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Urbanization and Values

Edited by
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Preface

George F. McLean

The phenomenon of urbanization has multiple facets in our times. In many countries this process is rapidly accelerating as fewer persons are needed in agriculture. In countries developing an industrial base workers are attracted to the city for employment. Everywhere populations are drawing together in urban centers or networks for the benefits this provides in the fields of employment, education, services and cultures.

This implies many changes. Traditional patterns, which had been stable and well articulated in a village environment, often become confused as people of diverse cultural backgrounds gather in new urban settlements. Indeed, oftentimes the shift to the city is itself a choice of a new life style with an openness to, or even a desire for, change.

From this comes a series of important issues: How is it possible in the modern urban environment to form communities within which new human self understanding and hence new values can emerge? Is it feasible for neighborhoods with distinctive value pattern, due possibly to similar or delicately balanced ethnic background, to perdure in the pluralism of modern metropolis? Are smaller communities within a metropolis feasible; can they serve as a buffer against the depersonalizing force of mass society? Are the goals for which people move to the city so materialistic as to render the development of positive value patterns improbable, or are there new spiritual potentialities in the urban setting upon whose discovery and promotion the future of most of human kind will depend?

Hence, there is need for study of the nature of urbanization and its impact upon values. It must search out ways to develop conditions which promote the realization and expression of one's cultural values, and does so in a way that is harmonious and complementary to those of others with whom we live.

The present interdisciplinary and cross-cultural study is one response to this need. It has been designed to enable continued reflection by scholars from such different disciplines as philosophy, anthropology and politics. It has provided them with the occasion to formulate their scholarly insights on the issues, to discuss these critically, in depth and in view of the multiple dimensions of the problem, and to work on this with persons from different cultures. In the light of such intensive discussion they drafted and gradually shaped this volume which reflects the coordinated discoveries of the group regarding the impact of urban environment on the personal, especially the social, life of its citizens.

The Introduction by John Kromkowski takes an important step in opening up the dimensions of the theme. He shows how the city goes beyond providing merely utilitarian services for a large number of people in a relatively restricted space. Far beyond this, it provides the context for the full humanity of their life, with sacred roots and with goals which are as exalted as are the potentialities of human life itself. In this it must struggle against the various reductionisms which would homogenize, standardize and, in the end, kill life that is truly human.

The prologue by Paul Peachey helps further to formulate the question by recalling that in the past the move to the city was essentially a pilgrimage to freedom. In contrast to the intensively communitary character of village life, the city was looked upon as providing greater opportunity for freedom: composed of autonomous citizens, the city was in a sense a world unto itself. Two changes have taken place in the last two centuries. On the one hand, though the city has lost its autonomy, the whole world has become increasingly urban. On the other hand, in the context of

the resulting mega structures the shift of horizons from family to individual has had the counter effect of limiting or devaluing personal and social freedom.

This implies that we have yet to learn how to live our urban freedoms. To investigate this issue the study took three steps: it looked back to the origin of city life in the various regions of the world, it studied the impact of the urban environment upon values, and it looked forward to ways to humanize city life.

Part I, on the history and theory of the development of cities, begins with a study by Vasiliki Papanikolaou on the Greek Polis. She investigates especially the developments of 5th century Athens which generated a new sense of the bonds between persons and clarifies the way in which the polis came to be considered the condition of possibility for a fully human life. Tamas Toth follows this with a pair of studies which together analyze urban development in Germany since the middle of the last century. In Chapter II he studies the circumstances and the extent of the flight from the countryside which generated the twin phenomena of emigration to North America and the development of European cities. Especially, he analyzes the critique of the latter for its role in generating a depersonalized proletariat. In the following chapter he extends this study to the post-World War II period, noting not only the abandonment of the earlier romantic critique, but also the way in which urbanism, based upon an individualist and capitalist ideology, destroyed both public and provide values. His decade by decade analysis leads to the suggestion that we may have exhausted the possibilities of present ideologies and hence be in need of new vision.

The following three chapters analyze the development of the city in other regions of the world: Africa, Latin America and North America. Joseph Asike provides the historical context of the problem of urbanization in Africa. Though it had known great cities in ancient times, Africa's modern cities are largely the outgrowth of colonial commercial centers. In this sense, despite their allurements, they symbolize something alien. This is reinforced by the differences of cosmopolitan and well-organized center cities from the difficult living situation of the large majority of the urban population. In these circumstances ethnic and village ties remain crucial for the humanization of urban life.

Carlos Blank notes how surprisingly urban is life in Latin America. 80% of the population there lives in cities of over 20,000 people. This is higher than in the U.S. (74%), and vastly greater than in Africa (25%). That this move up to cities has generated great dislocation and hardship is unquestioned. This reflects not only a free choice of manner of life, but dependency which reaches back to colonial structures and is continued today commercially from without and politically from within. Thus any search for solutions must engage people, capital and state in ways which treat people not merely as means but as goals.

John Kromkowski approaches the development of urbanization in the United States from the point of view of the great waves of immigration by which the country was built. The picture he draws delineates both the hardships endured and the phenomenon of upward mobility. Central to the latter is the ability of the new peoples to build communities of human scale with shared values, interpersonal communication and pluralism, that is, with solidarity in pursuit of justice. This, in turn, becomes the story and the challenge of the development, decline and redevelopment of neighborhoods.

Tellingly, it is the geographer, Joseph Wood, who questions the tendency to stress the geographical factor of physical proximity, and points instead to the structural elements in the chapters of Black and Dechert and to the humanist elements of the semiotic approach of Echavarría in his Epilogue to this volume. In other words, the central factor may be less the place than the form of socialization. In this light it can be seen that, though clustered in the center of a city, the

marginalized are the least connected to it. By studying such diverse instances as the New England village and the Mexican town of Oaxaca, he suggests moving beyond a three dimensional model in order to understand urban space as a region of encounter which can be traversed in multiple and interlocking ways. In its fundamentally human concern for neighborhoods as centers of pluralistic social interaction the paper of John Kromkowski might be seen also as an application of Wood's development of urban theory.

Part II focuses upon the problems faced by contemporary cities in providing for this manner of social interaction. Stephen Schneck begins this study by looking back to the ideal of the polis in Aristotle and then studies the dynamics of its modern history from village built in terms of public familiarity, to city as providing the personal and private freedom of anonymity, to state as imposing a public and anonymous heterogeneity. Should then one look back to the village as a romantic ideal or, with Toqueville, as a means of social control? Or is the problem of our times rather that of opening realms of personal expression so that the city can fulfill original promise of freedom?

The following four chapters focus upon the city in Africa; indeed, with the chapters of Asike and Atomate, they constitute a substantive study of the impact of urbanization upon African values. Okolo provides an exceptionally deep and sensitive view of the nature, depth and cohesion of values in the African cultural heritage, as well as the new values emerging as a result of the Christian leaven upon its social life. Further, he brings out the contrasts and even the reversals deriving from trends related to the accelerating pace of urban development. Thus, he sees the future as depending upon the success of Africa in domesticating the forces of modernization in building a continent that is both modern and African. Donders stresses the need for symbols and myths to explain some truths about nature and life while grappling with the ambiguities of urbanization.

The cultural dilemma is reflected also in the papers of Ernest K.M. Beyaraaza and Ibrahim Gambari. The former traces out the cultural issues implied in the shift from village to city, the resulting dilemmas and the role of philosophy in their resolution. Gambari illustrates through the conflict of cultures between the Moslem north and the Christian south of his country the depth of the problem of developing an effective national unity, especially where resources and employment are in short supply, and in a period of rising fundamentalism.

If thus far the study has concerned the so-called first and third worlds, the next two studies by Leon Dyczewski and Leslaw Paga shed light upon the problematic of urban life in the second or socialist world. By attempting first to clarify the values of Polish culture, sociologist Dyczewski is able to identify the tensions and disorientation of public vs private as they emerge in a socialist system. As an economist, Paga is able identify these dislocations in the economic order as well as the strategies employed in response by the people and the new principles of social organization these suggest.

The chapter by Marge Zacharias directly concerns the hardship faced by those who live on the streets in Recife, Brazil—it is a sobering tale indeed. Perhaps, though, it tells us not only about people there, but about the intensity of the anguish experienced by those who face problems of urban life in all the situations described above. If so, the suffering it describes is a true call to action, while the flashes of human decency it reveals are a basis for real hope.

Part III turns to modes of responding to the problematic delineated in Part II. Of course, many rich resources and even some of the key suggestions for a response were found in the chapters on the history and theory of urban development in Part I, and even in the delineation of the problematic in Part II. The chapters of Part III, however, are marked by a more direct focus upon elements for transforming urban life by making room for persons and values.

Charles Dechert initiates this work on the structural level by suggesting ways of mapping formal and informal social structures of the city and relating them to the functions and values of the society. This can make it possible to determine the trends and order the values that governs group life. Within this context it become possible to face rationally such basic issues as the limits of freedom and diversity, the protection of the weak and the promotion of the freedom and welfare of the persons and groups which constitute the polis.

Eulalio Baltazar, while conscious of the negative impacts of urbanization upon family life, searches out the resources for an effective response, following the principle that it is in union with others that one is able truly to express and hence differentiate oneself. In this light the Christian contribution to deepening the sense of the person is not seen as antithetic to urban life as, for example, had been suggested in the conservative German critique studied by Toth. On the contrary, according to the line of thought from Augustine's *City of God* to Teilhard de Chardin's notion of planetization, urban setting rooted in a strong sense of community, such as is native to many Philippine culture can provide a founding context for unfolding the rich potentialities of the human person.

Introduction

John Kromkowski

This volume is the result of a cross-cultural and interdisciplinary study initiated in a semester-long colloquium sponsored by the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy and National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs. Some of the participants from various countries assisted also in a concurrent seminar at The Catholic University of America entitled, *Metropolitan World: Tradition and Modernity*. This volume is being published in order to extend the conversations begun during that semester and to catalyze additional inquiry into the issues of urban settlement, tradition and change. It is one attempt to respond to the need for international forums on timely issues that can enable us to think globally and to act locally.

The paucity of philosophic clarification that is rooted in the honest-to-experience reality of contemporary life makes this study on urbanization especially attractive, for it adopts a multi-disciplinary approach toward understanding the urbanize human condition. In addition it illumines the thought process by drawing on the resources of various cultural expressions and traditions. Such reflection can foster both the appropriation of cultural insights and the application of practical critique to current dilemmas which emerge at the intersection and interchange of forces which form contemporary urban situation in various cultures throughout the world.

The energy of vital cultural traditions and the dynamic character of urban modernity make such intersections interesting challenges and moving experiences of profound consequence for the human spirit and its encasement in social reality. To maintain scientific and systematic discipline over such an array is difficult, yet the tradition of intellectual questioning and applied dynamism which gave birth to the theory and practice of the modern city has been charted.

Francoise Choay's chronological chart of the modern philosophical social mathematical and natural sciences and their application in correlation with events in the development of city planning may be useful as an intellectual map of the journey you are invited to take (see Table I). This chart is also a semiotic algorithm which suggests relationships of an earlier era's tradition to World War I and II and massive transformation of human settlement and aspirations which followed these enormities.

The catastrophic and planned destruction of cities and civilizations and the weakness of moral vision measured and guided by an ethics of intention prompted some in the post world war period to announce absurdity as the only viable and honest symbol of the species. The same crisis prompted others to return to the humble origins and experiences of human praxis and to the deep insights into the human condition recorded by the ancients. For example, Camus' reflection on modern rebellion, which lead to his recovery of limits symbolized in the return to Ithaca--the ancient order and place of Odysseus--are worth pondering:

The errors of contemporary revolution are first of all explained by the ignorance or systematic misconception of that limit which seems inseparable from human nature and which rebellion reveals. . . . To escape this fate, the revolutionary mind, if it wants to remain alive, must therefore return again to the sources of rebellion and draw its inspiration from the only system of thought which is faithful to its origins: thought that recognizes limits. If the limit discovered by rebellion transfigures everything, if every thought, every action that goes beyond a certain point negates itself, there is, in fact, a measure by which to judge events and men. . . . Rebellion, at the same time that it suggests a nature common to all men, brings to light the measure and the limit which are the very principle of this nature. . . .

The men of Europe, abandoned to . . . the shadows, have turned their backs upon the fixed and radiant point of the present. They forget the present for the future, the fate of humanity for the delusion of power, the misery of the slums for the mirage of the eternal city, ordinary justice for an empty promised land. They despair of personal freedom and dream of a strange freedom of the species; reject solitary death and give the name of immortality to a vast collective agony. They no longer believe in the things that exist in the world and in living man; the secret of Europe is that it no longer loves life. Its blind men entertain the puerile belief that to love on single day of life amounts to justifying whole centuries of oppression. That is why they wanted to efface joy from the world and to postpone it until a much later date. Impatience with limits, the rejection of their double life, despair at being a man, have finally driven them to inhuman excesses. . . . The Rebel . . . the only original rule of life today: to learn to live and to die, and, in order to be a man, to refuse to be a god.

At this meridian of thought, the rebel thus rejects divinity in order to share in the struggle and destiny of all men. We shall choose Ithaca, the faithful land, frugal and audacious thought, lucid action, and the generosity of the man who understands. In the light, the earth remains our first and our last love. Our brothers are breathing under the same sky as we; justice is a living thing. Now is born that strange joy which helps one live and die, and which we shall never again postpone to a later time. On the sorrowing earth it is the unresting thorn, the bitter brew, the harsh wind off the sea, the old and the new dawn. With this joy, through long struggle, we shall remake the soul of our time, and a Europe which will exclude nothing. Not even that phantom Nietzsche, who for twelve years after his downfall was continually invoked by the West as the blasted image of its loftiest knowledge and its nihilism; nor the prophet of justice without mercy who lies, by mistake, in the unbelievers' plot at Highgate Cemetery; nor the deified mummy of the man of action in his glass coffin; nor any part of what the intelligence and energy of Europe have ceaselessly furnished to the pride of a contemptible period. All may indeed live again, side by side with the martyrs of 1905, but on condition that it is understood that they correct one another, and that a limit, under the sun, shall curb them all. Each tells the other that he is not God; this is the end of romanticism. At this moment, when each of us must fit an arrow to his bow and enter the lists anew, to reconquer, within history and in spite of it, that which he owns already, the thin yield of his fields, the brief love of this earth, at this moment when at last a man is born, it is time to forsake our age and its adolescent furies. The bow bends; the wood complains. At the moment of supreme tension, there will leap into flight an unswerving arrow, a shaft that is inflexible and free.

The somewhat peaceful decades since this account and prescription have yielded a remarkable recovery of philosophical anthropology, a phenomenology of religious experiences, and a development of historical and economic analysis from which substantial retheoretization of urbanization and social reality have emerged. The application of such findings are needed now more than ever, for there has been no abatement of the processes which drive urbanization: population growth, a diminishing of rural isolation, and technological, communication, cultural and economic expansion. The world-wide expansion of urban life and the challenge of urban dynamics in various countries prompted the inquiry and reflection which has constituted this study.

Clearly the exchange among the participating scholars and the insights generated by the interaction of scholars from cities throughout the world can only be extended by aggressive reading of its findings. Equally important are the reader's receptive gaze into the authors' experiences of the drama of urbanization. A rethinking of, and reflection upon, the mysteries of being, of history and of diversity is the additional purpose of this presentation.

This study is significant because it moves beyond the analysis of urbanization and the descriptions, explanations and prescriptions of economic and urban studies literature. Such literature by and large ignores what Fustel de Coulanges reminds us about cities:

Civitas, and Urbs, either of which we translate by the word city, were not synonymous words among the ancients. Civitas was the religious and political association of families and tribes; Urbs was the place of assembly, the dwelling-place, and, above all, the sanctuary of this association.

We are not to picture ancient cities to ourselves as anything like what we see in our day. We build a few houses; it is a village. Insensibly the number of houses increases, and it becomes a city; and finally, if there is occasion for it, we surround this with a wall.

With the ancients, a city was never formed by degrees, by the slow increase of the number of men and houses. They founded a city at once, all entire in a day; but the elements of the city needed to be first ready, and this was the most difficult, and ordinarily the largest work. As soon as the families, the phratries, and the tribes had agreed to unite and have the same worship, they immediately founded the city as a sanctuary for this common worship, and thus the foundation of a city was always a religious act.

Thus, it is through the rearticulation of the contemporary civitas and the critical clarification of the signs which really represent it that the discoveries of the various inquiries can be anticipated and interpreted. The exploration of civitas and the movement toward an ethics of consequences has become increasingly important in an era of metropolitan and world-wide interdependence. The philosophic exploration of the tradition of analysis and action and the urban experiences and cultural traditions of various social realities are intertwined in this study. In this regard the volume complements the works of Eisenstadt and Schachar, *Society, Culture and Urbanization* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1987), of Bairoch, *Cities and Economic Development* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1988), Dogan and Kasarda *A World of Giant Cities and Mega-Cities* (Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1988).

The post WWII urban era generation of persons throughout the world has been seduced by reductionisms of various sorts as the focus of intellectual, economic and technical change reduced persons to workers, consumers and bureaucrats. The emergence of rebellious citizenries in the face of desires and dilemmas excited by expectations, inequities and claims that impinge upon assumed prerogatives are signs of discontent with the managerial state and its underpinnings. The eruption of rebellious citizenries, chronicled by Manuel Castello in *City and the Grassroots*, suggests that the city is the shaping locus and force of modern history. Extreme manifestations of this could be seen in the Khimer Rouge and Senderoluminosa and their violent and total critique of urban form. Conversely, the recovery of the political at the level of the neighborhood-community may be the key to a redevelopment.

In economic and social crises persons look beyond economics and sociology. While some of the basic search for meaning turns toward radical action founded on disillusionment with the symbols of existing order, a counter position argues that it is good to live in a good city. Burchard argues that such a place contained the following measures of urban amenities:

This array of human expressions should be extended to include as well other associations and communities such as churches and universities, political parties, self-help cooperatives, and means of production.

Curiously, the breadth of this field indicates that a single-minded focus on the government-political recovery, such as lies at the base of Castells' aspiration for overcoming the experiences of modernity, is insufficient. At bottom, Castells' invocation of Lewis Mumford's quote from Rousseau: "Houses make a town, but citizens make a city," reveals the tradition and legacy he

hopes to bequeath. But the modern reality is more complex and differentiated. The honest-to-experience reality of the city reveals such a semiotic, institutional and cultural pluralism that it can be discerned only at the meridian, that is, on the one hand, the enlightenment vision of Voltaire implied in his celebration of privacy and anti-urban haven of his anti-hero Candide cultivating his garden and, on the other hand, the totalitarian vision of the mass-democracy of autonomous persons proposed by modern, comprehensive, citizenship.

Contemporary cities are the intersection of various spheres of human association and symbolization. These constitute various little worlds of meaning, or cosmions as Voegelin reports.

For man does not wait for science to have his life explained to him, and when the theorist approaches social reality he finds the field pre-empted by what may be called the self-interpretation of society. Human society is not merely a fact, or an event, in the external world to be studied by an observer like a natural phenomenon. Though it has externality as one of its important components, it is as a whole a little world, a cosmion, illuminated with meaning from within by the human beings who continuously create and bear it as the mode and condition of their self-realization. It is illuminated through an elaborate symbolism, in various degrees of compactness and differentiation--from rite, through myth, to theory--and this symbolism illuminates it with meaning in so far as the symbols make the internal structure of such a cosmion, the relations between its members and groups of members, as well as its existence as a whole, transparent for the mystery of human existence. The self-illumination of society through symbols is an integral part of social reality, and one may even say its essential part, for through such symbolization the members of a society experience it as more than an accident or a convenience; they experience it as of their human essence.

The modern city is a maze of interesting cosmions which simultaneously are both concentrated and decentralized. To govern justly such complex settlements--social realities--depends on the ability to tolerate semiotic, institutional and cultural diversity. One step toward such a capacity is the development of a cosmionology that can hold its own among the sectors that are etched on the large urbanized zones of this planet.

A landset view of this multiplicity of cosmions is required. This collection of articles is an intermediate view--an angle of vision which establishes the horizon from which a fuller reading of our commonalities and differences may be observed. Such observations surely will suggest judgments and courses of action so that learning and doing can be yoked together for the commonweal of pluralistic cities. Only this can enable them to resist the impulses of homogenization and standardization which paradoxically grow weaker as they impose their claims on the pluraformity of reality.

Chapter I

The Polis: The Nature of the Political Community

Vasiliki P. Papanikolaou

Preliminary Remarks

No one should discuss the various expressions of Greek culture without giving due credit to the polis, the characteristic form of the state in ancient Greece, which, by common assent, has nourished it. The polis, as literary evidence reveals, has been exalted by the most influential writers of antiquity and has been considered by them the human community par excellence, which assured the conditions for the civilized life. Even in the fourth century B.C., when the polis had started a steady course of decline, Plato and Aristotle continued to regard it as being the final and ideal stage of social development. For the Greeks, as C.M. Bowra rightly notices, "the city-state remained the focus of their loyalties and their thinking."¹

During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries many thinkers were occupied with the institution of the polis and its historical understanding. It should be noted, however, that their views bear the imprint and are affected by the general climate of their time. This has resulted in misinterpretations, as becomes apparent, for instance, in the case of N.D. Fustel de Coulanges.² In our century, W. Jaeger,³ in his monumental work *Paedeia*, is the most brilliant example of an author who realizes the complete importance and influence of the polis on all levels of the cultural and spiritual life of the Greeks.

As a social and political organization, the polis⁴ was wholly different from what existed before and what came after. Its emergence,⁵ some time between 800 and 700 B.C., was the beginning of essential innovations which moulded effectively the Greek outlook of life. Traditional patterns of moral and intellectual attitudes underwent radical changes and new ideas were introduced to define the framework of behaviour and thought.

The formation of the polis kept pace with a number of major developments in the Greek territory: An acute problem of overpopulation, the commencement of overseas colonization, an increase in trading activities, changes in the tactics of warfare, the disappearance of kingship and the establishment of aristocratic regimes and, lastly, the borrowing of the "Phoenician alphabet" and its adaptation to the requirements of the Greek language.⁶

The above processes, and other socio-political events occurring in different parts of Greece during the archaic period, were responsible for the creation of the very distinctive society of the polis, which was able to accomplish the so-called Greek miracle. Already in the early classical age the polis had reached its complete development,⁷ and its peculiar values and features were clearly delineated. This does not mean, of course, that the polis discarded all pre-existing attitudes and outlooks. Many of them endure, although they acquire a new significance as they become part of the spiritual orbit of the polis. However, the originality of the polis consists in certain characteristics and trends which were not found in the tribal stage of Greek society, which was based mainly on kinship and loyalty. In the following pages these characteristics and attitudes, as well as their course of development, will be discussed and analysed.

Social Structure

The Greek word polis⁸ signified in general an independent political, economic, religious and social unit, with a limited population and a restricted geographic area. As for what its regional organization, the polis consisted of an urban centre (asty) and surrounding land (chora) but, in actual fact, it was not so much a territorial entity. Above all it was a community of people,⁹ with a deep consciousness of the value of common life. For instance, polis was considered primarily to be the Athenians or Spartans and secondarily Athens or Sparta. Already, early in the sixth century Alcaeus, the poet of Lesbos, an island in the Aegean sea, was thinking of the polis in terms of the human environment when he said: "Cities are not stones or logs or the handiwork of carpenters; but wherever there exist true men who know how to defend themselves, there will be found a city and wall"¹⁰ (fr. 426 LP, trans. by D. Page). The polis assumed an identity and a form which reflected the totality of its citizens as a body, regardless of their individual inclinations, their ancestral origins, their professions or their social positions.

Not all the inhabitants of a city-state belonged necessarily to the body of its citizens. A considerable number of them were non-citizens, and they consisted of resident aliens--in Athens they were called metics¹¹ (metoikoi)--and slaves.¹² Both were excluded from public life, but their contribution to the existence and perpetuation of the polis was especially significant. Undoubtedly Greek civilization owes very much to these lower orders of Greek society, which, up to recent times, had not received the proper recognition. The metics were freemen and had undertaken a sizeable part of the mercantile activities of the polis. The slaves were, in general, responsible for the daily chores and other onerous work of their owners and were employed also in the city-state as secretaries, clerks, policemen and prison guards. The former had certain legal rights arising out of commercial contracts and they were under the protection of the laws. The latter were deprived of liberty and were not entitled to any rights, since they were legally the property of their masters. Thanks to them, the citizens were able to lead a particular way of life and to devote their energy and interest to tasks which they considered as being on a higher level when contrasted to those of menial labor.

The citizens, in the large majority, consisted of the indigenous population; they were all free men and equals among themselves. In the countries of the East, as G.W.Fr. Hegel¹³ states, there was only one free man, the despot. In the ancient Greek polis, freedom was not limited to a single person, but it was the privilege of a broader group of people.

The fact that Greek society comprised freemen and people held in servitude does not mean that the polis was a mere union of masters and slaves devoid of a common interest. Citizens and non-citizens could live together without apparent tensions and conflicts,¹⁴ since their coexistence was necessary for the realization of the ultimate goal of the political community, which was "the good life."

The polis, as was indicated above, had the same connotation as the totality of men composing its citizen body.¹⁵ This body consisted more specifically of the adult male members as full citizens--women did not participate in public life--who, through their general assembly, managed all state affairs by delegating functions to their elected officials and regulated the domestic and foreign policies of their community. That the citizen assembly knowingly identified itself with the polis becomes manifest in the phrase, "the polis decided" (edoxe tai poli. . .),¹⁶ which was a decree-formula meaning that the approved resolutions expressed the will of the citizen body. It could be of interest to call attention to this identification and to attempt to see what corollaries may be drawn.

First, the notion that the polis was indeed its citizens shows that the concept of the state in ancient Greece did not signify an abstract administrative entity standing above the citizenry. The distinction of state and society was a phenomenon of modern times and not a feature of the Greek polis. Since the holder of state sovereignty was a community of citizens and not a single person, the polis, "shorn of all private and personal character,"¹⁷ was the embodiment of the idea of the "common." From this point of view, one can have an indication why the polis aimed at the common weal and the general welfare, and why it demanded that the private ends be attuned to those of the community. It can also be explained why the institution of the polis was interwoven with the awakening of the collective consciousness, the creation of cooperative values and the development of strong group feeling.

Second, the conviction that the polis and the citizen body were one and the same thing makes it clear why evaluative terms such as 'just', 'unjust', 'honest', 'generous' and the like could equally apply both to the citizen and the polis, as evidenced by the extant texts of the classical period; and, furthermore, why it was claimed that the ethos of the individual and that of the state had the same qualities (e.g., Demosthenes, XX.13-14; Isocrates, II.31).

Third, the equation of the polis with the totality of its citizens resulted in the superiority of the whole over its component parts. This can be attested by the steady crystallization of Greek sentiment around the conviction of the priority of the polis over its individual members. The preference of the whole as compared to the part, which had wide application in ancient Greek thought, could receive also another social interpretation. It is worth remembering that wars between poleis were a customary phenomenon in all periods of Greek history. J. Hasebroek is not far wrong in stating that "to the Greek mind the normal condition of things was war between state and state, not peaceable coexistence."¹⁸ This meant that all poleis were constantly in danger of military defeat and even of total extinction. Thucydides describes a typical situation following the conquest of a polis in the following words: "They killed the grown men and enslaved the children and women."¹⁹ It is therefore understandable why there was a deeply rooted belief that the individual could not exist without the polis and why in the Greek consciousness the whole had precedence over its component parts. The memory of the Persian Wars (500/499-479/8) and the awareness of their awesome consequences for the citizen, in case the Greeks had been defeated by the Persians, must have also contributed towards these attitudes. As recorded by Herodotus (VI.19,20,101,119), a standard policy of the Persians, when they subjugated a polis, was the enslavement of the population and its dispersal in very remote parts of Asia.

The afore-mentioned characteristics of the polis found fertile ground for development with the disappearance of kingship in the Greek world and the so-called 'hoplite reform'. Between the eleventh and eighth centuries B.C. Greece was divided into numerous small tribal states in which a single man, the king (basileus), had concentrated in himself all forms of power--military, priestly, judicial. The overthrow of the kings²⁰ and assumption of their privileges by the social stratum of the aristocrats had very important consequences. Specifically it resulted in a broadening of administrative responsibility. Ruling (archein) ceased to be a single man's monopoly and became the affair of a greater number of people. The state, thereafter, was not conceived in a personified way, since it was no longer identified with the person of a sole leader. For the first time the 'group' made its appearance on the political scene²¹ and occupied the top echelon of the social hierarchy. Henceforth, the state was reflected in more than one individual. This number increased steadily until, in the democratic polis, it corresponded to the entirety of the native and adult males entitled to citizenship. Towards this direction the contribution of the 'hoplite reform' was undoubtedly significant.

As the available historical sources reveal, the armed forces of the state consisted, until the end of the eighth century B.C., exclusively of the nobles. At some time between 700 and 650 B.C., however, an innovation occurred in the military sphere, known as the 'hoplite reform', with many social, political and psychological effects. As A. M. Snodgrass²² has shown, it included two phases: At first, modifications in the equipment of the warrior; then the introduction of a new style of fighting, i.e., the massed tactics of the phalanx. One of the main presuppositions of this reform was the increasing availability of iron and its use for warlike purposes. The Greek subsoil was rich in iron ores, the exploitation of which brought on the fall of the price of iron and thus allowed the manufacture of cheap weapons.²³ The acquisition of the hoplite armament was no longer the prerogative of the nobility, but became accessible to the common people. Hence, it could be said for the period preceding democracy that "the whole Greece was 'armoured.'"²⁴

In the early archaic age and before the invention of a phalanx, the battle was conducted mostly by individual champions, members of the aristocratic society, operating customarily as cavalrymen. The majority of people did not play any important role in the defense of the country, or in its offensive wars and, therefore, did not have any essential participation in the administration of the state.²⁵ In the new tactical system in massed ranks of hoplites the outcome of the combat was determined by the collective effort of a relatively large number of fighters, who represented not only the thinly populated class of the aristocrats, but a wider spectrum of society. This resulted in strengthening the demand of the common men, who made up a majority in the ranks, for a share in the affairs of the developing polis and in the rejection of the central assumption of the aristocrats that they had an inborn right to rule.²⁶ At least in Sparta, as P. Cartledge emphasizes, the "'hoplite class' became synonymous with the 'citizen-body.'"²⁷ The above can be an indication of how contributive the phalanx was to the increase of the political power of the ordinary man and consequently to the widening of the concept of the state.

To fight in a phalanx formation meant that each man in the line had his right side protected by the shield of the hoplite on his right and that all moved in unison as a cohesive body. The adoption of the use of the phalanx as a military tactic required constant training and imposed upon the hoplites the spirit of cooperation and of strict discipline. Temperance or *sophrosyne*, which constituted the principal civic virtue²⁸ of classical Greece owed its emergence to this new style of fighting.²⁹ This obliged each one of the infantrymen to be master of himself with a view to being capable of obeying the rules of coordinated behaviour and of mass action.

When the individual warrior decides to serve in the phalanx, he abandons the aristocratic ideal of personal superiority and self-assertion and espouses the communal ideal, which implies a collective endeavor for a common cause. From this perspective, as W. Donlan notes, "the community rather than the individual becomes the focus of brave deeds."³⁰ Thanks to the phalanx, for the first time people of the upper class came in contact with commoners. This had the effect of lessening social antipathies and laid the foundations for the coexistence of men who did not share the same economic, social or intellectual status. The phalanx tactics allowed comparisons which invigorated the morale of the ordinary humans, cultivated the feeling of comradeship and solidarity and promoted the sense of unity among the hoplites. It also introduced equality into the ranks. This prepared the ground for the *isonomia* (equality of civic rights and equality before the law), and *isegoria* (the equal right of any citizen to speak in the assembly), the features par excellence of the democratic city-state.

It is evident that the various implications of the hoplite reform were especially constructive in the creation of the world of the polis. Since those dominating military affairs formed primarily the

citizen-body, there is no need to explain why the mentality of the hoplites gave birth to the resulting mentality of the polis.

Political Preoccupation

To live in a polis as a citizen was a unique experience. It meant primarily that the individual belonged to a privileged community which enjoyed full political rights. The institution of the polis imposed on its members a threefold responsibility: They were members of a governing assembly, they composed the judicial bodies and, if need arose, they were obliged to be soldiers. These responsibilities did not amount to a marginal or partial occupation; they constituted the main concern of the citizens and required the greater part of their time and energy. Hence the need to be freed from tasks which would prevent them from performing their public duties.

The idea of the polis did not allow any citizen to retire into private life, that is, to be unconcerned and a nonparticipant in the public life of the state. Its steady tenet was a life dedicated to public-political matters, a life devoted to the common weal of the community. In this context, privacy had a degrading meaning and, as H. Arendt remarks, "a man who lived only a private life, who like the slave was not permitted to enter the public realm, was not fully human."³¹ In the words of Pericles, if we are to believe Thucydides, "he who takes no part in the affairs of the polis is not regarded as someone who minds his own business (*apragmon*), but as a useless man."³²

The Greek city-states fall normally under two kinds of constitution: Oligarchy and democracy. The former signified roughly that the body of the individuals who shared in the administration of the state consisted of the few rich,³³ while the latter that this body consisted of the many,³⁴ who in the majority were poor.³⁵ In both cases the members of the sovereign assembly were obliged to continuous and intense political activity, enough to occupy almost one's whole existence.³⁶ The reason for this can be sought in the fact that the polis was governed in a direct and not in a representative way. This means that the citizen ought to participate personally in the making of major or minor political decisions, in the settlement of the various communal matters and, generally, in all the manifestations of the public life. Thus, it can be understood why leisure (*scholē*), which stood for a state of release from the compulsory or productive work,³⁷ was a necessary element for the functioning of the political community.³⁸ It was considered by the theoreticians of the fourth century B.C. to be an exclusive condition of the citizen.³⁹

For the Greeks, as many scholars have shown, leisure meant primarily the time reserved for political activities.⁴⁰ Although it presupposed abstention from the toilsome or routine jobs, it was never synonymous with laziness. The citizen set aside the world of bodily labour for the world of political action. He was convinced that *ascholia*, a word which could be used for all non-political occupations, did not befit a free human. However, it must not be assumed that the citizens by unburdening themselves of many undesirable tasks had become less energetic and ambitious. The world of political action was especially exacting. In parallel with the incessant corporate efforts which were required for the fulfillment of common goals, the members of the polis were in emulation of each other. This competitive attitude, which was an inheritance from the old heroic pattern of behaviour,⁴¹ had a special connotation within the framework of the city-state. The citizen was not like the homeric hero an "isolated, self-centered figure,"⁴² who in his desire for preeminence aspired basically to private satisfaction. The man of the polis strove to distinguish himself from all others through deeds which were not necessarily to his own advantage, but which were of benefit to the whole community. He tried to prove his superiority over his peers by the magnitude of his contributions to the social whole.⁴³ In this point the Greek polis presents one of

its most positive facets. Shared, as well as individual action was directed toward the well-being of the entire political association. The citizen broke through the boundaries of self-centered life into a realm which was primarily concerned in the advancement of the public good. He became involved in a life-pattern which demanded openness to the needs and desires of others and "delivered him," as G. L. Dickin son remarks, "from the narrow circle of personal interests into a sphere of wider views and higher aims."⁴⁴

As has been said above, political activity was the principal task of the citizen. This was instrumental in the development of personal responsibility and generally of a personal stance. Man, as a citizen, was equipped with a high sense of liability. He knew that each time he voted, he risked the fortune of the polis and of his own welfare and that, if his judgement was wrong, he would pay a penalty for it. In other words, he acted after pondering carefully the common affairs and in full consciousness of the consequences. This sense of liability was fostered, as well, when the citizen was appointed to function as a judge in the courts and reach verdicts. Thanks to his involvement in politics, for the first time in history man emerged as a "person," in the sense of "a rational being and moral subject, free and self-determining in his actions, responsible for his deeds."⁴⁵ The arena of politics taught the citizen to trust his reason, to appraise his abilities and to know his limitations. Within the polis the belief that "the greatest things are not the works of God or Chance, but of those who were in charge of them"⁴⁶ became widespread. Although, in the words of H.-G. Gadamer, "the self-awareness of the individual is only a flickering in the closed circuits of the historical life,"⁴⁷ it could be said that the citizen had achieved a fulfilling level of self-awareness.

Political activity, which was the most prominent part of the citizen's life took place publicly and in full view of the community members. This resulted in a public character for the whole organization and functioning of the polis. Everything that concerned the citizens as a whole belonged automatically to the public sphere. J.-P. Vernant holds rightly that "the polis existed only to the extent that a public domain had emerged," that is, "an area of common interest as opposed to private concerns, and open practices openly arrived at, as opposed to secret procedures."⁴⁸ Likewise, in H. Arendt's view, the polis stands for the authentic public realm.⁴⁹ The term 'public', according to her conception, represents two closely related aspects. The first is that "everything that appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody,"⁵⁰ while the second is tantamount to the existence of a common world⁵¹ which provides the basis for the condition of the 'public'. It is obvious that the concept of 'public' presupposes and, in a sense, coincides with the concept of 'common'. From this point of view the public life of the polis implied a common life, the dimensions of which are hardly intelligible to a modern man saturated by a pattern of private life and actuated by the "ideology of intimacy."⁵²

The insistence on publicness of the Greek polis was supported, as well, by two wholly public and open data: The diffusion of literacy in the Greek society and the written published law. Some time about the middle of the eighth century B.C. the spoken language of the Greeks became alphabetized.⁵³ The new system of writing⁵⁴ did not confine itself to the class of the professional scribes; due to its simplicity, from its very beginning it was addressed to the entire people. From the sixth century B.C. onward the democratization of literacy came to be a reality. This was a particularly significant event.⁵⁵ The storage and preservation of the cultural heritage ceased to be the exclusiveness of the individual human memory. Whatever was put down in writing was open to everybody. Writing, thus, was instrumental in the communication of knowledge and in the development of a common culture. Moreover, it contributed decisively to the organization and durability of the polis, since it permitted the record and promulgation of the laws, which undertook to regulate and control civic conduct. Being equally applicable to all, the laws acquired an

irrefutable validity and were regarded as the public property par excellence. Owing to writing, words were not only sounds, but, also, shapes;⁵⁶ the laws were no longer an agent's oral commands, but were impersonal utterances embodied in structures seen by the eye. As a consequence, the sense of vision gained in esteem and value⁵⁷ as compared to the sense of hearing, which under conditions of non-literacy always has precedence. The world of everyday experience obtained an unprecedented visual fiber. It is not a figure of speech that the Greeks were the people "who were able to see."⁵⁸ Along with the political activity, writing and the written law, as well as the open nature of the judicial settlement of disputes were conducive to the formation of the world of the polis and strengthened constantly its claim for openness. This public character penetrated every aspect of political community life. Even religion was not an affair of the inner man, but a matter of external public worship. The inner man did not exist. As W. Jaeger remarks, the conscience of the Greeks was entirely public.⁵⁹ The atmosphere of publicness is one of the reasons why the political society attributed such great significance to the appearance, which is typical of a "shame-culture." Thus it is easily understood why in the context of the polis men had to prove themselves through their actions, that is, through what could be visible and obvious and not through their intentions, which might never come to light.

By choosing politics as a way of life, the citizen decided to live within the realm of 'logos'.⁶⁰ This meant that politics made possible the appearance of a mode of living based on speech and persuasion and not on force or compulsion. In the agora,⁶¹ the public place of the everyday meetings of the citizens, the logos gave rise to the 'anti-logos' and, finally, became a dialogue. As such it attempted to illuminate and adjust the communal affairs. In the cultural context of Greece the validity of the spoken word remained unquestionable, despite the fact that people had realized the power of speech to deceive or to mislead. Speech was generally acknowledged as the sine qua non of the polis; it conferred dignity and importance on the man as a political being, making him a distinguished personality.⁶² P. Vidal-Naquet has no hesitation in stating that "the polis . . . is speech (parole), indeed speech, which was effective in the agora"⁶³ and that the Greek civilization is "the civilization of the oral political word."⁶⁴ In the public square the oral word determined the boundaries of action,⁶⁵ inasmuch as action was an activity consisting primarily of the appropriate words at the right time, which, through opposing argument and public criticism, resulted in a sound decision for the benefit of the whole. The experience of open political discourse gave birth to constructive scepticism and critical inquiry which, as modes of thought, were extended and applied widely in the domain of science and philosophy.⁶⁶ In general, this experience was decisive in widening the citizen's mental horizon and moulding his outlook.

On the basis of the above, one could conclude that political life, with its specific effects on man and social consciousness, was what gave the polis its peculiar identity.

Moral Stance

The polis, from its very first steps, brought to light new postulates in the sphere of human relations and attitudes, which gradually resulted in constituting its special moral principles and standards. These could be summarized as the demand for friendship, moderation and a legal status for the rules of civic conduct and action.

While the pre-political forms of human association were organized on the basis of kinship, real or imagined, the political communities rested upon ties of mutual friendship.⁶⁷ However, this was not the kind of friendship that unites two beings in one soul, but the friendly disposition of each individual towards his fellow-men which leads to less passionate and more reason-governed

relationships. The climate of amiability and friendliness was cultivated mainly by the conditions of equality and liberty that existed among the citizens.⁶⁸ Civic friendship was the foundation-stone of the unanimity of the polis and secured a warm human coexistence. Its lack implied a state of disorder or dissention. K. Vourveris is correct in pointing out that the friendly feelings and the community of interests constituted the essence of the polis.⁶⁹

That friendship was especially functional in the life of the polis is attested by the fifth century literature, where, as L. Pearson observes, "the vocabulary and reasoning of friendship is applied to public relationships, even to the relations between states."⁷⁰ He notices, also, that friendship was blended with the conception of justice,⁷¹ on which the ethico-political thought of that time was focused. Civic friendship underlay all co-operative efforts and sharing of activities. It was, therefore, a prerequisite for the realization of the common weal. Undoubtedly, friendship was a virtue of vital importance to the political community⁷² and marked a new stage in the formulation of Greek values. By creating the conditions of a free and genuine human communion,⁷³ the institution of the polis promoted the development of altruistic feelings⁷⁴ among the citizens, thus giving rise to political humanism.

Furthermore, friendship strengthened the steady tendency of the political community towards moderation. "Be moderate" was the permanent tenet of the polis, the basic presupposition of its existence. The polis needed peace and stability within. However, civil discord and strife were an endemic disease of Greek life,⁷⁵ which usually derived from the conflicting claims of contrary social classes:⁷⁶ The minority, the rich, who were not willing to give up anything; and the majority, the people, who, being reduced to destitution, wanted to grab everything. These two opposing parts often pushed things to extremes. It is understood that a polis with antagonistic social forces was in danger of dissolution. This disastrous effect could be avoided in periods when the socially and politically dominant class in the polis was the middle one.

The seventh, sixth and fifth centuries B.C. had been an age of rising prosperity⁷⁷ in the Greek world, which was made possible by the growth of manufacture and maritime commerce, as well as the invention and spreading of coinage. From the historical sources available, one could conclude that this notable prosperity influenced the standard of life of practically all sections of the population. One of the most significant consequences of this development was the emergence of a class of people who earned their livelihood through means other than the land, that is, by being engaged in manufacturing and mercantile activities. This class could be designated as the middle one,⁷⁸ for the large majority of its members⁷⁹ did not have the wealth of the old landed aristocracy, but neither were they in a condition of indigence. They were able to pay their daily expenses, to become eventually small land proprietors and to obtain their own armour and weapons. The middle class consisted initially of the urban artisans, merchants and traders. In due course it included the small farmers, who, during the age of the tyrants,⁸⁰ succeeded in rising economically.⁸¹ Finally it was extended to all those who managed to have an average standard of living due to their occupation. The 'middle' people soon demanded political rights and, after persistent struggles, gained them.

Ever since the middle class managed to participate in the conduct of public affairs it became the stabilizing factor of the polis, for it was able to play a moderate and reconciling role between the rich and the poor. Thus it secured both the necessary social balance for the preservation and well-being of the polis and the like-mindedness (*omonoia*) among the citizens which was considered to be the greatest blessing a state could have.⁸²

This political rise of the middle class created a new situation, not only in the administration of the polis, but in the matters of social ethics as well. The aristocratic tendency towards *hybris*⁸³ or

arrogance, which cultivated the spirit of excess in human behaviour and entailed the lack of respect for one's fellow men, retreated before the new morals of the 'middle' people, who extolled the moderate attitude in all the manifestations of life. This attitude found its best expression in the famous dictum "nothing in excess" (*meden agan*), which was inscribed over the temple of Delphi and was supposed to meet with Apollo's approval. This saying constituted the principal moral rule of the polis; in its terms Apollo was fairly characterized as "The God of Civic Morality."⁸⁴ Taking into consideration all the above, it can be understood why the man who acted in a moderate manner and consciously avoided a life that knew no measures was regarded as the embodiment of the ideal citizen. The social order, unity and harmony, without which the realization of the common good was unattainable, could be achieved only by a modest people. Thanks to the middle class and its values the polis set as its goal to overcome centrifugal forces in the public domain and proclaimed that "the mean in all things is best"⁸⁵ (*metron ariston*).

The principle of limit, of measure and of 'no excess' that the individual ought to follow and behave by was the most essential quality of *sophrosyne*⁸⁶ or temperance. In the archaic and classical periods this emerged as a great political virtue.⁸⁷ In the Greek moral consciousness which was inseparable from the political one, there existed the conviction that a deficiency of *sophrosyne* would make life in the polis unbearable; the result would be despotism or anarchy, both equally harmful and destructive for the political society.⁸⁸ Besides moderation, *sophrosyne* was manifested as soundness of mind, restraint, self-control, gentleness, prudence, contempt for luxurious habits, control of pleasure and appetites, proportion and self-knowledge. *Sophrosyne* in all of its nuances contributed to a suppression of human aggressiveness in the context of the community and to the building of a civilized life. It was, therefore, a highly positive force.⁸⁹ From the first steps of its political career it was associated with the virtue of justice, since only the man who knew his human and personal limitations and was moved by the spirit of moderation and self-control could be just,⁹⁰ that is, able to obey the rules and laws of his society and to treat others without disregarding their rights and their proper claims. Obviously, in the Greek polis the virtue of *sophrosyne* was not an expression of the ascetic spirit, but a factor able to assure suitable civic conduct.

That the middle class protected and fostered *sophrosyne* appears clearly in the historical life of the fourth century B.C. Because, through the Peloponnesian War, the middle class became thinly populated,⁹¹ the polis lost its equilibrium. Instead of moderation, many of the known city-states suffered from domestic strifes (*staseis*) of long duration and extremity reigned. The need for *sophrosyne* was imperative, as attested by the works of the fourth-century writers who constantly appeal to it and praise bygone days, during which, as they believed, *sophrosyne* was prevalent.⁹²

Proper behaviour in the polis was of vital importance. Since the citizens needed to act in unison in pursuing the common good their conduct could not be arbitrary and uncoordinated. There had to be an objective and impartial measure, accepted by everyone, that would define behaviour in general, and this was the written law.

In the course of the seventh century B.C. laws were codified and published in many poleis, in widely scattered parts of the Greek world. This was one of the most significant achievements of the archaic period.⁹³ The published law not only contributed to the evolution of judicial practice and procedure towards a more fair administration of justice,⁹⁴ but also to the improvement of the citizens' morals. The latter becomes apparent in the ancient testimonies relative to the legislation of the famous archaic lawgivers, where one could find a considerable number of laws designed to implant sound principles in the minds of the people and to oblige them to act accordingly.⁹⁵ Clearly the first lawgivers showed a strong interest in *sophrosyne* and in its predominance in the polis.

This reflected their social origin. As Aristotle records (Pol. 1296 a 18-21), most of them belonged to the middle class which was inclined to this excellence.

The laws of the polis were regarded as setting the standard of what was right or wrong for the citizens and, thus, as being a code of morality able to exercise a great educative influence.⁹⁶ The moralizing power of the law, that is, its power of inculcating moral and social virtues in individuals, was conducive to the creation of the conditions of the good life, which was the aim of the polis. As the Greeks viewed the law as expressing the collective will,⁹⁷ they did not doubt that the law wanted "what was just and noble and beneficial"⁹⁸ for the whole. Hence, despite their love of freedom and independence, they submitted themselves willingly to it.⁹⁹ The belief that the laws, which functioned as ethical commitments, were a product of common agreement¹⁰⁰ constitutes a strong indication of the anthropocentricity of the polis, since it makes manifest that men and not gods were the ultimate authority for moral norms. This did not necessarily imply the questioning of the validity of law. However, it surely shows that in the context of the polis, men became conscious of the fact that their common agreements were the measure of all things and values and that the good life was an artifact.

The laws of the polis codified the relations among the citizens according to the principle of reciprocal advantage which governs the drawing up of a contract. This means that the law presupposed the qualities of measure and proportion and, thus, it appeared as representing the spirit of compromise and balance which was an essential attribute of the character of the polis.

From what has been said, it seems clear that the ethico-political outlook of the middle class was instrumental in promoting order and friendship within the community. Therefore, it needs no special effort to comprehend why the moral ideal of the polis was shaped on the basis of this outlook.

Final Remarks

The fourth century B.C. was one of deep crisis¹⁰¹ for the polis and its institutions. This was mainly due to the Peloponnesian War (431-404), which brought great evils upon the Greek poleis and ushered in the beginning of their decay.

From the point of view of morality, one of the symptoms of this decay was the strong tendency of the individual towards an easy and pleasurable life. The people who survived the war and its miseries had an intense wish to taste any pleasure available and to avoid any pain. Moreover, the turbulent post-war state of the polis increased the uncertainty of life, which resulted in strengthening the hedonistic attitude of the entire society.¹⁰² Another symptom was the growing spirit of individualism.¹⁰³ The average citizen became more interested in his own welfare than in that of the polis, that is, his desire of working for the common weal was eliminated. This tendency is clearly portrayed in Greek New Comedy. Contrary to the Old one which concentrates on public figures and matters, New Comedy deals with private life and its affairs, for such subjects were of interest to its audience. Both hedonism and individualism undermined the foundations of the polis and were considered to be its great enemies. The thinkers of this epoch did not miss the opportunity to criticize the situation, hoping for the rehabilitation of the old authority of the polis, which unfortunately did not occur. Plato and Aristotle tried, in vain, to revitalize the communal spirit and to reconnect the individual with the community.

In the second half of the fourth century B.C., we also have the destruction of the institution of the polis, which for more than three centuries had inspired the great pedagogues and the philosophers of Greece. The battle of Chaeronea (338 B.C.), which was meant to be the final

triumph of the Macedonians, delivered the coup de grâce to the autonomy of the poleis and made them insignificant parts of a large-scale state. The polis ceased to be a self-governing and independent community. Its mission to uplift the morals and the spirit came to an end.

During the Alexandrian times the public life of the Greek cities declined dramatically. The individual felt himself in the grip of a world, which he could not control or affect. The Roman domination made things even worse. The political helplessness of the age is reflected, as E. Zeller¹⁰⁴ maintained, in the philosophical doctrines of the Stoic apathy, the Epicurean self-satisfaction and the Sceptic imperturbability. The Hellenistic polis had no bearing on the Classical polis, despite the assertions¹⁰⁵ by some scholars that there were close links between them. The former lacked autonomy, the sine qua non of the latter; the gulf was unbridged. With the battle of Chaeronea the ideal of the polis collapsed definitively and irrevocably.

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Notes

1. *The Greek Experience* (1957; London: Cardinal edition by Sphere Books Ltd., 1973), p. 80.

2. N.D. Fustel de Coulanges in his work *Lacit  antique* (Paris, 1864). The English translation of this work bears the title *The Ancient City* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956). He sees the polis under the influence of the liberal individualism of the 19th century and as a consequence emphasizes the omnipotence of the polis over its members. He expresses also the belief that "the ancients knew nothing of individual liberty" (p. 219 from the Engl. trans.). This assertion is characterized by A. Zimmern as "a gross exaggeration, or misuse of words." See *The Greek Commonwealth. Politics and Economics in Fifth-Century Athens* (1911; 5th ed., rev. 1931; rpt., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1961), p. 82.

3. Jaeger, *Paideia. The Ideals of Greek Culture*, translated from the second German edition by G. Highet, in three volumes (2nd ed., New York: Oxford University Press, 1945).

4. For more complete information concerning the institutions of the polis see, among others, G. Glotz, *Lacit greccue. Le d veloppement des institutions* (1928; Paris: Editions Albin Michel, 1968) and V.L. Ehrenberg, *The Greek State* (2nd ed., London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1969). For an introduction to the constitutional and cultural history of the most important poleis see K. Freeman, *Greek City-States* (London: Macdonald, 1950), L.H. Jeffery, *Archaic Greece. The City-States c. 700-500 B.C.* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1976) and P.J. Rhodes, *The Greek City States. A Source Book* (London and Sydney: Croom Helm Ltd., 1986). For documents portraying various aspects of the polis, and mainly of Athens, during the fifth and fourth centuries B.C., see the work, *The Greek Polis*, edited by A.W.H. Adkins and P. White, series, *University of Chicago Readings in Western Civilization*, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1986).

5. The polis of the classical period was the product of long evolution. Unfortunately our historical sources do not offer adequate information concerning its origin and its early form. For the specific period which gave rise to the polis and is still a matter of controversy see V.L. Ehrenberg's well-documented article "When Did The Polis Rise?" *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 57 (1937), 147-159. On the historical development of the polis see also more recent discussions in the following books: C.G. Starr, *The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece. 800-500 B.C.* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), pp. 31-34, 98ff.; M.M. Austin and P. Vid al-Naquet,

Economic and Social History of Ancient Greece: An Introduction. (London: B.T. Batsford Ltd., 1977), pp. 49-53, a revised English trans. of the French original, *Economies et sociétés en Grèce ancienne* (1972; 2nd ed., Paris: Librairie Armand Colin, 1973); J.V.A. Fine, *The Ancient Greeks. A Critical History* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1983), pp. 48-51; M.H. Crawford and D. Whitehead, *Archaic and Classical Greece. A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 27-51.

6. The afore-mentioned developments are not unrelated to each other and, with a proper examination, their causal relationships can become apparent. A correlation of some of them is attempted by R.M. Cook, in his study "Ionia and Greece in the Eighth and Seventh Centuries B.C.," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 66 (1946), 67-98, particularly p. 79. Cook emphasizes the problem of overpopulation and says that it led to three practical solutions: a) expansion into other neighboring territories, which implies warlike activities, b) decrease of the population by the colonizing movement and c) imports of food and other necessities. The last two solutions require, according to him, a higher level of organization, which can be assured within the boundaries of an organized state, i.e., the developing polis.

7. At the end of the archaic period--conventionally the eighth, seventh and sixth centuries B.C.--the polis managed to suppress the power of the great family groups. This is considered by many scholars as reflecting the initiation of the "true polis." It must be noted that the terms 'polis', 'city-state', 'political community', 'political society' are used interchangeably as being synonymous.

8. When the term 'polis' is used, one should never forget that in mainland Greece, South Italy, the islands and Asia Minor there were hundreds of separate poleis with many differences in their structure and constitution. However, in spite of the dissimilarities, they had a number of common features that allow us to use the word polis as an abstraction and to proceed in certain generalizations. In particular, we use here sources from Athens regarding the polis.

Concerning the precise meaning of the term polis, as well as of the terms 'ptolis', 'polisma', 'asty' and 'kome' in the fifth century Athens one may refer to C.W. Dunmore's dissertation *The Meaning of Polis* (Albany: New York University, 1961), *Dissertation Abstracts* 22 (1962), 4008. See, also, E. Barker, *Greek Political Theory. Plato and His Predecessors* (5th ed. 1960; rpt., Bungay, Suffolk: Methuen, 1964), p. 27, n. 1.

9. Cf. M.I. Finley, *The Ancient Greeks: An Introduction to Their Life and Thought* (New York: The Viking Press, 1963), p. 39 and E. Barker, *Greek Political Theory*, p. 28.

10. Cf. Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus*, 56-57: "Neither walled town nor ship is anything at all if it be empty and no men dwell together therein" and Thucydides, *History*, VII. 77. "It is the men who are the polis."

11. Authoritative information concerning the institution of the 'metics' in Athens is offered by D. Whitehead in his study *The Ideology of the Athenian Metic* (Cambridge: Cambridge Philological Society, Suppl. vol. 4, 1977).

12. From the rich bibliography concerning the meaning of slavery in the ancient Greek society and other related issues, I refer only to T. Wiedemann's book *Greek and Roman Slavery* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). This is an especially valuable work, because it is the first publication to include such a great selection of ancient references, epigraphical as well as literary, on the subject of slavery.

13. See *Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie*, Bd. I (Sämtliche Werke, Bd. 17) (1831; 4th ed., Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: H. Glockner, 1965), p. 134.

14. Cf. A. Zimmern, who supports the view that in Athens, the most famous representative of the poleis, the human relations between the citizens and the settled alien population, including the slaves, were based on cooperation and not on compulsion or coercion (The Greek Commonwealth, pp. 380-396). Cf. also R. Schlaifer, "Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to Aristotle," *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology*, 47 (1936), 165-204, particularly, p. 110.

15. M.H. Crawford and D. Whitehead, (op. cit., pp. 1 and 4) are proponents of the view that the polis was meant to be the body of its citizens and they give reference to certain Thucydidean passages, which support this view.

16. See, for example, G. Dittenberger, *SIG³*, no. 121. Cf. R. Meiggs and D. Lewis, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p 2, no. 2: "The city thus decided . . .;" (ad' eFade/poli). Equivalent decree-formulas were the phrases "the demos decided" (edoxen to demo)--in decrees and inscriptions the term 'demos' meant the people constituting the citizen assembly--and "the council of the citizen assembly and the demos decided" (edoxente boule kai to demo).

17. J.-P. Vernant, *The Origins of Greek Thought*, trans. from the French (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1982), p. 47.

18. *Trade and Politics in Ancient Greece*, trans. by L.M. Fraser and D.C. Macgregor (New York: Biblo and Tannen, 1965), p. 118. Cf. M. Ha das, "From Nationalism to Cosmopolitanism in the Greco-Roman World," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 4 (1943), 105-111, particularly p. 105 and A.W. Gouldner, *Enter Plato: Classical Greece and the Origins of Social Theory* (New York, London: Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1965), p. 144.

19. *History*, V. 32.1 and 116.4; III.36.2. Cf. K.J. Dover, *Greek Popular Morality. In the Time of Plato and Aristotle* (Oxford: B. Blackwell), p. 161.

20. For more details on this subject see C.G. Starr, "The Decline of the Early Kings," *Historia*, 10 (1961), 129-138.

21. Cf. M.I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus* (1954; 2nd rev. ed., Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin, A Pelican Book, 1979), who states that "the aristocrats ruled as a group, equals without a first among them," (p. 106).

22. See his article "The Hoplite Reform and History," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 85 (1965), 110-122, particularly pp. 110-113.

23. The political consequences of the low cost and availability of iron, which enabled the non-aristocrat to obtain his own weapons, are described and analysed by S.D. Kyriasopoulos, in his book, *Politikaaitiates Ethikestou Aristotelous* (Ioannina, 1971), pp. 11-12. Cf. M.O. Wason *Class Struggles in Ancient Greece* (Roma: Edizione Anastatico, "L'Erma" di Bretschneider, 1972), pp. 30-32.

24. Thucydides, *History*. I.6.1.

25. See the following much-debated Aristotelian passage: "And the earliest government which existed among the Hellenes, after the overthrow of the kingly power, grew up out of the warrior class, and was originally taken from the knights (for strength and superiority in war at that time depended on cavalry; indeed without discipline, infantry are useless, and in ancient times there was no military knowledge or tactics, and therefore the strength of armies lay in the cavalry). But when cities increased and the heavy-armed grew in strength, more had a share in the government." *Pol.* 1297 b 16-24 (trans. by B. Jowett).

26. For the political implications of the 'hoplite reform' see J. Salmon, "Political Hoplites?" *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 97 (1977), 84-101, particularly, pp. 93-101.

27. "Hoplites and Heroes: Sparta's Contribution to the Technique of Ancient Warfare," *The Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 97 (1977), 11-27, particularly p. 27.

28. H. North supports the view that *sophrosyne* was not a heroic virtue and that it acquired high value with the growth of the polis. See *Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1966), pp. 2-3.

29. Cf. J.-P. Vernant (op. cit., p. 63), who regards *sophrosyne* as the characteristic quality of the hoplites, and A. Andrewes, *Greek Society* (1967; 1971; rpt., Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books Ltd., 1975), who writes that "the needs of hoplite fighting, steady discipline and a steadfast refusal to give ground, shaped the classical conception of what a good man ought to be" (pp. 161-162).

30. *The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece: Attitudes of Superiority from Homer to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.*, (Lawrence Ks: Coronado Press, 1980), p. 40.

31. *The Human Condition* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1958), p. 38.

32. History. II.40.2. Cf. Plato, *Republic*, 550 A and 620 C.

33. See Plato, *Republic*, 550 C, 551 A-B, 533 A etc., where it becomes apparent that in an oligarchical regime the essential criterion for active citizenship was a property qualification.

34. See Thucydides, *History*. II. 37.1: "It is true that our government has been called democracy, because its administration is not in the hands of the few, but of the many."

35. See Plato, *Republic*. 557 A.

36. N.D. Fustel de Coulanges, op. cit., pp. 334-336, presents in a descriptive and colourful way the politically active life of a citizen.

37. See J.L. Stokes, "Schole," *The Classical Quarterly* 30 (1936), 177-187 and particularly pp. 181-182. For an interesting interpretation of how the Greeks, as well as the Medieval Europeans, understood and valued leisure, see T. Pieper, *Leisure. The Basis of Culture*, trans. by A. Dru (New York and Scarborough, Ontario: New American Library, 'A Mentor Book', 1963), especially pp. 19-68. Pieper's specific message for the bourgeois Western societies is plain: Unless we rediscover true leisure and cease idolizing "work," we are in danger of destroying our culture and ourselves.

38. According to E. Barker, op. cit., pp. 32-34, the ideal of leisure was nourished mainly in the oligarchical poleis. In contrast, actual life in Athens, which represents for him the normal Greek community, shows that the assembly included a large number of craftsmen and workmen, who, as Pericles could boast in his Funeral Oration of 431 B.C., were "not prevented by attention to their own business from knowing adequately the political matters" (Thucydides, *History*, II. 40.2). Barker associates leisure with aristocracy and cites certain Aristotelian passages to support his view. However, it is worth remembering that in the aristocratic society of Homer no work was deprecatory and that kings and heroes did not hesitate to perform manual labour. For more details, see G. Glotz, *Le travail dans la Grèce ancienne. Histoire économique de la Grèce depuis la période homérique jusqu'à la conquête romaine* (Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan, 1920), pp. 19-21.

What caused the demand for leisure and consequently the contempt of productive work was the institution of the polis itself, which consumed most of the citizen's time, regardless of whether the regime was democratic or oligarchic. Despite the fact that the citizens of the Greek city-states did not really constitute a purely leisure class, the idea of the polis was never reconciled with the idea of work for the necessities of life. Cf. W. Donlan, op. cit., pp. 172-173.

39. Although the philosophers tried to give a new meaning to the concept of leisure, by associating it with the *vita contemplativa* (see, for instance, Plato, *Theaetetus*, 172D-176A, and *Phaedo*, 66B-D) they never ceased to treat leisure in its widely accepted sense of time assigned to

political activities. The above thought is strongly supported by the well known Aristotelian passage "leisure is necessary both for the development of virtue and the performance of political duties" (Politics, 1329 a 1-2).

40. See, among others, T.B. Eriksen, *Bios Theoretikos. Notes on Aristotle's Ethica Nicomachea X, 6-8* (Oslo, Bergen, Troms: Universitetsforlaget, 1976), p. 110. But see F. Solmsen, "Leisure and Play in Aristotle's Ideal State," in *Kleine Schriften, Bd. II* (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1968), 1-28, particularly p. 9, who maintains that because of the "exhausting worries and tensions of the Peloponnesian war" and the restlessness and anxiety of civic life at that time, *scholē* was also thought of as leisure from the polypragmosyne of political life.

41. See W. Jaeger, *Paideia*, vol. I, p. 7.

42. C.M. Bowra, op. cit., p. 37. Cf. M. I. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*, p. 116, who states explicitly that the "notion of social obligation is fundamentally non-heroic." Finley uses as an example of the heroic mentality Hector's prayer to Zeus and other gods (*Iliad*, VI 476-81) and comments as follows: "There is no social conscience in these words, no trace of the Decalogue, no responsibility other than familial, no obligation to anyone or anything but one's own prowess and one's own drive to victory and power" (p. 28).

43. A man's influence and status in the polis depended upon what contribution he made to its maintenance, welfare, amusement and protection. This can be attested by the institution of the "liturgies," a wide range of public offices undertaken by the well-to-do citizens. For more details, see M.I. Finley, *Politics in the Ancient World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), pp. 36-39.

44. *The Greek View of Life* (1896; 4th ed., London: Methuen and Co., 1905), p. 122.

45. C.J. de Vogel, "The Concept of Personality in Greek and Christian Thought," in *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy*, ed. J.K. Ryan (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963), vol. II, 20-60, particularly p. 23. In this essay, the author ascribes the creation of the concept of the "person" to the ancient Greeks, but she does not attempt to see this development as the result of specific socio-political conditions. On the contrary, B. Snell considers the rise of the personal attitude and the communal establishment of the polis as being contemporary events. See *The Discovery of the Mind. The Greek Origins of European Thought*, trans. by T.G. Rosenmeyer (New York and Evanston: Harper and Row, 1960), p. 69.

46. *Thrasymachus*, (DK 85 B 1). Cf. Solon, Poem 8 (Diehl), Democritus, (DK 68 B 119): "Men have fashioned an image of Chance as an excuse for their own stupidity. For Chance rarely conflicts with Intelligence, and most things in life can be set in order by an intelligent sharp-sightedness" (trans. by K. Freeman) and Plato, *Republic*, 617 E: "The responsibility is his who chooses; God is not responsible." The above passages express ideas which are typical of the classical period of Greek thought, i.e., of the culture of the polis, where a strong faith in man's power and reason, as well as in his freedom of the will and moral responsibility, was prevalent. However, see A.W.H Adkins' well-known book *Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values* (1960; rpt., Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1975), the central theme of which maintains that the concept of moral responsibility was unimportant to the ancient Greek.

47. *Truth and Method*, translation from the second (1965) German edition, edited by G. Barden and J. Cumming (1975; New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company, 1982), p. 245.

48. *The Origins of Greek Thought*, p. 51.

49. *The Human Condition*, p. 41. For an interpretation of Arendt's conception of the public realm see M. Canovan, "Politics as Culture: Hannah Arendt and the Public Realm," *History of Political Thought* 6 (1985), 617-42.

50. *The Human Condition*, p. 50.

51. See *The Human Condition*, p. 52. On Arendt's conception of "the world," see L.A. Cooper, "Hannah Arendt's Political Philosophy: An Interpretation," *The Review of Politics*, 38 (1976), 145-76.

52. For more details on this subject see R. Sennett's stimulating work, *The Fall of Public Man* (New York: Random House Inc., Vintage Books, 1978), particularly pages 3-32, 259-68, 337-40.

53. This dating is accepted by many scholars. See, for example, L.H. Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece. A Study of the Origin of the Greek Alphabet and its Development from the Eighth to the Fifth Centuries B.C.* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 21ff. and J.N. Coldstream, *Geometric Greece* (London: E. Benn, 1977), pp. 295ff. On the contrary, E.A. Havelock supports the view that the alphabet first came into use in 700 B.C., *The Literate Revolution in Greece and its Cultural Consequences* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1982), pp. 82, 102.

54. This invention is owed to merchants from Ionia who borrowed from the Phoenicians a number of letter-shapes ("phoinikeia grammata," Herodotus, *History*, V. 58) and adapted them to the needs and sounds of the Greek language.

55. See A. Burns' recent survey of the evidence for Greek literacy "Athenian Literacy in the Fifth Century B.C.," *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 42 (1981), 371-87. Burns concludes that "from the end of the sixth century B.C. the vast majority of Athenian citizens were literate" (p. 371). For the effects of the expansion of literacy see E.A. Havelock, *op. cit.*, pp. 82ff.; J.-P. Vernant, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-3; S.D. Kyrisopoulos, *Togegonostes philosophias* (Athens, 1969), pp. 46-71.

56. For the relationship among the written word, the ear and the eye, see E.A. Havelock, *op. cit.*, pp. 181-2, and of the same author, *The Greek Concept of Justice* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1978), pp. 224-5.

57. This attitude is expressed by Heraclitus in his characteristic fragment "The eyes are more exact witnesses than the ears" (DK 22 B 101 a); cf. Herodotus, *History* I.8.

58. The view that, due to the written word, the sense of sight was awakened and activated could be supported by B. Snell's challenging position that the Homeric man--who lived under preliterate conditions--did not have the ability to see, *op. cit.* p. 4-5.

59. *Paideia*, vol. I, p. 9.

60. The term 'logos' was one of many senses. For a detailed survey of what this word meant in the fifth century B.C. or earlier, see W.K.C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* (1962; rpt., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), vol. I, pp. 420-4. For a schematized classification of the significations of the term 'logos', see D. Guerrière, "Physis, Sophia, Psyche," in *Heraclitean Fragments. A Companion Volume to the Heidegger/Fink Seminar on Heraclitus*, ed. by T. Sallis and K. Maly (Alabama: The University of Alabama Press, 1980), 86-134, particularly pp. 99-100. Here it is used in the sense of 'speech', as a coherent and rational arrangement of words.

61. For the meaning and significance of the agora in the life of the polis, see J.-P. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs. Etudes de psychologie historique* (Paris: F. Maspero, 1971), Vol. 1, pp. 179-181 and G. Glotz, *La cité grecque*, pp. 30-31.

62. The fact that 'rhetoric', the art of speaking, flourished in the Greek poleis and was considered to be the art of success in public life, as well as the prerequisite for access to power shows what 'speech' meant to the ordinary citizen.

63. *Le chasseur noir. Formes de pensée et formes de société dans le monde grec* (Paris: F. Maspero, 1981), p. 22.

64. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

65. For a profound interpretation of the meaning of action in ancient Greece, see H. Arendt's book, *The Human Condition*, especially chapter V.

66. For the relevance of the political experience to science and philosophy in the ancient Greek world, see G.E.R. Lloyd, *Magic, Reason and Experience. Studies in the Origin and Development of Greek Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), pp. 246-67.

67. Cf. J.-P. Vernant, *Mythe et pensée chez les Grecs*, vol. II, p. 28, n. 59, who considers friendship to be an essentially 'political' sentiment. For interesting discussions of the Greek view of friendship see L. Pearson, *Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece* (1962; rpt., Stanford California: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 86-9 and 136-60 and J. Ferguson, *Moral Values in the Ancient World* (1958; rpt., New York: Arno Press Inc., 1979), pp. 53ff. and 102ff.

68. Cf. Plato, *Laws* 697 C-D, who is conscious of the fact that when the *demos* is deprived of its freedom and despotism instead of equality prevails, "the friendly feelings" (to *philon*) and "the common" (to *koinon*), within the polis, are destroyed. See also *Laws* 757 A, where the old saying that "equality begets friendship" is quoted, which shows how the Greeks were convinced that civic friendship was the result of equality.

69. "To *philon kai to koinon en te polei*," in the honorary work *Charisterion eis Anastasion K. Orlandon* (Athens, 1965), vol. I, pp. 153-165, particularly p. 158.

70. *Popular Ethics in Ancient Greece*, p. 86. Cf. W.R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1971), pp. 105-6, where it appears that the politician of that era should present himself as 'philopolis', 'eunous toi demoi', 'philodemos', or the like, if he wanted to make the "demos his loyal friend" (*Hero dotus*, V. 66) and thus gain political advancement and power. See also the chapter "Political Friendship and Civic Loyalty" (pp. 35-84) of the same book, where the author examines and analyses the political function and relevance of friendship within the framework of the democratic polis.

71. See L. Pearson, *op. cit.*, p. 87.

72. It is not coincidental that in Empedocles' natural philosophy 'philotes' (Love or Friendship) is regarded as a cosmic principle of great significance. It is in this idea of his that the vital functioning of friendship in the polis is reflected.

73. Where there is no partnership and communion, there is no friendship. Cf. Plato, *Gorgias*, 507 E and Aristotle, *Politics*, 1295 b 24.

74. See E.M. Wood's and N. Wood's work, *Class Ideology and Ancient Political Theory. Socrates, Plato and Aristotle in Social Context*, in which is pointed out that altruism was one of the aspects of Greek popular morality. Concretely the authors maintain that "kindliness (*philanthropia*)" was not an insignificant virtue in the Greek moral code and that it was expressed "as good will toward others, gratitude, affection, and a spirit of conciliation," (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1978), p. 262. Cf. J. Ferguson, *op. cit.*, pp. 102-17.

75. The references to civil wars in ancient sources are innumerable. See, for instance, Thucydides, *History*, III. 82-84; Athenaeus, *Deipnosophistae*, XII. 523 F-524 A; Diodorus, XV.57ff; Isokrates, *To Philip* 52; Aeneas Tacticus, XI, 13ff. For modern discussions on the cruel struggles between the rich and the poor in most of the poleis during the fourth century B.C., see C. Mossé, *La fin de la démocratie athénienne. Aspects sociaux et politiques du déclin de l'acité grecque au IV^e siècle avant J.C.* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1962) pp. 30-31, 224-27 and G. Glotz, *Lacite grecque*, pp. 326-34.

76. I am aware that the term 'class' is not the suitable term for describing the social categories of population, when referring to pre-capitalist societies, like the ancient Greek ones. I utilize the term 'class' the way M.I. Finley uses it, that is, "in the sense intended in ordinary discourse, not in a technical sense, Marxist or other" (Politics in the Ancient World, p. 10, n. 29).

77. It should be noted that this economic development was undoubtedly stimulated by the early movement of colonization in eighth and seventh centuries B.C.

78. Among the contemporary scholars there exists no agreement that there was a middle class in the Greek poleis. M.I. Finley, Politics in the Ancient World, p. 11, for instance, is not willing to accept that such a class existed and restricts himself to the distinction between the rich and the poor, while F.J. Frost, Greek Society (Lexington, Massachusetts: D.C. Heath and Company, 1971), pp. 87-93 and G. Glotz, *Lacit  grecque*, p. 324, consider that the middle class was a reality in several poleis and especially in Athens, which represents the most perfect form of the ancient polis.

79. From the class of the merchants and craftsmen there came into being a number of people who surpassed the economic status of a middle class man and acquired even greater wealth than that of the aristocrats. They were the first of the commoners who demanded equality of political privileges with the nobility and soon separated their interests from those of the middle class. Probably these were the parvenus against whom the poet Theognis of Megara addressed his complaints (See Theognis, 39-58).

80. This age is the period from about 650 to 510 B.C. See A. Andrewes, The Greek Tyrants (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1958), p. 8.

81. The tyrants' policy was anti-aristocratic in character. One of the most significant reforms they brought about for the benefit of the peasants was the redistribution of land, which contributed decisively to the betterment of their economic situation.

82. See, for example, Xenophon, Memorabilia, IV.4.16 and Lysias, XVIII.17.

83. For more details on the concept and meaning of *hybris*, for instance, C.M. Bowra, The Greek Experience, pp. 106-107; L. Pearson, op. cit., pp. 71ff, 104-107, 137-44; H.D. Oakeley, Greek Ethical Thought. From Homer to the Stoics (Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971), pp. xv-xvi.

84. This characterization was given to Apollo by S.D. Kyriasopoulos in a well-documented essay that bears the same title, published initially in *Epeterida Stereoelladikon Meleton*, 5 (1974-75), 11-32 and later in a collection of essays of the same author entitled *Logos kai ethos. Philosophia tou archaiou Ellenikou pneumatou* (Ioannina: University of Ioannina, Dodone, Suppl. 6, 1976), 26-47. An English translation of this essay has been published in *Mosaic, Journal of the Comparative Study of International Literature, Act and Ideas* (New Delhi, 1976), 23-44.

85. Cleobulus, *Stabaeus* III.1.172 a 1 (DK 10 A3). Cf. Phocylides, fr. 12 (Diehl). For a thorough inquiry concerning the concepts of the mean (*mesotes*) and measure (*metron*) in Greek thought, with the exception of Aristotle's doctrine on the mean, see G.P. Cousoulakos "Mesotes kaimetron ente ellenike dianoesei," in *Xenion*, Festschrift f r Pan. T. Zepos, Herausgegeben von E. Von Caemmerer, T.H. Kaiser, G. Kegel, W. M ller-Freienfels, H.T. Wolff. Unter Mitarbeit von Th. T. Panagopoulos (Athen-Freibourg/BR.-K ln: Ch. Katsikalis Verlag, 1973), Bd. I, 203-264.

86. The most exhaustive enquiry into the concepts of *sophrosyne*, from its earliest appearance in the Homeric poems to its transformation into a Christian virtue during the first centuries A.D., is offered by H. North in his splendid work *Sophrosyne. Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature* (op. cit.). For the meaning of *sophrosyne* in the classical Greece, see A. Kolimann, "Sophrosyne," *Weiner Studien*, 59 (1941), 12-34 and G.J. de Vries, "Sophrosyne en Grec classique," *Mnemosyne*, 11 (1943), 81-101.

87. On *sophrosyne* as a political virtue, see especially H. North, *From Myth to Icon. Reflections of Greek Ethical Doctrine in Literature and Art* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979), Chapter 2, 87-134. It is worthwhile mentioning that *sophrosyne* did not have any political significance in the heroic age. Furthermore, the Homeric society did not attach high value to it. As A.W.H. Adkins has pointed out, it was unnecessary for the Homeric hero to possess this excellence, *Merit and Responsibility. A Study in Greek Values*, pp. 37, 61.

88. See Aeschylus, *Eumenides*, 516-34. Cf. Sophocles, fr. 622 (Nauck), where one could clearly see that *sophrosyne* and justice were regarded as salutary for the polis.

89. The opposite view, which does not ascribe a positive value to the Greek concept of *sophrosyne*, has been maintained also. See, for instance, C. Kluckhohn, *Anthropology and the Classics* (Providence, Rhode Island: Brown University Press, 1961), pp. 64-7 and J. Ferguson, *op. cit.*, pp. 32-42. However, the majority of the modern scholars emphasize the dynamic and positive nature of *sophrosyne* and see its characteristic imprint in every achievement of the classical civilization.

90. What mainly supported the political status of *sophrosyne* was its connection with justice which was considered the supreme socio-political virtue. The belief that justice presupposes *sophrosyne* finds in Plato its climax. See, for example, *Gorgias* 507 A-C; *Laws* 691 C.

91. See Aristotle, *Politics*, 1296 a 23-4, who notices that "in most poleis the middle stratum is small" in his days.

92. See H.F. North, *From Myth to Icon*, p. 124.

93. For recent evaluations of this period, see A. Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece: The Age of Experiment* (London: Dent, 1980) and C. Mossé, *La Grèce archaïque d'Homère à Eschyle. VIII^e-VI^e siècles av. J.C.* (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1984).

94. See M. Gagarin, *Early Greek Law* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1986), who points out that the early Greek inscribed laws referred greatly to procedural matters concerning the judicial process (pp. 81, 86, 123, 128), in order to prevent it "from being corrupted or otherwise abused for political or financial gain" p. 86. Contrary to the published law, the unwritten customary law of the pre-political stage of Greece usually functioned at the expense of the common man, inasmuch as it could be modified and interpreted to suit the interests of the nobles who had the privilege of administering justice. See Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 38-9 and 220-24, who is full of complaints about the 'bribe-devouring' kings (aristocrats), who violate justice through the lure of gain.

95. Cf. R.J. Bonner and G. Smith, *The Administration of Justice From Homer to Aristotle* (1938; rpt., New York: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1968), vol. I, p. 82, H.F. North, *From Myth to Icon*, pp. 122-3 and G.C. Field, *Plato and His Contemporaries. A Study in Fourth-Century Life and Thought* (1930; 3rd ed. London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1967), p. 82.

96. For the educative function of the law see J. de Romilly *La loi dans la pensée grecque. Des origines à Aristote* (Paris: Société d'édition. "Les Belles Lettres," 1971) and especially the chapter "L'éducation par le lois," pp. 227-50.

97. See [Demosthenes], XXV.16. Cf. Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, I.2.42.

98. [Demosthenes], *Ibid.*

99. See Herodotus, *History* VII. 104.

100. It was also held that the laws had a divine origin. See, for instance, Heracleitus (DK 22 B 114) and Sophocles, *Oedipus Tyrannus*, 865-72. However, this conception did not characterize the spirit of the classical polis, but it was associated with the period of the first lawgivers, when

the civic consciousness was not fully developed and the story of the extra-human status of law was necessary for the effectiveness, validity and inviolability of the laws.

101. For more details on this subject see M.M. Austin and P. Vidal-Naquet, *op. cit.*, especially the chapters 7 of the first and second part of the book, pp. 131-55 and 334-83 respectively; C. Mossè, *La fin de la démocratie athénienne*; G.R. Morrow, *Plato's Epistles. A Translation with Critical Essays and Notes* (Indianapolis, New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1962), mainly the chapter "Faction and Disorder in Fourth-century Greece," pp. 123-30.

102. Besides certain Platonic dialogues, such as the *Protagoras*, *Gorgias*, *Republic*, *Philebus*, etc., many of the extant speeches by the Athenian orators are an important source of information about the tendency of the fourth-century man towards hedonism.

103. For the growing spirit of individualism from the fourth century onwards, see G. Glotz, *Lacités grecque*, pp. 303-16 and F.J. Frost, *Greek Society*, pp. 99, 102.

104. See his work, *Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics*, trans. by O. Reichel (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1870), p. 18.

105. See, for instance, V.L. Ehrenberg, "Some aspects of the transition from the Classical to the Hellenistic Age" in *Man, State and Deity. Essays in Ancient History* (London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1974), p. 55.

Chapter II

Urbanization and Its Conservative Critique: The German Experience

Tamás Tóth

The arts and sciences profusely illustrate the historical role played by cities in the development of human society. In negative terms, one can gauge the extraordinary significance of urban development by the intensity of the ideological reactions to the birth of metropolises and the extension of their impact on society as a whole. In Europe, antagonism to, and criticism of, cities have ancient and medieval roots,¹ and are found in nearly every advanced capitalist society in modern times. Such a broad tendency unites a wide variety of ideological factors, though certain motifs recur. To be more precise, anti-urban sentiments may constitute more or less important parts of various ideologies. Let it suffice to recall such diverse expressions of this as John Ruskin's and William Morris' "anti-urbanism on culturalist grounds: in Victorian England,² the urban criticism of the literary circle "Strapaese" in Fascist Italy,³ and the quasi-Marxist analysis of the urban crisis in late capitalism by France's Henri Lefebvre, etc. The two main countries where anti-urbanism have centuries-old, uninterrupted traditions influencing the whole national culture are the United States⁴ and Germany.

This study will attempt to outline pre-1945 conservative forms of urban criticism in Germany in four steps: (a) the anti-urbanism of W.H. Riehl, (b) the urbanization of Germany, (c) Oswald Spengler's critique of the capitalist metropolis, and (d) the mass impact of romantic agrarian urban ideologies.

The First Classic of Modern Anti-urbanism: Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl

The first "classic" of the anti-urban trends in the modern sense in Germany was W.H. Riehl (1832-1897), the motifs of whose critical conception were profusely elaborated by the German ideologists in the following decades. Though his outlook was thoroughly conservative, he exerted a widespread and lasting effect as he put his finger on the sorest points and analyzed them acutely. The events of the year 1848 prompted Riehl to conclude that the forces of "social constancy" (Beharren) were pitted against those of "social movement" (Bewegung) and that the outcome of their battle would determine the future. He was firmly committed to the conservative traditions of precapitalist Germany and to the forces fighting a rear guard action. He recognized correctly that the last bulwarks of the past were to be found in rural areas and in some towns which remained practically quasi-feudal. The new towns and cities of the 18th and 19th centuries, in turn, attracted his critical interest as they concentrated the forces of "social movement."⁵

Riehl identified one of the central problems of the age with the fact that after the Thirty Years War the formerly "proper" relationship between town and country had been disrupted: urban interests had gained predominance over rural interests. Thus Riehl, who considered the medieval urban development in Germany to be unambiguously positive, sharply criticized as "artificial" formations both the residence cities mushrooming over the 18th century and the new urban centers created by the "eccentricities and fads" of "over-refined 19th century life abounding in needs." But he considered the most alarming outcome of "unnatural" urban development in modern times to be the excessive growth of metropolises. These "large and small metropolises," in which the

specificities of the traditional German urban system become atrophied, are “the hydrocephalies of modern civilization.” “The largeness of its cities is ruining Europe.”

Riehl’s analyses are first and foremost political critique, on the one hand, and cultural critique (Kulturkritik) on the other. Big cities, he claims, are the centers of the deterioration of the traditional social structure. “London is the burial ground for all the sound features of old England. Paris is a constantly festering sore on the body of France.” City life, he says, wipes out the “natural differences” between social groups, embodies the modern views according to which the only differentiation is between the rich and the poor, the learned and the uneducated, and refuses to accept traditional differences between orders. Culturally, big cities “reduced art to be the maidservant of luxury industry” and proved to be an unfavorable environment for the maturation and work of outstanding talents in arts and sciences, etc. Obviously, these tendencies took place against the background of the historic transition from feudal to capitalist urban development in Germany and Riehl must be given credit for keen-wittedly recognizing some of the characteristics of this process. For instance, in analyzing the “artificial cities” he gives an interesting account of the radical transformation of the German urban system, or—to use more up-to-date terms—of how the transformation of urban functions (especially the rise of the industrial function) entailed the decline of certain types of towns and cities and generated new (capitalist) urban settlements.⁶ The reason why Riehl could have such a lasting and extensive ideological influence is that he called attention first and quite suggestively to one of the most conspicuous social phenomena in connection with the capitalist urbanization which alarmed his contemporaries for decades, and that he made a precise political prognosis. The phenomenon in question was the population’s extremely rapid regional reshuffling of *inner migration* (Binnenwanderung) of unprecedented dimensions. A sketchy analysis of this process will be given below.

Sooner or later, as Engels writes, capitalist urbanization led everywhere to a “sudden housing shortage among workers and representatives of small-scale trade and industry depending on worker customers.”⁷ In most cities living conditions considerably deteriorated. What engaged Riehl’s attention, however, was not so much the misery of life, nor the urban problems which emerged early but became acute only later in unsettled housing problem was growing into a “social question,” at least in Berlin. His main concern was to denounce politically the [large] cities as targets of “social migration.”

The immense growth of the cities, he stresses, does not derive from their birthrate, but from the influx from rural and small-town populations. These masses, uprooted from the traditional rural joint families, increase the atomization (Vereinzelung) of the urban population already gravely threatening the status quo. Heightened social mobility also slackens the ties that used to bind people to their birthplace or residence. City dwellers become more and more indifferent to communal life (Gemeindelben)—to the municipal policy in their own township—whereas the “common people can only conceive the state in the form of a local community (Gemeinde).”

Thus the metropolis of the 19th century as a socio-political entity is not merely figuratively the seat of the forces of modern “social movement” as concentrating the proletariat. (Riehl declares this quite explicitly, saying that general suffrage would only consummate the perceptible superiority of cities over the country, and “the domination of cities would eventually mean the rule of the proletariat.”) For Riehl, the city is also literally the center of “social movement,” for the tendency to flow into the cities is coupled with tendencies to migrate further on to other towns or back to the country. What makes cities really so daunting for him is not so much their permanent population as the “streaming and flowing” masses they bring into motion. This frequent migration of mass proportions so deeply worried Riehl that he seems to find the origin of the specifically

“modern opposition of two and country” in the antinomy between predominantly migrating and predominantly sedentary people settled in their native communities. However, in this context he regards cities as the strongholds, not simply of the proletariat, but, to use his most general term, of the “fourth estate.”

Most of Riehl’s conceptual motifs had diffuse ideological influence till most recent times. But his 1853 ideas discussed thusfar can be taken as the starting point of a distinct trend of urban criticism continuing to Spengler and, as a subtrend, even beyond the turning point of 1945, only if we take into account also his work of 1852 on the “bourgeois society.”⁸ Without the latter—a surprisingly rarely cited work and a splendid encyclopedia of contemporary conservative thought—Riehl’s concept of the modern city cannot be understood with precision, partly because the said book clarifies the notion of the “fourth estate.”⁹

In Riehl’s view, the decisive social factor in modern urban development is the “fourth estate.” This consists not only of the industrial proletariat, of the “have-nots living from one day to the next, the hotels of capital, these talking tools shackled inextricably (unlösbar) to the mechanism of our incredible machine world.” It includes not only workers but also loiterers, not only poor people in the lower reaches of the social strata but also rich people of high social status. The “fourth estate” comprises all those who “extricated themselves from the existing groups and structures or got shut out.” All those “who aren’t anybody yet and who haven’t anything yet, and who are no longer anybody and who have no longer anything.”

To this belong “degenerate” peasants, ruined petty bourgeois, has been aristocrats as well as swindlers, all sorts of idlers and tramps, i.e., the down-and-outs or dregs of society, on the one hand, and forces described below, on the other hand. In Germany, however, the classical representative of the fourth estate is not the manual worker, as in England and France, but “the proletariat of intellectual work,” “the learned, cultured bourgeoisie.” This means part of the artists, particularly the “modern men of letters” as products of the “era of modern journalism.” Though readily acknowledging their worth, Riehl regards Goethe and Schiller also as the prophets of the fourth estate. It includes as well the modern group of virtuosos travelling throughout the country and the world. This proletariat of intellectual work includes also a section of the university staffs, in particular the special group of private docents, and first and foremost the “clerical proletariat.”

Modern officials, as products of centralized administrative power and bureaucracy, are the embodiment of the citizen, the typical subject. These constantly transferred officials, “migrating under the tent of the state” and without time to strike root in any town or village—nor even standing in need of “feeling the shelter of the community (Gemeinde) above their heads”—were predestined to sink into the fourth estate. Artificial cities are also the centers of bureaucracy, and by the mid-19th century the “clerical proletariat” had become a particularly dangerous element. Yet another segment of the fourth estate is made up by junkmen and peddlers surviving from the past as well as the higher-level and more modern group of brokers and trade agents all belonging to “the commercial proletariat.” Part of the servants and artisans belong here also, as do the industrial proletarians, these masses “without family, home or history (geschichtslos)” “used and used up by the capitalist like machines.”

Riehl is fully aware that he is describing the fourth estate as a highly heterogeneous social formation which comprises none of the above-mentioned social groups to the full. What is common to the members of the fourth estate is principally their renunciation of the “organic” structures of the precapitalistic society and the fact that they consider themselves to be the representatives of “the actual people,” of “Volk sans phrase” as against the “third estate” or feudally constrained bourgeoisie.

Regarding their relationship to the decaying structures of the feudal system. Riehl points out politically significant differences within each layer of German society, and hence within the fourth estate as well. These descriptions, at times with the accuracy of sociology, throw light on certain specific traits of German development. Though his main concern is to warn that modern urbanization leads to the disruption of precapitalistic society all over Europe, his discussions reflect also some of them to the most emancipated urbanite “proletarians”—those of France—Riehl even praises the relative underdevelopment of German industrial workers, their rural roots preserved in certain regions and industries, and the patriarchal-conservative elements of their mentality. It is an indirect reflection also of the actual German situation that it is precisely the industrialist’s social portrait which remains blurred in his work, while the new group of bourgeois intellectuals, and the specifically interpreted social category of the “philistines,” come to the fore.¹⁰ (It is to be noted that, however, conservative a thinker Riehl may have been, he had a firm sense of reality, or at least far more than some of his followers in the age of imperialism. Several of his statements are indirectly borne out by Engels as well.)¹¹

Thus Riehl trenchantly criticizes the new type of large cities which he interprets as being strongholds no longer of the third estate, nor yet of the industrial proletariat, but of the “fourth estate.” Though predominantly “bourgeois” this fourth estate was opposed in his opinion to the old, precapitalistic bourgeoisie, and was undergoing “proletarianization” in the above mentioned sense of this term. He attributes the social danger implied by this estate to their lack of ties and to the mobility of the city-dwelling masses. (The native village or town, he writes, has become too narrow for the “huge and typically modern occupational groups” of industry, intellectual work and civil service. Further development of the division of labor will only increase the mobility and social alienation of these strata.)

At the same time, he ascribes the “wonderful colossuses” of modern cities, not only to inner migration, but also to the “searching calculating, hardworking industrial spirit” of the 19th century. This is the point at which the otherwise conservatively sober Riehl flashes an apocalyptic vision. The bloom of modern industrialism, he declares, will rise to a climax “at and through which the modern world, the world of metropolises will collapse.”

On the other hand, Riehl’s work of 1851 is essential also for its interpretation of the historical role of the peasantry.¹² He states that against the cities, against “socialism,” no effective fight is possible through government measures or, e.g., through the press. The last support in this fight is the peasantry—“the last piece of nature as against the artificial world,” “history incarnate” in the teeth of the “historylessness” of modern strata. For the peasants are the “most conservative forces in a state.” Therefore, everything must be done to increase their weight, to foster their persistent customs and traditional way of life, to reinforce the “special traits of their character.” If “the peasant is the preserving force of the German people,” then conservative politics must do everything “to keep this force for itself.”

These ideas are tantamount to a political programme. For many decades, anti-urban ideologies retained their agrarian romanticism¹³ in Germany. Inner migration or urbanization was generally understood as *Landflucht*, which means not simply the exodus from the village or influx into the town, but rather a flight from the village, which is a clearly negative value judgement. (The word *Landflucht* is easily associated in German with *Fahnenflucht*: desertion or treason.) Urban criticism in Germany remained for decades interwoven with the reactionary-minded, irrational idealization of the negative features of the German peasantry.

The Urbanization of Germany

Let us review the social background of Riehl's concept and the secret of decades-long influence of anti-urban ideas he was the first to formulate.

As late as 1847 Engels wrote of the grave backwardness of the German urban system, whereas at the end of the century, besides England, urbanization in Europe was the highest in Germany. It took only a few decades for capitalist development "to concentrate the capital in a few hands, on the one side, and to concentrate the propertyless masses in the town, on the other side."¹⁴ To understand these processes, the following factors must be born in mind.

There was an unprecedented demographic explosion in Germany between the end of the 18th century and the 1930s. For instance, between 1815 and 1913 the population rose from 26 million to 67 million. This temporally and regionally diverse demographic growth had a manifold effort on the life of German society. For example, between 1830 and 1950 there was considerable overpopulation, especially in the countryside; this "population jam" which caused severe problems was channeled off by two large and partly different waves of migration into the cities between 1850 and 1970, and after 1870.¹⁵

Obviously, however, the relationship between town and country, and its corollary, the proportion and magnitude of rural and urban populations, could not change fundamentally as long as the feudal constraints of serfdom and the guild system were in effect in German territories.¹⁶ Very slowly, step by step, the obstacles were removed by the Prussian reforms begun in 1870; they also abolished the strictest limitations on the right to move freely (though even in the latter half of the sixties in practice it was difficult freely to choose one's residence).

Naturally, inner migration had also other than demographic causes, as well as other than legal obstacles. The participants of this social mobility were first of all recruited from rural masses rapidly reduced to pauperism. The problem of modern pauperism, however, does not derive simply from the demographic inflation of the strata hit by the earlier forms of poverty typical of agrarian societies. The real problem was that within the process of the absolute demographic growth of Germany's population, itself a compound of various economic and social factors, the proportion of the major social groups had considerably changed: the rate of the lower impoverished strata had increased inordinately.¹⁷ My general interpretation of these phenomena significantly differs from that of some modern researchers.¹⁸

In my view, the overpopulation of the German rural areas was relative overpopulation, and pauperism in the first half of the century was an integral part in the genesis of the modern proletariat. The German proletariat, however, was not (only) "brought about in the natural way," as the young Marx remarked, but it was born of the masses of "artificially produced poverty" derived from the "acute disintegration of society."¹⁹ To comprehend how this happened we must consider that capitalist development in Germany was delayed and particularly problematic. The overpopulation of the areas east of the Elbe was due basically to the "Prussian way" of the capitalist transformation of agriculture. This drained some sources of the working population's income in a manner parallel to the rapid growth in the number of inhabitants.

As a result of the Prussian agrarian reforms, small-holders were deprived of some of the advantages that had come from the former liabilities of the landlords towards them (servitudes); they also lost their share of the usufruct rights of the Commons, *Mark*. As Engels put it, "the damage they suffered by losing the usufruct rights of the Mark was economically far greater than the gain they had from the abolition of economy gradually eliminated the traditional ability of rural populations to supply themselves with certain manufactured goods."²⁰ Further, the reforms allowed the fusing of the peasant plots with each other or with the seigniorial lands. The change-over to

manorial farming and the constant increase of seigniorial lands supervised by the landlord himself began in the 16th century and produced huge estates was achieved by depriving the peasants of the land (Bauernlegen), by appropriating a significant part of the land they owned.²¹

In view of the growing indebtedness of small-holders (due in part to redemptions, tax liabilities, and the division of land between heirs aggravated by demographic factors), Engels called the small-scale farmer “the proletarian of the future.” Naturally, this applies even more to the immense masses of serfs becoming landless peasants after the abolition of serfdom. The most obvious way for the proletarianization of these strata, however, would seem to be agricultural production: rising agrarian capitalism was, after all, in need of an agrarian proletariat.

In fact, the mainstay of the rule of Prussian Junkers was the masses of agricultural laborers, paradoxically kept in a quasi-serfdom which perished for a long time.²² But the Junkers employed only the amount and type of labor they actually needed, and increasingly did so only seasonally. In addition to the widely different opportunities for the various layers of agricultural laborers to obtain work on a large estate,²³ the demand for agrarian labor—as Marx pointed out—decreased at the rate at which capitalist production spread in agriculture, and what is more “without the repulsion of these workers begin offset by an increased attraction elsewhere, as in non-agricultural industry.”²⁴ Note that this tendency was bolstered also by the agrarian revolution emerging under such specific social conditions as the strong mechanization from the middle of the century in large agricultural factories and by the Century’s agricultural crises.²⁵

As the social and technical development of the Junker estates invariably made the agrarian laborers “redundant,” they always “had one foot in the swamp of pauperism.” The rise in the absolute number of people dramatically aggravated the subsistence problems of latent and apparent overpopulation in rural areas. The social thinkers of the age were deeply disturbed by the unprecedented dimensions of pauperization, yet for quite a long time there was no outlet whatever to channel off the population jam except mass emigration to the United States. Whereas in England and France the ascendancy of capitalist production in agriculture drove the “redundant” rural population to the towns, in Germany this was impossible because of the backwardness of the network of cities.

At the turn of the 18th and 19th centuries 500 out of 1016 settlements with municipal rights had a mere 1000-3000 inhabitants, while 397 or nearly 40% of all the towns had less than 1000. Moreover, 80% of the urban population were “farming citizens” (Ackerbürger) in whose activity farm work and urban occupations were still tightly interlaced: they supplied themselves with food, clothing and other means of subsistence (e.g., home-made soap), which would otherwise have been manufactured goods which would be bought in the market-place. The urban medieval town walls and fortifications had been demolished in very few towns (Entfestung). Though the Prussian municipal reform (1808) did remove the most distressing precapitalistic and patriarchal obstacles in the way of bourgeois progress, it still contained several semi-feudal constraints.²⁷ Above all, over the centuries in the areas east of the Elbe, the development of municipal industry had assumed specific forms which were not favorable to a quick boom of modern large-scale industry.

Historically, as Engels points out in 1847, everywhere the feudal system disintegrated. At the pace at which “a manufacturing class emerged besides agrarian labor, the towns emerged besides villages.” Only this newly formed class was not yet the bourgeoisie “that is in power in the civilized countries today and is aspiring to power in Germany, but the class of the petty bourgeoisie.” One of the characteristics of Germany was the belated nature of the process which produced out of this old, rather precapitalistic bourgeoisie the modern bourgeoisie, together with free competition and the concentration of capital.²⁸

In the 18th century the Prussian state extended the old limitation of handicraft industries from the towns to the whole country. Though this rule was never strictly observed (and the inconsistent economic policy also contained modern mercantilist tendencies), it was strong enough to hinder industrial development in the countryside. As a result, compared to the western areas of Germany, the transformation of the system of towns here was less significant. New urban settlements were rare. In the old towns and cities, however, the compulsory character of the guild regulations remained unchanged up to the Prussian reforms, although the central control of manufacturing had breached the isolation of the guilds.²⁹ Just as the social organization in Germany was “a compromise between the nobility and the petty bourgeoisie” as late as 1847 (Engels), for a long time to come the motor of Prussian urban development remained also the petty bourgeoisie.

This old bourgeoisie, however, in contrast to the modern bourgeoisie, represents the interests of “inland and coastal trade, artisanship, manufacturing based on manual labor—that is, occupational branches of a limited scope that demand little capital, return the capital slowly and generate only local and low level competition.” Where the modern bourgeois represents universal interests, the petty bourgeois represents local interests. “The classic products” of the latter were the “German imperial towns.”³⁰ In the course of the early urbanization of the Prussian state in the 18th century most towns became administrative centers and garrisons. This opened the way for some secondary, servicing industries, partly to meet the luxury requirements of courtiers. After the Prussian reforms, too, small enterprises by artisans and tradesmen continued to be set up.

It is, however, easy to demonstrate the narrow scope and limitation of this petty bourgeois urban development. Even in the capital city of Berlin there were no more than 25 steam engines as late as 1830, and they were all employed in artisans’ workshops. There was a general shortage of capital in the country. The freedom to pursue a trade was not inviolable, even decades after the Prussian reforms; some restriction remained in force up to the late sixties, and the staunchest resistance was put up precisely by the petty bourgeoisie of the towns. They were numerically the strongest and politically the most important layer of the urban population during the upswing of the industrial revolution (while “the bourgeois were only reckoned with as petty bourgeois officially,” as Engels found).³¹

No doubt, between 1818 and 1847 the Prussian bourgeoisie, despite its comparative underdevelopment, “did away with the patriarchalism of the peasantry and the petty bourgeoisie in certain districts, concentrated some of the capital, produced a number of proletarians and built relatively long railway lines.” Quite characteristically, however, the proportion of the urban population had hardly increased over the first half of the 19th century in Prussia (1800: 26%; 1849: 28%). This was important because it did not permit the alleviation of the overpopulation of rural regions.³²

It may seem that the labor force, once redundant in agriculture, did not have to migrate from the country to the town to be employed. In fact, however, east of the Elbe the poorly developed rural industries (first of all the textile industry), being unable to match English manufacturing, could not absorb the surplus agricultural population. What is more, crowds of craftsmen also “became redundant” and were reduced to poverty.³³ The relative overpopulation of Prussia which caused these dramatic problems could not be alleviated before widening the “channels of outlet” (Marx) through the emergence and upswing of mining, road and railway construction, and the large-scale urban industry entailed by the rise of the industrial revolution.

As a result, however, the manufacturing industries being in need of laborers attracted the rural paupers to the towns and cities and turned them into urban proletarians and partly into urban

paupers (the urban forms of pauperism being interrelated with the urban forms of overpopulation). At the beginning (1830-1860) migration to town meant migration to the seaports. Its first great wave (between 1850 and 1870) was the so-called *Nahwanderung*, in the course of which a center for manufacturing handicrafts drained the excess population from its immediate surroundings. The second huge wave of inner migration (from 1870) was *Fernwanderung*, which transferred part of the agrarian population from areas east of the Elbe to western regions, and concentrated them in the urban centers of the Rhine and Ruhr regions.³⁴

Within a few decades inner migration assumed gigantic proportions. In 1907, for instance, over half of the Germans did not live in their native localities. While the proportion of rural population was still 64% in 1871, in 1910 60% of Germans were city-dwellers. Between 1880 and 1910 there were 5.5 million births among the agrarian population, while 6.5 million people left agriculture during the same period. Keeping this in mind, one is less surprised to find that the inner migration, interpreted as *Landflucht*, appeared as one of the central concerns of the age in the thought of many social and political thinkers, e.g., Riehl, G. Hansen, O. Ammon, H. Sohnrey, O. Spengler, etc.³⁵

Oswald Spengler's Critique of the Capitalist Metropolis

Quite naturally, at the end of the 19th century the condemnation of the *Landflucht* incorporated new elements missing in Riehl. It merged the fear of a violent proletarian revolution with considerations of the external power relations of rising German imperialism, as well as some biological-racial constructions. Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West* is itself a "classic" synthesis of these currents, considering the *Landflucht* and, generally, "the victory of the metropolis over the peasantry" as the axis of world historical development from the bourgeois revolutions to the First World War.³⁶

Riehl's approach to the peasantry was relatively concrete—almost sociological—and responsive to regional differences. His conservatism gave unconditional approval to the contemporary German peasant's actual conservative-reactionary traits (also emphasized by Engels in other contexts). In contrast, Spengler mythicized and biologized the global historical process and in this vein stylized the peasantry into a supra-historical category. For Spengler, the "timeless" village is "outside world history"; the peasant is the "eternal," "the only organic human being." Its deep attachment to its property makes the peasantry a significant representative of the "feudal forces of blood and tradition." The "primitive instincts" of the peasant class (*Stand*) constitute the base for every conservative policy, "the rule of every state and every nobility." Peasants not only feed the nation (*Nährstand*) with grain, they are "the perennial and again in the eternal wars of the mighty fighting for "power and booty," "yet the survivors fill out the ranks again with their primitive fertility and go on suffering."³⁷ For Spengler the decline of the peasantry interpreted in this way brings along the "decline of the West."

Spengler's book is only one of the many works of Germany imperialist ideology, termed by Leopold von Wiese as "social philosophies, social ethics and social aesthetics of town and country." And, it should not be forgotten that the peasantry can be interpreted as the representative, not only of the feudal forces of blood and tradition, but also of the fascist forces of "blood and soil." Even some empirical sociologies with a claim to strict scholarship seemed to find in the peasantry and the "marvelous uniformity of village" the "eternally restful rock" on which to build society. After the turning-point of 1945 Konrad Adenauer also deemed it vitally important to adopt a settlement policy that made the *Landflucht* and the recurrence of the mistakes of 19th century

urbanization impossible. Last but not least, Chancellor Erhard too declared one of his major political tasks to be “to retain the broad strata of peasants affirming property tasks to be “to retain the broad strata of peasants affirming property and attached to the native soil.”³⁸

In any case, the tendencies outlined above go together with a specific critical approach to large cities. The “urban philosophical” positions of Tönnies, Spengler and others appear to be the modernized reformulations of Riehl’s ideas in many respects.

Most importantly, they claim that the cities negate the “cultural symbols” of the feudal past. Denying the differences in social standing, “well-ordered property” and “well-ordered knowledge,” they degrade the peasants and the landowning nobility into contemptible “country people”: they disintegrate the preindustrial ways of life. In cities traditional family structures begin to decay, new crimes mushroom, suicides grow in number and modern individualism as “a bare will to live in rootless freedom” triumphs.³⁹

Heated criticism was levelled at the cities for demographic reasons as well. Asserting that the sterility of civilized man reaches its climax in metropolises, Spengler prophesied that they mark a “metaphysical turn toward death,” though the diminishing birth rate was regarded also by many others as a constant and basic feature of metropolitan life. Not a few researchers were convinced also that in addition to the demographic deficit, big cities were characterized by unequivocal, irreversible and unhealthy selective processes regarding psychological and anthropological types and talents, as well as by the distribution of the population by age and sex.⁴⁰

In this regard, modern cities are artificial and wholly unnatural parasitic formations compared to the country and medieval cities. “Partly ripening and partly enjoying the fruits” of previous developments, “they seem to exist by themselves.” But in actual fact, slowly gaining ascendancy over the whole society, they tend to absorb its forces and thereby destroy it. “The culture of the metropolis is the culture of general and increasing luxury.” In its “vicious beauty,” the metropolis is “the last wonder of the whole of history,” the symbol of the modern world.⁴¹

The question is rightly raised: how could the big city become the center of critical attention as early as Riehl and Tönnies? That the former ascribed decisive social significance to the metropolis at a time when there were no real metropolises in Germany shows that he astutely anticipated subsequent progress on the basis of a big city, he actually means a city of a definite social type (note his paradoxical phrase “large and small metropolises”) which hardly, if at all, depends on the size of the population and the area. In Tönnies, this implication becomes quite unambiguous. In his principal work of 1887 he declares that “the rich or the upper classes and the poor or subjected classes have antagonistic interests.” The resulting opposition, “reproduced on a mass scale in the relationship between capital and labor,” makes the cities “divided against themselves (in ihrem Körper selber gespalten), which means in our terminology metropolitan.”⁴²

The real target of conservative urban criticism is thus the capitalist metropolis, but the clearly audible anti-capitalistic overtones can only be correctly interpreted in view of the thinkers’ precapitalistic ideals. While Riehl, a nostalgic adherent of the disintegrating traditional forms of life, simply fought a rearguard action, Spengler’s mythicization of the past is a specifically modern phenomenon of the age of imperialism. This distorts the interpretation of the present and the future (see above); it covers up rather than uncovers. His economic discussions vividly reveal that the conservative anticapitalism of his urban criticism results in the mystification of the facts of capitalist society. He is clearly on pre-fascist grounds when he envisions the victory of the noble and rural forces of “blood” over the capitalist and urban powers of “money.”⁴³

Spengler conceived the reign of the metropolis first of all as the reign of a specific “type of human being.” The city dweller, this “modern nomad”—this “factual man existing only in an

amorphous and fluctuating crowd”—is a “traditionless” and “parasitic” creature; what is more, as Spengler charges with contempt, he is “irreligious, intelligent and sterile.” This “rootless” metropolitan crowd “at variance with its origin and having no future” is partly the scum of inner migration⁴⁴ and partly, as with Riehl, the “fourth estate.”

With palpable hatred Spengler repeatedly calls this “the dregs, the mob.” Though allegedly this latter category is also “eternal,” Spengler unmistakably means here the plebeian and proletarian strata of modern history who, in Engels’ wording, “are behind the big bourgeois.” For him this threatening crowd (whom Tönnies had already found to be the enemy of the state) is “the end, the radical nothing.” In his image of the metropolis Spengler also denounces other foes of “the peasantry and its most superior manifestation, the rural nobility.” In his conception the “fourth estate,” which destroyed or superseded the “third estate” originally dominated by the old bourgeoisie, apparently incorporates not only the non-proletarian layers of the metropolitan population already analyzed by Riehl, but also the modern bourgeoisie. He goes so far as to assert that the financial oligarchy and the “mass” are bound together in a “natural alliance.” Accordingly, the programme of the country’s war against the supremacy of the town includes targets of bourgeois values as well: it is waged against “rationalism intellectually, democracy politically and money economically.”⁴⁵

Finally, the metropolitan multitude, the fourth order, is seen by Spengler in his *Decline of the West* as the “crowds of fellaheen” ruled over by the “Caesars” of the modern age. As regards the Spenglerian opposition of “Caesars” and “fellaheen,” it is interpreted even by George Lukács simply as that between the monopolist capitalists and the modern proletarians.⁴⁶ In my view, however, the actual opposition is, for Spengler, between, on the one hand, the objectively heterogeneous city-dwelling masses including the bourgeois, petty bourgeois, intellectuals and elements of the urban mob altogether successfully manipulated by the press as an electoral crowd and, on the other hand, some groups of the financial oligarchy manipulating the whole system of bourgeois democracy.

By public opinion Spengler means the influence that townspeople (and capital cities) exert over the whole of the given culture, which has become decisive in modern times, “Modern journalism” as one aspect of this was already criticized by Riehl, anticipating several subsequent positions in this respect. Fighting against general suffrage he condemns modern journalism as a typically urban phenomenon for being a mouthpiece of a politically dilettante “public.” This included those who “want to judge and decide” and also those who indifferently withdraw into the private sphere. Tönnies emphasized that in big cities sciences and arts are “also used in a capitalist spirit” (warden selber kapitalistisch verwertet). Thoughts and opinion “are formed and changed at a great pace,” “speeches and publications incite immense passions owing to their mass propagation.” Some years later G. Simmel generalized the problem of the “hypertrophy of objective culture” and “atrophy of individual culture.” Spengler, who highlighted the crisis of bourgeois liberalism, saw the (world) press—this product of urban civilization—as a means to manipulate the urban masses, while “plutocracy” or financial oligarchy would triumph over “democracy.” “Anyone who has learnt to read,” he says, “will fall into the grip of the world press; in latter-day democracy the much-longed-for right of the peoples to self-determination will turn into complete dominion (radikales Bestimmtwerden durch) over the peoples by forces which command the printed word.”⁴⁷

Keeping in mind throughout that Spengler criticizes modern democracy from a right-wing position, later readers may also find some “up-to-date” arguments in his discussion of the above theme. When in the fifties and sixties the anti-fascist philosopher, Theodor W. Adorno, considered

Spengler's philosophical heritage, the only thing to which he could feel any affinity was the conception of manipulated democracy. With essential reservations, he took this into account when he formulated his conception (apparently also inspired by Simmel) of the metropolis, which he interpreted both as the setting for the development of bourgeois freedom and as a form of power (Herrschaftsform). He saw metropolitan culture as a manipulated mass culture.⁴⁸

This historico-philosophical pessimism in conservative urban criticism grew ever deeper from Riehl to Spengler. The vision of the "collapse" of urban civilization anticipated by Riehl gave way to Tönnies' idea that "the whole...German culture, having developed for some time now in the duality of country and town, or in broader terms of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, is at the same time in a state of constant progress (Fortgang) and constant decline (Untergang)." Because for Spengler world history is the history of cities, and the birth of a city entails its death, it is logically inevitable for him to arrive at the "decline (Untergang) of the West"⁴⁹—and for him the fall of West European civilization is practically the end of all history.

Agrarian conservatism and the Mass Impact of Urban Ideologies

As the above discussion will have revealed, the scholarly merit of conservative urban criticism in Germany is moderate. The significance of these tendencies for social science lies in the mass impact of the views they imply, rather than in their scientific level.

Riehl and Tönnies are rich in insight, but upon the transition to monopolist capitalism and imperialism, i.e. from the last decade of the 19th century, unscientific and demagogic moments clearly gained predominance in German ideology. Let us dispense with a detailed refutation.⁵⁰ Some of the critics of the first, Spenglerian synthesis of these dangerous tendencies—which still was all-European in perspectives and pessimistic-fatalistic in its final conclusion—sought to transcend it in the 20s and 30s in the spirit of limited German nationalism, advocating the aggressive, "heroic" activism⁵² which directly prepared fascism. At the same time, not only were Riehl's and Spengler's books read by millions, but other millions came under the influence of extensive propaganda by various conservative agrarian organizations. How did these anti-urban ideologies exert their effect?

In retrospect, some recent authors tend to discern the social basis of urban criticism in middle-class intellectuals (Bildungsbürgertum).⁵² Undoubtedly, the mostly rural professionals (village teachers, priests, doctors, etc.) had a significant role in reinforcing and spreading the anti-town sentiments, shared also by a part of the urban intellectuals. However, so long as the German anti-urban ideologies and urban criticism retained their specific agrarian romanticism, they cannot be fully understood without considering the interests of the agrarians, the landowners.

It was a typical feature of German social development, also noted by Engels, that, unlike France and England, for quite a long time in Germany the village prevailed over the town, and agriculture over trade whelming majority of the German masses and the producer of the main export goods of the country, was represented by the nobility, the class of big landowners. Over the 19th century, however, the land-owning strata underwent significant structural changes. Since Napoleonic times due to an increase in production costs and competition, the old nobility gradually became poorer and increasingly indebted. They used the spreading civilization to squander their fortunes in the big cities. In contrast, the rising strata of capitalist landowners with huge estates were growing in influence.⁵³ This constantly reviving class of large estate owners composed of noble and middle-class elements, but functioning economically as a faction of the bourgeoisie "exploiting agriculture," remained a highly privileged upper class conserving and reproducing

several semi-feudal features until the time of the Weimar Republic. Although in imperial Germany and during the Weimar Republic its representatives assumed a democratic disguise, they made use of the forms and methods of bourgeois democracy in an anti-democratic manner and for non democratic goals.⁵⁴

The ideologies of the conservative agrarian forces were greatly influenced by the grave crises which began in the 1870's and worsened in the following decades, as well as by the fact that in the early nineties the Caprivi government gave up the policy of protective tariffs which had favored agricultural interests.⁵⁵ The difference between the opinions of Junkers and the large industrialists concerning this decision led to a split of the alliance of Roggen und Eisen (grain and iron). In 1893 the conservative agrarian forces became the country's second largest political mass organization and launched ferocious demagoguery. The target of the highly efficient propaganda of the Farmer' Union was partly the urban bourgeoisie and especially the Social Democrats as the urban party par excellence.⁵⁶

In the last quarter of the century, however, not only was the power position of the Prussian Junker shaken but agricultural small-scale production further declined, with part of the businesses going to ruin. (This was largely due to North American agricultural competition which "shook the very foundations of European landed property, both large and small.) Both large landowners and the small-holders felt endangered. "As both own land and both belong to the countryside, the landowner becomes the protagonist of the small-holder's interests and the small-holder accepts him as his protagonist." Subsequent development (and modern western research) confirmed this statement by Engels. The spread of international and ever keener economic competition, together with the new conditions of universal suffrage, forced the landowners to make new organizational and political efforts. The Bund der Landwirte (Farmers' Union), which was firmly in the hands of large landowners, began fruitful cooperation with the German Conservative Party. The latter represented agricultural interests in parliamentary debates, while the former recruited a mass basis for the conservatives among the rural population which they had sought in vain among the urban middle strata.⁵⁷ All this explains how conservatism became more and more "agrarian," while the formerly aristocratic agrarian conservatives became more and more "plebeian."

In theory, the statement in *Capital* is perhaps true that, as a consequence of the use of modern industrial methods, "the desire for social changes and the class antagonisms are brought to the same level in the country as in the towns." Yet in practice the German ruling classes managed to bridle this tendency or delay it for a long time, partly as a result of the political efficiency of conservative ideologies centering around agriculture. That capitalist development threatened to annihilate the peasant, the bulwark of the old society, was clearly revealed by the militant trends in agrarian conservatism. But however much the small farmer may have been the "proletarian of the future," the prevailing ideologies could successfully use his "inbred adherence" to his possessions to make the socialist workers "suspicious and abominable in his imagination as idle and envious townfolks." Engels' statement of 1847 that even the field-hand or day-laborer "will support the interest of the nobleman or peasant in whose estate he is employed" applied for a very long time. In a thorough-going study of the peasant question as late as 1894 Engels identifies as a future task of social democrats to this decisive battlefield.⁵⁸

Indeed, the conservative agrarian forces had always identified "socialism" as their main foe. The chief source of their fear of big cities had always been a fear of social democracy (or its precursors). In the earlier 1890s the socialists "put the peasant question on their agenda everywhere all of a sudden" and it dawned on them that "their party must first go from the town to the village, to become a power in the village" so as to gain political power later. The reactions of the owners

of large estates already alarmed by the agricultural crises and inner migration were often hysterical. At the same time, however, K. Bergmann is quite right in emphasizing that the anti-urban drives of the masses in that period cannot be derived exclusively from specifically agrarian interests.⁵⁹

There was a revival of the alliance of “grain and iron” in 1902 in a new phase of an economic cycle (though the economic weakening of the Junkers continued to the benefit of the bourgeoisie under imperialist conditions). There was also a lasting community of political-ideological interests between the class of industrial landowners approaching the bourgeoisie and the strata of industrial entrepreneurs assimilating into the hierarchical society of imperial Germany through “feudalizing” their manner and philosophy of life. The common interests of various factions of the German ruling class in the maintenance of the political status quo, the consolidation of the country’s inner unity, and the promotion of its international influence, all fused in a sort of “imperial ideology.”

According to this conservative consensus, social democracy was the main hindrance to the assertion of imperial interests. That it became a mass party was attributed directly to inner migration and urbanization. Some military considerations also had extensive influence. They claimed that the “deflation” of the eastern provinces by the exodus to the cities, the unfavorable demographic trends in town as regards army reserves, etc., all weakened the country’s “defenses.”⁶⁰ World War One was dramatically to confirm the worries of the enemies of the big city.

Furthermore, the urban workers themselves seem to have had an ambivalent attitude to urban development. True, for the working classes the countryside was tantamount to pauperism: material poverty was aggravated there by grinding, semi-feudal, patriarchal forms of personal dependence. Yet in retrospect, the masses fleeing (or driven) to the cities saw the country as a sort of “paradise lost.” As a matter of fact, despite significant social changes, the traditional way of life was slower to disintegrate in the villages and small towns, and certain “idyllic” relations from precapitalist times survived (as, e.g., Hermann Hesse’s early short stories bear out).

In contrast, the living and working conditions of the new big cities caused problems of accommodation on a mass scale. Rapid urbanization spread various new, specifically urban forms of misery and further worsened the bad housing conditions of the workers. As the “architectural plan of old towns no longer met the requirements of new large-scale industry and the resulting traffic,” Engels wrote, new streets must be staked out, new railroads must cut across them, etc., entailing the mass demolition of working quarters. As a result, the number of the homeless increased, as did crowdedness, real estate jobbing and rents. To compound the problems, workers had been deprived of all the guarantees of basic security and stability they used to have in the village community: the guild institutions, the extensive and varied relief of the poor in the countryside and, last but not least, the traditional large families—not only materially, but morally and psychologically as well.

The recurrent critical observations by conservative authors of the city-dwellers’ “uprootedness,” “atomization” and “loss of individuality” warned of real problems. As Engels was quick to note, “the customs and relations of the good old times are most radically annihilated in the big cities.” Here “unspeakable misery” is coupled with “brutal indifference,” “every single person is shut in himself, heartlessly concerned with his own interest only.” No romantic anticapitalism was needed in order to realize that in modern industrial cities “the disintegration of humankind into monads has reached its consummation.”⁶¹

True, following the efforts of social policy, the rudiments of social security as well as urban planning began to emerge in Germany too at the end of the century: provisions for workers’

lodgings multiplied, etc. In the final analysis, however, as far as the working masses were concerned the industrial revolution did not have a better impact on urban development in Germany and America than in England. In addition, a more or less conscious and contradictory nostalgia fed on memories of the independence of small-scale production and the closeness to nature of the rural way of life. This was found especially in the first and second generations of workers transferred from the country to town. (The repercussions throughout Europe of F. Howard's reformist "suburban movement" have links to this nostalgia as well.)⁶²

The dislike of big cities, as well as the complementary "country and small-town cult," had an immense mass base in Germany for a long time. (During the 1920s, for instance, the Junkers—in alliance this time with the German National People's Party—were able to extend their political influence to additional constituencies in big cities).⁶³ That the arguments of urban criticism with a romantic agrarian bias had relevance in far wider circles than the direct economic interests of agrarian conservative forces is attributable, however, not only to the political-ideological constellation of interests indicated above, but also to the peculiar ambiguity and amorphous character of these arguments.

The capitalist metropolises brought to life by the industrial revolution appeared to be the encasements, the "vast encyclopedias" (Riehl) of the new European civilization. This was true to such an extent that in some contemporary analysis the urban character of the new, industrializing society was given greater emphasis than the capitalist nature of the modern industrial cities. Even in those conceptions which stressed the antagonistic, "split" character of modern urbanization, the edge of criticism was apparently aimed at "liberalism" and "socialism" alike, at both the modern bourgeoisie and the proletariat of mass production as equal forces of urbanization. Obviously, the sharp criticism of the negative effects of city life affected ever wider strata of society: the proletariat, the petty bourgeoisie, the intelligentsia. But by eventually concealing the essential socio-economic facts out of naiveté or demagogy, this criticism favored the status quo and the ruling classes of that time. It provided strong incentives—and in part the goals—for the elaboration of reformist concepts of urban policy. With the praise of the allegedly "organic" and "harmonic" conditions of living in the countryside, it performed also a directly manipulative function.⁶⁴

Over time the pathetic argumentation of big-city criticism with a romantic agrarian bias led to widely-shared anti-city prejudices. Their growing abstract and amorphous character, and their increasing "independence" of unambiguously and relatively easily definable economic interests enabled them to join certain elements of other ideological constructs. Thus, the results of urbanization and the related symptoms of crises also gravely worried the conservative theoreticians of cultural critique and cultural pessimism; they too exerted an extremely wide influence.

As there appeared between agrarian conservatism and cultural pessimism a remarkable affinity in other questions, despite differences and disputes, the urban criticism of these two theories obviously intermingled and strengthened one another.⁶⁵ The acute anti-urban feelings in wide strata of the German society were given due attention and were used demagogically by the urban programmes of the Third Reich. Although it shared some prejudices of traditional urban criticism, Nazi ideology on the whole worked out a relatively more differentiated conception of urbanization, taking into account also the industrial, military and manipulative requirements of empire.⁶⁶

Elements of urban ideologies with a romantic agrarian bias eventually became "detached" from their socio-economic origins and achieved relative independence. These combined with each other in rather contradictory manners, irrespective of the historical continuity of their relevant ideologies, and dragged on for a while after World War Two. Though no longer able to mobilize

masses of people, they could still influence the activities of some groups and institutions.⁶⁷ In the early sixties urban debates gained renewed momentum in the Federal Republic of Germany, but to face up to the problems of post-war urbanization self-critically one must begin with a critique of conservative urban criticism.

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Notes

1. Cf., e.g., H. Oswald, *Die Überschätze Stadt* (Olten: Walter Verlag, 1966), pp. 69-73, 86-87; J. le Goff, "Az értelmiség a középkorban" /Intellectuals in the Middle Ages/, *Szociológiai füzetek* (Budapest), 11 (1976), 33-38.
2. Cf. F. Choay, *L'urbanisme: Utopies et réalités* (Paris: Seuil, 1965), pp. 21-24, 155-178.
3. The politically relevant debate between the literary groups of "Strapaese" and "Stracitta" was pointed out by A. Gramsci, *Oeuvres choisies* (Paris: Edition Sociales, 1959), pp. 398-399.
4. M. White and L. White, *The Intellectual versus the City* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962).
5. W.H. Riehl, *Land und Leute* (Stuttgart: Cotta'scher Verlag, 1861) (first edition, 1853), esp. pp. 101-154.
6. S. Gyimesi, *A városko a feudalizmusból a kapitalizmusba való átmenet időszakában / Towns in the Period of Transition from Feudalism to Capitalism* (Budapest: Akademia Publishers, 1975), pp. 45-78.
7. F. Engels, Vorwort zur zweiten durchgesehenen Auflage "Zur Wohnungsfrage," *K. Marx and F. Engels Werke*, Band 18, p. 647. N.B.: Almost all citations from works by Marx and Engels are quoted from the edition of their complete works (shortened in MEW in the following published from 1959 on by Dietz Verlag, Berlin.
8. W. H. Riehl, *Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft* (Stuttgart-Tübingen: Verlag der Cotta'scher Buchhandlung, 1851).
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 267-381.
10. Riehl's description of the "philistine" and the "philistine spirit of the masses" (*op. cit.*, pp. 221-225) anticipates in some respects Spengler's arguments of the "crowd of fellaheen" to be discussed below.
11. "In Germany, the working classes are also petty bourgeois from head to toe," Engels wrote in 1847. He also mentioned the importance of the "lumpen proletariat" at another place: "it is the scum made up of the declassé elements of all classes which pitched up its tent in the big cities." He considered it the worst of all allies for the proletariat. Elsewhere, Engels also remarks that, at least between 1815 and 1830, the revolutionary party of Germany consisted "merely of theoreticians," recruited at universities solely of students. In a certain sense, even Marx confronted the social forces of "constancy" and "motion." Though calling the peasant "the bulwark of the old society," he remarked that capitalist production, "by collecting the population in great centers, and causing an ever increasing preponderance of town population..., concentrates the historical motive-power of society." F. Engels, *Der Status Quo in Deutschland*, MEW, Band 4, p. 50. F. Engels, Vorbemerkung zu "Der deutsche Bauernkrieg" (Ausgabe 1870 und 1975), MEW, Band 7, pp. 50. K. Marx, *Das Kapital*, MEW, Band 23, pp. 527-530; citation

from *Capital, A Critique of Political Economy*, eds. Bennett A. Cerf and Donald S. Klopfer (New York: Modern Library, 1906).

12. W.H. Riehl, *Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, pp. 33-115.

13. Cf. K. Bergmann, *Agrarromantik und Grosstadtfeindschaft* (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag A. Hain, 1970). Bergmann's book is one of the best synthetic analysis of conservative anti-town drives and first directed my attention to many important problems.

14. F. Engels, *Der Status Quo in Deutschland*, pp. 4344. F. Engels, *Herr Eugen Dührings Umwälzung der Wissenschaft* (Anti-Duhring), *MEW*, Band 20, p. 38.

15. E. Deuerlein, *Gesellschaft im Machienenzeitalter* (Reinbeck bei Hamburg: Rowhlt Verlag, 1970), pp. 38-40; J. Ciepiewski, I. Kotstrowicka, Z. Landau, and J. Tomaszewski, *A világ gazdaságtörténete a 19. és a 20. században / The Economic History of the World in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1974), pp. 38-39; Riehl, *Das bürgerliche Zeitalter*, pp. 183-185; K. Bergmann, pp. 11-13.

16. Deuerlein, *op.cit.*, pp. 35-38; H. Mottek, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte Deutschlands*, II. Von der Französischen Revolution bis zur Zeit de Bismarckschen Reichsgründung (Berlin: VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1973), pp. 21-26, 43-49.

17. Cf. W. Becker, "Die Bedeutung der nichtagrarischen Wanderungen für die Herausbildung des industriellen Proletariats in Deutschland, unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Preussens von 1850 bis 1970," *Studien zur Geschichte der industriellen Revolution in Deutschland* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1960), p. 213; C. Jantke and D. Hilger, *Die Eigentumslosen* (Freiburg-München: Verlag K. Alber, 1965), p. 17. An interesting description of the social-sociological determinants of the mentioned demographic processes can be found in G. Mackenroth: "Bevölkerungslehre," *Soziologie*, hrsg. A. Gehlen and H. Schelsky (Düsseldorf-Köln: E. Diederichs Verlag, 1955).

18. The intriguing analyses of pauperism by contemporary West German researchers including W. Conze, C. Jantke and W. Fischer argue with Marxism or with an oversimplified theory they interpret as Marxism. Cf. W. Conze, "Vom 'Pöbel' zum 'Proletariat'" (first published 1954), see *Moderne Deutsche Sozialgeschichte*, hrsg. W. U. Wehler, Kiepenheuer and Witsch (Köln, 1976), pp. 111-136; Jantke and Hilger, 7-13; W. Fischer, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft im Zeitalter der Industrialisierung* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1972), pp. 214-284.

19. K. Marx, *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie*. Einleitung, *MEW*, Band I, pp. 390-391.

20. F. Engels, *Die Bauerfrage in Frankreich und Deutschland*, *MEW*, Band 22, pp. 483-505. E. Niederhauser, *A jobbagyfelszabaditas Kelet-Europában / The Abolition of Serfdom in Eastern Europe* (Budapest: Akademia Publishers, 1962), p. 52; F. Lutge, *Deutsche Sozial-und Wirtschaftsgeschichte* (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1952), pp. 324-329.

21. The basis for redemption was land itself. Peasants with an hereditary right to their land submitted one-third of their plots to the owner of the manorial estate, while lease=holders and non-hereditary users submitted half (the rest of the land became free property). However, the landowners incorporated in the seigniorial estates a greater part of the peasant plot not redeemable according to various orders (nicht regulierungsberechtigt), depriving the peasants of all of their land in such cases. It is estimated that the East Elban Junkers got hold of at least a million hectares in this way. F. Engels, *Über Deutschland und die deutsche Arbeiterbewegung*, Band 1 (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1978), pp. 568-578. Niederhauser, pp. 32, 45-49, 56-67, 63; Mottek, pp. 33-37; Ciepiewski, etc., pp. 72-74; W. Abel, *Die drei Epochen der deutschen*

Agrargeschichte (Hannover: Verlag M. and H. Schaper, 1962), pp. 71-75, 92-97; Jantke, *Der vierte Stand* (Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1955), pp. 143-145.

22. F. Engels, *Die Bauernfrage in Frankreich und Deutschland*, pp. 487-489, 504-505. H. Kötter, *Landbevölkerung im sozialen Wandel* (Düsseldorf-Köln: E. Diederichs Verlag, 1958), pp. 49, 60; Lütge, *op.cit.*, pp. 325, 328-329. Engels writes of the industrial landowners: "The few rural Junkers whose prudence saved them from ruin came to constitute the new class of industrial landowners together with the newly emerging bourgeois landowners. This class pursues agriculture, without feudal illusions and knightly nonchalance, as business or industry, with the use of bourgeois tools: capital, expertise and labour... This class is the part of the bourgeoisie that exploits agriculture." F. Engels, *Der Status Quo in Deutschland*, pp. 46-47.

23. Cf. Lütge, *op.cit.*, pp. 327-328; Mottek, *op.cit.*, pp. 223-225. Mottek explores in an interesting way how consciously the big landowners differentiated between certain layers of agricultural labour such as landless cotters (Hausler), domestic servants (Insten) and seasonal farmlands (Einlieger).

24. Marx, *Capital*, p. 762. I immediately add that the overpopulation of the countryside is also relative in the sense that "There are always too many agricultural laborers for the ordinary, and always too few for the exceptional or temporary needs of the cultivation of the soil." This recognition of Marx probably applies to the East Elban development. One sign of this is that as late as the 1860s it was often difficult to realize in practice the principle of free choice of residence; also, the increasing exodus caused seasonal labour shortages in the eastern provinces which made the landowners recruit cheap agrarian labour from Galicia and the Polish Kingdom. Cf. Mottek, *op.cit.*, pp. 25-26, 227; H. Linde, "Cie soziale Problematik der masurischen Agrargesellschaft und die masurische Einwanderung in das Emscherrevier," *Moderne Deutsche Sozialgeschichte*, pp. 468-469; Ciepielewski, et.c, pp. 73-74.

25. K. Marx, *Das Kapital*, pp. 672, 720-721, 773-774. Ciepielewski, et al., pp. 60-67; *Das bürgerliche Zeitalter*, pp. 143-148, 79; Kötter, p. 60; Conze, p. 133; Lütge, pp. 338-341; Jantke and Hilger, pp. 16-17.

26. K. Marx, *Das Kapital*, pp. 672, 720-721, 773-774. Becker, pp. 220-221; Deuerlein, pp. 61-70; there is an ample selection of analyses of pauperism in the anthology of Jantke and Hilger.

27. K. Czok, *Die Stadt. Ihre Stellung in der deutschen Geschichte* (Leipzig: Urania Verlag), pp. 73-76; cf. Jantke, *Der vierte Stand, ed. cit.*, pp. 138-141.

28. F. Engels, *Der Status Quo in Deutschland*, pp. 44-45.

29. S. Gyimesi, pp. 86-91; Mottek, pp. 45-46.

30. F. Engels, *Der Status Quo in Deutschland*, pp. 44-45.

31. F. Engels, *op.cit.*, p. 50. Gyimesi, *op. cit.*; Mottek, pp. 43-49; Czok, pp. 77, 92-95; Lütge, pp. 329-336; Jantke, p. 140; R. Mackensen, "Städte in der Statistik," *Die Stadt*, hrsg., W. Pehnt (Stuttgart, 1974), p. 141.

32. Engels, p. 44; Jantke, p. 140. On the belated and contradictory development of the class of German industrial capitalists see also F. Zunkel, "Industriebürgertum in West-Deutschland. Der Kampf um gesellschaftlichen Aufstieg und soziale Emanzipation (1843-1879)," *Moderne Deutsche Sozialgeschichte*, esp. pp. 335-341.

33. K. Marx, *Das Kapital*, p. 672. Kötter, pp. 60-63; Mottek, pp. 46, 222-223. Conze, pp. 112-113; Becker, pp. 225-226. Marx says that "the third category of the relative surplus-population" (which he calls "the stagnant") "recruits itself constantly from the supernumerary forces of modern industry and agriculture, and specially from those decaying branches of

industry where handicraft is yielding to manufacture, manufacture to machinery.” K. Marx, *Kapital*, pp. 7055-706.

34. Marx, *Das Kapital*, pp. 284-286, 671-672; Mottek, pp. 225-228. Becker, pp. 217-223, 234-238; K.E. Born, “Der soziale und wirtschaftliche Strukturwandel Deutschlands am Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts,” *Moderne Deutsche Sozialgeschichte*, pp. 271-273; *Das bürgerliche Zeitalter*, pp. 78-81; Deuerlein, p. 47; K. Bergmann, pp. 14-17. On the interrelation between cities and the traffic network, see H.G. Helms: “Zur politischen Ökonomie des Transportwesens,” *Architektu und Städtebau*, hrsg., J. Petsch (West Berlin: Verlag für das Studium der Arbeiterbewegung GmbH, 1974), esp. pp. 59-81. The interpretations of these processes as given by Jantke, *Der vierte Stand*, pp. 150-153, and Conze, pp. 133-135, are basically unacceptable to the present author.

35. For a detailed analysis see K. Bergmann, pp. 16-18, 56-57, 64-69.

36. O. Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (München: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1923), I, pp. 62-65, II, 493-495; K. Bergmann, *op.cit.*, p. 18.

37. Riehl, *Die bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, ed. cit., pp. 33-115; F. Engels, *Der Status Quo in Deutschland*, pp. 48-49; F. Engels, *Die Bauernfrage in Frankreich und Deutschland*, pp. 485-489, 502-504. Spengler, I, p. 449; II, pp. 104-105, 113-114, 123, 341, 453, 543, 595. For the underdevelopment of German ideology in general in the imperialist age see: Georg Lukács, *The Destruction of Reason*. Cf. also A.F. Asmus' three essays on Spengler in his volume of studies, *Marx és a polgári historizmus / Marx and Bourgeois Historicism* (Budapest: Gondolat Publishers, 1973), pp. 317-409.

38. L. von Wiese: “Siedlungen. I. Ländliche Siedlungen,” *Handwörterbuch der Soziologie*, hrsg.: A. Vierkandt (Stuttgart, 1931), pp. 522-526; D. Bellmann, W. Trapp and G. Zang, “Provinz' als politisches Problem.” *Jursbuch*, no. 39, pp. 91-92.

39. Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (Berlin, 1926; first edition: Leipzig, 1887), pp. 241-245; on the problem of crime and suicide cf. A. Bellebaum, *Das soziologische System von F. Tönnies unter besonderer Berücksichtigung seiner soziographischen Untersuchungen* (Meisenheim am Glan: Verlag A. Hain, 1966), pp. 13-28, 116-128; Spengler, II, pp. 440-443, 116, 118, I, p. 449.

40. On this see: E. Pfeil, *Grosstadtforschung, Entwicklung und gegenwärtiger Stand* (Hannover: Gebrüder Jänecke Verlag, 1972, 2nd revised ed.), pp. 43, 48-59, 128-129, 152-157; Bellebaum, pp. 40-42; Spengler, II, pp. 123-127.

41. Tönnies, *op.cit.*, p. 250; Spengler, *Der Mensch und die Technik, Beitrag zu einer Philosophie des Lebens* (München: C.H. Beck'sche, 1932), pp. 61-62, 72-73; Spengler, II, pp. 120-121. In the Italian context Gramsci also argued against a similar interpretation of towns. In the course of analyzing the so-called “Neapolitan secret” and the “hundred towns” he also exposed the real social problems which the conservative authors had mistakenly generalized. See A. Gramsci, *Oeuvres choisies*, ed. cit., pp. 398-399 and *idem: Filozófiai írások / Writing in Philosophy* (Budapest: Kossuth, 1970), pp. 350-352.

42. Riehl, p. 103; Tönnies, pp. 241-243.

43. Spengler, *Der Untergang...*, II, pp. 628-629.

44. Spengler, II, pp. 121-122, 442-443, I, p. 43.

45. Tönnies, p. 246; Spengler, I, 43; II, pp. 114-442-443, 495-496, 510; F. Engels, *Vorbemerkung zu Der deutsche Bauernkrieg* (Ausgabe 1870 und 1875), pp. 534-535.

46. Spengler, II, pp. 125, 222, 224, 567; George Lukács, pp. 368-369.

47. Riehl, pp. 221-225; Tönnies, p. 243; G. Simmel, "A nagyváros es a szellemi élet" / "Big Cities and Cultural Life," in *Városshociológia / Urban Sociology* (Budapest: Publishers of Economics and Law, 1973), pp. 264-265; Spengler II, pp. 572-579, 496-503, 561-563, 112, 557-559, 605.

48. Th. W. Adorno, "Spengler nack dem Untergang"; Adorno, *Prismen, Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft* (Berlin: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1955), pp. 51-81; see also Adorno's arguments in the volume *Die europäische Grosstadt. Licht und Irrlicht* (Europa-Gespräch, 1963; Vienna: Verlag für Jugend und Volk, 1964), pp. 59-62. Cf. also G. Simmel, p. 265, who concludes that regarding world history the big town is the arena where people fight for liberty and equality through enlightenment, and for the safeguarding of human "uniqueness and irreplaceability" through romanticism, etc.

49. Cf. Tönnies, p. 251; Spengler, II, pp. 111, 116, 120-121, 442-443.

50. Note that in his analysis of the German ideology of the imperialist era Georg Lukács showed the constant lowering of the standards of philosophical thought and the increase of dilettante element, e.g., in Spengler (op.cit.). Adorno also called Spengler's economic views "hopelessly dilettante" (Adorno, *Prismen*, p. 74). The demographic arguments of urban criticism and the myth of the ahistoricity of "the village" and "the peasant" are also criticized by today's western scholars. Cf. E. Pfeil, pp. 48-50, 128-157; H.P. Bahrtdt, *Die modern Grosstadt* (Rowohlt, 1961), pp. 17-22; H. Kotter and H.J. Krekeler, "Zur sociologie der Stadt-Land-Beziehungen," *Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung* (Stuttgart: R. König, DTV, 1977).

51. Cf. K. Bergmann, pp. 177-181, 189-191, 210-219.

52. E.g. H.P. Bahrtdt, "Die modern Grosstadt," *Die Stadt als Lebensform*, hrsg. O.W. Haseloff (Berlin: Colloquium Verlag, 1970), pp. 140-144. See also Bellmann-Hein-Trapp-Zang, p. 84; Bergmann, op.cit., 76-77.

53. F. Engels, *Der Status Quo in Deutschland*, pp. 43-47.

54. H. Rosenberg, "Die Pseudodemokratisierung der Rittergutsbesitzerklasse," *Moderne Deutsche Sozialgeschichte*, pp. 289-301. The basis of the power of the Prussian junkers, as Engels contended, was the fact that in the closed area of the seven ancient Prussian provinces, that is, some one-third of the whole empire, they had not only the land but also the main industries in their hands. The possession of land meant the possession of social and political power as well, which enabled them to keep the east Elban agricultural laborers reduced to semi-serfdom. See f. Engels, *Die Bauernfrage in Deutschland*, pp. 504-505.

55. Cf. K.E. Born, pp. 276-279; W. Abel, op.cit., pp. 104-111; Lütge, pp. 379-382; Bergmann, pp. 22-25; Tokody Gy.-E. Niederhauser, *Németország története / A History of Germany* (Budapest: Akadémiai Publishers, 1972), p. 218; Ciepielewski, etc., pp. 83-84.

56. T. Nipperdey, "Interessenverbände und Parteien in Deutschland vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg," *Moderne Deutsche Sozialgeschichte*, pp. 380-381; H. Rosenberg, "Die Pseudodemokratisierung...", *ibid.*, pp. 303-304, 306; K. Bergmann, pp. 28-39; Born, p. 278.

57. F. Engels, *Die Bauernfrage in Deutschland*, pp. 486, 504-555. K. Marx and F. Engels, Vorrede (zur russischen Ausgabe von 1882), *manifest der Kommunistischen Partei*, MEW, Band 4, pp. 575-576. H. Rosenberg, "Die Pseudodemokratisierung...", pp. 302-303; Nipperdey, pp. 308-381; Born, p. 277.

58. Concerning the last two paragraphs, see K. Marx, *Das Kapital*, pp. 527-530, citation from *Kapital*, 1906, p. 554. F. Engels, *Die Bauernfrage in frankreich und Deutschland*, pp. 485-489, 503-505; F. Engels, *Der status Quo*, pp. 48-49. On the political alliances of various strata of the peasantry see *ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

59. F. Engels, *Die Bauernfrage*, pp. 485-486. Bergmann, pp. 74, 78-80; H. Rosenberg, "Die Pseudodemokratisierung...", p. 300.

60. Bergmann, pp. 21, 71-74, 78-80, 164-172; Rosenberg, "Wirtschaftskonjunktur, Gesellschaft und Politik in Mitteleuropa 1873-1896," *Moderne Deutsche Sozialgeschichte*, pp. 247-252; H. Rosenberg, "Die Pseudodemokratisierung...", p. 305; *Tokody-Niederhauser*, pp. 218, 223-224; F. Zunkel, "Industriebürgertum in West-Deutschland. Der Kampf um den gesellschaftlichen Aufstieg und soziale Emanzipation," *Moderne deutsche Sozialgeschichte*, pp. 331-341.

61. In connection with the above, c.f. Bellmann-Hein-Trapp-Zang, pp. 82-84; Deuerlein, pp. 55-60; Bergmann, pp. 20-21; F. Engels, Vorwort (zur zweiten durchgesehenen Auflage "Zur Wohnungsfrage") *MEW*, Band 18, pp. 647-649. F. Engels, *Zur Wohnungsfrage*, *MEW*, Band 18, pp. 213-214. F. Engels, *Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England*, *MEW*, Band 2, pp. 255-258. On the "rational core" of urban criticism see also, H. Oswald, *Die Überschätzte Stadt* (Olten: Walter Verlag, 1966), pp. 29-68.

62. K. Zapf, *Rückständige Viertel* (Frankfurt/Main, 1968), pp. 21-22; B. Lutz, *Vorlesungen zur Grosstadtsoziologie* (München: Manuskripte des Institut für Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung, Universität München, 1968); Deuerlein, 98-109; Bellmann-Hein-Trapp-Zang, pp. 83-84; Mottek, p. 223. "Where capitalist production is fully naturalized among the Germans (for instance, in the factories proper), the condition of things is much worse than in England," Marx wrote in 1867, "because the counterpoise of the Factory Acts is wanting. In all other spheres, we...suffer not only from the development of capitalist production, but also from the incompleteness of that development. Alongside of modern evils, a whole series of inherited evils oppress us." *Capital*, p. 13; see also K. Marx, *Das Kapital*, pp. 12-15.

63. Bellmann-Hein-Trapp-Zang, pp. 83-84; H. Rosenberg, "Die Pseudodemokratisierung...", pp. 306-307.

64. H. Berndt, "Der Verlust von Urbanität im Städtebau," *Das Argument*, 4 (1967), 266-270; H. Berndt, *Das Gesellschaftsbild bei Stadtplanern* (Stuttgart: Kramer Verlag, 1968), pp. 25-29, 3-44, 48, 58-59; Oswald, pp. 72-73, Pfeil, p. 10; Zapf, pp. 21-23; Lutz, op.cit.

65. Cf. F. Stern, *Kultur pessimismus als politische Gefahr. Eine Analyse der nationalen Ideologie in Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Scherz Verlag, 1963), pp. 1-22, 207-208, 285-287, 321; H.-J. Lieber, *Kulturkritik und Lebensphilosophie. Studien zur deutschen Philosophie der Jahrhundertswende* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974), VII, 3-5; Adorno, "Kulturkritik und Gesellschaft," pp. 7-13. These points of contact are clearly defined in F. Stern's work cited above analyzing the activities of P. de Lagarde, J. Langbehn and M. van den Bruck. Addendum 1: as regards the history of ideology in Germany between 1871 and 1918, I consider as fundamental a book by Hans-Ulrich Wehler first published in 1973, *Das Deutsche Kaiserreich, 1871-1918* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Reprecht).

66. H. Berndt, *Das Gesellschaftsbild...*, pp. 21-24; Bergmann, pp. 278-281, 354-360.

67. H.P. Bahrdt, *Humaner Städtebau. Überlegungen zur Wohnungspolitik und Stadtplanung für eine nahe Zukunft* (München: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1973), pp. 19-20, 23-27; H. Berndt, *Das Gesellschaftsbild*, pp. 46-59. The long list of catchphrases surviving from urban criticism includes: the "unnatural," "biologically self-destructive" towns whose population is characterized by "being reduced to mass standards," being "atomized" and easily "manipulated," while their relations are characterized by "levelling off" and "reification." Cf. e.g., Oswald, pp. 87-90.

Chapter III Urbanization and Social Change in Latin America

Carlos Blank

Cities, like all social reality, are historical products, not only in their physical materiality, but in their cultural meaning, in the role they play in the social organization, and in people's lives.

Manuel Castells

Space and Society: Methodological Considerations

The first problem which arises when we take up this issue is that 'urban' does not have a precisely defined meaning and all do not agree on what we have to reckon with, either as social or as social change. In the field of the social sciences, and of sociology in particular, there is a dispute regarding: (a) what is to be considered as the basic social object, (b) the definition of social change, and (c) the means to accomplish this change.¹ Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to enter into a detailed discussion of these epistemological and methodological subjects, nevertheless, some of these questions must be taken up in treating urban change.

Frequently, studies treat urbanization as an autonomous and self-contained process, or take into account just one of its aspects, namely, the eco-demographic, the economic, the social, the political or the cultural, without trying to relate them and to understand how they are all intertwined. This approach can be very useful as a methodological technique, but it is very misleading when it becomes forgotten that it is only a methodological device to explain an extremely complex and many-sided phenomenon.

The city and urban space are not a priori or fixed categories, but are "the social meaning assigned to a particular spatial form by an historically defined society."² Urban space cannot be reduced to an abstract or geometrical form devoid of social and human content, nor can it be reduced to a reflection of this social interaction.³ Nor are social processes spaceless and timeless, for they take place in a concrete spatio-temporal form. It is just this Kantian dualism between the spatial or physical order and the social or human order which must be overcome.⁴ There is a common ground between the physical and social reality in which "spatial structure is now seen not merely as an arena in which social life unfolds, but rather as a medium through which social relations are produced and reproduced."⁵

Nevertheless, though space makes a difference, as Andrew Sayer puts it,⁶ this does not mean that space has of its own the casual power usually attributed to it in physical determinism and other theories.

Just as it is important not to make a fetish of spatial relations, it is important also, as we shall see, not to overstress economic, social, political, etc., relations which takes place in urban space. This has been the main limitation of the theoretical attempts to define the city.⁷ Because of this the four attempts at defining the city as an object of sociological study, namely, as an ecological community, a cultural form, a system of resource allocation, and a unit of collective consumption-all have had a too limited theoretical framework.⁸

According to P. Saunders all these attempts to define the city are doomed to failure because the modern city is no longer the basic economic, political and cultural unity it was in the Middle

Ages. With the emergence of the nation-state the city can no longer be the basic unit of social study.⁹ In other words, to explain the city we must go beyond the city itself.

Keeping in mind the intricacy of urbanization as a dimension of social and historical change, our aim is to outline the basic features of urbanization in Latin America and to identify the main social agents which lead to this process of change. In so doing, we must review some of the basic concepts which have been used to explain this process: in particular the concept of dependency. We do not pretend to give a full account of this historical process of urbanization or of the many theories which have been used to explain it, nor to build up a new general theoretical framework, but rather to open a discussion concerning the complex causality involved in this phenomenon.

Urbanization and Social Change in Latin America

An Historical Perspective

It can be useful to begin by recalling some of the demographic aspects of the process at hand. In Third World or developing countries there is an undeniable trend toward urbanization. This trend can be illustrated by some overwhelming statistics. At the present growth rate of 3.8%, by the year 2,000 (see table I) the urban population of the Third World is expected to be over 2 billion people; this is three times greater than in 1970.¹⁰ Latin America is the most urbanized area in the Third World (see table II). Compared with Asia which has 27% of its population in cities of over 20,000 inhabitants, and Africa which has 25% (and the USA's 74%), Latin America has over 80%¹¹ (see table III). In 1985 Asia had 9 cities of over 5 million, whereas Africa, which is the least urbanized region, had Cairo with over 10 million and Lagos with about 5 million.¹² In the same year Latin America had four of the fifteenth largest cities in the world (Mexico City, Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires), each with a population of over 10 million inhabitants.¹³ Argentina, Chile and Uruguay are ranked among the most urbanized countries in the world, with 36% of their population concentrated in cities of over one million inhabitants.¹⁴ The only Latin American country with a more balanced distribution is Colombia¹⁵ (see table IV). Commonly, these numbers are used to make gloomy predictions about Latin America's future and to reveal a fear of "urban explosion,"¹⁶ but this is only a quantitative feature of a process which needs to be understood qualitatively.

A current theory to explain the process of urbanization in Latin America was launched in the late '60s and the early '70s by Castells¹⁷ and Quijano¹⁸ among others. The cornerstone of this theory may be stated in the following argument: if every process of urbanization is rooted historically and if Latin American history cannot be divorced from its different modes of dependency, then neither can we divorce the process of urbanization in Latin American countries from the different modes of dependency.¹⁹ This cannot be seen as an "external hindrance" or as "a simple state of `submission"; it is an internal and structural factor which shapes the process of Latin America urbanization.²⁰ Its history has the following steps: colonial domination, commercial capitalist domination, and imperialist (industrial and financial) domination.²¹

Period of Colonial Domination

The colonial cities in Latin America were shaped by the concrete interests of the Spanish and the Portuguese (in the case of Brazil) Crowns. These settlements did not respond to the internal needs of the regions, but were centers mostly of administrative (also religious and military) power,

whereby the Crown controlled the surrounding rural areas²² and the strategic suppliers of raw materials.²³

The colonial settlement pattern was decidedly monocentric oriented toward a single large city in which the majority of the economic, political, and cultural resources were concentrated. Internally, the city reflected the European city, with its central plaza surrounded by the main symbols of political power: the church, the prefecture, and the wealthiest merchants.²⁴

Not only was the internal pattern of the Spanish American cities very similar to their Spanish counterparts, but the hierarchical structure was also very similar to the urban networks of Castille: ciudad, villa, pueblo and so forth.²⁵ In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries this urban system remained virtually stagnant both because of the dispersal of population and the lack of communication and because the power of Spain was gradually substituted by other European powers.²⁶

In a sense, Hispanic America's war of independence can be viewed as a consequence of the fragmentation or "balkanization" of the urban areas. The economic restrictions imposed by the Spanish Crown contrasted with the more flexible and integrative system established in Brazil.²⁷

After the war of independence the four Vice-Royalties gave birth to the present national configurations with their respective capitals.²⁸ Until the 20th century this urban pattern remained fundamentally the same because the interests of the new criollo oligarchy, "were not substantially different from those of the Crown."²⁹

Period of Capitalist Commercial Domination

This second period is related by Castells to the emergence of the USA as the dominant nation of the international capitalist system and the insertion of the Latin American economies into that system.³⁰ This insertion gave rise to different types of economic structures according to the natural resources available and the maturity of the internal organization of each society.³¹ These types were: the enclave economy (e.g., Venezuela, Chile, Bolivia), the agricultural and cattle raising export economy (e.g., Argentina and Uruguay), and the plantation economy (e.g., Central America and Brazil before 1920).³² Castells finds in the first two a strong trend toward urbanization, whereas in the last the level of urbanization was very weak.³³

We can only add that the pattern has not differed greatly since the colonial period. Gwynne notes:

Latin American countries did not generally follow the example of their northern neighbor. Indeed from their own independence until 1930, they were a set of free-trading countries, supplying a wide variety of agricultural and mineral raw materials to Europe in return for a wide variety of manufactured goods.³⁴

As a consequence of the world depression in the early '30s Latin American exports dropped abruptly "from an average of about \$5,000 million in 1928-29 to \$1,500 in 1933."³⁵ The national governments encouraged more autonomous industrialization and shifted "from a set of free-trade economies to one of highly protected economy."³⁶ Castells sees the decline of rural migration and, hence, of urban growth as a consequence of this more autonomous and national orientation of the economy.³⁸ The process of industrialization in this period was more equilibrated because it was oriented to the internal needs of each country, rather than to the external interests of the industrialized centers. Accordingly, the pattern of urbanization too was more balanced.³⁹

A striking factor about this position was its attack upon international capitalism while at the same time it longed for a national capitalism, as if the rules and the contradictions were not the same--outside as inside. This period is viewed as an idyllic interlude in the whole history of capitalist domination; as a utopian regression it permeates the whole analysis.

Period of Imperialist Domination

After World War II the remaining Latin American countries engaged progressively in a process of "import substitution industrialization." In this the Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA) and its former director, Raul Prebisch, played an important role. This process, according to Quijano and Castells, was no longer led by national entrepreneurs, but was taken over by large multinational firms. Thus, the commercial domination, which had characterized the second stage of capitalism, changed into a more subtle form of domination or dependence, namely, one that was financial and technological in nature.⁴⁰ In this new international division of labor the process of decision-making was situated outside the boundaries of the Latin American countries and responded to an economic global strategy.⁴¹

In order to lower the cost of production it is characteristic of this third stage of capitalism to locate labor intensive industries in areas where the work-force is cheaper and to transfer the benefits to their holding companies or trusts.⁴² These industries settle in areas with the necessary agglomeration economies (i.e., the support structures required for their development). This generates a mutual reinforcing relation between urbanization (particularly of the capital city) and industrialization.⁴³

In this the urban pull is always weaker than the rural push: the speed of urban growth is faster than the speed of industrialization.⁴⁴ This asymmetrical relationship between urbanization and industrialization is from the beginning a dominant feature of Latin America. This contrasts with the experience of Europe and the U.S.A., where this relation has been more symmetrical and balanced. The construction industry absorbs non-skilled hand laborers, but it is the tertiary sector, mainly the service sector, which absorbs a large part of migration.⁴⁵ Nevertheless, the vast majority of the urban population cannot be absorbed by the formal economy (see tables 5 and 6). If we add to this panorama the ever-changing mode of industrial production, in which the technological innovations tend to a more capital-intensive mode of (industrial) production, the obvious result is an increase in unemployment and underemployment. As a consequence of all this there develops a process of segregation in illegal urban settlements.⁴⁶

This marginal pole is no longer a "reserve industrial army" a concept borrowed from Marxian theory--but plainly a "surplus."⁴⁷ Such urban marginality can be defined as the inability of the market economy, or state policies, to provide adequate shelter and urban services to an increasing proportion of urban dwellers, including the regularly employed salaried workers, as well as practically all people making their earnings in the so-called informal sector of the economy.⁴⁸

This more accurate definition of urban marginality allows us to grasp its nature. As is illustrated by the case of Caracas, urban marginality cannot be understood merely in terms of low income or unemployment, but by dependence upon public programs and the permission of the state (see table 7).⁴⁹ Such urban marginality is, according to Castells, "the most surprising aspect of dependent urbanization."⁵⁰ "Ranchos" in Venezuela, "Villas miseria" in Argentina, "favelas" in Brazil or "tugurios" in Colombia are different names, but point to the same reality.

This is repeated in many developing countries (see table 8), but it would be a mistake to think that these are homogenous (see tables 9).⁵¹ As was noted, the key factor to be understood regarding

the squatters is their dependence upon the state. The attitudes among the different governments "range from benign neglect, to active opposition, to acceptance and gradually to the provision of some services."⁵² This policy of assistance is very common among Latin American countries.

The existence of urban marginality is now the most notorious feature of urbanization. It is, as it were, a "hard fact" that cannot be denied or hidden. The merit of the theory of Qui jano and Cas tells is that it sensitizes one to these "recalcitrant" or "stubborn facts" and casts light upon important factors which had remained in the shadow. However, as do all theories, this has raised some criticism.

Dependency, Urban Marginality and Social Change: Critique and Conclusions

The first point of critique is the generality of the concept of dependency, which attempts to explain all the different experiences of Latin American countries and their processes of urbanization. Does this concept of dependency fit well all Latin American countries? Can it account for the differences among them? Can we explain all the intricacy of the process of urbanization in Latin America relying solely on dependency?

We cannot deny that dependency has existed, and still exists to different degrees among Latin America countries, just as we cannot deny the existence of squatters, but can we consider dependency to be the only factor in shaping the process of urbanization past and present? What does dependency mean? Is it a working hypothesis, an all explaining theory or a blatant reality that pervades all the dimensions of Latin American countries? Or is it all of these at the same time? This is just the point. Dependency may play all these different functions; it can be used to explain all the historical process of Latin American countries. As Singer says "indeed it is always possible to find some relation between dependency and any historical event in a 'dependent' country; we just need to work at a sufficiently high level of abstraction."⁵³ Once again it is not the case of denying its existence, but rather of casting some doubt about its unlimited power of explanation.

For instance, according to Gwynne, Quijano's standpoint of urban marginality is influenced by his Peruvian background or experience, but cannot be generalized to such Latin American countries as Mexico, Brazil or Venezuela.⁵⁴ To him, Quijano underestimates the growth potential of some Latin American Countries, as he illustrates in the case of Brazil. In this country, between 1950 and 1960, the manufacture and service sectors grew at a rate of 4 and 4.8 respectively, adding 8.41 million new jobs to the work market.⁵⁵ In the next decade, "the secondary sector grew at a faster rate than the tertiary sector".⁵⁶ As may be evident, comparing the different performance of Latin American countries, the industrial growth is closely link with the size of their internal market (See table X). This is so because only in a large market the unit cost of each manufactured product (scale economies) can be reduced in order to accomplish the four stages of import substitution industrialization (ISI).⁵⁷ Owing to the limitations of this process some Latin American countries are engaged in an open process of export promotion and the exploitation of comparative advantages. Indeed, these economic indicators sometimes hide the real social structure. As Friedmann comments in a similar context:

One might be tempted to conclude from this quotation that economist don't like to talk about the cities at all. As by magic, they have made the city disappear into the air.⁵⁸

And he adds:

In the economist's language, particular cities are dissolved into market configurations, their history is replaced by something called the urban dynamic, people disappear as citizens of the polis and are subsumed under the categories of abstract urbanization processes, while human concerns are reduced to property, profits and competitive advantages.⁵⁹

Exactly; and this is why we must look very carefully at these economic factors.

Another fact is that Latin American companies are more and more organized in a monopolist manner and become international corporation themselves (see table XI). In part, this is due to the nationalist policies of these countries and the international scale of the capitalist system. An important consequence is the bargaining power this gives some of these countries vis à vis multinational corporations.

A more useful framework within which to analyze transnational power in Latin American countries is that of bargaining--bargaining between multinational enterprises, on the one hand, and the territorial organization (national or regional governments), on the other. Some studies have shown how the host government can often hold the strongest bargaining position as with the nationalization of the foreign oil interest in Venezuela.⁶⁰

Another question is whether this bargaining power has been translated into more social welfare and a better quality of life for the overall population. Friedmann notes that "Latin American cities, located as they are on the periphery of the global economy, are more accurately regarded as 'parasitical' than as 'generative'. Expressed in human and social terms their growth is an illusion."⁶¹

But the question is whether we can blame foreign capital or multinational corporations as the main source of social disparities (a similar questioning of "foreign" investment and its "evil" consequences is noticeable now in USA, as if the same capitalistic rules were not working in this process). The idea that one need only break this link of dependency in order to solve inter-urban and intra-urban disequilibria seems, to say the least, dubious. More likely, as we have seen, "the monopolistic sector of Latin American economies would display the same features as at the present even though it was not dominated by foreign capital."⁶²

To Singer, this view of urban marginality and urban growth has the flavour of 'reactionary utopia' and reveals a set of dominant anti-urban ideas.⁶³ Castells' and Quijano's urban ideas entail that a more autonomous and 'national' capitalist development would diminish the urban unbalances and would be more harmonic and equilibrated.⁶⁴ But this does not stand scrutiny, according to Singer, because these unbalances are at the very core of industrialization and of the capitalist structure (whether autonomous or dependent); they are unavoidable consequences of this mode of production.⁶⁵

Up to this point the crucial question is: can the necessary changes be made within the capitalist system in order to overcome these disparities (e.g., by a more rational urban and regional planning) or must we change the system radically to solve these problems? To put this in other words, how can the economic rationale and the social and human rationale be wed?

Current policies carried out by most Latin American countries to abridge these inequalities (e.g. industrial decentralization and the creation of new growth poles) have been unable to alleviate these contrasting urban inequalities.⁶⁶ But if neither capital nor state alone are able to change this situation, where can we look for these changes? In Friedmann's words,

if there is to be another development, it will come neither for the state nor from the powerful international organizations that represent the old order of things, but from among the people themselves, as they perceive new possibilities for action.⁶⁷

The importance of the community as a key agent of change in the city and in society is usually overlooked, as if people could not change the dominant social relations and were only the outcome of social forces beyond their control.⁶⁸ Obviously this is not new, "for in the beginning were the people."⁶⁹ Communities are challenging the current values of capitalist society and raising new values in their stead, as was pointed out by Castells in his later work (see table XII).⁷⁰ Where these new grassroots movements and their values will lead is difficult to foresee, but in the meantime the communities are changing "their" world.

When people find themselves unable to control the world, they simply shrink the world to the size of their community.⁷¹

This does not mean that a new development can be hinged upon these new social movements alone, but rather that we need new ways to engaged people, capital and state--ways in which people are not means to achieve a goal, but are the goal.⁷² Kant said that the human person is an end in itself. We must bear in mind this simple and fundamental idea in order to build a better society and a better city in which people matter.

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NOTES

1. Theodor W. Adorno et al., *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology* (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1976).

2. M. Castells, *The city and the Grassroots* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), p. 302.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 311.

4. See Derek Gregory and John Urry (eds.), *Social relations and spatial structures* (London: MacMillan, 1985), pp. 1-8 passim.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

6. See "The Difference the Space Makes" in *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*, pp. 49-66.

7. Peter Saunders: "Space, the city and urban sociology" in *Social relations and spatial structures*, pp. 67-89.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 70-76.

9. *Idem.*

10. Stephen Mayo et al., "Shelter Strategies for the Urban Poor in Developing Countries," in *Research Observer* (The World Bank), I (n. 2, 1986), p. 183.

11. "Human settlements" in *World Resources, 1986* (New York: Basic Books, 1986), p. 31.

12. *Idem.*

13. *Idem.*

14. *Idem.*

15. Singer has criticized this catastrophic view based upon demographic projections in *Economía política de la Urbanización* (Mexico: Siglo XXI Ed., 1986), pp. 81-84 passim. Also see *World Resources 1986*, p. 32.

16. "La urbanización dependiente en América Latina" in M. Castells et al., *Imperialismo y urbanización en América Latina* (Barcelona: Ed. Gustavo Gili, 1973), pp. 7-26. See also *La cuestión urbana* (Mexico: Siglo XXI Ed., 1985). In this book Castells criticized the functionalist view of The Chicago School as well as the very idea of a urban sociology. He considered the idea of an "urban culture" to be a myth which assumes the characteristics of modern capitalism,

specialization and heterogeneity along with modernization, urbanization and westernization which derive from the German sociology.

17. Anibal Quijano, "Redefinición de la dependencia y marginalidad en América Latina," in Cuadernos de la Sociedad Venezolana de Planificación, N. 94-95, Caracas. See also "Dependencia, cambio social y urbanización en América Latina" in América Latina: Ensayos de interpretación sociológico-política (Santiago: Ed. Universitaria, 1970) and "La urbanización de la sociedad en América Latina," Revista Mexicana de Sociología, XXX, 1967.

18. Quijano, "La urbanización..", pp. 684f.

19. Quijano, op. cit., pp. 679-684 passim. See also Castells, "La urbanización dependiente," p. 16.

20. Castells, op. cit., pp. 16f.

21. R. Gwynne: Industrialization and Urbanization in Latin America (London: Croom Helm, 1985), p. 137.

22. Castells, op. cit., pp. 17f.

23. Thomas Angotti, "Urbanization in Latin America: Toward a theoretical synthesis," in Latin American perspectives, n. 53 (14-2-87), p. 139.

24. Gwynne, op. cit., p. 137.

25. Ibid., p. 138.

26. Idem.

27. Ibid., p. 139.

28. Angotti, op. cit., p. 139.

29. Castells, op. cit., p. 18.

30. Ibid., p. 19.

31. Idem.

32. As was pointed out by Singer this is a too simple typology to explain the urban forms that took place in Latin America. See op. cit., pp. 73ff.

33. Gwynne, op. cit., p. 22.

34. Ibid., p. 23.

35. Idem.

36. Idem; see also Quijano, op. cit., p. 686.

37. Castells, op. cit., p. 21.

38. Idem.

39. Singer, op. cit., p. 79.

40. Castells, op. cit., p. 22. Singer asks how can international entrepreneurs take over this process of "import substitution" if it is determined by the internal needs of each market. See op. cit., p. 78.

41. Idem.

42. Quijano: "Redefinición de la dependencia", p. 11.

43. Gwynne, op. cit., p. 149.

44. Castells, op. cit., p. 10. This fact can be explained as a classical process of capitalist penetration in an economy of subsistence. But the question is why this penetration has not brought about an authentic development of agriculture in most of these countries. See Singer, op. cit., pp. 91f.

45. Ibid., pp. 10-14.

46. Castells, op. cit., p. 14; see also Quijano, op. cit., pp. 5-19, 33f. This shift is also, to Quijano, the main cause of the growing poverty in industrialized countries. See p. 11.

47. Quijano, op. cit., p. 7-12 passim, 46.
48. Castells, *The city and the Grassroots*, p. 185.
49. Castells, op. cit., p. 211.
50. Castells, "La urbanización dependiente," p. 15.
51. Castells, *The city and the grassroots*, p. 187.
52. *World resources 1986*, p. 39.
53. Op. cit., p. 74; see also John Walton, "La economía internacional y la urbanización periférica" in *Ciudades y sistemas urbanos* (Claxo: Biblioteca de Ciencias Sociales), pp. 9-25.
54. Gwynne, op. cit., pp. 166f.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 166.
56. *Idem.*
57. *Ibid.*, pp. 35-42 passim.
58. "The right to the city" in *Development dialogue* (1987), p. 145.
59. *Idem.*
60. Gwynne, op. cit., p. 189.
61. Friedmann, op. cit., p. 147.
62. Singer, op. cit., pp. 101f.
63. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 75.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 151.
66. See Sonia Barrios et al., *Urban Problem and Urban Policies in Oil Exporting Countries: The Case of Caracas Metropolitan area* (Tokyo: Asian Economic Press LTD, 1985), p. 83.
67. "The right to the city", p. 148.
68. J. Walton, op. cit., p. 18.
69. Marc Nerffin, "Neither Prince nor Merchant: Citizen. An Introduction to the Third System" in *Development Dialogue* (n. 1, 1987), p. 179.
70. E.g., *The city and the Grassroots*; see also Jorge Jatobá, "Alternative resources for Grassroots Developments. A View from Latin America" in *Development dialogue* (n. 1, 1987), pp. 114-134.
71. Castells, op. cit., p. 331.
72. For instance, in Mexico after the earthquake in 1985 new ways of coordination among capital, communities and state were very successful. See "Ciudad de México: una notable recuperación. La reconstrucción de vivienda económica después del desastre de 1985" in *Horizontes urbanos. Ideas e innovaciones, II* (n. 9, 1987). See also Aldo Paviani: "La urbanización en América Latina: El proceso de constitución de periferias en las áreas metropolitanas" in *Revista Interamericana de Planificación*, ed. SIAP, XIX (n. 73, 1985), pp. 74-95; and Victor Fossi: "Desarrollo urbano y vivienda: la desordenada evolución hacia un país de metrópolis," in *El caso Venezuela: Una ilusión de armonía?* (Caracas: Ed. IESA, 1986), pp. 472-497.
- tables:
- a. 1-4, 6. 10. 11
- b. 5, 8
- c. 7,,9,12
- R. Gwynne, *Industrialization and Urbanization in Latin America* (London: Croom Helm, 1985).
- Johannes F. Linn, *Cities in the Developing World* (Washington: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 1985).

M. Castells, *The City and the Grassroots* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).

Chapter IV
Democracy and Urbanization in Africa
from Tradition to Modernity

Armand Epas-Ngan Atomate

Introduction

The purpose of this account is fourfold: (a) to synthesize in what democracy consists and concerns. It will be argued that democracy is "good, fair and just government", corresponding closely to Abraham Lincoln's definition of democracy as "government of the people, by the people and for the people". (b) To evaluate democratic practices in the African traditional societies. It will be argued that the African traditional societies were, in the majority of cases, open and participatory. Decisions often were made on a consensual basis, the concern being always the welfare of the community. However, exceptions were to be found in those societies which had stratified socio-political systems and a rigid structure of authority. The bureaucratization of their socio-political life acted against democratic behavior. But the problem was confined to only a few areas. (c) To explore the relations between this phenomenon of culture and the phenomenon of urbanization taken at its point of furthest development, then moving on from tradition to modernity. As may be expected, this specific project involves directly two very important sociological factors, relating to different methods: on the one hand, the sociology of the less "advanced" African traditional societies and, on the other hand urban sociology which is itself part of the sociology of the more industrial states. (d) To identify the urban pathology and to propose a possible therapeutic. It shall be argued that although the city in Africa is an "exchange agent", transforming tradition into projections of the future, it also risks being the place where man in general and the African in particular perceives the absence of all collective and personal projects, the meshing of means in the absence of ends, and the loss of meaning.

Democracy: A Synthetic Meaning

Democracy can be said to have at least three moments or dimensions: in its abstract moment it exists in the imagination, in its practical moment it exists in ways and means, and in its concrete moment it exists as our experience.

This multifaceted mode of existence no doubt is one of the principal reasons why there is so much disagreement about what it really is. To the point, George Orwell writes: "in the case of a word like `democracy' not only is there no agreed definition but the attempt to make one is resisted from all sides."¹ Nevertheless, in the interests of clarity we must specify the facet of democracy to which we are referring.

It is not the purpose of this study to review of the myriad and diverse theories and practices of democracy which have arisen through the ages. Rather, it is intended to use these as a broad point of departure and source of inspiration in an attempt to elaborate a synthetic definition which both reflects the substance of the diverse, contrasting and sometimes contradictory definitions and usages of the concept "democracy", and transcends or surpasses any one of its forms. In this sense, democracy means simply "good, fair and just government"; in Abraham Lincoln's words, it is "government (or rule) of the people, by the people and for the people."

Therefore, democracy has been described as an umbrella concept used to refer to, and to designate, a multitude of diverse and varied socio-political systems or realities. It has become so "universally sanctified"² that no one dares say he or she is anti-democratic.³ The general term "democracy" has come to have an unequivocally "laudatory meaning,"⁴ though "democracies" and "democrats" come in all colors, shapes and sizes: social democracy, christian, liberal, popular, national popular democracy, African, Arab, progressive democrats and just plain democrats.

One would imagine that democracy is the antithesis of dictatorship. But in Marxist parlance the "dictatorship of the proletariat" is simply another name for "popular democracy," which supposedly is a more substantive type of democracy, at least materially or economically than the purely "formal" liberal/bourgeois/capitalist variety. Indeed, General Pinochet of Chile speaks of "authoritarian democracy"!

What is meant by "government of the people, by the people and for the people"? Without belaboring the Greek origins or the linguistic subtleties of the term, we should state that democracy in its etymological sense means simply "rule by the people". As to what is meant by either "the people" or "rule" there hardly exists a consensus. To some authors indeed "Kratia"(-cracy) refers not to "rule" but to "power"⁵. This controversy is not of great consequence for present purposes, however, because it is possible to define "rule" to include power relations. To this end, we shall define "rule" as "the exercise of power, authority and influence in society".

As a result, the democratic ideal or model proposes that the people be the rulers--the rulers of "themselves". This implies that the people should have their destiny, and that of their society, in their own hands; they should order, organize and manage their own affairs. In a word, the people should be free.

But--and this is the other hitch--who exactly are "the people"? Various conceptualizations have been advanced as to who or what constitutes the people; Giovanni Sartori⁶ gives the following list:

- people meaning an approximate plurality, just "a great many";
- people meaning an integral plurality, "everybody";
- people as an entity, or as "an organic whole";
- people as a plurality expressed by an "absolute majority" principle;
- people as a plurality expressed by a "limited majority" principle.

The only realistic and tenable conceptualization of "the people" would appear to be one which is both practically operationalizable and empirically demonstrable or ascertainable, that is, the "people" as a plurality expressed by "the majority" principle. Here, "people" is merely the plural of "person". The people therefore refers to merely many individuals and not to a quasi-monolithic and transcendental being possessed of its own independent existence. Nor does it refer to some assemblage in which each and all count for the same. Rather, it refers to a relatively large number of people: to "many" at least in comparison to some other group or assemblage of people. This leads immediately to the idea of majority which can be defined as "the many" in contrast to a smaller number or "minority", meaning "the few".

Most definitions of democracy, therefore, stop with an etymological clarification of at "rule" and "people". It is our contention, however, that the conjunction concepts "by" and "of" are of much more than superficial significance. Many authors define democracy as "rule by the people" or "rule of the people", to which Abraham Lincoln in his celebrated definition has added the third: government (rule) "for" the people.

In very succinct terms we can say that the "of" raises the question of the "genealogy" of the rule; the "by" raises that of the "mode of existence" of that rule; and the "for" raises the question of the "purpose" of the rule.

In proposing that the rule should be "of the people, by the people and for the people", then the democratic ideal postulates that this is the only way to establish the ideal, the perfect or best government of men and women in society. But then, what concrete or substantive meaning can we attach to the concept of the ideal or perfect government or rule; In real, concrete terms what kind of government should be considered ideal or perfect, or as close to that as can be?

This paper suggests that such a government must be able to be described as good, fair and just and possesses or manifests the characteristics and attributes of each of these three concepts taken as absolute categories. To support the argument, we shall analyze these three concepts.

Good: First of all, "goodness" can be conceived as a "social category". In so far as it is a matter of form, structure and appearance. From this standpoint a government or social system stands all the more chance of being qualified as "good," and to that extent democratic, if it is the government "of" the people. By "of" is meant that the rule and the rulers are "born of," "issue of", or are "begotten of" the people. The rule and the rulers are a creature or creation of the people. This implies immediately that the government/system is socially legitimate, meaning recognized and accepted by the people who "fathered" or "begot" it.

It is in this the sense that we say that the "of" raises the question of the genealogy of the rule/system. A democratic system is one which has its roots in the people, and therefore is not alien, imposed or forced upon the people.

Apart from being a social category, the faculty of "goodness" is also a "functional attribute". In the case of a government, this means that the government functions according to or in conformity with written or unwritten, explicit or implicit rules, procedures and regulations established by the people. In a word, it means governing or ruling according to or in conformity with, the constitution. To the extent then that the rule of law is established by the people, it is the people who rule--it is rule "by" the people.

Finally, "goodness" can be taken in terms of "results". In relation to this criterion a system is good if it "delivers", that is, if it serves some useful or practical and concrete purpose. A democratic government in this perspective is capable of producing good results in terms of tangible or intangible benefits for the people. It lives up to "its purpose for existence" or justifies its existence on the strength of the good it does for the people, the goods and services it provides them. As a government "for" the people it is one which serves the material, social and other interests of the people.

Fair and Just: The analysis of the meanings of the concepts "fair" and "just" follows or parallel lines. As a "social category" a fair government is the one which is of the people concerned, "begot" by them: it resembles them or is "cut in their image"; a just system is truly "representative" of the people. Viewed from a "functional standpoint, a fair and just government is the one in which there is rule of law. This is the opposite of a bandit or rogue government which does not respect and enforce the law, plays foul, and is arbitrary and capricious. Finally, a government which fair and just concretely or in terms of its results must be a profitable or beneficial enterprise giving adequate returns in goods and services to the people as well as ensuring a fair and just distribution of the nations resources

This three-dimensional perspective on democracy immediately incorporates and transcends the various oppositions between "substantive" and "formal" democracy between "economic" and "legalistic" democracy between the "material" or "real" and the "mystificatory" or "unreal" . The

"of" and the "by" of the people are important in that they bring out "l'art et la manière d'être" of democracy, that is, its "form" and "mode of existence"; the "for" of democracy is equally important because it brings out the "substance" of democracy.

If democracy means "good, fair and just government" of men and women in society according to the various connotations of the concepts outlined above, it follows that it can be established, it can live, survive and thrive only in a country of good, fair and just people. The question is: where is such a land to be found? The sad answer to this question is: nowhere on earth. For, as Jean-Jacques Rousseau writes, "if there were a people of gods, they would rule themselves democratically. So perfect a government is not suited for men"⁷ The equally sad conclusion is that there is no democracy on planet earth-- at least not in its ideal or pure form. Democracy in the real world is negated or limited in the fullness of its concrete manifestations by the non-ideal or limited character of the men and women who must nurture or operate it.

To say that democracy does not exist in its ideal form, however, is not to say it does not exist in any form. To that extent we can advance the proposition that, rather than their being either democratic (or undemocratic) systems, what exists in the world are "more or less" democratic (or undemocratic) systems, depending upon the perspective from which one chooses to look at them. What exists in the real world, as always when the ideal meets the real, are only "approximations of varying degrees of fidelity" to the ideal model.

The uncontested fact is that some governments are more representative, more "cut in the people's image" than others. Some observe more scrupulously the rules of the game, primarily the letter and spirit of the constitution, than do others. Some are more useful and deliver more tangible benefits or goods and services to their people than do others. All these are parameters for measuring democracy.

Traditional African Political Systems: A Practical Evaluation

The study of African traditional societies has raised more problems that it has solved. Pertinent issues include such questions as the following. Were there or were there not social classes in the African traditional societies? If there were, are these classes to be conceived in the classical Marxist-Leninist paradigm of the incompatibility of class interests and attendant class struggle? Or, were these societies egalitarian in essence and perspective as Mwalimu Julius Nyerere has tried to show; in other words, were these societies without any class interests or class conflicts? What was the nature of political power in the centralized and the so-called decentralized polities? Were such concept as democracy, as C.R. Macpherson says, a new development within the Western liberal state that may be quite foreign to the African traditional societies and cultures?⁸

As proven in our contribution to the study, *The Place of the Person in Social Life*,⁹ many African and foreign scholars, politicians and historians¹⁰ have portrayed the African societies before colonialism as harmonious, undifferentiated entities enjoying democratic tranquility. Rousseau's view of the Noble Savage in a state of Nature seems to be the background against which Nyerere developed his "Ujamaa" philosophy¹¹

This idea that African traditional societies were by and large democratic in the sense that the common citizens had a say in their governance is questioned, however, by other scholars who argue that, to a certain extent, there was no democracy in the African traditional societies. While observing that the problem was more accentuated in the stratified, centralized polities, they are quick to point out that even in the so-called democratic, decentralized political systems

gerontocratic principles and practices militated against openness and popular participation. Therefore they consider the notion that African traditional societies were democratic to be a myth.

To support the argument, primarily with regard to the so-called centralized and class structured societies, Emile Mworoha asserts that in 19th century Burundi, and by extension the central African regions, political power and life revolved around the personality of the King and his aristocratic entourage¹²

Underlying the clear distinctions between the social classes in central and western Sudanic regions, Lansine Kaba declares that the society of the ancient kingdom of Songhay was divided into two groups for economic production¹³, "large estates belonging to the crown and employing an extensive labor force" and those that belonged to the elite in the provinces and near Gao, the capital. These estates were that possessed by the crown, the elite and the military, who were very powerful in this militaristic regime; it was these classes that had access to resources, trade, power, knowledge and prestige.¹⁴

Elsewhere in West Africa, Majhemout Diop notices a similar class structure. He states that in ancient Mali there was a three-tier system of castes composed of (i) "Rimbe Benangatobe", the upper and ruling class; (ii) "Rimbe Nangatobe", the middle class; and (iii) "Matioube", the inferior class or caste of slaves¹⁵

The conclusion which flows from the above descriptions of the so-called centralized political systems is that by and large, on the whole of the African continent, there was no democratic tradition.

To support this conclusion with regard to the so-called decentralized political systems, Wagner Gunther points out the inegalitarian character of lineage systems in the African traditional societies. Taking the case of the "Bukusu" of the Western Province of Kenya, he argues that in this system, the senior members had more privileges, material, legal and moral, than the junior members in the same lineage structure¹⁶ He concludes that such a system could not be democratic.

Elsewhere in Kenya, W.R. Ochieng has described the political organization of the Gusii people. According to him, "the Gusii society did not constitute one, but a collection of many political units.¹⁷ He asserts that the Gusii had a system of chiefs who were supposed to lead and make decisions with the consent and support of the elders.¹⁸ However, the position of chief was hereditary: "persons automatically assumed their position of chiefs by virtue of being the most senior survivors of the hereditary leading clan families."¹⁹ Furthermore, Ochieng argues that the Gusii society was egalitarian because "everybody was entitled to equal rights and privileges of their society."²⁰ However, the same author gives evidence which contradicts the statement. He says that among the Gusii there was also another type of leadership, "Omotang'ani", a person who by force of example, talent or qualities of leadership played a directive role, wielded commanding influence or had a following in any sphere of thought or activity.²¹

Here, we would be tempted to see the democratic essence of the recognition of personal merit, but the description of the lines of authority rules this out. From the level of the home the head of the family had enormous powers. All disputes were handled by him; his wives, sons and daughters had to submit to his authority. The clan chief presided over a council of elders who generally were heads of homesteads. This practice, therefore, defeats any argument of egalitarianism or democracy among the Gusii.

Describing the political institutions of the Kiyuyu, Muriuki argues along the same lines when he writes: "by the end of the nineteenth century, Kiyuyu society was patriarchal..."²² At the nuclear level, the head of the family or father was the supreme authority. He decided virtually all matters except really serious ones, where he consulted "all the initiated males who had attained elder

status"²³ At the clan level, the "Mbari" council chose a head known as "Muramati" who was "the eldest son from the senior house line" (githaka)²⁴ Muriuki also states that although the initiated young men forming the military forces had "enough power and privileges in (their) hands they were strictly governed by their council. The titular head of this council was the 'muthamaki'".²⁵ But, precise H.E. Lambert, not every muthamaki joined the council of elders.²⁶ Indeed, Muriuki notes that the age determined system in the Kiyuyu political system acted as "a very important agent of social control".²⁷

Analyzing the political organization of the Arusha Maasai of Tanzania, P.N. Gulliver asserts that they also have quite an elaborate age structure, with fourteen formal stages; and when these are exhausted, the cycle begins once again.²⁸

To conclude this section, what comes out of the examination of the political institutions and mechanisms of the African traditional societies is a mixture of democratic principles and practices, on the one hand, and aristocratic, autocratic, gerontocratic and/or militaristic practices and tendencies, with varying degrees of despotism, on the other hand. It would be incorrect to equate these democratic principles and practices, found especially in the non-centralized communities, with advanced forms of democracy. But we can call upon African scholars to delve into the study of these societies in order to bring out what can be blended with the present African political structures, institutions and practices regarding the phenomenon of urbanization.

Urbanization: From Tradition to Modernity

Dennis A. Rondinelli's analysis²⁹ shows the African continent to be one of the world's less urbanized regions because of the relatively slow pace of urbanization there during the first half of the 20th century and the large percentage of the population which remains in rural areas. Nevertheless, the same author argues that although Africa is relatively late in urbanizing several cities (Kinshasa, Nairobi, Harare, Addis-Abeba, Lome, Abidjan, Bamako, etc.) emerged as significant urban agglomerations. Some of them have a long tradition in African history. They were

indigenous urban centers that emerged from commercial and trading functions or as defensive or administrative centers. Others were Islamic cities providing a combination of religious and trading functions. Many were formed for colonial purposes and shaped by European aesthetic principles. Still others have emerged as dualistic or hybrid cities that accommodate or integrate foreign and indigenous activities with varying degrees of harmony".³⁰

Therefore, in turning to the phenomenon of urbanization, I wish to consider a certain number of features³¹ chosen here as possibilities offered to modern African citizens by the large city in order eventually to confront them with the phenomenon of culture described above. These features are the following: relations and interchanges, accelerated mobility, concentrated organization and the image of human energy.

City as Relations and Interchanges

The first general principle which seemed to lie at the base of nearly all African political systems was that the "age-set" tended to thwart or contain the aspirations of the more volatile, active and probably intelligent younger generations. In some cases, the age-set system seems to have combined with the class structure to lower the aspirations and rights of the lower echelons of

the society--even to suppress them permanently--reducing thereby the network of human interrelations.

With the phenomenon of urbanization taken at its highest point of development, we move to a very large extent from more restrictive to a more varied, specialized, abstract and densely ramified network of human relations. Thus, the city is, first of all, a fact of "communication" similar to an enormous exchange or a giant name-board. To modern African citizens, this means ever more numerous opportunities for both encounter and choice. This phenomenon could be expressed in terms of "information".

With Harvey Cox, I am interested in the so-called "anonymity" of human relations. This ill of modern civilization must be described first of all in neutral terms as a new division between the private and the public, and even more fundamentally, as a defense reaction or even an immunization against the innumerable outside intrusions which result from a multiplicity of contacts.³²

This anonymity implies, in turn, a positive "depersonalization" of most of our relations in terms of the preservation of authentic encounters and means that not all social relations can be transcribed in the language of "I" and "You".

City as Accelerated Mobility

The second general principle found in the majority of the African traditional societies was the "insular type of structures", in other words, structures without upward mobility or open recruitment outside the set and rigid rules of procedure. In some instances, there was no chance of any upward mobility whatsoever.

With the phenomenon of urbanization, the modern city in Africa is characterized by an accelerated mobility which is geographic, residential, professional, social and psychological. This accelerated mobility implies "internal migration" which inaugurates the relations and contacts noted above, but at the same time represents an unavoidable ordeal for the modern African citizens forced to change socially and at times professionally. Nevertheless, accelerated mobility adds a new feature inasmuch as it means that for most African citizens the places of residence and of work are widely separated. This geographical distance symbolizes a psychological distance: the different roles are disparate and disjointed. For the underprivileged, this uprooting poses the problem of "adaptation" to the modern world while for the privileged it takes the form of a voyage or vacation, sometimes of dislocation, and always of an "estrangement"³³.

In spite of the "nomadism" and "deracination" which accompany this accelerated mobility, its cultural effects are largely beneficial. Most modern African cities, because of the important and sometimes dominant social and economic functions they provide that make them the most attractive locations for rural migrants,³⁴ have become national centers for social transformation. They absorb rural migrants, accommodate and encourage the integration of diverse social, ethnic, religious, or tribal groups; support organizations that help socialize and assimilate rural people into city life; and provide new economic opportunities for people seeking social and economic mobility.³⁵

City as Concentrated Organization

The third general principle which flowed from the examination and analysis of the African traditional political systems was the concept of "hierarchy". The societies and therefore their

political organizations were conceived in a hierarchical structure with little or no horizontal checks and balances.

With the phenomenon of urbanization, the traditional hierarchical structure by and large is balanced by a "concentrated organization". The geographical concentration previously mentioned is only the superficial and quantitative aspect of a much more important functional phenomenon whose source is in the modern method of organizing work. The "metropolis" is a "technopolis"³⁶ dominated by the a bureaucratic division and organization of labor.

Around this technological core are distributed the quite diverse systems of public education, sanitation, recreation, legal institutions, etc. Rondinelli argues along the same lines when he writes:

As in other parts of the world, large cities in Africa perform important social and economic functions. Huge cities provide economies of scale and proximity that have been conducive to industrialization, allowing the cities to absorb significant numbers of workers in manufacturing jobs, and the government to construct the modern infrastructure and provide the advanced health, educational, commercial and other facilities required by large population concentrations in order to operate efficiently. Most large African cities now play crucial roles as communication and transport hubs for their surrounding regions, providing modern international ports, harbors and air facilities. Most have become national financial centers. Nearly all serve as important commercial, service, and administrative centers, providing large numbers of managerial, clerical, and professional jobs. The informal or small-scale service and manufacturing sectors of these cities absorb thousands of low- or nonskilled workers who cannot find employment in large industries or in the formal commercial sector."³⁷

For all of these reasons the modern African city is the logistic apparatus of social roles.

City as Image of Human Energy

The fourth general principle which seemed to characterize almost all traditional African societies was the perception of their societies as an "image of human energy". The collective picture men held of their societies was as important a part of the "society-phenomenon" as the reality itself. This is to say no more than that the traditional African societies had always an image of society much as were the mythical images of the "civitas", the visible face of a heavenly patron (a Babylon, Jerusalem or actually all of the "civitates dei") or the Greek identification of the city and the political unit or polis.

With the phenomenon of urbanization, African citizens have quite another and more modern image for themselves, a perception of the city which makes it the major witness to human energy. The city is the inverse of the earth, product of nature; the city is the complete artifact, the realized human project.³⁸ This sign of man's power is at the same time a sign of a force essentially directed toward the future. The city is always building, looking to its own future; it is where African modern citizens perceive change as a human project, the place where they perceive their proper modernity.

With regard to the features described above and in the context of modernity that the phenomenon of urbanization implies, democracy, along with a handful of other concerns such as health, development and peace, has become one of the core or foremost preoccupations of the peoples of Africa today. Millions of men and women are clamoring for it, ready to invest enormous sacrifices of sweat, tears and blood, including even death, in order to secure it. This is a measure of the value of democracy to civilized mankind.

Thus in modern Africa the quest for democracy has become more than ever the quest for freedom, justice, equality and human dignity. It is a quest for the liberation of mankind from all

manner of servitude, injustice, discrimination and humiliation. It is a far-reaching and wide-ranging movement, encompassing the liberation of African citizens from local despots and tyrants, of women from domestic and social subjugation, and of nations from foreign domination and exploitation. In one vast panorama the story unfolds from women's efforts to obtain the simple right to vote and stand for political office to revolutions and mass uprisings that have changed the destiny of nations.

From this perspective, progress towards the realization of the democratic ideal in a modern and urbanized African continent is the great epic of mankind's movement towards civilized political behavior.

Urban Pathology and Democratic Misuse

As succinctly described by Paul Ricoeur,³⁹ each of the four features around which we have tried to understand the phenomenon of urbanization presents its own pathology.

Communication: we experience it as an excess of signals, a flood of information which, in both the physical and psychical senses of the word, exhausts our capacity to integrate and discriminate. The congestion of our cities is a symbol of a general pathology, namely, the swelling and saturation of relations which no longer link up. We know also that anonymity is not only a way of immunizing ourselves against excess signals and signs, but a subtle destruction of private life itself.

Mobility: It is not only functional, but aberrant. The accumulation of junkyards at the edges of our cities, the flight of the rich to the suburbs, the rotting of great cities from the center, all attest to the fact that social mobility is not a solely beneficial phenomenon. The neo-nomadism of modern man is without roots or focus. The lowered value of tolerance due to an excess of confrontations results in cynicism and in indifference.

Organized concentration: It too has its pathology. Our cities suffer simultaneously from bureaucratic over-organization and under-administration. Today's African modern city is like an uncontrolled cancerous phenomenon so that man finds his destiny there to be at the same time cumbersome and dispersed. In the place of the generalized constraint and surplus-repression described by Herbert Marcuse, it is also the place of fragmentation of the personality.

The image of human energy: We have described it as an image of our own energy, but this energy, insofar as it is dominated by technology, risks losing itself in an empty futurism or useless Prometheanism through loss of memory. All technological progress accumulates by destroying its past. The "old cities" are also cities of art, sometimes veritable museums. The city is thus an "exchange agent" in a new sense, namely, it exchanges tradition for the projection of the future. But, insofar as the element which dominates the construction of the city is technological, the city risks also being the place where man perceives the absence of all collective and personal projects, the meshing of means in the absence of ends, and the loss of meaning.

Concretely, the implications of urban pathology on life in the African countries can be described in terms of "adversities of large-scale urban concentration", that is, serious social, economic, and political problems as the result of their high population growth rates and low levels of economic expansion.

In consequence, democracy is affected by this "sociological sickness" and its principles are misused. Many electoral systems for example are institutionalized frauds. They include the so-called "democratic centralism" of communist systems and most one-party systems so that the people have hardly any choice in who their representatives shall be: one way or another the choice

is made for them. Many African rules/governments/peoples pay only lip-service to the procedural aspects of their electoral system, such as it may be. The rules of the game are not adhered to except in the most perfunctory, formalistic and ritualistic manner. Quite often they are openly and directly or indirectly violated through such practices as vote rigging, fraudulent disqualification of candidates, harassment and intimidation of others, illegal arrests, corruption, bribery, violence. Certainly it is not through the most scrupulous adherence to the letter and the spirit of the electoral rules and procedures that, for example, some African rulers manage to be regularly elected with majorities of 99%.

Moreover, most African electorates are incapacitated by objective socio-economic conditions from playing an effective role in the choice of representatives. Television and other avenues of mass media political marketing are used with extraordinary effectiveness in the manipulation of the electorate and public opinion. At the other end of the scale, the illiteracy, ignorance and poverty of African masses, plus poor communication facilities, militate to a large extent against the full development of the democratic process.

Thus, if democracy does not fail due to defective procedures or mechanisms for its implementation, then it fails due to the bad faith of those who are to implement it or, if not that, due to the objective conditions of the social and material life of the people until, in the final analysis, democracy in its ideal form or fullest sense, remains in Africa, what it has always been everywhere--a dream. Perhaps for this reason, many people see it basically as impossible to realize: "Democracy is forever impossible,"⁴⁰ Carlyle wrote.

Conclusion

We have described "democracy" as "good, fair and just government" according to the three very fundamental meanings of each of these terms, and corresponding closely to Abraham Lincoln's definition of democracy as "government of the people, by the people and for the people". We have argued that if democracy means good, fair and just government, it can be established, it can live, survive and thrive, only in a country of good, fair and just men and women. But such a country exists nowhere on earth.

To say, however, that democracy does not exist in its ideal form does not mean that it does not exist in any form! Hence, after a close examination of some of the traditional African political systems, attention to different opinions about the existence and/or the non-existence of democracy in the African traditional societies, we have advanced the proposition that, rather than being either democratic or undemocratic, African traditional societies were "more or less" democratic or undemocratic, depending on the perspective from which one took in their regards.

Moving to the modern era, we have pointed out that the phenomenon of urbanization in many instances fundamentally changed the existing situation. It exchanged tradition for modernity, that is, for a projection of the future. In relation to democracy, we have argued that regardless of the existing form of government the phenomenon of urbanization or modernization at once brought with it a new form of authority to which all had to relate. The unification of the locus of authority in a territorial sense had introduced a new form of governance with which the old political order had to contend. The progressive loss of traditional institutional structures and authority that accompanied the phenomenon of urbanization/modernization was to deprive the old order of some of its democratic character and later, when cupidity, abuse and misuse of power were achieved, the situation in Africa tended to deteriorate in many respects.

For if governments by "divine right" virtually has disappeared in Africa, there remain still a dozen or so of them. If many have "gone down under," still they are too many African social and political systems where racial, religious, ideological, tribal, sexual minorities, privileged elites, castes and/or socio-economic classes, maintain oppressive and repressive hegemonies over the majority of the people. Although many African tyrants, dictators and despots of various hues have continued to bite the dust, it remains true nevertheless that there are still too many ruling with "iron fists" and leading heavily upon their people. Finally, if much has been accomplished in terms of liberating African masses from material misery and exploitation by fellow man, it remains incontestable that in many parts of our continent extreme poverty and deprivation are the order of the day, while slave and near-slave conditions are the daily lot of millions of men and women.

This misuse of democratic principles has been described as the results or implications of city pathology. But what is the city? We have approached this phenomenon in neutral terms as a new way humans can relate one to another. This opportunity is experienced in turns as liberation and as constraint: liberation from the constraints of town and village, constraint of a new sort.

Is this to say that the city has only positive aspects? We do not intend to deny the "pathology" of the city which is mixed inextricably with the search for a new balance in its movement. Precisely because this pathology is felt to be unbearable today there is such a thing as "urbanism".

Urbanism is the reply to urban pathology. Urbanism means that the city cannot continue to grow according to its natural movement; this must be dominated, controlled, directed. Not only is there a pathology of the city, but this pathology is the awesome expression of the pathology of global society; it plays the role of the abscess, drawing corruption and draining it with respect to diffused sociological sickness.

Altogether, rather than being either optimistic or pessimistic, we shall be realistic and bear in mind the city's ambiguity and ambivalence as we continue to reflect upon that therapeutic action for which the cultural and intellectual (and ecclesiastical) communities are responsible.

In the same way, freedom, equality and human dignity are goals that are still far from being realized in most parts of the world, particularly in the African continent. More thinking, more action and more sacrifice, therefore, continue to be called for in the move towards the creation of democratic society.

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Chapter V

The City in Modern Nigeria: A Force in Rapid Social Change

Joseph Asike

Historical Perspectives

It is common knowledge that the history of human civilization is really the history of urban life. Archeological records indicate that the cradle of urban development was located in the lower Middle East--the "Fertile Crescent." Its beginnings have been dated between 9,000 B.C. and 6,000 B.C. in the Heolithic age. Whether or not it was from the Middle East alone that this important "revolution" spread to other parts of the world, or whether there were other independent centers of urban growth, is still a matter of great controversy among historians and anthropologists. However, somewhat later in time very important centers of (urban) civilization appeared in Northern China, in the Indus Valley of Northern India and in the lower Nile Valley.

What was the thrust behind the slow development of these communities in which a large number of people lived in units much larger than a village or scattered homesteads? Is it appropriate to refer to these communities as towns? Were they perhaps no more than large-scale peasant settlements? After all, when does a village become a town? The last two questions in particular have relevance to the history of urban life in Africa.

Though the archeological record still is not complete, urban development has its roots in inventions and discoveries of very great magnitude: the change from food gathering and hunting to food producing; from being preyed upon by animals to their domestication; from an uncertain existence based upon a subsistence economy to the production of a food surpluses. In short, urban development was rooted in the agricultural revolution which, in turn, eventually gave rise to yet another transformation, perhaps of even greater significance, the industrial society.

It might be desirable to apply some conceptual shorthand in order to identify and label the main characteristics of this great transformation because some scholars have suggested that the basis of urban life in Africa is historically so very recent that we are still able to detect some of these early characteristics in many of the new towns in Africa. Whether this is a really creative approach to understanding African urbanization is a matter to be discussed in the next section.

The change from a subsistence economy to one which rests progressively on the ability to create a surplus of food can also be described as a change from a nomadic-based society to a village-based society. For the sake of shorthand we can say that this is a change from hunters and food gatherers to peasantry; from a high degree of mobility to settled village life. To identify a form of human settlement as a village is to suggest an important intermediate step in the movement from band societies to urban life. As the size of these settlements grew so did the competition--sometimes positive but more often negative--between them.

While we should keep our conceptual options open and accept the premise that industrial urban life has its historical roots, the view we shall develop in the paper is that the link between tradition and modernity has been all but severed in Africa urban life. It will also be argued that, unlike the experience of the Western countries of Europe and North America, in colonial Africa the process of urbanization was in no way associated with the process of industrialization. In fact, the towns were the sumps into which the needed cheap labor was flowing. In an attempt to reverse this trend, for instance, the post-independent policy-makers in Nigeria aimed at industrialization without urbanization and achieved urbanization without industrialization. Consequently, the rapid

urban growth in the post-independent period had a 'dysfunctional' effect as it failed to take into account the specific conditions, traditional values, and the human and material resources of the people.

It is important to recognize that tradition, be it in the realm of material or non-material culture, must be nurtured and reinforced by a total complex, that is, by habits, ideas and behavior and by social, economic and political institutions which reject any alternative to tradition. Because this is not the case in Africa today, despite the subsistence economy which still prevails over most of the continent, it might be necessary to apply to the study of urban life in Africa a rather different set of premises. Failure to do this would gravely distort any reading of both the historical development of towns in Africa, their contemporary structure and the problems they face.

We are not suggesting an irrevocable rejection of any link between the past and the present, or that some "traditional" ideas and practices of the more recent past do not play some part in the present. No observer could fail to be impressed by the startling differences between the medieval Islamic city of Timbuktu and the city of Lagos (Nigeria) which was established about a century ago. Rather we might work with the premise that when and where we are able to detect traditional practices and ideas, it is because these are appropriate, or seem appropriate to some category of the urban population in some situations and on some occasions. But even then it must be recognized that if we make an effort to see these traditional practices in the total context in which they take place, we will find that this alleged tradition has been substantially transformed. If this is so, are we still talking about tradition?

Thus, we should not confuse tradition with history. Ancient city walls, an old mosque, a local shrine, the use of a hoe rather than a tractor, the use of a gourd rather than a glass or basin, the use of a "native" doctor (herbalist) rather than a modern medical practitioner, a house built of sun-dried mud rather than bricks or cement blocks, the use of spears rather than rifles, the importance of kinship rather than an emphasis on individuality, work on the land rather than in an office or a factory, all this and much more is no indication that custom is king and that modernity has not reached the furthest corners of a society.

Traditions are long established conventions as these determine or influence the behavior and shape the ideas of a people. Tradition is a point of reference, a measure and a guide. A truly traditional society is impregnable; its members will fight to keep it traditional. The non-conformist, or the heretic, is put to death, expelled or shunned. When custom really is king, tradition will not compromise with alien influences and pressures. Any external pressures against its boundaries agitate traditional society.

Of course, these are generalizations and abstractions, but they also serve to highlight the implications of the use of the concept tradition. In modern Africa, and in particular in urban Africa, we cannot get very far if we apply this concept too frequently. Social scientists, particularly anthropologists who are beginning to take an interest in urban studies in Africa, tend to concentrate their attention on what they consider to be traditional because they have been reared on the rural tradition of the tribe. But if the anthropologist were to give greater thought to what is really implied when he talks about tradition he would conclude that the institutional fabric of the African society was radically transformed when the continent fell under the impact and control of colonial domination.

We have said that tradition and history are not the same. Traditions are conventions which change, while culture is the constant presence of the ideational, institutional and material roots of a society as a living people, sharing a recognition, and perhaps, a pride in their past. It is this past which is important to (some) people rather than, as we have been told over the years, the

conventions or the traditional practices of a people. Whereas history is not compelled to adjust itself to the present --it being no more than a view of past events and ideas--conventions are concerned with behaviors, everyday behavior, everyday demands, hopes, failures and successes.

We have thus far offered some thoughts to guide our approach to the study of the urban phenomenon in Africa, whence it started, what it is, and how to conceptualize it. We must now take a closer look at the main features of urbanization and urbanism (traditional and modern) as a process of social change and way of life in Africa.

Pre-colonial Urban Centers: Traditional African Cities

Judging from the paucity of materials on traditional urban centers in Africa, very little about the history of urbanization in Africa south of the Sahara is known. The main reason for this is that much archeological work remains to be done, particularly in "Middle Africa," the vast region south of the Sahara and north of the Limpopo. Thus far archeologists have concentrated on the history of the Nile Valley and the important trading centers on the North Coast of Africa, the "City States" on the East African coast, and the Zimbabwe complex in what was Southern Rhodesia.

Although Africa is the least urbanized of the continents and its urban history is less well documented than that of Asia, Europe, America North and South, it has the fastest rate of urban growth in the world. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that the "rise of the cities" is probably one of the most significant events behind the great transformation of contemporary Africa. Yet despite this it is important for us to recognize that today only a very small proportion of the population of Africa lives in cities.

While Africa remains the least urbanized of the continents, its urban history is not insignificant. Evidence for this can be taken from those areas which pre-date European colonization. These are the Nile Valley, the Savanah and forest regions of West Africa, and Southern Africa. The first urban centers in Africa emerged probably around 3500 B.C., in the Floodplains of the lower Nile. They resulted from the efforts by the Pharaohs to exert their influence and centralize their administration over the population of the Nile Valley. Their attempts were successful and for 3,000 years their control and hegemony prevailed. These political efforts created such towns as Memphis, Thebes and Th-el-Amarna--all of which grew up and declined as the capital cities of successive dynasties. The lower Nile towns were complex structures containing a fairly wide range of people such as priests, traders, craftsmen, shopkeepers, administrators and members of the dynastic elite.

Similar centers were to be established in 1200 B.C. on a smaller scale as trading posts on the North African coast. The fathers of this urban development were the Phoenician and Carthaginian traders who dominated life in these centers for nearly one hundred years. There is no need to dwell on the internal structure of these centers.

Suffice it to say that they were complex social, political, and economic systems with a considerable division of labor and a distinct "urban culture," inasmuch as virtually all the residents were engaged in non-agricultural activities. The most important aspect of their function, as far as West Africa is concerned, was the fact that these coastal towns had close and vital ties with the inland centers which connected the North African coast with the areas to the south of the Sahara.

In the Western and Southern Sahara, and in the Savanah belt, there emerged some important and large kingdom states, whose leaders centralized political and economic power in central capitals and regional towns. In the Western Sudan region, the cities were not merely important trade and communication centers which bridged the Islamic North and the rest of the southern

regions. Such important towns as Timbuktu on the banks of the River Niger as it penetrated deeply into the heartland of the Southern Sahara were also centers of a flourishing intellectual life centered around a university. Further south were towns whose importance is still great today as they have become major centers in the new nation-states of Africa. These are the towns and capital cities of Kano, Zaria, Katsina (Nigeria), Bomako, Djenne, Segou and Ouagadougou. Thus far the best documented instance of the rise of a West African kingdom is probably that of Yoruba (West Coast of Nigeria and portions of Benin Republic).

The Yoruba, linked loosely by language and a certain homogeneity of customs, were really a set of independent kingdoms each of which attempted to exert influence and power over their neighbors.¹ The old Yoruba towns: Oyo, Ile-Ife (regarded as the cultural mainspring of Yoruba Society), Oshogbo, Owo and Ogbomoso, trace their origins to having been important centers of political power at one time or another. Many of these pre-colonial towns still exist and are now part of regional and national units, linked by means of modern communication, trade and political unions.²

The first semblance of Western-style urban towns and cities emerged in Africa with the Berlin Balkanization Conference (1885), and the establishment of colonial empires immediately thereafter. The traditional urban settlements inland, and/or the ivory and slave trade coastal towns, became the natural points of contact and concentration for Western type urbanization in colonial Africa.

The Primate City Growth Phenomena

To establish effective socio-economic and political control over the Balkanized territories, the first duty of the colonial powers was to open up the hinterlands by establishing easy and permanent river, road and railway networks. In Nigeria, the Lagos-Kano, Port Harcourt-Kano railroads were constructed. The East and Central African regions experienced similar developments: the Mombasa-Nairobi-Kampala, and the Tanga-Arusha-Moshi railways, for example, were constructed. The central purpose for this adventurism in Africa was the need to open up new sources of raw materials and to promote international trade. Along such systems of transport and communication, as in the case of Nigeria, there emerged such major urban centers as Lagos, Port Harcourt, Calabar--all were established along or at the entrance and/or exit of a major communication route. Among other factors that promoted the establishment of these centers was the unbalanced distribution of natural resources which had dictated the pattern of indigenous human settlements. This also influenced the colonial pattern of settlement and general development.

The new urban centers had a number of outstanding functions which, although conventional, differed in their order of priority from the pre-colonial towns. Effectively to promote commercial activities in the colonies, administrative functions were added to ensure law and order and to establish a conducive social, economic, and political atmosphere for efficient resource utilization. The centers also served as "cultural enclaves" where Western life-style could be promulgated, ostensibly to maintain the cultural and environmental climate to which the colonialists had been used at home. Johnston (1977) describes it as an organizing nexus where a concentration of merchants, soldiers, bureaucrats, and others could administer the colony for the homeland.⁴

Other functions of these cities, including education, health, entertainment and information were incidental. These services were targeted to serve the foreigners, that is, the non-indigenous settlers. In most cases the natives could not officially participate in these services, nor were they

involved in their development. In short, since the culture and pattern of life of the natives were not taken into consideration in developing the cities, and given the fact that what remained of the traditional towns--where incorporated into the new setup--were completely marginalized, the new cities lacked any native taste. There was, therefore, a clear and deliberate demarcation between the new and the so-called "native reserves."

These two categories of human settlements could not mutually coexist except in one fundamental sense. Often where for pragmatic reasons they were allowed to coexist, they exhibit a dual internal structure--a kind of "two cities in one"--consisting of an indigenous, "tradition oriented" sector and modern (Westernized) sector.⁵ A structural duality results from the mixture of two contrasting forms of social, political and economic organizations, and the dominance-dependence, relationship in which colonial contact took place. Its persistence in recent times stems from the fact that in formulating the future growth plans of these cities, planners and policy makers have tended to concentrate upon creating new modern sectors quite distinct from the old settlements. This has been done under the pretext of preserving tradition or minimizing encroachment on "native" authority.⁶ More often than not, however, this is a rationalization for convenience and a least-effort development/planning approach.

Unity and Community

Negative Impacts of Structural Duality

Bearing in mind the general aims and the specific objectives of the British colonial administration in West Africa, the administration was not interested in developing the cities in a way that would realize and maximize their positive role in the overall development of the region. Perhaps one could argue that part of the reason was due to the hostile climate and geographic conditions which rendered difficult any hope of permanent settlement by the colonists. Urban planning in the region was merely to provide enclaves or escapes where temporary migrants from the homelands could be posted to organize increased productivity. With such a limited objective and a narrowly defined role for the region, the colonial planning approach was simple. Its strategy was basically to regulate and control the physical growth of the cities within a graded framework. Land use, zoning, and building bylaws were designed to minimize costs and to separate the colonizers from the colonized. Therefore, the traditional (older) sections of the towns were simply ignored and contained, while serious planning efforts were concentrated on the establishment of new areas.⁷

The major cities in Nigeria: Lagos, Ibadan in the West, Kano, Kaduna and Zaria in the North, Enugu, Port Harcourt and Calabar in the East, provide excellent examples of such development strategies; the results are evident today in these cities which retain dual personalities. Although their pre-colonial foundation constitutes a significant proportion of these cities, they have been outstripped by the post-independence development in terms of area. The pre-colonial development still commands attention because of its almost unbelievable density of buildings, their spectacular deterioration and virtual absence of adequate sanitation. Their inhabitants (native land-owners and their descendants) live their lives apart from modern immigrants who now inhabit the gradually evolving suburban rings around the old sectors.

Urban studies done world-wide, particularly in the Western hemisphere, seem to reveal that the historical experiences of the West tended to demonstrate a correlation between economic growth and urbanization.⁸ Specialization of activities, functional division of labor, and economies

of agglomeration necessary for efficient production are engendered in the city. Perhaps more important is the belief that cities are the main agents of change and hence instruments of modernization.⁹

Thus, cities are expected to act as centers for the refinement and preservation of the highly held social values, minimize the frictions inherent in the process of transition by mediating and narrowing conflicts between the old and the new, and prevent the dualism or polarization between the traditional and the modern. They are also expected to act as places for the promotion of ethnic and political integration by maximizing the opportunities for interaction among the diverse populations and their contact with the outside world.

While the convenience-planning approach followed by the colonial rulers and perpetuated by post-independence political leaders may have been the most logical from their perspective, it is undoubtedly unfit for today's realities. Instead of achieving the ideal in promoting generational homogeneity or at least social and inter-ethnic harmony, they have become centers for all forms of ethnic rivalry and nationalism.

Secondly, the transfer of values and ideas affecting the rate and direction of socio-economic change is by no means a one-way process limited to the flow of ideas from the modern to the traditional sectors. For transition to occur in a balanced and orderly manner, avoiding the creation and exacerbation of conflicts, it must accommodate and be subjected to the influence of highly valued traditional social norms. Increasing social interaction in the economic and administrative areas would most likely provide the necessary controlling mechanisms and guard against any excessive deviations or tendencies alien to the indigenous value system. In terms of locational and physical planning, this implies concepts which imaginatively integrate the traditional and the modern in a unified spatial framework without undermining the integrity or disturbing the balance of the traditional culture.¹⁰

Urban Ethnicity

Identifying with one's ethnic group powerfully influences the perspectives and practices of the residents of Nigerian cities. "We Ibos and those Yorubas," "we Housas and those Binis" such conceptualizations take place in many social, political, and economic situations. They help to maintain and structure the boundaries of culture and interaction. Despite the changes that have taken place since colonialization, the boundaries between ethnic groups have been able to retain, or resume, great significance. Indeed, the perceived distinctions among ethnic groups are often as sharp as the distinction most Americans make between blacks and whites. Thus, ethnicity may be considered Nigeria's equivalent of the "American dilemma."¹¹ It affects where one lives, with whom one associates, for whom one votes, at what occupation one works, and so forth. For these reasons a typical Nigerian city exists as a cluster of partly overlapping ethnic enclaves, each with a somewhat distinct set of perspectives and practices. Lagos, Kano and Port Harcourt show three categories of ethnic membership. Other cities, depending on their level of urbanization, demonstrate this to a lesser degree.

One category differentiates broad racial groups: Europeans, Americans, Asians and all other foreigners from Africa. A second differentiates the "indigenes" of the area in which the city is located from the immigrant or "stranger elements" from all other parts of the nation. A third category distinguishes various ethnic, clan and/or locality groupings. Although the enclaves may be geographic realities, more importantly they are behavioral realities.

Ethnic ties and identities are reinforced because most city-dwellers are to some extent "encapsulated" within their own ethnic network, which serves as a partial barrier between them and the wider social system. The sharp cultural differences among many groups further hamper the development of an inter-ethnic sense of community. "Like the choice between competing political institutions," that between the groups proves to be "a choice between incompatible modes of community life."¹²

It is also observed that ethnic identity and ethnic conflicts are often greater in the cities than in the rural areas. Rouch (1956) sees this as a product of the interaction among peoples of different cultures.¹³ Rather than weakening ethnic pride and cohesion, the city or urban life tends to increase them. The greater the fear by one group of being dominated the greater the emphasis on their own culture. An ethnic group adjusts to the new realities by reorganizing its own traditional customs or by developing new customs under traditional symbols, often using traditional norms and ideologies to enhance its distinctiveness within the contemporary situation. Immigrants living in cities other than their own "native towns or villages" at times manipulate their own cultural tradition(s)--fostering retribalization--in order to develop informal political associations which can serve as organizational weapons in contemporary political struggles.

In analyzing the Nigerian urban system, a basic decision has to be made whether to concentrate on the cultural or the structural aspect of heterogeneity. While these two approaches are not mutually exclusive and their relevance to each other should be brought out, not only will different data come to light as we concentrate on one approach or the other but, also, our interpretation will be rather different. For instance, faced with an incomprehensible and multifaceted alternative, a group theoretically has the option of responding to the other in terms of identity or difference. If the group assumed that the other is essentially identical to it, there is a tendency to ignore the significant divergencies and to judge the other according to the groups' own cultural values. If, on the other hand, the group assumes that the other is irremediably different, then it would have little incentive to adopt the viewpoint of that alternative: it would again tend to turn to the security of its own cultural perspective.

Genuine and thorough comprehension of otherness is possible only if the self can somehow negate ethnocentrism or at least severely bracket the values, assumptions, and ideology of his culture. This entails in practice the virtually impossible task of negating one's very being, precisely because one's culture is what formed that being.

Smith (1969) lends credence to the above when he warns that social and cultural dimensions of heterogeneity and pluralism neither necessarily nor always correspond. This is so for two reasons. Besides ideational and procedural correlates of social relations, culture includes such systems as language, aesthetic styles, philosophies, and expressive forms which may be transferred across social boundaries easily and with little social effect. Conversely, systems of social relations may perdure despite substantial shifts in their cultural content or explicit orientations. Thus, despite their institutional basis and tendencies to congruence, "culture and society may vary independently; indeed their divergent alignments have special importance in contexts of pluralism."¹⁴

Although culture and structure are related through institutions, basically it is certain distinctive processes of interaction which regulate social relationships in heterogeneous societies. How these processes work, and the nature of interaction between various groups, are primarily determined by urban conditions rather than cultural differences. Thus, the analysis of heterogeneity under urban conditions is best treated in structural terms because this reveals how racial, ethnic, cultural, language, occupational and class differences are converted into particular type of personal and

group relations; how economic and political irregularities emerge; around what urban conditions conflict arises (and whether the element of heterogeneity is significant and if so why); how political relations are structured and what impedes or encourages the development of mechanisms of incorporation of various ethnic groups into the urban culture.

It is therefore, important to note the structural elements responsible for heterogeneity in Nigerian cities. It is equally important to analyze the dimensions of pluralism in these centers--that is, the number of mechanisms of incorporation, or exclusion, of diverse groups into the system. A close look at the above reveals that two conditions can prevail: the polarization of pluralism, and depluralization. According to Kuper (1969, p. 479), polarization in African cities is marked by the heightened "salience of sectional identity" and the increasing perception of social relationships in terms of racial, ethnic, or other sectional conflict. Political reactions get polarized by "antithetical interpretations of the same event . . . or by antithetical emotional responses."¹⁵ Kuper further argues that at the objective level of polarization in social interaction, there is contraction of the middle ground of optional relationships. Lines and issues of cleavage are superimposed, and this is expressed in the rapid escalation of the most varied, and sometimes most minor local and specific disturbances to the level of general nationwide intersectional conflict. The Nigeria-Biafra war (1967-1970) and the recent religious riots (the new wave of Moslem fundamentalism) in the Northern States are clear cases that corroborate this view.

Contrasting this to depluralization, Kuper suggests that depluralization indicates subjectively the diminishing salience of racial, ethnic or other sectional ties. There may be explicit ideologies which assume the common interests of members of different sections, assert the efficacy of compromise and inter-sectional cooperation, and affirm the social ideal of assimilation (as in ideologies of the common society, or of the melting pot). Other bases of association, horizontal linkages arising from common interests and functional differentiations, cut across initial cleavages. Segregated, parallel, and intercalary structures dissolve, and there is increasing integration in institutional structures. Qualitative differences in intrasectional and intersectional relationships diminish. With the increasing significance of many diverse bonds between people of different sections, lines of cleavage and issues of conflict become dissociated, thus reducing the probability of escalation from minor disturbances. There is a commitment to compromise, and the cumulative experience of compromise and conflict resolution may be expected to encourage further depluralization.¹⁶

Whether the urban centers in Nigeria are in a process of increased ethnic polarization due to the heterogeneity of their population, or whether they are being depluralized (a process which definitely involves considerable violence) are issues which need a great deal of attention by its leaders and policy-makers. Perhaps the first methodological approach, as Gutkind (1974) suggests, is to establish the range of heterogeneity both from the point of view of ethnic diversity and in terms of diversity in occupation, education, wealth and class. Secondly, we need to retrace our steps to find out how, in general terms, the population did become ethnically diverse, that is, when and what groups migrated to the town; how and what groups became established, where, and under what conditions, and in what occupations.

Third, what is the relationship of particular colonial policies to the varied manifestations of urban heterogeneity (that is, why did the colonial administration treat some tribes as "more honest" or "harder workers" than others?) Fourthly, during the period of colonialism what is the relationship of economic changes to heterogeneity. That is, what groups responded to what opportunities, and with what results?¹⁷ These, and numerous other questions, must be asked in an

effort to piece together the circumstances which brought about the heterogeneity of the Nigerian urban population.

The data obtained will lead to the recognition that the diversity of the urban population reflects a similar diversity in the population as a whole. This might be the baseline for the analysis of numerous problems linking urban structures and behavior to ethnic pluralism and other aspects of diversity.

Social Change and Modernization

Urban Life in Nigerian Cities

With the background provided in the preceding section, we can begin to understand the role of Nigerian cities and urban centers in social change and modernization. While specific urban and city conditions will vary according to particular historical legacies that led to the establishment of the centers, Nigerian towns are now clearly the "motors of development," the main agents of social change. Town life is identified with the idea of progress--a rejection of the "totalitarian rural and village tradition." To the many migrants who flock to the cities from the rural centers--whether armed at times with high school or even college certification, or unskilled labor in search of almost non-existing jobs--city life is seen as an "escape from the traditional rural life" which simultaneously absorbs, clutches and emasculates. To this set of migrants, the urban superstructure has real value as a refuge.

What is less often discussed is that the cities have become bases for administrative and economic activities rather than centers of civilizing influence. Nowhere else is the economic, political, and social distance between the rich few and the masses of the poor greater than in the cities.

The decay of traditional society and its values, the pace and haphazard character of city growth and the conditions there of labor, exploitation, inadequate housing and the lack of other infra-structural facilities have created, to use Karl Marx's terminology, "a sizeable lumpen-proletariat."¹⁸ While the impact of the "high life" (a popular aphorism in Nigerian cities) in the urban centers sets an elevated model before the population at large, the expectations inherent in this model are far from being realized for any significant percentage of the population.

Tensions of an economic and political nature between rural and urban areas multiply as class lines become more sharply defined and as the rural populace begins to sharpen its political consciousness, which in turn leads to more concern for political and economic participation. The same situation is true of the urbanite who, being closer to the model of "the good life" ("high life"), often seeks a larger slice of the small "national cake." It is then understandable why the Nigerian urban centers have become the arena for major ethnic and class confrontations. The ever-increasing rate of violent street crimes, mounting by a dialectic of violence and counterviolence, prostitution and drug abuse--earlier thought typical of Western cities--demonstrate the degree of the miscarriage of the traditional values of the people.

While the classical Marxist theory would suggest that the urban proletariat, in cooperation with farmers and peasants, will be the spearhead of agitation against exploitation and major inequity, it seems that the cities are already in the grip of an exploitative indigenous class whose make-up and ideology put constraints on its political activities. As long as a disproportionate percentage of the city dwellers live in utter misery and abject poverty (which might be more

debilitating than rural poverty), a true restructuring of the Nigerian society, at least a change from misery to decent life for the city poor whose numbers swell each year, will be difficult to realize.

However, there are aspects of city environment which present some hope--if not material, at least psychological--for the city poor. City life for this group promises a hope for modernization. It is this hope that enables the urban poor to endure their situation. In this regard, the will to achieve change through new ideas and actions, to select from a wide range of alternatives, to participate in new structures and new institutions which have no antecedents for many of the city migrants are a totally new phenomena. This is the sense in which the city represents modernization to the people. Thus the link between social change, modernization and urban life is that the cities not only generate a new range of institutions, activities, structures and values particular to the local situation, but reflect the national transformation as a whole, an index of progress and prosperity.

But as McLean pointed out above "the transition from traditional patterns to urban settings raises a series of important issues." Perhaps the most pertinent to our discussion is: "How is it possible in the modern urban environment to sustain the distinctive traditional values "against the depersonalizing force of mass society"? No answer to this question can be complete without examining the extent to which urbanization affects the family. Being in most traditional societies the core institution, the family is a sensitive barometer of whatever changes that occur in any society.

Urban Family

As elsewhere, the family is the most basic unit of social organization in Africa. However, unlike its counterpart in Western society, family membership is not restricted to husband, wife and children, for it is characteristic of this basic unit to be part of a larger extended family. It is within the family that the effects of urbanization and urban migration are most evident. Family members are separated and scattered throughout a country (and sometimes beyond its borders), and as a result parental authority and established marital conventions are weakened.

The normative structure of marriage and family life spills over into many other organizational and institutional features. Thus marriage involves more directly the families of the bride and the groom than in the Western culture. While the two individuals are central to the marriage, a larger number of kin on either side become involved in the rearrangement of social relationships which follow. The bonds which held members of the extended family together were their strictly allocated duties, reciprocity of mutual aid and support, responsibilities and rewards which gave each individual the satisfaction he sought and the knowledge that should dependency overtake him he would not be cast out.

This sense of "communalism" finds a further articulation in the view espoused by Holmes Rolston (1986) that a person's social capacity can be roughly measured by the span of his "we."¹⁹ The "self" is stretched over to the "other," and social concern does not stop with the individual's skin but overflows to the kin. Social maturity comes with a widening of that sense of kinship, and, with broad enough recognition of this togetherness, the self is immersed in a communal life. However, this sense of "communalism" in Africa has been disrupted and the city, in Peachey's aphorism above, has become "the atelier of the autonomous person."

If indeed the family is the basic unit of social organization then changes taking place in economic, political and religious institutions will clearly be reflected in family life. While this raises rather complex theoretical issues, the following should guide our discussion: changes in family and marriage must be studied against the background of who migrates and why, who stays

in the city and who circulates back and forth between rural and urban areas, the ratio of male-female migrants, the attitude of the new educated elites (particularly women) towards some of the traditional roles in family, marriage, etc.

Despite the variations which exist, the impact of certain changes have produced some common characteristics. Perhaps one of the most fundamental changes is that the African family, as the family in the Western society, has lost some of its traditional functions while taking on new ones. The African urban family as Gutkind (1974) puts it has dropped some ritual and ceremonial functions and taken on new economic ones.²⁰

Two aspects of familial change need to be elaborated. The ethnic and familial heterogeneity of most Nigerian cities, for instance, has meant that heterosexual relationships are determined more by two immediate participants than was formerly the case. This individualization of the marital decisions stems not only from the geographic dispersion of families but also from fundamental changes in the operative values of urban residents. As an example, the role of women has been transformed by advanced education and entry into modern competitive professions. Studies on the relationship between polygamy and social change have shown that education, religion, ethnicity, economic position and urbanization affect the level of polygamy. Educated women can use their scarcity value to require formal monogamy of their husbands.²¹

A second aspect of familial change is that the early socialization process of some of the city children has been altered. As in the United States, the child of a broken home may in large part be socialized by peers, creating intergenerational cleavages and the possibility of being introduced to the delinquent world as a functional alternative to family satisfactions. In most of the major cities in Nigeria: Lagos, Enugu, Ibadan, Kano, it has been observed that because of the cultural lag which exists between the needs of some of these potential delinquents and the lack of adequate institutions to channel their needs, this discrepancy places these youths in a marginal position. This impels them to satisfy their needs through deviant conduct with their peers, in the process of adapting to urban community. Just as the extended family traditionally had joint responsibility for bringing up children, the breakdown or contraction of this responsibility is one of the major primary causes of urban juvenile delinquency.

Third, in a context in which most of the traditional social supports (the extended family, kinsmen, age-group, organizations of the migrants according to their rural origin) are no longer relevant or operative, the inability of urban centers to provide substitutes creates problems of mental stress, personal disorientation, and social disorganization for many people. This is regarded as partly responsible for the high incidence of all forms of psycho-pathological phenomena in urban centers. Concern with these problems is only gradually receiving attention, although some of the initial studies emphasize caution in ascribing these manifestations to the urban environment per se, rather than seeing them as reactions to the stress conditions involved in any process of socio-economic transformation.²²

Even when the tradition of joint responsibility is maintained, its impact may be different in the cities than in the traditional milieu: a shift of responsibility from one relative to another within the village context usually does not mean a significant geographic change or interaction with new faces in new places, but in the cities the shift may be to a new neighborhood of strangers with different values.

Conclusion

In general terms, many of the Nigerian elite subscribe to the view that the city is the mirror through which foreigners make their initial appraisal of the nation. To this group the city is an index of progress and prosperity of any nation. Another important element in the fascination exerted by city culture is the material reward which accompanies the adoption of Western life-style. One cannot deny that this way of life has enabled Western society, not only to raise its standard of living and general level of material welfare far above that of the rest of the world, but also to bring many other parts of the world under its influence. The enormous material power of the West, based on its advanced technology, is a fact. It stands to reason that the Nigerian urban elite who reflect on this often come to the conclusion that the only way the nation can share in this power is by adopting a Western life-style.

Others, more intellectually honest or more introspective, will admit that modernization (in the Western sense) is the same as Westernization. To this second group, belong the traditionally oriented elite (traditional-rural elite). It is therefore clear why two value systems and two elite groups coexist in Nigeria. In juxtaposition, they create a potential for inter-elite conflict and intra-personal stress. Elite conflict arises because those who value the traditional-rural ways come into conflict with the group equivalently linked with modern-urban values.

Intra-personal stress occurs because many migrants leave a situation which is dominated by traditional-rural elites within a status system infused with traditional values, and go into an urban community influenced by new elites with modern urban and Western values. The consequent necessary adjustments are potentially stressful, not only because of changes in the bases of stratification, but also because status by achievement is less predictable and therefore less stabilizing than status by ascription.

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Notes

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3. A.D. King, *Colonial Urban Development: Culture, Social Power and Environment* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976).
4. R.J. Johnston, "Urban Origins, Urbanization and Urban Patterns," *Geography*, 62 (1977).
5. A.L. Mabogunje, "The Growth of Residential Districts in Ibadan," *Geographical Review*, 52 (1962), p. 60; see also *Urbanization in Nigeria* (London: University of London Press, 1968).
6. The Eastern region [Kenya and Uganda] and the Southern region [South Africa, Zimbabwe] of the continent differed. The shift in policy was principally due to favorable climate and the typology of the soil which made permanent settlement possible.
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11. Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1944).

12. Cf. T.S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 94.

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16. L. Kuper, *op. cit.*, p. 480.

17. P.C.W. Gut kind, *Urban Anthropology: Perspectives on Third World Urbanization and Urbanism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1974), p. 173.

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21. For the statistical and demographic pattern covering a wide range of West African cities, see: Margaret Peil, *Urban Life in West Africa* (New York: Africana Publishing Co., 1981), pp. 143-154.

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Chapter VI

Philippine Urbanization and Christian Values

Eulalio Bal Tazar

Introduction

All third-world countries are in a process of modernization, which implies industrialization and bureaucratization, and is carried on primarily in the city. For the success of modernization urbanization, the in-migration of peoples from the rural areas, and the creation of an urban consciousness are deemed necessary. Along with the wished-for beneficial effects of urbanization, however, there are such negative effects as the loosening of family ties and kinship and the weakening of local customs and of ethnic culture--all of which endanger identity and autonomy. This situation raises the question of whether identity and autonomy can be realized in an urban setting. Third-world countries are grappling with this problem and look toward the West for a solution. The paradox is that the youth culture and counterculture in America and western Europe are looking toward the third-world for models. As Peter Berger notes, the clothing, aesthetic and religious expressions of the youth culture and counterculture have an Asian basis, and their political heroes are third-world revolutionaries.¹

Each third-world country must reflect on the problem of urbanization and values in the context of its own history and culture. This paper is a reflection on urbanization and values in the Philippine context.

The Philippine Context

As an Asian country, the Philippines is unique in being the only predominantly Christian country in the Far East. Unlike European and North American countries, however, where there is a strict separation of Church and State, the Church is very much involved in the public life of the country. This was demonstrated in the peaceful revolution of the ousting of former dictator Ferdinand Ma r cos, in which the Church was instrumental in the peaceful change of government. The Church would have been ineffective if the population had not believed in its authority and internalized Christian values. Therefore, when we discuss Philippine urbanization and values we need to see these, not only in the light of Philippine cultural values, but also in the light of enculturated Christian values. Does urbanization endanger or promote these values; how should urban life be structured so as to promote these values?

For ease of treatment we will unify Christian values under the rubric of the autonomous and liberated Christian. The question then becomes, does urbanization promote or inhibit the emergence and development of an autonomous Filipino Christian, or is Christianity anti-urban? To answer this we need a basic understanding of the concept of the autonomous Christian.

The Autonomous Christian

Let us discuss first the general Christian ideal of an autonomous person. Then, in the light of this general concept, we will consider what an autonomous Filipino Christian means.

The concept of an autonomous Christian depends on the kind of theology one espouses. If one accepts the Augustinian theology of two worlds, then one attains autonomy or freedom by an

escape from this world into another. Life in this world becomes merely a time of patient waiting and acceptance of the vicissitudes and travails of life. The kind of historical structures we build are not important, for all these structures will pass away. To attain freedom and autonomy one must escape the historical in order to attain the eternal. In being thus anti-historical this view necessarily is being anti-urban, for it sees autonomy in terms of membership in the city of God, not the city of man. This other-worldly mentality has conditioned the traditional church attitude toward the socio-economic and political order. Because the church's goal is other-worldly it should not be involved in the socio-economic and political realms, but should remain neutral as to forms of government or economic systems.

According to Mary R. Hollnsteiner, director of the Institute of Philippine Culture in the Ateneo de Manila University, "the efforts of the Church in the field of urban development have been few and often undertaken hesitantly, without full conviction."² Commenting on this point, Jose Blanco, a Philippine Jesuit sociologist, notes the need for a change in our other-worldly thinking and orientation. Theology needs a new direction where Christian salvation is not merely a personal effort to save one's soul and rescuing it from the evils of this world. Faith, he notes, should direct us to grapple with socio-economic and political problems in the world.

This new theological direction towards the world has been outlined by Vatican II . Thus, in the document, *The Church in the Modern World (Gaudium et spes)*, the vocation of all men is an integral one. (no. 57, also nos. 10, 11, 59, 61, 63, 64, 75, 91). By integral is meant that the whole man has but one calling. Gutierrez notes that the "most immediate consequence of this viewpoint is that the frontiers between the life of faith and temporal works, between the Church and the world, become more fluid. In the words of Schillebeeckx: "The boundaries between the Church and mankind are fluid, not merely in the Church's direction, but also, it may be said, in the direction of mankind and the world." Some even ask if they are really two different things: "Is not the Church also world"? Metz asks. "The Church is of the world; in a certain sense the Church is the world: the Church is not Non-World."³

Another important consequence of man's integral vocation according to Gutierrez is that the affirmation of the single vocation to salvation, beyond all distinctions, gives religious value in a completely new way to the action of man in history, Christian and non-Christian alike. The building of a just society has worth in terms of the Kingdom, or in more current phraseology, to participate in the process of liberation is already, in a certain sense, a salvific work."⁴

The autonomous Christian, then, is synonymous to an integrally liberated one. This means that the whole man, the socio-economic and political part of him and the theological or religious part together are liberated. Hence, according to the new theology the phenomenon of urbanization has a theological dimension, so that mere sociological methods of analysis will not reveal its full meaning and import.

The theological dimension of liberation means that in order to be fully autonomous one must be a member of a community whose principle of unity is love. The individual cannot be autonomous without a Thou: autonomy means freedom from one's aloneness and the full development of personality. It is the Thou that gives the I autonomy; only in a loving relation is the I freed from its isolation and able to grow as a person. The creative union of love is differentiated so that more complete being is in fuller union. The I, then, needs a community united by love as ground for full freedom, differentiation or individuation, and therefore, for autonomy there are two levels of Thou: the Divine Thou in whom ultimate liberation is to be achieved and the human Thou in and through whom we achieve partial liberation on earth. We are interested

here in the notion of freedom and autonomy achieved through the I-Thou relationships of human beings.

The I-Thou notion of autonomy is lacking in the individualist notion of autonomy as enunciated by Isaiah Berlin.

I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, not on external forces of whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument of my own, not any other men's acts of will. I wish to be . . . a doer--deciding, not being decided for, self-directed and not acted upon by external nature or by other men as if I were a thing, or an animal, or a slave incapable of . . . conceiving goals and policies of my own.⁵

If we were to structure a society to produce this kind of autonomous individual then we would have one like that which Adam Smith envisioned. It would be constituted of atomistic, acquisitive and egoistic individuals, each guided by unfettered self-interest in pursuit of their private ends, with conflict among them being resolved by an invisible hand. While a degree of autonomy is achieved in such a society, the I-Thou notion of autonomy cannot be attained in the public sphere.

Christian autonomy implies that the individual be not reduced to an object or tool. Thus, it is an ally of individualism in its struggle against the dehumanization and depersonalization of the individual by technological and bureaucratic instrumental rationality: the I cannot be reduced to an it. But having rescued its subjectivity the I cannot claim full autonomy. It must now attain the fullness of autonomy through union with the Thou--a community united by the principle of love.

What follows from the Christian notion of autonomy is that urban structures must be judged not only in terms of rescuing the I from objectivation, but also in terms of promoting an I-Thou relation. The question then is whether the city as a way of life and its various industrial and bureaucratic structures are conducive to integral liberation? This question brings us to a Christian approach to the city.

A Christian Approach to the City

The city is an important concept in Christian thought, for the eternal city is the heavenly Jerusalem where all Christians hope to dwell.

The concept of city is used by one of the greatest Christian thinkers, St. Augustine, bishop of Hippo in Africa, to contrast the City of Man as ruled by egoism to the City of God as ruled by love. We are accustomed to seeing the city as a space outside of us in which we dwell. But in a deeper sense, the city is inside, a mental space or world. How we build our outside cities depends on how our internal city is constructed, structured and lived. External ecological space and its problems depend on internal ecological space.

To the question 'Should we abandon the city of man?' the answer depends upon one's notion of autonomy. In a Platonic two-world perspective, the world above and the world below, we must abandon the city of man for the City of God. But in the world view of a single macrocosmic process of evolution the way to the City of God is through the city of man. To say this means simply that it is through history and its structures that we attain the City of God. The question then becomes, 'Is the city an historical structure that leads to the City of God?' There are those who believe that it does not and therefore that we should flee the city and return to the country where strong family ties are preserved, closeness to nature is maintained and one's identity is rescued from the anonymity of the city by the purity of ethnic culture.

We believe, to the contrary, that the trend of cultural evolution and socialization is towards planetization and that the city is the prime carrier of this convergence. Convergence is not a

totalitarian, but a pluralistic unity based on love.⁶ This may not be the actual outcome, but at least it is the Christian ideal and the pattern which Christians must use to bring about this ideal. E. A. Gutkind suggests that we should see the city in the context of an expanding environment such as that described by Teilhard, whom he describes as "one of the great thinkers and most optimistic visionaries of our age."⁷ He cites a statement of Teilhard, significant for our understanding of cities: "Are we not at every instance living the experience of a universe whose immensity, by the play of our senses and our reason, is gathered up more and more simply in each one of us?" This means, he says, "that the growth of the world's population and the improvement of communications have destroyed the old frontiers and united our world in spirit and in reality."⁸

With Teilhard de Chardin, we view the city as having the potentiality to be the agent for planetization and integral liberation. According to Teilhard de Chardin, the direction of evolution is towards convergence: atoms unifying to form molecules, molecules congregating to form cells, cells associating to form brains producing personal centers of consciousness, and persons forming communities with a head or leader. From the biological stage, evolution has now become cultural, which means evolution in terms of mind or consciousness rather than of matter or body. For a new consciousness to be born, personal centers of consciousness must unite. The goal of the evolution of consciousness is planetary, such that the individual is no longer a citizen of a nation but a citizen of the world.

Given this scenario, the city becomes the prime agent of the planetary evolution of consciousness, for in it is concentrated economic energy in the process of industrialization. It is the nerve center for international economy, the place where intellectual energy is harnessed in universities, libraries and museums. Through mass communications and transportation, it is the processing center for the interaction of cultures and the linkage of the peoples of the world. It is the womb, as it were, for the growth of planetary consciousness.

Of course, modern cities do not conform to this ideal. They are anti-thetical to this goal, for they are places of depersonalization and alienation, high crime rates, slums, mental and physical sickness due to mental and physical pollution, etc. They are environments that foster and reward competitive attitudes which are anti-thetical to love and cooperation. However, despite these negative values, which hopefully can be remedied, the cities as historical phenomena are the structures most adapted for planetization.

Thus far we have considered the city in general in its relation to planetization and integral liberation. Now, let us focus on third-world cities in general and Philippine cities in particular.

Third-World Cities

Third-world cities are characterized as primate cities with a peripheral slum. By primate cities is meant "massively concentrated urban centers, abnormally large and complex and modern in relation to the countryside," differing qualitatively in cultural level and type from the hinterlands.⁹ These primate cities are the single center of "government, culture, and economic activity in each country."¹⁰

"The native or third-world urbanite," notes Howson, "stands to his country cousin the way the European settler during the colonial period related to the natives."¹¹ The rural people go to the city not only for jobs and a better way of material life, but also with the intense desire to become urbanized. However, they rush to the city in such massive numbers, unprecedented in history, that they not only threaten the organization and services of the city, but, being psychologically and

culturally ill-adapted to city life, they themselves become disoriented, alienated, manipulated and oppressed.

There is a debate as to whether in third-world countries, rural people are pushed or pulled into the city. The answer, it seems, is both. As Mary Hollnsteiner notes, "migration to cities stems from the push factor of a stagnant countryside and the pull factor of anticipated opportunities in the city."¹² They are pulled into the city because of the hope for jobs, though the jobs available to them are mostly menial, that is, as domestics, in retailing, etc., for the industrial economy is not fully developed. They are pushed into the cities because of the drudgery of rural life and its lower level of material welfare.¹³

Are Philippine Cultural Values Lost Because of Urbanization?

The following are generally agreed to be Philippine cultural values: close family ties and interpersonal relationships, friendliness (*utangnaloob*), a reverence for nature which is considered sacred, playfulness and a carefree attitude towards life (*bahalana*), emotionality and religiosity. The city would seem to loosen family ties separating the in-migrant from his family in the *barrio* (village). Technological production and bureaucracy force him to think of himself as a component of the production process, thus fostering a componential and functionary mentality.¹⁴ This technological mentality invades the private sphere and also sunders his mystic oneness with nature, which begins to be seen as an object to be manipulated, exploited, even raped. These negative effects of urbanization found in the West are, however, mitigated in third-world countries.

Bruner, who studied urbanization in North Sumatra, observed that "contrary to the traditional theory, we find in many Asian cities that society does not become secularized, the individual does not become isolated, kinship organizations do not break down, nor do social relationships in the urban environment become impersonal, superficial and utilitarian."¹⁵

Mary Hollnsteiner supports this conclusion in her research. She notes that the new Filipino in-migrants are disillusioned with city life, being thrown into densely populated slums of the city and facing the reality of extremely limited access to power, participation and opportunity. Nevertheless, these lower income groups are not depersonalized or dehumanized, for they

find solace and security in the personalized, crowded neighborhood of cities. They even resist government and private efforts to change their lifestyle to a more ordered but depersonalized one. Squatter communities are notorious for trying to prevent their bodily transfer from inner city slums into more spacious suburban areas or neat high-rise housing. Apparently this is not the milieu they find conducive to a sense of security and well-being.¹⁶

Hollnsteiner adds that, for Filipino culture and for Malays, high-rises are depersonalizing, while in Hong Kong and Singapore dwellers seem to do all right. For Filipinos, though the slum shanties are sub-standard and poor, the pseudo-*barrio* setting provides a sense of community. This is not to say, she adds, that the shanty towns should not be improved, but that the personalized value should be built into them.¹⁷

Lillian Trager, visiting research associate at the Institute of Philippine Culture, Ateneo de Manila University, and professor of anthropology at the University of Wisconsin, notes that Filipino family ties are not weakened by urban migration. The reason is that migration is not an individual affair for the purpose of promoting the individual's own interests and goals; it is a family and household strategy for family maintenance and preservation. Exchanges of food and money between the rural and urban members "take place in a context of strong interpersonal ties."¹⁸

While the neighborhood peripheral slums are densely populated, the reason that depersonalization and a high crime rate do not occur may be due to some mediating groups that help the newly arrived in-migrant to fit in. F. William How ton notes five levels of these mediating groups seen as stages of urbanization:¹⁹

1. When the individual from the country comes to the city, he usually stays with relatives who live in the slums in stilt-shanties or stays with close friends from the home village. Thus, his immediate need of a "village Gemeinschaft with its time-worn certainties of identity and obligation" are met.

2. The second stage is a wider grouping, still based on the kinship or quasi-kinship of those who come from the same village or tribe and/or who speak the same dialect. The important bond is that the members feel themselves to be brethren.

3. Once the individual gets to familiarize himself with his surrounding environment, he widens his association. He joins neighborhood clubs mostly for recreation and entertainment which are mostly illegal such as gambling, drinking, cockfighting, etc.

4. At this level, the individual joins clubs that cuts across neighborhood boundaries but are still communal in structure such as sports clubs, protective organizations, self-help and burial societies.

5. The fifth is founded on common interests that are economic and political rather than social, and the organization has become bureaucratic rather than communal.

We find these five levels verified in the Philippine situation. At the fourth level there is an effort by some sectors of the Church to form basic Christian communities in which, through dialogue and discussion, the individuals in the slums become aware of the causes of their oppression and poverty. The church workers, however, are merely facilitators and catalysts, making the workers and urban poor the real agents of change for the "transformation of society characterized by equality, freedom, peace and justice, and where socio-economic life is reflected in self-reliant, self-governing and self-sustaining communities."²⁰

Urban Work and Alienation

Karl Marx speaks of the alienation of the worker from his product and from his work. We will not consider these forms of alienation which have to do, not so much with technological production as such, but with the capitalistic arrangement of worker and employer. We will consider rather the alienation from oneself and loss of subjectivity arising from the process of technological production.

For productive efficiency, it is necessary to separate work from private life.²¹ Private life is usually associated with leisure, play, relaxation; public life with work, seriousness and goal-orientation. Enjoyment comes later as a fruit of one's work. Technological work is planned, organized and structured by the clock, the calendar. According to Berger, youth culture sees this separation between work and leisure as repression, alienation, inauthenticity and therefore is opposed to the values of hard work, sobriety and saving for the morrow; it extols the virtues of hanging loose, turning on, giving no thought to the morrow. Between the two there is a reversal of values.²²

For Filipino culture, however, there is no separation between work and play. Human life is structured in terms of the now; thus life is to be enjoyed, the moment is to be savored in a Zen-like

way. Work is not engaged in so as to enjoy its fruits after retirement. Because of this easy-going and carefree attitude towards life the Spaniards who colonized the Philippines spoke of the laziness of the Filipinos (*la indolencia de los Filipinos*).

The Filipino philosopher, Leonardo Mercado, observes that:

The Filipino blends work with leisure. For instance, planting and harvesting is not purely work, for together with it go singing, drinking, and eating. For the fishermen who draw their nets, some of their companions roast the catch and drink tuba on the seashore. Working is more personalistic, and leisure is a part of it. The above-mentioned rural examples can also be applied in the city. Market vendors join work with the leisure of gossip and listening to the radio. And in the city, the office workers stress not pure work but the pleasure of camaraderie, i.e., the tendency of combining pleasure with work.²³

Mercado traces this intermingling of work and leisure to Philippine cultural values or, as he calls it, the Filipino's world-view. This world-view is non-dualistic: the opposites, subject and object, are harmonized and this runs through his views on nature, man and God. For instance, he notes, "the nondualistic principle appears in the Filipino harmony-with-nature orientation. It leads consequently to a non-linear concept of time, space, causality. The same principle of non-dualism (or of harmony) also explains the Filipino's view on work and leisure."²⁴ Mercado contrasts this non-dualistic view of work and leisure with the western view:

In western-oriented factories and other business firms, the goal is producing more through efficiency. And specially with technological progress, work becomes more impersonal and man becomes a slave of his machines. The slogan goes: "Duty before pleasure." In other words, leisure is separate from work. . . . Only after retirement is he expected to fully enjoy life.²⁵

Thus, while the Filipino has imported the modern method of technological production and bureaucratic organization, he has adapted it to his world-view, thereby saving his cultural value of a non-dualistic view of human life and the integral unity of the private and public spheres.

Urbanization and Cultural Identity

Is cultural identity lost because of urbanization? Those in the rural areas have their ethnic cultures. When they migrate to the city they come into contact with popular (mass-media generated) culture.²⁶ Philippine popular culture has at least two clearly identifiable layers of cultural influence, the Spanish and the American, along with the Chinese, which is less discernible because of its deeper assimilation.²⁷

The interaction of ethnic cultures with popular culture need not mean a loss of ethnic identity as long as basic Christian communities help to mediate the process of inculturation, and thereby obviate the possibility of domination and manipulation by the dominant elite. There is, of course, the possibility that popular culture become the vehicle for bourgeois ideology representing the interests of the wealthy; this could be presented as Filipino values as such and thus perpetuate colonialism. Certainly, in an over-all discussion of the autonomy of the individual and his society, this question must be addressed. But a capitalist system is not an intrinsic structure of urbanization/industrialization. While it can endanger Filipino Christian autonomy due to the class conflict of the wealthy and the poor, our concern is with the relation of urbanization as such to the autonomous Christian, not with the capitalist socio-economic and political system.

If popular culture were non-ideological, it would not be dominating or colonizing, but would broaden and enrich ethnic culture. In terms of the principle that union differentiates, ethnic culture would be differentiated. It would become more global and planetary, and thus able to create an individual that is more global and planetary in outlook. Popular culture, as the product of cultural interaction with western culture and with indigenous ethnic cultures, would provide a wealth of relationships and knowledge. By increasing, in turn, the individual's freedom of choice and self-determination, it would increase his or her autonomy.

Conclusion

We have presented here a partial and sketchy discussion of the relation of urbanization and Philippine values. We have not covered all aspects of urbanization in relation to values, nor all values in relation to urbanization. The discussion was selective.

Our attitude towards urbanization and its effect on Philippine values and Filipino identity and autonomy is positive; we are not anti-urban. The criticism about the slums, the poverty, the overcrowding, the increasing gap between the wealthy few and the many poor may not all be due to urbanization as such, but to the capitalist context in which urbanization is carried on. A careful analysis must first be made as to the causes of the evils in the city before one can take a position with respect to urbanization and values. Any recommendations for urban planning and new structures must, in the final analysis, be based on one's cultural definition of the autonomous person, for, to paraphrase Plato, the city is the individual writ large: as the individual, so the city.

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Notes

1. Peter Berger, *The Homeless Mind* (New York: Random House, 1973), p. 200. 2. See her article, "The AECD: Its Implications for the Philippine Urban and Industrial Development," in *Philippine Studies*, 19 (1971), 13-24.

3. Gustavo Gutierrez, *A Theology of Liberation* (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1973), p. 72.

4. *Ibid.*

5. Quoted from Stephen Lukes, *Individualism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1973), p. 55.

6. Teilhard de Chardin, *The Future of Man* (New York: Harper and Row, 1964), pp. 234-35.

7. See his *The Twilight of the Cities* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1962), p. 75.

8. *Ibid.*

9. F. William Ho w ton, "Cities, Slums, and Acculturative Process in the Developing Countries," in *Urbanism, Urbanization, and Change*, ed. Paul Me dows and Ephraim H. Mizruchi (2nd ed.; Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publ., Co., 1976), p. 408.

10. *Ibid.*

11. *Ibid.*, p. 409.

12. *Op. cit.*, p. 16.

13. Euiyoung Ham, "Urbanization and Asian Lifestyles," in Meadows and Mizruchi, *op. cit.*, p. 225.

14. These are terms used by Peter Berger in his book, *The Homeless Mind* (New York: Random House, 1973).

15. Ephraim Mizruchi, "Romanticism, Urbanism, and Small Town in Mass Society: An Exploratory Analysis," in Meadows and Mizruchi, op. cit., p. 242.
16. Op. cit., pp. 16-17.
17. Ibid., p. 17.
18. See her article, "Urban Migration and their Links with Home," in *Philippine Studies*, 29 (1981), p. 228.
19. Op. cit., pp. 411-12.
20. From a pamphlet, *Basic Christian Community* (Manila: Jesuit Apostolic Center, 1973), p. 1.
21. Berger, op. cit., p. 29.
22. Ibid., pp. 207-208.
23. See his article, "Notes on the Filipino Philosophy of Work and Leisure," in *Philippine Studies*, 22 (1974), p. 72.
24. Ibid., p. 71.
25. Ibid., p. 72.
26. Doreen G. Fernandez, "Philippine Popular Culture: Dimensions and Directions," in *Philippine Studies*, 29 (1981), p. 26.
27. Ibid.

Chapter VII

An Experience of Urbanization and Human Values with the Street Dwellers in Recife

Marge Zacharias, O.S.F.

Introduction

These are stories, written some time ago, first of street life in general, and then of individual street dwellers. They are reflections on the experience of a missionary, a religious educator, and a Franciscan woman, from which perspectives they describe one aspect of the theme: Urbanization and Human Values.

The one statement I would like to make regarding urbanization and human values is: That the human psyche has the capacity, even within the most violent structures in an urban setting, to transcend them and to remain human. I would go further to say that the very survival of a person depends largely upon his or her capacity to choose human values over destructive ones within a given violent situation. At the same time, I do not want to say that all aspects of urban life are violent or necessarily destructive.

In the ministry to the street dwellers in Recife Brazil, Fr. Larry Rosebaugh, O.M.I. and I, focused on three processes: valorization, conscientization, and evangelization.

- the valorization is stressing the innate value of a person. It says: In the eyes of God, we are equal and one. This has nothing to do with any possible gifts we may have: all of God's people have equal value, deserve reverence and respect, and possess freedom of choice over their lives.

- Conscientization is the heightening of awareness toward the situation in which one lives. Heightened awareness generally leads to assuming some sort of responsibility over the situations of one's life.

- Evangelization is the proclamation of Christ's activity in the person and in the world. It evokes the dignity of the person, made in the image of God.

The Life of the Street Dweller: Recife, Brazil

Once a person takes on the life of the street dweller, it does not take much time to distinguish the different types of groups which exist there, each with its own set of problems. In a brief period of time we saw some six different types of communities.

There were the fishermen who came from the interior, fished for crayfish, and every seven or eight days took the train back to sell them and bring the few coins they made to their families before returning to the streets. These men slept in clusters by the canals.

Another group were the women beggars who would come to the city twice a week, sit on the steps of the church and beg for coins. These were usually old and sickly women, raising grandchildren.

A third grouping were the carriers and sellers. These men would buy about three dollars worth of vegetables, place them on burlap on the street, price them a couple of pennies more, and try to earn some wage.

A fourth group were youths, ranging in age anywhere from three or four years to sixteen or seventeen. Sometimes they left home out of a sense of responsibility. Sometimes they were left

behind by the parents who could not provide for them. Most of them either sold coffee, shined shoes, or collected and sold plastic.

A fifth group were the market dwellers, the adult men. They rummaged through garbage in the night to collect plastic and cardboard which they sold to earn a few coins to buy rice.

Still another group of people were the cardboard apartment people. These were families who, with hopes of improving their life, moved to the city and lived in cardboard boxes along the warehouses. The men tried to earn a few coins by carrying one-hundred-pound weights of rice or vegetables, or by washing cars.

Even though there are different ways of describing the various street people, each having unique problems, there are certain general forms of oppression which they share. Most street dwellers suffer humiliation and violence at any effort even to begin to improve their way of life. Most street people are treated like animals or psychopaths, not only by the police but by the agencies that are expected to be helpful to the poor. The street people live with a stigma of being dirty, lazy derelicts. Very often the social agencies, health clinics, and sometimes the churches, respond to their needs with a qualifying degrading benevolence, if not outright rejection of assistance.

Perhaps a glimpse at a typical day can give some insight into the life of the street dweller and the extent to which their poverty actually is institutionalized.

The day begins with general movement in the market at the break of day, around 4:30 or 5:00 a.m. The people acknowledge one another silently and then move to their jobs for the day. Larry and I begin each day with prayer. Larry decides to take Jose to the hospital to see if anyone will assist him: he has a badly diseased open sore on his leg the length and width of a hand. Larry knows that he will have to try three or four clinics. He knows that Jose may be rejected and will be humiliated and called names. He checks about the buses. We agree to meet at 7:00 p.m.

I will spend my day with Luis. Luis had almost died and this scared him into wanting to make an effort to get off the streets. The first step was to register for a birth certificate. Without this proof of identity, Luis could not obtain employment. To register, the applicant must submit his home address and the signatures of his parents, and must be able to read and write. Luis has neither parents nor home in Recife, nor can he read or write. A priest in Recife had given me an address in one of the favelas that Luis could use. Luis memorizes the name and address, and we go to the station. We stand in line from 5:00 to 7:00 a.m. At 7:00 a.m. the police arrive and proceed to give a token to the first fifteen arrivals. These fifteen will be helped that day; the others must come back on Thursday, since the police meet only three times a week. Today we are among the first fifteen. The station opens at 8:00. We are helped at 9:30. The police take Luis' home address and give him a piece of paper that says he must pay a fifty-cruzeiro tax (about \$5.00) and come back next week.

It is close to noon by the time we walk back to the market. Luis is trying to figure out how to find enough cardboard to raise \$5.00 in the next week. His goal is to return to the interior again to see his aging father and to find a job. To do this, we will repeat our trips to the police station about ten times because of the extensive paper work. Luis will pay several taxes and receive several humiliations and lose a lot of working time waiting in a line, filled with anxiety and insecurity. He will need the identification papers, a work document, and a health document. It will take Luis seven months just to be identified and eligible for work. He will continue to live on the streets until he can find a job that will give him enough money to buy a shack.

I have a few hours left of the afternoon, and so I go to visit some cardboard apartment people. I talk to a man who has saved a thousand cruzeiros (about \$70.00). He wants to find a shack in which to move his family but no one will rent him one. This family comes from the interior where

they had lived on a piece of land for several generations. One day a man came with the police and told them that they would have to leave, because a rich stranger had bought the land and wanted to raise sugar cane. The family must leave or be killed. The poor man does not understand why, but he supposes the rich white man must be right because he is white.

The rage in me rises. I see this poor man who is only twenty seven years old and looks fifty; he has already known the exploitation and manipulation of my own countrymen. I see his children, aged three and four, already cardboard infants. The Lord loved and identified with these people long before they were born, but never justified an institution or individual that maintains such exploitation and oppression.

There is still time to read the paper. The headline states that a tenth person has been found dead, all had been brutalized, killed and left in the weeds. Everyone knows the unwritten law of the police: if a policeman is killed, twenty people die. This will be the last death because the policeman had only been wounded.

It is six o'clock. The sun has set; the people are beginning to disappear from the market. Some of the sellers are covering their vegetables and wares. Two or three street dwellers begin passing through the market toward the plaza, picking up vegetables that have fallen from the carts. They will peel and wash these for supper. Others in the plaza have already gathered two or three stones and some fruit crates and have begun a fire. It is an important part of the day. The street people call this plaza "home." It is where they will eat, where they will pray, where they will sing and sleep.

A good number of people are sitting on their cardboard; some are busy with the preparations, others are beginning to tell jokes, others start to sing. Some are just quietly telling their story. News is exchanged: "The civil police took all of Joao's vegetables." "Luis got his registration document." "Jose is in the hospital." Prayers are said for the kids who sniff glue, for Jaime's drinking, in thanksgiving for warm weather, for health, for food, for one another. Then it is time for fun. Luis takes Larry's hat, and Larry takes Luis's cane, and they carry on a "beggar's theater," an exchange of character, doing a dialogue in imitation of the other. The poor are great mimics, and once they start, they pick up on everyone.

A surprising thing about the poor is that they do not resent the rich. They seemingly do not understand things are so. It is hard for them to grasp concepts like possession, acquisition, ownership--much less, attitudes of greed and excess. One of the clearest examples I can recall of the street people occurs at meal time. The people gather for their small bowl of soup, which will be all they will eat that day. When invited to a second bowl, they generally remark that they do not need it because they had soup yesterday, too. The evening comes to a close about 11:00 p.m. with the dying fire encouraging people to leave the plaza, pick up their cardboard, and seek out their dark corner or Church steps for sleep. There is exhaustion and fear as the street people huddle in two's and three's or four's, each seeking the security of another's physical presence. Each knows that tonight the police could come and pick them up, and they could be beaten and jailed for being on the streets, for simply being a marginalized person without an identity. They go to sleep, incapable of thinking of the future, but being grateful they have lived through that day.

A Myth--It Is Not True That They Are Poor Are Poor Because They Are Lazy

Every Friday afternoon the church doors of Nossa Senhora do Penha open at 3:00 p.m., giving blessings every fifteen minutes. It is a good time for beggars--those who may have a room in some barrio, or those living on the street--to sit on the steps and hope for coins from people entering the

Church. They may earn as little as seven cru or up to twenty-five or thirty cru during four hours there.

The interesting thing about the Friday p.m. group is the type of community they form. The group is made up generally, but not exclusively, of women--old ones raising grandchildren, or younger ones probably deserted by husbands. This group forms a type of community with similar needs: daily bread, a few cru for rent, medicine for their children, security with one another from the violent fear that affects their lives:

- fear of being put out on the streets and exposed to thieves and other cruel people;
- fear of starvation, depending on the kindness of others;
- fear of sickness, which requires medicine they cannot afford;
- fear of their own malformation: many people have enlarged and swollen feet, useless legs, blindness, malformed limbs, which prohibit work.

But those that can work do try:

- Many women take in wash, working three or four days a week for families of five to seven persons, earning 100 cru a month (\$5.00);
- Dalva and Maria live together and work together as cleaning ladies at a bus station seven nights a week from 10:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m., earning 1000 cru a month (\$50.00);
- Jose and Luis collect cardboard through the night. They sell what they gather at 1 cru (20 cents) for 1 kilo (2.2 lbs.), earning up to 15 cru a night (about 75 cents);
- Preto works from 2:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. carrying ice on his head (about 100 lbs.), earning 120 cru a night (about \$6.00);
- Baptista works, washing cups, selling hot dogs and drinks for a few hours each night. Earns 15 cru an evening (about \$1.25).

The inability to work, the low wages, the long hours, the heavy labor lead to a low morale in the face of an oppressive reality. The urgent need of women with children for a room leads to sometimes five or six women and up to ten children living in the same one-room house. There is no way in which they could pay the 400 or 500 cru a month for rent if fewer than five women shared the expenses.

It is generally the men and the children who keep to the streets. Men hardened and roughened by shame and indignities seek out the dark and hopefully-safe hideaways for a few hours of sleep. Children appearing in two's, three's, four's, abandoned by frustrated parents, or keeping away from angry, harsh parents or crowded huts, seek solidarity in groups, escape from fear by doing violence, and escape from hunger by robbing.

The low-level street people and beggars do work, carrying heavy loads of cargo, doing large amounts of wash, sifting through garbage for plastic or cardboard, washing lavatories and/or sitting in them all day to keep them clean and collect their few cruzeiros. But their limited money allows for the sheerest level of survival: bread, medicine, rice, beans, rent for the women, alcohol for the men, glue for the youths. These are the escapes they seek to help them live the day-to-day struggle for survival.

A Documented Month

Date Fact

Dec. 1 The prefectura arrived. Without explaining why, or acknowledging the people's right to payment they took 670 cruzeiros worth of vegetables from three sellers (Francisco Amendu Santana, 70; Zedecheus, 200; Jose Gonzales, 400).

Dec. 2 The prefectura took 610 cruzeiros worth of vegetables from four sellers (Milton Jose da Silva, 100; Jose Luis Oliviero, 60; Paulo Jovo da Silva, 200; Severino Joaquin da Silva, 250).

Dec. 5 A man (Dameao Raimundo da Silva) aged 33, after being in Roabas e Furtes four days, returned to the streets with definite marks of beatings. Charge: he is not sure, but was found sleeping on the ground and taken.

Dec. 6 A girl (Yvenette da Silva) aged 11 was attacked by a woman with a knife who mutilated her ear badly. The police, upon request to drive her to Pronto Suse, drove away.

Dec. 9 The prefectura took 750 cruzeiros worth of vegetables from three sellers (Ana Lucinda Silva, 250; Maria de Conceicae, 200; Joao Pedro da Silva, 200).

Dec. 13 Midnight. Boy, aged 12, was shot at, hit and kicked by a plain- cothes policeman as the boy lay on the ground. The policeman refused to show his credentials, but his identity was confirmed on the arrival of the M.P. The boy has not returned to the streets. The charge: he stole 50 cruzeiros.

Dec. 15 The prefectura took 750 cruzeiros worth of vegetables from three sellers (Paulo Jovo Patrice da Silva, 450; Severino Joahim da Silva, 200; Aloisio Gomez da Silva, 100).

Dec. 24 5:00 p.m. Two girls (Nera--, Maria Garcia da Silva), aged 10 and 17, were taken by police while washing clothes in the tank under the viaduct. No charge given.

Dec. 28 7:00 p.m. Joao Baptista, aged 26, after being in Roabas e Furtes for nine days, returned to the streets with a drastic loss of weight and marks of beatings. Charge: intoxication.

Jan. 2 Reme Jarima De Arajo returned after 44 days in Roabas e Furtes. Severe marks of beatings. Charge: No documents.

Jan 4. A man (Carlos Fernandos de Oliviero), after 43 days in the same jail, returned to the streets with severe marks of beatings. Charge: stealing (which he denies), Still unable to regain documents which were taken by the police. Note: Carlos remembers the nicknames of his torturers: Russo, Edinko (confirmed by J. Baptista).

Jan 5, 9 Two men (Expedito and Lawrence Rosebough) were hit several times by the police. Charge: none known.

Damiao

In November 1978, Damiao, aged 32, together with eleven other men, was arrested for being drunk. They were not stealing or committing any violence, but were simply drunk.

During his imprisonment, Damiao was given farinha and water to drink for four days, and was brutally beaten several times. A whip made of tire rubber with small nails attached was slashed across his back, face, and chest, leaving still-open and raw welts of flesh. His fingers and toes were struck with wooden sticks; his body bloated with water.

Damiao committed no crime. Of the twelve men arrested, he was the only street dweller. Damiao owns a little cart for transport of cargo, and generally makes enough to feed himself and

occasionally to sleep on a bed, but normally does not make enough to live in a house. As a result he is a street dweller.

Damiao does not steal; he does not have a reputation for violence; he works hard through the night and sleeps during the day.

Josef: Today Is Enough. What More Do We Have?"

It was a lazy Friday afternoon. I was sitting on the Church steps, next to a man who generally remains silent; but I have already come to be familiar with him, and this day, the following dialogue took place.

M. Josef, you have been on the streets long?

J. Two years.

M. Where were you before?

J. In prison for twenty-five years.

M. For what?

J. A crime I didn't commit. I was accused of killing a man on the fazenda when I was 22.

M. Same prison?

J. No. Eighteen years in the Casa de Detencao and seven years at Itamonica.

M. Are you angry, Josef?

J. No.

M. Do you have a family?

J. After I was released twenty-three years ago, I returned to my home. But everyone was ashamed of me, so I left and came to Recife.

M. I never saw you drink. Do you drink?

J. Only once in a while.

M. Josef, you are about fifty and in good health. You can read and I see you selling cardboard. You are always clean. Do you ever think of leaving the streets; do you think about the future?

J. The future? For twenty-five years I kept sane by never allowing myself to think of yesterday, by never thinking of tomorrow. No, I cannot think about the future. We do not have the future; we have only today, and that is enough. What more do we have?

Josef is one of the most industrious, calmest men on the street, with eyes that show he has seen hell, and a smile that protects others from their hell.

Mauricio: I Asked, "Where's The Exit?" and the Police Said, "Over There." So I Left.

I arrived one Saturday night on the streets about 8:00 p.m. The beggars from the steps were just about all gone. I was sitting with some of the night people, and Larry was wandering about the praca. When Lourdes called attention to a young boy lying on the street, Larry and I tried to awaken him. Larry questioned the other kids on the street about what had happened, as I searched for a pulse. I told Larry that I was having a hard time finding a pulse, although I was sure he was still breathing. The kids told us that the boy had an attack and had taken an overdose of medicine. We called a taxi and took the boy to the emergency room.

"Name?" "We don't know, but the kids call him negrito." "Home?" "The streets."

"Family?" "None."

"Age?" "Uncertain."

"Birth document?" "None."

"Problem?" "Uncertain. Possibility of an overdose of medicine." A ten-year-old boy with no identity, no family, lying in a coma.

We were sick. Larry accompanied the boy as he was carried to another room, and I waited, feeling crushed with the reality of the boy's life. After about an hour, Larry returned, disgusted with the lack of care and the dirt in the room. He told me to go to see the boy.

Saliva and foam were oozing from his mouth, and his head lay in it. Urine was released from his body and was dripping around him and falling on the floor. The boy was dirty, and no one had as yet touched him. They assumed that he would be violent, and had bound his hands and feet to the table. Larry returned, and we wondered what could be done. Larry found gauze and tried to wipe the boy's mouth, and with some paper tried to clean the floor. We were told that the boy would be held for observation through the night, and that we could leave. It was about 11:00 p.m.

We returned the next morning about 7:00 a.m. The doctor was in, Negrito looked the same, only now he was on sorro. The doctor said that he would hold the boy until 4:00 p.m. On our return that afternoon, the nurse told us that he would be held until morning. He was resting. They thought that the boy might have epilepsy, and they wanted to check.

Two o'clock, a.m., Monday morning. Larry was resting on the streets when Mauricio woke him. He had left the hospital. Larry asked how. Mauricio responded: "I got up, got some clothes, walked to the exit, asked the policeman sitting there how to get out. He pointed to the other door, and I walked out."

L. How did you get back here? (The Mercado is about four miles from the hospital.)

M. I walked.

L. But it's 2:00 a.m., and you haven't eaten in three days!

M. I know. I'm hungry.

L. Here's ten cru (about 50 cents). Get a sandwich.

M. O.K. Thanks.

* * * * *

One cannot help wondering at the inner capacity of survival which the street kids have. The capacity to calmly, logically work out their own essential needs. Their fearlessness, clarity of purpose, and endurance. The poor, possessing nothing: somehow they inherit the earth, a capacity to survive in situations that would destroy any one less poor.

The King of The Streets

Jose da Silva was born twenty-eight years ago, more or less. He does not know the day or year exactly. There were three children in his family--one other brother, one sister, and Jose, the youngest of the three. He was raised in the interior, near the city of Nazore do Mato, where his parents were field workers. Jose remembers well participating in the field work, digging, hoeing, and planting seeds. When he was about eight or ten, his parents died. He then went to live with his married sister.

For a few years he continued to live the normal life of the poor boy by carrying water to earn a few coins. One thing that made his life a little more difficult was the temper of his sister's husband. He did not like Jose and frequently beat him. It was during this time that Jose contacted

epilepsy. This made life in the house even more difficult, for the husband frequently beat Jose during the attacks and because of them.

Because of this, Jose left the house to make a life alone, living on the streets and searching for work. He worked at various jobs: in cheap hotels, cleaning in shoe stores. He worked for a while carrying heavy loads of rice or grain for the warehouses.

Jose's life continued to worsen. He was not able to earn enough to live in a house, making barely enough to keep alive, so he remained on the street, sleeping wherever he found a place, and eating whatever he could find. It was during these years also that he had an accident. A car hit him, leaving him with one badly shattered leg. This ended whatever work Jose was able to do.

With a broken leg, with epilepsy, without a family that cared, and without the capacity for work, Jose remained on the streets for ten years.

- He had to become accustomed to search for food amidst the garbage.
- He had to get used to waiting until stores closed to find a place to sleep.
- He had to get used to using cardboard for a bed and plastic for a cover.
- He had to get used to remaining dirty, lacking money for a bath, lacking a change of clothes.
- He had to get used to people calling him names and throwing garbage at him.
- He had to get used to the sufferings of being refused water or being sold a cigarette.
- He had to get used to losing the little money he had earned (by begging, by going through garbage at night to salvage what he could sell) by being robbed at night or by having his pockets cut while he was sleeping.
- He had to get used to the whims of the police, who, when they decided to clean the streets, picked up whomever they wanted, whenever they wanted, and carted them off to jail.
- He had to get used to survival in a world violent because society's laws prevented the poor from rising out of their miserable condition.

Jose is a victim of violence, but is not violent. Whoever takes the time to talk to Jose, to pray with him, or to listen to him, finds in him a spirit both profound and beautiful. Whoever gives him a plate of soup or changes his bandaids finds that he receives with humility and gratitude. Jose is a king of the streets, because he is a man who can live in dignity. Jose does not drink; he does not steal. Everyone on the streets has respect for him, perhaps the women and young girls more than others. In Jose they find a person they can trust, talk with, receive in honest and real friendship.

Jose earns money by going through the garbage at night and then selling whatever he can salvage, and by begging. With this money, he frequently gives women what they need for bread and medicine. Everyone in the market likes him as a man with a large and generous heart and a sensitive and humorous spirit. Jose is a special man and an example for those living on the streets, because of his capacity to survive within violence; receiving violence, yet never giving violence, never being violent.

Like Christ, Jose is a sign of contradiction, remaining human and just in a society that is dehumanizing and unjust. He remains among the beggars as a light of hope; without words he invites them to transcend their misery.

May our hearts find room.

Sister Alexandrina: Among the Outcasts, in the Shadows of Darkness, One Can Find Saints

Among the outcasts, in the shadows of darkness, one can find Saints. Such a discovery happened on Wednesday of this past week. After a full day of walking, we visited the "house hospital" of Sister Alexandrina.

The house hospital is a wooden shack, with a long table for eating at the entrance, and an altar in the corner of this same entrance room. Further to the side is a room of bunks for the men. Toward the back of the house are several bunks for women, and the kitchen--all made of mud. The stove is of mud and Sister uses wood to keep the fire going. The roofing of the shack was quite inadequate with many places where the rain had come in.

The house is very much like the houses of the Interior, providing the barest essentials. But it is a place where a group can gather, and in the security of this group feel safe. Sister's work of living in a primitively constructed building among the sick and serving them, has made her a bit of an outcast in her community, and has made her loved by the people with whom she identifies.

Since 1964, Sister Alexandrina has used this house to allow and welcome poor people from the Interior who are sick and waiting for a place in the hospital for treatment. With no concern for herself, she receives anyone too poor to procure other waiting arrangements. A woman of stamina and courage, yet even more, of gentleness and humor, she mothers the houseful of invalids, even calling them to pray at 7:30 each evening.

It seems that the more radical the gospel message one hears, the more one must become an outcast, in order better to unite with the outcasts of the world and the children of heaven.

Yvette: "But Where Will You Take Her?" in Anger, the Police Drove Away

About 9:00 p.m., Larry and I were listening to Renaldo and Lourdes relate the incident of Renaldo's attack, in which he had fallen on his face, leaving him with cuts over his face and a bloody nose. I began washing Renaldo's face, while Larry was cleaning cuts off Jaime, when a sobbing young girl ran to the steps.

I went to see what had happened and saw her ear all butchered. I said to Larry, "This one must go to the emergency room!" Frightened, she said, "No!" I held her a few minutes, trying to calm her, and said, "Don't worry. We won't leave you alone. You will be all right, but you do need a doctor right now."

Just then, a police car drove up and ordered her in. I asked the policemen where they would take her. They gave no answer and insisted that she get in the car. Again I said, "But where will you take her?" (I asked this because I knew that police cars took people only to prisons or houses of detention, where they would only be beaten for crimes they did not commit.) The police became angry and drove off.

I said to Larry, "The girl must go to the emergency room." Larry went to find a taxi. I continued to hold the girl and to reassure her that she would not be left alone.

The help at the hospital was slow, crude, but better than anywhere else. While waiting, I learned the story. A boy had thrown a rock at a drunk woman. The woman turned and seeing, not the boy, but Yvette who was passing, attacked her with a knife, butchering her ear pretty badly.

The intern who sewed and repaired Yvette's ear was friendly but very inefficient. His application of the anesthesia was harsh, his sewing inaccurate and too soon. He had to cut the stitches and redo them.

Through all this, Yvenette buried her head in my shoulder and dug her nails into my back and my arms. Because they worked on her before the anesthesia took effect, she felt every bit of the pain. She sobbed pitifully, but rather calmly.

Yvenette is eleven years old. She has no parents or family, except one living sister of eighteen. The two walk the streets and find their friends among the street people.

At one point, the pain and the odors of blood and medicine made me dizzy, and I felt that I would black out. I called Larry to hold Yvenette and left for a few minutes. I returned with great admiration for this young girl, surrounded by almost total strangers, who was suffering such pain without hysteria or melodrama.

We returned to the praca by bus, and when we arrived at the streets, Larry went to buy some medicine for the girl, while she and I returned to the praca. I asked Yvenette whether there was a house she could go to. There was, but she did not want to go to her sister who was very nervous and would beat her for what happened. So I told her to spend the night with me, and that I would get cardboard for both of us.

Just as we arrived, about ten of the young boys showed up. Some were concerned about Yvenette, and others, knowing that I had some peanut butter and bread, were looking for their "daily bread." We settled down, and all were in awe of Yvenette. One boy quietly pressed a cru into her hand and said, "For your suffering." Another, equally quietly, brought her coffee; still another handed her a cigarette. Paulo just looked at her, and said, ever so gently, "Yvenette, tu e tao bonita."

Upon Larry's return, the group continued in the same spirit that already permeated it. It was a wonderful aftermath, one that both Larry and I enjoyed. The sensitive, caring level that emerged in these tough, crusted youths, their honest appreciation of the bread and peanut butter sandwiches they received showed itself in their attitude.

One, noticing my exhaustion, said to the others, "Look, Margarida is tired. Let's leave Yvenette with Margarida and Lorenza to sleep. Clean the cardboard before you leave." And they did.

Cruelty received, courage revealed, tenderness restored. "O Lord, your ways are incomprehensible, your paths unknown."

Chapter VIII

Cultural Differences and Value Clashes in African Cities

Ernest K.M. Beyaraaza

Introduction

While it is true that the cities in Africa are rather few and less populated in comparison to the rest of the world, it is also true that currently there is a mass movement to urban centers. Very soon Africa will be faced with the problem of a population explosion in its cities. Already a number of problems exist in these cities; this paper will focus mainly on those which have arisen due to cultural differences and value clashes.

To understand the nature of these problems, one needs to have an insight into the basic social structures in Africa. In other words, to understand city life, one needs to look beyond the city and understand rural and tribal life because the people who live in cities come from rural areas, and African cities still maintain very strong relations with rural societies. Consequently, both the urban and rural mentalities have influenced each other so much that they bear indissoluble marks on each other. This two-way influence may vary from country to country, or from city to city, or even from individual to individual. However, it is such a strong characteristic of African life today that those who are not aware of it will fail to understand a number of issues in their African experience.

As various individuals meet in the city, cultural differences tend to emerge, since these individuals come from different cultural backgrounds to which they are strongly attached. If African cities had been built on unpopulated islands, they would present the picture of market places, or churches, or any other public places where different people meet for certain purposes and then return home. However, most of the African cities are built amidst certain ethnic groups, some of whom think the land is theirs, and wonder why the rest of the groups have invaded them. For example, in 1966 problems arose in Uganda between the figurehead President and the executive Prime Minister. The Prime Minister removed the President from office and took all his power. But the deposed President happened to be the Kabaka or king of the Baganda, and the capital, Kampala, happened to be on Buganda land. Consequently, the Baganda ordered the Prime Minister to remove the capital from Buganda land! I will dwell on the fact that urban life in Africa is not yet divorced from rural life in the second part of this paper.

When we talk of cities in Africa, it is important to distinguish between those which developed during pre-colonial Africa and those which were introduced through colonialism. The significance of distinguishing between these two types of cities will be discussed in the third part of this paper. Concentration will be on modern or colonial cities which are more relevant to our theme. Modernity in Africa is measured by Western civilization: generally, urbanization leads to westernization. But as I have already explained, a westernized, urbanized individual has strong ties with the rural life of the area where his relatives live. The first problem to which this type of relationship leads has been described as cultural differences. The second problem, however, arises from within one cultural group. A school educated person tends to develop values that are strange to his traditionally educated parents. More broadly, those who have embraced the modern or western values find themselves clashing with those who have maintained their traditional values. What makes matters worse is that while the two categories may live apart conceptually, physically they share the same space and time.

The strange circumstances in which Africa finds itself today have an historical explanation. We have already seen that there were traditional cities, but today cities are mainly modern or western. Similarly, before the colonialists set foot in Africa, a number of nations had fully developed into kingdoms or democracies, among other forms of government. But when Africa was partitioned on a sheet of paper at the Berlin Conference, no one paid attention to these already established dynamic, progressive, peaceful nations with their various cultures and values. Instead nations were mercilessly mutilated and disorganized into grotesque territories, colonies, or protectorates. In nations the people are held together by indivisible bonds fabricated out of the common culture and values. But what held people together in these new territories were the gun, cruelty, positive law and the conditioning to western culture, among other foreign values.

The concern of the colonialist was territorial. Regardless of the civilization that had existed on this territory over centuries, the colonialist demarcated his territory according to natural boundaries like rivers and mountains. This divided communal areas where families drew their water or grazed their cattle together, so that a father could cross over to visit his son only with permission from the new authorities.

Thus, Africa may be seen in historical perspective through three phases: pre-colonial Africa, colonial Africa, and post-colonial Africa. Part four of this paper will be dedicated to this historical explanation of the African predicament.

Many Africans have reacted differently to the circumstances that were created for them by the colonial authorities, among other foreign powers or influences. As this is a broad subject, I will cite only some examples of those who have resisted, and those who have crossed to the other side. This fact may also best be understood within the historical framework of the three phases. When the westerners fought the Africans physically and psychologically there was both resistance and success. Once the Africans freed themselves from the colonial yoke they established ministries of culture to liberate the African values. Generally, this type of reaction may be summarized into three parts: those who over-react against the western influence and would rather cut the umbilical cord, thus making an about-turn toward everything African; those who, like their masters, still see nothing good in African culture and values; and those who are liberal and look at both sides objectively, accepting only what is acceptable and rejecting the rest. This reaction will be dealt with in part five.

Having shown the situation in African cities, the historical background which explains it, and the reaction of the people to it, we shall evaluate the significance of the city in African life today. In part six, I will show how the African city is double-edged. Finally, in part seven, I will discuss what philosophy can do for Africa, for it is not enough to describe and explain problems: it is necessary to seek solutions. I have suggested a philosophical approach to these problems, not as the best solution, but as one of the possible solutions. If my academic field were different, probably I would suggest a different approach.

Whenever one talks of philosophy, people react with mixed feelings, in the facial expressions of some one sees wonder and even disbelief. The general tendency seems to be that philosophy is too lofty to be called upon for down-to-earth problems. Of course, a lot depends on what one thinks philosophy or a philosopher is. At an International Philosophy Conference on "Philosophy and the Mass-Man" in Cairo (1983), some philosopher argued that philosophy is for special people. I would like to retain the position I took there, namely, that philosophy does not come from heaven but from the people in their capacity as people. Any mentally healthy person is capable of philosophizing. It is true that many people ask themselves philosophical questions without

knowing it, but look lost when one speaks of philosophy since they know nothing about academic philosophy.

The basis of my argument, therefore, will be the assumption that what makes people human is certain common powers and abilities, e.g., the mind, the will, and such products of these powers as language, morality, law, religion and art, among others. While we may have different languages, moralities, laws, religions, etc., we have a common mind that enables us to reflect on our differences, appreciate others and learn from one another.

It is this type of reflection that I recommend for the African quandary. Generally, people acquire values through conditioning; they accept values without any rational grounds. Thus, whenever these values clash, chauvinism tends to set in and no one can convince the other. My position is that when we reflect on our values we should be able to establish rational grounds for them. While all values are valued, their rational grounds are not equally strong. Through philosophical reflection, we should be able to hierarchize our values and thereby be able to resolve many differences regarding which is the higher value.

Urban vis-a-vis Rural Life in Africa

Urban life in Africa is so close to the rural that one can say, without expecting much contradiction, that almost all people who live in urban areas have roots in rural areas where they have a great deal at stake. Those who do not have parents have other relatives there. Unless one is a foreigner, one has both a house where he stays in the city and a home where his parents and other relatives live. The difference between house and home are extremely important. Many working people, including high officials, live in the houses that either belong to or are rented by the unit for which they work. It is important to note here that the employee lives in this house with his family and even other relatives only as long as he is still employed. This is very significant because at any time one can lose one's job or die, and eventually one must retire. In the event of any of the above, the family members, relatives, and whoever has been in the house will have to go. But where? This question arises, not on the spur of the moment, but much earlier in one's life, particularly when one gets married and knows there is a family that some day will need a home. What makes the question more crucial is that nobody can tell when!

Due to this uncertainty, many tend to resort to the rural areas. This is the safest in Africa today. First of all, when you have a good job and fit in the city it does not follow that all your children will fit there as well. Thus many think it wise to keep contacts with both urban and rural life. Second, experience has shown that whenever wars break out or even political uprisings, it is the urban people who suffer most. One may lose all one's savings in a day. Therefore, even those who can afford establishing homes in urban areas think twice before they do so. Many first develop rural areas and then build houses in the urban areas for mere comfort. Third, many feel more comfortable outside urban life when they retire where life is often far cheaper and much easier to cope with. Fourth, the general tendency in Africa is to bury the dead at home, i.e., in rural areas, whereas urban areas are generally places of work. Loss of job, death, or retirement generally mean returning to the rural areas. Due to inflation land development is better than an insurance policy.

The following presidential examples illustrate this point. Recently, the former President of Tanzania, Mwalimu Julius Nyerere, retired to a remote village at the shores of Lake Victoria in Northern Tanzania, at the far end of country from the city of Dares Salaam where he had lived as President for over twenty years. He is the pride of Africa, not only because he left power and retired to his home, but because he served Tanzania and Africa with a clean record. The

government and the Party of Tanzania had to give him a pension to survive and even built him a house--a very rare thing in political life.

The second presidential example is that of the late Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya who died at Mombasa. Immediately the body was flown to Nairobi, and then driven to his home in Gatundu where his family members and relatives intended to bury him. In recognition of his services, the government of Kenya had to plead hard with his family to let him be buried in the city centre. Partly due to culture, his body lay in state at Mombasa, then at Gatundu, and finally in the parliamentary buildings.

Generally, political life in Africa is considered to be the highest calling. Many take it as a sign of prestige, while others consider it the means to whatever they dream. To get into parliament, however, generally one has to win in elections in a constituency situated in the rural area. This situation has led parliamentarians, together with other aspirants and their respective friends, to keep in touch with the people back home. This entails developmental projects and other activities which keep urban areas in close contact with rural ones. There are also a number of organizations intended to keep in close contact the members from certain rural areas who are working in urban areas. These serve a number of purposes: social activities, marriage arrangements, rural development projects and burials, among other activities. As the various ethnic groups become so organized, the city tends to remain a no-man's land, merely a meeting place, or rather a place of work.

However, cities and towns are organized in a special way. People do not just go to work there as if it were in their gardens at home. Someone has to know which jobs are vacant, to advertise these jobs, and to arrange interviews. But as this someone must come from somewhere, and is bound thereby to certain others, corruption sets in. It is common to find certain organizations employing people from a particular ethnic group simply because the top man in that organization is from that group. This often leads to rivalry among ethnic groups as to who should man which job. Such tribalism not only leads to inefficiency at work, but often to actual fighting and political upheavals.

While this is an acceptable fact, it is also true that some organizations and individuals have transcended the tribal groupings, and deal with others objectively. They employ people on merit, and even marry those they love regardless of where they come from. While the clashes of values due to inter-marriages are becoming less, they are not dead. Many marriages fall into problems due to individual differences, but some are in difficulty due to inter-marriage. For example, some ethnic groups are patrilineal in contrast to those which are matrilineal. Whenever there is a divorce in a patrilineal ethnic group, the woman leaves the husband with the children and may marry elsewhere and have other children. In the matrilineal group, however, a woman leaves with her children, and goes with them to another husband. This entails two major complications. First, in the modern economy where many children are no longer an asset, the patrilineal group finds it difficult to accept the woman with another man's children. Secondly, such children will not be committing incest if they cohabit with those they find in the new family. Traditionally, brothers are supposed to protect their sisters against any immoral activities, but the sons of this new woman will not be in position to fulfill this responsibility.

The language barrier is often a problem too. Some marriages are made difficult by the in-laws who fail to communicate with their son's wife. It is important to remember that extended families in Africa are still the order of the day. It is not uncommon to find a house full of both the husband's and the wife's relatives, despite the fact that the salary of one or even both is not even enough for

their food. Yet, it is almost a crime to tell these people to go back home. Often you are forced to borrow money, not only to buy them food, but to pay for their school fees and buy them clothes.

This extends beyond one's relatives. People assume the right to knock at your door explaining that they are a son of so-and-so from the village neighboring that of your fathers. You may not even be able to recall his father, but you will squeeze yourself and give him what he wants. Without this special manner of African life many of the big officers driving big cars in big cities would never have seen the inside of a classroom! We are rich because we share our poverty, and we are poor because we share the little we have.

The African City

Urban organizations seem to be natural to man. As nations naturally develop, certain circumstances lead a part of these nations to live in urban areas. Such circumstances could be those of administration, trade, industry or agriculture, among other human activities. Partly because of these activities cities arose in Africa at dates which are only partly known. Such cities include famous ones and those whose sites are the only thing known about them. For example, some ancient cities in North Africa were built thousands of years before Christ, others existed on the Eastern Coast of Africa, and still others existed in the interior and along the Nile Valley.

However, our immediate concern is with the modern cities where the problems of cultural and value differences are concentrated. In the previous part it was pointed out that these modern cities are not yet divorced from rural areas. For city life this implies that cultural clashes and tribalism, among other problems, exist in the city. While in the previous part we saw that city dwellers had difficulties coping with each other due to their cultural backgrounds, in this part we see them having some problems in common regardless of their cultural backgrounds since various individuals are similarly influenced by city life and similarly harassed by their respective cultural backgrounds. The problems of intermarriage and extended family introduced us to this new type of value difference.

Traditionally, marriage to an African meant the preservation of life. Among the Bakiga of Western Uganda, part of the blessing of a marriage ceremony was: Ozaare ozarurukane. This phrase is difficult to translate, but may simply mean: may you produce as many children as possible! One of the reasons that justified polygamy was failure on the part of the wife to bear children. Whenever a man failed, his brothers would assist, but the children would be his. This conception of marriage still exists and because of this Africans find it a real problem to allow their sons and daughters to become celibate priests and nuns.

A man is supposed to produce children not only for the sustenance of life, but to keep his lineage strong, and also to survive the grave through the sons left behind. One who produces only daughters is better only than one who produces nothing. While daughters are supposed to go to other families, it is the sons who are supposed to keep their fathers' families alive. Those who fail to achieve this die encwekye, or literally, "broken off." Hence, producing only daughters also traditionally led to polygamy. The presence of children at home was always a pleasure. The parents and grandparents would have someone to send here and there for water, firewood, fire, among other things.

But what has the city done? Many have turned into Europeans due to city life. They have only one or two children. Some even prefer cats and dogs to children. While they see nothing wrong and actually enjoy themselves, their parents at home are saddened. Even those who have many children are not of much greater use to their parents. It is very difficult for a modern parent to send

a few of his children to their grandparents to look after cows and goats, to fetch water and firewood for them. So the poor grandparents die as if they had produced no children. The moral aspect is still worse. While traditionally parents knew what to do to control their children, today they do not even know where they sleep. Partly because of this, in certain areas some parents are against their daughters going to far-off schools.

The city has threatened the traditional social control in Africa. Traditionally, the people knew who was who. This was vital for the married life which, in turn, is vital for life itself. According to the Bakiga, Oshwera abuuza, i.e., it is very important to marry someone you understand. Traditionally, this understanding was made possible by relatives and friends who would recommend which girl your son should marry. The girls were always aware that eyes were on them from all corners and through secret chinks. This made them behave themselves wherever they went and in whatever they did. Today the city is the safest place for sinners. A girl may become pregnant, run to the city, abort and return to tell people she had gone to visit her aunt.

The city is the hiding place for all sorts. One who cuts people's throats at night, during the day is greeted with "Sir." A child who is out of control at home may run to the city where there they can always find something befitting their character to do. The worst danger from the city is its ability to keep secrets so that there exist all sorts of impenetrable networks beyond the control of anyone, including the government.

Due to this private and secretive life, society has come to be threatened by innumerable problems, including foreign diseases like VD and AIDS, among other catastrophic harbingers. Cities in Africa are swelling with people, but many are afraid of them. Surprisingly, those who fear them include not only rural dwellers; many city dwellers spend sleepless nights in beautiful surroundings.

Why is the city so strange to African people? This leads us to the question of origin. As we already have seen, the modern city was introduced into Africa by the West. So, urbanization, modernization and westernization in a sense mean the same. In Africa many systems were introduced and maintained by Europeans. At the time of independence these were inherited by Africans some of whom had not been prepared at all for such duties. The city is one of these systems. It is not surprising that it is strange to many Africans. It seems that, as some Europeans did not expect to leave, they built the cities for themselves, and never explained much about them to the Africans. Perhaps we shall get a better picture of this when we see the city in its general historical perspective in the next part. However, it is also important to realize that while the rest of the world became urbanized through industrialization, Africa remained rural as it was used for the raw materials for the European industries. People would go to work in plantations or mines and then return to their homes in rural areas. Those who worked in urban areas were the educated class, who, as we have seen, also were strongly attached to rural areas. So the city remained distanced from the African population.

The Historical Explanation of the African Predicament

When the African nations were destroyed and rearranged into new territorial groupings, much planning on the side of the Europeans had to be done to keep the situation under control. First of all, participation had to be achieved. For this reason, the British, for example, recruited Indians and then Africans into the army to be able to suppress any uprising or resistance. The following contradicts the popular belief that the Indians in Africa were mere laborers, particularly to help build the Uganda railroad.

It is rather humiliating to think that a tribe of natives with scarcely, if any, a gun amongst them, and using for the most part bows and arrows, can defy and has defied, ever since May all the well-armed Indians commanded by a colonel of the Nubis and all native troops and maxim guns sent against them.¹

Secondly, it was considered necessary to turn the people against their own culture before they effectively could introduce another. To achieve this, the colonialists needed the assistance of the missionaries. As the missionaries never participated in fighting or harassing the people in any way they were more trusted by the people. They made an effort to learn the peoples' languages. One of them, after learning Kikamba had the following to say.

Their language is wonderfully expressive. . . . It gives one much food for thought to find a language so philosophic in its structure on the lips of naked savages, and we come to the conclusion that Kikamba must have come to them at babel or elsewhere, from the hand of the Eternal Omniscient."²

More ideas that give us some inkling about the order that was destroyed by the Europeans in Africa will be dealt with when we turn to the African reaction to colonialism and imperialism.

Despite the clear evidence available, those acquainted with European conversation or even literature about Africa come across bizarre stories, for example, that the Africans have a simple primitive language consisting only of a jargon of somewhat inarticulate sounds, or of only a few words which are followed by much gesticulation. Dr. Kihumbu Thairu reports that in the late 1950s his European teacher told his class that there was still a tribe in the Congo--present-day Zaire--which could hardly communicate in the dark because the word for "come" was "U," and the word for "go" was also "U," the two words only being distinguished by hand movements. With such mentality, it is quite possible that another teacher in the Congo taught that there was a tribe in Kenya which could hardly communicate in the dark. . . . There are too many malicious stories about Africa; the reasons behind them are so obvious as to be transparent!

Hardly any African who stayed long at school during colonial days will not tell you a story about language. One was caned for uttering a single word in one's mother tongue. Many European languages, including Latin, were learned but never spoken, yet in expressing oneself, there are many things which can be expressed only in one's own language. Different schools had different methods of punishing those who spoke the "vernacular," "primitive," or "dirty" language. Some had placards reading "I am a fool," others were made to kneel on bare knees on hard ground with their arms stretched sideways for a long time.

Immediately after the African countries became independent, a Ministry of Culture was established to cater to the sadly downtrodden African cultures and values. In the case of language, probably the best example is that of the former President of Tanzania, Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere, who not only made Kiswahili the national language, but made it also the general language for communication, including teaching. He personally translated important books, including the works of Shakespeare, into Kiswahili. Scientific terms were also translated. Other countries like Kenya also developed Kiswahili and put it on an equal footing with English. For example, one needs to pass tests in both to be able to contest a parliamentary seat. While in Uganda only English has been spoken in parliament, recent developments show that one is free to express his views in his mother tongue as long as one arranges in advance for the translation of his address. In Uganda more than twenty languages are spoken.

The language example has been dwelt on in a representative capacity. What happened to language also happened to the other aspects of culture and to the whole value system. This has taken place in three stages. In the first stage culture and values were freely developed. In the second

stage there were deliberate attempts to destroy the African culture and to condition Africans to Western culture: during this stage culture meant only Western culture. When someone was described as "uncultured," this meant someone was not "westernized." In the third stage efforts have been made to liberate African culture. Besides the Ministry of Culture, many individuals seem to have reacted bitterly against the way the Europeans looked down upon their culture and values. It is probably in reaction to this mistreatment that a man like the late President Jomo Kenyatta, who had studied in England and even married an English woman, later decided against speaking English. It is also possible that President Mobutu Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu wa Zabanga banned all foreign names in Zaire and reinstated African ones for similar reasons.

While all this mistreatment was going on, the city served as the residence of the oppressor. In many countries there were both the colonial and the local governments. The posts from that of Governor to that of District Commissioner were manned by Europeans; local governments were under District Commissions. At District Centers there were two types of residences those for the Europeans and those for the Africans whose houses were often mere single rooms.

Those who dared go into urban areas did so to buy things from the Asian shops and then returned home. Generally, urban centers were symbols of oppression; it is not surprising, therefore, that many people tended to avoid them. The present feeling of uneasiness in the city could be explained as the oppression-hang-over. In many countries, rulers who replaced the colonialists tended to behave like their former masters. The soldiers are those who served the colonialists and continue still to mistreat the people the way they were trained. Some of these soldiers who have taken over power are even more brutal than their colonial master. In the case of Uganda, many people had to escape from urban areas and hide in rural areas till only recently. So, while many cities in Africa were expanding, Kampala and other cities in Uganda have been dwindling.

The nature of insecurity and its magnitude, among other aspects, vary from city to city, and from country to country. In South Africa the apartheid policy has created special problems for the Africans who are discriminated against in their own home. In many other countries political upheavals have turned the cities into monsters from which even presidents flee. Yet in many others peaceful co-existence has led to the swelling of the numbers of city dwellers to such a degree that people worry about the population explosion. The city of Nairobi may serve as an example. Unfortunately, planners have not been able to cope properly with the swelling numbers. Consequently, 60% of the city is slums, and whenever there are heavy rains people drown in their vehicles due to the lack of a proper drainage system.

However, the African seems gradually to be catching up with the realities of the city. We have already noted that the modern city is as strange in Africa as is the European. It was planned by Europeans, built by Europeans, and even maintained by Europeans. With the departure of the Europeans the cities remain behind and their maintenance is a problem. For repairs then lack not only expertise and spare parts but, more importantly, the willpower and responsibility. When things are always done for someone they will not know where to begin when the organizer departs.

The following observations may illustrate the changing spirit in Africa. In 1971, Id Amin toppled the Obote government in Uganda; in 1972 he sent away the Asians who had been controlling trade and commerce in the country. Asians' shops were re-allocated mainly to Nubis who only sold off what they found there and did not know where to get new goods. Consequently, Uganda fell short of commodities. In 1979 when Amin was toppled, the subsequent looting destroyed shops and houses. For a long time cities like Kampala looked like ghost towns as nobody cared to repair anything. In 1985 Obote was toppled for the second time, and again looting followed. At this juncture, however, one noticed a change. Within one week, the people themselves

had repaired all the broken shops and houses. The "they" concept which had crippled the Africans ever since the Europeans entered Africa, was at long last being overcome. Unfortunately, the Ugandans have learned the hard way. Elsewhere, it is still the foreigners who do everything for the Africans in terms of technology, etc. Thus, there are many things which have never been repaired since the colonial masters left certain countries in Africa.

The African Reaction to the European Invasion

Despite the malicious propaganda about Africa, it is a fact that before the European interference, the African nations were very well organized, and even powerful enough to challenge the heavily armed Europeans with their Indian and Nubian soldiers. Commenting on the Ugandan situation recently, Prof. Jean-Francois Medard recognized the following fact:

At the time of colonization, the Baganda Kingdom was a true state fully set up with an administration, an army, a navy and a road network. . . . The British colonizers therefore relied on the Baganda Kingdom and on their aristocracy to establish their domination.³

Yet this was only one among other well organized kingdoms in Uganda alone. Even the tribal populations which had no kings were well organized. One could talk of the existence of both representative and popular democracies here before the confusion created by Europeans. Tribes were connected through marriages, among other relations.

The resistance met by the Europeans in Africa is another indicator of independence and sophistication. They will never forget the wars they lost in trying to subdue the Africans. It was mainly because of this sophistication that the Europeans later tried to ban everything traditional, including the making of arms and other war objects. Unfortunately, when they had succeeded in crippling the African, they turned around and maliciously asked: "Where is your technology? You are the stupid son of Ham good only for manual work"! Deep inside, however, they bitterly remembered great kings and warriors like Kabalega. The following is a mere example of the beating the Europeans suffered in Africa.

The manner in which Ketswayo has been received by the British public would be amusing if it were not disgusting. This gormandizing black savage, who cost us many of the flowers of youth, thousands of lives, and millions of money, has scarcely landed, before a young lady presents him with a valuable locket and all Southampton is waiting to clasp his enormous paws. The airs the fellow gives himself are tremendous. He would not receive the Governor of Madeira, but sent word that 'the King sleeps,' and on waking the first morning at Melbury Road, he expressed a wish that the people should be thanked for the way in which they had cheered him. This really only wants the insertion of 'was graciously pleased to express to read like a bit of our own Court Circular.'⁴

There are many examples of this nature, but when the Europeans introduced their educational system in Africa, they made sure nothing was taught to recall the part of Africa. Some people have gone so far as to claim that African history began with the coming of the Europeans. This deliberate distortion of the African reality has annoyed modern Africans so much that many little trust Europeans. Many who thought they were good historians feel ashamed of themselves when accidentally they come across great names like Ketswayo about whom they know nothing, though they can tell you everything about Livingstone!

In African history, we have tended to distinguish between the following types of foreigners: The Colonialist (the bad European), the missionary (the good European), the farmer (the settler), and the Indian (the business man who came as a work-man to build the railroad). After

independence, the Indians stayed behind along with the missionaries. Some farmers also remained behind and, surprisingly, some of the colonialists who even physically had fought the Africans stayed behind to become Reverends.

Today, the mistrust of all Europeans and Asians is deepening. We have seen the involvement in fighting by the Indians. Many Africans also were shocked when they discovered the role of missionaries in colonialism and the contributions they made even in transporting European settlers to Africa. For example, Rev. Dr. R.T. Campbell in his book, *The Life of Livingstone*, reveals the following: "In December, 1850, pressing his kindred to emigrate he says he believes the cause of Christianity will be better advanced by emigration than by missionaries. . . ."

Livingstone himself in the first chapter of his book, *Missionary Travels*, pledges two thousand pounds, out of the profits of the book sales, "towards the cost of equipping and sending out selected British families to colonize the shores of Lake Nyasa (parts of present-day Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia) if the (British) government would support the proposal."⁵

The African mind today seems to be at a loss. It is clear that the Europeans hid much truth about Africa from the new generations under their control. Now the African wonders: if he was not told the truth about historical facts, was he told the truth about values and culture? While the colonialist seized the land, harassed the Africans and was hated for this, the missionary promoted an education which eroded African culture and values. The co-operation between the two is brought out by the following:

We as missionaries are indebted to the presence of the (colonial) government in this country (Uganda). And we would not forget, when we reckon up the triumphs of the cross in Uganda in how large a measure these victories have been owed, under God, to the fact that the way has been paved for us by others, and that an immense amount has been done for us which we could never have done for ourselves and which has rendered the progress of missionary work incomparably easier than it otherwise would have been. To the presence of a strong government and a settled government (i.e., with its officers around the missionaries) we owe a peaceful country. . . .⁶

The missionaries vital role in colonization was, in turn, recognized by Colonel Sadler, a Commissioner of the Colonial Government in Uganda in the following words:

The C.M.S. (Church Missionary Society of the Church of England) was the first in the field: its connection with political history in the early days, the difficulties it successfully suppressed, and the assistance its members (i.e., missionaries) rendered the Colonial Government at the time of the (African nationalistic) rebellion are too well known to need recapitulation. . . . There has been complete accord between the (colonial) government and the three (Christian) denominations (the White Fathers, French Catholics; The Mill Hill Mission, British Catholics; and CMS, English Protestants) and in no single instance has there been friction of any kind. Besides recording my appreciation of the excellent work these societies have done during the years in the cause of education and in the progress of civilization, I would wish to thank them for the assistance they have given the (colonial) government in the matter of Hut Tax and to myself personally in willingly placing at my disposal the fund of information they (the missionaries) have given regarding the country and its people.⁷

Colonel Sadler's claim about the relationship between the government and all the three denominations is not quite true. The British government certainly discriminated against Catholics, and this brought about subsequent political upheavels, particularly in Uganda. Today we still have problems arising out of this discrimination.

While so many questions are being asked by some Africans regarding their traditional culture and values, there are many who feel quite at home with the new western culture and system of

values. Those who are asking questions have different points of view. Some are of the view that Africans should go back to their roots and reject the European culture and value system. An example of these are the late Prof. Okot p'Betek from Uganda who has written much particularly on Africa, mainly as a poet. His famous poem: Song of Lawino, criticizes the modern "educated" African about the religion and the politics he practices, about keeping time, going to school, reading books, dancing, kissing, using cosmetics, and even using the toilet.

Commenting on the above criticisms, one of the greatest academics in Africa, Prof. Austin Lwanga Bukkenya, observes:

Far from being banal, this extremely down-to-earth approach makes the poem go straight down to the depths of our feelings. We are forced to ask ourselves the fundamental question: what sort of people are we as individuals and as a society?⁸

This question can be answered in hundreds of ways, and there is quite a variety of positions in Africa. There are those who, being totally conditioned, see African values and culture as evil and even the color of the skin as devilish, and have become split personalities due to this conditioning. They want to be something else: what the Europeans have told them is the ideal, but, unfortunately there are certain realities they cannot change. So, the poor souls are caught between their unattainable dreams and the rejected realities which are part of them. It is a special pity when one is convinced to hate oneself for one cannot possibly run away from oneself!

Still others are confused. They are committed to neither side, and are being swayed from side-to-side like reeds in the wind. They have no sense of direction and are therefore a concoction of everything that has come their way. They do whatever they have seen others do without any personal initiative to select what is right from what is wrong. Luckily, there are also those who are thinking hard, asking themselves the deep question: what am I? Why? What can I do about it? The list is long.

As for society, we can easily establish a similar pattern along the lines of the individuals analyzed above. Many societies have little sense of direction, despite the presence of governments. Corruption in Africa is very high, and many people enter government offices, not to serve, but to "eat." A government may be compared to the mind of an individual as an engine is to a vehicle. To have good societies in Africa we must have good governments first. There are strong views that foreigners who want to keep on exploiting Africa see to it that weak governments are installed and kept in power by any necessary means.

Another example is that of Dr. Kihumbu Thairu, whose book, *The African Civilization*, has been quoted above. After analyzing the pathetic situation in Africa, he asks the following questions: "How has this deplorable situation come about? Who is meant to benefit from it? How can it be changed?"⁹

Again, these are deep questions and the answers to them are many as he himself confesses: "Full answer to all these questions would fill several volumes." But he adds:

In the heart of every African, however Westernized or Easternized, she or he may be, there is a small African fire which, when fully ablaze, will release the dignified complete person that the unadulterated African is. This book is but a small drop of fuel to make the flame in every African burn a little brighter. At least it is hoped that the African reader will, on reading this little book start, (if he has not already

started) asking himself who he really is--instead of accepting slavishly what the non-African has said the African is.¹⁰

While those who have been conditioned would describe Okot and Thairu as radicals, there is a third group that gives the two sides both credit and discredit. Judging neither of the two sides to be totally right or totally wrong, they see something to choose and discard from either side. Prof. Chinua Achebe, one of the best writers in the world, seems to belong to this category and Prof. Kwasi Wiredu, one of the best philosophers, is also against an African over-reaction which tends to accept values and cultural practice on the basis of being African, and rejects the rest on the basis of being foreign, e.g., European. Both academics recommend selecting values and cultural practices from both sides basing ourselves on the worth of what we select. This category seems the ideal situation.

The Significance of the City in Africa Today

The modern city in Africa is of great significance, despite the problems related to it. It is a reality to cope with, however foreign we consider it to be. Since I have discussed the negative side and its problems, now I would like to turn to the other side.

First of all, the city is the unitive factor in African social and political life. We have already seen how city dwellers have strong roots with rural areas. But the reality of the city as a dwelling place has contributed to bringing the various peoples together. Rationalistic movements and wars, among other activities, have brought certain cities close to unity. Common language, e.g., English and Kiswahili, and the nature of work in which various groups emerge jointly have also fostered unity. Today it is possible to talk of sub-cultures vis-a-vis cultures due to common platforms like the city. While cultures may be characterized by the same outlook or life, the same language, the same practices, among others, sub-cultures may be characterized by exactly the same ingredients. While culturally I belong to Bakiga people, sub-culturally I belong to the university community, and particularly to philosophical thought and activity. My outlook on life, my philosophical language, my practices as a philosophy teacher: reading philosophy and attending international conferences and seminars are shared not only by my colleagues at my current university, but by many philosophers all over the world. It is possible that one may feel closer to one's colleagues or to a thinker one admires in one's field of study than to his mother. While one finds one reading and thinking about this thinker almost every day, one may meet one's mother and speak one's mother-tongue once in a number of years. The city, therefore, through such multidimensional facets as educating, is undoubtedly a great unitive factor, not only nationally but also internationally.

The colonialist used the city as the center of administration. At independence, various nation-states have taken over the same center for organizational purposes through various ministries. Social services have also been organized in the cities before moving down to the people in rural areas. Therefore, the city in Africa is the nerve center of the whole network in the country.

Internationally, the city serves as the means of unity. Due to limited resources and technology in Africa, the TV networks that unite huge countries like the USA are absent. In many African countries TV's are available only in cities. As it unites the city people with the rest of the world, it also trickles down to the rest of Africa through other types of mass media.

In a nutshell, the learning obtained from the universities and other advanced institutes in cities, the facilities for information and other services obtainable only in cities, the central government and other means of organization that exist only in the city, the religious institutions centered in the

city, among others, are eventually of great service to the people in rural areas despite their distance in terms of space.

What Can Philosophy Do for Africa?

In the introductory part, I stated my assumption of what man is, and pointed out that this nature of man makes it possible for him to reflect upon and critically assess things. Such a mental activity is philosophical in nature. Hence, basically what philosophy can do for Africans as regards the problems raised in this paper is to help them understand basic issues and resolve their differences, among other problems, through vigorous thinking or reflection. We need such vigorous thinking to be able to get to the root causes of our problems.

I have already pointed out, also, that philosophy belongs to us in our capacity as human beings. We do not need to learn philosophy at school to be able to ask philosophical questions. This may be illustrated by the fundamental questions we have already examined, i.e., those posed by Prof. Bukenya, and Dr. Thairu. These certainly are philosophical questions, but I know very well that the two gentlemen would shy away were they to be called philosophers. Professor Bukenya is by profession a professor of literature, while Dr. Thairu is a medical doctor.

When it comes to professional philosophers, my contention is that while philosophy may be a personal affair, in the sense that philosophical issues are internalized and visualized at individual level, the philosophers' activities are not limited to themselves. Their writings are read in all directions and at various levels of understanding. Their addresses influence people in a similar manner. Consequently, the picture I painted of the city being isolated from the rural area mainly in terms of space may also apply to the philosopher. Simply develop correct ideas, and like the biblical story of the sower, go out and sow them!

People's minds have been influenced from pulpits, political rallies, classrooms, and other places where men and women of ideas have spoken. Those who have opened their ears, accordingly have made various resolutions. In this paper we have talked much about "conditioning." We have also seen the role of the gun in paving the way for Christianity in Africa. As a matter of fact, taking the time factor into account, when we compare the spread of Christianity into Europe before it became "Christendom," with that into Asia, America, and Africa, Africa seems to lead statistically. According to me, it would be unfair not to attend to African intellectual activity during the transitional period. True, fighting took place and conditioning was rampant, but the African mind was also at work comparing and contrasting the various values.

It is this type of evaluation that I would like to see continue, but now, free from the gun and conditioning. This way, the Africans will be able objectively to examine their traditional values vis-a-vis those that are European and something new and better will result.

I have already discussed how I think traditionally people acquired values. What strikes me is that when one does not quite understand how and why one acquired a certain value, one tends to be tied to it even to the extent of physical combat for it. Philosophy can help one take a stance before their values and those of others, so that when one says yes or no to one or the other, one does so based on rational grounds.

Today we distinguish between the modern and the traditional methods of education. The basic distinction seems to be that the traditional system of education was concerned mainly with producing people patterned upon traditional culture and values. Thus, the truths to be taught and the teacher to teach these truths were the most important. The student had only to learn, or rather conform. Hence, methods which made the student internalize the truths, such as rote learning, were

stressed. The various ethnic groups in Africa learned various value systems through this traditional system of education. Yet those who brought new values to Africa also conditioned the people.

The modern system of education values philosophy. I have already mentioned that philosophy is an individual affair. So, this system is more for the individual than for the society. Consequently, instead of giving the truths and the teacher prominence, this method stresses the learner. Instead of rote learning, the modern system cherishes creativity, dialogue, and discovery. When eventually the learner discovers and internalizes the truths, the same learner will be in position to take a stance to these truths, elaborate them, showing what makes them more or less valuable.

If such an approach could be applied to the cultural and value systems in relation to which many of us are biased, we could go a long way in bridging the gaps between us, whether in our cities or in our rural areas. As I have already mentioned, such awareness is possible at an individual level, or at least at the level of the leadership that will slowly influence the individuals in society.

However, I must admit that it is one thing to know the truth and quite another to follow it. So, philosophy is not enough. Many know the truth that man's life is more valuable than material things. They can even write good books about this. But, in practice, they will destroy people in order simply to loot the land and its minerals, among other worldly gains! So, we need both philosophy and committed leadership.

Conclusion

While it is clear that the city is double-edged, we may not sit back and lament among ourselves the problems we have harvested from the city. We must think hard, get to the roots of these problems, and then devise ways and means of resolving them. Nor should we fix our attention only upon the problems and be shaken by them to the extent of developing city-phobia. We must look at the other side of the coin and appreciate what we have reaped from the existence of the city amidst us. Certainly, life would not be the same without the city. We must, therefore, make this reality our own, instead of regarding it as foreign. We should agree that whatever is foreign and good is good, and whatever is traditional and bad is bad, and vice-versa.

We should be open-minded, reflect on our cultural values, accept what is acceptable, and reject what is rejectable. If we can replace bias with critical thinking, at least we can establish the hierarchy of values by which we can tell which is more of a value and which is less, thus being able to become conscientious objectors. Although knowing the truth will not necessarily make us follow it, at least it will make us feel guilty when we do not. Above all, we must search for correct leadership, a very rare commodity in Africa and, perhaps, in the world.

By stressing correct leadership, I am not suggesting a one way flow of ideas. This should be clear since I recommend the role of philosophy and indicate that this is an individual affair. Individuals must listen to one another and then to leadership, just as leadership must listen to individuals. I stress correct leadership because it is a necessary condition for healthy social interaction.

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Notes

1. Colonel Sadler, *Mengo Notes*. Vol. 1, No. 8, 1900.
2. Rachael Stuart Watt, *In the Heart of Savagedom* (Glasgow: Pickering and Inglis, 1922).

3. Jean Francois Medard, *The Creation of a Political Order in Uganda* (Nairobi: Centre for Research and University Exchanges, 1986), Working Paper No. 1.
4. Francis Ellen Colenso, *Ruin of Zululand, Vol II* (London: William Ridgeway, 1885).
5. David Livingstone, *Missionary Travels*, Ch. 1.
6. Rev. J.J. Willis, *Mengo Notes*, Vol. 5, No. 4, 1904.
7. Colonel Sadler, *op. cit.*
8. Lwanga Austin Bukenya, *Notes on East African Poetry* (Nairobi: Heinemann, 1978).
9. Kihumbu Thairu, *The African Civilization, Utamaduni Wa Kiafrica* (Nairobi: Kenya Litterature Bureau, 1985).
10. *Ibid.*

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Chapter IX

Urbanization and African Traditional Values

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One can easily characterize the struggle of the African* since independence as a total commitment to urbanization and modernity. Wrongly or rightly, the African has considered his pre-independence or colonial existence as a period of serfdom, political and economic oppression, rural poverty and underdevelopment of natural resources. Consequently on gaining independence, his overriding task appears to be nation-building and a serious effort to raise his standard of living. As a result, growth, especially as development of cities, has been rampant in Africa. Hence, in his important study of the growth of urban population in Africa, Professor Jacques Maquet remarks that,

In 1961 it was estimated that about ten percent of the population of Africa lived in cities. Even more significant are the rate and speed of growth.¹

What we are concerned about in this article, however, is not the phenomenon of city-growth as such, but the possible deleterious effects of urban life on the traditional values of the African. For experience clearly teaches that urbanization, and industrialization, for that matter, are mixed blessings for man as a political animal whose aim in forming a political community is the "good life," as Aristotle phrases it. What has increasingly become obvious to the African as he pursues national growth, development and urbanization as important values for a reasonably contented existence is the crisis of his traditional values and, of course, the creation of new ones. He is fast learning from experience that the development of his rural setting into urban and semi-urban centers entails certain hazards to his long-cherished traditional values. This change of habitat, Professor Maquet puts it simply, "alters everyday life." Other great scholars of the many-sided problems of Africa have also made mention of the influences of the "European ways of life" and have noted strikingly that these influences "have had a devastating impact on the traditional way of life."²

The point of it all is that the African himself is also increasingly aware that his daily life in its traditional village setting characterized by a stable and well articulated pattern of events is gradually "falling apart," in Professor Chinua Achebe's known phrase.³ In what characteristic ways has urbanization affected the traditional values of the modern African? This is the question to which this paper is designed to respond by research in contemporary African values as critically influenced by the process of urbanization and the many dynamic changes taking place in the African continent. The first task, however, is a brief critical examination of the major traditional values of the African.

The African and His Dominant Values

In this paper, we take "value" in its simple connotation of 'a thing of worth.' A thing has value if it has some worth, and in this sense man considers life worth living because he finds certain things intrinsically valuable.

In his traditional life the African holds certain things to be of great value. It is these values which give him a distinct cultural personality and enable him to make some contribution to world

knowledge, history and civilization. It is not our task in this essay to articulate all the cultural values of the African, but only the dominant ones as we attempt to assess their status against the current tide of urbanization sweeping across the continent.

One of the foremost traditional values of the African is love for large families. Children are of supreme value to the African. His primary purpose for marriage is children and to have as many of them as possible. This is the reason why polygyny or the union of one man with several women still holds supreme attraction for him, and also why the birthrate in Africa is among the highest in the world. The fact is that the African still counts his blessings by the number of children he has whether they are educated or not, rich or poor, healthy or sick, well-fed or hungry.

Another important traditional value of the modern African is love for, and practice of, the extended family system. As a matter of fact extended familyhood characterizes the life of the African and somehow shapes his personality and outlook in life. Unlike the Western man, for instance, the African sees his nuclear family as broadening out into a larger family unit. Professor Maquet describes this broader family life thus:

The African child has only to take a few steps in his village to visit several who can substitute for his father, mother: brothers and sisters and they will treat him accordingly. Thus the child has many homes in his village, and he is simultaneously giver and receiver of wide-spread attention.⁴

This extended family system is widely practiced in Africa. Indeed it is one "in which everybody is linked with all the other members, living or dead, through a complex network of spiritual relationship into a kind of mystical body."⁵ Consequently, it is not just "being" that the African values; "being-with-others" or as Maquet says, "being-rooted in kinship" is equally an important existential characteristic of the African.

He is never isolated since several persons are assimilated into one parental role: his father's brothers are assimilated by extension into the role of father, his mother's into the role of mother, his patrilineal uncle's daughters into the role of sister.⁶

Against the background of this great African value, a person is an individual to the extent that he is a member of a family, a clan or community. But what is the status of this African traditional value in the face of the increasingly dominating influence of urbanization and industrialization in Africa? This, again, is a central focus of the paper and will be dealt with after a brief consideration of some additional traditional values.

Another great value in traditional Africa is respect for old people ("Senior Citizens"), particularly one's parents, grand- parents and relatives. Together with this value, one must also consider "ancestor worship" as an important related value in the African culture. In fact, the basis for the honor and respect accorded to the old people in the traditional African culture is their closeness to the ancestors. For, in his ontological conceptual scheme, the African places his old relatives closest to his ancestors or dead relatives in his great hierarchy of beings.⁷

It must be noted that in the African universe both the living and the dead interact with one another. Life is beyond the grave for the African and is a continuous action and interaction with dead relatives. These unseen ancestors technically called "the living dead" become part of one's living family and often are invited to partake (spiritually) in the family meals. As Parrin der observes:

The ancestors are not just ghosts, nor are they simply dead heroes, but are felt to be still present watching over the household, directly concerned in all the affairs of the family and property, giving abundant harvests and fertility.⁸

According to the traditional belief of the African ancestors--the morally good ones, of course--are held in high esteem. People have great recourse to them as powerful intermediaries between

God and the living members of their particular families. These good ancestors are expected also to re-incarnate into their families in due time.

The respect and honor bestowed on the ancestors filter through the old people--one's parents, grandparents and other relatives--as living embodiments of wisdom and of the good moral life who are expected sooner or later to join other good ancestors in the land of the "living dead." Old age therefore is an important value to the African.

Another value we have to examine in the light of the urbanizing influences in Africa today is religion. To the traditional African, religion is an indispensable value. "To be" for him is to be religious. Professor John Mbiti of Kenya, East Africa, speaks of him as "notoriously religious"; other scholars regard him as "incurably religious." As religion truly permeates his total life, there is for him no "secular" existence or naturalistic vision of world order. In this important way also, the African exhibits a cultural personality distinct from Western man, for instance, who easily makes a radical distinction between the secular and the religious, the natural and the supernatural, this world and the next. How does this religious value of the African stand the test of urbanization and technological advances evident in Africa today? This is a central question and, like other values considered above, will be the object of later reflection.

Also one cannot forget the fact that the African loves nature and feels one with it. We are clearly reminded by Professor Maquet of the basic fact that,

unlike westerners who, having succeeded in defying nature, proceed toward its complete subjugation, Africans seek harmony with nature, they achieve it by sharing its life and strength.⁹

The African values the whole of creation as sacred. Nature to him is not uncanny, nor is it for subjugation and exploitation, but something sacred, participating in the essential sacred nature of God Himself and of all reality. Open spaces, fields, forests, trees, oceans and lakes are sacred to him and consequently important as places reminiscent of the ashes of his fathers and the temples of his gods. But in these days of urbanization, what of the cult of progress and modernity? What is happening or has happened to this traditional African value of "oneness with nature" or as Maquet calls it "being in harmony with reality"?¹⁰ This too must be an object of our inquiry.

Many other values distinguish the life of the African and in characteristic ways determine also his mode of being-in-the-world, such as music, dancing, sense of family togetherness, hospitality and love for community, but we have made mention of the dominant ones. The main objective of this essay is to discover the status of these values in the wake of such modern values as urbanization, industrialization, science and technology. Definitely, as the African passes from folk to urban society, from traditional to modern urban and semi-urban life with its complicated money economy and international trade, his traditional values are bound to be affected. In some cases, old values disappear only to reappear as higher ones in a transvaluation of values. In other cases some traditional values suffer disruption, at times to the point of extinction; in other cases the African suffers a reversal of his traditional values; lastly, he creates altogether new values with consequent tensions. In short, these are the main ways that urbanization and industrialization, as modern African values, seriously affect traditional values. We will discuss briefly each category.

Of course, note that in speaking about the cumulative effects of urbanization on the traditional life of the African, one must not lose sight of other such factors as education, technology, arts, science and Christianity, which are now part and parcel of modern civilization and which influence

the values and destinies of peoples and nations alike in their continuous thrust for progress and better life.

The African and the Transvaluation of Value

Of course, in speaking about the traditional African and his values, we bear in mind that urbanization as a process of development is itself a value to him since independence, that is to say, since after the Second World war. His thinking has remained practical and existential in the sense that his priority value has been the concrete modes of self-realization. The growth and development of his cities have remained an integral part of his post-independence struggles for self-reliance and self-development.

Together with urbanization, since independence the African has steadfastly pursued industrialization and "technological transfer" in his outright effort to control and dominate the environment. In this on-going struggle, the African is gradually realizing the price--rather the peril--of progress, particularly with reference to his traditional values. In some cases, he does not experience a total loss but a transvaluation. One of these is his traditional religion, with its own code of ethics. Scholars of African traditional religion have come up with different names in their effort to describe the nature of the religion of the African's forefathers. "Animism," "paganism" "polytheism" and "diffused monotheism" have surfaced at one time or the other in their scholarly journals.

The point is that in Christianity, the revealed religion of Jesus Christ which the African is increasingly embracing as he comes under the dominating influences of the missionaries, his traditional religion does not cease to be practiced but somehow reappears at a higher level. Christianity and the ethics of Christ become new, and at the same time, higher values for the African.

The African Christian now no longer believes in the many-gods of his traditional religion but in One God, as his ultimate Lord and Master. Rudolf Otto's sense of the numinous--*fascinans et tremendens*, as he characterizes religious feeling-- for African Christian as for Christians the world over has reference to the One true God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ. Consequently, belief in this God is no longer belief in the plural gods of his "pagan" world or the natural morality which characterized their worship.

In connection with the transvaluation of religious values, one must not forget the African's great value of ancestor worship. "Everywhere the African is first defined by reference to his ancestor," Maquet reminds us.¹¹ The ancestors or "living dead" are the great intermediaries between the African Great God (with different names in different African nations), the nature gods and human beings. On becoming a Christian, the African easily sees Christ, the only Mediator between God and man as "a proto-ancestor." This is one of the ways advanced by the African theologian in his effort to Africanize the church or incarnate Christianity in the local culture. It has its problems, of course, as a Zimbabwean Jesuit theologian notes,¹² but it is a potent mode of recovering and at the same time transforming an important African traditional value into a higher one.

Also since urbanization as a modern African value is really inseparable from other concomitant values such as industrialization and Christianity, for that matter, the African's great love for large families, extended familyhood and community--what the late Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal (West Africa) calls "the sense of communion--becomes practiced on a much higher level in Christianity, since the African Christian sees the church as one large institution

housing all members of the one family of God. All men become his brothers under one God, as all strive for the same home and destiny, namely, heaven. Consequently, the African Christian sees not only the members of his natural family as brothers and sisters, but all human beings, for Christianity professes the same common Father and hence a common brotherhood for all men. This too is a transvaluation of traditional values.

In this consideration of the African's transvaluation of traditional values, note should be made also that with urbanization, the African exhibits his existential trait of being a lover of community or essentially a man-in-community by his development of new voluntary associations which increasingly have become distinctive features of his urban milieu. These associations willingly formed by the urban African increase his chances for more economic security, social well-being and, in general, provide more opportunities for self-survival. These ends specify and define the nature and activities of the associations themselves." Indeed Peter S.C. Gutkind rightly notes,

the activities of the voluntary associations are manifold, ranging from burial services to recreation clubs and friendly societies, improvement, saving and contribution clubs, and occupational and religious associations.¹³

Consequently what the African loses in his tribal village life or experiences as highly precious is doubly assured in his urban life through these voluntary associations.

The African and Reversal of Values

The growth of cities in this era of industrialization and push-button technology is not exactly a total blessing for the African as for anyone else. It brings about its own reversal of traditional values, perhaps most obviously of his (novel) radical attitude toward nature or his environment. Mention has been made that to the pre-modern African nature was sacred, not "a given" to conquer and exploit; he felt in harmony with all reality.

But urbanization itself is a value, and such other concomitant values as education, technology and industrialization have brought about a completely different mental posture towards the African environment. Land and open spaces are no longer as sacred as in the days of old. They are increasingly scarce since more and more they are converted into urban and semi-urban industrial centers, as well as into areas for mechanized farming. Consequently, land or nature as a whole has acquired much economic value. The sacred groves of the ancestors: trees, forests, and places consecrated to the gods, are fast decreasing in number as the African, like the rest of the world, joins the industrial and technological age and adopts the scientific spirit which underlies its progress. Like the western mind, the African has set out to conquer, subdue and exploit nature, no longer to venerate it; this is a far cry from his pre-modern mentality and outlook.

In addition, one must also mention the serious impact urbanization has upon African families as another instance of a reversal of values. One great attraction of urban life, the reason for city-population growth, is the possibility of making a "decent living" which, in short, means more income for the family. In practice this means establishing new homes away from homes mostly by many young men, women and fathers of families.

The obvious consequence is a gradual, but inevitable, break-up of families. For the African, that is a tragic reversal of values since African families are close-knit. Unity and togetherness in the family are the basic values. In these days the quest for more money, and better living conditions

has pushed him out into the city; gradually it is alienating him from his family; worse still, it is tearing the family apart. Gutkind rightly points out that

Among all the problems which are alleged to have their etiology in urbanization and urbanism, frequent reference is made to the breakdown of African kinship and family life in towns.¹⁴

Perhaps in no place is this observation more true than in South Africa, especially among mine workers.

Although urbanization and industrialization have their advantages, yet they exact their full toll from the African as from anyone else. He, too, experiences all sorts of new problems and difficulties in his new way of life in the city, such as slum poverty, loneliness or estrangement, poor sanitation, light failure, joblessness, organized and unorganized crime waves, traffic jams. The lover of space and nature in his rural setting has now to contend with over-crowded cities and run-down apartment buildings. He has begun seriously to complain about city dirt and pollution of the environment in an unexpected reversal of values.

But these unhappy consequences are light when compared to their effect on the family size of the urban African. He now speaks in terms of family planning and cutting down family size. The younger urban generation are no longer prepared to make the same mistakes as their parents and grand parents particularly in not limiting the number of births. The overall effects of urbanization, the increasing lack of habitable space and the high cost of education and living standards have brought about this reversal in the African traditional value, which the Zairean theologian, Otene, called simply "the African value of fecundity."¹⁵

In a way, monogamy for the African, particularly the Christian, is a reversal of value since polygyny or plurality of wives is the ideal and primal value for the traditional African. The new cultural determinants we mentioned above, such as urbanization, the high cost of living, education and Christianity, have meant a reversal of this value.

What of the depersonalizing force of mass society upon the African as a result of increasing urbanization and industrialization? The urban African rooted in his kinship who usually maintains a very close family relationship becomes suddenly all alone in the city, uprooted so to speak from his kith and kin in his village and forced to cultivate individualism as a new way of life. This is certainly another instance of a reversal of value. Of course, the urban African forms new associations in the city, but this is an altogether new way of life which does not really cure city loneliness and estrangement--which Viktor Frankel calls "Existential vacuum."

In addition, other traditional values suffer in the wake of urbanization, such as "respect for the aged" and high regard for their wisdom. This appears natural for, as the African, particularly the younger generation, faces up to the challenges of modern life dictated by education, modern economy, developments in art, science and technology and the new values they create, increasingly he finds the "senior citizens" and their wisdom irrelevant to his life. Time becomes important to him as increasingly he defines his existence in terms of work or business rather than leisure. As in the Western world, this means for the African also less time and concern for the older generation and their views and thereby a reversal of traditional value.

The African and New Values

In the process of urban growth and development, the African acquires new values as he forms new units as component parts of his new urban settlement. His mental horizon and pattern of life change rapidly. He is no longer enclosed in his rather stable village environment with its close-knit families; he is no longer in the midst of members of his village. In the urban environment, he

has to learn to live with; and respect, people of different ethnic background since urban life is a "melting pot" of people from different tribes with their different customs, traditions, mannerisms and languages, etc. This new love for new peoples is healthy for the African since, he too, can build a viable and progressive nation only through the cooperative endeavour of all.

In this context of "love-for-other-people" as opposed to "love-of-one's-own ethnic group" characteristic of village life, mention can be made of the virtue of patriotism as an additional value for the African. He now learns to appreciate and love his country with all its peoples and subcultures. The African learns to fight for common interests, for the common good even at the risk of his own or ethnic good. In a continent such as Africa characterized by excessive outbursts of ethnic feelings or prejudices (tribalism), often to the point of war and national disorders, patriotism is indeed a new value. With urbanization and the technological development which underlies its progress, the African learns to appreciate scientific knowledge and education. Literally scientific education has become a dominant value to the African, rather than the oral education, unwritten customs and traditions of his fore-bears. This is one of the outstanding areas where he has profited from colonialism and the consequent Westernization of African values.

Formal education, a result of colonialism, radicalized the traditional values of the African and introduced some completely new ones. Professor Ali A. Mazrui put it thus,

The colonial impact, I have argued, transformed the natural basis of stratification in Africa. Instead of status based on, say, age. there emerged status based on literacy. Instead of classes emerging from the question, 'who owns what?' Class formation now responds to the question, 'who knows what?'¹⁶

Education is indeed a priority value to the African; it is truly power. In Africa, it is a door to other values and carries with it particularly affluence and social influence,

Two forms of knowledge have been particularly critical in determining who rules Africa: literacy or academic knowledge among African intellectuals and military knowledge within the African armed forces. The knowledge of the intelligentsia has produced something approaching a meritocracy; the skills of the soldiers have produced what might be called a militocracy.¹⁷

Also as a result of urbanization and its economic imperatives on modern life, money has assumed a very important value in Africa, as in every other continent. Like knowledge it too is power. "The pursuit of personal profit has escalated in African economic systems," Professor Mazrui noted. With the heavy influence of western capitalism, the African clearly is developing and appreciating the values of capitalism as well, such as class distinction based on the haves and have-nots, competitive spirit, private enterprise and the profit-motive. These values are highly operative particularly in the economic life of the modern urban African. Indeed money economy and what Mazrui paraphrases as "the culture of the clock"¹⁸ or time consciousness have made material progress in the modern scientific and technological sense additional values for the African.

One cannot really speak about urbanization and its philosophy of material progress without mentioning labor or work. Consequently work in its modern scientific sense is a new value. Of course, for the pre-modern African as Guy Hunter well observed,

work was necessary for subsistence, to fulfil tribal and family obligations, to amass bride price or perhaps gain a mark of status: it had no personal moral connotation.¹⁹

But to the educated urban African particularly, work has increased its value. Work is seen as a condition for progress and for money too. It does mean long hours at the office or in the farms, the emergence of working class mothers, of young working girls and boys particularly in cities, and less leisure too. Hunter summarizes it all; "Probably the greatest shock to the newly educated African in paid employment is that he has to work all day and everyday."²⁰ Certainly, this new attitude to work is far removed from the older African way of life.

Urbanization and the African Self-Realization: Conclusion

From the above reflection, there is no doubt that urbanization as a sociological process alters the every-day life and culture of a people. In Africa as in practically all cultures, it has given rise partly to a transvaluation and partly to a reversal of traditional values. Certainly it has created additional ones. Of course, urbanization need not go with industrialization and technological development. These, however, are great factors and causes for city-growth and development. Education too is one of the causes of rural drift to cities, or urbanization, in Africa as everywhere else.

The point which must be stressed here is that it is through all these factors, namely, healthy development of cities, of science, arts, technology and education that the African hopes and strives to achieve self-realization. This is the ideal he has pursued steadfastly since independence. His post-independence thrust has been for self-reliance and the selfmastery of his continent, for his experience of colonial subjugation and its concomitant humiliation was highly unpleasant. "We have for too long been the victims of foreign domination," Kwame Nkrumah, the late leader of Ghana once echoed. "For too long we have had no say in the management of our own affairs or in deciding our own destinies."²¹

The same realization of impotence and frustration on the part of the African after his colonial experience is concisely stated by Obi B" Egbuna:

We do not control our land, our lives or our direction. We do not command the means of distribution or production. We do not even earn a reasonable living wage, but we were born here and our fore-fathers claim ownership of the land.²²

Consequently, what the present-day African wants is power, the scientific knowledge and, technical skill to establish himself as the master and architect of his world and destiny. This is tantamount to a re-establishment of self in a self-determined, self-directed and self-controlled environment.

In this great task, he needs, among other things to industrialize, to build-up and develop his cities, and not least of all to enter into the same race of technological, scientific, and material progress as the rest of the world in the quest for "a good life" which is the end of all political societies. In this ambition the African experiences definite tensions. As we have seen in this essay on the one hand, he wishes to retain many values of his traditional culture which, on the other, urbanization and the imperatives of modern life seriously threaten.

For Africans, as for the rest of the world, rural drift to cities has a purpose, namely, to seek employment, education, better living conditions or even negatively to escape from certain

traditions which they find unpleasant. In other words, escape of people to towns is to search for alternative forms of subsistence, generally for making life worth living. In so doing in this case of urbanization certainly they experience additional problems.

Another outstanding value of the modern African is his desire to build up African culture. "We are doing everything to revive our culture," Nkrumah assured the National Assembly in Accra in 1965. Indeed since independence, culture-building has remained with the African a top practical pursuit. The various festivals of arts and culture held in many African countries bear this out, as well as the pursuit of indigenous technology and political systems as the "Ujamaa Experiment" in Tanzania initiated by that nation's former leader Julius K. Nyerere,²³ and the promotion of indigenous music, paintings, religion, fashion and education for self-reliance experienced in many African nations today.

In short the African wishes to retain his self-identity through retaining his traditional values, yet, he experiences that his drift to the cities and the values of his scientific and technological culture which are vital concomitants of modern civilization, highly endanger his traditional values, and consequently, his cultural identity. He wants to retain the past, from which he yet alienates himself. Is this possible or as Professor Maquet put it, "Is such an undertaking viable"?²⁴

Urbanization therefore poses serious problems for the African. Although industrial techniques and scientific development do not yet completely dominate his life, steadily they are influencing practically all aspects of his life today. Will the scientific and technological values of modern civilization, in time, eliminate the traditional ones and alienate the African from himself? This is the question; and it is a crucial problem for the African himself.

Professor W.E. Abraham gives his own view. "The future of Africa," he says, "rests on the present and the present is an outcome of the past. By the present, one wishes to indicate the resultant of the operation of the forces of traditional Africa and the forces which the contact with Europe has unleashed."²⁵ Scientific knowledge and techniques--modern man's common inheritance--may well be regarded as one of the "forces" "unleashed" on the African by contact with America and Europe. Consequently an important test of his maturity, his quest for self-realization and self-identity, is his ability to domesticate or indigenize these adventitious values, that is to say, those values brought about by his contact with the white man's scientific and technological culture.

"The progress of Africa will depend on Africa's ability both to appreciate problems and to solve them," Abraham reiterates.²⁶ Likewise Africa's success in her struggle for self-realization and self-identity will depend on her ability to subject foreign values to the traditional ones, to master and at the same time domesticate industrial techniques and scientific knowledge to serve her own ends, and not the other way round.

Notes

*The African referred to in this essay is the Black African unless the context indicates otherwise.

1. Jacques Maquet, *Africanity: The Cultural Unity of Black Africa*, tr. Joan R. Ray field (New York: Oxford University Press 1972), pp. 124-125.

2. Guy Bonveniste and W.E. Moran, Jr. "African Economic Problems" in Peter J.M. McEwon and Robert B. Sutcliffe, *The Study of Africa* (London: The Camelot press, 1967), p. 265.

3. Professor Chinua Achebe, a Nigerian, is today among Africa's topmost novelists. His most known work, *Things Fall Apart* (Lagos: Heinemann: 1964), is about the continuity and discontinuity of change in the traditional life of modern Africa.

4. Jacques Maquet, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

5. Professor E.A. Ruch and Dr. K.C. Anyanwu, *African Philosophy: An Introduction to the Main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa* (Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1981), p. 328.

6. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

7. God or the highest spirit tops the list for the African in his ontological hierarchy or hierarchy of beings. This supreme Spirit is followed by the nature deities or spirits, then, the ancestors or the "living dead" (thus ends the invisible universe). Close to the "living dead" are the elders generally revered as wise, holy, and soon to join the ancestors, then ordinary human beings, lower animals and inorganic nature.

8. E.G. Parrinder, *West African Religion* (London: Epiworth Press, 1949), p. 125.

9. Jacques Maquet. *op. cit.*, p. 64.

10. *Ibid.* p. 63.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 60.

12. Ignatius M. Zvarevashe, "The Problem of Ancestors and Inculturation," *AFER (African Review)*. 29 No. 4, (1987), pp. 242-251.

13. Peter S.C. Gutkind, "The African Urban Milieu: A Force in Rapid Change" in Peter J.M. McEwan and Robert B. Sutcliffe, eds., *The Study of Africa*, p. 343.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 341.

15. Matungulu Otene, *Celibacy and the African Value of Fecundity*, tr. Louis C. Planomeon S.J. (Kenya, GABA Publications, Spearhead no. 65, 1981).

16. Ali A. Mazrui, *The African Condition The Reith Lectures*. (London: Heinemann, 1980), p. 63.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

19. Guy Hunter, "From the Old Culture to the New" in Peter J.M. McEwan and Robert B. Sutcliffe, eds. *The Study of Africa*, p. 322.

20. *Ibid.*

21. Kwame Nkrumah, *I Speak of Freedom* quoted by Gideon Cyrus M. Mutiso and S.W. Rohio, eds., *Readings in African Political Thought* (London: Heinemann, 1975), p. 61.

22. Obi B. Egbuna, *The ABC of Black Power* (Lagos: Third World First Publications, 1973), "Introduction."

23. Julius K. Nyerere, *Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).

24. Jacques Maquet, *op. cit.*, p. 123.

25. W.E. Abraham, *The Mind of Africa* (Chicago: The University Chicago Press, 1962), p. 161.

26. *Ibid.*

Chapter X

Religion, Class and Ethnic Politics in Nigeria

Ibrahim Gambari

It was about fifteen years ago when John N. Paden wrote his celebrated book on Religion and Political Culture in Kano¹The substance of the book is still very relevant to a discussion of "Religion, Class and Ethnicity in Nigeria"; hence, my review of the book will be used as background to an up-date of the situation not only in the key Northern city of Kano, but in Nigeria as a whole.

The title of Paden's book is misleading in two ways. In a positive sense, the subject matter is not limited to an analysis of culture, society and the relationship between religion and political culture. The author did a very impressive job of examining the socio-economic factors of urbanization, ethnicity and connectivity in Kano. He also dealt with the orientation of the Hausa and Fulani, the major indigenous ethnic groups in Kano, towards authority and religion.

It will be recalled that Kano is a modern city in the Northern part of Nigeria, but one with ancient roots. For centuries, Kano was the gateway to North Africa and the Middle East and an international commercial center. The opportunities for greater personal wealth and status which the city of Kano presented over the years were real magnets attracting different ethnic groups and classes of people. The attempts to transform the collectivities of People into a "melting pot" were neither fully successful nor abandoned.

Paden was, however, not very successful in his attempts to make distinctions between the political culture of Kano and its general culture and also to differentiate religion from political culture in that ancient city. Perhaps such differentiations could be made only in a purely intellectual or analytical sense. Some western scholars such as Talcot Parson would argue--wrongly, in my view--that failure to draw such differentiations for an organizational entity indicates the existence of a primitive society. Although Paden did not go as far as Parson, his delineation of the political from the religious culture tends to contradict his own major theories and evidence. He argued, for instance, that changes in religious culture have produced changes in the culture of Kano--thus illustrating the inevitable linkage. Moreover, Paden pointed out the fact that the community dimension in Kano's political culture has historically rested on the notion that "the primary boundaries of communal loyalties are religious."

This is not to reject Paden's point that there were indeed in Kano those who have explicitly religious, and those who have explicitly political roles. Even then, however, there were times when both roles merged. One of Paden's own conclusions in this book is that community crises, especially inter-ethnic tensions, can best be resolved by authority figures with fused religious and political roles.

Paden also failed to demonstrate in detail the role of the colonial power in most of the subjects discussed in this book, except for a brief mention of the link between colonial policy and inter-ethnic tension in Kano. Admittedly, this is not a book about colonial policy in Kano, but the author could have shed more light on the relationship between each of the religious groups and the colonial administration. Surely the British colonial government had tremendous impact on the power of the Emir of Kano and the limitation on dissent and reform there.

Nonetheless, the major significance and success of this study is the way in which Paden presents and analyses Kano as a microcosm of the political reformism and social change in Northern Nigeria. He also shows how the Kano urban area reflects many of the problems facing

the federation of Nigeria as a whole. The establishment of broadly acceptable authority, the handling of succession and deposition and the balancing of ethnic, urban, regional and national loyalties are carefully and competently examined in this book.

Kano was historically a major center of Islamic learning and reformism in Nigeria at the time when that religion was also the basis of the trans-ethnic political communities in Northern Nigeria ("jama'ar Arewa"). As the pace of urbanization grew and light industries were established therein, Kano became a powerful magnet for migrations from other parts of the Northern region as well as of Southern Nigeria. Nonetheless, there was no integration of the districts where the migrants settled in the Kano urban area into a single, political, administrative or judicial entity. This lack of central authority during the colonial regime, and even after independence, meant that there was no conflict resolution machinery in Kano and this was largely responsible for the disasters and tragedy in 1953 and 1966 when several people died or were injured in inter-ethnic clashes.

However, the central concern of this book is not interethnic conflict in Nigeria but the legitimization of authority, the process of decision-making and conflict resolution and the boundaries of communities in Kano from the fifteenth century to recent times. An in-depth examination of the pre-eminence and evolution of the Islamic brotherhoods of Traditional as well as Reformed OudiriyYa and TijaniYya is given in relation to their influence on legitimation of authority in Kano. Islam was always the most important point of reference for the defenders of the status quo (the Fulani and Arabs who have dominated Kano society for the past one hundred and sixty years) and the Islamic brotherhoods which articulated dissent and organized to realize their demands. These brotherhoods also facilitated rural to urban and inter-urban, trans-ethnic connections.

Of course, political culture and religion, as well as legal reform, in Kano have never been static. The dynamic changes expanded the boundaries of the political community (from the Emirate to the Northern region as a whole) and left changes in the structure of political authority. Kano nationalism (the result of religious claims of the regional government under the Northern Premier, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the century old conflict between Kano and Sokoto and other political grievances) and the new Kano State creation in 1967 contracted the boundary again, but within a new awareness of larger national consciousness.

The authorities of the new state under military governor Audu Bako curtailed the former Emirate's powers. Specifically, the judicial functions of the previous Alkali Court and those of the Emir's Court based, at least until 1959, on Sharia (Muslim law derived from the holy Quran) were abolished. It is only through the skillful use of his personality and influence that the present Emir of Kano, Ado Bayero, former Ambassador of Nigeria to Senegal, succeeded in salvaging and symbolizing his vision of the reformed basis of that once all-powerful office. The Emir may no longer be "Sarkin Yanka" (Emir with the power to order capital punishment), but by working for Muslim unity in Kano, Nigeria as a whole and external areas, Ado Bayero remains a force to be reckoned with. The future role of the institution could not be fully seen, however, until the present military regime gave way to a civilian government based on a new constitution.

When the transition from military to civilian rule did take place in October 1979, conflict was almost inevitable between the Emir, Ado Bayero, who represented traditional, conservative authority and the newly elected Governor, Abubakar Rimi, who represented a radical Political following in Kano State. Throughout the almost four years of civilian administration in Kano State (Oct. 1979 to September 1983), there were great tensions between the "democratic" institutions represented by the governing party, the Peoples' Redemption Party (an off-shoot of the defunct Party of the Talakawa-Common People-Northern Elements progressive Union) and the authority

of the traditional rulers of which the Emir of Kano was the most influential figure. This tension resulted in open violence between the supporters of the "status quo" and those demanding change in the direction charted by the ruling party. It appeared as if the traditional authorities won the first round of the contest. However, the intra-party schism in PRP eventually weakened the authority, and led to the electoral defeat of the "progressive" Governor Rimi and the ascending to power of another elected Governor, Barkin Zuwo, from a rival faction of the same Party. Governor Zuwo was prepared to collaborate with the traditional authority in the state capital, Kano City, and thus somewhat restore the status quo ante. His administration lasted only until December 1983 when soldiers once again took over the running of the whole country.

Despite the demise of the Second Republic and the return of military administration, or because of these events, the state bureaucracy tried to accomplish the objective of differentiating the religious and political roles in Kano notwithstanding Paden's observation that the embodiment of political and religious authorities in some actors of the charismatic variety facilitates resolution of community crisis. However, the question still remains as to whether or not such attempts to differentiate the religions from political roles at the local level in Kano were doomed to failure.

Paden has obviously written a comprehensive book on the various aspects of Kano culture which will not easily be surpassed. Nonetheless, his perspective in this book needs to be broadened and updated. C.S. Whitaker's book, *The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change in Northern Nigeria* would add a wider perspective. It covered the entire Northern region of Nigeria which now contains eleven of the total twenty one states of Nigeria (1987) and, by all estimates, more than half of the entire population of Nigeria, currently put at about one hundred million.

Kano shares with the rest of Northern region the twin characteristics of Hausa-Fulani and Muslim majorities. Like almost all traditional Northern cities, Kano has an inner "city" composed of are indigenous population and an outer "new city" populated by strangers and other relatively newer immigrations from other parts of the North and South of Nigeria.

However, not all the cities in the Northern part of Nigeria are as cosmopolitan as Kano or as dominated by Hausa-Fulani and Muslim populations. Kaduna, a relatively new city created to serve as the administrative capital of the former Norther region; Jos the present capital of Plateau state, and MaiduGuri the capital of Borno State, the ancient home of the Kanuris, were in many ways quite different from Kano. The more Southern areas of the North contains towns and cities such as Makurdi (Benue State) and Ilorin (Kwara State). These towns have rather different histories and organizations closer to their counterparts in Southern Nigeria while retaining political and administrative ties to the Northern region.

In terms of an up-date towards more recent political developments in the country in relation to the issues of religion, class and ethnicity, the following points can be made for further discussion.

The competition for political power in Nigeria has largely taken place within the framework of ethnic and regional divisions. This was surely the case from the period of the country's independence to the Civil War (1960-1970). The almost thirteen years of centralized and hierarchical military rule after the demise of the First Republic, nine years of which followed the end of the Civil War itself, put a lid on ethnic antagonisms. With the return to civilian, constitutional rule in 1979, a serious attempt was made to re-orient competition for political power towards a more national, rather than ethnic, perspective. The constitutional provisions for the organization of political parties and the conduct of the presidential elections as well as the "victory" of the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in the federal elections pointed to a direction which could have down-played if not transcended the ethnic dominance of the country's politics. Unfortunately,

the politicians of the Second Republic did not try hard enough and did not remain in office long enough to sustain the hopes for a new political order in Nigeria.

The down-turn in Nigeria's economy and the hard-ships caused by the implementation of IMF-type for structural adjustments had serious social and political consequences. Class consciousness was raised and antagonisms between the "haves" and the "have nots" have increased. The wave of armed robberies throughout the country was a manifestation of the conflict. Since the return of military rule in January 1983 also meant the suppression of open political activities, the discontent and frustrations of the populace with the prevailing socio-economic conditions were channeled elsewhere.

However, religion did not replace ethnicity as the driving force of Nigerian politics; it merely reinforced the prevalent ethnic antagonisms in the country. There are three main aspects of the role of religion as a factor reinforcing ethnic conflicts which threatens the peace, stability and unity of Nigeria:

First, the danger of a North-South dichotomy in Nigerian politics arising from three principle factors. First, the relatively uneven socio-economic development in the Northern and Southern regions of Nigeria. Of the two regions, the South came into earlier and more sustained contact with Europeans. The resulting Westernization brought with it education, literacy and access to the expanding public sector during the colonial era. Even after independence there was a certain lopsidedness in the levels of economic development and educational attainment prevailing in the North and South. This situation may have aroused the leaders of the Northern region to demand a slower pace in the decolonization process in order to have more breathing space to close the gap. The closest manifestation of the "fear of Southern domination" in the North was the adoption of the "Northernization policy" whereby local talents were given preferential treatments in recruitment for the regional civil service. In more recent times, the Northern leaders also demanded that the distribution of federal jobs and even the location of federally owned industries should be done in such ways as to reflect the "federal character" of Nigeria. This reflection of "federal character" in public appointments was in fact enshrined in the constitution which ushered in the Second Republic.

Secondly, there is a religious division in Nigeria whereby the North is predominantly Muslim and the South is dominated by adherents of the Christian faith. This is, of course, not a neat division because there are significant Christian populations in the North while in the South-west of Nigeria Islam is, in fact, the religion of almost fifty per cent of the population. Nonetheless, the demand by some Muslims that "Sharia" laws and Islamic legal and Customary Court systems be extended from the North (where they presently are operating for civil cases) to the South (where they are currently not) has led to sharp differences of opinion between some of the leadership of the Northern and Southern parts of Nigeria.

Third, the facts of demography in Nigeria also contribute to the North-South divide in the country. All the population censuses conducted to date show that the North has more people than the Southern part of Nigeria. Translated into political power terms, there is fear on the part of some Southern peoples that the largely Muslim majority in the North would use their demographic weight to rule over the largely Christian South, perhaps forever. Such a situation was considered unacceptable by many Southern, Christian leaders.

(ii) There is rising unemployment in Nigeria and growing social tensions stemming from deteriorating economic conditions. Whereas the impact of these conditions have been in the areas of drug use and trafficking, armed robberies, etc., in other parts of Nigeria, in the North they have

resulted largely in the expansion of the pool from which young religious fanatics have been drawn. It should be pointed out that the most destructive religious riots and even class-based social and religious antagonisms have occurred in the Northern region. They also have taken place largely in the cities and urban centers in the North. Of course, prior to colonial rule and throughout its duration, there was a social class of the talakawa (commoners) in the process of formation and consolidation among the Hausa people of Northern Nigeria. What Islam did was to graft on to this indigenous social class formation a new sense of solidarity and integration of workers from divergent ethnic and rural backgrounds in the new urban environments in which they found themselves.

This factor of unemployment and resulting social tensions resulting from the worsening economic conditions culminated in this religious riots which broke out repeatedly in Northern cities in the early to mid 1980s has been emphasized by sociologists and Government Tribunals and Commission of Inquiry established to look into the root causes of those unrests. The fact that these violent uprisings of a religious nature continue to occur shows that not much has been done by the authorities to come to grip with the underlying socio-economic causes of the riots.

It is, of course, true that industrial workers and urban wage earners in the major metropolises of the North did not participate in the violent, spontaneous forms of class conflicts reminiscent of the Yan Tatsine insurrections of the early 1980s. This was largely due to the energies of those workers and wage earners in the cities being channeled towards partisan political activities (many belonged to the radical Peoples Redemption Party led by Aminu Kano); the growing sense of class maturity and the strengthening of the trade union organizations.²

This development is hardly comforting to the Nigerian State. The larger reality is that the power, awareness and tactical sophistication of the urban working class has increased significantly since the decade of the 1970s. This new or sharpened capability to wage a sustained class struggle in the factories and other working places could be used in either direction. When open party political activities were permitted in the late 1970s and early 1980s, they provided an outlet for the energies of the working peoples which remained in the secular sphere. In periods of military rule and the ban on open political activities and poor economic conditions, such energies may well go in the other direction of Islamic nationalism. As Lubeck reminds us in his excellent study of Islam and Urban Labor in Northern Nigeria, "radical Islamic populist ideology exists and appear attractive to the impoverished urban masses of Muslim Northern Nigeria."³ And when it comes to direct action to challenge the country's "establishment" or the socio-economic status-quo, the enlarging pool of unemployed urban youths is clearly a fertile place for recruitment.

(iii) The rise of religious fundamentalism, largely of the Islamic faith but also including some of the Christian sects, constitutes real threats to the delicate balance of forces on the issue of the secular nature of the Nigerian state. Islamic fundamentalists, perhaps emboldened by the establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran by the cleric Ayatollah Khomeini, intensified their rejection of the idea that religion and politics are separable. Some of their leaders also believe that under the pretext of maintaining the secularism of the Nigerian state, Judeo-Christian values were gaining the upper-hand in Nigeria. It was perhaps in this context that the demands for the extension of Sharia laws and legal system to cover all areas of Nigeria where Muslims live gained prominence. In any case, the issue of "Sharia" seriously undermined the proceedings of two Constituent Assemblies (1978 and 1988/89) established to produce the Constitutions for the Second and Third Republics of Nigeria respectively. Both times the Federal Military Government had to step in to arrange compromises which essentially allowed the status quo to continue.

The news leaked by some Nigerian papers in 1986 that Nigeria had joined the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) as a full member, instead of its previous observer status, so poisoned the relationship between Muslim and Christian leaders that the political stability of the nation seemed to be in question. Each side threatened to destroy the corporate existence of Nigeria as one nation should the country respectively remain or quit her new status as a full member of the OIC. The potential or real benefits that may accrue to the Nigerian state in the international organization which deals with issues affecting Muslims throughout the world, were not seriously examined. Finally, a compromise was arrived at by the government whereby a Religious Affairs Council (composed of equal numbers of Muslims and Christians) was established to look into the benefits or otherwise of Nigeria's membership in the OIC. The Council has had difficulties in meeting this and other mandates of theirs including the promotion of peaceful interaction among the followers of the Islamic and Christian faiths in Nigeria and to advise the government on such matters. Nonetheless, the OIC issue has been diffused, at least for the time being.

However, the poisonous atmosphere surrounding the debate on Nigeria's membership of OIC may have been a key factor in the (March, 1987) religious riots in the Kaduna State of Nigeria. The immediate cause of the riots was the stiff challenge by some Muslim students in the audience to what they saw as disparaging remarks about the Holy Qur'an by a Christian preacher (who was a convert from Islam) at a Teacher's College in Kafanchan town of that state. Kafanchan is a largely Christian town in a predominantly Muslim Kaduna State. In the initial melee that followed the preacher's incident, several Muslims and their mosques were alleged to have been attacked and a number of deaths reported. When news of this development reached other parts of the state, several churches and properties belonging to Christians were destroyed in apparent retaliations. It took a few days before security forces were able to restore order following this very serious inter-faith disturbances. The country was indeed fortunate that the riots did not spread to other states of the Federation of Nigeria.

In conclusion, it is clear that the growing linkage of political radicalism in the North under the escalating fervor of Islamic Fundamentalism poses serious challenges to the secular nature of the Nigerian state. Yet, without a secular state, how could constitutional government and equality before the law be established and sustained in a multi-ethnic and multi-religious country such as Nigeria? Obviously, the search for a new political order in Nigeria which would transcend ethnic antagonisms, North-South dichotomy and intra as well as interreligious schisms of the past, present and future, will be difficult. However, one thing is clear: religion as a political tool tends to re-enforce and not replace ethnicity in Nigeria. The greatest danger yet may well be the appeal of religious fundamentalism (of either world religion) to the dispossessed and down-trodden class and the threat this poses not only for social harmony, but to the secular nature of the state in Nigeria.

Finally, within the Nigerian state, it is in the cities and metropolitan areas that the ethnic, religious, regional and class antagonisms often are fully played out. In particular, it has been in the Northern cities where such conflicts often assume the most dangerous dimensions and levels of violence capable of destroying the fragile socio-political fabric of Nigeria.

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Notes

1 John Paden, Religion and Political culture in Kano (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).

2 Paul M. Lubeck, Islam and Urban Labor in Northern Nigeria: The Making of a Muslim Working Class (Cambridge: Cambridge University press, 1986), p. 308

3 Ibid., p. 309.

Chapter XI

The Values of an Urbanized Society in a Socialist System

Leon Dyczewski

The term value can be understood in different ways. Here by value is meant an object (e.g., an apartment, a car, a precious ring or painting, etc.) or a condition of human existence (e.g., a sense of security, justice, love, peace, etc.) which is recognized to be good. That is, it is considered to be so attractive as to be wanted, to stimulate action, to specify the mode of one's behavior and to become the basis for its evaluation. Values refer to a given person, to a social group and to society. Sets of values form the picture of a good and happy person, a successful family, a group of friends, a good environment and a good society. Thus, they have individual and social dimensions but they are always concerned with a person. They always belong to somebody: i.e., there is somebody to become aware of them and put them into effect; they make somebody happy or unhappy. Values always have a personal nature.

The following states in one's attitude towards values can be distinguished:

1. becoming aware of values;
2. considering them as worth possessing and then desiring them as the aim of one's activities;
3. undertaking actions aimed at achieving these values; and
4. feeling satisfaction in achieving values, or suffering distress at not being able to achieve them fully, or properly, or not at all.

From these states it is evident that not every value is appreciated and that not every appreciated value can be brought to effect. There are values which are recognized and desired by the individuals, but cannot be put into effective whole or in part--at this time or in the place the individual is living at a given moment. Their realization must be postponed or spread over a longer period of time; they thus pass into the world of ideals. Therefore, the fact that someone does not express a given idea at the moment or does not bring it into effect does not necessarily mean that he is unaware of, or does not desire, it. This implies three questions.

1. Becoming aware of values, expressing them and putting into effect depends upon various factors, the most important of which are: a) the general atmosphere or so-called spirit of time (*Zeitgeist*) which is expressed, on the one hand, in current ideologies, trends in thinking, religion and fashion and, on the other hand, in social structures, ways of exercising authority and living conditions; b) psycho-physical features of the individual: for example, one who is healthy prefers different values than one in poor health; the same is true of the person who has a gift for art and the individual insensitive to beauty; c) intermediate structures, i.e., social groups to which the individual belongs, e.g., a state official of high rank and his children may look and act upon the value of social equality in a quite different manner than a casual laborer and his family. Material values may be expressed and brought into effect differently by a member of a religious charismatic group and a member of a commercial enterprise.

2. Preferences of values and the ways of bringing them into effect change both among individuals and among social groups.

3. Empirical study of the values of individuals and social groups, not to mention the whole society, is extremely difficult. The fundamental problem is to find proper indicators of a given

value and to formulate them in suchwise that they are understood in the same way both by the person carrying out the research and by the respondents. None of the empirical methods which have been applied so far can assure that values which belong to the deepest areas of human personality will be properly expressed, understood and interpreted.

Psychologists, sociologists and students of culture undertake research of this type, aware of the difficulties which may arise while studying values. In spite of some disadvantages, they are able to demonstrate in a more or less accurate manner the things people desire and aim at, the values for which they are willing to suffer, and those about no one could ever persuade them. This knowledge enables them to define better the character of a given society, to understand the processes it undergoes, and even to control these changes or to bring about new phenomena. For the latter reasons the politicians are now becoming more and more interested in the study of values.

Polish sociology has always been interested in values. Their study is its most specific feature, while macro-social problems and processes of overall social change are more characteristic of American sociology. Problems connected with values have become very popular in Poland of late, and for several reasons.

1. Poland has undergone rigid urbanization and industrialization, and this process has not yet been completed. Apart from GDR, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, Poland is one of the most urbanized and industrialized socialist countries: over 70 percent of the population and over 60 percent of all families live in towns.

2. Among socialist countries, social and political unrest arises more often and on a larger scale in Poland, as can be witnessed by events in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, 1980-81 and 1988.
3. There has been a deep political, social and economic crises in Poland since December 13, 1981 when the "Solidarity" movement was repressed.

Values are closely related to these three groups of phenomena. Their basis lay in the appreciation of certain values and in tenacity of purpose. The values achieved then became the basis for new ones, and the system of values changed. Students of social life, as well as politicians, have been researching the values of different social groups in order to explain changes in society, to foresee their direction and to influence their course. In various ways we have managed to collect and interpret vast miscellaneous data.

Regardless of these reservations, an overall picture of the values of Polish society can be drawn. It should be stressed that this picture is made up mostly of the values declared, i.e., elicited from the respondents regarding the things they consider valuable, what they desire, and what they want to achieve. Their actions may or may not be consistent with their declarations, for though one may declare in favor of a certain value that does not mean necessarily that one will bring it into existence or vice versa. For example, in the seventies the studies indicated that young people were most interested in marriage and family life, friends and settling down--i.e., in private affairs and stabilization. The authorities declared by them did not contain tendencies towards change, not to mention revolution. In spite of this a new social and political movement "Solidarity" came into being at the beginning of the eighties and it was for the most part the younger generation of Poles who supported it. They were most interested in political and social problems, and took an active part in carrying out reforms. Thus, they behaved quite differently than might have been concluded from their opinions on the values they expressed in interviews by researchers.

One more comment: the picture of the values of Polish society presented here is concerned for the most part with the urban population and the younger generation as most studies on this subject were conducted in towns and among the youth.

The fundamental set of values esteemed by Polish society has been stable for a long time. These values can be divided into two groups. The first includes values concerning social (public) life which constitutes a picture of the so-called good society. The second comprises values related to private life and creates an image of the so-called good man, husband, friend, neighbor, or co-worker. This difference is only of methodological nature, for facilitating the analysis of the material collected. In reality, however, these two groups of values overlap each other and are realized by the same person.

The set of values concerning social life is made up of the following items which most often are mentioned in the various studies:

1. equality of opportunity for life and development;
2. pluralism of ideologies, parties, and democracy understood as opportunity for citizens to influence the exercise of authority on its various levels;
3. freedom of expression and truth in mutual communication;
4. justice;
5. dignity as manifested in respect for the citizens by authorities and offices;
6. political independence and national sovereignty, an independent economy;
7. a healthy and efficient economy reflected in a sufficiency of goods and services to satisfy the needs of all citizens.

All these values seen together constitute the so-called good society which Poles want to create. The respondents have mentioned the same values over a long period of time with little change. If we can speak of change in recent years it is only that the set of values mentioned above has become more explicit. Poles are fully alive to them and cannot imagine engaging in social life deprived of the possibility of putting these values into effect. Thus they became less responsive to suggestions that certain values be achieved now and others left for the future when conditions, internal and external, are more favorable.

The values related to private life most often mentioned by respondents include the following:

1. love, a successful marriage, a good family;
2. the transcendental values of God, religious and eternal life;
3. a group of friends;
4. a good job, i.e., one with sufficient income, interest and satisfaction;
5. proper, but not too high, living standards as measured by the possession of such permanent goods as a) a place to live, b) such basic household appliances as an automatic washer, refrigerator, TV set, telephone and c) a car--even the smallest;
6. dignity and respect in interpersonal relations; and
7. a sense of life purpose in life--that you are useful and have somebody or something to live for.

Independently of our classification of values around social and private life, both of these groups are seen together so that a success is seen in putting them into effect simultaneously. In any case, the values of social life are not considered by the Poles as autotelic, but rather as instrumental

in relation to a person. Thus, the creation of the so-called good society is to improve the lives of a given people and to enable them to be more satisfied with their existence. In the Poles' system of values there is a strong relationship between the values of social and private life, but these relationships are based not on the society, the state as would be desired by the official sociopolitical system, but on the person. The second feature of this system of values is its stress on direct interpersonal relations in small groups; the third one is its appreciation of values concerning such so-called human rights as dignity and freedom; the fourth is its emphasis upon transcendent and religious values.

Values guide human behavior but all these activities are dependent not only on the things people value, but also on various other factors which influence their life situation. One factor of great importance is the socio-political system of a given country. It is so important because it determines general patterns of the activities of individuals and social groups, which in turn may facilitate or impede the exercise of values which they desire. Most Poles oppose the Marxist-Leninist system of their country and consider it an obstacle to achieving their values.

It should be noted here that disaffection from the socio-political system is characteristic not only of Polish society, but of Western countries as well. There are, however, two basic differences between this negative attitude in the two societies. The first is that in the West it is expressed mainly by the younger generation and weakens considerably when they become adults. Thus, it can be interpreted as a symptom in social life. The negative attitude in Poland, however, is strong in all generations, although it is weakest among the oldest persons. The second difference is the degree of reluctance regarding the system. This is total in Polish society as more and more of its members come to a conclusion that this system cannot be reformed in any way, but that its principles, i.e., the whole system, should be changed. In Western countries, however, the reluctance concerns only certain elements of the system. Though people criticize it bitterly, they consider it reformable.

Three attitudes can be taken to be an obstacle: one may overcome it, one can evade it, i.e., escape from it, or one can get used to it and get along with it. All these attitudes toward the socio-political system can be observed in Poland.

Several times Polish society has tried to overcome a socio-political system imposed upon it. All such efforts, however, have been unsuccessful so far. The "Solidarity" movement in the years 1980-1981 was the most likely to succeed.

A considerable part of Polish society evaded the system by leaving the country. It is estimated that since 1951, i.e., since the socialist system stabilized, 1,400,000 citizens emigrated from Poland, about 500,000 of these during the eighties.

Those who stay in the country have managed to work out certain ways of adjustment after 40 years of living in a socialist system. It would be extremely interesting to analyze how these ways coincide or disagree with the values of the people. It has been impossible so far to make such comparisons because there are many patterns of human behavior with even more varied motivations. They can be explained, to some extent, by characteristic features of so-called behavioral orientations which were shaped throughout two generations and, like values, can be divided into behavioral orientations towards social or public life and behavioral orientations concerning private life. It is difficult to characterize all the behavioral orientations functioning in contemporary Polish society. This paper will discuss only the seven pairs of orientations which, according to M. Maroda, are the most typical.

1. There has been a devaluation of work in the public sector: it is not valued and is badly done. Factors influencing such an attitude include especially poor organization, low wages and little influence of workers upon production and distribution of goods. In the private sector, however, work is highly valued and well done.

2. People expect the state to take care of all their affairs, without any risk on their part. They are deeply convinced that the welfare state should insure their rights. In their private lives, however, these citizens are self-reliant and undertake very risky actions.

3. In the social sector the initiative belongs to the state; people are helpless and even unable to undertake independent actions which require much responsibility. All decisions are in the hands of political authorities who are responsible for everything, even for people's actions in the public sector. In private life, however, citizens are energetic, make decisions, and are fully responsible for their actions and their consequences.

4. In the social sector people concentrate on short-term, immediate needs and matters: long-term planning and actions are impossible. The time horizon becomes constrained in public life, whereas private life is characterized by long-term planning and action extending for a whole generation. The extreme nature of the situation can be observed when parents of a nursery school child begin to look for an apartment, a better school, or even a good job for the child in the future.

5. In social life people aim at an "average level" and try not to be too good. In private life they tend to develop all their possibilities as much as they can, to distinguish themselves and to stress the differences of their personality.

6. In social life there is an egalitarianism of opportunity and achievement which S. Novak calls "envious egalitarianism" because it does not duly appreciate achievements and people's efforts are underestimated. In private life people are eager to praise the success of the others achieved through talent and hard work.

7. In social life there is collective egoism expressed by citizens' demands upon the state based upon their membership in a certain group favored by the state. Members of the PZPR (Polish United Workers' Party), ZBOWID (Association of Fighters for Liberty and Democracy), PRON (Patriotic Movement for National Rebirth) or ZSP (Polish Students' Association) expect certain privileges simply because they belong to these organizations without any active participation on their part. In private life, however, people manifest altruism through their sensitivity and generosity towards individuals in need, families with problems, or initiatives wanted and needed by society.

While comparing the above behavioral orientation with the system of values some discrepancies can be observed which are especially important to social life. There may be various reasons, but one of the basic causes is the socialist system, founded on Marxist-Leninist principles. It functions badly because the socio-political system of a country creates conditions which are less favorable for shaping behavior if it is inconsistent with the preferred values.

The discrepancies between the values and the behavioral orientations of the Polish society in a socialist system create some specific phenomena.

1. A hierarchical (vertical) system of values in which all values are subordinated to one superior value becomes more rare in Polish society. The predominant system of values is compound and a horizontal system becomes more frequent. In a compound system when a set of values is accepted two or three values dominate and the situation determines which will be chosen and brought into effect. There is no supreme value which varies according to the situation. This

system is characteristic for individuals of immature neurotic personality. From their behavior one may conclude that they have lost their orientation as to what is possible and impossible, what is rewarded and punished by society. Their behavioral orientation is worked out by trial and error as they oscillate between the attitudes that everything is possible and that nothing can be done.

2. Public and private life become separated and even opposed to each other, while at the same time differences between the roles performed by one individual in these two spheres of life is obliterated. Thus, individuals performing certain roles in public life profit for their private life, which is officially forbidden, while in their private activities they take advantage of their social status. In such situations the same behavior can be considered as both good and bad, depending on the point of view from which it is evaluated. This results in a double morality in society.

3. Family, being one of the most appreciated and desired values, is in a difficult situation, not only because of the economic crisis, but also because of the unfavorable conditions in which its basic function is performed. The family inserts the younger generation into the system of values properly, but less properly into social roles. This is because social roles are connected mostly with the general principles of human actions and behavior, and less--or even disconnected from--the aims of the social group in which these roles will be performed in the future. This happens because the family does not frequently approve of the aims officially adopted and accepted by the group. Quite often it presents youths with other aims or interprets existing aims in a different way. Thus, the process of socialization does not fully suit the official groups of a society.

4. Society, in seeking to realize its values encounters many difficulties and easily adopts ideas promising total improvement of political, social and economic life. Overly simplified offers dependent on but one factor become very popular. This is manifested in popularity of such slogans as: "if the authorities approved of agricultural foundations, the problem of shortage of food would be solved quickly"; "if PRON did not exist, there would be national agreement"; or "if we did not export so many goods to the USSR, our balance of trade would be profitable." Social orientations of this type make it difficult to work out complex and long-term plans for social and economic development, and even if such plans were worked out it would impair their approval by society.

5. Polish society is much interested in macro-social problems and politics in a broad sense. The average Pole is well acquainted with internal and external politics, but at the same time he/she avoids any political activity within existing social and political organizations because they are considered to be extensions of the authorities. It can be concluded then that for the most part society knows how to shape social life but does not do so and, what is more, that it is dissatisfied with its government. In December 1987, about 80% of respondents expressed only negative opinions on government. This creates an atmosphere of contingent socio-political riot, which was confirmed by studies in December of 1987 when people revealed their strong tension and dissatisfaction. Only 12% of the respondents were of the opinion that there would not be any serious social conflicts in the years to come. This kind of atmosphere does not foster social reforms, impedes the development of social life as a whole, and deprives the citizens of a sense of security.

6. The society does not readily abandon its desire to maintain consistency between its values and its actions and behavior. Such consistency is necessary, even decisive, for social development. In order to achieve this desire many members of Polish society form social groups of various kinds in order to realize their values. Many groups exist and still more are being formed. They provide a basis for creative social life and a cultural alternative to the official structures. We can say even that in the eighties two separate societies and public lives came into being in Poland: one connected with the authorities and other official forms of state power and the other withdrawing from everything related to the authority and the state. Such a situation surely impedes responding to the

needs of, and decisions regarding, social life. At the same time, however, it makes it possible to respond to the values of the society, or at least of the major part.

Several conclusions can be drawn from this analysis of prevalent values in Polish society in the '80s as regards the behavioral orientation and socialist system based on Marxist-Leninist principles.

1. Values in Polish society in the '80s actually resemble values prevailing in Western societies regarding social life, but they are quite different as far as the private life is concerned. In private life the Poles highly value, desire and realize what concerns family, personal contacts and religious life; this is not the case in Western societies.

2. Values are the basis of social life. When values which are appreciated and desired by most of the society can not be realized in a given socio-political system it results in the following situations:

- a) the society becomes more aware of values that are crucial for social and political life;
- b) spiritual elite groups are formed which express and propagate values important for the society;
- c) behavioral orientations arise which are inconsistent with appreciated and desired values, especially with regard to social life; and
- d) general social phenomenon emerge which impair the gradual, overall development of social life.

3. Neither economic nor administrative reforms can eliminate, or prevent, the negative phenomena in social life which arise as a result of the inconsistency between the values of the larger part of a society and the propounded offered by the official socio-political system. It is necessary to change the system so that it corresponds to values prevailing in social consciousness.

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Chapter XII

Beyond the City: A Semiotic Overview

Jorge Echa Varria C.

Through the years a man peoples a space with images of provinces, kingdoms, mountains, bays, ships, islands, fishes, rooms, tools, stars, horses and people. Shortly before his death, he discovers that the patient labyrinth of lines traces the image of his own face.

Jorge Luis Borges

Because of the city's complex network of relationships on multiple levels, a common subject appears repeatedly throughout contemporary bibliography on urbanization as a self-critique common to different theoretical approaches. It is the assumption that the city cannot be embodied in a single framework, which leads, in turn, to a recognition of the need for more "qualitative" tools. Almost all of these proposals include both an implicit admission of theoretical weakness and a subordination of the "new qualitatively-focused" disciplines to such classical disciplines on urban growth as economics, history, sociology, anthropology, etc. Thus, the new vision has remained strongly limited by a self-defense of the major disciplinary frontiers. As a result the city has remained in need of an adequate common ground of interdisciplinary interpretative models able to avoid a "dependency theory" in relation to their own academic context.

Toward a Semiotic Approach

MacCannell (1982) explores what he called post-disciplinary fields involved in this effort to cross disciplinary boundary lines in order to extend the known models of culture beyond the classical approaches, and thereby to contribute to a general semiotics of culture. Blonsky (1987) traced this evolution of the semiotic vision in three stages. The first stage, ruled by the linguistic sign, sought to see the world or to "catch its meaning" in a logocentric manner, that is, to put the signifier in the service of the signified. Such semiotic thought slipped to being a mechanical technique for reading only what can be verbalized; and lost interest in the social character of the sign. A second semiotic approach concerned the functioning of the world's semantic organization; it attended not to meaning but to signification or the production of meaning. In this stage of development semiotics focused upon urban studies in architecture, literature and anthropology and explored the deep meaning behind non-verbal systems. In its present, third, stage semiotic studies now accept as a main task to emphasize the mechanisms for the production of culture, cultural values and interactions, and changes in the perception and action of societies, in order to enable us to perceive and comprehend these in terms of their structural relationships with other groups and entities.¹

This semiotic interest is not possible without a radical critique of the logocentric model of thought, the fictional and arbitrary philosophical and moral divisions (self/other, West/East, signifier/signified, subject/object . . .) which have supported conventional Western science and philosophy. This model of thought, or "logocentric epoch" in Derrida, is metaphysical closure, a reduction to empirical and rationalist models interested in the search for systematic knowledge where "truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that they are illusions," as Nietzsche puts it (quoted by Norris, 1983). Hence, the contemporary semiotic movement addresses "the problem of

how we know and how things mean from a non-abstract standpoint" (MacCannell, 1982). This, in turn, transforms semiotic concern into potential political action, because, in "seeing the world as signs able to deceive, semiotics should teach the need to fix on every fact, even the most mundane, and ask 'what do you mean?'" (Blonsky, 1987).

The privileged position given to language in earlier semiotics (very clearly in Benveniste and Barthes) is also transcended as semiotics turns to the explanation of meaningful human existence. This liberates meaning from language and vice versa, centering and decentering the linguistic hierarchy on a Freudian-like condensation point, at which the sign-components of meaning join to produce meaning.² Some cultural products can re-open cultures to creative speculation in the same way that dreams condense in images many experiences and emotions, and allow individual psyches to face them. This semiotic approach is also cross-disciplinary. Hermeneutics, phenomenology, ethnomethodology, symbolic anthropology and semiotics itself intersect in a mutual analysis. This dynamic is found in all cultural systems.³

Culture and Cognition

The first milestone in this contemporary effort at cross-disciplinary experience was the work of Lev S. Vygotsky on many issues related to the field of semiotics. Specialized in literature and interested in the psychology of art, Vygotsky in the early 20s began the development of a unified Marxist psychology. The three sources Wertsch (1986) identified for the Vygotskian construct were: the psychological approaches of his time (from Pavlov to Piaget), Marxist philosophy, and the semiotic theory of cultural development. To these I would add his primary interest in art as the catalyst of his entire framework. Vygotsky developed the Pavlovian concept of the Second Signal System, which he described as "the world encoded in language: nature transformed by history and culture" (Wertsch, 1986).

On Marxist theory Vygotsky based both his assumption of the social origin of psychological processes and his methodology. He sought psychological support for Marx's basic claims about the social origin of consciousness and the link between natural and cultural human development.

Through his interest on the nature of signs and their impact on the organization of culture he was able to recover the notion of mediation for signs and language.⁴ In this way, he came into a unified explanation of how, through the progressive control of external signs by children, consciousness first emerges and how subsequently the move from elementary to superior mental processes is shaped and mediated by language. Wertsch (Mertz and Parmentier, 1985) suggests that the work of Bakhtine, which develops a more exact notion of semiotic social mediation than Vygotsky, could provide a theory of semiotic mediation including both social context and individual psychological processes. Bruner (1986) remarks that Vygotsky's work was first conceived in tracing the changing peasant mentality through language and its products.

Vygotsky's work contributed to the research of such American cognitive and cultural scientists as Jerome Bruner and Michel Silverstein, and to the valuable neuropsychological approach of the Soviet, Alexander Luria. In summarizing Vygotsky's contribution, Bruner says: "Looking at his work again after many years of inspiration from it, I think he provides the still needed provocation to find a way of understanding man as a produce of culture as well as a product of nature" (1986).

Cultural Texts and Cultural Change

This relationship between language and cultural change, which is close to Benveniste's assertion, is modified in the Tartu school. They see this as "dependent, at least in part, on the existence of other cultural forms" (MacCannell, 1982), which act as semiotic mechanisms of cultural evolution--meaning production structures--thereby introducing a dynamic of evolutionary elements to explain cultural change. The Tartu scholars reserved a particular primacy for "artistic acts" conceived as productive, models in generating cultural production, but almost every cultural production potentially provides a meta-system for the interpretation for other cultural aspects, as is shown in the works of Lev i-Strauss, E. Goffman and Marvin Harris.

Based upon this conception of cultural production, MacCannell (1982) deduces a double interpretative model. On the one hand, cultural models appear as the result of a culture's self-reading mechanism, which is the interplay between a mnemonic function (or self-consciousness of the origins) and resistance to such remembering. On the other hand, a cultural sign model "defines a unified, and artificially schematized image that is raised to the level of a structural unity. When imposed upon the reality of this or that culture, it exerts a powerful regulating influence, preordaining the construction of culture, introducing order and eliminating contradiction" (Lotman/Uspensky quoted by MacCannell, 1982). This latter model reflects a mimetic culture--one concerned only with reproducing itself in a series of sterile images, whose social and ethnic groups construct images of themselves in order to live in this officially accepted sign world.

If it be accepted that culture is pure change,⁵ we can approach morality and values as sign systems by which "a culture is constantly in a process of being recreated and renegotiated by its members. In this view, a culture is as much a forum of negotiating and renegotiating meaning and for explicating action as it is a set of rules or specifications for actions" (Bruner, 1986: 123). Thus, culture is conceived as a permanent transactional negotiation, where subjects are not limited to passive roles but are active in the creation and recreation of their culture through a redefinition or resignification of their meaning.

The structuring mechanism of values, based upon a primary associative and open act,⁶ works by creating an exchange of values or developing a comparative value set into comparative scales, this allows one sign to be compared to another or exchanged against the other in order to determine at least a relative meaning, value or worth. In the first operation the basis for the structure of values is metonymy (exchange); in the second it is metaphor (comparison). Both processes fix values and give a second nature appearance to culture, thus closing off the possibility of negotiating new meanings. "The scales of value, based upon an original metaphorization, tend to rotate ninety degrees around an axis, and to be applied metonymically to other aspects of culture. Items which should only be compared (e.g., persons) are exchanged, and items that should be exchanged (e.g., goods) became compared" (MacCannell, 1982: 35). Lotman, Uspensky and Pjatigorskij (in Lucid, 1977 and Lotman, 1979) explored the implications of these processes through the concept of text as a separate message, perceived as being clearly different from a non-text, whose functions are its social role or ability to meet the specific needs of the collective that creates the text.

A culture's attitude towards its texts can vary from considering its texts meaningful because of their sacred character (in closed cultures) to considering them meaningful because of their functional role in historical experience. Thus, culture can be defined both as a totality of texts--or as a complexly constructed text--and as a totality of functions in which texts are derivative of a function or function set.

This does not mean, of course, that non-texts should be excluded from semiotic studies. On the contrary, their interaction with cultural texts not only "fixes" the limits of each, but also carries complementary traits of cultural expression. In fact, when a system of truth and values ceases to be considered as true and valuable by the members of society, "distrust arises toward the means that compelled perception of a message as a text and testified to its veracity and cultural significance" (Lotman and Pjatigorskij in Lucid, 1977). Only a message that does not have the marked limits of a text could fulfill the emptiness. In these processes of continually exchanging roles, a non-text fulfills the functions of texts and becomes a text itself.

Because of these semiotization and desemiotization tendencies, it is necessary to consider the description of the system of textual meanings that defines the social functions of texts in a culture. They have three types of relations, from which we can derive three independent viewpoints for cultural description:

- subtextual meanings (common linguistic meaning),
- textual meanings, and
- functions of texts into a cultural system.

From this approach, Lotman and Pjatigorskij (in Lucid, 1977) postulate the existence of two types of cultures: a text-oriented culture which tends to create specialized texts for each cultural function, and a function-centered culture which tends to erase the distinctions between texts so that uniform texts can perform the complete set of cultural functions.

A Focus Upon Latin American City Cultures

Hence, through a semiotic reading the multitextual reality of a contemporary city, besides its material definition and mechanisms,⁷ could be interpreted as a product of the struggle between two cultural tendencies which are related not exclusively to the urban/rural polarity, but to different semiotic processes of cultural creation and interpretation: the homogenous attitude of the closed, text-centered societies, or the open, function-centered attitude toward culture of pluralistic societies. This could explain how, in spite of the diversified production of texts for the specific purposes of each group and/or individual in the mostly urban mass-society, instead of plurality, society achieves homogeneity and anonymity, as pointed out by Schneck above.

It could explain also how communities lose their historical perspective and reject the plurality offered by a function-oriented culture. Text-centered cultures forget the mediation character of signs and make them sacred, reinforcing the regulatory character of modeling systems. This is the normative social definition. However, as Uspensky (Lotman, 1979) shows, conflict situations juxtapose "languages," as systems of information processing. Thereby their mechanisms are revealed and possibilities are opened for cultural awareness and change. This takes place both for the material and the non-material dimensions as languages participate in structuring all dimensions.

Culture is not a rational structure--it cannot be reduced to either its arché or its telos--but can be understood in the processes of development, of change and of reading and re-reading of its texts.⁸ Texts, signs and values communicate not only a finished product, "but also the processes which make the ongoing production of that (those) message(s) possible" (Blanchard, 1980). It is not only a question of urban values within an urban culture, but a semiotic question regarding the processes of the production of such values in order to recover the human beings "subsumed under the categories of abstract urbanization processes" (Friedman, 1987).

Vygotsky's efforts at developing a culturally based conception of cognition, that is, a cross-cultural psychology, resulted in his concept of a Zone of Proximal Development, that is, the difference between the actual development and performance of children and the superior potential level of activity they can achieve under adult guidance and with peer collaboration. On the basis of contemporary research in anthropology, Cole (in Wertsch, 1986) understands this mechanism in a cultural manner as "the structure of joint activity in any context where there are participants to exercise differential responsibilities by virtue of differential expertise."

Here several ideas converge. The role of social guidance varies in its particular shape from society to society, but that role is always related to an individual engaged in a "goal directed activity under conventionalized constraints" (Cole in Wertsch, 1986) and to the acquisition of culturally appropriated behavior as a direct result of this interaction. In traditional societies these processes act as a clear link between tradition and the present, where culture and cognition create each other. Both suggest answers to the questions on "the roots of learning in community" and the role of tradition as a significant perspective that allows judgment regarding the present, as Gadamer, points out.

This provides a basis for discussing an old polemic recently brought up by Kolakowski (in Revel, 1988). He suggests that the intellectual's role in society is to serve as critical link with the cultural tradition, not as political ruler.⁹ It helps also to understand Dechert's (1980) definitions of subsidiarity and voluntarism as specific facets of the zone of proximal development as regards social performance dimension, and his transactional approach (Dechert, 1988) as being not human engineering, but human participation where "the pupil . . . becomes a party to the negotiatory process by which facts are created and interpreted. He becomes at once an agent of knowledge making as well as a recipient of knowledge transmission" (Bruner, 1986).

The symbolic quest for identity, a traditional topic in the arts and social research in Latin America, reflects clearly the struggle both for a transactional participation in the local and international spheres, and for an understanding of the place of tradition in modern society.¹⁰ This requires a translation of the mestizo cultural awareness, a plural level text that had been repressed or reduced to a marginal role. Although these processes began very early in the Spanish colonial city and were shaped by ideological and economic practices, it is in the contemporary city that they appeared as dynamic forces. In that generally weak and limited space for democratic expression, they appear not only as an urban power, but mostly as the historical momentum of cultural consciousness.

This finds in the city structure a sort of amplifier¹¹ for its claims, an opportunity for cultural change through an understanding of, and action upon, the mechanisms of the juxtaposition of cultural texts. "Urbanization makes the urban the primary level at which individuals now experience, live out, and react to the totality of social transformations and structures in the world around them" (Harvey, 1985). The city is a contradictory material reality which people experienced, and from which they constructed, an elementary consciousness of the meaning of its phenomena.¹² Thus, the growing of self-consciousness and identity were attached not to the land or to settlement, but to the construction of a culture that allows plurality on the basis of the common ground provided by the cities. The city is a cultural opportunity to face the "others" and, in that way, to be able to read themselves. This is an important opportunity in countries with well differentiated and isolated regions which are closed to foreign migration.

The so-called 'alternative culture', developed as a marginal space won by the courageous action of people struggling against repression, is the expression of a non-textual proposal attempting to give new meaning to a culture and to traditional values. In this light the quest for

identity is neither a chauvinistic or naive project, nor the possibility of realizing some kind of historical fate, but the acceptance of a semiotic and socio-historically grounded identity such as a mestizo culture. It is an 'uncentered' project of culture which began before the Spanish conquest, passed through colonization into the Western and Arab legacies, received an African influence, and is still being continued as a complex everyday reality. This underlines the creative potential of culture to adapt and survive; it is a permanent effort to yield communal meaning to life in everyday interaction through non-conventional actions and alternative communication. In this it uses both traditional, popular and rejected texts to forge a colorful and energetic affirmation of life as based on the dynamic of difference.

As Dussel (1980) remarks, popular culture in Latin America implies a project for the liberation of culture.¹³ This must be shaped by a new pedagogical project which, in turn, is realized through the reciprocal interaction of popular culture and intellectual reflection. This is a very controversial issue and is widely discussed. In any case it points to the interaction of political change, cultural dynamic and pedagogical mediation.¹⁴

Heraclitus's conception of logos as a wall which protects the city from barbarians, is translated in Latin America into a logos that denies alternative projects of culture and political action. In doing this it benefits the imperial culture (Freire, 1971) as a prevalent text which overwhelms the possibilities in the mestizo cultures to giving integrative meaning to tradition and change, since "a live tradition is both communitary and historically conscious" (Dussel, 1980). In contrast, the new pedagogical project refers ethically to alternative projects. In these, cultural transactions and the recognition and action in a cultural version of Vygotsky's Zone of Proximal Development play the main roles both in the acceptance of a set of integrative skills developed by popular cultures, and in the new dynamic of cultural change.

Alternative Projects and Creative Dynamics

Lefebvre (1972) explains how urban experience changes every day life through transforming quantity into quality by the intervention of ludic activity and fiesta times; these restore the preeminence of usage value over exchange value. Following a different pattern of analysis, Friedmann (1987) in comparing such features as streets and markets in North American and Latin American cities observes that the interaction in the barrio, based upon a permanent usage of streets and nuclear plaza-like spaces,

brought back to life (the idea the polis) without fanfare or even knowledge of the extraordinary nature of this event. . . . A revolution without violence, the (new) polis is engulfing the ancient régime that clings ever more desperately to its privileges. This constitutes an emergence of polis as a convivial society, in the course of which it is discovering its own forms and institutions. Dense social networks cross and recross the barrio, giving rise to myriad activities which, taken together, sustain life.

Hence, it is not at all surprising that literature and arts, as privileged ambits of ludic exercise, according to Huizinga (1943), allow for the insertion of a reflexive consciousness into daily urban interaction and make possible the continuation of a man-world dialogue as a double presence of mankind in the world and of cosmos in man. In environmental esthetic activity, the daily patient exercise of communal practices, and the fiesta's esthetic--the extraordinary emergence of collective and individual beings--provide the possibility of decoding the processes through which a culture is built and projected into the future, as Sepúlveda (1982) points out. In short, creative activity

established the basis for an integrative space of social practice. Literature and the arts provided the first approaches to these alternative and lively realities.

In a Vygotskian transliteration of concepts, this Zone of Proximal Development is a potential space for community education established on a transactional base. It enables us to look at ourselves through a de-centered project of culture and life and to look at the so-called "poor neighborhoods" as a common ground which establishes a new standpoint on the urban processes. This is the direction of social semiotic activity which is the basic context of a life. "Despite its Spartan circumstances, life in the barrios is a generous and optimistic life based on natural aid, cooperation and democratic self-guidance" (Friedmann, 1987).

This recognition of new social practices linked to rapid urbanization processes could help also to incorporate in social studies the visions of poets like Neruda in describing Valparaiso's barrios, as pointed out by Walton, or the vital network of spatial and esthetic acts of appropriation in the working-class barrios in Medellín. This appears in the painful beauty of the works of, among others, Helí Ramírez, Fernando Macías, Juan José Hoyos and José Libardo Porras,¹⁵ who themselves are human and cultural projects of their community's semiotic definition. Sklovskij (in Fokkema and Ibsch, 1986) observed that "only the creation of new artistic forms may restore to man awareness of the world, resurrect things and kill pessimism," this echoes Proust's claim that art is the only way of getting outside of ourselves and knowing another's view of the universe.

Those fragmentary constructions of semiotic space, each one a non-text with proper and shared values, provide us with an ability to understand the mechanisms for building up communities on the basis, not only of conflict resolution, but of the esthetic appropriation of cultural texts and physical realities. This can be done only on condition, as de Certeau (1986) points out, that before being studied popular culture not be censored in an attempt to eliminate its danger toward the prevalent text. Communities, also, are built by their active responses to concrete situations, regardless of the nature of the circumstances.¹⁶

Latin American cities are implied, even without being stated, in what Wallace (Caughey, 1984) called a "revitalization movement." This is a radical cultural reform in the search for a more satisfying culture, through a growing recognition of the multiplicity of texts, languages and voices, each of which "mutually inter-animates the others in a dialogic relationship" (Bakhtin, 1985). In fact, they face the challenge of their own renovation, as Brecht observes, "the assimilation of the cultural legacy is not a peaceful process" (Fokkema and Ibsch, 1986) in either the material or the symbolic orders.

Lotman (Lucid, 1977) proposes that each culture assumes different attitudes toward signs, attitudes of variable semioticity. These vary from the so-called medieval high level of semioticity where nothing is culturally meaningless, to the enlightenment cultural position based on qualifying things as natural or unnatural. Then, signs are disapproved and only the world of objects is taken as real. Concepts of social value are also linked with these extreme positions and their historical variations and vary between two poles. On the one hand is an axiology of the sign marked "not only by the value of the thing for which it is a substitute in the cultural code's general system, but also by a certain qualitative characteristic in the relation between content and expression, the presence of the creator in his creation." (Lotman in Lucid, 1977). On the other hand is the enlightenment position where "things that only received a meaning in sign situations are revealed to be valueless and false" (Lotman in Lucid, 1977). The effort to bring together the "medieval" and the "enlightenment" positions toward cultural signs is in some way the effort to introduce social and cultural modernization without discarding traditions.¹⁷ The attempt of the city to rule culture through an "enlightenment" set of value relationships in all its actions and institutions has

not been successful in Latin America. The logocentric model of city forgets both the semiotic mobility of the cultural text according to which different information is furnished from the same text and the same cultural rules of encoding messages.¹⁸ It forgets as well the existence of a multitextual reality at the base of Latin America historical construction.

The complicated tissue of cultural production in which different connections alternate, overlap or combine to determine the texture of the whole--transliterating Heisenberg--is produced in semiotic mediation. This semiotic environment makes human consciousness possible and is now an important concern for Colombian social and human research. I have tried to show here that the main issue in this research tendency is cultural-dynamic. Cities play an important role, but not the only one, for other semiotic processing levels are also implied in this change. In general, these works include the following.

a. The Cultural Development Plan for Antioquia, which has a broad interest in urging an interdisciplinary approach to cultural manifestations on the regional level.

b. The socio-historical research done by Orlando Fals-Borda. He develops the model of research and reflection through community participation (investigación-reflexión-acción) in order to recover the hidden historical development of marginal communities. This model has been used to obtain materials and approaches to community education and participation.

c. Jesús Martín Barbero's work in progress on soap operas as significant structures of the perception of everyday life.

d. The film work of Gloria Triana is a first attempt to give to national public opinion a deep, serious and aesthetic view of marginal communities throughout the country.

e. The filmwork of Víctor Gaviria, a young director, to develop a proper language for approaching regional identity.

f. The semiotic work of Armando Silva on the use of spatial relations and marginal communication in a public university, and his work on popular markets and cemeteries.

g. The effort of a handful of students and teachers to apply semiotics models to study and understand the use of public parks, fashions or political cartoons (Universidad Nacional, Medellín).

h. The deep insights of CINEP in its research on popular culture and alternative communication.

i. The academic awareness of Antioquia's universities and cultural institutions in discussing and extending the basis for research and action on culture, concretized in periodic meetings to discuss theoretical and practical issues in applying semiotic models to cultural analysis.

j. The architectural effort to identify the shapes of our space, color and use of native materials.

All these efforts, and many more, suppose a broad consciousness and an academic response to the challenge of cultural change. Returning to Borges' quotation at the beginning of this paper, it is perhaps an attempt to recognize our own face in the labyrinth of culture, while we are yet alive, through creative and culturally renovative approaches. Thomas Kuhn (as quoted by Alves Pires, F., 1986) suggests that the evolution of science is linked to revolutionary transformations.

Savater (1983) speaks against the idea of a well defined identity, against the utopia that excludes doubt and imperfection: "Man's city must not be a mausoleum but a work in progress; it must remain as open and ever unfinished as Penelope's fabric or Ulysses' sea" (Savater, 1983).

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Notes

1. This project is also close to Habermas' proposal in *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston: Beacon, 1971) relating specific symbolic acts to the broader symbolic environment in which they occur, instead of relating culture to social structure.

2. Derrida's work pointed this out (see MacCannell, 1982; Derrida, 1977 and Norris, 1982).

3. MacCannell (1982) explores deeply the development and implications of this semiotic model. See also John N. Deeley *Introducing Semiotics: Its History and Doctrine* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982).

4. See also Wertsch, 1985.

5. "Cultures do not continue by repeating themselves. They grow and change, yet remain the same" (Bakhtin, 1985).

6. For a complementary elaboration of this idea, see Evon Z. Vogt and Ethel Albert, *The Comparative Study of Values in Five Cultures* (New York: Atheneum, 1966).

7. "Bakhtin . . . pointed out that within the domain of culture it is impossible to draw a sharp distinction between expression and meaning" (Fokkema and Ibsch, 1986). Lotman and Uspenskij subscribe to this conception, developing a definition of meaning as "the invariant in reversible operations of translation" (see Lotman, 1979).

8. Jauss (in Fokkema and Ibsch, 1986) observes that even where there are a plurality of meanings in the text, only certain possibilities can be chosen at the expense of others. In this Jauss adds a clarification to Eco's "Opera Aperta."

9. See also Barthes (1964) and Freire (1970).

10. Pope John Paul II in his message to intellectuals and university teachers in Medellin, pointed out: ". . . la identidad cultural es un proceso dinámico y crítico: es un momento en el cual se recrea en el momento presente un patrimonio pasado y se proyecta hacia el futuro para que sea asimilado por generaciones nuevas. De este modo se asegura la identidad y el progreso de un grupo social" (Medellín: Universidad Pontificia Bolivariana, 1986).

11. See Restrepo (1984) for a discussion of what he called "the village roots of corruptness", an attempt to show how many contemporary problems are not exclusively urban related in Latin America, mainly in the field of changes in value patterns.

12. For urban consciousness formation see Harvey (1985), where he relates the urbanization of capital and the urbanization of consciousness. See also Caughey (1984) and Berger and Luckmann (1966) on the cultural relativity of consciousness building.

13. Project means here "ideal", in the sense given to it for the phenomenology of axiological ethics (Max Scheller in Dussel, 1980).

14. See, for example, Octavio Paz, *El laberinto de la soledad* (México: FCE, 1973); Enrique Dussel (1980); José Vasconcelos *Laraza Cósmica* (México: Espasa-Calpe, 1966); Paulo Freire, *Pedagogía del oprimido* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1970) and *La educación como práctica de la libertad* (Buenos Aires: Siglo XXI, 1971); Frantz Fanon, *Los condenados de la tierra* (México: FCE, 1969).

15. Helí Ramírez, *En la parte alta abajo*--poems; *Lanoche de sudesevelo*--novel; Luis Fernando Macías, *Amada está lavando*--novel; Juan José Hoyos, *Tuyoes micorazón*--novel; José Libardo Porras, *Estarde en San Bernardo*--short stories.

16. Linking together some of these issues, J.L. Caughey observes, "The mass media did not create these (pernicious) values. They have their roots in the American values system".

17. The new economic approaches developed by Manfred Max Neef in *Development Dialogue* (special issue, 1986) and Hernando de Soto, *El otro sendero* (Bogotá: Oveja Negra, 1987), attempt to put together this multiple definition of culture and the creatively oriented community building economic alternatives in Latin American countries. Needs are both lack and potency.

18. As shown by M.L. Lekomceva and B.A. Uspenskij in their work on fortune telling with playing cards as a simple syntaxis semiotic system that involves different information (Lucid, 1977).

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Chapter XIII

The City: Atelier of the Autonomous Person

Paul Peachey

Horace Miner once wrote, "Everyone knows what a city is, except the experts." Don Martindale, in his "Prefatory Remarks"¹ makes the same point: "The theory of the city somehow cannot account for what every journalist, poet and novelist knows—the city is a living thing." Martindale drives the point home by listing a few of the myriad elements that comprise a city, then continues, "One may find anything or everything in the city texts except the informing principle that creates the city itself." In the end, however, whether intentionally or not, Max Weber's ideal type of the city serves Martindale as a stand in for a city theory. Weber's conception will engage us later in this essay.

In the absence of an informing principle, urbanists are much like the fabled blind men of Hindustan, trying to describe an elephant. Each is right in the semblance which he discerns, but wrong in concluding that what he has his hand is the organizing principle of elephantness. Yet the need and the desire for a basic theory are so persistent that every successful part theory soon sounds like a candidate for the real thing. Meanwhile, any urban dimension, coherently viewed, is theoretically valid. But the dimension chosen in any given instance depends of the observer's stance and purpose. The urbanist likely has one advantage over the blind man of Hindustan. If he or she finds the elephant very like a rope, it is not because of the happenstance of reaching the tail first, but rather because of an interest in ropey things.

Given its assumptions, the question: "How is it possible in the modern urban environment to form the communities within which new human self-understanding and hence new values can emerge?" lands us somewhere midstream. It assumes that values exist, that they are essential, that they depend on human self_ understandings, which in turn depend on communities. Finally it implies that the urban environment is somehow problematic for communities. Any one of these questions deserves a monograph to determine what they entail before we take them finally as axiomatic. But overarching these problems is the implication that we know what "the modern urban environment" is, in a word, that we have a conception and theory of the city.

All this represents our human predicament. Always we must begin somewhere midstream, else we are doomed to infinite regression. For the purposes of this study and its authors, a better question can hardly be posed. Both our interests and competencies, presumably, pertain to the human component of the city rather than to its spatial order, its architecture, or even its demography. It is human beings, of course, who build cities; and as they are built they act back upon their builders in an unending spiral. Thus we confront both dialectic and paradox in the urban experience.

The human consequences of city growth is what the question intends to probe. It is an ancient question, yet ever new; and not merely with every generation, but also with every new turn of the urban screw. A recent urban textbook, in its opening remark, formulates the problem as the "difficulties cities have encountered in performing their communal functions."²Communal functions are the "we"_creating consolidations out of which the human self, in this instance "the new human self," emerges. Both Berger and the present study sense that these processes are jeopardized in the growth of cities. Cities presuppose and require a new type of human being, an autonomous and individualized self, which traditional societies neither required nor produced, but which nonetheless must be communally rooted.

The Age of the City at an End?

In the absence of a full_fledged urban theory, we are compelled nonetheless to posit a working definition with some degree of generality. For that purpose I shall accept Weber's conception of cityness, without seeking here either to critique or to defend it. As a direct route to the heart of that conception I shall take Martin dale's final prefatory sentence. Given Weber's definition of the city, Martindale concludes that "the age of the city seems to be at an end." Martindale's preface is thirty years old and a great deal has transpired meanwhile, both in historical developments and in the social sciences, of which we need to take account. Given the often explosive urban growth meanwhile, the claim that the age of the city is at an end at first blush may seem nonsensical. If we go deeper, however, we discover an important key to a decoding of advancing urbanization in the world today.

Allow me to quote the pertinent paragraph from Weber's text. "An urban 'community,' in the full meaning of the word, appears as an eternal phenomenon only in the Occident. Exceptions occasionally were to be found in the Near East (in Syria, Phoenicia, and Mesopotamia) but only occasionally and in rudiments. To constitute a full urban community a settlement must display a relative predominance of trade_commercial relations with the settlement as a whole displaying the following features: (1) fortification; (2) market; (3) court of its own and at least partly autonomous law; (4) related form of association; and (5) at least partial autonomy and autocephaly, thus also an administration by authorities in the election of whom the burghers participated."³

In effect, Weber takes here the European medieval city, with its Greek antecedents, as the "ideal type" of the city. The backdrop, of course, is the pre-modern era. The "city," thus conceived, contrasts starkly with the tribal, feudal, agrarian and patrimonial orders of the traditional world. A city is an autonomous and free community, composed of free, self_determining citizens. A military encampment, a royal court or a kinship_based settlement is not a city. The case in point is the walled medieval city, ruled under a contracted charter which had been wrested from the authoritarian rule of the territorial prince or from the Empire by independent craftsmen. "The City Makes One Free" (Die Stadtluft macht frei) was the slogan that inspired the serf to abscond. If he escaped detection for a year and a day, he was formally free as well.

From City Growth to Societal Urbanization

In the above setting urbanization meant the growth in the number and size of urban settlements in populations and territories that had not been urban.⁴ The measure of urbanization was thus the proportion of the total population living in urban places or changes in that proportion.⁵ In the Western world, however, the growth in the number and size of settlements and the increasing proportion of populations that was urban was linked to other development in technology, industry, and economic and political organization. Not only did the urban sector become dominant, but the entire population or society became "citified."

Urbanization thus appears as a finite process, a process that does not and cannot continue indefinitely. Sorokin and Zimm erman⁶ likened this process to a parabolic curve. In the beginning the rural_urban distinction does not exist because there are no cities. As the number and size of urban settlements grows a rural_urban contrast emerges and increases. At a more advanced stage, when the rural population is itself drawn increasingly into the process, the distinction declines. Cityward migration of rural peoples ends when the rural population has been incorporated into the urbanized whole. It should be noted in passing that the last decennial census (1920) before the

Sorokin_Zimmerman text appeared reported that the urban portion of the American population for the first time had passed the 50% mark.

Martindale's postulate that the age of the city is at an end applies only in those instances in highly industrialized countries where the society generally has been urbanized. The proposition, moreover, entails a change in the definition of the city, and hence is subject to challenge. We noted above the distinction between the two word_families, urban and civic, the former referring to physical space, the latter to social quality. The earlier definition of urban referred to number and size of settlements and to population proportions residing in urban settlements. To shift the definitional focus to qualities characterizing entire populations, in fact, refers to a different phenomenon. Even in urbanized societies, differing population densities persist, and in that sense Martin dale is wrong__high density/low density distinctions have not disappeared, and are unlikely to do so.

Sociologically, nonetheless, the argument can be sustained. The technologies generated in the industrial city have greatly reduced the friction of space. "Cities were evolved primarily for the facilitation of human communication,"⁷ hence the rise of high density settlements. High density, however, has certain negative side effects. With the advance of communication and transport technologies, deconcentration of urban settlements set in (see below). Much initially uniquely urban activity has now been delocalized and characterizes entire populations irrespective of place of residence. We have only to recall that our entire political vocabulary arose by extension of civic (urban) categories to entire populations, and hence to territorial states.

The flip side of this development, however, is the reversal at some levels of the dominance flow between cities and societies. As Martindale observes, the city has "everywhere lost its military integrity__its right to defend itself by military means." Its local self_sufficiency and self_determination has been superseded by larger national and supranational systems of action, of which it is now the dependent variable." "The modern city is losing its external and formal structure. Internally it is in a state of decay while the new community represented by the nation everywhere grows at its expense."⁸ Lewis Mumford makes the same point in the preface to his work, *The City in History*.⁹ The book opens, he says, "with a city that was, symbolically, a world; it closes with a world that has become, in many practical respects, a city."

From Family to Individual

Before returning to our original question regarding the formation of "the communities with which new human self understanding . . . can emerge," we must engage another, even more fundamental problem. We noted that the language of cities refers to qualities characterizing urban dwellers, specifically "citizenship," rather than to properties of geography or real estate. This notion was critical in Weber's definition of the city, which depended on the action of free citizens. Louis Wirth, whom Martindale mentions briefly, and whose 1938 essay, "Urbanism as a Way of Life,"¹⁰ has been considered by some as the most influential paper ever published by an American sociologist, defined the city as "a relatively large, dense, and permanent settlement of social heterogeneous individuals." It is not the family, but the individual that is the basic social unit. Wirth's essay is in fact a distillation of the classical literature on urbanism to which Martindale refers.

One of Wirth's predecessors, the legal historian, Henry Sumner Maine¹¹ contrasted traditional, kin_based "stationary" societies with modern "progressive" societies. The distinction lies in the fact that in the latter instance, "The Individual is steadily substituted for the family as

the unit of which civil laws take account." We readily recognize here the categories of social and political expectation that continue to make revolutionary history around the world in our own time, and even in such ostensibly advanced societies such as the United States. Every person, irrespective of variations in kinship, race, religion, sex, nationality, occupation, place of residence, claims equal dignity and right. One person, one vote. Coercive, ascriptive qualities, the ties and definitions of blood and of place, must yield to the self that each individual creates. This is an urban phenomenon. The city is the atelier of human individuality and personhood.

The Urban Malaise

Despite the fact, however, that historically the city has been the scene of human liberation, the growth and spread of cities has been accompanied by considerable gloom among both subjects and analysts of urbanization. Cities have been the scene of disorganization, alienation, violence, and crime. Curiously enough, American culture long harbored a strong anti_urban bias. I say "curiously" because here, if anywhere, the traditional definition of urbanization developed above is misleading. Low density and the long dominance of ostensibly rural life diverts our attention from the fact that the republican conceptions underlying the entire system are highly urban. The American system presupposes, in the words of Maine, that the individual has already been substituted for the family as the unit of which

the civil laws, indeed the values, the mores and institutions of the society, take account.

One can detect malaise behind the question. "How is it possible in the modern urban environment to form the communities with which new human self-understanding . . . can emerge"?--the implication is that this may not be happening. Berger is more explicit__cities are experiencing difficulty "in performing their communal functions." Indeed, we must go further, for at least in the American case we see serious problems, even breakdown, in many sectors of our urbanized society. Counter_urbanization, the increasing deconcentration of the population, is but one response to the problem.¹²

In fact, however, the situation is bewildering. Continuing advances in science, technology, affluence, and other areas are paralleled, as it were, by increases in alienation, rebellion, crime, substance abuse and the like. Yet the relationships among phenomena, both positive and negative, elude ready detection.

Still there are anomalies, lags and anachronisms. For women in the United States the shift from family to individual has not yet fully matured. "Status" continues to prevail over "contract," to use Maine's language, and Freud's old adage, that 'anatomy is destiny', has not yet been fully surmounted in the society. The historical reasons for this are instructive and, if understood, could hasten progress. On the other hand, families increasingly come apart or are never established as families in the first place, as births out of wedlock become more common--and it is families above all that form "human self understanding" and hence autonomous selves.

From Consanguinity to Conjuality

Early human societies were family and kin based. In fact, for kin_based peoples the term "society" is inappropriate, for there is no enveloping social fabric beyond family and clan. In the rise of the Greek polis we witness the rise of the "public" realm over against the private, a realm in which further differentiation then appears, eventually that between state and society.¹³ Meanwhile, the rise of the public realm has meant a corresponding abridgement of the kinship system. As the public realm expanded and became more highly differentiated, it assumed

the economic, political, and educational functions once vested in family systems. By the same token, household and family, now more limited in scope, specialize in the nature of persons.

Kinship, however, is a resilient force, and until the modern political and industrial revolutions the ascriptive power of kinship—the attachment and placement of people in the social scheme—remained decisive. While many champions of modernization viewed familial solidarities as obstacles to progress, the process was viewed more popularly and sorrowfully as family decline. In this climate the significance of these transformations were often obscured.

It will be argued here that the ostensible decline of the family was, in fact, its liberation. Contrary to widely prevailing views, especially among anthropologists, the intrinsic axis of the family system is not the blood tie or consanguinity, but the marital tie or conjugality. Failure to recognize and to come to terms with this fact in the modern world is the source of much of our trouble. To be sure, the resulting isolation of the marital pair and of the nuclear family is in itself a problem with which we have scarcely begun to cope. But this is merely a special case of the more general problem in the society.

Our concepts of human dignity and liberation require the attenuation of family-based ascriptive solidarities in favor of personal achievement. But liberation is understood too often as mere freedom from external constraints, as the possibility of impulsive, self-interested action. ("I'm entitled to my own happiness.") Ethicists, to the contrary, stress the importance of the proper balance between rights and duties. The problem is not merely perceptual or attitudinal; it is structural as well. The social, economic, and political dynamics of American society impinge on us in ways that permit, even foster, communal irresponsibility. The issues come into sharp focus in the mounting rates of marital breakdown, for onesided individualism makes the marital "we" ever more difficult to realize.

This paper, however, is about the city, and not in the first instance about marriage or the family. The city breaks down and recombines the raw human material, as it were, much as a factory of synthetic materials breaks down and recombines substances given in nature. Thereby individuals are freed from the unwilled ascriptive ties given in nature, and are made available for recombination in the willed contractual relations that constitute society. The formation of communities "within which the new human self-understanding can emerge . . ." now confronts us on two levels: the infra-urban and the urban or societal.

On the former, or infra-urban, level, the family persists as the primary matrix of personal identity. But once reduced to its nuclear core or husband, wife and immediate offspring the family is often too isolated from communal supports of kinfolk and place to carry this freight. Thus, we confront the question: given modern urbanized contact, how can the communal underpinnings of family life be reconstituted and maintained.

On the urban or societal level, meanwhile, cohesion falters. The synthetic urban fabric consists, strictly speaking, of systems of roles which are separable from the persons (individuals) who perform them. This permits social collaboration on a scale unimaginable in pre-urban settings. Role-incumbents, on the other hand, invest only limited facets of the self in these roles, enabling them to participate in many diverse configurations of action. Role-based affiliations make only role-specific demands on the incumbents; the rest of the person remains beyond the reach of the given role set. Multiplicity of roles means multiple partial identities as well. Thereby personal autonomy is enhanced, not only because individuals choose among numerous roles, but above all because such diversity of experience and affiliation enriches and expands the socially constituted self.

Integration and cohesion, in both the self (or personality) and the city or society, now become problematic. In traditional settings, personal identity is anchored in family, clan or village. Apart from emigration or exile, alternative affiliations or identities scarcely exist. In urbanized societies individuals must "choose" their identity from among the various affiliations and possibilities the context offers.¹⁴ Many people are poorly prepared for this terrifying task. Indeed, we lack the understandings and norms essential for this task. Much of our insight is fragmented, locked up in specialized investigations. The lack of cross_fertilization between century-long reflections on the nature of the self in philosophy and modern inquiries in the behavioral and social sciences is a glaring example.

But how is "community" and/or cohesion to be formed and sustained on the level of the urbanized society? Emile Durkheim, one of sociology's founding fathers, proposed that the interdependence that is rooted in advancing division of labor provides a partial answer.¹⁵ On the expressive or emotional side of the human enterprise, nationalism has been perhaps the strongest communal force on the societal plane. But this has proven to be vulnerable to excess, perhaps largely because the nation state, in displacing numerous lesser loyalties, has had to assuage the emotional needs thereby generated. Yet in many respects both nation and state are too remote and impersonal to meet the very needs which they thus evoke. For this reason modern societies are emotionally volatile and vulnerable to symbolic fluctuation and manipulation.

It is unlikely, even on a theoretical level, and much less in practice, that a single answer can be given to the question put forward for this study. Societies differ too greatly in their point of departure, as in their resources, their composition and their possibilities. Urbanization nonetheless possesses features that we may well regard as intrinsic, and thus--however varied in manifestation--generally identifiable. It is these common features and our global diversity that makes the work of this study both possible and promising.

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Chapter XIV Urban Space as Region of Encounter

Joseph S. Wood

Society is just not that easy of a place"
-- recorded by Studs Terkel¹

In the world of Studs Terkel's anonymous informant, society, easy or not, is a place of some meaning. We all have such worlds within which we act and formulate perceptions. Scholars view such worlds in objective, quantitative terms, like beakers having physical dimensions, which allow for the enumeration of contents. Science expects no less; the prominence of empiricism has limited research to measurable phenomena able to be grasped and to discrete events. Yet most of us, scholars and others, would also recognize that our worlds have a qualitative dimension as well. Within that qualitative dimension lie the encounters that give meaning to place.

How might we improve the qualitative dimension and foster the encounters that make society an easier place? Or, in terms of the question addressed by this volume, how might we realize positive values in an urban setting? This has two questionable premises. We presume that traditional cultures are stable and well articulated in their environment (*gemeinschaft*, for instance) and that change occurs inevitably to those who move to the city, where traditional values are not sustained. Although I do not intend to build the case, I would argue that the choice to remove, not the removal itself, reflects a shift in values and an alteration in the configuration of social relations. Likewise, slums are created, not as much by those who move to them, as by those who move from them, leaving to the newcomers the rebuilding costs the former inhabitants were unwilling to bear. In both cases, the change is actually embodied in the social context of the decision to move.

We presume as well that city somehow exercises influence over or determines social outcome (*gesellschaft*, for instance). Said another way, the physical dimensions of our worlds shape our behaviors, our perceptions, and the values incorporated in the qualitative dimension of our lives. The nature of inquiry forces us to such deterministic, cause-and-effect views, thereby obscuring social meaning. Louis Wirth recognized the inherent fallacy fifty years ago in "Urbanism as a Way of Life."² To Wirth urbanization was more than removal from countryside to city, with its attendant adaptations and alterations. It was a cumulative accentuation of the mode of life typical of the city.³ I would add that location may be irrelevant. One does not need to move to the city to become urbanized, nor does one's removal to the city insure urbanization in Wirth's terms. Urbanism may inhabit any number of geographical forms, just as urban has assumed any number of geographical forms. Neither the meaning nor the form is constant across cultures, or in time or space. Indeed, urban form is a configuration or expression of values, no more concrete or unchanging than is society as a configuration or expression of values. Nevertheless, geographical form has become a metaphor for social meaning. Unwittingly in contemporary society and in contemporary scholarship, we assign social meaning in relation to one's location.

Recent structuralist and humanistic thinking in the social sciences has called for fresh assessment of what lies beyond the appearance of the physical dimensions of our world. The city is increasingly seen as reflective of the social relations which support it and equally a constraint on modifying or altering those social relations. The city, in this view, is both mirror and mold,⁴ and several of the essays in this volume deal frankly with this assertion. Blank, building on structuralist arguments, notes that "city" and "urban" are social meanings assigned to a particular spatial form

by a historically defined society. As if by example, Paga discusses the standardization effect of central authority on the city's "material aspect." Ostensibly governed by ideological precepts of egalitarianism, in practice, Paga argues, the city mirrors "an equality of shortages" that in turn molds human response. To reveal meaning in the material aspect, we require qualitative tools of analysis, to which Echavarría proposes a semiotic overview. Alternatively, Hosven argues forcefully that a labyrinthine view, seeing the city from within, will reveal the city to us.

My concern is with further articulating this problem of urban space as metaphor for social meaning, thus complementing the structuralist and humanistic critiques which others have offered. What follows is an exercise in ideas, one that lies dangerously and provocatively astride several disciplinary boundaries. I argue that we create our own geographies as spatial configurations that mirror and mold social configurations. Australian Aboriginals, for instance, conceive of their geography not as a fixed block of land but as a series of "interlocking lines" and "ways through."⁵ I suggest as an alternative spatial metaphor for assessing urbanization and values a set of such "interlocking lines" and "ways through." The alternative is grounded--at least is meant to be grounded--in the spirit, if not the formal logic, of the structuralist and humanistic critiques expressed here. Its purpose is to try to reveal the qualitative dimensions of urban space that lie beyond appearances. Yet I also question the value of imposing any preconceived configuration of space on another's world.

Urbanism and Urban Space

My argument has two parts. The first of these, that we create our own geography, has a double meaning, and in the context of urbanism and values it has some undesirable implications. We create our own geography in a very material fashion, one that varies from society to society, by such actions as selecting and molding environments to suit our needs. We have found, for better or for worse, that cities serve certain material and meaningful purposes for our livelihoods and our lifestyles. We have built cities for 10,000 years, and we will find in our lifetime half of the world's population living in cities. Indeed, the removal of population from countryside to city is the dominant geographical process of our time.

Cities are not solely geographical forms, however. They are human constructs as well. As corollary to the first part of my argument, we create our own geography not only by our actions, but in our mind's eye. Regretably perhaps, what is on the ground and what is in our mind are often quite different geographies. Regardless, we define what a city is and what it is to be. Geography is the outcome of human imperatives about how people and activities should be allocated in space. We conceptualize relationships between humans and the space within which such relationships take place. We also assign to the relationships such names as society, and to the spaces such names as city. Labeling them as such does not reify them, give them agency over us, or imbue us with values. To argue that the geography of metropolitan Washington causes Washingtonians to behave in certain ways and to hold certain values is fallacious, despite what one might conclude after a drive on the Capital Beltway. Washington is both mirror and mold, reflecting the configuration of our patterns of social interaction. In so doing, it affects our world views, constrains our actions, and evokes our visceral responses to the city. Had other values prevailed, we would have produced a quite different urban landscape. By the combination of design and deed we have created the geographies we deserve.

As geography is as much in our mind's eye as it is on the ground, we build generic geographical models to express the physical dimensions of our worlds. We all do so in order to

find our way; for wayfinding. Scholars do so as well for analysis. City is such a model, one that carries quantitative and qualitative meaning quite in contrast to that carried by such other models as village or suburb. Insofar as places embody meanings, so the models of place types, whether for wayfinding or for analysis, become geographical metaphors of those meanings. Schneck's argument in "City and Village" is instructive. He implores us to think of the notion of the eclipse of *gemeinschaft* for *gesellschaft* as illustrating more the history of ideas about cities than the history of cities. In that history of ideas, village and *gemeinschaft* and city and *gesellschaft* have become metaphorical equivalents. As village embodied community, village has become community. As city embodies urbanism, city has become urbanism. Village space and city space are consequently different and distinctive generic place types of different and distinctive social meanings.

Our contemporary notions of social and spatial configurations of human relationships are exactly that--they are of our contemporary world. Social and spatial configurations are fluid, dynamic entities which reflect not only difference between city and village as place types, but differences in place types across cultures and through time. The second part of the argument, then, is this: To gain perspective on the question at hand, we must step back from our contemporary models and accepted geographical metaphors and associated meanings. We must seek alternative social and spatial configurations of the expression of values, expressions from other times and other cultures, to give us fresh perspective on our own place and time. The lesson we learn, I suggest, is that every society has its own identifiable physical and qualitative dimensionalities. We also learn, I think, that our contemporary metaphors of social meaning fail us in analysis of our contemporary world.

Oaxaca and Olymbos. People elsewhere in the world, away from social and spatial configurations familiar to our contemporary world, create their own indigenous geographies. A study of Oaxacan peasants in Mexico illustrates that spatial configuration is a creation of adaptation to a structural change in economy, and by implication that our contemporary notions of rural and urban have no place in Oaxacan conceptions of social relationships.⁶ The home villages of Oaxacans contain perhaps 300 households. Rotating markets foster local exchange and serve as points of articulation for extra-local exchange with the wider world. The social village of Oaxacans, however, extends over thousands of miles as a multilocal economic exchange system allowing peasants to sell their labor to urban employers. Oaxacans who have migrated from home villages to urban places have extended their social configuration across the intervening space to perpetuate their spatially extended community. They have done so not because they have become urbanized, but because of external constraints on their traditional economic behavior in their home villages that required them to seek employment elsewhere. Their dynamic social geography, a social web sustained by buses ferrying Oaxacans between home villages and urban encounters, is intrinsically neither urban nor rural.

Villagers from Olymbos, Greece, inhabit a similar reconstituted space in which they have symbolically created a new 'Olymbos' both in the home village and in new settlements around the world.⁷ The lived territory is discontinuously filled, transcending our notion of an absolute space. Olymbites have reconstituted their geography as a means of adaptation to the changing structure of the economy of which they have become a part. Within this geography, Olymbites encounter others as well, those who in their own fashion reconfigure society and reconstitute space as adaptation to the changing world.

In Oaxaca and Olymbos, neither our contemporary notions of community as locality nor our place-type models, like village or city, mean very much. Our physical dimensionality has little

explanatory significance and little relevance to the qualitative and socially meaningful dimensions of others' worlds. Emigrants encountering a larger world carry their own world views as cultural baggage as Gambari has noted. Even as Oaxacans and Olymbites encounter the geography that mirrors and molds modern capitalistic society, they reconstituted their own spatial configurations to mirror their social adaptation.

The New England Village. Closer to the functional and locational origin of the modern capitalistic world, New Englanders created a geography epitomized by a village which has become the singularly significant symbolic community of the American past. The village stands for theocratic, hardscrabble yeomen clustering about simple meetinghouses in which freedom of religion and self-government were fostered and came to flourish. Village and community, the spatial and social configurations, were one. Village was community, and community was village, interchangeable in meaning and correlated in configuration. But the village was not a compact or nucleated settlement. Our contemporary model, built on contemporary conceptions of geographical form, is wrong.⁸

In colonial New England, village was a corporate mechanism for land distribution. The space allocated to the village came to be inhabited by yeomen living with their families on discrete farms dispersed within the village's corporate space. The community, although not clustered compactly in geographic terms, was a social web of frequent, purposeful, and sustained economic, religious, and political encounters. The village road network suggested the spatial configuration that both mirrored and molded these encounters. Indeed, the spatial configuration worked so well as to sustain dispersal of farmsteads without testing the social web.

The nucleated forms that we see today are spatial configurations of nineteenth-century economic intercourse and thus early manifestations of urbanization of the United States. Contemporary villages were built by New Englanders who were becoming fulltime nonfarmers and rapidly restructuring their commercial economy. The relict nature of villages in this century is simply a consequence of Americans' unquenched thirst for reconstituting their geography as they abandoned New England farmsteads and village centers during westward expansion and continued urbanization. Today we seek out these villages as unspoiled retreats from the city. Paradoxically, they symbolize for us a particular historic association of social and spatial configuration that we chose to relinquish when we chose urbanization.

The Galactic Metropolis. When we chose urbanization, we chose a form of social relations, not a place-type. The place-type commonly associated with urbanization, once quite nuclear, is becoming increasingly decentralized, reflecting our changing social configuration. As we reconstitute our geography, we reconstitute the qualitative dimensions of our world as well. This new urban geography, which Lewis⁹ calls galactic metropolis, is both mirror and mold of American society. Metropolis is practically everywhere, a material manifestation of the success of our collective pursuit of material gain.

The social configuration of this modern metropolis, unlike that of the New England village, is not easily read in its spatial configuration. More than ever before, the locus of one's qualitative dimensionality may be spatially unrelated to the locus of one's physical dimensionality. The road network allows swift movement, and electronics have facilitated interaction, but not everyone has equal access to, nor wishes fully to employ, these means of encounter. In the galactic metropolis, the physical dimensions of inhabited space are bursting, while society is polarizing as never before.

In traditional geographic metaphors we associate affluence with suburban, but the affluent live and work in a variety of distinct home and workplace types interchangeably distributed from center city to rural countryside. Qualitative connection to the urban economy distinguishes these

home and workplaces from those of the less affluent. Urban--and its subsidiary term suburban--artificially differentiate or distinguish types of affluence, which really are products of the quality of connection. Even the Corn Belt farmer, dispersed upon the family farm like the colonial New England villager, is an integral part of this new configuration, interlinked reciprocally by modem, satellite dish, and Federal Express.

Conversely, we associate poverty (and lack of positive values) with inner city, yet those who experience poverty are qualitatively no more connected to the functioning of the urban economy than those who live in pockets of rural poverty. In recent years the term "underclass" has come to characterize the "truly disadvantaged," who are disconnected from the urban economy.¹⁰ Also disconnected are those involved in the underground economy of drugs; though cash rich, they are not qualitatively connected. Again, urban serves artificially to differentiate or distinguish between types of poverty, but not between qualities of connection to the economy. Others may remain apart voluntarily. The Appalachian construction worker, like the Oaxacan laborer, inhabits a reconstituted social geography in which home is connected by interstate highway and electronic media to urban encounters where the worker can sell his labor and selectively engage urban society without relinquishing the qualitative dimensionality of home.

An Alternative Spatial Metaphor

Blank, drawing on structuralist sources, concludes that we are on the threshold of a new meaning for the city. The city's complex network of relationships at multiple levels can no longer be embodied in a simple framework of physical dimension. Grasping the complexities of this reconstituted geography requires imagination, which Friedmann,¹¹ distinguishing between life space and economic space, offers. Life space and economic space, paraphrasing Friedmann, constitute a "unity of opposites." Life space is the "theater of life"; economic space "corresponds more narrowly to the conditions of livelihood." Life space is bounded, territorial space that also provides sense of place, having both quantitative and qualitative aspects to it. Economic space is abstract, discontinuous, and global, reflecting the broad, encompassing sweep of the capitalist economy. Flows across linkages to nodes, not physical dimension, give substance to economic space. Superimposed over the life space of individuals and communities, however, economic space creates the illusion of independent economies within traditional physical dimensions.

Although designed for different purposes than our model, Friedmann's model provides a useful point of departure for an alternative spatial metaphor. In Dechert's transactional terms, economic space lies on an orthogonal plane distinct from that of life space. Yet life space itself has both physical dimensions of bounded territory and qualitative dimensions of a sense of place that themselves may be orthogonally located with respect to one another. Only if we escape three-dimensional space might we then be able to accommodate all of the dimensions of the spaces we inhabit. Multi-dimensional scaling for assessing relative connection or the hyperspace of computer systems offer the possibility to think of urban space as a configuration of sets of overlapping, discontinuous social configurations, much like the reconstituted geographies of Oaxacans and Olymbites.

The galactic metropolis--or any geographic form--might be conceived, then, as a dynamic region of encounter. The intensity, frequency, and quality of encounters all vary. National Airport represents very different kinds of encounters for pilots, porters, and passengers. The Kennedy Center represents a high intensity, high quality encounter for many Washingtonians, but something quite different for its custodians. Many encounters will be weaker, reflecting weaker connection.

Other encounters will be infrequent reflecting greater selectivity. Together these encounters comprise a complex multidimensionality of intersecting orthogonal life spaces, all nested within an encompassing global economy. Traditional geographic models of space offer only a panoramic view. Aboriginal notions of "interlocking lines" and "ways through" suggest a more useful conception of space than bounded land. Focusing on interconnection and encounter, one may attain Hosven's labyrinthic view, giving insight into the logic of the social configuration and related qualitative dimensionality of Oaxacan peasants, New England villagers, or denizens of the galactic metropolis alike. Even Wirth's conception of urbanism as a way of life is enhanced by a geographical model of the encounters of the modern world.

Conclusion: Imposing Spatial Configuration

How might we improve the qualitative dimension of one's world and foster the encounters that make society an easier place? Planners have long tried to develop utopian societies by designing utopian geographies; but all planned geographies have failed. Still today, we attempt to make society an easier place by configuring spaces to encompass, and paths to direct, the encounters of the modern world. Yet how many university campuses are criss-crossed by dirt paths linking places of encounter where students have created their own geographies independent of the formal geometries of concrete sidewalks and plazas? Imposing preconceived spatial configurations on others' social configurations, whether as an academic exercise or as cultural hegemony, is counterproductive. As academic exercise it fails us, precluding a labyrinthic view. As cultural hegemony, it may be as well the social glue of which, Schneck argues, cities need no more.

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Notes

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Chapter XV
City and Village
Stephen Schneck

ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTIONS

A tacit Aristotelianism dominates most academic conceptualizations of the city and constitutes an intellectual field within which questions of "city" are resolved. At one pole of the field is the polis as crafted by Aristotle himself, an hierarchical corporation whose order points toward a divine telos. At the other pole of the field, however, is the society of self-interested individuals. This also obviously draws its inspiration from Aristotle but simply inverts the idea of polis. In the West, this two-poled Aristotelianism has defined the intellectual field by which the idea of city has been considered.

The polis exerts the more intense grip on academic thinking and is linked to many interpretations of the human being itself. For Aristotle's zoon politikon there are no persons beyond the walls of the city; outside the city there exist only beasts or gods. To be a person means to be part of the corporate whole of the polis. The essence/end of the person does not inhere in the individual; it does not emerge in the development of the solitary self nor in the development of the self in family as child, brother or father. Neither, for Aristotle, does the person emerge in village, imperial or cosmopolitan life. Only in the polis can there be persons, for the nature of the person is political. This notion of cities and persons is not an empirical claim: Aristotle's review of contemporary politics revealed a panorama of cities at wide variance with his notion of polis. Nor, philosophers tell us, did Aristotle mean this in an eidetic way--that some ideal of the polis existed waiting only for the right sort to uncover its reality. No, Aristotle's polis represented an end (telos) called for by the changeable character of cities and of people in everyday experience. In other words, apparent in the dynamic of human living was a direction toward an unchanging universal end for being a person. By this teleological nature, the person is political. The political life of the polis is the definitive condition for being a person.

Thinking in this manner it is not surprising that academics approach their crises of the city as a crisis in being human, for the life of the polis takes on a normative ambience. Lurking in the rhythms of their thinking lies Aristotle, who maintains that without the polis (its corporation, harmony, divine end and so forth) the person is not possible. At this pole of the intellectual field, cities are normative for the highest reason: they make possible being human. Good cities conform with the polis. In accord with this reasoning, since the cities of our experience do not conform, then the city is in crisis.

At the other pole of the Aristotelian intellectual field is found an inversion of the polis called "liberal/romantic." While opposite the polis, this too takes its bearings from Aristotle. Indeed, it is little more than an inversion of Aristotle's thinking, an inversion of his notion of the relationship between person and nature. From the liberal/romantic perspective nature is inverted from being a distant end to being a lost origin. It is still the measure for norms in human practice, but contemporary human practice is measured against an original rather than a teleological nature. The measure is how human beings ought to have been, not how human beings ought to be. There is an implied regression in such thinking. The hint is that as humans are increasingly alienated from their original being, they are perverted. Moreover, because our original being had not been in cities, then city is doubly perverted. A construct of perverted humans and a condition of human living at

some distance from the original condition of being human, the city for the liberal/romantic is suspect. Rather than an urban life, live an agrarian life when possible; when it is not, bring agrarian life into the city. Reform the urban character of city life.

The ideas of polis and perversion delimit the boundaries of the usual academic approaches to the city. At one extreme, vision of city as polis conjures an image of a coordinated harmony of parts in a social whole, an image that inspires much of the literature that celebrates community and neighborhood. At the other extreme, the vision of city as perversion seems attuned with many of the so-called progressive approaches to the idea the city. But, what of approaches to the city that begin with an effort to resolve this dichotomy, or point to an overcoming of the dichotomy in some final synthesis of polis and perversion? Toennies' analysis of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*. for example, implies such a synthesis. Max Weber's bureaucratic society, Hegel's state and Karl Marx's communist society are even more proximate origins of many of these contemporary models for the city. Yet, do these notions represent an overcoming of the polis/perversion dichotomy, or are they an amalgam of qualities of the two poles still situated within the boundaries inspired by Aristotle? How far do the notions of bureaucratic society, communist society and state vary from the corporate hierarchy of the polis? Perhaps our theoretical approaches to the city tell us much more about the impact of Aristotle on intellectual history than they do of the city.

The City as Place of Freedom

If only to open up greater intellectual space for considering the idea of city, a line of analysis outside the usual might be entertained. Instead of polis and perversion, consider a line between "city" and "village." The line is drawn well by that apocryphal 15th century peasant who claims that "Die Stadluftmacht frei!"¹ ("the city air makes us free!"). Consider the tension revealed here between the qualities perceived in village life and those anticipated in the city. Village represents a smothering community. An homogeneity of tastes, styles and desires is inscribed on each villager's soul by an intrusive familiarity that begins in the cradle. The village represents a life lived with intimate, ubiquitous authorities wherein all is public. City, for our peasant, offers the heterogeneity of anonymity and the possibility of private spaces resistant to the intrusive, public scrutiny found in village life. In the peasant's ideal of the city there is room for private space and authority is formal, not intimate or personal.

The peasant's analysis is intriguing. If die Stadluftmacht frei then Aristotle's polis is no measure for the idea of city. Even more clearly, it is not the city of experience. Consider Athens on the eve of Alexander's empire; note the distance between the experience of its occupants and the polis of Aristotle's *Politics*. For the 75,000 people who left their villages and communities for the Stadluft of Athens' Piraeus the appeal of city life was not corporate hierarchy and communal place. The city was not sought for its public space so much as for its private space. They saw city life as desirable for the space it offered that was relatively free from the suffocating presence of community as experienced in their village living. On the other hand, choosing Piraeus was certainly not congruent with the escape from living in civilization that is the characteristic of the liberal/romantic pole.² Indeed, for the Piraeans as for our apocryphal peasant, the cities and villages of their experience seem to be in keeping neither with the polis nor with the perversion.

If this thinking is persuasive, then the so-called "crisis of the city" bemoaned by so many urban theorists is a misconception. That is, it is misconceived if the crisis at stake is judged against the standard of insufficient solidarity (polis) or the standard of harmony with mankind's individuality in nature (perversion). In the analysis of our peasant, the notion of city is not

associated with concern for solidarity. The notion of city, rather, conveys an opening or space that relatively is free from the hegemony of expression and taste that one finds in village living. Neither, for our peasant, is the notion of city associated with concern for being alienated from some individual nature or natural condition. The crisis is not one of alienation from community nor of alienation from natural self. If, for the peasant, the notion of city is one of private space--creative space opened by heterogeneous anonymity--then the crisis of the city involves loss of that space. The crisis of the city from peasant's line of analysis concerns an erosion of the heterogeneity of anonymity, and the narrowing of discretion for urban living. The peasant yearns to create a life on his own responsibility, not one measured against the standards of traditional community nor against an idyllic natural man. Perhaps, therefore, the crisis of the city is that the space for such responsibility is narrowing on both fronts.

A consideration of contemporary experiences of the city lends credence to the peasant's analysis. The expressed concerns about urban life seldom evidence the theme of missing solidarity. Instead, the concerns revolve around missing vitality and heterogeneity. Cities are losing their free air. The why and how of this loss reveals an absent line in our peasant's analysis, for unknown to our peasant was the emergence of state-society as a smothering macro-village of tastes, values and expression against which the city seems unable to endure.

Understood now as a crisis of heterogeneous anonymity (a crisis of the space for personal creativity, responsibility and difference), the crisis of the city concerns the loss of free city air to the extension of authority by what is here called "state-society." State society has so pervasively and subtly insinuated its grip on the soul of the contemporary person that the space once opened by the idea of city largely has been lost. But, what is state-society that this has occurred?

For the contemporary world, state-society is the paradigmatic sociality of human experience. For all intents and purposes it defines the character of social and political life. Some might argue that there are two ideals of state-society: state dominant and society dominant. But, seizing on the increasingly slippery difference between the two only serves to obscure the more fundamental singularity of state-society (arguably, Saturday morning children's programming on NBC and Maoist opera, converge more than they diverge). In this larger sense, then, state-society can be recognized as something like our peasant's village writ large and raised to the level of universality. The idea of village connoted a smothering familiarity that instructed the person in a traditional public order. The city idea, in contrast, evoked the absence of such familiarity, instruction and monolithic public order; at its center is the heterogeneity of anonymity. State-society infiltrates the space opened by the city. Like the village, it opposes diversity and pluralism, filling the space for personal responsibility and creativity with public scrutiny.

Still, there is a difference between state-society and village. Where the idea of village proposes a public heterogeneity of familiarity, and where the idea of city suggests a personal, private heterogeneity of anonymity, the idea of state-society conjures the picture of a public homogeneity of anonymity. Instruction into the public order in state-society involves the reification of persons into singular, interchangeable objects under the gaze of rigorous public scrutiny.

The idea of state-society, perhaps unlike the ideas of city and village, has a modern history. Village, city and state-society are the Aristotelian field of traditional approaches to the idea of city. But, as we have seen, village is not Hegel's "community," city is not his "civil society" and (most clearly) state-society is not simply "state." Hence, not Hegel, but Tocqueville offers a better glimpse of the crisis of the city.

Tocqueville's New England Town and America

Alexis de Tocqueville's *Democracy in America* offers a picture of three polities that parallel our notions of village, city and state-society. The township of New England is Tocqueville's village. His ideal of America stands in complex fashion as both dystopia and utopia--or, in our words, as city and state-society. Tocqueville's work on America can be perceived as a klaxon warning of the possibility of state-society. He ranks among the first to recognize the dangers for city. Yet, unwittingly perhaps, he pursues the idea of village as defense against the possibility of state-society.

Writers on this continent have long been amused or confused by the apparent errors in Tocqueville's treatment of the government and laws of the United States. Amusement is perhaps more in keeping with Tocqueville's intent, for the laws and government are best understood as constituent elements in the story he tells. At the foundation of the politics of his America is the principal of popular sovereignty. That the people rule in fact, he claims, is a universal for all human institutions. In the United States, however, this universal is not kept secret from the people; it is a manifest public knowledge that informs all aspects of the polity and its operations. Still, there is a riveting incongruence in Tocqueville's discussion of the principal of popular sovereignty. Cultivating ground for his later arguments of the dystopia of America, he determines that the expression of the sovereignty of the people in America is not by way of "the people united" or "the genius of the people" or "spirit of the people." In his America, popular sovereignty is expressed via the numerical majority of individuals.³

Why does he opt for this utilitarian formulation instead of the more aristocratic Montesquieu version that one senses as the inspiration of Tocqueville's new science of politics? Frankly, what he brings to life at this point is a straw man. The people who inhabit his America must stand a priori as radical individuals, each equal in political efficacy, in order that the specter of mass society--his dystopia--be made most frightening. The anarchy, chaos and anomie of the potentially resultant state begs the therapy which Tocqueville proffers. In other words, the foundation for America as the dystopia of undisciplined democracy is laid here. Atop this foundation he constructs a politics where a faceless calculus of quantitative popular input actually rules. It is a bottoms-up politics wherein policies result from vast, on-going tabulations of the yeas and nays which constitute the political activities of homogenized and radically equal individuals.

From this dystopic perspective of Tocqueville's city, America is a directional sign which points toward a polity as masterless and uncontrollable as Shelley's *Frankenstein*. His purpose is plain. If the foundation of America points as it does, he implicitly asks, then should we not take steps to discipline and educate the monster in its infancy--to bind its mind and the habits of its heart?

In keeping with the federalism he describes, townships lie nearest the foundation of Tocqueville's order. "In the townships as everywhere else," he explains, "the people are the source of power; but nowhere do they exercise their power more immediately."⁴ Nearest the dangerous, unbridled discretion of the people as individuals, townships must provide the first and most effective political layer in the boilerplate necessary to contain and thereby canalize the forces of democratic man. Tocqueville writes that the township, "at the center of the ordinary relations of life," serves his America "as a field for the desire of public esteem, the want of exciting interest, and the taste for authority and popularity." In this way, he continues, "the passions that commonly embroil [democratic] society change their character when they find a vent so near the domestic hearth and the family circle."⁵ It is in the towns and villages that the habits of the heart most

precisely and effectively can be wielded. Townships "form a complete and regular whole; they are old; they have the support of the laws and the still stronger support of the manners of the community over which they exercise prodigious influence."⁶

Moreover, it is not a generic township that Tocqueville has in mind for this element of his theory. Rather, it is the peculiar township of New England. Renowned for its ubiquitous "manners of the community" that peer into every nook and cranny of individuals' lives, the township of old New England is an appropriate counterweight for the operation of Tocqueville's city. His imagery evokes the ambience of a Norman Rockwell illustration: the one with the simple worker rising to speak his piece in the town meeting? "Town meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science," Tocqueville advises, "they bring it within the people's reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it."⁷

The imagery notwithstanding, however, it is not Rockwell's town meeting but that of Arthur Miller's *Crucible* that is more in keeping with Tocqueville's intent. Instead of the accessibility of political power, it is the instruction and critical disciplining of individuals under the community's gaze of judgement that is most important for Tocqueville's thesis. Indeed, the very origins of the New England town meeting in the Puritan past are precisely in congruence with Tocqueville's tacit purposes. In Puritan times town meetings in part served the function of maintaining the conformity of individuals to the mores of the community and, more politically, town meetings were controlled settings for bringing indictments against individuals held to be in non-conformity.

Similarly, Tocqueville notes:

I believe that provincial institutions are useful to all nations, but nowhere do they appear to me to be more necessary than among a democratic people. In an aristocracy, order can always be maintained in the midst of liberty; and as the rulers have a great deal to lose, order is to them a matter of great interest. . . . But a democracy without provincial institutions has no security against these evils. How can a populace unaccustomed to freedom in small concerns learn to use it temperately in great affairs? What resistance to tyranny can be offered in a country where each individual is weak and where the citizens are not united by any common interest? Those who dread the license of the mob and those who fear absolute power ought alike to desire the gradual development of provincial liberties.⁸

Tocqueville's city is presented to the technicians of the state as a parable of a polity teetering on the edge of controlling the powerful forces of democracy. Both the promise and its supposed peril are necessarily presented, just as Machiavelli's prince is shown the path to chaos and failure and the path to order and success.

In my opinion, the main evil of the present democratic institutions of the United States does not arise, as is often asserted in Europe, from their weakness, but from their irresistible strength. I am not so much alarmed at the excessive liberty which reigns in that country as at the inadequate securities which one finds there against tyranny.⁹

Laws and governments alone are insufficient to withstand the irresistible strength. Laws and governments are too general and too formal to provide the critical targeting and particular application of discipline to the people as individuals. Especially those laws and governments at greater distances from the people are capable only of rudely channeling the passions of individuals toward appropriate paths. For these reasons, Tocqueville assigns the administration of formal and general law in his America to vigilante groups and to voluntary associations. Nearer to the objects

which must be ordered and disciplined, such volunteer groups as his admired posse are able to apply the designs of law more precisely and with correspondingly greater effect.

These efforts to manipulate the sovereignty of the people are not really, then, of the character of law. Tocqueville realizes this, naturally; it is the greatest novelty of his science. Formal and general, laws and governments--overtly political institutions--lack the effectiveness and surgical precision available to these extra-governmental authorities. In his conceptualization of America something more is needed to discipline the individual himself in the minutiae of daily living. As he puts it:

American laws are good, and to them must be attributed a large portion of the success that attends the government of democracy in America; but I do not believe them to be the principal cause of that success; and if they seem to me to have more influence than the nature of the country upon the social happiness of Americans, there is still reason to believe that their effect is inferior to that produced by the customs of the people.¹⁰

Tocqueville turns to those authorities of our everyday homes and workplaces, to the enforcers of customs, manners, mores, and to the discipliners of the habits of the heart, for the ultimate mechanism of control of the dangerous power of the people. Needed is something like the ubiquitous hand of village life that effectively reaches into the private, daily living of citizens, binding and ordering their lives from cradle to dotage. This intimate power canalizes personal desire and disciplines the habits of the heart. It is the ordering of tastes, values and mind, wielded best in the smothering familiarity of the New England town, America's village.

Tocqueville, clearly, is no friend of cities among democratic peoples. He notes with some relief that American state-society works because it travels in the direction of the New England town writ large. "The principles of New England," he is happy to say, "interpenetrated the whole confederation." In the state-society as village, as Michel Foucault puts it:

The judges of normalcy are present everywhere. We are in the society of the teacher-judge, the doctor judge, the "social worker" judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the normative is based; and each individual, wherever he may find himself, subjects to it his body, his gestures, his behavior, his aptitudes, his achievements.¹¹

The State-Society and the City

The last quote from Foucault brings much of what I have to say about cities to a head. State-society as an encompassing village of tastes, values and mind undercuts the heterogeneity of anonymity by which the air of the city was free, by which the city had the quality of "city." The crisis of the city is the extension of state-society such that it defines the human condition of our time almost completely; the quality which was city is more and more difficult to have in even the smallest ways. I see the ghostly hand of Hegel (sire of the German mandarins) among academics who write about the city. In the Philosophy of Right there is much of the Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft in embryo. Hegel sees a final synthesis of human sociation where corporate solidarity and societal individuality are fused and transformed in a resulting sociation where we have the best of both village and city. They are both right and, sadly, wrong. State-society overcomes both village and city such that we have the worst of both qualities: the homogeneity, orthodoxy and smothering familiarity of the village and the anonymity of the city.

Tocqueville is more accurate than the Germans: Democracy in America well explains the origin of the state-society and its overcoming of the quality of city. Moreover, Tocqueville demonstrates the human intent of the technologists of the state in the creation of the state-society, where the Germans see only the Gang Gottes in der Welt. The bane of the city is the ever-tightening grip of state-society on its citizens, the insinuating of public fingers into every crevice and fiber of human being. Foucault, in Discipline and Punish, speaks to the problem with a comparison that fits well with these musings. He discusses the cities of antiquity--before the emergence of state-society. He talks of Athens not as Aristotle's polis, but as a city. The heterogeneity of anonymity in the city allowed individuals the space for spectacles. In contrast, he writes:

Our society is one not of spectacle, but of surveillance; under the surface of images, one invests bodies in depth; behind the great abstraction of exchange, there continues the meticulous, concrete training of useful forces; the circuits of communication are the supporters of an accumulation and a centralization of knowledge; the play of signs defines the anchorages of power; it is not that the beautiful totality of the individual is amputated, repressed, altered by our social order, it is rather that the individual is carefully fabricated in it, according to a whole technique of forces and bodies. We are much less Greek than we believe.¹²

So, what is to be done? I do not know about urban planning, or architecture, or social services; and would rather not presume. But, if the crisis of the city is to enhance the quality of "city" then it seems to me we make a mistake by taking our bearings from the village (or from the noble savage or some unholy amalgam of the two). Cities ought to serve as a bulwark of sorts against the disciplining of tastes, values and mind at the hand of state-society. The inevitable structures of city life need to allow for maximizing the heterogeneity of anonymity by which the Stadtluft frees us. Cities do not need more social glue, they need to provide mechanisms by which to fend off the subtle and pervasive insinuation of individuals into the maw of state-society. If this thinking is valid, cities must respond to the crisis engendered by state-society with a celebration of pluralism, of difference.

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Notes

1. Special thanks to Prof. Paul Peachey who brought this line to the author's attention in his chapter in this book.

2. This distinction between city life and community owes inspiration to Hannah Arendt's distinction between public and private as outlined in *The Human Condition*. In making her distinction, Arendt maintains that life in the public sphere is open and free while private life is the realm of necessity. Human associations can be either public or private. Private associations would be what I call here "community"; Arendt speaks of family and village as belonging to the private realm. Public association has the character of city. Unfortunately, Arendt refers to polis as public, even using Aristotle to illustrate the concept. I would see the corporate hierarchy of Aristotle's polis as only marginally different from the life of the village. See *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), especially Chapter II on public and private.

3. Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, Book I, transl. by Reeves (Boston: Engmann, 1868), Chap. 4, p. 46

4. *Ibid.*, Book I, Chap. v, p. 50.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

6. Ibid., p. 50.
7. Ibid., p. 49.
8. Ibid., Chap. v, pp. 69-70.
9. Ibid., Chap. xiv, p. 150.
10. Ibid., Chap. xvi, p. 193.
11. Michel Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage, 1979), p. 304.
12. Foucault, 219.

Chapter XVI
Functional Differentiation, Hierarchy and Subsidiarity in
Community Analysis

Charles R. Dechert

After World War II the social sciences witnessed the growth of a new mode of thinking based upon the results of interdisciplinary work in the life sciences, the newly opened areas of communications theory and the study of control processes in self-regulating systems. An interdisciplinary Behavioral Science group at the University of Chicago under the leadership of James Miller laid the groundwork for the theory of Living Systems. Bigelow, Rosenblueth and Wiener had published their epoch-making paper on "Behavior, Purpose and Teleology" during the war, followed by Wiener's work on *Cybernetics-Communication and Control in Animals and the Machine*. Ludwig von Bertalanffy in the United States and Ross Ashby in Britain laid the groundwork for a General Theory of Systems while in the social sciences Parson's structural/functional approach was built on foundations laid by Pitirim Sorokin. Glenn Snyder and his associates at Princeton emphasized decision-making in the conduct of international affairs, paralleling the work of management theorists who were much taken by the new "hard" approaches to organizational decision-making provided by the various techniques of operations research, including linear and dynamic programming, the critical path method and network analysis. Ethics published "The Functional Prerequisites of Society" by Aberle, Cohen et al, suggesting a basis for values underlying decision-making founded upon the commonalities of human nature and experience in group life.

In a paper dating back nearly 20 years, "A Transactional Approach to Environmental Planning," I attempted to apply this new mode of thinking to the city and region. These were considered as social systems having geographic boundaries that were also human communities, capable of satisfying the full range of human needs and human values, each at its own level in the hierarchy of communities.

I speak here of a hierarchy of human communities and of social systems, and suggest that the notion of subsidiarity is intimately linked to this concept. Unfortunately the term "hierarchy" tends to be identified with power relations of inferiority-superiority, dominance and submission, differential access to values, and invidious distinctions of class and social rank. As used here the term is more neutral; it refers to the inter-relations of system components into groupings that are themselves components of a more extended system, which, in turn may be a component of a system yet more vast as the earth is part of a solar system that forms part of a galactic system, which in turn belongs to a "cluster" of galaxies in the physical universe we know.

An organism consists of differentiated organs, often associated in functionally defined subsystems, e.g., circulatory, reproductive, etc.; the organs consists of tissues which are in turn composed of individual cells. Social systems demonstrate certain analogous structural characteristics. In some sense individual persons may be conceived as the ultimate components of social systems--both functionally specific social systems such as banks or universities or automobile plants and omni-functional communities. If we look at these omni-competent "communities" we find that at successive levels of aggregation there tends to be greater functional differentiation of the group components and a correspondingly greater range of products, goods and services satisfying human values. From family to neighborhood, to town or city, to county and region, to nation-state (or political federation or confederation of peoples), to the global

community inhabiting "space ship earth," there is an increase in community size, functional complexity, communications and other exchanges and interdependencies. In turn, increased functional differentiation, enhanced productivity and the challenges produced by intellectual and cultural exchanges showed increase in the possibilities of a "good life" for each group and person belonging to the whole.

Anyone who has lived under primitive conditions must be aware of the "liberation" and leisure for more human pursuits provided by a social and technical machinery which obviates the need to chop wood for heat, cultivate a garden for food, and care for horses and sheep for transport and clothes at the individual family level. Note, incidentally, the functional differentiation by sex, age, strength and skill that seems to arise naturally in farm families and more recently in Israeli agricultural Kibbutzim--despite their ideological commitment to equality. In the presence of such differences, "equality of opportunity" seems to result in something approaching more traditional patterns of social role differentiation.

Let us now examine more closely the rationale for hierarchical organization, that is, the underlying structural characteristics of social systems that require some degree of functional differentiation, especially in the communications roles that link together the human (and group) components to achieve coherence as a recognizable social system characterized by some degree of functional unity. At the base level and in its simplest form the group is held together by continuing coordinative communications among its members.

In theory, at least, such groupings [insert fig. 1] may be completely egalitarian although in practice leadership tends to come to the fore. German military psychologists in World War II would send an unstructured, leaderless group of raw recruits to another part of the training base to dig a ditch, lay a pipe or erect a structure, providing maps, materials and tools. Psychologists as participant/observers would attempt to identify "natural leaders," those who could help find the way to the site, gain cooperation, analyze the job and encourage an efficient division of labor to facilitate the work. These were singled out for leadership training in NCO or officer candidate schools.

Creative and scientific work is most effectively accomplished in "horizontally" organized peer groups with complete freedom of intercommunication. The "bull pen" in large architectural and engineering firms with easy visual and physical access to all one's professional colleagues reflects this form of organization. The Salk Institute at La Jolla was designed around an easily accessible and amenable atrium that facilitated colleagues' meeting in informal, interdisciplinary encounters among peers.

Note that in our three [insert fig. 2] person group above ($n=3$) there were six unidirectional communications flows ($f=6$). Since by definition, a system is characterized by multiple components, a boundary and functional unity, it is clear that a social system is integrated by the communications that link its elements. Each member is a self-regulating system, a living system that perceives its environment, decides, and acts in a continuing process of short term adjustment and long term adaptation to that environment. For an individual member the group itself is a most significant "environment" to which the individual responds on the basis of signals conveying expectations, values, plans of action, affective relations, orders or suggestions, praise or condemnation, etc. These are the basis for the unity of group action. As the number of group components (n) increases arithmetically, the number of communications flows (f) increases geometrically ($f=n^2-n$).

[figure 2]

This may also be expressed as a matrix.

[figure 3]

Similar considerations apply to organisms and non-human social systems.

Organizational theorists have long recognized the concept "span of control," namely, that the primary work group normally numbers five to ten persons in more or less continuous communication. Larger groups tend to get bogged down, devoting inordinate time and resources to the process of communication. Coordinative communications channels in a horizontal organization of 57 persons number 3192. If, however, the group is organized hierarchically, employing the "linking pin concept," we find eight such groups of eight persons arranged in two echelons and communications flows reduced to 498.

Three such echelons would permit the systemic integration of 400 components with only 3192 communications flows (1596 two-way channels) as opposed to fifty times that number required by a non-hierarchical organization.

[figures 4 and 5]

When we use the "linking pin concept" we do away with the need for rigidly defined "lines of authority" or formal relations of superiority-inferiority, order-giving and order-receiving. The various groupings might well be quite open in their deliberative structures, although the communication node obviously has the structural advantage (power) deriving from his being the first to receive information from the institutional environment and his control of the information going from his group (and the groups reporting to its members) to the institution's central/coordinative information processors, who, in turn, normally possess effective decision-making powers.

Even informal "networks" take on this hierarchical character; communications nodes in the network may effectively control much of the net-worked groups' decision-making. When, in the 1950s, the question arose of who, in actual practice, was running a major element of the U.S. defense establishment I suggested that the source and destination of all internal telephone calls be tracked, suspecting that the administrative officers in personnel, supply, travel, etc., to whom everyone had to make requests and render accounts, had a substantial degree of effective control through administrative vetoes (e.g., claims of lack of funds, personnel freeze, etc.), opportunities to introduce delays (misplaced or lost documents, regulatory requirements for interagency coordination, etc.), or the representation of alternative uses of scarce resources.

More recently the anti-Vietnam-War network of the late 1960s and early 1970s demonstrated the rapidity with which a network of millions of activists can be brought into existence and deployed with a surprising level of strategic and tactical coherence using a hierarchically organized yet informal communications network. The Armies of the Night that moved on Washington for the March on the Pentagon in October 1967 took some six months to mobilize. A few years later their continuators could rally over a weekend hundreds of thousands to march on Washington, and millions to take over American college campuses to protest U.S. incursions into Cambodia employing an informal capillary communications network that reached virtually every university campus in every region of the nation.

What has all this to do with urban society and the principle of subsidiarity? A great deal, actually, for the theoretical considerations raised suggest that the relegation of decision-making power and authority to the lowest competent level in the hierarchy of social groupings is based on the very nature of groups. The coordinative information exchanges necessary for participative decision-making are possible only in relatively small groupings. Representative government, by elected officials or virtual representation, involves at best only sporadic participation and is amenable to manipulation by those controlling resources, especially the mass communications media. Due to its being one or more steps removed from day-to-day reality representative government may lose moral contact with its constituents and/or physical contact with the environment(s) it tries to order. In any society, especially those having some pretense of democracy, participative institutions are the key to legitimacy.

By allowing lesser communities and functional groups to retain most of their resources and allocate them prudently in terms of concrete felt needs the welfare of the whole tends to be well-served. The higher echelons, encompassing more people, greater geographic areas, larger market shares and more inter-related functional specialties serve best by restricting themselves to what is beyond the scope or capacity of the smaller (lower) groupings, namely, coordinating, regulating in terms of the common welfare, sustaining, defending, providing encouragement, counsel and community resources as needed to complement and supplement the activities of smaller communities and functional grouping. Such areas as monetary and fiscal policy, national defense and internal security, infrastructure and other collective goods beyond the capacity of individuals and lesser groups clearly lie in the domain of political decisionmakers, legislators, some at the city and regional level, others at the national or even global level. Environmental pollution, for example, has become a critical issue at each of these levels.

On the other hand, we have witnessed an increasing recognition in recent years that many areas are handled more efficiently and economically at the level of the smaller and smallest communities, neighborhood and family: educational and vocational choices, personal and family budget in terms of values maximization with limited resources, neighborhood watches for neighborhood security, neighborhood councils to discuss and decide local issues. City, county and state authorities are increasingly jealous of their limited autonomy and prerogatives vis-a-vis larger political units. More questions are being raised about the competence of the omnicompetent state: Are the goals of economy and efficiency best served when administered by remote bureaucracies governed by abstract norms that increasingly ignore, when they do not openly offend, local traditions, customs, usages and values?

We can apply the notion of a pluralistic social order to urban analysis and to the encouragement of those participative social institutions which integrate people into communities. The French revolutionary model of an omnicompetent state cementing together a nation of isolated individuals, equal in their impotence and enervated by a dense web of minute regulations, is being replaced. In its stead is an acceptance of multiplicity in unity and the legitimacy of diversity in a multitude of communities capable of joint action in matters of common concern. Constrained to live together in an orderly manner, each inhabits a "life space" adequate to its legitimate requirements.

Early in this century Arthur Bentley proposed a Group Theory of Politics in a volume entitled *The Process of Government*. Basically he identified "group" and "interest" and suggested that legislative policy outcomes in a democracy are the result of a kind of parallelogram of social forces. In my own work on transnational business and political parties I have found it very useful for analytic purposes to deal with a wide variety of organized groups in terms of a variety of

defining criteria. Countries have geographic boundaries, their political parties are defined by ideology while their government agencies are differentiated by function. Business concern produce specified goods and services as they buy from and sell to other businesses and households. They relate to government as suppliers and taxpayers, campaign contributors and the object of regulation. They relate to labor unions and educational institutions, as well as to other firms in their industrial sector. Most adults in advanced countries form part of some corporate entity which serves as employer and source of income and life opportunity.

Each individual has a broad range and variety of group appurtenance and loyalties: to family and friends, to local community, region and country, to corporation or university or agency of government, to associations of like-minded people, to labor union and church and political party, and to the values these embody or represent. Harold Lasswell has suggested that the following values, broadly defined, largely encompass the universe of social groups: Power, Enlightenment, Wealth, Well-Being, Skill, Affection, Respect, and Rectitude. A single group may pursue several values; groups on one values plane may relate to those pursuing other values. All are in continuing dynamic interaction, adjusting and adapting to one another as part of the overall natural, artifactual, and social environment to which each must continually adjust and adapt.

This is no Leibnitzian universe of monads, without windows or doors, in pre-established harmony. It is rather a busy, bustling, dynamic universe subject to will and chance, to calculation and plan, to precision and pre-emptive action on the part of others. Only by identifying the social actors, their structures, resources, aspirations and operations, their communications inputs and outputs, their suppliers and clients, their co-operators and adversaries can we begin to sort out the social reality of the community.

"Community" is the term we apply to the omniscient social grouping whose only evident end, like that of an organism, is itself, the common welfare of the whole. To this each functionally specialized person and group in the community contributes, each in its limited but (presumably) constructive way, as a part of the whole. One of the most serious errors of modern social thinking has been to conceive community principally in terms of large social aggregates: the nation-state, the volk united by history, culture and language, or the class united by its status as victim or exploiter in a radical adversarial relation with the "other." Yet if we look at community from another perspective--the hierarchy of omniscient communities with each succeeding level characterized by a larger population, greater complexity and functional differentiation, and usually encompassing a greater geographic area--then the natural complementarity of communities becomes clear. Each level of community possesses its appropriate "common welfare," which contributes to and is enhanced by the greater resources, diversity, and enhanced functional specialization and integration of the larger community.

The ever-present temptation is for decision-makers, political authorities, to employ the power of the larger community to over-ride or pre-empt the legitimate roles and appropriate autonomy of lesser communities. The world has become very sensitive to the individual's human and civil rights; it must be sensitized to the rights of families, local communities, peoples, voluntary associations and corporate entities. Does the notion of "academic freedom," for example, apply primarily to individual professors or to individual universities as corporate entities engaged in the pursuit of truth according to the founders' and constituents' values and frame of reference.

Similar considerations are relevant to towns and cities, peoples and ethnic groups, associations and corporations. Must the "rule of law" and "equality under the law" liquidate all social subsystem boundaries, autonomy and discrete identity in the pursuit of some egalitarian homogeneity? Or should the "rule of law" provide rules of the game that respect the diversity, legitimate autonomy

and inherent rights of communities and mediating groups while assuring the conditions of their peaceful and orderly convenience? Does "equality" demand the liquidation of all social boundaries in the greater society? This produces an inevitable tendency toward social homogenization at ever lower levels of economic, intellectual and moral achievement. Perhaps equality as a desirable social characteristic might better be sought in terms of opportunity and the coexistence of a variety of "life spaces" that are both accessible and satisfying in terms of men's multiple and diverse allegiances and value orderings.

Not least, we must think of social groupings longitudinally over time. Communities and corporations are potentially perpetual. Families endure and successive generations build on the achievements (or may recoup the failures) of their ancestors. The same is true of larger groupings, urban aggregates, regions, nations, cultural areas and the great globe itself. Intellectually, we are pygmies standing on the shoulders of a few giants and a lot of other pygmies. Within our cities we gain increasing respect for the past. Contextual building and historic preservation recognize that men cannot live comfortably without roots in their past, a sense of place, identity within a structured and hence delimited (and to some degree intractable) physical, artifactual, social and cultural environment.

The applicability of these notions to urban analysis are, I think, clear. It is entirely feasible to map the formal and informal social structures of the city as well as its physical facilities, buildings and public places, and relate them to the functional requirements and values orderings of the community. Secondly, we can trace these over time, determine trends and more or less probable futures. Not least, we can begin to make explicit the value orderings governing group life.

In turn, inevitably we must confront again the most basic issues of social philosophy. What is the good life, the common welfare? What are the limits of freedom? What is the range of diversity compatible with an ordered life in society? What are the limits to individual and group behavior in terms of social protection and the defense of the very young and very old, the weak, the poor, the disadvantaged, the marginal? And above all, what is the range of provisions, the rules of the game, compatible with the autonomy, freedom of action and welfare of the individual persons and the social groups that comprise the polis?

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Chapter XVII
**Are Cities Communities? Early Debates on Urbanism in the
German Federal Republic**

Tamas Toth

The period of reconstruction and the restoration of capitalist relations which lasted until the late 1950s in West Germany was of great importance to urban development. As 40% of the housing in present-day West Germany had been destroyed in the war, the significant growth of the population due to resettlement, the influx from East Germany and the post-war demographic boom resulted in an acute housing shortage. The urgent mass demand for housing made capital investment in the building industry highly lucrative in the years of the "economic miracle." According to statistics, about 15 million homes were built between 1949 and the late 1970s. By 1956--at least statistically--every family in West Germany had a home and every person had at least one room of his own.

More importantly, however, there were some qualitative changes in the West German settlement structure. Experts agree that a new period began around 1960 in West Germany's urban development with the growing influence of the economy's third or service sector. This new trend of urbanization began to elicit increasing criticism from the early sixties, while in the seventies urban debates assumed ideological importance.

The various ideological tendencies in urbanism and urban criticism¹ elaborated which at times were carried into practice in West Germany after World War II considerably differed from the conservative anti-urbanism formerly so influential in Germany (see my chapter, above); indeed the two frequently engaged in open polemics. While conservative anti-urbanism displayed an anti-capitalist attitude, relying on obviously mystified pre-capitalist ideals (like villages in agrarian societies and pre-industrial towns), the new tendencies decidedly accepted capitalist urban development as at least inevitable and irreversible. On the other hand, unlike Riehl, Tonnies, Spengler, etc., who concentrated on the universal relevance of modern urban development and interpreted it on theoretical level of a philosophy of history, most analysts of the post-war period abandoned the examination of such global aspects of urbanization. What the restoration period apparently required was a sober-minded analysis of the status quo, on the one hand, and a basically practical involvement, on the other. This, in turn, resulted in an ideological rejection of all ideologies in the revived urban sociology.

Before long, however, the spread of these attitudes of hostility toward ideology and theory began to hinder the analysis and interpretation of the facts and materials accumulated by the rapidly expanding empirical research. Some sought a solution in choosing comparatively concrete research objectives which supposedly could be analyzed in a direct, empirical manner and yet at the same time worked also like a lens in focusing upon and illuminating the diffuse tendencies of society as a whole. Forms of human settlement appeared to be typical models for such structures and tendencies. And indeed, the first major results of post-war empirical research in West Germany were achieved in the field of urban sociology.

The 1950s: Community Anti-Urbanism Gemeindesoziology

A dominant trend in post-war urban sociology up to the late fifties was called Gemeindesoziologie. (Though the term is generally accepted, its ambiguity has caused much

difficulty even in German-speaking areas. As "Gemeinde" may mean village, town, city, community parish, congregation, etc., it cannot be translated precisely by any single word.² According to one of its leading exponents, R. König, Gemeindeforschung is a coordinated complex of three branches of empirical sociological research, namely, that concerning: (1) towns and cities, (2) villages and rural areas, and (3) the interactions between urban and rural regions.

Post-war urban research in West Germany was at first patterned on American models (and partly supported directly by American authorities financially and scientifically). It is clear now that the periods and trends of American urban sociology must be interpreted in the context of the social and political tendencies within the USA. It is also obvious now that the social criticism in the USA of the twenties eventually gave way to a kind of "unbiased scientism" which, however, did not rule out the possibility of a manipulative adaptation of research findings to the status quo in the spirit of "social technique". Nevertheless, after the war many West German researchers adopted American research methods with, at times, uncritical enthusiasm. Rejecting because of their ideological implications the conceptions of former German theorists, which either had been compromised during the era of Fascism or proved unfeasible under the new circumstances, they considered positivist methods in sociology to be a guarantee of scientific objectivity. As is widely seen today, Gemeindeforschung succeeded in pinpointing many remarkable facts but failed to cope intellectually with the new empirical materials for it remained empiricist throughout. As a matter of fact, R. König himself considered this "thought-less empiricism" to be detrimental to the prestige of Gemeindeforschung. Indeed, König's and the others' efforts were sometimes billed--not without justification--as a trend "in search of a theory". These facts notwithstanding, Gemeindeforschung never fully complied with the criteria of empirical sociology, nor did it arrive at a creative theory.

Of all the researchers involved, it was R. König who set out most determinedly "in search of a theory." As we shall see, he wished to elaborate a general and "neutral" concept of the Gemeinde. Sharply differentiating between its administrative and the sociological aspects he defined it in terms of the latter as "a place where the extreme complexity of society as a whole can be directly perceived and even experienced by the people." But, having declared the Gemeinde to be "a basic form of social existence in its empirical reality" and raised heuristic hopes in the reader, in a sense König retreats. Although consistently refusing to interpret human settlements as isolated and independent phenomena, he thought it the specific task of Gemeindeforschung to study them in terms of their specific socio-cultural nature. In this conception the Gemeinde is both a local unit (*lokale Einheit*) and "a definite social system."

The "social system" of a settlement however, is considered by König as practically independent of economic, demographic, administrative and ecological features; he interprets it as the structural interrelatedness of "specifically social moments". Translated into practice, this means that the focus of research shifted to discrete investigations of social group relations, to communication systems, social control and cultural traditions characterizing individual settlements. All this took place precisely in a period when, in addition to the overall importance of economic aspects, the role of the specifically local determinants of social life was being significantly reduced. Of course, there were more empirical surveys whose organizers proved more responsive to global social relations, yet at least in the field of theory the only real merit of Gemeindeforschung seems in retrospect to have been its effort to supersede the conservative heritage.

The essays of Riehl, Tönnies, and Spengler--and, in another context, of M. Weber and W. Sombart--aimed at creating general typologies of human settlements which sometimes reached the

level of a philosophy of history. Nevertheless, all these typologies proved to be specified to varying extents in economic and social terms as well. In comparison, even though more of less problematic in their content, certainly it was a step backward to examine mainly what was "specifically local in character" among the "values" and "symbols" that were supposed to ensure the inner cohesion of a given settlement, as well as in the social interactions.

Relatively, however, West German researchers of this period made some progress by turning against the conservative thinkers' passionate and often demagogic anti-city stance, empirically reviewing their arguments, disproving them and showing their ideological implications. The specific "neutrality" of R. König's or H. Kötter's definition of the "Gemeinde" reflects a sort of synthesis of these recognitions.

What the new Gemeinde concept disproves in the first place is the sharp conservative contrast between village and town, and between small town and big city, implying as well an unmistakable value judgment. König sees no reason to consider a small commune more "natural" or "organic" (and hence to be judged more favorably) than a metropolis; in theory Kötter finds no considerable difference between rural and urban settlements. In view of the conspicuously sharp "class divisions" of modern society, irrespective of the type of settlements, König repeatedly and emphatically rejects the identification of Gemeinde and Gemeinschaft (the latter term in Tönnies' interpretation denoting an integrated community). In his analysis of the history of the German village, Kötter proves how utterly untenable were the ideologies that idealized the way of life in the allegedly "harmonic," "well-arranged" and "organic" preindustrial rural communes which were the basic frame of reference for the conservative agrarian policy. Post-war research also has refuted the demographic and "anthropological" racist arguments of anti-urbanism.

Nevertheless, one problem raised by the conservatives engaged the attention of urban research for quite some time: notably, social disintegration as an allegedly inevitable consequence of city-life. No doubt it is not fully unjustified to speak of the "rootlessness," "atomization" or "proletarianization" of the working masses, especially in big cities during the industrial revolution, since the change-over to a new way of life on a mass scale entailed great difficulties. Engels' youthful writings also bear this out. Conservative German thinkers, however, regarded the allegedly growing disintegration of the urban masses always to be an immediate threat to the political status quo. After World War II this also was more subtly treated by research.

Such Gemeinde-sociologists engaged in big-city research as E. P. Feil tried to answer the question whether "people in big cities are really lonely or not" (Schelsky) on the basis of a thorough empirical analysis of human relations.³ They found that although a certain degree of "anonymity" and "indifference" was typical of their passing and superficial relationships, city dwellers were not devoid of attachments from the point of view of urban sociology. True, in the cities as elsewhere the traditional large family was reduced to a unit of two generations with few children and lost many of its former functions, especially in production but it did not disintegrate.

The family adjusted flexibly to the changed urban circumstances. To offset the alienated sphere of production, the family assumed a greater role in protecting the intimacy of human life and defending the psychic integrity of the personality. Modern housework was assigned a new economic functions, etc. Studies of neighborly relations have shown also that it is quite unwarranted to speak of the irreversible disintegration of all human communities and relations in modern cities. E. Pfeil and others wished to define in terms of urban sociology and as objectively as possible the extent to which individuals and their communities are isolated and integrated in the post-war big cities. But they did not use their findings to form general value judgments--certainly not direct ones and, even less, negative ones--on cities as complex phenomena.

So the extreme ideal types of conservative urban policy failed the test of the time. Its representatives had ignored the subtle differentiation and social problems of small settlements. They also underrated the advantages that big cities offer to the development of new types of human relationships, whereas the main trends in urban planning after World War II relied precisely on these advantages in an effort to solve the problem of a developing disintegration.

Conceptions of green-belt suburbs and neighborhood units, ideas prompted by elements of the Charter of Athens which had a fundamental influence on urban reconstruction in West Germany,⁴ embraced a program of "loosening up and articulating the settlement structures? Their aim was not only to put a stop to the "amorphous growth" of modern cities and to bring about "organically articulated" urban settlements divided by smaller territorial units or "cells," but also to give a specific "social shape" to the cities.⁵ They sought to organize the atomized masses into living communities--chiefly into neighborhood communities--which were supposed to "reintegrate" city dwellers in political, ideological and sociopolitical terms. As several West German scholars have pointed out, this "integration"--a widely and uncritically adopted goal in the post-war years--was meant to reinforce the basis of legitimation of the capitalist system just being restored in modern democratic conditions.

It is typical of modern Western architecture to pursue the idea of integration, borrowed from the classical Greeks and reformulated in several utopian conceptions, with an overtone of social criticism. Here, however, the notion is often tamed to become a tool of "social technique" (or social engineering) with a view to a close interrelation and interaction of settlement and socio-political structures. If the rational core of that idea be ignored one cannot comprehend either the full importance of nineteenth and twentieth century Western urban models for the social sciences or their practical impact. Although urban and, more importantly, housing conditions strongly influence the everyday existence of the population and may entail serious socio-ideological consequences, it seems basically erroneous to assume, as did the advocates of urbanism motivated by social engineering, that by manipulating these relations--by revolutionizing architecture or the patterns of settlement--one might radically reform the entire society.⁶ This was realized also in West Germany where, after a brief triumphal march, the "neighborhood ideologies" sustained final defeat. Hence, "neutral" Gemeindesoziologie, after having refuted the pessimism of conservative anti-urbanism, had to admit the failure of the optimism of "neighborhood ideologies."

True, the specialized literature normally differentiates between neighborhood units as specific forms of community and as basic units of a town with definite institutions. While the latter proved technically feasible as the principle for dividing an urban territory, the ideals mainly of preindustrial communities often reminiscent of Tonnies--which were almost always present in the background in West Germany--did not strike root in the urban soil of modern (especially post-war) capitalism. Neighborhood communities eventually failed to exert the integrative influence expected of them: they failed "to exercise a therapeutic effect on the social and personal problems of city dwellers." (F. Pfeil).⁷

The 1960s: A Person Centered Urbanism

In the sixties urban research in West Germany took several new directions. This is manifest clearly, for example, by the powerful influence of H. P. Bahrdt who discarded the conservative goal of "total integration" and replaced it with the idea of "partial integration" as better suited to modern Western ideals. Opposed to neighborhood ideologies that "want to deprive cities precisely of what makes a city be a city," he not only approved of urbanization in general, but regarded as

the best way of reviving settlements to extend the "still rudimentary urban way of life in the throes of emerging," and to further "urbanize" the big cities. Rejecting both the biological analogies of organicistic ideas so fashionable after the war and the unphilosophical empiricism of Gemeindeforschung, Bahrdrff reaffirmed the role of "abstract thoughts," declaring that "the basic concepts of urban planning . . . must be defined by philosophy, social anthropology, sociology and economics." In this regard, he went beyond exploring the specifically local implications of the social processes taking place in the urban environment and raised the question of the dynamic interrelation between definite social states and definite urban structures. In this way, Bahrdrff's work is a transition between Gemeinde-research and the "sociology of urban construction" (Soziologie des Stadtebaus).⁸

In the final analysis, the new questions were raised by the problems of a new phase in urban development and in West German society as a whole. No doubt West German post-war reconstruction managed to alleviate the acute quantitative housing shortage. Yet in terms of global society it caused such grave and multiple malfunctions as to elicit massive, almost nationwide unrest. (This kind of urban criticism reached its peak in 1977.) Bahrdrff was one of the first thinkers to realize the new negative consequences of urban development after the war, and in terms of quality considered reconstruction a definite failure of the whole West German society.

Let us at least note the main symptoms⁹ which increasingly alarmed the public in the sixties and seventies. After the war, the gaps caused by the war destruction in the old infrastructural pattern were filled in. These constructions were determined by the size and ownership of the building sites.

Soon, however, in West Germany inner city development was relegated to the background, giving way to tendencies of massive agglomeration. In particular in the period between the mid-fifties and the late sixties huge housing estates mushroomed on the outskirts of cities: virtual "subcities" cropped up in quick succession. At the same time, masses of the population began to swarm more and more to the outlying suburbs.

Both forms of housing developments (especially the suburban type) are diffuse and land-intensive. The sprawl of cities led to a sharp drop in the number of improved building sites and posed a major threat to the vigorously expanding "leisure-industry" which required vast areas. All this pushed up land prices and rents, and precipitated land speculation.

To compound the problem, neighborhoods with different functions were separated territorially as well, or the territorial sectors of a town became "monofunctional." Especially conspicuous was the split between the city center and the residential areas. While the latter became purely "living- or bed-towns" devoid almost of all productive and even of commercial functions, the allegedly "superior" forms of efficiently utilizing the sites in the city centers squeezed out the residential apartments, sectors of commerce, etc., as is spectacularly shown by the difference in the day and night population. As city life continued to be "center-oriented" after the war the gravitation towards the center even increased. As public transportation failed to cope with the related requirements of sprawling settlements, the above processes were paralleled by a mass spread of the private cars. All this led to a chronic crisis, and occasional "collapse," of traffic in (big) cities.

Thus, when Bahrdrff took seriously the widely held view that modern urban development must be "man-centered" he could not but conclude that the West German cities and apartment living "did not satisfy the needs of urban job holders." In accordance with his general urban theory, Bahrdrff stressed the problems caused by the disruption of the former equilibrium between the two vitally important spheres of urban life, the private and the public on the one hand, appropriate forms of the public sphere either were distorted or failed to emerge both in neighborhoods and in

city centers while, on the other hand, excessive privatization was taking place as city dwellers locked themselves up in their privacy and became centrally concerned with how more efficiently to consume leisure time.

For this reason Bahrtdt turned against the program of "loosening up and articulating" the settlement structures. On the one hand, he says: "the sub-units of an urban social organization experienced collectively cannot be arbitrarily small, as below a certain magnitude the urban character is lost." On the other hand, to follow out his train of thought, no city center can be arbitrarily busy either, as too heavy traffic might destroy the preconditions of the specific forms of publicity: "the multifunctional character on a perceptible scale." The public sphere of a given district should not be "integrated" to any arbitrary extent, because that might jeopardize the independence of the private sphere and reduce man to "rural" and "feudal" conditions. Nor can a settlement be wholly inarticulated or unplanned for Bahrtdt would claim that the loss of the "clarity" or "transparency" of a district--features postulated by Konig--contributed largely to the decline of publicity."

For Bahrtdt, the right proportions and appropriately chosen scale are of paramount importance. Carefully weighing the advantages and disadvantages, he tries to find a constructive compromise amidst the antinomies of West German urban development. His general goal is "to restore with architectural measures the public or communal sphere of the city," and the healthy correlation between the private and the public.

The critical writings on urbanism by A. Mitscherlich, a renowned social psychologist from Frankfurt, though falling short of Bahrtdt's in subtlety of analysis, also caused extensive repercussions. Modern urbanism, he claims, could not keep pace with the biological and technical processes of the growth and concentration respectively of the population. The city, once the cradle of civil rights, produced such incredible disasters as wars, unemployment and Nazism in our century. The intimacy of human relations withered in the cities of a "technocratic mass society" as interpersonal communication was replaced by anonymous transmissions. All the efforts of urban planners reveal a shocking ignorance of genuine human needs. The "unfriendliness" and monotony of modern cities result in the political alienation of the population and their emotional exodus from the urban universe. In metropolises troubled souls become drug addicts and the sub-cultures of crime flourish. Therefore, Mitscherlich opines, the task is to create "eubiotic" environmental forms that may provide the minimal biological and psychological conditions in order for socialization to be effective in an urban context.

Mitscherlich's Frankfurt circle inspired the efforts of H. Berndt, A. Lorenzer and K. Horn, who tried to identify the social and psychological contents of modern architecture. Heide Berndt first used the phrase which probably most aptly sums up the criticism made by West German urbanists since the early sixties, namely that the modern city has "lost its urban character." (Verlust von Urbanitat im Stadtebau.) Although the writings of the above three authors, especially the sections on the history of ideologies, afford several remarkable observations, their final conclusion is quite moderate: namely, as the monofunctional development of different urban sectors unfavorably influences the interpersonal behavior of people, the architectural and aesthetic axioms of urban planning must be renewed; and the way to do this is by "experimenting."

Let us now examine how the trend of Bahardt understands the causes underlying the above-mentioned symptoms and the concrete ways to correct urban development. Mitscherlich sees the cities as political formations; Bahardt, too, intends his books as "political brochures" in his attacks on the anomalies of post-war urbanization. The central concern of both is the alarming dramatic decline in the weight of local (communal) politics. In their view this resulted in personages and

groups (e.g., building contractors) with great influence in the development of a city being driven by an "undiminished egoism," since this no longer is curbed by the responsibility of the "citizen." They do more, however, than merely expose and condemn individual profiteering and the grave social consequences of privately owned land and housing for the majority of the inhabitants of a town.

They also formulate a more general judgment: "If there is a point where the free market economy has failed," Mitscherlich writes, "it is the reconstruction of our cities." In analyzing the limitations of liberal housing, Bahr dt even draws attention to the (relative) backwardness of the West German building industry, which in fact had more than an insignificant role in perpetuating the problem. Yet both conclude that the failure of reconstruction could have been avoided "simply by more intelligence and better nerves," that the resulting crisis even could be altered subsequently "with some courage and consideration."

In our opinion however, this demand for a political interpretation of West German urban development stopped with the mere acknowledgement of the influence of certain politically relevant ideologies. Besides the direct effects of conservative anti-urbanism, Bahr dt emphasizes as ideological attitudes "restorative liberalism" and the "apolitical technicism" of technocratic urban planning. At the same time, however, he points out--partly under the influence of the so-called "decline of ideologies"--that by the sixties the former comprehensive, "history-making" ideologies had disintegrated, their distorted vestiges living on as "quasi-taboos" which continued to exert their influence in various eclectic admixtures. Bahr dt's main achievement was to explore with considerable objectivity the practical impact of the major ideological factors in effect during the first two decades of urban development in the Federal Republic of Germany. He discarded their extremes, synthesized in a subtle and well-balanced theory those elements of the questions which had been formulated and the proposed solutions which he considered still rational and summarized his conclusions in a program for urban architecture. Most significantly, Bahr dt regarded the cooperation among the scientific disciplines concerned with studying various processes of urbanization to be the main tool in bridging the gap between theory and practice and in solving the problems.

An Ideological Critique

Thus, through the sixties the criticism of the negative features of modern urbanization was carried out of place in the works of the above-mentioned authors--with shifting emphases, of course--mainly in terms of ideological criticism. As such, it often stressed highly interesting and comparatively progressive viewpoints. In essentials, however, this critical line did not go beyond the theoretical postulates of the contemporary interpretations of modern urban development but merely relativity their theses one against the other. Progress in this respect picked up momentum at the very end of the sixties and mostly from the beginning of the seventies when several representatives of a quite radical new-left criticism of capitalist urbanization came to a progressive realization of the significance for social sciences of the city as the "medium of exploitation". Viewed from this angle, the tendencies of ideological criticism deriving from Bahr dt appear as ultimately rather "affirmative" and promotive of the social and political status quo.¹⁰

If reconstruction diverted West German urbanization in a problematic direction, the question as to who had set the false direction should be answered. Bahr dt and his colleagues had at least raised the question of the ideological responsibility of the immediate protagonists of these developmental processes (architects, urban planners, building contractors, real estate owners, etc.).

What is more, they also exposed in more or less concrete terms the historical origin and social value-orientation of the ideologies analyzed and giving expression to the "awakened sense of justice" of contemporary German scholarship. At the same time, however, they unwittingly hindered the exploration of the deeper components of West German urbanization by channeling the public discontent in a definite direction.

Their analysis of urban development from the point of view of ideological criticism has its defects. Though the apartments, houses and neighborhoods can in some way be conceived as embodiments of ideologies and, though the urban environment, as influencing ideologies, ideological content is not to be comprehended not by analyzing the "urbanists' conception of society" (as the title of Berndt's book suggests) in the first place. Wedged more and more firmly between the socio-political and aesthetic convictions of the urbanists and the actual development of the urban environment is the increasing influence of social interest groups, bureaucratic structures and technical constraints. The ideological factors which most effectively modify development are institutionalized in the guiding principles of the central housing and urban policies, the law concerning groundplots and the taxation system. One can reveal these often hidden contents only gradually, through ideological criticism of the complex process of urban planning. True, Bahrdt and Mitscherlich also take notice of the state's role, expecting it to have more courage to intervene firmly and introduce "social legislation." But they fail to conceptualize the state as the theoretical and practical representatives of distinct social interests.

Actually, in the fifties and sixties the West German state's housing and urban policies played an active role in several regards in the spread of the negative consequences of modern urbanization. This policy turned into an official program those elements of reform ideologies (suburban movement, neighborhood communities, Charter of Athens) which tended to "slacken and articulate" the settlement structures. Most of these reform ideologies, however, which never gained mass influence in Germany before the post-war period, were originally devised to solve the problems raised chiefly by conservative urban criticism. Further, if we realize that a market economy regulated exclusively by the mechanism of free competition often entails dysfunctional consequences in urbanization and housing, then we must also note that it was none other than the state's housing policy which in 1960 radically "reliberalized" the West German housing market--in spite of itself, as it were.

It is also important that, following from the above, the state had given priority to the building of freehold family houses from 1956 onward: nearly 50% of new homes belonged to this category from the end of the fifties. In West Germany a whole system of prejudices and illusions, a real "home-of-your-own ideology" (*Eigenheimideologie*) evolved around this form of housing and property and influenced the mentality of millions of people.¹¹ This conception, whose early advocates had already been sharply attacked by Engels, was severely criticized because of its integrative function by M. Kallmunzer in 1971. In point of fact, she stresses, the "home-of-your-own ideology" legitimated the capitalist system of production by making attractive values and ideas which harmonized with the theory of the "social market economy" (*soziale Marktwirtschaft*), the basic socio-economic conception of the Christian Democrats. The doctrine of the social market economy connected with A. Muller-Armack and L. Erhard blends various, mostly neo-liberal ideas, as well as Christian social concepts of property and personality, most suitably implemented through the "own-family-house" as a specific and particularly popular form of private property.

The notion of the "house-of-your-own" expressed and fostered the belief that no free and autonomous personality or social security could be imagined without some form of private property as its basis. This served as a frame of reference for the so-called performance-ideologies

which sought to legitimize the hierarchic structure of West German society according to the difference in performance and social usefulness of individuals (the private home featuring as the measure and reward of personal effort). Also, it laid the ideational ground for the government's social policy which attempted to encourage the "formation of property" on a mass scale by "redistributing" some of the social wealth.

In the sixties however, most urban researchers had started from the urban processes' dysfunctional consequences which were obvious at the level of everyday experience. As a corollary to the fact that critical attention came slowly to be focused on the role of the "monofunctionality" of certain urban sectors in the loss of their "urban character," these dysfunctional phenomena were, paradoxically enough widely attributed to the oneness of architectural functionalism and to the functionalist-structuralist trends in urban sociology (summed up in 1968 by Schmidt-Rehlenberg), on which technocratic urban planning heavily relied. However, as they failed to comprehend the general nature¹² of the West German state's housing and urban policy in this period, they did not raise the question whether the long delay in solving the West German urban problems was only accidental or ideologically postulated, whether the criticized dysfunctions were not actually "functional" in terms of some covert but comprehensive social interests.

Such questions, of course, cannot be raised and even less answered correctly, if the researcher forgoes the dimension of social totality or excludes economic factors from the interpretation of that totality. The major historical types of urban development and the successive socio-economic formations seem substantially related to one another. A deeper insight into urban development in West Germany could be obtained only by studying it more or less consistently as capitalist urban development, taking a systematic account of the complex economic mechanisms this implied.¹³ Such an approach reveals that the symptoms of the modern urban crisis are the spontaneous negative outcomes of often rival economic strategies expressing various interests of power and profit, which can be tolerated by the ruling interests for some time.

This is what accounts for the odd fact that, although the symptoms of crisis generated mass unrest and although Bahrdr, for instance, admittedly wanted only to create optimal environmental forms for the status quo, he failed to translate into practice even his seemingly most obvious and feasible urbanist ideas. Generally speaking, it was impossible to restore both the ideal neighborhood communities and the harmony of the "private" and "public" in urban life. Typically enough, Mitscherlich thought that no one but an enemy of his would demand of him more than a critique. Nor could other authors put forth comprehensive, but at the same time concrete and practical proposals to solve the urban crisis. Yet proposals were not wanting in quantity. What is more, the practical response to some of them also gained strength (somewhat surprisingly) from the end of the sixties.

The 1970s: The Preservation of the City

A series of theories proposed in the footsteps of Bahrdr and Berndt have favored the preservation or restoration of the urban character of cities.¹⁴ They no longer belonged to the clearly progressive endeavors of West German urbanology in the seventies. Yet, besides their quite wide-ranging impact, they were noteworthy because they expressed international tendencies. They were linked not only with certain American views (J. Jacobs), but also with some elements of the earlier work of H. Lefebvre. Their arguments adduced in defence of the "urban character" used mostly a rather obscure terminology indicative of uncertainty as to content.

"Man continues to remain in the center and when this type of urbanology wishes to assert its claim to scholarship it consciously draws on a philosophical anthropology. But it is a "negative anthropology" for lack of an acceptable image of man. It assigns major significance again to the city as a form of human self-representation, but acknowledges that the existing order is no longer generally acceptable. Thus, the social content to be expressed has ceased to be unambiguous. These authors claim that what urbanology could do--note how necessity turns into virtue--is to recognize this "openness" of urban development and ensure cooperation among all the scientific disciplines concerned with urban research in order to alleviate some strictly delimited partial problems.

Of the latter, the clearly demonstrable alienating effect of the architectural environment is stressed above all. In the view of these urbanists, the deterioration of the city-dwellers' intercommunication and their decreasing ability to identify with their surroundings leads indifference to public life and growth in the dangers of conformism and manipulation. Since, however, their horizon is the determinative implications of social production, at best they attribute the problems of urban residents to certain specifically urban conditions of labor. Some "comprehensive" but unfeasible conceptions envisage the solution in radically reuniting urban functions which have become spatially separated over the past decades (G. Suter). The majority, however, hope to eliminate "alienation" by improving "communication" through typically urban means.

One of the central categories of urban research in West Germany is public life. C. Heil proposes developing the critical forms of urban public life in pedagogical-political ways. In most cases, however, after divesting this of its political dimension what remains is the various forms of "everyday public life" which, in turn, blend into the everyday forms of communication. H. Glaeser proposes only aesthetic and psychological approaches to modifying man's relation to this environment. He would do this by creating in the given "one-dimensional" urban milieu "ecological playgrounds" which encourage more "encounters", "relations" and "interactions" among the people in order to "orientate" and "socialize" them. These urbanistic counter-places (Gegenorte) are realized in the quite prosaic forms of no-car zones, walking malls, etc., which really do help to mitigate the dreariness of downtowns.

In the final analysis, however, the defence of the "urban character" are often unwitting protagonists of gradually more and more deliberate economic and power interests. They gained ground rapidly after the SPD-FDP coalition came to power in 1969, because its new urban and housing policy (Stadttebauforderungsgesetz, 1971) included some conclusions of the urban debates of the sixties.

The considerable rise in the activity of various state and local agencies in the field of regional and urban planning, however, is not attributable only to the arguments of the urbanists. Politics had to face up to the specific social tensions and the increasing demand of a part of the population for participation in urban politics rooted in urban problems. Above all, as the possibilities of private capital significantly changed in West Germany over the second half of the sixties (note, for example, the economic recession of 1966-67), the creation of new, up-to-date infrastructural conditions for the accumulation of capital in urbanization and transportation, as earlier in education and research, could no longer be put off. Obviously, private capital is interested in a problem-free supply of labor and the appeal of the "high value of leisure" in a truly urbanized environment is an important element in the rivalry for highly qualified labor.

Last but not least, one must remember the outstanding traditional role of towns, cities and their centers in the turnover of consumer goods. Of course, there have been significant changes in this respect as well over the past decades due to the rising importance of the mass media as

channels of advertisement and the spread of such new commercial forms as, e.g., suburban shopping centers, mail order houses, etc. Nevertheless, private capital has important vested interests in preserving (or restoring) the city centers "remaining urban functions which cannot be taken over by other media" (Gude). Visitors to city centers are first and foremost consumers who are offered, in addition to such specific shopping possibilities as more department stores and elegant boutiques, some extravagances as well. Sometimes these include the historic atmosphere of a set of old monuments and mainly high-class restaurants, cafes and bars, and a variety of shows, concert houses and theatres. A city center whose specific atmosphere makes "shopping a pleasure" is not simply a place for consumption: it is also characterized by "the consumption of the place," to use Lefebvre's words.

In recent years profit strategies have changed and the urban significance of the third sector of the capitalist economy has increased considerably. This has made it both necessary and possible for the changes sketched above to take place gradually, without affecting the basic system of production. Unwittingly or not, enthusiastic reference to the cities' "urban character" and indiscriminatory allusions to the unquestioned significance of urban development in civilization and the complex of "urban virtues" sometimes endows this very trend with progressive features.

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Notes

1. H. Korte, *Soziologie der Stadt* (Munich: Juventa Verlag, 1972); and H. Berndt, *Das Gesellschaftsbild bei Stadtplanern* (Stuttgart: Kramer Verlag, 1968), provide thorough studies of this point.

2. Between 1950 and 1970 this trend produced about 55 publications, among which: R. König, *Grundformen der Gesellschaft* (Hamburg: Die Gemeinde, 1958) and "Einige Bemerkungen zur Soziologie der Gemeinde," *Kolner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie*, Sonderheft 1, 1962; H. Kötter, "Die Gemeinde in der landlichen Soziologie," *Kolner Zeitschrift*, and Kötter/Krekeler, "Zur Soziologie der Stadt-Land Beziehungen," *Handbuch der empirischen Sozialforschung* (Bd. 10), (Stuttgart: Enke Verlag, 1977); etc. In the field of research on the Gemeinde, we used the following works: Adorno/Horkheimer, "Gemeindestudien," in *Soziologische Exkurse*, by the same authors (Frankfurt/Koln: 1974); R. Zoll, *Gemeinde als Alibi. Materialien zur politischen Soziologie der Gemeinde* (Munich: 1972); H.-L. Siewert, "Ansätze und Konzepte innerhalb der Gemeindeforschung," in H.-G. Wehling, ed., *Kommunalpolitik* (Hamburg: 1975).

3. See: E. Pfeil, "Soziologie der Großstadt," in Gehlen/Schelsky, *Soziologie* (Düsseldorf: Diederichs Verlag, 1955); E. Pfeil, "Nachbarkreis und Verkehrskreis in der Großstadt," in Mackensen, ed., *Daseinformen in der Großstadt* (Tübingen: 1955). See also H. P. Bährdt, *Die Moderne Großstadt, Soziologische Überlegungen zum Stadtebau* (Rowohlt: 1961).

4. The Athens Charter is an important document of functionalism in architecture. It was accepted at the congress of the International Congress of Modern Architecture in 1933 and had great influence on town-planning after the Second World War. The relationship of the trends and their influence in West Germany are dealt with by: K. Zapf, *Rückständige Viertel* (Frankfurt/M.: 1969), pp. 18-33; M. Kalimunzer, "Zur Kritik der Eigenheimideologie," manuscript (Munich, 1971), pp. 57-68; H. Berndt, pp. 35-72. Useful information on problems and trends in modern urbanism can be found in: F. Choisy, *L'urbanisme: Utopies et réalités, une anthologie* (Paris: Seuil,

1975); I. Pe renyi, *The Modern City* (Budapest: Technical Publishing House, 1967); *Modern Encyclopedia on Architecture* (Budapest: Technical Publishing House, 1978).

5. Essential references here include; Gode ritz, Ra iner, Hof fmann, *Die gegliederte und aufgelockerte Stadt* (Tubingen: Wasmuth, 1957), and S. Gie dion, *Architektur und Gemeinschaft* (Hamburg: Rowohlt Verlag, 1956). For criticism of this trend see E. Ba uer, "Integration als Wunsch und Wert in der Soziologie der Stadt, Versuch einer Ideologiekritik, in *Soziologie der Stadt*.

6. See: *Programme und Manifeste zur Architktur des 20. Jahrhunderts*. Zusammengestellt und kommentiert von U. Conr ads, (Frankfurt: Verlag Ullstein, 1964), pp. 28 and 59, and I. Rosows "Die Sozialen Wirkungen der physisohen Umwelt (1958)," in *Materialien zur Siedlungssoziologie*; G. Ribeil: "Elements pour une approche gramscienne du cadre de vie," *Espaces et Societes* (1975); K. Zapf, pp. 18-21.

7. E. P feil, *Grosstadt-Forschung* (Hannover: Janecke Verlag, 1972), pp. 343-348; H. Klages, *Der Nachbarschaftsgedanke und die nachbarliche Wirklichkeit in der Grosstadt* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer Verlag, 1958); H. B. Bah rdt, *Humaner Stadtebau* (Munche: Nymphenburger Verlagshandlung, 1973 (first edition, 1967), pp. 95-111.

8. Bahrdt, *Die moderne Grosstadt*, and *Humaner Stadtebau*, and excerpts from works by Bahrdt in: *Varosszociologia* (Budapest: The Publishing House of Economy and Law, 1973); A. M itscherlich, *Die Unwirtlichkeit unserer Studte. Anstiftung zu Unfrieden* (Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1967); A. Mitscherlich, *Thesen zur Stadt der Zukunft* (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1971); B erndt/Lorenzer/Horn, *Architekture als Ideologie* (Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1968); H. Be rndt, "Der Verlust von Urbanitat im StadtBbau", *Das Argument* (1967/4); H. Berndt, *Das Gesellschaftsbild bei Stadtplanern*.

9. Aspects on the subject: T. Tot h, "Problems of Urbanism in the Developed Capitalist Countries," *Vilagossag* (1977/12).

10. In connection with this the following materials were used: H. C. He lms, *Die Stadt--Medium der Ausbeutung. Historische Perspektiven des Stadtebaus*, and studies by L. Buck hardt, H. C. Kirch enmann and P. Nei tzke in *Kapitalistischer Stadtebau*, ed. Helms/Jansen (Berlin: Luchterhand Verlag, 1970); the analyses by H. K orte, E. Ba uer and Br ake/Gerlach in the *Soziologie der Stadt* cited earlier.

11. The question is analyzed in a highly interesting manner by Kall munzer, op. cit.

12. As many have pointed out, the main aim of the housing policy of the CDU-CSU can be summarized as follows: to restore a purely capitalist organization of housing management; as a corollary to gain the support of the people by promoting the idea of the private homes; and to use housing policy as an instrument of employment and business cycle policies.

13. E.g., S. Bie rmann, "Stadt und Stadtplanung, Ein Ansatz zu einer sozialwissenschaftlichen Theorie" (xeroxed diploma thesis) (Munche, 1971); the authors of "Kapitalistischer Standtebau," *Soziologie der Stadt* and *Kursbuch*, no. 27, as well as M. Kallmunzer, op. cit. However, the representatives of this trend fail to match their comprehensive analysis and criticism of West German urban development with the outlines of an alternative urban program.

14. These endeavors are aptly illustrated by the studies of *Urbanistik, Neue Aspekte der Stadtentwicklung*, hrsg. von H. Glaser (Munche: Verlag C. H. Beck, 1974), and C. Hei l, *Kommunikation und Entfremdung* (Stuttgart: Kramer Verlag, 1971). Cf. also: C. Su ter, *Die grossen Stadte* (Bergisch Gladbach: G. Lubbe Verlag, 1966). For a criticism of these views see: H. Linde, "Urbanitat" in *Handwörterbuch der Raumforschung und der Raumordnung* (Hannover: Janecke Verlag, 1970); S. Gu de, "Wirtschaftsentwicklung, Infrastrukturpolitik und Stadtplanung,"

in Soziologie der Stadt, S. Gude, "Der Bedeutungswandel der Stadt als politische Einheit" in Zur Politisierung der Stadtplanung (Dusseldorf: Bertelsmann Verlag, 1971); R. Bauer, "Stadt und Regionalplanung, I," Neue Politische Literatur (1976/1); M. Kallmunzer, pp. 168-182; and P. Peters, A város az emberért [Town for Man] (Budapest: Corvina, 1978), pp. 63-73.

*Only the most essential references are given here.

Chapter XVIII
Immigration, Ethnicity and the Neighborhood
Agenda Urbanization in America

John Kromkowski

The prospect of learning from the past has become especially attractive in an era of conservative critique. The political invocation of traditional values such as work, family, neighborhood and entrepreneurialism fill public discourse.¹ Conservatives point to the success of European immigrants in America and the contemporary celebration of the Statue of Liberty seems to enshrine the productive and enlivening elan of an earlier era of immigrant social formation and urban economic development.

The line between image and reality of immigration, ethnicity and urbanization needs to be drawn. No doubt much can be learned from traditional practices. But the process of learning from human experience begins with the honest-to-memory recollection of experience and ongoing analysis of human phenomena especially social inventions which shape the various dimensions of sociality, economy and polity that constitute our worlds of meaning and action. Honest-to-memory recollection and radical phenomenology are especially relevant for such relatively under-analyzed fields as the history of immigration and urban economic development. Moreover, the mere selection of desirable values--work, family, neighborhood, enterprise--and the announcement of their merit and efficacy runs the risk of inviting ideological counter-selections and counter-incantations based in other historical preferences and findings. The upshot of such debates is the generally distrust of learning from the historical and experiential and the subsequent search for innovative 'ahistorical' recipes and a priori therapies for persistent conflictual issues of urban life in America such as: immigration, ethnicity and the decline and development in urban neighborhoods' economies.

At bottom the cultural conflict in a multi-ethnic society and economic crisis of urban development are not resolved by historical claims and ideologies supported by selective historical evidence. The resolution of conflict and the recovery of civility and economic well-being in a multi-ethnic and mobile urban society are the ongoing tasks of our era as they were in earlier circumstances. Then as now formative and guiding forces of experience teach profound lessons. What one learns and values at the first intersection of the personal in one's family and of the public in one's neighborhood shapes one's judgment and action in the urban arena of culture and economy that constitute the urbanized settlements in which larger and larger numbers of the American people live.

Periods of change often produce a conflict but more importantly they force us to define the commonweal we share. But groundless expectations for the future based in ideological images of the past eclipse honest-to-experience representations of reality which ought to inform and guide us.

Thus the argument begins: the neighborhood is the building block of a city and the neighborhood experience of immigrants are a source of civility and a model of economic development which are significant to contemporary urban well-being. In the American experience, the small scale settlement--the neighborhood--not only mediated the passage of immigrants, toward becoming ethnics, citizens, producers and consumers, as importantly, it mediated the person from family into the public world of common culture, politics and economics. Through such interaction and relationship a society fashions bonds of association and exchange. The

neighborhood is the initial locus of an interesting set of intersections which may be fruitfully named the public, private and community sectors of the American reality. Thus the neighborhood is a social invention whose capacity for economic and cultural well-being appears to be pivotal for social formation, economic well-being and political development.

Contemporary urban neighborhoods exist in uneasy tension with large-scale governmental, cultural and economic institutions. The agenda proposed for urban neighborhoods and the endorsement of American social formation influenced by immigration and ethnicity does not invoke either of these sources as merely symbolic or as romantic political totems. The neighborhood agenda emerges from experiential analysis of the relation of immigration and ethnicity to the moral universe of exchange of goods and services. Such experiences informed by pragmatic common sense suggest the ground from which preference for the neighborhood can be determined without the sleight of hand employed by either romantic nostalgia or destructive progressivism.

Immigrant Experience

Feldstein and Costello, editors of *The Ordeal of Assimilation*, point to certain neglected aspects of social and economic practices of the early 20th Century and argue against romantics who concentrate on the success stories and magnificent contributions made by the newcomers to American life. According to Feldstein and Costello understanding the foreign-born's plight in America reveals ways in which these aliens have been affected by their new environment.

Immigration to America included experiences in 'uprooting' themselves from their native lands, making the arduous journey to America, trying to establish roots here, facing discrimination and privation, and attempting to adjust to a culture which was totally alien to the one they had left. They faced the threat and difficulty of detention or rejection at the port of debarkation, entrapment by unscrupulous shipping and boardinghouse agents, finding decent lodgings and employment and adjusting to a very unfamiliar life-style.²

During economic booms jobs in America were plentiful. Native-born Americans and immigrants from Northern and Western Europe were moving along the occupational scale and were no longer available to fill menial positions. Feldstein and Costello and others report that that Eastern and Southern European newcomers generally lived in the worst urban tenements and were exposed to the ravages of periodic epidemics. They were exploited by absentee slumlords and ruthless employers. The immigrant workingmen often toiled long hours and at very low wages, and many through no fault of their own, were the victims of serious industrial accidents.

Upon arrival in the United States, immigrants usually came under pressure to become "American," to conform to the actions, values and beliefs of the Anglo community. The pressure frequently caused the newcomers some uncertainty about the values and sense of community which they could develop in their new situation. Feldstein and Costello confirm the findings of many social historians:

The aliens also were constantly under pressure to strip themselves of all aspects of their Old World backgrounds. Furthermore, the advocates of Americanization sought to divest them of their ethnic characteristics and have these new citizens of the republic adopt the customs and language of the predominant culture. While being discriminated against, the foreign-born found themselves in the paradoxical

position of being forced to become part of the homogenized mass which was victimizing them.³

While such influences were strong, closer-grain analysis of ethnicity and the American regime suggest an angle of vision which runs obliquely to, if not counter to, the lines of argument of that focus upon the victimization of immigrants by the Anglo culture and the capitalist system. However, the success of immigrants in America cannot be denied. Closer attention to the diversity of culture and history that characterized Southern and Eastern European ethnic groups reflects their job experience after arrival in the United States. Some immigrants, such as the Armenians, were far more interested in entrepreneurial opportunities than others such as the Bulgarians who looked to employment in industry to make their living.⁴ Certain groups such as the Greeks were attracted to service jobs, while others such the Poles were employed primarily in heavy industries as miners or steelmakers.⁵ From 1890-1950 the occupational mobility rates of immigrants and their children also varied from group to group; for example, 43 percent of second generation Romanians moved into white-collar occupations, but only 16 percent of second generation Slovaks did the same.⁶

Certain aspects of the immigrant experience, however, were shared by almost all groups. All began at the bottom of American society; they endured difficult social and economic conditions, often for several generations; the rate of occupational mobility for most of them was low until relatively recently; and they were victims of social and economic discrimination at the hands of their fellow Americans.⁷ The Kerner Commission Report summed up the experience of Southern and Eastern European immigrants in the course of its analysis of the problems of American cities in the 1960s. Eastern and Southern European ethnics,

who came to America from rural backgrounds, as Negroes did, are only now, after three generations, in the final stages of escaping from poverty. Until the last 10 years or so, most of these were employed in blue-collar jobs, and only a small proportion of their children were able or willing to attend college. In other words, only the third and in many cases the fourth generation has been able to achieve the kind of middle-class income and status that allows it to send its children to college. Because of favorable economic and political conditions, these ethnic groups were able to escape from lower-class status to working class and lower middle-class status, but it has taken them three generations.⁸

Historical and local factors must be examined even more closely. The conditions under which the immigrants worked and lived remained difficult and marginal for the first two or three generations. The conditions in immigrant neighborhoods such as Manhattan's Mulberry Street or Chicago's Noble Street, rivaled in congestion and unhealthiness those of any urban slum in the world.⁹ Chicago housing inspectors for 1900, 1910 and 1920 concluded that living conditions in the worse quarters of Calcutta or Tokyo were more favorable than in the Polish neighborhoods of the city.¹⁰ As late as 1940, the infant mortality and tuberculosis death rates in Slavic and Italian immigrant districts were the highest or among the highest in the cities in which they lived.¹¹ In a city such as Detroit, the 1940 census showed that more than half the housing in immigrant areas was classified as substandard.¹² Working conditions were equally difficult and dangerous. The United States in the early part of the twentieth century had one of the worst industrial safety records among industrialized countries, and Eastern and Southern European immigrants who worked at

the least desirable and most dangerous jobs suffered a disproportionate amount of the casualties.¹³ For example, at the South Chicago mill of Illinois Steel for the five-year reporting period between 1906 and 1910 one out of every four immigrant workers was injured or killed each year. The victims numbered more than 3,000 men over the five-year period.¹⁴

The low occupational and social status of Southern and Eastern European immigrants was matched by equally low wages. For the years 1908 through 1910 the Commissioner General of Immigration reported that 58.2 percent of foreign-born Bulgarian, Greek, Croatian, Italian, Lithuanian, Macedonian, Magyar, Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Russian, Ruthenian, Serbian, Slovak, Syrian or Turkish males earned on the average less than \$400 per year, while only 15.2 percent of the foreign-born who were Dutch, English, Irish, Norwegian, Scotch, Swedish and Welsh earned less than \$400 per year.¹⁵

Their low status is reflected in the fact that in many industries they earned less and held less skilled and prestigious jobs than the small number of obviously disadvantaged Black Americans in Northern cities with whom they worked.¹⁶ Only during World War I did Eastern and Southern Europeans definitely begin to pass Black Americans in their occupational and economic status.¹⁷ That advantage came just as large numbers of Blacks from the South began to migrate North to fill the growing demand for labor caused by the wartime suspension of immigration, and hence to replace gradually the Southern and Eastern Europeans at the bottom of the society. The presence of a new group may have served to push Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry a step or two up the ladder of occupational status as they themselves had boosted native white Americans and immigrants from Northwestern Europe a generation before.¹⁸

Thus, for several generations Eastern and Southern Europeans provided a major pool of cheap labor for the mines, mills and factories of America. As a result "many millions lived in abject poverty in the densely packed slums. They were also too often without the most simple comforts and conveniences which their own labor made possible for others. They struggled merely to maintain their families above the level of actual hunger and want."¹⁹

Social Mobility

The rate and patterns of occupational mobility for Southern and Eastern European ethnic groups varied considerably. Certain groups such as the Romanians showed a surprising mobility and interest in education and a significant segment of second generation Romanians in the inter-war period moved into middle class occupations.²⁰ On the whole, however, the rate of mobility for most Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry was slow and gradual before the 1960s. It is interesting to note that in many cases second generation males of some of those groups showed a decline in status in relationship to the status achieved by their fathers.²¹ This was especially true if the fathers had attained a precarious hold on a middle-class position. In his Cleveland study, Josef Barton notes, for example, that "Italian fathers who gained middle-class status . . . consistently failed to pass their status on to their children. As a result, the second generation started out the thirties with no better chances than those with which immigrants had begun."²²

These conclusions are supported in general by Stephen Thernstrom's mobility study of the population of Boston, *The Other Bostonians*. Perhaps the most careful and extensive historical mobility study ever done, it covers the period between 1880 and 1970. Several of the findings are worth noting. First Thernstrom observes that the Great Depression had a particularly stunting effect on the occupational mobility of the cohort of men born during the first decade of the century

who were beginning work at low-skilled occupations in the 1930s.²³ Northern cities in 1900 contained immigrant populations with high birth rates and a disproportionate concentration in the laboring classes.²⁴ It is clear that this disadvantage fell with heaviest consequences on many second generation Southern and Eastern European ethnics and retarded their upward mobility for life. Secondly, he concludes that there are sharp ethnic differences in economic opportunity. Immigrants consistently fared less well than natives in occupational competition, and the children of the immigrants were "distinctively less successful than men of old native stock."²⁵ He concludes that even though immigration restriction in the 1920s caused these differentials to blur, "half a century later they remain visible to some degree still."²⁶ Finally, Thernstrom found that there were variations in mobility rates between immigrants, second generation men and Yankees. Certain groups such as English and the Jews "found their way into higher occupational strata with exceptional speed" while Catholic ethnic groups such as those from Southern and Eastern Europe "moved ahead economically only sluggishly and erratically."²⁷

It appears that although by the middle of the twentieth century most Southern and Eastern European ethnic groups had established themselves solidly in the working class and had built stable and orderly communities, they had not yet moved in significant numbers into middle-class occupations.²⁸ Martin Mager's study of Detroit's elite graphically bears out that findings for one city. He concludes:

What is most striking is that by the mid-twentieth century Southern and Eastern Europeans still did not appear among the business, financial and industrial leadership of Detroit, in spite of the fact that two and in some cases three generations had passed.²⁹

The explanations of the "slow and erratic" mobility of most Southern and Eastern European groups have revolved around a series of cultural factors. Observers have pointed to the obvious lack of skills useful in an industrial society, strong initial interest in returning to their European homes after a few years of work in America, poor educational preparation, inability to speak English and low social status as hindering the advancement of immigrants. These disadvantages carried over to their children.³⁰ In addition, particular features of their religious background and/or their rural or national cultures were often cited.³¹ Some scholars using a Neo-Weberian analysis argued that Catholicism in general and the particular Catholic orientation and upbringing of the immigrants produced a worldview that placed less emphasis on worldly success and higher education than did Protestantism.³² Others pointed to the relative importance of community rather than individualism, and of the accumulation of capital to purchase land and homes rather than to engage in entrepreneurial activity, as the product of value systems and mobility strategies characteristic of rural societies. These strategies were seen, at a number of points, as antagonistic to urban, secular or "modern" value systems.³³

The value of these factors as sufficient and necessary explanations have been challenged. For example, Miriam Cohen has recently argued that the attitudes of Southern and Eastern European ethnic groups toward education was shaped not by deep-seated cultural factors, but by demographic and economic circumstances and the structural features of the job market.³⁴ She shows that when circumstances changed and the possibility of securing work and advancement as a result of education was perceived by Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry, they responded accordingly.³⁵ Cohen concludes that

parental attitudes about education changed not because attitudes about females, males or children in general changed but because these parents had to adapt to changing social circumstances in an effort to do what they had always done - to prepare their children with the proper skills so that they would survive, even succeed as adults.³⁶

The rather significant leap in income, education and middleclass status in recent years for Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry--a phenomenon Andrew Greeley called "the Ethnic Miracle"³⁷--also raises questions about the success of the cultural interpretation fully to explain their mobility patterns. Steven Steinberg's recent study, *The Ethnic Myth*, has argued that the establishment of strong ethnic communities and a stable working-class life pattern created the economic and cultural base from which third and fourth generations could move up economically once they perceived that barriers to mobility such as discrimination had begun to fall.³⁸ Steinberg, in fact, points out that the cultural and economic base from which Eastern and Southern European ethnics have begun to move into professional occupations and academic life is much more narrow and precarious than that which afforded Jews the opportunity to make a similar move a generation before.³⁹ The children of Jewish immigrants from Eastern Europe who moved into academic life so successfully, came overwhelmingly out of the merchant and small shopkeeper class, not out of the Jewish working class. Catholic ethnics appear to be making their move primarily out of a working-class base.⁴⁰ These explanations of the "Ethnic Miracle" would strongly suggest that their mobility was not the result of rejection of the cultural background of the ethnic community and its values but rather of building upon them.

Conflict and Civility

During every major economic crisis since the 1880s, immigrants have become a target for complaints and frustrations. Such conflict, which even occurs between established ethnics and new immigrants of the same nationality, does more than reduce production and services: it destroys civic confidence and damages the moral universe of victims and victimizers. Group-based oppression and discrimination based on national origin in America have been ignored and neglected dimensions of our moral order. Economic, social and cultural conflicts that exist beneath the surface of passive civility explode during crises. Times of limited resources provoke competition for access to the sources of power that are presumed as remedies. Because explosions are rare in a society of abundance and well-orchestrated diversions, some recommend no moral therapy. Put simply: if its not broke, don't fix it. This argument, however, discounts the importance of developing social consensus and dismisses approaches to cultural justice and the classical sense of civitas anchored in the experiences of lived cultural communities.

Sporadic reports of group violence and the demographics of immigration indicate that America is beginning a new round of population and cultural change. The number of Asian and South American immigrants has increased. The U.S. Census counted over 14 million foreign-born persons in 1980. In 1970 the Census revealed 9.6 million foreign-born persons. Yet Afro-Americans are isolated in urban areas and the expectation of an integrated society seems further off today than two decades ago. Such social indicators may induce fear and hatred. The challenge for leadership, however, is to channel the fresh and vital social energy of a new generation into attitudes, policies and programs which reflect the convergent hopes for fairness, dignity and respect for all persons.

Before this society yields to internal disintegration which may prompt extraordinary and tyrannical corporate and governmental remedies, we need to address the task of enabling Americans to understand the non-governmental, `natural', `organic', neighborhood based, community character of civil society in America. What I propose is a new agenda and action thrust to understand, to protect and to encourage community-based institutions which create a sense of human scale, cultural grounding for personal efficacy and common citizenship. There is good

historical-cultural evidence for the claim that community-based institutions have created wholesome and helpful bonds between persons as well as between people and large scale governmental and corporate institutions.

Careful attention to what is left of the community-based reality in America may enable us to understand the forces leading to group conflicts and to seek new approaches to achieving liberty and justice. Without a new vision of civility, the rights of persons will become only forced behavior. Resources that can be bargained and accommodated can obviously be lost.

It is time to recall that civility and civil rights are not merely the products of inspired speech and law. They spring from the best and most generous impulses in human society and culture and are created by living in communities. It appears then that to establish justice means to awaken America to an understanding of its complexity, its pluralism and the importance of small-scale community-based institutions. That is the agenda for the renewal and recovery of solidarity in the pursuit of justice.

Neighborhoods Decline

In 1904 G.K. Chesterton published his first novel, *The Napoleon of Notting Hill*. It was a curious and prophetic book set in 1884 about a young leader of the Notting Hill neighborhood of London who leads his people in defense of the neighborhood against a proposed highway that would cut it apart. Chesterton had a great love for particular places and, though a man of universal vision, his essay proclaimed that, "Empires wax and wane and never provide the kind of local democratic loyalty that men need."

Chesterton loved those particular places. "There stood a row of shops. At one end was a public house . . . somewhere a church . . . there was a grocer's . . . a second hand bookstore . . . an old curiosity shop . . . shops supplying all the spiritual and bodily needs of men." By the turn of the century he came to understand that his "progressive" friends wanted to destroy the Notting Hill's of the world in the name of modernity and human advancement. At that point Chesterton discovered that he opposed these planners and idealists--as he said, "I drew my sword in defense of Notting Hill."

In the eighty years since Chesterton drew his rhetorical sword, the warning bells his art and insight sounded now resonate in the life and experience of neighborhood people. The neighborhood has not fared well in the United States. In fact, at the very time he was writing, the Progressive movement was readying its attack on ward government and neighborhood representation in city government in many American cities. As a result by 1920, in cities such as Detroit and Pittsburgh, the ward organization and the patronage system that supported it were replaced by city councils elected at large and by an extended civil service. The local political machine associated with bosses and immigrant and working-class politics disappeared in favor of a new, city-wide, middle-class machine based on educational qualifications, civic clubs, trade associations, men's groups associated with prestigious mainline Protestant churches and blue ribbon commissions. Even in cities that were not "reformed," the increasing centralization and professionalization of city administration and services diminished the role of local and ethnic institutions.

After the Second World War, the infusion into the cities of state and federal monies with their accompanying guidelines covering highway building, welfare and educational policy, industrial development and urban renewal destroyed local autonomy and initiative and completed the ruin of many neighborhoods. The growth of new suburban areas, fostered by some of the same politics,

lured away many of the younger and more upwardly mobile of the neighborhood people. With the decline of the neighborhoods came the decline of the churches, schools, ethnic organizations, political clubs, shopping strips and entertainment centers that had tied them together and given them distinct identities. As a result, by the sixties many urban areas had been neglected, bulldozed, 'redlined' and paved over into highways.

In addition to growing powerlessness and deterioration, neighborhoods faced demographic changes that altered their ethnic and racial composition, culture and social cohesion. This sometimes brought on and exacerbated conflict and competition for control of housing and local institutions. Moreover, racial and ethnic succession in urban neighborhoods was often poorly understood, misinterpreted and exaggerated by media and national leaders. Though neighborhood weakness still abounds, the struggle in defense of neighborhoods foreshadowed by Chesterton has begun and the defense of neighborhoods based on honest-to-experience analyses has yielded judgments and actions that are fueled by Chesterton's moral sensibility. Yet, unlike his artful world of imagination, the praxis of contemporary defender of neighborhood is rewriting the agenda for urban life in the decades to come.

The neighborhood experiences of the 1970s indicates that there is a definable process of urban decay in American neighborhoods. And commercial disinvestment is a crucial component of this decay. The damage done to local, national and urban economies is severe. However, neighborhood revitalization which began as an art is now emerging as a science. Because commercial disinvestment is a key feature of decay, commercial revitalization is an indispensable part of the general revitalization. Neighborhood commercial revitalization can succeed under the right conditions and provided the appropriate development experiences are transferred to, and applied by, the private, public and community sectors of America.

The pattern of urban decline is well known and documented. Something like the following happens. When an older residential neighborhood begins to experience signs of distress, its commercial strip of retail and light manufacturing, although affected, still functions and provides jobs and services to the residents. However, a crucial stage is soon reached as the older population begins to die off or move out.

Signs of decay occur. The commercial strip, which is one--in some cases the only--source of capital accumulation for the neighborhood economy, begins to deteriorate as businesses begin to close or move out. Government sponsored urban renewal may occur, destroying residential and commercial building without replacing them. A local employer may move out due to the structural differences in taxes created by the federal system. Banks and insurance companies begin to reassess their risk in the area, perhaps denying insurance and access to capital at any price. The municipal government may begin to limit city services due to the decreased political clout of the area. The most affluent move out, commercial and residential closings accelerate, the area becomes less and less attractive and the speed of decay accelerates.

The cycle of decay does not usually limit its effect to the initial neighborhood. If left unchecked, the negative conditions begin to spill into adjoining neighborhoods; severe dislocations and distortions are introduced into the economy as jobs move out and workers follow. Many of the newly unemployed, especially those from lower income families, however, simply can't move in order to follow the jobs. Valuable existing facilities (commercial, industrial, and residential) are abandoned or underutilized, and replaced with costly new facilities in a more desirable location. The classic liberal responses of government subsidies usually does little for the neighborhoods affected while further compounding inflation. As the government is forced into the political

position of allocating a greater share of economic resources, the ability of the market to achieve efficiency and productivity is hampered.

The process can continue until the city and ultimately the nation find themselves in the now too frequent predicament of having unlivable neighborhoods with a large unemployed population. Without any agencies for internal capital formation, this population is dependent upon outside sources for permanent subsidies to maintain even subsistence levels. Usually the main government assistance comes in the form of costly ongoing subsidies such as welfare, food stamps, public health and temporary job programs.

To the extent that government tries to create permanent jobs, it has tended to concentrate on large-scale industrial projects through the Economic Development Administration or highly visible showcases in central business districts through HUD's Urban Development Action Grants. These have only marginal impact on the neighborhoods. It is well known that over 80% of net jobs created in this country in the last ten years came from the small business sector which is the keystone to neighborhood commerce. This fact suggests that neighborhood commercial revitalization is a prime development arena as well as a key to neighborhood salvage.

Neighborhood Revitalization

The success or failure of community and economic development activities throughout the cities and communities of the U.S. depends largely upon very localized characteristics, dynamics and developments. Federal agencies, state and local governments can provide various incentives and supportive programs, but they cannot supply directly the most critical need nor can they alone implement community and economic development ventures and processes. These public sector actors can, however, recognize needs and design programs which eliminate bottlenecks and promote the development of those factors which produce successful development.

The factors which ensure the steady increase in potential production and consumption, as well as participation and ownership in a given community, form a complex equation. Community and economic development depend on a host of interacting processes: entrepreneurial activity, the actual basis of all production, the availability of productive processes and resources, the accessible level of technique, social institutions and attitudes, capital, and sufficient population and level of consumption. The saliency of these various contextual factors shift from time to time, and their relationships to each other change. Some of the factors are of course external and beyond the influence of a community. But, experienced neighborhood analysts and proven practitioners of neighborhood revitalization have fashioned an understanding of this complex process. They can help discern what is meaningful, effective and needed to develop a community and to promote its full economic potential.

In addition to a correct analysis of economic and market factors, it is now more than obvious that the full use of community resources, in all their variety, are important to any particular local economic development endeavor. The non-participation of any sector public, private or community puts a venture at extreme risk. Citizens groups, private businesses and other institutions can either oppose change and stifle development or be the primary impetus for development and improvement. Frequently, the difference between the adoption of one or another posture is determined by a group's self-interest and its understanding of its ability to share in the development.

It is clear then that the process by which a neighborhood economic development program is carried out requires this process of cooperative interaction. The public sector, primarily municipal

government, must create the proper environment in order for business to operate effectively. The private sector, principally business people and financial institutions who indicate a desire to remain and invest in the neighborhood, must take a central position in the actual process of business development. Organized community groups must actively participate in the planning and implementation of the revitalization program, provide broad-based citizen support, relate the economic development program to the overall neighborhood revitalization process, and mediate between conflicting interests when and if the occasion arises. The three sectors should be jointly involved from the outset. The following narrative model includes a description of the public, the private and the community sectors each, and the role each must play in an effective economic revitalization program.

Public Sector

The primary responsibility of the public sector is the delivery of various types of services and actions which are essential to a healthy community environment. In many cases, adequate delivery by the public sector can be a sufficient trigger for considerable private investment in the neighborhood. Provision of certain services and/or public actions by the municipality can spell the difference between the feasibility and non-feasibility of development projects. A partial listing of those necessary services and actions include:

- Police/security
- Parking
- Sanitation and neighborhood appearance
- Transportation facilities
- Code enforcement
- Other public actions--zoning, taxing, etc.

Adequate lines of communication should be established between public agencies and the private sector. Also because they are composed of, and represent, the interests of the residents of the area (who are the electorate), the community leadership must also play a vital role in this communication process.

Private Sector

In the context of the revitalization process, the private sector generally is made up of the local business and financial community. In any economic development program, this sector must carry the bulk of the development activity. The existence of a strong local merchants' association is often a precondition for an effective program. The members of such associations should be expected to contribute to the support of their organizations by both financial involvement and the contribution of in-kind services.

Experience has shown that business development must involve all or most of the following aspects of the neighborhood economy. A neighborhood commercial revitalization program, as carried out by a local public/private partnership, must be able to deliver services in all the following areas.

Improving the Competitiveness of the Existing Merchants. Local merchants forced to compete with regional shopping centers, generally are unable to do so effectively. By forming and working through active merchants' associations patterned along the lines of those regional shopping centers, merchants can upgrade the physical appearance of their stores and the quality of merchandise,

increase the scale of operations, promote the neighborhood as an interesting and convenient place to shop, institute building and equipment maintenance programs, and achieve cooperation in other programs of mutual benefit.

Providing Basic Commercial Services Lacking in the Neighborhood. Most old urban neighborhoods are under-served in terms of availability of basic goods and services. Treating the neighborhood essentially as a shopping center or district provides a way to analyze demand patterns, identify opportunities for new commercial activities, locate potential entrepreneurs, and assist in packaging and developing new business enterprises such as supermarkets, drug stores, junior department stores, hardware stores, etc.

Quality of Life Elements. A viable neighborhood economy should have interesting and entertaining commercial establishments such as restaurants, boutiques, and other shops, drawing heavily on the ethnic or cultural foundations in the neighborhood. These quality of life elements enhance life in the neighborhood and also attract customers from outside the neighborhood.

Involvement of Financial Institutions in the Local Economy. The local banks must play a central role in the revitalization process by providing loans to the merchants and property owners for rehabilitation and physical improvement. In most cases, banks are far more receptive to loan applications if they are properly packaged and part of a larger revitalization effort. For this reason, a local development organization should assist in individual business packaging and should help structure an overall development program. Its participation in establishing effective lines of communication between the financial institutions and the overall development effort can help assure an ongoing and mutually beneficial working relationship between the financial institutions and the local business community.

Upgrading the Employment Base in the Community. Except in very rare cases, the revitalization process will be severely limited if there is no expansion of the job base provided by the industrial sector. The city's overall economic development entity and community-based organizations should develop an active program to retain what industry is already in the neighborhood and to attract new industry by acquisition and relocation. In most cases, light assembly-type plants providing 50-70 jobs each are ideal for urban neighborhoods because they generally are nonpolluting and relatively labor intensive.

Community Sector

While the bulk of revitalization activity will come from the private sector, there are several aspects of the revitalization process in which community development organizations play a critical role. As part of their involvement in the planning process, community organizations must see that the economic revitalization program relates to, and supports, the overall neighborhood development program, especially as it pertains to land and physical development (e.g., housing) as well as to stability and neighborhood cohesion. Areas in which the community development organizations might be involved include the following.

Property maintenance. Just as maintenance of commercial property is critical to the success of a commercial revitalization program, overall neighborhood revitalization requires physical maintenance and improvement programs for residential property. By working with homeowners, the development organization can assist in arranging for property improvement loans through local banks and savings and loan associations. The confidence generated on the part of lending institutions toward the economic revitalization program should be transferable into other areas of a neighborhood revitalization program, including housing and home improvement programs.

Certainly the lines of communication and working relationship established by the development organization between the financial institutions and the community should result in a closer partnership in these areas.

Development of Land and Physical Resources. Neighborhood revitalization cannot occur without reference to the land and physical resource needs of the area. These needs include living and working space (housing and building construction and rehabilitation), social services (e.g., medical and educational facilities), and recreational opportunities (places of entertainment, sport and relaxation). In each of these areas there are obvious opportunities which a community development organization can help identify and package. Keep in mind that local ownership or oversight of these resources is a primary goal and requirement for neighborhood stabilization.

Local Ownership of Commercial Real Estate. To allow for greater local participation in neighborhood land use, programs can be developed to increase the local ownership of commercial and industrial real estate. The development organization can assist in the development of investment syndicates, organize property management companies, and recommend methods for improving the attractiveness and marketability of the commercial locations. It is also felt that broad-based community ownership of commercial real estate could improve the quality of maintenance and reduce vandalism.

However, these strategies and techniques regularly are neglected by economic planners. Moreover, the impact of investments which improve the capacity of community-based economic development are not factored into traditional approaches to unemployment, joblessness and poverty. New, yet tested, opportunity-creating approaches are needed to promote community development as an alternative to welfare dependency. Research and demonstration projects in neighborhoods which are successfully revitalizing their commercial strips suggest the validity of the following neighborhood economic revitalization (NER) approach. This approach replicates ordinary entrepreneurial processes which take into account different variables in each neighborhood. It is structured around ordinary entrepreneurial processes so that performance can be measured by profit and loss and assessed by community satisfaction.

A Neighborhood Economic Revitalization Approach

There are four major steps in such an approach: 1) identification and capacity building; 2) development; 3) implementation; and 4) wrap-up. These steps parallel those a private developer/entrepreneur would take to revitalize a commercial strip.

1. Step one begins by focusing on a troubled but still robust neighborhood which includes a neighborhood commercial area. The neighborhood residents and their institutions, along with local businesses, financial organizations and city officials are organized to shape their future through the initiatives of energized local leaders. Local leaders often are assisted by small seed grants and professional neighborhood organizers. They begin a process of meeting local needs, addressing unfairness in public and private allocation of resources, and developing neighborhood confidence. At this point, a rudimentary plan of action is clear and a series of development sites and possibilities are proposed.

2. In step two, the development process, the leaders contract for a market analysis of the existing area, hire an architect or engineer to review the physical plans and environment, expand the staff organization if necessary, and coordinate funding allocations and availability. They also work with a planner, the city, businessmen and residents to draw up a plan for their area. Step three

involves implementing the plan. The final step, wrap-up, includes grand opening ceremonies and management of the commercial operation.

The revitalization of an inner city commercial strip involves the same public and private sectors which led to its decline in the first place. The major task is revitalizing the spirit of these forces to bring about a concerted, comprehensive program for the total rehabilitation of the social, economic and physical environment.

The selection criteria used in the identification process are comparable to the ordinary entrepreneur's identification of a suitable market place. The economic revitalization of a community depends on the existence of a host of preconditions which ensure the profitable rebuilding. Profits must be measured not merely in cash flow balances of the merchants or cost benefits to city coffers, but also in the sense of place, dignity and freedom from fear of the inhabitants of the neighborhood. Initial and ongoing processes of community organizing and empowerment, leadership training and recruitment, as well as fashioning indigenous institutions to meet the challenges of rebuilding community cohesion, are needed to achieve optimum improvement.

Commercial revitalization will be most successful in an area where other programs for housing, crime control, jobs and health care exist. The ills of a ten to twenty year period of disinvestment cannot be cured piecemeal or quickly, even if all the people will it to happen. The pump can be primed with grant/subsidy dollars, but the successful operating cash flow mechanism for restoration of a neighborhood's life blood requires more dollars than it is politically possible to extract from the coffers of government. With an organized community, a series of coordinated programs and an active publicity campaign for communication between all sectors, the approach can operate successfully in the overall fabric for neighborhood economic revitalization.

The neighborhood economic revitalization approach will operate with few government controls or reviews, but it requires capital input at several points to ensure the successful capture of conventional funds. A careful balance, therefore, must be maintained between effective public control mechanisms and the allocation of limited public resources. It will take hard surveys and human energy for organizing groups into productive contributors in order to rebuild neighborhoods, cities and the nation; it is, therefore, important that local government be a sensitive, helping partner rather than a bureaucratic obstacle. Although it requires only a small amount of seed funds to begin the process, an astute organizer is needed to entice the initial capital investment which, in turn, is used to leverage other investments of capital. There are a number of sources of capital and matching capital funds, i.e. public and private sector funds, foundation funds, etc. An organization can afford to call in technical assistance to further its efforts at banding the neighborhood together, identifying revitalization processes and determining goals and objectives as some of these capital sources are identified and become available.

As a tool for the reversal of disinvestment in neighborhoods, the revitalization approach includes almost all applicable steps or activities necessary to affect reinvestment. It has taken at least ten to twelve years for neighborhood organizations in the inner city to coalesce, to identify themselves and their needs, and to learn the processes of reinvestment. This approach is an outgrowth of these decade-long efforts. Continued efforts of the sort and the consequent successful rebirth of inner cities for all peoples who live and work there can be accomplished during the next two decades.

Conventional approaches to development could be operational in inner city sites if redlining by bankers and insurance companies were not a counterproductive factor. The Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, the Community Reinvestment Act as well as some features of the tax code are

rudimentary incentives for recapitalizing jobless and poor areas. The perceptions of large-scale financial institutions should be refocused so that dependency and decline may be abated. Building or restoring the participation of banks, insurance companies and other investing institutions as trusting partners is thus a key factor in this approach. The political machinery and bureaucratic process should also be refocused so that the faith of all the parties concerned and affected by the process of revitalization can be restored. Most successful efforts towards revitalization are achieved by joint efforts of community residents and merchants acting in concert with public agencies and public and private source of investment capital.

An important difference between this and conventional approaches is the nature of the "entrepreneur." From one decisive, profit-motivated individual this approach goes to a tripartite group of various vested (and often conflicting) interests. Whereas the conventional entrepreneur works almost singlehandedly and with single purpose of mind, in the neighborhood approach the entrepreneurial team must relate to a host of negative influences and obstructions. This challenges the simple-minded notion of the individualistic entrepreneurship which neglects the effects of positive and negative external factors and fails to see that the neighborhood is a micro-market and economic multiplier. In point of fact the use of the neighborhood approach has begun the reexamination of conventional wisdom and market trends.

Reinvestment in urban neighborhoods by ordinary entrepreneurial interests will probably accelerate. However, this action for justice through development is not an automatic mechanism. It must be catalyzed and assisted by public, private and community resources. These must be targeted toward local projects that increase the flow of reinvestment and market activity in neighborhoods and encourage the development of viable establishments which will increase the range and quality of goods and services available to the community.

Projects could accomplish such goals through various program components that:

- lend support to potential businesses that will employ neighborhood residents
- encourage an increase of local ownership and involvement in new businesses
- aid in making the commercial corridors more competitive with outside markets by supporting physical development programs that will improve the appearance of and help stabilize the district
- support the establishment of a strong and active business association to organize cooperative advertising and promotional events
- encourage the involvement of community residents supporting and developing the direction and programs of the project.

Thus the process and the project of neighborhood revitalization includes more than invocation of wholesome values and symbols. The celebrated recover of squandered practices is mostly imagery. In most respects neighborhood revitalization is a complex contemporary artifice--a contemporary social economic invention. The measures of success proposed in this agenda are articulated and exercised by the persons involved. That the large-scale mechanism of cultural, economic and social formation ought to be attentive to the presence of the social fabric that constitutes the lived experience of urban neighborhoods is as important today as it was in the early 20th Century. The record of that era is as uneven as it is today. The ongoing work of social and economic justice is a task for each generation and each period of immigration. Honest-to-experience recollection of the immigrant experience, ethnic social mobility and neighborhood

decline are the pathway to normative and practical prescription about multi-cultural social formation and neighborhood development.

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Notes

*Portions of this paper will be included in the forthcoming work by P. Kochanowski, J. Kromkowski and T. Radzilowski, *Urban Ethnic Neighborhoods and the Occupational Status of Southern and Eastern European Americans* (Washington, D.C.: NCUEA).

1. See John K. White, *The New Politics of Old Values* (Hanover, NH: University of New Hampshire Press, 1988).

2. Stanley Feldstein and Lawrence Costello, editors, *The Ordeal of Assimilation* (New York: Anchor & Doubleday, 1974), p. XIX.

3. *Ibid.*, p. XX.

4. On the occupational and regional distribution of Southern and Eastern European immigrants prior to World War I see Caroline Golab, *Immigrant Destinations* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1977), pp. 3-64.

5 *Ibid.*

6. Josef J. Barton, *Peasants and Strangers: Italians, Rumanians and Slovaks in an American City 1890-1950* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974), pp. 137-141.

7. Philip Taylor, *The Distant Magnet: European Emigration to the U.S.A.* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971). pp. 167-209.

8. "Comparing the Immigrant and Negro Experience," National Advisory Commission Report on Civil Disorders in the United States (Washington, D.C., 1968), p. 145.

9. J. Reis, *How the Other Half Lives* (New York, Sagamore Press, 1957).

10. The Chicago Homes Association reported an average of 339.8 tenants per acre and 2,716 families compressed into forty acres in which no building rose over four stories. The report concluded that the density of the "Polish Quarter was three times that of the most crowded portions of Tokyo, Calcutta and many other asiatic cities." One block contained 1,349 children. *Tenement Conditions in Chicago: Report by the Investigating Committee of the City Homes Association* (1901) quoted in J. Parot, "Ethnic Census Black Metropolis" *Polish American Studies*, XXIX (no. 1-2, 1972), 7-12. The situation in the early 1920's had not changed dramatically with 50,000 people living per square mile in squalid, disease-ridden neighborhoods in which less than 10% owned their own homes. Edith Abbott, *The Tenements of Chicago 1908-1935* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936) Social workers and other observers often reported severe undernourishment and malnutrition in these areas well into the 1920's. For a report from Detroit, see *City of Detroit, Annual Reports of the Departments of Public Welfare, 1922*. On file, Benton Collection, Detroit Public Library. Helen Wendell, "Conditions in Hamtramck," *Pipps Weekly*, vol. 2 (Sept. 24, 1921).

11. For example, the infant mortality rates for Polish and other Eastern European neighborhoods in Detroit in 1940 ranged from 40 to 60 per 1,000 live births and the death rate from tuberculosis, a high of 70 per 100,000. *City of Detroit, City Plan Commission, Master Plan Reports: The People of Detroit* (Detroit, 1946), pp. 33-34.

12. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Housing Bulletin for Michigan Hamtramck Block Statistics* (Washington, D.R.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1942), pp. 5-8.

13. David Brody, *Steel Workers in America: The Non-Union Era* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969). pp. 100-101.

14. *Ibid.*

15. Data summarized from a table abstracted from a report by the Commissioner General of Immigration in Peter Roberts, *The New Immigration: A Study of Industrial and Social Life of Southeastern Europeans in America* (New York: MacMillan, 1912), p. 366.

16. The Dillingham Commission on Immigration (1907-1911) reported that the average wages of Blacks in the industries surveyed were higher than immigrants in industries such as steel making or meat packing. Blacks held higher positions and earned more money. For example in 1909 in the meat packing industry the average daily wage was \$2.35 for native Whites, \$2.05 for Blacks and \$1.79 for Poles and Lithuanians. See David Brody, *The Butcher Workman* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 85. On the steel industry see John Bodnar, "The Impact of the 'new immigration' on the Black Worker," *Labor History*, vol. XVII, no. 2, (Spring, 1976), pp. 214-229. For a study that puts the overall wage for Southern and Eastern European Ethnics engaged in mining or manufacturing at the same level or a few cents a day higher than for Blacks. See Robert Higgs "Race, Skill and Earnings: American Immigrants in 1909" *The Journal of Economic History*, XXXI (1971), 424-426. The low status of Southern and Eastern European Ethnics is evidenced by that fact that Blacks, the most discriminated-against native American group, were not infrequently hired as armed guards to police Southern and Eastern European immigrants up to the end of World War I, often with resulting violence. For incidents that resulted in numbers dead and injured see T. Radzialowski, "Competition for Jobs and Racial Stereotypes: Poles and Blacks in Chicago" *Polish American Studies*, XXXIII (no. 2, 1976), pp. 5-18; and W. Tuttle, *Race Riot 1919* (New York: Anthenum, 1974), p. 138.

17. Bodnar, "The Impact of the 'New Immigration' on the Black Worker" concludes that Southern and Eastern European Ethnic workers passed Blacks in their occupational status and wages by 1915. The increase in their numbers also displaced a significant number of Blacks working in this and a number of other industries. On this also see David Katzman, *Before the Ghetto: Black Detroit in the Nineteenth Century* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1973), pp. 116, 120. And Gilbert Osofsky, *Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto* (New York: Harpers, 1971), pp. 196-198. Mobility rates for some Eastern and Southern European groups remained at the same level as that of Blacks even after World War I. A new study of Pittsburgh concludes "as late as 1920, half of the Russian Poles and nearly three quarters of the German Poles and Southern Blacks had failed to move from the bottom of the occupational classes . . . Northern born Blacks and Italians, conversely, moved out of the lower skilled levels with increasing frequency each decade." John Bodnar, Roger Simon and Michael Weber, *Lives of their Own: Blacks, Italians and Poles in Pittsburgh, 1900-1960* (Urbana, Ill.: University of Illinois Press, 1982).

18. On the "uplifting" effect of a new group of migrants on other workers see Theodore Hershberg, and others, "Occupation and Ethnicity in Five Nineteenth-Century Cities: A Collaborative Inquiry," *Historical Methods Newsletter*, VII (no. 3, 1974), 212-213. While the replacement of Southern and Eastern Europeans by Blacks at the bottom of the occupational scale may have had a significant impact on their mobility in some cities and some industries it is almost impossible to calculate and no detailed studies of this aspect of Black-Southern and Eastern European relations have been done. It is clear that such mobility would not have changed in any

way the relative hierarchical ranking of any groups occupational status. Bodnar, Simon and Weber, *Lives of their Own*, have recently called into question the thesis of the uplifting effect. p. 141.

19. Foster Rhea Dulles, *Labor in America: A History* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 170-182.

20. Barton, *Peasants and Strangers*, pp. 172-173.

21. Stanley Lieberson, *Ethnic Patterns in American Cities* (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963). pp. 170-182.

22. Barton, *Peasants and Strangers*, p. 172.

23. Stephen Thernstrom, *The Older Bostonians: Poverty and Progress in the American Metropolis 1880-1970* (Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1973), p. 233.

24. U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of the Census Sixteen Census of the Population, Special Reports, *Differential Fertility 1940 and 1910* (Washington, D.C.: Govt. Printing Office, 1940). See tables 3 and 4 "Fertility for States and Large Cities."

25. *Ibid.*, p. 250.

26. *Ibid.*

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 250-251. Andrew Greeley argues that Thernstrom's findings on the Irish mobility rates may be true only for Boston and not for the Irish in the remainder of the country. A. Greeley, *The Irish Americans* (New York: Harper, 1981), p. 116.

28. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan, *Beyond the Melting Pot* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1964). pp. 181-207, 322. Herbert Gans, *Urban Villagers* (New York: The Free Press, 1962). Paul Wrobel *Our Way* (Notre Dame, Ind., University of Notre Dame Press, 1979).

29. Martin Marger, "Ethnic Penetration of the Elite Structure of 1900-1950s Diss. Michigan State University, 1973, p. 190. Two other studies of Detroit during the mid-1960s point to the still largely working class character of Southern and Eastern European groups twenty years ago. John Leggett, *Class, Race and Labor* (New York: Oxford, 1973) showed a Polish and Slavic sample that was more than 60% working class and with unemployment rates 40% higher than the white male population of Northwest European origin. Edward Laumann in his classic study *Bonds of Pluralism* (New York: John Wiley, 1973) studied the status and occupational distribution of major Southern and Eastern European groups in relation to the high prestige groups in the city. Using the Duncan index of socio-economic status he calculated the status of the fifteen major groups in Detroit. The highest three were Jews (63.4). Anglo-Presbyterians (59.2) and German Presbyterian (58.0) Slavic Catholics were ninth (46.5), Italian Catholics, tenth (44.1) and Polish Catholics, thirteenth (39.6). The occupational data from his sample showed that in the 1960's in Detroit, Slavic Catholics with 60.5 percent in blue collar jobs, Italian Catholics with 56.4 percent and Polish Catholics with 67.3 percent in the same category. In the professions the representation of the three groups was 18.4 percent, 14.5 percent and 11.8 percent, respectively.

30. Taylor, *Distant Magnet*, pp. 167-209.

31. See, for example, the widely-quoted study by Gerhard Lenski, *The Religious Factor: A Sociologist's Inquiry* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1963). See also Thomas O'Dea, *The American Catholic Dilemma* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1959); H.C. Lehman and P.A. Witty "Scientific Eminence and Church Membership" *Scientific Monthly*, XXXIII (1933), 548550 and Kenneth Hardy "Social Origins of American Scientists and Scholars" *Science*, 185 (1974) 497-506.

32. Lenski, *The Religious Factor*.

33. See, for example, U.S. Immigration Commission, *The Children of Immigrants in School*, vol. 4, Select Document 5074, 61st Congress, 2 cong. session, 1911; John Bodnar, "Immigration

and Modernization: The Case of Slavic Peasants in Industrial America," *Journal of Social History*, X (1976), 44-71.

34. Miriam Cohen "Changing Education Strategies Among Immigrant Generations: New York Italians in Comparative Perspectives," *Journal of Social History*, XV (1981), 443-465.

35. *Ibid.*

36. *Ibid.*, p. 464.

37. Andrew Greeley, "The Ethnic Miracle," *The Public Interest*, 45 (1976), 20-36.

38. Steven Steinberg, *The Ethnic Myth* (New York: Atheneum, 1981), pp. 145-150.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 147-149.

40. *Ibid.* Steinberg's study calls into question the traditional argument that Jewish mobility was the product of a religious culture that stressed literacy and valued education. He argues that these factors should have worked regardless of class and occupation, if they were significant, but they did not according to his figures. The primary factors of Jewish mobility in his view were: greater skills than other Eastern and Southern Europeans especially in those industries such as the garment industry, about to expand rapidly; greater familiarity with urban life; inclination toward entrepreneurial activity which created a shopkeeper class with the resources to educate children for the professions; and no interest in returning with their earnings to Europe.

41. The classic study of nativism remains John Higham, *Strangers in the Land* (New York: Atheneum, 1973). See also Oscar Handlin, *Race and Nationality in American Life* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday-Anchor, 1957).

42. Higham, *Strangers in the Land*, pp. 68-105, 264-299. See also R.K. Murray, *The Red Scare* (Minneapolis, Minn.: The University of Minn. Press, 1955).

43. Barbara Miller Solomon, *Ancestors and Immigrants* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972), pp. 152-175, 195-210.

44. *Ibid.*, p. 195.

42. W.P. Hartman, "The Nordic-Superior or Inferior," *Scientific American*, (August, 1933), pp. 33-34.

43. G.M. Frederickson and D.K. Knobel, "The History of Prejudice and Discrimination," *Harvard Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups*, pp. 840-847.

44. Michael Katz, *Class, Bureaucracy and Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change in America* (New York: Praeger, 1971).

45. *Ibid.*

Chapter XIX
The Recovery and Removal of Toleration:
New Developments in National Origin Discrimination
in the United States

John Kromkowski

Ethnicity in the United States has been perceived as a passing phase of social development. The anthropological terms "ethnicity" and "ethnic group" now so frequently used in various contexts are publically associated with primordial origins, personal ancestry, primitive society and pre-rational consciousness. Moreover, academic understanding ethnicity in the United States has not been advanced by the European social science tradition of differences such as *Gemeinschaft* and *Gessellschaft*. The limits of such dichotomous types of consciousness, simplistic anthropological ways of knowing and the romantic critiques of cultural change and urbanization are now clear. Such explanations of the traditional and the modern rest on simplistic notions of traits and types of human consciousness behavior and relationships. In America ethnicity became a popularized category used descriptively and normatively to analyze personal identity and social change. In broadest outline this statement of the ethnic question yielded the following climate of public opinion: On the descriptive level, the immigrant or ethnic possessed a compact experience of rural, tribal life--blood, land, faith--characterized by a type of consciousness that was unlike the differentiated experience of urban individual life--autonomous, mobile, orderly, yet free. Urban citizens, whose consciousness and action were rational and liberating were unlike ethnics. On the normative level, some cheered the withering of primordial attachments and compact patterns as signs of human advancement and enlightenment. Others argued, however, that changes brought on by the loss of ethnicity were sources of spiritual breakdown, psychological confusion and social pathologies. The loss of ethnic tradition produced anomie, normlessness, rootlessness and meaninglessness of an absurd urban world.

Knowledge is the solvent for inappropriate and unfair forms of social formation. The insightful development of ethnography and ethnology and the application of phenomenological life-world analysis to urban communities and ethnic cultures as well as a clearer understanding of the long-term processes which form and influence our consciousness of social and political realities cast new light on the sources of social formation which sustains misunderstandings and discrimination against urban ethnic populations in the United States.

The search for theoretic and applied insight into ethnicity and immigration of ethnic populations in the United States requires the displacement of a paradigm based on fear and conflict as well as ignorance and neglect of ethnicity which distorted significant pieces of the American tradition. The recovery and renewal of this tradition is possible. However, the fashioning of a hopeful narrative of multi-ethnic cooperation is by no means an easy task. It requires a corrective warning about misuses of ethnicity as well as honest-to-experience appraisals of social, political and economic aspects of the multi-ethnic reality of contemporary America. The task of recovery and renewal begins with critical clarification of existing practices and processes which drive social formation. In this regard three recent public events can be viewed as vectors which will shape the future: The Immigration Reform debate of the mid-80s, The U.S. Census and The Supreme Court Decisions on National Origin Discrimination. The first raised public awareness, the second focused attention on public data collection and the third restated legal doctrine. These three events

converge to indicate a pivotal point in the new discussion of ethnicity in the United States. From this point new directions in public policy and social formation can be expected.

Reviving the Desire For Liberty and Justice for All

In recent decades the American government has adopted strategies of active intervention in social, economic and political areas to eliminate illegal discrimination and to redress its effects. This direction of policy was partially the result of the need to make a special effort to end the exclusion suffered by African-Americans, especially the descendants of persons ravaged by the legacy of Southern practices of isolation and terror. However, it was clear that attempts to assure liberty and justice for all by national governmental action have many consequences. African-Americans participation in political and social action would be a limited success without economic growth and prosperrity produced through urban development.

Morover, the possibility of economic mobility through urbanization is far from certain for many ethnic groups. The Kerner Commission Report sums up the experience of Southern and Eastern immigrants in American cities during the 1960s:

Eastern and Southern European ethnics, who come to America from rural backgrounds, as the Negroes did, are only now, after three generations, in the final states of escaping from poverty. Until the last 10 years or so, most of them were employed in blue-collar jobs, and only a small proportion of their children were able or willing to attend college. In other words, only the third and in many cases the fourth generation has been able to achieve the kind of middle-class income and status that allows them to send their children to college. Because of favorable economic and political conditions, these ethnic groups were able to escape to middle-class status from working-class and lower middle-class status. But it has taken them three generations.

In fact, the Kerner Commission report appears to endorse and to forecast a linear and universal path of development of ethnic and economic progress. The implication is that ethnic differences over time become less significant and that economic and political participation are the driving forces and measures of inclusion. This parsimonious reduction of a complex social reality to a linear economic and political progression of class statuses is useful, but incomplete. The experience of the twenty-year since the Kerner Report demands a fuller range of social theoritization that is attentive to historical antecedents. To understand and to analyze the intersection of American ethnicity with the social, legal, economic and cultural dynamics and essential aspects of the development a hopeful narrative required to govern a multi-ethnic society.

Because American history and contemporary America are an ethnically charged social reality, deterministic historical explanations are inadequate. Theoritization about the American reality must extend to a philosophical anthropology which is sufficiently expansive to include ethnicity as a form of consciousness. Moreover, ethnicity must be included as an element of a societies' self-understanding of its social history as well as its contemporary shared understanding of itself as a multi-ethnic social reality. Linear economic explanations of multi-ethnic development have lost credibility and ethnic consciousness has emerged as a variable in a variety of contexts. The existential and practical nexus between political and social economy and ethnic consciousness has become patently clear. Simplistic class and cultural paradigms are giving way to the search for more comprehensive explanations of the human condition in pluralistic societies.

Including ethnicity into models of social reality has been prompted by the recognition of humankind's symbol-making and meaning-seeking `tendia'. Thus ethnicity may be one of the basic codes of order for human consciousness. Moreover, the uses and misuses of ethnic

symbolization and the incorporation of ethno-mythic materials into modern public philosophy and civil theologies often influenced by sciences of society ill equipped for the analysis and the rhetoric needed to govern multi-ethnicity has engendered forms of political language and action that demand critical clarification.

Fundamentally, the rise in ethnic consciousness seems to be an integral and fundamental aspect of the search for meaning and order. This search has a number of origins and facets:

- The general search for meaning in the wake of an era marked by existential meaninglessness and the absurd from the 1930s to the 1950s.
- The breakup of the empires, the World Wars and the process of nation-building raised the level of national consciousness and ideologies of the nation-state.
- The establishment of ethnic groups by immigration into multi-ethnic or other ethnic contexts raised the issue of self-identity and group rights.
- A serial effect seems to have been generated in the United States by the revision of American history attendant upon the civil rights movement. Cultural-nationalist interest that began with African-American identity moved other groups to search for clearer self-identity.
- Even the social sciences were affected by this search for meaning and self-identity, moving researchers beyond ideals of abstract objectivity in a shift of paradigms which involved a process-metaphysics and epistemology.

The Struggle for the Recovery of Tradition

Increasingly, the term 'ethnic' has taken on broad meanings. Thus, exploring ethnicity involves integrating the whole range of factors relating to the person, group, society and international affairs. Yet tremendous gaps of scholarly and academic knowledge and lags in the dissemination of such information are present, even at the highest level of public consciousness and decision-making.

The following exchange between Clare Booth Luce and Dr. Thaddeus Radzilowski illustrates the problem and suggests the therapy needed to overcome inadequate analytics. The exchange is quoted at length because it is archtypic of the debate derive from misunderstanding the past and misreading the persistence of ethnicity in modern changing societies and the rise of ethnic scholars and their rightful claim on fashioning a restatement of the American tradition.

An issue of GEO magazine which carried an interview with Clare Boothe Luce, former Congresswoman, Ambassador and member of President Reagan's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, reveals a nativist Americans' ingrained perception of ethnicity. In the course of her remarks Mrs. Luce said:

We are now encouraging illegal entry of so many aliens at an hour in history when there are so few, if any, frontiers left open that there are bound to be dreadful clashes within our society. Soon there will probably be as many Mexicans in Texas, New Mexico, lower California and Arizona--and as many Cubans and Latin Americans in Florida--as there are natives. They are also pouring in from Haiti. Now a vast majority of these are illegal. They're coming over the border, and they're coming in with wives and sisters and nieces who get pregnant immediately because they can then become American citizens and go on relief. I do not know how much more we can absorb.

In the nineteenth century, the United States absorbed something like forty million immigrants. But the vast majority were of a fundamental culture, and they were all white. They were not Black or brown or yellow. (Emphasis added).

. . . I am not sure we are not heading for the fate of ancient Rome, which in its later days had far fewer Romans than immigrants from all the conquered provinces around the Mediterranean basin. Rome became the city of pollution and noise and foreigners, and it collapsed under the weight of the barbarians.

. . . Americans identify with America, and increasingly there are people--Poles, Italians, Israelis--who identify with two countries. But I do not know of any other identification that I can make, say, with the condition of the people of the Sahara. I repeatedly see pictures in the papers of a starving mother with her child holding out its hand. I think it would be hypocritical if I didn't say that I would feel a little more compassion if one of my pet birds had broken a leg in its cage in my own house.

A particularly vigorous critique of such contemporary scapegoating was distributed by The National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs. Dr. Thaddeus Radzilowski, Senior Research Fellow of NCUEA and former Special Adviser on Ethnicity and Social History, National Endowment for the Humanities presented the following rejoinder:

That Mrs. Luce is obviously not a paragon of liberal, internationalist compassion is clear. That she does not seem to be aware of the underlying racism of her remarks is obvious. That she also re-writes history to suit her arguments appear to be a symptom of social, economic, and cultural amnesia which has become increasingly used to justify and to defend the transformation of public policy initiated by the national executives Mrs. Luce advises.

Not unlike most political story-tellers who attempt to conjure and to evoke visions of a pristine and simpler pattern of human history and social order, Mrs. Luce's vision of America includes a claim about a "fundamental culture" that "the vast majority" of the earlier immigrants shared with Americans as well as the charge that the newer immigrants are utterly different. Her story is silly and pernicious. She clearly has forgotten, for example, who the "natives" of Texas, New Mexico, Arizona and California were when Americans arrived in the Southwest in the 19th century. Just as importantly as she has conveniently forgotten how remarkably similar the pre-World War I immigration is to current immigrants. This, of course, enables her to close her eyes to the possibility that our experience with latter-day immigrants will be as successful as the Americanization she claims for earlier immigrants.

Story-telling aside, let's look at the facts: It is difficult to imagine that Mrs. Luce believes that an English speaking, literate, West Indian Episcopalian shares less with Americans today than an illiterate Catholic Slovak peasant or a Greek Orthodox fisherman from the Peloponessus did or that a restaurant waiter from a Catholic, Latin culture is more alien than a Yiddish speaking, Hassidic garment worker was seventy five years ago. It is equally difficult to conceive of the reasons she feels the children of the better educated, more sophisticated Asian immigrants of today are less likely to adapt successfully to American life than the descendants of the peasants from Kwangtung and Honshu who came during the nineteenth century.

In point of fact, many upper class WASP Americans before World War I did not perceive the immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe as sharing a common fundamental culture with them. Upper class pessimism about the ability of the immigrants and their children to ever become

American was far more profound than Mrs. Luce's about the new immigrants. In the 1920's immigration restriction laws were passed, after all, not to keep out Mexicans or Haitians but to exclude Poles, Greeks and Jews.

In the minds of many the perception of the cultural gap was so great for some that they could even doubt the fundamental humanity of the new immigrants. As one mine owner noted about the cold and hungry Slavic immigrant workers he locked out: "Suffering? How can they be suffering? They don't even speak English?"

Though many persons recognize cultural changes, it is equally important to note the cultural aspects of race consciousness and ideology in America.

In this regard, Mrs. Luce has also forgotten that color in America has been as much a social fact as a physical attribute. At the turn of the century. the most common way of distinguishing natives from the new Eastern and Southern European immigrants in popular speech and writing was "white men and foreigners" or "white men and hunkies." Even a distinguished sociologist could affirm that "a Pole can work under conditions that would kill a white man." Those who saw the society from bottom made the same distinctions. A Black artisan in Detroit in response to a reporter's question about whites practicing his trade remarked. "There's no white men. There are some Polacks but they ain't white, you know." Clearer and more obviously understood evidence emerges from the record of mobs that lynched Italians in New Orleans or burned their houses and forced them out of Frankfort, Illinois. These violent, armed bigots and racists "knew" they weren't dealing with whites."

Thus the debate on Immigration Reform provokes Americans to rethink their historical record and imputed historical-myth are evoked to interpret current conditions. The historical warrant for optimism and pessimism are passionately argued. Most interestingly, however, is the extension of the analysis of ethnicity into the categories such as race and color. This overlap of consideration, as Dr. Radzilowski points out, has a long and passionate ideological function in the South and generally neglected history in the North. While this history is not the purpose of this inquiry, its contemporary linkage to ethnicity and the collection of information by the Census of the United States reveal its immediate and practical significance.

Renewing the Struggle for Inclusion and Equal Protection

In the climate of opinion shaped by the immigration reform debate the public discussion of national origin discrimination surfaced in the early 1980s when the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs challenged the regular, though apparently inadvertant, exclusion or lapse in reporting on discrimination based on national origin by Robert Pear of the New York Times. Pear regularly covers civil rights issues. Typically, the New York Times reported that discrimination based on race, religion, gender, age, sex, handicap defined the purview of the Justice Department and the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights. Owing to advocacy on many fronts, by the mid-80s the New York Times began to acknowledge the statutory inclusion of protection of persons who were discriminated against because of the national origin. This issue grew in public perception because of the influx of new immigrants and because of the raging congressional debate over the Simpson-Mazzoli Immigration Reform Bill. A particularly salient episode was captured by Robert Pear in his article "Immigration and the Randomness of Ethnic Mix" (New York Times, October 2, 1984) Pear quotes Lawrence Fuchs, an expert on immigration and former staff director of the Select Committee on Immigration Reform, saying "We are probably going to have a browning of

America over time." He concludes as a result "concepts of color and race will probably change and its possible that questions about color won't even be asked in the Census 150 years from now."

The prognosis of the National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs was passionately different. In presentations to the U.S. Census and to the Commission on Civil Rights NCUEA argued against the point of view reflected by Dr. Fuchs:

It is surprising and unfortunate that a scholar as careful as Professor Fuchs should contribute so to the continuing popular and legal nonsense and to the debasement of the language of the public discourse with his talk of 'browning' and 'non-white.' To focus on the skin color of the new immigrants or of their off-spring as they intermarry with other Americans is to say nothing of significance or about our future as a people. What is important about them is their culture. It would be the height of absurdity to tell us for example, that the immigrants who shaped the history and culture of New York City were "white" instead of Jewish, Irish, Italian, Puerto Rican, Barbadian, Dominican, etc.

NCUEA's testimony to Congress regarding the 1990 census pursued the issue further:

There is no question why we should wait 150 years to eliminate questions about color from the Census. We can do it now and we should. Such a move would spare us the insults to intelligence and assault on meaning that the present system of racial classification delivers. What can be more bizarre than the category of "white?" It is a remnant of the racism and nativism that infected our national culture earlier this century.

The Supreme Court and the Recovery of Congressional Intention

On the very day the above testimony was presented to Congress a particularly potent and legally relevant history of this issue was promulgated by the Supreme Court in *Saint Francis College, et al., Petitionery v. MAJID Ghaaidan AL-KhazeRaji* (May 18, 1987). This case of a United States citizen born in Iraq who was denied tenure as a professor because of national origin discrimination prompted the court to revisit the Congressional intent of the 1870 Civil Rights Law (42 USC Section 1981) and by so doing indicated the historical roots of racial/ethnic discrimination within the American social reality and the desire of Congress to protect citizens from discrimination because of being "genetically part of an ethnicity and physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens." The *Al-KhazeRaji* case is quoted in its entirety because it offers a capsule the historical and legislative record. The court shows the climate of understanding which prevailed at the very time plans for the recruitment of the large scale immigration from Eastern and Southern Europe were being made. Moreover, the court uses this historical and legal basic to affirm Congressional intent to protect all ethnic persons. Because all persons are ethnic and ethnicity is neither a scientific nor a legally-historically acceptable warrant for the denial of equal protection.

The Supreme Court findings and argument follows:

There is a common popular understanding that there are three major human races--Caucasoid, Mongoloid and Negroid. Many modern biologists and anthropologists, however, criticize racial classifications as arbitrary and of little use in understanding the variability of human beings. It is said that genetically homogenous populations do not exist and traits are not discontinuous between

populations; therefore, a population can only be described in terms of relative frequencies of various traits. Clear-cut categories do not exist. The particular traits which have generally been chosen to characterize races have been criticized as having little biological significance. It has been found that differences between the 'average' individuals of different races. These observations and others have led some, but not all, scientists to conclude the racial classifications are for the most part socio-political, rather than biological, in nature. S. Molnar, *Human Variation* (2nd ed. 1983); S. Gould, *The Mismeasure of Man* (1981); M. Banton & J. Harwood, *The Race Concept* (1975); A. Montagu, *Man's Most Dangerous Myth* (1974); A. Montagu, *Statement on Race* (1972); *Science and the Concept of Race* (M. Mead, T. Dobzhansky, E. Tobach, & R. Light, however, was different. Plainly, all those who might be deemed Caucasian today were not thought to be of the same race at the time ? 1981 became law.

The historic evidence cited by the court bears quoting:

In the middle years of the 19th century, dictionaries commonly referred to race as a 'continued series of descendants from a parent who is called the stock,' N. Webster, *An American Dictionary of the English Language* 666 (New York 1830) (emphasis in original), '[t]he lineage of a family,' J. Donald, *Chambers's Etymological Dictionary of the English Language* 415 (London 1871). The 1887 edition of Webster's expanded the definition somewhat: 'The descendants of a common ancestor, a family, tribe, people or nation, believed or presumed to belong to the same stock.' N. Webster, *Dictionary of the English Language* (W. Wheeler ed. 1887). It was not until the 20th century that dictionaries began referring to the Caucasian, Mongolian and Negro races, 8 *The Century Dictionary and Cyclopeida* 4926 (1911), or to race as involving divisions of mankind based upon different physical characteristics. Webster's *Collegiate Dictionary* 794 (1916). Even so, modern dictionaries still include among the definitions of race as being 'a family, tribe, people, or nation belonging to the same stock.' Webster's *Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary* 969 (Springfield, Mass. 1986).

Encyclopedias of the 19th century also described race in terms of ethnic groups, which is a narrower concept of race than petitioners urge. *Encyclopedia Americana* in 1858, for example, referred in 1854 to various races such as Finns, vol. 5, p. 123, gypsies, 6 id., at 123, Basques, 1 id., at 602, and Hebrews, 6 id., at 209. The 1863 version of the *New American Cyclopaedia* divided the Arabs into a number of subsidiary races, vol. 1, p. 739; represented the Hebrews as of the Semitic race, 9 id., at 27, and identified numerous other groups as constituting races, including Swedes, 15 id., at 216, Norwegians, 12 id., at 410, Germans, 8 id., at 200, Greeks, id., at 438, Finns, 7 id., at 513, Italians, 9 id., at 644-645 (referring to mixture of different races), Spanish, 14 id., at 804, Mongolians, 11 id., at 651, Russians, 14 id., at 226, and the like. The Ninth edition of the *Encyclopedia Britannica* also referred to Arabs, vol. 2, p. 245 (1878), and Greeks, 11 id., at 83 (1880), as separate races.

The Court goes in the present the legislative intent:

These dictionary and encyclopedic sources are somewhat diverse, but it is clear that they do not support the claim that for the purposes of Section 1981, Arabs, Englishmen, Germans and certain other ethnic groups are to be considered a single race. We would expect the legislative history of ? 1981, which the Court held in *Runyon v. McCrary* had its source in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat 27, as well as the Voting Rights Act of 1870, 16 Stat. 40, 144, to reflect this common understanding, which it surely does. The debates are replete with references to the Scandinavian races, Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess, 499 (1866) (remarks of Sen. Cowan), as

well as the Chinese, *id.*, at 528 (remarks of Sen. Davis), Latin, *id.*, at 238 (remarks of Rep. Kasson during debate of home rule for the District of Columbia), Spanish, *id.*, at 251 (remarks of Sen. Davis during debate of District of Columbia suffrage) and Anglo-Saxon races, *id.*, at 542 (remarks of Rep. Dawson). Jews, *ibid.*, Mexicans, see *ibid.*, (remarks of Rep. Dawson), blacks, *passim*, and Mongolians, *id.*, at 498 (remarks of Sen. Cowan), were similarly categorized. Gypsies were referred to as a race. *Ibid.*, (remarks of Sen. Cowan). Likewise, the Germans:

‘Who will say that Ohio can pass a law enacting that no man of the German race . . . shall ever own any property in Ohio, or shall ever make a contract in Ohio, or ever inherit property in Ohio, or ever come into Ohio to live, or even to work? If Ohio may pass such a law, and exclude a German citizen . . . because he is of the German nationality or race, then may every other State do so.’ *Id.*, at 1294 (Remarks of Sen. Shellabarger).

There was a reference to the Caucasian race, but it appears to have been referring to people of European ancestry. *Id.*, at 523 (remarks of Sen. Davis).

The history of the 1870 Act reflects similar understanding of what groups Congress intended to protect from intentional discrimination. It is clear, for example, that the civil rights sections of the 1870 Act provided protection for immigrant groups such as the Chinese. This view was expressed in the Senate. Cong. Globe, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 1536, 3658, 3808 (1870). In the House, Representative Bingham described 16 of the Act, part of the authority for Section 1981, as declaring ‘that the States shall not hereafter discriminate against the immigrant from China and in favor of the immigrant from Prussia, nor against the immigrant from France and in favor of the immigrant from Ireland.’ *Id.*, at 3871.

Based on the history of Section 1981, we have little trouble in concluding that Congress intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics. Such discrimination is racial discrimination that Congress intended Section 1981 to forbid, whether or not it would be classified as racial in terms of modern scientific theory.⁵ The Court of Appeals was thus quite right in holding that Section 1981, ‘at a minimum,’ reaches discrimination against an individual ‘because he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive sub-grouping of homo sapiens.’ It is clear from our holding, however, that a distinctive physiognomy is not essential to qualify for Section 1981 protection. If respondent on remand can prove that he was subjected to intentional discrimination based on the fact that he was born an Arab, rather than solely on the place or nation of his origin, or his religion, he will have made out a case under Section 1981.

Toward a Fresh Focus: Toleration of Diversity?

Thus the Supreme Court documents the original legislative intent of Congress: to prohibit ethnic discrimination in 1866 was much fuller and extensive than the focus on African-Americans which shaped the debate of the 1960's and polarized the discussion of ethnicity by limiting the range of ethnicity to a Black-White zero sum game. Thus, the 1960s use of ethnicity as a political symbol eclipsed the earlier experience and effort of Congress to illegitimate discrimination based upon ethnicity. This legal clarification is important and timely. That this intent of Congress was not implemented even in the 1870s is painfully clear from the social history of those decades. This legacy continued into the 1960s. Nonetheless the inclusion of this ignored statute in the law and the recovery of the legal basis for contemporary practice and for its contribution to a multi-ethnic

and theology is especially relevant sources of precedent. In point of fact, two generations after the Civil Rights Act of 1866, President Theodore Roosevelt's Commission on Immigration (1907-1911) produced a set of reports which extended the racism of the Post Civil War South to the Eastern and Southern Europeans who had been recruited and attracted to the Northern cities of the United States. Through several years of testimony and 42 volumes of materials the Dillingham Commission, as it was called after its chairman, subtly but decisively "presented the current theory of race. The moral difference between the "old" and "new" immigration emerged to the discredit of the late arrivals, as it were, factually." The intensity of this fear was publicized in the Congressional Debates on the Census and Reapportionment in 1911 and 1920. When the growth of immigrant populations in cities signaled an awesome shift in potential political power. Throughout this period states resisted legislative reapportionment and city charters limited the enfranchisement of ethnic citizens by systems of at large rather than district elections.

More than twenty years after the Report of the Dillingham Commission was published such racial views were still respectable and "scientific" enough that a prestigious journal such as Scientific American could publish blatantly nativist articles such as "The Nordic-Superior or Inferior" by W.P. Hartman in 1933. In the article Mr. Hartman, who identified Nordics as the blondhaired people of the British Isles, Scandinavian and Northern and Western Europe, concluded among other things, that

Love of liberty is exclusively Nordic. Self-government has never been known by any other race...With a few exceptions...(the Nordic) unquestionably developed the great civilizations that are known to history.

Not until World War II revealed the horrible fruits of racism did such 'scientific' prejudice begin to wane and discrimination start to lose its legitimacy. What remained of them went underground.

Discrimination and bigotry that affected the life chances of Americans of Southern and Eastern European ancestry began with their earliest schooling. Considered less able and intelligent than their American counterparts, Eastern and Southern European children were actively discouraged from pursuing the same education as native-born children. Michael Katz in his study of the American school system has shown that the end of the common school and the development of special schools designed to provide manual training were a direct response to the need to separate "inferior" immigrant children from better American students. The low expectations and racist attitudes of teachers and administrators compounded the effects of poverty and a non-English speaking home to handicap permanently the immigrant child. The sentiments expressed by E.P. Cubberly, the father of American school administration, are not untypical of the early 20th century educators:

These Southern and Eastern Europeans are of a very different type from the Northern Europeans who preceded them. Illiterate, docile, lacking in self reliance and initiative and not possessing the Anglo-Teutonic conceptions of law, order, and government, their coming has served to dilute tremendously our national stock and corrupt our civic life... Everywhere these people tend to settle in groups...and to set up here their national manners, customs and observances. Our task is to break up these groups or settlements, to assimilate and amalgamate these people as part of our American race and to implant in their children, so far as can be done, the Anglo-Saxon conception of righteousness, law and order, and popular government . . . (emphasis added)

Toward A Social Therapy: A via Negation

Given this prevailing sentiment and the social formation of consciousness it produced one can begin to understand the pessimism which sums up the entire attitude toward ethnicity in the United States. The recent decisions of the Supreme Court regarding discrimination based on national origin and the foregoing accounts of political, social science, failure of political will and their consequences for previous social formation suggest that much more attention to ethnicity could be incorporated into the processes of contemporary social formation in the United States. In point of fact, the revival of ethnicity during the 1970s was such an attempt. The ethnic revival was in some respects a sort of disparate affirmation and a sort of social therapy. It was somewhat effective.

Nonetheless the reflections of Paul J. Asciolla, a founder of the Illinois Consultation on Ethnicity, provides an insightful set of misuses of ethnicity that must be avoided. Asciolla argues that a proper application of ethnicity as a factor and concept in American culture is an uphill battle. Asciolla claims that ethnicity is kept alive consciously. It can diminish and indeed vanish. Asciolla suggests the following explanation for the small gains in Federal public policy concerning Eastern and Southern European-American populations, but one could extend his claims to the entire field of ethnic politics and efforts to use ethnicity in American society. Asciolla's record as an ethnic activist enables him to recount the strange applications of ethnicity. Asciolla writes that ethnicity has been:

1. Romanticized and glamorized by novels, articles, readers, lectures, radio, television and film, newspaper columns and newsletters, and personal born-again ethnic apologias where the thrill of ethnicity and the process of raising the issues is more important than the product and policies which result.

2. Commercialized by ethnic entrepreneurs from T-shirts to topless bars.

3. Politicized by offering it as a commodity to be bartered for votes, political appointments, contracts, and grants.

4. Plagiarized in sundry ways such as ethnic food-fun-and farmers people, films-television media, festivals, and television situation comedies.

5. Polarized by using it as a wedge to get a piece of the pie without respect for the rights of other individuals or groups.

6. Mythologized by separating it from real life, and giving it exhorbitant transcendental meaning. By the way, don't be surprised if you see two new books on the bookstands: *The Joy of Ethnicity* and *Inner Ethnicity*.

7. Homogenized or Balkanized by editorial writers and columnists, it depends on the time of the year or the crisis.

8. Criticized as the root cause of social strife and intergroup conflict.

9. Memorialized following a coup de grace from a Time magazine essay or some scholarly journal . . . or as just the special demon of another Washington-based special interest group.

10. Canonized by chauvinists who would make ethnicity the snake oil for all of society's ills and the miracle cure for all our troubles.

11. Guerilla-ized in a jungle-type warfare search and destroy mission making a journey up the river like the travellers of Joseph Conrad's *Heart of Darkness* and Francis Coppola's *Apocalypse Now!* searching for Colonel Kurtz.

12. Capitalized by compensatory grants and contracts and other drippings from the table of the Federal coffers.

Asciolla closes his case and litany of misuses with the following assessment:

We have been able to do almost everything except institutionalize ethnicity and the self-evident reality: monocultural social policy cannot satisfy the needs of a pluralistic society!

Asciolla's critique of such misuses of ethnicity and his injunction to "institutionalize" ethnicity as necessary and self-evident for a multi-ethnic society underscore the importance of the search for new approaches to social policy and social formation. Thus both critiques of misuses and creative approaches that foster understanding of the multi-ethnic character of the American society must be yoked together. A social therapy of this sort would involve nothing less than a retheorization of ethnicity in America and the implementation of a process of social formation derived from this retheorization. Efforts of this sort would be the ground upon which a new social formation and public policy could be fashioned.

The fashioning of a social policy for a pluralistic society begins with the critique of social definitions that constitute the very structure of rewards and benefits of a society steeped in racial/ethnic exclusion and denial. Thus the theory and practice of ethnicity and politics interact. The ongoing program of resource allocation and regulation toward such ends raises prudential and practical questions with regard to the scope, mechanisms, level of effort and measurement of success, as well as criteria for assessing the composition of those populations assigned or targeted as beneficiary of equal protection, due process, and compensatory remedies. Clearly at the level of practical common sense and in American public debate no one seriously challenges the national legal warrant to recognizing ethnic and racial realities of the human condition and the American population. Recent approval by the United States of the Genocide Convention is further evidence of universal and international legal affirmation of cultural rights of ethnicity populations within the power-field of political, governmental authority. But contemporary conflicts among ethnic groups are not easily resolved by appeals to universal claims. Fresh approaches are needed.

The Search for Experience That Could Shape a New Narrative of American Pluralism

Among the multiple ways of knowing and using ethnicity few are more relevant than the historical studies at the micro level--investigations that trace the development of a particular population and the geographical differentiations within the same national group. Such close grain analysis tends to expose the fiction of large scale historical mythologies of ethnic groups. Social historians and radical phenomenologists are discovering at the experiential level that ethnicity is a dense network of local meanings. What Frank Thistlethwaite wrote of pre-World War I migration is equally true today:

Seen through a magnifying glass, this undifferentiated mass surface breaks down into a honeycomb of innumerable particular cells, districts, villages, towns each with an individual reaction or lack of it to the pull of migration. This is not simply a question of Scottish Highlanders emigrating in a body to Upper Canada, Rhinelanders to Wisconsin, Swedes to Montana, Northern Italians to France and Argentina, Southern Italians to the United States, though these elementary distinctions are important. We only come to secret sources of the movement if we work at a finer tolerance. We must talk, not of Wales, but of Portmadoc or Swansea, not of North or South Italy but of Venetia Giulia, Friuli, Basilicata and Calabria, not of Greece or even the Peloponnese, but of Tripolis, Sparta and Megalopolis, not of Lancashire but of Darwin or Blackburn, not of Norway

but of Kristiana and North Bergenhus. . . . Only when we examine . . . districts and townships, and trace the fortunes of their native sons, do we begin to understand the true anatomy of migration.

The governing feature of the American ethnic reality that is conveyed in Thistelhwaite's finding is that ethnic group and ethnicity, includes a local experience of national, linguistic and religious differentiation among participants in the American cosmion--the American reality. Moreover, the American reality also is constituted by communally shared symbols of order. Thus ethnicity as constituted within the American experience is mediated by social processes among and between populations at the local level. Thus the term ethnic consciousness is well understood as local consciousness. This form of consciousness has been juxtaposed or opposed to modern forms of shared consciousness constituted by large-scale institutions--the national government and corporations organized for large-scale order and the large-scale production and distribution of goods and sources. To be sure the large scale governmental and economic enterprises have initiated new forms of human autonomy and prosperity. But their record of providing peace and well-being must be read in the shadow of World Wars, modern horrors and the destruction of tradition. Hence, the emergence of ethnic consciousness in an era driven by large-scale systems of governance, production and culture frequently appear as signals of the cost of modernity. This critique of modernity and support of ethnicity in thought and action compelled the search for mechanism within large-scale institutions of order which could accommodate the persistence of ethnic group variety within the American reality. The Supreme Court's recent recovery of the legislative intent to render equal protection and due process to all populations and the changing contour of the American brought on by new immigrations are elements of a new narrative which is simultaneously true to the tradition and attendant to the needs of current practice.

It is the immigrants and their children then and now who are optimists; who still live and believe in the possibility of liberty and justice for all. The grandchildren of the immigrants from Eastern and Southern Europe, from the Middle East and the Orient who were, only a few decades ago, considered genetically incapable of becoming Americans have succeeded beyond expectation. Poles, Italians, Romanians, Irish, Slovak, Germans, Lithuanians, Chinese, Japanese, Arabs and Armenians now exceed the national average for income and education and are rapidly moving into the academic, professional and business bastions of the older elites. Contrary to Mrs. Luce's claim we can expect the newer immigrants, Hispanic and African-Americans, if assured the same opportunities to succeed, to do as well. Careful disaggregation of mobility indices for African and Hispanic populations suggests a trend toward mainstream status, but an unfilled agenda of equal opportunity and a bankrupt national policy for urban economic development are constraints which have hindered progress and isolated urban ethnics at the margins of human political, social and economic success.

All immigrant groups, of course, suffered from the alienation and dislocation that came from moving from the farm to the factory and from Europe to Asia to America. The ethnic groups that Mrs. Luce cites as having successfully adapted to America suffered most of the same problems the new migrants do. Their success has obliterated the memory that at the height of the immigration almost one-third of the prostitutes in New York City were Jewish, that the majority of juvenile delinquents in Chicago were Slavic and that in the 1920's Poles were either first or second in every category of welfare recipients in the City of Detroit.

Nevertheless, contrary to Mrs. Luce's fears, few immigrants then or now come here to go on welfare. They come because they are ambitious, want to work and to succeed. However, they also want more. It has never been ignoble in America to want to make money, even though both earlier

and newer immigrants have often been criticized for it. But most immigrants also shared the rest of the American dream which at its best and in its most generous form promised the citizen a place to live in freedom, with honor and dignity. The American dream promised an opportunity to provide security for their families, to build communities, to educate their children, and to raise them to be good and useful human beings.

The immigrant experience is not a tourist trip: It is no easier now than ever in human history to leave family and friends and undertake often long and dangerous journeys to live and work, usually at the lowest and most menial jobs, among strangers who do not speak your language. Those physical and ultimately spiritual journeys of immigrants are born of necessity and nourished by hope and desire. Contrary to the horror stories about alien hordes and the self-servicing aristocratic myths of sending countries, it is usually the best and the brightest who yearn for the American world. We must adjust our social policy and social formation as well as our immigration policy to continue to take as many of the newcomers as we can. As in the past, the immigrants are bringing our future with them and that future is a uniquely American story we should be telling again. When one hears the laments which destroy our past and divide our future as a free, multi-racial, multi-ethnic people, it is time to sing a new and hopeful song about our past so that our future as Americans can be strong and free.

Notes

1. "Comparing the Immigrant and Negro Experience," Kerner Commission Report, National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders in the United States, (Washington, D.C. 1968), p. 145.
2. GEO, September 1984.
3. Response to Clare Booth Luce, NCVEA, Oct. 1984.
4. New York Times, Oct. 2, 1984.
5. In forthcoming proceedings of Changing Perspectives on Civil Rights Regional Forum, United States Commission on Civil Rights, Los Angeles, Sept. 8-9, 1988.
6. Congressional Testimony, House Subcommittee on Population and Census, May 18, 1987.
7. Saint Francis v. Al Khaziraji and Shaari Tefila v. Cobb, US Supreme Court Decision, May 18, 1987.
8. W.P. Hartman, "The Nordic-Superior or Inferior" Scientific American, August 1933, pp. 33-34. Michael Katz, Class, Bureaucracy and Schools: The Illusion of Educational Change in America (New York: Praeger, 1971).
9. Elwood P. Gubbenly, Changing Conceptions of Education (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909), pp. 15-16.
10. Paul Ascioffa "Response" in Civil Rights Issues of Euro-Ethnic Americans in the United States: Opportunities and Challenges, US Commission on Civil Rights Consultation, December 3, 1979, (US Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1982).
11. Frank Thistlewaite, "Migration from Europe Overseas in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries" in Stanley N. Katz and Stanley I. Kulter, New Perspectives on the American Past: 1877-Present (Boston: Little, Brown, 1972).

Chapter XXI

Consumer Mutual Aid: Adaptation or Challenge?

Leslaw A. Paga

Observation of the behavior of the Polish society between 1980-85 raises the question whether changes in this behavior are simply an example of better adaptation to a long-term crisis, or whether it is more an overcoming of this crisis by a better organization of consumers. The fact of consumers undertaking mutual aid in a broad sense, along with self-organization in the field of distribution of goods and services, suggests the hypothesis that there is a slow process of easing or avoiding the consequences of the crisis by an aware middle class. This is true of only one part of the society. The upper class and the social elite overcome the crisis either through surplus funds or the "privileges of the system." Groups living below the "social minimum", although they have the greatest needs, seem to be organized for survival in a quite different way. Consumer mutual aid of the middle classes is in some ways quite different from its counterpart in the societies of Western Europe or North America.

Status of the Consumer in a Centrally-Planned Economy

The principle that each member of society has a legal opportunity for free development is understood here in a specific way. Systemic principles in a centrally-planned economy reject private ownership as a basic economic law, and accept the superiority of public property-- "public" meaning either state or cooperative ownership. The principle of the superiority of state property limits the free choice of employment or hiring and the choice of the mode of economic property. A further consequence of this principle is that such a definition of the laws regulating economic activity implies a concessive, or government approved, system of social organization.

Furthermore, the fact that the whole economy is regulated centrally, which is usually characterized by direct administrative interference, makes the situation worse for consumers. Shortages are endemic in this system of management. This was excellently described by J. Kor nai,¹ who also defined the basic manner of the allocation of goods: non-market allocation is predominant, sometimes occurring together with market allocation and with a "grey" or "black" market. Only in the reformed Hungarian management has market allocation comes to the fore. In an economy in crisis, which for centrally-planned economy means an increasing shortage of goods and services, there is, according to J. Kor nai, the following relationship: "The more intensive the regular shortages, the more decisive the role of administrative rationing or rationing by the supplier, or the greater queuing of buyers or users."²

On the other hand, it is worth attending to other elements which show the "differentia specifica" of the consumer situation in this system. This includes legal status in protecting consumer rights and the function of institutions created for this purpose or to regulate consumer movement.

When we compare consumer rights in industrialized countries, e.g. the Consumer Protection Programme accepted in 1975 by the Council of Ministers of the European Economic Community, to the condition of consumer legal protection in Poland, even in the sphere of legislation Poland fares badly. This situation results from the principle that most services are provided or are within an administrative legal framework, while only some are within a civil legal framework of agreements. In the first case, as described by E. Letowska, the consumer is treated like an

"administrative subject," i.e., as a suppliant, either subordinated to an enterprise which renders services to him or to a firm which produces goods. In the second case, that of a civil/legal framework, the situation is usually that of a symmetrical relationship between subjects which, in practice, means also subordination of consumers. A typical example is the legislation regarding the state railways--as the transporter--in relation to passengers.

Thus the legal status of the consumer is actually very low, although Article 4 of the Polish Constitution stresses the satisfaction of citizens' needs. This is impossible without radical changes in the legal status of the consumer in Poland, i.e., the introduction of a law concerning consumer protection or the long awaited anti-monopoly law. In spite of the above, many institutions are intended, among other aims, to protect the consumers. A long list of these institutions, starting with the Parliament, the Chief Board of Supervision [NIK], the Ministry of Internal Trade and Services, and the State Health Inspectorate, may suggest that the consumer lobby in Poland is exceptionally powerful. But a closer look reveals that the Parliament, which should take care of the legal status of the consumer, often passes bills which only consolidate its present status; the NIK reports concern consumer affairs, but their existence does not change the situation. It would be strange to treat the Ministry of Internal Trade and Services, which is responsible for monopolization of trade and for the whole problem caused by state control of staple goods, as the institution which actually protects the consumer. Such institutions, whatever their official aim, do not improve the consumer's situation.

The consumer movement in Poland, with the help of the powerful trade union, "Solidarity," began in 1981. However, the circumstances at that time were very bad. The economic crisis at the end of the '70s manifested itself in a very acute form, and the fact that many active consumers were engaged in trade union activities did not help its development. From the very beginning "Solidarity" allowed itself to get involved in interventionist actions, instead of undertaking actions towards changing the legal system, strongly opposing monopolization of the economy, and aiding the consumers in legal conflicts with state producers. The subsequent political events consolidated such a state of affairs, making the three existing consumer organizations weak and unattractive for the society--the largest of them having only a few thousand members.

Discussing the specificity of the consumer situation in Poland as a whole, we must remember that all the elements analyzed, i.e., legal status and institutional or organizational protection, even if they were able to function in a limited way during the period of economic growth, became practically useless in the crisis situation of shortages of consumer goods. In the situation of unsatisfiable demand and progressive inflation, the monopolistic state producer gained a very privileged position in which practically all of his products found several buyers waiting to purchase. The main indicators of this situation were the number of people in queues and the time necessary for buying an article or a service.

The Queue Society

The open crisis intensified all the negative symptoms; at the same time, a new phenomenon spread in society as a form of defense mechanism. Economic and sociological literature has many detailed analyses of the behavior of a society endangered by war or economic crises. The "grey" or "black" market, state regulation of staple goods and inflation are not atypical phenomena specific only to the Polish society. Furthermore, history shows economic crises resulting in more serious social consequences than in the case of Poland. However, some aspects of social conduct evolving during the crisis deserve analysis because of the overlapping of, on the one hand, a crisis

in a centrally-planned economy and, on the other hand, social adaptation to a new situation and the creation of new social ties independent of the official economic system.

Three new elements are particularly striking: the organization of the queue society, the interpersonal dimension of goods, and the organization of mutual-aid groups.

Some elements of the organization of a queue society can be analyzed, while others may yet surprise us. The queue society in Poland did not appear suddenly. It was the reaction of the society to increasing shortages of goods and services. Queues became longer in the mid '70s. To some extent they caused the appearance of egalitarian control demands in 1980. Queues are a constant element of social life and occur for almost all goods and services, beginning with such staple goods as meat, through clothes, detergents and medicine, to durable goods as furniture, washing machines and cars. Four aspects of such a system of distribution deserve further analysis.

The first is the organization of the queues themselves in the '80s through the development of "queue committees" during the period of subjectivization of the society. Their aim was to improve organization and shorten the time spent in queues. A new element deserving analysis is that these queue committees tried not only to control members of a given queue by registering their time of arrival and stating their position in the queue, but also, and what is more important, to stop the state stores from limiting the quantity of goods and their distribution. This aroused determined resistance from store management and staff, resulting in the Ministry of Internal Trade and Services depriving the spontaneous queue committees of the possibility of controlling distribution. Although in the end the consumers did not manage to get the forms of distribution and supply under control, nevertheless their pressure had the benefit of a considerable decrease of illegal transactions in the stores.

Second, the exchange of information about a commodity in demand increased and strengthened social ties among existing neighborhood or worker groups. It also stimulated the creation of new groups, which may be called mutual aid groups and which will be discussed later.

Third, a revival of direct ties between urban and rural societies was connected with the functioning of an informal food market and of food distribution outside official structures. This is connected also with the formation of the "grey" or "black" market for goods in demand.

Fourth is the appearance of groups of persons who, having a great deal of spare time, buy or reserve places in a queue as "standers" for other persons on condition of payment. This causes redistribution of income between persons who can offer their free time and those who pay for this time. Of special interest is the rise of a new criterion of job attractiveness, i.e., whether this new occupation opens the way to leaving a previous job so as to have time to seek merchandise or services. A position which offers such "mobility" can be more attractive than a better paying job without it.

Although the organization of the queue society brings us closer to the conscious consumers mutual aid, the second aspect of the crisis situation--the interpersonal dimension of goods, indirectly strengthens ties in certain consumer mutual-aid groups. In the industrial countries the consumer faces a problem of choice among many commodities, produced by various firms, having various parameters of utility and a wide range of prices. In a centrally-planned economy, however, especially during the crisis, the priority is simply to be able to purchase an article in demand. For the consumer in the USA who has the choice between 752 models of cars and trucks, plus the choice of various colors, or who can see 2500 different kinds of bulbs in a shop in Manhattan, satisfaction from having bought a bulb necessary to illuminate one's house may seem quite unreal. Yet if this bulb, or any other commodity in great demand at a given moment, were to be bought for the consumer by another consumer, it would assume, in addition, an interpersonal dimension.

These mutual services, as well as the distribution of purchased goods among the members of an informal mutual-aid group, strengthen ties and mutual interdependence. It is a first step towards the voluntary organization of consumers into various mutual-aid groups. It is very difficult to present in a graphic form all these relations and to define in which group certain consumers may be classified. She/he belongs at the same time to many such groups, formed variously by family, neighbors, friends and co-workers. These groups are of a fairly stable character for the market situation forces the consumers to belong to them for longer than merely one exchange. New groups are linked to existing ones based on the constant exchange of services and other forms of aid, for example the relationship between a car owner and a mechanic servicing his car. This is not a relationship of the "regular customer" type, but a new type consisting of the exchange of information and services. Information about a commodity or the possibility of its purchase attains here an economic value and can be exchanged for another commodity or service. The general impoverishment of society, together with a very stiff and bureaucratized banking system offering credits only for restricted purposes, creates the need for loans within one's own group and thus contributes to their stabilization.

To summarize the discussion so far, mutual-aid groups, coming into being in this way, make up to some extent for some of the most glaring faults in the existing formal structure of the society. They also influence that structure. So we may hazard stating that here we have to do with a new social structure, a "network" coming into being. By using the term "network", popularized among others by John Naisbitt in his book *Megatrends*, we intend to suggest that this phenomenon is similar to the one occurring in the USA, although caused by factors and an economic situation which is absolutely different. That is why, when we quote Naisbitt's definition of a network, it turns out that the phenomena described by us fit into it. When asked what a "network" is J. Naisbitt answers: "Simply speaking the network is formed by people who talk to one another, they divide ideas, information and resources of information, changing the society, increasing productivity, improving working conditions and distribution of resources".² Before we try to evaluate to what extent new structures created by mutual aid groups fit into world megatrends, it is necessary to look at the formal mutual-aid groups sponsored mainly by the Roman Catholic Church.

Mutual Aid Groups: A New Organization Of Society?

The deepening economic and social crisis in Poland, together with the State's withdrawal from protective functions and with the lack of other institutions and organizations (help from the Polish Red Cross and the Polish Committee for Social Aid is insufficient), created a situation threatening the biological existence of many families. With the constant increase of families living beneath the poverty level and the spread of poverty, the Church, which traditionally aids the poor, was prompted to undertake action along with some union activists. The specific position of the Church was strengthened by the distribution of food and clothes aid offered by Western Europe and its Churches. "Solidarity for the Family," which came into being in 1981, had the goal of strengthening family and neighborly ties. The imposition of martial law and the de-legalization of "Solidarity" broke the barrier of isolation surrounding many families, and stimulated action towards bringing aid to the most needy. These actions had to be within the framework of the Church because of the political situation. The few secular initiatives such as "Family Alliance" in Warsaw or "Family Mutual Aid" in Lublin are obviously not mass movements. They are, however,

pertinent in that they bring a new element into our analysis, i.e., formal organizations for mutual aid which are of a higher level than the informal mutual aid groups analyzed previously.

These actions have still another interesting aspect. Informal networks formed by the middle classes included mainly people who had something to offer to the others. In contrast, the groups sponsored by the *Ch urch*, which very often comprised people engaged in the distribution of material aid, created a chance for many people who had been badly organized till then to join this movement. In many cases it was possible to turn from the distribution of foreign gifts to the higher level of self-organization, i.e., mutual-aid, even when there were few, or no, gifts to distribute.

These actions cannot be classified solely as an adaptation to the crisis, they are the consumer's response to the economic crisis. Obviously at this time it is impossible to answer explicitly the question as to whether all these groups, formal and informal, will develop into credit unions, or whether they will create new associations providing aid for their members. In the situation of a constant decrease of living standards for most of the population and when the middle class begins to feel the consequences of the long-term economic crisis, it is impossible to answer such questions as to whether these groups will continue to develop or, on the contrary, whether their members will try to deal with the crisis on their own. The answers to these questions are directly connected with the still more important problem of whether, in the present situation in Poland, we are dealing with a specific manifestation of world megatrends, or only with a form of self-defense against a crisis which will become unnecessary once the crisis is over or eventually lessens.

This problem is crucial for the future of the society and we shall try to judge the phenomenon using the criteria applied by J. Nais bitt in his evaluation of the American situation:

Mutual aid has always been a part of American life. In the seventies the idea of mutual aid once again became a movement which penetrated institutional, disciplinary, regional and ideological divisions. Mutual aid can take numerous forms, i.e. creating groups to fight against crime, for the strengthening of neighborhood ties, distributing of surplus food to the aged --food which otherwise would have been wasted--the rebuilding of homes without government aid or at least with local control over the aid. In health care, self-help manifests itself in the responsibility for healthy habits, environment and life-style, while demanding that doctors treat their patients--with their body, brain and emotions--as a whole. Inspired by the idea of mutual aid, people are demanding the control over the mysteries of life and death, resulting in the trend towards natural births and giving birth to their children at home. Mutual aid also finds expression in growing resourcefulness in the rejecting of employment in large corporations to establish one's own business or employment in a small company. In education there is the growing engagement of parents, who question public education and send their children to private schools or, more radically, educate them at home.³

When we join the characteristics of mutual aid movements producing new social structures and the situation of the Polish consumer, it appears that all attempts to compare them are utopian, for the mode of life and living standards are quite different. But when we analyze particular elements it turns out that many aspects of the situation are comparable, although distinctive situations and causes must be taken into account.

The major problem is that of local ties, especially among the inhabitants of new housing estates which are cooperative in name only. Aid groups based on the parish structure of the *Chu*

rch have a chance of overcoming isolation. Naturally there is a long way to go from the formation of such groups to the control of local authorities, but the beginning has already been made. Protection of the old people has currently become a question of life or death, because old-age and disability pensions are very low. The question is all the more crucial when we take into account the present demographic trends because Polish society is becoming older and older. The same is true of the low efficiency of the educational system. The state monopoly in this field is very difficult to overcome, although there are some signals showing different ways of organizing this sphere of social life, e.g., private kindergartens. An alternative conception is a very well developed system of private lessons, which serve mainly the purpose of giving the University, or other high school, candidates equal chances during entrance examinations. Nevertheless their expansion might contribute to the improvement of the general level of education in the society. The most critical situation appears to be the medical care system which suffers from a chronic shortage of personnel, hospitals and medication. But private medical practices, although only the well-off can afford them, show that changes are possible.

If all these intentions are to be realized, the society must be more active. It may seem difficult when we consider the limitations imposed by the system, but it may prove very attractive for the more active and resourceful members of the society who, rather "involuntarily," transferred into private business. In this sphere there are two groups of obstacles: the first is connected with the social awareness of the instability of the private sector in the so-called socialist system, and with the preference of the state sector resulting from this awareness. More consumers are active in the "grey" market, e.g., within the "trade fair tourism", or they run their own production in state factories. This obstacle is also caused by controls imposed on the private sector, especially in the cities, where it is difficult to keep up with the constantly changing regulations.

The obstacles belonging to the second group are strictly economic in character and relate to the lack of the necessary capital for establishing one's own private business. The income obtained from work in the state sector does not facilitate saving the necessary money whereas, as already pointed out, the bank system, in its present form, favors mainly the state and the cooperative sectors. The private sector in rural Poland is served by the so-called Cooperative Banks. The only factor which allows optimism in overcoming financial difficulties is that mutual-aid groups, although sometimes unconsciously, have already started to grant loans to their members for purchasing durable goods. If it were possible to start the process of accumulating capital in this way, this sector could soon be considerably strengthened. The next optimistic sign is the analysis of the behavior of the people who failed in their first independent ventures as private businessmen. They usually try again in another sphere of the private sector with only some of them returning to the sector managed by the state.

The assumption that private enterprise becomes more important during a crisis is confirmed by the fact that more and more private shops and workshops are being registered. They are mainly small ventures, but their share in market production is increasing in spite of the state authority's various attempts at administrative control of this sphere.

To sum up our observations to this point, there are new elements in the Polish social behavior caused by the political and economic crisis, as well as by changes in consciousness, especially that of the younger generation. These lead us to accept the thesis that we are confronted with a situation which would be inadequately defined merely as an adaptation to new conditions of social life; it is something more which may be called a grassroots' reform. Although we cannot be sure that these processes are directly forming a new social structure, which runs horizontally rather than

vertically, phenomena have already occurred which can be defined as changes in behavior and in social structure.

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Notes

1. J. Ko rnai, *Niedobór w gospodarce (Economics of Shortage)*, (Warszawa, 1985).
2. *Ibid.*, p. 575.
3. J. Na isbitt, *Megatrends* (New York: Warner, 1982).

Chapter XXII

The Role of the Family in the Formation and Transmission of Culture

Leon Dyczewski

Family and Culture

The culture of every society, of any social group whatsoever, is made up of three basic elements: 1) values and ideas; 2) modes of behavior which are not casual or sporadic, but the realization of a distinctive behavioral pattern created by definite norms that induce an individual to behave in one way rather than another (for example, the pattern of behavior in a place of worship causes the Moslem to take off his shoes before entering it, the Jew to cover his head, the Catholic to take off his hat and genuflect before the Blessed Sacrament); 3) objects which are the effects of the values, ideas and modes of behavior which are the essential or core elements of every culture. Being immaterial, they are hidden in signs which can be either modes of behavior or objects. Concrete values join with a specific mode of behavior within a group, so that the same behavior or object may have different meanings for persons belonging to various social groups. Thus, for some the cross means punishment and disgrace, for others it is the redemption of mankind, for others it has an artistic value because made by a good artist, while for yet others it affirms the culture of which it is typical, for example, the cross with three diagonal beams in the Ukraine.

The meaning of modes of behavior and of objects is passed on from person to person and from generation to generation, thereby making interpersonal communication possible. In this communication everything has its own meaning: bowing the head as well as raising the brows, shaking hands, a smile or giving a present. Interpersonal communication, then, has a symbolic character. Symbolic communication may be carried out directly ("face to face") or indirectly. In the former, persons can interchange roles so that the same person is at one time the giver and at another time the receiver of the message. The communication is carried out by speech, mimicry, bodily gestures, the voice, sound, smell or objects. Indirect symbolic communication takes place when the persons who exchange the meaning do not see each other or live in the same place, do not know each other personally or live at the same time. In this case, the transmission of meaning is done through such lasting means as writing, a picture, a sculpture or a building. Here there is no interchange of rules between the giver to the receiver as in the case of direct communication.

Direct communication is superior to indirect symbolic communication, for by appropriate modes of behavior values, ideas or norms can be expressed more fully, and its meaning and mode of realization can be shown. This can evoke a strong emotional experience as well, thereby strengthening its acceptance or rejection. This type of symbolic communication takes place within small groups, among which the family belongs in the first place. It is precisely the family with its many features that brings about the creation and transmission of meaning and hence the formation of culture. The family is the bridge to general culture, as well as its shelter when necessary. This role of the family in the formation and the transmission of culture is conditioned by some typical features, among which three must be mentioned.

First the family is a clearly separate or individualized group. Marriage, as well as natural consanguinity or legal relationship by virtue of adoption, set the limits of who belongs to this group and who does not. Those who constitute the family generally have the same surname in order to emphasize their distinctness from those who do not belong to it. Thus five, ten or more people bear

the name Smith, Kowalski or Rizzzi; they occupy a definite place and possess definite objects. They identify their house by means of a doorplate which declares to all that is their home and no stranger has the right to enter it without their invitation or at least consent.

The second feature of the family is the great differentiation regarding positions and roles assumed by the small number of its members. There are the positions and roles of husband-father, wife-mother, both parents together, daughter-sister, son-brother, children, father-in-law, mother-in-law, grandfather, grandmother, son-in-law, daughter-in-law, grandson, granddaughter, and more especially even great-grandparents and great-grandchildren. This system of position and roles in the immediate family becomes even more rich when expanded to include uncles and aunts, as well as their children. Thus, the number and variety of contacts is great, even within such a small social group as the family, and form in turn a distinct social system.

The third feature of the family group, especially important because of its role in the formation and the transmission of culture, is its types of interior contacts. These usually are direct, but can be also indirect, and either informal or formal. Their content includes matters both serious and trivial; they involve each one individually and all simultaneously; as a rule, they have emotional overtones and embrace the whole person; and they range from birth to death. Therefore, even when one deserts it, one cannot escape the family.

Due to these features, the family possesses its own life: it is capable of creative activity, it can isolate itself from its environment and live as it sees fit; it can have its own system of values, its own norms and patterns of behavior; it can spend its leisure time and keep family feasts in its own way. Thus, it is the most formative group with regard to culture. This characteristic of the family manifests itself in various fields. In this present article, only the following formative tasks of the family will be discussed: 1) its molding of the creative person; 2) its formation of its own culture, as well as the system of values and the fundamental attitudes of its members; and 3) its linkage with a national and cultural identity. The conditions which lay the basis for the fulfillment of the role of the family in the formation of culture will be presented in the conclusion.

Family as Environment for the Creative Formation of the Person

Thinkers from various times emphasize the features which distinguish the human person from the other living creatures, as well as those which differentiate people among themselves. Aristotle, St. Thomas Aquinas and Descartes have underscored, above all, the human capacity to think and to control biological impulses. They see these qualities as distinguishing human beings from the animal world. More modern thinkers, chiefly those of the XVIII century, have underscored the sphere of cravings, desires and emotions. Man, they argued, is distinguished by his constant pursuit of happiness and by the fact that he reaches such a state intelligently by choosing the most appropriate means.

Presently, without negating the human qualities mentioned above, it is stressed that man is a creative agent. His most essential need is to create and in this creative process are developed. His spiritual and physical attributes, his intelligence and ability to make choices, and his emotional life achieves maturity. In creating he consolidates and enriches himself and the world.¹

To see the person as a creator emphasizes one's developmental attributes. As one affirms and improves these, one becomes a more complete and more perfect person. Initiating and directing the creative attributes of one's development depends on many factors, but the decisive role is played by the family as the most important "school" for greater human development. Each family fulfills this task in its own way, and some are more formative of the person as creator than are

others. Nevertheless, every family is called by its very nature to this as its fundamental task. It fulfills this task of developing the person first and foremost by forming the very important dispositions indispensable for being a creator.

Family as Forming Social Optimism

The process of human development comes to pass through innumerable impulses which stimulate development and strengthen independence of the individual. Their influence is neither permanent nor homogenous: the same impulse which today is the basis for development and brings reward, tomorrow may bring punishment and become a setback. Furthermore, as many impulses are disorganized, they may cause fear, fatigue and apathy. The first task of the person is to put the impulses in order so as to bring about their harmony, simplicity and understanding and enable the outside world to become intelligible. Oftentimes the individual is unable to do this alone and his closest friends, and in the first place his own family, come to his help.

The family as a clearly separate group which embraces man in all his aspects and simplifies the complex environment of life.² It performs the task of a peculiar filter, as it were, which allows only certain elements of the environment to reach the family members; and, while some elements pass without any change, others are simplified or modified. The family also plays the role of a regenerator should one of its members be "wounded" in the environment of education, work or play. Regeneration consists in restoring one's sense of worth, dignity and security.

This way the family enables the outside world to become comprehensible to its members so that they can enter it full of optimism. It provides the indispensable conditions enabling its members to know this world, to deal with it as their own and transform it, to enrich it with different goods and make it more beautiful. The family fulfills its role of forming social optimism for all its members, but this is most evident in the case of its youngest generation. Selecting the influences which affect the child, organizing and interpreting them are the main tasks of the family. Whether the child grows without unnecessary fears and stresses and comes to trust people and the world, depends upon how the family fulfills this role. This task of the family is especially important today: first, because the world has become more differentiated, intricate, incomprehensible and aggressive; second, because modern man encounters this world from his earliest years through the process of education, and as an adult remains in it for a significant part of his life performing his professional duties.

Family as Introduction to the World of Symbols

The reality surrounding a person is recognized and named; everything has its own name. Behind every object and mode of behavior, behind the links between objects and behavioral patterns, there lies some meaning. Hence, the person lives in a twofold world: the one which he perceives and feels with his senses as existing independently or apart from him; the other which he himself creates and exists in the form of names, ideas, definitions, divisions and connections—this is the world of symbols. The knowledge of this world of symbols is the basis or key for knowledge of the world and of oneself. Through it one can describe and analyze the outside world as well as one's own most intimate thoughts and experiences; one comes to an understanding with one's fellow man, creates social bonds and fashions the world.

By one's nature a person aspires to know the world and to establish ties with other people; one desires to know the world of symbols. This can be seen perfectly in the case of a child asking

adults incessantly: "What is this?", "What is the name of this?", "What does this mean?". The family is the first to give answers to these questions. It introduces the person to the world of meanings. It teaches that a smile and an outstretched hand mean openness and good will but that brows tightened in a frown mean tension or a bad interior condition, an obstacle to interpersonal communication; that in its culture black may mean sadness and sorrow whereas white indicates joy and happiness; that the three letters "yes" mean approval or consent, while three other letters, "nay", mean prohibition and denial.

The world of meanings into which the family introduces the child, can be more or less rich, more or less consciously perceived, as is evident in language. Children from lower social groups use more meager vocabulary, lack abstract concepts and have difficulty in joining different kinds of meanings into a complex whole. In turn, this makes it more difficult for them to acquire knowledge, to learn about the world and to communicate with children from higher social classes whose world of symbols is more rich. A reverse example of the family's importance in forming the world of symbols among its members is found in children from orphanages who manifest farreaching retardation in the acquisition of many words and in understanding many signs.

The introduction of the child, as well as of adults, into the world of symbols occurs spontaneously within the family, on the basis of deep biological and spiritual bonds. Family members learn from each other the meaning of words, modes of behavior, sounds, colors, smells and objects in their wholeness, as it were, without requiring reasons but acting "on faith" and in total mutual confidence. During the early years of the child's life the mother plays a much greater role in this than the father.

When the family introduces a child and adults to the world of symbols, it fulfills the peculiar role of a doorman, as it were, letting them into the world of culture. The number of symbols acquired within the family, enables them to understand and experience their culture, and then to enrich it. It would be difficult for an adult Pole, for example, to understand and experience the whole symbolism behind the objects and modes of behavior at Christmas which represent the essential element of Polish culture, if he did not participate from early childhood in preparing the Christmas tree, sharing the wafer, setting up the manger, singing Christmas carols, extending good wishes or feeling some emotions during the Christmas Vigil supper.

Family as Cultivating the Power to Understand

The family fashions the image of the world in its members, first of all by passing on the image of man and woman and of social life. However, this creative role of the family in culture does not consist in providing its members with an adequate number of facts, for with the modern progress of knowledge this would be simply impossible. The role of the family in the formation of culture should not be reduced to increasing our mass of intellectual data; acquired knowledge and accumulated experience are merely the means to know the world and self, to learn about social processes and to understand social life comprehensively.

The role of the family in this domain of cultural creativity lies, above all, in forming its members' way of perceiving reality, posing questions, seeing problems and finding solutions. The family forms the style of acquiring knowledge as well as of formulating its content. It molds the person's attitude toward truth, goodness and beauty--the three fundamental values of every culture. By presenting these values to the individual, the family oftentimes becomes a decisive factor as to whether one will realize them in one's individual and social life, and how this will be done.

Neither the closest social environment nor the state have any control over the family in forming such intellectual qualities in its members. In this regard parents and the other family members are not subject to any institution, nor by the same token to any social control. Being free, they bear great responsibility as to what image of the world, of man and of woman, and of social life, what attitudes toward truth, goodness and beauty they form in their family.

B.S. Bloom put forward the hypothesis that the greatest development of the child's cognitive capacity takes place between the third and eighth year of life. This is the preschool period and the first years of schooling.³ Kindergarten, when properly directed, and good educators in the early school years can introduce the child to a richer world of symbols and develop his or her cognitive abilities above the level determined by the conditions in the family. This is the task of kindergarten and school which should be oriented more to the formation of a child's cognitive qualities and of proper attitudes toward truth, goodness and beauty, then to the accumulation of a mass of intellectual data or information. They should be oriented more to the formation of a creative posture with regard to the world and themselves, rather than toward filling children's heads with information of various kinds which is often inconsistent or quickly outdated. Today computers are storehouses of information; children should not be educated to replace them, but to be able to use them creatively and to perfect them.

Family as Introducing the Person to Action

In realizing its basic goals of creating a community of persons and forming fully human beings, the family undertakes many long-range activities as well as individual actions. It involves its members in both long range and immediate matters according to their ability. Everyone has their own task to perform as inventiveness and appropriate effort are required of all. Each member participates in the whole of family life: all look together for solutions and all share in the fruits of individual and group activity. This develops the capacity of each family member to live together and cooperate with others. This promotes their realization as creators on the microsocial scale. In this way the family becomes the first and the irreplaceable school of social life, an example and a stimulus for broader social contracts in the spirit of respect, justice, dialogue and love. This is indispensable in order for an individual to become a truly creative participant in the individual and social dimensions of life.⁴

By initiating its members into the world of symbols and developing in them the capacity to know and interpret the world and themselves, by forming in them social optimism, involving them in numerous activities, and at the same time teaching them the ability to dialogue, the family develops their creative qualities, thereby making them capable of more creative actions. Where the family does not fulfill its role properly in these spheres, institutions of different kinds should provide help, but should never aim at replacing the family in this capacity. Observations made so far teach us that man as creator develops best within the family. This development of a creative person is the most important task of the family, as the school for human enrichment which is realized through creative activity.

Family as Creating Its Culture and Forming the Value System and Attitude of Its Members⁵

Every family has its own history, preserves remembrances of its ancestors, cultivates its genealogical bonds, and uses words and idioms peculiar to itself. It evaluates social reality in its own way, possesses specific values, and lives up to its own norms and patterns of behavior. It has

its own beliefs, political and social views, traditions and feasts, each celebrated after its own fashion. All of this creates the culture of a given family and accounts for the fact that, although families live in identical houses, provided with standard furniture and appliances, nevertheless each one arranges its own apartment differently, uses things differently, and spends its leisure time distinctly. Interpersonal contact within each family has its peculiar content and form: guests are welcomed and bid farewell in different ways; members feel their distinctness in relation to other families and the global society. For example, a Polish family has a sense of being different from an Italian family, and both sense this distinctiveness with respect to Japanese family.

Finding itself in the center of social, political and cultural transformations, the family must take an active stance, as well as with regard to different cultural groups living next door, from some groups it accepts some prevalent elements and assimilates these into its own life. Before other groups it adopts an attitude of isolation and defense in order to preserve its own cultural distinctiveness. To maintain such a position, today's family has developed a special selective function. Though this existed in the past, the modern family has perfected it and exercises it more consciously.

This selective function forms something of a cocoon which surrounds the family, isolating it from other families and from global society. At the same time this serves as a kind of filter which allows some elements of global society and various cultural groups to enter the family, while keeping out others. Because of this consciously selective function, the family accepts only certain values, norms and patterns of behavior from the many existing outside, and having accepted these it puts them into practice after its own manner. From commonly used language it takes only a few words and idioms, and introduces into its own life only those feasts and customs which can be integrated into those already practiced. It connects its history with but a few events and changes in global society and forms a family ideology in order to set guidelines for its members. Through its developed selective function, the family sensitizes its members to the fact that not everything publicly proclaimed is equally true, that not every novelty is good. It teaches them how to participate more reflectively in a continually changing society and introduces order into the many highly diversified elements which make up the individual's life environment and link one with the local ambient. It compels the individual to reflect on the changing world, thereby giving one the greater stability needed for the correct development of one's personality.

Due to this well developed and consciously exercised selective function, the family is characterized by relative isolation as well as by relative openness to the outside world. This enables it to preserve and develop its own culture without alienating itself from its environment or global society.

Possessing and developing its own culture enables the family to serve in a number of ways.

a) It represents for its members the natural and fundamental environment for the formation of its own value system, norms and patterns of behaviors.

b) At the same time it introduces them into the general culture as well as into the culture of the connected groups.

c) It moderates the speed of cultural changes in society. As a rule, this is a cultural advantage because the family does not tolerate very drastic changes in the area of values, norms and patterns of behavior and drastic changes in these spheres would arrest the development of culture.

d) The possession and development by each family of its own culture prevents the uniformity of the general culture. This has special significance when only one model of culture is being realized in a society.

Transmission of culture in families in the past proceeded in one direction: from the oldest to the youngest. The older generation introduced the younger to the fullness of its own family culture, environment and nation, to its own experiences and practical wisdom. This structure still functions, but a new phenomenon has appeared alongside it: young generations more often and in ever greater scope transmit the conquests of engineering and organization to the older ones, and impose on them new values, norms and patterns of behavior. This is most evident when the older generations adopt from the younger new forms of leisure, dress, expression and interior decoration. This transmission of culture within the same family has created a pluralism which certainly is more difficult and interesting, more conducive to reflection and to making personal choices. The family is the place for dialogue in cultural communication which embraces all generations: the older ones link the younger to the recent and more distant past, while the younger ones connect the older with the present and future. In this situation the impact of the older generation in the communication of cultural heritage has diminished. Nevertheless, for a number of reasons the family still plays the most important role in the formation of basic values, norms and patterns of behavior among the young, especially with regard to the defence of the value and dignity of the human person.

First, the family comes into being and functions on the basis of love, which enables persons to preserve their individuality even as they form a single unit. In this kind of unity each member feels that the thoughts and efforts of others are directed toward him or her. One finds oneself in the center of the family group and serves the others in that family group without asking what he or she gets for it. This giving, as well as the contact with the other person, is already a value or reward. Such a situation, existing only in the family, makes it possible for a particular person to experience that he or she is important and valuable because others make sacrifices for his or her sake, even to the degree of being ready to give up their lives.

Secondly, more than in the past, adult members of the modern family, especially parents, concentrate their efforts around the child, who is the center of their concerns. They devote much time to the care of, and to contact with, their child providing thereby a continuing opportunity for the child to experience his or her value and dignity. From the earliest days a child feels his or her worth within the family.

Thirdly, in today's family a far-reaching autonomy is given to the individual. The family is directed toward helping in the development of the child's likings and talents. This requires a common effort as well as some self-denial on the part of others. It convinces individuals of their importance and worth since others freely bear hardships and make sacrifices for them.

This climate of family culture forms attitudes of generosity, unselfishness, friendship, piety, patience, self-sacrifice, reconciliation and peace, patriotism and religiosity. These attitudes of individuals, which are then realized in their social life, result in making social life more human and in giving a greater degree of satisfaction to those who participate therein. This creative role of the family in the formation of culture is extremely important today because the quality of mutual relationships rather than institutions and organizations is decisive for the culture of any society. These relationships differentiate societies into those whose people may live in prosperity but somewhat "less humanly" and those in which people may live a more difficult life but in a more rich human atmosphere. The ideal is that societies live both prosperously and "humanly", but the realization of this postulate depends upon the degree to which the family fulfills its role in the creation of culture through the formation in its members of a sense of value and dignity with the accompanying humane attitudes.

Family as Link to National and Cultural Identity⁶

The family fulfills this role by cultivating customs and by the whole range of exchange between the lives of generations which the family most natural encompasses.

1. Many objects and modes of behavior which are symbolic in nature come into play within family life. Through them the family expresses its religious, social and political convictions, comprehends its value system and consolidates within them the content and quality of mutual family relationships. These symbolic objects and modes of behavior function individually and in groups, thereby creating the entire complex of customs connected with events and celebrations of the family and nation.

For example, in the Polish family the customs richest in symbolic modes of behavior and objects are those associated with Christmas, Easter, All Saints, birthdays, marriage and the death of a member of the family. These are closely united with the whole of national and religious culture, and thus they possess an especially rich symbolism, developed rituals and stability. Through the centuries new symbolic objects and modes of behavior are added and become an integral part of national culture. Many customs once practiced apart from the family in local and regional communities are now preserved only within the family.

A special feature of family customs is the lack of radicalism in their transformation. Newly introduced elements do not supersede those existing for a long time, but coexist with them in harmonious symbiosis. Symbolic objects and modes of behavior are not discarded easily, even if they have already lost their former meaning for those who practice them. That is why a Polish family, for example, which has lost its ties with religion nevertheless preserves Christmas customs which are full of religious significance, though without understanding their content.

Such customs as language are an important part of national culture. They contain the history, ideas, beliefs and nature of the social relations of the nation. Therefore, their preservation marks the continuation of national culture of which they are the bearer. Here the family plays the role of bridge, as it were, between old and new times, as well as between individual and nation. Because customs cultivated in families as small groups of persons are experienced very personally with a heavy emotional charge, they anchor the individual deeply in what we call the cultural heritage of the family and nation.

Those who organize family customs are as a rule the older generations, above all the women. How family customs function, including the emotional climate during family celebrations and feasts, depends mostly upon them. As customs play very important educational and socializing roles for all family members, especially for the youngest generation, the family enriches its customs and tries to celebrate them as solemnly as possible, especially when there are growing children.

2. Integrating at least three generations, and increasingly even four, the family is the place where life itself is shared.⁷ The older generations tell the younger ones about their childhood and youth; they relate the events in which they participated or which they witnessed or heard about from others. Their stories are full of scenes from the oldtime dances, receptions, celebrations, weddings, wedding receptions and funerals. They do not pass over in silence stories of quarrels and reconciliations in the family and among neighbors. If it were not for the stories of grandparents, many a child in the Polish family today would not know that during the Christmas Vigil a sheaf of grain was usually brought in and placed in the corner of the room, and hay was placed under the table and become a favorite sleeping place for the children; that for Pentecost not only the living

quarters but the house itself was decorated with sweet rush and birch branches; that in the Kielce region when a girl was ready for marriage the family home was painted blue, etc.

The older generations hand down the whole family history to the younger ones, and link it with the local setting and the region, as well as with global events. They pass on not only a cut-and-dried description of facts which the young generation can find in history books, but add their own interpretation of everything. Recreating history in this way, they form the family ideology as well. When the younger generation listens to the stories and songs of older persons, when it sees their reactions to past and current matters, their gestures and overall behavior, it discovers its roots within the family and national history, reaching back to the deepest sources of its national, religious and family identity.

Studying history as taught in school, the younger generation learns about great events, wars, revolutions, social and religious movements, and famous cities. Through direct contact with older generations, however, it gets to know of all the little facts of the past regarding relatives and acquaintances who were full of devotion and unheard-of courage, or of some small cities, towns and villages for which one may look in vain on the map. This is history on a small scale, but pregnant with strong personal experiences. Thanks to precisely such stories of the older generations, young people develop a more personal approach to the past which is immensely helpful in coming to understand and appreciate it. This is the incorporation of the young generation into the past and its own region. When it comes to evaluation, not at all infrequently a young person evaluates a book dealing with the latest national history in the light of the experience, knowledge and careers of his or her grandparents; they are the real reviewers. Thanks to them the young person realizes that he or she is dealing with two different histories, and such an affirmation can evoke a deeper interest in the past of one's country.

In the overall transmission of the past, the older generations include their wishes concerning the young as well. They stress what should be adopted from the family history and consequently handed down to succeeding generations. In many young minds and hearts, love of country, freedom and justice develop grounded in the stories of older family members, concerning relatives who fought for these values, were imprisoned, had to leave the country and even gave their lives. Because of contact with older generations, the lives of the young are rooted in the history and environment of the family and bound up with the role it played. While communicating the past to the young, elders form in them the future and invest them with characteristics of continuity and stability which are indispensable for the preservation of the distinctness and identity of the culture in the society as a whole.

Conditions for Realizing the Creative Role of the Family in the Formation of Culture

When the family fulfills its role with regard to the formation of culture in the areas described above, the effects may be diverse, depending on many conditions, the following, however, seem the most important.

1. The internal family atmosphere. The more positive this is, the more it is free from continual conflicts, based on mutual trust and imbued with emotional bonds, the more fully does mutual communication of culture take place between generations.

2. Firmness and stability in the life of the family. All forms of disintegration in the life of the family especially divorce as well as too frequent changes in the setting of a family's life make more difficult or even disturb the exercise of the creative role of the family in the formation of culture.

The creation and communication of culture require peace, though the creative inspiration itself is an effect of the author's spiritual tension.

3. The proportionate sharing in the entire married-family life of both spouses-parents. By reason of their different psychophysical characteristics, distinct kind of work and aspirations, each stresses different elements in the family culture. Predominance by one of the spouses-parents, or even worse, the total cutoff of one from the creation and communication of the family's culture, impoverishes the processes of culture within the family.

4. Bonds between the basic family, relatives and befriended families. The creative role of the family in the formation of culture requires richness of content. The more often positive contacts are maintained by parents and children with relatives of various degrees as well as with befriended families, the greater and more diverse is their richness. This is of special importance in large cities to which young people are drawn and where they set up their own families. In such cases they should not isolate themselves or lose contact with their former environment.

5. An adequate standard of housing-living conditions. In order to fulfill properly its creative role in the area of culture, it is necessary for the family to have adequate housing conditions as well as relatively high salaries. Material destitution or very difficult housing-living circumstances make it quite difficult or even impossible for the family to fulfill its role in the formation of culture to the measure mentioned above. In the event the family itself is not able to guarantee these circumstances, the various social and state institutions should come to its aid.

6. Leisure or family time after work and the satisfaction of basic needs. This is time shared by the family members as they play together, tell stories, exchange information and participate in joint activities. The mutual communication of culture is facilitated in this way and vision for the future is formed.

7. Openness to transcendent values. Their presence in the life of the family widens and deepens interests as well as experiences. They provide motivation for doing good for others, for living in truth and for searching after what is beautiful. Thus, they facilitate cultural exchange between generations.

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Notes

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Chapter XXIII

The Hierarchy of Human Values

Walerian Slomka

Independently of all theories of value, throughout history man has given continuous evidence of living in a world of values and anti-values. At the same time he has left many examples of his enchantment with true values and has disillusionments with anti-values or false values. Contemporary theories of values are aware of the importance of the problems, but many lack an integral anthropology and thus have been incapable of coping with the tasks they confront. The sources of such limitations regarding a theory of values can be psychologism, sociologism or basic elements in their theory of knowledge.¹

The first condition for a true theory of values must be the truth about man conceived integrally. Only in the light of such a truth about man is it possible properly to understand the full needs of man and to respond to his need for values.

An integral vision of man always has been a subject of the teaching of the Catholic Church; it has become a special concern of John Paul II. Referring to the cognitive possibilities of man and to the data of divine revelation, this teaching sees man in the world, but as a quite distinctive entity. By nature he belongs to the world, while transcending it by the personal character of his existence—particularly his capacity to enter into personal communion with God and other personal beings. In such a vision man appears within nature, but at the level of a personal subject with a personality or psychic structure characteristic of his human mode of existence.

This mode reveals itself as an order or hierarchy constituted of nature, personality and personal subject. It is in this order that one must seek the basis for understanding the hierarchy of human values.²

Values of Nature

Analogously to all other living natures, human nature, potentiality and values, through which it is fulfilled and achieves its proper fulfillment. The needs of human nature can be expressed as tendencies to self-preservation, to preservation of the species and to the acquisition of the material conditions necessary to achieve those needs.

To the need of self-preservation corresponds the value of food and drink. More recently we have become aware also of the value of the natural environment. This need is so unconditional that failure to satisfy it threatens the human individual with inevitable ruin, while its insufficient satisfaction paralyzes one's development and sentences one to a slow and painful reduction of human capabilities. The satisfaction of this need can be accomplished either in harmony with the human mood of existing or through its abandonment. The person-subject retains its human identity only when it does not violate its nature. When satisfaction of human needs breaks the bonds of human integrity food and drink are replaced by the anti-values of debauchery, drunkenness or drug addiction (narcomania).

To the need for the preservation of the species corresponds the value of sex. In itself this is not evil but good; it is a real value corresponding to a real need in human nature. It should be noted, however, that there is a difference between this and the former needs. Whereas the need for food, drink and the natural environment were unconditional needs of the human individual; the need for sex is an unconditional need not for the human individual, but for the species. In order to live the

individual must satisfy the need of self-preservation, but it is not necessary for the human species that each individual satisfy his/her sexual need. This may be important for understanding the value of virginity or celibacy.

In spite of this, the need for preservation of the species is rooted in the concrete human individual. Concrete human individuals are carriers of this need, which is satisfied in them by the value of sex. Each normal individual of the human species is marked with a sexual need and its connected powers, and has a natural right to satisfy this need for sexual values. This right, however, can be realized only while respecting the right of the species to exist and respect the character of the personal subject created to the image and likeness of God. With the choice of virginity or celibacy the above right is fulfilled by abnegation, motivated by dedication to higher values.

The use of sexual values contrary to the good of the species or the human person, or against chosen higher values, creates disorder in human life. Independently of the pleasure experienced, it will lead to behavior contrary to the dignity of the person subject and his God-given goals.

The need to possess material goods and their satisfactions does not belong to human nature in the same sense as do the former needs. Nevertheless, due to the role of this value in relation to self-preservation and the preservation of the species, it should be counted among the needs of human nature, although in a derivative sense. Under the value of material goods must be listed primarily the possession of a home, clothing, and the means for living without fear of tomorrow. Absence of those values undermines the potentiality of the person for self-preservation and preservation of the species. Danger to humanity may consist not only in the lack of those values, but also in the imprisoning effect of such possessions as they alienate the person and do violence to the hierarchy of human values. The Catholic Church expressed this point in the Vatican Council II in the Constitution on "The Church in the Modern World": "A man is more precious for what he is than for what he has." (n. 35).

The Values of Personhood (Personality)

Although the notion of personhood is still a matter of debate, generally it is agreed to consist in a holistic unity of psychic characteristics which is organized into a dynamic structure acquired during a life-long experience and open to the world of values and meaning.³ Adapting somewhat the thought of A.H. Maslow⁴ we may say that the basic needs of the human personhood can be reduced to three: existential security, personal security and development. To these correspond three basic values: the existence, the value of personal security and dignity and respect.

Material security, already mentioned in connection with the value of nature, is reflected on the level of the person and pertains to the very existence of man. It is not the mere fact of possession that counts here, but societal affirmation and security through belonging to a definite social group.

Acceptance, love and friendship are values of personal security. Lack of these produces pathological individuals. The profile of this malady has been developed amply by Karen Horney as rendering a human individual incapable of loving himself but incessantly desiring to be loved, reaching for threads and manipulating others even through demands for justice.⁵

The development dynamism of the human person as directed toward the realization of self-identity, one's own dignity and respect for this dignity. Here we see the bridge between the needs and values of personhood and the human person in whom both nature and personhood find their completion.

Values of the Person

The mystery of the personal subject can be, and de facto is, felt in experimental psychology. This is reflected by Maslow's statements about the so-called peak experiences of human beings which bring them closer to the realm of "being" through selfless experiences of truth, goodness and beauty and through the experience of purpose, growth and happiness.⁶ This is studied directly, however, in the philosophy of being and ultimately by God as creator and savior. The foundations of human dignity and immortality, as well as its moral character and the ultimate beatific fulfillment are founded at this level. It is in these terms that we shall seek to formulate the problem of the needs and values, or rather the problem of their corresponding potentialities and dynamisms. Among these would include the capacities proper to man as man for knowledge, love, wonder, conscience and goal directedness. To those capacities and dynamisms correspond the values of ultimate truth, good and beauty, as well as the moral values and that of happiness.

The Value of Truth. Human history bears witness to the fact that man carries within himself a hunger for truth which does not allow him to rest until he reaches the ultimate truth, which is God. This hunger expresses itself in the search to discover others and oneself. It may lead to practical pragmatic knowledge; ultimately, however, it leads one toward the ultimate Mystery of Being and forces one humbly to open oneself to its sphere of action. Thus, it leads to meditation and contemplation in which knower and known merge into oneness without losing their identities.⁷

The Value of the Good. To the capacity to love or to "be for" corresponds the good, both possible and actual. This capacity is rooted in the very structure of man's personal existence which defines itself by existing in relationship. Existing in relationship has cognitive and aesthetic aspects also, but existing in a relationship of love means being a gift of the actual Good. Precisely because of love possible goods are changed into actuality. Along with beatific, cognitive and aesthetic communion, in the communion of love the lover and the beloved by becoming gifts for each other constitute an inseparable unity. This is the second half of the self: a communion of indivisible happiness.

Philosophy speaks at this point about a unity of truth, goodness and beauty; it is Christianity that raises specifically the values of love. The originality and essence of the Christian religion is expressed in the thesis that God is Love; that God loves us to the point of giving his Son and the Holy Spirit, and that He made us capable of loving as He Himself loves. Within this context it can be said that realization of the capacity for loving through existing for God and others reflects Divine love as a Source. In that sense, making love present makes God present.

The Value of Beauty. Although theories of the beautiful and of aesthetic experience are so many that it is impossible to find a common dominator, nevertheless looking at the problem from the vantage point of a philosophy of being and of man's personal potentialities we can expect to achieve some understanding. Man is endowed with a capacity for admiration or fascination to which there corresponds the value of the beautiful extending even to Absolute Beauty or God. The peak human experience described by Maslow confirm this capacity and its corresponding values, as well as the unity of being, truth, good and the beautiful.⁸ For Christians it is precisely God who is the Truth, the Good and the Beautiful so that their highest experience is ecstatic fulfillment through beatifying communion with the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.

Moral Values . Though it has been disputed that humans are characterized by conscience, whenever faced with evil, even though it may have been legalized by human law, people judge it as evil. As an ability rooted in the human being by the Creator, conscience is directed towards

moral values as a dynamism discriminating moral good and evil and making it possible to choose the good as a moral duty. Conscience is the first judge of man and bespeaks duty.

As a special presence of God in man, conscience is a sanctuary of one's humanity; it is the basis of human dignity and freedom against all pressures and forces of unfreedom. The betrayal of one's conscience and sense of duty is a betrayal not only of God, but also of human dignity and freedom. It is deviation from one's own happiness, which ultimately consists in communion with God and with the creatures participating in this communion.

The Value of Happiness. Human beings as such are characterized by a sense of purpose directed toward union with a personal God. In turn, this produces ecstasy, joy and happiness. Man is created for happiness, which consists not only in self-fulfillment, but above all in communion with the Divine Persons of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and also with all persons and everything in communion with God. This communion of love is the final all-embracing fulfillment, the ultimate happiness no longer subject to any danger. "I saw" new heavens and a new earth . . . God's home is with mankind! He will live with them and they shall be his people. God himself will be with them, and he will be their God. He will wipe away all tears from their eyes. There will be no more greed or crying or pain" Rev. 21, 1-4.

Practical Demands of the Hierarchy of Human Values

Accusations against Christianity as doing violence to the requirements of human nature have their source in the lack of an integral vision of man and in neglect of the hierarchical character of the human being and its values. The Christian vision of man does not question the reality of the human body and senses, their needs and values. Nor does it question the reality of the psychic, personal life of man and its related needs and values. But neither does it overlook the reality of the human being as a personal subject, with its proper dignity, a vocation to self-awareness and self-direction, and their distinctive needs and values. It maintains that the basis of the dignity and freedom of the human being is located in one's personal subject. In effect this dimension of human existence must be acknowledged as the foundation of ordering and composition within man, as well as of the related needs and values.

The source of unfreedom in the realm of human values lies not in the acceptance of the reality of its needs of the biological-sensory nature of man or in the reality of psycho-personality needs and values, while rejecting the hierarchical composition of the human being. This results in confusion regarding the value of that being. This may take place whenever the needs and values of man's biological nature are considered without regard to the needs and values of human personality; it may occur also whenever the needs and values of one's personality are considered without taking into account those of the human person. Finally, confusion is possible whenever the needs and values of the human person are experienced without taking into account the hierarchic composition of the person with its implications for an ordered harmony of needs and values.

Material needs and their related values will not threaten human dignity and freedom if they are conceived in connection with those of personality and the personhood. On the contrary, the satisfaction of one's biological needs and its corresponding values is the condition for proper human development on the level of personality. Similarly, satisfaction of psychological needs and their corresponding values is a condition for the proper development of a personal life.

It must be stressed, however, that properly human fulfillment or value is based upon not what is conditioned, but what transcends conditioning. In this sense we may say that man's physical

nature is fulfilled through relation to his personality; similarly human personality is fulfilled through its place in the human person. Analogously, the needs and values of human nature are fulfilled in relation to the needs and values of the human personality. This, in turn, finds its fulfillment in relation to the divine through the similarity of the person to God and its existence in communion with God: Father, Son, Spirit, and with the whole divine order.

Violence to this hierarchical order of human needs and values may imply deception in the experience of human freedom. Ultimately, however, it constitutes an attack upon the orderliness of being life and upon the achievement of one's final fulfillment and happiness.

In this regard the position of H.C. Link, an American psychologist, is very instructive. At first he objected to the demands of religious life as inimicable to humanism and human freedom. Afterwards, he arrived through experience at the conclusion that psychology shows that man cannot reach his full happiness without discipline and sacrifice. Because he found man to be incapable of these without the values based upon religion, he entitled his book: *The Return to Religion*.⁹

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Notes

1. A.J. Nowak. "Hierarchia wartosci a sumienie w aspekcie psychologii glebi," *Rocz. Fil.*, 30 (1982), z.4 pp. 105-124; A.L. Quintas, *Las experiencias de vertigo y la subversion de valores* (Madrid: 1986); A.L. Quintas, *A Methodological Introduction to the Study of Values*. (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy and the University Press of America, 1989).

2. W. Slomka, *Wolnosc i zniewolenie* (Clifton, N.J.: Computoprint, 1988).

3. W. Prezyna, *Funkcja postawy religijnej w osobowosci czlowieka* (Lublin, 1981, p. 32; G.W. Allport, *Personality: a Psychological Interpretation* (New York: 1937).

4. A.H. Maslow, *Toward a Psychology of Being* (New York: Van Nos Reinhold, 1968).

5. K. Horney, *The Neurotic Personality of Our Time* (New York: Norton, 1964).

6. A.H. Maslow, *ibid.*

7. *Ibid.*

8. *Ibid.*, ch. II.

9. H.C. Link, *The Return to Religion* (New York: Folcroft, 1977 [1936]).