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Series IIA. Islam. Volume 3

Philosophy in Pakistan

edited by
Naeem Ahmad

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Preface

Naeem Ahmad

The idea of developing a volume, indicative of the nature and tenor of philosophical activity in Pakistan, emerged a few years ago during my correspondence with Dr. G. S. Shanker, a fellow of Oxford University. Dr. Shanker showed a keen desire to know about Pakistan and its philosophy. This, perhaps, is due to our own negligence and inability to introduce Pakistan to the international community that most scholars abroad are still not able to differentiate between Pakistani philosophy and Indian (Hindu) philosophy. The publication of *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* by Radha Krishnan (ed.) has added to the confusion, giving the impression that it represents the philosophical activity of the entire Sub-continent. Thus it was felt highly imperative to identify the nature of philosophy in Pakistan.

As is indicated above, Pakistani philosophy is quite distinct from, and independent of, Indian philosophy (with its six systems and Buddhism etc.) No doubt, the philosophical tradition in India dates back several centuries B. C. whereas the Muslims came to India as late as the seventh century of the Christian era and Pakistan came into being only a few decades ago. What then does the title 'Pakistani Philosophy' signify? Does it imply that the present articles could not have been written outside of Pakistan or prior to its inception? If so then it must necessarily imply that the inquiries embodied in these pieces of writing are over-ridden with some considerations peculiar to Pakistan and, as such, they would lose their character as independent inquiries; withdraw the given preceding conditions and the whole structure will crumble to dust. Such an approach to the scope, motive and ultimate findings of these attempts is irrelevant if not absurd.

The history of the Sub-continent is replete with military incursions of different invaders; some of them eventually went back to their homeland while some settled down here permanently. The Muslims first set foot on the Indian soil during the period of the second caliph of Islam, Umar Ibn Khattab; but this expedition had to be postponed for several reasons. The second time a more organised expedition was sent was during the first Umayyad Caliph Mu'awiyah in 664 a. d. which again remained unsuccessful. Finally, in 711 the famous Muslim general, Muhammad bin Qasim was sent to India. He succeeded in conquering Sind and its adjacent areas including Baluchistan and Multan which were eventually incorporated into the Muslim Caliphate.¹ This area came to be ruled for some time by the *Qaramites* under the Fatimids of Egypt. The *Qaramites* belonged to the *Batini* movement which had produced such great philosophers as Farabi and Ibn Sina. Thus, the tradition of Muslim philosophy was first introduced in the Indian environment by the *Ismaili Du'at* (missionaries). Multan was the centre of *Qaramite* government where philosophy flourished to a great extent. But in 1010 Mahmud Ghaznavi invaded Multan to uproot the *Batini* movement which was considered to be an imminent threat to orthodox Islam. The educational centres and libraries of the Ismailis were burnt; the leading Ismailis were slain, some of them fled to Iran, Egypt and other countries; many of them went underground. The budding tradition of Muslim philosophy in the Sub-continent was thoroughly hampered, in fact arrested, by dogmatic religion. Thus we hear no mention of philosophy during the early centuries of the Muslim rule in India. But this does not mean that philosophy had been eradicated once and for all. Philosophical broodings continued privately and secretly and appeared in the mystical writings of the subsequent Muslim sages. Evidently mysticism was considered to be less harmful to religious orthodoxy.

The first ever recorded book of Islamic mysticism in India was written by Syed Ali Hujwairi. The tradition of philosophical thinking that had remained dormant and underground for a long time, escaping the notice of the historians, now became visible and its contours of development can definitely be traced in the subsequent periods.

One point regarding the determination of the lineage of philosophical thought should be made clear. Although the intellectual environment of the Sub-continent was impregnated with various schools of Indian philosophy, the development of Muslim religio-philosophical thought, despite certain conciliatory efforts, ran parallel to it without ever being influenced by it. Aziz Ahmad remarks:

The history of medieval and modern India is to a very considerable extent a history of Hindu-Muslim religio-cultural tensions interspersed with movements or individual efforts at understanding, harmony and even composite development. The divisive forces have proved much more dynamic than the cohesive ones. . . . As a religio-cultural force, Islam is in most respects, the very anti-thesis of Hinduism. Hinduism is a large aggregate of belief, developed in the course of many centuries, evolving from the sacrificial hymns of the Vedas to the philosophical speculation of the Upanishads, the discipline of Yoga, the metaphysical subtleties of Vedanta and passionate devotion of Bhakti. Islam, on the other hand, is bound by an austere central discipline, revolving round Qur'an, the *Vox Dei*, and Hadith, the *Vox Prophetarum*; and whatever speculation it has evolved or borrowed from external sources has been more or less adjusted to these two primary sources of religious authority. Psychologically Hinduism tends to be melancholy, sentimental and philosophical; Islam tends to be ardent and austere. Hindu genius flowers in the concrete and the iconographic; the Muslim mind is on the whole atomistic, abstract, geometrical and iconoclastic.²

A number of factors, the warp and woof of which spread over a period of about ten centuries, have contributed to the shaping of Pakistani mind. Rather, the very creation of Pakistan is a logical consequence of a long religio-philosophical movement.

Hence reference to Pakistan is relevant only in a spatio-temporal sense, a purely accidental and superfluous allusion -- it may only provide a rationale for the prevailing circumstances in Pakistan.

In Pakistan there prevails a socio-religious consciousness. It is quite deep-rooted at the sentimental level of our psyche perhaps as a hereditary trait, perhaps as an acquired prejudice which serves to delineate and consolidate our national entity which is otherwise vulnerable to distracting pulls for a number of causes, centrifugal cataclysm or magnetic attraction exercised by global powers at work in different fields of international activity. It sounds quite plausible in a geo-political context but, I am afraid, it denies or falsifies the principle of historical continuity so manifest in the process of the advent of nations.

Leaving apart these questions, the very movement for the creation of Pakistan on the world map is replete with references to this historical background. The concept of a separate homeland for the Muslims of South-Asia, enunciated by Allama Iqbal, in his Presidential Address at the Annual Meeting of the Muslim League in 1930, was based mainly on the idea that Islam was an all-permeating principle determining the behaviour of a Muslim as an individual and that of the Muslim community at socio-political level. Then there is a saying attributed to the Quaid-i-Azam that Pakistan was established with the first Muslim stepping on the coastal lands of Sind. Viewing in this context the philosophic studies undertaken in Pakistan may, perforce, have an inherent and predominantly relevant reference to philosophic systems which were developed by Muslim scholars in the past -- and this despite the fact that sufficient source material is not readily available. The original works of the Muslim thinkers have perished during the adversities of time; and those

which have survived have remained alien to the present day scholars. Non-availability coupled with our inability to avail ourselves of these works because of a linguistic impediment (Arabic and Persian are not so familiar to us these days as they used to be even at the beginning of this century) makes it difficult to establish a well-connected relationship between the thought structures of Muslim philosophers of old and the present day intellectual achievements in a correct evolutionary perspective. Still it is possible to trace such influences and to identify areas of affinity.

It is generally recognised that the revival of the Greek tradition of philosophy is due entirely to the interest taken by the earlier Muslim scholars in the field of learning. They did not study Greek philosophers passively or with a prejudicial point of view to find faults with them. They developed simultaneously what they termed as *Hikmat-e-Yunaniyan* (wisdom of the Greeks) and *Hikmat-e-Imaniyan* (wisdom of the faithful) which contributed to the development of philosophy at a level which marked the originality, depth and clarity of the original authors. It is a pity that for several reasons their efforts could not be recognised or appreciated in a proper perspective. Under the influence of Greek sages the Muslim scholars in India also contributed fairly to this heritage, particularly during the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries. *Ma'qulat*, as they called them, were studied and taught at the *Madaris*. The Middle Eastern countries where the *Ma'qulat* originally developed, unfortunately remained in the grip of political turmoil during this period and thus it fell to the lot of Indian Muslim scholars to develop these systems to a venerable point of perfection. We may particularly name among them Mulla Abdul Hakeem Sialkoti, Mulla Mahmood Jonepuri, and Mulla Mohibullah Behari. Strangely enough, some other local scholars of their stature were better known outside India. A systematic and coherent account of their achievements has not been handed down to our age. Allama Iqbal lamented this state of affairs which led the European scholars to believe that no Muslim philosophic tradition existed in India. The Orientalists have been tracing the Muslim legacy in various fields in the Middle East steadily, but not so in the case of India. This may be due to their preoccupation with, and interest in, Indian (Hindu) philosophy or a misconception that Muslim scholars of India were only the passive followers of philosophic systems which developed in the Middle East and to a greater degree in Muslim Spain.

It may not be quite relevant for the present study to delve into or expand upon the achievements of Muslim scholars outside India except that they were the predecessors of the men of learning who lived in India. It may suffice to say that the philosophic studies developed in the Muslim countries under the Abbasids for the first time. Al-Kindi was the first one to receive the title of *Failsoof-al-Arab*. But, with the decline of central control over the Muslim states, there spread a wave of inconsistencies, upheavals and political instability leading to bloodshed. In these circumstances, the strictly Muslim systems of thought and ideology suffered confusion and paved the way for certain schools of thought which apparently leaned on philosophy to project and sustain the atheistic element in their movements. They had their periods of ups and downs coinciding with the rise and fall of their political patrons. Most of these movements developed an emblem of mystery about them which suited their treacherous political designs and also served as a garb to protect them against the wrath of steadfast rulers. The leading pioneers of these movements such as Zakriyya Razi, Ibn Sina and the anonymous authors of *Rasail-e-Ikhwan-as-Safa* were well-versed in philosophic traditions; their own contributions were no less formidable. This is another thing for which they have been condemned, namely, for leading Muslims astray so far as religious belief and practice are concerned.

Side by side with these thinkers there flourished a mystic tradition. The earlier mystics in Islam did not show much reverence for philosophy. But there does exist a close relation between

the mystical experience and philosophic broodings, so to say. Both try to reach the Ultimate Reality or, inversely, try to bring down the 'Transcendental Real' to within the reach of sensuous experience or to permit sensuous descriptions. The mystics depend more on their direct experience of the 'Real' which they term, 'encounter' (*wisal*). Here they part ways with the philosophers. The mystic, after the ultimate experience of encounter, is hardly ever able to describe or sustain it. It was perhaps for this psychological factor that Allama Iqbal in his book, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia*, observed that the best metaphysical thinking of the Iranians found expression in isolated verses of *ghazal* (a form of poetry where each verse expresses a self-contained idea or experience).³ But there have been mystics of a very high order who were able to explain their experience, although in highly mysterious tones. Of them all, Ibn Arabi combines in himself the best qualities of a philosopher, a poet and a mystic. His religio-mystical philosophy has had powerful and far-reaching influence on the development of philosophical thought in the Sub-continent.

With this background and the local Bhakti movement and *Din-e-Elahi* of Akbar, we come to the Mughal period of Muslim India. Towards the end of this period there appeared on the scene Shah Wali Allah, in whom we find a point of culmination point of our entire wholesome and purely rational tradition. At the end of this period, with the advent of British rule, we find the Muslims of India making hectic efforts to preserve their illustrious heritage of religion, culture, civilisation and learning in various fields. This brings us to the door-steps of Pakistan.

But before proceeding further, I ought to pause for I have left out a congenial lineage of thinkers who expressed themselves in a perhaps more sound and a more plausible strain combining the wholesome traditions of *Shari'at*, *Tariqat* and *Hikmat*. They had al-Ghazali as the source-head, a philosopher who turned out to be a staunch antagonist of, and tried to defeat, philosophy with the same method it adopted for its strength. Rumi displayed the same characteristics and finally it came down to Shah Wali Allah who upheld their tradition in India. It is through his encyclopaedic writings the whole heritage of early Muslim theology, mysticism and philosophy was disseminated in Indian intellectual life.

The Pakistan movement did not take this name till 1932 or still later. But as an under-current of thought, it crystallised in a formula enunciated by Iqbal in 1930 which then was adopted as a political demand by the Muslim League in 1940. This was discernible from the moment when someone first thought of a plan of action to bring the downtrodden Muslims of India back into the body politic of the region. Strangely, this was not a straightforward plunge into active politics. It started with a humble rehabilitating effort to pull the Muslims out of despondency, by educating them so that they might be well-equipped to play the role for which they were destined in the future years. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was the man to give the lead. One main problem he faced was posed by the Christian missionaries which, on the one hand, hardened the Muslims in their faith (with, of course, some freakish break-throughs) but, on the other hand, tended to broaden and deepen the cleavage between Christian rulers and their Muslim subjects. Claiming secularism, the British regime never shook off its complex against the Muslims and this worked favourably and to the advantage of the Hindus who were full of hatred and revenge for Muslims and tried all possible means to win the favour of the British rulers at the cost of the Muslims.

Sir Syed Ahmad Khan was quick enough to grasp the implications of the situation and thought that education was the only panacea to cure the Muslim crowds of their suicidal rigidity and to enable them to join the main stream of the socio-political activities. To dispel the Christian prejudices against the Muslims, he strived hard to explain away the theological differences between Muslims and Christians by a handy rational approach for which he coined the term

‘Nature’. This was no doubt a crude attempt both at the religious as well as at the rational level, far less to claim for itself the title of theology or philosophy. Dr. Abdul Khaliq observes: "In spite of his (Sir Syed's) declared objective to reveal the 'original bright face of Islam', Sir Syed Ahmad Khan imperceptibly advocates the relative primacy of scientific naturalism."⁴ (With due reverence to Dr. Abdul Khaliq, I may add that Sir Syed had no idea of what scientific naturalism is.) However, the crude rationalism he preached finally matured into the ideal of a Muslim university to introduce the Muslim youth to the modern Western advancements in fields of learning.

There was, however, an early set back. Shibli No'mani, who began as a disciple of Sir Syed, decided to part company with him and established *Nadvatul Ulama* which discarded the scientific naturalism of Sir Syed. Although Shibli himself wrote a book (in two volumes) on *Ilm-al-Kalam*, on the whole his institution and other Islamic *Madaris* predominantly condemned rationalism, an ill omen for philosophy. For some steadfast and austere devotees of Islam too much emphasis on reasoning and on attempts to harmonise dogma with the principles of science and philosophy amounted to interfering with the fundamental belief system of Islam. This tradition of rationalism suffered immensely at the hands of Qasim Nanotavi, Abul Kalam Azad, Anwar Shah Kashmiri, Syed Sulaiman Nadvi and Muhammad Ali Jauhar. This also marked a definite cleavage between religio-philosophical writings, on the one hand, and orthodox preachings, on the other. A liberal interpretation of dogma and philosophising flourished at Aligarh, whereas strict adherence to dogma and austerity and purity of faith became the hall-mark of such institutions as Dar-ul-Uloom Deoband, Nadvatul-ul-Ulama and Jamia Millia, Delhi. In fact these two attitudes contributed to the formation of two almost parallel stances of the religious mind in the Indo-Pakistan Sub-continent which have come to stay.

And now we come to Iqbal who stood for the rational interpretation of dogma. There has been some controversy over the years following his demise as to whether or not Iqbal was a philosopher. But long before he himself made the point clear. "Most of my life has been spent in the study of European philosophy and that viewpoint has become my second nature. Consciously or unconsciously I study the realities and truths of Islam from the same point of view. I have experienced this many a time that while talking in Urdu I cannot express all that I want to say in that language".⁵ Dwelling on this theme, Dr. Taseer went on to make the point that "Iqbal was great enough to be a bridge between the East and the West."⁶ "It is a mark of his greatness that he is in line with the great thinkers of the world and, having absorbed the best thought of the day, has kept his individuality, and contributed something to the world thought."⁷ "And it is as an activist -- 'practical philosopher', as Russell terms it -- that Iqbal should be judged. As such his main contribution to thought is his development of the conception of Ego. Before this, Ego was merely a philosophical concept. Iqbal pregnated it with practical content."⁸ That may suffice although much water has flown down the stream since Dr. Taseer made these observations. They help us to construct an image of Iqbal without falling prey to many 'ifs' and 'buts'.

The greatest contribution of Iqbal to his posterity is that he created an atmosphere of confidence which has helped the present generation to outgrow the apologetic tone that had become almost a predicament. Now we can say, whatever we have to, without looking for authority from occidental sources.

It is here that we can pick up the thread to approach and assess the value of the collection of writings embodied in the present volume, viz., an attempt to bridge the chasm between the old and the new; between the East and the West; between dogmatic assertions and analytical ponderings; the present day scientific theories regarding the nature of the matter and the metaphysical thought

that endeavours to connect them into a coherent whole -- thereby leading to a realisation of the all-embracing unitary or unifying (whatever one prefers to call it) principle underlying all existence.

At the time of the creation of Pakistan, philosophy at post-graduate level was taught only at Government College Lahore. But very soon post-graduate departments were established in different universities of the country. In 1954, the Pakistan Philosophical Congress was formed with Professor M. M. Sharif as its first president and Khalifa Abdul Hakim, Dr. C. A. Qadir, Qazi and M. Aslam among its founding members. Since 1954 the Pakistan Philosophical Congress has held its annual sessions regularly at various universities of the country. Its proceedings and a quarterly, *The Pakistan Philosophical Journal*, are published along with some important symposia as separate volumes. The publication of several books, including an excellent English translation of al-Ghazali's *Tahafut-al-Falasifa*,⁹ also goes to its credit. The monumental work *A History of Muslim Philosophy*,¹⁰ compiled and edited by M. M. Sharif, is a major land-mark in the intellectual history of Pakistan.

A perusal of the present collection of articles will reveal that in Pakistan various types and brands of Western philosophy, though not alien, have failed to catch root in this soil. These are studied and accepted only in an indigenous framework, i.e., the Pakistani mind accepts only those elements of Western philosophy which accord with its temper. It is, however, premature to form a judgement on the nature of philosophy in Pakistan. Only when the readers have carefully perused and critically appraised these articles can thing definite be said.

Notes

1. Al-Baladhuri, *Futuh-ul-Buldan* (Cairo, 1932), pp. 57-58.
2. Aziz Ahmad, *Islam in Indian Environment* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1964), pp. 73-74.
3. Muhammad Iqbal, *The Development of Metaphysics in Persia* (Lahore: Bazm-i-Iqbal, n.d.), p. ix.
4. Abdul Khaliq, *Qur'an Studies* (Lahore, 1990), p. 9.
5. Sh. Ataullah, ed., *Iqbal Nama*, Letter no. 19 (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf).
6. *Aspects of Iqbal* (Iqbal day lectures) (Lahore: Qaumi Kutub Khana, Railway Road, 1938), p. xii.
7. *Ibid.*, p. xiv.
8. *Ibid.*, p. xvi.
9. Al-Ghazali, *Tahafut-al-Falasifah* (Incoherence of the Philosophers), translated into English by Sabih Ahmad Kamali (Lahore: Pakistan Philosophical Congress, 1958).
10. M.M. Sharif, ed., *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, 2 volumes (Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1966).

Introduction

George F. McLean

At the turn of the millennium, new sensibilities are opening for the human spirit. Dimensions of the mind long forgotten since the beginning of the Enlightenment and its reductionist focus upon reason are now re-emerging in human consciousness. Levels of human sensibility such as feeling and imagination, as well as the creativity of whole cultures, now come into view as essential to the properly humane character of philosophical awareness. In this light, we turn to the cultures and traditions of different peoples for more than history. Their experience of what it means to be human and how to live in their circumstances the dignity and glory of human life now able serve as a genial resource for a world facing the new challenges which have come with the end of the bipolar world structure and the intensification of inter-communication.

A major task for philosophers is to rediscover the riches of these cultures and to bring them to the common table. In contrast to the past histories of contrast and even conflict, and in the image of all peoples on pilgrimage to the Holy Mountain, the prospect of the coming millennium should be one of convergence and mutual enrichment.

It is in this spirit that the present volume has been written. It is the work of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy to promote such discovery and to help in the sharing of its results. Hence, we celebrate this achievement by the Department of Philosophy at the University of the Punjab, Lahore, Pakistan and wish them well as they lead their people into the global dialogue, which promises to constitute a new era for humankind.

Islam has always known that philosophy is a human creation, but also that humans are creatures of God. Hence the challenge of the philosophy of the deeply Islamic people of Pakistan is to be able to see deeply enough into human life in time to unveil its transcendent dignity and eternal destiny. The present work is an outstanding effort toward this goal. It reflects a mobilization of philosophers intent upon contributing to the realization in modern times of an Islamic society and culture; it reflects a series of studies which situate this effort in its historical and trans-historical horizon; and it tests out the strengths and weaknesses of a number of Muslim approaches to philosophy with a view to their ability to contribute to the achievement of this goal.

The work begins with a preface by Naeem Ahmad which identifies the historical context and parameters of this effort. He looks back into the major stages of this effort, especially in Islam, and delineates the characteristics of its present challenge.

Part I lays out the character of the philosophical effort as a search to unite all in the Transcendent. Chapter I by M.M. Sharif, "The Philosophical Interpretation of History" lays bare the character of the challenge by asking what, after all, is history. The challenge could be bypassed were history to be seen as static, or at least unilinear. Instead, he points out its character as a process which includes diversity, which he sets in a teleological context open to creative effort. Hence, history must be read in terms not of a mechanistic and deterministic science, but of creative aesthetic sensitivity.

Chapter II by Khalifa Abdul Hakim, "One God, One World, One Humanity", sets this within the unity of God as articulated through metaphysics. In this relation the human person is seen as the vice-regent of God in time. The surrender of the human to the divine is a breakthrough which sublimates human freedom. In these terms ethics points out a unity of virtues which orient human life and social reform.

Chapter III by Q.M. Aslam, "Iqbal's 'Preface' to the Lectures on *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*", reflects the complexity of this vision for humanity as not only spiritual but bodily. It points out well the importance that Iqbal recognizes for the physical sciences, their empirical contribution and the need to proceed by induction rather than by authority. But Iqbal states clearly the overall intent of his work in the very first pages where he points out the essential requirement for a Total Absolute as a condition for human thought. In this light the empirical work of the physical sciences is recognized as but only a first layer of the work of the mind. Iqbal goes on to identify its real teleology and destiny as transcending, but not forgetting, this narrow band of truth in order to uncover the real meaning of the physical world in terms of the divine destiny of humankind.

Chapter IV by C.A. Qadir, "A Case for World Philosophy: My Intellectual Story", makes this clear by an initial review the human options in philosophy. He sees the need to move beyond the ideal, whether that of Plato or of Kant, but also the inadequacy of a logical positivism unable to justify its own principle of verifiability. He concludes that clarity is not enough for a philosophy which must point the way in the basic realities of life. This is detailed in the following parts.

Part II describes the metaphysical character of classical Islamic philosophy. Chapter V by Intisar-ul-Haq, "How I see philosophy", provides a first survey of that tradition, indicating its indicative character. He does not restrict this to an empirical approach, but shows how this unfolds from a philosophy of science, through an epistemology, to social philosophy and philosophy of religion.

Indeed, Chapter VI by Muhammad Hanif Nadvi, "God, Universe and Man", reverses the field in a way that is perhaps more true to the overall Islamic context. He would begin from the classical ontological, cosmological and teleological ways to God, and suggest that they are all ways that reveal one's personal experience of God. This chapter was completed in Urdu only days before Professor Nadvi's death and was translated by Dr. Abdus Khaliq.

Chapter VII by Javid Iqbal, "Iqbal on the Material and the Spiritual Future of Humanity", follows this theme by pointing out how for Iqbal philosophy done in terms of physical reality missed the human center and unity which could be regained only by a religious philosophy attentive to the human spiritual center.

Chapter VIII by M. Saeed Sheikh, "Philosophy of Religion: Its Meaning and Scope", reviews a number of approaches to such a philosophy of religion: empirical, historical, existential and phenomenological, concluding to the essential importance of religion for the future of humankind.

Chapter IX by Abdul Khaliq, "The Function of Muslim Philosophy", relates this work of Islamic metaphysics and philosophy of religion to the Qur'an. He points out the importance of logic as well as of allegorical interpretation in order to appreciate divine grace and the character of human life in time as a watching and waiting for divine generosity.

Chapter X by B.H. Siddiqui, "Knowledge: An Islamic Perspective", integrates this Islamic and hence religious view of philosophy by pointing out the importance of knowledge in Islam. It is seen as a gift of God, basic to human virtue, able to unite faith and reason, and thereby capable of researching the meaning of life in our time.

Part III presents a mode of proceeding in philosophy more reflective of the British heritage of Pakistan and its positivist character. Chapter XI by Kazi A. Kadir, "On Sense and Nonsense", points out how that tradition progressively reduces all philosophy to nonsense. Chapter XII by Ali Dkhtan Kazmi, "Quantification and Opacity", is a more positive illustration of the virtuoso logic

evoked by this effort to reason in empirical terms alone. Chapter XIII by Absar Ahmad, "The Nature of Mind", shows how this tradition is in effect a concerted effort to understand all in physical terms. Finally, Chapter XIV by Abul Hameed Kamali, "Knowledge of Other Minds", indicates how this can be strengthened not directly, but by attending to the cultural context of the other -- though it is not clear how culture can be grasped in empirical terms alone.

Part IV points out a more promising phenomenological and existential path.

Chapter XV by Manzoor Ahmad, "The Notion of Existence", attempts to proceed in empirical terms by the use of family resemblances, but comes to the need to proceed rather in terms of human freedom. This meets the challenge of technology to the sense of self and to religion. The way ahead may consist precisely in facing these challenges.

Chapter XVI by Waheed Ali Farooqi, "From Anguish to Search", pursues this through such basic human challenges as that of death. In this context philosophy contributes by examining death critically and opening the self to the other, not in a syncretism but in conveying the deep truth one's experiences.

Chapter XVII by Muhammad Ajmal, "Individual and Culture", considers the variety of the symbolic expressions of this center of personal meaning, placing it at the heart of culture and thereby situating anew the classic role of law in Islamic life.

Chapter XVIII by Shahid Hussain, "Descartes' Concept of Person", follows the theme of human subjectivity as reflected in Descartes' *Meditations*. He adds to this from the analytic tradition reflected in Part III, showing thereby what the combination of logical clarity and insight into human subjectivity might contribute.

The work culminates in a veritable *tour de force* in Chapter XIX by Khawja Ghulam Sadiq, "God and Values". This faces the weakness of a phenomenological approach when taken exclusively in terms of the human person. Instead, a proper contribution of Pakistani philosophy in the Islamic tradition is to enable its sense of the unique reality of the divine to provide a foundation of human meaning and values. This is found in the absolute love which reaches from God to man whom in turn it bears up and exalts.

In the appendix, the late Richard V. De Smet, S.J., carries out a truly exceptional work. He reviews the entire philosophical output of Pakistan's thinkers during the fifteen years following partition and analyses in detail the issues they treat and the positions they take. This provides a solid philosophical basis from which the present work emerges. De Smet's study is a massive work of intellect analyzing each field; it needs to be continued in order for Pakistani philosophers to be able to situate their work and build effectively on that of their colleagues. Even more, it stands equally as a monument to De Smet's life of loving service to the philosophers of the subcontinent.

Part I
Philosophy as a Search for Unity in the Transcendent

Chapter I

The Philosophical Interpretation of History

M. M. SHARIF

When we discuss the philosophy of history, the content of our topic is philosophical and not sociological. Sociology deals with human relations and the forces that determine the laws that govern and the phenomena that arise from these relations from time to time. The sociologist attempts to discover the effects of such forces as heredity, climate, race, instinct, means of production and ideas. He tries to study the specific characteristics, repeated features and constant relations of the lives of individual groups: specific characteristics such as modes and customs, repeated features like rises and falls, conflicts, cycles, isolation, interaction, imitation, migration and mobility; causal correlations such as those that hold between climate and culture, technology and fine arts, city life and criminality, scarcity and suicide, forms of religious and political organisations. The philosopher of history is not concerned with these details of group life; nor does he study the history of the individual groups and specific questions relating to them as ends in themselves. From these fields he only collects material for the solution of his main problems. He is concerned mainly with the life course of humankind as a whole, and his chief problem is the determination of the nature of change in the history of man. His second question relates to the law of change in the lives of individual groups, civilisations or cultures. Thus, his first question is that of the dynamics and destiny of man; and, second, the dynamics and destiny of groups of men. It is to these questions that I mainly devote main attention.

The 20th century philosophies of history are more sociological than philosophical. This turn in the philosophy of history has its advantages as well as disadvantages. Its main advantage consists in a collection of vast material on which a philosophy of history can be based. Its main disadvantage lies in the narrowness of outlook which often goes with work in narrow fields.

Some 20th century philosophers of history such as Paul Ligeti, Frank Chambers and Charles Lalo confine themselves to the study of art phenomena and draw conclusions about the dynamics of culture in general. Their conclusions which touch the two philosophical questions stated above are:

1. That art forms, like waves in the ocean, rise, develop and decline.
2. That the tidal ebb and flow of art in general is an index of the tidal waves of human culture in general and individual cultures in particular.
3. That side by side with these larger waves there arise, so to say, 'surface ripples' or shorter waves within the same art form corresponding to smaller changes in social cultures.

These conclusions I readily accept. But these thinkers advance another hypothesis which to me does not seem true. According to most of them, it is always the same art and the same type or style of art which rises at one stage in the life history of each culture: one art or art form at its dawn, another at its maturity and yet another at its decline, when gradually both art and the corresponding culture die. I do not accept this conclusion. The life history of Greek art is not identical with that of European art or Hindu or Muslim art. In some cultures, like the Egyptian, Chinese, Hindu and Muslim, it was literature which blossomed before any other art; in some others such as the French, German and English, it was architecture; and in the culture of the Greeks it was music. The art of the Palaeolithic people reached a maturity and artistic perfection which did

not correspond to their stage of culture. In some cultures, as the Egyptian, art shows several waves, several ups and downs, rather than one cycle of birth, maturity and decline. Unlike most other cultures, Muslim culture has given no place to sculpture, and its music has risen simultaneously with its architecture. Thus it is not true that the sequence of the rise of different arts is the same in all cultures. Nor is it true that the same sequence appears in the style of each art in every culture. Facts do not support this thesis, for the earliest style of art in some cultures is symbolic, in others naturalistic, formal, impressionistic or expressionistic.

There is a group of 20th century philosophers of history who view a society or culture as an organism which has only one life cycle. Like the life of any individual organism, the life of a culture has its childhood, maturity, old age and death; its spring, summer, winter and autumn. Just as a living organism cannot be revived after its death, even so a culture or a society can not be revived once it is dead. Biological, geographical and racial causes can to a limited extent influence its life course, but cannot change its inevitable cycle. They agree with the aestheticians whose position I have just discussed that social history is like a wave, it has a rise and then it falls never to rise again. To this group belong Danilevsky, Spengler and Toynbee. The view that the dynamism of society is like the dynamism of a wave we have already accepted; but are the two other doctrines expounded by these philosophers equally true? First, is it true that a given society is a living organism and, second, that it has only one unrepeatable life course? Let us take the first. Is a society or a culture an organism? Long ago, Plato took a state to be an individual writ large. A similar mistake now is being made. All analogies are true only up to a point and not beyond that. To view a society on the analogy of an individual organism is definitely wrong. No society is so completely unified into an organic whole that it should be viewed as an organism.

An individual organism is born; it grows and dies, and its species is perpetuated by reproduction: but a culture cannot repeat itself in the species by reproduction. Revival of an individual organism is impossible, but the revival of a culture by the infusion of new events is possible. Each individual organism is a completely integrated whole or a complete *Gestalt*, but though such an integration is an ideal of each culture, it has never been achieved by any culture. Each culture is a super-system consisting of some large systems such as religion, language, law, philosophy, science, fine arts, ethics, economics, technology, politics, territorial sway, associations, customs and mores. Each of these consists of smaller systems, as science includes physics, chemistry, biology, zoology, etc., and each of these smaller systems is comprised of yet smaller systems, as mathematics is comprised of geometry, algebra and arithmetic, and so on. Besides these systems, there are partly connected or wholly isolated congeries, unorganised heaps within these systems and super-systems. Thus, "a total culture of any organised group consists not of one cultural system but of a multitude of vast and small cultural systems that are partly in harmony, partly out of harmony, with one another, and in addition many congeries of various kinds."

So much about the organismic side of the theory of Danilevsky, Spengler and Toynbee. What about its cyclical side? Is the life of a culture like that of a meteor, beginning, rising, falling and then disappearing for ever? Does the history of a society or a culture see only one spring, one summer and one autumn and then in its winter it is completely closed? These thinkers concede that the length of each period may be different with different peoples and cultures, but, according to them, the cycle is just one moving curve or one wave that rises and falls only once. This position also seems to be wrong. As the researches of Kroeber and Sorokin have conclusively shown, "Many great cultural or social systems or civilisations have many cycles, many social, intellectual and political ups and downs in their virtually indefinitely long span of life, instead of just a life

cycle, one period of blossoming and one of the decline. In the dynamics of intellectual and aesthetic creativity, Egyptian civilisation rose and fell at least four times, Graeco-Roman-Byzantine culture several times. Similarly, China and India had two big creative impulses; Japan and Germany, four; France and England, three; and their economico-political rise did not coincide with the course of their intellectual activity."

This shows that there is "no universal law decreeing that every culture, having once flowered, must wither without any chance of flowering." A culture may rise in one field at one time, in another field at another, and thus as a whole see many rises and falls. If by the birth of a civilisation these writers mean a sudden appearance of a total unit like that of an organism, and by death a total disintegration, then a total culture is never born, nor does it ever die. At its so-called birth each culture takes over living systems or parts of a preceding culture and integrates them with newly born items. Again, to talk about the death or disappearance of a culture or civilisation is meaningless. A part of a total culture, its art or its religion, may disappear, but a considerable part of it is always taken over by other groups by whom it is often developed further and expanded. States are born and they die; but cultures like the mingled waters of different waves are never born as organisms, nor do they die as organisms. Ancient Greece as a state died, but after its death a great deal of Greek culture spread far and wide and is still living as an important element in the cultures of Europe. Jewish states ceased to exist, but much of Jewish culture was taken over by Christianity and Islam. No culture dies *in toto*, though all die in parts. In respect of those parts of culture which live, each culture is immortal. Each culture or civilisation emerges gradually from pre-existing cultures. As a whole it may have several peaks, may see many ups and downs and thus flourish for millennia, decline into a latent existence, re-emerge and again become dominant for a certain period and then decline once more to appear again. Even when dominated by other cultures a considerable part of it may live as an element fully or partly integrated in those cultures.

Again, the cycle of birth, maturity, decline and death can be determined by the determination of the life-span of a civilisation, but there is no agreement of these writers on this point. What according to Danilevsky is one civilisation, say, the ancient Semitic civilisation, is treated by Toynbee as three civilisations, the Babylonian, Hittite and Sumeric, and by Spengler as two, the Magian and Babylonian. In the life history of a people one notices *one* birth-and-death sequence, the other *two*, the third *three*. The births and deaths of cultures seen by one writer are not noticed at all by the others. When the beginning and end of a culture cannot be determined, it is extravagant to talk about its birth and death and its unrepeatable cycle. A civilisation can see many ups and downs and there is nothing against the possibility of its regeneration. No culture dies completely. Some elements of each die out and others merge as living factors in other cultures.

Another group of 19th century philosophers of history avoid these pitfalls and give an integral interpretation of history. To this group belong Northrop, Kroeber, Schubart, Berdyaev, Schweitzer and Sorokin. Northrop, however, weakens his position by basing cultural systems on philosophies and philosophies on science. He ignores the fact that many cultural beliefs are based on revelations or intuitive apprehensions. Jewish, Muslim and Hindu cultures have philosophies based on revelation as much as reason. The source of some social beliefs may even be irrational and non-rational, often contradicting scientific theories. Kroeber's weakness consists in making the number of geniuses rather than the number of achievements the criterion of cultural maturity. Schweitzer rightly contends that each flourishing civilisation has a minimum of ethical values vigorously functioning, and the decay of ethical values is the decay of civilisations.

Whatever their differences in other matters, in one thing the 20th century philosophers of history are unanimous, and that is in their denunciation of 'progress'. I associate myself with them

in this. Just as in biology progress has been explained by a trend from lower to higher or from less perfect to more perfect, or from less differentiated and integrated to more differentiated and integrated, similarly, Herder, Fichte, Kant and Hegel and almost all the philosophers of the 18th and 19th centuries explained the evolution of human society by one principle, one social trend, and their theories were thus stamped with the linear law of progress. The present day writers' criticism of them is perfectly justified against viewing progress as a line, ascending straight or spirally, whether it is Fichte's line advancing as a sequence of certain values or Herder's and Kant's from violence and war to justice and peace, or Hegel's to ever-increasing freedom of the idea, or Spencer's to greater differentiation and integration, or Tönnies's advancing from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*, or Durkheim's from a state of society based on mechanical solidarity to organic solidarity, or Buckle's from diminishing influence of physical laws to an increasing influence of mental laws, or Navicow's from physiological determination to purely intellectual competition, or any other line of a single principle explaining the evolution of human society as a whole. Everyone of the 18th and 19th century thinkers understood history as if it were identical with Western history. They viewed history as one straight line of events moving across the Western world. They divided this line into three periods, ancient, medieval and modern, and lumped together Egyptian, Indian, Chinese, Babylonian, Iranian, Greek and Roman civilisations, each of which had passed through several stages of development, into one group of ancient history. Histories of other civilisations and peoples did not count, except for those events which could be easily linked with the chain of events in the history of the West. Toynbee justly describes this conception as an egocentric illusion; his view is shared by all recent philosophers of history.

Every civilisation has a history of its own and each has its own ancient, medieval and modern periods. In most cases these periods are not identical with the ancient, medieval and modern periods of the Western culture starting from the Greek. Several cultures preceded Western culture and some starting earlier are contemporaneous with it. They cannot be thrown into oblivion because they cannot be placed in the three periods of the cultures of the West: ancient, medieval and modern. Western culture is not the measure of all humanity and its achievements. One cannot measure other cultures and civilisations or the whole of history by the three-knotted yardstick of progress in the West. Humankind consists of a number of great and small countries each having its own drama, its own language, its own ideas, its own passions, its own customs and habits, its own possibilities, its own goals and its own life-course. If it must be represented lineally, it would not be one line but several lines or rather bands of variegated and constantly changing colours, reflecting one another's life and merging into one another.

Turning to the logic of history, a controversy has gone on for a long time about the laws that govern historical sequences. Vico in the 18th century contended, under the deep impression of the lawfulness prevailing in natural sciences, that historical events also follow each other according to the unswerving laws of Nature. The law of mechanical causality is universal in its sway. The same view was held by Saint Simon, Herbert Spencer, Karl Marx and in recent times by Mandelbaum and Wiener. On the other hand, idealists like Max Weber, Windelband and Rickert are of the view that the objects of history are not units with universal qualities, but unique unrepeatable events in a particular space and a specific time. Therefore, no physical laws can be formed about them. Historical events are undoubtedly exposed to influences from biological, geological, geographical and racial forces; yet they are always carried by human beings who use and surmount these forces. Mechanical laws relate to facts, whereas historical events relate to values. Therefore, the historical order of law is different from the physical law of mechanical causation. To me it seems that both groups go to extremes. The empiricists take no account of the freedom of the will and the resolves,

choices, and goals of human beings; the idealists forget that even human beings are not minds, but body-minds, and though they initiate events from their own internal sources, they place them in the chain of mechanical causality. It is true that historical events and the lives of civilisation and culture follow each other according to the inner laws of their own nature. Yet history consists in moral, intellectual and aesthetic achievements based on resolute choices using causation -- a Divine gift -- as a tool, now obeying and now revolting against divine will working within them and in the world around them, now cooperating and now fighting with one another, now falling and now rising, and thus carving out their own destinies.

Skipping over several important issues we come to the views of two philosophers whose thought has had great influence on the development of philosophy of history, namely Hegel and Marx. As is well known, Hegel is a dialectical idealist for whom the whole world is the development of the idea, a rational entity. It advances by posing itself as a thesis, and develops from itself its own opposite or antithesis. The two ideas, instead of constantly remaining at war, unite in an idea which is the synthesis of both and becomes the thesis for another triad. Thus triad after triad takes the world to even higher reaches of progress. The historical process is thus a process of antagonisms and reconciliations. The idea divides itself into the 'idea in itself' (the world of history) and the 'idea in its otherness' (the world as nature). Hegel's division of the world into watertight compartments has vitiated the thought of several of his successors, Rickert, Windelband and Spengler and even Bergson. If electrons, amoeba, fleas, fish and apes begin to speak, they can reasonably ask why, born of the same cosmic energy, determined by the same laws, and having the same limited freedom, they should be supposed to be mere nature having no history. To divide the world-stuff into nature and history is unwarranted; history consists of sequences of groups of events. We have learned since Einstein that objects in nature are also groups of events with no essential difference between the nature and history. The only difference is that up to a certain stage there is no learning by experience; beyond that there is. According to Hegel, the linear progress of the Idea or Intelligence in winning rational freedom culminates in the State, the best example of which is the German State. Such a line of thought justifies internal tyranny, external aggression and wars between states. It finds no place in the historical process for world organisations like the UN or the World Bank and is falsified by the factual existence of such institutions in the present stage of world history. Intelligence is really only one aspect of the human mind, and there seems to be no ground for regarding this one knowing aspect, or only one kind of world-stuff, i.e., humankind, to be the essence of the world-stuff.

The mind of one who rejects Hegel's idealism at once turns to Marx. Marxian dialectic is exactly the same as Hegel's, though the world-stuff is not the Idea, but matter. Marx uses this word 'matter' in the sense in which it was used by the 19th century French materialists. But the idea of matter as inert mass has been discarded even by present-day physics. World-stuff is now regarded as energy which can take the form of mass. Dialectical materialism, however, is not disapproved by this change of meaning of the word 'matter'. It can still be held in terms of realistic dialectic -- the terms in which the present-day Marxists hold it. With the new terminology, then, the Marxist dialectic takes this form: something real (a thesis) creates from within itself its opposite, another real (antithesis). Instead of warring perpetually with each other the two unite into a synthesis (a third real) which becomes the thesis of another triad. This goes from triad to triad till, in the social sphere, this dialectic of reals leads to the actualisation of a classless society. Our objection to Hegel's position, that he does not find any place for international organisations in the historical process, does not apply to Marx, but the objection that Hegel considers war a necessary part of the historical process applies equally to Marx. Hegel's system encourages wars between nations,

Marx's between classes. Besides, Marxism is self-contradictory, for, while it recognises the inevitability or necessity of the causal law, it also recognises initiative and free creativity by classes in changing the world. Both Marx and Hegel make history completely determined and totally ignore the universal law of human nature, that people, becoming dissatisfied with their situation at all moments of their lives except when they are in sound sleep, are in pursuit of ideals and values (which before their realisation are mere ideas). Thus if efficient causes push them on as both Hegel and Marx recognise, final causes are constantly exercising their pull, which both Hegel and Marx ignore.

The recognition of final causes brings me to my own hypothesis which I would call dialectical purposivism.

According to dialectical purposivism, human beings and their ideals are logical contraries, in so far as the former are real and the latter are ideal, whereas real and ideal cannot be attributed to the same subject. Nor can a person and his ideal be thought of in the relation of subject and predicate. For, an ideal of a person is what a person is not. There is no real opposition between two ideals or between two reals, but there is a genuine incompatibility between a real and an ideal. What is real is not ideal and whatever is ideal is not real, both are opposed in their essence. Hegelian ideas are, Marxist reals are not, of opposite natures. They are in conflict in their functions; mutually warring ideas or warring reals and are separated by hostility and hatred. The incompatibles of dialectical purposivism are so in their nature, but not in their function; they are bound by love and affection and, though rational discrepant, are volitionally and emotionally in harmony. In the movement of history real selves are attracted by ideals, and in realising them are synthesised with them. I have called this movement dialectical, but it is totally different from the Hegelian or Marxist dialectic. Whereas their thesis and antithesis are struggling against each other, here one is struggling not 'against' but 'for' the other. The formula of the dynamic of history, according to this conception, will be: a real (thesis) creates from within itself an ideal (antithesis) both of which by mutual harmony unite into another real (synthesis) that becomes the thesis of another triad, and thus from triad to triad. The dialectic of human society, according to this formula, is not a struggle of warring classes or warring nations, but a struggle against limitations to realise goals and ideals, which goals and ideals are willed and loved rather than fought against. This is a dialectic of love rather than of hatred. It leads individuals, masses, classes, nations and civilisations from lower to higher and from higher to yet higher reaches of achievement. It is a dialectic which recognises the over all necessity of a transcendently determined process (a divine order), and take notice of the partial freedom of social entities and of the place of mechanical determination as a tool in human hands.

The hypothesis is not linear because it envisages society as a vast number of interacting individuals and intermingling and interacting classes, societies and cultures, and humanity as a whole moving towards infinite ideals -- now rising, now falling, but on the whole developing by their realisation. It is like the clouds constantly rising from the foothills of the Himalayan range, now mingling, now separating, now flying over the peaks, now sinking into the valleys, and yet ascending from hill to hill in search of the highest peak, the Everest.

This hypothesis avoids the Spencerian idea of steady progress, because it recognises ups and downs in human affairs and the rise and fall of different civilisations at different stages of world history. It avoids measuring the dynamic of history by the three-knotted rod of Western culture and does not shelve the question of change in human society as a whole.

There is one important question which I should like to touch briefly. The 20th century social philosophers are unanimous in maintaining that the Western culture (whether it is called European

with Danilevsky, Faustic with Spengler, Western Heroic with Toynbee and Kroeber, Heroic Promethean with Schubart, or Western Sensate with Sorokin) is now declining, and see no chance of its survival except as a living factor in a new culture. Most hold that its geographical centre must shift from the West to elsewhere and all agree that its character must change from the present one to what is called by Danilevsky, Spengler, Toynbee, Schubart and Berdyaev religiously ideational, by Northrop, aesthetic-theoretic, by Schweitzer voluntaristically ethical and rational, and by Sorokin ideational-sensate. In short, all agree that the coming culture would be a synthesis of the Western culture which is rationalistic, empirical, humanistic, sensate and secular and the Eastern cultures, which are basically intuitional, ideational, ethical and religious, and would be characterised by love, solidarity, cooperation and reconciliation.

Such a synthesis was envisaged and a warning was given to the West earlier by Leibniz, Goethe, Schopenhauer, Herder, Rickert, von Hartmann and others, but no heed was paid. Now Danilevsky, Schubart and to some extent Spengler think that the centre of the coming culture is likely to be Russia, where, they hold, the above synthesis is taking place. But this view is most surprising, because the Communistic culture that Russia developed was rational, humanistic, non-ethical and non-religious -- not at all of the type they envisaged.

On the other hand, that if a new culture emerges, and emerge it must, its centre must develop in a place other than Russia. It cannot be China because Russian secularism, collectivism, material dynamism, anti-religionism and non-ethicism radically conflict with Taoism and Buddhism. Perhaps it will be America if she combines with her own Western culture the spirit of the East and attends to ends as values, or the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent if it synthesises its own culture with the spirit of the West and attends to means as values. Conscious efforts are being made on both sides and it remains to be seen which succeeds. The third possibility, however, that the West, after imbibing new elements of religion and ethics, may have another revival, cannot be completely ruled out. But will it do so?

To sum up, I have accepted the main conclusions of the aestheticians insofar as they relate to change in society as a whole, but have rejected them insofar as they concern the history of individual civilisations and cultures. I have rejected the view of Danilevsky, Spengler and Toynbee regarding the life span of cultures because it is cyclic and organic. I have not accepted the views of the 18th and 19th century philosophers, because they take a linear view of history. I have agreed with most of the findings of the integralist school insofar as they relate to the history of civilisations, but I have not subscribed to their view that the question of change in society as a whole is not worthy of consideration. I have not agreed with the empiricists, for they close their eyes to final causes, nor with the idealists because they deny that mechanical causes have any role to play in human history. I have not agreed with Hegel because he completely ignores the factual, nor with Marx because he completely ignores the ideal. Finally, I have given my own hypothesis that the culture of the future will be a synthesis of the East and West, centred either in the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent, or in America, or, by remote chance in the West.

Chapter II

One God, One World, One Humanity

Khalifa Abdul Hakim

The fundamentals of Muslim culture are derived from the religious experience of the Prophet Muhammad and his interpretations of this in theory as well as practice. The *Weltanschauung* of the Muslim has been determined by the Qur'anic revelation. The theologians, politicians, jurists, philosophers and mystics, through all the centuries of Muslim history, have claimed to base their arguments and conclusions on the teachings of the Qur'an. Even during the periods of the greatest intellectual activity, under the powerful impact of pre-Islamic cultures, the Muslim mind never doubted the essentials of the Qur'anic outlook.

Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism, described three stages of intellectual development through which humanity has passed: theological, metaphysical, and scientific. The distinguishing characteristic of Islam which was the source and the driving force of its cultural development was a creative synthesis of these three stages. Islam is theological, metaphysical and scientific at the same time. Based on revelation, Islam, in essence, might be considered to be theological, but its theology has a core of metaphysics, and its theistic outlook is an ally of the scientific outlook.

The Metaphysical Basis of Islamic Culture

The fundamental belief, which according to Islam is the basis of all true religions, is the Unity of the Ultimate Reality. This Ultimate Reality called Allah is infinite, volitional, and rational. It is personal as well as impersonal, transcendent as well as immanent. It is Supreme Consciousness or Knowledge whose chief attributes are Power, Reason, and Love. According to the Qur'an everything comes into being through the Creative Will of God, Who, "notwithstanding infinite stores of potential power, creates and regulates things and events with a definite measure." "His love covers everything." He is the sustainer and Cherisher of the worlds; all the worlds are unified in Him. Hence we live in a universe and not a multiverse. God, in His essence, being Spirit, Nature as well as Life, has a spiritual basis and a purpose.

God is the Source as well as the Goal of all existence and the purpose of life is the realisation in thought, as well as in practice, of this spiritual basis. This Ultimate Reality is not devoid of intrinsic values; all creation and evolution are the progressive realisation of these values. In the infinity of existence nothing happens by chance. Man's own ideal nature is a manifestation of this reality; therefore, loyalty to God is loyalty to one's own ideal nature. God is the principle of change as well as of permanence. The ultimate spiritual basis of life is eternal, though, in the words of the Qur'an, "Every moment God's Glory has a new effulgence." Life changes perpetually according to principles that are eternal.

Western thinkers have acknowledged the intellectual unity of all aspects of Muslim culture. Muslim law, ethics, economics, politics, sociology and attitudes towards nature and humanity all are derived from the metaphysical background of a Primeval Unity. The pre-Islamic world had sundered what God had joined. The chief service of Islam was a re-integration of life in all its aspects. The very first line of the Qur'an described God as 'God of the worlds'; the world of matter is not separated from the world of the spirit by unintelligible or impassable barriers. The material world, too, is holy ground. As the Prophet said, "The material world is a mosque." Knowledge as well as virtue is an avenue of approach from creation to the Creator. Religion does not consist in

belief, in dogmas or mysteries. As knowledge grows, more and more reverence develops along with it. The essentially religious people, according to the Qur'an, are those who reflect on the workings of nature. Those who want supernatural proofs are directed by the Qur'an to the obvious, to which they have become blind.

There is nothing like mechanistic, purposeless, blind and dead matter in Muslim thought. "Every creature and every aspect of nature is engaged in communion with the Creator, glorifying Him in a tongue which you do not understand." Islam, therefore, repudiates every type of materialism, by spiritualising matter itself and making it akin to the spirit.

Pre-Islamic philosophies as well as religions had bifurcated existence and sundered the ideal from the actual. Spirit had made abortive attempts to free itself from body and from matter and in this vain attempt had stultified itself. In the attempt to exalt the spirit, matter with its laws and beauties was despised. This led to asceticism in the East as well as in the West. The demands of the body became a temptation and a risk. Nietzsche classified religions in two ways: those that say 'yes' to life, and those that say 'no' to life. The revolution that Islam accomplished and the outlets for human energies that it created, were due chiefly to this re-evaluation: the ascetic ideal was spurned as a life-negating outlook. Islam is accused by its critics as presenting fascinating pictures of a physical paradise, with beautiful men and women living in a beautiful environment enveloped in peace and beauty, but this overlooks that thereby Islam proclaimed the sanctity of the senses and envisaged the development of the spirit as manifesting itself also in the physical aspects of existence -- value which are derided by pseudo-idealism and hypocritical spirituality.

In the present-day world all practical idealists and believers are engaged in the materialisation of this dream and the creation of conditions of freedom and social justice in order to create this very paradise on earth, where human relations and human environment can assimilate Truth, Beauty, and Goodness. The goal of all human endeavour is the final identification of virtue and happiness. The way is not the suppression, but the realisation and sanctification of all those creative instincts with which life has equipped itself.

The result of this teaching was that the Muslim considered all Nature including his or her body as divine, and it was not derogatory to human dignity to crave for physical beauty and physical well-being, provided it did not violate the laws of physical nature or the laws of social justice. Nature, which was despised by ascetic religions, is mentioned in the Qur'an as replete with the 'Signs of the Lord' and points to the ineffable Unity of Reason and Love, the Creative Urge from which all creation emerges.

And your God
Is one God.
There is no God
But He,
Most Gracious
Most Merciful.
Behold! In the creation
Of the heavens and the earth;
In the alternation
Of the night and day;
In the sailing of the ships
Through the ocean
For the benefit of mankind;

In the rain which God
Sends down from the skies,
And the life which He gives therewith
To the earth that is dead;
In the beasts of all kinds
That He scatters
Through the earth;
In the changes of winds,
And the clouds which they
Trail like their slaves
Between the sky and the earth
Here indeed are Signs
For a people that are wise.
The Qur'an, II: 163-4.
He granteth wisdom
To whom He pleaseth;
And he, to whom wisdom
Is granted, receiveth
Indeed a benefit overflowing,
But none will grasp the Message
But men of understanding;
The Qur'an, II: 269.

Islam turned the attention of humanity to the phenomena of nature. Instinct as well as reason is a revelation of the Original Life Force. (The word 'vahi' is used in the Qur'an for the prophetic revelation as well as the instincts of animals, whereby they pursue unerringly and, for our present knowledge sometimes miraculously, the purposes of their lives.) The Qur'an was the first scripture which proclaimed the identity of revelation, reason and nature, and proclaimed that the contemplation of nature within and nature without is the highest act of worship.

The student of history is astounded by the sudden and marvellous metamorphosis of an illiterate people into the greatest seekers of knowledge and the assimilators of all values in human culture wherever they may have originated. This took a breadth of mind which could not have been expected from a society supposed to have a rigid theocratic basis. (Dean Inge, in his outspoken essays, has paid a tribute to the creative and assimilative periods of Islamic culture by saying that the Muslims sought knowledge from everywhere without any prejudice. They proved to be remarkable assimilators of foreign culture, which has not been the case in any society with a theocratic background.) Islam uses the same word, '*Haq*', for God as well as for Truth. In Islam the search for Truth was identified with the search for God. It was the spirit of its teachings that released human energies in all directions. The Prophet said, "Knowledge is the lost property of every Muslim; he is entitled to get hold of it wherever he finds it." "Seek knowledge even if you have to travel to China."

People who read these verses every day and imbibed their spirit have taught the methods of accurate observation and made the beginnings in experimental science. The Qur'an says about the seekers of God in nature:

Men who celebrate

The praises of God,
Standing, sitting,
Any lying down on their sides,
And contemplate
The wonders of creation
In the heavens and the earth,
With the thought:
"Our Lord! not for naught
Hast thou created all this;"
The Qur'an, III: 191.

It was the repeated emphasis in the Qur'an on the study of nature in order to discover in it uniformities and adaptations that resulted in the development of a rational outlook. The history of Islam is free from the wars of religious bigotry and persecution except in a few scattered and individual cases where religion was exploited for the purposes of political power. Similarly in the history of Muslim culture there never has been a conflict between religion and science -- unlike the history of the West which offers many examples of intellectual persecution and even martyrdom in the cause of science. The entire body of Greek scientific thought was rescued by the Arabs, and Muslim kings demanded scientific books as tribute in preference to gold. Socrates, Plato, Aristotle and Plotinus were revered as philosophical monotheists. Great philosophers and scientists like Ibn Sina (Avicenna) and Ibn Rushd (Averroes) were devout Muslims and freethinkers at the same time.

Free and liberal thought was assimilated even by the mystics. It is a peculiar feature of Muslim culture that great Muslim mystics like Rumi, who are at the same time freethinkers and rationalists, tried to define the boundaries between intuition or religious experience and logical thinking, and to create a liaison between them. None of these great men ever suspected that either religious experience or the free exercise of rational activity ran counter to the spirit of Islam.

The spiritual odyssey of a person such as al-Ghazali is one of the most interesting biographies of a great soul. He plunged from dogmatic theology into rationalism and from rationalism into scepticism -- from which finally he was rescued by religious experience. This, according to him, created a direct and intimate contact with higher realities through a more exalted state of consciousness which comprehends wider dimensions of being. This insight which not only solves some of the riddles of perceptual and logical knowledge, but opens up vistas of new values which do not destroy, but fulfil the values of the lower grades of existence. Al-Ghazali, an acute critic of Greek science, is a mystic, a rationalist and a theologian at the same time; this combination and synthesis was made possible by the spirit of Islam.

The Role of Humankind

The Greek philosopher, Protagoras, said "Man is the measure of all things", to which Socrates and Plato replied that Eternal Reason identified with God is the measure of all reality.

If we take the ideal man of the Qur'an -- Adam, the prototype of humanity -- these two antagonistic views easily could be reconciled. The Qur'an says that the essence of the human self is divine: God infused into Adam His own spirit and destined him to understand nature and mould it in the service of ideal values. Through knowledge and right action, the ideal man, participating in the divinity of God, himself becomes divine; through his ideal self and infinite possibilities he

becomes the measure of the Universe. Neither the Universe nor the Ultimate Reality is isolated from the human mind, which is the greatest manifestation of that Reality. The Adam of the Qur'an is not an individual but the ideal common essence of the whole of "humanity which originated in one soul."

Islam has drawn two major corollaries from the Unity of God: the unity of creation or of entire nature, and the unity of humanity. The conflict of ideologies at the present time is concerned less with the concept of God and more with the concept of humanity, but Islam is as much concerned with the nature of man as with the right concept of God. For making ideal humanity the measure of reality along with God who is the source of all reality, the Qur'an transformed the ancient legend of Adam and Eve, of the Fall and Original Sin, into a doctrine that places humanity at the centre of the universe, making all agencies of nature subservient to it through the power bestowed by knowledge.

Behold! Thy Lord said to the angels: I will create a vicegerent on earth! They said: wilt Thou place therein one who will make mischief therein and shed blood whilst we celebrate Thy praises and glorify Thy name? He said: I know what ye know not. And He taught Adam the names of all things; then He placed them before the angels, and said: tell me the names of these, if ye are right! And behold, He said to the angels: bow down to Adam! And they bowed down. Not so Iblis! He refused and was haughty. He was of those who reject faith.

There existed before Islam other theologies which had fixed their gaze on the fall of man, made Original Sin an eternally inheritable taint, and laid down that the birth of every human being is a punishment for the original sin committed by the first progenitor of this condemned species. Hence, no amount of virtuous life could suffice for salvation and well-being here and hereafter until God put on flesh Himself and punished Himself vicariously in love for his hopeless creature.

Qur'anic teaching repudiates the entire basis of this doctrine which drags down all humanity along with its Creator into a slough of despair, from which man can be rescued only by grace. According to Islamic teaching there are no deities or powers of nature to which man has to submit; nor must he submit to any deified man. Man can never become God, nor can God become man. All agencies of nature must bow to man as he progresses in knowledge. But there shall remain one recalcitrant force which he will find hard to subdue, namely, Iblis which is his own selfish ego. The principle of moral evil, which is an inevitable result of the gift of the freedom of the will, is personified and symbolised as a character in the drama. The Qur'an and the sayings of the Prophet are strewn with examples where every kind of moral as well as physical evil is called Satan, denoting thereby that Satan is not really a person, but a principle. The Prophet said once: "Every man has with him his own Satan". A hearer promptly asked, "Is there a Satan with you, too?" The Prophet replied, "Yes, but I have converted my Satan to Islam."

The Religious Meaning of Freedom

The word 'Islam' means surrender as well as peace. All religions other than Islam are named after their founders and such names do not give the connotation or distinctive character of a creed. All religious experience is the experience of a Reality, which, though akin to the human spirit, transcends it by its infinity. Before Islam in the Arab world, groping humanity was surrendering itself to imaginary deities, revering totems and fetishes; one class, caste, or group surrendering explicitly to another dominant class; some individuals being deified and worshipped either as incarnations or as absolute monarchs with power of life and death over their subjects. Everywhere humankind was enslaved by exploitation, imagination, tradition or fear.

Islam put before humanity an ideal of human freedom unknown to the pre-Islamic world. It declared that all nature is God-created and God-directed, whose will is not subject to any caprice and who works according to set and stable laws, which the Qur'an calls the 'habitual modes of the Divine Will'. "Thou shalt find no alteration in the habits of the Lord." All deities are the creations of the human imagination and human desires. Epicurus said that man could not be happy until he is freed from the fear of gods. But belief in the reality of gods was so fixed and firm in the classical pagan mind that even a materialist like Epicurus could not venture to deny their existence. He ventured to think only that in their Olympian aloofness they do not interfere with the life of man. Islam rationalised nature and freed man from all fear; only one rational God was left, Who alone should be loved, obeyed and feared.

Fear of God has nothing in common with the fear instilled by the power and tyranny of a hostile being; it is identical with practical wisdom which is afraid of the violations of the laws of nature and of the laws of human welfare. A person who has attained virtue and wisdom is described in the Qur'an always as one who is 'freed from fear and grief.' He is freed from fear because a wise and virtuous man has nothing to fear except his violations of the laws of his own well-being, and freed from grief because Ultimate Reality is conceived as the Cherisher, Sustainer and Preserver of all real values. Grief for the loss of what has little or evanescent value for life is irrational; grief for the loss of the really valuable is equally irrational because nothing of genuine and lasting value is lost. Belief in a rational and beneficent God is really belief in the conservation of values.

When Islam demands surrender it does not demand the relinquishing of anything that has an abiding value. The lower aspects of life exalt themselves by surrendering to higher aspects; they are not destroyed; rather their real purpose is fulfilled. There is demand for only life-enhancing surrender whereby the physical aspect is spiritualised and sublimated by subordinating itself to a higher ideal.

It is claimed by some materialists and naturalists that man can become free only by repudiating all belief in the reality of God, in the objectivity of an ideal existence. But can a belief in the blindness of existence, where ideals are created only by the wishful human thinking, really make one free and grant that peace of mind which one craves? If the island of human values is surrounded by an infinite ocean of indifferent or hostile forces, all life is reduced to a vain effort and a mockery. Could such a cosmic outlook create inner satisfaction or peace?

It may be argued that the theistic outlook of Islam if proven to be a true interpretation of existence certainly would free one from fear and grief and create an attitude of calm resignation and peace that passeth understanding, but that human knowledge and experience offer no adequate proof or guarantee for this outlook. The thesis of Islam is that besides the religious experiences of saints and the prophets, a wider and deeper study of nature, history and the human mind leads one to belief in a Life Force which is creative, evolutionary and preservative.

The Qur'an teaches that good has an inherent tendency to multiply itself and evil is ultimately self-destructive. The universe is an ordered whole, in which no event is a product of mere chance and all life is a goal-seeking activity. The Ultimate Goal is God, as the Ultimate Source of all cosmic activity is God. In the words of the Qur'an, "God is the beginning and God is the end; God is the appearance and God is the reality." The universe is not mechanistically blind as the materialists assert, nor is it volitionally blind as Schopenhauer taught. Islam teaches one to say 'yes' to life because life is destined to create value and well-being. Life being a dynamic movement of the unfolding of immense potentialities, man is destined to move to higher things by constantly dying in order constantly to be reborn at every moment on ever higher planes. The infinity of

divine existence being the goal, the process of spiritual evolution is infinite. This infinite progress guarantees enhancement of life and consciousness, the constant creation and re-evaluation of values and the immortality of ever-striving egos.

Upon an ego, striving for an infinite ideal, mere adaptation to circumstances can bestow no peace. Biological evolution of the Darwinian category taught that chance variations were the means, and adaptation to environment the goal of life. Islam repudiates the hypothesis of chance and in place of mere adaptation to environment, which is already achieved by the worms, places before man the perpetual assimilation of the attributes of God as his goal and purpose. In such a process there can be no quietistic and static peace; one can only enjoy the peace and satisfaction of moving in the right direction, progressively realising an ideal by perpetual achievement through perpetual surrender: perpetually dying in order to be perpetually reborn in the richer and wider vistas of being. Personal, social and cosmic peace through surrender, with the purpose of divinising and enriching life, here and hereafter, is the meaning of Islam.

Ethics

The ethics of Islam follows from the Islamic view of Reality. In Islam, ethics cannot be sundered from its metaphysical basis. One is created as God's vicegerent on earth in order to understand and subordinate the whole of nature, within and without, to an infinite ideal; one is a creator and co-worker with the Infinite Creator. As nothing in existence is alien to God, nothing can be alien to humankind. As "nothing is created in vain", so in the human individuality or personality no aspect is created in order to be utterly repudiated or annihilated. As the cosmic ego is a unity, so too the human ego fundamentally is a unity. One's body as well as one's mind is a unity in diversity: the spirit is bound up with the flesh and cannot develop by inflicting indignities on the latter. The body with its senses and its instincts is sacred; God dwells and works not only in the spirit but also in the body.

Among great religions Islam alone raised its voice against the identification of spirituality with asceticism. One cannot attain to God by fleeing from life and neglecting physical existence; the way to God leads through nature and through humanity. One cannot by-pass the creation to reach the Creator; the Creator conceived in isolation from his creation is an abstraction. The individual cannot save his or her soul by meditation in a cave or by ascetic practices; one's essential self is social. According to the Prophet, "the worker in the everyday business of life is a friend of God." The lengthening of prayers to the extent that man is prevented from the performance of family and social duties is prohibited. Islamic ethics is an ethics of integration of all the aspects of human existence. In the self-realisation of the individual, no aspect is to be neglected. All one's instincts have definite life-functions, which have to be understood, respected, and regulated so that they work as an organic whole under the guidance of a supreme ideal, the part subserving the whole and the whole strengthening every part.

The fundamental Islamic ethics are given in the Qur'an. Belief in one God is tantamount to belief in the unity of virtue and the objectivity of life-values. The belief may be acquired either through religious experience or intellectual effort, or it may be inherited from social tradition. The distinction between good and evil must be accepted as a postulate before any moral life becomes possible. But according to Qur'anic

, mere verbal profession intellectual apprehension or traditional acceptance is not enough; knowledge apart from action is a sterile abstraction. Wisdom ceases to be wisdom if it does not mould character.

One of the characteristics of the Qur'an is that it seldom mentions 'faith' without coupling it with good deeds. "Woe to the people who pray but are not charitable." Socrates identified knowledge with virtue; he was of the opinion that a person who knows what is good necessarily will follow it. The Qur'anic view is that good deeds are the true test of faith and knowledge, and unless a person disciplines himself and creates good habits his faith alone will not suffice when face to face with temptations. What Islam means by *Iman* or faith is not merely an intellectual assent or belief based on authority. Like the word 'Islam', which means both surrender and peace, the word *Iman* too has a double significance; it has a cognitive as well as a conative side. In Islamic teaching truth is always pragmatic in a higher and a broader sense. *Iman* is derived from the root *amn* which used transitively means, "he granted him peace or security"; when used intransitively it means, "he came into peace or security."

The word 'Islam' as well as *Iman* emphasises the idea of peace or harmony, the ideal of human experience. One must strive to be at peace with himself, with one's neighbours or the society in which one lives, with the universe that forms one's physical environment, and above all with that Source and Goal of Reality called God reflected in one's ideal self. One who, by becoming true to his real or higher self, attains inner and other personal peace, qualifies to attain peace and security also for others. Al-Mu'min, the granter of security, is an attribute of God. Islam is a sum-total of those principles which create harmony in every aspect of life. In a number of sayings of the Prophet good deeds and right attitudes are considered to be a substantial part of faith which sometimes is completely identified with virtue. Some sayings of the Prophet will elucidate his conception of faith. "A person has no faith unless he loves for his brother what he loves for himself." "A man should try to prevent evil and tyranny by action. If he is unable to do this, he should express strong disapproval of it in words. If he is prevented from freely expressing his disapproval he should hate it in his heart. This last attitude is the weakest expression of faith."

Law and justice are the central concepts in Islamic ethics: justice has an intrinsic, and law only an instrumental, value. God's attributes of beneficence and mercy precede his quality of a law-giver and a judge in the daily prayers of the Muslims. There is a general human tendency to practise a different morality towards friends and foes. The Qur'anic teaching warns human beings against this weakness: covenants must be fulfilled with allies as well as opponents. Treatises cannot be violated unilaterally at the will of one party, and the code of justice is the same for all. "O ye, who believe! Stand out firmly for God, as witnesses to fair dealing, and let not the hatred of others make you swerve toward wrong and depart from justice. Be just: that is next to piety. And fear God, for God is well-acquainted with all that ye do." (The Qur'an, V: 9)

Islam and Social Reform

As the Prophet conceived humanity as a single organic whole, tribal prejudices must be transcended. He knew that differences of tongues and colours and diversity of conventions existed and would continue to exist. These diversities are called in the Qur'an, 'the signs of Allah', which is a term used in the Scripture in a very exalted sense. He was not an advocate of colourless uniformity; he was convinced that if people could see the unreality of tribal gods and could believe in One Creator and Sustainer of all of nature and humanity, and if the fundamentals of virtue and social justice could be established on a broad and universal basis, the irrational conflicts of creeds and tribes could be ended. He was successful in his lifetime in uniting the tribes, not on a nationalistic, racial or a patriotic basis, but on the basis of a universal creed and universal morality.

The division of humanity into tribes and nations serve only the purposes of recognition. Nations become superior or inferior by their character and their outlook. In his last address, delivered at a time when he was at the acme of his power and when the Arabs had achieved unprecedented solidarity and were intoxicated with success, he said, "Remember! The Arab has no inherent superiority over the non-Arab". Individuals and nations must be evaluated on the basis of their character alone; all pride based on race, tribe or creed is false. The Negro, when he happened to be also a slave, was despised by the pre-Islamic Arabs. The Prophet selected one such Negro slave and made him his dear companion, entrusted with the honoured duty of calling faithful to prayer. He said, "Follow your leader even if he is a Negro slave."

Muhammad (PBUH) cherished the vision of a classless society and of different communities living side by side in peace. He taught his followers to respect the founders of all theistic creeds. The Qur'an states explicitly that the good life and salvation are not the exclusive monopoly of any creed.

Those who believe in the Qur'an
And those who follow Jewish scriptures,
And the Christians and the Sabeans,
And those who believe in God,
And the Last Day,
And work righteousness,
Shall have their reward
With their Lord: On them
Shall be no fear, nor shall they grieve.
The Qur'an, II: 62.
To God belong the East
And the West: Whitherever
Ye turn, there is the Presence
Of God. For God is All-Pervading,
All-knowing.
The Qur'an, II: 115.

Different individuals and nations choose different goals. The main thing is that these goals should lead to the Good, the *summum bonum*. People should choose and strive, even competitively as if in a race, to realise the Good. If they keep that in mind, the diversity of subsidiary aims would not make them hostile to one another.

To each is a goal
To which God turns him;
So, strive together
Toward all that is good.
Wherever ye are,
God will bring you
Together. For God
Hath power over all things.
The Qur'an. II: 148.

The Prophet had a definite vision and a plan to create a classless society and a well-harmonised humanity. When the world was groaning under religious persecution he promulgated the principle that there must be complete freedom of conscience. The Qur'an proclaimed that "there must be no compulsion in religion." A Muslim is prohibited from exercising pressure even on his slave in order to convert to him to Islam. The great Caliph Omar had a Christian slave who, notwithstanding his refusal to accept Islam, lived in peace and freedom in the household of his master. A Muslim could have a Jewish or a Christian mother, who should be loved, respected and obeyed. There were instances of Muslims carrying on their backs their aged Christian mothers to the church. This is the spirit of Islam in action. Conventional differences of creeds should not make human beings hostile to one another. Righteousness is different from dogmas and conventions: it is an attitude of mind dominated by love, compassion and justice. Differences of customs and manners should not blind people to the essentials of virtue, which form the core of all genuine spirituality.

It is not righteousness
That ye turn your faces
Toward East or West;
Righteousness is
To spend your substance,
Out of love for Him,
For your kin,
For the needy,
For the wayfarer,
For those who ask,
And for the ransom of slaves;
To be steadfast in prayer,
And practice regular charity;
To fulfil the contracts
Which ye have made,
To be firm and patient
In pain and adversity
And throughout
All periods of panic:
Such are the people
Of truth, the God-fearing.
The Qur'an, II, 177.

Muhammad's conception of humanity excluded slavery of all types. Ancient civilisation and its entire economic structure were built on this unholy institution. The Prophet saw that it could not be abolished at a stroke, but that it could be eliminated progressively by humane legislation tending towards that end. A philosopher like Aristotle had taught that slavery could not be abolished because it was rooted in the nature of things: some persons were created for slavery. The Prophet thought otherwise. He regarded slavery to be an obnoxious institution created by the artificial need and greed of self-seeking men. The emancipation of slaves was made a moral duty and a number of wrongs done by a person could be expiated by the emancipation of a slave. A slave as such could be allowed to be kept only on the condition that the master fed and clothed him as he fed and clothed himself. Ransoming of captives was made one of the items of state

expenditure. The Muslims followed this teaching only partially, treating their slaves as members of the household, conferring on them great positions of power and prestige in the state, to the extent that some of them founded royal dynasties; but they did not take the further step of abolishing this institution altogether, toward which Islam had urged them.

Next to slavery, feudalism which created the division of landlords and serfs. The Islamic law of inheritance prohibited primogeniture, by which the eldest son inherited the whole estate, undivided, depriving all other heirs. Following the Islamic law of inheritance no feudal estates could be created.

After the abolition of feudalism, the Prophet turned his attention towards the restriction of laissez-faire capitalism. Capitalism is a product of the concentration of capital and untaxed hoarded wealth. Islam laid it down that all avenues of unearned income must be closed or narrowed. Usury was prohibited so that wealth might not concentrate in unproductive hands. Society must not be allowed to split up into classes of haves and have-nots. Free initiative of rightful earning of profits by enterprise and labour should not be curbed, but there must be a tax on capital to the extent that is necessary for a healthy levelling of economic resources. Wealth should be taken away from those who have a surplus and spent on the essential requirements of the needy. The Prophet said that poverty must be abolished because it blackens man's face in both the worlds, and it should be eradicated to the extent that a man may walk through his country in search of those who would accept charity, but find none to receive it. Accumulated wealth, on the one hand, and poverty, on the other, create diseases in the social organism; a healthy society and the state should see that these extremes do not exist. Islam foresaw that with economic disparities of a glaring kind, social justice is impossible. As in everything else, it struck a media between free enterprise and forced egalitarianism.

Muhammad is the only prophet in the history who turned his attention to the reform of the economic order. The definite pattern of a plan for a free humanity was chalked out by him. Monarchy was declared evil; he did not ask his followers to render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, but said that a man owes nothing to Caesar and society should aim at this, that "there shall be no Caesars."

Similarly, there should be no feudal lords and usurers living on the needy. Wealth may be freely and lawfully earned, but means should be adopted to spread it out so that, in the words of the Qur'an, "it does not circulate only among the rich." There must be equality of opportunity for all. Disabilities of the weaker sex must be removed. Woman should inherit and hold property in her own name. She should be free to contract marriage and have a right to divorce, if the husband is proved unable to perform his duties. Any conditions that are not immoral or unlawful can be inserted in the marriage contract.

Conclusion

To summarize:

- The Islamic outlook is theistic, considering God as Ultimate Reality.
- Creating, sustaining and developing, motivated by infinite love, are the chief attributes of God.
- No being or power other than this Ideal and Ineffable Reality deserves to be worshipped.
- Islam means voluntary surrender to this Ideal which is also Real in the Being of God, but has to be realised by man through intellectual and moral effort.

- Nature is a system of unities and uniformities, but the ultimate basis of all causation is not purposeless mechanism, but teleological spirituality.

- The Unseen is infinitely more than the Seen, but is organically related to the Seen. The basis of Reality may be ultrarational but is not irrational.

- Truths are revealed to man not only through rational and perceptive channels but also through experiences that transcend them.

- As nature is a unity in diversity, so is humanity a fundamental unity.

- All ethics is based on the theoretical and practical realisation of this Oneness.

- All nations and groups can come together on the basis of two fundamental beliefs: God and the Moral Order.

- Differences of conventions and customs ought not to stand in the way of the acceptance of universal ideals of conduct.

- Freedom is the essence of the human ego. Slavery, servitude, and serfdom of all kinds must be abolished. One must cooperate in the social order, but no one is the master of another.

- All civilised societies must cherish and defend freedom of conscience. There must not be any overt or covert coercion in matters of belief. Variety in conduct and life-attitudes that do not lead to social confusion and tyranny must be respected.

- Human beings are not equal in capacities and achievements. Forcible levelling and attempts to establish unnatural egalitarianism are detrimental to personal and social development.

- Society must be planned and developed as an organic whole without such regimentation as encroaches on personal liberty and individual initiative.

- In Islamic jurisprudence no right is absolute; all rights are subject to public welfare.

- A truly Islamic state must be a democratic republican state. The head of the state is to be elected by the consensus of those who are fit to give an opinion on the basis of knowledge and character. Government by consultation is enjoined by the Qur'an; hereditary monarchy or autocracy has no place in Islam.

- There must be complete equality before the law. The head of the state can be sued in the court by an ordinary citizen. No invidious distinction is allowed on the basis of race or creed.

- Communities with different cultures within the same body politic may be allowed to be governed by their own personal laws. The Prophet decided the cases of the Jews according to the Torah.

- Fundamentals of the constitution based on broad principles as enunciated above form a constant and stable element. Application of these principles may vary according to circumstances. What is not definitely prohibited is permissible, subject to the public weal. The consensus of the learned can modify laws to any extent demanded by the principles of justice and equity.

- Economic life is to be moulded on the principle that concentration of national wealth in a few hands is to be avoided.

- Hoarded wealth is to be taxed to any extent that is necessary for public weal. Society must not be allowed to be split up into the classes of haves and have-nots. Feudal estates must be split up by inheritance and by prohibition of primogeniture.

- Usury as a main source of living on unearned income is prohibited; private property is allowed, subject to certain restrictions.

- Legitimately earned wealth can be taxed to any extent according to the needs of the state and society, but outright expropriation is not permitted.

- The state is envisaged as a welfare state. Law and order and defence are not its sole functions; relief of poverty and suffering is an essential function of the state.

- War is permitted only to punish aggression and to re-establish fundamental liberties. War for the propagation of creeds compelling another by force to accept its way of life and wars for economic gains or territorial expansion are not permitted.

- The Qur'an teaches that quarrels between groups should be settled by the intervention and adjudication of neutral groups, and the award enforced by them against the refractory party. This can form the basis of a just league of nations.

In short, Islam is theistic socialism, conceiving humanity as one family. The Prophet said, "God is my witness that I hold the belief that all humanity is one family and no group is specially privileged." There are no Chosen People except those whom God chooses for their vision of Truth and excellence of character. Racial superiority is a myth. Man is destined to develop and assimilate divine attributes through knowledge and love; all rules of life must be subordinated to these two fundamentals.

Islam claims that religion in this form is a universal truth and can form the basis of a universal humanity, free to develop its infinite potentialities unhampered by artificial restrictions and barriers created by superstition and selfishness.

Professor Gibb, the well-known orientalist, is right in his assertion that Islam is in the best position to mediate between the East and the West. Who knows that this outlook, fully realised and practised, might transcend the contradictions of conflicting ideologies. Bernard Shaw, when questioned about the future religion of humanity, expressed his belief that the future religion of the world would be Islam or something very similar to it; not the Islam of Muslim orthodoxies, but the fundamental attitude of Muhammad towards God and man: One God, One World, One Humanity.

Chapter III
Iqbal's 'Preface' To His
Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam
Q. M. Aslam

Iqbal's "Preface" to his *Lectures on The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* is a very compact statement, the point of which is not easy to grasp. However, after one has gone through the *Lectures* themselves, much of its obscurity disappears.

Iqbal seems to be of the view that at the present time a rational approach to the problem of the reconstruction of Islamic religious thought is the most suitable one. Other approaches are possible and even exist; Iqbal's criticism of these is hinted at, but not made explicit. The argument of the "Preface" is rather a defence of the largely rational approach employed in the Lectures. Let us restate the issue in a series of propositions:

- It is true, Iqbal says, the Qur'an offers the way of experience in preference to that of logical argument.
- It is also true that religious faith itself rests ultimately on a special type of inner experience.
- But this special type of inner experience cannot be had by everyone; some remain strangers to it.
- Especially the modern person has become a stranger to this experience because of his habits of thinking, viz., observing and experimenting and relying generally on sense-experience.
- In the earlier phases of its cultural career Islam itself fostered these habits of concrete thinking.
- The modern person shaped by modern science has become incapable -- or at least less capable -- of the experience on which religious faith rests, over which Islam will have no regrets because it itself has fostered habits of concrete thought.
- Not only has the modern person become less capable than ancient or medieval of having the unique experience which makes for religious faith, but the whole process of such experience has become suspect because "of its liability to illness." Such experiences are often had by persons who only suffer from hallucinations.
- The more genuine schools of Sufism have done good work in shaping and directing the evolution of religious experience in Islam. This means that religious experience can be genuine and valid -- anything but illusory. Some Sufis schools have taken pains to describe and record this experience and reduce it to some kind of order, so that Islamic religious experience could be said to have become a continuing and developing tradition, with its unique methods, terminology, criteria, etc.

What then is the difficulty; why cannot modern man benefit from this tradition?

- Iqbal's reply is that the present-day representatives of these once genuine schools are ignorant of the modern mind, by which he means the product of the intellectual, political, and technological progress which has taken place in the West in the three modern centuries. This ignorance of how the modern mind works, how it thinks, judges, and feels, have made the Sufis of today incapable of learning anything from modern thought or of imparting anything to it. They are happy and content with methods created for generations possessing a cultural outlook different in

important respects from our own and which now have become obsolete. The way Iqbal contrasts the modern with the ancient or medieval mind as having quite different methods of thinking, persuading and arriving at conclusions was to the distinct advantage of the modern. But it may be questioned whether they are so very different?

- Iqbal is adamant and even cites the Holy Qur'an in support of his view. He cites verse 29 of *surah Luqman* which says: 'Your creation and your resurrection are like the creation and resurrection of a single soul'. The verse points to an analogy between the individual mind, soul, or spirit and a whole people's mind, soul, or spirit. The two points stressed in the analogy, viz., creation and resurrection direct the inferences may be drawn from the analogy. The point of this verse for Iqbal's defence of the rational approach to the problem of Islamic reconstruction is not clear at once, but emerges from Iqbal's determination to reach the mind of modern man and modern Muslims and from the course of his *Lectures*. Some excerpts from the *Lectures*, speak for themselves:

Lecture III (Meaning of Prayer):

Religion is not satisfied with mere conception; it seeks a more intimate knowledge of and association with the object of its pursuit. The agency through which this association is achieved is the act of worship or prayer ending in spiritual illumination. The act of worship, however, affects different varieties of consciousness differently. In the case of the prophetic consciousness it is in the main creative.

Lecture V (Spirit of Muslim Culture):

During the minority of mankind psychic energy develops what I call prophetic consciousness -- a mode of economising individual thought and choice by providing ready-made judgements, choices, and ways of action. With the birth of reason and critical faculty, however, life in its own interest, inhibits the formation and growth of non-rational modes of consciousness through which psychic energy flowed at the earlier stage of human evolution. . . . The idea, however, does not mean that mystic experience, which qualitatively does not differ from the experience of the prophet has now ceased to exist as vital fact. . . . God reveals His signs in inner as well as outer experience, and it is the duty of man to judge the knowledge-yielding capacity of all aspects of experience.

Iqbal warns, however, that the *Lectures* will not draw on the mystical experience reported in past Muslim traditions or by contemporary Muslim mystics or theologians. The time is over when appeals to mystical experience could succeed. Modern man no longer understands or appreciates such experience. Iqbal does not indicate whether he himself shares this disability. But it is obvious enough in the course of the *Lectures* that Iqbal sympathises, though he does not see eye to eye with modern man in this respect. Iqbal values mystical experience and cites Shaikh Ahmad Sarhindi (Lecture vii) to show that such experiences are valid experiences and that they constitute a part of the continuing tradition of Islam. Mystical experiences of a higher order -- which Iqbal calls prophetic experiences -- have ceased. Islam's role in the history of human progress is to lead mankind -- the whole of mankind -- away from authoritarian, and towards the inductive approach to the moral and spiritual problems of man.

The Qur'anic text in support of this thesis is the verse from *surah Luqman*: Human communities -- and therefore humankind as a whole -- recapitulate, etc. -- which constitute the career of the individual human soul. The human individual is a child to begin with, but becomes an adult. Methods which could be valid in childhood are no longer valid when the child has become

an adult. Humankind resembles the human individual. Therefore, a time must come when religious thinking must forsake revelational authority and fall back upon the ordinary method of observing, experimenting, and reasoning. This seems to be the point of view of the Qur'anic verse which Iqbal quotes.

Iqbal's conclusion, in short, seems to be that prophetic experience which could be authoritative has ceased, and mystical experience which has not ceased is not authoritative; the only method left for religious discourse is the method of science. "The demand for a scientific form of religious knowledge is only natural," says Iqbal and in any case modern man, including the modern Muslim -- if he is to attain to a living reconstruction of faith -- must have at his disposal a method physiologically less violent and psychologically more suitable. The reference here is to mystical exercises of holding the breath and making the body resound to the repetition of religious names or formulae. These exercises cannot be adopted by modern man. He will not try them out, and probably will not think the experiment worthwhile. Occasionally Western writers turn up and say they have tried Yoga exercises and found them more or less true to their scientific appeal. If they are valid they are valid only for those who perform the exercises and have the alleged experiences. They are not valid for all and sundry. They are not experiences which all can have, and which all can test, check and judge, like the experiences of science.

Iqbal's *Lectures*, therefore, try to meet even though partially the urgent demand for a reconstruction of Muslim religious philosophy, in the light of the philosophical tradition of Islam, on the one hand, and of the more recent developments in the various domains of human knowledge, on the other. Reconstruction, in short, is to be achieved by a rational criticism and construction of the Islamic tradition and modern science.

The time at which Iqbal wrote the *Lectures* was most favourable for such a reconstruction because classical physics had moved away from its traditional assumptions, namely, the crude 19th century materialism according to which the universe including man ultimately was made up of irreducible last particles constrained by their nature to follow only mechanical laws. Iqbal was optimistic about the outcome of modern physics. Religion and science, he said (in 1928) may discover hitherto unsuspected mutual harmonies. The *Lectures* indicate where these harmonies could be found.

In true scientific humility, Iqbal warns that there is no finality in philosophical thinking. Therefore, his is not -- and cannot be -- the last word on the subject. "As knowledge advances and fresh avenues of thought are opened, other views, and probably sounder views than those set forth in these lectures, are possible. Our duty is carefully to watch the progress of human thought and to maintain an independent critical attitude towards it."

Iqbal begins by saying that the preference of the Qur'an is for 'deed, rather than idea'. But the burden of his Preface carries a preference for 'idea' rather than 'deed'. Is this a contradiction and a serious one; is it proof of emotional ambivalence? It seems not. The Preface is an intellectual defence of an intellectual approach adopted by Iqbal in the *Lectures*. Appropriately the *Lectures* provide an exposition of the New Physics which emerged with Einstein earlier in the present century, also of the constructions which philosophers following Einstein had begun, and which some Muslim philosophers in their time had already put on such basic ideas in philosophy as space, time, matter, man, mind and God. The message that emerges out of the *Lectures* extols 'deed' rather than 'idea'. The argument for the existence of God is 'experience'; this may be the experience of religious seers throughout the world and over centuries or it may be the experience of Shaikh Ahmad Sarhindi nearer home. The ultimate end of human life is an ever more free,

creative, spontaneous and constructive life. Like all voluntarists such as Bergson and Neitzsche, he wishes to extol 'deed', but not without absorbing into it 'idea'.

Chapter IV

A Case for World Philosophy: My Intellectual Story

C. A. Qadir

Critique of Metaphysics

It is said about a European coming to the Middle East for the first time witnessed in an Islamic country a group of people weeping and crying loudly. When he enquired concerning the cause of that bemoaning he was told that it was due to the fact that Hazrat Imam Hussain and his band of devoted followers were mercilessly slaughtered in the battlefield of Kerbala by Yazid's army. He then enquired as to when this tragedy happened and was told that it took place about 140 years ago, to which he replied 'Have these mourners heard of it so late?'

Something of the same sort happened when the Pakistan Philosophical Congress had the first session in Lahore and Professor John Wisdom -- a world-renowned philosopher of England -- came to attend the session and to deliver a public lecture. As Oxford had been the centre of logical positivism, a movement unknown in Pakistan, the organisers of the Congress asked that I prepare myself thoroughly on logical positivism. But in 1954 logical positivism had lost its force in Oxford and elsewhere and when asked if he was a logical positivist Professor Wisdom denied it most vehemently.

However, what struck me in this movement was its revolutionary spirit and its directness and clarity. Professor Ayer's book *Language, Truth and Logic*, written in a clear, forceful style, with the vigour of a young committed convert, had tremendous impact on me.

Logical positivism was born in 1918 in the Vienna Circle, whose godfather was Professor Schlick. The Circle came into existence ostensibly with the grand purpose of establishing science on firm foundations and eliminating metaphysics altogether. With this object in view, Professor Schlick gathered around him a group of scientists, mathematicians, historians, philosophers -- all bent on banishing metaphysics and providing factual and empirical sciences with a methodology, incontestable in spirit and indubitable in results. Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, through the rigorous application of symbolic logic and the analysis of language, provided a firm foothold. I was enamoured of the neat edifice that logical positivists had built through logic, and of the way in which they had cleaned the Aegean stable of philosophy of the rubbish that had blocked its way to progress for centuries and made it the laughing stock of scientists and logicians.

It was Aristotle who said that philosophy begins in wonder, and ends in wonder and surely there is a charm in this. But if wonder means mystification or cloudy thinking, and philosophy is said to originate and end its thinking in mystification, then the whole endeavour of philosophy will be nothing but an exercise in futility. The common man will get from it confusion and nothing else -- possibly at a higher level.

The concept of "wonder" is a dominant note in Greek philosophy. With the Greeks philosophy was a search for truth or quest for wisdom, which lay in knowing how the world originated, what destiny is in store for man and what the ultimate nature of the universe is. In other words, there were three questions, namely, the creation of the universe and therefore God, His attributes and His relation to the world He created; the human soul, its nature and being after the physical dissolution of the body; and the nature of the universe, whether it is material or spiritual. All three questions about God, the soul and the nature of the universe which constitute the content of wisdom

are known as the perennial questions of philosophy. They are the great imponderables. They present them-selves to every age but the great minds fail miserably to find an answer. Accordingly one philosopher after another builds his edifice of philosophy on the ruins of the other, first demolishing what has been built so far and then building his own. But as his philosophy is demolished in turn by his successors the history of philosophy looks like a shambles in which each philosophy is destroyed to make room for the next. Consequently there is no agreed knowledge in philosophy, whereas in the sciences knowledge accumulates through the collective efforts of scientists. One, wonders, therefore, what is the good of philosophy and how the great minds of the world have failed to achieve there anything substantial and solid.

This is not to imply that philosophers achieved nothing at all or that their activity was altogether futile. They did give brilliant flashes here and there and useful pieces of advice, but so far as the final output of their endeavour is concerned, that is to say, their utopias and grand systems, there is nothing which could stand the onslaught of their adversaries. The result is that philosophy, in spite of the brilliance of its protagonists, has no achievement to show. This set the philosophers looking to science and mathematics and their dazzling victories. If philosophy were like that it could present an incremental agreed upon knowledge. It could provide a calculus of reasoning, in which each symbol stood for a single meaning. In mathematics, where precision, exactness and unambiguity is the goal, each symbol, whether of negation, disjunction or anything else, conveys a single idea and can be conveyed through that symbol alone.

Leibniz did not follow this programme to the end, but the idea led ultimately to symbolic logic, logical positivism and scientific philosophy. Spinoza took geometry as his model and in his great book *Ethics* began his metaphysics with a number of self-evident truths, just as a geometrician starts with a number of axioms and definitions, and then deduces from them propositions and corollaries by dis-implicating what is implicitly contained in the initial assumptions. He thus made metaphysics a deductive discipline, little realising that deduction, being a closed and formal discipline, could not deal with the actual concrete reality sought by metaphysics. In the hands of such idealistic philosophers as Taylor and Bradley metaphysics became a deductive discipline. The logical positivist's main charge against metaphysics is that deduction being analytic and formal must deal with tautologies and so cannot reveal the true nature of the universe. Taylor, for example, starts by defining metaphysics as the study of the reality as a whole. This assumes right from the beginning that (1) there is a reality and that (2) reality is a whole. Both this is too much; it assumes what should be the endeavour of a philosopher to prove. After this Taylor tries to prove the nature of reality with the help of the law of contradiction, but as formal this is suited for tautologous arguments and not where reference has to be made directly or indirectly to sense-experience and the knowledge that it generates. Bradley's book, *Appearance and Realit*, also used deductive logic and its law of contradiction to substantiate his claims about reality.

Underlying this indictment of metaphysics is the idea that metaphysics is a study of the supersensible reality. Indeed this is how Professor G. E. Moore has defined metaphysics in *Principia Ethica*. The roots of this conception about metaphysics go far back to Plato who bifurcated the entire realm of being into a world of senses and a world of ideas. He further condemned the world of senses as illusory and undependable and extolled the world of ideas, raising it to the world of perfection and completion. Metaphysics dealt with the world of ideas which is not that of the senses; it is a supersensible world standing independently by virtue of its own intrinsic nature. According to W. H. Walsh (*Metaphysics*, Hut-chinson University Library, 1963, p. 35) Plato held that "philosophy differs from other branches of enquiry (e.g., geometry)

(a) in taking nothing for granted; (b) in its scope, which is universal; (c) in being fully intellectual, in no way dependent upon sense-experience."

Realising this difficulty Kant put forward of a priori synthetic propositions, meaning thereby that a proposition could be analytic and synthetic at the same time. He did give some examples from the field of mathematics which, while formal and analytic, yet entailed reference to mundane reality. A clear statement of this position is found in Joseph's *Introduction to Logic* wherein it is maintained that the laws of logic are laws of reality. His contention is that the law of identity "A is A" is true because in the world in which we live, things remain the same or their identity never changes. Likewise the law of contradiction that a thing cannot be B and non-B at the same time and at the same place is true because it never happens in actual life that B and not-B are true at the same time. Imam Ibn Taimiyya was the first person to criticise this standpoint. He maintained that the laws of logic conveyed no information about the world as it is. The law of contradiction that A cannot be B and not-B is likewise purely blind and tautologous in nature. It has no means to tell what a thing actually is. Hence to state that the laws of logic are the laws of reality is to ignore the nature of logical truths. The logical positivists hold that there is no meeting ground between synthetic and a priori propositions. Hence the contention of Kant that there could be a priori synthetic propositions has no basis. But in spite of his attempt to unite the synthetic and a priori propositions, Kant is well-known for his opposition to metaphysics. If the scope of metaphysics is confined to noumena and noumena are by definition inaccessible to the human intellect, then metaphysics stands condemned.

But the difficulties noted above in respect to metaphysics are due to the fact that metaphysics is so defined, in one case as the study of supersensible Reality, in the other as the study of Noumenon, thus making it impossible by virtue of these definitions. You can call a person dog and then kill him. But if there is no bifurcation as is supposed by Plato or if the world of noumenon does not stand over and above the world of phenomenon, then the argument against metaphysics entirely fails. In the East metaphysics has never been decried. (Here metaphysics comes first and philosophy afterwards. In Indian philosophy, metaphysics precedes philosophy. There are six systems of philosophy, though the fundamental metaphysical reality is one.) In the Eastern way of thinking, the so-called world of Ultimate Reality is not entirely different from the world of senses, but is a continuation or prolongation of the same. In pantheism Reality is not the world of senses, but is one and the same. Hence if one opts for a different definition of metaphysics and a different account of Reality than what is advocated by Plato and Kant, one can escape the criticism levelled against metaphysics.

Logical Positivism

Logical positivism was unheard of in Pakistan till 1954. It is strange that Allama Muhammad Iqbal in his lectures on the *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* mentions dialectical materialism and psycho-analysis and criticises them because of their atheism, but does not mention logical positivism or atheistic existentialism, though they were equally vociferous in their denunciation of God and religion and in some respects much more than the former. Both logical positivism and existentialism had long been on the philosophic scene of the world. Logical positivism was born round about 1918 and existentialism, though born much earlier, expressed itself as a live force between the two World Wars. Many people feel that a new reconstruction of religious thought in Islam is needed so that the newer movements in the realm of thought might be accommodated and their influence on Islamic thought might be properly appreciated. Logical

positivism has given birth to the linguistic philosophy of Wittgenstein, John Wisdom, Gilbert Ryle, Austin, to name but a few. These movements, some of which were contemporary to Allama Muhammad Iqbal and some were born after his death, have had tremendous effect on the theory and practice of religion. Likewise, the physical sciences have made rapid strides and revolutionised our conception of animal organism, the working of genes, artificial intelligence, E. S. P., etc., all of which require a new interpretation of religious reality.

Logical positivism has caused a revolution in the field of philosophy and is regarded as a turning point in the history of philosophy. Though its main purpose was the elimination of metaphysics and putting sciences on firm foundations, in actual practice it helped provide philosophy with a new field of enquiry and a new methodology. All the old problems of philosophy such as the existence of God, the destiny of man and the nature of the universe were outlawed; in their place a programme of elucidation and clarification of concepts was launched. The so-called perennial problems of philosophy which had blocked the way to progress in philosophy were pronounced illogical and nonsensical. They had a place neither among the problems of factual, empirical or positive sciences nor among the analytical, formal and tautologous problems of logic and metaphysics and hence were devoid of sense and significance.

The analytic method was adopted by logical positivism for clarifying concepts, but it is not clear what analysis really stands for. Certainly it has an affinity with definition, for in definition a concept is analysed into genus and differentia in order to clarify its meaning. But many philosophers like G. E. Moore are not very clear as to what in fact they are doing in analysis. In their programme of the Unity of Sciences the logical positivists attempted to reduce all sciences to the level of physics. They analysed or reduced the sentences of sociology to those of psychology, the language of psychology to that of biology, and the language of biology in turn to that of physics, thereby reducing the language of all sciences to that of physics. But is the reduction complete and final; can the language of one science be reduced to the language of another science without a remainder? Though the programme of the Unity of Sciences seemed attractive as it placed the entire gamut of human knowledge on one footing, yet it was a miserable failure for it destroyed the uniqueness of the different types of knowledge and made a mockery of them.

Though logical positivist, under the lead of the *Tractatus* of Wittgenstein, recognised only two types of meaningful sentences, it was soon realised by Wittgenstein and Ayer that language could not be confined to two types of meaningful sentences and that there were innumerable ways in which human beings could communicate and express their meanings. Hence, Wittgenstein introduced the idea of language games and held that each game had its own rules and so its own system of meaning. Though in the beginning I fell into the snare of logical positivism and talked as if there were two types of meaningful sentences, I corrected myself in my earlier *Logical Positivism* to recognize only one, namely sentences of positive sciences, as having meaning. The other type of sentences was recognised under compulsion, as without mathematics and logic the positive sciences could make no advance and could not interpret their data.

For the factual statements of the positive sciences they devised the verifiability test, namely, that the truth of a proposition depends upon the mode of its verification. This could be direct or indirect, actual or possible, but in every case it was done in the light of facts. Hence, the theory of truth for logical positivism was the correspondence theory. There are many difficulties in this theory, the greatest of which is to tell what indeed is a fact, for in the world we live in there are no facts but only interpretations. Whatever facts a scientist chooses for his enquiry they are nothing but an interpretation of a specific spatio-temporal continuum. Moreover, though there is what Rome Ray has called "the matching of reality", yet that matching also depends upon the

interpretation of a scientist as to what matching would be in a specific case and how that matching is to be affected. In some cases, particularly in the case of the so-called introspective facts, matching is an impossibility for they cannot be taken out and compared with the actual living reality to judge their correspondence.

The logical positivists were not successful in formulating the 'verifiability principle'. They knew that complete verifiability was never possible in the domain of the physical sciences, as the future and past were not at their beck and call, nor even the present. Hence what they could aim at was probability, but even the notion of probability was assailed by philosophers like Karl Popper. Hence the logical positivists had to come to what is known as the 'falsifiability principle', which means that a scientist continues to cling to a theory till it is proven false. It is easily seen that the 'falsifiability principle' is a negative principle and can offer no positive guidelines to a researcher. But the greatest difficulty with the 'verifiability principle' and its different formulations is their logical status. According to the logical positivists the meaningful sentences are either the descriptive sentences of the positive sciences or the tautological sentences of logical-mathematical sciences. In order that the 'verifiability principle' be regarded as meaningful, it should be proven to belong to one of these types. But it cannot be tautological for such sentences say nothing, and it cannot be descriptive for such sentences are problematic. Thus in both cases there are difficulties which the logical positivist cannot surmount. Consequently many opponents of logical positivism have dubbed this principle metaphysical in nature. Walsh would label such statements categorical; they are necessary but cannot be proven true or false. But if the fundamental principle of logical positivism is metaphysical, the whole activity of the logical positivists is rendered ineffective. The one main ambition of the logical positivists was to eliminate metaphysics, but metaphysics enters their territory from another door. This never struck Schlick, who in a flush of enthusiasm generated by the *Tractatus* of Wittgenstein said by way of prophecy that philosophy "which never talks sense but only meaningless nonsense" will soon disappear, because philosophers will find that their audience, tired of empty tirades, has gone away. This prophecy, however, did not come true, and philosophy and metaphysics continued to exist with redoubled zeal.

Though logical positivism is now a spent force, yet in the language of Professor Ayer it is like a wealthy uncle from whom everybody borrows but no one acknowledges. Logical positivism has left its powerful impact upon every discipline and particularly on philosophy. It has brought sanity to philosophy by outlawing wornout, dilapidated notions and problems, thereby breaking the vicious circle in which many philosophers were caught. It laid far greater emphasis on questions than on answers. Some of the questions with which earlier philosophers tried to grapple were worded in such a manner that no answer could be given. If somebody asks what the purpose of the universe is, one can give no answer, for one can understand the meaning of purpose in relation to human beings and their activities, but not in relation to the universe which is a vast conglomeration of events. Unless one defines purpose and universe, it is difficult to say what the purpose of the universe is. Allama Muhammad Iqbal once said that he could only answer the question, "Does God exist?" if he knew the meaning of 'exist' and 'God' (*Stray Reflections*, ed. by Dr. Javid Iqbal). Voltaire's requirement that if one wanted to converse with him they must first define their terms contains a lot of good counsel though in an exaggerated form. In countries where people are accustomed to loose and irresponsible talk, it is a good piece of advice that they should first define their terms and then talk.

My own debt to logical positivism is immense; my involvement and commitment to this doctrine was intense and deep for a fairly long time. But my *Logical Positivism* and various articles bear out that I never subscribed to this doctrine completely, for I always felt that there was a large

area of human life where logical positivists had nothing to say. In my chapter on "Reason and Faith" as well as in the chapters on "Language and Religion", Modern Challenges to Religion', I criticised very strongly the standpoint of logical positivism and regarded it inadequate. In the chapter on 'Language and Religion' I tried to refute the charge of meaninglessness against religion and held that religious discourse conveyed its meaning through the events of nature which are God's signs. However, I felt that logical positivism has done yeoman's service to science, which latter owes its existence to a large extent to the efforts of logical positivists. The Encyclopaedia of Unified Sciences prepared by the logical positivists, though incomplete, is a great step. The attention they gave to the analysis and clarification of language and its concepts removed many a bottleneck from the field of sciences and provided them with sharper tools to deal with their problems.

It is rather sad to observe within the logical positivists differences of fundamental nature between two powerful groups, one mathematical and the other linguistic or non-mathematical, between which there seemed to be no meeting ground. The mathematical group led by Carnap is busy devising the special language of symbolic logic for philosophy. The other led by the later Wittgenstein, as evidenced in his posthumous book *Philosophical Investigations*, is busy analysing language and putting forward the 'use theory' or its variation in respect of language and its meaning. Some of these philosophers are concerned with conceptual analysis which they regard as the main function of philosophy. Both have taken extreme positions and quarrel over trifles; like the true believers of Eric Hoffer they exhibit the same kind of irrationalism.

The trend towards mathematisation in philosophy began with Leibniz and had been developed and refined by Whitehead and Russell in the *Principia Mathematica*. Carnap is busy developing a special language to rid philosophy of imprecision, ambiguities and obscurantism. The programme is laudable no doubt, but one wonders if the work of philosophising is ever carried on in the language of mathematics. Professor Strawson in his *Introduction to Logical Theory* strongly criticised the mathematical programme of Carnap and his followers and I have pointed out the main difficulties in my "Contemporary philosophy". No doubt scientific and philosophical language has always differed from the spoken and the literary one, but it has never been so different as to be unintelligible to an ordinary educated person. Mathematising philosophical language, besides putting philosophy in an iron cage and chaining it within the narrow confines of a highly sophisticated kind of artificial language, will impoverish it and render it ineffective and lifeless.

The other line of logical positivism which is very much alive in the Anglo-American world is headed by Austin and by Wittgenstein who played a double role. He put logical positivism on a firm ground through his *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* and in his later years, through his *Philosophical Investigations*, demolished these foundations and laid the basis for the philosophy of ordinary language. The *Tractatus* was based upon two ideas (i) that the world divides itself into facts (atomic facts) and into things and (ii) that each proposition ultimately resolves itself, by analysis, into one uniquely determined truth-value of elementary propositions. Hence each proposition had one and only one final analysis. Behind these two ideas was the assumption that the constituents and especially the ultimate constituents of anything are fixed in the very nature of the things. In the *Philosophical Investigations* Wittgenstein questions these assumptions and holds that no components of a thing are uniquely determined by reality so that one account would be right and all others wrong. One account may be better for some purpose, another better for some other purpose. John Wisdom says similarly, "An account of the world in terms of things, an account of the world in terms of facts and an account of the world in terms of events is just an account of one world in three languages."

Like Plato, Wittgenstein thinks that a philosophical problem has the form "I do not know my way about." When one probes into certain notions, one falls into puzzles and confusions. Wittgenstein was always anxious to make people feel the puzzles -- he was dissatisfied if he felt they had not done this. "My aim is to pass from a piece of disguised nonsense to something that is patent nonsense." Philosophy starts with riddles and philosophical problems are paradoxes so that even at the end of our enquiry we are no better than we were at the start. Other moves are possible, but they too prove to be of no avail; we remain trapped in the puzzle. Wittgenstein once remarked to Malcolm, "A person caught in a philosophical puzzle is like a man in a room who wants to get out but does not know how. He tries the window but it is too high. He tries the chimney, but it is too narrow" (Malcolm, *Memoirs*, 51). According to Wittgenstein, the difficulties experienced in the domain of philosophy are not like those in the domain of sciences. Scientific difficulties can be removed by bringing in new facts, but the philosopher has all the facts before him: he needs no new facts to solve his problem. For instance no conceivable discovery a physiologist might make would help the philosopher solve his problem about sense-perception or free will. A philosopher's problem is not to find new facts, but to find some way of constructing the facts he already has, so that they do not appear to conflict one with another.

Wittgenstein arrived at the same kind of uncomfortable conclusion in the *Tractatus* when he said, "My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way -- anyone who understands me eventually recognises them as non-sensical, when he has used them as steps, to climb up beyond them." In other words, his philosophy is an indispensable nonsense, not just an idle nonsense. His view is that philosophy is not a theory for it does not issue into a body of assertable propositions, but rather is an activity of making the meaning of propositions clear. This type of nonsense can be compared, on the one hand, with the nonsense of metaphysics which is the least excusable one and with the nonsense of religion and mysticism which is deep nonsense.

When Wittgenstein talks of confusion and puzzlement and even of wonder he comes very near to existentialism which maintains, in the language of Marcel, that philosophical issues are not like scientific problems but are riddles or paradoxes -- to which no single answer can or should be given. The world is a mystery, not because of its multifarious activities, but simply because it exists. The mystery that surrounds life and the world cannot be resolved by discovering more facts, because it is a question not of facts but of interpreting them; all depends upon how one looks at life and the world. It is like interpreting a dream, where interpretations would differ depending upon whether one is a Freudian, Jungian, Adlerian or a devotee of some other system of psychology. Perhaps all the dream-interpreters would be giving equally true or equally false interpretations; there is no way to pronounce one as true and the other as false, and strange as it may seem they all work. As in the cure of a diseases one can be cured through allopathy, through homeopathy, through Unani Tib or acupuncture or the ayurvedic method. This is true of philosophy as well, once it is conceded that philosophical problems are mysteries and puzzles. Hence the cult of objectivity adhered to by scientists and scientifically-oriented philosophers cannot be defended. Truth is subjectivity, as the existentialists say with regard to existential truths, but this is equally true of the scientific truths.

Though I am a great believer in the fundamentals of logical positivism and its offshoots and subscribe to the programme of the clarification and elucidation of concepts, yet I feel strongly that clarity is not enough and that the sole or primary function of philosophy is not to elucidate but to grapple with the basic realities of life. What those basic realities are depends again upon one's point of view. For a Marxist the basic realities are socio-economic and the remedy for them is revolution. The Marxist believes that dialectics is the ultimate principle of human and physical

reality and that there are some basic ways in which dialectics works. Dialectical Materialism also known as scientific materialism, treats philosophy as a branch of science. Religion. It considers religion an opium of the masses which clever politicians and rulers use to accomplish their ends, to silence their opponents and to create a dreamland for the masses. Instead of facing the bitter realities of life by fighting them in this world, they are given a promise of another world in which present injustices and inequalities will be repaid by a system of compensations guaranteed by an Almighty God or the law of *Karma*. Marxists have no faith in God or gods, but feel that what is needed is science and technology to remove the miseries of life and a revolution to change the material structure of the society which has sanctioned a system rendering the rich richer and the poor poorer. Because of their faith in science and technology, they feel that they need have no engagement with religion or God.

This, however, is going too far. No doubt religion has been exploited in the past, but that would hardly justify condemning religion for no fault of its own, but of its exploiters. Though socio-economic problems are very vital, they do not constitute the whole of life. The saying of Jesus Christ that man does not live by bread alone, though very much clouded by such dark realities of life as famine, poverty, drought, disease, serfdom, despotism and imperialism, has a truth which cannot be altogether ignored. In the Eastern way of thinking, as exemplified by yoga, Transcendental Meditation, Zen Buddhism, *Tasawuf*, Baghti practices, the emphasis is on inward life. This is not withdrawal from the world or its renunciation but adopting an attitude of detachment by which, while remaining in the world, one escapes its hold. The inner life of an individual or of a nation needs nourishment which comes not from wealth, prestige or domination, but by turning attention within or by, as Allama Iqbal says, suppressing temporarily the efficient self and giving freer scope to the appreciative self. It is as if the window towards the world is shut for the time being and the window towards God or the inner self opened. Marxism has no room for such experiences and consequently, in spite of its world-shaking philosophy and the material benefits that it promised, it failed to satisfy -- not because it was untrue but because it was incomplete.

Existentialism

Existentialism though not a philosophy of inwardness, goes deeply to the bottom of life and identifies problems which concern Being and are, therefore, more ontological than epistemological. Anglo-American philosophy is mainly concerned with two questions, "How do I know" and "What do you mean," both of which are epistemological in character. Existentialism, on the other hand, though not unmindful of the correct use of language, considers ontological problems the proper subject matter of philosophy. I realised the importance of this approach while reading *Rubaiyyat-i-Omar Khayyam*, where towards the end a conversation breaks out among the pots at the potter's house. One pot with a rather awry neck asked, "Why of all the pots is my neck awry? Did the hands of the potter shake, while he was making me?" To this question and similar others no answer was forthcoming. In philosophy, as we all know, questions are much more important than answers. Like all philosophers, Omar Khayyam leaves his audience and hearers guessing as to what the answer to this riddle might be. There is indeed the question of unjustifiable personal sufferings: why should a person suffer for no fault of one's own?

Sartre perhaps would not be willing to acknowledge that there is suffering right from the beginning, but thinks that whatever a person is, he can make or mar himself by his own choices. It is true that a person with an awry neck can make use of his disability in such a manner that it goes

to his advantage. It is said about Lord Byron, the poet, that he limped a little, but by his charming and seductive manners he made limping a fashion in England so that every person who wanted to be looked up to limped a little. This, however, is not universally true. A congenitally blind person cannot set a fashion for blindness. Such disabilities constitute initial barriers in life and become accentuated day by day until they become stone walls, hard to cross over. Hence persons (poets in the language of Omar Khayyam) can ask legitimately why they were born with an organism which works against them. Khayyam raises questions about creation, good and evil, reward and punishment in the life to come, the ultimate destiny of man, the purpose of the universe, death, etc. which are vital to life. On the loss of a son one asks what is this life and for what are we born; are we like flies to be swept away by the whirlwinds of fate; why this suffering to the parents, to the family and to the friends of the deceased? Some say it can be for their moral and spiritual uplift, but it is difficult for one who is grieving to believe that. Questions like those of the poet are there, but there is no answer from anywhere. The makers of the universe and the architects of fate play the joke and leave us wondering. Is it the philosophic wonder of Plato or the Ram Lila of Hindu gods who play with our lives for their sport? Whatever the case, the mysteries of life stare us in the face; they demand answers from every age and from every person for they are very basic, that is to say, they are the inalienable and indubitable truths of life.

It is said that existentialism is the product of two world wars and of the mechanical life that the modern man is made to lead because of the tremendous and rapid progress in sciences and technologies. The two World Wars brought untold miseries in their wake and machine life has created such problems as alienation, loneliness, anguish and joylessness. But we would underrate the importance of existentialism, if we did not consider it as arising from the basic realities of life and attribute it to such temporary calamities as war and machines. Even Adam, the first man, had to face existential problems. He felt lonely till Eve was created, and then had to ask for forgiveness and repent his whole life when he disobeyed the orders of God. Adam is made to feel lonely, as the ancient mythology says, because he was alone in the beginning. That may be one cause, but the real and most vital causes were, as they remain, the absolute ignorance about what life and death are, the whence and whither of life, unmerited sufferings, the system of punishments and rewards here and in the hereafter, anguish and anxieties of life, bereavements, infidelities and so many other incomprehensible things. It is true that existentialism has laid stress on the dark side of life and failed to notice its joys and charms. Luckily this drawback has been remedied by what is called the philosophy of the Living Spirit. Though the philosophy of language with its emphasis on clarification, elucidation and proper use of language has great value in the field of the physical sciences, yet so far as culture and inner life are concerned existentialism is more helpful and should not be ignored.

Like Allan Watts, I feel that words are not enough and that we should go beyond words in philosophy: just as clarity is not enough, so neither are words. Wittgenstein, himself recognised the need of going beyond words when he concluded the *Tractatus* with the remark, "Of that whereof one cannot speak, thereof one should remain silent." After this, British philosophers should have remained silent, but they have not. For this reason after the *Tractatus* philosophy which clings to language becomes puerile and concerns itself with trivial issues far removed from life. The philosopher becomes specialist in grammar and symbolic logic and loses touch with the basic realities of life. William Earle in his essay on "Notes on the Death of a Culture" says that the new academic philosopher is a pragmatic, nine to five businessman, going to his office with a briefcase to 'do philosophy' in the same spirit as an accountant or a research chemist; this is the poverty of philosophy. Preoccupation with E. S. P. and occultism to some extent has convinced

me that concern with language is but a small affair, though not a negligible one, in the wide expanse of human life. As there is a world without, so there is a world within, and just as we embellish the world without by flower pots, beautiful furniture, carpets and curtains so should we embellish the interior by the development of moral sense and by dipping occasionally into the Great Ocean of Reality. There is not one way to do it, but many out of which one should be selected which is in tune with one's own nature. In the West people hanker after Sadhus, mystics and Yogis to know what life is and how best to live it. In the East where spiritualism lies hidden in its holy scriptures but seldom is dug up, people are fast becoming as materialistic, if not more than the Westerners and thereby lose contact with their moorings. They too need to turn their attention inwards occasionally to keep themselves in touch with the basic truths of life.

A World Philosophy

It should be obvious from the above that thinking need not be wedded to any particular school of philosophy. Gone are the days when philosophers belonged to one "ism" or the other; why should there be an 'either-or' attitude in philosophy. Just as a gardener prepares a bouquet of several flowers, all different from one another in hue, smell and beauty, why cannot a philosopher also prepare a bouquet out of the truths contained in the various systems of philosophy? There is much truth in Hegel and Karl Marx that thesis and anti-thesis are not all wrong, and that some amount of truth lies in the thesis and some amount of truth in the anti-thesis and the task of the philosopher is to extract the truth of both and to deposit it in a new proposition which they call the synthesis. This process of extracting truth goes on till one reaches the final stage which contains all truth and nothing but truth. Though it is never possible to reach complete truth, there is no denying the fact that if the truth contained in different schools somehow be gathered together it would lead to a philosophy which, instead of cancelling all others except itself, would authenticate all others including itself and vouchsafe a better vision of life and the universe.

This position leads toward a world philosophy. In the past only European philosophy officially occupied the throne of philosophy, while all others like Indian, Muslim and Chinese philosophies were dubbed poetic, mystical or emotive outbursts of untutored minds. But by the end of the 20th century due to quick, easy and cheap means of communication and transport, cultural isolation came to an end and people came to know one another more intimately. It was realised that just as no nation has been without religion and a prophet, so no nation had been without philosophy of some sort and philosophers of some worth. Indeed in some cases the philosophies of other regions are as rich as is European philosophy itself and even surpass it in depth and vision.

Hence, a need has arisen to synthesise the flashes of insight exhibited by the inhabitants of the various parts of the globe. This attempt is yet in the initial stage, but it is hoped that it will be successful one day. The need of such a philosophy is very great, for the different philosophies of the world have created as much a barrier between nations of the world as their religions. Just as the adherents of one religion fail to understand the thoughts and language of the adherents of other religions, likewise the followers of one school of philosophy fail to appreciate the truth propounded by other schools of philosophy. The world, at present, is divided into three philosophical empires, namely Anglo-American following the philosophy of language, Continental Europe following existentialism and the philosophy of dialectical materialism. The rest of the world follows one of these three philosophies according as they are politically influenced by this or that nation. The devotees of these philosophies are as much prejudiced in favour of their own philosophic creed or ideology as are religionists with regard to their own religion. There is the same heat, the same

nervousness and the same 'believe or perish' attitude. Several of my essays such as "Philosophy for World Understanding" and "Contemporary Philosophy," have emphasised the need for world philosophy for the peace of the world. Political peace cannot be achieved if nations lack the framework of common understanding provided by a common universal philosophy.

There are stupendous difficulties in the way of such a project. But if the world was not dismayed by the political difficulties posed by different ideologies and different ways of looking at the world, why should it be dismayed by different philosophies? The problem of how to make a bouquet out of different philosophies is a challenge which the philosophers have to take up. The computer with a far greater range of intelligence, quicker grasp and a miraculous power of manipulating and organising data may help in the not too distant a future. Already, it has tremendous influence on some of the cherished concepts and notions of philosophers and has compelled them to think afresh. The computer might weld together the thinking of different nations and prepare a synthesis acceptable to the majority of right thinking people. Philosophers can ignore the domain of computer science and parapsychology only at their own peril. If these two sciences can help in bringing mankind together by giving them a common way of thinking, it will usher in an era of peace and common understanding through a common Universal Philosophy.

The idea of 'World Philosophy' is not foreign to the Muslim mind. When the brilliance of the Arab mind was at its apex, besides the inspirations coming principally from the Islamic traditions, there were powerful influences coming from Greek, Christian, Jewish and Indian thought which were not only welcomed but assimilated and developed by the great system builders of Islam -- Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, Miskawaih, Ibn Rushd -- to name but a few. Even those who resisted the invasion of Greek thought, as for instance Al-Ghazali and Ibn Taimiyya, could not escape the charms of foreign thought. The result was a happy amalgam and a fruitful synthesis of East and West in a common endeavour to reach the ultimate truth. Only when foreign influences were completely boycotted and the spirit of independent enquiry languished in the Islamic world did the decline of Arab civilisation set in.

In the undivided India, with the advent of the West, particularly the British, a new chapter opened in the history of the Muslims' assimilation and adjustment to new ideas. They were already living among Hindus who had a strong and a powerful tradition in philosophic and religious thought. The Muslims were trying to hold their own against Hindu thought, but there is strong evidence that Hindu ideas about God and human destiny filtered down imperceptibly into Muslim beliefs and practices. Our Sufis borrowed ideas from Vedantism, Buddhism, Jainism and from other Hindu sources, though they also influenced Hindu thought in many important ways. Because of the confluence of Muslim, Hindu and Western thought, a new type of thinking arose. The Muslims on their part tried to come to terms with Western thought. Syed Ahmad Khan made this attempt and so did Allama Muhammad Iqbal in his great treatise *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*. Indians, too, have tried to imbibe as much as they could from Western sources. The Hindu movements of Raja Ram Mohan Rai, Swami Dayanand, Swami Vivekananda and the philosophies of Sri Aurobindo Ghosh and Mahatama Gandhi are the products of Western and Islamic influences.

Dr. Radhakrishnan of India, in his books *East and West in Religion*, *Eastern Religions and Western Thought*, and *The History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western*, has attempted to present a philosophical perspective which should be shared by both worlds. M. M. Sharif, in his *History of Muslim Philosophy*, has prefaced the Muslim thought by Indian, Chinese, Iranian, Greek and Alexandrian-Syriac thoughts. Though pre-Islamic thought has characteristics of its own, yet it

shares with Islamic thought some very important insights and ideas. Similar attempts have been made in China and Japan to weld together Eastern and Western thought.

In the West, however, the idea of a common philosophy is quite foreign. There have been isolated instances of philosophers influenced by Indian, Chinese or Muslim thought but, by and large, the West has been characterised by its insularity and arrogance, considering that Europe alone had a philosophy worth the name, while the so-called philosophies of other nations were nothing but cock-and-bull stories. Their histories of philosophy accordingly contained only the names of the philosophers of the European countries with, if at all, very casual reference to Indian or Muslim thought. This was highly deplorable, for God did not bestow intellect upon the West alone. It is now realised by a good many thinkers of the West, particularly those of the younger generation, that real philosophy was spoken and written in the East and that what is termed philosophy in the West is altogether barren, lifeless and unrealistic. This indictment may be a bit exaggerated, but there is no doubt that a large number of the younger generation, both male and female, of the U. K., and the U. S. shows interest in Sadhus, Sanyasis, Mystics, meditationers, testifying to the fact that they are in search of something not available in their own thought of system. This is a good augury which will force the European mind to think towards assimilation and common understanding thereby paving the way for a world philosophy.

I am not oblivious to the difficulties which lie in the way of this effort. Each nation writes in its own diction, which is not easily translatable. Further, each philosophy is written against a cultural background, a socio-political complex, which varies from nation to nation. In addition, as each philosopher writes with his own life blood and expresses his own fears and longings in his own peculiar manner, which may not be possible to harmonise and there may be many more difficulties. But as different nations were forced by the logic of circumstances to come together and to the U. N. thereby surrendering a part of their own autonomy, so the different philosophies of the world should be willing to sacrifice a part of their autonomy in the interest of common good. In the U. N. all nations retain their sovereignty though they agree to submit to the wishes of the U. N. in some specified respects. Likewise the different philosophies of the East and West would retain their own territories, but engage an overall philosophical standpoint which expresses the common thinking of humanity. The task is formidable but not impossible; it requires a broad outlook and a tolerant spirit.

It may be asked what is the content or subject matter of a world philosophy. A simple reply to this question would be that it is no other than the problems that the philosophers have been discussing throughout the ages, namely, (1) God, or the Creator of the universe, the why and how of creation, the attributes of God and the relation of God with His creation; (2) the nature of the human soul, the ultimate destiny of human beings, life in the hereafter, reward and punishment and hell and paradise; and (3) the nature of the world we inhabit -- spiritual or material, real or unreal, favourable or unfavourable to human wishes and aspirations, monistic, dualistic or pluralistic, dreamlike or substantial.

Besides these ontological problems like all philosophies it will discuss the nature of human knowledge, its limits and possibilities, sources and kinds of knowledge, and their validity, as well as the nature and validity of scientific knowledge.

As regards the methodology of a world philosophy, in the first place attempts will be made to accommodate all types of philosophies, Indian, Chinese, Muslim, Japanese, Russian, African and others in the history of philosophy, so that instead of being the history of philosophy of the white races -- the European and the Americans -- it may become the history of the thinking of all humankind, including as well the philosophies of the black and brown races. Philosophy is not the

privilege of any colour; it is universal in spirit and grows and develops wherever the soil is fertile for original, innovative thinking. A universal or a worldwide history of philosophy, instead of beginning with Thales, the earliest Greek philosopher, should begin with the first philosopher of India or whichever are chronologically the earliest. In the past it was not easy to ferret out which person or which civilisation gave the first indications of philosophic thinking, but now as archaeology and anthropology push their enquiries to the remote past, it should not be difficult to arrange human thought in chronological sequence. Hence the first task before the exponents of world philosophy would be to assign due place to all the philosophies of the world in the grand account of the world philosophy, without discrimination with respect to colour, creed or race.

Another method for bringing about a worldwide awareness would be to institute courses of comparative philosophy in all universities, so that the similarities and dissimilarities of different systems become obvious. If, for instance, Muslim philosophy be studied along with European philosophy, many things attributed to British or European thinkers may have to be ascribed to the Muslim thinkers. Descartes' method of doubt was present in al-Ghazali many centuries before. Likewise, parallels can be found between Chinese and Indian thought or between the six systems of Indian philosophy and many philosophic systems of the West. The more different philosophies are studied side by side, the more similarities in thought and thought structure will become apparent in human thinking. Just as a study of comparative religion leads to a wider outlook and a transcendental vision, so will the study of comparative philosophy will lead to a breadth of vision and a softening of angularities. Al-Ghazali has said the higher we go the better we see; this certainly is true of philosophy. As we transcend the narrow barriers created by geographical, socio-political and cultural conditions, the better we see the criss-cross of human thought, the interdependence and interrelatedness of ideas as they flourished in different ages and climes and in the various regions of the world. As there has been no territory of the world without a prophet, so there has been no area of the world without a thinker.

Still another way in which world philosophy can be studied is to adopt the method of interfaith dialogue. In this dialogue, adherents of different religions expound their own points of view regarding one and the same problem. As the purpose is to understand with sympathy and love the point of view of the other, the exponents are struck by the spiritual similarities and agreement in the broad principles of life. Likewise, if different philosophers are studied with understanding and sympathy, a common core of thinking surely will emerge. A one-to-one correspondence is not needed for world philosophy, some areas of correspondence will suffice as a meeting ground. When a person seeks friendship, he does not look for complete identity in thought and feelings, but only for an area where both may agree and which may be cultivated and developed in order that it be sufficiently comprehensive. In like manner when areas of friendship are discovered in the philosophies of the world, these areas can be developed and strengthened.

Still another thing which can help in this connection is to hold conferences, dialogues, seminars in which philosophers of all orientations participate. Such conferences held at the international level will provide a sort of clearinghouse for ideas and surely some-thing tangible and concrete will emerge. In this connection, computers can be pressed into service. With its powerful brain, its far-reaching grasp and its unparalleled manipulative power the computer may succeed in welding together the different strands of thought in some kind of homogenous unity. This may not be possible now, but in the distant future it may accomplish what looks like a dream today.

There is no denying that there are serious and in some cases fundamental differences in the points of view presented by the protagonists of different philosophies. We have spoken of the three

philosophic empires dominating the scene at the moment, each one speaking in a language of its own, sometimes hardly intelligible to the other. But the rift is not hopelessly permanent. The three were unheard of in the 19th century when only two types of philosophies, idealistic and materialistic, dominated the scene. Hence what is true of the philosophic world today may change tomorrow and yield place to something quite different and perhaps more accommodating in spirit. Already, logical positivism which entered the arena of philosophy with bravado has become a thing of the past. Linguistic philosophy is nearing its end and the mathematical branch of logical positivism under the leadership of Carnap seems to have exhausted itself and to face a revolt due to losing contact with the realities of life. Philosophy seems to be at the crossroads, trying to find a new way. In my opinion life has become so complex that no single doctrine or point of view, however comprehensive, can cover all the facets of life. What is needed is a synthesis of all the points of view which ultimately will lead to a universal transcendental philosophy. Some philosophers like Professor H.D. Lewis sees a return to metaphysics, for the philosophy of language and of symbolic logic can hardly meet the requirements of life.

Signs of give-and-take are visible in different systems of philosophy. J. P. Sartre, a great existentialist thinker who turned Marxist for sometime, tried to bring Marxism and existentialism together. Though he did not succeed there exists an affinity between these two systems of thought. Again Marxism and existentialism are both humanistic, as are pragmatism and personalism. Moreover, there is negative agreement in that all three principal movements are anti-metaphysical. Marxism rejects supersensible reality and has subsumed philosophy under the Sciences. Logical positivism arose as a protest against metaphysics and wanted to eliminate it. Existentialism is concerned specifically with the being of man and his predicament and has nothing to do with supra-mundane realities. Hence all three movements agree in outlawing metaphysics from the domain of philosophy.

But are not all philosophers in Platonic diction seekers of truth, and so in a way fellow travellers? No matter what their route or what their destination, so long as they seek truth they are comrades in arms and have affinities so far as their aim and ambition are concerned. In the *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* Mahatma Gandhi says that his religion is truth, and so long as a person seeks truth, no matter in what way and with what results, he is a brethren in religion. The same is true of philosophy. So long as a person seeks truth, no matter in what form and with what methodology, he is a co-worker. Considered in this light all differences pale into insignificance and what remains is the quest; this is what matters, not the result or the techniques. Truth is one but its forms are many, just as dream may be one but its interpretations are many.

World philosophy arose from the need to ensure a totality of outlook and peace for the world by piecing knowledge together and by removing thought barriers, aiming thereby at a totalisation of knowledge and desires to constitute a world view. This desire is shared by physicists who work with three or four fundamental energies, namely gravitational, electromagnetic, strong and weak nuclear energy. What Professor Abdul Salam, the Nobel prize winner, has done is to amalgamate two of them, the electromagnetic and the weak nuclear energy. He hopes to do the same with respect to the other two types and ultimately to arrive at one fundamental energy. People who dream of a world philosophy think in the same lines.

World philosophy will not be built on one pattern. It is quite conceivable that different writers working on world philosophy may present it differently. One may construct it on the Marxian model, making class struggle or dialectics the fundamental basis and norm for accommodating different philosophies in different perspectives. Another may construct it on the Hegelian model and may consider the absolute unfolding itself at successive stages of human history. All

philosophies will find their place in the absolute according as they are more or less consistent and more or less comprehensive. There can be other criteria. It should be understood that these criteria may change; the contents of world philosophy may also change because world philosophy is a growing, developing system of thought and not a static one.

For the common people what is important in world philosophy is that, if it is realised, it will become a mighty force for world peace, by removing ideological barriers and harmonising the claims of conflicting theories.

But what of the two questions, 'Does God exist' and 'Who am I', which set one on the path of philosophy?

To the first question, 'Does God exist?' everyone knows this to be among the great insolubles of philosophy. No philosophical argument has so far been given for the existence of God. The traditional proofs of God, namely, the ontological, cosmological, and teleological fail miserably, as do the existential and the ethical. Theologians and philosophers have tried to find proof for the existence of God in religious experience, but that, too, has proven shaky. One big reason for this failure is that according to the Holy Qur'an, nobody has ever seen God or the like of Him; further, nobody can ever imagine what He would be. If God is incomprehensible and unimaginable by nature, how can the finite and weak human intellect ever know what He is. Moreover, none knows what the term 'existence' would mean in connection with a Being who is above imagination and above human comprehension. Does He exist like human beings, like concepts, like dream ideas, or in some other mysterious manner? One cannot say whether the word 'existence' can be meaningfully employed in the case of a Being whose nature is a hidden mystery.

Therefore, the question should be changed to 'What does God mean to me?' In this new form the question becomes one of testimony, rather than of objective verification. From objective validity one passes to subjective validity. In the Holy Qur'an, God has chosen to reveal Himself through His 99 names, which by no means exhaust infinite, unfathomable and incomprehensible nature. Out of these names one can select as many as one likes depending upon one's requirements, capabilities, aspirations and material modes of existence. To the question 'What does God mean to me?' rather than 'Does God exist?', I have selected out of the 99 names of God the name *Rahim* (mercy, kindness), as it or its derivatives is found among the names of Hazrat Muhammad (may the peace of God be upon him), Lord Buddha and Jesus Christ. Our Holy Prophet is called "*rahmat*" for all the universes, Lord Buddha is the prince of light and compassion, while Jesus Christ stands for love. Human society needs to be remodelled on the foundations of *rahmat*, for therein lies the hope for human survival in this wartorn world. The concept of "*rahmat*" requires that the sumtotal of human happiness be increased by all the means at our disposal. Avoidable sufferings should be prevented and the extent of unavoidable sufferings be lessened much as possible. It also requires the elimination of all forms of exploitation, oppression, depersonalisation and subjection.

The second question, 'Who am I?' is one of the most difficult questions in the domain of philosophy. Psychology first of all banished the idea of soul, then of mind or self, and then of person in order to talk in terms of reflexes and conditioned reflexes. Hume spurned the idea of self, and the logical positivists who follow in his wake (even Gilbert Ryle who had outgrown logical positivism) have outlawed this idea. In this connection as linguistic philosophy seems of no value one turns to existentialism for the concepts of choice, responsibility and freedom. As Descartes said, 'I think, therefore, I am', similarly the existentialists say, 'I choose, therefore, I am'. The fundamental idea is that a person is what he makes of himself through his choices as a free, self-responsible being. His spiritual life consists in self-transcendence which should be

creative and not simply repetitive; and one should add to the stature of life and the world through one's choices. One should feel that one is bearing the burden of the world with responsibility as unlimited as one's freedom, in spite of the fact that there are limiting situations in life. It is said that God will judge us on the final day in terms of what we have become through our actions and choices during our life. Hence, the only tangible and positive thing that I can say about myself, or about who I am is that I am what I am through my choices, direct or indirect, conscious or unconscious. Metaphysical notions about the nature of the human self seem no better than fairy tales; they have poetic value, and may provide solace and satisfaction, but that is immaterial to one who gives one's life to the search for truth.

In conclusion:

- no philosophy can ever be final, much less that of a person who is still growing;
- one function of philosophy is to elucidate and clarify ideas, though clarity is not enough;
- many mistakes in the past occurred because philosophers did not take due care in the use of language, though philosophy cannot be confined to sorting out linguistic mistakes and teaching people the proper use of 'if', 'can', 'but' and so on;
- for problems of culture and the most intimate and personal questions such as for those of life and death, existentialism is more helpful than the philosophy of language;
- for the inner being of a person, what is most appropriate is a new technique which is found in the practice of meditation, in prayers, in obedience and in complete surrender to the ultimate reality;
- for the peace, amity and concord of the world a world philosophy is needed in which East and West will meet and better understand each other; and
- finally the great questions of life can be understood better by changing both their wording and their shape.

Chapter V

How I See Philosophy

Intisar-Ul-Haque

One classical concept of philosophy see it as the mother of all sciences. I will interpret it as a fountainhead of the key-concepts of all the basic sciences, knowledge and beliefs. All systematic knowledge, belief and sciences with their hypotheses and theories presuppose consciously or unconsciously certain assumption as their key concepts or cornerstones. I shall take philosophy to be the study of the fountainhead of such presuppositions and key concepts. Philosophy then emerges as an elucidation of what the genuine key concepts or views corresponding to reality in contrast to those that are fake or spurious ones.

Connected with this approach, there used to be a concept of philosophy as *weltanschauung* or worldview. There was a time when rationalists and idealists constructed their worldviews. Spinoza, Leibnitz, Hegel, Bradley were great system-builders who gave us a view of the whole universe, the whole of reality or of the really real with which we could draw compare the apparent, the unreal and the untrue. Given such a broad basic framework, our worldly existence was explained as derivative, and our place and response to the principal reality were elucidated. In short, both 'is' and 'ought' were to be accommodated in such a metaphysical *weltanschauung*, and the proper study of philosophy was thought to be such an intellectual adventure. Particularly the term "my philosophy" was used to connote a personal metaphysical worldview. Those who selected the present topic may have had this conception of philosophy in mind, but I believe such an adventure to be impossible in the present state of our sciences and knowledge.

Older rationalists and idealists thought that there are certain undeniable, irrefutable basic truths or axioms like 'the whole is greater than its parts', 'cogito ergo sum', 'the concept of self-sufficient and self-dependent substance', 'three angles of a triangle together make two right angles', etc. From such axiomatic truths they inferred certain other conclusions, theorems or lemmas, presumably after the manner of a geometric system, and thus erected their metaphysical systems. Now we know that many of their so-called axioms were either not true or that the concept of truth simply was not applicable to them. Hence their metaphysical constructions are inappropriate and unacceptable. Such an approach to metaphysical construction now seems misleading, unfruitful, unscientific and invalid. So I hold the repetition of such an exercise to be useless and unwarrantable.

What then is left as the key concepts and basic areas as the fountainhead of all knowledge are: (1) the philosophy of logic and necessary truth; (2) the methodology of the sciences and the philosophy of science; (3) epistemology; (4) philosophy or religion and metaphysics; (5) ethics and political philosophy. I hold that the basic concepts are rooted in and originate from these.

Logical and Necessary Truths

Mathematical disciplines like arithmetic, geometry, logic, set-theory, number theory, etc., have been regarded as realms of necessary truths above space and time. On the other hand, the world of senses i.e. objects perceivable by senses, have spatio-temporal reference. The question posed was wherein lay the truth of mathematics and logic and what sort of existence had logico-mathematical objects had. What are numbers; what sort of existence has the number "six" and how are the propositions like ' $2+2=4$ ' always and necessarily true? To account for logico-mathematical

truth, it was proposed that the logico-mathematical realm belonged to the realm of reason, over and above our sensuously perceived one. But it seems useless and superfluous to have a separate realm of Logos, a Platonic universe to account for logico-mathematical truth. For the same question may again be posed as to why and how logico-mathematical entities should subsist in such a universe and why and how relations involving number-theory and logical entailment should be true in it. What is the relation of such an exalted non-sensuous, supra-spatial, supra-temporal universe to our sensuous, spatio-temporal universe and why does the latter universe copy or obey the prior one? Duplication of universes serves no purpose.

Some philosophers tried to explain logico-mathematical truth in terms of our convention, or in terms of our deep psychological and anthropological considerations or even in terms of causal or mechanical laws: geometrical truth was adequately explained in terms of our conventions: philosophers and mathematicians realised that the concept of the absolute cannot be applied to geometry. Once basic axioms, better called postulates, primitive ideas and definitions are accepted, theorems and lemmas are logically deduced or entailed therefrom. Geometrical deductions and theorems thus have relative truths depending upon the truth of basic postulates and the relevance or truthfulness of primitive ideas and definitions in connection with the basic postulates. These basic postulates, once called axioms, may not be true, that is they may not ultimately hold good for the sensuous world, they may not correspond to the facts. Selection of basic postulates and primitive ideas and definitions are in the last analysis our conventions, but the question whether or not they are true is a scientific discovery or empirical finding. Clarification of Euclidean geometry in the last century led mathematicians to develop non-Euclidean geometries in which a triangle may have less than or more than two right angles contrary to Euclidean geometrical theorem. It follows that the geometrical truth is relative to the acceptance of basic postulates.

But in the case of logic and arithmetic it is implausible to accept such a conventionalism. Logic and counting, for example, the logical rules of entailment and arithmetical equations like ' $2+1=3$ ' are the most general rules or generalisations applicable to the world. Whenever there is counting we must have arithmetic and its derivations; whenever and wherever we want to have entailments or logical deductions we must have logic: it is the characteristics of things to be countable and to be reasoned out. The question of necessary truth relates to this very spatio-temporal world; there is no need to invoke a supernatural, supra-rational, supra-sensible or supra-spatial worlds. For example with "colour is extended," "the same spatial point cannot be both red and green simultaneously," "if B is temporally prior to C, and A is temporally prior to B, then A is temporally prior to C," such transitive, intransitive, non-transitive relations arise out of our efforts to understand nature. Symmetrical and asymmetrical, equal and unequal, reflexive and irreflexive and other such relations are actually sensed and found in this actual world. We also generalise these logical relations and create logical concepts and conceptual apparatus to exhibit logical relations and deductions. We create a contradictory concept with a prefix 'non' and say the same point cannot be both red and non-red simultaneously. We further create symbolisms and a symbolic system to express logical deductions in a far more effective way, although they may not faithfully depict the real logical necessities imbedded in the actual world because of the extended generality in symbolism. We should not raise the question as to why there is logical necessity in the world, because such a question can be raised for any world, natural or supernatural, sensible or Platonic. Our sensible world is such that there are some necessary relations in it. The old theses that logical necessity does not belong to existence but to the relationship of ideas and that it is only analytic are misjudgments.

The Philosophy of Science

We may safely and profitably divide this into the methodology of sciences, what may be called scientific metaphysics or systems built on scientific concepts, and principles used in basic sciences. Since his advent on earth, man has been trying to understand his environment and universe. He passed through various stages of animism and mythological and superstitious beliefs in order to explain and understand the workings of nature. Science did not emerge by chance or sprout all of a sudden, man had to learn and is still learning to know and acquire scientific methods. For immediate needs and for the natural and empirical phenomena at hand man applied empirical methods, but the idea of experiment essential to scientific method came much later. Muslim thinkers did a good deal to apply inductive method and experimentation to nature. After the Renaissance in Europe, the search by the inductive method gained momentum. In late 19th century and early 20th century the Vienna Circle took special pains to develop a scientific language, and the logical positivists announced their 'verifiability principle', according to which a non-analytic statement is meaningful only to the extent of its verifiability by sense-experience. Later a 'falsifiability principle' was added to accommodate some other types of statements e.g. generalisations which were not subject to the verifiability principle. But it was soon found that several types of scientific statements, e.g. about sub-atomic particles, about hypotheses, about electro-magnetic fields still could not be accommodated. Hence, a weak principle of verifiability was put forward i.e., that there should be some sensuous experience to justify the statement. The question about the relevancy of the bulk of sensuous experience was left vague. Thus many sentences, say about God, taken by logical positivists to be clearly metaphysical become meaningful. Such concepts as those of confirmation and probability were developed, but they could not remove the vagueness involved.

In any case the services rendered by logical positivists to tying reality to sense-experience cannot be set aside. Scientific thinking took centuries to develop and is still developing, looking into facts, connecting them, explaining them through hypotheses or theories or laws contrived for them, predicting certain phenomena and verifying them through observation, performing experiments, etc. We also note through inductive success that an hypothesis which predicts and thus explains more phenomena is to be preferred. So one accepts an explanation or hypothesis having more harmony and consistency, more explanatory power, more reducibility to mathematical computation, more comprehensibility and interconnectedness, more simplicity. This world or cosmos is a universe, an integrated whole each part of which is connected with others, and for this we have inductive proof. On this supposition we are successful in our scientific pursuits and thus in controlling the nature and acquiring better knowledge of the universe. The success of our science and scientific methodology is a good evidence towards their truthfulness and wherever clearly possible scientific methodology should be adopted in every sphere of life.

Scientific methodology cannot be separated from the achievements of science in terms of knowledge. Change in the basic concepts of the basic sciences may lead to the change in methodology and vice versa. Old methodological concepts of causation, uniformity of nature, natural laws, etc., now are replaced by such key methodological concepts as statistical probability, functional dependence and evolutionary change. Such older key concepts as those of space, time, mass and unitary particles are replaced by such concepts as space-time, energy, magnetic fields. I thus hold that the more we know about the cosmos, the better we acquire the methodology of sciences, and the better our methodology the more we know about the cosmos. Furthermore,

acquiring the right methodological approach makes possible a better acquisition of knowledge and a better grasp of nature.

Scientific Metaphysics

There is no absolute demarcation between science and philosophy. The basic distinguishing method of philosophy is logico-deductive reasoning and that of science is sense-experience and experimentation. This contrast is based on the dominant notes of the two. Efforts to base philosophy and metaphysics on self-evident axiomatic truths are bound to fail as they actually have done. We need philosophical analysis in order to harmonize various key concepts which are the cornerstones of the basic sciences, physics and biology, in the subatomic world and in the macrocosm. This task may lead us to the creation of a new conceptual framework and a fresh restructuring. There are areas, e.g., para-psychic phenomena, which defy presently available explanations. A new conceptual system is needed for them and to interconnect with concepts of other sciences. A new structural and conceptual framework can be expected to emerge as soon as para-psychic phenomena become explainable. This will usher in a new era in scientific metaphysics. Such an enterprise is goal-directed, fruitful, verifiable and falsifiable, scientifically plausible and commendable, having all the virtues of good hypotheses and scientific concepts. But such an approach can be handled properly only by those who are well-oriented in scientific fields and able to appreciate key scientific concepts.

There can be another approach towards constructing scientific metaphysics. We may hit upon a most general hypothesis which may be applicable to all scientific fields, empirical facts, and mental or physical phenomena. The example Marx's dialectical materialism may be cited. Marxists assert that this is a key scientific principle, but ultimately it is a matter of definition as to what be accepted as a scientific hypothesis or principle. Such conditions are imprecisely defined as much as is the criterion of meaningfulness after the fashion of logical positivism. But here the vagueness oversteps scientifically desirable limits. Such an adventure is too ambitious and moves predominantly from hypothesis to particular empirical and scientific data. It is much safer and well-grounded to move from the key concepts, data and generalisations of different particular sciences and sense-experiences to the construction of a key principle, which is self-consistent, well-knit and makes an harmonious organic whole with them. The Marxian principle mentioned above and the Marxian economic interpretation of history stand as historically and scientifically falsifiable and refutable. Therefore the first approach to constructing scientific metaphysics seems preferable. Even this approach is still not possible because many areas like para-psychical phenomena are still unexplainable and there remain fields which defy our effort to construct a consistent and harmonious conceptual framework. The present state of scientific knowledge still is not ripe for such a scientific metaphysics. But with scientific progress the time for such an adventure could come.

Epistemology

This inquires about the sources of knowledge and their validity. For knowing reality some rely on reason, others on sense-experience and some others on intuition. Intuition as source of knowledge has proved notoriously inadequate and misleading. Reason as ultimately based on self-evident truths did not fare better. Empiricists tried to base ultimate truths on sense-experience, which they somehow thought to be infallible, but this ultimate infallibility of sense-experience or

sense-data proved inadequate and erroneous. The phenomenon of 'referred pain' belies the expectation of infallible sense-experience. For example, sometimes the pain is felt on the medial side of the left arm upto the little finger, although the real pain is in the heart. This means that ultimately it is questions of scientific explanation, consistency and the inter-connectedness of sense-experiences that count. It is the scientific method, which includes senses, reason and intuition (taken in broader sense), that prevails in knowing reality. Thus, the older philosophical discipline of epistemology, which employs special rational philosophical methods seems doomed. There cannot be an independent epistemology without a corresponding relevant scientific investigations or discipline; just as there cannot be a metaphysics without scientific methodology. So, in epistemology we need to have psychology, physiology, neurology, para-psychology, physics, etc., and their interconnected systems, besides logic and deductive reasoning.

Ethics

Ethics pertains to the realm of values where as an evaluating animal one cannot but value one thing in preference to others. In matters of morals he is sensitively concerned. Words like 'good', 'bad', 'right', 'wrong', 'virtuous', 'vicious' betray our preferential judgements, praises or blames, approvals or disapprovals. A primary job of a philosopher is to analyse these concepts by studying their interconnectedness and independence. Such exercises, no doubt, throw some light on another task of ethics, namely, determining ethical principles and ends to be achieved by human beings. As distinguished from socio-political and religious activities, ethical activity concerns human individuals and is essentially connected with what they can do. Although ethical judgements are ought-judgements, they arise out of judgements of existence regarding the socio-physical environment and self's hereditary, physical and mental capacities. They are value judgements having some moral excellence or commitment or obligation. Man is by nature moral. His choices and ideals lie before him, and the gap between 'is' and 'ought' is bridged by deciding to move from the existing position or status to the more commendable one.

To say that man is a moral animal is to say that he is morally-conscious, able to use consciously and conscientiously the moral concepts just mentioned. But these moral concepts remain contentless unless some guidance is given about particular duties and rights, about particular moral principles and ends. For this we find no decisive rational or intuitive argumentations and injunctions or rules to follow, as is evident from the diversity of moral codes prevalent in different cultures and in different ages. Since his advent on earth, man has been learning to grasp moral rules and goals consciously or unconsciously, deliberately or by trial and error, through philosophical thought and experience, from sages or prophets, by the examples of great men or the magnetic charm and captivating beauty sensed in moral actions. Man is still learning to know the humanity and morality in human beings.

This is no less than a scientific process and has achieved consensus and universality in some ethical judgements. For example, we accept that moral rules should be universally true and that giving unnecessary pain to others is evil. We agree that jealousy, hate, avarice, malice, pride, ignorance and war are humanly undesirable, whereas forgiveness, generosity, humility, helping the needy, world peace and knowledge are desirable. We have come to realise that promise-breaking and the betrayal of truth, thievery and exploitation, usurpation of others' rights and rightful earnings are undesirable in spite of some rare customs prevalent in some parts of the world even in modern times in which a man is honoured or permitted to marry if he performs a skillful

act of stealing. Agreement is reached by learning through experience while considering humanity and civilisation at large.

Still there are some ultimate disagreements that cannot be ignored. This becomes pronounced when we have to harmonise teleological and deontological ethical views. Given the deontological maxim: 'always speak the truth', and a teleological ethical end 'save human life', a situation may arise when one needs to tell a lie to save the life of a particular heart patient. There are no hard and fast rules: our ethical code has emerged for finding the best system of compromise in order to suit the well-being and ideals of the human individuals in the society. There have been and are disagreements in asserting what are individual human ideals and preferences in society. But the real ethical judgement concerns the character of the individuals, which is built out of more or less permanent traits or features from which sprout conduct. This is the emotional, conative and mental bedrock for ethical activities.

I take inspiration from the Qur'anic injunction which enjoins imbibing the spiritual attributes of God, exceptions being those which are meant only for God such as eternity. To follow what are called *Asmaul Husna*, i.e., the excellent names or attributes of Allah, is the hallmark of nobility in character. To be merciful and compassionate, to be a forgiver and unheeding of petty faults of others, to be a helper and generous, to be patient and just, to be creator and innovator, to be wise, etc. are commendable virtues. Again, in the Qur'an there are mentioned specific moral ideals to be followed, like respecting the life and property of others, showing patience and tolerance and avoiding anger while dealing with others. In one place it is said that one unjust murder is like murdering all mankind. The dignity of man as man is one of the moral patterns upheld by the Qur'an. Again it is announced that the better man is he who is better in deeds -- not because of his colour, race or progeny. So the moral models and patterns maintained by the Qur'an, are to be commended, but with the big caution that moral sayings in the Qur'an should be discreetly separated from legal and socio-customary injunctions. Moral injunctions are binding on us in a moral framework, but socio-legal injunctions are changeable with the changes in the social milieu.

This does not imply that a person will be able to make a moral choice automatically! An individual is a conscious and conscientious being. Keeping in view the Qur'anic moral wisdom he has to make moral choices in context. The choices between serving teleological ends and following deontological duties, and between different courses of actions leading to different virtues have to be made by the responsible individual concerned. The difference between a person following Qur'anic wisdom and another person is that the former has a set guideline, while the latter is still groping to find moral wisdom, because no strict rational argumentations can settle ultimate issues about moral teleological ends and deontological maxims and duties. We are still learning through historical experience, which I hold points to the validity of the Qur'anic moral wisdom and virtues.

Socio-Political and Legal Philosophy

My view is that we should construct a socio-political structure and legal system which promotes the ideals and morality of individuals. That is, one which would help promote the character building of individuals, arouse the higher consciousness promote justice and fairness in the society, and provide better opportunities for the mental and physical development of individuals. Our value judgement on socio-political and legal systems derives from that on individuals, only in a secondary sense do we say that such-and-such a society is morally better or more sound or commendable. Our socio-political and legal systems and other institutions are objective factual phenomena, but ultimately they are constructed of, and refer back to individuals

without whom they lose their value. Hence, nationalism and slogans of the superiority of the state over individuals, whether in the shape of Hegelian idealism, Marxism or in any other 'ism', are misguided. The real valuable thing is the higher consciousness and conscience of individuals, whence flows morality, ideals, the search and struggle for human perfection, altruistic regard for other human beings, etc. Such an ideal and struggle for higher human perfection can be achieved better in a democratic society with such democratic institutions as education, liberty, equality, knowledge and justice. For the establishment of such institutions we need a society free of exploitation, with education, relevant opportunities, health and shelter for all. From an ethical viewpoint democracy in a broad sense and its institutions mentioned above are ethical 'corollaries'. The ethical sphere is not logic-tight, but borders on aesthetics, politics, law, etc. This has to be so not only through analysis of ethical and related non-ethical concepts, but also because ethics flows from the individual self-awareness of higher human consciousness, from conscience and higher ideals which step beyond any limited moral sphere. Law is law-like and by its very nature any generalization is not suited to some individual cases. So, although one tries his or her best to bring harmony between law and morality, some discrepancies and inconsistencies may emerge. But respect for law is also a virtue, and cannot be lightly ignored. Hence, sometimes we need to sacrifice our subjective moral views for the sake of the generalised objective legal code.

Philosophy of Religion

Man is not only a moral animal, but also a religious animal. Now, religion is often confused with morality and some people even take for granted that if a person is not religious, he is not moral and vice versa, or again that if a person is moral, he is religious too and vice versa. This confusion arises because of the ambiguity of the word 'religion'. As in one sense religion and morality belong to higher consciousness, the illusion arises by taking too general and homogenised a view of higher consciousness. But there are differentiations in higher consciousness -- one part may belong to a higher moral consciousness and another to a higher religious consciousness and the different types of consciousness may exist independently from one another. An irreligious or atheistic person may thus show highly commendable virtues. And a person inspired by religious feelings may be unmindful of moral considerations. This sort of phenomenon of separation we occasionally witness in the case of aesthetically gifted individuals like artists who do not care about, or rather are not quite conscious of their moral duties and responsibilities. The same sort of separation between moral and religious consciousness is noted, for example, at the tombs of great saints or sufis. The phenomena of favours or *sefarish* and sex-exploitation are notoriously present where mystical religious practices and rituals are performed. A religious person thus may be unheeding of a higher morality or civic sense, or may not even sense the morality involved in the situation.

But this does not mean that there is no connection between the two sorts of consciousness. Religious consciousness appears to have higher authority, more charm and magnetism, a superior binding force. So we see that in certain cases outmoded customs and legal systems, which to an impartial observer appear immoral, gain authority with us because they have religious sanctions, e.g., so-called old religious family and religious evidence laws. This is a vicious aspect of religion. But there can be wholesome effects of religious consciousness on morality. This may be achieved in two ways: one is to take inspiration from higher religious consciousness for the commendable morality we cherish. The succour and encouragement received from higher consciousness can be immeasurably great. The second is to have metaphysical religious beliefs and faith which give

further momentum to our commendable humane and moral convictions, such as moral reliance on God's attributes and Qur'anic ethical principles.

Another aspect of religious philosophy is the analysis of various religious concepts and their interdependence. We need to analyse such concepts as religion, value, prayer, trust, faith, God, person, freedom, commitment and their interconnections with other concepts and their impact on man and society. This is the job not only of a philosopher of religion, for he needs to assess the truth involved in all religions and in any particular religion. Historically religion has been associated with magic, cults and rituals. There always has been exploitation in the name of religion and the exploiters in various fields collaborate to secure their hold and influence. Three broad-based exploiters are found in: economics, to gain and hoard wealth; politics for the existence, strength and continuance of their government or rule; and religion, to have spiritual hold on people and to strengthen the hands of other sorts of exploiters for their mutual flow of benefits. In order to have religious exploitation there needs to be a system of beliefs and some sort of rituals such that a class, such as clergymen or priests, could claim to have special knowledge of them, or special right to handle them for the sake of the 'spiritual health' of the people. In our own Muslim culture, we have this class in the form of mullas, maulavees, maulanas, pirs, sufis, ulama, etc. Their claim of having some special knowledge, called religious knowledge, whether in the form of beliefs or rituals, is unjustified.

They claim that their religious knowledge is the specialised sort which is not and cannot be gained by various sciences, rational argumentations and philosophical analysis. And just as we refer matters pertaining to animals to zoologists, matters pertaining to plants to botanists and likewise other matters to physicists, chemists, historians, archaeologists, anthropologists, etc., so matters pertaining to religion are to be referred to the above-mentioned religious class. But they suffer self-deception and deceive others wittingly or unwittingly. Their claim is a remnant of magical and superstitious beliefs, just as magic is not a science, but a deception. Again, the claim of mystics or sufis, that through religious intuition they get insight into the ultimate Reality or God, is unjustified, because the same emotional mystical elations are and can be associated with different concepts and views, as is evident of mystics belonging to different religions and creeds. Again, even if their intuitional claim were true and even if certain deductive conclusions follow for human welfare, how can a dead saint be helpful to us now? Hence, what is happening at the tombs of great sufis, etc., is spiritual exploitation and highly to be condemned.

In Muslim culture both mysticism or sufi-cult and religiousness in the sense of beliefs and rites in connection with worship, prayer, salvation etc., have become the dominant note for centuries. The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) himself made *jihad* in a rational way against all the three above classes of exploiters. But it appears that through planned conspiracies Islam became essentially a system of religious ceremonies, charms and rituals. Instead of seeing into the rationale and reasons, we have been enamoured by personality cults. Books with the pious name of 'Sayings of the Prophet' and of other spiritual heroes, and *fiqh* were evolved and attained a permanent position in religion. My considered impression is that the Qur'an is better understood through understanding the Arabic root words and their derivatives, and the Arabic idioms used during the time of Prophet (PUBH), seeing the internal consistency and coherence of the Qur'an and how one verse is connected with subsequent ones in a rational and logical way. Furthermore, being the divine book, we can better understand it if we have more scientific knowledge and find appropriate meanings through new scientific discoveries. For this the more we know about physics, astronomy, history, archaeology, etc., the more we shall appreciate and understand the Qur'an, whereas understanding the Qur'an through the books of *Ahadis* and old *fiqh* misleads us. We must

drastically change our socio-legal system, of course, paying attention to the moral picture of the Qur'an, and for that purpose we must not pay heed to so-called ulama and maulavees etc.

Chapter VI

God, Universe and Man

Muhammad Hanif Nadvi

Let us start with a negative statement. In order to understand God, logical arguments are not at all adequate. We shall have to inculcate in ourselves faith in Him and so develop a personal, 'I' to 'I', encounter. This kind of approach to God is immediately responded by Him by showing us ways that lead to Him. The Qur'an says:

As for those who strive in us, We surely guide them to our paths. (29: 69) One may immediately react to this point of view and say that this amounts to the fallacy of *petitio principii*, that is, we presuppose the reality which we have yet to prove. The second objection will be that man's approach to God, by virtue of being only a matter of experience, would have nothing to do with the exercise of human reason.

We accept both these points of criticism. Our answer is that if there is something which is directly relevant to our experience it cannot possibly be subjected to a system of definitions and captured by the net of premises and conclusions. For example, if you want to know about the fragrance of a flower you have to smell it; dry and lifeless logic cannot be applied to attain that knowledge. Similarly, if you want to have knowledge of the good taste and the refreshing quality of milk, butter or honey you will have actually to taste these things. Exactly in the same way the nature of God is not a conclusion of any set of major and minor premises, but is rather a matter of acceptance by faith and personal experience. If you have to understand the God of Abraham, Moses, Jesus and the last prophet Muhammad (peace be upon them) and have to attain an awareness of His power, wisdom and omniscience, it is necessary to develop in yourself Abraham's faith, Moses' conviction, Jesus's *gnosis*, and the last prophet, Muhammad's, (peace be upon them) personal experience of God.

Faith is a sort of phenomenon less directly relevant to the existence of God than to the harmony available in the universe, the phenomenon of evolution going on in it, the resolution of the complications in the realm of life, and consciousness and the creation of order and unity in the field of knowledge in general. God existed when no man had yet been created and even when the universe was still going through a period of formation and arrangement, that is to say, God existed before men started thinking about nature. This fact will become more and more evident as man progresses in the elaboration of the dimensions of knowledge and consciousness. The existence of God is not a dogma, but rather a fact which becomes ever clearer with the advancement of knowledge and experience. Divine knowledge is the beginning of experience as well as its final goal.

How is faith related to reason and understanding? In order to know the answer to this question we should realise that faith is due to the grace of those selected few who tried to know God directly through their own experience. The civilisation and culture they produced is a source of inspiration for us even today. If man today adopts the method of faith and gets satisfaction through it, he will not find this universe scattered and disorderly but rather orderly scheme with meaning and purpose. The sciences and their discoveries will appear to him to be well-connected and well-organised in a single whole.

Faith is a meeting point where the intuitions of Rumi and the arguments of Razi meet each other: it is the consummation of man's 'will to believe'. Man is a complex reality; along with his desire to discover and investigate realities his nature demands that he should unreservedly submit

to certain realities. Together these have had an impact on civilisation and culture. The present stage of evolution in the universe is not entirely due to logic and reason, but also and to a very great extent to faith and unreasoned commitment. That is why almost all religions have emphasised the importance of reasoning and speculation about the problems of existence, but alongwith faith in God.

The exception of Buddhism and Jainism to the above principle is understandable. If Buddha had believed in God he would never have succeeded in bringing about the social revolution he described in Hindu society. In that age, faith in God amounted to the acceptance of the supremacy of the Brahman, which, in turn, amounted to the division of men into the higher and the lower, castes sacred and profane, select and outcast, and so on. Thus if Buddha, in order to realise the objective of human dignity and the unity of humankind, did not erect his conception of civilisation and spirituality on faith in the existence of God, he was to a very great extent justified. If one hundred untruths must necessarily come along with one single truth, it is immensely desirable to do away with that one truth. Jainism can also be declared as the outcome of a similar situation. Man of today no doubt finds in himself an aversion to religion and faith because along with its one truth he is made to accept various superstitions regarding the Brahman, and all kinds of irresponsible talk by priests and irrational declarations by the *mullah*.

Thusfar I have talked of the importance of faith for life. Now let us move to the arguments for the existence of God as formulated by traditional philosophy. Kant has referred to three kinds of arguments, under one or another of these all possible arguments for the existence of God can be subsumed. They are:

- a. the ontological argument,
- b. the cosmological argument, and
- c. the teleological argument.

Before we discuss these arguments simply I would like to emphasise one thing. Arguments in general should be regarded as relevant to persons for whom they are offered, to their temperaments and attitudes and people differ in their intellectual capacities and emotional constitutions. In the face of this situation no arguments are equally acceptable to all. The real question is not the degree of certainty an argument has, but rather to who the argument is offered and, what is the standard of acceptance for that person.

Secondly, strictly logical arguments ignore not only the experience and emotive subjectivity of man, but also disregard the fact that God Whom we try to prove and discover and before Whom we lie prostrate, also of His own tries to reveal Himself and to have contact with us. He desires that we pray to Him and adore His creativity and wisdom, and that we dialogue with Him. While we are in search of Him, He too is ready to disclose Himself. If, due to our limitations in understanding and logic, we are not capable of discovering Him, nevertheless we shall be justified because He is beyond all limitations and infirmities. There may be a hundred and one ways in which He can introduce Himself. This exercise of self-revelation on the part of God has been realised again and again. He has revealed Himself through the prophets and other holy men, through art and literature, and in general through various events and occurrences in the universe. He is so benevolent and kind that to whomsoever comes out in search of Him He Himself goes forward and shows Himself. These three arguments have left out many ways to God-awareness, thousands of other ways also lead men to God.

As to the value of these arguments themselves, at the very outset we must recognise the fact that these are the attempts of finite human minds to reach the Infinite, Unlimited, Eternal Being and that the limited cannot at all fully comprehend the Unlimited. In this regard we agree with Kant that the thing-in-itself is unknowable by strictly limited human resources. Despite this, we also realize that reason is the best mode of awareness available to the common man; so it does have a value. Even the moral argument for the existence of God formulated by Kant is the result of deep thought and speculation. Thus, in the last analysis, we have to fall back upon reason and make the best possible use of it.

The first argument generally offered for the existence of God is the ontological argument. This argument has a historical perspective. In strict philosophical terms it was first framed by St. Anselm, though informally it had already been formulated in the Psalms of David. After St. Anselm it was presented, with certain modifications, by Descartes and Leibniz. According to this argument God is a reality greater than Whom no reality is possible. He exists because if He were non-existent, He would not be the greatest and the most perfect. In other words the concept of a perfect being itself necessitates the existence of this being. The Qur'an itself always pictures God as a being Who exists of necessity.

The ontological argument is less a logical argument than an assertion of the fact that man, due to his instinctive need to pray to, and prostrate himself before, a Superior Being, necessarily believes in a God Who is perfect in all respects and Who does not need any external attributes to His perfection, a God by Whom we are inspired to be more and more perfect. In other words, the essence of this argument comprises our desire to scale ever higher levels of perfection in life. Today's sophisticated stage of civilisation and culture is due to this perpetual desire of man.

In this connection, Kant objects that the idea of an object is different from its actual existence, e.g., that the idea of 200 dollars in my pocket is not the equivalent of 200 dollars actually being there in my pocket. Hence, the idea of a Perfect Being does not necessitate the existence of this Being. We have already said that the philosophy that underlies the ontological argument cannot be reduced to the terminology of logic. However, if we do insist on the application of logic, we must ask if one eliminates existence from the concept of a Perfect Being, how that Being can continue to be perfect? Were Kant to say that a being can be perfect despite being non-existent it would be a blatant contradiction.

Another objection to the ontological argument is that it is basically negative in approach; it is based on an awareness of the limitations and infirmities of man. When a person finds himself mortal, evanescent and limited, his awareness automatically is diverted to the concept of an Infinite, Permanent and Unlimited Being, although he is not directly aware of any such being. This objection is not valid. If a sick person, on the basis of the awareness of his sickness recognizes the value of health, there is absolutely no harm in this approach: after all we have moved in the right direction. Further, if we closely analyse this phenomenon it is not that the awareness of our limitations occasions the concept of Unlimited Being, but rather it is the awareness of the Unlimited Being which has given us an awareness of our limitations and failings. This produces a firm faith in us that if we propose to transcend the limits of our being we shall have to establish a personal encounter with the Unlimited, the Perfect Being.

The greatest difficulty with this argument is how we can determine the meaning of perfection as we apply this characteristic to God, the Ultimate Being, because, beyond every perfection that we conceive there is a still higher perfection in an unending series of more and more perfect beings. Our answer to this objection is that the God that we seek to prove on the basis of this argument is not finite, so His perfection must be infinite also. Further, as perfection is not an independent

characteristic by itself the perfection of God simply means that all his attributes and qualities are so perfect and supreme that beyond them there is nothing higher.

The cosmological argument is relevant to the relationship between the universe and God. Among the propounders of this argument are Plato, Aristotle,

, Descartes, Leibniz and some other religious thinkers. Those who opposed it include Hume, Kant, Mill and Russell. Of the celebrated Five Ways of Aquinas three relate to this argument. The first one proves God as the Unmoved Mover, the second one as the Self-sufficient Cause and the third one as the Eternal Being which is opposed to the transient or contingent universe. These ways are various versions of the fact that God is the Supreme Cause of the universe. This notion of causality has undergone a metamorphosis at the hands of Einstein's Theory of Relativity and the Darwinian concept of evolution. In the process of evolution, specially, it is emphasised that every stage of existence is the outcome of an immediately earlier stage. The question arises whether we can delineate a being who supervises and determines the direction of this process of evolution and looks after its moral and spiritual implications. Just as the various stages of evolution are not totally alien to one another, so this Being cannot be alien to the grand phenomenon of evolution which is the Universe. The latter is a kind of mirror in which the Supreme Being is thoroughly reflected and an arena in which His objective has been realised. This is how we move out of the closed circuit of physics and into the realm of metaphysics and develop a kind of oneness with the Supreme Being. This experience is the source of solace and comfort for one's own being. Once this level is attained it is irrelevant and redundant to ask who caused this Supreme Being. The evolution that characterises the universe, the macrocosm, is also the hallmark of the human person, the microcosm. So the significant pointers to God that are available from without are also traceable within the human self.

The teleological argument relates to the purposiveness in the universe. As we look at the universe we do not find it as simply a jumble of disjointed objects and events; rather, it is characterised by harmony, order, arrangement and purposiveness. This phenomenon discredits all attempts to explain the world as an outcome of blind, ruthless, mechanical forces or simply of certain chance variations and accidental manoeuvres. The immanent charms and inherent beauties of the universe are so spectacular that one is thoroughly enchanted and irresistibly declares:

Our Lord: Thou createdst this not in vain. (Qur'an 3: 191)

The various faculties of the human organism are fitted to the aims and objectives it has to realise; in fact, the entire universe has been made congenial to his purposes. One objection that has been raised against this argument is that along with harmonies in the universe we also find spectacles of disharmony and disorder; along with uniformities we come across a number of discordances in the universe. This objection is, however, superficial and is the result of a partial view of the universe. As our point of view grows higher and higher and we look at the universe from a universal, synoptic and total point of view, all the disharmonies are removed and everywhere we find perfect order. Now if, for example, in a library the books are placed in a thorough arrangement for ready availability, we are immediately led to the conclusion that there is a person behind this, a librarian who has done this. So order and arrangement in the universe leads irresistibly to the conclusion that there must exist a Supreme Being Who is responsible for the creation and continued maintenance of this order.

The rational arguments which have been briefly dealt with in the above pages, it must be reiterated, are not conclusive proofs because no such proofs can be given for the existence of God. They simply provide us moments of speculation. In order to know Him we shall have to establish contact with Him through personal experience.

Chapter VII

Iqbal on the Material and Spiritual Future of Humanity

Javid Iqbal

Iqbal's world view is based on his deep concern with the future of humanity as well as of religion. On the future of humanity his thoughts are scattered in his poetic works and some of his prose writings. But on the future of religion he has elaborated his ideas in the last chapter of his book: *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, entitled "Is Religion Possible?"

Broadly speaking, religion is required for the moral uplift of humans: if there had been no humans, there would have been no need for religion. Therefore humanity and religion complement each other and it is proper to assess Iqbal's views on the future of humanity before considering his ideas on the future of religion.

Let us begin by defining two relevant terms: (a) development, and (b) the modern person. In the modern context, development means increase in the per capita income of a nation state; this purely materialistic concept of development is generally considered a Western innovation. The meaning of "the modern person" reflects changes in the mentality and way of life of the Western as a result of the dissemination of materialism and the evolution of Western Europe from a developing to a developed society. The modern person or man is sometimes called industrial man, technical man, mass man, one-sided man, angry man, lonely man, etc. One believes in the supremacy of the science and technology of which one is a product; one relies on reason and feverish activity; one is secular, proud, selfish, and amoral; one seeks happiness only through multiplying material comforts and wealth. According to Iqbal, the modern person is so much overshadowed by the results of intellectual achievements that one has ceased to live soulfully, i.e., from within.

Many liberal thinkers and poets of the West have criticised the modern man. There is a very interesting passage in Iqbal's *Reconstruction Lectures* in which he shows his disillusionment with both the Western and the Eastern person.

In the domain of thought he is living in open conflict with himself, and in the domain of economic and political life he is living in open conflict with others. He finds himself unable to control his ruthless egoism and his infinite gold-hunger which is gradually killing all higher striving in him and bringing him nothing but life-weariness. Absorbed in the 'fact', that is to say, the optically present source of sensation, he is entirely cut off from the unplumbed depths in his own being.

About Eastern person, he laments:

The conditions of things in the East are no better. The technique of medieval mysticism by which religious life, in its higher manifestations, developed itself both in the East and in the West has now practically failed. . . . Far from reintegrating the forces of the average man's inner life, and thus preparing him for participation in the march of history, it has taught him a false renunciation and made him perfectly contented with his ignorance and spiritual thralldom (*Reconstruction*, pp. 148-149).

Generally speaking, the modern person is the Western and is found in materially prosperous countries, technically called I. D. Cs (Industrially -Developed Countries) as oppose to U. D. Cs (Under-Developed Countries).

The Development of Materialism and the Emergence of the Modern Person

What took place in Europe which eventually led to the development of materialism and the emergence of this modern person? European society in the Middle Ages was feudal. The average person lived as a serf, totally dominated by cruel feudal lords and a static Church. The hold of the Church was primarily based on Ptolemy's cosmology, according to which the earth was the centre of the universe and everything, including the sun, revolved round it. On the basis of this cosmology, the position adopted by the church was that man was under the direct gaze of God. Thus the Church, being the vicar of God and with the support of the feudal lords, acquired enormous power over the ignorant, superstitious and frightened masses who were exploited for centuries.

However, certain events and movements in Europe changed that state of affairs. These were: the Reformation, which released man's faith from the hold of a dominating and static Church; the Renaissance, which liberated the human mind, which in its quest for knowledge gradually learned to depend on reason, sense-perception and scientific thinking; and the shattering of Ptolemaic cosmology by Copernican astronomy, according to which the earth could no longer be considered the centre of the cosmos: as one celestial body among many revolving around the sun it was but an insignificant speck.

Hence, human beings were not under the constant gaze of God, indeed Darwin's theory followed that they had descended from apes, biologically evolving from animals. Iqbal feels that this formulation of evolution in Europe (unlike the one advanced Islam which evoked Rumi's tremendous enthusiasm for the biological future of man) led to the belief that there existed no scientific basis for the idea that the present rich human endowment would ever be materially exceeded. For Iqbal "This is how the modern man's secret despair hides itself behind the screen of scientific technology" (*Reconstruction*, pp. 148).

However Iqbal realised that all these events collectively made people conscious that they had to depend solely on themselves, which led to their awakening. People gained confidence through the philosophies of criticism and naturalism, and felt that their future lay exclusively in their control over the forces of nature. Thereafter the industrial revolution changed the face of Europe, and with the French Revolution came the concepts of liberty, equality and fraternity. It was in fact this awakening which led to the rise and growth of materialism, and to the disappearance of religion from the collective life of the people.

After learning how to produce energy through coal and steam, cheap energy and labour were used for running factories and mills. Europe manufactured more goods than ever before seen in the history of humankind. The sale of these goods required markets, the search for which and, in turn, for more raw materials led to colonialism and imperialism. As a market society was created in Europe, the standard of life of the average person improved and emphasis upon freedom of trade curtailed the autocratic powers of monarchs, supplanting them by capitalist democracies on the basis of territorial nationalism.

In Europe these events engendered the formation of a new mentality and a new freedom; the new person who emerged in this process demanded absolute freedom without any kind of control which actually amounted to tyranny and meant ruthless trampling over the rights of others.

Therefore, the modern person with all its dedication to and respect for, human rights maintained double standards as, broadly speaking, human society was divided into the exploiters and the exploited. The competition and jealousy among the exploiter-robber nations of Europe eventually led to the first World War, on the one hand, and the establishment of atheistic socialism or communism in Russia, on the other. The struggle for supremacy over the others continued and resulted in the second World War.

But no lesson was learned by man from these two wars of mass destruction of human life and property. The race for the manufacture and production of fatal arms did not stop. According to the figures provided by Dr. Hans Blix, by 1985 there existed 50,000 nuclear devices with an explosive yield of 1000 Hiroshima bombs -- the equivalent of four tons of TNT each human being in the world.

The I. D. Cs sustain their prosperous position through the production and use of energy. While the population of the I. D. Cs is 27 percent of the population of the world it consumes 80 percent of the world's energy produce. The population of the U. S. A. is only 6 percent of the world population but it consumes 36 percent of the energy, whereas the U. D. Cs constitute 73 percent of the world population and use only 20 percent of the world's energy.

The U. D. Cs aspire to become like the I. D. Cs, and have before them the model of the West, but the I. D. Cs maintain their economic and technological hegemony by imposing an economic system based on loans. If the U. D. Cs increase the prices of raw material, the I. D. Cs increase the prices of technology or finished products. This results in a global inflation which is not as destructive for the I. D. Cs as for the poor U. D. Cs. Thus the material prosperity of modern man is founded upon and maintained on this discrimination between people. Nevertheless, despite the oil crisis, global inflation, and a population explosion in the U. D. Cs, the movement there for economic freedom and technological participation gains in momentum.

Meanwhile a depressing picture of the future is presented in the annual reports of the Club of Rome. According to these reports by approximately the middle of the 21st century the world's food resources may be completely exhausted. Hunger is likely to strike first in certain parts of Africa and thereafter in Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, etc. If the growth rate of the population remains the same as it is at present, this situation is likely to arise in the first quarter of the 21st century. The reports also state that the conventional means of energy may be completely exhausted before the end of the 21st century.

In the light of these reports, some liberal thinkers of the West are recommending that the political leaders of the I. D. Cs review their definition of development. According to some of them the utopias of the early 20th century i.e., communism and capitalism, as economic orders, both have failed to get rid of under-development on a global scale, and at present there is no economic system which can generate the human will and courage to improve living conditions. The eminent Marxist philosophers, Herbert Marcuse and Maximilien Robespierre, were extremely critical of the Soviet policy of concentrating on breaking the Western industrial and technological supremacy instead of using the Soviet revolution for the economic betterment of humankind. Such a policy could have forestalled the eventual breakdown of the Soviet economy.

At present, world politics are not development-oriented but power -oriented. As power is dependent on economic stability, then the emergence and continuance of a unipolar power cannot perdure in an ivory tower, when 73 percent of the population of the world is afflicted with global inflation, population explosion and underdevelopment. Liberal thinkers see the world today on the edge of a global economic crisis which can lead to the total destruction of mankind. Consequently, they suggest the establishment of a new international economic order based on ethics and morality.

Such artificial discriminations as blacks and whites, capitalists and communists, developed and underdeveloped, etc., have been harmful for the natural advancement of humanity. Tofler suggests that the U. N. should establish an international body composed of economic experts belonging to both I. D. Cs as well as U. D. Cs, to control the threatened global economic crisis and to keep an eye on the negative trends of world economy. In order to save humanity from future economic crises, it is necessary to think in terms of the unity of human beings rather than of nations. The world's population should be planned according to its resources and that these resources, which should be fully exploited. All are underdeveloped in the sense that for economic survival they depend on one another. Therefore the future survival of humankind is possible only if it is matured by the bitter past experiences and learns to respect fellow men. (*Future Shock/The Ecco Spasm Report*).

It is interesting to note that the views now stated by such liberal thinkers regarding the future of humanity are more or less the same as those expressed by Iqbal in his writings more than 50 years ago. Iqbal rejected territorial nationalism as a basis for human unity even when he was a student in Europe. In the *Allahabad Address* (1930) which contained his suggestion of the formation of a Muslim state in the north-west of the Indian subcontinent, he had stated:

Luther . . . did not realise that in the peculiar conditions which obtained in Europe, his revolt (against the Church organisation) would eventually mean the complete displacement of the universal ethics of Jesus by the growth of a plurality of national and hence narrower systems of ethics. Thus the upshot of the intellectual movement initiated by . . . Rousseau and Luther was the break up of the one into a mutually ill-adjusted many, (and) the transformation of a human into a national outlook. . . . The result is a set of mutually ill-adjusted states dominated by interests not human but national. And these mutually ill-adjusted states after trampling over the morals and convictions of Christianity, are today feeling the need for a federated Europe, i.e., the need of a unity which the Christian Church organisation originally gave them, but which, instead of reconstructing it in the light of Christ's mission of human brotherhood, they considered fit to destroy under the inspiration of Luther (*Speeches and Statements*, ed. by A. R. Tariq, pp. 4-6).

In a poem titled "Mecca and Geneva" included in his *Zarb-i-Kalim*, he points out that in this age nations seem to be mixing freely with one another, although the principle of unity remains hidden from the discerning eye. This is so because the aim of Western diplomacy is to divide humanity into nations, whereas the mission of Islam is to unify human beings into one fraternity. In this regard Mecca sent a message to the city of Geneva: Are you content to be a seat of the League of Nations or would you prefer to be the centre of United Humanity?

In a statement recorded a couple of months before his death in 1938, Iqbal pointed out:

The modern age prides itself on its progress in knowledge and its matchless scientific developments. No doubt, the pride is justified. . . . But inspite of all these developments, the tyranny of imperialism struts abroad, covering its face in the masks of (capitalist) democracy, (territorial) nationalism, communism, fascism and heaven knows what else besides. Under these masks, in every corner of the earth, the spirit of freedom and the dignity of man are being trampled underfoot in a way which not even the darkest period of human history presents a parallel. The so-called statesmen to whom government had entrusted leadership have proved demons of bloodshed, tyranny and oppression. The rulers

whose duty it was to promote higher humanity, to prevent man's oppression of man and to elevate the moral and intellectual level of mankind, have in their hunger for dominion . . . , shed the blood of millions and reduced millions to servitude simply in order to pander to the greed and avarice of their own particular groups. After subjugating . . . weaker peoples . . . they sowed (the seeds of) divisions among them that they should shed one another's blood and go to sleep under the opiate of serfdom, so that the leech of imperialism might go on sucking their blood without interruption. . . . The governments which are not themselves engaged in this drama of fire and blood are sucking the blood of the weaker peoples economically. It is as if the day of doom had come upon the earth, in which each man looks after the safety of his own skin, and in which no voice of human sympathy is audible. . . . The world's thinkers are stricken dumb. Is this going to be the end of all this progress and evolution of human civilisation? . . . Remember, man can be maintained on this earth only by honouring mankind, and this world will remain a battleground of ferocious beasts of prey unless and until the educational (and moral) forces of the whole world are directed to inculcate in man respect for humankind. . . . National unity too is not a very durable force. Only one unity is dependable and that unity is the brotherhood of man, which is above race, nationality, colour or language. . . . So long as men do not demonstrate by their actions that they believe that the whole world is the family of God, so long as distinctions of race, colour and geographical nationalities are not wiped out completely, they will never be able to lead happy and contented lives, and the beautiful ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity will never materialise. (*Speeches and Statements*, ed. by A. R. Tariq, pp. 226-228)

The Future of Religion

It has been pointed out that, broadly speaking, religion is required for the moral uplift of man. However, a counter argument may be advanced that questioning why morality or ethics, being a branch of philosophy, should it be founded on religion. This line of questioning leads naturally to the discussion of the difference between philosophy and religion.

According to Iqbal, philosophy is an independent inquiry based on reason for the comprehension of reality in the broader or higher sense, religion also is a search for reality, but its foundations are laid on experience which is not at the normal level, were one to claim that the normal level of experience is the only one that yields knowledge then religion need not attract anyone's attention. But, Iqbal argues, the universe as normally perceived is only an intellectual construct, and there are other levels of human experience capable of being systematised by other orders of time and space in which concept and analysis does not play the same part as normal experience. For this reason the knowledge gained by religious experience, essentially personal and incommunicable. However, Iqbal maintains, this does not imply that the pursuit in if religion has been futile.

The modern person is secular in the sense of being indifferent toward religion. The reason is that according to their evaluation religion is not in conflict with science, but science has precedence as its findings are rationally demonstrable religion is reduced to mere superstition providing solace in stages of ignorance, but has no authentic relevance in the present and future. Iqbal does not agree with this conclusion. In his view reality has outer as well as inner dimensions; science is concerned with the external behaviour of reality, whereas the domain of religion is to discover the meanings of reality in reference to its inner nature. In this respect both scientific and religious

processes run parallel to each other: "A careful study of the nature and purpose of these really complementary processes shows that both of them are directed to purification of experience in their respective spheres" (*Reconstruction*, p. 155).

Iqbal divides religious life into three periods. In the first religious life appears as a form of discipline voluntarily accepted by an individual or a group of people as unconditional commands, without any rational understanding of the ultimate purpose of those commands. Only in this sense is religion based on dogma, ritual or some kind of priesthood. In the second period revelation is reconciled with reason and its discipline is accompanied by a rational understanding of its discipline and of the ultimate source of authority. At this stage religion may claim to be sole possessor of the Truth and may become exclusive or engender hatred against other religions, as well as within one religion itself when one mode of interpretation comes into conflict with another. In the third period religion becomes a matter of personal assimilation of life and power. Iqbal calls this third stage of religious life higher religion.

It is, then, in the sense of this last phase in the development of religious life that I use the word religion. . . . Religion in this sense is known by the unfortunate name of mysticism, which is supposed to be a life-denying, fact-avoiding attitude of mind directly opposed to the radically empirical outlook of our times. Yet higher religion, which is only a search for a larger life, is essentially experience and recognised the necessity of experience as its foundation long before science learnt to do so (*Reconstruction*, p. 143-144).

In this context of higher religion, where God is the centre of all religions and the Truth is absolute, why is there a diversity or relativity of religions? The answer of Martin Lings is that God has sent different religions suited to the needs, requirements and characteristics of the different groups of humanity in different temporal cycles. But if these groups of men, in the course of human history, have persecuted one another on account of religious differences, then Providence cannot be held responsible. However, despite winning converts through persuasion or slaughter of human beings in the name of religion, many religions which have fought or competed with one another in past history have survived and now dominate different parts of the world. It is necessary, therefore, irrespective of the position adopted by the partisan religious authorities, that we must carefully examine what, according to Iqbal, higher religion teaches about the nature of God.

Modern Western civilisation has dealt with the problem of religion through encouraging the development of two types of secularism. One is based on indifference towards religion; this attitude is adopted by modern man in capitalist democracies. The other type is based on the suppression of religion; for a number of years this policy has been followed by the socialist countries. But experience tells us that indifference towards religion automatically leads to the demand for that variety of "freedom" which Albert Camus calls "tyranny" or "waywardness." On the other hand, recent developments in the U. S. S. R. and the other socialist countries indicate that atheism cannot be successfully imposed on a people from outside, and that whenever such an attempt is made, it is bound to fail. Thus it is evident that the existing types of secularism have not been able to resolve the problem.

It is perhaps in this background that Iqbal rejected the methodologies of territorial nationalism, capitalism, atheistic socialism, as well as religious conservatism, as drawing upon the psychological forces of hate, suspicion and resentment which tend to impoverish the soul of man, closing up his hidden sources of spiritual energy.

Surely the present moment is one of great crisis in the history of modern culture. The modern world stands in need of biological renewal. And religion, which in its higher manifestation is neither dogma, nor priesthood, nor ritual, can alone ethically prepare modern man for the burden

of the great responsibility which the advancement of modern science necessarily involves, and restore to him that attitude of faith which makes him capable of winning a personality here and retaining it hereafter. It is only by rising to a fresh vision of his origin and future, his whence and whither, that man will eventually triumph over a society motivated by an inhuman competition, and a civilisation which has lost its spiritual unity by its inner conflict of religious and political values. (*Reconstruction*, p. 149).

From the above analysis it appears that the solution of the problem lies in the adoption of the policy, not of indifference or suppression, but of respect for all religions. Every religion in the narrower sense consists of dogma, ritual and some form of priesthood. This aspect of religion is exclusive or relative to the people who adhere to it, and only in this sense is the international community multi-religious. Unfortunately some of the religious communities in the world today are passing through a phase of conservatism or fundamentalism which has let loose the forces of hatred and resentment. Whatever may be the reasons for this affliction, let us hope that the phase is temporary and shall pass away. However according to Iqbal, each great religion at the higher level contains the absolute Truth. Therefore it is necessary for every religious community to discover and project the higher level of its religion. It is at this level that religion can restore to humanity its spiritual unity and ethically prepare one to respect one's fellow-men.

Iqbal does not consider Islam as a religion in the ancient sense of the word. For him, "It is an attitude -- an attitude, that is to say, of Freedom, and even of defiance to the Universe. It is really a protest against the entire outlook of the ancient world. Briefly, it is the discovery of Man (*Stray Reflections*, p. 193).

Iqbal deduces the principles of higher religion from the verses of the Qur'an and bases his political idealism on them. Two examples may be useful.

In *Sura XXII*, verse 40 it is stated: "If God had not raised a group (i.e., Muslims) to ward off the others from aggression, the churches, synagogues, oratories and mosques, where God is worshipped most, would have been destroyed."

Broadening the interpretation of this verse so as to include all religious minorities in a Muslim state, he proclaims in the *Allahabad Address*:

A community which is inspired by the feeling of ill-will towards other communities, is low and ignoble. I entertain the highest respect for the customs, laws, religious and social institutions of other communities. Nay, it is my duty, according to the teachings of the Qur'an, even to defend their places of worship, if need be (*Speeches and Statements*, ed. by A. R. Tariq, p. 10).

For Iqbal "*Tauhid*" (The Unity of God), as a working idea, stands for equality, solidarity and the freedom of man. Therefore from the Islamic standpoint, the state is essentially an effort to transform these ideal principles into spacial and temporal (*Reconstruction*, pp. 122-123). He not only sees the republican form of government as consistent with the spirit of Islam, but is convinced that the ultimate object of Islam is the establishment of a "spiritual democracy."

There are specific verses on which Iqbal could have relied? Let us examine the relevant verses.

(a) In *Sura XL* verse 78 while addressing the Holy Prophet, God says: "Verily We have sent messengers before thee. About some of them have We told thee, and about some have We not told thee."

The self-evident meaning of the verse is that God has sent not only those prophets whose names are known to the Semitic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam), but others bearing the tidings of numerous other modes of religion of Truth.

(b) The second relevant piece in this connection is *Sura V* verse 69 in which it is stated: "Verily the Faithful (Muslims) and the Jews and the Sabians and the Christians, whoso believeth in God and the Last Day and doeth good deeds, no fear shall come upon them, neither shall they grieve." As for the expression "Sabians" there is no general agreement as to which religion this is. However, as indicated in the verse, that category of religions is based on a central idea of God and accountability, which emphasise doing good deeds. Thus according to the Qur'an, everyone who believes in God and eventual accountability and who does good deeds need not fear as no grief shall come upon them.

(c) The third is *Sura V* verse 48 in which God, addressing human beings, declares:

For each of you We have appointed a law and a way. And if God had willed He would have made you one (religious) community. But (He hath willed it otherwise) that He may put you to the test in what He has given you. So vie with one another in good works. Unto God will ye be brought back, and He will inform you about that wherein ye differed.

If God had sent only one religion to a world of widely differing aptitudes, it would not have been a fair test for all. Therefore He has sent many different religions and in this Qur'anic verse He expects human beings to enter into rivalry with one another only in doing good deeds and nothing else. It was in the light of such verses of the Qur'an that Iqbal desired that the Muslims of today evolve and establish a "spiritual democracy." He maintains:

Humanity needs three things today -- a spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual, and basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis. Modern Europe has, no doubt, built idealistic systems on these lines, but experience shows that truth revealed through pure reason is incapable of bringing that fire of living conviction which personal revelation alone can bring. This is the reason why pure thought has so little influenced men, while religion has always elevated individuals and transformed whole societies. . . . With him (i.e., the Muslim) the spiritual basis of life is a matter of conviction for which even the least enlightened man among us can easily lay down his life; and in view of the basic idea of Islam that there can be no further revelation binding on man, we ought to be spiritually one of the most emancipated peoples on earth. Early Muslims emerging out of the spiritual slavery of pre-Islamic Asia were not in a position to realise the true significance of this basic idea. Let the Muslim of today appreciate his position, reconstruct his social life in the light of ultimate principles, and evolve, out of the hitherto partially revealed purpose of Islam, that spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of Islam. (*Reconstruction*, p. 142).

The conclusion is that if for the survival of humanity it is necessary to respect his fellow-humans, in the same way it is necessary for one to learn to respect religions other than one's own. Only through the adoption of this moral and spiritual approach, borrowing Iqbal's phrase, may one rise to a fresh vision of one's future.

Part II
Classical Islamic Philosophy and Metaphysics

Chapter VIII
Philosophy of Religion: Its Meaning and Scope
M. Saeed Sheikh

The philosophy of religion is not a religious philosophy: it is the application not of the ideas of religion to philosophy, but of philosophy to the facts of religion. Religious philosophy is a way of thinking which is prompted by religion and takes religion as its foundation, whereas philosophy of religion makes religion its object. In religious philosophy, philosophy and religion are supposed to be inseparable, whereas the philosophy of religion has to start with the assumption that they are separable.

History

Religious philosophy is as old as Plato and Plotinus, but philosophy of religion is essentially a modern phenomenon. With the professional philosophers it began taking its distinctive character only during the 19th century in Germany; the term philosophy of religion came into use only at the turn of the century. The most probable first instance was a work by Immanuel Bergers entitled *Geschichte der Religions-philosophie*, published in Berlin in 1800. The earliest book in English which used the title *The Philosophy of Religion*, was that of J. D. Morell, published in 1849.

The credit for first defining the philosophy of religion in the sense in which it is used to-day goes to Hegel. Many consider him the founder of the philosophy of religion, for he saw religion as one of the four fields of human experience to be interpreted and given place in a total philosophy. This standpoint is supported by a quotation from the *Encyclopaedia* (1817). "The beginning of all philosophical knowledge is the acknowledgement of the four fundamental forms or types of human experience, namely, the scientific, the moral, the aesthetic and the religious. Philosophy consists in seeking the truth implicit in these fundamental forms." This is later reiterated at the very outset of his *Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion* (1832): "It has appeared to me to be necessary to make religion itself the object of philosophical consideration, and to add this study, in the form of a special part, to philosophy as a whole." His claim to being the father of the philosophy of religion, however, is debatable, for his actual philosophy of religion followed upon his philosophy of history with the typical Hegelian premise of a dialectical development of religions towards an absolute religion -- which in fact was to compress the subject within the mould of a particular philosophy. No doubt, he brought the philosophy of religion to a par with other branches of philosophy, namely, moral philosophy, philosophy of art, and the philosophy of nature, each seen as being concerned with its distinctive intrinsic kind of experience. He treated his subject with greater catholicity and sweep than those who came before him in the long tradition of Christian theology. This showed that he was well aware that the philosophy of religion was not the study of any particular religion, but of the religions of all times and places, more specifically, of religion in history.

He missed, however, the fundamental principle of an empirical or critical philosophy of religion, namely, that the facts and experiences of religion are to be interpreted and evaluated primarily with reference to their own field and only secondarily from the point of view of any general philosophy. Moreover, he did not see that the philosophy of religion is an inquiry independent of commitment not only to any positive religion, but also to any preconceived

philosophical system, for where the one leads to a religious apologetics or dogmatics, the other may equally lead to an apologetics or dogmatics of a philosophical brand. Any philosophy of religion which starts from the point of view of a system of philosophy and violates the primary principle of internal interpretation, even when favourably disposed towards religion, is not entitled to be called an empirical philosophies of religion, though it may be an idealistic, personalistic or pragmatic philosophy of religion. I may venture to say that the Gifford Lectures of Royce, Haldane, Bosanquet, Pringle Pattison, Jones and Webb, one and all, fall short of the real title of philosophies of religion inasmuch as their starting point is not the phenomenology of religion, but the philosophy of idealism. Idealistic conceptions of religion may not be entirely false; one of these, for example, represents religion to be a kind of devotion to the true, the good, and the beautiful considered as eternal values. All that this implies is included in religion to a great extent. Nevertheless, it is not an adequate conception of religion, for it lacks recognition of what is in religious experience and not arrived at from the consideration of actual religion in human history.

The real pioneers of an empirical philosophy of religion were a set of philosophers in Germany who published their works on the subject in the last quarter of the 19th century. The movement which these works initiated virtually ceased with the impact of the two World Wars. Foremost among these writers was Wilhelm Vatke who lectured on the subject in Berlin from 1839 to 1875 and defined philosophy of Religion as "the philosophical consideration, with free reflection and independent of pre-conceptions, of religion in general, as known in the development of religions in human history." Religion is given in history; it is not generated by philosophical thought, which has the task only of understanding and grasping it conceptually. Without an adequate knowledge of the concrete and varied facts of religion in its historical and psychological manifestations, philosophy leads only to dead formulae. Insisting on religion as *sui generis*, Vatke developed his philosophy of religion with reference to the psychological, historical and metaphysical. The threefold treatment of the subject by him was adopted by some of his younger contemporaries. Other names belonging to this group are O. Pfleiderer; C.B. Punjer; G. Teichmüller; H. Siebeck; A. Sabatier.

Empirical Philosophy of Religion

It would be necessary to examine briefly certain forms of empirical theology which have been claimed to be empirical philosophies of religion *par excellence* as they certainly are grounded on some sort of immediacies of experience. Theology in general as contrasted with philosophy of religion is primarily concerned with the idea of God; whereas philosophy of religion cannot start with this assumption for it has to leave open the possibility in history of religions without God.

One form of empirical theology has been called natural theology for it is based upon the immediate experience of the observable facts of the world of nature. So far as natural theology is historically connected with the 17th and 18th century English and French deists, it is hard to distinguish it from rational theology, though this association is no longer acceptable to the contemporary natural or sense-bound theologians. Some form of natural theology has been presented by all kinds of religious thinkers: Jewish, Christian and Muslim for whom nature is the Book of God in which He has revealed His power, wisdom and goodness; the human vocation is to interpret this divine hieroglyphics. "The knowledge of nature is the knowledge of God's behaviour," Iqbal tells us in his *Lectures* and continues to say that this is only another form of worship. Whereas a religious person starts from his or her religious experience or belief in God and proceeds to nature, a natural theologian starts from his sense-experience of nature and proceeds

to the idea of God. The nerve centre of the latter is essentially some form of teleological argument, which may be as naive as that of Bernardin de St. Pierre who demonstrated: "God made fleas black so that it should be easier for us to catch them, and divided melons into sections so that it would be easier to cut them up in equal portions for the sake of domestic harmony."

But teleological argument becomes really formidable when treated by such eminent natural theologians as F. R. Tennant, who prefers to call his brand of philosophy of religion "philosophical theology" rather than natural theology. As heavy with scholarship as Tennant's main argument may be, it lacks a logical base for as with other natural theologians he leaves God in the final analysis as a mere hypothesis, even if the best of all hypotheses. But if God can be regarded as a hypothesis to explain the facts of sense experience, then these facts in some sense already are religious facts because the function of a hypothesis in science is not to create facts, but to explain them by discovering the law of their behaviour. When the hypothesis works, it may lead to new facts, but these are always of the same order as those already experienced, for valid logical reasoning allows nothing in a conclusion not contained in the premises.

Another form of empirical theology is based not on the immediacies of sense experience, but on the immediacies of moral experience. The writers of this group, regarding moral experience as the revelation of an objective realm of values, make this experience either the central theological fact, or at least one of the central data on which a theology may be constructed. For both Rashdall and Sorley, God is primarily a speculative, conceptual implication of ethics; yet both insist that ethics itself is to be based on moral experience as *sui generis*. Unless it be asserted that religion is nothing more than morality, it is reasonable to maintain that the concepts associated with religion are likewise to be understood with reference to religious experience as *sui generis*, whatever application may be made of these concepts afterwards.

The term "empirical theology" is most justifiably referred to in the case of such writers as make the immediacies of their own religious experience as the sole and sufficient basis for theology. It may be going too far to challenge the claims of the writers of this persuasion to be the real philosophers of religion, but there are two kinds of inadequacies to which they usually are exposed. Either they may emphasise particular aspects of religious experience at the cost of others or they may analyse and interpret religious experience with reference to their commitments to a particular religion. Both of these inadequacies are true, for example in the case of Schleiermacher, who otherwise is rightly claimed to be the father of 'religious empiricism'. Schleiermacher was so impressed with the importance of the part played by feeling in religion that he gave it not merely the predominant but the exclusive place. He defined religious piety as consisting essentially neither in knowledge nor in action, but in determination of feeling.

The root of all religion, he held, was man's feeling of absolute dependence on some power or powers other than himself. But this dictum, while it emphasises rightly the large part played by feeling in religious experience, overlooks the part played by the cognitive faculty in forming some conception of the power or powers on which we depend and the part played by will in choosing and adopting means for entering into harmony with that Supreme Power or Being. Further, Schleiermacher is not justified in selecting exclusively the Christian religious consciousness for the explication and interpretation of the feeling of absolute dependence. From the standpoint of other forms of the feeling of absolute dependence within Islam and Hinduism, for example, there may be constructed different systems of theology. In the case of Schleiermacher it may be added that his empirical theology was not only circumscribed by his commitment to Christianity but also dominated by a particular system of philosophy, namely Spinozistic pantheism and the developing German idealism.

Philosophy of Religion and Religious Experience

Philosophy of religion, to be adequate, cannot be based merely on the religious experience of any one particular individual; nor can it possibly be refuted on the basis of an individual's lack of that experience. No individual limits the propositions he accepts as truths to those attested solely in his own experience. The experiences of his contemporaries and those of others in the past have to be acknowledged and that there are experts and specialists in every field has to be admitted. The philosophy of religion is essentially a reflection on religion in history. A philosopher of religion in order to do justice to his subject has to recognise this fact and has to study not only his own religion, but all religions without distinction.

Unless I should be judged overhastily to be outlining in what follows a particularly Muslim philosophy of religion I may be allowed to mention that all this has been very well emphasized by the Qur'an, according to which there is not a nation in the world in which a prophet has not been raised up: "There is not a people but a Warner has gone among them" (35: 24); again: "Every nation has had a messenger" (10: 47). Though the Qur'an mentions only about twenty-five prophets by name, Biblical or otherwise, it tells us that there have been prophets besides those named therein: "And we sent messengers we have mentioned to thee before and messengers we have not mentioned to thee" (4: 164). The Qur'an goes further and makes it necessary for a Muslim to believe in all those prophets. In the very beginning it says that a Muslim must "believe in that which has been revealed to thee (*i.e.* to the Prophet Muhammad) and that which was revealed before thee" (2: 4); a little further on: "Say (O Muslims!): We believe in Allah and in that which has been revealed to us and in that which was revealed to Abraham and Ismael and Isaac and Jacob and the tribes and in that which was given to Moses and Jesus and in that which was given to the prophets from their Lord; we make no distinction between any of them" (2: 136). The injunction to believe in all the prophets without distinction has been repeated in many other verses of the Qur'an, and in fact to accept some prophets and reject others has been condemned as unbelief: "Lo, those who disbelieve in Allah and His messengers and seek to make a distinction between Allah and His messengers, and say: We believe in some and disbelieve in others, and seek to take a course between (this and) that; such are disbelievers in truth" (4:150)

Whatever may be one's personal religion or private opinion concerning it there is no gainsaying the fact that there is no more widespread and impressive thing in human history than religion; throughout the ages it has occupied a central place in life. In every known period of history some kind of religious beliefs and observances have been in evidence, in tribes and nationalities the most unlike in other respects, too remote from one another to allow the possibility of mutual influence, and pursuing the most divergent lines of practical activity. "In wandering over the earth," Plutarch says, "you can find cities without walls, without rulers, without palaces, without treasures, without money, without gymnasium or theatre; but a city without temples to the gods, without prayers, oaths and prophecy, such a city no mortal has yet seen and will never see." However crude religion in its primitive forms may have been and however gross the superstitions with which it has often been associated, its omnipresence and centrality in the history of the race are the facts to be reckoned with.

Investigators in the fields of anthropology, sociology, the history of religions, the comparative study of religion, the psychology of religion and the study of human life and culture have accumulated an enormous mass of facts about the religious rites, customs, activities, beliefs, sentiments, aspirations of men and communities. These phenomena, if studied according to certain special requirements and with the care necessary for the study of religion, provide the empirical

base upon which alone the philosophical structure of the philosophy of religion can later be erected. This base is better described as the phenomenology of religion, but of late it has been more and more named the science or sciences of religion.

Religious phenomena may be studied basically from two points of view, firstly from the point of view of the inner or subjective experience of religious consciousness: the psychological point of view, and secondly from the standpoint of religious experience as externalised in rites, institutions, events and creeds, theologies: the historical point of view. These two points of view cannot be kept absolutely apart for the subjective and the objective are ever intimately intertwined in the unity of life.

In view of the age-long human experience with religion it may seem strange that neither the ancients nor the moderns until very recently have undertaken to inquire objectively and comprehensively into the facts of religion. This is due partly to the lack of an historical sense and perhaps even more due to the fact that religions all along have remained encased within the 'hallowed theologies' whence they always have perceived secular inquiry with suspicion. Some of the theologians even today may be quite shocked by the very proposal of a science of religion. Anyhow a philosophy of religion without a survey of facts as presented by the science of religion may be no more than mere cobweb spinning and the spewings of the thinkers' own mind; sheer acrobatics of semantics or the ecstasies of love and hate. But there is also the other extreme position, mostly taken up by the naturalists and the humanists who holds that the philosophy of religion consists entirely of its history, psychology and sociology: we read that the historical, psychological or sociological approaches are the only ones.

The Psychology of Religion

It is of utmost importance that though the history of religion and the psychology of religion makes real contribution towards building up a phenomenology of religion, it is none of the business of these sciences as such to try to arrive at any explanation or evaluation of religious phenomena. Their function is restricted to the simple description of these phenomena as objectively and as faithfully as is possible within the social sciences. Any attempt on their part to explain these phenomena is exposed to the dangers of genetic, reductive or naturalistic fallacies. The psychology of religion may very easily develop into a psychologism of religion and the history of religion into an historicism of religion. A historian of religion does not start with any loyalties towards the naturalistic or the idealistic theories of evolutionary development or any other prepossessions about the nature of history. The method of the sciences of religion has to be purely internal and descriptive, which is possible only when the scientist is able to forget for the time being his own beliefs and describe those of others without any thought of orthodoxy or heresy, edification or peril to faith.

But the whole matter is much more delicate than this: the description of valuations without evaluations requires a subtle kind of objective subjectivity. It is sometimes wrongly supposed that one can understand religion only by becoming irreligious. This is an ordinary concept of objectivity, but the objectivity required for a science of religion is of a wholly different order: it cannot be an objectivity that excludes the element of understanding. It is impossible to understand religion without participating, in some form and in some degree, in the life of religion. We cannot even understand the ordinary behaviour of human beings without in some sense being involved in their experiences. It is still more true that we cannot understand that extraordinary behaviour of religion -- that prayer and praise which men call worship -- unless we participate in their life at

least empathically. As A. E. Taylor says, "A philosophy of religion to be of any value, must not come from the detached theorist, holding no form of creed, but contemplating all; it must be fruit of candid self-criticism on the part of men living the life they contemplate, each in his own way, but each alike ready to learn alike from the others and from the outsider" (*The Faith of a Moralist*). A completely detached theorist, if indeed such be possible, might indeed know much about religion, but not what religion itself is all about.

Just how much must the philosopher or the scientist live the life he contemplates? How much must he share in order to understand and what form of creed must he hold? These are important but difficult questions. However, this much is sure, that if a philosopher or scientist of religion lives the life he contemplates on the highest level of his own religious tradition then he has taken the first necessary step towards the understanding of any other religion. Personal association with others of at least one more religion than one's own appears to be an almost necessary if inadequate prerequisite for the study of the science of philosophy of religion. Each religion has a character of its own, an inner impulse, a distinctive atmosphere that may be appreciated only from within the community in actual participation. In the psychology of religion, only that individual is likely to be successful who himself has some religious experience with reference to which he may understand the experiences of others.

With this consideration many contemporary exponents of psychology may be considered unqualified for any real work in the psychology of religion. Iqbal is justified in making the rather disheartening remark, "Modern psychology has not yet touched even the outer fringe of religious life and is still far from the richness and variety of what is called religious experience." Iqbal's statement is true insofar as it indicates that the psychology of religion is yet in its infancy, but this is equally true of the other sciences of religion. The 'science of religion' has yet to be born and is one of the most difficult subjects, particularly because of its peculiar paradoxical method, namely, of objectively subjective understanding of the religious phenomena: description of the religious 'valuations' through a sort of emphatic participation in them, and yet without evaluating them in the first instance with reference to any external standard. All this requires an involvement without any commitment. An analogous difficulty is encountered by a literary or artistic 'critic' whenever he undertakes to write on psychology, history or comparative study of literature or art.

The psychology of religion as a phenomenological study began its career only at the beginning of this century, by making quite suggestive disclosures about the nature of conversion, varieties of religious experience, the techniques of mystics, types of worship, etc. Due to the confused state of psychology in general and especially to the recent vogue of behaviourism, this subject has been somewhat shelved and further progress seems to have been arrested. The psychology of religion cannot be based on the premises of a secular psychology such as behaviourism, for which 'the Divine breath' called human soul is a sheer myth, and man, 'the great creative mystery', is no more than an assembled organic machine ready to run as a Jack-in-the-box between stimuli and responses. Similarly, psychology of religion cannot have its moorings in such systems of thought as consider man primarily a 'theopathic' animal. However useful psychopathological studies may be, it is no more possible to construct a psychology of normal religion on a foundation gathered from religious pathology than it is to construct a psychology of normal persons from data collected from abnormal persons only. Talking of religion merely in the terms of pathology is itself pathological, for it overlooks the fact that the deep unconscious of the human psyche is an inexhaustible storehouse not only for the abnormal, but also for the supernormal. Erotogenetic theories of religion have extracted quite a blessing out of such coincidences as that of pubescence

and the main peaks of the conversion curves, palpably committing the genetic fallacy and forgetting that sex itself may be 'divinely ordained'.

However, very recently some searchings of heart have been evinced with regard to the scientific status of psychoanalytic methodology and much talk about the 'Uses and Abuses' and 'Sense and Non-Sense' in psychology is in the air. A distinction has been made between the second hand, ossified, traditional religion, dead and moribund, hanging over the soul, and a first hand religion, spontaneously blossoming from the soul which through its autopsychiatric and psychohygienic function brings a peace and bliss to it that passeth all understanding. Some psychotherapists have found themselves to be involved in a religious situation by being absolutely consecrated to their task of saving souls, on which ultimately rests their own peace of mind.

The most important fact about the psychology of religion as a phenomenological science is that it is to be an existential study of religious phenomena in their experimental actuality. Among the best sources for its data are autobiographies, confessions, self-analyses, letters and other works of the great mystics and other religious leaders. There is no dearth of such literature in the world: in fact it is overwhelming by its super-abundance. Of course there are difficulties of translating the religious symbolism of the past into the thought idiom of the present. More attention, however, must be paid to the religious experience of the living mystics and saints of the world through personal contacts wherever possible. A close study of prayers and hymns, odes and psalms are of great value inasmuch as they give expression to a large variety of experiences. Ritual acts and ceremonies are also important insofar as they are expressions of inner feelings and attitudes and modes for their cultivation. Particular religious emotions are stimulated and expressed in religious rites associated with birth, initiation into religious group, marriage and the disposal of the dead. In short, the richness of the varieties of religious experience should be acknowledged by a psychologist of religion, and nothing should be left unexplored, unshared and unprobed wherever it be found.

The History of Religion

Similarly, the richness of religious experience cannot be denied by an historian of religion whose duty it is to give a faithful account of religions of all times and places, whether dead or living. In the early development of this science, undue emphasis was laid on primitive religions and too much delight was taken in moving among golden boughs and totems, divine kings and heavenly twins, collecting specimens for a museum of dead cults and anthropological curiosities. All those early studies, important and useful in their own way, were mostly vitiated by their fallacy of primitivism, *i.e.*, trying to discern the essence of religion by "peering into its cradle and seeking oracles in its infant cries" rather than contemplating the more mature forms it has attained. Later students of the history of religions have occupied themselves predominantly or solely with creeds and articles of faith. The card index cataloguing of dogmas and beliefs and overemphasis on the doctrinal has sometimes led to faulty representations of religions, as if they were no more than the mere moulds of orthodoxies and catechisms of dogmas. Dogmas and doctrines are, of course, important -- without their assistance religions cannot develop -- but they are only external symbols for bringing the basic truths of religion to human understanding. Doctrines have been formulated at different times and in different communities as expressions of religious experience. The historian of religion should return from doctrines to experience; rather than describing meticulously some or several creeds, it is more important to study the nature of the religious

impulse itself and of what happens to it under varying cultural conditions as it solidifies into a creed.

For the study of religion the lives of saints, mystics and religious founders, the growth of devotional and liturgical literature; the origin and changes, the elaborations and simplifications of religious practices; and the religious, emotional attitudes and ideals are of far greater significance. There have been few histories of religion with adequate attention to these.

Among most students there has been a concentration of attention on the respects in which religions are similar. The similarities are important; in the similarities one finds some fundamentals, but the variety of experience adds to the spiritual richness of the world. No adequate account of religion can be given in terms of the elements common to all religions; only with attention to differences can justice be done to the evolutions of religion.

The historian of religion should not dismiss the mythological in religions as merely superstitious and primitive. More often than not myths carry profound religious implications. Religious myths and symbols are sometimes the eternal images of psychic reality, and not merely arbitrary imaginative phantasies. Even Plato recognised the significance of mythical language, and his use of it is a part of his greatness as a philosopher. It is out of the tension between the finite and the infinite, most intensely felt in the tension between time and eternity, that the mythopoetic imagination develops its categories of beginning and ending, of ultimate origination and ultimate destiny -- its mythical cosmologies and eschatologies. Thus much more can sometimes be learned from a consideration of the implications of the mythological in religions than from the intellectual formulations of doctrines. Allied with the mythological is the legendary, especially in the stories of great saints and religious leaders. These legends may be of significance in portraying in symbolic form the religious characteristics of religious personages.

These are some of the very general, yet insufficient, suggestions with regard to the kind of work required in psychology and the history of religion. The mere gathering and arranging of material, however, does not constitute a philosophy of religion. We have to interpret and evaluate this infinitely complicated system of arranged facts and experiences and we have to face the question of how far the religious conceptions of mankind correspond to truth. It may be said that religious beliefs, doctrines and creeds are so amazingly varied in character that it is not possible to arrive at any consistent conception of religion in general from the survey of religions in history. The variety and relativity of religious beliefs has sometimes been overemphasised as also has been done in the case of morals. Religion in history may be likened to a pyramid. At the base which corresponds to the particular pronouncements of the different positive religions, we find great variations from race to race and from time to time due to the varied natural conditions under which the religious experience finds expressions. But as we pass from the base to the apex, we find less of the particular and more and more of the universal. The relation of history as such with religion, though very important, is a difficult subject; without subscribing to the view that history and religion are congruent with each other, it may be said that, by and large, history indicates a process of self-criticism with regard to religion. By the expurgation of crude practices and obsolete ideas and rising to the higher levels of religious apprehension there has been a general advance in religions. Take, for example, the development from the naively materialistic views of God to a spiritual conception, from the merely ritualistic and often grossly immoral religious practices to the highest moral idealism, from the tribal and national view of religion to a universal religion, from mere legalism to experiential mysticism. With respect to whatever grows and develops, it is the higher stages that help us to understand and evaluate that which is evinced in the lower.

The philosophy of religion insists that it is the inner religious experience and not its precise formulations in the form of doctrines and creeds that are significant for the formulations are relative to the context of the cultural level and the historical circumstance of the age in which they are made. A discrimination has to be made between the merely local and the temporal and the specifically religious, which can be done only when the history of religions is studied in the light of an insight and understanding gained through the psychology of religion for the basis of their agreement lies in the 'religious psyche' underlying all types of religion. It may be said that there is a religion of spirit which represents the transcendental unity of religions, above their empirical diversity. In a sense religions are as varied as the individuals are varied; every individual has his own lonely confrontation with 'the Divine'. But variety brings richness of experience and diversity does not necessarily mean discord. The future of religions does not lie in a dead uniformity or in an incongruous eclecticism, but in their plurality. All can be members of one family of religions; the Qur'an has spoken of all the prophets as one community (21: 92). The more one understands the basic truth of one's own religion, the less one differs with other religions.

Religion as Meta-Empirical or Meta-Physical Reality

There is a tendency with the thinkers of a more empirical type to restrict the scope of the philosophy of religion only to the functional character of religion in human evolution and to tracing the practical value of its effects on social life. This, according to them, is the only vindication of the truth of religion that need or can be undertaken. But even the purely empirical study of religion shows that the religious consciousness itself points to a supra-empirical reality as its ground and support; hence its essence cannot be understood merely empirically. Religion strives for an ideal which derives its validity and authority from 'beyond the veil' (42: 51), that is, from 'the beyond that is within' the world of spiritual values which transcends the empirical world of space, time and events and yet which is immanent within it as constituting its deeper meaning. Without this ground and support, religion is nothing more than a baseless dream, a beautiful illusion with no foundation in objective reality. The inner dissolving into its merely 'emotive meanings' or subjective illusion cannot be concealed by its supposed beneficial effects in practice. Religion means to be true as well as effective and effective because true, for it assumes an inseparability of value and existence and of the axiological and the logical. Merely pragmatic and operational notions of truth may work in science, but in religion truth to be true must be true altogether. The religious consciousness in its highest development claims to be in an intimate sense *en rapport* with the ultimate nature of things. Hence religion more than anything else is a perpetual challenge to philosophy, compelling it to investigate its claims to be a valid interpretation of truth and reality and to examine its assumptions. The philosophy of religion is the response of philosophy to this challenge.

Chapter IX
The Function of Muslim Philosophy
Abdul Khaliq

Traditional Muslim philosophy, we know, had its inception in an atmosphere thoroughly charged with Greek ideas. These ideas were then being officially introduced into the Muslim culture through translations, commentaries, and so on, with such bewildering rapidity and at such large scale that no one could fail to be influenced by them. The Muslim philosophers -- Farabi, Ibn Sina, Ibn Rushd among them -- were awed by this Greek worldview and they tried, in general, to reconcile with it the principles and doctrines of Islam. They had in view the rational mode of knowledge duly recommended, or rather enjoined, by the Qur'an:1 so, they thought, if the Greeks had used logic and argumentation for the solution of various problems there was nothing un-Islamic either about this method or about what this method logically discovered. On the other hand, Ghazali, Ibn Taimiyya and a few others revolted against various aspects of Greek philosophy and, in some sense, also built up a reasoned position regarding their own points of view. In both these cases the overwhelming socio-cultural context was one and the same, whether the Muslim philosophers were positively or negatively oriented towards it.

Relevant to modern times, and specifically in the Indo-Pakistan environments, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan's philosophy is an attempt of the same character. He observed that just as the learned people of the earliest times of Islamic history had tried to reconcile orthodoxy with Greek philosophy,

in the present age we are in need of a modern *ilm-ul-kalam* by which we may either refute the doctrines of modern sciences or declare them to be doubtful or show that the articles of Islamic faith are in conformity with them. . . . Those who are capable of the job but do not actually try their utmost to do it . . . are sinners all of them, surely and definitely. . . . There is none at present who is aware of modern science and philosophy and (in spite of this awareness) does not entertain in his heart of hearts doubts about the doctrines of Islam which are today accepted as such . . . though I am equally sure that it does not, in the least, affect the original glory of Islam.²

Thus, according to Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, essential principles of Islam contained in the Qur'an are in conformity with the conclusions reached by the contemporary natural sciences. As the physical universe is the work of God, whereas the Qur'an is the word of God; how can there be a contradiction between the two! "Islam is Nature and Nature is Islam"³ is the title of one of his essays, and in fact the burden of his entire philosophy of religion. Elsewhere, he remarked that in a way God Himself holds on to naturalism: He can initially enact any laws of nature He likes, but once they are so enacted absolutely nothing can happen against them.⁴ Under the aegis of these and similar observations, he built up a comprehensive point of view, explaining away the so-called supernatural component in phenomena like miracles, prayers and their acceptance by God, mystic illuminations, prophetic visions, angels, paradise, hell, and so on. This religio-philosophical thought of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan is relevant for our present purposes, because it prefaced a whole chain of moorings and speculations -- particularly in the Sub-continent -- which, during the 20th century, consciously or unconsciously sought to interpret Islam in such a way that it stood

reconciled with the current scientific fashions. Allama Muhammad Iqbal, Khalifa Abdul Hakim, Allama Inayatullah Mashriqi, Ghulam Gilani Barq and Ghulam Ahmad Parvez have all had ample sympathies for naturalistic reason and for the conclusions of positive sciences.

Broadly speaking, there is nothing unusual in recognising and giving due weight to one's cultural environment. How can a thinker avoid inhaling his or her own 'climate of opinion',⁵ just as no living person can help consuming oxygen from the air around; one environment is always seriously to be reckoned with. For that matter, contemporary Muslim thinkers justifiably are bringing out the veracity of religious phenomena in the face of certain recent movements in Western philosophy, like atheistic existentialism, logical positivism, dialectical materialism, psycho-analysis, and so on. They have learned that passive resistance is not enough and that arguments must be countered with arguments alone; logic must be met with logic. It was essentially this requirement, we remember, that had compelled Ash'arite theologians of the seventh century a.d to reason out their standpoint despite a strong opposition by Muslims who regarded arguing in religious matters as an innovation and a heresy.⁶

One essential aspect of the function of Muslim philosophy, has not been adequately recognised. Muslim philosophers have avowedly been Muslims first and philosophers later. To all appearances they professed the Islamic 'point of view' with which they claimed to look at the contemporary thought-fashions in order either to accept or reject them, but they failed sufficiently to analyse the 'point of view' itself. With only a rudimentary and vague concept of meaning of the Qur'anic propositions, Muslim philosophers -- with very few honourable exceptions -- generally rush to judgement as to whether a particular idea is, or is not, in accord with the will of the Qur'an. There is seldom realisation that, before thus reacting to the 'climate of opinion' to which he belongs he must have a thorough understanding of his 'local weather' i.e., his attitude which, *ex-hypothesi*, comprises the teachings of the Qur'an. Seyyed Hossein Nasr very appropriately recommends that "contemporary Muslims",

should be realist enough to understand that they must begin their journey in whatever direction they wish to go from where they are. A famous Chinese proverb asserts the journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step. Now this first step must necessarily be from where one is located. And that is as much true culturally and spiritually as it is physically. Wherever the Islamic world wants to go, it must begin from the reality of the Islamic tradition and from its own real, and not imagined, situation. Those who lose sight of this fact actually do not travel effectively at all. They just imagine that they are journeying.⁷

In other words, the meaning of the Qur'an must first be understood by all Muslims who intend to philosophise. Clarity on the basic issues having been attained, Muslim philosophy, worthy of its name, could then develop as a well-grounded, well-organised school of thought and build up a metaphysics that suits its native temperament.

Incidentally, it may be objected that the concepts of 'Muslim philosophy' and 'Islamic philosophy' have been confused here, and in fact are appellations of two distinct states of affairs generally it is observed that it is properly the characteristic function of Islamic philosophy to understand and interpret the meaning of the Qur'an and to translate its descriptions into the language which the contemporary man understands. Muslim philosophy, on the other hand, would comprise the philosophical speculations of the one who is a Muslim by convention: these speculations themselves might well be nihilistic and un-Islamic in character. This distinction,

however, is not entirely justified for Muslim philosophy, in general, cannot possibly afford to be un-Islamic. If, in a particular case, it actually happens to be so, it may be the philosophy of this or that particular person or even, if one likes, the philosophy of this or that particular Muslim, but it will not be 'Muslim philosophy' properly speaking. Actually the distinction between the two concepts is only one of relative emphasis. In Islamic philosophy the emphasis is on 'Islam' while 'philosophy' is secondary in significance, meaning only a sort of rational understanding. In Muslim philosophy the characteristic terminology of philosophy in vogue at a particular period in history is visibly the dominant factor, because it is in that terminology that the meaning of the Qur'an is to be expressed and conveyed to others. Due to this the traditional problem of the reconciliation between philosophy and religion is, and has been, a problem of 'Muslim philosophy', rather than of 'Islamic philosophy'.

'Muslim philosophy' and 'Islamic philosophy' can be shown to be mutually fitting in another way also. A Muslim, we understand, can profess his religion at two levels: either he may hold only to the ritual and moral principles enunciated by the Qur'an and thus be a good Muslim in the socially acceptable sense of the term; or he may identify himself with the essence of Islam and so interiorise the ideals set forth by the 'Book of God'. The second meaning can be expressed no better than by an incident relating to the Holy Prophet (peace be on him). When someone asked Hazrat Aisha about his moral character, replied that his character was the Qur'an itself. Now when a Muslim is stationed at this level -- more or less, all his activities without exception will be 'Islamic'. Even his apparently ordinary and purely worldly behaviour will be 'religious' in the fullest and most genuine sense of the term. Specifically, for our present purposes, when he speculates consistently about any matter whatsoever, his philosophy will be no less 'Islamic philosophy' than 'Muslim philosophy'. It will be impossible to make a distinction between the two concepts.

Thus, ultimately, it is a matter of choosing a point of view, acquiring a vision of life and values. In the history of philosophy we encounter a number of godless, heretical doctrines. There is definitely nothing wrong in knowing and understanding these doctrines: "Knowledge is virtue", Socrates is reported to have said. What he meant obviously was that a recognition -- with the deepest concern and conviction at one's disposal -- of what virtue is irresistibly would lead one to the virtuous action. It can be complementarily added here that knowledge of vice is a virtue too because the more sincerely and honestly we are convinced that something is vicious, the more we shall tend to avoid it and, correspondingly, act virtuously. Analogically, given an organic assimilation of the Islamic spirit by one of faith, a study of even atheistic and naturalistic philosophies will fail to do any harm, but rather would put one to a test for which one is bound to qualify and as a result thereof to become a still better person in the scale of moral and spiritual values. Thus, it is the subjectivity of the person which is basically important.

Physical sciences today have, by and large, an entirely naturalistic worldview whose validity is not questioned. The man of science has a firm belief in sense-experience as the only source of knowledge, and in human reason as the adequate instrument of manipulation. The ground of this belief is not the principles of naturalism itself for this belief could be the discovery neither of sense-experience nor of reason. In reality, it has been occasioned by the vested motive of implementing a forced and artificial separation between the worldly and the religious, the natural and the supernatural -- the former to be reserved for so-called specialised scientific treatment and the latter placed under the suzerainty of the spiritual, the mystical and even the mythical. This unfortunate watertight distinction is not at all recognised by the Qur'an, whose epistemology as well as metaphysics is comprehensive and total. It lays great emphasis on the observation of nature

and its exploitation by humans for their own benefits; but, at the same time, it holds that there are signs of God in various facts of sense-experience. Nature comprises no less than the habits of God. "Knowledge of nature," says Iqbal, "is the knowledge of God's behaviour. In our observation of nature we are virtually seeking a kind of intimacy with the Absolute Ego."⁸

The Qur'anic concept *iman bil ghaib*, which is one of those essential qualifications without which a person would simply be incapable of getting guidance from the Qur'an,⁹ implies this metaphysical dimension of a study of the physical universe. It means that the spatio-temporal aspect of the world of ordinary observation is not the be-all and end-all of everything and that there is also a 'world beyond'. Just as the realm of life presides over the realm of matter and the realm of mind presides over the realm of both life and matter, so the *mo'min* has a strong conviction that at the highest level there is the realm of the Divine which permeates and presides over all the lower realms of existence -- matter, life and mind. Thus there is no absolute separation and no polarity between the 'natural' and the 'supernatural'. Conviction in this state of affairs was the rationale of the earliest Muslim pioneering interest in scientific studies, despite infatuation with the idealistic metaphysics of the Qur'an.

How does one determine the meaning of the statements which I have already described as the primary function of Muslim philosophy? It is illustrative to refer here to a distinction drawn by philosophers of language between primary and secondary meanings of words. The primary meaning of a word is its literal meaning, its lexical or reportive definition. Secondary meanings, on the other hand, are the various shades of significance of a word that it acquires during its lifetime i.e., its actual usage in situations of diverse characters. We can take up any dictionary to confirm this fact. This, really, is the economy measure woven into the very nature of conventional language so that a separate word need not be coined for every individual situation that one encounters. The Qur'an makes a distinction, which it is relevant to mention here, between the *muhkamat* and the *mutashabihat* among its verses.¹⁰ The former ones are basic and fundamental to the overall objectives of the Qur'an. Being thus of primary importance, their meanings are fixed and determined, and are the same everywhere and always. The latter, on the other hand, are amenable to various interpretations in accord with differing environmental situations, needs of people and even levels of human intellect and understanding. Being allegorical in nature, they have many layers of meaning, at least one of which must be relevant to a particular spatio-temporal context. Thus they ensure that the Qur'an is a book of guidance for everyone and for all times to come.

How should one interpret the allegorical verses which relate incidentally to the metaphysics of the Qur'an? There is a special inherent difficulty in the language of the Qur'an. It is truly believed that the Qur'an is the word of God: it is God's speech.¹¹ After having 'sent down' His speech, He has taken upon Himself to preserve its originality and save every syllable of it from any possible human interference and corruption.¹² On the other hand, it is also a plain fact that the Qur'an is couched in human language which Arabs developed over a period of time. Those thinkers who have exclusively stressed the latter position have been encouraged to understand the entire Qur'an literally i.e., in the sense in which we human beings would normally understand the meanings of words and propositions. For instance, God is described as hearing, moving, sitting on the throne, having eyes, a face and so on.¹³ These attributes of God were consciously or unconsciously accepted almost exactly in the same way in which they are employed as regards human beings. Similarly, angels for them were creatures with wings who flew here and there, sometimes assuming a human form. Heaven and hell were localities with all the actual paraphernalia ascribed to them in the Qur'an. And so on.¹⁴ These thinkers were the *mujassimah*, who wanted, in their own way, to remain closest to the word of God.

However this approach has never fitted in well with the requirements of a theistic religion and invariably has led to linguistic confusions. For example, when a human is called 'good' it is meant that he submits to the moral law or that he resists temptations, etc. When this epithet with these conventional meanings is applied to God, immediately we observe the oddities involved in our position. A God who is required to obey an alien moral law or who may harbour evil intentions is not at all the Supreme God of Islam Who deserves our unqualified obedience and Who is the Grand Ideal of all moral and spiritual endeavours. God is unique; so all His attributes are singular and have no proportion to the apparently corresponding human attributes.

Those philosophers, on the other hand, who have emphasised the essentially and exclusively Divine character of Qur'anic language, tend to believe that religious symbols are totally unmeaning marks insofar as ordinary human comprehension is concerned: they have no cognitive content for man. It is observed that religious statements are not statements worth the name because they do not mark out any one state of affairs. They are taken by the religious person to be compatible with any and every human situation. Specifically, our knowledge of objects and events has nothing to do with our knowledge of God's character. For instance, when we see floods, tempests and earthquakes upsetting human habitations, innocent persons dying in wars and accidents, or small children being snatched away by death from their parents, we still tenaciously hold on to the assertion that God is kind, loving, just, and so on. In this regard, a parable was developed by Antony Flew from a tale told by John Wisdom:

Once upon a time two explorers came upon a clearing in the jungle. In the clearing were growing many flowers and many weeds. One explorer says, 'Some gardener must tend this plot'. The other disagrees: 'There is no gardener'. So they pitch their tents and set to watch. No gardener is ever seen. 'But perhaps he is an invisible gardener'. So they set up a barbed wire fence. They electrify it. They patrol with bloodhounds. . . . But no shrieks ever suggest that some intruder has received a shock. No movements of the wire ever betray an invisible climber. The bloodhounds never give cry. Yet still the believer is not convinced. 'But there is a gardener invisible, intangible, insensible to electric shocks, a gardener who has no scent and makes no sound, a gardener who comes secretly to look after the garden which he loves'. At last, the sceptic despairs: 'But what remains of your original assertion? Just how does what you call an invisible, intangible, eternally elusive gardener differ from an imaginary gardener or even from no gardener at all?'¹⁵

Substituting God for gardener, the above is the celebrated 'argument from falsification' against the reportive and descriptive character of religious propositions. This argument has been criticised on many counts. For our present purposes we may simply point out that the assertion of a proposition and the falsification of its opposite cease to be complementary to each other specially when we are dealing with two different levels of existence. When we assert the attributes of God, we are describing a transcendental reality and our language is symbolic, but when we have to deny the opposites of these attributes we are dealing with the world of our normal experience and our language is literal. The words that we use in both these cases may be the same, but still their meanings are widely different because of the different universes of discourse to which they belong. Hence no comparison can be made between them nor can they stand at par with each other. However, to a layman or even to a rationalist for whom faith in God is extremely relevant to everyday life and for whom the Qur'an is the book of guidance in all departments of life, such a dissociation of normal experience from the Qur'anic metaphysics is simply unthinkable.

We have explained two extreme points of view regarding the meaning of religious language and have seen reasons to reject the claim of each one of them to exclusive truth. But, as both do have some elements of truth in them, the correct state of affairs must lie somewhere between them. The Muslim philosopher should set before himself the task of determining and delineating that middle state of affairs. He must search out the meaning of religious language which takes care of its Divine origin as well as its human context. How is this to be done? How and at what platform is a meeting between man and God to be arranged?

The way usually recommended in this connection and unwarily followed by laymen is the method of analogy. To understand what analogy is let's take the word 'healthy'. Normally this characteristic is attributed to a living organism. But then we also say about a complexion that it is healthy or that a particular drink or habit is healthy and so on. Similarly, we attribute sweetness to sugar, a smell, a song, a breeze or a little baby. This is the basis of an argument by analogy. Sugar, a smell, a song, a breeze or a little baby are sweet, not exactly in the same sense and not absolutely in different senses. Each one is sweet but so only according to its own specific nature. On this pattern, when we say about God that he is knowing, powerful, kind, just, or that He sees, hears, and so on, we usually understand these attributes on the analogy of verbally the same attributes in human beings. Man possesses them according to his nature and God would possess them according to His own nature.

But what God's nature is we don't know. It is obvious that unless we already know God to some extent analogy cannot operate fruitfully for a comprehensive understanding of His character. So the entire reasoning is misleading. Analogy is tolerably effective as long as all the analogates belong to the sensible nature. But the moment we talk about supersensible realm we are involved in a circle: in order to know God we must use analogy and for the use of analogy itself we must already know God's nature. However, if, for a moment, we do not take into account this 'unknown nature of God', the reasoning ultimately results in a position which is not very different from anthropomorphism.

Due to these difficulties some philosophers of religion have, instead, recommended what they call analogy of grace. According to this kind of analogy it is the characteristics of God that are ontologically first; their human analogues are derivative and secondary. It is by virtue of the grace of God that a liaison, a community, is established between Himself and human so that it is rendered possible for us to talk of Him in human terms. One cannot possibly talk about God in divine language, but He can condescend, if He chooses, to communicate with human in their language. "If," for instance, "we know about God as the creator, it is neither wholly nor partially because we have a prior knowledge of something which resembles creation. It is only because it has been given to us by God's revelation to know Him, and what we previously thought we knew about originators and causes is called in question, turned around and transformed."¹⁶ In the religious -- specifically, mystical -- literature of Islam, *taufiq* of God is pretty equivalent to the grace of God mentioned here. Ghazali calls it *nur-e-Ilahi* (light of God). In his autobiography *Al-Munqidh min al-Dalal*,¹⁷ Ghazali writes:

This (i.e. the truth) did not come about by systematic demonstration or marshalled argument, but by a light (*nur*) which God, Most High, cast into my breast. That light is the key to the greater part of knowledge. Whoever thinks that the understanding of things Divine rests upon strict proofs has in his thought narrowed down the wideness of God's mercy. . . . From that light must be sought an intuitive understanding of things Divine. That

light at certain times gushes forth from the springs of Divine generosity, and for it one must watch and wait.¹⁸

However, this 'watching and waiting' for 'Divine generosity' is not an entirely passive expectancy, but rather an acquisition with a positive content. In order to establish the credentials, the genuineness and authenticity of this state, which the Qur'an describes by the term *iman* or, more appropriately, *iman-bil-ghaib* a lot of concerted effort is required. Faith indicates an attitude of receptivity and preparedness to accept the will of God. The man of faith may be put on trial out of which invariably he emerges successful with a receptivity keener still and so a stronger and more indomitable faith. Even 'death in the way of God', the *shahadah*,¹⁹ would be incurred with a smiling face. It earns for the *shaheed* eternal life and constant companionship with God.

The grace or light of God as available to the man of faith necessarily requires that we establish a direct personal encounter with Him. By virtue of this encounter ultimately one is steeped in divinity so as to be able to look at everything, including the language of the Qur'an, with Divine effulgence and thus discover the true significance of His revelations. Canonical prayer, which is an effective instrument of encounter, has been given very great importance among the duties enjoined by the Islamic *shari'ah*. The Qur'an mentions it no less than 80 times. In the mystic literature of Islam, it is pointedly described as spiritual ascendance *par excellence* for the believers. There is no special way for the realization of this encounter. A mystic who struggles hard to realise his own selfhood (I-amness), a natural scientist who gets involved in the study of the physical universe, a historian who tries to discover the principles of the rise and fall of nations, a moralist who is in search of higher and higher ideals involved in human nature, and so on -- all are equally legitimate candidates for a meeting with God provided they are honest in their intentions, sincere in their efforts and strongly committed to the faith that beyond this world of space and time there is also a supersensuous and supernatural reality. According to the verdict of the Qur'an itself, the signs of God are spread everywhere in the universe: "And Allah's is the East and the West, so whithersoever you turn, thither is Allah's face."²⁰

What I have said concerning the function of Muslim philosophy appears to have a family resemblance with that known in the modern Anglo-American world as 'philosophical analysis'. The traditional philosophers, we know, had raised certain questions about the constitution of the universe, its relationship with appearances, etc. They laboured hard to answer these questions of supreme significance, but failed to arrive at any answer on which they could all agree. The modern linguistic philosophers are firmly of the opinion that the failure was due not to any defective reasoning on the part of these thinkers, but rather to their inability to evaluate the status of the questions themselves. These questions, it is now believed, were pseudo-questions and could not in fact admit of any answer: that is why even the most thorough investigations of the philosophers turned out to be futile and fruitless. Thus the language of the questions is to be analysed and their logic understood so that they can be dealt with properly. The philosophers of today are not only reformulating and rephrasing the questions; they are, in general, making efforts to construct a model language free from the ambiguities and vaguenesses that usually infest the ordinary, conventional language. Philosophical analysis is neither more nor less than "an obstinate pursuit of clarity in our meanings and in the way our meanings are expressed through language." However, as must be evident from above, the operation proposed here is different. Linguistic analysis in the West has been inspired by Logical Positivism, an empirical, naturalistic and anti-metaphysical movement which thrived on the idea that a truth in order to be genuine and valid must be either analytically or empirically verifiable. But as the language of the Qur'an is a revelation from God,

every syllable has an avowed metaphysical context. It has to be given a special kind of treatment, as detailed above.

God-consciousness, I reiterate, is of immense significance for the truest and the most authentic comprehension of the Qur'anic language. For the inculcation of God-consciousness what is required further is the purification of the self and bringing out its essential nature by eradicating from it all that is redundant and accretive. This, however, is the ideal and, like all ideals, is not completely realisable: it has to be approximated as much as is humanly possible. The more free from all contamination is a person's self the clearer becomes one's vision and the better equipped one's not only to see things in true perspective but also to act in a truly moral manner. One then attains a super-rational, mystical understanding of God, His will and His entire scheme of things, which is the subject-matter of the Qur'anic text.

Notes

1. For instance, the Qur'an says:
Do they not reflect on the Qur'an? Or, are there locks on their hearts? (47:24)
Surely the vilest of beasts, in Allah's sight, are the deaf, the dumb, who understand not (8:22).
And they (i.e., the residents of hell) say: Had we but listened or pondered, we should not have been among the inmates of the burning Fire (67:10).
2. Altaf Hussain Hali, *Hayat-e-Javed*, p. 274.
3. Muhammad Ismail Panipati, ed., *Maqalat-e Sir Sayyid*, vol. 3, p. 16.
4. *Ibid.*, vol. 13, p. 4.
5. This phrase has been quoted from Whitehead by Professor Stebbing who has herself coined the cognate phrase "local weather". See L.S. Stebbing, *A Modern Introduction to Logic*, p. 291.
6. Cf. Abu al-Hasan al-Ash'ari, *Risala Istihsan al-Khawdh fi Ilm al-Kalam*. This book has been translated into English by Richard J. McCarthy, *The Theology of al-Ash'ari*, pp. 120-130.
7. *Al-Iklimah* (Lahore: Research Journal of the Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab, 1975), vol. 6, p. 63.
8. Allama Muhammad Iqbal, *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 57.
9. The Qur'an, 2:2-3.
10. The Qur'an says: "He it is who has sent down to thee the Book. In it are verses basic or fundamental (*muhkamat*); they are the foundation of the Book; others are allegorical (*mutashabihat*)."
11. The Qur'an, 48:15, etc.
12. *Ibid.*, 15:9.
13. See the Qur'an, 20:39, 28:75, 2:272, etc.
14. This state of affairs has, by one stretch of imagination, encouraged the concept of God as a mystery and as essentially unknowable. Of course, we do not know God as we know objects in nature, but we do have faith in Him and this faith is no less than the most intimate awareness of Divine existence and an organic concern with Him. It has also occasioned a wrong view of the *barakah* of the "Book of God". Its entire worth, it is sometimes believed, lies in reciting it and in using this recitation for healing various mental, physical, spiritual ailments and for magically realizing various objectives, both desirable and undesirable.
15. See Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre, eds., *New Essays in Philosophical Theology*, pp. 96-99.

16. Quoted from Barth by John Macquarrie, *Twentieth Century Religious Thought*, p. 323.

17. This book has been translated into English by W. Montgomery Watt, *The Faith and Practice of al-Ghazali*.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

19. *Shahadah* is literally 'testimony' or 'bearing witness to'. The person laying down his life for the Divine cause bears witness to his commitment to one God and to His scheme of things. The proclamation of faith in Islam is also a *shahadah*. The man of faith says: I bear witness (*ashhada*) that there is no god but God and that Muammad (peace be on him) is His messenger. This formula is announced by the official announcer to prayers (*Mu'azzin*) at the highest pitch of his voice five times a day.

20. The Qur'an, 2:115.

Chapter X

Knowledge: An Islamic Perspective

B. H. Siddiqui

Cultural Value of Knowledge

Culture is a way of life peculiar to a people. It is a way of looking at things and acting accordingly. Every way of life is based on a body of knowledge of man and the universe he lives in. Knowledge determines man's attitude towards his own self (*anfus*) and the universe (*afaq*) in general, and his place in the universe in particular, besides setting norms to which his thoughts and actions must conform. All beliefs, ideals and values -- sacred or secular -- spring from the worldview that emerges from the fund of knowledge at the disposal of a community. This is to say that knowledge is the root of culture and culture is the fruit of knowledge. Culture is like the knowledge on which it is based. Its value can be judged by the type of individuals it produces and of society it establishes. It is not enough for man to be born physically. One is made human through a cultural birth, through the inculcation of knowledge along with the beliefs, ideals and values it carries with it. The primary fact about man is that he is not only a social but a cultural being. It is culture that gives meaning to what the Qur'an calls the divine *amanah* and *khilafah*, and makes man worthy of the exalted position of the moral agent of God on earth.

Thus knowledge is normative through and through. It is value-full, and not value-free and neutral as the Western scientists would have us believe. It is value-full, because it is based on the unshakeable belief that God is the creator as well as the sustainer of man and of the world he lives in. He created the world *ex nihilo*, not in sport, but with a definite purpose in view. It is this fundamental belief that should be reflected in all a man's thoughts, feelings and actions, and in all the divisions of knowledge -- physical, biological, social and normative -- developed by man himself.

Belief in God is not an end in itself, but a means to action in accord with it. Since knowledge is a precondition of action, Islam exhorts us to acquire and transmit knowledge as a matter of duty. It ordains the Prophet (SAWS) to pray: "My Lord! increase me in knowledge."¹ The Prophet (SAWS) in turn implored God not to burden him with knowledge which is not beneficial for him.² In saying this he showed a keen awareness of what we call today "the sociology of knowledge." He esteemed and desired knowledge not for its own sake, but for reforming the individual and reconstructing society on a sound basis. Because of the moral and social implications of knowledge, he bade his followers to "seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave",³ and "go in search of it as far as China".⁴ Not content with this, he unreservedly made "the acquisition of knowledge incumbent upon every Muslim male and female".⁵ The story does not end here. Once knowledge is acquired by an individual, it becomes obligatory for him to spread it as far as possible.⁶ What is learnt must be transmitted to others. There is no knowledge without teaching, and no Islam without knowledge. That is why the Prophet (SAWS) said: "Verily! I was not sent but as a teacher".⁷ Knowledge, as the root of culture, is not given to man at birth. He has to acquire it for himself at the feet of a teacher and undertake long travels for it. F. Rosenthal's *Knowledge Triumphant* (E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1970), is a refreshing account of the zealous pursuit of knowledge in the world of Islam.

For whatever purposes other creatures might have been created, man has been created primarily to know what is good for him and to order his life accordingly. One cannot choose and

attain goodness unless one knows what it is. Knowledge is power; it is a great cultural force that controls human ideas and actions, paves the way for moral struggle, and leads to the growth of a strong moral conscience which is the source of all good actions. The knowledge which makes man a really good man is not left to one's reason to ascertain, to one's personal likes to determine or to considerations of being beneficial to the society as a whole. Instead, it is revealed directly by God to prophets, the Qur'an being the last and final revelation in this regard. Since virtue is knowledge, God has taken it upon Himself to provide man this knowledge.

That virtue is knowledge is an unchallengeable proposition. Unless one knows what virtue is, one cannot strive to attain it. But Socrates, for one, thought otherwise. To say that virtue is knowledge, he said, is a half truth. The whole truth is that knowledge is virtue.⁸ What he stresses is that knowledge is not only the necessary, but the sufficient condition of virtue. It is the highest good. No one pursues that which he knows to be evil; he does so in all ignorance. But this is certainly not true, for more often than not we see the better and approve of it, but pursue the evil. What Socrates failed to see is that knowledge is a matter of intellect, while virtue is a matter of will, and there is no direct way from the intellect to the will. Feeling that intervenes between them and paves the way for the choice of good in preference to what is evil. Thus knowledge, though a necessary, is not the sufficient condition of virtue. What assures the choice of the good is not mere knowledge, but knowledge coupled with feeling. Feeling provides the motive power for voluntary actions. In his zeal to provide morality with a purely rational basis Socrates displaced feeling by intellect and completely eliminated the role of feeling or heart in volition. He demolished the edifice of conventional morality, but to fill the resultant void he failed in his attempt to reconstruct it on an exclusively rational basis. No wonder he was charged with corrupting the Athenian youth, and a cup of poison sealed his fate.

Just as knowledge is a means of attaining virtue, of gaining power over one's own self, so also it is a tool for gaining power over nature (*afaq*) and harnessing its stupendous forces in the service of man. But it is not the same knowledge that leads to self-conquest and to the conquest of nature. Knowledge: the knowledge of what is morally good for man, and knowledge of what is materially useful for him are two different kinds of knowledge. The former is the prerogative of religion, the product of revelation; the latter is the privilege of science, the product of inductive intellect which, as Iqbal is convinced, was made self-conscious by the recurrent appeal of the Qur'an to reason and experience.⁹ Since the knowledge of what is materially useful is as essential for man as the knowledge of what is morally good, he needs both science and religion for steering through life in this world. What he needs is not science without religion, but science structured by religion. Conversely, what he requires is not religion without science and philosophy, but religion given intellectual content, wherever possible, by science as well as philosophy, without doing violence to its spiritual framework. Western science is positivistic and atheistic. It is value free and poses a threat to the continuance of life on earth, if it is not tempered with the high ideals and values preached by religion. Culture is not mere virtue or self-conquest, nor mere power or conquest of nature, but an organic unity of the two; it is a happy blend of science and religion. Man is neither mere body nor mere spirit, but an embodied spirit. The knowledge which will adequately answer to the needs of this complex of body and spirit must be one in which science and religion are completely integrated.

Intellectual Temper of Islam

The one thing that we must always remember about Islam is that it is rationalistic and mobile in spirit. It is rationalistic, because reason acts in it as the deputy of revelation. It is mobile and forward looking, because of *ijtihad* as the principle of movement in its structure. Revelation in it does not stand above reason; nor does reason stand above revelation, as rightly stressed by Arberry, al-Faruki and others.

Secondly, Islam is not only rationalistic and mobile, but a universal and comprehensive religion. Its law embraces both the spiritual and the temporal, the *anfus* and *afaq*. Religion "is not a departmental affair; it is neither mere thought, nor mere feeling, nor mere action; it is the expression of the whole man."¹⁰ It employs all the three modes of consciousness in arriving at the knowledge of reality. Besides revelation it uses sense-perception for the knowledge of things concrete, intellection for the knowledge of things abstract, and intuition for the knowledge of things spiritual, besides revelation. It does not confine its epistemology to any one of these sources, for in that case it would cease to be the expression of the whole man and would be reduced to a truncated expression of one or the other part of his nature, at the cost of doing injustice to the remaining part or parts of it.

Thirdly, there is no room for renunciation of the world in Islam. It exhorts us to pray for the good in this world and the good in the hereafter.¹¹ It further reminds us not to forget to take our share from the world.¹² We must always seek the good of the world to come, but not at the cost of the good here and now. This makes it abundantly clear that neither the spiritualism of religion nor the naturalism of science taken singly can solve all our problems. What we require today is the integration of science and faith, of facts and values, of foresight, hindsight and insight.

Fourthly, Islam is characteristically a religion of moderation in all spheres of life, extremism of any sort is alien to its spirit. The distinguishing feature of Muslims is that they are 'a community of the middle path'.¹³ They are neither extravagant nor niggardly in matters of expenditure, but hold a just balance between the two extremes.¹⁴ Allah does not love those who exceed the limit set by moderation.¹⁵ Epistemology is no exception to it. With moderation as the cardinal principle of Islam, it has no room for arch rationalism, arch empiricism or arch intuitionism in it. It strips off these theories of their extremism to suit its moderate temper.

Finally, the nature of an act in Islam unmistakably depends upon the intention (*niyyat*) with which it is done,¹⁶ as is clearly stated by the Prophet (SAWS). In other words, "It is the invisible mental background of the act which determines its character. An act is temporal or profane, if it is done in a spirit of detachment from the infinite complexity of life behind it; it is spiritual if it is inspired by that complexity",¹⁷ as elaborated by Iqbal. An act, though secular in its import, is spiritual, if it is done to earn the pleasure of God; it is profane if it is done without any such concern. We should never lose sight of the fact, says Iqbal, that "the spirit finds its opportunities in the natural, the material, the secular. All that is secular is, therefore, sacred in the root of its being . . . the merely material has no substance until we discover it rooted in the spiritual. There is no such thing as a profane world. All this immensity of matter constitutes scope for the self-realisation of spirit."¹⁸ Since God is the creator and sustainer of the world, the knowledge which science gives us about it is the knowledge of the work of God. In other words, "The knowledge of nature is the knowledge of God's behaviour."¹⁹ Nature is to God what habit is to man. This leaves us in no doubt that a scientist, in his study of the phenomena of nature, is essentially in 'an act of prayer'.

Knowledge: A Gift of God

Since God is the creator of the world, Islam assigns transcendental value both to things empirical and to knowledge of them. It is God who created the world out of nothing, and it is He who is the source of all knowledge about it. All knowledge begins and ends with Him. The object of knowledge is nothing but the realisation of God; both teaching and learning are directed to achieve this objective.

Knowledge is a gift of God to man; it is He who taught man the use of the pen and taught him that which he knew not;²⁰ he bade him to read with His blessed name.²¹ What He taught man is no secret. He taught Adam among other things 'the names of all things'²² of the world in which his lot was cast. Names are of two kinds: proper and common. Proper names are non-connotative; they are not given because of any essential attribute inherent in the objects named. They denote individuals, but connote no attributes. For example, Karachi, Lahore and Aslam and Ahmad are the names of individual cities and men which serve the social purpose of identification. Common names which God taught to Adam are denotative as well as connotative. They are given because of the attributes which essentially belong to the objects named. They not only denote the individuals of a class, but also connote their attributes. For instance, the essential attributes of man are animality and rationality. We call him man because of the possession of these attributes. Thus when God taught Adam 'the names of all things', He made him conversant with the essences of things of the world where he was destined to be sent. He did not bless angels with this knowledge, for they did not need it in heaven. It is the possession of knowledge of the things of the world which gave Adam a higher position than the angels in deference to which they had to bow before Adam. God gave this knowledge to Adam as a weapon to control his environment. But he did not give him knowledge of each particular thing of the world. He gave him analytic as well as speculative intellect as the source of the knowledge, respectively of the concrete and the abstract and thereby gave him instant knowledge of 'all things' of the world. "The first thing God created was the intellect,"²³ said the Prophet (SAWS).

Rationality is the specific difference of man, distinguishing him from the rest of the animals. Animals are devoid of reason and so they are not required to learn how to live in the world. They are born fully equipped with a natural way of life and live at the level of instinct. They are armed with physical weapons of defence, e.g., horns, hoofs, paws, sharp teeth, swift running feet, feathers, etc., to protect themselves against possible dangers. This is not the case with man. He has to learn everything in the world and invent weapons to defend himself against threats to his life. Not nature, but he himself is his teacher. God-given knowledge comes to his rescue and gives him power over himself as well as his environment. It not only preserves his life, but also makes it worth living. It is his only weapon in the struggle for existence; without knowledge he cannot survive on this planet.

Knowledge has not only survival but immense cultural value for man. It is knowledge which makes man a human, a creature of high ideals and values, the moral agent of God on earth. It beautifies his life and infuses him with the spirit of godliness.

Value

Since God is the fountainhead of knowledge, it is value-full. It brings with it a complete system of beliefs, ideals and values inseparably linked with its teleological worldview, as opposed to the value free mechanistic worldview of the secular Western science. It instil's in us the belief

that the world, far from being an accidental juxtaposition of the blind forces of nature, is a creation of an all wise and all good God. He created it with the sole objective of seeing which of us is intensely God conscious in his thoughts, feelings and handsomely good in conduct. It is normative knowledge which helps us in realising the ideal of good life here as well as in the hereafter. The Qur'an gives us moral guidance; it is a book of transcendent morality. It seldom speaks of *kitab* (knowledge) alone, but pairs this with *hikmah* (wisdom).²⁴ The Book gives us knowledge of the true objective of the creation of man. Wisdom makes us realise the rationale, value and importance of this knowledge for ordering our life, individual and collective, in accordance with it. This consists in reflecting on what we already know, and implies extension in depth, in internalising knowledge, rather than in extending the frontiers of knowledge. Every wisdom is at the same time knowledge, but every knowledge is not wisdom. This gives knowledge an edge over wisdom, but it is wisdom, not mere knowledge, which has sole value in the eyes of God. "Whosoever is given wisdom, is given abundant good,"²⁵ says the Qur'an.

Again, since God is the creator of the world and the source of all our knowledge about it, Reality is at once being and knowledge. The knower and the known are not poles apart; there is no cleavage between the subject and the object of knowledge. The knower and the known fuse into one in the act of knowing. It is the presence of "the infinite in the movement of knowledge that makes finite thinking possible,"²⁶ says Iqbal. In other words, "thought, in the very act of knowledge, passes beyond its own finitude. The finitudes of nature are reciprocally exclusive. Not so the finitudes of thought which is, in its essential nature, incapable of limitation and cannot remain imprisoned in the narrow circuit of its own individuality."²⁷ Thought, stripped of positivistic Western rationality, is indeed 'a greeting of the finite with the Infinite'.²⁸ Insofar as he has body, man is a part of nature, but nonetheless is not a mere cog in the machine of the universe. Unlike other parts of nature, he is conscious of his being a part of nature, because of being substantially more than a mere part of nature. He is conscious that the world and himself are two distinct realities. He is not only conscious, but self-conscious, which breaks the chains of his finitude and establishes his contact with the Infinite.

Knowledge: An Organic Whole

The distinguishing feature of knowledge in Islam is that it is value-full, normative through and through. Its normative characteristic is not a mere matter of thought, feeling or volition, but an organic whole of all these aspects of consciousness. Islamic epistemology is, therefore, not restricted to the revelations made by God to the Prophet (SAWS), to intuitions characteristic of mystics, to the abstract speculations of philosophers, or to the concrete thought of scientists. It is an integrated whole of the knowledge derived from all these sources, for without this integration it cannot satisfy the demands both of the head and the heart. Neither mere intellectual nor mere emotional satisfaction would make man a whole man. Dissatisfaction with any side of this nature would disturb the balanced growth of his personality, and he would remain far away from the ideal of the whole man as envisaged by Islam.

Knowledge is the result of interaction between the knower and the known, man and the world, *anfus* and *afaq*. From either of the two angles we view it, it is invariably structured by the whole of human consciousness, besides revelation. Viewing it from the side of the world, we cannot make it wholly intelligible, if we restrict ourselves to any one form of consciousness such as thought, feeling or volition. In order to attain a true and comprehensive knowledge we must integrate the findings of reason, sense-perception, intuition and revelation into a well-knit whole.

Light from only one direction does not and cannot illumine the whole of reality in all its manifestations, temporal and spiritual. The Qur'an regards both *anfus*²⁹ and *afaq*³⁰ as the veritable sources of human knowledge. The outer experience of man no less than his inner experience yields knowledge of Reality in its own way. Hence "it is the duty of man to judge the knowledge yielding capacity of all aspects of experience."³¹ Thus Islamic epistemology is neither exclusively rationalist, nor empiricist, nor intuitionist. It is an integrated whole of rationalism, empiricism and intuitionism, under the overriding authority of the knowledge revealed by God to the Prophet (SAWS).

Sources of Knowledge: Divine and Human

Man is a questioning being; he raises questions to satisfy his thirst for knowledge. The Qur'an is a model of the question-answer form of knowledge. Who created the world and all that is in it? How did His creation take place? Why was the world created at all? What is the place of man in it? The most certain answer to all these questions was revealed by God to the Prophet Muhammad (SAWS). The history of revelation begins with Adam and ends with Muhammad (SAWS). The Qur'an is the last and final revelation of God who has taken it upon Himself to preserve it in all its purity of letter and spirit. It particularly gives us knowledge of what virtue is and how it is to be attained. The one condition of becoming virtuous in accordance with it, is unquestionable faith in its veracity. 'Believe in order to understand' is the standard of Divine knowledge for belief not only yields knowledge, but also provides an impulse to action.

I shall now turn from the Divine to the human sources of knowledge of the world and its creator. These are intuition, sense-perception and intellection. Intuition is inner-perception of the self (*anfus*), an immediate certainty of the heart (*fawad*) without the aid of the senses or intellect. It is a question put to one's own self, the answer to which lies in meditating over the self where one encounters Reality face to face. This inner experience is called ecstasy, and the knowledge yielded by it is called esoteric, as opposed to the knowledge which we call exoteric. Positivistic rationalists identify reality with what is observable, and so regard the intuitions of the heart or feeling as non-cognitive. But man is not an invention of the Renaissance; He is a creation of God with Whom he has emotional involvement. As a form of human consciousness, feeling is not devoid of cognitive content, but in its own way is a source of knowledge and reaches the innermost core of reality.

The Qur'an recognises not only the intuitions of the *anfus*, but also the sense-experience of *afaq* as a veritable source of human knowledge: senses are the gateways of our knowledge of the external world. Of these, the Qur'an specially draws our attention to 'hearing and sight',³² the two major tools of science. The knowledge thus obtained, when internalised, makes us see the signs of God in the sun, the moon, the mountains, the rivers, the fields of corn, the orchards,³³ in the clouds held in the air,³⁴ in the lengthening out of shadows,³⁵ in the alteration of day and night,³⁶ in fact in the whole of nature revealed to human sense-perception. It is the frequent emphasis of the Qur'an on the faculties of "hearing and sight" that made self-consciousness the rational and scientific faculties of man, and convinced Iqbal beyond any shadow of doubt that "the birth of Islam . . . is the birth of inductive intellect".³⁷ Scientific knowledge is based on sense-experience, that is, on observation and experiment. Observation is watching a fact; experiment is making a fact through a question put to nature. We should not feel shy of asking questions, for it is the questions, said the Prophet, which yield knowledge.

Sense-experience gives us knowledge of the concrete and finite. Intellection gives us knowledge of the abstract and immutable. The one is called scientific knowledge, the other philosophic knowledge which the Qur'an calls *hikmah* (wisdom). Science is concerned with facts, philosophy with the meaning of facts; it discovers the value and worth of things. Science is analytic, philosophy is analytic as well as speculative. Science tell us something about everything, but there are no things about which it tells us everything. Its explanations are partial and quantitative; it is concerned with the how and how much of things, and with their manner of acting. But the mind of man is so constituted that it longs to know not only how things act, but why they do as they do; it craves to know the why and wherefore of things as well. This knowledge is provided by philosophy which seeks to comprehend the world as a whole, particularly with regard to its meaning, purpose and value for human existence, which concern it shares with religion.

Philosophy is a consistent and persistent effort to think clearly. It is the art of thinking things through. Its essence lies in a discursive movement of thought. *Hujjah*³⁸ (argument) *burhan* (proof)³⁹ and *jadal* (disputation)⁴⁰ are the three words which the Qur'an uses interchangeably for this discursive exercise. The knowledge obtained through the discursive movement of thought is certain only epistemically (*ilm al-yaqin*).⁴¹ It does satisfy the mind of its certitude, but possesses theoretical certainty at best, as opposed to what the Qur'an calls the certainty of sight (*ain al-yaqin*)⁴² characteristic of personal observation. The highest degree of certitude belongs to the knowledge revealed by God to the prophets which the Qur'an calls truth of assured certainty (*haqq al-yaqin*).⁴³

Possibility of a Synthetic Approach to Knowledge

Islam is essentially and fundamentally a religion of moderation; extremism is alien to its spirit. Committed to the accommodative principle of moderation, its epistemology is neither exclusively rationalist, nor empiricist, nor intuitionist. It employs all the sources of knowledge -- reason, sense-experience and intuition -- to arrive at the knowledge of truth, and integrates the relative truth supplied by them with the absolute truth revealed by God to the Prophet Muhammad (SAWS). A question may be raised here. Is it possible to harmonise the knowledge supplied by divergent sources into a well-knit whole? Do not rationalism, empiricism and intuitionism mutually exclude each other; if not, how can these be integrated into a meaningful whole?

The objection cannot be sustained. When we hear a song on television, our ears and eyes give us knowledge of two different sorts, the one pertaining to the realm of sound, the other to that of sight. But nobody doubts the unity of the knowledge thus arrived at. Its dualism is lost in the unity of the singer. Likewise, thought and intuition have distinct roles to play and operate at different levels. They are not essentially opposed to each other. "They spring up," writes Iqbal, "from the same root and complement each other. The one grasps reality piecemeal, the other grasps it in its wholeness. The one fixes its gaze on the eternal, the other on the temporal aspect of reality. . . . Both are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation. Both seek the visions of the same reality which reveals itself to them in accordance with their function in life."⁴⁴ Springing from the same root, thought and intuition are organically related and cannot be antagonistic to each other. If we agree with Bergson that intuition is a higher kind of intellect,⁴⁵ the possibility of their being antagonistic to each other is entirely ruled out.

Again the Qur'an does not separate the faculties of hearing and sight, the two major tools of inductive intellect, from the faculty of heart, the seat of intuition. At more than one place it pairs the one set of faculties with the other faculty: "It is He who has made for you the faculties of

hearing, sight and feeling (*fawad*), but little ye thank Him for these." This pairing of the two kinds of faculties suggests that there is a close affinity between them, and so they cannot be antagonistic to each other.⁴⁶ The outer experience of *afaq* must, in its last analysis, agree with the inner experience of *anfus*.

Consequences of Desacralization of Knowledge

With philosophy as a handmaid of religion, knowledge continued to be sacramental till the Middle Ages. The revolt of the Italian Renaissance and the German Reformation against authority and tradition of all kinds, and the gradual rise of science as an intellectual and social force, particularly in its violent conflict with the Church, played a decisive role in desacralizing sacred knowledge, and ushered in the modern era of secular science and technology. The spirit of the modern age is rationalistic in the sense that it makes human reason the highest authority in the pursuit of knowledge, and naturalistic in that it seeks to explain the inner and outer nature without supernatural presuppositions. Belief in God is reduced to a presupposition of a prescientific era. Man is not a servant of God, but desires to become God. Religious humanism is replaced by a humanism of the scientific sort which puts human interests above everything else, making man the source of all knowledge -- the knowledge of what is materially useful, as well as of what is morally good. This humanism lies at the root of all the ills -- political, social and moral -- of the modern world.

Modernity is proud of separating the State from the Church. But this divorce of politics from religion has reduced it to a weapon of plunder, loot and destruction. Iqbal's New Year message broadcast from the All India Radio Station, Lahore, on January 1, 1938, is a brilliant monograph on the religionless politics of the modern world.

Remember, man can be maintained on this earth only by honouring mankind, and this world will remain a battle ground of ferocious beasts of prey unless and until the educational forces of the whole world are directed to inculcating in man respect for mankind. Do you not see that the people of Spain, though they have the same common bond of one race, one nationality, one language and one religion, are cutting one another's throats and destroying their culture and civilisation by their own hands owing to a difference in their economic creed. This one event shows clearly that national unity too is not a very durable force. Only one unity is durable, and this unity is the brotherhood of man, which is above race, nationality, colour or language. So long as this so-called democracy, this accursed nationalism and this degraded imperialism are not shattered, so long as men do not demonstrate by their actions that they believe that the whole world is the family of God, so long as distinctions of race, colour and geographical nationalities are not wiped out completely, they will never be able to lead a happy and contented life, and the beautiful ideals of liberty, equality and fraternity will never materialise.⁴⁷

Three and a half months after the establishment of Pakistan, an education conference was hastily held at Karachi, from November 27 to December 1, 1947, to formulate broad guidelines for shaping the future education policy of Pakistan. In his spirited presidential address to the conference Fazlur Rahman, the then education minister, highlighted the inhumanism of desacralised knowledge, and laid pointed emphasised developing and shaping the spiritualist outlook of the students with the zeal of a reformist:

I attach the highest importance to the spiritual element, for its neglect, which has characterised modern education, has had disastrous consequences, and the experience of

two World Wars as also the vast technological inventions of recent years, fraught as they are with incalculable possibilities of destruction, have brought home to us the realisation that unless the moral or spiritual growth of man keeps pace with the growth of science, he is doomed to utter destruction. It is surely a profoundly disturbing thought that every step forward in the domain of knowledge should be attended not with a diminution but with an increase in barbarism and frightfulness, so that the pursuit of knowledge becomes a self-defeating process.⁴⁸

Desacralized knowledge has made man spiritually homeless; he has become a stranger to himself. The anguish of self-alienation has ruined him. "The greatest problem of our time," says S. M. Vujica, "is to find a way of preserving the humanity of man, and preventing the erosion of spiritual and moral values in an age dominated by science and technology, which by their very nature are incapable of promoting these larger human goals, and may even be destructive to them." As one man put it, "The future of the human race lies in its humanity, . . . A purely scientific civilisation, destitute of ideals and values, devoid of the humanising and mellowing influence of religion, philosophy and art, would be as cruel for the soul as the pre-scientific civilisation was for the body."⁴⁹

The main problem of the twentieth century, says Andre Malraux, is to fill the vacuum created by the nineteenth century's loss of faith. And the way to fill this vacuum is to reaffirm man's spiritual dimension. The answer is humanism of a religious sort. "The greatest need of this age is a great prophet who can accept the facts of science and at the same time give inspiration to fill the great spiritual void,"⁵⁰ observes Dr. H. Urey. Spengler sounds a strong note of pessimism about the fate of the earth-rooted civilisation of the West. Both Sorokin and Toynbee call for a spiritual rehabilitation of modern man returning to the religious idealism of the past, for science cannot heal the wounds of the spirit.

Notes

1. *Qur'an*, 20:114.
2. *Bukhari*, vol. I (Lahore: Hamid and Compnay).
3. Haji Khalifa, *Kashf al-Zunun*, vol. I (Liepzig, 1825), p. 13.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
5. *Mishkat al-Masabih*, vol. I (Lahore: Al-Faisal Publishing Co., n.d.), p. 87.
6. *Qur'an*, 3:184.
7. *Mishkat*, vol. I, p. 87.
8. F. Thilly and L. Wood, *A History of Philosophy* (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1955), p. 86.
9. Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, ed. M. Saeed Sheikh (Lahore: Institute of Islamic Culture, 1986), p. 101.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 2.
11. *Qur'an*, 2:201.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, 2:143.
14. *Ibid.*, 25:67.
15. *Ibid.*, 2:190.
16. *Bukhari*, vol. I, pp. 94, 119; vol. III, p. 53.

17. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 122.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
21. *Ibid.*, 96:1.
22. *Ibid.*, 2:31.
23. Cited by al-Ghazali, *Ihya al-Ulum*, vol. I kitab al-Ilm, translated into English by Nabih Amin Fairs, Sh, Muhammad Ashraf (Lahore, 1962), p. 222; E. Gilson, *The Unity of Philosophical Experience* (London, 1938), 9-34.
24. *Qur'an*, 1:129; 3:164.
25. *Ibid.*, 2:269.
26. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*, 41:53; 51:21.
30. *Qur'an*, 41:53; 51:21.
31. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
32. *Qur'an*, 16:78; 32:9; 67:23.
33. *Ibid.*, 13:16; 16:11.
34. *Ibid.*, 24:43.
35. *Ibid.*, 25:44-45.
36. *Ibid.*, 2:159.
37. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 101.
38. *Qur'an*, 6:82; 6:149; 4:165.
39. *Ibid.*, 2:111; 21:24; 27:64; 38:32; 28:75.
40. *Ibid.*, 16:125.
41. *Ibid.*, 102:5.
42. *Ibid.*, 102:7.
43. *Ibid.*, 69:51.
44. Iqbal, *op. cit.*, p. 2.
45. H.L. Bergson, *Creative Evolution* (London: 1911), pp. 187-88.
46. *Qur'an*, 16:78; 32:9; 67:23.
47. L.A. Shervani, ed., *Speeches and Writings and Statements of Iqbal* (Lahore: Iqbal Academy, 1977), pp. 250-51.
48. F. Rahman, *New Education in the Making in Pakistan* (London, 1953), pp. 6-7.
49. *Proceedings of the Eighth Session of the Pakistan Philosophical Congress* (Karachi, 1961), p. 171.
50. *Ibid.*, p. 172.

Part III
Pakistan Philosophy in the British Tradition

Chapter XI

On Sense and Nonsense

Kazi A. Kadir

When the early Wittgenstein declared that most of what usually went by the name of philosophy was nonsense,¹ Ramsey reminded him that it was an important nonsense which should be taken seriously.² Wittgenstein then informed us that philosophy was a kind of disease,³ a sort of sickness, which needed a therapeutic treatment. We had only to show the senselessness of philosophical thought as if they were a kind of obsessive fear and frustration and the therapist could show that they were unreasonable fears.

But why must philosophy be a sort of nonsense or a kind of disease. And if it is such, why has it also to be an 'important nonsense'? Can 'nonsense' be important, and finally what is 'nonsense' anyway?

'Sense' and 'nonsense' are usually regarded as polar concepts. We talk about 'sense' in opposition to 'nonsense'; a reference to one excludes talk about the other. What is nonsense cannot at the same time be sensible; an assertion about the one is taken to be a legitimate rejection of the other. However, talk about the one is not complete without the other since these concepts are, in fact, defined in terms of mutual exclusion; what is one, the other is not. But the burden of definition lies on 'sense' rather than on 'nonsense'; we lay down the structure of sense, and what does not fit in this structure is rejected as nonsense.

When we use the word 'sense' in opposition to 'nonsense' usually we mean that it is 'understandable' and 'cognitively acceptable'. When we say of a discourse that 'it makes sense' or 'it is sensible', we need not say also that it is 'meaningful'.

A sentence or talk may not be meaningless, yet it may be nonsensical. Imagine a case where, after hearing a certain explanation of an event or after being told of a reason for a decision, a person may say, "It was nonsense." I may ask my young nephew not to talk nonsense when he says that he saw fairies in my room last evening or that he was afraid of going to the storeroom because he thought there were ghosts there. Or again, my exclaiming "What nonsense" when someone tells me that the light went out without any reason, etc.

In all such cases when we use the term 'nonsense', we mean that what is being said is either not backed up by cogent reasons, there are no reasons, some further reasons are needed, or that some facts are lacking. We have a hazy idea "that if such and such things are also said or done" then this talk would make sense. We always have a criterion in such situations and when all the elements of the talk fulfil that criterion we say, "It makes sense". If that is not possible or is not done, the talk is described as 'nonsensical'.

To 'have meaning' is to fulfil a 'semantic criterion'; to 'have sense' is to fulfil a 'context criterion'.

To invoke a semantic criterion in order to signify the 'meaning' of a talk is to refer to the role or function the elements of that talk are supposed to perform. There can be other semantic criteria too, e.g., of mirroring or referring to images. A semantic criterion holds good in the case of indicatives and utterly fails with regard to imperatives and performatives. There are can-sentences as well as must-sentences but some such as do-sentences come under neither head. It has been the general practice to regard the indicatives as (1) different from the can- and the must-sentences, and (2) as more fundamental in the sense that what has 'meaning' must be reducible to the indicative-structure and that what fails any such reduction is nonsensical. Thus, it is believed that the can-

sentences and must-sentences should be assimilated to the indicatives. Accordingly, to say that "I promise to return this book tomorrow" is to say that "I am prepared or set to behave in a particular manner" and the sentence "I promise to return this book tomorrow" is descriptive of this set or preparedness.⁴ But is this reduction or assimilation really correct? "I can walk ten miles a day" is not reducible to "I have just walked ten miles today" which does fulfil the semantic criterion, if I have just walked ten miles that day. But then "I can walk ten miles a day" is not nonsensical.

This 'either-reducible-or-nonsensical' principle, though correct, is derived from too restrictive a notion of meaning assimilable to truth. Meaning is confined to what is true or that which may possibly be true. This leads us to the strange conclusion that whatever is false or is liable to be false is nonsensical and meaningless. Unless we are writing a highly personalised dictionary, such a cavalier attitude towards conventional usage can hardly be allowed.

The only way out of this situation is that while still holding the necessity of the reduction of non-indicatives to indicatives, one refer to the 'odd job'⁵ character of words. Meaning then will not involve 'truth' but will refer to a medley of roles and functions. However, what is overlooked here is that to say that someone is engaged in odd jobs does not tell a person what sort of job he is doing. 'Odd job' is not another job. To say 'meaning is not one but many' is not very illuminating. If such is the case then the very attempt to assimilate the performatives and the imperatives to the indicatives will meet failure.

We must then treat sentences like "I can walk ten miles a day", "I hope you get good marks in the finals" independently of sentences like "Ishurdi is between Dacca and Rajshahi", etc. All this amounts to treating 'sense' independently of 'meaning', and having a criterion for sense different from the criterion of meaningfulness. The sense-criterion, as I have said earlier, will be called the context-criterion.

However, one may object that if 'sense' is contextual, so is meaning. The semantic criterion is fulfilled in a context. The meaning of 'knowing', it may be said, is contextual to human capacities and dispositions. If both 'meaning' and 'sense' are contextual, what reason can there be to distinguish one from the other? I hope this can be explained with help from an artist's vocabulary. Let us take the example of colour. Colour is one form of radiant energy.⁶ One colour is distinguished from the other because of a difference in wavelengths. The colour red will have a wavelength different, say, from that of yellow. However, there are different kinds of reds. When red is placed along with light brown, it undergoes a very decisive change. It loses its luminosity. If placed against a white background, red attains a kind of brightness which it did not have when it was placed beside brown. It is called 'red' in both the situations or contexts, yet it 'looks' different. A colour's vibratic-criterion is analogous to a word's 'semantic-criterion',⁷ while its 'context-criterion' is not very different from the principle according to which because of different colour contexts, a colour may undergo a series of gradual chromatic changes. Similarly a word may undergo such context variations and have different senses without losing its meaning. The principle of the chromatic changes because of the presence of different colours is a clue to the different senses of words. Words acquire different senses because of the human contexts in which they are employed. The sentence "shut the door" addressed to a son by a father and then again by the son to his father 'means' the same but 'sounds different'; the words are the same but they have a different 'ring'. Words 'sound different', acquire 'different senses' and give different 'rings' because we have gone beyond the notion of function (semantic criterion) to the concept of human ends and purposes. Function is a purely instrumental concept where we deal with tools and appliances; apart from one's own self, others are taken merely as replaceable and manipulable

entities. But to invoke the context-criterion, to talk about the sense of a word, is to refer to persons rather than to things, and to open the vista of human relations, hopes and aspirations.

In talking about 'nonsense' we should keep these facts in view. Ordinarily, what does not fulfil a criterion is regarded as nonsense and in most cases, such a situation is thought to be final. Nonsense cannot be more or less nonsense. Apart from Ramsey's one brief remark, perhaps unintentional, philosophers believe that there are neither grades nor types of nonsense. What is nonsense is nonsense and that is the end of the matter. For them, I believe, nonsense is essentially incorrigible.

It appears, however, there is already a reason, at least at the common sense level, to grade 'nonsense'. We hear remarks such as; "I tell you, it is complete nonsense." Or, "Yes, it is nonsense, all right." There are attempts at categorising 'nonsense'. The categorising, again, is contextual. Remember sentences like: "It is nonsense if you take that position, but look at it from this angle." One can rightly conclude, perhaps, that 'nonsense' can be treated both vertically and horizontally; there can be grades as well as kinds of nonsense. However, I would not go so far as to say that every nonsense can be considered in both these ways. Not every nonsense can be graded. There are types of nonsense which shade into other types; some are hard to classify.

The concept of type is used to refer to a range of application of a predicate. If two predicates or sets of predicates have similar application (or range of application), they are said to fall under the same type. This is true of 'kind' as well; to say that two are of the 'same kind' is to say that a certain set of predicates is applicable to both. In cases where two sets of predicates are neither reducible to, nor replaceable by the other, they are said to refer to different types. There are type words, and there are question types as well. Questions can be of different types if they are satisfied by different sorts of answers. The question, "When did it happen?" is not satisfied by the answer, "It is red, or it is bigger than that," etc. When I speak of different types of nonsense, I have such satisfiability criteria in view. There are always almost unmentioned distinctions between our various references to 'nonsense'. These distinctions need spelling out.

Consider the case of a doctor who diagnoses a certain disease and another doctor commenting: 'nonsense'. What is implied here is that the first doctor has not taken all the facts into consideration and that if he had he would have given a different diagnosis. In ordinary language we will say that the diagnosis was 'wrong'; philosophically, the statement about the patient's sickness was 'false'. Similarly, when I tell my nephew that it was nonsense to talk about ghosts in the store room, in philosophical jargon I implied that it was false that there was a ghost in the room. Nonsense in such situations means 'false'. There is also a reference to the 'fitness of things' in our talk about 'sense' and 'nonsense'.⁸ If we take the case of a person naming a ship and a 'low type' wrecking the ship, were someone to say that the intruder named the ship, we would angrily ask him not to talk nonsense. This may be called 'non-formal' type of nonsense to distinguish it from the 'formal' where 'reasons' are sought and not 'facts'. In such cases, conceptual schemes are isolated, logical distinctions are overlooked, and unwarranted 'reduction' of the types is attempted.

I will now take the concept of grading in nonsense, but start from the other end. We have said that 'sense' is a context-criterion word. Criteria are fulfilled. We achieve success by different methods and through various ways. Sometimes these ways are approved; at other times they are disapproved, even if we have succeeded in fulfilling the criterion. Sense, then is a 'success word'. It is used in contexts where we successfully fulfil a norm or a criterion.

Success, however, is not a fixed concept. We are rather liberal in talking about 'success'. In cases where someone fails to come up to the full norm, and does not meet with full success, we do not mind saying, and sometimes quite approvingly, that "he almost did it", "he almost beat it".

After a track event, we hear someone talk of "almost winning the race". While marking the examination scripts we have a 'rough norm' rather than a rigid, logically tight standard. This 'rough norm' goes fairly well with the mundane affairs and even with scientific assessments as well. 'Attainable certainty' is an expression one often hears in functional physics. In field studies standards of research are loosely set and 'attainable accuracy of results' is enough to guarantee the success of an expedition. In such cases 'success' does not mean proving a theorem in classical geometry and initialling it Q. E. D. Not all successes are mathematical.

What we have said about 'success' holds equally well in the case of 'sense' as a success word. Literature does not lack examples of expressions like: He was fairly successful in making sense of his theme, i.e., he was surprisingly able to work out all the implications and consequences of the subject discussed. After a classroom session, a tutor may confide to his colleagues about a student's paper that as it stands it can be judged approvingly, however 'partial' the 'success' that the student may have achieved.

Now we grade partial success by marks, but unfortunately we do not have cataloguing *names* for 'partial success' or 'partial achievements'. A similar difficulty is encountered in cataloguing grades of success. However, we do sometimes refer to a talk being 'weak' or 'weighty', 'sound' or 'unsound'; we hear of a 'plain talk', 'just a talk'. 'Unsound', 'weak', 'plain talk', 'just a talk' are pretty often regarded as descriptive of a discourse being short of a desired status. These words refer to certain characteristics over and above the 'meaningfulness' of a discourse. Of course, they cannot be taken as forming a hierarchy of grades. Here we find the same difficulty as we do in a less advanced language which has names for distinct hues but no names for colour-saturation. It is similar with 'sense'. At one end of the scale we have 'sense', at the other we have 'nonsense'. As far as the intermediate grades are concerned, i.e., above nonsense, below sense, our language is blind as regards grades.

No doubt we do mention 'sense-grades' since we talk about 'making complete sense', not 'frightfully nonsensical', etc., but there are no descriptive names for them. There are, however, languages which do have such descriptive names for various grades of sense/ nonsense.

The question about a kind of 'nonsense' being important or not, can be answered with reference to its possible social and conceptual relevance. There are 'grand failures' and 'miserable successes'. There are also 'important mistakes' which, though they do not solve an immediate problem, serve as pointers to other issues. When Ryle⁹ tells us that Hegel does not deserve study even as an error, we have a case of an error being unimportant.¹⁰ But for Popper, Hegel is important as an error. It is the same with nonsense. The history of philosophy offers a variety of important and unimportant 'errors' and 'nonsense'.

The classical example of philosophical nonsense for Wittgenstein, I believe, will be Platonic thinking. Plato tried to put meaning in an apparently meaningless world, order in a disorderly situation, reason in absurdity. The result is philosophical anomaly and bewilderment. Plato devised a style of philosophical writing which for him did justice to the issues which pertained to life and were thus dramatic. They could not be dealt with in a neat, dry textbook fashion. The 'drama of life' has to be dramatically, conversationally, presented. The dialogues move, twist and turn. The conversation starts, breaks; there is a deviation of theme; again, the thread of the conversation is picked up and a chain formed.

However, one may ask: why is the thread picked up and a chain formed? If life is a drama, why can it not have an unpredicted end? Why does every fact or event have to point to the impending end? It appears as if Plato after all is writing textbooks in a rather untextbooklike fashion. The threading through separate entities which do not stand for such a treatment, for

Wittgenstein, leads to the genesis of philosophical absurdity, i.e., to reading a system where there is none.

One will hold that philosophy has, through the ages, been an attempt to reconcile the 'irrationality' of the earthly existence with the idea of system and order.¹¹ This is the absurd discrepancy between what is the case and what ought to be the case. But a person cannot, or should not say, what ought to be the case because he does not know his way about it.¹² A philosopher is like Kafka's surveyor who had a work to do but does not know how to go about it. There is persistence of effort, but no method.

However, there is more to Plato's hopeless swing between order and disorder, namely, his equally incurable oscillation between hope and despair which becomes so manifest in his tragic account of knowledge. The most eager, skyward flight of the soul to attain *Episteme*¹³ turns into the tragic realisation by the freed prisoners of the cave that truth and beauty are too painful to behold.¹⁴ Some lucky people may dare and succeed, for the rest, all knowledge is nostalgia. We are nostalgic when we fail to relive our past. Our being becomes alienated and we crave for unity and completeness, but are prevented by our present. *Meno*'s question about goodness remains unanswered. The knowledge one acquires by looking into the past, as shown by Socrates, is not knowledge of the highest, but of the mathematical¹⁵ -- one step down from the highest.¹⁶ It is then no knowledge.¹⁷

This epistemic pessimism pervades Platonic writings and the Socratic searching. Socrates asks questions, but gives no answer, and those supplied by others are wrong since the logic of the questions does not correspond to that of the answers. There is an essential discrepancy between the two logics. If one is the logic of *Episteme*, the other is the logic of the *Doxa*: Answers are sought for the contingent, but they are sought in the necessary.

The category confusion which we found in Platonic writings had its counterpart in Baconian conclusions. Bacon succeeded no doubt in giving a non-Platonic start to his system but finally succumbed to, what I would like to call, category-equivalence nonsense. There were some Platonic elements too in Bacon's thinking. He intended to provide a new 'instrument' of knowledge with which its possessor could do many things. It supplied him with power. The source of this power was nature. A person only had to purify himself from irrational prejudices, commonplace notions and sentimentality to have the right to possess that power -- knowledge.¹⁸ For Bacon, then, knowledge had some special status, which a person acquired the way he could earn title to a piece of land. In the latter you presented the relevant documents, in the former you showed your credentials.

Knowledge did not imply frustrations, which was obvious from the role Bacon gave to knowledge. If knowledge was power, an instrument which gave you mastery over the affairs of the world, the value of such an instrument lay in its uncanniness, efficacy and infallibility. Knowledge could not go wrong. This was almost definitory with Bacon. He believed, one thinks, that it was stretching the meaning of knowledge to cover cases where you expected but found your hopes frustrated and broken, 'Anticipating nature' was a case of ignorance and not of knowledge. A person was not supposed to make conjectures, frame hypotheses, manipulate data, verify or falsify hypotheses. Nature is an open book; you only had to look at it with unprejudiced eyes and behold its majesty. The gods of classical antiquity were now replaced by the goddess Nature.¹⁹ This is what I meant by the category-equivalence nonsense.

For Plato knowledge either was hidden in your past or had a transcendent source for Bacon as for Plato, knowledge was the court of last resort. If knowledge was power, it should also have

authority, without which all power is impotent. Nature gave Bacon that authority and this is precisely what one would like to object to.

What strikes us here is the fact that while Bacon strove to give an account of human knowledge, the account itself became so inhuman. He relied on 'senses' and yet ascribed 'non-sensory', logical and necessary qualities to them. He strove to deal with the actual, in opposition to the ideal; and yet made it an unattainable ideal. *The mistake was to see the contingent as the necessary*. What were separate and distinct categories were seen as equivalent.

Hegel went further than Bacon and tried to argue the necessity of the contingent. Hegel started by making a distinction between Necessary and Contingent, the all-embracing and the merely individual, and viewed the contingent as a mode or determination of the necessary. The principle of dichotomy holds good in the whole of Hegelian thought: the distinction between Reason and Understanding, between the Ideal and the Actual, between the Particular and the Universal. These distinctions are put under the fundamental division between the Necessary and the Contingent; in each case the particular, actual or individual was shown to 'swing over' to its opposite and exhibit its particularity and contingency as its necessary mode of existence. All existence is fatal existence. Hegel's logic showed this fatality or essentiality of the non-essential. Hegel not only assigned this logic to physical nature, but applied it to social and psychological phenomena. For Hegel, it was not enough to talk about the case but also 'why this and not otherwise'; it was not sufficient to say that if promises are made 'they ought to be kept', but why there must be promises at all.

I take this to be a legacy of Platonism. In Plato the particular 'shared' its existence in the Ideal. It 'participated' in the Universal the way members of the family do in the affairs of the family. But one is a member of the family because one is fated to be so.

This Platonic echo with Hegelian 'resonance'²⁰ found its full expression in Wittgenstein. The early Wittgenstein was also concerned, like others, with 'order' and 'disorder'. If there was no order, we must invent one. But Wittgenstein afterwards confessed that all this was nonsense. I would certainly like to say something about the background of this confession and then end with the observation that the sort of nonsense Wittgenstein found in his earlier writings plagued his later writings too.

The 'method' which the early Wittgenstein wanted to impose upon the world and which he was 'forced'²¹ to abandon was the traditional logico-mathematical one. Wittgenstein had found that this method relied on consistency and adherence to the non-contradiction principle, which principle had to be followed. Whether it had to be faithfully followed was the problem for the post-*Tractatus* Wittgenstein. It was an either-consistency-or-contradiction dilemma. The later Wittgenstein chose contradiction, and from formal deduction 'swung over' to Hegelian dynamism.²² He asked: "Does it make our language less unable if . . . a proposition yields its contradiction and vice-versa?"²³

This 'superstitious fear' of 'contradiction'²⁴ is to be replaced by the Hegelian boldness that contradiction is the soul of the real. "If there is a contradiction here, well, there is a contradiction here." "Does it do any harm here?"²⁵ The difficulty with contradictions is that they are not helpful for predictions and generalisations.²⁶ But the craving for generality and consistency²⁷ overlooks the role of language in life; they give rise to 'philosophical puzzles' and 'bewilderment' and thus must be cured. As with illnesses and their treatment,²⁸ we have to look for the source²⁹ of philosophical illness -- the philosophers' puzzlement.³⁰ This is looking for the cause, rather than seeking reasons. In fact philosophical convictions are not unlike the groundless conviction (*Unbegründeten Überzeugung*) of a person who, while taking a walk in the environs of a city, may believe that the city lies on his right rather than on the left.³¹ As the person has no reason for

such a belief, we have to explain it psychoanalytically and determine its causes.³² The source of philosophical bewilderment is ascribing a permanent role to odd-job³³ words: we make unreasoned, groundless decisions with regard to the use of words.³⁴

If earlier Wittgenstein was involved in nonsense, that is, in the absurdity of reducing the empirically contingent to the mathematically necessary, later he swung over to ultra-contingency and irrationalism. If no contradiction reigns in the *Tractatus*, contradiction rules afterwards. This world, however, is populated mainly with 'things' rather than with persons. There are chess pieces; machines breaking down; streets, suburbs and cities; maps and their countries.³⁵ Words too are things; they are tools and appliances which have functions and uses.³⁶

I have a feeling that with all his fight against the craving for generality and system, Wittgenstein is aiming at a sort of 'monism of things' at the expense of persons. If language is a form of life,³⁷ he has made this form rather rigid and arbitrary. Fundamentally, Wittgenstein's explanations are thing-bound,³⁸ rather than person-oriented: his talks of persons is in terms of things.³⁹

Though Wittgenstein's purpose is to break false analogies between different expressions, he creates fascinating but false analogies between men and machines, behaviour and function. If for Wittgenstein all pre-*Tractatus* philosophy was nonsense in the way that pre-Kantian philosophy was less than real philosophy for Hegel, then post-*Tractatus* philosophy is no less a nonsense in a definitely non-*Tractatus* sense. But it is important in so far as it points to a possible avoidance of such one-sided reductions.

We can still achieve sense in our talk and actions, provided we first come out of this nonsense in which thusfar we have been living.

Notes

1. L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967), prop. 4.003.
2. P.F. Ramsey, *The Foundations of Mathematics* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1931), p. 363.
3. L. Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, (P. I.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), p. 51c, *133.
4. J.L. Austin, *Philosophical Papers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 220-41.
5. L. Wittgenstein, *The Blue and Brown Books* (B. B.) (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), pp. 43-44.
6. M. Graves, *The Art of Color and Design* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1941), pp. 171-76.
7. I must confess that it is not a very happy analogy, since it makes 'meaning' stable or constant which is regarded as a sin these days.
8. J.L. Austin, *op. cit.*, pp. 226-27.
9. See J.N. Findlay, *Language, Mind and Value* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1963), p. 128.
10. I certainly do not subscribe to Ryle's views.
11. A. King, *Albert Camus* (New York: Grove Press, 1964), p. 6.
12. L. Wittgenstein, *P.I.*, ss, vi, 123.
13. *Republic*, Book VI, ss, vi, 510-11.
14. *Ibid.*, 516.
15. The argument developed in the *Meno* proves only the innateness of geometry and nothing else.

16. *Ibid.*, 510-11.
17. No doubt there had been, in the later writings, an attempt to identify ideas with numbers but this is inconclusive and can be interpreted differently.
18. Bacon, *Novum Organum*, 1, 68, 97.
19. Cf. K. Popper, "On the Sources of Knowledge and of Ignorance" included in J.N. Findlay, ed., *Studies in Philosophy* (Oxford: Paper Books, 1966), p. 188.
20. (a) J.N. Findlay, "Some Merits of Hegelianism", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* (1955-56), pp. 1-25.
(b) *Idem.*, "The Contemporary Relevance of Hegel", included in *Language, Mind and Value*, p. 227.
(c) D. Pole, *The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein* (London: Athlone Press, 1958), p. 103.
21. *P.I.*, Preface, xe.
22. Cf. J.N. Findlay, *Hegel: A Re-examination* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958), p. 80.
23. L. Wittgenstein, *Remarks on the Foundations of mathematics (R.F.M.)* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell), 51e.
24. *Ibid.*, 53e.
25. *Ibid.*, 53e, prop. 11.
26. *Ibid.*, 53e, prop. 14.
27. *B.B.*, p. 27.
28. *P.I.*, ss. 255.
29. *B.B.*, p. 59.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *P.I.*, p. 215e.
32. *Ibid.*
33. *B.B.*, pp. 43-44.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 73.
35. *P.I.*, ss 12, 18, 271.
36. *Ibid.*, ss 12, 569.
37. *Ibid.*, ss 11, 12.
38. *Ibid.*, ss 11, 12.
39. This is especially true of some Wittgensteinians.

Chapter XII

Quantification and Opacity

Ali Akhtar Kazmi

In a 1943 paper, Quine says: "No pronoun (or variable of quantification) within an opaque context can refer back to an antecedent (or quantifier) prior to that context."¹

The view articulated in these words, which I shall describe as Quine's Thesis, occupies a central position in many of his later papers, and informs large parts of Chapters IV, V, and VI of *Word and Object*.

Quine's thesis should be distinguished from his misgivings about the intelligibility of essentialism, the doctrine that, among the traits of an object some are essential and others are not, to which he thinks quantified modal logic to be committed. Likewise, Quine's thesis should be distinguished from his more recent doubts about the intelligibility of certain epistemological doctrines to which he thinks the quantified logic of belief to be committed. Quine's thesis is about quantification in general. It seems to be his view that quantification into opaque constructions faces a purely technical difficulty can be established on the basis of logical and semantic considerations alone. Thus, in "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes", after distinguishing what he calls "the relational senses" of propositional attitudes from their corresponding "notional senses", he notes:

However, the suggested formulations of the relational sense 3/4 viz.,

(x) (x is a lion. Ernest strives that Ernest finds x)

(x) (x is a sloop. I wish that I have x)

(x) (Ralph believes that x is a spy)

(x) (Witold wishes that x is president)

all involve quantifying into a propositional attitude idiom from outside. This is a dubious business.²

The rest of that paper is an attempt to offer a reconstruction of the relational senses of propositional attitudes which does not involve quantifying into opaque constructions. Similarly, in "Intensions Revisited", after noting that quantified modal logic also involves the allegedly illicit quantifying into opaque constructions, Quine offers a reconstruction of quantified modal discourse which is free from this alleged defect.

In Section 1.1 of this paper, I present a general characterization of referential opacity, and contrast it with the notion of a purely referential occurrence of a singular term. In Section 1.2 and 1.3, I examine two lines of argument in defence of Quine's Thesis, and, argue that they fail to establish it.

1.1

Quine characterizes referential opacity in terms of a principle that he describes as "the principle of substitutivity". Quine formulates this principle in these words: ". . . given a true statement of identity, one of its two terms may be substituted for the other in any true statement and the result will be true."³ Making allowances for Quine's use of the word "statement", this principle may be understood as the claim that:

(A) for all expressions α and β , if, relative to an assignment I , $\alpha = \beta$ expresses a true proposition, then, for any sentences S and S' , if S contains an occurrence of α , and S' is the result of

substituting β for some occurrence of α in S , then, relative to the assignment I , S expresses a true proposition, only if, relative to I , S' expresses a true proposition.⁴

It should be recognized, as Quine has frequently stressed, that (A) is false. For example, the propositions expressed by

- (1) 'Giorgione' = Barbarelli, and
- (2) 'Giorgione' contains nine letters, are true, whereas,
- (3) 'Barbarelli' contains nine letters, expresses a false proposition. Similarly,
- (4) Giorgione was so-called because of his size, expresses a true proposition, but
- (5) Barbarelli was so-called because of his size,

does not express a true proposition. Counterexamples to (A) are not confined to those cases which involve substitution within contexts of quotation. For instance, though:

- (6) $9 = \text{the number of planets}$, and
- (7) It is necessary that 9 is odd, both express true propositions,
- (8) It is necessary that the number of planets is odd, expresses a false proposition.⁵

The temptation to think that (A) is true might arise from a failure to distinguish (A) from the principle that:

(B) The universal closure of every instance of the schema

(9) $(x)(y)(x=y \supset (Fx \supset Fy))$

or a notational variant of (9), expresses a true proposition.

But, notice that whereas the proposition that (1) and (4) express true propositions, and (5) fails to express a true proposition falsifies (A), it does not falsify (B); and, therefore, (B) does not entail (A).⁶

Quine argues in defense of (B) as follows:

(B) does have the air of a law; one feels that any interpretation of "Fx" violating (B) would be simply a distortion of the manifest intent of 'Fx'. Anyway I hope one feels this, for there is good reason to. Since there is no quantifying into an opaque construction, the position of 'x' and 'y' in 'Fx' and 'Fy' must be referential if 'x' and 'y' in those positions are to be bound by the initial '(x)' and '(y)' of (9) at all. Since the notation of (9) manifestly intends the quantifiers to bind 'x' and 'y' in all four shown places, any interpretation of 'Fx' violating (B) would be a distortion.⁷

Now, even if one were to disagree with the details of Quine's argument, his conclusion that any interpretation of 'Fx' violating (B) would be a distortion seems indisputable. One is inclined to say that (B) is false, only if there is a sequence and an expression **F**, such that there is an assignment under which the element of the sequence assigned to the free occurrences of x and y in Fx and Fy respectively are identical; the sequence satisfies Fy but fails to satisfy Fx . But, if there is an assignment under which a sequence satisfies Fx , then, the element of this sequence assigned to the free occurrences of x in Fy , call it ' a ', is in the extension of **F** under that assignment. And, if, under that assignment, the element of the sequence assigned to the free occurrences of y in Fy , call it ' a ', is identical with a , a is in the extension of **F** under that assignment; and, therefore, under that assignment, the sequence satisfies Fy . Though one is inclined to say this, it is unlikely that this would satisfy critics of (B). For in the claim that if a is identical with a ', then, if a is in the extension of **F** under an assignment, the a ' is in the extension of **F** under that assignment, a critic of (B) will see yet another appeal to (B).

Some critics of (B), on the other hand, are likely to argue that (B) is false, because, for example, (i)

- (10) $(x)(y)(x=y \supset (\text{it is necessary that } x \text{ is odd} \supset \text{it is necessary that } y \text{ is odd}))$

is an instance of (9), and, (ii) the proposition expressed by (10) is falsified by the proposition expressed by

(9)=the number of planets. It is necessary that 9 is odd. (It is necessary that the number of planets is odd)).

An advocate of (**B**), then, must reject either (i) or (ii). Consider, for instance:

(11) (x) (y) ($x=y$ (' x ' is the 24th letter of the alphabet ' y ' is the 24th letter of the alphabet)).

There is, presumably, a way of understanding (11) according to which it expresses a false proposition, a proposition which is also expressed by, for instance:

(12) (w) (z) ($w=z$ (' x ' is the 24th letter of the alphabet ' y ' is the 24th letter of the alphabet)).

But it is unlikely that it would be thought that the proposition that (11) expresses a false proposition falsifies (**B**). Instead, one is inclined to say that (11) is not really an instance of (9), that given the interpretation of:

' x ' is the 24th letter of the alphabet,

which is required for (11) to express a false proposition,

' x ' is the 24th letter of the alphabet,

is not an open sentence. Now, some advocates of (**B**) would be inclined to assimilate the case of (10) to that of (11). They would be inclined to say that (10) is not really an instance of (9) either, because,

It is necessary that x is odd,

is not an intelligible open sentence. However, the apparent intelligibility of such sentences as:

There is something such that it is necessary that x is odd,

and

The number of planets is such that it is necessary that it is odd, suggests, on the contrary, that

It is necessary that x is odd,

is an intelligible open sentence, and that, therefore, (10) is an instance of (9). But, if (10) is indeed an instance of (9), then, (**B**) is true only if (ii) is false.

Quine takes the falsity of (**A**) as evidence that an occurrence of some singular term in a sentence is not purely referential. For instance, in 'Reference and Modality', he writes: 'Failure of substitutivity reveals merely that the occurrence to be supplanted is not purely referential, that is, that the statement depends not only on the object, but on the form of the name.'⁸ And elsewhere in the same essay, he notes: the failure of substitutivity shows that the occurrence of the personal name in (4) is not purely referential. These remarks indicate that Quine would endorse the following principle".

(**C**) For any sentence S , any singular term α , and any z , z is a purely referential occurrence of in S , only if, for any sentence S' , and any singular term β , if S' is the result of substituting β for z , in S , and $\alpha=\beta$ expresses a true proposition then, relative to an assignment I , then relative to the assignment I , S expresses a true proposition, if and only if, relative to I , S' expresses a true proposition.

Since, (1) and (4) express true propositions, and (5) does not express a true proposition, if (**C**) is true, then, the occurrence of 'Giorgione' in (4), and, the occurrence of 'Barbarelli' in (5) are not purely referential. Similarly, since (6) and (7) express true propositions, and (8) does not express a true proposition, if (**C**) is true, then, the occurrence of '9' and 'the number of planets' in (7) and (8) respectively are both not purely referential. It is worth stressing that (**C**) is a strong principle. If (**C**) is true, it is also true that:

(**D**) For any sentences S and S' , any singular terms α , and β , and any z , if z is an occurrence of in S , and S' is the result of substituting β for z in S , then if, relative to an assignment I ,

$=\beta$ expresses a true proposition, but, it is not true that, relative to I , S expresses a true proposition if and only if, relative to I , S' expresses a true proposition, then, z and the corresponding occurrence of β in S' are both not purely referential.

Though there is evidence that Quine would endorse (C), there is also evidence that he does not intend (C) to be taken as part of a definition of 'a purely referential occurrence of a singular term', then, we are owed an account of what this expression means. Quine has, at times, described a purely referential occurrence of a singular term in a sentence as an occurrence of a singular term 'used in a sentence purely to specify its object'.⁹ Quine's remark that 'failure of substitutivity reveals merely that the occurrence to be supplanted is not purely referential, that is, that the statement depends not only on the object but on the form of the name', may appear more helpful.¹⁰ Presumably, the thought is that the only contribution a purely referential occurrence of a singular term in a sentence makes towards determining the truth-value of that sentence is the specification of the object it refers to. One might, then propose to understand a purely referential occurrence of a singular term in a sentence as follows:

(E') For any sentence S , any non-vacuous singular term α , and any z , α is a purely referential occurrence of α in S , if and only if, for any S' , if S' is the result of substituting, for z in S , a variable which does not occur in S , then, relative to any assignment I , S expresses a true proposition, if and only if, relative to I , whatever z refers to satisfies S' .

(E') accords with some of the remarks in the literature about the concept of a purely referential occurrence of a singular term. If (E') is true, then, the first occurrence of 'Giorgione' in

Giorgione was called 'Giorgione' because of his size, is purely referential, since, this sentence expresses a true proposition if and only if, for any variable x Giorgione satisfies was called 'Giorgione' because of his size.

On the other hand, given (E'), the occurrence of 'Giorgione' in

(4) Giorgione was so-called because of his size,

is presumably, not purely referential. We want to say that for any variable x , Giorgione does not satisfy was so-called because of his size.

For any variable x ,

was so-called because of his size,

is not a kind of sentence that anything satisfies, and, hence, Giorgione does not satisfy it; but

(4) expresses a true proposition if (E') is true, the occurrence of 'Giorgione' in (4) is not purely referential.

However, it should be noted that an advocate of (C) is in no position to endorse (E'). Surely we also want to say that, for any variable x , Barbarelli does not satisfy was so-called because of his size.

For any variable x , was so-called because of his size, is not a kind of sentence that anything satisfies, and, hence, Barbarelli does not satisfy it; but

(5) Barbarelli was so-called because of his size, does not express a true proposition, and, hence, if (E') is true, the occurrence of 'Barbarelli' in (5) is purely referential. But, since unlike (5), (4) and

(1) Giorgione = Barbarelli,

express true proposition, if (C) is true, the occurrence of 'Barbarelli' in (5) is not purely referential; and, hence, if (E') is true, (C) is not true.

It would seem that our present difficulty arises because (E') fails to take into account the fact that, for any variable x , was so-called because of his size, is not a kind of sentence that anything would either satisfy it or its denial. This suggests that we should revise (E') as follows:

(E'') For any sentence S , any non-vacuous singular term α , and any z , z is a purely referential occurrence of α in S , if and only if, for any S' , if S' is the result of substituting, for z in S , a variable which does not occur in S , then, S' is an open sentence, and, relative to any assignment I , S expresses a true proposition, if and only if, relative to I , whatever z refers to satisfies S' .

Unlike (E'), (E'') is not in conflict with (C). It is not true that if (5) does not express a true proposition, and, for any variable a , Barbarelli does not satisfy was so-called because of his size, then, (E'') is true only if the occurrence of 'Barbarelli' in (5) is purely referential. A further condition needs to be met in order for the occurrence of 'Barbarelli' in (5) to be purely referential, i.e. that for any variable a , was so-called because of his size, is an open sentence; and, surely that is not the case.

Though (E'') is not in conflict with (C), it has another consequence which deserves attention. Consider, for instance, the following sentence:

(i) It is possible that the number of planets is odd.

One would be inclined to say that the occurrence of 'the number of planets' in (i) is not purely referential. But, if (E'') is true, and, the occurrence of 'the number of planets' in (i) is not purely referential, then, given that ' x ' is a variable,

(ii) It is possible that x is odd,

is not an open sentence. For, suppose that (ii) is an open sentence. Then, surely, 9, the number of planets, satisfies it, and, since, (i) express a true proposition, if (E'') is true, then, the occurrence of 'the number of planets' in (i) is purely referential. Hence, if we are inclined to say that (ii) is an open sentence and that the occurrence of 'the number of planets' in (i) is not purely referential, we had better reject (E''). However, even if these are grounds for rejecting (E''), these are not grounds for rejecting the following consequence of (E''):

(E) For any sentence S , any non-vacuous singular term α , and any z , z is a purely referential occurrence of α in S , only if, for any S' , if S' is the result of substituting, for z in S , a variable which does not occur in S , then, S' is an open sentence, and relative to any assignment I , S expresses a true proposition, if and only if, relative to I , whatever z refers to satisfies S' .

It is worth noting that (E) is a weaker principle than (C). Unlike (C), (E) does not guarantee the truth of (D). If (E) is true, then, it is true that

(D') for any sentences S and S' , any singular terms α and β , and any z , if z is an occurrence of α in S , and S' is the result of substituting β for z , in S , then, if, relative to an assignment I $a = b$ expresses a true proposition, and, it is not the case that, relative to I , S expresses a true proposition if and only if, relative to I , S' expresses a true proposition, then, either z or the corresponding occurrence of β in S' , is not purely referential.

Consider, for instance, sentences (6), (7), and (8). Since (6) expresses a true proposition, for any variable a , 9 satisfies

It is necessary that a is odd,

if and only if, the number of planets, satisfies it. But, since (7) expresses a true proposition, and (8) does not express a true proposition, if (E) is true, then either the occurrence of '9' in (7), or the occurrence of 'the number of planets' in (8) is not purely referential. Of course, if, for some variable a ,

It is necessary that a is odd,

is an not open sentence, then, the occurrence of '9' in (7), and, the occurrence of 'the number of planets' in (8) fails to be purely referential. But, it does not follow from (E), or from (E) and the fact that (6) and (7) express true propositions and (8) does not, that for some variable a ,

It is necessary that is odd, is not an open sentence.

Now, (E) is in conflict with some of Quine's remarks about the concept of a purely referential occurrence. Apparently, Quine thinks that not only (C) is true but the following stronger principle (C') is true as well:

(C') For any sentence S , any singular term α , and any z , z is a purely referential occurrence of α in S , if and only if, for any sentence S' , and, any singular term β , if S' is the result of substituting β for z , in S , and relative to an assignment I , S' expresses a true proposition, then, relative to I , S expresses a true proposition, if and only if, relative to I , S' expresses a true proposition.

If (C') is true, then, the occurrence of 'Giorgione' in

(i) 'Giorgione' names a chess player,

is purely referential. But, surely, we want to say that, for any variable x , ' x names a chess player,'

is not a kind of sentence such that anything would either satisfy it or its denial, that it is not an open sentence. But, if for any variable x , ' x names a chess player,' is not an open sentence, then, (E) is true only if (C') is not true.

(E) purports to give the necessary conditions of a concept which I think, are of interest in discussions of referential opacity. I propose that we accept (E), and that therefore (C') should be rejected. As for Quine's remarks about (i), the intuitions which underlie it are captured by another distinction that Quine draws attention to.

Quine writes:

In sentences there are positions where the term is used as a means simply of specifying its object, or purporting to, for the rest of the sentence to say something about, and there are positions where it is not. An example of the latter sort is the position of 'Tully' in:

(1) 'Tully was a Roman' is trochaic.

When a singular term is used in a sentence to specify its object, and the sentence is true of the object, then certainly the sentence will stay true when any other singular term is substituted that designates the same object. Here we have a criterion for what may be called purely referential position: the position must be subject to the substitutivity of identity. That the position of 'Tully' in (1) is not purely referential is reflected in the falsity of what we get by supplanting 'Tully' in (1) by 'Cicero'.¹¹

This passage presents a two-fold distinction: one, a distinction among positions occupied by singular terms in a sentence, and, two, a distinction among uses of singular terms in a sentence. Substitutability *Salva veritate* of coreferential singular terms is offered as a criterion for distinguishing those positions of a singular term in a sentence which are purely referential from those which are not; but, what is apparently given as a justification for this criterion is a claim which involves distinguishing those uses of a singular term in a sentence which are a means simply of specifying its object from those uses which are not. Quine has frequently referred to the latter distinction as a distinction between a purely referential occurrence of a singular term in a sentence and other kinds of occurrence. To avoid confusion between Quine's distinction among positions, and the associated distinction among occurrences which is partially characterized in (E), let us agree to use the phrase 'referentially transparent position' in place of Quine's 'purely referential position'. I shall understand by 'the position of an occurrence of a singular term in a sentence S ' the result of deleting that occurrence of from S .¹² Thus, the position of the occurrence of '9' in '9 is odd' is ' $_$ is odd', the position of the first occurrence of ' x ' in ' $x = 9$. x is odd' is ' $x = 9$. x is odd', and, the position of the second occurrence of ' x ' in ' $x = 9$. x is odd' is ' $x = 9$. x is odd'. It should

be noted that each occurrence of a singular term in a sentence has exactly one position in that sentence; and, that the occurrence of two or more singular terms in different sentences may have the same position in those sentences, as, for instance, '3/4 is odd' is the position of the occurrence of '9' in '9 is odd', and also, the position of 'The number of planets' in 'The number of planets is odd'. Following Quine, I shall define referential transparency of the position of an occurrence of a singular term in a sentence thus:

(F) For any sentence S , any singular term w , and any z , if z is the position of an occurrence w , of in S , then z is referentially transparent, if and only if, for any sentence S' , and, any singular term β , if S' is the result of substituting β for w , in S , and relative to an assignment I , $=\beta$ expresses a true proposition, then, relative to I , S expresses a true proposition, if and only if, relative to I , S expresses a true proposition.

And, following Quine, I shall say that the position of an occurrence of a singular term in a sentence is referentially opaque if and only if it is not referentially transparent. The position of the occurrence of '9' in '9 is odd' is presumably referentially transparent, but, the position of the occurrence of '9' in

(7) It is necessary that 9 is odd,

is referentially opaque. Notice that the position of some occurrence of a singular term in a sentence is referentially opaque if and only if (A) is false.

I shall say that a one-place sentential operator O is referentially transparent, if and only if, any position of Z of an occurrence of a singular term in a sentence is referentially transparent only if OZ is referentially transparent; and, that a sentential operator is referentially opaque, if and only if, it is not referentially transparent. The sentential operators 'It is true that', and, 'It is not the case that', are referentially transparent; but 'It is necessary that' is referentially opaque, since 'is odd' is referentially transparent, but 'It is necessary that is odd' is not.

The concept of referential transparency of a position, as one would expect, is closely connected with that of purely referential occurrence. Suppose that the position of an occurrence, w , of a singular term in a sentence S , is not referentially transparent. Given (F), there is, then, a sentence S' , and a singular term β , such that S' is the result of substituting β for w , and, relative to an assignment I , $a = b$ expresses a true proposition, but it is not the case that, relative to I , S expresses a true proposition, if and only if, relative to I , S' expresses a true proposition. But then, given (D'), either w is not purely referential, or the occurrence of β in S' which corresponds to w is not purely referential. Consider, for instance, (7). Since the position of the occurrence of '9' in (7) is not referentially transparent, given (F) and (D'), there is some singular term a , such that, relative to an assignment I , $= 9$ expresses a true proposition, and the occurrence of a in 'It is necessary that is odd' is not purely referential. Given the referential opacity of the position of the occurrence of '9' in (7), and (F) and (D'), it also follows that for any singular term a , and any assignment I , such that $= 9$ expresses a true proposition relative to I , if the proposition expressed, relative to I , by It is necessary that a is odd differs in truth-value from the proposition expressed, relative to I , by (7), then, either the occurrence of '9' in (7) is not purely referential or the occurrence of a in It is necessary that a is odd is not purely referential. However, it is important to appreciate that it does not follow from the referential opacity of the position of the occurrence of '9' in (7), and (F) and (D'), that the occurrence of '9' in (7) is not purely referential.

Quine notes that the existence of referentially opaque positions shows not only that (A) is false, but that existential generalization is the principle that:

(G) For any sentences S and S' , any singular term w , and any variable β , if β does not occur in S , and S is the result of substituting β for some occurrence of in S , then relative to any

assignment I, S expresses a true proposition, only if, relative to I , $(\beta)S'$ expresses a true proposition.¹³

As Quine notes, the existence of vacuous singular terms falsifies (G) ; 'There is no such thing as Pagasus' expresses a true proposition, but, ' (x) There is no such thing as x ' does not express a true proposition. (G) is also falsified by some pairs of sentences consisting of (i) a sentence containing an occurrence of a singular term which is not purely referential, and, (ii) an existential generalization of such an occurrence of a singular term in that sentence. Consider, for instance, (4). (4) expresses a true proposition, but, if (G) is true, then,

(4') (x) x was so-called because of his size,

expresses a true proposition as well. But, surely we would say that (4') does not express any proposition, and that, therefore, it does not express a true proposition; and hence, (G) is false. And consider (2). Since (2) expresses a true proposition, if (G) is true, then,

(2') (x) ' x ' contains nine letters,

expresses a true proposition as well. Now, it is not clear what sense is to be made of (2). Perhaps, one is to think of (2) as expressing the same proposition that ' x ', the 24th letter of alphabet contains nine letters. If so, (G) is false.

From considerations such as these, Quine appears to conclude that 'if to a referentially opaque context of a variable we apply a quantifier, with the intention that it govern that variable from outside referentially opaque context, then what we commonly end up with is unintended sense or nonsense. . . . In a word, we cannot in general quantify into referentially opaque contexts'.¹⁴ Making allowance for Quine's allusion to unintended sense, Quine's claim in this passage may be formulated as:

(H) An occurrence of a variable in a sentence may be bound by a quantifier outside of that sentence only if the position of that occurrence of the variable in the sentence is referentially transparent.

Since the position of the occurrence of ' x ' in " x contains nine letters", and, the position of the occurrence of x in ' x was so-called because of his size' are both referentially opaque, if (H) is true, the second occurrence of ' x ' in (2) and, the second occurrence of ' x ' in (4'), both fail to be bound by the initial quantifiers in (2') and (4') respectively.

(H) is to be distinguished from the claim that if an occurrence of a singular term in a sentence is not purely referential, then, existential generalization on that occurrence is unwarranted. The latter is suggested by the pairs of sentences (2) and (2'), and (4) and (4'), and Quine, I think, endorses it; but, it is the stronger (H) , which articulates Quine's frequently repeated assertion that there is no quantification into referentially opaque contexts.

1. 2.

Is (H) true?

In a recent paper Kaplan writes:

I have concluded that in 1943 Quine made a mistake. He believed himself to have given a proof of a general theorem regarding the semantical interpretation of any language that combines quantification with opacity. The purported theorem says that in a sentence, if a given position, occupied by a singular term, is not open to substitution by co-designative singular terms *salva veritate*, then that position cannot be occupied by a variable bound to an initially placed quantifier. The proof offered assumes that quantification receives its standard interpretation. But the attempted proof is fallacious. And what is more, the theorem is false.¹⁵

Kaplan goes on to reconstruct the alleged proof as follows:

Step 1: A purely designative occurrence of a singular term α in formula ϕ is one in which α is used solely to designate the object. (This is a definition)

Step 2: If α has a purely designative occurrence in ϕ , then the truth-value of ϕ depends only on what α designates, not how α designates. (From 1)

Step 3: Variables are devices of pure reference, they cannot have non-purely designative occurrences. (By standard semantics)

Step 4: If α and β designate the same thing, but α and β differ in truth-value, the occurrences of α in ϕ and β in β are not purely designative. (From 2)

Now assume (5.1): α and β are co-designative singular terms, and α and β differ in truth-value, and (5.2): x is a variable whose value is the object designated by α and β .

Step 6: Either α and β differ in truth-value or β and β differ in truth-value. (From (5.1) since α and β differ.)

Step 7: The occurrence of x in ϕ is not purely designative. (From 5.2, 6, and 4)

Step 8: ϕ is semantically incoherent. (From 7 and 3)¹⁶

Kaplan notes:

All but one of these steps seem to me to be innocuous. That is step 4 which, of course, does *not* follow from 2. All that follows from 2 is that at least one of the two occurrences is not purely designative. When 4 is corrected in this way, 7 no longer follows. The error of 4 appears in later writings in a slightly different form. It is represented by an unjustified shift from talk about *occurrences* to talk about *positions*. Failure of substitution does show that some occurrence is not purely referential. (Shifting now from ‘designative’ language of ‘Notes on Existence and Necessity’ to the ‘referential’ language of ‘Reference and Modality’). From this it is concluded that the context (read ‘position’) is referentially opaque. And thus what the context expresses ‘is in general not a trait of the object concerned, but depends on the manner of referring to the object’. Hence, ‘we cannot properly quantify into a referentially opaque context.’¹⁷

If we understand the notation of ‘ ϕ ’ in Step 4 as standing for any sentence S which contains one or more occurrences of a singular term α , and ‘ β ’ is the result of replacing some occurrence of α in S by a singular term β , then, the proposition expressed in Step 4 is equivalent to (D) of section 1.1. As Kaplan emphasizes, if the proposition expressed in Step 4, or equivalently (D), is true, then, there is a strong argument for (H). Suppose that a sentence contains an occurrence of a singular term α . Let us agree to represent S as follows:

S :

Suppose, moreover, that the position of the displayed occurrence of α in S is not referentially transparent. Then, there is a sentence S' , and a singular term β such that S is the result of replacing the displayed occurrence of α in S with β .

S' : β

and, there is an assignment I relative to which β expresses a true proposition, but it is not the case that, relative to I , S' expresses a true proposition. Consider now a sentence S'' and a variable x such that S'' is the result of replacing the displayed occurrence of α in S with x ,

S'' :

and suppose that, relative to I , the value of x in S'' is the same as the value of the displayed occurrences of α and β in S and S' respectively. But, since relative to I , the propositions expressed by S and S' differ in truth-value, either the propositions expressed, relative to I , by S and S'' differ in truth-value, or the propositions expressed, relative to I , by S' and S'' differ in truth-value. But, then, if (D) is true, occurrence of x in S'' is not purely referential. And, if it is true that

(J) an occurrence of a variable in a sentence may be bound by a quantifier outside the sentence only if that occurrence is purely referential,

then, the occurrence of in S'' may not be bound by a quantifier outside of S'' . Hence, if (D) and (J) are true and the position of an occurrence of a variable in a sentence is not referentially transparent, then, the occurrence of that variable in the sentence may not be bound by a quantifier outside the sentence.

Are (D) and (J) true? To answer this question we need to know what is for an occurrence of a singular term in a sentence to be purely referential. Quine remarks: 'Failure of substitutivity reveals merely that the occurrence to be supplanted is not purely referential'. I formulated this claim in Section 1.1 as (C). It is easily seen that (C) is true if and only if (D) is true. Perhaps, it would be thought that (C) is one half of a definition of 'a purely referential occurrence'. It would then be argued that if (C) is a truth of definition, (D) must be true. But, as we have seen, if (D) and (J) are true, (H) is true; and surely, the argument would go on, (J) is a truth of standard semantics; hence, (H) is true.

Now, I think that if (J) is to appear as a premise in any argument for (H), we had better not construe (C) as a truth of definition. Notice that according to (C), an occurrence of a singular term in a sentence is purely referential only if its position in that sentence is referentially transparent. But, if (C) is a truth of definition, then, it is a truth of definition that if

(J) an occurrence of a variable in a sentence may be bound by a quantifier outside the sentence only if that occurrence is purely referential

then

(J') an occurrence of a variable in a sentence may be bound by a quantifier outside that sentence only if the position of that occurrence of the variable in that sentence is referentially transparent.

And (J') is (H). Hence, if (C) is a truth of definition (J) can appear as a premise in an argument for (H) only on pain of circularity.

In section 1.1, I proposed that we accept (E). I argued that (E) is a weaker principle than (C); that though (D) is a consequence of (C), it is not a consequence of (E). If (E) is true then it is true that

(i) if a sentence S contains an occurrence of a singular term a , and
(ii) if S' is the result of substituting β for an occurrence z of in S , and
(iii) relative to some assignment I , β expresses a true proposition, but
(iv) it is not the case that relative to I , S expresses a true proposition if and only if relative to I , S' expresses a true proposition, then

(v) either z or the corresponding occurrence of β in S' is not purely referential.

But it is not a consequence of (E) that given (i) - (iv), both z and the corresponding occurrence of β in S' are not purely referential. What Kaplan describes as 'the error of step 4' is presumably the error of thinking that (D) is a consequence of (E). But it is not clear from Quine's writings that he is guilty of this error; Quine endorses (C), and (D) is a consequence of (C). Kaplan writes that the error of step 4 'is represented (in later writings) by an unjustified shift from talk about occurrences to talk about positions'. But notice that (C) does in fact license this shift, for (C) states that an occurrence of a singular term in a sentence is purely referential only if its position in that sentence is referentially transparent. If this shift from talk about occurrences to talk about positions is unjustified, then, (C) is unjustified.

1.3

Quine has observed that if we try to apply existential generalization to

(7) It is necessary that 9 is odd,

we obtain

(x) It is necessary that x is odd.

But, as he asks rhetorically, what is this object which is necessarily odd? In the light of (7) it is 9, but in the light of

(6) 9 = the number of planets,

and

(13) It is not necessary that the number of planets is odd,

it is not. Now, it is not clear why these observations are relevant to (**H**). Perhaps, as Cartwright says, we should construe Quine as pointing out that a double application of existential generalization to a conjunction of (6) and (7) with (13) yields

(14) (x) (y) ($x = y$. It is necessary that x is odd. It is not necessary that y is odd).¹⁸

But now consider the schema:

(9) (x) (y) ($x=y$ (Fx Fy)).

If

(10) (x) (y) ($x=y$ (it is necessary that x is odd it is necessary that y is odd))

is an instance of (9), then (14) is in conflict with (**B**), the claim that the universal closure of every instance of (9) expresses a true proposition. Thus, given that (**B**) is true, either (10) is not an instance of (9), or (14) does not express a true proposition. Now, presumably the principle of existential generalization whose double application to the conjunction of (6) and (7) with (13) yields (14) is this:

(G) for any sentences S and S' , any non-vacuous singular term β , and any variable β , if β does not occur in S , and S' is the result of substituting β for some occurrence of β in S , then relative to any assignment I , S expresses a true proposition, only if, relative to I , (β) S' expresses a true proposition.

Since the conjunction of (6) and (7) with (13) expresses a true proposition, given that (**B**) is true, either (**G'**) is false or (10) is not an instance of (9). Now, I think that it should be granted that (10) is an instance of (9) if and only if

(15) It is necessary that x is odd,

is an open sentence. Hence, I think that it should be granted that, given that (**B**) is true, either (**G'**) is false or (15) is not an open sentence. However, I do not see why this is any evidence for (**H**). That (**G'**) is false is established by the facts that

(4) Giorgione was so-called because of his size,

expresses a true proposition, but

(4') (x) x was so-called because of his size,

does not express any proposition, and hence does not express a true proposition. What is needed to establish (**H**) is an argument which shows that any apparent counterexample to (**G'**) involves an attempt to bind an occurrence of a variable which is not in an open sentence.

Cartwright notes:

Perhaps Quine is to be understood rather as follows: It would be counter to astronomy to deny (16) (y) ($y = \text{Phosphorus}$ $y = \text{Hesperus}$), and an application of existential generalization to the conjunction of (16) with

(17) $\text{astro Hesperus} = \text{Phosphorus}$

would yield

(18) $(x)(y)(y = \text{Phosphorus} \rightarrow y = x) \rightarrow \text{astro } x = \text{Phosphorus}$.

Again, no one could reasonably deny

(19) $(y)(y = \text{Phosphorus} \rightarrow y = \text{Phosphorus})$,

and an application of existential generalization to the conjunction of (19) with

(20) - $\text{astro Hesperus} = \text{Phosphorus}$

would yield

(21) $(x)(y)(y = \text{Phosphorus} \rightarrow y = x)$.

- $\text{astro Hesperus} = \text{Phosphorus}$.

Consider, then, the thing identical with Phosphorus. Is it a thing such that it is a truth of astronomy that it is identical with Phosphorus? In view of (18) and (21), no answer could be given. There is some one thing identical with Phosphorus. But there is no settling the question whether it satisfies ' $\text{astro } x = \text{Phosphorus}$ '. To permit quantification into opaque constructions is thus at odds with the fundamental intent of objectual quantification.¹⁹

Cartwright sees in this reasoning an argument in defence of **(B)**. Surely the conjunction of (18) and (21), he suggests, is not true; for if it were, the question: 'Is the thing identical with Phosphorus such that it is a truth of astronomy that it is identical with Phosphorus?' would be intelligible, but no answer could be given to it. However, seen as an argument for **(H)**, this reasoning, I believe, is invalid. The last sentence, i.e. 'To permit quantification into opaque constructions is thus at odds with the fundamental intent of objectual quantification' does not follow from the rest. Consider, for instance, the following argument:

Perhaps Quine is to be understood rather as follows: It would be counter to history to deny

(16') $(y)(y = \text{Reagan} \rightarrow y = \text{the president of the U.S.})$,

and an application of existential generalization to the conjunction of (16') with

(17') It was not the case in 1972 that the president of the U.S. was identical with Reagan,

would yield

(18') $(x)(y)(y = \text{Reagan} \rightarrow y = x)$. It was not the case in 1972 that x was identical with Reagan.)

Again, no one could reasonably deny

(19') $(y)(y = \text{Reagan} \rightarrow y = \text{Reagan})$,

and an application of existential generalization to the conjunction of (19) with

(20') It was the case in 1972 that Reagan was identical with Reagan,

would yield

(21') $(x)((y)(y = \text{Reagan} \rightarrow y = x))$. It was the case in 1972 that x was identical with Reagan.)

Consider, then, the thing identical with Reagan. Is it a thing such that it was the case in 1972 that it was identical with Reagan? In view of (18) and (21), no answer could be given. There is some one thing identical with Reagan. But there is no settling the question whether it satisfies 'It was the case in 1972 that x was identical with Reagan'. To permit quantification into opaque constructions is thus at odds with the fundamental intent of objectual quantification.

Surely we must resist the suggestion that no answer could be given to the question 'Is the thing identical with Reagan such that it was the case in 1972 that it was identical with Reagan?' The question is intelligible; there is indeed such a thing identical with Reagan; and there is little doubt that this thing is such it was the case in 1972 that it was identical with Reagan. The conjunction (18') and (21') is not unintelligible; it is false.

Now, it ought to be noted, as both Quine and Cartwright would emphasize, that the intelligibility of this question or the intelligibility of the conjunction of (18') and (21') is not

guaranteed simply by the intelligibility of quantification and the intelligibility of the role of 'It was the case in 1972 that' as an operator on close sentences. Cartwright notes:

The symbol "°" is sometimes so used that ° count as true if and only if itself is necessary. If that is all there is to go on, we have no option but to count the '°' construction opaque and hence

(i) $(x)(y)(x = y \text{ } ^\circ x = x \text{ } ^\circ x = y)$

unintelligible. But (ii),

(ii) $(x) \text{ } ^\circ(x = x)$

and

(iii) $(x)(y)(x = y \text{ } ^\circ x = y)$

are witnesses to a contemplated transparent '°' -construction.

Now the intelligibility of such a construction is not guaranteed simply by an antecedent understanding of quantification and of the opaque '°' -construction.²⁰

And Quine remarks:

The important point to observe is that granted an understanding of modalities (through uncritical acceptance, for the sake of argument, of the underlying notion of analyticity), and given an understanding of quantification ordinarily so-called, we do not come out automatically with any meaning for quantified modal sentences.²¹

I think that it ought to be conceded that for any reverentially opaque operator **O**, if all there is to go on about **O**, is that for any closed sentence, **S**, **OS** is true if and only if **S** is such and such, then we do not thereby gain any understanding of **OS**, where **S'** is an open sentence. The point, I think, is a perfectly general one; one which is independent of any considerations about referential opacity. Indeed, it ought to be conceded that for any operator **O**, if all there is to go on about **O**, is that for any closed sentence, **S**, **OS** is true if and only if **S** is such and such, then we do not thereby gain any understanding of **OS**, where **S'** is an open sentence. Consider, for instance, the operator 'It is not the case that'. If the only available rule for understanding 'It is not the case that' is that

(i) It is not the case that **S** is true if and only if **S** is not true,

and quantification is understood, we are not guaranteed any understanding of

(ii) (x) It is not the case that x is odd. For surely,

(iii) (x) ' x is odd' is not true

does not count as an explanation of (ii). What is obviously needed is an explanation of the role of 'It is not the case that' as an operator on an open sentence. But now suppose that

(22) It is not the case that x is odd,

is specified as an open sentence, and the problem of determining which sequences, if any, satisfy this open sentence is somehow to be settled. It seems to me that it would not be a necessary condition for settling this problem that the position of the occurrence of ' x ' in (22) be counted as reverentially transparent; for, I am inclined to think that this problem is to be settled independently of any considerations about what singular terms (other than the variables) or what kinds of singular terms (other than the variables) are available. The point is not that there is some doubt about the referential transparency of the position of the occurrence of ' x ' in (22); it is rather that the referential transparency of this position is not a necessary condition for settling the problem of determining which sequences, if any, satisfy (24). Similarly, suppose that

(15) It is necessary that x is odd,

and

(23) It was the case in 1972 that x was identical with Reagan,

are specified as open sentences, and the problem of determining which sequences, if any, satisfy these open sentences is somehow to be settled. It is not a necessary condition for settling

this problem that the positions of the occurrences of 'x' in (15) and (23) respectively be counted as reverentially transparent. Why is it, then, claimed, as Quine apparently does, that 'to permit quantification into opaque constructions is thus at odds with the fundamental intent of objectual quantification'.

One cannot help but think that at issue are some principles of instantiation and generalization. Given that **(B)** is true, if (15) is an open sentence, and the position of the occurrence of 'x' in (15) is not reverentially transparent then the following principle of existential generalization is not true:

(L) For any sentences *S* and *S'*, any non-vacuous singular term *x*, and any variable *β*, if *β* does not occur in *S*, and *S'* is an open sentence which is the result of substituting *β* for some occurrence of *x* in *S*, then relative to any assignment *I*, *S* expresses a true proposition, only if, relative to *I*, *(β)S'* expresses a true proposition.

If the position of the occurrences of 'x' in (15) is not reverentially transparent then there are singular terms and *β* such that

= *β*. It is necessary that *x* is odd. It is not necessary that *β* is odd
x expresses a true proposition. But if (15) is an open sentence, then surely
x = *y*. It is necessary that *x* is odd. It is not necessary that *y* is odd
 is an open sentence as well. And if **(L)** is true, then

(14) *(x)(y)(x = y)*. It is necessary that *x* is odd. It is not necessary that *y* is odd)
 expresses a true proposition. But (14) conflicts with **(B)**. Granted that **(B)** is true, either **(L)** is not true or (15) is not an open sentence in which the position of the occurrence of 'x' is reverentially transparent.

(L) is closely related to the following principle of universal instantiation:

(M) For any sentences *S* and *S'*, any non-vacuous singular term *x*, and any variable *β*, if *β* does not occur in *S*, and *S'* is an open sentence which is the result of substituting *β* for some occurrence of *x* in *S*, then relative to any assignment *I*, *(β)S'* expresses a true proposition, only if, relative to *I*, *S* expresses a true proposition.

Again granted that **(B)** is true, if (15) is an open sentence in which the position of the occurrence of 'x' is not reverentially transparent, then, **(M)** is false. If the position of the occurrence of 'x' in (15) is not reverentially transparent, then there are singular terms and *β* such that

= *β*. It is necessary that *x* is odd. It is not necessary that *β* is odd.
x expresses a true proposition. But granted that **(B)** is true, if (15) is an open sentence, then
 (10) *(x)(y)(x = y)* (it is necessary that *x* is odd it is necessary that *y* is odd)

is an instance of (9) which expresses a true proposition. But if **(M)** is true, and (10) expresses a true proposition, then for any non-vacuous singular terms and *β*,

= *β* (It is necessary that *x* is odd it is not necessary that *β* is odd)

expresses a true proposition. But that conflicts with the claim that there are singular terms and *β*, such that

= *β*. It is necessary that *x* is odd. It is not necessary that *β* is odd

expresses a true proposition. Hence, if **(B)** is true, either **(M)** is false, or (15) is not an open sentence in which the position of the occurrence of 'x' is reverentially transparent. It is readily seen that given that **(B)** is true, if **(M)** is true then **(H)** is true. For given that **(B)** is true, if **(M)** is true then the positions of the free occurrences of a variable in any open sentence are reverentially transparent. But, then, **(H)** is true, since, surely it is only the free occurrences of a variable in an open sentence which may be bound by a quantifier outside of that open sentence.

But is **(M)** true? It seems to me that **(M)** is not a principle which is fundamental to the intent of objectual quantification. Objectual quantification is best understood in terms of satisfaction of

open sentences, and it appears to me that the problems of determining what it is for a sequence to satisfy an open sentence are to be settled independently of any considerations about what kinds of singular term other than the variable are available. It seems, then, that it is not required for an understanding of objectual quantification that the principle that the position of an occurrence of a free variable in an open sentence is reverentially transparent is true. But since, this principle is true if (**M**) is true, a defense of (**M**) is not to be found in any appeal to the fundamental intent of objectual quantification.

Notes

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1. "Notes on Existence and Necessity", *Journal of Philo-sophy* (1943), p. 127.
2. "Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes", reprinted in *Reference and Modality*, edited by Leonard Linsky (Oxford: Oxford, 1971), pp. 102-03.
3. *From a Logical Point of View*, second edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), p. 139.
4. In any sentence which contains expressions such as "It is not the case that", and "It is necessary that", etc., which generate structural ambiguity, I interpret these expressions as operators on "their complement sentences, rather than as modifying the copular or the verb phrase of their complement sentences.
5. See note 4.
6. A proposition x falsifies a proposition y if and only if x is true and x entails the denial of y .
7. *Word and Object* (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1970), pp. 167-68. I have changed the notation and the numbering to conform to this essay.
8. *From a Logical Point of View*, p. 139.
9. *Word and Object*, pp. 141-42.
10. *From a Logical Point of View*, p. 140.
11. *Word and Object*, pp. 141-42.
12. The use of the word "position" here, corresponds to the way Quine sometimes uses "context".
13. *From a Logical Point of View*, p. 145.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 148.
15. David Kaplan, "A Historical Note on Quine's Argument Concerning Substitution and Quantification", unpublished, pp. 3-4. This paper has been incorporated in a longer unpublished paper entitled "Opacity", in the Library of Living Philosophers' volume on Quine.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 6-7.
18. Richard Cartwright, "Indiscernibility Principles" in *Mid-west Studies in Philosophy*, vol. 4, edited by French, Uchling and Wettstein (University of Minnesota, 1979), pp. 302-03.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 304.
21. *From a Logical Point of View*, p. 150.

Chapter XIII

The Nature of Mind

Absar Ahmad

Far from banality or philosophical naivety, the question of the nature of mind as distinct from the physical body is a major crux of philosophical thought to which the brightest intellectual geniuses have devoted their attention. With the possible exception of moral philosophy, it is the subject on which the largest number of full-size books, monographs and journal articles have been written in the academic philosophy of the present century. Its ramifications reach very far into the fields of ethics, psychology and sociology, to say nothing of religion. Within the traditional divisions of metaphysics itself, it touches such diverse disciplines as ontology, epistemology, mental philosophy and the variegated questions of the essential nature of the human person and the explanation of his behaviour, freedom, moral responsibility and immortality.

I hold no brief for the currently fashionable linguistic-analytic method that has turned philosophy into a narrow and specialised academic subject of little relevance or interest to anyone outside small circle of some professional philosophers. The inevitable result of this type of philosophy has been that serious philosophical work beyond the conventional sphere has been minimal. It is characteristic of this type of philosophers that they come to think they can dismiss, analyse away or dissolve a complex and profound metaphysical question in a few deft "moves" or with a few clever points and to distrust whatever is not put in the professional patois of "claims," unpacking or entailment and which does not have the sleek professionalism and glibness that now passes for rigour and brilliance. By declaring a deeply significant question to be a muddle, they easily try to escape it. This unincisive and cavalier attitude has been particularly exhibited in the case of the nature of mind by the best known English-speaking philosophers from Gilbert Ryle down to Richard Taylor, D. M. Armstrong and K. V. Wilkes. The last mentioned philosopher, for example, writes in her recently entitled *Physicalism*:

The physicalist we have described has no longer to contend with the 'mind-body' problem. The problem, though, is dissolved rather than solved. Psychophysiological functionalism prevents it from arising, stops the question even being posed. The reason, very simply, is that it allows for no class of mental events, states or processes that can be set in an interestingly problematic relation to a class of physical events, states, and processes.¹

The same cavalier attitude comes out unmistakably when we read the following lines by Richard Taylor in his book *Metaphysics*:

If a philosopher reasons that a body cannot think, and thereby affirms that, since a person thinks, a person is a soul or spirit or mind rather than a body, we are entitled to ask how a spirit can think. For surely if a mind or soul can think, we can affirm that a body can do so; and if we are asked how a body can think, our reply can be that it thinks in precisely the same manner in which the dualist supposes a mind or soul thinks.²

These lines, I am sure, jolt all its readers and are likely to produce very poor views of the role and utility of philosophical arguments. Despite the works of the numerous philosophers writing in

this vein, the question of the nature of mind has survived to this day and remains a source of acute perplexity to serious thinkers. Astonishingly enough, it survives to this day in much the same form.

The problem of the nature of mind has many facets, and it is not possible for me to touch them all within the compass of a short paper. The best I can do is to point out my own general position on this question and briefly mention the bases on which I take my stand. I think that the most profound, and for that matter, most enduring solution to this riddle was that of Descartes. I do not agree with every feature of Descartes' dualism or for all the ways in which he presented his views. Nevertheless, I believe that he was right in essence in his views about mind and body and that he was much more perceptive in his ways of presenting his ideas than today is commonly supposed. To rehabilitate Descartes *in toto* is a Herculean task while I cannot attempt in the short space at my disposal. My aim is a more modest one. I shall take the *via negativa* of making rather detailed critical comments on D. M. Armstrong, a major writer on the subject who has taken an anti-dualist position on this issue, defending a materialist or physicalist theory of mind in a massive work under the same title.³

D. M. Armstrong's version of the mind-body identity theory, the doctrine of central-state materialism, is extremely radical and tough-minded in identifying conscious experiences with the brain. The central point of his theory is that it does away entirely with conscious mental states, insofar as they are very crudely identified with brain states. The substance of Armstrong's view can be put briefly and not too misleadingly in the proposition: 'The mind is nothing but the brain'. Like other identity theorists he too bases his argument on extremely misleading analogies. We must first look carefully at the analogies that he gives to elucidate the mind-brain identity, and examine its soundness. For example, he writes:

If it is true that the mind is the brain, a model must be found among contingent statements of identity. We must compare the statement to 'The morning star is the evening star', or 'the gene is the DNA molecule', or some other contingent statement of Identity.⁴

Armstrong then goes on to argue, quite correctly, "But, if the mind is the brain, is a contingent statement, then it follows that it must be possible to give a logically independent explanation (or alternatively, ostensive definition) of the meaning of the two words 'mind' and 'brain'." Armstrong seems fundamentally mistaken in his implicit premise that his two examples of contingent identity are comparable analogies to the thesis that 'the mind is the brain'. This becomes clear when we analyse the three cases:

- The morning star and the evening star are one and the same physical object.
- The gene is a theoretical concept; the DNA molecule is a chemical entity.
- The mind is a person's lived conscious agency i.e., it is given before we can begin any analysis, etc. If it is regarded as a theoretical concept, it still refers to the subject of experience or psyche. Whereas the brain is an organ of the body.

Now obviously there are important differences between these three cases and it is glib and unincisive to consider them as analogous statements. Only in the first case (morning star and evening star) can the two things be regarded as one and the same thing. The concept of identity as applied in the supposed gene concept is indeed very loose and naive. The discovery of DNA, the elucidation and analysis of its structure, etc., has not altered the conceptual status of the gene in any way. The word 'gene' continues to represent a principle (or a theoretical concept) which is

temporarily prior and logically distinct from the chemical entity to which, we now know, it refers -- the DNA molecule. But apart from whether or not the identification in this case is justifiably maintained, it surely has no parallel to the mind-brain case.

The problem in relation to the mental state is not simply one of finding out (through science as in the case of the gene) what the empirical referent of a particular theoretical concept is. It is in fact the far more considerable one of establishing that an already existing 'empirical' referent of the concept 'mental state', viz., conscious experience, is identical with a hypothesised brain state. Armstrong, with other central state materialists, is in fact asserting that conscious experience and neurophysiological processes are one and the same thing; to equate this with the gene-DNA example is grossly inaccurate and therefore very misleading. This also shows the philosophical futility of the idea of 'contingent identity' on which the identity theorists so heavily base their arguments. If two apparently distinct things are thought to be one and the same thing there can be no question of any kind of identity until the issue has been decided one way or the other by critical inquiry and investigation. When identity is established it is logically necessary that the two things are in fact one and the same thing (a tautology). Even here, it must be observed, the identity of the mental with the physical is not exactly of this sort, since it is held to be simultaneous identity rather than the identity of a thing at one time with the same thing at a later time. If an object did not have two distinct aspects or phases, it would not be a *discovery* that they are indeed one and the same body. My essential point here is that the analogies usually cited by identity philosophers are not at all relevant or helpful in this context.

The second stage of Armstrong's argument is that if 'the mind is the brain' is a meaningful statement, then it must be possible to give a logically independent explanations of the words 'mind' and 'brain'.

The word 'brain' gives no trouble . . . the problem is posed by the word 'mind'. What verbal explanation or ostensive definition can be given of this word without implying a departure from the physicalistic view of the world? This seems to be the great problem, or, at any rate, one great problem, faced by a Central-state theory. Central-state Materialism holds that when we are *aware of* our own mental states what we are aware of are mere physical states of the brain. But we are certainly not aware of the mental states *as* states of the brain. What then are we aware of mental states as? Are we not aware of them as states of a quite peculiar, mental sort?⁵

Conscious experience does have this 'quite peculiar, mental quality' and Armstrong is undoubtedly right in seeing this as a formidable problem for a materialistic programme. This problem has led some physicalists to the extreme and clearly paradoxical position of not allowing the statements that assert or imply the existence of mind. A true physicalistic world-view would simply talk about the operations of the central nervous system, and completely write off talk about the mind and mental processes.⁶ Armstrong does not accept this approach. Despite the difficulties, he attempts to sketch out a solution of the word 'mind' in the form of a physical, quasi-behaviourist explanation:

Psychologists very often present us with the following picture. Man is an object continually acted upon by certain physical stimuli. These stimuli elicit from him certain behaviour, that is to say, a certain physical response. In the causal chain between the stimulus and the response, falls the mind. The mind is that what causally mediates our response to stimuli. . . . As a first approximation we can say that what we mean when we talk about the mind, or about particular mental processes, is *nothing but* the effect within a man of a certain stimuli, and the cause within a man of certain responses.⁷

This line of reasoning is certainly a very desperate one; an outstanding example of pure question-begging. Man has conveniently been turned into a machine and his conscious experience reduced to the effect of certain stimuli and the cause of certain responses. A dualist certainly takes effects and responses into consideration, but he would not maintain with Armstrong that the brain processes as such causes purposive human activities. Armstrong here wrongly derives a materialist ontological conclusion from the psychologists' methodological behaviourism. Experimental psychologists undoubtedly talk of mind as a sequence of stimulus-effect response in a rough and tentative manner, but that surely does not warrant a philosophical theory about the nature of the conscious subject or mind in itself and mental states.

Armstrong goes on: "The concept of a mental state is the concept of that, whatever it may turn out to be, which is brought about in a man by certain stimuli and which in turn brings about certain responses. What it is in its own nature is something for science to discover."⁸

This position is implausible on two counts. First, it is naive at best to allow a facile equation of 'the concept of mental state' with 'whatever it turns out to be', which in fact he clearly envisages will turn out to be a physical process in the brain. Is there not a profound theoretical problem here: how will it ever be possible to say or to demonstrate that the conscious experience and a neurophysiological process are as a matter of fact one and the same thing? Secondly, if indeed this is 'something for science to discover' why not deal with this scientifically, i.e., by producing supportive scientific evidence and devising ways of examining the theory as a scientific hypothesis by actual neurophysiological experimentation.⁹ Armstrong, instead of giving any positive evidence, dogmatically asserts:

Modern science declares that this mediator between stimulus and response is in fact the central nervous system, or more crudely and inaccurately, but more simply, the brain.¹⁰

This is more question begging. The sole mediator is the central nervous system only in reflex activity. If Armstrong or for that matter any neurophysiologist wants to include mind and mental states in his conception of the central nervous system, clearly the burden of proof is on him to show how conscious experience can be equated or identified with the brain. In any case 'modern science' cannot 'declare' anything because it is not a person.

By far the largest part of Armstrong's book is devoted to a philosophical analysis of the concept of Mind in which he tries to show that the ordinary meaning of 'mental' can be summarised adequately in the formula 'apt for the production of bodily behaviour'. Though Armstrong separates himself from the earlier positions of Feigl, Smart and others who tried to take behaviourism as far as it could go, yet his amended position is also heavily indebted to behaviourism. Put succinctly, his position is that: "The concept of mental state is primarily the concept of a person apt for bringing about a certain sort of behaviour."¹¹

What differentiates this from behaviorism is that the mental state is not absorbed into behavior but left with its separate existence. But it is characterised in a topic neutral way, for it is only identified extrinsically through its consequences. It is further asserted that in reality it can be identified with physico-chemical states of the brain, but this is where the confusion starts. Armstrong elaborates on some of the terms used in the above formula in some detail, but all the hedging only reinforces one's feeling that the formula (and the above approach it entails) is fundamentally unsound. The issue is clinched by a statement of Armstrong which can be regarded as a major confession of the weakness of his position.

It will be seen that our formula 'state of the person apt for bringing about a certain sort of behaviour' is something that must be handled with care. Perhaps it is best conceived of as a slogan or catch phrase which indicates the general line along which accounts of the individual mental concepts are to be sought, but does no more than this.¹²

Slogans and catch phrases invariably involve considerable over-simplification, if not distortion. It is surely significant that Central-state materialism is driven in desperation to devise a formula that is, in principle, liable to be found so crude and misleading. Let us take a closer look at the two main components of the formula: (1) a state of the person (apt for bringing about the corresponding behaviour), and (2) behaviour.

(1) If 'mental states' are to be equated or identified with 'states of the person', let us see where the consistent application of the formula leads. Two examples: (a) A completely unconscious person may show behaviour of various kinds, both reflexive and spontaneous. Here 'a state of the person . . .' is in fact the physiological state which is apt for the production of the kind of behaviour exhibited. A specific example of this would be the sort of physiological change that a clinical neurologist infers following his examination of an unconscious patient who has had a stroke. In Armstrong's formula the particular physiological state concerned is in fact the person's 'mental state'. (b) Disordered behaviour in a conscious person may be the specific expression of an actually demonstrable organic lesion in his brain, say, a brain tumour. If we are to follow Armstrong, the brain tumour is the person's 'mental state', since it is that state of the person which is apt for the production of corresponding behaviour.

(2) Behavior. There are two objections regarding this. Firstly, behavior is too limited and superficial a concept (even the extremely complicated behaviour of an artist painting a picture) to allow of any simple equation with the corresponding 'mental state'. Take the example of a novelist for closer examination. His behaviour which on a superficial view is relatively uniform, in fact turns out to be very complex on minute scrutiny: consider as one aspect of this the fine movements of his hand and fingers as he writes. This behaviour may be very complex, *qua* behavior, yet remains a fragmented, erratic external expression of the novelist's actual succession of 'mental states' as experienced by him. Here one has only to think of the wealth of imagery a novelist's imagination must call forth when he is at work. Secondly, to the extent that there is any correspondence between mental states and behaviour surely it is the former that must have priority. So that we need to invert Armstrong, and then we get: some items of behaviour may be apt for allowing an inference about the mental state which produces them.

An examination of Armstrong's analysis of various mind-related concepts like secondary qualities, will, perception, imagination, etc., makes it clear that he does not in fact allow us to use these mental words in the way to which we are accustomed. He, too, like Smart and other mind-body identity theorists, falls back upon some sort of translation scheme. He tells us, for example:

'I have pain in my hand' may be rendered somewhat as follows: 'It feels to me that a certain sort of disturbance is occurring in my hand, a perception that evokes in me the peremptory desire that the perception should cease'. What is meant by 'a certain sort of disturbance' here? If we simply consult our experience of physical pain, its nature cannot be further specified.¹³

But is there any point in purging the mental through attempts like this? Once we have admitted introspective language, that is, language describing how things are for the experiencing person, then we have accepted in some sense an 'inner reality', for we accept talk about states and occurrences as they are experienced by an agent. Armstrong shows a lot of ingenuity in adapting his scheme to make room for such difficult notions as those of imagination and perception, but on the points of central importance he seems to be more anxious to cling dogmatically to his identity

thesis than to report and accept the facts as he finds them. To give one example, although much of the language he uses (e.g., 'seeing', 'hearing') suggests very strongly that perceptual learning depends on the occurrence of sense experience which is 'something quite different from the acquiring of beliefs about environment', he shies away from admitting this uncomfortable conclusion because (as he tells us frankly on page 217), he 'has been unable to see how' it can be made 'compatible with a causal analysis of all the mental concepts'.

I shall now try to show that Armstrong has not been able consistently to maintain the strict identity of the mental states with the cerebral ones. My argument is based on the consideration of an objection against the identity thesis which Armstrong himself formulates in the following very precise manner:

I begin with the relatively frivolous objections: those that are based on a failure to understand the position being attacked. In the first place, it may be objected that the theory has the absurd consequence that, when a person is aware of having a pain and at the same time a brain surgeon looks at his brain, the two of them may be aware of the same thing.

The objection is frivolous, because the consequence is not absurd at all. The patient and the surgeon may be aware of the same thing, but they are aware of very different characteristics of it. An analogy would be: one person smells the cheese, but does not taste it; the other tastes but does not smell it. The patient is aware that there is something within him apt for the production of certain behavior; the surgeon is aware of certain intrinsic characteristics of this something. And, unlike the case of cheese, it needs a theoretical scientific argument to show that what each is aware of is in fact one and the same thing.¹⁴

Far from being frivolous, the essence of this objection is probably the most weighty single counter-argument to Central-state materialism. The theory most certainly does have the absurd consequence that a conscious experience is identified with a neural process in precisely the way indicated in Armstrong's example. It is simply a logical consequence of the thesis that material states and brain states are one and the same thing. The argument used to counter this criticism is fundamentally inconsistent with his main thesis: indeed, it destroys his whole theory. The essential point here is that the statement that mental states and brain states are 'one and the same thing' has now become "they are very different characteristics of it, i.e., of one thing." There is a very great difference between the two statements, and it turns out to be crucial.

Take Armstrong's own analogy of smelling and tasting the cheese. The consideration here is that the taste and the smell are different characteristics of, but by no means one and the same thing as, the cheese. They are properties, in fact emergent properties, of the cheese; these emergent properties are logically, epistemologically and physiologically distinct from that of which they are properties, i.e., the cheese. Indeed I would say that there is no strict analogy between our sensations pertaining to cheese and the awareness of pain. The patient's experience of pain is not as such related with the brain state as smelling and tasting are related with the cheese. The absurd consequence that what the patient feels is what the surgeon sees is not 'based on a failure to understand the position being attacked'; it is a direct consequence (logically necessary) of Armstrong's position. We must therefore conclude that the absurdity is the result of a consistent application of a theory: *a reductio ad absurdum* of Central-state materialism itself.

The argument adduced by Armstrong in order to save his theory introduces a distinct notion altogether, that of 'very different characteristics' of one thing, and is clearly inconsistent with his main theory. To assert that the patient's pain, i.e., the conscious experience of pain, is a property (or Armstrong's 'characteristic') of the neural process, quite different from the property of the

same process seen by the surgeon, is in fact to hold a dualist position -- at least in its 'double-aspect' version.

However, I would not agree with Armstrong even in maintaining that the experience of pain is an aspect of the underlying brain state. From the point of view of the patient surely the conscious experience of the pain itself is quite distinct from the physical state of his brain. I cannot see how this conclusion can be avoided. We are left then with no less a position than the consciousness-brain dualism itself. Armstrong's attempted defence of Identity theory or a materialistic view of mind is a very question begging undertaking indeed. It is radically wrong to talk of "a theoretical scientific argument to show that what each is aware of is in fact one and the same thing." The experience of pain is a distinct mental occurrence ontologically different in nature from anything we can observe externally through our senses. We do not feel sensations in our brains -- brain tissues are actually insensitive. Therefore sensations and experiences are not states of the brain or central nervous system. No kind of observation or investigation with instruments could determine the presence of thinking inside the skull, unless investigation was conceived of as determining the occurrence of some physical process inside the skull, the occurrence of which was itself to be used as the criterion of the occurrence of thinking. But if the investigation was so conceived the theory would not be that of mind-brain identity.

A similar mistake was committed by P. F. Strawson when he summed up his position in Chapter 3 of his book *Individuals*. He wrote: "X's depression is something, one and the same thing, which is felt but not observed by X, and observed but not felt by other than X."¹⁵ How are we to interpret this sentence? If we take it literally, Strawson is identifying what X feels with what others observe. In that case there is an obvious objection. Strawson mentions the awkward facts in a single sentence, but offers no further comments: he says in brackets, 'Of course, what can be observed can also be faked or disguised'. Strawson is not, surely, entitled to gloss over these facts as if they made no difference to his thesis. Ali's feeling depressed and his depressed behaviour cannot be identified, since, as Strawson himself concedes, either may occur in the absence of the other. Since depression may be successfully simulated without being felt and may be felt without being betrayed, we cannot accept Strawson's thesis that it is 'one and the same thing'. Once we admit intentional language, that is language describing how things are for the agent, then we accept in some sense an 'inner reality', for we accept talk about things as they are seen or experienced by an agent.

On the positive side, my claim is that the identity or physicalistic theories of Armstrong, the philosophical or logical behaviourism of Strawson and his acolytes and the psychophysiological functionalism of K. V. Wilkes leave a vacuum at the heart of our moral and practical life. They all make us out to be hollow men in a wasteland. They tell us that we are machines -- enormously complicated machines, but in the end nothing more. And after all what is the value of a world in which only such machines exist? If one looks at the list of things which, in the opinion of major thinkers, make life worth living, one finds such things as spiritual bliss or happiness, wisdom or understanding, friendship, the sense of beauty, the sense of duty. All of them, mind you, are forms of consciousness. The wisdom prized by Spinoza was not that of a computer. It was conscious insight, the experience of understanding, cultivated and enjoyed by a human person. If mind is undermined, philosophy itself becomes mindless. Such a self-negating enterprise should not be indulged. This is far from accepting the position of most writers and thinkers on the subject which reduce human person to a physical entity or a complex machine.

Notes

1. K.V. Wilkes, *Physicalism* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 14.
2. R. Taylor, *Metaphysics* (Prentice-Hall, NJ: 1974), p. 30.
3. D.M. Armstrong, *A Materialist Theory of the Mind* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971).
4. *Ibid.*, p. 77.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 78.
6. See, for example, Paul Feyerabend, "Mental Events and the Brain", *The Journal of Philosophy*, vol. LX (1963). He proposes that mentalistic language involves an irrational, unempirical theory carried over from a primitive and superstitious past.
7. Armstrong, *op.cit.*, p. 89 (my italics).
8. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
9. I am, however, not sure if scientific experimentation can help in the area at all. If scientific instruments gave a neurologist access to my processes, this would not be the "direct" access which I have to my experience.
10. Armstrong, *op.cit.*, p. 99.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 82.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 84 (italics not in the original).
13. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
15. P.F. Strawson, *Individuals: An Essay in Descriptive Metaphys* (London: Methuen and Co., 1959), p. 109 (italics mine).

Chapter XIV

The Knowledge of Other Minds

Abdul Hameed Kamali

Limitations of the Problem

Knowledge of other minds may be thought to be closely integrated with the fields of the cultural *wissenschaften* as determining and changing their formulation and structures. But this line of thought is mistaken, for no theory of the knowledge of other minds is able to articulate the axiomatics, modify the structure, or disturb the scheme of those sciences. Cultural, social, political, legal, economic and other orders of collective life never presuppose the mutual knowledge of minds in their makeup and configuration. As formal in character they are determined solely by their formal properties.

Every formal system is comprised of constant relations between the variables. The meanings, interpretations, constitutions of the variable terms do not participate in the meanings and essence of the formal systems. The logical constants and their rules of combination or operation constitute the meanings of the existence of the formal systems. For instance, such variable terms as 'points', 'straight lines', etc., are identified within geometric systems. Only the formal relations between them are studied by us. If we know the meanings of the points and straight lines, this in no way affects the constructions of geometric systems, for it does not form part of that system. Likewise, we are aware of the serial system of numbers; we do not know the meanings of one, two, three, etc., its variable terms but their mutual connections and the rules of their relatedness. This is so in mechanical, thermo-dynamic, electro-magnetic and chemical systems. Socio-cultural systems are not exceptions; they too consist in constant relations between variable terms.

The 'meanings', 'inner processes', and 'interpretations' of the variables are irrelevant to the existence of these systems. Only the socio-cultural relations and their rules of operations are constitutive of these orders of existence. Individuals are the variable terms in the socio-cultural systems, but their nature and meaning are excluded from the constitution and existence of these systems. Therefore, the theory of knowledge of other minds has no bearing on the cultural, social and economic systems.

Some may think that the world of socio-cultural reality might be independent of epistemology, but indispensable for the formulations of a general science of psychology. But this is not so. Psychology studies a closed system comprised of two sub-systems: (1) individual and (2) environment; it studies the mutual interaction between them. The object-matter of psychology is, thus, a formal system and the sub-systems are its terms. In studying this, psychology does not define the terms which are involved therein; the definitions and meanings of the terms are redundant for the existence of the system. Therefore, here again, the knowledge of other minds has no meaning even in psychic systems.

Neo-Platonic Form of the Problem

In our above elucidations we did not deny the existence of minds and individuals nor attempt to show that they do not exist. Our point is that there is no problem of the knowledge of other minds in social, cultural and psychic fields. If they exist, they are knowable. Many subjects of

knowledge know other minds to some extent, and that there may be some beings who are acquainted with other minds adequately and completely without any remainder.

We are acquainted with trees, stars, and mountains; we are aware of other individuals; we know our friends, parents and teachers. But we are interrupted by the epistemologist, who raises the question: how do we know other minds? To be sure, these problems appear meaningful and significant to him and not to other persons including Moore and Ryle. What is the matter?

The epistemologist, whether a Kant or a Hegel, a Neurath or a Carnap, is the same neo-Platonist who believes (1) that the form of knowledge determines the mode of reality, (2) that what is not known by anybody does not exist, and so (3) knowledge somehow or other institutes the reality. In the meek form, the neo-Platonist is a logical positivist or a phenomenologist demanding the conditions of experiences; in the bold form, he is an idealist, asking about the categories of experience. He postulates any or all of the three above-mentioned propositions.

Indeed, the European idealistic tradition of thought is trying to secure a new lease of life in the guise of logical positivistic, instrumentalistic and psychologistic philosophies. Its basic belief-structure holds a logical priority of epistemology over ontology. Therefore, following this tradition, the epistemological question of the knowledge of the external world and of other minds is logically prior to the ontological problem of the existence of the external and the world of other minds. As it is the common and cardinal principle of phenomenological and idealistic philosophies that an idea consists in the steps of its constructions, the problem of other minds becomes for them the problem of the knowledge of other minds.

The inevitable direction of such formulations of the problem is towards the conclusion that other minds are logical constructions, as is the external world.

Bertrand Russell and Carnap are in alliance with Mannheim and Bradley as neo-Platonists for whom 'to be' means 'to be known'. For Bradley and Croce, other minds are logical constructs of the objective spirit. To Russell and Carnap, they are logical constructs of the observer.

Just as the external world is a consequence of the constructive activity of the observer, other minds are the products of constructive activity. Carnap points out how, from the stuff of the private experience, the inter-subjective world is carved; how the logical construct of one's own body and other bodies (selves) emerges in the field of experience.

But the essential characteristics of the 'fact of knowledge' are missing in constructionism. The pan-physicalistic and idealistic philosophies consider that construction and synthesis are the only functions of intellect. They altogether miss the cognitive or knowledge function of the mind. Therefore, the entire idealistic, pan-physicalistic alliance, although a good guide in combining, creating, and producing activities, is unhelpful in the demonstration of knowledge which is analytical. It seizes upon the components of the object, but never constructs it.

There are three possibilities in the knowledge of an object: (1) either it is completely known, or (2) it is incompletely known, or (3) it is unknown. None of these three facts effects the object, as knowledge is merely an awareness of the world, not its construction in the sense of being an addition or change.

We are not interested in the modifications of other minds, but only in their knowledge. Our interest in influencing and reforming them does not enter into their being known by us. Neo-Platonic philosophies, in their failure to distinguish between knowledge and construction, always confuse the issue.

The laborious task of constructing the inter-subjective world of experience out of the stuff privately given by a subject of experience does not slightly enlighten us on the problem of

knowledge. Similarly, the construction of other minds by the objective spirit does not throw light on the problem of the knowledge of other minds.

To Know vs to Create

The universal presupposition of the neo-Platonism enshrined in polylogism and logical positivism is that 'To create an object implies to know the object.' But knowledge and creation are two distinct words and one cannot be reduced to the other. Knowledge is a *sui genre* fact in the universe; similarly, constructivity is an unanalysable fact. Analysis or reduction of these facts in terms of any other fact is also impossible.

The Universal Ego in its creative act creates the object, and in its knowing act knows the object. He is the Creator and the Knower. To be knower, then, is one of His functions, and to be creator is another. The Hegelian philosophy in either Croce or Mannheim does not distinguish between these two. In describing the knowledge function, they introduce the modifications of reality, so that there is no knowledge without distortion even for the Universal Ego. Therefore, even God does not know other minds without modifying them.

In the pan-physicalistic version, the other mind is a logical construct out of elementary data. This goes beyond presentation and unifies them by fitting them into a 'concept' of mind. A constructive activity is either consistent or inconsistent but is never true or false. Yet the physicalists say that this construct is either true or false in the sense of corresponding or not to reality. This 'novel' feature of the construct is made plausible by the mind not only apprehending the presentation but moving beyond it in the world not of reality but of language. Logical constructs, like chairs and minds, are formulations in the system of language, propositional functions.

Whether language construct corresponds or not to the objective fact of reality is the problem. Whether there is a chair or a mind still remains a problem which only the future will answer. And the future does not decide it at one stroke, but simply changes the probability of a language construct on the truth-falsehood scale. Hence, although I have constructed something in the realm of language, I do not know whether it exists in the external world. In this way language philosophers do not enlighten us about the problem of knowledge.

The difficulty again lies in the concept that mind is constructive and never cognitive. Whenever the language philosopher is forced to admit the cognitive function of mind, he reduces it to the constructive function and attempts to solve the problem of knowledge in those terms. Professor Qadir is beset with the same difficulty when he says that our knowledge of all other things is inductive and probable. Induction is a name of the constructive function at the symbolic level; it is a movement towards a general construct synthesising the particulars. Induction is a process of creative activity, but knowledge is never a creativity. Creation and construction, induction and synthesis belong to the sphere of practical activity. We never know other things by induction or by logical construction.

Knowledge is a fact distinct from the inductive generalising acts. It means analysis as opposed to induction. Our knowledge of other minds and of the furniture of the universe, therefore, is not a case of induction but of analysis. Our doings, orderings, systematisations and action-patterns follow the principles of construction and induction, while knowledge is the grasp of an object in its constitution, an apprehension of a presentation in its components.

Knowledge is not a doing, indeed all sorts of activity are besides the fact of knowledge. The sentence "I know X" is a distortion of language as it suggests that knowledge is an activity; perhaps

all neo-Platonic philosophies have taken their start from this deceptive formulation of language. Therefore, "X knows Y" must be reconstructed as "Y is known to X", so that the colour of doing may be removed. The reformulation of a knowledge situation in the structure of language represents it as a relational system, in which there are two terms in the non-symmetrical relation of "is known to." Let us denote this relation by R. It is a dyadic, non-symmetrical, non-transitive relation.

Like all systems, the knowledge system requires the existence of its constituents only and nothing else: (1) the two terms and (2) the relation R. No further elements and no other systems of reality are involved in the existence of knowledge systems. Consequently, "X is hankering after Y." "Y is in need of X", "X is the neighbour of Y", etc., may be facts, but their factuality does not influence nor does it determine the systems: 'Rxy', or 'Ryx', or both. Knowledge systems are among the possible systems of the universe. They are not modified by any other system nor do they modify other systems in their compresence with them.

Constituents of Knowledge

The only meaningful question is: what is apprehended of the object? This investigation becomes an inquiry into the constituents of the object. Instead of describing how knowledge is possible, the epistemologist admits the actuality of knowledge and starts the analysis of the object.

Some philosophers assert that there is a limit set on the knowledge of everything. In the case of other mind, they say, it is the body of the mind which is apprehended and not the mind; they think that we know the body in which a mind is incarnated and never know the mind. Obviously, this argument is a proposal as to the use of the words: the known is called a body, and the unknown is called a mind. It is just possible that someone is self-conscious and is also conscious of all others. Then the entire universe including oneself is a body (or bodies). It is also possible that some entity is neither self-conscious nor conscious of others; then the entire universe is a mind (or many minds). To the extent to which I know myself I am a body; and to extent to which I do not know myself I am a mind. I am mind in the body or rather mind and body.

But, these philosophers point out that they are not forwarding a proposal of reform of linguistic conventions, but are hitting at a fact in reality, namely, that what is unknowable is the fact that there are also other subjects of experience. We know organic movements, factual expressions, and muscular coordinations, but do not know that other persons have knowledge; we cannot know that they are conscious beings.

This argument, so far as it goes, presupposes a 'ghost-in-the-machine' model of the living beings that is confounded by its failure to see the 'ghost', the driver of the machine. But if one notices the 'ghost' in the machine, and no one apprehends the 'mind' in the body, then no one can assert or think that the Ghost is in the machine and the mind is in the body.

The fact is that the ghost is the machine and the body is the mind; mind and body are two names of the same entity. If the 'same entity' is the object of knowledge, it is a body; and if it is subject of knowledge, it is mind. Again, the distinction between body and mind is merely verbal and symbolic. These words are merely indications of the position a term holds in the knowledge system.

Yet, there is a problem: is it possible to know that some entity (other than the writer or the speaker) knows other objects? Philosophers, like Ayer, say that it is impossible; knowledge is private to subject and inaccessible to others. Professor Qadir would, at once, agree with Professor

Ayer. I gaze at Mr. X, but do not know the depth and expanse of his knowledge; therefore, I cannot know that Mr. X is a knower, or has consciousness, etc.

This entire approach, in my opinion, is a cynical misdirection of energies; for the problem is not to know X, but to know what X knows. Surely, by 'Rix' I cannot know 'Rxa', 'Rxb', 'Rxm' [(I, = the speaker); (a, b, m = objects of knowledge)]. I must direct my attention to all the knowledge-systems in which X is the subject term instead of dissipating myself in looking at X in isolation.

'X' and 'Rxa' do not mean the same thing. The neo-Platonists conceive that 'Rxa' is a part of 'X', which is an ontological mistake in which the part of a system contains the whole as its part. This mistake continues in all their traditions, even in the contemporary empiricism, and compels them to apprehend 'X' on the occasions when they have to grasp 'Rxa'. My problem to know X's knowledge really means I must (1) not only know X, but (2) all the objects which are known to X, and then I must behold (3) the relational systems the objects make with X.

Since human beings are fond of symbolisations, they name the entities, and remember them by their names or symbols. Our inquiry would then amount to be an inquiry into the existence of knowledge systems composed of X and various symbols.

No one can look into the individuals so as to discover the treasures of knowledge inside them. Knowledge is not contained in mind. It is mind which is contained as a term in the system of knowledge. Along this line we can dispose of many problems as to the knowledge of other minds.

Bifurcation vs Process

Common people and the Neo-Platonists are so much saturated in the dualistic terminology of mind and matter, ghost and machine, internal and external, that in describing plain facts of life they create puzzles. For instance, the ordinary fact that I am happy means to them that happiness is inside me, and my face and body are simply an agency of its expression. They employ the 'cause-agency' and 'end-means' formulae in understanding themselves, other beings, and perhaps the entire universe.

Although the Muslim tradition of thought used the classification of the 'seen' and the 'unseen' before the impact of neo-Platonism, yet it never employed the categories of 'mind and matter', 'soul and agency', etc. For most of the sufis and thinkers of the time the dualism of materiality and spirituality never existed, and so the ordinary facts of sadness, happiness, frustration, etc., could not be conceived as internal states.

But, in the historical development since then, language cast in neo-Platonic frameworks has so transformed the habits of thought and so much penetrated the traditions of our society that every man, as if by nature, is guided to accept them as inner facts, accessible to the possessor and inaccessible to the outsider. We must try to deliver ourselves from these models of language construction which induce us to adopt those norms of understanding at the cost of all others.

The class character of the traditional models of thought is the bifurcation of a continuous process into two halves; one of them becomes the reality, and the other appearance (expression). Professor Dev's ungraded poles of truth and falsehood, of reality and *maya*, are the climax of this tendency. The consequence of this bifurcation is a list of causes and motives in the field of mind which are said to be independent of the vehicles and means in which they are expressed. This ideology is beneath the subjectivistic, hedonistic and emotivistic ethics of our times; it is the esoteric structure of polylogism and historicism; again, it is the bedrock of the ideal of the privacy of the content of experience which is basic to logical positivism.

The result is that happiness, frustrations, ambitions, pains, headaches, loves, hates, conflicts, cooperations, etc., are supposed to inhere within individuals. As internal states, they are unknown to others. The epistemologists ask: how do we know the motives of other persons, since *ex hypothesi* they are unknowable? After raising this question in despair, he replies that the reality is unknown, only the gateway to appearance is open to us. Therefore, nothing but induction, speculation and guessing is our business. Only in the hereafter will we know whether our guesses were true.

If this is right, then there is no solid support for mutual confidence, no sure guarantee behind the system of credit and no process of justice, for it is not secure in its principles of evidence. No one is prepared to accept the dangerous conclusions of this line of thought. People must reject it not because it is dangerous, but because it rests on the slippery grounds of the bifurcation of the reality into cause-effect, motive-expression, appearance-reality groups.

Of the life of mind some particular process is happiness, another specific process is depression, still another is wonder, and there are many more. But a process is an ordered series $\frac{3}{4}$ a set of events -- such that it is uni-directional; it has a first element and its duration is determined by its (number of) recurrence. If it halts at any of its points, it is no more. The observer of the self (of which it is a process) breaks it down into (1) the motive segment, (2) action segment and (3) goal. This attempt to cut down and label the various pieces of a process represents the horrible power of a certain habit of mind inherited by us from the past. It is a convention in the same sense in which there are other customs and traditions of a group of people, transmitted from generation to generation. Its sole justification is that it is there.

By grafting this convention of classifications onto the facts of life, we make the problem of the knowledge of other minds unanswerable.

This convention, embedded with certain definitions, declares the mind unknowable. The definitions are: (1) the motive segment is isolable from and is independent of the action and goal segments, (2) the motive segment is one which is interior and the rest of the process is exterior, (3) the motive segment is that part which is unknowable, (4) it is the essence of Mind. All of these definitions given with the convention of classification would mean that if there is an E-group of the life of mind which is known, then it is an exterior fact; consequently, it is not a motive, and so does not form part of the essence of mind. Thus mind is made unknowable by the very definitions. The unknowable is the motive which is the essence of mind. If we adopt this scheme of the taxonomic concepts, we would be doomed not to talk about the knowledge of other minds, which existence would always appear as a guess.

The processes of life, in spite of their conventional segmentations, are public facts. They are open to inspection; there is no exterior and no interior. They can be apprehended in their totality and as such are called states, every one of which has a volume or dimension in which many tiny events or elements are densely populated. Our vision of a cluster, garden or gathering does not depend upon counting every single item, although in principle that is just possible, rather we take a view of it and know what exists. Similarly, a spectator takes a snapshot of the state of affairs without noting each of its items, and knows that it is there. People, living in a community, are aware of the various constellations of the facts of life.

They are public facts open to inspection by any mind. Sometimes, the constellation of happiness enters in my life. Sometimes, it occurs to X, and sometimes to Y, and so on. We human beings have a direct awareness of the different constellations of the facts of human life: they happen to anyone who belongs to our society, and we at once recognise them when they occur, as we recognise the colours, the chairs, and other entities if they are present. This means that the fact

of cognition is the same; the apprehension is not different, only its objects differ. We often seize upon the objects completely in a field of cognition; we comprehend them in their unity without waiting for individual verification or the future that may betake it.

The Role of the Total Configuration

The apprehension of the total configuration of a state enables a man to mark off some of its portions as a motive. This is a mere selection and there is no real problem. But, not satisfied with this, he declares it to be more real and substantial and relegates all other parts to the status of subordinate and shadowy existents. The motive sector is elevated to the status of 'really' real and is labelled as the 'original meaning'; the rest of the configuration of the state is reduced to its vehicle of expression. The argument is that meanings may be expressed in various languages, styles, and words and are independent of their expressions. The reality is independent of its manifestation; it may change its expressive form and invent new modes of its expression. The motive segment is the real meaning of the totality of a state. The state itself is symbol. This idea has its genesis in the symbol-making and name-giving function of the intellectual life. In the context of symbolisation, it is true that what is symbolised is independent of the symbolism. The facts may be reproduced in multifarious symbolic transformations. But these truths are generalised by us to cover the fields for which they are not meant. As a result we try to grasp the world history as an expression of some immanent meaning. We may be easily deceived to conceive that the legs of a chair are the symbolic expressions of the chair, whereas they are only parts of the chair. We generalise that some parts of an event are the reality of the event and other parts are the symbols of that reality, that the motive segment is the real and all other segments are its expressions. So the same motive may redirect itself in various possible action patterns and conditions of life, which are nothing but its symbolic expressions.

The reduction of some component set of a configuration to the level of symbolism, and the elevation of some other part to the level of the 'reality' and the 'essence', by the very nature of its model of schematisation, rule out the knowledge of other minds. What is known is symbolic. We are led to believe that 'self-contentment' can express itself in the symbols of richness and palatial buildings, and again can express itself in the symbols of wretchedness and slum housing. Our belief in the symbolic nature of the presented events and the known facts heavily presses us to guess whether the man sitting before us is self-content or not.

There is no escape from the unknowability of other minds in face of the unrestricted application of the 'reality-symbolism' or the 'meaning-expression' models of approach. This model of organisation of the facts of mental life permeates all the sceptic and inductive formulations of the problem of the knowledge of other minds.

We must get rid of this convention of systematising models, and then see other minds. Let us see, for example, a man of a slum area in stringent financial condition, yet with a smiling face. What we observe is a form of life which is instituted in (1) the slum residence, (2) stringent finance and (3) the smiling face. All these three factors are component of an integral form of life. We may call it self-contentment, if we like. Now we observe another man living in a spacious building abounding in riches; his face also shines with a smile. This is also a composite form of life instituted in (1) the spacious building, (2) generous income and (3) a beaming face. There is nothing invisible which is expressed in this form. Let us not hasten to call it self-contentment, because, if this word stands for the former experience, it cannot also stand for this latter form of life. Both the forms have only one component in common and it is the shining smile; all other

factors are different. We have to invent words and terms to denote distinct and mutually irreducible integrated styles of existence.

All the factors peculiar to a form contribute to the existence of the form. If some of the components are dissociated from it, and combined with some other elements, then a new form emerges. A dissociation of some components disintegrates the form of which they are parts. The study of a mind is a study of the emerging, developing, continuing, and disintegrating forms of its existence. The knowledge of other minds consists in the awareness of the elements found in its field, their associations and combinations, their dissociations and reorganisations. To every possible combination of the elements, we must give a specific name. The model of chemistry is to be used in the knowledge of other minds. We must use and develop a symbolism, over and above ordinary language, which must represent the facts of life with consistency and without confusion as has been done in physics and chemistry on the pattern of algebra.

Some of the elements of a specific form attract attention; they are 'preferred' by the self or the observer. But this fact of being linked by the mind does not place them in a privileged position; their selection does not assign them a different ontological status. They are designated as motives, but their being predicated with cathexis does not give rise to other elements which they combine. They do not determine the formations of life; they are not motives. It is just possible that I may prefer the oxygen component of a compound, but this does not mean that other components of the compound are caused and generated by the oxygen element. It also does not mean that the principle of compounding is governed by the oxygen parameter of the compound-form. The compound, its principle of formation, and the elements of its being, exist independently of my preference. Similarly, the being of a form of life, its essentialisation, and its structural law are independent of my preference of some of its parts, whether it happens in my life or in some other life. Therefore, those elements, charged with cathexis, are not the movers of the formations of life; they do not constitute the essence of formal existence, they are not the principles of dynamism in the flow of life.

To be cathected is a fact, but this does not import an ontological character to the cathected elements. The ontology of the formations of life is not rendered meaningful by discovering them. Therefore, in the knowledge of other minds, we must observe the forms, their constitutions, and their elements. Cathections, values, etc., are facts but do not make the group of meaning at the level of formal existence of mind. The form itself is meaning and its elements are the elements of meanings.

Knowledge by Assimilation

The elements of the mental field are combined vertically and horizontally. The relations of simultaneity and succession, peculiar to the mental order, prevail between them. If we observe an element in our apprehension of the other mind, we look into its relation with other simultaneous elements, and also look into its relations with other preceding elements. This is knowledge of the spatio-temporality of the mental existence.

In the knowledge of other minds we are in cognitive contact with a spatio-temporal reality, which constitutes the life of mind. We know minds as they are in their spatio-temporal organisations. This spatio-temporal context, like every other context, contains its filling 'contents' which are peculiar to it. They have the same common level and type of existence; the elements in a context share the same type and level of existence which cannot belong to other contexts. For instance, chemistry possesses the elements which cannot be extrapolated to other fields of being;

the elements like oxygen, hydrogen, iron, etc., share the same type and level of existence which is enjoyed by any other element to be discovered in the chemical context.

So in a specific context of mental life, its elementary data are at par with one another; their typology is the same. The muscular sets, changes of the faces, the poses of the organs, the housing conditions and so on are the data (elements) at the same plane of existence with the same typology of being.

All these elements or data are combined with one another in spatio-temporal configurations. In the observation of other minds we grasp the spatio-temporal coordinates composed of these elements of the same sort and level. We catch hold of these elements in their successive and simultaneous arrangements and describe that 'X is anxious', 'Y is furious', 'Z is disappointed'. There is no connotation of these forms -- anxiety and fury and disappointment, etc. (crude symbolism as they are) -- which require elements of some other level and kind of Being. We do not go 'inside' the elements. We merely observe their relations, horizontal and vertical, with other elements. We remain at the level of presentations and comprehend their spatio-temporal coordinations and arrangements whenever we observe other persons.

After the observation, we twist our objects and, instead of representing what we have seen, we introduce our own constructs and describe the facts of observation. The consequence is that the descriptions do not have one-to-one relations with the field of observation. The descriptions are projections of the observer into the field under inspection. This sort of activity is preached by historicism. It is said that in the knowledge of other minds the observer 'internalises' the presentations, which process issues in identification in which the observer lives through the internalised data of other minds. The observer makes them data of his own self, and reads his internal processes, thereby knowing what these data mean. He projects these readings on the face of the other person and understands what he is likely to be.

This is called the principle of 'Understanding', according to which the assimilation of the known in the knower is the principle of knowledge of other minds. It constitutes the philosophy of historicism. Collingwood, Sorokin, MacIver, and Znaniecki in their explications of the epistemology of mind propound that no one knows the other person without the process of identification, and in identification we thrust ourselves into the contents of the life of other persons. Thus, the knowledge of other minds is nothing but an image of our own self. We observe the contents and fill them with the meanings supplied to us from our own inner resources. Therefore the historical works do not reproduce the ancient civilisations; they mirror the historian's, they portray their own subjective spirits. In knowing other men, I know myself.

This theory of knowledge supported by many great social scientists, anthropologists and philosophers of culture of today is challenged by Fakhruddin Razi, Hazamudin Behrawi and Sadruddin Sherazi. The unity of the knower and the known in the fact of knowledge is also rejected by Shah Waliullah for it means that a noble man cannot know the ignoble and that God cannot know the criminal without assimilating him into His being. This subjectivistic theory really rules out knowledge of other minds; it means that I know rather my states of consciousness.

The knowledge-by-identification theory provides the so-called 'meaningful components' of the facts of life. Accordingly, if there is an element X after which appears Z, the transition from X to Z is made possible by some Y which is its meaningful causal component. The variables X and Z require an intervening variable of 'causal-meaningful' lines. This schemata is behind the physicalistic philosophy also when applied to the knowledge of other minds. The physicalists admit that their reductionism does not define their states of mind but provides simply the physical signs (components) of the mental situations with which they are related to a certain degree of

probability. This reductionism must again return to the method of imaginative reconstruction in order to pour meaning into the physical signs of the mental life. Therefore, this pan-physicalistic movement is the same idealism of knowledge-by-identification sort.

Knowledge and Content

The theory of the knowledge of other minds advocated here is plain. It does not seek any intervening variables and does not demand identification. It asserts rather that we know other minds without internalisation of the data apprehended. We observe them and note their spatio-temporality, their relationships with other data or par with them in their typology and level of being.

We observe ourselves and others in the same objective manner. This is real knowledge and the knowledge of mind does not need any special sort of categorisation as distinct from the knowledge of such other things as stones and trees. We stop to know other persons and ourselves as soon as we start to pour in some mentally constructed variables from the situations of our lives or of other lives, with the result that there remains no correspondence between what there is and what we imagine.

However, the formations we observe are reducible without remainder to the elements found in the spatio-temporal continua of the life of mind. Some formations of life include such elements as (1) limbs, (2) office, (3) factory organisation; others include (1) the sky and stars, (2) landscape, and (3) the cultivated land; still others are comprised of (1) church organisations, (2) rituals and (3) township. Thus, the context of mind in some of its formations is congruent with the entire universe; in others is installed in its rural or urban setting; in some others is narrowed down to a breathing centre. There is no particular and rigid limit to its context. We simply see the face and want to know what there is in all formations. In this misapplication of our energies we observe only a tiny element of the big formations of the mind and report to others that mind is invisible.

Consciousness of some objects terminates at the grasp of the simple unanalysable elements given in its nature. They are presented as ultimate given data which do not admit of further analysis; in their nature they are mutually irreducible because mutually distinct. Therefore they are unanalysable in terms of the order of their existence. They are not simply distinct from each other, but are predicated with possibility and as such are identical with each other; they share the existence or "is-ness" peculiar to all of them. In other words, there is an existence of which the simple distinctions are possible differentiations, which collected together form a complex. Thus every complex (formation or event) belongs to the context of a specific existence wherein it occupies the fourth order of existence. To be precise, every *Is-ness* in its contextualisation formulates the following categories or orders of itself:

The universal category of existence.

The category of possibility.

The category of the simple distinctions.

The combinations of the simple distinctions, which in this order, are called elements.

Cognitive comprehension always remains within a context and penetrates up to its third order only. It notices the distinctions and knows their mutual differentiations, yet they do not move further analytically. It cognises the order of existence without analysis; and apprehends it as unanalysed given datum universally pervading all the orders formed in its context. It is the final

definitive essence of everything, but itself does not admit of definition. We are simply acquainted with it. Our acquaintance with the simple elements of a context presupposes a direct acquaintance with its universal existence and with the possibilities that constitute the essence of these elements. Thus, awareness with the homogeneous mass, defining and articulating the entire field delineated in its context, is an a priori condition of its recognitions in its heterogeneous distinctions. The knowledge of distinctions presupposes the knowledge of the reality of which they are distinctions.

Consequently, the knowledge of a formation involves the earlier cognition of its possibility and existence that constitutes its essential givenness. For example, we must know the bare existence of chemical interaction in order to know the chemical formations like carbon dioxide and calcium chloride, etc. Similarly, we must be aware of the category of 'mechanical displacement' in order to apprehend the motions of the motor-cars, the flights of rockets, etc. Without the direct knowledge of the existence of 'exchange', we cannot grasp such complex phenomena as price fluctuations, interest rates, employment levels, etc.

By the earlier direct acquaintance with the existence of a context, we do not mean temporal precedence, but simply logical priority. From this discussion it follows that the knowledge of the formations, states, and articulations of mind involves the earlier knowledge of the existence of mind. We are able to cognise the facts of mind because we directly know it as a given datum, an unanalysable existence. 'Chemical interaction', 'mechanical displacement' and 'electromagnetism' are unanalysable facts in their respective fields in which we study their formations, intricate developments and transformations. Since we directly know 'sociation', we know the realities that develop in its fields like cooperation, competitions, institutions, cultural patterns, etc., and finally the social system. There is no such question, 'How do we know'? but only 'What do we know'?

Knowledge and Context

Every entity is a member of some context defined in terms of the specific existence that constitutes it. Stripped of the context, the entity is meaningless and connotes nothing; its name is simply a meaningless utterance.

Pan-physicalistic movement is an adventure into this sort of meaninglessness. It tries to reduce all entities, happenings and formations, stripped of their contexts, to terms of the language of physics (Hempel). Its programme is to reduce any context so that it must be presentable in sentences which contain only physicalistic terms. As this programme is not promising to many physicalists they are satisfied to discover the essential (and unique) physicalistic parts of the situation that may serve its sign -- test conditions. Since the sense impressions are stuff in some particular contexts, they cannot be carried over to become the sign situations of other contexts without themselves becoming meaningless. Therefore complete or partial reduction, in its essential nature, is meaningless.

If a physicalist is asked to signify the monetary phenomena, his reductive technique would compel him to reduce it to the 'metal with the marks' and the 'paper and the printed impressions' which name the units of the money. The printed paper and the marked metal in the pecuniary world are simply symbols of the money and not its signs, in the same way in which our proper names are symbols of our beings and not parts of ourselves. In this manner, the physicalist is doomed to utter failure. The context of 'credit' defines the money as a medium of exchange. We know credit, therefore we know money; but credit has no physical signs as part of its existence. If we reduce it

to printed paper, the entire mass of regular monetary transactions would be reduced to a heap of disconnected pieces of paper mysteriously moving from hand to hand in geophysical space.

Similarly, the 'exchange of goods' does not admit of the physicalistic reduction, neither is the existence of sociation reducible to protocols containing physical terms. Physicalists are not able to grasp these realities, fortunately they are human beings first and never fail in the community of minds. Those physicalists who have contributed to the advancement of the cultural sciences, like Dodd and Lundberg, had first recognised the irreducible character of the contexts of their study and then proceeded forward.

Exchange, credit, sociation, etc., are simple distinctions within the context of mind, which in turn formulate their own respective contexts. If the physicalist is not able to reduce these distinctions defined in the context of mind to the propositions of physics, he has no chance to reduce the ultimate mental existence to physicalistic protocols. Such simple relations as 'and', 'if then', 'smaller than', 'greater than', etc., do not have physical signs as part of their nature, but they are known to us.

An entity is a relation if it is dyadic or polyadic in its character. Love, hate, cooperation, competition, rivalry, etc., are relations. They are not like colours or like sounds; yet they are known. They are relations which obtain between events, facts and any stuff which is appropriate to them. Their presence in a field organises the field in its respective configurations. Therefore, we are able to recognise the love configuration in such diverse things as poetry, religious experience, mother-child relations, etc. Similarly, we recognise the competitive situation because we are aware of the relation of competition which organises the whole content of the situation in its relational manifold. Likewise, we cognise the power of politics, because we know the relation of power.

The reduction of these configurations to physicalistic terms is quite impossible. Perhaps, it may be said that a particular set of the face is the sign of benevolence which therefore is reducible to this sign. But for this to be recognised as a 'sign' of benevolence presupposes our knowledge of 'benevolence'. Moreover, the 'sign' is also an arrangement of the elements in which the peculiar relations appropriate to benevolence must prevail.

Love, competition, pride, hatred, etc., are visible not because the 'physical' elements are part of their reality, but because they are directly known and recognised by us in every configuration. Moreover, bright smiles, facial expressions, shapes of the human body, etc., are not things of the physical field, but of the mental field independent of their discovery in the physical context. Physics or the language of physics does not recognise patches of colours; it only knows the refraction of the rays. The chairs and tables which decorate our dwellings are not matter for chemistry or physics with its electromagnetic whirlpools, but are artefacts of human culture and as such they exist only in the human context. We have Ellura, Ajanta and Taj Mahal; chemistry has silicates, carbonates and calcium compounds; we have fevers; physics has thermal change.

Thus, the audio-visual fields open to a knower are besides the contexts of physics and chemistry and belong to their own contexts. But the language symbolising the entities of their context is carried over to the physical and chemical fields in violation of the rules of language construction. Physicalists worship these law-breaking customs. These contexts -- the audio-visual fields -- are continuous with the mental contexts. They possess their own 'simple' distinctive beings (for instance the various colours in the visual field) independent of the elements of chemistry and the "simples" of physics. These "simples" are arranged in various ways in the context of the life of mind. One particular manifold of their systematisation is competition and another is cooperation. It is by virtue of their relational manifold that we know what they signify. In themselves they signify nothing; only as a part of a relational order are they significant.

Signs, Cultures and Knowledge of Other Minds

Sign is a role played by some parts of a whole when an observer is present. Their sign function is essentially communicative. Every arrangement of a spiritual formation contains its own temporality so that the data which appear earlier are signs of that which follows. If, a priori, we know the entire formation then we are able to know what is signified. A competitive form of existence undergoes various turns of its formation; and at a single moment the observer notes only the parts which then appear. They signify what is gone, and also what is to come. A soft mind, who knows nothing about the form of competition, cannot read the significance; for him the data are meaningless and the mind is not known. Therefore, we develop the formal sciences of human fields and the human scientists who know human formations are called upon to tell us what a particular event means.

A mind at a particular instant of its being is an order of signs which constitutes its entire life at that particular instant. Consequently, although we know other minds, we know them in their different moments of life, and never in their entire formations. The difficulty is not only in knowing others, but also in knowing ourselves; we do not know what we will do tomorrow.

To remove this difficulty and to be able to predict future behaviour, we develop and follow the ethos and norms of formations. We evolve various sorts of mores and standards of the patterns of activities; we give ourselves various conventions and rules of formation. We know them in advance and comply with them, and therefore we know what each of us is doing. We know the formative conventions of a performance, and if in the context of some other mind it is taking place, our knowledge enables us to predict what will happen next. We make routines and schedules, time-tables and programmes, introduce them among ourselves, and know what is going to be tomorrow.

The totality of the conventions, norms, rules, customs and schedulings guaranteed by the coercive forces of various sorts, is called the culture. It provides a comprehensive mapping of the behaviour field of the entire society, fixing the roles of the individuals and their respective movements. We move in its field via the routes and trajectories fixed for us. All of us know the culture at least up to the primary and some of the secondary relations; consequently, if we know the place and position of some other person, we are able to know his roles, determinations and formations.

In the principle of culture we are lifted above the knowledge. Mind or self is the maker, inventor and contriver, and as such operates above the cognitive principle. From that position, he gives to himself laws of operations, rules of formations, styles, manners and the programmes of his life; then he knows what he would do. In mutual communion minds do the same, and communicate with each other through the medium of the rules, constitutions and modes of their own making.

There remains the ultimate question: what is communicated to us in the knowledge of other minds independent of all its constructions and inventions, formulations and determinations? A bare existence, unanalysable and indivisible, is known to us in the knowledge of other minds. To know a mind in its complete purity without any of its distinctions and articulations is as much good as to know any other mind. It is direct acquaintance with this existence, indistinct and unspecified, that is presupposed in every context of its recognition. Its knowledge, as Professor M. Aslam remarks, may be a miracle as is every other knowledge.

Part IV
Phenomenological and Existential Philosophy in Pakistan

Chapter XV

The Notion of Existence

Manzoor Ahmad

"If I am not asked, I know; if I am asked, I know not." This is perhaps true of most notions which seem to be self-evident. No sooner is the question put to us then we are at a loss to define it, or sometimes even to describe it.

"What is 'existence,?' is such a question. I know that I exist, that this pen with which I am writing exists, that God exists, but what is existence? Does existence exist in the same way as selves, pens, or God are said to exist? The answer is not so clear as it might have seemed. Philosophers have expressed a variety of views that it is the 'ergo, of the 'cogito'; that to exist is to be perceived; or that it is the outcome of 'dread, or 'horror'. Others would smilingly put away the idea of existence, quoting Plato's *Eros*, "Existence is the child that is born of the infinite and the finite and is therefore constantly striving"; they would say that it is fictitious, nonsensical or meaningless poetry.

Why is it difficult to answer such a simple questions?

If someone asks us: "What is hydrogen?" We can reply: "It is a gas" or "It is a gaseous element, which is colorless, whose atomic weight is 1 and whose atomic number is 1." There can be other answers, and all or any of them will satisfy the questioner. Suppose someone asks us, what is good, what is beauty or what is existence? The form of the question is the same, but it is puzzling and cannot be answered as straightforwardly as the previous question. We cannot find the meaning of existence from a dictionary or an encyclopedia, though the person who asked the question may want the same kind of answer as given in the case of hydrogen. Here lies the difficulty.

When we ask such questions as those concerning existence, what we actually seek is information concerning the nature or essence of existence. We could say, perhaps, with equal justification that when we ask questions about hydrogen we request in the same manner information about the nature or essence of hydrogen. But Noone would say that: though the questions are analogous. Traditional philosophy has long sought for the essence or nature of existence, and has tried to define, following Plato and Aristotle notion that the "definition is the formula of essences." But this magic formula which could resolve the various and contradictory state-ments of the philosophers about existence was never found, and if someone did claim to find it, very strangely it was so simple that it could be expressed only in words except recognized as synonyms of existence. Further all thought that we are perfectly familiar with its meaning and that everyone can at once perceive what is meant by it.

Had it been as simple as Moore thought, there would have been no difficulty, but where does the difficulty lie? It would seem to be in the basic assumption underlying the question as well as the answers, namely, that every existence in its various expressions possesses a common nature or essence which can be discovered; that there is something the same or common in the existence of this table, myself, God, ideas and imagination, unicorns, chimeras, whiteness or blackness, in the universal and in the particular. This 'esse' is elusive; it peeps through everything but escapes away when we want to seize it. It is the property of every content but we cannot find it. Surely there must be something common to them all, they say, or we should not call them all by the same name, "Unum Nomen, Unum Nominatum." And they ask, "What is that property of 'existence' which may belong to every content which I observe or may again belong to none? What is this property

which may belong to the perception of a movement and yet belong neither to the movement perceived nor to my perception of it, or which again may belong to both or to neither?

The assumption that existence, despite its vast differences in manifestation, must possess some common characteristics or mark, something in its essence which must distinguish it and by which we can define it, constitutes the first mistake of traditional philosophy. The moment we start searching for the common elements, the nature or essence of existence which all things are supposed to possess, we become bewildered. We handle tables and chairs, we know our-selves, we believe in other minds, we have faith in God, and therefore we ought to encounter "existence" somewhere. We look, but we do not find. Like "substance" for Locke, we assume that it is something hidden or behind and that that should be its essence. That is why, unlike hydrogen, existence is hard to describe and why we have a philosophy of existence but of hydrogen.

It may be suggested that if we have patience, search diligently and continue to scrutinize, some day we might lay hand on existence as such. But there is still another possibility, namely, that we may be looking for something which is not there. There may be some resemblances and common elements between different things, but as we begin to push through these resemblances we meet insurmountable difficulties. Is it the form which is common between "this" and "that" or is it matter? But what is matter and what is that matter which is common between matter and energy? If it is one and the same, then what is common between this and God? Is God energy; is my idea of the square root of minus one also energy? Must we draw a line between existence and subsistence?

It all seems to be the greatest the man has ever invented.

Then, should we say that the "notion" of existence is simply nonsensical, and the search for a common denominator and similarities among different existences is a fool's errand? To say this requires great courage and some of the diehardness of a logical positivist as well. The answer to this question depends upon what we expect to find after such a search. If we are after the mysterious, evasive essence or nature, we are doomed. Perhaps we will never find such a common element.

But this search can be fruitful. On the one hand, it may be the search for a kind of family resemblances; on the other, it may enlighten us on different aspects of existences which at first glance may escape our view. This search may further be useful in dealing with things manipulating them, and differentiating them one from another. Taken in this light, the various conceptions and theories of existence, which different philosophers have put forward from time to time, are not nonsense, but have a significance and meaning in their own universe.

The history of modern philosophy provides ample proof of this. Take, for example, the problem of existence in modern philosophy. It is a cosmological problem, which arises with the question of what nature we must attribute to that existence of which we partake. This is a cosmological problem because it leads to the discussion of the possibilities of constructing a general conception of the world based upon the data of experience. Its actual value lies in the significance and comprehensiveness of experience upon which it is based or upon coherence and consistency of the construction as such. With the advent of the new age when Kepler, Copernicus and Bruno brought about a kind of revolution and a new outlook on different problems, a question strongly presented itself. The picture of the world given by immediate perception is totally different from what the world actually is, leading to an opposition between existence and knowledge. Galileo's solution is that this difference between knowledge and existence disappears to a certain extent in the clearest knowledge we possess, i.e., mathematical knowledge. "Here

human knowledge participates in the necessity with which God thinks the truths which underlie the content of existence."

The impact of scientific development, which created the problem of the subjectivity of sense qualities and a separation between knowledge and existence, crystallized over 50 years. A need was felt to systematize the wealth of facts, thought and new discoveries, on the one hand, and on the other, to reduce them to simple notions. This brought the problem of existence more forcefully to the fore. Bruno had already treated it from the point of view of the new world scheme, yet with the modern mechanical explanation of nature, thought was confronted with the problem of mind, and the relation between the physical and the mental. At the same time there were demands that religion should be reinterpreted in the light of new knowledge. Descartes had to face this difficult and important problem. His training at the Jesuit College may have oriented him toward saving the existence of God, and the impact of Renaissance compelled him to account for the causal and me-mechanical world. To strike a balance between the two so that they might not clash, on the one hand, he had to save philosophy and thereby religion as well by finding some fundamental principle, some maxim, some starting point free from doubt, which could serve as the basis for further deductions, on the other hand, he had to account for scientific and mechanical reason he was forced to derive each and everything from a subjective and psychological maxim. This is true of nearly all great systems produced before the advent of the English empirical school: all proceeded from the conviction that clarity of thought was sufficient to account for existence.

The English empirical school reversed this order, and discussed the problem of knowledge before metaphysics. The nature of existence was not taken for granted but, proceeding according to clarity of thought as the norm, existence was now subservient to epistemology. Thus, the conception of substance melted in the hands of George Berkeley, and later totally disappears in the hands of David Hume. With substance the "notion of existence" is also gone, because it does not correspond to any impression. To think of a thing and to think of it as existing are one and the same. In this a thoroughgoing empiricism reached its climax.

Recently there have been some attempts to solve this problem that are opposed in intent to rationalistic constructive systems, on the one hand, and to the empirical approaches, on the other. When Heinmann bases existence on the formula of *Respondeo ergo sum*, it has significance only in the context and for the purpose for which he is speaking. For him the central problem of our time (as against that of Hume and Descartes) is that human activities, whether in philosophy or in arts, have become too technical and have lost their grounding in human existence. They cannot regain this ground through instrumentalism an technology where ideas are definitions of operations or plans of activities, rather than a flow of subjective consciousness; where the quest for certainty with which the age began enters a new stage in holding that secure values can be realized only by perfecting methods of inquiry and action; where the knowledge of the greatest value is that of technique by which values can be reached or restored. This "irrational" system of thought and life developed by Western industrial society and its philosophical representatives has given birth to a logical and naturalistic me-mechanism which challenges individual freedom; as an analytic rationalism it transforms everything including man himself into objects of calculation and control.

This basically is not a problem of the description or definition of existence, but fundamentally the problem of human freedom; it is the challenge of modern technology to man, his self and his religion. How to save them; how to meet the challenge? Heinemann suggests returning to concrete experience and reality. It is this aspect of the problem which has disappeared in the dazzling light of the modern scientific methodology. The interpretation of existence as "an unconscious

participation in reality" is not as ridiculous as a logical positivist would make us believe, provide we do not make the mistake of taking this as the definition of the "notion of existence".

Consider, for example, the following proposition. "The nothing exists," because "Anxiety reveals the nothing," and "we know the nothing." Apart from the article "the" before nothing, very ingeniously used, which contributes an air of mystery around "nothing", and to which existence is attributed in some extra-rational way, the whole of the assertion is a great confusion. The assertion that "nothing exists" quite plainly cannot be constructed as an utterance which is intended to state a fact about the existence of something. It cannot be construed as affirming the existence of a kind of a thing, or as denying the existence of everything. Even the way out that insists upon the "existence" of nothing as an "idea in the mind" is conducive to this confusion for it implies a double existence, that of being here, and in the mind. Such a confusion can be easily remedied by abandoning the notion that talking sense always necessitates there being things talked about.

The point here is that we can interpret different notions existence only as functional descriptions relative to the purpose for which they are used, and in the particular context in which they occur. Apart from that, and talk on the "notion of existence" as such is simply to talk of nothing.

Therefore a logical analysis of existential propositions must always attempt to seize upon the context in which it occurs. Devoid of context not a single word, let alone a general concept, is meaningful. The most general methodological mistake is the dis-junction of a concept or idea from the field of its being, treating it as an independent and self-contained. Hence, "existence" is meaning-ful only in a special context of being -- "non-existence" being its other aspect.

Moreover, every existent may be located in the extension of the context of its own specific existence. Our inquiry would then be a search after different and distinct contexts of existence. All these distinct contexts would appear to fall in the most general field of "the Existence" which must appear as a co-member with the "non-existence", in the universal context of Being.

In this manner we may work out a general theory of Being which would be formal in character and which could be fitted to any context of experience.

Chapter XVI
From Anguish to the Search for Truth
Waheed Ali Farooqi

Biography

When I was asked to put into words my personal philosophy I was reluctant to accede to this request. For a person whose fragmented thoughts found expression only in the form of stray articles over the course of three decades, it was no easy task to condense them all in the shape of one article. But the request was so insistent and so kind that ultimately I was left with no choice but to agree.

Pretentious though it may sound I feel no hesitation to state at the outset that my philosophical views have largely followed the footprints of the great al-Ghazali who thought and wrote with the weight of his personal experience, and whose philosophy and life were almost synonymous. In a sense therefore the present article may be treated as my concentrated spiritual autobiography.

I was born in 1929 and brought up in the northern Indian province of U. P. (now known as Uttar Pradesh), where I lived until I migrated to Pakistan in 1948 after the partition of the sub-continent. Coming from a family of religious scholars I had the opportunity of meeting, quite early in life, many people of sincere and deep religious convictions. It was through them that I acquired my first hand knowledge of religion.

After leaving high school I was stricken, at the age of 15, with a paralysing illness whose agony I suffered continuously for a period of two years. This ailment gave a big jolt to the otherwise calm and serene routine of my life. The most valuable lessons of my life grew out of this crippling attack. My suffering helped me to know things in their true perspective; I was aroused from the slumbers of my existence. The commonplace notions of life suffered a setback at this stage as I was brought to grips with the problems of human freedom and destiny. The phenomenon of death and widespread suffering deeply afflicted my mind and I came to realise that suffering is universal. Life is a series of crises which challenge everyone and must be faced. These problems became all the more pronounced with the advent of my college studies when I came across the mystic Persian poets Hafiz and Omar Khayyam. Not only the charm of their poetry, but their oft-repeated themes of the transitoriness of life and the vanity of all existence firmly caught hold of me. Their thoughts were therefore my introduction and first incentive to the study of philosophy.

The second World War had just ended and society was in a state of ferment. The cherished value-system of my parents was tottering and the finely tailored routine of my home also lost meaning for me. I now eagerly looked to philosophy for the resolution of all the problems that baffled me.

In 1952 I joined the University of Karachi for my graduate studies, with philosophy as my major subject. Here I was deeply enamoured with Socrates whose life and teachings helped to mould and shape my innermost life. After obtaining my Master's degree I joined the University of Sind as a lecturer in 1955. Here I came under the influence of the Irish philosopher Berkeley and post-Kantian German idealism. For several years I continued to profess the doctrines of idealism and pan-psychism and firmly believed in the spiritual nature of the physical world. In 1966 I wrote my doctoral thesis at Michigan State University on "A Spiritual Interpretation of Reality in the Light of Berkeley's Immaterialism." This dissertation aimed, on the one hand, to synthesise

Berkeley's immaterialism with 19th century German idealism and, on the other, with the mystic doctrine of the unity of all existence.

However, soon after my return from the United States I began to realise that even after a protracted intellectual exercise of ten years I was no nearer to solving the fundamental issues that agitated my mind. I had simply 'come out of the same door I went in'. "What difference does it really make," I pondered, "if the nature of the physical world is mental or material, or if the monads are windowless or full of windows." I was also an eager reader of Schopenhauer and of Kierkegaard, the existentialist. The gloom and tragic mood of my early college days again caught hold of me.

In sympathy with the existentialists I clearly saw that the great thorn in man's consciousness throughout his life is that he is condemned to die. "Like shipwrecked mariners who struggle and struggle to save their wearied bodies from the terrible waves, only to be engulfed at last," human beings are tormented throughout life by anxiety, melancholy and frustration only ultimately to face the grim reality of illness, old age, pain and death. All those things which they prized and valued so much in life prove empty, rotten and trifling, for death cuts off all relations to the world. All looks like a tale told by an idiot, full of sound and fury but signifying nothing. For a number of years, with pain and effort, man gathers knowledge and skill and his mind becomes a repository of all sorts of learning and wisdom. But just as he is learning how to live it is already too late as his mental and physical powers begin to decline. Every breath that he draws is a protest against the death which is constantly threatening him, and against which he is battling. There is weakness of sight, weakness of limbs, incapacity to work and earn. The world considers his existence futile. Where is the stage, he begins to ask, of using and applying all the learning and talent for which he toiled and suffered all his life. Is not he, with Thomas Hardy, justified in calling this world:

A senseless school where we must give
Our lives that we may learn to live.

He now comes to realise that he had really been standing on the brink of an abyss all his life, though he dared not confess it. Unfortunately he was invisibly caught up in a ghostlike routine, and the stormy activity of his life kept him tied to the wheel of existence. He was enticed by the solid assurances of common sense upheld by the impersonal dictator of "everyday life." This I thought was the most tragic aspect of the whole story. My nature shrank and I began to experience remorse. I began to lament the finitude and the transitoriness of life. This poignant state of man's existence brought me to the verge of despair, what Kierkegaard termed "sickness unto death." I began to ask questions as to why there is a world at all, why man exists, and whether life is at bottom meaningful or meaningless. I began to wonder whether anything like an Infinite or Eternal Being exists, and whether I can ever come to know or find succour in Him. I found myself in the grip of what James called "ontological wondersickness."

Phenomenology

Life forces us to make decisions which, I thought, could be evaded only at my own peril with the words of Socrates that "an unexamined life is not worth living," still resounding in my ears, I sat down to work out for myself a system of philosophy which, I thought, should not only provide me with mental solace but strictly should correspond with the facts of existence. To do this I needed a definite method of work which should escape all the uncertainties of the old. The methodology

of any philosophy, we know, is its most decisive aspect in the sense that it presents philosophy with *terra firma*, its solid ground, on which to build its entire superstructure. Soon I discovered that the method of phenomenological reduction professed by the German philosopher Husserl, with certain modifications, furnishes the surest guide to any philosophical inquiry of this sort. His method of concentrating attention on the data of consciousness as they are presented to man's mind and subjecting them to a rigorous and exhaustive examination, the proposal to set aside all questions of interpretation, evaluation and validation, perhaps still provides the best approach to solving the crucial issues faced by mankind. In order to restrict ourselves to what appears, it uses the method of complete intellectual suspense (*epoche*) and abstention from all judgement about the nature of phenomena and their manifold relationships. Usually we corrode the objectivity of phenomena as given in our pre-reflective situation by not allowing reality to reveal itself in its pristine form and by not letting facts speak for themselves. *Epoche*, on the other hand, reduces the phenomena to their original givenness, unspoiled by all pre-conceived notions, uncorrupted by all prejudices, and uncritically accepted "self-evidences."

But phenomena should be studied in their totality -- phenomena as manifested in man's consciousness, nature and history. In order to achieve a unified and veritable outlook on life one who searches for truth has to study not only the inner processes of his mind, but also be a historian of facts and an impartial observer of Nature.

Now out of the multiplicity of man's inner experiences, the idea of a Supreme Being is one of the most primitive notions. The history of humankind cannot produce a more impressive phenomenon than the existence of this universally prevalent idea. This indubitable notion is so firmly implanted in man's subliminal consciousness and has such universal dimension that it needs no profound intellectual gift to know the power of this genuinely religious experience. It is perhaps for this reason that man has sometimes been defined as a religious animal. Every human being encounters this transcendent and eternal reality irrespective of what he calls it, and irrespective of whether or not he chooses to acknowledge its reality. Provided one is not inhibited by false and pre-conceived notions, there is hardly any person whose mind is not open to this sense of the infinite and the mystery which surrounds his existence. An agnostic may deny its existence with his lips, but he cannot deny it with his heart or in his practical life. In the feelings of dependence, creatureliness and finitude which, according to Otto, go with the idea of the holy (numinous) one has a sense of a being who is ultimate, unconditioned and infinite. Concern for this *numinus* demands a total and unconditional commitment on the part of man, and once committed this exercises a profound effect on his entire life. This unique content of man's experience is neither a pure emotion, nor simply cognition, nor will. Had this experience been a pure feeling he should remain for ever shut up within the circle of his own subjectivity. On the contrary, it involves his whole self and represents a total human attitude.

Now this *numinus* strand in man also makes him cognisant of another important phase of phenomena viz., the marvellous, sublime and awe-inspiring features of the universe around him. By an observation of this aspect of phenomena a divine presence is borne in upon him, this time not by the majestic beauty of the moral law within, but by the starry heavens above. The physical world here serves as language of the Book of God. We all know how Ibn Tufail in his philosophical romance *Hayy bin Yaqzan*, and some early 18th century Deists sought to establish the existence of God through observation of design and teleology in Nature. God, they attempted to prove, speaks Himself through nature and all existence is a medium of revelation.

But though man's own conscience and nature do provide an intuitive evidence of a supreme being as creator of the universe, sheer examination of these phenomena cannot lead us to a

knowledge of the personal God of religion, His nature and attributes, what He wills us to do, what is the ultimate destiny of man, and wherein lies man's eternal felicity. God may be self-revealing in nature and in man's conscience, but in none of these phenomena are his intentions and purposes overwhelmingly manifest and unmistakable. This gap is, however, filled up by the data supplied by the third category of phenomena, human history. History, it may be noticed, plays an important role in explaining what is really true and valuable in life and provides a guide to the ultimate questions of human concern. The cumulative record of the religions and philosophies of humankind lies within this mundane world and is fully open to historical observation. As being on earth means being historically conditioned, historical circumstances assume an overriding importance in the search for philosophic truth. This, however, is possible if history is not simply devoted to the life of kings and their dynasties but accords primacy to the analysis and comprehension of human ideals and institutions, and of the undercurrents of the long enduring spiritual life of man. Once studied with this frame of mind we find in history a succession of wonderful men (generally known as prophets) who delivered to humankind a self-consistent message, involving lofty principles about God, His nature, and about the nature and destiny of man. In view of the limited guidance provided by the data of man's conscience and nature, a revelation from a Supreme Being is not only conceivable but indispensable which, instead of violating, augments the light of reason and supplies satisfaction and response to its urgent questions.

The above threefold data of our phenomenological existence serve as the raw material for laying an unshakable foundation for the edifice of human knowledge. But how to sift this data so as to reach apodictic certainty in our objective search for truth is now the Archimedean point of the whole philosophical endeavour. In spite of the immense significance of these three-dimensional data, we still find a vast variety not only in the pronouncements of men's conscience but also in the way they perceive nature and in the way they interpret the facts of history. The so-called conscience of an individual may, in Ruskin's phrase, be the conscience of an ass. Again, nature whose one impulse could teach a Wordsworth the deep mysteries of human life and divine existence, to a Tennyson is red in 'fang and claw', and for a Schopenhauer it is 'dreadful in her features and savage in her gestures'. In like manner recorded history too provides a formidable record of how it has been distorted in the course of time. Further, not all claims to prophethood or revelation can be accepted as true because there have been true and false prophets as there have been true and false revelations.

Therefore true to our principle of phenomenological reduction I uphold the universally accepted criterion of rationality as the only unquestionable measuring rod and the only valid instrument in my search for religious truth. A true religion must seek expression in rational categories and comprehensive logical examination and testing. In order to prevent hasty and premature commitment our method demands a complete suspension of judgement until all opinions are properly investigated and their credentials thoroughly examined.

Religion

It should, therefore, be clear that reason is of two kinds: (i) scientific reason and (ii) transcendental reason. Since the tools and methodology of scientific reason are analysis, observation, logical consistency, inference and prediction science is most suited to the phenomenal world. Transcendental reason, on the other hand, is that faculty of the apprehension of truth in which the whole personality of man, not only his perceptual, intellectual, emotional and volitional

faculties, but also his spiritual faculties (which Pascal called the reason of the heart) are inextricably involved. It is a tool for our understanding of transcendental and noumenal realities. But it is the methodological requirement of the human mind that scientific reason, and transcendental reason instead of being mutually exclusive, should jointly work in the search for truth.

Now it will be seen that only a perfect religion can stand the rigours of such a test of *philosophia perennis* on the basis of our criteria of scientific and transcendental reason. A completed philosophy which goes beyond the traditional fields of knowledge -- metaphysics, physics, ethics, political theory -- to embrace all possible knowledge by a unitary and certain method of combining empirical content with logical order can only be presented by a perfect religion coming as it does from an infinite source through a process of divine revelation. In such a religion eternity and time come into a close contact and there is no time/eternity antithesis. All compartmentalisation between the temporal and the eternal, the secular and the religious is ended. Here the material world serves as a channel for communication with the spiritual.

God and the world are not rivals; the world rather becomes a "vale for soul-making." In a perfect relation God should not be the God only of soul but also of body, of science as well as of faith. Its ideal for the individual should not be a retreat from the world, but a forceful moral role therein: religious and moral behaviour form a vital unity.

Kierkegaard wrongly assumed that the religious and the ethical move in different directions. He broke off his engagement with Regina Olson because he felt it necessary to surrender the life of the world in order to dedicate himself to the life divine. In the perfect religion, on the other hand, God wants the individual to come to Him by means of the Reginas He Himself has created, not by means of renunciation. Its religious ideal is no retreat from the world. The world, according to it, is not *maya* or an illusion and life is not a dream. Its laws are the universal laws of God and the whole world is filled with His glory.

If religion makes such impractical demands on our life and environment which the majority of mankind cannot stand, and feel to be a burden, there is something wrong with that religion itself. The laws of a true religion should be akin to the laws of nature which the human mind is prone to accept 'a priori'.

A perfect religion should present a coherent and comprehensive system pervading both the mundane and the transcendental with elaborate doctrines about God, man, nature, creation and redemption in such a way that it solves all the enigmas of phenomenal and noumenal existence without involving itself in the so-called antinomies of reason. A true faith must be clear and satisfying and its metaphysical doctrines should teach that Truth and Reality are one and the same.

One great criterion of a perfect religion is that it should be a powerful motivating force for action. Religion should not be only an individual affair but a serious call for social duty. A community is, therefore, a must for the religious development of man. Whitehead's view that the essence of religion is what the individual does with his solitariness, entirely ignores this social and corporate dimension of religion. A perfect religion should engender in man what is the noblest and the best in him, leading to the strengthening and cohesion of society at all levels. It should have an elaborate system of casuistry in which the right way of acting or serving is defined for every conceivable situation. It should be a complete code and way of life where religious, political and social factors are bound together in an organic unity, capable of meeting all challenges of the advancing civilizations.

In the ethical realm a vital religion, such as I am talking about, is one which is a great standard bearer of human freedom. For it is absurd to make anybody responsible for any act for which

honestly he cannot assume any responsibility. Further, it should tell us that not our overt actions but our motives and intentions are the axis of all moral life. Mankind is here considered as one community because all owe allegiance to one Supreme Being. It demolishes all distinctions of caste, color, creed or nationality. Humanity being one spiritual brotherhood, the notion of patriotism is totally transformed in such a religion.

In the spiritual sphere God is not treated an *elan vital* or a blind force without knowledge and purpose. Unlike the Absolute of the philosophers who is simply a disinterested spectator of the drama of existence, and who on occasions is simply introduced as *deus ex machina* to save the existence of the physical world, a perfect religion envisages a direct relationship between man and God who at every moment is concerned with the supreme happiness of mankind. This divine human encounter provides man serenity, peace, courage and consolation in the face of the grim realities of life.

Life and existence being understood in this sense, the trials and tragedies of human life also lose much of their poignancy. The great question of the meaning and purpose of human life that always agitated my mind is largely resolved in this system of perfect religion. Once the life of man is accepted as being for another, providing him with an opportunity to act, sufferings and afflictions make sense. By compensating for the injustices of earthly existence balance is restored and justice ultimately done to the individual. Man is not then simply considered as thrown into an alien world without any meaning or purpose, but in the course of his brief transit he now discovers that existence is a pilgrimage and a vocation. The greatest question of all philosophy "Why is there something rather than nothing" is thus finally answered.

Perfect religion is, to me, the only *philosophia perennis*. Being the sole public criterion of knowledge and the only perennial body of eternal truths and wisdom, it visualises a complete unity of science, philosophy and revelation. There reason and faith are co-extensive, and the theoretical and the practical concerns of life are so resolved as to unite all people of all time in a universal vision.

Can there be a method for discovering this perfect religion or *philosophia perennis*? It is the moral duty of every seeker after truth that before making any final religious commitment he should study all religions of the world without bias and prejudice and try to find out, on the basis of these dual criteria of scientific and transcendental reason, which one is true. Such an unbiased search for a perfect religion should be the prime objective of every philosopher.

The search for the perfect religion should not, however, be considered as a barren intellectual pursuit. In matters of such momentous import on which depends the eternal felicity or damnation of mankind we fiddle with academic pastimes at our own peril. Consequently, once convinced of the truth of this perfect religion after a thorough, unbiased and objective examination, it is the most urgent demand of reason that we should be committed to it with all our heart and soul. The prime objective of all Ecumenical movements and inter-religious dialogues also should be not simply a barren academic discussion, but an existential search for truth for the sake of whole-hearted commitment thereto. Otherwise all the effort, time and energy devoted to it would be an exercise in futility.

But can the brevity of human life permit any long drawn out inquiry of this nature? Can we afford, Hamlet-like, to wait all our life for fuller information? The exactly right moment may mean letting the crucial moment pass by default. To suspend judgement on ultimate issues to the point of paralysing all capacity to commitment is not the attitude of a true philosopher. But the method of phenomenological reduction and critical evaluation does not require a permanent suspension of judgement to evade commitment to definite conclusions. Rather, it emphasises that in dealing

with issues fraught with consequences of such momentous import one should possess an absolutely open mind and should avoid all dogmatic presuppositions.

It is a tragedy of human life that man has not always been governed by his reason. He has behaved more as a creature of passions and emotions than as a responsible human being. His early childhood orientation and indoctrination has served as a stumbling block to his judicious weighing of facts. Instead of adopting his religion by an act of deliberate and conscious moral choice usually he is born into his religion and by the time he reaches an age capable of discriminating between truth and falsehood he is thoroughly brainwashed by the forces of his environment. The unconscious attachment to his own ancestral faith then gradually becomes so strong that even when its defects become painfully manifest to him he has not the courage to abandon it. This propensity of mind has the capacity to force a religious 'shell' or 'casing' (*Gehause*) which becomes inimical to the discovery of new truths. He exists within a 'horizon' and a 'standpoint', his ego being trapped within the circle of his own social context. This bondage of his particular orientation is like a self-incurred tutelage which cramps his spiritual powers and stifles his mental capabilities. It is the chief destroyer of his integrity and the main cause of his spiritual impoverishment. Religious devotion, in such circumstances, becomes a form of pernicious idolatry leading to dogmatic fanaticism and blind cruelty. It was in pursuance of this closed-minded attitude that the ancient Hebrews stoned their prophets and the fanatics of Athens demanded the death of Socrates.

Philosophy

To maintain one's faith and at the same time examine it critically is no doubt a Herculean task, but in view of the very grave stakes involved, the achievement of the goal is still worthy of our sincere efforts. For this purpose a universal focus can be provided by the philosopher who, supposedly standing on independent grounds, endeavours impartially to examine and weigh the testimony of every claimant to truth. In the quest of this viable philosophy of life his personal inclinations and affections should not blunt his honesty. The unbiased search is the prime objective of the *philosophia perennis*.

In such a state of affairs what should be the attitude of the person convinced of the truth of his position? Does his absolute and unconditional commitment to truth leave him any room for compromise? Truth, we know, enjoys a status of its own and it would be not only unthinkable, but criminal to extend this right to falsehood. Therefore while remaining unflinchingly faithful to the principles and ideals of truth the philosopher should be a man of great liberality of mind and broad human sympathies. His attitude should be one of dignified toleration to all those with whom he does not see eye to eye in matters of religious belief. Conscious of the frailty of the human spirit he should avoid all sorts of compulsion even if he happens to possess the capacity to apply it, for freedom of choice is one of the greatest prerogatives and glories of man. Physical constraint in such matters is all the more undesirable because though it may sometimes lead to lip service, it never inculcate true conviction. Indeed to penalise an error is not to refute it, and persecution has always led to a rebellious mental attitude. It is indeed unfortunate that the religious history of humankind is replete with instances of intolerant persecution.

But the tolerant attitude which the philosopher extends to other persons should not be construed as his compromise with falsehood. Truth and falsehood mutually exclude each other, and contradictories cannot both be true. Tolerance towards that which I firmly believe as radically wrong or evil would be sheer hypocrisy. This would be pseudo-tolerance which leads to moral and intellectual cowardice and an inhuman attitude towards life. Of late there have been attempts in

certain parts of the world towards some sort of religious syncretism and eclecticism. In India Rabindranath Tagore and Mahatama Gandhi have been the great exponents of this ideal. But without casting any aspersion on the sincerity and integrity of such persons one can clearly see that in the face of conflicting and contradictory truth-claims of various religions a confused mind or a hypocrite alone can adopt this attitude and take the risk of playing with the spiritual life of mankind.

Thus I think it is the imperative duty of the philosopher and, for that matter, of every conscientious person to adopt all pacific methods to convey to others the truth of which he feels sincerely convinced after an unbiased and impartial inquiry. By precepts, preaching and example he should try to win others to his faith and make them see the truth of his convictions. He should emphasise that such an objective quest for truth is not his sole responsibility, but the joint responsibility of humankind.

Chapter XVII

Individual and Culture

Mohammad Ajmal

When we consider the relation between 'Individual' and 'Culture' we must be cautious about the mischief the word 'and' can make. It is a truism which still may need to be repeated that individuals compose cultures and that culture is a word which describes a set of complex interrelations between individuals. This set of interrelations involves proximity and distance in space and time, in economic class and status. But as a matter of fact we *do* tend to think of culture as if it were a person distinct from an individual. Even when we think of *our* culture, we are prone to personify it, give it individuality and feel as if it were an entity apart from us. It is very largely this tendency in us which makes us formulate hypotheses like that of the group-mind. Why do we tend to give personality to culture? The main reason is that we tend to project our 'self' onto culture, and remain mere appendages to this person. The concept of 'self' is the central theme of Intensive Psychotherapy, and it is from the point of view that I will discuss the relation between individual and culture.

Culture

Philosophers have discussed the nature of man both in its divine and diabolical aspects. Some, for example, Plato, have attempted to indicate the degree of the depth to which man can sink and also to describe the ideal-limits which he can approximate. Plato's 'Philosopher-king' and Spinoza's 'God-intoxicated Man' are two outstanding conceptions of ideal-limits which a man can strive to reach.

The conception of ideal-limit about human nature is derived from the ideal-limits in Nature which, according to Broad, have three characteristics:

- There is generally no lower limit to such series. There is a concept of a perfectly straight line, but there is no concept of a perfectly crooked line.
- When we have formed the concept of an ideal-limit we find that sometimes it is analysable and sometimes it is not.
- We could not reach the concepts of these ideal-limits unless we had the power of reflection on the series and of recognising the characteristic which is more and more adequately, though still imperfectly, realised in the higher members of the series.

These three characteristics apply to the ideal-limit of human nature: 1. although we can conceive of a 'normal man', we cannot conceive of a perfectly abnormal man; 2. the concept of a normal man is to some extent analysable; and 3. when we reflect on this series, we see the presence of those characteristics in the more normal members, although imperfectly.

The only discipline today which not only deals with the dynamics of the diabolical and the divine in man, but also appreciates the necessary relations between the two is Intensive Psychotherapy. The main tenet on which this discipline is based is that man is essentially creative. The basic theme which runs throughout Depth-analysis is not adjustment, but love. 'Adjustment to environment' is an ideal derived from the assumption that society or culture is morally and

intellectually superior to the individual. The concept of the 'group-mind' entails the consequence that group possesses greater wisdom and a more subtle and stable moral fibre than the individual. Herbert Spencer, and in our own time Professor Waddington, detected a direction in the growth and development of the human species and have maintained that the individual *ought* to live in accordance with this direction which is determined by our capacity to adjust ourselves to environment. But there is a huge non-sequitur in the argument that because human evolution is unfolding in a direction, and therefore we ought to mould our lives in accordance with this direction. Moreover, it is quite doubtful whether there is such a direction. Adjustment is no longer the category which governs the concept of normality in Depth-analysis. One may be very well-adjusted in an authoritarian society and yet abnormal from the depth-analysis point of view. When the Nazis came to power in Germany, quite a few inmates of mental hospitals joined the Nazi Party and became well-adjusted. This does not mean that they had become normal by succumbing to the allurements of the symbols of power and destruction.

It is quite true that in our conceptions of ideal-limits we are greatly influenced by the archetype of the new man of our own age. This archetype or configuration has expressed itself in all ages in one form or another. The 'new-man' seems to be the ever-elusive goal for all generations to cherish and to pursue. He recedes into more distant future the closer one gets to him. But he perpetually goes on beckoning to us to move on and on, determining and designing a more or less definite shape and structure out of the future as the indeterminate and diffused end of the temporal dimensions.

Therefore, the conception of the individual which intensive psychotherapy works on is that the font of one's thoughts, feelings and actions is love and creativity. By 'love' is meant not amorous emotions, but care. The 'ideal' individual is one who, in the words of Jung, has attained "individuation." This, he says, "has two principal aspects: in the first place it is an internal and subjective process of integration; in the second place it is an equally indispensable process of objective relationship. Neither can exist without the other. . . ." Both these aspects can be characterised as 'love'. For one who seeks internal and subjective integration loves his own talents, abilities and potentialities of growth and expansion. He loves not only his positive, but also his negative attitudes. He cares for his negative attitudes in the sense that he assimilates them in his consciousness and attempts to canalise (channelise) their energy to the supreme task of fulfilling his vocation. Such a being loves not only himself but others in the sense that he is capable of entering into personal relationship with his fellow beings and of fostering their growth. This is the ideal-limit of the growth of an individual. Whether the culture to which an individual belongs encourages or thwarts the individual in the loving realisation of possibilities, this seems to be the ideal-limit he is trying to attain. It means that one can assess and evaluate cultures in the light of this ideal-limit. Some cultures are nearer this limit than others, but the criterion of the value of a culture is the individual: the kind of individuals a culture produces is the criterion of its worth.

The degree to which a culture realises this ideal-limit can be ascertained by the nature of the symbols it employs to reinforce its institutions. Symbols carry the emotional or numinous energy of the individuals composing the group and evince the constellation of forces operating in a group at a particular time in history. In Nazi Germany the symbols which cast a spell of fascination over the Germans were not 'Christ as a child' or 'Virgin Mary' but the 'Swastika' and the 'Wotan'. The primitive and archaic ideas of racial superiority and the inherent devilishness of the nearest out-group could be emotionally supported only by a 'collective regression' to the pre-Christian symbols. Thus Nazi Germany had a culture which did not tolerate the growth of the individual in the sense in which we have conceived of him as an ideal-limit. The ideal-limit for the Germans

was the 'Nazi-type' which crusades against evil and breeds death and destruction on the Jews. Love and creativity were abandoned and tabooed.

This is an example of one culture which had developed symbols to express its peculiar psychic situation at a particular stage in history. But we can find symbols in every culture which represent its attitude towards this ideal-limit. Are we aware of the symbols of our own culture, which express our own psychic condition today? There are some symbols which, according to this ideal-limit, a culture ought to have. If it is dynamic and vital a culture must have the 'child' as one of its basic symbols for the child expresses not only a fresh birth, but also infantile possibilities of development. A child is not only infantile, but also childlike; he or she has that 'seriousness at play' which is the goal of all mature development: intense but relaxed concentration, insatiable curiosity, readiness to be surprised and eagerness to explore, to seek and to experiment. If we are a newly-born culture, does the 'child' play any part therein? Have our artists and literary writers, our myth-makers and dreamers expressed the 'child-archetype' in any of its forms in their creative work? We cannot smother the child archetype without in some way surrendering our freedom and responsibility to others. A closed society has no place for the child who carves out his own destiny from a 'blooming and buzzing confusion'. I cannot understand why in our culture -- unless it is for the reason that we are doomed to remain patriarchal, authoritarian and closed -- *Id-i-Milad-un-Nabi* is not celebrated with intense and wild jubilation and merry-making. For what could be more significant and numinous for a Muslim than the birth of our Prophet?

Again, we have no symbol analogous to the crucifixion in Christianity. Crucifixion, if I understand it aright, is a symbol of universal love, affirming individuality against social tyranny, and symbolising self-realisation. It emphasises the need for withdrawal from social life in order to contact our genuine desires and goals. It represents an existential *angst* -- the need to experience one's loneliness, to feel that one is the carrier of one's life and not a mere derivative of social life. The individual who is crucified is a person who is set for a serious reckoning with himself in order to be reborn.

Of course, we have 'individuals' in our culture who are too ready to defy and flout social values. But such individuals are more in the nature of the son-lovers of the great mother than genuine individuals. They are irresponsible and immature, creating illusory storms in empty tea-cups. But as soon as it is a question of a real encounter with the social forces they cower and shrivel back in the womb of the great mother. They masquerade as heroes, but their approach is primarily negative. They are anxious to play with ideas, but without committing themselves to them. They have what Kierkegaard calls an aesthetic attitude, as opposed to the moral attitude of the real 'individual'.

In his book, *Islam in Modern History*, Wilfred Cantwell Smith criticises the role of intellectuals or its absence of in the religious and social movements of Pakistan. He castigates and provokes our intellectuals, but does not tell us why they *do not* feel committed to any religious or social movement. He does not see that they are irresponsible 'son-lovers'; suffering from what David Riesmann calls 'the nerve of failure'. They have swallowed Western liberal values, but are afraid of testing them out in this country lest they should fail. However, this possibility of failure, defeat and crucifixion are no part of our spiritual resources. We regard history as both significant and decisive, regard community as sacred and important, yet there is scant provision for defeat and disaster in our faith. Fright, therefore, holds back the Muslim intellectual from venturing forth and texting in reality; basically this is the 'fright of failure'.

Individual

To talk about the individual in relation to 'culture' generally means three things:

(1) 'Individual' can mean what in mythological terms can be called the son-lover, the irresponsible 'Don Juans' of a culture. They prattle and sparkle a great deal without committing themselves to any definite set of values. Their sweet and adorable appearances are a glamorous facade, but it is more froth than substance. They defy social values and live safely on the periphery of danger, but they bolt as soon as they come in precarious proximity to it. They fight cultural values without having assimilated them or comprehended their significance. "Implicit in this stage," says Erich Neumann, "is the pious hope of the natural creature that he, like nature, will be reborn through the great Mother, out of the fullness of her grace, with no activity or merit on his part.... Masculinity and consciousness have not yet won independence, and incest has given way to the matriarchal incest of adolescence. The death ecstasy of sexual incest is symptomatic enough of an adolescent ego not yet strong enough to resist the forces symbolised by the great Mother." Such an individual's defiance or denial of social values, or any values for that matter, is more in the nature of self-immolation. His is a negative protest, for the more he protests, the more he yields to the guiles of his culture. These 'son-lovers' are individuals, but have no individuality; they are neither integrated nor have their personal relations outgrown the narcissistic stage.

(2) The second kind of individual is the one who breaks his dependence on his family by being initiated into his culture -- another but larger mother in which he is completely contained. He the average individual, moderate in his attitude. He does not transgress social and cultural norms but lives by them for they are the *only* sanctions of life he has. He grows and develops in grooves set by his culture, and his inner peace and security depend on conformity to the customs, mores, and attitudes of his culture. He feels secure because for him these embody ancient and repeatedly tried wisdom. The individual accepts the authoritarian father, and through him acquires ideas like social ambition, fame, pride of birth, feelings for his tribe, clan or nation, hope of future riches, and social position. This individual has some consciousness, but most of his life is spent in a 'participation mystique' with the other members of the group. His relations are unconscious and institutionalised. He uncritically accepts, like a person hypnotised or infatuated, all his cultural institutions or institutional symbols. Whether he loves or hates, competes or struggles for success, his initiative and energy are confined to the moulds and forms laid down by the culture he belongs to. Such an individual invests most of his energy in his persona. In less complex societies, people can easily live with their personas but in highly differentiated and technically advanced cultures the persona, or what Erich Fromm calls marketing orientation, can cause intense neurotic pain and suffering.

(3) The third kind of individual, who is the theme of this paper, is what mythology call a hero. Freud calls the 'genital' character and Jung calls the 'individuated' person. Such an individual is an 'accident' par excellence in the sense that his personality owes its uniqueness to a socially uncommon set of circumstances. The unusual circumstances which mould the personality of the hero are known in mythology as the miraculous birth of the hero. It seems as if the web of cultural traditions and values had an undetected and unaccounted for cleft or crevice from which emerges the unusual habitat which moulds and rears the hero. In mythology the miraculous birth of the Hero stands for his basic independence. It means that the Hero because of his unusual upbringing is perpetually exploring and seeking 'roots'. This exploration leads to an ardent curiosity about the foundations of the traditions and values of his culture. His attempt, therefore, is to conquer the darkness of the unconscious and to live by the light of consciousness. He tries to live by the light of consciousness in the full realisation that the unconscious is the fount of his energy. This

realisation engenders in him a feeling of the 'self', which is different from the ego-consciousness. This 'individuated' person is the 'ideal-limit' referred to earlier.

The 'individuated' person combines in himself two opposite kinds of masculinity. One is the phallic masculinity, which for Freud and Wilhelm Reich is the epitome of humanity. This is the masculinity which reaches its peak development in a full-blooded orgasm. The second is the solar masculinity, the higher masculinity which "is correlated with light, the sun, the eye and consciousness." That Freud ignored this important distinction (which was first made by Bachofen and later incorporated into analytical psychology by Erich Neumann) is evident from the fact that in his description the genital character of determinism occupies the central place. The scientific attitude is an expression of the genital character and there is no reference to arts or creativity. In fact it seems as if Freud's genital character passively suffers determinism and does not proffer bold and challenging hypotheses founded on the perception of new relations. Freud's normal man does not take risks about truth; he observes, but does not experiment. His knowledge is Spinoza's second kind of knowledge. But the individuation to which Jung refers as the ideal-limit, emphasises both kinds of masculinity, genital and solar. Jung's normal man creates positive values and productively exploits his phantasy in the formation of new hypotheses. Both artists and scientists can combine in themselves those two strands of masculinity. The aim of intensive psychotherapy is to unite these two forms of creativity.

The dangers inherent in technological change have been described very well by Dr. Sailer: The individual is threatened with becoming a robot. We, who have lagged behind in the race for technology, as Dr. Hamiduddin has pointed out, have been more concerned with the subtle nuances of religious institutions and religious experience. This indeed might be a blessing in disguise, for as we are balancing on the verge of considerable industrial endeavour, we can derive spiritual sustenance from our religious orientation which we change and transform in a manner that may avoid the unconscious transition to the 'marketing orientation' which is the bane of a modern industrialised society. We can succeed in this only if we try to incorporate into our culture symbols which represent individuality.

Chapter XVIII

Descartes' Concept of a Person

Shahid Hussain

Descartes is sure that he exists;¹ but he wants to discover what he actually is, and how he becomes involved in the concept of a person. He is in pursuit of that which constitutes him, i.e., his essence or nature. The terms 'essence' and 'nature' for him refer to those properties without which a thing will no longer remain what it is. He says: "There is however one principle property of every substance, which constitutes its nature or essence."² This is supposed to be permanent, never changing, and both necessary and sufficient to establish the existence of a thing with certainty. It may be objected that it cannot be both necessary and sufficient, since in that case the essence of a thing will imply its existence, and this, according to Descartes, is true only of God. There is no doubt that God is defined by him in this manner, but he maintains that created things also can be called things, because they need only the 'concourse of God'³ in order to exist; hence, the same principle will be applicable to them as well.

Descartes proposes to examine himself as clearly and as attentively as possible to determine his essence, of course, through sense perception. He mistrusts senses not only because they can be deceptive, but also because they can be called away. He does not intend to hold himself before himself, as Malcolm suggests, like an object O, having an essence, so that the perception (according to Malcolm some other verbs of cognition can be substituted for perception such as 'be aware of' or 'apprehend') of E may be the perception of O and vice versa, in which case E may as well be the essence of O.⁴ He certainly does not appeal to the principle suggested by Malcolm:

X is my essence if it is the case that if I am aware of *x* then (necessarily) I am aware of myself and if I am aware of myself, then (necessarily) I am aware of X.

Malcolm is wrong when he says that 'sense perception' is the same as 'intellectual awareness'. He takes "I am aware of myself" as equivalent to "I am aware that I exist". Descartes, on the other hand, is of the view that his existence is not something he is aware of; rather it is a conclusion of an inference. He tells us:

We do not have immediate cognition of substances . . . , rather from the mere fact that we perceive certain forms or attributes which must inhere in order to have existence, we name the thing in which they exist a substance.⁵

Malcolm is not right in saying that nothing implicitly is concluded by Descartes about his essence in the 'Second Meditation'. It is true that he does not say that thinking is his essence, but he does say that it is his only inseparable property. In Descartes own words: "Thinking is another attribute of the soul; and here I discover what property belongs to myself. This alone is inseparable from me."⁶

In order to know what actually pertains to himself, Descartes adopts the method of doubt. He calls into question everything about which he finds the slightest uncertainty. He finds that he can doubt his body, but not his existence. In his celebrated *Discourse*, he tells us:

I attentively examined what I was, and as I observed that I could suppose that I had no body, and that there was no world nor any place in which I might be; but that I could not therefore suppose that I was not; and that, on the contrary, from the very circumstance that

I thought to doubt the truth of other things, it most clearly and certainly followed that I was; while, on the other hand, if I had only ceased to think, although all the other objects which I had ever imagined had been in reality existent, I would have had no reason to believe that I existed; I thence concluded that I was a substance whose whole essence or nature consists only in thinking, and which, that it may exist, has no need of no place, nor is dependent on any material thing.⁷

In the *Principles*, Descartes suggests that we can doubt the existence of God, sky, physical objects, and a body having hands, feet, etc., but we cannot call into question our own existence.⁸ In 'The Search After Truth', Polyander declares that he is sure that he exists, but that he is not a body, "otherwise doubting of my body, I should at the same time doubt myself and this I cannot do, for I am absolutely convinced of it, that I can in no wise doubt of it."⁹ Descartes thus discovers his essence in thinking. He moves from the premise that 'he can doubt the existence of his body not his own existence' to the conclusion that he as such is either different from his body or there is no necessary connection between him and his body.

The remarks in 'The Search After Truth' contain the following argument:

I can doubt the existence of my body.

I cannot doubt that I exist.

My body is not the same as I.

This argument, as it runs, gives the impression as if it were based on the principle that if two things are identical, then whatever is true of one is true of the other. It follows from this that if something can be said to be true of X, but not of Y, then X is not identical with Y. This principle has not been explicitly enunciated by Descartes but, perhaps, this might have been in his mind while framing the above argument.

It is true that Descartes can doubt the existence of his body, and not his existence, but from this it does not follow that he is different from his body. Let us take a counter example to see the falsity of this principle. If some one doubts whether or not the Prime Minister of England exists and proceeds in the Cartesian fashion, then he cannot resolve his doubt by arguing:

I can doubt if a Prime Minister of England exists.

I cannot doubt if I exist.

I am not a Prime Minister of England.

In the passage quoted above from *Discourse*, Descartes draws rather a stronger conclusion. He not only asserts that he is not identical with his body, but also that he is not dependent for his existence on his body. He notices that the proof of his existence depends upon his thinking and not on his body or the world. It appears as if he were employing some general principle of the kind that the existence of X depends upon Y, if the proof of existence of X depends upon Y. But he cannot accept this principle, because he offers a proof of God's existence which depends upon his idea of the existence of God. And he would not be prepared to say that the existence of God is dependent upon his idea of God, for God could exist without anybody having an idea of Him. This argument, however, suggests an interpretation different from that given in 'The Search After Truth'. Let us consider the following propositions:

- (a) I think
- (b) I have a body
- (c) I am in the world
- (d) I am in a place
- (e) I am.

Here (b), (c), and (d) are uncertain, but (e) is certain. If (a) is true, and (b), (c), and (d) are doubtful, (e) is certain. From this, it follows that (a) is the premise both necessary and sufficient to establish the certainty of (e). It is true that each of the propositions from (a) to (d) entail (e), but they are neither individually necessary nor collectively sufficient to establish the truth of (e) because, in order to establish a conclusion to be certain, a premise should itself be certain. The premises (b), (c), and (d) are not necessary to establish the truth of (e), for even when each of them is doubtful the truth of (e) can be derived from the truth of (a). Moreover the truth of (b), (c), and (d) is not sufficient to establish the certainty of (e), not because they do not entail (e), but because, even if true, they are doubtful. The truth of (a), on the other hand, is necessary to establish the certainty of (e), for it cannot be doubted. The sense in which we cannot doubt the proposition "I think" is just this, that one's doubting oneself presupposes its truth.

The principle, which Descartes appears to be following here is that those attributes constitute the essence of a thing which are individually necessary and collectively sufficient to establish the existence of that thing with certainty. As thinking is the only attribute both necessary and sufficient to establish his own existence, Descartes concludes his essence is thinking. One feels inclined to believe it, since it makes sense to say that those attributes constitute the essence of a thing which are individually necessary and collectively sufficient for the existence of that thing. Moreover, if a single attribute guarantees the certainty then it appears to establish it as true.

But this principle unfortunately is false, because it permits one to draw a false conclusion from premises which are true. In case we should suppose it to be true and affirm that thinking without possessing a body is not possible, then all the premises of Descartes remain intact and true. The proposition (a) will be both necessary and sufficient to establish the certainty of (e), since (b) though it follows from (a) in conjunction with the aforesaid supposition, it is not certain, because the supposition itself is doubtful. But the conclusion of Descartes that thinking is his essence will be false, since it may not be possible to think without possessing a body. Hence, it cannot be true that my essence is thinking, and at the same time that my existence is not dependent at all on the existence of my body.

In order to prove his thesis that thinking constitutes his essence, Descartes also resorts to the argument from clear and distinct ideas. He claims to have a clear and distinct idea of himself as a thinking and unextended thing, and concludes from this that he is distinct and separate from his body. He says:

I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and as, on the other hand, I possess a distinct idea of body, in so far as it is only an extended and unthinking thing.¹⁰

This argument can be formulated as follows:

Whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived by me is true.
I clearly and distinctly perceive X.

X is true.

The 'clear and distinct perceptions' are self-evident truths for Descartes; they are held to be 'known by the natural light in our soul', i.e., by our intuition. They are said to be mental operations, hence beyond any logical or mathematical proof. The distinct perception of a piece of wax is an excellent example offered by Descartes. The piece of wax perceived by mind and senses is the same, but the perception of it is not sensory. It is a mental act, which Descartes calls the intuition of the mind.¹¹ In his words: "It is neither an act of sight, of touch, nor of imagination . . . but is simply an intuition (*inspectio*) of the mind." He further believes that what is produced by the light of nature or reason is indubitable. He is not prepared to doubt what nature makes him believe, for even if he tries to do so he cannot.

Descartes makes a distinction between intuition and deduction. He regards the principles of both as simple and self-evident. But they do not escape his systematic doubt. The reason for doubting mathematical demonstrations and their principles is that people make mistakes in such matters and regard as absolutely true and self-evident what, in fact, is false. Moreover it may be due to the deception of an All-Powerful God. He might have created the people in such a way that they are always deceived even regarding those things which they claim to know best. Descartes remarks:

. . . how do I know that I am not also deceived each time I add together two and three, or number the sides of a square, or form some judgement still more simple, if more simple indeed can be imagined?¹²

The examples of intuition given by Descartes are of metaphysical nature, viz., "In order to think one must exist", "Nothing can be created out of nothing", and "If equals are added to equals, the result is equal". He does not regard them to be generically indubitable, rather extremely indubitable even to a prejudiced mind, for they are dictated by the light of nature. It is true that they are beyond doubt, but he does not hold that they are equally known to everybody, because people do lack clear and distinct apprehension of them. He says: "When we apprehend anything we are in no danger of error . . . we would never fall into error, provided we gave our assent only to what we clearly and distinctly perceived."¹³ So the fault lies with ourselves and not with the axioms.

But how can Descartes be sure that the light of nature is a true light and whatever it commands is never false? Here, he brings in the Author of this nature Who is veracious and never deceptive. His veracity being beyond question, and He being the creator of all things, whatever is clearly and distinctly perceived by us can never be false. It must be true, since it is in conformity with nature. He says: "After I have discovered that God exists, seeing I also at the same time observed that all things depend upon Him, and that He is no deceiver, and thence inferred that all which I clearly and distinctly perceive is of necessity true."¹⁴ Here it should be noted that when Descartes says that self-evident truths cannot be doubted, he does not mean that we should not doubt them; his point simply is that, even if we try to doubt them, we cannot but give them our assent.

There are, however, certain propositions which are held by Descartes to be generically free from all sorts of doubts. He had already concluded that "I think, therefore I am", but the second part of this proposition is re-assessed in the 'Third Meditation'. He wonders about the source of his existence, and rejects it being himself or his parents. It cannot be himself, because then he would not have been so imperfect and ignorant as he is. It cannot be his parents, for they are

primarily responsible for the existence of his body and not that of his mind. He asks: "From what could I in that case derive my existence?" once again affirming it to be his thinking. He also observes that as a thinking thing he possesses the idea of a Supreme Being, and therefore he must owe his existence to Him. The existence of God and that of himself is proved from the idea of a Supreme Being. Thus he concludes that thinking and the idea of God, or the propositions representing the mind's consciousness of its ideas and thoughts, are beyond any doubt. In other words, the propositions that report the contents of the mind are unquestionable in the system of Descartes.

If the veracity of God is a ground for accepting the truths of intuition, then Descartes can be accused of arguing in a circle. Arnauld points to this circle thus: "We can be sure that God exists, only because we clearly and distinctly perceive that He does; therefore, prior to being certain that God exists, we should be certain that whatever we clearly and evidently perceive is true." Frankfurt is of the opinion that though Descartes was guilty of circularity, he could be acquitted of this charge provided we accept that while validating intuition, he was not trying to show that whatever was intuited was true, but rather that there could be no reasonable ground to doubt it. He further remarks that this is not the case with Descartes because he appears to be quite unconcerned about the truth of intuition; hence, there is a circle.¹⁵

But there, in fact, is no circle, for Descartes does not bring in God and His veracity to prove intuition to be valid. He regards simple intuition itself the ground for accepting its truth. The veracity of God is referred to not to prove the truth of what is intuited, but rather to indicate that what we have once intuited, can not be questioned. This does not show Descartes' lack of interest in the truth of the principles and the conclusions he draws as Frankfurt believes; rather it indicates that there is no other reasonable way to establish the truth of a proposition but by intuiting it. Moreover, when something can be apprehended through intuition, a deductive proof is of no use. This is why Descartes did not think it necessary to demonstrate the veracity of God or to offer a deductive proof of His existence. When he moves from a clear and distinct perception of a thing to the affirmation of its truth, he does not appeal to the suppressed major premise, but affirms the truth of that thing directly from intuition. The veracity of God is brought in to avoid errors and to be sure that intuitions are true. He does not rely on an unproved assumption; he does not think that the veracity of God is a ground for accepting the truths of intuitions; Descartes does not at all doubt the individual intuitions. What he doubts is their universal validity, and it is in order to vindicate this fact that the individual intuitions are employed by him.

Descartes offers another argument to supplement the previous one to prove mind to be distinct and separate from body. What strikes him is the divisibility of the body into its various parts, i.e., ears, nose, limbs, etc., and the indivisibility of the mind into different parts such as knowing, feeling, willing, etc. The thoughts of a mind, according to him, are not related to it as the members of a body are related to a body; therefore mind must be different from body:

There is a vast difference between mind and body, in respect that body, from its nature, is always divisible, and that mind is entirely indivisible. For in truth, when I consider the mind, that is, when I consider myself in so far only as I am a thinking thing, I can distinguish in myself no parts, but I very clearly discern that I am somewhat absolutely one and entire; and although the whole mind seems to be united to the whole body, yet, when a foot, an arm, or any other part is cut off, I am conscious that nothing has been taken from my mind.¹⁶

Descartes maintains not only that mind is distinct from body, but also that there is a bipolar opposition between the two. We are told that it is not possible "to conceive the half of a mind, as we can of any body, however small, so that the natures of these two substances are to be held, not only as diverse, but even in some measure as contraries."¹⁷

However, when Descartes says that if some parts of a body are lost, then nothing is taken away from the mind, he is wrong; for, if the head is lost, mind also is lost. But perhaps what Descartes wants to assert is that the facts about the body of a person are not the facts about him, for it is logically possible that someone's body might have been the body of someone else or no one at all as is the case with the body of a dead person. It also makes sense to suppose that persons might switch bodies.¹⁸ If this is possible, then it follows that the fact that someone has a body is a mere contingent fact, so much so that the next moment one might find oneself with some other body or no body at all. Thus, what makes a particular person or a mind is entirely different from what makes his body the particular body it is.

This disparity between mind and body led Descartes to believe in the durability of the former. The body is destructible, because it has parts, and parts can be separated; but the mind cannot be destroyed, for it has no parts to be separated. It may, however, be pointed out that mind's not containing extensive parts is no reason to infer its incorruptibility, because not all that ceases to exist is extensive. For example, a sound does not cease to exist by falling apart into pieces, but by diminishing in intensity, so a mind may pass out of existence in the same way. Descartes would, however, deny this to be applicable to the mind, for whereas the mind is a substance, sound cannot be said to be so. Moreover, he does not infer the indestructibility of the mind from its indivisibility only, but also from its being a dependent substance requiring the concurrence of God for its continuance. This is why he regards -- and rightly so on his premises -- the arguments commonly advanced against the durability of the mind or soul to be inconclusive, for they make presuppositions which are demonstrably false. Thus, he establishes at least the possibility of the mind surviving bodily death.

Notes

1. Cannot doubt my own existence without thereby affirming it: this is the paradox of '*dubito ergo sum*'.

2. Descartes, *A Discourse on Method, Meditations, and Principles*, tr. John Veitch (London: Everyman's Library, ed.; J.M. Dent and Sons Ltd., 1965), p. 185.

3. *Ibid.*

4. Cf. Norman Malcolm, "Descartes' Proof that His Essence is Thinking", *The Philosophical Review*, LXXIV (July, 1965), reprinted in *Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Willis Doney, *Modern Studies in Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1968), pp. 312-38.

5. *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, tr. E.S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), II, 98.

6. Descartes, *op.cit.*, p. 88.

7. *Ibid.*, p. 27.

8. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 167.

9. *The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, I, 319.

10. Descartes, *op.cit.*, p. 132.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

12. *Ibid.*, p. 82.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
15. Cf. H.G. Frankfurt, "Memory and the Cartesian Circle", *The Philosophical Review*, LXXI (October, 1962), 504-11.
16. Descartes, *op.cit*, p. 139.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
18. Cf. Anthony Quinton, "The Soul", *The Journal of Philosophy*, 1962.

Chapter XIX
God and Values
Khawaja Ghulam Sadiq

Knowledge of God

In various periods philosophers, moralists and theologians have advanced different proofs for the existence of God, but for one reason or another none of these can be accepted. The question arises: Can we furnish a valid proof of God's existence? Even if one answers in the affirmative, it will not imply that one has established God's existence. An argument that makes strong appeal to the theologians could be expressed in classical syllogism and a valid conclusion drawn, but a valid conclusion may not be a true proposition. Mere validity does not establish truth. The argument is:

If Moses is trustworthy, God exists.
Moses is trustworthy.
Therefore God exists.

Does the argument establish God's existence; does it fulfil the constitutive and epistemic conditions of inference? Granted that Moses is trustworthy, does his trustworthiness permit us to accept his recommendation for a belief in a trans-empirical reality? The epistemic condition of inference is not fulfilled here. The gulf between the empirical and the transempirical cannot be bridged by logical reasoning. Nor is the constitutive condition met: the relation between the constituents of the major premise is not that of implication. I believe that God's existence has to be intuited. I do not know myself by inference. Descartes' *cogito ergo sum* is fallacious when he inferred thinker from thinking. Hume, too, wanted to have a perception of 'I' or self but could not get behind the passing states of consciousness to an enduring self and thus was led to deny the reality of self. In fact, I do not need any proof to know that I exist. In *Payam-i-Mashriq* (Ruba'i 54, p. 38), Iqbal beautifully makes this point:

I am silent on the question of my being and non-being.
If I say 'I am', I commit myself to "a worship of myself."
But whose voice is this simple note?
Someone in my bosom says that I exist.

I intuit myself and there the matter ends. I also intuit the external world. Unless this is granted, no transition can be made from thoughts or states of consciousness to the objective situation. Berkeley wanted to prove the existence of the external world, but was led to his subjective idealism. Leibniz's reasoning about the unity of force led him to conclude that monads or metaphysical points had no windows, yet he knew that there were an infinite number of monads each reflecting the same universe from its special point of view. Berkeley believed in the existence of the external world, but his presuppositions that ideas are passive and spirits alone active and that passive ideas cannot act upon the active spirits forced him to make his ideas (things) exist in the mind of God. Descartes' reasoning that because the senses sometimes deceive us, therefore they have to be distrusted completely, is hard to understand. His inquiry should have been directed towards sifting true perceptions from illusions and hallucinations. He was not justified in doubting

the existence of the external world from the fact of illusions. His reasoning about the reality of the external world, on the basis of the veracity of God, is quite illogical. Kant intuitively feels the existence of the external world and of the self, but declares them unknowable. He held that all knowledge is through categories and that the latter are applied not to things, but to our thinking of them. Kant's followers made things to be only thoughts (the identity of thought and being) and were thus committed to objective idealism. This destroyed the distinction between the subject and the object and reduced the individual, in the words of Kierkegaard, to a mere paragraph in a system.

Thus, we find that in the history of modern thought the attempt to prove the existence of self or the external world has landed philosophers in great difficulties. Such attempts presuppose a belief in the reality of the two. The real problem of the self and the external world belongs to the field of description and logical positivists are justified in stressing this aspect of philosophical inquiry.

We intuit our own existence and also the existence of the external world. God also has to be intuited; the most authentic form of intuition which yields knowledge of God technically is called religious experience. But this is not readily available to an individual. The whole history of mysticism points to the fact that it presupposes certain qualities of head and heart. A novice has always been tested by the preceptor and subjected to a strict moral discipline and self-examination before he is fit to enter the various "states" and "stations" of the Sufi path. The preceptor helps his disciple from falling a victim to illusions and hallucinations. Thus the recipient of religious experience is cautious and takes great care to distinguish genuine from spurious experience. The Qur'an too lays emphasis on the possibility of religious experience being vitiated by Satan. The following verse (xxii. 52) will make the point clear:

We have not sent an Apostle or Prophet before thee among whose desires Satan injected not some wrong desire, but God shall bring to naught that which Satan had suggested. Thus shall God affirm His revelations, for God is knowing and wise.

The next step in religious experience, communication, constitutes the crux of the difficulty. Language is the medium through which communication can take place, but language pertains to sensory experience, whereas religious experience refers to trans-empirical reality. Hence the language of religion is vague, full of similes, metaphors, allusions and symbols. The content of the experience is not communicable, but the interpretation which a mystic puts on his experience is communicated in the form of propositions. "Since the quality of mystic experience is to be directly experienced, it obviously cannot be communicated. "Mystic states are more like feelings than thought," says Iqbal. The result is that the accounts of the religionists regarding the nature of reality differ. This fact has been emphasised by the Sufis. Rumi, for instance, said that if animals were to imagine God, every animal would see in Him his own magnified image. Muhammad Ibn Zakariya al-Razi, a Muslim thinker of the 9th century of the Christian era, condemned religious experience on the basis of the contradictions in various religions. He had overlooked the fact that religious experience in its essence is a synthetic experience and does not easily lend itself to expression in words. It is the unanalysable wholeness of religious experience which makes its linguistic rendering an extremely difficult task.

Sciences deal with static facts, with abstractions, and thus can capture their data in concepts and categories. Religion deals with life in all its wholeness. Life is dynamic and not static; hence the language difficulty. But this does not mean that the language of religion has no meaning or that the verification of religious discourse is not possible. The criterion for establishing the truth of

religious discourse is different from the criterion used in verifying descriptive statements of empirical sciences. The contributions which religious propositions have made to the moral and intellectual fund of the world make it abundantly clear that religious propositions cannot be brushed aside as untrue. One judges the truth of religious experience by its fruits and not by its roots, observed William James. Again, as has been pointed out by Professor C. A. Qadir in his article "God and Logic," the religious proposition pertains to eternity, and its rejection is not possible on the basis of experience which spreads over a small period of time.

Thus, for our knowledge of God we have to depend primarily on revelation as expressed in religious propositions. Of course, there are other sources too, e.g., the study of nature and history. Ibn Tufail showed in his romance, *Hayy bin Yaqzan*, the possibility of knowing God through a study of nature. These sources involve a purely intellectual approach and the Absolute thus arrived at appears more akin to thought and reason and hence static. For this reason we have to depend primarily on revelation for our knowledge of God. The facts of religion are genuine facts. Ghazali was justified in stressing this fact in his *Tahafut al-Falasifah*. In what follows, I accept the hypothesis of God as stated in the Qur'an. I shall not try to harmonise religion with science or philosophy as has been the universal practice of almost all Muslim philosophers from al-Kindi to Iqbal, Hakim and Sharif. I shall only bring out the implications of the unity of God and in this connection my conclusion is that the true import of Divine unity is difficult to grasp. There is an element of agnosticism in religion. I contend further that the Qur'anic concept of the attributes of God as ultimate values provides a sound basis for morality and lends meaning and significance to moral effort.

The Qur'an conceives of God as an individual. He is one; all things depend on Him who neither begets nor is begotten. He is the bearer of beautiful names (attributes) and is nearer to man than his neck vein; He has direct contact with His creatures: there are no two but He is their third, no three but He is their fourth. He is the Creator and comprehends all creation: "My mercy encompasses all things" (vii. 156). He is powerful, wise and is not limited by anything. "He is the First and the Last, the manifest and the hidden; He is knower of all things" (Ivii. 3).

The unity of God has been of special interest to Muslim thinkers and the Qur'an lays major emphasis on this.

And your God is one God; there is no god but He! He is Beneficent, the Merciful (ii. 163).

Say, He is only one God (vi. 19).

Your God is one God: so those who believe not in the Hereafter, their hearts refuse to know and they are proud (xvi. 22).

And Allah has said: Take not two gods. He is only one God: so Me alone should you fear (xvi. 51).

Due to this emphasis, the unity of God has been the cornerstone of Muslim religious and philosophic thought. It was a cardinal principle with (i) the various schools of Muslim theology particularly the Mu'tazilites and the Ash'arites, (ii) Muslim rationalists (philosophers) and (iii) the sufis. Some of the sufis conceived God as the only reality and were led to the doctrine of the Unity of Being, *Wahdat al-Wujud*, a pantheistic interpretation of reality.

The Qur'anic emphasis on the unity of God is directed primarily against polytheism. The Mu'tazilites argued that the unity of God required the denial of His attributes. They called themselves the people of unity and justice (*ahl al-tawhid wal 'adl*), and feared that admission of attributes would lead to a plurality of eternals and hence polytheism. They reduced the attributes either to relations or negations or made them God's essence. Abul Hudhayl al-'Allaf (748-840 a. c.), a disciple of the second generation from Wasil bin 'Ata, the founder of Mu'tazilism, taught

that God's attributes were not in His essence, but were His essence. The Mu'tazilites reduced God to an abstract unity. The Ash'arites, in conformity with the orthodox view, accepted God's attributes as distinct from God's essence, but at the same time warned that they were to be accepted *bila kaifa*, without asking 'How' and *bila tashbih*, without drawing any comparison. The Qur'an says, "Nothing is like Him, and He is the Hearing, the Seeing" (xlii. 11). The philosophers al-Farabi and Ibn Sina made the unity of God a basis for their emanationist account of Being. The universe, which is a unity, was conceived by the Muslim rationalists as an eternal, i.e., non-temporal, emanation from God. God being the Necessary Being, His essence and existence coincided, while the possible beings depend on the Necessary Being for their existence. Thus Ibn Sina, despite his emanationistic account of Being, avoided committing himself to a pantheistic interpretation of reality by making the universe dependent on God for existence.

Iqbal explains the unity of God and the multiplicity of His attributes on the pattern of human personality. Despite the multiplicity of selves human personality is a unity. This unity or integration of ego is, of course, a matter of degree. For Iqbal the moral ideal is the attainment of a perfectly integrated ego. The moral worth of an action is determined by its tendency to promote integration of personality, "There are no pleasure-giving and pain-giving acts; there are only ego-sustaining and ego-dissolving acts. It is the deed that prepares the ego for dissolution or disciplines it for a future career." With God unity achieves perfection. This attempt to understand the unity of God in terms of perfected integration of egos is not to fashion God after the image of man, warns Iqbal; it is only to affirm that Divine Life is not a chaos, but an organised principle. It is our habit of pictorial thinking which lends anthropomorphic colouring to our concept of God.

Ever since the time of Hume, the sciences have tended more to restrict their field to the observable, to phenomena. The scientists believe in the unity of the universe, regard it as a cosmos and do not consider it justified to step beyond the phenomenal to the trans-empirical reality. Idealist thinkers lay emphasis on the unity of intellect or reason, but cannot go beyond reason. But for religion the unity of the universe and the unity of reason point to an ultimate unity which alone could explain the two opposing unities of matter and mind. In the words of the Qur'an the experience within and without is symbolic of reality described by it as "the First and the Last, the visible and the invisible (lvii. 3). God is, therefore, both immanent and transcendent. He is immanent in that the universe is a visible expression of His creative activity; he is transcendent in that the universe does not exhaust the creative activity of God.

A complete comprehension of the unity of God is a difficult task. The degree of unity depends on the degree of individuality. With man individuality is a relative affair. We become conscious of our own self in opposition to the not-self. God can afford to dispense with all the worlds says the Qur'an. This implies that the universe is not to be conceived as confronting God as His other. The Qur'an is careful to state that all things depend on God. There is no spatial notion involved in the concept of dependence. A conclusion depends on its premises; a work of art depends on the artist; and an idea depends on the mind which conceives it; and these objects in one way limit their subjects. To form a complete notion of the unity of God is beset with difficulties. We can only have an approximation of it. Hence, I fully endorse the view of Dr. K. A. Hakim that "there is an element of agnosticism in all true religions and even in the deepest religious experience."

Values

The Qur'anic attributes of God represent ultimate values. These constitute the ideal which controls and guides the process of social evolution. The unity of God implies the unity of the Moral

Law or the interrelatedness of values. Social progress is a fact: humankind today is wiser by his past experience. In all ages man has been gradually moving towards a fuller realisation of the social order calculated to secure well-being. At no time in the recorded history of man, did any group take upon itself the promotion of evil as its end. It is true that social progress has not been uniform. There have been periods when social order was greatly upset, but man emerged from every ordeal with greater determination to promote peace and harmony. The Qur'an too takes a teleological view of the universe and man. The following verses are relevant to this point:

And we did not create the heavens and the earth and that which is between them in sport. We created them not but for a serious end, but most of them understand it not (xliv. 38-39).

Do you then think that we have created you in vain, and that you will not be returned to us (xiii. 115).

And everyone has a goal to which he turns, so vie with one another in good works (ii. 148).

That the attributes constitute ideals is clear from the following verses:

And that to thy Lord is the goal (liii. 42).

God desires the perfection of His Light (ix. 32).

(We take) Allah's colour, and who is better than Allah at colouring (ii. 138).

Some of the attributes of God which the Qur'an describes are Life, Power, Wisdom, Truth, Beauty, Goodness, Love and Justice. "He is Allah the Creator, the Maker, the Fashioner. His are the most beautiful names" (lix. 24). In philosophical terminology the verse implies that God is the locus of all ultimate and intrinsic values. His being guarantees the objectivity of values. But as God is nearer to man than his neck vein, one carries value-consciousness with him. It is the "Moral law within" and not "the starry heaven above" that bestows on the individual his true status and prepares him to be deputy of God on earth. It is this development of the ethical personality that the Prophet of Islam, peace be upon him, signified when he enjoined Muslims to assimilate Divine attributes. With God as the locus of all values it follows that there is no distinction in Islam between the spiritual and the mundane, the religious and the secular. Material prosperity is a condition of the spiritual growth of a people. Islam recommends a positive, seeking attitude towards life in all its manifestations.

The objectivity of values does not rule out difference of opinion in moral matters. The content range of a value widens with experience. Kant was wrong when he recommended complete divorce between morality and experience. He held that the moral law needed no content to be filled in by experience. His moral system remains formal and barren. The true significance of values in the ever-changing social set-up is discovered gradually by the advancing consciousness of man. Ultimate values or formal ideals of value need a content to be filled in by experience.

With God as the locus of all intrinsic values the requirements of morality are fully with. This implies that moral effort is in tune with reality. A morally developed individual or society is more truly real. Further, the Qur'anic emphasis on the continuity of life after death makes moral effort all the more meaningful. In this moral effort, according to the Qur'an, God becomes co-worker with man.

The existentialist thinkers deny the objectivity of values. When Nietzsche killed God, he thought that he had made the individual bold and courageous. Man had been working, thought Nietzsche, from the dawn of history under the fear of mighty and revengeful gods of God, but now man had become mature enough to walk fearlessly without the support of God or gods. This loss of faith in God led to anguish, anxiety, dread feeling of being forsaken, which concepts are the prize possession of existentialist thinkers. There is no purpose in life, they say, but you can make

it meaningful by making a certain commitment. Man is just wedged between life and death, merely a freakish accident. But if absurdity, irrationality and purposelessness be the key notes of existence, why should we try to make it meaningful by making commitments? Why endure non-authentic or authentic existence at all? Existentialism is the philosophy of pessimism, frustration and failure. It had stepped in to save the individual, to plead for him, but succeeded only in bringing home to him that he is a mere supernumerary, something superfluous. For Camus, the symbol of man is Sisyphus who was condemned by the gods to perform a meaningless task. He was to take a rock to the top a mountain and when he scaled the mountain the rock was dropped down, and Sisyphus set to the same task again and found a certain happiness in that meaningless routine. The cycle of existence is very much like the routine performance of Sisyphus. The individual's life history is nothing but a series of contingent happenings. The schools and colleges where you are educated, the teachers you meet and the friends you make or the person you marry and even your birth are all mere contingent happenings.

These philosophers forget that contingency is the result of the mobility and freedom that man enjoys. Let all person be earth-rooted like mountains or trees and most of the happenings will disappear. Choice presupposes a variety and multiplicity of possible events or courses. Contingent happenings are the price we pay for our freedom and choice. William James was right when he asserted that the mere fact that one continues to live is sufficient proof that one regards life as worth living. It is the meaningfulness of life that sustains you to live it. Your commitments yield you a richness of experience and an increase in the depth and fullness of life.

Life is not meaningless. It is directed towards ends and goals, as becomes obvious when we reflect on the working of our own minds. It is true that a well-planned action may not meet with success but that is no basis for condemning life as meaningless. Failure sometimes goads one on to greater effort. The existentialist thinkers forget that the values one finds in society at one time are the operative values. These are the choices made by persons who were here before us. These are their interpretations of the formal ideals of values, which are the same for all human beings, values which the Qur'an describes as the beautiful names of Allah. We start our lives by adhering to the operative values of our group. But it is for us to reflect on these values and see if they agree with the formal ideals of values. This implies that we have to check if the operative values continue adequately to guide life. "Virtue without imagination is a constant danger in civilisation," says F. Mayer. Changes in operative values are brought about by thinkers who, by active participation in and reflective withdrawal from the social life of the community, reinterpret them by pressing them back to the principles on which they rest. Thus operative values undergo a steady process of change in the individual and the race. But the formal ideals of value remain the same. It is these which give universal character to morality, and the unity of the moral law follows from the unity of God. We do not talk in terms of American or Chinese or Russian moral law. Societies differ in operative values only, but the formal ideals of values are the same for all. According to Islam these values have their locus in God. "And to thy Lord is the goal" (liii. 42). Belief in God guarantees the objectivity of values, and the objectivity of values gives all the meaning and significance to moral efforts.

Biographical Notes

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- Principal works: *The Metaphysics of Rumi, Islamic Ideology, Islam and Communism, Prophet Muhammad and his Mission*.

Abdul Khaliq: M. A.; Ph. D. (Punjab). Retired as Iqbal Professor and as Chairman, Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab, Lahore. Lectured at various American Universities as a visiting Professor on the invitation of the American Institute of Pakistan Studies in 1982. Presently, President Pakistan Philosophical Congress.

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Absar Ahmad: M. A. (Karachi University); M. Phil (Reading); Ph. D. (London). Chairman and Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab, Lahore. Taught at Makerere University, Uganda. His research was recognised in the UNESCO Report on *Teaching and Research in Philosophy* (Asia and Pacific) 1987. Member Board of Governors Qur'an College, Lahore. Honorary editor of monthly journal *Hikmat-e-Qur'an*. Read and published over thirty articles/conference papers in the areas of philosophy, Islamic thought and philosophical psychology.

- Principal works: *Self and Self-Identity in Contemporary Philosophy; Kant and Kierkegaard: A Comparative Study; Knowledge-Morality Nexus* (Ed.).

Manzoor Ahmad: Educated at the Universities of Karachi and London. Retired as Vice Chancellor, Hamdard University, Karachi. Has been Professor and Chairman Department of Philosophy; Dean Faculty of Arts, Karachi University; President of Pakistan Philosophical Congress. Senior Fulbright Scholar. Lectured in the Universities of Chicago, Columbia, Pittsburgh, California and Hawaii. Author of a number of articles published in journals of international repute.

- Principal Works: *Law and Morality* (Ed); *History of Philosophy* (Ed); *Khida-o-Khirad*.

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- Principal Works: *Greek Philosophy; A History of Modern Philosophy; Bergson's Philosophy; Iqbal's Concept of Immortality; Freud's Theory of Psychoanalysis*.

Muhammad Ajmal: Educated at Government College Lahore and London University. Formerly Head of the Department of Psychology and Principal Government College Lahore; Vice Chancellor, University of the Punjab, Lahore. Retired as Federal Secretary of Education. He was a practising Psycho-analyst. Author of a number of books and articles. Died in 1994.

Q. M Aslam.: Educated at Aligarh and Cambridge. Retired in the capacity of Chairman, Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab, Lahore. Previously he had been Professor and Chairman Department of Philosophy and Psychology, Government College, Lahore and then the Principal of the same college. His main areas of interest were Psychoanalysis and Religious Psychology. Died in 1981.

- Principal Works: "Muhammad: a Psychological Essay", *Confinia Psychiatrica* (Switzerland) 1968; "Psychoanalysis and Islam", *Psychology of the 20th Century* (Germany); "Religious Behaviour: Islamic Description", *Islamic Culture* (Hyderabad, India) 1934; "Religious Experiences of Muhammad", *Indian Journal of Psychology*, 1936; "Illusion of Depth in Colour-Perception" abstract in *Psychological Abstracts* (USA) 1950.

Waheed Ali Farooqi: M. A. (Karachi) and Ph. D. From Michigan State University, East Lansing. Post-doctoral fellow at Temple University, Philadelphia. Retired as Professor and Chairman Department of Philosophy University of Sind Jamshoro, Hyderabad. Has been the President of Pakistan Philosophical Congress and also its General President for the 24th session. Wrote several articles on numerous philosophical themes, especially on British Empiricism and Phenomenology. Presently working on a volume entitled *Boundaries of Human Reason* to be published jointly by the Princeton University Press and Longman and Todd, London.

Shahid Hussain: M. A. (Punjab) and M. A. (Lancaster, UK.) Professor and Head: Department of Philosophy Government College, Lahore since 1973.

- Principal Works: "Locke on Personal Identity", *Pakistan Philosophical Journal* (1972); "Hume on Religion", *Pakistan Philosophical Journal* (1973); Abstract of "Locke on Personal Identity", *The Philosophers Index*, Bowling Green University, USA, 1971; Abstract of "Hume on Religion", *The Philosophers Index*, Bowling Green University, USA, 1973.

Intisar-ul-Haq: M.A. (Punjab), Honours (London University), Ph. D. (Edinburgh). Holder of Post-doctoral Alexander von Humboldt Senior Fellowship, Germany, 1974-76, Senior Fulbright Fellowship, 1984-85. Retired as Professor and Chairman Department of Philosophy University of Peshawar. He is primarily interested in Logic, Philosophy of Logic and Analytical Philosophy.

- Principal Works: *A Critical Study of Logical Paradoxes, Percept and Object, Wittgenstein's Logical Mirror and Philosophy of Religion*. "Person and Personal Identity", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, USA, 1970; "Wittgenstein on Number", *International Philosophical Quarterly*, USA, 1978.

Javed Iqbal: M. A. Philosophy and English, Government College Lahore, Ph. D. Cambridge and Bar-at-Law Lincoln's Inn, London. Received Honorary Doctorates from Villanova University, USA and Seljuk University Konya, Turkey. Served as Judge, Lahore High Court (1971-82), Chief Justice Lahore High Court (1982-86), and as Judge, Supreme Court of Pakistan ((1986-89). Presently, elected member Senate of Pakistan. Has participated in more than twenty seven international conferences held in various parts of the world and contributed papers.

- Principal works: *Ideology of Pakistan; Legacy of Quaid-e-Azam; Mai Lala Fam* (collection of papers on Iqbal in Urdu); *Zinda Rud* (Urdu biography of Allama Muhammad Iqbal, in three volumes); *Pakistan and Islamic Liberal Movement*.

Kazi A Kadir.: M. A. (Karachi), Honours (London), Ph. D. (Karachi). Retired as Professor and Chairman Department of Philosophy, Karachi University. Also taught at the universities of Peshawar and Rajshahi. General President of the Pakistan Philosophical Congress for the 30th annual Session held in 1995.

- Principal Works: *Sartre and God, Education and Philosophy of Education, Introduction to Modern Logic, Principles of Writing and Researching and Dictionary of Philosophy*.

Abdul Hamid Kamali: Educated at Usmania University Hyderabad, India and Karachi University. Formerly Head: Department of Philosophy, S. M. College, Karachi and Deputy Director Iqbal Academy, Assistant Editor *Iqbal Review*.

- Principal Works: *Muslim Political Thought*; *Muslim Constitutionalism*; *Self and Social Experience*.

Ali Akhtar Kazmi: Educated at University of the Punjab, Lahore, Dalhousie University, Canada and Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Presently Associate Professor, The University of Calgary. Has taught at various Canadian universities such as the University of British Columbia, Simon Fraser University, McGill University, the University of Western Ontario, Carleton University. Referee for the *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *Linguistics & Philosophy Synthese* and *Dialogue*. His areas of specialisation are Philosophy of Logic; Philosophy of Language; Philosophy of Mind and Metaphysics.

- Principal Works: "Some Remarks on Indiscernibility", P. Hanson and Bruce Hunter, eds., *The A Priori Revisited: The Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supplementary Volume 18 (1992); "Indiscernibility" abstract in *Abstracts of the 9th International Congress of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science*, Volume 1; "Parthood and Persistence", D. Copp, ed., *Canadian Philosophers: The Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, Supplementary Volume 16 (1990); "Remarks on Information and Intentionality", P. Hanson, ed., *Vancouver Studies in Cognitive Science*, Volume 1: *Information, Language and Cognition*, Vancouver, BC; University of British Columbia Press; "Meaning and Propositional Attitudes", W. Bright, ed., *Oxford International Encyclopaedia of Linguistics*, OUP; Review of French, Vehling, Wettstein, eds., *Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy of Language* in *Canadian Journal of Linguistics* 27, no. 2 (1982).

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C. A Qadir: M. A. and D. Litt. from University of the Punjab, Lahore. Retired as Iqbal Professor and Chairman, Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab, Lahore. Was President Pakistan Philosophical Congress from 1976 to 1987. Wrote about 19 books and monographs in Urdu on Philosophy, Psychology, Sociology and Scientific Method. Died in 1987.

- Principal Works: *Logical Positivism*; *Philosophy and Science in the Islamic World*; *Islamic Philosophy of Life and its Significance*; "Pre-Islamic Indian Philosophy"; "Alexandrian Syriac Philosophy"; "The Dark Age of Islam"; "The Influence of Islam on the East"; *A History of Muslim Philosophy*, ed. by M. M. Sharif; "Contemporary Philosophy and Religion", *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 1965; "An Early Critic of Aristotelian Logic- Ibn Taimiyyah", *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 1968; "God and War", *Philosophy of War*, ed. by Professor Ginsberg.

Khawja Ghulam Sadiq: Retired as Chairman Board of Intermediate and Secondary Education, Lahore. Served the cause of education in various capacities such as Iqbal Professor and Chairman, Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab, Lahore, Chairman, Punjab Text Book Board, Lahore, Secretary, National Education Council and Vice Chancellor, University of Azad Jammu and Kashmir. His articles have been published as *Islam, Iqbal and Philosophy*. Died in 1984.

M. M Sharif: educated at M. A. O. College, Aligarh and Cambridge University. Was Professor and Chairman Department of Philosophy, Aligarh University, India. Later, Principal of

Islamia College, Lahore and Director, Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore. General President of the Indian Philosophical Congress in 1945. Represented Pakistan in the UNESCO sponsored South and South-East Asia Conference held in the USA in 1956; East-West Party Meeting held at Canberra, Australia; International Philosophical Conference held at Venice and Padua in 1958 and the East-West Philosophers' Conference held at Honolulu, Hawaii in 1959. Was a member of the American Philosophical Association (Pacific Division) and a Director of the International Federation of Philosophical Societies, Paris. Founder-Life-President of Pakistan Philosophical Congress. Died in 1965.

- Principal Works: *About Iqbal and His Thought, Studies in Aesthetics, Islamic and Educational Studies, Muslim Thought: Its Origin and Achievements, National Integration and Other Essays*, "Dialectical Monadism", *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* edited by S. Radhakrishnan, "Neo-Platonism", *History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western*, ed. by S. Radhakrishnan. Edited the monumental two-volume *A History of Muslim Philosophy*.

M. Saeed Sheikh: Educated at Muslim University, Aligarh, India. Retired as Director Institute of Islamic Culture, Lahore. Formerly, Professor and Head, Department of Philosophy, Government College, Lahore. One of his most commendable works is his annotated edition of Allama Muhammad Iqbal's *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*.

- Principal Works: *Studies in Muslim Philosophy; Dictionary of Muslim Philosophy* and *Studies in Iqbal's Art and Thought*(ed.).

B. H Siddiqui.: Educated at Aligarh Muslim University, India. Retired as Principal, Government College of Education, Lahore. Formerly, Director Punjab Textbook Board, Lahore; Director Libraries and Professor of Philosophy, Government College, Lahore. Presently, Visiting Professor, Department of Philosophy, University of the Punjab, Lahore.

- Principal Works: *Iqbal's Philosophy of Education*. Contributed articles on Ibn-e-Tufail, Nasir-al-Din Tusi and Jalal-al-Din Dawwani to *A History of Muslim Philosophy* edited by M. M. Sharif. "Miskawayh on the Purposes of Historiography", *The Muslim World*, Hartford Seminary, USA.

Appendix
Philosophical Activity in Pakistan: 1947-1961

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Philosophy in Pakistan

Introduction¹

With the carving out of Pakistan in 1947, the philosophers of the northwest and northeast areas of the sub-Himalayan peninsula found themselves severed from their colleagues in the new state of India, with whom they had, until then, been on good terms both in the universities and at the meetings of the Indian Philosophical Congress founded by Dr. S. RADHAKRISHNAN in 1925. It was only in 1954 that they were able to reconvene in a parallel association, namely, the Pakistan Philosophical Congress, formed by a committee of eminent figures presided over by the indefatigable Professor M. M. SHARIF. Its membership strength today is about 80. By its annual sessions, its publications, its suggestions to the government and universities, and its delegations to conferences held in foreign countries this organization has contributed to no small extent towards enlivening philosophical activity and re-establishing the importance accorded to philosophy in the country's universities (i.e., the universities of Karachi, Lahore, Hyderabad in Sind, Peshawar, Rajshahi, and Dacca).

Describing the situation in 1954, Prof. M. M. SHARIF noted the total absence of philosophical instruction in one of the five universities then in existence, as well as in numerous colleges, and the insufficiency of such instruction in the other universities and in a great number of colleges, even among those which are affiliated to universities in which the importance of philosophy is officially recognized (54.3).² Positive psychology and what goes under the name of the social

sciences were studied in but a few institutions. As far as historical research and the preparation of critical texts of the great works of the past were concerned, they were only individually pursued by investigators who had insufficient libraries at their disposal. This situation has been somewhat ameliorated but is still deplored, as is shown in the resolutions of the Congress in its session at Hyderabad (58.402).

Since 1954 the Pakistan Philosophical Congress has published regularly the proceedings of its annual sessions and has reprinted in separate volumes six of its symposia. Since 1957, it also publishes a quarterly, the *Pakistan Philosophical Journal*. Moreover, it has edited an excellent English translation of one of al-Ghazali's works, *Incoherence of the Philosophers*.³ This translation was begun at Aligarh under the patronage of Prof. Sharif, pursued and completed at the Institute of Islamic studies, McGill University, Montreal, and accepted by this university as the thesis for the licentiate before being finally published in Pakistan.

The Two Poles of Philosophical Reflection in Pakistan

The trait of international collaboration which I have just mentioned allows me to indicate a first important characteristic of the Pakistani philosophers: not only were they educated in English and through works, original or translated, available in this language, but many of them completed their formation in England, the United States, Canada, and to a smaller extent in Europe -- France especially and Germany. Having remained dependent on this first formation, they generally envisage their problems in terms often quite foreign to their own Muslim tradition. The philosophical positions around which they center their reflexions are those which have lately been in vogue, or are flourishing today among English speaking philosophers. If they happen to consider present-day problems, they generally do it in the same terms as American or British professors do. Moreover, American and British professors form the majority of the foreigners who visit Pakistani universities. Russian philosophers have attended several sessions of the Congress, but the Marxist prestige has seduced none of the professional philosophers of Pakistan, whose courtesy and catholic curiosity never overwhelm their deep-seated Muslim distrust of Marxism. Thus English influence even today remains preponderant. Their linguistic world is English and they commonly refer to but a few of the continental philosophers of Europe: Kant, Hegel, Bergson, Heidegger. . .

This situation may not trouble some of them who recall the noble words of Al-Kindi, quoted by Mr. Justice Hamoodur RAHMAN (60.2): "We should not be ashamed to acknowledge truth and assimilate it from whatever source it comes to us, from former generations or foreign people." But many are conscious of it as of a mixed blessing which limits them while sustaining them. Let us consider the statement of Honorable Nian Abdul RASHID, supreme judge of Pakistan. "We do not possess Western philosophy, we are possessed by it" (54.7). And he added: "We owe such acquaintance as we have with our own philosophers mostly to Western scholars, who bring to bear on them values and judgments grounded in their own intellectual heritage" (51.8). With less exaggeration, Prof. M.M. Sharif wished that his colleagues would retain their ties with the English culture of the past. He expressed his desire in these words: "We must borrow from the West whatever is best in its culture, but we must not repeat its mistakes" (54.4).

Dr. M. Hamid-ud-din faces the situation squarely when he asks the pertinent questions: Why even now this West-oriented approach to philosophy? Why has Eastern philosophy become for us a matter of history? The unsavory answer is, he says, that having touched great heights of intellectual achievement, our great forefathers left no scope for their successors. The materials of philosophy, the facts which constitute the challenge for philosophizing, were so thoroughly treated

by them that nothing was left for anybody who came after them. In the West, on the contrary, with power-technology renewing this material of facts, men started getting involved with life and the universe more deeply than they could with only the non-power technology of previous ages. This new power-technology pushed them into doing first-rate thinking at breakneck speed. Thus philosophy in the East came to a dead end because it did not get the material of philosophy which could nourish it and keep it alive. But philosophy in the West is now heading for a similar fate because, having involved itself in the so-called perennial problems, it has lost touch with sources which could constantly feed it with fresh nourishing material. To remedy this double disease of inanition, Dr. Hamid-ud-din proposes the perhaps utopian remedy of an international conference of philosophers which would set itself the task of systematically eliminating all unfruitful philosophical problems and of planning a programme of research unanimously accepted and feasible (60.9-94).

The facts, however, do not completely countenance the diagnostic of Dr. Hamid-ud-din. The influence of Islam still commands more than does that of the West the allegiance and the fundamental choices of the majority of Pakistani philosophers. Together with their few Christian and Hindu colleagues, they are animated by a religious faith. Doubtlessly, this faith varies in orthodoxy and intensity. Their convictions are very often contaminated with modernism and a few are reacting vehemently against their traditional religion, but the belief in only one God, in the immortality of the human soul, in the absolute importance of this life for eternal salvation, in the brotherhood of all men, in the divine mission of the prophets, in the morals of the Quran, social as well as individual, determines the philosophical tenets of the majority of them, as we shall see in due time.

We must here stress the enduring influence of the writings of the poet-philosopher, Muhammad IQBAL (1873-1938), and especially of his most important book, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, which was translated into several languages and continues to be republished. In his formulation of the new Muslim humanism, he was influenced by Sufism and, philosophically, by Bergson and to some extent by Nietzsche and the American Pragmatists. He placed on a pedestal the formula which makes man *vicegerent of God on earth*, a formula which recalls the Perfect Man (*Insam al-kamil*) of the Sufis. One of his translators, R. A. Nicholson, has aptly expressed the essentials of this conception:

The vicegerent of God is the completest Ego, the goal of humanity, the acme of life both in mind and body; in him the discord of our mental life becomes a harmony. The highest power is united in him with the highest knowledge. In his life, thought and action, instinct and reason, become one. He is the last fruit of the tree of humanity, and all the trials of a painful evolution are justified because he is to come at the end. He is the real ruler of mankind; his kingdom is the kingdom of God on earth. Out of the richness of his nature he lavishes the wealth of life on others, and brings them nearer and nearer to himself. The more we advance in evolution, the nearer we get to him. In approaching him we are raising ourselves in the scale of life. The development of humanity both in mind and body is a condition precedent to his birth. For the present he is a mere ideal; but the evolution of humanity is tending towards the production of an ideal race of more or less unique individuals who will become his fitting parents. Thus the Kingdom of God on earth means the democracy of more or less unique individuals, presided over by the most unique individual possible on this earth. Nietzsche had a glimpse of this ideal race, but his atheism and aristocratic prejudices marred his whole conception.⁴

'Tis sweet to be God's vicegerent in the world,
 And exercise sway over the elements.
 God's vicegerent is as the soul of the universe,
 His being is the shadow of the Greatest Name.
 He knows the mysteries of part and whole,
 He executes the command of Allah in the world . . .
 His genius abounds with life and desires to manifest itself:
 He will bring another world into existence.⁵

Iqbal has thus proposed an ideal with a Messianic tinge. He sees in man the noble creature of God, with unlimited possibilities of development in the direction of a greater physical and especially spiritual potential. Man completes creation. Mechanical causality does not bind him, it is his instrument.

God said, 'The world so lies, and say not otherwise';
 Said Adam, 'So I see; but THUS it ought to be!'⁶

This creativism ignores original sin and redemption. Iqbal is assured of the dynamic value of human nature considered integrally as a unit of thought, of will, and of free choice, which can answer to the divine commandment by faith, prayer, generous action, and the effective love of all men. The unique value of the human self is beyond doubt and it is from this vantage point that we must understand and transform the world. The self transcends space and time; it outlasts all changes. Highly probable in philosophy, and certain in faith, the immortality of the soul is perhaps possible for the perfect man only, but it is up to us to become perfect through our moral endeavor answering the grace of God.

Miss K. ISMAIL (59.194-197) and Mr. Taj Ali QURESHI (60.329) have treated briefly Iqbal's conception of the human self. More important is the doctoral dissertation of Fr. Augustine FERNANDEZ, O.F.M., on the philosophy of Iqbal, an abstract of which has been published.⁷ It provides a valuable account together with a critical appreciation of Iqbal's Islamic humanism. I may also mention that Dr. Momtazuddin AHMED'S presidential address during the 1961 session of the Congress at Karachi was inspired by Iqbal's philosophy, and that there exists in Karachi an Iqbal Academy of which Mr. M. RAFIUDDIN is Director.

Many are captivated by this modern prophet, who is so faithful in essence to the doctrines of the Quran. As to the fact that he is also inspired by recent philosophies, nobody reproaches him because everyone knows that Muslim tradition is far from being purely prophetic. Islam very soon encountered Greek philosophy -- the Pakistani Aflatun (Plato) and Arastu (Aristotle) are not rare -- and this encounter between revelation and philosophical reflexion has posed problems which are still very real today. But before listening to what the Pakistani philosophers have to tell us on this subject, we must consider what they think about the nature of philosophy itself.

The Nature of Philosophy

They generally agree in recognizing its universality and its distinction from the positive sciences. However, in their efforts to characterize it, they proceed from suggestions and partial descriptions rather than from precise definitions.

Mr. Justice Amin AHMAD approaches philosophy from the judiciary angle and stresses that ". . . in its purely logical aspect, philosophy is no other than cool judicial temper applied to the sphere of thoughts and ideas, to the hopes and aspirations of man since his troubled history began" (57. xxiii).

The definition proposed by Mr. A. K. BROHI is broader and refers to the repercussion of thought upon action. "Philosophy," he tells us, "is an unusually resolute attempt to think clearly about man's total environment in order that correct action could be designed" (57.4). "Revealed Religion," he continues, ". . . was calculated to furnish a guidance to man at a time when his capacity for rational thought had not yet fully evolved" (57.4). "The age of revelation has been followed by the age of realization" (57.5). This supposes that man can trust his intellect, and it is altogether correct because he who denies this postulate *ipso facto* trusts his intellect at least to the point of accepting the validity of the intellectual act involved in his negation. Therefore, the anti-intellectual objection is always an act of suicide since it denies what it proposes (57.13). Kantian Skepticism is doubtlessly valid on the purely conceptual level where it stays (57.7), but the philosophical effort tends to become experience by the concentration of consciousness and the aspiration which brings it to the term of its desire, and thus transcends the Kantian objection (57.16). From then on metaphysics changes its nature; it is no longer only a reflexion concerning the universe, but becomes ". . . hardly distinguishable from the direct participation in, and perception of, that world" (57.18). This change which elevates man to wisdom does not result from a necessary biological evolution but from freedom which characterizes spiritual evolution (57.20).

Diwan Muhammad AZRAF equally rejects skepticism as a psychological impossibility. The methodic doubt itself, he assures us, is a postulate which rests on the belief in my capacity to know. It is the postulate of the philosophical question itself. The intellect testifies to the continued unity and universality of consciousness (55.167-174).

Dr. Govinda Chandra DEV, a Hindu, also recalls to our attention the impossibility of consciousness' doubting its own objective capacity. It is by passing from ascertained facts to the necessary conditions of their possibility that philosophy erects itself. This process, called *arth patti* by Indian logicians, is decisive in Aristotle, Sankara, Ghazali, and Thomas Aquinas along with Kant, Hegel, Bradley, etc. (56.38-39). But to attain completion philosophy must accept, beyond the evidence of sense intuition and of reason, the ultra-logical intuitions of the religious consciousness, of which awareness the Vedic tradition appears to give the essential under the form of a conviction of the radical identity of all beings. It is the very movement of thought toward a complete accord with itself which requires this synthesis of the senses, of reason, and of religious intuition that constitutes the whole of philosophy (56.39-40). Moreover, a welcome marriage of philosophy and the sciences, which would unite them intimately while respecting their differences, is the hoped for prolongation of this synthesis. The universal love which philosophy engenders ought to perfect itself through the unlimited potentiality that the sciences are now procuring for man (56.35). This open and sympathetic doctrine obviously affiliates itself with the theses of modern Hinduism, such as one finds them in a Vivekananda, a Radhakrishnan, and an Aurobindo. Dr. Dev has set them in relief on a brightly colored historical background in two important books to which our readers may direct themselves.⁸

More critical, Mr. Athar RASHID notes at the outset that philosophy differs from the positive sciences as well by its object as by its method. The strict sciences are subordinated to it because they depend upon philosophy in order to validate their own possibility and their basic postulates, and to evaluate the truths they discover. Nevertheless, the function of philosophy is not, as some people claim, to coordinate and integrate in one whole the results of these diverse sciences. Taking

up the problem from Aristotle and displaying an exceptional knowledge of Western tradition right up to its recent representatives in France and Germany, he reaffirms that the universality and primacy of metaphysics stem from its formal objects that is to say, from the concept of being according to which it considers all beings. He further develops this classical position according to Heidegger's distinctions, which he grasps well but which he exposes without any special originality (55.33-49).

Others, in great numbers, remain embarrassed by the conclusions of the Kantian critique. Many also are intimidated by the discrediting of metaphysics which the English neo-Positivists indulged in, especially since these attacks were particularly aggressive during the years of their formation.

Accordingly, Prof. Qazi M. ASLAM, for instance, does not object against reducing philosophy to a critique of the foundations of the other sciences (54.109). Prof. M. M. SHARIF tells us rather vaguely that philosophy is the study of those problems which do not fall under the jurisdiction of the other sciences (54.3) and, more positively, that it is a disinterested and not pragmatic study of values. Mr. AJMAL and Prof. Abdul QADIR profess a type of Logical Positivism which originated in Cambridge. Prof. Qadir, in the course of an excellent exposé of this doctrine, affirms without hesitation that the reduction of all significative propositions to the two categories, first, of empirically verifiable assertions, and secondly, of tautologies or analytical assertions, has arrived at this very important consequence "that it has demonstrated once for all and that too on logical grounds the impossibility of deductive metaphysics" (56.77).

In general, however, the rejection (already historical) of metaphysics by the Cambridge philosophers has found few adherents among the Pakistanis. The latter react against it not only with a type of good common sense, but also with a criticism which is at times very sharp. Thus, for instance, Mr. Syed M. TAQI attacks with vigor and pertinent arguments the foundations of Russell's philosophy and discovers a certain unaccountable ignorance -- especially in the matter of history and of exegesis of texts -- together with contradictions in the carrying out of his criticism of formal logic and, in particular, of the syllogism (55.119-128). Mr. S. Z. CHOUDHURI has exposed other deficiencies of positivism: its naiveness when it demands definitions of the same type for all possible realities; its rationalism approaching pragmatism when it chooses as its theory for truth a univocal correspondence, the hasty generalization which leads it to reduce all inductions to merely probable propositions, its ignorance of the ego as a personal subject and of the active aspect of understanding, its Don Quixotic attitude which leads it to label with the name 'religion' and 'metaphysics' imagined monstrosities which correspond only remotely to religion as it is lived and to real metaphysics (55.90-96).

Others at the Congress have also reacted against the positivist position in a paper entitled "Is Philosophy Worth Studying?" Mrs. Akhtar IMAM has tried to answer the many criticisms leveled against the study of philosophy. First of all she mentions that refined happiness which can be found only in the search for truth and in the contemplation of reality. This affects only the best minds, but philosophy has also an important indirect influence on mankind as a whole. This influence of philosophy on mankind is very conspicuous in the political field and in the development of civilizations. The development of science which marks our present civilization needs to be supplemented by philosophy in order to ascertain its principles and basic concepts and in order to infuse wisdom into the minds of those who are to make the decisions in the use of scientific discoveries. Philosophy is more radically critical than the particular sciences; the realm of its enquiry is all-inclusive; the scope of its problems is more existential and the answers it provides are of decisive importance for man's decent survival in this scientific age (59.21-27).

In a spirited but not very substantial "Defence of Philosophy" Mr. S. Islam CHAUDHRY showed that skepticism can never be final and presented philosophy as a sort of "frontier" which ever remains open to our exploration and conquest for it is "the attempt to deal with the whole and with our experience as a whole" (61.)

We can conclude this section with the remarks of Dr. Khalifa Abdul HAKIM. Philosophy, he tells us, studies the postulates of the other sciences and coordinates their results, but its investigation also bears upon certain fundamental problems never entirely solved. Especially does it maintain a sense of unity, a sense of the universe, and realizes little by little the cultural unity of man. Unlike religion, philosophy must portray neither dogmatism nor narrowness of spirit. Without falling into academicism, it ought to keep itself above partisan choices and national ideologies. Philosophy guides, it warns, and its strength comes from its independence. Turned over to the theologians only, the human spirit would find itself fossilized; turned over to positive science only, it would turn to fragments. Philosophy is there to render possible a synoptic vision of life. Faith is not in itself a stumbling block for philosophy; but it can stagnate, and that is what has happened to the Moslem faith (54.9-24).

The Relationships between Reason and Faith; the Existence of God

Whenever the Pakistani philosophers discuss the relations between reason and faith or between philosophy and religion, the divergence of their views is apparently as marked as when they discuss the nature of philosophy. In the published documents, the critics of faith predominate. However, the majority of them are believers whom the Muslim faith inspires. Many passing phrases in other discussions betray this adherence.

Mr. Diwan Muhammad AZRAF has exposed his views on the relationship existing between reason and faith in a communication with the rather misleading title: "Philosophy of Religion." A more accurate title would be "Philosophy and Religion" since he has tackled the rather difficult task of distinguishing the two. Both, he says, have their origin in some sort of doubt as to the nature of the experienced, and in the attempt to determine the truth of different views about reality. That doubt is coupled with a belief in the capacity of man to know truth, and that attempt is a search for a unitary principle. Kant has shown that the idea of God as the unitive principle of experience is inescapable, even though he could not ascertain its objectivity through his *Critique of Pure Reason*. This tendency to reduce all the facts of experience to a unitary principle still persists. With the exception of William James all the philosophers of our age show this inclination in varying degrees. In religious circles we find a similar tendency. Even polytheism is usually henotheism of some sort.

But religion and philosophy differ with regard to their methods and attitudes. In religion, especially revealed religion, there is a strong tendency to extol intuition at the cost of intellection; truths are accepted on the authority of the individual whose intuitions are taken as infallible. In philosophy, on the other hand, stress has been alternately laid on the exercise of the senses or reason in order to attain the knowledge of Ultimate Reality. The controversy for the supremacy of either reason or the senses in philosophy has rightly been characterized by Bergson as an admission of the predominance of the intellect. But he has pointed out that the nature of the universe is such that it can only be grasped through intuition. Yet it cannot be overlooked that the evaluation of intuition cannot be done by intuition itself and that knowledge attained through intuitions is to be tested by the intellect in spite of the latter's being deprecated as a method. Philosophy, therefore, has to rely on the intellect for arriving at the truth.

Besides this, there is a difference between the attitude of religion and that of philosophy towards reality. In philosophy the emphasis is on knowing. In religion, on the other hand, there is a feeling of dependence on the Ultimate Reality who is looked upon as the source of all that is. This feeling of dependence is present in all religions despite the fact that they differ in other respects. It is perhaps due to this feeling of dependence that religion imposes laws and builds up institutions so that people may be able to satisfy their spiritual yearning. In philosophy there is no such conscious effort. Religions are democratic in their appeal and institutions in their practical shape, while philosophy is aristocratic in its appeal and seldom affects the practical life of the common man. Marxism may apparently be viewed as an exception to this rule. But Marxism is not a philosophy in the strict sense of the term. It is a combination of philosophy and economics informed and permeated by a spirit of prophecy and a promise of a future Blessed Kingdom (though not of the Spirit) like that of religion. The sense of dependence on the Absolute is present in Marxists and they show the same sentiment and emotion for it which is found amongst the orthodox in religions, although the Absolute to which they pay homage is interpreted materially.

Historically religion preceded philosophy. But while philosophic thought developed from the ideas of religion through reflection and criticism, religion as a practical phase in man's life never ceased and its hold on the non-intellectual strata of society always persisted. The linear theory of Auguste Comte cannot stand the test of historical evidence. No hard and fast line of demarcation can be drawn between the theological, metaphysical and positive stages in human civilization. All that can be said in favor of his contention is that the centre of interest varies from age to age amongst the thinkers.

The modern tendency was at first to discover the meaning of existence in terms of the intellect. Naturally, therefore, religious ideas were relegated to the background. The recent tendency, however, in some quarters is to accept religious experiences as data for thought. Others, such as Russell, condemn this tendency as a sort of romanticism. Supporters of religion oppose both these points of view. They do not accept Russell's view of this as romanticism; yet they are equally opposed to placing religious experiences on a par with other experiences. To them, religious experiences have a value superior to that of other experiences; accordingly, they must be assigned a unique status in philosophy.

The criterion of certitude in religious consciousness is a harmony not to be found at the ordinary level of consciousness. It is sought in an immediate experience which comprises all the varieties of the universe in its all-inclusive whole. This harmony is also sought in philosophy through intellectual or supra-intellectual methods in which contradictions are transformed and sublated. The attitude towards this harmony in religion is one of reverence and devotion whereas in philosophy it is *par excellence* an attitude of knowledge for its own sake.

Viewed from the standpoint of philosophy, religion may, therefore, be characterized as reverent philosophy and philosophy as irreverent religion. They can, however, have a meeting ground if we can find a source of knowledge in which thought as such can be divested of its relational character and in which intuition as a method is universalized and our attitude towards knowledge is changed from that of simple interest in knowledge for its own sake to the attitude of deep reverence manifested by a devoted soul. The possibility of such knowledge cannot be ruled out. Let us, therefore, hope that in the days yet to come man will set wings to his feet and succeed in attaining it (59. 36-49).

Dr. K.M. JAMIL, on the other hand, has emphasized rather the continuity of philosophy and religion and the interactions which profitably bind one to the other. He stresses that language is analogical and therefore basically inadequate. Since philosophy cannot move except within the boundaries of language, it suffers limitations. It is religion, and especially mystical experience, which accomplishes the project of philosophy. The rich efflorescence of scholasticism, both Christian and Mohammedan, proves conclusively that human reason can scientifically assimilate a supra-rational testimony and find in it its own completion. James and Bergson have reintroduced mystical experience into the temple of philosophy. Today's philosopher should pursue his efforts critically but with the determination to understand the riches of faith. *Credo ut intelligam*. Possibly philosophy would fail in its attempt to achieve this mystical unity with God since: "After a long struggle, Al-Farabi expected to achieve this until the last moment of his life, but he could not. In the end he cried out: 'All is vain.'" Averroes relates this and, although he was far from being perfectly orthodox, he concludes: "But this disappointment is not the proof that it is not possible. It only proves that Farabi was not one of those who had been favored by Divine Grace" (57.55).

The conceptual metaphysics can at most strengthen or lead to a correct belief but beyond that there are realities wherein our metaphysics is blind and the language that is used there has its own grammar and logic. That is what we should call a metametaphysics -- a philosophy that goes beyond Aristotle's *Proté Philosophia*. A philosopher must have courage enough to penetrate into such a domain and have his investigations there (57.59).

Plotinus has shown us the way but, as Bergson said about Plotinus:

It was granted to him to look upon the promised land, but not to set foot upon its soil. He went as far as ecstasy, a state in which the soul feels itself, or thinks it feels itself, in the presence of God, being irradiated with His light; he did not get beyond this last stage, he did not reach the point where, as contemplation is engulfed in action, the human will becomes one with the divine will.⁹

It is this point that the Christian mystics and Muslim sufis have reached and it is their experience that we must scrutinize if we want our philosophy to complete itself by tending beyond its own limits.

The supernatural might not be very far from the natural. It could be in us, in our faculties, and in the world we live in; though it has been pointed out that it is found in its true sublimity and grandeur in a realm which is not open to all (57.62).

But an inquisitive mind will never be satisfied if you ask it to restrict its activity to logical analysis of language, or clarification of definitions or some such work. Philosophy must remain a search for the truth and take cognisance of the fact that some of the questions that puzzle our mind are those that concern us most intimately. The desire to know the nature of the universe, its stuff or material, its creator or God, its purpose, its relation to man and his destiny, is very natural to us. No amount of philosophizing would prove that we do not know or are not clear about what we would like to know (57.63-64).

Mr. Tufail A. QURESHI re-echoes all these views of Dr. K.M. Jamil. I should like to quote him at great length since his address (58.317-326) abounds in pertinent judgments and auspicious

formulas on mysticism and the social influence of mystics, but the time has come to pass on to complementary or divergent opinions.

Dr. Athar RASHID begins by reminding us that the controversy between reason and faith imposed itself upon philosophers only with the coming of Christianity, and that Christian thinkers -- an Augustine, a Thomas Aquinas -- saw no conflict between reason and faith, which, according to them, complement one another. The difficulties arose only later, after the Reformation. It was then only that the synthesis split into rationalism and fideism. We unfortunately inherit this division (57.95-98).

There are doubtlessly beliefs which cannot be scientifically substantiated. Those beliefs, however, which spring either from immediate experience, or from the experiences of genuine mystics, or from divine revelation, propose themselves to reason as a complement although they do not depend on it. With regard to these the competence of reason is total and its effort at critical justification is legitimate. There is apparently an antinomy between the dogmatism which is congenial to religious faith and the dynamic progressivism of rational activity. The philosopher ought to remain faithful to his vocation and, without ever rejecting faith, he ought to subject it to the judgment of reason (57.99-100).

Let us come now to views dependent on the Kantian critique. Mr. M. M. AHMAD maintains with Berkeley that there is a universal spirit which keeps unified in consciousness the objects and events of this world (*Pakistan Philosophical Journal*, II, 1, p. 3), and repeats Kant's idea that there must be a permanent consciousness preceding the changing consciousness. *Thea priori* which command the determinations of changing consciousness find their own reduction in the unity of the eternal consciousness (*ibid.*, p. 5). Since the manifold proceeds from it, it is also from this unique conSCIOusness that we must await the full light. "For the knowledge of destiny and the ordering of life therefore one has to depend on revelation and it is in the light of revelation that things are rightly apprehended and proper value is set on them" (*ibid.*, p. 6). But the nature of the revelation Mr. Ahmed refers to remains very ambiguous.

Mr. S. Z. CHOUDHURI likewise vaguely refers to faith as a "trust in what is presented to us by our highest thought, deepest emotion, and noblest will" (57.115). Furthermore, he maintains that "Reason is faith in the making," and that "faith is reason par excellence" (*ibid.*) "Hence reason is not the antithesis of faith, rather reason finds its normal fulfillment and culmination in faith." For "faith is a unique synthesis of thought, emotion and will at their best." However, "although faith of the highest order is capable of being analyzed, the analysis cannot be stretched to its logical limit. There is a supreme moment in faith which it is well-nigh impossible to communicate" (57.116). However, this is normal in virtue of the continuity between reason and faith which are "twin aspects of the same reality, i.e., the mind" (*ibid.*) One feels that such views originate in Heidelberg rather than Mecca.

Mr. A. KARIM also limits his exposition to the relations existing between reason and faith in the order of our purely natural knowledge according to Kant. Hegel, Croce, Bergson, Otto, and Bradley, and proposes views resembling closely those of Mr. Choudhuri (57.347).

Mr. Kazim-ud-din AHMAD means by 'reason' what Kant calls discursive understanding, excluding higher reason or *Vernunft*, which he would rather translate as 'intuition.' By faith, he means religious faith, that is, "a belief in the existence of God and other entities of an order of reality other than the natural" (57.109). He thus reduces the discussion of reason and faith to this question: "Can the existence of a personal God be proved logically?" His answer is in the negative; he rejects this possibility, without, in spite of that, denying that God can exist. To justify his negation, he reduces the various possible proofs to three types: the mathematical demonstration

which "alone gives certain truth" (*ibid.*); the intellectualization of the inductive sciences, which aim at verifying an hypothesis without ever being able to attain absolute certainty but only probability to a higher or lower degree; and rationalization, which "consists in inventing arguments in order to support a pre-existing conviction. Thus the conclusion is prior to the argument, and not its result. This is no proof at all" (57.110). Too sure, no doubt, of the validity of his division, he immediately proceeds to group under it the classical 'proofs' of the existence of God. He finds no place for them other than in the third category, which arrangement *ipso facto* places them outside the order of proofs (*ibid.*) Is it not possible, however, to prove the existence of God by basing oneself on the testimony of the mystics ? That would be possible if the experience of the mystics could be called 'knowledge,' but wherever the object cannot be distinguished from the subject we can no longer speak of knowledge, since nothing objective is revealed. Having thus easily disposed of mystical experience which he misapprehends, he rejects the pretensions of the intuitionists stating that, psychologically, an intuition is "just a conviction of which the causes are not known," and that neither Sankara, Plato, nor Hegel proved the first premise of their philosophy (57.112). Our convictions are contingent and do not bear with them their evidence. Our conviction, for example, that the highest value ought also to be the highest reality has but a pragmatic and subjective value (57.113). "Nobody knows God, but only the philosopher knows that he does not know" (57.114).

Perhaps an excessively literal disciple of the Cambridge philosophers, Mr. C.A. QADIR, already mentioned in the preceding section, analyses certain objects of belief and shows their origin to be in linguistic obsessions and deceitful expressions. If, he says, according to Kant himself, the 'Thing-in-itself' can give rise to contradictory affirmations, it obviously has no rational meaning and can only be the object of pseudo-questions. However, pseudo-questions can only receive pseudo-answers, that is, they are absurd. The 'Thing-in-itself' has thus no right to evoke faith (57.103-104).

As far as the question about God is concerned, Mr. Qadir restricts himself to refuting Fr. Copleston, who maintains that it is possible to have about God a discourse which does not possess merely emotional, persuasive, or prescriptive value, but which is strictly meaningful. Copleston explains that the propositions concerning God are not entirely anthropomorphic but intrinsically analogical. We must distinguish between the objective and subjective meaning of the terms which must be purified and elevated to the eminence demanded by the prescriptions of the theory of various meanings: univocal, purely equivocal, and equivocal *secundum quid*, that is, analogical. To discern which one of these meanings applies depends on the indications of the context. Mr. Qadir rejects without ado this distinction as impossible, and considers all theological language as anthropomorphic or absurd (57.106).

He also attacks Jasper's 'philosophical faith' conceived as a leap which, under the pressure of his limiting situations, man takes beyond conceptual knowledge and towards transcendence. For Qadir, every consideration of this kind is futile (57.107-108).

To Mr. M.X. RUB, a beginner in philosophy, it appears equally prudent to reduce the idea of God to a pure creation of fancy, which has perhaps contributed to the growth of our civilization, but which has caused more harm than benefit (57.352).

Mr. Mazher-ud-din SIDDIQI reduces the discussion about God to an antithesis between idealism (Plato, Berkeley, Bradley) and realism: (James, Russell). From this vantage point he has no difficulty in indicating the exaggerations of both tendencies and in showing that we cannot reduce reality to a monist Absolute, or to an absolute pluralism of individuals. Likewise, he states, "It is clear therefore that neither a completely transcendent God nor a purely immanent one offers

the solution of the theistic difficulty. In fact, transcendence and immanence involve each other (67.331). He seems to understand this implication in the sense in which Whitehead takes it, for whom God must necessarily be conceived as a creator essentially related to creatures. This conception does not admit a creative act (cf. 57.330). It follows from this that the realistic conception of the world as independent of and opposed to, the spirit is as untenable as the idealistic thesis, according to which only the spirit exists and prescribes the laws of knowledge without reference to an already existing world. Leibniz's Monadology is perhaps the only outlet from this difficulty, with, however, the reservation that the monads are not windowless but that each one shares the life of all the others be it only to an infinitesimal degree (57.331).

The duality of the described positions is due partly to the fact that the question was the subject of a symposium which normally implies exposes pro and con. It is certain that the number of those for whom religious faith retains also a rational value is greater than it appears to be in the accessible publications. It is also certain, nevertheless, that this faith is undermined in many cases because of their excessively exclusive familiarity with philosophies of the modern age which were often skeptical or hardly apt to confirm faith. While it is already waning in Europe, atheistic humanism is here making fresh conquests. It is further certain that despite the repugnance of many, it is difficult for them to resist the attack levelled against metaphysics by the neo-positivists and their successors, at least until about 1950. This recent trend has the vigor of novelty. It has hardly been filtered, criticized, limited to its valuable elements only. It is in fashion and even philosophers resist with difficulty the attraction of novelty.

Before ending this section, we must refer to a remarkable article by Mr. M. Saeed SHEIKH on a related topic, philosophy of religion. He defines it as the application of philosophy to religious facts. Philosophy of religion since Hegel realizes that the term 'religious' designates a fundamental, distinct type of human experience, a type open to philosophical investigation. Hegel, however, ignored an essential principle of this philosophy as we understand it today, namely, "that the facts and experiences of religion are to be interpreted and evaluated primarily with reference to their own field and only secondarily from the point of view of any general philosophy" (58.38). This very principle was also ignored by such philosophers as Royce, Bosanquet, Pringle-Pattison, Jones, and Webb, who attempted to reduce these facts to their idealistic philosophy. Following W. Vatke, who insisted in the last century on the *sui generis* character of religious facts, and on the necessity of an empirical inquiry, free of prejudices, such philosophers as O. Pfleiderer, C. B. Punjer, G. Teichmüller, H. Siebeck, A. Sabatier, etc., have fortunately made progress in this direction.

Natural theology can supply an hypothesis (God) explaining the religious facts, but these facts must nevertheless be clarified and evaluated independently of the hypothesis. Certain empiricist theologians insist almost entirely on moral experience which is, however, not identical with religious experience. Others, such as Schleiermacher, adhere to their individual religious experience, which may be too partial and too greatly dependent upon their own religious and even philosophical affiliation. But to be adequate, philosophy of religion must essentially be a reflexion upon religion in history, that is, upon all religions. The Quran recognizes this universality of religion when it states that no people has been left without prophet (35/24; 10/47; 4/164), and that the believer should receive all the messengers of Allah (2/4; 2/136; etc.) without distinction between any of them (4/150).

The phenomenology of religion has accumulated an enormous wealth of information, which should provide us with an empirical base. The psychological study of the religious consciousness ought to be completed by a historical study of the religious facts, but both are but preparatory

stages. The critical evaluation and profound explanation are not within the province of the history or psychology of religion since their function is purely descriptive.

The author then makes the point that "the description of valuations without evaluations requires a subtle kind of objective subjectivity" (58.44). It does not at all require that we be irreligious; on the contrary, it demands a sympathetic understanding and even some kind of participation in religious life. A lived commitment to religion is preferable to detached contemplation. And among the degrees of commitment, that one is preferable in which "the philosopher or scientist of religion lives the life he contemplates on the highest level of his own religious tradition" (58.45). The personal contact with adherents of at least one of the other religious traditions appears to be equally necessary. The absence of such a real or at least sympathetic participation accounts for the weakness of the majority of published works in this domain. The limited viewpoints of behaviorism, or of more or less Freudian psychoanalysis, along with that of "primitivism," are altogether inadequate.

What we must study is the religious experience expressed in myths, in the lives of the saints, the accounts of mystics, etc., and even in legends. We cannot bypass these doctrinal or religious experiences although we are aware that the reality of religious experience transcends them. Further, the resemblances among religions are important, but attention to differences is also essential.

Our task as philosophers of religion is "to interpret and evaluate this infinitely complicated system of arranged facts and experiences and we have to face the question how far the religious conceptions of mankind correspond to truth" (58.49). We can, apparently, be guided by history which rises from the particular to the universal, and manifests a process of self-criticism in the domain of religion. A spiritual conception of God has succeeded naively materialistic views; a moral idealism, purely ritualistic and often immoral practices; a universal religion, purely tribal or national outlooks. It is by the superior that we must understand the inferior, and not *vice versa*. We must recognize authentic experience beyond the doctrinal formulations. The more we understand the fundamental truth of our own religion, the more our differences from other religions diminish. This is what the purely pragmatic study does not attain.

Religion means to be true as well as effective and effective because true, for it assumes an inseparability of value and existence or of the axiological and the logical. Merely pragmatic and operational notions of truth may work in science but in religion truth to be true must be true altogether. The religious consciousness in its highest development claims to be in an intimate sense *rapport* with the ultimate nature of things. Hence religion more than anything else is a perpetual challenge to philosophy, compelling it to investigate its claims to be a valid interpretation of truth and reality and to examine its assumptions. The Philosophy of Religion is the response of philosophy to this challenge (58.51).

As an example of philosophical reflection upon one's own religion, I shall now acquaint the reader with the paper of Dr. Richard C. RUDER, entitled "The Triune Man." Man, says Dr. Ruder, is characterized by a threefold relationship: first, to self; then, to others; and, thirdly, to the world of abstractions or ideas, that is, to the symbols of thought. Hence, he has "self-awareness," "other-awareness," and "understanding-awareness." The ordinary man exercises all these three awarenesses in turn. But it is possible to concentrate on either of the three exclusive of the other two. When successful this concentration terminates in an "ecstasy," which may be called mystical.

Thus there are three forms of ecstatic mysticism, characterized as absorption in self, or in the other, or in the abstract.

Ecstatic mysticism often results in highly creative activity, but it easily carries with it a denial of those relationships which its very movement tries to exclude. Hence, it can alienate man from his complete self and such estrangement often results in inner conflicts, which can further give rise to social conflicts. Christianity obviates such dangers through its revelation of the personal trinity of the One God. It is maintained by Dr. Ruder that the person of God the Father expresses the particular Lordship of God over those areas of life where other-awareness is greater. In prayer the Christian prays to the Father. The person of the Holy Spirit expresses the Lordship of God over the inner structures of man's self-awareness. The Christian prays in the power of the Holy Spirit. The person of the Son, incarnated in Christ, expresses the Lordship of God over our understanding-awareness, since He is the Revealer, the Mediator, the principle of unity of all men under God as the Head of the Church which is His Mystical Body. When Christians pray, they pray through the Son.

It must be clearly pointed out that it is One God who is revealed as Trinity of Persons, and that God is not identified with man but stands over him as Lord. It follows then that the fundamental importance of the doctrine of the Trinity is to insure that the One God is brought into relationship with all the activities of man, and that His Lordship over man is explicitly guaranteed through worship of God in His Trinitarian revelation.

Again, it is here claimed that there are three types of Christian heresy. Heresy is witnessing to a truth but to a partial truth, exclusive of the rest of revealed truth. The first type of heresy may be called a God-the-Father heresy. It witnesses only to the otherness of God. Deism is of this type. A second might be called a God-the-Spirit heresy. It witnesses to God only as the supreme Self of man. Pentecostalism is an example of this second type of heresy. The third which be called a God-the-Son heresy, where reason, thought and understanding are considered to be of exclusive importance. Gnosticism is a good example of this type.

Christianity is a social religion; its doctrine must hold for all men, represent all men, and bring all men under the lordship of God. The Deist, the Pentecostal and the Gnostic stand apart; the more strongly they hold their beliefs true though they may be, the further apart they stand. The Church can only witness to the fullness of the divine revelation. Therefore, while it can make use of the dynamic power of mystical experience in individual persons, it cannot identify it as being a valid and direct experience of God. At the most it can consider it to be only an experience of God which must be placed alongside of the fuller revelation. Thus in Christian understanding it is considered to be a special grace but it is not an end in itself (59.252-265).

Mystical experience was further considered by Mr. Hafizur *RAHMAN* and analyzed from a philosophical and psychological standpoint. Besides the four notes mentioned by W. James, namely, ineffability, noetic quality, transiency, and passivity, we should add four more traits, viz., sense of an all-pervasive presence, sense of the unreality of space and time, loss of personal identity, and sense of a deepened significance in life.

Mystical experience differs from those produced by drugs, psychological means, etc., at least in two important respects. First, in the case of those different means, the experience is followed by exhaustion and weakness but the sense of power that comes in mystical experience is just the opposite. Secondly, the moral effects are also different: on the one side, a weakening of the will and loosening of the moral fibre; on the other, a new and growing integration of individual and social life.

Mr. Rahman considers all mystical effects as fruits of auto-suggestion, yet he makes the following refreshing remark: Even regarded as autosuggestion, it is probable that prayer must be more effective than autosuggestion proper. For precisely that element which was seen to be most essential and yet most difficult to attain, namely, the abandonment of voluntary effort, is provided naturally by the mental attitude of prayer. The trust in an all-powerful God makes possible that abandonment.

Mr. Rahman is also sure that these inward mystical experiences cannot be turned into compelling ontological proofs. Indeed, they do not settle the question of the reality of God for everybody. However, he wisely remarks that while it is true that psychology cannot prove the reality of the mystical perception, it is equally true that it cannot disprove it (60. 315-327).

Mr. Ahmad SAEED is less prudent in his effort to show that mystical experience is a purely psychological phenomenon (60. 333).

Islam and Philosophy

The time has come to tackle the more particular question of the relationship between Islam and philosophy. This question preoccupies particularly the Moslem majority of the Pakistani philosophers. At the outset we shall consider what Mr. Muhammad SHARIF, a retired judge of the Supreme Court of Pakistan, has to say about the insufficiency of science and the need of prophecy to answer some of life's basic problems. Mr. Sharif drew the attention of the Congress to some statements of the Russian mathematician and philosopher, Ouspensky, concerning the helplessness of science regarding the problems of life and death, space and time, the mystery of consciousness, etc. "By the aid of scientific method," writes Ouspensky, "we cannot even tell what the man beside us is thinking about. No matter how we may weigh, sound or photograph a man, we shall never know his thoughts *unless he himself tells them to us.*" The difficulty is even greater when we attempt to catch a glimpse of God's cosmic consciousness. Here, says Mr. Sharif, we have no other recourse than listening to the prophets whose high office is to instruct people.

A prophet is, so to say, standing upon a high eminence, and this world and the next and all the universe with its scheme and purpose lie open before him. His knowledge of things is derived from the Original Source, his words are not his own: these are messages from the Lord-on-High.

He then recalls the basic concepts about God, man and the world, revealed in the Quran, and on the foundation of which a new world has to be constructed. "This," he thinks, "cannot be brought about by the statesmen; the theologians with their narrow outlook; are unable to cope with it; let the philosophers with cosmic outlook and breadth of vision try!" (59.ix-xiv).

Let us now consider how the Pakistani philosophers understand and defend their 'prophetic' religion. We shall begin with the remarks of Principal Muhammad AZRAF, even though his interpretation of Islamism is tainted with modernism. Russell wrote somewhere that Moslem thought has developed as a pure deduction starting from the Quran's dogmas. Mr. Azraf rises up against this assertion and points out the importance of induction in this development. When it is a question of the experimental sciences, Russell acknowledges that the Arabs were more inductive than the Greeks, but he has not realized that they were so precisely because of their belief in the Quran (55.209-210).

The Quran's dogma, Mr. Azraf maintains, does not imprison the spirit, and he also stresses that the fact of prophecy in Islam "indicates the revolt of the human spirit to have an independent role in searching out its own track without the guidance of any authority" (55.210). He bases this rather modernist conception on a passage in *Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam* where Iqbal states that

In Islam prophecy reaches its perfection in discovering the need of its own abolition. This involves the keen perception that life cannot for ever be kept in leading strings, that in order to achieve consciousness man must finally be thrown back on his own resources.

This is why Muhammad is the last prophet. Moreover, Mr. Azraf, following Abdus Salam Khan, recalls that

The Quran draws a distinction between *Ilm*, the knowledge gained by intuition, and *Hikmat*, knowledge gained by scientific research, and it postulates that one who is granted the latter receives the supreme advantages. Hence the importance of scientific knowledge and research in Islam.¹⁰

That the Muslims have used deduction and derived from the Quran secondary rules to direct their lives is a fact that justifies itself if their faith is true. The belief in Allah, Creator and universal Providence, is a postulate of their thought since this postulate is the only guarantee of the correspondence between thought and reality which is itself postulated in every effort to know. Other conceptions of the Divine can constitute an obstacle to free thought, and fall as such under Russell's critique. Russell himself admits that "the sphere of values lies outside science except in so far as science consists in the pursuit of knowledge."¹¹ Yet values are necessary to human existence. The Quran provides the required base for values when it affirms that the government of the world is a moral government. The Quran is concerned only with values without meddling in the sphere of the empirical sciences to which, however, it affords a necessary supplement. To judge the value of the Quran according to the conduct of Moslems would hardly be fair. For everywhere men have betrayed the spirit of their religion and the dark days of Islam, which began in the year 661 of the hegira, that is, after the assassination of Hazrat Ali, are continuing right into our own times.

Russell does not distinguish the deductive spirit from the deductive method. The latter is legitimate and necessary, even in the positive sciences. The former can become fatal if it implies a blind recourse to undiscussed premises. Islam does not encourage this type of laziness, although it may be frequent among its adepts, but rather recommends an aptitude of discernment, open to two methods, the deductive and the inductive (55.211-217). Mr. M. S. HASAN AL-MASUMI has also emphasized the importance of reason in Islam (60.310-314).

Treating more generally Islam's attitude towards philosophy, Mazherud-din SIDDIQI (56.133-138) proposes the view that Islamism is neither a philosophy nor a religion but a movement of social transformation. However, its message of action implies a philosophy. The dominant philosophical conception, implied everywhere but never directly expressed in the Quran, is the unity of human life (*tawhid*). The Quran opposes itself to distinctions founded on religion, race, color, nation, function. It does not accept two classes: the clergy and the laity. In the matter of knowledge, contrary to the Greeks and Indians, it attributes equal value to the interior (*anfus*), the heart, intuition, and to the exterior (*afâq*), the senses, thus restoring the unity of the knower. In

matters of social life, it breaks down the walls between religion, polity, and economy, and wants all three to be dominated by the fundamental values: sovereignty of God, vice-sovereignty of man. Thus, for example, it rejects the capitalist position just as much as the communist one which wants to base economy entirely on the factors of production. The Quran proposes, on the contrary, a sort of Muslim socialism which limits the individual rights by the rights of society and of the common good (cf. *infra*).

In general, it cannot but consider with favor a pluralist pragmatism in the vein of W. James, and oppose itself to the Platonic idealism and the individualism which the latter implies. The way towards God which Islam proposes is not that of individual contemplation, but that of the effort of all towards the progress of all (*jihad*). Aristotle attracts it more than Plato, law more than theology.

The reality of the individual in Islam and his primary importance in any social scheme, Islam's adherence to and insistence on democracy, its opposition to political absolutism and totalitarian autocracy, the Islamic concept of God as an individual standing in personal relationship with His creatures -- all these spring from its basic anti -- Platonic world view (56.1 37).

This does not mean that Islamic realism considers the realities of this world as perfect; on the contrary, it considers them as determined, but in potency to a higher realization. To bring this about man presides as God's vicegerent. Man participates in God's efficacious causality.

Mr. Muhammad A. HYE also takes up the concept of *tawhid*. He defines it thus:

Tawhid means a (categorical) negation or rejection of all sources of real power, of all objects of human devotion and loyalty except the power of Allah, to whom alone all devotion and loyalty is due; it implies a rejection of all fears except the fear of Allah; a complete surrender of our will and purposes to His will and increasing purpose; and an unflinching devotion and loyalty to Him (55.219).

Iqbal considers this principle of *tawhid* as "the foundation of world unity and Islam as a religion is only a practical means of making the Principle a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind." It is expressed in this phrase of the Quran: "None but Allah possesses real power and is worthy of human devotion and loyalty."

The second fundamental principle of Islam is prophecy, which implies a divine revelation touching upon the angels, human souls with their freedom and immortality, the resurrection of all men, the last judgment, heaven, and hell. Accepting here Kant's conclusions, Mr. Hye considers that these truths being supra-sensible, they cannot be demonstrated by pure reason but only believed on the Quran's authority. Mr. Hye simply brings out the contrasts between revelation and reason, without accepting that some of these truths could be discovered with certitude by reason and not only taken on faith. He excludes, for example, the possibility of a rational proof of the existence of God, and even considers every effort in this direction as blasphemous.

However, no more than any other religion can Islamism be opposed to reason. which must at least be able to judge upon Islam's claims for credibility. This rationalization of faith, far from being due to foreign exigencies, is for Islam a strict obligation, which arises out of its own spirit as well as being prescribed by certain verses of the Quran. Islam therefore needs a theological science while at the same time it rejects the pretensions of every purely rational theodicy. History

shows that this theological bent in Islam was essentially spontaneous and original, and not simply determined by influences exterior to it.

The principal problems treated by these theologians concern the freedom of the human will, the unity of God, His attributes, the distinction between faith (*imam*) and action (*'amal*), and the relationship between reason and faith. The Mu'tazilites began theological speculation before the first wave of Greek influence, which does not date earlier than the year 150 or 200 of the hegira. Against those who, during this period, held that the vision of God is the end and achievement of revelation, the Mu'tazilites based their rejection of this doctrine on the following arguments:

1) The vision of Allah can only be due to his essence or to a necessary attribute of his essence, and if this is so, He ought always to be seen and by all. This, however, is not the case, therefore this vision is impossible.

2) Nothing can be seen if it is not present in space and time. Now Allah cannot be present in this way because of his spiritual nature.

3) Nothing can be seen which does not have a form capable of impressing the eye. However, Allah has no such form. . . .

To these arguments the Mu'tazilites added the scriptural argument. For the Quran says: "The eyes of men cannot see Him." Those who demand a vision of the Lord "definitely show arrogance and strong defiance!" "O ye believers, when you said, 'O Moses, we shall never believe you unless *we see Allah face to face*,' then they were taken by *sa'zika* (punishment)." Allah says to Moses, "[O Moses] You can never *see Me*." "Allah never speaks to a man except through revelation or from behind a screen (wall). All this shows that theological reflexion arose immediately after the preaching of the Quran, although it is true that it was later influenced by the studies of the Greeks (55.219-237).

Mr. Aldus *SUBHAN* has likewise demonstrated, using the texts of the Quran and the Sunna as a starting point, that reason and the spirit of independent inquiry are inculcated by the Quran and are soon to be found at work in the elaboration of tradition. Indeed the first task of the compilers of the Sunna was rationally to reconcile those texts or partial traditions which were apparently opposed; and later on when conquering Islam encountered the philosophies of the preceding civilizations, their second task was to develop the rational consistency of the faith in order to defend and propagate it. The political evolution of Islam also posed problems about political and social morality to the solving of which the thinkers applied themselves under the double guidance of reason as the criterion of good and evil, and of the Quran and the Sunna as the supreme authorities (57.321-326).

Philosophy and Values

Several of the Pakistani philosophers consider philosophy above all as a search for values. Mr. Taj Ali KORAISHY tells us that "the quest of Truth, Beauty and the Good is the pole star of the life of man" (57.289). If knowledge is very utilitarian at the outset and arises spontaneously from man's efforts to master a rather hostile environment, it is, nevertheless, not a simple instrument of the desire for power, but is soon sought for itself. It is in this disinterested perspective that philosophy made its appearance. Truth is thus the first value, but philosophy also reveals the goodness of objects; this second value leads us to say that philosophy is the search for happiness. Since man is complex, he has diverse appetites and his well-being is founded on different levels,

the physical, the psychological, and the spiritual, which are arranged in a scale. Beauty itself is a special kind of goodness. These values can conflict. The search for a certain degree of beauty, the sensible for instance, can bring with it dangers and evils. Truth is not always beneficent. The welfare of one may bring privation of another. The identity between the true and the beautiful may be affirmed by a poet such as Keats, but experience declares it to be false. The source of such conflicts of values lies in the multiplicity of degrees of the true, the beautiful, and the good. Nevertheless, if we consider them in order, the conflicts diminish and even disappear.

The Quran provides this order according to which God is first and the other degrees of value descend from Him as the starting point. This order is inscribed in our aspirations which do not stop until they reach Him and in the disappointments that cap our inferior pursuits. Such failures come from the fact that we do not experience values at the supra-sensible level and the sensible experiences which we have deceive us and turn us away from our goal. It is only by approaching God, says the Quran, that we attain the full measure of peace and happiness (57.289-303).

The majority of those who treat this subject insist upon the objectivity of values. M. Fazlur RAHMAN recalls to us Urban's opinion that there cannot be any description, even the most scientific one, without an element of appreciation. To be valid is a character of reality as such. This character is acknowledged by reason in judgments of subjective valuation. The values are eternally realized in God, Who actualizes them in the world; however, they are never completely apprehended by men (58.175-183).

Prof. M. TIMUR likewise maintains that values are objective. The good is not the good simply because it pleases me, but in itself and universally. The objective existence of values reveals itself in ordinary experience, as when we judge that an object or a man is superior to others, although we do not prefer him.

We thus form universal judgments about four classes of objective values: pleasure, beauty, knowledge (or truth), and creative activity. Creative activity is indeed a value provided it is moral, thus implying love, especially the love of those similar to us which is at the origin of social creativity. It is also this creative, moral activity which is the origin of artistic and technical creations. This value, therefore, extends itself to our instruments and we can speak of an instrumental value.

What is it, then, which underlies these four values and renders them good? Evaluation consists in placing the different objects of our experience in a scale of excellence. Excellence, superiority, moral height, are thus what determines our judgments of value. The idea of superiority thus appears as one of the ultimate modes of thought. Good and evil, value and its opposite, form a vertical gradation according to their respective degrees, but are separated by a horizontal break imposed by judgment, which distinguishes pleasure and pain, beauty and ugliness, knowledge and ignorance, creation and destruction as pairs of contraries (and not contradictories). It seems impossible to define these contraries absolutely other than by the relative terms of 'upper' and 'lower.' We must therefore define value or goodness as the fact of occupying a certain place in the upper part of the scale of excellence, and evil or disvalue as occupying a certain place in the lower part of this scale. The upper and lower parts are opposed to one another as the positive and negative poles at the very point where they meet, which is a point of discontinuity (54.45-54). Prof. Timur gave us a further analysis of the moral judgment in a recent paper (60.255-267).

Prof. Timur's theory rightly stresses that good and evil are terms essentially relative to a certain center, which is either the subject or, more precisely, the needs inherent in the subject's appetites. But he does not examine sufficiently the nature of this center and thus only imperfectly rejoins the classical analyses of the transcendentals

The notions of success and failure are bound to those of value and disvalue. Mr. Abdul MATIN defines success as "any achievement of necessarily intrinsic value" (57.309). This definition appears to him as one which cannot be perfectly verified, so that we cannot speak of an absolute success but only of a relative one. He defines relative success as "the relation of something smaller or less valuable with something greater or more valuable", for example, the relation of the human individual to the universe of beings. With man, in particular, this relation is obtained through the exercise of his faculties of practical action, of knowledge and contemplation, the faculty of contemplation giving him his unique position among beings.

To these three faculties correspond three values: happiness, satisfaction, and bliss, which he defines by almost synonymous terms. By practical action he means all change caused by the motor nerves and the muscles, by knowledge all change caused by the perceptive nerves, by contemplation all mental change. The three constitute the domain of human activity, which can be moral, immoral, or non-moral. Moral activity is essentially organic, in this sense that it comes about only when the diverse parts of an organism work in harmony to procure the greater good of the whole organism or at least of its most important part. The limits of our power over the other beings are the limits of our moral success. This power comes about only in the measure that such a harmony can operate, that is, to begin with, in the individual, then, but less perfectly, within the human society. Our relation with lower beings no longer turns out to be effectively moral, that is, organic. However, it continues to be governed by morality and can in certain cases become immoral because of its disharmonizing repercussion on the socio-human organism, for example, in the case of cruelty towards animals, or the extravagant exploitation of mineral resources. Harmonious activity, which requires the exercise of such virtues as honesty, love, sympathy, certainly conditions man's success as man. This is why it is obligatory and objective. The more men organize, the more also this obligation is recognized, and the more diverse its applications become. Moral obligation is more radically founded in our nature than in the belief in God or in the immortality of the soul, with which this obligation does not identify itself.

Human knowledge can be scientific if it terminates a conscious process of exact observation and verification; if it is obtained without recourse to such a process it is non-scientific, or ordinary knowledge. The value of ordinary knowledge is but practical and uncertain. Scientific knowledge is a true value since it ascertains our relation to a universe that transcends us.

By contemplation, we try to seize all reality as the content of our own mind. We thus go beyond the horizon of scientific knowledge. Contemplation can likewise be of three types: rational, irrational, and non-rational. The first one only is properly valid. Irrational contemplation, through poetry and the other arts, ought to subordinate itself to reason, which is our supreme criterion. Rational contemplation alone leads us definitively to bliss, which is our highest value.

When through practical action we attain the moral values, we can say that our life is "good." However, complete success is only attained by the acquisition of scientific knowledge and rational contemplation. The moral man is happy, the scientist satisfied, but the philosopher alone attains bliss (57.309-320).

Prof. Fazlur-RAHMAN distinguishes also the aesthetic, moral and religious values from that of scientific knowledge. He regrets that the almost exclusive attention accorded to scientific knowledge contributes to undermine those values which science cannot apprehend. We want to explain everything by mechanical causality, and we forget that the total explanation can only be found in the intelligent and voluntary activity of God. The medieval thinkers were superior to us in this respect. They knew that there are various disciplines because there are various methods of investigating reality and that it is a mistake to want to know everything by a single method. The

search for the immediate antecedents which is proper to the empirical sciences must grant scope to the search for ultimate causes, that is, to philosophy. Philosophy does not ignore the difference between the various kinds of causes. Quoting Dr. N. K. Brahma, he writes: "Modern science is not truly scientific inasmuch as it lets reason lie dormant and does not realize the inadequacy of what it is asserting to be the cause." It does not feel the need of recourse to the higher categories. It sins through dogmatism, considering its own explanation as ultimate and sufficient.

Science forgets the fact of freedom which imposes itself upon man and which derives from his nature as rational animal. Modern psychology makes light of this original character of the human being, although it rarely denies (the strict behaviorists have become rare) the teleological character of human activity. We must on the contrary recognize with Iqbal that, "in his inmost being, man, as conceived by the Quran, is a creative activity, an ascending spirit who, in his onward march, rises from one state of being to another."

By freeing us from the narrow concept of mechanical causality, this recognition of human freedom opens to us the realm of the formal and final causes and, through them, gives access to the notion of a real and supreme Spirit, Who creates and freely supports a universe which He directs towards an end He has chosen. It is by this recourse to a freely creating God that we can find the adequate explanation of this universe. God is the creative Will. The universe is His wilful creation. God is immanent to it but, more essentially, transcendent; for, according to the expression of Dr. K. A. Hakim, "the universe in any phase, at any one time and collectively in all phases, at all times, is only a limited and partial expression of His creative will." This is why science ought to be complemented by philosophy, and philosophy ought to perfect itself in religion (56.151-169). Prof. Rahman further developed these ideas in another paper, entitled "Idealistic Metaphysics" (60.25-39). Seven of his papers have now appeared in book form under the title, *Philosophy, Science and O! her Essays* (Lahore, Pakistan Phil. Congress, 1961, 160 pages).

In connection with what precedes we may note here the contribution of Mr. S.M. TAQI who condemns the attempt of certain philosophers of the sciences to consider the notion of cause as bereft of all ontological value and to reduce the bond between effect and cause to a mere coincidence. He is adamant in his defence of real causality but somewhat journalistic in tone, and he does not introduce anything really new (56.121-128).

The Symposium on Basic Human Values which took place in 1960 simply confirmed the general trend of the above papers. Mr. Khwaja Ghulam SADIQ struck the tone of the discussion when he upheld the objectivity of values (60.81-86). Mr. Ala-ud-din AKHTAR based this objectivism on religion and the Quran (60.87-94). Dr. G. C. DEV once more showed himself as a universalist and down to earth humanist (60.95-102). And Mr. Abdul QAYYUM stressed the importance of the basic material values as opposed to ultimate ideal values (60.103-108).

Mr. Abdul MATIN, whose general conception of values we have summarized above, provides a suitable conclusion. Every great traditional religion, he tells us, presents itself on two planes, the one of practice where it prescribes good actions, and the one of contemplation where it proposes the correct faith and proper worship. Following here Otto, we may call the first plane rational and moral, the second non-rational and non-moral. The first retains even today all its value; the second is at present encumbered with doubts and should remain a private affair. However,

If I am allowed to talk of an absolute Deity, having in a sense both a physical and a mental aspect and identifiable with Nature as a whole, I would like to characterize moral practice, scientific cognition and rational contemplation as the three grades of worship towards Him, of which the latest is obviously the highest. Thus rational contemplation, as the highest form of

worship, relates us with the Deity, which is the highest limit of our relation. Somehow or other, intuition may have some contribution to this worship by associating to the same an additional relish of mystical feeling or ecstasy, just as, I must say, it can enhance the agreeability of our moral practice by adding to its foundation a feeling of love and sympathy (57.319).

The Notion of Existence

The Lahore session of 1959 devoted a symposium to the notion of existence. The choice of this topic was timely since existence is the focus of continental existentialism, and has also been interpreted anew by some of the prominent Anglo-Saxon philosophers.

Dr. Athar RASHID'S masterful survey of the historical development of the notion of existence from Kierkegaard to Heidegger and Jaspers shows, following Heinemann, that this trend arose as a reaction against the two great movements which reached their climax in the nineteenth-century: naturalism which culminated in Darwinism, and idealism which reached its zenith in Hegelianism. These two movements had undermined the notion of human freedom and reduced man to an insignificant position in the grand process of life evolution or of the evolution of the Idea, Hegel's Absolute. Since Kierkegaard, existentialism simply seeks to restore man to himself instead of allowing him to be swallowed by the all-devouring Absolute, or to be robbed of his freedom, of the power to transcend natural existence and rise above the material world. Kierkegaard's "subjective or existing thinker" must replace the "objective or abstract thinker." For the objective thinker, being and thought are to be kept apart. The subjective thinker, on the other hand, sets himself to the tasks imposed upon him by his existence. Existence does not allow itself to be thought; the actual, the active, the self-determining existence functions at a level totally different from that of thought, which is kept out and is drawn into service only in the intervals between actual existence. Thought is, so to say, always an afterthought.

To give a straight and direct definition of Existence is not possible for the simple reason that it emerges only after it has shed off all determinable contents. So long as man identifies himself with any determinable elements, he is determined and not free and as such alienated from himself. . . . The innermost core of man, which is 'beyond' all assignable contents and which is discovered only because everything, of which the contents are determinable, falls or drops away as something external, strictly speaking that core which remains intact, is the Existence. The process of this inner realization which man experiences amounts to his alienation from all his possessions and from the whole environment forming his 'home' in which he habitually feels safe and in which he would be lost if his heart clung to it. . . .

In a sense, Existentialistic experience may be conceived on the analogy of the so-called 'negative theology' . . . since it becomes evident in the completion of the movement in which all possible determinations are found as improper. What is then saved from the negative process is Existence This impossibility of defining Existence and determining 'what' it is, is felt at the very outset.

Existence being undefinable, it can only be approached, and this can be done in various ways. Jaspers and Heidegger have explored some of those ways. The second part of Dr. Rashid's paper summarizes their contribution (59.67-85).

In the same symposium Prof. Fazlur RAHMAN also treats of existence but in the quite different context of contemporary British philosophy. The skeptical statement, "Nothing exists,"

is strictly speaking meaningless, since it involves the reality of that very denial and therefore also of the one who makes it. In the *cogito* we experience existence. Existence is the most primitive concept and, hence, indefinable, but the ground of every definition. There may be many modes of existence: subjective or objective, Ultimate Reality or appearances, logical or real, but existence itself is pervasive and need not be restricted to the world of spatio-temporal existents.

The New Realist tells us that there are two types of being, namely, the ultimate metaphysical stuff and the constructional world of existents in space and time. By logical analysis of the existent objects, he arrives at certain logical and mathematical concepts which are simple and indefinable, namely, terms, propositions, numbers, equations. These are neutral because they are neither mental nor physical. The world of existents has been constructed out of these neutral entities. The neutral stuff is neither existent nor non-existent. It is neither real nor unreal.

Against this view it may be pointed out that concepts are but signs of reality and therefore different from it. We cannot deduce reality or actual existence from concepts. Concepts are but forms of thought and have no other being than being thought. As to the objects of dream, illusion, hallucination, and mathematical objects, they have been given the status of subsistence. As such they are said to be unreal or non-existent. Yet, should we not attribute to them that sort of existence which is 'to be illusorily posited,' i.e., a form of logical existence? Hence, we should understand 'subsistence' in terms of existence or reality.

Prof. Rahman further objects against the purely formal treatment of judgments by Russell, Ayer, etc. In thus treating judgments the existential import of the copula is lost sight of. Russell's neutral monism, which posits an ultimate metaphysical stuff, the subsistent, to which he reduces the mental and the physical as logical constructions superimposed on that neutral entity, does not really succeed in reconciling the subjective and Objective poles of our experience. It still is a witness to the reality of existence but fails as an account of our grasp of existential reality. McTaggart's criticism of that theory deserves attention, for it appears to be thoroughly pertinent.

In the wake of Bradley, one sometimes restricts the meaning of existence to the sphere of spatio-temporal existents or in general to that of dependent entities, whereas the term 'Reality' is reserved for the independent and pure Being in which diversities do not exist.

But we think that Reality does not exclude existence. There is nothing which falls outside existence. Reality must include everything. It must also include appearance. What appears also is. In this sense the spheres of reality and existence coincide (59.93).

The universe not only is or exists, but is intimately connected with our personality or life. . . . We assess this existence in terms of value. . . . We characterize existence as true or false. . . . This is a necessary characterization, for existence must have a meaning for us. . . . Facts are thus interwoven with the judging mind. Facts are real in so far as they cohere in a whole of which the mind is an integral part. 'Truth is reality explicating itself as a logical whole through minds as the organ of its self-expression.' So, Reality explicates itself in truth and there is no truth apart from thinking and judging. Thus a study of 'Existence' necessarily includes a reference to Reality and knowledge.

In reflective thought we try to understand things in their mutual interrelation. When we experience A to exist, B to exist, C to exist, etc., we raise the question of existence as

common to all existents. . . . The notion of existence, then, is universal . . . as common to all facts. Such a universal as is common to all is called Pure Universal (59.93-94).

It is not through their existence that existents are differentiated but through their essence. This cannot be reduced to a quality or to a group of qualities, for quality does not exist by itself. It requires some thing or substance in order to exist. So we arrive at the idea of substance. Substances are differentiated

The Pure Universal 'Existence' is one, but the existing substances are many.

The Many are real and their reality is a fact of experience. The Many as experienced are not unreal in immediate experience. . . . It is only in the light of the Ultimate Reality that the many existents may appear unreal.

As an existent, the One is that Ultimate Reality which includes the Many and at the same time transcends them. It is because it is thus infinitely comprehensive that it is not possible for our finite mind to have a complete knowledge of Reality.

Absolute non-existence or universal nothingness is an impossibility, as Bergson definitely established. As to Heidegger's nothingness, it is used not as a logical term but only to characterize the basic mood of the *Dasein* or human Existent

Human thought is analytic; it breaks up the concrete whole of experience into its fragmentary aspects, that is, into subject and object. Hence, it cannot grasp the Reality which is all-comprehensive. Even in self-consciousness human thought remains analytical and partial. We may perhaps agree with Bradley when he emphasizes the comprehensive grasp of reality which we may obtain through intuition or direct experience in the form of feeling. Yet, even this sort of grasp is deficient, and Bradley himself confesses, "Fully to realize the existence of the Absolute is for finite beings impossible." Even in mystic experiences there is no complete merging of the finite in the infinite. The distinction remains. Iqbal points out that

In the higher Sufism of Islam unitive experience is not the finite ego effacing its identity by some sort of absorption into the Infinite Ego; it is rather the infinite passing into the loving embrace of the finite. As Rumi says:

Divine knowledge is lost in the knowledge of the saint!

And how is it possible for people to believe in such a thing? (59.86-101).

Mr. Manzoor AHMAD was the third member of the Congress to take part in the symposium on the notion of existence. He very ably showed that the question 'What is existence?' differs from all other questions because it is not asking about an essence and essences alone can, strictly speaking, be defined. However, he is only partly right when he accuses traditional philosophy of having attempted the vain quest for the essence of existence. The mere perusal of E. Gilson's *Being and Some Philosophers* could have convinced him that if indeed that vain question has played havoc in the field of philosophy at various periods of its development, yet some of the most classical philosophers, such as Aquinas, have perceived very well that the "act of being" is not a concept and, hence, not definable, and still can be grasped in its own way since it is signified in every judgment by the copula in its existential function. But Mr. Ahmad himself falls victim of essentialism when he concludes that "any talk on the 'notion of existence' as such is simply to talk on nothing" (59.108), and accepts as significant only particular questions on propositions regarding

various forms of existence, i.e., according to the vocabulary of classical as well as phenomenological philosophy, various essences (59.102-108).

Epistemology, Universals, and Causality

The problems of epistemology have been the topic of various papers; in particular the problem of universals was the subject of one symposium in the course of the 1958 session, and causality of another during the 1960 session.

Dr. M. M. AHMAD has dealt with the reconciliation of thought and experience from the standpoint of the ethics of values. He takes as his starting point the conflicts that present themselves between the exigencies of virtue (thought) and happiness (experience) on the level of our moral life, or on the level of social life between the demands of society (the state may require that we risk our lives) and of the individual (who experiences his life as an essential good). The only satisfactory solution of this kind of conflict supposes that man, being rational, ought to pursue universal values, and that the sacrifice of his individual values is commanded by his pursuit of the total value. The difficulty in accepting this solution resides in the fact that individual values are directly experienced as good, whereas the universal values are only thought of as ideals (54.55-56).

Dr. Ahmad believes that this difficulty is more apparent than real. In fact, dreams and hypnosis show us that images and ideas can reach the intensity and objectivity felt in an actual experience. The question of their truth must therefore be resolved by some factor other than this feeling of reality, namely, their degree of coherence with our other experiences. Even repeated experiences can be false, as in the case of illusions created on a screen, or the apparent movements of the sun. It is by reference to a complete system of coherence that we can finally judge about the truth of our experiences. This complete system can only come about by abstraction and generalization, that is, by cold and abstract thought.

Is the experience of the whole and of the universal good impossible? It seems that by detaching oneself from the sensible, and by a consuming love of the ideal, we can reach an intense realization of the universal values. This is why the philosopher ought to be a lover of wisdom (54.57-58).

Mr. M. Abdul HYE studies more extensively the relation between epistemology and metaphysics. Metaphysics, which deals with supra-sensible realities such as God, free will, and the immortal soul, seems to have waned after a period of despotic dogmatism. However, man cannot be satisfied with this setback and the philosopher naturally rediscovers Kant's way while he turns again towards the questions of epistemology which metaphysics presupposes. Certainly every epistemology presupposes a certain amount of metaphysics. It presumes at least that reality is such that it can be grasped by our faculty of knowledge. This is the fundamental postulate of every inquiry. This is why we cannot strictly say that one or the other of these disciplines must absolutely be first, but rather that they are interdependent (57.23-24).

Theories of knowledge can be reduced to three: the reproduction theory, the creation theory, and the revelation theory. The first one depends on Cartesian metaphysics and conceives the relation between subject and object in terms of the relation between two physical substances. It normally ends in either rationalist or empiricist subjectivism which posits the object only as an 'X' since to know it otherwise would induce an infinite regression. Therefore we must attack the very root of this theory if we want to free ourselves from subjectivism.

‘The substantiation of the knower,’ said Pringle Pattison, ‘into a being outside the world he desires to know and the treatment of the two as separate and independent facts, having no organic relation to one another, is at the root of this difficulty. It is because of treating man, the knower, as if he were a stranger visitant, contemplating ‘ab extra’ an independent universe, that it seems impossible for him to know the real nature of anything or in the last resort, to know anything but his own states’ (57.31).

The creation theory of knowledge is ordinarily, but erroneously, attributed to Kant. It is diametrically opposed to the reproduction theory. If it is not the object which creates in us its representation, we must be the ones who create the object. Kant clearly states that we constitute the object as object, that is, as posited by thought, but he does not eliminate the object in itself which he holds as independent from thought. However, even this construction of the object as such is for Kant matter for belief. We can thus doubt it. If all that we know is the object as such, that is, as synthesized, constructed by us, the knowledge of the object in itself remains unexplained. However, this knowledge is an irrefutable, ultimate fact which it is meaningless to try to explain by a reduction to other facts (57.32-33).

The third, namely, the discovery or revelation theory of knowledge, is generally held by modern realists, such as G. E. Moore, S. Z. Hazam, B. Russell, etc. Knowledge is a revelation on the part of the object and a discovery for the subject. This theory implies two theses: the thesis of the reality independently of us of the exterior world, and of its direct revelation to our senses. The evidence of this revelation prevents us from reducing the knowledge we have of exterior objects to a mere belief. The facts of illusion and error do not justify the generalized objection of the skeptics. This objection cannot even attempt to pose itself except by admitting in fact the validity of the knowledge which it verbally rejects, and therefore the validity of direct perception on which in the final analysis depends all other knowledge. When it is a question of first facts, notions, or principles, we can give no other proof than this impossibility of the objection posing itself without *ipso facto* admitting them. We must therefore adopt this third theory of knowledge, which is the most adequate (57.35-39). After having studied knowledge in general, it behooves us to pass to particular problems such as the one of universals. Introducing a symposium on this topic, Mr. C. A. QADIR, a logical positivist, attempts to distinguish universals from particulars. He notes in the first place that, according to Russell’s distinctions, the universals are verbal concepts (objects of conception -- let us remark that Russell says rather that there are also verbal and syncategorematic, besides the nominal and adjectival universals), relative, neither temporal nor spatial, and predicable (but not necessarily predicated), whereas the particulars are percepts (objects of perception), substantive and not relative, temporal, spatial, and unpredictable. He refuses to designate with Russell the very special mode of being of the universals as subsistence because it reintroduces surreptitiously the existence we have already denied as belonging to universals. He also refuses to understand the universals as simple perfections, as Plato does, since this term cannot have any precise meaning although it may have a poetic one. The distinction between the universals as predicable and the particulars as unpredictable must equally be rejected since it rests only on the structure of certain languages and cannot apply to the syncategorematic universals, such as the conjunctions ‘or,’ ‘either,’ etc., and the prepositions, which are evidently not predicable. Aristotle seems to think that since a universal can be predicated of several subjects, it denotes a property common to all these subjects, but such an assumption is a *petitio principii*. Moreover, as Spinoza noted, every property cannot be but particular, and if we eliminate its difference, we lose it entirely.

The recent position of the problem conceives the distinction between universal and particular on the pattern of the distinction between the type word and the token word. The token words, whether spoken or written, are all individually different, the type word remains the same. However, it seems impossible to designate, other than relatively, any word as a type word. We can agree to recognize certain types as norms, but that does not make of them natural norms. And we seek in vain for those essential and unchangeable qualities Aristotle speaks about. Our paradigms are all conventional, adopted for reasons of economy and convenience as Locke had already noticed. Even in geometry the Euclidean definitions have lost their exclusiveness. It therefore remains doubtful whether or not there are common properties. However, we cannot deny that certain words are employed distributively and seem to indicate the existence of the universals they designate (58.53-59).

The logical analysts warn us that before we seek the answer to a question, we must ascertain whether the question has any meaning. The question, "What is a universal?" resembles in its linguistic form the question, "What is a table?" However, its subject is not real and thus it lacks meaning. The question of existence is foreign to the sphere of universals. The universals designate a kind of terms; we can ask how they function but not what they designate, for they designate nothing that exists.

If we accept this interpretation, the problem becomes purely linguistic and merely a problem of quantification. The quantifiers such as 'all,' 'some,' and 'any' have been called by Frege incomplete symbols because, considered apart from the propositions where they have their function, they have no significative value, whereas within a proposition they codetermine its meaning. Being therefore but a type of incomplete symbols, the universals cannot be reified. Universals have also been considered as a sort of syncategorematic term, that is, incapable of serving as subject or predicate in a logical proposition, yet determinable by other constituents of such a proposition. However, this view encourages our tendency to reify them (58.59-64).

Moore used to maintain that, without being existents, the universals are. Russell holds that there is at least one universal which we cannot eliminate, the one of similarity, which opens the door again to other possible universals. Mr. Qadir thinks he can refute Russell's position, but the argument he proposes does not appear to me as convincing. Whatever the case may be, Mr. Qadir does not deny that individual beings belong to species, but he denies that this belonging implies some entity other than these beings themselves and which would transcend them (58.65-66). It is clear that his whole treatment of the subject begins from a consideration of the Platonic doctrine of ideas that is too exclusive, coupled with an insufficient penetration of the Aristotelian doctrine.

Diwan M. AZRAF has a better knowledge of both the general and even medieval history of the question. Before asking himself, as Mr. Qadir does, whether or not the universals exist, he is of the opinion that the epistemological problem of their status in our knowledge must be solved first.

The universal is a fact given in every judgment. The predicate of the judgment is of itself universal, though it be particularized by its relation as significative predicate to a concrete subject. Universality is a mode of being which is *a priori* in the intellect. Therefore, we cannot derive it as such from pure sensation. Plato's error is not that he recognized this, but that he attributed to universals a form of existence which is proper to real beings only, which necessarily leads to infinite regress (cf. the argument of the third man). To avoid this difficulty, Aristotle attributes existence to them only insofar as they are realized in the individuals. This theory offers its own difficulties, but to want to reduce the universals to a fact of linguistic convention is but a subterfuge, since such a convention can function only if it is based on a common concept in the

minds of those who accept it. The medieval thinkers applied themselves to defining the metaphysical status of universals, but this quest seems to be in vain. It is as if we asked ourselves what is actually the subject 'Alexander' in the affirmation 'Alexander defeated Porus,' or the subject 'Hamlet' in the assertion 'Hamlet is the best tragedy of Shakes-peare.' To treat them as incomplete symbols or as syncategorematic terms is impossible. They are not actual, but they are not nothing. They exist at least as objects of thought. The same holds for universals.

There are, evidently, two kinds of universals: the nominals, which can serve as subjects as well as predicates, and the others (verbs and syncategorematic terms) which cannot, but are not, however, restricted to a singular application. The former are universal functions of consciousness, which play a role even in the judgment of direct perception and become empirically real in it. By themselves, or when employed in absolute propositions, they have but an intentional existence. As far as the syncategorematic universals are concerned, they express relations, and that is where their functional value lies. Verbs and adjectives can equally be reduced to relational functions. "So at the end we may conclude that universals are functioning patterns of our consciousness. Whether these have any metaphysical status or not is beyond the scope of Epistemology" (58.67-76).

Mrs. Akhtar IMAM, a realist, quite correctly states that the reality of universals is presupposed by the very objection that denies them. To reduce them to pure symbols implies some reality of which they are a symbol. It is this reference to some sort of reality that Mr. Qadir neglects and even denies. Diwan Azraf, on his part, conceives universals as functional, universal patterns, and his definition, therefore, being a vicious circle since it presupposes what is to be defined, explains nothing. He also runs the risk of falling into subjectivism, whereas the commonness of similarity indicated by universals is objective. After these criticisms which may appear to some as not quite convincing she herself admits that she is unable to explain positively the fact of universals, but refuses to consider this inability as a sufficient reason to abandon the realist theory of universals (58.77-84).

Mr. S. K. HUSAIN equally rejects every form of nominalism as well as Platonic realism. The formation of general or universal concepts is one of the components of the formation of a science. Unless we are prepared to reduce the sphere of scientific knowledge to a realm of illusions, we must grant universals a very honorable position. Universals are synthetic concepts in the sense that they describe quantitative or qualitative relations between singulars. Their reality stems from the fact that they are organizations of singulars. Formal relations are no less fundamental than the sensible qualities. This conception of universals as synthetic preserves the authentic element in nominalism as well as in absolute realism, yet avoids the extremism which has transformed them into errors (58.85-89).

Causality is another thorny topic of epistemology to which the Congress devoted one of its two symposia of 1960. Prof. A. M. DATTA introduced the subject with an historical conspectus ending with the remark that Hume's skepticism regarding the causal relation has not yet been completely refuted but that we can at least hold the causal conception as a good working hypothesis (60.109-115).

Prof. Abdul Hye, on the contrary, thinks that Hume has successfully proved that we do not know with certainty that particular events are necessarily connected with other individual particular events because our repeated past experience is no guarantee for the future. However, Hume failed to disprove that every event must have some cause. Besides he tacitly assumed the principle of causality in denying it. Prof. Hye then describes briefly the interesting theory of causality of the Ash'arite school. While agreeing somehow with Hume and Kant, this theory yet posits God as the creative Cause of the universe and all events (60.116-126).

Dr. M. AJMAL, considering the meaning of causality in the context of social sciences, recalls that it used to mean the possibility of prediction as well as of control. The present trend, he says, is towards retaining the first while eschewing the second (60.127-132).

Mr. Khwaja Ashtar HUSAIN throws much light upon the history of the concept of causality by showing that it is implied by every dynamic view of the world whereas it is excluded by every form of logical staticism. Indeed, Neoplatonism from Plotinus to Porphyry, Averroes, Leibniz, Kant, and even Hume, always tends to expel real causality. It is mainly against this view that Ghazali directs his writings. But for him, God is the only Cause as creative Will and this causality which renders the world intelligible does not imply predictability. Ghazali's realistic trend is pursued by Schopenhauer, Bergson, and Hartmann and lies at the base of the social sciences, whereas the physical sciences, issuing from the Neoplatonist trend, depreciate the realism of causality.

We must, however, take into account the fact that determinism and causal principle are two distinct notions. The former implies 'binding necessity': the latter involves a power to effect modifications, which always leaves room for variation. The equalization of the two is an enlargement of the Neoplatonic logical determinacy of the dualising nature of the knowledge-relation, that reduces every relation to an unalterable binding necessity. The recent development in physics, however, refutes determinism without disparaging the causal relation in any way.

Consequently, there is no place for the nominalism of causality. Sciences study a selected feature of reality. They study the causal interactions between things and events (60.133-143).

As a logical positivist, Prof. C. A. QADIR considers the problem linguistically. Propositions are either analytical or empirical. The statement of the law of causality is neither; what is it then? Prof. Datta said that it is an hypothesis, but this cannot be for it can be neither verified nor falsified. Some think that it has been falsified by Heisenberg's principle of indeterminacy but this principle has not overthrown the law of causation. It has not even eliminated determinism, though it has perhaps limited it. But even to say this implies that one considers subatomic entities as Newtonian entities and macroscopic bodies as non-different from their ultimate constituents. But parts should not be assimilated to wholes and neither should the deterministic character of wholes be necessarily attributed to their parts. Against Dr. Ajmal, we should note that the notion of cause is not inextricably bound up with the notion of predictability. On the other hand, to speak of power is to speak anthropomorphically.

As I see it, the sentence 'Every event has a cause' is an optative sentence whose value is determined and also strengthened by the extent and range of predictions it leads to. But I also feel that a complete verification of causality is not possible because of its unrestricted generality. . . . It is a vacuous statement or at best an optative sentence indicating the faith of a scientist. . . . But howsoever strong the wish might be, it can never preclude the possibility of explaining nature through techniques other than that of causality (60.144-155).

Epistemology of the Knowledge of Other Minds

In 1959 the Pakistan Philosophical Congress held an important symposium on a difficult topic which has for some years exercised the minds of many Anglo-Saxon philosophers as well as of many Continental thinkers, especially the Existentialists: our knowledge of other minds.

Mr. C. A. QADIR had the honor of opening the debate. After indicating that he intended to speak only about human minds he rejected as insufficient the position of a good many positivists who have allied themselves with behaviorism in order to escape solipsism. These positivists are driven to that position because they hold that a person can through introspection verify only his own feelings, thoughts and desires, but not anybody else's; hence, a statement about another person's feelings, in order to be verifiable, must be reducible to a statement about what the first can observe of the other's bodily behaviour. What is implied by this mode of thinking is that statements about the so-called mental experiences are reducible without a remainder to statements about overt behaviour. This is open to serious objection.

As an improvement upon the behaviorist position, Carnap in *Testability and Meaning* replaces those behaviour-statements by reduction-sentences which provide decisive tests for the presence of mental states. This is called physicalism, an epistemological procedure whereby through a series of positive and negative reduction-sentences, the vagueness of the reduced property is diminished and a psychological predicate is translated into a physical predicate. Those reduction-sentences express mere physical correlates of the psychological properties; they do not pretend to define those properties adequately, nor to reduce them to observed behaviour.

Physicalism comes closer to the traditional view which is based upon analogy alone. Directly I am only aware of my mind as accompanied by distinct sorts of behaviour, internal and external. This awareness serves me as the sure term to which I compare the various sorts of external behaviour which I observe outside myself. When the similarity between these two terms is sufficient, I conclude to the existence of another organism also accompanied by a mind and states of mind analogous to my own.

Mr. QADIR finds this solution not altogether correct in so far as it would be difficult to hold that recognition of another mind is always an inferential process, for instance in a baby who comes to know his mother. Yet, Prof. Wisdom exaggerates the criticism of the analogical solution when, in his book, *On Other Minds*, he writes:

You want to infer from the shadows on the blind to the existence of the people inside the room; but the parallel does not hold. For there is nothing which corresponds in this case to going into the room and meeting the people. It is rather as if you were to look for the invisible fairy that you supposed to animate your watch. You are succumbing to the myth of the ghost in the machine.

Thus Prof. Wisdom wrongly implies that the possibility of direct acquaintance with the analogically inferred fact is a requisite of the argument through analogy. Prof. Ayer also holds that, in an ordinary way, an argument from analogy is a substitute for direct observation. But if this is true only in an ordinary way it is then not a property of this type of argument. And, so far as other minds are concerned, the argument from analogy is not a substitute for any observation. It is true that direct observation of other minds cannot be had in the way we directly observe our own mind, but this impossibility does not falsify the argument from analogy since the latter does not require the contrary possibility. However, to maintain the validity of the argument from

analogy is not tantamount to saying that it infallibly reaches conclusions that are certain. Yet, in ideally favorable circumstances, the conclusion will be highly probable.

Another difficulty which Prof. Wisdom has noticed is that it is not clear to him what condition is to be fulfilled in the case of analogical inference from a man's outward state to his inward state. Mr. Qadir thinks that this difficulty can be overcome through the technique of reduction-sentences evolved by physicalists. The concept of verifiability which this technique implies is to be understood as confirmability and the latter sharply distinguished from definability. Reduction-sentences should be of the nature of operational tests, i.e., very much like crucial instances which enable an investigator to decide and to determine the degree of confirmability. And we should aim at a whole series of such sentences capable of providing both confirming and disconfirming evidence. It is obvious that the reduction-sentences can at best establish a fairly high degree of confirmability. This may not be enough for the skeptic but it is foolish of him to ask to be given regarding other minds the same sort of direct evidence which he enjoys regarding his own mind (59.109-121).

Mrs. Hamida KHANOM would also reject the strict empiricist position as well as the metaphysical monism of the Bradley or Mayavadin type which eliminates the problem of our knowledge of other minds by simply denying that other minds really exist. She further rejects, rather naively, any metaphysical approach to this or any other problem through the concepts of transcendent, substance, etc. And, moreover, she denies logical value to religious statements. Such rejections imply that our belief in substantive selves is a fictitious assumption and other minds are in that sense inaccessible to our experience. Yet, she says, it does not follow that our knowledge of other minds is a purely irrational belief. For denial of the substantive ego should not lead us to believe that the self is "nothing but a bundle of different perceptions." All that is required is "the ability of the self to remember some of its earlier states." I might object to this assertion that the concept of memory appears untenable unless some concept of substance underlies it, but I cannot now dilate upon this objection.

What then is our knowledge of other minds? Mrs. Khanom holds that it is given through intuition, but she hardly explains the nature of that intuition apart from characterizing it as intimate, warm, lively, and different from our knowledge of other objects. Further on she accepts with Mr. Qadir the role which analogy plays in that knowledge. But she stresses more than he does the uncertainty of analogically inferred knowledge since she holds that the person can never be sure even of his own mind and the starting point of the analogical process is therefore uncertain (59.122-127). Dr. G. C. DEV is an advaitin and to people but superficially acquainted with advaita it may appear that this allegiance can only be an obstacle in the treatment of our problem. Thus, both Mr. Qadir and Mrs. Khanom have referred rather disparagingly to the position which they thought Dr. Dev ought to maintain to remain faithful to his basic conviction (cf. 59.112-113 and 123). As to Dr. Dev, he considers himself as much a realist as G. E. Moore, who observes that belief in other minds is a truism, a plain fact which cannot be disputed. He is therefore ready to speak, in the terms of Alexander, of our experience of sociality as a special type of knowledge. But he rightly remarks that the invention of a new name does not mean much unless we can determine it in precise logical terms.

The difficulty in ascertaining the precise nature of that knowledge lies in the fact that, although it may be a truism, our knowledge of other minds is not and cannot be an immediate experience. "There is an insuperable barrier between two subjective realms, one represented by my mind and the other by the mind of my good neighbor." My knowledge of his mind is therefore mediate, i.e., inferential. Obviously this is not a consciously elaborated process of inference but a spontaneous

affair; we might call it a sort of instinctive inference. Perhaps too easily Dr. Dev compares it to that mixture of perception and inference which we simply call perception and states that just as perception is normally valid so also is our spontaneous inferential awareness of other minds. He would range it among those "protocol facts" which, being immediately derived from experience, need no verification. Yet because it is inferential it should be treated as a "protocol fact" of the second order. Hence, some sort of verification of its validity may be deemed necessary. It is sufficiently verified by its workability and by a statistical average.

Dr. Dev agrees with Mr. Qadir and Mrs. Khanom as to the analogical character of the inference our knowledge of other minds implies. It is therefore of limited certainty but Dr. Dev sees no difficulty in this since, "from a correct perspective, analogy is the basic principle in all inductive generalizations." If we press for undue similarity all inference will ultimately collapse. But inference is warranted by the fact that it is a postulate of action, and as to the instinctive inference we are now treating we should say that it is a postulate of our social existence.

Advaita as exposed by Dr. Dev, especially in his recent book *Idealism: A New Defense and a New Implication*, never denies the reality of the finite centers of experience which we call minds. Dr. Dev states his opinion in the following words:

In the light of abstract speculation backed by religious experience of unity, I believe in a universal mind and, in the light of our normal experience, I also believe side by side in other minds and the world around. Both are for me true and their mysterious merger I call *Maya* and I do not think I am treading an unknown path.... My claim is that religious experience in its fruition is no other than the confirmation of the idea of unity which is the ultimate goal of abstract speculation, the pole star, as it were, for intellect in its voyage to reality in the perilous sea of appearances. If religious experience of unity stands to reason, as I believe with Iqbal and others that it does, this may be said to be the very climax of our knowledge of other minds, an immediate awareness of them in love (59.128-137).

Prof. Qazi M. ASLAM does not find it irrelevant to emphasize the certainty of the fact that we really know other minds and communicate with them, and the exceptionality of errors in that domain. The only thing in question is the sort of explanation we should give of that fact. How then is social communication possible? Theories of language are here of little help, for the capacity to communicate presupposes the capacity to interpenetrate without explaining it. This is why social psychologists have felt the need of more refined descriptions of the fact of social interpenetration. Prof. Aslam quotes approvingly from Asch's sensitive analysis of the special gift of perception of others implied in interpersonal relations (*Social Psychology*, pp. 161-63; 346).

Accordingly, if we realize that communication implies self-commitment, we shall refuse to separate social behaviour from the socially behaving selves and we may then find it easier to concede that knowledge of other minds is at least as direct as knowledge of physical objects. Likewise it is also liable to error, superficiality and other limitations

But, perhaps, we have better right to speak of peeping into a man's heart than of peeping into the heart of matter. Perhaps we have more checks for correcting errors in our knowledge of other minds than we have for correcting errors in our knowledge of physical objects.

Communication has its degrees of success or adequacy and also its direction and our knowledge of other minds really depends on the degree of the adequacy of communication

and its direction. If one party gives more and receives less, it reveals itself. This mind is more known than it knows. . . . No wonder, good listeners know more about other minds than bad listeners (59.138-144).

The extensive and thought-provoking contribution of Prof. Abdul Hamid KAMALI to this symposium is of unusual quality and deserves to be summarized at some length, mostly in his own words.

Prof. Kamali begins with a preliminary remark: since no science is concerned with individuals as such and the latter appear in sciences only as variables which do not affect the meaning of the scientific symbols, it is obvious that whatever may be the solution of our problem concerning our knowledge of other minds it will not affect psychology.

However, it is a fact that we are acquainted with other minds. Concerning this fact the epistemologist raises the question: How is it possible? But the epistemologist, whether Kant or Hegel, Neurath or Carnap, "is the same old Neoplatonist who believes that the form of knowledge determines the mode of reality. . . . In the meek form, the Neoplatonist is a logical positivist or phenomenologist demanding the conditions of experiences; in the bold form, he is an idealist, asking about the categories of experience." In either form he postulates that "knowledge somehow or other institutes the reality." The inevitable direction of his formulations is "towards the conclusion that other minds are logical constructions." "For Bradley and Croce, other minds are logical constructs of the objective spirit. To Russell and Carnap, they are logical constructs of the observer."

The trouble is that:

The essential characteristics of the 'fact of knowledge' are missing in constructionism. The Pan-physicalistic and Idealistic philosophies consider that construction and synthesis are the only functions of the intellect. They altogether miss the cognitive or knowledge-function of the mind. . . . Knowledge is analytical; it seizes upon the components of the object and never constructs it. . . . It is merely an awareness of the world. While a construction is really an addition or change in the world, and not a knowledge of the world. . . . 'To create an object implies to know the object' is the universal presupposition of the Neoplatonism enshrined in polylogism and logical positivism. But knowledge is a *sui generis* fact in the universe; similarly, constructivity is also an unanalysable fact.

Knowledge is the grasp of an object in its constitution, an apprehension of a presentation in its components. Knowledge is a fact such that it is not a doing. Any sort of activity is besides the fact of knowledge.

Rationalists, from Plato and the Vedantists to the Logical Positivists of our own day, are imbued with the false principle that the distinctions brought forth by our mind are the very distinctions that obtain in reality. They objectify the dualism of appearance and reality and destroy the unity of the human person. Whereas we obviously know the person as an integral subsistent, a unity of mind and body, of reality and the activities and states that express it, it is for them a reality separate from its expression, a mind imprisoned in matter, a ghost engaged in a machine.

In that case, knowledge of other minds becomes a matter of induction, speculation, and pure guessing. And if this is right, "then there is no solid support for mutual confidence, no sure guarantee behind the system of credit and no process of justice, for it is not secure in its principles of evidence."

To me it appears that the people must not reject this line of thought because it is dangerous, but because it rests on the slippery ground of the bifurcation of reality into cause-effects, motive-expressions, appearance-reality groups.

Happiness, wonder, etc., are the processes of the life of the mind. The distinct segments (motive, goal, action) into which our analysis breaks them are undivided in the unity of the person. Apprehended in their totality, those states are "public facts."

The apprehension of the total configuration of a state enables a man to mark off some of its portions as a motive. This is a mere selection and there is no real problem. But not content with this, he declares it more real and substantial and relegates all other parts to the status of subordinate and shadowy existents. The motive sector is elevated to the status of the 'really' real . . . ; the rest of the configuration of the state is reduced to be considered as its vehicle of expression. . . . The Reality is independent of its manifestation.

If this opinion is true, other minds are for ever unknowable. But it is obvious that they are not. Hence we must get rid of this "reality-expression" model of approach.

All the factors peculiar to a form contribute to the existence of that form. If some of the components are dissociated from it, and combined with some other elements, then a new form emerges. . . . The study of a mind is a study of the emerging, developing, continuing, and disintegrating forms of its existence. The knowledge of the other mind consists in the awareness of the elements found in its field, their associations and combinations, their dissociations and reorganizations. . . . Some of the elements of a specific form attract the attention; they are 'preferred' by the self or the observers. But this fact . . . does not place them in a privileged position; their selection does not assign them a different ontological status. . . . The form itself is meaning and its elements are the elements of meaning.

We do not go 'inside' the elements. We merely observe their correlations. Grasping them as elements, i.e., as integral parts of the reality presented to us, we immediately understand that they all share the one *Is-ness* of that reality.

Cognitive comprehension . . . cognises the order of *Is-ness* without analysis; and apprehends it as an unanalysed given datum universally pervading all the orders that are formed in its context. It is the final definitive essence of every entity that is formed in its field, but itself does not admit of definition. We are simply acquainted with it. . . . It follows that . . . we are able to cognise the facts of mind because we know mind, and we directly know it, we know it as a given datum, an unanalysable *Is-ness*.

Relations do not have physical signs as parts of their nature, yet they are known to us. Their presence in a field organizes that field according to various configurations. Therefore we are able to recognize the love configuration in such diverse things as poetry, religious experience, mother-child relation, etc.

Love, competition, pride, hatred, etc., are visible not because the 'physical' elements are parts of their reality, but because they are directly known and recognized in every configuration.

Minds manifest themselves through their inherent states. Sign is a role which is played by some of their parts when some observer is present. Their sign-function is essentially a communicative function.

A mind at a particular instant of its being is an order of signs. The sign system present constitutes the entire life of its being at that particular instant. Consequently, although we know other minds, we know them in their different moments of life; and never know them in their entire formations. This difficulty is not only in knowing others, but also in knowing ourselves.

To remove this difficulty and to be able to predict future behaviour we develop and follow the ethos and norms of formations. The totality of these formations is called the culture. All of us know the culture, at least to some extent. "It provides a comprehensive mapping of the behaviour field of the entire society, fixing the roles of the individuals and their respective positions in their movements." Our mind knows the laws of operations it sets for itself, the styles, manners, and programmes of its life. In mutual communion the minds do the same and know each other through the medium of the rules, constitutions, and modes of their culture.

There remains the ultimate question: What is communicated to us in the knowledge of other minds independent of all constructions and determinations ?

A bare Is-ness, unanalyzable and indivisible. . . . It is direct acquaintance with this Is-ness, indistinct and unspecified, that is presupposed in every context of its recognition. Its knowledge, as Professor Aslam remarks may be a miracle as every other knowledge is (59.145-68).

Teleology and the Philosophy of History

It was especially around 1956 that the notion of purpose in nature and history was the object of several important contributions.

Diwan M. AZRAF reminds us that the notion of finality, which enjoyed a peaceful reign in ancient and medieval philosophy, was seriously criticized by Bacon and especially by Kant before receiving the same treatment from Darwin. However, H. Driesch, Windelband, Whitehead, Eddington and other notable philosophers have tried to restore a truly scientific status to finality. Russell accuses finality of irremediable anthropomorphism. However, the question is whether or not our scientific knowledge must or even can entirely rid itself of all anthropomorphism. Purpose is not an object; we cannot discover it as a fact among the other facts, but it is a postulate of thought, without which we cannot progress in either science or philosophy (56.97-102).

Dr. M. HAMID-UD-DIN first of all clarified the notions of nature and purpose. There is purpose, he affirms, wherever there is an entirely immanent principle of activity. As far as the concept of nature is concerned, it appears to him that for science the word 'nature' has come to mean "a passive mass of phenomena," which are simply there, waiting to be discovered, since observing and experimenting can only come about with regard to a perfectly inactive entity. If it

is so, it is impossible to speak of finality with regard to nature. Absolute idealism, on the contrary, which only knows a totally active Real, could without ado attribute to this Real an internal purpose, but this is ruled out by the fact that it conceives its absolute as so perfect that it is inaccessible to human knowledge and, consequently, its purpose is also inaccessible.

Dr. Hamid-ud-din is convinced that Nature and Absolute are two human creations, on which man projects his own image. He should, on the contrary, recognize these projections for what they are, and be aware that purpose belongs to man alone and has meaning in him only. Only this recognition would deliver man from the sense of sin which has been weighing him down since the remotest ages, and would reinstate him in his true freedom (56.103-106).

The symposium of 1954 on the philosophical interpretation of history likewise brings us back to man, but to man in society. Moreover, the three philosophers who took up the question avoided the excess of Dr. Hamid-ud-din's conclusion. Prof. M. M. SHARIF tells us that

history consists in the moral, intellectual and aesthetic achievements based on resolute choices using causation -- a Divine gift -- as a tool, now obeying, now revolting against divine will working within them and in the world around them, now co-operating and now fighting with one another, now falling, now rising, and thus carving their own destinies (54.68).

Therefore, it is not true, although Danilevsky, Spengler, and Toynbee may have thought so, that human society is exactly like an organism, that the phases of its development are not repeatable, and that the blossoming of a culture cannot but be followed by its decline (54.63-64). We must reject the determinism of such assertions as much as pure indeterminism. Neither Hegel nor Marx are good teachers of interpretation of history. The *a priori* views, the exceedingly narrow viewpoints (European or Western, for example), the excessively synthetic interpretations, are declared false by reality which authorizes neither the theory of linear progress, nor the one of a well-determined pattern, nor catastrophic dialectics. We must rather recognize in history a dialectic purposiveness. There are real men and there are also ideals, final causes, that are real in the divine will and realized by men who can discover them, desire them, and strive to realize them in their own lives. Real men and ideal values are opposed by relation rather than by contrariety. The law of history is therefore not a law of war, of a struggle among contraries, but a law of love, of the attraction of men by these values which can perfect them. The law of history supposes freedom which introduces purposeful movement. This law of history does not eliminate all struggle, but rather tends to direct this struggle which is not waged against the values or the persons but against the limitations which hinder the attainment of these values.

Understood in this sense, dialectic purpose respects all the complexity of the historic real, but safeguards the idea of a master plan, the fulfillment of which is not imposed by God, but proposed to the effort of man (54.70-71). Such a theory suggests that we are truly moving towards a synthesis of Eastern and Western values. As far as we can judge, there are hardly more than three centers where such a synthesis could become operative: America, the Indo-Pakistan peninsula, and perhaps Western Europe (54.72-73).

Following these very noble views of the president of the Philosophical Congress, the more down to earth remarks of Dr. M. AJMAL may yet command interest. Insisting upon the fact that cultures are no more static than individuals but, on the contrary, changing, he sees in history the interplay of their multiple interrelations, which activates humanity as a great organism. Does this complex activity follow any laws? It seems exaggerated to speak about laws in this regard, since

we hardly have set laws, but more or less statistic constants, regularities to which numerous "accidents" are exceptions. These accidents are profoundly decisive events, but cannot be explained by these very "laws," although they may be explained in terms of other sciences (catastrophic epidemics, vast geological accidents, the birth of a Marx or a Stalin, etc.) (54.73-77).

As far as Mr. M. Abdul HAMID is concerned, he willingly accepts the existence of historical laws as a necessary postulate of every philosophy of history and considers that life, not only of the individual man, but even of the species, must have a meaning, irreducible, however, to a completely predetermined and determining design. This history resumes itself into the complex effort of men to satisfy their different types of needs, and not only a certain number of them as, for example, the Marxist interpretation would have it. This effort is dynamic but not constantly progressive. It tends, however, towards progress, that is, towards an ever more complete domination of all natural forces, governed by the principles of morality (54.77-82). Let us note once more Iqbal's inspiration in this view of history.

Mr. B. A.

has also exposed his reflexions on the dynamics of human societies. He rejects the narrow conceptions which subject this organic process to the exclusive determinism of physical factors (Hegel, Marx, Darwin), or of a reality as illusory as the concept of race, or, in general, make society follow the path of a linear evolution (interpretations inspired by Hegel, Marx, Darwin). He strongly insists on the importance of strictly human factors:

It is the psychological urge within, the will to do and strive, the impulse to create, that rises out of the depth of individuals that form and constitute societies, that is responsible for the change in the socio-cultural patterns

As the Quran says: "Verily God will not change the condition of men till they change it themselves."

It is the inward push of life and the urge for creativity that is the main, if not the sole, factor.

There is no limit to the moral and spiritual creativity of man and the true nature of social dialectic is therefore to incorporate as many divine attributes as possible within the space-time context (57.93).

Being a psychologist, Mr. S. M. Hafeez ZAIDI has recourse to the dynamic, no longer associationistic, concepts of recent social psychology. Human life consists of processes in which diverse forces or drives exercise themselves following intentionalities that must be discovered. Human groups are not simple constellations of individuals, but associations of persons dynamically bound to each other by a fundamental intention and the activities of these associations are processes of adjustment to this intention. These activities constitute a field which can be studied by experimental methods. The field of a group is not constituted by its present alone, but includes its psychological past and future. The diverse groups form a hierarchy whose basic units are integrated into higher, vaster groups. Each group must be studied in its proper field in relationship with the superior fields to which it belongs and according to a multiplicity of viewpoints. The error of many is to restrict themselves to a limited number of viewpoints or even to only one, such as Freud's 'unconscious-motivation,' MacDougall's 'parental instinct,' Sheriff's 'social perception,' etc., viewpoint.

Two series of factors have generally been studied: the factors of integration and disintegration. The integration factors are essentially the felt needs of the individual on one hand, and on the other the manifested resources of the group to satisfy these needs. This very satisfaction is the factor which retains the individual within the group. Do these factors suffice to explain the modalities of social integration? They do not appear to, and many investigators underline the social importance of the often deeply marked individuality of the members of groups.

Leighton has reduced the factors of disintegration to three, namely, persistent frustrations, persistent conflicts, and the confusion or uncertainty which obscures a clear perception of the satisfaction resources of the group. Every incident of disintegration is itself the source of a more serious disintegration, unless adjusting processes are put to work (for example, the change of leaders, of the form of government, or the change of religious beliefs). Social disintegration also favors the interior disintegration of individuals (57.71-79).

The reader will have noticed that Dr. S. M. Hafeez Zaidi's exposé is but a sketch, adorned with brief critical remarks, of group psychology as developed by the late Kurt Lewin (at that *Research Center of Group Dynamics*, first established at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, later transferred to the University of Michigan), who died in 1947.

Dr. S. M. Hafeez Zaidi has also sketched a socio-psychological program of research to pursue in Pakistan:

- 1) Analysis of the stereotyped, emotional concepts (based on beliefs, myths and legends) of the groups of the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent.
- 2) The socio-psychological implications (adjustment, maladjustment) of its industrialization.
- 3) The socio-psychological consequences of group dislocation due to migrations that have followed its partition.
- 4) The resistance reactions due to the encounter of both the old and new groups.
- 5) The internal psychological reactions of each of the groups and their motivations.
- 6) The incidence of criminal behaviour, especially adolescent, in the wake of such a dislocation (57.241-245).

Prof. Qazi M. ASLAM has given a similar expose and has emphasized Lewin's positive contributions: his vocabulary and original concepts, his study of real situations instead of laboratory cases, his substitution of practical concepts and well-determined dimensions for the vague or insufficiently technical concepts of preceding psychology. However, he says, we should moderate our enthusiasm. The movement inaugurated by Lewin doubtlessly cannot realize all the hopes it has given rise to. This movement should now apply itself to re-translate its discoveries into concrete language. It does not consider sufficiently the history of groups and of their social conflicts and limits itself almost exclusively to research in the present (where observation and experimentation can be immediate). It seems to be imbued with that type of rationalism which is convinced that virtue automatically follows true knowledge (57.65-69).

Mr. Khan BADRUDDOZA examined more in detail the subject of one of Dr. Zaidi's remarks, namely, the necessity of examining all the diverse instincts (sexual, gregarious, imitative, preservative, aggressive, sympathetic, etc.) at work in the individuals of human groups, and of integrating these analyses, if we want to arrive at an adequate social psychology (57.247-251).

Prof. M.M. SHARIF has indicated five conditions for the growth of a nation:

1) its capacity to meet with success the challenges which its geographic situation poses as well as the competition and other various pressures exercised against her by other nations (he wisely notes that it is not necessarily a drawback that a nation have powerful neighbors);

2) its creativity; concerning this he remarks that be it in the sphere of science and culture or in that of administration, creative individuals are necessarily limited in number -- an aristocracy; it is therefore necessary that national conditions allow their inspiration to infuse confidence in the masses;

3) the quantity of scientific knowledge possessed by the creative elite and disseminated into the masses;

4) the moral quality of the character of this elite group's members, and of the laws and customs which rule the nation (the qualities of an elevated national character are unity, solidarity, stability, freedom, equality, opportunity, and security);

5) the existence of plans for not only material but also spiritual national development (55.13-29).

Let us note that this was proposed before, and therefore independently of, the new political experiment directed by General Ayub Khan. Under the auspices of the new regime a report has just been published which proposes far-reaching innovations for a thorough reorganization of education in Pakistan.¹²

The Morality of International Relations

Prof. M. TIMUR gave a good exposé of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* (United Nations, December 10th, 1948) in which he insists on their derivation from the nature and dignity of the human person, and indicates the historical importance of this Declaration (54.82-87).

The maintenance of peace is a human duty the conditions of which the philosopher should analyze. We must not, Dr. I. LATIF tells us, rid ourselves of this responsibility by shrugging it off upon God. The existence of a lived religion favors peace but is not, however, the sufficient condition. In fact, religion does not of itself destroy all the factors which threaten peace: it can coexist with anarchic economy, rivalries within groups, racial pride, despotic and ambitious imperialism, etc. To favor peace, it is necessary, on the one hand, intelligently to organize society, its economy, its health services, etc., and on the other, to act on the individual self of men in order to weaken the aggressive instincts and strengthen the altruistic. This must be done indirectly by improving the human environment and directly by an education conforming itself to the findings of scientific psychology, including preventive, re-educational, orientation treatment, etc., and extended to all children -- and, in necessary measure, to their parents (54.27-44).

In this effort to transform men into patriots and citizens of the world, Mr. Ahmad KAMAL wants to assign a primordial role to religion. For, he says, the natural sciences are insufficient to assure this development and metaphysics is without authority since the different systems of metaphysics nullify each other. However, religion itself can be adulterated or turned to particular ends by those who represent or propagate it. It is therefore necessary to supervise its activities and evaluate them by their results (58.398-399).

Mr. Badruddin M. UMAR proclaims the necessity of a liberal attitude. On the basis of a rather extensive historic expose of the rise of civilization along with a critique of the present situation of Pakistan, he points out "the necessity of freeing our minds from prejudice and superstition which

are absolutely inconsistent with the rationalist temper." It is up to the Pakistan philosophers to create this liberal climate which is so greatly lacking, he thinks, in their nation (58.237-245).

Dealing with the foundations of peace among nations, Prof. Qazi M. ASLAM recalls that during the past five hundred years, thirty major wars have afflicted mankind, and that philosophers such as Emeric Cruce (in *The New Cyneas*, 1623), Rousseau, Bentham, Kant, proposed peace plans that were unfortunately followed very little. Our century has seen the establishment of international institutions to preserve peace and to foster among men and women of all nations the growing awareness of a certain sense of responsibility in this matter. Therefore a general good will for peace exists; peace plans exist, but they are often of narrow conception; morality finally penetrates into the sphere of international relations, where, however the *fait accompli* still too often prevails; the politicians cannot escape this moralizing movement, but their acquiescence is still too often encumbered with numerous mental reservations (56.15-21).

Islam can greatly help us to establish peace. For whatever eminent but informed men may have said on the subject, Islam propounds a coherent ethics of war and peace. It proposes as basic principles of conduct brotherhood of all men under one God, respect for treaties and other conventions among political groups, active protection of the oppressed, resistance to aggression which it banishes as an instrument of power, the choice of peace as soon as possible and even at the risk of being deceived by the enemy, humane treatment of war prisoners, moderation even during operations of defensive wars, respect for the laws, customs, and religion of conquered aggressors. Islam sanctions these principles on the authority of God Himself. It is by developing these Islamic principles that the Pakistani philosophers will efficaciously contribute to the establishment of peace (56.22-31)

Concerning the morality of war in our own times, Dr. HAMID-UD-DIN maintains that due to their excessively destructive power, which places them entirely outside the category of conventional weapons, any military use of atomic weapons is immoral. The question about their usage exceeds the bounds of political or military strategy. The efforts made and the plans proposed at the United Nations have unfortunately failed until now. The problem thus remains formidable and its solution uncertain. However, the discussions that have taken place were not futile and new attempts, the accomplishment of which we can hope to see finally, are now being prepared. The United Nations Organization should, accordingly, continue to receive our confidence (55.50-68).

Mr. S. Karamat HUSAIN considers that the greatest danger to peace comes from the persistent influence of pragmatic philosophy and especially from the pragmatic outlook which characterizes Marxism as well as Deweyism. The morality of pragmatism is logically a morality of power and success, which excludes every idea of an eternal justice founded in God. We can hope that the wisdom born from fear will deter men in their race to mutual extermination. Nevertheless, what we must promote beyond fear is a change of heart by a return to a religious view of existence. Man can save himself even at the eleventh hour provided he turns towards God with a broken heart and a contrite spirit (57.41-50).

Prof. Fazlur RAHMAN abounds in the same opinion and criticizes pragmatism and allied philosophies, humanism, behaviorism, Freudianism, with Moslem ideology as his vantage point. These philosophies, he states, neglect important aspects of human existence and excessively accentuate others. By exalting exclusively the empiric method of the sciences and the search for material progress, they neglect the transcendental values, ignore the spirituality of man, and brutalize conscience. By rejecting religion, they nip in the bud morality, which should sustain and direct man's admirable effort, and set lust for power in the place of humble obedience. Even when these philosophies avoid directly opposing religious conviction, they do so for pragmatic reasons.

But the necessity of belief in God is neither pragmatics nor biological; it is implied in the very nature of reason (57.149-171).

Mrs. Hosna ARA BEGUM, on the contrary, along with Mr. S. HUSAIN, considers pragmatism with sympathy and thinks that it can serve as the philosophy not only of scientists but equally of educators (57.350).

Finally, taking up more profoundly the question of the rights of man introduced, as we saw above, by Prof. M. Timur, Mr. Hamidullah SIDDIQI makes a distinction between a simple recognition, perhaps totally pragmatic and opportunist, of the rights of man and the conviction, bound to a philosophy, that these rights are universal and inalienable. The question is what is the philosophy which upholds this conviction? Many agree in thinking that it is a question of a philosophy of the natural law, emanating from God and totally transcending the contingencies of human situations. Mr. Siddiqi esteems that such a philosophy implies between the natural law and those whom it governs a relationship that is too external. Such a philosophy leads us to consider men as individual atoms closed within themselves, and endowed with absolute rights and duties, independent of the condition of men as members of a society. The myth of the Social Contract and the philosophy of liberalism derive from such a philosophy, which doubtlessly has its origin in Platonic dualism.

As a reaction against this absolutist theory, another theory has been proposed according to which man's rights and liberties derive their legitimacy and sanction from his role in the historic evolution of the community of which he is a member. This relativist theory depersonalizes man and is related to pantheism which depersonalizes God by rendering Him purely immanent to the world.

Between these two exclusive poles of transcendence and immanence Islam, precisely because of its creational and personalistic theology, maintains a valid doctrine of the rights of man. The transcendence of the Creator guarantees the absolute character of certain rights, for example of the right to life, and the objective solidarity of values. His immanence guarantees the reality of our concrete existence and the variability of our conditions and situations. His unity permits us to conceive all men as a brotherhood and their rights as extending to all. His personality guarantees ours and allows us to say that the aristocratic democracy conceived by Islam is the best political regime because it offers the greatest scope to our creative freedoms to which God has entrusted the care of fulfilling his will. It is thus within this creational doctrine that we must reconsider the rights of man and integrate the doctrine of the natural law (54.87-97).

Mr. Chaudhri M. ALI also wants to avoid two extremes, namely, the absolute sovereignty of the state and asocial individualism, and likewise finds in Islam the balanced doctrine which synthesizes the individual and social values. Islam subordinates the state to the individuals but grants to the state the degree of control required for national security, international peace, and the administration of public justice. According to Islam, all regimentation of thought is condemned and religious freedom along with freedom of expression must be granted to all. The only authority which Islam recognizes as binding in conscience is reason, and reason is subjected to experience, to induction, and to internal coherence. Faith itself, which is legitimate wherever experience cannot be direct, must confirm its titles to credibility with regard to the testimony which revelation proposes. Islam also grants every individual the right to express his disagreement or his complaints against the established order. In order to avoid anarchy, Islam refuses the individual the right to employ force to make his own opinion prevail, but it permits him to withdraw from the religious or political community to which he belongs and to emigrate elsewhere. As a political regime, it upholds the Khalif democracy system, in which each one has the right to express his opinion and

where the judges are completely independent, even from the chief of state who himself falls under their jurisdiction (54.98-108).

We can join to these views those of Mr. Mazher-ud-din SIDDIQI on the individual and social aspects of morality. Starting from Dewey who taught that reflective thought has as its function the resolution of situational problems, he affirms that moral reflexion is also a response to the needs of social adjustment. It is only in a society and in virtue of his connection with his kin that the individual becomes a moral being. However, once this is granted, we must recognize that individuals alone are the source of progress in morality. The individual is the lever of moral and social change, whereas group morality is always static, conservative and intolerant of progress, as Henri Bergson exposed at great length.

However, be it individual or social, morality fails to satisfy the deepest moral aspirations of the religious man. Only the belief in a God, Himself moral, can save human morality from relativism. Nevertheless, this belief in God is maintained and transmitted by society when the latter is permeated by the individual action of the great prophets. And this shows us that we cannot disintegrate the individual and social aspects of morality (58.29-36).

This is confirmed by Mr. Shafi M. MEMON who proposes that children should be educated into world-citizens. Life, he says, is a great cooperative spiritual adventure. We must therefore inculcate in our children's minds the idea of one humanity, the ideal of true service and a higher consciousness of their manifold relations with God and the universe (61).

The Social Sciences and Psychology

Mr. Abdul Hamid KAMALI has tackled the problem of the methods employed in the social sciences. He elucidates their fluid state and the present effort of sociologists to reformulate their viewpoints and norms. Having sprung from a more or less Newtonian conception which is static and deterministic, these sciences have little by little assimilated the notion of time, of history, of emergent evolution, and are at present involved in a search for dynamic meanings. Axiology and the philosophy of values have rendered these sciences attentive to the relation of means to ends and to the continuity of thought and action, and sociologists are now endeavoring to discover in the various cultures the differing hierarchies of values which mankind has given itself (55.239-246), whereas in philosophy, especially British, there is a theoretical lag in morals, which contributes to the crisis of our time (60.274-295)

According to several, the importance of positive psychology has not up to the present been sufficiently recognized in the university institutions of Pakistan, even though the University of Lahore, for example, had created a chair of psychology as early as 1923, and Dr. Ghulam Jilani has recently begun the *Pakistan Institute of Social Psychology* having especially in view the study of the tensions between East and West Pakistan.

There is therefore a reason why Mr. M. K. FAZLI and Dr. S. M. MOGHNI should plead for scientific psychology. The former deplores the fact that in Pakistan scientific psychology is often confused with psychiatry, psychoanalysis or even with palmistry, physiognomy, or simply with magic. Philosophers only accept it to be an integral part of their discipline, and men of science refuse to recognize its scientific nature. Quacks have exploited it without shame and novelists have filled their books with Freudian jargon. Therefore, the time has come to show that psychology has outgrown the age of James, Kulpe, Freud, and MacDougall, and that pioneers such as Pavlov, Watson, Hull, Lewin, Tolman, and Allport represent the actual currents of scientific psychology.

Beyond doubt its status as a science is still imperfect; it is in its infancy, but it deserves from the present moment a place among the scientific disciplines (56.213-218).

Dr. S. M. MOGHNI gives to his defence a national emergency slant. "All Our plans and programmes," he tells us, ". . . must be psychologically sound. . . . For these reasons I strongly feel that psychologists . . . must have a hand in formulating the objectives of our social living, as also implementing the policy decisions related to these objectives." Psychology actually is sufficiently equipped for this task by its comparative approach, its field theory, its operational definitions, etc. There are problems in Pakistan with which it alone can deal effectively: the problem of the reduction of tension among groups, problems of the psychology of education and of professional orientation, industrial problems concerning the adjustment of workers to their machines and fellow-workers, etc. (58.17-26).

Mr. Mofassil-ud-din AHMAD has suggested that the various techniques used so advantageously during World War II, group intelligence tests, audio-visual aids, techniques of psychological warfare, etc., should now be adapted to the peaceful purpose of reconstructing the Pakistan nation (60.40-50).

Dr. M. RAFI-UD-DIN has attempted to determine which one among man's many human appetites is the highest motive power of our activity. He classes these appetites into two categories: first, the category of biological desires or instincts (of sensation, sex, aggressiveness, etc.), which are necessary for the preservation of the individual and of the race, produce strong compulsion, give pleasure and are common to man and the other animals; and secondly, the category of strictly human desires, the desire for an ideal, for moral action, for knowledge and for aesthetic creation. These strictly human desires flow from intellectual consciousness, imply a freedom that transcends biological compulsion, and their satisfaction is qualitatively superior to pleasure, since it consists in attaining ends in the strict sense, and such ends can all be reduced to the contemplative value of beauty.

The dynamic unity of the human being forces us to think that there must be among these desires a dominant one which controls all the others. In fact, we have seen Freud exalt the sexual instinct; Adler, the self-assertion instinct; Marx, the desire for material security; MacDougall, the gamut of biological instincts, etc. Nevertheless, the only acceptable answer appears to be that the desire for the ideal is our dominant appetite. This answer evidently provokes a certain number of further questions concerning the ultimate meaning of this very desire, but these pertain to the field of metaphysics (58.261-265).

Dr. M. AJMAL also utilizes the notion of the ideal to evaluate both individuals and cultures. There is no man who does not realize in some way the human ideal. We can in some way conceive of the "normal" man, but it is impossible for us to conceive of a perfectly abnormal man. In psychotherapy we must with Jung recenter man on effective love and creativity rather than on social adjustment as proposed by others who deify the social group. True love is that which constitutes objective relations and integrates the individual.

Cultures should be evaluated in the light of their "ideal-limit" and according to the human quality of the individuals they produce. These ideals are manifested by the symbols that these cultures employ to re-enforce their institutions. If we consider for example the Muslim culture, we see that it unfortunately does not employ such symbols as the "child" and the cross. We have no feast to commemorate the birth of the Prophet and, on the other hand, what characterizes individuals of Muslim culture, at least in Pakistan, is what Kierkegaard has called the "aesthetic attitude" as opposed to the "moral attitude" of the real person. We do not feel committed, called to become eminently personal individuals, heroes. The cross, the symbol of universal love, remains

foreign to us. The courage to envisage as possible setback, failure, crucifixion does not constitute an element of our spiritual resources. We remain immature, morbidly attached to the love of our mothers and to our very culture as to a great mother. This is why even our intellectuals are satisfied with theoretically assimilating liberal values from the West but are afraid to put them to the test in this country. The time has come to bring masculinity to our culture by turning towards those activities which require courage and creativeness (58.123-130).

Dr. Randolph C. SAILER has treated with competence the relationships between persons and technological culture. He defines the person as:

. . . a being in control of his own destiny, who can choose goals intelligently for himself and can work towards their fulfillment (58.111).

The real person is in touch with inner resources that well out in productive expression. Since his feeling of self-worth is firm he does not fear to face himself in solitude; he need not seek the tonic of constant approval from those around him. Yet he is far from being isolated. He is responsible to himself and to others. He finds life full of meaning, and its deepest significance in relatedness. He is not confined to an individualistic self, but contributes his individuality to the group (58.112).

The freedom which characterizes the person is not self-indulgence, but the power to find real significance in life through the development of one's own best powers.

As far as technological culture is concerned, its very rapidity, and the significance and novelty of the strides by which it progresses, call for not only a generalized primary, but also for a more extended secondary and superior education. Indeed, the need for specialists is becoming more and more urgent. Technological progress offers even to women more and more opportunities. It introduces lives regulated by a clock, constant competition, rapid communication, information made general among the masses, and possibilities of rapid individual development which divest age of its traditional prestige.

The technological revolution brings with it dangers for individuals because it renders them strangers to their traditional culture. They feel their values are threatened. Being submitted to the discipline of industrial life, their freedom threatens to turn into individualism or is ready to abdicate in favor of economic or political dictatorship. However, their personality can also find scope for development in the technological revolution. In the first place, since this revolution is after all but a cultural one, it cannot change biological heredity, nor can it change radically at least the natural institutions of marriage and the family. Secondly, technological revolution can even improve these two natural institutions, since the independence and economic security along with the variety of employment which it affords to industrial workers enables them to contract marriages based upon love rather than upon an agreement between the families to which the betrothed belong. As soon as such marriages become frequent, the perverse distinction according to which there is a double standard of morality, one for men and the other for women, soon loses its binding force. (In this regard, it is interesting to note that as I write these lines the new Pakistani regime is promulgating a marriage code essentially based on monogamy.) Finally the facility of transportation in an industrialized country improves social life by permitting parents and friends to meet at will.

As this revolution is now in progress, it is in a technologically developed society that the Pakistani philosophers are called upon to work. Let them remember that before being manipulators of men or adjusters of individuals to their environment, psychologists should be promoters of human personality (58.109-121).

Dr. M. HAMID-UD-DIN is equally insistent that we direct our attention to the individual and always keep in mind his culture. We know very little about cultures and the knowledge we do have of them is often vitiated by biases which come to us from the West, for example, the bias that technological changes are the essential determinants of cultural changes, or that technological development cannot experience a stalemate without corresponding stalemates in cultural development. This, he says, is not true of Asia or Africa. In the Orient, at least, religious have greater import than economic factors. Here they are the cause more than a product of culture. Now religion is of itself unrealistic and likewise produces an unrealistic culture, which devaluates technological factors. Hence, the East is more dogmatic, more unchanging, than the West. The East concerns itself more with the other world, with eternal realities. In the East those who determine the changes in culture are not scientists but religious men.

The non-technological cultures can be described as follows: their political structure is generally monarchic; the spiritual power is developed but is subjected to the political power; they do not educate the masses except in their religious duties whereas the intellectual elite of such cultures engage themselves in pedantic hairsplitting theological disquisitions; their economy is primitive and their social system is static; they propose as the only end the glory of the next world while during this life such cultures obviate affective isolation and neurotic anxiety by promoting a spiritual fraternity, limited however to the adherents of one religion.

In these civilizations, individual acculturation is profound; there are few mutants, rebellious deviators. The type of super-ego which they magnify molds individuals who are often unconscious of the process. These civilizations favor conformity, discourage eccentricity, reduce the variety of unpredictable types of conduct and limit the role of adaptation. Centered on few needs, such civilizations are highly integrated and this very cohesion is the cause of emotional tensions among those few of their members who are not suited to conformity. But if such societies happen to disintegrate, then the rebellious mutants have their opportunity, whereas unhappiness spreads over the masses.

It is only by taking all this into account that the Pakistani psychologists will be able to help advance the human person in their country (58.91107).

Speaking about frustrations caused by the rigidity of cultures, and more generally, about the conflicts arising out of the complexity of life, Mr. Syed Matiur RAHMAN draws attention to their necessary function, since man cannot progress unless he encounters obstacles he must overcome. A well-adjusted individual is one whose frustration tolerance is such that he withstands frustrations without resorting to abnormal or neurotic modes of conduct. Psychologists have studied and classified conflicts as well as the various kinds of sane or neurotic responses by which man can meet such conflicts. Mental hygiene has thus developed and it is comforting to note that it has courageously and optimistically accorded a positive value to conflicts (58.267-272).

Mr. Mofassil-ud-din AHMAD has shown what type of collaboration must exist between mental hygiene and education. Education tends to develop well-adjusted personalities, mental hygiene strives to correct maladjustments and to provide individuals with that interior equilibrium which will enable them to assimilate with profit the lessons and example of their educators (58.247-254).

In the domain of mental hygiene proper an excellent and quite original communication of Dr. Muhammad AJMAL presented the concept of acceptance in the light of the American school of counselling, but on the basis of personal case-work. Acceptance "involves the operation of: (a) imaginative reversal with the client, (b) reflection or interpretation by an original mythical or

poetic image, (c) regarding the client every time he comes for analysis as a new, unfamiliar person, and (d) having the capacity to play his role" (59.28-35).

Concerning education itself, several other members insisted on the necessity of anchoring it in a sane philosophy. for Mr. Ihsanullah KHAN this philosophy cannot but be a religious one, for religion alone integrates all values (57.271-288). For Mr. Abdul QAYYUM, on the contrary, the scientific vision of the world must replace entirely the religious ideology based on faith (55.179-185). As for Mr. S.Z. CHOUDHURI, he also wants an entirely secular education, but based on the idea of the spiritual unity of the human race and on a humanistic metaphysics (56.61-69).

Finally, a rather fashionable educational philosophy, that of Sir Percy Nunn, has been sharply criticized by Dr. Muhammed RAFIUDDIN (59.236-242).

For Dr. G. JILANI philosophy is:

. . . wisdom concerned with human values. It is a reflection on the conflict of values to discover which values are more desirable . . . Two points emerge out of this view of philosophy: as a form of criticism of human values or ends, it must concern itself with the world of men, with the great and momentous issues of life and death; secondly, it should not feel shy of dealing with the passions and conflicts of humanity living today, of bringing about understanding and order in its affairs. To do this, it is not necessary to decipher the secrets of eternity, with which philosophy is usually identified. It is, therefore, neither the spirit nor the aim, but the subject-matter in which philosophy differs from science.

It should therefore be based upon experience. But:

It is not to be inferred from this that philosophy is a slave to the existing conditions of the time. On the contrary, philosophy is an active reflection on the existing conditions with reference to the past with a view to moulding the future. . . . The role of philosophy is additive and transforming in the history of civilization (59.1-2).

It is with this view of philosophy in mind that Dr. Jilani has attached himself to a socio-psychological enquiry about the complex and complicated problems facing men today in Pakistan:

What are, for instance, the basic values that we Pakistanis in the modern world of today are expected to cultivate? What is the end to which our educational system should be directed? What are the immediate and intermediate goals that we should put before the nation so that achievement of the final goal may be facilitated? And the like. (59.3-4).

His survey of the mentality of students of the Dacca University revealed to him that over 70% of them feel dissatisfied with the prevailing academic atmosphere, or are otherwise frustrated. Poverty, non-availability of books, wrong choice of subjects, inadequacy of teaching methods, sterility of teacher-student relationship, and exploitation of students by the politicians stood out as the most important causes of frustration in the minds of the students. Individual interviews led him to suspect that most students have no moorings in life and that teachers seem to have no hold on them. His next enquiry related to religion. It revealed that only 55% feel attracted to Islam and this in proportion to their having read the Quran usually in childhood and generally in Arabic only, a language which they hardly understand. Even among these, many were disturbed by all sorts of doubts concerning the truth of Islam and its capacity for helping them solve their problems.

Summing up his findings, Dr. Jilani drew up the following outline:

- 1) Students start their career as Pakistanis with no positive traits of personality.
- 2) Their immediate environmental conditions are highly unsatisfactory and frustrating.
- 3) The turnings and twistings of political parties and the character displayed by the majority of the political leaders have created disgust and bewilderment among the youth.
- 4) Their education has not helped them to develop any idealism in life.
- 5) Nor have they moulded their daily life according to the concrete ideal presented in the person of the Holy Prophet,
- 6) Nor in the person of the Quaid-e-Azam.
- 7) They feel no sense of attachment and security in relation to their teachers and therefore do not look up to them for guidance in their day-to-day lives.
- 8) They have no respect for and, therefore, expect no guidance from the religious leaders either.
- 9) Of religion they admit they do not know much and many feel no attraction towards it.
- 10) They have been greatly shocked by the actual secularism of those very leaders who outwardly professed that they were taking Islam as their practical guide even in politics. However, the attitude of the leaders of the present regime, who believe in doing things rather than making big pronouncements, seems to have already restored to some extent the lost prestige and dignity of Islam in the young wavering minds.

Further enquiry showed that buried under heavy debris of suspicions, jealousies, prejudices, frustrations, ignorance, anti-religious temptations, deep down in the innermost recesses of those young minds, there is still something basically stable, the lingering hope and a wish that religion will guide them one day.

This situation needs sympathy rather than hatred, appreciation rather than condemnation, repentance on the part of those who have been responsible for this state of affairs in the minds of the youth, and serious thinking by those in whose hands the reformation of the youth now lies. Favorable conditions have been created by the present regime to make the proper approach to the minds of the youth. It is up to the thinkers and human engineers to start immediate work on the ground already provided and to prepare new ground for the future as a long-term policy. A vast field for persistent and cooperative effort is open (59.8-20).

Dr. Jilani's important presidential address which I have just summarized can be supplemented by his report of further findings on the same subject (60.330) and by Mr. Alauddin AKHTAR'S Study of the "Causes of Indiscipline in Educational Institutions" (59.198-204). It has also been discussed and criticized by Mr. F. RAHMAN (60.330).

Other valuable papers in Psychology should at least be mentioned: on "Intelligence Testing," by Mrs. Zahida BIRJIS (59.219-221); on "Methodological Variables in the Study of Perceptual Thresholds," by Prof M. U. AHMAD (59.205-218); on the "Influence of the Cultural Element in the Perception of Time," by Miss Aziz M. HUSAIN (59.222-226); on "Phobias," by Mr. Munir QURESHI (59.230-235); and on the "Attitude of Undergraduate Girls towards Their Future Husbands," by Miss Iftikhar-un-nisa HASAN (59.227-229).

In the matter of rational psychology, Mrs. Nayyar MANSOOR has contributed a thoughtful paper on "Life After Death" (59.279-284). She first vindicates Plato's main argument based on the 'simplicity of the soul' by restating in a refreshing way the genuine nature of human consciousness.

Then she revives Kant's argument in his *Critique of Practical Reason*. Mr. Shafi M. MEMON also treated the same subject (60.302-309).

History of Philosophy

To complete our survey of the philosophical activity in Pakistan, we must likewise turn to the philosophical authors and doctrines which have been the subject of more or less critical exposés during the sessions of the Congress. In Western philosophy, the authors who were the preferred object of historical study were Hume, Berkeley, Kant, Nietzsche, Bergson, Dewey, Dawes, Hicks, the Logical Positivists, and the Existentialists. We omit any detailed analysis of these contributions, since they afford less scope for the expression of the personal philosophy of their authors, in which we are primarily interested.

The history of Islamic philosophy has been the object of a few general or particular studies. The general studies comprise the paper of Mr. M. S. HASAN AL-MA'SUMI on the theory of prophecy according to Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi and Ibn-Sina (58.345-349) as well as Ibn-Bajjah (Avempace) (61), and Mr. B. H. SIDDIQI'S brief survey of the development of the teaching of Ethics (*Ilm al-Akhlaq*) in the Muslim world (59.243-251).

The more particular studies are the following:

Mr. M. S. HASAN AL-MA'SUMI has revealed to his colleagues the contents of a manuscript of Al-Farabi, which is a synopsis of the works of Aristotle and of which Dr. R. Walzer was in 1956 preparing a critical edition in Oxford (56.143-150). He has also given them a short but excellent expose of Al-Farabi's political philosophy (57.333-339).

Mr. Abdul KHALIQ has presented the fundamentals of Al-Ghazali's ethics (60.51-67). Since we recalled earlier the arguments of the Mu'tazilites against the possibility of seeing God, their refutation by Al-Ghazali may be mentioned here, as recorded by Mr. Khaliq (*ib.*, 66). It may also please the reader to find here Al-Ghazali's charming allegory of the purification of the heart:

Once the Chinese and the Greeks held a contest in the art of drawing and painting. One part of a big room was given to the Chinese and the other to the Greeks. In between was hung a curtain so that they might not see the work of each other. The Greeks decorated the wall with many rare colors; but the Chinese proceeded to brighten their side and polish it. When the curtain was raised, the beautiful art of the former was reflected on the latter's wall in its original beauty and charm. Such is the way of the saints who strive for the purification of their heart to make it worthy of the knowledge of God Most High (*ib.*, 55).

Mr. B. H. SIDDIQI has sketched the plot of the famous philosophical romance, *Hai Ibn Yaqzan*. He still attributes it to the Andalusian philosopher, Abu Bakr Ibn Tufail, who died in Maghrab in 1185 or 1188. But in a book published in 1959, *Le recit de Hayy Ibn Yaqzan*, commenté par les textes d'Avicenne (Desclée de Brouwer, Paris), Mlle A. M. Goichon attributes it definitely to Ibn Sina. The author leads his hero, Hai, a prefiguration of Crusoe, from mere sense experience right to the mystical heights of the vision of the One, following as a guide the Quran and borrowing from such other sources as Aristotle, Galienus, Ptolemy, Al-Farabi, etc. (58.327-333).

Dr. K. M. JAMIL has supplied us with an elementary study on the immortality of the self in Jalal-ud-din Rumi (55.141-148) and another on the nature of intellect in 13th century Sufism

(60.296-301). The term 'intellect' stands here for what Rumi calls partial reason or false intelligence which is the source of imagination (*khayâl*) and illusory suggestion (*waswasah*).

Dr. Serajul HAQUE turned to an anti-Sufi of the 14th century, Ibn Taimiyya, and expounded his two degrees of truth: natural truth (*haqiqat al-kaunitiya*) and truth of faith (*haqiqat al-diniya*), both of which are required for salvation (60.212-217).

Dr. Abdul Wahid HALEPOTA showed the superiority of the conception of society by Shah Waliullah (1703-1762) over that of Spencer and Comte. Shah Waliullah presents a very organic theory of society, based on the unity of mankind as inculcated by the Quran (57.341-346). Dr. Halepota also developed his own concept of a synthetic philosophy of religion according to the method of Shah Waliullah (60.68-75).

Mr. B. A. DAR presented an outline of the thought of the late Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, a dominating figure and one of the first Muslim modernists of the nineteenth century (died in 1893). Sayyid Ahmad Khan wanted to revivify the Quran's teaching by reconciling it with the context of modern, naturalist, and rationalist civilization. He therefore attempted to show the conformity between the teachings of the Quran on the one hand, and common sense and empirical reason on the other, along with the conformity existing between the Quran's teachings and nature, a nature which he conceived, however, after the manner of the nineteenth century. Being inspired especially by Ghazali and ruled by a sort of anti-mystic scepticism, he succeeded only in depriving Islam of its religious sense of mystery, and reducing it to a kind of natural, extremely impoverished theodicy (56.139-142).

A History of Islamic Philosophy is being compiled by about 300 scholars under the editorship of Prof. M. M. Sharif. Two volumes, comprising over 1400 pages, are ready for the press. We may also mention Prof. M. M. Sharif's article on "Islamic View of Being and Sense," contributed to the large symposium edited by Prof. F. J. von Rintelen (*Sinn und Sein: Ein philosophisches Symposium*, Max Niemeyer Verlag, Tübingen, 1960, 860 pages).

The Philosophy of Professor M. M. Sharif

To compensate for the disadvantage of the problem-by-problem presentation which I have adopted so far, I shall now offer to the reader a brief glimpse of the thought of Prof. M. M. Sharif, a philosopher of international renown, to whose initiative the Pakistan Philosophical Congress owes its existence. He himself has recounted the evolution of his thought in the collective volume entitled *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*,¹³ first published in 1936, and republished in a revised and enlarged edition in 1952. In spite of its date of publication, this exposé continues to represent Prof. Sharif's thought.

From empirical idealism stemming from his years of study in India, Prof. Sharif shifted to realism under the influence of his Cambridge professors, G. E. Moore and B. Russell, and during his later years, to what he calls a dialectical monadism. He has studied with interest the Arab and Indian philosophers, but feels more attuned to modern Western thought.

Philosophy, he says, must find a place for the sciences in the systematic whole of knowledge. We must even say that philosophy cannot take its departure from anything but experience. Experience does not only consist in our apprehension of objects, but includes those objects themselves. However, the ultimate foundation of experience lies perhaps beyond experience itself. If it is true that the sciences consider what *is*, history what *was*, prediction what *will be*, philosophy as synoptic knowledge must consider all that and, furthermore, place man in intimate relationship with the ground of every form of existence, and this gives a religious outlook to philosophy.

By his immediate reflection, man directly knows his experience as an experience. He recognizes its dynamic character as orientated towards the future. What is directly experienced has an immediate evidence which establishes the conviction of its reality. Certain realities without being directly apprehended in experience are, however, indirectly connected with it in such a way that they participate in its evidence. Prof. Sharif calls 'existent' those realities which are known as temporal or spatial; those known only in time he calls 'temporal'; and those which are known as transcending time and space he calls 'subsistent.'

To be truly known is not the essence of reality, it is but an external mark of the essence. Reality is generally knowable and known, but whether or not ultimate reality is, not to say known, but simply knowable, is another question.

We know our perceptions as well as our sensations as responses to the action of another. This other one, different from us, is the *basis* of our sensation, whereas the knowing subject is but the *base*. However, he is the base for sensations only in so far as he is attentively conscious. Sensation is therefore bi-polar. It results from an *a priori* (mind) and an *a posteriori* (object). Both transcend in some fashion the individual subject and, consequently their ground or ultimate root is equally transcendent and supraindividual.

The body, which is transcended by the mind, is itself different from the world. As far as the mind is concerned, since it knows by consciousness, it cannot be more unknowable than objective reality; it is indeed known at least as the knowing subject. We must therefore reject the (characteristically Indian) distinction between the empirical and the transcendental subject. I know myself and can assert many facts concerning myself, and similarly I know the things in themselves notwithstanding objections to the contrary.

By means of an analogy developed from the self as the starting point, I know other base-entities of knowledge, that is, minds or monads which are not existent, but subsistent (transcending space and time). The higher monads are immanent to, yet transcending, the lower ones.

The things-in-themselves are the ground of phenomena and they can be known by analogy with the monad which I am. The phenomena are relative to their context, and yet retain self-identity, although these phenomena are not totally discrete.

By direct apprehension we are informed about the existence of objects, but not yet explicitly about their nature. It is only by the judgment that this explicit knowledge is given to us. The judgment presupposes four functions which condition it: (a) the function of reproducing the object in the mind, (b) the recognition which renders it familiar, (c) identification in the light of previous experiences, and (d) the ideation or abstraction which forms from it a universal concept. It is in this way that we obtain our empirical ideas which are known as such. It is also by a similar process that we obtain the clear view of the *a priori* ideas. Our judgments can indeed be either *a posteriori*, synthetic, or *a priori* and analytic.

Each judgment is selective and therefore partial, but it is possible to form systems of judgments either by immediate inference, by deduction, or by induction. Universal *a posteriori* premises are but probable; analogical conclusions also lack certainty, but there exist universal, necessary principles that are *a priori* and hence absolutely certain. If these principles are wrongly enunciated, they evidently lose their certitude along with their truth. For example, the principle of causality can be enunciated in terms of the succession of cause and effect, which is nonsense, since the series of converging forces which we call the cause must evidently be present simultaneously with the effect at the very instant of causation.

Every judgment supplies us with fresh ideas, for an idea is nothing but condensed judgment. The objects have manifold meanings along with manifold qualities or values. Value concepts are as *a priori* as the categories.

Truth consists in a correspondence between the mind and the object. But since every judgment is relative to its context and therefore partial, the ultimate truth cannot be obtained but through systems of judgments. The concrete and not only logical coherence of these systems has degrees, and ultimate truth thus remains an ideal.

Knowing is an activity. Monadic activity is dialectical, not in the Hegelian or Marxist sense, but in so far as it is a correlated movement of beings essentially like my self. This movement goes from the self through the complementary not-self to a more developed self which is a synthesis of the former self and the not-self. In man this dialectical movement is explicitly teleological, in animals it is incipiently so, and among other beings it is simply *de facto* teleological. The total dialectical movement of all the monads, which integrates the movement of each monad, is an endless process. Manifold monadic organizations appear at the different stages of this dialectic. At times some monads repel others and conflicts arise, but more commonly they attract each other and the totality of these attractions and repulsions produces the rhythms of world history.

The ends to which the monads tend by their dialectical movement must be distinguished from objects and monads, and constitute a tertiary species of reality. Indeed, they consist in syntheses of subject and object. Values are the characteristic qualities of those ends. Everything which opposes their realization is called disvalue.

In a more recent paper (59.56-66), Prof. Sharif has taken up again the question of values and developed his thought about them. Granting to the subjectivists that "all values do not arise in human consciousness at the same time or at one time in the same degree," and to the sociologists that "again at some period of history certain values are specially emphasized because in the preceding periods they have been more or less ignored or because they have only recently entered in their fullness in social consciousness (as reason in Greek society, self-control in Buddhism, love in Christianity, justice in Islam and power over Nature in the modern West)," he admits that "these facts give the fair impression that *ultimate* ends are different in different circumstances for the same individual as well as for different individuals, lending the appearance of plausibility" to the subjectivist and the sociologist theory of values.

However, borrowing Professor Macbeath's distinction between *formal ideals* and *operative ideals*, he shows that such theories keep in view only the operative ideals of either individuals or societies and both completely ignore the formal ideals. But this does not prevent those formal ideals from being "the standards by which the operative ideals and the means to them are to be tested." The formal ideals are "rooted in human nature and are the same for the whole of humanity." The operative ideals are 'the same ideals as actually apprehended and pursued by different societies and different individuals.'

The most important of the formal ideals is life itself which forms the basis for all other values. Others are goodwill or devotion of the self to other goods in themselves, exemplary conduct and character, duty, self-regulation, social service, love of benevolence in its different forms, justice, social liberty, beauty, truth, happiness, freedom in the various fields of human life, strength and power, health, and lastly unity expressing itself internally, in the harmony of thought, passion, and action, of action and profession and in the integration of the self as a whole, and, externally, in social organization and group solidarity. "These values in themselves are consciously, half consciously or even unconsciously desired and, in right ways or wrong, pursued by most individuals in every society. They are the ethical heritage of mankind. "

There are certain instrumental values which are generally desired as means to the ends in themselves. These are food, clothes, and shelter hospitality, honesty, efficiency and mutual trust; private property, Social security and public services in the fields of health, education, communication, defence, etc.

Some of those second-level means-values appear in different social groups owing to their cultural differences either as special features or with special emphasis.

For example, the peculiar means-values of the Western culture of today are wealth, industrialization, mechanization, free enterprise, high standard of living, recreation, material comfort, equality of sexes and pragmatic adjustments. The Asians, on the other hand, emphasize the family, the home, simplicity of life, contentment and sex morality.

The goods-in-themselves are so closely interrelated and interdependent that each can become a means for the realization of others. The value of means is determined solely by the end they serve, but when the goods-in --themselves are used as means, they draw light from the ends they serve and also shine in their own glory.

Values and particularly duties sometimes seem to conflict in particular situations. But where they do so, "the lesser of them have to be sacrificed for the sake of the greater of them" (59.59-62).

Prof. Sharif's conclusion in *Contemporary Indian Philosophy* treats of the source of values. The source of *a priori* values and categories must be supra-spiritual, non-dialectical, and absolute. Such is the Being we call God. We have a concept of Him, but it is less certain that we have proved His existence. We must doubtlessly hold with Kant that His actual existence is at best a plausible hypothesis. But faith can bind us to Him as to the ultimate real, not only on the plane of thought, but on the plane of being. In fact,

The testimony of the whole of our soul -- the criteria of the intellect, clarity and consistency; the criterion of emotion, satisfaction or *rasa*; the criteria of our will, our highest hopes -- all lead not to the knowledge (for the finite cannot know the infinite), but to the faith that such an infinite Absolute which is Perfect Knowledge, Perfect Beauty and Perfect Good, does exist i.e., does subsist as the Ultimate and Absolute monad immanent in and yet transcending all finite monads and the phenomenal world that comes into existence as a result of their interaction.

Conclusion

As much by the seriousness of their reflections as by the nature of the problems they are dealing with, Pakistani philosophers occupy a respectable place in the world society of philosophers. Those who know the economic difficulties of every description which they must face in a country which is but emerging when compared to the nations that are technologically more developed, and the illiteracy which is still prevalent in spite of the efforts already being made to raise the level of the intellectual culture among the Pakistani masses, will appreciate so much the more the quality of the teaching and of the publications of this courageous elite.

We find among some of them a type of moderate skepticism with regard to the traditional pretensions of metaphysics, for example, in the case of Mr. Kazem-ud-din AHMAD who, retaining the conclusions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, doubts that metaphysics has a real content, but

remains faithful, however, to the conclusions of the second *Critique* when he exalts what he calls the philosophical attitude tending entirely towards a synthetic vision of the future, based on science and common sense, and committed to satisfy our needs (58.7-15). We find among others a sectarian submission to the method of linguistic analysis and to the anti-metaphysical trend which became fashionable with a number of English philosophers between the years 1930 and 1950, but is now waning. Among still others, the will to revivify philosophy results in various types of eclecticism without much depth but inspired with a common sense which avoids extremes, and which is animated by the hope that some genius, whose coming they long for, will complete or even surpass their attempts.

More generally, however, we find, in spite of the marginal doubts about the validity of the philosophical endeavor, a thought that is firm, lively, with wide interest, and a profound confidence in the supreme enterprise of reason, which confidence takes root in the ever vivifying soil of religious faith. This is, I think, the attitude of the majority of Pakistani philosophers. It continues to be inspired by the stimulating message of Muhammad Iqbal who never ceased proclaiming the supremacy of God and the vicegerency of man who is entrusted by God to continue His creation.

I deem it fitting to conclude by summarizing a few pages of Prof. Bahadur ALI whose views are remarkable for their balance, although exception could be taken to some of them.

Philosophy, he tells us, is a systematic study of the ultimate nature of reality. This is what distinguishes it from science on the one hand and from art and religion on the other

The sciences study restricted aspects of reality only. They fall, Iqbal would say, on the lifeless body of nature like so many vultures which then disperse, each carrying away a morsel of its flesh. The sciences treat facts from the purely objective point of view. Philosophy, on the contrary~ treats them as items of experience in relation to the interest and aspirations of the thinking subject. The sciences do not concern themselves with the question of the ultimate origin and of the ultimate purpose of the realities which they observe. But philosophy does just that and this is why it can judge the sciences and their conclusions in the light of the ultimate criterion, God, the Highest Good. By defending in ethics the relative freedom of man philosophy delimits the principle of mechanical necessity which is too widely generated by the sciences. Philosophy also critically inquires into the postulates of science in order to scrutinize their nature and establish their validity. Contrary to the sciences, philosophy is entirely critical since it justifies even the very first principles of all knowledge.

Though Prof. Ali maintains, I think erroneously, that the philosophical method is precisely the scientific method, still he holds that philosophy differs from science due to its material object, which is the whole of experience.

Moreover, philosophy differs from religion although both have the same material object. They differ as to their respective ends and methods. The end of religion is the salvation of the soul; that of philosophy is the discovery of truth. The method of religion is dogmatic; that of philosophy is the method of critical inquiry. One is governed by faith, the other by logic; while the philosopher reasons and disputes, the religious man believes, acts, lives, and loves. The religious feeling must be tested in the fire of metaphysical thought, which is pitiless and wants only truth. But religion is not simply a branch of philosophy for, unlike philosophy which is nothing but thought, religion is an expression of the whole man. Philosophy should therefore, while it evaluates religion, realize the central position of religion.

Science only tries to penetrate that portion of total experience which comprises the physical facts, but it cannot validly deny the rest of reality. Reciprocally, religion cannot deny the physical facts but it rightfully considers the subjective facts, the spiritual aspirations and emotions, as more

immediate, real, and concrete. Philosophy, on the other hand, is basically empirical since it considers the whole of experience, including science and religion. In the final analysis, we can therefore say that religion depends on philosophy, for it is a necessary application of metaphysics to life. It is necessary to elevate man above the sub-human level and to establish his moral life in God, the first source of every value. Religion should become as philosophical as possible, and likewise to find its truth philosophy should become fully religious.

Science by its conquests has forced nature to minister to our material welfare. But it belongs to philosophy to nourish and refine the spirit which lives in us, and to religion to establish within us that interior peace without which we cannot realize the reign of Law and Justice in this world. Man as a thinking being has the duty to doubt, scrutinize, philosophize, and his quest for wisdom must turn into the prayer of the Prophet: "O God! increase my knowledge" (56.175-179).

Notes

1. A less extensive version of this survey was published in French in *Archives de philosophie*, XXIII (1960), 403-52. I am indebted to Mr. L. Abello, S.J., for his assistance in preparing the English translation of this enlarged version, which has been brought up to date to 1961.

2. We shall use the following abbreviations throughout the article:

54.12 for *First Session Pakistan Philosophical Congress*, Lahore, April 4-6, 1954, page 12.

55.25 for *Second Session Pakistan Philosophical Congress*, Karachi, February 20-22, 1955, page 25.

56.36 for *Third Session* . . . , Peshawar, April 10-12, 1956, page 36.

57.23 for *Fourth Session* . . . , Dacca, February 15-17, 1957, page 23.

58.79 for *Fifth Session* . . . , Hyderabad (Sind), March 15-18, 1958, page 79.

59.67 for *Sixth Session* . . . , Lahore, March 7-10, 1959, page 67.

60.51 for *Seventh Session* . . . , Dacca, January 9-12, 1960, page 51.

61 for *Eighth Session* . . . , Karachi, January 11-14, 1961, No page numbers will be given for this session, since the Proceedings have not appeared.

3. Al-Ghazali's *Tahafut Al-Falasifah (Incoherence of the Philosophers)*, Eng. trans. by Sabih Ahmad Kamali (Pakistan Philosophical Congress, Publication no.3, distributed by M. A. Darr, 8 McLeod Road Lahore, 1958).

4. M. Iqbal, *The Secrets of the Self*, trans. R. A. Nicholson (Lahore, 1944), Introduction, p. xxvii.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 79-80.

6. M. Iqbal, *Persian Psalms*, trans. Prof. Arberry (Lahore, 1948), p. 25.

7. A. Fernandes, *Man's Divine Quest: An Appreciation of the Philosophy of the Ego* according to Sir Mohammed Iqbal, reprint from *Annali Lateranensi*, XX (rome, 1956), 265-334.

8. G. C. Dev., *Idealism and Progress* (Das Gupta & Co., Ltd., 54/3 College St., Calcutta-12, 1952); *Idealism: A New Defence and a New Application* (Dacca University 1958; distributor: Pakistan Cooperative Book Society, Dacca).

9. H. Bergson, *The Two Sources of Morality and Religion*, trans. R. A. Audra and C. Brereton (New York: Holt, 1949), p. 210.

10. Abdus Salam Khan, *The Essence of the Teaching of the Quran*, p. 185.

11. B. Russell, *The Scientific Outlook*, p. 275.

12. *Report of the Commission on National Education*, Pakistan Ministry of Education (Karachi: Government of Pakistan Press, 1960).

13. *Contemporary Indian Philosophy*, ed. S. Radhakrishnan and J. H. Muirhead (2nd rev. and enlarged ed.; London: Allen & Unwin, 1952), pp. 565-90.

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