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The Authenticity of the Text in Hermeneutics

By
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The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

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Preface

George F. McLean

The work of hermeneutics rightly began as interpreting sacred texts. These bear the properly transcendent message of God to humankind regarding His goals for creation and the ways to realize them in time. Each culture has been endowed with such knowledge which enlightens the mind and with values which move the heart. Some even have been recipients of explicitly dictated Sacred Texts.

In the past the focus of scientific knowledge was entirely upon objective knowledge to which the human appreciation of reality was restricted. In this light hermeneutics was concerned with how the text stated objective truth. In recent times human self-awareness has taken dramatic steps. This has made possible a greater appreciation of the reality of human subjectivity, its development through time, and indeed its character as the highest of God's creation. In this light hermeneutics has tended to shift from the external referent of the text to the text itself, as bearing through history the creative work of human subjectivity.

Today we stand at a crossroad at which objectivity and sub-jectivity meet and generate new challenges and opportunities. This has led to important concerns, especially in relation to sacred texts. If human subjectivity enters the picture would it not be at the expense of what is truly divine and transcendent in a text; and if so must human interpretation be suppressed in the reading of the text. In that case, one is faced with the impossible choice of either re-jecting human historicity in order to be faithful to the sacred text, or needing to journey through time alone without divine guidance. The first path leads to fundamentalism, the second to secularism; both, in the words of Parmenides, are "all impossible ways".

In the face of this dilemma Professor Seyed Musa Dabadj, a professor at Qom in Iran, in this work, written at the Catholic Uni-versity of America in Washington, has accomplished something of the greatest moment for hermeneutics, both in general and, by implication, for Sacred texts in particular. He has entered upon the issue through the contemporary Betti-Gadamer debate over objecti-vity and subjectivity in the hermeneutics of legal texts. This enables him to identify the special role of subjectivity for the text, which, he shows, lives and speaks through time via the human reader.

But he has done something more, and of crucial importance to the dilemma described above. With Heidegger, he has shown how Transcendent Being emerges in time precisely through the *Dasein* or the human as conscious. By tracing the text to these metaphysical roots he establishes the deeper truth of Kierkegaard's insight that subjectivity is indeed objectivity. In the light Professor Dabadj is able both to protect the text from relativization by the reader and to show how, on the contrary, the reader gives voice to the meaning of the text in time. This enables the text to guide humankind in its many and ever changing circumstances.

More the deeply insightful and comprehensive vision of this work has yet broader importance at this turn of millennia. For four centuries philosophy has focused on reducing all to human reason in a way that allowed for humanization only at the lost of the divine borne by cultural traditions of the many peoples. Seyed Musa Dabadj points out another, more hopeful route, namely, a humaniza-tion of our world which is authentic precisely because a new transcendence in the divine. His is a work which must be read.

Introduction

Seyed Musa Dibadj

This work examines the text as the reference of interpretation as this generally is employed in the human sciences (*Geistes-wissenschaften*).

It will investigate the fundamental question of understanding the text, from the standpoint of contemporary hermeneutics. The aim here is to show that an adequate hermeneutical theory presupposes an understanding of being. One reason for pursuing this aim is a recent debate about the possibility of objectivity in interpretation. In particular, Emilio Betti does not want attention to the role of human subjectivity to undermine the place of the text as the source of objective criteria for interpretation. This issue is not simply a matter of epistemology, nor of choice between subjectivism and objectivism. Rather, it is a matter of drawing out the hermeneutical implications of respecting the role played by the understanding of being in interpretation. A principle source for the present investigation is the work by the other party to this debate, H.-G. Gadamer.

The work is divided into four chapters. Chapter I situates the issue in the contemporary debates by looking at Betti's effort to resolve the question of the role of the text in terms of the "objectivisation" in understanding. The chapter will advance Gadamer's critique of Betti's position and thereby show how Gadamer's thought transcends the issue of subjectivity and objectivity.

Chapter II unfolds Gadamer's view that the task of hermeneutics is not to develop a method for interpretation, but to facilitate the understanding that takes place in the human sciences. The first part of the chapter will show that the consideration of the prejudicial conditions of understanding is necessary but insufficient as a theory of interpretation. The other part of the chapter will raise the question whether an adequate hermeneutical theory can avoid ontological issues.

Chapter III critically expands Gadamer's hermeneutic of pre-judicial understanding to its ontological dimensions. In this respect the first task will be to show how, following Heidegger, Gadamer understands the text as the essential requirement of interpretation. A study of temporality will aid in showing that the text must be re-garded as the reference of interpretation and that it determines the understanding.

Chapter IV draws the central conclusions from the previous chapters. It will show how the question of the text is inextricably tied to the question of ontological understanding in interpretation, conceived as the process of constructively unveiling the text. The last section will articulate some important consequences of taking the concept of the text as the fundamental question in human sciences, in poetry and in the study of Scripture.

I would like to acknowledge here the assistance of my professor and colleagues at the Catholic University of America, Washington, particularly Professor George F. McLean in the accomplishment of this work.

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Chapter I

The Need of Hermeneutics for a Sufficient Foundation

The Inadequacy of the Theory of Objectivation in Understanding

To review the history of the problem of hermeneutic objectivity, one must begin with the aim of Dilthey's hermeneutics, namely, emphasizing the objects in which human life is expressed. Dilthey writes that hermeneutics has a further and main purpose behind its theorizing, namely, to preserve the general validity of interpretation against romantic caprice and skeptical subjectivity. A theoretical justification is needed upon which every certainty of historical knowledge is followed.¹

Hermeneutics includes both grammatical and psychological interpretation. As Gadamer correctly shows, in Schleiermacher's theory of hermeneutics more emphasis is placed upon psychological interpretation described ultimately as an apprehension of the inner origin of the composition of a work, a re-creation of the creative act.² In this sense, interpretation is a reproduction of an original production, a reconstruction which begins from the vital moment of conception. This view of understanding, as Gadamer explains, prevents us from seeing the reference of hermeneutic in terms of its subject matter, in the sense of Schleiermacher's "being". Following Kant, Schleiermacher considers artistic thoughts as life moments which contain pleasure, but still are not regarded as tied to being.

This involves a crucial distinction between the poetic text and the scientific text. According to this account of interpretation, poetic utterance is not subject to the criterion of agreement with the thing meant, because what is said in poetry cannot be separated from the way it is said.³ Yet, in this understanding, the object of the hermeneutic reference is not a strong foundation. In spite of the case of complete understanding which is fully illuminated in a divine manifestation of being such as is observable in the Scriptures, still there is a lack of adequate explanation of how understanding relates to the hermeneutic reference.⁴

Schleiermacher thinks of the act of understanding as a reconstruction of production, which means that different aspects of a thought are hidden from the consciousness of the author.⁵ For Gadamer, the "better understanding" that:

Distinguishes the interpreter from the writer does not refer to the understanding of the text's subject matter, but simply to the understanding of the text, i.e., to what the author meant and expressed. This understanding can be called 'better' insofar as the explicit, thematized understanding of an opinion, as opposed to actualizing its contents, implies an increased knowledge.⁶

Gadamer regards objectivity to be threatened by all those who, following Heidegger, bind meaning to subjectivity. And he regards as mistaken Betti's attempt, following Schleiermacher, to ensure the objectivity of the understanding by a strict psychologism with a romantic flavor.

Under the title *Teoria generale della interpretazione* (1955), Betti studies questions concerning the objective status of interpretation. Restricted by the claim of a hermeneutical method for the interpretation of things, he criticizes Gadamer's rejection of this and states that such lack of methodology imperils the objectivity of interpretation.⁷ Instead, he returns to the mental objectification and meaningful forms proposed by Dilthey, assuming a "triadic process", that is, an interpretative act in which meaningful forms mediate between the mind of the author and the mind of the interpreter. In this hermeneutic manner the interpreter understands the

objective reference: the interpreter reproduces the original creative activity of the creator of the text, whether it is a written or unwritten text.

By referring to the Hegelian terms of subjective and objective spirit, Betti believes that the subject and the object, as objectifications by mind of the process of interpretation, are locked together in an antonymous relationship. The mind congeals into permanent form and confronts the subject as an other. But both are dependent upon one another. A given, interested subjective mind requires objective activity in order to develop consciousness and becomes free from itself. The objectifications (*Vergegenständlichungen* and not *Versachlichungen*) contained in what is handed down are themselves completely dependent on the interested mind, in its disposition toward interpreting the things, in order to be brought to the under-standing, i.e., to be reintroduced into the sphere of understanding via the process of interpretation.⁸

Since Betti regards interpretation as a means toward understanding, objective interpretation would help overcoming barriers of understanding and facilitate the re-appropriation of the objective mind by another subject. The need for 'relatively objective' knowledge requires the subject of interpretation to enter into a subject-object relationship with a text even though the object represents the expression of another subject. Any interpretative act is a triadic process in which meaningful forms mediate between the mind of the author which is objectivated in these forms and the mind of the interpreter.⁹ In his rejection of the subjectivity and relativism introduced into hermeneutics by existentialist philosophers, Betti re-affirmed the possibility of, at least, relative objectivity of the results of interpretation. Objectivity is possible in principle owing to the autonomy, the existence-in-themselves, of the objectifications of mind.¹⁰

Historic *Geisteswissenschaften* have been characterized by the attempt to assimilate the research process regarding what the mind creatively objectivates, especially in history, to the standards of the natural sciences. Betti has argued forcefully against failing to take account of the specificity of the object of the *Geisteswissenschaften* since this requires an internal recognition and reconstruction, and is dependent on the spontaneity of the perceiving subject. In Dilthey's view, "Human studies have indeed the advantage over the natural sciences that their object is not sensory appearance as such, no mere reflection of reality within consciousness, but is rather first and foremost an inner reality, a coherence experienced from within."¹¹

Betti holds this reconstruction as a responsibility in order to protect the objectivity of the results of the interpretations produced in all the human sciences. In this way, Betti does not follow the overtly objectivist nature of the "historical school" around von Ranke. It can be argued that his concern with salvaging at least "relative objectivity" through the implementation of a set of canons is a residue of the scientific approach to the non-natural sphere.¹²

It is only through the reciprocal mobilization of corresponding elements in the chain of their conceptual universe that mutual understanding, rather than merely an exchange of material signs of objects, takes place. The objectivation of the mind is provided here by the openness of the mind towards its inside, to which the outside contributes, as an impulse, the invitation to resonate in harmony.

On the one hand, for Betti the content of interpretation does not presume to be totally in agreement with the intent of the conscious representation of the author.¹³ As a result, it becomes possible to conceive an activity through which thought, without having the intent, becomes an object of interpretation. Proclaimed to defend the objective characteristic of interpretation, yet, this analysis of thought as a reluctant non-phenomenological term leads finally to the possibility of a sort of abstractive hermeneutics.

On the other hand, Betti thinks that the meaning expressed in the activity of mind can be elicited voluntarily by practical activity as possessing internal meaning, which may be unconscious. Does this imply an idea of interpretation as practical activity in which it is possible to interpret the text even when we do not intend to do so? Such a concept of practical knowledge, however, would not be applicable to what Gadamer sees in Aristotle's sense of *Phronesis*.

The problem becomes more complicated when seen with regard to the content of the practical activity of jurists and historians. This leads Betti to claim that, because of the absence of any conscious intent at representation, the most genuine and reliable indication of the attitude of both jurist and historian (with some differences) is provided by allowing safe inferences regarding the underlying mentality of the author.¹⁴ Thus, the only way to implement the doctrine of "meaning-full forms" of objectivation of mind is to make clear how the fundamental representational characteristic inherent in these forms is possible. Betti introduces his general theory of interpretation by considering this problematic relationship between the perceiving mind and object. The interpretation of "meaning-full forms" he hopes will provide insight into the possibility of objective understanding in general.¹⁵

Meaning-full forms, as objects of interpretation, are essentially objectivations of mind. The representational function of these forms does not need to be conscious, but it does require an act of another mind addressing our ability to understand through these forms, provided we become conscious of the other mind's consciousness of the meaningful forms.

Accordingly, in explicating the relation between understanding and interpretation, it must be pointed out that the final goal of the process of interpretation for Betti is to solve the epistemological problem of understanding. "Interpreting, in view of its task, is to bring something to the understanding." But Betti, in a circuitous explanation, says that the unity of the process of interpretation can be comprehended only in terms of the elementary phenomenon of understanding as actualized through the mediation of language.¹⁶ A real object for understanding is not the same as a ready-made physical object which we receive. This Kantian presupposed object plays the role of material source of "a stimulation directed at our insight to re-translate what has been perceived and to reconstruct its meaning from within."¹⁷ Betti generalizes von Humboldt's thesis regarding understanding according to which the process of interpretation is designed to solve the problem of understanding, because it is unified and homogeneous despite the differentiations required in its application in any usages of language. A demand is made on the spontaneity of the one called upon to understand which cannot be fulfilled without his active participation. "A challenge and appeal emanates from meaning-full forms in which mind has objectivated itself and which is directed at a subject, an active and thinking mind, whose interest in understanding has been stimulated by the varie-gated concerns of everyday life."¹⁸

Based upon this, interpretation is a "triadic process" at strategic positions in which the interpreter, the thinking mind and the mind objectivated in meaning-full forms are found. Through the simultaneous mediation of meaning-full forms, these three parts of the triadic process interconnect. "Subject and object of the process of interpretation, i.e., interpreter and meaning-full forms, are the same as those found in every process of cognition; only here they are characterized by specific traits which derive from this fact that we are not dealing with just any object but objectivations of mind."¹⁹

Interpretation as explained by the objectivation of mind provides a hermeneutical process in which the interpreter retraces the steps from the opposite direction by re-thinking them in his inner life. Betti himself acknowledges that the difficulty in such an inversion rests in the transposition into another subjectivity which differs from the first one. Objectivity is the interpreter's

reconstruction of the meaning contained in meaning-full forms and corresponds to their meaning content; the subjectivity of the interpreter lacks awareness of the preconditions of his ability to understand in a manner adequate to the subject matter (thanks to which the requirement of objectivity can be met). These two contradictory requirements lead to an antinomy of which Betti himself is aware. It introduces "the whole dialectic of the process of interpretation and provides the starting point for a general theory of interpretation just as the antinomy between the being-for-itself of the subject and the otherness of the object."²⁰ Coming into contact with meaning-full forms (*sinnhaltige Formen*) provides a place for inter-communication. Understanding can know its subject matter by apprehending the meaning reserved by these forms. In different realms of understanding "whenever something from the mind of another approaches us there is a call on our ability to understand, issued in the hope of being unfolded."²¹

In order to make a valid general theory of interpretation Betti formulates the first criterion of hermeneutics, i.e., what he calls the "hermeneutical canon," on the basis of the hermeneutic autonomy of the object (the source of hermeneutical enterprise) or meaning-full forms. This source of hermeneutical enterprise has to be understood with reference to the other mind that has been introduced through meaningful forms. This first and most important hermeneutical canon is not to be regarded as an independent guideline, having for itself any meaning, while abstracted from the representational function, as what is acquired by the form itself. Betti also believes that the meaning to be determined may not "be inferred into" meaningful forms in an arbitrary act, but rather ought to "be derived from" it. This characterization of the necessary reference of the object does not agree with what earlier was mentioned in explaining the structure of this canon, i.e., the immanence of the standards of hermeneutics. Moreover, Betti holds that meaning-full forms should be judged in relation to the original intention: "The created forms should correspond to formulate an impulse in the course of the creative process; it follows that they must not be judged in terms of their suitability for any other external purpose that may seem relevant to the interpreter."²² For him, however, it remained obscure whether this original intention itself is justifiable by the hermeneutical characteristic of the reference in meaningful forms.

Betti tries to clarify the relation between the objective and the subjective element in all understanding. He formulates a complete canon of hermeneutical principles, at the head of which stands the autonomy of the meaning of the text according to which the meaning, i.e., what the author intended to say, can be gained from the text itself. This canon is emphasized equally with the adequacy to the object. However, his view requires the work of the interpreter as a particular perspective and as an integrating element of hermeneutical truth.²³

As Betti warns, there is a danger of confusing the possibility of considering only what is meaning-full to oneself and of missing what is different and specific in the other (bracketing it as a presumed myth). He takes the counterposition:

The texts which are approached with a meaning -- inferring 'preunderstanding' (*Vorverständnis*) -- are not to be used to confirm already held opinions; we have to suppose, instead, that they have something to say that we could not know by ourselves and which exists independently of our meaning inference. It is here that the questionable character of the subjectivist position comes to full light; it is obviously influenced by contemporary existentialist philosophy and tends toward the confounding of the interpretation and meaning inference and the removing of the canon of the autonomy of the object.²⁴

The tension between objectivity and subjectivity is a precondition for the perception of a personal or cultural "style" in which continued "tendencies" and an "inner coherence" are apparent. There is a doubt whether the epistemological solution to the problem of objective understanding

provides the pivotal point in the entire argument.²⁵ A false theory of hermeneutics is one in which the sub-jective and objective elements of the problem are not conciliable in a manner of being unitarily justified. We must search for at least a proper definition of the hermeneutic game (as Gadamer develops it), in which both sides of subjectivity and objectivity can be dialectically united in an interaction.

The hermeneutic game carries the task of providing significance for the object of interpretation. Through the act of understanding in the human sciences, the structure of Dasein is projected and, realizing its own being, Dasein appears as understanding.²⁶

In chapter 19 of his outlines of the 1819 lectures, Schleiermacher had told us to equate ourselves with the author by objective and subjective reconstruction. With objective reconstruction one proceeds through a knowledge of the language as the author used it. The resulting knowledge is more exact than even that of the original readers, for one must put oneself into the place of the author through a subjective reconstruction in which one proceeds through knowledge of the author's inner and outer life.²⁷ Emphasizing objective reconstruction, Betti in contrast to Schleiermacher argues for the essential autonomy of the object of the hermeneutical reference. Betti aims his argument at Gadamer's dialogical approach, criticizing it for inserting the subject into the hermeneutical circle. In Betti's view, this approach leads to both subjectivism and relativism, with the consequence that hermeneutics is unable to adjudicate between correct and incorrect interpretation.²⁸

In his reply to Betti's critique Gadamer claims that his line of thought prevents us from dividing the hermeneutic problem in terms of the subjectivity of the interpreter and the objectivity of the meaning to be understood. In Gadamer's view this would be starting from a "false antithesis" that cannot be resolved even by recognizing the dialectic as subjective and objective.²⁹ Based on the fact that aesthetic consciousness does not confront an object, Gadamer replies to Betti's charge of subjectivism that its validity depends on its being posed within a dualistic framework. If understanding is granted as the project of a subject confronting an alien object, then the activity of such understanding can be called "subjective behavior." But for Gadamer, understanding is constructed dialogically and dialectically as a process of question and answer. This process of understanding (hermeneutical *Urphanomeno*) ties it to the being of that which is understood.³⁰ In order to illuminate the ontological basis of the hermeneutical object, Gadamer takes the concept of play in its broader understanding as found in Kant, Schiller, and later in Betti.

Play, in reference to the experience of art, does not mean the state of mind of the creator or of those enjoying the work of art. The real hermeneutical application of play is in the "mode of being of the work of art itself" in which aesthetic consciousness cannot be restricted only as an object. The work of art, as Gadamer views it, is not an object that stands over against a subject for itself. The work of art "has its true being in the fact that it becomes an experience that changes the person who experiences it."³¹ It is the work itself, not the subjectivity of the person who experiences it, that can be considered the real subject of the experience of art. As Gadamer explains it: "This is the point at which the mode of being of play becomes significant. For play has its own essence, independent of the consciousness of those who play."³² The being of art can not be defined as an object of an aesthetic consciousness.

The hermeneutical game essentially is representation, but is not necessarily going to be defined in presentation for the person who shares in the game. In this sense of game, both sides in interpretative play are in a real play as though there is no "presentation for" though there might be much "presentation of." As a result, for example, it is possible within hermeneutics to have

representation of "presenting for" by different sides in a hermeneutical game, but not vice versa, i.e., not presenting for representation.

Based on the fact that the interpretative play is independent of presenting for, we can see how the activity of the thing itself, the coming into language of meaning, points to a universal ontological structure, namely to the basic nature of everything toward which understanding can be directed. If the linguistic meaning can be founded on the ontological structure of a thing, then, correspondingly, this indicates that the being that can be understood is language. The hermeneutical phenomenon here projects its own universality back onto the ontological constitution of what is understood, determining it in a universal sense as language and determining its own relation to beings as interpretation.³³

Heidegger in his *On the Essence of Truth*, takes the term Being usually to mean beings as such taken as a totality (*das Seiende im Ganzen*). In so far as this totality is affected by negativity, it is called "mystery". But it is clear that for Heidegger Being is more than just this totality. It is referred to by the expression *wesen*, which is to be taken in a verbal sense as emerging into presence and abiding as such. It too is inherently affected by negativity: Being is said to be the one, and the only one, which conceals itself. This one and only "self-concealing" is what we call Being.³⁴

Finally, on this basis, a text at least as a hermeneutical paradigm can be said to constitute the hermeneutical objectivity. In this case, as Ricoeur believes of written discourse, the author's intention and the meaning of the text cease to coincide. The text's career escapes the finite horizon lived by the author. A text can surpass the ostensive references of spoken discourse by opening up possible modes of being, a whole new "world," over and above the restricted "situation" in which the partners of a dialogue find themselves. Through its display of non-ostensive references the text, in a way, faces the meaning of discourse from the dialogical situation. Ricoeur believes that through being permanently fixed, a text can achieve a universal range of its addresses, in contrast to the often limited number of partners in spoken discourse. This points to a possible solution for the hermeneutical dilemma of objectivity.³⁵ Ricoeur sees the primary concern of the hermeneutics of the text to be to unfold a world in front of the text, rather than to discover the subjective intentions of the author behind the text. This hermeneutical prospect transforms the relation of the world to the subjectivity of the reader. In addition, exposing oneself to the world that the text puts forward enables the hermeneutic inquirer to recognize the possibility of the falsifiabilities in the act of the subject in hermeneutics.³⁶

The Principle of the Universality of Hermeneutics

Since it is necessary to evaluate the basis of the objectivity of the hermeneutical question, as we pointed out in the previous section, then we must make clear whether universality of the interpretation, as the most important characteristic of hermeneutic play and disclosed in the objectivation of the meaningful form, can itself be considered as the philosophical correspondent for the dilemma of the validity of the interpretation.³⁷ Hermeneutics from the time of Schleiermacher has depended on an artificial methodical abstraction to establish a universal instrument of the mind, and has tried to use this instrument to express the saving power of the Christian faith. In Dilthey's grounding of the human sciences, however, hermeneutics is more than a means, it is the universal medium of the historical consciousness for which there no longer exists any knowledge of truth other than the understanding of the expression and, through the expression, the understanding of life. "Life and history make sense like the letters of a word."³⁸ As in Dilthey,

the thematic investigation of conscious life must override the tendency to base itself on individual experiences.³⁹

So far as the concept of history depends on life, it is grounded on presentiment of the meaning of the whole which is concealed from us. Understanding is more than just a universal method that occasionally appeared through the affinity of the historian with his historical object. It is not the historian's own fortuitous sympathy, but rather the historicity of the historian's own understanding that works in his choice of objects.⁴⁰ Betti could not describe clearly how an historical element works in his distinction between legal and historical hermeneutics. For Gadamer, there is no antithesis between these two aspects, for we naturally assume that the legal meaning of a legal text is clear and that the present legal practice simply follows the original meaning. Yet he does not point out that this original meaning for both legal and historical hermeneutics in general must become available through the text itself for hermeneutics.

To be more clear, a legal historian apparently is concerned only with the original meaning of the law, the way in which it was meant, and the validity it had when it was first promulgated. But how does he know this? Can he know the original meaning without being aware of the change in circumstances that separates his own present time from that past time? Must he not then do exactly the same thing as the judge, i.e., ultimately assume the original meaning from the vantage point of the present? The hermeneutical situation of both the historian and the jurist seems to Gadamer to be the same in that, faced with any text, one has an immediate expectation of meaning. There can be no such thing as a direct access to the historical object objectively revealing its historical value. The historian has to undertake the same reflection as the jurist.⁴¹ The legal hermeneutics is, in Gadamer's interpretation, not a special case. On the contrary, it is capable of restoring the hermeneutical problem to its full breadth and so of reestablishing the former unity of hermeneutics, in which the jurist and the theologian meet the philologist.⁴² In an approach of greater hermeneutical relevance to the question of universality, the hermeneutical situation of both the historian and the jurist would be the same in that when faced with any text there would be an immediate expectation of meaning.

Moreover, Gadamer's hermeneutic philosophy represents a gigantic re-orientation of hermeneutics by freeing it from a methodologically secured objectivity. This provides a perspective for viewing scientific progress in general in terms of the universality of the hermeneutic aspect (which was expounded on parallel lines by Kuhn's paradigm-oriented conception of scientific revolutions).⁴³ This fact must be understood together with a universality corresponding to Kant's principle. Based upon this the validity of an aesthetic judgement, which is correlated to the practical judgement in hermeneutics, can not be derived and proved from a universal principle. (Indeed, we must distinguish the work of art from aesthetic theory which is restricted to a scientific conception of truth. *Truth and Method*, p. xxiii.) Moreover, as Gadamer acknowledges, there is an *a priori* principle in Kant's discussion of the aesthetic of taste which is not legitimized through an empirical universality.⁴⁴ Questions of taste cannot be resolved by a general sense of argument and proof. We cannot motivate taste, nor can it be attained by empirical universality.

Gadamer considers that the universality (*Allgemeinheit*) limited by ascribing it to the faculty of judgment is by no means as common (*gemein*) as Kant thinks. Based on Kant's idea of judgment the particular can be grasped as an instance of the universal and sound understanding is "common" in the truest sense of the word; it is to be found everywhere without possessing any merit or advantage.⁴⁵ In Gadamer's example, a swindler, who correctly calculates human weakness and always makes the right move in his deceptions, nevertheless does not possess "sound judgment" in the

highest sense of the term. Although a swindler has judgments about right and wrong, he does not know what is really important, i.e., from a right and sound point of view. On the other hand, according to Gadamer, taste is more than recognizing this or that as beautiful. It looks at the whole and allows things to harmonize beautifully. Having a true sense of community, taste does not depend on an empirical universality, nor is it social such that everyone will agree with another's judgment or that others must agree necessarily, as Kant suggests. For Gadamer, taste carries knowledge in that it is certain of the agreement by an ideal community. It follows that taste knows something, though in a way that cannot be separated from the concrete moment in which that object of taste occurs.⁴⁶ This sense of taste opens a new and special way of knowing. For Gadamer both taste and judgment evaluate the object in relation to a hermeneutical whole, seeking to fit all together. Hence, there must be a sense of taste rather than an understanding.⁴⁷ Gadamer states that this sense of taste obviously is needed wherever a whole is intended. But taste is in no way limited to what is beautiful in nature and art, rather, it contains the whole realm of morality and manners.

Following his consideration of universality, Gadamer poses a new definition for the concept of judgment when he says that judgment is not so much a faculty as a demand that has to be made of all. Every one has enough "sense of the common" (*Gemeinsinn*), i.e., judgment, that he can be expected to show a "sense of community" (*Gemeinsinn*), genuine moral and civic solidarity; but that means judgments of right and wrong, and a concern for the "common good."⁴⁸ "Even moral concepts are never given as a whole or determined in a normatively univocal way. Rather, the ordering of life by the rules of law and morality is incomplete and needs productive supplementation. Judgment is necessary in order to make a correct evaluation of the concrete instance."⁴⁹ This function of judgment is familiar, particularly in jurisprudence, in which case the supplementary function of hermeneutics entails an adapted realization of the law.

In addition, Gadamer explains that in order to study a tradition more thoroughly and closely, a receptivity to the "otherness" of the work of art or of the past must already be presumed. This idea of tradition naturally led Gadamer to follow Hegel in emphasizing the general characteristic of *Bildung*, i.e., keeping oneself "open to what is other -- to other, more universal points of view."⁵⁰ At the same time Gadamer considers *Bildung* in a manner that it has no goal outside itself. He transcends the notion of *Bildung* as merely practicing and cultivating to an end.⁵¹ This hermeneutical concept of *Bildung* embraces a sense of proportion and distance in relation to itself and consists in rising above itself to universality. "To distance oneself from oneself and from one's private purposes means to look at these in the way that others see them." But it must be taken into consideration that, as Gadamer says, this universality is by no means a universality of the concept in understanding. It is just as conceivable as the "viewpoints of possible others."⁵² The universality of the concept in this hermeneutical appeal is that it remains open to a particular field and grasps the objective/subjective distinction within what is opened to it.

For Gadamer, discussion about the hermeneutical whole and part must be treated more in the context of hermeneutic universalism than as a question of method. Gadamer raises the question whether or not "the universality of understanding involves a one-sidedness in its contents since it lacks a critical principle in relation to tradition and, as it were, espouses a universal optimism." One can prove knowledge of the *intentio operis* only by comparing it with the text as a coherent whole. This idea, too, is an old one and comes from Augustine (*De doctrina christiana*): any interpretation given of a certain portion of a text can be accepted if it is confirmed, and must be rejected if it is challenged, by another portion of the same text. In this sense the internal textual coherence controls the otherwise uncontrollable drives of the reader.⁵³ Nonetheless, the concept of the whole is itself to be taken as understood only relatively.⁵⁴ As a result, the whole of meaning

that has to be understood in history or tradition is never the meaning of the whole possibility of history as we shall point out later.

In the language of conversation, poetry, and interpretation the speculative structure of language emerges not as the reflection of something given, but as the coming into language of a totality of meaning. This draws us toward the dialectic of the Greeks, who did not conceive understanding as a methodical activity of the subject, but as something the thing itself does and which thought "suffers" or undergoes. It is, this activity of the thing itself which is the real speculative movement that takes hold of the speaker.⁵⁵ To come into language does not mean that a second being is acquired, but rather, that something presents itself as it belongs to its own being. Thus language has a speculative unity; the distinction it contains between its being and its representations of itself is no distinction at all.⁵⁶

In addition, universality of understanding is compounded with this unity of language. The universality of a language means that it is not a delimited realm of the speakable over against which other realms are unspeakable. Language is all-encompassing and from it nothing fundamentally is excluded. Accepting the total consistency of language, we must acknowledge that interpretation belongs rather to the essential unity of the meaning of the text than to the universality of understanding. This is the reason why the unitary content of an interpreted text is confirmed by the fact that we encounter it in each and every interpretation. Does this mean that understanding is already presupposed by the essential unity of interpretation? Or are both understanding and essential unity identified together indicating one reality that must transcend both?

It would seem that interpretation or understanding, represented in the beingness of beings, presents and represents (metaphysically) the totality of beings as such. Through describing the most universal attributions of beings, interpretation unveils what understanding references in the beingness of beings as one. Based on the hermeneutical universal traits of beings, therefore, the unity of experience is prior to the discreteness of experiences. This can be derived from the fact that the necessity of the hermeneutical reference, accompanied with the fact that all have an understanding of it, is prior essentially to the variety of experiences. This fact unveils the reason why Heidegger, before others, describes the concept of understanding merely as the universal determinateness of Dasein.⁵⁷

The Non-Complementarity of Objectivity in Historical Knowledge and Phenomena

Here we must exchange a poor understanding of historical thinking for one better equipped to perform the task of understanding. It is the historical character of understanding that Betti sees negatively as the factor allowing only 'relative objectivity.' We know that real historical thinking must take account of its own historicity, for only then will it cease to chase the phantom of an historical object that is the object of "progressive research" and learn to view the object as a counterpart. The true historical object cannot be an object at all, but an unseen persisting relationship that constitutes both the reality of history and the reality of historical understanding. Thus, an adequate hermeneutics would have to demonstrate the reality and efficacy of history within understanding itself,⁵⁸ without which any claim of objectivity in historical knowledge is raw and incomplete.

One thing is common to all contemporary criticism of historical objectivism, namely, the insight that the so-called subject of knowledge has the same mode of being as the object, so that object and subject belong to the same historical movement. The subject-object antithesis is

legitimate where the object, or *res extensa*, is the absolute order of the *res cognitans*. Nonetheless, historical know-ledge cannot be appropriately described by this concept of object and objectivity.⁵⁹

Historical knowledge, in Gadamer's view, can be gained only by seeing the past in its continuity with the present which is exactly what a jurist does in his practical, normative work of "ensuring the unbroken continuance of law and preserving the tradition of the legal idea." The jurist asks whether the case being discussed is really characteristic of the general problem of historical understanding. It is a critical question for Gadamer whether a legal historian who turns to the legal cultures of the past (and certainly any other historian seeking to understand a past that no longer has any direct continuity with the present), would recognize himself in the case we have been considering, namely, a law which is still in force. He would say that legal hermeneutics has a special dogmatic task that is quite foreign to the context of historical hermeneutics.⁶⁰

Obviously legal hermeneutics cannot seriously be satisfied with using the subjective principle of the meaning and original intention of the lawgiver as a canon of interpretation. Often it cannot avoid applying objective concepts, e.g., the notion of law expressed in a particular law. Thus one can regard applying the law to a concrete case as the logical process of subsuming the individual under a universal.⁶¹

In Gadamer's view against Betti it would not be enough to say that the task of the historian is simply to "reconstruct the original meaning of the legal formula" and that of the jurist to "harmonize the meaning with the present living actuality. This division would make the definition of the jurist more comprehensive to include the task of the legal historian. Someone seeking to understand the correct meaning of a law would have to know the "original one." Thus, according to Betti, he must think in terms of legal history taking historical understanding as merely a means to an end.⁶²

Gadamer believes that the question of the meaning of a law would be both juridically and historically the same. This recalls Kant's distinction between determinative judgment, which subsumes the particular under a given universal, and reflective judgment, which seeks a universal concept for a given particular. Hegel has rightly shown that to separate these two functions of judgment is a mere abstraction; judgment always is really both. The universal under which the particular is subsumed continues to determine itself through the particular. Thus the legal meaning of a law is determined through adjudication, and fundamentally the universality of the law is determined through the concreteness of the case.⁶³

In a similar manner, Nietzsche, against Schleiermacher, holds that there is no general, abstract, and universal interpretation. Scientific explanation (*Erklärung*) is merely a form of interpretation where the singularity of an active configuration prevails over the perspective plurality of active drives in their varied and variable ensemble.⁶⁴ Nietzsche, from a more generalized point of view, emphasizes interpretation, rather than explanation of a text. Only in an interpretive reading of a text can we have the real singularity of a possible bodily plurality. "Perspectives are plural or many, formal and *in abstracto*: each one is real as a singularity, and only passes from one to the other by metaphor."⁶⁵

The interpretive reference to texts, whether it corresponds to a determinative or reflective judgment is not in principle different from the verbal reference to objects of the world of experience in accordance with Schleiermacher's argument that the experience of a universal can be achieved only in unceasing approximation of the particular. Wherever a literary hermeneutics pretends to perceive its specific potentials for interpreting, as Schleiermacher believes, it operates on the border between regional hermeneutics and meta-hermeneutics. Oscillating between both, it

uncovers as the latter the general conditions of understanding and as the former the particular, material and historical modifications which traverse all pretensions toward universal validity.⁶⁶

Gadamer holds that in an intimate conversation with a friend his way of living and thinking are more familiar to the conversational partner than the linguistic and historical conditions under which a text arose. Even under such circumstances, in which the totality of linguistic, historical and personal factors are given, still, difficulties of understanding arise. This devalues the thesis that all particulars can be completely explained through a given whole. For a segment breaks from the formation of a given horizon of agreement and thereby betrays the consensus between the speakers, itself oriented toward "an ideal of a preestablished harmony."⁶⁷

Betti follows Dilthey in emphasizing the need for historical categories which guide and elucidate the inner coherence and style of various meaningful constructs, and which have the character of changeable elements in accordance with given historically conditioned situations.⁶⁸ Betti does not take the subject historically as a participant in a tradition, in universal discourse, etc. He conceives the concepts he employs initially as instrumental and potentially determined by the objectivity of interpretation.⁶⁹

An hermeneutics that does not make the nature of the historical question the central thing, and does not inquire into an historian's motives in examining historical material, lacks its most important element.⁷⁰ Yet, the hermeneutic problem is universal and prior to every kind of concept of history because the latter is concerned with what is always fundamental to "historical questions." Gadamer regards the question of what is historical research without considering primarily historical questions. Simply put, hermeneutics is a kind of knowledge that something is so because of understanding that it has come about so.⁷¹ Historical research requires applying the theory of understanding itself. Application, for Gadamer against Betti, must be involved in the activity of both the legal historian and the practicing lawyer, with both having the same legal understanding of the law. The judge's decision aims at being a correct, never an arbitrary, application of the law. Therefore, he must have a correct interpretation which necessarily includes the "mediation between history and the present in the act of understanding itself."⁷²

The general structure of understanding, Gadamer says, is realized in historical understanding, in that the concrete bonds of custom and tradition and the corresponding possibilities of one's own future become effective in understanding itself.⁷³ We will develop later that there is no knowable or necessary *a priori*; except that which makes an hermeneutical object of history possible. The hermeneutical interpretation of a thing becomes manifested in historical understanding, whereas historical understanding can not be based conceptually on itself since there is no longer any correspondence in the subject or in the object.

As Gadamer made clear, the historian chooses concepts to describe the historical particularity of his objects without expressly reflecting on their origin and justification. He simply follows his interest in the historical material and "takes no account of the fact that the descriptive concepts he chooses can be highly determined to his proper purpose if they assimilate what is historically different to what is familiar and thus, despite all impartiality, subordinate the alien being of the object to his own preconceptions."⁷⁴ In following Gadamer, we must replace badly understood historical thinking by one which can better perform the task of interpretation. Real historical thinking must be able to give a convincing interpretation of its own historicity. The object of hermeneutical research based on its internal determination prefers an object as counterpart to the historical object. In this sense not only is the true historical object not an object at all, but even the unity of the one and the other cannot be explained except by the correspondence which is characteristic of the hermeneutical game itself. This hermeneutical unity is the only thing that can

drive the possibility of the hermeneutical phenomenon. Having this unity, an essential hermeneutics would bring the reality and efficacy of historical subject-matter within interpretation itself. Whether or not this interpretation can be considered as an historically effected event, remains a fundamental question.

The term "history" in this definition by Gadamer still can be investigated as in an objectively independent hermeneutical study. Consciousness of being affected by history (*wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*) is essentially and primarily consciousness of the hermeneutical situation.⁷⁵ The truth of the hermeneutic situation means finding oneself within the situation with regard to the tradition we want to understand. The illumination of this situation that reflects effective history, as Gadamer explains, can never be completely achieved due to our essence as historical beings. As historical, the knowledge of oneself never can be complete.⁷⁶ Indeed, the hermeneutical text "that is understood historically is forced to abandon its claim to be saying something true," since acknowledging the otherness of the other, in historical understanding, is to make the otherness an object of objective knowledge rather than only a hermeneutical source of historical understanding, and this requires suspension of its true character.⁷⁷ The ideal of a universal history necessarily becomes a special problem for the historical world view. The universal content of history lacks the self-containedness of a text for the critic, and which, for the historian, seems to make a biography a complete unit of meaning: a text that is intelligible within itself.⁷⁸ Indeed, Dilthey formed his romantic hermeneutics based on relative wholes. In the theory of universal history, as in hermeneutics of the concept of life, a totality of meaning must be considered detached from the person who understands it. Gadamer sees the hermeneutical basis as going even further here.⁷⁹ Given the problematic situation with regard to universal history, there is, therefore, a question with regard to hermeneutics as a foundation for the study of history since there is no other history but universal history. Hermeneutics is endowed with this universality by which the significance of the parts is determined.

Based on Betti's view of the historical interpretation of a text, it is not sufficient merely to reconstruct a past event (in analogy to philological interpretation), for historians have to consider the context in which a document was produced. The continuity of world history is conceived neither teleologically nor in the style of the pre- or post-Romantic Enlightenment in terms of a final state as the end of history, but according to the historical school for which there exists neither an end of history nor anything outside it. Gadamer concludes that, the whole continuity of universal history can be understood only from historical tradition itself. "But this is precisely the claim of literary hermeneutics, namely that the meaning of a text can be understood from itself." Hence, the foundation for the study of history can be found safely in hermeneutics.⁸⁰

Granting that universal history is hermeneutic, still it can be said that the interpreter involved in hermeneutical criticism in philology or history generally is not simply trying to understand; he is not interested in or intending the objective truth of what is said as such, even if the text itself claims to teach truth.⁸¹ Hegel was the first to believe that the truth of the experience of the work of art is mediated with historical consciousness, but this must be understood, as Gadamer indicated, so that there are not two really different horizons, that is, one in which the person tries to understand and another in which he regards himself historically. Any neglect of this fact leads to an artificial concept of the historical object as really non-hermeneutical.

In the context of a critique of historical objectivism Gadamer considers Erich Rothacker's work important since it enables hermeneutics to face the problem of relativism. He sees the concept of the dogmatic thought form as an entirely hermeneutical concept. The dogmatic is

defended as a productive method of knowledge in the human sciences, insofar as it elaborates the immanent content that determines an area of significance. Rothacker appeals to the fact that the concept of dogmatic enjoys by no means a merely critical and pejorative sense in theology and jurisprudence. But in contrast to these systematic disciplines, the concept of dogmatic is not intended to be merely a synonym for systematic knowledge, e.g., for philosophy, but signifies "another attitude," to be defended as some-thing separated from the historical inquiry which attempts to understand the process of development. For Rothacker, "dogmatic" has its fundamental place within the total historical attitude and receives its relative justification therefrom. It refers ultimately to Dilthey's concept of the structural context and its particular application to historical methodology.⁸² Such a dogmatic, nevertheless, according to Gadamer, exercises its corrective function where there is historical thinking and knowledge.⁸³

Gadamer confirms the Heideggerian position in phenomenology that historical knowledge is not a projection in the sense of extrapolation of aims of the will or ordering of things according to prejudices, rather it remains something adapted to the object, *a men-suratio ad rem*. This object, as manifested in the mirror of art, is not *a factum brutum* or something merely at hand, but itself ultimately has the same mode of being as Dasein.⁸⁴

The dilemma of objectivity in historical knowledge can be pursued also alongside by asking whether "ontological radicalization" contributes to the construction of an historical hermeneutics. Heidegger's existential analytic of Dasein implies no particular historical ideal of existence.⁸⁵ Since the historical meaning of a phenomenon cannot offer a convincing account of the fact that the interpreter belongs to his hermeneutical object and that his stand must be considered only an hermeneutical task, the problem of hermeneutics becomes universal in scope, even attaining a new dimension through Heidegger's transcendental interpretation of understanding.⁸⁶

However, if understanding is not viewed totally in terms of history, understanding is not a merely reproductive, but also a productive activity as well. There is a question whether we can refer to the productive understanding as better understanding. Gadamer comes to the conclusion that understanding is not understanding better, either in the sense of superior knowledge of the subject because of the clearer ideas or in the sense of fundamental superiority of conscious over unconscious production. It is enough to say that one understands and interprets in a different way, if there is understanding at all.⁸⁷

Returning to Husserl's logical investigation, we must say, consciousness is an "intentional experience" as distinguished from the real unity of consciousness in experience and from its inner perception. As Gadamer pointed out, this sense of consciousness was not an "object," but an essential coordination. Investigating this coordination revealed the starting point for overcoming 'objectivism.' Intention and fulfillment of meaning belong essentially to the unity of meaning rather than that of object; like the meaning of the words, every valid existent is of its nature an "ideal universality of actual and potential experiencing modes of givenness."⁸⁸ In hermeneutics these modes of givenness can be revealed in the understanding of a text as the reference of hermeneutics of which the unity of meaning is derived.

Since it seems that the human understanding exchanges position in dialectical hermeneutics, even if a prejudice becomes questionable in view of what another person or a text says to us, this does not mean that it is simply set aside and the text or the other person accepted as valid in its place. Rather, historical objectivism in a productive understanding shows its naivete in accepting such disregard of ourselves as what actually happens. In fact our own prejudice is properly brought

into play by being put at risk. Only by being given full play is it able to experience the other's claim to truth and make it possible for him to have full play himself.⁸⁹

The understanding of a text is not to be compared with an immovable point of interpretation that has only one question for the interpreter. Therefore, again, understanding certainly is not limited essentially as is historical interpretation, which seems ostensibly to be possible through reconstructing the time of the text as it came into being. Since it is not merely a conceptual truth, understanding is to be determined by the text, rather than by the time of the text in order to follow the way of truth as it is recognized in the experience of art itself. Is this to say that "interpreter's own thoughts too have gone into re-awakening the text's meaning?"⁹⁰ In an ultimate hermeneutical analysis of understanding, the effect of the interpreter's own horizon can be seen only insofar as it helps the interpreter "make one's own what the text says."⁹¹ Hence, instead of historical validity, it is the absolute validity in hermeneutics which makes meaningful defining the universal element in understanding.

We have already noticed that a person seeking to understand something has a bond to the subject matter that comes into language through a connection with the tradition from which the text speaks.⁹² On the other hand, hermeneutical consciousness is aware that its bond to this subject matter does not consist in some self-evident, unquestioned concord, as is the case with an unbroken stream of tradition. Hermeneutic work is based on a polarity of familiarity and certainty of the meaning; but this polarity is not to be regarded psychologically as with Schleiermacher in the range of the mystery of individuality, but truly hermeneutically, i.e., in the language in which the text addresses us and the story that it tells us. Here, too, there is a tension between being as an historically intended, distanced object and being as belonging to a tradition. The true locus of hermeneutics and the question of the aesthetical truth is this in-between.⁹³

Chapter II

An Introductory Survey on the Inner Sufficiency of the *Hermeneutikos Methodos*

An Inquiry into the Prejudicial Condition of Understanding

Following Kant's critique of the condition of our knowledge, Gadamer traces a philosophical question in human sciences and experience as lived, that is, how is understanding possible. He turns to an old insight, according to which the manner in which understanding of a text is achieved has three dimensions: understanding (*intelligere*), interpretation (*explicare*), and application (*applicare*). These mental refinements, formerly referred to as 'subtilitates' are now considered by Gadamer to be integral parts of the hermeneutical process. Accordingly, this concept of understanding reaches its climax in application, which concludes the fusion of horizons. Application, then, is conceived not as an afterthought or a contingent element in the phenomenon of understanding, but rather as determining this a priori and in its totality.⁹⁴

We have noted in the previous chapter that understanding as it occurs in the human sciences is essentially historical, i.e., that in the human sciences a text is understood only if it is understood in a different way as the occasion requires.⁹⁵ Understanding can be our director in hermeneutical experience, but we must be cautious about the result of assuming the conception of understanding to be an exceptional ground for hermeneutical analysis.

In his revival of hermeneutics, Gadamer believes understanding not to be a so-called hermeneutical method to which the inquiring consciousness can have recourse in order to gain an objective knowledge in experiencing an event. His intention is not to create for classical hermeneutics a manual for guiding understanding as is formed in the methodical procedure of the human sciences.⁹⁶ Indeed, being situated within an event of tradition, it is a process of handing down the prior condition of understanding.⁹⁷ If understanding be a method, then, it should hold itself unprejudiced, free from relating to tradition; but that would disregard the true meaning of tradition, in which understanding is able to question continuously, provided the door of knowledge be open. This means that understanding cannot be restricted only as a simple interpreting activity of consciousness. Rather, it is a prejudicial condition of interpretation which is provided transcendentally by the event of being in different occasions.

In order to analyze the applicability of understanding as the prejudicial condition of interpretation, we must remember that the possibility of a "direct" contact between subject and object, in which the former could suppress any categories that are not appropriate to the object, is problematic. The interpreter can commence his activity only on the basis of the use of categories of thought; rather, these categories have already been "put to work" when he approaches anything.⁹⁸ The art of interpretation essentially claims that it is looking for what the author intended in his or her own sense. This "own sense" does not mean what the author himself intended, but rather that understanding can go beyond the author's subjective act of meaning; even that it necessarily and always goes beyond it.⁹⁹

But we know also that understanding is not self-understanding in the sense of the self-evident, as certain idealisms have asserted. Also it is not exhausted in the revolutionary criticism of idealism that thinks of the concept of self-understanding as something that happens to the self and through which it becomes an authentic self. Understanding, as Gadamer stresses involves a moment of "loss of itself."¹⁰⁰

On the other hand, the prejudicial condition of hermeneutics or the so-called pre-understanding as the condition for understanding eliminates the distinction between interpretive understanding and "lived experience." We will look for how this theory of pre-understanding reflects an existential relationship between the interpreter and object of interpretation or the text in which the latter addresses the former and discloses new possible ways of existence.

Indeed each and every instant of a text provides a new horizon for pre-understanding, although it is clear that the existence of pre-understandings does not require that a particular interpretation be closed off against what is foreign to it. This fact requires that understanding remain loyal to the language of a conversation unless some prejudices require new approaches to the universality of interpretation. The fact that the play character of language involves a process of natural concept formation that is dependent on the concrete applied circumstances into which the meanings of words are spoken, does not require one to deny the effective presentation of the general pre-given conditions of understanding in any hermeneutical text.

We are not so restricted within prejudices as not to be able to judge by our understandings. In any activity of human understanding a new judgment comes out, something not mentioned or remembered by any experience. But how can we know this judgment to be new where no comparable judgment exists? The new judgment can be established only when we already know what is coming as new (in contrast to the old). In some aspects our expectation and our readiness to hear the new judgment necessarily are determined by the old. Hereby, Gadamer relates the concept of prejudice to that of authority, while neglecting the mere original fact that the prejudices are justifiable because it is only through thinking them as supra-empirical "givens" that the very beginning of a hermeneutical text can be remarked. The role of a supra-empirical norm can be recognized in Kant's classification of the aesthetic judgment. In this, the aesthetic judgment appears to justify an *a priori* aspect, although it remains limited by the claim to universality.¹⁰¹ This, however, does not mean that the text can be considered as a realm of prejudices, nor can a prejudice qua prejudice be regarded as a text. An exception is when we are talking about prejudices in order to find their structure, then prejudices are regarded as text qua text. The relation between the text as what is talked about and prejudices is as remarkable as the immediate relation of the text and understanding. Hence, we can think of the text as that which should be faced hermeneutically through temporally prejudicative interpretation since understanding as an act of interpretation is not to be considered, even conceptually, purely as prejudice.

In Heidegger's analysis of understanding, a person in his attempt to understand, is tuned by fore-meanings that are not borne out by the object reference itself. The task of understanding is to work out appropriate projections to be confirmed by the things themselves. Here, again, objectivity is the confirmation of a fore-meaning through its being worked out.¹⁰² The interpreter, approaching the text while relying on the given fore-meaning, examines its origin in the event. Yet we must understand this confirmation in terms of Heidegger's disclosing the fore-structure of understanding through reading what is there.

Understanding is, for Heidegger, the original form of the realization of Dasein, which is being-in-the-world. It is Dasein's mode of being, in so far as it is potentiality-for-being and possibility.¹⁰³ Based upon this, Heidegger's doctrine that it is not our judgments, but rather our prejudices that constitute our being, provoked Gadamer to formulate a positive sense of prejudice. By giving a new approach to this concept, he broadened it apparently beyond what the French and English Enlightenment could think of only as unjustified and erroneous and thereby inevitably a distortion of the truth.¹⁰⁴ The existential prejudices, entailed in the historicity of our existence,

constitute the initial human ability to experience. On this ground, "Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world." We cannot have experience of something unless it is conditioned by prejudices.¹⁰⁵ Experiences only occur when what is encountered hermeneutically in being says something to us.

Consequently, given the intermediate position in which hermeneutics operates, it follows that its work is not to develop a procedure for understanding, but to clarify the conditions in which understanding takes place. In other words, to understand how a thing happened indicates identically that it is so.¹⁰⁶ Additionally, these conditions do not amount to a "procedure" or method which the interpreter must of himself bring to bear on the text; rather, they must be given.¹⁰⁷

According to Baumgarten's definition, judgment is not simply a pre-given concept of the thing, but of the sensible individual grasped in itself merely as it exhibits the agreement of the many with the one.¹⁰⁸ As Gadamer extensively interprets it here, this is an application of the universal, but internal coherence of itself. According to such a notion of judgment, that we can have a concept of a thing as given implies that the individual object comes immanently to our interpretation.

On the other hand, temporal distance can resolve the hermeneutical question of how to distinguish true prejudices by which we understand from false ones by which we misunderstand. It makes conscious the prejudices governing our own understanding, so that "the text, as another's meaning can be isolated and valued on its own."¹⁰⁹ Gadamer explains that as long as the mind is influenced by a prejudice, one cannot consider it a judgment; further, judgment does not simply mean applying a pre-given concept of the thing, but rather the sensible individual is grasped in itself.¹¹⁰ Therefore we can not foreground (*abheben*) a prejudice. It is not possible to make ourselves aware of a prejudice while it is constantly operating unnoticed. As a result, the open admission of the productive power of prejudice in the nature of understanding leads Gadamer into explicit opposition to the scientific ideal of an unprejudiced objectivity in interpretation. We can say that understanding loses itself in its own prejudices. This loss of itself in understanding requires a mysterious realm of language which is unconscious and selfless, which will be explained in the next chapter.

By transforming the negative idea of prejudice in the Enlightenment, Gadamer initiates a new positive meaning for prejudice through and before which all the elements that determine a situation must be finally examined.¹¹¹ Prejudices are not necessarily unjustified and erroneous distortion of the truth. Indeed, the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute the initial point of our whole ability to experience. "Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world." In interpreting our environing world they preoccupy our understanding. It is more our prejudices than our judgments that constitute our being.¹¹²

Gadamer acknowledges that more than thinking about the tradition covering the source of interpretation, hermeneutics by disclosing whatever exists of prejudices in our understanding must try to save tradition itself from the "tyranny of the hidden prejudices" that makes our understanding deaf to what speaks to us in tradition.¹¹³

Suspension of judgments and therefore, *a fortiori*, of prejudices, has the logical structure of a question. Does this mean that we can never come to a text because of suspending it in continuous questions about it? Here, a reductive understanding of the question discloses itself and opens up all possibilities of a hermeneutical reference. The question of a prejudice, after all, must find its proper answer in the text opened to us. What justifies our asking about a prejudice is that the text already existed that can open itself and determines what, indeed, understanding can depend on in

prejudices. Thus, from the aspect of historical objectivism, understanding focuses the reference of the question while constitutively suspending the judgment in a nontemporal manner. Here we can grasp the real historical question of a text when it is based on the question of the temporality of the reference. As a result, in fact, there is no prejudicial understanding on the level of judgment so far as it carries a mere reference of hermeneutics.

The reader, as the person who understands, already anticipates sense in the fore-understandings as prejudices which he brings to bear on the text. These preconditions become available for the interpreter in the first conversation with the text in its general meaning. Gadamer went so far as to consider prejudices as preconditions of understanding.¹¹⁴ Hereafter, we can communicate with the sacred by explicating the precomprehension which animates the interpretation. We can be optimistic about the challenge between understanding and prejudicial symbols of belief when hermeneutics (as a child of modernity) enables modernity to overcome its forgetfulness of the sacred.¹¹⁵ As Ricoeur states, hermeneutics starts out from the comprehension of the very thing which through interpretation it is trying to understand. This might imply a fruitful function for hermeneutics where understanding is unable to judge, for example as regards being. Being speaks to us not only in the pre-critical form of immediate belief, but also indeed as the second immediacy identified with understanding as the aim of hermeneutics.¹¹⁶ In other words, understanding cannot initiate an hermeneutics, unless prejudices have been related to all the beings already there, whereas hermeneutics is concealed by being again.

While hermeneutical understanding takes its origin in each case from a traditionally determined fore-understanding which changes within linguistic communication (as with Habermas), a depth hermeneutics demands a systematic fore-understanding which extends to language as a whole.¹¹⁷ Hermeneutics shows how language works within the limits of the pre-understandings, which in turn effect and give form to conventional dialogues.¹¹⁸ One can speak only when one's private pre-understandings can be shared with others through a language. There is a question whether we can count one's speaking to oneself as a real speaking. It becomes clear that pre-understandings can be related and discovered through a fundamental discussion of tradition, although they are not essentially linguistic.

In its turn, language functions for both author and reader to the degree that although the work cannot be grasped totally as it might be, it is not conditioned also by the use of language by both sides. This function relates to the fact that language attains its ultimate significance in the act of expressing itself (*des Sich-Ausserns*). In this self-expression necessarily it assumes a distance from the meaning-term syntheses that previous language usage had reserved in conventions.¹¹⁹

Nevertheless, the function of language, for Gadamer, depends mostly on the prejudices of comprehending rather than on showing how the linguistic reference of a text becomes disclosed. This definition of language restricts hermeneutics to what is readable, rather than to what is referred or returned to. On the other hand, with regard to the problem of language itself, as Gadamer acknowledged, the fundamentally linguistic character of understanding cannot indicate that all experiencing of the world takes place only as language and in language since there are prelinguistic and metalinguistic dawnings, dumbnesses and silences in which the immediate meeting with being expresses itself.¹²⁰

There is an argument that if language is a closed system of signs, within which each element refers only to the other elements of the system, then the claim of hermeneutics to reach beyond the "sense" as the immanent content of the text to its "reference" can be excluded.¹²¹ Thus critics cannot challenge the fact that the reference of the text, as to what it says about the world can be regarded as sense-free or beyond sense.

It is useful to mention that a purely linguistic study shows the importance of the idea Wittgenstein expressed in *Philosophical Investigations*,¹²² that the learning of a language is not explanation, but training. In the concept of language games Wittgenstein has formulated an idea of understanding that is not unlike what Heidegger and Gadamer call an "understanding of being." It is more than simply the product of the individual's "inner experience." Understanding in this sense has intersubjective validity which goes before and along with all empirical experience of the events and yet is pre-ontological (preconceptual).¹²³

Wittgenstein's language games contain rules according to which one receives training into existing life-forms. These forms cannot be achieved by our tendency to understand; rather as didactic rules for linguistic instruction they can be gained only by training rather than interpreting. Indeed, by becoming familiar with a text in such a play-game the different ways of thinking found in the text occur to us.

Consequently, every interpretation in its linguistic determination remains in the final analysis hypothetical. Sartre too spoke of the hypothesis of understanding we must propose in order to understand what is not discovered by the convention of discourse and words. Otherwise, even if we had an expression, there would be nothing new in it. Hence, there is an irreducibly hypothetical character of understanding that distinguishes textual interpretation from the methodological and deductive procedures of scientism.¹²⁴

On the other hand, coherent philosophical discourse of a text can be at once hermeneutic recovery of the enigmas which precede and envelop this discourse and inquiry. Such discourse, in its turn, also is similar to the performance of a poet or of musician. The meta-linguistic ambiguity lies also here in the relation between hermeneutics and reflection on a symbol. If every symbol gives birth to understanding by means of an interpretation, then how does it become possible for understanding to appear both in and beyond the symbol?¹²⁵ Can we say that here prejudices lead to the symbols, whereas understanding comes after prejudices have already happened? Does this mean that we must believe in order to understand?

Phenomenology, can be used here to understand one symbol by another. For Ricoeur the first stage of the movement of understanding is determined the comprehending of symbol by symbol, that is, by the totality of symbols. A symbol would be understood here by a rite and a myth, i.e., by other manifestations of the sacred.¹²⁶ The same symbol unifies several experiences of representation by which understanding becomes more and more extended. The phenomenology of symbols shows how understanding sheds light on prejudices by leading into internal coherence like a symbolic system. However, the hermeneutic philosopher is responsible for showing whether symbols can play a hidden role in language. What gives value to this hidden role is the text's overdetermination. Therefore, symbolic language says something of something other than what it seems to say. This symbol's meta-language provides a living condition for our prejudices by releasing interpretive meanings.

Finally, it must be noted that in its manner Gadamer's hermeneutics is based also upon finitude and the historical character of Dasein and tries to carry forward Heidegger's turn away from his transcendental account of himself. It does not follow Heidegger's direction reflecting an inspiration from the poetic mythos of Holderlin, but rather is a return to the open dialectic of Plato.¹²⁷ Whereas Heidegger's half-poetic attempts at discourse are sometimes more expressive of a linguistic need than of its overcoming, Gadamer emphasizes the interchange of dialogue and the dialogical structure of language in which an entirely undogmatic dialectic is constantly enacted.¹²⁸

Hermeneutics on behalf of prejudicial understanding anticipates meaning, whereas *hermeneuein* creates the anticipatory or annunciative structure of meaning itself. Jean-Luc Nancy¹²⁹ notes that the first is possible only on the ground of the second, while the latter does not define interpretation, "nor in all rigor something like pre-understanding." Thus *hermeneuein* determines a manner through which condition understanding is possible only by the anti-cipation of meaning which creates meaning itself.¹³⁰

Socrates indicates that the rhapsodist must comprehend the poet and give an *exegesis*, but his activity cannot be called *hermeneia*, which implies knowledge that is simple and direct. Here even the task of deciphering hidden meanings would no longer exist. As a conclusion, *ekmathesis* consists in what the poet says through what he says, while *hermeneia* consists in restoring the poet in his verse, in making him speak in his own words.¹³¹ Socrates notices that it is impossible to be a good interpreter if one does not know what the poet means to say (*o ti legei*). This critical definition introduces a theory of hermeneutics in which *hermeneia* is distinct from the acquisition of understanding relating to this *logos*. Interpretation provides that a beautiful or good *hermeneia* be possible for the listeners; otherwise *hermeneia* never become disclosed. *Hermeneuein* is to interpret the meaning of the orator and to produce the *logos* of the poet. "The *Logos* (and/or the *dianoia*) distinguishes itself from the verse (*epe*) as such, and the good *hermeneus* is the one who makes heard (*fait entendre*: makes understood) the *logos* in the delivery of the verse."¹³²

Therefore, those who are not poets simply speak again a language which is already prepared, given and conditioned. Holderlin describes accurately the procedural mode of the poetic spirit where he says that the poet's word has to dissolve completely all prior factors and conditions of linguistic formation and construction. The poet finds the word which makes possible his poem; he does not possess it as something already given. In order to be poetical, language must be free for its own infinity. Conclusively, Gadamer comes to his view that in the creation of the poet, the "all in all" becomes a lasting being. As a *hermeneuein* we all have the same linguistic experience in a certain sense, while the poet has it in the most exemplary way. In other words, whoever speaks on and in different events finds the language which is not yet there. Every real speaking is a "language event," as Holderlin would say, "Something infinitely new." A real word which addresses someone presupposes a readiness to leave behind what one brings along by prejudices and prior attitudes.¹³⁴ We can reveal this as indeterminate openness toward the text, an openness which occasionally conditions whenever a word addresses us. This openness implies in human experience a "beginning" and a new creation of interpretation and language.

In response to the question why this indeterminate openness becomes poetic, we must refer to what Gadamer sees as the poetic work and as pertaining to art, rather than as a primordial truth happening, as did Heidegger. The poetic work is not a corrective for the ideal of objective determination. Rather poetic work provides food for thought for our own hermeneutic orientation since in his hermeneutics, following Plato, language is thought up out of dialogue.¹³⁵ Consequently, we must try to provide a fluidity for the language of the text even when it is presupposed by some fixed concepts produced in thematic analysis.

Understanding comes into action through the fact that we are engaged in conversation by the text of art and our anticipations of meaning and our prejudices are challenged to measure themselves against the text and thus become open to question *ad infinitum*. The structure of a question to the text can be recognized in the manner of a suspension of judgment, and especially of prejudices.¹³⁶ How far this question can relate to Kant's definition of the aesthetic judgment

in which no concept is given, but rather in which the individual object is judged immanently, must be treated again in the context of hermeneutics.

An Inquiry into the Possibility of the Phenomenological Method in Hermeneutics

As the question of methodology in the theory of interpretation is very important, Gadamer addresses the issue explicitly in his afterward in *Truth and Method*.¹³⁷ The open dialectic of absolute knowledge in Schleiermacher appeared far more promising as the foundation for a methodology of the historical sciences, as we see in Dilthey, than the dialectical methodology found in Hegel's treatment of the historical science. Hermeneutics would like to find in the temporal understanding of the text a nontemporal methodology.

In a romantic hermeneutics, grounded on Kant's Third Critique, the transcendental justification of the aesthetic judgement is the basis of the autonomy of aesthetic consciousness; historical consciousness is legitimized on the same ground while believing the radical subjectivisation in Kant's aesthetic to have been truly epoch-making, Gadamer criticizes Kant's position in reserving the concept of truth to conceptual knowledge (in keeping with Schleiermacher's view of hermeneutics) and not extending it to the work of art.¹³⁸ Nonetheless, Kant's critique cannot be covered by the historical method.¹³⁹

Whoever wants to learn a science has to master its methodology.¹⁴⁰ But there is a basic question whether the application of a method in hermeneutics as inseparable from understanding will be productive (which we will discuss later in chapter which will be discussed later in chapter four, section two).

Based on the previous chapter and in company with Husserl, subjectivity is not opposite to objectivity, because such a concept of subjectivity itself would then be conceived in objective terms. The transcendental reduction taken by Husserl goes beyond the Kantian dissolution of the opposition between realism and idealism and the judgement, is the "judged content of the judgement as such," which is nothing other than what we ordinarily refer to as judgment as such.¹⁴⁸ For hermeneutic interpretation this refers primarily to its content. This does not constitute a special problem in the case of texts because the context can be referred to in any experience of judgement. For Husserl the *noema* found in reality (*wirklich*) can be seized in its full concreteness in judging, for the *noema* of the act of presenting becomes part of the concrete act of judgement.¹⁴⁹

The pre-predicative experience of Husserl does not seem to be free from the structure of predication. Heidegger is right when he observed an "ontological prejudice" operative in Husserl's foundational structure, which finally affects the whole idea of a constitutive phenomenology.¹⁵⁰ Husserl can escape this criticism by saying that every sense of being must itself be capable of exhibition in constitutional analysis and that "Dasein" comes into the discussion only as the *eidōs* "Dasein".¹⁵¹ It is not easy to find the point from which Heidegger could confront the phenomenological idealism of Husserl.

Indeed Heidegger's project in *Being and Time* does not itself escape completely the problematic of transcendental reflection. The idea of fundamental ontology and its foundation in Dasein, which is concerned "with being" and the analysis of Dasein, at first seemed simply to mark a new dimension within transcendental phenomenology.¹⁵² But under the title of a hermeneutics of facticity, Heidegger objected to Husserl's eidetic phenomenology that a hermeneutic phenomenology must contain also the theory of facticity, which is not in itself an *eidōs*, Husserl's phenomenology which consistently holds to the central idea of proto-I cannot be accepted without

reservation in interpretation theory in particular that this *eidōs* belong only to the eidetic sphere of universal essences. Phenomenology should be based ontologically on the facticity of the Dasein, and this existence cannot be derived from anything else.¹⁵³

Nevertheless, Heidegger's complete reversal of reflection and its redirection of it toward "Being", i.e. the turn or *kehre*, still is not so much an alteration of his point of view as the indirect result of his critique of Husserl's concept of transcendental reflection, which had not yet become fully effective in *Being and Time*.¹⁵⁴ Gadamer, however, would incorporate Husserl's ideal of an eidetic ontology somewhat "alongside" transcendental constitutional research. Here, the philosophical justification lies ultimately in the completion of the transcendental reduction, which can come only at a higher level of direct access of the individual to the object. Thus there is a question of how our awareness of essences remains subordinated to transcendental phenomenology, but this does not rule out the possibility of turning transcendental phenomenology into an essence-oriented mundane science.¹⁵⁵

Heidegger does not follow Husserl from eidetic to transcendental phenomenology, but stays with the interpretation of phenomena in relation to their essences. As 'hermeneutic', his phenomenology still proceeds from a given Dasein in order to determine the meaning of existence, but now it takes the form of a fundamental ontology.¹⁵⁶ By his careful discussion of the etymology of the words "*phenomenon*" and "*Logos*" he shows that "phenomenology" must be taken as letting that which shows itself be seen from itself, and in the very way in which shows itself from itself.¹⁵⁷ The more genuinely a methodological concept is worked out and the more comprehensively it determines the principles on which a science is to be conducted, the more deeply and primordially it is rooted in terms of the things themselves;¹⁵⁸ whereas if understanding is restricted to the things themselves only so far as they correspond to those judgments considered "first in themselves", then the things themselves cannot be addressed beyond particular judgments regarding events.

The doctrine of the thing-in-itself entails the possibility of a continuous transition from one aspect of a thing to another, which alone makes possible a unified matrix of experience. Husserl's idea of the thing-in-itself, as Gadamer introduces it, must be understood in terms of the hermeneutic progress of our knowledge. In other words, in the hermeneutical context the maxim to the thing itself signifies to the text itself. Phenomenology here means grasping the text in such a way that every interpretation about the text must be considered first as directly exhibiting the text and then as demonstrating it with regard to other texts.

Heidegger called this "descriptive phenomenology" which is fundamentally tautological.¹⁶⁰ He explains that *phenomenon* in Greek first signifies that which looks like something, or secondly that which is *semblant* or a semblance (*das scheinbare, der Schein*). He sees both these expressions as structurally interconnected, and having nothing to do with what is called an "appearance" or mere "appearance".¹⁶¹ Based on the ordinary conception of phenomenon, the definition of "appearance" as *referring to* can be regarded also as characterizing the phenomenological concern for the text in itself and for itself. Only through referring to the text in itself can we have a real phenomenology based on appearance. This theory, however, requires a broad meaning of appearance including what does the referring as well as the *noumenon*.

Heidegger explains that what does the referring must show itself in itself. Further, the appearance "of something" does not mean showing-itself, but that the thing itself announces itself through something which does show itself. Thus, Heidegger urges that what appears does not show itself and anything which fails to show itself can never seem (*was sich in der Weise nicht zeigt wie das Erscheinende, kann auch nie scheinen*). On the other hand, while appearing is never a

showing-itself in the sense of phenomenon, it is preconditioned by something showing-itself (through which the thing announces itself). This showing itself is not appearing itself, but makes the appearing possible.¹⁶² Appearing then is an announcing-itself (*das sich-melden*) through something that shows itself.

Also, a phenomenon cannot be represented by the word "appearance" if it alludes to that wherein something appears without itself being an appearance. That wherein something appears means that wherein something announces itself without showing itself, in other words without being itself an "appearance" (appearance signifying the showing itself which belongs essentially to that "wherein" something announces itself). Based upon this argument, phenomena are never appearances. This, however, does not deny the fact that every appearance is dependent on phenomena.¹⁶³

In hermeneutics such a phenomenological method, based on the definition of the concept of phenomenon with the aid of appearance, will never be able to distinguish clearly the text in itself from the text for itself, that is, the text in itself as it is brought within the hermeneutics of interpretation. Heidegger's original thinking attends to this difficult issue in regarding the concept of appearance as prior to phenomenon.

On the other hand, the text understood in hermeneutics is constitutively present in the text interpreted. It announces itself phenomenologically through interpretation which refers again to the text. Therefore, we must assert an "other text" beyond the hermeneutic text and where it is characteristic to show-itself-in-itself. This so-called text in itself makes it possible for the hermeneutic text to appear in the interpreted text; the "text interpreted" must be referred to the hermeneutical text and not vice versa.

For Heidegger, it is most characteristic of hermeneutical phenomenology to discover the specific meaning of the *Logos*. This can be recognized also in terms of the thinghood (*Sachhaft*) of that which is to be described by the scientific determination provided by any text. Only through this textualization of phenomenology does it become possible to have both ordinary and formal signification of the phenomenon as really united in the exhibition of an entity as it shows itself in itself. Nonetheless, as Heidegger elaborates it, whenever something is explicitly exhibited by its very essence, it does not show itself at all, but lies hidden, while belonging as well to what shows itself.¹⁶⁴

Ricoeur follows Husserl only at a secondary level, namely, with regard to the eidetic phenomenology that supersedes the descriptive phenomenology (which had been the abiding interest of Husserl's *Cartesian Mediation and Ideas*). What role can eidetic phenomenology play in the hermeneutics of a text? Ricoeur takes the longer route by, first of all, allowing for a hermeneutic philosophy in some contrast to the classical methodical approach to the text. He sees phenomenology as an indispensable presupposition of hermeneutic theory.¹⁶⁵ On the other hand, Ricoeur is concerned about the epistemological legitimacy of methods and techniques developed independently of any ontological grounding, for no mediating ground between discourses can be supposed a priori. He fears that an exclusively ontological hermeneutics become just another self-contained discourse.¹⁶⁶ Therefore, philosophical hermeneutics must distinguish itself from the methodological disciplines.¹⁶⁷

For Gadamer philosophical hermeneutics is an ultimately selfless level of discourse. It will be explained later that, based on this, the philosophical appropriation of the text lies not in "becoming self," but in "becoming other." Moreover, it is possible to think of a methodological hermeneutics becoming a total instrumentalization of experience which would preclude openness to the new, and thus an authentic recovery of the past.

Language is more than the consciousness of the speaker, and thus more than a subjective act. Play is fundamentally prior to the consciousness of the player and represents an order in which the to and fro motion of play follows of itself. From this *authentic sense* it follows that hermeneutics is not only without goal or purpose, but also without effort of understanding.¹⁶⁸ Play happens, as it were, by itself; it refers phenomenologically (and not naturally) to the absence of strain. The structure of play absorbs the hermeneutic consciousness into itself.

A hermeneutic phenomenology sees philosophy as in danger and its future threatened; for Husserl this suggests the need for historical reflection. This does not mean that the great task of philosophy is a mere relativism, though philosophical self-reflection does have meaning. According to Heidegger, the aim of phenomeno-logical reduction is not only to lead our vision from beings back to being, but also to bring ourselves forward positively toward being itself.

On the other hand, the idea of a scientific philosophy is not surrendered. Husserl's *The Crisis* reflects a certain change in his former confidence that by his "total life-situation which in the end becomes fully without an object he could provide a foundation for philosophy as an apodictically rigorous science,¹⁶⁹ As a result, in contrast to typically scientific method, according to Gadamer the method of phenomenology deals with that which has no foundation; it proceeds by a transcendental experience rather than empirical induction; and it must first create its own ground.¹⁷⁰

Though phenomenology's call for philosophy as a rigorous science is unable to satisfy the common need for a world view,¹⁷¹ Gadamer still believes that one's own philosophical standpoint shines through his description of the basic meaning of phenomeno-logy. Moreover, he joins philosophy and phenomenology in one by stating, "It is simply not possible in philosophy to isolate a methodo-logical technique that one can learn independently of its applications and their philosophical consequences."¹⁷²

There is no unique sense of phenomenology, since everyone has his own opinion about what it really means. Has then Gadamer trapped himself in recognizing different "reflections on phenomenology", rather than merely one phenomenology? He acknowledges that there is a "hierarchy of self-evidence" united by a "systematic consistency." Restriction to pure phenomenon first opens the pheno-menological dimension of question. The need for knowledge was not satisfied by mere differentiation of essence and fact, nor by appeal to the self-evidence of what is given directly in the intuition of essences. In the last analysis, the appeal to self-evidence had only the legitimation of a belief in oracles, as Husserl recognizes in *The Crisis*.¹⁷³ In order to reach more certain knowledge, a further reduction was needed, one that distinguished within what was given in self-evident intuition as that whose non-being was absolutely absurd and impossible. As Gadamer emphasizes, only from such "apodictic self-evidence" could a hierarchy of evidence be expected that would satisfy the claim of philosophy to be a rigorous science.¹⁷⁴

We accept that phenomenology provides a scientific theore-tical-explanatory analysis of the perceptual object. It does not come down to merely object to observing how such a theory is implemented in the world, in a particular medium, at a particular place and time, but provides an existential hermeneutical account of perception. Due to this transformation of phenomenological inquiry, we must open a new understanding a perceptual object based on the question of being.

In the Heideggerian point of view hermeneutics is also phenomenological. Hence the term 'hermeneutics,' used by the early Heidegger, cannot be reduced to a methodology, but is a theory of the real experience that thinking is.¹⁷⁵

For Heidegger, there are three basic components of the phenomenological method: reduction, construction and destruction. All these belong together in their content, and their mutual related-

ness must be grounded. In philosophy construction is necessarily destruction, that is to say, a deconstructing of traditional concepts carried in an historical turn to the tradition. But this deconstruction must not be taken as a negation of the tradition; rather, as destruction belongs to construction, philosophical cognition is essentially historical cognition. The history of philosophy belongs to the concept of philosophy as science, to the concept of phenomenological investigation.¹⁷⁶

Phenomenological reduction is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of a human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the transcendental condition of consciousness and its noetic-noematic experiences. A text is unveiled whenever a phenomenological theory of interpretation becomes certainly possible, though there are also contexts of texts, which cannot definitely set out the factual conditions of hermeneutical experience. The fundamental grounds for the existence of texts become the factual condition of hermeneutical experience.

Husserl had made it a universal working method to go back to life, abandoning the restrictions of the scientifically advocated methods (including that of the human sciences). Indeed, Husserl's analysis of the life world had given the question of objectivity a totally new background. "Science is anything but a fact from which to start." Beyond this transcendental objectivity, Heidegger takes a radical step toward being. By assuming the special methodological nature of the historical sciences, with Husserl, (and against Dilthey) he believes that historical being is not to be distinguished from natural being.¹⁷⁷

Hermeneutics can be characterized as phenomenological if it takes into consideration that the essence of interpreting is the practical understanding determined in an historical world. As an understanding is determined by being-in-the world, hence, phenomenology as an hermeneutic method is realized in language which uncovers the horizons of the being-in-the-world.

Phenomenological apprehension must direct itself toward a being in such a way that the being of this being is thereby brought out and can be thematized. Such an apprehension of being always turns at first and necessarily to some being, but then it is led away from the being and back to its own being. This leading back or reduction of investigative vision from a naively apprehended being to being is phenomenological reduction and can be called the phenomenological method.¹⁷⁸ Phenomenological reduction is this method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural attitude of a human being whose life is involved in the world of things and persons back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its experiences of the noetic-noematic events. As an hermeneutic approach, this means leading phenomenological vision back from the apprehension of being to the "understanding" of the "being" of the being.¹⁷⁹

Phenomenology is the name for the method of ontology, that is, of scientific philosophy, which precludes its expressing any thesis about being.¹⁸⁰ To return to the phenomenological given as such one must renounce all theory and metaphysical construction. Thus, phenomenological reduction is connected closely with epoché, the suspension of all interpretation. But transcendental reduction is not a suspension of all the "being references" of hermeneutics: rather it releases all the interpreted references. Reduction should not be oversimplified; its goals is not to reduce to the unity of a principle, but to discuss the wealth of self-given phenomena in an unbiased way. Thus, there is no real conflict between the Husserlian reduction of epoché, understood as seeking a single principle, and the general hermeneutic sense of a self-given phenomena, provided that in first defining the source of being hermeneutics is not disregarded.

According to the phenomenological *epoché* any scientific interpretation of the natural world must be discontinued so that all standards of scientific interpretation are absolutely abstained from.

For hermeneutic truth concerning the realities of the texts, these scientific interpretations must be placed in brackets. *Epoché* modifies the sense of a text as it appears in interpretation so that it can be valid and can be taken for further scientific analysis. In experience there can be no validity of the whole; that must be set in brackets. Thus, all sciences as approaches to text are invalid, and must be put in brackets.

Nonetheless, phenomenology, notes Gadamer, has been no less criticized than the habits of thought of contemporary philosophy. Though phenomenology sought to avoid every unwarranted construction and tried to subject the philosophical theories to critical examination, such phenomenology is nonetheless a prejudiced construction in Gadamer's eyes since, for example, it attempted to derive all the phenomena of human social life from a single principle.¹⁸¹

Accordingly, phenomenology comes up against a limit for its ideal of a "final grounding." The *aporiai* connected with the self-referential character of phenomenology as the science of pure consciousness, as well as the *aporiai* connected with the self-constitution of temporality, brought the entire project of a transcendental phenomenology to its downfall.¹⁸² It is perhaps, for this reason that Gadamer says that Husserl's *The Crisis* attempts to give an implicit answer to *Being and Time*.¹⁸³

An Investigation of the Condition of the Hermeneutical Method

Hermeneutics as the science of being is fundamentally distinct in method from all other natural and even human sciences. Hermeneutics as an interpreting concern of philosophy cannot be merely the methodological basis of the so-called human sciences. The methods of the human sciences are not at issue here.¹⁸⁴ The hermeneutics developed by Gadamer, for example, is not a methodology of the human sciences, and the hermeneutical phenomenon is not basically a problem of method at all.¹⁸⁵ The hermeneutical phenomenon goes beyond the methodological self-consciousness of the human sciences to reflect an understanding of what the human sciences are. It is also not an art or a technique of understanding, for it does not propose to prescribe for the sciences of the conduct of life. In the context of the history of human sciences which are the products of those modes of experiences outside of the natural science, Gadamer discusses whether hermeneutics stands closer to rhetoric or to logic and the methodology of sciences. Inquiry into the history of such sciences as linguistics indicates that the notion of method fundamentally dissolves the notion of science by opening it to the nature of being human.¹⁸⁶

Hermeneutical reflection, indeed, serves a unique methodological endeavor of science by making transparently clear the guiding pre-understandings in the sciences, thereby opening new dimensions of questioning. Meanwhile, in hermeneutics, there is no way for understanding to become the consumer of the inventions and information attained by science. Conversely, this understanding, by providing all human relations to the world, stands as a point of independent validity within science and resists any attempt to be reinterpreted as a scientific method.¹⁸⁷

Although the historical sciences' attitude toward method and the influence exerted by the successful model of the natural sciences led philosophical reflection to restrict the universality of the hermeneutical experience to its scientific form, the full extent of the fundamental hermeneutical uniqueness of experience was not indicated before Gadamer, either in the work of Wilhelm Dilthey or in the studies of the neo-Kantians. For Gadamer, Heidegger's extension of the concept of understanding to an existential, i.e., to a fundamental categorical determination of human existence, should be regarded as the fundamental impetus in the fundamental hermeneutical experience. This led Gadamer to transcend the discussion of method and initiate a new

and expanded formulation of the hermeneutic question.¹⁸⁸ Only by this attempt can the methodological uniqueness of the human sciences among the historical human sciences and the natural sciences ground its legitimacy.

This hermeneutical question seeks, first of all, "to discover and bring into consciousness something which that methodological dispute cannot serve or even conceal and neglect, something that does not so much confine or limit modern science as precede it and make it possible."¹⁸⁹ Moreover, this question does not make its own immanent law of advance any less decisive.¹⁹⁰ Gadamer sometimes calls this question the "problem of phenomenological immanence"; he acknowledges too that his book is phenomenological in method. Yet he leaves unexplained how this hermeneutic phenomenology would join with the fundamental question of understanding being.

It must be mentioned, first, that the priority of the question of knowledge shows how the idea of method is fundamentally limited.¹⁹¹ This question appears as the starting point for our argument as a whole. "There is no such thing as a method of learning to ask questions, of learning to see what is questionable. Socrates taught us that important knowledge is knowledge that one does not know."¹⁹² And it is crucial that important knowledge remain knowledge even when nobody knows of it in any manner.

Concern with the question of knowledge, the traditional point of opposition between Plato and Aristotle, could be less and less confirmed. Both are ruled by the enduring urgency of the Socratic question of the good. Therefore, the content of the Platonic dialogues can be depicted on an Aristotelian conceptual level. Gadamer believes there is a unique contemporaneity (*Aktualitat*) of the Platonic dialogues in the fact that they transcend all ages in the same way as great masterpieces of art.¹⁹³ The indissoluble entanglement of theoretical and practical knowledge testifies to the continuity of the Socratic question which binds Plato and Aristotle to one another and both to every human present (*Gegenwart*).¹⁹⁴

There is a primary question of how interpretive knowledge can be achieved in a methodical manner. The perplexing task of hermeneutics is grounded neither on a methodical praxis of art history and historical scholarship, nor on the consciousness of method; rather, it is the philosophical idea of grounding an argument to the extent that it is a philosophical requirement of science and method to recognize their distinctive character in the context of human *Existenz*.¹⁹⁵ We must remember that although Gadamer in *Truth and Method* takes the aesthetic question as a starting point for his reflection and occasionally returns to it, this plays a rather subordinate role in developing his investigations. Aesthetics has to be absorbed into hermeneutics.¹⁹⁶ For him, hermeneutics has to do basically with a theoretical attitude toward the practice of the understanding of the texts (and as Gadamer thinks, toward the experiences interpreted in them).¹⁹⁷ Understanding for Gadamer is conceived as part of the process through which meaning comes into being, in which the significance of all statements in art or other dimensions is formed and made complete. Thus, in the third part of his work, the study of understanding is practically identical with that of the understanding of texts.¹⁹⁸ This also means that without an understanding of the text there are no practical situations of understanding that can be resolved by hermeneutics.

On the other hand, Gadamer attempts to articulate the effective historical consciousness as well as the aesthetic question as combined with the being in hermeneutics, rather than with the understanding itself. He says: "What in Heidegger's thinking had led to 'the turn', I for my part attempted to describe as the horizon experience of our self-understanding, as the effective

historical consciousness (*wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein*) that is more being than being conscious."199

The consciousness of effective history seeks to be aware of the prejudgments and to control its own pre-understanding; thus it also does away with naive objectivism.200 In this connection, for Gadamer a task of speaking on behalf of understanding and also of over-coming modern times takes place in the analysis of the hermeneutic experience as it becomes aware of itself. Gadamer says that what he means by *wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein* is inevitably more being than consciousness, though being is never fully manifest. Only through hermeneutical reflection is one free over against oneself and able to evaluate freely what in one's pre-understanding may be justified and what is unjustifiable.201 Thus, the hermeneutic consciousness, for Gadamer, seeks to confront something of the truth of remembrance with what still is and remains ever real.202 In this context, hermeneutics can be freed from the consequences of a transcendental theory of consciousness. This fact can be studied through Heidegger's idea of half-poetic language whose task it is to go beyond the language of metaphysics in which transcendental consciousness still can be realized by adopting its own method of procedure.203

As we made clear, understanding is the placing of oneself within a process of tradition, in which past and present are constantly fused. This is what must be expressed in the hermeneutical question of knowledge, as we see in *Truth and Method*, which is far too dominated by the idea of a process, a method. The understanding subject does not contribute the interplay of the movement of the interpreter, but moves in the common ground, connecting it with tradition from which it gleams the fore-understandings which activate the dialogue with the text.204

The strangeness of the tradition, criticized by Romanticism, becomes the basic methodological presupposition of the hermeneutical procedure. Hermeneutics, thus, becomes a universal and general "methodical attitude" in the study of tradition that presupposes the forgiveness of the content that is to be understood. Its first task is to overcome this foreignness by the understanding. The foundation of the modern sciences gets validity from hermeneutical reflection on alienation which has achieved reflective awareness through the concept of method. This psychological-historical understanding, according to Schleiermacher, is the immediate insight into the subject matter and becomes the only genuinely "methodical, scientific attitude." Therefore hermeneutics becomes the universal organ of the historical method in human sciences.205

One is aware of the normative viewpoints in the practical situation in which one stands owing to its binding validity, rather than to theoretical knowledge. (Practical philosophy can make this awareness an object of its theory, described by Aristotle as ethical virtues.) The theoretician can see these viewpoints adequately only from the standpoint of their concrete realization, in so far as he experiences himself as bound by their validity. Gadamer follows Aristotle's view that the possibility of theoretical insight is restricted apparently by the practical field. The same is true for *Geisteswissenschaften*, and beyond that in a more general hermeneutical way of thinking of being. It must be remembered here, that without this practical knowledge gained from the methodical attitude of tradition the theoretical analysis of the possibilities of understanding would not in itself be an objectifying reflection enabling understanding to be mastered by means of science and methodology.206

The hermeneutical object of reference does not appear to be fulfilled completely, either in theory or in practice, by a phenomenology such as we see in Hegel, in which an object in itself is active in the hermeneutical process. The free play of our interpreting being is not operative in real philosophical speculation. The doctrine addressed by the historical attitude of philosophy, as in

pheno-menology, "to the things themselves" appears similar in this. The fact that in hermeneutics there is no room for unprejudiced analysis of the phenomenon puts it basically in controversy with the traditional classical understanding of the concept of the thing. Also, as reflected in hermeneutics, the concept of the thing tells us more than the concept of *res*. The hermeneutical object of reference is more placed in the concept of the thing or *Sache* in the German world, by which, as Gadamer says, "all what is called *causa* is permitted above."²⁰⁷ This object of reference here represents the disputed matter which is under interpretation.

Beyond the idealistic of knowledge of a thing in Hegel, life experience and ideas brought Gadamer to the view that the truth of a single proposition cannot be measured by its merely factual re-relationship of correctness and congruency. Rather it depends, ultimately, upon the genuineness of its foundation, since the meaning of a statement in hermeneutical consciousness is not merely exhausted in what is stated.²⁰⁸ This basic givenness of the hermeneutical problem can be made concrete in terms of fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception. As Gadamer says here, we must be concerned with what historical-hermeneutical consciousness requires. In fact, methodologically consciousness will be concerned, not with forming anticipatory ideas, but with making these ideas conscious, so as to acquire right understanding from the things themselves.²⁰⁹

Regarding the issue of the hermeneutic thing itself, Husserl perceives the coincidence of its intuition and explication, but he fails to draw all its consequences.²¹⁰ Here, all phenomenology is an explication of evidence and an evidence of explication. The phenomenological experience is nothing more than that evidence which is explicated and which unfolds evidence. Based upon this view, phenomenology can be realized only as hermeneutics. Indeed, phenomenology and hermeneutics presuppose one another if the idealism of Husserlian phenomenology succumbs to the critique of hermeneutics.²¹¹ It is only in the light of interpretation that something becomes a fact, and only within this process can we express any observation of a thing (what-so-ever it might be).²¹² In this sense of phenomenology one can follow the trace of an ontological method required by the study of the thing itself.

Ricoeur shows how in the encounter between essential intuition and interpretation Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* indicated that interpretation becomes necessary at the point of culmination of phenomenological idealism, i.e., in the context of the problematic of constitution. Hence *Seinsgeltung* is completely enclosed in the transcendental life of the ego; what exists for me (*für mich*) derives from myself (*aus mir selbst*) all its validity as being.²¹³ Phenomenology, with its idealistic self-interpretation, according to Ricoeur, cannot attain the significance of intentionality, viz., that the meaning of consciousness lies beyond the intention. Hermeneutics as the theory of the text performs a radical detouring from the subject to the world.²¹⁴ In Ricoeur's hermeneutics of the text, the subject is no longer the ego bearing the ultimate responsibility for the world as its radical origin. Subjectivity finds its validity at the end of a hermeneutical process, the moment of application where the ontological constitution of a finite, plural, historical subjectivity is the issue.²¹⁵

There remains always a question whether hermeneutics can carry a methodological concern or not. This methodological concern, however, permits another attitude of hermeneutics which sets it apart from the anti-methodological cast of Gadamer who in this issue appears the more faithful disciple of Heidegger. There is always a question whether shifting from eidetic phenomenology to phenomenological hermeneutics is ultimately preferable. In this way, Ricoeur tries to demonstrate the universality and fertility of intentional analysis applied to the effective and lived experiences, and also to use the results won by this stretching of the phenomenological method to call into question the transcendental doctrine erected on the narrow base of the analysis

of representations.²¹⁶ Ricoeur believes that it is not a question of providing some kind of imaginative intuition, but rather of thinking, of elaborating concepts that comprehend and make one comprehend, concepts woven together, if not in a closed system, at least in a systematic order. It is also a question of transmitting, by means of this rational elaboration, a richness of "signification that (is) always there," that has already preceded rational elaboration. Based on this fact, it can be concluded that all that hermeneutical methodology represents is a way in which what has been said by any human being takes place before philosophy (*meta hermeneutica*). Heraclitus already warned us of this where he said, "The master whose oracle is at Delphi does not speak, does not dissimulate; he signifies."²¹⁷

Therefore, hermeneutics and phenomenology, despite their opposite questions, stand in reciprocal relatedness which needs to be brought out. Hermeneutics is erected on the basis of phenomenology which in turn remains an unsurpassable presupposition of hermeneutics. Based upon this, Ricoeur acknowledges that phenomenology cannot constitute itself without a hermeneutical presupposition. This hermeneutical position of phenomenology is linked to the role of *Auslegung* (explication) in the fulfillment of its philosophical project.²¹⁸

Ricoeur believes that each of the terms, 'phenomenology' or 'hermeneutics,' represents the point of arrival of histories which criss-cross the general history of ideas. Phenomenology is the ultimate embodiment of philosophical idealism. Hermeneutics is the final stage of the art (*techné*) whose name it bears, that of reading omens, interpreting signs and announcing messages. This later became the art of the jurisconsults, the exegetes of sacred books, the learned scholars of the classics. Later still it was the general theory of interpretation, an organon of historical reason. Thereby now it has become ontological and foundational.²¹⁹

In addition, there are two concepts of hermeneutics of phenomenology. The first is what Ricoeur calls Heidegger's "short route," that is the ontology of understanding, through which we determine the conditions upon which a knowing subject can understand a text. The other way is Ricoeur's "long route," which moves along the paths of semantics as well as of reflection.²²⁰ As a result of the solidarity between hermeneutics and phenomenology, the phenomenological question can direct itself toward a being, while it must yet do so in such a way that the being of this being is thereby brought out in order so that it can be thematized. Apprehension of being, for Heidegger, always turns, at first and necessarily, to some being; but then it is led away from that being and back to its being. This basic component is called the phenomenological method, i.e., the leading back or re-reduction of investigative vision from a naively apprehended being to a phenomenologically reduced being.²²¹

Here, there is a question of how meaning would be restored on behalf of hermeneutic methodology, how we can return to a discourse which does not pertain to my cultural circle. For Ricoeur this is the inverse problem of demythologization, for which it was a question of eliminating discourse which is no longer our own. It is, indeed, a question of how we can recover a discourse and express it in modern speech. The solution, for Ricoeur, lies in posing the question of philosophy as a hermeneutics. The task of philosophy is to elaborate a general theory of interpretation (as we see in the light of Marx, Nietzsche and Freud). Schleiermacher had begun and Dilthey continued this. Ricoeur sees this as extending the problem of the understanding of texts to understanding all signs susceptible of "being considered as texts."²²²

Understanding being within a phenomenological manner means to regard hermeneutics with the sense of the text, not as behind it, but in front of it and disclosed. What has to be understood is not the initial situation of discourse, but what points toward a possible world, due to the non-ostensive reference of the text.²²³ Every theory of interpretation postulates a theory of text; it

becomes the task of hermeneutics to read a text and to distinguish its true from its apparent sense, to search for the sense under the sense, to search for the intelligible text under the unintelligible text. There is a proper way of uncovering what was covered and veiled, of removing what Nietzsche identifies by the metaphor of mask.²²⁴ The relation of concealing and revealing of the text calls for a specific reading of the text, that is, for hermeneutics.

Frege was concerned with the cognitive value of a sentence; for him the sense and the reference of the thought deserve the same attention. These concepts indeed should be ranked after the level of the text in order to affirm that the ideality (*Sinnidealität*) of texts is not exhausted in subjective representations. Moreover, an objectivity of meaning (*Sinn*) can be defined only in such manner that the text is a kind of atemporal object unbounded by ties to any historical development of events.²²⁵

On the other hand, instead of recognizing a pure transcendental reduction, Heidegger's short route of hermeneutics suggests the Being of the beings and Being itself as the explicit object of his ontology. This approach can be developed through Husserl's phenomenological method. It must be remembered that phenomenology is not only a complete and autonomous science, it is the only science which can entirely found all its statements independently of any other science and scientific method, therefore, phenomenology is, as viewed by Husserl, the philosophy, and ontology is either phenomenology itself or a system of conclusions which necessarily result from phenomenology.

Yet the early Husserl strongly insisted on the *Ansich* (in-itself) of the object of hermeneutics.²²⁶ This object of hermeneutics as what can be defended in phenomenology is not exactly that for which the question of being or text is responsible, but is the prior question in hermeneutics. What Husserl regards as a necessary condition of philosophy as a rigorous science, for Heidegger is impossible except by negation of the philosophical attitude. Heidegger denies any reduction of the human being to only pure consciousness and of Being to being-object. One experiences oneself not as pure consciousness, but rather as a Being-in-the world who exists toward worldly beings.²²⁷ Heidegger makes a completely new beginning in this issue. His point of view is completely different since pure analysis and description do not have the same value for him as for Husserl who thinks of phenomenology only as the instrument of a pre-existing, but yet implicit doctrine.²²⁸ In contrast, Heidegger here takes a radical step toward the hermeneutical question of being.²²⁹

Consequently, in hermeneutics we need an ontological method, but not in the sense of some definite hermeneutical discipline interconnected with others. Rather it must be taken in terms of the objective requirements of definite questions and the kind of treatment which 'things themselves' require.²³⁰

In clarifying the scientific character of ontology, the task of demonstrating the ontic foundation and characterization of this foundation itself and of distinguishing the mode of knowing operative in ontology as the science of being are not strictly separable.²³¹

Understanding-of-being is transcendence, whether pre-ontological and non-thematic, or thematic and conceptually ontological.²³² This disclosure is the metaphysically primordial being, the truth which is transcendence itself, *veritas transcendentalis*. With the "happening of transcendence," beings are already manifested to be in the first instance and at length concealed so that truth must be called unconcealedness with reference to this corresponding concealedness.²³³ Beings are generally concealed as long as they are not faced with understanding-of-being. As the Greek word *aletheia* shows, beings must first of all be drawn out from concealment. Later we will point out that concealment and unconcealment of being become understandable to Dasein only through the hermeneutical discovery of the text.

We must remember in brief that Gadamer's hermeneutics is grounded on the separation of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics from his dialectics, while trying to defend Dilthey's attempt to establish a pure hermeneutics against the consequences drawn by Heidegger and Nietzsche. On the other hand, Gadamer proceeded with Hegel who challenged Gadamer both negatively and positively.²³⁴ At the end of his introduction to *Truth and Method*, through a comparison to the method of phenomenology, Gadamer describes what kind of method hermeneutics might be. He states that his investigation of hermeneutics is directed by Husserl's con-sciousness of phenomenological description, by Dilthey's breadth of historical horizon, and, not least, by the reference to both of these by Heidegger. This is the standard by which the hermeneutician desires to be measured.²³⁵ Indeed, Gadamer's aim is not to propose a method, but rather to describe what is the case when understanding takes place.

He studies these basic states of affairs in *Truth and Method* guided by an understanding of texts. With the help of textual understanding he carries out his transcendental reflection, and derives his theoretical insights.²³⁶ Thus, Gadamer tries to build philosophical hermeneutics by describing what always happens whenever an interpretation is convincing and successful. Consequently, it is not a doctrine about a technical skill that would state how understanding ought to be.²³⁷

The very idea of a definitive interpretation seems intrinsically contradictory in unveiling the truth of the text. Interpretation cannot be the result of a procedure for interrogating and construing pre-given texts by a methodically informed interpreter. The real power of hermeneutical consciousness is our ability to see what is questionable.²³⁸ Interpretation is always on the way. The word 'interpretation' points to the finitude of the human being and of knowledge.²³⁹ Hermeneutics is not a "know-how" which, like some know-how-to make, just chooses its task. It is posed according to the practice of one's living.²⁴⁰ As a result, like practical philosophy (politics) for Aristotle, hermeneutics is more than the highest technique. Reflecting upon the possible, interpretation can be defined as a teaching about a technical skill (*Kunstlehre*) in the manner of rhetoric and in the same manner is a natural capacity of human beings.²⁴¹

Philosophy, in this connection, can be regarded as a hermeneutics, an analysis of significations. (This recalls Husserl's definition of phenomenology as philosophy). Hermeneutics, then, is not simply a reflection on the rules of exegesis, because culture itself is a text. Consequently, philosophy is exegetical in the degree to which it is a deciphering behind the masked signs of the intentions.²⁴²

But one must not take hermeneutics as philosophy also as metaphysics. It would be a mistake, according to Gadamer, to place hermeneutics under the category of metaphysics just because it refers to a meaning presented by the text, for it is also independent of any philosophy of presence, as Gadamer develops it in *Philosophical Hermeneutics*.

For this reason Heidegger sees the acceptance of the doctrine of ideas as the beginning of the forgetfulness of being, and believes the earliest Greek thinking about being prepared for the forgetfulness of being in metaphysics. Gadamer discloses this by defending the authentic dimension of the Platonic dialectic of ideas beyond every thing that exists (or what we call text vis-a-vis interpretation); this allows us to understand by going beyond a simple-minded acceptance of ideas. In the final analysis this is a countermovement against the metaphysical interpretation of being as the being of existing beings (*Sein als des Seins des Seienden*). Yet, Gadamer appreciates Heidegger's view regarding the forgetfulness of being by recalling the question of being through dismissing whatever had been attempted by the metaphysical tradition toward understanding being.²⁴³

If being is the proper theme of philosophy as hermeneutics and if philosophy is also not a simple world view, can we determine the specific method of hermeneutics as ontology? In answer we must say that hermeneutics in principle relates to the origins of interpretations as beings or texts, while philosophy deals with what every positing of being, even that by a world view, must presuppose fundamentally. The method of ontology, that is, of philosophy in general, is the analysis of the truth-character of being. Being is given only if the understanding of being, i.e., Dasein, exists; accordingly this lays claim to a distinctive priority in ontological inquiry. It makes itself manifest in all discussions of the basic problems of ontology and above all in the fundamental question of the meaning of being in general. Ontology, then, as a fundamental discipline, is the analytic of the Dasein. This means that ontology cannot be established in a purely ontological manner; its possibility is referred back to a being, to something ontic, that is, to Dasein.²⁴⁴ This new concept of ontology can be defined basically without any need for a methodological understanding of a text or being.

Consequently, hermeneutics in this manner, as always, reflects upon the possible (instead of 'possibilities') interpretation as useful and advantageous not for anything except itself. Therefore the hermeneutical analysis must be determined by the limit of philosophical interpretation or discourse. The limit (not the death) of philosophy is the condition for philosophy to become possible (or to be dead). Through this episteme, hermeneutics is taken as in-scribed within the text in contrast to the hermeneutical view that attempted to govern it from without.²⁴⁵ The fact that scientific knowledge demands rigorous scientific demonstration of its grounds, is not a task of methodology, but is a characteristic of hermeneutics which in any case is already operative in that which is understood. Therefore, results as scientific come to maturity only in the circle of understanding or interpretation.²⁴⁶

For Gadamer, the event of understanding is the formation of a comprehensive horizon in which both the horizon of text and that of the interpreter become united into a common view of the subject matter i.e., the meaning.²⁴⁷ We can gain critical awareness of prejudices of understanding and correct them in our effort to hear what the text says to us. As far as it depends on our understanding, the correction of prejudices is no longer to be regarded as transcending all prejudices toward a prejudice-free arena.

Consequently, a so-called hermeneutical methodology can come into account in differing presence. This is the very basis on which present interpretation is announced or desired; it corresponds to the method of hermeneutics. It no longer exists without *différance*, but must be understood as something other than the classical economy of metaphysics. The movement of *différance* as producing different things is the reference of different things. It becomes that which differentiates as the common root of all the oppositional concepts that mark language, such as sensible or intelligible, intuition or signification, nature or culture, etc. Through considering *différance* as a common root, that is the element of the same, it already has been assumed as one reference to which all differentiations of beings must refer through the hermeneutical method of differentiating.²⁴⁸

Chapter III

The Text as Internally Founded in the Introspection of Hermeneutics

Interpretation and the Temporalization of Time²⁴⁹

In his earlier works, and notably in *Being and Time*, Heidegger had already advanced the view that temporality constitutes the meaning of the human's mode of Being. Temporality is also the condition which makes historicity possible as a temporal mode of Being constitutive for man's coming-to-pass as such.²⁵⁰

We must review this position briefly in Gadamer's hermeneutics.

There is a temporal continuity in Dasein. This is required for the revelation of a work of art through interpretation, both as under-standing which already was, and as the way in which understanding was. Understanding is possible only in the temporal revision of one's standpoint through the mutual relations of author and interpreter which allow the subject-matter to emerge. Here, the prejudices held by the interpreter play an important part in opening an horizon of possible questions.²⁵¹

Subsequent understanding that is superior to the original production, does depend on the conscious realization, historical or not, that places the interpreter on the same level as the author (as Schleiermacher pointed out). But even more, it denotes and depends upon an inseparable difference between the interpreter and the text and this precisely in the temporal field provided by historical distance.

It may be argued that the historian tries to curb this historical distance by getting beyond the temporal text in order to force it to yield information that it does not intend and of itself is unable to give. With regard to the particular text in application, this would seem to be the case. For example, what makes the true historian is an understanding of the significance of what he finds. Thus, the testimony of history is like that given before a court. In the German language, and based on this reason, the same word is used for both in general, *Zeugnis* (testimony; witness).²⁵²

But referring back to Gadamer's position, we can see that it is in view of the historical distance that understanding must reconcile itself with itself and that one recognize oneself in the other being. The body of this argument becomes completely firm through the idea of historical *Bildung*, since, for example, to have a theoretical stance is, as such, already alienation; namely, dealing with something that is not immediate, but is other, belonging to memory and to thought. Moreover, theoretical *Bildung* leads beyond what man knows and experiences immediately. It consists in learning to affirm what is different from oneself and to find universal viewpoints from which one can grasp the thing as "the objective thing in its freedom," without selfish interest.²⁵³ This indicates that an aesthetic discovery of a thing is conditioned primarily on assuming the thing where it is no longer, i.e., from a distance.

In this connection, we can extend critically Gadamer's concept of the dynamism of distanciation from the object of under-standing which is bounded by the frame of effective consciousness. This is based on the fact that in spite of the general contrast between belonging and alienating distance, the consciousness of effective history itself contains an element of distance. The history of effects, for Ricoeur, contains what occurs under the condition of historical distance. Whether this is either the nearness of the remote or efficacy at a distance, there is a paradox in

otherness, a tension between proximity and distance which is essential to historical consciousness.²⁵⁴

The possibility of effective historical consciousness is grounded in the possibility of any specific present understanding of being futural; in contrast, the first principle of hermeneutics is the Being of Dasein, which is historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) itself.²⁵⁵ In Gadamer's view, Dasein's temporality, which is the basis for its historicity, grounds the tradition. The last sections of *Being and Time* claimed to indicate that the embodiment of temporality can be found in Dasein's historicity.²⁵⁶ As a result of this, the tradition is circularly grounded in Dasein's temporality, while also surpassing its borders in order to be provided by a hermeneutical reference in distance.

We must study the root of this dilemma in so far as it is related to the sense of time. This is presupposed by historical consciousness, which in turn is preceded essentially by temporality. This inherent enigma in the hermeneutics of Dasein's time led Heidegger to distinguish between authenticity and inauthenticity in our relation to time. The current concept of time can never totally fulfill the hermeneutical requirements. Ricoeur considered that time can be understood only if grasped within its limit, namely, eternity, but because eternity escapes the totalization and closure of any particular time, it remains inscrutable.²⁵⁷

On the other hand, a text can be seen as temporal with regard to historical consciousness since it speaks only in the present. The text cannot be made present totally within an historical moment fully present-to-itself. It is in its *a venir* that the presence of the text transpires, which can be thematized as *revenir* (or) return.

Based on this aspect, each word is absolutely complete in itself, yet, because of its temporality, its meaning is realized only in its historical application.²⁵⁸ Nevertheless, historical interpretation can serve as a means to understand a given and present text even when, from another perspective, it sees the text simply as a source which is part of the totality of an historical tradition.²⁵⁹

For Heidegger, the past character of time, i.e., the 'pastness' (*passéité*) belongs to a world which no longer exists, while a world is always world for a Dasein.²⁶⁰ It is clear that the past would remain closed off from any present were present Dasein not itself to be historical. Dasein, however, is in itself historical insofar as it is a possibility of interpreting. In being futural Dasein is its past, which comes back to it in the 'how'. This is the ontological question of a thing in contrast to the question of the 'what.' The manner of its coming back is, among other processes, conscience. This makes clear why only the 'how' can be repeated. According to Ricoeur, history presents a past that has been as if it were present, as a function of poetic imagination. On the other hand, fictive narration imitates history in that it presents events as if they had happened, i.e., as if they occurred in the past.²⁶¹ This intersection between history and fiction constitutes human time (*le temps humain*) when an historical consciousness develops, where time can be understood as a singular totality.²⁶²

Since the text can be viewed temporally, interpretation, as the work of art, is temporal and the best model for hermeneutical understanding is the one most adequate to the experience of time.²⁶³ Nevertheless, against Ricoeur, Gadamer found the identity of understanding not to be fixed in eternity. Instead, it is the continuity of our becoming-other in every response and in every application of pre-understanding that we have of ourselves in new and unpredictable situations.²⁶⁴ On this issue, it can be asked whether there is a way to reconcile Gadamer and Ricoeur on the issue of hermeneutical temporality.

The authentic source in the eternal return to Being can be discovered in Heidegger's position: the eternal repetition of that which is known as that which is unknown, the familiar as the

unfamiliar. The eternal return introduces difference which is disruptive to our conceptions of temporal movement. However, identity and difference must be destabilised in favor of the performance of a new concept of hermeneutics. In this a temporal event requires that one cross over to another hermeneutics of time that cannot be thought restricted only in temporalization since it is beyond when one begins. This concept is called by Heidegger the nearness of what lies after.²⁶⁵

In addition, understanding is to be taken not as reconstruction, but as mediation insofar as it conveys the past into the present. Even when we grasp the past "in itself," understanding remains essentially a mediation or translation of past meaning into the present situation. As Gadamer states, understanding itself is not to be thought of so much as an action of subjectivity, but rather as the entering into an event of transmission in which past and present are constantly mediated.²⁶⁶ This requires not detaching temporality from the ontological preconception of the present-at-hand, but trying to distinguish that from the simple horizon phenomenon of temporal consciousness.²⁶⁷ The event of hermeneutics never takes place if understanding is considered to be defined in the arena of the temporalization of time in the past in itself.

Gadamer sees one of the most fundamental experiences of time as that of discontinuity or becoming-other. This stands in contrast to the "flowing" nature of time. According to Gadamer, there are at least three "epochal" experiences that introduce temporal discontinuity into our self-understanding: first, the experience of old age; second, the transition from one generation to another; and finally, the "absolute epoch" or the new age occasioned by the advent of Christianity, where history is understood in a new sense.

The Greek understanding of history as deviation from the order of things was changed in medieval philosophy to accept that there is no recognizable order within history except temporality itself. (Nonetheless, the absolute *epoch* is not to be taken merely as similar to a Christian understanding of time, which would result in a technological conception of time in terms of which the future is unable to be planned or controlled.) The new in temporality comes to be as the old is recalled in dissolution. In recollection, the dissolution of the old becomes provocative, i.e., an opening of possibilities for the new.²⁶⁸ The dissolution of the old is not a non-temporal characteristic of temporalization.

Therefore, the old is able to be surveyed in itself as something departed, where an indefinite future begins. Gadamer here states explicitly that hermeneutical transition is not the same as the 'now' that couples together what has preceded and what is to come, while it itself does not endure. Transition appears for Gadamer as the true being of time in the sense that everything is in it at the same time, such that past and future are together. Therefore understanding an epoch is not a chosen departure from something in order to understand it; but, rather, concerns time itself.²⁶⁹ For Gadamer this transition is a definite indefinite being which brings the flow of time to a standstill. In transition, the new comes to be as the old that is recalled in its dissolution.²⁷⁰

From the discussion of the continuity and discontinuity of time, we arrive at the point that what is distinctive about specificity (*Jeweiligkeit*) is that, through running ahead into authentic time, it has all time for itself in each specific case.²⁷¹ The difficult question is whether time itself occurs in hermeneutics or not. We know only that time never becomes long because originally it has no length. Based on the fact that Dasein is temporal, the nature of the hermeneutical experience is not, as Gadamer says, outside of our inter-relations. However, as a result of this dilemma, it seems, we are possessed by something as a temporalization of time which enables us to be opened up for the hermeneutical moment concerning our experience whether past or future.

But it is the reality of time which is so experienced. In experience, time is not conscious as an empty horizon embracing every occurrence in time. Rather, it is conscious as primordial temporality, which occurs as an entity as such, and which is driven by the anxiety of our life. This is why, consequently, Gadamer insists in reckoning 'world-time' as secondary time compared to the primordial time which comes from the core of time in itself.²⁷²

The achievement of continuity among previously discontinuous moments is something "new," and thus presents a discontinuity of its own. In this way, the logical process, reflected in the temporalization of time, remains open and without a preordained end.²⁷³ This logical process must not mistakenly be regarded as the hermeneutics of time although it is congruent therewith.

As we have stated about Dasein, here also with regard to time, the fundamental phenomenon is the future. Hence, Gadamer's understanding of Aristotelian time as empty calls for a sense for time which is primarily a sense for what is future. This sense is present in the prolepsis of time and refers what is present to what is not present. As human creatures, we can set objectives for ourselves and thus are able to seek means which are appropriate to these objectives. This presupposes distance from what captivates one for the present moment. Therefore, based on this sense of time, hermeneutical understanding prejudices itself in the future while anticipating the purposes of time.²⁷⁴ It does not seem correct to say that this understanding has a free hand in creating prejudices. It means, instead, that it is false to claim a sense of hermeneutical absence in the present.

According to Ricoeur, since the meaning of a text is open to any one who can read and interpret it, it is the omnitemporality of meaning which opens it to unknown readers. The historicity of reading is the counterpart of this specific omnitemporality. Yet for Ricoeur it is difficult to think that there is a moment in which the text separates from its author and the author's situation, that provides the text with the ability to procure new interpretations.²⁷⁵ We can ask why omnitemporality of meaning can provide futural events, while temporality itself is determined with the present situation.

We come to the conclusion that temporality is the condition of the possibility of all understanding of being; being is understood and conceptually comprehended by means of time.²⁷⁶ Not only in Aristotle's notion of being as *ti en einai*, but also in Hegel's notion of *Wesen*, the temporal horizon of being resounds. Moreover, Aristotle's concept of time, and also that of Hegel as pointed out by Heidegger, is the representative of the vulgar notion of time as measured time, which, in fact, constitutes the object of their thematic analysis of the problem of time.²⁷⁷ Does not this indicate that Aristotle was aware of the fact that time itself must be referred by the hermeneutical determination of time?

But time itself is ecstatic; ek-sistence transpires in *ectasis*. Dasein is thrown into the *ectasis* of time and one can understand oneself only in time. Time is the horizon through which understanding is brought about.²⁷⁸ It seems, thus, that time as the origin of events must be regarded as a horizontal text before Being. Through the unveiling of time, Being unveils itself in understanding.

In the ontological analytic of Dasein it becomes clear that the original constitution of Dasein's being is temporality.²⁷⁹ Temporality as the original meaning of Dasein is the origin of the concept of time. The understanding of being is possible only on the basis of temporality, which constitutes the meaning of the being. Therefore one can conclude that time is the horizon from which something like being becomes at all intelligible.²⁸⁰ This means that Being is interpreted by way of time, that is, temporally. In other words, it is Being's temporality that makes possible the

understanding of Being. Through Being's temporality it can be understood why the most original temporalizing of temporality as such is temporality.

We must mention briefly, however, that Heidegger is not concerned to conceive the horizon of time in terms of the self of Dasein, but rather in terms of "there" (*Dort*), as the ontological structure of resoluteness. Thus primordial temporality is not the being of the futurity of Dasein which understands itself out of its being, but rather it is the "event of Being." We shall explain this in the next section.²⁸¹ The temporal horizon implied by the event of Being is the region in which concern for 'care' understands itself. This, however, means that the understanding of care itself is not preceded by hermeneutical understanding, that is, by understanding Dasein by itself, but must be distinguished from that. This new sense of understanding essentially does not require that Dasein's reality be outside of temporality. Rather, Dasein's understanding as the projection of a temporal horizon is to be possible by the above men-tioned understanding of 'care'. We measure time because we must reckon with time.²⁸²

Moreover, we should mention that the temporality of language makes it difficult to explain an authentic understanding of a text. Temporality operates in a transcendental realm, rather than in a normal sense. Derrida goes beyond the situated temporality of Dasein and its community to disclose an autonomous temporal sphere, by which the constitution of anything becomes possible.²⁸³ His departure from Heidegger refers back to the concept of origin where he criticizes the value of propriety (*Eigentlichkeit*) and of original authenticity. For him this is a fanaticism of monotony which, although startling, is not really sufficient. *Grammatology*, controversially, is the general science of the 'architrace', presenting itself as an explicating thought of the myth of origins. It is concerned only with the original, rather than with historical origin.²⁸⁴

Blanchot accurately expresses the temporal situation of the hermeneutic activity when he says that things are terrible when there is neither the time to corrupt, nor the origin to find oneself, and where things eternally find their own likenesses. In being temporal, out of themselves, things do not affirm themselves, but rather, beyond the dark flux and reflux of repetition, affirm the absolute power of the resemblance which is no one's and which has no name and no face. That is why, as Blanchot says, "We can love and love only what is most terrible!"²⁸⁵

The Temporal Text and the Question of Time

Here, the primary goal is to examine whether in our understanding of time there is an authentic means of calculating time in hermeneutics. This is supported, briefly, by the fact that the mere being of time does not mean that time is something just present-at-hand.

Emphasizing the reality of time do we not indicate, then, that beyond hermeneutical time there is an authentic basis of time which cannot be contained in any realm of understanding or any interpretation of a text? Indeed, beyond ordinary time, there is an atemporal being where understanding fails. Here, Gadamer's distinction between empty and fulfilled time becomes dubious, since all forms of interpretation implied by a sense of unauthentic temporality or "empty time" as Gadamer calls it (i.e., an experience of time which presupposes a more original temporality) can be considered non-authentic as regards interpretation of the projecting being (Dasein) which is hermeneutically authentic.

Let us explain. Time is essentially a self-opening and an expanding into the world. Heidegger says that it is, therefore, difficult to go any further here by comparisons. The interpretation of Dasein as temporality in a universal ontological way is an undecidable question which remains "completely unclear" to him.²⁸⁶ Time as a philosophical problem is a kind of question which no

one knows how to raise because of its inseparability from our nature. As Gadamer notes, we can say what time is in virtue of a self-evident preconception of what is, for what is present is always understood by that preconception.²⁸⁷ Insofar as it makes no claim to provide a valid universality, philosophical discussion is not a systematic determination of time, i.e., one which requires going back beyond time (in its connection with other categories).²⁸⁸

In his doctrine of the productivity of the hermeneutical circle in temporal being, Heidegger develops the primacy of futurity for possible recollection and retention of what is already presented by history. History is present to us only in the light of futurity. In Gadamer's interpretation, it is rather our prejudices that necessarily constitute our being. His view that prejudices are biases in our openness to the world²⁸⁹ does not signify the character of prejudices which in turn themselves are regarded as an *a priori* text in the terms already assumed. Based upon this, prejudices in this sense are not empty, but rather carry a significance which refers to being. Thus we can say that prejudices are our openness to the being-in-the-world. That is, being destined to different openness, we face the reference of our hermeneutical attributions. Therefore, the historicity of the temporal being is anything except what is past.²⁹⁰

Clearly, the past is not some occurrence, not some incident in my Dasein, but its past; it is not some 'what' about Dasein, some event that happens to Dasein and alters it. This past is not a 'what,' but a 'how,' indeed it is the authentic 'how' (*wie*) of any temporal being.²⁹¹ The past brings all 'what,' all taking care of and making plans, back into the 'how' which is the basic stand of a historical investigation.

Rather than encountering a past-oriented object, hermeneutical experience is a concern towards the text (or texts) which has been presented to us. Understanding is not possible merely because our part of interpretation is realized only when a "text" is read as a fulfillment of all the requirements of the tradition.

For Gadamer and Ricoeur the past as a text always changes its meaning in relation to the ever-developing world of texts; so it seems that the future is recognized as textual or the textual character of the future. In this sense the text itself is not tradition, but expectation.²⁹² Upon this text the hermeneutical difference essentially can be ex-tended. Consequently, philosophy is no history of hermeneutical events, but philosophical question evokes the historicity of our thinking and knowing. It is not by accident that Hegel, who tried to write the history of philosophy, raised history itself to the state of absolute mind.²⁹³

What matters in the question concerning time is attaining an answer in terms in which the different ways of being temporal become comprehensible. What matters is allowing a possible connection between that which is in time and authentic temporality to become visible from the very beginning.²⁹⁴ However, the problem behind this theory still remains even after long exposure of the Heideggerian interpretation of whether Being-in-the-world can result from temporal being or vice versa. After the more hermeneutical investigation, it seems that Being-in-the-world must be com-prehensive only through Being-in-time.

But, in *The Concept of Time*, Heidegger has already taken into consideration the broader grasp of the text by considering Being as the origin of the hermeneutics of time. If human Being is in time in a distinctive sense, so that we can read from it what time is, then this Dasein must be characterized by the fundamental determinations of its Being. Indeed, then being temporal, correctly understood, would be the fundamental assertion of Dasein with respect to its Being.²⁹⁵

As a result, only the interpretation of being as its reference by way of temporality can make clear why and how this feature of being earlier, of apriority, pertains to being.²⁹⁶ The *a priori* character of being as the origin of temporalization calls for a specific kind of approach to

being-a-priori whose basic components constitute a phenomenology which is hermeneutical, as shown in chapter two.

Heidegger notes that with regard to Dasein, self-understanding reopens the possibility for a theory of time that is not self-enclosed. Dasein comes back to that which it is and takes over as the being that it is. In coming back to itself, it brings everything that it is back again into its own most peculiar chosen can-be.²⁹⁷ It makes it clear that, although ontologically the text is closest to each and any of its interpretations in its own event, ontically it is closest to itself. But it must be remembered that this phenomenology does not determine completely references of the text by characterizing the temporalization of the text. Through phenomenological research regarding the text, in hermeneutics we are informed only of how the text gets exhibited and unveiled.

Text and temporal hermeneutics stand in a dialectical relationship to each other. The relation between the text and interpretation has the character of a process of time. Based on this so-called temporal relationship, the interpreter has been determined by the possibility of himself being changed through facing the text.

Indeed, as we mentioned in the previous chapter, it is the hermeneutics of time which enables us to believe the text interpretively exposed. Husserl was the first to make clear that for the interpreter the text is simply there; in a verbal or figurative sense it is "present". This is so whether or not one pays any special attention to it by concerning oneself with it, considering, thinking, feeling, willing.²⁹⁸

The *réell* can represent the textual component of the lived temporality of experience which is non-real. The *réell* exists neither in the world nor in experience. By introducing this component, it becomes possible to have a philosophy which is not based on presence. Here, Husserl's theory of internal time consciousness can provide a non-hermeneutical determination of the text in temporality in Derrida. As a result of this, in Derrida's view the study of I is tied to its temporal foundation, which seems similar to the Husserlian investigation of time. The *réell*, however, indicates the other side of temporality which is indispensable throughout the hermeneutical process of willing (reading or writing) a text.²⁹⁹

Gadamer finds in his own way the Platonic dialogue in which there is an authentic mode for understanding the "thing itself," the subject matter of historical texts which is the same subject matter for the present and future.³⁰⁰ Heidegger believes that the thing is there as a holding of things in relation: *The Thing Things*. Because of the thing, that is, the thing as indicative of the difference and identity of things, there are things generally. It can also be said that the thing is in a state of appearing in the world as thing only if it discloses itself as distanced (dis-stanced) from other things. Hence the thing comes into Being only to the extent that it has never fully arrived into the world as thing as a thing-in-itself.³⁰¹ This can also be observed by the fact that the thing in interpretation is never regarded satisfactorily by what becomes exposable as thing-in-itself through the past.

It is noteworthy that hermeneutics reflects the contrast between Leibnitz and Heidegger that derives from the different interpretation from the point of view of the monad and of Dasein as far as temporality is concerned. By placing the Cartesian *ego cogito* at the basis of his conception of the monad, Leibnitz takes the monad as substance enclosed in itself without any windows toward the outside since the monad has everything within. Heidegger urges that monads have no windows because there is neither an outside nor an inside because the temporalization of the monad in itself requires that the ecstatic happening of world-entry of the time is not a *mundus concentratus*, but the converse.³⁰² We can see that, as far as the unity of the monad as a temporal reference is obstructively separated from the unity of being in itself, it requires that a sense of ecstasy be taken

as having no determination for itself. The ecstatic happening of world-entry can be considered a dark point; without having the most firm senses of unity, it is impossible to interpret the temporal ecstatic of being as text. Even the word happening testifies to that: there can be a window in the monad open to the outside only if there is a room.

Dasein is authentically alongside itself; it is truly existent whenever it is running ahead, which is nothing other than the authentic (*eigentliche*) and singular (*einzig*) future of one's own Dasein. In running ahead Dasein is its future, in such a way that in this futural it returns to its past and present. Therefore the Being of understanding, conceived in its most extreme possibility of Being, is time itself, not in time.³⁰³ In *Being and Time*, as Gadamer interprets it, the real question is not how being can be understood, but in what way understanding is being, because the understanding of being represents the existential distinction of Dasein.³⁰⁴ Does this mean that hermeneutics, rather than being in time, is itself time in being temporal (not temporality)?

For the later Heidegger being is essentially temporal. And since it is a continual coming into being, it is said to be "older" than the intervals of time (*die Zeiten*) that can be measured by beings. Yet it is not "older" than time itself, because Being is time in its origin. In other words, Being is neither beyond time, if time is understood in the usual metaphysical sense, nor eternal, if eternal is defined as is usual in Christian theology.³⁰⁵ This means that this is the understanding of time which can imply the recognition of understanding as temporal. Here, the understanding of time obviously represents the temporal distinction of hermeneutics.

Time is Dasein which is my specificity, and this can be specified in what is futural by running ahead correspondingly to the certain yet indeterminate past. Dasein always is its possible temporal being and as the origin of any thing that can be said about the time. Time is temporal as far as hermeneutics represents the un-veiling of this temporality; it is not time, but temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*). The fundamental assertion that time is temporal is therefore the most authentic determination. It is not a tautology, because the Being of temporality signifies nonidentical actuality. In this running ahead, as Dasein I am authentically time, I have time.³⁰⁶ Time itself is meaningless, (not baseless) as Heidegger states, i.e., it is not to be interpreted at all since it can be interpreted only in each case where there are many times, or, let us to say, when time is temporal. In the *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, time is interrogated in terms of Dasein's being beyond being i.e., beyond its ek-stasis wherein time is disclosed.³⁰⁷

As Heidegger states, temporality is itself the self-unifying ecstatic unity in ecstatic temporalization.³⁰⁸ The unity of temporality, for Heidegger, is characterized in such a way as to eliminate the notion of anything thing-like, present at hand, which is between having-been-ness and the future.³⁰⁹ It should not be taken as a personal center beside being. The essence of time lies in the ecstatic unified oscillation which is the origin of the unity of temporality. In other words, the unity of horizons belongs to this peculiar unity of time.³¹⁰ However, this ecstasy surpasses every being beyond being located in the sphere of the subject. It is nowhere, since it presents no determinate being. It exists not as such, but as it temporalizes itself.³¹¹

Heidegger, however, thinks the unity of the ecstasies of time must not be regarded as something present at hand unecstatically. But he does not prove sufficiently why it itself is ecstatic. We can speak about the being of the ecstasies only when this being is considered to be grounded directly in the free ecstatic momentum.³¹² Without considering the text in temporalization, there is not enough reason why the ecstatic is identified by unity and vice versa, how the hermeneutic unity of the text unveils itself in understanding.

Consequently, Heidegger acknowledges that the basis of temporalization is the result of interpreting temporality in itself. The no-longer-now and not-yet-now, as the present, extend time

as the now into the respective directions of non-being, thus as soon as one overlooks the ecstatic character of temporality one must inquire into the unity of temporality as that which primarily temporalizes itself ecstatically.

Moreover, by and through having an ecstatic character, time indeed measures and reckons us, which means that it takes the other into account. Every Dasein is acquainted with time and knows what he means when he refers to time, yet one seldom has a conception of time. Every understanding reveals time itself, yet time remains something strange. Hölderlin says there is something lasting in a lingering sojourn of time.³¹³ We must free our vision for the total essence peculiar to that which reveals itself as time. Time itself is named by "now": we say "now" immediately, completely and without reflection. Nevertheless, this does not mean that "now" itself can be meant in a truly thematic manner, since we do not find it as having such and such a quality.³¹⁴ The "now" itself guides our understanding forward to that which is just transpiring there in the now.

Understanding does not come across the "now," nonetheless it expresses its presence in the "now" with immediacy. Understanding cannot focus on time and time cannot be brought exactly into any interpretation of it; yet time is there immediately, particularly when its understanding becomes suspended. When we say "now" we say it only latently. It can be revealed that the now is before our language, indeed it cannot be grasped within our ordinary use of words.

There is no discrepancy between the structure of time in its ecstatic process and that "there is time" (*Es gibt Zeit*). In both, time must be understood from the "present," which must be taken, not as "now," but as presence. But what is to be understood by presence (*Anwesenheit*)? This is the continuous lingering-dwelling-abiding (*verweilen*) which concerns understanding. Dasein is always concerned with the presence of something which is present, and never immediately heeds presence itself.³¹⁵

This foundation of time can be grasped within the restricted realm of its uncovered hermeneutic ecstatic. There is something in time that makes it eligible to be posed as of questionable origin. Heidegger is aware of this when he states:

Let us disregard the answer and repeat the question. What happened to the question? It has transformed itself. What is time? becomes the question: who is time? More closely: are we ourselves time? or closer still: am I my time? In this way I come closest to it, and if I understand the question correctly, it is then completely seriously . . . then Dasein would be: being questionable.³¹⁶

It can be stated that, textuality provides past and future in presence. Here, the reference to the text can be made in presence even though there is no reality for presence as is pointed out. The question of hermeneutics is identified by the status of present time as a matter open to debate. Textuality, which can be treated temporarily, clarifies present time while also keeping us away from establishing present time as a stable reality to which we can refer.³¹⁷

In Heidegger, temporality is disclosed in language as the persistence of what is. Past, present and future belong to the appropriation (with regard to the text) of persistence (with regard to the time). The nearness of temporal moments occurs as the metalepsis of saying, in which repetition and displacement, identity and difference, redundancy and unrecoverability occur.³¹⁸

The question of the temporality of the interpretation of a text can culminate in the rhetoric of ontology without becoming distracted by the question of being as nostalgically seeking a plenitude within paracusia i.e., the revelation of Being. The continuum of temporal consideration of the question of being recognized by the *différance*, initiates the effect of the

disconstituting *différance* from within a continuous teleological structure, that is, thinking from origin to end.³¹⁹

Text as being in hermeneutics becomes unconcealed whereas we forget the nature of presence. We know that the beginning and origin (*Anfang und Ursprung*) of existing things is the *apeiron*, which concerning the existing things becomes unveiled, even though it also transpires in what lies beyond.³²⁰ *To apeiron* has an indeter-minacy which implies a nihilistic wear and tear on that which is given by being. The *apeiron* is not simply a genesis from which (and to which) Being is originated (or a forgotten origin), but it is a temporal source in which Being is at once revealed and concealed.³²¹ Therefore, to *apeiron* is more than a beginning or something which comes after; it is what transpires in a manifold of temporality. We have already discussed some of what hermeneutics would mean if regarded as philosophy. Heidegger's answer is that it would mean an adoption of history instead of a break with, or repudiation of, it. In *Being and Time* he calls this 'destruction' (*Destruktion*), which is not a destroying (*zerstören*) but a dismantling, liquidating or putting to one side (*sondern Abbauen, Abtragen und Auf-die Seite-stellen*).³²² The meaning of the historical assertions about the history of philosophy is an opening of our ears and freeing of ourselves for what the Being of being wants interpretatively to speak to us in tradition. This speaking of the Being-text enables understanding to attain the reference or the interpretation of that reference.³²³

Based on what has been stated, there is a chance here to modify Heidegger's statement in choice between attempt to regard time as a being-concept since time "is" not or rather time as temporalizing itself. A question always remains how time can be the subject of the basic 'temporalizing' concern due to the fact that Heidegger attributes 'temporalizing' to time by saying that time temporalizes. In other words, time must be fitted into a hermeneutical reference in saying that time temporalizes, even if this equals time is time. This reflects the fact that time "is" not, but that temporalization is a reference to being. Heidegger attested to this fact by attributing to time the primordially self-unifying unity of expectancy, retention and making-present. This unity of time, mentioned earlier, has its hallmark in the heart of the temporal reference. In the "then, when . . . an onward-reference occurs to beings."³²⁴

After his discussion of time as "now," Heidegger turns to consideration of "then." He says that "then" can not be grasped in an object or in a subject in the traditional sense. "Then" (now not yet) is indeed in our "on-the-way," as the stepping-over or as transcendence. The on-the-way is only a reference to the "location" of the "is" which is uttered as time character.³²⁵ "Formerly" always pronounces a retention of something previous; it is equally the utterance of a forgetting. "Now," in contrast, expresses being toward that which makes present (*Anwesendes*); we term this presentation of the text or being toward presencing of things a holding in being present making present.³²⁶ That is why *there*, then, formerly, and now appear in their unity.

Expecting (*Gewärtigen*) as Heidegger characterizes it, is nothing other than that getting-carried-away (*Entrückung*) into the then-quality which lies at the basis of intentional compartments toward the futural, which has previously already overleapt *all possible beings* (emphasis mine) about which we can and must say they will be then. The then and each particular then essentially is only the utterance and expression of the expectancy that is potentially *in advance* (emphasis mine), always carried away beyond all beings. For this reason the then in its own foundation is *an indicator* (emphasis mine).³²⁷ It now becomes more clear, why we must believe that everything that is said and is there in the text stands under anticipation so that it can be understood and not be merely unintelligible.³²⁸

Expectancy, as Heidegger meant, is to understand oneself from out of one's own capacity-for-being. Approaching oneself in advance, from one's own possibility, i.e., experience is the primary ecstatic concept of the future.³²⁹ Heidegger illustrates this structure in the following diagram:

Obviously, the question mark means that the horizon is open (and ambiguous).³³⁰ Regarding the monad-ness of the reference of time, the diagram can be completed as follows:

As has been pointed out, for Heidegger time has first of all an ecstatic character. It neither passes nor remains, but temporalizes itself. Temporalization is the primal phenomenon of motion. Time, in its metaphysical meaning, exists in motion. The temporalization of time constitutes, methodologically, the metaphysical continuity of Dasein. It is not intelligible if Dasein is construed as a theoretical scheme. In addition, the analysis of Dasein must select for its guiding horizon the horizon which guides Dasein's being-toward-itself, continuously, in its being-with other.³³¹

Heidegger states that Being has always been interpreted as Being-present (*Anwesen*), while Being-present and presence (*Anwesenheit*) refer to the present (*Gegenwart*), which in turn, together with the past and the future, constitutes what is characteristic of time. Thus as Being-present, Being is determined by time. Both Being and time determine each other, but Being is not temporal and time is not something-which-is. It is more a question of whether we can transcend Being and time toward a higher and wider unity since this leads away from the thing itself. Thus, whether the relationship between Being and time results from a certain combination of being and time is an important question. We can also think that this relationship itself is primary, so that Being and time both result from it. Being is a theme of thought, but not a thing; and time is a theme of thought also, but not something temporal. We can say that the thing "is," while with respect to Being and time, we can say there is (*es gibt*: there is something which grants) Being and there is time.³³² In agreement with Kockelmann's interpretation of Heidegger, it seems that there are henceforth two autonomous realms of hermeneutics, one having being as its source interpretation, and the other dealing with the interpretation of the temporal. The first is a classical understanding of philosophy, while the second appears ambiguously in Gadamer's discussion of the fulfillment of time. Even in *Philosophical Hermeneutics* there is no sign that Gadamer ever tried to explain the hermeneutical uniqueness by which Being and time are able to ground the understanding of each other.

Whenever we speak about Being in general, we present it in a way in which it never presents and gives itself. For Being appears in particular historical forms, as physics, *logos*, idea, *energia*, substance, and so on. The way in which Being gives itself is itself determined so that it itself gives and sends itself. As such, Being endures and abides for us only in so far as it frees its genuine recollection. The same is true also for our experience of the characterization of the difference of Being and beings as such, in which to each case there corresponds a given interpretation of beings.³³³

Based on what has been brought out, remembrance, not as expecting and in contrast to it, has no history, and theories have no such thing as a growing remembrance. Remembrance is what comes to one; what overcomes in representing (*Wiedervergenwartiges*) offers a brief respite from passing away and forgetting. But remembrance of a being is in no way the memory of a prior knowing now 'presencing.'³³⁴ Remembrance, therefore, for Gadamer is not remembrance of a lost text, taken in its very uniqueness as what can be considered in a question. In this sense it can be accepted that remembrance is the meaning of a "prior question" (rather than "prior questioning" as used by Gadamer which is more likely articulated as the function of hermeneutical understanding) instead of a prior knowing. Nonetheless, it is very important that, even if the reference of the remembrance is restricted only as a "prior question," this question, in its mere

significance, is the question of something, that is, of what we call text. Since we can remember again and again, the questions can be produced time and time again, and concern for the answers can be indispensable, but "questions" always and forever mean "asks for".

Here, any question as such, since it is not reducible to a re-quest for understanding, is not a mere remembrance. It cannot be neglected that this characterization of the question has validity as far as remembrance requires a very explicit sense of the text. This is the hermeneutical need of reference to fulfilling the request of the question, i.e., the answer. The text in its 'being answered to' can come as the answer to the 'question of' which prior questioning presupposes the text.

As a result, we can also conclude that textual time can be presented in the intentional structure of symbol. It intends something beyond and stands for this something. But it is not that any time is a symbol, for a symbol conceals in its intention a double intentionality.³³⁵ The symbolic meaning is constituted in and through the literal meaning, which brings about the analogy by giving the analogue. The temporal symbol can be regarded as the very movement of the primary meaning which makes us share in the latent meaning. It thereby assimilates us to symbolized time, without our being able intellectually to dominate the similarity. The text gives time since it is a primary intentionality that gives the second meaning. Here, by means of language, the poet is like an horizon gathering together moments in which the poem arrives as an articulation of that which speaks from beyond our lived or worldly sense of time.³³⁶

THE CONCEPTION OF THE TEXT IN HERMENEUTICS

An important question arises and, indeed, imposes itself regarding thinking in an hermeneutical act. On the other hand, we have learned from Gadamer that there is no method for learning how to ask questions in hermeneutics. If understanding the text is what we would find by asking questions, then it is obvious that the text is the fundamental basis which allows one to make question of it. Is it the text itself that is to be questioned, or is the text itself in the place of a question. This, however, can shed light upon the basic concept of the text in hermeneutics. The old rhetorical doctrine *de inventione* contains an indirect indication of the significance of the question for all knowledge,³³⁷ yet contemporary hermeneutics has not addressed what can be asked in the search for knowledge. Besides there is the issue of the origin of the question for further hermeneutical processes of questioning. Therefore, any knowledge containing its own correlated questions is already determined by the origin of the questions.

On the other hand, according to the validity of Collingwood's logic of question and answer, the two are intrinsically related with one another. Replying to the query "why question" Gadamer answers that an answer is something that one must understand, but this can be through understanding the question itself. This, in turn, limits the dogmatic claim of any proposition.³³⁸

In this light, one can question the text by interpreting it, but the discussion must deal also with whether and how it is the text that speaks, whatever be the response. The understanding of the text has not begun at all, as Gadamer affirms, as long as the text remains silent.³³⁹ If the text begins (we think that it has already begun) to speak, it does not speak simply a word which is always the same, but gives ever new answers to the new pattern of questions and poses new questions which it is supposed to answer in turn.

The most important task of hermeneutics is that every event has to be seen as a response to a question and that the only way to understand a statement regarding an event is by taking it as an answer. As we pointed out in the first chapter, Gadamer calls the hermeneutical question 'a prior questioning'. This has its own direction of meaning and is "by no means to be gotten hold of

through a network of background motivations, but rather reaches out to the broader contexts of meaning encompassed by the question and deposited in the statement."³⁴⁰ By putting modern philosophical hermeneutics in contrast to traditional hermeneutics, Gadamer clearly points out the important characteristic of fundamental hermeneutics i.e., that hermeneutics is based more on the questions than on the answer.³⁴¹

We must decide whether the questioning or the question itself is prior. If the question has priority to the hermeneutical response, it must itself create whatever comes as the answer. It is an important point that we cannot take the question as if it were understood in its full dimensions, for there is always some ambiguity to the question.

Gadamer initiates the term *hermeneutical urphänomen*, by which he means that no assertion is possible that cannot be understood as an answer to a question, and that all assertion must be understood in this way.³⁴² This means that whatever is brought in a literary work has its origin in the question itself. The same argument can be applied with regard to the aesthetic character of these texts, with their own language. There could be no absolute text in literature if there were no content with an objective meaning that one can discern. But at least the hermeneutical question of a text must involve entering into a relation with what we will find meaningful in the answer.

Gadamer himself agrees that by an articulate reading of what is there as a text one disregards much of what is there so that it is simply not there any more (as in vision for example). Understanding what is there involves entering into an indefinite relation which marks some specific answer to the question about a thing.³⁴³ But as we already pointed out in the second chapter, our perceptions grasp the thing itself as a text in its direct givenness in understanding.³⁴⁴ Understanding of the thing itself is not attained simply by looking beyond what one grasps based on a perception of a thing. Besides, none of these perceptions of a thing can address the other's role in understanding the text. Knowledge as intuition, in perception for example, is the direct givenness of what is known in perception, having its own certainty in itself.³⁴⁵ Based on this phenomenology of perception, found in Heidegger, philosophical problems and concepts must be studied scientifically by returning to the original sources of intuition and the insights into the essences to be derived therefrom. In this way concepts can be clarified intuitively, problems can be posed anew on an intuitive ground which is further identified in principle. There is a unity in the thing itself, in its direct givenness, for every perception is perception of both the perceiving and the perceived in one. This is the sense of the saying: *aisthesis is aisthesis aistheseos*. This concept of unity is absolutely aesthetic and aesthetically absolute.³⁴⁶

This hermeneutical unity of question is reflected in phenomenology in which in every experience in its noetic phase the essential nature of a thing functions as a belief consciousness in the sense of the *protodoxa*.³⁴⁷ In other words, one can look towards what is problematically required in the world of presumptions in interpreting the things only after being involved primarily in the probability-for-being itself and as such. This can be explored in the hermeneutical question itself. Phenomenologically, questioning can be carried out in the intention towards the noematic object in which the presumption-noesis has been given. This is why Husserl believes that, from the second viewpoint, the object with its meaning, together with this probability-character, is given as being (*Seined*).³⁴⁸

We are persistently aware of the intentional object in the process of consciousness. Although in this experience the object is ever presenting itself differently, it may be the same object with but other predicates. Husserl believes that if it is always understood as a noematic description of what is meant at the time, then the self-same intentional object separates itself off "self-evidently" from

the shifting and changing predicates.³⁴⁹ In the temporal description of the noema, while detaching itself as the central noematic phase, the object, the objective unity (*Objekt*), the self-same, the determinate subject of its possible predicates, "the pure x in abstraction from all predicates", disconnects itself from any predicate.³⁵⁰ This pure x can be considered as the textual reference for the hermeneutic act of intention. However, this reference, indicated as text or x here, can-not have the validity of an original hermeneutic notion unless it not be preconditioned. Recognizing this problem, Ricoeur tries to extend the meaning of the text beyond phenomenological boundaries. According to him, the text becomes an object for explanation without becoming a natural object.

Through a text as the bearer of meaning which, as an empty x, is open for the possibilities of interpretation, the essential nature of the meaning in harmonious combination is grounded in unities of meaning so that not only every meaning has its object, but different meanings refer to the same object. In this object the determinate Xes of the united meaning coincide (*Zur Deckung kommen*) with one another and with the X of the total question and, as a result, the unity of meaning under hermeneutical investigation is secured.

The difficulty is to establish the authenticity of experience in hermeneutics without annihilating the unity of the work of art. The critique of authenticity is formulated from one reduction to another in search of the original evidence until the evidence itself is subjected to reduction.³⁵¹ Phenomenology as displayed in transcendental reduction needs to establish the validity of being in its interpretation of intentionality. This is the question of original foundation itself which in the hermeneutical response. Is this the reason why in phenomenology, however, being as the being-object in the question is less important than sense or meaning? According to this view, every being is only a meaning for, in and through consciousness.³⁵²

We have already pointed out Heidegger's view that under-standing being is not the result of the objectifying operation of con-sciousness that we see in Husserl's phenomenology; rather the real question in *Being and Time* is in what way understanding is being rather than in what way being can be understood.³⁵³ On the other hand, the variety of performances or interpretations are not simply subjective variations of a meaning related to subjectivity, but in fact belong to the ontological possibility of the work.³⁵⁴

Moreover, phenomenology must face the problem of how interpretation of a fact can result in a new interpretation by claiming that the references to reality which appear in the immediately valid premises of eidetic sciences can reappear only in mediated positions. Concisely speaking, within a hermeneutical frame of analysis this leads to a total independence of hermeneutical events from each other in relation to the interpretation of the text, neglecting the interdependence of the text and the hermeneutical sciences. Heidegger acutely states that the meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation. Thus hermeneutics as a science of interpretation lays the basis for fundamental phenomenology which deals with the authentic meaning of Being. Consequently, the phenomenology of Dasein is a "hermeneutic in the primordial signification of this word, where it designates the work of interpreting."³⁵⁵

Beyond phenomenological boundaries, the being itself with which thinking is concerned is not initially dependent on thinking or hermeneutical interpretation. The problem of Being in Heidegger occurs as a question precisely in the treatment of the concept of "question" in which we shall discover this reference to a self. What does it mean that the problem of Being occurs as a question and that what has been forgotten is not only being, but the question of being?³⁵⁶ Thinking comes to the point at which it arises from being itself so that it corresponds to being as such only when being itself affects thinking. This principle is followed by both Gadamer and Heidegger

(except that for Heidegger, hermeneutics is more like the science of the concealment or unconcealment of the poet).

If interpretation is thinking and thinking is interpretation, we can say that interpretation accomplishes the relation of Being to the Dasein not in the sense that interpretation causes the relation to Being, but rather that interpretation reveals the text in relation to being. To prefer saying Being is the text or the text is Being does not change with regard to interpretation. With Heidegger, it is preferable to say that Being becomes the text in interpretation. As language is the house of Being, so interpretation is the house of text or being in hermeneutics. If we agree that Being in Being-in-the-world can be pointed out only in the present, then, it is correct to speak of the text-in-the-present and not-in-the-present (yet).

Additionally, as the unveiledness of that to which assertion refers, truth is a possible determination of the being present-at-hand. It is a determination of the being present-at-hand so far as the being-present-at-hand is unveiled in an assertion. Hence, following Aristotle, Heidegger concludes that truth is not in the understanding, if the understanding is taken as the subject of the present-at-hand. Truth is in things, so far as things are taken as the uncovered objects of the assertion made about them. Being-true is present-at-hand neither in things nor in mind.³⁵⁷ This is the reason Gadamer makes a case for partnership in the conversation of thought with itself in spite of the fact that he attributes it to what appears in Heidegger's perspective as a growing oblivion of being.

Hence, the hermeneutics of Dasein by Heidegger no longer refers to the science of interpretation, i.e., theoretical hermeneutics, but rather to the process of interpretation which is an essential characteristic of Dasein. Far beyond that, Dasein is an entity which in its very being comports itself understandingly toward itself, to-ward its being. Dasein, as Heidegger says, can, should, and must become master of its moods. This means that Dasein is disclosed to itself prior to all cognition and beyond the range of disclosure.³⁵⁸ Nonetheless it is not mentioned, either by Heidegger or by Gadamer, that the question of the relation of the text and interpretation can be formulated in terms of deciphering meaning as that which is most fundamental in interpretation.

It must be recalled here that Dilthey thinks of the text as an object to be deciphered although he does not explicate whether the text is being or not. This aspect of the text was not seriously taken into consideration by earlier and later hermeneutics: by Romantic hermeneutics and Schleiermacher, and by Gadamer and Betti. It seems that, for Gadamer, the text is not to be considered necessarily in hermeneutics as the original source (*point de départ*) of the interpretive question. Based on Gadamer's theory of hermeneutics, Dilthey's view on the text becomes the claim of a specific method for the human sciences (drawn from the natural sciences). This repeats a great error, namely, that of holding the subject-matter of method *per se* as what is most important in hermeneutics.

In spite of considering the process of understanding a text as the announcement of what the text says, Gadamer regards this text as only a literary object. He seems not to listen to Hermes when he identifies being as the text that can be spoken of. Beyond this principal concept of hermeneutics, we cannot have a correct meaning of the text in hermeneutics. However, Gadamer's view requires taking the text restricted as a literary being outside the art of interpretation that is hermeneutics.

In regard to the question of whether a non-idealistic philosophy of meaning, that is, a non-Husserlian phenomenological hermeneutics, is possible Ricoeur thinks that the subject as a being for meaning is such that meaning does not appear as simply a product of the subject. This saves hermeneutics from the accusation of being idealistic since, for Ricoeur, idealism consists in the

claim of con-consciousness to be able to create meaning, where creation is taken "in the absolute sense". Here Ricoeur finds a non-idealistic conception of meaning. Even in Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, the first formulation of the theory of intentionality indicates that no consciousness is self-consciousness without first being consciousness of something toward which it transcends itself.³⁵⁹

On the methodological level, the conception of the fixedness of meaning provides, of course, the pre-supposition of any attempt at objective interpretation, a notion to which Ricoeur strenuously ad-heres.³⁶⁰ In a hermeneutical methodology, we can see imaginatively what is questionable in the subject matter and further question the subject matter. The precondition of this capacity is to be open to being questioned as the text.³⁶¹

It seems, in Gadamer's view, that the subject matter of the text can be interpreted so that both the text in an ordinary sense and understanding are intertwined therein. The fundamental hermeneutic notion of the text, as subject matter, is represented by the *logos* caught in that notion. This remark, however, must be regarded cautiously in order to avoid a hermeneutical vicious circle between the subject-matter of a text and the text.

If we state that no reading of a text without interpretation would be possible, we destroy the very essence of hermeneutics having the priority of a valid science by itself. Indeed we must state that interpretation is possible as interpretation of a text, and as a result no understanding of the text is possible except by interpreting it. Only on this foundation is it justifiable to claim that the conditions of possibility of an interpretation in general are such that they preclude interpretation being a condition of possibility of comprehension of meaning in general, or a condition of the possibility of reading a text in general.³⁶²

The classical debate is aimed at finding in a text either what its author intended to say, or what the text said independently of the intentions of its author.³⁶³ Hence, for Gadamer, understanding is not a matter of relating the parts of a text to the whole or the text to the interpreter. Rather, for him, the aesthetical thing itself is related to the process of dialogue between the text and reader. The complete-ness of the aesthetical work is not measured by the criterion of its purpose, i.e., the use that is to be made of it. Therefore, only after accepting the second horn of the dilemma can one ask whether what is found is what the text says by virtue of its textual coherence and an original underlying signification system, or rather only what the addressees find in it by virtue of their own systems of expecta-tions.³⁶⁴

In the final passage of *Text and Interpretation*, Gadamer concludes that we understand what is beautiful and the autonomy of the work of art, so that it does not depend on any context of use. Our ear hears and our understanding takes in the shining of the beautiful (*des Schein des Schönen*) as its true nature. The interpreter, who gives his reasons, disappears and the text speaks.³⁶⁵ Kant's ex-pression of the non-conceptuality of taste has not been applied to the mode of existence of the object being judged aesthetically. This di-mension of the question necessarily opens up from the standpoint of taste, though going beyond it.³⁶⁶ What is beautiful, however, shines blissfully in itself; "*Was über schön ist, selig scheint es in ihm selbst*", says Mörike. Moreover, when there is no longer any inter-pretation, there remains the naive belief in the natural goodness of things, the simplicity of events, the evidence of appearances. The desire to preserve such a naive belief exists where the reference of interpretation cannot be interpreted. In this situation, what one can see is not merely what one can see, but rather it is clear that what one can see is what is there to see and one can see it.³⁶⁷

It can be said that the aesthetic definition of any object created under the aesthetic dispensation would be guided by its capacity to elude what is conceived to be our "normal" worldly interests

by creating its own self-sufficiency. The literary text perhaps can be preferred over others; it is set up as an idol to be adored and end-lessly interpreted, in pursuit of the interactions its language generates. Disinterestedness is emphasized, to set the text apart from the world and from the rest of language, just as we frame a painting to cut it off from the surrounding wall and then place it in the separate sanctity of the museum. In the case of a verbal artifact worthy of being called "aesthetic," it begins to define the tendency to use language.³⁶⁸

For Kant the harmony and coherence discerned between the whole and the parts creates the architectonic structure of interpretation or understanding.³⁶⁹ Transcendental idealism is an entire system enabling one to make perfect sense of empirical experiences as well as of a priori knowledge. In any hermeneutical experience of being as what is already there, something is repeated continually throughout this familiar experience. For Gadamer "there is always a world already interpreted".³⁷⁰ Therefore, if the world is familiar, being-in-the-world is already interpreted in any hermeneutical moment. In fact, we are already aware of the world since the being-in-the-world is already interpreted, providing hermeneutics be un-veiled. But there remains an important question of why the being-in-the-world is urhermeneutics, that is, already hermeneutical before any hermeneutics appears.

Gadamer would redevelop the dialectic within hermeneutics. Plato had designated the network of relationships among the *logoi* as dialectic. This *logoi* dialectic pertains to the being which exposes itself to thought. In Gadamer's interpretation of Plato the being itself may never be apprehended in the unrestricted presence of some unitary intuition (*unus intuitus*) or of an infinite Leibnizian monad. Heidegger had admitted the possibility of reading *Being and Time* based on the dialectic of consciousness and of being close to the Platonic dialectic as Gadamer suggested later.³⁷¹ Recognition of the Platonic dialectic can be another evidence of the fact that the text is already deciphered, although the deciphered text in itself does not imply that it is certainly understood.

Following Plato, we must acknowledge that if everything is interpretable, then, everything must be regarded as a text. Does this mean that everything is available to discourse? In truth, everything can always be called before our eyes for interpretation.

Interpretation as a work of thought consists in deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of meaning implied in the literal meaning of the text which is responsible for its plurality. This relates to the older exegetical tradition of deciphering texts where the text was not a simple narrative or descriptive treatise, but one in which there was some analogical or allegorical meaning. The surface meaning may hide or conceal, or at least contain, a less obvious deep meaning which nevertheless is dependent upon the literal surface meaning. Therefore, the hermeneut must discover and explicate the significance of the text.³⁷²

Concerning the problem of multiple interpretations of text, the fact is that predicates are predicates of "something," as Husserl said. But this "something" stays alongside the predicates as such. On the other hand, this something makes the predicate to be a predicate, because without it no predication is possible. This "some-thing" is the central point of the unification and connection of the predicates.³⁷³ This "something" provides an independent hermeneutical sense of unity without which the unity of the predications in itself would not be possible.

It is argued that whatever can be interpreted can also not be interpreted. This fact points to general reasons for interpreting something, whatever it might be (and also for not interpreting it). We must add that the text, having its own authenticity, is what can be interpreted or cannot be interpreted. Therefore, to say that 'a text does not rule out its being interpreted equals saying that

it does not rule out its not being interpreted,' manifests only a repetition of an ambiguity of the reference.³⁷⁴

We can ask whether interpretation of what interpreting is all about is nothing except what we interpret since it remains as what must be interpreted. We have an interpretation of a text and also we have interpretation about it; there is interpretation only when we incline toward what there is in itself to be some interpretation of.

In the relation between what we interpret and interpretation, it can be said, that there is the text or the original source of interpretation and the interpretation of the text or the translation of the original source. There is no text to be determined merely as an interpretation of what we interpret, since this so-called text which equals interpretation can never stand alone. This does not mean that it is impossible to interpret a text since we only face the text or what we interpret. The interpretation cannot be discovered as long as the text does not appear to be interpreted. Strictly speaking, based on Schleiermacher's principle of interpretative understanding, there would never be any interpretation, but only attempts to face the new texts again and again. This leads to the fact that an interpretation of a text would be possible only when first of all one assumes in questioning that the text is there without interpretation. A text can be interpreted only if there exists a prior text which does not need to be interpreted.³⁷⁵

According to Gadamer, the history of the concept of text shows that it does not occur outside an interpretive situation. The text refers to all that resists integration in experience. From the perspective of interpretation, the text is the authentic given which is to be understood. In this sense, the text would be nothing outside the firm point of relation of the possibilities directed towards the text.³⁷⁶ But what is behind these different possibilities of interpretation that we release? It is always the same text presenting itself to us understood in different ways. Yet hermeneutics is not merely a matter of deciphering; rather Gadamer sees it as a question of meaning.

Gadamer's reading of the history of the concept of the text is not sufficient. His not attempting to extend transcendently his metaphysical reference to the book of nature rests upon the same foundations. He thinks of the text as a phase in the execution of the communication event (*Verständigungsgeschehen*).³⁷⁷ In Gadamer's understanding of text, the nature of interpretation can never be a matter of deciphering that would reproduce the text in explanation. Text and interpretation coalesce into one movement of departure and return. A text attains ideality in the way it stands apart from necessary repetition.³⁷⁸

The text is what is readable. Therefore it is the subject matter of the text and not the text itself that is the point of interpretation.³⁷⁹ This fact, however, does not prevent seeing that philosophical hermeneutics needs to take the hidden text as what is most fundamental and required by a readable text, without which no interpretation or reference of this interpretation would be possible. The same issue emerges when Gadamer defines the text as what only oneself about being in general, it is necessary to begin with the "there" of a being.³⁸⁸

If Being be considered as the source of hermeneutics and can be accounted as the reference for a hermeneutical discussion, it is a text that is referred to. Hermeneutics is nothing but acknowledging that this reference is not resourceless. In other words, interpretation affirms the referent or what affirmatively is taken as the answer. Heidegger claims that any relation because of its formal general character has its ontological source in a reference.³⁸⁹ But no interpretation in its final hermeneutical expression, can be explained without considering the phenomenon of reference.

The different ways of hermeneutical indicating are grounded in the mere possibility of a reference. Considering the main characteristic of the reference grounded on the being-structure of

equipment (in serviceability for), Heidegger does not define the notion of reference as totally responsible for the general hermeneutical question, since the understanding of being overlaps the being structure of equipment as it is regarded in Dasein. This fact led to a confusion when Heidegger agreed that "referring" is wider than "indicating," yet held "referring" to belong essentially to Dasein's Being-in-the-world. Dasein is always directed (*ausgerichtet*).³⁹⁰ There is a question whether indicating (raised by sign) is finally an equipmental character of something ready-to-hand since it belongs, as mentioned, essentially to Dasein's Being-in-the-world, taken for granted by Heidegger. He thinks that the indication belongs to a totality of equipment in context of assignments or references.

Reference for Heidegger is not an ontic characteristic of something ready-to-hand. Yet, in answering the question, in what sense reference is presupposed ontologically in the ready-to-hand, he states that, in anything ready-to-hand, the world is always 'there' (though not thematically). The world is that in terms of which the ready-to-hand is ready-to-hand, while, on the other hand, the constitutive state for the ready-to-hand as equipment is one of reference.³⁹¹ This dualistic thinking of the origin of understanding comes from an unfounded separation of the reference of interpretation and of Being as the fundamental constitution of hermeneutics.

The same problem that is linked to the text in interpretation occurs also in the linguistic realm. It is the same, since these are linked to the concept of the word in speech. When the text comes into interpretation, denomination assigns the place of its hermeneutics in the Being. Text is brought into language as Being. Language seeks its origin in interpretation and finds its answer as a text. In this sense, language is a text unveiled in words and the text is what is hidden in the word and which language is not able to discover. The emergence of the word repeats the text, but in the vain hope of having interpretation in itself.

Unfortunately, without solid grounding, Gadamer creates a distance between language about a thing and the nature of the thing. While the nature of the thing is capable of being encountered in different opinions, the language of the thing implies its being heard in the way in which the thing brings itself to be expressed in language.³⁹² This separation between thing and language brings hermeneutics to a distinction between speech and things in themselves (the same as one can observe in Protagoras). Moreover, this leads to creating an unbridgeable distance between hermeneutics as the language of the thing in interpretation and the language of the thing in itself if it be language at all, since the thing itself cannot be defined as knowable only through the language of others, rather than from its own language.

As a result of the temporalization of language, authentic Dasein is born from the response to Being, and in responding it preserves the strength of Being by the strength of the word.³⁹³ The word is both a fusion of horizons between epochs and an epochal event itself. For Gadamer, the word calls us to take leave of our prejudices and prior attitudes and to hold ourselves open to the future, which as noted earlier, is indeterminate.³⁹⁴

There is always a question whether or not we are able to restore the word.³⁹⁵ Hermeneutics carries this enigmatic property as a heritage; it is as if thinking is brought to its own self through its own word. We stated that the interpretation of a text is such only when the text answers to what interprets. Does this make clear why in Western metaphysics the destiny of the being as the text is determined to be separated from that of the being in interpretation? The assertion that what is most thought provoking is that we are still not thinking, does not indicate that we are no longer thinking, nor does it say that we are not thinking at all, since after all we are conditioned by hermeneutics. Yet in this connection Heidegger is not optimistic regarding the present moment of Western thought.³⁹⁶

Nonetheless, Heidegger denies that his own assertion of the destiny of thinking is negative. Thoughts are representational ideas, while the source of the event remains obscure. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger tries to show that through the history of Western thinking, continually and from the beginning, what is thought in reference to Being; yet the truth of Being remains unthought. Based on this view, for hermeneutics as philosophy, the truth of Being or of the text is denied to thinking as a possible experience. This sense of Western hermeneutics unknowingly veils a denial of the truth of Being.

Finally on the question of the word as the text, carried by metaphor, there are constructive results. Metaphor implies the polarity of sense and reference, and the possibility of distinguishing between, on the one hand, what is said by the sentence as whole and by the words as parts of sentence, and, on the other hand, what is said, i.e., to speak is to say something about something.³⁹⁷

Rather than an aesthetic opposition between metaphor and symbol, Gadamer accepts that these two terms carry meanings which have something in common. Both terms refer to something whose meaning "does not consist in its external appearance or sound, but in a significance that lies beyond it."³⁹⁸ It also has been acknowledged that more than a metaphor, a memory of what originally was the case, initiates descriptively the work of hermeneutics as a conversation with the text.³⁹⁹ According to Ricoeur, a symbol and metaphor itself, instead of being self-sufficient as to significance, require interpretation, which constitutes the stages of the path towards a theory of interpretation. They are not simply units or a store of abstract words of the language or of the linguistic system. They function on the level of discourse, whose linguistic form is the text. With this, reflection reaches the level of the text. Henceforth, the significance and centrality of the text can be shown increasingly in one's own hermeneutics.⁴⁰⁰

Chapter IV

The Fundamental Character of the Question of Text in Hermeneutics

Being in itself and its essence loves to conceal itself and to remain in concealment.
(*Fragment*, 123)

The Text as the Primary Criterion of Hermeneutical Understanding

The question of being as the reference of hermeneutics, is more radical than the question of hermeneutics. We have come to this point: that the text opens to interpretation a mode of being-in-the-world which provides the possibility of interpretation. In this section, we must elucidate why the reference of the text is believed to deserve priority over understanding. Since understanding always pertains to Being-in-the world, all interpretation operates in the fore-structure. Any interpretation which is to contribute understanding, must already have understood what is to be interpreted.⁴⁰¹ We live in traditions and experiences are led to a knowledge of the unknown source. These are not a fragment of our world experience; rather, it is the world itself that communicates what is experienced and given over to us as an "infinitely open task." Thus, the hermeneutical sense of the world-text is not like the world on its first day, but one that is already handed down to us.⁴⁰²

Based on the world text hermeneutic experience does not encounter an object, but rather stands in a relationship to tradition, i.e., to the text (or texts) which have been handed down.⁴⁰³ Openness to the tradition reflects the structure of a question of the text. This question can be conducted through a conversation, which in turn allows one to refer to the event to which the partners in the conversation are directed. This, however, means that the question of the text elaborated in any use of language aims to discover the meaning of the text itself. This, however, correlates the pre-hermeneutic language of the text with all modes of hermeneutic consciousness.⁴⁰⁴

Truth as the disclosure of being must be revealed in the play or let us call it the dialogue of the text and interpreter. Being that comes to be represented in play is defined as the transformation of reality into truth or speech.⁴⁰⁵ Can we take this truth as holding the interpreter to a fixed meaning limited by the structure of language? In this sense, the text becomes the ultimate point of reference for discovering the hermeneutical truth by which misunderstanding and understanding of a text both have the same hermeneutical validity in providing an objectivation of the text in tradition. Thus, the hermeneutical truth of a text would be emphasized by any affirmative or negative stand on the possibility of understanding as we can observe in Gadamer (or Derrida). The text is where Gadamer believes an authentic understanding of a text discloses an historical truth.⁴⁰⁶

Concerning our assumptions that the text stands behind or beyond or below us, there is no doubt that our judgments and interpretations can be free of assumptions and beliefs. We like to think of ourselves as minds free from any textual determination. Also we want to think of our assumptions and beliefs as not textually, but naturally grounded, and that we operate unaware of the text. We equate our beliefs and our myths with our nature. This is the reason why we try to deny our textual location in play, but the more we deny restrictions and directions the more we are determined by it.⁴⁰⁷

When one is engaged in a particular concrete kind of interpretation, in the sense of exact textual interpretation, one likes to appeal (*berufen*) to what "stands there."⁴⁰⁸ But in contrast it must be stated that what stands there in the first instance is not only an unreflected assumption of the person who does the interpreting. The text really does stand there, for otherwise nothing remains for understanding except some illusions. There must be a 'text there' that has been taken for granted in any interpretation precisely as an interpretation i.e., that which has been presented in the forehaving, foresight and foreconception.

If we presuppose, as Gadamer acknowledges, that there is no such thing as a fully transparent text or a completely exhaustive interest in explaining and translating texts, then all that is perceived relative to the hermeneutical statements are to be shifted. This leads us to think of a given subject matter, rather than simply to interpret the evident content of a statement.⁴⁰⁹

Therefore, everyone who asks a question tries to find another confirmation for his own assumptions in the answer. We cannot separate these assumptions from the text itself. In one aspect, these prejudices are also partially constructive of the text as the being in interpretation. However, as Gadamer points out, the text itself remains as the first point of relation over against the questionability or the possibilities of interpretation directed towards the text.⁴¹⁰ It is not contrived to reflect upon the presuppositions implicit in our questions; Gadamer states that on the contrary it is artificial to imagine that statements fall down from heaven. They cannot be subjected to analysis without bringing into consideration why they are primarily responses to something.⁴¹¹ If we take texts to be primitive criteria as coming from heaven then questions must come from heaven since we already pointed out that "questions" are indeed "questions of." Therefore if we want to evaluate our hermeneutical question we must study how questions truly come down to us. It would not be more justifiable to say that a question in itself is not another question. Each and every question in hermeneutics goes back, that is, can be regarded as reference rather than as answer, as Gadamer suggests.

We understand the subject matter of the text when we locate its question. In attempting to gain this question the text in its historical horizon is continually transcendent.⁴¹² To locate the question of the text is not simply to leave it, but to put it again so that understanding itself is questioned by the subject matter of the text. While the text as the center of interpretation stands beyond what we understand of it, the need to question the text always remains.⁴¹³

One can think about a hermeneutical method as a description of "what understanding is" as we saw in Gadamer's holding fast to the hermeneutical circle. It is impossible to break out of this circle unless the description of "what understanding is" is realized and identified by "what understanding is of." A true estimation of what understanding is might never forget that in the procedure of uncovering the given meaning the text unveils itself only in the very truth of "understanding of." Understanding cannot construct itself if there is no text in front of one even though this text can be mere under-standing itself. The text as other is not necessarily laid out outside understanding, but the mere presence of the other helps under-standing by extending itself to break out of its own base and narrowness. It follows then, as Gadamer himself acknowledges, that there is something else in understanding's experience that is a potentiality for being other (*Anderssein*) that lies beyond every coming to agreement about what is common.⁴¹⁴

The text can be explained by its hierarchial aspects. Dasein's understanding of itself can be interpreted as though it functions by fulfilling the transcendental condition for the question of its reference in hermeneutics. This fact forces us to recognize in Heidegger's later works a priority of being as the reference of hermeneutics over Dasein's self-understanding. Understanding faces itself as already signified by the reference. That which is disclosed in understanding, that which is

understood, according to Heidegger, is already accessible in such a way that its 'as which' (or what can be revealed as its referential significance) can be made to stand out explicitly.⁴¹⁵ The procedure of the explicitness of anything that is understood depends on the "as" or referential significance, or, rather, is constructed by it.

Gadamer in the second and third part of his work comes to realize that the study of understanding is particularly identical with that of the understanding of the texts.⁴¹⁶ Unfortunately, in spite of grasping the reaching back to the text as such, he never tried to explain the hermeneutical return to the text as a fundamental characteristic of hermeneutics itself. He thinks that reaching back to the text is an accidental result motivated by something unusual having arisen in the process of understanding.⁴¹⁷

For Ricoeur, to understand a text is to follow its movement from sense to reference, from what it says (as the *textcharacteris-tique primus*), to what it talks about.⁴¹⁸ Through this vantage point, the identity of the text within the process of interpretation can be rescued while, on the other hand, the act of the reader's participation which is the subjective side is also taken into careful consideration.⁴¹⁹ The reader must obey what is said in a text. This means that the reader or interpreter extends himself by force of play. If we write on Plato explaining what he already said in the *Phaedrus*, we are only repeating Plato. Indeed, it is said in this work of Plato that writing can only repeat itself, that is, signify always the same, and that it is a "game" (*paidia*).⁴²⁰

In this respect, it can easily be accepted that, if there is an interpretative text, it must in principle be understandable and interpretable, if not by us at least for an interpreter in general (which might be God). The task of hermeneutics is to show that the possible interpreting is referential understanding. The authentic task of hermeneutics is not to enter into a systematically exhaustive understanding of all different possibilities, rather it must provide the condition for the hierarchically main interpretation presenting this again as one context of references.

Nonetheless, to do justice to the text does not require that we exclude a plurality of readings. We require a plurality of readings in order to do justice to the text, something which a single reading perspective of itself can never sustain.⁴²¹ In a responsible interpretation which tries as far as possible to do justice to the text, it cannot be merely a question of an innocent fusion of the horizons of the reader and the text. Rather, every understanding of the text must be verified in the accompanying explanation of the coherence of the text and of its claim to make sense, as Paul Ricoeur has convincingly shown.⁴²²

On the other hand, application as articulated by hierarchical understanding is where the subject makes the proper re-entry to the text as an effect of its appropriation (*Aneignung*). In application there is nothing behind the text, but only that which the work unfolds, discovers and reveals.⁴²³ Application or the meaning of going to the reference subsumes every particular interpretation in the process of understanding, so that finally understanding or interpretation finds its real determination through a referential contemplation of the text.

According to Heidegger the question of the possibility of the understanding of being results in something that transcends being, a "beyond." We know that understanding itself belongs to the basic constitution of the Dasein and since Dasein is rooted in temporality, temporality is the condition of possibility for understanding, as was pointed out earlier. Therefore, when something within the world is encountered in interpreting there is no naked thing which is present-at-hand over which we then throw a signification. The thing in question already has an involvement which is disclosed in our understanding of the world: this involvement is laid out by the interpretation.⁴²⁴ This is why thinking, as Gadamer believes, always points beyond itself. Platonic dialogue has an expression for this by referring to the one, the being.⁴²⁵

Thus, as is manifested in the process of interpretation in application, the thing spoken about no longer belongs to the situation shared by the different participants in a dialogue, but becomes a "matter of the text."⁴²⁶ Every interpretation of a thing attempts to be transparent to the text so that the meaning of the text can speak for any further time.⁴²⁷ It is indeed true to say that in our understanding of the text, what is said and what it referred to remain absolutely the same.⁴²⁸

Consequently, through this analysis of the text, entities within the world, being considered as projected upon a whole of significance which reference-relations concern, i.e., Being-in-the-world, have been tied up in advance. Entities have meaning (*Sinn*) when discovered along with the Being of Dasein, as being understood.⁴²⁹ What is understood is not meaning; rather it is the entity or alternately the text. Therefore, the difference of the entity we are interpreting refers back to the entity itself or being.

As was pointed out earlier, hermeneutical phenomenology thematically considers the source of interpretation as demanding an interpretation of its object. Heidegger in *Being and Time* acknowledges that, based on an authentic phenomenology, what remains hidden and replaces and gets covered up again is not just this or that entity, but rather the Being of entities. This Being can be covered up so that it becomes forgotten by our understanding and no question arises about it or about its meaning.⁴³⁰

We must add that, there is an inauthenticity of the existential analytic which has its present counterpart in man's pretense to consider himself master of his own speech. Authenticity in Ricoeur becomes the ability to hear, obey and respond to the *Urdichtung*, the originary utterance of language as revelation of being which thinkers and poets present.⁴³¹ The world manifests itself in the situation of understanding as a power-to-be. For this reason the power of hearing is stronger than the power of saying. The fundamental root of "saying" is keeping silent. As Ricoeur believed, the sciences of language should move within the limits of speech so that simple saying (*reden*) can be reached only by going to the very roots of the matter.⁴³² Therefore, whereas even a common understanding (*Verständigung*) is not possible (because of, e.g., the lack of a language), hermeneutics still exists, not in saying but in silence. The hermeneutic task, here, poses itself as the task of finding a common language.⁴³³ The ability to understand as a fundamental endowment of man becomes possible by way of language and partnership in conversation. Therefore the universal claim of hermeneutics is beyond any doubt motivated by language.⁴³⁴ For Gadamer, however, this phenomenon of language, in its hermeneutical sense, is restricted in the dialogue.

By Heidegger's posing the question of being in terms of a language, it no longer is concerned with pronouncing judgment and thinking a corresponding validity claim in terms of objectivity, but rather is continuously concerned with the whole of being.⁴³⁵ Through this concern totality is not an objectivity to be determined in the procedure, but is the world horizon embracing understanding.⁴³⁶

Through bringing written fixed language once again into speech, interpretation is consequently the event of overcoming self-alienation. The return is not a reconstruction; for the thing meant is nowhere else than in the appearing word.⁴³⁷ This means that in interpretation we face a newly constructed text, rather than a reconstruction of an old reference of meaning. There is an essential relation between a newly constructed text and the previous text which was discovered once as a reference of our meaning, but taking the reconstruction of meaning as finding the text again is perhaps an illusory act of mind. Gadamer seems to have distinguished this fact in dialogical reference when he saw it as an endeavor that continually modifies itself and as such

leaves "behind the intended meaning" of the speaker; hence this return is the hermeneutic event of speaking again in a new voice.⁴³⁸

For Gadamer it is only by considering together both the concept of interpretation and the concept of the text that we are able to constitute a central concept in the linguistic structure as such.⁴³⁹ The wording of the text as its linguistic foundation comes into question when the process of understanding is disrupted. Understanding is possible (might be and must be) only after the wording of the text and in the forgetfulness of it. But this does not indicate that understanding is there before any text appears as given. The wording of the text, as Gadamer pointed out, is to be differentiated from the text itself, even though this nomenclature always can act also as a substitute for the other.⁴⁴⁰ Each word in its turn has a circle of the unexpressed preceding the meaning of the language.⁴⁴¹

We can think of the relation of meaning as sign to a being that can be logically represented in combining of concepts in judgment.⁴⁴² Kant tried to explain how the 'copula' functions in a judgment, saying that it can be thought of as posited merely relatively. But then there is a question whether the 'copula' itself is the purest text at all. To view the 'copula' as a text by virtue of which any literal text becomes meaningful is rooted in the fact that 'copula' in itself cannot be taken in any way into consideration unless it be found in an interpretive attribution. It is rather an indication that there is an attribution that cannot be repeated in interpretation. Based on this, the 'copula' functions as a connective text never attainable in itself. The very significance of this unreferential reference is that it shows the being, whereas it itself is in absence. Through this aspect of the 'copula,' the *logos apophantikos* (statement) is considered inseparable from the general meaning of *logos*. In other words a real understanding of *logos* could be possible if the copula is taken as a hermeneutical term, as mentioned above. 'Copula' as understood in a hermeneutical sense looks like a text that enables reading being true or being false in an assertion while it itself cannot be pointed to (or read). Otherwise how is being true related to the being that is also present in the assertion in the sense of the is as 'copula'?⁴⁴³

The "is" need not be expressed necessarily in language; it can be found also in such statements as "it rains." The "to be" that appears in the sentence is termed the 'copula'. The determinative thinking basically is preceded by the "is," by being. This indicates that there is a special connection between thought and being which determines the priority in hermeneutics. Thinking is, in turn, a being and as such is directed toward beings.⁴⁴⁴

The question of being itself (*die Frage nach dem sein*), as Heidegger in his famous lecture *What is Metaphysics?* argues, is not asked by traditional metaphysics, which on the contrary concealed this question, inasmuch as it constructed metaphysics from the concept of being as what is circumscribed as already out-there-now. Gadamer believes that the real intention of what was asked in Heidegger's question about being can be understood only in the light of what Gadamer himself describes under the concept of interpretation.⁴⁴⁵

Heidegger says that any interpretation which is to contribute to understanding must already have understood what is to be interpreted.⁴⁴⁶ Whether understanding in hermeneutics is preliminary to interpretation (as most would agree is Heidegger's view) or not, understanding of a text must begin with some pre-hermeneutical knowledge of the text to be understood. Understanding the text is an act of searching for something. Without having any idea about what we are looking for we cannot understand it as what we were looking for. Therefore, there is a sense of the text which is already understood wherever it comes to be understood. Understanding cannot be delivered without this sense of the text in which what one finds is what one is referred to.

Gadamer claims that he himself tried to reconcile the discussion of Being (not the Being of the beings) with the pure study of understanding itself. But this step was not taken by later Heidegger who abandoned the concept of the hermeneutics.⁴⁴⁷

For Heidegger the problem is that truth and being true as unveiledness and unveiling must be studied within the Dasein's mode of being. We meet with a being's being in the understanding of being. It is understanding that first of all discloses or reveals something like being. Being "is given" only in the specific disclosedness that characterizes the understanding of being.⁴⁴⁸ We must be aware of the fact that hermeneutics originally would be possible between Dasein's ontical closedness to itself and ontological distance from itself. To the Dasein as unveiling there belongs essentially something unveiled in its unveiledness. To unveiling there belongs as to every other intentional comportment an understanding of the being of that to which this comportment as such relates. If the closedness of something is truth, then Being is given only if there is disclosure. But there is truth only if a being exists which opens up and discloses. This means that disclosing or truth itself belongs to the mode of being of this being.⁴⁴⁹

Heidegger says that if man is to find his way once again into the nearness of Being (*in die Nähe des Seins*) he must first learn to exist in the nameless. Heidegger's statement that 'the substance of man is ek-sistence' can be considered as the way that man in his proper essence (*in seinem eigenen Wesen*) becomes present to Being (*zum Sein anwest*) in ecstatic inherence in the truth of Being.⁴⁵⁰ This indeed means that as concerns the being of Dasein, we never really are free of interpretation in talking about being. In other words, the text as a nameless reference in Dasein can become present to it only as interpretation. The destiny (*Geschichte*) of Dasein exists in interpretation. Now, since the 'end of man' is the thinking of Being and man is the end of the thinking of Being, it is impossible for Dasein to be in a 'nameless-Being'. Consequently, it is not possible to say that the text as nameless Being can never be thought of in itself. In other words, it is in itself, and prior to the thought of itself.

In addition, Dasein projects itself on the for-the-sake-of-itself as the whole of the essential possibilities in its capacity-to-be; therefore, it is fundamental to hold that indeed Dasein is for-the-sake of its own being or text. It is as if Dasein tries to interpret its own Being. This provides a particular hermeneutics of each Dasein which is distinguishable from the others. In suspending before itself this for-the-sake-of-itself and existing in this suspension, being applies itself in this attention not for anything except for itself.

In constructing the Being of the *Da*, understanding comes along equiprimordially. The state of mind is one of the existential modes in which the Being of the 'there' maintains itself. If understanding is taken as a fundamental *existentiale*, this means that it is conceived as a basic mode of Dasein's Being.⁴⁵¹ The ambiguity of this explanation lies in considering the Being of the 'there', that is, Dasein in such a way that maintains itself only in some aspects of the existential structure rather than others. How would the Being of the 'there' not maintain itself at all, that is, how would the Being of the 'there' not be there since it is not maintained by itself? Otherwise in spite of Heidegger's disinterestedness as shown in *Being and Time*, the only remaining solution would consist in referring to Being rather than to the Being of Dasein.

Gadamer agrees with Heidegger that the understanding in which Dasein understands itself in its Being is not a way of comporting itself toward definite objects of knowledge, but is rather the carrying out of Being-in-the-world itself.⁴⁵² This understanding raises a new realm of hermeneutics based on facticity. Heidegger explains that in Dasein itself and hence in Dasein's own understanding of Being, the way the world is understood is, as we shall show, reflected back

ontologically upon the way in which Dasein itself gets interpreted.⁴⁵³ In whatever way we conceive understanding, it is a comportment toward beings.

Based on this, in Heidegger's view, understanding must not be considered as comportment toward beings. All practical-technical commerce with beings is a comportment toward beings. On the other hand, an understanding of being is present also in practical-technical comportment toward beings so far as we have at all to do with beings as beings. In all comportment toward beings, whether it is specifically cognitive or whether it is practical-technical, an understanding of being is already involved. A being can be encountered as a being in the light of the understanding of being, but there is a question whether an understanding of being always and already lies at the basis of all comportment of the Dasein toward beings, whether nature or history, theoretical or practical. If this is so, we cannot define the concept of understanding.⁴⁵⁴ Finally, since understanding is not at all primarily a cognition and since existence is more than mere cognition in the usual spectator sense of knowledge, which knowledge presupposes existence, it is rather a basic and prior determination of existence itself that determines the cognitive agent.

Dasein is occupied with its own being, with its ability to be. Heidegger neglects to define how the multiplicity of possibilities is united under Dasein. He thinks that Dasein is free for specific possibilities of its own self: it is its own most peculiar ability-to-be. There are some possibilities in Dasein itself which are nothing except determinations of existence. If the Dasein is free for definite possibilities of itself then it is these possibilities themselves.⁴⁵⁵ The understanding of being belongs to the human Dasein which makes possible all comportment toward beings. The understanding of being itself has the mode of being of the human Dasein. The more appropriately we define this being in regard to the structure of its being, the more demand one faces to comprehend the structure of the understanding of being that belongs to the Dasein. Hence, based on the primary character of the being or text in hermeneutics, we can ask more clearly and unequivocally "what is it that makes this understanding of being possible at all."⁴⁵⁶

This is reflected in these passages of Heidegger:

That which is understood gets articulated when the entity to be understood is brought close interpretatively by taking as our clue the 'something as some-thing'; and this articulation lies before (*liegt vor*) our making any thematic assertion about it. In such an assertion the *as* (*als*) does not turn up for the first time; it just gets expressed for the first time, and this is possible only in that it lies before us as something expressible.⁴⁵⁷

and:

When we have to do with anything, the mere seeing of the Things which are closest to us bears in itself the structure of interpretation, and in so primordial a manner that just to grasp something free as it were, of the 'as', requires a certain readjustment. . . . When we merely stare at something, our just-having-it-before-us lies before us as a failure to understand it any more. This grasping which is free of the 'as', is a privation of the kind of seeing in which one merely understands.⁴⁵⁸

Textuality as the Process of the Text in the Determination of Hermeneutics

Text or Being as "what is" above all else includes thinking, which establishes the relation between Being and man. It does not cause this relation to be, but merely offers this relation back to Being as something first handed over to it by Being. This returning back to Being is implied by the Being itself as the result of giving itself to Dasein. The sending of Being (*die Schickung des Seins*) takes place in seeking for Being.⁴⁵⁹ Based on this principle, the *ereignis* (e-vent) of appropriation, the event which sends Being to thought and makes the history of metaphysics

possible, does not mean Being but that which grants Being. One can not say that Being there is (*es gibt*) mere Being, and that *ereigenis* is the "It" which gives Being to thought since the history of metaphysics is the history of the various ways in which Being is named, while leaving the "it" which gives Being unthought.⁴⁶⁰

In the history of metaphysics the forgetting of Being, which can be addressed by *es gibt*, is grounded in forgetting the difference between Being and beings. Since the text is being in hermeneutics, this forgetfulness results in oblivion of the origin or text, and therefore, oblivion of textual thinking is forgetting the distinction between Being and beings. In so far as Heidegger asks about the meaning of Being or the essence of truth, he is still engaged in meta-physical language of the being that thinks the thing as something out there that is to be discovered (*Vorhandenen und Aufzufindenen*).⁴⁶¹ Therefore, as Gadamer says, the concept of interpretation, if it is formulated in the manner of Nietzsche, does not entail the discovery of a preexisting meaning, but the positing of meaning as we see in the *Will to Power*.⁴⁶²

Let us explain this. The history of Being means that the sending of Being structures the possibility of hermeneutics. The historical character of the history of Being must be determined on the basis of that which is characteristic of this sending and not from some undetermined coming-to-pass. The sending itself or being allows being unveiled in understanding as well as that mysterious "it" which sends, holds itself back in the various ways in which Being "shows" itself. To hold oneself back means in Greek, *epochè*. This is the reason we speak of epochs of the sending of Being.⁴⁶³

To think means to move into the proximity of Being and to let oneself be addressed by Being itself through its sending of beings. Therefore, by responding properly to Being's address, man will be able to bring to light the truth of Being.⁴⁶⁴ Man's standing out into the truth of Being does not mean that man is the ruler and above Being. Rather, man is thrown by Being itself into the truth of Being so that, existing in this way, he may only argue the truth of Being in order that beings may appear in the light of Being as the beings which they are. Thus man does not decide whether and how being appears, whether and how God, history, and nature, for example, come forth into the clearing of Being, come-to-presence, or depart. Rather, the advent of all beings lies in the destiny of Being's sending.⁴⁶⁵

There is another way of explaining the problem in Gadamer's statement that for Heidegger Being does not unfold totally in self-manifestation, but rather withholds itself and withdraws with the same primordially with which it manifests itself. In its turn this doctrine leads Gadamer's hermeneutics toward not forgetting the limit which is implicit in every hermeneutical experience of meaning.⁴⁶⁶ In other words, the fact that being can never be completely understood indicates that as a text it can occur in hermeneutics again and again.

If philosophy as symptom of something in a textual work, as Derrida states, cannot be presented in the history of philosophy, or better, is nowhere present,⁴⁶⁷ then the text never comes in its determination as presence, which Heidegger recognized as the destiny of philosophy. However, the inefficiency of the Derridian symptom must be regarded in the fact that it is not to be a presented text; rather it is described more as a writing text and not a mere text that immediately corresponds to Being as one might see in Heidegger's outlook.

When we try to forget a being as a text, i.e., as something interpretable, it is still interpretable in forgetfulness. Not to be a text is still to be a text. "Not to be a text," means the text when it is re-garded as a real metaphysical text. It seems that the text comes to the absence when it becomes a substantial reference of metaphysics. In this sense the Nietzschean fragment "*Ich habe meinen Regenschirm vergessen*" requires first of all that "it is my umbrella that I forgot."

Textualität (textuality) may approximate *Subjectität* (sub-jectness). Heidegger uses this to refer to a mode of Being's coming to presence in its reciprocal interpretation with what is, i.e., the mode wherein being manifests itself in respect to what is appearing as *hypokeimenon* (that which lies before). Based on this explanation one can say that *Textualität* should emphasize the fact that Being is determined in terms of the subjectum of the text and not necessarily by cognitive interpretation.

Therefore, we must point out that the secret and validity of the text is not dependent on the life or the death of the author. The same is true concerning the reader. The text can be unveiled through changing events, but only the text itself talks to us here or there. Hence, Gadamer notes that by the theme of the text there is more at stake than reflections upon the methodology of the philosophical sciences.⁴⁶⁸ Text for Gadamer is more than a title for the subject matter of literary research and correspondence, and therefore inter-pretation is more than the technique of scientifically interpreting texts.⁴⁶⁹ It is in the act of assessing the textual sense that every interpretation finds at once its consistency and its vulnerability. The latter invites new efforts at interpretation and accordingly under-lines in principle the open-ended character of every interpretation.⁴⁷⁰ Therefore, the process of retrieval means something more than an exposition of what an author has said already. It means, rather, bringing what he cannot and does not yet say but nevertheless is laid before our eyes as unsaid in the expressions which one actually uses. What must become decisive, then, is not merely what is expressed in explicit formulae, but what is laid before our eyes as still unsaid through the formulae used.⁴⁷¹

It is the reflection on the textuality of texts which provides the position of determining more accurately the relationship between text and reader. Through this way, the presence of subjectivism or an objectivism in the process of interpretation can be recognizable.⁴⁷² As the result of the textuality of the text, it becomes possible to unfold the self rendering a critique of the ego by accompanying all stages of the collection of sense in the self-understanding of the interpreter. This fact realizes the possibility of understanding of her-meneutics based on an understanding totally different from Gada-mer's concept of understanding.

The textual appropriation of the text is then an event of the text independent of interpretation in the sense that this appropriation is set in motion primarily as a preliminary anticipation of the meaning of the text. This anticipation of the text is necessary so long as the text exists.

For Ricoeur, a textual production must be understood as a process of distanciation and decontextualization from which results textual autonomy, making the text susceptible to future appropria-tions.⁴⁷³ Therefore, textuality while containing distanciation as its intrinsic element, presupposes discourse as a living language with its immanent dialectic of meaning and event.⁴⁷⁴ For Gadamer inter-pretation is probably recreation, in a certain sense; however, this recreation does not follow the process of the creative act, but the lines of the created work which has to be brought to representation in accord with the meaning the interpreter finds in it.⁴⁷⁵

It is clear that the interpreting text has to be derived from the interpretative text, in a productive or recreative manner. It is proble-matic to take merely the interpreting text or interpretation as a con-structive hermeneutical foundation.⁴⁷⁶ Understanding is a perpetual attempt toward a text while this attempting enables one to see the reference of his interpretation as long as this becomes wider and deeper and darker in the temporality. In this sense, conceptually the text is interpretative in itself, although not because of being inter-pretable, that is, a text that can be interpreted. Therefore, it must be acknowledged that it is impossible to speak of interpretation or of something resembling an interpretation unless one points to some-thing having the role of the interpretative

text, to something playing the role of the interpreting text only through a productive hermeneutics exchange for (as) the first text (interpretative text).⁴⁷⁷

The distinction between "text in interpretation" and "text in itself" can be exemplified by Husserl's distinguishing between individual object and essence. To each individual object belongs a state of essential being as its essence. Conversely, in general, to each essence there corresponds a series of possible individuals as factual instances (*Vereinzelungen*). Hence, based upon on a corresponding reciprocal relationship between sciences of fact and sciences of the essence, there must be a fundamental relationship (which in hermeneutics is considered to be hierarchical) between hermeneutical understanding and textual revelation.

We must also notice the fact that a text occurs in the process of textual unveiling because there is always a potentiality of otherness. For Gadamer, the fact that a potentiality of otherness remains suggests that the text remains plural.⁴⁷⁸ This potentiality is amalgamated with the ambiguity of the text as reference of different interpretation. Thus, the plurality in this potentiality virtually must be considered beyond the structure of interpretation itself. The text emerges in its performative character here so that it takes its direction from the communicative situation (*Verständigungssituation*) in which it is located merely as a concept.⁴⁷⁹

On the other hand, the criticism introduced by Nietzsche concerning the hermeneutical doctrine of the text, characterizes interpretation as the substitution of an interpreted text for an interpretable text. Based on this criticism, one cannot distinguish the moment of criticism which establishes the text, from the hermeneutic moment that is the moment of commentary (or based on our attitude, the textualization process). The critic would seek "to re-establish the original text, to eliminate interpretations, corruptions, errors in coping, etc. Now, in order to decide on the version of the text to be retained, the critic will be anticipating possible interpretations of it."⁴⁸⁰ Therefore, the text to be interpreted is already the result of an interpretation. Descombes reacts to this anti-text theory by stating that there is no question here of denying that the interpretive text can itself be the product of an interpretation, but it is also the product of another interpretation, that is, of another substitution. This means in other words, that one interpretation resting on another results from the very notion of the substitution of one text for another.⁴⁸¹

The interpretation provides a contrast only for the text to establish its own textuality or the meaning "tendency of the text." Therefore, the textuality of the interpretive text comes from the core of the text, rather than from what is seen to be substituted for the text; the textuality of a text is its process of coming to an interpretation. Therefore, the textuality of a text is the text's process of coming to an interpretation of itself. A text establishes itself in a variety of ways. Its right to interpretation is not comparable to any particular understanding which might determine it in such a way. A text is interpretative in a wide variety of ways: in interpretation, in its "textuality and textualities", it formulates the dominance and limits, centrality and supplementarily, decidability and indidability of its interpretativity.⁴⁸²

We must note that man fundamentally is concerned with beings. When he begins to think and presents beings as beings, he undoubtedly relates to Being. As we mentioned earlier, in truth he usually thinks of beings as such, but never of Being itself. Even in its critical phase, philosophy thought from beings back to other beings, and in passing had only a glimpse of Being. Being itself cannot be thought. Thus that which is free in the most original sense is not Dasein, but Being itself. Being is liberation which frees from concealment.⁴⁸³ There is no listening to the others; indeed Being listens to itself while others listen to Being.

Consequently, hermeneutics as the creative speculation of the being has a universal ontological significance in language. To be sure, what comes into language is something different

from the spoken word itself. But the word is a word only because of what comes into language in it. Its own physical being exists only in order to disappear into what is said.

Likewise, that which comes into language is not something pre-given before language; rather, the word gives it its own determinateness.⁴⁸⁴ The literary text is text precisely because it points back to an originary act of linguistic utterance while it also pre-scribes all repetition and act of speaking. In the literary text according to Gadamer the word first attains its full self-presence (*Selbstpräsenz*). The word makes what is said present and also makes itself present in its radiant actuality as sound. It must not only be read, but also must be listened to.⁴⁸⁵ As Heidegger says in *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, the word is not a thing and if we search for it we shall never find it among things. But he does not explain whether a word can be forgotten in others or not. The word "is" not, if we reserve the word "is" for the realm of things, but nonetheless it is in a more privileged way than all things since the things must refer to the word "is." As far as the word is concerned, in this relation 'it is' (*es ist*) must be replaced by 'it gives' (*es gibt*).⁴⁸⁶ *Es gibt* in this textual actuality of the word, implies thinking not as a dictating but rather a listening to being. It is an opening oneself up for Being's demand; thus, it truly is an act of freedom by which man as Dasein acquiesces to Being's address. Yet, Being's call to thought does not necessitate; it invites but does not compel. It leaves Dasein free to refuse its call; it is the address of Being which makes man free.

Following Heidegger we can say, even if the text or referential signification of a thing ontically be unexpressed, this must not prevent us from regarding it as a constitutive state for understanding it existentially and *a priori*. The text is a tissue or a galaxy of meanings which refer to other meanings only within itself and the intentionality of it.⁴⁸⁷ The words used by the interpreter have their origin in the content of language that comes to form an aura of meanings which are quite unique. The appropriation of textual meaning, consequently, has to be regarded not so much as a duplicate effort, but as a genuine creation itself.⁴⁸⁸

For Heidegger, everything which is "thought-provoking" gives us to think or, perhaps it would be better to say, to interpret. Moreover, "It always gives that gift just so far as the thought-provoking matter already and intrinsically is what must be thought about."⁴⁸⁹ Based on hermeneutical terms, thought-provoking is the real source for interpretation. This means, however, that the text itself is what provokes interpreting itself.

It is clear that textuality corresponds not to a certain intention or consequence of discourse generally, whether written or oral. This is to be understood in opposition to orality, as taken by Derrida. "It provides a world we have in common." The intentions and consequences of the discourse, the existence of a common world to which we can refer, do not depend only on those artifacts we think of when the word "text" is used, such as books, documents, and laws.⁴⁹⁰

The logical question 'whether the text is posed as explanatory for determining the interpretation or vice versa' remains open forever. However, we must agree first of all that the circularity dealt with here is not a metaphysical, but rather purely hermeneutic logical one against what Gadamer characterizes as the hermeneutical circle in the domain of understanding. There can be absolutely no derivation of one from the other as can be observed in hermeneutic diversity of the history. But here, we believe that the standards of textual hermeneutics would seem to prevent a vicious circle in the interpretation of a text.

The problem of this circular movement from interpretation to the text, and from the text to the interpretation, would seem to disappear if the text is taken into consideration as an original text and understanding is seen as an interpreting such that the hermeneutical possibilities of the text are disclosed by the event of hermeneutics. Even in a very pure logical sense of determination, the

reference of the interpretation is the starting point. Gadamer thinks that, as a hermeneutic precondition, only if we pursue everyday speech in accord with the concept of understanding are we able to see the hermeneutic circle as really directed toward the structure of being.⁴⁹¹

In short, if the text responds to any interpretation referred to it, then it is the text itself again which is corresponded to in the hermeneutical determination of things. This can be done by having the character of an event be in allowing its being-reference to open up to new further references in understanding the things again and again. This genuine characteristic of the text as reference seems neglected by some hermeneuts like Ricoeur, so that the reference for the latter appears only as the second aspect of the meaning, that is, the intentional direction toward a self.⁴⁹² Explanation and sense are text-internal categories whereas understanding and reference are external to the text. The reference expresses, as is pointed out by Ricoeur, the full exteriorization to the extent that the meaning is not only the ideal object intended by the utterer, but also the actual reality aimed at by the utterance.⁴⁹³ But it becomes clear that this actual reality can be defined only by referring to the text since otherwise the referent of the text will be a non-essential referent. Therefore, it is completely to misunderstand the meaning of the hermeneutical text if we think interpretation is not a means of getting back to an original expression which is textual.

Textuality thus can and must be defined in its characteristic as based on referability. There are some other characteristics of textuality, like stability, iterability, and past-future inclusiveness. But all these secondary characteristics result from the referability of the text. The textual is that which we can assume or to which we can refer.⁴⁹⁴

Reference might be described as the pointing into the interpretative purview of information. A reference, that is information known about the referent, becomes available to transformations in the same way as the other conditions of the text. A reference itself does not specify its function; the function of a reference must be denied through combinations of transformations and inferences.⁴⁹⁵

If we are still not thinking it stems from the fact that the thing itself that must be thought about turns away from man.⁴⁹⁶ What must be interpreted turns away from man; it withdraws from him. The question is how we can find a definition for the source of interpretation whereas it withdraws from the outset of interpretation. The reason we can not define this provoking-source is because indeed we name our interpretations of it. One can never know a true name for a text but only what the text is called in itself; we can only point to it. The source of interpretation is withdrawn; it is as hermeneutical beings that we draw toward it.

By widening the hermeneutic characteristic of activity and potentiality we can examine this view that the concept of the thing (*Sache*) reflects more than the concept of *Res*. The meaning of the *Sache* is permeated above all by what is called cause, that is the disputed matter under consideration. *Sache*, as Gadamer defines it, is the thing placed in the middle between the disputing parties since a decision must be rendered regarding it. *Sache* was to be protected against the grasp of one party or the other.⁴⁹⁷ Heidegger thinks that the thing is there as a holding of things in relation and therefore, the thing things.⁴⁹⁸ The thing as indicative of the difference and identity of things enables things to be there. As far as it concerns the thing, that is in a state of coming, its arrival into the world as thing is only in so far as it describes itself as distanced from other things.⁴⁹⁹ A thing becomes a hermeneutical source only to the extent that it has never totally arrived at the possibilities of interpretation a text contains in itself. Therefore, in facing the question what is a text as signified by a thing we can say that a text is that which is in the process of interpretation.

As Gadamer says, the text with its charge of meaning (*Sinn-bezug*) constitutes the only present. We are thrown back on the meaning relations that articulate the framework of the whole text when we read a text; the text is uttered in its whole meaning each time we leaf back through the text. While beginning and reading anew, we discover new dimensions of meaning of the text.⁵⁰⁰ We do not leave the text behind; no act of studying or reading a text can leave the text behind as understood completely. Whatever text be given for understanding, we go more and deeply into its meaning. The text is not behind any understanding; rather we have already entered into it forever. We are in the present text just as everyone who speaks is in the words he says and does not hold them at a distance.⁵⁰¹

Heidegger in his later period tries to depart from the Dasein-centered terminology to hiddenness as well as unconcealedness; thereafter, the hermeneutical reference toward being can stand in itself and withhold itself from interpretation.⁵⁰² Following this principal view, Gadamer believes that the conflict between concealment and unconcealment is not restricted to the hermeneutics of art in any particular meaning, but rather reveals the textual tendency wherever it might be.

The agreement on textual meaning, whenever achieved, is to be accounted for by another ground that is the simple distinction between a supposed meaning-in-itself and its significance for the interpreter.⁵⁰³ According to Gadamer, the meaning of the text cannot be restricted to the *mensa auctoris*. Tradition builds upon what he calls the "excess of meaning" that it finds in the text.⁵⁰⁴ There is an incommunicability of the text which has been affirmed by poets. In Hölderlin for instance it is a means for approaching the inapproachable. It brings to the "not said" as what makes possible "*la communication de l'incommunicable et aboutit au langage*." This means, in other words, that the poet speaks, but doesn't speak. In this turning and backing away from speech, the poet elevates himself in the ruin; the speaking speaks from within the silence that refuses speech.⁵⁰⁵

However, to understand a being, it is not necessary to understand the related understanding of the text as such, but the understanding of a being must be considered as an understanding of a text as it is related to the text of being.

The returning or coming back of a text again to itself never takes place in Heidegger and in Derrida. Indeed this "homelessness" of the text becomes a concern in Derrida's *The Postcard*. Other Heideggerians, such as Blanchot, consider transcendence as a distance whose divisions are not capable of being unified even in the utopian sense of the text.⁵⁰⁶

In hermeneutical theology also, because of not having a fundamental definition of the text, there are a great many confusions around the relation between the Bible as sacred scripture and the text as being. For example, without predicating its logical consequences, Ricoeur proclaims that the Bible should come to the fore only in the conclusion of a hermetic process.⁵⁰⁷ We must state that the first misconception which can result from this theory is that it regards as possible having a philosophical determination presumably unrelated to the question about the origin of a being, in other words, without a presupposed theological subject-matter of being. Nonetheless he agrees that defining the Bible as the word of God does not rely on a psychologistic concept of inspiration, rather, it is addressed to the quality of the view of being as it announces itself.⁵⁰⁸

This is neither understanding as a universal concept nor a universal structure of understanding, but the textual understanding from which philosophical statements about a certain type of human self-understanding are justified.⁵⁰⁹ There is here an important question which is not answered by Gadamer, namely, whether textual understanding can be distinguished from his concept of understanding. Every interpretation would be in a position to justify its existence if its textually was

realized through postulating an explanation of its possibility. The possibility of an interpretation demands an analysis of the text which regards the act of interpretation as its capacity of referentiability. The determinative characteristic of the textual referentiability must not be considered as against the possibilities of understanding.

Understanding becomes possible on the basis of the textual possibilities. Any text which discloses itself in possibilities of interpretation is itself a potentiality for the coming texts. The development of the unveiling of the text in different possibilities gradually determines its interpretation (*Auslegung*) in which understanding appropriates what can be understood in the text. This is why Heidegger states that in interpretation, understanding does not become something different, but becomes itself.⁵¹⁰ Interpretation is not about acquiring merely what is referred to as a text, rather it is the possibilities of the text which are worked out of it. Determinate interpretation can go on because being has already been understood in some specific way. In this way it is not that we grasp being, but being that grasps us through this determination.⁵¹¹

There is a circular activity of the text and its interpretation, and this hermeneutical circle is the right way to understand a being. This circle reflects the process of textuality from text to the interpretation and from this interpretation as a text again to a new and different text. The text cannot engage in new being addressed again and again unless it remains the same. The text can become a text, for that which is said is not simply understood, rather it becomes an object in order to reproduce that which was intended (not to be identified as the multiplicity of possible intentions).⁵¹²

The defect or shortcoming of the metaphysical definition in the question of being calls us to modify the meaning of the text so that it is considered not as a mere universal characteristic in various interpretations as metaphysical being. Text, as the reference of the hermeneutics, represents beings coming forward into unconcealedness in the event of disclosure. It then becomes clear why *Being and Time* already begins to counteract the forgetfulness of being designated as the essence of metaphysics.⁵¹³

We must attempt to determine the text from Being as coming-to-presence and from time as the fundamental transcendental domain in which coming-to-presence in its diversities is granted. There is a position that time is the "it" which grants Being. But it must be considered also that time itself is the gift of an "it grants."⁵¹⁴ Thus, this mysterious "it" is still undetermined and is open for further investigation in a hermeneutics of "*es gibt*."

The Role of the Conception of the Text in the Construction of Hermeneutics

Das Fragen sucht den Grund für das Seiende, so fern es seiend ist. Den Grund suchen, das heisst: ergründen. (*Das Problem Des Grundes* . . . p. 21.)

In answering whether there is a text in itself, in a letter to Detlev Ludres, Heidegger sees himself willing to strike his "impossible remark" concerning the priority of interpretation.⁵¹⁵ Indeed, for him the question of when a text is fully appropriated is constitutively prior to such questions as whether the text is itself made of interpretation (as his interpretative preoccupation is with the essentially "unsaid" or what is expressed by *logos*).

Let us review the story. Heidegger's remarks on Hölderlin's fragmentary hymn "*Der Ister*" come to this conclusion that the poetry itself must always be "what is first and present" and therefore it must legitimate the interpretation offered to it.⁵¹⁶ The poem, as Blanchot says, is that which holds together and gathers in its unanchored unity an open unification of principle. The fissure of illumination discovers a foundation on which something comes to appearance and

enables what appears to maintain itself in agreement or in tune (*un accord*) vacillating but stable.⁵¹⁷ The conceptual explanation cannot exhaust the content of a poetic creation and its uniqueness. This has been recognized, as Gadamer says, at least since Kant. Poetry can take a form of speech in which meanings come together in their relatedness. Since the separation of the aesthetic from the theoretical and freeing it from the concepts and rules is not enough, hermeneutics must help us to determine the special place of poetry in the structure of the binding force of language, where the conceptual is in play.⁵¹⁸ Based on this determination, language is realizable as art and can be demonstrated in poetic creations where it emerges in its full autonomy so that it stands for itself and raises itself to this position.⁵¹⁹

Wittgenstein's idea of language discovers a notion of the game which is similar to Gadamer's own concept of prejudice structures, whereas what he finds in the concept of language game is not unlike what Heidegger and Gadamer see in the understanding of being.⁵²⁰ It is language that can be unveiled in both poetry and more basically in literature.⁵²¹ In an opposite direction, here the fact that language occurs once again, in both vocabulary and grammar, within the inner infinity of the dialogue is the fundamental dimension of hermeneutics. Hermeneutics, thus as the universal task, becomes possible through a language in which words are sought in order that one can reach the other.⁵²²

On the one hand, it is true that the ability of the myth can be comprehended in a language through its need to change and openness for ever new interpretations on behalf of symbol. The symbol can be regarded as a structure of meaning in which a primary literal sense designates in addition another sense which is secondary and which can be apprehended only through the first.⁵²³ Symbol gives rise to thought and wants to be thought with all its presuppositions. This indicates that the interpreter does not posit the meaning; it is given by the symbol. What it gives is something for thought, something to think about, in other words, first the giving and then the positing. It is for reasoning ever to begin again and re-begin everything in the perspective of thought.⁵²⁴

A mediation on symbols must start from the fullness of language and of meaning already there. It begins from within language which has already taken place and in which everything in a certain sense has already been said.⁵²⁵ In this sense, symbol must represent a direct language of myth, not because of its posing thought, but rather since it speaks of something which is already said; that is, the origin of language exists in myth. Symbol provides an ahistorical condition for myth in language and must be taken a priori of any mythical interpretation. Heidegger interpreting Hölderlin's poem "We are a sign that is not read," says that "myth means the telling word." For the Greeks, to tell is to lay bare and make appear: both the appearance and that which has its essence in the appearance, its epiphany. Mythos is what has its essence in its telling, that is apparent in the unconcealedness of its appeal. As Heidegger emphasizes, *logos* and mythos are the same, and *logos* means also the telling word (following Parmenides, *Fragment 8*). Thus, myth covers up all hermeneutical activity. "Mythos are the *Logos* become separated and opposed only at the point where neither mythos nor *logos* can keep to its original nature."⁵²⁶

We must also know that the myth, as the highest source of hermeneutic effective consciousness, solidifies its being as concept of religious source. Gadamer explains how Augustine notes that light is created before the differentiation of things and the creation of the light-giving heavenly bodies. When light is created God speaks for the first time. Augustine sees the way in which light is created and commanded as the coming into being of mental light by means of which the difference among created things is made possible. Only through light is the formlessness of the

first created mass of heaven and earth rendered capable of being shaped into a multiplicity of forms.⁵²⁷

Philosophical hermeneutics cannot be addressed merely as a general theory from which hermeneutics of the myth, as we see in biblical hermeneutics, is derived. Rather the latter offers an irre-placeable cultural mediation for that "unique case" represented by faith, since faith as such lies outside any possible generalization and brings the whole hermeneutical question back to its original non-hermeneutic roots.⁵²⁸ Yet, biblical discourse can be considered not as absolute, but as a particular case within general hermeneutics, at one and the same time, where philosophical hermeneutics might appear ultimately like the organon of theological hermeneutics.⁵²⁹

It is an important fact that biblical faith cannot be separated from the movement of interpretation which elevates it into the power of a word ceaselessly renewed by its interpretation in signs and symbols which have created this concern for centuries. Hence, theo-logy is enmeshed in texts, rather than mere language i.e., the lan-guage used in interpretation. Texts are the manner in which theo-logical thinking can be accomplished. This insight rests on the know-ledge which has emerged in textual linguistics according to which the leading paradigms of linguistic usage consist not of the word or the proposition, but rather of the text. The importance of this know-ledge for theological thought deserves to be investigated because it can happen that, from the perspective of textuality, theological thought and discourse disclose a new understanding. This is similar to literary science which turns anew to the text as paradigm, away from the fragments of discussion about individual propositions within a text. Such discussion is outside the frame of reference of the text.⁵³⁰

As in theological hermeneutics, in legislative hermeneutics there is a tension between the fixed text-the law (such as the gospel) on the one hand and, on the other, the sense arrived by applying it at the concrete moment of interpretation, either in judgment or in preaching. The claim of the validity of law rests on the fact that it is like a text. Law as a text requires interpretation for practical ap-plication. This means conversely that the law or the text (and not interpretation) has already entered into every practical application. A law is not only for historical understanding, but more to be realized in its legal validity by being interpreted. Similarly, the gospel does not exist in order to be understood as a historical docu-ment. Therefore, the text, no matter what it would be, must be understood at every moment in a new and different way.⁵³¹ (This does not deny the fact that, as we mentioned earlier, the text falls in temporal changes.) As is insisted on repeatedly by Gadamer, under-standing is nothing but application of different texts in various realms. In addition, it is clearly one thing to be interpreted as a law and quite another to have to interpret the Holy Scripture, hence the meaning of such texts is determined not for a neutral understanding but, by their own claim to validity.⁵³²

In order to be able to understand the "mysterious message" contained in texts, it was necessary to look for a revelation beyond human utterances, one which would come announced by divinity itself, using the vehicle of vision, dream and oracle. But such an unprecedented revelation, never heard before, would have to speak of an as yet unknown god and of a still-sacred truth. In contrast, Ecco believes that as soon as a text becomes `sacred' for a certain culture, it becomes subject to the process of suspicious reading and therefore to what is undoubtedly an excess of interpretation. Through this extension of hermeneutics this had happened, with classical allegory, in the case of the Homeric texts, and it could not but have taken place later in the scriptures (as in Jewish culture with the interpretation of the Torah).⁵³³

Gadamer tried to describe the mystical aspect of the text in a more delicate manner. A literary text, for him, does not disappear in the act of understanding but stands there confronting the under-

standing, with normative claims. The text is authentically there only when it comes back to itself. Only in this way is it text in the original and authentic sense. Through this explanation, it seems that Gadamer comes close to a real hermeneutical understanding of the concept of the text. Thus, the word of a text, in constituting literature, is authentically there only in coming back to itself.⁵³⁴ These words help the text to develop itself out of itself. The text speaks. The literary text has such a primary character that in reading it one must listen. "When such texts are recited, one not only listens but inwardly speaks with them. They attain their true existence only once one has learned them 'by heart'." Then they live as a mysterious message. They live in the hermeneutics as remembrances of the great bards, the chanting choruses (*choreuten*), the lyric singers."⁵³⁵

Gadamer also is prompted to extend the sense of a literary text. A literary text is not only the rendering of spoken language into a fixed form or what refers back to an already spoken word. The literary text in the most special sense in the highest degree prescribes all repetitions and acts of speaking. No speaking can match adequately the prescription given in the poetic text. However, it seems that Gadamer sees in the constitution of poetic texts ultimately what can be seen in the real hermeneutical pattern of text. "The poetic text exercises a normative function that does not refer back either to an original utterance nor to the intention of the speaker, but is something that seems to originate in itself, so that in the fortune and felicity of its success, a poem surprises and overwhelms even the poet."⁵³⁶

Perhaps, with defining only the poetic text as the pure hermeneutical text, we inevitably would encounter a divided realm of hermeneutics so that in nonpoetical hermeneutics there is a kind of text that cannot talk of itself, while in the specific realm of poet the text can speak of itself to itself. If the literary text possesses its own authenticity in itself, there would be really no reason to deny that the text corresponds to the meaning of being, having its own authenticity regardless of any interpretation. Language as a common condition for hermeneutics accompanies the text in any interpretation; it cannot be considered as eligible only for poetic hermeneutics rather than for a broad hermeneutics within all different possible contexts.

One might say, since the poetic text is for Gadamer the only text having the quality of leaving untouched the primacy of the content of the discourse, therefore only this text can be authentic. This argumentation is mostly defeated by the simple fact that so far as our understanding allows us to judge, we are never able to reach the whole of the text by emptying it of itself. So to speak, the text withholds some of its inspiration from being unveiled in interpretation. Hence, there is only a mere possibility in a text to become wholly interpreted; whereas the text has potential interpretability, in actuality this does not exist.

Interpreting Hölderlin, Jean-Luc Nancy says: One of the meanings does not arrive (*Mais l'un du sens n'advient pas*). Not that there is no meaning, but the non-advent of the unity of meaning is what alone counts with respect to meaning. This unique thing may survive within meaning unto meaning.⁵³⁷ Following this, the success of the work originally constituted by its origin provides its meaning. This means that it is not only what is meant by the work that can provide the meaning. If the text is not maintained, how could interpretation be referred to significantly by different parts of dialogue. In other words, hermeneutics has a universal significance which is not threatened, accidentally, when an entire culture is threatened by radical doubt and critique; this significance is really a "persuasive inner logic" by a merely hermeneutical appeal. Indeed, hermeneutics can be regarded as a very pure philosophical question which does not result necessarily in doubt regarding the credibility of the knowledge of a thing. Rather, a doubt indeed cannot have any meaning except it be referential. Hence hermeneutics embraces even doubts about doubt.

No original can be replaced by a translation in hermeneutics. In response to the argument that original assertion should be more easily understandable in the translation because the suggestive background in the original would not be carried over, Gadamer says that no translation is as understandable as the original. This view does not change the fact that the text plays a constitutive role in various hermeneutics. Moreover, the most inclusive meaning of what is said comes to language only in the original saying and slips away in all speaking and saying that follows. The task of translation, in its general meaning, is not to copy what the text is, but to ground translation in the direction of what is said or spoken of as the text in order to carry over what is to be said or spoken of in the direction of his own saying or speaking.

In its constructive character, the notion of text is relative. For example, it is from the point of view of a translation or commentary that one thing becomes the text and the other the interpretation.⁵³⁸ But what does the authenticity of the text and the inaccuracy of the other mean? The answer is that there is nothing important or even existent everywhere beyond the textuality of the text. In other words, nothing precludes translating a translation, it must be seen as another exercise in translation.

In this regard, it is possible to think of Kant's architectonic of human reason in terms of the hermeneutic model.⁵³⁹ We know that the hermeneutical model cannot be constituted without the autonomy of the judgment as the grounds for practical reason. Based upon this position, we see that in his discussion on Leibniz's doctrine of judgment Heidegger explains how the proposition has the alternative, true or false, in so far as something is said about something.

The question is, as was pointed out previously, what is the essence of judgment, or, in other words, what can be explained of the judgment in its essence. As a judging about beings, it is in itself related to beings. This constructive relationship to beings is called intentionality.⁵⁴⁰ Judging about it is in itself intentional, in itself it constructs what is judged as determined in the judging. In a judgment, there is a relation of the subject and the predicate. But, according to Heidegger, there is another relation in judgment articulated by a relation; this is called the relating relationship. To be intentionally related is intentional in the sense of determining something as something.⁵⁴¹

The question about the essence of truth as far as this is concerned with the judgment, becomes the question about the essence of judgment. Judgment, for Heidegger, shows the structures of intentionality and bifurcation, both of which are structures of judging Dasein.⁵⁴² The constructive priority of judgment not only can be regarded in logic as attributed to Aristotle, but is deeply adopted with the basis of any hermeneutics about the being. In fine, judgment *is* being in *is* and *being is* judgment in *is*. Regarding this hermeneutical ground of judgment, it is justifiable to state that the concept of assertion is related to the concept of judgment.

From the point of view of a morphological phenomenon, this cannot be evidence of a relationship of cause and effect, since it does not fit in with other data concerning causal relationships. According to Eco, hermetic thought made use of a principle of false transitivity by which it is assumed that if A bears a relationship X to B, and B bears a relationship Y to C, then A must bear a relationship Y to C.⁵⁴³ Yet hermeneutic inference should be grounded on being to the extent that it brings the contribution of the sciences into fundamental hermeneutical agreement. As we said, hermeneutics is not just a repertory of methods, but refers to the fundamental question of various sources in being. Only in this way can we think of hermeneutics as philosophy which is able to give an account of the questions that are "prior to the application of every science." These are the questions which Gadamer sees as determinative for all human knowing and doing.⁵⁴⁴

Heidegger, in his work *Von Wesen des Grundes* asks from what ground beings come and go toward it:

Das Fragen sucht den Grund für das Seiende, so fern es seiend ist. Den Grund suchen, das heisst: ergrun-den. Was in Frage gestellt wird, rückt in den Bezug zu Grund. Allein weil gefragt wird, bleibt offen, ob der Grund ein wahrhaft grundender, Grundung erwirkender, Ur-grund ist ; ob der Grund eine Grundung versagt, Ab-grund ist; ob der Grund weder das Eine noch das Andere ist, sondern nur einen notwendigen Schein von Grundung vorgibt und so ein Un-grund ist.⁵⁴⁵

Habermas himself considered the dangers of the groundlessness of a hermeneutics with no hermeneutical origin in itself. For example, he provided a basis for constructive hermeneutical reflection in refer-ence to universal history, a goal that lifts itself out of the multiple goals and conceptions of goal in social actions.⁵⁴⁶

Husserl's ideas were based on accepting a pure science (sciences) of essential being as not only possible, but as necessi-tating the science of fact. In the pure sciences like pure logic, pure mathematics, etc., no experience *qua* experience, i.e., *qua*con-sciousness that apprehends or sets up reality or concrete being can take over the function of supplying a logical ground. "Where experience functions in them, it is not as experience."⁵⁴⁷ In addition, the scholastic distinction pointed out between the *actus signatus* and the *actus exercitus* were interviewed by Heidegger as the distinction between saying "I see something" and "I am saying that I see some-thing." This statement originally taking place is already something as a new intentional object in which this seeing is presented alive.⁵⁴⁸ Here, the practice of understanding in life and also in science is similarly the expression of the affinity of the one who understands to the one whom he understands and to that which he understands.⁵⁴⁹

Practical philosophy is scientific knowledge of the universal that as such can be thought and learned. Yet it demands of the one learning it the same indissoluble relationship to practice as of the one teaching it.⁵⁵⁰ But it must always be recognized that this know-ledge has an indispensable relation to the good (or what for Derrida can be represented by father)⁵⁵¹ as an ultimate text must be read by asking questions of it.

Moreover, hermeneutical activity presupposes that both con-versational partners are concerned with a common subject matter, a common question about which they converse, for dialogue is always dialogue about something. The difference between Gadamer and his hermeneutic predecessors, Schleiermacher and Dilthey, is based on the fact that he focuses his attention on the subject matter of the text itself that possesses a certain ideality of meaning, rather there is taking the language of the text as a cipher for something lying behind the text. It is not a kind of dialectical question between different partners, but rather a participation in the communication which the text makes to us. What is said to be present in understanding means it is entirely independent in hermeneutics although this under-standing can be historical (which is not independent of history).⁵⁵² The text is a universal category of human activity. As such, textual genres play a significant role in human communication. Essentially the major function of the text can be announced through different strategies, for instance by the title, by the manner of presentation or by being embedded in a larger content of action.⁵⁵³

Ricoeur develops four themes of the text: the text as the relation of speech to writing, the text as a structured work, the text as a world projection and the text as a mediation of self-understanding. As we can see, the sense of the text that is the reference of interpretation remains hidden from Ricoeur's eyes.⁵⁴⁴ For him it is the notion of language as discourse rather than the notion of being, which is the immediate basis of the notion of the text which ulti-mately is a phenomenon of discourse. In his hermeneutic philosophy of existence, Ricoeur tries to show how the textual

element effectively functions in the world of interpretations. The Freudian interpretation of dreams, of art works, of jokes, can be read as a type of hermeneutics. A patient, for instance, where he expresses himself does interpret, and hence also the psychotherapist. We must interpret for example the dream "text." But, for Ricoeur the object of this interpretation is no longer a text as such, but is the human subject which, as a result of radical phenomenological vision, can be deciphered again as a new text. The connection between the "world of the text" and the "text of the world" is not determined by Ricoeur. In other words, Ricoeur takes the text, that is a discursive text, as not being closed in itself, but as having a world, that is the "world of the text" in which it is discovered.⁵⁵⁵ This understanding of the text contains the "world of the text" as supplementary in the determination of the text. The genuine cause of this fault results from a very fundamental logical definition of the meaning the text. This has been constructed only on the primacy of the semantic with respect to the semiological dimension.

For this reason, metaphysics is criticized by Heidegger since it thinks about beings as beings, whereas this sight is owed to the light of being. The light itself, or what such thinking experiences as light, does not come within the range of metaphysical thinking.⁵⁵⁶ In spite of this fact, however, it does not seem that the hermeneutical approach of the text is impeded by any metaphysical argumentation since nowhere can the light itself be studied in itself beyond its metaphysical representation.

The intention of the Heideggerian fundamental question what is metaphysics? is to inquire what metaphysics really is in contrast with what metaphysics "wants to be and with what it understands itself to be." What is the significance of the fact that the question of philosophy took the shape of metaphysics. Gadamer says: "If one understands the question, what is metaphysics? in the sense that one asks what happened with the beginning of metaphysical thinking, then the Heideggerian question first acquires the force of its provocativeness and is disclosed as an instance of the new notion of interpretation."⁵⁵⁷ Based upon this, the new notion of understanding and consequently of hermeneutics, surpasses the limits of any hermeneutic theory, no matter how universally understood.⁵⁵⁸

Philosophy for Heidegger is universal phenomenological ontology which takes its departure from the hermeneutic of Dasein.⁵⁵⁹ The Being of Dasein on which the structural whole as such is supported ontologically becomes accessible to us only through this whole of a single primordially unitary phenomenon which is considered in such a way that it provides the ontological foundation for possibilities.⁵⁶⁰

The dynamism of the construction of hermeneutics springs finally from Being itself in granting itself to Dasein and dominating it. What is meant by sending Being or *Sendung des seins* is that Being gives itself to Dasein. The sending of Being comes with its destiny which asks hermeneutically after and for Being. Being sustains the process of sending and guards it so that in its light Beings can appear as what they are.⁵⁶¹ The appropriating of event can be Being in itself in a certain perspective. Being appears as a hermeneutical reference in arising out of the event which is simply Being in so far as it sends itself in any given epoch. The term "event" is therefore another word for "sending"; its advantage is that it suggests the ontological difference as such.⁵⁶²

In *Of Grammatology*, the Heideggerian *Sprache* has been brought within a metaphysical framework in order to deconstruct it so that it cannot provide the fundamental question of being. Derrida notes that Heidegger after evoking the "voice of being" recalls that it is silent, mute and wordless and the voices of the sources are not heard. A rupture between the original meaning of being and the word, between meaning and the voice which at once confirms a fundamental

metaphor, translates the ambiguity of Heidegger's position with regard to the metaphysics of presence.⁵⁶³

We find in ancient Hermetism and in contemporary approaches some disquietingly similar ideas such as the view that a text is an open-ended universe where the interpreter can discover infinite interconnections. It is possible also to think that a text, as pretending to assert something univocal, is a miscarried universe, that is, the work of a muddle-headed Demiurge (who tried to say that 'that's that' and on the contrary elicited an uninterrupted chain of infinite deferrals where 'that' is not 'that').⁵⁶⁴

Without regard to the text as poet (we do not mean poet as text), we must say that, language is unable to grasp a unique and pre-existing meaning. Language can show that what we speak of is only the coincidence of the opposites and it reflects the inadequacy of thought. Hermeneutics is to transform the text from an illusion of meaning to awareness that the meaning of the text can be infinite.⁵⁶⁵

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Notes

1. Gayle L. Ormiston, and Alan D. Schrift, editors. *The Hermeneutic Tradition: From Aristotle to Ricoeur* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990), p. 14. Hereafter *HT*.

2. Hans-George Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Seabury Press, 1975). p. 187. Hereafter *TM*.

3. *TM*, p. 188.

4. Although Schleiermacher believes that the sacred books of the Holy Spirit finally must not be dealt with differently than others, the question remains that if the books of the Holy Spirit are not different from the others regarding to the actuality of interpretation, nonetheless, since they represent the different callings of the source of being to itself, in this respect they are different from the others.

5. *TM*, p. 192.

6. *TM.*, p. 192.

7. Rothacker believes relativism does not endanger the immanent "objectivity" of research. Its starting point is the variability and freedom of scientific inquiries, which develop from the variable ways in which the lived world creates significance. From this point of view, modern science itself is seen as the dogmatic of a quantifying world view. This might be the reason why Gadamer considers Betti's remarks to be a "naive misunderstanding" that hermeneutical reflections practiced by Gadamer will mean a weakening of scientific objectivity. (*TM*, p. 556.)

8. Joseph Bleicher, *Contemporary Hermeneutics* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 30. Hereafter *CH*.

9. *CH*, p. 47.

10. *CH*, p. 36.

11. *HT*, p. 101.

12. "Gadamer has rightly linked science with method -- a development originating with Galileo -- and its introduction into the hermeneutical process can only lead to the objectification of the 'object' and the subject's mastery over it." (*CH*, p. 125).

13. *HT*, p. 161.

14. *HT*, p. 161.

15. *CH*, p. 28.

16. *HT*, p. 162

17. *HT*, p. 162.

18. *HT*, p. 163.

19. *HT*, p. 163.

20. *HT*, p. 164.

21. *HT*, p. 160.

22. *HT*, p. 164.

23. *TM*, p. 511.

24. *HT*, p. 177.

25. *CH*, p. 38.

26. *TM*, p. 264.

27. *HT*, p. 94.

28. *HT*, p. 19. However, we must know that Gadamer applauds Betti for attempting a hermeneutics of justice and history, characterizing him as a "legal historian whose hermeneutics

pro-vides an account of the hermeneutica manifesto which is remarkable for the breadth of its horizon in which he was safe from the "dangers of a naive historical objectivism". Gadamer describes him as being in a position "to reap the great harvest of hermeneutical reflection that has ripened over the years since Wilhelm von Humboldt and Schleiermacher". *TM*, p. 511.

29. *TM*, p. 311.

30. *HT*, p. 21.

31. *TM*, p. 101.

32. *TM*, p. 102.

33. *TM*, p. 475.

34. *On the Truth of Being*, p. 54.

35. *CH*, p. 230.

36. *HT*, p. 24.

37. There is a rigid distinction between the universality of hermeneutics which is more likely a characteristic of hermeneutics as such and the hermeneutic universe which embraces all human understandings.

38. Based on this, Dilthey ultimately conceives inquiring into the historical past as deciphering and not as historical experience (*Erfahrung*). This idea, however, has important significance in our understanding of the text as being what to be ciphered and unveiled in and through interpretation. See: *TM*, p. 241.

39. *TM*, p. 249.

40. Hans-George Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 48. Hereafter *PH*.

41. *TM*, p. 327.

42. *TM*, p. 328.

43. *CH*, p. 127.

44. *TM*, p. 42.

45. *TM*, p. 34. Based on Gadamer's interpretation of Kant's aesthetic judgement as not made according to concepts which the aesthetic taste implies universal agreement even if it is sensory and not conceptual. Although Gadamer here agrees with the possibility of judgment of aesthetic taste, yet he is silent analyzing how the mere task of hermeneutics is carried by this judgment itself.

46. *TM*, p. 38.

47. *TM*, p. 38.

48. *TM*, p. 32.

49. *TM*, p. 38.

50. *TM*, p. 17.

51. *TM*, p. 11.

52. *TM*, p. 17.

53. Umberto Eco, *Interpretation and Overinterpretation*. Edited by Stefan Collini (Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 65.

54. *TM*, p. XXXV.

55. *TM*, p. 474.

56. *TM*, p. 475.

57. This ontological universality of understanding means for him the futurity of Dasein. However, for Gadamer, claiming to be more in company with Nietzsche, this universal determination limits the position of the philosopher in drawing radical inferences from every thing and in knowing it all. (*TM*, p. xxxviii.)

58. *TM*, p. 299. Gadamer refers to this as "history of effect".
59. *TM*, p. 228. We saw that Dilthey did not break through to the full consequence of this insight, even if it is in his wake that the consequences are drawn.
60. *TM*, p. 327.
61. An historian he approaches the historical object in order to determine its historical value, whereas the jurist, in addition, applies what has been learned in this way to the legal present. (*TM*, p. 326.)
62. *TM*, p. 326.
63. *TM*, p. 557. Aristotle, earlier had gone, so far as to claim that the Platonic idea of the good is vacuous, and rightly so, if we have to think of the good as a being of the highest universality.
64. *Transforming the Hermeneutic Context: from Nietzsche to Nancy*, p. 84.
65. *Ibid.*, p. 84. On the grounds of Schleiermacher's concept of language constitution, later more developed by Nietzsche, stands the assumption that no historically invariable categories prescribe the rule of the relation of language to objects. (*Ibid.*, p. 199.)
66. *Ibid.*, p. 194.
67. *Ibid.*, pp. 180-181. Here, in the line of Schleiermacher, it must be considered that in order to have a fair explanation which cannot be inscribed in the body of rules of any language community, we need an effort of the divinatory faculty.
68. *CH*, p. 29. This is true even though they are *a priori* in so far as they exist on the epistemological level prior to these con-structs and provide their transcendental justification.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 123.
70. *TM*, p. 339.
71. *Ibid.*, p. 5.
72. *Ibid.*, p. xxxii.
73. *Ibid.*, p. 264.
74. *Ibid.*, p. 396.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 301.
76. *Ibid.*, p. 302.
77. *Ibid.*, p. 303.
78. *Ibid.*, p. 199.
79. *Ibid.*, p. 199.
80. *Ibid.*, p. 199.
81. *Ibid.*, p. 335.
82. *Ibid.*, p. 516.
83. *Ibid.*, p. 516. For the hermeneutic philosopher, after all, the contrast between historical and dogmatic method does not carry an absolute validity. (*Ibid.*, p. xxxiii.)
84. *Ibid.*, p. 261.
85. *Ibid.*, p. 262.
86. *Ibid.*, p. 264. Gadamer comes to this conclusion, since the structure of Dasein is thrown, a projection, indicating that in reali-zing its own being, Dasein understanding must also be true of the act of understanding in the human sciences.
87. *Ibid.*, pp. 296-297.
88. *Ibid.*, p. 244.
89. *Ibid.*, p. 299.
90. *Ibid.*, p. 388.
91. *Ibid.*, p. 388.

92. Gadamer claims to have formulated his universal hermeneutics on the basis of the concept of language not only in order to guard against a false methodology that infects the concept of objectivity in the human sciences, but also to avoid the idealistic spiritualism of a Hegelian metaphysics of infinity. (*Ibid.*, p. 475.)

93. *Ibid.*, p. 295.

94. Ernest Lepore, *Truth and Interpretation* (Oxford, U.K.: MacLaughlin, 1988), p. 16.

95. *TM*, p. 309.

96. *Ibid.*, p. xxviii.

97. *Ibid.*, p. 309.

98. *Transforming the Hermeneutic Context*, editors' introduction, p. 38.

99. *PH*, p. 122.

100. *Ibid.*, p. 51. It must be mentioned that this moment of "loss of itself" relevant to the theological hermeneutics.

101. *TM*, p. 43.

102. *Ibid.*, p. 267.

103. *Sein und Zeit*, s. 153.

104. *PH*, p. 9.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

106. *TM*, p. 5.

107. *Ibid.*, p. 295.

108. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

109. *Ibid.*, p. 299.

110. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

111. As he says this concept does not necessarily mean a false judgment, but part of the idea is that it can have either a positive or a negative value. *Ibid.*, p. 270.

112. Hans-George Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Method* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1985), s. 261.

113. *TM*, p. 270.

114. Refer to: *ibid.*, p. 245.

115. Charles E. Reagan and David Stewart, *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His Work* (Boston: Bacon Press, 1978), p. 46.

116. *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, p. 46. It is also important to note that saying Being speaks to us in its realm is not contrary to Being judges. In fact this realm belongs to the judgment itself while in providing understanding it is free of it.

117. Werner G. Jeanrond, *Text and Interpretation as Categories of Theological Thinking*, trans. Thomas J. Wilson (New York: Crossroad, 1988), p. 23.

118. This fact that one can never depart too far from conversation is also regarded essential for a language itself.

119. *Transforming the Hermeneutical Context*, p. 161.

120. Hans-George Gadamer, *Philosophical Apprenticeships* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, c1985), p. 179.

121. *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, p. 90.

122. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigation* (New York: Macmillan, 1953), p. 5.

123. *PH*, p. xxxv.

124. Frank, "Interpretation of a Text". *Transforming the Hermeneutical Context*, p. 161.

125. *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, p. 44. It must be mentioned that for Ricoeur the theory of the text and that of meta-phor enjoy a common ground. Based on this limited notion of the text, we need some explanations in order to interpret the text as the source of hermeneutics as being. See: *ibid.*, p. 135.

126. *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, p. 45.

127. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1981), p. 56.

128. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

129. Jean-Luc Nancy, "Sharing Voices". *Transforming the Hermeneutic Context*, pp. 211-259.

130. *Ibid.*, p. 223. It must be mentioned that Nancy comes to this conclusion that this ontological anticipation is anterior to all anti-cipation as "pre-judgment" of meaning.

131. *Ibid.*, pp. 231-232.

132. *Ibid.*, p. 231.

133. Hans-George Gadamer, "Concerning Empty and Full-Filled Time" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 8 (winter 1970), 352-353.

134. *Ibid.*, p. 353.

135. *Philosophical Apprenticeships*, p. 190.

136. *Text and Interpretation*, p. 15.

137. *TM*, pp. 560-578.

138. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

139. *PH*, p. 6.

140. *Ibid.*, P. 11.

141. *TM*, p. 256.

142. *Ibid.*, p. 256.

143. *PH*, p. 154. Thus, based on this concept of phenomenology, the stratification can be grounded by ascertaining the shifts of intention.

144. Suzanne Bachelard, *A Study of Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic* (Evanston: North Western University Press, 1968), p. 147.

145. *PH*, p. 161.

146. Edmund Ideas, trans., W. Kluback and J.T. Wilde (New York: Twayne, 1958), p. 52. "Objects about which" or "objects concerning which" are those which are judged about and must not be regarded alone as the way of given being. But "objects about which" are part of the content of the judgment qua content (the other part refers to "judged content of the judgment as such").

147. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

148. *Ibid.*, p. 251.

149. *Ibid.*, p. 251. There is an ambiguity in distinguishing 'objects concerning which' as the matters judged about, from the judged content of the judgment. It can be said that 'reference to which' be possible taken as 'what judged about'.

150. *PH*, p. 169.

151. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

152. *TM*, p. 255.

153. *Ibid.*, p. 254.

154. *PH*, p. 149.

155. *Ibid.*, p. 149.

156. *CH*, p. 219.

157. M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. J. Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harbes and Row, 1992), p. 58. Here-after *BT*.

158. *Ibid.*, p. 47.

159. *PH*, p. 73.

160. *BT*, p. 59.

161. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

162. *Ibid.*, pp. 50-51.

163. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

164. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

165. One of these objections is that, "the ideal of scientificity encounters its fundamental limit in the ontological condition of comprehension" (1975, p. 88); this refers to the hermeneutic experience of belonging to *zugehörigkeit*. Secondly, Husserl's reference to intuition remains on the level of epistemology and consequently that of *Geisteswissenschaften*; whereas hermeneutic philosophy, by contrast, has already pointed out the universality of understanding in the figure of the hermeneutic circle. Furthermore, once produced the object of interpretation, the text takes on an autonomous character, so that it is no longer adequate to refer merely to its original meaning; instead of having a fixed meaning, a text invites plural interpretation. It is on this basis an open, unlimited process. In addition, Ricoeur cites the reservation against an ultimate foundation in subjectivity, as the immanence of the cogito, provided by psychology and the critique of ideology. Since hermeneutics has to aim for the subject-matter of a text which projects a world, and not for the psychology of the other, the implication for Husserl's conception is that phenomenology, which was born with the discovery of the universal character of intentionality, has not re-mained faithful to its own discovery, namely that consciousness does not have its meaning beyond itself. The idealist theory of the constitution of meaning has thus "hypostatized subjectivity", (1975, p. 94). See: Nancy, "Sharing Voices", *Transforming the Hermeneutic Context*, p. 221.

166. L. Lawlor. "The Dialectical Unity of Hermeneutics: On Ricoeur and Gadamer". *Gadamer and Hermeneutic*, ed. Hugh J. Silverman (New York, N.Y.: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 1991), p. 80.

167. G.E. Aylesworth. "Dialogue, Text, Narrative: Con-fronting Gadamer and Ricoeur". *Ibid.*, p. 80.

168. *TM*, p. 105.

169. *PH*, p. 159.

170. *Ibid.*, pp. 159-160.

171. *Ibid.*, p. 136.

172. *Ibid.*, p. 143.

173. Edmund Husserl. *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology; an introduction to phenomenological philosophy*. Translated, with an introduction, by David Carr (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 188.

174. *PH*, p. 153.

175. *TM*, p. xxxvi.

176. Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 23.

177. *TM*, p. 258.

178. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 21.

179. *Ibid.*, p. 21.

180. *Ibid.*, p. 20.

181. *PH*, p. 131. However, the hermeneutics must still be grounded on the basis of phenomenology so that by stepping behind Husserl's phenomenology Heidegger's fundamental question leads Gadamer to believe such hermeneutical phenomena as bearing their meaning within themselves, rather than from a single principle.

182. *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 162.

183. *PH*, p. 161.

184. *TM*, p. xxviii.

185. *Ibid.*, p. xxi.

186. *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 114.

187. *TM*, p. xxii.

188. Hans-George Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation" from *Dialogue and Deconstruction, the Gadamer-Derrida Encounter*. Edited by Diane P. Michelfelder & Richard E. Palmer (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), p. 22.

189. *TM*, p. XXIX.

190. *Ibid.*, p. XXIX.

191. As Gadamer pointed out, this does not mean to deny the necessity of methodical work within the human sciences. (*Ibid.*, p. xxix.)

192. *Ibid.*, p. 365.

193. Hans-George Gadamer, "Gadamer on Gadamer", *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 19.

194. *Ibid.*, p. 19.

195. *Philosophical Apprenticeship*, pp. 178-179.

196. *Text and Interpretation*, p. 12.

197. *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 112.

198. *Text and Interpretation*, p. 12.

199. *Philosophical Apprenticeships*, p. 178. The hermeneutical question may seem 'paradoxical' both due to Heidegger's criticism of transcendental inquiry and his "turn" (*die Kehre*) and on the basis of Gadamer's treatment of the universal hermeneutic problem, which will be pointed out later. (*TM*, p. XXXVI.)

200. *PH*, p. 27.

201. *Ibid.*, p. 38.

202. *TM*, p. XXXVIII.

203. *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 43.

204. *Text and Interpretation*, p. 14.

205. *PH*, p. 47.

206. *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 48.

207. *Hermeneutical Philosophy*, p. 71. The doctrine of the thing-in-itself could mean the possibility of a continuous transition from one aspect of a thing to another which would make possible a unified matrix of our experience. Therefore, Husserl's idea of the thing-in-itself, must be understood in terms of the hermeneutical procedure of our knowledge, whose ultimate dominion lies in scientific investigation. (*Ibid.*, p. 73.)

208. *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 44.

209. *TM*, p. 269.

210. "Toute la phénoménologie est une explicitation dans l'évidence et une évidence de l'explicitation." Paul Ricoeur, "Phénoménologie et Herméneutique," in *Man and World* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), volume 7, p. 252.

211. Jervolino Domenico. *The Cogito and Hermeneutics: The Question of the Subject in Ricoeur*, translated by Gordon Poole (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1990), pp. 100-101. And also "Phenomenologie et hermeneutique", pp. 251-252.
212. "Text and Interpretation", p. 30.
213. *The Cogito and Hermeneutics*, p. 98.
214. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
215. *Ibid.*, p. 93.
216. *Ibid.*, p. 10.
217. *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, p. 44.
218. *Cogito and Hermeneutics*, p. 87: "D'une part . . . la phé-nomé-nologie reste l'indépassable présupposition de l'hermé-neutique. D'autre part, la phé-nomé-nologie ne peut se constituer elle-même sans une présupposition hermé-neutique."
219. *Cogito and Hermeneutics*, p. 89.
220. *Ibid.*, p. 22. By reflection we mean a renewed philosophy of the *cogito* in which the subject which interprets himself, while interpreting signs, discovers himself.
221. Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Translated by Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana Uni-versity Press, 1982), p. 21.
222. *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, p. 232.
223. *Text and Interpretation*, p. 51. As a result of this, a theo-logical theory of textual interpretation can take exception neither to the idea of participation in the contemporary controversy regarding adequate theories of interpretation, nor to the concern regarding the acquisition of an adequate theory of textuality. (*Ibid.*, p. 73).
224. *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, p. 215.
225. *Text and Interpretation*, p. 58. In the next chapter we will discuss this non-temporal hermeneutical object.
226. *CH*, p. 219.
227. Joseph Kockelmans, edit. *Phenomenology, the Philoso-phy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation* (Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1966), p. 535.
228. *Ibid.*, pp. 535-536.
229. In comparison we must say that a hermeneutical question can be formulated based on the ego, which is similar to the thing in itself presupposed by being as Dasein, can be taken clearly as a source of hermeneutics. Interpreting Leibnitz, Heidegger holds that the subject which poses for itself the problem of being can put itself into question. Therefore, the subject can take itself as paradigmatic in as much as it provides, as itself a being, the idea of being as such. Hence, the subject can consider itself as that which understands being.
230. *BT*, p. 49.
231. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 19.
232. Martin Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic*. Translated by Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana Univer-sity Press, 1984), p. 217. Understanding-of-being and its essential basic modes is the disclosure that resides in the ecstatic unity of tem-porality as we will explain in following chapter.
233. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
234. *Reason in the Age of Sciences*, p. 63.
235. *TM*, Introduction, p. XXV.
236. *Text and Interpretation*, p. 10.

237. Gadamer, like Heidegger, insists that, even if we could, we should not at all want to change the fact that unacknowledged presuppositions are always at work in our understanding at (*Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 111.). Thus, there is no presuppositionless understanding as Husserl's phenomenology suggests.

238. *PH*, p. 13.

239. *Reason in the Age of Sciences*, p. 105.

240. *Ibid.*, p. 135. As a result, therefore, the experience of interpretation implies something not implied by Schleiermacher's sense of self-understanding.

241. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

242. *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, p. 216.

243. *Philosophical Apprenticeships*, pp. 186-187.

244. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 19.

245. For Derrida, this is the *épistème* functioning within a system of fundamental constraints and conceptual oppositions out-side of which philosophy is not practicable. (Jacques Derrida, *Posi-tions*. Translated by Alan Bass [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981], p. 6).

246. *BT*, p. 194.

247. *PH*, editor's introduction, p. xix.

248. Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*. Trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 123. Derrida refers to Socrates in the *Crito* when he urges Cebes and Simmias to practice philosophic dialogue and seek its most worthy object that is the truth of the *eidos* is identical to itself.

Henceforth as Derrida says it is always the same as itself and hence simple, incomposite, undecomposable, invariable. The *eidos* is that which can always be repeated as the same. That ideality of *eidos* is its power-to-be-repeated. The law, therefore, is the law of repetition and repetition is always submission to a law.

This fundamental manner of hermeneutics, aimed at by Derrida, determines it as textual study. The textual study here is not demythologization, rather it is assimilation of the philosophy of the text and the myth of the text. Whether we should call such hermeneutics a mythical philosophy of the text or the philosophical mythic of writing is still an opened question. The new concept leads to a realm of analysis within the literary text, unites shadows that can not be included within philosophical opposition, but resist and deconstruct it without ever constituting a third term as an outcome or speculative solution. Derrida explains that :

The *pharmakon* is neither remedy nor poison, neither good nor evil, neither the inside nor the outside, neither speech nor writing; the supplement is neither a plus nor a minus, neither an outside nor the complement of an inside, neither accident nor essence, etc.; the human is neither confusion nor distinction, neither identity nor difference, neither consummation nor virginity, neither the veil nor unveiling, neither the inside nor the outside, etc.; the *gram* is neither a signifier nor a signified, neither a sign nor a thing, neither a presence nor an absence, neither a position nor a negation, etc.; spacing is neither space nor time; . . . Neither/nor, that is simultaneously either or; the mark is also the marginal, limit, the march, etc. (*Positions*, p. 43).

However, this implies that interpretation or thought means nothing, it remains unresolved whether hermeneutics or philosophy in general can be a representation of nothing. Perhaps, we must distinguish here hermeneutics from interpretation or interpreting of, from the mere interpretation or thought itself. For Derrida mere interpretation is to be the substantiated void of a

derivative ideality, that is, the reflection of a *différance* of forces, the illusory autonomy of a discourse or a consciousness whose hypostasis is to be decon-structed (*Positions*, p. 49).

Nonetheless, even assuming the distinction mentioned, as between the text and the interpretation or the thought of it, it does not seem to show how the hermeneutics of a text becomes possible outside of philosophy. It is clear that no hermeneutical text (either philosophical or literary) can simply step outside an historio-meta-physical framework (Rapaport, Herman. Heidegger and Derrida, *Reflections on Time and Language*, [Lincoln: Nebraska University Press, c 1989], pp. 33-34.); it is not sufficiently argued why des-truction or deconstruction, in terms of the end of a historico meta-physical temporal structure or a going beyond metaphysics, is not to be prophesized.

249. The following hermeneutical sense of time can be corre-lated also with Kant's doctrine of time as something invisible which cannot appear in any experience, but is only presupposed as the condition of human experience. Hermeneutic time does not isolate each proper time, but grounds a temporal phenomenology free of all obligations to temporal objectivity.

250. *On the Truth of Being*, p. 40.

251. *CH*, p. 122.

252. *TM*, p. 338.

253. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

254. Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*, ed. John B. Thom-pson (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 61.

255. *The Concept of Time*, p. 20E. But, it follows that, philo-sophy as regards this possibility does not discover too much, since it will never get to the root of what history is so long as its method is to analyze history as an object of contemplation.

256. Deborah Cook. "Rereading Gadamer: A Response to James Risser", *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 107.

257. G.E. Aylesworth. "Dialogue, Text, Narrative: Con-cerning Gadamer and Ricoeur", *ibid.*, p. 78.

258. *Ibid.*, p. 79. Based upon this character of the world, the analogue of eternity is the emanation of the word, the process through which one word emerges from another.

259. *TM*, p. 198.

260. *Reflection & Imagination*, pp. 345-346.

261. As Ricoeur says, in an historical perspective of time, we no longer have to say that past is something over and done, but rather, it is something that has been and because of this is now preserved in the present. Thus the historian as such asks not about the ontological status of the trace. Historical science in this sense is limited to the epistemological problem of inference. (*Reflection & Imagination*, p. 345.)

262. Aylesworth, Gary E. "Dialogue, Text, Narrative: Con-fronting Gadamer and Ricoeur". *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 78.

263. *Ibid.*, p. 74.

264. Leonard Lawlor. "The Dialectical Unity of Hermeneutics: On Ricoeur and Gadamer", *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 81.

265. *Heidegger and Derrida*, p. 40.

266. *PH*, p. xvi.

267. Hans-George Gadamer, "Concerning Empty and Ful-Filled Time" of *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 8 (winter 1970), p. 346.

268. G.E. Aylesworth. "Dialogue, Text, Narrative: Concerning Gadamer and Ricoeur", *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 75.
269. Hans-George Gadamer, "Concerning Empty and Ful-Filled Time", p. 350.
270. *Ibid.*, p. 351.
271. *The History of the Concept of Time*, p. 14E.
272. "Concerning Empty and Ful-Filled Time", p. 345.
273. G.E. Aylesworth, p. 76.
274. "Concerning Empty and Fulfilled Time", p. 343.
275. Paul Ricoeur, *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action and Interpretation*, ed. John B. Thompson (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 192.
276. *The Basic Problem of Phenomenology*, p. 274.
277. *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 62.
278. *Heidegger and Derrida*, p. 87.
279. According to Heidegger the interpretation of temporality leads to a more radical understanding of time. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 16.
280. *Ibid.*, pp. 16-17.
281. "Concerning Empty and Fulfilled Time", P. 345. Gadamer says that Dasein is not the only reality that has a temporal structure.
282. Reflection & Imagination, p. 102. In Ricoeur's explanation of the Heideggerian ambiguous concept of time, this reckoning with time becomes part of the characteristic of care as mundane concern.
283. Deborah Cook. "Rereading Gadamer: A Response to James Risser", *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 114.
284. *Positions*, p. 54.
285. Blanchot, *When the Time Comes*, p. 71. Trans. Lydia Davis (Barry Town, N.Y.: Station Hill Press, 1985). This poetic turn also is provided by Ricoeur in his serial works, *Time and Narrative*, where he tries to address in what way the ordinary experience of time transforms by coming to narrative interpretation. The aporetic of time has not been in vain because of its openness to the justification of the concept of historical time. Historical time, in its turn, is justified in the sense that it brings about the conjunction of lived time as mortal and cosmic times. Therefore, we must begin to give a poetic response, the response of poiesis, to the aporetic of time (*Reflection & Imagination*, p. 346).
286. Martin Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic*. Translated by Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), p. 210.
287. "Concerning Empty and Ful-Filled Time", p. 341.
288. *The History of The Concept of Time*, p. 2E.
289. *PH*, p. 9.
290. *The History of the Concept of Time*, p. 19E.
291. *Ibid.*, p. 13E. Heidegger explains, interestingly, that Kant inevitably determines the fundamental principle of his ethics in such a way that we call it formal. Kant must have known, perhaps from familiarity with Dasein itself, that Dasein is its 'how'. It was left to contemporary thinkers to define Dasein in such a way that the 'how' is covered up.
292. Wesley A. Kort, *Story, Text, and Scripture* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, c 1988), p. 102.
293. *Philosophical Apprenticeships*, p. 187.

294. *The History of the Concept of Time*, p. 7E.

295. *Ibid.*, p. 7E.

296. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 20.

297. *Heidegger and Derrida*, p. 88.

298. *Ideas*, p. 91.

299. It is very important for our discussion now to know that for Derrida, in the originary temporalization of the relationship with the outside, nonpresentation or derepresentation is as originary as pre-sentation. In this way, the process from the oral to the written text introduces a decisive element into the dialectic between belonging and distancing. This distinguishes the hermeneutic situation of a text (from the situation of the dialogue.)

300. Gary E. Aylesworth, p. 64.

301. *Heidegger and Derrida*, p. 146.

302. Martin Heidegger, *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, Translated by Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 209-210.

303. *The History of the Concept of Time*, pp. 13E-14E.

304. *PH*, p. 49.

305. *On the Truth of Being*, p. 59.

306. *The Concept of Time*, p. 21E

307. *Heidegger and Derrida*, p. 90.

308. *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, pp. 205.

309. *Ibid.*, p. 208.

310. *Ibid.*, p. 208.

311. *Ibid.*, p. 208.

312. *Ibid.*, p. 207.

313. "Concerning Empty and Fulfilled Time", p. 353.

314. *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p. 200.

315. *On the Truth of Being*, p. 69.

316. Martin Heidegger, *The Concept of Time*. p. 22E. Trans. William McNeill (Blackwell, 1992).

317. *Story, Text and Scripture*, p. 125.

318. *Heidegger and Derrida*, p. 135.

319. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.

320. *Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, p. 89; noted from *Heidegger and Derrida*, pp. 28-29.

321. *Heidegger and Derrida*, p. 54.

322. *Heidegger, What is Philosophy?* Trans. W. Kluback and J.T. Wilde (New York: Twayne, 1958), pp. 69-71. Unlike Heidegger, Derrida sees the history of Being only as a trace structure of erasures and of facements. The history of ontology is not a translation of traces or the handing down of textual residues, but an unwriting as whitening out. (Heidegger and Derrida, pp. 58-59.)

323. *Heidegger and Derrida*, p. 34. There is a return to a beginning in Heidegger's destruction. This beginning is what was never studied as such and has been skipped over; it is the essence of metaphysics which comes into view only retrogressively to now.

Heidegger showed that there is priority in the concept of time with regard to the *wesen*. *Wesen* understood as a verb is the same as (*währen*) That means to last or endure. Socrates and Plato already think the essence of something as what comes to presence in the sense of what endures. They find what endures permanently in what tenaciously persists throughout what

happens. That which remains (*währen*) they discover in the aspect (*Aussehen, eidos, idea*). Heidegger tries to stand that enduring is not necessarily based solely on the Platonic ideas or on what Aristotle thinks that any particular thing has always been (*to ti en einai*). However, based on Heidegger's appeal of time, hermeneutics can go further than what meta-physics interpretatively finds as *essentia*.

324. *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, pp. 204-205.

325. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

326. *Ibid.*, p. 202.

327. *Ibid.*, p. 205.

328. *PH*, p. 121.

329. *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p. 206.

330. *Ibid.*, p. 206.

331. *Ibid.*, p. 198.

332. *On the Truth of Being*, p. 66.

333. *Ibid.*, p. 86. In the broader discussion of the issue, as the complementary outlines of this work suggests, I shall bring at least two other chapters concerning the relation between the concept of the text and the concept of being as follows:

Chapter 1. The meta-hermeneutic *lage* of the text

A) The authentic hermeneutic of the text

B) The ontological and ontical priority of the text

C) Text in ontic and ontological analysis

Chapter 2. The text in letting be itself

A) The theory of the text

B) The text in itself and for itself

C) Authenticity and the signification of the being of the text

D) The Text Being and the textual Dasein

E) The primacy of the textual truth or the true text

334. *Philosophical Apprenticeships* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, c1985), p. 187.

335. Paul Ricoeur, *The Conflict of Interpretation* (Evanston: North Western University Press, 1974), p. 289.

336. *Heidegger and Derrida*, p. 121. In "*La parole sacrée de Hölderlin*", Blanchot says that the poet's existence is given in the adumbration of time by the poem, in the poem's forecasting of time. The reason the poet foresees is because the poet exists in the future anterior. In arriving or coming the poem precedes the existence of the poet which it anticipate.

337. *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 47.

338. *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.

339. *PH*, p. 57.

340. *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 106.

341. *Ibid.*, p. 107. As Gadamer himself answers, the requirement of going back to the motivating questions when understanding statements is not an artificial procedure, but, on the contrary, is the normal practice.

342. *PH*, p. 11.

343. *TM*, p. 91.

344. In phenomenology of knowledge, there is no inference from sense stimuli, no subsequent synthesis of various stimulus-effects into the unity of a cause or thing which as a construction has no warrant in the phenomena.

345. *PH*, p. 132.

346. The concept of the unity of the work of art, for Kant, refers to its form in its referring to the structure of the aesthetic object not as opposed to the meaningful content of the work of art but to the purely sensuous attractiveness of the material (*TM*, p. 92).

347. *Ideas*, p. 277.

348. *Ibid.*, p. 277.

349. *Ibid.*, p. 337. Husserl tries to explain harmonious unity in separated acts with what mentioned as "same Something".

350. *Ibid.*, p. 337.

351. *Cogito and Hermeneutics*, p. 44.

352. *Phenomenology, The Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Its Interpretation*, p. 188.

353. *PH*, p. 49.

354. *Ibid.*, editor's introduction, p. xxvi.

355. *BT*, p. 61.

356. *The Conflict of Interpretations*, p. 225.

357. Martin Heidegger, *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), pp. 310-311.

358. *BT*, p. 175.

359. *The Cogito and Hermeneutics*, p. 95.

360. *CH*, p. 231.

361. *PH*, p. xxii.

362. Vincent Descombes. "The Interpretative Text", *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 255.

363. "What happens if I find the text of Wordsworth in a bottle and I don't know when it was written or by whom? I shall look, after having met the word 'gay' to see if the further course of the text supports a sexual interpretation, so to encourage me to believe that 'gay' also conveyed connotations of homosexuality. If so, and it is clearly or at least persuasively so, I can try the hypothesis that the text was not written by a romantic poet, but by a contemporary writer -- who was perhaps imitating the style of a romantic poet. In the course of such a complex interaction between my knowledge and the knowledge I impute to the unknown author, I am not speculating about the author's intentions, but about the text's intention, or about the intention of that Model Author that I am able to recognize in terms of textual strategy" (*Interpretation and Overinterpretation*, p. 69).

364. "Over Interpreting Texts", in *Interpretation and Overinterpretation*, p. 64. Ecco stresses that there are somewhere criteria for limiting interpretation. (*Ibid.*, p. 40.)

365. Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation", pp. 50-51.

366. *TM*, pp. 49-50. The fact of Kant's going beyond disinterested pleasure not for the sake of art can be indicated to the aesthetical origin of interpretation as text rather than the ideal of beauty.

367. Vincent Descombes, "The Interpretative Text", *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 250.

368. Murray Krieger, *Words about Words about Words: Theory, Criticism, and the Literary Text* (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, C1988), p. 9. M. Krieger says: "As a result of our myopic commitment to modernity, we may neglect to remember that the notion of the aesthetic -- indeed the very word aesthetic itself as we know it -- is an invention that goes back only to the mideighteen century. With the word aesthetic came a newly defined discipline, and by the time

Kant was through with it in his third Critique (the Critique of Aesthetic Judgment, to be sharply distinguished from the earlier two Critiques, of Pure Reason and Practical Reason), this activity and the objects associated with it came to be seen as (separate field. What was special) about them was their freedom from the objectives imposed by the scientific pursuit of knowledge (governed by pure reason) or by the moral pursuit of the good (governed by practical reason). Both these latter two, the cognitive and the practical, served and were controlled by interests stemming from outside those activities and directing them, while the aesthetic -- free from any outside interest or purpose -- could be directed only by its own internally generated purposes that thus seem to trap and hold our disinterested contemplation. So an object is aesthetic only to the extent that it avoids leading us toward our worldly concerns and, instead, exploits its own system of internal relations." (*Ibid.*, p. 9.)

369. "Kant's Architectonic and Hermeneutical Model", *Kan-tstudien, Heft 2*, 1993.

370. *PH*, p. 15.

371. *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 66.

372. *The Conflict of Interpretations*, p. xiv.

373. *Ideas*, p. 337.

374. *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 250.

375. *Ibid.*, p. 259.

376. *Ibid.*, p. 99.

377. "Text and Interpretation" by Gadamer, p. 35. Indeed Gadamer's idea here shows that his comprehension of the text is incomplete and taken mostly taken from the non-philosophical backgrounds in law or psychology and so on. He holds a methodological apprehension of the text, motivated perhaps by his orientation toward a practical understanding of knowledge.

378. James Risser, "Reading The Text", *Gadamer and Her-meneutics*, p. 101

379. *Ibid.*, p. 102.

380. *Ibid.*, p. 104. Borrowing from Max Weber, Ricoeur asks to what extent meaningful action exhibits the characteristics of a text, i.e., represents objectivations of meaning which would render it open to scientific investigation. He finds that by analogy to texts, meaningful actions can assume a fixed form, possibly, in the habitual patterns of action in which meaning becomes detached from the event, the intention from the consequences of action. (*CH*, p. 231.)

381. *BT*, p. 191.

382. *Ibid.*

383. Vincent Descombes, "The Interpretative Text", *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 258.

384. *Ibid.*

385. *PH*, p. 67.

386. *Ibid.*, p. 68.

387. *CH*, p. 232.

388. *The Conflict of Interpretations*, p. 7.

389. *BT*, p. 108.

390. *Ibid.*, p. 110. Heidegger explains that if 'indicating' is a sign, it addresses itself to a Being-in-the-world which is specially 'spatial'. "Signs always indicate primarily 'wherein' one lives, where one's concern dwells, what sort of involvement there is with something." (*Ibid.*, p. 111.)

391. *BT*, p. 114.

392. *PH*, p. 81.

393. *The Conflict of Interpretations*, p. 234.

394. Gary E. Aylesworth, "Dialogue, Text, Narrative: Con-fronting Gadamer and Ricoeur", *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 76.

395. Based on Bultmann's theory of hermeneutical principle of translation the word has primacy over against the text (*TM*, p. 528). As we pointed out the text can not be separated from the word and vice versa: the word is text and the text is word. If the word is first being, therefore, it is the text as far as it occurs in the interpretation.

396. Martin Heidegger, *What Is Called Thinking*, trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 28.

397. *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, p. 137. In Ricoeur's characterization, the text is never isolated from its proper sense. Text is indeed a real source of all sense, and sense without reference is void. Nonetheless, he expresses an important connection between the immanent design of discourse and the problems of interpretation to the dimension of "reference" understood as the power of dis-course to apply to an "extralinguistic reality" about which it says what it says (*Ibid.*, p. 137).

398. *TM*, p. 72.

399. *Text and Interpretation*, p. 13.

400. *Ibid.*, p. 44.

401. *TM*, p. 194.

402. *Philosophical Apprenticeships*, p. 181.

403. *Text and Interpretation*, p. 18.

404. The pre-hermeneutic effective historical consciousness must be conceived as revealed by this pre-hermeneutic of talking of the text. The pre-hermeneutic language that can be understood is interpretation.

405. Deborah Cook, " Rereading Gadamer: A Response to James Risser", *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 111. Gadamer develops the concept of the *Thou* as representing that which in inter-pretation stands over against me, asserts its own rights and requires recognition and in that very process is understood. Although Ga-damer modifies his concept of the *Thou*, stating that indeed it is the truth of what the *Thou* says to us that can be understood, yet it is not well explained why we must define this characteristic based on the term *Thou* rather than of text.

406. Also, for Derrida the idea that a truth can be wrestled from an interpretive reading is rejected. The very notion of otherness needs to be deconstructed. The text produces its own reading and never discloses a historical or non-historical truth (Cook, Deborah. "Rereading Gadamer: A Response to James Risser", *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 113).

407. *Story, Text and Scripture*, p. 129.

408. *TM*, p. 192.

409. *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 106.

410. Gadamer. "Text and Interpretation", p. 30.

411. *Reason in the Age of the Science*, p. 107.

412. *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, introduction, p. xxi.

413. As an example, the educational process constitutes an increasing awareness of the primarily unnaturalness and not ne-cessarily of the many assumptions and beliefs by which our analysis and assumptions are constructed.

414. Gadamer "Text and Interpretation", p. 26.

415. *BT*, p. 189.

416. *Text and Interpretation*, p. 12.

417. Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation", p. 33. Nonetheless, Gadamer emphasizes the semantic autonomy of the text from which it follows that the meaning of a text constantly transcends the author and as a result of that the exhaustion of its true meaning has to be thought of as an openhanded process. (*TM*, p. 265.)

418. The notion of the text as raised by the analysis of the ideal link of meaning within the acts of language can be extended in a manner in which a method of explaining the horizontal aspects of the text is regarded primarily, which is to say, the syntactic and semantic elements and relations which go to make up a text. *Text and Interpretation*, p. 50.

419. *Ibid.*, p. 52.

420. Jacques Derrida, *Dissemination*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 65. Derrida states that only a "blind or grossly insensitive" reading could have believed that Plato is simply condemning the writer's activity (*ibid.*, p. 67).

421. *Text and Interpretation*, p. 135.

422. *Ibid.*, Introduction, p. xvii.

423. *Cogito and Hermeneutics*, p. 83.

424. *BT*, pp. 190-191.

425. *Philosophical Apprenticeships*, p. 186. Only based on this interpretation can we follow clearly why dialogue is comparable to writing, while one refers to "being" and the other goes back to the "the same". It can be said that as far as concerns to Dasein, both "being" and "the same" are identified in one.

426. *Cogito and Hermeneutics*, p. 79.

427. *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, p. xxvi.

428. *Ibid.*

429. *BT*, p. 192.

430. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

431. *Cogito and Hermeneutics*, p. 61.

432. *Ibid.*, p. 73. Heidegger's reflection starting from methodological hermeneutics is transformed by Ricoeur into a new understanding of the opposition between ontology and epistemology, between philosophy and the linguistical sciences, (*ibid.*, p. 74).

433. *Philosophical Apprenticeships*, p. 180.

434. Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation", p. 21.

435. *Philosophical Apprenticeships*, p. 190.

436. *Ibid.*, p. 191. In other words, philosophy is not to find its object, but rather to construct it. Nonetheless, it seems there is no clear answer to the question of why the language of philosophy constructs itself unmovingly in philosophical systems.

437. James Risser, "Reading The Text", *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 102.

438. *Ibid.*

439. *Text and Interpretation*, p. 30. By this statement, Gadamer apparently means that the concept of the text is characterized by presenting itself in connection with interpretation.

440. "Text and Interpretation", p. 33.

441. See: Hans Lipps, *Untersuchungen zu einer hermeneutischen Logik* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1938), p. 71.

442. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 179.

443. Heidegger's interpretation of 'copula' showed how being has meaning only in our thinking configuration so far as being means this combination in the proposition S is P. Here, by implying or signifying, being expresses the relation itself. "Is" signifies the being of a being and

is not itself an existent (present-at-hand) thing. (*The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, pp. 181-182.) It does not signify something present-at-hand which would be present-at-hand itself. It is not a being outside and prior to thought, and not some-thing that stands for itself independently. The sort of a being of this "is" is obscure.

444. *The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, p. 21. There is a hermeneutical question, based on what is mentioned, whether it is true that being is.

445. *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 101.

446. *BT*, p. 194.

447. "Text and Interpretation", p. 23.

448. *The Basic Problem of Phenomenology*, p. 18.

449. *Ibid.* Resulting from this view, as we mentioned in the previous chapter, Heidegger distinguishes his own vision of phenomenology by stating that the intention of unveiling the assertion has the character of unveiledness.

450. *Heidegger and Derrida*, p. 99.

451. *BT*, p. 182.

452. "Text and Interpretation", p. 23.

453. *BT*, pp. 36-37.

454. *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, p. 275.

455. *Ibid.*, 276.

456. *Ibid.*, p. 16.

457. *BT*, p. 190.

458. *BT*, p. 190.

459. *On the Truth of Being*, p. 33 and p. 60. Therefore, language is the house of Being, in which humans dwell and are destined. Those who do philosophy and those who poetize are the guardians of this home. The house is not made by language, but is brought for it.

460. John D. Caputo, *Heidegger and Aquinas* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982). Meanwhile, it is important to mention that, Heidegger refers to Being, as having the character of a happening as an event that comes-to-pass, with the word *wesen*, which is to be taken in a verbal sense. The technical term *Ereignis* was used by him for the first time in 1946 in order to show the event character of Being. Derrida acknowledges the hermeneutical doctrine of "*es gibt*" of being in his fundamental understanding of *différance*. The play of differences supposes syntheses and referrals which forbid at any moment that simple element to be present in and of itself. Additionally, it is impossible for an element to function as a sign without referring to another element which itself is not simply present. This can be followed in any monad phoneme or grapheme, being constituted on the basis of the trace within it of the other elements of the chain or system. Is that a new concept of writing produced as *différance* or *gram*? (*position*, p. 26). However, this interweaving, or, as Derrida calls it, textile, the text is produced only in the transformation of another text (or texts). For Derrida, nothing among the hermeneutical parts nor within the system is ever simply present or absent. There are only differences and traces of traces. Derrida considers the term "trace" as it comes after the question of presence. Presence for Derrida is far from what is commonly thought. The trace refers to presence and it is the trace of the trace. In other words, it is the trace of the erasure of the trace. The trace of the trace can not otherwise appear or be named as such, that is, in its presence, but is in the metaphysical order. (*Margins of Philosophy*, p. 66).

461. Derrida criticizes later Heidegger, claiming that even he shared the fault of forgetting Being since he has not broken through the logocentrism of metaphysics.

462. "Text and Interpretation", p. 24.

463. *On the Truth on Being*, p. 68.

464. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

465. *Ibid.*, p. 36.

466. "Text and Interpretation", p. 25.

467. *Positions*, p. 7.

468. Hermeneutical philosophy focuses not on the methodo-logy of the *Geisteswissenschaften*, but on their relationship to the whole of our experience of the world; by evidencing understanding as a fundamental characteristic of existence it does not intend to restrict the disciplined and skilled understanding of texts, but only expects to be free from a wrong self-understanding (*CH*, p. 120).

469. "Text and Interpretation", p. 28.

470. Werner G. Jeanrond, *Text and Interpretation as Categories of Theological Thinking*, Trans. Thomas J. Wilson (New York: Crossroad, 1988), introduction, p. xvii.

471. *On the Truth of Being*, p. 43.

472. "Text and Interpretation", pp. 70-71.

473. *Ibid.*, p. 46.

474. *Cogito and Hermeneutics*, p. 94.

475. *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 111.

476. Vincent Descombes, "The Interpretative Text", *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 260. Note here the essential ambiguity which exists behind the claim called the "right of interpretation".

477. See and compare: *ibid.*, p. 255.

478. James Risser, "Reading The Text", *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 99.

479. It must be remembered that, in Derrida's eyes, hermeneutics is an attempt to read what is obliterated within it. It inscribes within the text that which intended to govern it from without. Derrida tries, on the other hand, to respect as much as possible the internal regulated play of philosophemes or epistememes by reducing them to the point of their non pertinence, their exhaustion and closure. Deconstructing philosophy therefore means to think the basis of the genealogy of philosophical concepts. It seems that the inside and outside of a text of western philosophy, as a text in Derrida's view, have the same credit in simultaneously faithful or violent circulation between philosophemes. Nonetheless, this circulative movement from within and without, produces a certain textual work that creates a new interpretational realm. The textual work, interested in itself, also enables us to read philosophemes and consequently all other texts of culture as kinds of symptoms of something that could not be presented in the history of philosophy (*Positions*, pp. 67). But what might be after a total deconstruction of a text is over, Derrida thinks that deconstruction is not interested in it. No event could arrive or make itself present (*Heidegger and Derrida*, p. 144).

480. Vincent Descombes, "The Interpretative Text", *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 256.

481. *Ibid.*, p. 256.

482. Therefore, the textuality of a text is not, as Hugh J. Silverman thinks, both a result from and establishing of the need for a right to interpretation. See: Silverman, Hugh J. "Interpreting The Interpretative Text", *ibid.*, p. 276.

483. *On the Truth of Being*, p. 58.

484. *TM*, p. 475.

485. "Text and Interpretation", p. 43.

486. The given is not the result of an interpretation even though it seems that interpretation really performs mediation between man and the world. As Gadamer discovers, even in the domain of the natural sciences, the grounding of scientific knowledge cannot avoid the hermeneutical consequences of the fact that the given cannot be separated from interpretation (Gadamer, "Text and Interpretation", p. 30). The fact that the given is not separable while it is not a consequent outcome indicates that to which we were brought earlier: that givenness is the primary characteristic of the text.

487. Deborah Cook, "Rereading Gadamer: A Response To James Risser", *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 113.

488. *CH*, p. 123.

489. *What is Called Thinking*, p. 4.

490. *Story, Text, and Scripture*, p. 110.

491. "Text and Interpretation", p. 23.

492. *The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur*, p. 139.

493. Paul Ricoeur, *Interpretation Theory, Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning* (Fort Worth: Texas University Press, 1976), p. 80.

494. *Story, Text, and Scripture*, p. 110. For Frege it is starting for truth which in every case implies that we move forward from sense (*sinn*) to reference (*bedutung*) from which Ricoeur draws the conclusion that returning to referentiality is the soul of language (*langage*) itself. (Frege was concerned with logic, whereas Ricoeur holds reference to reality.) That indicates a clear extension away from the truth value of the sentence and to the reality of the text. The reference of the text is the project of a world. But it is not the reader who primarily projects himself; rather he is enlarged in his capacity for self-projection by receiving a new mode of being from the text itself (*Text and Interpretation*, p. 59).

495. *The Bounds of Interpretation*, p. 100.

496. *What Is Called Thinking?* p. 7. Perhaps it is based on this argument that Ecco brings an interesting example: "We have all heard the legend of the Caliph who ordered the destruction of the library of Alexandria, arguing that either the books said the same thing as the Koran, in which case they were superfluous, or else they said something different, in which case they were wrong and harmful. The Caliph knew and possessed the truth and he judged the books on the basis of that truth. Second-century Hermetism, on the other hand, is looking for a truth it does not know, and all it possesses is books. Therefore, it imagines or hopes that each book will contain a spark of truth and that they will serve to confirm each other" (*Interpretation and Overinterpretation*, p. 30).

497. *PH*, p.71.

498. We must remember that the word helps the thing to its Being and keeps it therein. Thus the word is not merely related to the thing. It is that which maintains the thing as thing, that which Heidegger calls the "relationship" (*das Verhältnis*). The word is thought of not as a mere reference or relation, but as that which keeps and maintains (*das Haltende*) in the sense of that which grants (*On Heidegger and Language*, p. 86).

499. *Heidegger and Derrida*, p. 146.

500. "Text and Interpretation", p. 48.

501. *Ibid.*

502. A text, as Derrida states, is not text unless it hides the law of its composition and the rules of its game. A text remains forever imperceptible. In demonstrating that the text hides itself, Derrida considers that in fact the text can never be found in the present, whereas it can be identified

by so called perception. This indicates itself that the text can be lost in any perceptive interpretation.

503. *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, p. xxiv.

504. *Ibid.*, p. xxv.

505. *Heidegger and Derrida*, p. 122.

506. *Ibid.*, p. 132.

507. *Cogito and Hermeneutics*, p. 84.

508. *Ibid.*

509. *Text and Interpretation*, p. 71.

510. *BT*, p. 188. Heidegger rejects presuppositionless under-standing taken in Husserl's phenomenology in favor of bringing understanding out of the vicious circle. Therefore, for us, the concept of the text can not be considered again in such a phenomeno-logical presupposition, but it can be described within the herme-neutical circle from the text to interpretation and from interpretation to the text.

511. *PH*, p. lii.

512. "Text and Interpretation", p. 32.

513. *PH*, p. 50. The turn will be a recognition that it is im-possible to overcome the forgetfulness of being within the frame-work of transcendental reflection.

514. *On the Truth of Being*, p. 71. In the previous chapter it was pointed out that there is something which grants Being as well as time. This is not noein nor the *einai*. Is it as finally expressed in *Identity and Difference*, the *Ereignis* that lies deeper than Being and Dasein? What is this "it"? In answering this question, Heidegger suggests, we must not think of this "it" as a "power" or a "God".

515. Veronique M. Fóti, *Heidegger and the Poets: Poiësis/Sophia/Techne* (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1992), p. 45.

516. *Heidegger and the Poets*, p. 45.

517. *Heidegger and Derrida*, p. 121.

518. *Philosophical Apprenticeships*, p. 192.

519. *Ibid.*, p. 192.

520. *PT*, editor's introduction, p. xxxv.

521. For Wittgenstein learning a language is not explanation but training (*Blue Book*, p. 17).

522. We can say, based on the occurrence of language, that theology tries to read the textual message already talked about.

523. *The Conflict of Interpretations*, p. xiv.

524. *Ibid.*, p. 288.

525. *Ibid.*

526. *What Is Called Thinking?*, p. 10. Based on this impor-tant point, the only way to consolidate the source of the herme-neutics and interpretation of myth, and more generally, is to found its basis upon of the Plato's philosophy. In *Dissemination*, Derrida opens his work with the chapter called "Plato's Pharmacy". He quotes Socrates statement in *Phaedras* in explaining the mythology of the writing (*grammata*) on egyptian gods and tries to discover the importance of the great text. Derrida says: " The value of writing-or of the *pharmakon* has of course been spelled out to the king, but it is the king who will give it its value, who will set the price of what, in the act of receiving, he constitutes or institutes. The king of god (Thamus represents Ammon, the king of the gods, the king of kings, the god of gods. Theuth says to him: O basileu is thus the other name for the origin of value. The value of writing will not be itself. writing will have no value, unless and

to the extent that god-the-king approves of it. But god-the-king nonetheless experiences the *pharmakon* as a product, an *ergon*, which is not his own, which comes to him from outside but also from below, and which awaits his condescending judgment in order to be consecrated in its being and value." However, God does not know how to write, but that ignorance or incapacity only testifies to his sovereign independence. He has no need to write, he speaks and dictates and his word is sufficient itself. (*Dissemination*, pp. 75-76.) This can also result to the fact that by dictating his word good the king produces good or what Derrida identifies as father. In addition, the Platonic origin and power of speech, precisely of *Logos* which is continuously followed in Platonism, is considered to be its father. We can say *Logos* is a son, a son that would be destroyed in his very presence without the attending presence of his father who answers, who speaks for him and answers for him. Without his father, he becomes only writing. (*Dissemination*, p. 77. The father, as Derrida explains later must not be understood in such a way that he is generator or procreator in any "real" sense prior to, or outside, all relation to language. It is *Logos* that enables us to perceive paternity.) Living *Logos* in contrast to writing, is alive in that it has a living father who is present, standing near it, behind and within it while sustaining it with his rectitude. Living *Logos* forbids itself and thinks it can forbid itself patricide.

527. *Truth and Method*, p. 484.

528. *Cogito and Hermeneutics*, p. 85.

529. *Ibid.*, p. 85.

530. *Text and Interpretation*, p. xv.

531. *TM*, p. 309.

532. *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 125.

533. *Interpretation and Overinterpretation*, p. 52. The literal sense of this attitude toward sacred texts has been translated, in secularized form, to texts which become metaphorically sacred in the course of their reception. It happened to Virgil, in the medieval world, and to Shakespeare (*ibid.*, p. 53).

534. See: "Text and Interpretation", pp. 41-42.

535. *Ibid.*

536. *Ibid.*

537. *Heidegger and the Poets: Podesis/ Sophia/Techne*, p. 44.

538. *Gadamer and Hermeneutics*, p. 257.

539. *Kant Studien*, Heft 2. 1993, p. 159. With this model, we can illustrate Kant in a unified interpretation, that itself moves in the hermeneutical circle.

540. The intentional relation the proposition has to that about which judgment is made is in itself bifurcated in the "is" of the relation to a being and the bifurcation (*The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*, pp. 100-101).

541. *Ibid.*

542. *Ibid.*

543. *Interpretation and Overinterpretation*, p. 51.

544. *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 137.

545. Ingeborg Koza, *Das Problem Des Gründes in Heideggers Auseinandersetzung mit Kant* (Henn Verlag, Germany: Ratingen 1967), p. 21. "Die Transzendenz ist der Grund für die ontologische Differenz. Dieser Grund jedoch ist noch nicht der nach der Heideggerschen "Kehre" intendierte letzte Seinsgrund, der selbst auf keinen Ursprung mehr zurück verweist. Die Transzendenz ist zwar der Grund für Möglichkeit des in der ontologischen Differenz sich ausdrückenden Unterscheidungsvermögens von Seiendem und Sein, doch sie selbst wurzelt wiederum

in etwas noch ursprünglicherem, dem Dasein zugrunde liegendem das zu erforschen Heideggers gesamtes spatwerk sichzur Aufgabe stellt" (*ibid.*, pp. 20-21).

546. *PH*, p. 28.

547. *Ideas*, p. 55.

548. *PH*, p. 123.

549. *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 48.

550. *Ibid.*, p. 93.

551. The figure of the father is that of the good (*agathon*) *Logos* represents what it is indebted to, that is the father who is also the chief, the capital, the good. The good, in the visible figure of the father, or the sun is the origin of all onta, responsible for their ap-paring and their coming into *Logos*. We can be protected from being blinded by any direct intuition of the face of the father, of good of the origin of being in itself (*Dissemination*, pp. 81-83.) One must turn to *Logos* and not merely when the solar source is present and risks burning the eyes if stared at. One has also to turn toward it when the sun seems to withdraw during its eclipse. The star is more dangerous than ever when it is hidden. But after all, it is questionable whether the foundation of metaphysics is in *Logos* or in writing that is *Logos* without father. For Gadamer, it is the good (*agathon*) or father (in Derrida's term) which leads hermeneutics, whereas for Derrida it is god-the-king. God-the-king has his sovereign independ-ence in the good and hermeneutics.

552. *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, introduction, p. xx.

553. *Text and Interpretation*, p. 98.

554. *Cogito and Hermeneutics*, p. 77. For Ricoeur the referential aspect of discourse goes back to the capacity of each interlocutor (*ibid.*, p. 81). This perception neglects the initiate definition of the text as the reference of any discursive or nondis-cursive interpretation. Without regarding to the immediate reference of interpretation in general, skepticism remains always superior to the possibility of any knowledge as understood by Socrates.

555. *Cogito and Hermeneutics*, p. 81.

556. Martin Heidegger, *Was ist Metaphysics?* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1965), pp. 7-8.

557. *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 102.

558. *Ibid.* Gadamer agrees that this implies a totally new con-cept of understanding.

559. *BT*, p. 62.

560. *BT*, p. 226.

561. *On the Truth of Being*, p. 60.

562. *Sendung* itself is above the event of *Logos*, though Hei-degger never talks above a productive relationship between the two.

In a similar manner, the productive dynamism of hermeneutics appears in the *différance*, which for Derrida, refers back to the movement that consists in differing (by means of delay, delegation, reprieve, referral, detour or postponement). What defers presence is the very basis on which presence is announced or desired in what represents it, its sign or trace (*Positions*, p. 8). The concept of *différance* is neither structuralist nor geneticist, which themselves are effects of *différance*. The *différance* is the production of the differences such as sensible, intelligible, intuition, signification and so on. Differences studied by taxonomical science are the effects of *différance*. They are inscribed neither in the heavens nor in the brain, yet they are to be taken as produced by the activity of some speaking subject. (*Ibid.*, p. 9.) The actuality or productivity, in her-meneutics, connected by the *différance* refers to the generative movement in the play of differences. These are not fallen from the sky, but rather are the effects of transformations. Derrida acknow-ldges that *différance* produces systematic and regulated transfor-mation which leaves

room for a structural science. Even the concept of *différance* develops the most legitimate principled exigencies of structuralism. Nothing -- no present and indifferent being -- precedes *différance* and spacing (*ibid.*, pp. 27-28).

563. Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), p. 22. De-construction theory, requires that hermeneutics and its source in being not be separated since the text is at once contained within metaphysics and intends to transgress it. The very movement of this textual transgression, holds it back short of the limit. Translation and transcription are modalities of this destruction. A destruction (or what Derrida calls deconstruction) allows one to pursue a path toward the bearing of a relationship of Being to being. (*Heidegger and Derrida, Reflections of Time and Language*, p. 33.) In this way, the philosopher is a destroyer of continuities, while still not breaking with history or dismissing it. This deconstruction itself preoccupies father and son as far as they are announced to us within *logos*. In addition, Derrida himself believes that it is precisely *logos* that enables us to perceive paternity although *logos* itself indebted to father (*Dissemination*, p. 80).

564. *Interpretation and overinterpretation*, p. 39.

565. *Ibid.*, p. 39. The reader must suspect that every line conceals another secret meaning; words, instead of saying, hide the untold; "the glory of the reader is to discover that texts can say everything, except what their author wanted them to mean: as soon as the meaning presented is allegedly discovered, we are sure that it is not the real one; the real one is further on, and so on and so forth."