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edited by

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Preface

George F. Mclean

After the Second World War, especially since the 1960's, there has been a great upsurge throughout the world of discussions regarding problems of modernization. These have evoked a strong response in philosophical circles.

The concept of "modernization" has various meanings according as it is seen from different angles. Some emphasize the significance of economic development and take modernization as industrialization with a high level of science and technology. Others attach more importance to changes in socio-political systems and connect modernization with their reform. The philosopher's field of vision should be more broad for, beside the above elements, philosophers attend also to the condition of democratic consciousness, to moral and axiological principles, and to the full range of spiritual and cultural elements. Each country has its own special historical background, cultural heritage, political system and level of economic development. Together these lead peoples to different understandings of modernization, different ways to its realization and different standards according to which to evaluate it. As conditions differ greatly between developed and developing countries, the people's understanding, needs and attitudes differ as well. This so complicates the discussions on modernization that it is very difficult, if not impossible, for peoples from different countries to reach a common understanding.

Such divergence does not reduce the theoretical and practical importance of these discussions, however, for they promote understanding with regard to the hopes and strivings of peoples and countries with different views and attitudes. Also they help to draw worthwhile ideas and even inspiration from the views of others, for despite some conflicts, views generally are not absolutely exclusive one of the other, but rather complimentary and mutually reinforcing.

Each theory of modernization requires some theoretical foundation and can be analyzed philosophically from multiple points of view. Compared with economics, sociology, law and other humanities, as well as natural sciences and technology, philosophy may at first seem far from the realities of people's practical social life, and therefore far from the real movement of modernization. In the past, philosophy, especially in its abstract and analytic modes, has not directly addressed the concrete questions now being treated in terms of modernization. This may be a reason for the neglect of philosophy, consciously or unconsciously, in the present efforts at modernization in many countries.

A deeper analysis, however, shows philosophy to be even more closely involved with modernization than other disciplines. For modernization is a movement which human beings undertake for their own purposes. But how people set goals and how one can understand and realize them are cardinal questions for philosophy as an activity of human self-reflection and self-transcendence. Hence, philosophy is centrally important to the effort of people to set their goals in the present historical period; without philosophy -- without reflection and self-transcendence -- modernization would fall blind and fail.

Efforts at modernization in China have travelled a very long and tortuous road, but now are entering a new stage which promises great success. In the special conditions of Chinese culture modernization is imbued naturally with characteristics which differ from other, especially Western, countries. But attention to culture is now part of the historical course of modernization throughout the world, both developed and developing. Thus, studies of the problems of

modernization in China, while based on the unique conditions of China, must be situated also within the overall world process. Conversely, studies on the modernization of China should be of value for other countries, which may be the main reason why many Western scholars have become increasingly interested in studies on China.

Though there are many differences between Chinese and Western scholars about how philosophically to analyze modernization, these differences should be considered not as obstacles to cooperation and exchange, but, on the contrary, as enriching and rendering discussions fruitful. Only through discussions between different views and ideas can people make use of experience and be mutually inspired.

The professors of the Department of Philosophy of Fudan University, Shanghai, consistently have been concerned to develop cooperation and exchange with Western philosophical circles. In 1991, Professor George F. McLean, Secretary of The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (RVP) and of The International Society for Metaphysics (ISM), visited Fudan University for a fruitful discussion on academic interchange and cooperation. In April, 1992, an international conference on ontology and modernization was held at Fudan University, of which this volume is an outcome.

The volume consists of two parts. The first treats more directly questions of modernization itself, mainly in China, while the second part deals with the philosophical foundations of modernization. The division is not absolute as the papers presented in this volume sometimes treat a number of aspects.

Part one begins with the paper of Mo Weimin, "Two Aspects of Modernization," in which the author takes modernization as a dynamic process with two separate aspects: the one material, the other spiritual. He sees Chinese efforts at modernization as indulging in the material aspect to the neglect of the spiritual, which, he suggests, is an important reason why for a long time Chinese modernization made no real progress. The paper "Modernization and the Copernican Transformation of the Relationship between Individuality and Totality" by Professor Yu Wujin indicates some of the contents of such development in spiritual civilization. Chinese society was built on village communities with natural blood-relationships where all was controlled by leaders. They so symbolized the whole that individuals had little freedom to express their creativity. With the process of modernization in China, individuality has begun to rise while the focus upon clans and village communities has been prone to decline. At the same time the traditional ethical spirit has made place for a new spirit, namely, that of law. These elements of the spirit are seen as keys to the process of modernization in China.

But will such spiritual changes be at the cost of Chinese identity; or how can Eastern and Western elements be related? Wang Xincheng in "Overcoming Nihilism and the Modernization of China" argues that the main reason for the earlier failure of modernization movements in modern China has been that the leaders of these movements fell into nihilism with regard to Chinese civilization. Their focus solely on foreign elements and their failure to integrate Western elements into the dominant Chinese pattern condemned their movements to minority status. The chapter, "External Influences as Driving Forces in China's Modernization" by Professor Li Jizong, stresses that modernization as a revolution had to be imported from the West, but that the concept: "Chinese ends by Western means" fettered economic development in China. It is necessary now to re-evaluate capitalism and to dare to learn modernization therefrom.

In "Western Philosophical Trends and Chinese Modernization," Professor Liu Fangtong studies directly the key questions of how to evaluate the role of the Western model of modernization, especially its philosophical trends, and how to relate them to the modernization of

contemporary China. He analyzes the historical experience and lessons from Western trends in the modernization of China and discusses the relation between modernization and Westernization, as well as between Western modernization and its philosophical foundations. On this basis, he points out that in order to promote the development of the economy and of science and technology in China it is necessary to study and use Western philosophy and other spiritual cultures as a reference.

From Part I it can be concluded therefore that in order to understand the philosophical, including the metaphysical, foundations of Chinese modernization it is necessary to understand the relation between traditional Chinese, Western and Marxist philosophies for these constitute the fundamental content of the modern and contemporary philosophical experience of China.

Part II undertakes this task. The first paper of this Part, presented by Professor Huang Songjie, provides a synthetic study of the relation of these three philosophies, which he describes it as the "great triangle." Among them, Marxist philosophy plays a leading role, but as it originated from the West both theoretically and academically and it is closely linked to other Western philosophies. As a philosophy foreign to China, Marxist philosophy must be brought into combination with Chinese social practices and traditional Chinese culture, including its philosophy. Hence, the triangle or matrix of the philosophical foundation is not static or fixed, but moving and developing.

In his paper "Tradition, Modernization and Human Existence," Wang Ping deals with the problems of tradition and modernization from the point of view of human existence which he considers to be the only criterion by which they should be weighted. The historicity of human existence has determined the tradition and delineates the present needs for its transformation and renewal.

What this attention to existence will mean, however, is the subject of a debate which occupies the remainder of the volume. For some it means deconstructing the content of philosophy. Thus She Biping's "The Tao of Difference: Zhuang Tzu's Deconstructionism" discusses the correspondence between the ancient Chinese philosopher, Zhuang Tzu, and the contemporary French philosopher Jacques Derrida. But while this is seen as liberating the human spirit it does so by undermining the meaning of life and removing the principles for the orientation of human action. Li Guangcheng writes in similar terms on "Rorty: from Philosophy to Post-Philosophy". He sees the result as leaving even philosophy itself dependant upon facts and popularity, which is to reduce it to the relativism not of cultures as extensive patterns of human life and learning, but of ephemeral surface interests.

Rorty would call this a pragmatism, but Professor Liu Fangtong provides a much richer sense of what pragmatism has meant in the past, its deep democratic commitments and the history of related interest in China. In "The Sixty-year Samsara of Studies on Pragmatism and the Road of Cultural Development in China," Professor Liu Fangtong describes the historical course of the introduction and spread of American pragmatism in China; its coincidence, differences and even conflicts with Chinese traditional culture; its political and ideological implications; and its positive and negative influences upon the development of contemporary China. At the end, Professor Liu Fangtong suggests how to draw upon the experiences and lessons from the past studies of pragmatism and how to use these and other Western philosophical trends to promote the modernization of China.

This provides a real start for reviewing the Chinese process of modernization. But there are crucial additional steps to be taken. For if one wishes to build a life upon concrete experience it must include not only an account of facts but a determination of values and a framework for relating the two. This challenge is undertaken by Professor Li Guancheng in his chapter, "An

Inferential Conception of Meaning and its Applications in Terms of Values," where he studies the logical patterns of involved.

But beyond these the crucial metaphysical issue remains. There has been general agreement in the previous chapters in jettisoning *a priori* ideals in favor of existence and life, but these were shown to have such little meaning that the resulting philosophy came down to nihilism and/or fads. Hence to take up Professor Liu Fangtong's work of learning from experience and Professor Li Guangcheng's effort to extend this from fact to value requires renewal of the ontological concerns which have always been fundamental to the Chinese tradition.

But modernization is not only the human being's pursuit of good living conditions; it is also a search for a pattern of human self-understanding and the delineation of a peoples hopes and fears which enables them to construct a life that has meaning and which satisfies because it is good. As the following two papers show, this makes ontology central to the issue of modernization. In the chapter, "The Ontology of Contemporary Confucianism and Modernization," Professor Shi Zhonglian shows that contemporary Confucianists use ontology and its exploration of being as the major premise for their philosophy of life and culture, their ethics and political theory. This partiality for ontology is a crucial and sane reaction of Chinese traditional philosophy to the nihilising factors in modernization. Detailed analysis of the relevant theories, their successes and failures point to Confucian ontology as central for overcoming the crisis of spirit and meaning in modern society. Professor Gao Guoxi's chapter, "Ontology and the Foundation of Ethics," extends to ethics this exploration of the reach of ontology. He shows how ethics draws upon ontology for: (a) its criterion of values, (b) its primary principle of action, and (c) its primary method of moral enquiry. On the basis of its ontology then the Chinese philosophy of development can avoid an abandonment of meaning under the banner of "life", and become a new unfolding of a sense of life that is rich in the wisdom of tradition and vital in its response to present challenges.

Throughout, this volume has focused on its task of analyzing philosophically the issue of modernization. It has noted that this means primarily the rationalization of life begun in the West. It has been possible to identify the contributions of reason, but some uneasiness remains. To cite but two, on the one hand, from within Western philosophy one hears a note of skeptician regarding the project of modernization bordering on the despair of a post-modern willingness to consider nihilism; on the other hand, one encounters a perduring fear that if modernization means Western rationalization then it is available to China only at the cost of its soul. But then "What does it matter if a man obtains the whole world but suffers the loss of his very soul?"

Hence, at the end of the millennium new agenda items have begun to occupy center stage. Culture is now of central importance, as are diversity, environment, women and minorities; a new agenda is in the making. Reason, while important, no longer seems self-sufficient for directing human life; new dimensions of human awareness such as the aesthetic must be added in order to carry forward and indeed more beyond the project heretofore called modernization. In the place of simple Westernization the present call is for globalization, both horizontal in terms of opening to all cultures and vertical in terms of entering more deeply into the human spirit and into being itself.

Some of these notes are suggested also by papers in Part II which point to the need for ontology to bring the rich Chinese vision fully to bear upon the challenges of the future. Some papers of visiting professors which were particularly suggestive in this regard make up Part III of this volume. The first by George F. McLean points out how Kant's third critique of aesthetic judgment in integrating his first two critiques on science and freedom suggests the way in which Confucius's aesthetic doctrine of harmony can help in the thusfar elusive task of integrating science and democracy. The chapter of Ghislaine Florival "Perception and Value: the Affective Basis of an

Ethics of Encounter" matches this new dimension of awareness with a phenomenological study of the essentially relational character of the human person. Other related papers were presented also in the joint colloquium of the RVP with the Institute of Philosophy of the Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences. This is published under the title: *Beyond Modernization: Chinese Roots for Global Awareness*, edited by Wang Miaoyang, Yu Xuanmeng and George F. McLean (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1997). Effectively, it constitutes Part II of the present study.

By the term *horizon* Husserl designates the openness of meaning which makes possible unification in a single totality of all the profiles constituting the appearance of what is given perceptually. By the expression *horizon of the horizons* he designates the unity of understanding of the whole of the beings. This unity is not effective, but is implied in the sense of the life world which always is already there as a primordial donation. In the concrete the experience of this horizon is the condition of possibility of experience as such. It is the field of possibilities which gives meaning to our present experiences in our intercourse with things and people. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty underline the fact that the world becomes a universal frame for all experiences only in as much as it is for a being already there who explains him or herself with others. Things pertain to the world because I seize them as possible means for the realization of my possibilities. In this sense the world is the horizon of my possibilities and thus the measure of the process of temporalization, rather than the pole of a concrete universality. There is then no life world as a universal basis, but a *plurality* of life worlds, "each one of which contains a component which cannot be seized." That component is the mystery of the world, which, as a whole, embraces and penetrates all historical worlds; this mystery never gives itself as present in the flesh, but always as that which has to be projected from the present world. Thus primitive cultures, for example, are worlds which have the form of myth because we interpret them from our present world.

If so, does the philosophy of Husserl itself fall once again into the perspective of an universal rationality which precisely he had wanted to avoid? Must we believe that such an attitude toward universality is immanent to Western rationality, which tries always to understand and dominate everything?

Conversely, Gadamer seizes in the dimension of horizon "a fusion of horizons", in as much as they delimit each other in the historical repetition and overcoming of their reciprocal interpretations. This is no longer a unitary ideal, underlying universality and subtending its forms, but the reversibility of singular cultural structures which constitute the difference and the sense of history. Thus, every culture measures itself with respect to the horizon of all the others, reflecting itself in them as singular, autonomous expressions.

Conclusion

We have tried to reflect on the sense of a philosophy which is not based on a universality of transcendental reason, but meets the event of existing beings as being-at-the-world. The ontology of M. Merleau-Ponty has helped us to understand the dimension of reversibility; this exceeds the sensible as "sense or differentiation" and "flesh" of the world. It is along that axis of "vertical Being", the sense of sense, that the human experience of bodiliness reveals itself to us. Bodiliness itself is already taken as cultural interrelation, and more originally as arising out of a personal appropriation in the sexed difference.

This contribution of a phenomenology open to the hermeneutics of meaning is articulated in a new ontology which understands Being as "difference which makes sense". That new ontology invites us to live a proper existence as "ex-ist" or event of presence.

Notes

1. Patocka, *Liberté et sacrifice* (Grenoble: Millon, 1990), pp. 14f.
2. *Idem.*, p. 23.
3. M. Heidegger, "La question de la technique", in *Essais et conférences* (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), pp. 9-48.
4. This remains the position of F. Van Steenberghen (Louvain) in his *Anthropologie philosophique* (Montréal, 1990).
5. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Bulletin de Psychologie* (Cours de Sorbonne, 1964), pp. 747f.
6. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible* (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 18.
7. H. Maldiney, "Chair et verbe dans la philosophie de M. Merleau-Ponty", *M. Merleau-Ponty, le psychique et le corporel* (Paris: Aubier, 1988), p. 59.
8. M. Merleau-Ponty, *op.cit.*, p. 211.
9. M. Heidegger, *L'être et le temps* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), ch. 72.
10. E. Levinas, *Humanisme de l'autre homme* (Fatamorgana, 1992), p. 47.

1. **Two Aspects of Modernization**

Mo Weimin

History concerns human civilization whose progress lies in the transformation of humankind from a slash-burn culture to the utilization of modern science and technology. Modernization is important in the this history for it indicates rapid progress in the ability to control nature and improve one's material and spiritual conditions. It is a linear concept resulting from a harmonic relationship between subjective human activity and external nature. More importantly, it is also an open-ended concept for it requires every country not only to develop its traditional rational factors, but to tolerate and even adopt progressive foreign ideas.

In a narrow sense, modernization refers to attaining "modern and advanced levels of science and technology" in, for example, agriculture, industry, national defence, science and technology. But as a product of human progress it should include also modernization of thoughts and ideas. These two aspects cannot be separated, let alone be arbitrarily isolated. How to grasp properly the relation between these two aspects and their respective degrees is the key to the realization of modernization. This chapter will con-sider this problem by combining a review of history with reflection upon the present situation.

An Historical Review

In ancient times, especially in the Song dynasty, China once had an outstanding history of leading the world in science and technology typified by the "Four Inventions": printing, gun powder, paper-making and the compass. However, good times do not last long. At the end of the 18th century, the ruling class of the last feudal dynasty (Qing) in Chinese history, on the one hand, closed the country to international interchange, blindly opposed every-thing foreign, was arrogant in its parochialism and discriminated against any who held different views. On the other hand, it was on the decline and had serious social crises, of which the more obvious were: corruption and incompetence on the part of officialdom, decline in armaments, annexation of its territory, increasing financial deficits, and a serious distance between the poor and the rich so that a large number of its working people lived in an abyss of misery. Moreover, a massive importation of foreign opium at the cost of great wealth not only poisoned the working people, but aggravated the Qing dynasty's financial difficulties. At the same time, the Western great powers had long coveted this old and mysterious territory.

With difficulties both at home and abroad, a few landlords and intellectuals voiced dissatisfaction and even indignant resentment. Currents of social thoughts then underwent a radical change, and there emerged "Jing Shi Zhi Yong", whose main representatives were Gong Zizhen, Wei Yuan, Lin Zexu and Bao Shichen. Their thought included the following important points: (a) to reveal the dark and decayed phenomena in feudal society; (b) to criticize the Han learnings' stress upon the past rather than the present and its attempt to escape rather than confront reality, as well as the hollow vagueness of Song learning; (c) to propose political and economic reform; (d) to advocate guarding against and resisting the economic and military invasion by Western great powers.

When defeat in the Opium War shocked the Chinese intellectuals, the clearest response was insistence upon studying the Western capitalist world. The first person to raise the question of how to study this was not Lin Zexu, but Wei Yuan who discovered that the reason the great Western powers won the Opium War was their possession of powerful armaments and advanced technology. Hence, he advocated learning from advanced foreign technology in order to resist or even control the West. This recognized the disparities between China and the West and that China's progress in modernization must be through the study advanced Western science and technology.

Moreover, after the second Opium War, Feng Guifen realized not only that Chinese technology was inferior to the West's, but more importantly that China could not be compared to the West in the following things: the employment of human resources and territory, the close relationship between the ruler and the people, and the correspondence between speech and reality. Feng Guifen advocated that Chinese modernization should retain the Chinese feudal ranking or seniority in human relationships as a matter of substance, with the great Western powers' methods of wealth and power playing a subsidiary or functional role.

As the invasion by the Western powers intensified and people's rebelliousness rose like a raging fire, the ruling class of the Qing Dynasty was greatly shocked and split internally into diehards and a Westernization movement which introduced techniques of capitalist production initiated by such bureaucrats as Zeng Guofan, Li Hongzhang and Zhang Zhidong in the latter half of the 19th century. The diehards obstinately clung to the creed of "Tian (Heaven) does not change, nor does Tao" in order to preserve the feudal rule of the Qing government, while the Westernization Movement attempted to learn from Western technology and "Zhi Qi Zhi Qi" under the motto that "what changes is Qi, but not Tao." Thinking Chinese cultural heritage and institutions to be vastly superior to the West, so that there was no need to resort to the West, they refused to accept Western democracy and civilization. The major guide of the Westernization movement was Feng Guifen's emphasis upon modernization in science and technology, but not in thoughts and ideas. This was the first stage of China's modernization, insisting that "the Chinese factors remain fundamental, while Western factors play a subsidiary role."

However, after the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, representatives of the Constitutional Reform and Modernization movement, such as Tan Sedong, Liang Qicao, and Kang Youwei representing the interests of the liberal bourgeois and the enlightened landlords, sharply criticized the weakness due to the failure of the Westernization Movement. the Modernization's Reform Movement of 1898 marked modern China's second step toward modernization. This insisted that the West was fundamental or the matter of substance while China was subsidiary or functional. Because of lack of agreement on the part of the ruling class and obstruction by the diehards the Movement met with failure. However, the political reform decreed by the Qing government on January 9, 1901 reflected that some agreement had been reached among the ruling class. Although the reform repeated the old themes of the un-changeableness of "the three cardinal guides: ruler guides subjects, father guides son, and husband guides wife, and of the five constant virtues: benevolence, righteousness, propriety, wisdom and fidelity," it also manifested a pressing historical sense of "over-hauling and consolidating government practice" and "moderation in wealth and power". The reform indicated that the only solution to the problem of destitution and weakness was to learn from the strong points of foreign countries in order to offset China's weakness. What had been learned in the past of Western learning was merely superficial, not its essentials without which China could not become prosperous and strong.

In fact, neither the idea that "China was the fundamental and the West subsidiary", nor the alternative that "the West was the fundamental and China subsidiary" were decisive because, as Yan Fu pointed out, "Chines Learning had its own fundamental and subsidiaries, as did Western Learning." In the Westernization Movement, Guo Songtao and Zheng Guanying began to revise the doctrine that "China was the fundamental"; especially Zheng Guanying thought that the prosperity and strength of the West lay in its political and economic institutions, and advocated the establishment of a House of Representatives and an introduction of constitutionalism. In the course of learning from Western modernization, the Qing government gradually underwent a painful change from refusal to acceptance.

The May 4th Movement of 1919 was an anti-imperialist, anti-feudal, political and cultural movement; it was influenced by the October Revolution and led by intellectuals having the rudiments of Communist ideology. From then till the foundation of the People's Republic of China in 1949, there were three views on the problems of modernization: (a) modern neo-Confucianism evaluated Western civilization and preached Chinese traditional civilization; (b) some advocated an overall Westernization, of whom Chen Xujing and Hu Shi were representative; and (c) the Communist Party suggested making "the past serve the present and foreign things serve China." The third view would appear correct and logic suggests that Chinese modernization should have advanced this way; however, the facts are quite the opposite.

There are striking similarities in history and the thirty years after liberation. China followed the way of the Qing government in once again closing the country to international intercourse and an overall rejection of Western civilization. From the Anti-rightist Struggle (the counterattack in 1957 against the bourgeois rightists) and Anti-Rightist Trend at the Lu Shan meeting to the Communist Party's Third Plenary Session of the Eighth Central Committee's stress upon the absolutes of class struggle, all leftist thought led to such feudal survivals as absolutism and royalism in their modern forms. What had already been extinguished in the West began to spread in China and thoroughly engulfed the kindhearted, but in-sensitive and meek, working people. Especially, "the Cultural Revolution" so wantonly trampled on Chinese democracy and legal institutions that the basic human rights of citizens could not be guaranteed. In order to preserve its own absolutism and obscurantism, modern absolutism could not tolerate the splendid Western civilization permeating China, which was old and obstinate.

Things take an opposite direction when they become extreme. In 1978 the Communist Party's Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee advocated and carried out a policy of reform and openness, signaling thereby that Chinese modernization had taken a turn for the better. Practice shows that the reform provided thriving vitality, for example, in importing advanced technology and equipment, establishing special economic zones, importing foreign capital, and advocating in the countryside a contract system by which the family has access to its products. All these reforms led to rapid progress in the national economy and greatly raised people's living standard. Although at the same time Western spiritual civilization was imported, modernization was confined mainly to the material field and concerned science and technology. Western thoughts and ideas were guarded against overcautiously and twice campaigns against bourgeois liberalization were initiated. This was no coincidence, but a positive reflection of the long-accumulated conservative psychology of the whole Chinese ruling class. It came from the particular political role played by China on the international political scene. This contributed to the traditional and deep-rooted bad habits of being satisfied with destitution, being overcautious and meekly submitting to the oppression and maltreatment of fellow countrymen. However, just as there is interaction between material and spiritual civilizations, there is interaction as well

between Western modernization in science and technology and in thought and ideas. Modernization of science and technology provided the material basis for modernization of thoughts and ideas, while the latter in turn prompted and guided the former. Hence, if there is emphasis merely on Western modernization of science and technology with-out at the same time emphasizing and adopting that of thoughts and ideas, then even if the economy advances and people's living standard are raised, this will be temporary and limited, or may stop or even go backwards, because this kind of modernization of science and technology does not receive the help and support of thoughts and ideas.

The Present Situation

Although the Chinese government emphasizes importing Western science and technology and its approach to management, it does not at the same time import Western thoughts and ideas; this results in a separation of content from forms of modernization. Just as Westerners cannot import Chinese Confucianism to guide their modernized science and technology (the Asian "Four Small Dragons" originally were nurtured in the spirit of Confucianism), China cannot merely import Western science and technology in order to engage in modernization in a context in which Chinese traditional culture is dominant. For example, almost every state enterprise spends much foreign currency in importing advanced West-ern technology and equipment each year, but it does not import their mechanism of management or if it exists it is greatly limited. To say the least, the Western countries' economic development is due mainly to their sound method of management and perfect system of legal institutions.

Herbert Spencer applied Darwin's doctrine of "struggle for existence" to human society and thought that, like the process of the evolution of living things, society evolved through a natural rule that "the superior exists, the inferior is eliminated" or survival of the fittest. Moreover, the competitive ability of enterprises is based on that of the individual. Only if the individual, who is a combination of intelligence, physical power and morality, brings his potential to full force can his enterprise win in competition with others. As Yan Fu pointed out, people's moral intelligence and physical powers reach maturity in environments made up of the struggle for existence within liberal institutions and a free economic field. Meanwhile, all these liberated abilities are organized, combined and enable the state to prosper and be strong.

In order not to harm others and to benefit oneself, there must be concepts and institutions which guarantee putting the individual's constructive abilities into operation. Thus all agreed that advanced weapons and technology and effective political-economic institutions were the main cause of the prosperity of the great Western powers' and their winning of the Opium War. Yet Yang Fu thought the reason lay rather in its different understanding and grasp of reality, that is, in its advanced thought and values, whereas the cause of China's destitution and weakness lay in its lagging with regard to ideas and values.

Over the years, China has advocated reform of the economic system in cities. Although this has had some success, if one con-siders Chinese enterprises carefully, one notes that they are not strictly like Western enterprises. This amounts to saying that the essential characters of the modern Western factory or enterprise are not the equipment employed, but the sites, the labor and the power resources. This means that production is completely independent and the economic accounting is very thorough. As this is lacking in the existing Chinese state enterprises, strange as it may sound, Western scholars think China in fact has no enterprise.

Some researchers think that the use of the term "unit" is not only characteristic, but directly reveals the internal link between cultural traits of the enterprise and the national cultural environment as a whole. Upon closer consideration one can find the following points involved in this link: (a) if the realization of profits and the growth of capital is the aim of an enterprise, then the various behaviors and norms in and out of the process of production of Chinese state enterprises bear little relevance to attaining this aim. Indeed, quite a few forms of behavior directly disturb the realization of this aim. (b) A large number of the behaviors and activities of state enterprises, which take place outside the process of production, are very similar to those of non-enterprises, for example, office, school, hospital, the press and mass organization. (c) Even the organization, choice of aims, transmission of information, human relationships, criteria of value and therefore the environment as a whole of state enterprises have very few distinctive features of an enterprise, but are similar to non-enterprises.

Under these conditions, the people in state enterprises are endowed mainly not with an enterprising personality, but with a unit-personality. This has the following manifestations: (a) great attention is paid to the treatment of human relationships, (b) its set of values gives priority to politics; (c) there is little expression of independent thinking and action, but one relies on others; (d) there is sudden enthusiasm, but no constant sense of efficiency or self-conscious spirit of creativity; and (e) there is scrupulous adherence to ethical principles in small closed circles where one is on intimate terms with the other persons, but no social morality. How can a sense of competition be generated and productive efficiency raised among "unit-individuals" working in this kind of "unit," which is not an enterprise, for who is the bearer of unit-personality?

Another important characteristic of the Chinese reform is to develop a contract system of responsibility of the family for products in countryside. Although this arouses a productive attitude among peasants, the inherent character of Chinese traditional agricultural society itself constitutes the deeper and wider cultural environments of the organizational system of the unit. First, due to the non-independence of the individual person, it is only through the community that one can exist. Second, social functions are concentrated on a closed village, which was organized in terms of blood relationships, was self-sufficient and had no mutual inter-change. Even the present community and village is essentially of this nature, rather than the earlier "People's Commune". Third, the natural village is strictly controlled by a highly-concentrated central political power to which it pays various tributes. Lastly, although distribution of farmland among families can make for intensive and meticulous farming and combine the peasants' interests with their responsibilities, it seriously impedes the mechanization of agriculture, reduces labor efficiency and unnecessarily binds a large number of peasants to sparse and small farmland.

Economic reforms both in cities and in the countryside show that it is not sufficient merely to make use of advanced Western science and technology; there is need also to draw lessons from Western ideas and institutions. Modernization requires reform, but the problem is: reform to what degree and how to reform? It can be seen from the above analysis that in the course of construction of modernization during the past century China has not been able to escape the vicious circle of merely emphasizing Western science and technology, but not its thoughts and ideas. The reason lies in the Chinese traditional culture of absolutism and obscurantism leaving an accumulation of power in the ruling government and fellow countrymen. The only way to escape this circle is to establish a sound democracy and legal institutions for the construction of Chinese modernization. A consensus must be reached among the ruling class: whatever the Western things may be (whether science and technology or ideas and thoughts), provided that they are advantageous to

the China's realization of modernization, they should be fully employed strategic decisions regarding modernization must be based on this agreement.

Other elements which need to be considered include the following.

- First, there must be long-term planning. This means avoiding by all means the issuance of an order in the morning and rescinding it in the evening. It is no accident that at present some people think Chinese policy always will change in three to five years. But it also means that those who make strategic decisions cannot be eager for success and instant benefit and have a narrow vision.

- Second, the reform must be proactive; several reforms in Chinese history were carried out under the circumstances of domestic trouble and foreign invasion, and therefore were largely passive. It is impossible for this kind of passive reform to remove or even touch the previously organized systems which hindered the development of productive forces or radically to reform old thoughts and ideas. However, if the ruling government can repair the house before it rains and put reform into force before experiencing difficulties, then surely the medicine can be suited to the illness, cure the sickness and save the patient. But the activities of reform must first be based on the modernization of thoughts and ideas.

- Third, it must be feasible, that is, it is necessary to assess and weigh the advantages and disadvantages without taking any hasty action or making an administrative intervention before the strategic decisions are made.

- Fourth, it must be pluralistic. Truth comes from the collision between several penetrating insights. Different thoughts and ideas can learn from each other's strong points and offset their own weakness. If one thought is artificially given priority over others, then it will certainly hinder the quality of the overall thought and the renewal of internal thought mechanism. Likewise, in making strategic decisions, pluralistic thinking should be permitted and encouraged. The authorities might well establish two or more groups to study and analyze important problems relating to the national economy and people's livelihood and to design counter-measures. Their decisions would be handed over to the National People's Congress, and finally put into force as scientific policy and law. However, at the present time, the representatives of the National People's Congress consider only one draft resolution, without an alternative with which to compare it. So the Congress's name does not fit its own reality, for there is no draft resolution which is not voted through by the Congress. A dependent and meek psychology exists not only in ordinary people, but also in the representatives and leaders at all levels. This is demonstrated by the historical fact of the initiation of the disastrous "Cultural Revolution".

From the state enterprises' nature as a "unit", to the agricultural economy's mode of production, to the one-dimensional mode of making strategic decisions regarding modernization, all these show how lagging thoughts and ideas seriously fetter the country's productive forces and the realization of modernization. The slogan that "science and technology are the first productive forces" should be revised and its ambiguous influence removed. In fact, science and technology do not play the same role under different circumstances. Research and the application of science and technology are restrained not only by economic conditions and the conditions of science and technology, but more by policy and law, thoughts and ideas and the researchers' abilities and qualifications. In the past years, the development of China's basic theoretical research has not been slower than the West, nor have their achievements been, but the application of their achievements, that is, their transformation into productive forces falls far behind the West.

If modernization cannot be improved and realized, and people's living standard cannot be raised, then the ruling party is not qualified. All depends on it having or not having the ability to deal with the relationship between the two aspects of modernization.

In sum, from historical retrospection and reflection on reality, it appears that the realization of modernization in China, both in the past and at present, is confined mainly to the material field and neglects the side of thought and ideas; for this reason it has been onesided.

Modernization and the Conflicts of Individuality and Totality in Chinese Culture

Yu Wujing

Contemporary Chinese culture finds itself in a painful transformation evoked by modernization. This means not only the modernization of industry, agriculture, military affairs and science-technology, but more importantly the modernization of culture, especially of people's ideas. At present, various conflicts in mixing new and old ideas are difficult for people to follow. This is not only an indication that the old cultural paradigm has fallen into crisis, but also that a new cultural paradigm is coming into being. Therefore, a consideration of the inner conflicts of contemporary Chinese culture in its process of modernization can have remarkable theoretical and practical meaning. These conflicts have the following main aspects.

The Conflict Between Political and Economic Standards

Reviewing the history of the People's Republic of China, one finds that the first thirty years and the following years represent respectively two cultural modes with different qualities. The culture of the first thirty years, like traditional Chinese culture, regarded politics and ethics as of basic importance, but the culture of the following years has regarded economic development as basic. The conflict between political and economic concerns in the process of modernization has provided the basic motivation in the evolution of contemporary Chinese culture.

At first sight, the culture of the first thirty years seems opposed to traditional culture, but in the final analysis they are consistent in giving the highest importance to politics and ethics. The saying: "gain knowledge from research into things" put forward by Zhu Xi recommended mainly research not in the natural sciences and economics, but on the problems of politics and ethics. Since Marxism spread in China because of the civil and anti-Japanese wars, theorists have had no time to investigate Marx's concept of historical materialism and his economic theory. Rather, they emphasized his theory of class struggle, which was identified with political theory. This social and historical background has formed a special cultural mode in which politics holds the central position, while ideas concerning economic reconstruction regularly were rejected.

Since China began the reformation of 1978, economic reconstruction became the most important question in daily life, reflecting the beginnings of an entrance into a new cultural mode in which the economy is central. This transformation does not mean that the relationship between politics and the economy was turned simply upside down, but that a foundational transformation of the cultural paradigm appeared. Practice shows that this the cultural mode based on economic reconstruction corresponds to the desire of the Chinese people. Not only has it raised the material level of life, it also has promoted the development of the entire culture.

However, the conflict between these two cultural modes -- the political and the economic -- has not ended. On the contrary, a series of debates appearing in political, philosophical, economic and literary fields, such as the problem of federation, the theory of ownership, and the ideas of humanism, freedom and democracy, all reflect the conflict between the two cultural modes.

In today's world with highly developed science and technology contributing to an improved life, China should no longer wallow in the old cultural mode focused upon politics. Only by

actively perfecting the economic culture can China be revived. This is not to deny the role of politics, but the politics to be stressed puts in the central position not class struggle, but democratic politics based on a new cultural and social structure.

Conflict Between Unity and Diversity

In the old cultural mode the highest political goal was the search for unity as opposed to variety. In the Spring and Autumn and Warring States Periods there appeared the theme: "Let a hundred flowers blossom, let a hundred schools of thought contend", reflecting the co-existence of many countries at that time. Since the first Emperor of Qin unified China in 221 B.C., and especially since the Han Emperor, Liou Che, advanced the slogan: "to dismiss a hundred schools from office, to have a monopoly of Confucianism," Chinese culture came to regard unity as the highest goal in order to suit the needs of a totalitarianism. Contemporary Chinese culture does not cast off the yoke of traditional culture which one-sidedly seeks unity. This was expressed very clearly in the Great Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 which tried to unify the thought of all people by some dogmatic ideas, even to standardize the clothing of all people to but the two colors, grey and blue.

On the contrary, in the new cultural mode based on the economy the variety of the economic order, which was necessarily reflected in the field of ideas, rejects such an absolute unity and approves diversity. In recent years criticism of the idea of "the great unity" in the historical field and the appearance of the new theory of "cultural pluralism" in the philosophical field indicate the common desire to seek the variety and the richness in which can be found the passion of the people to make a new life.

In fact, unity and variety are not two extremes of an abstract antagonism. There is no real unity without rich variety; in a word, unity should contain that variety which is an essential feature of modernization and a new cultural mode.

The Conflict Between the Development of Science-Technology While Avoiding Scientism

As noted above, traditional Chinese culture was centered on politics and ethics; therefore it looked down upon the development of economy and science-technology. Historically, the Chinese people had many inventions, but used these inventions in superstitions rather than in the development science and technology.

In contemporary Chinese culture, we are confronted with the following contradiction. On the one hand, China lags far behind in the field of science-technology, and also lacks a scientific spirit, especially in administration. Thus China needs to introduce results of science-technology from Western countries. On the other hand, together with the development of science-technology there appears also a scientific trend, namely, that science easily can resolve all problems, that modernization is only a matter of science-technology, and that China should be ruled only by technological experts. We must contain this trend in order to open a road for the development of humanism. In short, in the process of modernization one of the problems confronted is to promote the spread of science-technology, while avoiding scientism.

The Conflict between Historical and Ethical Evaluations

Because of the traditional Chinese culture based on politics and ethics, when Chinese intellectuals evaluated events they weighed heavily their ethical quality, rather than their historical quality. That is to say, the ethical valuation was put first, and the historical valuation second. For example, Cao Cao as an historical figure played an important role in the evolution of the Chinese history, but used to be considered a bad person due to his ethical failings.

There is both evil and goodness in ethics, and progress and retrogression in history; they go hand in hand. It is paradoxical that what is evil-doing in terms of traditional ethics is progressive in history, as Engels put it:

Bei Hegel ist das böse die Form, worin die Triebkraft der geschichtlichen Entwicklung sich darstellt. Und zwar liegt hierin der doppelte Sinn, dass einerseits jeder neue Fortschritt notwendig auftritt als Frevel gegen ein Heiliges, als Rebellion gegen die alten, absterbenden, aber durch die Gewohnheit und Herrschsucht, die zu Hebeln der geschichtlichen Entwicklung werden, wovon z.B. die Geschichte des Feudalismus und der Bourgeoisie ein einziger fortlaufender Beweis ist.¹

According to Marxism, the historical evaluation ought to be put first and ethical evaluation second. One can say even that ethical valuation also has its historicity, which is to say that ethical ideas cannot be abstract, but come always from definite historical conditions which determine whether an ethical idea is meaningful. Under the influence of the traditional cultural mode, contemporary Chinese culture is apt to put the ethical before the historical evaluation. Further, when people make ethical evaluations, they insist in great measure on old ethical ideas. Hence, sometimes the conflict between the two valuations can be very acute. For instance, the phenomena of selfishness, corruption, degeneration, embezzlement and bribery have appeared in the process of economic reform and modernization. Hence, some people conclude that what is evil comes from economic reform and modernization and believe that economic reform and modernization should be rejected. It goes without saying that they have forgotten that history does not float in the ether of goodness; on the contrary, it develops always together with what is regarded by traditional culture as evil-doing. Certainly, we should oppose corruption, embezzlement, etc. through law, and selfishness through altruistic education, but we should not be opposed to economic reform and modernization.

Putting the historical evaluation before the ethical does not mean that the latter is insignificant. It too is important and necessary, but it must be based upon new ethical ideas which are good for modernization.

The Conflict between Individuality and Totality

It is well known that the traditional Chinese society -- which reflected also the mode of production -- is typically a village community in which natural blood-relationships form the basis of all social life. In such natural communities the force of the whole or clan was great, whereas that of the individual was insignificant.

In jener galt und war der Einzelne wirklich nur als das allgemeine Blut der Familie. Als dieser Einzelne war er der selbstlose abgeschiedene Geist.²

Confucian filial piety and fraternal duty were a simple negation of the individual.

In ancient society a person was regarded only as a son or brother, not an independent personality: "the country is a great family and the family is a small country." If the individual in a clan was of no account then a clan also did not count in relation to the country. In a word, all were without meaning before the emperor, who in the last analysis also was not an independent personality because he was controlled by the family to which he belonged.

After the liberation of 1949, in the Chinese countryside a collectivization movement began, but was not able to change fundamentally the mode and communication of the traditional village communities, which slowly had permeated the cities. In cities persons always live in some organization or work unit; it is often said: "the individual belongs unconditionally a specific organization." It is very difficult for a person to change from one work unit to another.

Since the Cultural Revolution, together with economic re-form and the development of a market economy, the relationship between the individual and the totality has been undergoing a Copernican transformation. Whereas in the past the individual was absolutely dependent upon the totality, which was all and the individual nothing, now the individual has begun to rise and the totality, whether clan, village or community, has begun to decline. The private economy, the movement of population from the countryside to cities, the rise of hundreds of cities and towns and such like, all show that the traditional system of clans has broken down. In cities, together with the growth of the private economy, the individual belongs no longer unconditionally to some work unit. Temperamental voluntary contractual relations are taking the place of the permanent connections by which the individual was fixed to the totality. Of course, the change from a traditional society based on village communities to the new society based upon independent personalities is a long process of modernization.

Conflict between the Primitive Ethical Spirit and the Legal Spirit

The primitive ethical spirit based upon the blood-relationship was adapted only to the traditional Chinese society: Confucian doctrine is a typical expression of that spirit. On the contrary, the legal spirit based upon relationships of equality between persons is adapted to modern civil society. Those basic conditions which render the individual really independent -- private property, freedom of religious faith, political equality, democracy and freedom, reasonable sexual freedom, and so on -- must be guaranteed by definite law.

The differences between these two spirits are as follows. First, the primitive ethical spirit is characteristic of clans while the legal spirit is a characteristic of modern civil society. Secondly, in the former the individual is insignificant, but in the latter the individual is a truly independent personality. Thirdly, with the former the relationship among persons is unequal, whereas in the latter it is equal. According to Hegel's point of view, development from the primitive ethical to the legal spirit is historically necessary:

Dieser Untergang der sittlichen Substanz und ihr Uebergang in eine andere Gestalt ist also dadurch bestimmt, dass das sittliche Bewusstsein auf das Gesetz wesentlich unmittelbar gerichtet ist.³

From all this we can conclude that Confucian doctrine cannot serve as a complete guide for modernization. Only the legal spirit, based on independent persons and political equality forms the basis of the new society and the new culture. On this basis, we can discuss how to draw upon the heritage of traditional culture, especially Confucian doctrine. In one word, the formation of the

independent person (or the new individuality) and the democratization of the country (or the new totality) are synchronous in the process of the modernization.

Notes

1. Marx/Engels, *Ausgewählte Werke* (Dietz Verlag, 1990), Band 6, pp. 290-291.
2. G.W.F. Hegel, *Phaenomenologie des Geistes* (Suhrkamp Verlag, 1989), p. 355.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 354.

3.

Overcoming Nihilism and the Modernization of China

Wang Xinsheng

History

The modern history of China began with the Opium War (1840-1842), but China hardly underwent its real process of modernization until the reformation begun in the late 1970s. Why did China take so long to undertake a real process of modernization? The main reason was that the Chinese was suffering from a profound malaise, indeed from nihilism. This characterized the modern period in China as a history of devaluation of traditional Chinese civilization and values.

Before the Opium War, a prominent feature of Chinese civilization was its relative isolation for thousands of years from the outside world. Because of such isolation, feudal China had been left far behind, but the Chinese did not feel this. Until contact with modern Europeans, the Chinese believed their civilization to be superior to all others. They referred to their country as the Middle Kingdom because they thought of themselves as living at the center of the world.

In the Opium War, Western civilization intruded into China. Unfortunately, the result of this conflict between civilizations was totally unexpected by the Chinese for Chinese civilization had no prescription for dealing with Western civilization, which proved stronger. As Chinese civilization was no longer sustained there appears a nihilist tendency devaluing Chinese traditional values.

In modern history, both the negation of the Chinese tradition and the Westernization of Chinese culture went through three steps, namely, the Westernization Movement in the latter half of the 19th century, the Reform Movement of 1898 and the May 4th Movement of 1919.

After the Opium War, many China intellectual recognized that Western civilization had an advantage over Chinese civilization, so they called for learning from the West in order some day to defeat it. Following the model of Lin Zexu who advocated: "Pay the Western foreigner back in his own coin," such intellectuals as Zen Cuofan, Zuo Zongtang and Li Hongzhang, etc., launched the Westernization Movement to introduce techniques of Western capitalist production. Their intent was to modernize in order to preserve the rule of the Qing government. They built shipyards, textile mills and so on; especially they developed the Northern Navy, whose total tonnage ranked first in Asia and eighth in the world. On the surface the Qing seemed to be developing rapidly in the area of technology and manufacturing, which is to say that it seemed to have begun its modernization. But in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the Northern Navy of the Qing dynasty was defeated. The loss of this war was considered to be the failure of the Westernization Movement as a way of modernizing China, for the Northern Navy was the comprehensive embodiment of that Movement.

The fact that the grand Middle Kingdom was defeated by a so-called little "uncivilized" country awakened more Chinese. Many people felt this to be really galling and humiliating. But after drawing a lesson from this bitter experience, the Chinese began to realize that Western civilization included not only material civilization, but also political and economic systems, and that the latter were even more important. As a result, such intellectuals as Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao and Tan Sitong initiated the Reform Movement of 1898. They wanted to modernize China

by copying the Western political and economic systems which had been learned by the Japanese before the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895.

For example, to reform the old government organization, to better staff and simplify administration, to abolish the ancient Chinese examination system, to build new Western-style schools, to permit people to freely set up newspapers and societies, to establish General Bureaus of Railways, Mines, Agriculture, Industry and Business, etc. They even recommended an English man, Timothy Richard, as an adviser of Emperor Guangxu. Finally, however, this was bitterly strangled by conservative feudal forces because the Empress Dowager Cixi felt that the movement threatened her power, and some staff wanted to retain their stature.

The failure of the Reform Movement produced many more repercussions than that of the Westernization Movement. Many of the advanced intellectuals of China came to find that the modernization of China could not succeed only by advancing the material civilization and reforming the political and economic systems without introducing the modern Western ideas and the beliefs which underlay the Western civilization. This led finally to the May 4th movement of 1919, whose central point was "Down with Confucianism." But as "Down with the Confucianism" meant essentially "Down with China's Own World," the Movement destroyed the soul and the spiritual universe of the Chinese. As a result, it did not succeed in integrating the essence of Chinese civilization with the program of modernization.

The Failure of the Three Great Modern Reform Movements

Why did the three great movements of modern Chinese history not achieve their goal of modernizing China? The principal reason was that the leaders of the movements fell into a nihilism regarding Chinese civilization. The Westernization Movement was to modernize China by learning Western science and technology. The Reform Movement was to modernize China by imitating the Western political and economical systems. Both these reflect a deeper level of nihilism regarding Chinese civilization. Because of this they all chose Western patterns as the prescription for dealing with the problems of Chinese modernization, and failed to integrate this into the dominant trends of Chinese civilization by which China was China.

In fact, in the late Ming and the early Qing Dynasties, a Confucian transformation was led by three great Confucians: Wang Chuanshan, Huang Zongxi and Gu Yanwu. They found that though the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties had been prosperous, these dynasties were subjugated by two foreign nations respectively, the Yuan and Qing dynasties. They noted that the Confucianism of the Song and Ming dynasties laid particular stress on the "Inner Sage" or self-cultivation, but lost sight of establishing the "Outer King". Thus, they wanted to transform Confucianism from the "Inner Sage" to the "Outer King" model.

But this way was not pursued consistently. Up to the Qianjia period of the Qing dynasty textual criticism was absent, so the approach of transforming Confucianism was cut. Neither the Westernization nor the Reform Movement led to a transformation. All agreed the problem to be that of the "Outer King," which was approached in two manners: for Gu, Huang and Wang it was through Chinese national traditions; for Zen, Zuo and Li's Westernization Movement and Kang and Liang's Reform Movement it was through Western Learning. Therefore, both approaches were fundamentally minority movements, rather than movements of Chinese national life.

It was natural that such movements without a Chinese character and native cultural soil should fail. The same can be said of the May 4th Movement.

In the modernizing process of China, national nihilism and national conservatism had always been in conflict with each other. Although national nihilism was the main reason why the great attempts failed to modernize China, this does not mean that national conservatism could modernize China. History proved this as well. After the founding of the Republic of China, the nation experienced the autocratic monarchy of Yuan Shikai and the restorationist activities of Zhang Xun. Many intellectuals formed groups of royalists and conservatists, such as Kang Youwei, Lian Qichao, Liu Shiwei and Zhang Taiyan, most of whom were quite intelligent. Why did so many Chinese intellectuals support the monarchy, restore the dethroned monarch, and protect national conservatism and the Confucian Religion after the founding of the Republic?

The dominant reason was that the Chinese cherished a deep affection for Chinese cultural traditions. Democratic constitutionalism was not Chinese, nor were the accepted political and economic systems. The ultimate symbol of Chinese culture was the autocratic monarchy, so they sustained and protected this. Moreover, Western religion had intruded into China too; this paganism aroused Chinese resistance and generated the movement for Confucian religion.

When conservative intellectuals opposed Western democracy with a traditional Chinese monarchy, what underlay this action was affection for the Chinese tradition. The royalists, the national conservatives and the protectors of Confucianist religion embodied the Chinese intellectuals' last revolt against Western culture. They were defeated thoroughly because they were out of step with the whole era and could not respond to the challenges China then confronted.

Besides, the Boxer Movement (Yihetuan Movement) was not willing to learn from the West, but wanted to oppose it: emotionally they were against the West and unwilling to learn from it. They opposed strong warships and guns with their bodies, but suffered a serious and moving failure. As a stand for the nation, the Boxer Movement was the last popular resistance against Western culture. They did not learn rationally from the West as intellectuals, but directly opposed the intrusion of Western culture at the price of their lives. With the failures of the intellectual movement of the royalists and of the folk movement of the Boxers, due to the collapse of national dignity China began to worship with blind faith all things foreign.

Looking at the modernizing process of China from a distance, one can see that the Westernization and Reform Movements set the Western spear against China's own shield. The May 4th Movement did the same, attacking Chinese traditions with Western culture. This so injured Chinese national life that it could not stand. Therefore, the Chinese were forced to take another path. Seeking a new way which would "both satisfy the anti-Western passions, and echo the rational need for learning from the West" they chose the fashionable Marxist-Leninism. Marx's thought was essentially against the Western culture of capitalism, though conceived in the West. Marxism met simultaneously the psychological need for learning rationally from the West and for passionate opposition to the West. So the Chinese began to accept the "West" that opposes the West and Marxism came to dominate China for many years. Unfortunately, in emphasizing the anti-West aspect of Marxism, Marxist China ignored the national economy and people's livelihood, which for a long time led to a backwardness.

Principles for Modernization

Now, China is being carried to a new stage of modernization, but whether this can both overcome nihilism regarding Chinese civilization and avoid national conservatism remains an unsolved problem. To overcome national nihilism is not to quit learning from the West, for national nihilism is not entirely bad. The lesson to be drawn from history is to avoid learning from the West

in a scattered manner. We should learn from the West not only its science and technology, its political and economic systems, but also its ideals and beliefs. Only by learning comprehensively rather than one-sidedly from the West can we learn some of the essence of Western civilization.

Similarly, to avoid national conservatism is not the same as abandoning the entire Chinese culture. The problem is to distinguish between the essence and the dross of Chinese civilization. Only by integrating the cream of our national civilization with that of the Western civilization will the old ideal of modernizing China come true.

But what is the essence of Chinese civilization? What is in accord with the spirit of the times is the quintessence of civilization. According to this standard, for example, the following world appear to be the cream which we should carry forward in the modernization process of China.

The appreciation of the people as the foundation of the country: China has not undergone a bourgeois revolution as did the West. Nevertheless, while failing to form a tradition of democracy, China classically has taken the people as the foundation of the country. Mencius says, "the people is the most important, the country is the second most important, the king of the least importance." This can be developed into a modern democratic outlook.

The idea of humanity: In the whole world Confucianism was the first to stress the value of humanity. This appreciation of humanity is one thousand years earlier than the humanism of the West.

The reform of thought: China has a conservative tradition, but also has a sense of reformation. In the *Book of Change* or *I Ching* there are many ideas of change. It says directs one "to abolish the outmoded and to innovate," "the exhausted gives rise to change," etc. In the history of China there were many cases of reform which as examples can serve the modernization of China.

Consciousness of the moral dimension of the person: The Chinese tradition lacks a sense of practical free individuality, but it emphasizes the moral independence of the person and recognizes that everyone has his own independent moral will. Confucius says, "the supreme commander of the army can be taken away by force, but the will of any ordinary man cannot be taken away." Such an idea of personal value can play a positive role in the process of modernization.

The appreciation of subjectivity: Chinese idealism is fundamentally mistaken, but with reason it stresses subjective activity. Provided that this can be integrated critically, it will contribute to the modernization of China.

We believe that so long as the cream of Western civilization can be integrated and at the same time conservatism regarding national civilization can be integrated and at the same time conservatism regarding national civilization can be avoided, the modernization of China will be realized completely.

4.

External Influences as Driving Forces in China's Modernization

Li Jizong

A review of the development of the industrialized nations, whether of Europe, the United States, Russia or Japan, shows that at the very beginning of their industrialization they all connected their economy with international trade and the world economy. They thereby accumulated primary capital by means of exporting blood and iron, and importing large quantities of resources. In sum by opening to foreign markets they enabled their economies to take off through industrialization and international trade.

What of China? Britain's invasion of China in the Opium War (1840-1842) was more than 20 years before the Japanese Reform, but China retained a "closed door" policy until the end of the seventies of this century when it began to change. So, although China is different from the Western countries as well as from Russia and Japan, and cannot (and should not) take the "blood and iron," viz., the domestic and overseas predatory approach, nevertheless, external stimulation is indispensable.

Modernization Is a Revolution and Must Be Imported from the West

In economy, science and technological management there is quite a distance between the West and China. In the process of the transition from an agricultural to a modern industrial society, it is an historical fact that China has fallen behind. To complete their modernization the Western countries went through a number of revolutions, viz. scientific, civil (bourgeois democratic) and industrial. Those three revolutions took place only in Western countries so that modern science and technology, modern industry, modern capitalism and modern democracy -- all facets of modernization -- come from the West.

More concretely, after the 16th century, the West integrated the creations of all people working in science and culture; eventually it first conceived modern science and its related social structure. In the 18th century, the structure of science combined with the open system of technology to form the structure of modern science and technology which brought about the first industrial revolution. During that period, the bourgeois democratic revolution in the Western European countries promoted the historical interaction of the structures of modern science and technology with the social structure so that in the last three hundred years, science projected its rational spirit multi-dimensionally upon the whole of society. Hence, any traditional society must change its original social formation, which change is precisely the process of Western modernization.

Non-Western modernization, generally, is the effect of receiving the Western modernization revolution as a cultural transmission. Max Weber said that no non Western society can spontaneously create modern science, technology, professional personnel, capital and democratic legislation system. For non-Western countries such as Japan and China, industrial civilization is some-thing heterogeneous. Surely industrialization and modernization are common tendencies in human development, but there are essential differences between the processes of modernization East and West.

Especially for China, as an agricultural country with a less developed economy, the original revolutions of modernization, e.g., science-technology, democracy and the industrial revolution cannot be created homogeneously, but must be imported heterogeneously. Any import process from a heterogeneous civilization necessarily will have impact on the traditional order and even cause social disorder. That is the cost which the late-developing countries must pay for their modernization. Hence, without courage and sacrifice the process of modernization cannot begin.

The Concept "Chinese Ends with Western Means" as an Impediment to Economic Development in China

The cost of the democratic revolution in China is well-known, but that is just one aspect of the whole modernization revolution. Moreover, the establishment of a democratic regime does not mean the thorough and complete realization of democracy. For an agricultural country composed largely of small family-farms, the realization of democracy is a long process closely related with the modernization of science, technology and industry. Without those, especially without a change from backward agriculture and small family farmers, who are the main part of the people, it is impossible thoroughly to realize democracy. For that, it is necessary to accept the external impact and pay the cost.

The problem of democracy is the most essential aspect of the system of "ends and means" and requires an external impact. The modernization of science, technology and industry would appear to be even more the case, but in real history this has not been so. After the Song dynasty, China gradually fell behind the West. One of the important and direct causes was the "closed door" policy, a reluctance to accept external influences. When the Western countries opened the door by force of warships and guns, goods, technology and culture poured into China. Then the Chinese elite began to realize the usefulness of Western science, technology and management. However, mainly and finally it was agreed that "Western knowledge comes from the East", learn (only) the barbarous Western production technique, "Chinese ends with Western means", viz., what is inherited from the ancestors will never be touched.

After the democratic revolution and the establishment of the socialist state, this was combined with, or expressed as "keeping socialist purity." Whenever there was need to import more Western things, there were such cries of critique as "complete Westernization," "a total negation of the tradition," "national betrayal" and "taking the capitalist road". Joint-ventures were not permitted, and contracts, leases, auctions, mortgages, loans, bankruptcy, bidding and stocks all were regarded as capitalist things which socialism could never adopt. The result was that the economy was imprisoned and could not develop.

Historically, the main theme of the modern history of China has been a search for modernization. This long, winding road from a partial, especially economic, modernization to all-round systematic modernization can be divided into four periods: (1) the Westernization Movement initiated in the latter half of 19th century, whose goal was material or technical modernization; (2) from the early reformist movement to the Reform Movement in 1898, and eventually the Revolution in 1911, whose goal was mainly to seek political modernization; (3) the "May Fourth" Movement, whose goal was cultural modernization. In each of these periods an acceptance of external influences is necessary and the entire process demonstrates that the closed, conservative and backward traditional consciousness must be discarded. The last more than one hundred years move from conflict to fusion between Chinese and Western cultures, from tradition

to accepting external influences. Without discarding the bonds of a backward consciousness, reformist open door modernization would be but hollow words.

The Need to Re-Evaluate Capitalism and to Dare to Learn Modernization Therefrom

There is need now to re-evaluate capitalism. For a long time there was a bias against capitalism which was taken as the source of endless evils in modern society. Capitalism was taken to mean: oppression, exploitation, poverty, starvation, aggression, war and all social disasters; it had no merits at all. As a matter of fact, however, capitalism is a form of human civilization, a step in its evolution.

Undoubtedly capitalism has its inherent contradictions, and exploitation, oppression, aggression, etc., are real. However, as a civilized social form, it also includes or accompanies modern science and technology, bourgeois democratic legislation and the socialization of large scale industry which drive, as well as express, social progress. The inherent and insoluble contradictions, the dark evil side, is the inevitable price of social progress. Capitalism finally will be replaced by socialism, but its emergence and existence is also a result of historical selection. The advantage of the socialist approach in China has been to develop a directive theory so as to avoid the extreme evils of capitalism, but we cannot skip over the step of modernization.

Furthermore, contemporary capitalism is not wholly monopoly capitalism, but is entering a period of "social capitalism" in which the economic factors, including production, capital and the adjustive mechanism of social life are more socialized.

Firstly, the socialization of production: with the development and popular usage of computers and related technology, the capability for obtaining knowledge and communicating information has been promoted to an unprecedented degree. That leads to much closer interpersonal relationships in society. The social division of labor becomes more detailed and cooperation is broadened. This centralization and dispersion take place simultaneously. Industrial structures change rapidly, the service industry expands and the economy as well as the world economy are increasingly synthesized. In these tendencies, the key is that with the usage of machines (including computers), the productivity of labor is greatly promoted and thought becomes the main factor in the development of production. Hence, the speed of innovation and the speed of knowledge and technology rises ever higher.

Secondly, there is a socialization of capital. The corporation is an open system in which ownership is distributed; the state, community or socially owned sector of the economy and even inter-national or multi-national companies have been developed.

Thirdly, there is a socialization of the adjustive mechanisms of social life: the macroscopic control of economic activity has been enhanced and improved, while the anarchistic has been mitigated. The state plays a much stronger position in the distribution of national income, the development of public enterprises, public welfare and social security. All those alleviate some of the social contradictions so that the whole society is not the same as it was with monopoly capitalism before World War II. This can be interpreted even in terms of the socialist factors gradually growing into a developed capitalist society. Still more is to be learned then from contemporary Western countries.

The socialist approach does not require skipping over modernization. Indeed evolution and non-Western modernization require external or Western influences. This implies even more determination in opening the door and a greater readiness to respond to external influences.

5.

The Humanization of Objectivity

Li Jizong

The transformations of scientific thoughts in history from thermo-dynamics to evolutionism and to nonlinear science are substantial. In this process the scientific view of the world, as well as the method and model of scientific abstraction and their epistemological principles have been deeply transformed. Out of these have come, not only entirely new and valuable kinds of analytical materials and experiences, but quite new categories and ways of thinking for the investigation of epistemological and objective matters. These results not only have shaken completely the foundations of prior objective knowledge, but imply ways of reconstructing objectivity. For example, once the scientific model of the planets as a clock has been given up, the idea of taking the object as separate and dependent substance in time and space must also be given up. Another example: contemporary research on chaos theory as a science, recognizing nonlinear relations as more fundamental while linear relations happen only rarely even in inorganic events, implies that it is not unimaginable that there exist no clear or absolute boundary lines between what comes from the subject and what comes from the object, and that no absolute or eternal criterion can serve to distinguish such a boundary line. These new categories and ways of thinking have provided more suitable conceptual frames for grasping more deeply and exactly activities, practical structures and logic. A number of present discussions are carried out against such a background.

Frame of Reference

According to the central concepts of classic mechanics, each thing has all its attributes; they belong to this object without depending on any observation and even any relation. The distinction between primary and secondary attributes arises from such concepts.

The theory of relativity overthrew the concept of "primary attributions", by showing that all measures, such as time, space, mass, etc., which previously had been taken as absolute, were only certain relations or relative appearances depending on the special frame of reference. This means primarily that all physical objects and their attributes are special formulations which arise and exist under determined conditions. Hence, circumstances, the frame of reference, the model of interaction, etc., perform their functions as choices focusing, filtering and constructing all from finitude to in-finitude, from the potential to the actual, and from chaos to order. Namely, they collect all manner of attributes, structures and strata of objects and turn them into one finite combination or an actual space-time event. If separated from these functions of the frame of reference, the existence of things, their innate attributions, etc., would become more potencies in Aristotle's terms.

Obviously, only in a specific frame of reference, which appears as a specific choice-frame in cognitive activities, do there exist real relationships between man and reality. Establishing the object and formulating its attributes and essence can be done only in terms of a problem, a theoretical background and an operative system. The problem concerning whether or not our theoretical model is truthful, semantically perfect or corresponds to objects is meaningful only within the specific frame of reference.

In general, the frame of reference determines that one observer at one instance can hold only one position rather than many, that is, the observer always stays within the world. So, there can be no absolute observer, God, beyond the cosmos. This fact provides physics with some rather humanized attributes. Dialogues between us and nature could succeed only within nature.

Operator and Point of View

Of course, it is only after quantum mechanics and information theory had been developed that the above ideas became clear. Further, not only has the concept of a frame of reference shown that objective reality could exist only relatively in certain specific relations, but also that the integration of the notions of operator and *eigenstate* in quantum mechanics has shown that the objective reality is formed out of choices with irreducible subjective factors.

All previous theories of physics, including that of relativity, are theoretical expressions independent of observable means. In them all the primary concepts are physical concepts such as those of particle position as a time-function in Newtonian mechanics, and of the intensities of six split measures of the electromagnetic field in Maxwell's electromagnetics, etc. However, the concepts of quantum mechanics are completely different, which shows that all information about microcosmic objects have been achieved by means of macroscopic measures. The theoretical system of quantum mechanics consists in two parts: the equation of motions and the theory of observation, thereby elevating measure and observation to the level of primary concepts.

According to the quantum hypothesis, each measure is a unique interplay which has caused an irreversible or sudden change of the natural state. The famous physicist, Bohr said that "each measure breaks the natural process and leads to a new primary condition, called probability convergence. This is characteristic of quantum theory."

The state of microcosmic objects changes in a number of ways. The first is constant evolution in Hilbert space which is natural but not real, the second is nonconstant changes according to the law of probability. In our measures these are real but not objective as is called for by the classic theories, nor can they be encompassed in dynamic equations. Both ways are independent and mutually complementary; only by physical and philosophical interpretations are they connected. This is "the real duality" in quantum mechanics; it has nothing to do with the usually discussed duality of wave and particle, but is two models of a vector.

The apparatus used for measuring a state are designed according to the macroscopic theories, namely, the classic theories of physics and of process. As a result operations must be described in the language of classical physics and in ordinary language; at same time, we must depend upon these languages in order to understand and explain, that is, to build an audio-visual image. Both Bohr and Heisenberg stressed that the superficial duality of wave and particle came out of classic concepts with their limitations of language. Having really understood the theory of quantum neither ever dreamt of speaking of a duality of quanta.

Speaking conceptually, these characteristics appear by importing an operator replacing the usual physical concepts with an operator, that is, a mathematic operation as below: by putting the operator into a function there results a consequence. Under specified boundary conditions, a series of possible values as the solution of equations stand as *eigenvalues* of these equations. In general, the operator represents one sort of use and operation. This shows that the function has a series of definite values in accord with specific uses, and that, because of the effect of the operator the state of the system has undergone a sudden change. Thus the event that really happens is the result of choosings among a series of possible events. As a mixed state this actual event is a state of having

experienced certain interactions of the apparatus, which is to say, an *eigenstate*. Without such interactions, the observable phenomena would disappear completely.

At same time, since each definite appearance is connected with a definite set of operators, the micro-system has an irreducible multiplicity. An accomplishment of some possibilities has changed the structure of certain spaces as possibilities, that is, has excluded some other possibilities. Position and momentum are never changeable measures independent of each other, and the scientific world-image can never be analyzed as fundamental building-materials independent of each other. According to this uncertainty principle any local actualization will cause a change of the total space-structure as possibilities.

So, what phenomena or events appear depends on our choices of measuring instruments, the question we raise and our ways of answering. Whatever has been seen is not nature itself, but nature uncovered by our ways of investigation.

Modern science seeks answers from the nature by choosing and questioning. However, according to Einstein and K. Poper, there is no one final answer and many ways to arrive at it. On the contrary, quantum mechanics has uncovered that the final answer must be formed in the answering process, according to which, there exists no definite answer in nature; any answer will be shaped by the way we choose to answer.

First, "scientific facts" are also a sort of point of view. They are not arbitrarily subjective for otherwise not only would the facts not be such, but neither would science. But subjective roles have been encompassed by scientific facts in the following ways: scientific facts have been gathered by our practical means, described by our language, and chosen from various kinds of phenomena. Such choices, connected to our conjectures and expectations, are considered meaningful for expounding, interpreting, testing, and predicting, etc. They are not only a recognition and description of certain specified achievements of scientific research, but a description of the human activities themselves.

As regards concepts, laws and theories, the contributions of the subject to science are more obvious, and include the contributions of free thought creations and the human pursuit of unity, simplicity and aesthetics.

In general, the great contribution of quantum mechanics is that objective facts, which often are taken as independent of us and as a source for recognizing and testing criteria by common sense, are manifest finally to be one sort of *eigenstate* depending on the investigator's choices and constructions. Hence, we are deeply rooted in the world which has been described by us.

The Cosmos of Participants

In view of developments from quantum mechanics to information theory, cybernetics, systems theory and even ecology, scientists have been finding ever more clearly that science always unfolds around a human as the center, so science is only a science for humans. We are always living in a cosmos we have described; we live in a cosmos which we have described from the point of our inner world and with our own ways. As a cosmos of humans, it arises as objects as a result of human activities. The human objectifies oneself into science, stamping one's own spirit upon the world, and expressing one's essence in this creation. This is what K. Marx said about "the real awakening of nature, and of man" and "the finished naturalism of man and the finished humanism of nature."

In this world of participants recognition itself becomes a dialogue between humans and nature in which, according to J.A. Wheeler's metaphor, what is central is the question. This produces the

situation, state or network and leads forward the investigator and his or her objects. Thus, both subject and object lose their traditional meaning in philosophy for they are never substances independent or isolated with regard to each other, but participants in a dialogue of functions and structures distinguished by their different positions in this dialogue. They are openings each of which becomes itself in its relation to another; moreover, the dialogue proceeds through coordinations and couplings which happen in their possible spaces so that a substantial and stable structure is produced and a new possibility opens.

Naturally, a revision of J.A. Wheeler's model is necessary: before or beyond the dialogue, both subject and object are a whole of potentials. The answer is not given *a priori*, but exists only in the space of possibilities. That is, not only does the subject as method have its own orientation, ways of functioning, theoretical back-ground, expectations, aims, etc., but also the object itself has its own spontaneity, independence and laws. Such relations of sub-jects and objects appear as specific structures or limits, etc.; they are possibilities to be constructed. Because of these the dialogue becomes more like "an adventure of choices", a kind of "challenge and response"; its success lies in a coupling of parts of both the subject's and object's spaces as possibilities.

What Is Objective Existence?

This sense of a cosmos of participants has opened a new substantial view of physics according to which existence is a totality of possibilities with an infinitely complicated structure and infinite combinations. The appearance of each physical reality means that accomplishment of a possible world and a choice of actual relations. Similarly, the realization of each object in human activities is an actualization of a possible world, the relations and attributes of which are worked out only in our active research activities. This not only shows the possible modes of combinations and reconstructions that are permitted by existence itself, but also depends on the choices of the structure of human activities. It is then a coupling of both subjective and objective aspects.

Thus, the monistic world-image has escaped the limitations of classical science and become much more profound, complicated and broader. Modern scientific vision has expanded its scope rapidly, becoming ever deeper and more specialized day by day, has resulted in our knowledge disintegrating into many special departments with multiple levels and dimensions so as to appear as stereoscopic intersections. Such a multi-dimensional world-image reflects not only the fact that existence has many levels and a substantial multiplicity, but that modern scientific theories and their practical means have become pluralistic. That is, the ways of constructing the world subjectively and connecting to objects in action have become multiple. This asks us not only to admit the multiplicity of existence but, moreover, to emphasize the existence of the world's multiple dimensions, that is, the multiplicity of a humanized reality.

The richness of humanized reality as such exists beyond any unitary language or logical structure. Particularly, since many means of working are mutually exclusive or irreducible to each other and are limited, we are not able to exhaust all truths of possible worlds from only one point of view and by one method (here the importance of Bohr's "complementary principle" can be seen).

This conclusion applies also to the spiritual products of human beings. Whether science or art, each field includes objective and substantial factors, with ways to combine them in conceiving and measuring values. Thus, we find a profound and inner unification of the two cultures of human and natural science. Just as we objectify ourselves, this also is the way human subjects creatively unfold their models of activity. Such unification is not a formal result, but an original process.

Western Philosophical Trends and Chinese Modernization

Liu Fangtong

Wholesale Westernization vs “Chinese Learning as Foundation Western Learning for Application”

Chinese and foreign scholars all agree that China’s modernization is necessarily influenced by Western thought trends, including those in philosophy. But their views diverge widely with regard to what roles these trends should play and how to evaluate these influences. One view, which simply reduces modernization to Westernization, holds that China can realize modernization only by overthrowing China’s history and cultural tradition and following wholesale the example of the West, that is, by using Western thought as the sole guide in realizing Chinese modernization. This is the view of wholesale Westernization.

Another view is to reduce modernization to a self-renewal of China’s inherent tradition. It holds that China can realize modernization merely by exploiting China’s inherent tradition of thought and culture and making it the foundation upon which to transplant Western sciences and technologies into China without adopting the West’s socio-political and ideological culture. This is the view of “Chinese learning for foundation, Western learning as application.”

The struggle between those two views has lasted for over a century. The one-sidedness of each often is uncovered and criticized by the other, especially by the Chinese Marxists, and therefore each lost its influence. Nevertheless, the two views continuously reemerge in new forms, and continue to dispute with each other. In recent years, this dispute has taken a radical form and become more complicated due to practical political tensions.

After the ten year turmoil of the cultural revolution in which “Marxism” was tortured by the ultra-left, Marxist philosophy once again has been called upon to be an open-door doctrine, for otherwise it could not provide the theoretical basis for China’s modernization. This meant that Marxist philosophy had to absorb all the outstanding philosophical fruits of human thinking including contemporary Western philosophy. From the end of seventies, Chinese philosophical circles began again to study contemporary Western philosophy and made a great progress in subsequent years. Various modern and contemporary Western philosophical trends gradually were introduced into China and played an important role in promoting philosophical research there, especially in smashing dogmatism and ossified trends.

However, some people went too far. They often neglected concrete Chinese conditions and were so dissatisfied with the tortured Marxism that they advocated discarding it completely and cause of the existence there of factors unfavorable to modernization. They considered the social-philosophical institutions, ideologies and values, especially democracy and freedom in Western countries, as ideal and completely suitable for China. They suggested that in order to realize modernization in China society and culture should be rebuilt completely upon the West model. This is a new theory of wholesale Westernization. The TV play, “He shang,” which had influence for a short time, was an intense manifestation of this trend. The play criticized not only by most Chinese scholars on the mainland, but also not a few scholars in Taiwan, Hong Kong and overseas, because of its ultra-nihilist attitude toward the Chinese historical and cultural tradition.

However, in critiquing this new view of wholesale Westernization, some people as it were went to the other extreme, especially after the well-known political events of 1989 in Beijing. The reasons which caused the events are complex and manifold, but they reduced them simply to the influences of bourgeois liberalization, which they attributed to the reintroduction of Western philosophical trends into China. Therefore, once again there arose an almost totally negative attitude toward Western philosophy. Of course, it differed from the past leftist period in not fully rejecting concrete Western philosophy, but there was no positive side in their dealing with it. Perhaps in order to be diametrically opposed to those who preach wholesale Western modernization, they almost as highly advocated Chinese traditional thought and culture. They even were full of praise for factors of feudal superstition; for example some held that the doctrine of divination in *The Book of Changes* corresponds to modern scientific forecasting. Some people thought traditional Confucianist culture carried within itself the seeds of thought basic to modernization, and that all these things corresponded in turn to Marxism. According to them, Marxism as the foundation almost coincided with traditional Chinese learning as the foundation. They admitted that the accomplishment of modernization in China needed to learn from and to import Western science and technology as well as managerial experiences for the economy; they advocated also the policies of reform and open-door, but confined these to the field of economy and science/technology while still holding a closed attitude toward everything in the field of ideology and culture. Although this kind of theory is proposed in the name of Marxism, in fact it departed from true Marxism in many aspects. Therefore, it seems rather a new form of the view: “Chinese learning for foundation, Western learning as application.”

In recent years, the above-mentioned positions around the question of the influence of Western trends of thoughts in the course of Chinese modernization showed that some questions which had been disputed several times in the past and seemingly already had been resolved would be raised under the new historical conditions. Under present circumstances in order better to realize and assess the influences of Western philosophical trends on China’s modernization and to overcome the one-sidedness of these two extreme trends, some relevant questions must be considered. For example, what is the relationship between modernization and Westernization? What is the link of modernization in Western countries with their philosophical trends? What role does the introduction of Western philosophical trends play in China’s achieving modernization? What historical experiences and lessons should we draw? How to deal with Western philosophical trends in the present movement of modernization in China? How to deal with the relation between Marxist philosophy as the theoretical basis of China’s modernization and contemporary Western philosophical trends? We will discuss some of these below.

Modernization and Westernization: Their connection and Difference

The question of the relation between modernization and Westernization has been disputed for a long time and various views proposed. Here, I will not suggest any new opinion, but the question still has to be raised because in recent years two types of onesidedness regarding the mode of modernization in China have been related directly to an onesided comprehension of the relation between modernization and Westernization. Generally speaking, modernization is not the same as Westernization, but it cannot exclude Westernization in certain aspects.

People give various explanations of the concept of modernization. Sociologists, political scientists, economists, anthropologists and psychologists all give definition from different angles. From the philosophical point of view it is a dynamic process of transformation from

underdeveloped levels to reaching of surpassing advanced levels. As far as the whole society and country is concerned, its process of modernization can be divided overall into two aspects. One is the development of economy and science/technology, whose main manifestation is industrialization. The other aspect is change in people's thoughts, ideas of value, mode of life and behavior as well as corresponding changes in socio-political institutions. The two aspects are related to each other and cannot be separated. However, in talking of modernization, people pay more attention to the first aspect than to the second because historically those changes took place first in such Western countries as Britain, France, Germany and the USA, which are Western models. Hence, there is a close relation between modernization and Westernization.

After attaining national independence a series of developing countries often seek to reach Western advanced levels of development in their economy and in science/technology. Therefore, as regards the improvement of their material life as an important aim for modernization, they naturally relate modernization to Westernization or even at times identify the two. Although Chinese modernization emphasizes a socialist direction, as regards the modernization of industry, agriculture, science and technology and national defence as main contents of modernization, people first think it a matter of reaching and surpassing advanced Western levels in these aspects. This is the main epistemological reason why various views of wholesale Westernization in the history of Chinese modernization still attract people today.

However, if one inquires further into the relation between modernization and Westernization, one finds that, although they are contemporaneous in process, modernization and the Westernization are not equivalent. Since the model of modernization in Western countries cannot necessarily be rapidly realized in other countries which can take other models, while Westernization remains an important model for the achievement of modernization it is not universally applicable. The choice of a proper model is conditioned by concrete national conditions and cannot to be lumped together.

What is meant by the Western model of modernization? There are different answers. For example, the Britain-French, the German and the American approach, which usually are considered Western models, differ in certain respects. Generally speaking, modernization breaks through the less developed modes of natural economy, which restrain the socio-productive forces, in order to open and develop domestic and export markets and to develop a commodity economy. These are followed necessarily by a rationalization of life, rapid development in the sciences and technology, advances in production and the accomplishment of industrialization-revolution against feudal rule and the construction of democratic political system suitable to a commodity economy marked by liberty, equality and fraternity, along with the development of related thought, culture and values. This road toward modernization was realized without great obstacles in many Western countries. When Germany and America followed after Britain and France on the road of modernization the effects were basically similar, although a relatively different approach had been taken, especially in Germany. As there were not great differences in social structures and cultural traditions in all these countries, the way to modernization in Britain and France was easily to be copied in Germany and America.

Nevertheless, the models of modernization initiated by Britain and France do appear to be substantially different and foreign to the Orient whose social and cultural backgrounds are quite different. So when Western models of modernization and their social, economic and political systems. This makes the route to modernization of Eastern countries much more difficult and tortuous than in the West. Eastern countries cannot simply imitate and copy the Western models in order to realize their modernization, but must initiate or choose their own model according to

their own special historical-cultural backgrounds. This has happened in the history of the modernization of Oriental countries.

Among Eastern countries, Japan has been the most Westernized country; indeed, people usually take it as a Western country. However, when it began to realize its modernization in the middle of 19th century, Japan was still a feudal autocratic country. The ideas of liberty, democracy and fraternity, the ideological foundation of Western modernization, were not observable there. Individualism, which is considered the keystone of these ideas and therefore is sacrosanct in West, had not been much encouraged if the situation is viewed as a whole. Even the spirit of self-sacrifice for the sake of the whole, which was expressed in the ardent loyalty to the emperor (*Mikoto*), was eulogized as the highest morality. After World War II the Imperial power declined and the Western concepts of democracy and freedom became very influential in Japan, thereby Westernizing Japanese society in almost all fields. Nevertheless there still did exist many special characteristics which made Japan different from Western countries. In Japan adjustments and controls by the central government upon domestic politics and the economy in particular are much greater. Nationalistic passions and a sense of the importance of the preservation and esteem for the national cultural traditions are much stronger than in the West. This may be the decisive factor in the creation of the so-called Japanese economic miracle.

Having emerged since the middle of 1960s, the “four small dragons” of Asia, namely, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea, have preserved many characteristics of the Eastern cultural traditions, particularly the Confucian tradition – except to some extent Hong Kong where as a Britain colonies the Eastern influence was relatively less strong. For a long period, Western democratic policies were not active in these places. The trend toward Westernization has strengthened only since 1980, so they still differ from typically Western countries and are closer to Japan.

After the October Revolution, Russia took a socialist approach to modernization quite different from that of Western capitalism. For several decades its efforts toward modernization had many achievements, although at very high costs. The fact that a previously weak and important Russia and some European-Asian countries in alliance with it formed a superpower capable for contending with the USA shows that the socialist road to modernization was successful. In the 1980s radical changes took place so that socialism was abandoned and the Russian government is trying to take up the Western model of development. It is not necessary to predict if such changes will succeed, but the following is certain. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the failure of socialist model were the result of some very complicated causes, one of which may be its departure from the objective laws of socialism. We can say that at most it is a failure of Soviet model of socialism, not of all models.

The movement of modernization in China, started as early as the middle of 19th century, had often been frustrated because it oscillated between the polarity of simply repeating or simply rejecting the Western model. Only since the Chinese democratic revolution succeeded in 1949, and especially since the Chinese government has been carrying out the reform and open-door policies since 1979, has Chinese modernization been achieving world-famous results. Of course, the modernization since 1949 has been extremely torturous, at times relatively slow or even stagnant or with setbacks, all of which would be worth summarizing. Nevertheless, the achievements of China since 1949 have been very great, whether compared with its original base or with other similar developing countries such as India. But the Chinese road toward modernization is certainly quite different from that of Western countries.

In general, in the light of experiences of development in a series of Eastern countries, Westernization is not the only model of modernization; each country must choose its own route suitable to defects, contradictions and social crises have arisen in developed countries where modernization has been realized, as has been pointed out not only by many Western scholars, but also by many Western politicians. In view of this, it would be unreasonable to abandon other choices which may be more suitable and to take Westernization as the only model for modernization.

However, certainly we cannot conclude that modernization completely excludes Westernization. After all, the movement of modernization originally occurred in the West and a lot of factors which promoted modernization there have universal meaning and are effective not only in Western countries, but also in other countries once they are transformed and improved. The fact that Eastern countries, including China, have their own historic-cultural traditions or other peculiar environments and should not simply fully copy the Western models does not mean that those factors which facilitated the accomplishment of modernization in the West would not be effective in Eastern countries, in fact some of them are indispensable. Just as in the West, a great advance of social production forces as well as of science and technology is absolutely necessary in any other country or region intending to accomplish modernization. That knowledge and experience gathered in the West are worth modeling, indeed are indispensable in other places. Furthermore, although there are serious limitations, the reforms in socio-political systems, as well as in related fields of thought and culture provided the necessary conditions for the development of Western science and technology as well as the social productive forces.

Despite some elements of hypocrisy, the capitalist democratic system with its stress on basic human rights such as personal human freedom and equality before the law certainly is much more progressive than a feudal dictatorship depressing human nature and exploiting human rights. In fact, it is impossible to accomplish modernization fully without a democratic system and esteem for human freedom and other rights.

It is true that there are some precedents for a development of capitalism and science and technology under feudal monarchies in Germany and Japan. But these were limited developments and even led to such wrong roads as fascist dictatorships which destroyed modernization, so that finally these countries have taken the road to a democratic system. This shows that the democracy and esteem for basic human rights initiated in the Western movement of modernization ultimately are necessary conditions for a more complete modernization in any country. It is not unnecessary then to undertake certain aspects and degrees of Westernization in the course of modernization if this can be done within a certain scope rather than a sheer Westernization. To do so does not mean to disregard one's own excellent cultural traditions and peculiar historical backgrounds, but it does mean to integrate these with the universal factors developed in Western modernization, and on the basis of such an integration to create special models more suitable to one's country. To exclude Westernization absolutely would be not to improve but to diminish the Chinese modernization process.

Western Philosophical Trends and Western Modernization

No one hesitates to acknowledge that it is necessary to learn from the advanced Western sciences and technologies for Chinese modernization. The question concerning whether or not economic managerial and structures should be learned had caused many disputes, but these now are coming to a positive conclusion. The leaders of the Chinese government and the Communist

Party always call for a more rapid and daring practice of reform and open-door policy. What was called “capitalism” has come or could come to be called “socialism.”

However, all these seem limited to the fields of economy and of science and technology. Reform in the socio-political fields also are considered necessary, but should or could China learn from Western experience in those fields as well? Many still feel deeply suspicious. They are very much afraid that to do so should mean abandoning socialism and returning to capitalism. There is much more hesitancy to do so as regards ideology, including philosophy. There is no indication that those who took the introduction of Western humanistic trends as the decisive factor in causing the disturbance of 1989 have changed their attitude.

Why is the attitude toward the fields of Western science, technology and economy so different from that toward its politics and ideas. Of course, many reasons can be enumerated of this. Some exposures and critiques of the problems in Western politics and ideas are not groundless; in addition, as there are some great differences between the two fields, it is not unreasonable to treat them differently. But the inclination to make such differences absolute so as to think of them as opposed is one-sided.

In the course of the modernization of Western countries, on the whole the development of the political-spiritual field and that of economy and science-technology were coordinated with each other. There were various conflict and some incompatibilities, but essentially they were compatible. In the course of the development of capitalism in United States, for example, which of course was its process of modernization, pragmatism is regarded as the pillar of thought which shaped American politics, economy, education, culture, science and technology. Its basic principles became the guide for almost all fields. Experts in these fields are not necessarily edified by pragmatism, but they cannot escape its influence. The achievements of these fields, on the other hand, provide important data for the pragmatic approach. Without some understanding of pragmatism, one could not have a good understanding of the aspects of American society. This is true also of the fields of the science and technology where many take pragmatism as their methodology. In fact, at the outset pragmatism was regarded by Peirce as a method to determine what was true or false in scientific concepts. It had no political or ideological meaning; only later was it applied in other respects. In the eye of the ordinary American, pragmatism is the emblem not of philistinism and profit-before-all-else, but the embodiment of the courage, gumption and creativity of the American people. Therefore, while of course one can criticize pragmatism as a kind of philosophy which has great limitations, if one simply rejects it or neglects its existence one could not effectively draw upon the experiences and lessons gained in the course of modernization in United States.

In a word, the development of Western economy and technology cannot be divorced from its philosophy. The latter has given direction to the former, provided the methodology for research and made possible theoretical demonstration and summation. If one does not research contemporary Western politics, economics, law and pedagogy, as well as its theories about human rights, religion and cultural values, one could not understand how the West developed its science and technology and obtained the benefits of its capitalist economy. If one does not study seriously Western philosophy, it will be very difficulty to obtain proper fruits in these fields.

However, some Chinese theorists seemed to neglect the internal relation between philosophy and the economy and technology in Western countries; especially they neglect the positive role in played by the former in the development of the latter. They may not realize that if one completely negates Western thought, particularly its philosophy or fails to study it seriously and draw positive content therefrom, one could not effectively understand and evaluate what is happening in its

economy-technology. If an open-door policy is carried out only in the economic and technological fields, ideology, the openness in the field of economy and technology finally would be diminished.

Reviewing and Reevaluating Western Philosophical Trends in Order to Promote the Modernization of China

Marxism affirms that there is an internal relation among philosophy, politics, economy and science/technology. The notion that the development of the economy and of the science/technology of a country could be divorced from the condition of its spiritual culture such as its philosophy can never be considered combatable with Marxism.

Why then do some Chinese theorists, who regard themselves as the most faithful followers of Marxism, take a simply negative attitude toward Western philosophy when it comes to drawing on the advanced science and technology as well as experience in economical management of the West? This is to cater to short term political concerns. In addition, it seems to derive from a superficial interpretation without real understanding, and an ineradicable dogmatism which loses contact with reality in research regarding Western philosophy.

For almost thirty years before 1979, contemporary Western philosophy was considered to be essentially opposed to Marxist philosophy; it was seen as a completely irrational idealism and a decadent imperialist and bourgeois ideology. This conclusion was derived primarily from political arbitrariness, rather than the objective and scientific analysis of academic research. During these thirty years in China there were very few essays and books on philosophy which objective and practically evaluated contemporary Western philosophy. Hence, there hardly could be any objection to the arbitrary conclusion above. After 1979, this conclusion was gradually challenged and then negated after the resumption and development of objective research in contemporary Western philosophy.

However, this research still focused on the explanation of the theories of contemporary Western philosophy. Very few people researched deeply and concretely under what concrete social conditions these theories of philosophy came into being; what were the dependent relations between these theories and the politics, economy, culture and science-technology of Western society; what role did they play in the modernization of Western countries; what positive roles could they play in the course of enriching and developing Marxist philosophy? When some people went to the extreme of overvaluing Western philosophy, they had no concrete analysis and demonstration of their comments, which often were almost arbitrary.

In view of these facts, when some people again criticized Western philosophy based on changing political considerations they also could easily substitute their negative arbitrariness for a positive one. This was obvious in research on Jean Paul Sartre. At first, some people overvalued his philosophy, but did not study it deeply in order to have an adequate basis for their evaluation. Because of political reasons, many essays later appeared which criticized Sartre. Among these essays, there were indeed some good ones, but most of them were arbitrary. Unfortunately, this one-sidedness was not completely overcome later and some theorists criticized Western humanistic trends in philosophy (mainly European continental philosophy) for the political purpose of criticizing bourgeois liberalization. As usual, those making the criticism did not study deeply and concretely what they criticized. Therefore they raised some objections and made the sweeping claim that the drawback of the theories they criticized was that they propagated a theory of human nature and humanism, and therefore were opposed essentially to Marxist historical materialism. Some people maintained that to speak of contemporary Western philosophy

was to return to the anthropology of Feuerbach. In fact, if practically, it would be apparent that the humanistic schools of contemporary Western philosophy do not all propagate the same theory of human nature and humanism, but have different and sometimes even opposite explanations of the meaning of humanism. Indeed, strictly speaking, it is not accurate to call them schools of humanistic philosophy, for they differ from, more than they approach, the anthropology of Feuerbach.

If the critiques of Western philosophy mentioned above were only the usual academic discussions within philosophical circles they might not have had so much negative influence; but if affirmed by the government and taken as the foundation for formulating policy the attitude could not be wise. For both what is called Chinese and what is called humanistic among trends of thought are closely associated with the whole process of the modernization of Western countries. They provide theoretical bases or guiding ideas for the development of Western social economy and science/technology. These theoretical bases and guiding ideas are not all correct, but neither are they necessarily wrong; this requires that we seriously study and analyze them. The inclination to negate or affirm them simply is harmful to concrete research and critical use of the experiences and lessons of Western modernization because it cannot reveal the actual and concrete relation between Western thought and Western modernization.

Research on Western philosophy in Chinese philosophical circles should not only overcome the previous nihilist inclination, but also transcend the level of simple introduction which has been more common in recent years. A new stage must be achieved on which the internal relations between contemporary Western philosophy and the development of Western social economy and science/technology is researched in a concrete manner, and on which research respects, how these philosophical theories have improved or impeded the development of modernization in Western countries. This will make it possible to draw lessons from those experiences and improve modernization in China.

The "Great Triangle" of Chinese Philosophical Academia and the Modernization of China: Reflections on Chinese Philosophical Trends in 20th Century

Huang Songjie

Marxist philosophy, Western philosophy and Chinese traditional philosophy are three independent and yet interrelated philosophical trends in the 20th century Chinese academic and cultural world. I refer to this as the "Great Triangle". Dealing properly with this interrelationship is of great importance for the development of Chinese culture and the modernization of China.

The Great Triangle

Chinese philosophy has its own characteristics as an important part of Chinese culture. It has been believed generally that Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism are three major schools of Chinese philosophy. Among these Confucianism is the main one as it played a leading role for more than two thousand years from the Han dynasty to the revolution of 1911. Taoism and Buddhism prospered only at one time and their role and influence never surpassed those of Confucianism. As a foreign culture and religion originating from India, Buddhism could not have taken root and exerted social influence in the Chinese cultural world unless Buddhism, Taoism and Confucianism had been assimilated and fused with one another. So traditional Chinese philosophy is always summed up as the two schools of Confucianism and Taoism, while the former is seen as the principal representative of, and even as synonymous with, Chinese traditional philosophy.

With Confucianism as its main body, traditional Chinese philosophy depends upon and serves the clan system centered on honoring the emperor, esteeming the ancestors and caring for one's parents -- which is in perfect harmony with the closed natural economic system of which agriculture is the main part. Confucianism may be regarded as the ideal manifestation or epitome of this kind of social structure and economic base. Li Chiao at the core of Confucianism focuses on defending hierarchy and yet restricting the privileges and mediating the contradictions through such ideas as *Jen* (human kindness) and *Hsiao* (filial piety). Traditional Confucian philosophy is thus a kind of ethics and philosophy of life, having played active as well as positive roles in Chinese social and cultural development. It became the tool for justifying the feudal autocratic monarchy and hindered the growth of science and productive forces in China.

Western science and culture spread gradually in China after the Opium War (1840) and forcefully challenged traditional Confucianism. Early in 20th century, with the Revolution of 1911 and the May 4th New Culture Movement, traditional Confucianism was attacked intensely by a large number of progressive intellectuals and radical thinkers. During the twenties and thirties of this century, more and more Chinese intellectuals introduced and popularized Western philosophy in China, among which pragmatism was especially influential. But early in 20th century the greatest impact on Chinese society was the introduction and spread of Marxism. From the 1920's on the "Great Triangle" appeared in the Chinese philosophical arena, in which the traditional Confucianist philosophy was defeated and Marxist philosophy emerged as the winner. The victory

of Marxism is due to the fact that the Chinese communists combined Marxism tactically with Chinese social and revolutionary practice; they made of Marxism an ideological weapon against feudalism and imperialism, leading thereby to the founding of New China. It is unparalleled in history that Marxism as a school of thought was equipped with a revolutionary party to carry out a difficult social transformation and make remarkable achievements.

Enthusiasm for Culture

Everything develops in zigzag fashion, and Marxism is no exception. On the one hand, Marxism became the spiritual mainstay or guiding principle of all action and played the dominant role in the New China; on the other hand, Marxism was confronted with a series of new problems, among which how to build China into a modern socialist country was the most important. China formulated a sovietized line of modernization in the early 1950s, but later tried to probe a road different from that of the Soviets. The "Three Red Flags" of the "General Line", the "Great Leap Forward" and the "People's Commune" were its incarnations, but this road could not avoid the disadvantages of the Soviet mode and ran to the extremes of left deviationism. As a result, the class struggle was overemphasized as the universal guiding principle, which brought about the "Ten Years' Disaster". In the mid-seventies the Chinese economy teetered on the edge of collapse, but at the critical moment the communist party worked out a new modernization line of socialist constructions. The Sino-Western iron curtain broke down after China opened its doors, which meant that Chinese awoke again after paying a bitter price.

Since the 1980s, Western culture and philosophy have been disseminated in China along with the introduction of advanced scientific technology; the momentum exceeds that of the first wave of the 1920s. The "enthusiasm for the West" emerges rapidly especially among the Chinese youth. In fact, China wants to learn much about science and culture in order to find anything that promotes prosperity and power, while Western culture and philosophy stimulate this Chinese desire for transformation. Due to the growth of the socialist commodity economy and the introduction of the mechanism of competition, egalitarian distribution is collapsing, and all want to bring to full play their subjective activity and free will. Contemporary Western philosophy, although once proclaimed as a theoretical forbidden zone, caters to these needs and became a notable stream of Chinese social thought during the mid-eighties.

At that time another wave of the "enthusiasm for culture" followed the "enthusiasm for the West". In this the scholars of Chinese history, philosophy and culture played an active role. Their comparative studies of Sino-Western culture and philosophy put Chinese traditional culture into the context of world culture so as to reevaluate it. Thus, "enthusiasm for culture" is closely related to "enthusiasm for comparison". The reconsideration of traditional culture and philosophy as a need of Chinese modernization aims at setting up the cultural ideas and surroundings appropriate to the socialist commodity economy, because economic reform requires changes in cultural ideas. Chinese socialist modernization would not come true without changes in traditional culture.

The "enthusiasm for culture" is echoed also by, and merged with, the Neo-Confucianism popular abroad. This emphasizes that Confucian thoughts are meaningful and valuable not only for Chinese culture but even for world culture, and that the future of Chinese society is to absorb and transform Western culture based upon the main body of Confucianist thought. Neo-Confucianists are largely overseas Chinese scholars who study Confucianism and traditional Chinese culture and reflect on both the experiences and the lessons of the recent one hundred years in order to seek a sui-table way for Chinese modernization. Hence, it strikes a responsive chord in

those Chinese scholars interested in the fate of Chinese modernization. Dormant Chinese traditional philosophy began to revive in this convergence of "enthusiasm for culture" and Neo-Confucianism, so that the "Great Triangle" of Chinese philosophical academia now emerges in these historical conditions.

Developmental Marxism

Undoubtedly, the three parts of the "Great Triangle" should not be put on a par with each other. Marxism is the guiding principle and plays a leading role in contemporary Chinese society. During recent decade, because the Communist Party has broken with the rigid manner of studying Marxism and changed many orthodox ideas including those about Western culture and philosophy previously taken for granted, China has been taking great steps forward in modernization.

Originating from the West theoretically and academically, Marxist philosophy is close to other Western philosophies. Contemporary Western philosophy to a large extent meets the needs of Western social, economic and political developments. Its world-views, epistemology (theories of knowledge), social and historical views and ethics are theoretical explanations of the science, technology and human relations of contemporary capitalist society. It is fundamentally opposed to Marxist philosophy, e.g., each school of Western philosophy in varying degrees overstates the active role of the spirit and of consciousness, exaggerates the functions and meanings of irrationality, and overemphasizes individuality and the freedom of the individual will. Marxist philosophy is not a closed system, but a continuously developing philosophy along with the development of social practices. It is now confronted with some overall problems which are urgently to be dealt with, to which contemporary Western philosophy provides some illuminating remarks and valuable materials. So the introduction of Western culture and the communications of Sino-Western philosophies could be helpful to the development of Marxist philosophy.

It is particularly to be noted that political, economic and cultural communication increase rapidly among different countries, regions and nations. The cross-reference and cross-fertilization of different types of economies and cultures, which are the currents of the times, encourage the pluralistic development of this world. Marxism must face these currents. As far as philosophy is concerned, dialogue and communication among different schools and the absorption of other materials and viewpoints are inevitable. Contemporary Western Marxism is linked in varying degrees to different schools of Western philosophy. The task of Chinese philosophy is not sedulously to ape Western Marxists and philosophers, but to change simplistic and one-sided viewpoints.

Generally speaking, contemporary Western philosophers deal with two kinds of problems, one is about sciences and know-ledge, another about man; both problems are dealt with also by Marxists. Chinese academic philosophical circles have recently discussed such related problems as subject-object relations, and those of truth, humanity and alienation. To understand Western philosophers, viewpoints on these problems it is important to answer the questions of real life. Contemporary Western philosophers do not adhere rigidly to universal principles, but make use of modern scientific achievements (although sometimes distortedly) when they inquire into the problems of knowledge or of humanity. This gives rise to some illuminating reflections. For instance, they analyze epistemological problems in relation to conscious activities and mental processes; they analyze the perceptual and rational elements as well as the irrational ones in the knowledge process; they relate knowledge to language, logic and natural science, and the problem

of man is dealt with at the levels of language, culture, religion, science, etc. These analyses provide excellent materials for our studies.

Chinese and Western Philosophy in the Process of Modernization

As Marxist philosophy is a foreign culture to Chinese society, although it has universal truths it must be combined with Chinese social practices, traditional culture and philosophy. Our current aim is economic growth and the increase of productive forces. For this we need not only political and administrative means, but also economic and cultural ones. The development of the commodity economy calls particularly for breaking away from our customary monotonous mode of thinking and equipping our minds with advanced scientific and cultural knowledge, proper thought modes and lofty moral sentiments, so as to bring every-one's initiative and creativity into full play. This is inseparable from such elements as the national mentality and the mode of thinking embodied in traditional Chinese culture. This tradition has permeated the minds of the Chinese people at both the conscious and the unconscious levels. Marxism would have played no role if it had not been combined with traditional Chinese culture and philosophy.

This combination is rather complex. What is of the essence has been mixed with the dross in Chinese traditional culture, so that sometimes strongly feudal thoughts are integrated into Marxism while really essential aspects are criticized as dross. Both deviations impair Marxism as well as Chinese culture. For a proper wedding of Marxism and Chinese culture it is necessary to analyze and study traditional Chinese culture scientifically and objectively from the standpoint of Marxism, which process is itself a work of combination. Indeed, Marxism has taken root in China during recent decades and to some extent has become a component part of traditional Chinese thought. The crux of the matter is that the combination is not static or fixed, but moving and developing.

China is now at an historical turning point, at which the overwhelming central task is to modernize economically, though ideological and cultural modernization should not be neglected. To be sure, Chinese traditional culture is a mixture of the promising and the obsolete, from which comes some resistance to Chinese modernization. To a certain extent, the combination of Marxism and Chinese traditional culture means the transformation of the latter.

As component parts of two kinds of cultures, Western and Chinese philosophies have their advantages and disadvantages; but inevitably they also contradict each other. On the one hand, the introduction of Western philosophy strongly challenges Chinese traditional philosophy; on the other hand, the revival of Chinese traditional philosophy provides an antidote to the "enthusiasm for the West". To Chinese people who have accepted Marxism after having long been inspired by traditional culture, and especially to Chinese youth, Western philosophy is a stimulant. But as it is impossible to substitute Western culture for Chinese traditional culture it is important and significant to study Chinese and Western philosophies comparatively, to analyze their similarities and differences and to inquire into the logic of their occurrences and development in order to learn from each other's strong points and to create a new type of philosophy. We must face the fact of the "Great Triangle" in Chinese philosophy under the condition of the communication of Sino-Western cultures and philosophies if we are to reform our current philosophical system while persisting in and developing Marxist philosophy.

8.

Tradition, Modernization and Human Existence

Wang Ping

The aim of this paper is to approach the issue of tradition and modernization from the point of view of human existence or life. Its main points can be summarized as follows.

(1) Tradition and modernization both are rooted in the needs of human life and are the means which meet such needs. Thus, human existence is the only criterion by which we weigh and evaluate tradition and modernization.

(2) The historicity of human life has determined that of tradition as well as the need for its transformation and renewal. Tradition is not an abstract stance beyond change and development; its vitality lies in its development.

(3) Modernization has met the needs of human existence at a high level. It is not only the requirement in order that human beings pursue better conditions of existence, but also the key path through which transformation and renewal are realized. Hence, tradition should be subordinated to the requirements of modernization.

(4) Modernization is a synthetic process which includes political, economical, cultural and social content.

Tradition, Modernization and Human Existence

Tradition and modernization are so closely associated with the problem of human existence that only from the point of view of this existence can we really grasp the impetus and goal of tradition and modernization, and find the criterion by which to weigh and evaluate them.

Tradition is the product of the practice of human existence in which human beings transform nature, society and themselves. It is the unity of the various elements of culture created by human beings, which is handed down through the continuity of history. As the product of the practice of human existence, tradition is subordinated to the needs of this existence and the activities in meeting such needs. All traditions present or past are created in the activities by which human beings meet their needs for existence. Therefore, it can gain energy and vitality for its existence and development only from the needs of human existence. In a sense, history is a process in which tradition and the needs of human existence, as well as the activities in meeting such needs, interact on each other, but the impetus of this interaction comes from the activities of human life. Once a tradition separates itself from such needs and activities it loses the foundation of its existence.

All traditions try to explain the essential problems of human existence and to explore a path which can lead to a solution, no matter whether one take an optimistic or pessimistic attitude. We can regard this phenomenon as ultimate concern regarding the problems of human existence. Different traditions are characterized by their varied attitudes towards these problems.

The tradition of Buddhism sees human existence as endless pain: birth, senility, illness and death are all pain, and human life itself is a sea of pain. What caused the pain of human life is the desire to pursue secular pleasure. The tradition of Buddhism, how-ever, does not mean a simple denial of human life because it has a great spirit of mercy and sympathy for the human beings. Its goal is to point out the path through which human beings can escape such a sea of pain; it is to

break from the seduction of secular pleasure in order to achieve tranquility and harmony of mind. Whether or not the Buddhistic solution is correct, it expresses ultimate concern for human life through its great concern for the pain in that life.

Christianity established the notion of God. This is aimed at finding a fulcrum for the world in which human beings live, and at providing a goal and ideal for human life, as well as a system of values which makes it possible to realize this goal. According to Christianity human existence is sinful and decadent, but it is also a process of salvation for human beings: sin and salvation make up the subject of history. The tradition of Christianity scorns the corporeal existence of human beings because it sees the salvation of the soul, the ultimate goal of human life, as of dominant significance.

Confucianism has no deep religious notions as do Buddhism and Christianity. In its own way, however, it shows a great concern for the problem of human existence, focusing on its secular side. It pays great attention to the practice of human life and tries to provide for it a perfect system of ethical and political norms. On the other hand, Confucianism does not lack an ontology of human existence, which is embodied in the notion of the "unity of the cosmos and human beings." Unlike the Christian tradition that regards the relation between human being and nature as one of opposition, the Confucian tradition sees it as a unity.

In a word, the three traditions which have the greatest influence in the world all are closely associated with the problem of human existence, though this concern is embodied in different ways. Other traditions cannot avoid this.

Like tradition, modernization also is rooted in the needs of human existence and is the embodiment of human beings' desire to pursue a high level of existence. According to Max Weber, modernization is a tendency toward rationalization, that is, various uses of reason to control and overcome nature and the environment. The process of modernization begins in the Western world; it is a broad historical process of changes that takes the birth of industrial civilization as its origin and impetus, and contains political, economic and social contents. The needs of human life have different spheres which are finite in quality but infinite in quantity. The realization of the needs of a lower sphere will arouse the needs of a higher one and the realization of the latter will give birth to the needs of a yet higher sphere; the process is endless. We can treat history, in this sense, as the process in which the needs of human existence unceasingly are met, and as progressing from lower to higher needs. Modernization is a historically significant revolution which has revolutionized the conditions of human existence in many aspects and has met its needs at a very high level.

These needs are not only the impetus, but also the goal of modernization. The history of modernization in Western and the Eastern countries fully proves this point. Modernization in the West began during the period of bourgeois revolutions, the aim of which was to provide a certain condition of human life which could transcend that of medieval society, and to strengthen the nations' ability to exist. German history from 1871 to 1914 was a good example. The problem of modernization in the Asian world was the crisis of the existence of nations. Hence, the goal of modernization was to free the Eastern nations from the predicament of conflict with the West. The situation of China was typical; its contemporary history since the Opium War has been the pursuit and practice of modernization so as to strengthen the power of the Chinese nation to exist and to meet the needs this entails. Japan has effectively practiced modernization and achieved great success because it was very clearly and early aware that modernization is essential to resolving the crisis of national existence. Modernization made Japan into a powerful country which could even match Western countries in the late years of the nineteenth century. As a result, in the conflicts

between East and West, the Western great powers took a very different attitude towards Japan and China, respectively. In the World War II allied nations were able to win the final victory not only because their goal was just, but also because by modernizing they had greatly developed their power to exist; in a sense this latter factor was the more important. The great strength provided by the modernization of most of the allied nations played a very important role in the war. The Soviet Union, whose social system differed from other allied countries, was not destroyed by the German invasion, largely due to the fact that it persistently practiced modernization in its own way, though some of its modernization policies were unreasonable and even barbarous.

The Historicity of Human Existence and of Tradition

The needs of human existence and the activities which respond are not abstract, but concrete and historical. Hence, they have different expressions under different historical circumstances because human life itself is concrete and historical, that is to say, it is always associated with a certain historical condition. Human existence is a dynamic process in which the needs of human life are met unceasingly. As human existence and its needs are not an abstract and unchangeable metaphysical essence, but a dynamic process, tradition regarding human existence cannot be an ossified and absolute dogma or a metaphysical substance which completely transcends and controls the activities of human life. With changes in the conditions and needs of human life tradition must be transformed and renewed accordingly so as to help human beings cope with the new conditions and problems faced by human existence. Therefore, tradition should not be unchangeable, otherwise it will not have the tenacity and adaptability necessary for its existence and continuity. Rather, it would lose its vitality and become an obsolete artifact of history, like a dry corpse hermetically sealed in a vacuum which would crumble into dust were it to come into contact with fresh air.

With the changes of the conditions of human life, the traditions of both East and West have undergone several transformative renewals whose degree of adaptability to the needs of human existence has determined the tenacity and vitality of their existence and continuity.

The Western tradition is a union of Jewish and Greek cultures. Jewish culture gave the West the Old Testament by which Westerners obtained a faith and ethical rules, and find a fulcrum for the world in which they live and a goal and meaning of their existence; Greek culture gave the West science and reason by which the Westerners probe the secrets of the universe and nature. Therefore, faith and reason, revelation and science, are dual basic factors which form the Western tradition. To a certain extent, the history of the continuity of the Western tradition can be regarded as the one of the conflict and compromise between these two factors.

During the Middle Ages faith held the dominant place in the Western tradition; Christianity controlled every aspect of social life, and only under the guidance of faith could reason and science be legitimate. According to Christianity, secular and corporeal existence was insignificant, and concern for secular advantage was sinful. Only in ascetic efforts could human beings achieve salvation and the eternal life of the soul.

From the 14th to the 16th century, with the emerging development of economic relations in capitalism, the tendency toward secularization in the West became increasingly obvious. As the Christian tradition regarded such a tendency to be a sin and blasphemous because it denied the positive meaning of the spiritual existence of human being, traditional Christianity became a yoke impeding people's pursuit of secular existence. The humanism of the period of the Renaissance was a critique and correction of such a tradition, and a secularization of human existence. With the

development of the tendency toward secularization and the emergence of nation states, the Reformation in Christianity resulted in Protestantism which criticized decadence in the Catholic Church and its interference in secular affairs; it looked down on external forms and attached importance to internal faith. Protestantism approved the tendency to secularization which it implemented in religion, thereby adjusting the religious tradition of the Middle Ages to the secularization of human life. With the bourgeois revolution, this trend was fixed in the form of law.

The industrial revolution and the beginning of modernization engendered tremendous changes in the conditions of human existence which were a great shock to the world. Reason and science in the Western tradition gradually assumed dominance and controlled almost all of Western thought from the 17th to the 19th century. Philosophy also assumed the rigor and accuracy of science to be the goal that it should pursue, so that in the Enlightenment reason became almost a substitute for God.

By the end of the 20th century the achievement of modernization gives birth to the post-modern society in the Western world and human existence finds itself in a completely new situation. On the one hand, the needs of material existence have been met to an unprecedented degree and the power to control nature has greatly developed; on the other hand, the image of God lost the aura it always possessed, individuals sank into a mass, and reason suppressed the emotions, freedom and desires of human being. How can the human being exist under such a condition? The cries of relativism and "God is dead" resounded through the Western world. Modern Western thought now is newly greatly concerned with the situation of human existence and the problems it faces; profound introspection and critique of the Western tradition is underway.

In China, tradition has shown great tenacity, but it could not be insensitive to the new situation faced by the Chinese nation. The most influential among the cultural factors making up Chinese tradition was Confucianism which tried to provide a political-ethical ideal and a series of principles for its realization. In its history of more than 2000 years Confucianism has undergone several transformations and renewals in a process from Confucius and Mencius to the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties, and thence to contemporary Neo-Confucianism. All these transformations and renewals followed changes in the life situation of the Chinese nation, the former being a response to the latter.

But Confucianism is not a synonym for the Chinese tradition which includes also such other schools as Taoism, Mohism, Legalism, Buddhism and Logicianism, etc. With Confucianism these formed the body of the Chinese tradition which, like the Confucian tradition, also has undergone several transformations and renewals. Typically these were expressed in the prosperity of the various schools of thought from pre-Qin times to the early years of the Han Dynasty, and in the spread of Buddhism during the period of the Shui and Tang Dynasties as well as in the process by which the Chinese people have been attempting to overcome the predicament of the Chinese nation.

The above discussion makes it clear that tradition always develops along with changes in the situation of human beings, indeed only in such unceasing transformation and renewal can a people find the vitality for its existence and continuity. No tradition that can meet the needs of human existence absolutely because no tradition can be absolutely perfect. Only a process of continuous improvement is possible, though this can never arrive at an absolutely perfect state. Once a tradition becomes absolutely perfect, it loses its vitality, for the absolutely perfect state fully excludes the possibility of development, whereas the vitality of tradition lies in development.

It must be pointed out that there is a notion that once a tradition has come into being, it transcends and controls the human being who is seen as a result or a tool that tradition can manipulate absolutely. Thus the activities and existence of human beings can be only a means for realizing the intrinsic principles of a tradition they can never transcend. Tradition in this sense seems to correspond to Hegel's Absolute Idea. Nevertheless the Absolute Idea is logically prior to nature, society and human beings, whereas tradition cannot be beyond history. The notion in question completely neglects and forgets the subjective creativity of the human being and the tremendous influence of his or her activities on tradition, that is, it forgets the very important fact that tradition is also the result of the activities of human beings.

Indeed, human beings are always affected by tradition, but tradition is not simply the ossified norms and principles independent of human beings. More importantly tradition is also a living thing expressed in human activities. When tradition cannot cope with the new situation and the problems faced in human existence, new norms and principles appear which are expressed in one's activities in life. In these, therefore, on the one hand, the human being is affected by tradition, while on the other hand, he or she transforms and renews tradition according to the needs of his or her existence.

If we take tradition as an eternal and unchangeable substance, we cannot explain either the transformation and renewal of tradition in the course of its development or the fact that there is not only the Western tradition in a general sense, but also particular traditions such as the German, French, British, American, etc. The reason why these different nations in the circle of the Western tradition have their own characteristics is that the situation and problems which they face are different. They make different choices because of different situations and problems, which manifests the deeply subjective force that transforms and renews tradition.

Tradition and Modernization

How should we understand the relation between tradition and modernization? Broadly speaking, modernization also includes the modernization of tradition. If modernization is an approval of a higher sphere of human existence, tradition should be subject and adaptable to the requirements of modernization. Both tradition and modernization are rooted in the needs of human existence: the former is rooted in the historical needs of human existence, the latter in its actual needs. The historical needs of human existence should be subordinated to the actual ones because the latter contains the former within itself and therefore is the higher form of human life; hence tradition must be subordinated to modernization. A modernized tradition is the one which is adaptable to the actual needs of human existence and is vital. The modernization process of every country implies a certain transformation and renewal of its tradition.

This understanding of the relation between tradition and modernization is based on the standpoint which treats tradition from the point of view of the needs of human life. In the final analysis, tradition is nothing but the means of meeting the needs of human existence. If we separate tradition from the problems of human existence and regard it as an unchangeable metaphysical substance, then we will subordinate modernization to tradition; modernization thus becomes a means by which tradition is safeguarded and maintained. However, if we treat modernization in this way, certainly we will neither achieve authentic modernization with vitality and continuity. The Westernization movement of 19th century China provides an example of this.

In a sense the Westernization movement could be regarded as the beginning of the modernization of China, as a beginning undoubtedly it had a notable influence on the history of

modern Chinese society. But the misfortune of the movement was between tradition and modernization: they took modernization as a means to safeguard and intensify the feudal tradition of China. The guiding principle of the movement was "Chinese Body with Western Function", which was to advocate maintaining the Chinese traditional system while using the Western technology and industry. To modernize China then was to introduce Western functions into China in order to safeguard Chinese Body. They did not realize that the "Chinese Body" would become the impediment and yoke to introducing the "Western Function", or that "Western Function" would give the "Chinese Body" a great shock. The crushing defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 shattered their dream and made the Chinese people reconsider in the light of this very painful experience the relation between tradition and modernization, and between these two and the crisis of national existence.

It must be pointed out that there is an inclination to criticize and even deny modernization from the point of view of tradition since modernization has to some extent led to the disintegration of tradition. This critique focuses its attention on the negative phenomena which have appeared in the course of modernization. These can be helpful for our reflection and evaluation of tradition, which it treats, however, primarily from the point of view of tradition rather than of human existence. Even when it does treat the latter point of view, its consideration of modernization is very one-sided because it claims that modernization has brought many unprecedented and insurmountable disasters.

Modern civilization was the product of modernization, which brought with it an intense inclination to criticize and reject it. This was expressed typically in eulogies of the state of nature and of returning back to nature. However, by taking too simple a path one cannot understand the influence of modernization and civilization on the conditions of human existence. It cannot be denied that modernization has brought human beings many problems and puzzles which they never meet before, such as the control of people by industry, the harmful influence of industrialization on the natural environment of human existence (environmental pollution), the tremendous consumption of energy resources and the threat of nuclear war.

How should we treat this problem? Is it logical and reasonable to think that such a great historical change as modernization should bring only happiness without accompanying negative factors? Some problems which have appeared in the course of modernization are not certainly associated with modernization itself, but are caused by human error and negligence. Moreover, the process of human existence, like that of the individual, cannot all be smooth. One may avoid many dangers by closing oneself in a safe, but no one could bear such a state of existence; this is impossible because in order to exist one has to plunge into a world filled with dangers and uncertainties. If one were to shackle oneself in pre-industrial society, even in the state of nature, one could avoid many dangers and troubles in modern society, but could not ensure having less dangers and predicaments: a terrible epidemic that pre-industrial society could not overcome could threaten equally the existence of all of humanity; the rigorous burdens of nature that modern society can bear would make pre-industrial society gasp for breath. Our forefathers who wandered in the primitive forests would not have tasted the bitterness brought by industrial pollution, but they had to bear heavy burdens from nature.

To a great extent modern society alleviated the heavy burden born by human existence in pre-industrial society. It has extended greatly the life expectancy and abilities of people, and in an unprecedented manner it has displayed the wisdom and creativity of human beings, opening thereby wide horizons. Indeed, some people do die in traffic and electrical accidents every day, but the auto-mobile and electricity as one of the most important means of travel and a most

powerful energy resource, respectively, have brought human beings much greater advantages than disadvantages; they have made real many dreams, which were only illusions in pre-industrial society. Who can deny the reasonableness of the existence of automobile and electricity, because of their harmful side effects? Some people argue that the socialized production of modern society shackles the freedom and subjectivity of individual. But we would ask what freedom the individual had in Giordano Bruno's society which brought fire and death upon those who dared to advocated science and truth? In the society in which God was regarded as absolute and omnipotent, the ultimate of values, what subjectivity had the individual? In the times of despotism in which the king was regarded as the incarnation of an absolute power, what freedom did the individual possess?

Some would disguise themselves as spokesmen for the whole human being, but they refuse to accept what they want the whole human being to accept; they display little hesitation or conflict of conscience. Is this not a very great paradox? Those who strongly eulogize the state of nature and vehemently state the evils of modern society always choose the latter without hesitation when the choice is between a thatched cottage close to nature and a luxury modernized building far from nature; they violently criticize industrialization but seize every chance to chase after all the comforts it provides. In China, registered permanent city residence is controlled very strictly, and the higher the degree of modernization of a city the stricter is such control. The change of one's registered permanent residence in the countryside into a city gene-rally is regarded as a pleasure and glory; the life of city has very great attraction for the peasants who are close to nature and soil, but the life of the countryside has no such attraction to those living in a city. This is clear from the intense inclination of school graduates to return back to the cities where they were born and lived previously. There is then little attraction by the conditions of human existence provided by pre-industrial society.

The discussion about modernization above did not argue in favor of the negative phenomena which appeared in the course of modernization, but showed that these phenomena occurred in the course of human striving. Problems and predicaments are unavoidable because existence itself means striving, which is to face problems and predicaments. The human being can never arrive at a state in which there are no problems and predicaments; such a state is only an ideal goal which can never be embodied in any real form. When, however, it is recognized that the problems and predicaments do occur in human activities, human beings are able to re-solve and transcend them in their exercise of existence; the history of this existence is precisely the process in which the problems and predicaments unceasingly are resolved and transcended. This process unfolds in the form "predicament -- the solution of predicament -- new predicament. . . ." From the point of view of the evolution of tradition it unfolds in the form "the crisis of tradition -- the elimination of the crisis (the transformation of tradition) -- the new crisis of tradition. As tradition is formed in the course of surmounting predicaments, it should be subordinated and subject to the requirements of surmounting predicaments. There is no need for us to escape the actual predicaments of human life and even to retreat into the fortress of history in order to seek protection. Modern society is born in the course of surmounting the predicaments that human beings faced in the previous society it has transcended; likewise, modern society certainly will be transcended by a post modern society born in the course of surmounting the predicaments of human existence in modern society.

Modernization as a Synthetic Process

The process of modernization of China began with the Westernization Movement in the 19th century. The Movement took place under the historical circumstances of an intensifying conflict between China and the West and the encounter by the Chinese nation and tradition of a very serious challenge and crisis. The purpose of modernization was to enrich China and strengthen its military power by learning from Western industry and technology. At that time, the crisis of Chinese tradition expressed by the conflict was not very obvious: therefore the Westernization Movement primarily regarded China's crisis as one of material instruments. The power displayed by the industrialization and gunboat policy of the West made them think that what made the West stronger than China was its advanced technology and such powerful material instruments as gunboats, etc. Therefore, so long as China used the Western material instruments and followed the example of its industrial technology, it could enrich the country, strengthen its military power, and obtain an impregnable position in the conflict with the West. As they considered the tradition of China to be better than that of the West, the Movement must follow the principle "Chinese Body with Western Function." But the complete defeat of China in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 proved them wrong and urged the Chinese people to reflect further on the crisis China faced in its conflict with the West. The reform Movement of 1898 was the important result of such reflection.

The reformists thought that what made the West stronger than China was not only Western advanced material instruments, but also its advanced economic and political systems, with the latter being much more important than the former. In order to overcome the crisis, China had to introduce not only the former, but also the latter. The mistake made by the practitioners of the Westernization Movement was fully to deny the importance of introducing the Western economic and political systems. The success of the Meiji Reformation of Japan in 1868 held very great attraction for the reformists in China, who advocated practicing Western economic and political systems, while looking upon constitutional monarchy with reserve. They advanced many reform plans, but could not avoid their being aborted by conservative feudal forces.

After the failure of the Reform Movement, it gradually became a tendency to rescue China from crisis by political means as advocated and practiced by the revolutionaries led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. They maintained that only by fully revolutionizing the political and economic systems of China, that is to say, only by over-throwing the feudal system of the Qing Dynasty and founding a democratic republic could China overcome its crisis. The Revolution of 1911 finally overthrew the feudal system which had governed China for more than 2000 years, but the revolution did not fully realize the revolutionaries' ideal: Yuan Shi-kai's restoration of monarchy, the decadent rule of the Northern Government, the long separatist regimes and the web of warfare by warlords, etc., still immersed China in a dual crisis coming both from home and from abroad.

The debate about the issue of culture during the period of the May 4th Movement occurred under just such circumstances. It was a debate, between two basic schools: one traditional, the other modern. The former advocated defending Chinese tradition, the latter advocated practicing westernization and rejecting the tradition. Regarding the problem of culture and the future of China, the two schools waged a tit-for-tat struggle against each other; however, they had a common point, namely both treated the crisis of China as one of culture and therefore advocated rescuing China in a cultural way. The traditional school maintained that China had its own special tradition and culture and would no longer be China without them, so it was necessary for China to rejuvenate and carry forward its traditional culture in order to overcome its crisis. The modern school claimed that as Western modernization was based on science, democracy and values, the way to rescue China was to reject its traditional culture and fully practice westernization, that was to say, to introduce completely the spirit of science and democracy and the values of the West.

In the debate about the future of China, there was still another important school, that of communism, which regarded the political way as the essential path to rescue China from crisis. It maintained that only if China accepted Marxism and socialism could it overcome its crisis. In 1949, the political revolution of the Communist Party succeeded. From then on Marxism achieved a dominant place in China, and the Chinese tradition was greatly shocked. In the early years of the foundation of the People's Republic of China, modernization made a great progress. But in the following, because of the influence of the "Left", class struggle and the political movement took a dominant position. Thus the goal of modernization was postponed in favor of political change and the work of science and the social economy were neglected and even denied. Undoubtedly, this extended the gap between China and the West which had formed during the periods of modernization in the West.

Since the late 1979's, China began to see modernization as its most important task and accordingly to practice reform and an open policy. This began with the economy. In the course of the reform and openness, the introduction of science and technology were specially emphasized, but the Western political and economical systems and values were to be resisted. As the economic reform unfolded the negative factors of the political superstructure were gradually exposed. If these factors were not eliminated, the economic reform could not proceed; the task of political reform was put forward under these circumstances.

With the continuous development of the reform movement, there was movement among the traditionalists, which took the problem of the modernization of China to be one of culture. In the debate about culture during the May 4th Movement, some people advocated westernizing China completely, others advocated a return to Chinese traditions. Thus the history in which the Chinese people pursued modernization since the Opium War underwent a very strange circle.

What then is the road to the modernization of China; and how should the tradition be treated? Any discussion of these problems must be based on an understanding of modernization in terms of the actual existence of the Chinese nation. Modernization itself is a means which serves to meet the needs of such an existence. It is reasonable to preserve anything in tradition that is conducive to this end, whereas anything in tradition that is harmful to this end is unreasonable and should be rejected. The attitude towards foreign cultures also should follow this criterion. Regarding tradition, more rational critique and reflection is needed; one should be not swayed by emotions. Tradition should not be regarded as a counter balance to emotions, an escape from ourselves and our actual predicaments and conflicts, or a self-deceptive means of self-satisfaction, self-praise and self-solace. In the attitude of contemporary neo-Confucianism towards tradition, the emotional component is much stronger than rational reflection. Contemporary Neo-Confucians approach modernization from the position of tradition and ask people to look upon Chinese tradition with sympathy and respect, which prejudices reflection on the tradition.

Modernization is a complicated synthetic process which contains political, economic, social and cultural contents as an integrated whole; there would not be real and integral modernization without all these contents. If one sees modernization only as a matter of culture or of the transformation and renewal of tradition, one would neglect the social conditions for the solution of cultural problems and the transformation and renewal of tradition. Modernization would then be separated from the whole body of human life. On the contrary, if we see modernization simply as a political and economic matter, namely as the amelioration of the conditions of material human existence, we would have a poor modernization which overlooked the spiritual existence of the human being and the cultural content of modernization.

It is well known that in the course of modernization, the problem of population is a big puzzle for China, and birth control is imperative. This policy goes smoothly in the city, but encounters great resistance in the countryside, especially in very poor regions. Why is there such a striking contrast between the city and the countryside in this regard? There is a notion that the reason why this policy encounters great resistance in the countryside is that the values of tradition seriously control the thinking of the peasants. Is this notion convincing? Of course, the influence of tradition in the countryside is stronger than that in the city, but this cannot explain the above phenomenon. What affects its outlook most strongly is not tradition, but the conditions in which people live. These are much better and more comfortable in the city than for the peasants. City dwellers enjoy many goods, such as public health services, stable salaries, labour insurance, good facilities for everyday life and retirement pay. On the contrary, the peasants do not enjoy these benefits; when they become old and lose their ability to work they have to rely on their sons and daughters for their livelihood. This is much more obvious in regions where the physical environment is arduous and the conditions of human existence require high labour intensity. Thus having children in order to guard against old age is still a reality for many peasants in China.

To see the peasants' ideas regarding the number of children as the product only of tradition, and to try to change it only through a transformation and renewal of tradition is to attend to trifles to the neglect of the essentials. If the conditions in which the peasants live are not changed their ideas on the number of children could not be changed essentially. There is a strikingly general phenomenon in the world today: the poorer an area is, the higher its birthrate; the countries and areas whose birthrates are the highest are almost all in Asia and Africa. On the other hand, the developed countries, especially the Western ones, have a very low birthrate, while some developed countries such as Germany have minus growth in population; this is very closely associated with the conditions of human existence in these countries with modernization: to a great extent the standard of people's material life has been raised. Giving birth to children in order to guard against old age is seen as stratagem, and some people even see having children as unpleasant burden of existence. Therefore, the outlook on children is primarily not one of ideas or of tradition, but of existence. This requires that we lift it to the high plane of human existence and cope with it in various ways.

It is well known that the modernization of education and science as well as technology are essential to a country's modernization. China is a country with numerous illiterates; many children are unable to go to school or are obliged to discontinue their studies in some areas of the countryside. This is associated primarily with the conditions in which these children live. Some very backward countryside regions lack the conditions for running a school. According to statistics, among all Chinese schools (include elementary and middle schools) those in the countryside make up only one-third of the total, while the population in the countryside is four times that of the cities. In the countryside, especially in the very poor regions, backward conditions of human existence have cultivated a backward outlook of education, which is held in low esteem. Education and knowledge are not related because under the circumstance, manual production by the individual is the essential way of making a livelihood. Some simple tools, a tract of land, ordinary experience and physical strength: the simple combination of these factors can meet the requirements of this way of making a living. Therefore, if it be thought that the elimination of illiteracy and the intensification of education in the countryside are only an educational task, the backwardness of education in the countryside cannot be overcome.

In sum, on the one hand, the transformation and renewal of tradition are conditions of modernization, on the other hand, modernization is the foundation and impetus by which the trans-

formation and renewal of tradition are realized in reality. These two processes condition one another in the course of meeting the needs of human existence. China must take the four modernization as an integral process including political, economic, social and cultural content, and treat their interrelation from the point of view of human life.

The Tao of Difference: Zhuang Tzu's Deconstructionism

She Bipeng

In the discussion of language, Zhuang Tzu often used the word "dispute". Etymologically, "dispute" is related to "differentiate", the middle part is "sword" and "to distinguish". The script shows that like a sword it cuts a thing in two. Therefore, in Zhuang Tzu's Taoism, "to dispute" implies "using language to distinguish or analyze". Like most philosophers in the times of Pre-Qin Dynasty, Zhuang Tzu also regarded language as an instrument classifying and differentiating reality in a systematic manner.

In those times, "language" was often replaced by "names" because language consists of "names" whose function is to signify worldly things and their conditions. To name a thing is to point out the difference between this thing and the others and to reveal its independent being. In Zhuang Tzu's views, the problems involved were the signification of language and its impact on the sensibilities of human beings. Of the greatest concern was the dichotomy of language or conceptual dualism.

In accord with Zhuang Tzu's Taoism, as soon as the world was classified and analyzed by the conceptual dualisms -- yes/no, good/evil, living/dead, beauty/ugliness, gaining/losing, success/failure, more/less, long/short, large/small, etc. -- using these names has subconsciously led to an immediate judgment of value regarding the conduct of our own action. The results of this conceptual dualism are "preference" and "desire". Men always pursue the so-called "good" and reject "evil". On satisfying one's desire one feels complacent, whereas failure generates desperation and anguish.

This process of "to prefer" and "to desire" is a vicious circle with conflicting emotions: "Joy and anger, sorrow and happiness, caution and remorse, come upon us by turns, with everchanging mood" (*The Identity of Contraries*). Human beings are controlled by these conceptual dualism. As Zhuang Tzu said: "In the struggle between peace and unrest, the friction between good and evil, much fire is evolved which consumes the inner harmony of man. But the mind is unable to resist fire. It is destroyed, and with it Tao comes to an end" (*Contingencies*).

Of all the kind of desires, Zhuang Tzu considered "the desire of morality" to be the most dangerous. Philosophers have always based themselves on the conceptual dualisms of good/evil, yes/no, true/false. Zhuang Tzu mocked these philosophers, saying that, "Subjectively, we are conscious of certain delimitations which are right/left, relationship/obligation, division/discrimination, emulation/contention. These are called the Eight Predicables" (*The Identity of Contraries*).

Especially, he criticized the teachings of Confucian. The central idea of Confucianism may be reduced to the concept "benevolence" which means "human beings": it consists of humanity and corresponds with the rules of Heaven. The idea of "benevolence" was "etiquette" and "intellect" of course including "benevolence" itself. From these four virtues, Confucianists derived a complicated taxonomy of names, including "sincerity", "confidence", "loyalty" and "piety", etc. In the Confucian view the chaos of society is due to people lacking knowledge of these names or the knowledge being hidden by the forged names. As soon as the distinctions of benevolence/non-benevolence, etiquette/non-etiquette, intellect/non-intellect are demarcated society is in good working order. Therefore, Confucianists call for "reconfirming the names".

However, in Zhuang Tzu's views, if the distinctions of yes/no, good/evil are explicitly delineated, it is not necessary to emphasize "reconfirming names".

With reference to positive and negative, to that what is so and what is not so, . . . if the positive is really positive, it must necessarily be different from its negative: there is no room for argument. And if that which is so really is so, it must necessarily be different from that which is not so: there is no room for argument (*The Identity of Contraries*).

Because it is consistent with the rules of desires there occur desires if and only if the desired objects do not exist. Hence, the existence of desires shows a kind of lack or absence. If "benevolence" is the natural instinct of human beings according to Confucianism, it is not necessary to emphasize and promote these virtues. Zhuang Tzu concluded: "If the virtuous are honored, emulation will ensue. If knowledge be fostered, the result will be theft" (*Keng Sang Chu*). If these names once were promoted, people can struggle against each other for them so that the result of "reconfirming names: will be not order and life, but chaos and death.

Furthermore, Confucians regarded the system of names made by them as absolute criterions. It turns out, however, that in order to appeal to and model themselves on these names the believers even cruelly injure their own lives. Zhuang Tzu said: "He who disregards his reputation is not what a man should be. He who is not absolutely oblivious of his own existence can never be a ruler of men. Thus Hu Pu Hsieh, Wu Kuang, Poh I, Shu Ch'i, Chi Tzu, Hs' Yu, Chi T'o, and Shen Tu Ti, were the servants of rulers, and did the behests of others, not their own" (*The Great Supreme*).

In order to destroy the conceptual dichotomy, Zhuang Tzu first overturned the hierarchy of conflicting ideas. For example:

(1) The use of uselessness: from the craftsman's point of view, the useless trees are useful (because it may avoid being cut down and lives on its own lifetime.) On contrary, the useful trees are useless (because it could not keep its own life).

(2) Rukh and Cicada.

(3) The lady Li Ji's "crying first and laughing finally".

(4) A well-frog: the greatness of well-frog is the insignificance of the spirit of the river.

These examples are not only to show that these values are relative and limited by their contraries, but that all values are relative, unnecessary and forced on the nature of things by human beings. Therefore, to really know the nature of things or their internal structure we must understand the meaning of "the law of difference": "If we say that a thing is great or small because it is relatively great or small, then there is nothing in all creation which is not great, nothing which is not small. To know that the universe is but as a tare-seed, and that the tip of a hair is a mountain, this is the expression of the law of difference" (*Autumn Floods*).

According to the law of difference conflicting ideas or contraries could be replaced by each other. The hierarchy of good/evil and high/low are among these contraries to be dismantled. On the face of it, in the hierarchy of conceptual dichotomy, the contraries could not be in harmony with each other. However, on a deeper level they are inter-dependent and supplement each other. Zhuang Tzu said: "But for these external beings I should not be. But for me, they would have no scope. So far we can go" (*The Identity of Contraries*). Furthermore,

If there was a beginning, then there was a time before that beginning. And a time before the time which was before the time of that beginning. If there is existence, there must have been non-existence. And if there was a time when nothing existed, then there must have been a time before that when even nothing did not exist. Suddenly, when nothing came into existence, could one really say whether it belonged to the category of existence or of non-existence?" (*The Identity of Contraries*).

In Zhuang Tzu's part, the law of difference is the internal structure of ideas, names and symbols.

The strategy that Zhuang Tzu used to destroy the dichotomy of language is also called "deconstructionism". Like Jacques Derrida, Zhuang Tzu started with the conceptual hierarchy, and showed that the so-called superior (Being, Life, Here, I, etc.) has always already implicated the inferior (Nothingness, Death, There, Thing, etc.) which is the presupposition for the former. Thus, Zhuang Tzu exposed the limits of dichotomy.

Note the correspondence between Zhuang Tzu's law of difference and Derrida's "différance". Both show the contraries are inter-dependent and mutually supplementary in reality. In the essay, "La Différance", Derrida compared the word "différance" with Freud's "faciliation" (French, "frayage"), which was derived from the German word "bahnung". It implied "to open up a path" and reminds one of the "Tao" (path) whose literal meaning is "way" or "path". Etymologically it could be reduced to the Chinese hieroglyph " " (" " means "the head of human being"; " " means "the foot of human being"; " " means "way").

Similar to Zhuang Tzu, Derrida attempts to wrench the concept of "différance" from the classical scheme which would derive it from an originary presence. Derrida declares it an "undecidable", irreducible to the "either/or" logic of Western metaphysics. This logic was based on the logocentric practice of binary opposition and functioned according to three main principles: (1) the principle of identity (A is A); (2) the principle of non-contradiction (A cannot be non-A); and (3) the principle of the excluded middle (truth is either A or non-A). Derrida subverts this binary logic of either/or into a deconstructive logic of both/and -- or to be more exact, of neither/nor. In this manner, he deconstructs decidable concepts into undecidable traces which are never identical with themselves, but harbour meanings other than themselves. Thus they contradict themselves, differ from them-selves and operate under erasure. Derrida speaks of setting to work within the text of the history of philosophy "undecidable" terms which can no longer be included within philosophical (binary) opposition, resisting and disorganizing it, without ever constituting a third term, without ever leaving room for a solution in the form of a speculative dialectics. Thus, the Pharmakon is neither remedy nor poison, neither good nor evil, neither speech nor writing . . . neither/nor, that is simultaneously either/or (*Positions*).

Rorty: From Philosophy to Post-Philosophy¹

Li Guangcheng

It is a widely accepted opinion that Richard Rorty, in his provocative book, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (PMN)*,² and other works,³ presents us with some challenging, exciting pictures of how philosophy was, is and will be. Two themes run through these books: the first is an attack on the tradition which sees philosophy as, essentially, epistemology; the second is a recommendation of an alternative stance, a blend of hermeneutics, pragmatism, deconstruction, etc., or a post-philosophical culture.

For some years Rorty's alternative has provoked heated reactions and resistance both inside and out of the philosophical community. It was found unpalatable, not "fully exploring" or "at best a form of kibbutzing;"⁴ not plausible, not clearly and consistently articulated,⁵ "adventitious and unconvincing,"⁶ and that he "badly misappropriates" his heroes.⁷ Others, however, found it liberating and exhilarating. What was most impressive was his high sensibility and quick response to the latest developments not only in the field of philosophy, but also in the rest of culture. It seems to me, and to some critics, that since Rorty's list of recommended heroes cover most of the forerunners in different areas, his conception of philosophy and of culture must be in the leading position as well. His constant experience and adventure seems to suggest that, in his opinion, the best way to do philosophy is to find, name or create new philosophical, post-philosophical or even post-post-philosophical genres. It is this conception of which I am now more skeptical. It seems to be just an illusion, an upshot of the "false attraction of fashion worship" by both Rorty himself and his admirers.

In this essay I shall argue that Rorty's philosophical conception and practice is based on this illusion. This makes his alternative an attractive, but at same time a crude and in some sense an incoherent, blend. Part I is a sketch of his attack on traditional philosophy; Part II presents his positive alternative, based mainly on his *PMN*, his basic philosophical conceptions adopted from his heroes, and then his post-philosophical culture. Part III explains how this reflects the false attraction of fashion worship and the shortcomings which follow therefrom.

Rorty's Critique of Epistemologically-Centered Philosophy

In *PMN*, Rorty mainly attacks the epistemologically-centered philosophy from Descartes to Kant and its contemporary form, analytic philosophy. This tradition has as its basic conception that philosophy, in the first place, is epistemology. Its metaphor, owing mainly to Descartes and Kant, is that of mind as the mirror of nature. The task of epistemology is then to mirror something outside the mind, and to examine (repair or polish) this mirror, for the purpose of gaining an accurate representation of world and a valid foundation for knowledge.

In this context, Rorty points out that analytic philosophy (or more precisely such impure analytic philosophers as Dummett and Putnam), is still within this foundationalist tradition: they takes over Kant's task for philosophy, namely, to seek "rigorous" and "scientific" foundations of knowledge and hence to see philosophy of language, especially the theory of meaning, as the foundation of all philosophy. Even three of his heroes, Wittgenstein, Heidegger and Dewey, in

their early years, were still foundationalists in the sense that they tried to find a new way of making philosophy foundational (see *PMN* 5).

To sum up Rorty's critique of the Cartesian-Kantian-analytic tradition, we find four basic principles which characterize this tradition: (1) epistemology-centrism: philosophy's first goal is to seek justified knowledge and accurate representation of reality; (2) foundationalism: to achieve this goal philosophy needs first to discover the foundation of knowledge; (3) scientism: scientific or logical method are necessary for gaining such a goal; (4) philosophy-centrism: philosophy thus grounded can serve as the foundation of the rest of culture. It is this idea of philosophy that Rorty thinks we should now be willing to abandon.

Some Basic Principles of Reconstructing Philosophy

What functions, if any, can philosophy perform if epistemologically-centered philosophy is coming to an end?

Rorty's alternative, as we mentioned before, is a blending of themes suggested by the later Heidegger, Gadamer, Derrida, the later Wittgenstein, Dewey, Kuhn, Feyerabend and so on. He names this new philosophy "edifying philosophy," as opposed to "systematic philosophy." Sometimes, he prefers to call his alternative "post-philosophical culture," a term which suggests its break with traditional conceptions of philosophy. Although Rorty might deny that he has principles, it is fair to say some principles ground his conception of "edifying philosophy" and post-philosophical culture.

Incommensurability Against Foundationalism

The first principle is that of incommensurability, which he borrowed from Thomas Kuhn. In Rorty's opinion, traditional epistemological philosophy was based on an assumption of commensurability, namely, that "all contributions to a given discourse are commensurable" (*PMN* 316). It saw the process of constructing an epistemology as finding the maximum amount of common ground with others (*PMN* 316). This common ground within a tradition enabled its disputes to be resolved.

As an antifoundationalist, Rorty sees as a distinctive characteristic of his new philosophy incommensurability, namely, that philosophy is no longer a rational inquiry into truth as an attempted discovery of foundations. Rather, it is a conversation between different conflicting paradigms whose aim is mutual understanding rather than total agreement.

What Rorty has in his mind as the model of this new image of philosophy is hermeneutics. But Rorty emphasizes that he is not putting hermeneutics forward as a successor to epistemology, because "hermeneutics is not the name for a discipline, nor for a method of achieving the sort of results which epistemology failed to achieve, nor for a program of research" (*PMN* 315).

Abnormal Philosophy Against Tradition

Rorty's idea that after epistemology a new philosophy does not inherit the problem and method of epistemology comes from Kuhn's distinction between normal and revolutionary science. Rorty takes over this distinction and alters it into a distinction between normal and abnormal as a feature of all discourse and culture. Epistemology is seen as normal discourse while hermeneutics is an abnormal discourse in the sense that the former is conducted with an agreed-

upon set of conventions about what a good answer or argument should be whereas the latter does not follow the conventions of epistemology or even set aside its rules.

In his "Derrida on Language, Being and Abnormal Philosophy" Rorty takes Derrida as an example of an abnormal philosopher who does "not solve problems but rather overcomes predecessors."⁸ According to Rorty, the abnormal philosopher does philosophy "not by presenting arguments against one's predecessor's view, but by violent and erotic struggle with one's image of them."⁹ In short, abnormal philosophy is anti-traditional in its most extreme sense. By recommending abnormal philosophy, Rorty tries to justify his call for an end to epistemology. Since normal dis-course should be, and in fact always is replaced by abnormal discourse we should always support the latter.

The principle of "preferring abnormal to normal" is a key clue for identifying Rorty's "false attraction of fashion worship." In some sense Rorty's philosophical practice becomes a game of hunting for novelty or abnormal discourse. In so doing, Rorty has the image of being a philosophical representative of post-modernist literature and arts, and indeed he tries to impress people with this image.¹⁰ I shall challenge this image in the final section.

Edifying Philosophy Against Systematic Philosophy

If philosophy is no longer an attempt to seek truth and the foundations of knowledge, what positive functions can it play? After giving a long list of great philosophers, such as Goethe, Keirkegaard, Santayana, William James, Dewey, the later Wittgenstein, the later Heidegger, Derrida, etc., Rorty calls on us to learn from these philosophers, because, they all see the aim of philosophy as a desire for edification, rather than an inquiry into truth.

What is common to edifying philosophers is that they all object to, and even "make fun of the classic picture of man, which picture contains systematic philosophy or the search for universal commensuration in a final vocabulary" (*PMN* 368).

Great systematic philosophers are constructive and offer arguments. Great edifying philosophers are reactive and offer satires, parodies, aphorisms. . . . Systematic philosophers want to put their subject on the secure path of a science. Edifying philosophers want to keep space open for the sense of wonder which poets can sometimes cause -- wonder that there is something new under the sun (*PMN* 369-70).

Edifying philosophy in the end plays a role in post-philosophical culture: philosophy as a conversation of mankind. Like poetry philosophy is best seen as one of the many voices in this conversation.

Post-philosophical Culture Against Philosophy-Centrism

In Rorty's opinion, the conception of philosophy as a conversation of humankind ends tradition and begins a new era in philosophy. The term post-philosophical culture suggests both its novel and broad characteristics. By introducing this conception, Rorty attempts to destroy the traditional distinction between philosophy and literature, to overcome philosophy-Centrism, that is, philosophy as the master of the rest of culture, and to offer a broader conception of philosophy-culture.

Such a hypothetical culture would contain nobody called a philosopher (*Consequences of Pragmatism* -- xxxix). Doubtless, such a culture would contain specialists, but they "had no special problem to solve, nor any special method to apply; they abided by no particular disciplinary standards, had no collective self-image as a 'profession'" (*CP* -- xxxix). This non-professional philosophy is a "larger and looser activity,"¹¹ like literary criticism in its broadest sense, including literary, historical, anthropological and political considerations, all mixed up together. A post-philosopher is an all-purpose intellectual free to comment on anything at all.

A most important feature of the conception of philosophy in *CP*, and in some papers afterwards, is that Rorty joins with some recent European and American thinkers in trying to redefine philosophy as literature. Rorty owes this conception mainly to Derrida's deconstruction. According to Derrida, the idea that there is a sharp distinction between philosophy and literature is just a "white mythology", a myth that philosophy uses pure language and poetry uses metaphor. As Derrida tells us, in fact, philosopher and poet both use the same metaphorical language. Rorty accepts Derrida's basic idea that philosophy is just a kind of writing, and thinks that it leads to a new conception of philosophy, that is, to philosophy as just one more literary genre.¹² In another place, he calls this "narrative philosophy," opposite to "argumentative philosophy." Accordingly, to do philosophy is to "tell stories,"¹³ rather than to give argument. Rorty thinks that "This strategy of using narrative is what makes Heidegger and Derrida so attractive."¹⁴

Carrying on his searching for allies in his project, Rorty found the same voice in textualism, an intellectual genre, based on Derrida's slogan "There is nothing outside the text". It is jointly held by literary critics, post-structuralists, some historians and social scientists. The main aim of textualism is "to place literature in the center, and to treat both science and philosophy as, at best, literary genres" (*CP* 141). As we can see, this is to reverse of philosophy-centered tradition into a new literature-centered culture. Rorty regards "textualism as a specifically post-philosophical form" (*CP* 143).

Rorty seems unsure as to who will be the leader in the post-philosophical culture, philosophy or literature? Sometimes he tries to put both on the same level: to weave philosophical and literary texts together can "help one get rid of the idea that philosophy is somehow on another level."¹⁵ Sometimes he seems to support the literary critics' attempts to take over philosophy as the leader of post-philosophical culture (see *CP* 141). In this context, Michael Fischer's conclusion that Rorty still allows philosophy to decide literature's fate seems a misunderstanding.¹⁶

The Fatal Attraction of Fashion

Rorty's conception, obviously, is open to criticism for different reasons. Some, from a traditional point of view, tried to argue that philosophy needs a theory;¹⁷ some tried to show that the end of epistemology is not in sight;¹⁸ some attempted to reverse Rorty's conclusions.¹⁹ Although I might agree with some conclusions from this sort of criticism it is not the most effective because it will not convince Rorty or his sympathizers. The best way to argue against Rorty who claims that he is not an argumentative philosopher is to show that his own description of his project is inaccurate and incoherent. That is, to find a way to let him disprove himself. One possible way is to ask: is his alternative a coherent one? If not, Rorty will lose the rational ground upon which to hold together all the different theories he mentions. As a result, we are in a good position to see why Rorty holds such a contradictory blend of different theories, that is, we can see that his real motive, rather than theoretical coherence, is searching for new philosophical-literary genres: "false attraction of fashion worship."

To begin with, there is a problem in Rorty's way of doing philosophy. He simply puts all his favorite philosophies under the name of pragmatism, or sometimes of hermeneutics, or another name. This is first an oversimplification. To take pragmatism as an example, according to Rorty pragmatists, especially Dewey, see philosophy as an edification, rather than an inquiry into truth and method. In fact, however, pragmatism is mainly a theory of truth, although in a different way from the correspondence theory. Both Peirce and Dewey consider the inquiry into method as a central theme.

Secondly, given Rorty's way of doing philosophy, incoherence within his conception of philosophy is inevitable because his conception of philosophy is simply to blend the ideas of many different philosophers, apart from which he has no proper conception of philosophy at all. When Rorty uses the name of some great philosophers, he never claims one idea from among that philosopher's many ideas; rather, he claims that what he borrows is this philosopher's most important, even only, idea. This suggests that all these philosophers are essentially, if not totally, the same so that when he puts them together his whole system is coherent. Actually, this puts him in a very difficult position, for once one proves that these philosophers are different in many ways, or even in some crucial ways, the incoherence between these philosophers automatically becomes incoherence within Rorty's framework, and he thereby loses his basis for holding these different philosophers together. If, however, Rorty honestly admits that he just borrows one idea from this philosopher and another from another philosopher (as most philosophers do in forming their own thought), then he can hold coherently his conception of philosophy no matter how different the philosophers on which he based it. But if he takes this position then the philosophers he mentions are essentially different and he misrepresents the idea he takes from them. Secondly, why does Rorty select the ideas he does, com-mending some philosophers and ignoring others; the answer seems to be only that some are intellectually fashionable, while others are not.

As for the first aspect of my critique of Rorty's incoherence, I see no common ground between Heidegger and Dewey, or Wittgenstein and Dewey in most important aspects. For Heidegger, philosophy is an ontological inquiry into the meaning of Being, from *Dasein* in his early years to poetry and language in the later years. For the early Wittgenstein, philosophy is an explanatory activity of logical clarification of thought; metaphysical or ontological problems are what cannot be said; for the later Wittgenstein, philosophy is a pure descriptive activity and a kind of therapy, which differs also from the later Heidegger's inquiry into language. For Dewey, philosophy is close to human interests and serves as a means leading to a better life, so he has interests neither in metaphysics and ontology as does Heidegger, nor in "language-games" as does Wittgenstein.²⁰

Rorty's reason for putting them together is that they all "set aside" Kantian traditional philosophy. Even if this is correct it must still be asked, if "setting aside tradition" is the key criterion for Rorty in putting these three philosophers together why does he not recognize logical positivism as his ally? As logical positivists directly announced that their goal is to overcome metaphysics, to be coherent they should be most close allies in Rorty's anti-traditional philosophy project.

In fact, Rorty himself admitted that in carrying out his project he was carrying out the "positivist's original programme," and that this programme was a "therapeutic enterprise" a common feature he refers also to the later Wittgenstein and Heidegger.²¹ This shows again that Rorty cannot talk about "setting aside tradition" without referring to logical positivism or the early analytical philosophy of Russell and Carnap. But he denied this in his *PMN* because, as he said later, he was "sick of" that philosophy at that time.

Similarly, from a coherent point of view one can ask if analytic philosophy's inquiry into the theory of meaning can be classified as a foundationalist project, why the later Heidegger's inquiry into language and poetry is not so, for according to a widely accepted opinion Heidegger's whole life was concerned with the single theme: the meaning of Being as a foundation and "condition for the possibility of any ontologies."²² The fact that the later Heidegger turned to language and poetry does not mean that he gave up seeking the meaning of Being as foundation, but only that he found that the meaning of Being is to be found in language and poetry since "language is the house of Being" and only poetry and philosophy "are beings not related to other beings, but to Being."²³ There is no reason to treat the early Heidegger as a foundationalist and the later Heidegger an anti-foundationalist. This case suggests again that the reason that Rorty prefers the later to the early Heidegger is not that he really found some sharp distinction between them, but rather than from the seventies the later Heidegger became a hot topic among philosophers and literary critics.

Rorty's interview is obvious evidence in favor of my suggestion. In this interview, Rorty revealed that he "agree(s) with the later Heidegger that the science/poetry/philosophy distinction we have lived with are *outmoded*" (my emphasis).²⁴ Heidegger gave up this distinction not because it is outnoted, but because in ancient Greek thinkers there was no such distinction. For Heidegger, "the earlier the better;" for Rorty, "the newer the better."

When recalling his path to philosophy, Rorty once again revealed this fashionable motive for doing philosophy. As Rorty told us, by reading Sellars and Wittgenstein he changed himself from an old-fashioned philosopher into an out of date analytic philosopher because of the pressure from his peers at Wellesley telling him that his interests in historical philosophy and meta-physics was out of date. This fear of being left behind became a key motive for Rorty in choosing what kind of philosophical books he should read and what kind of philosopher he should be.

Rorty further told us that after ten years as an analytic philosopher, he got sick of that and tried to do something larger and newer in *PMN*. During that time he faced the dilemma, on the one hand, of avoiding contact with contemporary discussion, and on the other hand, of becoming immersed in contemporary discussion.²⁵ Rorty's list of publications shows that it was the latter temptation which took control of his mind.²⁶

Rorty's motive for introducing some new literary genres into philosophy remains the same: the situation in philosophy "has lagged behind", so philosophy needs some new stimulations to keep alive.

Thus my conclusion that Rorty's motive of doing philosophy is based on a "false attraction of fashion worship." In this chapter I do not intend to discuss why philosophy should not become a fashion business, and why we should not do philosophy and judge philosophy according to the fads; that would need another essay, perhaps, a very controversial one. However, one thing is sure: if one day in the future, Rorty gets sick of his present heroes, Dewey, Heidegger, Wittgenstein and Derrida, or if his own philosophy, if any, becomes old-fashioned there is no need for surprise because Rorty is fully aware that an edifying philosopher like him does not dream of building for eternity, but of destroying for their own generation.

Notes

1. I would like to thank Dr. Jane Heal for her assistance and comments on this essay.
2. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980) (hereafter *PMN*).

3. Mainly in *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980) (hereafter *CP*).
4. Richard Bernstein, "Philosophy in 'Conversation of Man-kind'," *Review of Metaphysics*, 33 (1980), 745-76, 767.
5. Kai NieOlson, "Scientism, Pragmatism, and the Fate of Philosophy," *Inquiry*, 29 (1986), 277-304, 279.
6. Joe McCarney, "Edifying Discourse," *Radical Philosophy*, 32 (1982).
7. Isaac Levi, "Escape from Boredom: Edification according to Rorty," *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, XI (1981), 4, 589-602.
8. Richard Rorty, "Derrida or Language, Being and Abnor-mal Philosophy," *Journal of Philosophy*, 74 (1977), 679.
9. *Ibid.*
10. In one place, he writes, "Pragmatism is the philosophical counterpart of modernism," "Nineteenth Century Idealism and Twentieth Century Textualism" in *CP*, p. 139.
11. Richard Rorty, "From Philosophy to Post-Philosophy" (interview), *Radical Philosophy* (Autumn, 1982).
12. Richard Rorty, "Deconstruction and Circumvention," *Critical Inquiry*, 11 (September, 1984), 20.
13. Richard Rorty, "Philosophy without Principles," *Critical Inquiry*, 11 (September, 1984-1985), 462.
14. *Ibid.*
15. *Ibid.*, p. 463.
16. Michael Fischer, "Redefining Philosophy as Literature: Richard Rorty's Defence of Literature" in *Reading Rorty*, Alan Malachowski, ed., (New York: Blackwell, 1990), 233-43. This reaction is a misunderstanding of Rorty's conception of philosophy. In fact, for Rorty, to see literature as lacking rules and arguments is not the same as to say literature is junior to philosophy. On the contrary, argumentative rigor is seen by Rorty as the shortcoming of traditional philosophy and has no place in his new post-philosophical culture.
17. James Young, "Pragmatism and the Fate of Philosophy," *Dialogue* (Canada), 23, (1984), 683-85.
18. Ian Hacking, "Is the End in Sight for Epistemology?" *Journal of Philosophy*, 77 (1980), 579-87.
19. Hugo Meynell, "Reversing Rorty," *Method*, 3 (1985), 48.
20. I do not intend to make a detail comparison between those three owing to the limitation of space.
21. See "From Philosophy to Post-Philosophy" (interview), *Radical Philosophy* (Autumn, 1982).
22. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (London: Blackwell, 1962), p. 34.
23. Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 26.
24. Interview.
25. Interview.
26. See *Reading Rorty*, "Bibliography of the Works of Richard Rorty," Alan Malachowski, ed., pp. 371.

11.

The Sixty-Year Samsara of Studies in Pragmatism and the Road of Cultural Development in China

Liu Fangtong

The May 4th New Culture Movement in 1919 is recognized almost unanimously by Chinese scholars as part of important event in Sino-Western cultural communication and the beginning of the development of contemporary Chinese culture. The development continued in a tortuous process in latter years, with a new starting point about 1979. Some Chinese scholars studying the May 4th movement take it as a samsara of sixty years. I agree with this view generally and see something similar in the studies in China of pragmatism and other Western philosophies. In order to develop a new culture which situates the future development of China in a changing world structure and to avoid a possible new samsara, it is very important to bring to light the samsara and to derive lessons from that experience.

The Introduction of Pragmatism into China in the May 4th Period: Its Main Characteristics

Pragmatism was first introduced in China as early as the beginning of this century. Chinese scholars Zhang Donsen and Lan Gongwu and others established the Journal, *Education*, in Tokyo in 1909 in which they published some papers introducing pragmatism. But it was through the "May 4th" New Culture Movement that pragmatism became a main trend of thought with strong influence in China. After returning home from America in 1917 young Hu Shi published a series of articles advocating pragmatism and became a leading figure of pragmatism in China. Tao Xinshi, Jiang Menlin, Fu Sinian and other Chinese scholars who received the theories of John Dewey in America also advocated pragmatism when they returned. John Dewey himself came to China in 1919-1921. He visited almost all the main cities of China and gave a series of lectures on pragmatism. This played a very important role in the spread of pragmatism in China. During this time, a great many Chinese intellectuals, especially the more enlightened and progressive, were favorably impressed by pragmatism to different degrees. Chen Duxiu, who became the first leader of the Chinese communist party when it was formed in 1921, received some ideas from pragmatism and admired Dewey's lectures.

Pragmatism was more or less received by many intellectuals involved in the New Culture Movement. Almost at the same time, such Western philosophies as the voluntarism of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, "Lebens philosophie" from Germany and France, as well as mechanism, were imported into China. Besides Dewey, such other famous Western philosophers as Bertrand Russell, Hans Driesch, etc., visited China, but their influence there was far less than that of pragmatism and Dewey.

Why did pragmatism have such a powerful influence upon China in the May 4th period? Before answering this question we must introduce briefly the main characteristics of pragmatism which were understood in broad terms by Chinese scholars at that time.

As to what pragmatism is many distinct, but nonetheless justified, answers can be given because it is a conception with various meanings. As the theories of three leading American pragmatists, i.e. Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey, differ one from the other it is

very difficult to give a simple but exact definition. But it has been understood by Chinese scholars since May 4th to have the following main characteristics.

First, pragmatism rejects traditional metaphysics, both of materialism and idealism, especially the older rationalistic speculative idealism. They were all against attempts to find the absolute substance of matter or of mind as well as objective or *a priori* necessity and any absolute principle beyond experience. It does not negate the possibility of the existence of a world beyond experience, but insist that the realm of philosophy should be limited to the world which can be experienced. Philosophy should be concerned with the world of experience, i.e. the life world of human beings.

Second, for the pragmatist experience differs from that of the traditional epistemologies of both empiricism and rationalism. It is neither knowledge resulting from a process of cognition, nor subjective consciousness separated from the object; rather it is human action, life, practice itself, or the united process of subject and object, or mind and matter. Drawing support from Darwin's theory of evolution, pragmatists insist that for the human being as an organism, like any other living being, the most important thing is to live. On that basis, the human constantly must adapt to his environment. This process is just the interaction between organism and environment, i.e. the process of life, action and practice. That humans must adapt constantly to their environment implies that humans must constantly struggle and keep forging ahead, that they must unceasingly be in progress and evolution. Applying this to socio-historical problems, history is a process of constant progress and evolution and society must be continually reformed.

Thirdly, pragmatism maintains that human adaptation to the environment, i.e., human action, life and practice, are different from the instinctive behaviour of animals. Human beings are born with intelligence; their action and practice are always in pursuit of some goals and are guided by reflection and thought. Therefore, the question of how human action is guided by intelligence, i.e., the question of methodology, turns out to be a central question with which philosophy should be involved. In this sense pragmatism is nothing but a methodology guided by intelligence, i.e., scientific methodology. Pragmatism does not reject any other method as long as it can bring some satisfactory effects: what pragmatism advocates is only the scientific method.

Fourth, pragmatists hold that every idea, theory and doctrine should serve to adapt human beings to their environment, should be an instrument of human behaviour. Therefore they reject the correspondence theory of truth and maintain that the criterion of the truth of every idea, theory or doctrine lies in its effects upon human action and practice, that is, its practical value. Truth does not have universal or absolute meaning, but only disjunctive or relative meaning. For this reason all truth is pluralistic, not monistic.

Fifth, pragmatists believe that each acting person is individual. His or her existence and interaction with the environment is in the end an individual behaviour. In order to live, every individual must struggle by oneself, one cannot depend upon anyone else or be controlled by any other or by some superhuman force or authority. Therefore, pragmatists maintain that the personality of every individual must be liberated and one's rights to act and to express one's own will freely must be respected. That is, a system of full democracy and freedom must be practiced in society. Nevertheless, they reject excessive self-will and egoism and emphasize that individual freedom must not harm that of other's and must be regulated by society. Society, for its part, should avoid both totalitarianism and anarchism.

The above-mentioned characteristics of pragmatism are interconnected and incarnate its cardinal doctrine from different aspects. In summarizing these ideas, pragmatists have given them distinctive expression from different points of view so that they can be described variously as a new empiricism, a scientific methodology, a philosophy of practice and behavior, instrumentalism,

humanism, etc. While taking pragmatism as a philosophy of society, they often see it as expressing the traits of democracy and science.

When pragmatism was imported into China at the time of the "May 4th" Movement a great many progressive intellectuals warmly welcomed it because of the above-mentioned characteristics, especially the spirit of science and democracy. Some facts coincide with several aspects of the Chinese traditional culture, while others coincide with the demands for science and democracy by the progressive Chinese intellectuals of that time.

Pragmatism and Chinese Traditional Culture

Though the May 4th Cultural Movement was launched against the old cultural tradition of China, it also grew from the soil of that tradition. As both the leaders of the movement and the broad band of intellectuals who took part in it had grown up under that tradition and then separated from it, only in reference to the tradition could there be criticism of the old culture or the introduction of anything new. Although some representative figures of the movement proposed radical slogans of totally negating the traditional culture, one of their feet always remained planted in the foundations of the old tradition. Therefore the introduction and reception of Western cultures in the May 4th period had to be limited by the field of vision which was controlled to some extent by the traditional culture. The ideas introduced at that time were first of all those which could coincide with some aspects of traditional Chinese culture and hence easier for the participants of the movement to approve and understand. Among the various Western trends, pragmatism seems to have related best to such ideas.

- First, among other things, Chinese traditional culture, especially philosophy, was imbued with following characteristics. Basically it was an ethically oriented discourse about nature, society, etc. The questions of the development and self-perfection of human beings frequently were the central issues in their discussions, which thus were basically humanistic.

- Second, as for the world as object of knowledge the ancient scholars stressed the real life world faced by people, not the transcendental world or world-in-itself separated from human beings. Hence, they did not develop systematic metaphysical or theological theories.

- Third, Chinese traditional culture emphasized experimental-intuitive knowledge and its practical effects upon human beings. The cardinal principle of knowledge was "study for the purpose of application." It sought truth from facts and checked it through its effects. Compared with their Western counterparts, ancient Chinese scholars did not like to create speculative and abstract theories. Fourth, Chinese culture was pluralistic and all-embracing. Although two thousand years ago Confucianism was officially considered to be the sole learning so that it controlled the whole field of thought and culture, there still were various trends and tendencies which co-existed or were mixed with one another. In fact, Confucianism itself was pluralistic and embraced a variety of trends.

- Fifth, Chinese culture, especially Confucianism, stressed harmony and the mean, avoiding extremes and conflict. The so-called "doctrine of the mean" has always been considered the most important characteristic of Chinese culture.

Generally speaking, Chinese traditional culture long based upon the feudal-patriarchal system, was quite different from modern and contemporary Western culture, including pragmatism. Nevertheless the above mentioned characteristics are to some extent quite similar to some thoughts

and ideas of pragmatism. Thus, although the leaders and participants of the May 4th movement had a deep background in Chinese traditional culture they objected against tradition and received pragmatism more easily. Note that Hu Shi, the leading figure of pragmatism in China, had already formed a framework for his academic thought which was similar to pragmatism before going to the United States and contacting American pragmatism. What he did after that was only a perfecting and systematizing of his original thought.

Pragmatism and the Ideological and Political Background of the May 4th Movement

The most important and even decisive reason why pragmatism had so powerful an influence in China in the May 4th period is that the ideas of science and democracy it advocated so suited the ideological and political demands of the New Culture Movement.

The "May 4th" New Culture Movement had started from a revolution in literature, but rapidly developed into a political and social revolution which took anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism as its main contents. The banner: "Strive for national rights outside and punish traitors within" which was held high by demonstrating students on "May 4th", and the slogans of "Down with Confucianism" and "Welcome Mr De (democracy) and Mr Sci (science)" which were put forward by the leaders of New Culture Movement were just the concentrated expression of this revolution. Although the political position and ideological tendency of the persons involved in this movement differed from one another, all had in common the following concerns:

- to re-evaluate the ancient Chinese tradition and culture;
- to reject the feudal autocracy expropriating people's freedom;
- to abandon the feudal morals which fettered people's thought; and
- to re-establish a new culture with scientific and democratic traits.

These demands coincided with common attitudes to some degree as they were all against the feudal forces and warlords' oppressing of the broad masses of the people, and against the privilege of foreign countries in China and the unequal treaties they imposed upon China. So to some degree they were able to establish a broader united front. The culture they talked about during that time went beyond the limits of simple literature or culture in a narrow sense, and was imbued with political and ideological meaning. Both the establishment of a new culture characterized by science and democracy and the re-evaluation of the old culture involved the social system and political and morale ideologies including that of democracy. Those involved in science sought a new world-view and methodology to replace the traditional un-scientific world-view and methodology; this had ideological meaning. Science and democracy represented the ideal of a new society, as well as an attitude and methodology which must be used in order to achieve such an ideal.

Facing the historical mission of "re-evaluation", especially of "re-establishment", many intellectuals imported a successive variety of Western ideas and theories. This made the "May 4th" period the time of the most intense sino-Western cultural communication in the modern history of China. Some radical personages began to receive Marxism under the influence of the October revolution in Russia. But for both social and epistemological reasons the broad masses of intellectuals could not accept Marxism with its theory of class struggle and dictatorship of the proletariat as the keystone of its doctrine. So they tried to find other theories from the West more suitable to their call for democracy and science. To many pragmatism, being characterized by

science and democracy, advocating constant progress and innovation of society, and promoting the liberation and freedom of personality, seemed the most suitable.

Qu Qiubai, one of the early leaders of the communist party of China, said "It was really not accidental that pragmatism had appeared in China around 'May 4th'. The patriarchal society of China had been shaken by international capitalism. It needed a new outlook on the world and life so as to adapt to the new environment of China. Pragmatism with its positive sides has satisfied this need." (Qu Qiubai, *Pragmatism and Revolutionary Philosophy*.)

Clearly, the importing of pragmatism gave an active role to the development of the New Culture Movement at the time of "May 4th". Many Chinese intellectuals received pragmatism's "new out-look on world and life" as their conceptual approach for eliminating evils and disadvantage and benefiting politics, destroying the old and establishing the new. Why did the reputation of young Hu Shi rise suddenly, why were the lectures of Dewey welcomed by a broad range of intellectuals, including even many of the left wing. The main reason is that the pragmatism advocated in these lectures was adapted to trends of thought in China at the time of "May 4th".

Differences in the Conditions of Life and Limits upon the Work of Pragmatism in the USA and China

There were some serious defects in the reception of pragmatism in the "May 4th" period. For example, people did not understand adequately the onesidedness and limitations of pragmatism. They did not give adequate attention to the impact pragmatism would have upon the conditions of the Chinese consciousness.

Pragmatism is generally acknowledged as embodying the American national spirit. The particular historical conditions of the formation and development of American society gave the American culture and national spirit the following traits: an under-estimation of other worlds, but close attention to the world of experience; a devaluation of speculative and abstract theories, but the promotion of practical and concrete actions; disdain for the beaten path, but great effort at innovation and creativity; disregard of every absolute authority, but admiration of all kinds of individual effort; opposition to autocracy, but the promotion of democracy; rejection of blind obedience and belief, but promotion of intelligence and science, etc. Pragmatism embodies all these traits. Such a philosophy played a very important role for the American people in constructing the world's most developed country on an almost uncultivated soil, in the prosperity of science and culture, and in the development of America's democratic system. This strongly impressed Chinese intellectuals striving for social progress and the renewal of their culture. In receiving and propagating pragmatism at the time of the "May 4th" Movement Hu Shi and others idealized pragmatism. They claimed that once the method of pragmatism was employed all kinds of problems regarding the re-evaluation and re-establishment of Chinese culture, even the innovation and progress of Chinese society, would readily be solved.

But pragmatism is not a perfect philosophy; still less is it fully suitable for China. As to the theory of pragmatism, although it contains many positive elements which deserve being affirmed, it has serious limitations. First, under the banner of rejecting meta-physics, pragmatists mention speculative idealism and materialism in the same breath, and negate both of them indiscriminately. Thereby, inevitably they cancel the objective basis of their own theory. Although pragmatism is not a pure idealism and at times it even opposes idealism, still it comes finally to a subjective idealism. Second, while stressing the activity of human cognition and practice, often they neglected the objective necessities which must be obeyed; their stand on progress and evolution

was imbued with some subjective arbitrariness. Third, while opposing dogmatism, absolutism and varieties of authority, as well as separating theory from practice, they negated the existence of objective and absolute truth. Sometimes they confuse the practical test of truth with its value for humans and make truth dependent upon the individual's subjective likes and dislikes. Fourth, having rejected the objectivity of knowledge and practice, even their so-called scientific method loses objectivity so that they could not break clearly with subjective fabrication and sophistry.

These and like oneness and limitations in pragmatism were criticized by many philosophers even in Western countries, and especially in its American birth place. Contemporaries of James and Dewey, such as British philosophers F.H. Bradley and B. Russell, and the American philosophers G. Santayana and A. O. Lovejoy, criticized its contradictions, ambiguity, vagueness and oneness. For example, Russell did not agree with a James' view that a belief is truthful in so far as its effects are good. Intellectually, this view has important difficulties because according to it people could not affirm even such a simple matter of fact as that Columbus crossed the Atlantic Ocean in 1492. The effect of the belief does not justify why some must say that it was in 1492 but not in 1491 or 1493. Therefore, Russell considered the philosophy of James to be nothing but subjectivist ravings. Of course, Russell and others misunderstood the real implications of pragmatist theories, especially that of James. Nevertheless, it was indeed oneness limited.

Because of this there must have been some reasons why pragmatism played so important a role in America. The principal one was that America had established a capitalist social and political system with the corresponding principles of value. This system and its principles do not simply assume pragmatism as its theoretical basis; the Declaration of Independence is the foundation of the country, but its theoretical grounds were Montesquieu's and Rousseau's rationalistic enlightenment doctrines of freedom, equality and universal fraternity. Therefore, although pragmatism declared itself against metaphysics and rationalist systems, it worked on the premises of rationalist systems which undergird the capitalist system and its principles.

Apparently one who pursues pragmatism emphasizes only action, but does not pay much attention to ideals; he or she is interested only in concrete reality and does not care about rational principles. In fact, however, pragmatists base their action and interests upon the above mentioned ideals and principles. Pragmatism was developed in America during its formation when Americans universally accepted their senior thinker's ideals as well as principles, institutions and the value system of capitalism. Without these conditions, pragmatism could not have emerged in America, or if it had emerged, it would not have been accepted widely. Therefore, one cannot reduce the American world-view and outlook on life to pragmatism, nor can we even trace to it the general development of American society and culture.

Nevertheless due to the conditions noted earlier, pragmatism did play an important role in its birthplace in the first half of this century and its one-sidedness and limitations were usually neglected. When it spread to China, although it played an active role in promoting the "May 4th" New Culture Movement, its role was greatly limited from the very beginning. The fundamental reason was that Chinese culture, unlike the American, lacked the social and intellectual premises required for pragmatism to play its full role.

China had spent thousands of years in the feudal traditions, which is a serious obstacle to the progress of Chinese society and places heavy spiritual shackles upon Chinese thought. After the Opium War in 1840, with the invasion of foreign capitalism, great changes took place in Chinese society and the country sank into a semi-feudal, semi-colonial state. During the "May 4th" Movement, China was in a turbulent state. The establishment of a new social system and

intellectual culture was advocated by many progressive persons who were still in an obscure state. At that time, China had many concrete problems, from rickshas to Presidential jurisdiction, from prostitution to government bribery and the betrayal of the country. China still needed to search for the social causes of these problems and for principles and direction for their solution. Without the latter, it would be unable to solve the former. The semi-feudal and semi-colonial social system which caused the above-mentioned problems and other types of social malpractice had not been basically overthrown. Hence, the solutions to the above-mentioned concrete problems which were drawn up in accord with the pragmatism advocated by Hu Shi and others could not be put into practice. Actually, before the introduction of pragmatism, in Chinese traditional thought and especially in Chinese modern Enlightenment thought it was emphasized that the secret of learning lay in solving practical problems and getting practical effects. However, these ideas did not help the Chinese before or during the "May 4th" Movement to solve the many problems they encountered.

Therefore, at the time, China's urgent need was for a revolutionary theory which would shape the future path of development of Chinese society; and for a new culture to replace the old Chinese cultural tradition, sort out its essence, and guide correctly the changes of Chinese society. The spirit of science and democracy advocated by pragmatism and scientific methodology in certain aspects suited the needs of many Chinese intellectuals and inspired their enthusiasm for destroying the old and establishing the new. But pragmatism did not correctly point out the mode of Chinese future development. It could not provide the Chinese with a conscious and definite path. Moreover, at that time, many propagators of pragmatism were favoring overall Westernization. They did not deeply investigate the relation of Chinese and Western culture and the problems of how Western culture could be adapted to Chinese soil. So the pragmatism they propagated was not able to meet China's special needs. When the "May 4th" New Culture Movement developed further and met the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution of the young students and broad masses of workers and peasants, Hu Shi and other leading pragmatists in China gradually withdrew from the position from which they had launched an attack on the old system and tradition: some even took the opposite position. This indicated that pragmatism in China had lost its active and progressive meaning.

Pragmatism and Chinese Politics Since May 4th

After being introduced into China, pragmatism did not play a long and profound role as it did in America. Being an important instrument in political conflicts of contemporary China, it became the victim of these conflicts. People cannot equate pragmatism as an ideology with a specific political tendency. It is an academic theory which includes scientific methodology, but does not always relate directly to politics. People even used the former to swallow up the latter so that the role of pragmatism was largely limited by China's special political circumstances.

At the period of May 4th, while introducing and propagating pragmatism as well as other Western trends, Chinese scholars generally did not distinguish their knowledge and value systems. In pragmatism and other Western trends there was a tendency to search for a general plan adapted to current circumstance but usually they did not investigate deeply their academic theories. In other words, the people's main attention was upon the connection between knowledge and the value systems of pragmatism and others orientations. They even confused the two and neglected their differences regarding, for example, the knowledge system's relative independence from political needs and other values. When they accepted and advocated pragmatism, this was not based mainly

upon the recognition of the truth of its theoretical system, but upon the utility it could have for politics and morality.

The pragmatism introduced in the period of May 4th was mainly Dewey's doctrine, especially his political philosophy and theories of morality and education. Dewey's own lectures in China and the introductions to pragmatism by his Chinese students (Hu Shi and others) all laid particular stress on concrete, especially political, problems rather than entering deeply into its structure. In the famous polemic on "Problem and Doctrine," Hu Shi promoted pragmatism in terms of its ability to solve the social and political problems of Chinese society. At that time, many people who accepted pragmatism had no correct and deep understanding of its academic content. Their reason for accepting pragmatism was mainly that the spirit of science and democracy it propagated corresponded to their political and moral choice at that time. However, with the further development of the "May 4th" movement, their political and moral choice changed and some came increasingly to distrust and even complete to negate it.

The tendency to determine choices in philosophy by politics and values developed further after May 4th. China's old unified tyrannical feudal system had been shaken, while the new unified political pattern had not been formed yet. The pluralist pattern of politics produced by the conflict among warlords and the struggle of political forces provided conditions for a pluralist ideological pattern. At that time, people's academic choices were slightly influenced by certain unified political structures. Because it was evidently pluralistic and was accepted to different degrees by people with different political inclinations, pragmatism was especially prevalent.

After May 4th, and especially after the forming of Chinese political pattern governed by two opposite forces, the CPC and the KMT, all research into Western philosophy was governed by this pattern. The investigation of pragmatism continued and it had definite influence in the field of history, archaeology, education and especially the natural sciences, which had little direct relation to politics. But generally speaking there was little deep study of pragmatism as an academic theory; it remained usually at the level of its politics and values and its fate in China actually was determined by the attitudes of the two above-mentioned political forces.

The political structure of the early KMT was rather complex. Among its members, there were not only conservative forces, but also progressive personages who struggled for a democratic revolution in China. Later, it became increasingly divided interiorly and in 1927, after the breakdown of the cooperation between the KMT and the CPC, the KMT was increasingly governed by the rightist forces. Sometimes they neglected or even abandoned the goal of democratic revolution of the period of May 4th. For example, democracy was replaced by dictatorship of Jiang Jieshi and the local warlords. In this case, the study of philosophy, including that of pragmatism, was strongly influenced by dictatorial politics. Around 1935, in the discussion of democracy and dictatorship some persons who advocated democracy in the May 4th period now supported carrying out a new type of dictatorship in the name of strengthening the cohesion of the country and rapidly realizing unification. The propagation and influence of pragmatism still existed, but essentially it had lost its reputation as a progressive theory which advocated science and democracy.

Although at the period of May 4th there were differences in principle between Chinese Marxism and pragmatism, still they formed a united front supporting science and democracy. Even in the famous polemics of problem and doctrine, Li Dazhao, the representative of Marxism, did not wholly reject Hu Shi's pragmatism. He even pointed out that some of his own ideas were completely the same as Hu Shi's while others differed slightly (cf. Li Dazhao, "On Problem and Doctrine Again").

After the "May 4th" Movement, because of the radical changes in the political situation of China, the political divergence between Chinese Marxism and pragmatism became increasingly pointed. The original united front having been destroyed, they took an increasingly negative attitude toward each other. Such changes reached a tuning-point in the thirties when Stalin's Leftist Line had formed in the USSR. Dewey openly took a critical and skeptical attitude toward the trial of Trotsky and others in the time of Stalin, he even organized an investigative committee on the Trotsky case which acquitted Trotsky of any crime, and opposed the authorities of the USSR. Thus, Dewey, who at first was praised as a distinguished progressive and democratic scholar, now was criticized as a reactionary philosopher of imperialism and a most vicious enemy of the USSR; the pragmatism linked to his name was declared a decadent and reactionary philosophy of imperialism. Such changes in the USSR's attitude toward pragmatism soon influenced China and its earlier, more objective and practical, realistic judgements which lent some degree of support for pragmatism were replaced by its overall rejection.

The Leftist inclination to judge theories purely by political criteria was developed further in the criticism of Hu Shi's pragmatism, led by Mao Tze Dong himself in the early fifties. At that time the many treatises criticizing pragmatism served special political needs, but did not proceed from a deep investigation of pragmatism as an academic theory. Many authors did little research, or did not even study the original works by the pragmatists; their arguments were based on conclusions already determined by persons in authority. The leaders of this critical movement sought their goals in politics and ideology, establishing Marx-ism as the absolute authority and eliminating any open influence from other trends. But out of neglect for learning and basing their critiques only on political choices, theoretically they failed to make a clear distinction between right and wrong. Hence, they criticized some active agenda which pragmatism had in common with Marx-ism or could be accepted by Marxism. Hence, this critique essentially deviated from real Marxism, neglecting some fundamental practical and realistic Marxist principles. Unfortunately, such leftist orientations were not overcome in time, but increased with the strengthening of the political left. This resulted in a unitary pattern for criticizing the whole of Western non-Marxist thought.

The above-mentioned leftist inclination reached its extreme in the so-called Cultural Revolution. It should be noted that while in the name of Marxism they mounted a punitive expedition against pragmatism and other Western trends, the extreme leftist leaders at that time essentially pursued a pragmatism which excluded the spirit of science and democracy; the result was an absolutism and dogmatism which reflected a feudal autocracy and was criticized by pragmatism. Thus, they acted arbitrarily in politics, deprived the mass of people of their democratic rights, wantonly trampled on science as theoretical and energetically advocated a cult of the individual. All this was not only fundamentally opposite to real Marxism, but differed greatly from pragmatism and other Western doctrines about science and democracy. Thus, they seemed to return people to the situation of feudal autocracy and obscurantism of the old China before the "May 4th" Movement.

Sixty Years of Pragmatism Studies and Its Lessons

In the early summer of 1976, the famous "April 5th" movement took place in Tienanmen Square in Beijing. It expressed the people's extreme hatred of "The Gang of Four" which had played the tyrant in the Cultural Revolution and the people's desires to cast off the yoke of politics and thought. In the winter of that year "The Gang of Four" was eventually overthrown and the

Cultural Revolution ended. Since 1979 Chinese society once again took up the path of innovation and development. People began again to investigate Marxism which had been distorted and misrepresented; also they began once again to study pragmatism and other Western trends.

This new beginning is just sixty years after the "May 4th" Movement of 1919. As earth shaking changes had taken place in Chinese society for those sixty years, we cannot think of this return as a simple repetition of the starting point. But surely great similarities exist between the two. For example, both faced the same national conditions: poverty and backwardness in economics, deficiency of democracy in politics, underdevelopment in science and ossification in thought. Hence, progressive Chinese intellectuals attempted to promote China's reform by introducing a new academic theory and working out a general plan for restoring China's prosperity and strength. The "May 4th" Movement took science and democracy as its main slogan; people have been calling again for science and democracy since 1979. People regarded the "May 4th" Movement as an Enlightenment in modern Chinese history, and the renewal of thought and ideas since 1979 as a New Enlightenment.

Why did the movement striving for science and democracy, which began in 1919, have to return after 60 years to a starting point quite similar to its origins? There were manifold reasons: the powerful influence of China's old feudal forces in politics and economics as well as its traditional feudal culture; the interference and destruction by foreign countries, especially the Japanese invasion; the ragged form of the modern Chinese revolution and the many faults committed -- all of these had hindered the smooth development of modern Chinese society and its corresponding thought-culture in various degrees. In addition to these analyses, another important reason is that people, mainly the authorities, had not correctly handled the relation between knowledge systems and value systems in thought and culture -- in other words, learning was taken as simply instrumental to politics, which itself was always unstable.

Confusing the knowledge system with the value system, taking it only as an ideology for the service of particular social and political groups, and judging its truth or falsity simply by its utility value generated two results. First, it hindered deep research in the knowledge system and impeded real knowledge of what was true and false. Second, it hindered the use of a correct theory for guiding action and achieving success; theory could not develop its own utility (including political) value. The main lesson of the sixty years experience with pragmatism in China seem to be here.

As has just been mentioned, because people who were for and against pragmatism took its utility value as the criterion of judgement, they were unable to study fully and deeply its theory. Although it has been over sixty years since the introduction of pragmatism to China, there still is no adequate book which introduces it fully and objectively. Deliberate misrepresentation appears every-where when people talk about it. Its theoretical contents are not the most abstruse in contemporary Western philosophy, but because it was closely related to politics and more easily governed by shifting political needs people had only a dim knowledge of its true meaning. Even in philosophical circles, many people from beginning to end had no true and definite knowledge of what pragmatism was, especially of its relationship to Marxism. This led to extreme confusion regarding theory. Some leftist Marxist theorists always stressed the contrasts between Marxism and pragmatism. At times they criticized such ideas of pragmatism as: "Any thought and idea that can make people successful is true" as prominent expressions of bourgeois egoism and a philistine approach to doing business; at other times they considered the same ideas to be profoundly Marxist if expressed in other terms, especially those borrowed from political leaders.

When revisionism was widely criticized in the fifties and sixties, its thought basis was first reduced to "bourgeois pragmatism" and therefore suppressed wantonly. In the last ten years, people

have not been criticizing revisionism and what was originally criticized is now regarded as tallying with Marxism. As to the line of demarcation between pragmatism and Marxism scarcely any scholars can give a clear answer.

Confusion in theory leads to confusion in action. Some people repeatedly declare themselves most devout advocates and followers of Marxism. However, because Marxist theory was ossified, dogmatized and divorced from practice it was unable to be used as a guide to practice. How then was practice to proceed? This depended only upon observing the effects produced, that is, on experience. "Look before every step" was the watch word, or to use a famous statement of a Chinese leader: to cross the river feel one's way along the riverbed. Such a way of guiding action merely in terms of daily experience and its effect was not Marxist theory, but it was close to the parochial empiricism of pragmatism. When the problems to be solved by practice were more simple and pure, this empirical method was not without effect, but when the problem was more complex this method was obviously powerless, and persistence in using it usually would lead to errors and failure in action.

The purely political utilitarianism of judging thought and theory, or, more broadly, culture, would lead to simplification, coarseness and vulgarization of theoretical research. Further, it would throw knowledge and theory into confusion which subsequently leads practice and action into new pitfalls or failure. In order to avoid this, people must study theory once again. If, however, people merely take up a short-sighted political utilitarianism as their criterion, another vicious circle surely would follow. From 1919 to 1979 the samsara phenomena of culture unfolded in just this manner -- a big circle of sixty-years consisting of a series of smaller circles.

Pragmatism and Present Problems of Culture Studies in China and a Possible Road for the Future

Since the new Enlightenment began in 1979 the progress and achievements of cultural studies in China have been unmatched by those in the corresponding period after May 4th. But as far as the study of pragmatism and other Western trends is concerned, there were still problems similar to those following the May 4th. Among them, the most striking is that cultural studies were still at times controlled by short-sighted leftist or rightist political utilitarianism.

The left deviation has been predominant. Some people attempted to judge the truth or falsity of pragmatism and other Western trends in the light of whether or not they corresponded to the political needs of the time. From such a point of view, these trends were non- or anti-Marxist. Such studies would be politically use-less and a harmful dissemination of spiritual pollution advocating bourgeois liberalization and as a result they must be strictly limited. After the events of Tiananmen Square in June 1989, the leftist political forces were more ascendant. The introduction and study of Western trends, being considered one of the main causes of the turmoil, was limited even more. Since the Spring of 1992 the winds of reform and openness have been blowing again more strongly than ever, while the leftist forces have been in decline. This wind has been mainly in the economic field; but the thought-culture field is becoming flexible.

On the other hand, a few overly liberal scholars uncritically accept some theories and ideas of pragmatism and other Western trends, especially those of Western democracy such as a multiple party system, parliamentarianism, etc. At the same time, they neglect traditional Chinese culture and even more the complex Chinese political and social conditions. They believe that if these Western theories and systems were introduced, all kinds of social problems faced by China would be solved naturally. A very few scholars go far beyond academic studies and attempt to force the

Chinese government to practice a scheme of political reform which they put forward according to Western patterns. Such political utilitarianism could not be successful in the realities of present day China; on the contrary, it provides a pretext for the leftists to strengthen their ideological control. It is evident then that the short-sighted political utilitarianism of both left and right hinder the development and progress of thought-culture studies, including that of pragmatism in China, and hinder also their possible political function.

Under China's present conditions the way in which cultural studies should proceed is in need of discussion from different quarters. It will not be discussed here in detail, but from the experiences and lessons of such studies since May 4th, especially in recent years, the following elements seem to emerge.

First, studies in thought and culture should not be taken simply as instruments of politics, especially of current policies. To be sure, almost every trend in thought and culture has its political tendency and the purposes of such studies often are connected with politics. But this does not mean that studies of thought and culture should be subordinated fully to politics. On the contrary, in order to study objectively and deeply in order to disclose the secret of every theory and thought pattern, including its political tendencies, people must extricate themselves from short-sighted political pre-conceptions. Otherwise, they would not only easily distort or misunderstand the matters they studied, but cause other disastrous effects such as were mentioned above. The lessons since May 4th must not be forgotten.

Second, studies in thought and culture should be manifold, even pluralistic, in order to prosper. One of the main reasons why the May 4th period produced the most prosperous cultural developments of contemporary China is that various trends and schools of thought and culture co-existed and freely discussed and debated one another. On the contrary, when a leftist political line of thought controlled China, all non-Marxist cultural studies were considered harmful and in fact were prohibited as Marxism was considered to be the only truth. There was a policy: "let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend," but by over-stressing solely the Marxist school in all decisions the hundred schools were controlled by this one school. Hence, essentially only this school existed. Without discussing, debating and being enriched by other schools, this school became increasingly ossified and dogmatic.

Third, studies in thought and culture should be open. Whether culture studies should be guided by Marxism is a matter of de-bate among Western and Chinese scholars. According to my view, the most important question is not this, but how to understand Marxism and its guiding influence. If people take it as closed, it would certainly become dogmatic and ossified: such studies certainly will turn into a blind alley. If people take Marxism as an open theory, it will receive every valuable thought and idea from other trends and abandon any thing of itself which becomes antiquated or is shown to be wrong. Culture studies under the guidance of such Marxism certainly will be fruitful.

What role could the study of pragmatism play in the future development of Chinese culture? From the lessons learned since May 4th, the answer is not difficult. Generally speaking, we should affirm audaciously that a number of theories and ideas of pragmatism are valuable in promoting the innovation and development of Chinese culture. For example, to advocate open interdisciplinary study in the field of thought and culture, as mentioned above, is consonant with the emphasis of pragmatism.

Two more points must be noted. First, useful ideas in pragmatism often are shared with Marxism to some extent, or are worth being referred to by Marxism. Second, some ideas in pragmatism are similar to aspects of Chinese traditional culture, as mentioned above. Being based

on developments in modern science and society the ideas of pragmatism frequently are more systematized and developed. Hence they are able to provide points of reference for the innovation and development of Chinese traditional culture. In a word, we should overcome the leftist deviation of simply negating pragmatism and other Western trends, strengthen those studies and receive everything valuable therefrom.

On the other hand, we should not forget that pragmatism is not a perfect philosophy, still less a philosophy fully suitable to China. Hence we must also disclose and criticize its onesidedness and limitations. To idealize pragmatism, certainly would be to re-peat the errors which in the past have hindered the smooth development of Chinese culture and society.

An Inferential Conception of Meaning and Its Application in Terms of Values

Li Guangcheng

My present concern is the meaning of value terms. In section I I shall first suggest a satisfactory criterion for a theory of meaning, namely that it should give a coherent explanation for both fact and value expressions. Then I shall argue that, none of the currently available theories of meaning satisfy this criterion. Section II will develop an inferential conception of meaning and apply it to the expression of facts. Section III discusses its application in value expression. According to this conception, the meaning of a word or a judgement consists in an inference or a syllogism. That is, by an inference, we understand the meaning of a word from the major premise (usually a definition), and understand the meaning of a judgment from the major premise to conclusion. Applied to value expression, this consists in the speaker's conception of value implied in the major premise and shown in the conclusion.

A Criterion for a Satisfactory Theory of Meaning

Inquiry into meaning is widely regarded as the central question of the theory of meaning. But this phrase is rather ambiguous because the word "to mean" or "meaning" has so many different uses that when people talk about meaning they are not always talking about the same thing. J. Heil in her "On the Phrase 'The Theory of Meaning'," distinguishes two ways in which the phrase 'the theory of meaning' can be used, that is, constructing a calculus or seeking a concept analysis. According to this conception, we cannot expect a sole, only-one correct answer. For the question of 'what is meaning,' G. Harman² also distinguishes three levels of meaning, corresponding to thoughts (Carnap, Ayer, Lewis, Hempel, Sellars, Quine, etc.), messages (Morris, Stevenson, Grice, Katz, etc.), and speech acts (Wittgenstein, Austin, Hare, Nowell-Smith, Searle, Alston, etc.).

Nevertheless, in my opinion, at least three questions play a central role in the theory of meaning, that is (i) what is meaning or what are we saying about a word when we say what does it mean?; (ii) what is the criterion of meaning i.e., what requirements must a language satisfy if it is to be called meaningful?; and (iii) how to clarify the meaning, i.e., how many different kinds of meaning are there in our language or what sort of meaning does this sentence have? The currently available theories of meaning all give a certain kind of answer to these questions in some way or other.

The problem is that although every theory of meaning gives some answers to the questions of meaning to some extent, none of these theories can give a coherent explanation for both fact expression and value expression. In other words, a criterion for a satisfactory theory of meaning should have a coherent application to all kinds of linguistic expression.

1. Let us look first into *referential theory*, which is the most natural answer to the question of meaning. This holds that the meaning of a word is that to which it refers, or a kind of object (referent) or bearer of this word. The meaning of a sentence is its truth value: "Dartmouth" means a city to which this word refers. The difficulty of this theory is that, as some philosophers realized,

it seems that meaning is the object itself. Then if the bearer of a name died, the meaning of this name no longer exists. Also, the naive version of this theory cannot explain the fact that some words have different meanings, but one referent (Venus-morning star and evening star), and the same meaning has different referents (I, you, here, etc.). And, since most value terms do not refer to any object (in a broader sense they do refer to some relations or properties), most value judgements do not represent facts. Therefore, the referential theory meets an obvious difficulty when applied to value expressions. In the example: "The democratic system is good." what is the meaning of the word "good", to what object does it refer? for the whole sentence, "the democratic system is good" has a meaning. But according to referential theory, since this sentence does not represent any fact, in what does the meaning of this sentence consist? In another example: "Utopia is a beautiful paradise." Although Utopia is a fictional paradise, the sentence has a moral and aesthetic meaning. However, according to referential theory, this sentence is meaningless, since we cannot find a place called "Utopia", and we cannot prove the truth or falseness of this sentence.

2. Facing a word like "Dartmouth", *ideational theory* will say that the meaning of Dartmouth is the idea or association when you hear this word. You might have an imagination that Dartmouth is the mouth of River Dart, or a port city in England. Ideational theory avoids some difficulties of referential theory, that is, we can talk meaningfully about something which no longer exists or never has existed, and a word cannot mean the same for all who speak or hear it, since each person has a different idea. But there are more serious difficulties involved in this theory. Firstly, an idea is private so that we cannot prove whether the idea in my mind is the same as the idea in another's mind. Secondly, we cannot have any idea of some words, such as, 'if', 'when', 'course', or some phrase like 'a four-dimensional space.'

Facing the question of the meaning of a value judgement, ideational theory appeals to the idea or imagination. The trouble is that if we have no idea of what Utopia is, we would have no imagination at all. Moreover, what is the idea of good, right or beautiful? Everyone has his or her own idea. In the case of judgements of fact, such as it is a table, it seems possible for two persons to have almost the same idea by looking at some table from the same direction; however, in the case of the value judgement, there seems no way to know what the speaker's idea of 'good', 'right' or 'beautiful' is, since there is no such thing called 'good' we can refer to or compare with.

3. Generally speaking, use theory finds the question of the meaning of Dartmouth difficult to answer, since they hold that only in a linguistic context can a word have meaning. The meaning of a linguistic expression is its use in the language game. To understand a word, is to grasp its different usages in different contexts.

The main advantage of use theory is that it gives some insight that language, like a game, has different rules and uses, so the meaning of a linguistic expression is not a particular object or entity. Wittgenstein even warns "don't look for meaning, but look for use." By this sentence, Wittgenstein tries to avoid a traditional mistake, namely, if we ask a question in the form "what is meaning" we naturally wish to find a something which is the meaning of this sentence. According to Wittgenstein this would lead to an ignorance of the multiple uses of linguistic expressions.

However, we must notice that the admonition "don't look for meaning but use" does not imply that there is not anything called "meaning." Wittgenstein tries to tell us that the best way to understand the meaning of a word is to understand its use in a language, or to grasp its rules in a

language game. Strictly speaking, use theory is a theory of how to understand the meaning of a word in a language.

Therefore, use theory does not mean that meaning is use itself. If consistent, it never asks a question like "what is the meaning?" replying "meaning is the use" for that would conflict with Wittgenstein's own principle by taking the use itself as an entity.

The vagueness of use theory is that by understanding Wittgenstein's claim that meaning is the use in the language people usually forget the purpose of grasping the use of a word. In fact only when one wants to know the meaning of a word does one seek its use; by grasping this use one can understand the particular meaning of a word in a certain context. The best way then to express use theory is that meaning consists in the use in a language, rather than that meaning is the use in a language.

Use theory in some sense has an advantage inasmuch as it can give an explanation for such value terms as "good" and "right". For example regarding the meaning of "good" use theory simply holds that to understand its meaning is to grasp its uses in different contexts. However, facing some more complicated value judgements, use theory fails to give any useful interpretation.

"She is a virgin" is a typical example of a descriptive-evaluative judgement. If used in a hospital's examination room, it is a descriptive sentence; if you hear it at a wedding in a remote village in China as an old woman shows a bloodstained sheet to the guests at a wedding, the sentence means "she is a morally good woman" or "she is virtuous". If you come from a Western country you do not understand that and must ask people in this situation what does it mean.

Use theory can tell you to try to grasp the use of "virgin" in different contexts. Still you cannot find the evaluative meaning, because the moral meaning of virgin is not contained in the use of the word "virgin" in some countries. The deep conception of moral value implied in this word can be revealed only by showing a traditional moral value in China through an inference.

All those who are virgins until getting married are morally good.
She is still a virgin on her wedding day.
So she is morally good.

Obviously, the key to understanding this sentence is to know Chinese moral values about sex and marriage, which was concealed in the major premise.

The problem contained in "She is a virgin" meaning "She is morally good" can be treated as a problem of natural meaning and non-natural meaning, or sentence meaning and speaker's meaning in the approach suggested by Grice.³ Grice would put the sentence as:

A means nn by X that P

That is, by uttering X, "She is a virgin", the speaker's intention is that P, "She is morally good." For Grice, the key to understanding this non-natural meaning is the audience's recognition of the speaker's intention. So to say that A means nn something by X is to say that A intended the utterance of X to produce some effects in an audience by means of the recognition of this intention.

Grice's theory, according to Searle, is a useful start on an analysis of meaning, because it shows the close relationship between the notion of meaning and the notion of intention, and secondly because it captures something which is essential to speaking a language: in speaking a language I attempt to communicate things to my hearer by means of getting him or her to recognize my intention. Searle then criticizes Grice's theory for failing to distinguish the different kinds of

effects, and for failing to account for the extent to which meaning is a matter of rules or convention. In my opinion, the fatal defect in Grice's theory is that, although he gives us three steps to show that meaning consists in the recognition of a speaker's intention, he fails to give us a clear explanation of how to let the audience recognize the speaker's intention. Therefore, when people actually ask "what does A mean by X that P", what they can be told from this theory is that so long as you recognize the speaker's intention, you can understand the meaning of a nonnatural sentence.

Having realized the difficulty in Grice's theory, Strawson,⁴ in his "Intention and Convention in Speech Act", adds that in order to grasp the speaker's intention we need some conventions. D. Lewis⁵ also pays attention to the convention by which he wishes to offer us a way of understanding linguistic conventions and a solution to what he calls the "co-ordination problem".

Once again, my challenge is that, although it is true that within a certain linguistic community people can understand some non-natural meaning of a sentence by showing some linguistic convention, how can I understand a linguistic convention if I come from a foreign linguistic community? In the case of "She is a virgin", while other Chinese know what this sentence means by their conventions, the Westerner still has to wait for an answer to what this convention means.

So as I have shown above, all these theories fail to give us a satisfactory explanation of how to let the audience know your intention, or your community's conventions. As I have shown earlier, by an inference one immediately gets a definition of a certain value term, or value criterion, or a convention from the major premise, and an understanding of the speaker's meaning or intention from the conclusion.

To turn to the *emotive theory* of ethics, it concerns the question: what is the nature of ethics? Ethical naturalism believes that the nature of an ethical sentence is one class of empirical description. Ethical intuitionism holds that the nature of an ethical sentence is its nonnatural characteristics. The emotive theory insists that the nature of an ethical sentence is neither descriptive nor nonnaturalist, but just an emotive expression. As a theory of meaning, emotive theory tells us the kind of meaning an ethical sentence has, that is, the ethical sentence is meaningful for it expresses the speaker's emotion or attitude. To say someone is "good" is to appreciate him or her. In this sense the ethical sentence has emotive meaning whereas a fact sentence has descriptive meaning.

Emotive theory was developed under the influence of the view that the meaning of language is to be looked for in the use to which it is put. By showing different uses of an ethical term, emotive theory tells us that the basic meaning of ethical terms is to express appreciation, condemnation, and so on.

Apart from telling us what kind of meaning an ethical sentence has, some emotivists also developed some conception of what the meaning is. Stevenson,⁶ for example, constructs meaning in general as the disposition of a linguistic expression to elicit a psychological effect in hearers. The advantage of this theory, known as causal theory, is that it connects the meaning of a language with the action it causes, so when applied to the speech act and communication it seems an acceptable theory. But we still find some difficulties not only in its application in fact expression of which it can give very little adequate explanation, but also in value expression.

Take an example, "the table is square": what kind of psychological effect will it cause if you understand this sentence? To explain the meaning of a fact expression in terms of psychological disposition, in most occasions is far from accurate. Take as another example giving a command to somebody. According to this theory the meaning of this sentence should be an action it causes, but

if the command is not obeyed no action is involved. Therefore, a command which was disobeyed would be meaningless, which obviously is absurd.

D. Davidson's theory of meaning concentrates on the accuracy of meaning. His insight is that since "meaning" is an ambiguous term we should develop a theory of meaning without appealing to any semantic notion. Davidson's approach is:

S means M can be replaced by
S means P and further, since "means" is ambiguous too,
S means P can be replaced by
S is true if and only if P.

Therefore, a condition for a satisfactory theory of meaning in essence is Tarski's Convention T that test the adequacy of a formal semantical definition of truth. That is, the meaning of a sentence consists in its truth condition; to understand the meaning of a sentence is to know its truth condition. Thus, a theory of truth for a language is at same time a theory of meaning. Now if you know "snow is white" to be true if snow is white, you know at same time that "snow is white" means that snow is white.

As Davidson locates the meaning of a sentence in its truth condition, this theory can explain the meaning of a sentence in a simple and accurate way. But the problem is, how can this theory apply to a value sentence, since, as Davidson himself realized, moral or evaluation sentence do not have a truth value? That is, how can we understand any value sentence which has no truth value if the truth value is the presupposition of the understanding of meaning? In the end of his article, Davidson admits that this is a difficulty his theory faces, and he suggests that a comprehensive theory of meaning should solve this problem.

The Inferential Conception of Meaning

The analysis in the last section set up criteria for a satisfactory theory of meaning and showed that the currently available theories of meaning fail to meet these in one way or another. Now it is time to develop an inferential conception of meaning.

An inferential conception of meaning means that the meaning of a word or judgment constitutes an inference or syllogism, that is, by showing an inference. We understand the meaning of a word from the major premise (usually a definition), and understand the meaning of a judgment from the major premise to conclusion. Consider these two sentences:

This table is square.

Stealing is wrong.

The first is a fact judgment and hence cannot be understood until you know the word "table", "is" and "square". To understand a fact judgment, usually you need:

- (1) to understand the word in this sentence by a major premise or a definition, then
- (2) you will understand the meaning of the whole sentence by an inference.

For example:

A shape with four straight equal sides forming four right angles is square.

This table has the same feature as the above definition,
so this table is square. (You know what the whole sentence means.)

As all fact judgments either describe some fact or assert/deny some states of affairs, to understand a fact sentence also means that you know its truth condition. Therefore,

(3) to know the truth condition of the sentence means you will have such an inference:

A shape with four straight equal sides forming four right angles is square.
This table has the same features as the definition,
so "this table is square" is true.

As we can see, if you just want to know the meaning of a word in a sentence or a word without context, you just need step (1). That is, to have a major premise or definition in a certain context, or, to have a general definition without a context is to give a full definition. Therefore, the inference, in the case of the word, not the sentence, becomes a *simplified inference*. That is, if you do not know what is the meaning of "square" in the above sentence, you just need a major premise or definition, then you will understand "this table is square" even without a full inference. Actually, this is what people do in ordinary life. To understand some fact judgements like "this table is square", people do not make a full inference. Once they know the meaning of "square", they immediately understand why this table is asserted to be square and whether this is true or not. This is because people have a lot of knowledge of fact, and this is why people sometimes just need a simplified inference to understand a fact judgement.

If this is the case, the inferential conception of meaning in the case of a word and some fact judgments can be simplified as a major premise or defining conception of meaning. Thus, we come almost to the common sense most people naturally hold.

The reason for saying that the meaning of a word, in the case of a fact judgment and especially of a word, can be reduced to a definition is that the meaning is always something you intend to tell people by a word or a sentence, or which you grasp when you say you understand a word or a sentence. The best way to grasp this something is the definition of the word which tells what this word means, how many different meanings this word has, and how to use this word in different situations.

This conception shares some basic principles with referential theory in the sense that both theories hold that meaning is always something expressed by a word or a sentence. The difference between the two is that referential theory identifies this as an entity or an object itself, whereas inferential theory holds that this is just what a word means, i.e., a definition in the case of a word, a value criterion (also a definition) in the case of a value term, or a principle of value for a value judgment. This approach can avoid falling into difficulty in a fictional word, meaning entity or fixed meaning of a word in referential theory.

To say that the meaning of a word is a definition does not mean that the meaning is independent of context. Actually, a definition always tells you different uses of this word in different contexts. So the meaning of a word without a context is the completed definition, whereas the meaning of a word in a certain context is one from the many meanings this word contains. When one wants to find out the meaning of a word in a sentence, one normally choose an accurate meaning among several. In the case of value terms, the meaning in one's value judgment is always one's value criterion; the definition of a value term is yours, not others.

Therefore, the definition theory of meaning of a word borrows some basic principles from use theory, but avoids its in-ability to give a satisfactory explanation to a word and the problem of some complicated descriptive-evaluative sentences.

The Meaning of Value Expressions

The above concerned descriptive expression and concluded that for the meaning of a fact-expression one usually appeals to a simplified inference. This is just a major premise or a definition. Now how about value expressions? Here there is a conventional distinction between the descriptive/emotive (or referential/emotive, cognitive/noncognitive) function. Carl Wellman even classifies five different functions of language: descriptive, emotive, evaluative, directive and critical. For convenience of expression, I discuss non-descriptive expressions under the name "value expression", although some of them are not really evaluative. For pre-sent purposes this simplification will have little affect on the conclusions.

The value judgement will include:

moral judgment The democratic system is a good system.

The man is bad.

non-moral This meal is good.

This is a good car.

aesthetic judgment This flower is very beautiful.

critical judgment This picture is too realistic.

This argument is invalid.

obligation judgment Stealing is wrong.

Telling the truth is right.

A professor ought to be paid more, and

descriptive-evaluation

judgment She is a virgin.

She is very tender (cultured, etc.)

As we have shown earlier, there is a main difference between a fact and a value judgement: the main function of the former is to represent a fact, whereas that of the latter is to express evaluation, criticism, attitude, emotion, etc. As a result, for a fact expression, meaning is connected with the truth value, whereas a value expression does not need such a condition. Also, for understanding a fact expression a simplified inference is enough in most occasions, whereas for understanding a value expression a full inference is necessary. Because the meaning of value term varies from one person to another, to understand a value expression depends to a great extent on one's understanding of a speaker's value criteria, of certain conventions in a community and so on, which one cannot grasp until a full inference is drawn.

Since the two kinds of expressions have such obvious differences, a natural question is whether it is necessary or possible for us to have a coherent theory of meaning for both expressions? Currently available theories of meaning are fully aware of these differences, so they pay attention to one kind of expression (for example, referential theory to fact expression and emotive theory to value expression). The point is that if we cannot find a coherent theory of meaning we cannot say that current theories are unsatisfactory. But if we do find a coherent theory

of meaning which can apply to both expressions and at same time does not ignore their differences, then there is valid reason to say that the current theories are unsatisfactory.

Now let us turn to the value expression. Like a fact expression, the meaning of a value expression also is implied in the major premise or definition. How is this meaning to be grasped. Again, we can appeal to an inference by showing a syllogism where we understand the meaning from a major premise to conclusion.

Since a judgement can be used either as a minor premise or conclusion depending on the context, to start an inference in the case of a value judgment, the first step is to determine what role the given value judgement plays in a syllogism. For example:

The democratic system is a good system.

(1) as a conclusion:

Any system which can bring happiness to the people is a good system.
The democratic system can bring happiness to the people,
so the democratic system is a good system.

(2) as minor promise:

All good systems can bring happiness to the people.
The democratic system is a good system,
so the democratic system can bring happiness to the people.

Generally speaking, it is easier to understand a value judgment as a conclusion. To understand your meaning or your intention, we need only to know what is meant by "good system", which I know by a major premise.

This becomes more complicated in the case of a value judgement as a minor premise, because with the same minor premise we can draw different conclusions from different major premises. Therefore, if someone says a sentence X means P, as Grice's A mean nn by X that P, to understand the speaker's real meaning or intention you must know the major premise.

Within a linguistic community, this major premise can some-times easily be identified or recognized. Suppose your friend wants you to drive him home, and you do not intend to do so, you say: "I drank to much." He will understand immediately what you mean because of a shared conventional principle:

No driving after excessive drinking.
I drank too much,
so I cannot drive.

However in some cases, the major premise or the speaker's special view of value is too difficult to recognize. For example, after a dinner party two men say the same sentence: "This meal is very good." If they use this sentence as a minor premise, they mean something else by this sentence. The first man's wife thinks her husband is appreciating her, because her husband has a principle or a convention for a good meal:

All good meals must have been cooked by my wife.
This meal is good,
so this meal must have been cooked by my wife.

The second man's wife knows that her husband wants to say: "I am going to sleep" as he has a habit or conventional inference:

Whenever I have a good meal will go to sleep.
This is a good meal,
so I am going to sleep.

If neither of them let people know their principle, no one would understand what this sentence really meant.

So, to understand a value judgement as a minor premise, you need two steps:

(1) Whenever you hear a sentence like this is a good X, or this X is good, you naturally treat this judgment as a conclusion. What you need is to know his criterion of a good X, say, a good meal. This can be achieved by an inference.

(2) If he says "No, this is not what I mean," that means he meant something else by the sentence. Now you should take the second step and ask: "What do you really mean by that?" He then gives you his principle. In real life, people usually just give you a principle or a major premise and leave the conclusion to you. That is we ignore the role a syllogism plays in understanding the meaning of a value judgement, or more generally, the meaning of the linguistic expression. Apart from the distinction between a value judgment as a minor premise and a value judgement as a conclusion, we can find another difference between a value judgment with a basic value term (good, bad, right, wrong and ought) and a value judgment without a basic value term. We call the former first level judgment and the latter second level judgment.

Let us look into first level judgment first. There are two kinds of structure in this level.

- (1) X is good.
- (2) This X is a good X.

By uttering (1), you are setting up your general value criteria. If people do not understand you, that is because they do not know your own view of "good", not because they do not know the common sense meaning of good, since everyone always presupposes they know the basic meaning of good and bad. Therefore we find an interesting fact that whenever people want to know your view of good, say, in the sentence "The democratic system is good," they simply ask "why" rather than what is the meaning of good. By asking "why", they want to know why you attribute the democratic system to "good". Your answer is:

Anything which brings happiness is good.
The democratic system can bring happiness,
so the democratic system is good.

Your major premise is your conception of "good".

In (2), "good" is used as an attribute. By "good X" you give your value criteria of a certain kind of thing, say: "She is a good doctor." If people do not understand your sentence, most likely

they do not know your criteria of a "good doctor", rather than "good". Therefore, by showing your criteria of a good doctor, you give a concrete value criterion.

Now let us turn to the second level. The value terms in this level are: satisfactorily, reasonable, admirable, and so on. These terms express evaluation, criticism, comment, and eventually can be reduced to the basic value term (good, bad, right, wrong, ought). Therefore, to understand this level of judgment, you need first to attribute them to the first level value term, and, according to the linguistic convention, to locate their degree of good, bad, right, wrong.

The difficulty in this level of judgement is that, not every value term has an obvious good or bad meaning. In some cases, the value term is so ambiguous that you do not even know whether it is approving or disapproving, let alone the degree of good or bad. This is very common in art and literary criticism. For example, "This picture is realistic." Firstly, you probably do not know what is meant by "realistic". After being told that "realistic" means "very concrete, not abstract", you still do not know the speaker's attitude towards this picture, good, or bad? So you ask further: "What do you mean by this sentence?" His answer is:

A good picture should be abstract.
This picture is not abstract,
so this picture is not good.

As we can see, to understand a second level value judgment is much more difficult than a first level value judgment. Moreover as shown above, since with the same judgement as a minor premise from different major premises we can draw different conclusions, the possible meaning for this judgment could be something other than good or bad. For instance:

No modern artist likes a realistic picture.
This picture is realistic,
so this picture must be from a classical artist's hand.

This shows again that to understand a value judgment we need to make not only a distinction between a judgement as a minor premise and a judgment as a conclusion, but also a distinction between a first level judgement and a second level judgment. In the case of the second level judgement, you sometimes need three steps to find:

- (1) the meaning of a second level value term (realistic)
- (2) the meaning of the sentence (attribute them to good/bad and the degree of good/bad)
- (3) the speaker's meaning or (as a minor premise) non-basic value term meaning

In short, the meaning of a value expression consists in the speaker's conception of value implied in the major premise (usually a definition), which can be revealed only by an inference or a syllogism. Therefore, the meaning of a linguistic expression consists in the course of inference.

Notes

1. J. Heal, "On the Phrase 'Theory of Meaning'", *Mind* (1978).
2. G. Harman, "Three Levels of Meaning", *Journal of Philosophy* (1968).
3. P. Grice, "Meaning", *Philosophical Review* (1957).

4. P.F. Strawson, "Intention and Invention in Speech Act", in his *Logico-Linguistic Papers*.
5. D. Lewis, *Convention*.
6. C.L. Stevenson, "The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Term", *Facts and Value*, also see *Ethics and Language*.
7. D. Davidson, "Truth and Meaning", *Syntheses* (1967).

The Ontology of Contemporary Confucianism and Modernization

Shi Zhonglian

Among those Chinese thinkers who treat philosophically the theoretical problems in modernization, modern Confucianists have devoted most attention to ontology. They have worked most painstakingly and achieved the greatest success in this sphere. Most Chinese philosophers have been doing their best to find weapons of philosophical thought to criticize autocratic ideas and systems and to solve urgent practical problems in the political, social, economic and cultural realms. The neo-Confucian thinkers, however, have been cudgeling their brains to explore the deepest reality of the universe, the *noumenon* of the world and the Absolute, and thus define the real meaning of life and the fundamental values of culture. They hold that ontology is the crux of the matter, and provides the essential solution to the problems of modernization. According to them, only by a clear understanding of the *noumenon* of the universe can the modern person find the dwelling place for his or her spirit; only by expounding ontology can theorists show clearly the correct orientation for the development of modern culture and solve practical problems in the political and economical spheres. If they failed to clarify an unshakable ontology, the modern world would sink into spiritual poverty. The measures to deal with affairs would then merely be utilitarian; Western thought would be introduced fragmentarily, incoherently, superficially and thus would arouse shallowness and confusion. That is why neo-Confucianists have been exerting every effort to expound ontology, and to use it as the major premise from which they deduce their philosophy of life and culture, their ethics and political theory.

The partiality of contemporary Confucianism for ontology is a peculiar reaction of Chinese traditional philosophy to the trends of modernization. Traditional Confucianism regarded Heaven as the supreme *noumenon*, which was transcendent; it is the most fundamental being generating and transcending all things. Moreover, Heaven is also thought to be immanent; it endows the human with Nature (*Xing*) whose essential content is humanity (*ren*). Nature forms the moral or spiritual ego, which as the real nature of man transcends the empirical ego and the physiological ego. Mencius said: "He who exerts his mind to the utmost knows his nature. He who knows nature knows Heaven." (Mencius 7A1). This implies that only by cultivating one's moral character does one recover one's nature and experience the *noumenon*. Humanity is both the embodiment of the way of Heaven and the manifestation of human nature. Thus, by searching for humanity one can realize the unification of Heaven and man, and thereby acquires the real meaning and true sacred value of human life. *The Doctrine of the Mean* said: "What Heaven imparts to man is called human nature. To follow our nature is called the Way. Cultivating the Way is called education." Therefore Confucianism demands that the theory of guiding the activities of the whole of society, state and individuals follow the Way of Heaven and proceed from a humanitarian mind. So the Great Learning said: "From the Son of Heaven down to the common people, all must regard cultivation of the personal life as the root or foundation." That is the conclusion of traditional Confucianism.

The ontology of traditional Confucianism and the ethics and political doctrine deriving therefrom, if not reformulated, would not be suitable for modern China for they could not be used to save the nation from subjugation and to construct a new society, nor could they be used to develop new culture. But the neo-Confucianists have firm faith in the value of the traditional culture. They firmly believe that only by returning to the *noumenon* of the universe can the human

spirit find its dwellings; only with the help of ontology can our way of governing society and our schemes for making the state powerful and people rich not lead to new political and social evils. They would not repeat the doctrine of "preserving heavenly principle and extirpating human desires," and have abandoned the dogma of "the three cardinal guides": ruler guides subject, father guides son, and husband guides wife. However, when they come to solve the problems of modern society they still follow the Confucian thinking of subordinating the incidental to the fundamental and uniting substance and function.

Modernization is fundamentally the rationalization of the world, that is, remolding the economy and culture of the whole society according to the principle of reason; hence rationalism and scientism have been in vogue in modern society. Modern Confucianists are unsatisfied with that state of affairs. For Liang Shuming, Western rationalism will lead to utilitarianism and make men indulge in material comforts, without human feeling and value. As a result, relations among person, including among family members, become cold and detached. Zhang Junmai thought that science could not solve the problems of the meaning of life, and scientism would result in mechanism and determinism. Tang Junyi pointed out that abstract rational analysis contains the "seed of extermination"¹ and turns man into an abstract concept; utilitarianism turns others into means, whereas rational methodology leads the human spirit outward. In short, modern Confucianists who think rationalism and scientism will result in the loss of the human spirit, the meaning of life and the human ego do not intend to oppose or liquidate the rational and scientific mode of thinking. But they do hope that "it should proceed from something fundamental," for otherwise it cannot establish a standard of right and wrong.² Mou Zongsan believed deeply that the origin of "meaning" and "value" could be found in the *noumenon* (i.e. the heavenly principle), and that by experiencing the *noumenon* one could find the real ego and live a life full of spirituality and religiousness. Modern Confucianists think that Confucian ontology can overcome the crisis of spirit and meaning in modern society.

With the exception of Feng Youlan, contemporary Confucianists all carry on the tradition of Ly and Wang, regarding the original mind, namely the humanitarian mind as the *noumenon* of the world. Nevertheless various philosophers justify this view differently. Liang Shuming thought that as an original mind, ego is the sole real being in the universe and creates all things in the world. Xiong Shili, who did his utmost to break with the popular view that mind and outward things are real, stressed that the original substance cannot be independent of original mind, and that the original mind, which is not the mind in physiology, psychology and epistemology, is the enlightenment of one's real self, i.e. the humanitarian mind. He said that the real self or enlightenment is "vacuous, intelligent, not beclouded, complete, and defectless. In spite of its stillness and shapelessness, it is orderly and inclusive of all kinds of principles, which may be called the source of all know-ledge."³ The original mind, as the Absolute, cannot be monopolized by one's subject, which is the true nature, uniting oneself and all things in one body. It "is self-existent before the visible comes into being, is completely void, but exists miraculously, manifests itself universally in all things, thus appearing through things."⁴ Tang Junyi said that as the source of all values, the humanitarian mind is full of vitality and becomes the supreme master of the universe. The humanitarian mind likes to see the grass and trees flourish, hopes that all prospects will develop and feels sorry for its ruin. Therefore it becomes "the heart of the world, which completes, holds and cherishes concrete things in a direct way." It affirms the existence of the world experienced directly and the values of all valuable things.⁵ Mou Zongsan, who studied Kant's philosophy thoroughly and was influenced by his ontology, holds that the free will in Kant's philosophy is equivalent to "the innate faculty" (*Liangzhi*). But unlike Kant, Mou regards the

original substance of mind not as an hypothesis dependent upon the analysis of concepts, but as a real being which can be experienced and grasped by human intuition. As the innate faculty, the humanitarian mind is not only the subject of moral practice, but also the cause of the emergence, change and development of being, because the Free Will, i.e. the original mind, which is absolute and infinite, is not effect but cause, just as with the original mind, which is absolute and infinite, is not effect but cause, just as with the original substance of the universe, the so-called "first cause." So, the original mind must be identical with the original substance of the universe for "it is impossible that there be two absolute and infinite substances in the universe."⁶ In short, in the extremely diverse and complex world, there is a spiritual unity which forms "the ultimate reality."

For modern Confucianists, the theory which regards the original mind (i.e. the real self, the innate faculty and the humanitarian mind) as the original substance of the universe, has the following several meanings.

First of all, this theory attempts to establish a supreme value for modern society and civilization. Neo-Confucianists agree that the Western ideas of democracy, science and reason are all valuable, but that these cannot help us grasp the original substance; moreover, if misguided, they will cause all kinds of abuses. The humanitarian mind, however, provides a vast sense of value. Tang Junyi said: "The sense of value in different times and places may incline to one side and neglect another side, but the humanitarian mind wants to correct the deviation and bring to light the neglected side. So the humanitarian mind is the innate faculty or conscience which can distinguish between what is high and what low, between a one-side and a well rounded sense of value, and perceive the origin from which all sense of value emerges, unceasingly expands and finally reaches its consummation. Therefore it can be the supreme master guiding all the behavior and activities in human life."⁷ Hence, the humanitarian mind should be the supreme master of all forms of culture.

Secondly, the humanitarian mind has set a supreme goal for the modern striving after a happy and meaningful life. According to modern Confucianism, as the universal nature permeating all things, the humanitarian mind is both the nature of man and the original substance of the universe. For this reason, through restoration to the humanitarian mind one can reach the realm of unification of Heaven and man, in which the man, Heaven, Earth, and the myriad things become one body. In this way the ordinary people will become lofty, and daily life sacred and spiritual, that is, ethical. People with lofty ideals cherish fine feelings for others and love all men. They transform the unfeeling money-centered relation among men in modern society, filled with cruel competition and cunning cheating, into fine relations of mutual trust, respect, love and mutual help. Thereby they maintain harmony and tranquility in a social life full of friendship and warmth.

Thirdly, the theory which regards the humanitarian mind as original substance shows that man should reflect in his mind (*fan-qui zhuji*), and bring his autonomous spirit (*zizuo zhuzai*) into full play. Modern Confucianists hold that what is independent of any-thing, the original substance of mind, is absolute, complete and self-sufficient, that it contains myriad principles and qualities which will bring about myriad changes. In Xiong Shili's terminology it is "a vast treasure", which is "so vast as to be boundless, so deep as to be bottomless, so rich as to be unmeasured; its motions and changes are endless."⁸ Therefore essentially the person is God, should have self-respect, be self-confident, and on no account be-little himself or give up on himself as hopeless. The person must not search for outward things blindly; he or she should not "abandon his or her boundless treasure, and like a beggar go from door to door." First and foremost one should open up inwardly, explore the inexhaustible spiritual strength, develop the infinite potentialities in one's mind; one does not depend on others and on ready-made things, but gives full play to one's own strength.

This is true not only of an individual, but also of a nation which should have a sense of self-esteem and self-confidence. It should treasure its own tradition, take its living national spirit as foundation, absorb, merge and digest foreign culture, and create a modern culture which is characteristic of its nationality.

Fourthly, the original substance of mind is an inexhaustible source of creative spirit. According to Xiong Shili, the original substance of mind which is vacuous, intelligent and pure, transcends and creates myriad things, but is not detained by things. It is a vitality which cannot be tied down, "and a strong tendency which is upward, developing, unwilling to be materialized."⁹ "If one experienced the original substance of mind and discovered his real self, he would open up and create all kinds of things by himself."¹⁰

Fifthly, the Confucian thought is of eternal value and universal significance. Modern Confucianists do not defend the values of traditional Confucianism passively, but try to overcome the crisis in modernization, i.e. the wrongs of modern society in the spiritual and cultural field. They clarify Confucian doctrine in order to show its value. They see Confucian metaphysics as the elementary part of Confucianism and the quintessence of Chinese culture. This takes ontology as its kernel and consider it capable of solving the spiritual crisis caused by Western values. As a theory suitable for modern society, it can meet the challenge of modernization and Western culture; it can survive and even develop. Moreover, Confucian ontology, which aims at the ultimate concern of humankind and discusses the values and meaning of life, is a value suitable for all times and is of eternal significance. Through expounding ontology, modern Confucianism establishes the position and role of Confucianism in modern society and human civilization.

From the above discussion it can be seen that the ontology of modern Confucianism not only preserves the frame and structure of traditional Confucianism, but also has been enriched by the times. Ontology is the most abstract part of philosophy and shows the least concern for the practical problems of society. Modern Confucianists keep to their own style and their old way of thinking in their absorbed study of their academic questions, regardless of praise or blame of others. Nevertheless, they still must conform to historical trends and absorb the spirit of the day. To meet the needs for developing the modern spirit, culture and society, they stress the full play of their independence, initiating creativity and making progress. In short, they pay great attention to human self-consciousness and subjectivity, and advocate self-realization and self-development as well as self-perfection. Certainly, the ontology of modern Confucianism can become the guideline for the spiritual cultivation for some Chinese intellectuals who are unwilling to accept either Communist beliefs or total Westernization, and who can exercise initiative. In fact, the doctrine has been inspiring some intellectuals to go their own way during a period of seventy years since the May 4th Movement of 1919. In the historical criticism of tradition, which swept across China with the momentum of an avalanche, they exerted themselves to enhance traditional culture with an incomparably firm belief, amazing courage and will-power. They realized notable achievements which have advanced the rediscovery of Chinese traditional culture and helped to explore its excellent heritage of culture and to carry forward the national spirit.

It must be pointed out that modern Confucianists, who are ambitious in academic study, are not satisfied with merely re-elaborating traditional thoughts. Their goal is to make neo-Confucianism the guiding ideology for developing the modern spirit and the theoretical foundation of modern culture; their hope is that their theory can dominate the process of the modernization. But in fact the influence of modern Confucianism upon the process of Chinese modernization has been small; it hardly contributed to the destruction of the old political and economical systems and the establishment of the new ones. It seems to have no impact on the progress of modern science

and technology and on the development of Chinese economy. Its effects on the formation of the modern Chinese spirit and the flourishing of modern Chinese culture are not worth mentioning. Neo-Confucian views and plans concerning modernization remained at the level of theory, so that its influence was limited to the sphere of academy.

Among many reasons for this state of affairs, an important one has been that neo-Confucianism has been impaired by its ontology on which neo-Confucianism has been unduly dependent. Influenced by the Confucian idea of subordinating the incidental to the fundamental, they thought that the solution to all theoretical and practical problems in modern society depended on the establishment of the original Substance, so they paid great attention to abstract and speculative metaphysics and looked down upon the concrete practical problems. Just as traditional Confucianism reduced bringing order to their states and restoring peace through-out the world to regrounding the mind and making the will sincere, so neo-Confucianism reduced perfecting modern society and developing modern culture to establishing the governing and dominant position of the humanitarian mind. Indeed, contemporary Confucianists have written many works discussing problems concerning democracy, science, literature, arts and so on, but these were concerned mainly with how these cultural spheres should accept the guide of the humanitarian mind. Most modern Confucianists who drifted away from the trends of the times were un-willing to understand and participate in those trends. On the contrary, standing aside, they sometimes talked about and criticized it, but did not pay due attention to the urgent social problems which they rarely investigated. Thus they could not put forward practical and effective solutions and hence were unable to influence the Chinese process of modernization.

History has indicated that modernization, with its own course, is not a product and accessory of a certain ideology; it does not develop according to an ideology. So long as the necessary conditions for social, political, economic and cultural development are given, the process of modernization advances vigorously, whether in a capitalist or a socialist society, whether in states and areas with Western democracy or without it. Modern Confucianism has reconstructed the traditional Confucianism, cast aside the latter's support for feudal autocracy, and assimilated the ideas of science and democracy. Xiong Shili accepted socialist thought in his later years. The humanitarian mind in modern Confucianism no longer means the "heavenly principles" embodying feudal morality, but a spirit of universal fraternity, exerting oneself, progress, opening up, creating, and perfecting oneself and the outward world. In spite of their inclination to anti-utilitarianism, they do not oppose utility per se. In its substance, modern Confucianism does not run counter to the modern spirit, and hence does not hinder the course of modernization.

Neo-Confucianism attempted to influence and even dominate the course of modernization, but in fact it failed. It is not that modern Confucianism is utterly incompatible with modernization, but that it is divorced from the practical course of modernization and indulges in empty talk about metaphysics. Although metaphysics does have bearing on modernization, empty talk about it cannot solve any practical problem, and cannot advance modernization. In today's world modernization is the most powerful force transforming society and the human spiritual world, and determining the orientation of history. Only by promoting the practical course of modernization can any idea, doctrine, party or individual have an important influence on society and man, and can an idea of value be qualified to guide modern society and the spirit of the modern man.

The undue dependence of modern Confucianism on its ontology is rooted in a fatal weakness of ontology, that is, con-fusing reality with the subject. The term "original substance" is a category with many meanings: ultimate origin, universal nature, ultimate reality, supreme unity, the absolute, supreme subject, the fundamental motive power, and the master of the world. Between

different philosophers the meaning of the term "original substance" differs greatly and the ambiguity of the meaning of the term caused many debates in the history of philosophy. In the works of neo-Confucianists the term for the original substance has several meanings at the same time. However, its primary meaning is the supreme subject, so they stressed that the original substance is the fundamental power, the master and creator of the world. Therefore it is said to be the subjective dynamic spirit, namely, the original substance of mind. Nevertheless, according to the philosophy of neo-Confucianism, since the original substance of mind is the ultimate reality of the universe, the outward physical world was created by the substance of mind, thereby negating thoroughly the objective reality of the world. Xiong Shili's ontology, which contemporary Confucians praise highly, did the most to clarify this view.

Xiong Shili pointed out time and again that things are not real being and said: "I do not think the material universe existed originally. Nevertheless we might as well accept the claim as did everybody else."¹¹ According to him, things are brought about by a function of the original substance which manifested itself in two ways: one is opening (*pi*), the other is closing (*he*). "Things are false traces aroused by a tendency (*Shiyong*) of closing,"¹² which is the process of shrinking and condensing. To avoid misunderstanding his thought, he pointed out that this condensing did not refer to that of the material substance, but to the closing function of the original substance of mind, condensing is based on non-being (*wu*) which is vacuous. The vacuous is the Great One (*Zhiyi*). As the vacuous is condensing, the many are emerging. Therefore, once the One is established, the many come into being. The vacuous contains the myriad beings, the number is infinite."¹³ Although he opposed the Taoist doctrine of the "emerging of being from non-being", in fact he still advocated the view that the universe was generated from non-being.

The concepts of the subject of the world and of the ultimate reality are quite different. The modern Confucians confused these concepts and regarded the dynamic, opening and creative spirit as the ultimate reality of the universe. For this reason, they were bound to fall into the pitfall of the doctrine of "emergence of being from non-being". Although the visible world is humanized, and outward things become the objects determined by the subject once they enter the sphere of human understanding, the outward world exists objectively and has its reality: the subject cannot create the object from nothing; the outward thing has its own definition and law. The complete negation of the objectivity and reality of the world undoubtedly will lead to a void and bring about subjectivism. By disregarding the nature and law of things and placing blind faith in a miraculous omnipotence on the part of the mind in opening and creating all, modern Confucianists overlooked the practical problems of modern society and did not study the theory of modernization. Thus they have had little influence upon modern society. Though the neo-Confucianists knew that traditional Confucianism failed due to its focus upon inner sagemess (*nei sheng*) to the detriment of outer kingliness (*wai wang*), they failed to overcome this drawback in their own philosophy.

Another problem caused by confusing the subject with reality is that the reality of the universe had a moral coloring. In modern society it is difficult to understand the traditional Confucian view that the mind is the original substance of the universe. Undoubtedly, the subject of cognition has a moral sense, but the substance of the universe does not possess consciousness. Regarding the mind as the original universe or its origin leads to mysticism.

Judging from the destiny of neo-Confucianism in modern society, ontology, which can establish the value and meaning of life for some people, can play a certain role in developing their spirit. Nevertheless, due to its own limitations, its effect on modern society is limited. Only a philosophical theory which can advance the process of modernization can produce a great impact on modern society.

Notes

1. Tang Junyi, "The Limits of Scientific Reason and Humanitarian Mind", *Democratic Review*, n. 6, 13.
2. Tang Junyi, "Our Illness of Mind", *Democratic Review*, n. 2, 7.
3. Xiong Shili, *The Neo-Consciousness only Doctrine* (Commercial Publishing Company), p. 4.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Tang Junyi, "Limits".
6. Mou Zongsan, *Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy*.
7. Tang Junyi, "Limits".
8. Xiong Shili, *The Inquiry on Confucianism*, vol. II, chap. 4.
9. Xiong Shili, *The Neo-Consciousness only Doctrine* (Zhonghua Publishing Co. 1985), chap. 4, p. 327.
10. Xiong Shili, *An Inquiry*, vol. II, chap. 4.
11. Xiong Shili, *The Neo-Consciousness-only Doctrine*, chap. 4, p. 325.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 328.
13. *Ibid.*

Ontology and the Foundation of Ethics

Gao Guoxi

In China today, there is still no book or paper on the foundation of ethics; this subject-matter seems to be beyond question. On the contrary there are many studies concerning this in Western philosophy. Surely, there should be a relation between metaphysics and ethics. Even though there is now study of ontology in philosophical textbooks in China, the warm discussion concerning "the ontology of nature", "the ontology of material" and "the ontology of social existence" or "the ontology of praxis" since 1987 shows that the problems of ontology has not been eliminated or deconstructed. Ontology, as the total grasp of the universe by human wisdom and the search of its foundations by natural intelligence, has lasting vitality but is in need of renewal. The goal of this chapter is to explore this relation between ontology and ethics.

When George Lukacs wrote "No ethics without ontology"¹ he left a puzzle for he provided no argument to support this. How can two poles of theory: ontology which is so abstract and ethics which is so actual, touch each other, as Lukacs suggests. Various theories concerning this appear in modern Western philosophy. Since the middle of the last century, a strong trend rejecting ontology emerged in Western philosophy, and then evolved into an overall movement of anti-foundationalism. This wants to break the absolute and unitary, and to concentrate on specificity, particularity and experience. This challenges any unitary view of value or any absolute system; it struggles against total and uncritical acceptance of the tradition and rebels against any absolute model of cognition. Thus, from time to time ontology is questioned.

Firstly, for more than a century the death of ontology has been called for by positivism. In those circles substantive problems, let alone the relationship between ontology and ethics, were expelled from philosophy as an academic field. Ontology was maintained only in religion and non-academic philosophy.

Secondly, F. Nietzsche's proposed "transvaluation of traditional moralities" threatens their foundations; moral knowledge was also shaken: is there then any stable basis for morality?

Thirdly, existentialism began with individual persons describing their psychological experiences, but can these provide a basis for morality?

Finally, as Alasdair MacIntyre said, since the Renaissance individualism has lead to relativism in morality which then appears to lack a common basis.²

This engenders a puzzle: is there any basis and ground for a position on values? If so is the basis shared or distinct for each culture? If the latter, then are the grounds comparable or not? This involves the issue of whether morality and ethics have fixed grounds, which is the task here.

Ontology and ethics have been regarded as having nothing to do with each other; this is the issue of our age. In ancient and early modern philosophy, the relation between them was very clear: ontology was the root, ethics the fruit. The Stoics took natural philosophy as the tree and ethics as the fruit. Descartes's metaphor is familiar: metaphysics is the root, and ethics the fruit. From its earliest ages till now ontology aimed at a unitary account of phenomena, and a fixed foundation for change or becoming. Frank Thilly saw the world as one, presenting to us a unitary whole. No phenomenon can be understood thoroughly in isolation from all others.³

According to its original meaning as a love of wisdom, philosophy is a grasp of the whole world. Thus it cannot be restricted within the limits of the empirical and logical spheres as with

analytic reasoning, nor within the psychological or mental experience which lacks positive content as with dialectic reasoning. Philosophy, both in analytic or positive theoretic reasoning and in dialectic or synthetic practical reasoning is a systematic fundamental understanding and explanation of the universe. As the basic and overall grasp of being, ontology is an important part of philosophy and must not be suppressed. What then is the role of ontology in the construction of ethics?

1. *Ontology provides ethics with the foundation of a Weltanschauung and principles for argumentation and agreement.* Thereby it provides ethical theory with unity and continuity.

Moral phenomena are diverse and confused; they are entangled with other social actions. How can we find the point for unifying them upon a fixed and adequate basis? As directions for human life, ethics must advocate something, critique something; it must promote the good, and suppress evil. At the level of a *Weltanschauung*, it must provide a basic point of view for the human's place in the cosmos and the human mission in society. All the above constitute the starting point and foundation for rational inquiry. This is Aristotle's *arche*, Aquinas's *principium* and A. MacIntyre's first principle. It determines the direction, trend, task, standard and criteria of ethics. In this sense, ontology determines ethics. Sartre noted, "Ontology and existential psychoanalysis must reveal to the moral agent that he is the being by whom value exists."⁴

Different bases for moral philosophy can lead to different ethical commitments: to take the feelings and the reactions of the subject as the basis of morality would engender ethical subjectivism; to base it upon different particular groups would lead to ethical relativism. It is often said that facts are the bases of values, but facts alone cannot construct values. This implies the problem of the objective or subjective grounds of morality. Some philosophers build their ethics on the basis of "nature", "utility" and "analysis", but none of those ethics is on stable ground.

Let us take the utilitarianism as an example. Utilitarian principles are not primary premises, but are dictated by other more fundamental thinking. Before J. Bentham came to his "utility" and "maximal happiness principle", he had started with ethical thinking on human nature; but the latter in turn was drawing upon an onto-logy of human existence. In this way, ethics is related to ontology.

Ethical concerns involve various levels, both in general and in particular, from social events to individual life. Under some fundamental principles, coherent reasoning leads to an explanation of phenomena and appropriate actions. Ontology, as a total *weltanschauung*, provides the main direction, the fundamental principles, the basic identity of the phenomena, the essence and the grounds. F. Brentano's ethics, for example, was constructed according to his ontology of intentionality as the foundation; R.M. Hare's ethics embodies overall an analytic ontology -- universal prescriptive utilitarianism. A. MacIntyre takes Aristotle's and Aquinas's *aretai* (virtue), *principium* and *telos* as the keys to ethics and philosophy, and insists that it is precisely because these conceptions have been abandoned that contemporary moral philosophy has fallen to pieces. He criticizes Sartre's self as a leap into the absurd from one state or moral promise to another with no basis in "a set of social relations". Such an opinion is so fragmented that it cannot provide a basis for coherent choices.⁵

2. *Ontology provides value-orientation and value-criteria.* Ontology has two main characters: *principium* and *telos*. *Telos* is common to all human acts in the practical and cognitive orders. It distinguishes the human and the animals and gives direction to human activity, whereby people choose the means to achieve their goals. The good and evil in ethical life are determined

in view of value, which in turn is based on ontology. Values are engendered from the point of view of the total universe. F. Brentano suggested that ethics was of ultimate importance, "one who identifies a goal at which he will aim is like a marksman who sees his target; he has a far better chance of striking it than someone who shoots at random.⁶ In the same sense, MacIntyre said that the first principle "provides the standards and direction from the outset."⁷

Just as value orientations are not universal, so value standards also differ. Kant takes universal validity and the valuing person as the basis for moral principles. Contemporary utilitarians judge the right and wrong according to the consequences of actions, Thomists according to their *telos*, and so on. All above opinions are far from being coherent with one another though each system has its own consistence. The reason for this is that different trends emerge on the ontological level. What one exalts the other excludes; to what one pursues the other is apathetic: all dispense with such synthetic social factors as the place in society, the level of education, the ideal of human life, and social relationships which provide the comprehensive social contexts. For these we need to turn to such sciences as psychology, religion, literature, culture and economics, all of which can be combined with ethics.

3. *Ontology transcends morality.* Moral life has ideals which can elevate human beings to a lofty realm of thought. We cannot treat the details but morality teaches humans to transcend themselves, to purify the goals of life and to elevate the human search. This sense of super-empirical, sublime ideals and of the transcendent comes from ontology. Induction cannot attain transcendence and essences. To observe and enquire about these as social beings, we must broaden our sights, to appreciate the ethical dimension or significance of everyday life. Ethics gives a non-empirical account of empirical affairs in order to provide humans with a basis for their stance in the world. This is where the strength and dignity of morality lies, and the reason why morality can elevate the human mind. Science is knowledge, but beyond this thought is a style of life. Morality then is not only knowledge, but surpasses this and concerns the moral style, meaning and structure of human existence.

S. Freud considered morality to be a function of the superego. As ideas and actions rooted in actuality but superior thereto morality shares this identity. The inclination to go beyond the details in order to promote a life is precisely the insight and contribution of ontology -- going through phenomena to grasp the substance, Kant considered the natural inclination of human reason to substance as the problem of how to be human: it is the key to the transcending grasp by the spirit and its reaction to the outside world of beings. Man's grasp of the whole of existence enables pure reason not to remain with observing the natural world, but to leap beyond all possible experience; it is in this that metaphysics is produced. The natural rational inclination to inquire regarding the ultimate foundation leads to the principles of practical life. The problems of substance are very important in practice; if there is no such realm to satisfy human hopes and desires, the absolutely necessary universality which reason seeks as a moral goal can never be achieved. Thus, in Kant's philosophy the principles of moral practice come from a transcendent ontology.

To achieve the goal, we must choose the means and the way that leads to it. This principle of action also come from ontology.

4. *Ontology provides the first principle of action.* Much ethical action follows the principles posited by ontology which provides the fundamental preconditions, specifies the actions and plays a deep directive role. Socrates held that knowing what is good, man can practice the good. This is

posited on the principle: "No man can do evil intentionally." Hence, Socrates kept discussing with others in order to clarify various conceptions, for only by knowing virtue could one do virtue.

Ethical actions are applications of practical reason and follow its action rules. According to Kant practical reason, as the practical application of pure theoretical reason, is indispensable for the completion and application of reason. As concerned with practice ethics certainly involves principles of action for living in the actual world. So, Plato did not distinguish ethics from social problems, and Aristotle's politics was a continuation of his ethics.

Traditional philosophers hold many common beliefs regarding right action, the adequacy of moral rules and the certitude of moral knowledge. Because they have broad agreement on morality, philosophers can search together for the common principles of morals and for resolving factual issues.

The principles of action should involve medium range rules which tell how to apply the principles. Because action is about discrete matters, one's theory must be coherent with particular things (cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 1107 a30). This leads to applied ethics.

It is the ontological foundations which coordinate the universal principles with particular maxims or rules so that they correspond one with the other. Thence derives the continuing coherent linkage and unitary method which can lead to the solution of particular and specific affairs.

5. *Ontology provides ethics with its primary method of moral enquiry.* An integrating world-view undergirds the method in the process of thought and practice; in this way ontology can influence directly moral enquiry and the resulting positions. Kant's philosophy is the best example. He held that in practical reason "Denn in der gegenwartigen werden wir von Grundsätzen anfangend zu Begriffen und von diesen allererst womöglich zu den Sinnen gehen."⁸ This reflects Kant's view of philosophy as superior to reason and will which allows morality to transcend the influence of experience. He began his ethics positing universal legislation by the categorical imperative. This endowed his ethics with transcendence, obligation, form and autonomy. This method of beginning from an application of pure reason and eliminating experience was determined by his metaphysics.

Another distinguished argument regarding ontology and morals is found in A. MacIntyre, *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (1990). He sees the three different ontologies (encyclopedia, genealogy and tradition) leading to three fundamentally rival opinions in moral research: Thomas's teleological tradition, the encyclopaedist's optimism regarding the progress of reason and Nietzsche's genealogy destroying the idols of traditional morals and reason. The different perspectives and methods lead to contrary or perhaps complementary solutions. This discrepancy in method is engendered from differences in views concerning substance. Various theories surely have their own methods of ethical enquiry and goals, which may lead to conflict. One of the tasks of ethics is to provide a method for comparing and making choices in moral problems.

The actions chosen by Socrates reflect a universal norm or principle; yet among those principles one must still consider which one has the greater importance -- the most important one being the first principle.

What does it mean to say that some actions are right, good or moral? The criteria for measuring them comes from principles at a deeper level and various levels require various methods. For example, the experience level requires a method of descriptive analysis, the normative level requires speculation and a selective method, while the meta-level calls for a critical method. Anglo-American philosophers now look for a rational method of moral inference and judgement.

6. *Ontology provides ethical criticism.* One of the functions of philosophy is criticism and ontology engages in the criticism of being-itself, which surely includes criticism of the discipline of ethics. Without mentioning ancient theories, contemporary ethics, from G.E. Moore's to R.M. Hare's analytical criticism of moral languages, and MacIntyre's criticism of contemporary moral theories all proceed from ethics to ontological criticism, and all embody different world view ontologies.

The difference between the philosopher's and the common person's view of moral problems is that philosophical criticism does its best to elucidate the moral versions, to argue its truth, to apply logical analysis and demonstration, and to examine the pro-posed principles and the prevailing theory of morals in society. Criticism includes unveiling the origin and essence of morality, examining moral criteria and standards, and analyzing the ability to know moral phenomena, such as whether this is a matter of *a priori* intuition, faith or feeling? Criticism includes also discovery the logical character of the language of morals, moral thinking and the levels of ethics. To take the levels of ethics as an example, moral thinking, according to W. Frankena, includes describing the levels of experiment, norm, analysis and criticism or meta-ethics.⁹ Most of the criticisms of metaethics proceeded at the level of logic, epistemology and semantics, and have not yet engaged criticism at the level of ontology. For this reason metaethics can do nothing for the different value-orientations and the difference between different systems of ethics still cannot be settled by metaphysics (such as R. Hare's criticism of fascism). Ethical criticism includes: the nature and scope of moral enquiry, its tasks, goals, principles, levels and its relations to history, literature, anthropology and sociology.

7. *Ontology can provide the ultimate explanation of moral status in society.* To analyze and understand adequately moral status in society, we must connect a moral phenomena with its concrete status. This requires understanding the broad cultural background, which in turn requires establishing an ontology concerning social existence. This bases ethics on the actual historical, practical and scientific criticism of reason, which then may merge with concrete social affairs to become the stable bridge and actual goal for improving society and leading to human happiness.

In his distinguished work, *After Virtue*, A. MacIntyre proceeded to criticize deeply the contemporary situation of Western morals. He argues that our society privileges emotivism and liberal individualism, which leads society into crisis. The lack of common moral criteria leads people into moral conflict. "All moral judgements are nothing but expressions of preference, expressions of attitude or feeling."¹⁰ He criticizes emotivism's "lack of any ultimate criteria."¹¹ The overall cultural background with its philosophical foundations suggests "virtue", "telos" and "principles" as the way to resolve the crisis of morality and philosophy. In linking moral and social life the 1960s pointed out that conceptions of morals must be embodied in social life. The difference between styles of social life can be traced to their different moral conceptions.¹²

The fundamental roles played by ontology in ethics have been traced above. In fact, all the ethical theories have their own foundation, value-orientation and viewpoint on human life. If ethics is to play a greater role in human life, we must have a more rational system of moral philosophy. The process of choosing, transforming, criticizing and completing must be based on an adequate social history, a scientifically critical mind and theoretical coherence; it cannot do this without an

ontological base in social existence. Both J. Rawls' contract theory and G. Lukacs' labor-practice are constructions of such a social ontology.

With the development of society and the progress of science and technology, the new problems of morals appear one after another, and the old problems, since they concern the fundamental status of human existence, emerge again and again in human life. They remain for thousands of years with no loss of charm or fascination; they last but are renewed. All of those phenomena can be understood adequately and truly only by being embodied in the social relations and products, in culture and ideology. The readjustment of universal institutions and morality required by the new changes can achieve their ultimate explanation only if they are embodied in actual social life. Only thus can morals be founded on a broad and stable base of social existence.

Notes

1. E. Joos, *Lukacs's Last Autocriticism: the Ontology* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press, 1983), p. 42.
2. A. MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (South Bend, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1981).
3. Frank Thilly, *Introduction to Ethics* (New York: Scribner's, 1913), Chap. 1, par. 7.
4. J.P. Sartre, *Being and Nothingness*, trans. Hazel E. Barnes (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), pp. 795-797.
5. A. MacIntyre, *ibid.*
6. F. Brentano, *The Foundation and Construction of Ethics*, trans. E.H. Schneewind (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973), p. 4.
7. A. MacIntyre, *First Principles, Final Ends and Contemporary Philosophy Issues* (Milwaukee, Wisc.: Marquette University Press, 1990), p. 34.
8. I. Kant, *Kritik Der Praktischen Vernunft* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1974), par. 17.
9. W. Frankena, *Ethics* (Englewood Cliffs, NY: Prentice-Hall, 1973), chap. 1, par. 2.
10. MacIntyre, *After Virtue*, p. 12.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 33.
12. C.f. A. MacIntyre, *A Short History of Ethics* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), preface.

The Knowledge of Virtue and Moral Ontology

Cheng Weili

The knowledge of virtue is an important philosophical issue for Chinese neo-Confucianism. In this regard the Chinese public commonly makes a category mistake by treating the mind-nature problem in ancient Chinese philosophy in a way similar to the problem of cognition in Western philosophy.

In his book *The Guiding Principle of Chinese Philosophy*, Professor Zhang Dannian wrote that the knowledge of seeing and hearing is from perceptual experience, while the knowledge of virtue arises from intrinsic intuition. The knowledge of seeing and hearing relates to experienced objects, while the knowledge of virtue relates to everything.

In his book *The Guiding Principle of the Known History in Ancient Chinese Philosophy*, Professor Pan Fuen notes that Zhang Zai also distinguished between the knowledge of seeing and hearing, and that of virtue, relating the first to perceptual cognition and the other one to the cognition of reason. He recognizes that perceptual recognition has limitations, which cognition by reason overcomes.

Professor Xiao Jiefu and Li Jinquan, in their book *The History of Chinese Philosophy*, observe that Zhang Zai does not understand the link between perceptual knowledge and that of reason and cuts the bond between perception and reason. He insists that virtue is not according to perception, but can concern all things in the world. In his book *Ancient Chinese Philosophy and Development of Logic*, Professor Fong Qi sees Zhang Zai falling into idealism in his cognitive theory for failure to understand correctly the relations between perception and reason. He divides knowledge of seeing and hearing from that of virtue. Obviously, in their books, the difference between virtue and seeing and hearing is not only a distinction between homogeneous objects of cognition, but between heterogeneous perception and reason.

The concept of virtue belongs not only to the characteristic propositions of Chinese philosophy, but to western philosophy as well. It would be a mistake to think that the Chinese philosophical public did not pay attention to the study of the concept of virtue in Western philosophy, where it is a central problem in ethics and even for philosophy as a whole. This began with ancient Greek philosophy. Socrates traced the nature of virtue in the market place in Athens. He discussed with others whether virtue means some outstanding character of things, similar to "Arete" in Greek.

Later, Plato put forward the famous theory of the four virtues in Book Four of his *Republic*. He considered every social stratum in the state to have their special nature, character and capabilities. The ruler is good at organizing; his virtue is wisdom. The soldier is good at fighting; his virtue is bravery. The worker is good at enduring; his virtue is temperance.

In Aristotle's ethics the concept of virtue retained its traditional meaning. But it suggests also force and strength, because wicked and weak are synonymous. Aristotle considers the main meaning of virtue to be in the choice of the means.

Although Kant was aware of the tradition of Western philosophy he did not agree with Aristotle's notion of the mean because principles must be constant throughout time. For Aristotle virtue and wickedness differ in quantity, rather than quality. According to circumstances there is great difference between excess and deficiency, hence virtue seen as the mean would remain

indefinite. Instead, for Kant virtue is the highest goodness; it is the unity of virtue and happiness in the same person. In fact, Kant sees virtue as the mastery of practical reason so that by reason one decides one's own destiny and overcomes one's own loves, desires and motives. Virtue is the moral force of the human will for fulfilling one's duty. This duty, however, is a moral necessity of the human legislative will and is the source of all moral value. Only if an action derives from duty could it have moral value. Only when reason overcomes desire and impulse is duty complete and the people pleased and quiet. This is real happiness in moral life.

It is important that Kant constructs his theory of virtue upon the basis of a general and *a priori* moral law; and he accepts moral ontology. The basis of duty is in pure reason, not in human nature or external circumstance. Thus the concept of duty is linked to the priority of reason restraining one's will through the reasoned legislative function of moral law. Duty is an active necessity according to objective universal principles. In the final analysis, the necessity, restraint and compulsion of duty, its priority, objectivity and lofty dignity are all from law. It is on the basis of pure, universal, effective and *a priori* moral law, that duty can be necessary and compelling, and hence the fountainhead of all moral value.

Kant's real intention was to draft a pure philosophy or metaphysics; he was against experientialism, and against perception in ethics. His is a moral metaphysics which depends upon the demonstration of the purity and loftiness of morals and the seriousness and sacredness of duty. There is a famous sentence in Kant: "There are two things with which I am more and more surprised and respect in my heart: the sky densely covered with stars over my head and the moral law in my bosom." In Kant's heart the actions of reasonable persons must be the basis for moral law just as all phenomena constitute the basis for natural law.

The concept of virtue in Western philosophy reflects not only its cognitive theory, but also its theory of human nature and moral-philosophy. The knowledge of virtue and of seeing and hearing belong to different levels of knowledge. Virtue is not equal to reason purely and simply but contains also perceptual intuition. In ancient Chinese philosophy virtue belongs to human nature or moral philosophy.

One section of a book, copied on silk and exhumed in 1973 from the third Han grave in Changsha Hunan, is named virtue. This belongs to the Zisi school of thought and was written as early as Mencius. It provides very important information for the study of the eight Confucian schools after Confucius. It tells us:

After this, Confucius described virtue in his books *Luen Yu* and *Zhong Yong*.

In the history of Chinese philosophy Zhang Zai put forward the difference between the knowledge of virtue and of seeing and hearing. "The knowledge of seeing and hearing is from contact with matter, but not knowledge of virtue, which does not arise from seeing and hearing." In Zhang Zai's view, the knowledge of virtue is *a priori* moral knowledge, which in turn is according to reflection upon oneself and recognition of human nature, whereas the knowledge of seeing and hearing is from objective things. But, as there are matters which such knowledge could not see and hear, in order to attain complete knowledge about the ontological world persons must try their best to know the mind and nature, This brings about the knowledge of virtue. Mental abilities are the sign of the subject; it can recognize the law of world without seeing and hearing. Virtue is known by conscience, which is intuitive knowledge intrinsic to oneself. Conscience and open-mindedness are of the nature of sky and of earth; trying one's best one could know nature.

Here, mind is not only the power to recognize, but the moral power to transcend oneself. It is Zhang Zi's idea that open-mindedness can grow in the light. This is to learn and observe the Tao. It insists on intuition and elevates the subjective spirit as absolute substantial existence. Here, Zhang Zi joins the subjective thought of the Taoist school with the moral content of Confucianism. He turns the "mind" into knowledge of virtue and of seeing and hearing, insisting that the knowledge of virtue does not start from seeing and hearing. His purpose is to advocate that the self recognizes morals and decides on the subjective principle of human morality. He differentiates the mind-nature problem into problems of moral theory and of cognitive theory. It is very important that Zhang Zai's knowledge of virtue is through direct contact with ontology, for in the final analysis it is a perceptual transcending of oneself and observing the world substance. In fact, knowledge of virtue is self-recognition of human nature, as well as of sky and earth which is included in moral ontology.

The distinction of the knowledge of virtue from that of seeing and hearing aided and popularized Neo-Confucianism and the neo-Confucianism. When Cheng Yi and Cheng Hao accepted the difference between virtue and seeing and hearing, they attended to virtue and depreciated seeing and hearing, and hence were more moralistic than Zhang Zai.

Zhu Xi tried to unify virtue and seeing and hearing, so that in his moral knowledge his greater experiential content. He considers that Ge Wu Qion Li must start from seeing and hearing, but this contains Qion Li, not only pure perceptual experience. In Zhu Xi's view, persons know a truth only from ordinary seeing and hearing. But if one puts a lot of work into seeing and hearing, he could attain perfect understanding and get Li. Although Zhu Xi attached importance to experiential knowledge, but remained a moral priorist, not an experimentalist. His purpose is mainly to respect virtue.

Lu Jiuyuan, opposite to Zhu Xi is a moralist thorough and thorough. He considers the knowledge of virtue to lie intrinsic to a person's nature, and don't to need outward knowledge. He insists on supporting and controlling one's subjective spirit, intuition and introspection. Wang Yang-Ming did not negate all knowledge of seeing and hearing like Lu Jiuyuan, but he opposed seeking knowledge outwardly did Zhu Xi. Wang Yang-Ming considered intuitive knowledge to be virtue, and that there is no virtue without intuitive knowledge. All knowledge including seeing and hearing is intuitive, not only seeing and hearing. In Wang Yang-Ming's view, intuitive knowledge is knowledge of virtue and as substantial consciousness is the fountainhead of all knowledge. In fact, intuitive knowledge is a pure subjective spirit. It could not be gained from experiential knowledge, but is realized through perceptual experience.

Wang Yang-Ming considers the relation between virtue and seeing and hearing noumenon and function. If the knowledge of virtue were limited to seeing and hearing it would lack its substance; and if it began from seeing and hearing, it would become body without use and reality. Wang Yang-Ming bases his moral ontology on the concept of intuitive knowledge. In his words, intuitive knowledge is the distinction of right and wrong. It is the highest yardstick for judging right and wrong, the good and evil of all things. Only the political and moral things and wrong existence in this sense; to limit the right would be to hold that "there is no Li and nothing beyond mind."

Modern neo-Confucianism approves and propagates even more the knowledge of virtue and moral ontology. Xiong Shi-Li accepts the notion of affection in Bergson's vitalistic moral ontology. When he discussed intuitive knowledge with Feng You-Lan, he stated clearly: "why do you say that intuitive knowledge is a supposition, whereas it is true and real, and certain in appearance. It needs present intuition and affirmative." In Xiong Shi-Li's view, moral substance is not an object

to be recognized, but the subject which observes. Only knowledge of virtue is the way to observe substance. His "New Wei Shi Theory" is not separated from his mind-substance in the unity of noumenon and function. He considers, the moral substance to have no shape, to be peace and quiet, vigorous, complete, absolute and eternal. The human mind is the substance having these conditions; no-noumenon is no-function, departing from function is no-noumenon. Workmanship is function through which noumenon is revealed. Substance can be drawn from function. Human mind is the nature and kindheartedness.

As Xiong Shi-Li's legacy spread, Mou Zong-San propagated a neo-Confucianism moral ontology in clear philosophical languages. Mou Zong-San held that it was through conceptual analysis that Kant takes freedom as a basic supposition, but regard the possibility of proving human conscience through such analysis.

Because persons have intellectual intuition, we know that they have hold conscience; this is an open and wonderful real the free will is intuitive knowledge; this is, not only the basis of moral practice, but is also the source of subsistence. The moral substance proves its self-existence from action and the appearance of mind and kindheartedness. In practical moral action, we directly awaken the sincere and honest conscience. Therefore, the person is not only a limited but has intuitive knowledge of the infinite. The infinite moral mind is identical with the fate appealing in human nature. This is not only the basis of morals in the heart, but also the source of universal subsistence.

Modern neo-Confucianism then not only carries on the virtue tradition of Chinese philosophy, but also expresses Kant's rational content. This raises the virtue theory of Chinese and western philosophy to a new height and serves deep reflection with regard to the modernization of Chinese philosophy and culture.

Kant and Confucius: Aesthetic Awareness and Harmony

George F. McLean

There is a striking and potentially instructive parallel between the structure of Kant's three critiques and recent Chinese history. Kant's first critique focused on science and necessity, while his second critique focused on freedom. He had expected that this would be sufficient, but before that decade was out he came to the conclusion that a third critique, that of aesthetic judgment was necessary.

The tantalizing parallel in modern Chinese history is that in 1919 two Misters were invited into China, Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy. At that time it was thought that in order for them to enter, Confucius had to be ushered out. The history of the sub-sequent decades has raised serious question about this formula and now, there is a call to review the May 4th theory. Indeed it appears that the two misters in order to collaborate effectively in the process of modernization are in of Confucius with his sense of harmony as their gracious host.

To understand this one should note that at the beginning of the Enlightenment Descartes' norms of clarity and distinctness pointed modern philosophy toward science as knowledge that was fixed and necessary. However, human life and relationships transcend neat categorization: freedom is by definition not necessitated and love as self giving is essentially unique and spontaneous. If freedom and love are the highest of human realities then the search for what is required for them and hence made manifest through them promises to point through science but beyond it in an especially penetrating exploration into the heart of being itself.

Of special interest here is not only that after Descartes this search was taken up by Kant, but that in this process Kant came inexorably to an aesthetic context for reality and thought which is reminiscent of Confucius' notion of harmony. If the two be truly related in this, then an investigation of Kant may be a way of discovering both the central place in the thought of Confucius for modern notions of freedom and a special contribution of the Confucian culture and its peoples in the modern world.

Moreover, it has been claimed often times that Confucius' notion of harmony stabilized life at the expense of creativity. It is important to see if this is true not so much historically as that is a question of the past, but in principle for that concerns the way in which the future can be constructed.

The paper will do this by following the sequence of Kant's *Critiques*:

(1) his construction of the universal and necessary laws of science and the role of the imagination therein;

(2) Kant's discovery of the reality of freedom as transcending the realm of necessity and universality;

(3) the requirement of for an aesthetic dimension, as found in both Kant and Confucius, in order both for science to be creative and for freedom to be real;

(4) the way in which some of these same insights can be found and/or grounded in the thought of Confucius.

The Critique of Pure Reason

Kant reasoned that since sense experience is always limited and partial, the universality and necessity of the laws of science must come from the human mind. Such *a priori* categories belong properly to the subject inasmuch as it is not material.

We are here at the essential turning point for the modern mind where Kant takes a definitive step in identifying the subject as more than a wayfarer in a given world to which one can but react. Rather, he shows the subject to be an active force engaged in the creation of even the empirical world in which one lives. The meaning or intelligible order of things is due not only to their creation according to a divine intellect, but also to the work of the human intellect and its categories. If, however, man is to have such a central role in the constitution of his world, then certain elements will be required, and this requirement itself will be their justification.

First there must be an imagination which can bring together the flow of disparate sensations. This plays a reproductive role which consists in the empirical and psychological activity by which it reproduces within the mind the amorphous data received from without according to the forms of space and time. This merely reproductive role is by no means sufficient, however, for, since the received data is amorphous, any mere reproduction would lack coherence and generate a chaotic world: "a blind play of representations less even than a dream".¹ Hence, the imagination must have also a productive dimension which enables the multiple empirical intuitions to achieve some unity. This is ruled by "the principle of the unity of apperception" (understanding or intellection), namely, "that all appearances without exception, must so enter the mind or be apprehended, that they conform to the unity of apperception."² This is done according to the abstract categories and concepts of the intellect, such as cause, substance and the like, which rule the work of the imagination at this level in accord with the principle of the unity of apperception.

Second, this process of association must have some foundation in order that the multiple sensations be related or even relatable one to another, and, hence, enter into the same unity of apperception. There must be some objective affinity of the multiple found in past experience -- an "affinity of appearances" -- in order for the reproductive or associative work of the imagination to be possible. However, this unity does not exist, as such, in past experiences. Rather, the unitive rule or principle of the reproductive activity of the imagination is its reproductive or transcendental work as "a spontaneous faculty not dependent upon empirical laws but rather constitutive of them and, hence, constitutive of empirical objects."³ That is, though the unity is not in the disparate phenomena, nevertheless they can be brought together by the imagination to form a unity only in certain particular manners if they are to be informed by the categories of the intellect.

Kant illustrates this by comparing the examples of perceiving a house and a boat receding downstream.⁴ The parts of the house can be intuited successively in any order (door-roof-stairs or stairs-door-roof), but my judgment must be of the house as having all of its parts simultaneously. Similarly, the boat is intuited successively as moving downstream; however, though I must judge its actual motion in that order, I could imagine the contrary. Hence, the imagination, in bringing together the many intuitions goes beyond the simple order of appearances and unifies phenomenal objects in an order to which concepts can be applied. "Objectivity is a product of cognition, not of apprehension,"⁵ for, though we can observe appearances in any sequence, they can be unified and, hence, thought only in certain orders as ruled by the categories of the mind.

In sum, it is the task of the reproductive imagination to bring together the multiple elements of sense intuition in some unity or order capable of being informed by a concept or category of the intellect with a view to making a judgment. On the part of the subject, the imagination here is

active, authentically one's own and creative. Ultimately, however, its work is not free, but necessitated by the categories or concepts as integral to the work of sciences which are characterized by necessity and universality.

How realistic is this talk about freedom? Do we really have the choice of which so much is said in the West? On the one hand, we are structured in a set of circumstances which circumscribe, develop and direct our actions. This is the actual experience of people which Marx and Hegel articulate when they note the importance of knowledge of the underlying pattern of necessity and make freedom consist in conforming thereto.

On the other hand, we learn also from our experience that we do have a special responsibility in this world to work with the circumstances of nature, to harness and channel these forces toward greater harmony and human goals. A flood which kills thousands is not an occasion for murdering more, but for mobilizing to protect as many as possible, for determining what flood control projects need to be instituted for the future, and even for learning how to so construct them so that they can generate electricity for power and irrigation for crops. All of this is properly the work of the human spirit which emerges therein. Similarly, in facing a trying day, I eat a larger breakfast rather than cut out part of my schedule; rather than ignoring the circumstances and laws of my physical being, I coordinate these and direct them for my human purposes.

This much can be said by pragmatism. But it leaves unclear whether man remains merely an instrument of physical progress and, hence, whether his powers remain a function of matter. This is where Kant takes a decisive step in his second *Critique*.

The Critique of Practical Reason and The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals

In the above terms the human mind remains merely an instrument of physical progress and a function of matter. In his second *Critique*, beyond pure reason's set of universal, necessary and ultimately material relations, Kant points to the reality of human responsibility in the realm of practical reason. If man is responsible then there is about him a distinctive level of reality irreducible to the laws of physical nature. This is the reality of freedom and spirit which characterizes and distinguishes the person.

In these terms he recasts the whole notion of law or moral rule. If freedom is not to be chaotic and randomly destructive, it must be ruled or under law; yet in order to be free the moral act must be autonomous. Hence, my maxim must be something which as a moral agent I -- and no other -- give to myself. I am free because I am the lawmaker.

But my exercise of this work cannot be arbitrary. If the moral order must be universal, then my maxim which I dictate must be fit to be also a universal law for all persons. On this basis freedom emerges in a clearer light. It is not merely self-centered whimsy in response to circumstantial stimuli; nor is it a despotic exercise of the power of the will or the clever self-serving eye of Plato's rogue. Rather, it is the highest reality in all creation; it is wise and caring power, open to all and bent upon realization of "the glorious ideal of a universal realm of ends-in-themselves"; in sum, it is free people living together in righteous harmony. This is what we are really about; it is the person's glory, as well as his or her burden.

This would appear to correspond to the deeper sense of Confucianism as understanding humans as bringing their life into harmony with other persons and in the concrete circumstances of everyday life. It is not massively programmatic, but one must underestimate the cumulative power which the Confucian sense of harmony and resonance can have when exercised creatively by the many persons with knowledge of their circumstances in an effort to provide for life in its

many modes, from family to farm to city. And because the exercise of freedom is a concrete and unique expression of the distinctive reality of its authors, it sees its task not as how to reduce these to abstractive and personally stifling universal laws, but how to enliven persons to engage actively in the multiple dimensions of their life.

Kant had a third step to take, for if the free person is sur-rounded by an alien and necessitarian universe, then one's freedom would be entrapped and entombed within the mind while action would be necessary and necessitated. If this is simply not so then the universe must not be alien to freedom. If there is to be room for human freedom in a cosmos in which man can make use of necessary laws, indeed if science is to contribute to the exercise of human freedom, then nature too must be understood as directed toward a goal and manifest throughout a teleology within which free human purpose can be integrated. In these terms, even in its necessary and universal laws, nature is no longer alien to freedom, but expresses divine freedom and is conciliable with human freedom. In principle the ontology provides the needed space.

But there remains the issue of how freedom is exercised, namely, what mediates it to the necessary and universal laws of science? This is the task of Kant's *Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment*,⁶ and it is here that the imagination reemerges to play its key integrating role in human life. From the point of view of the human person, the task is to explain how one can live in freedom with nature for which the first critique had discovered only laws of universality and necessity, that is, how can a free person relate to an order of nature and to structures of society in a way that is neither necessitated nor necessitating?

There is something similar here to the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In both, the work of the imagination in assembling the phenomena is not simply to register, but to produce the objective order. As in the first critique, the approach is not from a set of *a priori* principles which are clear all by themselves and used in order to bind the multiple phenomena into a unity. On the contrary, under the rule of unity, the imagination orders and reorders the multiple phenomena until they are ready to be informed by a unifying principle whose appropriateness emerges from the reordering carried out by the productive imagination.

In the first *Critique* the productive work was done in relation to the abstract and universal categories of the intellect and carried out under a law which dictated that phenomena must form a unity. The *Critique of Pure Reason* saw the work of the imagination in assembling the phenomena as not simply registering, but producing the objective order. The approach was not, however, from *a priori* principles which are clear all by themselves and are used to bind the multiple phenomena into a unity. On the contrary, in the first Critique, under the rule of unity, the imagination moves to order and reorder the multiple phenomena until they are ready to be informed by a unifying principle on the part of the intellect, the appropriateness of which emerges from the reordering carried out by the reproductive imagination.

Nevertheless, this reproductive work took place in relation to the abstract and universal categories of the intellect and was carried out under a law of unity which dictated that such phenomena as a house or a receding boat must form a unity -- which they could do only if assembled in a certain order. Hence, although it was a human product, the objective order was universal and necessary and the related sciences were valid both for all things and for all people.⁷

Here in "The Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment," the imagination has a similar task of constructing the object, but not in a manner necessitated by universal categories or concepts. In contrast, here the imagination, in working toward an integrating unity, is not confined by the necessitating structures of categories and concepts, but ranges freely over the full sweep of reality in all its dimensions to see whether and wherein relatedness and purposiveness or teleology can

emerge and the world and our personal and social life can achieve its meaning and value. Hence, in standing before a work of nature or of art, the imagination might focus upon light or form, sound or word, economic or interpersonal relations -- or, indeed, upon any combination of these in a natural environment or a society, whether encountered concretely or expressed in symbols.

Throughout all of this, the ordering and reordering by the imagination can bring about numberless unities. Unrestricted by any *a priori* categories, it can nevertheless integrate necessary dialectical patterns within its own free and therefore creative production and scientific universals within its unique concrete harmonies. More than merely evaluating all according to a set pattern in one's culture, it chooses the values and orders reality accordingly. This is properly creative work; it is the very constitution of the culture itself.

It is the productive rather than merely reproductive work of the human person as living in his or her physical world. Here, I use the possessive form advisedly. Without this capacity man would exist in the physical universe as another object, not only subject to its laws but restricted and possessed by them. He/she would be not a free citizen of the material world, but a mere function or servant. In his third Critique Kant unfolds how one can truly be master of his/her life in this world, not in an arbitrary and destructive manner, but precisely as creative artists bring being to new realization in ways which make possible new growth in freedom.

In the third Critique, the productive imagination constructs a true unity by bringing the elements into authentic harmony. This cannot be identified through reference to a category, because freedom then would be restricted within the laws of necessity of the first Critique, but must be recognizable by something free. That is, in order for the realm of human freedom to be extended to the whole of reality, this harmony must be able to be appreciated, not purely intellectually in relation to a concept⁸ (for then we would be reduced to the universal and necessary as in the first critique), but aesthetically, by the pleasure or displeasure of the free response it generates. It is our contemplation or reflection upon this which shows whether a proper and authentic ordering has or has not been achieved. What shows whether a proper and authentic ordering has or has not been achieved is a concept, the pleasure or displeasure, the elation at the beautiful and sublime or the disgust at the ugly and revolting, which flows from our contemplation or reflection.

One could miss the integrating character of this pleasure or displeasure and its related judgment of taste⁹ by looking at it ideologically, as simply a repetition of past tastes in order to promote stability. Or one might see it reductively as a merely interior and purely private matter at a level of consciousness available only to an elite class and related only to an esoteric band of reality. That would ignore the structure which Kant laid out at length in his first "Introduction" to his third Critique¹⁰ which he conceived not as merely juxtaposed to the first two Critiques of pure and practical reason, but as integrating both in a richer whole.

Developing the level of aesthetic sensitivity enables one to take into account ever greater dimensions of reality and creativity and to imagine responses which are more rich in purpose, more adapted to present circumstances and more creative in promise for the future. This is manifest in a good leader such as a Churchill or Roosevelt -- and, supereminently, in a Confucius or Christ. Their power to mobilize a people lies especially in their rare ability to assess the overall situation, to express it in a manner which rings true to the great variety of persons, and, thereby, to evoke appropriate and varied responses from each according to his or her capabilities. The danger is that the example of such genius will be reduced to formulae, become an ideology and exclude innovation. In reality, as personable, free and creative, and understood as the work of the aesthetic

judgment, their example is inclusive in content and application as well as in the new responses it continually evokes from others.

When aesthetic experiences are passed on as part of a tradition, they gradually constitute a culture. Some thinkers, such as William James and Jürgen Habermas,¹¹ fearing that attending to these free creations of a cultural tradition might distract from the concrete needs of the people, have urged a turn rather to the social sciences for social analysis and critique as a means for identifying pragmatic responses. But these point back to the necessary laws of the first *Critique*; in many countries now engaging in reforms, such "scientific" laws of history have come to be seen as having stifled creativity and paralyzed the populace.

Kant's third Critique points in another direction. Though it integrates scientifically universal and necessary social relations, it does not focus upon them, nor does it focus directly upon the beauty or ugliness of concrete relations, or even directly upon beauty or ugliness as things in themselves. Its focus is rather upon our contemplation of the integrating images of these which we imaginatively create, that is, our culture as manifesting the many facets of beauty and ugliness, actual and potential. In turn, we evaluate these in terms of the free and integrating response of pleasure or displeasure, the enjoyment or revulsion they generate most deeply within our whole person.

Confucius and the Aesthetic Sense of Harmony

Confucius probably would feel very comfortable with this if structured in terms of an appreciation or feeling of harmony. In this way, he could see freedom itself at the height of its sensibility, not merely as an instrument of a moral life, but as serving through the imagination as a lens or means for presenting the richness of reality in varied and intensified ways. Freedom, thus understood, is both spectroscopy and kaleidoscope of being. As spectroscopy it unfolds the full range of the possibilities of human freedom, so that all can be examined, evaluated and admired. As kaleidoscope, it continually works out the endless combinations and patterns of reality so that the beauty of each can be examined, reflected upon and chosen when desired. Freely, purposively and creatively, imagination weaves through reality focusing now upon certain dimensions, now reversing its flow, now making new connections and interrelations. In the process reality manifests not only scientific forms and their potential interrelations, but its power to evoke our free response of love and admiration or of hate and disgust.

In this manner freedom becomes at once the creative source, the manifestation, the evaluation and the arbiter of all that imaginatively we can propose. It is *goal*, namely to realize life as rational and free in this world; it is *creative source*, for with the imagination it unfolds the endless possibilities for human expression; it is *manifestation*, because it presents these to our consciousness in ways appropriate to our capabilities for knowledge of limited realities and relates these to the circumstances of our life; it is *criterion*, because its response manifests a possible mode of action to be variously desirable or not in terms of a total personal response of pleasure or displeasure, enjoyment or revulsion; and it is *arbiter*, because it provides the basis upon which our freedom chooses to affirm or reject, realize or avoid this way of self-realization. In this manner, freedom emerges as the dynamic center of our human existence.

There is much in the above which evokes the deep Confucian sense of the harmony and the role of the gentleman in unfolding its implications for daily life. This uncovers new significance in the thought of Confucius for the work of implementing in a mutually fruitful manner both science and democracy in our times. Looking to the aesthetic sense of harmony as a context for

uniting both ancient capabilities in agriculture with new powers of industrialization and for applying these to the work of freedom is a task, not only for an isolated individual, but for an entire people. Over time, a people develops its own specific sensibilities and through the ages forms a tradition and a culture, which is the humane capital for such a project. In this sense, one can look to the Confucian cultural heritage for its aesthetic sense of harmony as a way to carry forward the work of freedom in our day.

The Confucian sense of harmony is not a rationalist law whose unfolding would suggest an attempt to read all in an *a priori* and necessitarian manner. Its sense of life and progress is not that of a scientific view of history after the dialectic of Hegel and Marx. Rather, Confucianism is a way of understanding humans as bringing their lives together in relation to other persons and in the concrete circumstances of everyday life. In this sense, it is not massively programmatic like a rationalist scientific theory of history. This may be very much to the good, for it protects against efforts to define and delimit all beforehand, after the manner of an ideology.

Further, one must not underestimate the cumulative power which the Confucian sense of harmony and resonance can have when it brings together creatively the many persons with knowledge of their circumstances and in an effort to provide for life in its many modes. This extends from those farmers who know and love their land intimately and are committed to its rich potentialities (and analogously from all phases of productive economic life), to family members and villagers who love their kin to members of civil society who are willing to work ardently for the quality of life of their neighbors and nation. If the exercise of freedom is a concrete and unique expression of the distinctive reality of its authors, then the task is not how to define these by abstractive and personally stifling universal laws, but how to enliven all persons to engage actively in the multiple dimensions of their lives.

The Confucian attitude is of no less importance philosophically. For if harmony and resonance enable a more adapted and fruitful mode of made realization of being, then the identity and truth, dynamism and goodness of being are thereby manifest and pro-claimed. In this light, the laws of nature emerge, not as desiccated universals best read technically and negatively as prohibitions, but as rich and unfolding modes of being and actualization best read through an appreciation of the concrete harmony and beauty of their active development. This, rather than the details of etiquette, is the deeper Confucian sense of the gentleman and sage; it can be grasped and exercised only with a corresponding aesthetic, rather than merely pragmatic, sensibility.

Nor is this beyond people's experience. Few can carry out the precise process of conceptualization and definition required for the technical dialectics of Platonic and Aristotelian reasoning. But all share an overall sensibility to situations as pleasing and attractive or as generating unease or even revulsion. Inevitably, in earlier times, the aesthetic Confucian mode lacked in the technical precision which is now available regarding surface characteristics of physical phenomena. But, in its sense of harmony, it possessed the deep human sensibility and ability to take into account and integrate all aspects of its object. This is essential for the contemporary humanization of our technical capabilities for the physical and social mobilization of our world, namely, for Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy. If their presence be essential to modernization then Confucius has much to contribute as their gracious host enabling them to be truly at ease because truly creative for China.

Notes

1. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), A 112; cf. A 121.
2. *Ibid.*, A 121.
3. Donald W. Crawford, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory* (Madison: University of Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 87-90.
4. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A 192-93.
5. Crawford, pp. 83-84.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 37-200.
7. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), A112, 121, 192-193. Crawford, pp. 83-84, 87-90.
8. See Kant's development and solution to the autonomy of taste, *Critique of Judgment*, nn. 57-58, pp. 182-192, where he treats the need for a concept; Crawford, pp. 63-66.
9. See the paper of Wilhelm S. Wurzer "On the Art of Moral Imagination" in G. McLean, ed., *Moral Imagination and Character Development* (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992) for an elaboration of the essential notions of the beautiful, the sublime and taste in Kant's aesthetic theory.
10. Immanuel Kant, *First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment*, trans. J. Haden (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).
11. William James, *Pragmatism* (New York: Washington Square, 1963), Ch. I, pp. 3-40. For notes on the critical hermeneutics of J. Habermas see G. McLean, "Cultural Heritage, Social Critique and Future Construction" in *Culture, Human Rights and Peace in Central America*, R. Molina, T. Readdy and G. McLean, eds. (Washington: Council for Research in Values, 1988), Ch. I. Critical distance is an essential element and requires analysis by the social sciences of the historical social structures as a basis for liberation from determination and dependence upon unjust interests. The concrete psycho- and socio-pathology deriving from such dependencies and the corresponding steps toward liberation are the subject of the chapters by J. Loiacono and H. Ferrand de Piazza in *The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas*, G. McLean and O. Pegoraro, eds. (Washington: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1988), Chs. III and IV.

Ontology, Modernity and the Human Person

Ghislaine Florival

The Philosophical Issue

It is a well-known paradox of philosophy that its task is to know the world and recapture experience at the conceptual level, but that it can succeed in this project only by abandoning any singular viewpoint in order to situate itself at the level of the whole. As absolute knowing it transcends the world, but by so doing common opinion sees it as vain discourse, if not simply as losing touch with the world of lived experience. Is it not then of a different order than an "intrawordly understanding of the singular reality of things?"¹ Does it lose touch with the dynamism of life or, on the contrary, is it the only means of seizing life in its finitude? Naive daily life tries to conceal that finitude, because "seen as absolute creator God is not the same as the one who commands and saves."² If naive consciousness seeks security and certitude in metaphysical issues, it is reduced to language without content, to a purely anthropocentric form of its own desire of being.

Nevertheless, over the course of the centuries metaphysics induces us to take account of our central viewpoint, namely, our subjectivity. Critiquing the technological age which abandoned concern for authentic existence in the form of an objective omniscience of reason, hermeneutics wants to restore to existence meaning beyond that of wandering about in forgetfulness of its proper destiny.³

The Ontological Issue Regarding Being Human

The question of duality and/or unity as regards human beings is traditional in Western philosophy. In the Cartesian rationalist tradition man is interpreted according to a dualistic schema in which the human being is a subject, that is, a "thinking substance", linked with the body machine as an external organic reality. This rejects the traditional Thomistic hylemorphic scheme received from Aristotle which emphasizes the unity of the human being and sees the soul as the "form" of the human compound.⁴ The two traditions agree, nevertheless, in recognizing the priority of the soul or spirit with respect to the body or matter. Inversely, for contemporary positivistic determinism, the human is reduced to body or materiality so that man is but an object of nature.

The last works of Husserl and those of Merleau-Ponty have tried to rethink the unity of the human compound. For phenomenology and hermeneutics, the human person is not consciousness first of all, but effective existence in the concrete unity of being-at-the-world. The existing human being is a unity who lives through all its encounters with things, with others and with the world in general. Husserl has characterized the unity of consciousness by intentionality as the "tension of consciousness towards the world." It is constitutive of our openness toward the world in a temporal movement of memory and anticipation: The world is full of signification. Following Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty takes up the phenomenological thesis regarding "consciousness of" transforming it into "existence": existentially man is a relational being, or being-at-the-world. This mode of existing, which is proper to human, distinguishes them from other beings. The world is the horizon of existence or of openness to a lived whole. Thus, the world is not nature in the scientific sense

of a natural universe, but is rather the horizon of meaning: its is "habitat". As universe of meaning, the world is what we make ours by language and action. Concretely it is constituted by the whole of culture -- our traditions and our projects -- which manifest the destiny of our humanity. The scientific meaning of the term, nature, is a second concept built on the basis of being anchored in that reality.

Thus, phenomenology has put into question the conception of reason found in classical philosophical tradition, as a transcendental power or pure *a priori* endowed with a universal reach. This critique of classical reason does not concern its formal role (as logic), but its status with respect to the concrete understanding of effective, lived reality. In *La crise des sciences européennes* (1936), Husserl emphasized the circle of reason,⁵ that is, while necessary for the foundation of the "human sciences", reason sees itself also as being determined by those human sciences and by history. It is linked to the cultural evolution of humanity, just as it emerges in the intellectual process of every individual. But is it then able to retain the self-confidence of the logical certitudes which based objective character? If there is a circle, the understanding of reason must be enlarged and resituated with respect to a broader existential mode of understanding. This opens a pre-understanding of a world which is already there and makes sense for us as soon as we act or speak. That world, which Husserl calls "the life world" (*Lebenswelt*), is prior to any theoretical attitude. In this demonstrative, objectifying reason is no longer the only kind of meaning or the ultimate source of truth, but itself depends upon a "life" of meaning which is co-extensive with the unfolding of existence. It is on that, as the first instance, that the different forms of rationality: philosophic, scientific, aesthetic and even ethical are constituted.

In *Le visible et l'invisible*, Merleau-Ponty has shown firstly how existence is found in the actual reality of lived bodiliness (the lived body or the "I exist") and secondly how it itself is but the exemplary mode of the ontological anchoring of being as ontological differentiation, texture or meaning.

Let us try here to analyse the successive approaches: 1. bodiliness and 2. the ontological difference.

Bodiliness

In the introduction to *Phénoménologie de la perception*, published in 1945, Merleau-Ponty describes the nature of phenomenology as a philosophy of essences (*eidos*) based upon a consciousness rooted in the facticity of existence. The goal of the philosopher is to reread Husserlian intentionality, no longer as a transcendental subjectivity linking the subject with the object as consciousness "of" something, but by returning the existing being in its effective openness to the world and defining one's own existence as "being-at-the-world". From this point of view Merleau-Ponty underlines the character of our embodied situation. To perceive what is manifest in the intuited presence of the object and to catch its meaning is to give rise to the phenomenon as a meaningful event, to catch the phenomenon in its ontological emergence. Reversing the method of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty privileges "reduction" with respect to intentionality, which is still a manifestation of consciousness. For Husserl reduction was only an epistemological method by virtue of which he placed the metaphysical objectivity of the world "in parenthesis", in order the better to perceive the conditions of the consciousness of something. That is the noematic side or object *for* consciousness, rather than the noetic side or subject as creator of meaning directed at the object as meaningful for consciousness.

"Reduction" for Merleau-Ponty is an ontological method inasmuch as it enables one to see the being of existence as "being-at-the-world". It gives the very act of seeing our being-at-the-world, the phenomenality of the phenomenon of existence or openness to the world. At the same time it enables one to see the world as the permanent horizon of our presence to things and to others; it grasps our point of view as the center around which things receive their meaning and orient themselves with respect to each other. Things appear under diverse profiles and organize themselves according to the vision which constitutes them as they separate from the whole in the process of appearing. The subject exists for him or herself only while overcoming himself according to the temporal character of constituting oneself. Thus, on the side of the perceived (noematic) object as well as on the subjective (noetic) side, signifying always is open on the life-world. As temporal perception is borne by its own negativity, others enable us to discover that we transcend our situation: we see them as seeing us. Thus vision is by principle reversible and narcissistic. One's own body or bodiliness, that is our relational character articulated with the world, constitutes our lived, effective existence. The body is the basis of the differentiation from which the world derives its meaning.

As interpretative method, reduction enables one to see the intentional threads linking existing beings to the world as so many ties connecting the subject with its world. Thus, through perception the body as the point of the senses or sense organs is not only the central viewpoint, but also the space-making dimension which seizes things with respect to each other and articulates them in depth in the field of space-time. Based upon the world as the total horizon they understand things as dispersed from the here to there. In this sense, my body opens space and time while depending upon other things in order to orientate its motor capacity. By generating space it is able to move in a field of perception which has sense and orientation. The differentiation of the five senses is itself the result of an originary differentiation: one's proper body anticipates some meaning as regards the other: vision encroaches upon the sense of touch, in a certain way hearing is a mode of seeing, touching is also vision, and so on. Intersecting with one another, the senses slip from the concrete towards the abstract. As a result they see a problem, hear or grasp a question and manifest participation of the field of perception through metaphoric expressions.

The Difference

The phenomenological analysis of perception is so important because it lead us to the institution of a new ontology. Merleau-Ponty situates the lived body as both a feeling-being and as affected; it is at once both active and passive. The experience of the hand touching and touched, which at the same time wants to feel itself in the very act of being affected by itself, reveals a reflexing circularity which is always failing and incomplete. That discovery orients all of Merleau-Ponty's *Le Visible et l'invisible*. In a way this incomplete posthumous world (1964) gives witness to an ontology which is always ensnared in its own teleological transcendence.

If the perceptive body is a differentiating opening of the senses, it is also their reflected and reflecting pole: the fact that things are appearing makes it an embodied body, located in their regard. *A fortiori*, this situation of embodiment unveils itself in the openness of the body as expression. By gesture and word, the body unfolds a field of meanings. After the fashion of the cycle of feeling and being affected which constitutes the perceptive reflection of things upon the perceiving body, the lived bodiliness of the other and of others reflects itself upon the speaking subject as figure upon the background of the world. At the level of affective perception, by intropathy the body is already living from its very center the behavior of the other by a kind of

connivance which interweaves my body with his or hers and reciprocally. It is as if the bodies understood each other, without succeeding completely in doing so. The other is always irreducible to my constitution, as I am for myself in the impossible narcissistic reflection of the signifying I. In the same way that the word of the other extends my gesture and inhabits my expression, the expressive meaning escapes even while itself making sense. Visible because invisible, it leaves in its very presence. This is also the way temporality fills itself with nothingness in going ahead, while remaining open to a new act of signifying.

Thus an interrelation is formed which consists in a common belonging to the same sense and the same world. My perceptible gesture signifies my expressed word, and conversely. The expressive meaning always goes ahead of itself with respect to what remains unsaid in the expression, displacing the actuality of what is signified without exhausting its meaning. What is expressed in language always turns over upon itself in order to evoke the perpetual motion of a meaning whose sense it can never totally realize. In actuality the word is both voice and expression both for the one who utters it and for the one who listens: it listens to itself, as if the expressive body differentiated itself from itself in each of its expressions. Just as perception was both feeling and being affected, it is both expressive voice and phenomenon: the speaking subject constitutes a concrete unceasing movement of perceptibility regarding the sense present in language. Thereby the three meanings of the word "sense": the perceptive sense, orientation of sense and meaning, all meet each other as reversibly concrete and abstract. The lived meanings of the body meet each other in the space from me towards the other in intropathy and in language expression.

At this level of understanding through gesture and language, one's expressiveness opens to perception by the other. Here we can apprehend the internal affective interplay of encounter. As the differentiating dimension of one's own body, perception manifests itself as at once both gesture and word -- the gesture again taking up the word. In receiving my gesture, the other is actively assumed in it and speaks it in his own way. In the interchange of discourse which is always transcended, the perceptible sense unfolds itself in symbolic terms, thus opening the invisible depth of what is perceived in language. But the voice makes itself word addressed to somebody so that at another level we find once again the movement of differentiation: language achieves a visible form through listening or the material form of writing and differentiates itself as the invisible form of sense.

Thus, the perceiving body is at the same time active and passive, both being-affected and feeling itself in the differentiation which links one existing being to another through intropathy and the mediation of language. This originary perceptive and affective dimensional openness is an awakening which characterizes every encounter or actual communication.

That ever present distance, differentiating the touching-touched or the perceptive sense and the perceptual with respect to the expressive sense which is expressed in language, constitutes the reversibility from the concrete to the abstract and inversely. This distance points to a measure or foundation of sense which is always at work and exceeds itself in all perceptive moments. Lived as differentiating between feeling and being affected, the perception expressed interrelationally in language constitutes that eminent "difference" which creates the dimensionality or the living interrelation. In its own overcoming this is at once concrete and intelligible. Merleau-Ponty calls this the "flesh of the world".

The body is a privileged form of this "flesh" as it feels itself feeling in the expressive reversibility which language, while separating from the speaking subject, formulates objectively. But the structure of distance lived by the body is differentiation as such. This opening upon sense at all its levels belongs to a speaking subject, whose expressions refer to others and who finds him

or herself always already engaged in the realm of culture. It is from the milieu of sense that the possibility of speaking one to another arises, that the texture of the effective dialogue is constituted and that the differentiated poles of discourse become articulated in the power of each person to take the position of one subject facing another subject in a reciprocal creation of a common feeling and speaking.

Toward a New Ontology: The Being of Differentiation

The task of phenomenology is to unveil the mysteries of world and of reason: it aims at bringing to expression the things themselves from the bottom of their silence.⁶ Philosophy no longer poses itself as absolute onlooker before a pure object: the position of the *cosmotheoros* before the Great object. It is no longer absolute subject, but recognizes that lack with respect to being which is original and perpetually proper to the "there is". We have thus to learn how to see, and "how the eye is listening".⁷ "We question our experience, precisely in order to know how it opens us to what is not us".⁸ In perception Merleau-Ponty discovers the very annulment of transcendental subjectivity: perception is rather the opening of sense and of world. It is the event: "There is": above all it is the presense behind every thematized experience. As Erwin Strauss says, it is "sense of the senses", giving the capacity to understand the communication of feeling in such a way that "every sense is a world open toward the others, making with them one single Being." There is an encroachment of one profile upon the other, of the visible upon the invisible, in the sense where the depth dimension or horizon wraps itself about what presents itself to be seen and institutes the reversibility of the visible and the invisible. Perception is distance, transcendence, the insuperable overcoming of absence in presence. In principle, to see is to relate the visible to the invisible of the sense which presents itself to be seen. To be visible is to appear or to make absence emerge in presence. Distance is transcendence in the immanence of appearing. The Reversibility of the visible and the invisible is thus the very principle of experience.

We can see only because from that visible world of bodiliness we are susceptible of being seen -- the same "flesh" as the world. We saw how the experience of the reversibility of feeling and the felt body prevents the total reflection of the touched hand which in the same act aims at feeling itself and being touched. Similarly, the reflexivity of the body as existing, that is, as always away from itself in the transcendence of the world, reflects the originary experience of the world in its ontological dimension. Depth is precisely that invisible which founds that differentiation of sense which is always overcome: the "flesh" of the world. "It is by the flesh of the world that it is possible at last to understand . . . that perceived entity which my body is."

The Encounter with Others

Phenomenology is not simply an anthropology of the encounter of others, even if through language as lived intercommunication experience thematizes itself. However, there is no constitution of the other; the other is taken in that signifying openness of the world which gives it to me as to be understood in the articulation of desire. Thus, recognizing the other occurs in encounter according to an initial and initiatory reversibility.

The other appears to me in his otherness, thanks to the desire which is born from encounter. He or she opens in the subject a temporal distance of objective differentiation, subtended by the lived, affected interrelation. Desire is intrinsically "flesh" in the sense of differentiating distance, which bodiliness, as at once concrete and expressive, lives as the sign of its own overcoming. This

is because desire embodies the reflexive movement of narcissistic bodiliness in search of itself in the *alterego*. That is, in the ever vanishing promise of a fully realized reflexivity.

But whence does the intensity of desire arise? Does it belong to the language of the other, which opens the presence that living bodiliness attempts to grasp in its actual lived totality. Or does it belong more radically to the historical existential, that is, to the "passing" (*Gewesen*) of the period between birth and death?⁹

Desire gives rise at the same time to both directions of sense. On the one hand, the values which are to come appeal to the authentic liberty of an existing being understanding itself in the temporal totality of its "having to be". On the other hand, desire gives rise to the values of the past, as the temporal retaking of what originally was lived affectively. But whatever may be its affective modalities, desire aims at realizing itself in a hope of which the other(s) implicitly hold the secret, for others bear conditioning differences which give sense.

But the other appears in the sense way that every meaning appears in a cultural whole. The whole ensures his or her presence, while the presence of the other appeals to desire. This is not only in the cultural dimension, for it appeals to the dimension of desire, rather than to its effects which are the phenomena in the cultural world. As notes Levinas, because encounter concerns another in face-to-face expression, the other "is neither a cultural meaning nor a simple datum, but is primordially "sense".¹⁰ He does not come from the horizontal meaning of the world of perception, but is "visitation" out of context; "his manifestation is a surplus". He is a first word in the very openness of the face, an absolutely differentiating trace which announces reception of an "absolutely" other.

The "epiphany" of the face is not a phenomenon, but bespeaks the authentic existing being in its very occurrence. It expresses the sense of being, its invisibility in the trace of the expression. Thus the other invites me to more than myself; it urges me to recognize in him or her the infinite gift of being and draws me to affirm his or her excellence.

The relation with the other is reciprocal. In every relation, even when it directly concerns things or symbols, eventually it is the other who is made present to us. Every one is at the life horizon of all the others so that cultural groups constitute themselves and those groups meet and influence each other. On the basis of that interrelational support of sense we can progressively appropriate universe of cultural meanings and build a proper truth of existence.

This is all the more true when we have to do with the affective and sexed dimension of our situation, that is to say, with our singular manner of living the human condition. The sexed character of our particular constitution, what makes us man or woman, determines the particular and differentiated mode according to which we inhabit the cultural world, and according to which, consequently, we take part in sense life. This cultural world organizes itself according to a polarity, male and female, which is quite original and not at all reduced to the set of differences of the biological order. That polarity effects the existing human being in its quality as a personal subject. Thus, the fact of being man or woman is not a simple accidental determination added to a human essence which is defined by universal features, as in classical rationalism. The human being realizes humanity in the singularity of a life which is proper to him or her as a personal subject. Subjectivity can be understood only as intrinsically affected by the reciprocal constitution of the poles of man and woman. That means that the personal truth which everyone is called to discover and to build in his life as the sense of his or her existence constitutes itself not under the direction of a unilateral, disembodied reason, but precisely in the reciprocal exchange of the approaches of reason proper to man and woman. The truth of existence is found only within the relation of the mutual understanding or interweaving in which those two polarities interchange with each other;

existential truth is authentic only in reciprocal constitution. Furthermore, every approach to truth, be it existential, practical, ethical, spiritual or even theoretical, is basically effected from that originary differentiation which institutes the objective relation of the poles, one by the other, man and woman, of human existence as sexed "difference".

Recognizing Cultures

Recognizing cultural difference is closely related to our being in common, which differentiates itself according to generations and places. What are the conditions of this encounter? By the term *horizon* Husserl designates the openness of meaning which makes possible unification in a single totality of all the profiles constituting the appearance of what is given perceptually. By the expression *horizon of the horizons* he designates the unity of understanding of the whole of the beings. This unity is not effective, but is implied in the sense of the life world which always is already there as a primordial donation. In the concrete the experience of this horizon is the condition of possibility of experience as such. It is the field of possibilities which gives meaning to our present experiences in our intercourse with things and people. Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty underline the fact that the world becomes a universal frame for all experiences only in as much as it is for a being already there who explains him or herself with others. Things pertain to the world because I seize them as possible means for the realization of my possibilities. In this sense the world is the horizon of my possibilities and thus the measure of the process of temporalization, rather than the pole of a concrete universality. There is then no life world as a universal basis, but a *plurality* of life worlds, "each one of which contains a component which cannot be seized." That component is the mystery of the world, which, as a whole, embraces and penetrates all historical worlds; this mystery never gives itself as present in the flesh, but always as that which has to be projected from the present world. Thus primitive cultures, for example, are worlds which have the form of myth because we interpret them from our present world.

If so, does the philosophy of Husserl itself fall once again into the perspective of an universal rationality which precisely he had wanted to avoid? Must we believe that such an attitude toward universality is immanent to Western rationality, which tries always to understand and dominate everything?

Conversely, Gadamer seizes in the dimension of horizon "a fusion of horizons", in as much as they delimit each other in the historical repetition and overcoming of their reciprocal interpretations. This is no longer a unitary ideal, underlying universality and subtending its forms, but the reversibility of singular cultural structures which constitute the difference and the sense of history. Thus, every culture measures itself with respect to the horizon of all the others, reflecting itself in them as singular, autonomous expressions.

Conclusion

We have tried to reflect on the sense of a philosophy which is not based on a universality of transcendental reason, but meets the event of existing beings as being-at-the-world. The ontology of M. Merleau-Ponty has helped us to understand the dimension of reversibility; this exceeds the sensible as "sense or differentiation" and "flesh" of the world. It is along that axis of "vertical Being", the sense of sense, that the human experience of bodiliness reveals itself to us. Bodiliness itself is already taken as cultural interrelation, and more originally as arising out of a personal appropriation in the sexed difference.

This contribution of a phenomenology open to the hermeneutics of meaning is articulated in a new ontology which understands Being as "difference which makes sense". That new ontology invites us to live a proper existence as "exist" or event of presence.

Notes

1. Patocka, *Liberté et sacrifice* (Grenoble: Millon, 1990), pp. 14f.
2. *Idem.*, p. 23.
3. M. Heidegger, "La question de la technique", in *Essais et conférences* (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), pp. 9-48.
4. This remains the position of F. Van Steenberghen (Louvain) in his *Anthropologie philosophique* (Montréal, 1990).
5. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Bulletin de Psychologie* (Cours de Sorbonne, 1964), pp. 747f.
6. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible* (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 18.
7. H. Maldiney, "Chair et verbe dans la philosophie de M. Merleau-Ponty", *M. Merleau-Ponty, le psychique et le corporel* (Paris: Aubier, 1988), p. 59.
8. M. Merleau-Ponty, *op.cit.*, p. 211.
9. M. Heidegger, *L'être et le temps* (Paris: Gallimard, 1989), ch. 72.
10. E. Levinas, *Humanisme de l'autre homme* (Fatamorgana, 1992), p. 47.