the publication of the English edition of Osoba i czyn, with Church officials allegedly challenging the authenticity of the English text, from a “philosophical distance,” being aware of what I had heard from the author’s own mouth. What has been said about the English edition’s excessively “phenomenologizing” both Wojtyła’s language and ideas must, thus, be seen in the wider context of Church politics – in a constellation where a philosophical author suddenly finds himself in the position of pontifex maximus, i.e. as supreme authority in all issues of Catholic doctrine. Only a non-political, genuinely hermeneutical approach will help us to establish a fair and balanced interpretation and evaluation of his philosophical position which, according to my impression, did not suddenly vanish on the day of his election.

The series of phenomenological papers which Wojtyła published in the Analecta Husserliana during the 1970s provides adequate guidance, at least for the philosopher. In the (official) Preface to the English edition of Osoba i czyn the author himself declared his intention of “reversing the post-Cartesian attitude toward man … by approaching him through action,” referring to the work of Max Scheler – one of the main representatives of the realistic school of phenomenology – as “a major influence upon his reflection.” He stated his “full approval” to the changes proposed by the English editor and incorporated into the definitive version of the book. In a written communication to me which dealt with the presentation of his paper “Participation or Alienation?” in his absence at the Fribourg colloquium of 1975, he also expressed his confidence in the editor of the English version.

Irrespective of the implications of these interpretive questions for Church politics, one systematic problem of Wojtyła’s phenomenological anthropology will have to be addressed more specifically, namely that of the very meaning of the (human) subject. Is it appropriate to assume, as Buttiglione suggests, that Wojtyła’s usage of the term in the original Polish version essentially evokes the Greek meaning of υποκείμενον (sub-jectum) as “the metaphysical subject to which all attributions regarding the person refer”? Can one really say – as Buttiglione does – that the phenomenological interpretation of the subject “reduces” the importance of the υποκείμενον?
If one interprets Wojtyła’s usage of the terms “subject” and “subjectivity” in the context of his prepontifical philosophical writings, one can hardly read his reservations towards a “purely metaphysical ground” of the understanding of man\textsuperscript{55} as confirming a commitment to the traditional metaphysical definition of \textit{subjectum}. To the contrary, in papers specially written for phenomenological meetings – such as the one entitled “Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man”\textsuperscript{56} – Wojtyła made it abundantly clear that he was mainly concerned with the “concreteness of the existence of man, that is, … the reality of the conscious subject”\textsuperscript{57} which he understood as the irreducible element in man. While explaining, in \textit{The Acting Person}, that “[t]he subjectiveness present in both man’s acting and in what happens in him, implies or refers to an ontologically subsequent factor as its necessary condition,”\textsuperscript{58} his philosophical endeavor is far from building on the “objectivist” notion of the metaphysical subject in the sense of Aristotelian philosophy. When he speaks, in the context of \textit{The Acting Person}, of “a structural ontological nucleus that would account for the fact itself of man being the subject or the fact that the subject is a being,”\textsuperscript{59} this formulation cannot be construed in the sense of \textit{υποκείμενον} in its traditional metaphysical meaning. This becomes even more obvious in the Postscript to \textit{The Acting Person} where the author unambiguously states: “… our aim was never to build a theory of the person as a being, to develop a metaphysical conception of man.”\textsuperscript{60} In my own interpretation of his approach I have repeatedly tried to clarify in what sense and up to what extent Wojtyła tries to distance his personalistic anthropology from a purely “metaphysical” and objectivist approach.\textsuperscript{61}

Even some of his pontifical texts appear to confirm this phenomenological – or personalistic – interpretation of “subject” and “subjectivity.” Samuel Gregg has convincingly argued that Wojtyła’s prepontifical philosophical texts had an influence particularly on the social encyclicals promulgated by him as \textit{pontifex maximus}.\textsuperscript{62}

The encyclical \textit{Laborem Exercens}\textsuperscript{63} is a case in point. The distinction introduced in Chapter II (“Work and Man”) between work in the \textit{objective} and \textit{subjective} sense resembles very much the distinction made in his phenomenological writings between the human being in the objective and subjective dimension. Apart from the theological context in which any papal encyclical is being situated, he draws, in this particular text, the practical conclusions from his earlier phenomenological analysis of the nature of the human being; or one may say, more cautiously, that the text of this encyclical is perfectly in tune with his earlier phenomenological approach. By describing the person as “a subjective being capable of acting in a planned and rational way … and with a tendency to self-realization” and emphasizing the “pre-eminence of the subjective meaning of work over the objective one” (Art. 6, “Work in the Subjective Sense: Man as the Subject of Work”),\textsuperscript{64} the encyclical resembles in its conceptual approach the phenomenological description of man in \textit{The Acting Person} and in Wojtyła’s contributions to the phenomenological conferences referred to earlier. The encyclical’s critique of capitalism can equally be related to the personalistic philosophy of the Pope’s prepontifical
writings. The phraseology reminds the reader of earlier texts on the irreducible character of the human being, and on human self-determination as rooted in the inalienable dignity as a subject (person): “… the error of early capitalism can be repeated wherever man is in a way treated on the same level as the whole complex of the material means of production, as an instrument and not in accordance with the true dignity of his work – that is to say, where he is not treated as subject …”

Similarly, the encyclical Veritatis Splendor evokes Wojtyla’s philosophical-anthropological convictions, when, inter alia, it reflects upon the dignity of the human person, reasoning about the true meaning of self-determination, and speaking of heteronomy as “a form of alienation.”

The flow of the argumentation quite obviously resembles the style of his philosophical opus magnum.

Many other texts of his papacy document that Karol Wojtyła’s pontifical views on social justice – including his critical assessment of globalization – are fully consistent with his earlier philosophical convictions concerning the dignity of man as a subject irreducible to the realm of objects. His personalistic commitment to the building of a just world order, although – as far as the papal texts are concerned – primarily situated within a theological context, is clearly visible in the encyclical Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (1987) where, in the chapter entitled “Survey of the Contemporary World,” he states that the Church’s social doctrine “adopts a critical attitude towards both liberal capitalism and Marxist collectivism.” He poses the question: “in what way and to what extent are these two systems capable of changes and updatings such as to favor or promote a true and integral development of individuals and peoples in modern society?” Very much in tune with his approach in The Acting Person and with his anthropological notion of self-determination, he emphasizes, in the concluding chapter, that “[h]uman beings are totally free only when they are completely themselves, in the fullness of their rights and duties.” Similariy, in his paper for the Fribourg Colloquium (1975), he, as a philosopher, had referred to self-determination revealing “the freedom of the will … in the simplest and likewise fullest manner,” allowing us to designate that “through which everyone is his ‘own I.’” In the encyclical’s analysis, what is at stake – apart from all questions of social wealth and material development – is “the dignity of the human person;” he acknowledges, however, that “the present situation does not seem to correspond to this dignity.” His emphasis on a just global order, based on the inalienable rights of man, is further underlined by the encyclical’s repeated references to the virtue of solidarity and mutual human interdependence.

In a similar vein, John Paul II spoke repeatedly of the ethically ambiguous character of globalization, making clear his commitment to a world order that is oriented towards the needs of the human being. In the document Ecclesia in America (1999), while acknowledging positive consequences resulting from increased production and efficiency, he warns that “if globalization is ruled merely by the laws of the market applied to suit the powerful, the consequences cannot but be negative.” Among those he
mentions the “absolutizing of the economy,” “the growing distance between rich and poor,” and unfair competition between the developing and the industrialized countries.\textsuperscript{76}

It has been argued that Karol Wojtyła’s preontifical philosophical writings have in turn been influenced by Catholic magisterial texts. According to Gregory R. Beabout, \textit{The Acting Person} can be interpreted as a meditation on human action inspired by the Pastoral Constitution \textit{Gaudium et Spes}, which was promulgated by Paul VI as an official document of the Second Vatican Council (1965).\textsuperscript{77} Interestingly, this interpretation is confirmed by Wojtyła’s own brief reference – in a note in \textit{The Acting Person} – to the circumstances under which the book was written. He confides that while writing \textit{Osoba i czyn} (the first, Polish version of \textit{The Acting Person}), he attended the Second Vatican Council, and recalls that his participation in the proceedings “stimulated and inspired his thinking about the person.”\textsuperscript{78} In this connection, he further states that the Council’s Pastoral Constitution \textit{Gaudium et Spes} “not only brings to the forefront the person and his calling but also asserts the belief in his transcendent nature …”\textsuperscript{79} Some of the language of the Constitution is indeed very similar not only to the approach in \textit{The Acting Person}, but also to that in Wojtyła’s more specific contributions to phenomenological anthropology. This becomes particularly obvious in regard to the wording of Art. 3 of the Constitution’s Preface: “For the human person deserves to be preserved; human society deserves to be renewed. Hence the focal point of our total presentation will be man himself, whole and entire, body and soul, heart and conscience, mind and will.”\textsuperscript{80} Article 35 of the Constitution states, \textit{inter alia}, that “when a man works he not only alters things and society, he develops himself as well. … A man is more precious for what he is than for what he has.” The first sentence of this quotation is almost mirrored by what Wojtyła refers to in his article on \textit{The Personal Structure of Self-Determination} (1974), where he speaks about the human will and explains that every act of will effects a modification of the human subject as well.\textsuperscript{81}

While acknowledging that \textit{The Acting Person} – and Wojtyła’s anthropology in general – articulates the basic humanistic aspirations of \textit{Gaudium et Spes},\textsuperscript{82} we do not go as far as Samuel Gregg, who obviously wants to see Wojtyła’s philosophical conception absorbed by the theological tradition of Catholicism. For him, John Paul II’s preontifical writings merely acknowledge “insights into the truth which emerge outside the Church,” using language that is familiar to contemporary audiences,\textsuperscript{83} as if the writing of \textit{The Acting Person} was a mere tactical move by a theologian and Church politician. It is no wonder that in such a narrow hermeneutical context, lacking proper understanding for Wojtyła as a philosopher, “\textit{The Acting Person} reads like neo-Thomism couched in Husserlian language.”\textsuperscript{84}

Having witnessed the development of his anthropological approach in the period preceding his election (particularly from 1974 onwards) through our joint participation in the activities of the World Phenomenology Institute (at a time when I also served as member of the Editorial Board of the \textit{Phenomenology Information Bulletin}), I cannot but distance myself from
Karol Wojtyła’s Notion of Man

a tendency of interpretation that, while being subordinated to the realm of theology and official teaching, is alien to philosophy and its strictly independent approach. The Pope’s own brief statement to our phenomenological group on 26 February 1979 (to which I referred earlier) is sufficient proof of my interpretation. Compared to Gregg’s evaluation, Rocco Buttiglione’s biography is considerably more balanced, doing justice to the later Pope’s philosophical aspirations that were definitely not of a merely apologetic nature.

Wojtyła’s dealing with the question of “alienation” – a basic concept of Marxist philosophy – in the years preceding his papacy is further proof of his independent philosophical mind (which was also at work in the writing of encyclicals such as Laborem Exercens). While pointing to the limitations of the Marxist notion of alienation (insofar as Marxist doctrine suggests that “man is alienated by his own creations,” including religion), Wojtyła was determined to put the concept “to good account” so that it would help “in the analysis of the human reality.” Thus, he integrated the concept into his phenomenological anthropology, defining “alienation” as the “negation of participation.” According to his understanding, alienation cannot exclusively be linked to the world of human creations and the production of social structures, but is intrinsically related “to the place of the human being as a personal subject in this world.” In his critical – and at the same time productive – anthropological review of the discourse on alienation he paid tribute to “contemporary Marxists” such as Adam Schaff, who were drawing attention to the limits of a narrow materialistic interpretation and advocating a humanistic review of this essential element of Marxist doctrine. Thus, taking up a fundamental notion of Marxist philosophy, he was able to reshape it by interpreting it in a phenomenological context, namely as an essential element of the conditio humana. This led him to the conclusion that “participation or alienation remains the central problem of our age.”

Because of his deep commitment to the “human being in action” and his efforts at understanding the intricate structures of human self-determination, he transcended merely metaphysical notions of “subject” and “object.” Thus he reached out to a comprehensive anthropology that is based on Erlebnis in the phenomenological sense (“experience lived through”). Thus Karol Wojtyła has continuously expanded the scope of phenomenology and gone beyond the confines of an abstract transcendental (subjectivist) epistemology – as in the case of Edmund Husserl’s emphasis on επιστήμη – towards a comprehensive system of practical philosophy. After 1978, this approach – consistently documented in his prepontifical writings – has been transformed into what I would like to call the “applied philosophy” of the papal encyclicals, Laborem Exercens being the paramount example.

Through his emphasis on the concrete human being, Karol Wojtyła substantially contributed to the development of realistic phenomenology in the sense defined by Max Scheler and Roman Ingarden, combining a commitment to the irreducible nature of the human subject with an acknowledgment of objective reality. He bore in mind that the phenomenological method is “in the
service of transphenomenological cognition.” The core issue of his emphasis on phenomenological anthropology has always been the one outlined in his contribution to the Fribourg Colloquium of 1975: namely how the “I” constitutes himself in relation to the “other,” i.e. the relation of the concrete “I” to all human beings. According to his conception, “[t]hey are not only ‘other’ in their relation to the ‘I,’ but each one of them is at the same time a ‘different I.’” His personalistic-phenomenological approach enabled him to reach out to humankind as such, an attitude he brought to hitherto unknown perfection in his global pilgrimage as pontifex maximus, addressing men and women of virtually all cultures and civilizations. Thus, having remained loyal to his philosophical origins and true to his commitment to the dignity of the human being, John Paul II has proven the universal mission of phenomenology even in a realm that goes far beyond philosophical reasoning.

ANNEX

Writings by the author on the philosophical conception of Karol Wojtyla


NOTES

1 Both papers – Karol Wojtyła’s “Participation or Alienation?” and Hans Köchler’s “The Dialectical Conception of Self-Determination” – are reproduced in Vol. VI of the Analecta Husserliana: Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka (ed.), The Self and the Other. The Irreducible Element in Man, Part I: The
Karol Wojtyła’s Notion of Man


8 Formulation according to the French translation furnished to me by the author. (Now to be found in part four [“Participation”] of the English version.)


10 The Dialectical Conception of Self-Determination, loc. cit., p. 77.


13 Hans Köchler, Cultural-philosophical Aspects of International Cooperation, loc. cit.


15 In the context of cultural hermeneutics and personalistic anthropology such as the one advanced here this notion has nothing to do with the field of social theory covered by Marxist doctrine.

16 Carolus Cardinalis Wojtyła, Archiepiscopus Metropolita Cracoviensis, letter dated Kraków, 12 February 1975 (German) [in the author’s personal archive]: “… Only a limited amount of material was available to you as source of information on my conception; in view of this, your profound understanding of my conception deserves even higher respect …” (Trans. from the German original / H.K.)

17 Karol Wojtyła, “Participation or Alienation?” in: The Self and the


22 The Acting Person, pp. 31f.


32 The Acting Person, p. xiv. (Translated from the Polish original by Professor M. K. Dziewanowski.)


35 The text has been published in La Nuova Critica, Rome, Vol. 52 (1979), pp. 69-76.


37 Fifth International Phenomenology Conference held by the International Husserl and Phenomenological Research Society, 12-15 June 1975.


45 Ibid.

48 Buttiglione, op. cit., p. 117, fn. 1.
49 The Acting Person, p. viii.
50 Ibid.


52 Letter of 12 February 1975, loc. cit. (see fn. 16).
53 Buttiglione, op. cit., p. 117.
54 Ibid.
55 Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man, p. 114.

56 The text was written for the 5th International Phenomenology Conference in Paris (12-15 June 1975) and published in Analecta Husserliana, Vol. VII (1978).

58 The Acting Person, p. 72.
59 Ibid.
63 Ioannes Paulus PP. II, Laborem exercens. To His Venerable Brothers in the Episcopate, to the Priests, to the Religious Families, to the sons and daughters of the Church, and to all Men and Women of good will on Human Work on the ninetieth anniversary of Rerum Novarum, 14 September 1981. [Rerum Novarum was promulgated by Pope Leo XIII on 15 May 1891: Leonis XIII P. M. Acta, XI, Romae 1892, pp. 97-144.]
64 Text quoted according to the official English version released by the Holy See: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_14091981_laborem-exercens_en.html.
65 Art. 7 (“A Threat to the Right Order of Values”).
67 Cf. esp. Articles 50 and 65.
68 Ioannes Paulus PP. II, Sollicitudo rei socialis. To the Bishops, Priests, Religious Families, sons and daughters of the Church and all people of good will for the twentieth anniversary of “Populorum Progressio,” 30 December 1987, Art. 21, Par. 2. Text quoted according to the official English version released by the Holy See: http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/john_paul_ii/encyclicals/documents/hf_jp-ii_enc_30121987_sollicitudo-rei-socialis_en.html.
69 Ibid.
70 The Personal Structure of Self-Determination (1974). Cf. the author’s article The Dialectical Structure of Self-Determination.
71 Sollicitudo rei socialis, Art. 46, Par. 4.
72 Participation or Alienation?, p. 63.
73 Sollicitudo rei socialis, Art. 47, Par. 4.
74 Ibid.
75 Post-synodal Apostolic Exhortation Ecclesia in America of the Holy Father John Paul II to the Bishops, Priests and Deacons, men and women religious, and all the lay faithful on the encounter with the living Jesus Christ: The way to conversion, communion and solidarity in America, 22 January 1999, chapter “The phenomenon of globalization,” Art. 20. Text quoted according to the official English version released by the Holy

76 Loc. cit.


78 The Acting Person, p. 302, fn. 9.

79 Ibid.


83 Challenging the Modern World, p. 62.

84 Ibid.

85 This interpretation got even more credence by what has been reported on a statement made by John Paul II on 22 March 2003 to a visiting delegation of the World Phenomenology Institute, presenting him with a copy of the new encyclopedia “Phenomenology Worldwide.” According to Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka’s recollection, published in boston.com, he “described phenomenology as ‘an attitude of intellectual charity toward man and the world and, for the believer, toward God.’ Although we may long to discover the true meaning and ultimate foundation of human, personal, and social existence, we’ll never do so until we’ve learned to view reality, and one another, without any prejudice or schematisms.” (Quoted according to Ephilosopher, www.ephilosopher.com/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=413, 6 April 2003.)


87 Participation or Alienation?, p. 72.

88 Ibid.

89 Ibid.

90 Ibid.

91 In his article “Participation or Alienation?” he particularly referred


93 See, for instance, his article *Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man*, pp. 110f. (Chapter 3: “‘Experience lived through’ as an element of interpretation.”)

94 He made it abundantly clear that his method in phenomenological anthropology was not the one of Husserl’s εποχή. Commenting on the method applied in *The Acting Person*, he writes that his approach “does not entail that the essence is distilled and separated from actual existence, so characteristic for Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological epoché. Thus this study does not follow the principles of a strictly eidetic method …” (*The Acting Person*, p. 300, fn. 4.)

95 My personal philosophical development has been somewhat in tune with the tendency inherent in this approach, centering on the exploration of the intricate mechanisms of the “acting person.” In my endeavours in practical philosophy, following the phenomenological research during the 1970s, the irreducible element of the human subject is related to the subject’s autonomy which I perceived as the transcultural foundation of human rights. This brought me into legal philosophy and motivated, *inter alia*, my efforts at reinterpreting the traditional system of international law on the basis of human rights as basic norms not only for any domestic legal system, but for the relations between states as subjects of international law. (*The Principles of International Law and Human Rights. The Compatibility of Two Normative Systems*. Studies in International Relations, V. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1981.) One further step in my efforts at outlining the political-legal implications of a personalistic philosophy such as the one I had advocated in my phenomenological writings was the formulation of an alternative paradigm of democracy to be consistently applied in the domestic as well as the transnational realm (*Democracy and the International Rule of Law. Propositions for an Alternative World Order*. Vienna/New York: Springer, 1995). On the basis of a phenomenologically-inspired reformulation of the doctrine of international law I have attempted to advance proposals for a systemic reform of the United Nations Organization (*The United Nations and International Democracy. The Quest for Reform*. Studies in International Relations, XXII. Vienna: International Progress Organization, 1997).

96 *Subjectivity and the Irreducible in Man*, p. 113.

97 *Participation or Alienation?*, p. 64.

98 This fundamental orientation can also be discerned in some of his speeches on inter-religious dialogue such as the Papal Address at the Omayyad Mosque in Damascus on 6 May 2001, in which he said that “[i]nterreligious dialogue is most effective when it springs from the experience of ‘living with each other’ from day to day within the same community and culture.” (Quoted according to the English version published at http://www.catholic-forum.com/saints/pope0264qr.htm.)
Chapter 8

John Paul II: on the Solidarity of Praxis in His Political Philosophy

John C. Carney

INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW: ON LOCATING JOHN PAUL II’S CONCEPT OF SOLIDARITY IN THE WESTERN TRADITION

John Paul II’s concept of solidarity reflects the struggle of Poland for liberation from Soviet hegemony. Because of this it may be said that the concept of solidarity he came to embody was not merely a theoretical construct but was in fact primarily a form of praxis, defined here as an ontological category. The importance of this cannot be overstated in the light of contemporary political philosophy because as praxis, his concept avoids the problem of abstraction, considered by many contemporary political philosophers as a serious shortcoming in political theory. Briefly put, the problem of abstraction in political philosophy is an uncritical acceptance of biases and reifications that are residues of past ideologies. By contrast, theory that is based on praxis has an element of realism attached to it, largely because the theory or concepts emerge directly from the agency of the people. In short, praxis as theory emerges from the bottom and works its way up, as opposed to coming from the top down.

Presenting this view of solidarity underscores it as a set of actions and practices, but at the same time, it is also theory that is informed by these same practices. So, in our analysis we will need to focus not only on John Paul’s writings but on his participation in the political struggle that took place in Poland in the late 1970s. Of course, Polish political activism and identity - as well as the thought of John Paul II - had a history prior to the events of 1979. In the case of the citizens of Poland, this thought process was reflected in both their distant and their immediate history; in the case of John Paul II this was reflected in his own intellectual and philosophical development prior to becoming pope. However, beyond noting the historical links that exist among the various traditions that led to the development of solidarity as a concept within political philosophy, our primary focus will be on the relationship between the solidarity movement in Poland and John Paul II’s formulation of solidarity as theoretical praxis.

One initial question regarding the concept of solidarity concerns its history as a concept. Here it may be useful to recall that one of the ways that political philosophy has approached the question of politics is from the distinction between the Hebraic and Greek traditions. The Greek tradition in political philosophy stems from Plato and Aristotle and runs through modernity via Hobbes, Locke and J.S. Mill, for all of whom man is defined as essentially ego, and where there is a definite emphasis on the will. This
tradition of political philosophy has given rise to the liberal democratic ideal with all that it implies, including rights-based concepts of justice wherein, again, there is considerable emphasis on the faculty of the will.

The other, Hebraic tradition can be traced from the prophets of the Old Testament through Hegel and Marx, Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky. The prophets were invariably rejected, and yet willingly (as with Isaiah), or less willingly (as with the prophet Jonah), they succeeded in delivering the claims of justice to power. In this second tradition, certain specific events in the Bible deserve special attention. These events are momentous not only for the ancient Hebrews, but for all those whose normative political tradition traces to the Judeo-Christian tradition. In this regard, H. Mark Roelofs argues that more than any other events, the appearances of Moses at Sinai, of Joshua at Shechem, and of Josiah and Ezra in Jerusalem are foundational for the Western political tradition.¹

It is in the context of the great dialogue between the Greek and Hebraic tradition in political philosophy that I would like to discuss the concept of solidarity in John Paul’s philosophy.² For there was a great deal about John Paul II’s presence in Poland in the summer of 1979 that recalled the tradition of the prophets speaking truth to power in that, as Roelofs notes, “the prophet’s address brings history into focus, the people’s history as they are led to understand it.”³ John Paul’s appearance in Poland was a catalyst for the transformation of an entire nation in which, as in the prophetic tradition, he came to epitomize the nation of Poland.

Central to this transformation was John Paul II’s concept of solidarity, which included within it the idea of solidarity as a form of praxis. As a student of twentieth-century philosophy, Karol Wojtyla was already familiar with the major philosophies of the day.⁴ So it is likely that he was already familiar with the concept of solidarity; it was used by early social theorists, including utopians such as Charles Fourier in his depiction of the ideal society, and others such as Emma Goldman. For theorists of this tradition, solidarity entails resoluteness towards those with whom one shares an identity. However, for these earlier theorists the identity involved, while political, was often circumscribed by the non-identity of others. In other words, solidarity in the context of the early social theorists was particular as opposed to universal. The term ‘solidarity’ was also used by Marx and those in the Marxist tradition. For Marx and his adherents, solidarity was first and foremost solidarity against the Capitalist class, thus solidarity was subservient to the idea of class struggle. The idea of solidarity, then, for this tradition as well, is one that is particular and not universal.⁵ In the contemporary period, solidarity has been invoked by critical theorists, and for these thinkers the emphasis is upon the development of an ethics of solidarity.

However, since John Paul’s death the concept of solidarity has drawn renewed attention; this is especially true in the discipline of political theory, where a recent book by Steinar Stjerno provides a full historical study of the concept.⁶ We can also see its importance in a recent study by S. Laurel Weldon in the *American Political Science Review* that examines the concept
of solidarity and uses it to study the “Global Movement against Gender Violence.” However, in both of these works the emphasis is on the idea of solidarity as either a form of political discourse or an ethics that entails a specific political action.

By contrast, John Paul II’s use of solidarity departs from most uses of the term in that his concept of solidarity is first of all an ontology of relations wherein ethical action is derivative. John Paul’s concept represents a dialectical synthesis that negates the previous negation of universalism in political philosophy because he posits solidarity as a more fundamental relationship between the individual and the community, but this community is the human community per se and is thereby universal in the literal sense. It is an idea that is closely tied to his concept of the person in which the relationship between the individual and the community gives rise to ethics and praxis and not the reverse. There is, in short, a prior morality of the individual and the community that is the sometimes unacknowledged basis of ethical practice and virtue. In order to delve more deeply into John Paul’s concept of solidarity it may be useful to examine the political and historical context of the concept of solidarity in both theory and practice, or as praxis.

THE POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF JOHN PAUL II’S PHILOSOPHY OF SOLIDARITY

It may be recalled that at around the time of John Paul’s election to the papacy the state of political philosophy mirrored the state of global politics—a bipolar world order in which the claims of Marxist analysis competed with those of the liberal democratic tradition. An alternative third way, that of Eurocommunism, was considered at the time to be a plausible option. At the same time still other voices, such as Michael Foucault, Jacques Derrida and Jacques Lacan, each in slightly different ways questioned the usefulness, if not to say the validity of universals of any sort, including the idea of a universal political identity and struggle.

From a dialectical point of view, and John Paul frequently uses the term ‘dialectical’ in his writings, the empirical state of politics was quite otherwise. While espousing the universalism of democratic and market ideals, the public policy and rhetoric of the administration of President Ronald Reagan was overtly hostile to universal social welfare and identified the State as an essential political problem. This was true both in terms of domestic public policy and ideology. Thus, while promoting idealist universalism, the actual conduct of American domestic and foreign policy makers was thoroughly individualistic and even hostile to a universal concept of praxis, be it that of human liberation or social welfare. This is significant because it helps to underscore the Cold War posture of American foreign policy and some of the ironies that it helped to create. As scholars have noted, many of these ironies are to be found on the Soviet side of the coin. Yet one need only reflect on the simultaneous attack of the Reagan White House on the American labor movement, including the infamous crushing of the Air Traffic Controllers union, on the one hand, and
its support for a Polish union effort, on the other, to appreciate that the Cold War created paradoxes and ironies across the political spectrum.

On the other side of bi-polar politics the situation was otherwise. The Soviet Union took pains to point out through its news agency Tass and its newspapers such as Pravda that the gross inequalities of American society were inevitable consequences of Capitalism, and often ran documentaries on its state-run media that reflected the plight of the poor and marginalized in the U.S.. Yet Alexander Solzhenitsyn reminded the West that even while individual freedoms were nonexistent in the Soviet Union, the State also waged a relentless psychological war on its subjects, seeking to control human praxis as well as ideology. Everything, including the praxis of science and art, was subjected to psychological and ideological scrutiny. In fact, the movement within the Soviet Union that came to be known as Soviet Jewry included prominent scientists, such as Andre Sakharov, who through the course of their scientific inquiries recoiled against the inhuman telos they saw behind the façade of Soviet science and technology. Nevertheless, at the level of ideology the Soviet Union viewed itself as the global vanguard of worker rights and freedoms.

So on the eve of John Paul’s elevation to the papacy the world was indeed in opposition; at the level of ideology, individualism and solidarity were in conflict, while at the level of practical politics the same was true but in reverse – the West stood for individualist praxis and the East for universal social welfare. John Paul II, who his biographers note had a wonderfully keen sense of historical irony (the kind of discernment of irony that one would expect in a playwright and philosopher), insisted on the dignity of the individual worker in the worker’s State, even while pointing out the false promises of the consumer society and the dangers posed to authentic human existence by technology.

The world was hopeful about the elevation of Karol Wojtyła, the Cardinal from the Soviet bloc, but not utopian. It had already seen the Soviet tanks roll into Hungary in 1956 and then again into Czechoslovakia in 1968. However, in retrospect there may have been more reasons for optimism and hope. On the one hand, within the Soviet bloc the moral pressure against its control and domination had fermented in the years since Hungary and Czechoslovakia, as well as during the earlier resistance of the Church in Poland. In addition, political scientists have long noted that regimes are weaker when they actually have recourse to the use of force and are in fact weakened each time they have to use it. So, to a certain extent, the Soviet intervention in Hungary and Czechoslovakia weakened the Soviet Union because it held out the possibility that others would resist as well. Ideologically, of course, it also weakened the Soviet Union since it was plain to most members of the United Nations that these interventions violated international law.

However, on the other side of the bi-polar world, the foreign policy of the United States left it in a weakened position to condemn the ever-present threat of Soviet intervention. The Vietnam War had left in its wake the phenomenon of the “Vietnam Syndrome” according to which not only
was the U.S. less likely to intervene again militarily, but its moral legitimacy had been severely tarnished. In addition, the U.S. role in Latin America was coming under increased scrutiny, with critics and supporters of the Soviet Union pointing to the United States’ intervention in the Dominican Republic as equivalent to Czechoslovakia, and the Monroe Doctrine as the West’s equivalent to the dreaded Brezhnev Doctrine. In terms of traditional approaches to politics, both sides, along with their supporters, had checkmated one another, and the need for a new politics was acute.

However, 1979 was not 1968, and one major reason why there were additional grounds for hope was that the Soviet Union was already bogged down as never before in an intervention in Afghanistan, which the Soviet Union considered within its orbit. Whereas most scholars believed the fault line between the East and West to be Berlin, in fact it was the emergence of a new regional power, that of Islamic nationalism, that threatened Soviet hegemony. The irony here is that in the Soviet view, the greatest threat came not from its southern borders, but from the West and China. Indeed, its own ethnic and nationalities problems seemed to Soviet leaders to pale in comparison to the threats posed by China and the West. The irony also consists in the fact that Soviet political and military calculations seemed to reflect the same arrogance that asked decades earlier how many divisions the Pope had. So, it probably seemed that Afghanistan represented little more than ‘business as usual’ for Soviet political leadership. Of course, things turned out to be otherwise, and this had a two-fold impact on the situation in Poland. On one hand, the Soviet Union was exposed ideologically by then-U.S. President Jimmy Carter and his foreign policy team, led by his national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, while militarily it was exposed by the Reagan administration’s support of Afghan resistance. Interestingly, while most observers viewed the Islamic revolution led by Ayatollah Khomeini as a threat to U.S. and Western interests, the Iranian revolution in fact represented a serious if underestimated threat to the Soviet Union because of its border with Iran, its own Islamic population and its historical “nationalities issue.”

In sum, most political scientists believe that the Soviet Union was actually in no position to intervene once again in Eastern Europe on the eve of John Paul II’s pontificate. However, it must also be acknowledged that hegemony was exercised primarily through the threat of intervention and the internalized social control it elicited. Overcoming the totalitarian rule exerted on Poland required first of all the essential first step of resistance to the psychology of social control and the language of inevitability. The concept of solidarity as praxis addressed this specific aspect of social control.

**JOHN PAUL II’S CONCEPT OF SOLIDARITY**

John Paul II lived solidarity with his fellow Poles before the word was an articulated concept within political philosophy and before it was the name of a mass movement that helped liberate Poland. Thus, solidarity for John Paul II was foremost a form of lived praxis, rather than an abstract concept.
Years later, John Paul expressed this idea in his book *Crossing the Threshold of Hope* where he noted this aspect of experience: “You will remember that my first encyclical on the redeemer of man (*Redemptor Hominis*) appeared a few months after my election on October 16, 1978. This means that I was actually carrying its contents within me. I had only to ‘copy’ from memory and experience what I had already been living on the threshold of the papacy.”

That is to say, it was a concept that was derived not from theory, but rather from actual encounters in the world, including the everyday political world. John Paul’s experiences in both World War II and the Cold War equipped him with a first-hand grasp of both the politics of the Other and the need for resistance to evil.

However, since praxis is such an important aspect of John Paul II’s concept of solidarity, it may be useful to say a word about it. Most contemporary theorists of the concept usually cite the works of Aristotle and the revival of Aristotle’s concept of praxis in the work of Hannah Arendt. So, in the idea of solidarity as a form of praxis we see the Greek origins of solidarity or the influence of the Greek tradition as a complement to the Hebraic tradition mentioned earlier. However, in the case of John Paul II, praxis also recalls the Neoplatonic tradition and especially that of the Cappadocian Fathers, for whom praxis was also a spiritual synthesis of theory and activity. The Cappadocian Fathers were heavily influenced by Saint Augustine, of course, and Augustine’s early formulation of the doctrine of intentionality is an important facet of this concept of praxis.

We can see the influence of this understanding in John Paul II’s approach to labor, which he considers to be transformational and uplifting. For John Paul, there is something special about human labor that makes it more than mere behavior. We have seen that at the theoretical level, solidarity as praxis negates the particularism of the ideologies of liberalism and communism, even while at the practical level the praxis of solidarity negates human physical activity as mere rote behavior or extrinsic action. Solidarity as an ontology of relations renders human action a transcendence of mere physical, mental, or even menial labor. For example, in *Laborem Exercens* John Paul locates solidarity as a kind of praxis that works against the structures of sin as he identified them (imperialism, idolatry, class, technology and money). He maintains that “solidarity conquers these structures.” We will return to this aspect of John Paul II’s concept of solidarity shortly.

**SOLIDARITY AT WORK - THE MOBILIZATION OF POLAND**

Numerous biographies of John Paul II have already been published. Many of them recount the seeming inevitability of the trip to Poland and the eventual confrontation first with the Polish political and military leadership and eventually with the Soviet leadership, culminating in John Paul II’s letter to Leonard Brezhnev in December of 1980. Then, with Warsaw Pact troops massed on the border with Poland, John Paul resisted an overly cautious approach and tone, and instead gave full encouragement to his fellow Poles—
and thereby expressed, through his praxis, his total solidarity with them. In order to bring this aspect of his concept of solidarity into clearer view, it may be useful to look at it from the perspective of social movement theory,\(^1\) which provides additional concepts and processes that help to shed light on the phenomenology of solidarity as praxis.

One of these concepts is the idea of “cognitive praxis,” a footnote to praxis theory wherein, as Eyerman and Jamison note, linkages are established that pertain not only to shared identities, but also to ideas and transmission of these ideas. In other words, social movements like the Solidarity movement convey a new interpretation of reality and help to disseminate new views of the self and the community. They represent the attempt by social movements to redefine history and the current political and social context, as well as the nature of the obstacles faced. Eyerman and Jamison cite Alberto Melucci to note that the praxis of social movements transforms the meaning of the movement itself to those who are committed to it, thereby transcending their own present character to become signs. According to Melucci: “They do this in the sense that they translate their action into symbolic challenges that upset the dominant cultural codes and reveal their irrationality and partiality by acting at the levels (of information and communication) at which the new forms of technocratic power also operate.”\(^12\) The cognitive praxis of social movements often entails the redirection of consciousness or its intentionality away from the present towards significant moments in a movement’s past or its potential new beginning. It represents a new paradigm for thinking about the individual and the way the individual relates to the wider community. The first step of this involves a recovery of one’s place in history, coupled with a recontextualizing of identity. Here religious symbols, anniversaries, and significant texts take on additional importance and perform the task of transmitting the ideas of cognitive praxis. Participation in the life of the social movement, in other words, is tantamount to immersion in the cognitive praxis of social transformation.

A second aspect of social movement theory that is especially relevant to John Paul II’s participation in the Solidarity movement is the idea that social movements not only comprise the organized and explicit face they present to the world. Through unconscious intentionality they also express the deep, often historical longing of the people. John Paul’s pilgrimage to Poland and the important national shrines there reminded his compatriots not only of their dignity, but also of their history. At the same time, his presence also had the effect of expanding the scope of the struggle between the Church and the State because, though Polish, he occupied a position of such great prominence in the West.

In addition, social movement scholars maintain that special holidays, major anniversaries, and sites of significant historical importance such as shrines are reminders of identity and always present the possibility for mobilization. Thus, John Paul’s sermons and homilies at the shrine to Our Lady of Czestochowa, and the very celebration of Mass on the feast of St. Stanislaw, were monumental events because of the intentional horizons they
evoked. So, to the extent that one can ever identify a precise origin to the initiation of a new beginning like Solidarity, it seems clear that these events and John Paul’s direct participation were a new beginning for Poland. His actions focused Polish energy, and one can say that the eventual demands Solidarity made on the Polish and Soviet political structure began with the earlier mobilization of consciousness and praxis during his 1979 visit. The words John Paul spoke to the citizens of Poland in June, 1979 were magnified because of the setting and historical circumstances, but they also brought forth the unconscious hopes of the participants —and the thirteen million Polish citizens who heard those words. His words were the instruments for the transcendence of current political limitations; beyond their everyday or mundane meanings they were, under these settings, what Karl Jaspers called ciphers, signs that point beyond the mundane to the transcendental horizon of intentionality. Under these sorts of circumstances, the existence and identity of the participants is reawakened as true compatriots - one comes to view one’s self as other than what one currently is. Looking back at Solidarity and John Paul’s visit, one can almost hear a worker saying: “Yes, I am now a lowly shipyard worker in Gdansk, Poland; but in the presence of the Pope and through the recognition of all these other Poles, I can see myself as a free man.” The praxis of solidarity, in other words, was a total transformation not only of social relationships, but of the self-concept of those involved as well.

JOHN PAUL II AND THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF SOLIDARITY

If we adopt the perspective of Husserl’s *epoché* on the concept of solidarity in John Paul II, it seems that memory is essential. For, as we saw above, reminding one whom one is in solidarity with is first of all a reaffirmation of shared history and identity. This educational aspect of praxis often involves reminding others of this history. This is an especially important component of Solidarity and other instances of resistance to political oppression. Under these circumstances, politics is often mediated through the revision of history. In addition, because the individual living under political oppression is assaulted by not only ongoing psychological warfare but also by daily humiliations that may initially appear as apolitical, over time oppressed people can undertake what Sartre referred to as a negative praxis—an alterity that reinforces negative feelings, attitudes and behaviors, including self-loathing. The origins of these behaviors can be occluded by the behaviors themselves, and generate what appears to be an eternal recurrence of the same negative behaviors and attitudes. So the restoration of memory and the retrieval of history are of paramount importance for the solidarity of praxis. History itself takes on special importance since its loss is often a part of the oppression itself.

In this regard the role of Mary cannot be overstated, not only because of John Paul’s devotion, but also because the Church views Mary as an historical archetype – a presence that is historically transcendental. As
an archetype, she is both a direct link to authentic history and a negation of the alterity generated by political oppression. The evocative images of Our Lady of Czestochowa recalled the historical past of Poland in a direct and explicit way. After John Paul’s visit in 1979, the contrast between the image of Our Lady of Czestochowa and the power politics of the Polish Communist Party and Soviet leadership actually exacerbated the distinction between the authentic and the revised histories of the people. This was true not only in terms of world views, but in terms of the very meaning of history itself, including the individual’s relationship to history. Interestingly, later in his Pontificate John Paul placed the initial “M” for Mary on his coat of arms in order to reinforce the origins of the Church to young people taking part in World Youth Day.

The recovery or retrieval of history is significant, for the praxis of solidarity with the oppressed allows oppressed peoples to be resocialized on the basis of their authentic historical identity, that is, as immanently defined and emergent. Thereby, the praxis of solidarity overcomes the legacy of oppression and the cycle of alterity. Furthermore, as an historical category the praxis of solidarity for John Paul II was also explicitly political, as is clear in his letter to Brezhnev. For the very mention of human dignity and human rights in a letter to the head of the Soviet Union, initially founded to promote the freedom of workers, carries with it an implicit reminder of Soviet Communism’s own lost history and potential.

For John Paul, solidarity was also about the transmission of ideas and thus was educational. The powerful dialogues that opened up between John Paul and his audiences were spontaneous, but they were also educational; this was true whether the venue was Poland in the late 1970s, or New York City and Denver in the 1990s. Throughout his pontificate, the educational component of cognitive praxis was a consistent feature of John Paul’s praxis of solidarity. In this context the question arises whether solidarity as praxis is a virtue. A complete answer to this question would require a detailed account of the differences between praxis and practice, as well as an analysis of social ontology. Perhaps it will suffice to note that solidarity as praxis exists at a level prior to that of ethics, the level of Mit-sein or being-with. It is important to recall that John Paul’s concept of social relationships, like that of his predecessors Pope John XXIII and Pope Paul VI, was phenomenological. For since Hegel, the emphasis in the philosophy of social relationships has proceeded from the immediacy of the phenomenology of recognition and towards ethics. Virtue and ethics are de-ontic when compared to the prior morality of recognition implied by the existential structure of Mit-sein. We can see this in a direct way in John Paul’s Introduction to “The Task of Christian Philosophy Today” where he uses the vantage point of phenomenology to underscore the relationship of the individual person and the community.

As John Paul saw it, solidarity is a moral obligation that binds Catholics to transcend pure identity with the state. In Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, he notes that because the Church is distinct from the state, the Church’s assessment of what counts as a just pattern of development is not commensurate with the
mere accumulation of consumer products and wealth, which may or may not suffice for the state.\textsuperscript{16} For John Paul II, the concept of solidarity is a guide to the politics of development. But development is not to be construed as a national problem or one that takes place somewhere else, but is instead global. In other words, the underdevelopment of some nations of the South is directly related to other aspects of globalization such as immigration, and it is so globally. Thus, tensions arising from globalization are not national but rather international, although the constituencies involved can reinforce the desire for national political, often exclusionary, solutions. We can see this in the equally chilly climate afforded immigrant workers from Mexico and Latin America in the United States, Chinese workers in Indonesia and Turkish citizens working in Germany. It is in this sense that worker rights are globally based and necessitate a universal outlook, and John Paul maintains that Catholics have a “duty of solidarity” towards those less fortunate than themselves.

At the theoretical level, solidarity was reflected by John Paul II in his social teachings. In many of these writings there is considerable focus on the critical and theoretical components of solidarity. It will be recalled that as theory, solidarity emerged through the practice of resistance to political domination. Solidarity also stands over and against other challenges to human liberation. For John Paul the challenge of authentic human existence is directly tied to the praxis of solidarity in that solidarity entails work against those categories that limit human freedom such as: slavery to possessions; viewing other humans as means; idolatry; imperialism; class; and technology. In a way, what John Paul is arguing in his writings is that the challenge of authentic human existence is related to global authentic human development. The connection is an interesting one in that John Paul insists that each human being should strive for his or her most complete development as a person, while underscoring that what stands against such development are those “structures of sin” that present a problem not only for any particular person, but for the world community. For example, in his encyclical \textit{Laborem Exercens} John Paul uses the language of dialectics to argue for authentic human development as something that stands over against the slavery of possessions. In that encyclical he uses the expression “structures of sin” to describe idolatry of money, ideology, class, imperialism and technology as formidable obstacles. All of these structures are complex, especially when one considers them in relation to the individual person; in our explication of this aspect of John Paul’s concept of solidarity it may be useful to focus on only one, namely, on the relationship between technology and the individual person, and how something that appears morally neutral, like technology, may be thought of as a structure of sin.

John Paul II often cited the documents of the Second Vatican Council, and in \textit{Laborem Exercens} he returns to the distinction between being and having from Vatican II. At issue is the element of quality regarding a possession and what the possession does to the person. Possessions are intended to improve the quality of one’s being, as opposed to the often
John Paul II: on the Solidarity of Praxis in His Political Philosophy

obsessive accumulation of consumer products that is promoted as tantamount to living the good life in technological societies. The invocation of the phrase “structures of sin” is also noteworthy in that it identifies these phenomena as recurring problems of morality, both for the individual and the Church.

For John Paul II, authentic development refers not to the gadgetry and other accoutrements of modernity, but first of all to human development. Instead of weapons systems and policies that favor domestic and international elites, the emphasis should be placed on building schools, hospitals, universities and the infrastructure necessary for people’s authentic development. Implicit in John Paul’s idea of development is a critique of inauthentic development. For example, greater efficiency for exploiting labor is not authentic progress, but rather a regression or an instance of anti-development. This is especially the case if such a move erodes family relationships. Likewise, the explosive growth of military technologies and procurement programs exacerbate the global dependency, already deeply entrenched, within models of development that are geared towards elites at the expense of working families. One example of the insidious way in which technology creates dependencies on a global scale, often with disastrous consequences, is the extent to which national budgets, through the balance of trade, reinforce the dependency of advanced economies on the sale of weapons and weapons systems. Political scientists have long noted that because military weapons systems are the most efficient vehicle for the sale of technology, and because technology is the primary product manufactured by highly developed societies, to a certain extent their economies, through their balance of trade, imply a two-fold dependency. First, they are dependent on the sale of weapons that embody the latest technological expertise, and secondly, the client state becomes dependent on the maintenance of these systems; in turn the technological society becomes economically dependent on the client state. Furthermore, this economic dependency of the most developed technological societies generates its own logic in which human development is weighed in an ideological and actual scale of economic costs and benefits with no thought for the authentic development of the people.

The problem of technology is made even more difficult because in most discursive approaches to the problem, technology per se is perceived as neutral. However, this may not be universally true. For example, military weapons systems seem to invite the logic of pre-emption, against which John Paul warned in his final years. So, the depiction of technology as a structure of sin is both global and individual, practical and ideological. At the level of the individual person, the deforming effects of technology are perhaps the most elusive from the point of view of authentic human development. For on one hand, technology promises the individual person the maximum in terms of their development, but on the other, as numerous studies have already shown, it can also be isolating, passive, and even addictive. Communications technology has sometimes meant that the workday is expanded to meet the needs of the so-called twenty-four hour office. In this context, families are never truly at peace together, since the intrusion of the workplace through
cell-phones and other devices renders the worker universally manageable. So while the decline of the family in the West is often blamed on the absence of cultural values, these studies seem to suggest that technology also plays a role.

However, the most subtle effects of technology on the person may be those that William Barrett described decades ago in *The Illusion of Technique* and later in *The Death of the Soul*. Barrett argued that technology occludes the necessity for authentic existence and replaces it with the idea that performance or technique is the essential and decisive element in human existence. Somehow, he argues, technological societies have given their citizens the idea that if technical prowess is achieved, and if one merely masters technology, problems will be solved and individuals will flourish. Finally, as a moral issue, technology also suggests what Michael Foucault referred to as the technologies of the self—those procedures and practices by which the State and other institutions privilege and then reinforce some expression of the self even while working towards the elimination of others. So, technology as a structure of sin can also have an ontological as well as a phenomenological reference and *telos*, as the work of Barrett and others seems to caution. These aspects of John Paul II’s thought have sometimes been overshadowed by his critique of the culture of death, but his critique of technology is profound and timely, especially in the context of the person and global development.

The theme of technology appears in one of his early encyclicals, *Redemptor Hominis* (1979). In this encyclical, to which he returned later in his papacy, John Paul II invokes the language of human alienation to illustrate humanity’s collective but deep-seated fear. The menace represented by man’s becoming a “product of his product” becomes more acute in technological societies. The promise represented by human progress must not be at the price of greater dependency on technology with all that such dependency implies—the growth of the mass society and the ubiquity of the consumer culture. The need here, John Paul argues, is for progress with ethics. Certainly, in the years since those words were written this trend has continued apace with the emergence of bioengineering. At the same time, on the philosophical level, John Paul II consistently affirmed the individual’s right to economic initiative or free enterprise.

Despite its profound and critical analysis of some aspects of the human condition, the message of John Paul’s approach to solidarity is overwhelmingly positive. In fact, the victory of the Solidarity movement may be thought of as a cipher for solidarity at a more universal level. We can see this in more detail if we contrast John Paul’s moral leadership, itself an expression of the praxis of solidarity, with the predominant paradigm of political leadership.

The modern political leader remains very much in the mold of Machiavelli’s famous work, *The Prince*. The nomenclature of the modern political campaign, replete with focus groups, instant polling and image handlers, stands in sharp contrast with the direct moral leadership exercised by John Paul II. The tendency in recent years has been for the modern style of
political leadership to be seen as a global one, so that the same techniques that are used by political leaders in the United States may be easily and efficiently transported to other areas of the globe. In this context, politics becomes largely a matter of managing public opinion, complete with code words and euphemisms often intended to generate fear, or to reinforce long established patterns of acquiescence to political cues. The essential thing for the post-modern “prince” is to appear strong and well, and so current commentary on leadership is as likely to be about the quality of the leader’s attire as it is about his or her message. Defenders of Machiavelli’s amoral style of leadership note that it was for good purposes; similarly, the modern political leader is likely to say that these techniques are but the coin of the realm in order to have a seat at the table and enact pro-human policies, including humane foreign policy.

In fact, the techniques of post-modern political leadership are only part of the story. The other is the growth of a post-modern media culture that promotes a cult of personality and celebrity on the one hand, then takes whatever steps are necessary to tear down the carefully constructed image that the media itself helped to create. This state of affairs and the paradigm just described is nothing less than a predictable cycle of post-modern media culture that has been played out time and time again in country after country. The difficulty is that in the Machiavellian model, the leader must have a sufficient aura and distance in order to present the idealized type of leadership that brings success. But, as Misciagno notes, the post-modern media is designed to remove exactly that distance and to undermine exactly that type of posture. In this context, the search for proof sources escalates as political leaders come to recognize that the widespread cynicism generated by this culture and style of leadership leaves little room for rational persuasion.

In this context, the leadership of John Paul II is truly extraordinary. For, instead of grounding his arguments in technique or manipulation of the media, he merely led through moral persuasion. It is the effectiveness of this, more than anything else, that provides a basis for hope alongside his realistic analysis of the human condition. The enduring political lesson of his leadership is that for post-modern men and women at least, the only type of leadership that can endure the glare and intensity of postmodern media culture is the praxis of authentic moral leadership.

CONCLUSION: ON THE CHURCH’S TRADITIONAL TEACHING AND CONCEPT OF SOLIDARITY AS PRAXIS

One final issue that deserves attention is the question of solidarity and the Church’s traditional teachings on society and politics. John Paul II took pains to locate his thought in the venerable tradition of Church teaching, and in encyclicals such as Sollicitudo Rei Socialis he cites Pope Paul VI and the documents of Vatican II extensively. He cites Gaudium et Spes as well, so the concept of solidarity undoubtedly is best seen in the light of Church tradition. However, as with so many of John Paul’s concepts, the decisive factor is his understanding of the person. This re-contextualizes the relationship between
the individual and the community from the vantage point of phenomenology. It is on that account also a synthesis of two different political traditions. For most political theorists, the idea of solidarity was, as theory, not a spiritual concept but a political one, not an ontology but an ethics. However, in John Paul’s thought solidarity embodies the earlier insights of the existential ontology of Mit-sein; as noted earlier, it is primarily, an ontological category. In terms of politics it stands in contrast to most approaches which are de-ontic, or that move away from ontology. Solidarity defines the existential moorings of the person, and gives theoretical justice to the individual while insisting on the individual’s grounding in the community. One way of thinking of this is to say that solidarity is a notation to traditional Church teachings on matters of social justice.

NOTES


2 For example, the concept of alienation is treated differently in the Greek and Hebraic tradition and this is reflected in what counts as liberation within each of these traditions. One way of expressing this difference in approach can be seen in the question of whether human alienation is alleviated by political means alone, including political education, or if it is instead something that involves the human condition *per se* as one finds famously described in the Book of Job.

3 Roelofs, *op. cit*.

4 This aspect of the development of John Paul II’s thought was explicated by Professor George F. McLean in a paper entitled “Karol Wojtyla, Cardinal of Krakow: From the Liberation of Eastern Europe to a Mission for our Global Future,” which appears as the prologue of this volume.

5 There is of course a sense in which Marxists may argue that the application of solidarity to the working class is actually universal by dint of the nature of the working class as the universal class. However, the fact remains that it is particular because the concept of working class is a correlative term that implies the capitalist class.


7 In fact, in his unpublished Introduction to his article in the *Review of Metaphysics*, “The Person: Subject and Community,” he maintains that it, “is at the basis of human ‘praxis’ and morality (and consequently ethics) and at the basis of culture, civilization and politics.” The author would like to thank Professor George F. McLean for his generous sharing of this original Introduction to the *Review of Metaphysics* article, published only later in the Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, vol. 53 (1979), 3-4.

8 Invariably, the Soviet representatives at the U.N. would cite various articles of the United Nations Charter including *Article 51* to support their
claim that they had been rendering “fraternal assistance” to a neighbor. While this did occasion a huge debate over the meaning and scope of various U.N. Articles, there was little or no debate about the nature of the intervention in the court of world opinion, if not to say within the world’s moral conscience.


10 In several of her works Arendt maintains that praxis developed out of the Aristotelian tradition in which the emphasis is on a kind of contemplation. Praxis is thought or thinking for its own sake and it defines Philosophy. For Arendt this kind of intrinsic thinking is of a qualitatively different order than everyday human labor. This is in sharp contrast with the thought of John Paul II who, in Laborem Exercens places great value and dignity on labor no matter how physical.


13 Weigel, 320.

14 The author is indebted to H. Mark Roelofs for his description in his lectures of this aspect of transformational praxis.

15 One distinction worth noting in this regard is the one made by Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger and Hans Urs Von Balthasar that Mary is not merely a figure that is foreshadowed by earlier texts, but is an archetype of the Church itself. They note that Mary exists “not as a mere foreshadowing as the type of the Old Testament but as an archetype—that is as the perfectly, (and unsurpassable) realized Idea of the Church.”

16 This continues to be an area of friction between Church and State as evinced in the tension over immigration that exists between the United States government, including its elected representatives, interest groups and constituencies, on the one hand, and the Church on the other.


18 Ibid.

REFERENCES


In his 1981 encyclical *Laborem Exercens* (On Human Work), John Paul II makes an important and arguably radical claim. He states that “the key, maybe the essential key to the social question,” is the phenomenon of human work. In other words, the key to the question of how to live together in peace and justice, a hope that has concerned the human community for centuries, is to be found in a deeper understanding of the meaning and significance of human work. The aim of this paper is to determine the basis upon which the Holy Father makes this statement and to show that, in light of both Wojtyla’s account of human personhood and his philosophical method, the claim at the heart of *Laborem Exercens* represents a critical point of leverage in the ongoing quest to realize a peaceful and just society.

While writing in continuity with the Catholic Social Tradition, John Paul’s proposal constitutes a new and critical development. I will demonstrate that this development is grounded in Wojtyla’s philosophy of the acting person and that, in fact, the significance of the encyclical can only be understood through reference to the philosophical anthropology presupposed by its author. The evidence for this is easily found in the document itself, where he states that work in its “subjective aspect is always an ‘actus personae,’” involving the “whole person, body and spirit.”1 This statement is but a clue to the deeper meaning to which it points, found in Wojtyla’s earlier philosophical works, in particular *The Acting Person*. We will come to this shortly.

But first it must be stated that John Paul’s argument takes on additional significance when considered in light of Wojtyla’s philosophical method, in particular his starting place. For the point of departure for his anthropological framework is not abstract human “nature,” but the lived experience of the historical human “person.” In Wojtyla’s account of personhood, work understood as an “actus personae” is a reference to an act in which the person experiences herself as the efficient cause of her actions, as a conscious, self-governing, self-determining being. It is part of an ongoing process of self-realization directed at the full becoming of the person. As John Paul states in the document, work as an actus personae is an act by which the person becomes “more a human being.”2 Thus the key to the social question is identified – not with the theological equivalent of a jobs program, so to speak – but with the process of self-transcendence made possible – in a unique way – through the work that we do.

In what follows I will begin by orienting attention briefly to the
context of John Paul’s claim in the encyclical, after which I will highlight several aspects of his method, again briefly but of particular significance here. I shall then turn to his anthropological framework, focusing primarily on his theory of self-transcendence, returning at the end to identify the implications of this analysis for an interpretation of \textit{Laborem Exercens}.

\textbf{LABOREM EXERCENS}

John Paul grounds his argument concerning the significance of human work in the first creation account in the Book of Genesis, in which human beings are commanded to be fruitful, to fill the earth, to subdue it and have dominion over it. The fact that this command occurs before the fall of Adam and Eve, while they still existed in a state of original innocence, reveals that work is actually a fundamental dimension of human existence, not, as has sometimes been assumed, a punishment for the fall. Work may be more burdensome because of the fall, but it is central to who we are as human persons and ultimately, he argues, has a place alongside the other means of salvation at our disposal. This insight into a fundamental aspect of human personhood allows John Paul to reflect on human work in light of the explicitly philosophical anthropology under consideration.

Next, his argument must be seen in terms of the fundamental distinction he makes in the document between two dimensions of human work. The first, the objective dimension, is that which results from work in the external or material sense, either a product or a service, whether in the public or the private sphere. This is the dimension we most associate with working. It is what the customer buys, what we get paid to produce; it is the lecture – or paper – we deliver, the meal our family eats, or the never-ending home project.

The second, the subjective dimension, and the primary concern of the encyclical, refers to the person performing the work, that is, the “subject” of the work, who, by virtue of his or her very humanity, is called to be a person in the fullest sense of that word. The human person, made in the image of God, reflects God’s creative activity in the act of working and is “a person, that is to say, a subjective being capable of acting in a planned and rational way, capable of deciding about himself and with a tendency to self-realization.”

The value and dignity of work is not a function of the kind of work being done, but is to be attributed to the fact that the one who is doing it is a person. The dignity of the human person is, in part, reflected in his or her capacity for work and, through it, “man not only transforms nature…but…also achieves fulfillment as a human being and indeed in a sense becomes ‘more a human being.’”

Only when the goal of work is the person him- or herself, only when one is reflecting his or her personhood as a conscious and free subject in making decisions about work, can one be said to be master of it. It is only in this context that the biblical meaning of work is fulfilled, when throughout the process humanity manifests itself and confirms the person as the one who
“dominates.” This is what constitutes the ethical dimension of work – that the one who does it is a person, a conscious and free subject. The ethical value of work is linked to the fact that it is carried out by a person, that is to say, “a subject that decides about himself.”

Thus, the fundamental argument in the encyclical is concerned with the anthropological significance attributed to human action in the world. In the thought of John Paul II, the key to the social question is found in meaning of personhood. And he is invoking a very specific meaning when he makes these statements. To grasp this meaning we must first consider Wojtyla’s method. In my opinion, his method renders his conclusions extremely important in our ongoing effort to address the concerns of our own era. His approach is radical and creative; his starting place is the lived experience of the human person.

WOJTYLA’S PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD

The philosopher Karol Wojtyla was concerned primarily with the attempt to understand the human person as a dynamic subject who is able to achieve self-fulfillment through one’s actions and experience. His work is above all a pursuit of the meaning of the moral and ethical dimensions of human existence in respect both to the anthropology that conditions it and the role experience plays in discovering and living out its implications.

As is no doubt well understood, Wojtyla’s approach is an effort to synthesize a Thomistic framework (in the existential tradition of Gilson) with the insights of the modern phenomenological method. Wojtyla’s entire project reflects his interest in addressing the modern problem introduced by the so-called turn to the subject, without relinquishing the possibility of knowledge of an objective moral order. It reveals his conviction that both metaphysical and phenomenological reflections are necessary to account adequately for the subjective and objective dimensions of existence.

Wojtyla clearly grasps the contours of the modern problem and its significance. He acknowledges that a legitimate concern has arisen in modern philosophy concerning the focus on experience in an interpretation of the human being. The fear is that this preoccupation will necessarily result in “subjectivism,” driving any objective account of human life and action beyond the bounds of certain knowledge. But he argues that this stance is not only untenable, it robs reflection on personhood of its most significant component. Modern phenomenological analysis and advances in the field of psychology have made new information accessible, and this data cannot be ignored by philosophy. He assures us that there is nothing to fear as long as this reflection remains grounded in a firm connection with the “integral experience of the human being” and, most importantly, points out that, in taking up this approach, “we will also safeguard the authentic personal subjectivity of the human being in the realistic interpretation of human existence.”

Wojtyla maintains that the old antinomy of subjectivism vs. objectivism has more or less been set aside by contemporary thought, having been aided by these recent advances in phenomenological analysis and the
study of human consciousness. For Wojtyla, such results mean that “we can no longer go on treating the human being exclusively as an objective being, but we must also somehow treat the human being as a subject in the dimension in which the specifically human subjectivity of the human being is determined by consciousness.” He points out that the tradition that has defined the human person as a “rational animal” has viewed him primarily as an object—one of the many objects that exist and can be studied as a part of the natural world. This approach is no longer adequate (if it ever was) as it ignores the “primordial uniqueness of the human being” which should be the starting place of philosophical and theological reflection.

This horizon is reflected in his approach to the problem. He states that though the traditional Boethian definition provides a necessary foundation in the “metaphysical terrain” of the dimension of being, this must be built upon through reference to actual, human experience. More precisely, it is the category of “lived experience,” in which the person is conscious of herself as the acting subject that must now be at the center of our study of the human person and her actions. It is this aspect of human living that discloses the self and the personal, dynamic structure of self-determination. It is only through this experience that the person realizes the responsibility to possess and govern oneself and recognizes that self-possession and self-governance is a continual achievement. Thus, Wojtyla’s effort to define how the human person comes to know the objective order cannot be divorced from experience, and it cannot be understood without reference to the relationship between the knower and the known. The human person comes to know the good through the process of coming to know oneself.

Though Wojtyla affirms a basic Thomistic metaphysical and anthropological framework, his effort is to reconstitute it within the reality of human experience. He recognizes the limitations of phenomenological method, concluding that it is not able to replace metaphysical reflection on the question of being. But nonetheless he maintains that, when understood as a method of inquiry, phenomenology may provide a route into the realm of ontology from a starting place in the phenomenology of the human person. As delineated by Wojtyla, this “becomes a critical appropriation of the fundamental postulate of modern thought: the starting point is man. This means starting from the concrete reality of the person, not from the hypostatization of the notion of the subject.”

Wojtyla appears absolutely committed to the development of an ethical and moral theory that remains grounded in the experience of the human person, stating that the “apprehension” of what is essential for morality takes place in experience itself and not in some subsequent abstraction or reflection. He will argue that both the human being and morality are known through experience because the origin of the cognitive process is found, not in any kind of abstraction, but in the experience of the human person.

Although Wojtyla makes every attempt to account for the experience of the person, he is equally concerned to establish that experience is not divorced from, or independent of, the existence of a hierarchy of goods, an
objective order that does not rely on the perception of the person to exist. In his account, “cognition does not in any way create ‘reality’ (cognition does not create its own content) but arises within the context of the different kinds of content that are proper to it.” The good and the true have an independent existence. But they are accessible to human consciousness and cognition. They are known through the experience of the acting person.

In summary: on the one hand, Wojtyla seeks to mitigate what he points to as the objectivist emphasis found in the tradition of scholarship grounded in the Thomistic philosophy of being, an emphasis that he argues has come at the expense of a full account of the subjective dimension of human existence. On the other, he recognizes that the philosophy of consciousness associated in particular with the phenomenology of Scheler, has tended toward its own extreme, focusing exclusively on the merely subjective experience and interpretation of moral values. Wojtyla finds both of these orientations inadequate; neither accounts for the total experience of the human being, which, as we shall see, John Paul is intent on founding in the person’s ontological structure.

At a “meta-level,” Wojtyla’s interest is in bringing together “two great currents in philosophical thought separating the objective from the subjective and the philosophy of being from the modern philosophy of consciousness.” His thesis is that the divergence that has taken place between these two dimensions of human existence is due, at least in part, to the experiential “cleavage” that characterizes the inner and outer aspects of human existence. He will seek their integration through an analysis of the person, who is, at the deepest level of experience, an ontic unity in whom these two currents commingle and interrelate.

WOJTYLA’S THEORY OF SELF-TRANSCENDENCE

At this point it might be useful to recall that our interest here is in understanding the philosophical framework underlying the statement made in Laborem Exercens that work is an actus personae through which the person becomes “more of a human being.” Implicated here is Wojtyla’s theory of self-transcendence, which I have argued is at the heart of John Paul’s claim that work is the key to the social question.

In Wojtyla’s account of the human person, he states that he is using the term transcendence according to its etymological meaning: “to go over and beyond a threshold or a boundary.” There are two axes along which this transcendence can proceed in human existence. There is the “horizontal transcendence” that occurs when the person goes beyond his limits in an intentional cognitive or volitional act toward an external perception or object. This type of transcendence is only of secondary importance to Wojtyla. He is interested first of all in transcendence along the vertical axis. This “vertical transcendence” is the transcendence of the person in action, which regards not only the external object of the action, but also the person himself or herself.

At the level of its innermost personal reality, vertical transcendence
Deborah Savage

is constituted by the free act of the person when, in the moment constituted by “I will, but I may not,” I determine “I will” and, by my own free decision, I go beyond my own structural boundaries to become someone or someone else. It is in this moment that the transcendence of the person is manifest, for when a person wills something, he also determines himself in the same act. Vertical transcendence is the fruit of this self-determination, though only when freedom is exercised toward the true and the good is it authentic. This moment of self-determination is a personal “becoming” that has its own specific nature and ontic identity, always proceeding in the moral context characteristic of human personhood.

Unpacking the meaning ascribed in Wojtyla’s theory of self-transcendence as expressed in a moment of self-determination requires several steps. The problem of the personal structure of self-determination lies at the very heart of Wojtyla’s philosophy of the person and is itself a complex phenomenon. It presupposes that the person both possesses and governs himself; in fact, in Wojtyla’s theory, these three aspects of the structure of the human person, viz., self-determination, self-possession, and self-governance, mutually contain and explain each other. They bring to light the essential nature of the will in its actualization of his freedom. They are “brought into the orbit of experience” through the consciousness of the person.

Though in Wojtyla’s account, consciousness is not a constitutive part of human cognition and action, without it an act cannot be said to be truly human. The structure of self-determination cannot be experienced or understood without consciousness. Therefore, after some preliminary remarks concerning the foundations of his theory of the human person, I will begin with the place and meaning of consciousness in it and then turn to those elements he argues are essential to the ontic structure of the person in the act of becoming.

THE FOUNDATIONS OF WOJTYLA’S ACCOUNT OF THE HUMAN PERSON

While Wojtyla’s account acknowledges its starting point in the classical Boethian definition, viz., “a person is an individual substance of a rational nature,” he considers this an inadequate expression of the concept of the person. He argues that it does not fully express the dynamism of a being who is “the subject of both existence and acting” and whose existence is not merely individual but also personal. This dynamism is captured in two distinct ontological structures that “cut across the phenomenological field of experience, but…join and unite together in the metaphysical field.” These are the fundamental experiential phenomena that provide the basis for his analysis of human action: the experience of “I act,” i.e., of “man-acts,” and that of “something-happens-in-man.” Both of these phenomena are given in experience; their common root is the being of the person who experiences them. Taken together, they constitute the totality of the concrete manifestation of the dynamism proper to human being. This experiential difference is the
starting point of Wojtyla’s argument. It is discernable and determined by the moment of efficacy:

It is thus that in the dynamism of man there appears the essential difference arising from having the experience of efficacy. On the one hand, there is that form of the human dynamism in which man himself is the agent, that is to say, he is the conscious cause of his own causation; this form we grasp by the expression, “man acts.” On the other hand, there is that form of human dynamism in which man is not aware of his efficacy and does not experience it; this we express by “something happens in man.”

It is only in the experience of “man-acts,” when the human person experiences herself as the efficient cause of her actions, that an authentically human act, an actus personae, can be said to take place. In this moment, the person experiences her own efficacy, she recognizes herself as “the actor.” This experience “discriminates man’s acting from everything that merely happens in him.”

This particular dynamism has been expressed traditionally by the categories of potency and act, an analogy that Wojtyla still finds fruitful, for “act cannot be understood apart from potency and vice versa.” This language captures the essence of all change that can occur in any being, including the human person. Potency and act reveal two “differentiated, though mutually coincident states of existence, but also the transitions from one to another.”

In the transition from potency to act, the structure of the dynamism inherent in all being is manifest. The transition is an actualization of becoming, from within the inner structure of an already existing being. Every actualization contains both a possibility and its fulfillment in act as two interrelated forms of existence. This act does not signify merely the end or fulfillment of the potentiality; it “also signifies the transition itself from potentiality to fulfillment, the very fulfillment.”

Now the two phenomenologically given structures of human experience, ‘man-acts’ and ‘something-happens-in-man’, appear to suggest that there are two separate and mutually irreducible levels in the human person; if so, we are left with a divided account of the self. But, Wojtyla argues, the person is the subject in both experiences, and both of these phenomena must be grounded in an “ultimate ontological foundation” as a “necessary condition.”

This is “the ontological subject known in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition as the suppositum...which underlies all his actions as well as those which happen in him, of all the dynamisms which transpire in him.”

For Wojtyla, the suppositum is “human subjectivity in the metaphysical sense.” It can be affirmed as an important concept and an enduring part of our philosophical tradition, but it must be understood in a new way. It is the object of experience, not merely a philosophical notion, for the human person experiences himself simultaneously as both the subject and the object of his
or her experience. This experience reveals a subject who both exists and acts. This metaphysical subjectivity (the suppositum) is grasped through the phenomenal; it refers not to an abstraction but to a concretely existing being and guarantees the identity of the subject in its existence and activity. The existence proper to this subject is “not merely individual” but personal, for the human subject is not a “something” but a “someone.” Consequently all of the dynamism exhibited by the person, whether in the form of man-acts or something-happens-in-man, is personal as well. This ontic subject remains the locus of both these dynamisms; the person is both the actor and the subject. The person experiences both his or her efficacy and subjectiveness, though in the case where only something-happens-in-man, the person is not an agent and thus efficacy is not experienced. Thus, the ground of the dynamism of man is a foundational ontological structure that also serves as the mechanism for its manifestation. Wojtyla has preserved the traditional understanding of person, while going beyond it to account for the dynamism and experience available to us through consciousness.

THE ROLE OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Wojtyla makes a basic distinction between “conscious acting” and the “consciousness of acting”; he is more concerned with the latter. When referring to “conscious acting,” the word ‘conscious’ is used in the attributive sense. Here the act is conscious in the sense that it issues from cognition and the will, that is, it is voluntary. But “consciousness of acting” refers to the experience of a person who “has the consciousness that he is acting and even that he is acting consciously.” The person not only acts consciously, but is aware that he or she is acting, as well as the fact that it is oneself who is acting. The act and the person come into a dynamic interrelation through this aspect of consciousness. This is the primary aspect of consciousness of interest to Wojtyla in this account.

Consciousness cannot be subsumed under intellect as rationality or under will as voluntarius. It is neither cognitive nor intentional; these are aspects peculiar to the intellect and the will whose objects orient them toward acts of comprehension and knowledge. Acts of consciousness are not intentional by nature and do not lead to the constitution of an object. Consciousness has its own proper role that is an “intrinsic and constitutive aspect of the dynamic structure, that is, of the acting person.” It cannot be considered apart from the ontological structure of the person. It is not a “separate and self-contained reality” but part of the “subjective content of the being and acting…proper to man.” This is consciousness in its “substantival and subjective sense.” Wojtyla moves beyond the tendency to limit the location of consciousness to the mind, which tends toward a kind of dualism when attempting to understand its role in action. Instead, he locates consciousness-in-action, thus always in relation to the dynamism and efficacy of the person. Let us now consider the role ascribed to consciousness in Wojtyla’s theory of the person. It plays both a “mirroring” and a “reflexive” function.
Consciousness in its mirroring function is equated with its substantival sense. In this aspect, consciousness simply reflects to the subject what happens in him as well as his acting, “of what he does and how he does it.” It reflects the person as the dynamic source and subject of his actions. Also mirrored in consciousness in this sense are all the things that the subject meets externally through his activities, whether cognitive or otherwise. The subject has an elementary and non-intentional awareness of her actions and of herself as the actor.49

Nonetheless, this substantival aspect of consciousness, though not the agent in cognitive acts, has a role to play in cognition, for it mirrors what has already been cognized. It is “the understanding of what has been constituted and comprehended.” It illuminates the objects that present themselves in the field of consciousness, “keeping their cognitive meanings ‘in the light.’”50 Here consciousness not only reflects what it witnesses; it also “interiorizes” what it takes in, thus “encapsulating or capturing it in the person’s ego.”51 But consciousness could not play this role if it were not for the acts of cognition which it mirrors.52 Since cognition conditions consciousness, the extent and degree to which objective reality is constituted and comprehended by the human person, i.e., the various degrees of knowledge possessed by him or her, will also “determine the different levels of consciousness.”53 But this refers to the “objective” content of reality and its meanings; this must be distinguished from self-knowledge.

Self-knowledge plays a pivotal role in the interplay of consciousness and the awareness of the self and one’s actions. Self-knowledge is a “kind of insight into the object that I am for myself” and it is responsible for the sense of continuity that persists through different states in the being of the ego. Again, consciousness is only instrumental in the objectivizing of the self and its ego, its existence and its acting; this objectivizing is the purview of the acts of self-knowledge themselves. Such acts make possible the “objectivizing contact” between the person and herself and her actions. Ultimately, it is because of self-knowledge that “consciousness can mirror actions and their relations to the ego.”54 But it is consciousness that “interiorizes” what it mirrors, “encapsulating” the cognitive data of self-knowledge within the person’s ego. The person is both the subject and the object of this process. She is aware of her action; she is aware of herself acting; and, to the extent she has made consciousness an object of cognition, she knows she is acting consciously. Wojtyla states that self-knowledge “has as its object not only the person and the action, but also the person as being aware of himself and aware of his action. This awareness is objectivized by self-knowledge.” Unless consciousness and self-knowledge cohere, the inner life of the person cannot maintain its equilibrium.55

So, in the mirroring or substantival aspect of consciousness is found the field of the objects of knowledge, including of the self and of the self as acting and as conscious. But this is not yet the full meaning and significance of consciousness in Wojtyla’s account. Besides its illuminating function, consciousness has another, more essential function which is “the ultimate
reason for its presence in the specific structure of the acting person.” This is the “reflexive” or “subjective” aspect, and its function is “to form man’s experience and thus to allow him to experience in a special way his own subjectiveness.” Itself illuminated by the mirroring function of consciousness, this aspect permits us “to experience these actions as actions and as our own. It is in this sense that we say man owes to consciousness the subjectivation of the objective.”

Under the reflexive aspect of consciousness it is not just what is reflected in the mirroring of objects but rather the experience of one’s own subjectiveness that comes into more prominent view. Here consciousness “turns back naturally upon the subject,” disclosing it “inwardly” and revealing it “in its specific distinctness and unique concreteness.” This “disclosing” is the precise function of the reflexive aspect of consciousness. Through its action, I experience myself as the subject of my actions. In Wojtyla’s account, “it is one thing to be the subject, another to be cognized (that is, objectivized) as the subject, and still a different thing to experience one’s self as the subject of one’s own acts and experiences. (The last distinction we owe to the reflexive function of consciousness.) It is only when the person experiences herself as a subject that she can be said to be fully in act; every person is a subject because every person is a suppositum, but subjectivity so conceived possesses a potency that is to be manifested through the dynamism proper to it.

Thus, I am fully the subject of my own actions only when I experience myself as such. It is only then that I can genuinely say that I possess, govern and determine myself. Wojtyla does not deny that human subjectivity is the possession of every human person, for each is characterized by the existence of the suppositum and the potency that accompanies human action in both its manifestations. But all are in the process of becoming that full human subject that exists only in potency in some degree at every moment.

I must leave this brief analysis of the role of consciousness in Wojtyla’s theory of human personhood in order to take up the aspect central to his account: self-determination and its prerequisites, self-possession and self-governance.

SELF-DETERMINATION, SELF-POSSESSION, AND SELF-GOVERNANCE

As I have already explained, in Wojtyla’s theory of the person, it is only in the experience of “man-acts,” when the human person experiences himself as the efficient cause of his actions, that an authentically human act, an actus personae, can be said to take place. In this moment, the person experiences his own efficacy and recognizes himself as “the actor.” This experience “discriminates man’s acting from everything that merely happens in him.” It is this moment which reflects the exercise of freedom and the reality of self-determination.

To experience myself as the actor, as the efficient cause of my own action, is also to experience myself as the cause of my “self actualization
as a subject;” I am responsible for my own becoming and I sense the moral and ethical meaning of that responsibility. This is the meaning of self-determination: that at the same time the person determines his actions and their objects, he also determines himself. He is simultaneously both the object and the subject of action. The one as well as the other is the ego.

Thus every human action goes toward two objects: the intended (either external or internal) object of the will, and the primary object, the subject’s own ego. This means that an act of willing cannot be reduced only to intentionality or volition, for it will always include an element of self-determination, an act of the whole person. In fact, Wojtyła maintains that “volition as an intentional act is embedded in the dynamism of the will only to the extent self-determination is contained in it.”

Both the objectification of the ego that is necessary for self-determination and intentionality take place in particular acts of will. This “objectification of the ego” does not mean that we intentionally turn to the ego as the object; we impart actuality to its “ready-made objectiveness,” known to us through our experience and self-knowledge, and this ego is then further actualized or fulfilled in every act. Thus the will manifests itself as an essential feature of the person. More precisely, the person manifests herself “as a reality with regard to his dynamism that is properly constituted by the will.” In the relation between the self and the will is found the moment of self-determination.

The freedom under consideration is not the “concept of freedom as such,” but instead something that is “real” in that it is constitutive of the reality of man and the privileged position he holds in the world. Free will cannot be understood apart from its identity as an essential element in the structure of the human person without the risk of idealism. In other words, it is a characteristic of the person, not of the abstraction referred to as nature.

Now, any act of self-determination presupposes that the person possesses and governs himself “for only the things that are man’s actual possessions can be determined by him; they can be determined only by the one who actually possesses them.” This self-possession makes possible self-governance, which reflects the complexity of the structural whole of the person: the person is both the one who governs and the governed. Not to be confused with self-control, which refers only to one of man’s powers or virtues, self-governance points to the fact that the person is “encapsulated” within himself; the person is an “incommunicable” self-contained entity who is both the subject and object of his being and acting. Self-governance is the concrete manifestation of the person’s self-possession. These two aspects of the person both condition and are at the same time concretely realized in self-determination.

When consciousness brings it to the fore, the subject experiences directly his unique subjectivity in every self-determining act, along with
the awareness that “he is the one who is determined by himself and that his decisions make him become somebody, who may be good or bad.”

It is only when the person experiences himself as a subject, as someone who is constituted by a unique subjectivity and capable of action, that “we come in contact with the actual reality of the human self.”

When accompanied by the experience of consciousness, freedom and self-determination are most fully constitutive of the dynamism of human personhood. This dynamism is manifest most clearly in the vertical transcendence of the person in action, in the fact of her being free in the process of acting. But in this freedom is presupposed two additional elements that must be considered in order to grasp more fully Wojtyla’s theory of vertical transcendence: the person’s self-dependence in action and the intrinsic reference of the will to the true and the good.

**SELF-DEPENDENCE AND THE RELATION OF THE WILL TO TRUTH**

Wojtyla points out that if we are to hold that the person can determine himself through the exercise of his free will, we must consider that this means that the person “depends chiefly on himself for the dynamization of his own subject.” This self-possession is the foundation of the structure of the person. Wojtyla is here invoking the Scholastic axiom: *persona est sui iuris*, though expressing it in terms that reflect a grasp of the dynamic reality of personhood. Because the person is both the possessor and the one possessed, she is also capable of determining herself in freedom. The freedom of the person is thus grounded in “the basic structure of personal being.” This freedom cannot actually be exercised without the concrete ego, which is both the subject of acts of the will, and is also their object and determined by them. That is, in deciding about the objects of her acts, the human being also decides about herself and is the most immanent object of her actions. In this regard, the person, while horizontally transcending herself in the direction of an external object, also goes outside of her own previously constituted boundaries, vertically transcending her own subjectivity.

The nature and quality of this vertical transcendence is conditioned by the relation of the will toward the truth. Wojtyla affirms the traditional understanding of the will as ordered toward the good and its dependence upon the cognition of truth, since nothing may be the object of the will unless it is first known. But it is the moment of decision or choice, the moment of “I will,” in which is manifest the freedom of the person and his self-determination, which is the crucial constitutive moment. This is not a moment in which the subject is passively directed toward an object and determined by it from without. In an authentic act of “I will,” the person makes a choice, a decision to move in the direction of the object, and in this movement is revealed efficacy, transcendence and personhood. But this moment of decision is not without a moral context. Wojtyla states:
Choice and decision are obviously no substitute for the drive toward good that is appropriate to will and constitutive of the multifarious dynamism of the human person. The greater the good the greater becomes its power to attract the will and thus also the person. The crucial factor in determining the maturity and the perfection of the person is his consent to be attracted by positive, authentic values...Decision may be viewed as an instance of threshold that the person has to pass on his way toward the good.78

It is true that the closer the person comes to realizing the good, the more he is absorbed by it. But this would not be possible had he not gone “beyond the threshold of his own structural borderlines, transgressing his own limitations.”79 This act of self-transcendence takes place in “a moment of truth” when we can observe that cognition conditions the act of will; this transcendence springs from the will’s relation to truth.80 It is this “moment of truth” that determines the dynamism of the person as such for it is always within the context of the cognitive experience of value. Truth is always the basis of the person’s transcendence in action.81

Wojtyla makes an important distinction here between truth in the ontological sense and in the axiological sense. First the subject cognizes that something truly exists; then she cognizes the value it contains. This further apprehension ultimately will propel her toward another level of transcendence – toward a grasp of the good. This grasp is the “essential factor” in the movement of knowing to willing. Both are moments of self-transcendence. Wojtyla argues that the “cognitive transcendence toward the object as known is the condition of the transcendence of the will in the action with respect to the object of the will.” Any act of deliberation, choice or decision presupposes a judgment of values in which the truth concerning the objects has been first cognized.82

The self-transcendence of the person occurs in a moment of decision in which his freedom is exercised in accordance with the intrinsic orientation of the will toward the truth about the good; it is constituted by his dependence upon himself for the “dynamization” of his own subject, which he initiates in an act of self-determination by which he becomes “either good or bad”; it presupposes a reference to the existence of the concrete ego and the person’s capacity for self-possession and self-governance.

It is only in this act of transcending herself in accordance with the truth about the moral good that she is most fully herself, most fully a person.83 For it is in this moment that “the spiritual nature of the personal subject” is revealed and the action takes on the “authentic form of the ‘act of the person.’”84 What distinguishes the actus humanus (the specifically personal act of a person) from an actus hominis (a mere act of the human person) is a function of consciousness: it is only when the act is a conscious one that it can be said to be fully human.85 It is only when we are conscious that we not only
experience and judge our own actions, but are cognizant of the good or evil qualities that accompany them.

Now through acts that correspond to the personal structure of self-determination, the human person is fulfilled; he comes to realize that he is both a gift, given to himself, as well as a task, a responsibility that only he can assume.\textsuperscript{86} By fulfillment Wojtyla means
to actualize and in a way to bring to the proper fullness that structure in man which is characteristic for him because of his personality and also because of his being somebody and not merely something; it is the structure of self-governance and self-possession.\textsuperscript{87}

This structure is the “basis of morality” or at least of moral value as an existential reality.

This process of self-fulfillment and all that it entails reveals the human person to be a potential and not a fully actual being.\textsuperscript{88} This fulfillment cannot be actualized outside of a moral context, for to act contrary to the good amounts to non-fulfillment; fulfillment is only reached through morally good acts. But the human person possesses the freedom to choose to become either good or bad; in this consists a special feature of her contingency as a person. Freedom can be misused and its proper use is finally the role of conscience. In light of the structure of self-determination, conscience becomes the subjective norm of morality. It is conscience that allows the subject to distinguish the element of moral good in action and the sense of duty that accompanies this apprehension. This “\textit{sense of duty is the experiential form of the reference to (or dependence on) the moral truth}, to which the freedom of the person is subordinate.”\textsuperscript{89} Conscience is not only cognitive; in its complete manifestation, its function is to relate the truth as it has been made known to human actions.\textsuperscript{90}

Thus, in Wojtyla’s account, the process of becoming is a continual act of self-transcendence that begins in experience and cognition, first of the ontological truth contained in an object, then an apprehension of its moral value. These acts of the intellect are accompanied by a concomitant recognition of their object on the part of the will and propel the subject toward deliberation, decision and action, prompted by the sense of duty characteristic of conscience. Implicated in this process is the personal structure of self-determination and its essential elements, self-possession and self-governance, which, when accompanied by consciousness, allow the subject to act as an agent toward not only an external reality but his own subjectivity and becoming.

All of these factors lend to human action a value that is superior to any other consideration. This is the “personalistic value” of the action which is to be distinguished from its moral value. Moral values belong to the nature of the action but refer to a norm. The personalistic value of an action is anchored in the fact that the one performing it is a person. This value “is
a special and probably the most fundamental manifestation of the \textit{worth} of the person himself." For though the value of the person is prior to the value of the action (since being is prior to action), it is in the action that the person manifests himself.\textsuperscript{91}

The ethical value of the action is conditioned by the personal nature of the act; its moral value is compromised if in its performance somehow the authenticity of self-determination is betrayed, for this is the foundation of its moral content. The value of the action is personalistic because in performing it, the person \textit{“also fulfills himself in it.”}\textsuperscript{92} Human acts are instances in which human persons actualize themselves through enacting the dynamic structure of self-determination; their ethical value is rooted in this reality.\textsuperscript{93}

\textbf{THE IMPLICATIONS OF \textit{LABOREM EXERCENS}}

This analysis reveals that Pope John Paul II has something quite specific in mind in formulating his arguments in this encyclical. When it is read in the context of his overall body of philosophical work, it cannot be seen as merely an extension of the basic themes of the Catholic Social Tradition.\textsuperscript{94} Scholars of Wojtyla/John Paul II state consistently that his work is characterized by a notable level of intellectual consistency. I think we can assume that certain statements refer to philosophical framework reflected in his work as the philosopher, Karol Wojtyla. When this is taken into account, \textit{Laborem Exercens} represents a new and persuasive argument for the dignity of labor and reveals the implications of human personhood for engaging the theological meaning of the economic order. It is only now that we can more fully consider the basis of John Paul’s argument that work is the key to the social question.

As I have explained, in Wojtyla’s theory of the person, it is only when the person experiences herself as the efficient cause of her actions that an authentically human act, an \textit{actus personae}, can be said to take place.\textsuperscript{95} In this moment the person experiences herself as “the actor”; she experiences her own efficacy and “manifests and confirms” herself in an act of self-determination.\textsuperscript{96} The person grasps that she is responsible for her own becoming and senses the moral and ethical meaning of that responsibility. It is only when the person consciously experiences herself \textit{as a subject}, as someone who is constituted by a unique subjectivity and capable of action, that “we come in contact with the actual reality of the human self.”\textsuperscript{97} Thus, work as an \textit{actus personae} can be thought of as the key to the social question only when, in the actual conditions of work, the person is called to, and enabled to, engage in authentically human acts, that is, acts in which the reality of his or her personhood is fully manifest.

This obviously has critical implications for those engaged in creating and maintaining the social and economic conditions within which all persons work, and it is tempting to turn first to such matters. But we can conclude from John Paul’s account in the encyclical that he means to argue that each
human person must consider his or her own responsibility for engaging in authentically human acts. He states:

Since work in its subjective aspect is always a personal action, an “actus personae,” it follows that the whole person, body and spirit, participates in it, whether it is manual or intellectual work…These points need to be properly assimilated: an inner effort on the part of the human spirit, guided by faith, hope and charity, is needed in order that through these points the work of the individual human being may be given the meaning which it has in the eyes of God and by means of which work enters into the salvation process on a par with the other ordinary yet particularly important components of its texture.98

Human work is an element in the process of salvation because it is another means by which the human person realizes his own ultimate destiny. Thus, we cannot look first to the role that others play in creating the “right” conditions for work; we must look first to ourselves to discover the impulse toward self-realization and to accept the exigencies it places upon our personhood. John Paul’s enormous respect for the person shows here: the person is not a victim, he or she is a subject who decides about him- or herself. The point is that only when this is seen by the worker can work be the key to the social question, for only then can an understanding of the right conditions for work be fully manifest.

Nonetheless, without a simultaneous grasp of what those “right conditions” might be, the worker finds it difficult to maintain her sense of self, and so some consideration must be given to this question. First, such conditions must come to reflect a full understanding of the reality of human personhood and the person’s inherent impulse to manifest and fulfill his or her own subjectivity. This requires a recognition of the “personalistic value” contained in all work and the resulting dignity of any occupation, no matter what its objective results (provided it reflects the exigencies of the moral order). This implicates the work of those often considered less important in our culture, from garbage collectors and factory workers, to secretaries, nurses and stay-at-home mothers. Aside from its objective results, work has dignity because the one doing it is a person.

Secondly, since an authentic human act takes place only within the orbit of consciousness, work cannot be a place where conditions require the worker to forget oneself, where, to paraphrase Henry Ford, he or she is asked to bring only a “pair of hands.” No matter what level in the organization, working conditions must call each person to bring one’s whole self to the job, and must create a sort of “psychic space” for the movement of reflective consciousness and the manifestation of the person’s full subjectivity.

It becomes immediately clear that additional significance must be attributed to the more traditional principles of Catholic Social Thought. For
example, it is not simply a matter of “worker justice” when social reformers insist that organizations fully implement principles such as participation, subsidiarity, and the priority of labor. Beneath this claim is a much deeper reality from which its truth issues: the concrete reality of human personhood. The worker cannot engage in authentically human acts unless her environment affirms the personalistic value of her work and permits her the freedom to exercise her intelligence and capacity for self-determination.

Further, Wojtyla’s account of personhood, situated as it is in its moral context, reveals that the work itself and its purpose must reflect and honor the objective moral order in which it occurs. Each human act has both an objective and a subjective result, that is, the subjectivity of the person is implicated in and shaped by such acts. When the circumstances at any level of organizational life require or encourage the “worker” to act in any way contrary to the moral order, it constitutes a form of violence against his personhood and his potential for authentic self-realization. There has been much evidence recently of such transgressions, in both the business and government spheres; public commentary is usually concerned with their external impact, perhaps understandably. But the most insidious impact is much more hidden and more deadly, for the unethical or evil act cuts the person off from what is most essential to him. Each person is “a subject, capable of acting in a planned and rational way, with a tendency to self-realization.” Genuine self-realization can only be pursued and achieved within the context of the authentically moral life.

Finally, when work is understood in this way, one grasps that John Paul is offering a solution to the social question that transcends, not only the old antinomies of the subjective and objective dimensions of human experience, but also an even more ancient conflict: that of the “haves and have-nots.” For both the rich and the poor are implicated by this encyclical. The rich have in many cases lost sight of the responsibility each one of us has for our own personal becoming in its moral and ethical context. Were they to recover a sense of their own reality, perhaps they would feel the call to a greater sense of community and to their responsibility to create the conditions that foster human development.

Both the rich and the poor will find their way only when they are affirmed as beings characterized by potency and a tendency toward self-realization. Then perhaps, when in an act of self-determination they recognize that they are free to choose a life that has meaning for them and sense their own responsibility for their own personal becoming, will there no longer be rich and poor but a recognition that wealth is first of all a matter of “being” and not of “having.” Those who grasp this will be among the wealthiest of us, for they will have come into contact with the actual reality of the human self.

NOTES

1 Laborem Exercens, “Laborem Exercens,” Catholic Social Thought:
Deborah Savage


2 Laborem Exercens, 2.9.
3 Ibid., 2.6.
4 Ibid., 2. 9.
5 Ibid., 2.6.


8 I have relied on particular sections of The Acting Person as well as a volume of essays that contain some of the so-called “Lublin Lectures,” given when Wojtyla was a professor of philosophy at the Catholic University of Lublin, especially “The Problem of Experience in Ethics,” and “The Problem of the Theory of Morality. My analysis of The Acting Person, both in this section and the next, has been greatly aided by that of Melchor Montalbo in “Karol Wojtyla’s Philosophy of the Acting Person,” Philippiniana Sacra, Vol. 23, 1966, 329-387.


10 Ibid., 210.
11 Ibid., 211-214.
12 Ibid., 213-214.
13 Buttiglione, 61.


16 Wojtyla, “Basis of the Moral Norm,” 78-80. Wojtyla argues that Aquinas combined Aristotelian teleology with Platonic-Augustinian participation and that “the basis of this union is the idea of exemplarism.” The resemblance of creatures to God and the degree of perfection they exhibit are “cognitively encompassed in the divine mind as their exemplar.” For Wojtyla, this constitutes the very heart of the normative order because it presents a “world of goods and models” instead of the “world of goods and ends” that both Kant and Scheler disputed as tending toward utilitarianism. Exemplariness, according to Wojtyla, results in an objective hierarchy of goods in which each good is measured according to how close it approaches the perfection of the exemplar that exists in the mind of God. Wojtyla, “Basis of the Moral Norm,” 76-79.

18 Wojtyla, Acting Person, 19.
19 Ibid.
The Conversion of the Acting Person in Laborem Exercens

20 Ibid., 119.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., 110.
23 Ibid., 105.
26 Ibid., 107.
27 Ibid., 113.
28 Ibid., 29-30. Wojtyla follows Aquinas in arguing that consciousness is an accidental property of man, though he does not equate it with the intellect or knowledge. Here again Wojtyla is going beyond the inherited tradition to reach for a new understanding of a fundamental concept. Consciousness cannot be subsumed under intellect or will and cannot be considered apart from the ontological structure of the person. He states that “the singling out of consciousness as a separate object of investigation is only a methodical operation; it is like taking a term out of brackets in order thereby to gain a better understanding of what remains bracketed.” See also, 33.
29 Ibid., 74.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 65.
32 Ibid., 66. See also “Personal Structure,” Person and Community, 189. Elsewhere Wojtyla argues that Scheler’s fundamental error was to ignore the reality of human causality with regard to his actions and his becoming.
33 Ibid., 66.
34 Ibid., 63.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., 64. Wojtyla is not speaking here of becoming in the absolute sense as when something comes into being out of nonexistence, but in the relative sense, with reference to an already existing being.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 72.
39 Montalbo 343. In reference to a passage found in Acting Person, 73. The English translation of The Acting Person is notorious for its omission of Scholastic terminology and even some direct references to the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. This is one of those omissions. Montalbo was working with an Italian translation which contained the author’s original references to these terms. He reproduced the Italian version of a passage only partially reflected in the English text in which is stated quite clearly that this “ontological foundation” is the “principle of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas which found expression in the concept of the suppositum.” See Karol Wojtyla, Persona e atto, traduzione italiana di Stanislaw Morawski, Renzo Panzone e Rosa Liotta (Citta del Vaticano: Libreria Editrice Vaticanan, 1982) 98. Given this particular difficulty at this point in the text, I have relied on a different source for Wojtyla’s understanding of suppositum, his essay, “The Person: Subject and Community.”
41 Ibid., 222-223.
42 Wojtyla, Acting Person, 74.
43 Ibid., 28-29.
44 Ibid., 30-31. This is a critique of the traditional formulation which Wojtyla wishes to dispute and go beyond.
45 Ibid., 32. Wojtyla is here departing from the “classic phenomenological view” that the acts of consciousness are intentional and apprehend and are constitutive of their objects. He argues that such a view leads to idealism since it would equate reality with perception. See AP, 33.
46 Ibid., 31. Italics in original.
47 Ibid., 33.
48 Ibid. Wojtyla argues here against those who through a “philosophy of consciousness” would seek to establish consciousness as a separate realm of human subjectivity. The subject of consciousness is not itself but the human being. He argues that to conceive of consciousness as an independent subject leads to idealism in which perception is taken for existence. Wojtyla argues that consciousness is not an independent reality but is in the nature of an “accident” whose subject is the ego of the person. Its function is not cognitive but is rather to interiorize all that the human being cognizes, including acts of self knowledge. Wojtyla follows Aquinas in identifying consciousness as an accident derived from the rational nature of the human person, though, as mentioned, he also departs from the tradition in arguing against subsuming it into the intellect or the will.
49 Ibid., 31.
50 Ibid., 32-33.
51 Ibid., 34.
52 Ibid., 35.
53 Ibid. This has an interesting correspondence to Lonergan’s cognitional theory.
54 Ibid., 36.
55 Ibid., 36-37.
56 Ibid., 42.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 46.
59 Ibid., 44. Italics and parentheses in original.
61 Or, as Lonergan would say, we become subjects “by degrees.”
62 Wojtyla, Acting Person, 66. See also “Personal Structure,” Person and Community, 189. As mentioned earlier, Wojtyla argues that Scheler’s fundamental error was to ignore the reality of human causality with regard to his actions and his becoming. See Wojtyla, “The Will in the Analysis of the Ethical Act,” Person and Community, 20.
65 Ibid., 110.
The Conversion of the Acting Person in Laborem Exercens

66 Ibid., 109.
67 Ibid., 105.
68 Ibid., 115.
69 Ibid., 116.
70 Ibid., 106. See also Montalbo 356-7.
71 Ibid., 107.
72 Ibid., 113. See also Montalbo 356.
74 Wojtyla, Acting Person, 120. Italics in original.
76 Wojtyla, Acting Person, 120.
77 Ibid., 114.
78 Ibid., 127.
79 Ibid., 128.
80 Ibid., 140.
81 Ibid., 143.
82 Ibid., 146.
84 Wojtyla, Acting Person, 146.
85 Conscious in the reflective sense as described above.
87 Wojtyla, Acting Person, 151.
88 Ibid., 153.
89 Ibid., 154-56.
90 Ibid., 156.
91 Ibid., 264-65.
92 Ibid., 265.
93 Ibid., 266.
94 It should be noted that the footnotes to the encyclical are almost entirely biblical and include only one reference to a previous document considered to be a part of Catholic Social teaching, Gaudium et Spes. He mentions Rerum Novarum only in passing, though the encyclical was written to commemorate the 90th anniversary of the landmark document. Evident in the text is John Paul’s proclivity for combining phenomenological analysis with philosophical-theological meditation, a “distinctively Wojtylan” style. See The Encyclicals of John Paul II, ed. J. Michael Miller, C.S.B. (Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor 1996), 151 (editor’s introduction to Laborem Exercens).

96 *Laborem Exercens*, 2.6.


98 John Paul II, *Laborem Exercens*, 5.24. John Paul goes on to argue that work is not only a sharing in the activity of the Creator, but also allows us to suffer with Christ on the Cross. This is an important aspect of his theology of work, but certainly beyond the boundaries of philosophical reflection and my purpose here.

99 John Paul II, *Centesimus Annus*, 4.36. I am indebted to economist Amartya Sen, for his thinking on the meaning of poverty. He writes in *Development as Freedom* that poverty cannot be reduced to a matter of mere income level. He argues that poverty is a matter of “capability deprivation” and exists when individuals do not have what he considers a basic human right: to choose a life that they have reason to value. Amartya Sen, *Development as Freedom* (New York: Knopf, 1999) 86-110. There are problems with Sen’s account since it is grounded in an individualistic understanding of personhood. But his thinking on poverty and the challenge of eradicating it bears investigation.
Chapter 10
Person, Encounter, Communion:
The Legacy and Vision of Pope John Paul

Stephen M. Matuszak

In his fourteenth encyclical letter, *Ecclesia de Eucharistia*, Pope John Paul II wrote, “unlike any other sacrament, the mystery [of communion] is so perfect that it brings us to the heights of every good thing: here is the ultimate goal of every human desire, because here we attain God and God joins himself to us in the most perfect union.” John Paul’s great desire for all human persons was that they might encounter Christ and open wide the doors of their lives to Him, most especially in the Eucharist. This encounter has tremendous personal and social consequences, capable of transforming the social order in keeping with the love and truth of the Gospel. As a personalist philosopher, Karol Wojtyla saw that encounter with Christ as transformative. Christ, the ultimate “Thou,” who gives Himself to us in the sacrament of the Eucharist, provides each person the capacity to make a gift of self to others. The Eucharist therefore must be ordered to the transformation of the social order, giving rise to a culture of life and civilization of love. One who has studied the philosophical writings of Karol Wojtyla immediately sees the trajectory and development of his thought with its consistent Christocentric emphasis on the inviolable dignity of the human person, and the mystery and importance of marriage. Each of these themes gives rise to profound insights into the truth about the person and society which are greatly developed in the magisterial texts that now constitute the legacy of John Paul II.

This paper will trace some aspects of the development of his thought from the lectures that he prepared for his classes at the Catholic University of Lublin to the encyclicals *Redemptor Hominis*, *Laborem Exercens* and *Centesimus Annus*, and especially *Evangelium Vitae*. There is a remarkable unity in his thought in each of these stages. We find all of these ideas also present in his interventions at the Second Vatican Council. One could say that Karol Wojtyla / Pope John Paul II was a man who was intensely aware of the vocation of human beings to live in and through *communio personarum*, a communion based on truth, justice and love expressed in the self-giving of every human person. He saw clearly that human personhood is an image of the reality of Divine personhood, a reality that exists as the greatest mystery of love and communion that can be conceived.

In October 2004 Pope John Paul summoned the Church to observe a “year of the Eucharist.” This summons was one of the last acts of his long pontificate. What was his motivation for this celebration, almost four years after the celebration of the Jubilee Year 2000? What did John Paul have in mind for the Church during this year and how does the “Year of the Eucharist” relate to the concerns he addresses in his encyclicals and apostolic letters?
These questions lead us to explore the nexus between worship and ethics, the life of faith and the life of human beings in the world. The Eucharist is transformative of human society, but precisely how does this transformation occur, and how did John Paul understand their connection?

NEW INSIGHTS FOR ETHICS: LUBLIN’S PHILOSOPHICAL PERSONALISM

Karol Wojtyla sought to ground his ethics in a sense of the awesome mystery of the human person. “He saw the human being as a remarkable psycho-physical unity, each one a unique person, never again to be repeated in the entire universe.” His was a decidedly personalist approach to the principles governing social ethics, through which the requirements of justice are upheld and even exceeded. He established the norms governing human relations upon the foundations of both personalist philosophy and the “I-Thou” experience of interpersonal communion. He combined this with the principles of natural law understood as in a traditional Aristotelian-Thomistic framework. This approach allowed him to articulate and examine deeper dimensions of inter-personal communion rooted in an objective realist understanding of creation and the natural order. His phenomenological approach to philosophical anthropology gives rise to many insights which nicely complement natural law as well as norms introduced by divine revelation. Basing his philosophical anthropology on the unique dignity of the human person, which he understands as a dignity greater than that of any other physical being, he discovers in every human person one whose existence is already a revelation of the Divine Personhood whose love overflows into the created order.

Wojtyla’s wedding of new currents of thought in modern philosophy, especially phenomenological realism, to traditional Thomistic anthropology was still very new in the 1950s when he began his work at the University of Lublin. Stefan Swiezawski was one of Wojtyla’s colleagues at the University of Lublin and the man responsible for encouraging Wojtyla to “devote his abilities and his passion for truth at the Catholic University of Lublin and to assume the position of Chair of Ethics in the Philosophy Department.” At that time he saw the work that they were doing in Poland after the Second World War as having monumental significance for the whole of Europe and humanity. Swiezawski recalls,

In the works and discussion of our group of at first four and then six philosophers at the Catholic University of Lublin, we were deeply convinced that our efforts to “discover” the true Saint Thomas and to continue the line of development of European metaphysics and philosophy extending from medieval to contemporary times had crucial significance not just for our university, for Poland and for Europe, but for the whole world.
Lublin Thomism contains within it something of great importance. In these lectures Wojtyla considers the possibility of dealing with the problem of personalism in terms of the categories of Saint Thomas’ philosophy and theology. He notes that “personalism is not primarily a theory of the person or a theoretical science of the person. Its meaning is largely practical and ethical: it is concerned with the person as a subject and object of activity, the subject of rights, etc.” He further explains that even the evangelical counsel to love one’s neighbor is a thoroughly personalistic principle because only persons are capable of being subjects of love. Human love, when directed to other persons, finds in them an object of love that is commensurate with one’s own self. Therefore, human society is possible only because human beings are first of all persons who are capable of entering into relationships with each other in a way that is mutually enriching and not exploitive.

It is important to remember that the Latin word *societas*, from which the English word is derived, means partnership or companionship, a nuance which is sometimes lost in contemporary English use. Human society exists because the human person is a being who seeks companionship. The human being is able to fulfill oneself only by virtue of acting and existing along with others. Wojtyla refers to the desire for companionship as the first meaning of participation. It is one of the key aspects of his understanding of community. In several of his Lublin lectures, Wojtyla links this principle of companionship, and also the principle of self-determination, with *Gaudium et Spes* 24: “the human person cannot fully find himself except through a disinterested gift of himself/herself.” We are reminded that Wojtyla was engaged in teaching in Lublin and writing these lectures during the years of the Second Vatican Council. At Vatican II, the Church was likewise engaged in the “turn to the person,” and we find in the conciliar documents this same emphasis on the dignity of the human person and the vocation of the person to love and to give oneself. Wojtyla sees the ‘law of gift’ as an essential aspect of human freedom. In his lecture on “The Personal Structure of Self-Determination” Wojtyla writes, “It is precisely when one becomes a gift for others that one most fully becomes oneself. This ‘law of the gift,’ if it may be so designated, is inscribed deep within the dynamic structure of the human person.”

The ‘law of the gift’ changes the entire fabric of society; human relations are sustained beyond self-interest and the business of getting practical needs met. The main obstacle to the realization of a society characterized by ‘law of gift’ is the ‘law of use.’ Real companionship cannot exist where personal relations are reduced to ‘use’ of others. Persons always demand a level of respect from one another which must not be violated. In *Love and Responsibility* Wojtyla explains that “anyone who treats a person as a means to an end does violence to the very essence of the other, to what constitutes its natural right.” He develops this insight into his own personalist principle. At first glance, it seems to be identical to Kant’s personalist principle, but Wojtyla points out a fundamental distinction. While Kant meant the words, “we must not treat others *merely* as the means to an end” to signify that the person, as the possessor of its own nature, can, without harming itself, assume
the role, or even inadvertently perform the role, of “means to an end” on the condition that the end is a lawful one.\textsuperscript{10} Wojtyla holds that “nobody can use a person as a means towards an end, no human being, nor yet God the Creator.”\textsuperscript{11} In Wojtyla’s version of the personalist principle we see that that human personhood is of such dignity that it must never become an object for use under any circumstances. The reduction of the person to a mere means to an end, even a lawful one, is precluded by the fact that inviolable dignity inheres and flows from the essence of the person.

In his essay “Thomistic Personalism,” Wojtyla echoes Saint Thomas’s understanding of the complex relationship of the individual human being to society, but offers additional insights. Because the individual human being is always a person, and the society is a collection of persons who have an innate tendency to form interpersonal relationships as well as families and communities, the social fabric always involves an element of consciousness and freedom on the part of individuals. Since their relations must always be ordered to the good of each person as well as the common good, social relations (and hence the political realm) is sub-ordered to morality. Society must seeks to “create a system of relations between the individual and society that results in the fullest possible correlation between the person’s true good and the common good that society naturally seeks.”\textsuperscript{12} It is never an easy matter to attain the proper balance. On the one hand, when individual persons place their own good above the common good, they attempt to subordinate the good of the whole to themselves. The result of this disorder will be an individualism which gives rise to greed in economics and a distorted notion of civil liberties, to name but a few of the ensuing problems. On the other hand, when the state attempts to achieve the good of the whole by attempting to subordinate persons to itself, the true good of persons is limited or excluded. Such a society does not allow individual persons to exercise genuine freedoms; rather, it assumes a position of totalitarian control over citizens that inhibits authentic human development and diminishes the possibility for true happiness. In Wojtyla’s view, the common good of society and the true good of the person are harmonious, even though considerable sacrifice may be demanded of individual members. Such sacrifice can never entail harm, however; the true good of society can never threaten the good of the person.

Wojtyla is profoundly aware that something more is needed on the part of society in order for true human flourishing to exist. He calls this the “eternity of the person” or human transcendence, which arises from the spirituality of the rational nature in which the human person subsists. Persons must appropriate their transcendence in order to avoid harmful attachment to the material universe. Doing so gives rise to a new set of values that “are by nature trans-temporal, and even atemporal. Such values include truth, goodness, and beauty, as well as justice and love, and in general all the values by which the person as such continually lives.”\textsuperscript{13} In the end, Wojtyla sees that “the very content of the person’s life points to the eternity of the person. These values demand a more complete realization than they find in temporal life within the confines of the person’s bodily existence.”\textsuperscript{14} Wojtyla is referring
here to the ‘restless heart’ that beats in the breast of all human persons, stirring within them a longing for the God who is already searching for them. Human society must promote and respect human transcendence and the need for authentic spirituality in the culture. This fundamental need of the person for spiritual nurture gives rise to the responsibility of society to promote and respect true religion and religious festivals that are rooted in ancient tradition and especially in revealed faith.

In his essay “On the Dignity of the Human Person,” Wojtyla notes that the highest confirmation of the dignity of the human person is to be found in divine revelation and especially in the Incarnation. In this context we reflect upon the God who seeks society with human beings. The very fact of the Incarnation confirms the tremendous dignity of the human person.\(^\text{15}\)

By entering into the drama of human existence, God permeates the human being as well as human communities with divine grace. The fact of the Incarnation awakens in the human person the recognition of one’s own profound depth and the mystery of God’s plan in which God initiates a dialogue with man. In the words of the Psalmist, “deep calls out to deep.”\(^\text{16}\) This dialogue ensures that the human will never walk alone on life’s journey, and it confirms the fact that the journey is a journey to the Father. For just as Christ had come from the Father and returns to the Father, the being of each person begins in the mind of God, and is fulfilled through the personal knowledge of God.\(^\text{17}\) Every person must come to know his or her true identity, hidden in God and in God’s divine plan. Personhood therefore is also constituted by relationship and mission. Wojtyla’s reflection upon the mystery of Divine Paternity and the participation of human paternity in the Fatherhood of God is beautifully developed in his play, “The Radiation of Fatherhood.”

The concept of ‘participation’ designates a property of the person that expresses itself in the ability of human beings to endow their own existence and activity with a personal dimension when they exist and act together. To “participate” in the humanity of another simply means to be related to the other as a particular human being. Because of the reality of participation, human beings are capable of fulfilling themselves only in activity with others.\(^\text{18}\) The opposite experience of participation is alienation. Both arise from the interrelatedness and intersubjectivity of the human person. Persons always exist and act together as a multiplicity of subjects, but they also enter into community as personal subjects. The concept of ‘community’ has both a real and an ideal meaning. It signifies a certain reality as well as an idea or principle. Community is essential for human existence and cooperation. People fulfill themselves in and through communion with others. The fulfillment of the person cannot be reduced to a function of the community,
however. Wojtyla asks how persons fulfill themselves in communities and in answer to this question, he looks at interpersonal relations through I-Thou and We relations.

The “I” is in a sense constituted by the “Thou” of the other. This “Thou” is also another “I” different from my own “I.” “Thou” expresses not only the separation or difference of the other from myself; it also expresses an important connection, the inter-connectedness of all persons. The “I-Thou” relationship is potentially directed away from me toward all other human beings, but in actuality it always connects me with at least one other person. If it connects me with many persons, then it no longer has a relation to a “Thou” but to a “We.” The connection to a “We” is the experience of community. Human beings experience these relations even before they are conscious of them. The first experience of community is in the human family. These relations are so vital and necessary to human existence that persons cannot live without them. In his first encyclical letter, Pope John Paul II echoes this profound truth:

Man cannot live without love. He remains a being that is incomprehensible for himself, his life is senseless, if love is not revealed to him, if he does not encounter love, if he does not experience it and make it his own, if he does not participate intimately in it. 19

Wojtyla notes that there is a reflexive quality to all inter-personal relationships. When the relation directed from my “I” to a “Thou” returns to the “I” from which it proceeded, the reflexivity of this relation contains the element of constituting my “I” in a particular aspect of its being. The “Thou” assists the “I” in more fully discovering and affirming the self. The “Thou” of the other therefore contributes to one’s own self-affirmation; the subjectivity of one’s “I” is in a sense constituted by or grounded in the affirmation of and by another. This reflexive quality gives rise to participation if one’s “I” finds authentic affirmation of itself, or leads to alienation if one’s self is not valued, not affirmed. Wojtyla notes that when the relationship is reciprocal, “we can say that it is participation and not something else that forms the essential constituent of a community having an interhuman, interpersonal character.” 20 Hence participation is utterly essential for genuine human community. 21

The human being is not only an existing subject but also an acting subject. In this acting, the “Thou” becomes an “object” for the “I” of the self. 22 The “I” also becomes an object for itself in actions that are objectively directed toward a “Thou.” Thus, the subject experiences the relation to a “Thou” in activity that has the “Thou” as its object and vice versa. Through this activity the subject “I” not only experiences itself in relation to the “Thou” of the other, but also experiences its own subjectivity in a new way. These insights offer a new possibility to describe the deeper dimensions of interpersonal community, the metaphysical as well as a normative or ethical meaning which leads one to experience the “Thou” of the other as another self
in a kind of empathy of subjectivity. Here we can begin to see an answer to the question that was asked earlier, whether the law of love for neighbor can be known and applied to social ethics rooted in reason rather than revelation. Respect and openness to the “Thou” of the other is the only proper response that one can give to persons whose dignity is so great. Wojtyla couples this truth with the fact that human persons are always from God and for God, and hence deserving of profound respect. Wojtyla shows this by focusing on the empathy that is always present between persons, an “I” and a “Thou” who see their own self reflected in the person of the other.

The “Thou” that stands before oneself is a true and complete “other self,” which is also characterized, like one’s own self, by self-determination, self-possession and self-governance. This whole structure of personal subjectivity is mutually revealed through the community proper to the “I-Thou” relationship. In this way, the “I-Thou” relationship has its own transcendence and becomes an authentic subjective community. This community calls for the mutual self-revelation of the partners in their personal human subjectivity. A normative element arises among the two subjects since in their relations there always ought to be mutual self-revelation characterized by complete transparency and openness. The more profound or intense the bond between the “I” and the “Thou,” the more it takes on the character of trust and demands a deeper giving of oneself. With this deepening of trust comes the demand for greater fidelity and self-giving until there arises a special kind of belonging and a need for greater mutual acceptance and affirmation by the “Thou.” The highest level of this belonging is found in marriage and the human family, as well as in religious communities, but belonging should be found to some degree in all interaction between persons.

In this way, persons become aware of their mutual responsibility for one another. Authentic inter-personal community develops only if the “I” and the “Thou” abide in mutual affirmation of the transcendent value of the person. This value must be confirmed in human actions so that it motivates and tolerates only virtuous human action. While it is possible for two or more persons to band together for unlawful or unvirtuous acts, such actions exclude the proper form of participation because some disorder is introduced into the action, such as the wrong use of another or an injustice against another person or their property. The act can also be directed against the common good, which makes it even more seriously wrong. When the proper respect is present among persons and their actions are ordered to their own good as well as the good of the community, “only such a relationship deserves the name communio personarum.”

From these insights, one can readily see that the kind of relationships and transactions arising from interpersonal subjectivity understood through “I-Thou” relations must be quite different from those primarily governed by self-interest or pragmatic concerns. It can be readily seen that the level of personal responsibility and fulfillment - as well as the motivation necessary to value and strive after virtue - rises dramatically when such relations are in place. Such relations call forth a greater openness to truth and beauty
that further enhances the life of the community. Such relations undoubtedly characterize a “civilization of love.”

THE EUCHARIST AS THE THOU OF JESUS CHRIST, TRULY PRESENT AND GIFT FOR OUR LIVES

In our Lord’s gift of the Eucharist are found all of the aspects of an authentic “I-Thou” relationship. Christ gives himself as Gift to each of us, offering affirmation and acceptance of each individual “I” by one who as the ultimate “Thou” is the center of all human relatedness. He who says, “I am the Bread of Life,” offers Himself completely to the “Thou” of every believer for the life of the world. He fully discloses his infinite love for the subjectivity of each individual person, waiting upon each acting person to accept, receive and respond to the graces that He pours out abundantly within the depths of their own subjectivity. He awaits the “yes” of each disciple with complete affirmation and acceptance, seeking to love in return for love. In this way He knocks upon the interior depth of the human heart, soliciting empathy and awakening a hunger for eternal truth, goodness and beauty. Since He freely gives His whole Being to humanity, in return He asks for the genuine giving of oneself. But He also challenges us further to give ourselves to Him by giving our “I” to all those whom we encounter, those who are in need, those who ask our time, those who seek our love. We are reminded of the stern warning in the first Epistle of Saint John: “If anyone says, ‘my love is fixed on God,’ yet he hates his brother, he is a liar. One who has no love for the brother he has seen cannot love the God he has not seen.” The love that is commanded is first a gift. Logic tells us therefore that the proper response to the Eucharist is to live by the “law of gift” and allow love to flow freely through our lives. As the apostle John also tells us, “Love, then consists in this; not that we have loved God but that He has loved us and sent his Son as an offering for our sins.” Because Christ actually gives the love that He commands, every person who enters into our lives can and should be looked upon as a “Thou” awaiting acceptance, affirmation and respect. Although the love that some persons require may be more than what any one person can give, it is Christ who freely offers all of His love to each one in the Eucharist. Our capacity to love is in proportion to our willingness to imitate His generosity of self-giving and our openness to receive divine love from Him. In this context, a new perspective can be gained into many of the difficult ethical issues facing us today, such as caring for those in a persistent vegetative state, respect for the aged and infirmed, especially those suffering from Alzheimer’s disease, and especially respect for the unborn and affirmation of the dignity of embryonic human life.

FROM PERSONALIST PHILOSOPHER TO POPE: PASTORAL APPLICATION OF PERSONALIST PRINCIPLES

The philosophical principles governing human subjectivity,
interpersonal relationships and community that are developed in the *Lublin Lectures* and *The Acting Person* ultimately blossom into profound magisterial texts in John Paul’s pontificate. Even a cursory glance at his early pontificate, especially the Wednesday Catecheses on the book of Genesis (commonly referred to as the *Theology of the Body*), reveals how fruitfully these principles can be applied to articulating important truths.

In his 1981 encyclical letter *Laborem Exercens*, Pope John Paul II introduced for the first time into Catholic social teaching a distinction between the objectivity of human work and the subjectivity of the worker. Since work is made for the human being and not the human being for work, the Pope reveals a key distinction between the objective nature of work and the dignity of the subject of work which is the worker. While the value of different kinds of human work may be ordered along the lines of external standards, it is wrong to associate the dignity of the worker with the value that is placed upon the work that one does. The subjective dimension of work is always a higher order of value because it receives its dignity from the one who performs it.

The primary basis of the value of work is man himself, who is its subject. This leads immediately to a very important conclusion of an ethical nature: however true it may be that man is destined for work and called to it, in the first place work is “for man” and not man “for work.” Through this conclusion one rightly comes to recognize the preeminence of the subjective meaning of work over the objective one.

Given this way of understanding things, and presupposing that different sorts of work that people do can have greater or lesser objective value, let us try nevertheless to show that each sort is judged above all by the measure of the dignity of the subject of work, that is to say the person, the individual who carries it out… In fact, in the final analysis it is always man who is the purpose of the work, whatever work it is that is done by man—even if the common scale of values rates it as the merest “service,” as the most monotonous, even the most alienating work.

When this order of values is not properly upheld, a negative consequence for the whole of society always ensues, since individual members, human persons of inviolable dignity, are not valued or affirmed in the work that they do. When this happens, the value of “participation” by each member in the good of the whole begins to break down. Such has been the case with the “work” of women who stay at home to raise children. This also applies to the work of migrants who are often viewed as aliens or intruders by those who enjoy a more stable life in a particular community. Such persons are often not dealt with as subjects deserving of fair treatment or respect but rather are seen as a threat or cause of concern; therefore they are not welcomed to participate in the life of a particular community.
Later in the encyclical, John Paul coins the word “economism” to refer to values in the modern period which Catholic social teaching has sought to oppose with the “Gospel of work” and the dignity of the worker. The Pope writes, “In the modern period, from the beginning of the industrial age, the Christian truth about work had to oppose the various trends of materialistic and economistic thought.” The right order of values can easily be reversed:

[T]he danger of treating work as a special kind of “merchandise,” or as an impersonal “force” needed for production (the expression “work force” is, in fact, in common use) always exists, especially when the whole way of looking at the question of economics is marked by the premises of materialistic economism.\(^{27}\)

John Paul links this problem with inherent dangers in capitalism, dangers that unfortunately were all too common in the early decades of the industrial revolution. These dangers occur whenever the human subject is treated as a means of production and not as a personal subject, that is, one who is the whole purpose of the production process.

Ten years later, in 1991, John Paul returned to this discussion in *Centesimus Annus* when writing about capital and profit in business ventures. Again he offers a stunning criticism of the accepted norms by upholding the primacy of the person, even and especially in the midst of the competitive world of business and markets. One case in point can be found in *Centesimus Annus* 35 concerning the profitability of business. In this context, the Pope affirms the importance of profit as an indicator of the success of a business, but he also makes it quite clear that there are other factors which are of equal importance. He writes,

But profitability is not the only indicator of a firm’s condition. It is possible for the financial accounts to be in order, and yet for the people—who make up the firm’s most valuable asset—to be humiliated and their dignity offended. Besides being morally inadmissible, this will eventually have negative repercussions on the firm’s economic efficiency. In fact, the purpose of a business firm is not simply to make a profit, but is to be found in its very existence as a community of persons who in various ways are endeavoring to satisfy their basic needs, and who form a particular group at the service of the whole of society.\(^{28}\)

For many businessmen, it simply makes good sense to take good care of employees and reward them well when the firm prospers, allowing them to share in its profits. Others, however, question their obligation to their employees, viewing them as the means for production and the instruments for profit rather than as ends in themselves. In truth, as the Pope makes clear, it
is only when persons work together as a close-knit community, sharing their talent and enriching one another through their mutual intersubjectivity, that a particular business can succeed in providing a valuable good or service for the whole of society. For business owners or executives who see a dichotomy between self-interest and the interest of labor, this antithesis is one of the major obstacles to the transformation of the social order that is required for the “civilization of love.” It is this kind of civilization for which humanity longs and which it must embrace if the violence, bloodshed and ethnic cleansing so prevalent in the twentieth century are to be conquered.

In *Evangelium Vitae* 83, Pope John Paul II links the proclamation of the Gospel of Life to a call for genuine celebration which, “with the evocative power of its gestures, symbols, and rites, should become a precious and significant setting in which the beauty and grandeur of the Gospel is handed on.” This will be possible, John Paul states, only after we foster in ourselves a *contemplative outlook* that arises from faith in the God of life and views the gifts of creation with a keen sense of wonder, especially the wonder of one’s own being (cf. Psalm 139:14). The contemplative outlook is essential in order to see the true dignity of the human person, especially when human life is most frail and most demanding.

It is the outlook of those who see life in its deeper meaning, who grasp its utter gratuitousness, its beauty and its invitation to freedom and responsibility. It is the outlook of those who do not presume to take possession of reality but instead accept it as a gift, discovering in all things the reflection of the Creator and seeing in every person his living image (cf. Gen 1:27; Ps 8:5). This outlook does not give in to discouragement when confronted by those who are sick, suffering, outcast or at death’s door. Instead, in all these situations it feels challenged to find meaning, and precisely in these circumstances it is open to perceiving in the face of every person a call to encounter, dialogue and solidarity.

This paragraph contains a rich amalgam of insights drawn from John Paul personalist approach to philosophy, with its strong emphasis on encounter, dialogue and solidarity. The key words here are “the gratuitousness and beauty of human life with its invitation to freedom and responsibility.” These are the fundamental themes of John Paul’s ethics, anthropology and Thomistic personalism. It is a vision that arises from the Pope’s own contemplative spirit, from a deep sense of wonder before the mystery of the human person, “the only creature willed by God for his own sake.” This dignity is not grasped unless human life is also seen primarily in terms of gift and beauty, the value of which is only revealed ultimately on the cross, in the suffering that the Son of God endured to redeem every human life for eternal life.

The profound message we find so often in John Paul’s teaching is that
Christ has united himself not with humanity as an abstraction, but rather with each individual human being:

The Church wishes to serve this single end: that each person may be able to find Christ, in order that Christ may walk with each person the path of life, with the power of the truth about man and the world that is contained in the mystery of the Incarnation and the Redemption and with the power of the love that is radiated by that truth... Accordingly, what is in question here is man in all his truth, in his full magnitude. We are not dealing with the “abstract” man, but the real, “concrete,” “historical” man. We are dealing with “each” man, for each one is included in the mystery of the Redemption and with each one Christ has united Himself forever through this mystery.  

In light of these reflections on the necessity of a contemplative outlook in order to uphold the inviolable dignity of every human life, we can also explore the connection that John Paul II makes between the contemplative outlook that reveals the full truth about the human person and the faithful celebration of the Lord’s Day. We have seen that in Evangelium Vitae 83, this outlook is linked to “genuine celebration and proclamation of the Gospel of Life.” Dies Domini clearly affirms that Catholics are called to celebrate the Lord’s Day precisely in a way that fosters a contemplative understanding of human life as gift and mystery, redeemed for responsible freedom and celebration, as well as a more profound awareness of the mission entrusted to the laity to bring the Gospel of Life into every aspect of their activity in the saeculum. In many ways, this is precisely what the Pope has in mind for the “New Evangelization.” Responsibility for penetrating the world with the Gospel has been entrusted to the laity, who at end of the Eucharist are missioned forth into active service of God and neighbor. Each new week therefore begins as an opportunity for encounter, dialogue and human solidarity.

For John Paul II, the Biblical account of creation is a hymn to the Creator of the universe, pointing to God as the only Lord in the face of recurring temptations to divinize the world itself. At the same time it is also a hymn to the goodness of creation coming from the hand of God and bearing the imprint of his goodness. At the completion of creation, the Creator enters into His rest, but entrusts to men and women the responsibility of filling the earth and subduing it by means of their work for six days every week, and then resting on the seventh in order to enjoy contemplation with God. It is significant that God is seen as One who rests and enjoys contemplation. John Paul II interprets the Shabbat as the Creator’s joyful rest into which humans enter. This does not bespeak a God who is inert, but rather One who lingers before the “very good” work that He has made “in order to cast upon it a gaze full of joyous delight.” God’s contemplative gaze that is not so much concerned with new accomplishments in the ‘future’, but with a thorough
enjoyment of the beauty of what has already been achieved. This gaze is cast especially upon the crown of His creation, man and women.

It is a gaze which already discloses something of the nuptial shape of the relationship which God wants to establish with the creature made in his own image, by calling that creature to enter a pact of love. This is what God will gradually accomplish, in offering salvation to all humanity through the saving covenant made with Israel and fulfilled in Christ. It will be the Word Incarnate, through the eschatological gift of the Holy Spirit and the configuration of the Church as his Body and Bride, who will extend to all humanity the offer of mercy and the call of the Father’s love.\(^{34}\)

Marriage is the metaphysical key to understanding John Paul’s anthropology. Human persons are made for love, for communion. The *communio personarum* through which each person becomes a fuller image of the Triune God is the sacramental meaning of maleness and femaleness. Gender provides the otherness that enables unity to be achieved through difference. Each person’s dignity as spouse, parent or child is realized in the gift of self in love. But it is not only the human person who is called into communion with God. The entire cosmos that comes forth from God must ultimately draw back to God. Self-gift as the communion of persons and the union of opposites is in one sense, the entire metaphysical structure of creation, because it exists first in the Creator, the Triune God understood as *Communio Personarum*. This theme which has been a centerpiece of John Paul’s thought is more fully developed in his Wednesday Catechesis on the *Theology of the Body* and especially in *Mulieris Dignitatem*.\(^{35}\)

**THE LORD’S DAY AND THE CULTURE OF LIFE**

The Lord’s Day is at the basis of the culture of Life. The proper perception of it expands the horizons of man beyond the *saeculum* and life in the flesh, to the new and eternal life won for humanity by the Son of God. Humanity’s relationship with God demands times of explicit prayer. This is the character of the Sabbath given to Judaism. *Dies Domini* expands upon this theme:

The Lord’s Day” is the day of this relationship *par excellence* when men and women raise their song to God and become the voice of all creation. This is precisely why it is also the *day of rest*. Speaking vividly as it does of “renewal” and “detachment,” the interruption of the often oppressive rhythm of work expresses the dependence of man and the cosmos upon God. *Everything belongs to God!* The Lord’s
Day returns again and again to declare this principle within the weekly reckoning of time.\textsuperscript{36}

Moses receives the command to “remember the Sabbath day in order to keep it holy” (Ex. 20:8). The element of remembering signifies that the day is much more than simply resting from work. Early Christians saw the time inaugurated by Christ as a new beginning for all humankind. For this reason, Sunday became a festive day on which they gathered and celebrated the “breaking of the bread.” It is significant that the Jewish Christians continued to meet in the synagogue on the Sabbath and then celebrated the Lord’s Day afterward. The meaning of the Sabbath is thus not lost for Christians, but more fully revealed in the Resurrection of Christ.

For this reason, Saint Augustine refers to Sunday as a “Sacrament of Easter.” The distinction of the Lord’s Day from the Sabbath gradually grew stronger in the mind of the Church. Eventually it took on the character of the new “eighth day, leading the Christian to eternal life.”\textsuperscript{37} In the pastoral practice of the Church, it is also the “Day of the Sun” or the day of eternal light with which Christ, the Light of the World, shone in the darkest hour when death seemed to triumph over fallen humanity. Likewise, it is the day of the Spirit, the Day of Pentecost. “The ‘weekly Easter’ thus becomes, in a sense, the ‘weekly Pentecost,’ when Christians relive the Apostles’ joyful encounter with the Risen Lord and receive the life-giving breath of his Spirit.”\textsuperscript{38}

\textit{Dies Domini} affirms the tremendous importance of Eucharistic celebration on Sundays. The Eucharistic celebration makes Sunday not only a day of faith, but a “day of hope” in which the eschatological feast of the “Wedding of the Lamb” is prefigured (Rev. 19:9). Here again the nuptial mystery is invoked. This sacred celebration, through “the evocative power of its gestures, symbols, and rites,” should empower the People of God to be authentic witnesses to the world during the subsequent days of each new week. As noted above, this is precisely the role of the laity in the New Evangelization; all who are baptized into Christ are called to share in Christ’s threefold mission as priest, prophet and king. The urgency of this task is highlighted by the loss of the sense of the sacred in Western civilization.

Thus, through Sunday Eucharist, the laity ready themselves to undertake with the strength of the Risen Lord and his Spirit the tasks which await them in their ordinary lives. For the faithful who have understood the meaning of what they have done, \textit{the Eucharistic celebration does not stop at the church door}. Like the first witnesses of the resurrection, Christians who gather each Sunday to experience and proclaim the presence of the Risen Lord are called to evangelize and bear witness in their daily lives. Given this, the Prayer after Communion and the Concluding Rite—the Final Blessing and the Dismissal—need to be better valued and appreciated, so that all who have shared in
the Eucharist may come to a deeper sense of the responsibility which is entrusted to them. Once the assembly disperses, Christ’s disciples return to their everyday surroundings with the commitment to make their whole life a gift, a spiritual sacrifice pleasing to God (cf. Rom 12:1).

The role of the laity in bringing Christ to the world is precisely what the Second Vatican Council had envisioned in its desire to engage the modern world in a dialogue leading to salvation. It is one means by which sinful structures opposing the transcendent value and dignity of human life can be brought back to God. The Sunday liturgy is precisely the moment of encounter and communion leading to mission and conversion. The Lord’s Day also opens up the vision of Catholic laypersons to the real work that God has waiting for them as they engage the saeculum in the coming week. A contemplative experience allows one to step back from this engagement and reevaluate it in the light of Christ’s death and resurrection. Without a critical assessment of one’s activity in the world in light of eternity, human work cannot be spiritually fruitful.

John Paul also reaffirmed the “indispensable importance” of Sunday and called for all of the Church’s pastoral and catechetical resources to ensure that all members of the Church will continue to experience the grace of this weekly celebration, protecting it against the onslaught of secularism:

It is clear then why, even in our own difficult times, the identity of this day must be protected and above all must be lived in all its depth... The Lord’s Day has structured the history of the Church through two thousand years: how could we think that it will not continue to shape her future? The pressures of today can make it harder to fulfill the Sunday obligation; and, with a mother’s sensitivity, the Church looks to the circumstances of each of her children. In particular, she feels herself called to a new catechetical and pastoral commitment, in order to ensure that, in the normal course of life, none of her children are deprived of the rich outpouring of grace which the celebration of the Lord’s Day brings.

CONCLUSION: FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THE EUCHARIST

In personalistic terms, one can say that the Eucharist is the embodiment of our Lord’s total act of self-giving by which all who are one with Him in Baptism and faith come to share in His own communion with the Father and the Holy Spirit. They are sent out into the world as partakers of the divine mystery in order to transform human society by a conformity to Christ and acts of complete self-donation. This is the highest expression of love for
God and love for neighbor by which the new commandment of the Gospel is fulfilled. The transformation of the social order does not result from human efforts inspired by utopian ideals, but instead comes through a deep encounter with the One who teaches human beings to calculate their gain through the ‘law of gift.’ The Eucharist embodies this very reality: “No man can have greater love than he who lays down his life for his friends” (John 15:13).

The Eucharist is a powerful source of strength and hope in the face of human suffering because of the grace it makes available to us. The Eucharist gives rise to a sense of wonder concerning the mystery of life and opens the eyes of the heart to marvel at the goodness of God. John Paul II sees the recovery of a contemplative outlook as essential to fostering respect for human life and overcoming fear or discouragement that leads to attacks on the person such as abortion or euthanasia. For this reason, the proclamation of the Gospel of Life must also be accompanied by authentic celebration of life.

In his document Mane nobiscum Domine, in which he invited the faithful to participate fully in the “Year of the Eucharist”, Pope John Paul II says that the Year of the Eucharist “is meant to be a synthesis, the high point of a journey in progress.” He tells us that he is convinced that celebration will be of benefit to humanity in the “long term.” These words make it clear that for this personalist Pope, the Eucharist itself is the culmination of his philosophical writing and research, his encyclicals and all of his life’s work. There can be but one reason for this: the Eucharist is the gift par excellence, by which humanity is transformed from the inside out.

As we have traced the connection between the faithful celebration of the Lord’s Day through which man shares in God’s own contemplative gaze toward the world, it is clear that the path for humanity has already been trod by Christ, the new Adam who reveals to each person the meaning of life. The Son of God reveals to us the fact that our existence is first of all gift, and thus, that the appropriate response arising from man’s own heart is one of gratitude. Our calling is also revealed as being missioned into the world in order to engage the world not through the impulse of greed, resulting in separation and loss of communion. Rather personal engagement with the world must be seen in terms of the nuptial reality of interpersonal communion, prompting the desire to make a gift of oneself in all relations with others. Love and communion secure a sure remedy for the evils of abortion, euthanasia, fetal tissue research and the many other crimes against human life which seem to result from a rejection of communion and self-giving love. This mission precludes the possibility of engaging the world through the “criterion of efficiency, functionality and usefulness, whereby others are considered not for what they ‘are,’ but for what they ‘have, do and produce.’” Instead, through the experience of the fullest celebration of the Lord’s Day, and the profound existential experience of Communion with God and man, the impulse of fallen man toward “the supremacy of the strong over the weak” ought to be purified and transformed into the pursuit of communion for the sake of self-giving love.

Because the values by which the person lives must be determined
from the perspective of his or her final end, John Paul II would often challenge young people at World Youth Day celebrations saying, “Dear young people, where are you going? What are you looking for?” For many of these young people it came as a profound realization that the Lord was first seeking them. This awareness can have great impact on people today, who often feel profoundly alone; it can bring about a deep interior conversion. This conversion, expressed through the ‘law of self-gift’ enables one truly to live after the example of Jesus Christ, the Son of God, who gives Himself in the Eucharist in order to be a companion to every human person on life’s journey.

NOTES

1 Encyclical Letter, Ecclesia de Eucharistia, April 17, 2003. # 34. Quoting Nicolas Cabasilas, Life in Christ, IV, 10: S Ch 355, 270. The Pope adds, “Precisely for this reason it is good to cultivate in our hearts a constant desire for the sacrament of the Eucharist” (emphasis in original).


3 Ibid.

4 See Introduction to English edition of Person and Community – Selected Essays from Lublin, xiii.

5 Ibid., “Thomistic Personalism,” 165.


7 The entire text reads, “Indeed, the Lord Jesus, when He prayed to the Father, ‘that all may be one. . . as we are one’ (John 17:21-22) opened up vistas closed to human reason, for He implied a certain likeness between the union of the divine Persons, and the unity of God’s sons in truth and charity. This likeness reveals that man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself.”


10 Love and Responsibility, see footnote 6, iii on page 291.

11 Ibid., 27.


13 Ibid., “Person and Community,” 175.

14 Ibid., 175. Wojtyla adds here, “An analysis of the spiritual life of the human person from the perspective of the values that appear in it and that determine its whole character indicates that, for the full attainment of that spiritual life, the person must exist beyond the bodily conditions of human existence – in the dimensions of God.”
“The dignity of the human person finds its full confirmation in the very fact of revelation, for this fact signifies the establishment of contact between God and the human being. To the human being, created in “the image and likeness of God,” God communicates God’s own thoughts and plans. But this is not all. God also “becomes a human being;” God enters into the drama of human existence through the redemption and permeates the human being with divine grace” *Ibid*, 179.

**Psalm 42:8.**

17 These remarks, though are based upon Scripture, John 13:1 and John 17:3: “Eternal life is this, to know You the one true God, and Jesus Christ whom You have sent.”

18 This truth does not of course detract from the value of the contemplative life wherein fulfillment occurs precisely because of the privileged relationship that one enjoys with Christ by virtue of consecration and the evangelical counsels.

19 *Redemptor Hominis*, #10.


21 A further study might explore the connection between participation and the virtue of solidarity. Both are essential for a society in which all persons are valued and offered equal opportunities.

22 Here the word ‘object’ does not mean a ‘thing’ but rather as its etymological derivation from Latin implies, one who is ‘thrown before’ the self so as to constitute a reality that confirms the reality of the self in a fundamental way.


26 *Laborem Exercens*, #6.


28 *Centesimus Annus*, #35.

29 The Pope refers to this “contemplative outlook” first in *Centesimus Annus*, 37. “In all this, one notes first the poverty or narrowness of man’s outlook, motivated as he is by a desire to possess things rather than to relate them to the truth, and lacking that disinterested, unselfish and aesthetic attitude that is born of wonder in the presence of being and of the beauty which enables one to see in visible things the message of the invisible God who created them. In this regard, humanity today must be conscious of its duties and obligations towards future generations.”

30 *Evangelium Vitae*, #83.

31 *Gaudium et Spes*, #22.

32 *Redemptor Hominis*, #13.

33 *Dies Domini*, #11.

34 *Dies Domini*, #11.

marriage is the first and, in a sense, the fundamental dimension of this call. But it is not the only one. The whole of human history unfolds within the context of this call. In this history, on the basis of the principle of mutually being “for” the other, in interpersonal “communion,” there develops in humanity itself, in accordance with God’s will, the integration of what is “masculine” and what is “feminine.” In the chapter on “The Community of Mankind” in the Pastoral Constitution Gaudium et Spes, we read: “The Lord Jesus, when he prayed to the Father ‘that all may be one...as we are one’ (Jn 17:21-22), opened up vistas closed to human reason. For he implied a certain likeness between the union of the divine Persons and the union of God’s children in truth and charity. This likeness reveals that man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for its own sake, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of self.”

“With these words, the council text presents a summary of the whole truth about man and woman—a truth which is already outlined in the first chapters of the Book of Genesis, and which is the structural basis of biblical and Christian anthropology. Man—whether man or woman—is the only being among the creatures of the visible world that God the Creator “has willed for its own sake”; that creature is thus a person. Being a person means striving toward self-realization (the Council text speaks of self-discovery), which can only be achieved “through a sincere gift of self.” The model for this interpretation of the person is God himself as Trinity, as a communion of Persons. To say that man is created in the image and likeness of God means that man is called to exist “for” others, to become a gift” (Mulieris Dignitatem, 7).

36 Dies Domini, #15.
37 Cf. Dies Domini, #26.
38 Dies Domini, #28.
39 Dies Domini, #45.
40 Pope Paul VI, Ecclesium Suum, #3.
42 Dies Domini, #30.
43 Mane nobiscum Domine, #6.
44 Evangelium Vitae, #23.
Part III

On the Metaphysical Question: What Is a Human Being?
Chapter 11

Action at the Moral Core of Personhood: Transcendence, Self-Determination and Integration in the Anthropology of John Paul II

Thomas Ryba

At first glance, the writings of John Paul II seem to pose a paradox. One finds—to co-opt William James’s happy description of the thought of Charles Sanders Peirce—“flashes of brilliance against the stygian darkness.” But brilliance and darkness can each mean many things. Brilliance can be a difficult brilliance as well as a lucid brilliance, just as darkness can signify depth of mystery or turgid impenetrability. In an age that demands easy comprehension, the differences between kinds of darkness and brilliance can become muddied, just as the distinction between a difficult but worthy style can be confused with one that is difficult and not worth the effort.

An example of a critique that discounts the brilliance of John Paul II recently issued from Fr. Richard McBrien, one of the late Pope’s most vociferous public critics. In the course of a general discussion, he is reported to have remarked that he found the thought of the theologian, Benedict XVI, to be far preferable to the thought of the philosopher John Paul II, on two grounds. Because Benedict was a theologian, his writings would inevitably be: (1) more intelligible and (2) they would not be vehicles for the trenchant scrutiny and dogmatic rigidity typical of philosophers.

One might doubt that Father McBrien’s critique was truly directed at John Paul II’s philosophical training, but rather that a philosopher-Pope meant turgidity and dogmatism in Papal teachings.

A much friendlier example of John Paul II being taken to task for the impenetrability in his philosophical writings—in contrast to the clarity of his plays and encyclicals—comes from one of the great appreciators of the late Pope. In his well-known exposition of the philosophical anthropology of John Paul II, Kenneth Schmitz described his first encounter with the John Paul II’s magnum opus, The Acting Person as follows:

I first came to appreciate the philosophical reputation of Karol Wojtyła during a visit to Poland in 1978. When the English edition of Osoba i czyn appeared a year or so later under the title The Acting Person, I picked it up with some expectancy. Although the book made a certain impression on me, it was not an entirely satisfactory one. Despite many years of [reading] professional philosophy, including the study of Thomism and phenomenology, I could not—in my admittedly casual perusal—make out the lines of the
argument or reach a conclusion as to the value of the results. I could not quite decide what the author was up to.\footnote{1}

In part, Schmitz admits that his difficulty was a difficulty with the translation; in part, he admits it was a difficulty in his own application to the text. But he finally comes to the conclusion that \textit{The Acting Person} is a difficult philosophical work, in itself. To be sure \textit{The Acting Person} is a work which is highly abstract in formulation, though it was intended to have profound practical applications. The difficulty of this work made it the subject of a joke which circulated in the Polish intellectual circles after Karol Wojtyła became Pope and cast this work’s practical intent in a droll light. Apparently, some claimed that \textit{The Acting Person} was \textit{really} written with a miraculous pastoral prescience so that, when Karol Wojtyła eventually became Pope (and thus came into full possession of apostolic faculties to bind and loose), he would be able to prescribe it—if I may be allowed to collapse the two versions of the joke—\textit{either} as the condition for a plenary indulgence or as a penitential reading for priests in purgatory.\footnote{2} One wonders given the difficulty of this work, whether, even if \textit{The Acting Person} had been prescribed as a plenary indulgence, that this would have markedly improved sales of the book, with other avenues to forgiveness being so much less demanding.

Two final examples will be sufficient to indicate how the difficulty of the John Paul II’s thought was associated even with his encyclicals. I remember in the aftermath of the promulgation of \textit{Veritatis Splendor} that a kind of panic overtook some of the moral theologians who felt they were being singled out in that work. In connection with this concern, I have two clear memories. I remember an angry phone call I received from the then chair of the theology department at the University of Notre Dame, Larry Cunningham, scolding me because I had counseled a sociology professor at Purdue in his application for a Lilly foundation grant to describe aretalogy as the historically dominant model of Roman Catholic moral theology. The background to that scolding was that the new encyclical was interpreted as the spearhead of a movement to put an end to policy-oriented consequentialist approaches like that of the late Richard McCormick at the University of Notre Dame.

I also remember when (at about the same time I invited myself to the Chicago Archdiocese-wide consultation called by Cardinal Bernadine) the invited twenty or so theologians from the Chicago archdiocese each imagined it was she or he who was being specifically (but anonymously) censured out by that encyclical, until a wise Jesuit professor-priest suggested that the rhetoric of the encyclical was such that the Pope was not pointing the finger directly but developing ideal types with the purpose of circumscribing the limits within which a moral theologian might work and still be within the compass of orthodox thought. Even after this Jesuit moral theologian laid out a very plausible case for this reading—one which has also been substantiated by Schmitz and others—the moral theologians around the table found it difficult to dispel the paranoia that hung palpably in the air. Clearly, this was an encyclical whose code of interpretation and application was not entirely
unambiguous, perhaps intentionally. It was intended to prick the guilty consciences of moral theologians, and, at least in the Chicago archdiocese, it efficiently achieved its mark.

I tell these four anecdotes to highlight the difficulty of John Paul II’s thought as a preface to what I hope to accomplish here. I think that there is sometimes a tendency to treat his pastoral works and his moral-theological (or moral-philosophical works) in disconnection from one another, whereas they are best understood as an organic whole. When this disconnection happens, the philosophical works are viewed as thematically obscure, arcane and out of touch with contemporary moral-philosophical and/or moral–theological concerns, or the pastoral works are viewed as simplistic or uncomplicated in intention and without real connection to his philosophical work.

What I wish to argue here, instead, is that scholars of John Paul II have just scratched the surface of this organic interrelationship between theory and practice in the thought of John Paul II, and that the golden age of discovery of their rich interconnection and depth lies in the future. I would like further to argue that by temperament and gift, John Paul II was one of those few world-historical individuals who in his person possessed, in most exemplary fashion, the virtue of phronēsis. He, perhaps, more than any religious figure of the 20th century was the model for the unity of theory and practice. In the time allotted to me, I hope to show how this virtue of phronēsis was active by sketching the oppositions between John Paul the II’s pastoral concerns about a radical interpretation of fundamental option theory and his own phenomenological formulation of freedom, transcendence, self-determination and integration which he posed as a foil.

**PASTORAL ORIENTATION**

About John Paul II’s pastoral orientation, so much has been written that to reassert its importance is a tedious restatement of the obvious. A profound pastoral concern transfuses all of his ecclesiastical writings. Without question, this concern was one of Karol Wojtyła’s spiritual charisms from the beginning. George Weigel provides a particularly poignant illustration of this charism through examples which are of specific relevance to my argument.

Two characteristics constantly recur in Środowisko members’ descriptions of Wujek. The first is what Teresa Meleka describes as his ‘permanent openness’: ‘We felt completely free with him, without any burden. His presence led us to express ourselves. While he was among us, we felt that everything was alright. ... We felt that we could discuss any problem with him; we could talk about absolutely anything.’ … Openness and a seemingly endless capacity for listening were complemented by a deep respect for the freedom of others. Dr. Rybicki recalls, that, while [he] ... ‘talked to him for hours and hours ... [he] never heard him say, ‘I’d advise
you to’ ... ‘He’d throw light on [a problem]. But then he
would always say, ‘You have to decide.’” He was, in a word,
gently forcing judgments and choices.\(^3\)

He was, by the testimony of his penitents, a ‘fantastic
confessor.’ ... Each confession was an exchange of ideas
between two individuals, ‘not the mass production of
Christians’ (106). The individuality that Woytyła fostered in
the confessional was another reflection of his openness to
individual (107) paths,’ [of] his capacity to enter into others’
experiences.’ Ultimately, though, there was no ducking the
responsibility of making a decision. ‘He didn’t impose,’ one
penitent recalled, ‘but he did demand’ — that decisions be
made as wisely as possible. He believed that penitents and
friends had it within themselves to know the truth and live
it.\(^4\)

The biographical picture painted of the young Wojtyła as a curé of
souls, who camped out in the confessional, who assumed the intentionalities
constitutive of “‘permanent openness”’ and empathy (a virtue particularly
apt for a phenomenologist), who had an endless capacity for listening, who
illuminated without giving premature and precipitous advice, and who called
the confessor to decision, flies in the face of the critical characterizations of his
papal pastoral writings—like those of McBrien and others—who have seen
in them heavy-handed attempts to rein the Church in to a point antecedent to
Vatican II. It is always possible to opt for the explanation which suggests that
eventually a change took place in Karol Wojtyła between the time he was a
pre-Vatican II university church pastor and his inauguration as a post-Vatican
II Pope. It is always possible to opt for the explanation that a hardening of
the categories had occurred in him, so that there was a discontinuity between
his earlier practice and his later instruction. But there are other alternative
explanations. For my part, I would like to argue that there is near-perfect
continuity between Wojtyła’s earlier practice in the confessional, his theoretical
phenomenological writings and his pastoral encyclicals.

Time prohibits an extensive demonstration, so my argument must
proceed intensively, considering only a single case. I will use John Paul II’s
critique of fundamental option theory—cited in Veritatis Splendor—as the
axial point around which to turn my argument. I will attempt to show how
features of that theory are problematic both in terms of traditional Roman
Catholic hamartiology as well as in terms of the phenomenological approach
embedded in the pre-papal moral-philosophical writings of Karol Wojtyła.

**VERITATIS SPLendor AND JOHN PAUL II’S CRITIQUE OF THE
RADICAL INTERPRETATION OF FUNDAMENTAL OPTION
THEORY**

In this encyclical, John Paul II lauds those students of the “behavioral”
and “theological sciences” for developing a “more “penetrating” and dynamic analysis of the nature of freedom, one which “rightly” recognizes that freedom cannot be simply reduced to the choice of one particular action in preference to another but is also connected with conversion, with the decision to set the course of one’s life either for or against the Good, for or against the True or “ultimately” for or against God. The latter, broader conception of freedom stands to the former as the space which defines the boundaries and limits the field within which quotidian choices are “situated, develop” and are made.

However, as an extension of this freedom as charting one’s course, other moral theologians have proposed a radical revision which undermines the classical understanding of the “relationship between person and acts.” This revision consists of the definition of a “‘fundamental freedom’” which provides a more basic term of analysis of the orientation of the individual toward the Good or God than the simple sum of his/her moral choices taken as a series. This “‘fundamental option’” possesses five relevant features: (1) it is a basic freedom; (2) it is a freedom to overall self-determination; (3) it (often) occurs not through “specific and conscious decision[s]” but in a “‘transcendental’ and ‘athematic’ way;” (4) it is greater than the sum total of all the individual choices/acts which attempt to give it expression because the immediate objects of such acts are finite/”’categorical’” goods which cannot determine the freedom of a person in his/her totality; and (5) nevertheless, such individual actions are expressions or signs of one’s fundamental option.

The problem with this radicalization of freedom, according to John Paul II, is that some moral theologians drive a wedge “between the fundamental option and deliberate choices of a concrete kind.” This wedge is tantamount to a distinction by which ‘good’ and ‘evil’ are descriptors most appropriately applied to fundamental choice in its transcendentality, and by which ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are descriptors most appropriately applied to choices concerning “innerwordly” goods, such as human relationships and the relationships between humans and objects in the “material world.”

At this point, John Paul II describes how the fundamental option theory naturally comes to be coupled with a proportionalism as the means by which right or wrong behavior is evaluated on the basis of a “technical calculation of the proportion between the ‘premoral’ or ‘physical’ [finite or non-transcendental] goods and evils which actually result from the action.” Given the Kantian assumptions behind this version of fundamental option theory, what happens is that all such categorical actions—because they are freely chosen with an inner-worldly or phenomenal kind of freedom and because they are then experienced as space-time events in the categorically constructed world—become just another instance of physical action in the perceived world subject to laws of that phenomenal world. It is only the fundamental option that is susceptible to the evaluations ‘good’ or ‘evil’ because only it is the expression of a transcendental freedom exercised toward transcendent objects.

In successive sections of Veritatis Splendor, John Paul II raises a series of Scripturally-based objections against this understanding of fundamental
option, and it is here that he brings the Roman Catholic understanding of conversion to the foreground. First, he does not deny the importance of a fundamental choice which, in its orientation toward God, is a radical engagement of freedom and issues in a radical qualification of the moral life. This, he says citing the Second Vatican Council, is equivalent to conversion, to the “decision of faith,” or to “the obedience of faith” (cf. Rom. 16:26) ‘by which man makes a total and free self-commitment to God’, offering ‘the full submission of intellect and will to God as he reveals’ This decision is possible though faith; it issues from the core of human personhood, and it is vivified through love directed toward the bearing of fruitful works. None of these admitted features of the Scriptural version of fundamental option suggest that it is to be disengaged from concrete human action. Quite the contrary. The fragility of this conversion’s linkage to those acts (which shore it up or undermine it) is everywhere explicit in the New Testament. Fundamental choice in the New Testament is a “genuine choice of freedom” which is never divorced from specific moral actions. Thus conceived, it is a fundamental choice that gives a direction to human life and is aided in its progression to its ultimate end, God. The progression itself is a process of formation which is active as the person, in conformity with “God’s will, wisdom and law,” exercises freedom in choosing particular good actions. The Scriptural notion of this fundamental option, far from having an athematic, general intention, is precisely manifest in specific “conscious and free decisions.” It is for this reason that when one acts freely and in full consciousness of one’s violation of a command or norm that one’s orientation toward God is “revoked.”

Again, to separate the fundamental option from concrete moral choices is “to contradict the substantial integrity or personal unity of the moral agent in his body and his soul.” Constitutive of this integrity is the ability to choose rationally—to engage in rational deliberation according to an ultimate finality. No defective conceptions of the fundamental option—defective conceptions such as those that equate it with intentions devoid of thematic content or intentions disconnected from concrete moral demands and requisite actions—properly employ one of the correct standards of moral behavior: that is, whether it is “in conformity with the dignity and integral vocation of the human person.” All choices imply a deliberate will which issues in concrete actions that have as their horizon conscience and the synderesis rule: “Do good and avoid evil.” The virtue of prudence is engaged in these concrete situations when a positive moral precept is cited and it clarifies (a) whether the precept does, indeed, principally apply and (b) how that precept is to be enacted. In the case of moral prohibitions of concrete and/or intrinsically evil actions, no action other than obedience is allowed, whether it is deemed “morally creative” or not.

The pastoral upshot of this is to show the incompatibility between the notion of sin connected with the radical versions of fundamental option theory and classical Roman Catholic hamartiology. According to the radical conception of the fundamental option, it would be possible for a transcendental orientation toward God to co-exist in independence from
gravely immoral (but categorical) action. In a theoretical move which is the theological equivalent to re-inventing the wheel, the proponents of the radical fundamental option theory have recreated the most extreme versions of classical Calvinian doctrine of perfect assurance inasmuch as they argue that by “virtue of a primordial option for charity, … [an] individual could continue to be morally good, persevere in God’s grace and attain salvation, even if certain [kinds] of his/her … specific behavior were deliberately and gravely contrary to God’s commandments as set forth by the Church.” They further argue that the only sufficient condition for true opposition to God’s law and its accompanying loss of sanctifying grace, and thus damnation, would be a free “act that engages a person in his/her totality” or, in other words, in an act of transcendental freedom which fixes the orientation of the individual on evil. Mortal sin, as traditionally defined by the Church, exists only at the level of categorical acts of freedom and finite goods, but mortal sin, as on this view it ought to be defined, exists at a level of transcendence so great that it cannot even become an object of categorical awareness. The consequence of this radicalization of the notion of mortal sin is that a person might well commit mortal sins, without the “matter” of those sins being evidence that s/he were in danger of perdition; likewise, expeditious conversions to the faith—death-bed conversions, for example—would not be evidence that the transcendental option for God had been embraced; such conversions might even be doubted.

The problem is that the teachings of the Church are replete with statements to the contrary. Perdition is possible (even including a fundamental option for God) whenever a mortal sin is committed freely, with full knowledge, and with deliberate consent; even perseverance in faith is not a sufficient condition for salvation; salvation requires sanctifying grace, justifying grace and the grace of charity, all of which are lost because of mortal sin.

One might assume that with this exposition the last word on the subject had been produced: Dixit Papa. But the importance of the preceding summary is that among the writings of John Paul II it does not stand monadically; it does not stand as a little island of Papal teaching cut off from his earlier moral-philosophical work, but instead relies on it and is continuous with it. One might put it another way: John Paul II’s earlier works are constitutive of the ways he characterizes the problems in contemporary moral-theological formulations, and that constitution is not a matter of his avoidance of an anthropological turn or his not being concerned with transcendence. Indeed, he is concerned with both, but he operates with notions of transcendence and anthropology which are in line with Church teaching and which differ significantly from that of the radical fundamental option’s chief proponents.

**JOHN PAUL II’S PHENOMENOLOGY OF HUMAN ACTION**

Although it is useful, occasionally, to distinguish the person from the action, the phenomenologist ought to be concerned more with how to put the two together. The phenomenologist’s concern is how the act is the “real
act of the person,” how in performance of the act there is simultaneously a fulfillment of the person, how the act leads to an actualization of the potentialities that person possesses. With this concern, Wojtyła follows a long line of phenomenologists including Blondel, Husserl, Pfanderer, Scheler, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, among others.

According to Wojtyła in The Acting Person, there has been in traditional moral-philosophical and moral-psychological theory an excessive emphasis upon the object which is willed—the nature of the “‘willing of something’” [my italics] as he puts it, rather than upon that which does the willing—the “‘I will’” [my italics]. Once the phenomenologist’s gaze is redirected to this pole of an act of will, however, it becomes clear that the ego can also become thematized as an object of study in relationship to the moral act. Metaphysically, the person is both object and subject, both something and somebody. When, in relation to external goods and objects, this duality is most clearly expressed in the person’s being a patient to outside causes, this is the experience of personhood as primarily objective; when in relation to external goods and objects, the person has the ability to act effectively on them, this is the experience of personhood as primarily subjective. When the subject turns in efficacy on itself as object to determine itself according to moral action—according to the self-determination of the “I will,” then a “new synthesis” of effecter and patient is manifest. “Self-determination puts the ego, that is to say the subject, in the place of an object. Thus, simultaneously, it effects the objectiveness of the ego in subjectiveness.”

But the self-determination of the “I will” is not itself determined. It is chosen. It is chosen on the basis of the ego-image—the experienced reflection of him/her-self as it is reflected through that self-experience occasioned by one’s compete network of social relationships—as well as on the basis of the experience of the subject’s becoming as it grows along the trajectory of fulfillment it has set for itself.

The experience of self-determination is conditioned by consciousness, but the experience is not guided by consciousness. Wojtyła is careful to keep the experience of self-determination limited to a conditioning (but not a determination) by consciousness because he wishes to retain an objective world which has influence on the ego. Had he said that the experience of self-determination was both conditioned and guided by consciousness, then he would have sealed it off from any possible objective constitution; it would have been almost completely internally determined. As he puts it:

\[\text{if self-determination and the … dynamism of the will are to be guided by anything (this applies first of all to the intentionality of the will, to its orientation toward values or aims in general), then [they can only be said to be guided by] … self-knowledge together with man’s whole knowledge of … existing reality, in particular, his knowledge of values as possible ends and also as the basis of the norms he refers to in his acting.}\]
At best, volitional self-determination and the objectification of consciousness can only be correlated. Although to be willed something must be known, consciousness as subjectifying supplements the will “but does not guide or control it.”

The upshot of this is in the analysis of action; the guiding function of cognition must be stressed, not simply either “awareness [of that action] or the … consciousness that accompan[ies] it.”

The consciously acting person “reveals her/him-self as a specific synthesis of objectiveness (outwardness) with subjectiveness (inwardness) which supplement and balance each other: “consciousness supplements and is the counterpoise of self-determination and vice versa.”

All actions are external manifestations of the person, even when they are not intersubjectively observable. Immanent acts are those acts confined within the performing subject. External (or transcendent) acts are those acts intersubjectively observable. Nevertheless, every action performed by a person objectifies him or her, and this process of objectification results in the crystallization of traits which are manifested externally, in one way or another. But at the same time, because of the subjectivization of consciousness every action also remains immanent.

For Wojtyła, the significance of freedom to this analysis of acting is that it is to be identified with self-determination, and in self-determination the will is the “constitutive element” of personhood. This freedom is connected not with a transcendental postulate but with the concrete experience of the “I will as I may but I need not.” This dynamism is the meaning of human action; it is not reducible to one of the activations that we associate with nature, though it possesses an analogy with them inasmuch as, like them, it is an actualization of potentialities. It differs from them in that it supervenes over them and integrates them toward willed purposes. Thus, it is self-determination as the dependence of action on an ego that makes it a matter of freedom and not necessity. But this is not to be confused with the idealistic postulate of freedom as freedom from all conditioning factors. Such a postulate is fantasy. Those individuals in whom nature (the determined features with their potentialities) and second nature (the self-determinable features) are unconsciously disconnected are, for that very reason, determined by them. These unfortunates lack integration. In contrast, self-governing and self-possessing individuals—that is, free persons—take up the potentials of nature and actualize them in accord with the intended project of each individual. But there is always a tension in such an individual between “on the one hand, the power of deliberate choice and decision and, on the other, his bodily potentiality, emotiveness, and impulsions.” But the free individual accommodates her/himself to what is truly determinative while exceeding what is only apparently so. It is a question of reasonable acceptance and reasonable refusal.

Though the phenomenological investigation of human action reveals the importance of considering the subject of the action, it is incomplete without considering the ends of acts of willing. Whenever I act to attain something, I will freely when—even after the choice has been made—I preserve in my
consciousness of the determined end an awareness of the fact that “I will this but I need not will it.”\textsuperscript{55} This freedom to will is not an indeterminism but rather an autodeterminism rooted in self-governance and self-possession.\textsuperscript{56}

But this freedom is also manifest in another aspect of the will. The will is also experienced as a faculty or power. As such, the will, as the strength which sustains a choice, is the means by which one achieves the end which one has chosen. The power of will, thus construed, is a measure of the person’s ability to be free; it is a measure of the person’s ability to autodetermine him/her-self by choosing a course of actions and objects. \textsuperscript{57} The will as a power possesses the potentiality to be strengthened “by conscious choice and decision.”\textsuperscript{58}

**TRANSCENDENCE IN ACTION AT THE HEART OF MORAL PERSONHOOD**

The etymology of ‘transcendence’ suggests movement over a threshold or boundary, and it is this meaning that is the semantic horizon for its technical connotations. Philosophically, it may have an epistemic connotation referring to the kinds of intentional acts in which a subject transgresses her/his perception of an external object.\textsuperscript{59} Or it may be conative, when s/he transcends his/her understanding of an object by willing it. Neither of these varieties of horizontal transcendence is what Wojtyła has in mind in characterizing the transcendence of human acting. What he has in mind is a vertical transcendence.\textsuperscript{60} As such, it is a transcendence that is (relatively) ego-dominated, individualist, self-determining and self-reliant; however, its ability to understand itself as a part of the material world and the social order conditions its self-determination and reliance.\textsuperscript{61}

For Wojtyła, the transcendence of the person, \textit{par excellence}, consists in the ability to will and act to bring him/her-self to fulfillment. This means that for a person to act in such a way that the dynamism brings fulfillment, the action must involve the whole person according to a unique mode of self-formation which is expressed through characteristic structures of self-possession and self-governance.\textsuperscript{62} ‘Self-governance’ describes the capacity of the person to control and to be “subjected and subordinate” to that personhood. ‘Self-possession’ describes the capacity of a person to possess and be possessed by him/herself.\textsuperscript{63} This self-formation is a measure of a person’s transcendence and cannot simplistically be reduced either to the qualities that the ego possesses, at some moment, as subject, or to the intentions arising from the ego and which are volitionally directed to external values or goods.\textsuperscript{64}

Formation through free actions results in fulfillment insofar as those actions are not in opposition to nature and result—through self governance and self-determination—in a further integrality of personhood.\textsuperscript{65} “To fulfill oneself means to actualize, and in a way to bring to proper fullness, that structure in man which is characteristic of him because of his personality.”\textsuperscript{66} But this process unrolls by way of the person’s intentional willing and acting
toward different valued objects or goods, and it is the dialectic between action toward goods and the increasing self-possession and self-governance of his/her personhood that is constitutive of fulfillment. Fulfillment is the resultant inner formation of personhood; it is not to be found in the possession of an external finite good. Clearly for Wojtyła, fulfillment cannot take place in opposition to human nature (by which even personhood is grounded and determined). Morality cannot be relative but must be rooted, axiologically, in reality, even though moral behavior within that reality helps to further disclose its nature.

Although, from the side of intention, every action may be said to be a fulfillment of a sort, the kind of fulfillment that is connected with personal integrity or wholeness is possible only by (1) doing the good with (2) the conscious intention that one is doing it for the right reason. Neither the mere performance of the moral act—without the proper intention—nor the intentional performance of an immoral act ever leads to fulfillment, except in the most empty sense. Wojtyla admits that this analysis “appears … convergent with the [classical Roman Catholic] view that all evil, including moral evil, is a defect … [and] morality … [being humankind’s] fulfillment, whereas … allegiance to evil means … nonfulfillment.”

Though transcendence is experienced in fulfillment, the quest for fulfillment also makes the person aware that fulfillment is contingent on the external world and that the external world imposes limitations on his or her freedom. That very awareness is the means by which conscience is awakened, for as an intuitive awareness of humankind’s orientation toward freedom, transcendence and fulfillment, the conscience rejects imposed, external limitations of these “truths.” It is from just such a rejection of limitations that an ethics can engage in a critique of morality that limits fulfillment and thereby transcends it. For this reason, Wojtyla can rightly maintain that “conscience is the necessary condition for a Man’s fulfillment of himself in action.”

**INTEGRATION AND MORAL ACTION**

Karol Wojtyła understands integration as a complementary aspect of personhood or another perspective by which to view it which is not exhausted by his notion of transcendence. Transcendence indicates the possibility of becoming other than one is, on the basis of the free dynamism of the person, while integration supplies the complementary crystallizing structure of personhood. The notion of integration, as Wojtyła uses it, must also be understood against a specific etymological horizon relating it to the Latin ‘*integer*’ meaning “whole, complete, unimpaired.” Here, it is clear that Wojtyla intends a connotation much like the classical moral-theological notion of what it means to be well-ordered or even well-formed. But integration possesses both verbal and substantive modalities; it means both the process of assembly and the result of the assembly. Not to be taken to be either assembly *ex nihilo*, on the one hand, or assembly from a prior field of unrelated features, on the other, integration nevertheless includes real novelty.
Integration is the aspect of personhood which is cohesive and includes the objectiveness of the person as one who is formed, who is self-governed and self-possessed, an aspect which is correlative to the active self-determination and self-possession of transcendence. But its relation to transcendence is deeper still, in that it grounds the continuity in transcendence, for “without integration transcendence remains suspended in a structural void.”76 For there to be active formation—for there to be active self-possession and self-determination—there must be something to be formed, possessed and determined.77 Fulfillment is only possible if there is something to be fulfilled.

Wojtyła’s discussion of conscience presents a picture both of how moral formation takes place and the nature of the stable and abiding formation that remains behind. As he puts it:

The function of the conscience is essentially more than cognitive; it does not consist solely in informing that “X is good, X is the real good” or that “Y is evil, Y is not the real good.” The appropriate and complete function of conscience consists in relating the actions to the recognition of the truth that has been made known. In this relating by awakening appropriate virtualities in the action, the surrender to the recognition of the moral good means a simultaneous self-determination and surrender of the will to do the morally good. … The function of the conscience consists in distinguishing the element of the moral good in the action and in releasing and forming a sense of duty with respect to this good. [mutatis mutandis]78

Presuming that the conscience is a truthful (and well-formed) conscience, a “new moral reality” forms in the person which results in the fulfillment of that person and his/her further integration.79 This integral norm becomes the structural basis for further actions and defines the personhood of the actor.

But the conscience is directed not only to truthfulness but also to duty; it “consists in a very specific effort of the person aimed at grasping truth in the sphere of values.”80 Obligation or duty, here, is not a form of compulsion but rather the free subordination of the person to truthful values. Each obligation is coupled with an inexplicit imperative: be good, the way a human person can be good; do not be evil, as a human person can be evil.81 The conscience’s awareness of obligation also makes it the faculty whereby the social is mediated for the person; it makes a person an actor in the drama of inter-personal obligations and values.82 So important is interpersonal existence that outside of sociality, “[o]utside of [this] … drama,” persons cannot be fulfilled.83 The transcendence and fulfillment of the person is always inter-subjective and achieved through obligation as “the peculiar modification of self-determination” and “self-possession.”84 From this, the notion of an awareness of the equivalence of responsibility issues as awareness that my
obligations to self and others can be thematized as a field of efficacy within which I act on self and others.\textsuperscript{85} If the other is to be valued as I value myself, then I have a similar set of responsibilities to his or her formation as I have to my own formation. So important is responsibility for the formation of personhood, that a “diminished responsibility is [also] … equivalent to a diminution of personality.”\textsuperscript{86}

For Wojtyła, the conscience is primarily practical. In its quest for truth in values, it is not primarily aimed at theory but instead at the specific structure of the will in the self-determination of the person. The willing of a good brings the “discretion of the will” back to the scrutiny of the person. Even when the willing is a willing to attain the good of truth in the abstract realm of values, its aim is not simply the contemplation of those values but also the achievement of the “value of the person as subject of will and ... agent of actions.”\textsuperscript{87}

According to this analysis, the role of conscience in the integration of the person cannot be construed as compatible either with the Kantian notion of the autonomy of the will or with his allowing it the power to make its own laws.\textsuperscript{88} The conscience discovers moral truth; it does not create it. The idea that the individual’s will is the origin of values distorts the correct proportions between the person and community and the person and God. Just so, it can never be reduced to “a mechanical deduction or application of norms whose truthfulness” is a matter of “abstract formulas” later to be codified in legal systems.\textsuperscript{89} Its creativity instead consists of its ability to shape “the norms into unique and unparalleled” applications “within the experience and fulfillment of the person.”\textsuperscript{90}

This means that there will be a certain variability in inflection in each person’s reception of a universal value, these inflections being related to “the respective sense[s] of conviction and certitude” and resulting in further variable inflections in the respective senses of duty.\textsuperscript{91} Truth relieves the tension between the external values and personal freedom, because it brings the will to a reasonable submission to it, but this tension is only intensified by compulsion. Compulsion hampers the transcendence of the person and reflects the immaturity of the person compelling.\textsuperscript{92}

Finally, the highest perfection of fulfillment as transcendence and integration is felicity. Felicity is not simply freedom, but is the “fulfillment of freedom through truth.”\textsuperscript{93} The kind of freedom designated is not individualistic but has an essentially social component. Especially felicitous are those intersubjective relations whereby groups of persons participate in or share “strivings, modalities of existence and concerns.”\textsuperscript{94} And this according to “a suitable analogy” is a foretaste of “the felicity or beatitude that derives from intercourse with God and ... communion with Him.”\textsuperscript{95}

**DISINTEGRATION AND MORAL ACTION**

Wojtyła’s discussion of disintegration employs his notion of integration as its baseline. Against those disciplines which establish normality
Intuitively or statistically, he opts for a description which equates normality with integrality, one in which moral experience provides the mean for describing its “indispensable components” and intrinsic features. Thus, disintegration “in its fundamental sense signifies what in the structure of self-governance and self-possession of the person appears as a defect or a failing.” And this extends especially to moral defects or failings. It is especially a defectiveness in formation, in self-governance and in self-possession which at its worst seems to belie the ontological status of a human as a person because, in its worst instance, the individual suffers such disintegration so as to barely function or act like a human. Characteristic of this disintegration is a loss of transcendence expressed by an inability to govern or possess oneself and from subordinating oneself to and remaining in possession of oneself. An “insubordinative and unpossessible ego” is the hallmark of the disintegrative person.

What has been said to be generally true of disintegration in spheres outside of the moral is particularly applicable to moral disintegration. Here, the conscience is unable to act as a guide to the truth of values. This defect means that any ordered self-governing or ordered self-possession—which is the perfection of freedom and transcendence—is impossible. Such a person sees neither the convertibility of truthfulness and duty nor truthfulness and the good. Such a person is aware of no regular obligations. Such a person bears no responsibility for self or others.

Finally, disintegration may be gauged at three levels of depth or three levels of relative disorder. If the inability to self-govern and self-possess is inconsequential, incidental and momentary, then it exists at a level that is aleatory or accidental to the total integration of the individual; if the inability occurs with regular frequency, then it indicates a reparable but more serious symptom of the habitual disintegration of self-formation; and if it occurs as a determination with perfect regularity, then it exists at the level of nature itself, and may be an irreparable defect which undermines the integrity of the person.

But there is hope. The conscience’s susceptibility to faltering, to falsehood, to irresponsibility, to bad faith or bad conscience is a measure of its discord in relation to the good; it is a faltering which can be remedied by its reorientation to truth as long as this faltering is not a symptom of a defect of nature.

THE UPSHOT OF THE PRECEDING CLOSE READING

After this rather close—and I hope not too tedious—reading of the salient portions of the Acting Person against the background of his earlier moral-theological and moral-philosophical writings, I think it is clear that a case may be made that John Paul II wrote Veritatis Splendor with his earlier formulations of transcendence and moral responsibility in mind. I would go further and argue that, though the encyclical proceeds by citing Scripture and Ecclesiastical documents to lay its foundation (as an encyclical must),
its implicit horizon and legitimation is John Paul II’s phenomenology of the acting person. Not only did John Paul II have good ecclesiastical and pastoral reasons for arguing the way he did, but he also had good philosophical reasons. Let me briefly recap a few of the more important themes that show how John Paul II’s philosophy counters the assumptions of the fundamental option theorists.

Before indicating the various points of opposition between John Paul II’s theory of moral action and his typification of the inadmissible forms of fundamental option theory, a disclaimer is in order.

In *Veritatis Splendor*, John Paul II engages in a kind of typification that works by highlighting those inadmissible features in radical versions of fundamental option theory even though they may not occur together as a constellation in the thought of any one moral theologian. Thus, his listing of the features in his ideal typification does not mean that every one of the features, taken individually, is inadmissible. In some cases, it is how they are used in combination with inadmissible features that is the cause of their being mentioned. Here, it is important to note, once again, that he does not negate all versions of fundamental option, *tout court*, but only those that seal it off from concrete actions that would be determinative of it.

Let us remind ourselves of the five features that define John Paul II’s typification of the inadmissible notion of the fundamental option:

1. It is a basic freedom.
2. It is a freedom to overall self-determination.
3. It occurs not through specific and conscious decisions, but in a transcendental and athematic way
4. It is greater than the sum total of all the individual choices/acts which attempt to give it expression because the immediate objects of such acts are finite/categorical goods which cannot determine the freedom of a person in his/her totality.
5. And, finally, nevertheless, such individual actions can function as expressions or signs of one’s fundamental option.

I would argue that the first two features of this typification are not primarily in contention, except in that their interpretation is conditioned by the following three features in fundamental option theories. John Paul II has himself recommended interpretations of each feature, though these are not the interpretations radical fundamental option theorists would propose. He understands vertical transcendence—that is, the freedom to form oneself in self-possession and self-governance—as the most basic freedom that the person possesses. It is—within the limitations of rational subservience to moral truth—a freedom to overall self-determination. After all, he, himself, describes conversion as a variety of fundamental option or basic choice (*Grundentscheidung*).

Where the rub occurs is with the three subsequent features:

Although admitting the mystery of the person—and thus the distinction
between the knowable and unknowable features of personhood—John Paul II does not theoretize that distinction according to Kantian epistemological ontology. To be sure, the person is a transcendent font of self-reflexive action such that it can become both agent and patient to itself. It is thus both object and subject, though its own self-awareness is not sufficient to sound the depths of either aspect. But to accept this epistemic distinction is hardly to commit oneself to the Kantian bifurcation of reality which, as it were, is delineated a priori according to a distinction between the phenomenal realm of “iron clad” determinism and the noumenal realm of transcendental freedom.

For John Paul II, the Thomist realist, both objects and subjects may transcend understanding, but the boundary of what is known and what is not known is not fixed and pre-established. It is a boundary in flux. Through the dialectic of “horizontal freedom,” a dialectic of acting on the world and being acted upon by the world, humans come to an ever more capacious understanding of what is possible and impossible. For this reason, John Paul II rejects both the categorical schematization of horizontal freedom as well as the categorical schematization of vertical freedom in contrast to a transcendental freedom. There is only one modality of freedom for the person, and it is always inner-worldly, whether it is directed horizontally or vertically. Likewise, he is not tempted to bifurcate the life of humans into a noumenal existence, an existence of the transcendental subject, in contrast to a phenomenal existence, the existence of the objective body in the world.

The consequence of John Paul II’s one-world realism is that personhood—moral personhood—is always interpreted as a matter of both subjectivity and objectivity. And this means that it recognizes a greater dynamism between what it does and what it is. In contrast, the Kantian proponents of fundamental option theory place an excessive emphasis on transcendental subjectivity. By attaching fundamental freedom to this subject, and allowing the corresponding choice to fix the transcendental orientation of the subject, a stasis is accomplished which is (in its extreme form) the equivalent of an unalterable determination. The consequence of this philosophical decision is to devalue concrete actions in the world. Thus, the reason they are able to maintain that grave acts of immorality do not determine a transcendental orientation is that the truly significant determination exists at another level or reality, altogether. This move contradicts the view that actions have more than physical consequences.

In contrast, John Paul II’s construal of moral action sees actions as efficient in the formation and fulfillment of the person, the whole person, the inner-worldly person. Among these actions, virtuous actions are especially efficacious in the integration of that person, leading to fulfillment and felicity, just as gravely immoral acts are efficacious in leading to disintegration and infelicity.

Finally, the claim that the fundamental option is athematic is accompanied by a host of problems. If to be athematic means that it is an empty proclivity, tendency, pulsion, appetite or directedness divorced from intentionality and cognitive content, then it is difficult to couple it with
the notions of choice, judgment and freedom as commonly understood. If ‘athematic’ means that choosing does not have a particular theme but a general theme, then it must be construed as an intentional act whose cognitive content is that of an abstraction. Either it will then be independent of concrete actions or goods, or concrete actions will be susceptible to collection under it and, thus, mandated by it. Finally, if the fundamental option is an intentional act whose cognitive content is a transcendental (in the classical sense) then this act must entail the recognition of the participation of the transcendentals in beings and acts at the level of reality we inhabit. These too will be mandated.

Clearly the inadmissible senses of the athematism of the fundamental option are those which divorce it from concrete actions and goods. For John Paul II it is precisely these actions and goods—personal and impersonal—that are integrative. Even the goodness of God is not an abstraction. It is the goodness, in act, of a particular being.

CONCLUSION

I have provided a brief sketch of a single issue which retained its importance across the lifetime of Karol Wojtyła and whose development spanned his careers as both philosopher and Pope. I have tried to give an example of how his formation as a philosopher conditioned his teaching as Pope. Not contesting the observation that John Paul II’s philosophy is a difficult and nuanced one, but rather affirming it, I hope that this has been able to suggest that the difficulty intrinsic to it is a brilliant difficulty, one whose exploration is worth the effort. Finally, I hope to have been able also to indicate that his pastoral concern—as expressed in Veritatis Splendor—is one rooted in his philosophy and that the prudence of that linkage was one of the extraordinary features of this curé of souls, this saint, a feature that was not lost even upon professional moral theologians as they smarted under its power in the just scrutiny of their work.

NOTES

1 Kenneth L. Schmitz. At the Center of the Human Drama: The Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyła / Pope John Paul II. Washington, D.C.: CUA Press, 58.

2 One version of this witticism is given in Schmitz, At the Center of the Human Drama, 62.


5 Veritatis Splendor 3.65.1

6 Ibid., 3.65.2. In classical Roman Catholic moral theology, moral action is analyzed according to 5 components: (1) external norm [eternal law], (2) internal norm [well-formed conscience], (3) object of the act [type of action it is moral, immoral, neutral], (4) the motive [the reason one is performing this
type of action] and the (5) circumstances of the action [the attendant features which qualitatively and quantitatively multiply or diminish its effects.

7 Ibid.
8 It is ‘transcendental’ because it is, in Rahnerian terms, a “basic choice” [Grundentscheidung] which is not susceptible to scrutiny or observation from within categorical/phenomenal reality; it is “athematic” because were it thematized in object-constituting consciousness, it would have reference to categorical and thus finite goods. Here, the Kantianism of these features is evident.

9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., 3.5.3. Here, the distinction between “innerworldly” and “transcendental good” is a Rahnerian distinction that reflects his appropriation of the Kantian distinction between the phenomenal and noumenal realms.

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 It should be said that ‘fundamental option’ is not an unequivocal designator. It represents a spectrum of views rather than a single formulation. In fairness to the theology of Karl Rahner, it should be made clear that John Paul II’s criticisms of fundamental option theory are not primarily directed against Rahner’s formulations. Although there are difficulties in Rahner’s appropriation of the Kantian metaphysics—for example, in the way he seems to deny conscious awareness of freedom’s operations—he did not define the fundamental option as radically as did some of its other theoreticians such as Fuchs, Flick, Alszeghy, O’Connell, et al. See: Karl Rahner. Theological Investigations. “Theology of Freedom,” 6: 178-196; “Concerning the Relationship Between Grace and Nature,” 1: 297-317; Germain Grisez. The Way of the Lord Jesus. Volume One: Christian Moral Principles. Quincy: Franciscan Press, 1997, 404 n. 11, 404 n. 12, 405 n. 14, 405 n. 15, 405 n. 16, 406 n. 23, etc.

16 Ibid., 3.66.1.
17 Ibid. This is footnote 112: Second Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Dei Verbum, 5; cf. First Vatican Ecumenical Council, Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith Dei Filius, Chap. 3: DS, 3008.

18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 3.66.1-2.
20 Ibid., 3.67.1.
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., 3.67.2.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid., 3.68.1. The difference between such an interpretation
of the fundamental option and the Calvinian doctrine of perfect assurance is that the determining feature of the former is an irrevocable basic choice for charity while, for the Calvinian, it is an irrevocable election to grace. In both formulations, a radical voluntarism is evident. In the radical version of fundamental option theory—based upon a characteristic interpretation of the Council of Trent’s teaching on salvation—the transcendental choice of the individual must be completely inexplicable. It cannot be determined by preceding categorical conditions nor even contextualized by them. In the Calvinian formulation of perfect assurance, it is the sovereign will of God which is inexplicable ground of the individual’s election. See: Francis Turretin. Institutes of Elenctic Theology. Trans., G. M. Giger. Edit., J. T. Dennison. Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1992 [1679-85], “The Certainty of Election,” Question XIII. See also: Loraine Boettner. The Reformed Doctrine of Predestination. Phillipsburg: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1932, 193-201.

28 Ibid., 6.69.1. If one grants that there is a transcendental pulsion toward the Good as a feature of the transcendental existential, then such a choice is even more inexplicable than a fundamental option for the good. A transcendental basic choice for evil would be an example of surd evil in the Kantian sense. In raising the possibility, an advocate of this understanding of the fundamental option raises it simply to show that it is a virtual impossibility. This squares with the universalist soteriological tendency which is part and parcel of Rahner’s theology.

29 Ibid., 3.69.1.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 3.70.2.
32 Ibid., 3.68.2.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid., 112.
36 Ibid., 112, Chapter II: 60-101.
37 Ibid., 112.
38 Ibid., 113.
39 Ibid.
40 Wojtyła pointedly asserts this danger: “Failure to recognize this fundamental difference [between cognition as a guide to willing and consciousness as subjectively self-constituting willing] leads inevitably to solipsism, subjectivism and idealism, that is, to a situation in which the subject seems lost in its own specific reality or objectiveness.” Ibid., 114.
41 Ibid., 114.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Ibid., 115.
Animals, whose behavior bears the marks of some purpose, still cannot be said to perform action because of the absence of full personhood.

The role that truth plays in relation to conscience is key for Wojtyła. “The mind is commonly regarded as the organ of thought: the function of thinking … and also of comprehending is usually connected with the intellect. In fact, the mind is … merely a faculty of the [hu]man-person. Thinking and comprehending are the manifestations of its intellectual function, but besides its shaping of means and projecting their relations, its practical function consists in the evaluating of what is true and what is not. … Consciousness in its mirroring function draws its significative contents from the active intellectual and practical processes that are directed toward the truth. In this way, the state of truthfulness also becomes their share and thus consciousness in its reflexive function conditions the experience of truthfulness. … But … neither … the knowledge not the active evaluation and
understanding of truth constitute the proper function of consciousness. … It is the activity of the mind, the whole effort directed toward moral truth and not consciousness alone that seems to supply the basis for the transcendence of the person. … The grasping of truth is connected with a special striving in which truth as a value is the end which is sought. … Far from being but a passive mirror that only reflects objects, man acquires through truth as a value a particular ascendancy over them. This ‘superiority,’ which is inscribed into the spiritual nature of the person, is connected with a certain distance or aloofness toward mere objects of cognition. This is … why the use of reason, or of mind as the distinctive trait of the person, is so rightly stressed in the Boethian definition.” Ibid., 158-159.

80 Ibid., 160.
81 Ibid., 168.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Ibid., 169.
85 Ibid., 171-173.
86 Ibid., 173.
87 Ibid., 161.
88 Ibid., 165
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., 165-166.
92 Ibid., 166.
93 Ibid., 175.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid., 193.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., 193-194.
99 Ibid., 194.
100 Ibid.
101 Ibid., 195.
102 Ibid., 160-161.

103 This is especially true of Timothy E. O’Connell’s formulation of personhood in relation to the transcendental option. Note how, in the following passage, he links subjectivity and a kind of abstract thematization of being. “The freedom of the human act is categorical, however, only because it is a freedom associated with “doing.” At a deeper level of “being,” of personhood, things are quite otherwise. We experience ourselves as men and women who are free not only as agents but also as persons. But that does not mean that the freedom associated with these two levels of our reality is the same. No, the freedom associated with our core, our personhood, is quite a different sort. Only objects can be categorized, and my personhood is not an object. It is a subject. From the perspective of my central personhood, the focus of free decision is not that of one object or another. Rather, it is
all objects taken together. ... It is the decision to accept or reject reality as I find it. ... And form the perspective of my core, ... this cosmically inclusive objectivity presents itself for a decision. A simple, singular decision: yes or no. The freedom of the human person, then, is not categorical freedom at all. Rather, it is a freedom that transcends all categories, it is ‘transcendental freedom.’” Although characterized by some inherent confusions, the above passage clearly indicates the divorce between doing and choosing which is denied by John Paul the II. Timothy E. O’Connell. *Principles for a Catholic Morality*. Revised Edition. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1990, 70-71.
Edith Stein was born in 1891 and raised in Breslau, Germany, a city now part of John Paul II’s native Poland. Like John Paul II, Stein’s major studies were in philosophy, and particularly phenomenology. Stein was a close friend of the Pope’s teacher, Roman Ingarden. Both she and John Paul II were significantly influenced also by the teaching and writing of Max Scheler.

John Paul II and Edith Stein not only share much in terms of intellectual influences and formation, but John Paul had a special interest in Stein’s life, declaring her a “blessed” in 1987 and saint in 1998. He recommends the study of her work in Fides et Ratio and declared her a co-patronness of Europe in 1999.1 In his apostolic letter proclaiming Stein as co-patronness, John Paul II says, “[p]articularly significant for her time was her struggle to promote the social status of women; and especially profound are the pages in which she explores the values of womanhood and woman’s mission from the human and religious standpoint.”2 Prudence Allen claims that John Paul’s complementarianism as laid out in Love and Responsibility may be “following Stein’s intellectual lead,”3 and Laura Garcia quotes Cardinal Lustiger’s description of John Paul II as Edith Stein’s “best pupil.”4

It is likely that Edith Stein’s writings, particularly on women although certainly not exclusively so, had an important influence on John Paul II’s own thought. In this paper, however, I am less interested in investigating historically how and to what degree Stein’s work influenced John Paul, although such a study would be extremely worthwhile. Rather, I shall focus on a brief comparison of the two thinkers’ accounts of women. Their intellectual work shares many common features; there are, however, also points of critical difference—both in their respective emphases and in their respective accounts of the origin of femininity and masculinity. These differences are not unimportant for evaluating whether we ought to accept some version of gender complementarianism and, if so, which version we ought to accept. I will not here take the further step of evaluation, but perhaps the comparisons made here will lay the foundation for future evaluation. I will begin with a brief sketch of Stein’s and John Paul’s common descriptions of women and then turn to the two key points of divergence.

COMMONALITIES

It is immediately striking how similar are both the language and themes are in Stein’s and John Paul’s writings on women. Both speak regularly not only of the nature of women and men, but also of their ‘dignity,’ ‘distinctive value,’ and ‘vocation.’ These shared terms, however, indicate more than
linguistic commonalities; there is also a shared commitment to the idea that the differences between women and men are significant and that they involve some kind of call or vocation. But feminine and masculine distinctivenesses and vocations do not, for either thinker, in any way undermine our equality or common humanity.

Both thinkers account for our equality yet complementarity by pointing not to differing traits, but to differing emphases within our common human traits. Stein says, “[t]he existence of all powers, which a man possesses, [are] within the feminine nature – even though they may generally appear in different degrees and relationships.” Similarly, in a 1995 *Angelus Reflection*, John Paul II says, “it is obvious that they [women and men] have fundamental dimensions and values in common. However, in man and in woman these acquire different strengths, interests, and emphases and it is this very diversity which becomes a source of enrichment.”

Both claim that women and men share all human faculties and that the differences between women and men have to do with the order of development, use, or emphases among those faculties, not the faculties per se.

Further, both agree about how those emphases differ, describing the distinctiveness of women as a particular attention to, and concern for, actual concrete human beings and their holistic development and flourishing. One might call this a maternal care or motherliness. Such motherliness is not simply biological – and both warn that if one focuses on the biological version too simply or quantitatively, one will misunderstand true motherliness. (Thus both Stein and John Paul emphasize two ways of living out the feminine distinctiveness: motherhood and virginity.) Rather, by motherliness, both mean a particularly personal orientation. In his encyclical on women, *Mulieris Dignitatem*, John Paul says:

*God entrusts the human being to her [women] in a special way.* Of course, God entrusts every human being to each and every other human being. But this entrusting concerns women in a special way—precisely by reason of their femininity—and this in a particular way determines their vocation.

In a letter on the collaboration of the sexes, he says:

Among the fundamental values linked to women’s actual lives is what has been called a “capacity for the other”. Although a certain type of feminist rhetoric makes demands “for ourselves,” women preserve the deep intuition of the goodness in their lives of those actions which elicit life, and contribute to the growth and protection of the other. This intuition is linked to women’s physical capacity to give life. Whether lived out or remaining potential, this
capacity is a reality that structures the female personality in a profound way. It allows her to acquire maturity very quickly, and gives a sense of the seriousness of life and of its responsibilities. A sense and a respect for what is concrete develop in her, opposed to abstractions which are so often fatal for the existence of individuals and society. It is women, in the end, who even in very desperate situations, as attested by history past and present, possess a singular capacity to persevere in adversity, to keep life going even in extreme situations, to hold tenaciously to the future, and finally to remember with tears the value of every human life.  

He claims that the feminine “ethos” is marked by a “readiness to accept life” and suggests that there is “a special sensitivity” characteristic of femininity.

John Paul rarely makes these claims without also emphasizing our common humanity. For example, in the section just following the previous long quotation, he says:

It is appropriate however to recall that the feminine values mentioned here are above all human values: the human condition of man and woman created in the image of God is one and indivisible. It is only because women are more immediately attuned to these values that they are the reminder and the privileged sign of such values. But, in the final analysis, every human being, man or woman, is destined to be ‘for the other.’ In this perspective, that which is called ‘femininity’ is more than simply an attribute of the female sex. The word designates indeed the fundamental human capacity to live for the other and because of the other.

Stein likewise notes our common humanity and common calling, and yet distinguishes the feminine orientation in a similar manner. She writes in a 1928 essay:

Each human being is called naturally to this total humanity, and the desire for it lives in each one of us. We may consider that the drive for this which is particularly strong in woman is well related to her particular destiny of companion and mother. To be a companion, that means to be support and mainstay, and to be able to be so, a woman herself must stand firmly…. To be a mother is to nourish and protect true humanity and bring it to development.

Speaking of “woman’s intrinsic value”, Stein says:

The attitude of woman goes toward the living-personal and
goes toward the whole. To cherish, to protect and preserve, to bring nearer and to cultivate growth: this is her natural, genuinely maternal longing. Lifeless matter, the fact, interests her first of all insofar as it serves the living and the personal, not ordinarily for its own sake.  

John Paul describes this orientation as the “genius of women,” and Stein ties it to a feminine vocation—not in the sense of women’s roles or jobs, but in the sense of how women engage any field of activity in which they live and work.

Both think that our political, economic, and cultural realms all need the greater presence and influence of women and their distinctive “genius.”  

Both condemn discrimination against women and any hindrances preventing women from entering fully into the public arena.

Stein says, “[o]nly subjective delusion could deny that women are capable of practicing vocations other than that of spouse and mother,” and, famously, “there is no profession which cannot be practiced by a woman.” Stein makes note of the shifting of our societal structures and changes in the home and work, particularly since the Industrial Revolution. In light of these changes, she thinks that often the home is insufficient for engaging “all of woman’s potentialities.” Thus, it is no surprise and quite appropriate that women should increasingly want to enter the paid workforce.

Similarly, John Paul expresses such social concerns, arguing that “there is an urgent need to achieve real equality in every area: equal pay for equal work, protection for working mothers, fairness in career advancements, equality of spouses with regard to family rights and the recognition of everything that is part of the rights and duties of citizens in a democratic State.”

Both thinkers affirm the rights of women to enter all professional realms, and yet they also think that there are particular emphases and orientation that women are likely to bring to their work—which is all the more reason to encourage women to enter the various realms of the workforce.

Yet both also add the qualification that mothers ought to have a greater role in family life in the early years of a child’s life. Stein says:

It appears to me, however, that there is a limit to such professional activities whenever it jeopardizes domestic life, i.e., the community of life and formation consisting of parents and children. It even seems to me a contradiction of the divine order when the professional activities of the husband escalate to a degree which cuts him off completely from family life. This is even more true of the wife.

Similarly, John Paul II says:
Parenthood—even though it belongs to both—is realized much more fully in the woman, especially in the prenatal period. In rearing children, mothers have a singularly important role. Through the special relationship uniting a mother and her child, particularly in its earliest years of life, she gives the child that sense of security and trust without which the child would find it difficult to develop properly its own personal identity and subsequently, to establish positive and fruitful relationships with others.

He makes the point a bit more explicitly in his *Angelus Reflections*:

> the employment of women outside the family, especially during the period when they are fulfilling the most delicate tasks of motherhood, must be done with respect for this fundamental duty. However, apart from this requirement, it is necessary to strive convincingly to ensure that the widest possible space is open to women in all areas of culture, economics, politics, and ecclesial life itself, so that all human society is increasingly enriched by the gifts proper to masculinity and femininity.

Thus, both Stein and John Paul understand women and men as each having a gender distinctiveness—that is, distinctive emphases within our common human faculties; they describe those distinctivenesses in common ways, and yet they both consistently argue that these differences in no way ought to lead to the exclusion of women or men from any professional field. Yet, finally, they both add that a mother does have a particularly important role in the early part of a child’s life.

In addition to these rather significant commonalities, we could also note their common emphasis on Mary as the example for all human beings of union with God and their common attention to men’s as well as women’s distinctivenesses.

**DIFFERENCES IN EMPHASES**

Despite these quite striking similarities in claims and positions, Stein and John Paul do have at least two significant differences: (1) different emphases and (2) different accounts of the origin of femininity and masculinity.

The first, differing emphases, may in part be related to the differing contexts for their writings. Stein’s comments on women were made largely in the context of public lectures on women and women’s vocation, given before comparatively small groups in Western Europe.

John Paul wrote to a global audience and expected his words to be heard or read, not by thousands but millions. One might ask whether Stein
might have placed the emphases a bit differently were she talking to a global rather than a local audience, or whether John Paul might have focused his comments differently were he speaking only to a limited number of people. Nonetheless, for whatever the reasons—be they contextual or philosophical—there are significantly different emphases in each thinker.

Both Stein and John Paul discuss the fundamental equality of women and men. John Paul, however, returns to this theme repeatedly, putting a greater emphasis on it than Stein. Once again, I would like to make clear that both affirm the full equality of women and men, but the number of times this is repeated, and the intensity of the claim, are greater in John Paul’s writings than Stein’s.

We can see a clear example of this in their respective discussions of the opening chapters of Genesis. When John Paul II discusses the calling Eve the helpmate of Adam, he says:

In the ‘unity of the two,’ man and woman are called from the beginning not only to exist ‘side by side’ or ‘together,’ but they are also called to exist mutually ‘one for the other.’ This also explains the meaning of the ‘help’ spoken of in Genesis 2:18-25: ‘I will make him a helper fit for him.’ The biblical context enables us to understand this in the sense that the woman must ‘help’ the man—and in his turn he must help her—first of all by the very fact of their ‘being human persons.’ In a certain sense this enables man and woman to discover their humanity ever anew and to confirm its whole meaning. We can easily understand that—on this fundamental level—it is question of a ‘help on the part of both, and at the same time a mutual ‘help.’ To be human means to be called to interpersonal communion.27

John Paul emphasizes here the notion of Eve as a helpmate, not in order to illustrate differences between women and men, but to illustrate commonalities, our common reliance on each other and fundamental relationality.28

In contrast, when Stein comments on the same passages, she says:

God has given each human being a threefold destiny: to grow into the likeness of God through the development of his faculties, to procreate descendants, and to hold dominion over the earth. In addition, it is promised that a life of faith and personal union with the Redeemer will be rewarded by eternal contemplation of God. These destinies, natural and supernatural, are identical for both man and woman. But in the realm of duties, differences determined by sex exist. Lordship over the earth is the primary occupation of man: for this, the woman is placed at his side as helpmate. The primary calling of woman is the procreation and raising of
children; for this, the man is given to her as protector. Thus it is suitable that the same gifts occur in both, but in different proportions and relation. In the case of the man, gifts for struggle, conquest, and dominion are especially necessary: bodily force for taking possession of that exterior to him, intellect for a cognitive type of penetration of the world, the powers of will and action for works of creative nature. With the woman there are capabilities of caring, protecting, and promoting that which is becoming and growing.\textsuperscript{29}

John Paul discusses the original order and tasks given in that order, and says, “[a]s a rational and free being, man is called to transform the face of the earth. In this task, which is essentially that of culture, \textit{man and woman alike} share equal responsibility from the start.”\textsuperscript{30} Stein similarly points to our joint tasks, but says, “[a]ccording to the intended original order, her place is by man’s side to master the earth and to care for offspring. But her body and soul are fashioned less to fight and to conquer than to cherish, guard and preserve. Of the threefold attitude towards the world—to know it, to enjoy it, to form it creatively—it is the second which concerns her most directly.”\textsuperscript{31}

Once again, John Paul discusses our human tasks in order to emphasize our commonalities as human beings; Stein to emphasize our gender distinctivenesses.\textsuperscript{32}

Perhaps tied to their respective emphases on equality versus distinctivenesses, John Paul II’s and Stein’s discussions are more developed on the particular element emphasized. For example, John Paul discusses the various elements contributing to the discrimination against and desecrating of women and their dignity. He calls all of us—as individuals and as a church—to fight for equality in the social and political realm, to fight against influences that condition women and encourage them to deny their own dignity and equality; he addresses the sex trade, pornography, and the absence of women’s contributions from so much of our historical knowledge. He speaks of the women’s movement as “providential,” and he apologizes for the Church’s role in the denigration of women. John Paul addresses economic concerns and is critical of an unfettered free market that makes no allowances for the distinct pressures that women face.\textsuperscript{33}

Stein clearly does think that there should be no legal hindrances to women working in any professional field, and she encourages women to pursue all areas of work as well as political, social, and cultural involvement.\textsuperscript{34} She herself was influential in the 1919 declaration against sex discrimination in university hiring in Germany, and was concerned about issues of equal rights and equal access to education and professional opportunities, but she does not address nearly as many specific issues and areas as John Paul.

Stein does, however, say a great deal more about our gender differences. John Paul mentions that women and men exhibit different ways of living our common humanity and mentions \textit{motherliness} as part of the feminine genius, but relatively rarely does he develop exactly how this feminine genius differs
from a masculine genius, how the patterns of development differ in women and men, etc. Stein certainly affirms the fundamental equality and equal dignity of women and men, but she discusses the differences in greater detail. She describes in some detail what it means to say *motherliness* is the characteristic trait of women, articulating its significance for education and formation, and its role in how one pursues her vocational calling. She articulates the distinctive ways in which women and men tend to fall and degenerate, and she provides gender-related correctives for such degeneration.

John Paul recognizes that women as well as men can go wrong in their development and orientation. He says, “The woman of course, as much as the man, must take care that here sensitivity does not succumb to the temptation to possessive selfishness, and must put it at the service of authentic love.” Stein, however, articulates in some detail the specific ways each gender tends to go wrong.

**DIFFERENCES IN COMMITMENTS**

There are surely many reasons for these differences—some of which are likely tied to differing audiences and the different roles of the authors. But I suspect that there we can also tie these differences in emphases to differing metaphysical accounts of the person and the origin of our gender differences.

John Paul makes clear that he believes that our feminine and masculine distinctivenesses grow out of our physiological life. He says:

> The maternal instinct may develop in girls at the age of puberty, since it is biologically dependent on the action of the hormones, and the woman’s sexual rhythm prepares her every month to conceive a child and adjusts her whole organism to this very purpose. This is the origin of that feeling for the child which sexology calls the maternal instinct, in recognition of the fact that it is largely the result of changes which recur monthly in the female organism.

In *Mulieris Dignitatem*, he describes it a bit differently:

> This unique contact with the new human being developing within her gives rise to an attitude towards human beings—not only towards her own child, but every human being—which profoundly marks the woman’s personality. It is commonly thought that *women* are more capable than men of paying attention to another person, and that motherhood develops this predisposition even more.

John Paul affirms that *qua form* human beings are identical. It is *qua matter* that we differ. Because of our differing bodies, there are particular
motivations encouraging us to develop our human capacities in particular ways.\textsuperscript{40} I want to emphasize that the differing material conditions motivate different development, but they do not necessitate it. John Paul is not claiming that biology determines destiny. He is simply claiming that, since human capacities must be developed over time and in particular material conditions, our different biology encourages—but does not determine—a particular order and emphasis for that development. But John Paul does not think that these motivations are formal in nature, nor that the differences between women and men—even the more than biological ones—need be attributed to any formal element.

In contrast, Stein claims that, although women’s bodies are particularly fit for women’s distinctive vocation, they are not, as far as I can tell, the reason for that vocation. She speaks of a ‘species’ of women and men, and says, “[b]y species we understand a permanent category which does not change. Thomistic philosophy designates it by the term form, meaning an inner form which determines structure.”\textsuperscript{41}

Stein claims that there is a feminine and masculine species, by which she means a permanent category, and not types, which are variable. She also strongly suggests that the origin of this difference is the soul itself and not the influence of the body. Our particular sexual bodies are fit to our gender, but not the cause of our gender.

As far as I can tell, Stein does not by these claims in any way intend to undermine her claim that the differences between women and men are a matter of emphases among our common human qualities. Rather, that in virtue of which the emphases differ is not, according to Stein and in contrast to John Paul, our bodies, but some element of our soul.

One might think of gender as a hue or cast to the soul. It is not a different set of capacities, but some element in virtue of which women are motivated to develop certain of the human capacities more easily, and men different ones. Once again, this is a motivation, not a determination.

In other texts, Stein makes clear that she understands individuality as accruing to our souls as well as gender. Thus, for Stein, the form or soul is the principle of our common humanity, our individual distinctiveness, and our gendered nature. These must be developed in and through our material conditions, but matter is not the reason for these distinctivenesses.

CONCLUSION

Edith Stein and John Paul II share much in terms of broad understanding of women and men, and there is reason to think that Stein’s work on this topic contributed to John Paul’s position. But their positions are by no means identical, certainly not in terms of emphases, and, most significantly, not on the specifics of their metaphysical commitments. Although both accept the broadly Thomistic understanding of human beings as a unity of matter and form, John Paul stays closer to the Thomistic understanding of form as responsible for our common humanity, while non-formal elements are responsible for our
gender. In contrast, Stein places gender as well as humanity at the level of form.

NOTES

1 See Fides et Ratio, no. 74. In 1980, John Paul II declared Saints Benedict, Cyril, and Methodius to be co-patrons of Europe. On October 1, 1999, he added Saints Bridget of Sweden, Catherine of Siena, and Edith Stein, also known as Teresa Benedicta of the Cross.

2 John Paul points us particularly to Stein’s “The Separate Vocations of Man and Woman According to Nature and Grace.” See no. 8 of his apostolic letter proclaiming the three as co-patronesses.

3 She says, “perhaps following Stein’s intellectual lead, [John Paul II] argued for the fundamental equal dignity of the sexes and that woman’s body disposed her in a particular way to pay attention to another person” (Prudence Allen, “Philosophy of Relation in John Paul II’s New Feminism” in Women in Christ: Toward a New Feminism ed. Michele M. Schumacher [Eerdmans, 2004], p. 73, citing p. 280 of Karol Wojtyła’s Love and Responsibility).

4 See Laura Garcia “Edith Stein – Convert, Nun, Martyr” in Crisis, 6 (June 1997), pp. 32-35. See also www.catholiceducation.org/articles/religion/re0001.html.

5 Mary Lemmons has helpfully called this a gender vocation.


7 July 23, 1995 (The “Feminine Genius”), no. 2.

8 John Paul points to two “dimensions of the female personality”: virginity and motherhood (see Mulieris Dignitatem, no. 17), and he says in no. 21: “[a] woman is ‘married’ either through the sacrament of marriage or spiritually through marriage to Christ. In both cases marriage signifies the ‘sincere gift of the person’ of the bride to the groom.” Compare with Stein’s “Problems of Women’s Education” in Essays on Woman, esp. 227. See also Stein’s “Fundamental Principles of Women’s Education” in Essays on Woman, esp. p. 264.

9 Mulieris Dignitatem, no. 30.

10 Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church on the Collaboration of Men and Women, no. 13.


12 Ibid., no. 16.


14 Like John Paul, Stein also emphasizes our interpersonal communion as central to what it means to live as human persons. She says, “[a]ccording to everything which we learn from personal experience and the history of salvation, the Lord’s method is to form persons through other persons. Just
as the child is assigned to the care and upbringing of an adult for its natural
development, so also is the life of grace propagated through human mediation.
Persons are used as instruments to awaken and nurture the divine spark. Thus,
natural and supernatural factors reveal that even in the life of grace, ‘it is not
good that man should be alone.’” (Essays on Woman, p. 127).

15 Stein, “The Significance of Woman’s Intrinsic Value in National Life” in Essays on Woman, p. 256.


17 John Paul says, “In our own time, the successes of science and technology make it possible to attain material well-being to a degree hitherto unknown. While this favors some, it pushes others to the margins of society. In this way, unilateral progress can also lead to a gradual loss of sensitivity for man, that is, for what is essentially human. In this sense, our time in particular awaits the manifestation of that “genius” which belongs to women, and which can ensure sensitivity for human beings in every circumstance: because they are human!—and because “the greatest of these is love” (cf. 1 Cor. 13:13)” (Mulieris Dignitatem, no. 30). Stein says, “Woman’s nature is directed toward her original vocation of spouse and mother. … Both spiritual companionship and spiritual motherliness are not limited to the physical spouse and mother relationships, but they extend to all people with whom woman comes into contact” (Essays on Woman, p. 132).

18 Essays on Woman, p. 105.
19 Ibid.
20 Essays on Woman, p. 105.
21 Letter to Women, no. 4.
22 Essays on Woman, p. 80.
23 Mulieris Dignitatem, no. 18.
26 John Paul released Redemptoris Custos, on Joseph and men, a year after Mulieris Dignitatem, which could be compared with Stein’s statements about men in Essays on Woman.
27 Mulieris Dignitatem, no. 7
28 See also Mulieris Dignitatem, no. 6.
29 Essays on Woman, p. 100.
30 Letter to Women, no. 8.
31 Essays on Woman, p. 73.
32 We can see another example of this in their discussion of personal communion. John Paul repeatedly emphasizes how personal relations and communion is a human calling and equally so for both men and women. Stein, in contrast, says, “[t]he deepest feminine yearning is to achieve a loving union which in its development, validates this maturation and simultaneously stimulates and furthers the desire for perfection in others; this yearning can express itself in the most diverse forms, and some of these forms may appear distorted, even degenerate. As we shall show, such yearning is an essential
aspect of the eternal destiny of woman. It is not simply a human longing but is specifically feminine and opposed to the specifically masculine nature” (Essays on Woman, p. 94).

33 “The challenge facing most societies is that of upholding, indeed strengthening, woman’s role in the family while at the same time making it possible for her to use all her talents and exercise all her rights in building up society. However, women’s greater presence in the work force, in public life, and generally in the decision making processes guiding society, on an equal basis with men, will continue to be problematic as long as the costs continue to burden the private sector. In this area the state has a duty of subsidiarity, to be exercised through suitable legislative and social security initiatives. In the perspective of uncontrolled free-market policies there is little hope that women will be able to overcome the obstacles on their path” (no. 8 of “Welcome to Gertrude Mongella”).

34 For example, “Should certain positions be reserved for only men, others for only women, and perhaps a few open for both? I believe that this question also must be answered negatively. The strong individual differences existing within both sexes must be taken into account. Many women have masculine characteristics just as many men share feminine ones. Consequently, every so-called ‘masculine’ occupation may be exercised by many women as well as many ‘feminine’ occupations by certain men. It seems right, therefore, that no legal barriers of any kind should exist” (Essays on Woman, p. 81).

35 “Man’s endeavor is exerted to be effective in cognitive and creative action. The strength of woman lies in the emotional life. This is in accord with her attitude toward personal being itself. … The emotions, the essential organ for comprehension of the existent in its totality and in its peculiarity, occupy the center of her being” (Essays on Woman, p. 96).

36 “The Feminine Genius,” no. 2.
37 See, for example, Essays on Woman, pp. 190, and 256-7.
39 Mulieris Dignitatem, no. 18.
40 Prudence Allen nicely points out: “That women have access to a maternal instinct has recently been challenged by some feminists who argue that many women appear not to manifest such an instinct while many men do. The pope argues only that it is possible for women to access the maternal instinct if they choose to because of the lived experience women have of their bodies. ‘Every woman can observe in herself the changes which occur in the relevant phase of the cycle. Apart from these there exist objective scientific methods known to biology and medicine, which help us to determine the moment of ovulation, i.e., the beginning of the fertile period.’ [Love and Responsibility, p. 280] John Paul does not deny that many women do not access the subjective source of the maternal instinct. He agrees that many women intentionally cut themselves off from this access by technological or psychological means” (Allen, p. 97).
41 Essays on Woman, p. 173.
Chapter 13

A Mimetic Reading of *Veritatis Splendor*

*Tyler Graham*

**INTRODUCTION**

The 1993 encyclical *Veritatis Splendor* has been heralded by some as the greatest of Pope John Paul II’s pontificate.\(^1\) George Weigel argues that “*Veritatis Splendor*’s framework for the future development of Catholic moral theology will continue to shape Catholic life well into the twenty-first century and perhaps beyond.”\(^2\) Touching the heart of several key issues in contemporary moral theology, the encyclical is an answer to key post-conciliar questions. However, at a deeper level, it may also be a ground from which one may read all other encyclicals. Cardinal Avery Dulles notes, for example, that “*Veritatis Splendor* is the first encyclical by any pope that deals in a general way with the principles of moral theology.”\(^3\) Furthermore, John Paul himself explains in the introduction to the encyclical that “today, however, it seems necessary to reflect on the whole of the Church’s moral teaching, with the precise goal of recalling certain fundamental truths of Catholic doctrine which, in the present circumstances, risk being distorted or denied.”\(^4\) In fact, the encyclical asks that it be placed not merely in the dialogue of the 1990s but also in the eternal dialogue between church and human person – or, as we might say, the very dialogue between Christ and every “rich young man.”

Nevertheless, although the goal of the work is clear (to reiterate and reinforce the church’s teaching about intrinsically evil acts), the structure of the encyclical requires some interpretation. The piece has three main parts: a lengthy homily on the parable of the rich young man (chapter one), a significant and thorough reiteration of the moral theology of intrinsically evil acts (chapter two), and a concluding meditation on martyrdom (chapter three). Stylistically, though, the first and third chapters are more biblical and pastoral, while the middle chapter is what Cardinal Pio Laghi calls the “doctrinal” one. The stylistic shift challenges us to see the interconnection between the outer chapters and the inner one.

Mary Tuck argues, however, that the stylistic shift makes the interpretive task difficult. Although impressed by the poetry of chapter one, she claims that “the second, more argumentative chapter has a cooler, less poetic tone. . . . [It] is in this chapter that the modern reader . . . will have difficulties.”\(^5\) Furthermore, Nicholas Lash explains that “the lengthy second chapter is in quite different language” to the extent that the Thomistic view of natural law clear in part one disappears in part two to give way to a “code, a manual of law, ‘laying down’ (cf. VS 50), often in great detail, what we should and should not do . . . in the manner of nineteenth century text-books.”\(^6\) He suggests, it seems, that the comparison of parts one and two reveals a contradiction in John Paul’s encyclical.
In order to shed light on the structural difficulties in the encyclical, we should try to discern through textual interpretation what the author’s intention was in constructing the encyclical in the way that he did. A better understanding of the links between all three chapters can offer a better understanding of the moral theology which John Paul wishes to impart to us.

I propose that the encyclical opens the door for literary criticism, literary theory, or even literary philosophy, as a new tool in unpacking some of the key topics that have perhaps been somewhat closed off to moral theology. In this light, I argue that the “mimetic theory” first proposed by René Girard allows for a lens into the key anthropological insights of the introduction and conclusion of the encyclical which can shed light on some of the moral problems discussed in the middle part of the work.

In this paper I will try to show the more or less overt references to imitation in John Paul’s explication of the parable of the rich young man, and then I will give a brief discussion of Girard’s use of the idea of mimetic desire. Hopefully this analysis will show the relevancy for exploring the possible mimetic origins of the moral problems discussed in chapter two and will lead to a deeper understanding of the harmony between the chapters of the encyclical. The essay will conclude with a brief look at the Pope’s call to martyrdom in chapter three.

THE POPE’S MIMETIC ANTHROPOLOGY

Consider, to begin, the parable of the rich young man itself.

Now a man came up to Jesus and asked, “Teacher, what good thing must I do to get eternal life?” “Why do you ask me about what is good?” Jesus replied. “There is only One who is good. If you want to enter life, obey the commandments.” “Which ones?” the man inquired. Jesus replied, “‘Do not murder, do not commit adultery, do not steal, do not give false testimony, honor your father and mother,’ and ‘love your neighbor as yourself.’” “All these I have kept,” the young man said. “What do I still lack?” Jesus answered, “If you want to be perfect, go, sell your possessions and give to the poor, and you will have treasure in heaven. Then come, follow me” (Mt 19:16-21).

In the opening chapter of Veritatis Splendor, John Paul examines this parable in depth and sets up the key themes which will dominate the rest of the encyclical. As Livio Melina has aptly noted, one central message of this opening section is the claim that the desire for happiness “is the proper content of the moral question.” I would like to further this observation by highlighting the various ways in which John Paul implicitly (and at times explicitly) reveals the desire of every person to be imitative or mimetic in its nature.
The most evident sign of an implicit discussion of mimetic desire in the first chapter appears in the second-to-last section entitled, “Come, follow me.” This section fulfills something of a climactic role in the homily, for, as the Pope states in italics, “following Christ is thus the essential and primordial foundation of Christian morality.”

We are called to hold “fast to the very person of Jesus” which is nothing other than “sharing in his free and loving obedience to the will of the father.” To obey the will of the father is equivalent to imitating his desires. The pope draws on multiple images from the gospel to highlight this mimetic dimension of man. Jesus is the light of the world, the light of life, the good shepherd, the way, the truth, and the life (cf. Jn 6:45, 8:12, 10:11-16, 14:6). “It is Jesus who leads to the father.” Then at the end of this last paragraph in part 19, after listing all of these metaphorical expressions, John Paul clinches the argument with an explicit reference to mimesis. “To imitate the Son . . . means to imitate the father.” In fact, in this eight-paragraph section alone, the Pope uses the word “imitate” or “imitation” no less than seven times. The repetition of this word and words similar in connotation suggest how important the concept is to the anthropology he wishes to unfold.

The Pope clarifies that Jesus, as the model for our desires, is, in fact, a model of love. Quoting John’s gospel, the Pope reminds us that Jesus asks that we love as he has loved us (cf. Jn 15). John Paul explains that “the word ‘as’ requires imitation of Jesus and his love.” Love is the purest and greatest form of desire, and the pope suggests that we love only through the mediation of the Lord. In other words, love is born *imitatio dei.*

We note, then, that, even if the desire for happiness is part of the individual person’s nature, this desire attains its perfection only through imitation of another. In particular, the Pope makes clear that the perfect imitation is the imitation of Jesus’ loving obedience to the Father’s love. Jesus, we see, fulfills his perfection of desire through imitation, and we fulfill ours through imitating his. Imitation of desire has always already begun, for it is at the heart of God’s love.

But, John Paul points out, “Following Christ is not an outward imitation, since it touches man at the very depths of his being.” In explaining the parable, the Pope notes that the rich young man questions Jesus not because of ignorance of the law. “It is more likely that the attractiveness of the person of Jesus had prompted within him new questions about moral good. He feels the need to draw near to the One . . .” Here the Pope explains that this drawing-near to Jesus is a fundamental requirement of human beings in all generations, and, in self-quoting his first encyclical *Redemptor Hominis,* John Paul states that man “must, so to speak, enter [Christ] with all his own self; he must ‘appropriate’ and assimilate the whole of the reality of the Incarnation and Redemption in order to find himself.” The dynamism of the being of the other attracting the human subject remains at the heart of John Paul’s message.

John Paul explains, furthermore, that the rich young man, in asking about the good, is really asking a religious question. “To ask about the good,
in fact, ultimately means to turn towards God, the fullness of goodness.”¹⁵ To clarify, God “alone is goodness, fullness of life, the final end of human activity, and perfect happiness.” God alone, in other words, is the only source of full and authentic being. In fact, this deficiency of being of man in relation to God is highlighted in the rich young man’s encounter with Jesus, for “before the person of Jesus he realizes that he is still lacking something.”¹⁶

God’s self-revelation of His Being automatically calls man to imitation. “What man is and what he must do becomes clear as soon as God reveals himself.”¹⁷ God “remains the model for moral action,” as “the moral life presents itself as the response due to the many gratuitous initiatives taken by God out of love for man.”¹⁸

The end of the chapter entails the reminder to the faithful that the Holy Spirit, which calls us to discipleship in Christ, also offers through grace the power to imitate Christ’s love more and more fully. In fact, “to imitate and live out the love of Christ is not possible for man by his strength alone. He becomes capable of this love only by virtue of a gift received.”¹⁹ Furthermore, the spirit begets the church in each age to age for a furthering of this mission. “By the light and the strength of the spirit the apostles carried out their mission of preaching the Gospel and pointing out the “way” of the Lord, teaching above all how to follow and imitate Christ.”²⁰ Although the actions of God in this light remain beyond the scope of this paper (and, perhaps, human reason), the sentence from the Pope highlights how God’s will in the Spirit is to conform us mimetically to Christ. If the transformation of our mimetic desires into a perfect mimesis of Jesus’ mimetic desire of Our Father’s will is at the heart of the gospel, then mimetic desire must be central to Christian anthropology.

In sum, John Paul’s anthropology remains wedded to two key points: human desire is mimetic, and it is born from the desire for the being of another.

GIRARD’S ANTHROPOLOGY

Similarly, Girard begins his analysis of human culture with the claim that desire is mimetic. As such, he argues, the phenomena of education, cultural forms, and language (which are essential for the maintenance and development of society) are propelled by mimesis. Positive mimesis works excellently when models desire objects that can be shared by their imitators. Knowledge, for example, can be shared and the desire for knowledge can, for the most part, be imitated by as many people as possible without conflict. Yet, when a model suggests a desire for an object which cannot be shared (for example, a prestigious teaching position), then envy or rivalry can develop. Rivalry, if not curbed or abated, has the potential to runaway through mimetic escalation and lead to violence.²¹

Girard also claims that mimetic desire is desire for the being of the model. As such, once again, healthy imitation allows for a building up of one’s being in the likeness of the model. However, when the model becomes an
obstacle to the fulfillment of desire, the subject experiences an exacerbation of the desire for that person’s being, and, not infrequently, the original experience of admiration turns to envy, hatred, and also violence. Girard originally dubbed the negative effects of deviated mimesis “ontological sickness,” for he saw this structure of interaction at the root of multiple psychological ills facing modernity.22

A further element to the problems of bad mimesis in the modern world are those resulting from what Girard has called mensonge romantique (the romantic lie): the belief that our desires are our own and that spontaneity, uniqueness, and autonomy are real aspects of the human person who is free in his own desires. This romantic lie developed in Europe primarily at the dawn of the nineteenth century and is infused into a number of areas of modern thought. According to Girard, the great writers (such as Stendhal, Flaubert, Proust and Dostoevsky) were capable of shedding light on the problems of romanticism.23

The subject under the throes of mimetic envy tends toward a type of idolatry of the other to the extent that the traumatic symptoms of mimetic interaction only cease when the person renounces the apparent divinity of the other and seeks better role models. In some of the most extreme cases, the victim of ontological sickness has to first acknowledge that the hated other is, in fact, the source of his own desires. Girard has claimed that this process of acknowledgement of imitation and renunciation of the idolatry of the other is equivalent to what the church has always called conversion.24

If Girard has a theology, it begins with the claim that Jesus is a role model who never leads us into unhealthy rivalry. Jesus is the perfect model for our desires. In offering this hypothesis, however, Girard immediately begs the question: why is imitating the desires of Jesus better than imitating the desires of my neighbor? What makes the role model Jesus better at keeping me from conflict than, say, my neighbor?

Neither the Father nor the Son desires greedily, egotistically. God “makes his sun rise on the evil and on the good, and he sends his rain on the just and on the unjust.” God gives to us without counting, without marking the least difference between us. He lets the weeds grow with the wheat until the time of harvest. If we imitate the detached generosity of God, then the trap of mimetic rivalries will never close over us.25

But where does Jesus teach this anthropology of mimetic conflict? Is it true that Jesus was trying to teach his disciples to think about imitation in this way? Girard argues that this claim can be made if we follow the logic of some key passages in the New Testament. One key word for this concept is the Greek word, “skandalon” (sometimes translated “stumbling block,” “offense,” or just “scandal”). Jesus uses this term to encourage a continual conversion and self-examination.
Jesus warns his disciples about the severity of scandal. “Woe to the one by whom scandal comes! If your hand scandalizes you, cut it off; if your eye scandalizes you, pull it out” (Mt 18:7-9). Here the link between the word and mimetic desire remains unclear, though the severity of the problem of scandal follows from the hyperbolic dimensions of Jesus’ descriptions of dismemberment.

Saint Paul picks up on the same concept and in one instance uses it to solve the somewhat arcane question of eating foods sacrificed to idols. His solution to the problem is illustrative of the meaning of the word to the early Christian community. “Be careful, however, that the exercise of your freedom does not become a stumbling block [skandalon] to the weak. For if anyone with a weak conscience sees you who have this knowledge eating in an idol’s temple, won’t he be emboldened to eat what has been sacrificed to idols?” (1 Cor 8:9-13). Here the question of eating is linked to its representation as possible model of another’s desire. Paul sees the concept of the stumbling block as a model that leads one into the wrong path. The skandalon is a model who becomes an obstacle.

One text where Jesus himself suggests this radical link between scandal, offense or the stumbling block and the model/obstacle is at Caesarea Philippi. Peter rebukes Jesus for proclaiming his imminent passion, and Jesus turns on him and says “get behind me Satan, you are a stumbling block to me” (Mt 16:23). Peter’s desire for worldly power with Jesus is a bad model for the Lord, and Jesus sees that Peter has become a stumbling block to him. If Jesus imitates Peter’s desire for power in this case, then the two run the risk of becoming rivals for an object which cannot be shared (supreme worldly power), and the Kingdom of God will be sacrificed to a kingdom of this world, short-lived at best. At this point Jesus announces the only proper path of discipleship or imitation of the divine: “if any man will come after me . . . let him pick up his cross and follow me” (Mt 16:24).

Those of us familiar with basic Catholic catechism know that this phrase has worked itself into our language as a sign of morally bad role modeling. To “give scandal” is to act in such a way that, should someone imitate you, he/she too would do something bad. The concept of giving scandal depends on an implicit knowledge of mimetic desire. The fact that this teaching is part of the living tradition is, perhaps, added proof that it was part of Jesus’ teaching.

Through an analysis of the word skandalon and a meditation on mimetic desire, Girard tries to show how man is gravely in danger if he should choose to follow scandalous (or conflictual) models. In elaborating this concept, Girard explains that the word ‘scandal’

means not one of those ordinary obstacles that we avoid easily after we run into it the first time, but a paradoxical obstacle that is almost impossible to avoid: the more this obstacle, or scandal repels us, the more it attracts us. Those who are scandalized put all the more ardor in injuring themselves
against it because they were injured there before. By the very fact that a conflictual model which attracts also repels, we always run the risk of falling into patterns of behavior that entail the frustrations of this contradiction.

Girard explains that

as our confidence in our models increases, our self-confidence decreases. When this frustration occurs too often, and we turn too many models into rivals and obstacles, our perversely logical mind tends to speed up the process and automatically turn obstacles into models. We become ‘obstacle addicts’ to speak, unable to desire in the absence of an obstacle who is also a model.

We note at this point that the model/obstacle principle can be one person or many.

Perhaps the best literary depiction of the modern world’s struggles with “skandalon” is in what Dostoevsky called the “underground.” In the story Notes from Underground, the underground man is lifted up and moved by a military officer on the sidewalk, and he spends the next several weeks plotting his revenge on the man. His revenge consists in finally walking into the officer on the sidewalk several weeks later, after imagining writing the man a letter challenging him to a duel and all sorts of other preposterous fancies.

In another episode, the underground man invites himself to a party with former schoolmates and, having been brushed aside by the others at the party, spends five hours prancing up and down at the end of the room, refusing to leave and stirring in resentment.

The word “underground” can, in a sense, be translated as “resentment,” the condition of frustrated mimetic conflict. Those of you familiar with the Seinfeld episodes (and in particular the character of George Costanza) have a first-hand feel for Dostoevsky’s underground behavior.

Dostoevsky’s underground vision represents the acute stages of “obstacle addiction” or mimetic seduction where every possibly conflictual obstacle becomes a model. Thus, according to Girard, both the biblical tradition and the great literary works of the Western tradition shed light on the problems that man faces when he chooses the wrong models and follows the way of “obstacle-addiction” or “skandalon-scandal.” Later on, I will have some further recourse to Dostoevsky, as Girard’s elucidation of this thinker is particularly relevant to the topic at hand.

GIRARD AS HELPFUL LINK

Hopefully at this point, I have presented enough evidence for attempting to use Girard’s ideas as a tool for shedding light on the encyclical Veritatis Splendor. To begin to do so, I would like to return to one other major
insight in the Pope’s first chapter: the discussion of the commandments which cements the “lesson” of the entire encyclical. Whereas John Paul ultimately highlights the *sequela Christi* which crystallizes Jesus’ offer to the rich young man, he also notes with significant emphasis that Jesus instructs the young man first to obey the commandments. The commandments “are the first necessary step on the journey towards freedom, its starting point.”

The lesson from this homily is that if we wish to be authentic Christians, we must do what the Lord says: begin our moral journey with obedience to the ten commandments – even if certain elements of the Mosaic law have now been abrogated by the cross. Nevertheless, even in this section in which he discusses the call to obey the commandments, John Paul reminds us that these commandments are not in opposition to following Christ. Rather, following Christ fulfills the law. “Jesus himself is the living fulfillment of the Law inasmuch as he fulfills its authentic meaning by the total gift of himself; he himself becomes a living and personal Law, who invites people to follow him.” In other words, law and desire are one in Christ, and, because Christ is the font of true freedom, moral commandments are not in opposition to freedom.

In making this claim, the Pope holds to a long tradition of the church which has always claimed that obedience to the commandments and imitation of Christ are one and the same Gospel. Nevertheless, the encyclical implicitly asks us to seek further links between these two somewhat disparate elements of the moral life. In particular, we might ask the question: in what way do the commandments reflect a knowledge of imitation?

One work from Girard that seems particularly appropriate to this study is his text, *I See Satan Fall Like Lightning*. In the opening chapter, he attempts to explain his anthropology of mimetic desire using the ten commandments and the Gospels. He begins with an examination of the commandments, and, in particular, asks if there is relevance to the tenth commandment [do not covet thy neighbor’s goods] in our “prohibition-repugnant” world today. “Doesn’t the tenth commandment succumb to that gratuitous itch to prohibit, to that irrational hatred of freedom for which modern thinkers blame religion in general and Judeo-Christian tradition in particular?” Here the question sounds strikingly familiar to the one that John Paul asks in *Veritatis Splendor*. Is the moral law in opposition to human freedom?

Girard answers that

if we think that cultural prohibitions are needless, we must adhere to the most excessive individualism, one that presupposes the total autonomy of individuals, that is, the autonomy of their desires. In other words, we must think that humans are naturally inclined not to desire the goods of their neighbors.

On the contrary, argues Girard, the tenth commandment offers the “only
realistic” anthropology: “we tend to desire what our neighbor has or what our neighbor desires.”\textsuperscript{32}

If individuals are naturally inclined to desire what their neighbors possess, or to desire what their neighbors even simply desire, this means that rivalry exists at the very heart of human social relations.\textsuperscript{33}

Suddenly the previous four commandments (and thus the “bottom half of the Decalogue”) make sense as so many examples of the same process. “Mimetic rivalries can becomes so intense that the rivals denigrate each other, steal each other’s possessions, seduce the other’s spouse, and, finally, they even go so far as murder.”\textsuperscript{34} “If we ceased to desire the goods of our neighbor, we would never commit murder or adultery or theft or false witness.”\textsuperscript{35} An anthropology of mimetic desire means that the dignity of the human person is always threatened in society, for mimetic rivalry is always capable of giving way to violence that assaults this dignity. Girard, thus, arrives at the same place that John Paul does; the Pope, in fact, claims that the previous “moral rules formulated in terms of prohibitions . . . express with particular force the ever urgent need to protect human life, the communion of persons in marriage, private property, truthfulness and people’s good name.”\textsuperscript{36} What Girard adds to this commentary is simply the insight that the prohibitions of the moral law reflect as much of a sensitivity to the mimetic nature of man as does the call to follow Christ.

**ILLUSIONS OF FREEDOM**

At this point, I would like to try an application of these ideas to see if some of the moral problems discussed in chapter two of the encyclical can be explained by mimetic dynamics. According to John Paul,

a new situation has come about within the Christian community itself, which has experienced the spread of numerous doubts and objections of a human and psychological, social and cultural, religious and even properly theological nature, with regard to the church’s moral teachings.\textsuperscript{37}

At the core of these problems, argues the Pope, are modes of thinking that divorce freedom from its proper relationship to truth.\textsuperscript{38}

The first topic that he addresses is the relationship between freedom and law. According to John Paul,

some present-day cultural tendencies have given rise to several currents of thought in ethics which centre upon an alleged conflict between freedom and law. These doctrines would grant to individuals or social groups the right to
determine what is good or evil. Human freedom would thus be able to ‘create values’ and would enjoy a primacy over truth, to the point that truth itself would be considered a creation of freedom. Freedom would thus lay claim to a moral autonomy which would actually amount to an absolute sovereignty.\textsuperscript{39}

What is the source of this illusory freedom? According to Girard, the core of modern man’s dilemma stems from his failure to acknowledge that turning away from traditional models does not lead to autonomy; rather it leads to a new worldview mediated by a new model, often disguised or hidden consciously or subconsciously. Following Girard’s lead in describing the Dostoevskyan world as symbolic of the apocalyptic dimension of our time, we return to the principle of the underground to see if it sheds light on the issue of freedom and law.

Girard explains Dostoevsky’s critique of the ideology of “enlightened self-interest” that dominated some of the thinkers of his day. According to Girard, Dostoevsky establishes a critique of the pragmatists and utilitarian thinkers who thought that the human predicament can be solved through sheer neglect or pure laissez-faire, the original free market devotees. . . . According to these thinkers, human beings must be freed from religious faith. And then, if nothing else is done, if we are all left to our own devices, we will all spontaneously engage in productive activities beneficial to ourselves and to our communities.\textsuperscript{40}

The underground man, however, fits this description, and yet he realizes anything but happiness. Instead of finding fulfillment in the free market lifestyle, he, instead, finds obstacles as models for his desires. The true meaning of his desire is conflictual, and it is conflictual because it is mimetic.

It is at this point that the quintessential exaltation of modern freedom divorced from the divine law rears its ugly head.

Even though the underground hero occasionally talks about his freedom and he is free, indeed in the sense that no one can prevent him from impoverishing his own life, he is very much aware that he always reacts to the stimulus of other people in exactly the same predictable way.\textsuperscript{41}

The underground man is free to walk back and forth at the party stirring in resentment, but what kind of freedom is that?

Some illusory freedoms proposed by modernity are not in contradiction with the truth of humanity simply because they rebel against the divine law; they are fundamentally contradictory because they hide a vicious slavery:
Mimetic desire has the capacity to warp the subject’s perception of reality so that freedom seems at one moment consumed by the material world and at another moment exalted by a false divinity. An exploration of ontological...
sickness, as Girard terms it, can, perhaps, help the contemporary analysis of the roots of the nature/freedom problem.

**DISCERNING THE TRUTH**

Ultimately, the Pope argues, the modern world faces a crisis in knowing the truth. In fact, he argues that all of the problems in defining and using human freedom stem from a confusion over understanding freedom’s relation to truth.⁴⁷

**Conscience**

The pope first describes a tendency to divorce conscience from truth:

Some authors have proposed a kind of double status of moral truth. Beyond the doctrinal and abstract level, one would have to acknowledge the priority of a certain more concrete existential consideration. The latter, by taking account of circumstances and the situation, could legitimately be the basis of certain exceptions to the general rule and thus permit one to do in practice and in good conscience what is qualified as intrinsically evil by the moral law.⁴⁸

Again, it is Dostoevsky who prophecies the “unbinding of conscience” in the modern world. In his novel *Crime and Punishment*, the main character, Raskolnikov, whom Girard sees as a further novelistic incarnation of the underground man,⁴⁹ kills an old woman to test his hypothesis of the ‘extraordinary’ man: one who can rise above the moral law because he is one of the exceptional or extraordinary people. Less overt than the murder, but still present to the readers, is the fact that Raskolnikov desires to become Napoleon and imitate what he perceives to be Napoleon’s privilege of killing for the good of mankind. Dostoevsky reveals the imitation behind Raskolnikov’s desire for uniqueness.⁵⁰

Girard explains that Raskolnikov is obsessed with the fear of being ridiculed. He is thus an underground person, but he is more tragic than grotesque because he tries fiercely to test and surpass the invisible limits of his prison. The need for action, which for his underground predecessor was realized only in feeble and sorry gestures this time leads to an atrocious crime.⁵¹

Hence, a more exacerbated ontological sickness or mimetic seduction moves underground behavior out of mere intellectual pursuits into an action that transgresses the moral law. It is deviated mimetic desire that suggests an unbinding of conscience in the performance of the immoral deed.
Although this breakdown in moral reasoning is aggravated by the rivalry or model/obstacle presented by the idealized Napoleon, the vision of novelists like Dostoevsky suggests that moral relativism itself can often be the perspective of one caught in rivalry. In other words, the lure of the rival leads to the reformulation of values (one hears the echo of Nietzsche’s transvaluation of values), and the rivalry engenders a sense of one’s own conscience “liberated” from external immutable sources (like truth, tradition, or God).

**Fundamental option**

This analysis may also shed light on the problems concerning the theology of fundamental option. According to the Pope, another trend of moral thinking tries to establish a distinction between the fundamental option and deliberate choices of a concrete kind of behavior. . . . There thus appears to be established within human acting a clear disjunction between two levels of morality: on the one hand the order of good and evil, which is dependent on the will, and on the other hand specific kinds of behavior, which are judged to be morally right or wrong only on the basis of a technical calculation of the proportion between the ‘premoral’ or ‘physical’ goods and evils which actually result from the action.\(^5\)

In this case, the same distinction between universal claim and specific choice is transferred to a distinctly Christian universe: one hopes to remain a Christian fundamentally while doing specific acts that are opposed to the natural law. Here the desire is a little more complex, but might still make sense in terms of mimetic theory. The subject wants to maintain the prestige of being a Christian, in order perhaps to appeal to this or that model, but the subject also wants to indulge this or that desire contrary to the law, often, perhaps, in imitation of different models. The division within the subject seems to reflect the influence of multiple models of the person, a crisis in the individual that is not uncommon in modernity, according to Girard.

**Teleologism**

These reflections are perhaps also pertinent as we turn to what might be the central question of the encyclical: Do ends justify means? John Paul reminds us that one must always be careful which means one chooses to get to an end, even if that end is in line with the common good. John Paul’s final section in part two explicitly rejects
the thesis, characteristic of teleological and proportionalist theories, which holds that it is impossible to qualify as morally evil according to its species – its object – the deliberate choice of certain kinds of behavior or specific acts, apart from a consideration of the intention for which the choice is made or the totality of the foreseeable consequences of that act for all persons concerned.53

The fundamental purpose of the encyclical is to reaffirm the immorality of intrinsically evil acts even when intention and possible consequences make these acts difficult to avoid.

What makes modern man so willing to allow good ends to justify immoral means? If desire seizes upon a model whose prestige, aura, status, or being demands an act contrary to the moral law, desire can generate a new, deceptive, morality in the eyes of the subject (or person) that can justify the act. Here the apparent goodness achieved by following the new model appears to outweigh the badness of the path taken to get there.

One final look at Dostoevsky through the lens of Girard may be helpful here. We have seen a progression of ontological sickness from the underground man to Raskolnikov, which moved from a petty set of encounters to a hideous act of murder. Nevertheless, in *Crime and Punishment*, Raskolnikov repents in the end, though, as Girard says, the novel “still remains quite distant from final certainty. For yet some time Dostoevsky would ask himself whether a pride even more extreme than that of Raskolnikov could not succeed where his hero had failed.”54

The culminating character for Dostoevsky’s meditations on freedom and truth is, perhaps, Ivan, from the *Brothers Karamazov*, who asks his brother, Alyosha, whether he would choose to kill an innocent girl if, in doing so, he could found the edifice of a perfect world. In other words, would you perform one hideous act of evil if, in doing so, you could establish perfect good? Dostoevsky shows himself to be sensitive to the key questions concerning morality here.

Dostoevsky makes clear also that Ivan is not simply a moral philosopher posing interesting questions for enlightenment; Ivan also struggles with the haunting temptation that “all is permitted,” and the novel suggests that his struggles with nihilism are linked to Raskolnikov-like ideas. He becomes a suspect in his father’s murder, patricide being, perhaps, the full expression of modern evil in Dostoevsky’s eyes. Ivan is an icon of modern man haunted by the idea of freedom divorced from the truth.

Haunted is the appropriate word, here, for Ivan actually talks with the devil in one of the most chilling scenes of the novel. In describing Ivan’s wrestle with the demonic, Girard explains that the devil is “both seducer and adversary. He does not cease to thwart the desires that he suggests and, by chance, he satisfies them it is in order to deceive us.”55 Girard goes on to say that “the objective reading of the underground leads to demonology.” Ivan’s struggles with freedom stem from mimetic conflict at its underground worst
and leads him to imagine the most hideous promethean visions possible: to found the edifice of utopia by killing the innocent. Ivan is the idealization of the movement of fallen mimetic desire in the modern world to generate the self-idolization through other-sacrifice. The devil sums up all of Ivan’s model/obstacles and suggests to him that all is permitted if he desires to become king of this world. What Dostoevsky reveals for us, through the lens of Girard, is that obstacle-addiction can lead us to desire union with an apparent divine other so much that we forsake fundamental morality on our way to get there. We let idolatrous desire teach us that the ends can justify the means.

**METHODOLOGY AND CONCLUSION**

Although it may be the case that John Paul’s emphasis on imitation in chapter one of *Veritatis Splendor* suggests the need to draw out an imitative origin to the moral problems described in chapter two, my analysis may not be the best approach to this task. In using Girardian and Dostoevsyan references, I am offering only a possible means to the end, but I open the door to a scholar with greater capacity than I have to complete the task.

Furthermore, although describing the possible mimetic genesis of various heresies is helpful, it does not exhaust the possible causes of a given person’s moral descent into this or that confused vision of freedom in relation to truth. The mimetic explanation is a general descriptor that demands other resources when applied to specific cases. As John Paul himself explains, the moral theological objections of modernity have arisen with a “human and psychological, social and cultural, religious and even properly theological nature.” The mimetic theory allows for a dialogue among these areas of the humanities, psychology, sociology, cultural anthropology, religion and theology, but it needs help from all of them as well in answering the questions of causality in an area as difficult to explain as the human heart and its desires. Also, we must not forget that the shift from analyzing literary characters artfully crafted by great writers to analyzing real human beings whose lives and circumstances are much more complex is not an easy shift to make.

Finally, even if the mimetic explanation does point us closer to understanding why modern man falls into the illusions described by Pope John Paul, it does not explain why persons freely choose to follow bad models when so many good ones are available. The mimetic theory can never explain at the core the mystery of sin, that inexplicable free choice of the rich young man to choose his wealth over Christ. Here we must agree with the Pope fully when he says in the opening of the encyclical that proper obedience to God’s law is not always easy. “As a result of that mysterious original sin . . man is constantly tempted to turn his gaze away from the living and true God in order to direct it towards idols.” The mimetic theory offers a translation of what idolatry is today. It does not claim to explain the mystery of evil.

However, there is one final moment in the encyclical that suggests that the mimetic analysis of chapter two flows appropriately from the intention of the author. During the final chapter of the encyclical, John Paul returns to
a narrative approach to his message. He cites several examples of martyrs in the Jewish, Christian (and even non-biblical tradition). His message takes on particular poignancy when he points out that “martyrdom, accepted as an affirmation of the inviolability of the moral order, bears splendid witness both to the holiness of God’s law and to the inviolability of the personal dignity of man, created in God’s image and likeness.”

The call to martyrdom as witness to the moral law finds its perfect symbol in the cross of Christ. “Jesus, then, is the living, personal summation of perfect freedom in total obedience to the will of God. His crucified flesh fully reveals the unbreakable bond between freedom and truth.”

Again the language of imitation surfaces in his text.

Christ’s witness is the source, model and means for the witness of his disciples, who are called to walk on the same road: ‘if any man would come after me, let him deny himself and take up his cross daily and follow me’ (Lk 9:23). Charity in conformity with the radical demands of the Gospel, can lead the believer to the supreme witness of martyrdom. Once again this means imitating Jesus who dies on the Cross.

The Pope’s use of the phrase “once again” in this passage is important. He is calling us to see that imitation of Christ frames the encyclical. It is at the heart of chapters one and three. Although it may not be the best form of analysis to bank an argument on two words, the phrase “once again” suggests that the concept of imitation of Christ was key for John Paul while constructing and structuring the encyclical. It is for this reason that I am convinced that a mimetic analysis of the moral problems outlined in chapter two flows from the very intention of the author himself. Rather than being an imposition of one method of literary theory onto the text, the mimetic analysis of part two, in fact, originates within the text itself. The writer himself calls us to see imitation at the heart of his message concerning morality.

Providing the Girardian insights that shed light on the contemporary moral problems identified in Veritatis Splendor does not lower the credibility of the encyclical; it does not critique the Pope for failing to say what he could or should have said. Rather, it allows for us to see how the act of reading and interpreting the work can force us to ask the key moral questions that John Paul wanted us to ask. It was not the Pope’s job to answer every question about the link between following Christ and obeying the commandments. It was his job to remind us that this link exists, it is central to the faith, and it should be at the core of contemporary discussions in moral theology. It is our task to embrace the challenge that he sets forth to lead moral theology beyond this text and into others, into, in fact, the very dialogue with the modern world that John Paul stood for and modeled to so many people. I conclude that the Girardian methodology can be a helpful tool in bringing the philosophical legacy of John Paul the Great into the modern world.
NOTES


2 George Weigel, Witness to Hope: The biography of Pope John Paul II (HarperCollins, 1999), 693.


4 Veritatis Splendor, 4.


8 Veritatis Splendor, 19.

9 Loc. cit.

10 Veritatis Splendor, 20.

11 Loc. cit.

12 Veritatis Splendor, 21; emphasis mine.

13 Ibid., 8.


15 Veritatis Splendor, 9.

16 Ibid., 16.

17 Ibid., 10.

18 Loc. cit.

19 Veritatis Splendor, 22.

20 Ibid., 25.


22 Ibid., 1966.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.


26 Ibid., 16.

27 Girard, Resurrection from the Underground: Feodor Dostoevsky (Crossroad, 1997), 146.

28 Veritatis Splendor, 13.

29 Ibid., 15.

30 Girard, 2001, 8.

31 Loc. cit.

32 Loc. cit.

33 Ibid., 9.

34 Ibid., 11.

35 Ibid., 12.
36 Veritatis Splendor, 13.
37 Ibid., 4.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., 35.
40 Girard 1997, 150.
41 Ibid., 154 -155.
42 Ibid., 46.
43 Loc. cit.
44 Veritatis Splendor, 46.
47 Veritatis Splendor, 85.
48 Ibid., 56.
49 Girard, Resurrection from the Underground: Feodor Dostoevsky (Crossroad, 1997), 71
50 Ibid., 71-73.
51 Ibid., 71.
52 Veritatis Splendor, 65.
53 Ibid., 79.
54 Girard, Resurrection from the Underground, 73.
55 Ibid., 131 – 132,
56 Veritatis Splendor, 4.
57 Ibid., 1. Emphasis mine.
58 Ibid., 92.
59 Ibid., 87.
60 Ibid., 89. Emphasis mine.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


INTRODUCTION

Karol Wojtyła once observed that it was appropriate to analyze his philosophical work through the eyes of his poetry, for he himself “began from poetry,” and, “writing poetry, . . . began to philosophize.” His admission naturally leads one to examine his poetic and dramatic works for possible indications of his philosophical positions. In this paper, I will perform just such an examination with respect to Wojtyła’s philosophical theory of participation. I will begin by enunciating his theory, after which I will consider certain images and devices from Wojtyła’s artistic corpus that may be of hermeneutic value for understanding it. I will then attempt to formulate, in very broad terms, the outline of an interpretation of his theory that would take into account one of these artistic elements, although it will not be possible in a paper of this limited scope, to treat his theory in anything realistically approaching a comprehensive or even systematic manner. My purpose will rather be to display certain points at which a consideration of Wojtyła’s poems and plays may contribute to a grasp of his theory. For precision’s sake, I will work from the original Polish texts whenever possible.

WOJTYLA’S THEORY OF PARTICIPATION

Wojtyła, like Husserl, develops a phenomenologically formulated theory of interpersonal relations, but unlike Husserl, he usually describes these relations in terms not of intersubjectivity but of participation, which, for Wojtyła, has two meanings. First, it refers to a property of the person, expressed in the capacity to confer a personal (or personalistic) dimension on his own dwelling and acting “together with others.” Second, it refers to “a positive relation to the humanity of other people.” Polish, moreover, has two terms for humanity, one abstract, and the other concrete; here, Wojtyła refers to “humanity” not as ludzkosc (a universal reference to the abstract idea of man), but as czlowieczestwo (a reference to the always unique and unrepeatable, personal “I”), that which makes one human — and that, for example, which a cruel man might be accused of lacking. Thus “humanity” has, in each man, what Wojtyła calls the “concrete, specific weight of personal being,” so that “to participate in the humanity of another man means to remain in a living relation with the fact that he is that particular man, and not only in
relation with that by which he (in abstracto) is a man.” In fact, Wojtyla finds here the ultimate foundation of “the full specificity of the evangelical notion ‘neighbor.’”

The term Wojtyla uses for participation is *uczestnictwo*, literally, “taking part in something with someone.” For the most part, Wojtyla is speaking of participation here with respect to human interpersonal relations. In one very limited respect, however, there may be a point of contact between Wojtyla’s description of interpersonal participation, and Aquinas’ invocation of metaphysical participation to explain the relation between perfections in God and in creatures, in that Wojtyla’s notion of participation will depend, ultimately, on a potential for personalistic action that is instilled in man from his Creator and that orients man toward God, the *Absolute Person*, as his last End. Galarowicz reports, thus, that Wojtyla, consistent with his constant tendency to call phenomenological analysis back to an opening to metaphysical analysis, develops his theory out of an interest in the “ontological-metaphysical aspect of the controversy about intersubjectivity.”

By his own account, Wojtyla emphasizes, through his theory of participation, a dimension that totalitarian systems deny to persons through their practical alienation and isolation as mere units within an ideologically atomized and subsequently aggregated whole. In this sense, his theory of participation, like his entire philosophical approach, may be seen, *inter alia*, to constitute a response to his experiences under two totalitarian systems. At the foundation of the dimension of participation, a man’s actions “together with others” disclose the personal structure of self-determination, self-possession, self-domination, and self-gift that characterizes authentic human actions as such. Thus, as Galarowicz observes, while “[t]he theory of participation does not, . . . occupy a central place in Wojtyla’s philosophical anthropology, . . . it is one of the most important elements of that anthropology.”

Wojtyla’s theory of participation influences his treatment of human action, especially with respect to its culminating gift of self, which he claims is best, but not exclusively, understood in the context of betrothed love. In that context, with respect to the formation of a *communio personarum* through the conjugal act, a thorough grasp of the foundations and consequences of his theory of participation becomes an essential prerequisite for understanding Wojtyla’s approach to the primordial subjectivity of the family, in which the meaning of the conjugal *communio personarum* is the child, and each man comes to be seen as a common good.

FROM POETRY TO PHILOSOPHY

We may consider ourselves justified in turning to Wojtyla’s poetic and dramatic works at this point because he has clearly indicated that the trajectory of his intellectual *itinerarium* led him to philosophize from within a poetic context. We may also take into account that Wojtyla could express himself in these works rather freely, developing certain themes without the expectation that his positions would be subject to the same rigorous scrutiny
as in his philosophical texts. When faced with a difficult passage, then, or even an apparent *aporia* in his philosophical texts, we may reasonably hope to be able to illuminate it, if not to loosen it entirely, by turning to his artistic corpus.

Wojtyla is known as a consistent thinker, and he is solidly situated within a tradition in which great Polish intellectuals have tended to literary expression, and the greatest, to poetry, leading to a Polish philosophical style that has been described as “literary,” “non-systematic,” and “oriented toward the life-experience of the individual.”\(^\text{10}\) Perhaps what is most characteristic of the vision that he brings from poetry to philosophy is that it is primarily a vision not of analysis and posterior synthesis, but of synopsis.\(^\text{11}\) Formed in a poetic perspective steeped in the traditions of Polish Romanticism, educated by the theatrical experiments of Mieczysław Kotlarczyk, and inspired, through Jan Tyranowski, by the mysticism of John of the Cross, Wojtyla’s pre-philosophical vision, in his neo-Romantic period, was one that focused on the potential of the human person for transcendence toward the fundamental values of love, freedom, and beauty. Gradually, as he learned to philosophize, he would come to focus, in his poetry, on the transcendentals *ens*, *bonum*, *verum*, and *pulchrum*.\(^\text{12}\) At the same time, his poetic vision would prepare him for an approach to reality — as a concrete whole, engaged by persons in real, cognitive contact — that would found his philosophical vision of the inner life as a life fixed on the good and the true.

Wojtyla would express this “contact” in the formula that whenever a man experiences the world, he experiences also himself *in the very act*; through his every experience a man not only contacts reality, but is also “in touch with himself.”\(^\text{13}\) In this cognitive contact, a man knows the being of the world, and himself as a personal being; for Wojtyla, “all cognition, in some root of it, so to speak, is metaphysical, it reaches being, which cannot veil the significance of the particular aspects of this being for understanding it in all of its richness.”\(^\text{14}\) Thus Wojtyla’s *sui generis* approach to phenomenology attributes intentional acts not to consciousness, but to the conscious being of the human *supposit*, the person, and so he insists on a transphenomenological turn to metaphysics, a turn to being itself, emerging in experience through the phenomena.\(^\text{15}\)

This transphenomenological passage back to the *being* of things in themselves becomes necessary precisely at the juncture at which the *actus personae* is disclosed in experience as a field of responsibility for one’s becoming good or evil as a man. Based on this passage (in the form of a *metaphysical reduction*), Wojtyla is able to propose a vision of “nature” and “person” as dimensions of human experience to be integrated, rather than opposed.

In fact, as a further indication of his synoptic vision, Wojtyla’s methodological approach to philosophy is arguably based on a notion of philosophy itself as an *actus personae*. Put another way, minds don’t do philosophy, persons do, and the person, for Wojtyla, is fundamentally a subject of morality, relatively autonomous, that is, autonomous only in *truth*,...
Joseph Rice

who begins from an intuitive experience of the Absolute Good. Modern attempts to build a philosophical vision of man moving from a consideration of man as a “mind” to that of man as a “person” may ultimately need, if they are successfully to assess Wojtyla’s approach, to take into account the possibility of a pre-philosophical consciousness of personhood experienced at the root of human action, a consciousness in confuso, in which being as such, one’s own personal being and the horizon of Absolute Being are already present. In this light, Wojtyla’s transphenomenological passage may represent a moment of return within a synoptic vision, more than a moment of further, and parallel analysis. Such a vision, in fact, appears, in many respects, to be the consequence of his poetic approach to philosophy.

POSSIBLE HERMENEUTIC KEYS

The Question of the Pseudonyms

A number of biographers have attempted to establish Wojtyla’s use of three pseudonyms in publishing his poems and plays as a principle of hermeneutic analysis. Some evidence seems, at first glance, to suggest support of their position. The pseudonym Andrzej Jawien (A.J.), for example, appears to refer, contemporaneously, to the synonymous protagonist of Jan Parandowski’s postwar novel Return to Life. Other linguistic and cultural correlations, from Wojtyla’s neo-romantic background, would appear at least plausible for the pseudonyms Stanislaw Andrzej Gruda and Piotr Jasien. The veracity of such attempts to establish these pseudonyms as hermeneutically significant is not at all peripheral to our consideration of Wojtyla’s artistic works; if verified, in fact, such correlations would necessarily condition our treatment of these works. I have verified, however, through a direct question put to Pope John Paul II through his secretary, that there are no correlations to be had. None of the pseudonyms, which were all casually chosen, are of any hermeneutic significance; Jawien, for example, was chosen because it was a common surname in Niegowic, the site of Wojtyla’s first pastoral assignment. Thus, we must exercise caution against taking the supposition of Wojtyla’s intellectual consistency too far; not every apparent connection from his poetic world to his philosophical enterprise is automatically to be followed.

The Objective Equivalence of Emotion

An even more likely connection from Wojtyla’s poetic background to his philosophical work would seem to be found in his familiarity, by the time of his first exposure to Max Scheler, with the use of certain neoclassical poetic techniques, including the theory of the equivalence of feelings applied by the Krakow avant-garde movement, a theory loosely corresponding to T. S. Eliot’s “objective correlative.” As Eliot stated, in his essay, “Hamlet and His Problems”: 
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an “objective correlative”; . . . a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked.\textsuperscript{19}

Tadeusz Peiper, enunciating the Krakow avant-garde “theory of the equivalence of feelings,” or “theory of emotional equivalents,” differed from Eliot: Eliot’s objective correlative had to do with eliciting the emotional equivalent of a thought, while Peiper’s idea was to present the sensual equivalent of human emotion itself. Both Eliot and Peiper, however, can be said to have advocated the presentation of the inner world of the subject (whether thoughts or emotions) through an emotional identification with the outer world of actions and their objects.\textsuperscript{20}

Although one should rather hesitate to associate either Kotlarczyk or Wojtyla too strictly to the Krakow avant-garde movement (which postulated, for example, a break with metaphysics), there would, nevertheless, seem to be at least a point of contact between the avant-garde ideal of poetry and the ideal of the theater practiced by Wojtyla under his mentor Kotlarczyk, even though Kotlarczyk’s ideal was always, rather, to present the inner life as such through the power of the word. The use of an emotional or objective correlative appears rather sparingly in Wojtyla’s own poems and plays, but it does appear.\textsuperscript{21} While it is fair to assume, then, that Wojtyla might have learned of these theories and methods as a student of philology, it is certain that he was aware of them, as he practiced them himself. The notion that there might exist a connection between the objective world of actions and the objects of those actions, on the one hand, and the subjective world of thoughts, feelings, and emotions, on the other, was, therefore, not new to the young Wojtyla when he first encountered the approach of Max Scheler.

What was new, however, was Scheler’s proposal that the objectivity of actions might actually consist in the values accompanying them, that is, in their emotional content, and that emotions could be a way to the perception of the truth about the good. In his habilitation thesis on Scheler, Wojtyla alluded to what was appealing in this novelty when he specified that “by his fundamental tendency to bind human acts really to the object, and to extract from the latter the moral value of the former, Scheler’s system has been able to attract the attention of Catholic thinkers.” Wojtyla would not, in the end, be able to accept Scheler’s approach, however, due to Scheler’s ultimate failure to account for the causality by which the person becomes good or evil as a man.\textsuperscript{22} The consequential and strict application of the notion of an objective correlative to Wojtyla’s philosophical approach to personal becoming, which is essential to his notion of human action, and therefore to his theory of participation, would seem to be contradicted by the philosophical position that Wojtyla has clearly taken in regard to Scheler: values are only of value when they are ontologically grounded in the truth about the good. At the
same time, however, some traces of the influence of Wojtyła’s exposure to the objective correlative may be discerned in his integral approach to the *actus humanus as actus personae*, including his opposition to what he would term the emotionalization of consciousness.

*The Theater of the Word*

Perhaps a better clue to Wojtyła’s approach to value and its ontological foundations might lie in his involvement in Kotlarczyk’s “theater of the living word,” eventually known as the Rhapsodic Theater. As Wojtyła describes the goal of this project, it was “a very simple theater. The aspect of scenery and spectacle was reduced to a minimum, while everything was concentrated on the recitation of the poetic text.” Kotlarczyk taught Wojtyła not so much to entertain an audience, as to transmit to it the truth of life. An application of the principles of dramaturgical analysis enunciated by Urbankowski appears to suggest that Kotlarczyk’s emphasis on the word as the substance of a play, an emphasis carried over to Wojtyła’s own work, establishes the practical foundation of the play no longer on stage, but in the inner life of the witness to the drama, the hearer of the word, who is no longer merely a passive audience. What is then communicated as the essence of the play, unobscured by artificial intervention of any kind, is experience at the level of “Adam,” the experience of the essential human drama, and what limited props are used, are transferred to the level of the sacred. It was not uncommon for Kotlarczyk’s Rhapsodic Theater to use nothing more than a book or a candle as the one prop for a performance; Wojtyła’s own plays clearly reflect such “sacred” usage.

As Kotlarczyk’s ideas evolved under the pressures of the Nazi occupation, Wojtyła’s experience of the theater expanded beyond the bounds of Polish Romanticism. Taborski reports that Kotlarczyk now experimented with a more radical form of the theater of the word. The project became energized by a powerful asceticism, which would resonate, in Wojtyła’s life, with the new perspective that he was just then beginning to discover in the poetic works of John of the Cross. The human drama, pared to its essence, would come into focus as an intimate encounter of response following one’s interpellation by a silent “word,” and this drama would be best played without reliance on profane props.

In John of the Cross, Wojtyła would encounter a paradigm of love as a matter of communication, participation, and transformation. This transformation would ultimately depend on fidelity to a Word received and followed through faith. At the same time, he would experience the inner word of the Rhapsodic Theater as a kind of common good, capable of effecting its own transformation of the actors who participated in it by imposing on them an “interior discipline” that would prevent them from imposing anything of their own on the text. In such unanimous, solidaristic subordination “to the great poetic word,” Wojtyła found what he called “connotations of an ethical nature” that disclosed and accentuated a certain reverence for the being of the
word as a point of departure for their action together with one another. The poetic word, so conceived, exemplifies, and may have influenced, Wojtyla's eventual notion of the common good as a center of gravity for the communion of persons formed in reference to it.

Wojtyla's Neo-Augustinian Pondus

Images of such “weight,” or “gravity,” in fact, are central to the development of Wojtyla’s personalistic themes. One apparent reference to a human center of gravity as a kind of neo-Augustinian pondus appears both in Wojtyla’s artistic works and his philosophical texts. As rendered by his artistic translators to English, Peterkiewicz and Taborski, Wojtyla appears to refer to what he calls the proper weight of (a) man. In the philosophical texts, in contrast, similar references are often rendered by Teresa Sandok, the English translator of the collection of his essays entitled Person and Community, as specific gravity.

Artistically, Wojtyla employs this notion, whatever its translation, in three separate contexts. The first refers to the intuition of being as the immanent object of personal transcendence in what Wojtyla once termed heroic thinking, that is, thinking reality through to the end. The second refers to the intuition of the good in the moral life; in this instance, using imagery that recalls both Augustine and John of the Cross, Wojtyla refers to the weight or gravity of the human person as a moral potential to seek his last End in a return to his Creator or Source. The third refers to the mutual gravitation of a married couple to the complex good of marriage itself, the union of the spouses, which is inseparable from their generous acceptance of the value of parenthood in relation to the Creator. These three texts, moreover, appear to be of importance to an analysis of Wojtyla’s theory of participation not only because they represent three dimensions of the constitution of the personal self as subject and community, but also because Wojtyla’s philosophical use of the term in question takes place above all in his treatment of personal constitution in his essay “The Person: Subject and Community.”

This notion of proper weight or specific gravity is principally rendered in Polish by three distinct, but notionally related terms. At this point, I propose to perform a comparative exegesis of these terms as they appear in the artistic and philosophical texts in order to disclose what they may have in common, and, if there is a common meaning to them, how to render it most accurately. I will then return to apply the findings of this exegesis, even if only tangentially, to Wojtyla’s theory of participation through a consideration of the relevant artistic texts.
EXEGESIS AND APPLICATION TO THE THEORY OF PARTICIPATION

An Adequate Formulation of the Notion in Question

In a passage that we have already cited with reference to his theory of participation, Wojtyla refers philosophically to the “weight” of a man with the term “specyficzny ciezar gatunkowy.” Sandok renders this term as “particular specific gravity”;36 the unnamed translator of the first English version of the same essay, published by the Review of Metaphysics, rendered it simply as “specific gravity.”37 While these translations are defensible, nevertheless, neither appears to be entirely apt. Wojtyla refers here to the weight of “humanity” in a man, not as a universal or comparative reference but as a reference to the unique, non-exchangeable, personal “I.”38 Thus we noted that “humanity” has, in each man, the “concrete, specific weight of personal being.”39 “Specific gravity,” however, is a technical reference to a conventional, comparative standard used to measure the density of a substance against that of water; even as an analogy, it thus represents just the sort of abstract or universal reference that Wojtyla seeks to avoid, for he clearly refers to a particular property of each concrete person, a property not in relation to a comparative standard, but in a primordial relation to the Absolute Itself. The weight of czlowiecnstwo, concrete humanity, is something, for Wojtyla, then, that inheres in a man as a personal property; as a concrete weight, however, it does not represent a concrete instantiation of the abstract, universal notion “humanity,” rendered in Polish as ludzkosc.

Furthermore, it is somewhat puzzling that the English translators would select “specific gravity,” which, as a technical term, is actually rendered in Polish by “ciezar wlasciwy,” while here we have the term “specyficzny ciezar gatunkowy.” “Gatunkowy,” in fact, indicates a quality that comes from being a member of a particular species; it is thus “specific” in the most pure, etymological sense: that which comes with being a man, homo sapiens. “Specyficzny,” on the other hand, means “specific” as in “peculiar” or “concrete.” The Italian translator thus renders this term, in the context of the entire phrase, as “la specifica importanza dell’essere personale” (the specific import of personal being).40 With this term, Wojtyla seems to be referring not to a comparative standard at all, but to something like the Augustinian pondus, a specific relation to others that inheres, with all its potential, in each concrete person, and that stands at the root of participation. It is in the immediate context of the essay “The Person: Subject and Community,” in fact, that the term appears to refer, technically, to the concrete weight of personal being that comes with being a man.

We may confirm this exegesis through a glance at the poetic and dramatic texts: in “Przed sklepem jubilera” (In Front of the Jeweler’s Shop), I, 4, Wojtyla has the jeweler refer to the wedding rings he offers an engaged couple using the very term that should, literally, correspond to “specific gravity of a man” (ciezar wlasciwy czlowieka, which Taborski translates, “the proper
weight of man”) but, by its apposition with “ciezar własny człowieka” (the very own — or proper — weight of a man) it clearly refers not to “specific gravity” but to a concrete or proper weight. Peterkiewicz also translates ciezar właściwy as “proper weight” in “Mysł jest przestrzenia dziwna” (Thought — Strange Space), III, 3. Given the contexts, moreover, it is evident that these poetic references also refer to what we have termed the concrete weight of personal being that comes with being a man, the weight of humanity itself.

In English, then, the philosophical translators render as “specific gravity” a term that does not technically mean “specific gravity”; the artistic translators, on the other hand, decline to render even the precise term that could mean “specific gravity,” as anything but a “proper weight,” that is, a weight that is precisely one’s own. In the context of betrothed love, moreover, which exemplifies for Wojtyla the gift of self that ought to be the culmination of every human action, Wojtyla returns to speak, in the context of the conjugal act, of a “specific weight of a mutual gift of a person for a person.” Specific, here, is again gatunkowy, which refers to what comes with being a man, although Sandok, once again, prefers “specific gravity.” Again, however, Wojtyla’s clear reference to the notion of the concrete weight of personal being that comes with being a man is found in an explicitly philosophical text, and ought therefore to be taken as the foundation of any rigorous interpretation of other references to the notion of the proper, specific, or concrete weight of a man, the weight of humanity. This philosophical text generally postdates the artistic references, which suggests that it may represent a more finished state of development of the notion in Wojtyla’s thought.

Application to Wojtyla’s Theory of Participation

In Wojtyla’s notion of human action, the person fulfills himself through “fulfilling” acts in the light of the truth about the good. In this perspective, the Absolute is present, and it is the contact with the Absolute in the actus personae that forms the person, the subject of morality, as such. It would seem, then, that one is thus a person first in relation to the Source of personhood, the Absolute Person, and only then in relation to other men. With that perspective in mind, let us turn to the three artistic contexts in which Wojtyla employs the notion of the concrete weight of personal being that comes with being a man. The key to our analysis will be to maintain our focus on the notion of humanity, with its weight, for participation is always rooted in the humanity of those who participate.

**Heroic Thinking: Intuition of the Absolute Object.** Delivering the homily at Roman Ingarden’s funeral in 1970, Wojtyla appropriated a term from Konstanty Michalski to describe the vocation of the philosopher. Wojtyla referred that term, “heroic thinking,” to the human act of “thinking reality through to the end.” While the term is not originally Wojtyla’s, and does not in fact appear in his own work, the notion behind it does appear as early as 1952 in the poem “Thought — Strange Space.” This poem speaks of the interior
space into which a man must enter in order to dwell close to the truth about himself (in the perspective of the Absolute). Buttiglione, in this respect, has opined that there is in Wojtyla’s thought a “hidden man,” in some ways similar to the “hidden God” of Pascal; Styczen, for his part, has thus also compared a Wojtylan homo absconditus to the Deus absconditus of Isaiah 45:15. In the poem, heroic thinking is represented as a human act, a reflection of humanity, and a way to the Absolute in which the concrete weight of personal being that comes with being a man is somehow implicated:

And they say:
our thought has tied itself to the clarity of objects,
our thought has remained true to the power of ordinary things
But if so many of them still have not opened themselves to us
This means that our thought has still not reached its end.

3. Proper Weight.*

These words will shake everyone. For bringing thought to the end means, that it has to exhaust itself in the objects, and die out like the eye
whose resplendent essence satiates reality and transforms [it] — although it never frees it from the oscillation of human time.

But when it [i.e., reality] inclines over me with its weight and collapses
then it fills with thought and subsides into the rock bottom of man on which I seldom tread — which I do not properly know [how to do].†
Although I know
that I can decay no further,
for the vision and the absolute‡ Object§ possess just such an abyss.

Even seldom do I speak of it; incessantly, however, I infer from it about the proper weight of the world and about my very own inner-depth.¶

Man is able to infer about the weight of the world and his own weight because he has come into intuitive contact (in confuso) with the absolute Object; in this intuition there seems to be a primordial trace of human intersubjectivity — of an I-Thou — in relation both to the Absolute and the objective world. Elsewhere, Wojtyla explicitly indicates that thinking reality through to the end will lead to knowledge of the Creator and the engagement of the foundational questions of philosophy.¶

Wojtyla names the two central problems of the inner life as being, “what is the ultimate cause of everything; and how to be good, and to come into the possession of the fullness of the good.” An absolute Object so
invisibly perceived — without somatic pairing — may be constituted as a Thou only through such an intuition according to the inner life, which Wojtyla characterizes as fixed on the good and the true. Thus the Absolute may indeed be perceived in the intellectual life, and even more, in the moral life, as the Source or last End.

What is useful here for a development of the theory of participation is the recognition that the inference about oneself and about the world, the beginnings of human intersubjective awareness, are founded in some way in the cognitive contact with the Absolute. In this case, this contact is expressed in terms that are still objective, more than subjective, although the essential unity of the inner life would allow this same phenomenon also to be considered from a moral perspective, for heroic thinking clearly displays the character of a human act.

In essence, the person learns and becomes who he is in relation to the Absolute, fulfilling himself through human action, and actualizing the innate potential signified by participation in the first sense, the potential to live and act as a person “with others.” The first “other,” the Absolute, is present in every human action, every actus personae, as its horizon of fulfillment or nonfulfillment. The first meaning of participation founds the second; the person is able, through this relation to the Absolute, to direct himself to the humanity of each other man as person. Moreover, for Wojtyla, there are no persons-in-mere-potential; although humanity is actualized and formed in relation to the Absolute, it inheres in human nature as such. Existentially, humanity is received from the Source, as a gift, and a potential; morally, it is experienced as a munus or a vocation. In the act of thinking, here represented, the Absolute seems, as it were, to walk, gently but freely, in the intimate space of one’s own humanity, as the intuited last End.

In “participation,” one experiences the humanity of the other through conscious approximation. Participation in the first sense, formed in each person in the relation to the Absolute, enables participation in the second sense, the relation of each one to the other as related to the Absolute, for this is what it means to have a positive relation to the other’s humanity. Wojtyla even speaks of a kind of intersubjectivity of moral facts that enters into moral experience as the person experiences himself and, by analogy, others, as moral agents, and is also a witness to the good and evil that he does or others do. One can be such an eyewitness either immediately, through one’s own action, or else mediately, that is, through participation in the act and lived experience of another’s moral good or evil.

Without the first sense of participation, the second sense cannot follow; thus a denial of the Absolute often leads philosophers also to deny an essential relatedness to other persons. In the second sense of “participation,” moreover, one experiences the fact of the other’s own proper weight as appresent; no one could experience another’s proper weight directly, except the Absolute, for the inmost interior of man, symbolized by the abyss in “Thought — Strange Space,” is a place where only the Absolute may also dwell, as the Source of the inner life. There is, in fact, a decidedly Augustinian flavor to this abyss.
The New Narcissus: Man in the Field of Responsibility. The objective encounter with the Absolute Object in thought leads to the subjective encounter with the Absolute Person in moral action. Zygmunt Kubiak argues that Wojtyla, in “Piesn o blasku wody” (Song of the Brightness of Water), explores the myth of Narcissus in the person of the Samaritan woman who comes to draw water at the well in the middle of the day. Through her eyes, Wojtyla characterizes the moral drama that unfolds as she progressively discovers the water’s Source, Truth Itself:

Then I — I, then, conscious of my awakening,  
As a man in a lucid stream, conscious of his reflection,  
— suddenly lifted up from the mirror-surface* and brought to himself,  
catches his breath, astonished, swaying over his own light.52

The woman, here represented as Narcissus, has been acting out an inauthentic inner life, focused away from the true and the good, and has lost herself in unfulfillment. Now, through choosing to live according to the authentic inner life, she is renewed and finds herself in fulfillment.

In the following stanza, Wojtyla represents that the Absolute Person “has” something in her, a “portion” or “particle,” that liberates her and makes her weightless. It appears, in fact, that Someone has not only taken away a particularly negative, burdensome weight (apparently, the onus of inauthenticity) but has also given her a greater facility to bear a certain positive weight in its regard.† This Someone (or something) appears to represent (a recognition of) the Truth about the Good, a Truth that clarifies the direction of her love, and makes her following of the Augustinian pondus a rather free flight. In fact, if there is effort, it seems now to be on the part of the Absolute:

Look and see — not without toil did you have it in me  
— this small portion. Yet I know, that not suspended in a vacuum was  
this onus, which you removed from me —  
which no scale whatever will weigh — and none differentiate.  
Therefore I weigh the undifferentiated — and, by the undifferentiated, I am light‡ anew.  
So light becomes a flame carried away from dry wood, a luminous arch.  
Which all around itself pries up the far-flung lid of night.53

The water in which the Samaritan sees herself flows from the Source. Unlike Narcissus, she recognizes whence the water, and therefore her own reflection, comes, and she begins to “awaken” to the Absolute as her Source, but also as her last End. Kubiak sees her as a “symbol of man who looks into the mystery of his own existence and, at the same time, [as] the symbol
of solitude.” Through her, Wojtyla conjures Narcissus from the dead, and baptizes him into the community of the living: she, the new Narcissus, looks afresh into her own mystery in the context of the Absolute Person, and thus she overcomes her solitude once and for all.⁵⁴

What seems to be represented here, philosophically, is the actualization, through contact with the Absolute, of her potential for participation. In the Gospel account, the woman is promised “eternal” life (John 4:14), which refers to a life lived, beginning now (John 17:3), in a “full” relationship to the Absolute Person (John 10:10). This is the authentic life of the human person as conscience, exemplifying Wojtyla’s approach to the person not as a being-toward-death, but as a being-toward-judgment.⁵⁵ Through love of the Absolute Person, one becomes, intentionally, one with the Absolute; one becomes good as a man. While the basic notion is expressed theologically, its philosophical corollary has its own significant profundity.⁵⁶

The reawakening of the Samaritan woman is not an epistemological event, but a moral encounter with the truth about becoming in the Truth about Being. Esse and fieri, Wojtyla states, are objects of human experience; moral value, in phenomenological language, is something directly evident, as it were, through an immediate grasp of the essence (Wertschau). Moral value, which is “primordial” and “irreducible to any further, that is, more general, category,” can be explained only “by reducing it to the being and becoming of man as such”.⁵⁷ Thus Wojtyla locates, at the center of the moral life, a founding intuition of moral value, ontologically grounded in the good, that makes it possible for “man as man” to be and to become good or evil. Moral value is only understood when it is reduced to the concrete weight of personal being that comes with being a man, for only moral value “determines that [one] is good as a man, or also, evil as a man.” Morality is therefore the key to understanding man; humanity is in some way presupposed, but also disclosed, in moral value. In the experience of moral value — and only there — there is a “moment of the absoluteness of the good,” that conditions and enables man’s personal, ethical, and non-exchangeable transcendence.⁵⁸

The experience of morality is also an experience of ethical contingency and personal potential for the Absolute, an experience that helps man to define who he is even ontologically:

Man experiences the absoluteness of the good, and on account of it, he encounters the moment of the absolute within himself, not being at the same time the absolute. For he always oscillates between the possibility of good and evil.

This also explains for us why the encounter with the Absolute, that is, with God, takes shape in the realm of morality. Precisely that experiential contact of the moment of the absolute within oneself — in man, who simultaneously becomes conscious of his own contingency, and also of his ethical contingency as a continual possibility of good and
evil — sets free in man a relation to the Absolute in a sense at once ontic and ethical.\textsuperscript{59}

The core of the moral experience of \textit{man as man} and \textit{man as person} is this characteristic absoluteness of the good, which constitutes his personal transcendence through action. When the man-person fulfills an action (and himself), seeking the \textit{bonum honestum}, then, he does so not only in existential dependence on the Absolute, but also in the experience of a \textit{personal encounter with the Absolute}.\textsuperscript{60} It is in this primordial sense that Wojtyla insists that “the person is in fact conscience.”\textsuperscript{61} Without this transcendence, there is even a sense in which the person is “not himself.” “Moral value,” thus, “penetrates into the whole profundity of the ontic structure \textit{suppositum humanum}.”\textsuperscript{62}

In the person, as a subject of morality, one may speak of fulfillment or unfulfillment in both a metaphysical sense (\textit{becoming} and \textit{being} good or evil as a man), and an experiential sense (given in the consciousness and lived-experience of the moral values, “good” and “evil”), which together reflect the relation between \textit{suppositum humanum} and the human “I” as two poles of one and the same human experience. Personal fulfillment, ultimately, is inseparable from personal transcendence, becoming \textit{good as a man}. Wojtyla states, “The transcendence of the truth and the good has a decisive influence on the formation of the human ‘I,’ on its becoming within the whole reality of the personal subject, as one may perfectly see through an analysis of the conscience and of morality.”\textsuperscript{63} In the conscience, the weight of humanity, the concrete weight of personal being that comes with being a man, reflects the truth of man’s moral relation to the Absolute Person.

\textit{The Mutual Bestowal of Humanity.} In the perspective of the conjugal act, Wojtyla addresses the moral and existential experience of the spouses, characterizing the conjugal act as a mutual bestowal of their own humanity to each other, a bestowal that naturally leads, through fertile sexual relations, to parenthood. This mutual bestowal, from each spouse to the other, of the concrete weight that is the root of his or her capacity to act personalistically ‘together with others’ makes sexual communion a true \textit{communio personarum}, the meaning of which is none other than the child, and thus also the family.\textsuperscript{64}

In a scene from \textit{[In Front of] the Jeweler’s Shop}, the jeweler in the play remarks about the meaning of two rings that he is preparing for a young, newly-engaged couple. The weight of the rings, he says, is the “proper weight of (a) man” (\textit{ciezar wlasniwy czlowieka}), of each separately, and of both together. Later in the play, we meet the jeweler again; this time, a wife bound in a very difficult marriage attempts to sell her ring as a sign of her state of disaffection with her husband. In this case, we find that her own ring, without her husband’s, weighs \textit{nothing at all}.\textsuperscript{65}

What is in play here is a notion that Wojtyla terms the mutual bestowal of the humanity of the spouses. In the conjugal act, that is, each spouse makes a gift to the other of the specific richness of his own humanity. To bestow his \textit{humanity} means to commit to the other the entire \textit{weight} of his
own personal being, the weight that founds his relation to God as well as his relation to others, and to commit himself to the possibility that he may be — already, through this conjugal act — a father (mother). Each spouse commits his personal weight to the other, and through this commitment, he encounters the value of parenthood, for he encounters the child, virtually present in the active power of the Creator.\textsuperscript{66} It is through the mutual commitment of this weight, the weight of the humanity of each, that a communio personarum is formed, such that the two no longer “weigh” separately, but only together. The weight of the two is the bond concretized in the shared “flesh” of the child, which is anticipated in the shared “flesh” of the act itself.\textsuperscript{67} Wojtyla alludes to the meaning of this mutually bestowed weight when he speaks of humanity as “the value of the human person,” and the central value encountered in the conjugal relationship.\textsuperscript{68}

This mutual bestowal irrevocably unifies the life, being, and destiny of those who realize it in marriage. Thus, Wojtyla has the jeweler look deeply into the eyes of the person or persons before him as he measures the quality of the metal in the rings by determining its weight, which is the proper weight of a man, his humanity, his quality or value as a person, his earned capacity to make a gift of himself to another, relative to the attractive pull of his End, the Source.

Wojtyla seems to be emphasizing here that every being exists in a fundamental relation to its Creative Source, and that apart from this relation, it has no weight. In the physical world, gravity is mutual and interdependent; if a sparrow falls from heaven, earth also rises, infinitesimally, to meet it. In the inner life, and especially in the moral life, gravity is unidirectional, for the Source, as First Cause, depends on no created being. There is ultimately only one gravitational force in the moral life, and that is the attraction of the Good. Every other creature tends toward the Good by the irresistible force of the attraction of the Good, while the Good, in turn, is stable and constant.\textsuperscript{69} Man, however, is morally free to resist the attraction of the Good, not qua ens, but qua persona; he can choose to orient himself away from the Source, and if he does, he will weigh nothing. Such a choice need not be thematic, but only practical.

When two persons become one through marriage and the conjugal act, then, there is a sense in which they begin to “weigh” only together; each has bestowed on the other the concrete weight of personal being that comes with his being this man or her being this woman. They begin then to experience together the gravitational pull exerted by the Absolute Person on each concrete man, for it is together that they have each become particeps Creatoris. Similarly, to then tend away from the marriage (the foundation of being particeps Creatoris) is to tend away from the Creator, from the Good, and from one’s own gift of self, and to drift toward a habit of theft of the gifts of others, for even the weightless must seek to be anchored somewhere (adultery thus becomes a theft of the other’s gift of self, an intended theft of his humanity). This state of weightlessness, described by Wojtyla in \textit{[In Front of] the Jeweler’s Shop}, invites comparison with the state of “unbearable lightness”
of isolated situational being described by the novelist Milan Kundera;\textsuperscript{70} it is
the directionless drift of the finite personal \textit{ens} who has chosen (often, by not
choosing at all) to depart from the path of the \textit{reditus} to the Source.

Humanity, then, is disclosed not only as the root but also as the fruit
of conjugal participation, the meaning of which is the child. The mutual
bestowal of humanity is not absolute, but qualified. No one can surrender the
foundational relationship to the Absolute that makes him a person.\textsuperscript{71} What
one can do is to engage one’s own freedom unconditionally in \textit{love}, taking
into account the true good of the other, his \textit{end}.\textsuperscript{72} Rather than surrendering
the foundational relationship with the Creator, such an engagement of one’s
freedom actually affirms it. In the authentic conjugal act, the freedom of each
person is engaged in a unique way; the persons stand together before the
Creator, willingly disposing themselves to assist (possibly) at the creation
of a new person, for whom they themselves shall assume responsibility. In
essence, their bestowal of the concrete “weight” of their \textit{humanity} is directed
not only toward each other, but also, in some way, toward the \textit{new person}
that may come \textit{to be} as a result of a divine action that depends upon the
conditions that they freely decide to bring about. This new person, with his
own \textit{humanity}, is in some way the fruit of their authentic participation. Thus,
through the mutual gift of self and bestowal of \textit{humanity}, the spouses also
encounter parenthood as virtually present. The weight of each person is his
\textit{humanity}, his earned capacity to give himself in love. Marriage so joins a
couple that it is no longer meaningful to speak of a “weight” of love \textit{ad extra}
that is not at least grounded, \textit{ad intra}, in the marriage itself. Authentic marital
love, for Wojtyla, is love open to life.

\textit{The Radiation of Fatherhood}. Thus Wojtyla exhorts, in \textit{Radiation of
Fatherhood}: “One must choose to give birth, even more than to create.” He
employs the term “radiation of fatherhood” to indicate a dynamic situation
in which a person freely chooses to accept responsibility for another person
in the presence of the Absolute Source. Thus he claims, “one must step into
the radiation of fatherhood; only therein does it all become the full reality.”
Wojtyla refers here to a willing acceptance of the relation of \textit{spiritual paternity},
typified by man in the position of \textit{Adam}, who receives creation as \textit{given}, and
must decide whether to \textit{assume it as a munus} — a gift and a task. At play is
whether, for each man, the “given” will be allowed to point to a transcendent
Giver.\textsuperscript{73}

To become a \textit{father}, spiritually, one must first be willing to become
a \textit{child}, that is, one must first experience one’s own dependence in relation to
the Source. Paradoxically, it is by being willing to become a “father,” that is,
to assume responsibility for other persons, that one becomes a child “again”
in relation to the Source. This is not circular logic, but the \textit{exitus} — \textit{reditus} of
the inner life, a spiritual life, lived intersubjectively in the presence of the
Absolute Thou. Thus, one must “step into the radiation of fatherhood.” In this
sense, moreover, “motherhood” is also an expression of “fatherhood”; the two
terms are mutually indicative.\textsuperscript{74}
In *Radiation of Fatherhood*, Wojtyla alludes to a relation between ownness and intersubjectivity; for Wojtyla, the *I* not only constitutes the *Thou* (that is, *in* consciousness, but not *by* consciousness), but is also constituted *by* the *Thou*. Note, especially, Wojtyla’s reference to the “specific weight” of *humanity*:

**Adam**

... my child. When for the first time I decided to think like this, through that very fact I absorbed in myself the meaning of the word “mine.”

What happened? ... Something happened, something utterly simple, yet also eternal. There is the specific weight* of the words words that are even the smallest of all ... such a word is the word “mine.”

with this word I accept as my own,† but at the same time I bestow myself ... MY CHILD! My child! “Mine” means “own.”

A similar passage appears slightly later in the same scene:

**Adam**

The word “mine” — a tiny, simple word. How long I had to stand on its threshold. How long I looked into it through all the logic of existence ... This word has an eternal sense ... Do you know that we must not‡ accept only that which emerges on the tide of the heart until we assume responsibility for the truth of this word, the common simple word, which is “my word”?75

In essence, instead of ownness grounding intersubjectivity, intersubjectivity grounds ownness, in light of the common relation to the Source. (We are reminded, here, of Husserl’s idea of an “intersubjective sphere of ownness”). The deepest sense of the word “mine,” for Wojtyla, is only experienced in relation to the *Thou* of the Source, and the first content of “mine” is the *Other*, accepted as a *Thou*, also in relation to the Source, to the *Absolute Thou*. Thus, for Wojtyla, this analogue to a sphere of *ownness* is an experiential sphere in which the positive sense of that which belongs to oneself is defined, precisely, in terms of the Other as a *subject*. This sphere, moreover, is reached not by a primordial *reduction*, but by an equally primordial, personal and free act of *becoming* oneself, an act that Wojtyla describes as a kind of second birth.76
Wojtyla also alludes, in the play, to his description of love in *Love and Responsibility* as a commitment of freedom. This commitment of freedom so binds a person to the Thou as to constitute an experience of ownness in the I. Thus “Adam” observes, “Fatherhood binds me not only to the child; / it binds me also in myself: within my very self I am bound.” This ownness, finally, develops within a sphere of love, a sphere in which, through the mutual utterance of the word “mine,” loneliness is overcome. The love that enables this sphere, moreover, seems to be attributed to the Source, and seems to represent the very radiation of fatherhood.\(^77\)

The virtuality of the conjugal act is specifically a virtuality through participation. The authentic conjugal act functions as a kind of gateway that, unlocked by the freedom of each spouse, will open into a relation of creative participation with the Source. What makes this act creative, participatory, and ultimately unitive, first with respect to the Source, and then with respect to each other, is the willingness of each human participant to *assume* the person of the child — the one that *may* come — as a gift and a task, *before the fact*. The Creator has thus ordained the act in such a way that each and every child ought to come into the world having been welcomed into existence *before the fact* by his human parents.\(^78\)

To act deliberately in order to separate the conjugal act from its objectively creative potential, however, is to close off this gateway to participation. It is to step away from the cosmic stream of existence that leads back to the Source, and to step out of the radiation of fatherhood. Because of the nature of the conjugal act, and the specific way in which the Source is present, and given Wojtyla’s notions of the person and of morality, to separate the conjugal act from the value of the “child” (a value that represents the active creative potential of the Source) is to “wreck” and “thwart” one’s own potential to make a gift of himself in a specific and fundamental sense.\(^79\) It is also to effect the alienation of the spouses from each other, for the root of alienation inheres, for Wojtyla, “in the lack of recognition or the neglect of this depth of participation indicated by the noun “neighbor” and by the mutual interrelation of people in humanity itself implied therein as the principle of the most profound community.”\(^80\) To falsify the mutual bestowal of humanity in the conjugal act cannot fail to harm the conjugal *communio personarum* that depends on it; it is, ultimately, a denial of the concrete weight of human personal being according to which the spouses have begun to weigh together in the first place. “The concrete challenge of love,” Wojtyla once wrote to a friend, “cannot be separated from Him.”\(^81\)

**CONCLUSION**

Wojtyla’s *curriculum philosophicum*, from poetry to philosophy, has provided us with the opportunity to illustrate here a few instances in which certain poetic themes may help to shed light on his theory of participation. We have not attempted to treat that theory in detail, given our limited scope. We have rather displayed here certain points of contact between his artistic works
and a theory that, while not prominently featured, is of central importance to his anthropology. Participation is first a property of the person by which he is able to confer a personalistic dimension on his own dwelling and acting “together with others,” and second, “a positive relation to the humanity of other people.” Humanity, which has, in each man, the concrete weight of personal being that comes with being a man, founds the approach to the other as neighbor, one to whom the only proper and full-valued attitude is love. In Wojtyla’s poetic and dramatic texts, we have considered three different contexts in which Wojtyla presents this weight of humanity. In keeping with the nature of the inner life, the first has to do with the intuition of the Absolute in “heroic thinking”; the second, with the intuition of the Absolute in moral action, and the third, with the intuition of the Absolute in the conjugal act. The first instance of weight allows a man to infer about himself and about others in the objective world of experience according to his intuition of the Absolute Object. The second allows him to tend out of himself with freedom in human action toward active participation with another in the perspective of the Absolute Person. The third, finally, is that instance in which a man and a woman begin to weigh together in relation to the Creator, the Absolute Person, in the most excellent and paradigmatic example of every communio personarum.

Wojtyla’s theory of participation influences his treatment of human action, especially with respect to its culminating gift of self, which he claims is best, but not exclusively, understood in the context of betrothed love. In that context, with respect to the formation of a communio personarum through the conjugal act, a thorough grasp of the foundations and consequences of his theory of participation becomes an essential prerequisite for understanding his approach to the primordial subjectivity of the family, in which the meaning of the conjugal communio personarum is the child, and each man comes to be seen as a common good.

The inner life, for Wojtyla, is a life fixed on the true and the good, a life oriented to the reconciliation in practical experience of man’s origins and his ends. In this inner life, man encounters the Absolute as the Source and End of his humanity, from whom he has received the very same property of participation that allows him also to share in some way in the humanity of others, their own relationship to the Absolute. Through participation, as the culmination of authentic human action, which ends in self-gift, men may enter into communio with each other, forming a community oriented to the Source as its end, its ultimate common good. Our consideration here of Wojtyla’s artistic works, while not systematic or comprehensive with respect to his theory of participation, may help to place in better relief the various dimensions of that theory.

NOTES

1 Tadeusz Styczen related to a group of scholars that Wojtyla (John Paul II) made this observation to him as they discussed Kenneth L. Schmitz’s
book, W sercu ludzkiego dramatu: Antropologia filozoficzna Karola Wojtyły — Papieża Jana Pawła II [Nb: Polish diacritical marks are not reproduced here due to printing constraints] (English title: At the Center of the Human Drama), trans. by Wojciech Buchner (Krakow: Instytut Tertio Millenio; Wydawnictwo M, 1997); Wojtyła was noting that Schmitz begins from an analysis of Wojtyła’s poetry. — Tadeusz Styczen, et al., Critique of author’s dissertation proposal to the Catholic University of America, December 2, 2000, Tape recording, Instytut Jana Pawła II, Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski, Lublin, Poland. Nota bene: unless otherwise stated, all translations to English from any language are my own, and all emphasis is original.


3 Nota bene: I will rely on the inclusive force of the noun “man,” and the personal pronoun “he,” as traditionally understood. The various attempts by some Anglophone scholars to render Wojtyła in inclusive language by other means (e.g., replacing “man” by “person”) have significantly distorted the presentation of his thought. Too many of the terms typically substituted in such attempts are technical, in Wojtyła’s usage, for the attempts to be successful.


5 Galarowicz, Człowiek jest osoba, 270, cf. 266-70.


8 Galarowicz, Człowiek jest osoba, 264.


10 Krzysztof Dybciak, “The Poetic Phenomenology of a Religious


17 Correspondence of the author with the Most Rev. Stanislaw Dziwisz, Secretary to His Holiness, John Paul II, February 28, 2002, and March 5, 2002, on the question of Karol Wojtyla’s literary pseudonyms.


23 The Rhapsodic Theater, which took its name from this first production of the “Rhapsodic Verses” of King-Spirit (*Krol-Duch*), would continue in existence until its suppression by communist authorities in 1967. — Boniecki, *Kalendarium*, 82–83. The original choice of the name “rhapsodic theater” was casual, not descriptive; one should not glean from it a desire of the fledgling company to compare itself to a troupe of *rhapsodes*, and attempts to analyze the “rhapsodic” nature of Kotlarczyk’s initiative in this direction are therefore off the mark.


28 The origin of the term “props” appears to be a punning reference to stage requisites (properties) used as dramatic supports (props) (*OED*). Here, the drama supported takes place within man, rather than on stage.

29 Examples include: (1) the painting *Ecce Homo* (representing a reversal of the dynamic present in Oscar Wilde’s *Portrait of Dorian Grey*) from *Our God’s Brother*; (2) the mirror from *In Front of the Jeweller’s Shop*, and (3) the running stream (image of life, renewal, and the relation to the Source) in *Radiation of Fatherhood*.


33 Karol Wojtyla (Andrzej Jawien), “Rapsody tysiąclecia.” *Tygodnik*
Poetic Foundations of Wojtyła’s Theory of Participation


35 Boniecki, Kalendarium, 402.

36 Karol Wojtyła, “The Person: Subject and Community,” in Person and Community, 237.


41 Karol Wojtyła (Andrzej Jawien), “Mysł jest przestrzenia dziwna,” III, 3 (Poezje i dramaty. 47-51; cf. Poezje • Poems, 78-88; hereafter we shall cite this poem from Poezje i dramaty).


43 Rocco Buttiglione, introduction to Buttiglione, Carlo Fedeli, and Angelo Scola, eds., Karol Wojtyła, filosofo, teologo, poeta: Atti del I Collegio internazionale del pensiero Cristiano organizzato a ISTRA – Istituto di Studi Per La Transizione: Roma, 23-25 settembre 1983 (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1984), 19; Tadeusz Styczyn, SDS, “Vère tu es homo absconditus?” in Karol Wojtyła, filosofo, teologo, poeta, 129-34; Wojtyła, “Mysł jest przestrzenia dziwna” 47-51; Karol Wojtyła, Homily at the Funeral of Roman Ingarden (June 19, 1970), cited in Boniecki, Kalendarium, 402. Wojtyła’s context clarifies that heroic thinking is ultimately directed to God, the Source.

44 Karol Wojtyła, “Mysł jest przestrzenia dziwna,” in Poezje • Poems, 86-87, and in Poezje i dramaty. 50; my selective adaptation of Peterkiewicz’s translation for a more literal rendering of the Polish (in this chapter, my translator’s notes on Wojtyła’s poems are indicated with the standard series of arbitrary symbols, as follows). *Ciezar właściwy: cf. treatment of “specific gravity,” supra; nb: “3,” here, is present in the original text of the poem. †Umiem (umiec) seems to indicate a technical knowledge here, a “knowing how” to do something. ‡Zupełny, “absolute” (i.e., complete) in the sense of something which is “x” to the fullest extent. §Possibly, poetic license, but
Wojtyla resisted Garrigou-Lagrange’s use of “divine Object” only a few years earlier, yet, here, the “Object” is the separate, and in some way “absolute” Source behind the objects of human action (in this case, the action of heroic thinking). Wojtyla resisted the term, theologically, for the approach of Faith, but adopts it, poetically, for the approach, through intuition, to the Source of all existents, absolute in terms of its fulness; cf. Rocco Buttiglione, *Karol Wojtyla: The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II*, trans. Paolo Giuetti and Francesca Murphy (Grand Rapids, Michigan; William B. Eerdmans, 1997), 47.


49 By making participation depend on a relation to the other’s humanity, which comes to him by nature, as opposed to making it depend on the other’s active participation as such, Wojtyla avoids the trap of confusing active potential with potential *per se*, and thus avoids sanctioning the dismissal of defective or immature persons who may seem, according to experience, to be incapable of participation. Thus it may be seen that Wojtyla’s notion of participation is the fruit not only of experiential, but also of metaphysical analysis. In fact, in Wojtyla’s view, one relates, ultimately, to the Source of the potential, and not only to the potential itself.

51 Wojtyła, Milosc i odpowiedzialnosc, 25; cf. Augustine, De vera religione, I, 39, 72 (Migne, PL, 34.154).


53 Wojtyła, “Piesn o blasku wody,” 40; the imagery recalls both John of the Cross and Augustine (cf. Confessiones, XIII, 9 (Migne, PL 32.849): “Pondus meum amor meus; eo feror quocumque feror”; †ciezar (weight) and brzemie (load, onus) refer to the same objective burden, now subjectively light (‡“not heavy”).


56 Cf. Karol Wojtyła, “Dobro i wartość,” in Wykłady lubelskie, 120; Osoba i czyn, 98. Augustine, In Epistolam Joannis Ad Parthos, 2, 2, 14 (Migne, PL, 35.1997); Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles III, 25, 14-16; Étienne Gilson, Wisdom and Love in Saint Thomas Aquinas, The Aquinas Lecture, 1951 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1951), 12-13, note 6. This “full” relationship mirrors the “full dimension” of morality in the personal subject in his lived-experience of himself, as the one who is good or evil (cf. Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, 98).

57 Karol Wojtyła, “Problem teorii moralności,” in W nurcie zagadnień posoborowych, vol. 3 (Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Siostr Loretanek-Benedyktynek, 1969), 233-34. Wojtyła here affirms the reality of the experience of esse and fieri against its denial in positivism. The “primordiality” of moral value is manifest to the phenomenologist as an immediate and particular self-evidence: moral value is evident (1) qua moral, and (2) qua irreducible to any other category.

58 Ibid., 234-35, 245-46.

59 Ibid., 246-47.

Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 213-14; Étienne Gilson, God and Philosophy, The Powell Lectures on Philosophy at Indiana University, 1939-40 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), 143; Gilson argues that man’s existential dependence on the Absolute can also lead him to religion.


63 Ibid., 19 (cf. 20): “It can clearly be seen, that fulfilling oneself is not identical with the mere fulfilling of an action [czyn], but depends on the moral value of that action.” Personal fulfillment is the fulfillment of a man qua a subject of morality.


66 Wojtyla points out, supra, that only fertile acts actually lead to parenthood. Parenthood is thus virtually present in every conjugal act, but actually results only from fertile acts.

67 There is a certain direct symbolism to the image of two becoming one flesh. I do not intend to imply an exegesis of a biblical one-fleshness here, not least because, for a Hebrew of those times, “flesh” essentially included the entire reality of the “person,” body and soul, whereas the image I propose here is merely symbolic of “person”; cf. Francis Martin, The Feminist Question: Feminist Theology in the Light of Christian Tradition (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1994), 333-39.


69 As a theologian, John Paul II teaches, essentially, that divine mercy is reconcilable with divine justice precisely because of the constancy of the Good. — John Paul II, Encyclical Letter Dives in Misericordia (November 30, 1980) 5, cf. 6.


71 One could not surrender this relationship (as would occur in an unqualified surrender of one’s concrete weight to another) without violating the proprietary rights of the Creator. Logically, it would reduce to a contradiction in terms, once all the terms are clarified. Metaphysically, it would require an impossible reversal of the relation of dependence in being that makes one a creature. Although it is thus logically and metaphysically impossible to surrender this relationship, however, one may attempt to deny it; such an
attempt is verified whenever one consents to “use” a person, even (perhaps, especially) if that person is oneself. Ethically, such “use” amounts not to a gift but to theft; it ought not be done. The denial of one’s own humanity as well as that of the other through “use” is diametrically opposed to the mutual surrender and bestowal of humanity as a “gift.”

72 Wojtyła, Milosc i odpowiedzialnosc, 30.

73 Wojtyła, “Promieniowanie ojcostwa (Misterium)” (Radiation of Fatherhood: (A Mystery Play)), in Poezje i dramaty, 265, 271. Wojtyła uses the term “fatherhood” in a broad sense that recalls not only a theological reference to the Trinity, but a philosophical reference to man’s Source and last End.


75 Wojtyła, “Promieniowanie ojcostwa,” in Poezje i dramaty, 277-78; “Radiation of Fatherhood: A Mystery,” in The Collected Plays, trans. Taborski, 352-53. I have adapted Taborski’s translation for a literal reading, especially of the final phrase. Here Wojtyła develops his notion of “the belonging of a person to a person” (Wojtyła, Milosc i odpowiedzialnosc, 112; cf. Karol Wojtyła, “Instynkt, milosc, malzenstwo,” in “Aby Chrystus sie nami poslugiwal,” 42-47). *Ciezar gatunkowy. “The specific weight [of being a man]”; †To possess something na własność indicates literal entitlement, i.e., freehold, as opposed to leasehold. § Nam nie wolno: “we are not allowed,” “it is not permitted to us,” “we are not supposed to . . . .” For example, “Nie wolno palic” means “No smoking.”

76 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 107; Wojtyła, “Promieniowanie ojcostwa,” 279. In Wojtyła’s definition, “Love is a unification of persons.” — Wojtyła, Milosc i odpowiedzialnosc, 40.

77 Wojtyła, “Promieniowanie ojcostwa,” 280-81, 285-86.

78 Wojtyła, Milosc i odpowiedzialnosc, 54.


80 Wojtyła, Osoba i czyn, 334. On the problem of alienation, in general, see Wojtyła, “Uczestnictwo czy alienacja”. In this article, Wojtyła explores the problem of participation with respect to a Thou who is “neighbor.” For our purposes here, it is sufficient to note that Wojtyła reemphasizes the foundations of “neighbor” in the first meaning of participation. It is participation, in fact, that personalizes the “I-Other” relationship as an “I-Thou.” In this sense, the commandment to love sets the task for the acting person of participating in the other’s humanity and thus experiencing him as a person. See also Andrzej Szostek, MIC, “Karol Wojtyła’s View of the Human Person,” in The Philosophy of Person: Solidarity and Cultural Creativity, ed. Jozef Tischner, Jozef M. Zycinski, and George F. McLean, Polish Philosophical Studies, I, Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change, Series IVA, Eastern and Central Europe, Volume 1, ed. George F. McLean (Washington, D.C.: Paideia Press & The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1994), 59-74.

82 Wojtyla, “Osoba: Podmiot i wspólnota,” 20-21; Wojtyla, Miłość i odpowiedzialność, 42.
Contributors

The Rev. John E. Allard, O.P., Ph.D., received his degree in Religion and Religious Education from the Catholic University of America. He is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Theology at Providence, College, in Providence, Rhode Island, USA. His research interests center on religious imagination, particularly with regard to spirituality and to the intersection of religious belief and public life.

Richard H. Bulzacchelli, S.T.L., is a member of the Faculty of Theology at Aquinas College, Nashville, Tennessee, USA. He holds two master’s degrees, one from Marquette University, and the other from Providence College, and a Licentiate in Sacred Theology from the Dominican House of Studies in Washington, DC. Prof. Bulzacchelli is a doctoral candidate at the International Marian Research Institute at the University of Dayton, Ohio. He may be reached at bulzacchellir@aquinas-tn.edu

Peter J. Colosi, Ph.D. is assistant professor of philosophy for Franciscan University of Steubenville at their study abroad program in Gaming, Austria. His doctoral dissertation for the International Academy for Philosophy in Liechtenstein was entitled Radical Ethical Altruism in Analytic Moral Philosophy: A Critical Analysis. Prof. Colosi has written extensively on the contrasting ethics of Catholic natural law theory and the contemporary utilitarian Peter Singer. He can be reached via e-mail at pjcolosi@gmail.com

The Rev. John J. Conley, SJ is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, Bronx, New York, USA. He is co-editor (with Joseph Koterski, SJ) of Prophecy and Diplomacy: The Moral Doctrine of John Paul II (Fordham University Press, 1999) and Creed and Culture: Jesuit Studies of John Paul II (Saint Joseph University Press, 2004) and the author of numerous other articles on Pope John Paul II. Other academic interests include the historical retrieval of women philosophers; in addition to numerous articles on the topic he is author of The Suspicion of Virtue: Women Philosophers in Neoclassical France (Cornell University Press, 2002).

Peter R. Costello, Ph.D. is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Providence College in Providence, Rhode Island, USA. His research is primarily in Husserl and Merleau-Ponty.

Tyler Graham is Chair of English and Religion at Wayland Academy in Beaver Dam, Wisconsin, USA. He received a B.A. in modern thought and literature at Stanford University in 1995 and an M.A. in religious studies in 1998 at Syracuse University. He lives with his wife, Cassie, and two children, Catherine and Andrew.

Hans Köchler is Chair of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Innsbruck, Austria. He is the Founder and President of an international non-governmental organization in consultative status to the United Nations, with a membership in over 70 countries; the International Progress Organization is dedicated to the development of civilizational dialogue. Prof. Köchler has published over 300 books and articles, on such
varied topics as phenomenology, existential philosophy, anthropology, democracy, human rights, philosophy of law, international law, international criminal law, and United Nations reform.

Paul Kucharski is a doctoral candidate in the philosophy department at Fordham University, Bronx, New York, USA. His primary interest is in Medieval philosophy and, in particular, the thought of Thomas Aquinas. Other interests include 20th century attempts to formulate a Thomistic personalism, the thought of John Paul II, and questions relating to the philosophy of religion. He is currently working on his dissertation under the guidance of Joseph W. Koterski, S.J.

Stephen Matuszak, is a faculty member of the Cardinal Newman Institute for the Study of Faith and Culture at the College of Saint Thomas More in Fort Worth, Texas, USA. He received his S.T.L. from the John Paul II Pontifical Institute for Studies on Marriage and Family at the Catholic University of America and is currently candidate for the S.T.D. degree at the Institute.

George F. McLean is Professor Emeritus, School of Philosophy, at The Catholic University of America where he is Director of The Center for the Study of Culture and Values. As Secretary, and now President, to World Union of Catholic Philosophical Societies he worked with Cardinal Karol Wojtyla who hosted the Union's international convocation in 1978. The effort helped launch The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) whose work has extended to the opening of China and to Islam reflected in the publication of the over 200 volume series “Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change”.

Joseph Rice, Ph.D has been Philosophy and the Dr. Robert R. Banville Scholar at The Catholic University of America. He has studied the thought of Pope John Paul II in Rome and in Lublin, and has taught Philosophical Anthropology in a Masters Degree program in Ireland affiliated with the John Paul II Institute. His principal area of research is that of the ethical and anthropological foundations of human intersubjectivity and community. His dissertation is entitled, “Karol Wojtyła on ‘Acting Together with Others.’”

Thomas Ryba, Ph.D is Notre Dame Theologian in Residence at the St. Thomas Aquinas Center at Purdue University in West Lafayette, Indiana, USA. He is author of The Essence of Phenomenology and Its Meaning for the Scientific Study of Religion (Peter Lang, 1991), editor of The Comity and Grace of Method: Festschrift for Edmund Perry (Northwestern University Press, 2003), as well as numerous articles in phenomenological method, phenomenology of religion, and the history and comparison of religions. He may be reached by mail at the St. Thomas Aquinas Center at 535 W. State Street, West Lafayette, IN 47906, by phone at 765-743-4652 and by email at methexis@stooms-purdue.org

Deborah Savage is an adjunct Professor of Theology at the University of St. Thomas in St. Paul, Minnesota. She holds a Doctorate in Religious Studies from Marquette University and wrote her dissertation on “The Subjective Dimension of Human Work: The Conversion of the Acting Person
in the Thought of Karol Wojtyla and Bernard Lonergan.” Her primary research interests are in the philosophy and theology of work and human action and in the possibility of a Catholic feminism grounded in the insights of John Paul II and his philosophical method as Karol Wojtyla. She is a student of the work of Bernard Lonergan, but intrigued by the convergence between his project and that of Wojtyla and intends to continue her investigation of the work of both scholars.

Sarah Borden Sharkey is an Associate Professor of Philosophy at Wheaton College in Illinois. She has written an overview of Edith Stein’s life and thought in the Outstanding Christian Thinkers series (Edith Stein, Continuum, 2003), and articles on Edith Stein’s view of women, individuality, and being.
Index

A
Abortion 3, 5, 36, 38, 236
Absolute 3, 12, 17, 22, 37, 63, 67, 73, 79-80, 88, 121, 131, 146, 151, 162, 168, 178, 217, 286, 298-300, 304-315, 319-321
Abstraction 4, 7-8, 101, 138, 159, 183, 202, 206, 209, 232, 259
Accompaniment 104, 107
Acedia 83
Acting person iii, 1, 4, 8, 10, 20-29, 35, 45, 55, 58-59, 61, 72, 82, 85, 87, 99, 115, 127, 147, 149, 153, 165, 167-174, 177-182, 199, 203, 206, 208, 216-219, 228-229, 243-244, 250-251, 256, 261-262, 323, 326
Acting subject 112-114, 118, 202, 226
Adalbert 105-109
Adam 133, 153, 175, 200, 236, 270, 302, 312-314, 317
Aesthetic 12, 63, 238
Affections 63, 94
Agent 5, 35, 79, 80, 94, 113, 117-119, 122, 126, 128, 205-207, 212, 248, 255, 258
Alienation 48, 57, 141, 149, 165, 167, 171, 173, 176-177, 180-182, 194, 196, 225, 226, 298, 314, 323
Allard iii, 5, 101, 325
Allen 123, 265, 274, 276
Alogical 78, 79
Alpha 22, 25
Alszeghy 260
Altruism 325
Analogy 16, 51, 70, 130, 134, 139, 156, 205, 251-255, 304, 307
Apologetic 175
Arendt 188, 197
Aristotle 3, 15-18, 20, 27-28, 90, 111, 150, 165, 170, 183, 188, 217
Arneson 95, 96
Art 63, 172, 174, 180-181, 186, 301
Asceticism 302
Attitudes 39, 47-50, 190
Attunement 102
Augustine 3, 7, 17-20, 152, 177, 188, 234, 303, 320-321
Autonomy 166, 182, 255, 281, 284, 286
Averroes 18, 28
Avicenna 20, 24
Axiology 55, 56
B

Bad conscience 256
Bad faith 256
Beabout 174, 180
Beatitude 131-132, 141, 150, 255
Beauty 63, 68, 75, 87-88, 91, 115, 224, 227-228, 231, 233, 238, 299
Behavior 190
Benedict XVI 61, 86, 96, 136, 142, 149, 152, 155, 160, 243
Berkowitz 78, 94, 96
Berlin 187
Bernadine 244
Bible 40, 75, 148, 155, 184, 238
Bio-ethics 62
Blondel 250
Blosser 93, 96
Boethius 113, 115
Brentano 20
Brezhnev 187-188, 191
Bridget of Sweden 274
Brilliance 243
Brock 90, 96
Buber 19, 28

C

Calvinian 249, 260-261
Capitalism 6, 18, 172, 173, 184, 186, 196, 230
Cappadocian Fathers 7, 188
Care 6, 26, 36, 61-62, 77, 114, 125, 132, 228, 230, 266, 271-274
Carney iii, 7-9, 183
Casey 101, 107
Categorical 247, 249, 257-264
Catherine of Siena 274
Causality 16, 128, 149, 153, 156, 217-218, 291, 301
Celebration 189, 221, 231-236
Certitude 37, 255
Change ii, 17, 27, 46, 74, 85, 138, 205, 246, 273
Charity 34, 40, 156, 181, 214, 237, 239, 249, 260
Chatterjee 94, 98
Cherish 9, 267, 271
Ciphers 190
Circumstance 35, 115, 146, 275
Civilizations 26-27, 166-168, 176-177
Clark 28, 69, 90, 177
Index

Class struggle 184
Colosi  iii, 4-5, 61, 84, 93-97, 325
Comfortable 84, 126
Common good 4, 48-51, 57, 90, 104, 115, 119, 224, 227, 289, 298, 302-303, 315
Communism 7, 18, 188, 191
Competition 174
Complementarianism 11, 265
Complementarity 49, 266
Comprehension 166-168, 177-178, 206, 243, 276
Compulsion 254-255
Concerns 10, 24, 41, 47, 81, 133, 147, 183, 201, 221, 227, 245, 255, 266, 268, 271
Conformism 50
Conley iii, 3-4, 33, 325
Connectedness 102, 226
Connection 10, 46, 81, 102, 106, 122, 126, 169, 174, 192, 201, 222, 226, 232, 236, 238, 244-245, 300-301
Consequences 35, 36, 141, 173, 186, 193, 221, 258, 290, 298, 315
Consequentialist 244
Construction 27, 120
Consumer culture 194
Contemplation 9, 113, 120, 135, 197, 231-232, 235-236, 238, 255, 270
Contraception 113, 121-122
Conversion 180, 235, 237, 247-248, 257, 281
Cooperation 51, 55, 67, 103, 153, 225
Cornwell 179
Creative 21-27, 72, 74, 102, 112-114, 133, 165, 167, 200-201, 248, 271, 276, 314
Crosby 62-63, 67, 70-71, 73, 75-77, 87-97, 219, 320, 321
Cult of personality 195
Curry i-iii, 13

D

Damnation 132, 249
Darkness 130, 137, 158, 243
Decision 8, 34, 38, 77, 122, 204, 209-212, 246-248, 251-252, 258, 263-264, 276, 287
de Lubac 67-68, 72, 89, 95, 97, 126, 130, 136, 142, 147, 150, 157, 159, 161, 316
Democracy 26, 182, 326
Derrida 185
Existential philosophy 325
Exploitive 223
Eyerman 189, 197
Ezra 184

F
Fabro 3, 16-17, 20-21, 24
Faculties 63, 70, 89, 116-118, 129, 244, 266, 269-270
Falsehood 256
Family 36, 46, 50-51, 55, 81, 86, 91, 93, 106-107, 121-122, 156, 193-194, 200, 226-227, 268-269, 276, 298, 310, 315
Fascism 18
Fear 104, 194-195, 201, 236, 288
Fedoryka 95
Feelings 58, 66-67, 77, 94, 190, 300-301
Felicity 255, 258
Femininity 11, 265-269
Fides et Ratio 39-43, 126-130, 140-144, 147-150, 160-162, 265, 274
Finnis 181
First Cause 136, 155, 311
Flaubert 281
Flick 260
Foreign policy 185-187, 195
Foucault 185, 194
Fourier 184
Free will 67, 70, 113, 116-119, 133, 210
Fuchs 260
Fulfillment 10-11, 34, 51, 55, 82, 149, 151-152, 200-201, 205, 212, 225, 227, 238, 250-255, 258, 280, 284, 286, 307-308, 310, 322
Functionality 236
Fundamental option 10, 12, 127-128, 245-249, 257-261, 289

G
Gadamer 1
Galarowicz 298, 316, 320
Garcia 265, 274
Garrigou-Lagrange 28, 41, 126, 129-130, 136, 142, 147, 150-152, 154, 159-161, 319
Gestures 231, 234, 288
Gift 9, 57, 82-83, 107, 130, 143, 212, 221-225, 228, 231-239, 245, 274, 280, 284, 298, 305, 307, 311-315, 322
Gilson 17, 19, 28, 143, 201, 321
Girard 11-12, 278-294
Gniezno 105-109
Goldman 184
Goodness 21, 34, 40, 52, 57, 76, 86, 115, 118, 224, 228, 232, 236, 259, 266, 279, 280, 290
Grace 5, 34, 37, 67, 125, 130-142, 146, 149-158, 161, 225, 235-236, 238, 249, 260-261, 274-275, 280, 326
Graham iv, 11-12, 151, 277, 325
Greek 7, 16-17, 131, 148-149, 157, 161, 171, 183-184, 188, 196, 281
Gregg 172, 174-175, 180-181

H

Habitation 105
Hamartiology 246, 248
Happiness 131, 151, 224, 278-280, 286
Hating 78-79
Health care 62, 77
Hebraic 7, 183-184, 188, 196
Hedonism 37
Hegel 184, 191
Heidegger 2, 15, 19, 22
Heroic thinking 303-307, 315, 319-320
Heteronomy 173
Hildebrand 84, 89, 93, 97
Hobbes 18, 183
Holy Spirit 34, 105, 233, 235, 280
Homicide 37-38
Homosexuality 113
Hope 27, 37, 50, 80, 94, 104, 128, 135, 156, 186, 187, 195, 199, 214, 234, 236, 245, 256, 259, 276, 299
Hospitality 103
Humanea Vitae 112, 146, 322
Hume 18, 127, 147
Hunger 106, 228
Husserl 4, 19, 20, 45, 52-56, 59, 165-169, 175, 178-179, 182, 190, 250, 297, 313, 320, 323, 325
Hylomorphic 116
Hypostatic union 116, 159
Hypostatization 116, 202

I

Idealism 167-169, 209, 218, 261
Identity 7-8, 90, 95, 98, 101, 106, 127, 166-168, 183-185, 189-191, 204, 206, 209, 225, 235, 269
Ideologies 18, 64, 77, 183, 188
Idolatry 11, 188, 192, 281, 291
Ignorance 279
Index

231, 233, 237, 239, 250, 267, 292, 318, 322
Imagination 54, 67, 325
Imitative 11, 278, 291
Immaterial soul 63
Immaturation 255
Immigration 192, 197
Imperialism 188, 192
Inclinations 37, 113, 115, 120-121
Incommunicability 22, 65, 73, 76, 89, 93
Individualism 37, 47, 186, 224, 284
Individualist 186, 252
Industrialized countries 174
Ineffability 22, 93
Inference 51, 307
Ingarden 19, 28, 165, 175, 265, 305, 319
Injustice 47, 95, 107, 227
Instinct 85, 272, 276
Instrument 119, 143, 173
Integration 10, 25, 47, 49, 57, 113, 128-129, 144, 203, 239, 245, 251, 253-258
Intention 35, 39, 171, 245, 248, 253, 278, 289-292
Intentionality 7, 20, 89, 166-167, 188-190, 209, 250, 258
Interconnectedness 56
Interior spiritual life 118
International law 7, 182, 186, 326
Intersubjectivity 4, 12, 45-47, 52-54, 58, 225, 231, 297, 298, 306-307, 313, 326
Intimacy 53, 56
Isaiah 184, 306

J

James 59, 90, 96, 145, 156, 243, 294
Jamison 189, 197
Jawien 300, 317-319
Jerusalem 184
John of the Cross 19, 28, 42, 71, 299, 302-303, 318, 321
John Paul II passim
Jonah 153, 184
Joshua 67, 74, 88, 95, 97, 184
Josiah 184
Justice 6, 7, 50, 106, 140, 141, 149, 167, 168, 173, 175, 184, 196, 199, 214, 221-224, 322
Justification 23, 34, 37, 111, 121

K

Kant 9, 15, 18, 24, 83, 88, 97, 111, 148, 170, 216, 223
Kazakhstan 103, 108
Kierkegaard, 40
Köchler iii, 1, 6-7, 59, 165, 176, 177-179, 325
König 168
Kotlarczyk 299, 301-302, 318
Kubiak 308-309, 320-321
Kucharski iii, 5, 8, 111, 326
Kundera 312, 322
Kwitny 292, 294
Index

L

Laborem Exercens  iii, 8-9, 175, 181, 188, 197, 199-200, 203, 213, 215, 219-221, 229, 238
Lacan  185
Laghi  277, 295
Lash  277, 293, 295
Lemmons  274
Levinas 1, 82, 165
Liberalism  7, 188, 287
Liberation  8, 26, 49, 173, 183-185, 192, 196
Liotta  217
Listening  47, 245, 246
Literary criticism  278
Little  17
Lived experience  117-22, 127, 148, 199, 201-202, 216, 276, 307
Locke  183
Lonergan  218, 326
Love  6, 9, 21, 34, 36, 40, 57, 61-62, 66-71, 74-80, 82, 84, 86, 89-91, 94, 96, 103, 119, 122, 125, 134, 137-141, 155, 157, 221-228, 231-236, 248, 272, 275, 278-280, 298-299, 302, 305, 308-309, 312-315, 323
Lustiger  265

M

Machiavelli  194-195
Manifestation  40, 45, 51, 56, 134, 204, 206, 209, 212-214, 275
Marcel  17, 19, 28
Mardas  i-iii, 13
Maritain  64, 88, 143, 317
Marriage  12, 120-121, 221, 227, 238, 274, 285, 303, 310-312
Marx  22, 184
Marxism  2, 6, 19, 181
Masculinity  11, 265, 269
Mass society  194
Materialism  18, 20, 37
Maternity  85, 96
Matuszak  iii, 9, 221, 326
McCLean  i-iii, 1-4, 8, 13, 15, 29, 196, 323, 326
Mediation  274, 279
Melady  104, 108-109
Melina  278, 293, 295, 316
Membership  51, 101, 325
Memory  8, 105, 188, 190
Mercy  40, 125, 134, 139-143, 233, 322
Merleau-Ponty  102, 107, 250, 325
Metaphysics  3, 15-18, 21-22, 39, 68, 87, 93, 119, 148, 170, 222, 260, 299, 301
Michalski 305
Mill 183
Miller 67, 74-75, 88-89, 92, 95, 97, 219
Mimetic desire 11, 278-280, 282-290
Misciagno 195-198
Mission 166, 176, 225, 232-236, 265, 280
Mit-sein 191, 196
Mobilization 189-190
Moral accountability 117
Moral becoming 81
Moral evil 40, 253
Moral good 211-212, 254, 279, 307
Morality 4, 15, 23, 35, 82, 111, 114, 185, 191, 193, 196, 202, 212, 224, 253,
279, 289-292, 299, 305, 309, 310, 314, 321-322
Moral laws 62, 112, 114
Moral norms 5, 34-38, 63, 79, 80, 111-114, 120-122, 148
Moral persuasion 195
Moral relativism 114, 288
Moral theology 3, 11, 33, 35-36, 71, 244, 259, 277-278, 292
Moral values 86, 203, 310
Morawski 217
Moses 184, 234
Mother Teresa 91, 96
Mounier 64, 88
Murder 36, 38, 92, 278, 285, 288, 290
Muscar 58, 59
Mystery 6, 9, 26, 39-41, 51, 64, 72, 76, 81, 85, 130, 133, 137-143, 151-152,
156-162, 221-222, 225, 231-236, 243, 257, 291, 309

N

N’Diaye 178
Nationalism 187
Naturalism 112
Natural law iii, 5, 36, 38, 111-115, 120-123, 127, 222, 277, 287, 289, 325
Necessary 3, 18, 23, 25, 35, 41, 49, 65, 69, 79, 113-120, 131, 137, 151, 162,
172, 193, 195, 201-202, 205, 209, 226-227, 253, 269, 271, 277, 284, 299
Neighbor 4, 34, 45, 50-51, 56-57, 82, 115, 141, 196, 223, 227, 232, 235, 278,
281, 284-285, 298, 314-315, 323
Neo-Scholastic 2
Nietzsche 289
Nominalism 18

O

O’Connell 260, 263-264
Obedience 11, 34, 248, 279, 284, 291-292
Oben 274
Objectivism 18-20, 117, 201
Objectivization 169
Obligations 49, 94, 238, 254, 256
Omega 22, 25
Openness 40, 47, 227-228, 245-246
Opposition 4, 37, 40, 49-51, 58, 140, 155, 186, 190-191, 249, 252-253, 257,
284, 302
Overlaying 52-54
Index

P
Pairing 52-59, 307
Panzone 217
Paradowski 300, 317
Participation 3-5, 9, 12, 16-26, 45-52, 55-59, 112-114, 166, 168, 174-175, 183,
189-190, 214, 216, 223-229, 238, 259, 297-298, 301-309, 312-315, 320,
323
Particularism 188
Partnership 103-104, 223
Pascal 40-41, 306
Patrimony 61, 107, 143
Peace 27, 125, 133, 168, 193, 199
Peiper 301, 317
Peirce 243
Pentecost 234
Personalism 63, 70-74, 81, 115-122, 223, 231, 326
Personhood 5, 8-11, 45-46, 51-52, 57, 64, 71, 88, 92-93, 111-118, 146-149, 160,
199-201, 204, 208, 210, 213-215, 220-225, 248-258, 262-263, 300, 305
Peter iii, 4, 13, 38, 61, 77-78, 80, 84, 87, 89, 91, 93-96, 41, 45, 96-98, 108, 118,
Peterkiewicz 303, 305, 317, 319, 321
Phenomenology 1-10, 12, 15, 17-25, 33-39, 42, 45, 48-49, 53-59, 66, 71, 87,
89, 93, 101, 106-107, 111-113, 118, 148, 165-172, 174-182, 189, 191,
194-195, 201-204, 218-219, 222, 243-246, 251, 256, 298-299, 309, 325-
326
Philology 301
Philosophy, 1, 20, 24-25, 38, 39, 41, 62, 81, 88, 117, 129, 161, 170, 175, 182-
184, 222, 231, 243, 265, 278, 299, 314, 326
Pilgrim 5, 104
Plato 15-17, 20, 22, 151, 183
Political philosophy 183-187
Positive precepts 114-115, 120
Possessions 192, 209, 278, 285
Potency 8, 16-17, 21, 63, 205, 208, 215
Poulet 59
Power 27, 50-51, 102-103, 106-107, 112, 114, 118, 128, 135-137, 141, 150-
155, 184, 187, 189, 191, 209, 211, 231-232, 234, 251-252, 255, 259, 280,
282, 301, 306, 311
Praxis 5, 7, 23, 183-197
Private property 285
Promethean 37
Promethean 290
Proportionalism 3, 33-34, 127-128, 247
Protection 235, 270-271
Proust 281
Prudence 248, 259
Psychic 112, 214
Psychology 3, 34, 36, 79, 80, 116-117, 148, 186-187, 190, 201, 250, 276, 281,
285, 287, 291
Psychophysical 78-79
Q
Questioning 47
| Index | 339 |

**R**

Rahner 260-261
Rationalism 16, 19-20, 39-40, 79, 113, 128, 159
Ratzinger 132-139, 142, 148-149, 151-161, 197
Reagan 185, 187
Recognition 8-9, 26, 48, 50, 52-54, 57, 64, 103, 141, 144, 190-191, 212-215, 225, 254, 259, 268, 272, 307-308, 314
Redemption 5, 37, 41, 81, 238
Reduction 39, 55, 168, 224, 299, 313
Relationships 22, 45, 49, 190-191, 193, 223-229, 247, 250, 266, 269, 275
Relativism 114, 288
Religion 46, 50, 103, 134, 156, 175, 225, 274, 284, 291, 321, 326
Resistance 141, 186-192
Ressentiment 83, 95, 98
Revelation 6, 33-34, 37, 40-41, 105, 118, 129, 130, 134-137, 140-143, 151, 154-159, 161-162, 222, 225, 227, 237, 280
Rhapsodic Theater 12, 302, 318
Rice iv, 12, 297, 326
Ricoeur 1, 82
Rites 231, 234
Rivalry 280-281, 285, 288-289
Roelofs 184, 196-198
Romanticism 281, 299, 302
Rules 34, 88, 142, 285
Ryba iv, 10, 13, 243, 326
Rybicki 245

**S**

Sacred 75, 104, 144, 234, 302
Salvifici Doloris 40, 42, 95, 99
Sanctifying grace 131, 151, 249
Sandok 13, 122-124, 145, 237, 303-305, 319
Sanford 77, 88-89, 92, 94, 97
Sartre 19, 28, 82, 190, 250
Savage iii, 8-10, 199, 326
Sawicki 84
Scandal 40-41, 281-283
Schaff 175, 181
Schefler 78-80, 94-97
Scheler iii, 4-5, 15, 19, 21, 24, 26, 42, 61-99, 111, 126-127, 147-148, 167, 170-171, 175, 203, 216-218, 250, 265, 300, 301
Schmitz 41, 243-244, 259, 315-316
Scholastic 2, 16-21, 24-26, 125-126, 129-130, 136-138, 156, 210, 217
Second Vatican Council 2, 19, 24, 125, 174, 192, 221, 223, 235, 248
Secularism 27, 104, 235
Security 156, 187, 269, 276
Seifert 88-93, 98
Seinfeld 283
Self-concept 190
Self-conscious 21-22, 27
Self-consciousness 117, 122
Self-determination 8, 10, 118, 166-168, 173, 175, 177, 202, 204, 208-215, 223, 225, 227, 245, 247, 250-257, 298
Self-dominion 298
Self-donation 81-82, 235
Self-gift 82, 237, 298, 315
Self-governance 8, 57, 202, 204, 208-212, 227, 252, 256, 257
Self-interest 223, 227, 231, 286
Self-possession 8, 57, 202, 204, 208-212, 227, 252, 254-257, 298
Self-reflexivity 167
Self-reliant 252
Self-transcendence 8-9, 16, 57, 63, 105, 199, 200, 203-204, 211-212
Sensibility 78, 142
Sensitivity 10, 16, 77, 235, 267, 272, 275, 285
Shame 81, 84
Sharkey iv, 11, 265, 326
Simpson 41, 118, 123
Simultaneity 51, 55, 56, 57
Sin 8, 41, 58, 83, 107, 132-133, 141, 146, 149, 151, 155, 188, 192-194, 248-249, 291
Sinai 184
Singer 77-80, 84, 89, 93-98, 325
Slav 105
Smart 78, 80, 94-95, 98
Social ethics 222, 227
Social justice 7, 106, 173, 196
Social welfare 185, 186
Sociology 244, 291
Solidarity iii, 4, 7-9, 21, 26-27, 36, 49-51, 58, 106-107, 141, 173, 180, 183-198, 231-232, 238, 323
Solis 95
Solitude 309
Sollicitudo Rei Socialis 173, 195, 198
Soloviev 82
Somatic 112, 149, 158, 307
Sophs 15
Soul 1, 5, 36, 57, 63, 66, 83, 89, 92, 113, 116, 131, 145, 174, 178, 194, 248, 271, 273, 322
Sovereignty 86, 131, 286
Spector 77, 93-94, 98
Spirit 2, 6, 16-18, 20-21, 27-28, 34, 56, 81, 105, 139, 214, 231-235, 280, 318
Spirituality 7, 116, 224-225, 325
Spontaneity 281
Stein iv. 11, 58, 265-275, 326
Stendhal 281
Sterilization 113
Stillman 198
Stith 75
Stjernon 184, 196, 198
Ströker 102, 108
Subjectivism 3, 33, 36, 201, 261
Subsidiarity 9, 49, 214, 276
Substance 8, 20-25, 63, 93, 113, 116, 119, 143, 204, 302, 304
Suffering 4, 33, 39-41, 77, 78, 81, 84, 128, 141, 159, 228, 231, 236
Surroundings 101-104, 235
Swiezawski 222, 237
Symbols 8, 189, 231, 234
Synopsis 299
Synthesis 52, 54, 58, 143, 185, 188, 195, 236, 250-251, 299

T

Taborski 302-304, 318, 323
Technological progress 287
Teleology 216
Telos 113, 150, 186, 194
Tendencies 3, 23, 33, 113-114, 285
Teresa Benedicta of the Cross 274
Theological 1, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10, 33-34, 39-40, 42, 62, 73, 90, 101, 116, 126, 131-133, 136, 140, 142, 144, 147, 152, 161-162, 166, 172-174, 199, 202, 213, 219, 245, 247, 249, 253, 256, 285, 291, 323
Thomism iii, 2, 4-6, 17, 31, 126, 132, 143, 148, 152, 171, 174, 223, 243
Tillich 17, 19, 28
Tolstoy 184
Totalitarian 47-49, 187, 224, 298
Tragic 40, 149, 288
Transcendence 3-5, 8-10, 16, 22, 27, 39, 47-49, 57, 63, 104-105, 188-191, 199-204, 210-212, 224-227, 245, 249, 252-258, 263, 299, 303, 309-310
Transcendental ego 55, 58
Transcendental Phenomenology 165, 178
Transformation 9, 25, 149, 167, 184, 189, 190, 221-222, 231, 236, 280, 302
Transvaluation of values 289
Trinity 116, 129, 239, 323
Trust 80, 104, 227, 269
Tuck 277, 293, 295
Turrettin 261
Tymieniecka 165, 176-181, 261
Tyranowski 299

U


Uniqueness 2-5, 18, 21-22, 26, 41, 62-77, 86-93, 114, 118, 146, 160, 202, 281, 288


Urbankowski 318

Utilitarian 18, 27, 78, 80, 286, 325

V

Values 21, 26, 66, 81-86, 120, 194, 203, 211-213, 224, 229-230, 236-237, 250, 252-256, 265-267, 285, 289, 299, 301, 310

Veritatis Splendor iv, 3, 10-12, 33-37, 42, 111-112, 114-115, 120, 125-127, 144, 148-150, 173, 244-247, 256-259, 277-278, 283-284, 291-295

Vertical transcendence 10, 203, 210, 252, 257

Violence 20, 36, 37, 132, 215, 223, 231, 280, 281, 285


Vocation 5, 34, 105, 115, 221, 223, 248, 265-269, 273-275, 305, 307

W


Weldon 184, 198

White 89, 98, 185


Wisdom 40, 122, 248

Witnessing 51, 57, 58

Wojtyla passim

Woolf 59

Wrocław 106
THE COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH
IN VALUES AND PHILOSOPHY

PURPOSE

Today there is urgent need to attend to the nature and dignity of the person, to the quality of human life, to the purpose and goal of the physical transformation of our environment, and to the relation of all this to the development of social and political life. This, in turn, requires philosophic clarification of the base upon which freedom is exercised, that is, of the values which provide stability and guidance to one’s decisions.

Such studies must be able to reach deeply into one’s culture and that of other parts of the world as mutually reinforcing and enriching in order to uncover the roots of the dignity of persons and of their societies. They must be able to identify the conceptual forms in terms of which modern industrial and technological developments are structured and how these impact upon human self-understanding. Above all, they must be able to bring these elements together in the creative understanding essential for setting our goals and determining our modes of interaction. In the present complex global circumstances this is a condition for growing together with trust and justice, honest dedication and mutual concern.

The Council for Studies in Values and Philosophy (RVP) unites scholars who share these concerns and are interested in the application thereto of existing capabilities in the field of philosophy and other disciplines. Its work is to identify areas in which study is needed, the intellectual resources which can be brought to bear thereupon, and the means for publication and interchange of the work from the various regions of the world. In bringing these together its goal is scientific discovery and publication which contributes to the present promotion of humankind.

In sum, our times present both the need and the opportunity for deeper and ever more progressive understanding of the person and of the foundations of social life. The development of such understanding is the goal of the RVP.

PROJECTS

A set of related research efforts is currently in process:

1. Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change: Philosophical Foundations for Social Life. Focused, mutually coordinated research teams in university centers prepare volumes as part of an integrated philosophic search for self-understanding differentiated by culture and civilization. These evolve more adequate understandings of the person in society and look to the cultural heritage of each for the resources to respond to the challenges of its own specific contemporary transformation.

2. Seminars on Culture and Contemporary Issues. This series of 10 week crosscultural and interdisciplinary seminars is coordinated by the RVP in Washington.

3. Joint-Colloquia with Institutes of Philosophy of the National Academies of Science, university philosophy departments, and societies. Underway since 1976 in Eastern Europe and, since 1987, in China, these concern the person in contemporary society.

4. Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development. A study in values and education which unites philosophers, psychologists, social scientists and scholars in education in the elaboration of ways of enriching the moral content of education and character development. This work has been underway since 1980.

The personnel for these projects consists of established scholars willing to contribute their time and research as part of their professional commitment to life in contemporary society. For resources to implement this work the Council, as 501 C3 a non-profit organization incorporated in the District of Colombia, looks to various private foundations, public programs and enterprises.
CULTURAL HERITAGE AND CONTEMPORARY CHANGE

Series I. Culture and Values

I.2 The Knowledge of Values: A Methodological Introduction to the Study of Values. A. Lopez Quintas, ed. ISBN 081917419x (paper); 0819174181 (cloth).
I.3 Reading Philosophy for the XXIst Century. George F. McLean, ed. ISBN 0819174157 (paper); 0819174149 (cloth).
I.4 Relations Between Cultures. John A. Kromkowski, ed. ISBN 1565180089 (paper); 1565180097 (cloth).
I.6 The Place of the Person in Social Life. Paul Peachey and John A. Kromkowski, eds. ISBN 1565180127 (paper); 156518013-5 (cloth).
I.17 Ways to God, Personal and Social at the Turn of Millennia: The Iqbal Lecture, Lahore. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181239 (paper).


I.25 Reason, Rationality and Reasonability, Vietnamese Philosophical Studies, I. Tran Van Doan. ISBN 156518166 (paper).


I.35 Karol Wojtyla’s Philosophical Legacy. George F. McLean, Agnes B. Curry and Nancy Mardas, eds. ISBN 9781565182479 (paper).

Series II. Africa

II.1 Person and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies: I. Kwasi Wiredu and Kwame Gyekye, eds. ISBN 1565180046 (paper); 1565180054 (cloth).


II.3 Identity and Change in Nigeria: Nigerian Philosophical Studies, I. Theophilus Okere, ed. ISBN 1565180682 (paper).


II.7 Protest and Engagement: Philosophy after Apartheid at an Historically Black South African University: South African Philosophical Studies, II. Patrick
Giddy, ed. ISBN 1565181638 (paper).

Series IIA. Islam

IIA.1 Islam and the Political Order. Muhammad Saïd al-Ashmawy. ISBN ISBN 156518047X (paper); 156518046-1 (cloth).
IIA.3 Philosophy in Pakistan. Naeem Ahmad, ed. ISBN 1565181085 (paper).
IIA.4 The Authenticity of the Text in Hermeneutics. Seyed Musa Dibadj. ISBN 1565181174 (paper).
IIA.6 Ways to God, Personal and Social at the Turn of Millennia: The Iqbal Lecture, Lahore. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181239 (paper).
IIA.8 Islamic and Christian Cultures: Conflict or Dialogue: Bulgarian Philosophical Studies, III. Plament Makariev, ed. ISBN 156518162X (paper).
IIA.9 Values of Islamic Culture and the Experience of History, Russian Philosophical Studies, I. Nur Kirabaev, Yuriy Pochta, eds. ISBN 1565181336 (paper).
IIA.14 Philosophy of the Muslim World: Authors and Principal Themes. Joseph Kenny. ISBN 1565181794 (paper).
IIA.15 Islam and Its Quest for Peace: Jihad, Justice and Education. Mustafa Köylü. ISBN 1565181808 (paper).
IIA.17 Hermeneutics, Faith, and Relations between Cultures: Lectures in Qom, Iran. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181913 (paper).
IIA.18 Change and Essence: Dialectical Relations between Change and Continuity in the Turkish Intellectual Tradition. Sinasi Gunduz and Cafer S. Yaran, eds. ISBN 1565182227 (paper).

Series III. Asia

III.1 Man and Nature: Chinese Philosophical Studies, I. Tang Yi-jie, Li Zhen, eds. ISBN 0819174130 (paper); 0819174122 (cloth).

III.2 Chinese Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development: Chinese Philosophical Studies, II. Tran van Doan, ed. ISBN 1565180321 (paper); 156518033X (cloth).

III.3 Confucianism, Buddhism, Taoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture: Chinese Philosophical Studies, III. Tang Yijie. ISBN 1565180348 (paper); 156518035-6 (cloth).

III.4 Morality, Metaphysics and Chinese Culture (Metaphysics, Culture and Morality, I). Vincent Shen and Tran van Doan, eds. ISBN 1565180275 (paper); 156518026-7 (cloth).

III.5 Tradition, Harmony and Transcendence. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565180313 (paper); 156518030-5 (cloth).

III.6 Psychology, Phenomenology and Chinese Philosophy: Chinese Philosophical Studies, VI. Vincent Shen, Richard Knowles and Tran Van Doan, eds. ISBN 1565180453 (paper); 1565180445 (cloth).

III.7 Values in Philippine Culture and Education: Philippine Philosophical Studies, I. Manuel B. Dy, Jr., ed. ISBN 1565180412 (paper); 156518040-2 (cloth).


III.8 The Filipino Mind: Philippine Philosophical Studies II. Leonardo N. Mercado. ISBN 156518064X (paper); 156518063-1 (cloth).

III.9 Philosophy of Science and Education: Chinese Philosophical Studies IX. Vincent Shen and Tran Van Doan, eds. ISBN 1565180763 (paper); 156518075-5 (cloth).


III.18 The Poverty of Ideological Education: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XVIII. Tran Van Doan. ISBN 1565181646 (paper).

III.20 Cultural Impact on International Relations: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XX. Yu Xintian, ed. ISBN 156518176X (paper).

III.21 Cultural Factors in International Relations: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXI. Yu Xintian, ed. ISBN 1565182049 (paper).

III.22 Wisdom in China and the West: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXII. Vincent Shen and Willard Oxtoby. ISBN 1565182057 (paper).


III.24 Shanghai: Its Urbanization and Culture: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXIV. Yu Xuanmeng and He Xirong, eds. ISBN 1565182073 (paper).


III.26 Rethinking Marx: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXVI. Zou Shipeng and Yang Xuegong, eds. ISBN 9781565182448 (paper).

III.27 Confucian Ethics in Retrospect and Prospect: Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXVII. Vincent Shen and Kwong-loi Shun, eds. ISBN 9781565182455 (paper).

IIIB.1 Authentic Human Destiny: The Paths of Shankara and Heidegger: Indian Philosophical Studies, I. Vensus A. George. ISBN 1565181190 (paper).

IIIB.2 The Experience of Being as Goal of Human Existence: The Heideggerian Approach: Indian Philosophical Studies, II. Vensus A. George. ISBN 1565181395 (paper).


IIIB.4 Self-Realization [Brahmaanubhava]: The Advaitic Perspective of Shankara: Indian Philosophical Studies, IV. Vensus A. George. ISBN 1565181549 (paper).

IIIB.5 Gandhi: The Meaning of Mahatma for the Millennium: Indian Philosophical Studies, V. Kuruvilla Pandikattu, ed. ISBN 1565181565 (paper).

IIIB.6 Civil Society in Indian Cultures: Indian Philosophical Studies, VI. Asha Mukherjee, Sabujkali Sen (Mitra) and K. Bagchi, eds. ISBN 1565181573 (paper).

IIIB.7 Hermeneutics, Tradition and Contemporary Change: Lectures In Chennai/Madras, India. George F. McLean. ISBN 1565181883 (paper).


IIIB.9 Sufism and Bhakti, a Comparative Study. Md. Sirajul Islam. ISBN 1565181980 (paper).


IIC.1 Spiritual Values and Social Progress: Uzbekistan Philosophical Studies, I. Said Shermukhamedov and Victoriya Levinskaya, eds. ISBN 1565181433 (paper).

IIC.2 Kazakhstan: Cultural Inheritance and Social Transformation: Kazakh Philosophical Studies, I. Abdumalik Nysanbayev. ISBN 1565182022 (paper).

IIC.3 Social Memory and Contemporaneity: Kyrgyz Philosophical Studies, I. Gulnara A. Bakieva. ISBN 9781565182349 (paper).

IID.1 Reason, Rationality and Reasonableness: Vietnamese Philosophical Studies, I. Tran Van Doan. ISBN 1565181662 (paper).


IID.3 Cultural Traditions and Contemporary Challenges in Southeast Asia.
Warayuth Sriwarakuel, Manuel B. Dy, J. Haryatmoko, Nguyen Trong Chuan, and Chhay Yiheang, eds. ISBN 1565182138 (paper).


Series IV. Western Europe and North America


IV.2 Italy and The European Monetary Union: The Edmund D. Pellegrino Lectures. Paolo Janni, ed. ISBN 156518128X (paper).


IV.4 Speaking of God. Carlo Huber. ISBN 1565181697 (paper).

IV.5 The Essence of Italian Culture and the Challenge of a Global Age. Paulo Janni and George F. McLean, eds. ISBB 1565181778 (paper).


Series IVA. Central and Eastern Europe

IVA.1 The Philosophy of Person: Solidarity and Cultural Creativity: Polish Philosophical Studies, I. A. Tischner, J.M. Zycinski, eds. ISBN 1565180496 (paper); 156518048-8 (cloth).

IVA.2 Public and Private Social Inventions in Modern Societies: Polish Philosophical Studies, II. L. Dyczewski, P. Peachey, J.A. Kromkowski, eds. ISBN 1565180518 (paper); 156518050X (cloth).

IVA.3 Traditions and Present Problems of Czech Political Culture: Czechoslovak Philosophical Studies, I. M. Bednár and M. Vejraka, eds. ISBN 1565180577 (paper); 156518056-9 (cloth).

IVA.4 Czech Philosophy in the XXth Century: Czech Philosophical Studies, II. Lubomír Nový and Jiri Gabriel, eds. ISBN 1565180291 (paper); 156518028-3 (cloth).

IVA.5 Language, Values and the Slovak Nation: Slovak Philosophical Studies, I. Tibor Pichler and Jana Gašpariková, eds. ISBN 1565180372 (paper); 156518036-4 (cloth).

IVA.6 Morality and Public Life in a Time of Change: Bulgarian Philosophical Studies, I. V. Prodanov and M. Stoyanova, eds. ISBN 1565180550 (paper); 1565180542 (cloth).

IVA.7 Knowledge and Morality: Georgian Philosophical Studies, I. N.V. Chavchavadze, G. Nodia and P. Peachey, eds. ISBN 1565180534 (paper); 1565180526 (cloth).

IVA.8 Cultural Heritage and Social Change: Lithuanian Philosophical Studies, J. Bronius Kuzmickas and Aleksandr Dobrynin, eds. ISBN 1565180399 (paper); 1565180380 (cloth).


IVA.11 Interests and Values: The Spirit of Venture in a Time of Change: Slovak Philosophical Studies, II. Tibor Pichler and Jana Gasparikova, eds. ISBN
1565181255 (paper).
IVA.12 Creating Democratic Societies: Values and Norms: Bulgarian Philosophical Studies, II. Plamen Makariev, Andrew M. Blasko and Asen Davidov, eds. ISBN 156518131X (paper).
IVA.13 Values of Islamic Culture and the Experience of History: Russian Philosophical Studies, I. Nur Kirabaev and Yuriy Pochta, eds. ISBN 1565181336 (paper).
IVA.14 Values and Education in Romania Today: Romanian Philosophical Studies, Marin Calin and Magdalena Dumitrana, eds. ISBN 1565181344 (paper).
IVA.18 Human Dignity: Values and Justice: Czech Philosophical Studies, III. Miloslav Bednar, ed. ISBN 1565181409 (paper).
IVA.19 Values in the Polish Cultural Tradition: Polish Philosophical Studies, III. Leon Dyczewski, ed. ISBN 1565181425 (paper).
IVA.20 Liberalization and Transformation of Morality in Post-communist Countries: Polish Philosophical Studies, IV. Tadeusz Buksinski. ISBN 1565181786 (paper).
IVA.21 Islamic and Christian Cultures: Conflict or Dialogue: Bulgarian Philosophical Studies, III. Plament Makariev, ed. ISBN 156518162X (paper).
IVA.22 Moral, Legal and Political Values in Romanian Culture: Romanian Philosophical Studies, IV. Mihaela Czobor-Lupp and J. Stefan Lupp, eds. ISBN 1565181700 (paper).
IVA.27 Eastern Europe and the Challenges of Globalization: Polish Philosophical Studies, VI. Tadeusz Buksinski and Dariusz Dobrzanski, ed. ISBN 1565182189 (paper).
IVA.28 Church, State, and Society in Eastern Europe: Hungarian Philosophical Studies, I. Miklós Tomka. ISBN 156518226X.

Series V. Latin America

V.1 The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas. O. Pegoraro,
Publications


V.4 Love as the Foundation of Moral Education and Character Development. Luis Ugalde, Nicolas Barros and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565180801.


Series VI. Foundations of Moral Education


VI.3 Character Development in Schools and Beyond. Kevin Ryan and Thomas Lickona, eds. ISBN 1565180593 (paper); 156518058-5 (cloth).

VI.4 The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas. O. Pegoraro, ed. ISBN 081917355X (paper); 0819173541 (cloth).

VI.5 Chinese Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development. Tran van Doan, ed. ISBN 1565180321 (paper); 156518033 (cloth).


Series VII. Seminars on Culture and Values

VII.1 The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas. O. Pegoraro, ed. ISBN 081917355X (paper); 0819173541 (cloth).


VII.3 Relations Between Cultures. John A. Kromkowski, ed. ISBN 1565180089 (paper); 1565180097 (cloth).


VII.7 Hermeneutics and Inculturation. George F. McLean, Antonio Gallo, Robert Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565181840 (paper).

VII.8 Culture, Evangelization, and Dialogue. Antonio Gallo and Robert Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565181832 (paper).

VII.9 The Place of the Person in Social Life. Paul Peachev and John A. Kromkowski, eds. ISBN 1565180127 (paper); 156518013-5 (cloth).

VII.10 Urbanization and Values. John A. Kromkowski, ed. ISBN 1565180100 (paper); 1565180119 (cloth).


VII.13 Cultural Identity, Pluralism and Globalization (2 volumes). John P.
Hogan, ed. ISBN 1565182170 (paper).
VII.14 Democracy: In the Throes of Liberalism and Totalitarianism. George F. McLean, Robert Magliola, William Fox, eds. ISBN 1565181956 (paper).
VII.19 The Humanization of Social Life: Cultural Resources and Historical Responses. Ronald S. Calinger, Robert P. Badillo, Rose B. Calabretta, Robert Magliola, eds. ISBN 1565182006 (paper).
VII.22 Civil Society as Democratic Practice. Antonio F. Perez, Semou Pathé Gueye, Yang Fenggang, eds. ISBN 1565182146 (paper).
VII.24 Multiple Paths to God: Nostra Aetate: 40 years Later. John P. Hogan and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565182200 (paper).
VII.25 Globalization and Identity. Andrew Blasko, Taras Dobko, Pham Van Duc and George Pattery, eds. ISBN 1565182200 (paper).

**The International Society for Metaphysics**

ISM.1 Person and Nature. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds. ISBN 0819170267 (paper); 0819170259 (cloth).
ISM.2 Person and Society. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds. ISBN 0819169250 (paper); 0819169242 (cloth).
ISM.3 Person and God. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds. ISBN 0819169382 (paper); 0819169374 (cloth).
ISM.4 The Nature of Metaphysical Knowledge. George F. McLean and Hugo Meynell, eds. ISBN 0819169277 (paper); 0819169269 (cloth).
ISM.5 Philosophical Challenges and Opportunities of Globalization. Olivia Blanchette, Tomonobu Imamichi and George F. McLean, eds. ISBN 1565181298 (paper).

The series is published and distributed by: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, Cardinal Station, P.O.Box 261, Washington, D.C.20064. Tel./Fax.202/319-6089; e-mail: cuavrp@cua.edu (paper); website: http://www.crvp.org. All titles are available in paper except as noted. Prices: $17.50 (paper).