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Beyond Modernization: Chinese Roots for Global Awareness

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edited by
Wang Miaoyang, Yu Xuanmeng and George F. McLean

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Introduction

At this point of transition to the third millennium a profound change appears to be taking place. This has been a long time in the making, but, as with a young bird emerging from its shell, the older more rigid structure of modernity crumbles so that new life can break forth.

The history of the last half of this century has been characterized by the emergence of the sense of the person against the pressure of universalist ideologies which promoted mass movements through ruthless totalitarian repression. First Fascism was overthrown, then Colonialism and finally Stalinism. Each fell before a broad movement asserting the dignity of persons and peoples.

To understand this one needs to turn back to the beginnings of modernity in the Enlightenment. Despite its name, the scientific/mathematical focus of the thought of this period came at the price of extended forgetfulness and marginalization of all that was not manipulable in terms of clear and distinct ideas. This had to include any horizon that transcended humankind itself. Francis Bacon recommended smashing all the idols, John Locke spoke of a beginning from the mind as a blank tablet, holding exclusively to ideas from the senses and strictly controlling all their combinations. Descartes would achieve the same ends through his famous process of doubt, leading albeit to a different series of ideas.

Shortly thereafter Jean Baptist Vico would describe the resulting mentality as that of an intellectual brute, that is, a dehumanized intellect. The scientific character of this mentality gave it great power, which modern developments amply witness. But these successes themselves now awake the need to rehumanize life for the coming millennium. Thus, it happens that the October, 1996 meeting of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party should take as its theme: "Spiritual Civilization" and Vaclav Havel President of the Czech Republic should describe the meaning of the meeting of the Presidents of seven European countries with the Pope in early June of 1997 as reclaiming their legacy which "includes among other things the spiritual dimension of public life and the moral dimension in politics (and) is as valid today as it was 1,000 years ago."

Now there is a move beyond the modern universalist calls for equality to an expanding "global" concern for the quality of life and hence for its rehumanization. This is understood both horizontally as taking account of the broad variety of cultures and vertically as rooted in a richer awareness of the human sensibility, creative imagination and freedom from which cultures spring.

Hence, to find the key to progress in our times the authors of this volume have most properly sought in Part I to understand the philosophical character of this transition and in Part II to build this change of awareness and spiritual commitment upon the dynamics of practical life and its ethical characteristics.

Chapter I by Yu Xuanmeng, "In Search of Meaning," begins this inquiry by indicating how the search for meaning, even as regards the physical world, focuses upon values and their creation by human beings. For this he draws richly upon Heidegger's turn to the existential order which, while neither purely objective nor purely subjective, makes it possible to take account of human goals and hence of meaning.

Chapter II by George McLean, "Tradition, Modernization and Creativity," carries this notion further by studying the way in which modernization should be not a rupture with tradition, but is application in new and creative ways. This is seen as personal and is rooted in society; thus it calls creatively for going beyond modernity to a more fully humane realization of tradition.

Chapter III by Ghislaine Florival, "Perception and Value: The Affective Basis of An Ethics of Encounter," brings this to the point. By delving deeply into the constitution of the person as essentially relational, and even into the nature of relation as essentially reversible, she suggests the drama of present changes. Beyond the classical realist positions regarding the person built on objective knowledge of substances as beings in themselves, and beyond the modern abstractive thought built upon an absolute common human nature as the basis for equal and universal rights, she points to the relational character of the person rooted in his or her sexuality. This means that the human person must be appreciated as relational.

Hence, the new mode of understanding is not a matter of abstract universal uniformities. The modern universalization of rights and norms beyond cultures could bring us only part way. It must not be lost, but now it needs to be transcended in a richer vision. This must not ignore cultures, but build upon them truly personal interrelations and social commitments which enable the person and civil society to emerge. Professor Florival writes in her chapter:

What then is the status of cultures and of cultural values? To be sure, they reflect the surrounding milieu from which proceed personal exchanges; certainly also, they always are interpreted in the collective experience which they inspire afresh. But it is always inside a group or more exactly in the exchange between persons that the mutual respect of the customs and of aspirations is located concretely as an ethical demand for recognition. This recognition inscribes itself along three ethical dimensions: (1) the subject as responsible for others in one's relation to oneself; (2) the other as recognized by me in his or her otherness, which is to say in his or her responsible liberty with respect to others; and (3) the cultural interrelation constituting the institution or "neutral third party" with respect to which the truth and efficacy of our concrete actions, as well as of social justice, can be constructed, justified and objectively measured.

There are then no universal values which exist *a priori*, but only values stemming from concrete and differentiated experience in cultures. To be sure every tradition reveals, while repeating, the possibility of the *Desein* in its "to be as having been"; every existing being has "to be" as his or her destiny, by virtue of his or her power to be, and according to his or her choice, each time and in each situation. To live the tradition can take on different forms, all of which are supported by the experience of being-at-world. But in the last instance it is always the concrete existing being who performs acts, who lives them and is affected by them, even if those acts themselves can also become what Sartre called the "*praticoinert*", that is to say, can have effects which go beyond the intentions of those who performed them. In this way every existing being, as well as every culture, lives in the context of its own values. These delineate a plurality of human projects which intersect precisely in order, through diverse actions, to construct an ethical world.

It is then through confluence in action that there emerges hope of recognizing the values of each culture. This is not to amalgamate their approaches into one, but to detect in each culture the surge toward values as the promise of a better world. As every culture bears its proper tradition, it is up to each to give life again to the intrinsic truth of its tradition and to bring out deliberately the most humanizing aspirations of that tradition. There is no common ground of a uniform mankind; there are only pluralities of ethical forms all working for the recognition of a humanizing fulfillment.

In the same way that historicity enables us to live in the present the temporal destiny of a whole existence, it permeates the history of the world in its emergence under different figures. However, the genesis of the perception of values is parallel to the genesis of culture and of cultures. It has three successive moments, which reformulate the philosophical history of ethics and reverse what philosophy proposes to itself in its present state of second reflection.

1) Archaic societies operate in function of their universe of values located in a weakly differentiated collective interrelation, which Durkheim and Bergson called closed societies. Institutionally they are static in the distribution of the respective roles of their members. It is the function which determines the individual.

2) But the dignity of the subject sets down the objective reality of the individuals with respect to each other according to a criterion of recognition which provides a foundation for the notions of respect and autonomy for the person. Liberty then is no longer linked merely to the political role and shared by "peers" who have access to the public world of the *agora* in the Greek sense of that term. Henceforth, it must be understood according to its ethical dimension: men recognizing each other as equal before the greatness of the law which they bear in themselves as practical reason. That is, the capacity for the subject to rise in his actions to a universal point of view, that is, to be responsible for his acts as human. The Kantian notion of respect, which probably was the first philosophical argumentation radically to denounce slavery, made it possible also to understand the equality of cultural forms, of races, and of sexes which the 20th century has tried to discover through critical reflection upon its philosophical and religious self understanding.

Resituating this in the perspective of metaphysics and of non-critical religious behavior, together with the scientific revolution and the discoveries of technology, can contribute to rethinking the genealogy of values. Abandoning its closed society, the West which had come to consider itself to be the mankind of universal reason, now discovers and recognizes the contributions of other cultures. And though the West claims for itself the prerogative of spiritual universality with regard to "human rights", it should be noted that those rights appear only in the course of a progressive awareness of the other in his or her otherness and hence in his or her proper culture. Interrelational differentiation is at work in the recognition by which everyone becomes a citizen of the world, but it is always against the background of a new otherness operative at the level of racial or sexual differences.

3) In fact, the discovery of subjectivity is recent; it is a contribution from beyond modernity which interprets critically the lived appropriation of subjectivity. The I is no longer *a priori* the rational subject, but is self in the light of customs and cultural interchange. The I who discovers itself as "oneself like any other" is relevant only to the universal rights of humankind in general. But we must ask if there is not a still more specific distinctiveness or identity relevant not to the simple universality shared by all men, but to a part of humankind whose recognition as properly personal is made possible only by their sexed affectivity. Thus the attainment of the human is not yet "personal" as long as it has not learned to recognize its own differentiation as constitutive of humanity.

The sexual difference is understood immediately as a relational truth, which is spoken in the reciprocal and constitutive openness of the two sexes, male and female, the one calling the other as the other of the self. This new interchange of "sense" makes it possible to rethink values from the interior of the differentiating dimensionality of the sexes for they can be understood constitutively only as relative to each other. This path of understanding oneself as personal interiority passes through the constitutive otherness of every person in his/her embodied being as incomplete, precisely as this is manifested at the edge of desire. As we have seen in the analysis of affectivity, this induces the proper character of differentiated recognition in one's lived bodiliness, and therefore in the context of a desiring sexuality.

Here the dimension of person is linked to the radical polarity which already is the sexed difference at the dawn of life, and which serves as the foundation of every human relation. As radical, it provides the foundation for the situation of the person as person, for the person is always

relational with respect to the other sex and, thereby, to the truth of his/her whole behavior. But beyond itself, beyond the very experience of sexuality which is only a sign of the person, the person is also the ultimate goal at which desire aims.

The modernization of values has taken account thus far of the cultural and racial differences of humanity in general, but it is on the way to becoming aware of the sexed difference which is the life of the senses. This is not only the meaning of actual sexual desire, but colors the whole of life with a correlative and reciprocal truth. Every project of a society of persons, be it a socio-political or a religious society, must be rethought in the light of the new awareness of the sexed difference. The hermeneutics of person has radicalized itself: the truth and action of the senses present themselves to us in their primordial reversibility, which is the sexed difference in its cultural multi-dimensionality.

Chapter IV by Shang Zhiying, "An Axiointerpretation of the Confucian Ethical Spirit," suggests the importance of the hermeneutic approach which this radically relational character of the person entails and begins to sketch the range of its ethical implications.

Chapter V by Fu Jizhong and Zhou Shan, "On the Origin of Traditional Chinese Forms of Thinking," traces this back to its Chinese sources by showing the origin of the hieroglyph. What emerges from tracing the sample ideographs from their simplest forms to the sophisticated concepts in the thought of Confucius and Lao Tzu is the essentially analogical and hence relational character of thought. In the past this may have raised special difficulties for Chinese thought in relation to the abstract conceptualization of the Greek tradition, but it promises now to enable culture to proceed with special sureness in the global interchange emerging for the new millennium.

Chapter VI by Arnold Sprenger, "Some Contemporary Reflections on Science and Religion," speaks also to these new potentialities of culture. He shows that science in its classical origins was not seen as opposed to religion and points out that the attempt now to deepen scientific notions and open them to culture brings up issues of values and hence of the religious source and goal of basic human commitments.

Part II turns from theory to practice as emerging in the present transition. In chapter VII Shen Enming, "Lao Tzu's Idea of 'Governing with Non-doing' and Modern Management" shows that "non-doing" is not a merely negative concept, but a matter of holding to the nature of things. It does not force upon them a control which does not respond to the free determination of the other or to the circumstances, but manipulates and distorts. Where the subject is seen as opposed to the object it reaches out only at a loss to itself. Instead what is suggested is an approach which is truly sensitive to the subject. This enables the culture of peoples to emerge and the relation between persons and peoples to evolve in the new global context.

Chapter VIII and IX by Manuel Dy turn to the economic order. In "Ownership and Social Relations: The Moral Foundations" he carefully traces the nature and especially the history of the notion of ownership. This enables him to come to the key contemporary dilemma of the relation between the values of equality based on access to the resources of nature and equity based upon one's labor.

In Chapter IX, "The Economic Structure of Society: Habermas' Reconstruction of Historical Materialism," Professor Dy studies what can be done on the issue of power and distribution in terms of stages of communication. Habermas is able to arrive only at argumentative speech where norms lose their quasi-natural validity and require justification from universalistic points of view. This is the popular position at the present time, but it runs afoul both of Lao Tzu's ancient awareness of the need to take account of concrete nature and of G. Florival's future-oriented

phenomenological perspective. She moves away from transcendental reasoning and abstract universalization in order to take account of the analogy of diverse cultures and of their creative natural interrelation, as intimated by the chapters V, VI and VII of Fu Jizhong, Yu Xuanmeng and Shen Enming, respectively. In this light, Dy's call for "people power" takes us beyond the formal order of Habermas's ideal speech situation in which argumentation was focused on critique according to justifying norms built on universalizable principles. Dy calls rather for the vision of Florival which does not ignore the human differences by which each is unique, but builds upon them. It is in confluent interchange that a truly responsible civil society consists. This points beyond modernity to a global horizon.

Chapter X by John Farrelly, "Person, Work and Religious Tradition," applies this to the field of labor through an analysis of the religious tradition and the philosophy of the person in the analysis of work in John Paul II's document "On Human Work" (appended there). This carries forward the above themes by taking the analysis of work beyond mere concepts of utility, production and consumption to situate it in the context of the purpose of the creation of the material universe and its relation to the human person. Farrelly cites the eminent Keiji Nishitani of the Kyoto school of Buddhist philosophy, that "There is no doubt that the idea of man as a personal being is the highest idea of man which has thusfar appeared." The same may be said as regards the idea of God as personal being and the philosophy of subjectivity. This reinforces the dramatic importance of the new developments gradually elaborated in most of the above chapters, especially III, and moves this from philosophical reflection to the sphere of daily activity in the work place.

The concluding chapters XI, XII and XIII make this still more concrete. The first of these by Prof Zhang Huajin, "Human Quality and Social Progress", provides a statistical base. Professor Wang Miaoyang, in "The Culture of Shanghai and Its Modernization", points out how the opportunities of Shanghai as a great commercial port were followed by developments in writing and publishing, music and theater. There developed what can only be called a new spirit characterized by openness and innovation that is both creative and popular. This exemplifies what can be expected from the new burst of human creativity now emerging and which, it can be hoped, will flourish in the coming millennium.

Richard Graham in "Cultural Tradition and Modernization: Symbiosis in the Development of Moral Reasoning," suggests that this can be a true rallying of human resources. He looks for a synergy between tradition and modernity by noting the fact of stages in moral reasoning. In this light he regrets the tendency to set one against the other and points to an integrative vision in which "reason and passion are not in opposition; that 'enlightenment', tradition and revelation all can work together for human progress."

In sum, modernity has accomplished much in affirming the equality of persons and the universality of human rights. However, it is hard put to face the challenges found in the search for an equity that is sensitive to diversity and the effort to add pluralism to universality. These are rooted in a further awareness of human subjectivity and relatedness which requires new spiritual dimensions of human awareness.

The present work contains many suggestions of ways in which the new awareness can be understood and related to resources in the Chinese tradition in ways that can contribute to true progress for all peoples in the new millennium.

Part I. Resources in Philosophical Theory for an Expanding Global Awareness

1. In Search of Meaning

Yu Xuanmeng

The Problem of Meaning

One of the most obvious characteristics of the present process of modernization is that social life in all its aspects is changing more rapidly than ever before. Modernization changes the way of living as well as the picture of the world, so that one might say: "I seem not to be the person I was yesterday." And one might further ask: "Who are we? Where do we come from? Where are we going?" It is an old question, asked many times regarding the identity of the human being. The theme "Traditional Culture and Modernization" poses the same issue and calls one to sketch out a more meaningful life for the future. Hence, I should like to discuss in this chapter the question: What is a meaningful life and, first of all, what is meaning as such?

The meaning of life consists in one's way of living. Speaking generally, every manner of life has its own meaning whether we like or dislike it, for, whether we appreciate or criticize it we have already understood its meaning. So, a meaningful life does not contrast with one that is absolutely meaningless, but with one that is valueless. There must be a relation then between value and meaning.

Something valuable must be meaningful; but not vice versa. Value is only that part of the meaning which relates to the particular aim and interests of people in a certain historical period; in other words, with regard to man's aim and interests, meaning is value. A meaningful life must in fact be a valuable life. Therefore, people usually consider persons who live a valueless life as the walking dead. On the other hand, people who are trying their best to live a valuable life are willing to sacrifice even their own life in order to realize their lofty ideal. Since value is so important to human life, we should investigate its background in the meaning system, for it is impossible to evaluate something against a background which is absolutely meaningless. What is this meaning system?

To raise the issue of "Traditional Cultural and Modernization" means at least that people know that there is some difference between life in tradition and that in modernity. People look forward to modernization, because they are not fully satisfied with the tradition with which they are familiar. But, at the same time, they seem to be disturbed by the new troubles and challenges involved in modernization. Such disturbance can be seen from the books of some humanist philosophers. People bring about unacceptable effects while constructing the modernization to which they look forward. To be sure, modernization is expected to be a way to happiness and liberty for human beings, but in achieving modernization we must overcome the negative results which entail a devaluation of human beings. If it be accepted that one chooses and evaluates his or her life on the basis of a meaning system, it should be asked what is the relation between human beings and the meaning system? Do people create also the meaning system as the basis on which they choose and evaluate their lives? First then we must ask once again: what is the meaning of meaning, that is, what is meaning as such?

Meaning and Its Creation

The kernel of the question of meaning is that of the meaning of human life, for meaning is something created by humans. Meaning must be expressed, which humans know how to do, and must be understood and have a communicative character. Meaning then will be as humans create, express and understand it in the unique process in which meaning as such comes about. This is also the process in which human beings emerge as humans: for the question of meaning is that of one's humanness. Thus, the question of meaning can be studied in many ways, each of which, if it be investigated deeply enough, leads to the question of human life. In other words, one cannot clarify the question of meaning without clarifying the meaning of human life.

Some philosophers took the question of meaning as only a question of language inasmuch as meaning is communicated in language. However, it has become manifest that language, consisting of different sounds uttered by man, is itself a set of symbols which have no meaning of itself. Only as we accept through common usage that words as symbols represent factual things and are ordered in correspondence to real events does language become meaningful. That is to say, language has meaning because it can stimulate our consciousness about factual things or as a corresponding reaction. However, why one should pay attention to these rather than to those things and events in which meaning emerges surely is a matter concerning human life or existence. Furthermore, language does not cover the whole realm of meaning. For instance, one can grasp another's tacit meaning by a twinkle or a shrug without words. If you really feel from someone's eyes his or her kindness or ferocity toward you, though without words, you must have tacitly grasped his or her meaning more deeply and strongly than that in words. It is a Chinese idiom that: "Words are too poor to exhaust one's idea", but this does not hinder people from communicating such ideas, for a clever person is good at grasping the implication beyond the words. All this shows that there are many things not expressed in language, though we understand them surely.

We can also derive from Wittgenstein that human life is the root of the meaning in language. At first he thought that, if meaning consists in the correspondence between words and things or events, there must be something like an isomorphism of both language and events. He called this isomorphism a picture, and hence this theory is called "the picture theory". But is not this picture a real being beyond experience? As a philosopher in the experientialist tradition, he had to be disturbed by the above question and later came to another theory: "the theory of games." It is said that he got this inspiration from a football match. As all depends on the rules of the game in order for the match to proceed meaningfully, meaning must consist in the rules. But just as these rules are constituted by man for the game, meaning is created by human beings who are the origin of meaning. But it does not seem proper to reduce all kinds of human action to games, for human action is first of all for one's own existence in a struggle full of blood and tears. Nevertheless, when Wittgenstein substituted "the picture theory" with "the game theory" he declared the truth that in his life meaning is created by human beings.

Meaning in the Natural World

In a general sense, it might be agreed that humans are the creators of that part of meaning which concerns human life. But one might wonder how humans could be the creators of the meaning of natural things? We see the river flowing, the sun rising and falling, the flowers opening and withering, the seasons turning one by one. Are these not the inherent procedures of nature? We also know that acid neutralizes alkali, that a molecule of water consists of two atoms of

hydrogen and one of oxygen, and that atoms consist of electrons and neutrons. Are these not the innate attributes and intrinsic meaning of the natural things themselves? How can humans be the creators of meaning as such?

It is not difficult to answer the question. We need only to distinguish essence from existence. It is not determined by man whether a thing exists or not, whereas the essence or whatness of a thing must be named and described by man. The meaning of a thing is the whatness in which a thing appears to man. So long as a thing is named and described, it already has been noticed by man and has come into some mode of relation with him. For instance, the four seasons: spring, summer, autumn and winter, are distinguished by humans according to man's various ways of action. To speak more clearly, the changing of the weather first got its meaning in the ways of life essential for man, such as hunting, farming and migration. Nowadays, we change our dress, choose our food and plan our moves as the season changes. It is unimaginable that weather would have had the meaning of four seasons if there were no human being.

It is also accepted that the meaning of one and the same thing is in its changing or developing as time goes on due to the way in which man deals with it. This shows again that the meaning of natural things is revealed in man's dealing with them; indeed, dealing with things is the human way of life. To use, appreciate, notice, dislike, fear, discard, bother, observe, investigate, and so on, are all ways in which man deals with things. The meaning of a thing may be changed along with the way in which man deals with it. The so-called innate attributes of a thing are mainly revealed by a way of investigation in which the thing is taken as an object in the exterior world. Here, the one relation between man and thing is separated into subject and object. Then the meaning revealed is abstracted and put on the side of the object as its own attribute. From this point of view, we hold that the so-called attribute of a thing is also a kind of meaning revealed in the particular way in which man and thing are separated as subject and object. Man reveals the meaning of things as well as of life. The revealing of meaning is identically the creation of meaning; man is the creator of the whole world of meaning.

Though the question of meaning concerns mainly the essence, an actual thing must consist both of its essence and its existence; hence we should consider also the existence of a thing. This is the condition of the thing which makes it possible for man to reveal its meaning, for without existence we cannot factually encounter a thing nor decide which thing will be encountered in our life. To say "the possible condition" means that a thing has no meaning if it does not come into relation with man and hence has no actuality. Man, and only man, turns the existing thing into a meaningful thing because only man can establish the relation between himself and the things. As K. Marx and F. Engels said in *The German Ideology*: "Wherever the relation exists, it is a relation for me; an animal does not set any 'relation' with anything, no relation at all; for an animal the relation between itself and other things does not exist as relation" (translated from the Chinese version, p. 24).

Martin Heidegger on Meaning

Through an existential analysis in his *Being and Time*, Martin Heidegger described how the *Dasein* encounters things and establishes and reveals the totality of relationships involved in its Being and hence the meaning that is disclosed. The following is his main idea about meaning.

Things come into relation with man in the activities of human life. Here the fundamental action is using tools to make the needed provisions for his own being. Doing this work establishes a relation: man uses the tool for some purpose and for something. In order for the work to go

smoothly, one must have a good grasp of the tool and of the relationship involved, but the way of grasping the tool and the relation is different in the work from the way of grasping them in conception. In the work one grasps the tool and the relation in an unobstructive way. That is to say, one does not pay special attention to the tool and the relation. One's concern is the work, and the more smoothly the work proceeds the better one grasps the tool and the relation; the relationship is in a state of "readiness-at-hand", which is grasped in a preconceptional way. "Readiness-at-hand" becomes "present-at-hand" when, for example, one lacks the proper tool for the work, or the tool is broken. The tool then becomes obstructive and one recalls and explains the tool in its function of serviceability. This brings out the meaning of the tool in its "present-at-hand". But before we have the meaning in "present-at-hand", we already have had it in "readiness-at-hand".

As human action broadens, the amplitude of the relation involved in human dealing with the world also broadens. The total relationship thus involved is what Heidegger calls meaning. His point that meaning is relation is underscored in the above fact that people usually explain the meaning of the tool in its function or service ability. The whole relationship in "readiness-at-hand" is the environment for the human being, while that in "present-at-hand" is what we call the outer world. Further, the relational totality is established by people in their cooperative work. So, the environment or the world is for them the common environment or the common world in which they communicate and understand mutually (cf. chapter 3, section 17-18).

We can learn from Heidegger that meaning is neither purely subjective nor purely objective. Meaning opens from the single ground of phenomena which contains man and the world as its two poles. Or one can say that it is in man's encountering the world that meaning comes forth. Phenomenologically, man must be a "being-in-the-world"; hence the term "*Dasein*" is used to denote man. Man reveals meaning according to what he might encounter and how he deals with for his own being. For example, even today among some herdsmen the words of greeting may be "how about the livestock", instead of "how are you". While for some fishermen, it is a taboo to overturn the whole fish on the plate when eating, and they even forbid saying the word "overturn" when they are on the sea.

Many phenomena can be explained in a Heideggerian sense. For instance, since meaning is the relational whole involved in man's encountering the world, nowadays, when we talk about meaning we also call it "the meaning system" or "the net of meaning". A thing has its meaning only when it is situated in the relational system, and we understand its meaning according to its place in the context of that system. In other words, a thing has no meaning until it's involved in the relational system: an absolutely solitary thing is definitely meaningless, even should there be such a thing. Though a thing has its place in the total system of relations, if it has no place in certain parts of the system which happen to be the focus of the concerns of certain people, then, for these people the thing is relatively meaningless. Similarly when something is placed inappropriately in our communication, there results an absurdity.

The Meaning of Human Life

Since the meaning system is created and revealed in one's action for his Being, the breadth and depth of the system reflects that of one's action. Meaning is after all the meaning of human life, and the picture of the world in one's eyes reflects the degree of one's vitality. Even if one constructs his own world picture only by learning or speculating, it is still a result of his intelligence. So we might say, the meaning of one's life is that of the world picture or the

worldview constructed. Man constructs his world picture for the most part in terms of his goals, so we usually evaluate the meaning of one's life through his purposes and the related success with which he displays his vitality and involves the relational system. A person, though well-off, may be of less positive meaning if he lacks a goal. However, those who have a high purpose and success, must learn to reflect upon their meaning in terms of this cause and success. Otherwise, they may forget that man himself is his own ultimate aim, and may objectify and lose themselves in their goal so that they begin to wonder where is the meaning of their life.

Zen instructs people to be good at reflecting on the meaning of life in daily life. A well-known Zen proverb goes: "Fetching water, splitting logs, all of those are full of wonderful Tao". Here Tao is the ultimate aim and ideal for Zen Buddhism, and also can be understood as the meaning of life. This is to say that the meaning of one's life is nowhere but in one's own present daily life. The awareness of this truth must make the disciples optimists in their lives. It encourages disciples to endure pain and hardship and to develop confidence that they can overcome difficulties. In so doing they constantly enjoy the meaning of their life.

But implied in this instruction there is also something negative because the disciples are required to adapt themselves to any circumstances they encounter and even meekly to submit to maltreatment. In this way, there seems to be no need to improve one's life, and even unreasonable things are to be allowed.

Another problem concerns the unity of meaning. To be sure, meaning is rich and colorful according to the different regions, times and occupations of people. The meaning system of earlier peoples may differ from that of modern people, as that of artists may differ from that of scientists. Since meaning is after all the meaning of life, the terms of the various meaning systems should be united into one so that people may formulate a complete picture of the world and seize their own essence as a single whole or identity. Otherwise, one may wonder which is the real meaning of one's life and where one's essence lies. This urges man to search for the unity of meaning among people not only of his own time, but also of the past.

Various meaning systems can be united into one because the particular aims, whence emerge the various kinds of human action and hence the various meaning systems, are all ways to one's ultimate aim. It is this ultimate aim which is the ground for the unity of the various meaning systems. The various meaning systems are integrated into a meaning totality as many branches are integrated in a tree; the unity of the meaning totality ensures the unity of the meaning of life. As each branch is one part of an integrated whole, a person in his own meaning system is at the same time in the meaning totality. Hence, what a person does is a key link in the relational totality involving the entire people. Everyone, though he lives in a corner of the world and has a particular occupation, may have his complete meaning of life as well as a complete picture of the world. Furthermore, one person may have several meaning systems in his or her life, so long as he undertakes several tasks or plays different roles in society. But he can still have an integrated picture of meaning if everything he does serves his ultimate aim.

Of course, different meaning systems may contradict each other, especially, as meaning systems correspond to their respective value systems which can contradict each other. This is manifest in conflicts and wars among people when some meaning systems vanish along with the defeated side. Generally speaking, the meaning systems which survive conflicts are more effective in facilitating people's ultimate aim. This can be observed in the history of mankind. Here, we see also that the ultimate aim always functions as a coordinating force integrating the different meaning systems into a unity.

Objectivism

Modernization raises many new issues in the realm of meaning, of which the most remarkable is perhaps objectivism. This can be contrasted to one's attitude or outlook on life. According to this attitude, people take the world as their environment and deal with things mainly in terms of their direct needs in life. Thus they give meaning to things according to the relation these have to people in their life. Though people discover many "innate attributes" in things, they intend to discover only those which have some interest for human life. Thus, we have found only a small portion for our direct aim is to live, not to discover these "innate attributes" in things. Objectivism, however, is concerned only to discover the "innate attributes" in things no matter whether or not they have any interest for human life.

At the beginning, human beings uncovered more and more "innate attributes" as the breadth of human action broadened. The more attributes revealed, the more there were available for human life. This could have been the motivation from which the objectivists' attitude developed.

Expecting more to be available from "innate attributes", objectivists unconsciously changed their way of life. As the "innate attributes" of the thing are revealed in their own way man must develop a way different from those of daily life. In this way, persons no longer live directly for the sake of humans themselves, but for the sake of uncovering these attributes, and thereby become a key link in the chain of attributes. Since this does not follow the path of one's will and as one does not know where the chain of attributes leads, there arises wonder as to where we are going.

Further, the attributes uncovered through objectivism are not always available to human beings. For instance, people have access to a great amount of energy through the "innate attributes" uncovered by objectivism, but we are clearly aware that man thus has the power to destroy the whole of humankind many times over.

Theoretically, what we have found in objectivism is also a system of meaning, for it is founded by human action; but it is not a system of value, for it does not unfold itself in correspondence with human interests. For example, the theory concerning the structure of molecules and atoms is a meaning system, but no one would take it as a value system.

Though its origins can be traced to earlier times, objectivism has become more dominant in the process of modernization than ever before. More and more persons are trained earlier, even in their childhood, to be inserted into the chain of the "innate attributes" of the thing. The persons with the objectivist attitude play an important role in social life, while persons with no special technique lose their right to live in a society which is organized technologically for the sake of uncovering the chain of attributes in matter. Because it is thought that the human being should live according to the direction of the chain of innate attributes, as the attributes of things are unveiled the ultimate aim of human beings becomes veiled.

Objectivism separates meaning from value, which, in turn, causes various kinds of psychological conflicts. When one faces a world different from his life-world, one could not help feeling alienated, for one reflects his own meaning from the world picture one establishes by oneself. When one deals with two worlds -- the life world and the world in objectivism -- one might think of oneself as separated personalities. And when one wholly loses oneself in the world of objectivism this could only be the loss of one's own essence? The split between meaning and value leads also to a conflict between science and morality. It was reported, for example, that there was a fierce quarrel over whether one can as an experiment make a hybrid between a human being and a gorilla. In science this is not an absurd problem; it is even meaningful. But if an infant were to be born how should one treat him? Can it be allowed to die as an animal, or should it be given

the rights of a human and allowed to produce its own child? Such questions are moral ones. This debate makes us wonder where we are headed.

Many times before, human beings have integrated various meaning systems into one whole of meaning. Can we integrate the objectivist meaning system and the value meaning system into a unity? This is just the point. In the past, the ultimate aim of human beings was to integrate the various meaning systems into a whole of meaning. As an ultimate aim, this must be one for all humankind. But where is it; how can we find it today? We have seen that there are conflicts among communities, peoples and nations due to their respective aim and interests; do people really forget their ultimate common goal?

Perhaps, the ultimate goal will not reveal itself until the day when all people are threatened in their being. In the meantime we search for the truth by reflecting on the long experience from tradition to the modernization we are in the process of constructing. We should always ask: Who are we? Where do we come from? Where are we going?

Tradition, Modernization and Creativity

George F. McLean

Modernization as Application of Tradition

It is especially evident that tradition in the sense of what is passed on regarding morality has a permanent depth of meaning and value. This is its synchronic aspect. To this must be added its diachronic or particular meaning for each new time ordering the present and constructing the future. This will be our concern in this paper.

It is a matter, first of all, of taking time seriously, that is, of recognizing that reality includes authentic novelty. This contrasts to the perspective of Plato for whom the real was the ideal forms or ideas transcending matter and time, of which physical things and temporal events are but shadows. It also goes beyond rationalism's search for clear and distinct knowledge of eternal and simple natures and their relations, and beyond romanticism's attention to a primordial nature hidden in the dimly sensed past. A fortiori, it goes beyond method alone without content.

In contrast to all these, the notion of application¹ means that tradition, with its inherent authority or normative force, achieves its perfection in the temporal unfolding of reality. Secondly, it shows human persons and peoples, not as detached intellects, but as enabled by, and formative of, their changing physical and social universe. Thirdly, in the area of socio-political values and action it expresses directly the striving of persons to realize their lives, the development of this striving into a fixed attitude (*hexis*). Hence, as distinct from the physical order, *ethos* is a situation neither of law nor of lawlessness, but of human and therefore developing institutions and attitudes which regulate, but do not determine.²

Certain broad guidelines for the area of ethics and politics serve in the application of tradition as a guide for historical practice. The concrete and unique reality of human freedom when lived with others through time constitutes a distinctive and everchanging process. This historicity means that responses to the good are made always in concrete and ever changing circumstances. Hence, the general principles of ethics and politics as a philosophic science of action cannot be purely theoretical knowledge or a simple accounting from the past. Instead, they must help people consciously exercise their freedom in concrete historical circumstances which are ever changing and new.

Here an important distinction must be made from *techné* where action is governed by an idea as an exemplary cause that is fully determined and known by objective theoretical knowledge (*epistémé*). Skill consists in knowing how to act according to that idea or plan; and when it cannot be carried out perfectly some parts of it simply are omitted in the execution. In contrast, ethics and politics, though similar in the possession of a practical guide and its application to a particular task, differ in important ways. First, in moral action subjects -- whether persons or peoples -- constitute themselves as they act: agents are differentiated by their action. Hence, moral knowledge as an understanding of the appropriateness of human action cannot be fully determined independently of the subjects in their situation.

Secondly, adaptation by moral agents in their application of the law does not diminish, but rather corrects and perfects the law. In relation to a world which is less ordered, the law is imperfect, for it cannot contain in any explicit manner the response to the concrete possibilities

which arise in history. It is precisely here that freedom and creativity are located. They do not consist in arbitrariness, for Kant is right in saying that without law freedom has no meaning; nor do they consist in an automatic response determined by the historical situation, for then determinism and relativism would compete for the crown in undermining human freedom. Freedom consists rather in shaping the present according to the sense of what is just and good which we have from our cultural tradition, and in a way which manifests and indeed creates for the first time more of what justice and goodness mean.

Hence, law is perfected by its application in the circumstances. Epoché and equity do not diminish, but perfect the law; without them the law would be simply a mechanical replication doing the work not of justice, but of injustice. Ethics or politics is not only knowledge of what is right in general, but the search for what is right in the situation; it is also the choice of the right means for this situation. Knowledge about the means is not then a matter of mere expediency; it is the essence of the search for a more perfect application of the law in the given situation. This is the fulfillment of moral knowledge.³

It is important to note here that this rule of the concrete (of what the situation is asking of us) is not known by sense knowledge, which simply registers a set of concrete facts on the horizontal level. In order to know what is morally required, the situation must be understood in the light of what is right, that is, in the light of what has been discovered vertically about appropriate human action through tradition with its normative character. Only in this light can moral consciousness as the work of intellect (*nous*), rather than of sensation, go about its job of choosing the right means.

Therefore, to proceed simply in reaction to concrete injustices, rather than in the light of one's tradition, is ultimately destructive. It inverts the order just mentioned and results in manipulation of our hopes for the good. Destructive or repressive structures would lead us to the use of correspondingly evil means suited only to producing evil results. The true response to evil can be worked out only in terms of the good as discovered by our forebears passed on in tradition and applied by us in our times.

The importance of application implies a central role for the virtue of prudence (*phronesis*) or thoughtful reflection which enables one to discover the appropriate means for the circumstances. This must include also the virtue of sagacity (*sunesis*), that is, of understanding or concern for the other. For what is required as a guide for the agent is not only technical knowledge of an abstract ideal, but knowledge that takes account of the agent in relation to other persons. One can assess the situation adequately only inasmuch as one, in a sense, undergoes the situation with the affected parties. Thus, Aristotle rightly describes as "terrible" the one who can make the most of the situation, but without orientation towards moral ends, that is, without concern for the good of others in their situations.

In sum, application is not a subsequent or accidental part of understanding, but co-determines this understanding from the beginning. Moral consciousness must seek to understand the good, not as an ideal to be known and then applied, but rather through discerning the good for concrete peoples in their relations with others.

Cua finds similar notions in the distinctions of Chu Hsi in the neo-Confucian tradition regarding the diachronic sense of *tao* between the substantial (*t'i*) and the operational (*yung*), the stable basic or latent schemata and the operational in changing circumstances (*fei*). Hsün Tzu distinguishes the constant (*ch'ang*) and the changing (*pien*), the constant rule (*ching*) and the sliding scale (*ch'üan*). Use of the latter as an exercise of moral discretion based on *li* is essential for moral life due to the imperfections of our knowledge and the urgent complexity of life. In these

circumstances even to hold to a static mean would undermine the realization of the wholistic goal of the *tao*.

Creativity in the application of the tradition in the concrete circumstances of life thus becomes essential. In this context Cua deftly cites J. Pelican's aphorism: "Tradition is the living faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead faith of the living."⁴

Tradition and the Roots of Creativity: Personal and Social

The notion of application can help in sorting out the human dilemma between an absolutism insensitive to persons in their concrete circumstances and a relativism which leaves the person subject to expediency in public and private life. Indeed, the very statement of the dilemma reflects the deleterious aspect of the Platonic view of ideas. He was right to ground changing and historical being in the unchanging and eternal. This had been Parmenides' first insight in metaphysics and was richly developed in relation to human action through the medievals' notion of an eternal law in the divine mind.

But it seems inappropriate to speak directly in these terms regarding human life, for in all things individual human persons and humankind as a whole are subject to time, growth and development. As we become increasingly conscious of this the personal character of even our abstract ideals becomes manifest and their adapted application in time can be seen, not as their rejection, but as their perfection. In this, justice loses none of its force as an absolute requirement of human action. Rather, the concrete modes of its application in particular circumstances add to what could have been articulated in merely abstract and universal terms. A hermeneutic approach directs attention precisely to these unfoldings of the meaning of abstract principles through time. This is not an abandonment of absolutes, but a recognition of the human condition and of the way in which this reflects the ultimate richness of the source and principle of social life.

For Confucius the aesthetic vision is integrated in drama, of which dance is one moment. In the actual performance of *li* (ritual or liturgy) there is a combination of poetry, liturgical action and music. It is important to distinguish these as three levels, for Confucius said that in the poem our spirit can rise and stand in reality to achieve complete transcendence in the ecstasy of the spirit.

Confucius, however, may have looked upon aesthetics more as a matter of appreciation and conservation, rather than as original, creative and free expression. This suggests that in the works of Confucius there are important resources for developing a modern vision which were not mined by Confucius himself and his schools.

If so what should be the attitude of a philosopher in our day to this mode of aesthetics? If it be itself appreciative and conservative, does one who interprets it become limited to the same approach or can interpretation legitimately open up new meaning in old texts. In other words, must ancient texts be read only with an ancient outlook? Indeed, is it even possible today to have an authentically ancient outlook -- to see with eyes long closed -- or does the attempt to do so require so much make-believe as to be in effect impossible? Even if one were to succeed in reconstituting the past, would one be faithful to the text which was written as a vital expression of the process of life, or would one instead be rendering lifeless a living text (not unlike the biologist who makes a slide of once living tissue)?

It would seem therefore that our goal should be not simply to reiterate ancient times in reading ancient texts, but to recognize that we come to them from new times, with new horizons and new questions; that we should allow them to speak anew to us; and that in so doing the texts and philosophies are living rather than dead -- and therefore more true. Texts read in this sense are part

of a living tradition in which is situated our struggle to face the problems of life and to build a future worthy of those who follow.

Some would fear that to give such importance to the horizon of the reader of a text might constitute a relativism and lose the permanent significance of the insights of the author. But this would seem to reflect a material and mechanical model ruled by successive discrete moments of time in which universality is a function only of abstraction. This leaves what is universally applicable relatively vacuous and reduces one to pragmatism. The real issue here is one's metaphysics: what is the nature of being, what does it mean to be? If the answer, as the Confucian sense of community would be the first to suggest, is not that reality is reductively matter trapped in time but at least the human spirit living through time, then to look for meaning in terms of the reaches of the spirit across time is not to lose but to find meaning. This is the sense of being emerging through the consciousness of Heidegger's person as *dasein*. Being is not merely what was, but what blossoms ever fresh in the human heart. In a parallel manner in reading ancient texts philosophy is not archeology but, like every human act, a creative unfolding of being in time. This creative freedom is the essential characteristic of the person.

What then should we conclude regarding the root of the actuality, the good or the perfection of reality which mankind has discovered, in which we have been raised, which gives us dominion over our actions, and which enables us to be free and creative? Does it come from God or from man, from eternity or from history? Chakravarti Rajagopalachari of Madras answered:

Whether the epics and songs of a nation spring from the faith and ideas of the common folk, or whether a nation's faith and ideas are produced by its literature is a question which one is free to answer as one likes. . . . Did clouds rise from the sea or was the sea filled by waters from the sky? All such inquiries take us to the feet of God transcending speech and thought⁵

Notes

1. Hans Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroads, 1975), pp. 281-286.
2. *Ibid.*, pp. 278-279.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 281-286.
4. Jaroslav Pelican, *Vindication of Tradition* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), p. 65.
5. *Ramayana* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1976), p. 312.

3.

Perception and Value: The Affective Basis of an Ethics of Encounter

Ghislaine Florival

Cultural Tradition

To reflect upon tradition means to rediscover the lived rooted-ness of an experience of the collective life of a group as a people or a community in its temporal and geographic context and in its permanent self-transcendence. Reflection upon a cultural tradition raises the question of the becoming of that "heritage from the past" as both identical and different not only within its distinct factual situation and according to its own dynamic resources, but in its relation to other cultures. Generally speaking, to reflect upon a tradition means to consider an historical experience, that is, to the present meaning of that "precipitate of history" which past life forms offer to individuals today. For every generation leans on the cultural experience of its predecessors, even while reevaluating afresh its creative possibilities according to the new modalities of its life.

But modern philosophical questioning regarding cultures has its meaning only within a particular culture which, since Socrates, has articulated itself through a logic of questioning based upon the resources of a reflective and conceptual mode of thinking. Recently, contemporary philosophy has discovered the philosophical contributions of other worldviews, such as those of the East. Unceasingly, these have made present what remains of truths of life unthought by reason. In so doing they do not aim at building discursive representations, hence, the Western philosopher who tries to be initiated into those conceptions must make use of history, customs and civilization. Only thus can he achieve what M. Merleau-Ponty in *Les philosophes célèbres* characterized as "a fascination". For it is not possible to enter only half way into, e.g., Chinese philosophy because it "revolves around the same immemorial world which it does not try to think, but to make present."¹

It would be a simplification to oppose absolutely the contributions of the two cultures. Coming from the Hellenic world, Western philosophy was not without living relations with the East. The Greek world has been living from the symbolic contribution of the beliefs of the East, which in various forms have crossed the centuries from Heraclitus and Pythagoras until now. However, logical reason, coming from the patriarchal and juridical contribution of Rome, not only has marked with its imprint the entire Western Christian culture and all its national and church institutions, but in modern times it has taken on a representative consciousness which distances it from every imaginary or affective, if not symbolic, dimension. Today, Western philosophy recognizes the lack of these dimensions in its own proponents as, prompted by techno-science, they evolve the process of cultural universalization. Attending to the message offered by other cultures as is required by unavoidable co-existence should enable philosophy to situate itself in the scope of an "enlarged Reason" whose project Husserl foresaw as the *telos* of the whole of humankind: philosophers, as he said, are the true "state servants of mankind."

Some philosophers, to be sure, already have understood this life message from the East and others have criticized the West: Master Eckhard for example in the Middle Ages, a number of Renaissance thinkers and, in the modern period, Hegel (even in order to conceptualize the historical process), Schopenhauer (in his encounter with Buddhism) and Nietzsche. But it is mainly to the contemporary phenomenologists, attentive to what Husserl has so pertinently called the "life-

world", that we owe the birth of a contemporary current of philosophical and anthropological questioning regarding culture as such and the different cultures. According to a new ontology, Heidegger has developed the theme of "historiality" as understanding the "world" in its becoming. This has the living force of a tradition or destiny (*Geschik*), for an understanding of the history of a people depends upon an understanding of historicity or *Gewesen* in order to grasp the fate of the *Dasein*.²

Hermeneutics aims at interpreting concrete values shared with other cultures through language and its interrelated meanings. This path is followed by Gadamer³ in speaking of the horizontal dimension of cultures with respect to each other, by the more recent thesis of P. Ricoeur⁴ on the ethical character of cultural values, or also by the position of Levinas⁵ on culture as a language which expresses itself not merely as thought, but as embodied in the convergence of being through cultural interaction.

Finally and more fundamentally, that is, at the level of the lived body, it is found in the phenomenology of "difference" called "flesh of the world", presented by M. Merleau-Ponty in *Le visible et l'invisible*.⁶ Similar to the way a language is expressive, this phenomenology brings out the fundamental role of affective structures. These are lived in "chiasmus", but always are understood implicitly in the process of recognition inherent in language. It is on this last reference point, which Merleau-Ponty calls "flesh of the world", that I intended to base the essential elements of this presentation.

The Data of the Problem: Ethical Values and Morality

Here the problem is to put in perspective the notion of ethical value: how can one understand that notion for the contemporary world; how can its cultural diversity be grasped? Must one still have recourse to the metaphysical concept of "human being", in order to vindicate the universal character of ethical values; do we have to underline the differences of human beings in order to grasp the meaning of the *telos* which runs through them from the very roots of their diversity? And what is the meaning of Husserl's philosophical call for a sense of mankind on the move and opening to its self-actualization in the face of the rational desire of being for totality? This classical problematic is found in each particular culture and the relation between its different groups. Hegel contrasts it with the right of persons to a subjective morality, for it exists between persons. This enabled him ultimately to build a concept of the state as the synthesis of effective Reason.

In contrast, the philosophical problem concerning value in its concrete or lived dimension must be analyzed phenomenologically from the "unspoken" bases of reason which is prior to the articulation of language and learned discourse. Indeed, it is already at work at the level of lived experience, for what is given beforehand in the actual existence of the *Dasein* as existing "being-in-the-world" constitutes the basis of every perceptive encounter and particularly of the affectivity and experience of desiring.

But if an originary meaning is already present in the affective dimension of every encounter, could we not recognize in those dispositions also the premises of ethical valuation? In other words, is there an implication in principle between the element of perception in an encounter and its value dimension?

As this is the central aim of this study of the affective bases of ethical encounter, those bases will have to be transposed to the cultural level. In so doing, will we discover the same lived intuition in the ethical behavior of different cultures, or must we not reverse our procedure and say that every encounter is situated in, or borne by, its proper culture? This would give every encounter

its distinctive affective space and hence the possibility of unfolding its proper values, which will have its own truth in relation to other cultures? In other words, is not the lived cultural base the place also of a lived differentiation which manifests itself at all levels: personal, individual and collective; and is not this interrelational base in "life-world" the very "dimension" of intercultural exchange as such?

Firstly, I shall recall some methodological data which have guided phenomenological research from Husserl to Merleau-Ponty in order to examine in what measure those two philosophers share similar intuitions, though in different ontological contexts. Secondly, I shall take up again the notions of perception and value as sources of openness and differentiation in every encounter. Thirdly, I shall articulate the ethical dimension of encounter through the existential field of desire, which opens the field of freedom.

Affectivity and Phenomenological Perception in Merleau-Ponty

In the introduction to *Phénoménologie de la perception*, published in 1945,⁷ Merleau-Ponty describes phenomenology as a philosophy of essences (*eidōs*) but in contrast to Husserl he sees this as based upon a consciousness rooted in actual existence. Hence, he proposes a rereading of Husserlian intentionality, no longer in the mode of a transcendental subjectivity as a consciousness "of" something linking the subject with the object, but as restoring the existing being in its openness to the world, that is, as "being-at-the-world". This directs his attention immediately to our embodied situation. However, to consider the thing which presents itself in intuited presence as an object and to catch its meaning is to consider the phenomenon in its ontological reality as a signifying or meaningful event.

Hence, inverting the method of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty stresses "reduction" with respect to intentionality, which is still a manifestation of consciousness. For Husserl reduction had been only an epistemological method by which he placed "in parenthesis" the world as a metaphysical object in order to see better the conditions belonging to the consciousness of something, namely, both the noematic side (the object *for* consciousness) and the noetic side (the subject as donor of meaning and aiming at the object as meaningful for consciousness).

In contrast, for Merleau-Ponty the "reduction" is an ontological method which enables one to see existence as "being-at-the-world". In particular, it allows one to see the very act of seeing our being-at-the-world, the phenomenality of the phenomenon of existence, that is, our openness to the world. At the same time, it enables one to see the world as the permanent horizon of our presence to things and to others. It seizes upon the point of view which we are, that is, as a center in terms of which things receive their meaning and orientate themselves with respect to each other. Things indeed appear to our vision under diverse profiles as they organize themselves for being seen; this constitutes them in their discrete (non-total) movement of appearing for the subject. This is a form of temporality in the process of its own constitution.

Thus, on the side of the perceived noematic object as well as on the subjective noetic side, signifying is always open on the life-world. Perception is thereby temporal and borne by its negativity or specificity. In the same way, others enable us to discover what exceeds our situated existence: if we do not see ourselves as others see us, we at least see them as seeing us. Thus vision is in principle reversible and narcissistic. One's body is relational and by articulating itself with the world constitutes effective lived existence. In this way the body is the center of differentiation, from which the world takes its sense.

As interpretative method, reduction thus enables one to see the intentional threads linking the existing being to the world as so many ties connecting the subject with its world. In perception the body appears as the central point of view in terms of the opening of the sense organs, but it is also a space-making point of view by grasping things with respect to each other and articulating them in the space-time field according to an orientation which begins from here; this sets them in the world which is the total horizon. In this sense, my body opens space and time while it depends upon something out there to orientate itself as a motor capacity. Generating space, it is able to move in a perceptive field which has sense and orientation. The differentiation of the five senses is itself an originating differentiation as one's own body layers one sense upon the other. Intersecting with each other, the senses slip from the concrete towards the abstract in such a way that to see a problem or seize a question manifests the perceptive field in the expression of all metaphoric meanings.

Toward an Ontology of Difference or "Flesh of the World": Perception and Value

The phenomenological analysis of perception is important because it leads to the institution of a new ontology. Merleau-Ponty situates the lived body not only as an effective, but as a feeling-being which is affected both actively and passively. The experience of the hand touching while being touched, at the same time wanting to feel itself while being affected by itself, reveals a reflexive circularity which remains always incomplete. That discovery will orient all of Merleau-Ponty's research in *Le visible et l'invisible*, published posthumously. This gives incomplete witness to an ontology which concretely is ensured by its teleological self-transcendence.

If the perceiving body is the differentiating or discerning of the senses, it is also their reflected and reflecting pole: the fact that things are appearing to it makes it embodied in the sense of being located with respect to them. *A fortiori*, this situation of embodiment is manifest in the openness of the body as expressive through gesture and word. The body thereby unfolds a field of meaning, in a way similar to the cycle of "feeling/being affected", which constitutes a perceptive return of things upon the perceiving body. Like a figure upon the background of the world, the lived bodiliness of the others reflects itself upon the speaking subject. At the level of affective perception, by mutual feeling or intropathy from its lived center the body lives the behavior of the other by a kind of connivance which interlaces my body with his or hers, and reciprocally, as if the bodies understood each other. However, they never succeed completely in this because the other being remains irreducible, as I am for myself, in the narcissic reflection of the signifying I. In the same way that the word of the other extends my gesture and proceeds to inhabit my self expression as in a "chiasmus", my expression escapes me in order to emerge as meaning for the other. It is visible because invisible, it goes out in the very act of being present. Just as the temporal now ceases to be in going ahead, it is always opening to new signification.

Thus, there is formed an actual interrelation, that is, a common belonging to the same sense or the same world: my perceptible gesture signifies my expressed word, and conversely. The expressive sense always goes ahead of itself displacing the actuality of what is signified by what remains untold in the expression whose sense is never exhausted. What is expressed in language always turns over onto itself in order to evoke a perpetual process of a meaning whose sense can never be totally expressed. In actual fact the word is voice and expression not only for the one who is uttering it, but also for the one who is listening to it; indeed, it can be said to listen to itself as if the expressive body is self-differentiated in each of its expressions. As a feeling-being which is affected in perceiving, it is both expressive voice and phenomenon heard. As a speaking subject,

it is an unceasing concrete recapturing of the sense present in language. Thereby the three meanings of the word "sense" as perceptive sense, as orientation of sense and as meaning meet each other as concrete and abstract in a reversible manner as the lived meanings of the body meet each other, coming reciprocally both from oneself and from the other, in intropathy and in expression through language.

It is at this level of understanding through gesture and language -- which opens living expressiveness to perception by the other in a kind of chiasmas -- that the intropathic, affective interplay of encounter can be understood. Perception is the discerning and differentiating dimension of one's own body; at the same time it manifests itself as gesture and word. The gesture takes up the word, just as the other in receiving my gesture is actively engaged in the word which he speaks in his way. In this relay of discourse as being always overcome, as if the exceedence of the perceptive sense finds the possibility of unfolding itself on symbolic grounds, there opens the invisible depth of what is perceived in language. As the voice makes itself into words addressed to somebody, we find at another level the movement of discerning and differentiating. Language is assumed into the visible -- into listening or into the material form of writing -- and differentiates itself as the invisible of the concrete meaning.

Thus, at the same time the perceiving body is active and passive; it is both being-affected and feeling itself in the shared differentiation which links one existing being to another through intropathy and the mediation of language. This originary, perceptive and affective awakening and openness conditions every encounter and actual communication. The distance which always is present is like the difference of the touching-touched of the hand or two fingers pressed together which touch and feel touched at the same time; it is like the relation between the senses of perception and expression, or like perception with respect to what is expressed in language: both are reversibility from the concrete to the abstract and inversely. This distance indicates a measuring or signifying foundation which always is at work and which exceeds itself in all its perceptive moments. Lived as differentiating the feeling-being affected and as a mutually felt or intropathic interrelational expression in language, perception is assumed in creating concrete and intelligible differentiation through its own overcoming: Merleau-Ponty calls it the "flesh of the world."

The body is the privileged form of this as it feels itself feeling in the actual reversibility of language. This structure of distance and differentiation lived as such by the body opens meaning at all the lived levels. It is the structure of a speaking subject, whose expression is taken up by the others in the differentiated field that is the world of culture. It is from this core of sense that the possibility of speaking in common arises, that the texture of the effective dialogue is constituted and that the differentiated poles of discourse become articulated as the power of the shared feeling-speaking by each person.

Desire and the Ethical Dimension of Encounter

The life-world -- which is transposed by Merleau-Ponty as the signifying and concrete reversibility he calls "flesh of the world" -- is the dimension in which cultural interrelations and the sense of other can be understood as mutually felt and in the expression of language. Hence, we must take up the problem of ethical encounter, which alone is able to situate "persons".

Here, the approach of Merleau-Ponty is contrary both to transcendental idealism which promotes the universality of pure subjectivity, and to scientific positivism which reduces the body to its material causality in the chain of the concrete elements for the unprejudiced onlooker. He has deconstructed the *a priori* subjectivity as well as the objectivity of a subject in itself, in order

to reproduce them through contact with others in cultural interrelations. It is in the proper field of their responsibility to each other from inside the institutional environment that each person must learn to act and to know oneself: one rises to one's personal stature through receiving oneself from the culture. This is not from things in themselves, but from the works which symbolize lived actions and reflect them to others in a common world.

It is thanks to the ontological differentiation, to the "flesh of the world," that this encounter is varied according to sense differences, which always are reversible and are continually revived in their incompleteness. The ever more differentiated manifestations which constitute the cultural ground allow for discerning others in their particularity. They give the "I" the capacity to receive itself both as *alter* for others and as *ego* in its identity. One learns to recognize oneself in one's own field, to take the initiative in one's actions, to confront oneself with the surrounding world and to assume one's proper responsibilities. That recognition of oneself as an other originates in the movement which is identified by the other as an "otherself"; it is a function of intropathy or mutual feeling and its affective derivatives. The recognition of the other occurs in encounter through initiating an essentially reversible process.

Thanks to desire the other appears to me in his or her otherness. This opens in the subject that temporal distance of objective differentiation which is always already supported by the lived affective interrelation. Desire is intrinsically "flesh" in the sense of differentiating distance in which concrete expressive bodiliness lives as a sign of its own overcoming. Desire embodies the reflexive movement of narcissistic bodiliness in search of itself in the *alter-ego*, that is, in the ever disappearing promise of a fully realized reflexion.

But whence does the intensity of desire arise? Does it belong to the language of the other, opening a presence which the living and desiring person tries to grasp in a bodily manner as an actually lived totality? Or does it belong more radically to "concern" in as much as the existence is "passage" (*Gewesen*) between birth and death? Desire gives rise at the same time to both directions. On the other hand, the values which are to emerge in life call to action the authentic liberty of the existing person in understanding him or herself in the temporal whole of his or her finite being. On the other hand, desire gives rise to the values of the past, which recall what was originally lived in terms of affectivity. Whatever be said regarding its affective modalities, desire aims to realize itself in the hope of a promise of which the other and the others implicitly hold the secret inasmuch as bear they that difference which enables things to have sense. However, if the other appears as borne by that whole which ensures its presence as other, he or she is not then a simple phenomenon.

Here we find the emergence of the ethical dimension of encounter. It is not only a cultural work or something founded interrelationally on presence in the world. Rather it is a matter of desire itself and not its effects. This is due to the fact that ethical encounter concerns another who is facing me; he or she no longer is only a phenomenon included in the expressive whole of cultural meaning or a simple datum, but is primordially "sense".⁸ According to Levinas, the other does not come from the horizontal meaning of the world of perception, but is a "visitation" out of context; "His manifestation is a surplus". He is a first word, an opening in the very openness of "face", an absolutely differentiating "trace" which announces the reception of an "absolutely" other.

The "epiphany" of the "face" is not a phenomenon, but an enunciation of an authentic existing being, bespeaking both the sense of being and its invisibility. Thus the respect for the other invites me to be more than myself; it urges me to recognize in him or her the infinite gift of being and invites me to affirm the excellence of his or her appeal.

In his interpretation of the encounter of the other, Levinas emphasizes an absolute difference in otherness as such; he does so by recourse to the presence of the Infinite as the absolute Other. But though difference is so radical as to leave no possibility of exchange or mediation Levinas can speak of the existing being as hostage. This is because, though the perspective of difference is an originary differentiation polarizing the same and the other as different, it does so in a common expression of lived bodiliness. This sets the "event" of presence as unique, which no conceptual synthesis is able to represent and which in such events as birth and death is of the absolute order of person.

The Ethics of Cultural Values

What then is the status of cultures and of cultural values? To be sure, they reflect the surrounding milieu from which proceed personal exchanges; certainly also, they always are interpreted in the collective experience which they inspire afresh. But it is always inside a group or more exactly in the exchange between persons that the mutual respect of the customs and of aspirations is located concretely as an ethical demand for recognition. This recognition inscribes itself along three ethical dimensions: (1) the subject as responsible for others in one's relation to oneself; (2) the other as recognized by me in his or her otherness, which is to say in his or her responsible liberty with respect to others; and (3) the cultural interrelation constituting the institution or "neutral third party" with respect to which the truth and efficacy of our concrete actions, as well as of social justice, can be constructed, justified and objectively measured.⁹

There are then no universal values which exist *a priori*, but only values stemming from concrete and differentiated experience in cultures. To be sure every tradition reveals, while repeating, the possibility of the *Desein* in its "to be as having been"; every existing being has "to be" as his or her destiny, by virtue of his or her power to be, and according to his or her choice, each time and in each situation.¹⁰ To live the tradition can take on different forms, all of which are supported by the experience of being-at-the-world. But in the last instance it is always the concrete existing being who performs acts, who lives them and is affected by them, even if those acts themselves can also become what Sartre called the "*pratico-inert*", that is to say, can have effects which go beyond the intentions of those who performed them.¹¹ In this way every existing being, as well as every culture, lives in the context of its own values. These delineate a plurality of human projects which intersect precisely in order, through diverse actions, to construct an ethical world. It is then through confluence in action that there emerges hope of recognizing the values of each culture. This is not to amalgamate their approaches into one, but to detect in each culture the surge toward values as the promise of a better world. As every culture bears its proper tradition, it is up to each to give life again to the intrinsic truth of its tradition and to bring out deliberately the most humanizing aspirations of that tradition. There is no common ground of a uniform mankind; there are only pluralities of ethical forms all working for the recognition of a humanizing fulfillment.

In the same way that historicity enables us to live in the present the temporal destiny of a whole existence, it permeates the history of the world in its emergence under different figures.¹² However, the genesis of the perception of values is parallel to the genesis of culture and of cultures. It has three successive moments, which reformulate the philosophical history of ethics and reverse what philosophy proposes to itself in its present state of second reflection.

1) Archaic societies operate in function of their universe of values located in a weakly differentiated collective interrelation, which Durkheim and Bergson called closed societies.

Institutionally they are static in the distribution of the respective roles of their members. It is the function which determines the individual.

2) But the dignity of the subject sets down the objective reality of the individuals with respect to each other according to a criterion of recognition which provides a foundation for the notions of respect and autonomy for the person. Liberty then is no longer linked merely to the political role and shared by "peers" who have access to the public world of the *agora* in the Greek sense of that term. Henceforth, it must be understood according to its ethical dimension: men recognizing each other as equal before the greatness of the law which they bear in themselves as practical reason. That is, the capacity for the subject to rise in his actions to a universal point of view,¹³ that is, to be responsible for his acts as human. The Kantian notion of respect, which probably was the first philosophical argumentation radically to denounce slavery, made it possible also to understand the equality of cultural forms, of races, and of sexes which the 20th century has tried to discover through critical reflection upon its philosophical and religious self understanding.

Resituating this in the perspective of metaphysics and of non-critical religious behavior, together with the scientific revolution and the discoveries of technology, can contribute to rethinking the genealogy of values. Abandoning its closed society, the West which had come to consider itself to be the mankind of universal reason, now discovers and recognizes the contributions of other cultures. And though the West claims for itself the prerogative of spiritual universality with regard to "human rights", it should be noted that those rights appear only in the course of a progressive awareness of the other in his or her otherness and hence in his or her proper culture. Interrelational differentiation is at work in the recognition by which everyone becomes a citizen of the world, but it is always against the background of a new otherness operative at the level of racial or sexual differences.

3) In fact, the discovery of subjectivity is recent; it is a contribution from beyond modernity which interprets critically the lived appropriation of subjectivity. The I is no longer *a priori* the rational subject, but is self in the light of customs and cultural interchange. The I who discovers itself as "oneself like any other" is relevant only to the universal rights of humankind in general. But we must ask if there is not a still more specific distinctiveness or identity relevant not to the simple universality shared by all men, but to a part of humankind whose recognition as properly personal is made possible only by their sexed affectivity. Thus the attainment of the human is not yet "personal" as long as it has not learned to recognize its own differentiation as constitutive of humanity.

The sexual difference is understood immediately as a relational truth, which is spoken in the reciprocal and constitutive openness of the two sexes, male and female, the one calling the other as the other of the self. This new interchange of "sense" makes it possible to rethink values from the interior of the differentiating dimensionality of the sexes for they can be understood constitutively only as relative to each other. This path of understanding oneself as personal interiority passes through the constitutive otherness of every person in his/her embodied being as incomplete, precisely as this is manifested at the edge of desire. As we have seen in the analysis of affectivity, this induces the proper character of differentiated recognition in one's lived bodiliness, and therefore in the context of a desiring sexuality.

Here the dimension of person is linked to the radical polarity which already is the sexed difference at the dawn of life, and which serves as the foundation of every human relation. As radical, it provides the foundation for the situation of the person as person, for the person is always relational with respect to the other sex and, thereby, to the truth of his/her whole behavior. But

beyond itself, beyond the very experience of sexuality which is only a sign of the person, the person is also the ultimate goal at which desire aims.

The modernization of values has taken account thus far of the cultural and racial differences of humanity in general, but it is on the way to becoming aware of the sexed difference which is the life of the senses. This is not only the meaning of actual sexual desire, but colors the whole of life with a correlative and reciprocal truth. Every project of a society of persons, be it a socio-political or a religious society, must be rethought in the light of the new awareness of the sexed difference. The hermeneutics of person has radicalized itself: the truth and action of the senses present themselves to us in their primordial reversibility, which is the sexed difference in its cultural multi-dimensionality.

Conclusion

Our project was to grasp in the affective interrelation of feeling and being affected, as well as in its expression in language, the ontological foundation of our living together, our life-world. It is on that basis that every encounter with others is constituted and that the different facets of life exist as concrete and meaningful participations. However, while mobilizing the actors in affective space, the ethical character of encounter belongs to a dimension which not only appeals to desire at the phenomenal level of lived perception, but realizes one's presence as unique. This is because the encounter is for the subject an infinite invitation based on the excellence of one's gift of existence. Desire surmounts itself by the requirements of its orientation towards others and thereby opens itself to the excellence of the gift of existence in the other which enables it to receive from the gift of being. Hence, to love signifies the search which is simultaneously both immanent and transcendent. This is supported by the creative gesture of an appeal or vocation addressed to the whole human community. In this light it can be seen that ethical value belongs not to the horizontal order of a single milieu as a life-world, but to the "flesh of the world" in as much as "creating difference" expresses an infinite transcendence of the senses.

Notes

1. M. Merleau-Ponty, "L'Orient et la Philosophie", in *Les philosophes célèbres* (Paris: L. Mazenod), p. 15.
2. M. Heidegger, *Etre et Temps* trad. français F. Vezin (Paris: Galliniard, 1986), [par. 72], p. 439; [par. 79], p. 447.
3. H.-G. Gadamer, *Verite et Méthode* (Paris: Seuil, 1976), p. 147.
4. P. Ricoeur, *Toi même comme un autre* (Paris: Seuil, 1990), pp. 388s.
5. E. Levinas, *Humanisme de l'autre homme* (Montpellier: Fata morgane, 1972), p. 37.
6. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible* (Paris: Golimord, 1964), p. 324.
7. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenologie de la perception* (Paris: Gollimord, 1945), pp. i-xv.
8. E. Levinas, *Humanisme de l'autre homme* (Montpellier: Fata morgane, 1972), p. 47.
9. P. Ricoeur, *Soi-même comme un autre* (Paris: Seuil, 1990), p. 264.
10. M. Heidegger, *L'Etre et le temps*, trad. français (Paris: Gallimard, 1986), [ch. 76], pp. 457s.
11. J.P. Sartre, *Critique de la raison dialectique* (Paris: Gallimard, 1960), pp. 323, 344, 369.
12. M. Heidegger, *idem*, p. 453.

13. E. Kant, *Les fondements de la métaphysique des mœurs*, trad. français (Paris: Delagrave, 1966), p. 159.

4.

An Axial-Interpretation of the Confucian Ethical Spirit

Shang Zhiying

In the morning, hear the Way: in the evening, die content! -- Confucius, *The Analects*

In China, there has been a "love-hate syndrome" regarding the tradition since the May 4th Movement in 1919. Here we mean by the term "hate" cultural radicalism, and by the term "love" cultural conservatism.

The May 4th Movement is very important as the symbol of the New Culture Movement which created the paradigm of anti-traditionalism in the modern history of Chinese culture. Its slogan was "Down with Confucianism" and its program was anti-tradition. The leader of the New Culture Movement, Chen Duxiu, strongly criticized the Confucian ethical code and introduced science and democracy from the West. Under his guidance *New Youth* became the leading periodical in which the radical intellectuals of the Movement attacked the Confucian tradition.

As opposed to Chen Duxiu, Liang Shaming and his book entitled *Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies* represented the tendency to save traditional culture, especially Confucianism. He proposed that the intellectuals lead the Chinese people to perfect Confucianism and that the future world culture be a revival of Chinese culture.

During the period of the New Culture Movement, Chen was the leading figure of cultural radicalism, and Liang the leading figure of cultural conservatism; both were embodiments of the Chinese cultural tradition. The attitude of anti-tradition (Westernization) manifested the essence of the Chinese tradition because in a sense it was the Chinese cultural tradition itself which determined the anti-tradition of the May 4th Movement.

The reasons for this are as follows:

(1) In traditional China there had been a practical spirit characterized by an eagerness for quick success and instant benefit. In its eager pursuit of short range concrete goals it rejected both the positive reasoning of science and the transcendental consciousness of religion. In the period of the Movement, the program which abandoned the Confucian tradition and drew upon Western culture issued mainly from short term concrete motives, not from ultimate or academic considerations. Since 1841 Confucian culture had been attacked by the sciences, and modern Chinese intellectuals came to realize that in the short term the Confucian tradition no longer could resolve the serious crises in China. Hence, they introduced with urgency Western culture on a large scale for the salvation of China.

(2) At that time radical intellectuals accepted Western culture with an urgent and open mind because they were influenced by the tolerant spirit of traditional Chinese culture. Traditional Chinese culture does not appeal to fanatical religious passions, but assimilates diverse alien cultures. In the history of world culture traditional Chinese culture has accepted and assimilated alien cultures more easily than do other cultural traditions. For instance, indigenous Confucian culture integrated Indian Buddhism. The same tolerant tradition enabled modern intellectuals to learn and accept Western culture.

In sum, since the beginning of this century several anti-traditional movements have ended by returning to the way of tradition which has formed "the collective unconsciousness" of the Chinese people. Tradition coexists with us and continues.

Hermeneutics

As it is impossible then to discard tradition from top to bottom, it would be wise to develop a new understanding of tradition. This would be to dialogue with the tradition creatively and to interpret it in a new perspective. Contemporary hermeneutics can provide a new method and the theoretical grounds for such dialogue and interpretation.

According to hermeneutics, tradition is the basic fact of our existence in the world. Both text and interpreter are involved internally in the tradition. It is then not a tool which we can use or arbitrarily lay aside; rather the value system which exists before us determines our horizon and forms the presuppositions of our understanding. In a sense, the understanding of tradition belongs to tradition and we live in this understanding of tradition; that is to say, everyone makes his or her value choice of tradition and reforms it according to this choice. Tradition is not the unchangeable matter which already has passed away, but the living existence which is continually reinterpreted. It is in tradition that history can approach us, and that we can understand tradition. Hence the so-called "hermeneutic circle."

For contemporary hermeneutics, tradition is a "prejudice" in the sense both of Heidegger's prestructure of understanding and Gadamer's historical elements of understanding. Gadamer considers prejudice itself to be not a negative element, but a legitimate and valuable starting point for the understanding of tradition.

Although to some extent an interpreter's horizons are determined by the tradition, they have their present horizon. We not only understand the present in the tradition, but also understand the tradition in the present. The interpretation of tradition, in fact, is a process in which the horizon is reframed and created, and in which the prejudice is tested and transformed in a fusion of present and past horizons. Thus, interpretation contains a subjective reconstruction, and produces a new horizon. The fusion of horizons is the aim of the interpretation of tradition and the result of a dialogue between the present and the past.

The main idea of the present paper consists in interpreting the Confucian tradition from the viewpoint of ethics, by means of the contemporary hermeneutics and in the frame of reference of modernization.

The Confucian Ethical Spirit: Its Nature and Development

Ethics is the core of Confucian culture which is grounded in the patriarchal society of ancient China. In ancient Chinese society moral principles pervaded the whole political system, shape values and norms of behavior, and formed the criteria for the evaluation of social behavior. Corresponding to this social character, traditional Chinese culture, and Confucianism in particular, highly develops the moral tradition; indeed Confucianism is basically a culture in which morality is central. Therefore, Confucianism regards ethical thought as its root, and the interpretation of the Confucian ethical spirit is of importance in understanding the characteristics of Confucian culture.

"The Confucian ethical spirit" proposed here as a working-concept is inspired by Max Weber's notion of the Protestant ethic as the basis of the capitalist system. Similarly, the Confucian ethical spirit as a value system, which consists in a way of life, an ethical code, values and moral

thought, etc., represents the ethos of Chinese culture and is fundamental to the interpretation of Confucianism. In sum, the world of Chinese culture coincides with its world of values. As for the deep structure, the system of values is the soul of the cultural system, with the former determining the latter. Weber's famous work, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, is a successful paradigm of axil-interpretation of the Protestant ethic, and in this spirit I will attempt a macro-interpretation of the Confucian ethical spirit as one integrated system, including the following three components:

- (1) the ethical thoughts produced by the Grand Confucian Masters (Confucius and Mencius) as a sub-system of moral thought,
- (2) the ethical codes which are associated with social life and individual conduct and are regulated by the ethical thought as a sub-system of social behavior; and
- (3) the structure of moral psychology which results from the sedimentation of (1) and (2) in the deep level of the mass mind through the long process of historical evolution and cultural integration as a sub-system of moral psychology.

Of course, we should pay attention to the differences and connections among the above three components in the axil-interpretation of the Confucian ethical spirit. We begin with an overall genealogical analysis of Confucian ethical thought, which generally speaking underwent three major stages of development.

(1) Confucius (551-479 B.C.) and Mencius (372-289 B.C.), primitive Confucian ethical thought: (a) the pattern of cosmo-ethics advocating that "Heaven and man accord with each other"; (b) the pattern of political ethics characterized by the unity of benevolence (*jen*) and propriety (*li*); (c) the goodness of human nature; (d) the theory of righteousness and profit: the Superior Man prefers righteousness to profit; (e) the ideal personality; and (f) the self-cultivation of the moral character.

(2) Dong Zhongshu (179-104 B.C.), Confucian ethical thought of the Western Dynasty: (a) discarding the Hundred School and respecting only Confucianism; (b) demonstration of the origin of moral principles from the points of view of moral theology: the Heaven of nature is attributed to the Heaven of morality, while the Heaven of Morality is attributed to the divine Heaven; (c) the three cardinal guides: the sovereign guides the subject, the father guides the son, and the husband guides the wife, along with the five constant virtues: *jen*, righteousness, *li*, wisdom, and fidelity as specified in the feudal ethical code.

(3) The Cheng Brothers, Cheng Hao (1032-1085 A.D.) and Cheng Yi (1033-1107 A.D.), Neo-Confucian ethical thought: (a) dualism of human nature: as man is endowed at birth with good and bad, so human nature is divided into the two parts: the nature of Heaven and the nature of earth of which the former is superior to the latter; (b) opposition between human desire and the Heaven principle; (c) asceticism, maintaining the principle of Heaven and repressing the desire of man.

Dong and both Zhu and the Cheng brothers deviate from the orthodox path of Confucius. On the one hand, the so-called Dong's Confucianism is actually a mixture of Confucianism, Taoism, Legalism, the Yin-Yang School and the five elements theory. His three cardinal guides, as an ultimate rule for the Chinese feudal ethical value, derive from the famous legalist in the Pre-Qin Dynasty, Han Fei and his three rules of service: the subject serves the sovereign, the son serves the father, and the wife serves the husband. On the other hand, Song Dynasty Neo-Confucianism

results from the syntheses of Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. Its doctrine of asceticism comes from Buddhism, whereas Confucius's and Mencius's ethical thoughts essentially have a stronger humanistic spirit and emphasize that the Superior Man should make unceasing efforts to improve himself. Both neither propose the three cardinal guides, nor advocate asceticism, but propose the plain living and true tradition of the Confucian ethic. This tradition and its ethos are the subject matter of the following axil-interpretation, according to the extant Confucian texts, *The Analects of Confucius* and *Mencius*.

In Chinese traditional society, all social relationships are based on consanguinity and family relationships; thus family morality determines social morality. Confucian ethics is first of all a family ethics. For example, Confucius said: "Filial piety and fraternal duty are the foundation of *jen*" (Xie Er, *The Analects*); Mencius held that "family is righteousness" (Li Lou Shang, *Jing Xin Shang, Mencius*).

The value system of Confucius and Mencius's ethical thoughts includes the following five aspects:

(1) A pattern of cosmo-ethics: this holds that Heaven and man are in accord with each other, and that the way of man coincides with that of Heaven. Its function lies in: (a) explaining the origin of morality as human nature originates from heavenly nature, knowing human nature equals knowing Heaven; and (b) describing a certain kind of human state: one should be subject to the will of Heaven.

(2) A pattern of political ethics: *Jen* is the prevailing moral principle of the Confucian ethic. Its value orientation directs the personal relationship to tend to the central harmony. *Jen* has two meanings: (a) to love members of one's family, and (b) to love everyone. The way to cultivate *jen* is conscientiousness and altruism, the practice of which is the same as the practice of *jen*. For Confucius, *li* contains the norms for behavior and the rules for social etiquette under the direction of *jen*. Obedience to *li* is likewise commitment to *jen*, the unity of which causes both personal relationships to be harmonious and the social order to be stable. This leads rulers to administer the affairs of state by means of *li* and virtues, which is the criterion for humane government.

(3) The goodness of human nature: Confucius said: "There is an affinity among human natures" (Yang Huo, *The Analects*). He seems to imply that the original human nature is potentially good. Mencius maintained clearly that *jen*, righteousness, *li* and wisdom are all inherent in humankind, rather than being imposed upon it from outside; thus human nature was good.

(4) The theory of righteousness and profit: (a) what is right, or moral obligations, is more important than what is profitable, or selfish desires; and (b) personal interests are subordinate to group interests.

(5) The ideal personality: Confucius believed that perfect virtue was the highest moral character; one could enter the realm of the ideal personality and become a sage and a man of virtue only if one acquired truth, appreciated the beautiful and practiced perfect virtues.

(6) The self-cultivation of moral character: the Superior Man should be concerned with the cultivation of proper thinking, the practice of introspection, the training of a virtuous mind and the "four-nots": not to adhere to one's opinions stubbornly, not to assert something groundlessly, not to consider oneself in the right, and not to disrespect another's opinions.

An Evaluation of the Confucian Ethical Spirit and Modernization

In evaluating the Confucian ethical spirit it would be superficial and unreasonable to negate entirely its value and that of traditional Chinese culture on the basis of the principles of Western morality and on the excuse of the needs of modernization.

(1) As mentioned above, the Confucian ethical spirit is a value system consisting of sub-systems of moral ideas, social behavior and moral psychology. For contemporary Chinese people, this ethical spirit has penetrated into the deep structures of their minds and melted into their collective unconscious, whereby they are the carriers of this tradition. Consequently, it is their destiny to be engaged with the Confucian ethical spirit. They can get access to the future only by going through tradition. Hermeneutics can provide a theoretical basis for the legitimacy of tradition and its positive, creative interpretation.

(2) The Confucian ethical spirit contains several value paradoxes. On the one hand, Confucius and Mencius state moral codes and norms of behavior which fit in with ancient Chinese society based on consanguinity and family relationships. These codes and norms represent local and negative aspects of the Confucian ethical spirit. On the other hand, as great philosophers who reflect the social conscience, they express the value of the life-world and the mission of human beings. These criteria and principles are universal and positive aspects of the Confucian ethical spirit. It is a very interesting phenomenon that the same ethical proposition implies both the negative and the positive value orientations at the same time in the Confucian ethical spirit, hence the following paradoxes.

Central family: (a) negative aspect: lack of a sense of private property and a dependent personality; (b) positive aspect: respect for elders and love for the young, and a strong sense of responsibility for family.

Heaven and man accord with each other: (a) negative aspect: man behaves in accordance with the will of Heaven; (b) positive aspect: love beyond the blood relationships (love everybody).

Conscientiousness and altruism: (a) negative aspect: the suppression of individuality; (b) positive aspect: the spirit of tolerance and devotion.

Central harmony: (a) negative aspect: looks down on the sense of competition; (b) positive aspect: promotes harmony in personal relationship.

Group consciousness: (a) negative aspect: represses the consciousness of subject and the will of individual; (b) positive aspect: objects to egoism, strengthens cohesion among people and advocates patriotism and collectivism.

Relationship between sovereign and subject: (a) negative aspect: loyalty to the sovereign; (b) positive aspect: the people are the foundation of the state.

Theory of righteousness and profit: (a) negative aspect: despises profit; (b) positive aspect: through the sense of righteousness, control of the desire for profit.

"Four-nots": (a) negative aspect: propagates restriction of the ego; (b) positive aspect: objects to egocentricity.

The self-cultivation of moral character: (a) negative aspect: underestimation of the importance of social practices for the self-cultivation; (b) positive aspect: training the moral will and a perfect personality.

From the above it is clear that these positive aspects which have universal value to the Chinese nation are good factors in the tradition which should be inherited and carried forward by the present people of China.

The Present Challenge to the Confucian Ethical Spirit

In the context of these value paradoxes the axil-interpretation of the Confucian ethical spirit acquires two important consequences: (1) discovery of the two-fold character (negative and positive) of the Confucian ethical spirit, and (2) explanation of the reason why the Chinese people can now carry forward the spirit. Here the key point is that inheriting the tradition presupposes its criticism; axil-interpretation is axil-criticism. The Chinese people criticize their own tradition in a process of self-transcendence which requires comparative research on the Chinese Western traditions.

In the beginning of this century, Max Weber analyzed the value of Confucianism in reference to the Protestant ethic, and pointed out that Confucianism has unfavorable personality factors for the rise of modern capitalism. There are eight such factors: (1) a lack of the tension between this-worldliness and other-worldliness, nature and God, moral order and human weakness, religious obligation and social reality, rationality and non-rationality; (2) tolerance of the idea of magic; (3) contentment with things as they are; (4) lack of the notion of a calling or mission (5) lack of the sense of prophecy in Christianity and its idea of original sin; (6) ancestor worship; (7) patriarchy; and (8) lack of formal rationality. Weber sees these factors as hindering the rise of capitalism in modern China.

However, the fact of the economic miracle of Japan after World War II, and in particular the high level of economic development in Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea indicate that modernization of the economy can be part of a Confucian culture. This spurs many scholars to reconsider the relationship between Confucian culture -- especially, the Confucian ethical spirit -- and modern capitalism, and some advance as a proposition the notion of "Confucian capitalism".

However, the meaning of this proposition is vague, because it is not clear whether it refers to the fact that the Confucian tradition or ethical spirit can adapt to the developments of capitalism and economic modernization in East Asia, or designates the view that modern capitalism can arise spontaneously in a Confucian culture, that is, whether modernization results from the practice of Confucian culture.

Even if it refers to the former we would note the two following points.

(1) The Confucian ethical spirit which can adapt to modernization is not the Confucian ethic as a whole, but the result of a horizontal fusion and creative transformation of tradition: it both discards the negative aspects in the value paradoxes of the Confucian ethic and carries forward the positive aspects.

(2) Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and the South Korea did not intend to popularize the Confucian ethic until they had achieved modernization of their economies. The popularization of the Confucian ethics, as a cultural policy, in fact, is intended to resolve the moral crisis that occurred from Westernization. According to a principle of hermeneutics, the same text can be interpreted differently in different interpretative contexts. Similarly, the Confucian ethical spirit has different values in different social situations and interpretative contexts. Thus, the understanding of the Confucian ethical spirit in a country which is modernizing is very different from that in a modernized country.

Therefore, in such modernized countries as Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and the South Korea, the realization of modernization is primary, and the popularization of the Confucian ethic is secondary. In other words, the former is the cause, whereas the latter is the effect. To

reverse this causal relation is naive, so that the contemporary New Confucianists' assertion that the Chinese people can achieve modernization by means of Confucianism is evidently impractical.

The choice of ethical values, depends on the fusion of the horizons of tradition and modernization.

Whether or not China can succeed in modernization, it is not the same as Westernization, and different traditions can develop different patterns of modernization. But as a social process which is distinguished essentially from traditional society, modernization has certain universal value standards, such as (1) knowledge: rational methods of sciences and the spirit of science; (2) politics: democracy and rule by law; (3) economy: competition, standardization and specialization of production, revolution of sciences and techniques are the major agents of economic development; (4) society, urbanization, bureaucratic administration, contractual association; and (5) mind: the full development of individuality, a spirit of self-realization, awareness of competition, and so on.

By contrast with these standards, the negative aspects in the Confucian ethical spirit conflict with modernization. In general and beyond doubt, the Confucian tradition as an integral complex of values has lost its charisma for Chinese society and the Chinese people at the present time. In the domain of ideologies, the normative role of Confucian ethical spirit has declined, but as a structure of moral psychology it still exerts an imperceptible influence on the masses of people. The value direction and norms of conduct fall into the state of anomie. In a word, Confucianism is being seriously attacked by modernization.

Confucianism has fallen into a profound crisis as a faith in values, but this does not mean that the value of the Confucian ethical spirit has disappeared entirely. The Confucian crisis is due to the fact that the Confucian ethical spirit contains inherent value paradoxes whose negative aspects conflict with modernization and have obstructed this process in China. What is called the crisis of Confucianism refers to the fact that the system of Confucianism as a value whole has disintegrated and lost charisma in the face of the shock of modernization. In order to get out of the above value paradoxes and crises, the Confucian tradition must dialogue with modernization and carry out a horizontal fusion and creative transformation in which a new ethical spirit, new outlook on values, and new moral norms can arise, and a new charisma can appear. No doubt, this is a very difficult task, but a comparative interpretation of value paradoxes in Confucian ethical spirit and value standards in modernization may open a channel for positive dialogue and creative transformation.

5.

On the Origin of Traditional Chinese Forms of Thinking

Fu Jizhong and Zhou Shan

Chinese culture has so long a history that its origins are shrouded in mystery. At present there are many extremely divergent views regarding the appropriate approach to the study of the origins of traditional Chinese form of thinking and their characteristics, none of which views prevails over the others. It is, as Lao Tzu described ancient Chinese philosophy of 2000 years ago, "in a state of drifting from place to place."

Here I would suggest that while Westerners attach great importance to deduction, the Chinese give priority to analogy. This is not what Westerners call scientific analogy, but has dialectics as a central factor so that it is characterized by creative thinking. Therefore, it might be said that the traditional Chinese form of thinking has dialectics as its core and analogy as its cover. Combining this with the Western tradition could create a new theory about the form of thinking which would answer to the needs of development in our times.

The Hieroglyph: The Beginning of the Traditional Form of Thinking

The choice of forms of thinking by the ancient Chinese took place at the same time as that of the creation of characters. Indeed, the creative process of the hieroglyph, called symbolically the father of birds and beasts by later generations, is itself the process of searching for and selecting the form of thinking.

From Painting to Hieroglyph

It is said that these earliest Chinese characters took the form of paintings. Each painting, representing a character, is not a patch-work pieced together from sketches, but an indivisible body. For the character 刀 (knife) the earliest painting looks like "刀", for the character 止 (end). In the course of engraving this sort of hieroglyph on the surface of bamboo boards or tortoise shells, people gradually found it rather inconvenient. To solve this problem, another kind of hieroglyph made up of lines arose. Take the same examples, the character 刀 was engraved as 刀, and the character 止 as 止. During long practice, the former was gradually transformed into the shape of 止 which is very much like the present character; the latter, into the shape of 火 which is also close to the present form. The hieroglyphs of that age were already extremely similar to current characters. At the time of Xia dynasty, about 4000 years ago, the Chinese characters were reaching maturity.

The first stage of character creation had undergone a very long period of some 20,000 years; starting from integral paintings it ended with hieroglyphs consisting of clear lines. This is also the first step taken by our ancestors in search of the form of thinking; it determined the formation of thought patterns for the following several thousand years. From that time the Chinese form of thinking gradually took the shape of the object referred to, and facts were described by names.

From Hieroglyph to Ideogram

The second step, the transition from hieroglyph to ideogram, was taken as soon as the elementary form of thinking had been selected.

Generally speaking, a hieroglyph consists of a single character. For example, the hieroglyph 身体 (body), indicates human sense organs like eye, ear, nose, etc., and limbs like legs and arms. Object refers to sky and earth, mountains and rivers, birds and beasts, insects and fishes, etc. 工 (manmade objects) represents utensils and clothes. But with the development of human knowledge, the hieroglyph became increasingly inadequate for the requirements of thinking. Therefore, from the elements of the hieroglyph there arose an entirely new type of character which is composed of a synthesis of two or more kinds of hieroglyph. This is what we now call an ideogram.

In essence, an ideogram is composed of a hieroglyph and in this sense, without the hieroglyph there would have been no ideogram. The difference between a hieroglyph and an ideogram consists in the fact that while the hieroglyph is always involved in a name which usually indicates a single object and contains no other meanings than that of the object referred to, an ideogram is a kind of character which expresses a certain relation between objects. Certain dramatic changes take place when some hieroglyphs are bound together to produce a new type of character. In other words, what is displayed by the transition from hieroglyph to ideogram is a certain relation between objects or some kind of phenomenon. For instance, the ideogram 璞 (jade) is made up of several the hieroglyphs: 山 mountain, 璞 jade, 人 human being, 木 wood, and 筐 basket. It forms the following symbol with the symbolic meaning: on the mountainside there is a person who holds up a wooden stick to strike away and then puts it in the basket. Another example is the character 铸 forge which is composed of the hieroglyphs 手 hand, 缶 pot, 炉 stove, and 火 fire and appears as the form of symbolizing that a pot held by two hands was being heated on the fire.

Hieroglyphs as components of ideograms very often are given meanings which as single characters they do not possess. For instance, the character 武 military is composed of two hieroglyphs, 止 end which look like a foot and 戈 dagger, axe, whereas as a component of has the sense of walking. In this way the character 武 signifies a person walking with a dagger axe on his shoulder, from which derives the meaning imposing or powerful. If it be supposed that a hieroglyph comes from imitation of the shape of the object, it can be inferred that ideograms whose meaning can be understood by the composite structure of independent hieroglyphs reflect the beginning of generalization and abstraction from concrete things and specific circumstances. If the analogy is made properly the object referred to will be seen clearly.

As the transition from specificity to generality is a big leap by human beings in the course of understanding the world, the development from hieroglyph to ideogram is a major breakthrough as regards the form of thinking of our ancestors. By the analogical method it enabled traditional thinking to grow more and more solid.

Ideography and Analogy

Ideograms may generate all sorts of images according to the structure of the characters, as well as the broad association which often prompts one ideogram to acquire several new meaning associations through analogy. As noted above, this differs from scientific analogy in the Western mind which focuses on consistency for the reasoned connection between different objects. Furthermore, this does not necessarily reflect a general law but only one aspect of objects, that is to say, the resemblance between some objects on one point. Hieroglyphs play an active role as media for such associations. The character 幕 dusk is an example. Its archaic form looks like a sun

hanging over an expanse of thick forest, which is likely to remind one of a sunset as the sun approaches the West and is likely to lead people to think of reaching old age. Thus, the character 幕 has acquired two different meanings: the original meaning refers to early evening when the sun is just setting. Thus, it can be connected with other characters to form such phrases 日暮 as the waning of a day, 幕色 twilight. The analogical meaning indicates being close to the end of one's time, and can be linked to other characters to produce such phrases as 幕年 old age, 幕春 late spring, 幕气 lethargy, etc. Though 幕 has two distinct meanings they are connected in a certain point through the objects to which they refer.

It is because ideograms may cause associations which make it possible for people to use analogical inference that ancient Chinese philosophers paid great attention to analogical forms of thinking. The ancient Chinese philosopher, Confucius, regarded as important the task of cultivating the mental power of association and it is no wonder that one of his students, Yan Hui, who could know other things from those he had learned became his favorite disciple.

Anyone who thinks with hieroglyphs and ideograms invariably will adopt an analogical form of thinking. This is the basic reason why from the very beginning the Chinese took analogy as their basic form of thinking.

Zhou Yi: The Birth of the Dialectical Form of Thinking

Anyone who holds the view that the Chinese analogical form of thinking is derived from the hieroglyph and ideogram will surely agree that the Chinese dialectical form of thinking originated from *Zhou Yi*, the first symbolic deductive system in Chinese history. The appearance of *Zhou Yi* marks the birth of the Chinese dialectical form of thinking, and its prominent position in the whole of traditional Chinese culture helped this form of thinking to become a tradition.

The Ideogram and the Double Divination Symbols

It is agreed universally that *Zhou Yi* was produced during the Yin period or the Zhou dynasty. But no evidence discovered thus far enables one to fix the time or the person who began the 64 double and the eight singular divination symbols made up of three primitive symbols in the symbolic system. It is a still more puzzling mystery as to how these singular divination symbols and double divination symbols were invented. Consequently, it seems useless for some people to seek evidence of their creation from ancient divinatory activity.

The eight singular divination symbols are composed of three primitive symbols and every singular divination symbol imitates a category of things. Some of the symbols bear a resemblance to the object referred to by the hieroglyph. For instance, as the divination symbol *kan* 坎 refers to water, which symbol is similar to hieroglyph (water), it is quite natural for some to argue that this divination symbol comes from hieroglyph. As another example, divination symbol *qian* 乾 takes the form of which designates heaven and has much resemblance to the hieroglyph 天 heaven. This led some scholars to assume that it stemmed from the controversy as to whether the divination symbol is the source of the hieroglyph or vice versa which has lasted a very long time without definite conclusion. From the epistemological point of view, they seem to be the product of the same historical period and consequently the problem of what follows and what precedes does not exist. The hieroglyph imitates some concrete objects, and in the same way the singular divination symbol came by abstraction from some divination symbol/primitive symbol categories of objects,

e.g., a singular divination symbol stands for heaven and earth, thunder and wind, water and fire, mountain and river and has the purpose of summarizing natural phenomena. In reflecting family relations, they stand for father and mother, elder son and daughter, second son and daughter, youngest son and daughter. Likewise in order to represent the parts of the human body, they stand for head, abdomen, foot, buttocks, eye, ear, hand and mouth. This system classifies everything in the world only by means of eight singular divination symbols. Obviously, this method of classification with the category as its basis is more systematic and abstract than that a hieroglyph. The difficulty in deciding the origin of divination symbols is that after 10,000 years of history they probably are too remote from the present age.

At the time when our ancestors started to invent ideograms of complex shapes and various meanings by combining hieroglyphs indicating singular objects, they also began to join singular divination symbol in order to continue the process of summarizing the law of nature. Just as the creation of an ideogram indicates the end of the process of recognizing objects in isolation and the development of the art of discerning the relation between them, so the appearance of the double divination symbols signifies mankind's grasp of the law of origination and development within objects. The ordinal arrangement of the six four double divination symbols of *Zhou Yi* indicates the beginning of the mature stage of comprehension of the regularity of the objective world and the elementary establishment of a basic form of thinking. The double divination symbols and the hieroglyph originated from the same source and at the same time: the Xia dynasty. As for *Yi*, an innovation of *Zhou Yi* by Zhou emperor Wen, the question of whether it was only a rearrangement of the 64 double divination symbols in an ordinal sequence or whether, apart from that, some other changes, like adding statements to its symbols, were made remains to be settled through further archeological research.

From Analogy to Dialectics

The form of thinking adopted by *Zhou Yi* clearly shows two major characteristics of the traditional form of thinking: analogy and dialectics.

Analogy is one of the most outstanding features of *Zhou Yi*. A double divination symbols can be divided into two singular divination symbols, the upper and the lower, each singular divination symbol consisting of three primitive symbols. An analogy is constituted by the relationship between the things that the two singular divination symbols imitate. For instance, the divination symbol *yian* (salty) is the lower singular divination symbol is called *can* 坎 which looks like a mountain, but also like a boy; the upper singular divination symbol is called *dui* 兑 which imitates both rivers and girls. By analyzing the double divination symbol it seems quite natural for us to reach the conclusion that a boy courts a girl. One cannot make a mistake if one conducts one's life in accordance with this law: it is a good fortune if the boy marries the girl. The double divination symbols is named *xian* 咸 (saltiness) and the character *xian* 咸 can be obtained by taking away character *xin* 心 (heart) from character *gan* 感 (feel). This fact can be easily explained as: the boy expresses his love for the girl with all his heart and sincere affection. But as from another viewpoint the lower singular divination symbol represents a mountain and the upper singular divination symbol a river, we can arrive at an entirely different analogical inference: trees and grass are flourishing on the mountain because there is no lack of water: the mountain and the water show their verdant beauty, rather than being barren and bleak.

Each of the 64 double divination symbols is assigned a certain law of origination and developments about one category of objects. The statement following each divination symbol is a

sort of illustration made by ancestors to clarify the implication of symbols so that analogical inference can be performed and puzzling mysteries solved. Thenceforth, the Chinese form of thinking with analogy as its feature tended to be accepted by more and more people.

Apart from analogy, the divination symbols and statements of *Zhou Yi* were endowed also with the quality of dialectics of eight singular divination symbols. Except divination symbol *qian* (heaven) and divination symbol *kun* (earth), the rest of the six are formed by both positive and negative primitive symbols to set up a pattern embracing both negative and positive elements. Of these six singular divination symbols, the one with more negative primitive symbols is called negative divination symbol and the others are called positive. The dialectical thinking in these symbols is buried deeply in primitive symbols, and made manifest through the different positions occupied by primitive symbols as well as by their different relationships. The dialectical form of thinking is unveiled in the statements attached to them. In performing this sort of analogy, the ancient people actually were employing dialectical methods to ascertain the law of origination and development; thus they turned analogy into a sort of inference for comprehending or grasping the essence of objects.

The Dialectical Form of Thinking in Zhou Yi

From its divination symbols and the statements of *Zhou Yi*, we can see that as early as 2000 years ago, the ancient Chinese were aware of the dialectical form of thinking.

Firstly, there was the recognition of the law of the unity of opposites. The ancients employed positive and negative elements in the primitive symbols in *Zhou Yi*'s deductive system to build up 64 double divination symbols. Except for divination symbol heaven and divination symbol earth, which are made up of positive or negative primitive symbols, this pattern shows that the genesis of any object is a result of a struggle between positive and negative elements. Everything contains the two opposite aspects of a contradiction. These not only oppose each other because of their negative and positive quality, but also coexist within the same object on account of their opposition.

Apart from that, *Zhou Yi* makes a full demonstration of all sorts of relations of opposite aspects inherent in an entity. He points out profoundly that every such relation not only is restricted by the entity but conversely effects the nature of the entity. For instance, on the one hand, every negative or positive primitive symbol is related to the adjacent primitive symbol and produces a different effect if the neighboring primitive symbol is different. On the other hand, the two correspondent primitive symbols being opposite in nature stand for good luck: otherwise, it usually means ill luck. Both the proportion of positive primitive symbol to negative primitive symbol and the position of a primitive symbol in a divination symbol have profound effect upon its nature. For instance, the first three primitive symbols of divination symbol *tai* 泰 are positive; the remaining three are negative. This suggests that negative and positive qualities are not well-fitted in an object and therefore it is unlikely to grow soundly. Although the opposed relation of the contradictory aspects of a thing is described in a somewhat primitive manner, thus far no other book has ever given the movement of contradiction in a thing so systematic and full a description as *Zhou Yi*.

Secondly, we will discuss the theory that good luck and ill luck are mutually dependent and that weal and woe are inseparable. In *Zhou Yi* there is neither absolute good divination symbol nor absolute bad divination symbol. For example, all the statements of divination symbols, *gua* 卦, *kun* 坤, *tun* 屯, *ling* 零 and *tai* 泰, belong to the lucky type, while those of divination symbols *song* 讼, *pi* 否, *bo* 剥, *kai* 开 and *gu mei* 归妹 are attributed to the unlucky type. But

the lucky divination symbol contains unlucky factors, and the unlucky divination symbol contains lucky ones.

Lastly, there is the theory that anything developed to its extremity invariably will turn into its opposite. In fact the character *yi* 易 means change and hence *Zhou Yi* is about the universal law of change. The outcome of the struggle of contradictions within objects is necessarily a conversion to the opposites. But change is a gradual process from quantitative change to qualitative change, from the negative extremity to the positive, and from the extreme positive to the negative. This is not only the end point of a former process, but also the starting point of a subsequent one.

Throughout *Zhou Yi* one can see the role played by this law of change. For instance, divination symbol *qian* 乾 discloses the development of a healthy power from weak to strong by way of the description of a dragon from plunging into the abyss to flying in the sky. At the same time it reveals the law of change by an analysis of the fact that a virtuous man who for a long time has served in a high office often finds it difficult to stay on. Another instance is divination symbol *pi* 否, which symbol is made up of the singular divination symbol *kun* (earth) at the lower position and *qian* (heaven) at the upper position, meaning that heaven stays high and earth exists below. This explanation is consistent with natural phenomenon, but this consistency makes it an unlucky symbol, because the negative primitive symbol signifying a sinister tendency is in its growing stage, while the positive basic unit indicating righteousness has attained its climax and therefore is gradually weakened by the negative primitive symbol. On the other hand, primitive symbol upper-nine shows the law of extremity turning into its opposite. In traditional Chinese culture there is a saying that a peaceful situation follows upon one that was turbulent, which is a summary of this law.

(The last instance is divination symbol *ji qi*, the sole symbol of the sixty four double divination symbols in which all the primitive symbols are well-fitted and whose double form seems immaculate. Hence, it is given the name "*ji qi*", which means that its merits and virtues are perfect. But it is just the perfection that makes it turn to the opposite. Therefore primitive symbol upper-six expresses the disaster of being drowned at the time of crossing the river.)

From the above examples we can see that the dialectic was refined in the course of the study of *Zhou Yi*, and thus evolved into a tradition.

The Effect of Dialectics on Traditional Philosophy

It would not be going too far to say that the Chinese traditional form of thinking, which take analogy as form and dialectics as kernel, had already taken shape by the time of the appearance of *Zhou Yi*. The dialectical form of thinking has governed the direction of the development of the entire traditional Chinese culture. The philosophical thinking of ancient Chinese scholars is largely inspired by the study of *Zhou Yi*. Their way of analogical thinking and their capability in dialectical thinking for the most part were formed and improved under the impact of the annotation of *Zhou Yi* and by the discussions between the different opinions in its regard.

Confucius was one of earliest scholars to study *Zhou Yi*. He worked exceedingly hard on it, for he felt that the study of *Zhou Yi* could so guide people as to avoid serious errors. Dealing with forms of thinking, he very much approved of the analogical method demonstrated in *Zhou Yi* and consequently required his disciples to be equipped with the inferential ability to know three things from the one thing learned. He once warned his disciples in a class: "If some one cannot gain insight into three other related things from the one thing, I will teach him no more." Under his rigid training, the most excellent disciple could infer ten things from one thing by the analogical method.

Lao Tzu, the founder of Tao School (though there is no historical record of his having studied *Zhou Yi*), is the author of *Nature and Intelligence (Tao Teh King)*, the first masterpiece in Chinese history which shows clearly the influence of the dialectical form of thinking of *Zhou Yi*. Lao Tzu described thus the sequence of the origin of species in *Nature and Intelligence*, based on the principle of the formation of divination symbols in *Zhou Yi*: "Nature first begets one thing, then one thing begets another, the two produce a third. In this way, all things are begotten." According to the painting of divination symbols in which the positive and negative primitive symbols are combined, he also interpreted the law of the unity of opposites in the following manner: all things are pervaded by two alternating tendencies, that toward completion and that toward initiation; acting together, they complement each other. For the painting of divination symbols Lao Tzu used concrete things to bring out the subtle and implicit significance.

Indeed, all distinctions naturally appear as opposites, which get their meaning from each other and find their completion only through each other. The meaning of "is" and "is not" arises from our distinguishing between them. Likewise, "difficult and easy", "long and short", "high and low", "loud and soft", "before and after" -- all derive their meaning from each other. By divination symbols and statements added to them, *Zhou Yi* embodies the dialectical thought that good luck is closely related to ill luck, and weal is inseparable from woe. To express his approval of this thought, *Lao Tzu* said: "Happiness depends upon little, and misery depends upon much."

The dialectical theory of the conversion of the opposites in a contradiction is reflected in *Zhou Yi* by divination symbols and the statements. Lao Tzu applies this theory to many fields such as sociology, politics, ethics, and states: "Submit to Nature if you would reach your goal. For, whoever deviates from Nature's way, Nature forces back again; whoever gives up his desire to improve upon Nature will find Nature satisfying all his needs; whoever finds his desires extinguished will find more desires arising of their own accord; and whoever desires little is easily satisfied; whoever desires much suffers frustration."

He believed also that dialectics is the sole criterion for the observation of the world. Therefore, the intelligent person is at one with Nature and so serves as a model for others. He took up this criterion to sum up what happens in the world: The tougher fighters are more likely to be killed, and the harder trees are more likely to be cut down; therefore it is better to be soft and weak than to be hard and tough. On the basis of this principle, he suggested a series of scientific ways of dealing with various problems: the purpose of contracting (returning to Nature) is served by the expanding (emerging out of Nature in the first place); the purpose of weakening (subsiding or satisfying desire) is served by strengthening (arousing the will to live); the purpose of decline (of individual self-assertion) is served by arising (of individuality); and the purpose of taking away (culminating or perfecting life) is served by being given (it is the last of life for which the first was made). Simply speaking, Lao Tzu was inspired by *Zhou Yi* to set up a comparatively mature method or logical system of dialectical thinking and therefore became one of most outstanding philosophers in ancient China.

On the other hand, the dialectics of Lao Tzu is not perfect, but has some mistakes. For instance, he drew some arbitrary, absolute conclusions from the rule of the conversion of extremes. He says: He who is genuine is not artificial; who is artificial is not genuine. He who is intelligent is not quarrelsome; he who is quarrelsome is not intelligent. According to this theory, he further suggested such political propositions as evading secular events and establishing small countries with small populations.

During the time of the warring states, against the background of the contention of a hundred school of thought, the form of thinking of *Zhou Yi* was first widely adopted. Analogy not only

became the basic way of inference for dialecticians to express their academic views and political position, it also was summed up by Hui Shi, the leader of Ming School, and Han Fi, the leader of Fa School in theory and defined as the way of enabling one to know by likening what he does not know to what he has known. The dialectical form of thinking was chosen by dialecticians as the best approach to express their thoughts. Some famous dialectical propositions like "the heaven and the earth are on the same height and the mountain and the river are on the same level" indicate their basic outlook regarding the outside world.

In the early Qin dynasty, not only philosophers whose principal concern lay in abstract theories were much affected by *Zhou Yi*, but also pragmatic strategists and medical doctors were influenced, giving rise to the systematic military theory and medical theory represented by "The Tactics of Sen Tzu".

Chinese traditional culture was governed and affected by philosophy in the early Qin dynasty. It is from *Zhou Yi* that such pioneers of this philosophy as Confucius and Lao Tzu drew the primitive dialectical thought with which to build their philosophical system. This prompted a distinct Chinese form of thinking to mature and finally to become a tradition which has lasted 2500 years. The origination and formation of the traditional form of thinking took several thousand, even ten thousand, years to develop. Being the traditional pattern which has determined the direction of Chinese culture for more than 2000 years, whether it should be replaced by a new form of thinking or should retain its role in governing the development of Chinese culture is a serious question which requires study and an answer.

6. **Some Contemporary Reflections on Science and Religion**

Arnold Sprenger

Introduction

It was most unfortunate for China as well as for a promising East-West cultural exchange that Western science was not allowed to take root in China during the late Ming and the early Ch'ing dynasties. Thus the worldwide scientific revolution of the 19th and 20th centuries caught China largely unprepared and caused tremendous social and cultural upheavals. Academic discussions on the problem of modernization in China fill entire libraries.¹

The importance of modern science is commonly recognized in China today. What Matteo Ricci, Adam Schall² and their collaborators set out to do 400 years ago now is taken for granted. Modern science is no longer "Western Science", but has become part of mankind's fundamental equipment on its march into the future. It has become an important element with regard to cultural exchange on a worldwide scale. It is seen as a means to provide a better future for man, and should be considered a fitting instrument in humankind's common search for truth. As such it demands radical openness on the part of humankind.

In the face of the problems of modern man, there should no longer be any talk about scientific superiority, but about cooperation between East and West towards a common horizon with regard to the concept of science, its possible applications, as well as its limitations.³ In the following we shall discuss these ideas in some greater detail and formulate some suggestions as to what to concentrate on in future common efforts.

Science Through Time

Modern science, which originated in Europe, has become world science. It follows that historical, philosophical, and critical studies of science are or should be of universal interest. The history and genesis of modern science still await elucidation. Fortunately, the many distorted and ideological views on the history of science and religion, so rampant during the period of Enlightenment and in the 19th and 20th centuries, are giving way to solid research into these subjects. This has made manifest three important factors.

First, more recent studies point to the fact that the new sciences emerged through the reasoning and discoveries of many brilliant scholars in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance based upon the conviction of an ordered universe based upon a wise creation. Reference can be made here only to this religious conviction of some of the better known scientists.

Copernicus related his scientific activities and his Christian faith. "During his 40 years as canon, Copernicus faithfully served his Church with extraordinary commitment and courage. . . . Copernicus pursued his science with the sense of 'loving duty to seek the truth in all things, in so far as God has granted that to human reason.'"⁴ Stanley L. Jaki reasons along similar lines when he writes: "As a Christian, Copernicus firmly believed that the world was not a self-explaining entity. His Christian faith told him that the ultimate explanation of the world could only be found in the wisdom and will of the Creator."⁵

As a devout Christian, Kepler was convinced "that God had a master plan when he created this orderly, beautiful and mathematically perfect world. . . . God's plan is discovered in the mathematical laws he has provided."⁶ His relentless search for scientific truth reflected the devotion of a committed Christian. His sense of order and harmony was intimately linked with his theological understanding of God the Creator.⁷

Galileo was known to be a faithful believer and loyal member of the Church. "Galileo himself was a devout Catholic and found no conflict between his scientific and religious beliefs. God is the author of nature as well as the author of Scripture, the two sources of knowledge cannot conflict."⁸ Hummel maintained that Galileo's trial has been widely misinterpreted and used as a weapon against the Church. He comes to the conclusion: "Galileo was both a pioneering scientist and a practicing Christian. His experience can point the way for those in current conflicts who wish to maintain the integrity of both science and the Bible."⁹

Second, serious studies in the history of the sciences have brought to light the fact that the birth of modern science was a process started in the Middle Ages.¹⁰ The scientists of the Renaissance were deeply religious and based their scientific and cosmological reasoning on the rationality of a personal Creator-God, a concept which had been developed centuries before the new science took shape.

In his article, "Celestial Perfection from the Middle Ages to the Late Seventeenth Century," Edward Grant takes up important aspects of cosmology and astronomy that were vividly discussed by such scholars as Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), John Duns Scotus (1265-1308), John Buridan (1295-1358) and Nicolas of Oresme (ca. 1320-1382), the Coimbra Jesuits and many others. Grant suggests that "despite the general acceptance of Aristotle's cosmology by natural philosophers in the Middle Ages, they would eventually challenge all of these claims. Indeed, the divinity of the heavens never formed part of medieval cosmology because it was incompatible with the Christian faith."¹¹

Thomas Aquinas, though a genius in philosophy, made hardly any memorable steps along the road of science. Yet, Jaki argues,

It was no small matter to lead, as a new Moses, the mind out of its Averroist enslavement to Aristotle by correcting the Stagirite on at least three crucial issues, the existence of a transcendent God, the creation out of nothing, and the freedom of man rooted in the immortality of his soul." Jaki then suggests that the work of Newton and Einstein was steeped in an epistemology akin to the one applied in Aquinas' natural philosophy.¹²

Third, studies on the history and genesis of our modern sciences must be accompanied by serious efforts to understand the scientific enterprise from all possible viewpoints. We need a philosophy of science which should itself be scientific, hypothetical as well as self-consciously critical, human as well as rational, skeptical and undogmatic, while also receptive to discussion of first principles. All serious academic disciplines need each other in philosophical studies of the sciences. Not only can we find help across disciplinary boundaries of content (physics, chemistry, biology, ethics, etc.), of approach (history of science and logic of science), and of presuppositions (metaphysical, antimetaphysical and dialectical), but also across decades, centuries, even epochs and civilizations.

In the West interdisciplinary research is done on such topics as, e.g., science and theology in medieval Islam and the Latin West. It is expected that these studies will be helpful to late 20th and early 21st century specialists in scientific methods and concepts. Another ambitious research

project deals with historical and philosophical studies of Japanese science. Needham's published results of his very intensive research on the great scientific and technological achievements in China are now well known and appreciated.

In recent years an excellent dictionary on "Bioethics"¹³ has been compiled which not only discusses the problems of bioethics in relation to the fields of biology and ethics, but also from such points of view as philosophy, psychology, linguistics, religion and others. In addition, historical aspects of these problems are taken into consideration: questions of bioethics (as e.g. the relationship of body and soul, the meaning of life and death, genetic and environmental influences on the behavior of man, the relationship between the two sexes, abortion, etc.) are traced back to thinking and practices in such classical periods as Egyptian, Babylonian, Judean, Greek and Roman, as well as the Eastern classical traditions: Confucian, Hindu, Buddhist, Taoist, etc.

All three points offer new perspectives on modern problems and may be of great help in modern man's search for possible solutions to his problems. But a number of challenges remain.

It has been stated that modern philosophy of science has turned out to be a Pandora's box. Once the box was opened by independent critical minds puzzling monsters appeared. Not only was the neat structure of classical physics changed (partly by philosophical analysis within physics), but a variety of wide-ranging questions were let loose. The philosophy of science could not help but become epistemological and historical. It could no longer avoid metaphysical questions, even when they were posed in disguise. Once the identification of scientific method with that of physics had been queried not only did biology and psychology come under scrutiny as major modes of scientific inquiry, but so did history and the social sciences, particularly economics, sociology and anthropology.

This trend raises anew a much older question, whether the conception of science is to be distinguished from the wider conception of learning and inquiry. Is modern science to be seen as matured reason, or is it simply one historically adopted and limited species of reasoning -- of Western reasoning at that?

This latter question brings us to a host of questions. What does history reveal about the conception of science not only in the West, but also in the East? When and where did man begin to reflect on his cultural activities? When and how has the concept of science developed and how was it refined throughout the history of humankind? Why is the term "science" in its strict sense applied only to the search for knowledge during the last centuries, and particularly in the West? Is scientific knowledge in this particular sense the most important knowledge of and for man, or are there other equally important types of knowledge as well as different avenues for gaining such knowledge? What are the philosophical presuppositions for the classical sciences and what are the philosophical presuppositions for human knowledge as exhibited in the great ancient cultures?

A question that has occupied the minds of many people interested in the history of civilization is why classical science was developed in the West and not in the East with its long cultural traditions and great civilizations? In particular, why did the Chinese fail to develop modern science? Jaki feels that Needham comes close to an answer to this question when he indicates that for the Chinese there was certainly order in Nature, but that it was not an order ordained by a rational being. Hence that there was no conviction that rational personal beings would be able to spell out in their lesser earthly languages the divine code of laws which had been decreed aforetime.¹⁴ Jaki himself suggests that the predicament of China, both ancient and modern, is an eloquent though tragic witness to the need for natural theology if science is to flourish.¹⁵

In several of his publications. Liu Xiaofeng takes up the challenge of this "predicament" or "dead end" in the cultural history of China and comes to results that go far beyond mere cultural

issues. Lack of belief in a personal rational God is blamed for many problems China encountered in the process of modernization.¹⁶

We could continue to raise questions of a similar nature. The foregoing discussion makes one thing crystal clear: 400 years after Matteo Ricci and Adam Schall, East and West can no longer afford to go their own ways; scientific cooperation in the sense discussed is a simple must.

Religion for Today

Looking at humankind in its historical evolution and its march towards the future, we are inclined to suggest that two revolutionary forces have shaped mankind more than any other forces: science and religion. A.N. Whitehead seems to voice his support of these when he writes: "When we consider what religion is for mankind, and what science is, it is no exaggeration to say that the future course of history depends upon the decision of these general forces (apart from the mere impulses of the various senses) which influence man."¹⁷

Hardly anyone will deny that modern science has changed the world: this is patent to our senses. One must look deeper to see how religion shapes or could shape modern man's worldview. Religion has to do with man in his totality as he searches for meaningful and assuring answers to the most fundamental questions of his existence:

Men look to the various religions for answers to those profound mysteries of the human condition which, today as in olden times, deeply stir the human heart: What is man? What is the meaning and the purpose of our life? What is goodness and what is sin? What gives rise to our sorrows and to what intent? Where lies the path to happiness? What is the truth about death, judgement, and retribution beyond the grave? What, finally, is that ultimate and unutterable mystery which engulfs our beings, and whence we take our rise and whither our journey leads us?¹⁸

Confronted with today's worldwide problems, modern man in his anxiety poses anew and in a rather radical way all the age-old questions raised above. However, he is no longer content with prefabricated answers. Modern man has tasted all kinds of food offered to him by a variety of rational and irrational philosophies and by various humanisms, but his appetite for spiritual values has not been satisfied. Modern man is searching for answers that will restore his human and personal dignity and provide meaning for his entire existence in a technological, inhuman world:

The question is: How will the content of our cultural heritage be preserved under the conditions of the age of Technology and the reorganization of the whole human community? How shall we preserve the infinite value of the individual, the dignity and rights of man, the freedom of the spirit, the metaphysical experiences of the millennia?

The specific question of the future, however, which conditions and includes everything, is how and what man will believe. Man cannot live without faith. For even nihilism as the opposite pole to faith, exists only in relation to a possible, but denied, faith.¹⁹

There is a new interest in religious issues, a new search for God. In fact, it is our belief that in view of the great problems and dangers of our age, religious questions promise to be the most burning issues for decades to come.

In his book *Does God Exist?* Hans Küng deals with our problem in a rather extensive and convincing way. He raises man's perennial question: Where can I find the certainty upon which I can build all human certainty? He checks critically into the major thought streams and thought systems of our modern age and comes to the conclusion that only a knowing, personal God could be the absolutely trustworthy being, the One who could give meaning to the totality of human

existence. He winds up his thoughtful discussion with the statement that man is fully justified in believing in the existence of God.²⁰

We saw that scientific cooperation, based on radical openness of all partners, has become a matter of course in our time. What should be said of religious issues, especially if seen from the point of view of common worldwide problems? All genuine human, ethical and especially religious values should be highly appreciated and available to the modern mind. In the spirit of true openness, Christians should try to understand in what way and to what extent Eastern religions and humanistic ethical systems serve to answer the fundamental human questions. Correlatively Eastern cultures should search out the important role the religion of a personal God has played through many centuries in the West and will continue to play in the future.

So-called philosophical and/or theological systems in the West never had claim to be complete for too long. Who would still claim in our days that for instance the Christian World View of the Middle Ages, the great rationalistic movement of the Enlightenment,²¹ Kant's global treatment of scientific and ethical problems,²² scientific, technological or materialist could solve all modern problems? Generally speaking, all fall short of understanding the depth of modern man's spiritual anxiety, his loneliness, and his yearning for security. Today, one feels compelled to draw upon all these systems and to move ahead in facing anew the most fundamental questions concerning human life and existence; one transcends the systems of the past.

Similarly, few would claim today that any humanistic, ethical or religious system in China (including Buddhism and Neo-Confucianism) is complete and able to answer all of modern man's questions? At the time of Ricci and Schall, such a claim could still be made. However, in our pluralistic society humankind, which in the future will more and more have to rely on personal choices and decisions, needs more than the answers offered by past thought systems.

Today the new global awareness begins to search for answers that only a living, personal God can provide. Radical questioning suggests the dilemma that only in God will all things find fulfillment, but that God cannot be controlled by anyone through either rational or irrational means. This, in turn, suggests that only in true openness to the mystery of human existence in a world that is not of one's own making might one hear the voice of one's Maker speaking both from within and through the whole universe.

Does God exist? This question is an essential part of the Western heritage, strongly influencing its cultural history, including its approach to science. As East and West develop closer ties, the concept of God as a living, personal being, ultimately concerned about man will become increasingly central and the question will be asked: what would change in man's outlook if this God existed? and likewise, what would one forfeit in rejecting such a God?²³ As God of the entire Universe and of all humankind, these are questions of global breadth for every human being.

Conclusion

With Matteo Ricci, Adam Schall and their collaborators a movement of cultural interchange was initiated that has taken on unprecedented dimensions in our time. Looking at the work of these pioneers from our modern point of view, we may state that they were concerned largely with the most fundamental cultural issues of modern man: with science and religion. The legacy they left behind can be formulated in this way: to cooperate in matters of science and technology for the material well-being of modern man and to make available to him the richest and deepest spiritual values from the treasury of humankind.

Notes

1. Research on the life and work of such a prominent figure as Hu Shih reveals the enormous problems China was facing at the beginning of this century. A good introduction to Hu Shih and his time is offered by Jerome B. Grieder, *Hu Shih and the Chinese Renaissance. Liberalism in the Chinese Revolution, 1917-1937* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970).
2. At the beginning of May (1992) an international symposium was held in Germany to commemorate the 400th anniversary of the birth of Adam Schall.
3. Some ideas on this topic have been expounded in my "Die Katholische Universität in China (Taiwan), Fu Jen Universität 1979" in *NZM*, 36 (1980/2), 114-135, and 36 (1980/3), 219-234.
4. Charles E. Hummel, *The Galileo Connection* (Downers Grove Ill.: Inter Varsity Press, 1986), p. 55.
5. Charles E. Hummel, *Chance or Reality* (Washington, D.C.: University of America Press, 1986), p. 170.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 63.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 76.
8. Ian G. Barbour, *Issues in Science and Religion* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1966), p. 29.
9. Hummel, p. 17.
10. Pioneering studies in the history of science in medieval and Renaissance centuries were made by Pierre Duhem, an eminent French scholar of the history of science. Stanley Jaki has made great efforts to bring to light and to evaluate an intellectual enterprise which signals a Copernican turn in our understanding of the religious, philosophical, and scientific sources that led to the great revolutions. See Stanley Jaki, *Uneasy Genius: The Life and Work of Pierre Duham* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987).
11. Margaret J. Osler and Paul Lawrence Farber, eds., *Religion, Science and Worldview* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 138-162.
12. Stanley L. Jaki, *The Road of Science and the Ways to God* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 38.
13. Warren T. Reich, ed. in chief, *Encyclopedia of Bioethics*, 4 vols. (New York: The Free Press/Macmillan, 1978).
14. Jaki, *The Road of Science and the Ways to God*, p. 338, fn. 66.
15. *Ibid.*, 14f.
16. Jaki, *Zheng Jiu Gen Xiao Yao* (Salvation and Leisure) (Shanghai: People's Publishing Company, 1988).
17. Jaki, *Science and the Modern World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), p.181.
18. "The Church in the Modern World: Gaudium et spes" in Walter M. Abbott, S.J., ed., *The Documents of Vatican II* (Washington, D.C.: University of America Press, 1966), pp. 661f.
19. Karl Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History* (Taipei: Rainbow-Bridge, 1971), pp. 214f.
20. Hans Kung, *Does God Exist: An Answer for Today*, E. Quinn, trans. (New York: Vintage, 1981).
21. Günther Bohrmoser speaks in definite terms about the "end of Enlightenment" in his treatise "Die Zeit der Revolutionen ist vorbei," *Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt*, no. 12, March 19, 1982. The subject of his article is "Politik und Religion am Ende der Aufklärung".
22. See Küng's criticism of Kant's transcendental argumentation in his chapter "Kant in der Kritik " in *Does God Exist?*

23. For an extensive discussion of these questions see K  ng's chapter "Gott existiert" in his *Does God Exist?*

7.

Lao Tzu's Idea of "Governing with Non-Doing" and Modern Management

Shen Enming

As the concept of modernization is based on Western culture, the problems which appear in industrial society are closely related with its attitude towards the world. This attitude is actually an embodiment of the drive to control all. To avoid these problems, we should introduce as a new cultural element the principle of Lao Tzu, namely the idea of "governing with non-doing".

The Idea of "Governing with Non-Doing"

Non-being (Wu) and Non-doing

"Non-being" is a featured of Lao Tzu's doctrine and "non-doing" is the way by which this is demonstrated. Both express the attitude that we are not adversaries of the world. The reason for this is that the final source of value is Tao (the inner spring of the universal life) and the operation of the world is the incarnation of Tao. Hence, the subject's value is realized through imitating the operation of the world.

The division between subject and object is a feature of Western culture which internally prevents the subject from realizing its inner value, but urges it to develop outwardly instead. This results in a strong desire to pursue efficiency and utility ceaselessly which results finally in the ecological crisis and social problems. Lao Tzu's idea of "non-being" can lessen such desires and enable people to develop with equilibrium and in a reasonable manner. Becoming, as denial of the stationary state, is "non-being". Hence, "being" is not normal, whereas becoming and "non-being" are normal. "Being" is not constant, but is unceasingly in movement. In this sense "non-being" is the denial of "being", a void of definite "being". Here the word "being" is not limited to concrete material forms but includes abstract ideas and theories. Lao Tzu thinks that becoming is self-explanatory, in which case we can say that Lao Tzu's concept of "non-being" grasps the essence of the world radically. Therefore, Lao Tzu said in *Tao-de-ching*: "The world comes from being, and being comes from non-being" (40 chap.). Obviously, these words are not said in an ontological sense, but they express profoundly his insight into the world.

"Non-being" implies discarding the prejudice which binds the subject under the influence of "being" in an attitude of holding. Here, the word prejudice is not used in the sense of the subject quite divided against the object because the subjective knowledge of the object is fundamentally a subjective object. Even if we confirm a theoretical judgment by facts, the facts themselves are also held subjectively. This means that the subject cannot know the object beyond himself. The prejudice here is that one regards one's knowledge as most objective. This evokes dogmatic behavior which is the opposite of internally attending to the thing and produces harmful results. The reason for prejudice is failure to recognize that there is no completely objective knowledge in the sense of there being no engagement of the subject, in which case knowledge would be meaningless.

Only Lao Tzu's concept of "non-being" makes knowledge both effective and definite, which is the superior advantage of his concept in solving the problem. The concept of "non-being"

unceasingly both discards "being" and produces "being", that is, different knowledge of the world. As a limited condition of the subject's knowledge, our knowledge is just one perspective on the thing. Knowledge reflecting the nature of the thing must be balanced and dynamic so that as we produce "being" we also discard it in awareness of its limitation. That is the implication of the concept of "non-being" in epistemology.

Non-doing and What is Natural

As an idea about the world, "non-being" is identical with its nature. With "non-being" as their guidance, people will not antagonize the world but manifest a harmony between man and the world and behave naturally. The world here includes the natural world and society. "Non-being" reflects the attitude of not regarding the natural world as an object alienated from us and conquered, but joins with it to direct it. There is here no strong reflection of "being"; rather, with the "non-being" as our guide we can be harmonious with the world, where harmony and order is really the highest effect of controlling and managing. The ecological crisis of the modern world is just the result of too strong a sense of meddling, managing, controlling and subjugating the natural world. It reflects an attitude of holding-on to "being", of controlling and managing an object, whose result is to destroy the order. This fact confirms also the wisdom originating from the concept of "non-being" advanced by Lao Tzu, the Oriental sage of 2000 years ago.

In society the basic object controlled is people. Compared to material things, they are much more complicated because they possess self-consciousness, which in turn produces different characteristics in different situations. If we manage a person by strongly meddling and controlling, he will perceive this no matter what our means control, and will resist in his mind in the face of that danger. From this we find that, with the principle of "non-being" as our guide, we should make decisions without holding on to "being". This means that we should not resist the object; we should not make the object behave according to our will by force, but according to its nature so that it feels that it itself is acting under no external pressure. Lao Tzu said: "When there is success all people feel that they are this way of themselves" (17 chap.), that this is in accord with their nature.

What is said above is not a peculiar principle or way of management, but a natural incarnation of "non-being". For this we should "govern with non-doing." The important point here is "non-doing," not "doing". Let us clarify the real difference between "doing" and "non-doing" and the real implication of the latter. "Doing" is a rash action which is done regardless of the situation; the action is resistant to the nature of the thing. By "doing" we could have a temporary success, but one that leads to a later imbalance. The difference between "doing" and "non-doing" is not whether we attain success by our efforts, but the way of reaching a goal and whether the success generates an intrinsic maladjustment.

Behavior with "non-being" as a guide does not hold on to a theoretical system, for any theory is a distortion or incomplete expression of life. This is because of the congenital limits of language in the symbolic expression of human thought. The expression and reception of thought are closely related to the language which is unable to express the "non-being" of the thing. If language takes concepts understood in the spirit of "being" as its guide, the action surely will pose an intrinsic danger. The implication of "non-being" is not to discard theory and thought as our human intellectual achievements, but always to be aware of the limits of such achievements and always to treat them with a critical attitude.

As "non-doing" does not hold on to "being" but is identical with the nature of object, as Lao Tzu said: "Do nothing and do everything" (48 chap.). Some scholars consider Lao Tzu's concept

of "non-doing" to be inactive or passive, and hence as a special behavior. This is a misunderstanding. Lao Tzu's "non-doing" is not a particular behavior or principle, but a higher idea or attitude towards the world. "Non-doing" does not stipulate any special behavior. Sometimes it will be manifested by a quite active attitude and behavior, provided such attitude is not opposite to the nature of the thing. Indeed, in a certain sense "non-doing" is the most active and in a sense superior to that of "doing" because of the subsequent danger. As "doing" is rash action which is not natural, its results will destroy the subject himself in turn. Therefore "doing" has an active appearance, but its nature is inactiveness; whereas "non-doing" has an appearance of inactiveness but an active nature.

"Non-doing" is also more open and inclusive, for it does not hold onto any "doing" but includes all "doing". This means that its appearance does not have any fixed norm. Its behavior attains its goal by way of the thing's nature. (Of course, in the final analysis, the production of the goal is also the result of "non-being" for it is a derivation of Tao, the inner spring of universal life.) The fundamental basis of behavior is the nature of the thing or Tao. However, Tao is not a fixed norm which could be described. As Lao Tzu said: "Tao can be expressed but is not perpetual; Tao, the name, can be expressed, but it is not a permanent name" (1 chap.).

According to Lao Tzu, Tao is the fundamental law of the universe and is shown by the operation of the world. So we can consider "non-being" as behavior identical to Tao. Though we are unable to describe it because of the inherent limits of our language, this does not rule out any description. Tao can be expressed and named, but we must not hold on to such descriptions, for to do so would imply that there is no permanent Tao and name; "doing" cannot be behavior identical to Tao. We should be aware, however, that "doing" is not a special behavior; but only behavior with the attitude of holding-on. If we discard this attitude, all behavior is "non-doing" -- just as otherwise all is "doing". The difference between "doing" and "non-doing" is not established on the basis of a judgment of any particular behavior. The two do not differ in meaning in the strict sense: action itself is just "doing"; and from the point of "non-doing", holding-on to distinction also is "doing", as is holding on to "non-doing".

It is Characteristic of "non-doing" radically to deny any norms for this displays the diversity of the worldly by including all kinds of "doing". This is neither the common sense notion of doing nothing nor another behavior different from "doing". As an activity which is not rash or opposite to the nature of the world, "non-doing" is identical with Tao. As the diversity of the world embodies varied intrinsic tendencies, "non-doing" actually is the "doing" correspondent to the diversity of the world, but without holding on to a certain "doing". Such "doing" is just what we should deny.

This indicates why Lao Tzu said: "non-doing results in everything being done" (48 chap.). If we behave by way of "non-doing", everything can be done; no goal will be beyond reach for goals too are results of Tao and naturally produce. Hence, Lao Tzu said: "Tao often indicates non-doing, but finally everything is done" (37 chap.). The basic expression of Tao is "non-doing", and its radical characteristic "non-being". The idea of "non-being" and the way of "non-doing" is the nature of the world. Combining the idea of "non-being" and the behavior of "non-doing" with controlling and managing concrete objects is the concept of "governing with non-doing", which reflects "non-doing" and takes "non-being" as guide.

Governing with Non-doing

This is to disregard not the object (and hence be free to do anything), but the way of "doing" which is opposite to Tao. Such governing forces the object to behave so that it creates a crisis

which contradicts the original intent of governing. Governing with "non-doing" asks one to discard any "doing", i.e., any artificial behavior. Only in this way can we acquire good results, as Lao Tzu said: "Do non-doing and everything is governed well" (3 chap.). To eliminate the influence of the "doing", we should discard artificial wisdom and morals, which are not intrinsic to man but alienate one from human nature and in turn impede people from acquiring real wisdom and morals.

It should be noted here that some scholars think that such ideas of Lao Tzu are counter-cultural. This seems correct at the surface level, but more deeply it is a misunderstanding of Lao Tzu's original meaning. The culture to which Lao Tzu was counter was only that which alienates one from the nature of the world -- Tao, i.e., the culture of abstract ideas alienated from their source. Such a culture not only will hinder people in going back to their original nature, but also will make people hypocritical and fraudulent. As a result not only will it be impossible to manage people, but the internal order and harmony of society will be destroyed. Therefore it cannot in any case simply be summed up as a counter-cultural attitude in the general sense that Lao Tzu countered such culture as artificial. This attitude only reflects a higher level of culture which attends to the intrinsic moral realm of the subject; this incarnates the operation of Tao, making it conform to human nature. On the other hand, from the point of view of "non-being" dogmatically opposing the form and context of human wisdom and morals this culture is also an attitude of "being" and of holding-on. That is completely opposite to Lao Tzu's thought of "discarding holding-on." As Lao Tzu said: "the existence of the world cannot be described, the more you describe it, the farther you depart from it; the more you hold on to it, the more you will lose it" (29 chap.). "So the gentleman does not do so as not to fail, and does not hold on so as not to be destroyed" (64 chap.). In the above paragraph, by the word "hold-on" is meant any object.

"Governing with non-doing" means not to hold-on. That implies relieving people from the bonds of artificial wisdom and morals. As for wisdom, what Lao Tzu opposes is the wisdom pertaining to "doing", which is pursued as something extrinsic to people. In contrast, real wisdom is not acquired by pursuit according to our intentions, but is from human nature. Lao Tzu emphasized "going back to nature", "peace" and "recovering vitality" many times in the *Tao-te-ching* in order to express this meaning. Going back to nature is not for pursuing wisdom, but for obtaining Tao; once Tao is grasped, the highest wisdom is acquired naturally. Tao is not grasped by intent, but by "non-doing". Only "non-doing" corresponds to the nature of the object and combines with the world to become one, thus entailing the disappearance of any awareness of the division between subject and object. This is the highest wisdom or wisdom in its original sense. As this kind of wisdom is fundamentally the product of "non-doing", its result will not presuppose an intrinsic crisis. In contrast, artificial wisdom causes people to seek private benefits producing fraudulence and contradiction, as Lao Tzu said: "When the name of wisdom is produced, hypocrisy follows" (18 chap.). Hence, "the wise governor in ancient times caused people to be ignorant, but not to be shrewd" (65 chap.). Here the word "ignorant" means the elimination of artificial wisdom in order to go back to nature in order to acquire real wisdom.

As for morals, what Lao Tzu opposed was morals pertaining to "doing", that is, an artificial morals pursued as extrinsic to people. The pursuit of such morals will lead to hypocrisy, as Lao Tzu said: "When Tao is discarded, morals are produced -- when the family is at odds, there is filial piety, when the country is in chaos, people take such artificial morals as a front to hide their shameful behavior so that it is difficult to reach the fundamental goal of management -- by moral norm, as Lao Tzu said: "The gentleman not holding on to morals is the man with real morals" (38 chap.).

"Governing with non-doing" also implies that we should manage people as if nothing has happened. We should behave according to the nature of the object and not develop the object artificially by force, as Lao Tzu said: "The country is governed by way of no accident happening; if it is governed by accidents then the country is hard to govern" (48 chap.). We should not understand the idea of "no-accident happening" with regard to some particular events. It implies an attitude or spirit, but is not a peculiar way of management. The instructions of Lao Tzu are: "Do non-doing, work as if no-accident happened" (63 chap.), so that we can "manage the big country like family cooking."

Implications of Lao Tzu's Idea of "Governing With Non-Doing" for China's Process of Modernization

Compared with Western ideas regarding management, Lao Tzu's idea of "governing with non-doing", reflecting oriental Taoist culture, is a peculiar mode of thinking. Its holistic mode of thinking differs greatly from Western thinking that emphasizes analysis. Hence, people trained in precise Western analysis find it difficult to understand and consider it quite vague. This reflects the different ideas of value and the different visions of the two cultures in confronting the world.

The reception of the great achievements of modern Western civilization is an important aspect of Chinese modernization, and this includes modern management. The Western concept of management can be traced back a very long way and has undergone a long process of development. However, no matter how this thought be developed, it is first the product of the Western culture whose fundamental characteristic is a culture of intellect. Its management theory is marked by this sign.

One basic characteristic of an intellectual culture is a serious division between subject and object. As the subject is knowing and thinking, surely it will develop outward to conquer the object. In that case, all actions will be marked with the sign of outward conquest. The management theory originating within this culture obviously will be characterized by a strong sense of controlling and conquering the object. Western thought on management began by taking people as machines and now gives full consideration to human nature. But this does not contradict its characteristic of conquering and of extending intellectual culture, for these are problems at different levels. The nature of the culture on which the manner of concrete management is conceived does not change. The transformation and development of the latter are only the gradual incarnations of the former with which all along they have been closely related. The knowing and thinking subject certainly will improve his tools, the theory and practice of management, in order to know and conquer objects with a view to greater utility. The result is the historical development of a tool. The development of Western management thought reflects mainly the outward-oriented characteristic of conquering and the development of intellectual culture.

The main defect of such a culture and its goal of knowing and conquering objects is lack of a conscious spirit of self-introspection on the part of the subject. This spirit focuses completely on the value of the subject as the source of subjective activity, so that realizing the subject's values becomes a realistic activity. Its fundamental goal is to raise the moral level of the subject. If the outward orientation of the intellectual culture develops further, the activity of the subject will lose its inner support and concern for the value of the subject will be lost. This reflects the mental state of a lack of peace, which mental state can be called an ecological crisis of mind. The ecological crisis of the world and its social defects are the unavoidable result of such a mental crisis. No doubt Western culture has created a very high level of civilization and the Third World countries are too

far behind to catch up. However, if the third world countries take such modernization as their goal and develop in the same way, the problems they will face may be far more serious than those of the developed countries. Even if the level of the developed countries were to be reached after hard effort, would the effort be really worthwhile inasmuch as the value of the subject is not fully realized by such an effort. On the contrary, the result of the effort will seriously restrict the realization of the subject's value. The restraint that people feel in industrial society is just one example.

Hence, we should explore a spirit that can overcome the defects of Western culture by the traditional culture of China, while receiving healthy and vigorous nourishment from Western civilization in order to construct a culture that is appropriate to the new historical phase. In Chinese traditional culture, the Taoist culture with Lao Tzu as its originator may be able to overcome the defects of Western culture.

Although Lao Tzu's thought has not become the mainstream Chinese traditional culture, it has influenced greatly, and will continue to influence still more, the Chinese national culture and character. The feature of Taoist culture is the transcendence of morals and knowledge so that it is neither the Western culture moving from knowledge to morals, nor the Confucian culture of morals producing knowledge. It is the culture of "no knowledge, no morals" that can reach the highest level of freedom for the subject. To Lao Tzu, who takes the return to nature as his final goal, knowledge and morals are a bondage of the subject with respect to freedom; as artificial will they impede people from going back to their nature?

In the process of China's advance towards modernization, it is assimilating modern Western management science, but we should be cautious in this. Obviously, one cannot, consider the extent of material development as the only standard in comparing cultures. It is certain that Western material civilization has reached a very high level, but it has real defects. The main one is the serious separation between subject and object so that it is hard to raise the subject to a transcendental level. Meanwhile, this defect is incarnate in various social and ecological problems. On the other hand, when we introduce Western management thought into China with its different cultural background, there may be great negative effects for cultural suitability. Another problem with the use of special techniques and programs of the Western management is making them fit China.

To avoid these problems we should work on the basis of Chinese traditional culture to develop and construct a management theory appropriate to China's progress towards modernization, so that we can both avoid the defects of Western intellectual culture and open up an approach to modern management that is appropriate for China. That will also be of great significance to the Third World countries now progressing toward modernization and will change the basic concept of modernization, which now connotes mainly Western intellectual culture. In this way the traditional cultures of different nationalities can be introduced into the concept of modernization so that most Third World countries can free themselves from a blind introduction of Western culture in the process of modernization. This is of great historical significance for constructing a worldwide culture.

If Lao Tzu's thought of "non-being as basis" and the management idea of "governing with non-doing" are applied to different fields of management, we may avoid the mental state of a restlessness and the situation of endlessly plundering the world inherent in the Western world with its intense focus upon competition and success. The serious ecological damage and the mind-body diseases resulting from such a mental state are obvious. For that reason, to avoid repeating the Western approach and to overcome the defects inherent in Western intellectual culture (which

would be more terrible in China and the Third World countries), Lao Tzu's thought and ideas of "non-being as basis" and "governing with non-doing" may be an effective remedy. This is not to imply that Lao Tzu's ideas are surely superior to those of the Western culture as a whole, but that at the level of the prerequisites of the modern world civilization, the essence of Taoist culture promises to be of historic worldwide significance.

8.

Ownership and Social Relations: The Moral Foundation

Manuel B. Dy, Jr.

Many of the problems facing individuals, families, communities, societies and nations, especially in the Third World, have to do with property in its many forms. Modernization has made the problem more complicated even as different ideologies propose conflicting approaches to its solution. The task of this paper is to clarify the problem first by establishing the philosophical foundation of the right to ownership, secondly by explicating the evolution of property to its present form in the context of modernization, and thirdly by deriving some moral principles from the social reality of ownership. This paper will not attempt to examine the merits and demerits of the different juridical systems to regulate ownership for the "juridical order should be adapted to the evolution of social reality rather than adapting reality to the established juridical order."¹

The Philosophical Foundation of the Right of Ownership

The human person is an embodied spirit. In becoming oneself, the human person has to interact with outer nature in order to survive and care for his or her corporeal existence. The person's bodily existence depends on access to the goods of the earth, to calling material things one's own. Property simply refers to one's "relationship to earthly goods in a very general way."² Because ownership is based on the very nature of the human as embodied and contributes to one's being a person, it is an inherent right. All humans have the right to a share of earthly goods sufficient for themselves and their family.³

This right involves the power of disposal by use, consumption, sale, donation, bequest; the right to the fruits of property; the right to make property a source of gain; and the right to restitution.⁴

Because ownership is so intimately linked to the human person, the right of ownership has often been identified with private property. In this regard, natural law ethics dictates the institution of private property as an extension of the human person because the person by nature desires property, has dispositions to help friends, and has responsibility towards creative future development as one tends to propagate oneself in the family.⁵ The term "private", however, can include also group property, the state's collective ownership, and that of a federation of states.⁶ To equate ownership with private ownership must take into consideration the ambiguous character of possession and the social dimension of the human person, thereby limiting the right to private property.

Possession or "having" is an ambiguous reality. As an embodied spirit, the human person expresses oneself in the material world, one's spirituality assuming a particularized form in matter. Because the material world is limited and "having" shares in the unique value of the person, ownership rights include exclusiveness and particularization.

However, the human being can be so possessed with having things as to reduce his or her being to having and to identifying him or herself with material things from others. One's possessions come to so possess one that he or she becomes spiritually impoverished and is alienated from others.⁷ For material goods to enrich a person spiritually, ownership must take into account the social dimension of the person.

A person's being is a being-with-others. A person can become him or herself only in relation to others in the interpersonal and social realms. The right to ownership must be placed in this context as an instrument by means of which a person is able to relate to others and to recognize their own right to live as human persons. "In using them, therefore, man should regard external things that he legitimately possesses not only as his own, but also as common in the sense that they should benefit not only himself but also others."⁸

Thus, the right to private property is not absolute, but limited. It is "subordinated to the right to common use, to the fact that goods are meant for everyone."⁹ It is limited by the right also of others to possess a guarantee for their existence.¹⁰ "No one is justified in keeping for his exclusive use what he does not need, when others lack necessities."¹¹ "There is a social duty essentially inherent in the right to private property,"¹² namely, the just distribution of earthly goods in the service of the common good. This duty falls on the leaders of the community or on the state. They must institutionalize property in order to maintain social and individual survival, and take measures for a just distribution of material goods according to each person's fundamental right to live as a human person.¹³

The Evolution of Property

Property takes many forms: private, public, personal, corporate, familial and communal. A historical sketch of ownership¹⁴ will show the distinctness of modernization and the complexity of the problem of ownership vis-a-vis human social relationships.

Primitive man knew no distinct concept of private or individual property in contrast to the collective or public. The primitive worldview, being mythical, did not isolate one's own individual autonomy from that of the family and tribe and from nature as whole, which is the sacred "property" of higher divine powers. The person, family, tribe and nature constituted one organic whole, and as such there was no question of dominion over nature and no strict right of ownership. The utensils and ornaments used in daily life did not really point to individual rights.

Roman civilization initiated a differentiation of the family from the tribe. The familial community became the most important unit, an economic and political unit together with the state. The head of the family, the *pater familiae*, assumed almost absolute and total control over the persons and things of the family, his authority emanating from sacred tradition. Everything belonging to the family, including the cults and temple gods, was called the "patrimony" entrusted to the *pater familiae* who could not disinherit his children. Hence, the Romans still did not recognize any absolute right of private property, but only of familial property.

With the breakdown of the family structure at the time of the Roman Republic, individual rights of ownership began to appear along with contractual obligations on the basis of property. Individual rights of ownership were restricted by the state which gradually assumed totalitarian power. Soon the individual with his power of private ownership came to fall under the absolutism of the state during the Byzantine empire.

The Germanic tribes, however, were able to resist the authority of the state and revived the old *dominium* structure, but with the landlords exercising power over their domain and vassals instead of the old *patres familiae*. Since agriculture was the main economic activity, the seignorial system developed. The feudal lord owned the land and its inhabitants; the vassal used the land and rendered service to the lord. The lord in turn might stand in the relation of a vassal to higher lord. What existed during this time was not really a socialistic property right, because the individual and group constituted an organically undifferentiated whole. This was no different from

Roman *dominium* except that the Germanic feudal system admitted more vertical relationships beyond that of the family.

Beginning in the 12th century the growth of commerce and industry added various horizontal corporate bonds to the vertical relationships of the feudal system. Towns, guilds and market associations gave birth to social property with rights and restrictions crisscrossing those of the feudal system. The craftsman's power to dispose of his workshop and his products was restricted by the regulations of the town and guild. Individual rights were confined within the autonomous, undifferentiated social group.

The Renaissance and the Reformation gave birth to a new economic life beyond that of farm and craft, namely, to commercial capitalism. The work relationship was no longer tied to a bond of loyalty to the lord or guild but to a free contract; production grew to satisfy not only existing needs, but the desire for profit. This gave rise to individualism which would reach its height in the French Revolution. The merchant was offered new unrestricted possibilities for trade in goods and money, and acquired the right to dispose over his property. This individualistic spirit broke the established bonds and led to the idea of individual and absolute ownership of goods and capital, even of immaterial goods such as intellectual products. When capital began to be used to buy land, a problem arose as to which was superior, "direct dominium" represented by the ruler and the state or "dominium of use" represented by the bourgeois capitalist. The French revolution eventually eradicated all forms of superior and inferior ownership and recognized as sacred and inviolable the right of civil private property.

This individualistic ethos was one of the factors leading to greater industrial development and to the rise of modernization.

Modernization

Three features have characterized modern society: technology, bureaucracy, and socio-cultural pluralism.¹⁵ Underlying all these is an infrastructure of what Max Weber calls rationality. Rationality defines the form of capitalist economic activity, bourgeois private law, and bureaucratic authority; it is linked to the institutionalization of scientific and technical development.¹⁶ The various sectors of society are subject to the criteria of rational decision. This includes the industrialization of social labor, and penetrates such other areas of life as urbanization, technification of transport, communication, etc.

As a consequence, old legitimations are replaced by secularization, "a process whereby sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols;"¹⁷ religion becomes privatized. Concomitantly there is a split between the private and the public, the personal and the functional spheres of life, resulting from increase in the size and specialization of institutionalized structures.¹⁸ These features of modernization have a number of property and social relations.

First, the rise of science and technology and their institutionalization have led to the treatment of property as a form of social capital. Science and technology have made of contemporary economic activity a matter of specialized labor and common effort. The whole "apparatus of production represents a social capital and is by its structure orientated to the economic interest of many."¹⁹

Secondly, with regards to the bureaucracy prevalent in modern institutions, whether of government or enterprise, the management and control of production require many abilities and skills that the individual owner may not have. Rationality demands social management to

counteract the arbitrary control of the owner. As a result, there arises a separation between ownership and use or power.

Thirdly, the socio-cultural pluralism of modernization has given rise to many varied forms of ownership and has broadened the function of personal property. As the modern person has assumed many roles beyond the confines of the family, ownership can take various forms: money, loans, foundations, trusts, joint ownerships, cooperatives, banks. With a pluralistic system of property, emphasis shifts towards the right to use, and "personal property becomes more and more as man acquires for his enjoyment rather than his work."²⁰ There arises a distinction between the natural person and juridical person, which latter is more socially oriented. Personal property, however, retains its value insofar as it embodies family property and is used primarily for the sustenance of the individual and his family. But while in former times personal property was the only safeguard against the vicissitudes of life, modern man can now contribute funds for social security. Personal property is also important insofar as it gives one the material independence to develop oneself and to contribute to the community and society. In earlier times, personal property was the only means to personal development and status: now in modern society loans, grants and scholarships are available; society recognizes persons for their work rather than for their possessions. Because the family has gradually changed from a productive unit to a consumer unit, personal property consists mostly now of money and abstract titles of ownership which can be spent and used for a decent living and to provide education for one's children.²¹

Thus modernization with its rationality has brought about an awareness of the social dimension and responsibility of property and its problematic link with or separation from power.

In sum, thus far our consideration of the evolution of property from primitive times to the present has centered on the role of ownership and the increasing autonomy of the person. Modernization has focused on the social context of ownership. When this is joined to the philosophical foundation of the right of ownership the moral problem comes to light.

The Moral Problem and Principle

The moral problem regarding ownership has to do with justice, specifically or generally with social justice. The problem of justice with regards to property is the conflict between equality and equity.

We have seen in the first part that the right of ownership is based on the person, his or her freedom and the task of becoming oneself as a unique person in relation to others in society. Being an embodied spirit, each one has the right to partake of limited and divisible earthly goods in order to realize this task of personhood. Justice is giving to each his or her due as a person. As to liberty, all persons are equal one to another, each being an end in his or herself.

The problem of justice as regards property "is to give a meaning to equality of liberty,"²² because there is an inherent contradiction in the notion of equality when applied to resources that are limited or scarce. Equality has to take some form of quantitative equality with regard to material goods which each person has the liberty to enjoy. But liberty is also the power to gather, occupy, use, produce, consume and reproduce as one wishes, which causes inequalities to arise. The person is not merely a passive recipient, a passenger in the ship of state, but actively responsible for his own efforts and actions; "his due" is not only his equal share of nature's provision but all the products of his work or his services to others, or in the opposite case the penalties he may suffer for the injuries he may cause. This is the conflict between equality and equity.²³

Equality means that everyone starts with equal opportunities as far as material means of production and education are concerned. Equity, on the other hand, means that everyone reaps the rewards of his own efforts; this wealth is not equal but equitable, that is to say, proportionate to labor. "The conflict arises from the nature of our life in time and the build-up of causal sequences, and especially from the transition from generation to generation."²⁴

The conflict of equality and equity corresponds to two basic ways by which man relates to natural resources.²⁵ The first has to do with power, with the ability of the person to do what he or she wishes with particular resources. Natural resources are not human creations and the fact that persons, families or nations own them is simply a matter of power. If we have to apply the equality of liberty, then justice means that either they have to be redistributed to each person equally or private property should be abolished altogether. The second has to do with labor that is mixed with land and materials. Because of labor, persons can advance a claim of equity to appropriate them as their own. Justice in this sense is based on difference, on what Aristotle means by treating unequal persons unequally or equitably.²⁶ The two types overlap and present us with the two horns of the dilemma of social justice.

R.W. Baldwin contends that because it is difficult in theory or in practice to apply a justice of equality with regard to property, and because the notion of property flows so directly from human labor, primacy should be given to justice as equity.²⁷ He enumerates the claims of equity as follows:²⁸

1. Property consisting of, or derived from, personal ability and effort, such as:
 - a) ability, skill, and technology
 - b) material property made or obtained from abundant resources
 - c) income from self-made capital
 - d) goods acquired in exchange for products of the owner's labor
2. property combining personal effort with scarcity of resources. The greater the element of scarcity, the weaker the claim based on personal effort until personal effort and the related claim disappears.
3. Property acquired by gift (not will) from the producer
4. Property acquired by will from the producer
5. Property inherited or received as gift from a person other than the producer
6. Property appropriated by occupation.

On the other hand, the claims based on equality of liberty must consider the:

1. the magnitude of differences
2. degree of access
3. degree of contact, and
4. degree of responsibility.

In modern society, the conflict is not easily resolved because the problem of ownership is interlaced with the question of power in politics and diplomacy, and because, as we have seen, there is a tendency to separate ownership and control in the modern enterprise. The problem is highlighted by modern socialism which finds no justification for income derived from capital. For Marx, economic value springs only from work, and in an individualist, capitalistic society

ownership of the means of production constitutes social power which enables the capitalist to exploit labor.²⁹

In a modernized society, however, ownership is not necessarily tied to control. But the point made by Marx still stands today, namely that labor too must be vested with social power alongside property and be on equal footing in directing the socio-economic process.³⁰ Labor must be given an increasing role in the direction of production. Thus, the conflict between equality and equity as regards property is part of a wider problem of social power, the justice of power.

The injustice of power consists in too much power being concentrated in the hands of an individual or group to the detriment of the common good. Positively speaking, the justice of power is the responsibility of those in authority to serve the interests of the many under their governance. Social justice calls for social democracy where the differentiation of formal and material democracy applies to the realm of property. Just as in the individual person a distinction exists between the private and the public spheres, between the personal and the functional, social justice requires that ownership so appropriate property, especially large possessions, as to create opportunities for work and remuneration so that the propertyless can acquire income and property. When it is within its power to do so, ownership should distribute the effects of social cooperation between property and labor through just wages, prices and interests.³⁵ Hence, the sign of a just society is when medium-sized property becomes a common sight, and large-scale property and poverty are exceptions.³⁶ On the international scale, as a matter of social justice less developed nations have a right to aid and support from more developed and affluent nations.³⁷

The path of social justice is not easy to define, much less to tread, but it is the only way for the economic wealth of a people to lead to genuine liberation in the socio-cultural sphere. In the words of John XXIII:³⁸

The economic wealth of a people arises not only from an aggregate abundance of goods but also, and more so, from their real and efficacious redistribution according to justice, as a guarantee of the personal development of the members of the society, which is the true scope of national economy.

Notes

1. Martin G. Plattel, *Social Philosophy* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965), p. 295.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 295.
3. *Gaudium et Spes* (Second Vatican Council, 1965), sec. 69.
4. Johannes Messner, *Social Ethics* (London: B. Herder Book Co., 1964), p. 821.
5. *Ibid.*, pp. 822-823
6. In the 19th century, there were practically no intermediary social organs between the individual and the state, which resulted in a polarization of "individual" and "collective," of "private" and "social". Martin Plattel, *op. cit.*, p. 288.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 290.
8. *Gaudium et Spes*, sec. 69.
9. John Paul II, *Laborem Exercens* (1981), sec. 14.
10. John W. Walgrave, *Person and Society* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965), p. 120.
11. Paul VI, *Populorum Progressio* (1967), sec. 23.
12. John XXIII, *Pacem et Terris*, par.23.

13. John Walgrave, *op. cit.*, p. 121. John XXIII, *Mater et Magistra* (1961), par. 104. A.J.M. Milne, *Human Rights and Human Diversity* (Albany: State University of New York, 1986), p. 7.
14. I am indebted for this part to Martin Plattel, *Social Philosophy*, pp. 318-332.
15. Rubert Wuthrow *et al.*, *Cultural Analysis* (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 55-56.
16. Jürgen Habermas, *Towards A Rational Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1970), p. 81.
17. Rubert Wuthrow *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 61-62.
18. *Ibid.*, pp. 58-59.
19. Martin Plattel, *op. cit.*, p. 296.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 297.
21. *Ibid.*, pp. 298-301.
22. R.W. Baldwin, *Social Justice* (Pergamon Press, 1966), p. 102.
23. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 102.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 103-104.
26. *Ibid.*, p. 9.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 105.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 105-107.
29. Johannes Messner, *op. cit.*, p. 829.
30. *Ibid.*
31. Martin Plattel, *op. cit.*, p. 333.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 334.
33. Johannes Messner, *op. cit.*, p. 829.
34. Martin Plattel, *op. cit.*, p. 314.
35. Johannes Messner, *op. cit.*, pp. 826-827.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 830.
37. John Walgrave, *op. cit.*, p. 121.
38. John XIII, *Mater et Magistra*, par. 65.

9. **The Economic Structure of Society: Habermas's Reconstruction of Historical Materialism**

Manuel B. Dy, Jr.

The tendency in discussing the economic structure of society is to limit the discussion to the sphere of society concerned with the production, distribution and consumption of goods and services, thereby forgetting the social relations involved and the socialization processes. If society is not just a mere conglomeration of individuals in a particular situation, but a system or systems of human beings acting and interacting with each other in coordination, then the economic structure of society includes both the productive forces and the relations of production. This is the merit of Jürgen Habermas's general theory of social evolution.

I shall attempt to present in this paper the economic structure of society from his reconstruction of Marx's historical materialism, its evolution and crisis mechanism. Towards that end, I shall try to bring out the value implications at stake this entails.

Outer Nature and Inner Nature

At the outset, let us understand "society" as "all systems which -- through linguistically coordinated (instrumental and social) actions -- appropriate outer nature in production processes and inner nature in socialization processes."¹

Outer nature refers to the resources of the non-human environment. These are appropriated in production processes, setting free energies that are transformed into use values. Social systems organize and train labor power and develop technologies and strategies. These require technically utilizable knowledge which employs utterances that admit of truth. "Work or instrumental action, is governed by technical rules."²

Inner nature refers to the organic substratum of the members of society, which is appropriated in socialization processes. Socialization processes enable the members of the system to become subjects capable of speaking and acting with the help of normative structures, where needs are interpreted and actions are allowed or made obligatory. Social systems integrate inner nature through the medium of norms that have need of justification. Communicative action is governed by correctness or appropriateness, by valid norms.³

Both control of outer nature and integration of inner nature occur through the medium of language, for language has a double structure: speaking about something and to someone.

In sum, "the exchange between social systems and their environment takes place in production (appropriation of outer nature) and socialization (appropriation of inner nature) through the medium of utterances that admit of truth and norms that have need of justification."⁴

Social Labor

Marx pointed to socially organized labor as the specific way in which human beings reproduce their lives:

Man can be distinguished from the animal by consciousness, religion, or anything else you please. He begins to distinguish himself from the animal the moment he begins to produce his

means of subsistence, a step required by his physical organization. By producing food, man indirectly produces his material life itself.⁵

Marx did not limit "production" to the instrumental action of a single individual, but included the social cooperation of different individuals:

A certain mode of production or industrial stage is always combined with a certain mode of cooperation or social stage, and this mode of cooperation is itself a "productive force". We observe in addition that the multitude of productive forces accessible to men determines the nature of society and that the "history of mankind" must always be studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and exchange.⁶

Habermas explicates this socially organized labor of Marx in terms of three types of rules:⁷

1. the reshaping of material according to the rules of instrumental action or purposive-rational action,
2. the instrumental activity of different individuals organized for purposes of production according to the rules of strategic action, and
3. the socially organized distribution of products through the systematic connection of reciprocal expectations of interests according to the rules of communicative action or social norms.

The system that socially regulates labor and distribution is the economy. For Marx, the economic form of reproducing life is characteristic of the human stage of development. "As individuals express their life, so they are what they are; life, therefore, coincides with what they produce and how they produce."⁸

But for Habermas, Marx's concept of social labor does not capture the specifically human reproduction of life. Social labor and economy may be suitable to distinguish the hominid from the primates, but not human life itself. Among the hominids, we find the adult males forming hunting bands which: (a) made use of weapons and tools (technology), (b) cooperated through division of labor (cooperative organization), and (c) distributed the prey within the collective rules of distribution (rules of distribution).⁹

What actually distinguishes the *homo sapiens* is not the economy, but the family. Humans broke up the one-dimensional rank-ordering of the animals in which every animal is transitively given one and only one status. With the introduction of the father's role, the family system of human beings made possible the combination of the status of the male in the hunting band with that in the female and child system. Now the function of social labor is integrated with that of nurturing the young, and the function of male hunting is coordinated with those of female plant gathering. The familial social structure supplemented the economy of the hunt. The organization of society along kinship lines replaced the animal status system with a system of social roles and norms, based on intersubjective recognition of normed expectations of behavior. But this presupposes the development of language. The specifically human form of reproducing life "first took place in the structures of labor and language. Labor and language are older than man and society."¹⁰

Habermas summarizes the above in four points:¹¹

1. The concept of social labor is fundamental. The social organization of labor and distribution precedes the emergence of linguistic communication, and this in turn precedes the formation of social systems.

2. The specifically human mode of life is the joining of social labor with organization along kinship lines.

3. The structure of role behavior marks a new evolutionary threshold vis-a-vis social labor. Rules of communicative action cannot be reduced to instrumental strategic action.

4. Production and socialization, social labor and care of the young, are of equal importance for the reproduction of the human species. The familial social structure is fundamental for the integration of both outer and inner nature.

Mode of Production

For Marx, the key to the reconstruction of the history of species is in the "mode of production". A mode of production is characterized by the specific state of development of productive forces and by specific forms of relations of production. Productive forces consist of the labor power of producers, technical knowledge insofar as it is converted into means and techniques that heighten productivity, and organizational knowledge insofar as it is employed for mobilization, qualification and organization of labor power. Relations of production, on the other hand, are those institutions and social mechanisms that determine how labor power can be combined with available means of production. The regulation of access to the means of production indirectly determines the distribution of social wealth. Relations of production are expressions of the distribution of power. Marx assumed that the forces and relations of production do not vary independently, but exhibit structural correspondence to one another in such a way that they yield structurally analogous stages which can be ordered developmentally and logically: the handmill produces the feudal lord; the steam mill, the industrial capitalist.¹²

Five modes of production are distinguished: (1) primitive communal, (2) ancient based on slaveholding, (3) feudal, (4) capitalist, and finally (5) socialist. Later, (6) the asiatic mode was added. These six modes designate the universal stages of social evolution in terms of which any particular economic structure can be analyzed.

Marx's analysis of social development in terms of productive forces and social intercourse has advantages over: (a) the dogmatic version of the history of species, where previous world history exhibits a unilinear, necessary, continuous and irreversible development of a macrosystem; (from stone, bronze and iron to artificial materials) or energy sources (from fire, water and wind to atomic and solar energy); (c) the forms of organizing cooperative labor (from family and cottage industry to factory system, to national and multinational concerns); (d) the market structures (household, city, national economy and world economy); and (e) the social division of labor (from hunting and gathering to cultivation of soil and animal husbandry, to urban crafts and rural farming, to industry and agriculture). Still, there are problems in the application of his schema to available anthropological and historical material. Besides the problem with mixed and transitional forms (there is no pure form of a single mode of production), there are others in applying the schema:

(a) to the transition from Paleolithic to Neolithic societies: both are primitive yet they exhibit marked differences in productive forces and organization;

(b) to the Asiatic mode of production: is this the last stage or the first form of class society; is it a universal stage or a specific stage alongside the ancient?

(c) to feudalism: is it a single mode or a concatenation of several; was it universal or unique to medieval Europe?

(d) to the differences between archaic and developed civilizations: within the framework of the same political form of class organization there occurred a remarkable change in the structure of dominant world views in China, India, Palestine and Greece;

(e) to advanced capitalism: is state-regulated capitalism the last phase of an old mode of production or the first of a new one?

(f) to bureaucratic socialism: is it a variant of the same stage as organized capitalism or a higher one?¹³

These difficulties suggest that the mode of production is not adequate enough to analyze social development. To strengthen this schema Habermas adds the concept, "principle of organization".

Principle of Organization

By principles of organization I understand innovations that become possible through developmental, logically reconstructible stages of learning, and which institutionalize new levels of societal learning. The organizational principle of society circumscribes ranges of possibility. It determines in particular: within which structures changes in the system of institutions are possible; to what extent the available capacities of productive forces are socially utilized and the development of new productive forces can be stimulated; to what extent system complexity and adaptive achievements can be heightened. A principle of organization consists of regulations so abstract that in the social formation which it determines a number of functionally equivalent modes of production are possible. Accordingly, the economic structure of a given society would have to be examined at two analytic levels: firstly in terms of the modes of production that have been concretely combined in it and then in terms of that social formation to which the dominant mode of production belongs.¹⁴

The principle of organization determines the formation of society at any given time. Specifically, it determines: (1) the learning mechanism on which the development of productive forces depends, (2) the range of variation for the interpretive systems that secure identity; and (3) the institutional boundaries for the possible expansion of the steering capacity.¹⁵

It would be a mistake therefore to situate the social formation or the level of development of society simply in terms of the control of the means of production -- relations of production -- or to equate it with the determinate forms of ownership at any given time.¹⁶ This is the case of the economic interpretation of the "base-superstructure" of Marx. According to this theory, the forces and relation of production form an economic structure by which all other subsystems (culture, politics and religion) are determined. In the orthodox Marxist version, the processes in any "higher sub-system" are causally determined upon or structurally limited by "lower" (economic) sub-systems. In the Hegelian Marxist version, the economic structure is construed dialectically as the essence that appears in observable social phenomena.¹⁷

Habermas, however, interprets this theory of Marx in another way: the dependence of the superstructure on the base is meant only for the critical phase in which a society is passing over to a new developmental level. The economic structure is not an ontological constitution of society, but plays a leading role in social evolution. Marx introduced the concept of "base" to single out a domain of problems where innovations can be explained. But to equate the "base" with the economic structure could lead to the view that the basic domain always coincides with the economic system. This is true only of capitalist societies. In primitive societies, the relations of production (the function of regulating access to the means of production and thereby indirectly

regulating the distribution of social wealth) were fixed by the kinship system, and in pre-modern societies by the political system. The relations of production can make use of different institutions or institutional nuclei.¹⁸

The institutional nuclei are embodiments of the abstract principles of organization. The institutional nucleus functions as relations of production and determines a dominant form of social integration.¹⁹ Social integration secures the unity of the social life-world through values and norms. "If system problems cannot be solved in accord with the dominant form of social integration, if the latter must itself be revolutionized in order to create latitude for new problem solution, the identity of society is in danger."²⁰

The following are examples of principles of organization corresponding to certain social transformations:²¹

(1) *Primitive* social formation: The institutional core is the kinship system, the organizational principle being the primary roles of age and sex. Here the forces of production cannot be augmented through exploitation of labor power. There is hardly a systematic motive for producing more foods than are necessary, even if the state of productive forces may allow a surplus. Only external change (demographic growth, economic exchange, war and conquest) overloads the steering capacity of this society.

(2) *Traditional* social formation: The principle of organization is class domination in political form. The production and distribution of social wealth is transferred from familial forms of organization of ownership to the means of production, with the emergence of bureaucratic authority. With private ownership of the means of production, class societies emerge and a power relationship is institutionalized. Forces of production can be augmented with exploitation through organized forced labor, but the order of authority rests on traditional worldviews.

(3) *Liberal-Capitalist* social formation: The principle of organization is the relationship of wage, labor and capital, based on the system of bourgeois civil law. With the rise of state-free commerce between private owners of commodities, civil society is segregated from the political-economic system. Now the modern rational state becomes the complementary arrangement to self-regulative market commerce which is the institutional nucleus. Labor productivity is enhanced with the uncoupling of the economic system from the political, giving rise to a bourgeois society free from traditional ties and given over to profit-oriented competition. This strategic-utilitarian morality is based on a Protestant ethic, on the justice of a fair exchange of equivalents.

Mechanism of Crisis

Marx saw the mechanism of crisis in a dialectic of forces and relations of production:

At a certain stage of development the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or -- this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms - with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of the development of the productive forces, these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure.²²

This dialectic of forces and relations of production have been interpreted in a "technologicistic sense" to mean that productive techniques themselves determine a certain organization of labor and particular relations of production. Another interpretation is the structuralist interpretation: an endogenous learning mechanism provides growth of technical knowledge and its conversion into

productive forces. According to this interpretation, the mode of production is in the state of equilibrium only if there exists a structural correspondence between the developmental stages of forces and relations of production. Endogenous development of productive forces generates structural incompatibilities between these two orders, which in turn evoke imbalances in the existing mode of production, leading to a revolution in the relations of production.²³

Habermas still finds the structuralist interpretation inadequate. The learning mechanism described does not explain how the problems that arise can be solved. The development of productive forces trigger, but do not bring about, the overthrow of relations of production and an evolutionary renewal of the mode of production. The great developments that led to the rise of the first civilizations did not have any noteworthy development of productive forces as a condition, but only as a consequence. The cognitive potential produced by the postulated learning mechanism can be exploited for developing productive forces only when a new institutional frame-work and a new form of social integration has emerged. But the introduction of new forms of social integration (for instance, the replacement of the kinship system by the state) requires knowledge of the moral-practical kind. This is not technically useful knowledge, but knowledge of the structures of interaction; it is not knowledge of the expansion of control over outer nature, but knowledge that extends the autonomy of society in relation to inner nature.²⁴

How does the evolutionary step to a new form of social integration come about? The answer of historical materialism is through social conflicts, political struggle and social movements, in short, through class struggle; the answer of Habermas is through a bi-dimensional learning process, cognitive/technical and moral/practical. The development of the forces of production cannot be grasped independently of the development of the forms of social integration.

The Three Stages of Communication and Levels of Social Integration

Habermas focuses his attention on the moral/practical learning process and social integration. The *three stages of communication* correspond to the stages of Piaget's and Kohlberg's stages of moral consciousness and development.

(1) *Stage of symbolically mediated interaction.* Speaking and acting are still entangled in a framework of a single, imperativist mode of communication. A expresses a behavioral expectation through a symbol, to which B reacts with an action with the intention of fulfilling A's expectations, and vice versa: the symbol and action define each other. Participants suppose that they could in principle exchange places, but they remain bound to their performative attitudes. Here actions, motives and acting subjects are perceived on a single plane of reality. This stage corresponds to the *pre-conventional stage* of Piaget and Kohlberg, where only the consequences of action are evaluated in cases of conflict.

(2) *State of propositionally differentiated speech.* Speaking and acting are separated for the first time. A and B cannot only adopt the other's perspectives, but also can take the perspective of an observer. They can connect the performative attitude of the participant with the propositional attitude of an observer. The reciprocal behavioral expectations of the two can be coordinated in such a way that they constitute a system of social roles. At this stage, actions and norms separate. This corresponds to the conventional stage of Piaget and Kohlberg where motives can be assessed independently of the consequences of action; conforming to a certain social role is the standard.

(3) *State of argumentative speech.* The validity claims of speech acts can be made thematic and argued over. Norms and roles appear in need of justification, their validity can be contended

and grounded in principles. This corresponds to the *post-conventional stage* of Piaget and Kohlberg, where systems of norms lose their quasi-natural validity and require justification from universalistic points of view.

In distinguishing *levels of social integration*, Habermas prefers to keep separated: (a) generally structures of action, (b) structures of worldviews determinant of morality and law, and (c) structures of institutionalized law and of binding moral representatives. Below is the sketch of the levels of social integration.²⁶

Value Implications

Habermas' arguments for the different crisis tendencies (economic, rational, legitimation and motivation) which would have brought us in direct confrontation with Philippine social reality is beyond the scope of this paper. However, our presentation of his economic structure of society is enough to lead us to the following value implications.

1. Economic development cannot be divorced from moral (or practical, in the Greek sense of "*praxis*") development. Progress in productive forces, though it may lead to a highly differentiated division of labor processes and to differentiation of the organization of labor within industries, does not by itself bring about a development of moral-practical consciousness.²⁷ For a society to develop, system integration must be complemented with social integration. Social integration pertains to the identity of society, to the systems of institutions in which speaking and acting subjects are socially related in their life world.²⁸ In this regard, social justice becomes more important than commutative justice. While commutative justice sets the agreements of individuals with regard to the problem of wages and work conditions, it is social justice that creates the social conditions and agreements which commutative justice must observe.

2. The value of the family cannot be overlooked. It is the family system that is the locus of interaction between the individual and society. Socialization begins with the family. If development is to be specifically human it must foster the integration of the family.

3. The mode of production of any society needs a principle of organization embodied in an institutional nucleus. This institutional nucleus must be suited to the particular culture of society. If economic development is to benefit all the members of a society and if the people's welfare is the foremost interest, then technical and strategic acting are not enough. There is need for a principle of organization -- an institutionalization of "people power", where the citizenry actively participate in the decision-making process -- and a feedback mechanism. However, this presupposes that the participants are mature enough to enter the stage of argumentative speech in order to discuss, criticize and justify norms based on universalizable principles.

4. Social formation or transformation cannot be brought about by class conflicts because these threaten the identity and integration of society. Instead, transformation requires a bi-dimensional learning processes. These may take a long span of time, but in the long run they are the only alternative to violence. We must remember that economic liberation is only a step, albeit a major step, to total liberation.

Notes

1. Thomas McCarthy, *The Critical Theory of Jürgen Habermas* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982), p. 248.
2. Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), p. 9.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 9-10.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
5. Marx and Engels, *The German Ideology*, in L. Easton and K. Guddat, eds. *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society* (New York: 1967), p. 409.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 421.
7. Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and Evolution of Society* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1976), p. 132.
8. Marx and Engels, *op.cit.*, p. 409.
9. Jürgen Habermas, *op.cit.*, pp. 135-136.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 137.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 137-139.
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 138-139.
13. Thomas McCarthy, *op.cit.*, pp. 240-241.
14. Jürgen Habermas, *The Normative Content of Modernity* (Boston: MIT), pp. 153-154.
15. Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, pp. 7-8.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 16.
17. Thomas McCarthy, *op.cit.*, p. 243.
18. Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and Evolution of Society*, pp. 143-144.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 144.
21. Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, pp. 18-24.
22. Karl Marx, *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy* (New York: Dobbs, 1970), Preface, p. 21.
23. Thomas McCarthy, *op.cit.*, p. 244.
24. Jürgen Habermas, *Communication and Evolution of Society*, pp. 145-147.
25. *Ibid.*, pp. 154-156.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 156-158.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 146.
28. Jürgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*. p. 4.

10. **Person, Work and Religious Tradition**

John Farrelly

As regards the problem which has exited, and which still exists, in facing modernity there may be a certain parallel between Christianity and the Chinese cultural tradition. In the West in the 18th and 19th centuries there was a period of rapid modernization in economic, social and political life. Many leaders in this process rejected the Christian tradition as more of an obstacle than a help in the modernization process. They attacked this tradition as identified with the old order, and sought to build the future on completely different foundations. The destructive forces in some of these modernizing trends have worked themselves out in history, so that now some leaders in these different fields look more sympathetically to the potential of the Christian tradition. Meanwhile, many who kept faith with the Christian tradition had for many years been reinterpreting the premodern religious tradition and philosophy in order to bring out their potential for the present and the future.

Similarly, China has in Confucianism a great and ancient tradition which sought "the Great Harmony". Originally and in many of its later representatives it was a humanism in the sense of being based on an insight into the difference between human beings and other material beings, not in the sense of denying transcendence to human beings: it considered the unity of Heaven and man to be central for realizing the Great Harmony.¹ It would seem that such a tradition is not limited to past interpretations which seemed simply to justify the status quo. I do not presume to suggest how its potential for the present can be utilized, but perhaps an explanation of a current reinterpretation of the Western religious tradition and philosophy in view of a central modern problem may be suggestive for comparable problems.

One of the most important problems of our time, if not the most important, is building genuine communities in which the rights of individuals are recognized. One of the most serious foci of this problem is found in the sphere of work. Profound problems concerning the meaning and organization of work disturb and divide our societies and world. Can classical religious traditions and philosophies have something to offer toward the solution of the complex problems of a later age?

One way to answer these questions is through an analysis of a recent attempt to use religious traditions and a philosophy of the person to explore the meaning and organization of work. Here I am referring to the work of Karol Wojtyla, a Western Christian philosopher who grew up in a Communist country, studied phenomenology and taught philosophy for many years. Later he was elected Pope John Paul II and among his activities wrote an encyclical *Laborem Exercens, On Human Work*.² (The following numbers in parentheses refer to the numbered sections of this work.) Here will be taken not as an authoritative religious document, but as a notable effort to reflect upon the contemporary problem of work from the resources of a religious tradition and a philosophy of the person. As such it can be of interest to philosophers of other traditions and can be evaluated critically. In this document John Paul draws on many resources available to those of different faiths and cultures. We shall look to the richness of these resources in illuminating the meaning of work and providing norms for its organization. In this brief analysis, I will (a) indicate the context of this document, (b) show that John Paul II does turn to religious traditions and to the philosophy of the person and how he understands them, (c) give several ways in which he draws

on these resources in order to understand and organize work in our time, (d) reflect on the legitimacy of his use of these resources, and conclude by asking how other religious resources may be so used.

The Context of This Document

John Paul II grew up in Poland, and besides his ecclesiastical career studied philosophy, received a doctorate in the field and taught it for over a decade. He contested the official interpretation and organization of work in his country on both philosophical and religious grounds, while also critiquing Western capitalism. After being elected Pope, he wrote this document on labor in 1981, commemorating the 90th anniversary of Pope Leo XIII's encyclical, *Rerum Novarum*, the first papal encyclical treating modern social problems. Thus he treats the issue in the context of a long succession of papal documents on the questions.

As context for this document we should recall also, as does John Paul II, some of the basic conflicts that have characterized the world of work in the last few centuries. In early industrialization there was a basic conflict between the entrepreneurs as owners or administrators of productive property and the mass of people who by their labor shared in the production process.⁽¹¹⁾ Entrepreneurs very commonly sought to maximize their profits; they considered labor only within an economic perspective as one of the forces of production, and tried to establish the lowest possible wages and most inexpensive working conditions for their employees. This led to great injustices, as well as to a reaction by many who thought that the root of this evil was the private ownership of productive property. Marxists interpreted the problem as one of class conflict; they presented themselves as the spokesmen for the proletariat, and by various means, including revolution, sought to seize control of countries to impose collectivist systems. This, however, did not assure justice, but led rather, among other evils, to a bureaucratization of work in which the individual found himself no more than a cog in an immense machine. The injustices led to the establishment of unions of laborers who fought for just wages and working conditions, insurance, and other benefits. Early capitalism was significantly changed in the process.

But the problems remain and have evolved. In the West today there is widespread unemployment, hunger and hopelessness. The conflict between capital and labor, which previously had been primarily a problem within a particular country, has now become a global issue. Moreover, new technological developments, a new realization of the limits of the resources of the world, and a concern for damage to the environment that has already resulted from industrial pollution pose new problems for the meaning and organization of work. This then is the context in which John Paul II wrote about human work.

Resources: Religious Traditions and a Philosophy of the Person

John Paul does not attempt to give technical answers to the problems of the workplace in our time, but rather to uncover the basic human meaning of work and to reflect on this meaning and its moral implications. In fact, he writes that the purpose of his document is:

To highlight . . . the fact that human work is a key, probably the essential key, to the whole social question, if we try to see that question really from the point of view of man's good. And if the solution -- or rather the gradual solution -- of the social question . . . must be sought in the direction of "making life more human", then the key, namely, human work, acquires fundamental and decisive importance.⁽³⁾

Thus, he explores the meaning of work as described in the following and he turns to the resources of religious tradition and of a philosophy of the person for this purpose.

In seeking to shed light upon human problems, the document turns to the Judaeo-Christian Scriptures as a communication from the divine source of human wisdom. These Scriptures, in the same fashion as the sacred writings of other religions of the world, can be appreciated by men and women of quite different traditions also as a sedimentation of human wisdom, as we shall here. In literary forms appropriate to its time and to the purpose of its author the first book of the Bible gives an account of the beginnings of the world and of man. It does so in a way that leaves no doubt that there is meaning in human persons and their lives. It tells us that "God created man in his image; in the divine image he created him; male and female he created him." And "God blessed them, saying, 'Be fertile and multiply; fill the earth and subdue it.'"³ And God gave them dominion over all the earth, which dominion then is one way in which man images God.

In the gift of dominion is included the commission to work, for in their work human beings share in the work and purposes of the creator. The range of what God has committed to man's dominion is vast. It includes all the resources of the physical world and extends into the indefinite future, for this commission to the first couple is meant for all mankind. No future development of the resources of the world lies outside its embrace. In principle, therefore, the physical world is subordinate to humankind and is placed within its dominion to serve the human good.

An inquiry into the meaning of work should distinguish its objective from its subjective meaning. Any work, because of its specific nature, has its internal goals. Agriculture, for example, has as its goal the production of food; industry is for the manufacture of goods for human use. Goals specific to a certain form of work constitute its objective meaning. Technological developments have enormously increased the scope and, at times, the quality of human work as it fulfills these goals. Technology is thus man's ally, though at times it can seem to be his enemy.

Work can also, however, be considered subjectively or in relation to man as its agent and goal. As John Paul writes:

Man has to subdue the earth and dominate it, because as the 'image of God' he is a person, that is to say, a subjective being capable of acting in a planned and rational way, capable of deciding about himself and with a tendency to self-realization. As a person, man is therefore the subject of work. . . . Various actions belonging to the work process . . . must all serve to realize his humanity, to fulfill the calling to be a person that is his by reason of his very humanity.(6)

The divine commission to dominate the world is realized in relation not only to the things of the world, but to the work itself, i.e. through maintaining the order whereby man is served by his work, rather than allowing himself to be subordinated to its service. "This dimension conditions the very ethical nature of work."(6) It has an ethical value because it is an act of a person, "a conscious and free subject, that is to say, a subject who decides about himself."(6)

The basis for deciding the value of work is not primarily its objective meaning, but its subjective meaning. Work can have degrees of objective meaning, but the primary basis for the dignity and value of work is "man himself, who is its subject."(6)

This leads immediately to a very important conclusion of an ethical nature: however true it may be that man is destined for work and called to it, in the first place work is "for man" and not man "for work".(6)

The objective purpose of any kind of work cannot have a definitive meaning in itself, for "in the final analysis it is always man who is the purpose of work, whatever work it is that is done."(6)

Implications for the Meaning and Organization of Work

Religious tradition and elements of a philosophy of the person reinforce one another in the light they cast on the meaning and organization of work. Several implications are drawn by John Paul from the topic thus illumined.

The Priority of Labor. A central principle for the organization of work that flows from both religious tradition and a philosophy of the person is the priority of labor. To be given the commission to subdue the earth means that man is to dominate all the resources of the world. These resources are not created by man; they are given to him by nature and so ultimately by the creator. Man can modify these resources, as he does in successive stages of technological sophistication in production through history, thereby providing for himself more ingenious and effective "workbenches", as it were. Through the domestication of animals, through agriculture, through industrialization, and through the sophisticated technology of our time, man establishes increasingly effective instruments to aid him in his labor. All that goes by the name of productive property, or capital, is really a collection of such instruments. No matter how sophisticated be this instrument, it came from resources which God placed in nature for man to discover and modify. It is the historical product as well of the generations of labor that honed and developed the instruments of production we now have. These instruments are still fruitful because of the work of many people at the present time. Man is superior to all of this, no matter how impressive it may be. He is to dominate this whole order, because he alone is a person, and has been given the commission to subdue the earth.

Thus an opposition between capital and labor does not derive from the production process itself. The opposition arose from a materialistic culture that tends to view the whole production process from the perspective of material consequences, of products and money. In this "economism" man and capital both are considered as "forces of production". Labor is considered as a "merchandise" that laborers sell to the employers who own and organize productive property.

The error of this perspective and the injustices to which it has led come from considering labor and capital as being on the same level and as simple parts of an economic equation. Man is treated as an instrument of production, and not as the effective subject of work. In the process of production, however, "labor is always a primary efficient cause, while capital . . . remains a mere instrument or instrumental cause." (12) This instrument conditions man's work, but it does not constitute "an impersonal 'subject' putting man and man's work into a position of dependence." (13) "Man -- as the subject of work and independent of the work he does -- man alone is a person." (12) The practice and theory of work has to be in accord with the primacy of the person.

Private Property. The solution to the conflict between capital and labor is not a denial of the right to the private possession of property, even productive property. In accord with the constant Christian tradition, the Pope reaffirms the right to such ownership. Moreover, the expropriation of productive property and the transferral of its administration to a collectivity or the state in no way assures that the human rights of the workers will be respected. Such organization can easily lead to bureaucratization, with the result that the worker feels him or herself simply a cog in an immense machine with no sense that he or she is genuinely forwarding his or her own good through his work. There may be instances in which there are sufficient reasons to socialize some productive property, but the basic solution to the conflict between capital and labor is found in recognizing that owners of property are not morally free simply to use their property as they wish.

The resources of the world were given to serve the needs of all humankind. Privately owned instruments that facilitate production are in fact the products of the work of generations of laborers through the ages. As they are the fruit of many people's work, so too their present fruit is the result of people's labor. Thus owners of property must use their property within this context.⁴ They are to use their property not in a way that obstructs the initial and abiding purpose of the resources of the world, namely, to serve the needs of all, but in a way harmonious to that purpose. Moreover, property owners should seek ways to give laborers a more active voice in the productive process and a more substantial share in its fruits. The worker "wishes to be able to take part in the very work process as a sharer in responsibility and creativity at the workbench to which he applies himself."⁽¹⁵⁾

Work as Humanization. Through sin humans turned away from God, as is reflected in a certain resistance one encounters in one's work. Scripture says that God told Adam and Eve after their sin: "In the sweat of your face shall you eat bread."⁵ Human work, physical, intellectual, administrative, or parental usually involves effort or difficulty. Work nonetheless continues to be a good for man. Though, despite its difficulty, work may well be enjoyable, "It is also good as being something worthy, that is to say, something that corresponds to man's dignity, that expresses this dignity and increases it."⁽⁹⁾ It is good to transform the world and make it more adaptable to human needs.

Through work man also transforms himself and, in a sense, "becomes `more a human being'."⁽⁹⁾ Work calls him to exercise virtues such as industriousness, patience and creativity. Work can, it is true, be used to degrade man as when he is exploited or subjected to forced labor; but this is counter to the inherent meaning of work. Moreover, through work man not only shapes himself but is enabled to build a family, for work gives him the means to found a family and raise children. Through work man can contribute to the common good of his society, to the development of a culture and a civilization. By work, indeed, human beings share in God's creative activity. They can further his creative plan and continue his work.⁽²⁵⁾

Through their toil men and women can share in the redemptive work that Christians associate with Jesus Christ, thereby contributing to the building of the Kingdom of God. Through human labor "'human dignity, brotherhood and freedom' must increase on earth."⁽²⁷⁾ This theme deserves further analysis. In this document John Paul also offers us thoughts on the rights of the worker, on the duties of the employer and of what he calls the `indirect employer', i.e., the laws of a political community and the international economic order that affect the conditions of work and so the rights of workers.

Notes on the Use of Religious Traditions and a Philosophy of the Person

John Paul II in effect combines these two sources in the use he makes of them, but it is appropriate for us to reflect briefly on each in turn.

Tradition. The use of religious tradition in this document is in line with the work of Gadamer and others who contend, against the philosophers of the Enlightenment and their followers, that the resources of our traditions can legitimately and fruitfully be brought to bear upon the present.⁶ Rather than relying on a notion of human knowledge modeled on the physical sciences or on mathematics, which models discount the authority of tradition, we should acknowledge the central importance of the knowledge which has been passed on as the heritage of a community, and hence as having an authority based on the community's experience of living through time. Our access to this sort of heritage comes through being born into a family whose language and symbol

systems mediate a people's interpretation of reality. This interpretation has been gained from an experience in history and has been handed down to our generation in a tradition embodied in a variety of traditional forms.

Such an interpretation of reality affords a vision of the goals of human life which possesses an intrinsic authority and a normative quality for a people -- one that contains in germ that people's notion of human excellence and is exemplified in its great men and women viewed as paradigms or "archetypes" of human excellence. The authority of such a past is not so much limiting as enabling. It is but natural to recognize our dependence on others who have knowledge and competence, for example a medical doctor. The same is true of our dependence on "the contribution of extended historical experience" in our cultural heritage. Such recognition can lead us to acknowledge a normative "vision which both transcends its own time and stands as directive for time to come" for our own communities. The active and formative influence of tradition makes it a living influence in our own time, one that enables us "today to determine the specific direction of our lives and mobilize a community of consensus and commitment." It can, as well, enable us to recognize those deformations specific to our own time.

Such a heritage can have particular relevance to new issues that a people faces in the present, particularly in its social life. John Paul's use of tradition is one illustration that our heritage can promote a creative exercise of freedom in our day. To act freely in the present one must know one's identity, which is impossible without an active appreciation of one's heritage. A purely abstract knowledge of humanity is inadequate. Over time there is, as it were, a dialectic in our interpretations of our past. Time can open up new possibilities of understanding our past, and such dialogic engagement with our past can give us access to fruitful possibilities for the revision of meaning.

John Paul finds in Scripture also an important resource for a social critique in our time. Critique is carried on when our interests are placed within a larger context of interests such as unity, goodness and truth. A critique of ideologies presupposes the development of communicative action by free persons. For this to happen in our world, controlled as it is by technology, we must search first within our own heritage for resources of emancipation. Some modern social critics look back for these resources to the period of the Enlightenment, but the Western heritage has deeper roots in the Biblical tradition. To recall and celebrate this heritage is to reopen a channel of inspiration and guidance for social change that speaks directly to the liberation of the poor and the alienated.

The Person. Before he was Pope, John Paul wrote a book entitled *The Acting Person* in which he used a phenomenology of the person to argue for the need of a metaphysics of the person.⁷ A number of other contemporary philosophers would also hold that nothing less than a metaphysics can do justice to our experience of being persons.

One example is found in Thomas Tracy's book, *God, Action and Embodiment*.⁸ In it, he seeks to mediate between a classical Thomistic and a Whiteheadian philosophy and theology. He notes that we understand a person through intentional agency. That is, we know a person through his or her character traits, the ways in which the person orients himself or herself to action, to self, to others. This differs from the way we know other things in our environment. It is proper to a person to initiate activity, and thus we know a person not so much by what happens to him or her but by what he or she does and the intentionality which this action expresses. Unlike, behaviorism, Tracy's approach would define as personal action not simply the external event or happening, but that event in relation to intentionality. Far from being seen dualistically, the human person in his

or her bodily action is a psycho-physical unit. Further, that we are an enduring reality through time is shown by our "story" and by the responsibility we take for past acts.

The concept of the human being as a person is not confined to the Western cultural context. Without implying complete cross-cultural agreement as to the understanding of person, it is notable that Keiji Nishitani of the Kyoto school of philosophy writes: "There is no doubt that the idea of man as a personal being is the highest idea of man which has thus far appeared. The same may be said as regards the idea of God as personal being."⁹

The distinctiveness of the human being when compared with all other material reality, a distinctiveness expressed by the term "person", gives grounds for considering humans to be superior to all else in the material order. This distinctiveness constitutes the grounds for our sense of a special dignity intrinsic to each human being that deserves the respect of the person, of other individuals, and of those holding economic and political power. Here we have the crux of John Paul's argument that work is for man and not men for work, that the human and technology cannot be considered on the same plane, nor can humans be reduced to the status of a technological tools. This human distinctiveness underlies John Paul's conviction -- one that he is far from being alone in affirming -- that the worker must be considered as a person and that the organization of the economic order must accord with that value.

One may well ask why the results of a hermeneutic reflection on Scripture and the conclusions drawn from a philosophy of the human person coincide to such an extent. Both are grounded in, and reflect, experience. Much that is seen as divine revelation within the religious tradition has been recognized as such precisely because it comes from such a depth of human reflection on the experience of a people that the resulting wisdom is recognized as God's gift and not simply human discovery. Also, a philosophy always reflects the culture in which it was born. In the West, philosophical understandings of the human being as person were not independent of the Judaeo-Christian experience of divinity as personal and the personal names of Father, Son and Holy Spirit for God in the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. Both religious tradition and the insights of philosophy will, if the depth of their understanding of the human condition be sufficiently penetrating, have relevance for times and places other than those in which they were first elaborated.

In conclusion, let us note that other religious traditions have their own resources both for the humanization of the world of work and as a line of defense against the domination over man that can so easily be conceded to technology and science. Professor Vincent Shen makes this quite clear in the case of Confucianism:

On the theoretical level, Confucianism emphasizes the priority of human subjectivity and intersubjectivity over logical and technological systems. In other words, according to Confucianism, man has to be master and not slave of science and technology. All development of the latter must be in the service of the unfolding and realization of human potentiality.¹⁰

Notes

1. Tang Yi-jie, *Confucianism, Buddhism, Daoism, Christianity and Chinese Culture* (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1991), pp. 51-54.

2. Pope John Paul II, *On Human Work (Laborem Exercens)*, Sept. 14, 1981. U.S. National Catholic News Service translation (Washington: United States Catholic Conference, 1981). The numbers found in parentheses in the text refer to the sections into which the document is divided.

3. Genesis 1:27-28.

4. Pope John Paul cites here Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* II, 66, 2 and 6.
5. Genesis 3:19.
6. In my remarks on this topic, I rely on George F. McLean, "Hermeneutics and Heritage", in his *Man and Nature* (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy and the University Press of America, 1989).
7. Karol Wojtyla, *The Acting Person* (Boston: Reidel, 1979).
8. Thomas Tracy, *God, Action and Embodiment* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1984).
9. Quoted in Hans Waldenfels, *Absolute Nothingness. Foundations for a Buddhist-Christian Dialogue* (New York: Paulist, 1980), p. 80.
10. Vincent Shen, "Confucianism, Science and Technology. A Philosophical Evaluation", *The Asian Journal of Philosophy*, 1 (1987), 75.

11. **Human Quality and Social Progress**

Zhang Huajin

This chapter concerns the importance of the quality of human life for the promotion of social progress, and correlatively the role of social space and communication in the improvement of the quality of life.

Improving the Standard of Life as a Synthetic Measure of Social Progress

1. In the last analysis, the quality of human life includes two aspects: its spiritual character and the ability to know and to act. The former consists of ideals: values, moral consciousness and creativity. The latter consists in knowing ways and means of shaping nature (e.g. using tools), and the capacity to organize and administer socio-economic development. These are intrinsically interrelated. Spiritual qualities play a normative role in guiding knowledge and action. For example, science and technology are fundamental to the abilities to know and act. It is imperative that science and technology be guided by even the most advanced science and technology may fail to do so achieve this. At the same time, given today's advanced science and technology the spiritual quality of life depends upon the quality of one's ability to know and act, without which any advanced ideal and creativity would be rendered useless. The human person is an organic unity of spiritual qualities with knowledge and action.

The overall human quality can be described and generalized from various perspectives. In accord with China's socialist modernization, the quality of the contemporary Chinese can be characterized mainly by the "Four Possessions", i.e. of ideals, morality, culture and discipline". Though seemingly abstract, but these are popular and have profound significance for modern Chinese life. They emphasize the spiritual quality of human life, especially its ideals, morality and discipline. In working for the modernization of China, which is less developed but has a population of over a billion people, it is not conceivable that there will be one common ideal, a sense of morality, and the necessary discipline.

At the same time, culture, science and technology are highly emphasized. These are not only important for raising the standard of living, they are indispensable for improving the abilities to know and act. Therefore, generally speaking, the "four possessions" include the development of human reason and intelligence, the enhancement of knowledge and action based upon modern science, as well as the enhancement of morality and life ideals. Naturally, the "four possessions" are the main factors in the quality of human life. They do not exclude such qualities as "breadth of thought", "open mind", "planning", and "respect for others", as is claimed by some foreign scholars. The concrete content of the "four possessions" necessarily will be enriched and deepened as practice develops.

2. The developmental level of the productive social force usually is taken as the measure of social progress. Certainly, this is correct, but, it is neither the sole criterion nor an integral scale of social progress.

Society is a complex system and the scale of social progress is comprised of three main aspects. (a) The level of development of the productive forces. This is the main scale and is of fundamental significance because the social productive forces are the primary basis for social

guarantee increasing plenty in the material life of the members of society, but it provides a firm material basis for their mental and physical development. (b) The extent to which people are emancipated in their social relations is reflected mainly in the different developmental stages of the socio-political structure, e.g. the degree of realization of democracy and freedom. (c) The spiritual outlook of a society depends upon the state of the development of politics, economy, science and culture in a society, but is relatively independent. It is an important aspect of spiritual civilization and plays an important role in promoting the development and progress of society. Especially where worship of power, money and fame exists, such lofty life ideals and such noble moral qualities as goodness and honesty are the mental forces required for resisting various forms of corruptions.

3. Analyzing these three aspects of social progress, it is possible to use the improvement of the standard of living and all-round development as a synthetic criterion of social progress because all three aspects are closely correlated with human development. The improvement of the quality or all-round development of human life is the complex manifestation of these three aspects, the bridge that connects them.

Human quality is decisive for the social productive force. The role played by productive means frequently is overemphasized, and they depend upon persons as their makers and operators. Indeed, this is "seeing things, but not man." Obviously, if the members of a society have a low level of culture, science and technology, then the productive force also will be low. This is shown in the UNESCO statistics for 1985,¹ where the level of illiteracy of a country or area is in inverse proportion with its gross national product.

<i>Illiterate in Area</i>	<i>total population (%)</i>	<i>GNP (\$) (mean per person)</i>
World	27.7	2557
Developed countries	2.1	8324
Developed countries	38.2	656
Africa	54	629
Asia	36.3	960
Latin America	17.3	1671
Less developed countries	67.6	195

The extent to which people are emancipated from poverty is a necessary criterion for social progress or development. It correlates closely with the quality of human life. In comparison with feudalism, capitalism is a progressive form for society. The members of capitalist society have been emancipated from the yoke of feudal production and have won autonomy and the rights freedom and equality in both the economic and the political relations. "Emancipation" and "freedom" are equivalent concepts. According to Marx's doctrine, in the future ideal society the emancipation of humans will reach a very high degree so that "eventually man will become master of his own social integration, and hence of nature and of himself -- a man for freedom."² However, the further emancipation from the economic, political and other relations of society depends entirely upon the quality of human life, i.e. upon one's ability to know and act. To reform the productive and other social relations which have bound humans, it is essential that they consciously demand reform, and in doing this the ability to act is also important.

The spiritual outlook of society is an indispensable criterion of social progress. The ideal of life toward which humans strive is its spiritual support and the core of its spiritual force. Morality is the self-discipline of the human spirit; it is the interior law of one's self-responsibility. The ideal

of life and morality are generated from certain productive or economic relations in society and hence are determined by the material conditions of life, and vary as the economic and political relations of society are reformed. Different social systems and their developmental phases have their own life ideal and moral standards, some of which reflect not only the economic, political and cultural state of society, but also the developmental level of its quality of life.

In the work of reform in China, it is increasingly realized that it is impossible to judge the development of socialist modernization based only on economic indices. Recently, for the guiding ideas and concrete measures we pay greater care to ordinary economic activities but do not give sufficient attention to the all-round development of the quality of human life, its ideals and morality. Where the therefore has occupied great time, effort and interest. But there has been a failure in recent years to take account of the ideals and morality. Though non-economic, these factors could exert a tremendous influence upon economic development. Moreover, if one stresses the economy and slights the quality of human life, or stresses money and slights values and national consciousness and aspirations, it is difficult for the country to be economically successful. There is some progress in that now we stress more building the spiritual civilization of socialism and strive to enhance the quality of human life. Therein lies the hope of socialist modernization.

Enhancing the Quality of Human Life and Developing Social Interaction

1. The present possibilities for development lie in social interaction, namely, the mutual relations and exchanges in the economy, science and thought. In philosophical terms, social contact is the mutual subjective and objective exchange, through the medium of natural things of physical and mental products, between the individual (or person) and the community (such as state or area, group); also it is the basic pattern of individual actions which transform social activities.

This interaction has great significance for social development, while at the same time guaranteeing that this retains all the elements of a human. Whether or not the productive forces especially invention and creation are lost depend on the extent of these contacts in the process of development. There are cases in the Chinese past where a unique skill or secret medical care was lost because these were passed on only sons, not to daughters (*Chuan zi bu chuan nu*). Social contacts also could promote developments and the invention of scientific technology through the great vitality they inject. There are many instances of this, such as the four inventions of China gaining rapid development and application after spreading to Europe, and the transformation of the imperial examination system of ancient China into the civil service system in Western Europe.

Through social contacts in economic cooperation, importing advanced scientific technology and exchanging talent have come distinct improvements in politics and the economy. After the second world war, the Japanese economy underwent rapid development due to economic and scientific exchanges. China has strengthened and extended such contacts both internationally and internally, and thereby developed its social economy and the spiritual outlook of the people. In other words, transforming a closed and stagnant economic system into an open economic system has developed the productive forces. The country is now entering a new stage in which the economy will develop vigorously, the national power will be strengthened rapidly and the well-being of the masses will improve remarkably.

2. In order for social contacts to bring about great social progress there is required an improvement of the quality of human life. First, social contacts change the aim and the scope of people's production and activity; they broaden people's outlook, raise their level of freedom and

kindle their initiative and creative power. Secondly, social interchange enables to learn and absorb new cultural and scientific content; as a result the structure of people's knowledge and the form of their thinking is changed and their ability to reflect and act is strengthened. For example, the ancient Greeks spent a good deal of time travelling within their country, to Egypt, etc. This shaped an open manner of thinking, and a tradition which could absorb other cultures and create a splendid ancient civilization. Third, social interchange impels a change in people's values. undoubtedly, by reason one can envisage an ideal of life, think through the overall situation, and form a vision of the whole. But, this understanding depends upon broad contact and interchange the ideals of value which order objects of knowledge according as they are considered good or bad reflect also a people's hopes and desires, which in turn, are bound to be reflected and judge in the process of social interaction.

Since the transformation and the opening of China in 1978, people's social contacts have become more widespread; the scope of their activity has been extended, their vision broadened, and their enterprise and initiative intensified especially, more close ideas of value and forms of thinking have been transformed and increasingly replaced by a new horizons oriented toward modernization, the world, and the future.

3. Enhancing the quality of life depends upon social contacts and the implied social progress. Developments in the social economy provide a solid material foundation to enhance the quality of life by raising productive efficiency, this provides more "free-time", with opportunities to develop our cultural and scientific knowledge, and to engage in recreational activities. All this is good for health of mind and body, and enhances one's capacities for thought and action. The more rapidly a country develops its economy, the higher its productive efficiency and the more time people have, beyond the production of material goods, eating and sleeping, for other activities which enhance their abilities of mind and action. "Free-time" has differed for ancient primitives, agricultural peoples (the era of a self-sufficient agricultural economy), and industrial workers (the era of socialized production). Throughout the development of the social economy and the increase of "free-time" has been the condition for enhancing the quality of human life.

The life expectancy of primitive man: 18 years,
the "free-time" of primitive man: 4 years.
The life expectancy of agricultural man: 35 years,
the "free-time" of primitive man: 11 years.
The life expectancy of industrial man: 70 years,
the "free-time" of industrial man: 36.33 years.

In addition, information staff member's free-time in industrialized countries are four hours and 18 minutes to four hours and 24 minutes each day (men), and three hours to three hours and 30 minutes daily (women). This is connected with the development of human ability: the higher the degree of civilization in the social system, the greater the degree of freedom of political thought. However, arousing one's latent potentialities and creativity is the condition for enhancing the scientific and cultural quality of the members of society. Strengthening the legal system and good moral habits are bound to enable the member of society to develop law-abiding and the moral sentiments. As social conditions exert a strong uplifting influence on people, social development enhances the quality of life and human abilities.

The Quality of Life and the Modernization of China

An important task now faced all countries is to enhance the quality of life. Long experience practice has led to the conclusion that it is necessary to make great efforts to enhance this quality in order fully to achieve China's socialist modernization.

1. China is one of the oldest civilized countries in the world, the wisdom and diligence of the Chinese people has been well known everywhere. Its economy, politics and culture have developed greatly since the initiation of the new China. It is still a developing country, however, with the largest population in the world. Because of many complicated historical causes, its economic and cultural development lagged, and developed in an imbalanced manner. In general, then the standard of life is not accord with the requirements of socialist modernization. An idea of the progress that had to be made can be gathered from the 1990 Department of Population Census announcement 15.8 percent of the total population is illiterate and semi-illiterate; among these 10.8 percent of teenagers from 12 to 15 years of age are illiterate. Persons between 15-19 age receive less than a middle school education. In the industrial sector, experts and technicians are 2.8 percent of the total workers. The physical quality of the population is an important problem. The divorce rate is presently 1.5 percent, but rises to 17 percent in some region. There are 50 million disabled persons, among which 10 million are mentally handicapped.³ This situation of the population illustrates the gap between the quality of human life and modernization.

The character of the people has strongly affected China's modernization. Though sometimes overlooked, historically the production rate of the country remained low, and were general phenomena of high-consumption and low-efficiency, higher imports than production. China has had great achievements since 1949 and reform and open door policy of 1978; recent years this has been astounding. This effects the quality with respect of the politics, economics, thought, culture, ethics, etc. of the Chinese people.

2. The general quality of life and Chinese socialist modernization have been receiving ever greater consideration by politicians and scholars. Experience shows that modernization depends upon the quality.

The quality of life is a consequence of history which, in turn, it effects. Under socialist conditions, the quality of the whole people is improved by lightening the burden of social production developing new relationships among the people on the basis of public ownership, and deeply transforming the entire face of society. This is a requisite condition if the modernization of China is to be a success.⁴

In recent years, the government has done much to enhance the quality of life. Across the spectrums from the center to the localities great efforts continue to be made. This important goal of the country involves the following tasks.

(a) To emphasize education regarding ideals and morality. Common ideals and ethics are the spiritual support of our people, the symbol of the cohesion of the Chinese people, and the effective basis for modernization.

(b) To develop the scientific and cultural levels of the nation and to diffuse education in science and technology. In the process of modernization, the economy is, of course, the first factor; but cultural development has been disregarded, and both must supplement each other. Enhancing the quality of life depends upon education and has been increasingly emphasized. But the

educational investment is low in proportion of GNP. For instance, through out the world it was 5.7 percent in 1985, but only 3.2 percent in China in 1987. This was lower even than some developing countries in Africa. Recently, the various levels of government have paid more attention to this problem; some private people also have set up schools and spread education. It must be a matter of great and perduring efforts to encourage the various levels of society to esteem knowledge, to respect the intelligentsia, and to emphasize education in sciences and culture.

(c) To pay more attention to the construction of the legal system, and to develop legal education. The "person" is the embodiment of law and morals. John Locke, the English philosopher, said in his *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* that "Man is a term of law". Our country is one ruled by law: "To know law", "To observe law", and "To protect law" are both obligations of the people and qualities they possess. The government has enacted many laws and regulations. The Central Committee of the CCP and the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and the State Council decided that it would five years to spread a basic knowledge of law throughout the entire people of China. Significant achievements have been made in constructing the body of law and disseminating legal education; this trend will continue.

(d) To emphasize birth control and eugenics as necessary for enhancing the nation's quality of life. Unchecked growth of the population has retarded not only economic growth but the development and disseminate of technology and education, seriously hampering quality of life of the nation. Birth control and eugenics will be a significant problem for a comprehensive enhancement of life and relates even to national survival.

(e) Physical culture and training contributes to the natural quality of a human life and increases one's ability to act. On the one hand, it cultivates habits of application, of "firm and indomitable" endurance and of enterprise. The government and various social groups have invested a great deal of energy in developing physical-culture, and have had real achievements. However, there is still great unevenness in this regard whereas in some developed countries 50 percent of the total population engage in some form of exercise only 30 percent do so in China. More must be done to extend and intensify the physical quality of life.

Notes

1. *Journal of Chinese Education*, January 20, 1990.
2. Friedrich Engels, *Socialism from Utopia to Scientific Discovery*.
3. *Life*, August 1, 1990.
4. "Resolution on the Guidance Regarding the Construction of a Socialist Spiritual Civilization, the Central Committee of CCP", Oct. 1990.

12. **The Culture of Shanghai and Modernization**

Wang Miaoyang

Generally speaking, the Shanghai cultural style refers to one characteristic of the process of the modernization of Shanghai. During that process, various Western Cultures clashed and combined with Chinese cultural traditions to form a Shanghai culture, which featured its regional culture in contrast to that of Beijing. This will not be a systematic analysis of Shanghai culture, but a philosophical reflection upon it and the general issue of modernization in Shanghai.

The Modernization of Shanghai

The modernization of Shanghai began in 1843 when, for the first time, its harbor was opened to the outside world. During 1840-1842 China had lost the first Opium War and was compelled to sign the "Nanjing Treaty" which stipulated that China open five commercial ports, including Shanghai. The "Human Treaty" signed in 1843 by the Chinese and British governments specified that the British could build houses in certain areas of the five commercial ports, thereby laying the foundation for the foreign concessions in Shanghai. On November 17, 1843, Shanghai was officially opened to the outside world and during the next hundred years (1843-1949) became not only the largest city in China with the highest degree of modernization, but also one of the largest cities in Asia and in the whole world.

This is not a long history. Before 1840, Shanghai was an inconspicuous, medium-sized city with a moderate population of hardly 200,000. Compared to Suzhou, Hangzhou and Nanjing, it was less developed in politics, culture and economy. This lack of a prior developed tradition enabled it abruptly to become the largest multi-functional economic center in China as development in commerce stimulated the development of such relevant industries as finance, transportation, etc. Both the first foreign-funded bank and the first Chinese bank began in Shanghai. During 1920-1930, the head-quarters of all the main Chinese as well as foreign banks were established in Shanghai, making it the financial center of both China and the Far East. In 1930, one-seventh of ships from and to China exited or entered through Shanghai so that tonnage accounted for one-fourth of the total in China, the largest in the country. Its four passages: the inland and outland rivers, the Changjian river and the East China Sea, made it a central port. With the inauguration of railways and airlines connecting it with other parts of China, Shanghai became the most important transportation hub. In the 1930s, modern industry in Shanghai was drastically developed. Among the 12 largest cities in China, for example, the capital value of the enterprises with over 30 employees in Shanghai accounted for 60 percent of the total, while their output value accounted for 66 percent. All this indicates that Shanghai played a crucial role in the development of the Chinese economy.

Economic modernization promoted cultural development as well. With the opening up, Western thought became more and more popular. Influenced by its dissemination, seven of the ten famous translation agencies were located in Shanghai; 80 percent of the translations were published in Shanghai. Shanghai became the base for the best publishing houses, such as the Commercial Publishing House, etc. In addition, painting exhibits, plays, Chinese folk arts, novels and films of a unique Shanghai character emerged. By the end of the 1940s, Shanghai could be

considered the most Westernized city in China. Due to this communication between, and combination of, Chinese and Western cultures, Shanghai was influenced broadly and deeply in its material and spiritual dimensions, its behavior and concepts, and even its language and customs.

It should be pointed out that the special position of Shanghai in national politics and culture was not completely manifest till the Reform Movement of 1898. Before then Shanghai had become the largest base in China for disseminating Western thought, as well as the city with the largest number of modern schools, and the chief place to publicize new ideas. After the Reform Movement, some participants from other parts of China fled to concessions in Shanghai in order to avoid arrest. The 3,000 intellectuals from all over China who thus arrived in Shanghai greatly stimulated the culture of Shanghai and further added to the attractiveness of the city. At the same time, this promoted the development and dissemination of modern democratic thought. Later, in 1915, the New Youth, a well known magazine was published, which led to the upsurge of scientific and democratic thought. Moreover, socialist ideas were introduced to China, and finally in 1921 the Chinese Communist Party was founded in Shanghai.

The Western colonists, however mean their purposes and misdeeds, unconsciously played a positive role in stimulating social progress of Shanghai. In order to spread their own ideas and dominate education, the Western colonists translated their culture into Chinese and brought advanced science and technology, as well as modern Western social theories.

Three Types of Culture in the Modernization of Shanghai

Many factors facilitated the modernization of Shanghai, among which culture undoubtedly played an important role. Broadly speaking, all resulting from human behavior can be called "culture", but in a narrow sense only what becomes part of the social values and norm of behavior can be defined as "culture". Three factors, i.e. science, commerce and politics, played a comparatively major role in the modernization of Shanghai.

Of the three cultural factors, politics was the first to be manifest in terms of values and norms of behavior. Ever since the country was founded, politics, as one type of culture, had played a very significant role in social life. Aristotle's famous saying "Human beings are political animals" well reflects the guiding role of political culture in social life. Science and commerce appeared comparatively much later and did not become a worldwide culture until the emergence of the modern capitalist mode of production. For modern China, only political culture was native, while scientific and commercial culture came nearly all from abroad.

During the 50 years since the opening of Shanghai, science and technology were mostly imported. Only in the early 20th century did the quantity of works on social science and the number of literary and artistic novels notably increase. This phenomenon reflected the shift of attention in Shanghai from the Western material culture to Western values, ethics and other aspects of spiritual culture.

Compared with scientific culture, commercial culture experienced more setbacks. In feudal China an attitude closing the country to international intercourse led to the policy of the ruling class "stressing agriculture while constricting commerce". The development of commerce was limited, and merchants had a comparatively low social position. Although Zheng He, a well-known Chinese navigator, sailed to the Pacific Ocean half a century earlier than Columbus and surpassed his Western counterparts in scale, equipment and technology of sailing, he did not make a "great geographical discovery" or promote Chinese foreign trade. The deep-rooted attitude of "neglecting commerce" was closely related to the traditional concept of "emphasizing righteousness and

neglecting benefits". The modernization of Shanghai, which began with commerce and promoted the economy, challenged traditional values and neglected the principle of "emphasizing righteousness and neglecting benefits." The development of commerce not only changed people's values, but also trained the people to value actual benefits as well as to take concrete action. However, on the whole the commercial culture was fragile.

In the process of the modernization of Shanghai, new contents were added to its political culture. Some Western systematic cultural content and democratic ideas introduced through the concessions in Shanghai enlightened the feudal autocracy of the late Qing Dynasty and encouraged people to convert to modern political concepts. One new element must be pointed out specifically, namely, that in the political culture of the early 20th century Marxism and socialism combined with concrete revolutionary practice to form Mao Tse-tung's ideas. Later this was to become the guideline for the Chinese revolution and help to found the new socialist China with remarkable achievements. Dr. Joseph Lee noted that, "The reason why modern Chinese intellectuals commonly accept Communist thought is especially that neo-Confucianism is closely connected with the ideas of dialectical materialism." This combination of foreign and traditional Chinese cultures may account for the vitality of culture.

Generally speaking, the three cultural elements adapt to one another, but this does not mean that they do not have conflicts. Under certain circumstances, commercial culture may be contrary to scientific culture, and conflict with political culture. Therefore in the process of modernization, it is necessary to readjust and coordinate the relationship among the three so as to benefit both economic development and the progress of modernization.

Some Thoughts on the Shanghai Cultural Style

"Shanghai Style", a term widely circulated since the late Qing Dynasty, originated in the fields of painting and drama. At first, the painter who sold his or her paintings was said to belong to "the school of the sea" or "Shanghai Style". This was a derogatory term given to the new school of painting by the traditional painters, who regarded Shanghai as a place of disorder, immaturity, superficiality and vulgarity. Then the Beijing Opera circles in Shanghai launched a renewal of traditional Beijing Opera with a reform in theatrical techniques: co-staging actors and actresses, the production of new plays, and the employment of new stage properties such as artistic stage lighting and scenery. This was the beginning of an independent "Shanghai Style" different from the traditional Beijing Style. This gained in popularity and as people began to appreciate its broader possibilities they tended to apply this term to the general culture of the area. Till now, it has no strict, scientific and commonly accepted definition. We are inclined to attach to it a richer meaning, applying it to cultural characteristics in general rather than to one concrete cultural element.

Philosophically, the cultural characteristics of the "Shanghai style" are the following:

1. It harmoniously incorporates things of diverse nature. It is not non-traditional for it has inherited some parts of traditional culture; yet it contains additional elements. It has mixed, combined, and even merged and unified the cultures from home and from abroad, of East and West, of tradition and non-tradition, and of high and low taste to develop a special form of culture.
2. It has encouraged exploration and creation, while it has abandoned bondage to outmoded conventions. Lu Xun once made a penetrating analysis about the differences between the Beijing and Shanghai styles: "Beijing was the capital of the Ming and Qing Dynasties while Shanghai was the concessions of the big powers. The capital was rich with officials and the concessions were

rich with businessmen. . . . In general, 'Beijing Style' was the vehicle for the officials, while 'Shanghai Style' served businessmen." (*Essays in the Qiejieting*, II). The vehicle for officials naturally would defend conventions while that of the businessmen would renew itself to meet the needs of the audiences. Consequently, the former became the embodiment of conservatism, while the latter the sign of renovation.

3. It enjoyed massive popularity. Compared with the Beijing Style, the Shanghai Style obviously catered to more people and thus incorporated various characteristics and popular forms.

Shanghai's historic experience and the formation of the "Shanghai Style" during the period from the mid-19th to the mid-20th century appears to have contributed a great deal to the present modernization in China and invites further investigation.

13.

Cultural Tradition and Modernization: Symbiosis in the Development of Moral Reasoning

Richard A. Graham

Chinese philosophers seem to agree that the problem facing China today is to foster, at the same time, progress in both "material civilization" and "spiritual civilization". In the 1991 joint colloquium on "Cultural Traditions and Modernization" they developed this general idea in several ways in papers on "Morals and Law", "Individual and the Collective", "Quality of Man and Social Progress", "Conflict and Interfusion" and "In Search of Wisdom".

As one philosopher put it, "Traditional culture, as an accumulation of wisdom and historical experience is not something static or unchangeable, . . . traditional culture reflects the ways custom and modernization interact on each other." But, he adds, it is important to avoid "realizing modernization ahead of schedule."

The Chinese philosophers reached several other conclusions which seem consistent with the findings of the research of the late Lawrence Kohlberg and our colleagues at the Center for Moral Education and Development at Harvard University. The findings of this research are supported by studies conducted by other researchers on moral development and the development of self-identity. Studies by these researchers have contributed to a set of volumes on the foundations of moral education, edited by George F. McLean, especially the third volume. Much of what follows draws upon this work, and includes as well his "Person, Modern Growth and Character Development" in volume one.¹

Convergent Conclusions on Culture and Its Transformation

I shall draw the following conclusions from the papers of the Chinese philosophers and then refer to research and analyses from several fields of the social and biological sciences which appear to support them.

From China: Personal Culturation

The construction in material civilization, the construction in spiritual civilization and the reforming in the organizational system all promote one another.

The spiritual outlook of society depends on the states of development of politics, economy, science and the culture of a society. . . . Social contacts impel people's ideas of value change. The quality of human life is a consequence of history and in turn has effect on history.

Individual liberal development is the aim of human development. . . . When we trace back in history, we see that the further the age is from the present the less the individual is independent. In capitalist society . . . most people still lack the conditions for liberal development.

In the life of a primitive society, custom as the most important form of moral norm, became a system through a combination of moral and legal norms; morals and laws were fused to form the body of custom. . . . The moral norm has no specific form, but exists in the social ideology and popular views and beliefs of current society. . . . We should appraise the morals of human behavior objectively and historically.

Wisdom conceals itself behind knowledge. . . . The disclosing of the world corresponds to the opening of the mind; to know the world is to understand oneself. . . . If one cultivates his or her mind perfectly and allows it to open freely, one will know certainly what is right and wrong, what is good and what is evil, and then will behave accordingly.

From the Kohlberg Center for Moral Education and Development: The Developmental Character of a Moral Civilization

The research at the Center for Moral Education and Development² supports all of these conclusions, except the very last, the Socratic notion that if one knows the good, one will act according to the good. Indeed, our research shows that there is a quite complex relationship between moral judgment and ethical behavior. However, the research supports the other Chinese conclusions in the following ways."

Modern civilizations and their systems of organization do indeed appear to foster the development of what might be called "moral civilization". The research strongly indicates that the norms of moral development of the members of a society largely "depend on the states of development, politics, economy, science and the culture of society."

One of the clearest findings of the research was that the higher levels of abstract reasoning required for responsibility in modern science, industry and administration are also necessary, though insufficient, for higher level reasoning on issues of justice. In every longitudinal study conducted, the development of higher order abstract reasoning preceded an individual's development of a corresponding level of moral judgment.

Individual liberal development may not yet be the aim of human development in most societies, but the research strongly supports the Chinese conclusion that it should be a significant part of the aim. In their essay, "Development as the Aim of Education",³ Kohlberg and Mayer noted that in the United States, as in many societies, there are three somewhat conflicting, yet somewhat supporting aims of education, each of which is associated with a separate ideology and psychological theory. They are:

(1) The aim of mental and physical health and the development of identity and personality. The aim is associated with the romantic ideology and psychological view that, if left to biological maturation, the natural goodness in a person will come out. In the West, this notion often is associated with Rousseau and sometimes with Freud.

(2) The aim of cultural transmission, the internationalization by an individual of knowledge, cultural rules and values and vocational skills. This aim, associated with John Locke and B.F. Skinner, is the aim most cited as a political concern in modern societies.

(3) The aim of cognitive development or of the higher stage of reasoning which is required for technological and ethical development. This involves sequential reorganization of knowledge found in an individual's "deep structures of thought", "internally organized systems of relations" or "general patterns of thinking about the self and the world". In the course of individual human development, previously formed mental structures are found to be inadequate when the individual perceives discrepancies between his or her mental organization of concepts and categories, one-of-a-kind restructuring of thought which nonetheless follows a highly predictable sequence of development and which, at its highest stages, approaches a kind of universalizable pattern of scientific and moral reasoning. The content of thought, the knowledge and cultural heritage of each individual, remains quite different, but the structures of reasoning which organize the content of

thought show great similarity. An individual's thought content comes much from cultural tradition, while one's stimulus for progressive reorganization of mental structure comes much from the resorting of thought that is required by modernization and, most particularly, for the establishment and maintenance of representative government. As John Stuart Mill observed, representative government will not be maintained unless enough people are ready and willing to maintain it. Readiness requires a quality of thought, and willingness involves reliance upon personal and cultural values. Hence, the aim of education cannot be wholly cultural transmission, or liberal development or mental health and personality development, but rather a symbiotic combination of all three.

Convergence between Moral Reasoning and Personal Independence

Recent historical and anthropological analyses of how moral norms of societies seem to confirm the Chinese philosopher's conclusion that the further back the age, "the less the individual is independent," and that in primitive societies "morals and law were fused in the body of custom."

Similar observations have been made in assessing the independence or, more accurately, the autonomy of reasoning, of individuals in tribal and in feudal societies and, in more controversial comparisons, the relative independence of individuals in democratic and in authoritarian societies. The basic premise of the progressive development of cultures over time seems to be confirmed by the recent analyses of the historical development of a society's socio-technological complexity and the accompanying development of its religious, social and legal institutions -- the institutions of a society that are particularly concerned with the freedom and dignity of the person. Analyses conducted by Leonard T. Hobhouse around the turn of the century and reported in his *Morals in Evolution: A Study in Comparative Ethics*⁴ recently have been expanded upon by Elfenbein and others.⁵ They found comparable evidence that the patterns of moral reasoning as expressed in a society's religious teachings, its legal codes, its interpretations of legends and epics and the literature of the time, were remarkably alike. Further, the more primitive the socio-technological development of the society, the less its norms of moral reasoning were concerned with the independence and dignity of the individual.

The Chinese philosopher is certainly right in saying that in the United States and other Capitalist societies "most people are still lacking in the conditions for liberal development." Several studies confirm that in the United States and in other modern Western societies only about 20 percent of the people exhibit a capacity for moral judgment that can be considered liberal. This is the stage of individual development at which justice is defined in terms of equal rights and opportunities for all and at which one's rights are matched by one's obligation to assure them for all others.

It is a matter of pressing concern for many Americans that the conditions that foster liberal development still are lacking for most people and that there is a growing uncertainty about what to do about it. School improvement and the laws and regulatory agencies that are intended to advance equality of rights and opportunities seem unlikely to assure liberal development when an individual's growth begins in a fractured family and brutal neighborhood. And if, by the time a child reaches school age, he or she does not have a good foundation in language and a sense of what it is to be a good person as established by family precepts, religious teachings and cultural traditions, he or she is unlikely to possess the rudimentary structures of thought upon which the early experiences of formal education must in large part rely. Typically, this shared failure of family, school and society becomes apparent at about the fourth grade and, unless there is great

change in their social environment, for most Americans the likelihood of liberal development has already been closed off.

The research confirms the Chinese philosopher's conclusion that, "If one cultivates his mind perfectly, he will know what is right and wrong, what is good and evil but, as noted earlier, to know the good is not enough to assure behavior according to the good." The mind, as he suggests, requires more than a planting of knowledge and accepted belief. It requires cultivation, a plowing through and turning over of ideas and experiences with people in the world. And, if one has sufficient time and opportunity, one will indeed go beyond the transmitted knowledge and cultural traditions that establish good and evil for most people. He or she will progress to self-developed wisdom, to an individual, autonomous judgment of right and wrong, of good and evil that shares the same structure of reasoning for persons of autonomous judgement in all societies of the world. But, as noted earlier in this paper, for most people, in most societies the transmitted cultural values of the society to which one belongs, and especially the moral norms of one's sub-culture, whether they are of the seminary or the street gang, are the more powerful.

Conflicts and Reconciliation

The conflict between reason and desire or between reason and compulsion is perhaps the most worked-over aspect of the "philosophers' dichotomies". Sometimes it is expressed as the conflict between virtue and appetite or the super ego and the id. It is, I believe, the ultimate indication that the philosophical dichotomy is false, for just as cultural tradition and modernization are not dichotomous but rather symbiotic, so too are appetite and reason. This is borne out by two fields of research which are closely related although conducted in two widely separated disciplines. One is research in early childhood development which deals with the child's search for order, explanation, and identity, the other is neuro-physiological research which deals with the neural maps in the brain having to do with the formation of concepts and categories.

Gerald Edelman, in *Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection*,⁶ reports on his Nobel Prize winning research and describes how, during gestation, the human fetus begins to develop the fundamentally alike, but extraordinarily unique, interconnections in the brain upon which the phenomena of concepts and categories depend. Similarly, Jerome Bruner⁷ and others, in their research on early childhood development, describe the child's efforts that begin shortly after birth to make sense of things, to find order and predictability in the world and to establish his or her own identity as separate from others. It is, in effect, an effort to establish the rudimentary concepts, categories and structures of reasoning which act upon, and are acted upon by all subsequent information and experience. What seems clear from all of this is the inter-connection, from the very beginning, between the development of reason and the development of self.

Thus, in human development, as for all life on earth, there appears to be a natural force for the preservation and progress of the individual which acts to preserve and improve the species. For *homo sapiens* this force manifests itself in a drive to know the self, to know the world and to know God or Nature's intent as a means of preserving the self or the soul. When reason and passion for preservation of one's imaginary are in self-conflict, whether passion for "self"-preservation stems from sympathy or selfishness, "Reason", as David Hume observed, "is and must only be the slave of passion." As strong as the force for reason may be, the force for "self"-preservation is stronger. It is a "self" or soul that is self-defined in terms of nationality, faith or the social expectations of self-assigned responsibility. It is the self whose preservation is more important than life itself. Individuals sacrifice their lives for their children, their nation, their faith or their

pride. Most look to the after-life of the self in heaven, in reincarnation, in ancestor worship, in their vestiges in their children or by their names on college libraries or in the indices of philosophical journals.

I fear that most philosophers and historians distrust social science research and little understand its method. Even if there was room in this paper to present the tests of reliability and validity along with the research designs and data analyses which provide exceptionally strong evidence that these research findings have great significance for understanding the process of an individual's moral development and the development of the normative values and moral judgments of a society. I doubt that they would be more persuasive. Hence the credibility of these findings will need to be buttressed by their similarity with philosophical conclusions arrived at separately. Still I believe that this research provides telling insights on how to draw upon the stabilizing and unifying forces of cultural tradition during a period of accelerating modernization.

However, at least partly because it is so foreign to their usual criteria for analysis, this research is not much attended to by American philosophers, historians or theologians. Recent "best-seller" philosophers -- Alasdair MacIntyre,⁸ Isaiah Berlin,⁹ and, more recently, Francis Fukuyama¹⁰ -- largely ignore historical change in human nature and likewise eschew belief in human progress, however slow, toward a kind of universal sense of human justice that spans cultural traditions. Mostly they ignore the prospect of reconciliation of cultural traditions and modernization and instead revitalize "the philosophers' dichotomy" in its various manifestations: universalism vs cultural relativity, individualism vs communalism, reductionism vs hermeneutics, rationalism vs romanticism, scientific materialism vs philosophical or religious revelation. Most of them, more or less openly, subscribe to a kind of cultural relativity.

The more prominent contemporary philosophers seem to think of human nature in historical terms somewhat modified by the median characteristics of today's adult males in Western societies. They pay little heed to research that examines differences in the structures of thought of individuals of different ages or in different circumstances, both within a society and between societies. They appear unaware of how the general pattern of development of moral reasoning from childhood to adulthood varies in "primitive" and "modern" societies. Instead, they conclude from their observations of "median man" that "his" identity, values and moral judgments not only *are* determined by the norms of "his" society -- which the research confirms as generally true -- but that they *ought* to be so determined. Having witnessed the horrors of social engineering in behalf of "universal man", they deny the possibility of natural human progress toward universalizable principles of justice.

Conclusion

I fear that ethical relativist philosophers will reject what I believe to be the fundamental message from the research, namely, that the philosophers' dichotomy is false; that reason and passion are not in opposition, that "enlightenment", tradition and revelation can work together for human progress.

It is largely from cultural tradition and religious faith that the paramount virtue of sympathy or love will be preserved in a society. But the stimulus of modernization has much to do with the development of a quality of reasoning that is necessary a balanced sense of freedom and responsibility for the establishment and maintenance of representative government.

Notes

1. *Philosophical Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development*, George F. McLean, Frederick E. Ellrod, David Schindler and Jesse A. Mann, eds. *Psychological Foundations of Moral Education and Character Development: An Integrated Theory of Moral Development*, Richard T. Knowles and George F. McLean, eds. *Character Development in Schools and Beyond* Kevin Ryan, Thomas Lickona and George F. McLean, eds. (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992).
2. School of Education, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.
3. Kohlberg and Nager, "Development as the Aim of Education: The Dewey View." In L. Kohlberg *The Philosophy of Moral Development* (New York: Harper of Row, 1981).
4. J.T. Hobnswse, *Moral in Evolution: A Study of Comparative Ethics* (New York: Holt, 1923), (originally published in 1906).
5. D. Elfenbein, "Moral Stages in Societal Evolution", unpublished bachelor's thesis, Harvard University, 1973.
6. G. Edelman, *Neural Darwinism: The Theory of Neuronal Group Selection* (New York: Basic Books, 1987).
7. J. Bruner, *Child's Talk: Learning to Language* (New York: Norton, 1983).
8. A. McIntyne, *After Virtues: A Study in Moral Theory* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Press, 1984).
9. I. Berlin, *The Invoked Timber of Humanity* (New York: Knopf, 1991).
10. F. Fukugama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

Appendix I

Transcending Figures: Differences and Similarities between Chinese and Western Aesthetic Images

Cheng Chaonan

As we face the objective world, sheer sensitivity would encounter what William James called "a blooming, buzzing confusion." In describing the world and distinguishing things we make forms which can be representatives of things. Usually by copying an object, people formulate a figure or natural symbol. For most nations, this would not be difficult to understand, because a figure is linked mainly to sense and everyone's senses are the same.

Further, since the act of copying an object is likened to one's culture, it is an action of intelligence, and hence the figure must have some characteristics of the culture. For example, though there seems to be hardly any difference among the figures preserved on rocks since remote antiquity in 120 countries, still we find a difference between two kinds of figures which markedly reflect their respective culture. One is a figure of bear in the Three-brother's cave in France; this is lifelike and gives one a sense of three dimensions. The other is a figure of some wild goats in Inner Mongolia, which is succinct and lineal in style.

The key issue in Chinese culture concerns "How to be a real man", relations among persons, and the relation between man and nature. The aim of Confucianists is to be a sage or a benevolent person, that of Taoists is to be a true man or a man wholly in harmony with nature. In view of this, Confucianists expect artists to improve social and moral life, and take poems as uttering their lofty aspirations. Taoists expect artists to return to nature, and say "Nothing is more beautiful than simplicity."

In contrast, European art is developed from the Greek and has as its main point how to understand the world. Socrates said, "Knowledge is the most beautiful thing" and Aristotle wrote that "People got their first knowledge from imitation." The imitation theory of art was the most important in the European art tradition.

Transcending Ordinary Images

Artistic images are the results of transcending ordinary figures which themselves may not be works of art. Art works are figures which are essentially aesthetic in value; every good work of art is beautiful.

The Chinese cultural tradition exerted a tremendous influence on Chinese traditional arts. A silk painting from the Warring States period depicts a phoenix which defeated a serpent-like monster; below them is a young woman. It expresses the central idea that evil is overcome by good. All the images in the picture are flat, in the style of line drawing. This great image corresponds to the Taoist school of thought that "A great image is without form". Idea (import) is more essential than imitation for Chinese traditional arts.

Yi-Ching raises the problem of "forming images" and declares this to be necessary to express ideas. Zhuangzi said language is for ideas; when we have understood the idea, we must forget the language. "Writing cannot our meaning nor the meaning exhaust our idea (import)." He stressed getting the idea on import: "To get the idea" must be integrated with "to form images"; the integration to the two is called Chinese imagery. In creating works of art, Chinese traditional

artists paid more attention to "getting the idea" and belittled the importance of imitation. They maintained that the one who could imitate the object exactly was only a craftsman, not a painter.

The Greek tradition on "how to understand the world" exerted great influence on European art. One of the Greek bottle paintings from the 5th century B.C. describes some soldiers who are pre-paring for war. The figures are absolutely lifelike. It gives the observer the sense of three dimensions. Socrates asked a famous Greek painter whether in order to create a most beautiful man one should gather each beautiful part from different men; the answer was "yes." Aristotle wrote, "We make images and imitate things using various colors and postures." When European artists imitated objects, they intended to create typical images reflecting the essence of a kind of things. C.L.S. Moutesquieu declared that beauty is the gathering of the best general and typical things. The Russian democrats also advocated an art that reflected the essence of social life.

Art and Feeling

In Ming and Qing Dynasties, Chinese arts intended to express "feelings", "taste", "desire" and "beauty". It was a new trend reflecting the simple nature of man, which shook off the yoke of the feudal ethical code. Tang Xian Zu said, "Dream comes forth from feeling, and drama comes forth from dream."

In the Qing Dynasty, skill at imitation was introduced into China by Joseph Castilione. He drew some pictures in the Western style for the Qing Court, but they could not be appreciated there. One of the important painters of the Chinese painting circle then said that the Western painters were good at perspective so that you might take a picture on the wall as a real scene and be a tricked to go into it. Though we could learn something from it, it lacked the vigorous strokes of Chinese paintings. Though it might be meticulous in brushwork, it could not be called a fine work of art.

At the end of the 19th and the beginning of 20th century, pushed forward by the social revolution, Chinese traditional art absorbed not only the knowledge but the realistic factors of Western art. Lu Xun pointed out that artistic images have three factors: (1) things by nature, (2) thought, and (3) beautification. Chinese art changed its aim from "being a sage" to "reforming society", from "returning to nature" to "reflecting on reality".

At the end of the 19th century, Western artists were tired of copying objects exactly and detested abstract expression. One of the leaders of Impressionism, E.M. Monet often went to a shop called the "Chinese Window" and the Eastern style of painting could be seen from his works. Van Gogh held that art is nothing but putting man into nature. Henri Matisse, dissatisfied with both realism and impressionism, criticized them as unfeeling. Wassily Kandinsky searched for the spirituality in art and abandoned using figures in his paintings; he became the leading figure in abstractionism.

At the beginning of the 20th century, an Eastern artistic trend appeared in European literary circle, namely imagism. Its leader was Ezra Pound, who translated some Chinese poems into English. In his paper, "I gather the limbs of Osiris", he declared that Chinese poets expressed the poetic character fully, and did not preach. The imagist poets wrote their poems in a Chinese style and their poems were called "Chinese style poems".

In his book "Chinese Arts" (1935), L. Binyon recognized that some aspects of Chinese art were very modern. For example, they expressed correctly the proper place of man in the world, and man's sympathetic response to the life form of everything.

Art is a special symbol; like language it is an artificial and presentational form, not a deductive form. Susanne K. Langer pointed out that "Art is the creation of forms symbolic of human feeling." As a feeling image, art is a unity consisting of three levels: A work of art should copy or describe the object; this is the basis of a work of art. Every good work of art has both something that may be said to come from reality, and from the artist's own feeling about reality. Reality normally furnishes the images, which do not remain things in reality, but are figures which could be symbols of things.

The artist's feeling often springs from imagination and is more important than figure. It gives the first elements of form to the work, from which begins the work of composition, the creation of a feeling form for complete expressiveness. What is created in a work of art is a form, an image. It detaches itself from its actual setting and acquires a new aesthetic character; in other words, it has the special capacity to give us aesthetic value.

Art and Culture

Artistic forms lie in a dimension related to culture; a work of art is a part of a certain culture. It is impossible for an artist to create a work of art without a certain cultural tradition, nor can we appreciate a work of art correctly without the knowledge of a certain culture. This is the second level of a work of art.

The third level of a work of art is the level of importform. Xu Beihong pointed out that fine quality belongs to beauty, whereas being lifelike (Ðā) belongs to artistry. For S. Langer, "Beauty is an expressive form."

We find mutual communication and borrowing at all three levels between Chinese and Western art works in the 20th century. Both Chinese and Western art have improved through this complementarity. The style of Chinese art approaches that of the Western, and the style of Western art approaches the Chinese. Having absorbed each other's style, Chinese art can reflect real life and express modern consciousness better than before, while Western art can display the individual emotion freely, and keep a balance between the psychology and the physical in industrialized society.

The value of art is given by man, because art is a form which can fulfill human value. The human being realizes its own values more fully in an art which integrates in itself the merits of both East and West.

Appendix II

The Significance for Environmental Philosophy of the Traditional Heaven-Man Relation

Zhou Changzhong

The heaven-man relation has been the most important issue in Chinese traditional philosophy; relatively well developed theories regarding this relation were elaborated by the different schools. Modern society is faced with severe environmental problems; the consciousness of environment and its protection is now at an unprecedentedly high level. This makes the relation of man and nature as the environment of human life an important subject. This chapter discusses the traditional Chinese theories of the heaven-man relation, which possess great significance for environmental philosophy.

The Union of Heaven and Man

The basic idea of the Chinese traditional theory of heaven-man relation is the union of heaven and man. According to this, man lives in nature ("heaven") of which he is a part; thus man and heaven are united. Here the problem of heaven and man is considered in connection with the problem of life, which in turn is intimately connected with the environment. Hence, heaven is significant only for man and serves as the environment for human life.

In the last analysis, for ancient Chinese philosophers, heaven and man are one in the *Tao*. Confucianism and Taoism gave different meanings for *Tao*. Confucianism gave it mainly socio-ethical significance, whereas Taoism understood it as nature. According to Confucianism, the criteria of ethical value should be used as norms for nature ("heaven"), whereas for Taoism, the productive activity of man in using nature should be in accord with natural law. Here, the ideas of Confucianism and of Taoism are complementary and unite to form a doctrine of great significance for environmental philosophy. Human activity in using nature should serve "man's *Tao*". However, this scale of ethical value is made up not according to "man's will", but according to *Tao* as natural law. In other words, man follows the law of nature while observing the criterion of value which is consistent with the law. In this way, by shaping and utilizing it man protects nature in which he lives.

Human Usage of the Tao of Heaven

Another Chinese traditional theory of the heaven-man relation, namely that each has its own proper function but are mutually employed, was proposed by Liu Yuxi and Xiong Tzu. Heaven and man are different in *Tao* and hence in function and usage. All things in nature, including man as a living being have definite regularities as regard growth and death. As a social being man is capable of making up ethical criteria and establishing standards of value. Man and heaven function respectively in nature and society; they do not mutually intervene and cannot replace each other. But, there is a connection between the *Tao* of heaven and man's *Tao*, that is to say, man makes use of the *Tao* of heaven for human interests. Therefore, man should refer and improve all things in nature via using natural laws and making them benefit him. This is the mutual engagement of man and heaven.

This has important significance for environmental philosophy. In productive activity, it is imperative for man that he not only obey natural law, but also actively utilize and reshape nature according to human interests and demands. Obviously these are connected with man's *Tao* i.e., with social rule. It follows that this connection should form an essential link in human activity in using and remolding nature.

Today, faced with severe environmental problems and other negative results of modern science and technology, people speak of the Promethean and Faustian dilemmas. Of course, the ideal would be both a highly developed material and technological civilization and a perfect social life. Hence, in order to make full use of nature it is essential to develop an ethical social order while developing modern science and technology.

Supremacy of the Human Tao

Ancient Chinese philosophers thought that in the union of heaven and man, the two are not equal, but that man's *Tao* is higher than that of heaven. This notion too has great significance for environmental philosophy.

Firstly, according to this idea, man occupies a central place among all the things in nature. Heaven is capable only of producing things, but man can rule them. Heaven gives time, space and things, while man as a centre employs all these for his own existence. Broadly speaking, all these comprise the environment for human life. Man cannot exist without the environment. Thus, it is most important for human life to protect the environment as a facet of ruling things.

Secondly, the core of this idea consists in the human capability to master heaven and all things by morality which includes the two levels of individual and society. Therefore, man's *Tao* should be a norm also for heaven. The problems of environment and ecology are not simply ones of science and technology, but also of the morality of man and society. The morality of man and society is important for the relation of man and nature; at the same time, when making up ethical criteria, man should take extensive account of the relation of man and nature, especially the protection of the environment of human life.

Lastly, there is the argument that only after a high moral level is established can one talk about the utilization of all things in a way that is calculated to promote the happy life of human society.

Today, modern science and technology cause severe environmental problems while bringing forth advanced material civilization. This is due largely to the fact that the relation of man, society and nature was left to evolve spontaneously. To change this situation, man should intervene in the productive use of nature. In this the morality of man and society are the premise and basis for the organization of the productive activity of science and technology, and a high quality of social life is the aim of this activity.

There were four important pairs of categories in Chinese traditional philosophy, namely *Tao* and *Qi* (things), the unponderable (metaphysics) and the ponderable, substance and use, and *Tao* and art (skill). They form an essential part of the theory of the heaven-human relation. As a united whole, they displayed an attitude opposite to scienticism, which is one of the sources leading to severe environmental problems. Therefore, this part of the theory of the heaven-man relation is of great significance for environmental philosophy. *Qi* means all the things in nature which can be perceived by the senses. *Tao* is the origin from which things are generated. Moreover, *Tao* is the principle and law governing *Qi*, which as the product of *Tao* should benefit the social life of humankind. This is a supreme principle for the relation of *Tao* and *Qi*.

The pair, unponderable-ponderable, is, as it were, an extension of the above-mentioned pair, the unponderable is invisible, hence is *Tao*; the ponderable is visible, hence is *Qi*, i.e., thing. The ponderable is the equivalent of science and technology. The theory of the unponderable-ponderable relation claimed that the theory of *Tao* guides and contains things; hence the metaphysics guides and contains science and technology. Obviously this is opposite to scienticism.

The pair, substance and use, unfolds the *Tao-Qi* relation. *Tao* is a bodily entity with relation to *Qi*; *Qi* is a function or use with relation to *Tao*. *Tao* is substance as primary origin, while *Qi* is only derived "use". This pair further established the subordination of *Tao* to *Qi*.

All three pairs reduce finally to the pair *Tao* and art. Chinese ancient philosophers, such as Confucius, saw *Tao* as the root with art as the branches.

As regards environmental philosophy, the relation between man and nature is reduced largely to that between man, society and science and technology. Therefore, theory regarding the "*Tao-art*" relation is of great importance as art serves as the "branches" extending *Tao*. From this it follows that science and technology cannot be placed parallel to *Tao* and man's *Tao* as the ideal for the social life. Still less can science and technology be placed above man and his *Tao*, but only as subordinate to them. Furthermore, development, science and technology should conform to socio-ethical norms. Only by grasping properly the relation between *Tao* and art, can society hope to govern well the relation between *Tao* and *Qi*, that is to say, to utilize nature to the greatest extent while eliminating or minimizing any harmful results.

Appendix III

Community Consciousness in the Ancient Chinese

Gu Weikang

Ancient Chinese Culture and Community Consciousness

The ancient Chinese manifested a particularly strong community consciousness -- regarding the monarch as superior to the common people, society as superior to the individual, the elders as superior to their juniors, and justice as superior their juniors, and justice as superior desire. Where did all these arise?

The relations between community (society) and individual are the most essential relations in human society. Only by working out the relation between community (society) and individual can the relations between mankind and mature, person and person be comprehended. The real person is the social person, imbued with a social responsibility and restricted by society. In fact, no person is an unrestricted abstract individual, but specifically different cultural backgrounds and the historical traditions give the interests and personalities of community have different concrete formations and mocks of realization, that the interests and personalities of the community must be handled differently from those between the community and individual. In contrast to the Western tradition the ancient Chinese always tend to see themselves in the community. It is in terms of the community that the ancient Chinese grasp their personalities and interests. This is origin of the ancient Chinese community consciousness.

The development ways of ancient Chinese civilization differed from the West. In the West Greece and Roman did not cross the threshed of an ancient civil society before the use of ironware, and before individual production by the family unit substituted for cooperative production by the clan this meant exposing and criticizing the clan system, collapsing the primitive commune, and developing private ownership by the family. The reason why the West built a long and firm private tradition, why Western civil society took shape, why a ancient West social consciousness and the society by means of the flourishing artificial irrigation system of the bronze age.

Building and using the artificial preserves enhance of the social organization and led ancient China from the clan system to civil society. Because the primitive clan system had evolved the patriarchal clan system and both were assimilated together, the worship of ancestors at the end of clan society transformed the concrete ancestral temple to a theoretical organizational ancestral temple system. The system of marrying outside the clan evolved so that persons with the same first name could not marry and that only persons of the same social estate could marry; the right of inheritance between men inside the clan changed to the primogeniture of the blood clan; the duty of members inside the clan to protect and support each other inside the clan changed to the duty of the clans to protect and support one another in terms of their social relationship. From remote ages (in the shang, the Xia, the Zhou dynasties), in these reasons, mixed with the patriarchal clan system and the state system, there arouse state and the clan being the same structure. The most highly developed of its cultural features was the pyramidic patriarchal clan system. On this universal basis the features of Chinese civilization, its social consciousness and social psychology can be understood.

In this cultural context, the concrete patterns of personality and the interests of community in the ancient Chinese tradition were the actual patterns of the clan and the state. This was reflected

in the great respect had by the ancient Chinese for their ancestors, patriarch, monarch, superior and older generations. With regard to the blood relationships, in the patriarchal clan system the ancestor was not an individual who had an independent personality; rather ancestry was the symbol personality and interests of the clan in the past and at present. In such a spiritual network, "filial piety" went beyond ethics to turn into a political principle and the foundation of the state. "Loyalty" went beyond politics to become a principle of life and the foundation of cultivating a person's moral character. The essence of both filial piety and loyalty was that the person take up directly the personality and interests of the community. In ancient China, this sense of filial piety and loyalty implied a tendency and tradition in which the individual was included into the community.

Community Consciousness and Moral Development

This strong community consciousness was dominant in the philosophy of life of ancient China. It exercised control over people's words and deeds and became the soul of the traditional national culture.

The Chinese looked upon the idealized personality of Confucius as the perfect model. Thus, for example, Yao, Shun, the emperor of Zhou dynasty, Confucius, etc., were called saints. The essence of sainthood as explained in ancient Chinese books through the doctrine of "saints inside and emperor outside" was that they must safeguard the realization of the personalities and interests of the clan and state. This was the essence of the Chinese theory of culture.

In order to guide the ancient Chinese to live perfectly, the ideal personality as true, good and beautiful worked according to three value-tendencies: a) emphasizing the ancient in ancient times; b) bending one's mind to the monarch and the ancestors in ancient China, the minister and the son represented their personality and the interest as individuals, but the monarch and the father represented the personality and interest of the community, the former being subordinated to the latter; and c) morality and justice, the cultural habit of looking forward consciously to a metaphysical goal. The Chinese criterion for judging what desires would be good for the state and clan? The criterion of the Chinese is common physical action if it reflects the doctrines and the righteousness of the spiritual quest. The above-mentioned subordination of individual concerns became the traditional model of one's action.

Regarding the status as superior to things, the ancient Chinese were specially concerned about the person's status, reputation and intention, but underestimated consequences and practical results. An action is "perfectly justifiable" whose intention accords with the demands of three cardinal guides: ruler guides subject, father guides son, and husband guides wife; and the five constant virtues: benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and fidelity as specified in the feudal ethical code. Persons can adhere to these norms even though the actual conditions and consequences of their actions are not in accord with the customs.

Another person could be superior to oneself in economic, political or clan relations, for the Chinese lived in a patriarchal clan society, and were aware of being members of a community, but not as independent individuals. So, the norm for individual action is not the needs of the individual, but those of community. From generation to generation, the Chinese have been persuaded the highest goal of a "perfectly impartial" and "selfless life on earth" that safeguard the community interests as safeguarding individual interests. Only by succeeding in others can one achieve success oneself. This traditional psychology and social consciousness are appropriate in the Chinese tradition and are an important embodiment of the nation. But there are negative

influences, for logically to regard another person as superior to oneself means a relative lack of individual independence, sense of self-respect and creativity.

As regards justice as superior to desire, and morality as superior to ability, ancient China justice and morality were not only moral criteria for subjective action, but reflected and advanced the personality and interests of the community.

Western and Eastern Elements in Future Development

As a cultural style and a cultural model, how should the stronger community consciousness and the doctrine of the relation between persons be evaluated?

Chinese history bears different answers to this question. The Chinese today have two answers: a) In appraising the traditional relations between persons, it is one-sided either to affirm or to negate everything; one should affirm all positive factors and negate all negative factors. b) In appraising the relation between individuals and the community, the Chinese should learn the individual consciousness of the Westerner, but the Westerner should learn the community consciousness of the Chinese.

However, there is a great puzzle to be faced. How could one assure that the result of community consciousness would render a displayed person dutiful? Further, how could the Chinese assure that the result of learning the Westerner's individual consciousness would be to become self-confident, assertive, self-respecting and creative, but not selfish egoism? If these problems cannot be resolved the above-mentioned intention can only be a good and honest fantasy.

We believe the following: a) For modern society, the Chinese tradition of community consciousness or the Western tradition of individual consciousness are not good or bad, rational or nonrational. Because the world is plural, each cultural model and cultural style (whether Chinese or Western) has its reasons for existing and can be developed the future. b) The reason why the Chinese and Western tradition manifests shortcomings and crises is neither the community nor the individual, but the situation of social existence. Therefore, to check the negative and promote the positive, we cannot simply choose a community or an individual consciousness, but must reform social existence. c) One cannot casually call for "taking the ways of the West" or "taking the ways of China" because the Chinese and Westerners have specific tasks to fulfill at particular times according to the times and their historic mission to fulfill before the other will become the next stage of one's development.

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Under the leadership of Professor Wang Miaoyang, for many years the Institute has explored deeply the pathways for the people. May this work and that of his colleagues continue to bear fruit into the coming millennium.

To this John Farrelly brings a study of the parallel, and indeed convergent, contribution to spiritual civilization found in Encyclical on Human Work.

The meeting in this volume of these two streams suggests hope for this pilgrimage.

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