

Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change  
Series IIA. Islam, Volume 15

# **Islam and Its Quest for Peace: Jihad, Justice and Education**

by  
*Mustafa Köylü*

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

**Copyright © 2003 by**

**The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy**

Gibbons Hall B-20  
620 Michigan Avenue, NE  
Washington, D.C. 20064

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

**Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication**

Köylü, Mustafa

Islam and its quest for peace : jihad, justice and education / by Mustafa Köylü. – 1<sup>st</sup> ed.

p.cm. – (Cultural heritage and contemporary change. Series IIA Islam; vol. 15)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

1. Peace—Religious aspects—Islam. 2. War—Religious aspects—Islam. 3. Peace—Study and teaching. I. Title. II. Series: Cultural heritage and contemporary change. Series IIA, Islam; vol. 15.

BP190.5.P34K69 2003  
297.2'7—dc21

2003005555  
CIP

ISBN 1-56518-180-8 (pbk.)

# Table of Contents

Foreword <i>Mustafa Köylü</i>	v
Preface <i>George F. McLean</i>	vii
Introduction	
1. Rationale for Peace and Justice Education	1
War and Humanity The Economic Cost of Militarization The Effects of Militarization on Development, Employment and Social Welfare The Features of New Weapons and Wars in the Modern World	
2. Socio-Economic Justice around the World	12
3. Conclusion	18
Part I: War and Peace	
The Islamic Concepts of War and Peace	21
Contemporary Muslim' View on War and Peace	25
A Critical Approach to the Question of War and Peace in Islam	58
Conclusion	68
Part II: Social and Economic Justice	
Islamic Understanding of Socio-Economic Justice	72
Islamic Foundations of Socio-Economic Justice	73
Islamic Means for Attaining Social and Economic Justice	78
A Critical Approach to the Question of Socio-Economic Justice in Islam	107
Conclusion	117
Part III: Education for Peace and Justice	
The Definition of Peace and Justice Education	119
The Purpose and Learning Goals of Peace Education	123
The History of Peace Education	124
The Possibility of Education for Peace and Justice	134
Teaching Methods for Peace Education	137
A Course Plan for Peace Education for Departments of Religious Studies in Islamic Countries	145
Conclusion	150

## Conclusion and Recommendations

Conflict and Justice: An Urgent Priority	153
<i>Jihad</i> and Its Interpreters	154
Socio-Economic Justice: An Islamic Imperative	158
Peace and Justice Education: An Imperative	161
Notes	165
Bibliography	201
Notes	221

## Foreword

Though people everywhere expected the 21st Century to open a millennium of peace, justice and basic human rights, the events of September 11th were experienced as a world-wide phenomena understanding that hope for world peace. This disastrous event brought people face to face with terrorism in the name of religion in its most extreme and violent manner. After this disastrous event Afghanistan was subject to military incursion during which any innocent people lost their lives. And while the world was assimilating these results, another world threatening departure occurred vis a vis Iraq plunging the world again into the tragedy of war. In view of this course of history we must ask whether it is possible for humanity to avoid conflicts and wars?

Is this history of wars and conflicts due to a scarcity of natural resources, a lack of literacy, or forgetfulness of the teaching of religions which aim at establishing peace among peoples by ordering human life according to God's will? Though we have very high achievements in science, it has not been the same in the areas of peace, justice and human rights; and though the Qur'an constantly reminds Muslims to share what they possess, today millions live in conditions unsuited to their human dignity.

While Muslims have created great civilizations in the past, and the Qur'an speaks of them as a model for other people (Qur'an, 3:110), today their educational, scientific and economic development is in great crisis. Among the many reasons for this, the main one is their misunderstanding or misuse of Islamic teachings. A more effective use of resources and greater attention to education, as commanded by the Qur'an, would develop their countries both spiritually and materially.

According to the Islamic understanding, Allah guarantees sufficient food for all living beings in the world (see Qur'an 11:6, 6:151; 7:54; 13:16-17; 21:30-33; 66:2-3). Some scholars prove this in various ways and conclude that if there is a problem of food, this is not because resources are insufficient, but because of their misuse or abuse. Though the first verse of the Qur'an is about reading and writing, and the Prophet of Islam urges Muslims to seek knowledge in any circumstance and place, this important duty is neglected.

More importantly, Islam is the religion of peace and teaches that "Whoever kills a human being, except as a punishment for murder or other villainy in the land, shall be looked upon as though he had killed all mankind; and whoever saves a human life shall be regarded as though he had saved all mankind" (Qur'an 5:32). Yet Islam is perceived mostly as a religion of violence and war and some Muslims may share responsibility for this. However, the Quranic verses, when read in their totality and interpreted in their historical context, not only forbid any kind of violence, conflicts and wars, but also command Moslems to establish good relationships with non-Muslims. The basic teaching regarding world peace is: "Help ye one another in righteousness and piety. But help ye not one another in sin and rancor." (Qur'an 5:2).

How then can a peaceful world, in which everyone's basic human needs are met, be created? Though there will always be some who want to exploit resources which belong to others, only by raising the consciousness of people to a higher level can the lives of the poor and oppressed be improved.

In this context, the present work aims at a correct understanding of the concepts of *jihad*, which generally is misunderstood by Western people, of socio-economic justice in Islam, and of an educational framework for peace education.

May this first academic effort in the field of peace education for Muslim countries be followed by many more.

## **Preface**

George F. McLean

As we proceed beyond the divided world of the Cold War into the new millennium, the initial prospect of a period of unity and peace has turned suddenly somber and threatening. Massive armies assemble and lurch forward, not against might attacking foes but pre-emptively against possibilities, beliefs, and their interpretations.

In these circumstances it is no longer possible to file Islam under the exotic heading of “Orientalism” or to engage it only as an energy source. Instead its self-understanding becomes a matter of urgent concern for the entire global community.

Could its religion of peace become an ideology of war—if so, under what circumstances? Could its vision of social justice become a violent response to global injustice—again, under what circumstances? Could its great project of education, which for centuries has provided education through the village and urban madrassas, turn high religious inspiration into potent anger—yet again, under what circumstances?

This volume confronts these three pressing issues soberly, constructively and hence with hope. On the issue of peace, it exams carefully the meaning of Jihad and analysis in detail the range of interpretations from the interior spiritual combat with the self to the geo-political struggle against the threats of a global world. On the issue of social justice, it brings forward the inspiration of one of the world’s great religions for concern for the poor and for resolving the gross inequities which give birth to revolutions and social instability. On the issue of education, it presents what it is probably the first analysis and curriculum for a program of peace studies in an Islamic context.

In sum, this is a book for these times. Rather than proposing military violence to suppress anger, perpetuate cultural attacks and implement economic oppression, it mines the great spiritual and moral resources of Islam and shows how these can be mobilized and applied in a program of peace.

# Introduction

Peace and justice are among the most important, crucial, and urgent issues. This concerns not just one nation, or one religion or ideology, but all the peoples of the world for the destiny and future of humanity depends on these two concepts: peace and justice. If human beings can achieve the ideals inherent in these concepts and apply them, there is hope for the future; otherwise, not only the future of poor people and nations will come to an end, but also that of rich people and nations. Muslim countries and their peoples, numbering over one billion in the world today, are not excluded from this unavoidable conclusion.

This study examines Islamic approaches to war and peace, to socio-economic justice in the light of contemporary world conditions. Both of these are shown to entail the urgency of education for peace and justice in Muslim countries, for which a course plan is developed for use in departments of religious studies in Muslim countries.

## Rationale for Peace and Justice Education

### *War and Humanity*

War, which has been the best organized and most destructive form of violence in which human beings have engaged, has been an inseparable factor for human life through its history. Both the *Bible* and the *Qur'an* record its continuance.<sup>1</sup>

Why have human beings fought throughout history? What are the reasons for such wars? Why has the number of wars and conflicts increased in the 20th century? Will this situation continue forever?

A first answer derived from a historical study of relationships between the West and the East, or between Christians and Muslims, might be that religion is a main reason for war. However, it is incorrect to reduce the causes of war to but one explanation. Quincy Wright points out, there are many reasons for war:

To different people war may have very different meanings. To some it is a plague which ought to be eliminated; to some, a mistake which should be avoided; to others a crime which ought to be punished; and, to still others, it is an anachronism which no longer serves any purpose. On the other hand, there are some who take a more receptive attitude toward war and regard it as an advantage which may be interesting, an instrument which may be useful, a procedure which may be legitimate and appropriate, or a condition of existence for which one must be prepared.<sup>2</sup>

There is then no single reason for war, but many—political, social, psychological and economic. John Huddleston lists among the causes of 20th century wars the following: the nature of human beings, nationalism, racism, extremes of wealth and poverty, religious fanaticism and strife, male domination of public affairs, and competitive arms races.<sup>3</sup> Whatever the reason, wars have continued both between and among nations.

However, Betty A. Reardon points out that "Physical or direct violence, particularly military violence, in the 20th century, appears to be more varied and certainly more destructive than it has

ever been."<sup>4</sup> It can be asked why the 20th century's wars are so destructive, dangerous and inhumane, the following facts may be relevant.

Scholars estimate that from 1480 to 1940 there were 244 important wars in which the nations of the world participated, with 2,659 important battles fought by European nations alone.<sup>5</sup> Contrary to common belief, most of these wars were between nations whose religions were other than Islam.<sup>6</sup>

Since World War II there have been 149 wars.<sup>7</sup> According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of major wars (those that kill at least 1,000 persons) rose to 34 in 1993, after having dropped from 36 in 1987 to 30 in 1991.<sup>8</sup>

As a result of these wars, just since the 16th century, some 142 million people have died. Of that number 108 million, or 75 percent, have died in wars during the 20th century.<sup>9</sup> Overall, according to William Eckhardt's estimate, 73 percent of all war-related deaths since 3000 B.C. have occurred in the 20th century<sup>10</sup>. In addition to this direct killing, some 40 million people died as a result of war-related famine or illness. One analysis asserts that "more than twice as many people have been killed in wars in this supposed postwar period than in the entire nineteenth century, and seven times as many as in the eighteenth century."<sup>11</sup>

Another important feature of 20th century wars is that the larger numbers of conflicts and killings have occurred in the developing countries. From 1945 through 1992 over 92 percent of all conflicts were in the developing countries.<sup>12</sup> By contrast the more industrialized and democratically governed states have constituted a vast zone of relative peace for their more than three quarters of a billion people.<sup>13</sup>

### *The Economic Cost of Militarization*

Especially since World War II, both the developed countries which solved most of their basic human needs, and the developing and underdeveloped countries that are far from meeting their peoples' basic needs, compete fiercely for superiority in destructive power. Although there was a slight reduction during the 1990s in worldwide military expenditures, the corresponding arms sales still make up an important proportion of the Gross National Product (GNP) of most countries. In 1987 world military expenditures totaled more than US \$1 trillion equaling the total income of the 2.6 billion people of 44 of the poorest nations in the world.<sup>14</sup> As of 1993, the developed countries spent as much on military power in a year as the total income of the poorest two billion people on earth.<sup>15</sup> Overall, since World War II, global military spending has added up to a cumulative \$30-35 trillion.<sup>16</sup> Today, globally, between five and six percent of the world's total annual product is spent on military affairs.<sup>17</sup> This means that the world spends \$1,900,000 each minute for the purpose of defense.<sup>18</sup>

Who spends excessively for military defense? The irony is that not only the developed countries that can better afford military expenditures, but also developing, and even underdeveloped countries, with great foreign debts and unmet basic human needs, spend significant amounts of their GNPs for military defense.<sup>19</sup> During the 70s and 80s, three quarters of the global arms flow went to the developing countries.

However, the Middle East countries became the world's largest arms market, as they have waged war against each other in the last half of the last century. According to Shimon Peres, since Israel's recognition in 1948, Arab countries have fought six wars with Israel and another six among themselves.<sup>20</sup> Between 1977 and 1987, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimates the cumulative military spending of all the countries of the Middle

East to be approximately \$615 billions. As a share of the GNP, military expenditures in the region averaged 17 percent between 1978 and 1985, and represented nearly 40 percent of all arms imports in the world.<sup>21</sup> While there was a worldwide economic recession and Third World debt crisis during the 1980s, "Iran and Iraq accounted for more than half of the arms purchased by Third World nations in the mid-1980s, with total purchases in excess of \$100 billion over the course of decade."<sup>22</sup> When we add the nations of the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait, this figure rises to \$150 billion.<sup>23</sup> A report to the U.S. Congress indicated that U.S. arms sales to the Middle East from 1978 to 1988 represented two-thirds of total foreign sales.<sup>24</sup> Figures show that investments in military equipment in that region consumed between 21 and 26 percent of all government expenditures.<sup>25</sup>

Therefore, U.S. diplomats see the Middle East countries in general, and Saudi Arabia in particular, as a "great milk cow." In the words of William Quandt, a former Middle East specialist on the National Security Council, "It takes King Fahd about 10 seconds to write a check. It takes Congress weeks to debate the smallest issue of this sort."<sup>26</sup>

Developing nations, despite severe food shortages, use five times as much foreign exchange to import arms as for agricultural machines. In developing countries, while there is one soldier for every 250 persons, there is one doctor for every 3,700.<sup>27</sup>

Escalating debts are one result of this excessive military spending. By 1985 the external debt of the Third World countries was about \$750 billion—330 percent higher than in 1975.<sup>28</sup> By 1993 the debt of the world's developing countries rose to \$1.77 trillion,<sup>29</sup> and to \$1.9 trillion in 1994.<sup>30</sup> It is estimated that on average about 40 percent of developing countries' debts result from the importation of arms.<sup>31</sup> While these Third World countries continue to militarize themselves, they are not likely to repay their debts. Usually, they make occasional payments of interest rather than paying off the principal. Hal Kane points out that "developing countries pay \$180 billion every year in debt service. Taken as a whole, the Third World owes an amount equal to about half of its yearly income."<sup>32</sup>

Although Third World countries, including Muslim countries, spend billions of dollars on militarization, when compared with the developed nations, they are (and will be) always at a disadvantage in terms of their economies, their societies, and military powers. Why? Hilan Rizkallah suggests three reasons: 1) These countries are obliged to spend money on imports to build their arms and defense system. These expenditures use part of the country's meager hard currency resources and waste the beneficial effects that these resources would normally have exercised on industrial and economic growth within those countries. The result is a growing external debt and overall economic decline. 2) The essential needs of the "poor" countries go generally unsatisfied. Therefore, any military expense constitutes a heavy burden to support and a kind of useless luxury. 3) Much more than in advanced countries, the effect of militarization can be particularly dangerous, because militarization favors the installation of a political-military authority structure, the effects of which are dangerous to development in general.<sup>33</sup>

Besides these negative effects of excessive spending for military purpose on the economy and society of the Third World countries, the following factors keep these countries at a perpetual military disadvantage.

First, they lack the resources for military development, research and manufacturing of the developed nations. The money the U.S. spends for military purposes each year—an average of \$300 billion—exceeds the total collective GNP of most of the developing countries. Even if the Third World countries buy the newest and latest weapons, they are quickly obsolete. This was the case for Iraq during the Gulf War. Although the U.S. had sold Iraq billions of dollar worth of

planes, tanks and missiles of various sorts during the Iran-Iraq conflict, Iraqi soldiers and forces could not respond well against America and allied bombings in the Gulf War. While the United States was selling weapons to Iraq, it was spending trillions of dollars on more sophisticated military machines. Since Iraq had the old military machines, and the U.S. had the new ones against which the old ones would not be very effective, Iraq lost, and America won the war.<sup>34</sup>

Second, military organizations around the world do not sell all parts of the weapons such as airplanes, "so that some proportion of the nominal order of battle must always be unavailable."<sup>35</sup> For example, one Western military expert asserted that only ten percent of the Iranian Air Force's F-14s were battle-ready when the war with Iraq started.<sup>36</sup>

Third, in an arms race there is no end. New purchases of arms systems by one group of countries automatically will elicit similar moves in neighboring countries. As George Kim observes, "This is a kind of chain reaction resulting in permanent expansion, an uninterrupted replenishment of military arsenals, a kind of race in the quantitative and qualitative accumulation of arms."<sup>37</sup>

Fourth, since the manufacture of modern weapons and arms needs an outlet, the war industry requires field testing for new weapons, warplanes, and other sophisticated devices. Therefore, as Naji Abi-Hashem asserted, "The heavy production of weapons and the substantial economic value they can generate may at times cause powerful governments to manipulate tender spots around the globe or to feed regional conflicts in order to market their products."<sup>38</sup>

The following two examples substantiate the attitudes of the developed nations toward developing nations in terms of arms sales before, during, and after a war.

The first example relates to the Iran-Iraq War. During the 1979-81 Iranian hostage crisis, the U.S. imposed a total economic and military blockade on Iran. President Carter invoked the Emergency International Economic Powers Act for the first time since its inception. Under the provisions of this law, any U.S. citizen or corporation doing business with Iran was subject to felony prosecution of up to ten years of imprisonment and a \$50,000 fine. However, Iran was totally dependent on U.S. weapons and spare parts. The former Shah had spent some \$20 billion on U.S. weaponry between 1973 and 1978. On one of their trips, Charles Kimball and a small group met with President Bani Sadr of Iran. In the course of their conversations, Kimball asked Bani Sadr about the impact of the U.S. embargo on Iran's military. Bani Sadr smiled and said:

We can get anything we need. In spite of the embargo, we are currently doing business with over one hundred American companies. We can get any piece of military hardware we require. We must go through third parties and pay excessively high prices. But, *if the money is there, plenty of sellers can be found.*<sup>39</sup>

The second example is related to the Gulf War. While, on the one hand, President Bush counselled restraint in weapon sales to the Middle East in May 1991, on the other hand, the United States alone sold \$8.5 billion in arms to that region during the year after the Gulf War, excluding sales to Israel and Egypt representing two-thirds of all arms sales in the region.<sup>40</sup>

Fifth, while sellers of weapons such as the U.S., see the Middle East countries as the "great milk cow," they are not happy about selling their products. For example, a U.S. diplomat says: "In order to keep the *great milk cow* happy, the flow of advanced U.S. arms to the Saudis has to continue virtually uninterrupted, regardless of how these arms may ultimately be used by the Saudi Sheikdom or a successor regime."<sup>41</sup>

Consequently, it can be said that the Third World countries in general, and Muslim countries in particular, must know that the true aim of the developed nations is not to keep peace in the globe, but to sell their weapons and gain benefit even at the cost of millions of peoples' lives.

During Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, the attitude of President George Bush of the U. S. showed this fact when he argued for U.S. involvement saying: "Our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world would suffer if control of the world's great oil reserves fell into the hands of Saddam Hussein."<sup>42</sup>

### *The Effects of Militarization on Development, Employment and Social Welfare*

We have already spoken about some disadvantages of militarization from the point of view of developing countries that are importing their weapons from the developed countries. What about the developed countries? What effect does excessive militarization have on both developed and developing countries in terms of employment and unemployment, and the social welfare of their people? Although the answers to these questions differ somewhat from country to country, the fact is that excessive militarization in both developed and developing or underdeveloped countries is not an economic advantage, but rather an economic burden on the people.

Let's look first at the relationship between employment and militarization. Contrary to common belief continuation of the arms race creates unemployment, since disarmament and reallocation of money into the civilian sector would create more jobs and reduce unemployment.<sup>43</sup> Many economists see arms spending as subtracting from a nation's total resources. The first economist, Adam Smith, presented this position in his famous book, *The Wealth of Nations*:

[T]he whole army and navy, are unproductive laborers. They are the servants of the public, and are maintained by a part of the annual produce of the industry of other people. Their service, how honorable, how useful, or how necessary so ever, produces nothing for which an equal quantity of services can afterwards be produced.<sup>44</sup>

Undoubtedly, military expenditures employ some people. However, this does not mean that military spending creates more jobs than equivalent money spent for the domestic economy. Spending for defense not only produces nothing that consumers can buy, but also is a very poor way of creating jobs. According to one account given by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in America. "Every \$1 billion spent on military creates on average 75,000 jobs. The same \$1 billion spent on mass transit creates on average 92,000 jobs; construction, 100,000; health care, 139,000; education 187,000."<sup>45</sup>

Military expenditure not only creates few jobs compared with alternative civilian expenditure, but also uses the most highly skilled, scarce, and best educated people. For example, in 1989 in the U.S., "21 percent of all engineers, 24 percent of all electrical engineers, 32 percent of all mathematicians, and 34 percent of all physicists went to the military industries."<sup>46</sup> Meanwhile globally, 25 million soldiers were serving in the armed forces of different nations, more than 500,000 scientists and engineers were engaged in research and development for military purposes, and another five million workers were involved in weapons production.<sup>47</sup>

While both developed and underdeveloped countries spend billions of dollars for defense and hire the most skilled and educated persons for the military sector, most of the poorer nations have not met the basic needs of their people for food, health and literacy. According to the World Development Report of 1994, one billion people in the developing countries still lacked clean water, and nearly two billion people lacked adequate sanitation.<sup>48</sup> As a result of the lack of clean water, adequate sanitation and ample nutrition, in 1993 infectious diseases which are preventable

accounted for an estimated one-third of all deaths in the world—16.4 million out of 51 million. More than 99 percent of deaths from infectious diseases occurred in developing countries, most of which spend much more money for militarization than for health.<sup>49</sup> In addition in 1993 seven million adults died of conditions that could have been inexpensively prevented or cured.<sup>50</sup>

Illiteracy is also a serious problem in the developing countries. According to Ruth Leger Sivard, "One-quarter of the adults in the world cannot read and write, and most of them are in the low-income countries. Over half of the adults in South Asia and in Africa are illiterate, and almost half of those in the Middle East as well."<sup>51</sup>

As a result we can say that the ancient Roman's maxim *Si vis pacem, para bellum* (if you want peace, prepare for war), does not work in our times. Contrary to this famous dictum, as Renner points out, "The accumulation of unprecedented military power has brought not eternal peace but massive destruction during war and high economic and environment costs in preparing for it."<sup>52</sup>

### *Features of New Weapons and Wars in the Modern World*

When we compare modern conflicts and wars with earlier ones, we see that they have declined in average duration but have enormously increased in frequency, intensity, magnitude, and severity.<sup>53</sup> One judgment is that modern weapons and wars are "more ruthless, more immoral and more inhumane than ever conceived in past history."<sup>54</sup> Why is this so? The following comparison summarizes the judgments of scholars on this question:

*Non-combatant fatalities:* In the past, there was always the possibility that wars could be fought between the armed forces of the nations without including civilian men, women and children. But today this is not possible. While just at the beginning of the 20th century approximately one-half of all war-related deaths were civilians, by the 1980s the percentage of civilians killed in warfare rose to 75 percent; in the active wars in the 1990s the percentage of civilian war-related deaths has exceeded 90 percent.<sup>55</sup> UNICEF claims that during the last decade, 2 million children have died in civil wars—wars in which more children than soldiers were killed.<sup>56</sup>

*Environmental destruction:* While in the past environmental damages from wars were limited, such destruction has reached a new magnitude in our time. Robert McAfee Brown points out that "today's weapons and wars not only kill people and destroy cities, but also destroy forest, vegetation, arable land, and may upset the ecological balance for generations to come."<sup>57</sup>

*No winners:* While in the past, when the weapons were bows and arrows or even guns and bombs, there were ways in which one side could be considered the winner and the other side the loser. However, now there would be no winners if nuclear weapons were used.<sup>58</sup> That is why General Douglas MacArthur said, regarding a possible nuclear war, "If you lose, you are annihilated, if you win, you stand only to lose. [Nuclear] war contains the germs of double suicide."<sup>59</sup>

The above-mentioned differences are just a few in terms of comparing the past with the present warfare. However, the most significant difference between past and present wars is the nuclear weapons and nuclear wars which emerged in the 20th century.

Now we must speak of the nuclear weapons which threaten all of the world's nations whether they have them or not, and their possible effects when they are used. Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous, the most destructive, and have the longest effective power. The first experience of nuclear weapons was in 1945 in the two Japanese cities: Hiroshima and Nagasaki. With very small atomic bombs, compared with those later developed, 200,000 people of Hiroshima were killed;

62,000 of the city's 90,000 buildings were completely destroyed, and 6,000 other buildings were damaged beyond repair.<sup>60</sup> The explosive power of the bomb on Hiroshima was just about 12.5 kilotons.<sup>61</sup> Today most of the modern nuclear weapons are 3 to 50 times as powerful as the bombs of 1945.<sup>62</sup> The number is beyond of human imagination. At its peak in 1982, the global stockpile had almost 25,000 strategic warheads and more than 30,000 tactical ones (those that travel 3,000 miles or less),<sup>63</sup> with over 50,000 megatons.<sup>64</sup> This was the equivalent of 16 thousand million tons of TNT (or three tons of TNT for every man, woman, and child on earth) or enough to erase the human race several times over.<sup>65</sup>

Although the strategic arms reduction treaties (START I and II) reduced the number of nuclear warheads by six percent in 1993 (from 52,875 to 49,910), by three percent in 1994 (from 49,910 to 45,100), and by nine percent in 1995 (from 45,100 to 40,640), there remains still the equivalent of 9,700,000,000 tons of TNT destructive power.<sup>66</sup> Even if the two START treaties were fully implemented by 2003, the United States and Russia together would remain with 6,500 warheads containing enough firepower to annihilate all life on earth. Therefore, Michael J. Sheehan points out that "the essential objective of arms is to make the world safe for nuclear deterrence. It assumes that 'nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated and that the world must therefore learn to live with them.'"<sup>67</sup>

Why are nuclear weapons so destructive and dangerous? What are their effects on people, environment, and generations to come? What would happen if nuclear weapons were used in another war? Although nobody knows exactly what would happen if these weapons were used,<sup>68</sup> the consequences can be predicted: A report by the office of Technology Assessment (1979) concluded that "the most important thing we know about the nuclear war is that we don't know enough to make any confident judgments. Complex systems can be extremely vulnerable."<sup>69</sup> However, there are some accounts concerning what it would be like if they were used.

*Massive loss of life:* According to the World Health Organization, in a major nuclear war, 2.2 billion persons could be killed outright.<sup>70</sup> Existing nuclear weapons are enough to kill 58 billion people, or every person living in the world 12 times.<sup>71</sup> As Kiang points out, "No nation could expect to survive unscathed and thereby inherit the earth."<sup>72</sup>

*Ozone depletion:* Ozone is a chemical form of oxygen that exists in the upper atmosphere. It absorbs much of the sun's ultraviolet light. Since nuclear explosions produce large amounts of nitrogen oxides, they could deplete the ozone layer by perhaps 50 percent within about six months, depending on the size and number of detonations. Such a substantial ozone depletion would lead to a significant increase in skin cancer and blindness, the latter being especially severe among animals. Pollinating insects, such as bees, which use vision to locate flowers, might well be unable to function, the result would be severe and widespread ecological destruction, and possible collapse.<sup>73</sup>

*Nuclear winter:* A nuclear war would produce not only an immense amount of dust but also enormous fires, which in turn would generate huge quantities of smoke and soot. Rising into the upper atmosphere this material would absorb incoming heat and light from the sun, thereby making the earth cold and dark.<sup>74</sup> Temperatures would drop so dramatically that virtually all crops and farm animals would be destroyed, as would most of the uncultivated and undomesticated food supplies. Most survivors of heat, blast, and radiation would starve.<sup>75</sup>

*Nuclear contamination:* According to the scientists, radiation can contaminate air, soil, groundwater and vegetation, with dire consequences for nearby populations and wildlife. Lethal effects would persist for up to 240,000 years, some fifty times the span of all recorded human

history.<sup>76</sup> Since radioactive particles can be carried for long distance by clouds, winds and waterways, they can be exported to other regions and there enter the food chain. They cause cancers, genital defects, immune deficiencies from reduced monocyte levels in white blood cells, and consequently increased incidence of diseases.<sup>77</sup>

As a result it can be said that human beings are now confronted with a dilemma: ( in the words of George Kim) "Either to find ways to ease international tensions through the joint efforts of nations or to let the world slide down at an increasing speed toward the abyss of a nuclear conflict. A third alternative simply does not exist."<sup>78</sup>

### *Socio-economic Justice around the World*

History by its very nature includes periods both of relative stability, and those characterized by instability, change, and crisis. However, as Mexican social scientist Velaquez has said: "Today's crisis is different from any previous history because it is global, progressive and could possibly be terminal."<sup>79</sup> Our world has never seen such economic oppression, unjust economic distribution, and poverty as we have today. The following shows how the gap between the rich and the poor is widening. Fernand Braudel has given the following figures:

In 1700, on the basis of the 1960 exchange rate of the dollar, the gross national product per inhabitant ranged from 150 to 190 in England and from 250 to 290 in the British colonies in America (the future U.S.A.). In 1750, it was 170 to 200 in France, 160 to 210 in India (140-180 by 1900!), and 228 in China (but 170 by 1950!). Globally speaking by about 1800, the GNP per person in Western Europe was about \$213; in North America, \$266; in what is known as the Third World, about \$200. In 1976, however, on the basis of the same 1960 exchange rate, the Western European GNP had reached \$2.325, but the Third World's only \$355.<sup>80</sup>

In short, less than two centuries ago "before the Industrial Revolution, the life standard was almost the same everywhere in the world, approximately \$200 a year on the basis of the 1960 exchange rate, with a slight advantage in favor of the ancient Asiatic civilizations".<sup>81</sup> So while two centuries ago the average per capita income of the richest countries was perhaps just a few times greater than that of the poorest, today's average, for some rich countries, is almost one hundred times greater than that of its counterparts in Bangladesh, for example.

In fact there has been a great economic growth in the world. According to Lester R. Brown, the world economy has expanded from \$4 trillion in output in 1950 to more than \$20 trillion in 1995. In just ten years from 1985 to 1995 it grew by \$4 trillion, which is more than from the beginning of civilization until 1950. Again, since 1900 the value of goods and services produced each year worldwide has grown twenty-fold, the use of energy thirty-fold, the products of industry fifty-fold, and the average distance travelled perhaps a thousand-fold.<sup>82</sup>

However, the benefits of this rapid global growth have not been evenly distributed. Living conditions for roughly 20 percent of the world population have remained at subsistence level, essentially unchanged. As a result of this uneven distribution of wealth and income, "The ratio between income in the richest one-fifth of countries and the poorest one-fifth widened from 30 to 1 in 1960 to 61 to 1 in 1991."<sup>83</sup> Because of this uneven economic distribution, over one billion people, one in five of the world's population, still live in absolute poverty.<sup>84</sup> In other words, while the Third World nations contain 76 percent of the world's population, they earn only 27 percent

of the world's income.<sup>85</sup> Worse, this economic gap is not only between the rich and the poor countries, but also within countries. According to Alan T. Durning between 60 and 70 percent of the people in most countries earn less than their nations' average income. Almost nowhere does the poorest fifth of households earn above ten percent of the national income, while the richest fifth mostly receive more than half.<sup>86</sup>

Uneven economic distribution within countries is found in both developed and developing nations. For example, with six percent of the world's population, the U.S. consumes as much as 40 percent of the world's resources, including 33 percent of the world's oil and 63 percent of its natural gas.<sup>87</sup> The *average* American spends as many resources as it would take to sustain 90 Indians in one year.<sup>88</sup> But that does not mean that every American is rich, nor that wealth and income is equally distributed. While the top one percent of the people own about 23 percent of all wealth, and the richest ½ percent own fully 18 percent of the national wealth, the lowest 20 percent of U.S. families get only 4.6 percent of the total income.<sup>89</sup> If homes and other real estate are excluded, the concentration of ownership of "financial wealth" is even more glaring. More than 35 million Americans, about one in every seven people in the U.S., are poor by the government's official definition, and tens of millions are without adequate medical care.<sup>90</sup>

However, the most acute result of poverty and malnutrition globally is seen among the infants and young children of the underdeveloped countries. Sivard notes that between 1700 and 1987 there have been 471 wars in which 101,550,000 people were killed,<sup>91</sup> whereas just between 1977 and 1987, at least 136,000,000 children have died from preventable poverty conditions—more children dying in ten years than all killed in all wars in 287 years.<sup>92</sup> As a whole, 70 percent of deaths recorded each year in the Third World countries are due to hunger or to problems arising from hunger.<sup>93</sup> In addition to child mortality, each year 250,000 children, including 150,000 in Bangladesh alone, become permanently blind due to the lack of vitamin A.<sup>94</sup> The number of people who die every two days of hunger and starvation is equivalent to the number who were killed instantly by the Hiroshima bomb.<sup>95</sup> Thus, as Reardon points out, "Indeed, the children of the world are already living in the rubble of World War III."<sup>96</sup>

Although the remaining people in the Third World countries do not die because of hunger or starvation, their social welfare is very low when compared with that in developed countries. For example, in 1990, as a whole, the world health spending was about \$1,700 billion or eight percent of total world product. However, while developed nations spent almost 90 percent of this amount, for an average of \$1,500 per person, developing nations spent about \$170 billion, or four percent of their GNP, for an average of \$41 per person. The U.S. alone consumed 41 percent of the global total.<sup>97</sup> Again, while in 1985 the Third World countries spent an average of \$150 on the education of each school-age child, the industrialized countries spent an average of \$2,250.<sup>98</sup> As a result of this big gap in spending for education, the literacy rates are 37 percent in the least developed countries, 63 percent in the less developed countries, and 97 percent in the developed countries.<sup>99</sup>

Another big injustice is not between developed and underdeveloped nations, but rather between men and women. A recent United Nations survey reported that women in the world represent 50 percent of the world's adult population, one-third of the official labor force, and do two-thirds of the world's work hours. However, they receive just a tenth of the world's income, and own less than a hundredth of the world's property.<sup>100</sup>

Faced with the big gap between the rich and poor nations concerning poverty, starvation, death due to hunger, poor health, and illiteracy, we ask: Why do so many people, especially children, die? Why cannot the poor receive at least a rudimentary level of education and health care? Overpopulation is a common answer. Others respond that the real reason is not overpopulation or

the lack of food, but rather the misuse or abuse of resources both by developed and developing nations. Since I have already talked about how much money is spent for the purpose of defense, I shall not repeat it, but will note the adequacy of food in the world, when used appropriately.

First of all, according to God's creative design, there is room and food for all living creatures in the world.<sup>101</sup> This is explicitly mentioned in the Qur'an.<sup>102</sup> Second, some research also supports this fact. For example, specialists estimate that current world food production is enough to provide every human being in the world with 3,600 calories a day.<sup>103</sup> The World Bank has also agreed that world grain production alone could provide 3,000 calories and 65 grams of protein for every person per day, more than the highest estimates of minimum nutritional requirements. Therefore experts estimate that if only two percent of the world's grain output were redirected toward those who need it, hunger would essentially be eliminated.<sup>104</sup>

Since the production of most things consumed by the world's population has been increasing at a rate higher than the 1.9 percent per year increase of population, there is no problem with the growing population in the world. At this point, Nathan Keyfitz writes as follows:

Even allowing for the 1.9 percent increase in population, we seem to be getting better off individually at about 3 percent per year. Projecting on this basis, real goods per head would double every 23 years; each generation would be twice as well off as the preceding one. To dispose of twice as much wealth as one's parents, four times as much as one's grandparents, surely cannot be regarded as unsatisfactory; the world, such figures seem to show, is moving toward affluence.<sup>105</sup>

Several researchers have shown that even in a number of major famines, such as the great Bengal famine of 1943, the Bangladesh famine of 1974 and the Ethiopian famines of 1972-4, there was no significant fall in the supply of food grains. In the words of Keith Griffin, "Acute hunger was caused not by a sharp drop in production, but by a rapid change in *the distribution* of income."<sup>106</sup> Even today, the world's wealth is enough for everyone to meet their basic needs. The world average of GNP in 1995 per person was not less than \$675, but was \$3,629.<sup>107</sup>

As a conclusion it can be said that the problems of poverty, starvation, health, and illiteracy widely spread in the world today are not due to the lack of resources, but rather due to the misuse and abuse of resources and unjust wealth distribution. For example, one of America's best-known educators, Theodore Hesburg, president emeritus of Notre Dame University, observed that by the year 2000 one-third of the U.S. minority population will be unemployable because of lack of education. Then he said: "Give me the two billion dollar budget for one Trident submarine and I can turn around the education of minorities in this century."<sup>108</sup>

Globally speaking, as Renner points out, "If governments pursued the building of a peace system with the same seriousness as they build military muscle, in all likelihood many violent conflicts could be avoided and the problem of health, education, housing, poverty, and environmental sustainability could be solved."<sup>109</sup> He maintains: "A comparatively small investment—perhaps \$20-30 billion per year—could make a tremendous difference in the global war and peace balance."<sup>110</sup> However, although some reduction in the number of nuclear weapons worldwide has taken place, as well as peacekeeping negotiations between and among nations, expenditures for the United Nations' peacekeeping operations reached just an estimated \$3.36 billion in 1995 which was "equivalent to less than half of 1 percent of global military spending."<sup>111</sup>

Muslim countries and their peoples are not excluded from the results of wars, arms races, and the uneven economic distribution of wealth and income. According to the Qur'an, the Islamic community is defined as "the best of Peoples, evolved for mankind. Enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah."<sup>112</sup> Muslims are enjoined to establish "a political order on earth for the sake of creation of an egalitarian and just-moral-social order."<sup>113</sup> However, in practice Muslim countries often have been the worst representatives of Islam. Because of excessive military expenditures, actual wars and conflicts, and uneven economic distribution in the last century. Peoples suffer from poverty, and are far from being able to meet their basic needs, such as food, shelter, basic education, and health care.

According to the Islamic teaching "peace is the rule, while war is the exception." The Qur'an rejects almost all reasons that normally incite war, and condemns all wars for unjust gain and oppression.<sup>114</sup> In practice, however, some Muslim countries have spent so much for military purposes and wars that their countries have become very poor, and many citizens live in absolute poverty.

Again, Islam teaches that there is no room for poverty, oppression, injustices, and all other things which threaten and destroy humanity, and these ideals were achieved in the early days of Islam, when Muslims applied the rules of Islam to their social, economic, and political life. In contrast, today, according to Muhammad A. Mannan's research in 1990, over 160 million people of the least developed member countries of the Islamic Conference (LDMC), who constitute about 30 percent of the Muslim population of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) countries, were still living in absolute poverty, with inadequate food, shelter, education, health care and even safe water.<sup>115</sup> Moreover, this shocking figure does not include the poor of the remaining 26 developing countries of the OIC.<sup>116</sup>

In the light of these terrible facts, we should ask ourselves how both these Muslim countries and other nations can achieve peace and justice, and establish a community which guarantees for its people the basic human right and life with dignity. I believe that these aims can be achieved only when people are aware of the present state of the world with regard to war, peace, economic and social injustice, political participation, and ecological balance. In the words of Suzanne Toton, "The economic, political, and social structures and systems that oppress will continue to do so as long as we are ignorant of them, treat them as given, and do nothing to stop them."<sup>117</sup>

As I stated before, although the main purpose of Islam is to maintain peace, if *jihad*, which is one of the basic teachings of Islam, is not understood correctly, and the current situation of the world is not taken into consideration, it may cause great loss to Muslims. Also, if the teaching of Islam concerning social and economic justice is not applied, most of the people will have to live in absolute poverty, while a few people live in abundance. In fact, Islam has still a powerful impact on the behavior of Muslims. What Muslims need is to have an adequate and accurate knowledge about Islamic views on war, peace, and social and economic justice.

Departments of religious studies in Muslim countries can lead in making students and others aware of the world's situation in general, and their own countries in particular, concerning problems of war, arms races, economic and social injustices, and their solutions. Since peace and justice concepts are among the fundamental teachings of Islam, religious leaders who graduate from these departments should have a comprehensive understanding of Islamic views on war, peace and socio-economic justice. On that basis they can be more effective in teaching in the schools and preaching in the mosques.

The model plan for peace and justice education addresses the following questions:

1. Why is the issue of peace and justice an important subject in the contemporary world?
2. What are the Islamic approaches to the concepts of war, peace and justice?
3. How should the Islamic understandings of war, peace and justice be understood and practiced in the light of the contemporary world?
4. What can be done for the betterment of the world community in general and of Muslim communities in particular?

## **Conclusions**

Overall we can say that today both war and conflicts are more expensive, more destructive, more ruthless, and more immoral than in the past. Wars and conflicts between and within nations destroy countries' economies, environment, and the social welfare of the people. But peace (the absence of armed conflict) has not brought relief. Excessive military expenditures continue to destroy economies of nations and deprive millions of people of basic human needs in both developed and underdeveloped nations. While developed nations may still consider such expenditures to be advantageous, underdeveloped countries and their people are placed economically at an absolute disadvantage due to excessive militarization.

Today many people in both developed and underdeveloped countries suffer not only from the cost of excessive militarization with its related wars and conflicts, but also from unjust economic systems. As a result of economic injustices in the world, very few people live with a humane standard of life, and the majority is far from meeting their basic human needs.

Excessive militarization and unjust economic systems affect many other nations, including Muslim countries and their peoples. The prosperity and welfare of nations depend on true peace and socio-economic justice. Every county, every nation, and every person should strive for peace and try to share the goods of the world with others. They should remember that the food is enough for every creature in the world, as long as it is used appropriately.

Thus having examined the relationship between excessive military spending and peoples' well-being, as well as some of the social injustices between and within nations, we shall pass on to the subjects of war and peace, and of social justice in Islam, the religion of over one billion people in the world today.

I am happy to acknowledge the help of Ondokuz Mayıs University, Turkey, which supported this work; Dr. Norman Thomas for his advice; Drs. Okechukwe Ogbonnaya and Riffat Hassan for their corrections; and Ann Gilmour and Suzanne Smailes for their literary and bibliographic assistance.

Finally, I would like to thank Professor George F. McLean who reviewed the whole manuscript and made important suggestions concerning its reorganization, and the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy for having published this work and made it available throughout the world.

## Part I: War and Peace

In the Introduction I have attempted to state the consequences of excessive militarization and related wars and conflicts, and some socio-economic injustices which prevail in the world today. It is a fact that Muslim countries and their peoples not only are affected by the consequences of excessive militarization and related wars and conflicts, but also by accusations of outsiders concerning their faith, especially concerning *jihad*. Thus, while most of the producers and sellers of destructive weapons are in non-Muslim countries, those who are accused of having a religion of violence and being fundamentalists or terrorists are Muslims.

Part One does not attempt to answer these accusations, but rather deals with the concepts of war and peace in Islam in our contemporary world. However, since the subject of war and peace (*jihad*) is very broad, after giving very brief information about the Islamic concepts of war and peace, I focus on some contemporary Muslim views, including those of specific modernists, fundamentalists, and Sufis, on war and peace. Following introductory information about modernism, fundamentalism, and Sufism, I present the views on *jihad* of two or three well-known representatives of each position. Lastly, I try to evaluate the subject of peace and justice in view of the contemporary world situation. In this section, I have attempted to re-examine some basic topics regarding peace in Islam, such as the concept of jihad, the military power of Muslims, the use of sophisticated weapons, religious freedom, and Muslims' relations with non-Muslims.

### Islamic Concepts of War and Peace

According to Qur'anic teaching, human beings are the most valuable and noble creatures in all the universe and are to receive the greatest respect. Allah himself has honored the human being in many ways, such as "by making angels and *jinn* bow before him,<sup>118</sup> by teaching him the names of things,<sup>119</sup> by making him His vicegerent on earth,<sup>120</sup> by offering him the mission (*amanah*) which the mighty universe felt unable to shoulder,<sup>121</sup> by blowing His own spirit in him and creating him in the most perfect and fairest mold, both physically and spiritually,<sup>122</sup> by harnessing everything in the universe to his service,<sup>123</sup> and finally by rescuing him from human bondage by forbidding him to bow down to any creature except Him.<sup>124</sup>

Therefore, from the Qur'anic perspective, the right to life and respect for human life are the most important and sacred duties of all human beings. According to the Qur'an, "to put a life to death without justice means to put all humanity to death."<sup>125</sup> In the same way, the Prophet of Islam said: "The greatest sins are to associate something with God and to kill human beings."<sup>126</sup> In his Farewell Address on the occasion of his last pilgrimage, he again stressed this point by saying: "Your blood, property and honor are forbidden you till you meet your Lord in the same way as the sanctity of this day of yours, in this month of yours, in this city of yours."<sup>127</sup> Here it also needs to be stated that the Qur'an regards all human beings as sacred. In this context, a contemporary Muslim scholar, Abu'l A'la Mawdudi wrote:

In all these verses of the Qur'an and Traditions of the Prophet the word "soul" (*nafs*) has been used in general terms without any distinction or particularization which might have lent itself to the elucidation that the persons belonging to one's nation, the citizens of one's country, the people of a particular race or religion should not be killed. The injunction

applies to all human beings and the destruction of human life in itself has been prohibited.<sup>128</sup>

Another Muslim scholar, Abdul Hameed Siddiqi, has made the following observation with regard to the verses mentioned above: "On close analysis of those verses of the Holy Qur'an, we find that human life has been made sacred by God and its security is therefore the foremost duty of mankind."<sup>129</sup>

However, while the Qur'an stresses the sanctity and dignity of human life, it sees wars between or amongst peoples as a social reality and urges Muslims to fight against some peoples. Then it can be asked: Is war really a social phenomenon? Does Islam give permission to engage in war?

Muslim scholars have given different answers to this vital question. Al-Turfushi (d. A.H. 520) described war crises as *asocial anomaly*, and al-Hasan Ibn Abd Allah compared it to a *disease of society*,<sup>130</sup> as a danger that Muslim rulers should avoid. On the other hand, Ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) argued:

War has existed in society even since "creation." The origin of war is the desire of certain human beings to take revenge on others. It is something natural among human beings. No nation and no race (generation) is free from it. Human being is forever moved to fight either for his own selfish interests or by such emotional motives as jealousy, anger, or a feeling of divine guilt. Thus, the members of one group or nation, in order to attain their objectives, combined against others and the inevitable result was war.<sup>131</sup>

The prevailing point of view in Islam is that in order to maintain the sanctity of human life and to preserve the moral life in the world, the Qur'an gives permission for the use of force in certain conditions. These conditions include oppression, persecution, injustice, and restriction of religious freedom, not only for Muslims but also for people of other faiths. The very first passages which gave Muslims sanction to fight make a pointed reference to all these noble ideas. "[They are] those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right, [for no cause] except that they say, 'Our Lord is Allah.' Did not Allah check one set of people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which, the name of Allah is commemorated in abundant measure."<sup>132</sup> In the light of these verses, Siddiqi says that: "If one were to reflect calmly over this state of affairs, one would be convinced that the verdict of all religious and ethical philosophies, both ancient and modern, has been that under such circumstances war is not only justifiable, but a basic necessity and non-resistance is blameworthy and even immoral."<sup>133</sup> According to the Qur'an, human beings are viewed as being neither absolutely good, nor absolutely bad. As we mentioned before, the Qur'an teaches that while human beings are made "in the best of molds" and honored in many ways by Allah, if they do not use their faculties aright and follow Allah's Law, they may be abased to the lowest possible position.<sup>134</sup> Because of this dual nature of human beings, the idea of war in Islam is accepted as an inevitable social phenomenon.<sup>135</sup>

However, it must also be noted that in Islamic legal theory, the ultimate objective of Islam is not war, but the establishment of peace and justice. This, according to Majid Khadduri, may be regarded as another reason why *jihad* was not made the sixth pillar of the faith, since in theory it was merely a temporary instrument to establish ultimate peace, rather than a permanent article of faith.<sup>136</sup>

Then the question arises regarding when this ultimate peace can be attained. According to the Qur'an, until the *fitna* and *fasad* are ended.<sup>137</sup> What is *fitna*? As M. Khel explains, it is such a broad term that it cannot be translated into a single English word. "It means trial, temptation, putting a man into difficulties. It also means persecution, social tyranny or social disorder and compelling a man to unlawful submission, or forcibly keeping man from pursuing the right path, or misleading a man into false pursuits, or into deviation from truth."<sup>138</sup> Thus killing is sanctioned by the Qur'an only to prevent persecution and tyranny and to re-establish social order, peace, and social justice in the society.<sup>139</sup>

The real aim of the Qur'an concerning war or fighting is to enjoin *positive peace* and *goodwill*, not only towards Muslims, but also towards all peoples and nations.<sup>140</sup> At this point Marcel A. Boisard says:

Islam stands to defend not only the Muslims, but also persecuted Jews and Christians. This kind of armed intervention characteristically corresponds to what nineteenth-century European international law meant by "humanitarian intervention." This is a literal case of the assertion of basic human rights: security, guarantee of man's person and property, respect for freedom of thought. Islam's military power was the background and guarantee of this assertion.<sup>141</sup>

In the light of this brief evaluation concerning Islamic concept of war and peace, we can conclude that war in Islam is a social phenomenon to protect people from all kinds of oppression, persecution, and injustice, and to maintain peace among the people.

However, many factors have influenced the dramatic change in the understanding of *jihad* in modern times. In addition to some historical developments, the changing economic and political powers of Muslim countries; the changed character of warfare in the atomic era; the condition of Muslim countries under colonialism and neo-colonialism; liberation movements and the establishment of new nation-states coinciding with the end of the colonial era; and the ideas of various Islamic movements and groups have led Muslim thinkers to evaluate the concept of *jihad* differently from that of the past.<sup>142</sup> Let us consider the views of the new movements to indicate what kinds of changes have taken place in the interpretation of *jihad*.

## **Contemporary Muslims' Views on War and Peace**

### *Modernists' Views on Jihad*

Modernism is a movement that first originated in Arabia with Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792). He called for a return to the pure Islam of the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*, and its unadulterated monotheism, uncompromised by the popular cults of the medieval heritage.<sup>143</sup> Although the roots of Islamic modernism go back earlier to the 18th or even the 16th century, it is usually associated with the names of the Persian Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897) and the Egyptian Shaykh Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905).<sup>144</sup>

Regarding the goals of Islamic Modernism, Ali E. Hillal Dessouki writes as follows:

The goal of Islamic modernism was to make Islam relevant and responsive in the context of modern society. Its message was that Muslims can live, engage, and contribute actively to the modern world while remaining faithful to their religion. Its ultimate objective was to

provide Muslim societies with an indigenous ideology of development, one that was not copied from the West and could become the basis of a rational, modern society.<sup>145</sup>

Generally speaking, they tried to establish positive links between Islam and modern thought at certain key points, resulting in the interpretation of modern institutions in the moral-social orientation of the Qur'an and the *Sunna*. They resisted the extensive use of *ijtihad*<sup>146</sup> to find solutions to some of the pressing socio-political and economic problems of their times.<sup>147</sup> Afghani, for example, a major catalyst for Islamic reformation and change and the father of Muslim nationalism, stressed that the future strength and survival of the Muslim community was dependent upon the reassertion and re-establishment of Islamic identity.<sup>148</sup> He argued that Muslim revitalization of a subjugated community could be best achieved by direct, active engagement and confrontation with the West.

Afghani's legacy was continued by his disciples Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida (1865-1935). Abduh was convinced that the transformation of Muslim society required both a reinterpretation of Islam and its implementation among the Egyptian people through national educational reform saying: "Muslims must shed the dead weight of scholasticism and selectively appropriate what was best in western civilization."<sup>149</sup>

Rejecting the blind following of tradition, Abduh called for a new interpretation of Islam which would demonstrate its relevance to thought and life in the modern world. Abduh divided Islamic duties into two spheres: duties to God and social duties to other persons. He maintained that while the former, which includes beliefs and practices such as prayer, fasting, and pilgrimage, are immutable duties to God, the latter, including social obligations codified in criminal, civil, and family laws, are open to and subject to change.<sup>150</sup>

Thus modernists asserted that "We have to accept whatever new discoveries modern science may make and to change our interpretation of whatever religious text may appear to conflict with it, understanding it figuratively rather than literally."<sup>151</sup>

In doing so, according to Esposito, the modernists' aim was two-fold. First, they sought to reawaken the Islamic community and restore its strength through a modern reformation of Islam. Second, they wanted to overthrow European imperialism in the Muslim world and regain autonomy and independence.<sup>152</sup>

The social criticism by modernists also affected their notion of *jihad*. They lived at the time when the term *jihad* was vividly and continuously employed in Western journalism and polemic to describe massacre, rape, and various other atrocities attributed to Muslim fanatics during 19th century confrontations with Western rulers in the Balkans, Greece, Armenia, Anatolia, Damascus and Lebanon.<sup>153</sup>

In response to these accusations, modernists began to interpret *jihad* as only *defensive war*, or *self-defense*. Why did the modernists interpret *jihad* in this way? S. A. Schleifer gives this helpful explanation:

because it was so much relevant to the most immediate political problem confronting a Muslim world almost entirely under Western colonial control, a world in which one's appeal for succor and justice was sent not to the court of a distant caliph, but to such "courts of world opinions" as the League of Nations, European Peace Conference, anti-colonial societies, left-wing trade union federations, conscientious (and generally pacifist) Christian conferences for social action, the secular left wing intelligentsia, and the Western press.<sup>154</sup>

For both internal and external reasons modernists tried to imply that Muslims in the past waged war against unbelievers only to defend themselves. They viewed all wars in Islam as essentially defensive in character. Sayyed Ahmad Khan, the founder of Indian modernism, argued that all of the expeditions conducted by the Prophet were defensive wars. But Khan not only defined the Qur'anic limits of purely *legal* or *real jihad* in any time or place as strictly defensive. He also argued that those conditions could be applied to British-ruled India. He declared: "as long as the Muslims of India enjoyed liberty to conform to their religious rituals publicly and to propagate and defend their faith, there could be no theological case for them to rise against the British or even to aid a Muslim invader."<sup>155</sup>

Following Khan another modernist in subcontinent India, Chiragh Ali, in his book, *A Critical Exposition of the Popular Jihad*, declared:

All the fighting injunctions in the Koran are, in the first place, only in self-defense, and none of them has any reference to make war offensively. In the second place, it is to be particularly noted that they were transitory in their nature, and are not to be considered positive injunctions for future observance or religious precepts for coming generations.<sup>156</sup>

In order to support their ideas about the defensive character of *jihad*, these modernists interpreted some of the Qur'anic verses in new ways. Classical interpreters such as al-Qurtubi, Tabari, and al-Mujahid had defined *fitna* as *the subversion of unbelief* or *the sedition of unbelief*, *disbelief itself*, and *idolatry* or *polytheism*, respectively.<sup>157</sup> Chiragh Ali, however, translated *fitna* to mean *persecution* in the Qur'an, as: "And kill them wherever you find them, and eject them from whatever place they have ejected you for *persecution* is worse than slaughter."<sup>158</sup> Another verse vital to modernists is the following: "Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors."<sup>159</sup> Here, the key words are derivatives of 'adu (enemy). C. Ali translates the verse: "And fight for the cause of God against those who fight against you: but commit not the *injustice of attacking them first*: verily God loveth not the *unjust*." According to Ali's translation, "the condition is plainly laid down that the Muslims shall not be the first to attack."<sup>160</sup>

This view of *jihad* of 19th century modernists affected also the 20th century Muslim scholars. From among them let us consider the thoughts of three influential modernists; Mahmud Shaltut and M. Ebu Zahra from Egypt, and Fazlur Rahman from Pakistan.

### *Mahmud Shaltut*

Mahmud Shaltut (d. 1964) is one of the leading spokesmen for the establishment Islam in Egypt. During the 1930s he was dismissed from the faculty of al-Azhar for his modernist views. He helped to create a more conservative definition of Islamic society in the 1950s. He became the rector of al-Azhar in 1958 as a theologian of the Nasser Era. He emphasized the comprehensive and universal character of the Islamic message and argued that Egyptian socialism conformed to the Islamic tradition. In his view, human beings could find no more perfect, more complete, more useful, more profound system than that decreed by Islam.<sup>161</sup>

Criticizing both classical and modern scholars' interpretation of the Qur'anic verses on *jihad*, Mahmud Shaltut spoke of the methods of interpretation needed in order to have a correct and authentic understanding. He spoke about two kinds of interpretations of the Qur'an, the traditional

and the exemplary methods. According to the former, the Qur'an is explained verse by verse or chapter by chapter. This may be done from different points of view: grammatical, historical, stylistic, legal and philosophical. Using this method, verses are interpreted on the basis of certain extra-Qur'anic assumptions or principles. However, according to Shaltut, all these trends in interpretations obscure the Divine Guidance.

The second or exemplary method consists in collecting all the verses concerning a certain topic and analyzing them in their interrelation.<sup>162</sup> Shaltut found three strengths in this approach: 1) we do not see any contradiction among the verses in the Qur'an; 2) there would be no need for the notion of abrogation as the classical and some modern Muslims do; and 3) the meaning of the Qur'an can be understood more correctly and sufficiently.

Applying the second or exemplary method of the Qur'an to the notion of *jihad*, Shaltut distinguished two kinds of fighting in the Qur'an: the fighting of Muslims against Muslims, and the fighting of Muslims against non-Muslims. To him, since the Islam's aim is to preserve the unity and indivisibility of the Islamic state and to safeguard the religious brotherhood, which is one of the most important matters of faith,<sup>163</sup> two Muslim hostile parties preferably should solve their problems by means of negotiations. If that is impossible, then the oppressor or rebellion party against the legal power and public order must be fought by the Islamic community until they submit and return to what is right. "So justice between parties must prevail and each party must have its due."<sup>164</sup>

Shaltut divided the verses related to the fighting of Muslims against non-Muslims into three general subject categories: the causes of fighting, the aim of fighting, and the relationship between forgiveness and fighting.<sup>165</sup>

*The causes of fighting.* According to Shaltut, in Muhammad's Meccan period Muslims suffered for several years under the worst kinds of punishment. They were oppressed, persecuted for their beliefs, and terrorized with regard to property and personal safety. Under these circumstances, Muslims had to leave their dwellings and settle in Medina. The first verse dealing with fighting was as follows: "To those against whom war is made, permission is given [to fight], because they are wronged: . . . [They are] those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right, [for no cause] except that they say, 'Our Lord is Allah.' Did not Allah check one set of people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which the name of Allah is commemorated in abundant measure."<sup>166</sup> According to Shaltut, these verses deal only with permission to fight against injustice. He maintained that these verses are the first verses in the Qur'an dealing with fighting; they contain no evidence of compulsion but rather confirm the religious freedom of all peoples.

*The aim of fighting.* Shaltut argued that fighting must cease when there is no religious persecution but rather religious freedom, when persons are no longer oppressed or tortured but rather feel safe.<sup>167</sup> He gives the following verses as an authority:

Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you but do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors. And slay them wherever ye catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned out you; for Persecution is worse than slaughter; but fight them not at the Sacred Mosque, unless they [first] fight you there; but if they fight you, slay them . . . But if they cease, Allah is Oft-Forgiving, most Merciful. And fight them on until there is no more persecution and the religion becomes Allah. But if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practice oppression.<sup>168</sup>

*Forgiveness and fighting.* Many interpreters hold that verses concerning forgiveness and pardon were abrogated by those concerning fighting.<sup>169</sup> Shaltut disagreed and saw no contradictions between them. For him the key verse in the Qur'an was the following: "Fight those who believe not in Allah nor the Last Day, nor hold that forbidden which hath been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger, nor acknowledge the Religion of Truth, from among the People of the Book, until they pay the *jizya* with willing submission, and feel themselves subdued."<sup>170</sup> According to Shaltut, this verse does not say that the quality of being an unbeliever constitutes a sufficient reason for fighting. Instead, what is important is the characteristics peculiar to them, such as aggressive behavior as a further incitement to attack them.<sup>171</sup> For Shaltut, two phrases in this verse indicate the reasons for fighting: *being subdued* and *off hand* or *submission*. Shaltut argued that the poll-tax is not a sum paid in return for the right to refuse conversion to Islam or in return for their lives. "It is a symbol for their submission and for their desistance from fighting and impeding the Islamic mission, and a token of their participation in the affairs of the state, which grants them protection of their lives and property."<sup>172</sup> He maintained that:

If this verse had meant that they [*Ahl al Kitab*] must be fought because of their unbelief and that unbelief had been the reason why they should be fought, then it would have been laid down that the aim of fighting consisted in their conversion to Islam. Collecting poll-tax from them would not have been allowed in that case, and they would not have been allowed to abide by their own religion.<sup>173</sup>

Shaltut argued that the meaning of the word *unbelievers* in this (9: 123) and similar verses is "those hostile polytheists who fight the Moslems, commit aggression against them, expel them from their homes and their property, and practice persecution for the sake of religion."<sup>174</sup> He also suggested that the word *people* should be understood in the same manner in the following tradition "I have been ordered to fight the *people* until they say, 'There is no god but Allah.' When they say that, their lives and property are inviolable to me, except [in the case when] the [law of] Islam allows it [to take them]. They will be answerable to Allah."<sup>175</sup>

In fact Shaltut's ideas concerning fighting against unbelievers, both polytheists and the People of the Book, were laid down mostly in his understanding of religious freedom and religious diversity in Islam. He asserted that there is no single verse in the Qur'an supporting the opinion that the aim of *jihad* in Islam is conversion. To him:

Employing force as an instrument for conversion means wrapping this Mission in complexity, absurdity and obscurity and withholding it from the grasp of the human mind and heart. This, without doubt, would be a terrible injustice to the Mission as well as an insult and at the same time it would stand as an obstacle in its way.<sup>176</sup>

Shaltut believed that Allah did not wish people to become believers by way of force and compulsion, but only by way of study, reflection, and contemplation. If, to him, Allah had wanted to compel faith, He would have implanted it in human nature and made them like angels, unable to disobey His orders. But He did not do so and left human beings free "to choose between belief and unbelief, between guidance and going astray." Instead, He sent messengers to remind and summon them to think about the kingdom of heaven and earth.<sup>177</sup>

Turning to the Prophet Muhammad's role as messenger, Shaltut emphasized it as the function to admonish and to announce good tidings. He found that the mission of the Prophet Muhammad was the same in both periods—in Mecca when Muslims were few in number and powerless, and in Medina when Muslims had acquired considerable strength and fortitude.<sup>178</sup>

As a result, he argued:

There is no contradiction or incompatibility between the different verses of fighting and no room for opinions that some of them have been abrogated by others, since abrogation may only be applied when there is a contradiction. These verses are therefore fixed and inaccessible. They all amount to the same thing and establish one and the same rule, one and the same reason and one and the same end.<sup>179</sup>

Thus the reasons for *jihad*, according to Shaltut, are to stop aggression, to protect the mission of Islam, and to defend religious freedom.<sup>180</sup>

### *Muhammad Ebu Zahra*

He was born in Egypt in 1898 from a pious family. He began to learn Islamic sciences when he was very young and completed al Madrasatu'l Qadi as-Sari, and graduated from the Faculty of Daru'l Ulm. He began to work as a professor at the Camiu'l al-Azhar in 1933. One year later, he was appointed to the Faculty of Law at Cairo University where he became a professor. He worked as a head of Department of Islamic Law at the same Faculty and he was retired from the same Faculty and died in 1974. He has almost 80 books which are mostly related to the Islamic Law.

Although Ebu Zahra also accepts that *jihad* in Islam is purely *self-defensive*, his interpretive method differs from that of Mahmut Shaltut. Shaltut mostly focuses on the Qur'anic verses related to *jihad*, arguing that there is no contradiction between verses in terms of defensive or offensive *jihad*. Ebu Zahra, on the other hand, uses both the Qur'anic verses and historical incidents to support his ideas. The two scholars differ not only in method, but also in content. Ebu Zahra touches on every aspect of *jihad*, while Shaltut deals with only its defensive character.

The views of Ebu Zahra concerning *jihad* can be summarized as follows:

*The meaning and the necessity of Jihad.* According to Ebu Zahra, *jihad* "stems from mercy, and means the repelling of aggression and the establishment of justice against tyranny and corruption."<sup>181</sup> The spread of belief in Allah, or making Allah's name supreme over all things is not for him the aim of *jihad*. Instead, *jihad* is to repel and prevent aggression and the corruption of Muslims. He accepts *jihad's* defensive character, arguing that there will always be corruption and oppression in the world: "*Jihad* is and always will be part of our moral life until the end of the world."<sup>182</sup> Ebu Zahra emphasizes that God created human beings with an inclination towards both good and bad. Good and evil are always at strife in the individual and in society. In this strife and struggle *jihad* is necessary to defend the right and to prevent aggression from the wicked. He writes: "Without *jihad* oppression would prevail and evil would be victorious. The whole world would be covered with sin." His ideas about the necessity of *jihad*, in fact, were laid down in the Qur'anic verses and the *hadith*: In a *hadith* the Prophet said: "*Jihad* will continue until the day of judgment," and in the verse, "Did not Allah check one set of people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques, in which

the name of Allah is commemorated in abundant measure."183 Ebu Zahra writes: "The dispute between the good and evil undoubtedly necessitates killing and fighting among communities and even between states. This is natural."184

*Dar al- Islam* and *Dar al-harb*. While in the classical Islamic view all things related to *jihad* are connected with the notion of *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb*, Ebu Zahra does not accept this kind of division. He writes: "The term 'world of war' was invented by the jurists who classified people into three groups: 'world of Islam,' 'world of sulh,' and 'world of war.'" To him, this division was not derived from legislation, but was dictated by historical events.185 Although he does not accept such a division, in order to save Egypt from being a *dar al-harb* country, he uses these terms but from a different angle. He writes: "If a country did not enforce Islamic laws, but at the same time did not forbid their observance by Muslims, then it was not a hostile country." According to his evaluation, a country may be regarded as a world of war just in the following case:

A pagan country is one which gives security to pagans and insecurity to Muslims. Thus judgment is passed on the basis of security and fear and not on Islam and paganism. First consideration is given to security or its absence. Where the Muslims do not lack security, and where the established order is absolute, it is not a zone of paganism.186

As it is seen, Ebu Zahra also accepts the division of the world, Islamic or non-Islamic, but the difference is he uses the term *pagan country* or *zone of paganism* instead of *dar al-harb*.

*Jihad as a defensive war*. Ebu Zahra argues that for a majority of Muslim jurists the motive underlying a war against unbelievers was to repulse aggression. War was conducted only when transgression took place as defined in the Qur'an. Therefore, "Nobody is to be killed for his disbelief. He is only killed when he transgresses on Islam."187 To him, the Prophet Muhammad did not fight people, but fought only against those who transgressed. Because of this, the Prophet did not kill or give permission to kill those who did not take part in war and were not involved in it. In addition, He forbade killing women, workmen, children, and all people who had no connection with the war. In case Muslims had to kill their enemy, they behaved very humanely. For the Prophet said: "If you ever resort to killing, you must kill honorably."188 The Prophet also forbade such inhumane things as striking and defacing the enemies' faces, torturing the wounded, and mutilation.

In order to support his contention that war in Islam is only for defense, Zahra cited the following verse as an example, "Fight in the cause of Allah those who fight you. But do not transgress limits; for Allah loveth not transgressors."189 To explain the meaning of this verse, he says: "War is not justified in Islam to impose Islam as a religion on unbelievers or to support a particular social regime. The peoples Muhammad fought only to repulse aggression."190 To him the task of Muhammad was to defend freedom of belief. He went to war in order to defend freedom of thought and to prevent the believer from being diverted from his faith.191

Ebu Zahra explains the principles of Islam concerning a surprise attack on non-Muslims in this way:

Islam was against surprise attack on non-Muslims. It gave them notice before attack. This was proof that Islam did not intend, by fighting, to usurp territories, exercise arbitrary power, or dominate people's destinies. It only wanted to secure itself against danger, either by concluding a covenant with non-Muslims or by converting them to Islam. But if they

accepted neither of these two alternatives, then their aggressive intention was evident and it became the duty of the Muslims to protect themselves against aggression.<sup>192</sup>

*Power and the new weapons.* Since Ebu Zahra accepts war as a social reality in the life of human beings and societies, he also deals with current issues regarding the power of Muslims and new weapons. In his view, if the enemy uses a certain weapon in a war, Muslims should use an equivalent weapon. He writes: "The believers would act like their enemies and resort to all the means resorted to by them. For God says: 'Whoever offereth violence to you, offer ye the like violence to him, and fear God, and know that God is with those who fear Him.'<sup>193</sup>

However, if the enemy abandons all ethical considerations, Muslims must not imitate them. For in the Qur'anic verse, *to fear God* is firmly stated and associated with the permission to retaliate to aggression. He gives the following examples:

If the enemy mutilate the bodies of the Muslim dead, the Muslims are not allowed to retaliate with similar bestiality. If the enemy kill the aged and weak, the Muslim army is never allowed to retaliate. If the enemy torture Muslim captives by making them suffer from starvation and thirst, the army of Islam can never be allowed to reply in the same manner.<sup>194</sup>

*Peace.* In conclusion, Ebu Zahra argues that "Islam is the religion of peace." It is also a religion of realism, designed for the world in which wars and violence are facts of life in which evil and aggression exist. Islam accepts war only in order to repel aggression and to defend the weak. Therefore, killing is sometimes necessary, but it should be kept to the minimum. For him, "The Islamic system offers the greatest protection to people's lives, and the strongest guarantee of peace."<sup>195</sup> Zahra gives the following examples from the Qur'an to indicate the peaceful aspect of Islam. "But if the enemy incline towards peace, do thou [also] incline towards peace, and trust in Allah: for He is the One that heareth and knoweth (all things),<sup>196</sup> "All ye who believe! Enter into peace whole-heartedly."<sup>197</sup>

### *Fazlur Rahman*

Among the major Muslim thinkers of the second half of the 20th century, Fazlur Rahman was one of the most learned in both classical Islamic and Western philosophical-theological discourse and had the widest scope in viewing and applying the fundamental elements of the Islamic belief and action system. Born in 1919 in India's Punjab and educated there through the BA, he later studied at Oxford University. In the 1950s Rahman taught first at the University of Durham in England and later at McGill University in Montreal, Canada. He was called to Pakistan to head the new Institute of Islamic Research in Karachi. He founded and for several years edited the journal, "Islamic Studies," and was deeply engaged in Islamic affairs in Pakistan. Due to political reasons, he emigrated to the United States where first he taught in 1986 at the University of California, Los Angeles. Later he was appointed Professor of Islamic Thought at the University of Chicago where he remained until his death in 1988. He was the first Muslim to receive the prestigious Giorgio Levi Della Vida Medal for the study of Islamic civilization from the Gustave E. von Grunbaum Center for Near Eastern Studies at UCLA.<sup>198</sup>

*The meaning and the aim of jihad.* According to Fazlur Rahman, *Jihad* is "a total endeavor, an all-out effort" with somebody's wealth and lives. The main object of this total endeavor is to

"make God's cause succeed."<sup>199</sup> In this sense, he cited the following verse: "Go ye forth, (whether equipped) lightly or heavily, and strive and struggle, with your goods and your person, in the Cause of Allah. That is best for you, if ye (but knew)."<sup>200</sup>

For Rahman there are two aims of *jihad*—the welfare of humankind in this world, and achieving the ultimate salvation in the hereafter. The first aim of *jihad* is "to establish a political order on earth for the sake of creating an egalitarian and just moral-social order." Such an order should eliminate corruption on the earth and reform the earth.<sup>201</sup> Although all peoples are responsible for this duty, the Muslim community is particularly responsible. The Qur'an addresses the Muslim community saying: "Even so we have constituted you as a median community [i.e. between the imperviousness of Judaism and the liquidity of Christianity] that you be witnesses to mankind and that the Messenger be a witness over you."<sup>202</sup> They were defined as "The best community produced for mankind who command good and forbid evil and believe in God."<sup>203</sup> For this purpose, i.e. to establish a just, moral, social, and political order, the Qur'an created the instrument of *jihad*. Rahman cited the following verse for this function of the Muslim community: "(They are) those who, if We establish them in the land, establish regular prayer and give *zakat*, enjoin the right and forbid wrong."<sup>204</sup>

The second aim of *jihad* is to achieve ultimate salvation in the hereafter. "The concept of the ultimate end of this endeavor (*al-akhira*) is pivotal to the whole system of the Qur'anic thought."<sup>205</sup> However, this end can be achieved only by *jihad*. For it is God's unalterable law that He will not bring about results without human endeavor, otherwise there would be no difference between those who endeavor and those who do not.<sup>206</sup>

*Relationships with non-Muslims.* Although Fazlur Rahman saw Muslims as the first responsible for creating a just social and political order in this world, he also wanted other people, especially the People of the Book, to cooperate in building this kind of *ethico-social world order*. He cited the following verses for this purpose: "O People of the Book! Come [let us join] on a platform [literally: a formula] that may be common between us—that we serve naught except God."<sup>207</sup> Rahman commented concerning this verse:

It should also be noted that this invitation is for cooperation in building a certain kind of ethico-social world order and is not of the nature of contemporary forms of 'ecumenism,' where every 'religious' community is expected to be nice to others and extend its typical brand of 'salvation' to others as much as it can.<sup>208</sup>

According to Rahman, since the aim of *jihad* is to establish an egalitarian social order and to achieve the ultimate salvation in the hereafter, he did not see *jihad* as an instrument for converting people to Islam. He had a very broad pluralistic religious and worldview. To him there is no particular *salvation*, but there is only *success (falah)* or *failure (khusran)* in the task of building this kind of world order.<sup>209</sup> Rahman accepted religious pluralism, saw the People of the Book as participants with Muslims in establishing a just social world order, and was very tolerant towards the People of the Book.<sup>210</sup> Yet he was not happy with Western Christians because they have some misconceptions about Islam in general and *jihad* in particular.

Western Christian propaganda has confused the whole issue by popularizing the slogan "Islam was spread by the sword" or "Islam is a religion of the sword." What was spread by the sword was not the religion of Islam, but the *political domain* of Islam, so that Islam could work to produce the order on the earth that the Qur'an seeks . . . One must also admit that the means of *jihad* can

vary—in fact, armed *jihad* is only one form. But one can never say that "Islam was spread by the sword."<sup>211</sup>

### **Fundamentalists' Views on *Jihad***

Before treating fundamentalists' views of *jihad*, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of fundamentalism in Islam and its historical developments. In popular usage this term is most commonly applied to violent, fanatical, and narrowly-religious minded individuals or groups, particularly Muslims.

Andreas D'Souza has pointed out that "The term 'fundamentalism' was originally coined to describe the belief system of a group of American Protestants who refused to compromise on five basic fundamentals of their faith."<sup>212</sup> These five key points were the virgin birth of Jesus, his physical resurrection, the infallibility of the scriptures, the substitutional atonement, and the physical second coming of Christ.<sup>213</sup>

However, while this term applied in the 1920s to the ultraconservative Protestant Christians,<sup>214</sup> Riffat Hassan points out that it began to be used extensively in the 1980s "to epitomize the negative images of Islam and Muslims prevalent in the West."<sup>215</sup> Thus, in the description of Hassan, "While the term 'fundamentalism' may be relatively new, the image is that of a ferocious-looking Arab, wearing a flowing white robe, riding a wide charger, and flashing a saber."<sup>216</sup> Fundamentalism began to be understood as Muslim extremism, backwardness, confrontation, intolerance, fanaticism, rigidity, narrow-mindedness, militancy, radicalism, and unyieldingly aggressive stances.<sup>217</sup>

Is there really a connection between the fundamentalism described above and the realities of contemporary Islam and Muslims? If so, who are the fundamentalists? Why did such a current emerge? What are its characteristics?

As Hassan has pointed out, although the Arabic term *usul* can be used to refer to a fundamental or a principle, the term *fundamentalism* had no usage among Muslims until it began to be applied to some Muslim groups by Westerners or Western-conditioned Muslims. She maintains that: "If we use it as fundamentals of something, of course here religion, Muslims would have little or no problem referring to themselves as fundamentalists since they do, with a few exceptions, believe in the fundamentals of Islam set forth in the Qur'an."<sup>218</sup>

Indeed, if we use the term *Islamic fundamentalism* to connote strict adherence to the fundamentals of faith, as Anwar Muazzam argues, there is no difficulty in applying the term to a section of the Muslim population. He legitimately asks: "What is wrong in being a fundamentalist? Aren't all religious people supposed to be fundamentalists?"<sup>219</sup> As D'Souza suggests:

If we try to apply to Muslims the Christian fundamentalist idea of bringing religious observance and morality to the center of all activities, we find that for Muslims this has never been a problem. For the very word 'Islam' means submission, the ultimate goal of the believer being to submit all realms of life to God's will, particularly as expressed through the revealed word and its derivations. Thus almost all Muslims will and must affirm that a return to the 'fundamentals' of their faith is a necessary and good thing. Similarly, for Muslims, the idea that religion and state should be separated is a totally alien concept.<sup>220</sup>

In the light of these evaluations it can be said that, contrary to Western thinking, especially of the media, fundamentalists are not extremist, backward, narrow-minded, intolerant, or militant groups. Rather, in the words of Sayyed Nasr, "Fundamentalists are those who want to Islamize society fully through the application of the *Shari'ah* in a peaceful manner, and use all the ideologies and even techniques belonging to the revolutionary movement of modern European history, but with an Islamic coloring."<sup>221</sup>

As to the historical development of Islamic fundamentalism, if we accept fundamentalism as the pure application of Islamic rules to the social, economic, and political area of Islamic community, it can be said that the true fundamentalists were the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, because they tried to apply the fundamentals of Islam to their total lives.

However, if we consider it as it is understood today, we can date modern fundamentalism to two 20th century movements: *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* (the Muslim Brotherhood) founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-49) in Egypt (1928), and *Jamati al-Islami* (Islamic Community) founded by Abu'l Ala al-Mawdudi (1903-79) in Pakistan. As B. Lawrence Bruce has pointed out, both of these groups arose as socio-religious movements opposed to colonial rule and have continued up to the present day.<sup>222</sup> Although most Muslim countries achieved independence from colonial rule in the middle of the 20th century, their first rulers were generally from the Westernized elite or military committed to national goals.<sup>223</sup> Meanwhile, the majority of the Muslim peoples were left in an oppressed condition. Yvonne Y. Haddad depicts very well the situation of these oppressed peoples:

Who will dare to claim that those millions of hungry, naked, bare foot peasants whose intestines are devoured by worms, whose eyes are bitten by flies and whose blood is sucked by insects are humans who enjoy human dignity and human rights [as the Capitalist slogans claim?] . . . Who will dare to claim that the hundreds of thousands of disabled beggars, who search for crumbs in garbage boxes, who are naked, barefoot, with faces crusted with dirt . . . Who will dare to say that they are the source of authority in the nation, based on democratic election?<sup>224</sup>

For these reasons the founders of fundamentalist groups in Egypt and Pakistan challenged not only colonial administrators, but also those among their own compatriots—fellow Muslims—who embraced and projected European-Western-Christian values.<sup>225</sup> Thus, they believed that governments which neglected the *Shari'ah* and replaced it with Western codes implicitly separated religion from secular authority. In so doing, they "violated Muslim history and destroyed the essence of Muslim society."<sup>226</sup>

These historical, social, and political developments were the seedbed in which *al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun* was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan al-Banna (1906-49) and continued by Sayyed Qutb (1903-66). It spread rapidly first in the cities and villages of Egypt, and then to Syria, the Sudan, Palestine, and other Arab countries.<sup>227</sup> The Brotherhood stressed the comprehensive and inclusive nature of Islam based on *tawhid* (the oneness of God in everything) and the need for a transformation of all society through a program based on the fundamentals of Islam, rather than a blind traditionalism or uncritical borrowing.<sup>228</sup> Having experienced Western political presence and the cultural threat of Western colonialism, Hasan al-Banna concluded that: "Westernization was a major threat to Egypt and Islam, the source of much of Egypt's political, social and economic problems."<sup>229</sup> He believed that the major causes of Muslim impotence and decline were Western secularism and materialism. The cure for this *disease* was a return to Islam. Hasan al-Banna

presented the Brotherhood's organization and program as "a Salafiya message, a Sunni way, a Sufi truth, a political organization, an athletic group, a cultural-educational union, an economic company, and a social idea."<sup>230</sup>

The movement of *Jamat al-Islami* was founded by Abu'l Ala al-Mawdudi (1903-79) in Pakistan. The Islamic Society, which has played an important role in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and Kashmir, was similar to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Ahmad Mumtaz lists its program as follows: 1) to elucidate the teaching of Islam with reference to the contemporary social, economic, and political situations facing Muslim societies; 2) to create an organization of highly dedicated, disciplined, and righteous people to form an inner core of Islamic revival; 3) to initiate at the level of civil society changes that are conducive to the total transformation of society; and 4) to establish an Islamic state which would implement the *Shari'ah* and direct all affairs of the society, economy and polity in accordance with the Islamic scheme of things.<sup>231</sup>

In the light of this brief description, it can be asked how their goals and programs will be achieved. Besides other methods, *jihad* for fundamentalists is the primary means of achieving this ideal.<sup>232</sup> As Bruce has pointed out: "It is no accident that Mawdudi's first, and in some sense most controversial, writing was on *jihad*. Nor is it happenstance that the recent expression of Islamic fundamentalist theory by Abd as-Salam Faraj was entitled *The Missing Imperative*."<sup>233</sup> This was (and is) very normal. For there were (and are) many reasons for fundamentalists to write about *jihad*. These include the struggle against colonialism, imperialism, Zionism and communism, the subjugation of the Islamic countries to colonial powers, the impotence of the Islamic countries against economic backwardness, the need to spread Islam, the desire to establish a truly Islamic government, and the struggle against tyrannical and oppressive leaders and rules. All of these realities and goals have caused them to write on *jihad*.

According to fundamentalists, the most important objects of *jihad* are: "to bring about an end to the domination of man over man and man-made law. *Jihad*, in trying to realize these objectives, is a permanent revolutionary struggle for the sake of the whole mankind."<sup>234</sup> Sayyed Hossein Nasr predicts, "If the hopes and aspirations of the Islamic world continue to be shattered by the force of current events, there is no doubt that the revolutionary type of 'fundamentalists' movements will continue to manifest itself and even to spread."<sup>235</sup>

The fundamentalist movement's view on *jihad* as a means of achieving their ideals can best be understood through an examination of the thought of key spokespersons. I have chosen three as representative:

### *Sayyed Qutb*

After graduating from Dar al-Ulum where he came under the influence of Abbas Mahmud al-Aqqad and his Westernizing tendencies, Qutb was appointed as inspector in the ministry of education. While he had been enamored of the West like other Egyptian intellectuals, he underwent a transformation in late 1940, due to British war policies during World War II and the creation of the state of Israel. In 1949 he came to the United States to study educational administration in Washington D.C., and California. He witnessed the wide and unquestioning support of the American press for Israel. Upon his return to Egypt in 1951, he became a leading figure in the Muslim Brothers. He was imprisoned in Egypt for Islamic activities in 1954; released in 1964; rearrested in 1966, and condemned to death and executed that same year. Qutb's work has had extensive dissemination throughout the Muslim world, and his ideas have become the accepted

definition of Islam and its role in shaping the social, economic, political, intellectual, cultural, and ethical aspects of society.<sup>236</sup>

*The aim of jihad.* Sayyed Qutb argued that in the Islamic faith "peace is the rule while war is the exception." To him peace meant "harmony in the universe, the laws of life, and the origin of man, while war is the result of violations of harmony as injustice, despotism and corruption."<sup>237</sup> Since the aim of war in Islam is to maintain peace in the whole world, every kind of war in Islam is not legal. Islam eliminates almost all reasons that normally incite war, and abolishes all wars for unjust gain and oppression. For this reason, war based on racism, war caused by ambition and exploitation, war waged for ostentation which purposes to magnify the pride and pomp of kings, and war for the purpose of conquest, are all condemned by Islam.<sup>238</sup>

According to Qutb, although peace in Islam is the rule and war is the exception, war may become necessary. Then it should aim at one of more or the following objects: 1) to uphold the realm of God, to propagate the oneness of God on earth, and to put an end to the power of those who, by word or deed, challenge His omnipotence; 2) to eliminate oppression, extortion, and injustice by instituting the Word of God; 3) to achieve the human ideals which are considered by God as the aim of life; and 4) to secure people against terror, coercion, and injury.<sup>239</sup>

Qutb saw all Muslims as having a responsibility for those noble aims. He wrote: "They are required to rectify wrong regardless of who committed it. They are regarded as God's soldiers on Earth who look after its welfare."<sup>240</sup> For Qutb they are to achieve peace, not only within themselves at home, but also in the whole world.<sup>241</sup> Therefore, whoever, Muslim or non-Muslim, violates this rule (social, legal, and international justice) is an antagonist and a transgressor. It is then the duty of Muslims to fight and, if necessary, to use force in order that the Word of God, which is absolute and complete, prevail. He wrote:

Muslims are required to establish justice in the world and to allow all peoples to enjoy this justice as individuals, as members of a society, as citizens of a nation and as members of the international community. Thus, Muslims are commanded to fight against injustice wherever it may be; whether it be individual, social, national or international.<sup>242</sup>

In his book, *Islam and Universal Peace*, Qutb wrote in general about the aim of war as applicable to all humanity. In *Milestones*, however, he was concerned mostly with Islamic countries and their peoples. In these contexts the reasons for *jihad*, according to Qutb, are:

To establish Allah's authority on earth; to arrange human affairs according to the true guidance provided by Allah; to abolish all the Satanic forces and Satanic systems of life; to end the lordship of some men over others, since all men are creatures of Allah and no one has the authority to make others his slaves or to make arbitrary laws for them. These reasons are sufficient for proclaiming *jihad*.<sup>243</sup>

Doing this great job, he argued, Muslims should not lose self-confidence under the pressure of present conditions and the weight of the great powers of the world. He concluded: "The need for *jihad* remains and always will continue to remain, whether those conditions exist or not."<sup>244</sup>

Qutb believed that Islamic *jihad* has no relationship to modern warfare, neither in its causes nor in the way in which it is conducted.<sup>245</sup> "*Jihad* in Islam is simply a name for striving to make this [Divinely-ordained] system of life prevail in the world."<sup>246</sup>

One of his basic views, which differentiates Qutb from other contemporary Muslims, is the notion of *jahili* (ignorant) society. Before Qutb, the word *jahiliyya* simply referred to the period before the time of the Prophet Muhammad, or to those people at the time of Muhammad who did not know about him. However, Qutb used the term inclusively, extending it to all societies that did not apply the rules of God.<sup>247</sup> Qutb defines *jahili* society as follows: "The *jahili* society is any society other than Islamic society; and if we want a more specific definition, we may say that any society is a *jahili* society if it does not dedicate itself to submission to Allah alone in its beliefs and ideas, in its observances of worship, and its legal norms."<sup>248</sup>

According to his definition, all Jewish and Christian societies today to some degree or other are *jahili* societies. The reason is that they have distorted their original beliefs and ascribed certain attributes of Allah to other beings. The sonship of God or the Trinity is one such example.<sup>249</sup> More importantly, for Qutb, not only are idolatrous societies and all Jewish and Christian societies today *jahili*, but also all existing so-called Muslim societies are also *jahili* societies.<sup>250</sup>

Qutb classified Muslim societies among *jahili* societies not because they believe in other gods beside Allah, or because they worship anyone other than Him, "but because their way of life is not based on submission to Allah alone."<sup>251</sup> Some so-called Muslim societies openly declare their "secularism" and thereby negate all their relationship with Islam. Others pay respect to Islam only with their lips, but in their social life have completely abandoned it. Still other societies have given the authority of legislation to others beside Allah, making whatever laws they want. At the end, according to Qutb, "All these societies are the same in one respect, namely, that none is based on submission to Allah alone," and "all these societies [are] un-Islamic and illegal."<sup>252</sup>

*Defensive or offensive jihad?* Qutb, in contrast to many other contemporary Muslims, did not accept the argument that *jihad* in Islam is only for defensive purposes.<sup>253</sup> For Qutb "Islam is not a 'defensive movement' in today's narrow technical sense of 'defensive war,' but it is a movement to wipe out tyranny and to introduce true freedom to mankind, using resources practically available in a given human situation. It had definite stages, for each of which it utilized new methods."<sup>254</sup> For Qutb, Islam is not defensive, but a defense of human beings against all those forces that limit defense of Islamic beliefs, the Islamic way of life, and the Islamic community. To support his idea that Islam is not defensive but rather aims at the elimination of worshiping or subjection to anyone or *jahiliyyah* but God, he cited some verses from the Qur'an.<sup>255</sup> He asked what motivated early Muslims to fight in the cause of Allah. Then he maintained, "If they had been asked, 'Why are you fighting?' None would have answered, 'My country is in danger; I am fighting for its defense,' or 'The Persians and the Romans have attacked us,' or 'We want to extend our dominion and want more spoils.'"<sup>256</sup>

According to Qutb those who understand *jihad* as a defensive war only are affected by Orientalists who distort the concept of Islamic *jihad*.<sup>257</sup> He called the Muslim scholars who asserted that *jihad* in Islam is only defensive "defeated people." To him "those research scholars, with their defeated mentality, have adopted the Western concept of 'religion,' which is merely a name for 'belief' in the heart, having no relation to the practical affairs of life, and therefore they conceive of religious war as a war to impose a particular belief on other people by force."<sup>258</sup>

*Dar al-Islam and dar al-harb.* Qutb believed that "there is only one true system and that is Islam. All other systems are *jahiliyyah*."<sup>259</sup> For Qutb, what is important is not the number of Muslims in a land, but the structure of the state in that land. Therefore, the land that is not ruled by Islamic system and law is *dar al-harb* (land of war), no matter what the people believe in (even

if it is Islam). What makes a society Muslim is not its social composition. Only when Islamic law rules the society can it properly be called Muslim.<sup>260</sup>

According to Qutb's evaluation, "Only one place on earth can be called the house of Islam (*dar al-Islam*), and that is the place where the Islamic state is established and the *Shari'ah* is enforced and Allah's limits are observed, and where all Muslims administer the affairs of the community with mutual consultation."<sup>261</sup> Again, "Any place where the Islamic *Shari'ah* is not enforced and where Islam is not dominant, becomes the *dar al-harb* (the house of hostility)."<sup>262</sup> In such a situation, a Muslim can have only two possible relations with *dar al-harb*: peace with a contractual agreement, or war. Therefore, a Muslim should prepare to fight against *dar al-harb*, whether it be his own country or a place where his relatives live or where his property or any other material interests are located.<sup>263</sup>

*Religious freedom.* Qutb did not have an objective and clear idea about the matter of religious freedom, especially for people of other faiths. In his book, *Islam and Universal Peace*, he recognized religious freedom for all people regardless of race, nationality, and even creed. In *Milestones*, on the other hand, he understood religious freedom as only for the accepting of Islam, giving no credits to other beliefs and religions. The following argument will indicate his thoughts about this matter, which he saw directly related to the notion of *jihad*.

Qutb saw the absence of religious freedom as a main reason why Muslims fought in early Islam. The Meccans fought the believers, expelled them from their homes, and suppressed the new religion. "Consequently, to defend their rights to preach and worship, which is one of the fundamental principles of Islam, Muslims were allowed to fight back,"<sup>264</sup> he wrote. Qutb continued:

War has never been a means of forcing people to embrace Islam. It is true that there were some exceptions to this rule, but these were cases where war was waged by those who did not understand Islamic ideology and hence were not committed to Islam. Islamic faith was not spread by force as some of its adversaries allege. The only use of force through the long history of Islam . . . was in order to give people freedom of choice and to eliminate the injustices of oppressors who tried to usurp God's divine right to rule and deny Muslims the right to preach their religion.<sup>265</sup>

In fact, Qutb accepted religious freedom and tolerance as "a conditional agreement concluded between a victorious party and vanquished subjects."<sup>266</sup> That is, it is only when establishing the rule of God, who has unique power and authority and who ordained a free way of life for all people, that "everybody has the right to worship as he pleases."<sup>267</sup> Rejecting those who say Islam has prescribed only defensive war, he said that

Islam does not force people to accept its belief, but it wants to provide a free environment in which they will have the choice to believe. What it wants to abolish is those oppressive political systems under which people are prevented from expressing their freedom to choose whatever beliefs they want, and after it gives them complete freedom to decide whether to accept Islam or not.<sup>268</sup>

His main idea about *jihad* and religious freedom is to release all peoples from the servitude of some to others, through abolishing all systems and governments that are based on the rule of some men over others. Only when Islam liberates people from these external pressures, and invites them

to its message, does it give them complete freedom to accept or reject it.<sup>269</sup> The main premise which led Qutb to such an idea is that "Islam is the religion of Allah and it is for the whole world." Therefore, Islam has the right to destroy all obstacles in the form of institutions and traditions that restrict a human being's freedom of choice. However, it must also be noted that Qutb did not attack individuals, but rather institutions and traditions which distort human nature and curtail human freedom.<sup>270</sup>

As to the relationship between Muslim and non-Muslim societies, Qutb maintained there can be one of two things: either they accept Islam as the basis of international relations, or they give permission to propagate its call without a barrier from any political regime or material force. He believed that societies should give their people the freedom to accept or reject Islam.<sup>271</sup> However, he was not hopeful about this matter. Since truth and falsehood cannot co-exist on this earth, "The eternal struggle for the freedom of man will continue until all religion is for Allah, and man is free to worship and obey his Sustainer."<sup>272</sup>

Accordingly, it can be said that Qutb also accepted the Qur'anic injunction, "Let there be no compulsion in religion."<sup>273</sup> Contrary to the opinions of modernists, however, he presupposed the hegemony of Islam. Since Islam is the religion of Allah—a universal religion sent to all humankind whether all people accept it or not—there should be no obstacle in the way of propagating its mission. Thus, while force may not be used against individuals who do not have any opportunity to hear it, force may be or should be used against those who prevent people from a free choice of religion. It is only when such a freedom prevails that

people are permitted to follow the Word of God and are not beguiled from their divine religions; when there is no authority on earth that makes idols out of man, when justice is applied and no man is enslaved by his fellowmen; and when the defenseless feel secure before the strong, then there will be no warrant for using force as the peace of Islam will prevail.<sup>274</sup>

#### *Abu'l A'la al-Mawdudi*

Abu'l A'la Mawdudi (1903-1973) was one of the best known, controversial, and most highly visible of all the religious leaders of Pakistan. After having been educated privately at home by tutors, he began his career as a religious journalist in the period immediately after World War I, and participated in the Khilaf (Caliphate) Movement. He began to attract notice with the publication of two books, *al Jihad fi'l Islam* (1926) and *Towards Understanding Islam* (1930). In 1932, he took over the editorship of the monthly *Journal of Tarjuman al-Qur'an* and continued in that role for the rest of his life. In 1941, he founded an organization entitled the *Jama'at-I Islami* (Islamic Association). Because of his opposition to the then government of Pakistan, he was imprisoned in 1948, 1952, and in 1964. Each time he was considered a threat to public order because of the virulence of his attacks on the alleged infidelity to Islam of the political leaders. His writings have been influential in many parts of the Muslim world.<sup>275</sup>

*The aim of jihad.* Mawdudi argued that Islam purposely rejected the word *harb* and other Arabic words bearing the same meaning of *war*, and used instead the word *jihad* which means *struggle*. According to Mawdudi the nearest meaning of the word *jihad* in English is "To exert one's utmost endeavor in promoting a cause."<sup>276</sup> However, the *jihad* of Islam is not merely a struggle; it is a *struggle for the cause of God*. Its literal meaning is *in the way of God*.<sup>277</sup> Therefore, the objectives of *jihad* should be completely free from all kinds of selfish

motives such as gaining wealth or goods, fame or applause, personal glory or elevation. He wrote: "All sacrifices and exertions should be directed to achieve the one and the only end, i.e., the establishment of a just and equitable social order among human beings; and the only reward in view should be to gain the favor of God."<sup>278</sup> In the political arena, the objective of *jihad* is "to eliminate the rule of an un-Islamic system and establish in its stead an Islamic system of state rule."<sup>279</sup>

Therefore, according to Mawdudi, *jihad* is as important and primary duty as daily prayers and fasting. He wrote: "One who *shirks* [doubts] it is a sinner. His very claim to being Muslim is doubtful. He is a hypocrite whose *ibadat* and prayers are a shame, a worthless, hollow show of devotion."<sup>280</sup> The reason why Mawdudi saw *jihad* for Muslims as a primary obligation like daily prayers is that "It is impossible for a Muslim to succeed in his intention of observing the Islamic pattern of life under the authority of a non-Islamic system of government."<sup>281</sup>

Mawdudi, like other fundamentalists, considered the type of government in an Islamic state to be of great importance. He wrote:

The sole interest of Islam is the welfare of mankind. Islam has its own particular ideological standpoint and practical programme to carry out reforms for the welfare of mankind. Islam wishes to destroy all states and governments anywhere on the face of the earth which are opposed to the ideology and programme of Islam regardless of the country of the Nation which rules it.<sup>282</sup>

The main reason Mawdudi stressed Islamic ideology and the Islamic state was that he did not see Islam as merely a religious creed or a compound name for a few forms of worship. He accepted it instead as a comprehensive system which envisages annihilation of all kinds of tyrannical and evil systems in the world. The task of an Islamic state shall be to enforce its own program of reform which it deems best for the well-being of humanity. The Islamic system, he argued, does not harbor any animosity against any human being. Our animosity, he wrote, is "directed against tyranny, strife, immorality and against the attempt of an individual to transgress his natural limits and expropriate what is not apportioned to him by the natural law of God."<sup>283</sup>

After giving some references from the Qur'an,<sup>284</sup> Mawdudi continued: "Islam loudly proclaimed 'Sovereignty belongs to no one except Allah.' No one has the right to become a self-appointed ruler of men and issue orders and prohibitions on his own volition and authority."<sup>285</sup> To him, if a human being does not offer devotion to the one God, that person shall never be free from bondage to *small and false gods*.<sup>286</sup> With that conviction, the duty of Muslims is "to wipe out oppression, mischief, strife, immorality, high handedness, and unlawful exploitation from the world by force of arms."<sup>287</sup>

*Types of jihad.* According to Mawdudi since the aim of *jihad* is to establish an Islamic system and to wipe out all kinds of oppression, mischief, immorality, and unlawful exploitation from the world, every kind of effort which helps to achieve this goal is a kind of *jihad*. He did not see *jihad* as only the use of armed force. Regarding the types of *jihad* he wrote: "To change the outlook of the people and initiate a mutual revolution among them through speech or writing is a form of *jihad*. To alter the old tyrannical social system and establish a new, just order of life by the power of the sword is also *jihad* and to expend goods and exert physically for this cause is *jihad* too."<sup>288</sup>

Accordingly, Mawdudi does not accept the division of Islamic *jihad* into offensive and defensive. To him, "Islamic *jihad* is both defensive and offensive at one and the same time. It is

offensive because the Muslim Party assaults the rule of an opposing ideology, and it is defensive because the Muslim Party is constrained to capture state power in order to arrest the principles of Islam in space time forces."289

*Relationships with non-Muslims.* According to Mawdudi there are two kinds of citizenship in the Islamic state: one kind for Muslims who are domiciled within the territory of the state, and the other kind for all those non-Muslims who agree to be loyal and obedient to the Islamic state in which they live.290

While the non-Muslim citizens' (*dhimmi*s) life, property and culture, faith and honor, and basic necessities of life (food, shelter, and clothing) are guaranteed, he argued that they are not guaranteed full political expression or full equality with Muslim citizens. Mawdudi wrote:

Islamic "*jihad*" does not seek to interfere with the faith, ideology, rituals of worship or social customs of the people. It allows them perfect freedom of religious belief and permits them to act according to their creed. However, Islamic "*jihad*" does not recognize their right to administer state affairs according to a system which, in the view of Islam, is evil. Furthermore, Islamic "*jihad*" also refuses to admit their right to continue with such practices under an Islamic government which fatally affect the public interest from the viewpoint of Islam.291

He continued: "As soon as Muslims capture state power. . . . It will make it obligatory for non-Muslim women to observe the minimum standards of modesty in dress as required by Islamic law and will forbid them to go about displaying their beauty like the days of ignorance."292

However, although Mawdudi would place some restrictions on non-Muslim citizens in the Islamic state, he asserted that "Islam provides full opportunity for self-advancement to the people of other faiths under conditions of peace and displays such magnanimity towards them that the world has yet to show a parallel example."293

### *Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj*

Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj was one of the most articulate spokesman of the fundamentalist views of *jihad*. In his book, *The Neglected Duty* (1981), he argued that the Sadat regime (in Egypt) was indeed analogous to the Mongols. In fact, as we will see later, not only was the Sadat regime un-Islamic, but also most of the Islamic countries' regimes are un-Islamic. Faraj advocated that *jihad* has to be waged against these rulers without any mercy.294 Accused of assassinating President Sadat, he was executed on April 15, 1982. The following argument is drawn from his book, *The Neglected Duty*.

*The necessity of jihad.* Faraj argued that *jihad* has been neglected by the *ulema* (leading Muslim scholars) of this age, in spite of its extreme importance and its great significance for the future of religion.295 He saw *jihad* as a significant duty not only for the future, but also for the present situation. For him "the establishment of an Islamic state is an obligation for the Muslims, for something without which something which is obligation cannot be carried out becomes (itself) obligatory. If, moreover, (such a) state cannot be established without war, then this war is an obligation as well."296

Faraj believed that *jihad* is, in fact, an obligation for all Muslims. According to the *hadith* *jihad* is the best of the summit of Islam. The Prophet said: "Someone who does not participate in any way in the raids (against the enemies of Islam), or someone whose soul does not

talk to him encouraging him to wage a fight on behalf of his religion, dies as if he had never been a Muslim, or (he dies) like someone who, filled with some form of hypocrisy, only outwardly appears to be a Muslim."297 Then "Whoever really wants to be occupied with the highest degrees of obedience and wants to reach the peak of devotion must commit to *jihad* for the cause of God, without, however, neglecting the other (prescribed) pillars of Islam."298

Contrary to the common understanding of Muslims, Faraj saw *jihad* as an individual duty. To him *jihad* becomes such in three situations: The first is "when the infidels descend upon a country, it becomes an individual duty for its people to fight them and drive them away."299 According to Faraj, these infidels are not foreigners, but present rulers who have illegally seized the leadership of the Muslims.300 He asserted that the rulers of this age have apostated from Islam. They have been raised at the tables of imperialism, be it Crusaderism, or Communism or Zionism. "They carry nothing from Islam except their names, although they pray and fast and claim to be Muslim."301

Citing Ibn Taymiyyah (d.1328, reputed Egyptian theologian and Hanbali jurist), he maintained that "any group of people that rebels against any single prescript of the clear and reliably transmitted precepts of Islam has to be fought, even if these people pronounce the Islamic confession."302 If such people refuse to forbid abominations or adultery or gambling or wine which are forbidden by Islam, or refuse to compel what is good and to prohibit what is bad, then they have to be fought on these points by Muslims. For God says: "Fight them until there is no dissension, and the religion is entirely God's."303

Faraj believed that the duties of leadership of the Islamic community could not be given to an infidel. However, when a leader suddenly becomes an unbeliever, his leadership comes to an end. When one neglects his prayers, or changes God's law, or introduces an innovation (*bid'ah*)nt reduces an innovation (*bid'ah*) obeying him is not necessary, and Muslims have the duty to revolt against him and depose him, and to replace him with a just leader when they are able to do so.304

According to Faraj, since Western imperialism continues in Muslim countries through these rulers, and since they are apostates from Islam, and such apostates are worse by origin than an infidel, "The first battlefield for *jihad* must be the extermination of these infidel leaders and to replace them by a complete Islamic Order."305 Thus waging *jihad* against these rulers is an individual duty. Since *jihad* is an individual duty such as other pillars of Islam, "there is no (need to) ask permission of (your) parents to leave to wage *jihad*, as the jurists have said."306 He adds, "Islamic *jihad* today requires a drop of sweat from every Muslim."307

*Defensive or offensive jihad?* According to Faraj, to argue that all Islamic wars were defensive, as some Muslim scholars assert, was in his judgment a false view. "To fight is, in Islam, to make supreme the Word of God in this world, whether it be by attacking or by defending."308

Thus, Faraj did not accept that *jihad* in Islam was (and is) only defensive in character. He based his argument on the *verse of the sword*: "But when the forbidden months are past, then fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, and lie in wait for them, in every stratagem [or war]; but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and pay *zakat*, then open the way for them: for Allah is Oft-forgiving, most Merciful."309 He believed that the command in this verse abrogates 114 verses in 48 chapters which command living in peace with unbelievers.310

Faraj's other important notion concerning *jihad* is a distinction between *greater jihad* and *smaller jihad*. Once the Prophet, upon returning from fighting, said: "We are returning from a *smaller jihad* to the *greater jihad*." While this *hadith* is accepted by the majority of Muslim scholars as authentic,311 referring to Ibn al-Qayyum (d.1351, theologian, follower of Ibn

Taymiyyah) Faraj said that "The *jihad* against the soul, which is the great *jihad*, according to the Tradition, is a fabricated Tradition."<sup>312</sup> To him "the only reason for inventing this Tradition is to reduce the value of fighting with the Sword, so as to distract the Muslims from fighting the infidels and the hypocrites."<sup>313</sup> In addition to this, he asserted that four kinds of *jihad* mentioned in the *hadith*— *jihad* of the heart, of the tongue, of the hand, and of the sword— indicate aspects of *jihad*, not successive phases.

Finally, Faraj believed that Islam did not triumph by the majority.<sup>314</sup> Therefore, the majority is not important. "An Islamic state can only be founded by a believing minority," he wrote. "This is the custom of God" was his conviction.<sup>315</sup>

### Sufis' Views on *Jihad*

There are many proposed etymologies of the word *sufi*. The most credible is the one that derives it from *suf*, meaning "coarse wool," a reference to the kind of garb that many Sufis wore. The mainspring of Sufism is the desire to cultivate the inner life and to attain a deeper, personal understanding of Islam. The essence of Sufi doctrine, developed by early Sufis such as Hasan al-Basri (d. 728), al Muhasibi (d. 857), and al Junayd (d. 910), is moral contrition and detachment of the mind from the good things of the world.

Early Sufis taught that after the destruction of the human attributes (not the self), mortals acquire divine attributes (not the divine self) and "live in" them. In order to reach that stage they formulated a doctrine of "spiritual stations" (*makamat*). Although various schools have differed in the lists of these stations, they usually enumerated them as follows: detachment from the world (*zuhd*), patience (*sabr*), gratitude for whatever God gives (*shukr*), love (*hubb*), and pleasure with whatever God desires (*Rida*).

Up to the 12th century C.E., Sufism was developed in limited circles of a spiritual elite. From the 12th century onwards it grew into a network of orders involving the masses on a large scale. In the present century with the spread of modernization, Sufism and many Sufi orders have suffered greatly. Nevertheless, they are still to be found in many Muslim countries.<sup>316</sup> Since Sufis give great emphasis on the spiritual and moral life, and the inner meaning of the Qur'an, their Islamic understanding has affected the notion of *jihad*, too. The following argument will further elucidate their understanding of *jihad*. The Prophet, upon returning from an expedition against exterior enemies, said: "We have returned from the lesser *jihad* to the greater *jihad*."<sup>317</sup> This *hadith* has been the key tradition distinguishing Sufis from all other Muslims on the subject of *jihad*. Because of this *hadith*, Sufis from the early days to the present have given great importance to the *inner jihad* or the *greater jihad*. Their main idea concerning inner *jihad* is to purify the self, to control the evil forces, and to keep a watch over the frontiers of the soul. For Sufis this is more important than the exterior *jihad*, i.e. fighting against unbelievers. For them *jihad* means "to repel all evil forces and destroy or control them."<sup>318</sup> For authority Sufis generally cite the following verse: "Those who believe fight in the cause of Allah, and those who reject Faith fight in the cause of Evil (*Tagut*): so fight ye against the friends of Satan: feeble indeed is the cunning of Satan."<sup>319</sup>

For example the early Sufi, Sufyan Ibn Uyayna (d. 814), is reported to have said: "*Jihad* in the way of God consists of ten parts, of which only one is fighting against the enemy while the other nine are fighting against the self."<sup>320</sup> Muslim Sufis mostly have articulated the interior, non-military meanings of the term *jihad*. Al-Qushayri (d.1074) reported, for instance, that someone once asked Muhammad what was the most meritorious *jihad*. The Prophet replied, "A

just word in the presence of a tyrannical ruler."321 Another great Muslim theologian and Sufi, Al-Ghazali (d.1111), observed that "the acts of devotion are within the capacity of everyone, but the setting aside of desires is only within the capacity of the most devout." He then quoted the *hadith*, "The best flight (*al-hijra*) is flight from evil, and the best fighter (*al-mujahid*) is the one who fights his passions."322

While Sufis have given greater importance to this inner struggle, and have seen this inner struggle as a prerequisite for any military struggle. For them, "This internal *jihad* is more difficult and subtle than the external *jihad*."323 External *jihad* may be necessary at different times for the purification of society from all evil forces including oppression, injustice, falsehood, cheating, backbiting, suppression of human freedom, and denial of basic human rights guaranteed in the Qur'an. Syed Ali Ashraf contrasted the two *jihad*s as follows: "Internal *jihad* is a constant action that must go on within man so that he may distinguish between truth and falsehood, injustice, and right and wrong and kindle within himself the love for the good. Unless he tries to do so, he will probably falter or fail at the time of external *jihad* and be in the category of the 'losers'"324 Drawing upon the early Sufis, Abd al-Qadir al-Jilani (d.1166) explained that:

One calls the inner struggle 'greater' simply because it is unrelenting. Just when one succeeds in overcoming the lower self and slaying it with the sword of opposition, God restores it to life and it contends with you again, and demands of your desires and delights whether forbidden or permissible, so that you must return to struggle.325

In a similar vein Jalal ad-Din Rumi (d.1273) argued that "*Jihad* can only be waged by constant waging of the greater *jihad*; without spiritual-ethical content, the *jihad* becomes an instrument for ego and rebellious masquerading in the hypocritical soul as fighters for the sake of God."326 As Ashraf points out, "*Jihad*, therefore, is a compulsory function of a Muslim for both internal and external purification, purification of the individual and of society by resisting, fighting, and conquering the forces of evil."327 Therefore, to the Sufis a person can become a martyr not only by being killed on the battlefield, but also through internal *jihad*, although his stage may remain unknown to others. It is about this death that the Prophet said: "Die before you die."328

After this general information about the Sufis' view on internal or greater *jihad*, we shall consider in greater detail the views of two contemporary scholars who reflect the views of Sufis: Sayyed Hossein Nasr and Bawa Muhaiyadden.

Brought up in Teheran, Iran, educated in the United States at M.I.T. and Harvard, trained in science and philosophy, Nasr is recognized as one of the foremost world authorities on Islam. He is traditionalist Muslim, a Shi'ite, a philosopher, a scientist, an artist, and one well acquainted with the Sufi path. From 1958 to 1979 he was Professor of Philosophy at Tehran University. He became the Professor of Islamic Studies at Temple University in 1979 and is presently University Professor of Islamic Studies at George Washington University.329

*The meaning of jihad:* According to Nasr, *jihad* means simply exertion in the way of Allah. Of course, one of its meaning is to protect Islam and its borders, but the term has much wider usage and meaning for Muslims. For him, every religious act, such as performing the daily prayer or fasting, requires *jihad*; in fact, "The whole of life may be said to be a constant *jihad* between our carnal and passionate soul and the demands of the immortal spirit within us."330

Nasr interprets the basic belief system and the pillars (daily prayers, fasting, pilgrimage, and giving *zakat*) as forms of *jihad*. He writes:

The fundamental witnesses, "There is no divinity but Allah" and "Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah," through the utterance of which a person becomes Muslim, are not only statements about the Truth as seen in the Islamic perspective, but also weapons for the practice of inner *jihad*. The very form of the first witness (*La ilahe illa 'Llah* in Arabic) when written in Arabic calligraphy is like a best sword with which all otherness is removed from the supreme Reality, while all that is positive in manifestation is returned to that Reality.<sup>331</sup>

*Jihad and peace:* Nasr argues that "the role of religion is only in preserving some kind of precarious peace." Thus, "if religion is to be an integral part of life it must try to establish peace in the most profound sense, namely to establish equilibrium between all the existing forces that surround man and to overcome all the forces that tend to destroy this equilibrium. No religion has sought to establish peace in this sense more than Islam."<sup>332</sup> To him peace comes not in passivity but in true activity. He writes: "Peace belongs to one who is inwardly at peace with the Will of Heaven and outwardly at war with the forces of distrust and disequilibrium."<sup>333</sup> A Muslim will remain incomplete, Nasr argued, so long as all of the external forms of prayers and other religious acts are not complimented by the greater *jihad* or inner *jihad* which a Muslim should carry out continuously within himself or herself.<sup>334</sup>

*M. R. Bawa Muhaiyaddeen*

A Muslim Sufi from Sri Lanka, Muhaiyadden, dedicated much of his life to instructing people as to the true meaning of Islam and the path of Sufism. Although he himself was unlettered, the depth of his understanding of the Qur'an and the traditional stories of Islam has been recognized by Muslim scholars throughout the world.

Muhaiyaddeen argued that the holy wars being waged today are not true holy wars. Taking other lives is not true *jihad*. True *jihad*, for him, "is to praise God and cut away the inner satanic enemies." Muhaiyaddeen asserted that there are only a few who understand and fight the war against the enemy within themselves. He wrote about "the enemy who stands between them and Allah, the enemy who does not accept Allah and will not bow down and prostrate before Him. To cut our connection to this enemy who is leading us to hell is the true holy war."<sup>335</sup>

After giving an example of a child who has bad qualities and her mother's attitude towards her, he maintained that:

Likewise, Allah, who created us, does not strike down His creations for the evil they have committed. It would not make sense if He did that. They are all His children, the children of the Lord of all creations. As their Father and Mother, He helps them to dispel their evil ways and tries to bring them to the straight Path. He seeks to make His children happy and good. That is the way God is. And just as God does not kill His children because they have evil qualities, we must not murder others or cut them down. Instead, we must try to improve them by showing wisdom, love, compassion, and God's qualities, just as a mother teaches her mischievous child to change. That is our duty.<sup>336</sup>

Therefore, according to Muhaiyaddeen, praising Allah and then destroying others is not *jihad*. There is no point in that. There can be no benefit from killing a man in the name of God. He wrote: "Allah has no thought of killing or going to war. Why would Allah have sent His prophets if He

had such thoughts? It was not to destroy man that Muhammad came; he was sent down as the wisdom that could show man how to destroy his own evil."<sup>337</sup>

Muhaiyadden argued that the true battle is to fight the enemy within ourselves. Therefore, Muslims must fight against this enemy; if they do not do this, the qualities of evil will kill that which is good and the truth will be destroyed. But if they can win this huge battle, they will receive Allah's grace.<sup>338</sup> He maintained: "We will never attain peace and equality within our hearts until we finish this war, until we conquer the armies that arise from the thoughts and differences within ourselves, until we attack those enemies with faith, certitude, and determination and with patience, contentment, trust in God, and praise of God."<sup>339</sup>

### **A Critical Approach to the Question of War and Peace in Islam**

It is a fact that religion in human history has always been one of the most powerful forces either for war or peace in societies. It is possible to see its effects on war and conflicts between nations even today<sup>340</sup>. Thus, as John Huddleston points out, "It would be a grave mistake not to take it seriously as a major potential factor for peace or for war."<sup>341</sup> Any religion can work either positively or negatively depending on the content of the religious doctrine, its interpretation and understanding, and its application in real life. This is true especially for the religion of Islam. Muslims claim that there is a universal religion with a mission to be conveyed to all human beings. *Jihad*, which is one of the ways of spreading that mission, can serve either positively or negatively depending on the Muslims' understanding of *jihad* and its application to real life.

Because of that, M. Abedi points out that, "No topics are more important in the development of this contemporary Islamic theology than those of *jihad* and *shahadat* (struggle and martyrdom)."<sup>342</sup> *Jihad* is important both for the Islamic world and for the West. However, the concept of *jihad* has been so distorted that whenever Islam or Muslims are mentioned, the distorted meaning of *jihad* is immediately attributed to them, "as if the concepts have the same meaning—or as if they were two sides of the same coin."<sup>343</sup>

For a long time *jihad* has been distorted in Western literature.<sup>344</sup> Peters, in his study of *Islam and Colonialism*, concluded that the "wide semantic spectrum of the word *djihad* [*jihad*] has confused many a foreign visitor with a defective knowledge of the Arabic language. Hearing the *djihad* being used in sermons, in mosques or on the radio, they were led to think that a massacre of non-Moslems was at hand."<sup>345</sup> To this distorted image now has been added another—fundamentalism. The current stereotype is that Muslims in general, and fundamentalists in particular, are "innately bloodthirsty and inimical towards persons of a different persuasion, . . . owing to their religion, which allegedly preaches intolerance, fanaticism and continues warfare against unbelievers."<sup>346</sup>

Several events and incidents in the last two decades, such as Ayatollah Khomeini's denunciation of America as the *Great Satan*, the condemnation of Salman Rushdie (author of *Satanic Verses*), Saddam Hussein's call for a *jihad* in the Persian Gulf War of 1991, the bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, and lastly the tragedy of September 11, 2001, have reinforced images of Muslims as militants, and of Islam as expansionist, anti-Western, and intent upon war with the West.

As a result of these events and mass-media interpretations, the eminent Muslim thinker Arkoun concludes:

It is no longer possible today to use the word Islam before a Western audience without immediately conjuring up powerful imagery combining the strongly negative connotations of the terms *jihad*, holy war, terrorism, fanaticism, violence, oppression of women, polygamy, repudiation, the veil as the Islamic head scarf, the rejection of the West, the violation of human rights, and so on.<sup>347</sup>

In light of these thoughts of *jihad* prevailing both in the West and among Muslims, and its role both in the past and the present Muslim world, we must ask the following basic questions: Can *jihad* be conducted against unbelievers today outside the Islamic world as in the past? Can Muslims solve their socio-economic and political problems through *jihad* within Islamic countries as fundamentalists claim? In order to answer these two questions, we must re-examine some important and key issues concerning *jihad*.

First, it must be accepted that we neither live in the time of Muhammad nor in the Middle Ages; we live in very different times and conditions. Therefore, when we read and interpret the Qur'anic verses concerning fighting against unbelievers, we must take into consideration both the general social-historical background of the Qur'an and the current conditions of our time. Fazlur Rahman suggested that "this background is necessary for our understanding of the Qur'an." According to Rahman the Qur'an must be studied in its total and specific background, not just studying it verse by verse or chapter by chapter with an isolated "occasion of revelation."<sup>348</sup> He also warned that "Unless the material of the Qur'an is well systemized, it can be dangerously misleading to apply individual and isolated verses to situations, as most Muslim preachers and even many intellectuals tend to do."<sup>349</sup> This is especially true of *jihad*. Muhammed Ghazali says that differences in the Islamic law or in matters related to worship can have both positive and negative results, but "those matters and problems in which the slightest mistake or error can cause destructions of nations and can endanger the safety of the fields and generations, cannot be left to the mercy of some playful and carefree persons."<sup>350</sup> Therefore, we have to interpret the Qur'anic verses for our time, taking into consideration the broad historical, cultural, and scientific changes that have taken place, as well as the changes in basic mentality and outlook that characterize the modern world.

Second, another important issue concerning *jihad* is the question of power. When we examine the Qur'an we see that three verses are directly talking about the power of Muslims before and during warfare. The first two are as follows: "O Prophet! rouse the Believers to the fight. If there are twenty amongst you, patient and preserving, they will vanquish two hundred: if a hundred, they will vanquish a thousand of the Unbelievers."<sup>351</sup> In another verse, "For the present, Allah hath lightened your [burden], for He knoweth that there is a weak spot in you: but [even so], if there are a hundred of you, patient and preserving, they will vanquish two hundred, and if a thousand, they will vanquish two thousand, with the leave of Allah."<sup>352</sup> Yusuf Ali explained these verses as follows: when Muslims are given favorable conditions and high morale, by virtue of their faith, they can win against odds of ten to one, and when their organization and equipment are weak, and their morale falls short of the optimal situation, they are obliged to tackle no more than odds of two to one.<sup>353</sup>

If we continue to interpret and understand these verses without considering the new situations and developments, the result will undoubtedly be like that of the Gulf War. Although faith, favorable conditions, and high morale are always important, we must not underestimate the importance and the necessity of the sophisticated of weapons the world's countries today. In fact, another verse concerning power is more general and applicable to all situations and times. It reads

as follows: "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into [the hearts of] the enemies of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know."<sup>354</sup> While the meaning of the verse is very clear in its demands that Muslims must be powerful in terms of military equipment—as powerful as their enemies—unfortunately some Muslim authors, as well as fundamentalists, still argue that the number of Muslims and of military equipment is not important. For them the most important thing is true faith in Allah and that the victory is always from Allah, as Allah said in the Qur'an.<sup>355</sup> While Muslims believe that what Allah says and promises is correct and happens, Rahman proposed that we must examine the Qur'an in its totality and must take into consideration both the historical, social conditions when these verses were revealed and those of our own times. If we do not apply this rule, as Ghazali points out, the slightest mistake or error can cause the destruction of nations.

Third, closely related to military power is the issue of use of sophisticated weapons. While both modernists and fundamentalists talk about rules of warfare, they seldom pay attention to modern technological developments in warfare. Classical Muslim jurists, based on the *hadiths*, made a clear and firm distinction between combatants and non-combatants. It was forbidden to kill women, children, the aged, the infirm, the blind, hermits, peasants, serfs, travelers, and those devoted to monasticism. In short, they exempted from warfare all those who do not take part in actual fighting. Besides this distinction between combatants and non-combatants, they also forbade harming the environment. However, the regulations developed historically by Muslim jurists in the light of the Qur'an and the sayings and application of Muhammad, were based on conditions in the early days of Islam. Today, with the introduction of new weapons of mass destruction, it is impossible to make such distinctions between combatants and non-combatants or to protect the environment. As M. Watt argues, "Muslim jurists have done very little work in applying the principles derived from the Qur'an and the *hadith* to the multifarious problems created by the novel conditions and structures of life in the modern world."<sup>356</sup> What should be the attitude of Muslims towards the new powerful and destructive weapons? Watt suggests that all Muslims and statesmen should follow strictly the rules of *Shariah* concerning the rule of *jihad*.<sup>357</sup> If we accept the suggestions of Watt, Muslims should have only some swords and a few guns, for only with limited weaponry could the classical Islamic distinctions between combatants and non-combatants and other regulations be applied.

While Watt helps Muslims to think about the new situations, his suggestions concerning Muslim military power and using sophisticated weapons cannot be accepted on the strength of *surah* 8:60 in the Qur'an.<sup>358</sup> Applying this verse, I believe that Muslims should have all kinds of weapons including nuclear weapons, chemical weapons, airplanes, aircrafts, tanks and missiles. However, their use must be restricted to defense or retaliation in case of an attack by the enemy. The Qur'anic imperative reads: "There is the law of equality. If then any one transgresses the prohibition against you, transgress ye likewise against him. But fear Allah, and know that Allah is with those who restrain themselves."<sup>359</sup>

Fourth, there is the question of religious freedom. If we examine the classical and fundamentalists views on war and peace, we immediately realize that one of the main objectives of *jihad* is to spread belief in Allah and make His name supreme over all other things. In fact, this is commanded by the Qur'an itself and the *hadith*. For example, the Qur'an says, "And fight them on until there is no more persecution and the religion becomes Allah's. But if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practice oppression."<sup>360</sup> A *hadith* concerning the objective of *jihad* is as follows: "I have been commanded to fight the people until they say: 'There is no God

but Allah.' When they say that, then their lives and properties are inviolable to me, except [in the case when the law of] Islam allows it [to take them]. They will be answerable to Allah."<sup>361</sup>

If we elaborate on this verse and *hadith* literally, Muslims must fight against all unbelievers until the religion [Islam] becomes entirely Allah's. But in general this is not what Islam demands of Muslims. Therefore, we must elaborate the concept of religious freedom properly and must take into consideration the following situations.

First of all, as Safi argues, the word *mushrikin* (unbelievers) in this context indicates specifically the pagan Arabs. Therefore, these verses can be applied only to pagan Arabs who lived at the time of Muhammad. They were hostile to Muslims, persecuted and expelled them from their homes, and plotted against the Islamic state in Medina. The verses 22: 39-40 reinforced this understanding.<sup>362</sup> In the same way, the previous argument should be applied to the *hadith*: "I have been commanded to fight the people until they say: 'There is no God but Allah.' When they say that, then their lives and properties are inviolable to me, except [in the case when] [the law of] Islam allows it [to take them]. They will be answerable to Allah." Safi maintains that the word *people* implies the pagan Arabs only. For if the word is interpreted to be all-inclusive, the rule embodied in this *hadith* should also be applied to all the People of the Book. However, both the Qur'an and the Prophet himself permitted the People of the Book to maintain their religion. Thus, the word *people* has an exclusive meaning and applies only to the pagan Arabs.<sup>363</sup>

Second, numerous verses of the Qur'an provide for freedom of choice in religious belief and conscience. The Qur'an says: "Let there be no compulsion in religion."<sup>364</sup> In another verse, "Say, 'The Truth is from your Lord.' Let him who will believe, and let him who will reject [it]."<sup>365</sup> Because of these clear and firm verses, all Muslims, including so-called fundamentalists, agree that there is no compulsion to accept or reject the religion of Islam. It is to be left to the conscience of the individual. For example, Mawdudi wrote:

Though there is no truth and virtue greater than the religion of Truth-Islam, and Muslims are enjoined to invite people to embrace Islam and advance arguments in favor of it, they are not asked to enforce this faith on them. Whoever accepts it he does so by his own choice. However, if somebody does not accept Islam, Muslims will have to recognize and respect his decision, and no moral, social or political pressure will be put on him to change his mind.<sup>366</sup>

Mawdudi even argued that the freedom of conviction and freedom of conscience are not merely limited to the People of the Book, but apply with equal force to those following other faiths including idolaters, deities or the leaders or national heroes of the people.<sup>367</sup> In the same way Qutb pointed out that Islam confers essential rights on all people without any distinction. He believed that Islam brings all people together on a purely human basis, and guarantees persons freedom to adopt the religion of their choice, "under its own care and protection."<sup>368</sup>

Third, the Qur'an admits the differences and diversities in human religious beliefs; that is why a world of one religion is unthinkable in Islam based on the Qur'anic verses. The Qur'an says: "If it had been thy Lord's Will, they would all have believed, —All who are on earth! Wilt thou then compel mankind against their will, to believe."<sup>369</sup> In another verse, it says: "If it had been Allah's Will, they would not have taken false gods: but We made thee not one to watch over their doings, nor art thou set over them to dispose of their affairs."<sup>370</sup> Thus, it was neither the duty of the messenger nor is it the duty of Muslims to convert all unbelievers to Islam.

Fourth, although the Qur'an enjoins Muslims to invite all persons towards Islam, Muslims are not allowed to use force in this process. They are instead commanded to use persuasion. Those who are not convinced are to be left alone. The Qur'an says: "Invite [all] to the Way of thy Lord with wisdom and beautiful preaching; and argue with them in ways that are best and most gracious."<sup>371</sup>

In the light of these Qur'anic verses, Muslims first should accept that it is not their duty to convert all people to Islam. Second, they should develop new tactics and methods to spread belief in Allah. For if one of the main objectives of *jihad* is to spread belief in Allah, this is done not only through the *jihad*, but also through other peaceful means and ways. In fact, spreading Islam amongst unbelievers by peaceful means such as argumentation and demonstration is the commandment of the Qur'an itself, as has been mentioned before.<sup>372</sup>

Therefore, some modern authors hold that *jihad al-da'wah* (missional *jihad*) is the most important form of *jihad*. During the first period of Islam, when means of communication were lacking, conquest was the only method for spreading the message of Islam. In our times intensive communication is possible without recourse to military expeditions. Therefore, fighting as a means of propagation of Islam has become obsolete and must now be replaced by the concept of missional *jihad*.<sup>373</sup>

Fifth, there is the question of relationships with non-Muslims. There is no reason for not establishing good relationships with the followers of other faiths. In fact, as Safi and Muhammad Abu Zahra point out, the doctrine of the two territorial divisions of the world, namely *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb*, and its corollary concept of the permanent state of war, was conceived by Muslim jurists when hostile relations existed between the Abbasi caliphate and the Byzantine empire. Doing so, in the words of Safi, "The jurists who devised the classical doctrine, obviously, overlooked not only the peaceful co-existence between the early Islamic state and Abyssinia, but also the earlier hostility of Byzantium and its allies against the emerging Islamic state."<sup>374</sup>

Contrary to the views of early Muslim jurists<sup>375</sup> and some contemporary Muslims concerning the division of the world into two territories and permanent hostility towards them, there are many reasons for requiring good relations with the followers of other faiths, as long as they live with Muslims peacefully and do not prevent the peaceful spread of the Islamic message. These reasons can be indicated as follows.

First of all, certain passages from the Qur'an, used in the past by Orientalists to support their claims that Islam is biased towards Jews, Christians, and other non-Muslims, should be re-interpreted. For instance, "Let not the Believers take for friends or helpers unbelievers rather than believers: if any do that, they shall have no relation left with Allah except by way of precaution, that ye may guard yourselves from them."<sup>376</sup> "O ye who believe! take not My enemies and yours as friends."<sup>377</sup> Yusuf al-Qaradavi, evaluating these verses, first argues that, contrary to common belief, "not to take opponents as friends" refers specially to non-Muslims who actively work against Islam and Muslims—not to those who live peacefully with Muslims. Second, the enmity which is prohibited is not the relationship of cordiality, but rather enmity shown to those who harm Muslims and oppose the call and spread of Islam.

The reason for forbidding friendship with polytheists was twofold: These people denied Islam, and they unjustly expelled the Prophet and the Muslims from their homes. Thus Muslims may take as friends those unbelievers who do not oppress Muslims and destroy their faith. The Qur'an says, "Allah forbids you not, with regard to those who fight you not for [your] faith nor drive you out of your homes, from dealing kindly and justly with them."<sup>378</sup> Furthermore, Islam allows Muslims to marry the women of the People of the Book. This also proves that friendship between Muslims

and non-Muslims is allowed, for married life requires peaceful and affectionate relationships. It is understood from these verses that the Qur'an divides non-Muslims into two groups: those who maintained peaceful relations with Muslims, neither opposing nor expelling them from their homes, and those who treated Muslims with aggression and enmity, driving them from their homes, and helping their enemies to humiliate them.<sup>379</sup>

Second, Muslims are to respect and believe in the dignity of human beings, regardless of their religion, nationality, or color. For Allah himself honored human beings in many ways. The Qur'an says: "When I fashioned him and breathed into him of My spirit, fall ye down in prostration unto him."<sup>380</sup> "And behold, We said to the angels: 'Bow down to Adam:' and they bowed down."<sup>381</sup> "We have indeed created man in the best of molds."<sup>382</sup>

Third, since differences of religion among human beings are a matter of divine decision, as mentioned before, it is not the duty of Muslims to call the non-believers to account for their disbelief, nor to punish those who go astray for their errors. This world is not a place of judgment, for on the Last Day Allah will call them to account; on that day He will requite them. Allah says: "If they do wrangle with thee, say, 'Allah knows best what it is ye are doing: Allah will judge between you on the Day of Judgment concerning the matters in which ye differ.'"<sup>383</sup>

Fourth, rejecting the exclusivism and election, the Qur'an repeatedly recognizes the existence of good people in other communities—Jews, Christians and Sabians—just as it recognizes the people of faith in Islam. The Qur'an says: "Those who believe [in the Qur'an]. And those who follow the Jewish [scriptures], and the Christians and the Sabians,—any who believe in Allah and the Last Day, and work righteousness, shall have their reward with their Lord on them shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve."<sup>384</sup> Rahman argues:

In both these verses [2:62; cf. 5:69], the vast majority of Muslim commentators exercise themselves fruitlessly to avoid to admit the obvious meaning: that those—from any section of humankind—who believe in God and the Last Day and do good deeds are saved. They either say that by Jews, Christians, and Sabians here are meant those who have actually become "Muslims"—which interpretation is clearly belied by the fact that "Muslims" constitute only the first of the four groups of "those who believe" or that they were those good Jews, Christians, and Sabians who lived before the advent of the Prophet Muhammad—which is an even worse *tour de force*. Even when replying to Jewish and Christian claims that the hereafter was theirs and theirs alone, the Qur'an say, "On the contrary, whosoever surrender himself to God while he does good deeds as well, he shall find his reward with his Lord, shall have no fear, nor shall he come to grief" (2:212).<sup>385</sup>

Thus, the Qur'an accepts the positive values of different religions and communities. It urges Muslims to help each other in good deeds. It says: "Help ye one another in righteousness and piety. But help ye not one another in sin and rancor."<sup>386</sup> In another verse, "To each is a goal to which Allah turns him; then strive together [as in a race] towards all that is good."<sup>387</sup>

Fifth and finally, besides these theological supports in regard to living peacefully with non-Muslims, there are also some other factors which compel Muslims to live peacefully with persons of other faiths. Ghazali writes:

Now that the laws and the conditions of the world have been changed, a peace-keeping body has formed, the United Nations has come to into being, and many such institutions and organizations have been formed which try to solve all the disputes first by negotiation

and provide opportunities for the exchange of opposing and divergent views, we are not such as to keep away from these fields and not to take their advantage.<sup>388</sup>

Ghazali, with reference to the Qur'an (2: 190-93) maintains that, "We consider countries of other governments as *Dar al-Harb* (land of war), because they also treat our countries in the same way. If and when they change their attitude, we will also change ours."<sup>389</sup>

In view of these theological supports and changing world conditions, it can be said that Muslims are ready to negotiate with others with good intention and sincerity. They are to respond positively to all invitations which serve humanity, following the footsteps of their Prophet, as long as non-Muslims live peacefully with Muslims.

## Conclusions

In the last two centuries some Muslim intellectuals began to interpret *jihad* in new ways in response to changing world political, social, and economic conditions and those of Muslim countries. On the one hand, some leading Muslim scholars and activists, called modernists, desired to establish positive relationships between Islamic and modern Western thought. Those who sought to re-establish Islamic identity through positive links between Islam and the West explained *jihad* differently from the classical Muslim view. Modernists asserted that all wars fought in the early days of Islam were only defensive. They maintained that offensive war is never allowed in Islam while defensive war is permitted to defend the oppressed. They interpreted every Qur'anic mention of fighting as defense against Arab polytheists who fought, oppressed, and persecuted Muslims because of their religion. They did not accept the division of the world into two spheres *dar al Islam* and *dar al harb*. They argued that the Qur'an gives full religious freedom to all people. For them the reason for *jihad* is not to convert to Islam people of other faiths, but rather to defend Islam and Muslims from any kind of oppression, persecution, and tyranny. They believed that the Qur'an permits Muslims to wage war against others only when Muslims are attacked or persecuted.

On the other hand, others called *fundamentalists* desired to establish an Islamic state based on the rules of the Qur'an. They believed this was necessary to save Muslim countries from all kinds of tyranny, persecution, oppression, Western political presence, and technological and economic backwardness. They saw *jihad* as the primary duty of Muslims and the tool of achieving their ideas. Rejecting the distinction between offensive and defensive war, they asserted that the aim of fighting is to make supreme the Word of God in the universe, whether by attacking or defending. More interestingly, they wanted to wage war not against non-Muslims outside the Muslim world, but rather against those leaders who they believed held power in Muslim countries without following the principles of their faiths. They asserted that all countries that are not ruled by the Islamic law are *dar al harb*, no matter what the common people believed in. To them what is important is not the number of Muslims in a country, but rather the structure of the state in that country. From their perspective, Muslim countries should wage war against unfaithful Muslim leaders, and faithful Muslims should revolt against such leaders deposing them, and replacing them with true Muslim leaders. Although they saw *jihad* as a necessary duty for achieving Islamic ideals, they continued to respect the faiths of others. However, they stipulated that Islamic law and rule should be the goal. They argued that only when people have a chance to hear Islam do they have a right to accept or reject it.

Contrary to both modernists and fundamentalists, Sufis were not much concerned about external *jihad*. Instead their passion was to purify the soul from all kinds of evils. They believed that this act, purifying the soul, was more important than external *jihad*. They maintained that true peace and equity within a society could be attained only as Muslims waged war against the desires of the soul.

In fact, if we look closely at the views of these different groups concerning *jihad* we see that modernists, fundamentalists, and Sufis shared certain goals in common: to establish a just social-political and egalitarian society, and to put an end to poverty, injustice, despotism and corruption in Muslim countries. They differed, however, in the methods which they advocated. Modernists and Sufis accepted more peaceful means, whereas fundamentalists saw active fighting as one of the chief means to achieve their goals.

In the context of a critical approach to the question of *jihad*, Muslims should interpret and evaluate the Qur'anic verses regarding *jihad*, as well as other issues, both in the light of the total teaching of the Qur'an and of contemporary conditions. Muslims should always keep in mind that they live in a different world from that of earlier generations. In contrast with the past a radical transformation of the essentials and material circumstances of life today has taken place. Thus, Muslims should always consider the benefits and losses for the Islamic community when they decide something.

Although Muslims all believe that Islam is the last revealed religion sent by God to be conveyed to all human beings, it was neither the duty of prophets nor of Muslim rulers to convert all people to Islam.<sup>390</sup> The Qur'an has granted an absolute religious freedom to all people. Therefore, Muslims should give priority to the missional *jihad* instead of thinking to use military power to compel belief.

It is important to remember that Muslims live in a pluralistic world. Therefore, they are to take into consideration the circumstances and conditions of this world. As Watt suggests, instead of seeing the non-Islamic world as *dar al-harb*, they should see it as a sphere in which there are opportunities for Muslims to cooperate with non-Muslims in good works of many kinds.<sup>391</sup> In fact, this is the imperative of the Qur'an for Muslims as discussed above. Instead of seizing property or expecting *jizya* from unbelievers—conditions not possible in the modern world—Muslims should instead work hard to produce and to support their political systems with their own resources.

In addition, Muslims should re-examine some important topics regarding the concept of *jihad* such as the reasons for *jihad*, military power of Muslims, the use of sophisticated weapons, religious freedom, and Muslims' relations with non-Muslims. More importantly, in decision making Muslims should always consider the benefits and losses for the Muslim countries as a whole keeping in mind their social, economic, and political conditions.

## Part II: Social and Economic Justice

One of the basic parts of peace education is, of course, socio-economic justice. As we have seen in Introduction, there is a big gap between and within nations concerning socio-economic justice. Less than two centuries ago, before the Industrial Revolution, there was a relative economic parity between nations with approximately a \$200 a year per capita income. In contrast, today throughout the world there exist enormous economic disparities, unjust economic distribution and abject poverty. The result is that millions of people are condemned to lives of hunger, disease, and unmet basic human needs for food, education, and health. Moreover, the gap between and within nations is not narrowing, but continues to broaden.

Unjust economic systems and their consequences affect not only non-Muslim countries and their peoples, but also Muslim countries and their peoples. The irony is that Muslim countries produce many sources of wealth such as oil, natural gas, jute, rubber, and food grains. The Muslim faith urges believers within these nations to work hard, to become as rich as possible, and to share their wealth. Nevertheless, more than half the Muslim population of the world today lives in absolute poverty with inadequate food, shelter, education, and health care.

Part Two analyzes Islamic concepts of socio-economic justice. This part presents some key points on the Islamic understanding of socio-economic justice. This part consists of four sections: Section one analyzes the Islamic concept of justice such as poverty, economic equality, and basic necessities of life. Section two addresses the foundations of social justice such as the principle of unity and brotherhood, the principles of *tawhid* and sovereignty, and the principle of absolute conscience and freedom. Section three deals with the means for attaining social and economic justice under three subheads: 1) positive means such as working, *zakat*, voluntary spending, and inheritance; 2) prohibited measures such as *riba*, unlawful business transactions and wasteful expenditures; and 3) the role of the state. Lastly, section four on "a critical approach to the question of socio-economic justice in Islam" re-examines some important topics such as correct understanding of God's action and human responsibility, and the understanding of true development.

### Islamic Understanding of Socio-Economic Justice

In Islam justice is the foundation upon which dogma is built, and is directly related to the sphere of Islamic faith itself.<sup>392</sup> The concept of justice pervades the Qur'an. About 60 Qur'anic verses command those in power to be just; over 200 admonish against injustice; and almost 100 expressions embody the notion of justice in a variety of direct or indirect expressions.<sup>393</sup> Therefore, Khadduri argues that "second only to the existence of the one God, no other religious or moral principles are more emphasized in the Qur'an and traditions than the principles of uprightness, equality, and temperance."<sup>394</sup> In the same way, S.V. Reza Nasr says: "No single idea or mechanism in Islam is as pertinent to attainment of equilibrium as the religion's conception of justice."<sup>395</sup>

The establishment of justice on earth is unequivocally declared by the Qur'an to be a necessary condition for *taqwa*, being pious and God-fearing, which is one of the basic teachings of the Qur'an. Hence, faith that is mingled with injustice is not recognized by God. In other words, belief in God entails an automatic duty to do justice.<sup>396</sup> As S. N. Haider Naqvi points out, "The one cannot exist without the other."<sup>397</sup> The Qur'an proclaims: "We created not the heavens, the earth,

and all between them, but for just ends."<sup>398</sup> Thus Muslims are not merely exhorted but persistently urged by the Qur'an to establish justice, even if this hurts one's own interest or the interests of one's near relatives. The Qur'an says: "O ye who believe! Stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to Allah, even as against yourselves, or your parents, or your kin, and whether it be [against] rich or poor: For Allah can best protect both. Follow not the lusts [of your hearts], lest ye swerve, and if ye distort [justice] or decline to do justice, verily Allah is well-acquainted with all that ye do."<sup>399</sup> Another feature of the Islamic concept of justice is that Allah commands Muslims not only to uphold justice, enjoin good deeds, and give assistance and aid to relatives, but also forbids evil deeds and injustice.<sup>400</sup> The Qur'an expressly states that the giving of any assistance to an unjust person or having an inclination to associate or participate with him will result in punishment.<sup>401</sup>

While the Qur'an deals with different kinds of justice,<sup>402</sup> it gives special attention to social and economic justice.<sup>403</sup> At this point, referring to the early days of Islam, Rahman writes: "The economic disparities were most persistently criticized, because they were the most difficult to remedy and were at the heart of the social discord." He also points out that "The Qur'an's goal of an ethical, egalitarian social order is announced with a severe denunciation of the economic disequilibrium and social inequalities prevalent in contemporary commercial Meccan society."<sup>404</sup>

Although all kinds of justice are important in any society, economic justice is more important than others. For there is justice only if all, both at individual and international levels, have economically sufficient power, especially in our times. Chapra supports this judgment: "The Islamic teaching of brotherhood and equal treatment of all individuals in society and before the law would not be meaningful unless accompanied by economic justice so that everyone gets his due for this contribution to society or to the social product and that there is no exploitation of one individual by another."<sup>405</sup> Thus it can be said that economic justice forms the cornerstone of the Islamic social justice.

The Qur'an severely condemns the existence of class distinctions in a community where some live in luxury, and others live in inhumane conditions.<sup>406</sup> The aim of Islam is to create a balanced and humane society where, as M. Cesium Belkacem points out, "each individual must feel that he forms with the others a compact and solid unity, based on fraternity, social solidarity and equity of rights and duties."<sup>407</sup>

What then is social justice in Islam? Hassan Othman defines social justice as follows: Social justice is: 1) to treat man as an individual with liberty and equality as his birthright; 2) to provide him with equal opportunities of developing his personality so that he is better fitted to fill the situation to which he is entitled; 3) to give such individual his due, wherever his course of life may lie; and 4) to regulate his relation with society in such a manner that, far from being harmful to the interest of society, he contributes his own to its moral values and welfare.<sup>408</sup>

How can Islam achieve these objectives and create such a society? In order to understand the concept of economic justice properly, it will be appropriate to explain some key concepts about this matter. These can be examined in terms of Islamic understanding of poverty, economic equality, and basic necessities of life.

### **Islamic Understanding of Poverty**

There are a number of *hadiths* indicating the supremacy of the poor. Yet, when we examine deeply the Qur'anic verses and the *hadiths*, it is seen that Islam does not urge Muslims to be poor,

but rather encourages them to be rich.<sup>409</sup> In fact, being truly Muslim requires persons to become as rich as possible. The very fundamentals of Islam—*zakat*, pilgrimage, spending in the way of God, participating in *jihad*—all require Muslims to have sufficient economic power. Islam is not an ascetic religion. It does not aim at depriving its followers of the good things that God has provided.<sup>410</sup> The Islamic understanding of poverty and prosperity can be summarized as follows:

First of all, it is believed that Allah has created enough food not only for human beings, but also for the other creatures in the world. There is to be no scarcity concerning eating and drinking. Thus, according to Muslim economists, "The existence of hunger and abject poverty is entirely man-made and a direct result of an unjust economic system."<sup>411</sup>

The Qur'an is absolutely clear on this point. It declares: "There is no moving creature on earth but its substance dependeth on Allah: He knoweth its resting place and its temporary deposit: all is in a clear Record."<sup>412</sup> In another verse, it is said: "Seest thou not that Allah has made subject to you all that is on the earth, and the ships that sail through the sea by His command?"<sup>413</sup> According to Chapra, two fundamental principles may be derived from these verses: 1) God gives resources to all people, and not just to a privileged group or class; and 2) God-given resources are meant for general human welfare, including eradicating poverty and fulfilling the basic needs of all people in the world.<sup>414</sup>

Second, the Qur'an affirms that God has created the whole universe for human beings. Hence everything in the universe is for human beings to use and enjoy. The oceans, the rivers and mountains, the skies and stars, sun and moon—all have been created for the benefit and aesthetic pleasure of human beings.<sup>415</sup> The Qur'an urges human beings to gain mastery over nature, to exploit and utilize the resources of nature.<sup>416</sup>

Besides these Qur'anic imperatives concerning the use of materials in the universe, the Qur'an repeatedly commands human beings to eat, drink and enjoy themselves without abusing the sources.<sup>417</sup> In commanding all humanity to enjoy the bounties provided by God, the Qur'an sets no quantitative limits to the extent of material growth of the society. As Chapra points out, Islam even equates the struggle for material well-being with an act of virtue.<sup>418</sup>

The Prophet also urged Muslims to investigate, work hard, and have a better life. He stated that "There is no malady for which God has not created a cure."<sup>419</sup> In another *hadith* the Prophet declared that "A strong Muslim is better and more beloved before God than a weak one."<sup>420</sup> According to Chapra and Mannan, all the Qur'anic verses and *hadiths* refer to the responsibility of Muslims, individually as well as collectively, to provide adequate food, shelter, health care, and education in order to ensure the maintenance of a socially minimum level of living and to reduce suffering from poverty and disease.<sup>421</sup>

Moreover, both the Qur'an and the *hadiths* condemn poverty. In the Qur'an, poverty is the promise of Satan; those who are poor are chastised for their laziness and lack of daring.<sup>422</sup> The Prophet also is reported to have said on a number of occasions that "Poverty may bring a man to the verge of unbelief."<sup>423</sup>

Chapra argues that all Muslim jurists unanimously held that catering to the interests of the people and relieving them of hardship is the basic objective of Islam.<sup>424</sup> The great thinker Ghazali contended that the objective of Islam is to promote the welfare of the people by safeguarding their faith, their life, their intellect, their progeny, and their property; and that ensuring these five objectives is the responsibility of all Muslims and, of course, of the state.<sup>425</sup>

### *Islamic Understanding of Economic Equality*

Islam, like other faiths, faces the tension between disparities in economic wealth and basic human needs. On the one hand, the Qur'an recognizes and commands an absolute equality before the law, irrespective of the class, belief, color, and sex of people; it does not recognize an absolute economic equality or absolute equality of wealth.<sup>426</sup> The Qur'an allows for some income differences. It even advises people not to begrudge the same. Some socio-economic inequalities are quite natural for the efficient functioning of a society.<sup>427</sup>

On the other hand, the Qur'an emphasizes in very strong terms the need for distributional equity.<sup>428</sup> Since all creatures are created by God, they all have an equal right to God's inexhaustible earthly and heavenly treasures.<sup>429</sup>

Distributional equity or distributive justice in Islamic economics includes three major concepts. First, distributional equity as equity of shares to all regardless of a person's needs and/or contribution to the society. The second concept of equity is that of equal personal contributions and rewards. A third understanding emphasizes, among other things, that persons receive according to their needs. Although all three concepts of equality can find support in varying degrees in the history of Islam, the basic Islamic point of view the second type of equity between each person's contribution and reward. All human beings are not equal in their character, ability and service to society.<sup>430</sup> Therefore, while Islamic distributive justice or equity seeks for a humane standard of living for all, and the complete eradication of absolute poverty, it allows differentials in earnings commensurate with different contributions made or services rendered to society.<sup>431</sup>

While the Qur'an recognizes that some inequalities in income and wealth exist, it does not recommend extreme inequalities in income and wealth. In addition, it guarantees meeting the basic needs of all people through varying institutions.<sup>432</sup> Therefore, as long as a Muslim earns income and gains wealth by rightful means, and fulfils his obligations set by the Qur'an towards the welfare of the society. Chapra argues that "there is nothing wrong in his possessing more wealth than other fellow Muslims."<sup>433</sup>

### *Islamic Understanding of Basic Necessities of Life*

Islam has given great importance to the basic needs of human beings regardless of their origin and religion. Muslim jurists divide rights into two categories: *Huquq al-Allah* (rights of God) and *Huquq al-Ibad* (rights of human beings). God's rights include having faith in God, accepting His guidance, obeying and worshiping Him alone. The rights of human beings include all acts which do not harm or disturb people, including non-Muslims living in an Islamic state and society. More interestingly, in the view of Muslim theologians, God's rights stand second to human beings' rights. Rashid Ahmad Jullundhri gives the following example: If a man wants to make a pilgrimage to Mecca but owes something to his fellowmen, he has to fulfill first his duties towards his fellowmen. If he acts differently he will be responsible in the world to come. In fact, this was the practice of the Prophet Muhammad. For the Prophet never offered prayers for those who passed away without first paying debts owed by them.<sup>434</sup> Again Jullundhri says that "the measure of judging a man's religiosity is how he deals with people, not how much he prays."<sup>435</sup>

The Qur'an insists on the fulfilment of basic needs not only for a few people in society but for all human beings throughout the world. It is the intention of Allah that everybody should be provided with a minimum sustenance. As we mentioned before, the Qur'an says that "There is no

moving creature on earth but its sustenance is dependent on Allah: He knoweth its resting place and its temporary deposit: All is in a clear Record."<sup>436</sup> According to the Qur'an not only food, but also clothing and shelter, are basic needs.<sup>437</sup>

Building on these Qur'anic understandings in response to current economic realities, contemporary Muslim economists have broadened the understanding of basic human needs. Siddiqi points out that the condition of a society would play a decisive role in determining basic needs within it. He would ask: What is the average standard of living? What are the economic resources of the country concerned?<sup>438</sup> As Sayyid Muhammad Yusuf points out, "The satisfaction of the basic needs is not static at a low level; it rises with the development of economy until the extra comforts and amenities of today become the necessities of tomorrow."<sup>439</sup> According to Yusuf, the Islamic economic system has two broad objectives: 1) the satisfaction of the basic needs of life for all the members of the society, including those who may be incapacitated or handicapped in one way or another, and 2) a just reward of extra comfort and elegance to the talented members for their superior skill and enterprise through lawful means.<sup>440</sup> However, when we say that "God has provided sufficient means for fulfilling all needs," we must understand from this to mean genuine human needs as mentioned above. The Islamic approach to the fulfilment of basic needs is, as Anjum points out, that not every want is valid and deserves to be fulfilled, but only basic and genuine needs.<sup>441</sup>

Nevertheless, Muslim economists, Siddiqi, Chapra, and Mannan, agree that besides food, clothing and shelter, which are necessary for bare survival, some other material basic needs must be satisfied. They name four:

1. Training and education to develop the innate abilities of individuals and enable them to care for their well-being without becoming a burden on others;
2. A suitable job, profession, or trade in keeping with persons' aptitudes, abilities, ambitions, and the needs of society, so that both they and society benefit from such abilities and training;
3. A generally healthy environment combined with appropriate medical care and facilities, including sanitation, electrification and safe water; and
4. Financial support for those who want to get married but need assistance to repay debts, or aid to buy tools needed for a trade and even some facilities for recreation.<sup>442</sup>

## **Islamic Foundations of Socio-Economic Justice**

In order to create a balanced and humane society where every individual can meet his or her basic needs, and have a decent standard of living, Islam developed some basic principles without which it is impossible to establish such a society. These principles can be summarized as follows:

### *The Principle of Unity and Brotherhood*

According to the Qur'anic teaching, since God created all human beings from the first couple, Adam and Eve, all human beings are accepted as brothers and sisters irrespective of their color, language, country, or other distinction. Thus, the Qur'an considers humankind as one family, produced by the same origin; all members of this family are alike in the sight of God and before his revealed law. The Qur'an says: "O mankind! fear your Guardian Lord, who created you from a single Person, created out of it, his mate, and from them twain scattered [like seeds] countless men and women."<sup>443</sup> Concerning the meaning of this verse Sayyid Qutb says: "The fact that

people are different by nature is not a reason for dispute among themselves, but it is a reason for mutual acquaintance and cooperation."<sup>444</sup> The only criteria of persons' worth in the sight of God is their piety, devoutness to God, character, ability and service to humanity. God says: "O mankind! We created you from a single [pair] of a male and female, and made you into nations and tribes, that ye may know each other [not that ye may despise each other]. Verily the most honored of you in the sight of Allah is [he who is] the most righteous of you."<sup>445</sup> According to this verse all men and women make up one humanity. Emphasizing the unity of human beings, the Prophet said in His Farewell Address: "You are all brothers and are all equal. None of you can claim any privilege or any superiority over any other. An Arab is not to be preferred to a non-Arab, nor is a non-Arab to be preferred to an Arab."<sup>446</sup> Again, the Prophet says: "Certainly God looks at not your faces or your wealth; instead he looks at your heart and deeds."<sup>447</sup>

The Prophet of Islam accepts that particularly the Islamic community is like an organic body, in which each cell grows and contributes to the well-being of the other cells. The Prophet is reported to have said: "The believers in their mutual love and concern are like one body; if a part of it complains, the other parts call each other to come to its assistance, sharing its pain and sleeplessness."<sup>448</sup> In another *hadith* the Prophet says: "A Muslim is the brother of another Muslim; he neither wrongs him, nor leaves him without help, nor humiliates him."<sup>449</sup> In fact, this mutual love and concern in Islam is not an optional act or suggestion to the Islamic community, but a requirement for being a true Muslim. The following *hadith* shows this: "He is not a man of faith who eats at his will when his neighbor is hungry."<sup>450</sup> Islam even urges Muslims to prefer their brothers over themselves, and proclaims that without giving freely of that which the Muslim loves it is not possible to attain righteousness.<sup>451</sup> Emphasizing this fact, the Prophet also says: "No person may become a perfectly true believer unless he loves for others what he loves for himself."<sup>452</sup> While Islam stipulates that to be a true Muslim one should have love and concern for all people, it lays great stress, in particular, on kindness to children, other members of the family, the needy, the wayfarer, and orphans.<sup>453</sup> This is especially the case for neighborhoods. The Prophet emphasized on many occasions the duty owed to a neighbor, saying: "So repeatedly and so much has God impressed upon me the duty owed to a neighbor that I began to think that a neighbor might perhaps be named an heir."<sup>454</sup>

This Islamic concept of brotherhood is a unique characteristic of Islam and distinguishes it from all other social systems. Mannan argues that the contribution of Islam towards developing the concept of brotherhood from the moral standpoint is particularly absent for one reason or another in all other social systems, i.e. communism, socialism, capitalism, and fascism. He writes:

It is absent in communism, because communism, which is anti-religious, stresses more material progress in life and uproots all feelings of brotherhood from the minds of the people. It is absent in capitalism, because capitalism like socialism limits the scope of religion and morality to within four corners of the church. The dynamic interplay of spiritual and secular institutions is not found either in a capitalist or a socialist society. It is absent in fascism, because fascism glorifies only the state, which is an end in itself and not a means to an end. Therefore, it banishes all feelings of fraternity from the minds of the individuals.<sup>455</sup>

Thus, contrary to the other social systems, as Muhammad Iqbal Anjum points out, the Islamic belief of universal brotherhood creates a strong feeling of mutual respect and cooperation in the society. It negates absolutely justification for any type of discrimination and makes it clear that each person has individual as well as mutual rights and responsibilities.<sup>456</sup> Thus, the idea of brotherhood entails that all people living a community are responsible for each other's welfare and no individual or group of people can thrive at the expense of others.<sup>457</sup>

### *Principle of Tawhid and Sovereignty*

The concepts of unity and brotherhood of humanity flow from the concept of the unity of God. Muhammad N. Siddiqi points out that, "*Tawhid* is a coin with two faces: one implies that Allah is the Creator and the other that men are equal partners or that each man is brother to another man."<sup>458</sup> According to Muzaffar *tawhid*, that is, the faith in the oneness of God and the unifying world view of the whole of humanity in terms of religious, political, social, economic and biological activities of society, contains at least five important beliefs. First is a belief in the common spiritual origin, mission and destiny of the whole of humanity. Second is a belief in the organic unity in existence of the immanent and the transcendent, of life and death, of this world and the hereafter, of man and nature, of individual and community, of men and women, and of the material and the spiritual. Third is a belief in the human being as God's vicegerent or trustee. Fourth is a belief that there are universal moral values and principles which are beneficial to the whole of humankind. The last is a belief that human beings, both at the individual level and at the collective level, possess universal rights and responsibilities, roles and relations which help to nurture and nourish a holistic way of life.<sup>459</sup> Thus, as Alhabshi points out, *tawhid* not only signifies the oneness of God in everything, but also defines the unique relationship between humanity and its Creator, between man and his fellow beings, and between humanity and its environment.<sup>460</sup>

As is seen, *tawhid* is not only an abstract belief in the oneness of God in everything, but the unity and relationship between God, human beings, and the universe. These three concepts cannot be separated from each other in the Islamic understanding. Closely related to the concept of unity is that of sovereignty. It is also one of the most important features of Islamic understanding regarding the relationships of persons with their fellow beings. Islam differs fundamentally from all other systems in regard to the concept of sovereignty. In Islam, the ultimate sovereignty in all matters belongs to Allah, and to no one else. It is only His will that should prevail in this world.<sup>461</sup> Although humanity has been created to be God's vice-regent on earth, and to be superior over all other creatures, persons are not to make or abrogate the Divine Law.<sup>462</sup> Therefore, all human beings must necessarily submit to the will of God and realize that God who is all-knowing is the best guide in all their affairs. In the community, all affairs of Muslim life (political, economic and social) are to be exercised in the light of the Qur'an and the *Sunnah*, the way of the Prophet Muhammad, through the principle of mutual consultation enjoined by the Qur'an.<sup>463</sup>

According to Mannan, the Islamic concept of sovereignty is superior to all existing systems in at least two ways: First, its superiority lies in its belief in Allah and its fear of violation of the moral code of life. This belief and fear of God keep the Islamic community always within the borders of democracy and justice in the real sense of the terms. Second, the Islamic concept of sovereignty is clearer and simpler than the concept of sovereignty in other systems. Contrary to the Judeo-Christian concept of sovereignty which he judges to be unclear and vague, Mannan argues that "The Islamic concept of sovereignty is in consistence with the nature of things, with the place of mankind in the universe, with the position of the individual in society and the aims of moral, economic and political life evolved by it."<sup>464</sup>

### *Principle of Absolute Consciousness of Freedom*

Closely related to the principles of tawhid and sovereignty is the understanding of freedom in Islam. The Qur'an declares the sovereignty of God over all aspects of life. Those who accept that sovereignty, and who are in submission to God, are secure in their relationship to God. This is true freedom. Qutb wrote: "When it [the conscience] is filled with the knowledge that it can of itself gain complete access to Allah, then it cannot be disturbed by any feeling of fear of its life, or fear of its livelihood, or fear for its station."<sup>465</sup>

In order to save the dignity of human beings, the Qur'an insists that the individual be freed from any kind of fear which disturbs human beings such as the fear of death or injury, or the fear of poverty and destitution, for no creature can have any power over another creature in this matter.<sup>466</sup> According to Qutb, this freedom is one of the cornerstones on which all others must rest. He maintained: "For without such complete freedom, human nature cannot prevail against the force of humiliation and suaveness and servitude, nor can it lay claim to its rightful share in social justice; nor can it sustain the responsibilities of such a justice when it has attained to it."<sup>467</sup>

The observations of Jacques Waardenburg support the importance of belief in the consciousness of freedom in Muslim societies. He writes as follows:

Human rights are violated in so many Muslim and other Third World societies, not only by political systems and regimes whose secret services employ terror, but also by other sources of fear: violence, poverty, a hopeless existence. It is not Islam, however interpreted, which is the reason for such degradations of human existence. I would say, on the contrary, that it is thanks to their particular religious faith, their Islam, that so many Muslims are still aware of their human dignity and live accordingly.<sup>468</sup>

### **Islamic Means for Attaining Social and Economic Justice**

As we mentioned above, although the Qur'an recognizes some inequalities in the distribution of income and wealth to maintain the function of society, it does not leave the poor, the needy and the least privileged persons to fend for themselves. In order to create a just and humane society where the basic needs of all members of that society can be met, Islam has prescribed both moral exhortations and legal rules. In the words of Muhammad Abdul Rauf some are positive provisions and serve as sources of energy or fuel for the *economic boat*; others are prohibitions that point out *dangerous spots* which might wreck the boat, society.<sup>469</sup>

In the light of the Qur'anic verses, *hadiths*, and the work of Muslim scholars, these positive and prohibitive rules concerning the means of attaining social and economic justice can be summarized as follows.

#### **Positive Provisions**

Islam encourages all Muslims to work to gain their own livelihood so that they will not be a social burden on others. However, since all people in a society will not be able to supply their living due to some physical or social factors, Islam has made some provisions such as the paying of *zakat*, voluntary spending, and the law of inheritance. These positive provisions can be examined as follows.

#### *Work*

The basic Islamic principle related to economic justice and social welfare in a society is that all persons must try to earn their living by work. As Belkacem points out, there are approximately 500 verses in the Qur'an extolling the expenditure of energy in useful work.<sup>470</sup> Concerning the necessity of work, al-Faruqi wrote:

Islam ordered its adherent to cultivate his faculties: to understand himself, nature, and the world in which he lives; to satisfy his innate craving for food, shelter, comfort, sex, and reproduction; to realize balance and harmony in his relations with men and nature; to transform the earth into a producing orchard, a fertile farm and a beautiful garden; to express his understanding, his craving, his doing, and realizing in works of aesthetic beauty.<sup>471</sup>

Both the Qur'an and *hadith* frequently stress working and taking advantage of natural resources. Making an effort to earn an income is imperative. The Qur'an says: "And when the prayer is finished, then may ye disperse through the land, and seek of the Bounty of Allah."<sup>472</sup> In another verse, it is said: "That man can have nothing but what he strives for."<sup>473</sup> Human beings are reminded that God has caused day and night to follow each other so that they may seek their livelihood during the day and their rest during the night.<sup>474</sup> The Prophet, by his sayings and deeds, also showed the necessity and importance of working. He said: "A person does not eat anything better than he earns by himself." Kissing the hands of Sa'id b. Mu'adh which were hardened with manual labor, he said: "Those are the very palms that are loved by Allah."<sup>475</sup> Struggling for a living is believed to be as meritorious as the struggle for the faith, and the hand that gives is better in the sight of God than the hand that takes.<sup>476</sup>

Thus Islam requires everyone to be self-sufficient and discourages an able-bodied person from becoming a social burden to others. As Mannan points out, the concept of justice demands that both the poor and the rich must simultaneously fight to eradicate the problem of poverty, both at an individual and social level.<sup>477</sup> Thus, while Islam urges everyone to work to gain a living, it severely rejects begging. The following *hadith* shows the Islamic approach towards begging: When the Prophet saw a man begging, he gave a coin to the beggar and then said: "Verily it is better that one of you should get a rope and collect a bundle of firewood on his back and sell it, even if Allah does not give prosperity, better this than that you should beg from the people that they may give to you or refuse you."<sup>478</sup>

In fact, working is necessary for a Muslim not just to maintain a living, but also to be a better Muslim. For spending in the way of Allah and earning a reward in the hereafter requires Muslims to be rich. Thus as Masudul Alam Choudhury says: "It is a Muslim's religious duty to improve his economic conditions so that he becomes a zakat payer rather than a zakat receiver."<sup>479</sup>

It must also be noted here that while Islam encourages Muslims to work and to gain their livelihood, it has also brought some regulations and restrictions related to working, gaining income and ownership in order to protect the poor from any kind of exploitation. In this context there are two principles are important: 1) private ownership, and 2) economic morality.

*Private Ownership:* Every social system deals with the concept of private ownership in one way or another. For example, while capitalism gives absolute ownership to individuals, communism substitutes the concept of ownership in the name of society. Islam, on the other hand, maintains a balance between these two. However, as Mannan points out, "The most important difference comparing with other social systems is that in Islam 'absolute ownership of everything'

belongs to God."<sup>480</sup> According to Chapra, this principle of Islamic economics regarding God's absolute ownership of everything is significant and is due to two important reasons:

First, although property is allowed to be privately owned, it is to be considered as a trust from God because everything in the universe belongs to God; human beings as the vicegerents of God on earth enjoy the right of ownership only as a trustee. The Qur'an says: "To Allah belongeth all that is in the heavens and on earth."<sup>481</sup> As to the trusteeship of human beings, the Qur'an says: "Believe in Allah . . . and spend [in charity] out of the [substance] whereof He has made you heirs."<sup>482</sup>

Second, since persons are the vicegerents of God, and the wealth they own is a trust from Him, they are therefore bound by the conditions of the trust or, more specifically, the moral values of Islam. These include just earnings, brotherhood, social and economic justice, equitable distribution of income and wealth, and fostering the common good.<sup>483</sup> Thus Zarqa argues that when the concept that "God is the owner" settles in a person's heart, whether producer or consumer, that person feels honored and grateful that some of God's wealth has been put in his or her trust. A person is then inclined to acknowledge God's right to define proper limits for the enjoyment and use of the wealth and also to acknowledge God's right to designate other individuals or the community as the rightful claimants to a share of that wealth.<sup>484</sup>

While Islam urges and gives some rights concerning private ownership, it has also brought some regulations and restrictions in order to protect the rights of the weak and the poor in society. Yusuf lists the basic principles of ownership sanctioned by Islam as follows: 1) ownership signifies essentially the right to expect and utilize the wealth; 2) the owner deserves the ownership only as long as he utilizes the wealth; 3) the owner who ceases to exploit and utilize his wealth is induced and even forced by various means to part with his idle possessions; and 4) in no case is an owner allowed to charge rent for a free gift of nature from a fellow human being, who has an equal claim to share in the wherewithal of economic activity.<sup>485</sup>

Therefore, individual freedom and private ownership are sanctioned by Islam only as long as it does not conflict with the larger social interest or as long as the individual does not transgress the rights of others. According to Patrick Bannerman, private ownership is subject to two moral imperatives: 1) good management on behalf of the real owner, God; 2) the requirement to apply surplus wealth productively in pursuit of social justice and the general good.<sup>486</sup>

As we have seen, while Islam gives permission to individuals to exploit the natural resources of the universe and to own goods privately, it always protects the benefit of the common good. What if the acquisition of private property and the possession of individual freedoms harm society or oppress the poor? It is M. Y. Mazhar Siddiqui's judgment that "this right of private ownership could be curtailed and restricted, or even abolished altogether, in special circumstances when the maximum good of the Islamic Society is endangered and the benefits of this means of production are limited to a small minority to the exclusion or detriment of the vast majority."<sup>487</sup>

Regarding the rights of the individual vis-a-vis other individuals and society, jurists have agreed on the following basic principles: 1) the larger interest of the society takes precedence over the interest of the individual; 2) although relieving hardship and promoting benefit are both among the prime objectives of Islam, the former takes precedence over the latter; and 3) a greater loss cannot be inflicted to relieve a smaller loss, nor can a greater benefit be sacrificed for a lesser one. Conversely, a lesser harm can be inflicted to avoid a greater harm or a lesser benefit can be sacrificed for a greater benefit.<sup>488</sup> Thus, as Qutb said, Islam gives permission and even

encourages individualism and private ownership, but it does not permit individualism to become a harmful egotism.<sup>489</sup>

In brief, as Mannan points out, "While Islam allows the individual to promote his own good, it exhorts him not to forget that he is a part of the group, and reminds him of the need to protect and promote the interests of his fellows. The moral inductions about ownership are to create a sense of responsibility and a conscience."<sup>490</sup>

*Economic Morality:* Both the Qur'an and the *hadith* stress the rightful method of earnings. The Qur'an says: "O Ye who believe! Eat not up your property among yourselves in vanities: But let there be amongst you traffic and trade by mutual good-will: Nor kill [or destroy] yourselves."<sup>491</sup> The Prophet also says: "True and honest businessmen will be with the prophets, the truthful and the martyrs on the Day of Judgment."<sup>492</sup> In another *hadith* he says: "Whoever takes possession of a piece of land without right will be sunk down by the debt of seven lands on the Day of Judgment."<sup>493</sup> In Islam, wealth is to be regarded as a means, not as a final goal. It is a means of satisfying needs in moderation for survival in a limited term of life in the world, but leading to a more meaningful and lasting life hereafter. Therefore, as Rauf points out, "The wealth and all ecological resources, provided by God for the satisfaction of human needs, are to be sensibly treated, not abused, destroyed, or wasted or laid idle."<sup>494</sup> In Islamic understanding, economic gains are meritorious as long as they are in accordance with God's pleasure. Thus, in the words of Rauf, "The economic pursuit cannot be separated from the spiritual objective, nor should they be separated from the religious content and become purely materialistic."<sup>495</sup> From the Qur'anic perspective, God is the real owner of wealth; human beings have been entrusted with looking after it as a test.<sup>496</sup> Thus, as a trustee, humankind is responsible for making the best and most effective use of resources in ways that are acceptable to God. Therefore, it is unlawful to derive income from immoral practices or by spreading moral laxity, stealing, cheating, extortion, deceiving, gambling, distributing harmful drugs and pornographic materials, monopoly, hoarding, fraud and interest.<sup>497</sup> The Qur'an in many places has stressed the moral obligation of a Muslim to be scrupulous in the use of weights and measures and has termed a default in this obligation as being analogous to making mischief in the world.<sup>498</sup>

Can a modern economic system be based on understandings from the Qur'an and *hadith*? Muslim economists answer, "Yes." Concerning Islamic economic morality Chapra argues that:

If the Islamic teachings of *halal* [permissive and lawful] and *haram* [prohibited and unlawful] on the earning of wealth are followed, the norm of justice to employees and consumers is applied, provisions for redistribution of income and wealth are implemented, and the Islamic law of inheritance is enforced, there cannot be any gross inequalities of income and wealth in Muslim society.<sup>499</sup>

Mannan claims the same thing saying: "The Islamic principles of the social system, in which the principle of pure religion plays a part, have an appeal to humanity of all ages. Many of the social maladies of the present world of conflicting ideologies are bound to disappear if we implement the universal principle of Islam in our socio-economic systems."<sup>500</sup> According to Choudhury, "The root cause of the failings in the economic machinery has been the absence of ethical consideration in it."<sup>501</sup>

In fact, economic morality concerns not only the Muslim community, but all societies. For without ethical considerations it is not possible to maintain economic progress even in a capitalist system. John C. O'Brien writes regarding the necessity of morality in economics:

The new paradigm [social economics] would emphasize the importance of the public interest, the idea of community. It would place particular importance not only on man's quest for material progress but also for that ethical progress, without which man's material progress cannot even be preserved. Social economists would have no compunction, therefore, about making normative judgments in keeping with the traditional code of morality. Ethical considerations would not be excluded from the study of economic problems.<sup>502</sup>

### *Zakat*

Islam decrees that persons earn their own living as long as they can. However, since everyone in the world is not created the same in terms of intelligence, character and physical ability, all of which affect the chance of earning a good living, it is understandable that some people will be at a disadvantage compared to others. Zakat provides a guarantee for those who are without resources. It helps those who may have exhausted their powers and received no return, or those who received barely enough to meet their needs. It provides for those who cannot earn a living because of personal disability or handicap (physical or mental), or for those for whom there is no employment. Thus, in order to avoid destitution, to meet needy persons' basic needs, and to supply a nobler form of life, Islam set the institution of zakat.

Zakat, the third pillar of Islam, constitutes the principal base of Islamic social and economic justice. It is neither alms nor charity, but rather an obligatory duty. Ibrahim A. Toghais argues that "No duty is mentioned more often in the Qur'an than almsgiving."<sup>503</sup> In many chapters, the Qur'an urged Muslims to pay it; in some chapters the Prophet was ordered to take it.<sup>504</sup> Therefore, all Islamic scholars agree that he who consciously refuses to pay it is considered a renegade and runs the risk of mortal punishment. Thus, the act of withholding the *zakat* was understood as a form of apostasy and unbelief in this life and the withholder was subject to punishment. The war of the *rida* (apostasy) during the rule of Caliph Abu Bakr is the most striking evidence of this situation.<sup>505</sup> Upon being denied the paying of *zakat* by some tribes, Abu Bakr declared: "The right [of the state or community] in the wealth [acquired by an individual], and by Allah, if they refuse to make over even one lamb which they used to make over to the Holy Prophet, I will fight with them."<sup>506</sup> And he did what he said.<sup>507</sup>

The intended consequence of paying *zakat* is purification and growth. It is both a form of worship and a social responsibility. Thus, according to Toghais, it serves two purposes: 1) to establish an inner control of the conscience; and 2) to support and advance the innate solidarity of the human being.<sup>508</sup> Zakat creates a balance of wealth, prevents poverty, builds a responsibility between the rich and the poor, and shapes a healthy society through mutual relationships. The poor have a right to zakat in order to meet their basic needs or to better their lives. Qutb wrote: "The poor-tax is a right which the community claims from the individual, either to guarantee a competence to some of its members, or to provide some little enjoyment over and above a bare livelihood."<sup>509</sup>

Chapra argues that zakat should not be confused with the normal taxes levied by the modern states, including some Islamic states, to meet different state expenditures. To him "Zakat is a special social security tax on the rich for disbursement to the poor and the needy, so as to guarantee a minimum standard of living to all individuals in society and to reduce inequalities of income to a tolerable and healthy level."<sup>510</sup> In fact, this is the very aim of *zakat* in the Qur'an: "In order that it may not [merely] make a circuit between the wealthy among you."<sup>511</sup>

However, it must also be noted that, as Muhammad N. K. Khel points out, the aim of zakat is not to create a class of beggars having eyes on the income and the wealth of the rich; its aim is that wealth should not be concentrated only among the rich.<sup>512</sup> According to Abdulrahman A. Kurdi, the main purpose of zakat is threefold: 1) to meet the needs of the poor and the destitute, so that there are no needy people in the Muslim community; 2) to lessen the accumulation of wealth in rich peoples' hands, and 3) to purify and to increase the wealth of individuals as promised by God.<sup>513</sup>

Zakat relates to the moral, social and economic aspects of life. Mannan writes:

In the moral sphere Zakat washes away the greed and acquisitiveness of the rich. In the social sphere Zakat acts as a unique measure vouchsafed by Islam to abolish poverty from the society by making the rich alive to the social responsibilities they have. In the economic sphere Zakat prevents the morbid accumulation of wealth in a few hands and allows it to be diffused before it assumes threatening proportions in the hands of its possessors. It is a compulsory contribution of the Muslims to the state exchequer.<sup>514</sup>

Zakat benefits both the rich and the poor—those who pay it and those who receive it. Mushir-UI Haq believes that the Islamic system of social justice liberates both the poor and the rich. He writes, "Islam came to liberate both: one from the pinch of poverty and the other from the evils which follow the love of money."<sup>515</sup> According to Mannan zakat has many advantages for the economy of a society. He writes:

Zakat, by giving them purchasing power, brings about a balance between demand for and supply of goods and thus facilitates the course of production in the country and smooths the path of national progress and prosperity. Now these people, having purchasing power in their hands, will demand more goods; entrepreneurs will try to produce more; the scope of employment in the country will increase, and with that the national income will also go up.<sup>516</sup>

Again, according to Mannan, zakat has definite advantages over modern taxes in at least three ways: First, while tax evasion is a serious problem for modern tax collection and many people try to evade paying income tax by presenting false accounts, the question of dishonest practices of zakat is quite unexpected because of zakat's religious and moral character. Being a divine order, people will pay their zakat willingly. Second, since the main source of zakat is unused hoarded wealth, it is only through zakat that it is possible to unearth hoarded wealth and utilize it for the greater benefit of society. In fact zakat, checks the tendency to hoard money and provides a powerful stimulus to investment in productive purposes, for Islam allows and encourages profit and partnership. Third, since the purpose and priorities of use of zakat have been clearly defined in the Qur'an, the state is not permitted to spend the money collected through zakat in any way it likes. Thus, the poor and the needy will be the first to get their due.<sup>517</sup>

The advantages and the supremacy of zakat over other tax systems can be seen in the revenue of zakat, too. According to Muhammad Abdul Rauf, definite portions from almost all sectors of the economy are assigned for the relief of the poor. In addition to all idle wealth, gold, silver, and cash balances, zakat is also levied on wealth in the form of cattle, trade goods, agricultural products and on any treasure and mineral wealth exacted from the earth.<sup>518</sup>

Finally, zakat is a manifestation of social solidarity and brotherhood in the Muslim community. In the words of Rauf, while "It generates good will on the part of the poor toward the rich, its payment represents humble obedience to God."<sup>519</sup> In fact, as Naqvi points out, zakat is not only an economic necessity but also a means to spiritual salvation.<sup>520</sup> The Qur'an says: "Of their wealth take alms, that so thou mightest purify and sanctify them."<sup>521</sup>

Siddiqi argues for the advantages and the supremacy of the zakat when he writes: "If an Islamic society enforces the *zakah* [*zakat*] system and practices *infaq* [spending] in the way of God, it would certainly experience a social benefit, as the early Muslims did in the period of Islamic resurgence when there was none to take the *zakah* or *sadaqat* [voluntary spending], for each and every member of the society was able to satisfy his basic needs with ease and comfort."<sup>522</sup> Such a plan is not utopian thought, but actually occurred in Islamic history. At the time of Omar Ibn Abdel Aziz, the ruler of Umayyah (717-20), not only were there no beggars, poor or needy, but no evidence could be found of people liable to receive the zakat, "even though the legal definition of the *massakin* [needy] is, 'those who do not have the means to feed themselves for one year.'" An African governor under the same Caliph said one day: "We have to go from door to door to find someone who will accept the zakat."<sup>523</sup>

As has been mentioned before, in order to eradicate poverty and to meet the needs of the poor and the needy, the Qur'an clearly has defined the ways of spending the zakat. According to the Qur'an, zakat can be distributed only in eight ways, six of which are directly or indirectly related to the poor and poverty: "Alms are for the poor and the needy, and those employed to administer the [funds]; for those whose hearts have been [recently] reconciled [to truth]; for those in bondage and in debt; in the cause of Allah; and for the wayfarer: [thus is it] ordained by Allah. And Allah is full of knowledge and wisdom."<sup>524</sup>

### *Other Taxes*

Although the zakat is the fundamental basis of the Islamic socio-economic system, it does not mean that the practice of zakat can solve all social and economic problems of a country or meet the whole needs of that country. Therefore, if the proceeds of the zakat are not sufficient to eradicate poverty and meet the needs of the poor, all Muslim scholars agree that the state or community has a right to impose additional taxes on those whose income is greater than the minimum for sustenance in order to achieve the egalitarian objectives of Islamic social justice.<sup>525</sup> In fact, this is clearly defined in the Qur'an. It says: "They ask thee how much they are to spend; say: 'What is beyond your needs.'<sup>526</sup>

### *Voluntary Spending and Charities*

Besides the compulsory paying of zakat either to the state or directly to the poor, it is obligatory on all rich persons to spend an additional part of their wealth for the welfare of the poor and the needy. The Qur'an enjoins such spending not only to banish poverty, but also to promote social cohesion and harmony. In this context, the most frequently occurring terms in the Qur'an are *infaq* (voluntary spending), *ihsan* (benevolence), *sadaqat* (charity), and *it'am* (feeding). Feeding the hungry is stressed so much that neglect of the orphan and the destitute is equated to denial of the religion itself. The Qur'an says: "Seest thou one who denies the Judgment [to come]? Then such is the one who repulses the orphan, and encourages not the feeding of the indigent . . . and refuse [to supply] [even] neighborly needs."<sup>527</sup> In another verse, "And when they are told,

‘spend ye of [the bounties] with which Allah has provided you,’ the unbelievers say to those who believe: ‘Shall we then feed those whom, if Allah has so willed, He would have fed, [Himself]? Ye are in nothing but manifest error.’”<sup>528</sup>

Although the Qur’an does not exactly specify how much a Muslim should spend in the way of Allah, such spending is one of the basic requirements of being a good Muslim. It is believed that the more persons spend for others, the better it will be for them both in this world and hereafter.<sup>529</sup> This is stated in many verses in the Qur’an. For example, "And spend of your substance in the cause of Allah, and make not your own hands contribute to [your] destruction; but do good; for Allah loveth those who do good."<sup>530</sup> In another verse it is said: "It is not righteousness that ye turn your faces towards East or West; but it is righteousness . . . to spend of your substance out of love for Him, for your kin, for orphans, for the needy, for the wayfarer, for those who ask, and for the ransom of the slaves."<sup>531</sup>

More importantly, according to the Qur’an, spending for the poor and the needy by the rich is not a charity, but it is the right of the poor. The Qur’an says: "And in their wealth there is a due share for the beggar and the deprived."<sup>532</sup> The main objective of Islam here is not to create a class of beggars but to prevent the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few. Wealth should be circulated among all people and spent for the total social welfare. The Qur’an says: "In order that it may not [merely] make a circuit between the wealthy among you."<sup>533</sup> As Siddiqi explains: "This principle demands an equitable distribution of wealth among the people in general, making it impossible for the wealthy to prosper at the expense of the poor."<sup>534</sup>

From the Qur’anic perspective, as long as the accumulation of wealth does not become the focus of attention and deny the rights of the poor there is no problem. However, when those who accumulate the wealth fail to perform their charitable duties for the benefit of the Muslim community, they not only incur the wrath of Allah, but also may be compelled by the state to give of their wealth to the needy.<sup>535</sup>

It must also be noted here that the Qur’an not only commands the rich to help the poor, but also gives great importance to the dignity of the poor. The Qur’an particularly condemns the motive of showing off one’s generosity and warns against humiliating a person or hurting his feelings by reminding him of the assistance rendered to him.<sup>536</sup> Thus charities and voluntary spending must be paid sincerely, without any hypocrisy or show-off piety and without causing injury to the recipients. Above all the Qur’an enjoins the giving of the very best part of one’s wealth in the way of God.<sup>537</sup> Charity becomes worthless in the sight of God if it results in hurting the feelings of the poor or the needy.<sup>538</sup>

It must be added here that the Qur’an not only emphasizes the great aspects of charity such as the feeding of the poor, taking care of orphans and doing beneficial things for society, but it gives equal attention to small matters. In Islam even the use of kind words to parents and others is considered charity.<sup>539</sup> It is also mentioned in the *hadith* that "Removing any sort of obstacle from a road is charity."<sup>540</sup> "Greeting other people is charity."<sup>541</sup> "Enjoying what is right and forbidding what is wrong and refraining from doing evil to anyone is a charity."<sup>542</sup> More interestingly, the Qur’an has extended charity not only to all human beings, regardless of their beliefs, but also to dumb creatures.<sup>543</sup>

From all these verses and *hadiths* we can conclude that a Muslim is supposed to make two types of spending: 1) to meet his family’s basic needs, and 2) to meet the needs of others, for the sake of God, who are in need.

### *Inheritance*

Another powerful tool for redistribution of wealth and income in Islam is the Islamic law of inheritance. Since the aim of the Qur'an is to circulate the wealth among a large number of people, it laid down the law of inheritance, which has to be followed exactly when dividing any legacy. It has to be applied whether the legacy is small or large, whether an estate or money. Thus, as Kurdi writes, "This Islamic rule certainly plays a significant role in lessening the inequality in the division of the wealth in the Muslim community in each generation, as it effectively reduces the everlasting gulf between the rich and the poor."<sup>544</sup> The law of inheritance in Islam not only includes the members of the inner family, children, parents, and spouse, but also other relatives.<sup>545</sup>

Mannan argues that a fuller implementation of the inheritance law will reduce the burden of intra-family obligations and the poverty level in three ways. First, it will increase the probability of greater participation by women in economic activities. Thus, through the laws of inheritance women can own property and possessions, and enter into contracts in their own names. Second, it will increase the probability of greater participation by women in education and training. It is a fact that in most of the Islamic countries women are under-privileged and illiterate compared to men. Although under the Islamic system the obligation of maintaining the family rests mainly with the husband, the wife can, of course, enter into a legitimate profession for augmenting the family income. Third, it will also increase the probability of a better start in life by all the legal heirs of women. Thus, the initial advantage can have a multiplier effect in augmenting the level of social income among women.<sup>546</sup>

As Rauf points out, the other important aspect of the law of inheritance is that while Islam allows Muslims to spend their wealth as they want (in legal ways of course), it allows a Muslim to allocate only a maximum of one-third of his or her inherited wealth to charity, but never allows a person to make a will which deprives one of his heirs, or which favors one heir over another.<sup>547</sup>

## **Prohibited Measures**

In order to attain its objective of social justice and equality within the Muslim community, Islam has adopted not only the various positive measures mentioned above, but also some legal prohibitions. Islam has prohibited the charges of interest, unlawful business transactions, and wasteful spending. In so doing it has placed itself in opposition to many of the economic conditions and practices of contemporary economics.

### *Riba (Usury)*

Among the most important teachings of Islam for establishing social justice and eliminating exploitation in business transactions is the prohibition of *riba* (usury). *Riba* literally means increase, addition, expansion or growth. It is, however, not every increase or growth which has been prohibited by Islam. Chapra defines *riba* as follows:

In Islam, *riba* technically refers to the "premium" that must be paid by the borrower to the lender along with the principal amount as a condition for the loan or for an extension in its maturity. In this sense, *riba* has the same meaning and import as interest in accord with all the legal systems without exception.<sup>548</sup>

Choudhury adds that since *riba* means over and above a thing, the Qur'anic concept of *riba* is not limited to only loan interest, but covers both money and physical units of goods.<sup>549</sup> Thus, as Mahmud Ahmad says, while every increase in the capital sum which is generated by trade in all its various manifestations is acceptable to Islam, every increase of the capital sum which is generated by a money loan, in all its various manifestations, is prohibited by the Qur'an.<sup>550</sup> As Rauf suggests, prohibition of *riba* should be understood in the context of the Islamic philosophy of wealth and the legitimate ways of acquiring it.

Earning, in the context of Islamic economy, should not involve the exploitation of others, but it should be in keeping with the spirit of brotherhood and mutual cooperation. Since usury is a form of hoarding that will eventually violate the spirit of brotherhood and mutual cooperation, it is forbidden.<sup>551</sup> In fact, according to the Qur'an, earning through usury is not a gain, but a loss. The Qur'an says: "That which you give in usury for increase through the property of [other] people, will have no increase with Allah: But that which you give for charity, seeking the Countenance of Allah, [will increase]: it is these who get a recompense multiplied."<sup>552</sup> The Qur'an severely condemns those who take usury: it says: "Those who devour usury will not stand except as stands one whom the Satan by his touch hath driven to madness. That is because they say: 'Trade is like usury.'"<sup>553</sup> In another verse, those who practice usury are likened to those who make war against Allah and His messenger. The verse reads as follows: "If ye do it not, take notice of war from Allah and His Messenger. . . . Deal not unjustly, and ye shall not be dealt with unjustly."<sup>554</sup>

Siddiqi speaks of three reasons why the Qur'an has delivered such a harsh verdict against those who receive usury. These are: 1) Usury is a kind of oppression involving exploitation. While in the case of consumption loans it violates the benefits of the poor and the concept of brotherhood, in the case of productive loans, since it demands a guaranteed return to capital, it violates the enterprisers' profit; 2) It always transfers wealth from the poor to the rich. This situation increases the inequality in the distribution of wealth. This is against social interest and contrary to the will of Allah. Islam commands Muslims to cooperate and to build brotherhood between them. Whereas usury negates this attitude and symbolizes an entirely different way of life; 3) It creates an idle class of people who receive their income from accumulated wealth. The society is deprived of the labor and enterprise of these people. Whereas Islam demands all people, rich or poor, should work and gain their livelihood through legitimate ways.<sup>555</sup>

On the other hand, when usury is not practiced, Qutb argued that the ratio of inflation would decrease in that country. For inflation results when money increases in a ratio that is neither connected to labor nor profits, as is the case of the present capitalistic system. Without usury, the socially unproductive usurers would have to work to earn their profits. Thus, everyone would be forced to invest and recirculate the capital. This would eventually promote the general welfare and establish an economic equilibrium.<sup>556</sup>

### *Unlawful Business Transactions*

As discussed earlier, while Islam urges Muslims to earn their livelihood through lawful and hard work, it prohibits all kinds of earnings which come from unlawful means and violate the benefits of the greater society. In this context, Islam forbids monopoly, hoarding, and other unlawful gaining, such as gambling, theft, cheating, beguiling in production, profiteering, selling alcohol and drugs, pornography, black market, etc. Here I would like to touch only on monopoly and hoarding.

*Monopoly:* Qutb defined monopoly as follows: "Monopoly is power that is utilized against the interests of the consumer and the interest of the society as a whole. It exploits the people's needs for certain commodities that cannot be purchased except from the monopolizer whose aim is to make enormous profits at the expense of the community."<sup>557</sup> Kurdi argues that monopolization of goods and services imposes restrictions on the market's consumers and small businesses. It causes wealth to accumulate for a few people in the society, thereby increasing to a large degree the gap between the poor and the rich.<sup>558</sup> That is why monopoly, the exclusive control of commodities, prices and goods, has been severely condemned by Islam. The Arabic word *mal'un*, meaning accursed of God, has been used in the *hadith* to describe the monopolizer who is drawn away from the mercy of God.<sup>559</sup>

*Hoarding:* Islam prohibits hoarding, too. Hoarding is different from monopoly. Kurdi defines it as "an accumulation of articles, money or other valuables, preserved for future use."<sup>560</sup> Since withholding money or other valuable things from circulation impedes the progress and development of the Muslim community, and leads to general financial and commercial imbalances, Islam has prohibited this kind of business. The Qur'an says:

O ye who believe! There are indeed many among the priests and anchorites, who in falsehood devour the wealth of men and hinder [them] from the Way of Allah. And there are those who hoard gold and silver and spend it not in the Way of Allah: announce unto them a most grievous chastisement on the Day when it will be heated in the fire of Hell, and with it will be branded their foreheads, their flanks, and their backs,—'This is the [treasure] which ye hoarded for yourselves: taste ye, then, the [treasures] ye hoarded.'<sup>561</sup>

## **Wasteful Expenditures**

Another important measure taken by Islam to protect the benefits of common good is to establish some limitations on the use of wealth. As we mentioned before, Islam is not against the joyfulness of the world. On the contrary, Islam exhorts Muslims to enjoy all permissible pleasures of life, and condemns those who prohibit or dissuade others from such enjoyments. The Qur'an says: "Say: Who hath forbidden the beautiful [gifts] of Allah, which He hath produced for His servants, and things, clean and pure [which He hath provided] for sustenance? Say: There are, in the life of this world, for those who believe, [and] purely for them on the Day of Judgment."<sup>562</sup> Since Islam is not an ascetic religion, the Prophet even urged Muslims to enjoy the wholesome comforts and pleasures, saying: "You have obligations towards yourself and your family."<sup>563</sup> In another *hadith* we read, "Allah loves to see the result of His beneficence to His servants."<sup>564</sup> Qutb argued that "Hardship and poverty constitute the greatest possible denial of the beneficence of Allah, and He disapproves such a denial."<sup>565</sup>

While Islam recognizes the right of the individual to spend, it has also placed some restrictions on the spending of money. Wealth or income, a bounty from Allah, is a tool that may be used either for good or evil.<sup>566</sup> That is how spending is understood in the Qur'an. The Qur'an gives the following parable concerning spending as an act of goodness: "And the likeness of those who spend their wealth seeking to please Allah and to strengthen their souls, is as a garden, high and fertile: heavy rain falls on it but makes it yield a double increase of harvest, and if it receives not heavy rain, light moisture sufficeth it, Allah seeth well whatever ye do."<sup>567</sup> On the other hand, those who spend their wealth in the act of evil things deserve the following verse: "What they spend in the life of this [material] world may be likened to a wind which brings a nipping frost: It

strikes and destroys the harvest of men who have wronged their own souls: it is not Allah that hath wronged them, but they wronged themselves."568 Therefore, as Kahf writes, "The wealthy person is not free to be sparing of his property, or to spend it as he wishes, even though there may be a natural appearance of such freedom of disposal."569

At this point Muslim jurists have drawn distinctions between three types of human needs: *daruriyyat* (necessities), *hajiyyat* (convenience), and *tahsiniyyat* (refinements).

*Necessities (daruriyyat)*: The first type of needs includes basic necessities of life for food, shelter, clothes, education, and medical care. However, many Muslim theologians agree that life necessities include not only items which safeguard the Muslim's physical existence but also those which protect religion, life, intellect or reason, progeny, and property. Zarqa explains these categories to include: 1) establishment of the five pillars of Islam (belief, daily prayer, fasting, zakat, and pilgrimage) and calling to the way of Allah; 2) inviolability of human life and related sanctions and the means of maintenance of human life such as earning a living, eating, drinking, having clothes and a home, and related matters such as buying and selling; 3) prohibition of wine and other mind-attacking matter; 4) the institution of marriage and the prohibition of all acts destroying family life; 5) protection of wealth, and prohibitions of destruction of wealth and prohibitions of transgression against the property of others; and 6) struggling to defend these goals, i.e. the acquisition of basic knowledge and education and establishing sufficient economic activities to protect the five foundations mentioned above.<sup>570</sup> Thus, according to al-Ghazali "to preserve these foundations is one of the first goals of the religion of Islam" and, of course, of the state. He believed that religion could be preserved only through acquiring knowledge and offering prayers—both of which require "bodily health, survival and availability of a minimum of clothing, housing, and other supplies."<sup>571</sup>

*Conveniences (hajiyyat)*: The second type of needs, conveniences, comprise all activities and things that are not vital to the preservation of the five foundations (religion, life, mind, offspring, and wealth) but are needed to relieve or remove impediments and difficulties in life. The use and enjoyment of things that a person can do without, but with difficulty, are called *conveniences*. These include many crafts, industries and economic activities, the promotion of physical education to strengthen the body, and the development of wealth to the extent required for the achievement of conveniences.

*Refinements (tahsiniyyat)*: The third type of needs, refinements, include activities and things that go beyond the category of conveniences. They include matters that do not primarily remove or relieve difficulties, but rather add beauty and elegance to life. This category includes innocent hobbies, recreation and kindred activities, objects of enjoyment, and ornamentations (quality furniture, painting, flowers, jewellery, etc.).<sup>572</sup>

It must immediately be noted here that, as Yusuf points out, the second and third types of needs in Islam do not include any kinds of unlawful luxuries. In Islam, unlawful luxuries are not luxuries; they are just prohibitions.<sup>573</sup> Therefore, the jurists have indicated that it is the collective responsibility of the society to give precedence to fulfilment of necessities over the other two categories—conveniences and refinements.<sup>574</sup> At this point Zarqa writes: "Actions or things related to a lower level category (i.e. refinements) are disregarded if they conflict with the objectives of a higher level category."<sup>575</sup>

The Qur'an's main value concerning spending is moderation. As Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi points out, the Qur'an enjoins a middle-of-the-road policy in expenditures, which is neither too little nor too much, but only as much as meets basic needs first and then other conveniences and refinements.<sup>576</sup> Thus the Qur'an prohibits both niggardliness and wastefulness. It says: "Make

not thy hand tied [like a niggard's] to thy neck, nor stretch it forth to its utmost reach, so that thou become blameworthy and destitute."<sup>577</sup> The Qur'an speaks about the qualities of good Muslims regarding spending: "Those who, when they spend are not extravagant and not niggardly, but hold a just [balance] between those [extremes]."<sup>578</sup>

Although Islam prohibits wasteful spending, there is no agreement among the Muslim scholars regarding the scope of wastefulness. For example, Yusuf argues that Islam's prohibitions on wastefulness are mostly misunderstood. He focuses on two words commonly misunderstood: *israf* and *tabdhir*. According to Yusuf, *israf* (wastefulness) means "exceeding with respect to quantity in expenditure, which is ignorance of the values of the right objects, while *tabdhir* means 'exceeding' in respect of the right objects of expenditure." He maintains that both terms signify expending on items that are banned and prohibited such as purchase of wine—"expending otherwise than in obedience of God, whether little or much." For him, any amount spent on a spacious and comfortable house, a good car and a private helicopter is not *israf* and *tabdhir*.

Concerning the verse mentioned above (17:29), Yusuf argues that "the latter prohibitions apply to indiscriminate expending and not to large expending within permissible limits." Yusuf says that verse 25:67 does not mean that no money shall be spent on prohibited things or no money be withheld from approved and lawful pursuits. "It refers only to the quality of the acts, which is estimated without any reference to the amount of money involved." Thus, Yusuf believes that as long as a person spends with humility and obedience to God, there is no problem for him taking advantage of the enjoyment of worldly riches. He also says it is the duty of a Muslim to provide as many comforts and amenities for his dependents as he can afford.<sup>579</sup>

On the other hand, Choudhury argues that *israf* refers to excessive or wasteful consumption of goods and services, whether for necessities, comforts or luxuries. According to Choudhury, three points must be taken into consideration: First, the Muslim society gives priority first to necessities and next to the comforts of life. Thus the production and consumption of luxuries is prohibited in so far as this is tantamount to *israf*. Second, excessive production and consumption of any type of goods is not recommended for this creates waste both of production and goods. Third, savings in the form of investment to produce the necessities and comforts of life and more capital goods to increase productive capacities in coming years are highly encouraged.<sup>580</sup>

In fact, understandings of wasteful expenditures and luxury vary from culture to culture. While an expensive car may be considered a luxury in a very poor country or society, the same car may be considered a necessity in a rich country. Here, I believe, the measure is related not to the quality of goods, but to the situation of the whole community.

But should luxury be looked at only from an economic point of view? For Qutb, "Luxury corrupts not only the social structure, but also a person's physical and moral constitution."<sup>581</sup> For this reason the Qur'an severely condemns luxury. It says: "When We decide to destroy a town, We command those among them who are given the good things of this life [to be obedient] but they continued to transgress; so that the word is proved true against them: then We destroy them utterly."<sup>582</sup> From this perspective, any pursuit judged to be immoral or undesirable is *israf* (wasteful) whether it be cheap or expensive, little or much. Abu'l A'la Mawdudi wrote:

All methods of spending which cause moral or social injury are forbidden. You cannot fritter away your wealth in gambling, you cannot drink wine, you cannot commit adultery, you cannot waste your money in music and dances or other means of self-indulgence; you are prohibited (except in the cause of women) from using golden ornaments and jewels;

and you cannot decorate your house with pictures and status. In short, Islam has closed all those outlets through which the greater portion of a man's wealth is spent on his own luxuries and indulgences.<sup>583</sup>

In many verses the Qur'an emphasizes moderation in expenditure. The Qur'an says: "O Children of Adam! Wear your beautiful apparel at every time and place of prayer: eat and drink: but waste not by excess, for Allah loveth not the wasters."<sup>584</sup> The prophet also encouraged Muslims to be moderate in their eating, drinking and all other works. He said: "The child of Adam never fills a container more harmful for him than his own stomach. Let him fill his stomach only one third with food, leaving one third for water and one third for breathing."<sup>585</sup> In another *hadith* he said: "Eat and drink. Dress yourself well and give away charity. But there should be no extravagance or arrogance."<sup>586</sup> A Muslim ethics based on these verses and *hadiths* does not approve of niggardliness or wastefulness; for both are harmful both to persons and to the society.<sup>587</sup>

We should not assume, however, that Islamic ethics does not legitimate saving for future consumption or investment to improve the quality of future life. According to the Qur'an and *hadiths*, saving and investment are legitimate forms of spending. The Qur'an says: "To those weak of understanding give not your property which Allah has assigned to you to manage. But feed and clothe therewith, and speak to them words of kindness and justice."<sup>588</sup> In explaining this verse, Choudhury says "Wealth is the capital of life and its preservation by rational spending is obligatory on every Muslim." In fact, the saying of the Prophet that to leave one's inheritors better off is better compared to leaving them poor also signifies the importance of savings. He maintains a Muslim should try to save as much as possible and make investments both to acquire permissible comforts of this world, and to be able to have more to spend in the way of Allah with more reward in the hereafter.<sup>589</sup>

### *Role of the State*

While Islam has taken a number of measures, both positive and prohibitive, to protect the poor and to establish a social system where every individual, whether rich or poor, knows his or her rights and responsibilities, Islam has not left the poor and the needy only to the mercy of the rich. Instead it has given some rights and responsibilities concerning the poor directly to the state. At this point, as we mentioned before, the rich of society are bound to look after the needy. Whenever persons are faced with situations in which they fear losing their lives due to hunger or thirst, then it is lawful for a person "to take whatever will sustain him, from any place irrespective of whether it is the property of an individual or of the state. It is not permitted for him to eat carrion . . . If he can find lawful surplus food in the possession of any person."

Jurists have applied this general rule to cases of desperate need for necessities such as clothing, shelter and medicine.<sup>590</sup> As a result of this general rule, the Imam Ibn Hazm delivered a *fatwa* (the decision of a high authority in Islam), based on the Islamic law concerning the responsibility of the Muslim community, to the effect that: "If a man dies in starvation in any town, the people of that town are regarded as having killed him, and the blood-money may be demanded of them."<sup>591</sup> In fact, meeting the needs of the poor and feeding them is an issue of faith and the responsibility of the Muslim community. The Qur'an says: "Seest thou one who denies the judgement [to come]? Then such is the one who repulses the orphan, and encourages not the feeding of the indigent . . . But refuse [to supply] [even] neighborly needs."<sup>592</sup> In another verse

we read: "And when they are told, 'spend ye of [the bounties] with which Allah has provided you,' the Unbelievers say to those who believe: 'Shall we then feed those whom, if Allah has so willed, He would have fed, [Himself]?—Ye are in nothing but manifest error.'"593 The Prophet also gave great importance to the issue of feeding the poor. He said: "He has no faith in Me, who sleeps replete, while his neighbor beside him is hungry, and he is aware of the fact."594

First, Islam gives advice and warns persons who do not do their duties towards the poor and the needy. However, if after all these exhortations and regulations poor people remain and poverty continues, then the state itself is bound to care for its members. It is then responsible for eradicating poverty and meeting the basic needs of the poor. For this purpose the state can and should do the following:

First of all, the person is responsible for his livelihood. Therefore, as Yusuf points out, there are persons who are capable of work, possessing sound minds and bodies, but do not do so. In such cases, the society and the state shall refuse to support them. However, if persons are incapable of working, or unable to find means and opportunities to do so, it is the responsibility of the state to provide them with opportunities for work, and with honorable sustenance and support until they are capable to support themselves.595

In a number of *hadiths*, the head of state is likened to the head of the family. In this context the Prophet says: "Each of you is a shepherd, responsible for his flock: the head of the state for his [people] and the one who has the position of shepherd in his family for [the welfare] of his [family]."596 In another *hadith*, concerning the role of the state, the Prophet says: "He who leaves behind him dependents, they are our responsibility," and "The *wali* [ruler] is the supporter of him who has no supporter."597 Concerning the word *wali* in the *hadith* mentioned above, Mawdudi writes:

The word *wali* which has been used by the Prophet is a very comprehensive word and has a wide range of meanings. If there is an orphan or an aged man, if there is a crippled or unemployed person, if one is an invalid or poor and has no one else to support him or help him, than it is the duty and the responsibility of the state to support and assist him.598

In the same way Ziauddin Ahmad says: "Just as the head of a family assists the members of his family in accordance with their individual needs and requirements consistent with the resources available to him, the state is expected to ascertain the unfulfilled basic needs of its citizens and do the best it can to fulfil these needs."599 According to Chapra the state should make arrangements especially for those who are unemployed, the needy, the orphans, the widows, the aged, the disabled, and all those who do not have sufficient resources or the necessary ability to take care of their own needs and are in need of assistance and support.600

At this point Islam makes no distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. It guarantees economic assistance to indigent non-Muslims and promises that they shall not be allowed to remain hungry, naked or homeless. Caliph Omar once saw a blind old man begging for alms. When he informed him that he was a Jew of the *Ahl al-Dhimma*, He took him by his hand and ordered the treasury officials to allow him something. He then ordered the treasurer to look after such people incapacitated by old age, and ordered the *jizya* to be remitted for him and his likes.601

The state has some rights as well as duties in the matter of supplying a decent human standard of living to every citizen. First, in order to protect the rights of the poor and provide them a humane

standard of life, the state has the right, if necessary, to redistribute private property.<sup>602</sup> The Caliph Omar, in a public address said: "If I were to live longer, I would take the possessions that the rich have in excess and give them to the poor. No man is more worthy than another to be in possession of wealth. And following this, I would raise those who are last to the ranks of the first."<sup>603</sup> The main idea behind the concept of distributive justice is that the resources provided by God are gifts not only for a few people, but for all human beings. The Qur'an says: "It is He Who hath created for you all things that are on earth; then He turned to the heaven and made them into seven firmaments. And of all things He had perfect knowledge."<sup>604</sup>

Chapra explains: "There is no reason why they should remain concentrated in a few hands." He maintains: "The jurists have almost anonymously held the position that it is the duty of the whole Muslim community in general and of its rich in particular, to take care of the basic needs of the poor, and if the well-to-do do not fulfill their responsibilities in spite of their ability to do so, *the state can and should compel them.*"<sup>605</sup> Chapra argues "It would be perfectly justifiable for the state not only to intervene but also to use its coercive powers to eliminate social and economic injustice."<sup>606</sup> In fact, this is clearly indicated in the Qur'an: "And in their wealth there is a due share for the beggar and the deprived."<sup>607</sup> Confirming this verse, the Prophet said: "It will be taken from the rich and given to those in the community in need."<sup>608</sup>

Second, the Islamic state is the only legal agent that has the right to own all kinds of natural resources. In fact, as Yusuf points out, "All the resources of nature which are meant for the common use and convenience of a particular community of people are declared to be public property."<sup>609</sup> According to M. A. Zarqa the concept of public ownership, introduced by Islam, is one of the ways to reduce the disparity of income between individuals. For the basic rule about such property is it cannot be controlled by individuals. Thus everybody can and should benefit from it.<sup>610</sup> The Prophet named three things related to public property: that is, water, pasture, and fire.<sup>611</sup> However, as Yusuf argues, this *hadith* does not exhaust the number, but indicates only character. According to Muslim economists, all the natural deposits which lie on the surface and those which are extracted from underground, such as wild forests and animals, the products of the seas, lakes and ponds, salt, precious stones, gold, silver, iron, lead, coal and petroleum are public property. Thus, no one is allowed to take advantage of these natural resources, depriving others of their share of the resources of nature. However, in order to protect these resources and make them useful for the interest of all people, the state can regulate the natural rights of the people to the natural resources of the country without changing the character of public property in any way.<sup>612</sup> Thus, all natural resources must be used for the welfare, defense, and the service of the Muslim community.

Third, in order to protect the rights of the general public, the state can take control and manage properties of owners who have squandered their wealth wastefully and unreasonably and against the teaching of Islam. Toghais points out that "Islamic law justifies the state in putting into custody the property of a person who spends it wastefully and foolishly, just as in the case of a minor and the insane."<sup>613</sup> The Qur'an says: "To those weak of understanding give not your property which Allah has assigned to you to manage, but feed and clothe them therewith, and speak to them words of kindness and justice."<sup>614</sup> Kurdi points out that the main objectives of these measures are twofold: 1) to ease the lives of the unfortunate; and 2) to eliminate the concentration of wealth in the hands of a few persons.<sup>615</sup> For the same purpose, according to Chapra, Muslim jurists argued that if the rise in prices is due to monopoly or hoarding, the state should intervene by setting prices, or by requiring the hoarder to sell the hoarded goods. Monopolists should be required to increase their output so as to remove the cause of price increase and thus protect the common people from

loss.<sup>616</sup> Thus, whatever the reason, when people are facing scarcity, starvation, and suffering (especially during the famine when people fail to earn a living) the rulers should feed the people and give them financial assistance from the treasury.<sup>617</sup>

The following implications concerning all these rights and responsibilities of the state towards its people can be drawn. First, as Chapra says, the state should follow the middle course in the field of political and economic authority. Its authority is to be neither too much (as in a *totalitarian state*), nor too little (as in a *laissez-faire state*). "The state must serve as an instrument for fulfilling the goals of Islam. It must respect individual freedom and yet exercise sufficient authority to establish the rule of the Islamic moral norms, implement the goals of social and economic justice, and bring about an equitable distribution of income." Second, Chapra points out that the aim of an Islamic state is not to be the richest one, but to be an ideal state. All Islamic countries may not have access to adequate resources to finance the functions of the state properly. Moreover, adequacy of resources is a relative term according to a nation's stage of development. Therefore, according to Chapra, an ideal state has to achieve at least the following four goals: 1) to elevate the spiritual level of the Muslim society and minimize moral laxity and corruption; 2) to fulfill its obligations for general economic welfare within the limits of its resources; 3) to ensure distributive justice and to weed out exploitation; and 4) to cast educational systems in the mold of Islam so that educational institutions produce young persons imbued with the ideas of Islam.<sup>618</sup>

### **A Critical Approach to the Question of Socio-Economic Justice in Islam**

Above we considered the problem of widespread injustice in the world today. While the majority of the world's population lives in absolute poverty, unable to meet their basic needs, the minority everywhere in the world lives in luxury. This is true for both capitalist and Muslim countries. Why does this happen? What are the reasons for this great gap between the rich and the poor? Many answers can be given to this question, according to each country's social, economic, and political structure. However, I will focus here on the misunderstanding of God's action (fatalism or destiny) and human responsibility, which is mostly prevalent in the Muslim world and contribute to the backwardness of Muslims.

#### *A Correct Understanding of God's Action and Human Responsibility*

The central view in the Islamic world, is the belief that the will of God is primary in all that occurs in human affairs and history. However, the two terms *qada wa'l qadar* (the doctrine of divine decree and predestination) have been confused, misused, and abused by those in power throughout Islamic history. Although the Qur'an contains both the idea of predestination in terms of fate, the term of life, food, and even one's salvation and human responsibility,<sup>619</sup> since the Qur'anic verses were not approached in its totality, this concept, unfortunately, has been misunderstood by the majority of Muslims throughout the Islamic history and even today. Thus, while some groups called *Jabriyya* defended God's complete control rejecting completely human responsibility, the other group called *Qadariya* stressed only human responsibility. However, while the Qur'an talks about both God's control over the affairs of persons, and free will, in later times especially during the Umayyah period (661-750), people began to believe that life was completely fated—that it was out of their hands.<sup>620</sup> Why did this happen?

In order to maintain obedience among the people and to conceal their injustices and tyrannies towards the people, the Umayyah (660-750 B.C.) fabricated the idea of predestination, which was

already prevalent among the Arab tribes before the advent of Islam. That position continued to the present to be propounded by many leaders and oppressor groups. In the words of Roger Garaudy, "It [the belief in predestination] was necessary to draw from 'tradition' a doctrine affirming that Allah had decreed from all eternity that these people should obey; that their turpitude and crimes were part of a destiny ordained by Allah."<sup>621</sup> Rahman argued the same thing, saying: "This idea, pre-determinism, was propagated by the Ash'arite school of theology, pantheistic Sufism, and above all by the strong fatalistic doctrine of the Iranians, the echoes of which are still heard in Muslim countries."<sup>622</sup> W. Montgomery Watt supports the same interpretation. He argues that pre-Islamic Arabs strongly believed that much of human life, especially misfortunes, is predetermined. Especially they believed that a person's time of birth or death was determined. If he was destined to die on a certain day he would die then, no matter what he did. In the same way, according to their belief, a person's "provision," or "substance," that is food, was believed also to be determined. According to Watt, this fatalistic attitude helped the nomads to survive in the harsh conditions of desert life. While persons in more settled communities achieved regulation of nature, nomadic peoples faced irregularities which produced anxieties relieved by a fatalistic worldview.<sup>623</sup>

Advocacy of blind obedience to rulers, belief that human beings are powerless, because life is predestined, and to conviction that whatever happens, bad or good, comes from Allah, continue up to the present among many Muslim people.

Such a worldview has been used often by those in power to keep the common people quiescent and subservient even in this century. Javaid Saeed points out that in the aftermath of Egypt's defeat in the 1967 war with Israel, the president of the country proclaimed that "Precaution is useless against fate."<sup>624</sup> Thus God was made responsible, in effect, for Egypt's defeat. Second, a famous Egyptian writer, Taha Husayn, explains that the traditional way of thinking in Egypt is threatened with fatalism and determinism. He wrote: "People accept socio-economic miseries as 'an expression of the divine will' and disregard social, economic, and political causes."<sup>625</sup> Saeed says that 100 percent of Pakistani peasants believe that fate is decided by God. Since they accept pervasive fatalism and dependence on God, the landlords who are dominant in the social and political arena easily abuse these people.<sup>626</sup>

Another theological source of injustice and tyranny, as mentioned before, is the belief that one is to obey those in authority whatever they do. The following verse has been the tool of these tyrannical rulers throughout Islamic history and even today: "O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Messenger, and those charged with authority among you."<sup>627</sup>

Riffat Hassan writes regarding this misunderstood and mostly abused issue:

For hundreds of years now, Muslims have been taught that they were created to serve God by obeying those in authority over them and by enduring with patience whatever God willed for them. For hundreds of years, Muslim masses have patiently endured the grinding poverty and oppression imposed on them by those in authority. Not to be enslaved by foreign invaders whose every attempt to subjugate them was met with resistance, Muslim masses were enslaved by Muslims in the name of God and the Prophet, made to believe that they had no rights, only responsibilities; that God was the God of Retribution, not of Love; that Islam was an ethic of suffering, not of joyous living; that they were determined by "*Qismat*," not masters of their own fate.<sup>628</sup>

A closer examination of the Qur'anic teaching precludes this kind of absolute fatalism. As Reza Nasr points out, "Islam encourages hard work in tandem with a belief in the supremacy of the will of God in the outcomes of events."<sup>629</sup> Therefore, *tawakkul* (relying on God) is not fatalism, but the result of emphasizing the predominant role of the will of God in the affairs of the world. Absolute determinism and fatalism are contradictory to Qur'anic teaching. Rahman argued that "To advocate that the Qur'an suggests absolute determinism of human behavior, denying an individual free choice, is not only to deny almost the entire content of the Qur'an, but also to undercut its very basis."<sup>630</sup>

Contrary to the absolute determinism of human behavior, the Qur'an requires a balanced individual and social responsibility. The Qur'an makes it abundantly clear that human creation is not in vain but purposeful.<sup>631</sup> Therefore, the Qur'an proclaims that human actions are accountable. In so far as human actions are concerned, as Rahman pointed out, "the Qur'an is so action-oriented and so emphasizes the accountability of human actions that, for example, it insists that 'last minute' declarations of faith and pleas for forgiveness are absolutely rejected."<sup>632</sup> This was also emphasized by the Prophet Muhammad who said: "A person will not be able to move on the Day of Judgment until he has been asked four questions: about his knowledge, how much he acted upon it; about his time, how he used it; about his wealth, how he acquired it and where he spent it; and about his body, how he exhausted it."<sup>633</sup>

Furthermore, the Qur'an demands not only individual responsibility but also communal or social responsibility. As a matter of fact, Islam is not established on the basis of individualism, but on the basis of the group (*jama'at*) concept. Thinking of other members of the community is one of the main objectives of Islam. Because of that Muslims, as Abdul Rahman Salih Abdullah points out, in their daily prayers call upon Allah saying, at least seventeen times: "Show us the Straight Way." It is *usus* not *me* which is repeated in the daily prayers of the Muslims.<sup>634</sup>

The Prophet speaks of social responsibility: "If any one of you comes across an evil, he should try to stop it with his hand [using force], if he is not in a position to stop it with his hand then he should try to stop it by means of his tongue [meaning he should speak against it]. If he is not even able to use his tongue then he should at least condemn it in his heart. This is the weakest degree of faith."<sup>635</sup>

Again, emphasizing the importance of social responsibility, the Prophet gives the following metaphor:

Verily some people travelled in a ship, and they were partners, of whom, each one had his own place. One man among them struck his place with an axe, and the remainder said to him, "What are you doing?" He said, "This is my place, and I can do what I wish in it! Then if they restrain him, he and they are safe; but if they let him be, he and they all perish."<sup>636</sup>

Therefore, when the Qur'an describes the Islamic community as the best community that had been evolved for human beings, its goodness and supremacy are not just due to being Muslim, but because of the mission they must perform towards others. The Qur'an says: "Ye are the best of Peoples, evolved for mankind. Enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong, and believing in Allah."<sup>637</sup> Mawdudi explains this verse as follows: "This means that it is the obligation and duty of the entire Muslim community that it should invite and enjoin people to righteousness and virtue and forbid them from doing evil."<sup>638</sup> However, if the whole Muslim community cannot perform this duty, then at least a group of people should do this job. The Qur'an says: "Let there arise out

of you a band of people inviting to all that is good, enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: they are the ones to attain felicity."<sup>639</sup> Thus, enjoining what is good and forbidding what is wrong in society is not merely a duty of a believer, but is the basic characteristic of every Muslim. The Qur'an has described the quality of the faithful in the following words: "The believers, men and women, are protectors, one of another: they enjoin what is just, and forbid what is evil."<sup>640</sup> In contrast, it has described the character of a hypocrite as follows: "The hypocrites, men and women, are alike: they enjoin evil, and forbid what is just, and tighten their purse's strings."<sup>641</sup>

Thus, a Muslim can neither make God responsible for unfortunate things resulting from his own actions, nor escape from individual responsibility, nor violate his rights at the expense of others. This is the case not only in interpersonal relations, but also in the spheres of economics and politics. According to Qur'anic teaching, not only the individual who loves luxury and wasteful spending will suffer destruction and punishment, but also the community which permits the existence of such persons will be similarly affected.<sup>642</sup>

More importantly, this prescription for enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong and evil is to be the duty and characteristic not only of an individual Muslim, but also of the state itself (those who are in power). The Qur'an says: "[They are] those who, if We establish them in the land, establish regular prayer and give *zakat*, enjoin the right and forbid wrong."<sup>643</sup> Thus, if the state does not protect its people, and abuses its resources, then the people have the right to protest. According to Mawdudi, one of the most important rights that Islam has given human beings is the right to protest against tyrannical governments. Referring to the Qur'anic verse 4:148: "Allah loveth not the shouting of evil words in public speech, except by one who has been wronged," Mawdudi said:

This means that God strongly disapproves of abusive language or strong words of condemnation, but the person who has been the victim of injustice or tyranny, God gives him the right to openly protest against the injury that has been done to him. This right is not limited only to individuals. The words of the verse are general. Therefore if an individual or a group of people or a party usurps power, and after assuming the reins of authority begins to tyrannize individuals or groups of men or the entire population of the country, then to raise the voice of protest against it openly is the God-given right of man and no one has the authority to usurp or deny this right.<sup>644</sup>

In the same way, the Universal Islamic declaration states that:

The *Ummah* is not expected to be a passive spectator of human exploitation, nor of the perpetration of tyranny and injustice. It is called upon to organize itself in the form of a movement for social change and reconstruction, and to come forward to help the oppressed and the persecuted of the world. Islam exhorts the believers to strive incessantly to establish Allah's will on earth. It makes it obligatory on all Muslims to struggle against every obstacle that stands in the way of achieving this goal. This effort is known as *Jihad*.<sup>645</sup>

Overall it can be said that if Muslims live in abject poverty and are victims of violence, injustices and tyranny, this is not because Allah wants it so, but because they do not do what they have to do. Thus, in order to have a humane life and to stop injustices, tyranny, and all other social evils which mostly affect the poor people, everyone should take his or her responsibility.

Otherwise, as Toton warns us, "The economic, political and social structures and systems that oppress will continue to do so as long as we are ignorant of them, treat them as given, and do nothing to stop them."<sup>646</sup> With a correct understanding of the idea of destiny and human responsibility, Muslims must search the reasons for their backwardness and poverty not outside of themselves or in God, but within themselves. God says: "Verily never will Allah change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves."<sup>647</sup>

## **A Correct Understanding of Development**

As we saw above, Islam gives great importance to the issue of economic development and the fulfilment of all peoples' basic needs, regardless of their color, sex, nationality, and religion. In order to fulfil two of the five pillars of Islam, *zakat* and pilgrimage, Muslims must be as wealthy as possible. For this purpose Islam has put forth both positive and prohibitive measures.

Islam urges Muslims to work hard and to be rich. Today Islamic countries produce about 56 percent of the world's oil exports, 37 percent of natural gas, 80 percent of jute, 70 percent of rubber, 75 percent of palm oil, 25 percent of food grain, 13 percent of cotton and 10 percent of sugar cane.<sup>648</sup> With wealth derived from these high levels of production why do so many persons in Muslim countries suffer from abject poverty? Many reasons can be given.<sup>649</sup> However, since my aim is not to elaborate the reasons for the backwardness of Islamic countries and their peoples, I will focus only on some points concerning war, peace, and justice.

First, one of the most effective obstacles to development in certain Islamic countries is excessive military spending. Although many factors affect the development of a country and lead to an unjust economic and social order, the most important factor is excessive military expenditures. As seen earlier, the biggest portion of these countries' GNPs has gone to militarization, which retards their real development. Although there is an important reduction in arms races in some Islamic countries compared to the 1970s and 1980s, they still spend a huge amount of money for the purpose of militarization. For example, during the 1990s, while Iraq, Jordan, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Yemen, Brunei, and Pakistan spent only an average of five percent of their GNPs for education and less than two percent for health, they spent for militarization between ten to twenty-seven percent of their GNPs. Furthermore, if we add the costs of wars that have occurred between Islamic countries to this excessive and expensive militarization, it is not difficult to see militarization's adverse effect on these countries' development.

The following two examples also support this point.

All Muslim economists concur that there will be no abject poverty, if *zakat*, the cornerstone of the Islamic economic system, is collected and delivered according to the Qur'anic imperative. The reality is otherwise. Zarqa provides data on two countries, namely Syria and Sudan, to indicate the impact of *zakat* on the poor. In his evaluation, the *zakat* yield reached about 3 percent of the gross domestic product in Syria during 1971 and 3.6 percent in Sudan during 1982. Potentially *zakat* may amount to an average of 3 to 3.5 percent of national income each year.<sup>650</sup> Since the ratio of *zakat* is generally 2.5 percent of income, whether a country is rich or poor, the result would be the same. How can poverty be eradicated by this 3 percent of GNP collected through *zakat* in Islamic countries? Most of the population will remain poor so long as from 3 to 25 percent of these countries' income goes to military spending.

Therefore, the first and foremost requirement for development in all Islamic countries is to reduce military spending and, of course, to ensure peace within and among them. Moreover, peace

will not only affect these countries' economies, but also will bring justice among the people. Without peace it is impossible to reach a just social order. Muslim and non-Muslim thinkers alike agree that peace and justice cannot be separated from each other. Hassan points out that "justice is a prerequisite for peace, and peace is a prerequisite for human development."<sup>651</sup> Khadduri, another Muslim scholar, writes concerning the relationship between peace and justice:

Peace and justice seem to have been the two fundamental objectives of nations which sought to provide mankind with a public order regulating the relationship among nations, whether on the regional or global plane. Since no public order can endure indefinitely unless relative peace is established, peace may be said to have been the overriding objective. But any public order devoid of justice tends to breed tensions and conflicts, and therefore would undermine and ultimately destroy the foundation on which peace is established. It is thus tempting to argue that justice is the key to a lasting peace and that peace and justice cannot be completely separated.<sup>652</sup>

In the same way, John B. Cobb points out: "If we think deeply enough about the meaning of justice, we will find that there can be no justice without peace. And if we think deeply enough about the meaning of peace, we will find that there can be no peace without justice."<sup>653</sup> Thus justice includes peace, and peace includes justice.

Second, real development is not only material, but also spiritual development. According to Islamic understanding, real development is more than material development in science and technology, military, and economics. A genuine development is both material and spiritual. From this perspective the West is not necessarily *developed*, nor is the Muslim world *backward, undeveloped* or *underdeveloped*. As Reza Nasr points out, "Economic development must be part of the larger concept of Human Development . . . an integrated part of moral and socio-economic development of human society." By the same token, "Development in Islam cannot be measured only through social or economic criteria, but requires standards of judgment that would account for the spiritual as well as the material welfare of society."<sup>654</sup> In fact, as Saeed says, "The two go hand in hand and provide the opportunity to further enhance each other."<sup>655</sup>

Third, Islam is not against development. Religion does not play a part only in concerns of war and peace; it also profoundly impacts social and economic development. Samuel S. Cohen elaborates on the role of religion in development as follows:

Religion has been the axis on which civilization has turned. It has built empires and it has also torn them down. In its purity it has been the torchbearer and the vanguard of progress, the inspiration of the arts and science, and the life breath of morality. When put into the service of bigotry, religion has been the scourge of humanity, the stumbling block of science, and the death knell of searching intellect.<sup>656</sup>

Cohen's thesis, I believe, is also valid, for in Islam. When they have followed their religion fully Muslims have established brilliant civilizations. However, when they applied it partially they began to move backward. Noting the backwardness in science and technology of many Muslim countries during the past two centuries, some Orientalists at first insinuated that Islam is the real cause of such underdevelopment, and is against science and technology. Some Muslim thinkers began to follow these Orientalists' views.<sup>657</sup> However, as we saw above, the Qur'an is as much concerned with the welfare of persons in this world as with their salvation in the Hereafter. In

Islam can be found effective guidelines for eradicating poverty and achieving an equitable distribution of income and wealth.<sup>658</sup>

Fourth, development requires cooperation between and among Muslim countries as well as with other countries. Siddiqi argues that poorer Muslim countries can solve their economic problems more readily if assisted by the richer Muslim countries. He writes: "Cooperation among all Muslim countries in a region and between the rich and the poor ones at the international level is required to implement these [development] programs and to shorten the period of time within which need fulfilment can be ensured at the global level."<sup>659</sup> Muslim countries can help each other through grants, interest-free credits, job opportunities, technical assistance, joint projects for military research, development, and building up their own defense system as well as increased trade. However, all trade between Muslim countries accounts for only six percent, the remaining 94 percent of trade are done with non-Muslim countries.<sup>660</sup>

Cooperation is a Qur'anic imperative. The Qur'an says: "Help ye one another in righteousness and piety, but help ye not one another in sin and rancor."<sup>661</sup> In another verse Allah says: "The believers, men and women, are protectors, one of another: they enjoin what is just, and forbid what is evil."<sup>662</sup> Thus, Saeed concludes, "A Muslim society's failure in the material sphere is proof of its failure in the understanding and application of the Qur'anic doctrine. Such a society, on the terms of the Qur'an, can hardly be designated as Islamic."<sup>663</sup>

Fifth, per capita income is not a real indicator of a country's development. Saeed suggests that "The important question to be asked is how the national product is used, that is, who has benefited."<sup>664</sup> To decide whether a country is developed or underdeveloped we should keep in mind at least two things: at the national level we should look not only at the total GNP of that country, but also at the distribution of income among the people. Dudley Seers argues that we should ask the following questions in evaluating development:

What has happened to poverty? What has been happening to unemployment? What has been happening to inequality? If all three have declined from high levels, then beyond doubt this has been a period of development for the country concerned. If one of two of these central problems have been growing worse, especially if all three have, it would be strange to call the result "development," even if per capita income doubled.<sup>665</sup>

On the other hand, on the international level, we should take into consideration whether that country is a *being for itself*. Freire writes:

In order to determine whether or not a society is developing, one must go beyond criteria based on indices of "per capita" income (which, expressed in statistical form, are misleading) as well as those which concentrate on the study of gross income. The basic, elementary criterion is whether or not the society is a "being for itself." If it is not, the other criteria indicate modernization rather than development.<sup>666</sup>

Thus, according to Freire, if a country is not a *being for itself*, that is, if it is not independent in a true sense socially, economically, and politically, and it does not have its own political, economic, and cultural decision-making power, whatever that country's per capita is, it is not a developed country.<sup>667</sup>

## Conclusions

Economic justice with social justice is one of the main objectives of Islam. The Qur'an does not allow only a few people to hold economic power in the society. In the sight of God everyone is valuable and the vice-regent of God in the universe despite some economic inequalities due to differing abilities. Therefore, in order to supply every individual a decent and humane standard of life, the Qur'an sanctions some unique economic regulations. First of all, it encourages its followers to use and utilize the resources given by God as free gifts through investigation, hard work, and other economic activities. However, to protect the poor and the needy the Qur'an includes positive provisions including the duty of paying zakat, voluntary spending, and inheritance rules. It also includes prohibitive measures such as the prohibitions of usury, unlawful business transactions, and wasteful expenditures. All these injunctions in themselves assure that the poor and the needy will have the basic necessities of life. If all these economic and moral obligations do not provide the needs of the poor in society, to provide them the state has been given certain rights and responsibilities.

Islamic social and economic systems are in principle neither capitalistic nor socialistic. Instead, a welfare state is preferred in which basic needs of all members of the community are met. Such a state is to be based on Islamic values and guided by Muslim goals. It should give great importance to issues of morality in all economic and social activities.

Regarding the economic development of Muslim countries it should be kept in mind that if Muslims are backward in science, technology, and material progress, this is not because of Islam, but because of their failure to understanding Qur'anic teachings and to apply them to their daily lives. In this context, Muslims should have a correct understanding of God's action and their own responsibility. Instead of accusing their own fates, they should work harder, and use sources appropriately.

## Part III: Education for Peace and Justice

So far, we have traced the urgency of education for peace and justice globally, contemporary Muslim views of war and peace, and the Islamic understanding of socio-economic justice. However, we have not talked about the educational aspect of peace and justice which is a major focus of this study. Thus Part Three is devoted to education for peace and justice.

Part three consists of six sections: Section one begins to sort out the concepts of peace and justice education. It includes definitions of peace, justice, and peace education. Section two examines the purpose and the learning goals of peace education. Section three focuses on the history of peace education in some countries such as the United States of America, Canada, Japan, Britain and Muslim world. Section four discusses the possibility of education for peace and justice. In this section, I have argued the possibility of education for peace and justice in Muslim countries, the current educational systems prevailing in Muslim countries. Section five focuses on the teaching methods for peace and justice education. Lastly, in section six, I have developed a model course plan for peace and justice education for departments of religious studies in Muslim countries.

### The Definition of Peace and Justice Education

Like definitions in other academic disciplines, such as philosophy, religion, education, and psychology, no one definition of peace and justice education is accepted by everyone. Scholars tend to define education for peace and justice from different angles such as religion, politics, economics, psychology, sociology or education. However, some common principles concerning education for peace and justice are approved by most scholars.

Before giving a definition of peace and justice education, let us look at the definitions of such key terms as peace and justice. Many people define peace as *the absence of war*. This is sometimes referred to as *negative peace*.<sup>668</sup> In the words of M.V. Naidu, "Negative peace is the absence of physical violence that destroys human life or that creates disabilities that deny the enjoyment of life."<sup>669</sup> However, to many, peace is more than the absence of war or the absence of physical violence. It is also a positive process of people working to achieve positive goals.<sup>670</sup> This other type is *positive peace*. According to Betty A. Reardon, positive peace refers "to a set of positive, humane conditions that make up a preferred reality in which the causes of war have been overcome and the bases of security and comity have been established."<sup>671</sup> Marrio Borelli gives another important definition of peace as, "the results in any given society of equality of rights, by which every member of that society participates equally in decisional power which regulates it, and the distribution of the resources which sustain it."<sup>672</sup> Birgit Brock Utne adds the concept of nonviolence to Borelli's definition:

By peace we mean the absence of violence in any given society, both internal and external, direct and indirect. We further mean the nonviolent results of equality of rights, by which every member of that society, through nonviolent means, participates equally in the decisional power which regulates it, and the distribution of the resources which sustain it.<sup>673</sup>

From all these definitions of peace, we can conclude that peace is the absence not only of war or violence, but also of the following conditions: malnutrition, extreme poverty, social and economic injustice, discrimination, structural violence, oppression, exploitation, and the refusal of the basic human rights to food, shelter, education, health, and political participation. Negative peace alone does not make it possible for people to realize self-actualization and human dignity. In addition to the absence of all those conditions, peace is a process of progress of socio-economic justice, mutual respect, and equality of human rights to food, shelter, education, health, and political participation among the peoples. In brief, in the words of Naidu, it is "the opportunity for self-actualization which is the highest level of human needs."<sup>674</sup>

The other significant part of education for peace is, of course, *justice*. Like the definition of peace there no one definition of justice is accepted by all scholars and theorists. This is due to the breadth of the concept of justice, for it includes political, economic, social, theological, philosophical, and legal aspects of justice. That is why *justice* has been one of the leading themes in philosophy and ethics since such ancient philosophers as Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. What is justice? Is it fairness, equal treatment, "receiving one's due" or merit? These are perennial questions.

Every theorist or group has defined justice in accord with its own worldview. For example, libertarians define justice in terms of liberty, socialists understand justice in terms of equality, and communists see justice in terms of the common good.<sup>675</sup>

Just as there are different definitions of justice, so also there are different standards of reference. The first is the importance of having equal treatment before the law. Persons in a legal case to be treated equally and impartially regardless of their nationality, religion, sex, origin, language, race, and social status. Justice understood in this way is the correct application of law, so that arbitrariness and favoritism will be avoided.

The second standard of reference for justice is the sense of having one's fair share. Those who define justice in this way claim that there should be an equity in distribution of material goods wherever there is equity between persons themselves. Equal persons should receive equal shares, and unequal persons receive unequal shares. In other words, "to each according to his or her deserts."

The third standard of reference for justice is that of basic human needs. Those who define justice in this way claim that everyone in society has merit and should benefit equally from the common good, regardless of his or her physical or intellectual ability. In other words, "to each according to his or her needs."<sup>676</sup>

What should be noted here is that although each theory defines justice in a different way, all of them talk about justice as a positive value—liberty, equality, merit, opportunity, basic needs, and common good.

In as much as the terms *peace* and *justice* each have a variety of definitions, it is to be accepted that *education for peace and justice* (sometimes called peace education)<sup>677</sup> will also be defined in a variety of ways. For example, Utne defines peace education as "a social process through which peace is achieved."<sup>678</sup> Another definition given by Reardon is almost the same. For Reardon, peace education is "learning intended to prepare the learners to contribute toward the achievement of peace."<sup>679</sup> While these two brief statements indicate just the definition and the purpose of peace education, that of Nancy Shelley includes both a broad definition and a description of peace education. She writes:

Peace education is concerned with: respect for persons, personal relationships, conflict resolution, social justice, sharing the world's resources, cooperation and community. Peace education deals with oppression, sexism, racism, injustice and a recognition that violence has to do with power. Peace education involves a radical approach to curriculum, the structure of schools and the personal relationships within schools. Peace education is concerned for the planet, the environment and the connectedness of humans to other life. Peace education will make a study of war and its causes; will consider alternative ways of dealing with conflict, developing the machinery for resolving conflict internationally, nationally, and personally. Peace education is not confined to schools but involves the community as it moves to affect the whole of society.<sup>680</sup>

In short, education for peace and justice, in the words of Joseph J. Fahey, "is academic in nature, multi-disciplinary in method, global in perspective, and oriented toward action that is intelligent, constructive, and creative."<sup>681</sup>

As we have seen, peace education includes a wide range of subjects. They may include any or all of the following:

- . war (its causes and results), armament control and disarmament, dangers of nuclearization of weapons and industries;
- . negative consequences of militarization in terms of economics, politics and psychology;
- . harmful consequences of ecological destruction;
- . evils of colonialism;
- . inhumanity of structural violence such as the deprivation of the basic necessities of life (food, shelter, clothing, medical care, and education), the denial of political freedoms and rights that usually determine all other aspects of life;
  - . social justice, social change, and economic welfare;
  - . philosophy and methodology of nonviolence;
  - . crises of industrialization and developmentalism; and
  - . the helpful roles of some international organizations.<sup>682</sup>

### **Purpose and Learning Goals of Peace Education**

The purpose of peace education, according to Reardon, is "to provide knowledge and skills, as well as capacities and commitment, to overcome obstacles to peace, and to build a global community which encompasses the entire human family and accords equal value and full dignity to all human beings."<sup>683</sup> Another peace educator, T. B. Monez, describes the purpose of peace education in this way: "Its basic purpose is to help students design strategies of action which can contribute to the shaping of a world order characterized by social justice and absence of exploitation."<sup>684</sup>

Some peace educators define the purpose of peace education as a *humane world society* or *human world order* through education for authentic security. Most peace educators believe that true security can only be found in community. The achievement of security and community requires an understanding of the major obstacles to peace and barriers against security.<sup>685</sup> The ultimate aim of peace education, in the words of Suzanne C. Toton, is "to create a world of justice, peace and love—to remove whatever breeds oppression, be it personal,

structural, or systematic. It also aims to build structures that foster unity of people with people and people with God."686

For peace education, we suggest the following questions:

- . What is the present state of the world with regard to peace, economic welfare, social justice, political participation, and ecological balance?
- . If we make no significant changes in the international system, what is the state likely to be in the next generation?
- . If that state is, as most trend analyses indicate, not one likely to achieve peace and the other related world-order goals, what changes in the system would be most likely to do so?
- . How can we bring about those changes?

From our review of the purposes and the learning goals of peace education, we can conclude that its main purposes and learning goals are to awaken a critical sense which will lead people to reflect on the society in which they live and on its values, and to renounce or change those values when they cease to promote peace and justice for all.

## **History of Peace Education**

Although the origins of peace education are as ancient as humankind itself, only in this century with its two world wars has the subject become a systematic focus of attention. The first nuclear bomb used against Japan and the threat of nuclear weapons have been turning points in the field of peace education. That is why peace education began first in the United States, Canada, some European countries, and Japan. Let us trace its development there.

### *Peace Education in the United States*

Reardon divides the development of peace education in the United States from 1945 to the present into four historical periods as follows:

**1945-1955:** Much of the impetus for peace education came from the experience of two world wars. In this decade, peace education focused on the United Nations and how it could promote international cooperation and peace.<sup>687</sup> Manchester College in Indiana offered the first peace studies major at the university level in 1948.<sup>688</sup> It was entitled *education for world citizenship*, and later split into two separate areas: education for international politics, and education for international cooperation and peace.

**1955-1965:** Peace education was very limited during this period. Major energies of the peace movement were directed toward the growing dangers posed by nuclear weapons of mass destruction, with efforts to "ban the bomb" as a first step toward general and complete disarmament.

**1965-1975:** With the signing of the Test Ban Treaty in 1963, and the emergence of the Vietnam War, a new phase began for peace education. In 1966, an interdisciplinary course was established in the history department at Manhattanville College (in New York City) entitled "The Anatomy of Peace." This course was team taught by a historian, a biologist, an economist, and a theologian. Two years later, seven independent courses were added in peace studies along with a continued interdisciplinary analysis.<sup>689</sup>

The major focus of peace education during this period was on the ethical aspects of war, particularly the justness of war. There was renewed interest in exploring the just war theory, the individual rights and responsibilities of persons in combat, and the humane and inhumane ways of conducting warfare. Peace education became most acutely concerned with issues of structural injustice and institutional violence, especially in relationships between developed nations and their former colonies, the so-called *developing nations*. A significant development of this period was the document issued by the 1974 sessions of the General Conference of UNESCO - *The Recommendation on Education for International Understanding, Cooperation, and Peace and Education Regarding Human Rights and Fundamental Freedom*.<sup>690</sup>

**1975- 1997:** In this period peace educators focused mainly on the severity of the nuclear threat and called for a world disarmament conference to begin the process of achieving general and complete disarmament. This stimulated a new phase of peace education now being called *disarmament education*. This field was formally recognized as an essential component of peace education by the World Congress on Disarmament Education, an essential component of peace education, which UNESCO organized in June, 1980. There peace educators and experts from throughout the world created a final document outlining general principles for disarmament education with specific recommendations for their fulfillment.<sup>691</sup>

In the meantime, mention should be made of the efforts of some Popes and Catholic bishops and the Presbyterian Church in terms of peace education. According to Joseph J. Fahey, Pope John XXIII's *Pacem in terris* was a turning point for peace studies. *Pacem in terris* (1963) stimulated great discussion and debate not only within the Catholic Church, but also among the world's intellectual and political leaders. In 1965 a group of world leaders gathered in New York to assess the significance of *Pacem in terris*. This stimulated a small group of Manhattanville College faculty attending this convocation to offer courses in peace studies.<sup>692</sup> They were motivated also by the Catholic bishops' letter on "The Challenge of Peace." The bishops made a specific call for research in Section II (A) (5), entitled "Efforts to Develop Non-Violent Means of Conflict Resolution." They wrote: "With Pope John Paul II, we call upon educational and research institutions to take a lead in conducting peace studies: 'Scientific studies on war, its nature, causes, means, objectives and risk have much to tell us about the conditions for peace'."<sup>693</sup> After endorsing the concept of a national academy of peace and conflict resolution they continued:

We urge universities, particularly Catholic universities, in our country to develop programs for rigorous, interdisciplinary research, education, and training directed toward peacemaking expertise. . . . No greater challenge of higher priority can of be imagined than the development and perfection a theology of peace suited to a civilization poised on the brink of self-destruction.<sup>694</sup>

In response to the letter, almost all Catholic post-secondary schools began to study its contents. Some colleges and universities, including Manhattanville College and St. Bonaventure University (both in New York City), began to offer B.A. majors in peace studies. The programs include a core of courses that cover conflict resolutions, nonviolent strategies, world order, the arms race, and social justice. Graduates are prepared for a variety of jobs in government service, public policy, and ministry.<sup>695</sup>

The same concern has been echoed in Protestant religious education circles. For instance, the Educational Ministry of the Presbyterian Church USA issued the call in a reflection paper entitled "The Movement of Faith-The Meaning of Ministry." They stated:

Authentic Christian life in contemporary society expresses such Biblical qualities of faithfulness as: justice for oppressed people, love for near and distant neighbors, preservation of basic human rights, concern for the integrity of the family, care for the world creation, responsible exercise of power, and creative action for peace across every line of hostility. A faithful teaching church will help its members learn to act responsibly in public life by cooperating with authorities and policies that serve the common good, and by standing over against unjust structure and officials.

Education ministry that is responsible to God's future enables people to undertake a pilgrimage of growth in ability to serve others, especially "the meek."<sup>696</sup>

As a result of all these efforts, overall, about 100 colleges and universities and 50 or so research institutions in the USA currently have programs dealing with five broad areas of peace and justice: peace and arms races; social, political and economic justice; conflict regulations; the philosophy and practice of nonviolence; and a just world order.<sup>697</sup>

### *Peace Education in Canada*

Establishing the basis of an academic discipline, peace researchers created a number of peace research institutes and gave impetus to the institutionalization of peace studies in several universities and institutions in Canada.<sup>698</sup> According to Naidu's survey, 163 courses on peace, or at least on peace-related subjects, have been offered at 45 Canadian universities through 12 departments/programs. Naidu has categorized the peace courses being offered in Canada into 14 subject themes: international organization, international law, international relations, militarism, peace making, religion and peace, human rights, philosophy/ideology and peace, nonviolence and peace, economics and peace, regionalism and peace, peace education, environment and peace, and culture and peace.

According to Naidu's study, most of the peace courses are being offered in five of these subject areas: international organization (36 courses out of 163), international law (30 courses), international relations (26 courses), militarism (21 courses), and peace-making (18 courses). The remaining nine themes make up less than 20 percent of course offerings, with religion providing only 11 courses.<sup>699</sup>

Peace Education in Britain and Japan Toshifumi Murakami, the term peace education was seldom used in Britain before the late 1970s. Only in the 1980s did it become widely used by the press, politicians, and teachers. In Japan, however, the term peace education has been used since 1951.

Japan and Britain differ in both historical development and content of peace education. In Britain, peace education is not only about negative peace, but also about positive peace. Teaching nuclear issues is one part, but not the only part, of the content of peace education. By contrast, learning about the Second World War and the disaster of the first atomic bomb have been the main content of peace education in Japan. However, a wider scope of peace education as education for positive peace has begun to gain importance. Aims of peace education also differ. In Britain the aim of peace education is to investigate with a balanced approach the causes of wars, conflicts, and violence and to encourage students' search for alternatives to solve them. In Japan the main purpose is to foster children's attitudes against war by passing on the experience of the last war.<sup>700</sup>

## *Peace Education in the Muslim World*

"The concept of peace education is new in the world" writes Hassan in her pioneer essay on "Peace Education: A Muslim Perspective." In her judgment, no project or course in this field exists in any contemporary Muslim society.<sup>701</sup> However, although, there is no course or project in this field in any Muslim country, there are some theoretical developments in this area. The example of this is the First, Second, and Third world conferences on Islamic education, held in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in 1977, in Islamabad in 1980, and in Dacca in 1981, respectively. In addition, peace is a central theme in the Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights prepared by the Islamic Council of Europe in 1980.

Some of the most important developments in Muslim peace education took place at world conferences on Islamic education. The First World Conference on Islamic Education was organized by King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, Mecca and held at Mecca from March 31 to April 8, 1977. The main purposes of this conference were to study and analyze the basic problems in Muslim education, to state its aims and objectives, and to recommend methods of implementing them. 14 committees deliberated on 14 different topics. Muslim scholars from different parts of the world worked together. At the close the Muslim scholars and the heads of Muslim states in attendance made the following statement on Islamization of curricula and mass media:

Believing in the need to propagate the principles of Islam and the spread of its cultural glory throughout the Islamic societies in the world as a whole and to emphasize its rich heritage, its spiritual strength, moral values and laws conducive to progress, justice and prosperity, we are determined to cooperate to provide the human and material means to achieve those objectives.<sup>702</sup>

They all accepted the following statement on the aim of Islamic education:

Education should aim at the balanced growth of the total personality of Man through the training of Man's spirit, intellect, rational self, feelings and bodily senses. The training imparted to a Muslim must be such that faith is infused into the whole of his personality and creates in him as emotional attachment to Islam and enables him to follow the Qur'an and the Sunna and be governed by the Islamic system of values willingly and joyfully so that he may proceed to the realization of his status as Khalifatullah to whom Allah has promised the authority of the Universe; . . . Education should promote in man the creative impulse to rule himself and the universe as a true servant of Allah not by opposing and coming into conflict with Nature but by understanding its laws and harnessing its forces for the growth of a personality that is in harmony with it.<sup>703</sup>

The Second World Conference on Islamic Education focused on curricula for primary, secondary, and university education. This conference was held in March 1980 in Islamabad, Pakistan. It was organized by Qaid-I Azam University in co-operation with King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, with the full co-operation and support of the Ministry of Education of the Government of Pakistan. At this conference, Muslim scholars classified knowledge into perennial and acquired categories. They agreed that an Islamic civilization course covering economic, social life, war, and peace should be taught at the university level in all Islamic

countries. They concluded: "All the above branches of acquired sciences should be taught from the Islamic point of view; Islamic School of Thought should be established in all branches of social studies."<sup>704</sup> They considered it to be imperative, that departments, institutes, and centers be established for studies, research, and publications on Islamic philosophy, history and sociology of science and technology for development, and that Islamic ethics and values be taught in science and technology courses.<sup>705</sup>

The Third World Conference on Islamic Education was held in March 1981 in Dacca. It was organized by the Institute of Islamic Education and Research (IIER), and set up by the Bangladesh Government at the request of King Abdulaziz University. Muslim scholars, in the section on aims of secondary education, behavioral objectives, stated:

Students will not only follow the rules and regulations of Sharia regarding the fundamentals of Islam with a sense of duty and reverence. They will also follow all rules of conduct in society, develop a sense of mutual love and respect for other races and colors (no. 2).

Students will know all basic rules of social behavior, be sociable, humane and kind but firm in their commitment to righteousness and piety. They will also have a sense of wonder and love for external nature and all living creatures, great and small and thus resist the forces that disrupt society and destroy external nature (no.6).

In the section of aims on secondary education, they stated that students should have an insight into the natural environment. They should acquire the habit and love of living in harmony with external nature. They should also be taught to redirect science and technology for better human relationships and preservation of nature as desired by Islam (no. 6).<sup>706</sup>

As a result of these Islamic conferences on Islamic education, some Muslim countries began to include these objectives in their educational settings. For example, the Ministry of Education of Malaysia in 1982 stated one of its goals for Malaysian education as follows:

To promote international peace and understanding in the individual through the study of other nations from geographical, historical, sociological, economic, and political perspectives and their relationship with Malaysia. To sensitize individuals to issues confronting human-kind and develop in them understanding and appreciation of international effort towards peace and cooperation.<sup>707</sup>

In addition to these efforts and attempts taken by Muslim scholars at the World Conferences on Islamic Education, the 1980 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights also gave great importance and emphasis to issues of Muslim peace education. The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights was prepared on the initiative of the Islamic Council of Europe and its secretary general, Salem Azzam, in 1980. According to Arkoun, this Declaration was a response to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The authors felt that leaders in the West always had a tendency to exclude Islamic views when declarations of human rights were conceived, proclaimed, and interpreted. The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights was a response to that exclusion. Eminent scholars, Muslim jurists, and representatives of various Islamic movements prepared the text. They came together from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and other countries under the auspices of the Islamic Council of Europe. The Declaration contains 23 articles based on verses of the Qur'an or on selections from official Sunni compilations of *hadith*. No reference is made to the canonic corpus of Shi'i *hadith*.<sup>708</sup>

The following excerpts are drawn from this Declaration.

### *Economic Policy and Socio-economic Justice*

The 1980 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights stated that the Islamic economic system is based on social justice, equity, moderation, and balanced relationships. It is a universal system embodying both worldly and eternal values. While it forbids all forms of exploitation, it honors labor and encourages persons to earn their living by honest means, and to spend their earnings in rational ways. The following statements indicate these objectives:

Islam urges the believers actively to pursue, acquire and advance knowledge and fully approves the intuitive, rational and empirical methods of so doing. It confers on all human beings the right to an honorable life, freedom of worship, expression, movement and thought and the guaranteed right to retain legitimately acquired wealth.

Establishment of justice on earth is one of the basic objectives for which Allah sent His prophets and His guidance (*Al-Qur'an, Al Hadid 57:25*). All human beings have the rights upon all that Allah has provided, and as such Allah's bounties are to be shared equitably. The poor and the needy have the right to share in the wealth of the rich (*Al-Qur'an, Adh Dhariyat, 51:19*). It is the religious duty of Muslims to harness these resources to serve the ends of justice, to promote goodness and virtue, and to eliminate evil and vice (*Al-Qur'an, Al Imran 3:110*). Allah's resources must not be allowed to become instruments of oppression and exploitation by any individual or section of society or state.<sup>709</sup>

After stating the objectives of an Islamic economic system, the Declaration outlined the basic features of that system as follows:

- a) All natural resources are a trust (*Amanah*) from Allah and man is individually and collectively custodian (*Mustakhlif*) of these resources. Man's economic effort and its reward are determined within the context of this framework of trust.
- b) Wealth must be acquired through effort and by lawful means. It should be saved, retained and used only in ways approved by Allah and His Prophet.
- c) Wealth should be justly distributed. When personal wealth has satisfied the legitimate needs of its owner, the surplus is required to satisfy the needs of others.
- d) All resources available to man in general and to the *Ummah* in particular, must always be put to optimum use; no one has the right to hoard them or to keep them idle, or to squander them or to use them for wanton display, be it the individual, the community or the state.
- e) Development is an essential requirement, and participation in economic activity is obligatory on every Muslim. He must labor hard, and always seek to produce more than is necessary for his personal needs, because then alone would he be able to participate in the process of *Zakah* and to contribute to the well-being of others.
- f) Every worker is entitled to a fair recompense for his or her work. There must be no discrimination based on race, color, religion, or sex.
- g) The procurement of wealth and the production of goods must be lawful in terms of the *Sharia*. Usury (*Riba*), gambling, hoarding, etc. are forbidden sources of income.

h) The principles of equality and brotherhood require the just sharing of resources in prosperity as well as in adversity. *Zakah, Sadaqat, Al' Awf*, and inheritance are some of the means for the equitable distribution of wealth and resources in society.

I) Persons incapable of looking after their own needs, owing to permanent or temporary incapacity, have a just call upon the wealth of society. They are the responsibility of society which must ensure a supply of basic necessities of food, clothing, shelter, education, and health care to all, irrespective of age, sex, color, or religion.

j) The economic power of the *Ummah* shall be structured in such a way that there is cooperation and sharing within the *Ummah* and maximum self-reliance therein.<sup>710</sup>

### *Defense Policy*

The Declaration accepted the defense of Islam and Muslim lands as the sacred duty of all Muslims. While Islam stands for justice, it also enjoins Muslims to be ever ready to deter and repulse aggression. To fulfil this duty, the Muslim countries should:

- a) Develop their defense potentials to the maximum;
- b) Strive for the earliest achievement of self-sufficiency in defense production; .
- c) Establish the closest possible co-operation in every field of defense activity; and
- d) Consider aggression against any Muslim country as aggression against the entire Muslim world.<sup>711</sup>

### *Educational Policy*

The Declaration stressed that education is an important corner stone of the Islamic system. Pursuit of knowledge is obligatory for all Muslims. It stated some of the basic principles of Islamic educational policy as follows:

- a) There shall be universal basic education for all men and women in society, and adequate national resources shall be made available for this purpose.
- b) The purpose of education shall be to produce people who are imbued with Islamic learning and character and are capable of meeting all the economic, social, political, technological, physical, intellectual and aesthetic needs of society.
- c) The two parallel streams of secular and religious education prevailing today in the Muslim World should be fused together so as to provide an Islamic vision for those engaged in education, and to enable them to reconstruct human thought, in all its forms, on the foundations of Islam.<sup>712</sup>

### *The Role of the State*

According to the Declaration, the primary duties of the state are to establish justice in all spheres of life, and to nurture and strengthen the unity of the Islamic community. It also stated that these objectives can only be achieved when the just expectations of people are fulfilled, and differences in rank, power, wealth, and family ties are not permitted to undermine the socio-political process of Islam.<sup>713</sup>

The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights sets clear objectives in almost all aspects of peace education. The challenge will be to put these objectives set by this Declaration into practice in the real lives of Muslims.

### **The Possibility of Education for Peace and Justice**

Although religion on the one hand, can be used to sanction war or conflicts within and among the nations, on the other hand, it offers positive goals for peace and justice. All the great world religions promote justice, love of humanity, human cooperation and, therefore, peace for both individuals and for society.<sup>714</sup> If the believers of these religions follow just the *golden rules* of their respective faiths, many social problems faced today would be solved; and wars and conflicts within and among the nations would be reduced. As R. S. Johnson points out, "Religion offers no short-term solution, no palliative or panacea for the world's ills likely to find an immediate application. But unquestionably religion offers to men the only final solution of the world's problems, but it is a long-term solution."<sup>715</sup>

We can then ask the following fundamental questions regarding education for peace and justice: Is it possible to stop war and live peacefully with others? Is it possible to create a just and humane society where everyone can have a chance to live humanely and meet basic personal needs?

From a Qur'anic viewpoint, while the goal of stopping all wars cannot be achieved easily, creating a just and humane society can and must be attained through application of Qur'anic imperatives.

The Qur'an is not so optimistic about long-term peace between nations. There will always be some people who will violate others' rights and will create conflicts and wars to maintain their own interests and benefits.<sup>716</sup>

Some scholars and philosophers in the West are very optimistic about stopping wars. For instance, the well-known philosopher, Bertrand Russell, argued that "If the world could live for a few generations without war, war would soon come to seem as absurd as dueling has come to seem to us. No doubt there would still be some homicidal maniacs, but they would no longer be heads of Governments."<sup>717</sup> Reardon also argues that:

Biology does not condemn humanity to war, and that humanity can be freed from the bondage of biological pessimism and empowered with confidence to undertake the transformative tasks. . . . Just as wars begin in the minds of men, peace also begins in our minds. The same species who invented war is capable of inventing peace. The responsibility lies with each of us.<sup>718</sup>

John Huddleston is more hopeful about stopping war. He writes:

Just as in the nineteenth century it was possible, by a combination of consciousness raising and legislation to bring about the voluntary abolition of the institution of slavery though several thousand years old, so too it is possible to abolish the scourge of war by the end of this millennium if there is a will to do so.<sup>719</sup>

Other thinkers are not so optimistic about the stopping of war, conflicts, and unjust economic and social order within and among the nations. Paulo Freire of Brazil divides people into two groups—the oppressors and the oppressed—at both the national and international levels,

"Human beings" refers only to themselves; other people are "things." For the oppressor, there exists only one right: their right to live in peace, over against the right, not always even recognized, but simply conceded, of the oppressed to survival. And they make this concession only because the existence of the oppressed is necessary to their own existence.<sup>720</sup>

Since for the rich economic power is the measure of all things, and profit is their ultimate goal, what is worthwhile for the rich is to have more always more, even at the cost of the poor having less or having nothing. For them, "*to be is to have* and to be the class of the 'haves.'"<sup>721</sup>

Freire contends that the rich, in order to continue to dominate and subjugate the poor do not give them permission to act by themselves or to think critically. For Freire critical thinking is *revolutionary consciousness* or *class consciousness*. He writes: "The dominant elites are so well aware of this fact that they instinctively use all means including physical violence, to keep the people from thinking."<sup>722</sup>

Is Freire's analysis applicable to Islamic countries? It would seem so. Most of the Islamic countries' leaders do not give enough importance to the education of their own people. While the poor countries may lack educational resources because of their economic situations, the oil-rich countries do not lack resources. Yet often do not want to educate their people because it is easier to manipulate illiterate than educated people. The observations of Freire are very applicable.

Every attempt at liberation of the poor appears to the rich as a threat, and every attempt at liberation of the poor is seen by the rich as restriction of their own freedom. . . . When somebody asks who educates the rich, I say "the rich," but the irony is that the rich educate themselves to continue rich and they educate the poor to continue poor. And the rich educate the poor to accept their own poverty as a normal and natural thing.<sup>723</sup>

In the light of these evaluations, it can be concluded that educating for peace and justice is not impossible, but it is not easy. For some people everywhere always want to manipulate poor people and to misuse or abuse available resources in order to promote their own welfare. This is true at both national and international levels. Freire argues that one cannot expect the rich to promote making people aware of their unfortunate situation. This task mostly falls on the poor themselves. Thus, what can be done is to raise *class consciousness* among the people—even the people who try to prevent these kinds of activities. In fact, as Chapra points out, in order to create a morally conscious society having a spirit of fellowship and mutual help, it is a "moral obligation of Muslim society and indispensable function of the Islamic state to undertake such an educational programme seriously and sincerely."<sup>724</sup>

### **Teaching Methods for Peace Education**

Creating a morally conscious society having a spirit of fellowship and mutual help is a moral obligation for each Muslim society and an indispensable function of each Islamic state. How can an educational programme in general, and peace education in particular be achieved to enhance the fulfilment of this goal?

## *Education and Teaching Methods in the Islamic Countries: A General Outlook*

The importance of the role of education in all societies today cannot be denied. It is education which has the potential to pass on or to transform the social, cultural, economic, and political values of the next generation. It can be said that each generation is the mirror of its educational system. Understandings of peace, social justice, and moral values, and of their application to the real life of individuals, can be inculcated through education offered in schools. Regarding the role of education, Lawrence Kohlberg pointed out that "The school, like the government, is an institution with a basic function of maintaining and transmitting some, but not all, of the consensual values of society. The most fundamental values of society are termed *moral*, and the major moral values in our society are the values of justice."<sup>725</sup>

There are currently two kinds of educational systems in the Islamic countries. The first is *traditional* which has confined itself to classical knowledge within Islam; the second is *modern* or *secular*, which in form and content is imported from the West into Muslim countries. The former educational system is valuable because it tries to preserve traditional Islamic and cultural values. However, since it has not shown keen interest in new branches of knowledge or in the new methods of acquiring knowledge, it is not sufficient to meet the needs of Muslim communities today. The second system of education, while more open than the traditional to new knowledge and methods, is secular and non-religious, and thus judged by many to be inadequate to meet the needs of Islamic nations. This dichotomy is prevalent in almost all Islamic countries.<sup>726</sup> Ideas of liberty, equity and democracy are rarely taught in Muslim countries. This generalization holds true whether the educational system be traditional or religious or secular, and whether the governments of these countries are democracies or dictatorships. The goals for education and the teaching methods are the same.<sup>727</sup>

At this point the description of Freire regarding educational systems and student-teacher relations in some societies is very helpful in understanding the current educational system prevalent in most Muslim countries. Freire lists the features of educational system in oppressive societies as follows:

1. The teacher teaches and the students are taught;
2. The teacher knows everything and the students know nothing;
3. The teacher thinks and the students are thought about;
4. The teacher talks and the students listen—meekly;
5. The teacher disciplines and the students are disciplined;
6. The teacher chooses and enforces his choice, and the students comply;
8. The teacher acts and the students have the illusion of acting through the action of the teacher;
9. The teacher chooses the program content, and the students (who were not consulted) adopt it;
10. The teacher confuses the authority of knowledge with his own professional authority, which he sets in opposition to the freedom of the students; and
11. The teacher is the Subject of the learning process, while the pupils are mere objects.<sup>728</sup>

In sum, the teacher-student relationship in most of the Islamic countries' educational systems, as well as in other underdeveloped countries, is basically of narrative character. In the classroom there is a narrating Subject (the teacher) and patient, listening objects (the students). While the

teacher's task is to fill the students with the contents of his or her narration, the task of the students is to record, memorize, and repeat these narratives without perceiving what they really mean for them.

It can be concluded from this brief description regarding the educational system prevalent in most Muslim countries that it is, in the words of Freire, a *banking concept of education*. According to Freire, this banking concept of education attempts to conceal certain facts which explain the real aim of human beings in the world. It resists dialogue and treats students as objects of assistance. It inhibits creativity, and domesticates the intentionality of consciousness by isolating consciousness from the world. In this system, "The more completely he [the teacher] fills the receptacles, the better teacher he is. The more meekly the receptacles permit themselves to be filled, the better student they are."<sup>729</sup>

Fazlur Rahman argued that none of the higher Islamic institutions in the Muslim countries can produce good scholars because of inadequate educational methods. Besides governmental patronage, all have emphasized "acquisition of knowledge"—that is, learning certain static bodies of facts rather than creativity which requires intellectual effort.<sup>730</sup> Thus, in Rahman's judgment, "the basic problem in Islamic studies has been teachers."<sup>731</sup> Since teachers in these institutions do not have modern knowledge and critical and analytical minds, they have just preserved the classical theological learning and consequently provided "ill-paid, ill educated and ill-informed imams of the mosques."<sup>732</sup> It is obvious that such education can help neither the growth of religious consciousness nor economic and political consciousness.

From this brief explanation concerning educational systems in the Muslim countries we can conclude that peace education cannot reach its goals and aims under these conditions. We must ask then how peace education should be taught at the university level (in our case in the faculties of divinity) and what kinds of methods should be used in order to reach its goals? This question leads us to the question of teaching methods for peace education.

### *Teaching Methods*

First of all it must be kept in mind that peace education is different from many other disciplines. As Joseph J. Fahey states, it is "academic in nature, multi-disciplinary in method, global in perspective, and oriented toward action that is intelligent, constructive, and creative."<sup>733</sup> In order to teach peace education effectively, we must give importance to at least four points: First, peace education must be academic in nature. It must be based on an academic discipline having its own research, methods and contents. Second, instead of using only one method, as many methods as possible must be used, integrating resources from different disciplines such as history, sociology, psychology, economy, politics, and religion. Peace education is by nature interdisciplinary. Third, it must be studied globally. Today wars and conflicts, arm races, and international trade and finance link many nations and countries. Thus, when we study peace education, we must always consider its international dimensions. Finally, peace education requires not only theoretical studies, but also action. This is a most important point concerning peace education. If we do not try to stop wars, conflicts, excessive military expenditures, and socio-economic injustices prevailing in society, what is the point of studying about them. If we want peace and justice, we must prepare for peace and justice. This means, in the words of Krieger and Kelly, "educating for peace, organizing for peace, researching for peace, working for peace, and building and strengthening institutions at the regional and global levels that will be capable of supporting and maintaining peace."<sup>734</sup>

From this general outlook we can move onto the methods of peace education. Every discipline requires its own methods. Peace education as a different field from other disciplines requires its own distinctive approaches. Regarding the importance of choosing correct methods for peace education, Groom asserts that all "religious education regardless of context or curriculum must educate for justice, and that such religious education for justice requires that we educate *justly*."<sup>735</sup> Thus, this course must educate not only for peace and justice but must do it justly. If an unjust or inappropriate educational process is attempted to educate for peace, it is likely to defeat its own purpose. To reach desired goals, we must develop new approaches and methods towards its teaching. These methods can be summarized as follows:

*Dialogical Method:* One of the most appropriate methods for peace education is the method of problem posing developed by Paulo Freire. It is also called the dialogical or liberating education method. The main characteristic of this method is the relationship between the teacher and the student. Freire holds that without dialogue there is no communication and that without communication there can be no true education. A true education must resolve the contradiction between the teacher and the students. What are the characteristics of this method? How can it be applied to peace education?

Contrary to the banking concept of education mentioned before, Freire outlines three characteristics of this method: First, every human being is regarded as a unique, precious, knowing subject, and basically equal with others. Thus, in this method every person has the right to speak, develop critical consciousness and become a more fully human being by knowing and acting. Second, in this method there is no contradiction between teacher and student, but rather cooperation. The teacher is no longer only one-who-teaches, but rather one who is himself taught in dialogue with the students. The role of the problem-posing educator is to create, together with the students, the conditions under which knowledge can be transferred to each other. Third, although problem-posing education accepts the need for some degree of memorization and information gathering, basically it is based on critical thinking, asking questions, reflection, and action.<sup>736</sup>

In this method, critical thinking, consciousness, and a good relation between teachers and students are the key points. In fact, this is an Islamic imperative. Although the Qur'an commands Muslims to ask those who know better than themselves,<sup>737</sup> personal thinking is an inseparable part of the belief itself. While the Qur'an encourages and even commands persons to know, see, observe, think, ponder, and deduce, it denounces superficial thinking and all types of learning that lead to it.<sup>738</sup> The Qur'an emphasizes persons' using their own minds. While human beings hold the highest position in the scale of created beings,<sup>739</sup> those who do not use their minds are placed at a lower level.<sup>740</sup>

Today, many scholars teach the importance of critical consciousness, that is, thinking. For instance, Wren talks about three kinds of power—physical or political, economic, and cultural. While all of them are important for a nation, Wren asserts that cultural power is particularly important. He writes: "The development of critical consciousness helps to free people from all kinds of cultural domination, whether deliberate or unconscious. Where cultural power is the instrument of economic and political injustice, to develop a critical consciousness is a first step towards freedom, and one of the main tasks of education for justice."<sup>741</sup>

Thus, it can be said that the preferred method in teaching for peace education is the problem-posing or dialogical method. Instead of giving just facts regarding issues of war and peace, socio-economic justice or injustice, and other topics related to peace education, and asking students to

record, memorize, and repeat them during examination, subjects should be taught in a dialogical way, allowing and encouraging students to speak, think, criticize, and reflect their own ideas.

*Question and Answer Method:* A second important method is that of question and answer. Since the time of Socrates, the question technique in the classroom has been a major component of the instructoral process. Many educators today agree that questioning is the very core of teaching. It requires students to engage in the first levels of productive thinking, to think critically about information, and to perform original and evaluative thinking. In addition to this, it helps to arouse the students' interest and curiosity, to focus attention on issues, to encourage reflection and self-evaluation, and to promote thought and an understanding of ideas.<sup>742</sup>

Since peace education seeks to answer the question of *why* and *how*, instead of simply providing facts regarding peace, some fundamental questions concerning peace should be asked of the students, encouraging their response. In peace education in Muslim countries, for instance, the following questions might be asked and discussed with the students in the classroom:

- . What is the present state of the world in general and Muslim countries in particular with regard to peace, economic and social justice, political participation, and ecological balance?

- . If Muslim nations cannot make significant changes in the current international system or cannot participate in it sufficiently, what will be the state of the next generations?

- . If Muslims cannot make scientific progress and build their own military power, how will this affect the economic, political, and social welfare of Islamic countries?

- . The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, approved almost unanimously by the United Nations on December 10, 1948, declared in Article 25:

- 1) Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or the other lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control.

- 2) Motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. *All children*, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.<sup>743</sup>

- . Yet, what do human rights mean when the UN continued to impose severe economic sanctions against Iraq, long after its armed forces were evicted from Kuwait? Why were millions of Iraqi civilians, most of whom are children, left to die of disease and starvation? Should Muslim people suffer in this way when other states such as Israel—and for years Serbia—which invaded and occupied Muslim lands, were not subjected to any punishment?

- . While many developed nations have nuclear weapons, why are Muslim nations not given permission to build their own nuclear arsenals? Do they not have a right to defend themselves as do other nations?

- . Can Muslim countries meet their defense needs through buying weapons from the Western countries? What are the advantages and disadvantages of this dependence?

- . What should be Muslim attitude toward this *double standard* and *lop-sided justice* of the Western world? Should they avoid any cooperation with the West? What kind of position should they take?

These questions are suggestive but not exhaustive. Others may be added. My purpose is not to give a list of questions to be discussed in the classroom. Instead, what is important here is that instead of giving only lectures to the students concerning peace education, its historical development, and its contents, questions concerning peace and justice for Muslim nations should

be asked and discussed openly in the classroom. This helps students not only to develop an active role in the classroom, but also to think critically, and to be motivated for action.

*Experience:* Byron recommends that the best education for peace and justice is experience. Thus, students have to be *with* the poor before they will be *for* the poor. They have to see neglect before they commit themselves to the task of overcoming neglect.<sup>744</sup> Of course, seeing and living the conditions of the poor and the neglected can help students to realize the situations of the poor. However, in addition to the suggestion of Byron, I recommend that students be *with* the rich as well. They should see how they earn money, how they live, how they spend, and what they think about poor people, etc., Thus, those who study peace and justice will have a chance to observe the resources of the country being used wastefully or the inequities of distribution between the rich and the poor.

*Action:* Action is an essential factor for learning. This is especially true for peace education. Without action, there can be no true peace education. David Hollenbach says that "Justice is not an idea. It is an action, a matter of practice, structured reality that must be created by human freedom and choice."<sup>745</sup> In the same way James McGinnis points out that education for peace and justice "is not simply a concept to be taught, but a reality to be lived."<sup>746</sup> From these statements we understand that although the possession of knowledge regarding issues of war, conflict, and social and economic injustice is a necessary condition for peace education, it is not sufficient to achieve the goals of peace education.

In fact, action is an important factor in the lives of Muslims. As we saw earlier, the Qur'an emphasizes human responsibility. It does not offer any guarantee for an automatic fulfilment of the Divine plan. First, persons must make their own effort, physical and intellectual. The Qur'an is explicit on this matter. It says, "Verily never will Allah change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves."<sup>747</sup> The educational process must begin with the will—with the cultivation of a will to peace and justice, and it must be followed by the will to act.

As to the type of action, although no one type of action is recommended for everyone, persons and societies differ and what is appropriate for one person or one country is not necessarily appropriate for others. Peace educators suggest the following action or behavioral goals:

1. Actions should begin within the home or school. Social actions should be experienced as a regular part of life. It is to take deep root in our lives. The more it is integrated into home life, the more regular it can become. In these kinds of actions, peace students can write political letters (if it is permitted), greet prisoners and lonely persons, help in nursing homes, shelters, refugees, and raise money for the poor and the needy.

2. Actions should begin first in the local community, and then it must be extended to the others. Thus, in the first place, peace students should deal with local issues, for they generally permit much more concrete and personal actions and opportunities for longer term relationships. Food and hunger issues have a special potential for responding on both the local and global dimensions of social actions.<sup>748</sup>

## **A Course Plan for Peace Education for Departments of Religious Studies in Islamic Countries**

Within which academic discipline and to whom can peace education be taught properly, comprehensively, and usefully? Although various disciplines may be appropriate locations for courses on education for peace and justice, religious studies are more appropriate than others for

this course. Regarding the appropriateness of religious studies for education for peace and justice, Monika K. Hellwig points out:

No academic discipline offers a better or more fitting context for social justice and peace education than religious studies. Almost all imaginable courses in this field must include some observation of and reflection on lifestyle, values, social choices and decisions, relationships among groups, attitudes to wealth and power, and responses to suffering and violence, because all of these are dependent upon faith and beliefs.<sup>749</sup>

Thus, the departments of religious studies or faculties of theology in the Muslim countries may be a useful educational setting for teaching peace and justice. Most of the subjects offered by these faculties are directly or indirectly related to issues of peace and justice. It is not possible to teach Islamic courses, such as commentary on the Qur'an, *hadith*, Islamic law, Islamic history, etc., without reference to the social, economic and political aspects of Islam. What can be done or added to these subjects is a focus on the subjects of war, peace, and justice in the light of contemporary conditions, rather than only as historical facts.

To whom should peace education be taught? Although classes at all levels, from preschool children to graduate students are appropriate for this kind of subject, I believe that courses for undergraduate or graduate students in religion departments are the top priority. Those who graduate from these faculties will serve either in schools (religious or secular) as teachers, or at mosques as preachers. If these students have sufficient and correct information about issues of war, peace, and socio-economic justice, and learn means for attaining socio-economic justice, they can teach and practice in their professional lives what they have learned.

Although no one type of course plan can be recommended for every Islamic country and every educational setting, the following three-credit course plan could serve as a model for this kind of study in the departments of religious studies in the Islamic countries.

#### An Outline for Education for Peace and Justice in Islam

*Aims.* An introductory course on peace and justice in Islam should have these aims:

1. To provide an overview of contemporary world problems related to war and political conflicts, (excessive military spending, nuclear weapons, their effects on economy, environment, and social developments), as well as socio-economic injustices within and among nations;
2. To analyze the Islamic understanding and approach towards war, peace and socio-economic justice; and
3. To explore solutions to these problems through the principles and guidelines laid down in the Qur'an and the *hadith*.

*Goal.* Besides these basic aims, this course will attempt to provide the following purposes:

1. To inculcate awareness of the widespread and dangerous problems of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, of arms races among Muslim nations in particular and in the world in general, of common poverty, illiteracy, inadequate sanitation services, and the big gap between the rich and the poor, between nations and within Islamic countries in particular;

2. To develop for the present and the next generation a consciousness of social, economic and political problems facing the Muslim community and humankind that will encourage persons to strive towards their elimination for the betterment of the Muslim community and world community;

3. To cultivate a consciousness of needs to reduce national dependency on the outside world and greater integration within the Muslim world, and to inculcate economic, social, and cultural independency, self-respect and a gradual build up of strength and power;

4. To acquire an adequate and authentic understanding of Islamic *jihad* covering military power, the use of sophisticated weapons, religious freedom and tolerance, relationships with non-Muslims within and outside the Islamic world; of socio-economic development, and of individual and social responsibility based on the Qur'an and the *hadith*;

5. To cultivate a consciousness of the status and place of human beings on earth and their relationship to God, the universe and their fellow beings;

6. To develop in the individual the awareness of his or her rights and responsibilities to both seek, express and defend what is true, just, and humane, and to work to correct all that is evil and unjust; also to acquire through simulation, role playing and direct involvement the skills, strategies, and actions necessary for social change.

*Syllabus.* In order to reach its aims and purposes, the following outline may be suggestive for a 14-week course.

*Introduction* (one week)

Topic: Why is the issue of peace and justice an important subject in the contemporary world? Sketch out what is to be explicated in the course.

Suggested readings:

Betty A. Reardon, *Comprehensive Peace Education: Education for Global Responsibility*. New York: Teachers College Press, 1988.

Linda Starke, ed. *State of the World 1995: A World Watch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society*. New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1995.

*Part I: Perspectives on Global and Local Peace and Justice* (three weeks)

Topics: Peace and Justice around the World

Peace and Justice in the Islamic World

Peace and Justice in one is country

Suggested readings:

Stanley Fischer and others. *The Economics of the Middle East*. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993.

Ruth Leger Sivard. *World Military and Social Expenditures 1993*. Washington D.C.: World Priorities, 1993.

Chandra Muzaffar. *Human Rights and the New World Order*. Just World Trust, Penang, 1993.

*Part II. Islamic Understanding of War and Peace* (five weeks)

Topics: Islamic Understanding of Peace and Justice

Contemporary Muslims' Views

Fundamentalists' Views

Modernists' Views

Sufis' Views

Suggested readings:

Majid Khadduri. *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955.

Muhammad Abu Zahra. *The Concept of War in Islam*. Studies in Islam Series. Trans., Muhammad Al-Hady and Taha Omar. Cairo: Ministry of Waqf, n.d.

Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj. Al-Faridah al-Ghaibah, "The Neglected Duty." Translated by Johannes J. G Jansen. In *The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East*. New York: Macmillan, 1986. , 159-234.

Sayyed Hossein Nasr., ed. *Islamic Spirituality: Foundations*. New York: Crossroad, 1987.

*Part III. Islamic Understanding of Socio-Economic Justice (three weeks)*

Topics: The Concept of Socio-economic Justice

The Foundations of Socio-economic Justice

The Means for Attaining Socio-economic Justice

Suggested readings:

Majid Khadduri. *The Islamic Conception of Justice*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.

Muhammad Abdul Mannan. *Economic Development and Social Justice in Islam: An Analytical Study of the Process of Economic Development in the Muslim Community of Today*. London: Ta Ha and Bangladesh Social Peace Foundation, 1990.

Sayyid Qutb. *Social Justice in Islam*. Washington, D. C.: American Council of Learned Societies, 1970.

*Part IV. Some Critical and Practical Issues (two weeks)*

Topics: Re-examination of Islamic Understanding of War-Peace and Justice in the Light of Contemporary World Issues.

Human Dignity and Fundamental Human Rights in Islam.

The Hermeneutical Problems concerning War and Peace, Rethinking of Some Issues such as *Jihad*, Religious Freedom, the Concept of the Division of the World (*dar al-Islam and dar-al Harb*), Relations with Non-Muslims.

What Can be Done for the Betterment of World Community in General and Muslim Community in Particular?

Suggested readings:

Fazlur Rahman. *Major Themes of the Qur'an*. Chicago: Biblioethica Islamica, 1980.

Fazlur Rahman. *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.

Riffat Hassan. "On Human Rights and the Qur'anic Perspective." *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 19 (Summer 1982): 51-65.

Louay M. Safi. "War and Peace in Islam." *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 5 (Spring 1988): 29-57.

*Basis of evaluation*

1. Each student will be expected to complete weekly reading assignments and to make significant contributions to class discussion based on the readings, research, and personal experiences.

2. Students will be asked to do library research and write a 10-15 page paper related to the Islamic understanding of war, peace, and justice from the Qur'an and *hadith*, Islamic history, or contemporary Muslims scholars, as well as their own insights.

3. Mid-semester and final examinations on lectures and reading material, testing their correct understanding of Islamic view of war, peace, and justice as well as their ability to form their own position.

## **Conclusion**

Although there is no one definition of either peace or justice, or of peace education itself, as well as different understandings among persons of different cultures, ideologies, and religions, many scholars in this field agree on some common points concerning peace education. Generally speaking, peace education includes wars and conflicts, their causes and results; excessive militarization, its consequences on economies, politics, and welfare of people; the denial of basic human rights; philosophy and methodology of nonviolence; and the helpful roles of some international organizations.

The main purposes of peace education are to raise the consciousness of persons concerning the issues of peace education mentioned above, so that they may be motivated to try to stop those negative developments that are threatening all people in the world as well as the environment.

As we noted earlier, education for peace and justice is a relatively new field. As a result of rearmament in peacetime, nuclear weapons, and violations of basic human rights, this field emerged first in the United States and Japan after two world wars, and later in Canada and some European countries. Although there is no course titled *peace education* taught in the schools of Muslim countries, World Conferences on Islamic Education and the 1980 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights may be good sources for this kind of course. However, teaching methods used in most Muslim countries are not appropriate for the teaching for peace education. They rely mostly on the lecture of the teacher. The only agent in the teaching and learning activities is the teacher. The task of the students in these educational settings is to record, memorize, and to repeat whatever they learn. Since the teacher is accepted as one who knows everything, students do not participate in the learning process. The result is, as Freire states, the banking concept of education, mentioned above.

Whereas, teaching methods are as important as the subject matter itself. This is especially true for peace education. For peace education is not only learning oriented, but a critical thinking which is action-oriented. Thus, instead of using only one method, as many methods as possible should be used. In this context dialogical method, the question and answer method, and the experience and action method can be recommended for effective peace education.

Finally, although there may be resistance to begin education for peace and justice in Muslim countries, this is an urgent need that Muslims must not neglect. Although others may educate for peace and justice, religious studies is more appropriate than other disciplines for courses on this topic. All values, individual and social concerns, relations with others, attitudes toward wealth and power, and responses to any kind of oppression, violence, suffering, and denial of basic human rights depend on faith and belief. Departments of religious studies and their students may be a good location for this kind of course in Muslim countries.

## **Conclusion and Recommendations**

The purpose of this study was to seek: 1) the state of affairs in the world in general in terms of two important topics: war and peace and socio-economic justice; 2) what was the Islamic approach towards these two concepts which definitely have affected the followers of Islam today; 3) how these two important topics could be taught to students in departments of religious studies in Islamic countries in order that they may have correct understandings of these subjects and convey them to others; and 4) to develop a model introductory course on education for peace and justice for departments of religious studies in Islamic countries. Now we shall briefly summarize these points.

### **Conflict and Justice: An Urgent Priority**

Although wars and other conflicts between peoples and nations go back to the very beginning of human history, they have reached a very different and dangerous dimension in our times. They have become far more life threatening than ever before in human history. Why is this so?

First, today's wars are more ruthless, more immoral and more inhumane compared to the past. In the past there was always the possibility of making distinctions between combatants and non-combatants (children, women, and other civilians). By the beginning of the 20th century, 50 percent of all war-related deaths were civilian. Later, as a result of new mass destructive weapons and the increase in civil wars, the percentage of civilians killed in warfare rose to 75 percent in the 1980s, and exceeded 90 percent in the wars of the 1990s. Far more children and other innocent persons are now killed in wars.

Second, while environmental damage from wars in the past was limited, today such destruction has reached a new magnitude, not only killing people and destroying cities, but also destroying forest, vegetation, arable land and upsetting the ecological balance for generations to come. This was especially true when nuclear weapons were used.

Third, while in the past one side could be considered the winner in war and the other side the loser, today there would be no winners especially when nuclear weapons were used.

Not only are present-day wars ruthless, dangerous and devastating, but peacekeeping and defense expenditures also are very expensive and destructive to national economies. Although there has been a slight reduction recently in worldwide military spending, both developed and particularly developing and underdeveloped nations are spending excessive proportions of their GNPs for military expenditures. Worse, while these developed nations that meet most basic human needs of their people spent about 3.7 percent of their total GNPs for military purposes, other nations, especially Muslim countries, that have serious economic problems and are far from meeting basic needs for food, education, and health care spent on average 5 to 30 percent of their GNPs on militarization.

Who are the beneficiaries of excessive militarization and arms races? In fact, neither nations which produce and sell weapons nor those who buy them are at an absolute advantage in terms of their economies and their societies. However, underdeveloped nations, including many Muslim countries, are always at a disadvantage in arms races and excessive militarization.

Most countries, especially developing nations, not only suffer from the cost of excessive militarization and related wars and conflicts, but also suffer from unjust economic systems. Less than two centuries ago, before the Industrial Revolution, there was a relative economic parity

between nations with an average of \$200 a year per capita income in each. In contrast, today throughout the world there is enormous economic oppression, plus unjust economic distribution and poverty, condemning millions of people to a lives of hunger, disease, illiteracy, unemployment, and alienation.

As a result of the present unjust economic distribution of resources in the world as a whole, the top 20 percent of the industrial countries have nearly 75 percent of the world's economic production, while the remaining 80 percent produce the remaining 25 percent. Again, at the bottom level, 43 percent of the world's population live in nations producing less than four percent of the world's GNP. Moreover, the gap between and within nations is not narrowing but is continuing to widen.

### ***Jihad* and Its Interpreters**

The second major topic of this study was the Islamic understanding of war, peace, and socio-economic justice. Although there is no course entitled *peace education* in schools, colleges, and universities in Islamic countries, the concepts of peace and justice are an inseparable part of Islamic teaching and Muslim life. The first concept, war and peace, called *jihad* in Islamic terminology, is both misunderstood and sometimes distorted by Western people and misused or abused by some Muslims. On the other hand, the second concept, justice, is also rarely applied in the real life of Muslims. People in the majority of Muslim communities today suffer from poverty, illiteracy, and unfulfilled basic needs.

*Jihad* has played an important role in Muslim thought since the advent of Islam. Interpretations and applications of *jihad* have had both positive and negative consequences throughout Islamic history. When the rules of *jihad* were strictly applied and carried out only for the sake of God, both Muslims and non-Muslims benefited. However, when *jihad* was used as a tool for personal gain, interest, ambitions, or worldly aims, it was used to justify secular wars in which both sides suffered.

The analysis of the relevant Quranic verses showed an acceptance of war as a social phenomenon to prevent people from all kinds of oppression, persecution, and injustice, and to maintain peace among the people. In this context, *Jihad* played an important role in the life of Muslims until the first quarter of the 20th century. In the last century, however, some Muslims changed their interpretations of *jihad* in response to changing political, social, and economic conditions. Scholars called *modernists*, desiring to establish positive relationships between Islam and modern thought, have interpreted *jihad* only as defensive war. Others called *fundamentalists*, desiring to establish a just socio-political and egalitarian society based on Islamic rules in the Muslim countries, see *jihad* as a compulsory duty of every Muslim. *Sufis*, on the other hand, both in their classical and contemporary thought, have interpreted *jihad* more as a way of cleansing oneself from all kinds of inner evils.

As a result of the socio-economic undevelopment of many Islamic countries, Muslim ideologists began to seek solutions to some of the pressing socio-political and economic problems of their times. Rejecting the blind following of tradition, they called for a new interpretation of the Qur'an which would demonstrate its relevance to contemporary thought and life in the modern world. They sought to re-establish Islamic identity through positive links between Islam and the West. Thus, for both external and internal reasons, modernists tried to explain *jihad* differently from the classical Islamic view.

Modernists, asserting that all wars fought in the early days of Islam were defensive, justify *jihad* only as self-defense. They maintain that offensive war is never allowed in Islam, while defensive war is permitted only to defend the oppressed. Therefore, everything mentioned in the Qur'an with regard to the rules of fighting is interpreted as defense against the Arab polytheists who fought, oppressed, and persecuted Muslims because of their religion.

As a result of this interpretation of *jihad*, modernists either completely reject the division of the world into two spheres (*dar al-Islam* and *dar al-harb*) or consider that this idea should be re-evaluated in the conditions of the modern world. To them such a division of the world was not derived from legislation, but rather was dictated by historical events. Thus, as long as non-Muslims live peacefully with Muslims, Muslims are not obliged to fight against them.

On the other hand, fundamentalists want to Islamize society fully through the application of the Islamic rules. They want to save Muslim countries from all kinds of injustice, tyranny, oppression, western political presence, and the legacy of the colonizers. They abhor the impotence of the Muslim countries and their technological and economic backwardness. They see *jihad* as the primary means of achieving their ideals.

Although fundamentalists also hold that the main objective of Islam is to maintain peace in the world, they consider *jihad* as a necessity to 1) uphold the realm of God, to propagate the oneness of God on earth, and to put an end to the power of those who, by word or deed, challenge His omnipotence; 2) eliminate oppression, extortion, and injustice by instituting the Word of God; and 3) achieve the human ideals which are considered by God as the aim of life, and secure people against terror, coercion, and injury. Thus, according to fundamentalists, it is the duty of all Muslims, individually and collectively, to fight and, if necessary, to use force in order that the noble ideas mentioned above prevail.

More interestingly, fundamentalists first want to wage war not against non-Muslims outside the Islamic world, but rather against those who are in power in Muslim countries. They contend that most current leaders in these countries are apostates from Islam. Therefore, the current infidels against whom Muslims must fight are not foreigners, but those present rulers who have illegally seized the leadership in Islamic countries. Since those leaders are judged no longer to have qualifications needed to be leaders, fundamentalists argue that Muslims have the duty to revolt against them, depose them, and replace them with just leaders.

Although fundamentalists see *jihad* as necessary to the achievement of the Islamic ideals, they accept and respect the faith of others. However, they interpret religious freedom as that of Muslims alone and not as the religious freedom of others. Concerning non-Muslim societies, they contend that religious freedom should dictate either that they accept Islam as the basis of international relations, or that they give permission for Muslims to propagate their faiths without any political or material barriers. They argue that only when people have a chance to hear Islam do they have the right to accept or reject it.

While both modernists and fundamentalists talk about real fighting in different ways, Sufis on the other hand, speak about spiritual fighting. To purify oneself, control the evil forces, and keep watch over the frontiers of the soul is more important for them than exterior *jihad*, (i.e. fighting against unbelievers). Thus, they give great importance to the greater *jihad* (the *jihad* of the soul) rather than to the smaller *jihad*. To them the enemy is not outside but within ourselves. The true battle is to fight the enemy within. Sufis maintain that Muslims will never attain peace and equity within their hearts until they finish this *jihad* of the soul.

In terms of a critical approach to the understanding of war and peace in Islam, the following questions were raised: Can *jihad* be conducted against unbelievers outside the Islamic world today

as in the past? Can Muslims solve their socio-economic problems through *jihad* within Islamic countries, as claimed by fundamentalists? In answering these questions Muslims should take into consideration the following circumstances:

First, since we live in a very different world compared to the past, Muslims should take into consideration both the general socio-historical background of the Qur'an and the prevailing conditions of that time. Qur'anic verses concerning war and peace, as well as other issues, should not be studied verse by verse or chapter by chapter, but rather in their totality with specific background.

Second, are Muslims required to spread Islam and to make Allah's name supreme over all other things until Islam becomes entirely Allah's religion, or has Islam given religious freedom to others? Muslims should base their response not just on a few verses commanding them to fight against unbelievers to spread Islam, but also on numerous verses that provide for freedom of choice in religious belief and conscience, and permit differences and diversities in human religious beliefs. In responding to this question, again they should interpret the verses of the Qur'an taking into consideration their totality and socio-historical background. They should give precedence to missional *jihad* over military *jihad*.

Third, Muslims must re-examine the question of their relationships with non-Muslims. In this context, instead of dividing the world into two spheres (*dar al-harb* and *dar al-Islam*) and proclaiming a permanent hostility towards unbelievers, they should seek opportunities for good works in cooperation with non-Muslims. They should seek to live peacefully with others as long as they in turn, live peacefully with Muslims and do not prevent the peaceful spread of Islam.

Fourth, in decision making, Muslims should always consider possible benefits or losses for the Muslim nations as a whole. Thus, their decisions concerning war, peace, and relationships with the unbelievers should keep in mind Muslims' social, political, and economic conditions.

### **Socio-Economic Justice: An Islamic Imperative**

From the Islamic point of view peace and socio-economic justice cannot be separated from each other. Without peace it is impossible to reach justice; without justice it is impossible to live peacefully. In other words, one cannot exist without the other. Therefore, Muslim scholars argue that second only in importance to belief in the existence of the one God, is belief in the moral principle of justice. In fact, belief in God entails an automatic duty to do justice. Faith that is mingled with injustice is not true belief in God.

Although the Qur'an deals with different kinds of justice (political, social, economic, and ethical), it gives great attention to economic justice. For the dignity of human beings equal treatment of all people in society and before the law, meeting basic needs, and accomplishing fully the rules of Islam depend on economic justice.

According to Islamic teaching the whole universe is created for human beings. The Qur'an repeatedly commands persons to eat, drink, and enjoy themselves without abusing earth's resources. In fact, being a true Muslim requires a person to be as rich as possible, for the very fundamentals of Islam, (zakat, pilgrimage, spending in the way of Allah, participating in *jihad*) all require sufficient economic power.

The Qur'an insists that there is no scarcity concerning resources, for Allah has created enough food for every creature in the world. If hunger and abject poverty exist, this is not because of the scarcity of resources, but because of unjust economic systems. However, although the Qur'an recognizes and commands absolute equality before the law irrespective of social class, belief,

color, or sex of a person, it does not recognize an absolute economic equality or absolute equality of wealth. All human beings are not equal in their character, ability, and service to the society. In fact, some socio-economic inequalities are quite normal for the efficient functioning of a society. Without this element a society would be inactive. It is also a fact that while the Qur'an recognizes some inequalities in income and wealth, it does not accept extreme inequalities in income and wealth, but rather emphasizes distributional equity. Since all creatures are created by God, all have an equal right to God's earthly and heavenly treasures.

In order to achieve its aims concerning socio-economic justice, Islam has brought some basic foundations without which it is impossible to create a just society. In Islam the first foundation of socio-economic justice is the principle of unity and brotherhood. Closely related to the concept of unity is that of sovereignty. The third foundation of socio-economic justice in Islam is the principle of absolute consciousness of freedom.

After building these basic foundations in the society, Islam has set up more concrete regulations to ensure socio-economic justice and to eradicate absolute poverty. These regulations include positive measures such as working, zakat, voluntary spending, and inheritance; prohibitive measures such as riba (usury), unlawful business transactions, wasteful expenditures, and the responsibility of the state.

In addition to this basic duty of the Islamic state in terms of socio-economic justice, the state is also responsible to fulfil the following goals: 1) to elevate the spiritual level of the Muslim society and minimize moral laxity and corruption; 2) to ensure distributive justice and to weed out every kind of exploitation; and 3) to cast an educational system which will produce persons imbued with the ideas of Islam.

The other important topic related to the social and economic justice was the correct understanding of God's action and development. This involves concepts of predestination (or fatalism) and human responsibility which are mostly misunderstood by Muslims and have been misused by the ruling classes throughout Islamic history. Most Muslims believe that whatever happens comes from Allah, and that the will of God prevails in all that occurs in human affairs and history. Knowing that faithful Muslims believe that they are to obey those in authority whatever they do, both past and present leaders and oppressor groups have widely abused their authority so as to maintain obedience by the people and to justify their unjust and tyrannical rule.

Most Muslims incorrectly assume this concept of predestination and fatalistic doctrine to be true. Although the Qur'an emphasizes the predominant will of God in the affairs of the world, absolute determinism, fatalism, and blind obedience to the ruler are completely contradictory to Qur'anic teaching. The Qur'an requires a balance between individual and social responsibility. In many verses in which the Qur'an describes the features of the Islamic community, it talks about the Muslims' mission towards others, such as enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong. This is not only the duty of an individual Muslim or community, but also of the state (those who are in power).

As to the correct understanding of development, we should ask the following question: if the Qur'an urges Muslims to work hard, investigate, and to be as rich as possible both materially and spiritually, and Muslim countries produce many important resources of the world, why do many persons in Muslim countries suffer from abject poverty? The following conclusions were drawn.

First, Islam is not against material development as claimed by Orientalists and some Muslims. The Qur'an urges Muslims to work hard and to benefit from the bounties of the universe; it provides effective guidelines for achieving an equitable distribution of income and wealth.

Second, real development is not only material, but also spiritual. Based on this understanding, developed nations are not necessarily fully developed and the Muslim countries are not necessarily backward or underdeveloped. Material and spiritual development should go hand-in-hand and provide opportunities to enhance each other.

Third, per capita income is not a real indicator of a country's development. To decide whether or not a county is developed, we should look not only at that country's total GNP and per capita income, but also whether conditions of poverty, unemployment, and inequality in terms of income and wealth exist among the people. Even if per capita income seems to be very high, if one of these adverse conditions exists, the country is not a developed country.

Fourth, the most effective obstacle to development in most of the Islamic countries is excessive military spending with dependency on the developed nations. The biggest portion of most of the Islamic countries' GNP has gone to militarization which adversely affects the real development of these countries.

Fifth, development requires mutual cooperation among Muslim nations in terms of economic, social, political, and cultural life, and in defense. The Qur'anic imperative for Muslim communities holds that all Muslims are brothers and commands them to help each other in the good things.

### **Peace and Justice Education: An Global Imperative**

In reaction against developments in the armaments industry, nuclear weapons, wars and conflicts, violation of human rights, hunger, abject poverty, illiteracy, health problems, and unjust economic distribution between and within nations, a new movement occurred in the area of education—*peace education*. It developed first in the United States and Japan after the two world wars, and later in Canada and some other European countries.

Although there is no one definition of peace education which is accepted by all scholars, generally education for peace and justice deals with war and its causes, militarization, arms races, oppression, racism, injustice, poverty, human rights, and environmental problems. The main purpose of peace education is to promote peace and socio-economic justice through peaceful means.

This study's third focus was how the two concepts of peace and justice should be taught to students attending departments of religious studies in the Islamic countries in the light of current world conditions and in order to live peacefully and justly.

Lastly, this study dealt with peace education in Islamic countries including a course plan for education for peace and justice. Although there is no official course entitled *education for peace and justice* in any Islamic country, significant preparatory developments have taken place. The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights, prepared by the Islamic Council of Europe in 1980, deals directly with peace and justice in Islam. The first, second and third world conferences on Islamic education are also sources for education for peace and justice. In fact, their effects have been seen in the educational programs in some Islamic countries, such as Malaysia.

Following discussion of the possibility of teaching education for peace and justice, its teaching methods, noting both obstacles and necessities of such education within Muslim countries, a model introductory course plan has been proposed. It includes goals, a syllabus, bases of evaluation, and selected readings.

### **Recommendations Regarding Peace Education for Islaic Peoples**

This study is designed to further education for peace and justice in the Muslim countries for those who study in departments of religious studies. However, since it is but an introduction to peace education, further studies should be conducted in this field. In this context the writer makes the following recommendations.

First, as we saw earlier, peace education is a very broad term. It includes the following wide range of subjects: war (its causes and results); arms races and their effects on economics and social welfare; nuclear weapons and their effects on people and environment; human rights; liberation movements; structural violence, poverty, social justice, social change, and economic welfare; colonialism, racism, and other forms of oppression; crises of industrialization and development; philosophy and methodology of nonviolence; and the helpful roles of some national and international organizations. Although this study deals with the concepts of war, peace, and socio-economic justice in Islam and teaching concerning them at departments of religious studies in Muslim countries, it could not cover all subjects related to peace education. Other subjects should be studied individually and in detail.

Second, since peace education is a multi-disciplinary subject, it should not be examined only from a religious point of view. Further interdisciplinary studies will be needed linking understandings from religion with those from philosophy, economics, politics, psychology, sociology, technology, and education.

Third, the course plan presented is a generic one for those who study at university departments of religious studies in Muslim countries. However, peace education should address everyone from elementary school to the university. Separate course plans or curricula should be developed according to the needs of the students and their levels of intellectual, physical, and psychological development.

Fourth, since peace education is not only an academic study, but also oriented towards action, it should not be confined to schools and students, but should be offered also to the general population. In order to make people aware of their own situation, world order, and present and future conditions, various methods and study plans should be developed. In Muslim countries various university departments, research institutes, conferences, ministries of religious affairs, and mosques would be good vehicles for peace education.

Fifth, since war and war-related problems and social injustices concern not only one nation or people, but rather are universal concerns, a compulsory course related to peace education should be taught at all levels in the education systems in all countries. The aim of such classes should be to raise the consciousness of people everywhere that they are world citizens as well as citizens of their own countries and that humanity is one.

Sixth and finally, since every country has different problems and different conditions, each country should deal with peace education from its own perspective.

## Notes

1 The Bible: Exodus, 24; Numbers, 3; Deuteronomy, 2, 7, 30; Joshua, 6, 8; Matthew, 10:34. The Qur'an: 22:40; 2:216.

2 Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2nd (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965), 3.

3 John Huddleston, *Achieving Peace by the Year 2000: A Twelve Point Proposal* (Oxford, England, Chatham, N.Y.: One world, 1992), 10-45. See also Betty A. Reardon, *Comprehensive Peace Education: Educating for Global Responsibility* (New York: Teachers College Press, 1988), 16; Henry A. Atkinson, "Religion as a Cause of War," in *The Causes of War*, ed. Arthur Porritt (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1969), 118.

4 Betty A. Reardon, *Militarization, Security and Peace Education* (Valley Forge, Pa.: United Ministries in Education, 1982), 39.

5 Wright, *War*, 626, table 22; see also David P. Barash, *Introduction to Peace Studies* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1991), 33.

6 R.C. Johnson says: "With the single exception of Islam the other great world religions are all irreconcilably opposed to war and the things war involves." In "The Influence of Religious Teaching as a Factor in Maintaining Peace," in *Paths to Peace: A Study of War Its Causes and Prevention*, ed. Victor H. Wallace (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 347. Whereas according to Quincy Wright's research, the important participants of these wars between 1480 to 1940, were: Great Britain, 74; France, 63; Spain, 59; Russia, 57; Austria, 51; Turkey, 43; Poland, 28; Sweden, 25; Italy, 25; Netherlands, 22; Germany, 22; Denmark, 20; the United States, 12; China, 9; and Japan, 9, see Wright, *War*, 641-647; tables 31-41.

7 Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures: 1993* (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1993), 20.

8 Michael Renner, "Budgeting for Disarmament," in *State of the World 1995: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke (New York and London, W. W. Norton, 1995), 151.

9 David Krieger and Frank K. Kelly, "Introduction," in *Waging Peace II: Vision and Hope for the 21st Century*, ed. David Krieger and Frank K. Kelly (Chicago: Noble Press, 1992), xv.

10 William Eckhardt, "War-Related Deaths Since 3000 BC," *Peace Research* 23, no 1 (February 1991), 83.

11 Hal Kane, "Wars Reach a Plateau," in *Vital Signs 1995: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1995), 95, 110.

12 Sivard, *Expenditures 1993*, 20.

13 Bruce Russett, "Politics and Alternative Security: Toward a More Democratic, Therefore More Peaceful World," in *Alternative Security Living Without Nuclear Deterrence*, ed. Burns H. Weston, (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), 108.

14 Barash, *Introduction*, 265. All the costs which follow are calculated in U.S. dollars.

15 Sivard, *Expenditures 1993*, 5.

16 *Ibid.*, 152.

17 Huddleston, *Peace*, 27; Sivard, *Expenditures 1993*, 43-50.

18 Annabel Rodda, *Women and the Environment*, Women and World Development Series (London and N.J.: Zed Books, 1991), 38.

19 For the effects of excessive militarization on these countries' social welfare, see George Kim, "The Arms Race and Its Consequences for Developing Countries," in *A Peace Reader*:

*Essential Readings on War, Justice, Non-Violence and World Order*, ed. Joseph Fahey and Richard Armstrong (New York: Paulist Press, 1987, 148 ff.

20 Shimon Peres and Arye Naor, *The New Middle East* (New York: Henry Holt, 1993), 87.

21 Ishac Diwan and Nick Papandreou, "The Peace Process and Economic Reforms in the Middle East," in *The Economics of Middle East*, ed. Stanley Fischer and others (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), 19-20.

22 William D. Hartung, *And Weapons for All* (New York: Harper Collins, 1994), 205.

23 *Ibid.*, 203.

24 Charles A. Kimball, *Religion Politics and Oil: The Volatile Mix in the Middle East* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1992), 82.

25 *Ibid.* See also Peres and Naor, *Middle East*, 89.

26 Hartung, *Weapons*, 213.

27 Ernie Regehr, *Militarism and the Word Order: A Study Guide for Churches* (Geneva: Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches, 1980), 4.

28 Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1986* (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1986), 20.

29 Kane, "Wars," 74.

30 Gary Gardner, "Third World Debt Still Growing," in *Vital Signs 1995: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1995), 72.

31 Rizkallah Hilan, "The Effects on Economic Development in Syria of a Just and Long-Lasting Peace," in *The Economics of Middle East*, ed. Stanley Fischer and others (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), 59.

32 Kane, "Wars," 74.

33 Hilan, "Economic Development," 58-59.

34 Linus Pauling, "Reflections on the Persian Gulf War," in *Waging Peace: Vision and Hope for the 21st Century*, ed. David Krieger and Frank Kelly (Chicago: Noble Press, 1992), 31.

35 Thomas H. Etzold, *Defense or Delusion? American Military in the 1980s* (New York: Harper and Row, 1982), 17.

36 *Ibid.*, 18.

37 Kim, "Arms Race," 148.

38 Naji Abi-Hashem, "The Impact of the Gulf War on the Churches in the Middle East: A Socio-cultural and Spiritual Analysis," *Pastoral Psychology* 41 (Spring 1992), 14.

39 Kimball, *Religion Politics*, 85-86. Italics mine.

40 Ramsey Clark, *The Fire This Time: U.S. War Crime in the Gulf* (New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1992), 218.

41 Hartung, *Weapons*, 213.

42 Kimball, *Religion Politics*, 71.

43 Birgit B. Utne, *Educating for Peace: A Feminist Perspective* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1985), 11.

44 Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (New York: Modern Library, 1937), 315.

45 Michael J. Sheehan, *Arms Control: Theory and Practice* (Oxford, U.K.: Basil Blackwell, 1988), 68.

46 Lourdes Beneria and Rebecca Blank, "Women and the Economics of Military Spending," in *Rocking the Ship of State: Toward a Feminist Peace Politics*, ed. Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 195.

47 Peter S. Henriot, "Disarmament and Development: The Lasting Challenge to Peace," in *Peace in a Nuclear Age: The Bishops' Letter in Perspective*, ed. Charles J. Reid, Jr. (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 231.

48 *World Development Report 1994* (Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1994), 1.

49 Anne E. Platt, "Infectious Diseases Return," in *Vital Signs 1996: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1996), 130-31.

50 *World Development Report 1993* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 1.

51 Sivard, *Expenditures 1993*, 31.

52 Michael Renner, "Preparing for Peace," in *State of the World 1993: A World Watch Institute Report on Progress Toward A Sustainable Society*, ed. Linda Starke (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1993), 139.

53 John Kiang, *One World: The Approaches to Permanent Peace on Earth and the General Happiness of Mankind* (Notre Dame, Ind.: One World, 1984), 353.

54 M. L. Oliphant, "The Threat to Civilization from Atomic Warfare," in *Paths to Peace: A Study of War Its Causes and Prevention*, ed. Victor H. Wallace (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1970), 220.

55 Krieger and Kelly, "Introduction," xv.

56 Kane, "Wars," 110.

57 Robert McAfee Brown, *Making Peace in the Global Village* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1981), 48-49.

58 The Harvard Nuclear Study Group, *Living with Nuclear Weapons* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1983), 32.

59 Williard J. Jacobson, "The Last Day of Civilization," in *Education for Peace and Disarmament: Toward a Living World*, ed. Douglass Sloan (New York: Teachers College Press, 1983), 245.

60 Kiang, *One World*, 359-60, n. 19.

61 Dietrich Fischer, *Preventing War in the Nuclear Age* (London and Canberra: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984), 12.

62 Harvard Nuclear Study Group, *Nuclear Weapons*, 4.

63 Michael Renner, "Military Expenditures Falling," in *Vital Signs 1992: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1992), 86.

64 Kiang, *One World*, 380.

65 Freda Rajotte, "Justice, Peace, and the Integrity of Creation," *Religious Education*, 85, no. 1 (Winter 1990), 8; see also different estimations in Fischer, *Preventing War*, 12; Sivard, *Expenditures 1993*, 10; and Michael Renner, "Cleaning Up After the Arms Race," in *State of the World 1994: A World Watch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society*, ed. Linda Starke (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1994), 138.

66 Michael Renner, "Nuclear Arsenals Decline Again," in *Vital Signs 1995: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1995), 106; Michael Renner, "Nuclear Arsenals Continue to Decline," in *Vital Signs 1996: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1996), 100-101.

67 Sheehan, *Arms Control*, 10.

- 68 Francis X. Winters, "The Nuclear Arms Race: Machine Versus Man," in *Ethics and Nuclear Strategy?* Ed., Harold P. Ford and Francis X. Winters (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1977), 146.
- 69 Fischer, *Preventing War*, 12.
- 70 Leon Vickman, "Why Nuclear Weapons Are Illegal?" in *Waging Peace: Vision and Hope for the 21st Century*, ed. David Krieger and Frank K. Kelly (Chicago: Noble Press, 1992), 89.
- 71 Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1985* (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1985), 5.
- 72 Kiang, *One World*, 372.
- 73 Barash, *Introduction*, 112.
- 74 *Ibid.*, 112-13.
- 75 Larry Agran, "A Peace Conversion Program," in *Waging Peace: Vision and Hope for the 21st Century*, ed. David Krieger and Frank K. Kelly (Chicago: Noble Press), 63-64.
- 76 Agran, "Peace," 63-64.
- 77 Rodda, *Women*, 37.
- 78 Kim, "Arms Race," 153-54.
- 79 Jerry Folk, *Doing Theology Doing Justice* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991), 7.
- 80 Fernand Braudel, *Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800*, trans. Miriam Kochan (New York: Harper and Row, 1973), 92.
- 81 *Ibid.*, 93.
- 82 Alan T. Durning, "Income Distribution Worsening" in *Vital Signs 1992: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke (New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1992), 110.
- 83 Lester Brown, "The Acceleration of History," in *State of the World 1996: A World Watch Institute Report on Progress toward a Sustainable Society*, ed. Linda Starke (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1996), 3-4.
- 84 *Ibid.*, 8.
- 85 Folk, *Doing Theology*, 31.
- 86 Durning, "Income Distribution," 110-11.
- 87 A. Frazer Evans, Robert A. Evans and William B. Kennedy, *Pedagogies for the Non-Poor* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987), 260-61; Folk, *Doing Theology*, 33.
- 88 Folk, *Doing Theology*, 33.
- 89 Paul A. Samuelson and William D. Nordhaus, *Economics*, 13th ed., (New York: McGraw-Hill Book, 1989), 644-51.
- 90 National Conference of Catholic Bishops, *Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy* (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1986), 83; Agran, "Peace Conversion" 65.
- 91 Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88* (Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1988), 28.
- 92 James P. Grant, *The State of the World's Children 1987* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 109.
- 93 Folk, *Doing Theology*, 32.
- 94 John Ronsvalle and Sylvia Ronsvalle, *The Poor Have Faces: Loving Your Neighbor in the 21st Century* (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1992), 36; Barash, *Introduction*, 542.
- 95 The Hunger Project, *Ending Hunger: An Idea Whose Time Has Come* (New York: Praeger, 1985), 7.
- 96 Reardon, *Women*, 96-97.

- 97 *World Development Report 1993*, 4.
- 98 David, *Introduction*, 528.
- 99 Folk, *Doing Theology*, 33.
- 100 Barbara Omolade, "We Speak for the Planet," in *Rocking the Ship of State: Toward a Feminist Peace Politics*, ed. Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), 177; Huddleston, *Peace*, 22-23.
- 101 Caroline Thomas, *In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations* (Boulder: Colo.: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987), 92.
- 102 Q: 11:6: "There is no moving creature on earth but its substance dependeth on Allah: He knoweth its resting place and its temporary deposit: all is in a clear Record." See also 6:151; 7:54; 13:16-17; 21: 30-33; 66: 2-3.
- 103 Frances M. Lappe' and Joseph Collins, *World Hunger: Twelve Myths* (New York: Grove Press, 1986), 9; Barash, *Introduction*, 542; Sivard, *Expenditures 1985*, 27-28.
- 104 Barash, *Introduction*, 542-43; Kiang, *One World*, 451-53.
- 105 Nathan Keyfitz, "World Resources and the World Middle Class," in *Toward a Just World Order* Vol. 1, ed. Richard Falk and others (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), 300.
- 106 Keith Griffin, *World Hunger and the World Economy* (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987), 9.
- 107 See Lester R. Brown, "World Economy Expanding Steadily," in *Vital Signs 1996: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1996), 74-75.
- 108 Quoted in Mairead C. Magurie, "A Nonviolent Political Agenda for a More Humane World," in *Waging Peace: Vision and Hope for the 21st Century*, ed. David Krieger and Frank Kelly (Chicago: Noble Press, 1992), 55.
- 109 Renner, "Budgeting," 153.
- 110 Michael Renner, "Peacekeeping Expenditures Level Off," in *Vital Signs 1996: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke (New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1996), 101-103.
- 111 *Ibid.*, 102-103.
- 112 Q: 3:110. Unless otherwise indicated, the verses of the Qur'an are given from Yusuf Ali's translation. *The Holy Qur'an: English Translation of the Meanings and Commentary* (al-Madinah: King Fahd Holy Qur'an, 1410. H.)
- 113 Fazlur Rahman, *Major Themes of the Qur'an* (Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980), 62.
- 114 Sayyed Qutb, *Islam and Universal Peace* (Indianapolis: American Trust, 1977), 9.
- 115 Muhammad A. Mannan, *Economic Development and Social Peace in Islam: An Analytical Study of the Process of Economic Development in the Muslim Community of Today*, (London: Ta Ha and Bangladesh Social Peace Foundation: 1990), 79.
- 116 *Ibid.* 79.
- 117 Suzanne C. Toton, "Structural Change: The Next Step in Justice Education," *Religious Education* 80, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 457.
- 118 Q: 2:34; 17:61; and 18:50.
- 119 Q: 2:31.
- 120 Q: 2:30
- 121 Q: 33:72.
- 122 Q: 15:29; 38:72; 95:4.
- 123 Q: 14:32; 27:60-61; 31:20; 36:71-73.

- 124 Q: 4:36; 24:55.
- 125 Q: 5:32; see for others 6:151; 17:33; 25:68.
- 126 Abu'l A'la Mawdudi, "Human Rights in Islam," *Al-Tawhid* 4, no. 3 (Rajab-Ramadan, 1407 [1987]), 63.
- 127 M. A. Salahi, *Muhammad: Man and Prophet: A Complete Study of the Life of the Prophet of Islam* (Rockport, Mass.: Element Books, 1995), 721; Abd al-Malik Ibn Hisham, *The Life of Muhammad*, trans. A. Guillaume (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), 649.
- 128 Mawdudi, "Human Rights," 63.
- 129 Abdul Hameed Siddiqi, *Jihad in Islam* (Lahore, Pakistan: Kazi, 1979), 14.
- 130 Majid Khadduri, *War and Peace in the Law of Islam* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955), 70.
- 131 Abdul al-Rahman Ibn Khaldun, *The Mukaddimah: An Introduction to History*, Bollingen Series, trans. Franz Rosenthal, ed. and abridged by N.J. Dawood (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 223-24.
- 132 Q: 22:40; see also 2:251; 2:216; 22:39. Italics mine.
- 133 Siddiqi, *Jihad*, 20-21.
- 134 See the Qur'an 7:179; 25:44; 95:5-6.
- 135 Ibrahim M. Shalaby, "Islam and Peace," *Journal of Religious Thought* 34 (Fall-Winter 1977-78), 47.
- 136 Khadduri, *War*, 141.
- 137 See the Qur'an: 2:191-193, 217; 8:39.
- 138 Muhammad N. K. Khel, "Jihad and the Projection and the Spread of Islam," *Hamdard Islamicus* 7, no. 4 (Winter 1984), 40. See also Mehdi Abedi and Gary Legenhausen, "Introduction," in *Jihad and Shahadat Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam*, ed. Mehdi Abedi and Gary Legenhausen (Houston, Tex.: The Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1986), 1.
- 139 A. J. Abraham and George Haddad, *The Warriors of God Jihad (Holy War) and the Fundamentalists of Islam* (Bristol, Ind.: Wyndham Press, 1989), 28-29; John Kelsay, *Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics* (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993), 46-47.
- 140 Abdulrahman A. Kurdi, *The Islamic State: A Study Based on the Islamic Holy Constitution* (New York: Mansell, 1984), 111.
- 141 Marcel A. Boisard, *Jihad: A Commitment to Universal Peace* (Indianapolis: American Trust, 1988), 35.
- 142 Karl Wolfgang Tröger, "Peace and Islam: In Theory and Practice," trans. M. Walpole, *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 1 (January 1990), 19; Kelsay, *Islam and War*, 107-8; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, "War and Peace in the Islamic Tradition and International Law," in *Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions*, ed. John Kelsay and James T. Johnson, (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 196.
- 143 Fazlur Rahman, "Islam: An Overview," in *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, ed. Mircea Eliade (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 7: 319.
- 144 Ali E. Hillal Dessouki, "Islamic Modernism," in *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, ed. Mircea Eliade (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 10: 14.
- 145 Dessouki, "Islamic Modernism," 14.
- 146 One of the legal sources of Islam; independent legal reasoning based on the Qur'an and *hadith* engaged in by an authoritative Muslim scholar.

- 147 Abdulwahab S. Babear, "Intellectual Currents in Contemporary Islam," *The Muslim World* 81 no. 3-4 (1991), 240; John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 50; Ahmad S. Moussalli, *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyed Qutb* (Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1992), 214.
- 148 John L. Esposito, *Islam and Politics*, 2nd ed. (New York: Syracuse University Press, 1987), 45-46.
- 149 Quoted in Esposito, *Islam*, 48.
- 150 Ibid., 48-49; Sayyed Hossein Nasr, *Traditional Islam in the Modern World* (New York: KPI, 1987), 301-2. Mohamed Al-Nowaihi, "Problems of Modernization in Islam," *The Muslim World* 65 (July: 1975), 176.
- 151 Ibid. 176.
- 152 Esposito, *Islam*, 50.
- 153 S. Abdullah Schleifer, "Jihad: Modernist Apologists, Modern Apologetics," *The Islamic Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (1984), 26-27.
- 154 Ibid., 37.
- 155 Ibid., 29; Rudolph Peters, *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History*, Religion and History Series (The Hague, N.Y.: Mouton, 1979), 134.
- 156 Moulavi Chiragh Ali, *A Critical Exposition of the Popular Jihad* (Karachi: Karimsons, 1977), 116.
- 157 Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din al-Hilati and others, *Interpretation of the Meaning of the Noble Qur'an in the English Language: A Summarized Version of At-Tabari, Al-Qurtubi and Ibn Kathir with Comments from Sahih al-Bukhari* (Riddah, Saudi Arabia: Maktaba Dar-us Salam, 1994), 45, n.1.
- 158 Schleifer, "Modernist Apologists," 32; Q: 2:191.
- 159 Q: 2:190.
- 160 Ali, *Popular Jihad*, 33.
- 161 John Obert Voll, *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982), 177-78.
- 162 Mahmut Shaltut, "Koran and Fighting," in *Jihad in Medieval and Modern Times*, translated and annotated by Rudolph Peters (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), 26-27.
- 163 See the Qur'an: 49: 9-10.
- 164 Shaltut, "Fighting," 40.
- 165 Shaltut, "Fighting," 41.
- 166 Ibid., 41-42; Q: 22: 39-40.
- 167 Shaltut, "Fighting," 44-45.
- 168 Q: 2: 190-3; and also 4:75, 84, 90-91; 9: 12-14, 36.
- 169 Shaltut, "Fighting," 53; see the Qur'an: 9:36; 2:191.
- 170 Q: 9:29.
- 171 For the characteristics of the People of the Book see the Qur'an: 2:140; 5:82; 9:30-31.
- 172 Shaltut, "Fighting," 48.
- 173 Ibid., 49.
- 174 Ibid., 50.
- 175 Ibid. Abu Abd-Allah Muhammad ibn Isma'il al- Bukhari, *Al-Sahih* (Istanbul, Turkey, Çađri Yay., 1992), *Iman*: 17-18; Abu al-Husayn Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj, *Sahih*, (Istanbul, Turkey,

- Çađri Yay., 1992), *Iman*: 33-36; Sulayman ibn al-Ash'ath Abu Dawud, *Sunan* (Istanbul, Turkey, Çađri Yay., 1992), *Jihad*: 95.
- 176 Shaltut, "Fighting," 31.
- 177 Ibid., 31-32. For references from the Qur'an see 4:165; 5:19; 10:47, 99; 11:28, 118; 16:36, 89.
- 178 Shaltut, "Fighting," 36. For references from the Qur'an see (for the Meccan part) 81:27-28; 88:21-26; and (for the Medinan part) 2:256; 24:54.
- 179 Shaltut, "Fighting," 54.
- 180 Shaltut, "Fighting," 50-51.
- 181 Muhammad Abu Zahra, *The Concept of War in Islam*, Studies in Islam Series, trans. Muhammad Al-Hady and Taha Omar (Cairo: Ministry of Waqf, n. d.), 8.
- 182 Ibid., 9.
- 183 Ebu Zahra, *Concept of War*, 9; Q: 22:40.
- 184 Ebu Zahra, *Concept of War*, 12.
- 185 Ibid., 32.
- 186 Ebu Zahra, *Concept of War*, 35.
- 187 Ibid., 24.
- 188 Ibid., 57. Muslim, *Sayd*: 57; Abu Isa Muhammad ibn Isa Tirmidhi, *Al-Sunan* (Istanbul, Turkey, Çađri Yay., 1992), *Diyat*: 14; Muhammad ibn Yazid ibn Majah, *Sunan* (Istanbul, Turkey, Çađri Yay., 1992), *Zabaih*: 3.
- 189 Q: 2:190.
- 190 Ebu Zahra, *Concept of War*, 18.
- 191 Ibid., 23.
- 192 Ibid., 37.
- 193 Ebu Zahra, *Concept of War*, 52; see the Qur'an 2:190-93; 4:75-84, 90-91.
- 194 Ebu Zahra, *Concept of War*, 53.
- 195 Ibid., 75.
- 196 Q: 8:61.
- 197 Q: 2:208. Abu Zahra's translation.
- 198 Frederic M. Denny, "The Legacy of Fazlur Rahman," in *The Muslims of America*, ed. Yvonne Y. Haddad (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 96-108.
- 199 Rahman, *Major Themes*, 64.
- 200 Q: 9:41.
- 201 Rahman, *Major Themes*, 62.
- 202 Q: 2:143. Rahman's translation.
- 203 Q: 3:104, 110. Rahman's translation.
- 204 Q: 22:41.
- 205 Rahman, *Major Themes*, 64.
- 206 Ibid. 64; Rahman for this idea cited the following verses: 3:142; 4:95; 9:16; 29:1-2.
- 207 Q: 3:64. Rahman's translation.
- 208 Rahman, *Major Themes*, 63.
- 209 Ibid.
- 210 See Rahman, *Major Themes*, Appendix II, "The People of the Book and Diversity of 'Religions,'" 162-170.
- 211 Rahman, *Major Themes*, 63.

212 Andreas D'Souza, "The Challenge of Fundamentalism: A Crisis in Understanding A Paper Presented at the Silver Jubilee Celebration Seminar of the Christian Study Center, Rawalpindi, Pakistan 22-27 November 1993)," in *Annual Report 1993 of Uppsala Studies of Mission*, ed. C.F. Hallencreutz and S. Axelson (Uppsala, Sweden: University of Uppsala, 1994), 9; see also George M. Marsden, "Evangelical and Fundamental Christianity," in *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, ed. Mircea Eliade (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 5: 190-91.

213 Frederick M. Denny, *Islam and the Muslim Community* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 117.

214 Frederic M. Denny, *An Introduction to Islam* 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1994), 345.

215 Riffat Hassan, "The Burgeoning of Islamic Fundamentalism: Toward an Understanding of the Phenomenon," in *The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: A View from Within; A Response from without*, ed. Norman J. Cohen (Grand Rapids, Mich. William B. Eerdmans, 1990), 158.

216 Ibid.

217 Elsayed Elshaded, "What is the Challenge of Contemporary Islamic Fundamentalism?," in *Fundamentalism as an Ecumenical Challenge*, Concilium 1992/3, ed. Hans Küng and Jürgen Moltmann (London: SCM Press, 1992), 61-69.

218 Hassan, "Islamic Fundamentalism," 162-63; Elshaded, "Islamic Fundamentalism," 61-63. For the fundamentals of Islam see the Qur'an: 2:177.

219 D'Souza, "Challenge of Fundamentalism," 30.

220 Ibid., 15.

221 Nasr, *Traditional Islam*, 304-305; for a similar definition of Islamic fundamentalism see John O. Voll, "Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan," in *Fundamentalism Observed*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 347; Bruce B. Lawrence, *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt Against the Modern Age* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989), 214.

222 Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 193.

223 Yvonne Y. Haddad, "The Qur'anic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: The View of Sayyid Qutb," *The Middle East Journal* 37, no. 1 (Winter 1983), 26.

224 Yvonne Y. Haddad, "Sayyed Qutb: Ideology of Islamic Revival," in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, ed. John L. Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 72.

225 Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 193.

226 Ibid., 214.

227 Denny, *Introduction*, 347.

228 Voll, "Fundamentalism," 364.

229 Esposito, *Islam*, 131.

230 Ibid., 132.

231 Mumtaz Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamat-I Islami and the Teblighi Jamaat," in *Fundamentalism Observed*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 507-8.

232 Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, 134-35.

233 Lawrence, *Defenders of God*, 217. In the next pages, we will discuss Faraj's thoughts on this matter. However, his text was translated as "The Neglected Duty," instead of "The Missing Imperative."

234 Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, 130.

235 Nasr, *Traditional Islam*, 306.

- 236 Haddad, "Sayyed Qutb," 67-73.
- 237 Qutb, *Islam*, 9.
- 238 Qutb, *Islam*, 9.
- 239 Ibid., 10, 12, 80.
- 240 Ibid., 53.
- 241 References from the Qur'an see 2:190; 4:75.
- 242 Qutb, *Islam*, 72.
- 243 Sayyed Qutb, *Milestones*, revised and trans. by Ahmad Zaki Hammad (Indianapolis: American Trust, 1990), 57.
- 244 Qutb, *Islam*, 59.
- 245 Qutb, *Islam*, 47.
- 246 Ibid., 62.
- 247 Voll, "Fundamentalism," 371.
- 248 Qutb, *Milestones*, 66.
- 249 Ibid., 67; see the Qur'an: 5:18, 64, 73; 9:30. For more information concerning Judeo-Christian tradition see Sayyed Qutb, "That Hideous Schizophrenia," in *Christianity through Non-Christian Eyes*, ed. Paul J. Griffiths (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1990), 73-81.
- 250 Qutb, *Milestones*, 67; Niels C. Nielsen, *Fundamentalism, Myths, and World Religions* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1993), 89.
- 251 Qutb, *Milestones*, 68; see the Qur'an: 5:44, 45, 47, 60, 65.
- 252 Qutb, *Milestones*, 68-69; Denny, *Introduction*, 350.
- 253 Moussalli, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 205.
- 254 Qutb, *Milestones*, 50.
- 255 Q: 2:190: 4: 77; 9:29.
- 256 Qutb, *Milestones*, 53.
- 257 Ibid., 50; Youssef M. Choueiri, *Islamic Fundamentalism* (Boston: Twayne, 1990), 137.
- 258 Qutb, *Milestones*, 62.
- 259 Ibid., 102.
- 260 Qutb, *Milestones*, 50; Choueiri, *Fundamentalism*, 137.
- 261 Qutb, *Milestones*, 102.
- 262 Ibid., 107-108.
- 263 Ibid., 107-108, 102.
- 264 Sayyed Qutb, *Islam: The Misunderstood Religion* (Kuwait: al-Asriyya Printing Press, 1964), 13; see the Qur'an: 22: 39-40.
- 265 Qutb, *Islam*, 14.
- 266 Choueiri, *Fundamentalism*, 137.
- 267 Qutb, *Islam*, 15.
- 268 Qutb, *Milestones*, 46.
- 269 Ibid., 50.
- 270 Qutb, *Milestones*, 61.
- 271 Moussalli, *Islamic Fundamentalism*, 208.
- 272 Qutb, *Milestones*, 53.
- 273 Q: 2: 256.
- 274 Qutb, *Islam*, 12.
- 275 Sheila McDonough, *Muslim Ethics and Modernity: A Comparative Study of the Ethical Thought of Sayyed Ahmad Khan and Mawlana Mawdudi* (Ontario, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier

University Press, 1984), 55-59; Charles J. Adams, "Mawdudi and the Islamic State," in *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, ed. John L. Esposito (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), 99-111.

276 Abu'l A'la Mawdudi, *Jihad in Islam* (Lahore, Pakistan: International Islamic Federation of Student Organizations: 1980), 5; *Towards Understanding Islam*, trans. and ed. Khurshid Ahmad (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Teaching Center, 1988), 94.

277 Mawdudi, *Jihad*, 7.

278 Ibid., 8-9.

279 Ibid., 22.

280 Mawdudi, *Understanding Islam*, 94.

281 Mawdudi, *Jihad*, 19.

282 Ibid., 6.

283 Mawdudi, *Jihad*, 16-17.

284 See the Qur'an: 11:18-19; 18:28; 26: 151-52.

285 Mawdudi, *Jihad*, 11.

286 Ibid., 13.

287 Ibid., 18. For this job, he gave the following verses as references: 2:193; 3:110 and 8:73.

288 Mawdudi, *Jihad*, 7.

289 Mawdudi, *Jihad*, 26. It must be noted that when he wrote "Muslim Party," he meant "Muslim community." He used this term for the Prophet and his soldiers, and later the caliphs. Therefore, it was not a political party of Pakistan or elsewhere, but it was a general term designated for the Muslim community as a whole.

290 Adams, "Mawdudi," 122.

291 Mawdudi, *Jihad*, 27; see also Adams, "Mawdudi," 122; Ann Elizabeth Mayer, *Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), 159.

292 Mawdudi, *Jihad*, 27-28.

293 Ibid., 28.

294 E. Sivan, *Radical Islam, Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985), 127.

295 Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, Al-Faridah al- Gha'ibah, "The Neglected Duty," in *The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East*, trans. by Johannes J. G. Jansen (New York: Macmillan, 1986), 160-61.

296 Faraj, "Neglected Duty," 165.

297 Ibid., 183-84. See Bukhari, *Jihad*: 1; Abu abd al-Rahman ibn Suayb an-Nasai, *Sunan* (Istanbul, Turkey, Çađri Yay., 1992), *Hac*: 4.

298 Ibid.

299 Ibid., 199.

300 Ibid., 200.

301 Faraj, "Neglected Duty," 169.

302 Ibid., 170-71.

303 Ibid. Q: 2:193; 8:39. Faraj's translation.

303 Innovating something which is against the basic fundamentals of Islamic law and doctrine.

304 Faraj, "Neglected Duty," 191-93.

305 Ibid., 169, 193.

306 Ibid., 200.

307 Ibid.

- 308 Ibid., 193.
- 309 Q: 9:5.
- 310 Faraj, "Neglected Duty," 195-96.
- 311 Khadduri, War, 57; Abraham and Haddad, *Warriors of God*, 26.
- 312 Faraj, "Neglected Duty," 200-1.
- 313 Ibid.
- 314 See the Qur'an: 2: 249; 3: 139; 9: 25.
- 315 Faraj, "Neglected Duty," 185-86.
- 316 Rahman, "Islam," 313-16.
- 317 Bayhaqi, *al-Sunan al-Kubra*, Zuhd, 373.
- 318 Syed Ali Ashraf, "The Inner Meaning of the Islamic Rites: Prayer, Pilgrimage, Fasting, *Jihad*," in *Islamic Spirituality: Foundations*, ed. Sayyed Hossein Nasr (New York: Crossroad, 1987), 125.
- 319 Q: 4:76.
- 320 Montgomery W. Watt, "Islamic Conceptions of Holy War," in *The Holy War*, ed. Thomas Patrick Murphy (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976), 155; see also John Renard, "Al- *Jihad* al-Akbar: Notes on a Theme in Islamic Spirituality," *The Muslim World* 78 (July-October: 1988), 225.
- 321 Ibn Majah, *Fiten*: 20; Nasai, *Beyat* 37; Ahmad ibn Hanbal, *Musnad* (Istanbul, Turkey, Çađri Yay., 1992), 3:19, 4:314.
- 322 Tirmidhi, *Fazail al-Jihad*: 2; Ibn Hanbal, *Musnad*, 6:20-22.
- 323 Ashraf, "Inner Meaning," 128; Alvin Moore, "The Sword of Islam (Sayf al-Islam)," *Hamdard Islamicus* 14, no 1 (Spring 1991), 16.
- 324 Ashraf, "Inner Meaning," 126; see the Qur'an: 2: 27.
- 325 Renard, "*Jihad*," 235.
- 326 S. Abdullah Schleifer, "*Jihad* and Traditional Islamic Consciousness" *The Islamic Quarterly* 27, no.4 (1983), 199.
- 327 Ashraf, "Inner Meaning," 126.
- 328 Ibid., 129. According to some Muslim scholars this is not a *hadith*, but a saying of Sufis. See Muhammad b. Sayyed Dervish, *Asnal-Matalib* (Misir: 1355), 247.
- 329 Jane Smith, "Sayyed Hossein Nasr: Defender of the Sacred and Islamic Traditionalism," in *The Muslims of America*, ed. Yvonne Y. Haddad (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 80-95.
- 330 Sayyed Hossein Nasr, "Islam," in *Our Religions*, ed. Arvind Sharma (San Francisco: Harper, 1993), 475.
- 331 Sayyed Hossein Nasr, "The Spiritual Significance of *Jihad*," *Parabola* 7, no. 4 (1982), 17-19.
- 332 Sayyed Hossein Nasr, *Ideals and Realities of Islam* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), 73.
- 333 Ibid., 74.
- 334 Nasr, *Traditional Islam*, 31.
- 335 Bawa M. R. Muhaiyadden, *Islam and World Peace: Explanations of a Sufi*, foreword by Annemarie Schimmel (Philadelphia: Fellowship Press, 1987), 48.
- 336 Muhaiyadden, *World Peace*, 49.
- 337 Ibid., 51.
- 338 Muhaiyadden, *World Peace*, 52.
- 339 Ibid.

340John Huddleston gives the following examples from the 1945-1990 period related to the effect of religions in different regions: two decades of civil war between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland; an ongoing civil war in Lebanon, the assault on the Golden Temple of Amritsar, the assassination of the Prime Minister of India, Mrs. Gandhi, full scale terrorism in the Punjab and, of course, the resurgence of a fundamentalist and militarist form of Islam in Iran and other countries in Asia and Africa. Huddleston, *Peace*, 20.

341Ibid.

342Abedi and Legenhausen, "Introduction," 1.

343Shalaby, "Islam," 46.

344See M. Daniel Norman, *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image* (Oxford, England: One World, 1993), 146-48; Bruce Lawrence, "Holy War (*Jihad*) in Islamic Religion and Nation State Ideologies," in *Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions*, ed. John Kelsay and James T. Johnson (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 142.

345Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, 3.

346Ibid., 4.

347Mohammed Arkoun, "Is Islam Threatened by Christianity?" trans. John Bowden, in *Islam: A Challenge for Christianity*, Concilium, 1994/3, ed. Hans Küng and Jürgen Moltmann, (London: SCM Press, 1994), 49.

348Fazlur Rahman, *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), 145.

349Ibid., 161.

350Muhammed Al-Ghazali, *The Message of Islam to Greet the Fifteenth Century (A.H.)* (Delhi: Hindustan, 1982), 141.

351Q: 8:65.

352Q: 8:66.

353Yusuf Ali, *The Holy Qur'an English Translation of the Meanings and Commentary* (Al - Madinah: King Fahd Holy Qur'an, 1410 H.), 488-89, n. 1232-33.

354Q: 8:60.

355Abdullah b. Muhammad b. Hamid, *Al Jihad (Fighting for Allah's Cause) in the Holy Qur'an* (Chicago: Kazi, n. d.), xxxiii; see for the related verses 3:139-42; 2:249; 30:47; 37:171-73; 47-7.

356W. Montgomery Watt, "Islam and Peace," *Studia Missionaria* 38 (1989), 171.

357Watt argues that some Islamic countries have chemical weapons and used them against each other, referring to the Iran-Iraq War. To him this shows the failure of traditionalist Muslim jurists to deal with contemporary problems. Thus there is an urgent need for Muslim jurists to devote much time and thought on this issue. According to him, by doing so "The aim should be to reach widespread agreement about the detailed elaboration of how the principles are to be applied in various fields, and then to publish the results with due authority, so that all conscientious Muslims may join in putting pressure on Muslim statesmen to act in accordance with the Shari'ah." Ibid., 174.

358 The verse reads as follows: "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into [the hearts of] the enemies, of Allah and your enemies and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know."

359Q: 2:194.

360Q: 2:193.

361Bukhari, *Iman*: 17-18; Muslim, *Iman*: 33-36; Abu Dawud, *Jihad*: 95.

362They say: "To those against whom war is made, permission is given [to fight], because they are wronged . . . [They are] those who have been expelled from their homes in defiance of right, -[For no cause] except that they say, 'Our Lord is Allah.'"

363Louay M. Safi, "War and Peace in Islam," *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, 5 (Spring 1988), 36.

364Q: 2:256.

365Q: 18:29.

366Mawdudi, "Human Rights," 78-79.

367Ibid., 79.

368 Qutb, *Misunderstood Religion*, 317.

369Q: 10:99.

370Q: 6:107; see for others 2:213; 5:48; 10:19; 11:118; 16:82; 17:15; 18:29; 42:48.

371Q: 6:125; see others 18:29; 17:15; 29:46.

372For religious freedom in Islam see Isma'il al-Faruqi, "On The Nature of Islamic *Da'wah*," *International Review of Mission*, 65 (1976), 391-400; Mohamed Talbi, "Religious Liberty: A Muslim Perspective," in *Muslims in Dialogue: The Evolution of a Dialogue*, ed. Leonard Swidler (Lewiston, N. Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 481; Mohamed Talbi, "Islam and Dialogue- Some Reflections on a Current Topic," in *Christianity Through Non-Christian Eyes*, ed. Paul J. Griffiths (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1990), 90-91; Riffat Hassan, "On Human Rights and the Qur'anic Perspective," in *Muslims in Dialogue: The Evolution of A Dialogue*, ed. Leonard Swidler (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992), 458, 470; Roger Garaudy, "Human Rights and Islam: Foundation, Tradition, Violation," in *The Ethics of World Religions and Human Rights*, Concilium 1990/2, ed. Hans Küng and Jürgen Moltmann (London: SCM Press, 1990), 46-60; Mayer, *Islam*, 147; and Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, "Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the Qur'an," in *Human Rights and the Conflict of Cultures: Western and Islamic Perspectives on Religious Liberty*, ed. David Little, John Kelsay, and Abdulaziz A. Sachedina (Columbia, S. C.: University of South California Press, 1988), 53-100.

373See Peters, *Islam and Colonialism*, 119.

374Safi, "War," 45.

375 See for the classical Muslim Jurists' views on this matter Majid Khadduri, *The Islamic Law of Naitons: Shaybani's Siyar* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1966), 195, 224, Khadduri, *War*, 74-82, 143-44, 162-63, John Kelsay, "Religion, Morality, and the Governance of War: The Case of Classical Islam," *The Journal of Religious Ethics* 18, no.2 (Fall 1990), 125; Bernard Lewis, *The Political Language of Islam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 71-90; Muhammad Hamidullah, *Muslim Conduct of State*, 4th ed. (Lahore, Pakistan: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1961), 171.

376Q: 3:28

377Q: 60:1; see for others 4: 139, 144; 5:51; 9:23.

378Q: 60:8.

379Yusuf al-Qaradavi, *Non-Muslims in the Islamic Society*, translated by Khalil Muhammad Hamad and Sayed M. Ali Shah (Indianapolis: American Trust, 1985), 44-45.

380Q: 38:72.

381Q: 2:34.

382Q: 95:4.

383Q: 22:68-69; Al-Qaradawi, *Non-Muslims*, 31-32.

- 384Q: 2:62 and 5:69.
- 385Rahman, *Major Themes*, 166.
- 386Q: 5:2.
- 387Q: 2:148; and 2:177; Rahman, *Major Themes*,
- 388Ghazali, *Message of Islam*, 139.
- 389Ibid., 139-40.
- 390See the Qur'an: 3:20, 176-77; 6:107; 24:54; 39:41; 50:45; 88:21-22.
- 391W. Montgomery Watt, *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity* (New York: Routledge, 1988), 104.
- 392M. K. N. Belkacem, "The Concept of Social Justice in Islam," in *The Challenge of Islam*, ed. Altaf Gauhar (Islamic Council of Europe, 1978), 135.
- 393Majid Khadduri, *The Islamic Concept of Justice* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 10; M. M. Ahsan, "Human Rights in Islam: Personal Dimensions," *Hamdard Islamicus* 13, no. 3 (Autumn: 1990), 8. See some verses related to the concept of justice 2:188, 282; 4:58, 135; 5:8, 7:29; 45; 6:152; 16:90; 31:16; 42:15; 107:1-3.
- 394Khadduri, *Justice*, 10. Tradition in Islam refers to the sayings and practices of the Prophet Muhammad.
- 395Sayed Vali Reza Nasr, "Towards a Philosophy of Islamic Economics," *Hamdard Islamicus* 12, no. 4 (Winter 1989), 51.
- 396M. Umer Chapra, "The Economic System of Islam: A Discussion of Its Goals and Nature, Part I 'Introduction,'" *The Islamic Quarterly* 14, no. 1 (January-March, 1970), 10; see the Qur'an: 5:8.
- 397Sayed Nawab Haider Naqvi, *Ethics and Economics: An Islamic Synthesis* (Leicester, U.K.: Islamic Foundation, 1981), 88.
- 398Q: 15:85 and 44:38-39.
- 399Q: 4:135, see also 5:8.
- 400See the Qur'an: 16:90.
- 401See the Qur'an: 11:113.
- 402 See for more information Khadduri, *Justice*, 1-8; Chandra Muzaffar, "Implementation of Justice in Politics," in *Islam and Justice*, ed. Aidit B. Ghazali (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Institute of Islamic Understanding, 1993), 161.
- 403See the Qur'an: 6:152; 17:34; 4:2, 5-6.
- 404Rahman, *Major Themes*, 38.
- 405M. Umer Chapra, "The Islamic Welfare State and Its Role in the Economy," in *Studies in Islamic Economics*, ed. Khurshid Ahmad (Leicester, U.K.: Islamic Foundation, 1981), 154; "Introduction," 11-12.
- 406 See the Qur'an: 17:16.
- 407Belkacem, "Social Justice," 137.
- 408Abu Hassan Othman, "Implementation of Justice in Social Affairs," in *Islam and Justice*, ed. Aidit B. Ghazali (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Institute of Islamic Understanding, 1993), 67-68.
- 409Mannan, *Economic Development*, 73.
- 410See the Qur'an: 7:32.
- 411Syed N. Haider Naqvi and others, "Principles of Islamic Economics," in *Islamic Economic Alternatives: Critical Perspectives and New Directions*, ed. K. S. Jomo (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Ikraq: 1993), 157.
- 412Q: 11:6; see also 6:151.

- 413Q: 22:65; see for the others 2:29; 16:12-14; and 45:12-13.
- 414Chapra, "Islamic Welfare State and Its Role," 147-48.
- 415Isma'il R. Al-Faruqi, "Islamic Ethics," in *World Religions and Global Ethics*, ed. S. Cromwell Crawford (New York, N.Y.: Paragon House, 1989), 228; see the Qur'an: 16:4, 8; 18:7; 35:12; 37:6.
- 416See the Qur'an: 7:10; 14:32; 31:20.
- 417See the Qur'an: 2:57, 60, 168, 172; 6:142; 7:31; 16:114; 20:81; 23:51; 34:15; 52:19; 69:24; 77:43. .
- 418Chapra, "Introduction," 5; see the Qur'an: 28:77; 62:10.
- 419Bukhari, *T\_b*: 1, 377, 413; Muslim, *Salam*: 69; Ibn Majah, *T\_b*: 1.
- 420Muslim, *Kadar*: 34; Ibn Majah, *Mukaddimah*: 10.
- 421M. Umer Chapra, "The Economic System of Islam: A Discussion of Its Goals and Nature Part IV 'Role of the State,'" 248; Mannan, *Economic Development*, 90.
- 422See the Qur'an: 2:268; 4:95; 40:64; 53:39.
- 423Abu Dawud, *Adab*: 101; Nasai, *Sehw*: 90, *Istiaza*: 16, 29.
- 424Chapra, "Introduction," 6.
- 425Al-Ghazali, *Al-Iqtisad fi'l Itiqad* (Beirut, Dar'ul Amanah, 1969), 214, quoted in Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, "Guarantee of a Minimum Level of Living in Islamic State," *Distributive Justice and Need Fulfilment in an Islamic Economy*, ed. Munawar Iqbal (Islamabad, Pakistan: International Islamic University, n.d.), 255-56.
- 426Naqvi and others, "Islamic Economics," 87. As far as equality before the law is concerned, see many verses such as 2:282; 3:27; 4:58, 135; 7:29; 13:26; 16:90; 29:62; 34:36, 39; 42:12; 57:25. The following *hadith* is sufficient to indicate the Islamic approach towards equality before the law: "There was a theft committed by a woman of Bani Makhzumiyah. The chief of this powerful tribe asked Usamah Ibn Zaid to intervene with the Prophet, who held him in great esteem, since the honor of the tribe would be at stake if the woman was to be subjected to corporal punishment. The Prophet came in, angrily admonishing, "Would you intervene in the punishments set forth by Allah?" Then he turned to the Muslims declaring: "What has been the downfall of nations before you is that when a thief of nobler origin was caught, he was allowed to go free without punishment, whereas the thief of humble origin was submitted to punishment. I swear by all the oaths of Allah that if Fatimah, daughter of Muhammad, committed a theft, I would have her hand cut off." Bukhari, *Hudud*: 12; Muslim, *Hudud*: 8, 9; Abu Dawud, *Hudud*: 4. For income differences see the Qur'an: 4:32; 6:165; 13:26; 16:71; 34:39; 43:32.
- 427See the Qur'an: 43:32.
- 428See the Qur'an: 51:19; 59:7.
- 429See the Qur'an: 15:20; 41:10.
- 430See the Qur'an: 6:165; 43:32.
- 431Chapra, "Islamic Welfare State and Its Role," 157; Muhammad Abdul Mannan, "The Economics of Poverty in Islam with Special Reference to Muslim Countries," in *Distributive Justice and Need Fulfilment in an Islamic Economy*, ed. Munawar Iqbal, 303-34. Islamabad, Pakistan: International Islamic University, n.d., 304; Ziauddin Ahmad, *Islam, Poverty and Income Distribution*, Islamic Economic Series (Leicester, U.K.: Islamic Foundation, 1991), 16.
- 432See the Qur'an: 2:177, 219; 4:11-12, 176; 9:60; 59:7.
- 433Chapra, "Introduction," 16.

- 434Rashid Ahmad Jullundhri, "Human Rights and Islam," in *Understanding Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary and Interfaith Study*, ed. Alan D. Falconer (Dublin: Irish School of Ecumenics, 1980), 35.
- 435Jullundhri, "Human Rights," 35.
- 436Q: 11:6.
- 437See the Qur'an: 2:233.
- 438 Siddiqi, "Minimum Level," 260.
- 439Sayyid Muhammad Yusuf, *Economic Justice in Islam*, 2nd ed. (Lahore, Pakistan: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1977), 6.
- 440Ibid., 4.
- 441 Muhammad Iqbal Anjum, "An Islamic Scheme of Equitable Distribution of Income and Wealth," *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 12, no. 2 (Summer 1995), 225.
- 442Mannan, "Economics of Poverty," 306-308; Chapra, "Islamic Welfare State and Its Role," 148; Siddiqi, "Minimum Level," 258-59, 270.
- 443Q: 4:1; see also 39:6; 49:13.
- 444Qutb, *Islam*, 8.
- 445Q: 49:13. Italics mine.
- 446Ibn Hanbal, *Musnad*, 5: 411.
- 447Muslim, *Birr*: 32; Ibn Majah, *Zuhd*: 9; Ibn Hanbal, *Musnad*, 2: 285, 359.
- 448Muslim, *Birr wa al-Sila*: 66-67.
- 449Ibn Hanbal, *Musnad*, 2: 68, 277, 311.
- 450Ibid., 1: 55.
- 451See the Qur'an: 3:92; 59:9.
- 452Muslim, *Iman*: 71, 72; Nasai, *Iman*: 19.
- 453See the Qur'an: 2:83, 177, 215, 220; 4:2, 36; 8:41; 16:90; 17:26, 34; 29:8; 30:38.
- 454Bukhari, *Adab*: 28; Muslim, *Birr*: 140-41; Ibn Majah, *Adab*: 4.
- 455Muhammad Abdul Mannan, *Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: Islamic Academy, 1986), 335.
- 456Anjum, "Equitable Distribution," 226.
- 457Mushir -UI Haq, "Liberation and Justice Motifs in Islam," *Religion and Society* (Bangalore) 27 (January 1980), 25.
- 458Muhammad Nejatullah Siddiqi, "Muslim Economic Thinking: A Survey of Contemporary Literature," in *Studies in Islamic Economics*, ed. Khurshid Ahmad (Leicester, U.K.: Islamic Foundation, 1981), 195.
- 459Muzaffar, "Implementation of Justice," 178.
- 460Syed Othman Alhabshi, "Justice in Administration and Management," in *Islam and Justice*, ed. Aidit Bin Ghazali, (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Institute of Islamic Understanding, 1993), 183.
- 461See the Qur'an: 7:3, 54; 12:40; 59:23.
- 462See the Qur'an: 2:30; 6:165; 95:4.
- 463Chapra, "Islamic Welfare State and Its Role," 144; see the Qur'an: 3:159 and 42:38.
- 464Mannan, *Islamic Economics*, 341.
- 465Sayyid Qutb, *Social Justice in Islam* (Washington, D. C.: American Council of Learned Societies, 1970), 35.
- 466See the Qur'an: 2:257; 3:139, 145, 150, 154; 4:78; 6:14, 18; 9:28; 13:26; 15:23; 29:60; 35:3, 11; 57:2; 66:21.

- 467Qutb, *Social Justice*, 44.
- 468Jacques Waardenburg, "Human Rights, Human Dignity and Islam" in *Temenos*, ed. T. Ahlback, 27: 177.
- 469Muhammad Abdul Rauf, *The Islamic Doctrine of Economics and Contemporary Economic Thought* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979), 9.
- 470Belkacem, "Social Justice," 138.
- 471Al-Faruqi, "Ethics," 227-28.
- 472Q: 62:10.
- 473Q: 53:39; see also 4:32.
- 474See the Qur'an: 10:67; 14:32; 15:19-20; 25:47; 26:7; 67:15; 73:7; 77:25-28; 78:11.
- 475Quoted in Yusuf, *Economic Justice*, 16-17.
- 476Bukhari, *Vasaya*: 9, *Riqak*: 11; Tirmidhi, *Zakat*: 38; Abu Muhammad Abdullah al-Darimi, *al-Sunan* (Istanbul, Turkey: Çađri, 1992), *Zakat*: 22.
- 477Mannan, *Economic Development*, 86.
- 478Bukhari, *Zakat*: 50, *Buy'u*: 15; Ibn Majah, *Ticaret*: 25.
- 479Masudul Alam Choudhury, *Contributions to Islamic Economic Theory: A Study in Social Ethics* (Houndmill, Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1986), 152.
- 480Mannan, *Islamic Economics*, 332.
- 481Q: 3:129; and see also 2:284; 3:174, 180; 15:23; 23:84-85.
- 482Q: 57:7.
- 483M. Umer Chapra, The Economic System of Islam: A Discussion of Its Goals and Nature, Part II 'Nature of the Economic System of Islam,'" *The Islamic Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (April-June 1970), 93.
- 484Muhammad Anas Zarqa, "Islamic Economics: An Approach to Human Welfare," in *Studies in Islamic Economics*, ed. Khurshid Ahmad (Leicester, U.K.: Islamic Foundation, 1981), 12.
- 485Yusuf, *Economic Justice*, 19.
- 486Patrick Bannerman, *Islam in Perspective: A Guide to Islamic Society, Politics and Law* (New York: Routledge, 1988), 98.
- 487Muhammad Yasin Mazhar Siddiqui, "Economic Imbalances and the Role of Islam—An Essay in Qur'anic Interpretation," *Hamdard Islamicus* 10 (Summer 1987), 38.
- 488Chapra, "Introduction," 17-18. See also, M. Umer Chapra, "The Islamic Welfare State," in *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, ed. John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 226; Asghar Ali Engineer, "Islamic Economics: A Progressive Perspective," in *Islamic Economic Alternatives: Critical Perspectives and New Directions*, ed. K. S. Jomo (Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Ikraq, 1993), 121.
- 489Qutb, *Social Justice*, 276.
- 490Mannan, *Islamic Economics*, 334.
- 491Q: 4:29.
- 492Ibn Majah, *Ticaret*: 1; Tirmidhi, *Buyu'*: 4; Darimi, *Buyu'*: 8.
- 493Bukhari, *Bad al-Halk*: 2; Muslim, *Musakat*: 137-42.
- 494Rauf, *Islamic Doctrine*, 4-5.
- 495Ibid., 8.
- 496See the Qur'an: 6:165; 57:7.

497Siddiqui, "Economic Imbalances," 36-37; Rauf, *Islamic Doctrine*, 12; see the Qur'an: 7:33; 24:19.

498See the Qur'an: 2:219, 275-80; 3:130; 6:152-53; 7:85; 11:84-85; 17:35; 26:181-83; 55:9; 83:1-6.

499Chapra, "Introduction," 16.

500Mannan, *Islamic Economics*, 343.

501Choudhury, *Contributions*, 191.

502J. C. O'Brien, "Social Values, Social Goals and Manpower," [Mimeo.], School of Business and Administrative Science, California State University at Fresno, August 1983. Quoted in Choudhury, *Contributions*, 195.

503Ibrahim Abdulrahman Toghais, "Social Justice in Islamic Law," (Ph. D. diss., Claremont: Graduate School, 1982), 79.

504See the Qur'an: 9:103.

505Ahmad, *Poverty*, 48. Qutb, *Islam*, 66; Choudhury, *Contributions*, 27; Anjum, "Equitable Distribution," 232.

506Imam Malik, al-Muwatta, *Zakat*: 30.

507According to the classical sources after the death of the prophet Muhammad in 632, the young Muslim community lived in the most difficult and dangerous times. While on the one hand Abu Bakr, the first caliph who succeeded Muhammad as the head of the Muslim community, was threatened with a split among the leading members of the community, on the other hand a number of Arab tribes demanded that they be released from paying the *zakat* tax, thereby revolting against the centralization of the political authority by Abu Bakr. Under these circumstances, in order to protect the unity of the Islamic community and to bring newly Muslim tribes again under the dominion of Medina, Abu Bakr ordered his army to march against them, and the revolts were suppressed. For a broad explanation of this war see Sachedina, "Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the Qur'an," 80-81.

508Toghais, "Social Justice," 80.

509Qutb, *Social Justice*, 134.

510M. Umer Chapra, "The Economic System of Islam: A Discussion of Its Goals and Nature, Part III 'Spiritual Values and the Islamic Economic System,'" *The Islamic Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (July-September 1970), 154.

511Q: 59:7.

512Muhammad N. K. Khel, "The Rise of Muslim Umma at Mecca and Its Integration," *Hamdard Islamicus* 5, no. 3 (Autumn 1982), 66. See the Qur'an: 59:7.

513Kurdi, *Islamic State*, 117.

514Mannan, *Islamic Economics*, 254.

515Haq, "Liberation," 28.

516Mannan, *Islamic Economics*, 265.

517Ibid., 263.

518Muhammad Abdul Rauf, *A Muslim's Reflections on Democratic Capitalism* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984), 11. In the light of the applications of the Prophet, Muslim jurists classified the items and the amounts of *zakat* as follows: agricultural produce of land irrigated by rain (10 percent); agricultural produce of land irrigated by an artificial irrigation system (5 percent); gold, silver, cash balances, trade goods, mineral output (2.5 percent); treasure-troves (i.e., gold, silver, money, and other valuable items found in the ground or elsewhere whose owner is unknown) (20 percent); and factory assets,

including inventory and raw materials, but excluding machines and related equipment (2.5 percent).

519Rauf, *Reflections*, 11.

520Naqvi, *Ethics and Economics*, 88.

521Q: 9:103.

522Siddiqui "Economic Imbalances," 42.

523Belkacem, "Social Justice," 149.

524Mannan, *Islamic Economics*, 264; Q: 9:60.

525Mannan, *Economic Development*, 88; Chapra, "Islamic Welfare State," 225; Anjum, "Equitable Distribution," 233-37.

526Q: 2:219.

527Q: 107:1-3.

528Q: 36:47.

529See the Qur'an: 2:215, 219.

530Q: 2:195.

531Q: 2:177; for others see 2:3, 254, 262; and 9:34.

532Q: 51:1; see also 70:24-25.

533Q: 59:7.

534Siddiqui, "Economic Imbalances," 39.

535See the Qur'an: 18:46; 64:15.

536See the Qur'an: 2:262-64; 4:38.

537See the Qur'an: 2:267; 3:92.

538See the Qur'an: 2:263-64; 4:38.

539See the Qur'an: 17:23.

540Bukhari, *Mazalim*: 24; Ibn Hanbal, *Musnad* 2: 316, 350.

541Ibn Hanbal, *Musnad* 2: 316, 329.

542Muslim, *Musafirin*: 84; Tirmidhi, *Birr*: 36.

543See the Qur'an, 51:19; 2:272.

544Kurdi, *Islamic State*, 115-16.

545See the Qur'an: 4:11-12, 176.

546Mannan, *Economic Development*, 91-92.

547Rauf, *Islamic Doctrine*, 11.

548M. Umer Chapra, "The Nature of *Riba* [Interest] in Islam," *Hamdard Islamicus* 7, no. 1 (Spring 1984), 4-5; see also Mahmut Abu Saud, "Money, Interest and *Qirad*," in *Studies in Islamic Economics*, ed. Khurshid Ahmad (Leicester, U. K.: Islamic Foundation, 1981), 64.

549Choudhury, *Contributions*, 15.

550Mahmud Ahmad, *Social Justice in Islam* (New Delhi: Adam, 1982), 3; see for the verses in the Qur'an: 2:275-81; 3:130-32, 161.

551Rauf, *Islamic Doctrine*, 11.

552Q: 30:39.

553Q: 2:275.

554Q: 2:279.

555Siddiqi, "Economic Thinking," 253; see also Chapra, "Nature of *Riba*," 11.

556Qutb, *Islam*, 63. It is also a fact that while Islam severely condemns those who participate in the matter of usury or interest. Today Muslims both in Islamic countries and in secular states are involved in the modern economic system in which usury is the basic principle. For a good

evaluation of classical Islamic and contemporary economic system and the failing of Muslims on this matter, see Timur Kuran, "The Economic System in Contemporary Thought: Interpretation and Assessment," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 18 (1986): 135-64.

557Qutb, *Islam*, 63.

558Kurdi, *Islamic State*, 118.

559Ibn Majah, *Ticaret*: 6.

560Kurdi, *Islamic State*, 119.

561Q: 9:34-35; see also 2:195; 17:29.

562Q: 7:32; see also 7:31; 6:141-42.

563Bukhari, *Sawm*: 51, *Nikah*: 89; Abu Dawud, *Sawm*: 56; Darimi, *Nikah*: 3.

564Ibn Hanbal, *Musnad* 2: 182.

565Qutb, *Social Justice*, 126.

566Monzer Kahf, "A Contribution to the Theory of Consumer Behavior in an Islamic Society," in *Studies in Islamic Economics* ed. Khurshid Ahmad (Leicester, U. K.: Islamic Foundation, 1981), 23.

567Q: 2:265.

568Q: 3:117.

569Kahf, "Consumer Behavior," 30.

570Zarqa, "Islamic Economics," 13.

571Al Ghazali, *Al- Iqtisad*, quoted in Siddiqi, "Minimum Level," 255-56

572Abu Hasim al-Ghazali, *Al-Mustasfa fi' ilm al-Usul* (Cairo, Maktabah al-Tijarah al-Kubra, 1937), 1, 139-44. Abu Ishaq Ibrahim al-Shatibi, *Al-Muwafiqat fi usul al- Shari'ah* (Cairo: Maktabah al-Tijarah al-Kubra), II, 8-25 and 176-86. Quoted in Zarqa, "Islamic Economics," 13-15.

573Yusuf, *Economic Justice*, 55.

574Ahmad, *Poverty*, 19, 86.

575Zarqa, "Islamic Economics," 16.

576Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, "The Margins of State Intervention in an Islamic Economy," *Hamdard Islamicus* 6, no. 3 (Autumn 1983), 50.

577Q: 17:29; see also 6:141; 17:26.

578Q: 25:67.

579Yusuf, *Economic Justice*, 58.

580Choudhury, *Contributions*, 17.

581Qutb, *Islam*, 64.

582Q: 17:16.

583Abu'l A'la Mawdudi, *The Economic Problem of Man and Its Islamic Solution*, 5th ed. (Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications, 1978), 33.

584Q: 7:31; see also 6:141; 17:26, 29; 25:67; 28:77; and 55:7-8.

585Tirmidhi, *Zuhd*: 28; Ibn Hanbal, *Musnad* 4: 132.

586Bukhari, *Libas*: 1; Nasai, *Zakat*: 66.

587M. Cherif Bassiouni, "Business Ethics in Islam," in *The Ethics of Business in a Global Economy*, ed. Paul M. Minus (Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1993), 119.

588Q: 4:5.

589Choudhury, *Contributions*, 140-47.

- 590 Muhammad Anas Zarqa, "Islamic Distributive Schemes," in *Distributive Justice and Need Fulfilment in an Islamic Economy*, ed. Munawar Iqbal (Islamabad, Pakistan: International Islamic University, n. d.), 190-91.
- 591 Quoted in Qutb, *Social Justice*, 228; Belkacem, "Social Justice," 144.
- 592 Q: 107:1-3; see also 4:6; 93:9-10.
- 593 Q: 36:47.
- 594 Ibn Hanbal, *Musnad* 1: 55.
- 595 Yusuf, *Economic Justice*, 9.
- 596 Bukhari, *Juma*: 11, *Jenaiz*: 32; Muslim, *Imara*: 30; Abu Dawud, *Imara*: 1.
- 597 Quoted in Mawdudi, "Human Rights," 80-81.
- 598 Mawdudi, "Human Rights," 80-81.
- 599 Ahmad, *Poverty*, 53.
- 600 Chapra, "Role of the State," 248.
- 601 Ya'qub ibn Ibrahim al-Ansari Abu Yusuf, *Kitab al-Kharaj*, vol 3, translated by A. Ben Shemesh, (Leiden: E. J. Brill and London: Luzac, 1969), 87.
- 602 Choudhury, *Contributions*, 168.
- 603 Belkacem, "Social Justice," 144.
- 604 Q: 2:29.
- 605 Chapra, "Introduction," 15. Italics mine.
- 606 Chapra, "Role of the State," 243.
- 607 Q: 51:19. See also, 2:177, 273-74.
- 608 Bukhari, *Zakat*: 1, 41, *Mazalim*: 9, *Magazi*: 60; Muslim, *Iman*: 31.
- 609 Yusuf, *Economic Justice*, 28.
- 610 Zarqa, "Islamic Distributive," 163.
- 611 Ibrahim Canan, *Kutub al-Sitta: Tercume ve Serhi* (Ankara, Turkey: Akçađ, 1992), 5:300-301.
- 612 Yusuf, *Economic Justice*, 28-30; Naqvi and others, "Principles," 156.
- 613 Toghais, "Social Justice," 75.
- 614 Q: 4:5.
- 615 Kurdi, *Islamic State*, 125.
- 616 Chapra, "Role of State," 242.
- 617 Siddiqi, "Minimum Level," 257.
- 618 Chapra, "Islamic Welfare State and Its Role," 147; see also Siddiqi, "Minimum Level," 238; Naqvi, "Margins of State," 47-48. For the functions of the Islamic state see the Qur'an: 3:104, 110; 8:73; 9:60; 22:41; 70:24-25; and 106:4.
- 619 See the verses from the Qur'an related to predestination 6:2, 125; 3:154; 16:93; 30:37; 57:22; 63:11; for the part of human responsibility and free will see 4:70-80; 6:107; 10:99; 13:11; 18:29; 99:7-8.
- 620 For more information concerning free will and predestination see Fakhry Majid, *Ethical Theories in Islam* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991), especially part II, 31-61; W. Montgomery Watt, *Free Will and Predestination in Early Islam* (London: Luzac, 1984); *Islamic Philosophy and Theology* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1962), 27-35.
- 621 Garaudy, "Human Rights and Islam," 54.
- 622 Rahman, *Major Themes*, 23.
- 623 W. Montgomery Watt, "Free Will and Predestination: Islamic Concept," in *The Encyclopedia of Religion*, ed. Mircea Eliade (New York: Macmillan, 1987), 5:429.

624 Javaid Saeed, *Islam and Modernization: A Comparative Analysis of Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), 140-45.

625 Ibid., 131.

626 Ibid., 108.

627Q: 4:59.

628 Hassan, "Human Rights," 449. For broad information about the relationship between the rulers and the ruled and the limits of obedience, see Lewis, *Political Language of Islam*, especially chapters 3 and 5.

629 Nasr, "Islamic Economics," 47.

630 Rahman, *Major Themes*, 20.

631 See the Qur'an: 3:191; 21:16-17; 23:115.

632 Rahman, *Major Themes*, 30.

633 Tirmidhi, *Kiyama*: 1.

634 Abdul Rahman Salih Abdullah, *Educational Theory: A Qur'anic Outlook* (Makkah: Umm Al-Qura University, 1982), 127-28; Q: 1:6.

635 Abu Dawud, *Salat*: 242, *Malahim*: 17; Ibn Majah, *Ikama*: 155.

636 Bukhari, *Shahadat*: 30.

637Q: 3:110.

638 Mawdudi, "Human Rights," 78.

639Q: 3:104.

640Q: 9:71. For the responsibility of Muslim community see the Qur'an 3:10; 4:77; 5:3, 7; 9:111-12; 69:30-37.

641Q: 9:67.

642 See the Qur'an: 17:16.

643Q: 22:41.

644 Mawdudi, "Human Rights," 76; see also Ahsan, "Personal Dimensions," 7.

645 "The 1980 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights," quoted in Allahbukhsh K. Brohi, "Human Rights and Duties in Islam: A Philosophical Approach," in *Islam and Contemporary Society*, ed. M. Qutb, S. Nasr and others (London: Longman, 1982), 259.

646 Toton, "Structural Change," 457.

647Q: 13:11.

648 Pervez Hoodbhoy, *Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality*, with a foreword by Mohammad Abdus Salam (London: Zed Books, 1991), 32.

649 Muslim scholars generally give the following reasons for the backwardness of the Islamic countries: colonial exploitation, colonial legacy, economic dualism, financial dualism, educational dualism (secular and religious), market system, regional disposition and discrimination, neglect of human resources, low labor productivity, the lack of qualified leaders, the failure in the understanding of the Qur'anic doctrine, the high rate of illiteracy, backwardness in science and technology. See Mannan, *Economic Development*, 79-86; Mannan, "Economics of Poverty," 313; Qutb, *Social Justice*, 227-28; Syed M. al-Naquib al-Attas, "Introduction," in *Aims and Objectives of Islamic Education*, ed. Syed M. al-Naquib al-Attas (London: Hodder and Stoughton and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: King Abdulaziz University, 1979), 1-3; Chandra Muzaffar, *Human Rights and the New World Order* (Penang, Malaysia: Just World Trust, 1993), 172-73; Hoodbhoy, *Islam and Science*, 22-48.

650 Zarqa, "Distributive Schemes," 177-79. On the effect of *zakat* on Pakistan's people see Saeed, *Islam and Modernization*, 228.

- 651 Hassan, "Human Rights," 459.
- 652 Kadduri, *Justice*, 161-62.
- 653 John B. Cobb, "Envisioning a Just and Peaceful World," *Religious Education* 79, no. 4 (Fall 1984), 483.
- 654 Nasr, "Islamic Economics," 49.
- 655 Saeed, *Islam and Modernization*, 200.
- 656 Samuel S. Cohen, *What We Jews Believe* (Cincinnati: Union of American Hebrew Congregations, 1931), 3. Quoted in Saeed, *Islam and Modernization*, 26.
- 657 For example, Abd al-Aziz Mahmud al-Dib lists around 135 books written by Arab historians and philosophers who espoused the Orientalist position. See Babear, "Intellectual Currents," 232-37.
- 658 See Maxime Rodinson, *Islam and Capitalism* (Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 1978), who conclusively documents that Islam has not been and need not be an impediment to progress and development.
- 659 Siddiqi, "Minimum Level," 277.
- 660 Hoodbhoy, *Islam and Science*, 32.
- 661 Q: 5:2.
- 662 Q: 9:71.
- 663 Saeed, *Islam and Modernization*, 70.
- 664 Saeed, *Islam and Modernization*, 23.
- 665 Dudley Seers, "The Meaning of Development," in *The Political Economy of Development*, ed. Uphoff and Ilchman, 123. Quoted in Saeed, *Islam and Modernization*, 24.
- 666 Paulo Freire, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, trans. Myra B. Ramos (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 160-61.
- 667 Freire, *Pedagogy*, 160-61.
- 668 Reardon, *Militarization*, 14.
- 669 M. V. Naidu, "Dimensions of Peace," *Peace Research* 18, no. 2 (May 1986), 9.
- 670 Krieger and Kelly, "Introduction," xvi.
- 671 Reardon, *Militarization*, 14.
- 672 Utne, *Educating for Peace*, 2.
- 673 Ibid.
- 674 Naidu, "Dimensions," 9.
- 675 See different kinds of definitions of justice Robert C. Solomon, and Mark C. Murphy, ed., *What is Justice?: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Thomas W. Simon, *Democracy and Social Injustice: Law, Politics, and Philosophy* (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995); Karen Lebacqz, *Six Theories of Justice: Perspectives from Philosophical and Theological Ethics* (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1986).
- 676 Solomon and Murphy, *What is Justice?*, 3-11; Simon, *Democracy and Social Injustice*, 8-9.
- 677 James B. McGinnis, and others, *Educating for Peace and Justice: National Dimensions* (St. Louis, Mo.: The Institute for Peace and Justice, 1985), 5.
- 678 Utne, *Educating for Peace*, 73.
- 679 Reardon, *Militarization*, 38.
- 680 Nancy Shelley, "The Case for a Feminist Contribution to Peace Education," paper presented at the Conference of the Australian Women's Education Coalition, October 1982.

Quoted in Betty A. Reardon, *Women and Peace: Feminist Visions of Global Security*. (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press), 1993, 132.

681 Joseph J. Fahey, "The Nature and Challenge of the Justice and Peace Education," in *Justice and Peace Education: Models for College and University Faculty*, ed. David M. Johnson (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1986), 3.

682 Thornton B. Monez, "Working for Peace: Implications for Education," in *Education for Peace; Focus on Mankind*, ed. George Henderson, (Prepared by the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development 1973 Yearbook Committee, Washington, D.C.: ASCD, 1973), 18; M. V. Naidu, "The Nature and Scope of Peace and Peace Studies," *Peace Research* 20, no. 3 (September 1988), 1-10; M. V. Naidu, "Dimensions," 10.

683 Reardon, *Militarization*, 39-40.

684 Monez, "Working for Peace," 18.

685 Reardon, *Militarization*, 40.

686 Toton, "Structural Change," 456.

687 Reardon, *Militarization*, 68.

688 William Eckhardt, "The Task of Peace Education," *Peace Research* 18, no. 2 (May 1986), 15.

689 Joseph J. Fahey, "Parameters, Principles, and Dynamics of Peace Studies," in *Education for Peace and Justice*, ed. Padraic O'Hare (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1983), 173-74.

690 Reardon, *Militarization*, 70.

691 *Ibid.*, 71-72.

692 Fahey, "Parameters," 172.

693 The National Conference of Catholic Bishops, *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response* (Washington, D. C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1983), 228.

694 *Ibid.*, 229.

695 Catherine I. Adlesic, "The Effect to Implement the Pastoral Letter on War and Peace," in *Peace in a Nuclear Age: The Bishops' Pastoral Letter in Perspective*, ed. Charles J. Reid, Jr (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 395.

696 James B. McGinnis, "Education for Peace and Justice," *Religious Education* 81, no. 3 (Summer 1986), 446-47.

697 Fahey "Nature and Challenge of Justice and Peace Education," 3.

698 Paul R. Dekar, "Peace Education: Agenda for the 90s," *Peace Research* 24, no. 4 (November 1992), 68.

699 M. V. Naidu, "Peace Education in Canada," *Peace Research* 20, no 3 (September 1988), 23-30.

700 Toshifumi Murakami, "A Comparison of Peace Education in Britain and Japan," *Peace Research* 24, no. 4 (November 1992), 45-46.

701 Riffat Hassan, "Peace Education: A Muslim Perspective," in *Education for Peace: Testimonies from World Religions*, ed. Haim Gordon and Leonard Grob (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987), 90.

702 Syed Ali Ashraf, *New Horizons in Muslim Education*, with a foreword by S. Hossein Nasr (Cambridge: Islamic Academy and Hodder and Stoughton, 1985), 84.

703 Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, ed. *Aims and Objectives of Islamic Education* (London: Hodder and Stoughton and Jeddah, Arabia: King Abdulaziz University, 1979), 158-59.

704 Ashraf, *New Horizons*, 111.

705 *Ibid.*, 116.

706 Ashraf, *New Horizons*, 124-25.

707 Mohd Nor Wan Daud, *The Concept of Knowledge in Islam and Its Implications for Education in a Developing Country* (London: Mansell, 1989), 102.

708 Mohammed Arkoun, *Rethinking Islam: Common Questions, Uncommon Answers*, trans., and ed., Robert D. Lee (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994), 106; Mayer, *Islam and Human Rights*, 27.

709 "The 1980 Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights," quoted in Brohi, "Human Rights and Duties," 257-58.

710 "The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights," quoted in Brohi, "Human Rights and Duties," 261-62.

711 "The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights," quoted in Brohi, "Human Rights and Duties," 263.

712 Ibid., 262-63.

713 "The Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights," quoted in Brohi, "Human Rights and Duties," 258.

714 Francis Arinze gives the following examples from the different religions of the world related to the values mentioned above:

Hinduism: "This is the sum of duty: Do not do to others what would cause you pain if done to you (Mahabharata 5:15-17)."

Buddhism: "Hurt not others in ways that you would find hurtful (Udanavarga 5:18)."

Confucianism: "It is the maxim of loving kindness: 'Do not unto others what you would not have them do unto you' (Anaclets [Rongo] 15:23)."

Judaism: "What is hateful to you, do not to your fellow man. That is the entire law; all the rest is commentary (Talmud, Shabbat 31: a)."

Islam: "No one of you is a believer until he loves for his brother that which he loves for himself (The 42 Traditions of An-Nawawi)."

African Traditional Religion: "What you give (or do) to others these will (or do) to you in return (Rwanda Proverb)." Francis Arinze, "Interreligious Dialogue at the Service of Peace," *Islamochristiana* 13 (1987), 1-8.

715 Johnson, "Influence of Religious Teaching," 349.

716 The Qur'an says: "Did not Allah check one set of people by means of another, there would surely have been pulled down monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques" (22:40).

717 Bertrand Russell, *Has Man a Future?* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961), 51.

718 Reardon, *Women and Peace*, 46-47.

719 Huddleston, *Peace*, 90.

720 Freire, *Pedagogy*, 43.

721 Ibid., 44.

722 Freire, *Pedagogy*, 146.

723 Evans and others, *Pedagogies*, 219-20.

724 Chapra, "Spiritual Values," 155-56.

725 Lawrence Kohlberg, *The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981), 37.

726 Syed S. Husain and Syed Ali Ashraf, *Crisis in Muslim Education*, (Sevenoaks, England: Hodder and Stoughton; Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: King Abdulaziz University, 1979), 16-17; Saeed, *Islam and Modernization*, 104-105; 141-42; 199.

727Saeed claims that at the University of al-Azhar, in Egypt, which is considered the oldest university in the world, and the most famous in the Muslim world, ideas of liberty, equity, and democracy are treated very superficially in the textbooks and curriculum from the primary level to the advanced level. Thus, slavery is uncritically accepted. Worse, *hadiths* are quoted as to how slaves should be treated. In addition, while the concept of citizen rights is not even mentioned, the question of why a class of servant should exist in the society is glossed over. Saeed, *Islam and Modernization*, 139.

728Freire, *Pedagogy*, 59.

729Freire, *Pedagogy*, 58.

730Rahman, *Islam and Modernity*, 102.

731Ibid., 118.

732Ibid., 111.

733Fahey, "Nature and Challenge," 3-12; see also Dekar, "Peace Education," 68.

734Krieger and Kelly, "Introduction," xvi.

735Thomas H. Groome, "Religious Education for Justice by Educating Justly," in *Education for Peace and Justice*, ed. Padraic O'Hare (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1983), 71-72.

736Freire, *Pedagogy*, 59-68; Brian A. Wren, *Education for Justice* (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1977), 20.

737See the Qur'an: 21:7.

738See Salih, *Qur'anic Outlook*, 126; Q: 49:6.

739See the Qur'an: 6:165.

740See the Qur'an: 8:22.

741Wren, *Education*, 61-62.

742Gary D. Borich, *Effective Teaching Methods*, 2nd ed. (New York, N.Y.: Macmillan, 1992), 252; Myra Sadker and David Sadker, "Questioning Skills," in *Classroom Teaching Skills*, ed. James M. Cooper, 113. (111-48) (Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath, 1990), 113; Richard Kindsvatter, William Wilen, and Margaret Ishler, *Dynamics of Effective Teaching* (New York and London: Longman, 1988), 111-12.

743Kiang, *One World*, endnote, 205.

744William J. Byron, "Education, Reconciliation and Social Justice," *Religious Education* 72, no. 3 (May-June: 1977), 259.

745David Hollenbach, "Courage and Patience: Education for Staying Power in the Pursuit of Peace and Justice," in *Education for Peace and Justice*, ed. Padraic O'Hare (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1983), 3.

746McGinnis, *National Dimensions*, 5.

747Q: 13:11.

748McGinnis, "Peace and Justice," 460-61.

749Monika K. Hellwig, "Religious Studies," in *Justice and Peace Education: Models for College and University Faculty*, ed. David M. Johnson (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1986), 15.

## Bibliography

Abdullah, Abdul Rahman Salih. *Educational Theory: A Qur'anic Outlook*. Makkah: Umm Al-Qura University, 1982.

Abedi, Mehdi and Gary Legenhausen. "Introduction." In *Jihad and Shahadat Struggle and Martyrdom in Islam*, ed. Mehdi Abedi and Gary Legenhausen, 1-46. Houston, Tex.: The Institute for Research and Islamic Studies, 1986.

Abraham, A. J. and George Haddad. *The Warriors of God Jihad (Holy War) and the Fundamentalists of Islam*. Bristol, Ind.: Wyndham Hall Pres, 1989.

Adams, Charles J. "Mawdudi and the Islamic State." In *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, ed. John L. Esposito, 99-133. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Adlesic, Catherine I. "The Effort to Implement the Pastoral Letter on War and Peace." In *Peace in a Nuclear Age: The Bishops' Pastoral Letter in Perspective*, ed. Charles J. Reid, Jr, 387-98. Washington: D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1986.

Agran, Larry. "A Peace Conversion Program." In *Waging Peace Vision and Hope for the 21st Century*, ed. David Krieger and Frank Kelly, 59-69. Chicago: Noble Press, 1992.

Ahmad, Ziauddin. *Islam, Poverty and Income Distribution*. Islamic Economics Series. Leicester, U.K.: Islamic Foundation, 1991.

Ahmad, Mahmud. *Social Justice in Islam*. New Delhi: Adam, 1982.

Ahmad, Mumtaz. "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia: The Jamaat-I Islami and the Tablighi Jamaat." In *Fundamentalism Observed*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, 457-530. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

Ahsan, M.M. "Human Rights in Islam: Personal Dimensions." *Hamdard Islamicus* 13, no. 3 (Autumn 1990): 3-14. Alhabshi, Syed Othman. "Justice in Administration and Management." In *Islam and Justice*, ed. Aidit Bin Ghazali, 183-201. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Institute of Islamic Understanding, 1993.

Ali, Moulavi Chiragh. *A Critical Exposition of the Popular Jihad*. Karachi: Karimsons, 1977.

Anjum, Muhammad Iqbal, "An Islamic Scheme of Equitable Distribution of Income and Wealth," *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 12, no. 2 (Summer 1995): 224-39.

Arinze, Francis. "Interreligious Dialogue at the Service of Peace." *Islamochristiana* 13 (1987): 1-8.

Arkoun, Mohammed. *Rethinking Islam: Common Questions, Uncommon Answers*. Translated and edited by Robert D. Lee. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Is Islam Threatened by Christianity?" Translated by John Bowden. In *Islam: A Challenge for Christianity*, ed. Hans Küng and Jürgen Moltmann, 48-57. Concilium, 1994/3. London: SCM Press, 1994.

Ashraf, Syed Ali. "The Inner Meaning of the Islamic Rites: Prayer, Pilgrimage, Fasting, Jihad." In *Islamic Spirituality: Foundations*, ed. Sayyed Hossein Nasr, 111-30. New York: Crossroad, 1987.

\_\_\_\_\_. *New Horizons in Muslim Education*. With a Foreword by Sayyed Hossein Nasr. Cambridge: Islamic Academy; London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1985.

Atkinson, Henry A. "Religion as a Cause of War." In *The Causes of War*, ed. Arthur Porritt, 114-18. New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1969.

Al-Attas, Syed Muhammad al-Naquib, ed. *Aims and Objectives of Islamic Education*. London: Hodder and Stoughton and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: King Abdulaziz University, 1979.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Introduction." In *Aims and Objectives of Islamic Education*, ed. Syed Muhammad al-Naquib Al-Attas. 1-15. London: Hodder and Stoughton and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: King Abdulaziz University, 1979.

Babeair, Abdulwahab S. "Intellectual Currents in Contemporary Islam." *The Muslim World* 81, no. 3-4 (July-October 1991): 231-44.

Bannerman, Patrick. *Islam in Perspective: A Guide to Islamic Society, Politics and Law*. New York: Routledge, 1988.

Barash, David P. *Introduction to Peace Studies*. Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1991.

Bassiouni, M. Cherif. "Business Ethics in Islam." In *The Ethics of Business in a Global Economy*, ed. Paul M. Minus, 117-22. Boston: Kluwer Academic, 1993.

Belkacem, Mouloud Kassim N. "The Concept of Social Justice in Islam." In *The Challenge of Islam*, ed. Altaf Gauhar, 134-52. Islamic Council of Europe, 1978.

Beneria, Lourdes and Rebecca Blank. "Women and the Economics of Military Spending." In *Rocking the Ship of State: Toward a Feminist Peace Politics*, ed. Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King, 191-203. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989.

Boisard, Marcel A. *Jihad: A Commitment to Universal Peace*. Indianapolis: American Trust, 1988.

Borich, Gary D. *Effective Teaching Methods*, 2nd ed. New York, N.Y.: Macmillan, 1992.

Braudel, Fernand. *Capitalism and Material Life, 1400-1800*. Translated by Miriam Kochan. New York: Harper and Row, 1973.

Brohi, Allahbukhsh K. "Human Rights and Duties in Islam: A Philosophical Approach." In *Islam and Contemporary Society*, ed. M. Qutb, S. Nasr and others, 231-67. London: Longman, 1982.

Brown, Lester R. "The Acceleration of History." In *State of the World 1996: A World Watch Institute Report on Progress toward a Sustainable Society*, ed. Linda Starke, 110-11. New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1996.

\_\_\_\_\_. "World Economy Expanding Steadily." In *Vital Signs 1996: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke. 74-75. New York and London: W.W. Norton, 1996.

Brown, Robert McAfee. *Making Peace in the Global Village*. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1981.

Bukhari, Abu Abd-Allah Muhammad ibn Isma'il. *Al-Sahih*. 8 vols. Istanbul, Turkey: Çađri, 1992.

Byron, William J. "Education, Reconciliation and Social Justice." *Religious Education* 72, no. 3 (May-June: 1977): 251-61.

Canan, Ibrahim. *Kutub al-Sitta: Terceme and Sharhi*. Ankara, Turkey: Akçađ, 1992.

Chapra, M Umer. "The Nature of Riba [Interest] in Islam." *Hamdard Islamicus* 7, no 1 (Spring 1984): 3-24.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Economic System of Islam: A Discussion of Its Goals and Nature Part I 'Introduction.'" *The Islamic Quarterly* 14, no 1 (January -March 1970): 3-18.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Economic System of Islam: A Discussion of Its Goals and Nature Part II 'Nature of the Economic System of Islam.'" *The Islamic Quarterly* 14, no. 2 (April-June 1970): 91-96.

- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Economic System of Islam: A Discussion of Its Goals and Nature Part III 'Spiritual Values and the Islamic Economic System.'" *The Islamic Quarterly* 14, no. 3 (July-September 1970): 143-56.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Economic System of Islam: A Discussion of Its Goals and Nature Part IV 'Role of the State.'" *The Islamic Quarterly* 14, no. 4 (October-December 1970): 237-53.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Islamic Welfare State." In *Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives*, ed. John J. Donohue and John L. Esposito, 223-29. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Islamic Welfare State and Its Role in the Economy." In *Studies in Islamic Economics*, ed. Khurshid Ahmad, 143-69. Leicester, U.K.: Islamic Foundation, 1981.
- Choudhury, Masudul Alam. *Contributions to Islamic Economic Theory: A Study in Social Economics*. Houndmill, Hampshire: Macmillan Press, 1986.
- Choueiri, Youssef M. *Islamic Fundamentalism*. Boston: Twayne, 1990.
- Clark, Ramsey. *The Fire This Time: U.S. War Crime in the Gulf*. New York: Thunder's Mouth Press, 1992.
- Cobb, John B. "Envisioning a Just and Peaceful World." *Religious Education* 79, no. 4 (Fall 1984): 483-94.
- Darimi, Abu Muhammad Abd-Allah ibn Abd al-Rahman. *Sunan*. 2 vols. Istanbul, Turkey: Çađri, 1992.
- Daud, Wan Mohd Nor Wan. *The Concept of Knowledge in Islam and Its Implications for Education in a Developing Country*. London: Mansell, 1989.
- Abu Dawud, Sulayman ibn al-Ash'ath. *Sunan*. 5 vols. Istanbul, Turkey: Çađri, 1992.
- Dekar, Paul R. "Peace Education: Agenda for the 90s." *Peace Research* 24, no. 4 (November 1992): 67-72.
- Denny, Frederick M. *An Introduction to Islam*. 2nd ed. New York: Macmillan, 1994.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Islam and the Muslim Community*. New York: Harper and Row, 1987.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Legacy of Fazlur Rahman." In *The Muslims of America*, ed. Yvonne Y. Haddad, 96-108. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.
- Diwan, Ishac, and Nick Papandreou. "The Peace Process and Economic Reforms in the Middle East." In *The Economics of Middle East*, ed. Stanley Fischer and others, 227-55. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993.
- D'Souza, Andreas. "The Challenge of Fundamentalism: A Crisis in Understanding A Paper Presented at the Silver Jubilee Celebration Seminar of the Christian Study Center, Rawalpindi, Pakistan 22-27 November 1993." In *Annual Report 1993 of Uppsala Studies of Mission*, ed. C.F. Hallencreutz and S. Axelson, 9-32. Uppsala, Sweden: University of Uppsala, 1994.
- Durning, Alan Thein. "Income Distribution Worsening." In *Vital Signs 1992: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke, 110-11. New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1992.
- Eckhardt, William. "The Task of Peace Education." *Peace Research* 18, no. 2 (May 1986): 15-24.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "War-Related Deaths Since 3000 BC." *Peace Research* 23, no. 1 (February 1991): 80-86.
- Eliade, Mircea, ed. *The Encyclopedia of Religion*. New York: Macmillan, 1987. Vol. 5. "Evangelical and Fundamental Christianity." By George M. Marsden.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Encyclopedia of Religion*. New York: Macmillan, 1987. Vol. 5. "Free Will and Destination: Islamic Concept." By W. Montgomery Watt

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Encyclopedia of Religion*. New York: Macmillan, 1987. Vol. 7. "Islam: An Overview." By Fazlur Rahman.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Encyclopedia of Religion*. New York: Macmillan, 1987. Vol. 10. "Islamic Modernism." By Ali E. Hillal Dessouki.

Elshaded, Elsayed. "What is the Challenge of Contemporary Islamic Fundamentalism?" In *Fundamentalism as an Ecumenical Challenge*, ed. Hans Küng and Jürgen Moltmann, 61-69. Concilium 1992/3. London: SCM Press, 1992.

Engineer, Asghar Ali. "Islamic Economics: A Progressive Perspective." In *Islamic Economic Alternatives: Critical Perspectives and New Directions*, ed. K. S. Jomo, 117-24. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Ikrq, 1993.

Esposito, John L. *Islam and Politics*. 2nd ed. New York: Syracuse University Press, 1987.

Etzold, Thomas H. *Defense or Delusion? American Military in the 1980s*. New York: Harper and Row, 1982.

Evans, A. Frazer, Robert A. Evans and William B. Kennedy. *Pedagogies for The Non-Poor*. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987.

Fahey, Joseph J. "Parameters, Principles, and Dynamics of Peace Studies." In *Education for Peace and Justice*, ed. Padraic O'Hare, 172-85. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1983.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Nature and Challenge of Justice and Peace Education." In *Justice and Peace Education: Models for College and University Faculty*, ed. David M. Johnson, 4-12. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1986.

Faraj, Muhammad Abd al-Salam, *Al-Faridah al-Gha'ibah*, "The Neglected Duty." In *The Neglected Duty: The Creed of Sadat's Assassins and Islamic Resurgence in the Middle East*, 159-234. Translated by Johannes J. G. Jansen. New York: Macmillan, 1986.

Al-Faruqi, Isma'il R. "Islamic Ethics." In *World Religions and Global Ethics*, ed. S. Cromwell Crawford, 212-37. New York, N.Y.: Paragon House, 1989.

\_\_\_\_\_. "On the Nature of Islamic Da'wah." *International Review of Mission* 65 (1976): 391-400.

Fischer, Dietrich. *Preventing War in the Nuclear Age*. London and Canberra: Rowman and Allanheld, 1984.

Folk, Jerry. *Doing Theology Doing Justice*. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1991.

Freire, Paulo. *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. Translated by Myra B. Ramos. New York: Herder and Herder, 1970.

Garaudy, Roger. "Human Rights and Islam: Foundation, Tradition, Violation." In *The Ethics of World Religions and Human Rights*, ed. Hans Küng and Jürgen Moltmann, 46-59. Concilium 1990/2. London: SCM Press, 1990.

Gardner, Gary. "Third World Debt Still Growing." In *Vital Signs 1995: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke, 72-73. New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1995.

Al-Ghazali, Muhammad. *The Message of Islam to Greet the Fifteenth Century (A.H.)*. Delhi: Hindustan, 1982.

Grant, James P. *The State of the World's Children 1987*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987.

Griffin, Keith. *World Hunger and the World Economy*. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987.

Groome, Thomas H. "Religious Education for Justice by Educating Justly." In *Education for Peace and Justice*, ed. Padraic O'Hare, 69-82. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1983.

Haddad, Yvonne Y. "The Qur'anic Justification for an Islamic Revolution: The View of Sayyed Qutb." *The Middle East Journal* 37, no. 1 (Winter 1983): 14-29

\_\_\_\_\_. "Sayyed Qutb: Ideology of Islamic Revival." In *Voices of Resurgent Islam*, ed. John L. Esposito, 67-98. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Hamid, Abdullah b. Muhammad. *Al-Jihad (Fighting for Allah's Cause) in the Holy Qur'an*. Chicago: Kazi, n.d.

Hamidullah Muhammad. *Muslim Conduct of State*. 4th ed. Lahore, Pakistan: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1961.

Ibn Hanbal, Ahmad. *Musnad*. 6 vols. Istanbul, Turkey: Çađri, 1992.

Haq, Mushir -UI "Liberation and Justice Motifs in Islam." *Religion and Society (Bangalore)* 27 (January 1980): 24-31.

Hartung, William D. *And Weapons for All*. New York: Harper Collins, 1994.

The Harvard Nuclear Study Group. *Living With Nuclear Weapons*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1983.

Abi-Hashem, Naji. "The Impact of the Gulf War on the Churches in the Middle East: A Socio-cultural and Spiritual Analysis." *Pastoral Psychology* 41 (Spring 1992): 3-21.

Hassan, Riffat. "Peace Education: A Muslim Perspective." In *Education for Peace: Testimonies from World Religions*, ed. Haim Gordon and Leonard Grob, 90-108. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1987.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Burgeoning of Islamic Fundamentalism: Toward an Understanding of the Phenomenon." In *The Fundamentalist Phenomenon: A View from Within; Aresponse from Without*, ed. Norman J. Cohen, 151-71. Grand Rapids, Mich.: William B. Eerdmans, 1990.

\_\_\_\_\_. "On Human Rights and the Qur'anic Perspective." *Muslims in Dialogue: The Evolution of a Dialogue*, ed. Leonard Swidler, 445-63. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992.

Hellwig, Monika K. "Religious Studies." In *Justice and Peace Education: Models for College and University Faculty*, ed. David M. Johnson, 15-26. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1986.

Henriot, Peter S. "Disarmament and Development: The Lasting Challenge to Peace." In *Peace in a Nuclear Age: The Bishops' Pastoral Letter in Perspective*, ed. Charles J. Reid, Jr, 227-37. Washington: D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1986.

Hilan, Rizkallah. "The Effects on Economic Development in Syria of a Just and Long-Lasting Peace." In *The Economics of Middle East*, ed. Stanley Fischer and others, 55-79. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993.

Al-Hilati, Muhammad Taqi-ud-Din and others. *Interpretation of the Meaning of the Noble Qur'an in the English Language: A Summarized Version of At-Tabari, Al-Qurtubi and Ibn Kathir with Comments from Sahih al-Bukhari*. Riddah, Saudi Arabia: Maktaba Dar-us Salam, 1994.

Ibn Hisham, Abd al-Malik. *The Life of Muhammad*. Translated by A. Guillaume. London: Oxford University Press, 1967.

*The Holy Qur'an: English Translation of the Meaning and Commentary*. Translated by Yusuf Ali. Al-Madinah: King Fahd Holy Qur'an, 1410. H.

Hollenbach, David. "Courage and Patience: Education for Staying Power in the Pursuit of Peace and Justice." In *Education for Peace and Justice*, ed. Pdraic O'Hare, 3-13. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1983.

Hoodbhoy, Pervez. *Islam and Science: Religious Orthodoxy and the Battle for Rationality*. With a Foreword by Mohammed Abdus Salam. London: Zed Books, 1991.

Huddleston, John. *Achieving Peace by the Year 2000: A Twelve Point Proposal*. Oxford, England; Chatham, N.Y.: Oneworld, 1992.

The Hunger Project. *Ending Hunger: An Idea Whose Time Has Come*. New York: Praeger, 1985.

Husain, Syed Sajjad, and Syed Ali Ashraf. *Crisis in Muslim Education*. Sevenoaks, England: Hodder and Stoughton; Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: King Abdulaziz University, 1979.

Jacobson, Williard J. "The Last Day of Civilization." In *Education for Peace and Disarmament: Toward a Living World*, ed. Douglas Sloan, 240-54. New York: Teachers College Press, 1983.

Johnson, R.C. "The Influence of Religious Teaching as a Factor in Maintaining Peace." In *Paths to Peace: A Study of War Its Causes and Prevention*, ed. Victor H. Wallace, 336-49. New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1970.

Jullundhri, Rashid Ahmad. "Human Rights and Islam." In *Understanding Human Rights: An Interdisciplinary and Interfaith Study*, ed. Alan D. Falconer, 34-46. Dublin: Irish School of Ecumenics, 1980.

Kahf, Monzer. "A Contribution to the Theory of Consumer Behavior in an Islamic Society." In *Studies in Islamic Economics*, ed. Khurshid Ahmad, 19-36. Leicester, U.K.: Islamic Foundation, 1981.

Kamali, Muhammad Hashim. "The Limits of Power in an Islamic State." *Islamic Studies Quarterly Journal* 28, no. 4 (Winter 1989).

Kane, Hal. "Wars Reach a Plateau." In *Vital Signs 1995: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke, 110-11. New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1995.

Kelsay, John. *Islam and War: A Study in Comparative Ethics*. Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1993.

Keyfitz, Nathan. "World Resources and the World Middle Class." In *Toward a Just World Order*. Vol 1, ed. Richard Falk and others, 297-314. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982.

Khadduri, Majid. *War and Peace in the Law of Islam*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1955.

\_\_\_\_\_. *The Islamic Conception of Justice*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984.

Ibn Khaldun, *The Mukaddimah: An Introduction to History*. Bolligen Series. Translated by Franz Rosenthal. Abridged and edited by N. J. Dawood. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981.

Khel, Muhammad N K. "Jihad and the Projection and the Spread of Islam." *Hamdard Islamicus* 7, no. 4 (Winter 1984): 37-56.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Rise of Muslim Umma at Mecca and Its Integration." *Hamdard Islamicus* 5, no 3 (Autumn 1982): 59-74.

Kiang, John. *One World: The Approaches to Permanent Peace on Earth and the General Happiness of Mankind*. Notre Dame, Ind.: One World, 1984.

Kim, George. "The Arms Race and Its Consequences for Developing Countries." In *A Peace Reader: Essential Readings on War, Justice, Non-Violence and World Order*, ed. Joseph Fahey and Richard Armstrong, 145-54. New York: Paulist Press, 1987.

Kimball, Charles A. *Religion Politics and Oil: The Volatile Mix in the Middle East*. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1992.

Kindsvatter, Richard, William Wilen, and Margaret Ishler. *Dynamics of Effective Teachings*. New York and London: Longman, 1988.

Kohlberg, Lawrence. *The Philosophy of Moral Development: Moral Stages and the Idea of Justice*. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981.

Krieger, David, and Frank K. Kelly. "Introduction." In *Waging Peace II: Vision and Hope for the 21st Century*, ed. David Krieger and Frank K. Kelly, xv-xxii. Chicago: Noble Press, 1992.

- Kuran, Timur. "The Economic System in Contemporary Thought: Interpretation and Assessment." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 18 (1986), 135-64.
- Kurdi, Abdulrahman A. *The Islamic State: A Study Based on the Islamic Holy Constitution*. New York: Mansell, 1984.
- Lappe, Frances M., and Joseph Collins. *World Hunger: Twelve Myths*. New York: Grove Press, 1986.
- Lawrence, Bruce B. *Defenders of God: The Fundamentalist Revolt against the Modern Age*. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Holy War (*Jihad*) in Islamic Religion and Nation State Ideologies." In *Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions*, ed. John Kelsay and James T. Johnson, 141-60. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.
- Lebacqz, Karen. *Six Theories of Justice: Perspectives from Philosophical and Theological Ethics*. Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1986.
- Lewis, Bernard, *The Political Language of Islam*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Ibn Majah, Muhammad ibn Yazid. *Sunan*. 2 vols. Istanbul, Turkey: Çađrı, 1992.
- Majid, Fakhry. *Ethical Theories in Islam*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1991.
- Mannan, Muhammad Abdul. *Economic Development and Social Peace in Islam: An Analytical Study of the Process of Economic Development in the Muslim Community of Today*. London: Ta Ha and Bangladesh Social Peace Foundation, 1990.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Islamic Economics: Theory and Practice*. Cambridge: Islamic Academy, 1986.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "The Economics of Poverty in Islam with Special Reference to Muslim Countries." In *Distributive Justice and Need Fulfilment in an Islamic Economy*, ed. Munawar Iqbal, 303-34. Islamabad, Pakistan: International Islamic University, n.d.
- Mawdudi, Abu'l A'la. *The Economic Problem of Man and Its Islamic Solution*. 5th ed. Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Publications, 1978.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Human Rights in Islam." *Al-Tawhid*, 4 no. 3 (Rajab-Ramadan 1407 [1987]): 59-89.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Jihad in Islam*. Lahore, Pakistan: International Islamic Federation of Students Organization, 1980.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Towards Understanding Islam*. Translated and edited by Khurshid Ahmad. Lahore, Pakistan: Islamic Teaching Center, 1988.
- Mayer, Ann Elizabeth. *Islam and Human Rights: Tradition and Politics*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "War and Peace in the Islamic Tradition and International Law." In *Just War and Jihad: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on War and Peace in Western and Islamic Traditions*, ed. John Kelsay and James T. Johnson, 195-226. New York: Greenwood Press, 1991.
- McDonough, Sheila. *Muslim Ethics and Modernity: A Comparative Study of the Ethical Thought of Sayyed Ahmad Khan and Mawlana Mawdudi*. Ontario, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1984.
- McGinnis, James B., and others, ed. *Educating for Peace and Justice: National Dimensions*. St. Louis, Mo.: The Institute for Peace and Justice, 1985.
- McGinnis, James B. "Education for Peace and Justice." *Religious Education* 81, no. 3 (Summer 1986): 446-65.

Monez, Thornton B. "Working for Peace: Implications for Education." In *Education for Peace Focus on Mankind*, ed. George Henderson, 9-40. Prepared by the Association for Supervision and Curriculum Development 1973 Yearbook Committee. Washington D.C.: ASCD, 1973.

Moore, Alvin. "The Sword of Islam (Sayf al- Islam)" *Hamdard Islamicus*. 14, no. 1 (Spring 1991):15-19.

Moussalli, Ahmad S. *Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The Ideological and Political Discourse of Sayyed Qutb*. Beirut, Lebanon: American University of Beirut, 1992.

Muhaiyaddeen, M. R. Bawa. *Islam and World Peace: Explanations of a Sufi*. Foreword by Annemarie Schimmel. Philadelphia: Fellowship Press, 1987.

Murakami, Toshifumi. "A Comparison of Peace Education in Britain and Japan." *Peace Research* 24, no. 4 (November 1992): 43-54.

Muslim, Abu al-Husayn Muslim ibn al-Hajjaj. *Sahih*. 3 vols. Istanbul, Turkey: Çađri, 1992.

Muzaffar, Chandra. "Implementation of Justice in Politics." In *Islam and Justice*, ed. Aidit Bin Ghazali, 159-81. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Institute of Islamic Understanding, 1993.

Naidu, M. V. "Dimensions of Peace." *Peace Research* 18, no. 2 (May 1986): 3-14, 91-98.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Peace Education in Canada." *Peace Research* 20, no 3 (September 1988): 22-35.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Nature and Scope of Peace and Peace Studies." *Peace Research* 20, no. 3 (September 1988): 1-21.

Naqvi, Syed Nawab Haider. "The Margins of State Intervention in an Islamic Economy" *Hamdard Islamicus* 6, no 3 (Autumn 1983): 47-61.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Ethics and Economics: An Islamic Synthesis*. Leicester, U.K.: The Islamic Foundation, 1981.

Naqvi, Syed Nawab Haider and others. "Principles of Islamic Economics." In *Islamic Economic Alternatives: Critical Perspectives and New Directions*, ed. K. S. Jomo, 153-87. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Ikrak, 1993.

Nasai, Abu Abd al-Rahman Abmad ibn Suayb. *Sunan*. 8 vols. Istanbul, Turkey: Çađri, 1992.

Nasr, Sayyed Hossein. "The Spiritual Significance of Jihad." *Parabola* 7, no. 4 (1982): 14-19.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Traditional Islam in the Modern World*. New York: KPI., 1987.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Islam." In *Our Religions*, ed. Arvind Sharma, 425-32. San Francisco: Harper, 1993.

National Conference of Catholic Bishops. *The Challenge of Peace: God's Promise and Our Response*. Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1983.

\_\_\_\_\_. *Economic Justice for All: Pastoral Letter on Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy*. Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1986.

Nielsen, Niels C. *Fundamentalism, Myths, and World Religions*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1993.

Norman, M. Daniel. *Islam and the West: The Making of an Image*. Oxford, England: One World, 1993.

Al-Nowaihi, Mohamed. "Problems of Modernization in Islam." *The Muslim World* 65 (July 1975): 174-85.

Oliphant, M.L. "The Threat to Civilization from Atomic Warfare." In *Paths to Peace: A Study of War Its Causes and Prevention*, ed. Victor H. Wallace, 217-34. New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1970.

Omolade, Barbara. "We Speak for the Planet." In *Rocking the Ship of State: Toward A Feminist Peace Politics*, ed. Adrienne Harris and Ynestra King, 171-89. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989.

- Othman, Abu Hassan. "Implementation of Justice in Social Affairs." In *Islam and Justice*, ed. Aidit Bin Ghazali, 65-88. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia: Institute of Islamic Understanding, 1993.
- Pauling, Linus. "Reflections on the Persian Gulf War." In *Waging Peace: Vision and Hope for the 21st Century*, ed. David Krieger and Frank Kelly, 29-33. Chicago: Noble Press, 1992.
- Peres, Shimon, and Arye Naor. *The New Middle East*. New York: Henry Holt, 1993.
- Peters, Rudolph. *Islam and Colonialism: The Doctrine of Jihad in Modern History*. Religion and Society Series. The Hague, N.Y.: Mouton, 1979.
- Platt, Anne E. "Infectious Diseases Return." In *Vital Signs 1996: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke, 130-31. New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1996.
- Al-Qaradawi, Yusuf. *Non-Muslims in the Islamic Society*. Translated by Khalil Muhammad Hamad and Sayed M. Ali Shah. Indianapolis: American Trust, 1985.
- Qutb, Sayyed. *Islam and Universal Peace*. Indianapolis: American Trust, 1977.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Islam: The Misunderstood Religion*. Kuwait: Al-Assriyya Printing Press, 1964.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Milestones*. Revised and trans. by Ahmad Zaki Hammad. Indianapolis: American Trust, 1990.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Social Justice in Islam*. Washington, D.C.: American Council of Learned Societies, 1970.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "That Hideous Schizophrenia." In *Christianity through Non-Christian Eyes*, ed. Paul J. Griffiths, 73-81. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1990.
- Rahman, Fazlur. *Major Themes of the Qur'an*. Chicago: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1980.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Islam and Modernity: Transformation of an Intellectual Tradition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982.
- Rajotte, Freda. "Justice, Peace, and the Integrity of Creation." *Religious Education* 85, no.1 (Winter 1990): 5-14.
- Rauf, Muhammad Abdul. *A Muslim's Reflections on Democratic Capitalism*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1984.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *The Islamic Doctrine of Economics and Contemporary Economic Thought*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1979.
- Reardon, Betty A. *Militarization, Security, and Peace Education*. Valley Forge, Pa.: United Ministries in Education, 1982.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Comprehensive Peace Education: Educating for Global Responsibility*. New York: Teachers College Press, 1988.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Women and Peace: Feminist Visions of Global Security*. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1993.
- Regehr, Ernie. *Militarism and The World Order: A Study Guide for Churches*. Geneva: Commission of the Churches on International Affairs of the World Council of Churches, 1980.
- Renard, John. "Al-Jihad al-Akbar: Notes on a Theme in Islamic Spirituality." *The Muslim World* 78 (July-October 1988): 225-42.
- Renner, Michael. "Military Expenditures Falling." In *Vital Signs 1992: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke, 84-85. New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1992.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Preparing for Peace." In *State of the World 1993: A World Watch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society*, ed. Linda Starke, 139-57. New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1993.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Cleaning Up After the Arms Race." In *State of the World 1994: A World Watch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society*, ed. Linda Starke, 137-55. New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1994.

- \_\_\_\_\_. "Nuclear Arsenals Decline Again." In *Vital Signs 1995: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke, 106-107. New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1995.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Budgeting for Disarmament." In *State of the World 1995: A World Watch Institute Report on Progress Toward a Sustainable Society*, ed. Linda Starke, 150-69. New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1995.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Nuclear Arsenal Continue to Decline." In *Vital Signs 1996: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke, 100-101. New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1996.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Peacekeeping Expenditures Level Off." In *Vital Signs 1996: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, ed. Linda Starke, 101-103. New York and London: W. W. Norton, 1996.
- Rodda, Annabel. *Women and the Environment*. Women and World Development Series. London and N.J.: Zed Books, 1991.
- Rodinson, Maxime. *Islam and Capitalism*. Austin, Tex.: University of Texas Press, 1978.
- Ronsvalle, John, and Sylvia Ronsvalle. *The Poor Have Faces: Loving Your Neighbor in the 21st Century*. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 1992.
- Russell, Bertrand. *Has Man a Future?* London: George Allen and Unwin, 1961.
- Russet, Bruce. "Politics and Alternative Security: Toward a More Democratic, Therefore More Peaceful World." In *Alternative Security Living Without Nuclear Deterrence*, ed. Burns H. Weston, 107-36. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990.
- Sachedina, Abdulaziz A. "Freedom of Conscience and Religion in the Qur'an." In *Human Rights and the Conflict of Cultures: Western and Islamic perspectives on Religious Liberty*, ed. David Little, John Kelsay, and Abdulaziz A. Sachedina, 53-100. Columbia, S. C.: University of South California Press, 1988.
- Saeed, Javid. *Islam and Modernization: A Comparative Analysis of Pakistan, Egypt, and Turkey*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994.
- Safi, Louay M. "War and Peace in Islam." *The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences* 5 (Spring 1988): 29-57.
- Salahi, M. A. *Muhammad: Man and Prophet: A Complete Study of the Life of the Prophet of Islam*. Rockpart, Mass.: Element Books, 1995.
- Samuelson, Paul A. and William D. Nordhaus. *Economics*. 13th ed. New York: McGraw-Hill Book, 1989.
- Sayeed, S. M. "Human Rights in Islam." *Hamdard Islamicus* 9 (Autumn 1986): 67-75.
- Schleifer, S. Abdullah. "Jihad and Traditional Islamic Consciousness." *The Islamic Quarterly* 27, no. 4 (1983): 173-203.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Jihad: Modernist Apologists, Modern Apologetics." *The Islamic Quarterly* 28, no. 1 (1984): 25-46.
- Shalaby, Ibrahim M. "Islam and Peace." *Journal of Religious Thought* 34 ( Fall-Winter 1977-78): 42-49.
- Shaltut, Mahmut. "Koran and Fighting." In *Jihad in Medieval and Modern Times*. Translated and annotated by Rudolph Peters, 26-86. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977.
- Sheehan, Michael. *Arms Control Theory and Practice*. Oxford, U.K.: Basil Blackwell, 1988.
- Siddiqi, Muhammad Nejatullah. "Guarantee of a Minimum Level of Living in Islamic State." *Distributive Justice and Need Fulfilment in an Islamic Economy*, ed. Munawar Iqbal, 249-84. Islamabad, Pakistan: International Islamic University, n.d.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Muslim Economic Thinking: A Survey of Contemporary Literary." In *Studies In Islamic Economics*, ed. Khurshid Ahmad, 191-315. Leicester, U.K.: Islamic Foundation, 1981
- Siddiqi, Abdul Hameed. *Jihad in Islam*. Lahore, Pakistan: Kazi, 1979.

Siddiqui, Muhammad Yasin Mazhar. "Economic Imbalances and the Role of Islam—An Essay in Qur'anic Interpretation." *Hamdard Islamicus* 10 (Summer 1987): 35-46.

Simon, Thomas W. *Democracy and Social Injustice: Law, Politics, and Philosophy*. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 1995.

Sivan, E. *Radical Islam, Medieval Theology and Modern Politics*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1985.

Sivard, Ruth Leger. *World Military and Social Expenditures 1985*. Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1985.

\_\_\_\_\_. *World Military and Social Expenditures 1986*. Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1986

\_\_\_\_\_. *World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88*. Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1988

\_\_\_\_\_. *World Military and Social Expenditures 1993*. Washington, D.C.: World Priorities, 1993.

Smith, Adam. *The Wealth of Nations*. New York: Modern Library, 1937.

Smith, Jane. "Sayyed Hossein Nasr: Defender of the Sacred and Islamic Traditionalism." In *The Muslims of America*, ed. Yvonne Y. Haddad, 80-95. New York: Oxford University Press, 1991.

Solomon, Robert C. and Mark C. Murphy, ed. *What Is Justice?: Classical and Contemporary Readings*. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990.

Talbi, Mohamed. "Possibilities and Conditions for a Better Understanding Between Islam and the West." *Journal of Ecumenical Studies* 25, no. 2 (Spring 1988): 161-93.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Religious Liberty: A Muslim Perspective." In *Muslims in Dialogue: The Evolution of a Dialogue*, ed. Leonard Swidler, 465- 82. Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1992.

\_\_\_\_\_. "Islam and Dialogue -Some Reflections on a Current Topic." In *Christianity through Non-Christian Eyes*, ed. Paul J. Griffiths, 82-101. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1990.

Tirmidhi, Abu Isa Muhammad ibn Isa. *Al-Sunan*. 5 vols. Istanbul, Turkey: Cagri, 1992.

Thomas, Caroline. *In Search of Security: The Third World in International Relations*. Boulder, Colo.: Wheatsheaf Books, 1987.

Toghais, Ibrahim Abdulrahman. "Social Justice in Islamic Law." Ph.D. Diss., Claremont Graduate School, 1982.

Toton, Suzanne C. "Structural Change: The Next Step in Justice Education." *Religious Education* 80, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 447-59.

\_\_\_\_\_. "The Public and Political Responsibility of Christian Education." *Religious Education* 82 (Fall 1987): 606-22.

Troger, Karl Wolfgang. "Peace and Islam: In Theory and Practice." Translated by M. Walpole. *Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations* 1 (January 1990): 12-24.

United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). *Human Development Report 1992*. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Utne, Birgit Brock. *Educating For Peace: A Feminist Perspective*. The Athene Series. New York: Pergamon Press, 1985.

Vickman, Leon. "Why Nuclear Weapons Are Illegal." In *Waging Peace: Vision and Hope for the 21st Century*, ed. David Krieger and Frank Kelly, 89-101. Chicago: Noble Press, 1992.

Voll, John O. "Fundamentalism in the Sunni Arab World: Egypt and the Sudan." In *Fundamentalism Observed*, ed. Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, 345-402. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991.

- \_\_\_\_\_. *Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1982.
- Waardenburg, Jacques. "Human Rights, Human Dignity and Islam." ed. T. Ahlback. *Temenos* 27: 151-82.
- Watt, W. Montgomery. "Islamic Conceptions of the Holy War." In *The Holy War*, ed. Thomas Patrick Murphy, 141-56. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Islamic Philosophy and Theology*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1962.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Free Will and Destination in Early Islam*. London: Luzac, 1984.
- \_\_\_\_\_. *Islamic Fundamentalism and Modernity*. New York: Routledge, 1988.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Islam and Peace." *Studia Missionaria* 38 (1989): 67-78.
- Winters, Francis X. "The Nuclear Arms Race: Machine Versus Man." In *Ethics and Nuclear Strategy?* ed. Harold P. Ford and Francis X. Winters, 144-55. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1977.
- World Development Report 1993*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.
- World Development Report 1994*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Wren, Brian A. *Education for Justice*. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1977.
- Wright, Quincy. *A Study of War*. 2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965.
- Abu Yusuf, Ya'qub ibn Ibrahim al-Ansari. *Kitab al-Kharaj* Vol. 3. Translated by A. Ben Shemesh. Leiden: E.J. Brill and London: Luzac, 1969.
- Yusuf, Sayyed Muhammad. *Economic Justice in Islam*. 2nd, ed. Lahore, Pakistan: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1977.
- Abu Zahra, Muhammad. *The Concept of War in Islam*. Studies in Islam Series. Translated by Muhammad Al-Hady and Taha Omar. Cairo: Ministry of Waqf, n. d.
- Zarqa, Muhammad Anas. "Islamic Economics: An Approach to Human Welfare." In *Studies in Islamic Economics*, ed. Khurshid Ahmad, 3-18. Leicester, U.K.: Islamic Foundation, 1981.
- \_\_\_\_\_. "Islamic Distributive Schemes," In *Distributive Justice and Need Fulfilment in an Islamic Economy*, ed. Munawar Iqbal, 159-215. Islamabad, Pakistan: International Islamic University, n.d.