Chinese Cultural Traditions and Modernization

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Acknowledgements
Preface

Today inter-communication and inter-dependence between different nations is world-wide and irreversible. This reflects not only material, but spiritual production, which must now be given serious consideration.

Since the second World War great steps have been taken in world modernization. All nations, whether of greater or lesser production, whether more modern or more traditional are confronted by important problems concerning the management of the relations: (1) between tradition and modernization, and (2) between building material and spiritual civilization.

To the first problem, we must respond by combining both, building modernization upon traditional culture. A developing country must pay special attention not to discard its traditional culture and blindly copy modern modes from developed countries.

To the second problem, we must respond by paying more attention to building up our spiritual civilization while also developing its material counterpart. While working to "liberate productivity", we must pay more attention to the "liberation of the human being." This means not only freedom from colonialism, fascism and totalitarianism, from racial, sexual and class discrimination, but also freedom to realize the liberal individual development that is the aim of human development. All of the above pertain to the full meaning of the liberation of the human being. Hence, progress here must be a long historical process, which requires continuous and vigorous effort.

To respond to this call, the scholars of the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy and of the Institute of Philosophy of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences through intensive interchange have developed this volume on "Tradition and Modernization".

In the human advance toward modernization, it will be necessary to combine the rich experience of various cultures and the technical insights of the various sciences in a creative effort to deepen present wisdom and draw out new ideas. With a view to the coming century and millennia, this is the intent of this volume.

Wang Miaoyang
Introduction

As we approach the third millennium we ask what we want to bring forward from the past and what we wish to develop anew. Like planning to begin human life on a new planet, this gives occasion to ask what is of truly essential value in our experience of human life, what are its future possibilities and what are our resources for their realization.

The question is more complex than at first it might seem. If we were at the earlier stages of modernity we might simply take the characteristics of the times as defining human possibilities. In this case the question would be simply how to develop a modern pattern of life. In this light tradition would be at best a general resource to be used instrumentally where it could contribute, or to be discarded where it could not.

That simplistic age, however, has past; now we face the sobering truth that modernity itself has been of mixed value. As notes the opening chapter by Richard Knowles, it has brought not only great accomplishments which must never be lost, but a great reduction of the richness of human goals and self-understanding, not to mention great wars and massive atrocities. Even in the modern terms of a redistribution of power and control much now is said of a post modern period and more positively of an emerging global outlook. The twentieth century comes to a close under the epithet of "the most violent in human history"; none would call for its repetition, all hope for something new and more humane.

In this sense, we are especially well placed to look at the topic: tradition and modernization. Being freed from enclosure by either term we are able to assume a balanced critical stance with regard to each and to their mutual relation. Such a study promises as well to enable us to look further toward the resources for the global civilization which promises to be the achievement of the millennium about to dawn. That, however, will be the proper task not of this volume, but of those which follow.

The present study consists of three parts: Part I concerns the nature of tradition and modernity; Part II focuses upon the resources which can be brought from the tradition; Part III concerns how those resources can be developed critically in a way that contributes to the ongoing process of life in our times.

Part I begins with chapter I by G. McLean on the nature of culture and tradition. Its essential burden is to trace culture to the basic thrust of human life toward its realization, that is, to the search for human fulfillment in the concrete circumstances of a people. Culture is truly a matter of being rather than of non being, of life rather than of death. Synchronously, culture consists of the specific set of characteristics which constitute the mode of living together proper to a people. Diachronically, this is called "tradition" as the passing on of what is life-giving to the next generation in a manner adapted to ever new circumstances. Tradition then is not a matter of the past, though it reflects the cumulative struggles and learning of a people; rather it is their resources for facing the future creatively.

Chapter II by Richard Knowles matches this with an analysis of modernity. Coming to the task from the fields of psychology and phenomenological philosophy he reviews its characteristic fallenness in terms of rootlessness, consumerism, individualism and fascination with the technical. On this basis he is able to identify problems which modernity generates and leaves for resolution -- such issues as the meaning and purpose for life, justice and commitment without fanaticism.
Chapter III by Li Junru studies the concrete form of these issues in the transformation of rural China. He identifies some of the newly emerging values, as well as a number of contradictions. Perceptively, he looks for ways in which the old and new can be combined, finding examples in various areas of life, and seeing as well the threat of serious conflicts.

Chapter IV reviews these issues on a broader scale. Jiang Binghai notes the great riches of Chinese traditional culture and its indispensable role as the roots of present and future progress. At the same time he expertly identifies the tensions which emerge between the historical and present realities, between ideas and existence, and between understanding and sentiment. On this basis he is able to begin to prescribe the requisites for future construction, namely, both material and spiritual civilization, and the reform of structures.

Part II looks more deeply into the resources of Chinese culture for the work not only of modernization, but of still further development. In Chapter V Yu Xuanmeng focuses rightly upon the need for wisdom and its proper character as open and integrating knowledge. In this it reflects and indeed realizes what is proper to humanity as being not simply reactive to its environment, but capable of appreciating the whole of meaning and hence of shaping the paths of human life.

Chapter VI by Fang Mingson investigates the theme of cultural transformation by studying the transition from Greek to Christian culture. This requires considerable sensibility for, without sensitivity to the specific theological dimension added by Christianity, there is danger of reducing Christianity to Greek thought. This characterized the biased secularizing scholarship of the last century. On the contrary, more recent scholarship makes it possible to see how old themes are renewed and enriched by the new horizons. As was noted in Chapter III this is a characteristic of recent rural transformations in China. This is important for understanding what is new and how it builds upon and enriches the old.

Chapter VII by Fu Jizong illustrates this in the realm of law and its relation to morality. It is the strength and perhaps also the weakness of law in the Chinese tradition that it is not divorced from morality. This has at times overburdened the law and even kept it from focusing on its proper task in civil affairs. Nevertheless, it has reflected and implemented the concern of Chinese culture for ethics in life, which is to say, for the proper exercise of life in terms of human dignity and purpose.

Chapter VIII by Peter Kun-yu Woo shows the basis of this in Chinese culture by bringing out the way in which the Confucian vision is rooted in the family and consanguinity, building from person to family, to nation or tribe, and eventually to world. As a result the whole is pervaded with affectivity and a sense that by nature one serves parents and heaven. In contrast to this, modernity works in terms of a basically technical relation of means to end. Such relations are in principle among strangers and the question is no longer how to be kind, but why or whether. Reduced to the functional order interrelations become combative and the motivation of the older classical norms of human interchange begins to wane. Is it now sufficient to say, as was done by Confucianism, that this is a matter of human nature; or is some higher religious source and goal now needed both as sanction and as inspiration?

Chapter IX by Vincent Shen brings out the proper contribution to be made by the Chinese tradition in the modernization process by comparing the work of Lao Tsu to that of Jürgen Habermas. The former is ontologically based in the Tao, whereas the latter, for lack of such a foundation, is formal and empty of content. One limitation of Lao Tsu would appear to be a disregard for technology as a distraction from the relation of man and nature. But for lack of a positive metaphysical foundation Habermas can only be dialogical and negative in his critique.
This approach can analyze conflict between people, but for understanding and promoting positive communication Chinese culture has positive resources to contribute.

Part III undertakes to provide a critical approach to tradition in order to enable it to contribute effectively to life in our times. Chapter X by Charles Maes studies the traditions of human formation in order to identify how this can be developed in terms of the different cultures and traditions. He sees formation as a mystery at all levels: cosmic, biological and human. In comparison to faith traditions which are more basic and less adaptive, the formation tradition appears more concrete and adapted to the circumstances of life. In this light it is more engaged in the transformation of cultures and the preparation of persons to play a role therein.

Chapter XI by Zhang Huajin treats the quality of life and social progress taking the standard of living as a basic synthetic measure of social progress. In this light social interaction is a key to the development of such crucial factors as: education, science, law, etc.

Chapter XII by Tran van Doan enters deeply into the dialectics of tradition and modernity which it shows to be not opposed, but mutually essential. In so doing it distinguishes theoretical knowledge, where exact measurement is possible, from practical knowledge. The former, being a product of humankind, must not be allowed to control humans. The latter, concerned with human values and goals, does not lend itself to exact knowledge. In fact the natural and human sciences are not opposed for science too generates values. But this is only in terms of solving precise human problems, whereas tradition is concerned with the quality of the full breadth of human life. The problems emerge from ignoring the human dimension and its natural order, whether in tradition or in modernization.

Chapter XIII by Manual Dy tests out this thesis by reviewing the Confucian notion of Jen in terms of a critical hermeneutics. He studies closely the evolution of Jen through Confucius, Mencius and Taoism as it evolves from a love of humanity in men to the mind of heaven and earth. By reviewing Habermas’ technical, practical and emancipatory interests, Professor Dy establishes a basis for a critical approach. H.-G. Gadamer would point out, however, that this is not scientifically self-justifying, but is based ultimately upon the human content of tradition. On this basis, it is possible by a critical hermeneutics to see how the notion of Jen itself must evolve through an emerging sense of human nature, of person and of the requirements of the global community.

Chapter XIV by Wang Miaoyang treats the issue of individualism and collectivism as a test case for the overall theme of Chinese cultural traditions and modernization. He shows the importance of each and yet the different paths followed by West and East in their regard. In this light the process of modernization for Chinese cultural traditions becomes notably one of enabling the emergence of the individual within the sense of community. This is the challenge of our times.

In sum, this volume is not a plea for either the Chinese tradition or for modernization alone. Both are seen as possessed of values and dangers. What is important is to approach modernization in a critical manner so that its new sensibilities can be evaluated and, where positive, promoted. To do so, however, requires a rich sense of what it means to be human. This must be both metaphysically grounded in a rich sense of being and dialogically open to humankind and nature.

This promises to take us beyond modernity to a new global culture, but that will be the task of the century and millennium now coming fast upon us.

George F. McLean
1. The Notion of Tradition
George F. Mclean

This paper will concern the experience of modernization in the West. While certainly not irrelevant, implications for other regions can be drawn only from within those milieu themselves. In the West, modern times appear marked by two characteristics which have not always been at ease with each other. One is the thrust toward ever greater appreciation of self-determination and responsibility on the part of persons and communities. The other is the development of scientific knowledge. Both have gone through major evolutions and the search for their proper realization and interrelation has been at the heart of the modern project.

This search has not been easy. After centuries of preparation, by the beginning of the twenty century many thought that science had reached maturity and provided mankind with the ability to usher in a new age of freedom. In fact, however, by the 1930’s the West had come to be threatened by despotic totalitarianism and in turn oppressed other parts of the world through colonialism, against which the history of the last 50 years has been a constant struggle. In the 40’s a Second World War was fought against Fascism "to save the world for democracy." This was followed by decades of struggles for emancipation by peoples, former colonies, minorities, and by women at large.

If the whole cycle is not to be repeated, it is necessary to discover the roots of the problem in the excessive objectivism in modern thought which has depersonalized all, reducing mankind to a set of things at the disposition of the state or the system. In response we must open access to the store of human subjectivity in tradition, and then clarify the essential role this plays at the heart of democracy. This is the pattern of the three steps which follow.

Science and Culture: Objectivity and Subjectivity

The origin of the problem might be traced back to Descartes and his goals of a unified objective science predicated upon a pattern of clear and distinct ideas. On the one hand, as demonstrated by the rationalist efforts of Spinoza, Leibniz and Kant’s first Critique, this project searched out necessary laws of process, but left no real room for the concrete person and above all for freedom. On the other hand, the positivist efforts from Locke to Carnap1 to build this unified science upon concrete facts took account only of surface characteristics and led to a rejection of interiority and depth of being.

Freedom then became either the specious right to follow the necessary laws of the process or, when self-enclosed as a flickering in the closed circuits of history,2 became the stuff of Hobbes’ vicious war of all against all. Everything was object, everything and everyone belonged to the necessitarian system; there was no place for a self-conscious and free subject, for a community bonded by love and respect, or for the creation of anything definitively new and unique.

Kant suggested a way beyond this in his second and third Critiques concerning the practical reason and the aesthetic and teleological judgements. But in his rationalist context this remained too universalistic and formalistic to recuperate the uniqueness of the concrete exercise of freedom. Nevertheless, he pointed in a promising direction, namely, to subjectivity, to the actual exercise of human freedom as the point at which being emerges consciously and with passionate commitment in our world. This suggests that the moral tradition of a people can be an essential resource and
hold great promise for building the future, provided it can be effectively accessed and creatively drawn upon.

To do so, however, requires an important epistemological step, for it is necessary first to recognize the importance of objectivity without being trapped in a reductionistic objectivism. There are two approaches to this, the one theoretical, the other existential. I shall not stop at the first, but only refer to Feyerabend’s critique of Popper3 as an example of a sophisticated analysis of the particularly fundamental role played by subjectivity in the construction of science.

To a still greater degree reflection on history and tradition also brings out the importance of subjectivity in addition to the objective considerations and will take us more directly to our issue of the traditional attitude and modernization. If tradition consisted only in objects fixed empirically in the past it would be a distraction from present problems and an impediment to real progress. This, of course, is the way tradition is bound to appear to one trapped in a scientific objectivism, but it cannot be true, for that would belie the dynamic progress of the past. Hence, it is necessary to look to tradition not as a mere storehouse of past customs, but as the dynamic process of human decision-making and commitment in which our life finds both its challenge, its bearings and its hope. Such a search begins in the moral order, but points beyond.

The moral life does require objectivity for it involves free responses to objective goods; otherwise our actions could not contribute to our own real perfection and to that of others. Hence, many possible patterns of actions are objectively right because they promote the good of those involved, while others, precisely as inconsistent with the real good of persons, are objectively disordered or misordered. This constitutes the objective basis for differentiating between values and disvalues.

However, because the realm of objective relations is almost numberless whereas our actions are single, it is essential that we choose not only between the good and the bad, but in each case which of the often innumerable possible goods we will render concrete. Therefore, in order to follow the emergence of the field of concrete moral action, it is not sufficient to examine only the objective nature of the persons, actions and things involved. In addition one must consider the subjectivity of the person in the context of his/her society, valuing the good of an action, choosing it over its alternatives, and bringing it into actuality.

The term ‘value’ here is of special note. Though derived from the economic sphere where it has especially objective content—the good must really "weigh in" and make a real difference—the term expresses this good especially as related to wills which actually acknowledge it as a good and as desirable.4 This places the focus upon the creative capacity of the spirit of a person or people and their ability to work as artists. This is meant not merely in the restricted sense of producing purely aesthetic objects, but in the extended sense of shaping all dimensions of life, material and spiritual, economic and political, into a whole life characterized by unity and truth, goodness and beauty.

This differs among various groups of persons, and at various periods. Each people or community is sensitive to and prizes a distinct set of goods or, more likely, establishes a distinctive ranking in the degree to which it prizes various goods. By so doing it delineates among the limitless order of objective goods a certain pattern of values, actions and realizations which in a more stable fashion mirrors their corporate free choices.

This constitutes the basic topology of a culture. The term can be derived from the Latin term for tilling or cultivating the land. Cicero and other Latin authors used it for the cultivation of the soul or mind (cultura animi), for just as even good land when left without cultivation will produce only disordered vegetation of little value, so the human spirit will not achieve its proper results
unless trained. This sense of culture corresponds most closely to the Greek term for education (paideia) as the development of character, taste and judgment, and to the German term "formation" (Bildung).

A culture constitutes the prime pattern and gradation of goods which persons experience from their earliest years and in terms of which they interpret their developing relations. Young persons peer out at the world through a lens formed, as it were, by their culture, and configured according to the pattern of choices made by their family and community throughout its history—often in the most trying of circumstances. Like a pair of glasses it does not create the object—objectivity perjures; but it does focus attention upon certain goods involved rather than upon others. This becomes the basic orienting factor for one’s affective and emotional life. In time, it encourages and reinforces certain patterns of action which, in turn, reinforce the pattern of values. In relation to these, certain combinations of possibilities, with their natures and norms, take on particular importance and begin thereby to enter into the makeup of one’s world of meaning.

Freedom then is more than mere spontaneity, more than choice, and more even than self-determination in the sense of causing oneself to act. It shapes—the phenomenologist would say even that it constitutes—one’s world as the ambit of human decisions and dynamic action. This is the making of a person or people, of a community or nation. Through this process we constitute our universe of moral concern in terms of which we struggle to advance or at least perjure, mourn our failures, and celebrate our successes. This is our world of hopes and fears, in terms of which, as Plato wrote in the Laches, our lives have moral meaning.

Correlatively, the ability to follow one’s conscience and hence to develop one’s set of values and virtues must be protected and promoted by the relevant social entities. This is a basic right of the person—perhaps the basic human and social right—because only thus can one transcend one’s conditions and strive for fulfillment. Its protection and promotion must be the basic concern of any social order which would be democratic.

**Tradition and Cumulative Freedom**

The development of values and virtues and their integration as a culture of any depth or richness takes time and hence depends upon the experience and creativity of many generations. Thus, the culture which is handed on (or tradita) comes to be called a cultural tradition or heritage; as such it reflects the achievements of a people in discovering and mirroring the deepest meanings of life.

This could be understood merely as a process of trial and error. Continual correction in relation to a people’s evolving sense of human dignity and purpose constitutes a type of learning and testing laboratory for successive generations. In this laboratory of history the strengths of various insights and behavior patterns can be identified and reinforced, while deficiencies are progressively corrected or eliminated.

But this language remains too abstract, too limited to method or technique. While this can be described in general and at a distance in terms of feedback mechanisms and might seem to concern merely how to cope in daily life, what is being spoken about are free acts expressive of passionate human commitment and sacrifice in responding to concrete danger, building and rebuilding family alliances, and constructing and defending one’s nation.

Moreover, this wisdom is a not a matter of mere tactical adjustments to temporary concerns as it is on the horizontal plane of the successive ages of history, focused upon a limited number of leaders, with limited historical vision, attempting to manipulate social forces externally by
imposing their will. Instead, as our attention is directed vertically to the transcendent ground of being and hence to the limitless basis of our values it takes in the full meaning we are able to envision for life and which we desire to achieve through all such adjustments over a period of generations. Through this extended process of learning and commitment we achieve awareness of the bases for the decisions which constitute history.

This is not an other-worldly experience, for we have seen it mirrored in the unconditioned love of our grandparents and in the total dedication of the heroes of our revolutions. It is the basis of all the good which mankind has discovered. It is the context of meaning in which we have been raised. Infinite goodness beyond any particular goods, it frees us from being captivated by any particular object, thereby giving us dominion over our actions and reactions. This is at once the root of our freedom and the limitless source of our creativity. Does it come from God or from man; is it a matter of eternity or history? Chakravarti Rajagopalachari of Madras answered:

Whether the epics and songs of a nation spring from the faith and ideas of the common folk, or whether a nation’s faith and ideas are produced by its literature is a question which one is free to answer as one likes.... Did clouds rise from the sea or was the sea filled by waters from the sky? All such inquiries take us to the feet of God transcending speech and thought.6

One thing is sure, having seen this source our mind can never be entrapped or determined by our circumstances or structures. This vision enables us to look afresh at the present, and to evaluate it in terms which transcend any concrete circumstances, anything one can say or any power one can wield. This is the definitive basis of freedom and the source of limitless creativity.

Our cultural tradition then provides not only models and exemplars, but access to limitless meaning. In the cooperative process of learning, this wisdom was drawn from experience and affirmed in the cumulative free acts of commitment and sacrifice. Defined, defended and passed on through time, tradition is the corporate life of the community.7

Further, adaptation in our living of this tradition does not diminish it, but rather corrects and perfects it. It is precisely here that the freedom and creativity are located. They do not consist in arbitrariness. For Kant is right in saying that without law freedom has no meaning; nor do they consist in an automatic response determined by the historical situation, for then determinism and relativism would compete for the crown in undermining human freedom. Freedom consists rather in shaping the present according to the sense of what is just and good which we have from our cultural tradition, and in a way which manifests and indeed creates for the first time more of what justice and goodness mean.

The truly important battle at the present time is, then, not between, on the one hand, a chaotic liberalism in which the abstract laws of the marketplace dictate and tear at the lives of persons, peoples and nations and, on the other hand, a depersonalizing sense of community in which the dignity of the person is suppressed for an equally abstract utopia. A victory by either would spell disaster. The central battle is rather to enable peoples to draw on their heritage constituted of their personal assessments and free decisions, reflective of a transcending Ground of being and meaning, and elaborated through the ages by their community as it worked out its response to its present circumstances. It is of definite importance that this people’s response to its own challenges be truly its own: that it not simply be imposed as part of another’s history, or—worst of all—in function of abstract and depersonalizing structures or utopias, but that it be part of its history as its free response to the Good, for this is to live.
Democracy, the Hermeneutics of Tradition

It remains for us now to treat the third element in this study, namely, how can people work together to understand and unfold the great achievements of past human awareness in a way that is directive of our life in its present circumstances? In a word, how can we develop democracy? It must not be without the objective clarity of science, yet it must draw upon the richer and deeper resources of freedom to be found in a tradition which contains the experience of a people garnered from life in their families, communities and villages through the ages. Hermeneutics suggests a method for doing this and hence for democracy understood as a process of cooperative action on the part of a people to carry forward their tradition of free decision-making and apply it to new times.

As a first step in taking up a proposal for social life, a law or a constitution, as with any text, one first projects a conception of its content. This anticipation of meaning is not a fixed content to which we come, but what we produce as we participate in the evolution of the tradition in our times and further determine ourselves and it. This is a creative stance reflecting the content, not only of the past, but of the time in which I stand and of the life project in which I am engaged.

Of course, our first understandings are seldom sufficient. Hence, it becomes particularly important that they not be adhered to fixedly, but be put at risk in dialogue with others. For this we must maintain a questioning attitude. Rather than simply following through with our initial idea until a change is forced upon us, we must remain sensitive to new meanings in true openness. This is neither neutrality as regards the meaning of the tradition, nor an extinction of passionate concerns regarding action towards the future. Rather, being aware of our own biases or prejudgments and adjusting them in dialogue with others implies rejecting what impedes our understanding of others’ or of our own traditions. The democratic attitude is one of willingness continually to revise our initial projection or expectation of meaning.

The heart of the democratic process is then not to suppress, but to reinforce and unfold the questions of others. To the degree these probabilities are built up and intensified they can serve as a searchlight. This is the opposite of both opinion which tends to suppress questions, and of arguing which searches out the weakness in another positions. Instead, in democracy understood as conversation and dialogue one enters upon a mutual search to maximize the possibilities of the question, for it is by mutually eliminating errors and working out a common meaning that we discover truth. Democracy then enables one to adjust one’s prior understanding not only of the horizon of the other with whom one is in dialogue, but even of one’s own horizon. It is a process of authentic human growth.

Here, time is not a barrier, separation or abyss, but rather a bridge and opportunity for the process of understanding, a fertile ground filled with experience, custom and tradition. The importance of the historical distance is not that it enables the subjective reality of persons to disappear so that the objectivity of the situation can emerge. On the contrary, it makes possible a new and more complete meaning of the tradition through the very process of our dialogue with others, reveling in our mutual subjectivity, our shared hopes, insights and discoveries.

Thus, one’s personal attitudes and interests can be essential. If our interest in developing our horizons is self-centered, human interchange could be reduced simply to the promotion of our own ideas. Thus absolutized they would become an ideology cut off from life. Locked into an absoluteness of one’s prejudices, one would become fixed or closed in the past and disallow new life. In this manner powerful new insights can become with time deadening prejudices which suppress freedom.
In contrast, an attitude of authentic democratic openness appreciates the nature of one’s own finiteness, and hence both respects the past and is open to discerning the future. Such openness is a matter, not merely of new information, but of recognizing the historical nature of man and his relations to an absolute that both grounds and transcends time. This calls on us to escape what had deceived us and held us captive, and to learn deeply from new experiences. Only in dying to self, do we find resurrection and new life.

This suggests that democratic openness does not consist in surveying others objectively, obeying them unquestioningly or simply juxtaposing their ideas and traditions to our own. Rather, it is directed primarily to ourselves, for our ability to listen to others is correlatively our ability to assimilate the implications of their answers through delving more deeply into the meaning of our tradition and drawing out new and even more rich insights. In other words, it is an acknowledgement that our cultural heritage has something new to say to us.

The characteristic hermeneutic attitude of democracy is then not methodological sureness, readiness for compromise or new techniques of social organization; these are matters of social critique and manipulation on the scientific or horizontal level. Instead, democracy is readiness through dialogue to draw vertically new meaning from the roots of a common tradition. Such a life is not a closed structure, but a continual unfolding of the limitless possibilities of Being present to us through our tradition. This is the source of our freedom and of the creativity needed to build the future.

Notes

2.
The Psychological Impact of Modernization and the Need to Retrieve the Human
Richard Knowles

It may have been possible at some time in the past to pose a choice between a retention of traditional culture and adaptation of modern ways. However, as Berger (1974) suggests, there are very few societies which today can be described simply as non-modern (p. 120). Whatever remnants of traditional attitudes may remain, it seems clear that modernization and the attitudes accompanying it have become the major context within which most of us live. In his analysis of modern technological society Ellul states flatly:

There is no doubt that all the traditional cultures and sociological structures will be destroyed by technique before we can discover or invent social, economic and psychological forms of adaptation which might possibly have preserved the equilibrium of these peoples and societies (p. 123).

Even in societies generally thought of as traditional, the acceleration of the move to modernization seems to bear out Ellul’s prediction. For example, Shiva Naipaul describes the hero of a recent novel from Kenya:

I have chosen to write about it not because it is a particularly good novel but because of the picture, the sociological portrait it offers of African urban man as not merely detrinalized but drained clean of any memory of tribal existence. Its obligations and sensibilities, its rituals and routines—these are all utterly alien to him. . . . Ben, on the face of it, has traveled awfully far awfully fast. His world is relentlessly urban; his city is universal. The unswept streets, the smoke-filled bars, the cafes serving espresso coffee, the whores, the pestilential tenements, the shantytowns are the props of that vast megalopolis thrown up by industrial civilization. Ben is as bereft of "roots," of "identity," as any of his slave-descended American and West Indian brothers. He could be in New York, in Kingston, in Jamaica, in Rio de Janeiro, in Soweto (1979, pp. 40-41).

In a more personal way, the same author, an Indian raised in Trinidad, describes his own experience of modernization:

But in what sense could I be called an Indian -- a Hindu? I could not speak a word of any Indian language -- English was my "mother" tongue; I had been through none of the prescribed Hindu rites de passage. . . . At the age of eighteen (which was when I left Trinidad), I was haphazardly cobbled together from bits and pieces taken from everywhere and anywhere. The ugly parallel that suggests itself is one of those shantytown hovels built up from whatever dross comes to hand -- bits and pieces of cardboard, tin, wood, corrugated iron. I had inherited no culture; no particular outlook; no particular form. . . . When I left Trinidad at the age of eighteen I was nothing (1979, pp. 103-104).

For a common understanding of modernization, if a definition is needed, Berger’s is as useful as any other:
Thus, we will discuss modernization as the institutional concomitant of technologically induced economic growth. . . . Modernization, then, consists of the growth and diffusion of a set of institutions rooted in the transformation of the economy by means of technology. . . . As modernization proceeds and is diffused beyond its original territory, we see the institutions of technological production and bureaucracy, together and separately, as primary agents of social change (1974, p. 9).

The experience of modernization is so familiar by now that it is almost taken for granted and its definitions generally include the same constituents.

In this paper I am interested in spelling out the modern predicament in more human terms and to do so will make use of the Care Structure of Martin Heidegger as a framework. This structure is described by Heidegger as the central structure of human existence and expresses "the fundamental characteristics of Dasein’s Being" (1927/1962, p. 293). (The term "Dasein" is used by Heidegger in order to avoid the misunderstandings accompanying the word "self"). The Care Structure itself has three fundamental characteristics: "The fundamental ontological characteristics of this entity (Dasein) are existentiality, facticity and Being-fallen" (p. 235).

The outline of this paper will follow the form of the Care Structure: modernization as facticity, modernization as fallenness, and grounds of existentiality or possibility.

**Modernization as Facticity**

Facticity refers to the fact that the person lives within limits, having a past, having been born into a certain tradition, family or social class, being male or female, and so forth. In sum, this characteristic refers to all the limits within which the person may be free. Facticity refers primarily to the past, but for human beings the past is not linear and set, but is constantly being worked out along with the present and the future.

As a first step, then, modernization is already an aspect of our facticity; although we may remember our traditions more or less well, we are not operating in a traditional context. We are in a situation where the traditional interpretation is only one of many options. This is a radical difference; we are in a modern situation which sets different limits to our possibilities: modernization is a major aspect of our facticity.

**Modernization as Fallenness: The Psychological Impact of Modernization**

Heidegger uses the term "fallenness" to express what we would call the ego aspect of the person. By this term he means the typical way in which we are occupied by the daily events of life, our everyday tasks, and the way in which this involvement enables us to avoid confronting some other basic issues, such as death. Rather than seeing the narrowly rational, technical person as the ideal, as tends to be the case with proponents of modernization, Heidegger calls this mode inauthentic, meaning that it is precisely in this aspect that we are not ourselves. This ego-functioning is an essential aspect of being human and has its place in the total picture. However, its totalization or primacy in human living can be described as inauthentic or what Heidegger calls living in the "they". "They," the public or the latest fashion, says that technical solutions should be found for whatever problems we have, including those created by technology in the first place. The inauthentic mode prompted by modernization, which will be described below, will need to be modified in order to become authentic.
Here I shall list a number of psychological characteristics which comprise the inauthentic mode of the modern person and modern life and, in the third section, propose ways in which these characteristics could be modified so as to open up the possibility of authentic living.

**Divided Existence and Complex Society**

In his book of this title J.H. van den Berg, a Dutch psychiatrist, takes the position that the modern person experiences a different reality and has an existence different from that of his traditional forebears. The world of the modern person is one of complexity and plurality; the subjective experience is one of being divided or, as van den Berg puts it, of having "not one, but two, three, four, many souls, selves or egos (p. 1). As the society becomes more complex, the person becomes more divided. Van den Berg rephrases the statement of William James (1891) in *The Principles of Psychology:* "Every person has as many different social selves as there are distinct groups of persons about whose opinion he cares" (1974, p. 4). As distinct from a relatively integrated, undivided existence the modern person is compartmentalized, specialized and divided.

**Homelessness**

One of the psychological consequences of living in plurality is what Berger (1974) calls a condition of homelessness. With the pluralization of both the private and the public spheres of life, "the (modern) individual attempts to construct and maintain a 'home world' which will serve as the meaningful center of his life in society. Such an enterprise is hazardous and precarious" (p. 66). He says that in contrast with previous periods of history where individuals lived in life-worlds that were more or less unified and integrated, the modern person is fragmented and split:

The final consequence of all this (pluralization) can be put very simply (though the simplicity is deceptive): modern man has suffered from a deepening condition of "homelessness." The correlate of the migratory character of his might be called a metaphysical loss of "home." It goes without saying that this condition is psychologically hard to bear. It has therefore engendered its own nostalgia... in oneself and, ultimately, in the universe (p. 82).

A third psychological characteristic of the modern person is a heightened self-consciousness. In traditional societies it is a compliment to say that a person plays the social role well, the role of father, mother, teacher, etc. There is a congruence between the role and the person; the person really expresses himself or herself through the role. The modern person would feel insulted to be accused of playing a role well; being oneself means to be doing something private, something disconnected from the social roles.

In this position of self-consciousness there is a great concern for spontaneity. Of course, people who talk about being spontaneous are those who are not, for somehow spontaneity becomes a self-conscious goal. Nothing will bring about self-consciousness quicker than the statement "Now let's stop playing roles and really communicate," yet this is the approach of the modern person. The attempt to will spontaneity leads to great confusion.

A shift has taken place from concern with the object of one's activity to concern with how one is doing. The position of self-consciousness really is the impossible one of standing apart from oneself to observe oneself doing something: this means that the action will not be smooth or harmonious.
This habit of self-consciousness has grown in large measure from the principles of modern psychology. The modern ideal is not that of the hero or saint, but of the healthy animal -- the natural, healthy animal. The focus again is on being natural or spontaneous, and there is the illusion that one can will this, thereby creating the condition of self-consciousness.

**The Denial of Death and Limitation**

Martin Heidegger has a section in *Being and Time* in which he shows how the public collaborates in the person’s fleeing in the face of death (pp. 296-299). Ernest Becker describes the many ways modern persons have of denying death, both in the development of their own character (pp. 47-66) and in their relationship with others (pp. 127-158). The point to notice in both of these descriptions is that the more we attempt to deny death, the more anxiety surrounds it.

Along with the denial of death, the final limitation, there is a similar attitude toward other limitations, that is, the attitude that one should free oneself from whatever limits one’s possibilities. This attitude is reminiscent of the earlier point about forgetting one’s tradition or history, since that limits one’s current possibilities. However, the attitude toward limits includes even more. In seeking to rid oneself of all determinations, facticities or limitations, the modern person actually undermines his or her possibilities, for these facticities are at the basis of our identity and provide the context within which our possibilities exist. In contrast, the modern person defines freedom as the greatest number of decontextualized options.

**Consumerism**

On the other side of these denials is the quest for a sense of well-being. But this is not the ordinary human tendency to self-esteem; rather, it is a shift in attitude, a cultural change. The highest goal being to feel good implies a fundamental change. Rieff describes this change as follows:

That a sense of well-being has become the end, rather than a striving after some superior communal end, announces a fundamental charge of focus in the entire cast of our culture -- toward a human condition about which there will be nothing further to say in the old style of despair and hope (p. 261).

This model of life leads to what Alisdair MacIntyre (1981) has called the rich Aesthete (the consumer consumed by consuming), one of the three ideal characters of modern society. The relationship such a person has to the world is that of a customer in a supermarket, the person choosing this or that, even this or that philosophy of life. Such a person may do a lot of choosing, but has completely lost the sense of being chosen for a mission or project of some kind.

**The Technical Attitude**

The fifth psychological characteristic of the modern person is the technical or manipulative attitude. The other two ideal characters of modern society mentioned by MacIntyre are the Manager who represents in his character the obliteraton of the distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative social relations, and the Therapist who represents the same obliteraton in the sphere of personal life. Both these characters are preoccupied with the use of technique; they
are concerned only with the efficient use of means. Jacques Ellul, has written a most thorough
description of this in *The Technological Society*. He has shown how deeply immersed we are in
the technical attitude and how practically everything is enclosed within it.

The manipulative, technical position is one of mastery over things and people. Perhaps a good
example would be the attitude which prompted earlier Americans to conquer the West, to cut down
the forests, to tame the wilderness and, in general, to subject nature to technology. This same
attitude has been applied to winning friends, becoming self-actualized and even to becoming
spiritual. What obviously is missing in the attitude is a receptivity to the world and others. It fits
well with the aesthetic or consumer mode since it is geared to getting what one wants.

This attitude is problematic in as much as it means being in control and reducing everything to
a matter of technique. The main question is not "What is it", but "How can I get it?" So, for the
modern person, meditation, for example, is not a being in the presence of the Other. It is not even
concerned with the Other, but is a technique for lowering blood pressure and for maintaining a
sense of well-being. To meditate in this way is not to be meditating, but is a technical attitude,
which might be involved in writing a book or taking a walk. All activity is reduced to mastery,
efficiency and neutrality. But obviously for authentic living one must be able to transcend
technique and the technical attitude. This is a very difficult task for the modern person.

**Individualism**

Another commonly acknowledged modern psychological characteristic is individualism. Berger describes this characteristic as follows:

The liberation of modernity has been, above all, that of the individual. Modern social structures
have provided the context for the socialization of highly individuated persons. Concomitantly,
modern society has given birth to ideologies and ethical systems of intense individualism. Indeed,
it has been suggested that the theme of individual autonomy is perhaps the most important theme
in the world view of modernity. The experience of ‘alienation’ is the symmetrical correlate of the
same individuation. Put simply ‘alienation’ is the price of individuation (p. 196).

It is somewhat paradoxical that the stress on the individual is accompanied by a reduction of
the individual to a unit or statistic. Whether the individual is reduced to a unit of production as
seems to be the case in the East, or to a unit of consumption as is more prevalent in the West, the
result is a sense of alienation on the part of the person.

Berger notes also that the reduction of the individual to a category is an arbitrary and
unproductive strategy on the part of bureaucracies. He contrasts the categorizing of the engineer,
where such an activity is appropriate, to that of the bureaucrat, where it is somewhat pointless:

The engineer puts phenomena into little categorical boxes in order to take them apart further or to
put them together in larger wholes. By contrast, the bureaucrat is typically satisfied once
everything has been put in its proper box (p. 49).

Consequently, the process of modernization makes it very difficult for the individual to engage
in genuine communal commitment. Rieff makes this point well:
Positive communities were, according to Freud, held together by guilt; they appear attractive only in distant retrospect, but the modern individual would have found them suffocating. Instead, the modern individual can only use the community as the necessary stage for his effort to enhance himself -- if not always, or necessarily, to enrich himself (p. 53).

The above list of psychological characteristics prompted by modernization, though not exhaustive, provides a general picture of the habitual or fallen mode of the modern person. It is the particular form of inauthenticity shared by modern persons. According to Heidegger, inauthenticity is an essential constituent of human existence which, with some modification, may become authentic; in any case, inauthenticity appears as the starting point for change.

Because any description of habitual or inauthentic modes is bound to seem negative, it is important, too, to take into consideration the benefits that have been achieved through modernization. Many of these achievements have been described by Berger:

On the other hand, the unqualified denunciation of the contemporary constellation of institutions and identities fails to perceive the vast moral achievements made possible by just this constellation -- the discovery of the autonomous individual, with a dignity deriving from his very being, over and above all and any social identifications. Anyone denouncing the modern world tout court should pause and question whether he wishes to include in that denunciation the specifically modern discoveries of human dignity and human rights. The conviction that even the weakest members of society have an inherent right to protection and dignity; the proscription of slavery in all it forms, of racial and ethnic oppression; the staggering discovery of the dignity and rights of the child; the new sensitivity to cruelty, from the abhorrence of torture to the codification of the crime of genocide . . . ; the new recognition of individual responsibility for all actions, even those assigned to the individual with specific institutional roles, a recognition that attained the force of law at Nuremberg -- all these, and others, are moral achievements that would be unthinkable without the peculiar constellations of the modern world. To reject them is unthinkable ethically. By the same token, it is not possible to simply trace them to a false anthropology (pp. 95-96).

**Existentiality: The Future Possibilities**

At the same time that we find ourselves limited, both in ourselves and by the situation of modernization, and that we are constantly falling into the modern mode of inauthenticity, there is a third fundamental characteristic of being human which Heidegger points out: it is the mode of the possible which he calls "existentiality." Authentic living is related most directly to this characteristic. We are authentic neither in merely surrendering to the facticity of modernization, nor in calculating and busyng ourselves in the modern fallen way, but in discovering and creating our possibilities. In these moments and in this mode the future has the highest priority (Gelven, 1970): "The future is the most determinate and significant of the three ekstases and Dasein’s basic focus of meaning is future" (p. 189).

**The Recovery of the Relational Self**

Modern approaches tend to identify the person primarily with his or her ego functioning, with what we have called the inauthentic mode of the person. Modern psychology, for example, is concerned with the prediction and control of behavior, rather than with understanding. There is a
whole range of authentic human experiences which are omitted from scientific study because they
do not meet the requirement of being easily measured. In Human Development and Human
Possibility (1986), I attempted to reintroduce some of these which had been suggested originally
by Erik Erikson: hope, will, sense of purpose, competence, commitment, fidelity, love, care and
wisdom. These experiences were identified as authentic experiences and always involved the self’s
relation-ship with others and the world. Because by modern psychology these authentic
experiences have been reduced to such terms as prediction, control, direction, technique, decision,
consistency, affiliation, responsibility and information-gathering, modern people tend to identify
themselves only with these functional experiences and lose the sense of their authentic, relational
selves. Then authentic experiences, which in some sense still remain at the core of our lives and
our identity, are relegated to the private sphere.

It is important for modern persons to recover the sense of self, rather than to consider themselves
as units, categories or functional entities. The self, which is both the discoverer and co-creator of
meaning needs to be recovered and given a central place in the future. The first step is to affirm
that it is in our authentic experiences that our authentic possibilities exist and not primarily in the
functional, reduced categories of activity.

Modification of Social Structures to Support Authentic Selfhood

Berger questions whether it is at all possible to transcend the modern habitual mode:

There is an underlying paradox in all ideologies that seek to control or contain modernity, a
paradox closely related to the phenomenon that we have called cognitive contamination: if one
wishes to control modernization, one must assume one has an option and the ability to manipulate.
Thus one may opt against modernity and seek to manipulate the processes of modernization. These
very ideas, however, are modern -- indeed, modernization -- in themselves. Nothing could be more
modern than the idea that man has a choice between different paths of social development. One of
the most pervasive characteristics of traditional societies is the notion that there is no choice; that
the structures of the given society are inevitable, rooted in human nature, or indeed in the very
constitution of the cosmos. Similarly, the notion that the course of human events can be
deliberately manipulated and controlled is a specifically modern notion, which is alien to the
thinking of most people in traditional societies. Therefore, at least in this one fundamental theme,
modern consciousness is a well-nigh irresistible force, and it imposes the theme of option and
manipulability even on those who most strenuously resist it. (pp. 176-177)

However, in his use of such modern terms as control, manipulation, options, etc., Berger seems
himself to be caught in the habitual mode of modern thinking, which Heidegger refers to as
"calculative thinking". Berger seems to be unaware of the possibilities of "meditative thinking,"
which Heidegger describes as:

The mark of all thinking that plans and investigates. Such thinking remains calculative even if it
neither works with numbers nor uses an adding machine or computer. . . . Calculative thinking is
not meditative thinking, not thinking which contemplates the meaning which reigns in everything
that is (p. 46).
He goes on to emphasize the necessity of freeing oneself from the habitual mode of calculative thinking:

The approaching tide of technological revolution in the atomic age could so captivate, bewitch, dazzle, and beguile man that calculative thinking may someday come to be accepted and practiced as the only way of thinking. What great danger then might move upon us? Then there might go hand and hand with the greatest ingenuity in calculative planning and inventing indifference toward meditative thinking, total thoughtlessness. And then? Then man would have denied and thrown away his own special nature -- that he is a mediative being. Therefore, the issues is the saving of man’s essential nature. Therefore the issue is keeping meditative thinking alive. (p. 56)

In order to envision the types of social structures which will promote an authentic sense of selfhood, it is therefore necessary to free oneself for meditative thinking as well as to avoid remaining entirely encapsulated within the modern habitual mode of thought. In contrast to Berger, it seems not only possible, but necessary to transcend the modern inauthentic mode, to alter it in such a way that a livable future for human beings becomes possible.

There follows an outline of the requirements to which future social structures must respond in order to promote authentic self-hood:

- **Meaning.** In order to encourage a sense of hope, the social structures must provide meaning to the seemingly chaotic and tragic experiences of life, such as death and suffering. Berger describes how modern society has not been successful in addressing this need for meaning, which at the same time has weakened religious interpretations which previously addressed this need:

  In one way or another, religion made meaningful even the most painful experiences of the human condition, whether caused by natural or by social agents. Modern society has threatened the plausibility of religious theodicies, but it has not removed the experiences that call for them. Human beings continue to be stricken by sickness and death; they continue to experience social injustice and deprivation. The various secular creeds and ideologies that have arisen in the modern era have been singularly unsuccessful in providing satisfactory theodicies. It is important to understand the additional burden to modernity implicit in this. Modernity has accomplished many far-reaching transformations, but it has not fundamentally changed the finitude, fragility and mortality of the human condition. What it has accomplished is to seriously weaken those definitions of reality that previously made that human condition easier to bear. This has produced an anguish all its own, and one that we are inclined to think adds urgency and weight to the other discontents we have mentioned. (p. 185)

- **Justice:** In addition to a shared sense of meaning, people also require an atmosphere of justice in which their will for the future, and, consequently, their good will is nurtured. Being assured of their basic human rights, they are enabled to participate in the decisions that affect their culture and its future. The legal and political institutions of the culture are particularly formative in this process.

- **Purpose and occasion:** A shared sense of purpose and economic institutions must provide an outlet for the activity of its citizens. Vocations of all kinds to which people are called need to find a place in an economy which assures people a livable wage and a sense of participation in the broader vision of the culture.
- **Competence:** The educational institutions need to be structured so as to provide young people with the sense of competency which is so essential to a meaningful human life. Their challenge is to overcome the exclusive emphasis of modern society on technical skills and to raise their sights to a higher level of quality performance. According to Herrigel, Eastern cultures may have an advantage in this area:

One of the most significant features we notice in the practice of archery, and in fact of all the arts as they are studied in Japan and probably in other Far Eastern countries, is that they are not intended for utilitarian purposes only or for purely aesthetic enjoyments, but are meant to train the mind; indeed, to bring it into contact with the ultimate reality. . . . If one really wishes to be master of an art, technical knowledge of it is not enough. One has to transcend technique so that the art becomes an "artless art" growing out of the Unconscious (pp. v-vi).

The reduction of a sense of competence to technique has impoverished the lives of many modern people and has lead to great dissatisfaction.

- **Commitment without fanaticism:** Commitments regarding love and work are essential for a full adulthood.

"Promises are made because by making them a man puts himself into what he considers a 'promising situation.' . . . He commits his person in the joyful hope of bringing to actuality the promise which he foresees as possible in his life (pp. 11-12). These promises mark the transition from adolescence to adulthood. In addition to providing the contractual bases for marriage and work commitments, social structures need to support people in this giving of themselves to open-ended and permanent commitments. In the West at present, more support is given to experimentation in commitments than to permanences of commitment. Those who wholeheartedly commit themselves to projects and groups need to be rewarded in order to sustain themselves in their commitments.

With regard to the experience of commitment one of the great dangers is that of fanaticism. The American psychologist, Gordon Allport (1962), has defined commitment as being at one and the same time half-certain and wholehearted; he has stressed the need for remaining open to doubt. Fanaticism subverts the experience by being full-certain and whole-hearted; in the twenty century we seem to have suffered greatly from this tendency. Cultural commitments are needed by the citizens, while guarding against the tendency toward fanaticism.

- **Heritage:** Finally, cultural institutions must be modified so as to preserve the wisdom of the culture, particularly the historic experience of its older citizens. The tendency of modern society to identify wisdom with information must be resisted and means must be found to reconnect the present generation with the wisdom of the culture. Universities, libraries and the more everyday structures of storytelling should be encouraged.

Obviously, all of the above suggestions cannot be carried out by a small group starting from a zero point. As noted above, the modern person for the most part lives an anonymous and a historical life. Modern people have lost the sense of their shared stories or histories and have lost the ability to make sense of their individual stories. It is impossible for each person or a small group to invent culture. Rather, it is necessary to reach back into the past and to recover the traditions which should have been passed from one generation to the next in order to make sense of the current situation. The tradition, naturally, will need to be reinterpreted in terms of one’s vision of the future, but it can provide a much needed context for the continuation of the story.
Summary

This chapter, following the format of Heidegger’s Care Structure, has attempted to establish that modernization is a major aspect of our facticity, for it is the situation in which we find ourselves. It has attempted to outline some of the major habitual patterns which comprise the particular mode of fallenness to which modern persons are prone. These patterns represent the modern form of inauthenticity, the character of being lost in the "they" or the public interpretation of things.

In order to move to authentic future possibilities, it has been suggested that it is necessary to modify some of these structures. As Heidegger says: Authentic Being-one’s-Self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the "they"; it is rather an existential modification of the "they" (p. 168).

In order to begin the process of modifying the inauthentic mode, some conception of the authentic relational self is necessary as a beginning point. This chapter identified some experiences of the authentic self and distinguished them from the more reduced inauthentic experiences. Finally, some general suggestions were made as to how social structures could be modified so as to support authentic selfhood. This implies a recovery of the cultural tradition and dialogue with it in the light of the future vision of the culture.

References

3. From Conflict to Fusion: The Character of Conceptual Change in China’s Rural Areas in the Initial Stage of Modernization

Li Junru

As the much larger part of the Chinese population is rural, modernization in rural areas is the key to the modernization of China as a whole. In this process the change in the ideas of the farmers becomes a significant problem which requires our special attention. After making a thorough survey we discovered that "from conflict to interfusion" expresses the basic direction and character of conceptual change in the initial stage of China’s rural modernization.

Interaction between Social Reform and Conceptual Change

To follow the change of traditional concepts in the rural areas in the course of China’s modernization since May, 1988, we have visited Songjiang County in suburban Shanghai four times for social surveys. The past ten years have seen remarkable social and economic changes in this county. For the industrial structure, the figures from 1978 for the first, second and third industries respectively were 47, 67 percent, 38.99 percent and 13.34 percent. But the figures of 1988 became 27.34 percent, 51.31 percent and 21.35 percent; the same change also appeared in the structure of the labor force. In 1978 about 81 percent of the total labor force in this county was in the first industry, 15.2 percent in the second industry, and only 3.8 percent in the third industry. But in 1988 the respective figures became 31.33 percent, 51.36 percent and 17.31 percent. The above change of figures shows that by 1988 Songjiang County had begun its economic and social transformation from a traditional agricultural society to an industrial or an even modernized society. Living in such a historical period of great economic and social changes, the Songjiang people could not help but alter their ideas and concepts.

The traditional society of Songjiang was agricultural and based on the natural economy. The predominant view regarded agriculture as the very foundation of this society. The following is a quote from the survey records written in 1931 by the students from the Administration Department of the Central Political School of the KMT government after a several week survey of the county:

Wherever we went we discovered that the peasants looked so poor and hungry and the houses in the villages were all so small, low and dilapidated that a single glance would convince you that the peasants in Songjiang were in a very difficult condition, one of bankruptcy. In one of the villages we saw a couple which read like this: "Two things are really important; they are farming and reading.” Simple as the words were, they described the true situation in most villages in the county.

The above quotation tells of a typical phenomenon in China’s traditional agricultural society: the basic concept of China’s poor and backward peasants was the concept of farming and reading -- of farming in particular. Even if by some chance one started an industrial enterprise and made a fortune, he would not spend his money on expanding his enterprise. Instead, he would most probably be satisfied with buying more land for the family, putting up new houses for themselves, their sons and grandsons, and living peacefully in self-sufficiency. This concept does not change much until the beginning of reform in the early 80’s. Only with the development of the industries in towns and the countryside, did this concept begin to give way to new ideas.
The traditional concept is now challenged by the following concepts:

- industry as a foundation,
- commodity economy,
- individualism which has close links with commodity economy,
- pragmatism,
- efficiency,
- science, and
- democracy.

In the past the people in Songjiang county devoted all their energy to the development of agriculture, but that failed to bring them affluence. They now begin to look for new ways to narrow the gap between city and countryside, between workers and peasants. In the 12 years from 1966 to 1977 the grain output in the county increased by 32 percent, but the actual income for each farmhand increased only by a half yuan during the same period.

What can be done to end this situation? They have, of course, to restructure their agricultural production. But what is more important, they have to develop industry in the countryside. Out of their own experience and practice they gradually formed a new concept, namely, that they cannot really become rich if they fail to develop industries. In doing our survey, we asked such question as, "What do you think are the most important, industry, agriculture, auxiliary production or commerce?" The reply was consistently the same: "Industry". Priority is already given to the development of countryside industries in mapping out work plans among the cadres at various levels in the countryside. This development has enabled them through the market to escape their narrow countryside and enter into the whole country and even the world. Thus a new concept has taken shape in their minds: "There is no progress without commerce."

This change of concepts comes from China’s economic reforms in the 30’s, but in turn it promotes economic reforms. There exists a dialectical and interactive relationship between the change of concepts and economic reform. This is a distinguishing feature in the change of concepts in the rural areas of China today.

**The Identity of Renewal and Fusion**

At the initial stage of the economic reform in 1980’s among the people across Songjiang county there arose lively discussion about "conceptual renewal". This resulted from the unavoidable conflicts between the traditional concept and the drive for modernization which were expressed as follows:

*The contradiction between obligation and interests.* In China’s traditional agricultural society Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism had a deep-rooted influence over the people. In the Ming and Qing dynasties, there emerged in Songjiang 408 Jinshi (successful persons who passed the highest imperial exams), which clearly reflected a prevalence of Confucianism. In old China, there were in the county proper 19 Buddhist temples, 20 convents, 45 other temples and 11 Taoist temples. This in one way showed how popular Buddhism and Taoism were among the people. One of the characteristics of such a culture was to emphasize control over one’s self-interest and in contrast to emphasize obligation so as to submit oneself to nature and society. For example, in Songjiang’s Fang Pogoda park, there stands a large sized brick, carved with a monstrous beast
named "Tan" (greed). It was so greedy and unsatisfied that though it owned the earth and its power, it attempted to swallow up the sun, but only to fell into the East China Sea and drowned. The erecting of the figure by Taoists in the Ming dynasty was aimed at advising people to give up desires and let things take their own course. The concept "deny self and return to propriety", though it has its own place in the national culture, does not meet totally the needs of industrialized and commercial development. Therefore, some people proposed justifying "fame and gain", holding that without benefits there will be no incentive, nor any development. In the past, when a person was looking for a job he wanted to work in a big enterprise; now he is inclined to work where he can earn more money. In the economy, output value has come to be regarded as more important. As regards social value, in the past ideology always came first; now personal income stands in the front line. No wonder some old people found it hard to understand it, sighing that human morals were declining with each passing day.

The contradiction between a stationary and a mobile stance. Due to the influence of natural economy, people in Songjiang are in favor of a stationary stance rather than mobility. Often they describe Songjiang as a land of fish and rice, with the saying that "nine of ten (wild) deer (from Songjiang) turn around". The negative side of the legend illustrates the conceptual character of Songjiang people’s pursuit of a quiet life whereas the development of industry and a commodity economy has the character of intense mobility and change. At the initial stage of this rapid development of modernization people felt conceptually inept and psychologically over-whelmed.

The contradiction between "single and multiple". The pursuit of harmonious integration is an aspect of the traditional concept of Songjiang people’s. But a variety of economic patterns has emerged socially since the implementation of reform on the basis of the diversity of interests resulting from the emergence of various economic elements and commodity competition. A multiple price system has replaced the single price which used to be emphasized. As to distribution, there are several wage systems instead of a single one as in the past. Regarding the allocation of labor, multiple channels have been opened to substitute for the single one operated by the state, etc. Diversified concepts have begun to take shape. Some are happy about this, whereas others are not because it is very difficult to choose between "single" and "multiple".

Confronted with such conceptual conflicts key persons in the forefront of the modernization drive called strongly for a renewal of the overall concept, to replace what is now obsolete by something brand new. But in the renewal of concepts three patterns have emerged:

1. The co-existence of two concepts in an equilibrium within one overarching concept with mutual checks. When the concept of "taking industry as the foundation began to conflict with that of "taking agriculture as the foundation", people became anxious about agricultural development. However, the people of Songjiang have successfully created a new economic structure coordinating the development of industry, agriculture and auxiliary production by skillfully combining the two different concepts. They put forward a slogan of "stabilizing agriculture, developing auxiliary production, and focusing efforts on industrial development", they also formulated a policy of taking a part of the profits from industry to assist agriculture. Thus, a new concept of mutual assistance has been shaped. The formation of such a concept is quite complicated, but keeps a balance between the traditional concept of mutual supplementation and the modern concept.
2. The two concepts, interacting with and infiltrating each other, have formed one. In the conflicts of concepts between obligation and interests, stability and mobility, monolith and multiplicity the people first complained that "society degenerates, morality declines". But before long they found that the two conflicting concepts could be combined into one. For instance, it is advisable to take into consideration the interests of people, so that it could be asked that obligations be performed on the basis of interests. When a conflict between obligation and interests undermines the public interests, people are asked to protect public interests through sacrificing "little" interests to perform "big" obligations. Also by appealing for the stability of the whole, considerable changes can be made within the material and psychological limits of acceptability by the people. On the basis of multiple developments a new unity can be built, and within the demands of unity multiple developments should be allowed. For example, energy, raw materials and the funds used by township industrial enterprises all come from the market, and their products mainly go to market. It pertains to the nature of multiplicity, that the quota of production and profit for the township enterprises be fixed by the township governments; it is of the nature of unity, however, that people judge such combinations to be both viable and stable.

3. One concept assimilates the other concept, to form mixture. The people of Songjiang traditionally enjoy local operas such as Shanghai Opera and Shaoxin Opera, but since the start of the "reform and opening" policy the noble performing arts of such local operas have been snubbed, while third-rate light song and dance has become a hit. In 1986 Shaoxin Opera performed 34 times, and Shanghai Opera 17 times at the Songjiang People’s Theater, while the Light Song and Dance Troupe performed 41 times at the same place. In 1987, Shaoxin Opera performed only 11 times, Shanghai Opera 18 times, while the Light Song and Dance Troupe performed 44 times with much higher priced tickets and a larger audience. This is unprecedented in the history of Songjiang county. A survey further reveals that those who still like the traditional local opera, are old people above the age of 50, while those who prefer light song and dance performances are all young people, men and women, below the age of 35. While aged people regard the light song and dance to be low class art, young people hold that the fast rhythm of light song and dance has a contemporary atmosphere.

Obviously, this is a clash between old and new concepts, but things have changed since 1988. Now the most welcome performing art in Songjiang is the folk song sung to the rhythms of the pop music, or the traditional opera presented in the style of modern song and dance. A new cultural concept has emerged characterized by the mixture of Chinese and Western culture and an assimilation of modern culture by traditional culture, which itself is renewed in the process of assimilation.

All the above three cases tell us that it is possible for the traditional concepts to be renewed, preserved and developed under new forms. It may well be said that the renewal and fusion of concepts is another important character of conceptual change in present China’s countryside.

The Complexity of Negative Combinations

According to research, by no means has the conceptual change in Songjiang been ideal in the past ten years of reform and opening with the development of a commodity economy.

The advocacy of a commodity economy was originally aimed at getting rid of the influence of feudal, autocratic and small production ideas deeply rooted in Chinese society. But other noticeable phenomena appeared in the course of the renewal of concepts.
One is that the combination of the concepts of commodity economy and small production has distorted the image of socialist commodity economy. Egalitarianism, for example, is an important character of small production ideology, whereas, one of the goals of reform is to change the phenomenon of egalitarianism. It is historic progress that a batch of township and individual enterprises has emerged in the development of a commodity economy in Songjiang county. But the investigation showed that the internal management of the market enterprises bears a strong resemblance to the distribution system in the state-run enterprises, and still retains a largely egalitarian manner. The narrow-mindedness of the farmer’s small production, moreover, generates localism which accompanies the development of a commodity economy.

Another new phenomenon is the combination between the concepts of commodity economy and feudalism, which has marred the socialist market economy. The concept of market economy should have restrained the concept of feudalistic privilege because it pursues equality and freedom. But Chinese traditional concepts of hierarchy and privilege are so persistent that they combine even with the concept of commodity economy, thus enabling professional workers to "profiteer by using power". This accounts for the emergence of unhealthy trade practices which disgust people.

This combination of negative conceptual elements is one character of conceptual change in the early period of modernization in the Chinese countryside. Therefore, the way to socialist modernization must confront arduous and complicated tasks which will require much further and more careful efforts to explore the mechanisms for mutual restraint in combining traditional concepts with modern ones, and overcoming negative elements in the process of conceptual renewal.
Recently, many countries throughout the world have taken modernization as a goal and are working unceasingly to raise its level. Early in the period of the May 4th (1919) movement people used the term "modernization" in their discussion of cultures East and West. In July 1933, the Sheng Bao Monthly in Shanghai published a special issue on "The Modernization of China" showing that the Chinese peoples looked forward to the realization of modernization. However, at that time this was impossible because China was a semi-feudal, semi-colonial society. Real modernization of a country requires that the whole nation be awakened and that the traditional culture be fully carried forward. Otherwise, modernization imposed by the force of foreign power could only be semi-colonial and semi-feudal, not a modernization in the scientific sense.

The founding of the new China in 1949 opened wide the opportunity for China to realize socialist modernization. In the last 40 years by constant effort the Chinese people have made great progress in founding an independent industrial and national economic system with its multiple dimensions.

Traditional Culture and Modernization

As China is a country with a population of well over one billion people the Chinese government is practicing a policy of reform and opening in order to boost the realization of socialist modernization. There are two opposing points of view on how to realize modernization in China. One holds that it is necessary to start from the actual condition of Chinese society, carrying forward our own national cultural tradition; by maintaining a policy of self-reliance, this would make China a socialist modern country with its own character. The other holds that China can realize modernization only if it thoroughly abandons its traditional culture for Westernization; some maintain even that in this contemporary era of reforming and opening it is necessary to break completely with the traditional ideas in which they see not truth but fallacy: traditional culture is seen not only as worthless but as suffocating and the roots of the country's backwardness. Therefore, to understand the relation between the traditional culture of China and modernization is a problem of great significance.

Chinese Traditional Culture

A traditional culture is the crystallization of the material and spiritual wealth created by a nation through social practice over a long period of time. It represents the spirit of the nation and is the source for the re-creation of any newer and higher civilization. Hence, modernization cannot abandon traditional culture, for it is rather a development on the ground of traditional culture. (In contrast, modernization is characterized by modern scientific culture and spiritual civilization.) People can modernize their country only by carrying on their own nation’s cultural tradition, not by sheer fabrication. Each country has its own particular cultural tradition, and a foreign culture can be put to real use only when combined with this. Rejecting one’s own traditional culture will never bring results, for that cuts off one’s roots.
History develops according its own rule which can be changed not by man’s will. Only by operating in accord with that objective rule can there be correct and valid social practice. Engels stressed: "History is all what we have" (Collected Works of Marx and Engles, vol. 1, p. 650). History is so important because it re-presents the developmental procedure of things; it is a mirror from which we can draw lessons and strength. To deny traditional culture would be to deny history and the national spirit so that we could see nothing and would be sure to fail in practice.

Its traditional culture and spirit is important for a country because that which is most dreadful is not poverty, but the loss of spiritual support; this is the more lamentable and dangerous. A drop in the spirit allows for the re-emergence of ugly social phenomena which long since had been wiped out. Here, the main cause is being influenced by fallacious ideas of value and losing one’s fine traditional national culture.

The traditional culture of the Chinese people, formulated over a long period of social practice, represents the national spirit of China. Its persistence in actual life reflects the conviction that all depends on human efforts, that man will triumph over nature and realize a happy life all by himself: Don’t hope to find your fortunate on the other shore. According to an ancient Chinese saying: "Heaven operates strongly and the gentleman should try his best constantly" (Zhou Yi). This positive philosophy of life drives the Chinese people to fight against all kinds of social diseases and natural disasters, to blame god and man, but to submit to the will of Heaven. The unity between their ideal and actuality is realized through their own practice. This spirit of independence and reliance on one’s own efforts is essential for us today in order to realize modernization. Only a nation which firmly grasps its fate in its own hands can have the confidence and strength to create a new and happy life.

Chinese traditional culture highly emphasized the beauty of personality and self-cultivation; it looks down upon greedy desires and self-interest. With regard to the beauty of personality, Mencius said: "To be full of good in one’s mind is so-called beauty"; this means integrating one’s moral principle, the cultivation of knowledge and aesthetic emotion and expanding this in all aspects of human behavior and style. Based on this principle, Mencius formulated more fully the moral standard: "Neither riches nor honors can corrupt him, neither poverty nor lowly condition can make him swerve from principle, neither threats nor force can bend him" (Mencius, "Teng-weng gong", Part 2.). This traditional virtue is very precious as it is essential for being a man.

Now, however, some advocate that: "The key to anti-traditionalism is to smash the old national personality thoroughly in order to recreate anew a modern national personality. The founding of this modern personality is the liberation of the perceptual life of the individual." This point of view rejects all traditional moral principles and the traditional personality as feudal dross entirely out of date. This is absurd, for as the development of the human world has the character of inheritance, we cannot cut off the present from the past. That is, present moral principles are not fabricated, but are developed upon the inheritance of good traditional moral principles. The realization of a lofty personality is a concrete representation of the ideal of truth, good and beauty in a person determined by particular historical conditions and social practice. Therefore, "the founding of a modern personality" cannot be by a "liberation of perceptual life", but by social practice. To put it bluntly, the so-called "modern personality" is nothing but putting the individual above all -- taking the individual as the centre of all things. It cannot but direct the individual into a dangerous path of opposition to society. Since the individual cannot in the end renounce the world, neither can "the liberation of the individual’s perceptual life" leave the social process. Therefore, were we to abandon the national personality we could not expect a new modern personality; it would be nothing but fantastic talk and fabrication.
In any case, a man must have some spirit, which comes from his sense of mission and responsibility to his nation and human society. The modern personality requires a broader vision and the relation of one’s happiness and fortune to that of the nation and all mankind. If a person puts his own interests above all, injures others for the sake of his own advantage, seeks his own private gain at public expense, and intends nothing but profit then one cannot talk of personality, to say nothing of doing what he ought to contribute to the society. Albert Einstein said rightly: "The social value of a person consists first of all in how much his sentiment, thought and behavior promote the benefit of mankind" (collected Translations in Memory of Einstein).

To pursue the truth one must dare to sacrifice, be concerned about the condition of life before others, and enjoy comfort after others; these are essential elements in the Chinese cultural tradition. The Chinese traditional culture despises the villain who cares for nothing except saving his or her own skin, and seeks only one’s own ease and comfort. Regarding truth and value and the relation between the individual and the state, the ancient Chinese philosophers eulogized the spirit: "Dare to lay down one’s life for a justice cause", "The principle (Tao) is so important that if one knows it in the morning, it is no pity for him to die in the evening." Confucius said: "Great wealth and high social position based upon injustice are for me like floating clouds." The progress of human society accompanies man’s pursuit of truth. To search and persist in truth requires the spirit of hard work before others and the enjoyment of comfort after others, sacrificing one’s own wealth, rank and even life.

It is this spirit that has long inspired our nation’s growth despite fighting and civil war. Modern civilization requires that people bear in mind the need of the whole world and act in all matters according to the truth, for the current world has become a global community. The peoples of the world, whether or not they are aware of it, depend on each other; what the people do in some particular area may influence the people in other areas. Hence, only by constantly raising the people’s understanding of this and consciously fighting together for truth and justice, can the world’s civilization and prosperity safely develop.

History of Geographic Environment

The formulation of the Chinese cultural tradition is closely linked with its particular historical and geographic environment. As vanguard in the Modern Revolution of China, Li Dazhao said: "Our Yangzhi River and Yellow River may represent our national spirit. They go forward vastly and mightily with the momentum of a land-slide" ("A Hard Fortune of the Country and The Mighty People"). This environment shapes the particular cultural tradition and character of our people. Therefore, although the Chinese nation has met countless difficulties and hardships in its development, eventually it overcame them with an unyielding spirit. Each twist and turn in this development further awakened the whole nation and moved it forward with even greater courage. Mao Tse-tung once said to his guards when crossing the Yellow River: "You may despise everything but the Yellow River: to despise the Yellow River is to despise our nation." Today, some in China take every chance to depreciate the Yellow River Culture, considering it the opposite to modernization. This point of view is either a national nihilism or a typical metaphysics, for the Yellow River Culture is the origin of the Chinese culture.

The particular mode of production, the style of living and the way of thinking of a country could be only the continuation of the national traditional culture. Hence, one cannot talk about actual affairs without the tradition. One who advocates rejecting all traditional culture and realizing "Westernization exclusively" seems to be for a "revolution" realizing modernization ahead of
schedule. However, this is nothing but a facade, for one who looks down upon his own nation’s cultural tradition as worthless would never love his motherland and work hard for its prosperity.

In fact, western culture too can be distinguished into two parts: one worthy, the other worthless such as the value of money which is criticized even in the West. Hence the introduction of Western culture into China, can have good effect only if it is analyzed with discrimination. History shows us that a successful country in transition can never regret its national cultural tradition and worship with blind faith things that are foreign. It must carry out the transformation on the basis of the traditional culture of its own nation. A good example is the Japanese way of modernization. Though a very backward country before the Meiji Restoration, it did not abandon its traditional culture, but transformed it, on the one hand, and introduced foreign scientific culture, on the other. Especially after the second World War, it devoted major efforts to developing scientific education. While stressing the rational administration of enterprises, it took man as central. In involving the culture of enterprises, the staff was taught to follow the common ideas regarding morality, ideas and values. This led to a high level of creativity and spiritual cohesion among the Japanese people which enabled the country to recover rapidly from the war damage. Having modernized its national economy early in the 70’s, it surpassed Britain, France and West Germany to become one of the most powerful economic countries in the world.

Thus, the relation between traditional culture and modernization is not one of opposites, but of dialectical unity. This entails that, on the one hand, modernization cannot abandon traditional culture and, on the other hand, that the traditional culture can keep its vitality only through developing new practices. Although traditional culture, as an accumulation of wisdom and historical experience, has its particular implications, it is not static or unchangeable but develops along with social practice. Any old tradition which has lost its vitality and value falls into disuse; this fact is not subject to man’s will.

World Culture

National traditional cultures and world civilization interact with each other. The civilization of the world does not result simply from one country or nation, but is created by people all over the world. Due to the different conditions of various countries, each country makes its distinctive contribution to the world’s civilization. The difference here is in whether a country’s civilization will be more or less, not in whether a country does or does not have a contribution for the world. As an essential element of the human world, no country is an isolated being; its being and development cannot but influence, as well as be influenced by, other countries in one way or another. Four Chinese inventions: gun powder, the compass, paper and printing, have made great contributions to the world. The fact that Chinese culture is now very popular in the West shows that this ancient traditional culture still has its function in the world. Similarly, China has learned many things from foreign countries which have promoted the development of the Chinese civilization. Indian Buddhism was introduced to China from the time of the Han and Tang Dynasties. In the thirteenth century the Italian, Marco Polo, brought some elements of European culture into China, and returned with many elements of Chinese culture. Over two thousands years ago the Chinese learned the use of coal for fire, but it was not until the thirteenth century that Europeans learned about it through Marco Polo. Of course, he also criticized fiercely binding the feet of the woman and feudal superstitions in China.

Since modern times, the introduction of many scientific and other elements of Western culture to China has had a positive role in promoting the development and renewal of Chinese traditional
culture. All this shows that the national traditional culture and the world civilization interact and are influenced by each other. From this point of view, we can say also that what is of the nation is also of the world. Only if each country develops its particularities fully in order to contribute its share to the world can the development of the world civilization be assured. On the contrary, a country could not improve its future by indiscriminately imitating and copying the experience of other countries at the cost of its own particularities. Hence, the attitude of a country toward modernization is determined by understanding the current world and its tendency as well as its own cultural tradition. It could have no future without attending to the development of the current world and its particularities rather than closing the country to international interchange, giving in to parochial arrogance and sticking to conventions. It has hope only if it directs its development and promotes its process of modernization by effectively combining its own traditional culture with world civilization in an organic unity.

**Tension and Requirements of Modernization**

**Tensions**

The traditional culture is like a storehouse which contains both what is essential and dross: we can neither adopt national nihilism rejecting our whole traditional culture, nor take everything as being of the quintessence of Chinese culture and worship it blindly. What is important for a new development of traditional culture is to use scientific methods in carrying it forward critically, to select the essence and discard the dross; we must either follow the traditional culture, or dare and be good at breaking through it. Note that breaking through and abandoning traditional culture are distinguished from each other in principle: to break through is to sublate, while to abandon is to deny it subjectively and individually. The latter violates the rules of development, whereas the need to break through the traditional culture consists in traditional culture being itself a contradictory unity with both positive and inert aspects. This inertia can be seen in three contradictions.

**The first is the contradiction between history and present reality.** A traditional culture is not formed in a day, but over a long historical period. As it is by the experience and wisdom provided by traditional culture that we can make constant progress in the reformation of the objective and subjective world, without traditional culture there would have been no history. On the other hand, no successful tradition can be out of touch with, or avoid some combination with, present reality. But, since reality changes and develops continuously, while tradition is an accumulation of history, no tradition can wholly accord with the reality. Some of its aspects which are out of date may even hinder or do great damage to the development of reality. Further, coherence between tradition and reality is relative and conditional, for tradition is a general concept while reality is a concrete and vivid process. This requires that people must neither stress tradition or not make it a dogma in practice. Only thus, can tradition serve in a process of change.

**The second is the contradiction between existence and idea.** As an ideology traditional culture reflects social existence. But once formed it is relatively independent and does not change immediately along with social existence. In some aspects it functions more or less, obviously or dimly, over a long period for it is a strong spiritual power. Existing in the psychic structure of human and social culture, it cannot change easily. Thus, it has been 40 years since the founding of the new China in whose constitution it has been put down in writing that women have the same social position and equal rights as men. But, in people’s minds, especially in rural areas, the feudal
idea of regarding men as superior to women still exists. Thus, if a wife gives birth to a boy her parents-in-law and husband will be very pleased, and her position in the family will rise high. On the contrary, if she gives birth to a girl the whole family will be displeased and will not be satisfied until she produces a boy. This traditional idea is against modern civilization and harmful to the modernization and development of China whose main difficulty is the heavy burden of too great a population on the economy, preventing the level of material and spiritual life from advancing greatly in a short time.

The third is the contradiction between understanding and sentiment. Generally speaking, understanding looks forward and adopts new things more easily, while sentiment is apt to yearn for the past. Understanding is rational knowledge of things expressed by concepts which master things in their unity. Sentiment is a subjective experience of concrete things and apt to incline to the past. As we know, people usually show their feelings when they have some practical interests. Of course, as a sort of human wisdom sentiment is essentially a unity of reason and perception which cannot be separated from each other. Traditional inertia expresses itself in the habits of individual feelings which have a broad social foundation and constitutes a certain psychic attitude. Therefore it is difficult to ask people to overcome their inertia in a short time; in order to become conscious of it sometimes they must be taught in practice again and again. Here, various kinds of stimulating educational methods must be used. Only in raising their spiritual quality can people come to love all things valuable.

In short, traditional culture can keep its vitality only through verification in practice. It will court self-destruction if it is against modernization. Furthermore, as modernization deepens more and more, we must continually reconsider traditional culture through practice. Only thus can we effectively promote modernization and constantly improve traditional culture.

**Requirement**

Modernization is a great systematic social project. For China this includes mainly three tasks:

Firstly, the construction of material civilization is an essential condition and foundation for the construction of spiritual civilization. We cannot even talk about the other aspects of modernization without raising material production and the progress of science and technology. Hence, the fundamental task of modernization is to make a great effort to develop the forces of production.

Secondly, the construction of spiritual civilization must include both developing education, science and culture, and strengthening the construction of theory and morality. The modernization of society cannot take place apart from the modernization of human beings, for the realization of all constructive processes depends upon them.

Thirdly, reformation of structures or the system of organization is essential, for only by reforming unreasonable structures can a system operate well, bring into play all the positive factors and creativity and promote the development of productive forces. Recently, China has been at a turning point of deepening reformation; it has been a period of social reformation from the old system to a new one. During this time, conflict and struggle between the new system of organization and the old one, the traditional culture and modernization, the old idea and the new idea is unavoidable. The key to resolving these contradictions and conflicts consists in the correct policy measures and direction, boosting the development of productive forces and persisting in the construction of both civilizations, material and spiritual.
Construction of these civilizations and organizational reform promote one another. Without the construction of material civilization and development of the economy the construction of spiritual civilization would be a mere formality, reformation of the organizational system could not be carried out, and we would lose direction so that none of the three could advance. Several years ago, in constructing material civilization, China neglected spiritual civilization. This resulted in many problems in social life which harmed the development of modernization. This experience teaches us once again that we must persist in the principle of constructing both civilizations. Reality, too, tells us that when the spiritual world is backward, even should production be developed and the material life elevated, human spiritual life still will be poor and void resulting in a waste of wealth.

For instance, many people in Wengchou were too poor to afford necessary food during the cultural revolution, but in recent decades, due to the reform policy, they rapidly have become rich. But they spend great sums on building ancestral graves or even their own. As China’s land resources are very limited, however, if people have only old ideas, even when they have money, how can modernization and modern civilization be developed. Only by raising the spiritual quality of man can constructive modernization take place.
One might ask about the need to deal with such a speculative problem as wisdom, but the theme "traditional attitude and modernization," raises many related urgent problems. At the dawn of human civilization peoples experienced astonishment and undertook the ancient work of philosophy to express their love for wisdom. Now, people are busy picking the fruits of the positive sciences from the tree of knowledge, so that wisdom having disintegrated and been substituted by the positive sciences, philosophy now seems to have a dim prospect.

However, people recognize that human beings are facing serious conflicts and crises in the process of modernization which result from man’s misguided vision and action. Hence, it seems important to review the fundamental nature of wisdom. Only in reflecting upon such speculative problems can philosophy in turn revive its vitality.

In fact, developing human wisdom is more urgent in modern society than ever before. In our age of an explosion of information various branches of knowledge are emerging; scientific technique develops at an ever accelerating speed and characterizes contemporary social life. Man creates new worlds, which suggests in turn that only by mastering scientific technique does one have the right to live in the world. Today, not only do highly developed technical professions require skilled workers, but in the traditional industrial and agricultural production, and even in household work, people increasingly use technical means. The computer enters even into man’s creative work in the fine arts. It may perhaps be expected that soon a person ignorant of scientific technique will be able to do nothing in modern social life and therefore will be expelled therefrom.

To adapt to the development of social life, people generally emphasize education. Knowledge accumulated over thousands of years is concentrated into a basic course to be grasped in little more than a decade. As a result, classical physics, chemistry, biology, and so on, have become common knowledge among middle school students. But education can limit one, as well as make one knowledgeable. Because social development requires cooperation by various experts, long before the individual chooses the way of freely deploying his wisdom, social life already has determined the way and the direction he should take. In the present situation while the total knowledge possessed by human beings is increasing, the knowledge grasped by the individual becomes relatively ever more narrow due to the division of labor. For instance, the New Encyclopedia Britannica needs to be revised almost every year, and the number of authors exceeds 4,000. The contradiction between the boundless character of the action of knowing and the limitation of an individual’s life, the infinite expansion of human knowledge and the relative reduction of that of the individual, are not limited to our age, though they are more serious in the present day. They confront us with the question: what influence does this have on human beings and how can these contradictions be resolved.

These questions must be raised because these contradictions already have influenced the human condition. For the most part, a human’s value depends on the relations one establishes between oneself and the surrounding world, including nature and society. The richer the relation, the greater human’s value. Nowadays, through their actions human beings have developed rich relations to nature and the society reflecting the color and complexity of the world. On the other hand, the relation between the individual and the world is limited to a relatively small sphere, as each person lives in the world only by his special profession. This leads some philosophers to
conclude that in the social life of developed countries one feels rather homeless or alienated. Some would even say that contemporary man suffers the crisis of having become one dimensional, meaning that the realization of human’s full human value is obstructed. Is it possible to change this situation by human wisdom; if so, what is nature of such wisdom?

**The Nature of Wisdom**

Whenever one grasps knowledge, overcomes difficulties and deals with actual affairs, one uses wisdom; wherever one acts, his or her life sparkles with wisdom. But if we ask: What is wisdom? no direct answer can easily be given. A correct judgment includes wisdom, but it is difficult to judge what wisdom is for it cannot be death as an object of knowledge or an objective thing. However, let us attempt a description.

Though all our knowledge treats ourselves as an object, wisdom surely is not an object. It consists in the process of its exercise just as the meaning of the words lies in the context in which they are used. Thus, even a proverb full of wisdom could be dull if used indiscriminately, while an ordinary saying can sparkle with wit when used appropriately. Knowledge is certain and can be expressed exactly; wisdom makes knowledge possible and certain but cannot be ascertained precisely because it is subtle in its use. Therefore, we may say that knowledge is something present, while wisdom conceals itself behind knowledge.

Wisdom then is a concealed power which makes knowledge present. But we cannot describe it with the concept of potentiality which is the opposite of actuality. We can say that a physical, chemical or biological property is potential when it lacks the necessary conditions for its realization, but wisdom, although always concealed, is a real being as long as man acts. It is a reality that we can experience ourselves, for everyone of us is a wise being present at hand. Therefore, we would describe it as an actual possibility.

Since wisdom permeates the action of human beings, which will continue as long as there are human beings, no limitation can be defined for wisdom. We cannot enumerate the kinds of human action, nor can we prejudge its change or future development. Wisdom is openness: it opens along with the human’s life and consists in the full disclosure of human vitality. Since wisdom is boundless, we cannot define it simply by some of its aspects, for each would subtract from the integrity of the meaning of wisdom.

From the above discussion, we can express the nature of wisdom only negatively, for if some of its particular aspects were positively determined by us the rest of its meaning would be lost. For instance, people usually take reason as man’s highest wisdom, but then reduce reason to the capacity for logical thinking. As wisdom is the essential feature of man, they then define human beings as rational animals. This is not wrong, but it is not a perfect definition of man, for it denies the existence of the irrational function which also is an element of human wisdom. The imperfection of that definition lies in its one-sided understanding of wisdom.

Since wisdom consists in its fullness, we must avoid sinking into an onesided point of view when in search of it. Wisdom should be disclosed fully; this will avoid the one-dimensional man. People are inclined not to think of the fullness of wisdom. Usually they think a person to be wise or not according to whether he or she is competent for some particular skilled works, or how much knowledge he can grasp. But wisdom does function in grasping knowledge or in skills in operation; wisdom as full dimensional rather than a particular knowledge or skill. However, if the individual can only live by his special profession, how can one pursue wisdom apart from particular knowledge or skills. This then is the point. If we cannot search wisdom apart from our professions,
we need nevertheless to transcend from that particular knowledge or skill to the higher level at which wisdom resides. But is it possible to carry out such transcendence? Let us look for an answer among the words of ancient Chinese philosophers.

Transcendence from Particular Knowledge to Wisdom in Chinese Philosophy

Zhang Zi, one of the remarkable representatives of Taoism in ancient China, wrote at the beginning of his essay "The Principle of Keeping Good Health": "My life is limited, but knowledge is boundless. One must be at one’s wits end to follow boundless knowledge in one’s limited life." His main idea is that since our limited life cannot catch up with boundless knowledge, we should only grasp the key thing for the sake of keeping ourselves in health: that key thing is Tao. He suggests this idea in the following fable.

Once there was a cook who was very good at dissecting cows. As he had a profound understanding of the complex structure and the veins of a cow, he dissected as gracefully as if dancing. His knife, used for nineteen years, was still new and as sharp as if it had just been sharpened. In response to applause from visitors, the cook gave an unusual answer saying that the reason for his successful performance was that he had grasped Tao. "What I love most is Tao, rather than technique." Here Tao means "following Providence, . . . following the inherent nature of everything." He added: "Tao is not something seen by our eyes, but must be followed by the mind."

Having heard the cook’s words, King Weiwen who was among the visitors said that he suddenly understood the way of keeping good health. One may doubt how this could be, for is there any relation between dissecting a cow and keeping good health? Though it may seem rather mystic, the reason in fact is very simple. According to Taoism, there is only one Tao which acts as a general law and penetrates every thing and every process. Here, Tao is understood also as natural law; it dominates the organism of a human being, as well as that of a cow. To keep good health, one should follow Tao, that is, one should behave oneself according to the law of nature. Since nature is aimless, any strong desire of man is considered to be against Tao. So Zhang Zi said: "To be good is not to seek reputation; to be evil is not to violate the law. Always keep your mind at the center of your body." This means, both striving for reputation and violating the law come from man’s strong desire; it even indicates that nature is neither good, nor evil. To be too careful about good or evil is against nature. So the last sentence in the quotation means, try to rid your mind of any desire.

The story tells us that, according to Zhang Zi, since knowing is boundless and the individual cannot expect to grasp all knowledge, one had better grasp the highest principle, Tao, for one’s essential interests, namely, to keep oneself in good health and be long-lived. Though Tao is not something present at hand and cannot be seen by one’s eyes, yet one can experience Tao in everything one does for Tao is in everything. Of course, this suggests also that a wise person is one who has grasped Tao.

As Tao is the highest principle, it can be understood also to be the destiny of Heaven. Since it is something like general law, to grasp it one must not stick to any concrete knowledge, that is to say, one should go beyond the concrete things, and try to transcend from technique to Tao, as did the cook. The key step for grasping Tao is transcendence, rather than knowing more. So Lao Zi said: "The more you learned, the less Tao you got." "The wise person does not know much; the one who knows much is not the wise." Tao has the property of perfection and totality; but as knowledge is only part, to stick to knowledge cannot but overlook Tao. Taoism held even that
technique will harm man’s perfect mind, and so should be rejected. To keep one’s mind perfect is to hold and cultivate one’s mind in a natural state and full of vitality, like a baby or a virgin who possess a primitive and fresh vitality. Of course, this is simply a state of primitive perfection at the cost of not opening one’s own wits. Lao Zi said: “Give up being a sage, and refuse to be a knowledgeable man.” In short, in these extreme terms, Taoism wants Tao, not knowledge.

Taoism arose in the period of change from slave to feudal society. Generally speaking, social relations are richer and more complex in a feudal rather than in a slave society. As an ideology founded on a slave society, Taoism stressed the primitive state of balance and refused to adjust to the new social life resulting from feudal society. Taoism did not think that the rise of the new social relation also showed the operation of the great Tao, but took it as a reaction against Tao. Therefore, insisting upon the original understanding of Tao, Taoists could only withdraw from actual society and live a secluded life. Even now, there are still a few Taoists in China who live a special religious life in the temples. A great part of the collected Taoist scriptures handed down from ancient times is about how to keep good health. Many schools of Qi-gong in China come from Taoism.

Confucianism also admits Tao but, in contrast to Taoism, it did not restrict Tao to the realm of nature. Confucians acknowledged all social relations founded on the basis of the feudal system, and insisted that, as the highest and unique principle Tao should dominate both nature and social life. That is to say, in Confucianism, Tao operates on man not only as a natural organism, but also as a social, and especially an ethical being. In Confucianism the implications of Tao obviously are broader than in Taoism. The ethical element later became increasingly important in the Confucian understanding of Tao, so that to follow Tao meant to behave oneself according to the position one occupied in the ethical order of the feudal system. The evidence of this is that, in the Song (960-1279) and Ming (1368-1644) Dynasties, the Confucians developed a new idea of li corresponding to the idea of Tao. There is no English word corresponding to li. Though it sometimes is translated as reason this is not its exact meaning, because li is understood as a general law prevailing throughout both nature and social life. Obviously, in preferring li to Tao, the post-Confucians emphasized the social and ethical element in their conception of the general law. Since li is the general law, it is also in the innate nature of man. "Li is mind," said Wang Yangming (1472-1528), a great Confucian in the Ming Dynasty. From Wang’s point of view, if one cultivates his mind perfectly and allows it to open freely, he certainly will know what is right and what is wrong, what is good and what is evil; then he will behave conscientiously according to the ethical norm.

The proposition "Li is mind" has also an epistemological meaning. Since both mind and nature are determined by the same law, i.e., li, and since the disclosing of the world corresponds to the opening of the mind, to know the world is to understand oneself, for mind is the origin of the meaning of the world. Thus, to know the world one should first of all rectify one’s mind to its original state, i.e., a clear state of mind, for a clear state of mind makes one more sensitive and attentive. On the contrary, if one’s mind is full of private desire and attracted by outer things, one will be obstructed from knowing other things which perhaps are more essential for one’s life. To keep the mind in a clear state one needs to keep quiet, to exclude all disturbance from the outside and to clear up all distracting thoughts and private interior desires.

To keep oneself in a clear state of mind is also called "persisting in the li of heaven and destroying private desire." This is the method with which the Confucians undertake their spiritual self-cultivation. It is also a way of keeping good health. It used to be said that nine out of ten Confucians were good at traditional Chinese medicine.
Both Taoism and Confucianism take Tao as the first principle. In sum, they thought that since knowing is boundless and it is impossible for the individual to learn all things, the most important thing for him is to grasp the key point, Tao, which is the general principle, the essence of everything. Only a person who has grasped Tao can obtain a deep understanding of the things he deals with and do his work well. The criterion for evaluating an art or technique is whether the work shows the author’s understanding of Tao. Taoism also says that to be a father one should show kindness to one’s son; while as a son, one should show filial piety to his parents. All of these are determined by the position one occupies in social life. Of course, in Confucianism it includes also that as a subject one must obey one’s lord. In short, the theory of Tao tells us that when a person lives his own life he should try to bear in his mind all relations between individual and society, and between man and nature. To live one’s life according to one’s place in the whole pattern of relationships is the way for the individual to transcend his limited life and to win thereby the full meaning of limited life. A person in such a state of mind is called a sage. Of course, he is a wise man, yet, since all go naturally and Tao is aimless, a wise man who follows Tao does not have any particular aim different from that of Tao. He appears to be foolish, a man of no will; yet, at the same time he surely is a man of strong will.

Wisdom in Life

People have long taken it as the philosophers’ task to search after wisdom, but now perhaps the problem of wisdom must no longer be left to philosophers alone. In truth, only in the search for wisdom, can one realize the value of life. Nowadays, various information organizations and training centers in different skills have been founded, but people still do not pay sufficient attention to what wisdom is and what it pursues. What people want most is a skill, or the ability to grasp a skill. Generally people think of wisdom as something metaphysical, while skill or scientific knowledge is something real which they can put to use for some interest. The need for skill in social life is indubitable, yet, just as skill is something real, it can never help go beyond his or her limited life. In fact, most skilled work can be done by a computer or an automatically controlled machine. To get the full significance of life, one must find one’s place in the system of general relations and act according to that position in the relational system. This is to say that one should grasp Tao; such is the work of wisdom.

Here we use Tao, a concept borrowed from traditional Chinese philosophy, to express the idea of general relationship. The earth is an organism: all kinds of things on earth are linked together organically, and each has its being only as an organic part. The earth produces the human being, who reforms the earth. The human being organizes social life; society in turn determines the essence of man. All things exist through interplay one with another. Different things maintain their being in the different state of interplay. This mode of interaction is what we call Tao. Man approaches Tao by keeping himself properly in a certain state of interplay. This is a process not only of knowing, but also of practice. Hence, Tao is not an object of knowledge, but the aim of wisdom.

Tao is not something unchangeable. There is a constant process in which an old relationship is broken, and a new one comes into being. Perhaps, we are now at a turning point at which the old relation has been broken, while the new relation has not yet established its equilibrium. In this condition humanity faces serious challenges. First, the relation between humankind and nature has not been shaped in a reasonable manner. As we know, to improve their standard of living people invent all kinds of techniques, but they do so at the risk of damaging their life environment. As a
result, the ecological balance has been seriously damaged, climactic conditions go from bad to worse, and a great quantity of irreplaceable natural resources are consumed. This threatens the existential condition for human beings. Second, the relation among people has not been shaped in a reasonable manner. It is obvious as communication develops that the difference between the rich and the poor increases. The conflict among people from different interest groups and regions still exists, which in turn renders the world situation more restless and turbulent.

Since man gains the meaning of life from the organic relation between himself and the outside world, where can he find its meaning if this has not been organically grounded? The main cause for being one dimensional is not the division of labor, but that one always finds oneself in a conflict between various purposes.

This present situation urges human beings to organize social life reasonably; how can this be done? First of all, one may ask, what is the nature of social life in its organic relationship? Since the relation varies in the process of history, it has no determined mode. But what we can conceive is that the relation must be founded in accord with Tao, and that the natural process is one of the essential characters of Tao. From this point of view, it is not good for man to have too strong a will or desire, for it might often deviate from the process of nature, and thus from Tao.

To form a new relation in accord with Tao is a problem not only of knowing, but of practice. In short there is need for wisdom. Nowadays, as the human power to reform nature grows ever stronger, the influence of man upon nature also becomes ever stronger. A small deviation from the natural process might thoroughly change the environment for human existence. Also as people communicate with each other on a larger scale than ever, forming an organic relationship requires cooperation among people throughout the world. Only when people transcend their respective partial interests can they cooperate. It is wisdom which can help men to realize such transcendence.

From the point of transcendence, we cannot say that current education is the cause for wisdom because, for the most part, education takes as its main aim to teach students some special profession. It does not carry students beyond the specializations they study, as various branches of knowledge separate from one another in the university. Some parents point their children toward grasping a skill early in their teens. In short, people take education as a means to achieve their interests, rather than as a way to virtue, not to speak of gaining a broad perspective open to all peoples and the world.

As noted above, the conflict among various partial interests results in damaging mankind’s environment. As the greatest interest is the interest of the whole people, persons need to give up some of their partial interests, but this can never be realized without cultivating knowledge and virtue. Hence, in constructing material civilization in the process of modernization we must strengthen spiritual civilization. This is the reason we call for wisdom.
The various cultures of the world form an organic whole as they not only conflict with each other, but mutually affect, assimilate and merge in their development.

Over a long period of time Greek philosophy and Christianity with its theology occupied an important position in the development of the Western culture. Even now, they exert great influence on the literature, art, religion, philosophy and science of the Western world. Hence, it is nearly impossible to understand the past, present and future of the West without understanding Greek philosophy and Christianity.

There is a close relationship between later Greek philosophy and Christian theology. Neo-Platonism, as represented by Plotinus and its pioneer Philo, was taking shape and developing along with Christian theology in almost the same political, economic and cultural context. Hence, a full understanding of Christian theology requires an understanding of Greek philosophy.

With Alexander the Great’s invasion of the East in 334 B.C., and the establishment of a great Empire in Egypt and West Asia by his successors, politics, economy, culture, science, religion and a philosophy of the natural world began to take shape and develop in the entire Greek world. These were carried on in Imperial Rome from 30 B.C. Early Christianity as a worldwide religion took shape and developed in this context.

Later Greek philosophy or hellenism which, except for the materialistic atomism represented by Epicurus and Lucretius, was the philosophy of the Roman Empire was characterized by Platonism and Stoicism. Later, Philo added Judaism to establish a Hellenized Jewish Theology. This was a pioneer of neo-Platonism and Christian theology: the neo-Platonism represented by Plotinus exerted great influence on Augustine, the founder of Christian theology.1

Fundamentally, the Platonic tradition in philosophy was influential in the development of idealism throughout all later Greek thought, not only in Philo and neo-Platonism, but also in Christian theology, and to such a degree that, as pointed out by D.F. Strauss, no Greek did more than Socrates’ student,1 Plato, to prepare for Christianity and its theology. Characteristically, the philosophical ideas of early Christian authors were influenced by those of Platonism, neo-Platonism and Stoicism as in philosophy the tradition of Plato continued to influence Christian thinkers.

Philo, whom Engels called "the real father of Christianity", combined the doctrines of Platonism and Stoicism with the Jewish biblical sources to establish a Hellenized Jewish vision, which, however, had little influence the Jews. His theology joined Greek and Hebrew philosophy with The Old Testament. Knowledge of Philo could help to understand such important sections of The New Testament such as "The Gospel According to St. John" and "Epistle to the Hebrews", etc.

Neo-Platonism, which emphasized the metaphysical and mystical aspects of Platonism, is represented by Plotinus. It was transformed by Augustine under the influence of scripture and survived in Christian theology in the Middle Ages and the modern world. Even Thomas Aquinas, the founder of scholasticism and a main representative of Medieval thought, recognized the Platonism in Augustine’s work, who used Platonic phrases to convey his own original thinking. Of all philosophies he considered Platonism to be closest to Christianity, though non-Christian Platonists did not recognize Christ Jesus to be God: that "the Word was made flesh".
Under the strong influence of Hellenism, Christian theology began to take shape with some early Stoic influences. Particularly from the beginning of the second century the doctrine of Christianity was studied in the light of Greek philosophy. Early Christian authors, including the Christian apologists and Justin Martyr, considered Christianity to be reconcilable with Platonic thought, which for Augustine served as an antidote to Manichaeism.

The influence upon Christianity of Greek philosophy and the mutual interaction between the two are reflected in the following theoretical issues.

*Idea-Logos*

The doctrine of ideas is the core of Plato’s philosophical system. An idea "is everlasting; it neither comes nor goes, neither flowers nor fades." Ideas are absolutely real, whereas sensible things generated from the ideas are unreal or are located between absolute existence and absolute non-existence. They participate or imitate the idea which has the same name as the thing. Stoicism proposed the doctrine of Logos which it combined with Aristotle’s theory of form so that the Logos as the dynamic force explained the variety of the universe. It held Logos, like the seeds of a plant, to be the force or model on which all individuals depend in order to be able to develop. As the "Idea of Ideas" logos was considered to be imperishable and to pass through an everlasting cycle. Plato had shown the ideas to be objective or independent of men and gods, and the visible: the gods are the invisible residence of invisible Ideas. With this theory, Philo began to interpret *Genesis*, the first book of *The Old Testament* in terms of an "Idea" in a twofold sense: first, the Idea as the Idea of God is everlasting; second, the Idea as the model for God in creating is also immortal. As put into the world via creation this Idea is not everlasting. Philo then accepted the Stoic notion that there were differences between the inner Logos (which is equal to the Idea of God) and the outer Logos (which is equal to God’s word, that is to "God’s saying" in "The Old Testament"). Later, Plotinus took the "Idea of Ideas" as having three Hypostases -- first as One or Good, second as intelligence or *Nous*, and third as the soul.

This doctrine of the Idea-Logos developed by Plato, Aristotle, Philo and Plotinus played a role in the explanation of creation by Christian thinkers. Under the influence of these theories they saw the transition from the Old to the new Testament. For example, in the New Testament The Gospel According to St. John opens with the words: "In the beginning was the Word (Logos), and the Word was with God, and the Word was God"; it introduces Jesus Christ with the phrase "And the Word was made flesh". Early Apologists such as Justinian explained Logos with regard to the incarnation of Jesus. Tatianus held that God was Logos, that the Logos existed with and among God, and that it was the first Son of God and the beginning of the world. Clement of Alexandria and Origen emphasized the supremacy of the Logos, considering it to be the bridge connecting God and the world, religion and science.

The influence of the Catechetical school of Alexandria was also profound on Augustine. As Thomas Aquinas pointed out, Augustine Christianized Plato’s Ideas by understanding them as the model existing in the mind of God, according to which He created the world. Augustine himself believed the doctrine of the Idea-Logos to be an important element of the Christian creed reporting the early Christian recommendation that the sentence "In the beginning was the Word" be written in gold, engraved and hung in the most conspicuous place in all the churches.

The theology of the Greeks held God to be superior to all things of this world so that it was impossible to express God as an object and predicates as these express the things of the world. Plato saw this to imply a negative theology, for "if the one is one" -- the first hypothesis among
those proposed in the second part of "Parmenides" -- then it is absolute and amounts to nothing, that is, it abstracts from all differences. Hence one could not say anything about it; it was unique and without any difference -- nothing positive or negative could be said of it. As a result "It is not named or spoken, nor an object of opinion or knowledge, nor perceived by any creature" (Plato, *Parmenides*, 142A). Such one is equal to nothing in that it lacks all definiteness, so that any knowledge or explanation of it is impossible.

When neo-Platonism explained this as God, Plato, who was the original founder of the metaphysics of the Good became the founder of negative theology. Plotinus went on to prove this first existence to be the One, understood as the Good. The One had no relation with anything but was simply One. Even "to be" could not be used in its regard for God was unable to be known and could be expressed only by negative adjectives.

This negative theology was close by Philo. To understand God a human being would have to become God -- which is impossible. The divine nature could not be expressed by using the nature of limited objects, for God was absolute existence without any nature. God was pure *noumenon*: everlasting, self-dependent, better than good, and more beautiful than beauty. To attribute any nature to God, would make Him a being among limited objects. Therefore, one cannot say that God is so and not so, but should say God is not so and so, that is, we can describe God only through negative predicates in order to ensure the absolute loftiness of God who transcends the world. Augustine followed this train of thought, admitting that one could know more of what God was not, than of what God is.

At the same time, a positive theology also was created God is everlasting, fixed, the measure of everything, absolute justice, best cause, and able to give life as the maker of the cosmos; He is the formal cause and origin of the good in things. Philo held that God was One, the ultimate source of the many things below, but inside everything, self-created and everlasting, perfect, self-sufficient, and unchanged in creating.

Plotinus described God or One in nearly the same way, holding God to be the sole fundamental source of everything, absolutely transcendent, beyond and above everything, not being but reality, absolute and originating truth, good and beauty. Augustine later used these phrases to describe the God of the "Bible", holding that there was no essence limiting God who was absolute god, pure, great without or beyond quantity, transcending time and space, the unchangeable noumenon, omnipotent and ultimate source of all things. Thus Philo and Augustine transformed Platonism under the influence of the Jewish and Christian doctrine of God as Creator.

**Teleology**

Moved by Anaxagoros, Plato took up the issue of teleology as the motive cause and purpose of the movement of sensible objects. This extends the idea of the Good as the super-idea and ultimate effect sought by all things. In the Timaeus he connected the idea of the good with the making God, claiming that God formed the sensible world in which human beings live, endowed with soul and reason. Plato emphasized that it was because God was super-good that He formed the world and that, as he did this on the basis of ideas it must also be most beautiful and best. The effect of Plato’s theological teleology on the whole of Greek philosophy and Christianity was very profound and lasting.

Like Plato, Aristotle’s search for the real cause or explanation of things was not for their beginning, but for their purpose. He took pure form without matter to be the cause of all movement,
super-existence itself, and the final goal of everything. Further, he took the pure form as God who was not only the first mover, but also the ultimate principle and explanation of all movement.

Stoicism, however, stressed God’s will and a fatalistic theological teleology in terms of Logos-reason. This held that God had neither birth nor death, but was the creator of the order in all things, absorbing everything and then drawing out all from himself. The universe itself was under the control of reason and fate. Philo insisted that the unique God not only created the world in the beginning through the Logos as instrument, but also had continuing concern for the existence and happiness of the world created by Him. He developed Plato’s idea of the good in terms of a theological teleology, holding the One as the ultimate good or God to be the final source, first principle and cause of causes. All things emanated from the One and returned back to the One. Thus the design of all things and their existence were produced at the same time; things were not produced by chance, but had their own purpose.

The above insights had an effect on Christian theology from Augustine to Thomas Aquinas. Augustine believed the order and arrangement of everything in the universe to be from God; each thing from angel to beast and bird, even every leaf, was given their purpose and fitted with their own nature by God. Thomas Aquinas mentioned Plato’s theological teleology, holding the will of God to be of the divine essence; with Aristotle, however, he held God to be moved only by himself, and to be the first mover.

The Trinity

The doctrine of Trinity is one of the basic doctrines of Christianity. It states that there is only one God who is Father, Son and Spirit. This entails a Tri-personal God, of which the second person, the Son, is incarnate in Jesus Christ, who saves human beings. There was some notion of triadism in Greek philosophy.

The early Pythagorean School thought that the number Three could be generalized to all things in the universe because all numbers were provided with a beginning, middle and end. So they took the number Three out of nature, considered it as a law, and admired it as a divine number to be worshipped. Seeing that the theory of ideas could not make the connection between the Idea and individuals, Plato proposed a triad of three fields (principles, sources) and of their mutual relations, especially in his second Letter, holding that they were equal respectively to the One, Intelligence and Soul. Numenius of the neo-Pythagorean school advocated a corresponding sacred hierarchy including three Gods. The first God referred to the original God or super-god; the second and third Gods related to the world.

On this basis, Plotinus proposed the three realities (the One, Nous, the Soul) and developed a detailed system with these three fields, all of which had the same source, that is, the One. Plotinus taught that the souls in the higher world desired to go down and thus fell into the lower world of matter and being joined to a body. The further they were from this source the less perfect they were. Hence, the Soul contacted the sensible world and was stained by it, resulting in the fall of the Soul. Plotinus argued that the task of human beings was to improve themselves by getting rid of all desires and thereby purifying themselves so as to be like and to integrate with God by exerting the goodness of their nature. Human beings must not let themselves be absorbed by interests and thus forsake their power to contemplate the One. In this way they can reach the state of forgetting both objects and subjects, and of being with God.

By reading St. John’s gospel Augustine went on to articulate the doctrine of Trinity: Father, Son, and Spirit. God as spirit had complete self-knowledge, thus generating his Image, the Son;
from the one of Father and Son proceeded the Holy Spirit, whom Augustine called Love. This theology is, however, unlike any previous Greek thought. In no Greek philosopher were the three principles equal to each other, so that there is one God in three persons.

*Other Areas of Platonic Influence*

*Time.* Because the concept of time is involved in the origin of the world through creation by God it received special attention from Greek philosophy and Christianity. In explaining the concept of time, Augustine studied what others had said about the world and time as co-existing. Plato held that time was not everlasting, but occurred with the occurrence of the celestial bodies, sun and moon, which were the measure of time. Augustine believed that, created by God, time arose with the occurrence of the sensible world. But there were some differences between the thinkers, e.g., whereas Plato thought that as soon as time was produced it became objective like an idea, Augustine considered time to be subjective and to change with the subject of cognition and will.

*The Immortality of the Soul.* The doctrine of the immortality of the soul of Pythagoras and Plato had profound effect on Augustine. Augustine often mentioned the idea of the *Phaedo* that the soul was everlasting because it shared in the life of the Idea, and of the *Meno* that the soul in this life shared everlasting truth. Because it had knowledge of ideas as everlasting he concluded that the soul was everlasting. Holding a view identical to Socrates (actually Plato) in the *Phaedo*, Augustine opposed the materialist notion that the soul was the harmony of the body and accepted a tripartite soul (reason, passion and desire) as proposed by Plato. He emphasized that the human soul worked through sensation and reason, but did not accept Plato’s dualism of soul and body. As he denied any pre-existence of the soul, he rejected Plato’s doctrine of remembrance.

*The Ideal Society.* Plato was the first to suggest the doctrine of an ideal society of human beings, and even the concept of a "Republic" where philosophers are kings as a pattern in heaven, "the only state in whose politics he can take part" (*Republic*, 592B). Later, the Stoics proposed the idea of a secular city. Posidonius proposed two kinds of city, comparing the secular city with the one in which God resides. Combining this with the "City of God" recorded in the Bible, Augustine proposed two kinds of city: one the secular and evil city of Babylon, the other the city of God symbolized by Jerusalem. He related these to two kinds of love, and thought that the two cities were not sharply separated, but intertwined in certain persons. Members of the Church mingle as a unity until the Last judgement when they will be recognized as belonging either to the city of God or the ungodly city.

*Allegorical Interpretation.* How to defend religious theology through philosophical theory was an issue of method, among which allegorical interpretation was most representative. Early Greek philosophers had insisted that there was a "hidden meaning" behind ancient mythology. Stoicism later developed this anti-rational subjective idealism, seeking philosophical meaning in the epics of Homer and Hesiod. On this basis, Philo systematically developed and applied allegorical interpretation, contrasting mythology with Logos, which he considered to be real, reasonable and analytic. He emphasized that instead of taking the literal meaning of the Pentateuch, we should dig out a more profound message. His starting point was that God was both the direct or indirect source of the truth of both the Mosaic law and Greek philosophy. Because the minds of
human beings and God were akin, human beings had the ability to accept and discover real truth transcending space and time: religion and the best Greek philosophy were not irreconcilable. For example, Philo believed that Adam, Eve and Cain recorded in the Old Testament book of Genesis should be understood as mind, sensation and gain, and that combining mind and sensation produced evil thought. In this way, Philo established a religious theology with rich implications and great flexibility.

Philo’s method had some influence in the interpretation of the scriptures. For instance, the author of New Testament Epistle to the Hebrews" interpreted the temporal secular world as a reflection or copy of the real world, namely, heaven; the author of "The First Epistle to the Corinthians" interpreted the Spiritual Rock as Jesus Christ. Early Christian theologians often defended Christianity using this method. For example, they held that every word in the Bible was sublime and had deep meaning, commonly called sacred wisdom. Much in the Bible had a symbolic meaning. The Christian Fathers Tertullian, Jerome, and Augustine were fond of applying this method in their interpretations of scripture. Until Thomas Aquinas proposed a scientifically structured theology, allegorical interpretation was dominant in Christian theology.

From the above we can see that Christian theology and Greek philosophy held much in common and represent the convergence of Eastern and Western cultures, which enabled them to spread throughout the world. This shows also how strong social trends which converge in the different cultures. Christians tried to assimilate Greek philosophy, especially elements of Plato and Plotinus. Their common human nature, with human reason reflecting a shared human experience, was responsible for the Christian acceptance of many Greek insights. These assisted in the articulation of a Christian theology without subordinating divine revelation to human reason. Thus, Philo Zudaized Hellenism and Augustine Christianized it.
Among varied and sophisticated social phenomena, morals and law, which serve as the norms of human behavior, are closely related yet distinct. To neglect either their relatedness or their distinction would effect the progress of humankind and social development. Therefore the problem of the relationship between morals and law has long been a focus of research in moral and legal philosophy.

It has been characteristic of the Eastern cultural tradition that, although the thought of the legalists took shape very long ago and had been accepted by some ancient governors, Confucian moral thought held a predominant position during the long period of Chinese feudal society and provided the philosophical background for classical Chinese law.

The defect of legal thought in the Confucian manner is that, on the one hand, it overlooks the difference between morals and law while, on the other hand, due to the exaggeration of their difference and failure to admit their connection morals and law are seen as uncompromisingly conflictual. While legal thought moralized in the Confucian manner, emphasizes their foundational compatibility and contains some reasonable elements, on the whole it is a partial view. Hence, to reevaluate the moralized Confucian legal thought on a more balanced moral and legal basis holds important promise for promoting the social modernization of China.

The Philosophical Background of Ancient Chinese Law

The ancient Chinese legal system has many unique characteristics which are surprising from the modern legal point of view. For instance, there was no separation of civil from criminal law in the ancient Chinese legal system. The sense of right and of law were very weak. Young males and females did not have the right to choose their lifelong spouses, but had to obey the order of their parents.

Such issues cannot be treated one by one, for the legal system of a nation chooses certain main philosophical ideas which can be compared to the main switch of a machine. Only by finding this switch can we understand these issues. This relationship between philosophy and law is true also for the relation between philosophy and other concrete sciences, which manifests the functions of philosophy. What then is the philosophical background of ancient Chinese law? To answer this question, we must examine the relationship between morals and law.

On this relationship scholars throughout the world have advanced widely divergent theories. What commands attention is that ancient Chinese Confucian scholars unanimously considered morals to be the goal of law, and law to be a tool for morals: the sole role of law is to maintain morals. In the well-known Chinese law code of the Tang Dynasty, it is pointed out that "morals are the root of politics, while laws are tools of politics". Moreover, it cited Confucius’ words " " . According to this view, all human behaviors " " . Here we can see that ancient Chinese law took this philosophical concept as its background in order to solve the problem of the relationship between morals and law. Philosophically this is the historical view-point of moral monism.

Chinese legal thought moralized in the Confucian manner regards whatever is forbidden by law as immoral and believes that whatever is immoral should have attached penalties. Ancient
Chinese legal documents contain many cases which, according to the modern view belong to the category of civil relations, but upon which were imposed legal penalties. For instance, breaking contacts is basically a question of civil rights, where the one who breaks a contract has the responsibility for compensation, but is not involved in criminal legal proceedings. In ancient China, however, breaking a law was looked upon as a failure of honesty, of keeping one’s word, which was a violation of rites and a matter of immorality. But immorality must not escape punishment. This view-point about resulted in the merging of civil law and criminal law. As regards the philosophical background of the ancient Chinese legal system this point of law illustrates how the law becomes almost the guardian of morals. It can be concluded that it is characteristic of ancient Chinese law that once one has grasped its philosophical background, that is, its moralization, one can understand the whole.

The following story illustrates the Confucian moralization of legal thought: Once a county magistrate encountered a case involving two persons scrambling for a hen. He found out the true owner of the hen by asking what the hen had eaten. One said beans, the other replied rice. Then the magistrate order that the hen’s stomach be cut open and found that it had eaten beans. Therefore the person who said rice was punished.

The story is indicative. The scramble for the hen was the cause of the lawsuit; the two parties contended for ownership of the hen. But the magistrate handled the case by killing the hen and punishing the person telling the lie. Thus the question of ownership in civil law turned into a question of morals concerning honesty or dishonesty. In this case where is the issue of ownership; where the civil law?

The philosophical thought of ancient Chinese law had its own origins, the most important of which were Zhou Rites created by the saints of Zhou Dynasty. Everything was governed by the rites which combined religion, morality and law into one body. Though the rites were not a code, they controlled the Chinese legal system for a very long time.

The philosophy of rites divided the questions of right, law and legalism into two categories, rite and non-rite. In ancient China there existed a dictum that is, that lawsuits invariably lead to bad results. In the light of "rite", civilians should not resort to lawsuits for their disputes not only because they did not meet the standard of rite, but also because they could not settle disputes. So resort to lawsuits should not take place at all. Once it does happen, the result is always bad and harmful to both parties. To keep relations peaceful is a kind of virtue, whereas a lawsuit itself is something immoral.

In reality, however, lawsuits resulting from striving for legitimate interests are unavoidable and cannot be eradicated by moral lessons. The prosperity of the legal science and the development of a legalist spirit depend upon lawsuits. This sort of moralized legal thought, at its extremities, clings exclusively to morality, without any consideration of law. If this be the case, how can legitimate civil rights be as assured; how can society advance? The consequence of this philosophy can be imagined.

The view of the Chinese Confucian School on the relationship between morals and law once was attacked fiercely by its opponents, resulting in a confrontation between moralism and legalism. Although in the course of history legalism once was adopted by some political governors to the gradual prosperity of legal science, the Confucian School occupied the predominant position. Especially since the Han Dynasty, with the abolition of various other schools Confucian theory became the only authentic doctrine and determined the destiny of ancient Chinese law.

In modern legal terms, legal thought in the Confucian manner had a strong negative influence on the development of the Chinese legal system. It blurred the line separating administration and
jurisdiction and damaged the independent spirit of jurisdiction. In ancient China legal documents received little attention, whereas much importance was attached to the judge’s opinion. This can be seen in the lawsuits of the Han, Tang, Song, Yuan, Ming and Qing dynasties. All these laws reflected Confucian moralist thought, particularly in the case of civil disputes. The idea of compromise and reconciliation prevailed and was adopted both in and out of court, with consideration for the feelings of the two parties. In the formal legal documents, there is no distinction between civil and criminal law and no distinction between responsibility for crimes and for civil disputes. Legal terms are joined by regulations for penalties. Anyone who deviates from the norm of human behavior would be bound with moral punishment -- an idea derived from the lack of distinction between morals and law.

The philosophical background of ancient Chinese law reveals the Confucian moralization of legal thought and clarifies the related ancient Chinese cultural tradition. It has important significance in the further evaluation of the position of the Confucian school and its effect on the development of Chinese culture and on the further exploration of some essential problems of moral and legal philosophy.

The Difference and Interaction between Morals and Law

Both morals and law are behavioral norms and fall into the category of value for maintaining social interests. In essence, they are coordinated, dependent and complementary one with the other. The moral partiality of Confucian thought came from its over-emphasis on the function of morality, its neglect of the distinction between morality and law and its regarding law as subordinate to morality.

A similar situation obtained in ancient Western society where the theoretical difference between morals and law was not established for a long time. In the life of primitive society, morals and law were fused to constitute the body of custom which was the most important form of moral norm. At the end of primitive society, state law came into being, but the separation of morals and law still did not gain full recognition in ancient Greece. The ancient Greek philosopher, Plato, assumed that morality was the righteousness produced by subjective thinking; law was considered to be based on morality and to provide guidance for rightful living. During the Roman period law and morals were separated, but no precise theory for differentiating the two emerged. Some moral sayings such as "live rightfully" and "kind and fair actions" were applied to legal definitions. This did not change until the German natural jurist Thomasius (1655-1728) made a relatively clear distinction. Kant inherited Thomasius’s theory, but did not provide a justification for the distinction. Hence, there was a similarity between Eastern and Western cultures as regards the relationship of morals and law.

The legal view of Marxist historical materialism is that morals and law are determined by the material conditions of human beings. The social ideology is built on economic grounds and reflects social existence, of which philosophy, arts and religion are superstructure. Therefore, they are closely linked to each other in social life. Nevertheless, morals and law are separate social phenomena with significant differences in their emergence, functions and forms.

First of all, the backgrounds of the emergence of morals and law are different. In the course of historical development morals appeared earlier than law. Before the existence of the state morals already had been formed in social life, though no law had been established. Only after the emergence of the state did the governor, in accordance with his own will, formulate legal norms in order to consolidate his regime. As the fundamental issue of the state is political power, the
government naturally takes law as a weapon for maintaining its political power. Though they could not have their own law, the governed had a sense of morality. In a class society, the legal system and several moral systems co-exist, which provide different backgrounds for the emergence of morals and law. From among the multiple systems of morals one should not be simply approved or denied, but should be subjected to detailed analysis because every system surely is influenced by various factors during its historical development. Morals should be appraised objectively and historically, in contrast to laws which protect the government’s interests and reflect its will.

Secondly, though both morality and law belong to the norm of human behavior, they are different in nature. The legal norm is enforced: though the evaluation of human behavior is ground for establishing and administering legal norms, people are required to observe them. Whether they are for or against them, people are compelled to obey the law established and enforced by the state. This compulsion is a unique feature of legal norms in contrast with moral norms. On the other hand, moral norms are not imposed coercively by the state. To be put into action, this sense of moral obligation depends on the impact of public opinion, people’s beliefs, customs, traditions and education. It is evaluated in terms of the benevolence and malevolence, justice and injustice, fairness and unfairness, honesty and dishonesty of human behavior. The moral norm has no specific form, but exists in the social ideology and the popular views and beliefs of current society. Hence morals and law are different norms.

Thirdly, the intervention taken when moral and legal norms are violated is not the same. There are times when something that is within the law may not be moral. In such circumstances, the immoral behavior is beyond the power of legal norms, but will be variously condemned by public opinion, public denunciation, troubled conscience and so on. These are the resources of the moral norm. The society, family and organizations supervise actions in terms of moral requirements inspite of the fact that their methods do not have the compulsive quality of legal norms and do not need a special agency to enforce punishment. Besides, the pressure of social opinion is a kind of public judgement, and the mind’s uneasiness is a kind of mental force. Behavior deviating from the moral norm cannot escape moral convictions. For this reason, it is quite wrong to regard criminal behavior as only immoral and to fail to inflict legal penalties. For the same reason, in order not to impair normal civil rights, legal penalties should not be administered for immoral behavior as is done for criminal behavior. The legal character of criminal law requires that the line between crime and non-crime be clear, and that civil cases not be mistaken for criminal cases. Generally speaking, moral norms have far broader effect than legal norms because the moral has an imperceptible influence on human behavior which transcends the law.

The difference between morals and law is reflected in the legalist spirit. On one hand, one should not regard law as something superior and should not make use of some behavior beyond the power of law to degrade social morals. On the other hand, we should not look upon morals as something superior, so as to blur the boundary between crime and non-crime with the effect that criminals are forgiven. What is most important for research into the difference between morals and law lies in discovering a way of applying their mutual action, for only a clear idea of their difference can help us make better use of their mutual action to drive our society forward. For this reason a major tendency of modern legal philosophy and moral philosophy is to emphasize the common points of morals and law and their basic unity and compatibility.

The mutual action of morality and law can be elucidated in two aspects. Firstly, the moral norm can be used to defend law and to keep it stable, authentic and perduring. For instance, any behavior forbidden by law, such as betrayal of one’s motherland, embezzlement and robbery, can be viewed as an immoral, illegitimate and ignominious act. A criminal act often starts from an
immoral one and progresses from a breach of a moral norm to breach a legal norm: hence, morals can prevent acts forbidden by law. Secondly, the legal norm has coercive power to maintain and carry out moral norms. Many legal norms not only display the requirements of moral norms, but serve also as effective elements for the moral education of people. The law concerning keeping state secrets, protecting public property, observing social order and so on belongs not only to legal, but to moral norms. One who violates these laws not only will be subject to legal punishment, but also will be morally condemned by public opinion and the masses. This is a way to prevent crime and immoral acts and to stimulate people to develop the noble moral quality of observing law and order. Proper use of the mutual action of morals and law is necessary for the modernization of social life.

Social Modernization

At present a great project to build a modern socialist nation is under way in China. Morals and law can play a great role in accelerating the course of social modernization. Just as a person has two legs for walking, morals and law are two legs in the construction of modern socialist superstructure: the moral will not exist without the support of law, and vice versa. This phenomenon is determined by the inherent nature of morals and law and can be compared figuratively to the role of morals and law in social modernization.

From this point of view, if one reevaluates the thought of the ancient Chinese Confucian school about the mutual utilization of morals and law, one can find invaluable spiritual achievements in the cultural tradition of our nation. To develop the national culture, we should absorb what is positive in the tradition for the benefit of socialist modernization.

The moralized legal thought of the Confucian school had played reactive role in maintaining the social order for the feudal governors during the period of feudal society. Feudal morals and law were so tightly interwoven that they became twins. To take the law of Tang Dynasty as an example, by inheriting the doctrines of the Confucian school, the law of the Tang Dynasty not only fixed the feudal hierarchy into law, but also enforced feudal morals with the three cardinal guides (ruler guides subject; father guides son; husband guides wife) and the five constant virtues (benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and fidelity).

Among the "Ten Instances of Malevolence" listed in the law of the Tang Dynasty, the law was to punish not only rebels, but also those who did not observe feudal morals. It is right to say that the moral thought of the Confucian school did not completely dispense with law, but combined law and morals into one system. Apparently, this did not conform to legalist thought. But in another sense, the Confucian school paid much attention to the effect of morals on law and vice versa, and emphasized the relationship between the two. This is worth noting, for a good social order cannot fully be maintained by relying exclusively on legal penalties without the support of a refined moral spirit and strong public opinion. In view of this it is suggested in some developed countries that the moral thought of the Confucian school regarding the mutual utilization of morals and law be applied to their own administration.

The weak sense of law and right and the failure to separate criminal and civil law in the ancient legal system should be rejected and criticized. But the attention to the mutual action of morals and law which is the essential part of Confucian moralized legal thought should be taken up and developed. With regard to the Chinese cultural tradition one should assume a dialectical approach of partial denial, rather than total confirmation or total denial. The construction of modern socialism requires opening, rather than shutting the door to the outside world. In accepting the
brilliant cultural achievements of the capitalist society, we should not reject the fine cultural achievements of China.

A correct application of the mutual interaction of morals and law is a powerful tool for advancing the construction of modern socialism. By developing socialist democracy, China has strengthened the legal system, developed and perfected the system of representation of the people in congress, and established a series of important laws and acts. As a result, there are laws to which one can resort in various aspects of national and social life, the authenticity of law has been ensured and the socialist democracy is possessed of a systematic legal quality. Before the law everyone is equal, and the law is not to be changed by the fiat of the heads of the nation. This legal spirit has become manifest in such various aspects of social life as maintaining social order, building a strong economy, opening the door to the outside world, securing legitimate civil rights and establishing an honest administration. It is necessary not only to resort to law, but also to enforce it strictly. At the same time the supervisory function of the people’s representative congress as regards administration and jurisdiction should be strengthened as should public supervision over state officials according to a norm of law. This practice demonstrates the mutual checks and balances of powers which are consistent with the interests of the whole people and are a major feature in the construction of the legal system essential to modern socialism.

Along with the construction of the legal system, great importance has been attached to strengthening ideological and moral education and to combining law with morals. All state officials, whatever their rank or post, are required to observe law and order, to serve the people whole-heartedly, to intensify the sense of being a public servant, to develop a dedicated spirit and to cultivate a high moral sense of adhering to principles. People from all walks of life are required not only to observe national law, but to understand on the moral level that a job is not simply a means of making living, but an obligation for building modern socialism. Socialist morals have become a behavioral norm for people of all walks of life.

In order that social concerns be maintained, the interests of particular occupations should be related to general social interests. Of course, each occupation has its own moral psychology based on the division of labor, and therefore has its own specific standards of behavior. But in a socialist society the division of occupations is elevated to a higher level. For instance, military heroism is directed not only to winning a certain war, but to the protection of the motherland. The requirement that an entrepreneur maintain his reputation is based not only on his obligation to carry out contracts, but also to promote an open-policy and public trust. The indomitable sportsmanship of our athletes is not only for winning the game, but also for the development of sports and the improvement of people’s physical quality. Thus, moral norms exert their effects in every field of social life, thereby stimulating a broad development of social morals.

Hence, promoting both the legal system and moral education is like walking with two legs, lack of either cannot be accepted. We are to undertake the construction of both material and spiritual civilizations. A key to the latter is a proper application of the mutual action of morals and law. Hence, we should develop not only a legal, but a moral spirit. Moreover, we should take the Marxist view on morals and law and combine it with the Chinese national cultural tradition. We must oppose both the partial moralist thought which regards law as a part of itself and the partial legalist thought which neglects the effect of morals and law, and combine the two in such a way that each benefits from the other. In this way the cause of socialist modernization will take longer strides and achieve ever greater success.
Modernization is a relative procedure in which traditional and contemporary life styles encounter each other with the aim of engendering a transformation relevant for the present situation. It is relative because it is only a stage of development within the historical continuum. For example, in the Western world, the Hellenistic culture was traditional, and Rome was modern according to the standpoint of the Roman Empire, but for the Middle Ages, Rome became traditional and Christianity was modern. Likewise, in Chinese history, the Chin Dynasty was modern as compared to Pre-Chin dynasties, whereas it became traditional with regard to the Han Dynasties. Thus, modernization, though relative, is nevertheless valid for all time because traditional wisdom needs to be rejuvenated in order to cope with the life style of a certain time. The term modernization also signifies the prolongation of tradition with the addition of some new spirits as contributed by certain temporal conditions. For example, when ideas from the Hellenistic period were transmitted to the Middle Ages there was an amalgamation of philosophy and faith so as to give birth to a new spirit which enabled Christianity to flourish in the Western world. In a similar manner, in China Buddhism was the new stimulant which invigorated the sustenance of the Confucian and Taoist traditions in the Sui and Tang Dynasties. Thus, modernization is by no means anti-traditional or non-traditional; on the contrary, it is coherent and coincident with tradition in the historical continuum.

Traditional Culture

Without doubt Confucianism belongs to the Chinese traditional cultural heritage. It concerns political, social, moral, philosophical and cultural affairs. From the anthropocentric point of view Confucius (551-479 BC) insists that personal individual perfection is situated within the notion of "Chun-tzu" (gentleman), whereas interpersonal communal perfection is manifested through the notion of "Shen-jen" (sage). The philosophy of life is the focus of Confucianism which is built around moral-praxis. The question of how to live like a "Chun-tzu" and like a "Shen-jen" becomes the ultimate concern of the Confucians throughout Chinese history. The Confucian ideal society is visualized through the notion of the "Tatung-world" -- a cosmopolitan universalism in which all men live fraternally together like one big family. Universal brotherhood means interpersonal fraternal love all over the world. In Li-chi (The Book of Rites) it was said:

When the Great Tao prevails, the communal society is verified under Heaven and Earth. The virtuous and the potent are chosen for public offices. Fidelity and harmony are valued by all. People not only love their own parents and children, but also ensure that the old live their last years happily; adults are employed usefully, children are reared properly. . . . This is called the Age of Ta-tung.1
In the ideal society, all men are not only equal but are also immune from all natural and artificial pains and passions. Equality is upheld not so much from the viewpoint of innate human nature, but from that of the benevolence of the stronger towards the weaker. Immunity from pains and passions is likewise achieved due to fraternity and charity in social life.

The Confucian doctrine neither maintains the innate equality of man nor sees him as born for beatitude. Confucius himself makes a classification of man according to his talents and surroundings. Some are wise and some stupid; some are rich and others poor. But, instead of complaining about all these inequalities Confucius rather insists that interpersonal cooperation can take place among all men ranging from the wise to the stupid, from the rich to the poor. In regard to the political and social sphere he emphasizes that the government should be run by the virtuous.

Once Mencius was asked about humanity and about the difference between man and animal. He said:

Between father and son, there should be affection; between sovereign and minister, righteousness; between husband and wife, attention to their separate functions; between old and young, a proper order; and between friends, fidelity.2

For Mencius interpersonal relationships show the essence of humanity. Hence he gives a definition for humanity not from the substantial standpoint, but from that of interpersonal human relationships.

Thus, Confucian doctrine insists on charity both from the vertical viewpoint and from the horizontal, i.e. from the viewpoint of the government towards its people, and from that of one person towards another. Man has to learn to practice charity in daily life. In Ta-Hsueh (The Great Learning) Confucius shows the way of learning:

The Tao of Great Learning consists in illustrating illustrious virtue, in loving people, in resting in the highest Good. . . . The ancients who wished to illustrate illustrious virtue under Heaven (the whole world), first ordered well their own state. Wishing to order well their states, they first regulated their families. Wishing to regulate their families, they first cultivated their persons.3

The ideal society which Confucius intends to build would be verified through the perfection of different levels such as: personal cultivation of virtue, family regulation, order in the state, and peace in the whole world.

Consanguinity and Affectivity

Concerning the process of perfection starting from the individual person to the whole world, there are two mediate stations: the family and the state. The family consists of one’s heritage by consanguinity and marriage; it is characterized by generation. The state can be enlarged by families and tribes; it is bound together by blood relationships or by social contracts like the one that Jean-Jacques Rousseau described in modern time.

In an agricultural society, because of the spontaneity of inter-subjectivity, people live together in their consanguineous relationship. Multi-generational families enlarge themselves into tribes and clans. People encounter one another within five types of inter-personal relationship which Mencius considers to be the characteristics which differentiate man from animal. These five types of relationship are those between father and son, between sovereign and minister, between husband
and wife, between the old and the young, and, last but not least, between friends. In an agricultural society these five types of relationship really include every possible kind of interpersonal relationship and are well-known by everyone. Therefore it is not difficult to recognize the five coherent inter-personal virtues, namely, affection between father and son, righteousness between sovereign and minister, separate functions between husband and wife, proper order between the old and the young, fidelity between friends.

Thus, the Chinese traditional social order in the ancient agricultural society was rooted deeply in this familiar tribal moral relationship. The natural consanguineous relationship and its companion moral virtues were enough to sustain social order. There would be no need for the promotion of any religious commandments or institutional laws in order to build up the society or to maintain social life.

From the personal cultivation of virtues to the regulation of family, and from the regulation of family to the promotion of order in the state, there is only one central term, namely the consanguineous-affective relationship. This consanguineous-affective culture was characteristic of Chinese traditional thought, especially of Confucian moral philosophy.

Confucius spoke of the metaphysical foundation of this consanguineous-affective culture, in a very condensed form:

What Heaven has conferred is called nature; accord with nature is called Tao; the regulation of Tao is called instruction.

Heaven here perhaps means some transcendental divinity. Mencius offered an axiom with regard to the relation between man and Heaven, between man and parents, and between man and things:

Serve the Heaven. Be affectionate to parents, love people, be kind to creatures.

This moral obligation in traditional Confucian ethics seem to be both transcendental and immanent, theistic and anthropocentric.

Thus, the consanguineous-affective culture has its foundation both in metaphysical sophistication and in its praxis-orientation. However, Confucians, especially in modern times, concentrate rather on practice. The traditional axiom "to know is difficult; to do is easy," reveals the practical characteristics of the ancient Chinese philosophical spirit.

The general question of moral philosophy after Confucius and Mencius is therefore not "Why should one do good?", but "How can one be good?". The investigation of the ethical principle was delayed. So, charity would be practiced only because of the consanguineous-affective relationship, not because of any substantial or essential characteristics of the human person. The essential content of Mencius’ definition about humanity was interpreted only in the light of interpersonal human relationships without any consideration of the human substance or its objective dignity. Furthermore, interpersonal relationship has its function only because of consanguinity and affection, not because of rationality or legality. Man cherishes friendship and warm-heartedness only because he has affection. In other words, man acts friendly because he lives in an affective world. All interpersonal rites and rituals which are practiced in the ancient society manifest warmth and politeness because of this affection. The social structure supports and protects this kind of interpersonal relationship.

I do not mean that, in the ancient Chinese society, there was only an agricultural structure without commerce or technology. However, I do mean that agriculture formed the main structure
of traditional Chinese society for over two thousand years. This began from the Shan Dynasty (18th century B.C.) and lasted for many centuries until recent times. It should be emphasized then that traditional Chinese social structure subsists mainly in consanguinity and affection.

**Functional Relations**

The fruitful and valuable function of this praxis-orientation was carried out by the Chinese Confucian tradition for over 2,000 years. Consequently, it contributes to the tranquility, peace and progress of traditional Chinese society. It promotes the benevolent and frugal character of the Chinese people. But, with the challenge of Western technology and commerce, commercial cities and technical districts emerge day-by-day in contemporary Chinese society. The social attitude deteriorates rapidly from being consanguineous and affectionate to indifference and alienation. The most prominent type of interpersonal relationship is that among strangers. People live together not because of consanguinity, but because they share the same profession: this relationship between people lacks affection. That is the typical urban life-style in a technical commercial culture. The simple interpersonal relationship of the former family-centered society is not sophisticated enough to face this complex structure.

The ethical question "How should I be kind to my neighbor?" changes into "Why should I be kind to my neighbor?". The traditional categorical imperative "an eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth" evidently cannot sustain interpersonal relationship in the combative society caused by technology and commerce.

The metaphorical approach of Mencius’ five types of relationship has an ethical practical function, but it cannot resolve the difficulties raised by the combative society in which a new type of relationship emerges, namely that among strangers and enemies.

The Mosaic commandment "Love your neighbor!" was well practiced by Confucians for over 2,000 years. The commandment of Jesus Christ, "Love your enemies," was also fairly known by the Confucians. It is true that the Confucianists upheld the virtues of tolerance: that "injury should be recompensed with kindness" was true in theory and in practice. But there is a lack of any metaphysical motivation, i.e. there is ignorance of the substantial individuality of the enemy, who in Christianity is known as the Image of God and an object of redemption. Human dignity as recognized explicitly by Western philosophy is the metaphysical foundation of the social legal structure, in which all men are equal because of their origin. The philosophical problem of the arché or origin is valid and useful here.

In technical and commercial society the ethical principle "Do not do to others as you would not wish others to do to yourself!" has of course the passive function of avoiding or diminishing evil, but social order surely requires a more active principle to promote good for common life. There should be such an ideal as "anyone who wishes to be established himself, must seek first to establish others; anyone who wishes to be enlarged himself must seek first to enlarge others!"

In the consanguineous-affective society it was easy to understand and to practice the above-mentioned passive principle. But, for the active principle, how can man in a competitive society abandon egocentric values and accept an altruistic view without first understanding the principle of equality which reflects the notion of Image of God?

The Confucian philosophy does not exert itself through sophistication, i.e., it does not endeavor to look for the metaphysical foundation of the theory of man as Image of God so as to give an explanation for human dignity and the equality of mankind. In consequence, the consanguineous-affective relationship which was valued in traditional agricultural society loses its
validity in contemporary technical-commercial society. One might defend oneself for struggling or for aggressive action with the following reasons:

a. "I do not know him; why should I yield to him?" As the categorical imperative about one’s relationship towards strangers is not explicitly expounded in Confucianist theories, the common people were not prompted to do good for strangers.

b. "If I yield to him, he would not yield to me; so I suffer loss." Naive egocentricism would scarcely be transcended without supernatural motive.

The first example reflects the consanguineous and affective effect of interpersonal relationships. The second, however, has its psychological foundation in human behavior. In traditional agricultural society, one was accustomed to wait for the same yielding when one yielded. But in modern society, the expected yielding does not come spontaneously. One becomes disillusioned and begins to develop a defensive attitude: no more yielding, but combat and even struggle. Both culturally and psychologically we can explain the combative phenomena of our society today.

The genuine Confucian theory contained only the consanguineous-affective relationship, which was had in traditional agricultural society, but did not continue its influence in the modern technical commercial society.

The sentence "Injury should be recompensed with kindness" certainly reveals the implicit significance of one’s love towards strangers and even towards enemies. However, the question arises of "How to have sufficient reason and motivation to justify and realize the above-mentioned axiom?" From the anthropocentric point of view, is it enough to maintain that the ethical postulate exists within human nature? Or, does it require some more profound reasons such as religious retribution or some kind of samsara? In folk religion, the common people believe in retribution after death according to good or evil acts one has done in this life. Seeking eternal beatitude and to avoid evil forever might be a sufficient motivation to urge one to fulfill ethical obligations. In this light Confucian theory from Confucius on till historian Ssuma Chien (145-86 B.C.) was ignorant about life after death.

The fifth relationship "Fidelity between friends" by Mencius must be indefinitely enlarged, not only to all the acquaintance, but also to the strangers and even to the enemies. The Buddhistic predestined relationship (pratyaya) might be held in such an understanding.

The Confucian school as the main philosophical stream had two periods of development in Chinese history: one was the Pre-Chin period in which Confucius and Mencius grounded the genuine Confucianism; the other was the Sung-Ming period which was in a certain sense a response to the challenge caused by Buddhism. In these two periods, Confucianism remained intact and was free from the infiltration of other schools of thought in the Pre-Chin period, and then from Buddhistic influence in the Sung-Ming period. On the contrary, in the second period, it managed to build up a new theory called Neo-Confucianism, which was the result of the dialogue among Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism.

Now Confucianism has to face the challenge of Western science and technology. This challenge is not per se dangerous; but if Confucianism loses its spiritual heritage in exchange for material values, then there will be a crisis for Chinese culture.

In the Lu-shih Ch’un-ch’iu, a compendium of various schools of philosophy written in the third century B.C., there is a chapter titled "The Value of Agriculture". In this chapter a contrast is made between the mode of life of people who are engaged in the "root" occupation -- the farmers, and that of those who are engaged in the "branch" occupation -- the merchants. The farmers are
primitive and simple and therefore always ready to accept commands. They are childlike and innocence and therefore unselfish. Their material properties are complex and difficult to move, and therefore they do not abandon their country when it is in danger. Merchants, on the other hand, are corrupt and therefore not obedient. They are treacherous and therefore selfish. They have simple properties which are easy to transport, and therefore they usually abandon their country when it is in danger.\textsuperscript{18}

Here the author of this chapter obviously maintains that the mode of life of the farmers is far superior to that of the merchants. Herein lies the value of agriculture. This value is verified in fact through more than two thousand years in Chinese history. In the social change agriculture diminished day by day, whereas trading by merchants flourished. That is just the step of modernization. Our problem lies well not in "How to change the situation?", still less in "How to return to the agricultural form of life?" but in the question "How can we accept modernization and diminish the bad effect of the commercial society?" or "How can we live in a commercial society and still preserve the good value upheld in the agricultural society?"

It seems advisable to propose the following tentative program:

(a) Transcend the theoretical sphere of Neo-Confucianism of Sung, Ming and Ch’ing Dynasties (960-1912) and concentrate on its practical side in which man participates in social affairs, being concerned with social welfare like those charitable acts of Christians.

(b) Abandon anthropocentrism in favor of a metaphysical and transcendental standpoint to support the motive of ethical praxis.

(c) To avoid the anthropocentrism, one must accept the doctrine of original sin, i.e. human nature is born with evil tendency, and in fact human history is full of evils, sufferings and pains. Human being is not ontologically causa sui nor morally self-sufficient. The criterion for good and evil does not depend on man, human being cannot redeem himself. Redemption for human being comes from outside, just like the fact that his existence is caused by the external divinity.

(d) Although human being is ontologically ens ab alio and therefore a dependent being, the theory of the Image of God reveals, however, the supreme dignity and infinite value of the human person. Human being does not derive his value from inter-personal relationship because human being cannot be the foundation of himself. Human value lies in his own humanity which is related to the supreme being from whom all men participate their essence and existence. The definition of humanity lies, therefore note only in interpersonal relationship (as Mencius maintains) but also in the human essence.

Properly speaking, from Confucius on, the relationship between Heaven and man is often discussed. In his Analects, Confucius himself had frequently confessed that he believe in God. This was especially evident when he faced the ultimate limit of his life.

(e) In the process of modernization it should be very useful to uphold the Confucian traditional heritage. If we adopt the sabbatical system, it means not only that Sunday is a holiday, but also that it is day of spiritual exercise for fraternal love which is to be extended from consanguinity to strangers, from the beloved to the enemies, so as to fulfill the ultimate goal of Confucianism -- the Ta-tung world (the Great Commonwealth of Peace and Prosperity).

Notes

1. Li-\textit{chi} (The Book of Rites), chap. Li-yun.
9. This structure can be seen in Chinese societies, mainly in the associations for common ancestry and for fellow countrymen overseas in technologically developed nations.
17. If this was not the case, Ssu-ma Chien would not have complained about providence when he wrote the history of Po-I who was clever and virtuous, but suffered from hunger and death.
Forms and Formation Traditions

The concept of formation is always a reference to the shaping or forming of human life; at the same time it is applicable also to the formation of the human world, society, culture, etc. This paper intends first of all to define the foundational meanings of the concept of formation tradition. In some measure all of us have been formed, implicitly and explicitly, by one or the other formation tradition or by some mixture of them.

To begin, it is natural to ask: whence do these traditions emerge; how do they influence our receptive and creative patterns of formation of the self, of society, and of the world; what is their deeper or foundational meaning; and are particular formation traditions here to stay? In the analysis of formation traditions, what can we learn to enrich our own perspective, namely, the science of foundational human formation? We must question the specific formation tradition to which we may be personally committed and search how we can relate in a meaningful way participation in our tradition to the scientific study of formation. These are some of the critical questions regarding the emergence of this new science of human formation in a pluralistic society.

The key construct, mystery-of-formation, enables all forms in the cosmos to emerge, expand and maintain themselves. It recognizes for all forms, animate and inanimate, a foundational potency in terms of which their form persists, unfolds, expands and assimilates whatever can serve their maintenance and expansion.

Contemporary physics helps to elucidate this by showing how forms in the cosmos follow a principle of rising and falling. The moment all effectiveness to receive or to give a form is exhausted, this specific form disappears or emerges as other forms. Minerals, plants, atomic and subatomic particles form themselves in automatic consonance with their form direction: they have a built-in formation readiness. Among the cosmic forms are living organisms or organismic forms equipped with instinctive directives. These instinctual directives correspond only with those appearances of the world relevant to the survival and expansion of these specific organisms.

Only the human life form appears on the cosmic scene with almost no instinctual directives. Devoid of sufficient preformed life directives, the human life form has to disclose its own. Accordingly, the human life form has to bring into relief those appearances of the world that correspond to its self-forming life directives. By such enhanced, compatible world appearances the human life form shapes life and world in accordance with its own chosen directives. This anticipates the self-initiating human life form which is essentially connected to the emergence of a formation tradition (van Kaam, 1983, p. 198).

Thus, the human life form discloses receptive and creative directives and their corresponding attracting objects. In this process, human societies develop a whole universe of symbols as the only way to disclose and maintain trans-instinctual directives and their chosen objects. It is only by means of symbols that these can be set apart in the human mind and world. As humanly meaningful objects are not articulated as such in nature, human symbols are necessary to point to humanly preferred form objects in nature by which certain world appearances are symbolically highlighted or staged, as it were, and put into relief as formationally relevant. Situation, world and society thus become articulated for human life in formation symbols. This universe of formation
symbols and their implied potential directive constitutes, as it were, a life of its own in the realm of formation (van Kaam, 1987, p. 3).

"The formation tradition is the fruit of co-creative disclosures by countless generations-information. Not only humans of one passing generation, but those of many generations disclosed together the symbolic form directives thought to be ideal for the formation of life and world" (p. 3). No one human being, no one generation, nor a few fleeting generations alone could amass sufficient experience to propose a set of symbolic form directives which would constitute a style of distinctively human or spiritual formation.

Moreover, emerging formation traditions themselves have to be purified steadily by many generations. They must separate accidental historical accretions due to particular historical situations from the disclosure of foundational truths of human formation. Such universal, transcultural form directives may be hidden within the particular form directives handed over by past generations.

Our very word "tradition" comes from the Latin tradere, which means handing over. Formation tradition thus refers to the form directives that have been handed over from generation to generation. Foundational formation tradition refers to that aspect of the forming tradition that has a universal directive validity. It is no longer bound exclusively to the particularities of past or present socio-historical situations. Any concrete formation tradition is a mixture of universal and particular socio-historical accretions. These may remain formatively effective and contribute positively to the culture or to a sub-culture for whatever length of time the socio-historical situation needs that response.

Formation traditions have been the leading depositories of form directives for human life and society. Their continuity has been supported by the religious or humanistic belief systems in which they are rooted. This accounts for their perdurance as they support their adherents through writing, symbols, creative myths, rites and customs which rendered vital and powerful the ageless form directives. Even though the classical form traditions may have lost some of their power for increasing numbers of people, for the majority of humanity they remain among the significantly formative, if implicit, influences in their lives. Many people no longer realize how much they are influenced continually by such traditions embodied in the customs of their cultures and societies.

**Faith Traditions and Form Traditions**

The power of these form traditions lies in their presuppositions concerning the formation mystery and its epiphanies. The deepest question concerns the mystery of the ultimate nature and meaning of formation processes, for we do not have a definitive and compelling explanation of their ultimate meaning. The effective constitution of our daily living can proceed effectively only if somehow we abandon ourselves to this mystery, at least in some implicit elementary faith, hope and consonance. Formation traditions find their strength in symbols, stories, rituals, and writing that are deeply meaningful and nourish living faith, hope and consonance in the formation mystery. Such beliefs or convictions and their immediate symbols and implications are the heart of a religious or humanistic faith tradition.

The central concern of the subsequent formation tradition developed on the basis of such beliefs differs from the elements mentioned. The belief systems of specific form traditions function as necessary vitalizing, inspiring and controlling predispositions, accompanied usually by attempts at rational explications, explanation and legitimations. They may develop into self-consistent and rational systems of an ontological or theological nature. The sciences that emerge are not as such
the primary concern of that form tradition, but are utilized to study the tradition in order to achieve understanding of the presuppositions of its basic faith.

"Form tradition" refers primarily to the practical and formative customs, methods, styles, exercises, etc., developed and transmitted by generations committed to the same religious or humanist faith tradition. The form directives by which people guide their lives have been disclosed partly in answer to the presuppositional specific beliefs concerning the nature and meaning of the formation mystery as envisioned in the particular tradition. What distinguishes a form tradition from a faith tradition as such is the fact that its practical formation answers have been developed in dialogue (interaction) with the concrete everyday concerns and requirements of people-information within practical situations and social interaction situations. Form traditions are defined by tension between two fidelities: the primary fidelity is to the foundational faith presuppositions concerning the nature and meaning of the formation mystery; the other fidelity is to the facts and meanings of changing form situations and societies in which the faith tradition must concretely be incarnated.

Apparently, form tradition is much more plastic or flexible and more open to change than the foundational faith tradition. This difference remains always true. The form tradition as practical must change with the changing factual knowledge of the specific nature and demands of each human life, its form structure, its field of formation and the multifarious form dynamics (p. 7).

Ideally, any change in praxis should not be contrary to the foundational faith presuppositions of which the form tradition is an expression. When our understanding of formation changes profoundly, we may see more clearly that certain formulations of the foundational faith presuppositions were not precise enough to exclude in the minds of followers certain temporal accretions. When such problems arise, they are referred to the philosophers or theologians of the tradition whose expertise focuses upon the presuppositions.

Ultimate and Proximate Thinking

Until the 18th century, remote or ultimate thinking, mainly philosophical and theological in nature, prevailed in Western culture. Consequently, pronounced attention was given to the basic presuppositions of human formation, which gave rise to a great depth of understanding of such presuppositions. Spiritualities developed in this period were compelled to connect this presuppositional thought that focuses on ultimate human concerns with the practice of proximate spiritual life formation. The spiritual masters of formation developed a way of thought which was primarily or mainly proximate. They initiated form traditions or developed already existing ones. Something similar happened in the Orthodox and the far Eastern religious traditions. Along with their own basic faith tradition and its philosophies and theologies, they developed spiritualities or specific form traditions.

These form traditions took into account the available knowledge of life form structures, the form field and the dynamics of life and field, but concrete factual knowledge was very limited. Proximate knowledge gained immensely with the development of proximate thinking in and through the development of the natural and social sciences. The findings of the new proximate sciences complemented the knowledge of the remote sciences of philosophy and theology. With this immense increase in proximate knowledge, it would become possible for the various form traditions to refine their formation customs and symbols by engaging in a fruitful dialogue with the proximate knowledge provided by the new sciences.
This dialogue was temporarily delayed for a number of reasons. Firstly, the new scientists reacted strongly against the past dominance of form traditions, rejecting or ignoring their crucial role in the past and for the future of an historic humanity of faith, hope and consonance in the primordial formation decision of people. They ignored the necessity of traditional symbols, myths, and rites, and their rational elaboration by corresponding philosophical and theological sciences. Through reason these sustain, deepen and spark the primordial and foundational human spiritual acts of faith, hope and consonance. Without these distinctively human virtues, people miss the motivation to implement in their lives the insights that serve the function of a consonant life and world formation.

In turn, people steeped in the existing form traditions overreacted against their rejection by some proponents of the new proximate sciences, especially when these turned scathingly against the transcendent faith presuppositions of the various traditions. The presuppositions of a faith tradition can neither be proved nor disproved by the methods of the proximate sciences. With the "explosion of knowledge" which resulted from the findings of the new sciences, great confusion and fragmentation also ensued.

The imperialism of the form traditionalists also prevented the possibilities of dialogue between the old knowledge and the new. Christians lived in nostalgia of the glorious medieval time when a small part of the world, Europe, was given direction by a unified Christian form tradition. Humanity would only very gradually come to the realization that the "global village" must bear with differences of form traditions; that no one formation tradition would be able to convince or coerce all the others to establish world unity in its exclusive image alone. It has become more and more painfully clear that often wars, persecutions and much social injustice were caused by conflict between competing form traditions. In many cases they were the ultimate source of divisiveness, power excesses, wars and social injustice. As the possibilities of mutual annihilation increase, there is a growing awareness of the need to respect the possible contributions that each form tradition can make.

It is important that an elementary universal knowledge or science of the consonant formation of life and world develop in such a way that it can be articulated in each consonant form tradition. This must be able to be done without diminishing their unique and rich complementarity, rooted in their belief system with their assumptions or presuppositions. Our age proves convincingly that all attempts to level the unique traditions of contemporary humanity can only destroy our ultimate chance for social peace and justice.

Another factor that causes a delay in the necessary dialogue regarding a universal and foundational forming of humanity and society emerges out of the scientific assumption that only through its methods could one arrive at a true science for distinctively human formation. Scientists could develop compelling theoretical frames of reference which nonetheless are not compelling for life. This discloses the need for abandonment to the mystery of formation, for, despite the integrational goals of scientists it is evident that no proximate science can totally or exactly identify and demonstrate the ultimate sense or meaning of the formation processes in the universe. It is impossible to engage oneself whole-heartedly and creatively in these formation processes unless one does so with some implicit and elementary faith and hope. The forming traditions alone provide convincing, even compelling, ways to gain, maintain and expand a sense of faith or hope. Without foundational valorization, without faith or hope, it would be impossible for the great majority of people to implement their aspirations and ideals as proposed by a new creative synthetic knowledge. No matter how well theoretical and proximate knowledge might be validated by the fragmentary proximate sciences that would not suffice.
There is a need to distinguish between the cosmic, the personal-human and the trans-human epiphanies of the mystery of formation. Every tradition can be classified as prevalently concerned with one of these epiphanies. For example, the Buddhist form tradition seems prevalently intra-cosmic; it deeply fosters reverence for, and understanding of, the mystery of macro- and micro-cosmic formation. This also appears to be true of Taoism. The Confucian form tradition seems prevalently inspired by the personal-social epiphany of the formation mystery. This seems true also of the humanist and socialist form traditions. Christianity, like Islam and Judaism, initiated form traditions based on a belief in a trans-human revelation of the forming mystery. Faith in, and concern for, the cosmic (nature) and the personal-social (human) epiphanies is also present for these three traditions. We can gain much from the practical formation wisdom of any form tradition based on faith in any of the epiphanies. Insofar as each tradition goes beyond its underlying faith tradition in its attempts at practical implementation in daily life, it is the source of possible formation insights or wisdom that can be clarified and validated through dialogue with the different proximate sciences.

Transmission of the Form Tradition

Many agents transmit the directives of a tradition. Of course, in infancy and childhood the primary agents of child formation are the parents. However, the transmission of life-forming directives expands as siblings, the extended family, teachers, and others, reinforce the primary agency of parents or their surrogates. The transmission of the form tradition is effected under conditions that modify the ideal form of the tradition so that the tradition can never be transmitted in a perfect manner. There are many reasons for this; to cite but a few: the parents as prime agents of the transmission always understand the core of the tradition in the light of their personal biases, distorting the profound directives contained in the heart of the tradition. As good but not perfect specimens, their individual and subjective characteristics make for an imperfect transmission of the life-forming wisdom of the form tradition. By their vulnerabilities and limits infants and young children also contribute to the problems of transmission.

Nonetheless, the work of transmission intends a relative success in the formation of the young. Ideally, the society, acting through its primary formation agents, succeeds in providing a proper formation for the new human being. It intends the formation of the core of the child’s personality which embodies or incarnates the unity or web of beliefs that give meaning to life and to development as the essential raison d’être of the tradition. If the essential aspects of the tradition are appropriated and made one’s own they become part of the very being of the individual formed. In childhood the form tradition is taken on "externally" so to speak: the child conforms, which is all that it is capable of doing. However, adulthood requires that one’s motivational life change and that conformity yield to an "authorization from within" (Lacan, 1977, pp. 227-278).

This shift in the motivational life of the one being formed has profound significance. For example, there must be a decentering of the adult’s motivational life. They must act no longer primarily because of social expectations, but should increasingly manifest the profound and transcendent values of the form tradition. To live in this manner requires that one abandon oneself to the mystery of formation as comprehended and fostered uniquely and communally by the formation tradition.

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This chapter concerns the importance of the quality of human life for the promotion of social progress, and correlatively the role of social space and communication in the improvement of the quality of life.

Improving the Standard of Life as a Synthetic Measure of Social Progress

1. In the last analysis, the quality of human life includes two aspects: its spiritual character and the ability to know and to act. The former consists of ideals: values, moral consciousness and creativity. The latter consists in knowing ways and means of shaping nature (e.g. using tools), and the capacity to organize and administer socio-economic development. These are intrinsically interrelated. Spiritual qualities plays a normative role in guiding knowledge and action. For example, science and technology are fundamental to the abilities to know and act. It is imperative that science and technology be guided by even the most advanced science and technology may fail to do so achieve this. At the same time, given today’s advanced science and technology the spiritual quality of life depends upon the quality of one’s ability to know and act, without which any advanced ideal and creativity would be rendered useless. The human person is an organic unity of spiritual qualities with knowledge and action.

The overall human quality can be described and generalized from various perspectives. In accord with China’s socialist modernization, the quality of the contemporary Chinese can be characterized mainly by the "Four Possessions, i.e. of ideals, morality, culture and discipline". Though seemingly abstract, but these are popular and have profound significance for modern Chinese life. They emphasize the spiritual quality of human life, especially its ideals, morality and discipline. In working for the modernization of China, which is less developed but has a population of over a billion people, it is not conceivable that there will be one common ideal, one sense of morality, and the necessary discipline.

At the same time, culture, science and technology are highly emphasized. These are not only important for raising the standard of living, they are indispensable for improving the abilities to know and act. Therefore, generally speaking, the "four possessions" include the development of human reason and intelligence, the enhancement of knowledge and action based upon modern science, as well as the enhancement of morality and life ideals. Naturally, the "four possessions" are the main factors in the quality of human life. They do not exclude such qualities as "breadth of thought", "openmindedness", "planning", and "respect for others", as is claimed by some foreign scholars. The concrete content of the "four possessions" necessarily will be enriched and deepened as practice develops.

2. The developmental level of the productive social force usually is taken as the measure of social progress. Certainly this is correct, but it is neither the sole criterion nor an integral scale of social progress.

Society is a complex system and the scale of social progress is comprised of three main aspects: (a) The level of development of the productive forces. This is the main scale and is of fundamental significance because the social productive forces are the primary basis for social
guarantee increasing plenty in the material life of the members of society, but it provides a firm material basis for their mental and physical development. (b) The extent to which people are emancipated in their social relations is reflected mainly in the different developmental stages of the socio-political structure, e.g. the degree of realization of democracy and freedom. (c) The spiritual outlook of a society depends upon the state of the development of politics, economy, science and culture in a society, but is relatively independent. It is an important aspect of spiritual civilization and plays an important role in promoting the development and progress of society. Especially where worship of power, money and fame exists, such lofty life ideals and such noble moral qualities as goodness and honesty are the mental forces required for resisting various forms of corruptions.

3. Analyzing these three aspects of social progress, it is possible to use the improvement of the standard of living and all-round development as a synthetic criterion of social progress because all three aspects are closely correlated with human development. The improvement of the quality or all-round development of human life is the complex manifestation of these three aspects, the bridge that connects them.

Human quality is decisive for the social productive force. The role played by productive means frequently is overemphasized, and they depend upon persons as their makers and operators. Indeed, this is "seeing things, but not man." Obviously, if the members of a society have a low level of culture, science and technology, then the productive force also will be low. This is shown in the UNESCO statistics for 1985, where the level of illiteracy of a country or area is in inverse proportion with its gross national product.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Area</th>
<th>Illiterate in total population (%)</th>
<th>GNP ($) (mean per person)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>2557</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>8324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Developed countries</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Africa</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>629</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latin America</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>1671</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lest developed countries</td>
<td>67.6</td>
<td>195</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The extent to which people are emancipated from poverty is a necessary criterion for social progress or development. It correlates closely with the quality of human life. In comparison with feudalism, capitalism is a progressive form for society. The members of capitalist society have been emancipated from the yoke of feudal production and have won autonomy and the rights freedom and equality in both the economic and the political relations. "Emancipation" and "freedom" are equivalent concepts. According to Marx’s doctrine, in the future ideal society the emancipation of humans will reach a very high degree so that "eventually man will become master of his own social integration, and hence of nature and of himself -- a man for freedom.” However, the further emancipation from the economic, political and other relations of society depends entirely upon the quality of human life, i.e. upon one’s ability to know and act. To reform the productive and other social relations which have bound humans, it is essential that they consciously demand reform, and in doing this the ability to act is also important.
The spiritual outlook of society is an indispensable criterion of social progress. The ideal of life toward which humans strive is its spiritual support and the core of its spiritual force. Morality is the self-discipline of the human spirit; it is the interior law of one’s self-responsibility. The ideal of life and morality are generated from certain productive or economic relations in society and hence are determined by the material conditions of life, and vary as the economic and political relations of society are reformed. Different social systems and their developmental phases have their own life ideal and moral standards, some of which reflect not only the economic, political and cultural state of society, but also the developmental level of its quality of life.

In the work of reform in China, it is increasingly realized that it is impossible to judge the development of socialist modernization based only on economic indices. Recently, for the guiding ideas and concrete measures we take greater care to ordinary economic activities but do not give sufficient attention to the all-round development of the quality of human life, its ideals and morality. Where the therefore has occupied great time, effort and interest. But there has been a failure in recent years to take account of the ideals and morality. Though non-economic, these factors could exert a tremendous influence upon economic development. Moreover, if one stresses the economy and slights the quality of human life, or stresses money and slights values and national consciousness and aspirations, it is difficult for the country to be economically successful. There is some progress in that now we stress more building the spiritual civilization of socialism ad strive to enhance the quality of human life. Therein lies the hope of socialist modernization.

Enhancing the Quality of Human Life and Developing Social Interaction

1. The present possibilities for development lie in social interaction, namely, the mutual relations and exchanges in the economy, science and thought. In philosophical terms, social contact is the mutual subjective and objective exchange, through the medium of natural things of physical and mental products, between the individual (or person) and the community (such as state or area, group); also it is the basic pattern of individual actions which transform social activities.

This interaction has great significance for social development, while at the same time guaranteeing that this retains all the elements of a human. Whether or not the productive forces especially invention and creation are lost depend on the extent of these contacts in the process of development. There are cases in the Chinese past where a unique skill or secret medical care was lost because these were passed on only sons, not to daughters (Chuan zi bu chuan nu). Social contacts also could promote developments and the invention of scientific technology through the great vitality the inject. There are many instances of this, such as the four inventions of China gaining rapid development and application after spreading to Europe, and the transformation of the imperial examination system of ancient China into the civil service system in Western Europe.

Through social contacts in economic cooperation, importing advanced scientific technology and exchanging talent have come distinct improvements in politics and the economy. After the Second World War, the Japanese economy underwent rapid development due to economic and scientific exchanges. China has strengthened and extend such contacts both internationally and internally, and thereby developed is social economy and the spiritual outlook of the people. In other words, transforming a closed and stagnant economic system into an open economic system has developed the productive forces. The country is now entering a new stage in which the economy will develop vigorously, the national power will be strengthened rapidly and the well-being of the masses will improve remarkably.
2. In order for social contacts to bring about great social progress there is required an improvement of the quality of human life. First, social contacts change the aim and the scope of people’s production and activity; they broaden people’s outlook, raise their level of freedom and kindle their initiative and creative power. Secondly, social interchange enables one to learn and absorb new cultural and scientific content; as a result the structure of people’s knowledge and the form of their thinking is changed and their ability to reflect and act is strengthened. For example, the ancient Greeks spent a good deal of time travelling within their country, to Egypt, etc. This shaped an open manner of thinking, and a tradition which could absorb other cultures and create a splendid ancient civilization. Third, social interchange impels a change in people’s values, undoubtedly, by reason one can envisage an ideal of life, think through the overall situation, and form a vision of the whole. But, this understanding depends upon broad contact and interchange the ideals of value which order objects of knowledge according as they are considered good or bad reflect also a people’s hopes and desires, which in turn, are bound to be reflected and judge in the process of social interaction.

Since the transformation and the opening of China in 1978, people’s social contacts have become more widespread; the scope of their activity has been extended, their vision broadened, and their enterprise and initiative intensified especially, more close ideas of value and forms of thinking have been transformed and increasingly replaced by a new horizons oriented toward modernization, the world, and the future.

3. Enhancing the quality of life depends upon social contacts and the implied social progress. Developments in the social economy provide a solid material foundation to enhance the quality of life by raising productive efficiency, this provides more "freetime", with opportunities to develop our cultural and scientific knowledge, and to engage in recreational activities. All this is good for the health of mind and body, and enhances one’s capacities for thought and action. The more rapidly a country develops its economy, the higher its productive efficiency and the more time people have, beyond the production of material goods, eating and sleeping, for other activities which enhance their abilities of mind and action. "Free time" has differed for ancient primitives, agricultural peoples (the era of a self-sufficient agricultural economy), and industrial workers (the era of socialized production). Throughout the development of the social economy and the increase of "free time" has been the condition for enhancing the quality of human life:

The life expectancy of primitive man: 18 years,
the "free time" of primitive man: 4 years.
The life expectancy of agricultural man: 35 years,
the "free time" of primitive man: 11 years.
The life expectancy of industrial man: 70 years,
the "free time" of industrial man: 36.33 years.

In addition, information staff member’s free time in industrialized countries are four hours and 18 minutes to four hours and 24 minutes each day (men), and three hours to three hours and 30 minutes daily (women). This is connected with the development of human ability: the higher the degree of civilization in the social system, the greater the degree of freedom of political thought. However, arousing one’s latent potentialities and creativity is the condition for enhancing the scientific and cultural quality of the members of society. Strengthening the legal system and good moral habits are bound to enable the member of society to develop law-abiding and moral
sentiments. As social condition exert a strong uplifting influence on people, social development enhances the quality of life and human abilities.*

The Quality of Life and the Modernization of China

An important task now faced all countries is to enhance the quality of life. Long experience practice has led to the conclusion that it is necessary to make great efforts to enhance this quality in order fully to achieve China’s socialist modernization.

1. China is one of the oldest civilized countries in the world, the wisdom and diligence of the Chinese people has been well-known everywhere. Its economy, politics and culture have developed greatly since the initiation of the new China. It is still a developing country, however, with the largest population in the world. Because of many complicated historical causes, its economic and cultural development lagged, and developed in an imbalanced manner. In general, then the standard of life does not accord with the requirements of socialist modernization. An idea of the progress that had to be made can be gathered from the 1990 Department of Population Census announcement that 15.8 percent of the total population is illiterate and semi-illiterate; among these, 10.8 percent of teenagers from 12 to 15 years of age are illiterate. Persons between 15 and 19 age receive less than a middle school education. In the industrial sector, experts and technicians are 2.8 percent of the total workers. The physical quality of the population is an important problem. The divorce rate is presently 1.5 percent, but rises to 17 percent in some region. There are 50 million disabled persons, among which 10 million are mentally handicapped. 3 This situation of the population illustrates the gap between the quality of human life and modernization.

The character of the people has strongly affected China’s modernization. Though sometimes overlooked, historically the production rate of the country remained low, and were general phenomena of high-consumption and low-efficiency, higher imports than production. China has had great achievements since 1949 and reform and open door policy of 1978; recent years this has been astounding. This effects the quality with respect of the politics, economics, thought, culture, ethics, etc. of the Chinese people.

2. The general quality of life and Chinese socialist modernization have been receiving ever greater consideration by politicians and scholars. Experience shows that modernization depends upon the quality.

The quality of life is a consequence of history which, in turn, it effects. Under socialist conditions, the quality of the whole people is improved by lightening the burden of social production, developing new relationships among the people on the basis of public ownership, and deeply transforming the entire face of society. This is a requisite condition if the modernization of China is to be a success.4

In recent years, the government has done much to enhance the quality of life. Across the spectrums from the center to the localities great efforts continue to be made. This important goal of the country involves the following tasks:
(a) To emphasize education regarding ideals and morality. Common ideals and ethics are the spiritual support of our people, the symbol of the cohesion of the Chinese people, and the effective basis for modernization.

(b) To develop the scientific and cultural levels of the nation and to diffuse education in science and technology. In the process of modernization, the economy is, of course, the first factor; but cultural development has been disregarded, and both must supplement each other. Enhancing the quality of life depends upon education and has been increasingly emphasized. But the educational investment is low in proportion to GNP. For instance, throughout the world it was 5.7 percent in 1985, but only 3.2 percent in China in 1987. This was lower even than some developing countries in Africa. Recently, the various levels of government have paid more attention to this problem; some private people also have set up schools and spread education. It must be a matter of great and perduring efforts to encourage the various levels of society to esteem knowledge, to respect the intelligentsia, and to emphasize education in sciences and culture.

(c) To pay more attention to the construction of the legal system, and to develop legal education. The "person" is the embodiment of law and morals. John Locke, the English philosopher, said in his Essay Concerning Human Understanding that "Man is a term of law". Our country is one ruled by law: "To know law", "To observe law", and "To protect law" are both obligations of the people and qualities they possess. The government has enacted many laws and regulations. The Central Committee of the CCP and the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress and the State Council decided that it would five years to spread a basic knowledge of law throughout the entire people of China. Significant achievements have been made in constructing the body of law and disseminating legal education; this trend will continue.

(d) To emphasize birth control and eugenics as necessary for enhancing the nation’s quality of life. Unchecked growth of the population has retarded not only economic growth but the development and disseminate of technology and education, seriously hampering quality of life of the Nation Birth control and eugenics will be a significant problem for a comprehensive enhancement of life and relates even to national survival.

(e) Physical culture and training contributes to the natural quality of a human life and increases one’s ability to act. On the one hand, it cultivates habits of application, of "firm and indomitable" endurance and of enterprise. The government and various social groups have invested a great deal of energy in developing physical culture, and have had real achievements. However, there is still great unevenness in this regard whereas in some developed countries 50 percent of the total population engage in some form of exercise only 30 percent do so in China. More must be done to extend and intensify the physical quality of life.

Notes

2. Friedrich Engels, Socialism from Utopia to Scientific Discovery.
3. Life, August 1, 1990.

Introduction

The May Fourth Movement is best characterized by its radical rejection of the Chinese tradition (values) and by its absolute belief in scientism. The so-called Cultural Revolution (1968) tried to abolish Confucianism and replace it with a total new ideology, called Maoism. For its proponents modernization is the antinomy of tradition; it is possible only by means of a radical destruction of tradition.

This work will show such an understanding of modernity to be ahistorical and therefore undialectical. In contrast, modernization is impossible without a thorough grasp of traditional values, for there is a dialectical relationship between tradition and modernity. Thus, traditionless modernity is as blind as an anti-modern tradition is reactionary.

To approach these issues it is important to note that the Enlightenment generated scientism -- a new belief, or better, a new dogma that only through and by (natural) science can progress and therefore happiness be achieved. Such a belief became sacred and holy after the success of the industrial revolution, and especially the triumph of colonialism and imperialism. Humbled by Western technology (which ruled the battlefield and therefore the destiny of China), Chinese intellectuals called for an abandonment of the Chinese Confucian tradition which they held to be responsible for the backwardness of China, and for total and unconditional acceptance of Western scientism. The undeniable evidence of the Japanese historical victory over the Russian armada in 1905 due to the Meiji’s Westernized revolution confirmed the supreme and ultimate role of scientism as the new ideology. China became less interested in tradition, which it saw as useless, or even in pure science, than in the effectiveness of technology in solving pressing issues. In a word, science was taken to mean plain technology and the ideology was none other than what can rightly be termed scientism.

This ideology has remained unchallenged until today when mother nature comes to be destroyed by ruthless exploitation, when our life is endangered and when the specter of an apocalypse appears more visible than ever -- all by means of technology. This is not a tragedy of China alone; it is human destiny. It reflects less the impotence of science than the blindness of scientism which arrogantly dictates the human fate and enslaves all under its total domination. Such a tragedy was foreseen and warned against by Martin Heidegger, M. Horkheimer and Th. Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, and more interestingly by a great number of scientists. Recently, the blind domination of technology begins to be questioned, but in an equally ideological and biased manner in terms of a plea for return to a naturalistic Taoistic world. The politically motivated Green and the so-called anti-nuclear movements ignore the problematics of technology. The lone voice of some young thinkers who call for a balanced view of science and technology is often ignored or pushed aside for the sake of technological advance. The ruling elites hold firm in their view identifying modernization with technological advance -- which is not necessarily progress.

The point raised by Vincent Shen and others is that modernization is being left unchecked so that technology gets out of our control and becomes the modern Sphinx swallowing the world into a black hole. Thus a thorough reflection upon the process or modernization is urgent. A critique of technology does not mean being against it (indeed, it is absurd to be anti-technology). The
function of a critique is to attain a better understanding and thereby a better solution of the problems emerging in the process of modernization. I would further insist not only on the indispensable role of critique, but, in Gadamer’s terms, claim that modernization is not possible by means of technological advance alone, but requires a long process of reflecting upon and correcting the traditional ways of solving human problems. Beyond Gadamer, we hold the view that modernization has to deal with new problems which are still emerging in the complex web of new human knowledge, interests and even visions. In other word, the process of modernization cannot be reduced to the process of technologization, but must be understood from two different, though dialectically interwoven, processes: that of emergence from tradition and that of fulfilling the project born of new vision.

Modernity is often understood as specific to a new age emerging from a revolt against the middle ages as a conservative and even backward tradition. The "querelle des anciens and moderns" indicates a new psychological and ideological kind of revolt (as the term "moderns" expresses): a new attitude toward the new world and, not least, a new belief in modernity as the new Messiah. Here, modernity places itself in an antinomian position against tradition. An understanding of the issue is to be found not in a simple explanation of the reason for the conflict in terms of the genetic process of modernity itself, but more importantly in the confrontational attitude of both modernists and traditionalists. To prove this point, our argument centers: (1) on a description of the cause of the conflict between "ancients and moderns", from which, (2) we shall extract its main reasons, which we shall try to apply to our age in order to see whether it amounts to the same conflict, and (3) we will come to our main point, namely, that the conflict emerges not accidentally, but permanently in the process of the human search for new solution to human problems.

Modernity vs Tradition

The phrase, "La querelle des anciens et moderns" expresses a total conflict between two worlds: an autocratic world based on divine providence and a subjective world which strives for total emancipation from the former. From another point of view, the modern person attempts to escape from a moral, classical, normative . . . tradition. Humans are seen as surrounded and thus held captive by norms and morals so that the modern person revolts not against tradition per se, but against its norms (morals). Frederick Nietzsche was but following the rebellious path set up by his predecessors in the age of the Reformation and Enlightenment, of course, in more violent terms. The modern person objects to divine power precisely in order to acquire his own power. He calls for the abolition of traditional norms because he feels that they are an obstacle to progress. He sentences God to death not because he does not believe in Him, but because he holds Him responsible for evil or the human fate. In a word, modern man is modern precisely in wanting to be autonomous, independent from external power. Like a bird, he is growing, and tries to leave his nest, to be free from the cage built by his ancestors, the sacred tradition. The revolt against tradition, the protest against morals and God, the cry for freedom and equality, all testify that man is entering upon his adolescence.

The issue here is how the modern person knows that he or she must be fully independent and free, and how he exercises his freedom without hurting himself; like a bird, one has to learn to fly before attempting to escape the nest. How does the modern person know that he or she can fly without any assistance from a mother. Such a question could be answered only if one is conscious
of what one is calling for, namely, one must have a knowledge of freedom and equality . . . before hand. But what happens if such knowledge is distorted, fabricated, onesided or baseless.

The modern person knows that he or she possesses such a knowledge, and that it is certain and valid in the sense of resolving unsolved enigmas and furnishing a better means of living and knowing. This knowledge is identified as science, the new Messiah proclaimed by the Enlightenment. Thus, the birth of modern science provides self-confidence and the ambition to replace God. The success of Galileo in challenging the divine power, of the defiance by Rousseau of the social structure based on theocracy and aristocracy, as well as of Kant in demonstrating the autonomy of moral laws, all are constructs of modern science, of which mathematics and physics are the main models. This science has as its main characteristics feelings of confidence, autonomy and freedom.

The more advanced science becomes, the more self-conscious is man. The self-consciousness of modern man, praised by Locke and Hume, cultivated by Berkeley and Kant, and divinised by Goethe and Hegel, is another characteristic of modernity. Self-awareness now replaces the traditional paradigms of the providence of, and fidelity to God. It claims the power of creation (Nietzsche and partly Schopenhauer), and it claims the whole process of genesis (Hegel). The science sought by Hegel is, in fact, that of self-consciousness as developed in his Phenomenology of Spirit which is then applied to the world in Philosophy of History, Philosophy of Religion and Philosophy of Right.

That same consciousness is elevated by his disciples as the most important tool in dispelling the shadow of tradition: Bauer, Sirner, Strauss and Feuerbach, for example, sharpen self-consciousness to reject Christian belief and hence the Western heritage, while Marx goes even further in seeking to overthrow the total structure of traditional society which he condemns as alienated. With the rise of self-consciousness comes the decline or, in the hands of the young Hegelians, the death of tradition. Nietzsche’s radical call for the death of God marks the era of revolt against tradition.

Modern man describes himself as a rational man, a man against any form of superstition, unscientific belief and blind decision. Modern man seeks to abolish all systems which are "irrational"; he wants to dictate his own fate by means of calculation and not of belief. He objects to metaphysical determinism by constructing a kind of technological and economic device or effective instrument which can satisfy his life. In a word, he leaves his fate in the cold hands of rationality.

**Human Nature and the Goals of Modernity**

The new belief of modern man is justified as long as the world goes well along the path devised by science, and so long as science and its deacons perform up to the standard claimed and expected by human beings. Our question here is whether we would warrant an omnipotent role for science if it is rather one of our products? What happens if science is miscalculated and misapplied? What happens to humankind if it is distorted or manipulated?

The modern person seems not yet to have had time for reflection on the ideology of scientism, even if he has witnessed its atrocities, destructive force of scientism and its legitimate heir, technology. He or she defends it with counter proofs of progress achieved by technology, and blames man as responsible for the mess. In a word, scientism is still considered absolute and has the final word in deciding human fate. Ironically, modern man abdicates his sovereign role in favor of his own product, so that tragically a human product controls man himself. The inevitable result
of such a logic is precisely an anti-emancipation provoked and elaborated by the Enlightenment with the help of science. One liberates oneself from religious and moral tradition in order to fall into the deterministic trap of scientism.

Here, we would begin by questioning the independent and absolute role of science, and whether it is developed in full independence from man and human tradition. For if science is only a part of tradition, and is manmade with the specific purpose of solving human problems, then it could not be independent and absolute. Any sovereignty on its part would be fabricated blindly and arrogantly by those who have not yet grasped its nature.

First, it has been argued that science is fully autonomous from the human factor. Relying on Newton’s description of the mechanistic function of the universe, the path of the universe is seen to function according to the laws of motion between force, inertia and mass (the formula $f=ma$), and the law of equilibrium between force and reaction (the third law of motion which states that when one body exerts a force on another, the second body exerts a force on the first body of the same magnitude but in the opposite direction). One generalizes the Newtonian laws to all branches of sciences, including the human sciences, by insisting on their independence. Man has nothing to do, or better said, no force to change the path of the mechanistic function of the universe to which he belongs as a part.

Second, the exact character of mathematics and physics is taken as proof of its correctness and consequently its validity. One then argues that human error is the main cause of human problems, so that solving human problems consists in eliminating the error. Consequently, one comes to the conclusion that only science can escape error, and hence that it is the best (and only) solution to human problems. Here, science is elevated to the rank of the God of tradition and replaces Him, not only in solving our problems but, moreover, in dictating human fate.

Third, its universal competence and hence value makes science transcendental, in the sense of being unlimited and unbounded in history and in the politico-socio-economic order. As transcendental, science enjoys absolute power in determining the conditions necessary for life, which means that human life would not be possible without it.

There is no doubt about the power of science in terms of correctness and truth. However, to translate correctness and exactness into absolute truth and value is rather an adventure, itself unscientific and biased as seemed the pre-scientific age.

We would argue as follows: First, the correctness of a scientific statement, such as, "The distance between the sun and the earth is eight million kilometers" is beyond doubt. But the value of such a statement comes not from its correctness, but rather from its usefulness; this, however, can be understood only in terms of human life. The statement is useful and hence valuable so long it has a positive role or function in human life (for an astronomer or astrophysicist). Second, "correct" is not identical with "truth". Correctness is measured according to a standard or model which specifies all the necessary conditions, while truth cannot be calculated solely quantitatively. It is correct to state that the earth is round, that the sun is hot, and that the earth circles the sun. But it could be true or not that God exists, for here the criteria of truth are different. The first statements are understood by the yardstick of pure science, while right is the criterion of practical science. Correctness is determined by calculus, while right by value judgement. So, one can say rightly that one feels the need of a God, this need coming from human feeling. It is uncalculable because there is no visible criterion or model to measure such a feeling, nonetheless it is true and one cannot refute it. There are no fixed necessary conditions or transcendental categories for determining the truth of a statement such as "I believe in truth in terms of value (best seen in Kant and positivism); its rejection is born from a complete, one-sided grasp of the nature of science. The attempt to
reduce science to technology, wisdom to know-how and truth to correctness is the hallmark of present scientism.

It should be noted that, even if science is transcendental, it does not dictate human fate. Science is human knowledge about the object (nature, world), and as human it could not exist without man. One has to make clear that though nature exists independently from man, knowledge about nature does not. It is true that "the sun is eight million kilometers distant from the earth", and that this distance is not made or fabricated by man. However, our point centers on the knowledge of this distance. Such knowledge is impossible without the discovery of the solar system by man. Our argument leads to a tentative conclusion, namely, that the existence of science is self-evident, that science differs from nature or natural laws as such, and that it is foolish to object to it. However, to accept the absolute role of science is equally foolish, because it is human knowledge about something, a specific kind of knowledge which escapes the errors of ordinary knowledge, and which the Greeks expressed by the term "theoria".

As a consequence of the understanding of science as knowledge about something, with Aristotle it is necessary to insist on its manifold character. Depending on its mode of appearances, we construct scientific laws. Aristotle foresaw such kind of science when he designed the term "theoria" to express a certain form of pure knowledge which distinguishes itself from "praxis", a kind of practical knowledge. The former is elevated to "Wissenschaft", i.e. a knowledge of universal character, while the latter often is dismissed as non-scientific because of its inconsistency and particularity. Actually, the difference lies in its level of exactness and truth. Where pure science is true and exact, i.e. is transcendental in character, practical science lacks such universal truth, for the correctness of human action varies depending upon circumstance, human conditions, etc.

If we accept the distinction between pure and practical science and acknowledge its difference in terms of "truth", "exactness", "correctness", etc., we must accept that truth and exactness (in pure science) do not automatically generate rightness, which must be mediated by a human factor. That is to say, pure science, even if universally valid, does not generate values, and thus rightness, unless mediated by a human factor, i.e. unless it be put into praxis which means, in turn, for better or even for worse, to engage in human life.

If science has to be put in praxis, i.e. to be engaged in human life, then we can say for sure that the objective of science is not far from other forms of human knowledge: they all aim at discovering human problems and are looking for solutions, i.e., for ways to further human happiness. It is precisely here that we find the commonality between modernity and tradition. Human tradition reflects the whole process of the human search for valid paradigms, models which we take as the criteria of rightness in solving our problems. Whether they are still correct or valid is subject to a temporal and spatial test, which is the role of modernity as reflective, critical and revolutionary. But to critique tradition does not implicitly mean opposing it, much less abolishing it. The noble cause of modernity rests elsewhere, namely in shaping or making tradition more functional and valuable by means of critique. Science in the modern age should not be satisfied with the role of critiquing the obsolescence of tradition based on religious authority. It wants to offer modern man a true happiness which was promised but unrealized by religion. That means it continues the path of tradition in the sense that it is not detached from tradition as most modernists claim, but continues the traditional path.
Tradition and Modernity

Our arguments demonstrate so far the connection of modernity and tradition in terms of their commonality in searching for happiness by means of problem-discovery and problem-solution. The problems may differ as may their solutions, but the processes adopted by traditionalist and modernist could be the same. In this part, we shall inquire into the process of problem-discovery and problem-solution in order to show that fundamentally the traditionalists have been modernists and that tradition is not taken for granted, but rather for its effectiveness in solving human problems. In a word, tradition is accepted because of its value, or better said, because it still is generating or at least guarding human values. Tradition is thus neither a dead ideology nor a museum piece; it is a medium in which man lives, and without which any modernity is impossible. With Gadamer, we will argue that as long as tradition has been and still is the long human process of searching for happiness, it can serve as the source of modernity. This implies that modernity which excludes tradition as its starting point is simply unthinkable.12

In the first part, we draw attention to the artificial separation between natural and human science, the confusion of science and technology, the radical critique of modernists, and the inferiority complex of humanists reflected in their adopting solely the methods of natural science. Locke humbly accepted, for example, the role of “assistant and its secondary position”.13 We have also pointed out the difference between science as universal knowledge and practical science as pragmatic knowledge. Our point is that science generates value and demonstrates what is right only if it is concerned with human praxis, namely human activity in discovering and solving problems. Tradition primarily is concerned with basic human activities. Its value comes from its effectiveness in dealing with our problems. To prove this point, we shall examine some traditions to see whether they had to do with human problems, and whether their way (or method) is effective still in our days.

Let us take traditional morals as an example: some are obsolete while others are still valuable. We must ask why this is so. There is less doubt about Confucian morals as representative of Chinese traditional morals. Here, we can pick some basic moral principles found in Confucianism and examine them from a pragmatic point of view, that is, in terms of their effectiveness. The basic tenets in Confucian morals are the principles of Jen, Yih, Chung, Hsiao which still are accepted by most Chinese today. The first question which arises is the purpose of these principles and how Confucius constructed them. Another question, no less important, is why we accept them. To answer these three questions demands a thorough reflection on Confucius’ motives and methods in constructing the above tenets.

Here, the first question, of course, is not "how" but "why", not epistemological but ontological, not purely theoretic but rather pragmatic: why does Confucius propose Jen, Yih, Chung . . . as moral models which can solve human social problems?

The question demands first, a thorough understanding of which problem we have and then a search for the kind of solution that is effective. That is to say, the ontological question leads to the epistemological question, and finally to the pragmatic demand.

If we follow the order of this procedure, we may find that Confucius spent a great deal of time in study in order to discover the problems of human beings and society. To him, the problems are first implicit in un-natural human relationships (in the sense that such a relationship is against the natural order), in a lack of self-consciousness or self-recognition. Let us make a brief survey of the problems which we identify.
The symptom of an un-natural or anti-natural relationship is most manifest: (1) when one does not follow the natural order; or (2) when one revolts against such an order. In the first case, that one fails to follow the natural order could be due to human ignorance or to human alienation (in the form of suppression, ideological distortion, etc.) while in the second case, one revolts against such an order because of its impracticality, inhumanity, or human ignorance.

Here, we cannot go into a detailed investigation of the natural order. It is sufficient to note that such a natural order serves as the premise when Confucian morals have to be revised or discarded. Here, we shall just follow Confucius by taking his understanding of the natural order as an hypothesis, a tentative premise in Karl Popper’s sense, and not as truth.

For Confucius, human error consists in (1) disobeying the natural order due to ignorance, or (2) failing in self-correction due to alienation or lack of self-consciousness. Let us look first at what he describes as the natural order.

First, Confucius seems to follow the general understanding of order observed or experienced from nature: the order proceeds from the particular to the general, from the small to the great (quantitative), from imperfect to perfect values in the same manner as from less to more valuable, from less to more educated, from less to more powerful. In a word, Confucius’ order is arranged in accordance with human experience from nature: the greater is the better, the more perfect is the more desirable and so on.

It follows that it is easy to pinpoint human error: one commits mistakes exactly when one disobeys this order. A son is "bad" if he disobeys his father; a subordinate makes mistakes when he ignores the order of his superior; a wife lacks virtue when she does not fulfill the role assigned to her by her husband, etc.

One may argue against Confucius’ understanding of natural order and accuse him of simplifying problems, but one cannot blame him for his honest search for a better means to solve problems. We would object to some views which dismiss Confucius’ way of treating problems as unscientific (the view of Hu-Shi) by arguing that there is not a single scientific discovery without a careful observation of phenomena, a laborious diagnosis of the symptoms of phenomenal disorder, and a tentative attempt to explain and solve its enigma.

First, the natural order followed by Confucius was taken to be true at his time; even today in some ways our order is based on such an understanding of nature. St. Thomas, following Aristotle’s physics and St. Albert the Great’s natural sciences, discovered the same order: from less perfect to perfect, from moved to unmoved. We still hold the view that the universal is of higher value than the particular, or that the totality (collective) dictates the particular. Such an order is one-dimensional and is constructed vertically.

Second, it is true that we regard disorder as a symptom of illness or problems, or as a crisis or catastrophe. Thus, applying such an understanding of disorder as crisis, illness or catastrophe in human life, one cannot object to Confucius’ view of social disorder as the root of human disease.

However, to remain on the surface of the symptoms of a disorder is a bit naive. It is true that disorder comes from man’s ignorance of such an order, but, as in the second case, man disobeys the order not because of ignorance but because of being unwilling to follow it. Confucius does not take the first cause (ignorance) as the sole explanation of social disharmony, but proceeds further to accept the fact that man disobeys order for his own sake or his own interests. This is the point on which Confucius lays the greatest emphasis, for which reason he needs to search out the reasons for human selfishness and its conflicts. In the Analects, he offers a very good observation on human striving (desire) for self-satisfaction: "The inferior man understands profits", or in the ordinary
case of Tzu-Lu: "I wish to have a horse, a carriage, and a light fur coat and to share them with friends, and shall not regret if they are worn out",17 or "Wealth and honor are what every man desires."18

Thus, one has to ask why one strives for self-satisfaction, and why one risks one’s life to disobey the natural order. Confucius was not the only one to warn us of such a tendency. The fact that man, in order to satisfy his unlimited desire, has systematically destroyed nature, shows that Confucius was not wrong in identifying the tendency to disregard the natural order as the root of social problems. Of course, one can be unsatisfied with Confucius' too hasty and dogmatic simplification of the cause of human disobedience, but one cannot doubt his respect for procedure in discovering the cause. One may take Freud’s view by insisting that Confucius ignores the real cause of human desire, but one cannot object to his effective diagnosis of his times.

Let us turn briefly to the problematic of alienation as a systemic distortion of reality, i.e. an ideological interpretation of the natural order. What happens if one’s understanding of the natural order has been fabricated. In such a case, following the order does not solve the problems, but could even aggravate them. It is precisely here that we see in critique an indispensable function of tradition. Confucius had not singled out critique as the sole means for self-correction, but saw in it a necessary condition, the first step in finding a solution. In other words, critique is implicit in his observation of social disorder. His indirect critique of the moral system (or the moral understanding) of his society demonstrates its alienated status. This can be seen in the following story:

The Duke of She told Confucius, "In my country there is an upright man named Kung. When his father stole a sheep, be bore witness against him." Confucius said, "The upright men in my community are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this.19

The last point is to demonstrate the modernity of Confucius. If modernity is understood in terms of reason, or in terms of the scientific procedure of discovery (of problems and solutions) as Karl Popper defends in Conjectures and Refutations, and if modernity is characterized by its criticism and its search for self-identity (self-consciousness) then we have no reason to dismiss Confucian modernity.

However, if we accept this fact, then modernity is an essential character of human evolution, just as is science. Similarly, one finds modernity implicit in tradition, at least in the tradition of growth or of scientific discovery. It does not belong exclusively to the Enlightenment or to the May-Fourth Movement as most of the critics of tradition mistakenly claim. Actually, modernity is a part of tradition.20

Conclusion

The main purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that modernity truly is a part of tradition, that tradition and modernity are inter-related dialectically, and that modernity is impossible without tradition and vice-versa. We have not discussed so far the solutions offered by Confucius, to examine whether they are still valid or effective. We have left aside the question of whether he has correctly understood the natural order, and whether the concept of tradition could be understood solely in terms of scientific procedure, or in the sense of a set of dogmas, customs, etc., which are kept intact like treasures displayed in a museum. Actually, such problems demand a
more thorough analysis and information beyond the scope of this work. Here we are content to show that any one-sided understanding of modernity as an antinomy of tradition is simply ahistorical and unscientific. In its most original meaning of "transmitting" and "communicating", tradition does the work both of preserving and of transcending, as is found in the processes of scientific growth.

Notes

1. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* (1927); *Europaeische Nihilismus* (1956); and *Nietzsche II* (1936).
6. Habermas, (1985)
17. *Analects*, 5:25
A Speculative System of Analytic Philosophy

The philosophy of the Kung-sung Tzu (hereafter cited as the KSLT) was speculative in nature. This is due firstly to its having presented its ontology and epistemology in a purely formal manner, and on this basis having built as its main body a philosophy of language and logic. Secondly, it was constructed in terms of a set of abstract categories, many of which were strictly defined, such as "wu" (thing, matter), "shih" (actuality, individual), "chih" (concept), "wei" (order, class).

KSLT was a philosophy of understanding in the Kantian sense. This is extremely important for it to be considered a doctrine of reason in the Kantian sense one could conclude that it is sophisticated. This philosophy of understanding can be understood in two ways. Firstly, it developed around a centre, i.e., the knowing and grasping the essence ("wei" as order) of empirical individuals ("wu", "shih") by concepts ("chih") within the sphere of "concepts of understanding, the phenomenal world and theoretical knowledge of phenomenal world." In this connection, it strove to grasp the definiteness characteristic of understanding as thinking. Secondly, it established the autonomy of qualities (such as hardness, whiteness) as a part of the universal world.

KSLT was an analytic philosophy of language. On the one hand, it constructed ontology and epistemology by way of linguistic analysis. On the other hand and on this basis, it elaborated a philosophical doctrine of language itself. At the same time, many chapters of the KSLT are presented in the style of a dialogue. The question expresses ordinary usage in natural language, which forms the material; to this the Kung-sung Lung answers through a linguistic analysis and clarification. That is, it adapts the method of linguistic philosophy to analyze the ordinary usage of natural language.

KSLT was a systematic philosophy, not only materially, but also in a rigorously formal sense. This included two aspects. Firstly, it appeared in a systemic structure. The philosophy consisted of four parts: ontology, epistemology, philosophy of language and logic, together forming a theoretical system. As a structure those theories stood in a relatively definite relation with an inherent logical interdependence. The ontology acted as a basis and logical starting point for this entire philosophy. It established a two-world reality consisting of individual things and universals (as classes of individuals and qualities). The emergence of the world of substance entailed opposition between subject and object. This led in turn to an epistemology distinguishing sensibility and understanding, and working out the principles of the latter. Within the framework of the ontology and epistemology, a philosophical theory of language was developed with the well-known thesis: "white horse is not horse" as its center and inquiring deeply into the relation between name and actuality as its underlying context. In the course of this linguistic analysis, some logical ideas were generated. Secondly, the set of categories formed a structured system. For example, "shih" was restricted, and was individualized as "wu"; "wei" came into being along with "shih". If the structure of the theories was the "surface structure" of the philosophy of the KSLT, then the structure of the category system was its "deep structure".

In close connection with this systematic character is the sequence of the five chapters, except the chapter "Jifu" (Biography) on Kung-sun Lung’s life. This has been a focus of attention on the part of the scholars in research regarding KSLT, for it shows that great care has been paid to its
systematic character. The arrangement of the five chapters arranged reflects the fundamental view of KSLT. Several arrangements are given here.

(a) Bai-ma lun (On White Horse), Chih-wu Lung (On Concept and Thing), Tong-bian Lun (On the Explanation of Change), Jian-bai Lun (On Hardness and Whiteness), Min-shih Lun (On Name and Actuality) (the Tao-tsang version);
(b) Bai-ma Lun, Jian-bai Lun, Chinh-wu Lun, Tong-bian Lun, Min-shih Lun (Fung Yu-lang);
(c) Chih-wu Lun, Min-shih Lun, Bai-ma Lun, Jian-bai Lun, Tong-bian Lun (Wang Dian-ji);
(d) Jian-bai Lun, Chih-wu Lun, Mih-shih Lun, Tong-bian Lun, Bai-ma Lun (Du Guo-yang); and
(e) Chih-wu Lun, Min-shih Lun, Jian-bai Lun, Bai-ma Lun, Tong-bian Lun (Hou Wai-lu).

Based on the analysis of the deep and surface structures of the philosophical system of the KSLT, the present study orders the chapters in the following sequence: Min-shih Lun, Jian-bai Lun, Chih-wu Lung, Tong-bian Lun, Bai-ma Lun. This implies that, roughly speaking, the world of individuals was set up in Min-shih Lun. Quality as being in itself was established in Jian-bai Lun, thereby completing the world of universals. In the two chapters together with Chih-wu Lun, the epistemology was constructed upon the basis of this ontology. Then beings were further defined in Tong-bian Lun. All the four chapters formed the basis, upon which the philosophy of language was built in Bai-ma Lun.

**Ontology: Reality Consisting of Two Worlds of Individuals and Universals**

*A Philosophical Theology of Substance*

The general ontology of the KSLT can be described as follows.

Firstly, this ontology was based on the opposition between the knowing human being as subject and physical nature as object. "There is separateness throughout the world. Therefore, all things have turned out to exist independently in themselves" (Jian-bai Lun). This means that reality is none other than the world of separate things in themselves. The expressions "there is in the world" and "there is not in the world" appeared repeatedly in Chin-wu Lun and Jian-bai Lun; this fixes reality as the world of physical beings. It is obvious that the category "existence" was presented in the terms of "you" (there is) and "wu" (there is not). This object world was set up together with the subject world. "The world of things" was first stipulated in Mih-shih Lun which showed that the object world as relative to the human was signified by "min" (name). What is most important here is the opposition between subject and object. In the last analysis, this so-called opposition consists in separation and opposition in relation to knowing. "If there were nothing in the world, who could speak of concept?" (Chih-wu Lun). Here, "who", i.e., the subject, takes objects only through the objects themselves. As indicated in Min-shih Lun, "to rectify names" is essentially to rectify "shih" (individuals) according to "wei" (class), which manifests the opposition between subject and object. Furthermore, as explained in Jian-bai Lun, this opposition also consists in hiding hardness and whiteness by themselves. Indeed, the word "cang" (hide) sets the relation of knowledge between the subjects and objects as opposites.

Secondly, as previously mentioned, this ontology was constructed in the terms of abstract philosophical categories. Lastly, the entire philosophy including its four parts developed within
the three-dimensional framework of "reality-thinking-language". The first two, reality (world, heaven, earth) and thinking (concept, "who"), have been mentioned. Language is especially important for gaining insight into the true nature of the philosophy of the KSLT as a philosophy of language.

"To justify `shih' according to `wei' means to justify (or rectify) the `min’ (name) of `shih’" (Min-shih Lun). That "all things have their own name" (Chih-wu Lun) shows that Kung-sun Lung wanted to stipulate substance with the help of language: as "things cannot be signified without 'chih' (concept), things which are not signified by 'chih' do not exist" (Chih-wu Lun). This means that all things are signified by "chih" which has "min" as its expression, or knowing consists in speaking things by expressing the concept thorough names, thus introducing language into knowledge. Moreover, in Bai-ma Lun on the philosophy of language, Kung-sun Lung wrote straightforwardly at the beginning of the chapter: "The word horse is intended to name the shape, the word white to name the color. Therefore, we say that ‘white horse is not horse’." This made clear from the very beginning the purpose and main theme, namely, the philosophy of language.

The World of Things

Before constructing substances Kung-sun Lung distinguished between accidental and essential beings and between actual and potential beings. He showed that particular things such as a horse, a yellow horse, a white stone are beings in an accidental sense, while universals both as classes (such as horse, stone) and qualities (such as hardness, whiteness) which are separated from particular things are beings in an essential sense. "If horses had no colors, there would be simply horses; how can then we speak of white horses?" (Bai-ma Lun). "If there were no stones, where would hard and white stone come in?" (Jian-bia Lun). On the one hand, this affirms the being of horses and stones as classes; on the other hand, it emphasizes that they are essential beings in relation to particular horses and hard or white stones. As classes both horses and stones can be of different colors, particular things are beings in an accidental sense. "Hardness does not have to be combined with stone to be hardness; it is shaped by things. As it does not have to be combined with things to be hardness, it is hardness by necessity of its being hardness" (Jian-bai Lun). This indicates that as universals qualities are essential beings.

The meaning of actual being repeatedly indicated in Jia-bai Lun. For example, "Stone is one; Hardness and whiteness are two and reside in the stone. Therefore, in the stone one of them can be touched and the other cannot; one of them can be seen and the other cannot." Hard and white stones are perceptible beings in the actual sense; potential beings are also clearly indicated. "Hardness, whiteness and stone do not exclude each other. Could one of the three be hidden? They are hidden by themselves, not because someone has hidden them." "There is no hardness which does not make a stone and other things hard, because it is hidden." Classes of things and qualities as beings in themselves are hidden; they are not in the world.

The theory of the world of things can be described in three ways.

Firstly, the world of things consists of separate individuals. Kung-sun Lung wrote at the beginning of Min-shih Lun: "Heaven, earth and their products are ‘wu' (matter). When ‘wu’ (matter) becomes ‘wu’ (things) they are of themselves without ‘shih’." This strictly defined the two categories and their relation, thereby depicting the world of things. "Wu" is the most general characterization of the physical material world. In this sense, "wu" means matter. This in turn is depicted and restricted by "shih" which includes two parts; on the one hand, "wu" means things,
on the other hand, "shih" as things fill up space and time, in which sense "shih" is individual; hence, "wu" are actually individuals. "Wu" then has two senses, namely, as matter and as individuals. In fact, "wu" was used synonymously with "shih", especially in Chih-wu Lun and in Jian-bai Lun. The main characteristics of individuals are separateness or discreetness and autonomy. Therefore, the entire chapter, Jian-bai Lun, was devoted to demonstrate that "there is separateness throughout the world. Therefore, all things have turned out to exist independently in themselves."

Secondly, individuals are analyzed into matter and shape. As previously mentioned, "shih" means substantiating, which implies that "shih" consists in filling up a space-time region with matter. At the same time, as indicated in Bai-ma Lun: "The word horse is intended to name the shape"; it is used to denote horse as substance, but here it was considered as naming shape. It follows from this that shape was given a status equivalent to "shih"; in other words, "shih" as individual is composed of shape and matter. Obviously for Kung-sun Lung, the contribution of "shih" consists in endowing "wu" as matter with shape, thereby forming individuals.

Lastly, natural language uses the singular demonstrative pronouns "this" and "that" and proper names for referring to individuals. "If naming is correct, then the name for denoting that individual corresponds to that individual, and the name for denoting this individual corresponds to this individual." "Therefore, that name can be used to denoted that individual and is restricted to that individual, while this name is used to denote this individual and is restricted to this individual" (Min-shih Lun). It is clear that "this name" and "that name" denoting particular individuals serve as names proper for reference. Indeed, Kung-sun Lung here unveils the ontological commitment of natural language to the world of things.

The World of Universals (I): Class

The "wei" as class was stipulated is connection with individuals.

Firstly, class is potential being and in universal as substance. "Wei" is class; class is being in itself; class is potential being. The two latter points having been discussed, let us now turn to the first. "When `shih' (actuality) becomes `shih' (individual) of itself without wanting, it is `wei'. Out of its proper `wei', `shih' is not in `wei', while remaining in its proper `wei` `shih' is called to be correct in `wei'" (Mih-shih Lun). Individuals as the members of the class to which they belong form the class, in this sense, individuals are identical with the corresponding class, which is what is meant by saying that " `shih' is `wei'". At the same time, since "shih" is the members of its "wei" (class), "shih" can be in the class, and can also be out of the class. In this sense, "shih" is not "wei"; that is, "shih" means individual, while "wei" means class.

Secondly, both class and individual are substances, and are equal in status as regards substance, as is shown in Min-shih Lun. However, here KSLT is not coherent. As indicated by the passages previously quoted from Jian-bai Lun and Bai-ma Lun, classes such as horse and stone are primary, while individuals such as white horse and white stone are secondary. But, this is due to the emphasis on different aspects of the problem. Speaking generally, they were considered as equal, especially inasmuch as individuals came into being independently from the class, as is noted in Min-shih Lun.

Thirdly, the class is the norm for the individual. In this sense, "wei" is order, which incorporates a set of the determinants which determine the membership of the corresponding class. Therefore, when an individual is in its proper order it possesses the determinants of the
corresponding class and thus is a member of the class. To say that "shih" is ascertained (or rectified) to be correct in order, means that "shih" as an individual is judged as belonging to the corresponding class; and to say that an individual of itself is "without wanting", means that the individual completely and properly possesses all the determinants which should be had by a member of its proper class.

In this connection, an important idea regarding both the invariability of the universal and the variability of the individual is presented in On the Explanation of Change. This is in the Min-shih Lun, which shows that "shih" is variable, and should be certified (or rectified) according to the invariable "wei". In On the Explanation of Change, it is shown further that class and quality as universals are invariable whereas individuals are variable. For example, "right" as universal is invariable. However, when "right" is combined with something and comes to reside in an individual, as an attribute of the individual it appears variable, and could change into "left". Two operations "he" and "yu" means to combine so as to produce another individual or third. "Ox he ram are not horse", but are "ox and ram". In the universal as a sum of "ox and ram", both universals ox and ram are invariable, and remain ox and ram. For Kung-sun Lung, it is natural that universals as the basis for ordering (or rectifying) individuals should be invariable.

Lastly, names or general names are an apparatus for referring to the class. "To say that 'wei' is rectified, means that 'shih' is rectified according to 'wei'. And to rectify 'shih' according to 'wei' means to rectify the name of 'shih'" (Min-shih Lun). When a name is used to denote an individual, it actually is being used to stipulate the latter. This is to say, the individual should be denoted by this name because it possesses all the notes of the class so named and is a member of the class. In a word, the name ("min") is the expression of "wei" both as class and order. At the same time, "Zheng-min Lun" (the theory of the rectification of name) is examined here from an ontological view.

The World of Universals (II): Quality

The Kung-sun Lung’s world of universal incorporated class and quality. The theory of quality as universal forms an important part of this ontology and can be explained in the following three ways.

Firstly, qualities are universals as beings in themselves. In order to indicate this, Kung-sun Lung made the distinction between the qualities residing in individuals and those as universals. He wrote: "Some thing is white, but whiteness is not fixed on it; some thing is hard, but hardness is not fixed on it. To say that they are not fixed, means that they are shared things, so how can they be said to reside only in the stone?" (Jian-bai Lun). On this basis, as previously described, Kung-sun Lung further asserted that the qualities as universals are separate beings in themselves; they are potential but essential beings.

Secondly, qualities as universals are equal with the substance of classes and with individuals as regards their status as beings, but they differ from, and stand opposition to, substances. This opposition was repeatedly emphasized in Jian-bai Lun: "Stone is one; hardness and whiteness are two, reside in the stone." Here "two" did not mean the sum of one and one, but to be different from "one", thus showing that qualities (such as hardness and whiteness) are distinguished from substances (such as stone). In addition, as previously indicated, shape as substance is distinguished from the color as quality in Bai-ma Lun.
Thirdly, in the last analysis, the opposition between qualities and substances consists in considering qualities as attributes of substance. Kung-sun Lung first distinguished between essence and attribute. Essence is fundamentally among attributes and differs from attribute in general. For essence consists of a set of attributes, which constitute the determinants possessed necessarily by the individual members of a class. In this sense, essence is "wei" as class. Now it is clear that class as substance is a set of individuals, while class as the norm for the individual is the essence of the individuals of a class. In other words, the reference or extension of "wei" as class is the set of individuals, while the intention is their essence. When demonstrating the invariability of the class such as ram, ox horse in On the Explanation of Change, the class was showed as the essence and the attributes forming the essence were indicated as follows: "Ram has horns, ox has horns", "horse has not horn, but has mane, both ram and ox have none", "ram had upper front teeth and ox has none."

**Epistemology: Knowledge at the Level of Understanding**

The epistemology of the KSLT as a theory about knowledge as understanding was based on its ontology and manifested the principle such knowledge in the following three ways. Knowledge as understanding is characterized by definiteness; in contrast to knowledge as reason it aims at insighting into the universals and includes sensibility in addition to thinking.

*The Concept of Understanding*

This is the primary moment of the epistemology of the KSLT, which can be described in the following three ways.

Firstly, it established explicit consciousness of the subject. As previously indicated, "who", namely the subject, was emphasized in discussing the relation of concepts and things in Chih-wu Lun so as to give prominence to the existence of the subject. Then consciousness consisted in introducing the subject into the knowledge relation. For Kung-sun Lung, "Zheng-min Lun" should also be examined from the epistemological point of view, as this problem is inherently connected with the subject. He wrote: "It is imperative to correct (or rectify) the incorrectness in the order of 'shih' by the correct order; it is impermissible to fix 'shih' in the correct order with the incorrect order." "To rectify" and "to fix" both are acts of the subject making 'shih' conform to the norm of order. This was further developed by showing that the knowing subject consisted in sensibility and still more in mind (the 'shih' in Jian-bai Lun): "So-called 'shen' is also a separate thing" (Jian-bai Lun). This emphasized the status of mind as being in itself, in opposition to substance.

Secondly, it characterized the thinking subject by the concept of understanding. Kung-sun Lung emphasized the distinction between the concept and the thing signified by it: there are things in the world, and humans signify them by concepts. But he insisted that there are not things which are not signified by concepts. This was expressed mainly in the following passage cited from Chih-wu Lun.

There are not concepts, therefore things cannot be said as concepts are not the concepts signifying things. However, all things are signified by concepts. To say that 'there are not concepts, therefore things cannot be said as concepts signifying things themselves' does not mean that there are things which are not signified by concepts. There not being things which are not signified by
concepts' means that all things are signified by concepts. Therefore all things are signified by concepts, but the things signified by concepts are not the concepts signifying things.

In addition to this, Kung-sun Lung emphasized the independence of concepts from things. "Concepts are concepts; things are signified by concepts, and the things signified by concepts are not the concepts." Furthermore, concepts in themselves signify things, why do they have to be combined with a thing in order to be the concepts signifying things?" (Chih-wu Lun).

That "chih" is a concept can be recognized further in view of the relation among the main categories: "wu", "shih", "wei" and "chih". As previously indicated, "wu" was used in the same sense as "shih" when discussing "chih" and "wu" in Chih-wu Lun. "Wu" meant individuals; "wei" as the norm for individuals is the intention of "chih", i.e., concepts; while "shih" is the extension of "chih". "Classes" when manifesting themselves as the thinking of subjects become concepts and are used by subjects to signify individuals.

Having shown that "chih" is concept, it is imperative to make clear that concept in Kung-su Lung is of the nature of understanding. Concepts of this kind have two features: they are directly connected with empirical individuals, and they insure definiteness in thinking. In connection with the first feature, it was stated repeatedly and positively in Chih-wu Lun that "chih" is used to signify "wu", this is to say, that the concept is used to signify the individual. As to the definiteness of thought as understanding, the invariability of universals was emphasized and demonstrated in On the Explanation of Change. and concepts as the form of understanding contributed to grasping and recognizing the universals. Therefore, concepts in understanding are characterized by definiteness because universals are invariable.

Lastly, it justified "chih" as the contribution of subject to knowledge by linguistic analysis. A passage from Chih-wu Lun represented a common sense view about the usage of language, namely, that the name as the linguistic carrier of a concept is at most a symbol denoting the thing, thereby emphasizing the autonomy of "wu" and the passivity of "chih". "Three not being concepts in the world means that the concepts come into being only for the purpose of making all things have their own names. But things are not the concepts signifying them. If though not concepts, they are called concepts, then all are concepts." In response, criticizing the common sense view, Kung-sun Lung wrote" "There are not concepts in the world; nevertheless, things not signified by concepts cannot be things." Here he showed that things exist, but that existence has significance for humans as knowing subjects only when things are signified by concepts and hence referred to by names. In other words, for a knowing subject, the existence of things involves the contributions of language. Therefore, for humans, there are not things which are not signified by concepts. This showed that for humans the existence of things depends on implicitly on language.

Understanding Aimed at Knowledge of Universals

KSLT showed that knowledge at the ordinary level is limited to sensibility and thus gives opinions which seemingly are correct but really are incorrect, while the knowing at the level of understanding aims at insight into the essence behind empirical phenomena.

Firstly, understanding aims at knowing the essence of things. On the one hand, "chih" consists in knowing "wei"; as previously discussed, "wei" is the essence of things, and the object to be known by "chih", i.e., the concepts in understanding. "Chih's" grasp of "shih" is based on the knowledge of "wei". However, according to the common sense view indicated in KSLT, "chih" is used directly to signify only "wu" and thus is foreign to "wu".
On the other hand, "chih" as realizing essence transcends empirical individuals. As repeatedly indicated in Chih-wu Lun, "there are things in the world", "there are not concepts in the world". It is clear that here the "world" means empirical individuals. Epistemology shows that the essence known by "chih" is not in the world. Jian-bai Lun showed that hardness, whiteness and stone are separate universals; in the world of things "they are separated from each other by nature and will forever be so." In a word, within the world of things universals are hidden.

Secondly, understanding aims also at knowing qualities as beings in themselves. This idea can be seen from a dialogue cited in Jian-bai Lun.

The asker:

The eye cannot perceive hardness or whiteness. They have different functions, and cannot substitute for one another. Hardness and whiteness reside in the stone. How can they be separated?

This passage shows that at the level of common sense qualities are known by sensibility alone. Kung-sun Lung replied:

Hardness does not have to be combined with stone to be hardness; it is shared by things. As it does not have to be combined with things to be hardness, it is hardness by necessity of its being hardness. It is hardness without being the hardness of the stone or other things. But there is no such hardness in the world, because it is hidden. If whiteness is originally not capable of becoming whiteness of itself, how can it make the stone and other things white? If whiteness is whiteness by necessity of its being whiteness, then it is whiteness not because some things appear white. . . . Whiteness is perceived by the eye. This sees in virtue of light, but the light itself does not see. So, neither light nor the eye sees; hence, it is for the mind to see.

This passage showed the following four principles based upon which the qualities are known by understanding:

(1) What is perceived by the senses or by sensibility is hardness or whiteness "residing in the stone", but not the necessary hardness or whiteness as being in itself. Such quality is known by the mind with the help of understanding.

(2) The senses do not perceive such qualities because these are not in the world of things.

(3) The qualities are separate, which separateness can be realized only by the mind with the help of the concepts of understanding.

(4) For knowing the qualities as universals it is imperative to realize that they are shared with things, which is to say that the universals can be realized through discovering the attributes common to many things.

Sensation as a Moment in Understanding

In contrast to knowledge at the level of reason, understanding is connected with experience, for which reason sensation or sensibility is a necessary moment in understanding.

Firstly, sensation perceives phenomena. KSLT showed that such attributes of individuals as hardness and whiteness are perceived by sense organs. Furthermore, individuals are perceived through their attributes. "When whiteness but not hardness is perceived, we have a case of two.
When hardness but not whiteness is perceived, we have a case of two" (Jian-bai Lun). The two here means "whiteness and stone" or "hardness and stone". This passage means that the individual is perceived as an attribute belonging to this individual.

Secondly, the perception of attributes features separateness. Attributes such as hardness and whiteness are perceived separately, as is pointed out repeatedly in Jian-bai Lun. Especially, it was shown that the separateness is rooted in the separateness of qualities as universals. This explained epistemologically why thinking as understanding is definite and analytic.

Thirdly, it is imperative for knowing subjects to advance from knowing phenomena to knowing universals. KSLT showed that, being limited to the knowledge of sensibility, common sense realized only "the fixed whiteness" and "the fixed hardness" "residing in the stone"; thus it thinks that "either whiteness or hardness is necessarily combined with the stone which pervade each other." In order to surmount this limited view and to take note of the qualities as beings in themselves, it is of crucial importance to realize that "what is not fixed on anything is shared by things; how could it be only in the stone?" That hardness and whiteness are shared by things obviously is an empirical fact. It follows from this that when Kung-sun Lung was criticizing the view that "hardness, whiteness and stone do not exclude each other", he claimed that it is necessary to confine oneself to the use of the sense organs and to use the mind to know qualities as universals on the basis of attributes as phenomena.

Finally, knowledge of the senses, especially a separateness, can be subject to linguistic analysis. As indicated in Jian-bai Lun, according to the common sense view, the expression "hard and white stone" means that "hardness, whiteness and stone are three". Kung-sun Lung pointed out that they cannot be said to be three, and should be said to be two. He showed that this expression is actually the conjunction of the two expressions "stone is hard" and "stone is white". Therefore, as previously cited, in any case "we have a case of two."

The Philosophy of Language: The Theory of Meaning

The doctrine of the KSLT was known for "Shou-bai chih Lun" (the theory of maintaining whiteness) or "Bai-ma chih Lun" (the theory of white horse); in essence this is a philosophical theory of language. This was developed around the relations between language and world and between language and meaning. This theory of meaning was stated in the famous thesis "White Horse is not Horse" as a central thesis in Bai-ma Lun. It consisted of two parts, namely the theory of sense and that of reference.

The Theory of Sense or Meaning

The KSLT theory of sense can be described in the following four ways.

Firstly, sense and reference are distinguished: reference is the contribution of the world taken as substances to the meaning of language; sense is the contribution of mind with its knowledge of substance to meaning.

Such general names as "stone", "ox" and "ram" denote substances as universals. Their reference is wei as class, and their sense is wei as order. Moreover, general names express chih, namely, concept. From this it follows that from a logical point of view, thinking uses chih to signify universals; its extension is wei as class, its intention is wei as order. From the point of view of meaning, chih is a general name whose reference is wei as class and its sense wei as order.
The proper names or singular demonstrative pronouns denote \textit{wu}, namely, individuals. Their reference is \textit{shih}, and their sense has order as its main or essential part.

The classes are sets of \textit{shih}, i.e., individuals. The distinction between reference and sense is used in the theory of the rectification of names. Let an individual be named "a". If the individual changes, then its essence is no longer in accord with the order of the name "A" of class A, of which it is a member; thus it is no longer the referent of "A" and hence of "a", which results in correct naming. Therefore, the rectification of name consists in examining the sense of "a", i.e., \textit{shih} according to the sense of "A", i.e., \textit{wei}.

Secondly, a distinction is made between object-word and concept word. Words have two different uses: expressing sense and denoting reference; that is, when a speaker uses a word, he either expresses its sense or denotes its referent. In expressing the sense of a word, one does not consider its referent; when one denotes its referent, one attends to its sense. When a word is used to express sense, that is, to signify a concept, it is called a concept-word. When it is used to denote its referent, that is, to signify an object, it is called an object-word. Clearly, this distinction introduces the user of language and therefore is a pragmatic distinction. For the speaker, an object-word has only reference, while a concept-word has only sense. And whether a word is an object word or a concept-word can be determined only in the context of practical use. In the ordinary uses of natural language speakers are usually unconscious of the way in which they use a word, but usually use it as an object-word.

Kung-sun Lung realized the confusion in the ordinary uses of natural language and based his thesis: "White horse is not horse" on that distinction. He showed that the common sense thesis "white horse is horse" involves using "white horse" and "horse" as object-words. Having discovered the distinction between concept-word and object-word and the fact that in ordinary usage words are usually used as object-word, he proposed the thesis "white horse is not horse" by using the words as concept-words.

The distinction between object-word and concept-word is made in three groups of passages in Bai-ma Lun.

The first group is:

A (asker): ‘Is it correct to say that white horse is not horse?’ B (Kung-sun Lung as answer): ‘It is.’
A: ‘Why’
B: ‘The word horse is used to name the shape; and the word whiteness is used to name the color. What names the color is not what names the shape. Therefore we say that white horse is not horse.’ ‘The white horse means horse combined with whiteness. Can the horse combined with whiteness be horse? Therefore, we say that white horse is not horse.’

These two passages positively pointed out that both the words "white horse" and "horse" in the thesis are concept-words because they signify the intentions of the respective concepts: color combined with shape or shape alone. These express the senses of the two words, but they are used not to refer to objects, namely, to a white horse and a horse.

The second group is:

Ask for horse, either a yellow horse or a black one may answer. If white horse were horse, then what is asked for in both cases would be the same. ‘What is asked being the same’ means that white horse should be not different from horse. Since what is asked for is not different, it follows
that the yellow and black horses may answer in the one case, but not in the other. How can this
be? Obviously the two cases are incompatible. Therefore, the yellow and black horses both answer
to horse, but not to white horse. Thus, it is clear that white horse is not horse.

This long passage showed in a comparative way that the word "white horse" in "white horse
is not horse" is a concept-word, while "white horse" in "white horse is horse" both are what is an
object-word. Both white horse and horse in "white horse is not horse" are what is asked and are
conceptualized. The former means "whiteness and (the shape of) horse", while the latter means
"horse" alone. Because they are different we can say that "white horse is not horse". In "white
horse is horse", "yellow horse is horse" or "black horse is horse", "colored horses" denote the
horses which can answer to what is expressed by the concept-word "horse" or the like.

The last group of passages is:

When we say that 'there is white horse’ cannot be said because there is no horse, we are dismissing
the whiteness. If we take the whiteness into account, then we cannot say that there being white
horse means that there is horse. It is obvious from this that when we think that there is horse, we
do so simply because it is horse, but not because it is white horse.

This passage further reflects Kung-sun Lung’s consciousness in making the distinction
between object-word and concept-word. "Saying without whiteness" means speaking words while
ignoring their senses. This is to say, both the words "white horse" and "horse" in "there being white
horse means there being horse" do not involve their sense, but denote only their referents. "There
being white horse is not there being horse" is "saying with whiteness". This is to say, both "white
horse" and "horse" therein are used to express sense.

Now, we can comprehend "the theory of white horse" of Kung-sun Lung’s. It showed that
knowledge at the level of common sense is limited to the sense knowing of individuals in "the
world of things", whereas beyond sensibility knowledge at the level of understanding transcends
the sense knowledge of common sense and uses concepts of understanding to grasp the universals
behind "things". In language all these are the competence, apparatus and result of human
knowledge. Language condenses the knowledge of universals through understanding into its sense,
and fixes the sense identification or recognition of the object through its reference.

Using language, we can both speak of, or refer to, objects and express the knowledge of the
essence of objects, i.e., universals. It is imperative to be conscious of this double fact. In this way,
"the theory of white horse" acknowledged that "black horse is horse" or "white horse is horse", but
showed that the words "white horse" or "black horse" here are object-words; they denote only their
referents regardless of the senses; they are "saying without white". Therefore, as their referents are
horses, of course they "are horses", the latter word "horse" being a concept-word. It also admitted
that "there being white horse is there being horse", both "white horse" and "horse" here being
object-words. "The theory of white horse" aimed at showing that "white horse is not horse", and
"there being white horse is there not being horse". Here both the words "white horse" and "horse"
are concept-words. As they have different senses, that is to say, express two different universal,
they naturally are not identical.

It is clear that the "theory of white horse" does not violate common sense, still more it is not
a sophism. It aims not at grasping the dialectics of things, but at revealing the principles of
knowledge at the level of understanding, and thereby working out a philosophical theory of
meaning for language as the capacity for knowing.
Thirdly, different levels of concept-word are distinguished. The relation between the concept-words "horse" and "white horse" is treated in Bai-ma Lun. Kung-sun Lung wrote: "Horses originally have color; therefore, there are white horses. If horses had no color, there would be simply horses. How can we speak of white horse? Therefore, whiteness is not horse. The white horse mans horse combined with whiteness." This passage shows that Kung-sun Lung thought that "horse", on the one hand, and "white horse", "black horse" and "yellow horse", on the other, are concept-words of different levels. "Horse" is the concept-word for naming shape, but is always combined with a certain color, thereby constituting the concept-words "white horse", "black horse" and "yellow horse". "To say `horse’ does not involve any choice of color’; "to say `white horse’ does involve a choice of color” (Bai-ma Lun). This means that the reference of the concept-word "horse" is wider than that of the "white horse". Therefore, the concept-word "horse" is higher in level than "white horse".

It is still more important to note that as indicated by Kung-sun Lung, the relation between object-word and concept-word is different from that between two concept-words of different levels.

The relation between object-word and concept-word includes both sense and reference. As regards reference, "there being white horse cannot be said as there not being horse". This mans that the reference of white horse lies in the range of the reference of the corresponding concept-word. In terms of sense, "ask for horse, either a yellow or a black one may answer" actually asserts the fact that "black horse is horse" and "yellow horse is horse". In this way, the sense of the concept-word "horse" grasps and depicts the essence of the individual objects, black horse or yellow horse. This means that the object-word and the concept-word corresponding to it have something in common with respect to sense.

The relation concept-word on the two different levels is also two fold. Regarding reference, as shown from the previously cited passage, he thought that the relation between "horse" and "white horse" is that between class and subclass or between whole and part. Regarding sense, he said: "The white horse means horse combined with whiteness. Can the horse combined with whiteness be horse?" "What does not exclude color is not the same as what excludes color." Both these passages show that the concept-words relation on the two different levels "horse" and "white horse" are different in sense. It should be noted that both passages are followed immediately by the sentence: "Therefore, we say that white horse is not horse." This reflects the essential significance of "the theory of white horse", revealing the three closely interrelated principles of the philosophy of language, namely, the three distinctions between sense and reference, between object-word and concept-word, and between concept-words of two different levels.

Lastly, the structure of sentences is analyzed. What is claimed by "the theory of white horse" is the thesis "white horse is not horse". However, thus far our discussion has not involved the linguistic analysis of the sentence formulating the thesis, which no doubt is of great importance.

There was no grammar available to Kung-sun Lung for doing this analysis. However, he carried out not only a grammatical analysis of the structure of sentences, but also a logical analysis. However, as he did not use grammatical terms, this analysis used only coarse ideas as principles.

The analysis of the structure of sentences by Kung-sun Lung can be described mainly in three ways: copula; two kinds of sentence structures: subject-predicate structure and identity relation; and the distinction between sentences referring to objects and those referring to concepts.

The KSLT formulated its "theory of white horse" in the terms of the four sentences: "white horse is not horse", "there being white horse does not mean there being horse", "white horse is not horse", "there being white horse mans here being horse". When constructing these sentences, he
used the copula *shiu* (to be), *fei* (not to be), *wei* (to be) and *nai* (to be). The structure of sentences includes two levels, namely surface grammatical structure and deep logical structure. The same grammatical structures frequently conceal different logical structures. In order to uncover the deep structures it is imperative to distinguish two different senses of copulas. Kung-sun Lung did just this, which also forms an important link in "the theory of white horse".

It is obvious that the two different senses of the copula are closely interrelated with the two different logical structures of sentences, namely, the subject-predicate structure and the identity relation.

The four sentences mentioned above belong to the two different logical structures, respectively. "White horse is horse" is of the subject-predicate structure. "To ask for horse" is to ask for horse according to "horse" in the mind of the asker or the concept of horse. For this purpose a real white horse should be brought out. Then, "the asker" said: "This white horse is horse" or "white horse is horse". In fact, this introduces the white horse into the sentence as the subject by use of the object-word "white horse", as the object of which the sentence speaks. When, this subject is predicated by the concept "horse" denoted by the corresponding concept-word, it reveals the essence of the individual denoted by the subject and hence of the class to which the individual belongs. In other words, the concept-word is used as the order playing the role of norm for stipulating *shih* (the white horses). The other three sentences all belong to another logical structure in which copulas express identity or difference between the grammatical subject and predicate. The sentence "white horse is not horse" is typical of the three.

Kung-sun Lung showed this logical structure in four places cited from Bai-ma Lun.

"Therefore, the yellow and black horse both answer to horse, but not to white horse. Then, it is clear that white horse is not horse."

"What names the color is not what names the shape. Therefore, we say that white horse is not horse." White horse means horse combined with whiteness. Can the horse combined with whiteness be horse? Therefore, we say that white horse is not horse."

"To say 'horse' does not involve any choice of color . . . to say 'white horse' involve a choice of color . . . What does not exclude color is not the same as what excludes color. Therefore, we say that white horse is not horse."

It is obvious that by these expressions Kung-sun Lung emphasized that the intention or sense of the two concept-words "white horse" and "horse" are different, the former being the shape of horse combined with whiteness, but the latter being the shape alone. Therefore, they are different, that is to say, "white horse is not horse". What is expressed here by copula is not the relation of predication, but that of difference. Similarly, "there to be white horse is not there to be horse" also expresses the relation of difference between two concept-words "there to be white horse is there to be horse" expresses the identity of the reference of the two object-words. In sum, the sentences which express the identity or difference between two words have only a grammatical subject, but not a logical subject. Furthermore, in these sentences usually both words are concept-words.

When arguing the sentence "white horse is horse", Kung-sun Lung appealed to the fact that real horses can answer the request for a horse. However, when analyzing the sentence "white horse is not horse", he appealed to pure conceptual analysis. Thus, he realized that the sentences of the two different logical structures denote fact and concept respectively: the sentence "white horse is horse" refers to a fact, while the sentence "white horse is not horse" refers to a concept. This involves the well-known distinction between synthetic and analytic sentences.
The Theory of Reference

Kung-sun Lung based his philosophy of language on his ontology. Therefore, it was natural for him to pay great care to the problem of reference. His theory of reference can be described in the following ways.

Firstly, he established the objectivity of reference. "All these are signified by concepts, but the things signified by concepts are not the concepts signifying things." This thesis was repeatedly argued and an important aspect of this thesis and its arguments consisted precisely in establishing the objectivity of reference.

His ontology established the objectivity of "the world of things" and the universals which are self-hidden as beings independent from mind. This provided a premise for fixing the objectivity of reference. Concepts are expressed as names and "all things have their own names"; furthermore "all things are signified by concept". This implies that all "things" are denoted by name or that all names signifying things. In this way, it is affirmed that all names have reference; thereby the reference of language is affirmed. "The things signified by concepts are not the concepts signifying things," but are independent of each other. This shows that "things", i.e., references, are not influenced by concepts, because they are two different things. In sum, all names have reference to objective being independent from concepts.

From this idea about reference, we can further realize his ontology and epistemology. He emphasized that concepts are used to signify things, which have their own names. This means that the reference of language is individual. It follows from this that, although he considered classes as beings in themselves, yet classes are known by understanding; therefore they are expressed as the intention of concepts. Obviously, this is in accordance with his philosophy as principles of understanding. That is, understanding knows the world of universals via the world of things. This shows also why concept-words denoting universals are essentially the apparatus by which speakers express sense, but they do not signify objects.

Secondly, the problem of how reference is fixed was discussed. The KSLT gave two answers to the problem: the reference of a name is fixed both by naming and by wei as the essence of individuals.

Kung-sun Lung wrote: "The so-called problem of name and individual is that of naming. If we know that what is called by this name is not this individual, and that this name no longer refers to this individual, we shall not call it by this name. If we know that what is called by that name is not that individual and that that name no longer call that individual, we shall not call it with that name" (Min-shih Lun). This is to say, naming makes things have their own names and at the same time fixes the references of these names.

An important part of the theory of the rectification of names in the KSLT consists in showing that the essence of an individual, i.e., wei as order fixes the reference of names. For example, to what individual does the name "white horse" refer? According to the theory of the rectification of name, the sense of the name as the essence of the individual object which is referred to by the name (i.e. the intension of this concept-word) is now "the shape of horse and whiteness". The "shape of horse and whiteness" as the correct order determine the reference of the name white horse, i.e., as an individual. In this way, in a sense, "the rectification of name" is to fix the reference of name according to the order, i.e., the essence of object. It is clear that in the connection of reference, wei as order is equivalent to the definite description.
Thirdly, the problem of how reference is identified was discussed. The theory of the rectification of names also showed how the reference of name is identified with the corresponding order as norm.

This principle forms the main part of Tong-bain Lun.

Ram has horns and ox also has horns. Yet it is incorrect to say that ox is ram, ram is ox. For they both have horns, yet belong to different species. Ram and ox have horns, but horse has none; horse has mane, but 'ram and ox' has none. Therefore we say that ram and ox together are not horse. . . . Ram had upper front-teeth, yet ox has none.

This is to say, the references of the names "ram" and "ox" are ram and ox respectively. In order to identify these references it is imperative to take "ram has upper-teeth and horns" and "ox has no upper-teeth and has horns" as the basis. They can be said to be the indexical determinants composing their respective order. Therefore, the reference of a name is identified according to the indexical determinants of the order corresponding to the name.

It is further shown in Tong-bian Lun that this identification is based on the recognition of the difference of the indexical determinants of the reference of different names. Therefore, for him, it is important for identifying reference to compare similar names, while in the case of two names having too great difference the identification does not come into question. For this reason, he wrote: in order to identify the references of ox and ram, "horse is better than fowl for the purpose of illustration". Fowl is not suitable because "it is too obvious that fowl and `ram and ox' are of different species."

Lastly, the change of references was shown. This includes two sides. On the one hand, as shown by the above-cited passages, the individual is variable. Therefore, when individual objects change the names which previously referred to them are no longer used to denote them. On the other hand, as just-cited, "if we know that what is called by this name is not this individual, and this name no longer calls this individual, we shall not call it with this name." This is to say that the reference of name itself is variable.

Logic: The Fundamental Principles of Understanding

The KSLT as analytic philosophy of the knowledge by understanding necessarily produced a logical theory. But it does not provided a system of inferential rules like the syllogism, but only some fundamental principles. They include the following five points.

*Primary Definiteness and Analyticity*

It can be said that definiteness as the fundamental principle of understanding runs throughout the whole KSLT. It is obvious that thinking as understanding aims at grasping universals via individuals. As universals are invariable, as long as individuals are in their order they are definite. For this reason, both as signification of individual and as the expression of order and class, names are definite. This determines the definiteness of thinking because names are forms of thinking.

As to analyticity, the KSLT showed that in order to realize the essence of stone it is imperative to analyze the individual as a whole, thereby grasping its three separate determinants, i.e., "hardness, whiteness and (the shape of) stone". At the same time, these three determinants are grasped through analyzing one stone after another.
In a sense, the spirit of logic consists in bringing the thinking subject to the norms of definiteness and analyticity. In this connection, the KSLT contains the essence of logic.

The Law of Identity

A remarkable achievement of the logic of the KSLT is to advance the ideas of the laws of identity and contradiction. The law of identity is put forward in Min-shih Lun at three levels.

Firstly, the self-identity of things was uncovered at the level of things, Kung-sun Lung wrote: "It is imperative to rectify the incorrectness in the order of shih with the correct order, it is impermissible to fix shih in the correct order with incorrect order." This means that the individual norms itself according to the corresponding order, thereby becoming self-identical.

Then, the principle of identity is shifted from things themselves to the relation between speakers and things.

If names are correct, then the name to denote that individual corresponds to that individual, the name to denote this individual corresponds to this individual. If that name denoting that individual does not correspond to that individual, then that name will never do. If this name denoting this individual does not correspond to this individual, then this name will never do.

This passage clearly points out that names must be identical with the things denoted by them. Finally, the law of identity of thinking in linguistic form was presented.

Therefore, it is permissible that that name be used to denote that individual, and be restricted to that individual and that this name be used to denote this individual, and be restricted to this individual. It is impermissible that that name be used to denote this individual so that that name is used to denote both that individual and this individual; or that this name be used to denote that individual so that this name is used to denote both this individual and that individual.

On the one hand, this passage uses the expression "to be restricted" to fix strict identity. On the other hand, the requirement of identity is imposed from both positive and negative sides in terms of "to be permissible" and "to be impermissible". This gives full play to the strict requirement for identity in the logic of the KSLT.

The Law of Contradiction

The logical norm and the law of contradiction also were clearly expressed in the KSLT. This is seen from the passage which should be cited once again here.

Ask for white horse, neither the yellow horse nor the black one may answer. If white horse were horse, then what is asked for in both cases would be the same. What is asked for being the same means that white horse would be no different from horse. Since what is asked for is not different, it follows that the yellow and black horses may yet answer in the once case but not in the other. How can this be? Obviously, the two cases are incompatible. Therefore, the yellow and black horses both answer to horse, but not to white horse. It is clear then that white horse is not horse.
Here the sentence "... may yet answer in the one case but not in the other case. How can this be?" positively put forward the requirement of the law of contradiction: that it is impermissible for one and the same word or sentence to be something as well as not to be something, because "to be" and "not to be" are incompatible.

Kung-sun Lung logically refutes "white horse is horse" and justifies "white horse is not horse" by the law of contradiction. If "white horse is horse", that is to say, if the two concept-words are the same in sense, then if follows that the yellow and black horses may yet answer in the one case, but not in the other for that would violate the law of contradiction. In this way, the thesis "white horse is horse" is refuted, and "white horse is not horse" is justified via reduction to absurdity on the basis of law of contradiction. It is also clear that here the law of contradiction is put forward either as a logical law or a law of things, because he appealed to the fact that horses are led out as did linguistic analysis.

The Logic of Concept

Singular and general concepts, substance and attribute concepts. The former pair of concepts is the division of concepts with respect to extension. In Kung-sun Lung, concepts in general are chih. Realizing that what is signified by chih includes individuals and their sets, he distinguished singular and general concepts, namely shih and wei (as class) respectively. The extension of shih is individual, that of the wei is the class consisting of individuals.

The latter pair is the division of concepts in respect to intention. He pointed out that "horse" is used to denote the shape, and "white" to denote the color, while be contrasted "hardness and whiteness" with "stone", thereby consciously making the distinction between concepts substance and of attributes.

Extension and intention. In Kung-sun Lung extension and intention are shih and wei (as order) respectively. Shih is the occupation of wu in space and time. It characterized the existence of wu with respect to things, and represents the aspect of wu in respect to chih. Wei is the content filling the space and time occupied by wu, and the expression of the knowledge of wu by mind.

It is obvious that both shih and wei have double meaning. Shih means both singular concept and extension. This reflects also the inherent connection between the singular concept and extension. The singular concept generally is intended to denote things; therefore it is equivalent to extension and usually is considered as having no intention. Wei means both universal and intention. Which reflects also their inherent connection. A universal concept is usually intended to express sense; therefore it is equivalent to intention and is used especially to reveal the common essence of the individuals covered.

The extensional relation of concepts and division. Kung-sun Lung revealed two kinds of extensional relations. One is inclusion: "horse" and "white, black and yellow horses" are in the relation of inclusion. Furthermore, "horse originally has color", and becomes, e.g., "white horse" as it chooses color. In this way, the relation of "horse" to "white horse" is different from that of "white horse" to "horse". The former is superalternation, the latter is subalternation; "horse" is superaltern, "white horse" is subaltern.

The other is an incompatible relation. The relation among "white horse", "black horse" and "yellow horse", that among "ox", "ram", "horse" and "fowl", and that among "green", "white", "yellow" and "blue" all are relations of incompatibility, this is to say, they have no common member in their extensions.
He also put forward division as a logical method of making clear the concept by revealing its extension: "Horse chooses color", resulting in "white horse", "yellow horse", "black horse"; this is to say, the extension of "horse" can be determined by division with respect to colors. "Ask for horse, a yellow, a black horse or a white horse all may answer follows", because they are in the relation of inclusion with respect to extension.

*Restriction and generalization of concept.* "The whiteness means horse combined with whiteness. Can the horse combined with whiteness be horse?" The intention of the concept "horse" is added to by "whiteness" to form the concept "white horse". The intention of "white horse" is "horse" added to by "whiteness", therefore it is no longer "horse". This is the method of restriction which makes the concept clear by increasing the intention. As the concepts "white horse" and "horse" are different in intention, "white horse is not horse".

Kung-sun Lung also wrote: "If horse had no color, there would be simply horses." This means that the component part "color" is subtracted from the intention of the concept of "color horse" to give the concept "horse". This is the method of "generalization" which makes the concept clear by decreasing its intention.

In this way, he also revealed the relation of the inverse relation of the intention and extension of a concept. He wrote: "The expression `white horse' does not involve any choice of color; therefore either yellow or black horse may answer. But the expression `white horse' does involve a choice of color. Both the yellow horse and the black one are excluded because of their color; only white horse may answer." "Horse" is less in intention and wider in extension while "white horse" is great in intention and more narrow in extension.

*The "union" of concept and its commutalivity.* He pointed out in Tong-bai Lun that "ox `he' ram" gives "ox and ram" `he' (to add) here is the operation for forming the compound concept "ox and ram" from the simple concepts "ram" and "ox". The union "ox and ram" as class or set consists of ram and ox. In other words, its members are oxen or rams.

According to algebraic logic, union obeys the law of commutativity. Kung-sun Lung realized this commutativity as can be seen from the fact that "ox `he' ram" and "ram `he' ox", "ox and ram" and "ram and ox," are used interchangeably in the Tong-bia Lun.

*The logic of copula.* The logic of copula follows immediately from the analysis of logical structure of the sentence. Kung-sun Lung distinguished two logical functions of the copular through the analysis of logical structure: connecting the logical subject and predicate in the sentence (expressing the logical subject-predicate relation) and expressing the relation of identity. Indeed, in contemporary symbolic logic, the copula is divided into two different logical connectives: the logical copula and the identity sign.

**Chinese Glossary**

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h. tong-bia lun on the explanation of change
i. jian-bai lun on hardness and whiteness
j. min-shih lun on name and actuality
k. yu there is
l. wu there is not
m. min name
n. cang hide
o. he add
p. yu combine
q. zheng-min lun the theory of the rectification of name
r. shen mind
s. shou-bai chih lun the theory of maintaining whiteness
t. bai-ma chih lun the theory of white horse
u. shi to be
v. fei not to be
w. wei to be
x. nai to be
The Individual and the Collective

Wang Miaoyang

Today, communication and dependence between countries and nations are an irreversible world wide trend. It reflects not only material production but Spiritual production as well. Truly the spiritual products of different nations have become common wealth and, as indicated by Marx and Engels, should be seriously considered. In the developed capitalist countries many are interested in traditional Oriental spiritual culture. Also in relatively underdeveloped countries, even including all socialist countries which are developing policies of reconstruction and opening and seeking to elevate their productive forces, many are anxious to import from Western spiritual culture. In the initial stages cultural conflicts emerge more prominently than does cultural selection. Only by facing the conflicts rationally is it possible to make reasonable choices. To a certain extent, the deepest conflict in culture is the conflict between different concepts of values. This conceptual conflict of values focuses upon the opposition between individualism and collectivism.

In fact the contradiction between individualism and collectivism is a long-term problem in the world. A Russian philosopher vividly called it an "historical mystery." According to Marxism productive activity is the most fundamental of all social activities. Therefore, economic relations are the greatest determinant of all social relations. On the one hand, in the final analysis, any activity of production, exchange, distribution and consumption, is individual. On the other hand, this can be performed only in the collective because "Man is really a social animal not only as collected in a flock, but his independence is only in society." It is as unimaginable that an isolated man can work outside society as that isolated men could develop speech without conversation and living together.

The history of human society tells us that the relation between the individual and the collective is not as harmonious as people expect; often they contradict each other. Furthermore, this conflict becomes more prominent with the development of social productive force. This contradiction appears first, for the development of the social collective is realized on the basis of the "maximum waste of individual development." As in the animal and plant kingdoms, among human beings the benefits of the species are always achieved at the sacrifice of the benefits of individuals." Secondly, this contradiction manifests the fact that the development of the social collective is at the expense of a relative divorce of the individual from the collective to which he belongs. That is to say, the development of the social collective does not promote the collectivization of individuals; on the contrary it leads to an isolation of the individual. Originally, man expressed himself as a flock, whether of species or tribe; thus the isolation of man is an historical result. Under the capitalist mode of production the isolation of man reached a higher level than before. One is no longer restricted by natural blood relations and escaped from slavery. He is like a completely isolated free man under the law. Though human value, freedom and rights are recognized legislatively this does not mean true freedom of the individual. For most people these show only that the capitalist mode of production allowed non-freedom in the essence of the individual to express itself in the form of "freedom". Hence, the contradiction between the individual and the collective is expressed directly as the contradiction between an individual laborer and an "imaginary collective". At any rate the isolation and freeing of the individual doubtless represent great progress compared with the "collectivisation" in history.
The progress of history seems to express the perplexing fact that the effective way to strengthen the collective lies not in strengthening the collective itself or the restrictive forces, but the contrary. Superficially, liberal development of the individual seems to produce a centrifugal force against the collective, but the objective effects greatly strengthen the activity of the collective. Undoubtedly, this strengthening of collective activity does not always produce positive effects, but often is accompanied by negative effects. For example, material production in developed Western countries is higher than that in the Oriental developing countries, but social problems in the area of spiritual civilization, such as coldness of interpersonal relations and the high rate of divorce are more serious than in Oriental countries.

The contradictions between the individual and the collective exist objectively without exception in socialist countries. The only difference is between their expressions in different countries. Philosophically, the main fault of the old system’s political, economical and cultural models is over-concentrated; in other words, owing to over-restriction of the collective to the individual, activity itself is restricted. Therefore, “against high concentration” and “respect individual right” have become forceful slogans for reform in many countries. In China the most striking development in recent years is bold importation in almost every corner of social life of competition, the effective mechanism in commercial economy for promoting individual activity. It is not accidental that socialist countries direct their attention to how to initiate the individual’s activity and creativity. Apparently this is the result of absorbing the successful experience of developed countries. A Russian philosopher, Tolstoy, in his paper "The Socialist Collective and the Individual" reflects this reconsideration. He notes that the collective is a strong force which under the conditions of a socialist system ought to be strengthened greatly. He regrets, however, that it seems unable to stimulate the individual’s desire for creative work even though conditions favorable to action depend to a great extent upon the collective. Therefore, the contradiction between the individual and the collective has become a world wide problem, a paradox of the individual and the collective. On the one hand, the individual cannot be detached from the collective. To perform activity under favorable conditions the individual ought to leave the collective, because the more restrictive force of the collective reduces the individual’s creativity. Under real historical condition how is this contradiction to be resolved? Can we find a better method for dealing with it?

First, let us see how Marx discussed this problem; then let us come to our conclusions in the light of the historical tradition and the concrete situation of Oriental and Western countries.

The contradiction between the individual and the collective standpoint is stressed in Western developed countries, where emphasis is placed upon individual values, consciousness, freedom and equality. Philosophically, these mean individualism. But almost all socialist countries reject individualism and emphasize collectivism. Sometimes individualism even was stipulated as bourgeois morals and collectivism as proletarian or communist morals. In fact, both individualism and collectivism are not absolutely bad or good. Individualism takes the form not only of egoism but also of altruism; it has reasonable aspects just as collectivism has its unreasonable ones. In the inhibition of individual activity collectivism sometimes expresses itself as dictatorship, feudalism and the similar evils. Historically, the idea of collectivism was first put forward not by the proletariat but by bourgeois, i.e. For example, in 1796 a French bourgeois thinker, Rousseau, first formulated the idea of collectivism in modern time. He suggested that only if the individual obeys the "common will" of the collective can he obtain his true existence and freedom. Therefore, to call collectivism proletarian morals or to call individualism bourgeois morals is inappropriate.
The creators of Marxism usually did not discuss individualism and collectivism abstractly. Talking about the contradiction between "private interests" and "common interests" or the individual and the collective Marx said:

Communists do not use egoism to oppose self-sacrifice and self-sacrifice to oppose egoism. Theoretically, they do not understand the contradiction either as emotional or as ideational, but uncover the material roots of the contradiction. Along with the disappearance of these material roots the contradiction will disappear naturally.5

So far as the existential relation of the individual and the society is concerned mankind has gone through five different social modes: primitive, slavery, feudal, capitalist and socialist societies. The contradiction between individual and collective has existed throughout all these societies. Only in the ideal communist society can the contradiction between individual and collective finally and naturally disappear. Before then individualism and collectivism are but two methods which are used to overcome their mutual contradiction. In communist society, as the contradiction between individualism and collectivism will have disappeared it will be inappropriate to advocate either of them one-sidedly. Therefore communists do not prefer any moral teaching: "Do not put forward any moral demands to the people, such as you should love one another, do not be selfish, and the like. On the contrary they know clearly that both selfishness and self-sacrifice are necessary forms of personal realization under certain conditions."6

Thus, the contradiction between the individual and the collective finally comes down to the realization of individual freedom and development. Marx distinctively pointed out that communism itself is not the aim of human development, but is only a necessary link in the real historical development of the liberation of mankind;7 it is a common condition for the development of individual freedom.8

He divided the stages in the development of mankind into three social forms: natural economy, commercial economy and communist society. The natural economy includes the primitive commune, ancient slavery, the feudal system and other modes of production before the period of capitalist economy. The form of commercial economy implies capitalism, but at present it includes also socialism. The higher stage is communist society. Corresponding to these three forms of society are three forms for individual self-realization. First, under the form of natural economy the main form of individual self-realization is collectivism. As we trace back in history, we can see the further we go the less the individual is independent and the more one belongs to a greater collective. Firstly individuals belonged naturally to the family and its broader form, the clan, and then to various communes which are formed by the union of clans as a result of war. The appearance of private ownership did not change the fact that individuals belonged absolutely to the community, but re-enforced that relation which has grown from primitive natural blood relationships to subsequent subjection to regimes. The personal dependence of slavery is more cruel than that of feudalism, but the latter is wider. Peasants are situated not only in a dependent relation to the landowner, but also in relation to land and legislation. Hence, Oriental nations which have been through long periods in the social form of natural economy usually have strong collective consciousness and weak individual consciousness. Under the social form of natural economy neither the individual nor the society can develop fully.

Secondly, under the commercial economy the main form of individual self-realization is individualism. Since the 18th century this social relation has reached its peak so that it is possible for the individual to escape from the various relations of dependence and to achieve relatively full
development. Thus it has become possible to conceive things in terms of the "isolated man", and to treat problems in terms of the individual. This has enabled great achievements and promoted the full development of commercial economy, but many problems remain. Under the social form of the commercial economy the individual has escaped formally from the relation of dependence on the collective, but has fallen into certain material relationships by which the liberal development of the individual remains restricted. In fact, in a capitalist society only a few individuals can achieve true development, the conditions for which are still lacking for many.

Lastly, under the social form of a communist economy in the future individual initiative and the development of freedom will not be empty talk. "There each one’s development is the condition of the development for the whole people."9 On the other hand, "Only in the collective can the individual find the way to the full development of one’s talents."10 Then the form of individual self-realization will change radically; it will be neither individualism nor collectives, but a completely new form which escapes the limitations of individualism and collectivism and includes the reasonable and active factors of both.

Therefore, for Marxism, individualism and collectivism are two necessary forms for individual self-realization under the natural and commercial economies. The fact that socialist countries over-stressed collectivism is related to the underdevelopment of their commercial economy which has not fully escaped from the influence of the natural economy. The form of individual self-realization for socialist society, as distinct from both capitalist society or communist society requires further investigation and discussion.

In the foregoing section we have made a sagittal and overlooked investigation in the development of individualism and collectivism from different economical forms in the development of human society. Now let us further make comparison of them against a different cultural backdrop and economy or cross-sectionally.

Philosophically, individualism is in essence a matter of values. According to Western scholars the concept of individualism first appeared in France after the French Revolution. At that time the term was used by some socialists, liberals and conservatives to describe something which appeared to them to be evil, antisocial and selfishly impulsive. The term was put forward by a French political thinker, Alexis de Tocqueville. In vol. II of his *De la democratie en Amerique* he used this word in its negative connotation to denote a selfish threat to the society.11 Frenchmen despise individualism due to the collectivist influence idea of Rousseau, but the concept of individualism is derived from Lock’s idea of "natural human rights", though the term was not used at that time. Hence, in English-speaking countries individualism is not looked down upon but is embraced. The idea was first affirmed in America and the term was first employed by the famous American poet and philosopher, Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803-1882) in an 1835 paper. "This is the first use of the word individualism in English."12 The word was used in an affirmative sense of "individual first" by Emerson and his followers. Thus, the so-called Western individualism denotes in fact the English-American individualist tradition. In the tradition it is not completely either evil, or benevolent.

In China the first *Chinese Encyclopedia* published after the Chinese Cultural Revolution interpreted the entry individualism as: "An individual-centered idea or theoretical view which is used to deal with society and other people. It expresses itself in forms of egoism, altruism, liberalism, anarchism, etc."13 Here, individualism can express either the most despicable selfishness or lofty altruism. *Encyclopedia Britannica* states the main principles of individualism as: (1) Man is the center of all values, that is to say, any value is interpreted in terms of man (not always created by him). (2) The individual itself is the aim or the paramount value; society is only
a means for achieving the aims of the individual. (3) All individuals are to a certain extent equal. This Western individualism is inherited from Renaissance humanism, the Enlightenment and the ideological trends of bourgeois revolution. It is the result of opposition to the authority of God and the feudal emperors.

In certain historical periods it has motivated social progress by promoting the individual’s wisdom and capacity to act. To a certain extent, the achievements of America are based on individualism, which gives American a strong sense of independence and creativity. On the other hand, it leads to apathy in interpersonal relations, weakening of the agglomerative force between members of a society, collective and family. Attention is directed to the realization of the individual’s value and position and to equality. This ego-centric ideology neglects the contribution due to society.

In contrast, economic development and the cultural background in China are manifestly different from those in United States. The influence of the natural economic form, the hierarchical family system, the family-centered ethics of Confucianism led in the Han Dynasty to the theory of three dominants figures: the King over subjects, the father over the son, the husband over the wife. In the long history of China collective consciousness prevailed and the stress was upon family and society rather than on the individual’s position and value. The new socialist China, being established on the basis of the backward production force from old China, will require a long period to develop a commercial economy. However, in thirty years since the establishment of new socialist China collectivism has been over-stressed and individualism has been completely negated and subject to critique. This extreme one-sidedness in dealing with individualism reflects a psychology of individual nihilism. Yu Guangyuan has described its main points as "a negation or devaluation of individual interest, desire, personality, struggle, etc., and a one-sided over-emphasis on the `public’ and `collective’. Wide propagation of these views undoubtedly played an inhibitory role upon the activity of the individual. These views were the theoretical foundation of extreme leftist policies in China." The emphasis in China upon the collective consciousness and collectivism for thousands of years apparently formed a cultural tradition and ideology which contrasts with the Western tradition of individualism.

Conclusion

If individualism and collectivism as value attitude are investigated in terms of the development of socio-economic forms, their rationality and necessity can be correctly understood and their developmental trends projects.

In different countries, owing to the long-term influence of their distinctive economic development and cultural traditions different traditions regarding values are formed. In dealing with such traditions a simple attitude of complete negation or affirmation is not recommended; analysis, comparative studies and understanding based on social developmental trends are preferred. This enables one to study and absorb the positive aspects of a tradition and overcome its negative aspects.

The common search is for forms of the individual’s future self-realization in society so that the limitations of individualism and collectivism are overcome and their merits preserved. In the commercial economies of highly developed Western countries collectivism should be stressed in order to attenuate the faults of individualism. In the commercial economy of relatively underdeveloped Oriental countries it is necessary to bring the activity and creativity of individual into play in order to promote the development of the social collective. Such mutual restriction and
supplement between collectivism and individualism can guide an effective march toward a progressive future society.

Notes

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