Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change
Series III, Asian Philosophical Studies, Volume 15

Civil Society in a Chinese Context

Chinese Philosophical Studies, VII

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Gibbons Hall B-20
620 Michigan Avenue, NE
Washington, D.C. 20064

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication

Civil society in a Chinese context / edited by Manuel B Dy, Jr., Wang Miaoyang, Yu Xianmeng.
p.cm. — (Cultural heritage and contemporary change . Series III. Asia, vol. 15)
Includes bibliographies and index.
1. Civil society. 2. Civil society—China.
I. Dy, Manuel B. II. Wang, Miaoyang. III. Yu, Xuanmeng. IV. Council for Research in Values and Philosophy. V. Series.
JC338.C567 1996 96-20810
322.4’0951—dc20 CIP

ISBN 1-56518-083-6 & 1-56518-084-4 (pbk.)

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Introduction

George F. McLean

There can be little doubt that this transition of the millennia is a time of deep change, so deep indeed that the greatest danger may lie in not appreciating its depth and hence in not responding creatively.

For the 400 hundred years since the Enlightenment we have attempted to achieve its ideals of personal and social freedom by means of technical reason focused upon gaining control of the forces of the universe. Indeed, we have made amazing progress in ameliorating the external conditions of life and the practice of internal medicine. Moreover, this has been extrapolated as well to the social order as many facets of human life and interaction have been addressed.

However, like atomic energy, technical reason is a powerful tool fully capable of dominating those who would employ it, especially when they do so without the necessary critical reserve. This can be seen in the history of philosophy in modern times. Repeatedly, calls for attention to the more personal dimensions of human life, such as those made by Pascal and Kierkegaard, have been overridden by even more rigorously articulated rational systems. These took two major directions: one, based exclusively upon sense data and leading through the Anglo-Saxon tradition to recent positivism and analytic reason, emphasized the individual; the other, following the path of the intellect from Descartes through Kant to Hegel and Marx, emphasized the social unit. Both were characterized by a search for clarity which turned attention away from the uniqueness of the creative exercise of human freedom and toward social manipulation and engineering.

In their ultimate denouement, these two ideologies came into direct conflict in the Cold War between individualist capitalism and socialist communism. The collapse of the latter brings us, if not to the end of history, at least to the end of the period of rationalist Enlightenment. In the face of the present deep and pervasive changes in the very way we understand, it can rightly be feared that the extent of the change will not be appreciated, and that human effort will focus upon an even more radical attempt to reinforce individualism. This would result, on the one hand, in a renewed assault upon the exercise of the social character of the person, and on the other hand, in an increasing polarization between an ever more pervasive and absolute state, on the one hand, and an increasingly disenfranchised individual.

In this situation there is need to rediscover and newly articulate what in times past has been termed "civil society". Like all things in an ideology, however, this was understood too superficially. Hence, it was conceived differently, on the one hand, by Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson in the more individualist terms of the Scottish tradition and, on the other hand, by Hegel and Marx in the intellectualist and integrative continental tradition. In present times marked by the collapse of Communism, some in the individualist-capitalist regions see the realization of civil society as a way of building a bourgeois society. In other circles, shaped by neo-Marxism, the effort is seen to be basically that of grafting a new individualism upon the socialist trunk: enriching Habermas by Rawls, in the concluding formula of Cohen and Arato's.

If, however, the present changes are deeper and more pervasive, this will not suffice. If what is being questioned is not only the totalitarian offshoots of a lopsided emphasis upon either the social or the individual, but the technical, enlightenment rationality which had polarized each of these for exclusive attention, then what is at stake is not the validity, but the sufficiency of technical

reason developed in the Enlightenment and applied in an exclusionary and reductivist manner throughout the whole modern period.

The incisive paper of Lu Xiaohe on Vico makes this clear. She notes how at the same point in time Bacon smashed all the "idols", Descartes subjected all to doubt, and Locke suggested erasing the entire content of the mind in order to obtain a hypothetical blank tablet. All this was done with a view to establishing a method for generating an aseptic laboratory for clear, distinct and fully manipulable ideas based exclusively on either sense experience or on the isolated self.

Jean-Baptiste Vico wrote clearly about the threats to humanity which this entailed. Whereas the resulting overriding concern of modern times has been to submit all to a controlling objective reason, Vico pointed out what could not be attended to in these terms. Objectivity held one to the surface of things closing off their interior nature; in human affairs it closed off the subjectivity in terms of which freedom is lived and hence subjected all to manipulation from without. This constitutes a new barbarism of the intellect which first ignores and then trammels upon imagination and emotion, common sense and prudence, and the traditions of rhetoric in founding and maintaining social life. In this light one can understand much more penetratingly the character of the present crisis and the direction in which it points.

This is not to abandon the great achievements of modern times. The sense of the individual person as an end rather than as a means, the recognition of the human dignity and rights of the person in every society and its proclamation in comprehensive world treaties, the understanding of the way in which labor is not only a service to the material order but a mode of building human dignity, the improvement of agriculture, the construction of cities and industries--all these are brilliant achievements which must be promoted.

But there is need to look again to our own humanity and its place in the world in which we live. If done only in the same Enlightenment terms, this, of course, will not render new insight though rationalism made important contributions which must be retained, it did so in a manner that created deep problems which cannot be addressed in its terms alone. This was dramatically illustrated by the collapse of Marxism not only as a political theory for the vast Soviet Empire, but also as a project of world revolution for both hemispheres.. There is need to follow the suggestion of Vico to broaden our sense of the human person in order to take new account of reason and imagination, of body and spirit, of will and affectivity, and of the person as both individual and social. All of this opens the way to a life truly liberated from servitude not only to dictatorial powers from without, but to reductionist self-understanding from within.

This profound questioning of social life at this change of millennia could be expressed by the term "postmodern", provided this be taken not as the more skeptical program of some philosophers still preoccupied with power. What is really needed is a move beyond the narrow confines of the rationalism which has characterized modern times, to what increasingly is expressed as a "global" vision.

The challenge of profound social transformation at this turn of the millennia is truly global in scope for it goes to the root of what human beings properly and distinctively are as free beings and of how this can be lived distinctively in society by each people according to its culture.

It is then with freedom that we must begin. Hence chapter I begins with a phenomenology of civil society as encountered in ancient Greece. There early philosophical reflection on social life uncovered its basic element to be governance expressed as *arché*. This pointed to what is proper to the exercise of freedom, namely, that of being the source of determination which is not necessitated by anything prior or external.

Freedom, moreover, is itself a multi-leveled notion, moving upward from the ability to choose between and to possess external objects, to the ability to will as one ought, and finally to the ability to construct one's personal and community life. The three are not mutually exclusive, but ought to be cumulative. To impede this unfolding generates a major crisis; this would appear to be the root cause of the present challenge and to indicate what is needed in response. As modern rationalism undermined the third level of freedom, society was left either to the unbridled quest for possession (freedom at the first level), or to the determination of freedom by a "scientific" view of history (freedom at the second level).

It is necessary then to develop a more adequate sense of human freedom and creativity as it unfolds into social life. Chapter I looks to aesthetic reason for this and develops in those terms the meaning of culture and its normative force.

The chapter of Professor Que on the thought of Hannah Arendt focuses incisively upon freedom as foundational to civil society. Her analysis of revolutions and their frustrations manifests the need not to focus merely upon liberation from oppression, which could be accomplished simply by a change of regimes. Nor should the focus be upon resolving the social problem which concerns irresolvable physical human imperatives where freedom is not at play, nor upon individual human rights which constitute only minimal standards for social relations.

Rather the efforts of revolutions should concentrate upon the realization and exercise of freedom by establishing the conditions and structures for responsible participation in determining the direction of social life. Thus, Arendt looks upon the writing of the American constitution not as an exercise in delimiting what citizens and society can and cannot do, but rather as an act of voluntary association binding people not to the state, but to each other. This constitutes the public space in which one finds not liberation, but the exercise of freedom as participation in public affairs.

Her critique of the French revolution was that it soon substituted social and economic projects for the major project of constituting a free society. Her critique of the American revolution was that it substituted issues of representation and the protection of individual rights for concern with realizing freedom. In this way America has continued to react against archaic feudal oppression rather than paying sufficient attention to the challenge of constructing the new participatory realm of active freedom. It began, but it did not follow through; it seized the initiative (*archein*), but did not manage its continued exercise (*prattein*).

In this context, Que describes Arendt's notion of the system of councils which emerged spontaneously in the midst of various revolutions. These were organized locally as occupational or other groups and took active responsibility for social life in their area. Some sent representatives to higher councils where broader issues were treated. This formed a pyramid whose genius was to engage people with their peers so that responsibility and governance emerged from below, rather descending from above.

Que shows the contradictions and impracticalities which can emerge, but these, it would seem, result from placing political responsibility upon the councils. As described, the councils constitute not a political structure responsible for the accumulation and exercise of power, but a pattern of the proximate and diversified exercise of social responsibility tailored precisely according to the pattern of solidarities emerging from engagement in life. In other words, what is needed is a distinction between the sphere of civil society and the political sphere.

This done, Arendt's incisive description of the council system constitutes a major contribution to the theory of civil society and illustrates the way in which this transforms a democratic society from being one of rule over people into being action in concert by a people exercising its freedom

as a process of self responsibility. In this consists the real transformation from a feudal to a democratic society.

In the life of a community of free persons this provides the true components of civil society, namely, governance of, by and for the community. Communities, however, are complex in form; the ways in which people unite in view of shared goals assume myriad forms from ecology to religion, from a neighborhood to a global horizon, from labor unions to educational associations--all are forms of association in the exercise of human freedom.

The chapter of Angelli Tugado takes up the crucial issue of how the individuality of persons and the distinctiveness of groups is founded and can be recognized. Professor Antonette Palma-Angeles expands this vision beyond the distinctiveness of the person and group to cultures as creations of the community, thereby introducing not only a synchronic, but a diachronic dimension. In these terms she shows how the hermeneutics of H.-G. Gadamer enriches the abstract and objective method of modern science with attention to human subjectivity. This creates not only an integrated culture, but a cultural tradition. It is into this that we are born and by this that we are borne along, like the wind in one's sails, without whose force and direction all is lifeless and devoid of meaning.

This is particularly significant for the cooperative construction of human social structures which reflect and promote human meaning and dignity, and for its history in our times. It appears especially in the realization of civil society, which is constituted precisely by the cooperative action of people in their various solidarities. While each person enters and/or acts freely, it is their shared understanding and values which provide among the members of a particular group the basis for the development of a shared response to shared goals and a way to enter into subsidiary relations with yet other groups in a way that constitutes a cohesive society.

The chapter of Professor Zhou Changzhong searches the history of the philosophy of science for clues to the place of civil society in Chinese cultural history. If civil society gives new attention to subjectivity, this suggests that in the pattern of Chinese cultural history its roots are not in modernization as a search for scientific objectivity, but rather both in the more recent emphasis upon personal initiative in the market and other facets of life and in a deeper sounding of the potential resources of Chinese classical roots, for example, for the pervasive Confucian sense of harmony.

Part II is a search for the principles by which a civil society can develop and live. Professor Wang situates this issue especially in the urban environment. He sees the traditional values and structures as more operative in the countryside, whereas in the burgeoning urban context there is special need for new structures and value patterns to guide the flow of life.

Professor Wang deftly distinguishes two levels of morality and even of civilization, one material and the other spiritual; he inspects both carefully and impartially. In the former he locates the development of market dynamisms which he examines for their implications for the (moral) quality of human life. Beyond a simple provision of goods, he sees the market as generating or promoting many important human qualities such as initiative and creativity. Nor is he willing to trace the fact of corruption simply to this new economic form, noting that corruption was found equally or even more strongly in earlier, feudal patterns of life.

What would appear to concern him especially, however, is not the unjustified amassing of goods, which was the topic of the 1994 colloquium on "Philosophy and the Economic Order". Rather, Professor Wang's central concern is the loss of the ability to look beyond material civilization to a spiritual civilization with its social and political interests. This should have an absolute base either in a Kantian or a religious sense, and is able to inspire the altruism called for

by Chairman Mao. Spiritual civilization is the advance to a moral tenor of life. It may, however, be achieved only by the saint or the sage, who are therefore essential for providing the moral leadership for a tradition to contemporary civil life.

These ideals may not be realistic goals for the masses of people . Nevertheless a public social moral is required and possible. This points to the theory of stages in moral development developed by Piaget and Kohlberg. These point toward the higher levels, but find the larger number of a people at mid-route. What is true of a journey, however, is true as well for the life in society, namely, that it is the goal which gives meaning to the steps. In this sense, it is the high ideals of spiritual civilization as carried by the tradition (see chapter IV "Gadamer, Tradition, Dialogue" by A. Palma-Angeles) that gives meaning to the lives and struggles of all who are on the way.

Another principle which must be operative in a healthy and effective civil society is tolerance. Professor Dy in chapter VII studies the thought of Marcel on this issue. This has proven to be a major stumbling block with the most tragic results in such diverse areas as Ireland, the ex-Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Cambodia. But it is not merely such limit cases which are at stake here. The issue, as Professor T. Imanichi has pointed out, is pervasive and becomes increasingly so as ever more areas of life come to depend upon group decisions, that is, the greater the advance of solidarity and subsidiarity of which civil society consists. This, indeed, frames the issue. It is not the degree to which we can discount the significance of the positions and actions of others. Rather, to the degree to which we appreciate their importance they must be recognized, protected and even promoted.

Here, there is need to be able to see the absolute content, and yet relative manner, character of human actions. Their absolute content requires that they be seen in their religious roots as expressions of the reality, love or of a Transcendent. Their relative character comes from the recognition that the Transcendent can be expressed in multiple human modes. None of these can be made into the absolute itself without thereby becoming an idol; yet each mode is a unique manifestation of the divine of which together they constitute an increasingly rich affirmation, manifestation and affirmation.

This is the basis for the complementarity in principle of our free acts as multiple expressions of the good, the true or the sublime. It is not that they are absolute of themselves or as expressions of our freedom, for we are not gods. Yet because all, no matter how slight, are expressions of the divine creative power, there is a sacredness to nature, to a child, or even to a hope which deserves to be recognized and welcomed and which complements and enriches all else.

This is the underlying principle which makes possible that solidarity which is the first principle of civil society. Even more, it is the basis of subsidiarity as its second component principle. Indeed, subsidiarity is tolerance when this is taken not as a passive, but as an active virtue and when it is applied to relations between groups in the social order.

The chapter of Professor Ibana focuses upon solidarity as the foundation of civil society. He makes an important case for considering this not as a third sphere of public life along with the economic and the political, but as the key for the whole of social life. This has solid foundation in the way in which civil society expresses the basic freedom of the people in their patterns of solidarity and subsidiarity. However, it may be more proper to recognize the proper validity of each sphere and to concentrate on their proper interrelation in order to enable the full creativity and genius of each.

These themes are applied by Professor Heinz Holley on a macro level to global development and on the micro level in the concluding chapter of Professor Georges Enderle to corporate ethics in relation to civil society.

It must be noted, moreover, that the solidarities reflected in civil societies are not only communities of action for pragmatic goals, but also communities of life such as family, neighborhood and the like. As such they cannot be treated as means, but must be respected and promoted as ends after the formula of Kant regarding the human person or even as sacred in the context of a religious philosophy as noted above.

Part I

Civil Society as the Cultural Emergence of a People

1.

The Aesthetic as the New Space for Civil Society

George F. McLean

At this turn of the millennia it is being said that the modern period is over and that we are moving--groping our way--into what as yet can only be pointed to by the catch-all term "post-modern." This suggests that some of the main guideposts of the last three centuries of Western civilization no longer appear adequate. We are challenged to seize this rare opportunity to draw up the lessons learned from the past and to undertake afresh the effort to rebuild society in a manner that is, at once, more just and free, and which will allow our cultures to flourish and the hopes of the many peoples to be newly fulfilled.

It is essentially in these terms that attention is now turning to the redevelopment of that vast area of social life between the state above and the masses below, or between the political order and the market forces. Termed civil society, this has been the subject of multiple hopes, namely:

- that it can take us beyond the excesses authoritarianism (V. Tismaneanu),1 by expanding the active participation of citizens,
- that it can express an achieved synthesis of different values in the search for the good life (M. Waltzer),2
- that it points to a more manageable scale of life by emphasizing "voluntary associations, churches and communities, based on a conviction that decisions should be made locally, and should not be controlled by the state and its bureaucracies" (D. Bell),3 and
- that as such it is the cutting edge of the search for freedom in the modern world (C. Taylor).4

We might sketch out the challenge of responding to these hopes in three steps: first by delineating the field of civil society through identifying its basic components, second by surveying the liberal and more communal ways in which civil society has been thematized in modern times in order to draw upon the accomplishments and to learn from their limitations; and third to look for future ways in which civil societies can be more adequately grounded in the diverse cultures of the multiple peoples and more creatively realized.

The Field of Civil Society

To get to the root of the notion of civil society and to uncover its key components with a view to effective action M. Riedel5 suggests a phenomenological approach through an eidetic reduction after the manner developed by Edmund Husserl. In such a approach what is sought is not the natural object in itself, but its mode of appearing in consciousness, that is, its meaning for us.

The move here from individual objects to essences is called *eidetic reduction*, and the path to the essences is through imaginative variation. The empirical individual, either given in sense experience or constructed in the imagination, is considered as one possible instance of the *eidos* in question. One imaginatively varies the different features of this in-stance to discover what remains necessarily present through all the instances. He will discover in this way those variations that will lead to a change in the *eidos* as distinct from those that lead simply to another possible typical

instance within the limits of the *eidos*. In this way what pertains to this essence is brought to immediate evidence in intuition.6

A more adequate implementation of this approach than there is room for here might begin from an examination of the principles of social organization during the primordial periods of totem and myth (see my *Plenitude and Participation*7). Carrying out such a longitudinal search through time, promises to provide a cumulative sense of the meaning which can be accessed through the notion of civil society, to weigh possibilities and difficulties of the range of past approaches to its realization, and even to suggest new approaches appropriate to the challenges and opportunities of our times. It is the task of each people to assure that such a process takes full account of their own classical experience, whether beginning therefrom and finding means for its present thematization or employing the Greek contribution and assuring that its findings be appropriately enriched by their own experience of social life.

Following the latter approach, when we look at Aristotle's ethics and politics we find that, most properly, the political bespeaks governance or directive action toward the goal of social life. Significantly, this is expressed by the term *arché* meaning beginning, origin or first source, and which is extended to governance in the sense of directing others toward a good or a goal, without being oneself being necessitated. This is the true beginning or point of origin of social action; as such it bespeaks both responsibility for the overall enterprise and the exercise of freedom by individuals and groups who originate responsible action. This issue of the nature and range of such corporate directive freedom is one of two decisive issues with regard to the meaning of civil society.

A second issue of governance in Aristotle appears in his correction of his evaluative classification of types of governance. His first classification into oligarchy and democracy was based upon the number--few or many--of those who shared in ruling when this was understood as a self-interested search for material possessions. In place of this he chose instead a normative criterium based on the search for the common good in which all can participate.8 In this light governance has its meaning as a species of a broader reality, namely, the community (*koinonia*), which comes together to achieve as its end the happiness or good life of the whole.

The polis is then a species of community. It is a group, which as free and self-responsible, comes together in governance to guide their efforts toward the achievement of the good life. Community and governance are not the same or tautological, but they go together for persons are united as a community by their common orientation to the same end. As free they rightly guide or govern themselves toward that end. In this way Aristotle identifies the central nature of the socio-political order as being a *koin nia politika* or "civil society".

Civil society then has three elements. Governance or *arché* as the beginning of action or the taking of initiative toward an end is an exercise by *persons* of their human freedom. But persons are not isolated single entities; in contrast to rocks they are essentially open to others with whom they interact and communicate in various groups and subgroups. This bespeaks a second element, namely, *communication or subsidiarity*, with other members of one's group. The third element is participation or subsidiarity between these groups. As each has its proper sphere of free responsibility what can be taken care of at a lower or more proximate level should be left to the free creativity of the community of persons more directly involved. All persons and groups, each according to their proper competency, are to share in the concern and responsible action for the common good of the whole.9

The above reflects the Greek vision enriched by the sense of person developed under the impact of the Christian *kerygma* with its heightened sense of existence and the implications this entails for freedom in and of the community.10

This may be redone in terms proper to the Andean region and/or enriched by a phenomenological analysis of the many cultures. In any case, the process probably should be not one of essences with the external addition of formal modifiers, but an hermeneutic interrelation of horizons as worked out by H.-G. Gadamer in the tradition of Husserl and Heidegger. We shall see more of this in the third or last section of this paper.

Opening a New Space for Civil Society at the Turn of the Millennia

At the present juncture we find ourselves at the end of the cold war between the individualist and communalist ideologies and in search of ways to proceed. Civil society as understood in modern terms has experienced a check. But this may be more a check of the modern rationalist context itself. For it can be said that the individualist ideologies reflected the British tradition of working in empiricist terms (from Locke, the Scotts and Hume to Rawls) on the one hand, while the communalist ideologies reflect the continental traditions (of Hegel and especially Marx), on the other (both lines drawing on the first two critiques of Kant). From different perspectives they took up the perennial quest for ways to fulfill the human dignity of persons as free, self-determining and sharing in governance, not only in one mass society, but with respect to the variegated levels and modern of human comity. Both appear to have pushed the logic of their own positions and can be proud of real achievements. But the destructive and paralyzing isometrics into which they fell could be the judgement of history confirming the philosophical assessment above that neither line provided an adequate route for human progress. This perennial question returns now in the new and more potent circumstances of greater property, people and needs.

What strategy does this invoke for a response? Seligman's assessment upon reviewing modern field is that civil society is not sufficient for our times11 and Ernest Gellner would seem to agree.12 I believe Seligman to be correct in holding that the modern motions of civil society he investigates are insufficient for the future and have even been checkmated, but his work begins from the Stoics and ignores the rich dimensions of classical thought (Plato and Aristotle are referred to but once and together, p. 79). Others such as Cohen and Arato13 see civil society as a perennial task which must be taken up. But they would restrict its ambit to the realm between, but not including, the economy and the state. But should one simply strike a compromise by cutting off the dimensions of property/production, on the one hand, and of state, on the other, as areas to be guided by hidden hands or abstract laws of reason and their prerequisites. This would be to exclude where full humanness in order to be left in exchange with an intermediate realm of varied other forms of human comity. In that case the effort would be to suffuse this intermediate realm with ethical meaning and set it as a bulwark against supposed non-ethical realms of productive property ruled by the hidden hand and the coercive powers of the state. Or more manipulatively, is it desirable, right or feasible to set these two powers against each other as non-ethical counter balances in order to create the private sphere of civil society for a properly human life? This would seem to be neither feasible nor desirable for to leave both these power centers devoid of ethical direction would be to leave two of the most pervasive dimensions of reality unrelated to human dignity as source or *arché* and as goal. Thus, Hegel and Marx were correct however in stress the importance of the economic order for human self understanding and interaction in our times and to struggle to define a role of the state in this. We seem to have come to the end of the possibilities

of the present order of things and to be in need of considering life at a deeper, less abstractive and reductive manner. What is needed is a level which is more integrative and potentially fulfilling. What could this be?

All of this, together with the existential and postmodern critiques of rationalism suggest that the task of developing a more adequate notion of civil society must be taken up, but on a new, more open and inclusive basis. To do so will require a richer notion of reason and of freedom capable of integrating the personal dimensions of moral sensitivity in a broader sense of human life and meaning such as is suggested by the new hermeneutics of culture.

If then there is agreement on the need for civil society in the broad terms cited in the introduction, but disagreement on its feasibility in the terms of modern rationalism, this suggests that we need to continue the effort to redevelop the notion of civil society, but to do so at a new level of freedom. Adler's third level natural freedom of self-determination is: "to be able, by a power inherent in human nature, to change one's own character creatively by deciding for oneself what one shall do or shall become." It is significant that it is to this, rather than the proceeding two levels of freedom that Adler adjoins political liberty and collective freedom.

But there are a number of indications that this new level of freedom will require and reflect a new level of knowing: the result of Adler's search of philosophical literature shows how closely the levels of freedom correspond to those of knowledge; modern times has been defined by technical reason above all; the enlightenment whether the 16th and 17th centuries have worked in terms of empirical knowledge and in the 18th century in terms of Kant's first two levels of reason; finally it is particularly significant that post-modern attention has shifted to the third critique of aesthetic reason. Following the pattern used to analyze the modern notions of civil society, let us look at this third level of knowledge or critique and proceed from there to the new ambit of freedom, and thence to what this can mean for the development of civil society. Above the progression followed that of the earlier British-French Enlightenment in which the limitations of knowledge implied a corresponding limitation on freedom. This meant, in turn, that civil society was a realm of moral sentiment separated from economic and political life. For the later continental Enlightenment, it was constituted of necessary prerequisites of reason, whether the properly ethical was relegated to the private inner life of individuals. Here we shall look once again to Kant for indications of new dimensions meaning for social life which will draw upon the resources of the culture of a people and find there moral authority for governance. This will be based upon the rich store of their cumulative experience and free commitments and reflect the solidarity and subsidiarity of their society.

Aesthetic Awareness

The Critique of Aesthetic Judgement

In initiating the decade in which he wrote his three critiques Kant did not have the third one in view. He wrote the first critique in order to provide methodologically for the universality and necessarily of the categories found in scientific knowledge. He developed the second critique to provide for the reality of human freedom. It was only when both of these had been written that he could see that in order to protect and promote freedom in the material world there was need for a third set of categories, namely, those of aesthetic judgement integrating the realms of matter and spirit in a harmony which can be appreciated in terms not of a science of nature as in the first critique nor of society as can be worked out from the second, but of human creativity working with

the many elements of human life to create human life and meaning which can be lived as an expanding and enriching reality.

This can be seen through a comparison of the work of the imagination which he provides in the first and the third critiques. Kant is facing squarely a most urgent question for modern times, namely: how can the newly uncovered freedom of the second critique survive when confronted with the necessity and universality of the realm of science as understood in the *Critique of Pure Reason*?

- Will the scientific interpretation of nature restrict freedom to the inner realm of each person's heart, where it is reduced at best to good intentions or to feelings towards others?

- When we attempt to act in this world or to reach out to others, must all our categories be universal and hence insensitive to that which marks others as unique and personal?

- Must they be necessary, and, hence, leave no room for creative freedom, which would be entrapped and then entombed in the human mind? If so, then public life can be only impersonal, necessitated, repetitive and stagnant.

- Or must the human spirit be reduced to the sterile content of empirical facts or to the necessitated modes of scientific laws? If so, then philosophers cannot escape forcing upon wisdom a suicidal choice between either being traffic directors in the jungle of unfettered competition or being tragically complicit in setting a predetermined order for the human spirit.

Freedom then would, indeed, have been killed; it would pulse no more as the heart of mankind.

Before these alternatives, Kant's answer is a resounding No! Taking as his basis the reality of freedom -- so passionately and often tragically affirmed in our lifetime by Gandhi and Martin Luther King -- Kant proceeded to develop his third *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment* as a context within which freedom and scientific necessity could coexist, indeed, in which necessity would be the support and instrument of freedom. Recently, this has become more manifest as human sensibilities have opened to awareness that being itself is emergent in time through the human spirit and hence to the significance of culture.

To provide for this context, Kant found it necessary to distinguish two issues, reflected in the two parts of his third *Critique*. In the "Critique of Teleological Judgment",14 he acknowledges that nature and all reality must be teleological. This was a basic component of the classical view which enabled all to be integrated within the context of a society of free men working according to a developed order of reason. For Kant, if there is to be room for human freedom in a cosmos in which man can make use of necessary laws, if science is to contribute to the exercise of human freedom, then nature too must be directed toward a transcendent goal and manifest throughout a teleology within which free human purpose can be integrated. In these terms, nature, even in its necessary and universal laws, is no longer alien to freedom, but expresses divine freedom and is conciliable with human freedom. The same might be said of the economic order and its "hidden hand." The structure of his first *Critique* will not allow Kant to affirm this teleological character as an absolute and self-sufficient metaphysical reality, but he recognizes that we must proceed "as if" all reality is teleological precisely because of the undeniable reality of human freedom in an ordered universe.

If, however, teleology, in principle, provides the needed space, there remains a second issue of how freedom is exercised, namely, what mediates it to the necessary and universal laws of science? This is the task of his "Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment",15 and it is here that the imagination reemerges to play its key integrating role in human life. From the point of view of the

human person, the task is to explain how one can live in freedom with nature for which the first critique had discovered only laws of universality and necessity and especially with structures of society in a way that is neither necessitated nor necessitating?

There is something similar here to the *Critique of Pure Reason*. In both, the work of the imagination in assembling the phenomena is not simply to register, but to produce an objective order. As in the first critique, the approach is not from a set of *a priori* principles which are clear all by themselves and used in order to bind the multiple phenomena into a unity. On the contrary, under the rule of unity, the imagination orders and reorders the multiple phenomena until they are ready to be informed by a unifying principle whose appropriateness emerges from the reordering carried out by the productive imagination.

In the first *Critique*, however, the productive work was done in relation to the abstract and universal categories of the intellect and carried out under a law which dictated that phenomena must form a unity. The *Critique of Pure Reason* saw the work of the imagination in assembling the phenomena as not simply registering, but producing the objective order. The approach was not from *a priori* principles which are clear all by themselves and are used to bind the multiple phenomena into a unity. On the contrary, in the first Critique, under the rule of unity, the imagination moves to order and reorder the multiple phenomena until they are ready to be informed by a unifying principle on the part of the intellect, the appropriateness of which emerges from the reordering carried out by the reproductive imagination.

However, this reproductive work took place in relation to the abstract and universal categories of the intellect and was carried out under a law of unity which dictated that such phenomena as a house or a receding boat must form a unity -- which they could do only if assembled in a certain order. Hence, although it was a human product, the objective order was universal and necessary and the related sciences were valid both for all things and for all people.16

Here in "The Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment," the imagination has a similar task of constructing the object, but not in a manner necessitated by universal categories or concepts. In contrast, here the imagination, in working toward an integrating unity, is not confined by the necessitating structures of categories and concepts, but ranges freely over the full sweep of reality in all its dimensions to see whether and wherein relatedness and purposiveness or teleology can emerge and the world and our personal and social life can achieve its meaning and value. Hence, in standing before a work of nature or of art, the imagination might focus upon light or form, sound or word, economic or interpersonal relations -- or, indeed, upon any combination of these in a natural environment or a society, whether encountered concretely or expressed in symbols.

Throughout all of this, the ordering and reordering by the imagination can bring about numberless unities. Unrestricted by any *a priori* categories, it can nevertheless integrate necessary dialectical patterns within its own free and, therefore, creative production and scientific universals within its unique concrete harmonies. This is properly creative work. More than merely evaluating all according to a set pattern in one’s culture, it chooses the values and orders reality accordingly. This is the very constitution of the culture itself.

It is the productive rather than merely reproductive work of the human person as living in his or her physical world. Here, I use the possessive form advisedly. Without this capacity man would exist in the physical universe as another object, not only subject to its laws but restricted and possessed by them. He/She would be not a free citizen of the material world, but a mere function or servant. In his third Critique Kant unfolds how man can truly be master of his/her life in this world, not in an arbitrary and destructive manner, but precisely as creative artists bring being to new realization in ways which make possible new growth in freedom.

In the third Critique, the productive imagination constructs a true unity by bringing the elements into an authentic harmony. This cannot be identified through reference to a category, because freedom then would be restricted within the laws of necessity of the first Critique, but must be recognizable by something free. In order for the realm of human freedom to be extended to the whole of reality, this harmony must be able to be appreciated, not purely intellectually in relation to a concept (for then we would be reduced to the universal and necessary as in the first critique), but aesthetically, by the pleasure or displeasure, the attraction or repulsion of the free response it generates. Our contemplation or reflection upon this which shows whether a proper and authentic ordering has or has not been achieved. This is not a concept,17 but the pleasure or displeasure, the elation at the beautiful and sublime or the disgust at the ugly and revolting, which flows from our contemplation or reflection.

The Aesthetic and Social Harmony

One could miss the integrating character of this pleasure or displeasure and its related judgment of taste18 by looking at it ideologically, as simply a repetition of past tastes in order to promote stability. Or one might see it reductively as a merely interior and purely private matter at a level of consciousness available only to an elite class and related only to an esoteric band of reality. That would ignore the structure which Kant laid out at length in his first "Introduction" to his third Critique19 which he conceived not as merely juxtaposed to the first two Critiques of pure and practical reason, but as integrating both in a richer whole.

Developing the level of aesthetic sensitivity enables one to take into account ever greater dimensions of reality and creativity and to imagine responses which are more rich in purpose, more adapted to present circumstances and more creative in promise for the future. This is manifest in a good leader such as a Churchill or Roosevelt -- and, supereminently, in a Confucius or Christ. Their power to mobilize a people lies especially in their rare ability to assess the overall situation, to express it in a manner which rings true to the great variety of persons in their many groupings in a pattern of the subsidiarity characteristic of a civil society, and thereby to evoke appropriate and varied responses from each according to the circumstances. The danger is that the example of such genius will be reduced to formulae, become an ideology and exclude innovation. In reality, as personable, free and creative, and understood as the work of the aesthetic judgment, their example is inclusive in content and application as well as in the new responses it continually evokes from others.

When aesthetic experiences are passed on as part of a tradition, they gradually constitute a culture. Some thinkers, such as William James and Jürgen Habermas,20 fearing that attending to these free creations of a cultural tradition might distract from the concrete needs of the people, have urged a turn rather to the social sciences for social analysis and critique as a means to identify pragmatic responses. But these point back to the necessary laws of the first *Critique;* in many countries now engaging in reforms, such "scientific" laws of history have come to be seen as having stifled creativity and paralyzed the populace.

Kant’s third Critique points in another direction. Though it integrates scientifically universal and necessary social relations, it does not focus upon them, nor does it focus directly upon the beauty or ugliness of concrete relations, or even directly upon beauty or ugliness as things in themselves. Its focus is rather upon our contemplation of the integrating images of these which we imaginatively create, that is, our culture as manifesting the many facets of beauty and ugliness, actual and potential. Here Marx makes an important contribution in insisting that this not be left

as an ideal image, but that it be taken in its concrete realization of a pattern of social relations. As we appreciate more and more the ambit of free activity in the market and other levels of life, this comes to include those many modes of solidarity and their subsidiary relations which constitute civil society. In turn, we evaluate these in terms of the free and integrating response of pleasure or displeasure, the enjoyment or revulsion they generate most deeply within our whole person and society according to the character of our culture.

Cultural Traditions and Civil Society

Here Burke raises some important issues for the development of the notion of civil society in aesthetic terms. If as Manfred Riedel suggested the components of civil society are best manifest through an eidetic reduction that leads to meaning then how do patterns of meaning come together socially; if civil society requires governance then how can these patterns of meaning be endowed with the authority needed in order that governance not be arbitrary and willful; and if times change, how can this pattern of meaning which constitutes a culture adapt to new times and be articulated with an appropriate order of sociability and subsidiarity.

These questions point to the new hermeneutic sensibility opened by the work of Husserl, and developed by Heidegger and especially Gadamer (to cite the key figures over three generations) as a new road to the appreciation of civil society for our time.

This phenomenologically based approach would take account of the free and creative work of inspiring, social cooperation. Working out the aesthetic level it promises to be able to harmonize and direct social cooperation. And as with Kant's third critique, it would integrate rather than omit the natural basis and political coordination of social life. This directs us therefore to a hermeneutic procedure interpreting the human social creativity of civil society though time.

I have developed this at some length in a set of lectures delivered at Fudan University and published under the title: *Tradition, Harmony and Transcendence*21 especially lectures I, "Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Creativity" and III, "Harmony as a Contemporary Metaphysics of Freedom: Kant and Confucius". Here, I would recall the following with regard to values and virtues, culture and application.

Values and Virtues

For the drama of self-determination and the development of persons and of civil society one must look to their relation to the good in search of which we live, survive and thrive. The good is manifest in experience as the object of desire, namely, as that which is sought when absent. Basically, it is what completes life; it is the "perfect", understood in its etymological sense as that which is completed or realized through and through; once achieved, is no longer desired or sought, but enjoyed. This is reflected in the manner in which each thing, even a stone, retains the being or reality it has and resists reduction to non-being or nothing: the most that we can do is to change or transform a thing into something else, but we cannot annihilate it. Similarly, a plant or tree, given the right conditions, grows to full stature and fruition. Finally, an animal protects its life — fiercely, if necessary -- and seeks out the food needed for its strength. Food, in turn, as capable of contributing to animal's realization or perfection, is for the animal an auxiliary good or means.

In this manner, things as good, that is, as actually realizing some degree of perfection and able to contribute to the wellbeing of others, are the bases for an interlocking set of relations. As these

relations are based upon both the actual perfection things possess and the potential perfection to which they are thereby directed, the good is perfection both as attracting when it has not yet been attained and as constituting one's fulfillment upon its achievement. Goods, then, are not arbitrary or simply a matter of wishful thinking; they are rather the full development of things and all that contributes thereto. In this ontological or objective sense, all beings are good to the extent that they exist and can contribute to the perfection of others.

The moral good is a more narrow field, for it concerns only one's free and responsible actions. This has the objective reality of the ontological good noted above, for it concerns real actions which stand in distinctive relation to our own perfection and to that of others -- and, indeed, to the physical universe and to God as well. Hence, many possible patterns of actions could be objectively right because they promote the good of those involved, while others, precisely as inconsistent with the real good of persons or things, are objectively disordered or misordered. This constitutes the objective basis for values and disvalues.

Nevertheless, because the realm of objective relations is almost numberless, whereas our actions are single, it is necessary not only to choose in general between the good and the bad, but in each case to choose which of the often innumerable possibilities one will render concrete. However broad or limited the options, as responsible and moral an act is essentially dependent upon its being willed by a subject. Therefore, in order to follow the emergence of the field of concrete moral action, it is not sufficient to examine only the objective aspect, namely, the nature of the persons, actions, and things involved. In addition, one must consider the action in relation to the subject, namely, to the person who, in the context of his/her society and culture, appreciates and values the good of this action, chooses it over its alternatives, and eventually wills its actualization.

The term 'value' here is of special note. It was derived from the economic sphere where it meant the amount of a commodity sufficient to attain a certain worth. This is reflected also in the term 'axiology' whose root means "weighing as much" or "worth as much." It requires an objective content -- the good must really "weigh in" and make a real difference; but the term 'value' expresses this good especially as related to wills which actually acknowledge it as a good and as desirable.22 Thus, different individuals or groups of persons and at different periods have distinct sets of values. A people or community is sensitive to and prizes a distinct set of goods or, more likely, it establishes a distinctive ranking in the degree to which it prizes various goods. By so doing, it delineates among limitless objective goods a certain pattern of values which in a more stable fashion mirrors their corporate free choices.

This constitutes the basic topology of a culture; as repeatedly reaffirmed through time, it builds a tradition or heritage about which we shall speak below. It constitutes, as well, the prime pattern and gradation of goods which persons experience from their earliest years and in terms of which they interpret their developing relations. Young persons peer out at the world through a lens formed, as it were, by their family and culture and configured according to the pattern of choices made by that community throughout its history -- often in its most trying circumstances. Like a pair of glasses it does not create the object; but it focuses attention upon certain goods involved rather than upon others. This becomes the basic orienting factor for the affective and emotional life described by the Scotts as the heart of civil society. In time, it encourages and reinforces certain patterns of action which, in turn, reinforce the pattern of values.

Through this process, a group constitutes its of moral concern in terms of which it struggles to advance or at least perdure, mourns its failures, and celebrates its successes. This is our world of hopes and fears, in terms of which, as Plato wrote in the *Laches*, our lives have moral

meaning.23 It is varied according to the many concerns and the groups which coalesce around them. As these are interlocking and interdependent a pattern of social ends and concerns develops which guides action. In turn corresponding capacities for action or virtue are developed.24

Moral Authority and Governance for Responsible Freedom in Civil Society

Perhaps the greatest point of tension between a sense of one's heritage and the enlightenment spirit relates to authority. Is it possible to recognize authority on the part of a tradition which perdures, while still asserting human freedom through time? Could it be that a cultural tradition, rather than being the negation of freedom and, hence, antithetic to democracy, is its cumulative expression, the reflection of our corporate access to the bases of all meaning, and even the positive condition for the discovery and realization of needed new developments?

One of the most important characteristics of the human person and societies is their capability for development and growth. One is born with open and unlimited powers for knowledge and for love. Life consists in developing, deploying and exercising these capabilities. Given the communitary character of human growth and learning, dependence upon others is not unnatural—quite the contrary. Within, as well as beyond, our social group we depend upon other persons according as they possess abilities we, as individuals and communities, need for our growth, self-realization and fulfillment.

This dependence is not primarily one of obedience to the will of others, but is based upon their comparative excellence in some dimension -- whether this be the doctor's professional kill in healing or the wise person's insight and judgment in matters where profound understanding is required. The preeminence of wise persons in the community is not something they usurp or with which they are arbitrarily endowed; it is based rather upon their abilities as these are reasonably and freely acknowledged by others.

Further, this is not a matter of uniform universal law imposed from above and uniformly repeated in univocal terms. Rather it is a matter of corporate learning developed by the components of a civil society each with its own special concerns and each related to the other in a pattern of subsidiarity.

All of these -- the role of the community in learning, the contribution of extended historical experience regarding the horizontal and vertical axes of life and meaning, and the grounding of dependence in competency -- combine to endow tradition with authority for subsequent ages which is varied according to the components and their interrelation.

There are reasons to believe, moreover, that tradition is not a passive storehouse of materials simply waiting upon the inquirer, but that its content of authentic wisdom plays a normative role for life in subsequent ages. On the one hand, without such a normative referent, prudence would be as relativistic and ineffective as muscular action without a skeletal substructure. Life would be merely a matter of compromise and accommodation on any terms, with no sense of the value either of what was being compromised or of that for which it was compromised. On the other hand, were the normative factor to reside simply in a transcendental or abstract vision, the result would be devoid of existential content.

The fact that humans, no matter how different in culture, do not remain indifferent before the flow of events, but dispute -- even bitterly -- the direction of change appropriate for their community reflects that every humanism is committed actively to the realization of some common -- if general -- sense of perfection. Without this, even conflict would be impossible for there would be no intersection of the divergent positions and, hence, no debate or conflict.

Through history, communities discover vision which both transcends time and directs our life in all times, past, present and future. The content of that vision is a set of values which, by their fullness and harmony of measure, point the way to mature and perfect human formation and, thereby, orient the life of a person.25 Such a vision is historical because it arises in the life of a people in time. It is also normative, because it provides a basis upon which past historical ages, present options and future possibilities are judged and presents an appropriate way of preserving that life through time. What begins to emerge is Heidegger's insight regarding Being and its characteristics of unity, truth and justice, goodness and love, not simply as empty sideals, but as the ground of things, hidden or veiled, as it were, and erupting into time through the conscious personal and social life of free human beings in history. Seen in this light, the process of human search, discussion and decision -- today called democracy -- becomes more than a method for managing human affairs; more substantively, it is the mode of the emergence of being in time.

One's cultural heritage or tradition constitutes a specification of the general sense of being or perfection, but not as if this were chronologically distant in the past and, therefore, in need of being drawn forward by some artificial contrivance. Rather, being and its values live and act in the lives of all whom they inspire and judge. In its synchronic form, through time, tradition is the timeless dimension of history. Rather than reconstructing it, we belong to it -- just as it belongs to us. Traditions then are, in effect, the ultimate communities of human striving, for human life and understanding are implemented, not by isolated individual acts of subjectivity -- which Gadamer describes as flickerings in the closed circuits or personal consciousness26 -- but by our situatedness in a tradition. By fusing both past and present, tradition enables the to component groupings of civil society determine the specific direction of their lives and to mobilize the consensus and mutual commitments of which true and progressive community is built.27

Conversely, it is this sense of the good or of value which emerges through the concrete, lived experience of a people throughout its history and constitutes its cultural heritage, which enables society in turn to assess and avoid what is socially destructive. In the absence of tradition, present events would be simply facts to be succeeded by counter-facts. The succeeding waves of such disjointed happenings would constitute a history written in terms of violence. This, in turn, could be restrained only by some utopian abstraction built upon the reductivist limitations of modern rationalism. Eliminating all expressions of democratic freedoms, this is the archetypal modern nightmare, *1984*.

All of that stands in stark contrast to one's heritage or tradition as the rich cumulative expression of meaning evolved by a people through the ages to a point of normative and classical perfection. Exemplified architecturally in a Parthenon or a Taj Mahal, it is embodied personally in a Confucius or Gandhi, a Bolivar or Lincoln, a Martin Luther King or a Mother Theresa. Variously termed "charismatic personalities" (Shils28), "paradigmatic individuals" (Cua29) or characters who meld role and personality in providing a cultural or moral ideal (MacIntyre30), they supersede mere historical facts. As concrete universals, they express in the varied patterns of civil society that harmony and fullness of perfection which is at once classical and historical, ideal and personal, uplifting and dynamizing in a word, liberating.

Notes

1. Vladimir Tismaneanu. *Reinventing Politics: Eastern Europe after Communism* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

2. Michael Waltzer, "The Idea of Civil Society", *Dissent* (1991), 293-304.

3. Daniel Bell, American Exceptionalism Revisited: The Role of Civil Society", *The Public Interest*, 95 (1989), 38-56.

4. Charles Taylor, "Modes of Civil Society", *Public Culture*, 3 (1990), 95-118.

5. Manfred Riedel, "In Search of a Civil Union: The Political Theme of European Democracy and Its Primordial Foundation in Greek Philosophy", *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, 10 (1983), 101-102.

6. Robert E. Wood, "The Phenomenologist", in George F. McLean, *Reading Philosophy for the XXIst Century* (Washington: University of America Press, 1989), p. 136.

7. (Madras: University of Madras Press, 1978).

8. *Politics*, III, 8.

9. Aristotle develops this theme richly in chapter 6 "On Friendship" in Book IX of his *Nicomachean Ethics*, stressing a theme which will reemerge later, namely, that the members of a civil society need to be of one mind and one heart. Toward the end of this chapter he evolves the importance of this for the common weal.

Aristotle recognizes the many communities as parts of the political order when he treats justice and friendship inasmuch as this seeks not particular advantage but that of the whole. Justice here, as distributive, is not arithmetic but proportionate to those involved according to the respect and honor that is due to each. In the *Politics* in his concern for the stability of the state he stresses the need for a structured diversity. Groups such as the family and village differ qualitatively from the state, it is necessary to recognize this and promote these smaller units as such for the vitality of the whole.

The synergetic ordering of these groups, considered both quantitatively and qualitatively, and the realization of their varied needs and potentials is the stuff of the governance of civil society. The condition for success in this is that the freedom and hence responsible participation of all be actively promoted at each level. Thus, the proper responsibilities of the family must not be taken away by the city, nor that of the city by the state. Rather the higher units, either in the sense of larger numbers or more important order of goods, must exercise their governance precisely in such wise as to promote the full and self-responsible action of the lower units and in the process enable them to achieve goals which, acting alone, they could not realize. Throughout, the concern is to maximize the participation in governance, that is, the exercise of freedom by the groups which form the larger community, thereby enabling them, and by them the entire society, to flourish. This is termed subsidiarity.

10. For the rich development of these elements in the context of medieval Christian philosophy see G.F. McLean, "Philosophy and Civil Society: Its Past, Its Present and Its Future", *Civil Society and Social Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1997).

11. *The Idea of a Civil Society*, 199-206.

12. *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals* (London: Penguin,1994); "The Civil and the Sacred" in *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press), XII, 301-349.

13. J.L. Colen and Arato, *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge, Mas.: MIT, 1992).

14. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment*, trans. J.H. Bernard (New York: Hafner, 1968), pp. 205-339.

15. *Ibid*., pp. 37-200.

16 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, trans. N.K. Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), A112, 121, 192-193. Donald J. Crawford, *Kant's Aesthetic Theory* (Madition: University of Wisconsin, 1974), pp. 83-84, 87-90.

17 See Kant's development and solution to the problem of the autonomy of taste, *Critique of Judgment*, nn. 57-58, pp. 182-192, where he treats the need for a concept; Crawford, pp. 63-66.

18 See the chapter by Wilhelm S. Wurzer "On the Art of Moral Imagination" in G. McLean, ed., *Moral Imagination and Character Development* (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, in preparation) for an elaboration of the essential notions of the beautiful, the sublime and taste in Kant's aesthetic theory.

19Immanuel Kant, *First Introduction to the Critique of Judgment*, trans. J. Haden (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).

20William James, *Pragmatism* (New York: Washington Square, 1963), Ch. I, pp. 3-40. For notes on the critical hermeneutics of J. Habermas see G. McLean, "Cultural Heritage, Social Critique and Future Construction" in *Culture, Human Rights and Peace in Central America*, R. Molina, T. Readdy and G. McLean, eds. (Washington: Council for Research in Values, 1988), Ch. I. Critical distance is an essential element and requires analysis by the social sciences of the historical social structures as a basis for liberation from determination and dependence upon unjust interests. The concrete psycho- and socio-pathology deriving from such dependencies and the corresponding steps toward liberation are the subject of the chapters by J. Loiacono and H. Ferrand de Piazza in *The Social Context and Values: Perspectives of the Americas*, G. McLean and O. Pegoraro, eds. (Washington: Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1988), Chs. III and IV.

21(Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1994).

22 Karol Wojtyla, *The Acting Person* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979), pp. 48-50; "The Person: Subject and Community," *Review of Metaphysics*, 33 (1979-80), 273-308; and "The Task of Christian Philosophy Today," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 53 (1979), 3-4.

23 *Laches*, 198-201.

24For further notes on culture as based also on virtues and tradition see "Philosophy and Civil Society", pp. 38-44.

25*Ibid*., p. 254.

26 *Ibid.*, p. 245.

27*Ibid*., p. 258.

28 Edward Shils, *Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), 12-13.

29 *Dimensions of Moral Creativity: Paradigms, Principles and Ideals* (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978).

30 *After Virtue*, 29-30.

Discussion I

This chapter, "Philosophy and Civil Society: Its Nature, Its Past and Its Future", is built upon the notion of freedom in order from that vantage point to uncover the basic nature and components of civil society and the need for its development in our times.

Freedom can be understood in a number of ways, related also to the epistemological context which extends or restricts the extent of the capacity for understanding and hence for implementing and appreciating freedom. Being concerned with civil society as a construction by people, freedom here is understood not as a negative "freedom from" (except as it applies to overcoming unwarranted and stifling restrictions), but as a positive "freedom for." This, however, must be further differentiated between the three levels unveiled in the analysis of the body of the writings of Western philosophers by the team of Professor Adler at the Institute for Philosophical Research. The first, notably in the positivist and liberal traditions, is a freedom to choose whatever one pleases; the second, typically in the Kantian tradition, is to choose as one ought; the third, in the Aristotelian tradition, is to build one's character in order to be able to attain one's proper goal.

The three are not mutually exclusive, but build one upon the other, the latter shaping and orienting the former. Thus, freedom is truly the power to choose, but as a human reality it should be exercised according to appropriate laws or rules, which indeed are applied with a view to the realization of the good life which befits human persons and communities. As social this is not only the good of the individual understood merely as autonomous in his or her actions, but of the person as a member of society. For one must choose responsibly in a manner proportionate to one's human dignity, and hence not only for one's individual welfare, but for that of the community/ communities in which one participates.

It should be noted further that, as one moves from the first level of freedom which is concerned with selecting between external realities, i.e., activities or objects, to the second and especially to the third level, the horizon changes to become a matter not of external objects, but of interior, properly human, subjectivity lived with reflective consciousness and commitment. This is Heidegger's *dasein*, the point at which being most properly emerges into time. Essential to this is the deployment of human imagination, generating a creativity which opens new possibilities for integrating the human with the physical world and building social relations between persons and peoples. These are conceived, evaluated, appreciated and evolved in the integral exercise of human freedom.

Thus, as one moves to this third and deeper sense of positive freedom, the horizon changes from that of an individual selecting among various objects which he or she then acquires and subjects to his or her will, to that of a social being emerging in terms of the minds and hearts of people engaged through time in opening and extending their life to other things and persons. This is the cooperative work of realizing oneself and one's world--especially one's social world with other persons--with unity and truth, goodness and beauty. Following freedom thus understood promises to open from within insight into the nature and components of civil society.

For this, however, an appropriate methodology is required. It has been customary, especially in the modern rationalist West, to contrast subject and object, and then sedulously to exclude the former in order to learn about the object. It is increasingly evident that the attempt to ignore the subject, even in a subject-object relation, distorts knowledge of the object as well. When, as regards civil society, the concern is to appreciate how persons can interrelate freely, especially in the third sense of freedom, it is necessary to focus upon the order of intentionality and of meaning. For this,

Husserl developed the method of eidetic reduction in order to follow, not the external given, but the internal convergence of the dynamism of being into consciousness, affective relation and commitment.

This, of course, is not all that is included in the making of a civil society. According to the pattern of the four causes the goal of human fulfillment guides freedom and indeed is the first of the causes. There are also the formal cause, namely the pattern or structure of the society, and the material cause or the components of social life. Those include not only persons and groups, but the material dimension of their lives and the world in which they are engaged. All of these are studied as objects by the various sciences, human and physical. In studying civil society this chapter looks especially to the efficient cause by which the general goal is sought and which shapes that particular pattern of human life called culture. This is created in and by the creative exercise of human freedom, by which the material causes are prepared and shaped according to the formal social structures freely and creatively elaborated by the exercise of human freedom.

To uncover this work of human freedom the phenomenological method can be used not only in the sense of Husserl to identify the nature of freedom, but in the sense of Heidegger to uncover its existential reality as the properly human mode of emerging into time and space, and in the sense of Gadamer who follows this as the emergence and contribution of the cultural context. This implies approaching freedom through its concrete exercise, which is always the actual experience of a person or, as here, a people. As free this must be exercised from within: each people must do this for itself. As a result each people can carry to the whole of humankind the unique contribution of its own discovery/creation, which by analogy can prove suggestive and be drawn upon by others.

In the West a special object for such a phenomenological approach is found among the Greeks at the point at which they developed a capacity for philosophical reflection and for articulating in proper terminology what already had been lived in the classic golden age of Pericles. The ability to analyze, order and articulate was developed classically by Socrates and Plato, and especially Aristotle. This was not without its restrictions, of which we are more conscious today and are now able to introduce proper correctives. Nevertheless, for Western experience the Greeks offer rich written and well-ordered materials with which to work.

The world in which they wrote may not have been as pluralist as today, though interaction and trade were intensive. Also, those considered citizens were often a minority due to the institution of slavery. It should be remembered, however, that in the modern West suffrage was extended and accorded only very gradually and reluctantly beyond landowners to workers, slaves and only in this century to women. This reflects the uneven pattern of such progress, which even now is being restricted with regard to immigrants, other ethnic groups.

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What ancient Greece does provide, nevertheless, is a concrete example in which, with the structures in hand, there was developed very active participation by citizens in the public life of the city. It provides also a philosophical analysis of this in such works as the *Republic* and the *Laws* of Plato and the *Politics* of Aristotle, and the many Constitutions. These provide ready material for a phenomenological approach which can uncover the basic components of civil life.

This is not to imply that these elements were not present in other cultures, or indeed in Greece prior to the fourth century. Each people must investigate its own heritage diachronically as well as synchronically. The hermeneutic methods for interpreting prehistoric and oral traditions are now undergoing active elaboration.

This chapter is topical in that it identified and asserted the importance of elements whose lack or deficiency have distorted recent social life. It is also analytic and hence distinguished the specific components of civil society. Finally, being concerned also with social reconstruction it focuses on freedom as the efficient cause in this work. Each of these factors evoked helpful annotations, generally from more synthetic points of view.

Thus, it was noted that one could begin from the final cause or goal of such reconstruction. What would be a good society, what would be the nature of fulfillment which would satisfy human striving, asked those with an Indian background. Indeed, the final cause is the first of the causes in intention; it moves and guides all the others. Aristotle began his ethics in these terms, looking into what constitutes happiness as that which is sought by all. Work in terms of the final cause or goal will be important if the mind is to be open to the full range of goods and to avoid reductionism to, e.g., economic concern. But it must not overlook the dignity of the one who seeks these goods and the proportion thereto of the means by which they are sought, as can be the case in an utilitarian perspective. Further, one must integrate also the material cause by which provisions are set aside and employed, and the formal cause as the structure or disposition of these materials. All four causes are necessary; only a defective and unsatisfactory result will eventuate if any one is deficient.

In human life freedom holds a special place, for the human being is specially the one who lives consciously and responsibly. Moreover, freedom is essential to the final goal or human fulfillment, for only a situation in which freedom is exercised fully can fit the description of human fulfillment. Similarly, the realization of the material and formal causes must correspond to human freedom if the result is to be a truly human accomplishment which promotes human dignity. But the perspective of the chapter is especially that of the efficient cause, for its concern is to introduce the issue of how one can work to reconstruct civil society.

It was observed that if one distinguishes civil society from the political and economic order, these must not be considered antithetic or competing factors. Of course, in the aftermath of situations in which absolute power resided in the state or the economy and suppressed or excluded civil society, the development of civil society constitutes a break from such illegitimate absolutes. However, the intent and the result is not to inhibit, but to promote the proper functioning of both state and economy through the development of an active life by citizens in the groups in which they live and act. They bring their special experience and competency to the promotion of their dimension of human welfare.

Finally, reference was made often to the importance of culture, which was treated separately. It was noted, however, that culture should be within our ability to understand since it is something that human groups have made. Such understanding promises to take us beyond a passive state under the impact of culture, and to enable true freedom and responsibility. New developments in hermeneutics make possible such understanding so that one now can see how this culture is shaped through the work of the imagination and how this operates. One can see as well how, in reflecting the choice made through long generations, this constitutes a cumulative embodiment of the creative freedom of a people.

This points to a final dichotomy which appears in the history of civil society, namely, between affectivity at the individual level and universal rationality. When the exercise of rationality is

situated within human life it becomes apparent that its direction is provided and its openness secured by its social, historical and cultural contexts in which all dimensions of human life, cognitive and effective, are included. How else explain the distinctive historical phases of the work of reason or how things most present and obvious, e.g., the extension of "full and equal" recognition to slaves and to women could remain unappreciated for so long? This implies then the need to integrate attention to affectivity and to culture in efforts to reconstruct civil society.

Discussion II

Should one attempt to provide a definition of civil society at the beginning of its investigation? Certainly if one knew exactly what one was looking for it would be much easier to identify and organize its components. And from an *a priori* grasp of its nature it would be relatively easy and secure to delineate its characteristics analytically.

On the other hand a prior definition would have to depend upon and reflect knowledge and hence outlooks possessed in the past. This would hold any work on civil society to patterns which, being from the past, would be relatively unsuited for the present and would stifle the human creativity needed to move ahead with the times.

But perhaps more deeply the call for a prior definition reflects more the problem than the solution. Modern times are characterized by the Enlightenment devotion to reason, as a radical reduction of human horizons to what is clear and distinct not to intellect or reason as such but to the human mind, that is, as existing in the body. Thus, it proceeds not merely in relation to the senses, as Aristotle noted, but was limited to sense knowledge. Thus Bacon would destroy what he called "idols" but which Vico noted were the accumulated wisdom of a people. Locke proceeded on the supposition of the mind as a blank tablet on which was written solely ideas from the sense and their various permutations. Descartes would put all under doubt except the indubitable idea of his own existence.

The result divided between the individualist empiricism of the great British philosophers or the more communal rationalist continental route typified by Kant, Hegel and Marx. In either case reason allowed for only a narrow range of evidence, sought to manage all either as atomic individuals or through universal and necessary laws, and rigorously rejected all else. We had not philosophies seeking a wisdom which would integrate all but ideologies bent rather on a reduction of the human spirit and the suppression of all but its chosen idea, namely ideologies. The 20th century was the natural culmination of the limitations of this approach. Attention to society developed rapidly into totalitarianism; attention to the particular person developed rapidly into individualism. These ideologies recombined in order to defend an Hegelian inspired fashion, only to divide immediately into the Cold War conflict between the two ideologies.

Now, following the collapse of Marxism it is possible to look back not simply to adopt the opposing ideology but to ask what was omitted in the Age of Enlightenment which led us to such a violent and bloody 20th century. This could be a negative process of critiquing and deconstructing the past, or it could be a positive process of reconstructing the future. Where both of these elements are required would focus rather on the latter and understand in that sense the broadly shared view that we are in a post-modern period.

If so, then it may be less promising to begin our work on civil society from a definition, which would be limited in content to past vision and in method to an ideological approach, but to reopen the question in a way that makes possible the rediscovery and integration of what was available but rejected in choosing the path of modernity. This corresponds to Heidegger's notion that the real step forward is not a merely incremental advance along the path well trodden, but a return to factors which had been available but were consciously not included in concentrating upon the historic choice of the way of reason by Descartes and the characteristically rationalist Enlightenment of modern times.

This suggests the method of the present paper which returns rather to the freedom which marks human action as responsible and creative, to look for the characteristics of the exercise of

freedom with regard to social life. This enables two subsequent steps with regard to civil society: The first is to follow its exercise in modern times in order to uncover what has been accomplished there. The second is to take the step backward to culture as the cumulative and integrative exercise of freedom and on that basis to attempt a preliminary sketch of a development of the notion of civil society for the 21st century.

This should integrate such painfully achieved advances of the modern period as the universal declarations of human rights, while freeing the sense of reality from that of a merely technical construct in which individuals are enclosed. In its place is a sense of an unfolding of human freedom as people interact in the various dimensions of their life. This will include and build upon the richness of the humanizing cultures which had previously been omitted and often suppressed and build upon that new way of living our freedom with other persons and groups in society.

This must transcend the economic order and the exercise of political power, but set their standards and direction precisely as humane engagements in the world. Just as we have learned that democracy means that it is important to have civilian control of military and state powers, so we have learned that it is essential that the economy be directed not by a hidden material hand but by a conscious human concern.

The relation then between civil society and the economic and political orders is a major issue to be worked out. In some places the urgent present task is to make room for civil society; in others it may be to revive consciousness of its existence and roles. Beyond both, however, a progressive humanization of life for the next century will depend upon the way in which this mobilization of the freedom of a people can pervade, transform and inspire all phases of social life.

2.

G.B. Vico and Contemporary Civil World

Lu Xiaohe

The Critique of Descartes

Giambattista Vico (1668-1744) lived at the very point of emergence of the modern world. This world has been greatly influenced by the rapid advances in the natural sciences and in technology, which continue till now. Thus, the differences between the contemporary world and Vico's age are due principally to the sciences and technology having become more powerful and the range of study and life controlled by them having been broadened.

Vico's times also witnessed the establishment of the dominant paradigm for modern philosophy. This models philosophy upon the natural sciences, especially mathematics. As a result, philosophy has separated itself from the rest of culture as a science of sciences. Descartes's philosophy which was the source of such philosophy was prevalent in Vico's lifetime.

For Descartes, philosophy was yet not separated completely from the sciences. He considered knowledge to be "like a tree whose roots are metaphysics, whose trunk is physics, and whose branches, which issue from this trunk, are all the other sciences."1 Hence, metaphysics, as pure philosophy, is both the source and the foundation of all the sciences, while the other sciences, such as medicine, mechanics and ethics, are the branches of physics as the trunk.

Descartes began from his first truth acquired by means of his "critical method", and then proceeded step by step to elaborate a whole system of philosophy, using rational deduction as modelled on the procedures of mathematics. He thus reformed philosophy and established a rationalist paradigm, taking clear and distinct ideas as the criterion of truth. These were regarded as the sole aim and principles of philosophy and the sciences.

This philosophical paradigm was extended to many areas of culture by Descartes' followers during Vico's times and deeply influenced the subsequent development of modern Western philosophy. But, in Vico's view, Descartes' philosophy is inadequate for a modern civil world. Here I shall not explain in detail the reason for this reaction of Vico, but would point out that though at that time Italy lagged behind France and England in politics, economics and science, as a whole it had a more ancient culture and a higher level of civilization. Living in Naples, which was both a place of traditional culture and a centre of the spread of Descartes's "new philosophy", made it possible for Vico to draw a balanced assessment.

His philosophy might be described beginning from his early works, *On the Study Method of Our Time* (*De Nostri Temporis Studiorum Ratione*, 1709) and *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians* (*De Antiquissma Italorum Sapientia*, 1710), and proceeding to his masterpiece, *New Science* (*Scienza Nuovo* 1725, 1730/1744).

In *On the Study Method of Our Time*, Vico, assessing the advantages and disadvantages of the classical and modern worlds, affirmed, on the one hand, the achievements of the modern sciences and arts that "have vastly enriched human society".2 On the other hand, he pointed out that Descartes' new philosophy had many disadvantages, and that its new critical method, if applied as a common instrument of all arts and sciences, "is distinctly harmful"3 to many studies, and especially to social practice.

In *De Antiquissima*, Vico, critiquing Descartes's philosophy, drew upon Italian wisdom as emerging from the sources of the Latin language and literature. His criticism can be summarized as follows:

1. In order to obtain a pure first truth, Descartes's critical method required that, in addition to falsehoods, all secondary truths and all probabilities should be banished from the mind. This stifled the growth of common sense; allocated to the first truth a place before, even beyond and above, all bodily images; blunted imagination and memory as talents for the arts; and became a stumbling block to the natural development of the human mind.

2. Descartes assumed "clear and distinct ideas" as the criterion of truth, but in Vico's view "the criterion of truth is what we have made" (in Latin, *verum* "the true" and *factum* "what is made" are the same).4 Thus, "*cogito ergo sum*" is not truth, but only certitude of the consciousness of one's own existence. Since "made" and "truth" are the same, only the one who makes something knows it. Thus, only God knows the natural world, because he made it. Both metaphysics concerning being, and the sciences concerning the parts of nature, are a dissection of nature, belonging to human knowledge. Metaphysics cannot be the source and foundation of the truth of physics and the other sciences, for it is a science not by causes, but of causes. It provides the other sciences only with probabilities--not causes, let alone truth. As for geometry, the most certain of human knowledge which resembles divine knowledge in its operation, this too cannot provide other sciences with demonstration, for it does not contain in itself the creator's knowledge of those things.

3. In Latin, *causa* (cause) and *negotium* (operation) mean the same. "To prove something by means of causes is to effect it."5 That is to say, the process of proving or demonstration is that of operation and practice. Demonstration cannot be a result of rational deduction, nor can truth in physics or in the other sciences.

4. While Descartes' philosophy focused mainly on the natural sciences, it neglected ethics and its relation to social life. It took truth to be the sole aim of all studies, and transferred the method of judgment which is proper to knowledge to the sphere of practical wisdom. As a result, those whose concern is only for truth find it difficult to attain the means or even the ends of public life. They engage in public life without sufficient wisdom, and "would no more than spend your labor on going mad rationally."6

5. The three branches of philosophy, rational, natural and moral, formerly were handed down in a manner suitable to eloquence. Now, not only have these subjects reverted to the physicists, but the springs which make philosophy eloquent, expressive and impassioned have dried up as a result of today's method. "The rational part in us may be taken captive by a net woven of purely intellectual reasonings, but the passionate side of our nature can never be swayed and overcome unless this is done by more sensuous and materialistic means."7 "Therefore, the soul must be enticed by corporeal images and impelled to love; for once it loves, it is easily taught to believe, once it believes and loves, the fire of passion must be infused into it so as to break its inertia and force it to will."8

6. As for human truths, their fountainhead lies in the human being, in the operation of various faculties of the human mind. The faculties, whether of sense, imagination or understanding, are "faculties of making". We create colors in seeing, flavors in tasting, images in imagining, and even truth in understanding. Mathematics, geometry and mechanics are products of human faculties because in these sciences we make the truths we demonstrate. Of all faculties, ingenuity in connecting disparate and diverse things is the most creative; only by exerting all one's faculties

could one create human truths. Although God's truths are beyond human, they can know and increase human truths by their creation. Thus, "the idea of the origin and development of institutions as a way of saving humans from dissolution is not far off,"9 that is, it is not far from Vico's New Science.

As mentioned above, Vico criticized Descartes's philosophy with regard to the critical method, the criterion of truth and rational deduction, while defending the rationality of probabilities, common sense, topics, faculties other than reason, practical wisdom, humane studies and the world of experience. However, he did not "award to the one what he would have to take away from the other."10 In his field of vision reason, critical method and the natural sciences were still combined with what he defended, for "the whole is the flower of wisdom".11

The New Science

Vico not only pointed out the disadvantages of the modern philosophical paradigm, but also provided a new philosophy called "New Science".

Vico's philosophy usually is understood merely as a philosophy of history, different from philosophy of science.12 But in fact, this view is somewhat lopsided as his philosophy is a complete doctrine of human wisdom and the human civil world which can hardly be categorized according to our present division of philosophy. As is well known Marx said there was but one science which contained both natural science and human history. Long before Marx, Vico in his *New Science* considered natural science to belong to human history and definitely to human wisdom. This thought can be summarized briefly as follows:

1. The principle of *verumfactum* was developed into the brilliant truth "that the world of civil society has certainly been made by men, and that its principles are therefore to be found within the modifications of our own human mind."13 Whereas in *De Antiquissima*, knowledge of human affairs was the most uncertain, in *New Science* it became the most certain knowledge, even more certain than geometry, because it dealt with various human institutions which "are more real than points, lines, surfaces, and figures."14 These changes did not result from logical inference from principles in human affairs, but from Vico's discovery of "poetic wisdom" "which has cost us the research of a good twenty years."15 As a result, the civil world is no longer beyond the vision of philosophy or science, and knowledge of it becomes as certain as God's knowledge.

2. The view that the faculties of mind are faculties of making is supported by philology. Vico discovered that the founders of nations were "theological poets" who, by creative faculties other than reason--especially by imagination, which Vico called the primary operation of mind16--formed the first human wisdom. With poetic wisdom they founded the first customs, institutions, governments, languages, authorities, etc., in a word, the first civil world. So civilization was born of faculties other than reason, not in the esoteric wisdom of great and rare philosophers.

3. In contrast with Descartes's tree of philosophy, Vico's tree of poetic wisdom has poetic metaphysics as its trunk; the poetic sciences and poetic arts of humanity are two branches issuing from metaphysics. This means that the source of poetic metaphysics is the imagination which creates all things poetic, while the operation of the imagination in the various subjects forms the various branches of the arts and sciences. Logic, morals, economics and politics branch out from one limb, while physics and cosmography, astronomy, chronology (including mathematics) and

geography branch out from the other.17 In other words, in the *New Science*, there is no gap between the natural sciences and the humanities; all belong to poetic wisdom.

4. The relationship between wisdom and the esoteric is that what "the poets had first sensed in the way of vulgar wisdom, the philosophers later understood in the way of esoteric wisdom; so the former may be said to have been the sense and the latter the intellect of the human race."18 Moved by such passions as fear, the poets produced imaginative universals. If philosophers abandon imaginative universals and imagination, what they produce with their intellect (that is the "second operation of mind") are intelligible universals. In his view, philosophical or scientific understanding can be gained only when the mind returns to imaginative universals, recovers its own origins in poetic or creative wisdom, and does not stop at esoteric wisdom but combines imagination with intellect, and the poetic with the esoteric. The *New Science*, being such a product, became philosophical and scientific wisdom, for it was derived not only by combining philosophy and philology, but also by returning to poetic wisdom and to imaginative universals.

5. In Vico's *New Science*, the civil world goes through a course of three ages and their return. In this process, the civil world experiences ups and downs, manifesting many probabilities for change. More noticeably, Vico described two types of "barbarism": one is a "barbarism of sense" which is linked to the prehistorical state; the other is a "barbarism of reflection" or of "intellect" which is linked to Vico's third age. This latter, said Vico, turned people into beasts; they had "fallen into the custom of each man thinking only of his own private interests" and lived "like wild beasts in a deep solitude of spirit and will." Such barbarism was brought about by overusing the intellect in human affairs. As a result, society and the human spirit were separated from the natural forms of imagination, and common sense was replaced by determinations of the intellect and reflectively devised means of social organization. In Vico's view, the barbarism of the intellect is more inhuman than the barbarism of sense, for the former enables people to reach the point of reflective malice.19 Donald Philip Verene notes that this "barbarism is a reflection of the barbarism of technological life, the life of procedures of action and social organization."20 In describing the results of this barbarism, Vico also suggested the way to eliminate it, namely, in receiving "this last remedy of providence" one reacquires the faculty of holding the wholeness of human thinking.

In sum, it may be said that Vico's *New Science* constituted a colorful and comprehensive philosophy.

1. The range of this philosophy is not limited to the work of philosophy as a field of professional inquiry, but concerns human wisdom. It reflects a continuous extension and development of the various faculties of the human mind (not merely of the intellect) in an ever enlarging field of human activities. The branches of human wisdom issue from metaphysics as their trunk.

2. The characters and languages it uses are a combination of imaginative universals with intelligible universals, and there is a dialogue between the two languages rather than a monologue in one language. Philosophical understanding derives from this combination and dialogue.

3. The characteristic of Vico's philosophy is "acute", rather than "subtle." Where the subtle may be a single line of logic, the acute is twofold21 attending to both universal truth and contingent exclusiveness. It is characteristic of his philosophy to consider both sides.

4. The arts and the ends to which they appeal are the combinations of topics and critique, eloquence and philosophy, belief and truth, prudence and knowledge, rather than truth and critique alone.

Stephen Toulmin distinguishes three distinct stages of modernity and three corresponding cosmopolis. Toulmin argues that "it is in that very historical contingency" that the cosmopolis of Renaissance humanism, which began in the 15th century, was replaced by the Newtonian cosmopolis which began with Descartes and modern rationalism in the 17th century. In the first stage, practical interest characterized the intellectual community; the model rational enterprise was not mathematics, but law; and rhetoric and logic were not mutually exclusive, but complementary. In the second stage, however, rationality was identified with formal logic, whereas rhetoric was excluded from the domain of rational thought. The gap between nature and man opened, and emotions and desires were extruded from the domain of reason. In view of the philosophical development of the postmodern cosmopolis which began in the mid-20th century, Toulmin suggests that we need to return to:

The wisdom of 16th century humanists, and develop a point of view that combines the abstract rigor and exactitude of 17th century philosophy with a practical concern for human life in its concrete detail. Only so the 17th century's achievements could be humanized, and so redeemed.22

There remain many problems to be discussed, but the above description would seem to characterize the three stages. A contingent combination of various historical conditions with the help of 17th century philosophy formed the cosmopolis. Like history, philosophy has many developmental possibilities. We might ask what would have been the development of Western philosophy and even of Western society if the dominant modern philosophy had not followed Descartes's rationalist-foundationalist paradigm, and if Vico's philosophy had been accepted in his times, for Toulmin's wish had already found splendid expression in Vico's philosophy.

Implications for Contemporary Civil Society

It does not seem that Vico's philosophy can be taken as our own. This paper is merely an initial discussion; many issues in Vico's philosophy and its fate in the contemporary world deserve further discussion. But his philosophy provides many ideas which enable us to recognize the contemporary civil world and even to surpass philosophy.

The modern civil world which began in Vico's age has continued. Elio Gianturco, in the introduction to his translation of Vico's *De Nostri*, said that we still "live in a Cartesian world" which "invades and condition our lives."23 In comparison with Vico's times, our material wealth is more rich than ever, our horizons are broader, sciences and technology are well developed, the fields they touch are more extensive, and the means are more simple and convenient. Especially in the spring tide of modernization, more and more countries have been drawn into this process. Developing countries, such as China, aim at modernization, and face the problem of how to look upon "Descartes' world". Of course, the ideas of Descartes could not cause the world in which we live, nor could Descartes even imagine it. But this world does possess a mentality first expressed in Descartes' philosophy.

The debate between Vico and Descartes continues in our times and in this we may draw inspiration from a number of themes in Vico's philosophy:

1. On the barbarism of intellect: "Vico's new science is a kind of wisdom in an age dominated by the barbarism."24 We live in such an age. Intelligible universals have produced technical universals which become the unifying element of all economic, social and mental activities. Of course, the barbarism of reflection cannot be eliminated by Vico's new science, but it can help us to become aware of the fragmentation of contemporary thought and of the deviation of our society.

2. On overuse of the intellect: we neglect the important role of feelings, imagination, common sense, beliefs, prudence and the tradition of rhetoric in founding and sustaining society. A sound society cannot be built merely by intellect. Poetic wisdom, as a whole, has disappeared in modern philosophy, but elements of it are still indispensable for the contemporary civil world. For instance, in considering ethical issues in business we often rely on rationality to grasp the norms of ethics, but only when rational understanding is combined with common sense, practical wisdom, belief, even passion and imagination, and returns to its sense origins, can the will to follow ethical norms come into being. Vico enables us to recognize the role of these in philosophy.

3. On the source of philosophy: philosophy usually is thought to express the spirit of the times. Vico not only comprehended the spirit of his age, but also drew upon the ancient wisdom of the Italians and Romans in developing his position which counteracted the weaknesses of Descartes' philosophy. He saw that philosophy should take root not merely in one age, but should draw upon the traditions of a culture as its wellspring and develop these traditions in a new age. Philosophy is not a fashion but an inheritance; it is a development of past wisdom by people in the present day.

After visiting Naples in March, 1787, Goethe said of Vico, "It is a happy thing for a people to have such a patriarch." It is no less important for us now to remember his words.

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Notes

1. *Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. Elizabeth Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), p. 211.
2. *On the Study Methods of Our Time*, trans. Elio Gianturco (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 11.
3. *Ibid*., p. 13.
4. *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians*, trans., L.M. Palmer (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 45.
5. *Ibid*., p. 64.
6. *On the Study Methods of Our Time*, p. 99.
7. *Ibid*., p. 38.
8. *Ibid*.
9. *On the Most Ancient Wisdom of the Italians*, p. 34.
10. *On the Study Methods of Our Time*, p. 17.
11. *Ibid*, p. 77.
12. See my thesis: "A Preliminary Study on the Characteristics of Vico's Philosophy of History", *Social Sciences*, I (1988), 80-88.

13. *The New Science of Giambattista Vico*, trans., Thomas Goddard Bergin and Max Harold Fisch (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1968), paragraph 331.

14. *Ibid.*, paragraph 349.

15. *Ibid.*, paragraph 338.

16. *Ibid.*, paragraph 699.

17. *Ibid.*, paragraph 367.

18. *Ibid.*, paragraph 363.

19. *Ibid.*, paragraph 1106.

20. Donald Philip Verene, *Vico's Science of Imagination* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1981), p. 29. I owe much of my view on Vico to Verene's work.

21. *On the Study Methods of Our Time*, p. 24.

22. Stephen Edelston Toulmin, *Cosmopolis, The Hidden Agenda of Modernity* (New York: The Free Press, 1990), p. xi.

23. *On the Study Methods of Our Time*, p. xxi.

24. Verene, p. 29.

Discussion

Three levels of truth are engaged here. One concerns the metaphysical foundations and the basic truth that these reflect of the relation of all to God as the unique source or creator of all. The second concerns the social inventions created by the human imagination in uniting the many human elements. The third is scientific truth concerning nature; this consists of hypothesis and possibilities.

The first two are foundational for human action as they concern the sense of person, love and belief. An important problem is that love as a reflection of belief can be distorted into hatred. It is necessary to note the distortion that is involved here and to focus on ways to correct this perversion of truth and to overcome this as a perversion of love.

It was noted that Descartes proceeded on the basis of reason, while Hume saw society as proceeding rather on the basis of passion. Upon first consideration, especially under the influence of enlightenment rationalism it might seem that passion is the threat and needs to be subjected to reason. However, there are a number of problems in this view. One is the inability of abstract and disengaged reason to reengage life in order to control and direct reason. The second is the danger of abstract reason itself as only one dimension of the human, and hence as dehumanizing when used in isolation: this has been the sad experience of this century. Thirdly, and perhaps most fundamental is the abstractive and analytic character of the thought of both Descartes and Hume which dissociate the various dimensions of the person and thereby destroy their personal character. This is particularly true of Hume's turn to passion which then sees all in conflictual terms that must, somehow, be held in check by equally vicious passion and ambition.

Tragically missing here is the metaphysical dimension whereby the creation of all out of love is taken into account. Here the basic truth is not that of vicious passion or holding passion in check by an equally dehumanized reason, but rather God leading his creatures joyfully. This reflects an integration of all levels within the human person, and then of the human person with both nature and God. This has characterized the Chinese vision as described by He Xirong in her chapter on Confucian ritual.

Vico suggested something similar in objecting to the barbarism of reason and pointing to the need to overcome this by reintegrating it into the whole human person, which he sees as essentially integrated into both a culture and a history.

It should be noted that this is not a compromise between reason and the irrational, nor is it a mere juxtaposition of the two or an addition of one to the other. Rather, it reflects an appreciation of the unity of the human person in society in relation to an ideal of human harmony.

3.

Non-Indifference within Difference: Emmanuel Levinas on the Sociality of the Face-to-Face Relation

Angelli F. Tugado

Introduction

This chapter attempts to confront the problem of diversity in unity by following the thought of Emmanuel Levinas on the concept of difference found in the ethical face-to-face relation according to the thought of Emmanuel Levinas.1 Using Levinas' phenomenology this paper outlines the link between the spheres of the face-to-face (person-to-person) relation and of society. The assumption guiding this paper is that genuine unity within the larger societal and political context can be achieved through a reasoned respect for diversity within the experience of human sociality.

Today, diversity and unity can be seen as complementary. The concept of diversity usually regarded in apparently negative terms as tension, conflict and pluralism, can be understood more positively as a form of coexistence that is life-giving rather than life-threatening, creative rather than destructive, affirming rather than denying. The concept of unity has evolved from that of the danger of mere uniformity under totalitarian state authorities to that of harmonious coexistence. Furthermore, there seems to be a growing consensus that unity should ultimately be founded on metaphysical and transcendental principles. In its own way, this paper tries to dig into the "roots of our sense of unity with others" as it reflects on the fundamental yet often underachieved fraternity grounded on each person's ethical respect and responsibility for the Other in a face-to-face or person-to-person relation.2 To be investigated is how this forgotten respect for the face inspires the pre-institutional moment that creates the condition for the possibility of unity despite diversity in a civil society.

The method of this study is Levinas's unique brand of phenomenology with regard to what for him is a fundamentally ethical experience.3 It undertakes a return to the lived experience of the face-to-face or person-to-person with all the ambiguities such experience entails. To a certain extent, the method moves out of a strictly phenomenological framework to draw out the ethical implications of such experience.

The reader is forewarned that many of the ambiguities are articulated by Levinas in oftentimes contradictory and at times hyperbolic terms. Many of the ideas presented by Levinas need to be done more than said, and thus are more difficult to say. This warning, however, is given, not as an apology for ambiguity, but for the peculiar challenge posed by the very problematic of the theme of the paper.

The first part of the paper develops the notion of fundamental difference that emerges in face-to-face relations. The second part unfolds the various nuances of non-indifference that emerge as one responds to the approach of the other personality or "in-the-face". Finally, the third part reveals implications arising from the first two parts for the very possibility of unity this extends beyond face-to-face relations to the larger context of civil society.

Difference

In our daily dealings with fellowmen it is easy and sometimes even necessary to take the face for granted. It seems easier to get by in practical and routine circumstances without considering the singularity of each person with whom we deal. Most of the time we relate routinely to persons within a given social context: as businessman, colleague, customer or client. But we have not really related to other people personally or "in-the-face" as long as we deal with them in the "usual manner". When conflicts arise, whether or not intended, when a break in the usual routine occurs, or when a crisis unfolds we begin really to see the other person in-the-face. For better or for worse, we come to know persons with whom a break occurs, as we say, "in a different way," or again as if for the first time. Certain circumstances thus require that we bracket our usual understanding of other people; it is then that we experience other people as Other. This is the experience of what Levinas considers to be forgotten in usual face-to-face relations. Whether in commonplace circumstances or in critical situations, the other person is related to as face and as such as a presence; yet something in the Other's face still remains "infinitely foreign" no matter how native and familiar to us. The Other is one who "breaks with the world that can be common to us."4

However, we do not need dramatically out-of-the-usual circumstances in order to encounter other people as faces. The fact that people are (and not only have) faces is fundamental, yet often it is missed. The strangeness that one now sees in the Other is easier to see in one who to begin with already is regarded a stranger; regarding as Other a person with whom we are thoroughly familiar is more challenging. Levinas' precise point is for us to render even the familiar (or so we thought) radically strange, since the other as Other cannot simply be one's alter ego, an "appresented analogue of myself"; the other is "not one's equal nor a fellow citizen in an intelligible kingdom of ends."5 For Levinas the difference between one and the other is more radical and acute than mere difference in habit, interest, outlook, principles, even religion and other such matters that oftentimes and sometimes irreconcilably divide people.

The Other as other is separated absolutely from me such that I6 cannot think of the Other only with respect to what I am not. A concrete manifestation of this difference is the difficulty even in speaking of someone who is said to be very close (i.e., for the same reasons given above that sometimes "differentiate" people). There is something in the Other's face that resists being spoken of within and outside of the encounter, which perhaps makes it easier for one to talk about an-Other "in absentia". If only for this, there is some truth in the quip, "Do not bother to talk about yourself; others will do that when you leave." Thus, the Other as face is exterior to myself. All my attempts to speak of the Other, whether face-to-face or in presence or absence (as is often the case) of the face-to-face, fail to capture the "essence" of the Other. Something always escapes all the impressions I may gather of the Other in my contact with him/her.

Dealing with a face cannot therefore be reduced to dealing with someone only within the context of the totality of impressions left behind. Otherwise even one who is said to "exceed his reputation" may never be met in the face (i.e., in the area exceeding his reputation) as long as his reputation conditions the manner or even the very possibility of my relation with him/her. According to Levinas, the Other in his face is not a set of impressions, but more an expression. As such, the Other "presses out" of whatever impression or image I may have and in doing so presents himself to me. Although "I may turn toward the Other as toward an object, . . . the best way of encountering the Other is not even to notice the color of his eyes!"7 Further, while "the relation with the face can surely be dominated by perception, . . . what is specifically the face is what cannot be reduced to that."8 Thus, the face as such is not merely a "plastic image", a subject of

caricature or even of icons, but the very presence of one who comes to pass, i.e., as an "epiphany." As presence, the Other reveals him or herself ambiguously—by entering my world and yet remaining outside it, outside of my totalizing grasp. An aspect of the difference between the Other and me lies in the Other being given over and beyond my grasp. The Other faces me from a height which, however, does not really dominate or efface me.

This dimension of height also carries a depth. Even if the Other is beyond whatever I may perceive of him, still I am tempted to dominate him if only to bring him within my grasp. Levinas even goes as far as pointing out the temptation to kill born out of an "allergic intolerance" of the other. Yet the very epiphany of the face resists this temptation. The resistance is a show not of (physical) force, but a moral or ethical force, whose power lies in its very "defiance of my ability for power." At the moment I think I can do or say anything I want to dominate or suppress the other, I am proven wrong by the face, by *that* gaze. Thus Levinas describes, in haunting terms, the ambiguity of the Other's resistance as both a strength and a weakness:

The Other who can sovereignly say "no" to me is exposed to the point of the sword or the revolver's bullet, and the whole unshakable firmness of his `for itself' with the intransigent "no" he opposed can be obliterated because the sword or bullet has touched the ventricles or auricles of his heart. In the contexture of the world he is a quasi-nothing. But he can oppose to me a struggle, that is, oppose to the force that strikes him not a force of resistance, but the very unforeseeableness of his reaction (TI, p. 199).

In the heart of the face's vulnerability is its moral strength and authority: it is the face that "forbids one to kill"9 and thereby commands respect and nonviolence. For this, Levinas notes even during war when ethics is said to be suspended it is difficult to kill someone who looks one straight in the eye and that assassins usually attack their victims from behind.10 Further, the temptation to kill means not only taking someone's life by a gun or other means, but the mere doing nothing to keep him alive.11

The foregoing, moreover, accentuates another aspect of difference: the disproportion between one's own feeble powers of domination and control and the infinity of the force of the Other's resistance. In the face of such alterity, I may regard the Other as adversary, particularly if the Other is seen as a threat to my own survival. As long as this view is maintained, it is difficult to see how unity, at the very least with one's fellowman, can be achieved at all.

Non-Indifference

Yet in its indescribable feebleness and resistance, the face commands my respect as it orders me not to kill. As the subject of my regard (*Il me regarde*), the Other is one I am called upon not merely to look at, but look after, at the very least by keeping him alive. It must be noted that the Other's face also looks at me and talks back.12 I become more sensitive to this usually taken-for-granted experience of being looked at or faced in the presence of a different group of people in a foreign environment. In such circumstances I am called upon to transcend myself and to meet or face up to the Other who also transcends me, that is, who puts my autonomy into question and approaches me from a height and from the depth of his/her resistance to my grasp. Self-transcendence requires me to shift from the tendency to control to the ability to welcome the Other with open arms but not with empty hands. Levinas sees this shift as the move to proximity, i.e., when I meet and respond to the Other who approaches and speaks to me. The Other's approach allows me to be deposed from my closed and hitherto sovereign position and to be disposed to the obligation to respond to the Other's appeal and approach.

Proximity therefore summons my responsibility for the Other. In further deepening this sense of responsibility, Levinas explains that the other who approaches me exposed (the nudity of the face as such) and in destitution, calls me to "bear the bankruptcy and wretchedness of the Other, to suffer for his suffering." This is the heart of intentionality, over and above its phenomenological significance: to "turn toward the other who remains separate even in proximity, by also bearing his suffering without light, without measure."13

Proximity, however, does not obliterate difference. The other who approaches never comes near enough to dissolve the distance between the Other and me. I do not lose myself in the relation that cannot be reduced to reciprocity. In this light, one wonders whether in the so-called neighborhood, people who are geographically close may really be in ethical proximity to each other. Ethical proximity, realized in one's bearing of responsibility for the Other cuts across geographical and even ideological barriers. Levinas' point here leaves us with the question of how genuine community can be lived, that is, even within organized (or urbanized) settings.

The non-reciprocality of my responsibility for the Other marks still another (and rather strange) feature of difference: the "asymmetry of the face-to-face relation". I am responsible for the Other, even for his responsibility, but I cannot expect the Other, in turn, to be responsible for me. Furthermore, my responsibility for the Other cannot be calculated beforehand nor can it be subjected to auditing or bookkeeping of services rendered in order to be recompensed.

Levinas' concepts of 'obsession', 'substitution' and 'hostage' further stress the acuteness of this asymmetry and the ethical depth of responsibility. My obsession is triggered by the face: I am extremely affected as one who is caught up in an accusation for something I have not done. This responsibility is "an archic", in the sense that something that has been there prior to any debt incurred, prior to any contract entered into. The obligation of such responsibility is therefore "more passive than any passivity." I am summoned by the Other to answer for him, to stand in his place in order to see to his needs. I myself, and no one else am called; no one can substitute for me. This establishes my identity as a subject. I am subpoenaed by the Other for a charge beyond any fault, before any freedom exercised and before any innocence claimed or any guilt confessed.

Given this rather extreme formulation of responsibility, apathy seems to be the more attractive response of one who is closed in upon oneself (the "practical" question: "Am I my brother's keeper?). Even that being granted, the crucial question is whether I have any choice really before the gaze that singles me out; what becomes of my freedom? Here Levinas moves to an ethical concept of freedom as "the acceptance of a vocation to which I alone can respond or again, the power to respond to it when called. To be free is only to do what nobody else can do in my place."14 Freedom comes from my whole-heartedly taking the initiative to respond (Here I am!), expecting no one else to do so in my place. My responsibility to the Other as other also remains infinite: the more I turn to myself the more I discover that I am responsible; the more just I consider myself the more guilty I find myself to be. The infinity of responsibility and the perpetual unrest that this brings is such that I cannot even have the satisfaction of knowing whether I have done enough.

Any skeptic or "practical-minded person" would find this outrageous. Is this not too much and unfair? And granting that I open myself to this responsibility to an Other, what about the other Others? In other words the personal pronoun "I" may not really be that personal. Given my own finitude, for all intents and purposes, I cannot respond myself single-handedly and totally to an Other, when there are other persons who also call upon me, for there are other persons who also share my world. In addressing this objection, Levinas brings in the concept of the third party (*le tiers*) which will be discussed in the next section. Another question that remains about me: Is not

the Other also responsible for me? Levinas replies, "Perhaps, but that is his affair . . .", again precisely to stress the difference, the non-reciprocatability and extreme individuation of the responsibility of one who goes out of himself in non-indifference to the Other.

A crucial problem remains: how can such a sense of obligation be universalized if it remains individuated? In other words, how is it possible for a plurality of individuals to come together in peace and compassion for one another, despite their difference from each other? This problem must be considered in treating the issue of unity as fraternity.

Towards Unity Beyond the Face-To-Face

These questions present crucial aporiae to Levinas' conception of responsibility in the face-to-face relations, which must be overcome if the discussion is to move beyond the pre-institutionalized moment of face-to-face society. Levinas himself found problematic the fact that there are not only two people in the world (if there were, there would be no problem). The problem of justice or at the very least, justice-for-me also emerges. Furthermore, individuated, nonreciprocal responsibility of one for another, when stretched to its logical or even phenomenological consequences, threatens to rule out the possibility of universalization and therefore unity among a plurality of individuals. Ciaramelli asks the crucial question for philosophers:

How is it possible to express in philosophical language a situation [of the one-for-the-other] so strange that it takes place in the most extreme particularity, yet concerns the universal meaning of subjectivity? . . . If one were to be philosophical about Levinas' concept of responsibility for the other, can one posit that each and every subject will indeed take responsibility for an other?15

Possible answers to such questions can be found indirectly in the notion of the third party, which opens up to the ethico-metaphysical basis of social and political institutions, as well as in the idea of the ethical responsibility as prophetic witnessing.

According to Levinas, ethical responsibility of one for the Other becomes a problem when there are other Others that have to be considered. The undeniable fact that Levinas points to is that the Other's face (i.e., "*that* gaze") implicates other Others. This is manifested in certain enduring patterns of social interaction. It is interesting to note that in language used to address another person with respect, I also allude to other Others. For instance, the French *autrui*, expressing both singularity and plurality, is addressed as *vous* (singular and respectful form for "you") rather than *tu* in the same way that the Filipino, *kayo* (the plural form for "you") is also used for individuals who are to be addressed politely with respect, as one of the ground rules of civility. I may not only have a student or a client but other students and clients as well who demand my availability (the examples are infinite). If it were only a question of one, then my responsibility would be unlimited, without any measure. But involving one more Other, and still more, turns my responsibility into a complicated administrative problem: whom should I respond to first? to what extent? Where is justice when I give in to one and in doing so am no longer able to respond to the others? The problem becomes more complicated knowing that this one should be incomparable from that other. The relation with a third Other thus forces me into a "comparison of the incomparable."

Levinas admits that one cannot avoid comparison, weighing, and thus, calculation, even in situations of face-to-face negotiation of interests. This is where the significance of social and political institutions as part of the third party comes in. With the entrance of a third other, and the third party, "everything is together . . . out of representation is produced the order of justice

moderating or measuring the substitution of me for the other, . . . and there is also justice for me." The third party somewhat "corrects" the imbalance, the asymmetry of the face-to-face relation. For instance, the tragic and sometimes fatal consequences of domestic violence can be avoided with the timely intervention of genuinely compassionate and just social and legal institutions. Housing, mass transportation, water and electrical facilities are needed to help concretize responsibility for others' needs on a grand scale. Economic measures such as tuition fees and taxation schemes can be "socialized." However, the threat of institutional violence which sows hatred of others and even terrorism involving/instigated-by the third party remains possible. The tragedy of the Holocaust in the past half century serves as a constant reminder of this threat (and thus for Levinas is an event never to be forgotten).

It therefore seems that even the intervention of the third party, that which tries to render systematic justice to all, above and within the dyadic justice that is realized in the face-to-face, must be founded precisely on the spirit of compassion springing from one's infinite responsibility for the Other approached straightforwardly and welcomed "in the face." This echoes what Pope John Paul II once said in an address to the President of Nigeria in 1982: "Development pro-jects must always have a human face. They cannot be reduced to a purely materialistic or economic endeavor."16 The proximity engendered in one's non-indifference to the Other in the face-to-face thus serves as a normative basis for the formulation of a development program that would hold together and nurture masses of people.

What of the risk of losing the personal touch when societal relations and institutions become impersonal in the interest of efficiency? Levinas further argues that "justice remains justice only, in a society where there is no distinction between those close and those far off, but in which there also remains the impossibility of passing by the closest."17 Again the absence of distinction here must be spelled out carefully: it is the non-indifference to difference, the non-indifference despite difference. Then again, he strongly reminds us that a just and egalitarian society can thrive only on the inequality in the face-to-face, so that "the equality of all is borne by my inequality, the surplus of my duties over my rights." Justice is animated by the "forgetting of self" (not synonymous to the forgetting of the self) or dying to self. Levinas stresses that:

It is then not without importance to know if the egalitarian and just State in which man is fulfilled (and which is to be set up and especially to be maintained) proceeds from a war of all against all, or from the irreducible responsibility of the one for all, and if it can do without friendships and faces.18

Despite this, the problem of universalizing the attitude for ethical responsibility remains. The problem surfaces on two levels. First, on the institutional level; how can I argue for or "rally" the others to share in the infinite (and unequal) responsibility in order subsequently to even out the inequality? How can I be convinced myself that such magnanimity is not merely the stuff of which saints and heroes are made and therefore one that gives me the excuse that it is, given my human limitations, not easily manageable?

Ciaramelli perceptively asks:

While preserving the diversity of attitudes, how do we argue for the faith in humanity (of the responsible subject) in every person and thereby promote authentic harmony and universal justice?19

A way to address this problem, for Ciaramelli, is found in Levinas' own insight to the fulfillment of the ethical face-to-face relation as "prophetical". This marks the singling out or

"ordination" of each individual, that moment when the individual becomes individuated. Ciaramelli reads Levinas as stressing that each individual as such is called to witness the glory of the Infinite (God) through the human vocation of his/her responsibility for the Other. The individuation of each "I" opens up to universality through my inevitable link with an other. It is within this idea that Levinas hints at the relevance of institutions. But the singularity of each person is preserved in that "It is only from the perspective of my own assignation and election that I can put it into words. My own particular situation remains nonreciprocal and my position cannot be generalized."20

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to highlight various aspects of difference between one and the Other in the ethical relation founded on the face. In so doing, it has tried also to show how difference is never obliterated even as one refrains from being indifferent to the other in one's responsibility for the Other. Furthermore, it has shown, albeit sketchily, how responsibility for the Other, when assumed by each individual, who paradoxically cannot presuppose this of other individuals, opens up the very possibility of genuine unity. Genuine unity within society cannot be achieved till people become faces to each other.

The chapter has introduced insights on sociality that breeds non-indifference while respecting difference. Civil societies survive and flourish only as long as the people who belong in it do not lose sight of the face. Such insights, however, need further development. Perhaps all is prayer for a kind of fraternity that remains to be seen. However, one conclusion has surfaced: civil society can survive and flourish only so long as the people in it do not lose sight of the face.

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Notes

1. Among the works referred to in this study are *Totality and Infinity: An Essay in Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1969 (hereafter cited as *TI*); *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence*, trans. A. Lingis, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978 (hereafter cited as *OBBE*). also helpful in introducing Levinas' main thought is *Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo,* trans. Richard Cohen, Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985.

2. In this paper, the word Other (with a capital "O") is used to signify the other person in his irreducible otherness (*Autrui*) and other (with a lowercased "o") or Autre, to refer to the adjective qualifying a person as other but within the categories of the same (*meme*), following Levinas' own linguistic distinctions.

3. Such phenomenology incorporates and criticizes a long tradition of phenomenology founded by Husserl and Heidegger, for which there is no space in this paper to explore.

4. TI, p. 194.

5. John Llewelyn, *Beyond Metaphysics*? (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1985), p. 154.

6. From hereon the shift to the first person pronoun becomes crucial. More recent scholars of Levinas' works find ethical significance in the ambiguity of this pronoun's antecedent (whether it

refers to the author, Levinas, or a pseudonym for anyone) as we shall see in the later part of this paper.

7. Levinas, *Ethics and Infinity,* p. 86. Note, however, that the gaze in those eyes becomes ethically significant as will be seen in the second section of this paper.

8. *Ibid.*, pp. 85-86.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 86.

10. *Ibid.*

11. Wright, Tamra, et al., "The Paradox of Morality: An Interview with Emmanuel Levinas" in *The Revocation of Levinas: Rethinking the Other,* eds. Robert Bernasconi and David Woods (London: Routledge, 1988), p. 173.

12. A point that Jill Robbins underscores and pursues in her article, *Visage, Figure: Reading Levinas'* Totality and Infinity, *Yale French Studies* 79 (1991): 138.

13. Levinas, "Beyond Intentionality," in *Philosophy in France Today,* ed. Alan Montefiore, 1983).

14. Levinas*, L'audela du verset* (Paris, Minuit, 1982, 178 n. 6, 132), quoted by Fabio Ciaramelli, "Levinas" Ethical Discourse between Individuation and Universality" in *Re-reading Levinas,* eds. Robert Bernasconi and Simon Critchley (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 88.

15. Ciaramelli, "Levinas' Ethical Discourse" in *Re-reading Levinas,* p. 86.

16. Address to President Alhaji Shehu Shagari in the State House, 12 February 1982, in John Paul II, *Africa: Land of Promise, Land of Hope* (Boston, M.A.: Daughters of St. Paul, 1982), p. 28.

17. OB, p. 159.

18. OBBE, p. 159, italics mine.

19. Ciaramelli, "Levinas' Ethical Discourse" in *Re-reading Levinas,* p. 86.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 92.

4
Gadamer, Tradition and Dialogue

Antonette Palma-Angeles

Introduction

The word "civil" is an adjective which can be defined loosely as that which pertains to a community of citizens. Civil society refers to the life of citizens and their interrelations. Hans-Georg Gadamer, whose name is synonymous with the redevelopment of hermeneutics did not elaborate a philosophy of civil society or of the state. He has not even worked out a social philosophy, but has refined his position about social reason largely in the context of his long dialogue with Jürgen Habermas in the 70s, which dominated the German philosophical scene. Social reason was not discussed thematically in his magnum opus, *Truth and Method*.

Gadamer and Tradition

Nevertheless, Gadamer is still important to this discussion on philosophy and civil society. His self-proclaimed task was to uncover a truth in the human sciences (*Geisteswissenschaften*), which cannot be derived from the methodology of the physical sciences. This involves the rehabilitation of such old humanistic concepts as culture (*Bildung)*, taste and judgment, which he used in order to ground the human sciences. As these concepts evolve communally and at the same time contribute to the progressive development of community, *Bildung* acquires the meaning of constant formation. By way of these concepts Gadamer shows that truth is defined communally, rather than being derived solely methodologically as in the exact sciences.

Thus, though Gadamer's concern was truth in the human sciences, along the way he fashioned an understanding of community and culture (*Bildung*) which can be helpful in understanding civil society. Gadamer believes that solidarity is the condition of possibility of every individual event of understanding. This condition is a continuity of the solidarity or tradition of the one attempting to understand and of what is being understood. A community's history is continuous, that is, it is effective in present understanding. Yet it is not duplicated in every event of understanding, but is applied or creatively appropriated for present concerns which necessarily define the context in which anything from the past unfolds. What results is a fusion of horizons past and present. Hence, understanding is also application.

This creative appropriation, which always is implemented by individual freedom, is examined by Gadamer in terms of an ontology. That is, he focuses not so much on the individual's participation in his or her community as a willed and deliberate act, but as a reality spawned by one's being community-bound, or to put it in Heideggerian terms as a result of one's being-in-the-world. Freedom and understanding, as Gadamer understands these, are defined and restricted by a prior belongingness (*Zugehorigkeit*). As a result, Gadamer does not develop a normative discussion regarding the nature of civil society, but limits himself to an ontological description of how a community grows and changes.

Neither natural necessities nor causal compulsions determine our thinking and our intending--whether we will and act, fear or hope or despair, we are moved in the space of freedom. This

space is not the free space of an abstract joy in construction, but a space filled with reality by prior familiarity.1

For Gadamer the core of the discussion is this prior familiarity he calls effective history and which invites him to review the meaning of prejudice.

Gadamer and Dialogue

Prejudice is the foundation of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics; it is perhaps the most controversial concept in his philosophy. He speaks of the hermeneutic experience as an insertion into a world of relations and meanings (tradition), which is concretized and embodied in the language of a community. This insertion is not our doing, but is the mode of our existence. The result of this is a peculiar way of knowing and looking at the world. Even before we actually think we know, we already know in a certain way. Gadamer calls this phenomenon pre-understanding. He boldly states that understanding is always prejudiced, inasmuch as it is defined by culture and the community which define our language and our lives.

This biased hermeneutical situation has been looked upon constantly as an obstacle by disciplines predisposed to the objectifying mode of science and whose conception of knowledge is transcendent. Positing our relation to the world as one of separation from an object and the field of knowledge to be clearly delimited, it sees prejudice as compromising its neutrality and constituting an obstacle which method should overcome.

Gadamer considers this to be naive and focuses instead on our prior belongingness (*Zugehorigkeit*) to the world. In other words, the world cannot function primarily as an object to us as subject. The implication of this for our knowledge is that everything experienced is always a linguistic interpretation. Language, say Gadamer, is the "fundamental mode of operation of our being-in-the-world" but it is also the "all-embracing form of the constitution of the world."2

On the one hand, language displays the limits of our finitude and is therefore particular for it exhibits the way of life of a particular community. On the other hand, its reality is not circumscribed by any one language: it is the whole which embraces all beings-in-the-world, all linguistic communities. Language for Gadamer has a speculative nature exhibiting the complex relation between the totality that is the world and its finite manifestation in our human experience of that world. In other words, Gadamer sees tradition as a totality embodied in the reality of language, which manifests itself in the diverse presentations we call linguistic communities.

Tradition is a totality which exists to be differentiated in all its self-showings. Thus, the diversity of human communities and cultures is the self-manifestation of a whole. In this thesis Gadamer commits himself to two things: primarily, that different linguistic communities are not really isolated from each other; and secondarily, that a critique of a community's reason can be only within the context of a history which is effective. These two related points have important repercussions for the possibility of dialogue among communities and for the kind of changes individual communities realistically can initiate.

The Relation of Linguistic Communities

There is a seeming contradiction in Gadamer's conception of language in that he sees it as a totality or a whole which presents itself in a plurality and diversity of communities, yet it exists only in its concretization. The whole which Gadamer imagines language to be is not one accessible to anyone. He speaks of this as a "bad infinity" in that it remains to be anticipated. But it is precisely

this presupposition of a whole that allows Gadamer to be optimistic about the possibility of dialogue and prevents his philosophy from being relativistic.

Gadamer underplays the conception of dialogue as the balancing of two opinions. Instead he focuses on its to-and-fro nature which arises from its open-endedness. In other words, the primary element of dialogue for him is not the presence of two people filled with different ideas, but their willingness to let the subject matter develop or come into its own. What leads is the subject matter, not the people caught in the dialogue. "To conduct a conversation means to allow oneself to be conducted by the subject matter to which the partners in the dialogue are oriented."3

Thus, to converse is to recognize the "otherness" of another person or community. "Knowledge always means, precisely, considering opposites."4 We open ourselves to opposites because the subject matter which unfolds in dialogue is beyond each of the conversants.

Dialogue among communities is imperative because our societies are not enclosures with walls that keep us in. The totality of which Gadamer speaks is not commensurate and circumscribable by the limits any one group. That our communities are not traps is concretely manifested first in our ability to learn other languages and second in the ability of languages to change.

Languages are world orientations, to learn another language is to gain access to another orientation. We never abandon the worldview acquired through the mother tongue, but we do learn second and third languages. In language learning the world shows itself to be beyond the confines of what one previously thought to be its limits. Social reason thus shows itself to be beyond any one language and through dialogue is always in a process of formation.

Individual languages change as a community meets new challenges, redefines its needs, etc. That language has this virtuality can be explained again by the fact that language opens itself to a whole beyond its concretizations: language is porous. This expansion, however, is not a teleological movement. Our world picture is constantly expanding, but this infinity is manifested only through our finite experiences, in our feeble attempts at dialogue, both within our communities and with others.

Critique and Effective History

Change within any community is prompted by what is familiar and stable. Gadamer speaks of solidarity as the basic human situation which allows us to come to terms with change. The utopia of which every society dreams is not some far away future, but is the corrective of the present. The ideal we wish to pursue casts a critical light upon what has gone before. In this sense, it remains inextricably tied to the past.5 The solidarity which grounds a community is thus neither a starting point which is disruptive, nor a future goal which is not yet realized; for Gadamer, it is a process fostered only by a tireless ongoing conversation.

Radical changes are then ruled out by Gadamer. Revolutions never cut off the present society from a past it abhors. The famous 1986 Philippine EDSA revolution for instance ushered in new leaders, even a renewed faith in democracy. But the changes which unfolded in the subsequent years were far from radical. Much of the changes that the present and past leaders of government have successfully instituted have been possible only given a profound understanding of the Filipino culture, which specifies what is acceptable and feasible at any point in time. For instance, Philippine NGOs have come to realize that change in electoral attitudes and behaviors among Filipinos will not be achieved in five years. Their work of conscientization in the last two decades has not allowed enough alternative politicians to be elected, while even the alternative politicians

which rose from NGOs have to reckon with traditional politics to make inroads in governance. Phronesis has been a most important tool in social action:

What man needs is not just the persistent asking of ultimate questions, but the sense of what is feasible. . . . The philosopher, of all people, must, I think, be aware of the tension between what he claims to achieve and the reality in which he claims to find himself.6

What is that reality? For Gadamer it is that we are always already in a certain linguistic tradition. Even its critique cannot provide a transcendence which gives the luxury of a radically new beginning. What we have is an expansion of our world view, fostered by dialogue.

Conclusion

Gadamer never tires of admonishing us that a hermeneutical consciousness, despite effective of history in our understanding, never achieves transcendence. In fact, it functions more like a Greek oracle constantly telling us, "Know that you are a man and no god."7 The role of a Cassandra does not fit a philosopher, who can never write the final chapter to the continuing unfolding of human tradition, not even if his name be Hegel or Heidegger.

The world as we know it today is constantly expanding, and not merely to the regions of our own country or continent. Technology has given us a sense of community which is truly global so that whether we like it or not we are forced to reckon with differences. But because of the achieved level of progress and world solidarity we have everything to lose if we focus on differences rather than upon similarities. For this, dialogue has become even more imperative as the usher to the next century. Solidarity or harmony already exists, but this must be redefined as our conception of civil society changes, as do all the other forces of human life.

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Notes

1. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in Age of Science*, trans. by Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1981), p. 51.
2. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, trans., ed. and Introduction by David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976), p. 3.
3. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd rev. ed., tran. by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald Marchall (New York: Continuum Publishing Co., 1994), p. 367.
4. *Ibid.*, p 363.
5. *Reason in Age of Science*, pp. 79-80.
6. *Truth and Method*, p. xxxviii.
7. *Reason in Age of Science*, p. 150.

Discussion

It is important to note the phenomenological character of the thought of H.-G. Gadamer. This contrasts with the abstract rationalism which characterizes modern thought, for which what is real is the abstract and universal. In that light the philosophical search is to find universal ethical norms. These must be detached from life so that, as clear and distinct ideas, they can be treated with analytic tools.

The difficulty is that where these are impressed upon the process of life they prove quite insensitive to the concrete free human interchanges from which they were abstracted. They can provide guidance and some minimal ethical norms, but where they attempt to rule the whole they oppress rather than promote human freedom. This is the essence of an ideology as a pattern of clear ideas insensitive to the concrete exercise of human freedom which is a unique process because it consists in creative self-determination, rather than being determinated from without or by universal and common patterns from within.

In the modern context in which it is the universal that is clear to the human intellects and hence considered to be real, what is unique in the exercise of human freedom in time is discounted as relative; to work with this is to fall into a disaggregation of actions which are discounted under the term "relativism".

In the footsteps traced by his predecessors E. Husserl and M. Heidegger, Gadamer looks squarely at these unique acts of human freedom. Rather than leaving these as disaggregated moments with little significance, he sees these as the most proper exercise of properly human life.

Beyond this he sees these as being exercised in continuity not only with other acts of one's freedom, but especially in continuity with the whole process of lived freedom through the ages. It is this broader unfolding of human meaning which has shaped itself into various patterns or cultures. These provide the store of human meaning which then enables one's concrete expressions to have meaning.

In this way the phenomenological turn replaces the abstract universal ideas of modern rationalism with the lived actuality of tradition as the basis and guide for the exercise of human freedom. This allows for the uniqueness of the concrete exercises of human freedom, but locates them always in relation to the whole of a cultural tradition which they apply in ever new and unique ways and thereby renew and keep alive.

In this light, pattern of life, rather than being dismissed as merely relative, attain special meaning. These consist in an absolute good toward which all particular goods are directed and are interrelated among themselves in a linguistic whole which allows for mutual understanding between different expressions. They constitute the whole that is one's cultural tradition. In particular, this makes possible a new insight into civil society and its various unities. These appear not merely as aggregates of individuals, but rather as distinct areas or sets of meaning within which and in terms of which persons can unfold their own insights and exercise their own freedom and creativity.

Thus civil society, with its multiple groupings in relation to the various facets of life and the various persons who wish to engage in each, becomes the condition of active freedom. It provides the heritage of concern and insight on the basis of which new and creative steps can be taken. It is then civil life rather than ideology that is the basis of social action and expression.

Some would suggest that this shows that what is important is not philosophy but life. But that supposes a divorce between philosophy and life after the manner, again, of a rationalism focused

upon reason and ideas rather then, as with Gadamer's phenomenology, upon the free exercise of human life. Rightly understood the philosophy is the reflective personal dimension of life. Hence, it may be misleading to speak of an "applied" ethics as if ethics existed abstractly as a universal mental construct to be applied diversely to different fields such as business or medicine.

In Gadamer's view it would be the contrary. Ethics would emerge from the human experience of acting in these areas; it would consist not of abstract principles, but of cumulative learning from living in the light of what has been learned through the life of this cultural tradition. Indeed, philosophy is just this process of learning and discerning in the application of the tradition in new circumstances.

Further, as life, philosophy should be seen not simply as a matter of choosing this response rather than that, but as enabling life, with its store of wisdom and love, to flow again and ever more richly in our times. In this way we live with confidence that our tradition has more to say to us, but that it is we who must speak it.

5.

Science, Civil Society and Metaphysics

Zhou Changzhong

The origin and nature of civil society, can be illumined not only by contrasting it to feudal society but by considering two revolutions in the history of modern Western science. One is its initiation in the 17th century: the other is its contemporary crisis. Both correspond loosely to the modern formations of civil society and its development. Reflecting on these coordinated developments in science and society enables deeper insight into present social changes.

Modern science was generated in the West and diffused through other parts of the world, including China. Just as the rise of modern science in China generated an "objective turn" in culture, today's "subjective turn" in science could have important implications for the renewal of society. These developments in science will be the focus of this comparative study, with special attention to their implications for civil society.

Western Science: Objective and Subjective

At its birth in ancient Greece, Western science was strictly speaking only a philosophy of nature. Metaphysics or ontology provided both the premises for the philosophy of nature and reflection thereupon. It distinguished two worlds: one of objective phenomena and the other of essence, and focused upon the latter. Science, in contrast, was concerned with the representations of objective reality. For it the objective world is primary; in the last analysis even the knowing subject is an objective being. Western philosophy has long reflected this objective orientation, considering humans and their social construct as objective beings.

But modern Western philosophy took also a subjective turn in attending to the thinking subject. As science entered its contemporary phase in post-industrial society, this subjective turn was pushed further by attending to the human person as a cultural subject freely creating his or her social world. This is central to the new developments regarding civil society. Let us look more closely at these objective and subjective phases.

The Development of Objectivity in the Physical Sciences: The rise of modern science is closely related with the transition of Western society from medieval society to a modern society. As B. Barber noted in his *Science and the Social Order*, modern science emphasizes the combination of rational thinking and directly observable experience. This entails attention to natural facts, experience and experimentation. In addition, there was a secularization of knowledge related in the tolerance and then promotion by states and governments of inquiry into natural knowledge.

Viewed externally, modern science appears for the first time as a social phenomena in the establishment of scientific societies. These promoted a process of professionalization and specialization in science. These, in turn, evoked a strong utilitarian demand for science by modern Western society. Such internal and external changes in modern science were intimately interrelated. Supported by these societies, the experimental sciences gave full play to the naturalistic spirit, and at the same time obtained the necessary material facilities (sites, equipment and money for experiments) from their work so that the experimental sciences were able to meet

the societies' utilitarian demands. This generated a progressively reinforcing cycle between greater support for the scientific societies and further developments in the experimental sciences.

The rise of science in the modern Western society engendered philosophical refection, which, in turn, led to developments in metaphysics. Alfred North Whitehead in his *Science and the Modern World* pointed out that the new way of thinking generated by modern science completely changed metaphysical premises and content. This modern change in the Western philosophy was attributed mainly to Francis Bacon who, on the one hand, proposed an inductive methodology for experimental science, but more importantly and fundamentally reflected philosophically upon science from the social point of view. His philosophy sowed the social foundations for the revolution of knowledge (see J. Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*). According to Bacon, science not only shows human beings to be a mirror of nature, but also tells us that humans contribute to the welfare of society by producing knowledge via experiments.

The Development of Subjectivity through Social Concerns: While contemporary science has had decisive influence in various fields of society, it appears to have had a serious negative impact upon spiritual civilization. H. Marcuse in his *One Dimensional Man* stated that under the rule of advanced science and technology, contemporary society mainly suppressed free human development. High productivity based on high technology is destructive of human involvement and the free development of human talents; this, in turn, leads society back to barbarism.

To this social attack from contemporary science, philosophy has responded by focusing on the life of the human person in society. E. Husserl in *The Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology* stated that positive science which considers facts, but does not envisage their human meaning, means nothing for us as free subjects and completely misses the reality of subjectivity. Hence in his philosophy he intended to override Platonism's emphasis on objective essences by turning to the subjective aspect of the human life and action in the "life-world".

At the beginning of modern science, however, the subjective turn had consisted only in concern for the human being as agent, which action consisted mainly in experimental activities remolding nature. This subjectivity, however, was soon cancelled by positivistic philosophy, especially operationalism according to which conceptions are thoroughly reducible to operations, so that all that is human is objectified in operational behaviors. In response, in this century metaphysicians discovered that in order to overcome an essentialistic definition of the human being it is imperative to carry subjectivity to the utmost, that is, to define humans as subjective existents, which the existentialists placed prior to essence. Hence, they attributed ontological status to this subjective existence and proposed that philosophy should begin from subjectivity as its first principle.

What is the "human as subjective existence"? In his "Essay on Man" E. Cassirer replied that a human being is a subject acting freely to create culture; and that human nature is a system composed of activities including language, myths, religion, arts, science and history. This points to the importance of civil society in which all this is lived.

Chinese Traditional Metaphysics

Chinese traditional metaphysics is characterized mainly by the integration of heaven and the human. In turn, humans are one with the world which, in the last analysis, is the subjective

experience of humans. Thus, to a great extent, Chinese traditional metaphysics features subjectivity.

However, as Chinese feudal society, which had existed for more than 1000 years, began to turn toward civil society in the middle of the last century, the science and technology diffused from the West played a major role, generating an objective turn in the traditional Chinese metaphysics. The absorption of science and technology by society, and hence the objective turn in the metaphysics, were profound.

This modernization of Chinese society consists of two important consecutive phases: a period of Westernization and Reformation and the May 4 movement.

Objectivity in the Period of Westernization and Modernization: The rise of modern Chinese civil society came simultaneously with the introduction of Western science and technology, which entailed an objective turn.

With the second Opium War the closed Chinese empire sought arms reflecting Western science and technology. There resulted a great transformation in the common opinion of the court and the community consisting essentially in adopting modern civilization. The program of the Westernization Movement called for learning science and technology from the West, developing modern industries such as arms and machines, self-strengthening, and striving to become rich.

To these great changes, philosophy immediately responded with such doctrines as "Chinese scholarship as *Tao* (metaphysics) and Western scholarship as Qi (visible things)", "Chinese scholarship as *Tao* and Western scholarship as Yi (practical technology)". In these views, Western scholarship concerned only the practical arts or the level of Qi, and should only supplement Chinese scholarship as *Tao*. But even this meant facing up to Western scholarship, which due to the fundamental differences from Chinese scholarship meant an "objective turn" for Chinese thought.

The Chinese Reform Movement promoted the diffusion of Western scholarship, extending its scope to philosophy and the social sciences, and hence to social reformation in politics, law and education. This reformation, in turn, promoted further change in patterns of thought. By reflection on Western science and technology at the levels of theory and culture, it absorbed Western scholarship in a fusion of Chinese and Western scholarship.

By virtue of this fusion the objectivity which characterized Western scholarship came to manifest itself in Chinese scholars. Thus, Liang Qi-chao grasped the objectivity of Bacon’s philosophy, and considered subjectivity an obstruction to knowledge. Yan Fu reflected the profoundly objective character of Western scholarship in promoting its following features: grasping things in their essence and striving for a knowledge of systems with certainty and precision. On this basis he insisted on following the Western approach to objective nature and reality. Thus the objective turn was inserted within Chinese traditional philosophy as a ruling principle.

Objectivity and the period of the May 4 the Movement: As China began to move toward modern society in the May 4th Movement the interaction of Chinese and Western cultures took place in a broad social and historical context.

In this period, Chinese society was in a process of radical change. It was still in a semi-feudal and semi-colonial state, but was beginning a forward movement toward escape from this backward state. The May 4th the Movement, as a Chinese renaissance, reflected this social state and its implications for the field of ideas. Chinese philosophy enhanced the importance of objectivity

derived from Western science, making it a norm of thought which it suffused through the entire Chinese culture.

Whereas in the Reformation movement the fusion of Chinese and Western scholarship rested basically upon a static comparison of Chinese and Western cultures, in the May 4 Movement, the comparison shifted consciously to the longitudinal historical flow of society, and thus penetrated more deeply. Science occupied a prominent place in philosophical reflection, at the same time that science became the focus of the comparison of Chinese and Western cultures. Thus, Hu Shi grasped the need and importance of science for the transition of Chinese culture in the social and historical conditions of China.

In this period, fascination with material achievements and the experience of science as a phenomenon of knowledge led to efforts to grasp the scientific spirit; this became a main aim of philosophical reflection on science. Both Hu Shi and Lian Qi-chao emphasized that the fundamental spirit of Western science consisted in the search for objective knowledge. Truth was seen to consist in knowledge of things themselves that was inter-individual, transitive and corresponded to objective reality. The development of this objective spirit of science at a profound level led naturally to deepening the objective turn in Chinese traditional philosophy.

Firstly, this manifested itself in enhancing science from the level of Yi and Qi to that of *Tao*. The celebrated debate of science and philosophy in this period with regard to the outlook on life strikingly reflected the deepening of the objective turn. In the debate the school of science with its objective spirit strove to replace the *Tao* as the outlook on life.

Secondly, an effort was made to inquire into the doctrines of scientific objectivity in non-orthodox philosophy which, in conjunction with the objective spirit of Western science, gave renewed momentum to the objective turn in traditional Chinese philosophy.1

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Note

1. Through the structure of his three critiques, Kant suggests how the universal and necessary laws of science are distinct from the realm of freedom and how the two are synthesized only through the third critique of aesthetic judgement. A parallel role for the Confucian sense of harmony is described in chapter III of G. McLean, *Tradition, Harmony and Transcendence* (Washington: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1994).

Discussion

This paper traces the developments of the issue of subjectivity vs objectivity in science with special attention to its implications for civil society and the overall philosophy of life. It thereby situates the discussion of civil society in the more general issue of concern for technological progress in China.

The general schema of the paper sees scientific knowledge in feudal times as being relatively subjective, with its development in modern times as being oriented principally toward objective knowledge, but more recently beginning to reintegrate subjectivity.

The paper sees as parallel to this pattern the evolution of both social life and philosophy. The discussion takes up a number of essential issues.

1. *Science*. It is true that key figures in the development of science in early modern times, such as Francis Bacon, sought objectivity and were willing rigorously to expunge any elements of subjectivity in order to work with exclusively objective knowledge. At the time, others, such as Gianbattista Vico, objected that this was to abandon what was properly human. Nevertheless, the project proceeded and became even more radical and ideological.

This trend has been exemplified by Mario Laserna ("Kant's Relation to Thalesian Geometry and to Galilean Physics") in relation to the notion of demonstration. Galileo, who was pivotal in developing the new science wrote the work: *Discorsi e dimonstrazioni matematiche, intorno a due nuove scienze* (first edition; Leiden 1638). On the title page the largest type is given to the word "Demonstration". To him this meant not analytic deduction, but the work of the mind in thinking *a priori* in functional terms in order to assemble the available data in a coherent manner (the precise task which Kant attributes to the imagination in his third Critique). The importance he saw in the work of the subject having been forgotten, however, the translators of the work, Henry Crew and Alfonso de Salvio, simply omitted the term "demonstration" from the title. Similarly, where in his pivotal *Critique of Pure Reason* (Bxi-xii) Kant wrote: "the first man . . . who demonstrated the isosceles triangle", this has been translated as "the first man . . . who demonstrated the properties of the isosceles triangle", thereby reducing Kant's more open notion of demonstration to merely that of logical inference of properties according to the Euclidean axiomatic-deductive method.

This is not to say that there was intentional deceit on the part of the translators or that some type of conscious plot was afoot. Rather the dynamic was much more dangerous precisely because more insidious and unconscious. Namely, having embarked upon a radical objectivism, succeeding generations of practitioners and theoreticians of science were blinded to the human capabilities involved in scientific work. This led to reinforcing the blindness progressively by translating the very texts which could have helped to balance the matter in a way which instead closed off such a path.

Like a miner destroying the tunnel behind him, this cut off the possibility of taking Heidegger's "step backward" in order to open up new and as yet unexplored avenues of understanding. This closure of access to alternate and complementary resources turns an advance in thought into a reductionism and an ideology from which there is no escape: all loops back to this same objectivist position. Escape becomes logically impossible; one is trapped in this objectivism which thus becomes exclusivist and ideological.

2. *Subjectivity and Civil Society*. The paper notes that this was paralleled by a development of the notion of civil society in these early modern times. This appeared in the writings of the Scottish thinkers, Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson (*An Essay on the History of Civil*

Society [Edinburgh:1767]), where it played the role of a safety net protecting against the human ravages of capitalism's blind hidden hand of the market. It would not be incorrect then to consider civil society as related to (though more as a protection against) the objectivism of knowledge operative in the development of science in the early modern period. The social implication of that objectivism was rather an insensitivity to human freedom and creativity, and a progressive ideologization of capitalism which culminated in the Cold War.

In this context, the notion of civil society could not receive adequate development in modern times; even such prime theoreticians as Hegel and Marx considered it to be inadequate and destined to be superseded. Hence, only in the present post-modern period is this able to be radically rethought as the basis for a newly integrating vision of social life.

Some would see this as having been repeated in the history of China during this century. When in 1919 Mr. Science and Mr. Democracy were invited in it was hoped that the combination would provide for the modernization of China. The combination, however, proved unstable, for science was taken too simply to imply objective knowledge and to reject subjectivity. But without subjectivity the reality of freedom, on which democracy must be based, was itself depreciated and undermined. Thus, the path was opened to a "scientific" view of history in which objective laws would rule and individual activity would be of value only to the degree that it operated exclusively as a replaceable function in the larger machine. Where this occurred in Eastern Europe the subjectivity and creativity of a people was lost, and with it their ability truly to provide themselves, resulting in the collapse of `89.

3. *Objectivity and Hypothesis in Scientific Theory*. Within developments in the theory of scientific method one road was suggested by which the civil society could be developed. The implication of #1 above was that objectivism in science could have been salutary for its realist implications, i.e., for engaging the human mind in the dynamics of the world beyond it. However, the reductionist mode of its development turned it into a structure only of ideas, an ideology, which closed human horizons and desensitized humankind precisely to what it meant to be human. Thus, freedom could be no more than choices between external goods chosen for utilitarian, that is, external material purposes. This is the heart of consumerism which thereby becomes inescapable.

One way in which these negative effects might be attenuated, would be to delineate closely the proper achievements available through an objective method, while the non-essential restrictions are identified and put aside. In this sense it was suggested that scientific thought does not in fact provide objective knowledge or truth, but only develops hypotheses which one attempts to verify and which lead in turn to further hypothesis. This brings one not to objective knowledge, but rather to mystery, for which the appropriate method is aesthetics. In this light scientific knowledge can be seen as integral to culture as the more important and integrative outlook and practice of life. Conversely, one can understand the disastrous implications of the substitution of *Tao* by science earlier in this century, as described by Zhou Chang-zhong above.

4. *Aesthetic Criteria*. The opening to subjectivity in modern science is the positive correlate to the negative roots traced above. There is a relation here between philosophy and scientific theory. The phenomenological school of Edmund Husserl set out to clarify the categories of science through an eidetic reduction. From Brentano's Aristotelianism he rediscovered the intentional or conscious elements involved. Hence, rather than being limited in a purely external objectivism, he was able to enter into the inner constitution of knowledge and restore what was properly human to the scientific endeavor.

Husserl's successor, Martin Heidegger, turned this awareness from science to an appreciation of being; in turn, his successor H.-G. Gadamer applied it to culture. Correlatively, and probably as

a result in the varied ways in which ideas interact in a culture, this was reflected in an increasing attention to the importance of aesthetic criteria in the selection from among alternate possibilities, e.g., in mathematical theory the characteristic of simplicity, and in the development of science the search for a unified field theory.

5. *Subjectivity and Civil Society*. In this light it may be more helpful to relate the attention to civil society only in an auxiliary manner to the beginnings of modern rationalism and objectivity, and to grasp its present importance in terms not so much of the development of objectivity, as of the redevelopment of subjectivity in science. Thus, with the end of the Cold War ideologies, the task becomes that of reconstructing the social order in a way which integrates an objective awareness of the factors at play in our environment. But especially the task is to direct attention to the subjective reality of the human person with its characteristic freedom and its essential transcendence and openness to others, and hence to the reality of the social dimension of the human person in all its complexity. It is here that solidarity and subsidiarity are found, and hence the constitution and evolution of civil society.

Part II
Some Philosophical Principles for Civil Society

6.

Social Development and Improvement of the Moral Quality of City-Dwellers

Wang Miaoyang

As a modern concept, urban life appears along with establishment of the market economy and the formation of civil society. Modernization can be understood as a process of urbanization, secularization and rationalization; it is also the context for the development and progress of civil society. However, the historical experience of developed countries shows that economic development did not bring about social progress in all respects and that there still exist social problems which threaten human subsistence and development. Further, many persons are materially rich, but spiritually poor. In view of these problems, it appears that in the process of modernization the improvement of the individual moral quality of urban inhabitants needs to be an important concern for the entire society.

Historical Progress in Understanding Social Development

The development of contemporary society has implied considerable change in the concept of development itself. Before World War II, it was generally considered that the problem of social development could be solved automatically by economic growth. However, this link of social development to economic growth later proved to be onesided. After investigating the situation of France, an American scholar came to the conclusion that economic prosperity alone is not a sufficient condition in order for a society to be stable and for its people to live and work contentedly and in peace. He showed that in the course of its modernization urban French communities experienced a great economic leap. The resulting unprecedented prosperity, however, generated a feeling of insecurity. The main reason for this was that, with economic growth, traditional social groups disintegrated and some *nouveau riche* suddenly appeared which broadened the gap between the poor and the rich. Traditional morals were violated, corruption pervaded the entire society and grievances on the part of ordinary people reached a climax. Therefore the view that social development depends exclusively upon economic growth not only cannot ensure a healthy development of social life, but can damage continuous economic growth.

After World War II, it was suggested that the objective of social development should not be defined merely as economic growth, but should include also supplying the needs of people's daily lives. This view drew much attention. However, the impact of high-technology and the pursuit of the fulfillment of these needs produced many negative effects. These included ecological damage, unlimited exploitation of natural resources and neglect of the complete development of human beings and of improvement in the quality of human life. Under such circumstances, a comprehensive view of development which sets as one of the objectives of social development the improvement of the quality of human life now attracts ever greater attention and is accepted by more and more people.

This historical progress regarding social development marks the transition from a matter-centered to a human-centered state, and hence the advance of modern civil society. In fact, the above-mentioned three objectives, that is, acceleration of economic growth, fulfillment of people's needs and improvement of the quality of human life are internally interconnected: they are

mutually dependent and mutually promoted. The human-centered comprehensive view of development actually is embraced in Karl Marx's theory of scientific socialism, particularly in his goal of an ideal future society. Now China is in a period of socialist modernization. By unifying the foregoing factors--economic growth, meeting people's needs and improving the quality of human life--in a dialectical manner the theory of building socialism with Chinese features, created by Deng Xiaoping, puts forward a comprehensive view for social development with Chinese features.

Deng Xiaoping proposed that economic construction occupy the central position, and that the ultimate task for the present stage is the development of productive forces. He also pointed out that the nature of socialism is to liberate and develop productive force, to wipe out exploitation, to eliminate polarization in wealth and to reach the final goal of universal prosperity. In this way, he unified economic growth with the satisfaction of people's needs. Deng also insisted that in the course of socialist modernization two tasks should be given equal importance: one is the construction of material civilization and the other is the construction of spiritual civilization. The cultivation of a newly-educated and disciplined generation, with splendid ideals and noble morals, is the basic task in the construction of spiritual civilization.

The Double Effects of the Market Economy on Morality and Human Development

The experience of most countries in the world shows that the development of civil society and its modernization must be based on the growth of a market economy, which can be regarded as a developed commodity economy. Under the impact of the scientific and technological revolution, the rapid development of the market economy serves as a driving force for the rapid improvement of social productive forces and a heightened prosperity for the social economy. Before the founding of the new China, the country had long been a semi-feudal and semi-colonial society. Hence, the market economy was imperfect and in a strict sense there were no civil societies and urban centers as in Western European countries. On the founding of the People's Republic of China, a planned economy was generally adopted, but the commodity economy was not fully developed and the system of market economy was not set up and perfected until 1978. Then the open door policy was formally adopted and the proposition of establishing a socialist market economy was definitely set out.

In the high tide of modernization and market economy which followed, the mental outlook and moral ideas of the people have undergone great changes. In the present situation, the development of a market economy has both positive and negative effects upon peoples' ideology and moral quality, and hence upon social progress and human development. These double effects should be conditioned or controlled through society so that the positive effect can be brought into full display and the negative effect reduced to a minimum.

Is the market economy really a good economic system; can it be accepted by socialist countries? So far as the present condition in China is concerned, most people agree that the market economy is neither the devil it was considered to be in the past, nor the angel it was later overestimated to be. The fact is that it has twin positive and negative effects. It is wrong to reject the compatibility of a market economy with the socialist system, or the positive effects of the market, due to some corruption as a negative effect. First of all, it is through the average of market competition in the whole society, not through individual market exchanges, that the law of values takes effect. This is the main force that propels an enterprise to improve its management, to adopt new technology, to allocate material resources more effectively, to raise the productive efficiency

and to reduce costs, thus accelerating the development of production and of the economy. Secondly, the socialist system requires democracy, and without an exchange of commodities at equal value, there will be no modern democracy. The market economy begins from the principle of exchange at equal value and through equal competition achieves its goals of survival of the fittest and optimum allocation of productive capabilities and material resources. The market economy is not only the driving force of economic development, but also the economic base for democratic politics. Lastly, it seems more appropriate to attribute the cause of the phenomenon of corruption in society to feudal privilege, rather than to corruptive capitalist ideas. A market economy not only needs equal and open competition, but also requires that social justice be guaranteed by legal regulation and social norms. Therefore it helps to punish corruption, to disclose social evils and to check its expansion. For these reasons, we can say that the market economy can be used to maintain the socialist system.

Market economy also has positive effects on human development such as the establishment of some sense of efficiency, of competition and of interests, and also an intensification of some concepts such as those of justice, equality, human rights and the legal system. Under the conditions of a market economy working people have more independence and more potential for development. The independent personality of individuals is enhanced and initiative is intensified.

On the other hand, the growth of market economy has also produced many negative effects. The fact that the market economy has set profit as its goal makes deception, the worship of money and egoism more possible and more common. Such things as producing commodities of poor quality and with false trademarks, unlawfully reaping huge profits from customers and misleading advertising are easily observable in the market. Further it is common to harm others in order to benefit oneself or to damage new public facilities. Even when someone's life is in great danger, no one may be willing to help. In all these instances egoism and the worship of money have gone to the extreme; ultimate concern has been replaced by concern for money. Under the negative influence of the market economy, both public and traditional morals have been eroded, personal relationship commercialized and various masks of social corruption invented.

These double effects of the market economy occur in any social system and are inevitable in the progress and modernization of civil society. But this does not mean that society or the state has no power here. On the contrary, the society or state can bring it under control through conditioning the positive and negative effects. In a socialist system it is possible for the positive effects to be brought into full display and the negative effect to be limited as much as possible and therefore reduced to a minimum. What we must now discover is how, under socialist conditions, to limit the negative effect on human development. At present the main task is to promote the construction of a socialist spiritual civilization, to focus upon the continuous improvement of civil society and the quality of urban inhabitants, and thereby to promote to the maximum the positive effect of a market economy upon human development and to repress its negative effect in such a way as to inhibit their spread to more areas.

The Improvement of the Moral Quality of Human Life

The key point in the construction of spiritual civilization is to improve the moral quality of human life. The construction of spiritual civilization can be considered in terms of the improvement of human qualities. The quality of human life is a comprehensive concept which includes multiple qualities: moral, scientific, cultural and legal. Of all these the moral quality is

the most important, for it is indispensable in improving the scientific and cultural, the aesthetic and legal qualities. Hence, the improvement of moral qualities should be given first priority.

Morals may be dealt with on two levels: on the religious level they are called religious or spiritual morals; on the social level they are called social or public morals. Kant considered morals to be absolute: he posited a transcendent and universal necessity which was the moral imperative to be followed by everyone. Religious or spiritual morals express this transcendent and universal moral which usually is related to a certain faith or ideal; it is called *a priori* because it holds for mankind as a whole and is constituted of absolute, universal and necessary moral standards. "Not to tell lies", "to realize one's own talents", "to help others" and so forth are all requirements or implications of the moral *a priori* specified by Kant. Religious morals advocate devotion, sacrifice and the belief that by sacrifice one can ascend to a state of spiritual nobility; hence it is considered a spiritual moral.

In this sense, we can regard as a sort of religious or spiritual moral what was taught by Chairman Mao, namely, that to serve the people one should be devoted to others without any thought of oneself, and that in the interest of all one should fear neither hardship nor death. This kind of morals is situated on a higher level and is something to which a person entrusts the significance of his or her life; this is what is meant by one's ultimate concern. Without this kind of moral, civilization could not have developed and the moral world would have lost its splendor and attraction.

As compared with religious morals, social morals stands on a lower level; they are closely related to the policy and law of a certain society and must be observed by every member of the society. Social morals may be affected by many factors such as circumstances of time and space, the national culture, tradition and custom, and economic conditions. Professional morals are found here. With the development of society, moral ideas also undergo changes; social morals are an important component of this changing moral. At the New Year, people now say, "May you become rich", which had not been heard for a long time. This phenomenon shows that for some time it was considered to be immoral to be rich, whereas today making money is quite normal and common, with no connotation of immorality. Furthermore, we must also respect the individual rights and interests of every member in the society. These are changes which are now taking place in social morals.

Religious morals can be realized only in special social groups which constitute a minority of society, whereas social morals are a goal that most people can reach through their efforts. We can lead people to take up spiritual morals as a goal, but it seems inappropriate to require everybody to reach that goal. To impose this moral standard on the whole society would mean requiring everyone to become a sage; undoubtedly, this cannot be realized. On the other hand, if we do not advocate spiritual morals and are content only with the construction of social morals, morals in general will lose their spirit and attractive brilliance. Then the splendid chapter of the noble spirit written in the course of human history will no longer be inherited.

Often it is said that the value of traditional Chinese culture lies in its ethics. Ethics is indeed a major component of traditional Chinese culture, as can be seen from its Confucian content. Since the May 4th Movement too much emphasis has been laid on the negative aspects of traditional ethics. Today during the course of socialist modernization, it seems necessary to reevaluate the ethics in traditional Chinese culture so that some important distinctions can be made: what is of the essence and what is dross, what spiritual morals are of continuing use and able to be developed, what social morals can be reconstructed and what should be discarded? It is still beneficial for the development of current society to inherit and develop good morals from the traditional culture and

to criticize and reconstruct what is bad or out-of-date, for in traditional Chinese philosophy one may find statements concerning the significance of life and ultimate concern.

Through academic study some contribution can be made to the improvement of the moral quality of human life, to the progress of current society and to the improvement of the general human quality of civil society.

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Discussion

In considering the need for spiritual civilization in a country it is important to assure that the dignity of persons is taken into full account. This has been stated by Kant in terms of recognizing that persons are ends in themselves and never to be treated as means by others, whether individually or cooperatively. This points to the basic human reality of which civil society and nations are built and to the place which any program of spiritual morals must begin. This is the freedom which persons exercise; it is personal life as exercised in a self-responsible manner.

On this basis and in these terms one can construct a society of free and responsible people. If a public morality is attempted only as a set of external goals, promoted and/or imposed by society as an external force, without engaging the spiritual sense of a people there is danger that it will be counter-productive for lack of public response or that, if this be forced by ever harsher penalties, it will destroy the free initiative of the people.

This gives special weight to the thought of Professor Wang that human development has three levels: the economic, the public or political, and the spiritual. This latter, spiritual development is not cared for by the earlier two, but it is essential for them, while itself reaching much more deeply into the meaning and values of a culture. This is the level at which philosophy operates in uncovering the sense of life, opening the mind to goals for human growth, and attending to the human quality of life. This cannot be left entirely to economic theory, which is focused upon material civilization, without reducing humanity to its physical dimension only; nor can it be left to the political order without subjecting all to external relations of power at the expense of the internal personal engagement of persons as free and self-responsible. Hence there is need for philosophy to integrate all of these dimensions: material and spiritual, external and internal, public and personal. The unfortunate thing is that these have become dissociated and the higher have been subordinated to the others. (See Professor Zhou Changzhong's note regarding the substitution of science for *Tao* in this century.) It is the task of philosophy to hold open the mind to all these dimensions and to so integrate them that the quality of human life is promoted.

If this is to be done, however, it is necessary that there be a realm of human action and interaction which is dominated neither by economic nor political considerations, but where people inspired by the full range of human meaning can come together and interact. There they must be able to see things from the point of view of others not as means, but as ends in themselves. They must be able to come to a reasoned sense of what is due to others, to set goals and develop habits and customs of human interaction and social concern, and to decide which will come first, righteousness or interests, or more probably how these can be effectively interrelated. This precisely is the meaning of civil society.

Certainly, this is not without implications for the economic and political order, for the enhanced human quality of life which it enables and promotes has direct implications for the humanization of those orders. In their human social inventions those orders cannot but benefit from the cumulate creative imagination and the balancing of human needs and interests which can take place in civil society. This, in other words, is the realm of creative human freedom *par excellence*.

Philosophy must have a role here in order to hold open human horizons and allow in principle for the effective interaction and mutual promotion of the various dimensions of human life. In part this is the sense of J. Habermas' notion of communicative action. Unfortunately he leaves this simply on the formal level, whereas its substance is in the realm of actual existence and

interchange. It is in the actual exercise of human life in which being enters into time, in which the shape of social life is created, and in which public standards, opinions and expectations are formed. We must have confidence in this interaction, debate and, in the end, cooperate toward the common good; we must give humankind a chance to act humanly, expecting that in the end people will not act as mere animals which they are not, but as proper human beings with higher hopes for their children and with a willingness to be held to higher expectations for and by themselves. This is the reality of spiritual civilization and for its exercise there is need not only for an economic and a political order, but for the civic forum of civil society in which people interact and shape not only their ethics but their concrete life.

How can such a realm of civil society be opened? The fact of the development of a market economy suggests that this is not impossible. In part it was a matter of personal initiative, in part it was an effort by communities, in part is was a transformation of some previously public entities to private responsibility. Something similar may be possible for civil society as well. High ideals and the role of the citizen are integral to the thought of Marx. These can be given space to act and interact in smaller units closer to home where all can share in decision-making based on their special competencies and concerns, whether in education, health, public safety, celebrations, sanitation or the like. Generation after generation habits and tradition will grow as human life unfolds from within. This is the emergence of a civil society and indeed of a civil culture proper to each people.

7.

Marcel's Phenomenology of Tolerance and Civil Society

Manuel B. Dy, Jr.

As we approach the end of the 20th century, we witness phenomenal growth in globalization brought about by science and technology, notably by the mass media. Yet ironically, as globalization intensifies, ethnic conflicts have increased in many parts of the world. Most, if not all, of these conflicts have their root cause in intolerance of another group's religion, e.g., between Christians and Muslim factions in the case of Bosnia as well as in the Philippines. It is but fitting then that the United Nations has declared a Year of Tolerance; any discussion of civil society should include this notion.

Gabriel Marcel, the Christian existentialist--although he refused to be labeled as such--provides insight into the meaning of tolerance in his essay, "The Phenomenology and the Dialectic of Tolerance."1

The Problem of Tolerance

Marcel raises this issue in the context of his reflections on the relationship between belief and faith, or, more precisely, between opinion and faith. Between opinion and faith there lies a spectrum of meanings, with conviction serving as an intermediary. For Marcel, faith can degenerate into opinion which is characterized by externality and lack of commitment. Conviction is closer to belief, but its definitive judgement lacks the temporal openness and trust in someone which is characteristic of belief.

But if faith extends unlimited credit to an absolute Thou, how is it possible for one to tolerate another opposing belief without falling into skepticism, or reducing one's own belief to opinion? What is the principle on which we can base a tolerance which at the same time is a living incarnation of faith? Marcel attempts to answer this essential question regarding tolerance.

At the outset, Marcel justifies the use of the phenomenological approach because tolerance is not a psychological reality but a frontier zone between feeling and attitude or behavior. He doubts whether it can be said that one simply is tolerant; rather one shows that he or she is tolerant. Tolerance has to do with expressions which can be on this or the far side of tolerance.

What is the object of tolerance; with respect to what does a person show himself to be tolerant? Generally speaking, tolerance refers to expressions or manifestations of belief or opinion. There is tolerance only to what can be presented or overtly manifested, versus what occurs only in consciousness. Also tolerance involves a relation to an other *qua* other.

What does it mean then to tolerate? It does not seem sufficient for tolerance to mean non-prevention or non-prohibition. "To tolerate" can mean simply to support, and this is more than just non-prevention or non-prohibition. Still, "support" can be ambiguous. At one end, it can mean to "undergo" as when I say, "I have resigned myself to having M as my student," when I could have him removed from my class. At the other extreme is the meaning of recognizing not just the fact, but the right of M to stay in my class. Tolerance in this sense is ultimately a counter-intolerance, the negation of a negation. Tolerance then is not basic, but presupposes intolerance. As counter-intolerance, tolerance is inconceivable without a certain power or authority to sustain it.

This power or authority implies a mandate. Here, Marcel cites two negative examples of intolerance. The first is that of a gentleman who does not tolerate remarks made in his presence in defense of pederasty. The second is that of a father who does not tolerate subversive remarks made by a stranger at his table in the presence of his children. In both cases of intolerance, what is in question is not only the inner sincerity of the person, but the validity of the mandate entrusted to him. Like intolerance, tolerance implies a mandate; it is also manifested "in the name of. . . . "

At this point, Marcel distinguishes two different cases of tolerance. The first is when my position is contrary to the one expressed by the behavior of the other which must be tolerated. The second is when with respect to both my position and the contrary, I hold a neutral position.

Religious Tolerance

In the first case, I exhibit tolerance towards those who hold beliefs contrary to mine. I guarantee them freedom to practice their beliefs and I prevent anyone from interrupting them--a counter-intolerance. What makes this attitude possible? Does it not imply a contradiction of my own beliefs? Is it that I have loosened the ties to my belief and allowed it to slide into an opinion; that I show tolerance towards an adversary, who now becomes my neighbor? Is tolerance in this case the fruit of a certain skepticism of which I may not be sufficiently aware? This certainly is possible, but the inverse is also conceivable: a dialectic of tolerance, or to be more precise, of conviction.

To the extent that I am convinced of my opinion, I also envisage the other to be as convinced of his or her own opinion. I put myself in the place of the other and therefore guarantee his or her right to express his or her opinion. Here the emphasis is placed solely on the subject. Just as the validity of my belief consists in its expressing my actual being, so I must consider the other's contrary belief to be an expression of his or her own subjectivity. In the same way that I affirm myself, I must also affirm the other.

However, there is a difficulty in this kind of dialectic. In switching the center of gravity from the object of my belief to the subject, do I not betray my own belief? Isn't tolerance rooted in such a betrayal? I believe in a certain reality, and to the extent that I hold this reality to be true I am mandated, so to speak, to impose or spread it to others. When I encounter an obstacle to my proselytizing, my tendency would be to attribute error to his or her belief. I cannot grant that belief anything comparable to the absolute privilege of my own belief. To tolerate his or her belief would be tantamount to betraying my own belief, nullifying it or contradicting myself.

In the light of the above difficulty, does this mean that the believer who sees a responsibility to spread his faith must oppose the invidious use of the unbeliever's freedom in the same sense that I should prevent a child from hurting himself or herself or others? Marcel rejects this intolerance; proselytizing is not in itself intolerance. For to use such an approach ultimately compromises and debases the very end to which it was to be subordinated, i.e. conversion. Such action would confirm the believer in his or her unbelief.

Insofar as I consider the object of my faith sacred, am I not then prevented from taking any action such as showing tolerance which would confirm the other in his or her disbelief? Is it possible for a person who is completely certain of possessing the truth to show a tolerance based, not on skepticism, but on faith? Is it possible for tolerance to be a living incarnation of faith?

To set the proper dialectic, Marcel first analyzes the presuppositions concealed by an intolerance cognizant of itself and justifying itself. Intolerance of this sort would involve a state of distrust or apprehension. "If I do not prevent the overt manifestations of the subversive belief, if I

do not check its development, many evil consequences would follow." I hold a certain responsibility similar to that of a doctor who has to prevent an epidemic from spreading. "I must reject the argument that people have the right to poison themselves if they want and eventually to infect one another; such a right does not exist, is null and void, and must be categorically denied."2 The analogy, however, with the doctor is faulty. In the latter case, the doctor's concern is with the reestablishment of a normal state of affairs, not with a violation of a higher law.

In the case of a heterodox belief considered from the orthodox point of view, the fundamental difference from the case of the doctor is transcendence. The end of the orthodox believer is service to God, to the divine will. This divine will, however, can be misconstrued by a believer who converts it into a simple idol and becomes guilty of the subtlest kind of betrayal. On the other hand, to serve the divine will is to establish a type of relationship with God which is triadic: to serve the divine will is to act as a mediator between God's will and the believer. As a mediator, I act in such a way that the other turns to the divine will that I serve. Therefore, I the believer must be absolutely sure that the other consciousness, i.e., the unbeliever, does not feel that I am acting out of personal motives--for example, a desire to proselytize, in which I would be the center.

The only way to evoke the others' turning to God is to show love to them. I must go out to the others as they are with the belief that nourishes their souls. My love must be strong enough to allow others to be transformed and renewed, such that their belief may itself burst out of its narrow confines and throw off the elements of heterodoxy. It is obvious that in this process, I am merely an instrument and not the cause. Everything issues from God, the transcendent; I must respect this transcendence which includes others and their belief. Before God, I must remain humble.

To use instruments of force in the service of God's will is to engender in the other the feeling that I am acting out of self-interest and to project an image of a God of prey whose goal is to annex and to enslave.

Thus, to serve God in a way which respects and protects His transcendence, i.e., to show tolerance of another's belief, is in reality to go beyond tolerance itself, towards charity and grace. To act towards the other in love and grace is to embody God's transcendence in my action.

Political Tolerance

Marcel admits that the case of the doctor and that of the believer are limited cases. Between them are intermediate cases where his solution does not apply, at least not fully. Such cases are political situations; for instance, that of a government or head of state who must deal with a revolutionary party out to destroy the existing order. Any consideration of a transcendent may seem out of place here. Nevertheless, this situation cannot be identical with that of the doctor who is out to combat an epidemic. We cannot equate revolutionaries with rats or mosquitoes, even if the ends they pursue seem completely evil.

Therefore, a compromise measure is called for which will eliminate the capacity to harm. But the head of the state cannot exhibit anything like tolerance, otherwise he will be guilty of a weakness which can endanger the society he is supposed to protect. Tolerance in the political sphere can be practiced only within certain limits. These are impossible to trace out *a priori*, and only to the extent that the divergent opinions which are permitted free expression can be considered relatively harmless. Here we enter into a kind of tolerance that is more like a neutrality on the level of precepts. As to actual practice, this needs further investigation.

Marcel concludes that tolerance is:

Rough and ready compromise between certain psychological dispositions which are moreover distributed between benevolence, indifference and aversion, a Machiavellianism in the larval state--and a spiritual dynamism of a completely different kind whose ground and main driving force is to be found in transcendence.3

Tolerance and Civil Society Today

How relevant is Marcel's notion of tolerance to the contemporary discussion of civil society? As part of culture, religion plays an important and powerful role in our social lives. For many community organizers and development workers, it is their faith that inspires and challenges them to act for social transformation. For many citizens, it is their common faith that moves them to associate, unite and participate in forging a common stand on human rights and social justice issues, in preserving their identity and autonomy, in enhancing their lives as a community and as individuals.

Religion, however, can degenerate into mere opinion characterized by lack of social involvement or commitment; it can express itself simply in rituals and worship indifferent to the daily lives of ordinary peoples. For such religion, tolerance would simply mean a passive non-prevention or non-prohibition of the expression of a contrary opinion. If a dialogue were to take place, the meeting would be an exercise simply of rhetoric that would not make a difference in the participants' social lives.

On the other hand, religion can become a matter of conviction, which, carried to its extreme, can lead to dogmatism and proselytizing. Though imbued with social involvement or commitment, religion here is tempted to suppress contrary beliefs and to show intolerance to its opponents. In the public discourse essential to a civil society tolerance takes on an active character.

In the realm of religion, as of morals, both tolerance and intolerance imply a mandate, "in the name. . . ." Although Marcel does not specify what or whence this mandate comes, one can glean from his explanation that as far as religion is concerned there is a qualitative difference in the mandate of tolerance from that of intolerance. The mandate of intolerance is from an authority that has vested itself with a definite judgement and has thus opted to close itself to other points of view; its God is a god of prey or possession. On the other hand, the mandate of tolerance is from an authority that remains open to the history of truth and value; its God is a God of love that unites differences.

Is religious tolerance possible in civil society? Marcel, speaking mainly in the interpersonal level, clearly affirms the possibility. But can one transpose these ideas to the societal level? Can people of different religious beliefs live together in harmony in one society or in a world community without relinquishing their faith?

Marcel says that just as I am convinced of my opinion, the other must also be convinced of his or hers; therefore I must put myself in the place of the other and guarantee his or her right to express his or her opinion. Almost all religions contain the Golden Rule formulated in different ways: Do not do unto others what you would not want others to do unto you. On the subjective level, whether personal or social, tolerance appeals to the universality of the Golden Rule. There can be a common reason for peoples of different religions to respect each other, to tolerate each other.

Marcel, however, goes beyond this subjective inference and points to transcendence and a triadic relationship that is the ground of tolerance. But he admits that in the political sphere, tolerance can be practiced only within certain limits, perhaps by compromise. When free

expression is relatively harmless, tolerance in this sphere is more neutrality on the level of precepts. On the level of action, he suggests further investigation.

Indeed, on the level of social action and transformation, it is difficult to envisage a religious tolerance in civil society. Civil society needs to interface with the state, and public discourse cannot stay on the level of respect for another's opinion, but must come to a consensus. Would the reference to a transcendent and the ensuing triadic relationship then be sufficient ground for tolerance in civil society?

Following Marcel, I would suggest that philosophical, as well as sociological/historical inquiry on civil society reflect more deeply upon the transcendent that is in each culture. The transcendent was certainly the ground and inspiration of Mateo Ricci's work and achievement in China. Beyond tolerance, he embraced the Confucian culture (though he rejected the Buddhist and Taoist) and interacted with the Emperor, because he saw the divine in Confucian society. In the Philippines, the phenomenon of the 1986 People Power Revolution, where Christians and Muslims alike united for the sake of freedom and democracy without denying their faiths, is testimony that the transcendent, called by different names, may truly be One in our humanity.

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Notes

1. Gabriel Marcel, *Creative Fidelity*, pp. 210-221.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 217.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 221.

Discussion

Oftentimes today tolerance is looked upon simply as the negative stance of not interfering with others. For such tolerance it would be sufficient simply to discount what others do as being of no meaning or value. But it is too short a step from this attitude to that of considering that others themselves are of no importance, and thence to murder or even genocide when for any reason a person or people appear to be inconvenient. This seems to have been the case in the past when whole classes of humans were slaves and were put simply at the disposition of others for whatever service, even to the extent of serving as human sacrifices, and of the prevalence of abortion in our day.

A more positive sense of tolerance consists in recognizing the importance of others. In practical matters this can be realized by compromises. But when this extends to entirely integrating world views, compromises are less possible, for such views concern deepest commitments, in terms of which I conceive my self-identity and orient my self and my actions in this world.

In this case Marcel's phenomenological approach can be helpful for it directs attention not only to the content of one's beliefs and commitments, but to the subject who holds these. In these terms it becomes possible to recognize the positive, indeed vital, importance of enabling others to hold to their beliefs, for only in freedom can one act humanly and proceed through life in a manner that is authentically human.

However, this is not merely a matter of treating as absolute the position of anyone or everyone. If one is able to appreciate the infinite reality of Truth and Goodness, and the way in which this transcends, while being participated in by the life of any limited mind or heart, then it is possible to recognize the limited and relative character of the positions of others while acknowledging in them nonetheless a glimpse of the eternal in time.

In this light tolerance can be an active stance as I look positively for the truth in the view of others and, stimulated thereby, both advance in my own views and help others to proceed along their proper path. The attitude then is not that of trying to make them like oneself, but of accompanying them in their pilgrimage in search of truth.

Habermas would reflect this in terms of communication theory by attempting to see the universal good in enabling all to take part equally in the public dialogue. But this appears ultimately to remain self-centered inasmuch as the shared formal good of universal participation is also my good, in the sense of being a recognition of my right to participate as well. This takes account of the common project, but does not appear to reach out to recognize explicitly the importance of the unique contribution brought by each to the common project. For this one needs not only a characteristic common to every person, but an openness to the infinite being and truth which transcends any and all persons and positions, societies and cultures, and holds out new possibilities for each.

There are dangers in this, for various groups or state powers attempt either to seize this sense of absoluteness for themselves or to suppress it. Hence, the work of freedom consists centrally in preserving this absolute horizon of human life.

On the other hand, if in this process of communication each particular culture or ethnos must be able to justify its identity before all others, it can be expected to fail. For if each must provide a necessitating reason or one that is good for others, then the personal and free creativity by which they are most properly human will be discounted.

This leads to the conclusion that we cannot do without tolerance, but that tolerance should be not merely an allowance for difference but its celebration and promotion. Such tolerance depends upon being inspired by empathy and love, and ultimately upon being grounded in an infinity of Being and Truth.

8.
Buddhism and Democracy

Kirti Bunchua

As both terms, "Buddhism" and "democracy", are very broad, this chapter will limit their scope.

The term "Buddhism" here will be limited to only Theravada Buddhism, that is, to the teaching of the Buddha found in the *Tipataka* and clarified by the traditional commentaries of the Theravada School. To open to Mahayana Buddhism would add more and more later scriptures whose canonical list varies from school to school within the Mahayana tradition.

As for the term "democracy", we must distinguish between a "democratic regime" and the "democratic spirit" in a regime. It is possible to have a democratic regime with an absolutist spirit, and an absolute regime with a democratic spirit, not to mention regimes that use the name "democratic" for purposes of obfuscation. For this chapter to take the term "democracy" for the government or regime would be anachronistic, because in the time of the Buddha, such an idea would have seemed impossible and absurd. Hence, our topic, "Buddhism and democracy" is possible only if we limit our consideration to the "democratic spirit" as far as it can be found in Buddha's teachings and practices.

Some Preliminary Remarks

1. The Indians of Buddha's time could know only two types of regime: absolute monarchy with one absolute king at the head of the state, and oligarchic monarchy with several kings at the head of the state, but close joint authority as absolute as in the first regime.

Rajagrh is an example of an absolute monarchy, while Kapilavatthu (Buddha's original state) and Vesali are examples of the oligarchic monarchy states.

Buddha never showed a preference for one or the other of these political regimes, but gave guidelines to be followed by the people of both regimes.

2. Buddha had no intention of teaching politics. He seems to have had no preference for any regime or form of government. Any form may be good if it is exercised in a democratic spirit, conforming to His religious teachings; it may also be bad if it counteracts His religious teachings which are required necessarily for religious persons. The only interest of His religious teaching is to lead His followers from a way of life of suffering to one of real happiness.

3. Though Buddha never seemed to denounce the existing absolutism of His lifetime, He established the Sangha--the community of Buddhist monks--which could be considered model for later democratic regimes. Though the word "democracy" was never mentioned in the government of His monks, we can learn His democratic spirit through the process of governing and the regulations of the community which issued from that process.

History of the Democratic Spirit in Buddhism

The Establishment of the Sangha

The regulations of the Sangha are not a ready-made set prepared before its start, as St. Benedict or St. Francis of Assisi might have done for the Christian monastic orders.

Buddha started His Sangha without any prior regulations. This is understandable, because as founder of His own religion He had no need to obtain approval from a superior. He was free to evolve his attitude regarding community life, which in the end would develop a democratic character. From the acceptance of the first member of His Sangha it is clear that He emphasized the importance of the quality of life through teaching and formation.

After Buddha's enlightenment, He directed His attention first of all to persuading the Pancavaggi (the Group of Five) to enter into His way of life. He preached to them His first sermon, known as *Dhammacakkappa-vattanasutta*, at their residence, the Isipatana Marigadayavana or Deer Garden, in Banares State. After the sermon only one of the five, Kondanna understood thoroughly the meaning of life and requested to be admitted as His follower. Buddha accepted him by saying "Come, O Bhikkhu, well-taught in doctrine, lead a holy life for the sake of the complete extinction of suffering."1 In this way Kondanna was admitted as the first Venerable Buddhist Monk. During the first rainy season, 60 monks were admitted by Buddha Himself into His monastic order or Sangha.

During this earliest period, there were practically no regulations, for all the monks had good will and a firm intention to follow the life-style of Buddha Himself. All were under the direct inspiration of Buddha who presided like a loving Father over his beloved sons.

One of the Prescriptions of Buddha, for example, runs as follows: "I prescribe, O Bhikkhus, that only a learned, competent Bhikkhu who has completed ten years, or more than ten years, may confer the Upasampada Ordination."2 In such a way, more and more regulations were prescribed by Buddha, to be observed by all the Bukkhus of His Sangha.

The democratic spirit during this period was one of equality among the monks who might come from any caste and status in society: princes, nobles, brahmins, vaisayas and outcasts. All became equal once they were ordained monks. They were differentiated, however, according to their years of ordination: those later ordained had to be the first to pay respect to those earlier ordained because of the supposition that the earlier ones had more experience in the monastic life than did the later ones.

During the Experimental Period

As more and more people requested to be admitted into the Sangha, the elder monks were delegated to perform the ceremony of admission and also to take the responsibility of training and supervising the novices. We do not know if Buddha delegated such powers to only one monk or to a set of monks for each community. Each delegation had to take responsibility for the community under its care in a spirit of paternal love and under the general control of Buddha Himself.

It is not surprising that during this transitory period, with the rapidly increasing number of new monks to be admitted and trained, together with the new experiences each community of monks encountered, decisions had to be made for uniformity of conduct among the monks. After consultation with the senior monks, Buddha declared one after another the regulations of the whole Sangha. It can be said that most of the actual Sangha regulations resulted from particular cases which occurred to the Sangha at different times. It is believed that Ananda, Buddha's cousin and one of the senior monks or Theras, had a good memory so as to be able to remember all the regulations and the particular circumstance that gave rise to each of them. Only after Buddha's

death were the collection of regulations reported and the Theras helped Him analyze and rearrange them into a systematic collection, known later as the *Vinaya Pitaka*.

Final Development of Sangha

After a certain period of experimentation with the Sangha Organization through delegations under the direct control of Buddha Himself, Buddha saw that his Sangha had matured sufficiently to stand on its own feet. He let it go, being conscious that in time He would have to leave it behind--though surely it would have been better to see the result while He was living with them, so that, had any difficulty occurred, He would be able to suggest a wiser solution. He transferred His absolute authority over the Sangha to all the members of Sangha, so that they might all together decide how to apply the Sangha regulations to each particular case. These were the regulations all of them consented to accept in common as their Constitution on the day of their ordination into the Sangha.

Buddha then convened the Bhikkhus and proclaimed to them this Announcement or *natti*:

Let the Sangha, reverend Sirs, hear me. This person N.N. desires to receive the Upasampada ordination from the venerable N.N. with the venerable N.N. as his Uppajjhaya. If the Sangha is ready, let the Sangha confer on N.N. the Upasampada ordination with N.N. as Upajjhaya. This is the*natti* (announcement). Let the Sangha, reverend Sirs, hear me. This person N.N. desires to receive the Upasampada ordination from the venerable N.N. The Sangha confers on N.N. the Upasampada ordination with N.N. as Upajjhaya. Let any one of the venerable brethren who is in favor of the Upasampada ordination of N.N. with N.N. as Uppajjhaya be silent, and any one who is not in favor of it, speak. And for the second time I thus speak to you: let the Sangha etc. . . . (as before). And for the third time I thus speak to you. let the Sangha, etc. . . . (as before). N.N. has received the Upasampada ordination from the Sangha with N.N. as Uppajjhaya. The Sangha is in favor of it, therefore it is silent. Thus I understand.3

Surely this kind of democracy is a strict one, for any decision of the Sangha requires a unanimous vote. As to be silent at the moment of the vote means a vote in favor, such voting respects any kind of minority.

Such a strict democracy can be practiced within the Sangha because we can presuppose that all and each one of the monks has been well formed and has a good intention for the common welfare of the Sangha. As such democracy is appropriate to the Sangha, it has progressed continually to today.

It is to be noted that by this particular democracy, the Sangha members can vote only for the applications of regulations to particular cases. Buddha did not allow them to vote for the abolishment of the Sangha. As for the votes for change, Buddha allowed them only for minor regulations and still required a unanimous vote. During the Buddha’s lifetime, no such voting had ever been heard of. However, this allowance was like a time bomb within the Sangha, awaiting explosion at any time after Buddha’s death.

The adjective "minor" is very imprecise when it qualifies the noun "precept". Any change of precept with the intention of "adaptation for the better" can be considered a "minor precept". Such interpretation happened many times after the death of Buddha, leading to the split of Buddhism into Hinayana and Mahayana, and to the split of each into a number of sects until today.

Characteristics of Buddhist Democracy

1. Buddha's words are the final appeal. Buddha did not delegate any person or any group of persons to approve the actions, nor to modify the regulations. At His death, the oral teaching of Buddha came to an end. No one had the right to add or to subtract a word of Buddha. What disciples can do is to interpret and clarify the Buddha's words. Buddha's words are like a constitution which came from Buddha alone. He might consult in order to obtain opinions, but He always gave the final decision, and no one could change it. Therefore the democracy of the Buddhist Sangha is limited to the application of the regulations, and does not extend to making and modifying the regulations, except when a regulation is minor and the community unanimously gives it consent by silent vote.

This means that the Sangha government is absolutist in the formation of the Constitution, but democratic in its application. The *Mahaparinibbana Suttanta* expresses the vision and the reason of Buddha:

I have preached the truth without making any distinction between exoteric and esoteric doctrine in respect of the truths. Ananda, the Tathagata has no such thing as a closed-fist teacher who keeps some things back. Surely, Ananda, should there be any one who harbors the thought, 'It is I who will lead the brotherhood', or 'The order is dependent upon me', that is that he should lay down instructions in any matter concerning the order. Now the Tathagata, Ananda, thinks not that it is he who should lead the brotherhood, or that the order is dependent upon him.4

Therefore, O Ananda, be ye lamps unto yourselves. Be ye a refuge to yourselves. Betake yourselves to no external refuge. Hold fast to the truth as a lamp. Hold fast as a refuge to the truth. Look not for refuge to any one besides yourselves.5

It may be, Ananda, that in some of you the thought may arise, 'The word of the master is ended, we have no teacher more.' But it is not thus, Ananda, that you should regard it. The truths and the rules of the Order which I have set forth and laid down for you all, let them, after I am gone, be the Teacher to you.6

It is to be noted that the Sangha Constitution or the *Vinaya* should be distinguished from the Universal and Eternal *Dhamma* which cannot be determined at will or modified by any convenience or inconvenience. Only the *Vinaya* can be modified according to their appropriateness to the circumstances. Nevertheless, even here He allowed for modifications with regard only to the minor *Vinayas*.

2. All monks have equal rights regardless of family background or personal prestige. In the Indian context of Buddha's time, caste discrimination was taken strongly into account. But Buddha's *Vinaya* went against the current and this became the strong point of His Sangha Community. People of all castes found equal right of recognition in His *Sangha* and equal right to the perfect purification or Nibbana status. Read the following passage and imagine a triumphant tone of Buddha in pronouncing it:

Just, O Bhikkhus, as the great rivers -
that is to say, the Ganga, the Yamuna,
the Aciravati, the Sarabhu, and the Mahi -
when they have fallen into the great ocean,
renounce their name and lineage and are
thereceforth reckoned as the great ocean,
Just so, O Bhikkus, do these four castes -

the Khattiyas, the Brahmans, the Vessa, and
the Suddas - when they have gone forth from
the world under the doctrine and discipline proclaimed by
the Tathagata, renounce their names and lineage, and
enter into the number of the Sakyaputtiya Samanas.7

Any monk who has been such for a lesser period is to venerate the older one. This means that an outcast monk is to be venerated by a monk from the Brahmin caste, if the former has a longer period of monkshood. Such a practice could not be imagined at that time outside the Buddhist community.

3. A fraternal democracy is recommended. Buddha recommended six conditions for his monastic community. Buddha seems to have known how difficult this was, for in stating this He did not use the categorical imperative, but a persuasive form:

So long as the brethren shall persevere in kindness of action, speech, and thought among the saints, both in public and private--so long as they shall divide without partiality, and share in common with the upright and the holy, all such things as they receive in accordance with just provisions of the order, down even to the mere contents of a begging bowl--so long as the brethren shall live among the saints in the practice, both in public and in private, of those virtues which are productive of freedom, and praised by the wise; which are untarnished by the desire of future life, or by the belief in the efficacy of outward acts; and which are conductive to high and holy thoughts--so long as the brethren shall live among the saints, cherishing, both in public and in private, that noble and saving faith which leads to the compete destruction of the sorrow of him who acts according to it. So long may the brethren be expected not to decline but to prosper--so long as these six conditions shall continue to exist among the brethren, so long as they are instructed in these six conditions, so long may the brethren be expected not to decline, but to prosper.8

4. *Unus inter pares* (one among equals) democracy is an ideal of the *Sangha*. Buddha's words: "Think not that it is he who should lead the brotherhood"9 show that, though the eldest in years of monkshood is venerated by all the other monks, he is not by any means the leader of the whole community in the administrative affairs. He is only one among equals. To conduct an administrative affair, any monk of any number of years of monkshood may be chosen by the community. He is still one among the equals and has to venerate those monks of his community who have been monks for a longer period.

Conclusion

What is the best regime? This question was proposed to Jesus by the Pharisees: "Is it right to pay tax to Caesar?" which implies: Is the absolutism of Caesar the right regime? Neither founder, Buddha or Jesus, gave a direct answer, but proposed an ideal instead. "Dhamma will be your absolute leader", said Buddha; "Who is leader, let him serve", said Jesus. Dhammika regime as well as a service regime is not a form of government, but an attitude. Any regime that holds such an attitude, brings peace to the country and welfare to the people.

Nowadays, democracy is held in high esteem; we rightly join in this but should not be enchanted by the mere word "democracy". A Thai proverb warns: "A word as a word is it much important?" Any word can be abused to cheat the people in unclear politics. Experience tell us that

"Christian Democracy" is not always the best party; the same would be true of a Buddhist Democratic party if one were ever to exist. If now we prefer to use the word "democracy" for a way of governing the people, let it be practiced with the attitude and spirit of Dhamma and of loving service, as Buddha and Jesus recommended. Buddha's Rajadhammakatha speaks thus:

Kacchapinanca macchinam
Kukkutinanca dhenunam
Puttaposo yatha toti
Tatha maccesu Rajunam
As turtle and fish spare
As hen and cow nurture
Of their young ones care
Of their human sheep so a pastor.

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Notes

1. F. Max Muller, ed. *Sacred Books of The East* (Delhi: Motilal Barnasidass, 1968), vol. XIII, p. 97.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 178.
3. F. Max Muller, ed. N. 43, pp. 169-170.
4. *Ibid.*, n. 42, pp. 36-37.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
7. *Ibid.*, n. 61, p. 304.
8. *Ibid.*, n. 42, pp. 10-11.
9. Max Muller, Vol. 42, p. 372.

Discussion

Civil society raises the issue of the need for authority in social life. In Confucian cultures authority is exercised by ritual, which in turn has some relation to heavenly authority. Buddhism too agrees upon the need for authority. In the Theravada tradition authority remains in the words and action of the Buddha. Mahayana Buddhism also locates this essentially in the teaching of the Buddha, but allows for greater adaptation to circumstances, provided this continues to aim at the perfection of life.

Buddhism distinguished the monks from those living in the world. The life of the monks was subject to many precepts (217 for men and 358 for women). Those living in the world followed a lesser and varied number of precepts according to their advancement. They found guidance from the monks with regard to their spiritual welfare and in return were to support the minimum needs of the monks.

With regard to the political order Buddhism does not propose any particular regime, but stays where it is welcome and moves on where it is not. For civil society, however, and the quality of its life Buddhism is a main proponent of tolerance. This is the basis of civil life and is the predominant note of the 10 principles Buddha prescribed for kings.

In Thailand the king is, but need not be, Buddhist, as is 95 percent of the population. All religions are supported, but great emphasis is placed upon tolerance for others by those in the majority and from others by those in the minorities (4 percent Muslim and .05 percent Christian). This tolerance is not merely passive, i.e., waiting for others to become Buddhist, but did.

9
Confucian "Ritual" (Li) and Civil Society

He Xirong

Throughout its long history Chinese culture has been profoundly influenced by Confucian ethics, of which ritual is one important aspect. Looking at the ritual of Confucius and the contents of *The Book of Rites* and *The Book of Etiquette* at the end of the 20th century we would find much of them too elaborate or even pedantic. Besides, Chinese history has experienced a period of "killing people with ritual". For these reasons the ritual of Confucius often has been looked upon with a critical eye. However, from the philosophical point of view Confucian ritual is an essential aspect of a civilized Chinese society, and for the following reasons: firstly, it embraces the nature and dignity of human existence; secondly, it points to the highest realm of human idealism and to the way to achieve this; thirdly, it defines the position of human beings in the universe and the harmonious state of the human world. These three: order, intelligence and harmony, are the marks of a truly civilized society, and the starting points of a higher civilization.

The word for "ritual" in Chinese carries a series of meanings: "ceremony", "rites", "propriety", "rules of propriety", "good custom", etc. Here I will not discuss the meaning and content of ritual, but its historical and philosophical significance.

Ritual Defines the Nature of the Human Being, Separating it from Beasts: Directly it Restrains and Sublimates One's Natural Desires

At the time of Confucius, the discussion on "the difference between man and beast" had already begun. This reflected a deepening of human knowledge and its attempt to distinguish the human from the natural world. What is the fundamental difference here? Some thought that the feature of the human is to look after one's parents; others thought that whereas human feet are hairless, those of beasts are covered with hair; still some others thought that humans were capable of speaking, while beasts were not. All these ideas were based on physiological human phenomenon. For Confucius, the essence of what separates the human from the beast is none other than ritual: "the essence of being human is ritual and courtesy" (*The Book of Rites*). *The Book of Rites* says, "A parrot can speak, but it is not separated from birds; a gorilla can also speak, but is not separated from beasts." Hence, the capability of speaking is not the fundamental difference between the human and the beast. When one of the disciples asked about the way of filial piety, Confucius replied, "Today people see filial piety merely as looking after their parents, but even dogs and horses look after their parents. If one does not respect one's parents, what is the difference between a man and a dog or a horse?" Respect itself is part of ritual; hence only ritual separates the human from the beast.

The essence of the Confucian ritual is to inspire self-consciousness on the part of the human mind. It stresses the moral aspect of human nature and the accomplishment of the mind. Confucian ritual as the essence separating the human from the beast often reminds people of their unique human nature, which also reflects human self-consciousness. Confucius further explores how an individual abides by such ritual. Hence he is a moralizer and his inheritors also see the moral idea as separating the human from the beast. Mencius says, "It is inhuman to be without pity; it is inhuman not to be able to distinguish the good and the evil; it is inhuman to be without comity; it

is also inhuman not to be able to judge right and wrong." All these elements about which Mencius talks are moral judgments and belong to the moral aspect of ritual. Xunzi, in the Confucian school, thinks that the unique human feature is that one knows righteousness and has moral judgments. "Water and fire have air with them, but not life; grass and trees have life with them, but not sense; birds and beasts have sense with them, but not righteousness. Man has air, life, sense and also righteousness with him. He is therefore the most respectable under heaven."

A human being does not live in isolation, but in a society in which one is related to others in various ways; in other words, a human is a social being with moral integrity. For Confucius, in order to become a social being with moral integrity, one must restrain and sublimate one's natural desire. Because the natural desire of man includes such feelings as cunning, anger and greed, the makers of ritual must "rid man's cunning with intelligence, his anger with courage, and his greed with kindness" (*The Book of Rites*). Natural human feelings include "happiness, anger, grief, fear, love, hate and desire"; in daily life such feelings as desire for good and sex, and hatred of poverty and death, are most clearly revealed. These feelings of desire and hatred, which are the most natural emotions of the human mind, are characterized by particularly unrestrained impulses and therefore must be restrained and sublimated.

Although ritual is an institution coming from without, in the end it must enter into the individual mind and finally reach the level of "humane feeling". Confucius sees this as "the field of sage kingship", which must "be ploughed with ritual, sowed with righteousness, hoed with study, accumulated with kindness, and stabilized with music" (*The Book of Rites*). Here Confucius not only defined the nature of man, but also explained that the way to becoming a social being is through ritual. Ritual is both within and without the human mind. It can be known and realized self-consciously, but needs also to be regulated and taught. The ritual of Confucius is, on the one hand, a restraint and sublimation of man's natural desire, and, on the other hand, a creation of civilization.

Ritual Points to the Highest Realm of Human Idealism and to the Way to Achieve it

The essence of Chinese philosophy is to achieve the ideal life. Unlike Western idealism, the ideal life in Chinese philosophy includes two aspects, namely the ideal personality and the ideal society. Just as Chinese philosophy emphasizes harmony and unity, the ideal life focuses on harmony and unity between the individual and the community, and between man and nature. Hence, the individual can achieve an ideal life only through pursuing an ideal society. This view of harmony and unity helps to enhance love and unity in human society.

For Confucius ritual is also the mark of the complete human as far as the ideal life is concerned. "One cannot be a man if one does not learn ritual"; "One cannot be a man if one does not know ritual", "a man stands on ritual". Such sayings reveal that Confucius identifies ritual with being a human. Ritual is being a human; it is the symbol of an ideal life: it is sagehood itself. If one's life is based on ritual, one reaches the free realm of "following the desire of the mind without breaking rules". By placing oneself in the rules of ritual and at the same time surpassing them, one achieves the ideal life. Mencius too thinks of ritual as the only way to achieve sagehood: "Ritual is a door, . . . only the sage can walk through this door."

How then can one achieve this ideal life? Confucius explains this problem from two aspects, of which the first is the self-consciousness of the mind seen as the manifestation of ritual which is inherent in one's nature: one has only to follow and develop it. The second aspect is the restriction

and regulation of human behavior from without. The eventual purpose of both is to maintain order an harmony in the human world. Confucius says:

Ritual is the most important aspect of man's life. Without ritual man cannot worship the gods of heaven and earth, nor can he rightly judge the different positions of king and subject, of high and low, and of old and young. Without ritual man and woman cannot be differentiated, the blood-tie of brothers cannot be maintained, and marriage cannot be made (*The Book of Rites*).

As it is through ritual that order is maintained and one's position and status are situated rightly, one must keep one's correct position and maintain this order. "The king orders his subjects with ritual, and subjects serve the king with ritual." Once one knows his or her right position, one must behave according to ritual. "Look not at what is contrary to propriety; listen not to what is contrary to propriety; speak not what is contrary to propriety; make no movement which is contrary to propriety" (*The Confucian Analects*). Such are the inherent requirements for humans. Ritual is a common aspect of human nature, and it is by self-conscious behavior that one develops this nature. Therefore ritual surpasses the boundaries of one's profession and becomes the common feature of all human beings.

For those who are responsible for laying down the rules of ritual, it is necessary to understand human nature and to care about human destiny, for only then can they regulate the timeless and universal rules of ritual. Confucius himself is such a person. All his life he worked for an orderly society and an ideal life--"working for the unachievable". In order for the individual to pursue ritual, one should act in accordance with ritual from two aspects, namely, to abide by ritual and to examine oneself constantly. Confucius says, "When internal examination discovers nothing wrong, what is there to be anxious about, what is there to fear?" (*The Confucian Analects*) On another occasion he says, "When one sees a man of worth, one should think of equaling him; when one sees a man of a contrary character, one should turn inward and examine oneself." This method of abiding by ritual and self-examination are in accord with Confucius' idea of self-conscious benevolence, which believes that one is capable of self-awareness. The whole Confucian ethics is based on this belief.

On the other hand, ritual is without the individual: "Ritual works from without." "Ritual is the measurement of making relationships, of deciding on doubtful things, of distinguishing things, and of telling right from wrong" (*The Book of Rites*); in other words, ritual is the measure of everything. For the individual to achieve the ideal life, he or she needs to learn ritual, to know ritual and to abide by ritual in order to be righteous in daily life. Confucius is talking about the same process when he says, "The mind is aroused by the Odes; the character is established by the Rules of Propriety; and the finish is received from music" (*The Confucian Analects*). Odes and music are directed to the education of the mind since among human feelings there are elements which contradict the rules of ritual. Because ritual is to be raised in daily life, it must be concrete and practicable. Therefore there has to be a set of rules which restrain the mind of the individual from without. One of the disciples says, "The Master, by orderly method, skillfully leads men on. He enlarged my mind with learning, and taught me the restraints of propriety" (*The Confucian Analects*). However, it is not easy to reach the realm of ritual. Therefore when Zigong, another of the disciples, asked, "What do you pronounce concerning the poor man who does not flatter, and the rich man who is not proud?" Confucius gave the following answer, "They are all right; but they are not equal to one who, though poor, is yet happy, and one who, though rich, loves the rules of ritual." This is also the ultimate goal of ritual, as Xunzi says, "Ritual is the end of learning, it is called the moral end." Because it is not easy to reach this end, the individual should keep on learning ritual, knowing it and restraining himself by it.

For Confucius, the ideal life cannot be achieved by an individual's solitary learning. Since the individual lives in a community, he or she should abide by ritual in forming relationships with others or with the community. Therefore the individual must "cultivate himself in reverential carefulness", "cultivate himself so as to pacify others", and "cultivate himself so as to pacify all the people." "Wishing to be established himself", he must also "seek to establish others", and "wishing to be enlarged himself", he must also "seek to enlarge others" (*The Confucian Analects*). In Confucian ethics the individual is closely linked to the community. Starting from this point, later followers of the Confucian school sought to govern the country and in the end to pacify the world under heaven.

The ideal society should be an orderly society, namely one arranged according to ritual. In Confucius' own time, the right order of society was broken by the selfishness and power of some individuals. Confucius believed that the right order could be restored only by ritual. Therefore his policy of governing the state was to restore the right order, and to restore the proper positions of king and subjects, of husband and wife and of brothers. If everyone kept his proper position and behaved according to ritual, then the harmony and order of the society could be maintained. On the contrary, if the individual was not willing to keep his position, if one thought of doing things which were improper for his position, if the people talked about politics, or if dukes or princes controlled the affairs of state, then society would be in disorder. The Confucian ideal of a civilized society is an orderly and harmonious one, which is consistent with the Confucian ideal life. This makes society's most important concern, "in regard to the aged, to give them rest; in regard to friends, to show them sincerity; in regard to the young, to treat them tenderly." The ideal society of Confucius is one of ritual in which people are peaceful, friendly, wealthy and equal to each other. Based upon the rule of ritual in the real world, Confucius developed a social idealism which has become the ultimate goal of life for many virtuous and learned person. The two aspects of the Confucian ideal life, the ideal individual and the ideal society have become the philosophical bases for the advance of both the civilized individual and the civilized society.

"Ritual" Has Defined the Place of Human Beings in the Universe and the Harmonious Co-Existence of the Human and the Heavenly Way

The tradition of Chinese philosophy as founded by Confucius holds that human beings are born between heaven and earth; these are boundaries for humans which cannot possibly be surpassed. Similarly, the ritual that reflects human nature originated from heaven and is contained on earth. As says the *Book of Rites*, "Ritual is derived from heaven, and mixed with the earth." Such knowledge comes from the unique Chinese thinking regarding human existence. From direct observation the Chinese have discovered that everything born under heaven and above the earth originated from the interaction of such antitheses as *yin* and *yang*, the hard and the soft, and the high and the low. These antitheses give order and harmony to everything that is born; the purpose of ritual is to maintain such order and harmony between human beings and the universe. Confucius thinks that "music is made to mate with heaven, and ritual is made to mate with earth. "Only when ritual is performed does everything becomes peaceful." Only in a country ruled by ritual are all things properly placed; the ultimate purpose of ritual is to maintain harmony between heaven, earth and man.

This thinking differs distinctly from Western thought which inquires after virtue by means of reason. From the very beginning it sees the ideal life of mankind as part of the heavenly harmony. Chinese philosophers as represented by Confucius firmly believe that the universe is a harmonious

whole of which humans are a part. Therefore human society must also be in harmony both within itself and with the other parts of the universe. In the universe the human being co-exists with other kinds of lives for the universe is a single and undivided unit. The ultimate value of human existence lies in heaven and earth, that is, in the universe, not in humans themselves.

Heaven and earth are boundaries which humans cannot surpass; they should abide by the rule of heaven and perform ritual accordingly. This leads to one of the fundamental doctrines of Chinese philosophy: heaven and humans are one. Confucian ritual is aimed directly at returning to the order of the universe. Man can know and communicate with heaven through the education of virtue, as Mencius says, "One who exhausts his mind knows his character and one who educates his mind can serve heaven."

Feng Youlan, the famous Chinese philosopher, divides human life into four stages; the natural state, the functional state, the moral state and the state of heaven and earth. The first two stages are for the well-being of the self; only in the last two stages is the well-being of the self linked to that of society. In the last stage alone does the individual know that the self is part of the universe, and that what one does must be for the good of the whole universe. In other words, in this stage he comes to knows not only humans but also heaven; one becomes one with heaven. Feng sees this last stage as the ideal life which the individual should seek to achieve. This ideal coincides with what Confucius says: "Follow the mind without breaking the rules."

The thought of heaven and humans being one in Chinese philosophy compels one to realize that he or she is not small in comparison to heaven (or the universe), nor is heaven formidable in comparison to them; hence, one is willing to reach for heaven. The search for moral virtue is then not a kind of ascetic practice, but a happy experience. This concern for human life and for the universe reflects the dignity and sublimation of human existence. Ritual and the view that heaven and human beings are together have profound influence upon the advance of human civilization. Chinese philosophers see the nature of man as a process of "being born and growing from day to day" by consistently accepting the endowments of heaven.

Wang Fuzhi, a well-known philosopher living at the end of the Ming dynasty and the beginning of the Qing dynasty, holds that human nature is continuously improved. He believes that man learns the way from the sensual aspects of things such as their color and sound, and that learning the way enables consistent improvement in man’s nature. With the improvement of one’s nature one is better equipped to perceive the heavenly way or course. It is in this interaction of human beings and heaven that the human reaches the realm of freedom in behavior and thought. This dialectical tradition reflected in Wang’s theory of interaction between the heavenly course and human nature is an important contribution of Chinese philosophy.

The intrinsic character of ritual requires that humans grasp the rules of heaven with the mind in order to achieve unity with heaven; on the other hand, the practicality of ritual requires that humans grasp the rules of heaven from daily life. Therefore ritual is a set of rules or regulations that can be followed. This tradition of heaven and humans being one, and of knowledge and behavior being one, has put the relation of humans and nature, and of humans with other humans into a single whole, thereby constituting the idealism of unity and harmony in the Chinese mind.

The significance of Confucian ritual for civil society lies in Confucius’ seeing ritual not only as requirements from without, but also as an intrinsic factor within the mind that affects human behavior. This philosophy is helpful both for the sublimation of natural human desire and for the education of moral virtue. Were ritual to be seen only as requirements from without, it would ignore and eventually abandon human nature. Ritual points the way to the ideal life itself. The establishment of the order of the individual and society requires the individual to maintain such

order, and further to perfect both the individual and society. Ritual is the mode of access to the rules of heaven and earth. Heaven, as the boundaries that man cannot surpass, becomes the source of human value and the ultimate end of human existence. The view of "co-existence with man" and "co-existence with all lives" is helpful also in solving the vital problems caused by science and human existence. Ritual will always push toward the advance of civilization.

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Discussion

In the history of Confucianism a number of its dimensions were dissociated and manipulated for political purposes. Thus, originally the sense of harmony bespoke a sense of mutually beneficial relationship based on mutual personal restraint and benevolence on the part of the ruler as well as the citizen, the father as well as the child. In dynasties after the Han this original benevolent and internal character was forgotten so that it came to be understood as an external imposition of order predicated upon obedience to something alien. This, in turn, was compounded by a sense of tradition as mere repetition of the old which had become ossified and unchanging and by a sense of hierarchy as simply imposition and enslavement. In all of this the meaning of Confucianism was progressively obscured and perverted.

Hence, it is necessary to look once again at Confucian thought and its key notion of ritual or *Li*. First, it should be noted that the rationalist analytic dissociation of life so that some facets are means for others as ends is poorly adapted to appreciating Confucian thought. This, in contrast, is essentially synthetic and focused upon life taken existentially, that is, upon the very exercise of life. Hence keeping the order which promotes life cannot be dissociated as a means from life as a goal, but is essential to the very process of living. Indeed it is what gives it proportion and harmony, what institutes this as true and hence just, as good and hence attractive, indeed as beautiful and hence enjoyable.

It is necessary to see ritual not only as an external order imposed from without, but especially as internal in nature i.e. as being the natural order of things. This being the case, to revere one's father is not the act of a slave, any more than for a parent to love one's child is to lose the parent's power to direct and guide the child. On the contrary, it is to recognize the deep truth of all great cultures, namely, that real power is love, that real leadership is through doing, and that satisfaction comes not from one's own accomplishment but from the depth and extent of one's benevolence.

If this be so then tradition is not a dead repetition of the past, but an active search to apply the best that has been garnered by a people in the circumstances thus far so that the life of future generations can be enlivened and deeply enjoyed.

What then should be said of the stage of life in the classical traditions of the Chinese as well as of other peoples? One needs to recognize that this is an ideal and that most persons will achieve only the first stages in their own life time. This, however, does not mean that the higher stages are irrelevant, even for those who will not themselves achieve them. On the contrary, the higher stages are what unfold the full meaning of a civilization and of all that is within it. Hence, even if many will not achieve a highly altruistic practice in their life, they see in others and know themselves that their attempt to be decent, basically honest, and concerned with the welfare of their family is part of a civilization which points inappropriately to higher ideals and that these ideals inspire and give dignity to the whole.

What is the task of the philosopher in this? It should be his or her task first to go about understanding and articulating the content of the tradition as adequately as possible. This means not attempting to reduce it by an inappropriate mode of understanding, e.g. to a Cartesian analysis of all into clear and distinct ideas. On the contrary, it is one task of philosophers to attempt to broaden the appreciation of understanding to ways that include the aesthetic awareness needed for a more adequate appreciation of one's culture and its tradition.

Moreover, for Chinese (as well as other) cultures it will be important that the work of understanding be able to open to, and draw upon, the actual exercise of life, and in turn be able to work creatively in the circumstances to apply the tradition in new ways.

Beyond this issue of knowledge it is the task of philosophers to comprehend the various dimensions of this life--its sense of human beings both in their particularity and in their social character, and this on both the speculative and the practical levels.

In this context should one say then that each culture possesses its own truth which is meaningless to others. Certainly, to the degree that they have discovered saving truth philosophers should share this with others. But the inverse is true as well; what is discovered by other peoples should be sought by those in other tradition. It is the task of philosophers to go in search of truth and meaning of human life, to appreciate this and to interpret it to their own culture.

This sense that all peoples live and share in the truth is a special characteristic of our times. This awareness along with the development, through phenomenology, of hermeneutics as a way of appreciating the truth and beauty in other cultures gives promise of a more positive attitude toward others. Because, in contrast with material goods, the goals of the spirit can be shared without diminishment, this, in turn, gives promise that in the future there can be cooperation rather than competition between peoples. If so then there is promise of a cumulative sense of philosophical insight which can take peoples ever more richly and deeply into the meaning of their shared humanity.

10.

Collective Identity and Civil Society

He Xirong

The term "civil society" has become of increasing interest in many parts of the world, not least in Western societies. It is a kind of association and organization in between the individual and the state, a free realm which is protected but not interfered with by the state. The public sphere of Habermas points to the meaning of civil society. He sees this public sphere as firstly a sphere of our life world in which public opinion can be formed. In principle, the gate to the public sphere is open to all citizens who then act jointly; they are not limited, but protected by political power. In civil society citizens may meet together, associate and express their opinion freely. Here they deal with social concerns through critical dialogue as the instrument of public rationality. Hence, civil society can be described as the arena of popular organizations, social movements, voluntary organizations and citizen associations, as well as the forum of public communication. Civil society then is distinct from the economy and from the state or political society.

According to the above point of view, Chinese society seems to lack elements of a civil society. In Western society, the existence of a public sphere reflects the double polarization of the individual with state in the public and with society in the private sphere. This conception of society embodies an opposition between the free individual and associations which does not exist in traditional Chinese thought. Chinese thought pays far more attention to the organic connection of the individual with associations, society or state, and places greater emphasis on the obligation of the individual to society and the state. It takes self, family, state and world as a unitary whole, of which the individual is only a part.

The notion of civil society places emphasis upon a collective identity. In terms of the tradition of the person, at a high-level of technological development the Western world is beginning to abandon its individualistic tradition. People are being advised to unite their collective strengths against such pressures as state control, economic monopolies, damage to the environment, and so on.

Chinese culture has a long tradition of collective identity, which comes from the peculiar pattern of Chinese thought and understanding. To a certain extent this promotes the development of the Chinese nation and the progress of human beings. It is similar to the elements which form civil society, but is not identical with them. This traditional Chinese collective identity should be renewed and ascribed new significance in the modern world. China can relate with word trends so that the goal of civil society--that every citizen participate jointly in the work of society, and live in the kind of society to which they are committed--can be attained in China.

This paper will point out the character of Chinese collective identity and compare this with the sense of personal identity in Western society. It will investigate the philosophical background which produces the Chinese collective identity as well as its advantages and disadvantages in history. On this basis it will attempt to suggest how a new collective identity might be constructed. This joins the project of civil society as described by Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Arato: "What is needed is a conception of civil society that can reflect on the core of new collective identities and articulate the terms within which projects based on such identities can contribute to the emergence of freer, more democratic societies."1

The Nature of Chinese Collective Identity

We must treat collective identity as well as personal identity as very important moments of social philosophy, that is, we must discover the new sense of collective identity not as a pre-cultural primitive mentality but as a post-technological philosophical mode. In order to think in this line, we may consider the principal senses of identity as expressed in the different forms of each culture, for each has its traditional and customary mode of self-expression. Thus the way in which one introduces oneself which is necessary in one's every day social activity can suggest a culture's philosophical sense of self-identity and provide some access to the way of thinking about personal identity.

In Chinese society, when a brief self-introduction is required in a certain committee, firstly, one introduces the name of one's city or country, then the name of the society to which one belongs, thirdly one's profession, and at the end one's family name and own name. For instance, in introducing myself, I would say that I am from China, Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences, a scholar of philosophy, He Xi-rong. However, in the West, the word order of one's self-introduction is just the opposite. Another example is the order in the Chinese character for one's personal name. The first character states the family name of the Chinese, the second is his or her position in the family hierarchy, the last is the personal position in the family hierarchy, and "Rong" is my given name. Here, what is emphasized is the family. On the contrary, in Western names what is emphasized is the individual: first is one's own name, and second is that of one's father and hence of one's family.

Another example is the order in expressing time and address. When time is expressed what is expressed is in turn year, month, day, hour, moment, and second. When an address is stated, what is expressed is in turn country, province, county, road, and house number. In such an order of expression, what is emphasized is the synthetic relation beginning from the whole and proceeding to the individual. Contrary to this, the Westerner begins with the analytic reality of the individual and proceeds to the whole. So we may conclude that in Western society the personal identity is the most important, hence the personal name is the first thing one wants to introduce to which others and others wish to know. On the contrary, in China and many other Eastern countries, the collective identity of the society to which belongs is the most important; hence the first thing one wishes to let others know is not one's own name, but the name of the society to which one belongs.

The Philosophical Root of Chinese Collective Identity

In early times in ancient China many philosophers such as Confucius, Laotse and Tschuang Tschou used words like "the same", "sameness", "the one", "the one and same", "the oneness", etc. We also find philosophers using such terms as "Heaven and man are one", "knowledge and action are one", and "The other and I are one". Therefore, we can say there was a clear consciousness of identity in ancient China and that this indicates the character of its consciousness of collective identity.

The Ideal of "Heaven and Man Are One"

This was treated as the framework of all thought. Traditional Chinese philosophy is constituted mainly by Confucian thought, supplemented by Taoism and Buddhism. Its main character is that if the whole; it is a monism with two levels. On one level, it takes the universe

and human society as an organic whole of a certain structure. On another, it holds that such a whole takes ultimately the morally perfect human being as the subject. The typical category of this monism is the idea of the whole as stated in "heaven and man are one". The way to understand the *Tao* is by practice, first as examining one's mind and knowing one's own character and then as understanding heaven. According to such a monism, the life in which heaven and man are one is the supreme ideal of social development. Only through continuous practice at participating in social life can the human being make oneself morally perfect and merge with heaven.

What is meant in the Confucian school by "heaven" or "the heaven principle" is neither a personal god nor God, but the infinite universe which lives forever and brings about everything. The thought that "heaven and man are one" originates from the idea of "the morality corresponding to heaven" of the people in the Zhou Dynasty 2500 years ago which ascribes the moral significance of the heavenly principle. Confucius considered heaven and man to be one mainly from the point of view of natural law. He said: "Does heaven speak? The four seasons pursue their course, and all things are continually being produced, but does heaven say anything?"2 He also claimed that man needs to know the ordinances of heaven and stands in awe of them. Confucius thought, "The heaven-determined order of succession now rests on your person; hold fast sincerely to the Due Mean."3 In the Zhou Dynasty, Confucian thought further develops the idea of the morality of the people as corresponding to heaven; it emphasizes that the human being who lives between heaven and the earth should grasp fully and self-consciously the internal law, understand the heavenly principle of living life in such a way as to realize the value of "cultivating oneself and of pacifying others." Mencius claimed further that humans can communicate with heaven through education in virtue: "One who delves exhaustively into one's mind knows his or her character; one who knows his or her character knows heaven; and one who knows his or her character and educates his or her mind can serve heaven."

Confucius and Mencius provided the basis of the theory of the Chinese Confucian school which completes the meaning of "heaven and man are one". In ancient Chinese philosophy this was a process of applying the objective heavenly principle and will to human beings. It also gave full play to the subjective human activity of actively grasping the "heavenly will" or "heaven principle" by clarifying one's moral knowledge so as to reach the point of merging one's human life with heaven. This becomes the supreme goal in Chinese culture.

Feng Youlan, a key contemporary Chinese philosopher, divided human life into four stages or states, which are respectively the natural, the utilitarian, the moral and that of heaven and earth. The first two stages or states are for the well-being of the self. Only in the last two stages is the well-being of the self linked to that of society. And only in the last does the individual know that the self is a part of the universe, and that what he or she does must be for the good of the whole universe. In other words, one knows not only the human, but also heaven; one becomes one with heaven. Feng sees this last stage as the ideal life which the individual should seek to achieve. The thought of heaven and human being being one in Chinese philosophy compels one to realize that he or she is not small in comparison to heaven or the universe, and that heaven does not overwhelm the human; hence people are willing to reach heaven and belong to it.

The Social Collective Consciousness

The spirit of Chinese philosophy seeks self-realization. The goal of life is to be a sage in one's inner life and a monarch in one's outer life. How can life be significant, how can the value of self be realized? Chinese philosophy answers the questions at two levels. On one level, the answer is

internally oriented: it requires the development of personal morality to self-perfection and a merger with nature. This is the way of the sage in inner life. On another level, the answer is externally oriented and requires the extension of self in society. The goal of this extension is to make harmonious the relation between oneself and another and between the individual and society. This is the way to be a monarch in outer life.

It may be said that to be a sage in one's inner life is a matter of self-cultivation. This emphasizes the development of personal morality to the point of reaching the realm of merging with nature: it is a process of identifying oneself with the universe. To be a monarch in outer life is a morally praiseworthy achievement. It emphasizes that the individual can realize his or her own value only in society in the process of identifying oneself with the collectivity or society. Confucius said: "It is impossible to associate with birds and beast, as if they were the same with us. If I associate not with these people--with mankind--with whom shall I associate?"4

Confucius pointed out this social character of human beings. Human beings live in social relations with other human beings; they seek their own development in society in intercourse with others. Hence, Confucius paid special attention to the relation between humans. "One must cultivate himself in reverential carefulness", "cultivate himself so as to pacify others", and "cultivate himself so as to pacify all the people", "wishing to be himself established, he must also seek to establish others", and "wishing to be enlarged himself, he must also seek to enlarge others." On the other hand, "What he does not want to be done to himself, he should not do to others."

In Confucian thought, the individual is closely linked to the community. Everyone should treat others with love, righteousness, ritual, wisdom and confidence. If all behave in this way, a society with Great Harmony will be established. This is described by Confucius in the following terms: "With regard to the aged, give them rest; with regard to friends, show them sincerity; with regard to the young, treat them tenderly." In a word, the Great Harmonious Society is a society of ritual in which people are peaceful, friendly, wealthy and equal one to another. The traditional Chinese ideal of life is to realize the great harmonious society. Everyone should find one's position in conforming to the great harmony.

Beginning from Confucius, most Chinese philosophers would emphasize the obligation of individuals to others, to society, and to the state. The will of being a sage in one's inner life and a monarch in one's outer life indicates that one's attitude in life is that of a spontaneously active spirit. Confucius said repeatedly in the *Analects* that the cultivated person dislikes the thought of his or her name not being mentioned after the death.5 When one of disciples asked what was shameful, Confucius replied: "When good government prevails in a state, to be thinking only of one's salary, and when bad government prevails, to be thinking, in the same way, only of one's salary--this is shameful."6 This shows a spirit of active participation in social life which trains a useful person for society. That Confucius required that one pursue achievements so as to be known by others shows that the character of Confucian thought emphasizes the social character and collective identity of human beings and places in an important position the social value of the human being: the goal of being a sage in one's inner life and a monarch in one's outer life, along with the social consciousness that "oneself and the other are one." This is highly beneficial in elevating moral attainments of a human being and maintaining the stability of society.

The Values of Collective Identity

Placing "the public prior to the private" and "selflessness for the public".

According to the values of traditional Chinese philosophy, the value of the community is superior to that of an individual, which can be realized only in community. However, Chinese philosophy does not deny the value of the individual, but emphasizes that this must be merged with that of the community. So far as the value of the individual is concerned, that of the community is extrinsic and is expressed in ethical principles and moral norms. But according to traditional Chinese philosophy what the ethical principle and moral norm express is not simply extraneous, but also what "heaven gives to myself"; it is in this that the nature or essence of the human being consists. The intrinsic and the extrinsic are connected organically. As Confucius said regarding "ritual", this is not simply an extrinsic norm, but something essential, constituting the human being as human: ritual distinguishes the human from a beast.

From the point of view of value, the externalization of the value of the individual is the value of the community; conversely, the internalization of the value of the community is the value of the individual. In such an internalization, extrinsic social obligation is transformed into internal obligation. Chinese philosophy, especially early Confucian thought understands the relation between the value of the individual and that of the community in this way. With regard to the extension of personal emotion in social life, Confucius promoted "the way of truthfulness and consideration" and "subduing one's self and returning to propriety". This emphasized the realization of rationality and the value of the collectivity. The way of truthfulness and consideration reflects the application of personal goodwill in society. This process of generalization is one of eventual identification of the individual with the collectivity. The truth for Confucius is that "wishing to be established oneself, one must also seek to establish others." "Consideration" or "reciprocity" is reflected in his saying: "What one does not want to be done to oneself, one should not do to others." His advice "to subdue one's self and return to propriety" reflects what he considered to be the main choice and adjustment. He emphasized the domination of rationality over sensitivity, of the community over the individual. Because Confucius emphasized that the value of the individual must be in harmony with that of the community, when the interest of the individual conflicts with that of the collectivity Confucius emphasized the superiority of the latter to the former. This orientation toward treating the value of community as superior helps to induce people to act together for the establishment of a desirable society. But excessive emphasis upon the value of the community could lead to the obliteration of the value of the individual.

The Reconstruction of a New Pattern of Collective Identity

Traditional Chinese philosophy emphasizes the unity of heaven and man, of knowledge and practice, of myself and others; it attends closely to the development and quality of society; and it induces one to establish a healthy view of life enabling one to develop one's personality in adapting the developments of modern society. What distinguishes Confucian from Western thought is that the latter pays more attention to the study of ontology and epistemology, whereas Confucius paid much more attention to the norms of social life. Confucian thought emphasized personal moral cultivation, on the one hand, and the norm of personal behaviour in society, on the other. These are expressed succinctly in the dictum, "to be a sage in one's inner life and a monarch in one's outer life." Because of the close connection of Confucian thought with ordinary life, it is accepted by people of various social strata and is the core of traditional Chinese philosophy. Under the influence of such helpful thought, many Chinese take an active part in social life and realize their ideals through their contribution to society.

However, there is something in such a pattern of collective Eastern identity which does not suit modern society, so that its reconstruction is necessary.

The German scholar, Ernst Cassirer, in his book *An Essay on Man* wrote: "It is partial for Aristotle to define man as social animal; the definition gives us a concept of class, but not the differential specifics. The social character as such is not the only character of man, it is even not the character peculiar to man. Among man, what we can see is not only a society of action like animals, but one of thought and emotion." The social consciousness of man depends upon the activities of assimilation and differentiation. One can realize one's individuality only through the mediation of social life. However, such mediation for humans is not simply a power of external determination when, like an animal, one conforms to various social norms. Beyond this, one can participate actively in creating or changing the form of social life.

Cassirer's criticism of Aristotle may be applied to Chinese philosophy which emphasizes assimilation but ignores differentiation, which emphasizes the influence of society upon the individual but ignores the creativity of the individual in society. Hence, the resulting identity probably would be effected by power which would inhibit people's thought; such a superficial identity is called a functional identity. This is not a primitive collectivism under which individuality is dominated, but a functional collectivism. That is to say, it is free from any ideology or religion, provided the member can contribute to the function of the group. Hence, there is no spiritual identity, but there is an effective functional identity.

Therefore each member is in effect two individual subjects: one is a functional subject as a unit of collective identity in public life; the other is a personal subject as an individual identity in private. The Confucian view of life, to be sage in one's inner life and a monarch in one's outer life, is often separated. One's ambition might be fulfilled in society, but if one's desire or thought does not suit society one could turn one's mind toward being a sage in one's inner life. Confucius said: "My doctrine makes no way, I will get upon a raft and float on the sea."7 Mencius said that honest people behave in such a way that when they realize their ambition they should benefit; otherwise they abandon their ideal. Confucius and Mencius expressed the idea of two subjects, and most people who failed in public life used to choose the private aesthetic perspective such as poetry, painting and calligraphy, escaping from the public with its difficulty. This is to be half resigned to the life of a hermit. In such a way one finds personal fulfillment, but it does not help to improve society. On the contrary, some people do not cultivate themselves morally when they earn a high position or social privilege, but seek benefit for themselves without considering others and society.

In addition, paying attention only to the realization of a functional collective identity could cause one to abandon individual morality. For the Chinese the harm from egoism is substituted by the harm of nosism, namely looking for the welfare of the group. This is very efficient for teamwork, but presupposes the defeat of another team. Moreover the principle of Chinese collective identity, domesticism, carries the danger of inclinations to nationalism. Historically, Eastern states such as Japan and China in which the collective identity strongly dominates emphasize the Great Unity and become national states: they tend to establish a unitary nation and all matters are determined by a state plan. The state inhibits any differences or multiplicity that is not state approved.

Because of the technologization of the society, even in the Western world there arises the need for collective decisions by a committee and for teamwork in domains where in the past individual decisions were final. Thus, collective identity is needed in the contemporary world. Hence, the Chinese collective identity, but perhaps with some modifications. First, difference should not be

neglected when similarity is emphasized: similarity should be formed in difference. Second, the creativity of individual persons should be respected when conformity of the individual person to social norms is required: the collective identity of society should be based on personal identity. Third, in maintaining a harmony between the individual and the collective, a necessary tension between the individual person and society should be tolerated, that is, a mechanism for criticism should be allowed. Civil society is just such a mechanism; it mediates by adjusting the relation between the individual person and society. If all this be realized then, on the one hand, the individual person can develop oneself fully in society and, on the other hand, the power and creativity of individual persons can be interrelated enabling society to be more stable.

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Notes

1. *Civil Society and Political Theory* (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 1992), p. 421.
2. Yang Huo, *The Confucian Analects*.
3. Yao Yue, *ibid*.
4. Wei Zi, *ibid*.
5. Wei Xian, *ibid*.
6. Yuan Xian, *ibid*.
7. Gong Ye Chang, *ibid*.

Chapter XI
Metaphysics and Practical Life

Yu Xuanmeng

The question of the relation of philosophy to the civil world evokes two opposite poles: one is real social life and the other is the speculative world. If asked to choose between the two, few would prefer the latter, especially in a consumer society, for who would give up his or her real interest to live in a speculative world? As a result, philosophy, especially metaphysics, is not only widely neglected by ordinary people, but is asserted to be at its end, even by some philosophers of different orientations.

But is metaphysics really at its end? We do see people becoming more engaged in our times. However, to strive for a better future requires an ideal or faith: to judge what is better, people also should have an idea of the good and of values. All these are subjects of metaphysics which cannot be resolved by science. We cannot live a life without a faith or ideal we set for ourselves and toward which we dynamically create our own history. Scientific projection cannot replace faith or ideals, for scientific projection is marked by relativity and ceases to be ideal or faith as soon as it is realized; a metaphysical faith or ideal, in contrast, is absolute in the sense that it is our ultimate concern.

Thus we have the dilemma that, on the one hand, metaphysics is an essential element in our life; on the other, it is considered to be separated from practical life. This moves us to look into metaphysics once again. We ask: What is metaphysics considered as separated from practical life? Do we have any other kind of metaphysics? This paper will be concerned to show that the separation of metaphysics from practical life is due mainly to ontology, but that ontology is not the only way of doing metaphysics. Some patterns of metaphysics without ontology will be discussed.

The Origins of Metaphysics

The decline of philosophy is due to the decline of metaphysics. This is a point of agreement between both positivists and humanists. The title of one of R. Carnap's papers "Eliminating Metaphysics through Logical Analysis of Language"1 came to be almost the common task of the positivists in past decades. Heidegger added, "What we say about the end of philosophy means the completion of metaphysics", because, "philosophy is metaphysics".2 We should then make clear what is meant by metaphysics, because people have the right to make their own definition of metaphysics; we had better trace its origins from their beginning.

The term metaphysics was first formulated as the title of one of Aristotle's books by those who edited his papers; originally it meant "*meta ta physica*" (i.e., the location of these papers after those concerning the physical universe). Simplicius was the first to interpret the word as the name of the science of all things, including what lies beyond nature and, hence, treats reality not according to its physical realizations, but simply as real.3 This may be the reason people emphasize the following paragraph of Aristotle as the main point of the book and hence the meaning of metaphysics:

There is a science which investigates being as being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences; for none of these others treats universally of being as being. They cut off a part of being and investigate the attributes of this part; this is what the mathematical sciences for instance do. Now since we are seeking the first principles and the highest causes, clearly there must be something belonging to these in virtue of its own nature. If then those who sought the elements of existing things were seeking these same principles, it is necessary that the elements must be elements not by accident but just because it is being. Therefore it is of being as being that we also must grasp the first cause.4

The above quotation has led people to conceive that metaphysics is the universal science which seeks the first principles. For instance, G. Baumgarten put down, "Metaphysics is the science which contains the first principles of that which is within the comprehension of human knowledge."5

Since the development of the term metaphysics, understood according as Aristotle discussed it in that book, a great and by no means harmless change took place. As Heidegger said, "It has forced the interpretation of these treatises in a particular direction and thereby has determined that what Aristotle discusses therein is to be understood as metaphysics."6

What has happened here? Let us compare metaphysics as the first principles with philosophy in its original meaning, i.e., "to love wisdom". As knowledge, wisdom differs from first principles in that it is the description of man's own ability in both knowing and practice. "To love wisdom means to seek the development of one's own abilities. Of course, knowledge is the illustration and the effect of one's wisdom. Knowledge always concerns some object, and we can learn knowledge from others. But it seems hardly possible to talk about wisdom as something positive. As the proverb goes, "The first one who speaks out something is a genius, the second one who follows the same way is the fool." It is the same for wisdom: as soon as wisdom is spoken, it is no longer wisdom but knowledge.

As a result, when metaphysics took shape as the universal science seeking the first principles, and was considered as pure philosophy, the direction of philosophy was changed from seeking wisdom to seeking knowledge. This happened even earlier in Plato's philosophy, so that Heidegger could say, "All metaphysics, including its opponent, positivism, speaks the language of Plato."7

Again, we have the question: what does is meant by first principles? Principle, in Greek "*arché*", also means ground or cause. Metaphysics would have proceeded properly had wisdom been understood as the *arché* of all knowledge. Unfortunately, since Plato, *arché* is taken to be true knowledge in contrast to mere opinion: true knowledge is found in the realm of ideas; it is the object of intelligence. As ideas are the models for the things in our world, the knowledge formed by ideas is *a priori* or transcendental knowledge. In Plato's dialogues, *Parmenides* and *The Sophists*, we read how the ideas formed transcendental knowledge by combining with or separating from each other automatically.

The Western languages played a very important role in the constitution of an *a priori* philosophy, or at least some of their characteristics accord with Western metaphysics. In English, as an example, "being" is a key word in philosophy. Since Greek times Being (*on*) has been taken as the most general and universal category, hence it provides the starting point for the whole deductive system of logic, i.e., *a priori* knowledge. This makes Western metaphysics the science of Being, i.e., ontology. If Western metaphysics leads philosophy to seek knowledge instead of wisdom, it is in ontology that *a priori* knowledge is formulated. We need to look into ontology in more detail.

Ontology and Metaphysics

There are various definitions of ontology, but literally it is the science of Being. Its definition by the German philosopher, C. Wolff, is as follows: Ontology is "the treatment of abstract and quite general philosophical categories, such as Being and its being the One and Good: in this abstract metaphysics further there come accident, substance, cause and effect, the phenomenon, etc."8

Though metaphysics covers a broader area than does ontology, as pure philosophy people usually consider them to be the same or at least inseparable. In Baumgarten's definition of metaphysics as "the first principles of that which is", being is mentioned. Heidegger also maintained that, "Philosophy is metaphysics. Metaphysics thinks Being as a whole--the world, man and God--with respect to Being, and with respect to beings belonging together in Being."9 Though here the word ontology is not mentioned, there is no doubt that they speak of ontology.

The above excerpts indicate that ontology is pure metaphysics and deals with the first principles of all sciences. As concerned with the first principles, ontology should not be a generalization of the special sciences, but rather should be constituted by itself. The dynamics of its constitution is logic, which presupposes that the meaning of each category lies in its logical determination, by which a category distinguishes itself from a mere name whose meaning is hidden from that to which the name refers.

Hegel's "Logic" unfolds as a perfect category system, i.e., ontology. His first step is from Being directly to Nothing, for as the most general and universal category Being is no particular determination, and hence it equals Nothing. In each stage of change there must be a particular determination, i.e., *Dasein*. This must have its quantity and quality, which, in turn, are united in dimension. This introduces the relation of reflection which shows the Absolute Spirit developing from the realm of existence to that of essence. For essence is determined as reflection, just as a subject is reflected through its object. However, existence and essence are abstract and onesided, and hence are without actuality. Only when they unite together into a concept does the absolute idea achieve concrete completeness.

We saw that logic is so powerful that few could deny its necessity. The movement of absolute idea from the abstract to the concrete, from the simple to the complex, from the onesided to the complete, seems to accord with the real development of the cosmos and with the scientific process of human knowing. However, as Hegel would say, the system of the absolute idea is worked out by the movement of the concepts themselves, without appealing to experiential facts. It is a matter of *a priori* principles and the general laws for all the special sciences; the concrete principles are merely the externalization of the Absolute Spirit. Of course, Absolute Spirit is a world other than our life world.

However, there have been doubts about ontology. For instance, the quarrel between nominalism and realism is essentially with regard to whether ideas really exist outside our world. Also, taking ideas as descriptions of perception, empiricism absolutely denied the existence of a transcendental world. Though Descartes never doubted the necessity and validity of logic in ontology, he required clarity of the ideas and proceeded inward in "I think, I am." This means that it remained a problem for him how we can really get the meaning of ideas beside their logical determinations, especially the meaning of the idea of Being as the starting point in deductive logic.10

A heavy blow was made to ontology by Kant in his criticism of the ontological proof of the existence of God, in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. The ontological proof of the existence of God supposed the premise that God is the perfect or almighty Being. If this is the case, existence must belong to Being; so God exists. Kant criticized the proof in many ways. The decisive way was to point out that here concept is identified with possibility, whereas what we really seek here is the real. The difference is like that between a hundred dollars as an idea in my mind and a hundred dollars in my pocket. As Kant said, "In my financial position no doubt there exists more by one hundred real dollars, than by their mere concept (that is, their possibility)."11

Kant's criticism disclosed that ontology was constituted by pure ideas in a world separated from our life world. The propositions in ontology are only logical possibilities and have nothing to do with our real world. Hence, the so-called first principles should be dismissed as of no use in our world.

But if ontology is the essential part of metaphysics, then the decline of ontology is the decline of metaphysics; in turn, if metaphysics is pure philosophy, then the decline of metaphysics is the decline of philosophy.

Metaphysics in the Chinese Tradition

If ontology were the only way of doing metaphysics, then with the end of ontology, metaphysics, and hence philosophy, should have ended. But if we ask whether there could be metaphysics without ontology, I would like to introduce here traditional Chinese metaphysics which is a metaphysics without ontology.

When our predecessors translated "metaphysics" as "*Xing Er Shang Xue*", they got its meaning most probably from Yi Jing. In what was supposed to be put down by Confucius' *The Great Commentary to the Yi Jing*, we read, "That which ascends from the Hexagram is called *Tao*; what descends from the Hexagram is called a vessel."12 Here vessel means concrete, individual things; *Tao* is the supreme aim to be pursued while the hexagram is something between the vessel and *Tao*. On the one hand, it is not like *Tao* which is unseen; on the other hand, as a symbol, it is not tangible. Rather it is a bridge from the vessels to *Tao*: this is the way of ascending. The basic meaning then of "Sing Er Shang Xue", i.e., metaphysics, should be learning concerning the way of ascending from the vessels to *Tao*. Roughly speaking, thus understood, metaphysics in Chinese philosophy is not merely knowledge, but the striving for *Tao* in all of one's life. That means, it is then not merely knowledge, but also practice.

Since it is characteristic of Chinese metaphysics to be strongly related with the concept of *Tao*, this should be treated at greater length. But it is difficult to elaborate it positively and in detail, and perhaps no one could do so. Rather we read from the book "*Lao Tsu*" at its beginning: "*Tao* might be spoken out, but what is spoken out is not the constant *Tao*. . . . So, people usually reach its subtle meaning in the light of nothingness, and trace its indication in the light of being there."13 By this negative characteristic, Chinese philosophy distinguishes *Tao* from real things. *Tao* seems in a sense similar to Being in Western philosophy, for in Hegel's *Logic* we read that pure Being as the most universal Being equals nothingness. But Being as such in Hegel's philosophy is determined logically, while *Tao* has nothing to do with logical determination. Just as *Tao* is not determined logically, it is not pure knowledge; or to put it in other words, one cannot deduce from the concept *Tao* the other concepts. Though we read the following saying in "*Lao Tsu*" that, "From *Tao*, one is brought forth; from one, two; from two, three; and from three, everything is brought forth",14 this is by no means a logical deduction, i.e., it does not mean that *Tao* logically

implicates the concepts of one, two, three and everything. Rather, it indicates the phenomenon that everything develops from the simple to the complex, of which *Tao* is the general source. Everyone of us also is included in the concept "everything", so one can traces the indication of *Tao* even from one's own experience.

We should point out that when Chinese philosophy took its shape at the very beginning there was no copular in the Chinese language corresponding to English "to be". Though we have the copular "*shi*" in modern Chinese, it has no modifications as the participle and the gerund; even today people experience difficulty in thinking the abstract "*shi*" as a concept independent from its context, whereas something like Being is indispensable for ontology.

Perhaps the only positive character we could say is that of *Tao*, "tao follows nature".15 That means that *Tao* is in accord with nature's way of being itself, but what is nature's way? We do not know it unless we ourselves follow it. Nature's way is the way of being itself. We experience nature's way when we behave in accord with nature's way, as Confucius said, "At 70, I can follow my heart's desire without transgressing what is right."16

From an epistemological point of view, it seems absurd that as the supreme aim and the general source *Tao* would be uncertain and that its existence would be doubtful. But for traditional Chinese philosophy, just as *Tao* is uncertain, it will not be exhausted in our search for it. Practical striving for *Tao*is the most powerful justification of its existence. So in searching for *Tao*, people do not take as their purpose merely gaining more knowledge. Rather, in doing philosophy, i.e., in striving for *Tao*, people feel that their life is elevated to a higher and more meaningful level. This is what the sages or saints strive to be.

A basic point in the traditional Chinese philosophy about *Tao* is that *Tao* prevails in everything, which allows people to search for *Tao* in all sorts of practical lives. For instance, there is *Tao* in serving tea which is called the *Tao* of tea. Also, there is *Tao* in sword play, in playing chess, in doing calligraphy, and so on. Similarly, doing Qi Gong is a way for experiencing *Tao*. Everything will be fit so long as *Tao* is followed. In doing Qi Gong, following *Tao* means to bring oneself into harmony with nature both mentally and physically.

Since *Tao* is not separated from practical life, everyone, whether politician, merchant, scholar, staff, and so on, can search for *Tao* in his own career. One should take *Tao* as the most important aim in one's life, rather than as that which one seeks for directly in one's professional work. People have many different professions, but *Tao* is the aim of all people, namely, to make their perfect. It is called simply the *Tao* of being a man.

Given the fact that Chinese philosophy is not separated from the practical life, why is philosophy depressed in China today. The answer is twofold. Firstly, while prevailing over and being shown in, everything, *Tao* has at the same time the characteristic of concealing itself. Chuang Zi said, "*Tao* is concealed as soon as one thinks he has advanced even a little." This happens easily when one focuses one's eyes only on the practical part of life and indulges in one's interest. As we all know, the point of central interest in our times is the development of the economy. This situation calls us to pay more attention to *Tao*. Otherwise, *Tao* is easily concealed. Even though *Tao* cannot be destroyed, the new problems caused by economic development, such as pollution, population, education, urbanization, alienation, etc., remind us that humanity will be punished by its own actions against nature. This shows that *Tao* can neither be denied nor subjected to man's will.

Secondly, since Western philosophy was introduced to China, many scholars began to write the history of Chinese philosophy according to the pattern of Western philosophy, just as in the realm of grammar, some grammarians tried to formulate Chinese grammar according to English

grammar. This has proved a failure. Earlier in 1918, Cai Yuanpai, a famous scholar, wrote in the Preface to Hu Shi's "An Outline of the History of the Chinese Philosophy" that, "We have to take the history of Western philosophy written by the Western philosophers as the model in writing our own work, for we have no predecessors." His opinion exerted a great influence on the later scholars. For instance, we see such book titles as "The History of Categorical Development in Chinese Philosophy", and "The Logical Development of Ancient Chinese Philosophy". The influence of Hegel is evident in such books. This is worse than neglecting the original Chinese philosophy.

But I do not think that Chinese metaphysics will end in our time because it has melted into practical life and is the spirit of the entire Chinese culture. So long as life goes on, the metaphysical spirit of the Chinese people will continue.

An Existential Metaphysics

If metaphysics is as we have elaborated above, i.e., the human being's striving to elevate his or her life, ascending to a higher and more meaningful level, then every nation is sure to have its metaphysics despite the declaration of the end of metaphysics made by some philosophers. Since metaphysics permeates the human being's practical life, the spirit of metaphysics appears not only in philosophy, but also in religion, art, and so on. Metaphysics in philosophy is only the theoretical expression of the metaphysical spirit of life. From this point of view, though certain patterns of traditional metaphysics have ended, the real metaphysical spirit permeating practical life will exist forever, and perhaps may enable us also to elaborate theoretically the real metaphysical spirit.

For this I would like to take Heidegger's philosophy as an example because, while Heidegger criticized traditional metaphysics, his own philosophy is criticized as a metaphysics by, for instance, R. Carnap. If then Heidegger's thought is still a metaphysics, it must be a new one different from traditional metaphysics.

Hence, let us begin with Heidegger's criticism of the old metaphysics. His criticism could be summed up in one statement: "Metaphysics persists in the oblivion of Being."17 At first sight, it seems that Heidegger is still in the field of ontology, and hence would be in the old metaphysics. This impression might be reinforced by the central problem of his philosophy which he repeated many times, i.e., "the question of the meaning of Being." But, as a matter of fact, what he means by Being is thoroughly different from that found in ontology. As we know, Being in ontology is the most universal concept or the most general category. But for Heidegger, Being is neither a category, nor even a concept. To put it more clearly, for Heidegger Being is not "what" it is, but that what which "is". As Heidegger points out, in ontology Being as category or concept is a "what" which he calls entity (*das Seiendes*). Because ontology takes Being as an entity, rather than in the sense of "is", it is the oblivion of Being. According to Heidegger, the meaning of Being is more primordial than that of entity. But as Being is only a copular, whence and how can we find its meaning?

When we say "it is so and so", this means that we see, recognize, judge or understand something. We can take the same thing differently according to our ways of dealing with it. That is, through our different ways of dealing with it, an entity will be revealed differently. This different way of revealing is what Heidegger calls the meaning of Being, i.e., the basic meaning of Being is *Revealing*. And the different ways of revealing, i.e., the different ways of dealing with things, are our ways of Being, which Heidegger calls *Dasein*'s existence. This leads to the conclusion that to inquire into the question of the meaning of Being is to analyze the existential

reality of *Dasein*. Heidegger calls this fundamental ontology in the sense that the question of the meaning of Being is more primordial than that of entity; it goes deeply into the ground of ontology. As Heidegger wrote, "Basically, all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of categories it has at its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its own most proper aim, if it has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as its fundamental task."18

With regard to how existentials analysis goes to the depths of ontology, Heidegger mentions, as an excellent example, the category of nothing compared with the nothingness in existentiality. As a category, nothing is supposed to be without any determination; it is the complete negation of the totality of being. But since nothing "is" a category, it is a being, i.e., an entity after all. This shows that in ontology the category of nothing cannot reach the real meaning of nothing. Only in our own existentiality can we really reach nothingness.

One of the special existentials analyzed here is anxiety. Heidegger says:

Anxiety robs us of speech. Because beings as a whole slip away, so that just the nothing crowds round, in the face of anxiety all utterance of the 'is' falls silent. That in the malaise of anxiety we often try to shatter the vacant stillness with compulsive talk only proves the presence of the nothing. That anxiety reveals the nothing to man himself immediately by the person demonstrates when anxiety has dissolved. In the lucid version sustained by fresh remembrance we must say that in the face of which and for which we were anxious was 'really' nothing. Indeed, the nothing itself as such was there.19

One might wonder, what is the significance of clarifying the nothing in the way of fundamental ontology as compared with that of traditional ontology? In fundamental ontology, philosophy is called back from the other world to our life world; it deals no longer with abstract logical determinations, but with our own situation and the meaning of life.

Of course, philosophy does not limit itself to describing the situation of human beings; it should also deal with the general problems of the whole world. This is what Heidegger wants to do. Not long after his *Being and Time*, Heidegger began to seek the meaning of Being in new ways. The essential point of his later philosophy is that Being reveals itself in the four folds opening: man, God, heaven and earth. Everything is included in the opening of the four folds. Thinking, art works, language, poetry, technology, etc., all of these are considered the ways in which the four folds opens.

This means that the meaning of Being is nowhere but in our own practical life. Searching for the meaning of Being is searching for the fate of men and women. Heidegger does not deny that Being has the characteristic of mystery: while it reveals, it also conceals. Though in a Western language, all of this reminds us of the *Tao* of Chinese philosophy. Indeed, Heidegger himself says in one of his books that the way in which Being reveals itself is the *Tao* of Lao Tsu.20

No one would deny that Heidegger says something metaphysical. But it is surely not metaphysics in the sense of the traditional Western metaphysics. This confirms our point that so long as life goes on, metaphysics will go on, and that ontology is not the only way of doing metaphysics.

Follow your own metaphysics in practical life: ascend!

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Notes

1. "Erkenntnis", vol. 2, 1932.
2. *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. by D. Krell (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), pp. 224, 103, 374,
3. E. Zeller, *Aristotle and the Earlier Peripatetics* (New York: Russell and Russel, 1962), vol. 2, p. 80.
4. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1003a 20-32 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966).
5. A.G. Baumgarten, *Metaphysics*, 2nd ed. (Halae, Magdeburgicae: Hemmerde, 1743), p. 1,
6. M. Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1962), p. 10.
7. *Martin Heidegger*, p. 375.
8. Excerpt from Hegel, *Lectures on the History of Philosophy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul; New York: Humanities Press, 1974), vol. 3, p. 353.
9. *Martin Heidegger*, p. 374.
10. See Hegel, *Logic* (London: Oxford University Press, 1892).
11. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, tr. by M. Muller (New York: Anchor Books, 1966), p. 402.
12. "Yi Jing, Great Commentary", section 1.
13. "Lao Tsu", chapter 1.
14. *Ibid.*, chapter 42.
15. *Ibid.*, chapter 25.
16. *The Confucian Analects, 2, 4.*
17. *Martin Heidegger*, p. 224.
18. M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, tr. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper, 1962), p. 31.
19. *Martin Heidegger*, p. 103.
20. M. Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, tr. by P.D. Hwerz (New York: Harper and Row, 1971) p. 92.

Discussion

1. There is a significant parallel between the history metaphysics as presented here and the history of civil society. The paper of G. Mclean showed how the reality of civil society was developed in the democratic context of Athens in which all (free men) participated in the decision making process or governance of society. In the context of modern rationalism this was recalled as a safety net to protect those victimized by the capitalist economy developed in a rationalist utilitarian fashion, but even this was largely frustrated by the rigor of technical reason as reflected in the evolving ideologies.

Hence, if civil society needs now to be redeveloped, this must be done by going beyond technical reason to a sense of human awareness that is more open and integrates all with the uniqueness and effectiveness of creative human freedom. This must include not only theory, but practice, not only the individual but the social. To encompass all of this requires, in Kantian terms, not merely the technical and practical reason of the first and second critiques, but aesthetic judgement of the third critique as well.

Professor Yu's paper traces a similar trajectory for metaphysics and proposes a similar step forward. He sees that metaphysics was taken as theory only and was transformed into a system of categories under the title of ontology as the logos of beings. If this be the case then there is need now with Heidegger to reintegrate into metaphysics the fullness of life by turning from essence to existence or *esse* which would integrate the practical order, action, creativity and the aesthetic. This engagement in life is essential for rebuilding civil society, not as a fragile house of categorical abstractions or legal rights, but as a dynamic outreach and interchange between people.

2. This raises the question of whether the political and the economic reality should be removed from the discussion of civil society. That suggestion could be the result of the ideologies which use only technical reason and approach these spheres of life by deductive theories as mutually exclusive categories. If, on the contrary, one begins from the engagement of people, then their economic interaction is foundational, as was noted by Marx, though not all determining as he came to believe. Similarly, the political alignments, rather than being determined abstractly by theories of the exercise of power without attention to people's lives and concerns, should be seen to evolve from the engagement of persons with others in life.

To think of a civil society while excluding economic and political engagement would be to envisage not the life of a free citizen, but precisely that of a prisoner whose punishment consists precisely in such exclusions from participation in major forces shaping the life of one's community.

3. It is important then to consider what the horizons of this engagement will be. If civil society, understood as the comity or solidarity of persons in a particular place and time, were to be the full extent of one's horizons and hence of one's concern, then one would be trapped. All would be relative to what we are, all would be limited to what we could make or do; other peoples would be simply alien and interpersonal; relations as well could degenerate into animosity.

A metaphysical stance in the sense of Professor Yu then appears essential. His sense of the practical and existential engages every dimension of our everyday life, but, rather than leaving this by itself or making it absolute, relates it to the *Tao*. It is essential that this not be seen as another thing for then it would compete with our daily life, which would then be rendered insignificant. On the contrary, it is not another thing, but is expressed in the perfection with which we accomplish our daily tasks.

In this light, attention to civil society is not in competition with the *Tao*, nor is it a secularization of life, but an effort to integrate all dimensions of our life so that, cumulatively and in harmony with others, they might constitute a more perfect reflection of the absolute, the *Tao* or the divine in our daily life.

This encourages people to participate fully. Indeed, all have a sense of value in their life and some form of ultimate concern, for otherwise they would be unable to choose, or to possess the passionate concern to galvanize behind a worthy cause or simply to carry out the wearing tasks of everyday life.

What metaphysics in Professor Yu's sense can contribute is an ever upward direction for life, elevating the meaning and level of our everyday engagements. In this context civil society becomes the place in which we set and nourish our values, build the bonds of community, and commit ourselves to one another in building our world. Inspired by metaphysical meaning which has been developed through practice and coalesces as our culture, social unity can engage all in the upward movement, overcoming evil and building a life truly worthy of humankind because reflective of the Absolute Good.

Chapter XII

Seeking Harmony in Authority: The Reason and Values Necessary for Civil Society

Richard A. Graham

[I would like to begin with a personal note, going back over my own search for authority and obligation. About 45 years ago, when at 30 I was leading a discussion group on "The Great Books", I decided to follow the Greek model for a good life, which I took to be divided into four periods of 20 years each: the first 20 years as student, the second as family and businessman, the third in service to one's state and, from 60 to 80 as writerphilosopher. It worked out that way for me and, after 20 years as engineer inventor and co-founder of a company making industrial servo-mechanisms, I entered foreign service as Peace Corps Director in Tunisia. During the "Great Society" years of the 1960s and early 70s, I served as a Commissioner on the first U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and Director of our National Teacher Corps. Then, as a Fellow at the Brookings Institution, in an effort to understand why programs for large scale social reform sometimes over-correct and become unstable, I drew upon the methods of systems analysis employed in the design of military and industrial servo-mechanisms. And later, as Executive Director of the Lawrence Kohlberg's Center for Moral Development and Education at Harvard University, I helped with research on how individuals in some 50 societies throughout the world develop, reason about values and act upon their judgments.

Nancy, my wife, shared our overseas Peace Corps responsibilities and did most of the raising of our five children. She too then entered public service to become deputy to the Vice President for Education at the National Urban Coalition, director at the Peace Corps, Director of Peace Links (an international women's organization), co-founder and director of the Institute for Soviet-American Relations, and now an editor for the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy.

Today the United States seems less confident of its prospects for the future than at any time in its history. There is widespread fear that people in the United States, as individuals and as a society, have lost their sense of moral authority and there is little confidence that they can find a way to restore it. So, three quarters through this last period of my hoped for life, I thank you for this opportunity to join you in drawing upon moral and political philosophy to consider what can be done to reconstruct the culture and values that foster a good society.]

The Search for Moral Authority

In an effort to identify the reason and values that provide a foundation for a good society, I shall draw upon research that comes partly from the Center for Moral Development and Education at Harvard University. That research provides insight regarding the quality of reason and the foundations for values that are necessary for a civil society. It helps to explain why some of the reasons, values and passions that create a civil society are not the same as those that sustain it. It bears directly on how and why one seeks harmony in the moral authority of one's culture and religion, in the authority of one's country, and in the authority of one's inner self. For if we are to recreate a harmony of moral authority in ourselves and in our societies, we need a better understanding of how one comes to create one's own internalized combination of authority out of

the traditions and moral precepts of one's culture and faith, the history and laws of one's state, and the dictates of one's conscience. We need a better culture, religion and country.

I say culture *and* religion though it is not easy to separate them. Even for those who think of themselves as non-believers, religion is imbedded in their culture, in friends and associations, in literature and art, in admonitions and aphorisms, in customs, courtesies and ceremonies, in the marker celebrations of one's life--at birth, adulthood, marriage and death--and in the inescapable mystery of ultimate authority.

Aristotle's Obligation

One's internalized amalgam of authority imposes a sense of obligation to others which, for most people, is not far from the way Aristotle described it in his *Nicomachean Ethics*:

In our relation to our kinsfolk, our fellow tribesmen, our fellow citizens, and all other people, we should do our best to render them their due and to estimate their claims by considering the nearness of their connection with us and their character, or the services they have done us.

Although Aristotle's sense of obligation is more or less shared by most people in most societies, there is considerable difference within and between societies on the meaning of what others are "due", and on how to estimate the "nearness of their connection with us". We in the United States are now hotly debating what an individual is due from society, and, in much of the world, people are still brutally distancing themselves from one another because of differences in race, ethnicity, religion, class, ideology or culture.

In speaking of one's culture, I think mostly of the values and beliefs that largely shape the identity of one's society and, in turn, shape large parts of one's own personal sense of identity. These values and beliefs are, at first, mostly transmitted by one's family and by childhood friends and teachers and, later, by other associations and experiences. For the fortunate, these include the experiences of literature which, according to a definition that I particularly like, is "writings in which expression and form, in connection with ideas of permanent and universal interest are characteristic or essential features, as poetry, history, biography, essays etc." This, of course, includes the great religious texts, the national epics, and much of philosophy. For I believe that it is through the experiences of literature, as much as it is through personal experience, that nearness of connection is extended to others who outwardly seem apart. And it is a certain nearness of connection and a certain harmony of moral authority that provide the necessary foundations for a civil society and its institutions.

The Moral Authority of Relations Between Persons

John Dewey noted in his *Freedom and Culture* that:

Political institutions are an effect, not a cause . . . the relations which exist between persons, outside of political institutions, relations of industry, of communication, of science, art and religion, affect daily associations, and thereby deeply affect the attitudes and habits expressed in government and rules of law.

Yet many of the world's societies are now attempting change in their economic and political institutions without much regard for traditional relations between persons and without much regard for the moral authority of cultural values, religious belief and aesthetic sensibilities. Meanwhile, the relations between persons in industry, communication and science are changing at a furious

rate. The lesson to be learned from recent movements for large-scale social change is, I believe, that the necessary force for a lawful civil society can be found only in harmony between the several sources of moral authority; without this harmony a society loses its force for connection and individuals lose a moral sense of what is due one another.

Some of these movements for economic development have been dedicated, as Robert K. Merton expressed it, "to finding more effective means to carelessly examined ends". Some have become more dedicated to a market economy and to increased wealth as a source of greater power or well-being, than to the freedom and dignity of the person as the foundation on which the well-being of an individual and a society alike depend.

What then is to be done to foster the moral authority that is necessary for a civil society? Putting aside for now the issues of cultural preservation as affected by family stability, religious faith and formal education for responsibility and initiative, I would use Dewey's terms in examining the "relations between persons in industry" as they affect "the attitudes expressed in government and rules of law." I will concentrate briefly on the subject of business ethics and how it affects the broader ethics of a society and its moral authority, and this for three reason: One is that, in many societies, the relations between persons in business and industry are changing at an unprecedented rate and the traditional foundations for business ethics must be shorn up or replaced. A second reason is that the ethics of business does much to confirm or corrupt the moral authority of a society. A third reason is that enough has been learned about the ways business ethics are corrupted and enough has been learned about ways to reestablish moral authority in business to guide action that can be taken now.

From the Traditional Authority of Village Markets to the Uncertain Authority of National Markets

In the village market a wary "nearness of connection", along with traditional standards for how much one is "due" in the way of fair dealing, tended to establish obligations for business ethics that had little need of support in law. But in national and international markets, as obligations of connection all but disappear and as the services done or received create less personal obligation, the need for obligation under law increases. In some newly created market economies where cultural traditions and religious precepts have lost force and laws are not yet enacted or enforced, a kind of economic feudalism becomes a law unto itself. It eats away at personal security, civil authority and national cohesiveness. The current state of economic and social affairs in many parts of Russia provides an all too graphic example of a lack of moral authority in business and, increasingly, in society itself. According to David Remnick's report in the *New Yorker* magazine of February 1995:

It has turned into what Russians call *bespredel*, meaning anarchy, lawlessness, limitless greed. . . . In the standard sense of the word, honesty does not--cannot--exist. . . . Bribery is a fact of business life. Under both czarist and Soviet rule, bureaucrats always took bribes and accepted certain privileges as their due. But there were limits. . . . Now there are no such limits. . . . The "privatized" bureaucrat demanding cash for a signature is sometimes the least of a tycoon's concerns. The more dangerous question is one of protection. Russian bankers, especially, often worry about the threat of violence, even of contract killers hired by organized crime figures or perhaps by a rival banker. "Ten to fifteen thousand dollars and you are gone," one financier told the weekly *Moscow News* recently. . . . Millions of Russians feel that they are worse off now than they were before and they deeply resent these new masters of the Moscow universe . . . in which

politics is played out according to the economic interests of bureaucrats, entrepreneurs, and mafiosi. . . . (This is why) the new wave of Russian entrepreneurs craves a legal order; chaos is bad for the country and bad for business.

The Search for Moral Authority Needed for Civil Society

I would like to turn now from the Russian example to the findings of recent research in moral development, much of it originating at the Kohlberg Center at Harvard University. It is research that bears on how relations between persons provide moral authority for business and society and how to enhance such authority. Briefly summarized, it includes the following three findings:

- For most people in most societies, moral authority is founded in part upon the power of sanctions, whether of state or religion; but it is founded primarily upon the values of one's culture or sub-culture that are transmitted through relations between people in family life and through membership in communities of social life and faith. For many adults in modern societies, cultural authority is augmented by civil authority that does not exclude cultural and religious values. And for about a fifth of the older adults in a civil society, moral principles that are confirmed by one's own self-developed power of reason provide support for corresponding cultural and civil authority.

- One's capacity for the level of abstract reasoning that is required for technical or social responsibility in a modern civil society is developed, from infancy to adulthood, in a sequence of discrete patterns of reason and judgment that are found in all societies. One's progress to the next more abstract structure of reason is driven by a sensed dissonance or disequilibrium, by a sensed need to form and test hypotheses that can reconcile conflicts of perception or judgment. Thus, in the moral domain, one's early perceptions that what is right is established by the authority of the traditions and customs of one's own community tends to be challenged, in disparate societies, by the perception that other communities which differ in ethnicity, nationality or religion may hold to the authority of customs and traditions that are quite different. The search for harmony in one's own perceptions leads, for many, to the judgment that a disparate society requires overarching civil authority that respects diversity but can establish common ground. But not all the members of any society develop the higher levels of reasoning required for abstractions such as "civil society" or "market economy". Indeed, in a homogenous rural community where there is not much exposure to conflicting interpretations of ideas of permanent and universal interest, as these are introduced by literature and by the social issues of most modern civil societies, one's conflicts of perception are more rare and so is an individual's progress to the higher levels of abstract reason on which a civil society is founded.

- Whether or not one acts according to one's reason and values depends much upon one's strength of character and one's ability to establish priorities for one's self responsibilities for others, especially as these responsibilities may conflict with the drive for the preservation of one's essential self.

Perhaps the most significant outcome of this research is a kind of confirmation of the fundamental force for human life that is made manifest from infancy on. Almost from birth the infant embarks upon a search for security of self by means of discovery and predictability. The child and adult continue to seek security for their selves through predictability, through their search for reasons or belief. It is a search that produces the "eurekas" of life, the self-assuring fitting together of one's reason and beliefs. It begins as a search for the proximate causes of observed effects and becomes a search for ultimate purpose and authority that will support one's sense of being in this life and, as the concepts are developed, one's being in the life hereafter. This search

for reason and authority creates a preserving force for being that is stronger than the preserving force for life itself.

A second, highly significant outcome of this research is its implications for an "authority of reason" that will provide support for a civil society. It is a quality of reason that enables one to take a step beyond the point of one's own perspectives so as to consider justice from the points of view of others of a different culture, class or ethnicity. This involves the ability to perceive how others perceive and the development of reasoning that achieves equilibrium between what one is due and what is due to others. But, since many people in modern societies and most people in village societies, have not yet developed reasoning of this kind, one's sense of national identity, provided it is not inconsistent with one's cultural identity, must be counted upon to help maintain a civil society. For a civil society can be maintained only by general agreement on what a citizen should render to one's nation and on what one's nation should render to its citizens.

Perhaps the most important implication of these findings is that a rapidly changing society needs not only to reconstruct its foundations for moral authority as new relations develop between persons, but to reaffirm the cultural foundations of personal identity that empower one to act upon one's own internalization of moral authority.

The Moral Authority Needed for Business Ethics

Turning again to the more immediate concern for the ethics of business as it affects, and is affected by, moral authority in a civil society, a threefold effort to find harmony between the principal sources of moral authority now seems both urgently needed and seemingly practical.

First, the values of culture and faith can be strengthened in relations between persons as they are formed in new, business-related associations that are dedicated, at least in part, to moral authority. Almost all professional societies, trade associations and labor organizations publish standards for ethical conduct but almost none impose effective sanctions for violations. They can do better.

Perhaps the most effective force for business ethics lies in the interests of well-established businesses themselves. For they have learned that the forceful commitment of business management to a code of ethics, and its prompt imposition of sanctions for violations of the code, can forestall corruption within their business and its outside dealings, either of which, in time, will destroy their business.

Second, a civil society can strengthen its sanctions on economic corruption. The risk of penalties can outweigh the chance of gain from illegal or even from unethical business dealings. Loss of respect in one's associations can be as certain and as much to be avoided as loss of freedom or property. Perhaps the most telling lesson Americans have learned about the role of government in business ethics is that the process for enacting laws and for creating the regulatory agencies that help to enforce them must include participation by those concerned, otherwise neither the laws nor the regulations will command the respect necessary for adherence. But the experience and commitment most needed to foster compliance with the ethical standards that are established by government or professed by most businesses and business-related associations lie not in government as much as in a great variety of non-governmental organizations--charitable, cultural, educational, international and religious. Many are willing and able to respond to requests for help in applying higher standards for business ethics at home and abroad. Among these, multinational corporations or non-profit foundations associated with them may be the most willing and able to

help. They know, as does the new wave of Russian entrepreneurs, that it is not just that chaos is bad for a country and for business, but that corruption in business leads to chaos.

- Third is the need to strengthen education that fosters development of the internalized moral authority of people in business. This begins with the moral education of family life and continues in the childhood associations of school, neighborhood and religious faith; in youth groups, sports and the arts. The Harvard research confirms the importance of early foundations for moral judgment since a child's judgment at 13 years is a good predictor of his or her later judgment as an adult and, from studies elsewhere, it seems clear that persistent traits of character are shaped even earlier. The admonitions and examples of mentors, heroes and saints--in life and in literature--provide force for the transmission of values, but one's need to belong to associations with others provides an even stronger force. More has been learned of late about ways to create communities that establish a sense of belonging and of responsibility to others. As the importance of membership in these communities increases, so too does the foundation for commitment to a moral code and to a process of sanctions for violations of that code, especially when both the code and the process for sanctions are developed by the community itself.

These ideas are not new. Emile Durkheim spelled them out around the turn of the century and the Russian, Makarenko, applied them in his schools in the 1940s and 50s. They have long been the makings of a good scout troop, a good summer camp, a good military unit and a good work group. They are beginning to find their way into schools through the help of newly developed measures of group solidarity and measures both of the strength of commitment of group members to its moral code and of the adequacy of the concept of justice imbedded in the code.

The means is solidarity; the end is adherence to a highly developed concept of rectitude. The new measures of solidarity, commitment, and adequacy, along with the guides for program development, seem to help avoid the common failing of achieving community without moral foundation.

I say that all this is seemingly practical with greater assurance than I feel, for there is no way of assessing how much American commercial television is "dumbing down", and "culturing down" and "moralling down" the members of our society and of other societies through-out the world. Certainly commercial TV is the most pervasive moral messenger of our age and its insistent messages are that self-gratification is life's purpose, that celebrity is character, and that violent revenge is justice. We do not know what to do about it.

Still, I believe that there is much that we do know about better ways to do business. More generally, we are learning more about ways to foster harmony between the moral authorities of our cultures and faiths, our countries and our inner selves. I believe that in joining together to think afresh how to render to the members of our societies what is due them we will increase our nearness of connection one to another.

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Discussion

1. As moral authority dissipates, it seems true that there is a moral crisis in the United states. But it should be asked to what degree this is a problem and to what degree it is an issue of will. That is, should it be seen as a problem of knowledge of what is right in a society that has become too complex to be able to identify with surety the goods and moral purposes of life, or should it be seen as a problem of implementing what one knows to be right? While life is increasingly complex, even where we do know a course of action to be necessary, e.g., moral education, as a society we lack the will to implement it.

2. But this is not merely a matter of the first level of freedom, namely of searching for a beneficial pattern of goods or possessions as a matter of utilitarian calculus. In order for the issues truly to engage human freedom we need to turn directly not merely to the objects chosen as on the first level of freedom, but to the reality of human freedom itself.

On a second, Kantian level, freedom is the power to choose as I ought. This requires a deep appreciation of the unique importance of human freedom in the world and the need to protect and promote it and its exercise as humanity's greatest possession, indeed, as the essence of humanity itself.

But beyond this is the third level of freedom in which a person or a community constitutes itself. This is the appropriate level of freedom at which to consider civil society as a human creation and the ethical issues this involves. Here a basic consideration is that ethical (or un-ethical) action not only accomplishes external objectives, as on the first level of freedom, but makes the acting person him- or herself to be a good or wicked person as one acts in accordance with--or against the dignity of one's nature or against this. This is the question of what I make of my life. Similarly, if society is a joint creation of human beings then as one interacts with others to form various areas of association and interaction the fittingness or unfittingness of this action creates a society that is or is not worthy of its participants. As one acts according to, or against, one's nature in conjunction with others one creates a society that is or is not ethical.

In this light the ethical qualification is not an external denomination applied from without according to one or another calculus, but the inner quality of interaction itself at the heart of the society which this constitutes. This takes the issue beyond questions of what externally will be allowed or prohibited and places it precisely where it belongs, namely, in the quality of the operation of human freedom as creative of the social world we inhabit, indeed, of the social life in terms of which we exist.

At this point of juncture of ethics and metaphysics, ethics takes on its true seriousness, beyond casuistry and utility, as the issue of what we will make of ourselves as persons and societies. Here there is no escape, for any compromise is a compromise of our own reality and that of others with whom we are bound and interact. Ethical knowledge guides the exercise of our freedom by pointing out goals and means that promote personal and social life, and warning us away from behavior which is self-destructive of us whether as persons or as peoples. It is in these terms that we are fully engaged in the human project.

In this there are difficulties which can be seen from the stages of moral development. At earlier stages one can be focused more upon, and protective of, one's own interests. At higher stages one's horizon is more extended to include a broader range of persons. This increasing universality could be developed in abstract terms, but this entails the danger of a perverse dynamism, namely that the more one abstracts from, or leaves out of consideration, the particular identities of those to whom

one's concern is extended the less one is able to respond to their needs or to respect the identity they have created through the exercise of their creative freedom as persons or societies. Indeed in some ideologies these cultural and ethnic identities are considered to disrupt the recognition of basic human rights. The result is that the attempt to protect and promote all humankind is carried out in term which suppress what is most central to their humanity; a process of dehumanization becomes a prerequisite for being included in such a world.

Another difficulty seems inherent in the dynamic of social development with limited human resources. In the competition for these human resources the most creative people are drawn away, leaving in charge of directing organizations those whose vision is restricted to issues of ideological safety or ease of administration. In this way the structures of civil and other societies tend over time to become resistant to innovation and change, or even to the activities they were constituted to promote. Here again, it is only by keeping open and pressing one's commitment to the good that sufficient dissatisfaction with the status quo can develop, that newly emergent needs can be responded to, and that the possibilities of new opportunities can be aggressively pursued.