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The Poverty of Ideological Education

By
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The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

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Preface and Acknowledgments

Education has always been a burning issue and an obsessive preoccupation in my life. I still remember my childhood, growing up in violence, my innocence tainted with ideological doctrines. The Chinese and Vietnamese system of education and schools were fabricated after the model of Nazi concentration camps in which the teacher knew more about torture than pedagogy. Like my schoolmates, I went through primary, middle and high school in fear, despair and, curiously, hope, the hope of being liberated. All I can remember are long hours of indoctrination, self-confession and self-torture brought on by all kinds of imagined sins preached by the teachers. Yet, ironically such a horrible education was never despised in our country. We were so accustomed to it that we unconsciously took it for granted. The "success" of such an indoctrination was verified by the effectiveness of such products as "models," "patriots," "heroes"... and by the evidence of uniform thinking. This "success" was hailed and sanctified as virtue. One blindly believed and tried to defend it.

I was far from exempt from it. In fact, in my first writing on education, I argued for ideological training. I blamed the Western liberal education for its "irresponsibility." I turned a blind eye on the idolization of Mao Dze-dung, Ho Chi Minh, Kim Il-sung, Chiang Kai-shek and other leaders in Asia, which I mistakenly took as a matter of belief shared by most. I looked at Lee Kwan-yew of Singapore as a model Confucian, and I firmly embraced the principles of stability, order, and discipline as the most sacred doctrines for politics as taught by Confucius in *The Analects*.¹

Fortunately, I did not need David Hume to wake me up from the slumber of dogmatism as did Immanuel Kant. The tragedy of the Cultural Revolution launched by a divinized Mao, the crimes committed by our "dear leaders," be they the "great" Kim of North Korea or the new "savior" Polpot of Cambodia, be they the generals in most Asian countries or the colonels of Latin America, all demonstrated a sad fact: indoctrination is nothing but an instrument of repression used by our leaders to acquire power and accumulate their interests. In essence, ideology plays the sword of Damocles; hidden in its manifest form, one discovers the satanic soul of Machiavellian politics.

In China, the long, dark winter of totalitarianism seems to be ending as the idols are stripped of their divinity in the light of day. Infallible Mao, Generalissimo Chiang, indomitable Teng, one by one, are subjected to criticism by their own "lambs," their power decreased and their messianic magic, heroism, patriotism, omniscience, etc.—once carefully choreographed and glorified by their followers—now vaporized under sunlight. The "unedited" history reveals the unseen banality and hypocrisy of our godlike idols. Sadly enough, their tumble has not helped much in destroying idolization; one simply replaces Bacon's idols of the theater by idols of the forum. Like Nietzsche who pessimistically asked, how could one declare "the death of god" if "theism" is still accepted,² we question our education: how can Mao be demystified when the "sacred" Maoism is still the syllabus of our education? How could Richard Wagner and Nietzsche convince us of the "twilight of gods" (*Götterdämmerung*) if the new gods are still emerging?³ The caricature painted by us has taken on a life of its own, which makes of us, its fabricator, a self-caricature.

Thus, the hope for an end to idols seems rather utopian as long as their metaphysical foundation is still unquestioned, i. e. as long as there is still a belief in the heaven-mandate and our ideology remains uncriticized. The immunity of Maoism from any criticism demonstrated that ideology enjoys the absolute power once assigned to religion. As such, its authority imposed on the masses could not be challenged. This historical fact confirms rather than destroys idolatry. Thus, it is no surprise that the worship reserved for God is "naturally" applied to the leader, be he

and anyone (*quicumque*) or a someone (*homo quidam*). We witnessed how the idolatry of a "someone" named Mao is passed to another one called Teng. To the scholars well versed in Chinese culture, such a phenomenon is by no means unique. It is so common that only a few may raise eyebrows about it. Neither the revolution of 1911, nor the cultural movement of 1966; neither the collapse of the Man-Ching dynasty, nor the "victory" of the Communists in Mainland China could have destroyed the essence of idolatry. All they could do is replace one idol with another.

We may be optimistic by putting more hope in recent developments. The *Tiananmen* incident, the recently acquired democratic spirit in Eastern Europe and the massive investment in higher education are of great help in urging the intellectuals critically to reflect on the essence of idolatry, i.e. on ideology itself. This dismissal of idols could last forever if such of its metaphysical principles as the Mandate of Heaven are destroyed. The demythologization of leaders and henceforth the crusade for democracy can be successful only if every form of ideology, be it Marxism-Leninism or Maoism, Confucianism or Nationalism are challenged. The business of criticism has to be reinvented, as Marx insisted: "We do not anticipate the world dogmatically, but rather wish to find the new world through the criticism of the old."⁴ The collapse of the communist empire and its unfulfilled promise of a terrestrial Eden again confirmed the truth in Marx's ardent critique of ideology. Ironically, the death of Marxism-Leninism (as an ideology) was a logical consequence of Marx's radical objection to any form of ideology.

Our question is whether Marxist ideology really is dead, or simply transformed into another ideology. Such a question could shed some light on Mannheim's paradox that even Marx could not escape: that Marxist ideology is born in Marx's critique of ideology.⁵

Thus, we are not so naive as to believe in the immanent death of ideology, nor in its most effective means, ideological education. Our strategy will be critico-constructive in that we will eliminate the negative aspects of the ideologies embraced by China, i.e. Confucianism and Marxism, by means of critique, but at the same time we will take apart its positive elements to reconstruct a theory which could be of help for education in our modern age.

This book has been written over a quarter century of tragedy and joy, of despair and hope. Some chapters the author wrote in fear and despair, and he dared not make them public. Only after some liberalizations (such as the lifting of martial law in Taiwan), has he ventured to let some parts of the bulky manuscript be published, and then mostly in English, with only a few chapters in Chinese and those substantially altered. Such alteration reflects the process of maturation but also the prudence of the writer. Such prudence is imperative because dogmatism never dies, but pretends to sleep like a predator in hibernation. Dogmatism can be appeased only by means of rational education.

This work would never appear in its present form without the constant encouragement of friends and students. I take this opportunity to express my deep gratitude to all of them. A few friends must be mentioned in particular here, because without their support, I would have abandoned this project: Professor George F. McLean of the *Council for Research in Values and Philosophy* (Washington D. C.), Professor Richard Knowles of Duquesne University, Dr. Sophia Wen of National Taiwan Normal University and Professor Vincent Shen of the University of Toronto. To all those who have invited me for lectures I wish to extend my sincere thanks: Profs. John White and Graham Haydon of the University of London, Professor Carol Bal of Sofia University, Professor Julia Ching of the University of Toronto, Professor Klaus Claessen of Freie Universität in Berlin, the organizers of the World Congress on Philosophy of Laws, University of Göttingen, Professor Fritz Wallner of the University of Vienna, Dr. Won Yong Kang of the Academy House in Seoul and Dr. Chang Chung-hei of the Academy of Korean Study. I also own

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- "Freedom of Education or Education for Freedom," published in *Normal Review* (Taipei: Association of Educators, 1989).

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Notes

1 *The Analects*, 1:4; 1:6; 1:8; 1:12.

2 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Also sprach Zarathustra*, 372; or *Die Froehliche Wissenschaft*, 125.

3 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Gotterdammerung*, 7: "Wie ist der Mensch nur ein Fehlgriff Gottes ? Oder Gott nur ein Fehlgriff des Menschen?"

4 Karl Marx, Letter to Ruge, in *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, trans. and ed. L.D. Easton and K.H. Guddat, (New York, 1967), p. 212.5.

5 Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, (New York, 1936).

1.

Reflections on the Nature of Ideology

Prologue

The history of Chinese education has been one of ideological indoctrination. The expression sounds too harsh, but it reflects the historical facts. Until the educational revolution initiated by Tsai Yuan-fei (1876-1940) at the beginning of the twentieth century, Chinese education was no more than ideological training aimed at establishing a bureaucracy, training technocrats and defending the interests of the rulers. Despite Tsai's appeal for a pure education and for science, Chinese education continues along this traditional path. It is a well-established truism of our history that Chinese education is an ideological education in disguise, a disguise which fell off in the Tiananmen massacre (1989)¹ and even earlier in the so-called Cultural Revolution (1966-76), the Chinese holocaust.² Its ugly soul is gradually exposed when the students resort to protest and revolt to reject the tightly controlled system of education adopted by both communists and nationalists. The military presence in school, the long required hours of political brainwashing, the over-burdened classes of militarism and authoritarianism, all show that education for freedom, for the sake of knowledge (Wilhelm von Humboldt, 1767-1835), or for democracy (John Dewey, 1859-1952) are either strange words or simple rhetoric.³ This chapter aims to depict a clear picture of the nature of ideology and its power. It is the first step in demarcating the line between moral and ideological education and, consequently, in revealing the hidden but explosive danger implicit in ideological education adopted by authoritarian rulers.

The Search for the Correct Idea

The term "ideology," first used by the French Encyclopedists, has been unfortunate, ambiguous and contradictory. Before the Encyclopedists, ideology had been understood by Francis Bacon (1561-1626) as both positive and negative. He conceived of ideology in terms of a critique of false *idola*, of fallacious arguments. But his severe attack against the *idola tribus*, *idola fori* and *idola theatri* served as a means to work out the correct idea.⁴ The French Encyclopedists further developed Bacon's idea by identifying ideology as the most correct system of ideas, which serves as the foundation of our knowledge and as the guideline of conduct. Such an understanding of ideology remained uncontested until Karl Marx (1818-1883), who saw ideology as a sheer reactionary force, a naked instrument fabricated by the rulers to serve their interests. It is also the false consciousness of the oppressed class which seeks satisfaction in it.⁵ Marx's violent assault on ideology does not, however, dismiss its magic seduction. Ironically, the most ardent and fanatical believers in ideology are Marx's followers. With them, ideology rediscovers its positive character in what they proudly named Marxism-Leninism, a system of ideas which claims to be the ultimate science, providing the principles of human society, or better, of the proletariat.⁶ However, once again history proves that such an ideology is instead a great myth, the "false" consciousness of the twentieth century. Contrary to its boast, communism could neither satisfy human needs nor meet scientific criteria. In its nature, one finds a fascist soul; beneath its humanist appearance is hidden a demon. In the light, it appears as an even more rigid and brutal system of defending the interests of the rulers. It is exactly the false ideology that its founder, Marx, had tried to destroy.⁷

The controversy on the nature of ideology demands thorough reflection. Here we shall defend the thesis that ideology is historically and consecutively both positive and negative. By studying its genetic development, its effectiveness and its obsolescence, we shall try to incorporate into a more systemic body of human cognitive development both Karl Mannheim's (1893-1947)⁸ thesis of ideology as social structure (of either a particular or a total character) and Paul Ricoeur's (1913-)⁹ thesis of ideology as social function and cultural imagination. Consequently, we seek to reject the theme developed, but not followed through, by Marx and Daniel Bell, i.e. the end of ideology,¹⁰ by proving that we cannot escape ideology, but that we can criticize the old one and build a new one.

The Birth of Ideology

The French Encyclopedists were not the first to invent ideology, even though the term ideology is strongly associated with their works. Actually, they followed Bacon who had replaced false *idola* with correct ideas constructed on experience and experiment. Thus, to Bacon, ideology must be a system or, at least, a study of correct ideas with the double function of preventing false idols and guiding true knowledge.¹¹ The Encyclopedists went a step further by holding the view that the correct idea must be built on human nature. Therefore, like Bacon, they embraced a double task of criticising a false understanding of human nature and then looking for the true human nature. Etienne Bonnet de Condillac (1715-1780) argued that Bacon and John Locke (1632-1704) had not gone far enough in locating the source of ideas in experience and observation. According to Condillac, the source should be human sensations.¹² Pierre Cabanis and Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy systematised Condillac's philosophical sensism, while Claude Adrien Helvetius applied it to politics.¹³ To Cabanis, physical sensibility is the basic factor not only in knowledge, but also in human intellectual and moral life.¹⁴ De Tracy was much more radical in viewing ideology as part of zoology; human psychology, i.e. "the science of ideas", should be studied in biological terms. In a word, human nature is simply identified with human sensations and the human mind is understood in "psychological" (i.e. physical) terms. Not surprisingly, they dismissed the concept of human nature in religion as unscientific and nonsensical.

It is sufficient to note here the ambiguity and contradiction of their ideology in their confusion of physiology, psychology and epistemology.

Actually, with the Encyclopedists, ideology replaced the Platonic Idea and claimed the power of the Christian God. It assumed the role of guiding human conduct and furthering human knowledge. Whether such a claim is justified is up to science and history to judge. The fact that Napoleon Bonaparte pejoratively labeled the group "ideologues," i.e. visionaries and day-dreamers, was not quite unjustified.

Ideology or the System of Correct Idea?

As a matter of fact, the intellectuals of the modern age did not invent ideology, but turned Platonism upside down by giving to the Idea a body instead of a mind. They showed that the true, correct idea must be constructed *a posteriori* from the human senses. At the heart of their theory, they still shared Plato's insight by holding fast to the view that only their idea is correct and that as such it could serve as the foundation of human life. The validity of ideology is therefore unquestioned. Their idea that the reality of human senses must be the true one and that this idea has to represent the concrete facts of human nature is clearly Platonic in reverse. The struggle

against Platonism, led by Bacon with his *Novum Organum*, actually confirmed the Platonic logic. Though it tried to restore the role of experience dismissed earlier by Platonic thinkers, it still followed the logic that there should be an Archimedian point which is none other than their idea. In these terms one can understand the mood of the scientific world at that time where the triumph of experimentalism in physics and astronomy justified the belief that experience and experiments provide the new correct idea. Ideology understood as a system of correct ideas is still embraced today.

The Process

Our question centers on two points: how did they come to such an idea and how could they have absolutized it as the most fundamental, the unique concept. This is to question not only the procedure of the birth of ideology, but also the reason for this step. The answers could be of great importance in explaining the positive and negative character of ideology. The first answer deals precisely with the process of discovery of the idea, while the second deals with the process of indoctrination.

First, we cannot naively accuse Plato of being a day-dreamer or an unscientific visionary. As a matter of fairness, we must accept the fact that he discovered the theory of ideas not simply by imagination, but through a long critical examination of all the theories about the universe available to him in his time. Unsatisfied with the simple explanations of his predecessors, he developed further the view that there must be a point of departure or something which serves as the foundation of the universe.¹⁵ However, such a thing should not be a simple appearance such as water, air, number or whatever. Obviously, such a way of doing philosophy was tacitly adopted by most of the scientists of his time and perhaps even today. The obsession with an Archimedian point has always been the hallmark of scientists and ideologues alike. Descartes' *Ego cogitans*, Leibniz's monad, Newton's mechanics have been thought of as the Archimedian point for a new science, and this kind of thinking has been justified by the tremendous advance of science, and by the refinement of thinking. However, its success often is accompanied by a danger of stagnancy, and, especially, a tendency towards negative ideology. The fact that such a way of doing research is far from perfect is seen in its tendency to regard useful ideas as eternally valid and true. Faithful to the premise (correct idea), only a certain method (analytic) is accepted. Such a way of thinking is conservative, deterministic,¹⁶ and not always correct due to its incompleteness.¹⁷ Since Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Kurt Godel (1906-1978),¹⁸ philosophers and scientists agree that: (1) what philosophers and scientists observe does not appear in its full reality. As we know only a part of a phenomenon's partial appearance, any conclusion based simply on our observation of the phenomenon may be correct in some aspect, but incorrect in others. (2) The fact that the observer often is influenced by his social, historical and cultural milieu in perceiving the object, in judging and classifying its appearance, means that our knowledge of the thing often is pre-determined and hence biased. (3) Peter Winch (1926-) noted another fatal mistake, i.e. the category mistake of analogy and synthesis to our knowledge.¹⁹ We are often seduced by the ease of comparing phenomenal appearances or unrelated things according to some categories which are often invented by us, while ignoring that the thing known by us does not have exactly the same characteristics as the other unknown thing. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) might have been correct in insisting on the unknowableness of the thing. Our point is, the alpha point sought by scientists and philosophers cannot be regarded as the ultimate reality playing the foundation-role of all things. Such mistakes render the procedure of research and observation fallacious. Therefore, we

can conclude that ideology may be fallacious if its genetic construction is wrongly understood or falsely perceived.

We may go a further step to say that this fallacy is double in character: (1) The beginning of the procedure of ideological construction is mistakenly conceived and analyzed by scientists and philosophers due to incomplete observation, biased pre-understanding and one-sided judgment. (2) Even if our observation of the phenomenon seems to be correct and complete and if the appearance of the thing seems to fit our theory, it is still too early to draw a conclusion. We are often tempted by the desire for success to forget that no conclusion can be drawn as long as we do not firmly grasp the whole process of change in the thing and as long as it is not yet tested. Often a religious or political ideologue commits such a mistake in drawing conclusions too soon regardless of the problems of data-incompleteness, logical fallacy, category-mistakes, etc.

Second, after having discovered the Archimedian point, the scientist applies his theory in relevant fields, but his application serves primarily as a test. Only when his theory stands up to the tests can he generalize it.²⁰ The ideologue does the same by following the same procedure, and he may be rigorously scientific.

However, a close look manifests a big difference between the ideologue and the scientist. On the one hand, the scientist tries to apply his theory only to the relevant field while the ideologue prefers to generalize his theory and extend it to all fields, preferably practical fields. The ideologue conceives of ideology as a body of political, moral and religious beliefs. On the other hand, the scientist often revises his theory in light of new discoveries or when it appears ineffective or irrelevant.²¹ He reexamines not only the conclusion but also the procedure. In contrast, the ideologue stands inert to new discovery, and is reactionary with regard to ineffectiveness or irrelevancy. He may blame the subordinate executor for wrongdoing by insisting on the absolute correctness of his theory.

The Dialectic of Ideology

In saying that ideology, in its genesis, bears a remarkable resemblance to science we want to make the point that ideology is not quite false in its developmental phase. However, a clarification of its scientific status must be made here. Ideology is not science, especially not exact science. The claim of Marxists on the scientific-status of their ideology is, in Marx's mind, unjustified.²² Of course, Friedrich Engels (1820-1895) might have inclined to this version of Marxist science in his *Dialectics of Nature*, but such a claim contradicts Marx's understanding of human science as a branch of human knowledge acquired from human activities which are variable and developmental. The fact that ideology is correct in some phase or aspect, and equally incorrect in some other phase or aspect, confirms our point that ideology can be understood and judged from the point of view of its genetic process.

By focusing on the process and not on the conclusion of ideology, we further claim that there is no absolute ideology and that any effort to absolutize it will transform it to the negative one. Our claim is based on the arguments that ideology is not accidentally or randomly fabricated, but empirically constructed, which means that it is bound socially and historically. Thus, it is logical to conclude that it appears correct at its very first developmental phase and in some particular social aspect; however, due to historical and social change, it becomes incorrect in the long run. As Marx objected, it reveals its negative, ugly face, when it resists new human activities and hence new world-views and, consequently, jeopardizes human progress.

To prove our thesis, we will proceed first with a critical examination of such forms of ideology as culture, morals and aesthetics in which the two traits of correctness and incorrectness, positive and negative, appear consecutively in a dialectical manner.

Cultural Ideology

The fact that culture is almost indefinable is due not only to its richness and complexity, but also to its dynamic characteristics. Culture is in its first phase a process of synthesizing human experiences, evaluating and reevaluating them. In the second phase, culture either surfaces in the form of such common values as language and art, or is expressed in a hidden form and at a deeper level of human consciousness. In a third phase, culture is identified with the *Zeitgeist*, i.e. the most common or universal expression of history. Although we would not follow Hegel (1770-1831) in claiming the universality of culture, we hold that culture expresses at least a human effort of building common values based on their successful experience in dealing with problems, satisfying human needs and defending their interests. Thus, we understand culture not only in terms of language (Clifford Geertz), or morals (Confucianism), or technology (civilization), or arts, but more precisely all forms of human commonality which bear the above described functions and characteristics. The cultural analysis of Kroeber and Kluckhohn results in an over-production of 300 definitions and 164 concepts.²³ Actually, these definitions and concepts are worked out from what we mean by human forms of commonality in (1) dealing with human problems, (2) satisfying basic human needs, (3) defending human interests and (4) looking for a better life.

The effectiveness of our ways of dealing with problems secures the function and the validity of culture. That means that as long as culture is effective, it is accepted as something relating to our life. Otherwise, it would be regarded as a museum piece. In this context, we can say that culture bears a remarkable resemblance to ideology. Its genetic process is rooted in human modes of problem-solving, and its validity is almost identical with its effectiveness.

One may object to our interpretation of culture from the point of view of problem-solving by raising the question of its effectiveness. A great deal of traditional cultural values are no longer effective in dealing with our present problems. Should we reject them as non-cultural just because of their ineffectiveness; should all cultures be effective in dealing with human problems?

It would not be difficult, however, to point out that such an argument begs the question. First, one overlooks an important feature of culture: Unlike a matter which may be entirely dissolved, culture will never completely disappear. It is better to say that culture is transformed or enriched instead of dying off. A brief survey of our own culture would verify our understanding: our present day culture is rooted in old values, enriched with new values acquired from recent human efforts at problem-solving, and open to all possible new values. The example of Chinese filial piety confirms the above view: instead of being swept away by new and modern imported ideas as predicted by many Western-educated Chinese scholars, such as the members of May-Fourth Movement, it survives. But, of course, it does not remain intact in its old form; it no longer claims to be the sole structure of the family. In fact, it is transformed by absorbing new ideas on family, on the relationship between parents and children, etc., into a less rigid, less formal and more flexible kind of filial piety. Today, most Chinese still consider filial piety as the quintessence of familial structure, but they no longer accept its old form or regard it as the nucleus of the modern family. We still regard it as indispensable, but no longer as a unique value.²⁴ Second, filial piety is still effective in solving family problems: conflict between family members is still solved by means of the parents' authority, or by the recognition of such family codes as filial piety. Further,

filial piety could play a particular role in education and indirectly in solving social problems.²⁵ The recent crisis of education stems mostly from neglect of family-education, and consequently from its erosion.²⁶ The classic example of Mencius (317-289 B.C.) who was primarily educated by his mother is still accepted by Chinese culture as an effective model of education and of social problem-solving. The success of the overseas Chinese justifies the effectiveness of family-education.

Moral Ideology

Analogously, we may say that even morals are not *a priori* laws, but rather a set of solutions constructed *a posteriori* by social beings to deal with their problems.²⁷ The process of moral construction or the process of moralisation bears a remarkable resemblance to the process of ideological construction.

Generally, one may take morals to be a set of laws imposed by mythical gods, as in primitive societies or in earlier Greek civilization, and faithfully execute them. However, in the light of new studies on the nature of mythology by anthropologists, theologians such as Rudolf Bultmann, and especially by Freudian depth-psychologists, these seemingly *a priori* moral laws are actually seen to be constructed *a posteriori* on a set of agreements—voluntary or involuntary—by the members involved in social conflicts. They are "voluntary," "autonomous," and "conscientious" if both parts of the community reach agreement on the basis of equality in power, interest, and free decision. They are "involuntary," "ideological," and "alienated" if the agreement is attained by means of violence, or external force, and if it does not reflect the interests of the ruled. The first kind of morals is sought after and defended by Aristotle, while the second kind is characteristic of authoritarian society. Marx dismissed this second kind of morals which he labeled "class-morals."²⁸

The point is that though Aristotelian morals looked promising, they could not have generated the expected effects. In contrast, the second kind of morals has gained a strong foothold in human history: Nicolo Machiavelli's *Realpolitik* is based on this kind of morals. The question about the impracticality of Aristotle's morals and the effectiveness of Machiavelli's individual utilitarianism leads us to the meta-foundation of morals: morals are no more and no less than a set of rules dealing with human problems. They can be, like ideology, effective or ineffective depending on historical circumstances, on people's willingness to accept them and, more importantly, on whether they can solve human conflicts. *A priori* morals often are rejected, partly because they do not reflect reality, but most importantly, because they cannot solve human problems without coercion, violence, penalties, etc. Thus, we tend to *a posteriori* morals. *A posteriori* morals are not imposed, but mainly are accepted by us as a form of conventional agreement. We freely accept such morals, because they help solve our problems, or prevent us from committing mistakes. Their genetic process proceeds from the human effort of solving some puzzle, some anomaly or strange conduct. Thus, like the process of scientific discovery, morals are born from how we deal with our problems.

More concretely, we may formulate their genetic process as follows. First, we sense something wrong by discovering some anomalies in our life. We launch an investigation into it and may discover its reasons. We then think of a solution and apply it to solve our problems. If this goes well, we may adopt it again and again every time such a crisis reappears. If it proves to be ineffective, then we may look for another solution. In the first case, the effective solution is accepted as a model or a standard to deal with problems at its very first step. Slowly, it becomes a kind of custom unchallenged by the community. It then becomes a kind of law if it meets no

resistance and is still effective. The example of filial piety in Confucian society is a case in point. The conflict between parents and children is "normal" due to the growth of children, to their different world view, interests, etc. But the parents may regard such a conflict which jeopardizes their own interests as disturbing. To avoid such a conflict, they discover a kind of solution: educating the children to be obedient and to revere them. Such a solution seems to be very effective since the children themselves, once indoctrinated, believe they ought to do so. In fact, the children follow such a standard not only because they are taught, but because they may discover that they too could benefit from such a solution. They may be entitled to inherit the wealth left behind by their parents, and they may also find it relevant in dealing with their own children. Such a solution is then accepted by the community, and with time it becomes a kind of rule or law. It binds morally; *de facto* and *de jure* it is a moral law.²⁹

In a word, the process of moralisation begins with a human attempt to find a solution to a certain conflict, and ends with the human effort of institutionalising such a solution. Filial piety becomes a moral law governing the conduct of the children, the symbol of parent-child relationships, and the fundamental principle of family.³⁰

However, such a moral, because of its *a posteriori* characteristics, could easily be contested if it is no longer valid or effective in solving our continually emerging problems. In fact, it is better to say, such a moral may be of little use in solving some problems if it no longer possesses the absolute power it claims. The problems arise mostly from the part of the ruled, say, the children. They may find filial piety more a burden than a benefit—and consequently they try to abolish or ignore it. Sensing the danger of a loss of authority, the parents may resort to the policy of carrot and stick and even to institutionalization to defend filial piety. It is at this stage that filial piety becomes a kind of ideology.

Science as Ideology

The birth of science was hailed as an emancipation from religious and philosophical ideology (Auguste Comte, 1798-1857), and the new scientific age was proudly named the age of *Enlightenment*. However, the euphoria quickly eroded and science itself began to be doubted.³¹ The reason is simple: science is "scientific" only in terms of its process, but not in its claims.³² Once it absolutizes itself as the ultimate purpose—once it assumes the role of God—it becomes *scientism*, a theory which claims absolute power to determine the fate of mankind. Evidently, scientism too is a kind of ideology.³³

Here, we may inquire into the reason for such a twist: how could science as an anti-ideological force degenerate into a form of ideology? We will argue that even science could not be exempted from ideology, and that a positive ideology bears remarkably scientific characteristics. To be more clear, we tend to the idea that science is itself a kind of ideology, while scientism as degenerated science is a form of negative ideology. To explain the dramatic change from science to scientism, from positive to negative ideology, we have to discuss the nature of science. Here we are inclined to the view of Karl Popper (1902-1994) that what determines the scientific is not 'scientific knowledge' but its procedure of verification and justification: "One can sum up by saying that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability."³⁴

Here we wish neither to agree or disagree with Popper's overall position, but simply wish to show that science is positive as long as it is in the process of discovery. Popper's idea is ideological too,³⁵ but it is a positive ideology.

The second point is that we need some ideology, even in the world of science, just in order to carry on the project of science. We need some kind of conventional rules or meta-languages just as we need tradition. A breakthrough in science, say a revolution as Thomas Kuhn (1922-) insisted,³⁶ is possible not, as Paul Feyerabend (1924-1994) cynically suggested,³⁷ by accident, but by a permanent critical reflection on the meta-language, meta-structure, and meta-logic used in traditional science. That means that we need to rely on our previous knowledge to do science, but that we are not allowed to stop short on this kind of meta-language. We have to explore further and adopt the view that science is in a permanent revolution (Popper). This means that we have to take the stand of anti-ideology: to rest on a certain kind of knowledge, even the most certain knowledge, is to fall into the trap of negative ideology. Here we side with Imre Lakatos (1922-1974) in arguing: "The proving power of the intellect or the senses was questioned by the skeptics more than two thousand years ago; but they were browbeaten into confusion by the glory of the Newtonian physics. The success of Albert Einstein (1879-1955) again turned the tables and now very few philosophers or scientists still think that scientific knowledge is, or can be, proven knowledge. But few realize that with this the whole classical structure of intellectual values falls in ruins and has to be replaced, one cannot simply water down the ideal of proven truth—as some logical empiricists do—to the ideal of 'probable truth' or—as some sociologists of knowledge do—to truth by (changing) consensus."³⁸

Lakatos' view is close to the thesis of Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-) that we cannot escape from tradition³⁹ just as we cannot escape from positive ideology.⁴⁰ Thus, our main argument will follow the line that we cannot blindly take Marx's view for granted and reject all kinds of ideology. What we propose is to criticize such an ideology, to review it and to transform it as Hegel might have done.

Aesthetic Ideology

Since Nietzsche,⁴¹ arts are no longer understood in terms of categories established by the faculty of knowledge,⁴² but in terms of the human faculty of conceiving, which is infinite and undefined. Francois Lyotard (1924-), following Nietzsche and Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), goes even so far as to claim that arts aim at "the sublime" and that the project of synthesizing aesthetic experiences into a unity which determines beauty is destined to be doomed.⁴³ Actually, Lyotard has dramatized the antinomy of the two faculties of conceiving and presenting, and consequently the antagonism between arts as "the sublime" and arts as the "beautiful." He fails to discover an internal relationship between the two faculties and hence between the sublime and the beautiful. Let us explain his failure by relying on the human power of discovering "the sublime" and the human faculty of expressing or presenting "the beautiful."

First, it is true that artistic feeling cannot be adequately presented in our language and judged by our established categories. The unexpressed sublime clearly shows the limit of language and the obsolescence of categories. However, to deny a common feeling of the sublime just because we have no adequate language to present the sublime is erroneous. Lyotard ignores the fact that our inability to present the sublime comes rather from our inexperience. The first time we encounter some new spectacle, we are always "surprised," "astonished." There is simply no language to express or present our feeling. However, were we to encounter that same spectacle often, it would no longer be a "spectacle," and slowly we would find adequate language to present or express it. Of course, we do not claim that we can describe it completely, but at least we could present its main characteristics. This shows that we could work out a kind of "meta-language" to

express our feeling. Further, we claim that a meta-language is developed from our common feeling, and therefore that even the feeling of the sublime is not private or individual, but common.

Second, once we discover that we all possess the feeling of the sublime it is then a matter of how to express this feeling, a question of searching for a common language. Hence we can say our common experiences could be identified as what we call aesthetic feeling or aesthetic consciousness, while our common language is the result of our act of synthesizing, judging, cataloguing and categorizing these experiences. "Beauty" is the second stage, the more concrete and manifest face of the sublime.

It is not what Lyotard claims to be the antagonist of the sublime true. It may be true that aesthetic consciousness, that most of culture is shaped by means of "terror," "coercion," "violence," etc. in the world of the rulers. For if such an aesthetic consciousness is not accepted, i.e., felt, by the ruled then such experiences will vanish once the terror disappears. But that is not the case with regard to classical music, paintings or architecture. We still love the classics even when we are not manipulated, coerced, or terrorized. The love for classic art comes in fact from our common feeling. This means beauty is not simply a product of abstract categories, of a violent unification of experiences, but is rather a second stage of the sublime. The two faculties, to conceive and to present, are not in opposition, but in a permanent dialectical process of communication of arts.

From another point of view, however, we may say that Lyotard has seen in beauty, and quite rightly, its ideological nature. Criticism in the arts for example has taken the paradigms of beauty, which are constructed on rather abstract calculations, to determine the arts. Such a method is wrong, not because of the incorrectness of the paradigms, which are correct on their own terms, but rather because of an arbitrary "differentiation" between the sublime and beauty. The ideological essence of the classicism which sees beauty as its ultimate purpose is evident in its claim of foundationalism.

Consequently, classicism demands that its criteria or paradigms be the sole legitimate grounds for determining the arts. The point to which Lyotard may have rightly objected is the domination by the classic criteria and the fact that these criteria are arbitrarily constructed. Though we agree with this, we object to the program of "de-differentiation" of Lyotard and Jacques Derrida (1930-) for its impossibility. To return to the sublime and rest in it is as utopian as it is nihilistic. The utopia and nihilism of Derrida and Lyotard are seen in their radical refusal to accept any kind of ideology, be it negative or positive, be it beauty or the meta-narratives. How can one conceive of arts, how does one understand them and how does one communicate them to others: these problems force us to accept the internal, dialectical relationship between the sublime and beauty, i.e. to accept a certain kind of positive ideology implicit in beauty.

To be more clear, we may describe the formation of the ideology of beauty as follows. In the first phase, we discover the sublime which is unexpressed and not presentable. The second phase would begin with a reflection on the sublime, and with the discovery of a common feeling of the sublime. The third phase is seen in the human effort to reduce, classify, and categorize the experiences of the sublime. Finally, beauty is constructed from such a process. That means, beauty is not randomly or arbitrarily constructed as Lyotard falsely accused, and that beauty bears an ideology of a positive rather than of a negative character. However, the concept of beauty could become negative in the course of a human change in aesthetic consciousness. That is, once we discover a new common feeling of the sublime, we need to work out a new concept of the beautiful. Failing to discover and to accept the historicity of aesthetic consciousness,⁴⁴ failing to see the relationship between the sublime and beauty as a certain dialectical relationship,⁴⁵ is to fall into the trap of negative ideology.

Reason and Ideology

The analysis of culture, morals, science and aesthetic consciousness supports our thesis that ideology, in its genetic process, bears both positive and negative aspects. Further, ideology is not constructed *a priori* as understood by the Platonists. Quite the contrary, it is constructed *a posteriori* from common human experiences. Its validity is tested by the degree of its effectiveness in solving human problems, in unmasking cosmic puzzles, in dealing with our difficulties, etc. By insisting on the *a posteriori* character of ideology, we go a step further to reject any kind of absolute, eternal, perfect ideology; we consider any such claim as absurd. Such a claim would transform a positive ideology into a negative one.

One may object to our understanding by accusing us of being the victim of another kind of ideology: that embraced by David Hume (1711-1776), Locke and especially the positivists. One may argue for the necessity of a certain kind of metaphysics, meta-language and meta-rules in language games and raise the question of how and why we come to the idea of a perfect, absolute, and eternal ideology if such an idea does not exist. The transcendentalism of knowledge proposed by Kant seems not quite successful in wiping out the meta-foundation as Heidegger has proved.⁴⁶ Kant might have been good at treating *metaphysica generalis* as transcendental philosophy, but he failed to do justice to *metaphysica specialis* with his transcendental method.⁴⁷

Thus, it appears that the question of meta-foundation is not yet solved or eliminated as the positivists have claimed. Our position is neither positivist nor empiricist in the strict sense. We acknowledge that we possess the idea of an absolute that we can hardly prove with experiences, but we challenge the idealists to prove its existence. It could be a purely psychological matter of our own human projection in the course of reflection about our own limits. Here, we will not go beyond our limits into pure speculation. It is sufficient to say that ideology is not quite a projection. It does not exist prior to man, but is the result of human activities. Hence, we can categorically deny that it is by nature absolute.

Before coming to our main issue, namely, the process of the transformation of ideology from the positive to the negative, we have to deal with the question of how a positive correct idea could become a negative "ideological" one. Marx's critique of ideology might be useful here in grasping a more adequate understanding of the nature of ideology.

From Correct Idea to Incorrect Idea

Marx's Critique of Ideology

The fact that almost all ideologues firmly believe that their theories are unique is nothing new. We all are tempted by the idea of an Archimedean point and are seduced easily by the irresistible meta-foundation which we name metaphysics, meta-philosophy or meta-sciences. In a word, the search for a foundation on which we build our knowledge (epistemology), construct our life (social theory), or regulate our conduct (morality) is a matter of fact. The point is whether there exists such an Archimedean point in praxis, and how we discover and construct it. These two questions demand a thorough examination of the foundationalist claim. On the first question, it seems to most philosophers, including the empiricists, that a meta-narrative, meta-language, or meta-theory is possible. But in praxis, this is a matter of controversy. The failure of the Platonists, Kant and others in applying theory to the concrete world shows the great divergence between theory and

praxis. By applying this to ideology, we may say that an ideology could be right in theory, but not necessarily valid in praxis.

Marx is not concerned with the question of foundation, but with the problem of how we discover, construct and apply the meta-theory. To Marx the discovery of ideology is by no means a matter of pure knowledge, but a way of defending the interests of a certain class. That means, ideology could be right, scientific, etc., only if its process of discovery, construction and application is scientific. Therefore, it is not our business to discuss ideology as such, but to criticize the process of ideologisation. Hence, Marx's main task is to examine (1) how ideology is constructed, i.e. the process of ideologisation, and (2) what kind of ideology is scientific, and therefore acceptable. Marx's analysis of the first question includes his critique of the phenomenon of alienation in religion, politics and economics, i.e., the three forms of ideology adopted by capitalism, while his work on a scientific theory which can satisfy the demand of the proletariat gives birth to a new ideology which his followers proudly christened Marxism. Louis Althusser (1918-1990) for example attempts to prove, with remarkable vigor, the scientific characteristics of Marx's ideology in its genetic process.⁴⁸ However, Althusser fails badly due to his mistake of taking ideology to be science. We will follow Marx's arguments to show that any form of ideology, even Marx's own, could not stand the test of historical change, and more fundamentally, the test of human development. Any form of ideology cannot claim the universality of humankind, but only the particularity of a class, a historical period, etc.

Ideology as False Consciousness

Marx's contradiction in holding the view of an ideology of the proletariat makes his ideological criticism hypocritical, even if the proletariat is understood as the classless, universal class. Here, we are not concerned with Marxism as a form of ideology, but with Marx's original position against any form of ideology.

In his earlier works, influenced by Hegel, Marx rejected any form of ideology which he regarded as false, alienated, or a metaphysical distortion of reality. We will concentrate on Marx's understanding of ideology in this period. Up to 1844, Marx understood ideology in terms of religion and politics. Even if the term ideology does not appear in his earlier writings, the material elements of the future concept are already visible in his critique of religion, and in his objection to Hegel's concept of the state. To him, ideology was the inversion, the distortion of reality and finally, the alienation of man. He saw in religion, for example, an expression of the contradictions and sufferings of the real world. Following Ludwig Feuerbach (1804-1872), he claimed this to be the cause of alienation: "Religion is the fantastic realization of the human being, because the human being has attained no true reality."⁴⁹

Similarly, he criticized Hegel's concept of the state as the inversion of reality. The Hegelian political state was not the product of an illusory perception, but of a false construction of reality, or better, of an inversion of reality. In his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, he expressed this idea as follows: The state and society produce religion "which is an inverted consciousness of the world, because they are an inverted world."⁵⁰

After his break with Feuerbach, Marx used for the first time the term ideology to attack the young Hegelians who, according to him, had not changed much from Hegel. They had replaced the Hegelian premise with their own, by forgetting that they were in no way combating the real, existing world.⁵¹ Actually, they still believed that the object of philosophy was consciousness and

not the real social contradictions, as Marx affirmed. Thus, ideology meant a false consciousness built on a false basis was therefore negative.

After 1858, Marx rarely used the term ideology, though he developed it further and applied it in his analysis of the conditions and nature of the capitalist world. The texts of *Grundrisse* and *Capital* unmistakably show that ideology is meant as the distortion of the conditions and the nature of the value-exchange, and that such new forms of alienation as reification, fetishism, etc. are the logical consequence of the ideology of capitalism. 52

Ideology as a Form of Alienation

In sum, to Marx, ideology is not only a false consciousness: "Religious estrangement as such occurs only in the realm of consciousness, of man's inner life, but economic estrangement is that of real life..."⁵³ but also the consciousness of a class.⁵⁴ It is not only a production of ideas, or representations such as religions or morals,⁵⁵ but also the distorted condition of our real life.⁵⁶ It is not only a simple illusion,⁵⁷ but also the abstraction of reality.⁵⁸

With these critiques, Marx clearly sees in the process of ideologization the decisive factor determining the nature of ideology. The ideology of the ruling class is born in (1) the process of commodization or fetishization, (2) the process of abstraction of labor (3) the way of defending their interests and (4) the form of exchange.⁵⁹

All these deform ideology into a negative force, distorting and inverting reality, suppressing the human capacity for self-discovery and reifying humans.

Ideology in Process

Marx's critique of ideology consists of two fundamental characteristics. First, ideology is not quite wrong in the first stage of the process of thinking, either with regard to a specific class, or in dealing with some particular problems. Religion, for example, appears quite plausible as a force of consolation, reaction, resentment against the brutality of the world, or as opium helping man to escape from reality. Specific politics may be helpful to a certain class, and so on. He said of religion: "Religious misery is on the one hand the expression of the real misery, and on the other hand, the protest against the real misery."⁶⁰ He then connected religion with politics, and economy: "The critique of the heaven transforms itself there with into the critique of the earth, the critique of religion into the critique of Rights, the critique of theology into the critique of politics."⁶¹

Second, the same ideology (religion, politics, economy) becomes wrong in the course of human history when: (a) it claims the universality of all human activities, (b) it overlooks the change of reality (social change, the growth of knowledge, etc.) and thus, no longer reflects reality, and (c) consequently, it distorts the real world and real human nature as in the case of Hegel's philosophy. That left Marx in a dubious and ambiguous position. On the one hand, he acknowledged the importance of ideology, but on the other hand he saw in it the danger of distortion, inversion and domination. Marx's attitudes encouraged his followers to construct an ideology which reflects history, reality and human nature (by means of a scientific analysis, as they boast).

Marx's Search for a Correct Idea

The search for a correct idea is the main focus of Marx's later works. His analysis of Capitalism and its mode of production,⁶² its distortion of economic reality by a process of circulation of capital,⁶³ its forms of the process as a whole⁶⁴ and his reconstruction of the history of capitalism⁶⁵ show that he was laboring at a scientific, correct, socially conscious ideology even though he disliked the word. We may venture to say that, having dismissed other forms of ideology, the young Marx was not content with a pure critique. He went a step forward in constructing the correct idea. When Marx declared that "religion, family, state, law, morality, science, art, etc., are only particular modes of production, and fall under its general law," he intended to break down these particular modes and build a universal idea which he then identified as "communism": "Communism is the positive transcendence of private property, as human self-estrangement, and therefore as the real appropriation of the human essence, by and for, man. Communism therefore is the complete return of man to himself as a social being—a return which becomes conscious, and is accomplished within the entire wealth of previous development."⁶⁶

Needless to say, his followers took his writings for granted, and interpreted them word by word. Their main task seems to have been limited to elaborating the scientific character of Marx's idea,⁶⁷ applying it to a concrete world (Lenin), and, ironically, forcing people to believe in it. From Marx, and against his will, a new ideology is born: communism, the ideology of the 20th century.

The Marxist Paradox

Marx was not the first man to engage in such an enterprise. In fact, almost all great thinkers did so. The story of philosophy is the narrative of their struggle against Platonism. But, tragically, they are unable to break its grip. What they could do, and indeed have done, is blame their fellow philosophers on the one hand, and build a new version of Platonism on the other hand. The story of Nietzsche who tried to destroy Platonism but remained Platonian is true with regard to Marx, Heidegger and even Popper. Therefore, we can conclude that humans are obsessed with the idea of "the correct idea" and that one tries to discover it mainly by a critique of "the incorrect idea." We follow this tenet by looking for the key to open the black box of how a correct idea becomes incorrect, and consequently how we can judge its correctness. We will treat the question from the pragmatic,⁶⁸ theoretical and metaphysical perspectives.

Toward an Understanding of Ideology

Before explaining ideology in its three aspects, namely, pragmatic, theoretical and progressive, we need to say some-thing about Marx's attitude toward ideology. There is no doubt that Marx has made a decisive contribution to a more correct understanding of ideology, even if he treated it from a negative aspect. For the first time since De Tracy, one discovers with Marx the negative, dangerous, ugly face of ideology. However, Marx contradicts himself in proclaiming communism an absolute ideology, a mistake easily detected in his inconsistency. He seems to abandon his commitment to the dynamic, progressive and emancipatory nature of man for his dogma of the final stage of social development, the stage of communism. Actually, his first critique of German idealism demands the abolition of any form of determinism, thus the perplexity in

explaining why he embraces the idea of communism. If he held to his idea of human development, he would have rejected the idea of the proletariat as the ultimate ideology.

We follow Marx's ideological critique, but stand in an opposite position. We contend that ideology is correct in its first stage. However, it will become incorrect and hence negative in the course of human history due to: (1) newly emerging human activities, new interests and, therefore, new problems (pragmatic aspect); (2) new knowledge as well as new puzzles, and consequently a demand for new solutions (theoretical aspect); and (3) human aspiration for emancipation (progressive aspect) and perfection (metaphysical aspect). Unlike Marx, we have no ambition to discover a new theory or ideology to replace the old ones. Our aim is more modest: we wish to explore the nature of ideology by finding the line between the negative and the positive and to understand the reason for such a transformation or deformation, which we recognize as natural and permanent.

The Genetic Process of Ideology - The Pragmatic Aspect

We begin with the pragmatic aspect of ideology. Ideology is not constructed from a pure idea. It is born first in the process of the human search for solutions to practical problems. In the first part, examining various aspects of ideology such as culture, morals and arts, we discovered a common characteristic explaining ideology: the pragmatic aspect of problem-solving. All cultures, morals, arts, etc. are various modes of problem-solving which have been sufficiently successful in solving conflicts. Morals deal with practical problems arising from the conflict of practical interests. Culture deals generally with social and communicative problems; it tries to establish patterns and models for avoiding conflicts and constructing common regulations. The arts, a special aspect of culture, are often taken to be the medicine of the soul, or regarded as a force of emancipation, etc.

From this fundamental thesis, we come to the second thesis, namely, that an idea is correct as long as it is effective, i.e., valuable or usable, that is, if it can solve at least some problem. Failing to meet this requirement, it is no longer valuable or effective, but becomes incorrect. However, precisely here we encounter an epistemological problematic: how do we know or judge the correctness of our act or of a thing. To Max Weber (1864-1920), the correctness or the validity of our action is measured by the degree of achievement of the set purpose. But what happens if even the purpose is in a permanent changing state? The classic definition of correctness (truth) in terms of the adequacy of knowledge and (static) thing would be inapplicable to the living (dynamic) person.⁶⁹ Hence, we understand correctness in terms of effectiveness in solving our problems. Like Popper, we contend that since human problems are in a permanent emerging state, the solution of a problem is not the final purpose (because such a solution will appear obsolete when one changes, or once the problems disappear or reappear in other forms). We accept Popper's view that solutions are to be upgraded by means of permanent testing. Therefore, the concept of validity or effectiveness can be accepted if it stands up to the test. That means, effectiveness cannot be determined or calculated *a priori*, but is generated from *ad hoc* tests which in their turn are needed for *ad hoc* problems. This kind of pragmatics is built rather *ad hoc* solutions. Thus, the difference between theory and praxis could be formulated as follows: while in theory we need some transcendental schemata in advance that we later test; in praxis, the thesis and solution are mainly generated in an *ad hoc* manner. To a peasant, his *ad hoc* problem would be how to produce needed food and materials. He is not much concerned with the ideas of exchange of production, surplus, deficit, etc. His test is the sufficiency of food. The quota depends not on the demand of the market,

but on his family's needs, and the way of handling or managing work and household. His method is sound if he is succeeding in meeting the demands, needs or quota he set. Failing to reach the aim, his method or ideas turn out to be wrong. He must revise his way of handling the matter; he needs a new idea. Even his needs are not completely known or determined *a priori*. Most needs come unexpectedly, due to newly emerging problems, discoveries, etc. The need for tools for plowing or harvesting is a fundamental need because it is a *conditio sine qua non*, but a tractor comes to his mind only if the peasant intends to mass-produce products for the market. In sum, besides basic needs or interests for our life in the wider sense, most human needs, and hence problems, emerge *a posteriori* in an *ad hoc* manner.

The Linguistic Model

Satisfying basic needs is often problematic. The history of the human search for solutions dealing with its basic interests and needs forms an important part of human history. In order to find the right solution, one needs first to understand basic human interests and the reason for the conflicts arising from these interests. If with Marx, we could say that pragmatic problems are economic, while with Habermas, communicative, then the search for ideology is a search for the most effective solution to the problems of economic and communicative activities. To Marx, the main reasons for social conflicts, class-division and reification are the unequal and unreasonable distribution of wealth and the build-up of artificial needs and interests. Such inequality is justified by the ideology of the dominant class. Therefore, Marx demands the total abolition of the capitalist system of distribution and, more importantly, its ideology. At the same time, he works out a new "reasonable," "correct" idea based on the most fundamental human power, i.e. labor, with which one distributes wealth in accordance with the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."⁷⁰

Habermas develops Marx's view in a more complete version. For him, the economic factor is undeniably important, but to reduce all human activities to the single aspect of *homo labor* is to commit the fallacy of reductionism and simplicity. The practical aspects of human activities are not only economic but also moral, political and aesthetic. In short, one is searching for a total solution that is communicative in character.⁷¹ The ideology which we seek is linguistic and quasi-transcendental. However, he also acknowledges that such a model has to be upgraded, implemented, and in some cases, negated. A model based on human communicative action could serve as a positive ideology; but it could become negative if it is not "transcended" (*aufgehoben*), for like any linguistic model it could become obsolete once it no longer reflects reality.

Like Marx's ideology, Habermas's theory of communication consists of:

(1) a critique of negative ideology, i.e. a critique of obsolete linguistic models or language-games and their distorted conditions which hinder a normal speech-situation. Such a critique is applied not only to super-structural models such as religion and morals, but also to such infra-structural models as economics. The aim of criticism is to discover unreal, biased and distorted conditions, to unmask the domination of ideology, and to dig out the hidden power which dictates our social conduct such as the Freudian *libido*, the Nietzschean *Will-to-Power*, the Marxian *labor*. Any criticism thus has a double function: to eliminate the negative force and to rediscover the positive one.

(2) The second step in his model of communication is to work out a model based on a consensus of power, interests and needs, which is best seen in language. The linguistic model has

a decisive advantage in explaining a new model free of negative ideology: it is both transcendental and empirical, both consensual and reflective, and it is not necessarily rigid in interpretation. From another point of view, the linguistic model offers a relatively free and less oppressive consensus. The partners involved in a communication must sincerely open, agree on a starting condition (consensus), and work towards a new consensus.⁷²

In sum, in many ways the models for solving economic and communicative conflicts offered by Marx and Habermas are worthy of discussion. Such models could be taken as positive ideology if they are effective, i.e., if they can solve our economic and communicative problems. Marxist ideology has shown some promise in the past in contributing to the realization of a more equal and self-conscious society. But it has failed miserably in addressing human economic problems and therefore has failed as a definitive solution. Habermas's theory of communicative actions is not yet an ideology, because its effectiveness has not yet been tested. Actually, it will have a hard time becoming an ideology for a great number of reasons such as (1) its theory must be proven on an epistemological level; (2) it has to be put into practice (and that will be difficult because Habermas lacks the political power of a Vladimir I. U. Lenin (1870-1924), or a Mao Dze-dung (1893-1976); and (3) it has to be popularized or simplified for the masses (a task almost impossible with Habermas's obscure and difficult style).

The Problem of Meaningfulness

On the theoretical level, an idea is correct: (1) as long as it corresponds to reality, (2) when it expresses the sameness of a thing, (3) when it stands the test of certainty and consistency, or (4) when it becomes universally and necessarily valid. In a word, to most philosophers, a correct idea or a correct proposition must be a scientific idea, or better, a mathematical idea or proposition. That means, a positive ideology must stand fast on the theoretical level too. The ideologies of scientism, positivism and even Marxism are understood to claim for themselves scientific character and therefore universal validity. Scientism is the belief in the magic power of science, claiming for itself the role of Messiah (as the Enlightenment boasted) who can solve all problems once and for all. Thus, the Enlightenment was sure that humankind would only improve and progress. Positivism follows suit by declaring that truth must be built on a kind of logical certainty: only what we can prove is true and therefore real. These ideologies follow strictly the categories of tautology, certainty and consistency and successfully demonstrate their scientific characters of universality and necessity. They neglect to note that their claim of universality and necessity must be tested too, and not by the criteria of consistency, tautology or anything else, but by its effectiveness. Before critiquing such an ideology, one has to accept the fact that if the correct idea is unchallenged, and if it produces a satisfying result, it will become *de facto* an ideology regardless of our human reaction, etc.

We will develop further our thesis that even a theoretical idea must be tested for its degree of effectiveness. The meaningfulness of life is not identical with that of a mathematical proposition. Similarly, the acceptance of a (scientific) theory is not necessarily dependent on its truth. If the truth of a mathematical proposition is verified by an equation, i.e. by a tautology, then the meaning of life is verified by its effects. The mathematical truth is "meaningful" *for us* only if its truth can affect our life, and it would be *taken* if it can affect our life. The devastating effect of the atomic bomb proves not only the correct calculations of quantum physics, but also its terrifying utility in winning the war (or keeping the peace). Similarly, the discovery of the neutron, proton or quark is appreciated if it helps us to understand the mystery of our universe. It would be more appreciated

if it could be of use for a certain purpose. In sum, the effectiveness of a theory (in the human sciences) is the main criterion deciding the correctness of ideology.

Of course, we acknowledge a difference of degree of effectiveness between pure and practical sciences. However, our point is, science is by no means purely theoretical, because it is concerned with human knowledge (Habermas). It would not be appreciated if it had nothing to do with human life. Furthermore, the two characters, universal and necessary, to science can be understood also in terms of universal pragmatics (Habermas). A proposition, say a logical proposition such as "the King of France is bald" is true (universal) but meaningless (not necessary) to a Chinese peasant, simply because it has no-thing to do with the peasant. The idea of a pure science, fully free of interests is hardly accepted by most of us today. To such post-modernists as Michel Foucault (1926-84), Roland Barthes (1915-1980), Derrida and Lyotard, there could be no pure knowledge because science is meant for problem-solving.⁷³ That means, a pure ideology is impossible. This impossibility is evident in the incompetence and arrogance of scientism, our modern ideology. We may with certainty say that while science could help us solve our problems, scientism would, at its best, bring us back to the world of mythology. By putting more emphasis on the usefulness or the practicality of science, we are by no means playing against science, or denying its theoretical certainty. In fact, our aim is to distinguish science as such from science as ideology (scientism). The line which determines the difference is the claim of absolute power, and consequently that of domination. Science aims at solving our problems while scientism wants to dictate every aspect of our life. The latter proclaims itself to be the modern god. In other words, while science is set against any form of determinism, scientism takes determinism as its soul.

Progress as Metaphysical Principle

The Enlightenment proclaimed itself to be the age of progress, happiness and reason. Its claim has been proven partly true, but mostly wrong. It is true that we are developing more today, but it is impossible to assert that we are happier. We cannot even affirm that we are more rational than our predecessors, though we have relied more intensively on reason than ever before. The naivete of the Enlightenment is seen in that: (1) it reduced human progress to scientific progress, and in doing so it ignored the role of the subject; (2) it saw progress only in terms of the accumulation of knowledge, but not in terms of problem-solving; (3) it mistakenly identified happiness with progress and progress with reason. These are in fact three different, but related, aspects of human life. However, its biggest error was to ignore the antinomy between determinism and progress. To regard science as the decisive factor is to lay our fate in its cold hand. To believe in the absolute power of science is to divorce humanism and to refuse human progress.

In the following lines we seek to show that human progress is not identified with scientific progress, and that while the latter may help the first, it cannot determine it. First, scientific progress can be measured and thus predicted, as is evident in its own products such as technology. A civilized man with the most comfortable surroundings is far different from a primitive, uncivilized man as can be measured by their tools, surroundings, way of problem-solving, etc. Using a washing machine is more civilized than using our hands. However, human progress cannot be measured in terms of the things we use. Owning a car or traveling by plane does not mean human or social progress. One cannot translate scientific progress into human progress without understanding the role of science in human life. The fact that we cannot escape misery shows the great difference between human progress and scientific progress.

Second, technical and scientific progress cannot dictate our happiness. Technical and scientific progress has not made us happier. On the contrary, the two world wars were more or less the result of the over-confident and abusive attitude of scientists and politicians. Thus, we can say, scientific progress has a neutral function. It could further human progress, but it could also destroy it. In a word, an ideology is of use if it furthers human progress, but becomes negative if it hinders or destroys it. Any form of absolute ideology such as scientism tends more toward the negative because of its determinism, which means that it leaves no room for other possibilities. It tries to render humans one-dimensional and to return them to Plato's cave. In short, all forms of negative ideology always bear certain deterministic and conservative characteristics, a point Habermas has discussed brilliantly.⁷⁴

Ideology in Reconstruction

We have discussed so far the three main aspects of human life which may serve as provisory criteria to judge the positive or negative character of an ideology. However, they are far from complete. In the following points, we wish to add more criteria deduced from the pragmatic, theoretical and progressive aspects.

In a previous work,⁷⁵ we attempted to describe ideology in a Kantian manner, namely, from the scientific aspect. Such a description is inadequate because it is based on the dichotomy of truth and falsehood, which is of no use in dealing with practical human problems. They appear incompetent in treating emancipative or progressive human activities. This means that the scientific language-game could not be fully applied to other activities. We may need other language-games to deal with practical activities. Thus, we turn to Marx's progressive, or better, productive criteria.

The Marxian model has some advantage in dealing with our concrete life, but as it leaves no room for the dynamic force of emancipation, it hinders, instead of helping, our life. Hence, we revised the Marxian approach, and adopted a more balanced attitude toward ideology,⁷⁶ for ideology must be understood from all three fundamental aspects: pragmatic, theoretical and progressive. The multi-dimensional character of human life reveals its openness towards new activities and hence new models or new language-games. For the sake of discussion, we tentatively classify these as: pragmatic, theoretical and progressive. If truth and falseness belongs to the scientific and logical language-game, then rightness and wrongness should be the language of pragmatics or practical activities. Similarly, we venture to say the same about the language of the third aspect of human life: openness and closedness (Popper), emancipation and conservatism (Habermas), hope and despair (Ernst Bloch), salvation and slavery (Judeo-Christian tradition), and so on.

Ideology should be treated from its two functions: positive and negative. Positive ideology strives for correctness in ideas (scientific), in common sense or commonality (practical), and in human aspiration (emancipative). Negative ideology resists change and wants to maintain the *status quo*, to totalize all human activities under its domination, and to generalize its power beyond its limit. It is also important to note the dialectical relationship between the positive and the negative, and the negative and the positive. Ideology could also be studied from the point of view of its deterministic seduction, and the human resistance to being seduced. In short, ideology could and should be treated from a more global perspective, i.e., from the total aspect of human life.

The Criteria of Ideology

The following are the main criteria deduced from the three main aspects of human activities:

- In the pragmatic (practical) aspects, the criteria of correctness—incorrectness, rightness—wrongness, effectiveness—ineffectiveness, and validity-invalidity often are taken to differentiate positive from negative ideology.
- In the theoretical aspects, the criteria of truth-falseness, universal-particular, necessity-non-necessity, and consistency-inconsistency are used to differentiate the scientific (the positive) from the unscientific (the negative).
- In the progressive aspects, openness-closeness, emancipation-conservatism, salvation-slavery, hope-despair (nihilism), and development-backwardness, may serve as the criteria to judge the positive or the negative character of an ideology.

We may also adopt the criteria of power, domination, freedom, democracy, etc. to study ideology as in Marx's concept of ideology and Mannheim's elaboration of a sociology of knowledge based on ideology, the criteria of power, domination, and freedom. These are of undeniable importance in understanding our present ideology. One can formulate ideology as a system of power, which seeks to rally force to defend the interests of a community, to support its members or to further their growth. This is a positive ideology. However, the same ideology could become negative when it seeks domination instead of a self-preserving force. A negative ideology aims not at the community, but at power as such; it tries to dominate the community and, as such, negates the freedom and the development of the individual. It expands its power to other areas of human life and mobilizes all human activities. This expansionism results in such modern forms of ideology as Nazism, fascism, imperialism, colonialism, communism, etc. Consequently, any social system or social structure that is rigid in character, coercive, manipulative or doctrinaire in education such as fascism, militarism, etc. would fall into the category of negative ideology.

We may judge ideology from its dialectical nature implicit in the history of human development and intellectual growth. If in history, our ideas are enriched by an *Aufhebung*, i.e., a process of abrogation (negation), preservation and elevation of our concrete experiences,⁷⁷ then in intellectual development we learn by mistakes.⁷⁸ The dialectical movement of history requires first an affirmation, then a negation and finally a new synthesis of our experiences. Each moment is represented by a certain idea, while each historical moment is represented by a certain ideology. This means that each ideology is both positive and negative. It is positive in the moment of affirmation (thesis), while negative in the second movement of negation (antithesis). In the first moment, it is correct because it represents the commonality of a historical period (Hegel), or an historical class (Marx). In the second phase, it becomes incorrect due to the change of reality and hence the change of history. It degrades into a kind of false consciousness (Marx), or a reactionary force (Lenin).

Concluding Remarks

This short and sketchy description of ideology is, of course, insufficient in many aspects for a number of reasons:

First, ideology itself is changing. The genetic process of ideology bears remarkable resemblance to the birth of an idea, though it is much more complex and rich. Like an idea, it

presents the view not only of an individual or a class, but also of a world, a history and even of human fate (as seen in Nietzsche's *amor fati*, or in Messianism). However, unlike an idea, ideology manifests its power only if it is taken up by a society, class, or at least a strong individual (leader). Thus, there is need to investigate the question of power, the form in which it manifested, the way of acquiring power, and the relationship between power and social structure. Mannheim has done excellent work in his *Ideology and Utopia*, which we do not need to repeat.

Second, the progressive aspect of ideology has not been explored. The works of Bloch and Ricoeur have shed some light on it, but, like the Freudian *libido*, this aspect should be given a more important place. Utopia is not simply a dream like a unnecessary and toxic opium, but expresses human desire for a positive ideology. It may be the force behind human progress.

Thus, unlike Marx, we do not claim, that we have to reject all kinds of ideology, or that we have to build an absolute ideology such as the communism dreamed of by Marx himself. Such an ideology is easily shattered by a Prague Spring (1968), or earlier by the Budapest tragedy (1956), or more recently by the *Tiananmen* events (1989). In sum, ideology has a role to play if it reflects reality, defends common interests, and furthers human progress; that is, ideology is positive if it is effective (valuable) — otherwise, it is destined to be rejected and replaced by a new one. Thus, we acknowledge the existence of a positive ideology, though we are aware of the fact that most ideologies fall into the second negative category. However, we do not suggest a total abandonment of all ideologies. It is naive and irresponsible to break down Confucianism, or whatever, and throw it away as did the members of the May-Fourth Movement and the communist leaders in the Cultural Revolution. Any ideology is the expression of a historical moment, which may still have impact on our present condition. This is true with regard to our culture in general and to morality in particular.

Notes

1 George Hicks, ed., *The Broken Mirror: China after Tiananmen* (St. James Press, 1991); Lee Feigon, *China Rising: The Meaning of Tiananmen* (Chicago: Ivan Dee, 1990), etc.

2 Lee Hong-yung, *The Politics of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: A Case Study* (California: University of California Press, 1978); Joseph A. William, Christine Wong P. W., and David Zweig, *New Perspectives on the Cultural Revolution* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1991).

3 Hu Shi-ming and Eli Seifman, eds., *Toward a New World Outlook: A Documentary History of Education in the People's Republic of China 1949-1976* (AMS Press, 1976); Peter Seybolt, *Revolutionary Education in China: Documents and Commentary*, rev. ed. (International Arts & Sciences Press, 1973).

4 Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum* (London, 1620).

5 Karl Marx, *Die deutsche Ideologie* (1845/46), in *MEW* 3, p. 46; *MEW* 4, p. 480; *Zur Kritik der Politischen Oekonomie* (1857), in *MEW* 13, p. 632.

6 Louis Althusser, *For Marx* (Hammondsworth, 1969); also in "Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses," in *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays* (London, 1971).

7 Karl Marx, *Die deutsche Ideologie* (1845-46), in *MEW* 3, p. 20.

8 Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (London, 1936).

9 Paul Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia* (New York, 1986).

10 Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (New York, 1960).

11 Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, I, 38-68. According to Bacon, there are four types of idols: 1) idols of the tribe, 2) idols of the cave or den, 3) idols of the market place, and 4) idols of the theater.

12 Etienne Bonnet de Condillac, *Treatise on Sensations*, trans. G. Carr (London: Favel, 1930), I, iii, p. 1.

13 A. L. Claude Destutt de Tracy, *Elements d'ideologie* (1801-1815), 4 vols.; Claude A. Helvetius, *De l'homme, de ses facultes et de son education* (1772), trans. by Hooper: *On Man* (1777), I, p. 127.

14 Pierre J. G. Cabanis, *Rapport du physique et du moral de l'homme*, in *Oeuvres*, ed. Thurot (Paris 1823-25). Cabanis' famous slogan: "Les nerfs - voila tout l'homme."

15 Plato, *Politeia* and *Republic*, books 2-4, in Plato's *Works*; Taylor, *Plato, the Man and His Works* (New York, 1929), 3d ed., pp. 393-407. See also Paul Shorey, ed., *What Plato Said* (Illinois: University of Chicago Press, 1933), pp. 216 ff.

16 Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).

17 Richard Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1985), pp. 87 ff. See also Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman and Thomas McCarthy, eds., *After Philosophy - End or Transformation* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1987). Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (London, 1951).

18 Edmund Husserl, *Die Krisis der europaischen Wissenschaften und die Transzendente Phanomenologie* (1936), in *Husserliana* (1954), vol. 6 (ed. Walter Biemel); Kurt Godel, "On Formally Undecidable Proposition of Principia Mathematica and Related Systems," in Ernest Nagel and James R. Newman, *Godel's Proof* (New York: New York University Press, 1960). According to Godel's theorem, the incompleteness of arithmetic implies that there is no sound formal system in which arithmetical truth is deducible. Against Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell, Godel demonstrates that there is no consistent formal system in which mathematical truth is provable. See S. Shanker, ed., *Godel's Theorem in Focus* (London, 1988).

19 Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy* (London: 1958)

20 Carl G. Hempel, "Formulation and Formalization of Scientific Theories," in Frederic Suppe, ed., *The Structure of Scientific Theories* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1979, second ed.), pp. 244-254.

21 Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, p. 37: "One can sum up all this by saying that the criterion of the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, or refutability, or testability."

22 Josif V. Stalin, *Works* (13 vols.) (1952-1955), especially *The Foundations of Leninism* (1924); See also Robert Tucker, *Stalinism* (1977).

23 *Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions* (Cambridge, 1952).

24 See Chu-Yen, "Hsiao dao" (Filial Piety), in *Chung guo Wen hua Lwen wen Chi*, (Collected Essays on Chinese Culture), ed. Department of Philosophy, Tung Hai University (Taipei: You Shi, 1979) pp. 182 ff.

25 Tseng Chiao-hsuy, "Hsiao dao yu Dzung chiao" (Filial Piety and Religion), in *Chung guo Wen hua Lwen wen Chi*, vol. 3, ed. by The Department of Philosophy, Tung Hai University (Taipei: You Shi, 1981), pp. 512-22.

26 Yu An-bang, "Qing Yi Lwen shu" ("On Affection and Righteousness"), in *Newsletter for Research in Chinese Studies* (Taipei: Center of Chinese Studies, 2001), no. 78, pp. 9-26.

27 This conception of moral is the kernel of moral theories such as utilitarianism, consequentialism and decisionism.

28 Karl Marx, *Das Elend der Philosophie*. See Hans J. Sandkuhler, ed., *Marxismus und Ethik* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1975). See also L. Laurat, *Marxism and Democracy*, p. 16; Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, p. 391.

29 See Tran Van Doan, *The Formation of Vietnamese Confucianism* (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2001), chap. "What Can Be Called Tradition?"

30 Tran Van Doan, "Filial Piety and the Cult of Ancestors," in *Triet Dao*, No. 2, (Washington, D.C., October, 2001).

31 Max Horkheimer & Theodor Adorno, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment* (Boston: Continuum, 1973), p. 7.

32 Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, p. 36.

33 Jurgen Habermas, "Technology and Science as Ideology" in *Toward a Rational Society* (London, 1971).

34 Popper, p. 37.

35 See the critique of J. Habermas, "A Positivistically Bisected Rationalism," in Theodor Adorno, ed., *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology* (London, 1973), pp. 198-225.

36 Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, (Chicago, 1970), 2nd. ed.

37 Paul Feyerabend, *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge* (London: NLB, 1975), pp. 83, 98 ff.

38 Imre Lakatos, *Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 2.

39 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp. 12 ff.

40 Habermas' objection to Gadamer's thesis is grounded on his confusion between positive and negative ideology. ,

41 Nietzsche with the works: *Genealogy of Morals* and *The Birth of Tragedy*, etc.

42 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgement*, trans. J. C. Meredith (Oxford, 1969).

43 Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. Geoff Bennington and Brian Massumi (University of Manchester Press, 1984), pp. 77-79.

44 Georg Lukacs, *A Theory of Novel* (1911).

45 Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History" and Jurgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (1985).

46 Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1931) (Pfullingen: Klosterman, 1982).

47 Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason* (1929), trans. Norman Kemp Smith, p. 662.

48 Louis Althusser, *Pour Marx* (Paris, 1965); English translation (Hammondsworth, 1969); *Lire Capital* (with Etienne Balibar), (Paris 1970).

49 *The German Ideology*, pp. 131, 137.

50 *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, Introduction.

51 *The German Ideology*, vol. 1, (1845-6).

52 *Capital*, vol. 1, chap. 6.

53 *Manuscript*, 1844, p. 136.

54 *MEW* 3, 46.

55 *MEW* 3 26f., *MEW* 21, p. 179.

56 *Zur Kritik der Politischen Okonomie*, Vorwort, 1859, *MEW* 13, p. 9.

57 *MEW* 13, p. 632 .

58 *Grundrisse* , 1857-58, p. 81f.

59 *Das Kapital*, *MEW* 23, p. 87.

60 *Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie*. Introduction, 1843-44. In *MEW* 1, p. 378.

61 *MEW* 1, pp. 378f.

62 *Capital*, vol. 1.

63 *Capital*; , vol. 2.

64 *Capital*, vol. 3.

65 *The planned* vol. 4.

66 *Manuscript*, 1844, p. 135.

67 Louis Althusser, *Reading Capital*, Introduction.

68 We understand pragmatics in a sense much broader than that of John Dewey and William James. In our view, pragmatics is concerned with problem-solving. But the problems could be metaphysical (principle), theoretical, religious, etc. and not necessarily restricted to daily practical problems. Juergen Habermas understands (universal) pragmatics as an effort to "identify and reconstruct universal conditions of possible understanding." In other words, he treats universal pragmatics as a meta-theory. See Juergen Habermas, "What is Universal Pragmatics?" in *Communication and the Evolution of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979), p. 1.

69 Actually, correctness is not identified with truth. In our view, truth belongs to the theoretical category while correctness to the practical category. Our critique of ideology centers on its hasty identification of correctness with truth, truth of the static world with truth of the living human world, etc.

70 *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (1848): "Jeder nach seinen Faehigkeiten, jedem nach seinem Beduerfnissen."

71 Jurgen Habermas, "What is Universal Pragmatics?" p. 1; See also Jurgen Habermas, *A Theory of Communicative Action*, 2 vols., trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1985).

72 Jurgen Habermas, "What is Universal Pragmatics?" pp. 2, 65.

73 J. F. Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition*, op. cit., pp. 44-45.

74 Juergen Habermas, "Modernity versus Post-modernity" and *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987).

75 Tran Van Doan, "Ideology, Interests and Morality," op. cit., p. 123.

76 *ibid.* See also "The Danger of Self-Deception in Ideological Education" (London, 1990), op. cit.; chap. 4 in this volume.

77 G. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807); and Popper, "What is Dialectic?" in *Conjectures and Refutations*, op. cit.

78 Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, Introduction, p. 1.

Ideological Education and Moral Education

Introduction

The triumph of Confucianism in the Han dynasty can be seen from two aspects: its glorification and its domination. For certain motives (political, cultural, religious, educational and economic, etc.), Confucianism was adopted to defend the social status quo, to maintain social order, and to cultivate human nature. For this fateful multi-dimensional power Confucianism was glorified by the intellectuals (Shih) as a form of ideology (Ru-chia sz-hsiang) and by the ordinary people as a religion (Ru-chiao). When ideology and religion combined, Confucianism enjoyed unparalleled spiritual as well as political power, and the absolute domination of Confucianism in Chinese history (though challenged at times by Taoists and Buddhists, and later by Christianity) is the logical consequence. As a dominant force, it tends to dictate, manipulate and transform the whole life-world and life-view. Authoritarianism, dogmatism and dictatorship were all aspects of this domination. More exactly, as ideology and religion, Confucianism transformed its own doctrines into morality, and then, morality into canon law. Loyalty, obedience, rites-observance and filial duty have been both norms and dogmas ever since. Needless to say, Confucianism determined also politics, aesthetics and even economics.

This chapter concerns particularly the process of the transformation of Confucianism from a philosophy of life into an ideology and religion that have determined the features of current moral education in China. Its aim is to reveal the hidden essence of Chinese education through a critique of this ideology. Thus, it seeks to understand the ideological aspects of moral education in order to remove its mystical shell. To rediscover the rational kernel of moral education, authentic Confucian humanism must be clearly distinguished from Confucianism as a form of ideology.¹ These questions will be treated through both an analytic and a synthetic approach.

In the first part, current moral education is diagnosed from three aspects: policy, method (didactic) and application. No difference appears between moral education, citizen-education, patriotic education and national education.² The method of teaching and learning bears, in many aspects, the characteristics of the past, i.e., it is mimetic, uncritical, passive and dogmatic; its application is ambiguous and disoriented. All in all, moral education has been radically transformed from the noble cause determining human nature to a sheer instrument. From another point of view, however, this moral education registers a remarkable success: it helps the State in keeping social order, in maintaining the *status quo* of society and in uniting the nation. The second part aims at clarifying this contradiction whose essence lies in the ambiguity of moral education as a form of ideology. Thus, this part deals with ideology, whose main characteristics as they are used to defend the cause of the state or class-interests are instrumental and purposive reason. The third part attempts to dissociate moral education from ideological education by a critique of ideology. It critically reviews some ideas of Juergen Habermas and Lawrence Kohlberg, which can contribute to a discussion of moral education in general, and to a rethinking of Confucian moral education in particular. First, Habermas's theory of human interests as the basic characteristic of human nature and his theory of consensus and communicative action as a mode of resolving interest conflicts are worthy of careful study. Though this may be insufficient, its value and definitive contribution to understanding morality is undeniable. Second, Kohlberg's theory of moral development, an application of Jean Piaget's theory of cognitive-psychological

development, also deserves attention. Though somewhat materialist and mechanical, it should not discourage us from a careful evaluation on its merits, for this theory brings out the notion of responsibility and helps us rethink moral education. Finally, in a manner that is less dogmatic and ideological, Confucian morality will be rethought with its original insistence upon the central role of persons and their interaction within a totally integrated structure of man, world and God, and upon the dynamic development of social man after the model of nature. This contrasts to the ideological, static and dogmatic understanding of humankind found in most followers of Confucius.

Contemporary Moral Education

Even before Premier Lee Kwan-yew of Singapore declared the need for moral education,³ China had practiced it more rigorously than any other country. In over two thousand years, moral education had been *de jure* and *de facto* the only thing taught or permitted to be taught in Chinese schools. Moral codes were identified with juridical laws, while politics was synonymous with the art of applying these moral codes to social life.⁴

Far from being irrelevant then, the warnings of Lee and leaders in Taiwan seemed instead to touch but the tip of the iceberg. The increase of crimes, egoism, materialism, a-patriotism⁵ and the like revealed a sad fact: moral education, even if it was still included in the school; was losing its credibility and remained only as a footnote to Chinese culture. Its central role had been assumed by technology and the economy. The onslaught of the sciences, ironically by Hu Shi,⁶ casts morality in an anti-progressive role; *de facto*, it is dead. The reasons for such moral decadence are believed to be matters of recent history. Some blame the poisonous effects of Western culture, such as selfishness, irresponsibility and materialism;⁷ others blame the ineffectiveness of teachers and parents; still others blame the devastating consequence of technological development. In short, one blames everything which happens to be related to modern life. Most of our time and resources are spent in issuing declarations and warnings. Finally, to calm our consciences, we make some cosmetic changes such as upgrading techniques in teaching and learning, or substituting some modern themes. Yet it seems the official efforts have touched only apparent, phenomenal and less significant problems. While wasting mountains of paper for very little progress, they leave the *status quo* and the *modus vivendi* of the kernel of moral education policy untouched. The illusion that some new ideas imported from the Western countries, e.g., the U.S., and the upgrading of some techniques can solve the problems can be seen in the government prepared text-books.⁸ The naive belief that with economic and scientific progress moral problems might become non-existent turns out to be destructive. The whole problem is, in the expression of Max Horkheimer, that we do not recognize the constructive and destructive elements of our educational system.

The Enlightenment sought by Hu Shi is also an anti-enlightenment.⁹ The politics that relied on technique as an effective instrument for seizing and maintaining power, described by Niccolo Machiavelli and adored by our modern politicians, has destroyed the traditional politics built upon morality. 'Wang-dao' or the royal and moral way of governance, so important for coping with modern techniques of seizing power, is forgotten and replaced by 'ba-dao' (the art of usurping power, or the amoral way of governing). In a word, politics appears as a sheer instrument or tool as does morality which once was regarded as the scope of human life. It is sought only when politics and technology are overwhelmed by human problems. Thus, to tackle this problem, we need to look deeply into moral education, i.e., our policy, our method of teaching and learning, and finally the way of applying moral principles to individual and social life.

Present Policy in Moral Education

First, it must be noted that though, etymologically, citizen-education differs from moral education, today they are almost synonymous in educational practice in China. Such other terms as national education and patriotic education have more or less the same meaning. The purposes of moral education articulated by the authorities are to promote:

- Perfection in education
- Harmony in society
- Right in the legal system
- Democracy in politics
- Prosperity in the economy, and
- Harmony in culture.¹⁰

A quick glance at the content of the text-book shows unmistakably that moral education: serves as a means to protect the State, to safeguard the social order, and to develop the country; it aims at cultivating a model individual created by the State (useful, patriotic, moral), and preserving the traditional values; and it functions as the best means for preserving and promoting Chinese identity.

Moral Education for the State

The idea that morality aims at making man better is universal and as old as human history. Confucians regarded morality as the sole way to transform human nature. In *The Great Learning*, Confucius was totally convinced that morality alone best serves mankind and its world: "The way of learning to be great consists in manifesting clear character, loving the people and abiding in the highest good."¹¹ Although one might question the meaning of morality as expressed by Confucius, one could not deny the fact that after Confucius morality became the most important, if not the only, way of governing. In *The Great Learning*, Confucius describes politics in eight steps: investigating things, extending knowledge, sincerity of will, correction of the mind, cultivation of one's personal life, ruling one's family, national order and world peace.¹² A careful look at these steps shows morality to be the cornerstone of politics.¹³

After Confucius, the belief that morality is the metaphysical principle of politics became undisputed, unquestioned and unchallenged dogma. This transformed Chinese culture into a moral culture and Chinese politics into the moral art of governing (*wang-dao*). Peace and prosperity, humanity and love, order and rites are possible only if we possess morality.¹⁴ This dogma was so forceful and fateful that Confucians and Neo-Confucians have done no more than interpret and rearrange it in various manners. Chu-Hsi (1130-1200) for example, rearranged the text and placed 'the investigation of things' in the first place, while Wang Yang-ming (1422-1529) insisted on the correction of the mind and sincerity of will as the most important principles.¹⁵ They all share the view that these eight steps are indispensable for politics.

Although we are not in a position to determine clearly whether or not Confucius himself understood morality as the unique means for political life, it is commonly accepted that fundamentally morality is the ideal means. The text in *The Great Learning* clearly indicates that by correcting oneself one can rule one's family; by ruling one's family, one can govern the State,

and so on. However, this does not establish whether moral conduct is for the sake of the State or the world; morality is the best means for both. The confusion between means and ends, and the ambiguity in the sequence from the individual to the State and back to the individual, were used extensively in favor of the State. Han Fei-tzu, for example, by developing this idea, transformed morality into a kind of national law, the purpose of which was to defend the regime or State. Instead of morality, laws were taken as the best available means to serve state purposes. Han Fei-tzu argued that "the people's nature is such that they delight in disorder and do not cherish the law,"¹⁶ and that the "ruler in the end will be able to prove to them that their own long term interests will be served best by a system based upon a draconian code of penal law."¹⁷ His arguments sound like Hsun Tzu, famous for his theory that human nature tends to evil. This violent interpretation of morality in terms of law did not do justice to Confucius himself, who often regarded morality as higher and more noble than laws. Morality is for *chun-tzu*, the noble man, while laws are for ordinary people. Accordingly, laws or *fa* are not patterns forced on men;¹⁸ they play only a secondary role when morality does not prevail.

Mencius interpreted Confucius rightly when he wrote: "Noble men will violate the penal laws."¹⁹ However, Mencius did not take pains to make a clear distinction between morality and law. He often complained of the insufficiency of morality and his remark that "virtue alone is insufficient for ruling; the laws cannot carry themselves into practice,"²⁰ suggests that basically morality and laws have a similar instrumental character. Han Fei-tzu, in this respect, asserted the roles of law and morality in the same manner. Benjamin Schwartz rightly observed:

In the book of Han Fei-tzu, one even discerns the outlines of an ultimate utopia lying beyond the more immediate goals of the legalists' program. Once the laws and the methods of rational government have become internalized in the habits of the people, the old dysfunctional attitudes based on belief in 'private action' (*Ssu hsing*) will disappear. The irrelevancies of the cultural heritage with its stress on personal morality, the proud adherence of the wandering philosophers to their own inane 'private doctrines' and private values, private vendettas and 'private warriors' will have disappeared and the 'public interests' (*kung li*) will reign supreme. Peace, harmony, and general welfare will prevail.²¹

In brief, the instrumentalization of morality was taken as a matter of fact. Max Weber's description of rationalization in Western culture had taken place in Chinese history long before. Thomas Hobbes's definition of politics as an art of the matter, form and power of a commonwealth, his understanding of human behavior as the material for sciences, are not new to the legalists who had practiced Machiavellian *Realpolitik* long before. Well-known principles in *Il Principe*, such as "All human beings are ungrateful, fickle, hypocritical, cowardly and selfish,"²² or "politics is the art of governing men (*Menschenfuehrung*) or the science of domination" were familiar to the legalists. In short, with the legalists, moral education was also an art of governance analogous to politics and laws.

This historical fact explains why three quarters of the content of the textbook on moral education deals precisely with politics and laws. It explains also how the overtone of politics in moral education is accepted as undisputed, justified, rational and thoughtful policy. Lee Huan, a former Minister of Education of Taiwan, stated bluntly: Education is the fundamental and most important factor in constructing the Nation, and citizen-education (moral education) is the most essential of the many kinds of education. It can determine our success or failure, i.e. the fate, of our Nation. We must unite all the resources and powers of the people in order to survive.

(Therefore) citizen-education needs to be upgraded in order to make our nation stronger. Our most important task now is to upgrade, to better citizen-education.²³

With equal vigor, Chu Huei-shen, another former Minister of Education, traced the main lines of moral or citizen education as follows: 1) based upon morality or *wang-dao*; 2) aimed at democratic life, at respecting the national laws; 3) helps the young generation acquire more scientific knowledge; and 4) contributes to the improvement of the livelihood of the people.²⁴ Chen Li-fu, president of the *Confucius-Mencius Society*, insists upon citizen or moral education as the unique means for the survival of the Nation.²⁵ Those directives are executed literally and so effectively that one can hardly detect its artificiality. One gets the impression that moral education might be based completely on Confucian ethics, which turns out to be accurate if one understands Confucianism as a form of ideology.

Moral Education and the Chinese Model-man

The second character of moral education is seen in its goal of building a model man. Even if individuals are suppressed, some room is still made for them; however, it is necessary to note that the Chinese individual described in the textbook is a 'social individual'. The second and third volumes of the six-volume textbook reserve a great part to individuals, instructing the student on becoming a great citizen, a model student, a filial son or daughter, a responsible man or woman.²⁶ In short, the individual is mentioned in terms, not of the individual, but of his or her family, society and nation. What the authorities mean by individual is not synonymous with the solipsist romantic ego broadly assumed in Western culture. The Chinese individual is neither the center nor the starting-point of society, but a member or co-maker, living with others in society. One's life is determined by one's family and society to which one has responsibility. The concept of man (*jen*), for example, describes the social character of the person in terms of responsibility and communication.

Of course, in *The Analects*, one can detect some clues pointing to a certain type of individualism,²⁷ and in *Shi-King* or *The Book of Poetry*, one finds some similar passages. But this kind of individualism must not be understood in the sense of Kantian autonomy²⁸ or Hegelian self-consciousness, which expresses an individual who possesses a spiritual self-sufficiency which renders him independent of 'popularity' or dependence upon others. Thus, it has little to do with what is meant by an individual in Western culture. The Chinese individual is self-sufficient in virtue, but not in terms of sociality. What the official textbook stated concerning the individual is really the person of universal character required by Chinese society: a person with wisdom, responsibility, loyalty, politeness, filial piety, success and, today, technical knowledge. Moral education is supposed to help the student to become such a person. Thus, in the first two volumes, though many chapters deal with the ideal individual, nothing is left to the individual as such. The first chapter of the volume deals with the four main benefits of education, of which only one is related directly to the individual as such:

- it gives the knowledge (technical ability) indispensable for survival;
- it develops human capabilities;
- it instructs concerning the way of acquiring wisdom (the art of living); and
- it is the best means of realizing individual ideals.²⁹

The other, more important, benefits from education are for society, the State, and the world. Careful reflection upon the first individual benefits shows that it concerns an individual preparing for society. Morality, technology, knowledge, etc., primarily benefit one's family and the State. The third point, for example, which deals with the art of living (*dao-li*), is unmistakable: "Education instructs man on how to acquire wisdom (*dao-li*): the individual cannot be independent from society. He must share his life with others. Only when he understands this art of living (*dao li*), can he live peacefully and harmoniously with others."³⁰

From the above analysis, one can describe education in its own Chinese expression of *Chiao yu* as the best means to teach and to raise students to become model persons.³¹ According to these descriptions, one can describe the characteristics of a model person as follows:

- patriotic, altruistic and responsible (vol. I)
- possessed of knowledge and technical ability, useful to the society and the State (vols. I and V)
- law abiding and ready to fulfill one's duty to the State, and to defend its interests (vols. III and IV)
- a person of moral integrity, who strictly observes traditional values (loyalty, filial piety, benevolence, etc.) (vols. II, III and VI), and who maintains social order.
- one who puts the interests of the state prior to his or her own interests (vols. I and II).

In short, the ideal person as described in the textbook is conservative in a strict sense. He does not blame others but accepts his fate and fulfills his duty.

Moral Education or the Ideology of Chinese Identity

The public authorities in Taiwan attend to traditional culture for a number of tactical reasons.

- The emphasis upon Chinese culture has a less ideological tone, but more effective result. It is commonly accepted as the unique factor which could unite the Nation and preserve Chinese identity.³²
- It is designed as part of a policy against factors blamed for destroying Chinese culture and promoting internationalism.
- Chinese traditional culture is rich in morality. Thus, preserving the culture means respecting the social order, family structure, etc.

Culture and Chinese Identity

In all six volumes, culture is often mentioned under various forms of morality, laws and knowledge. The particularity of Chinese morality and laws is traced to the distinctiveness of Chinese culture as the most rich and most profound in terms of history and knowledge. Thus exaltation of Chinese culture is necessary for restoring Chinese identity. After the political, military and scientific failure of the Ching dynasty, a great number of Chinese lost faith in China. The mass exodus of Chinese to Western countries, disarray and disorientation, lack of self-identity and a self-defeatist attitude were the main causes of Chinese humiliation by Japan and Western colonialism.

These symptoms have by no means disappeared. The brain-drain,³³ lack of self-assurance, fetishism of science and commerce,³⁴ etc., which are born of such defeatism could cause more harm. Thus, restoring culture is identified with restoring Chinese identity. The stories of Chinese heroes are rewritten in a more patriotic and cultured manner; Chinese culture is exalted in such terms as "Chinese culture aims at humanism and spiritualism, while Western culture aims at materialism."³⁵ History, geography, philosophy and literature are rewritten in this context.³⁶

Culture and Ideology

In Taiwan the effort to restore Chinese culture was at first propaganda against communism (Ministers Lee and Chu), but later became a means for unifying China. Culture here being understood as traditional morality and social order, e.g., the virtues of obedience, piety, respect, reverence for Confucius, etc.

Culture and Morality

For lack of clear demarcation between culture and morality, morality is often taken for culture. Indeed, besides art, the rest of Chinese culture is identified with moral teaching. Thus, the teachings of Confucius, Lao Tzu, Buddhism, etc., constitute the central body of Chinese culture.

All in all, the exaltation of culture transforms it into a kind of ideology. In fact, *The Three Principles of the People*, written by Sun Yat-sen, are often described as part of Chinese culture and *vice-versa*, or rooted in Chinese culture. This theory was the main ideology of the Republic of China and its ruling party, which it has considered the key to the success of the economy and living standard of Taiwan.

The Method in Moral Education

The Facilitation of the Student's Understanding

Even when the language used is simple and brief and many arguments and examples are given, what counts is the content. This may be too difficult for first or second grade students. Metaphysical theories concerning human nature are explained superficially; theories of politics are abbreviated into a single sentence. Simple language does not mean that the readers can understand; on the contrary, even philosophers and scientists experience difficulty in reading so simple a book as *The Three Characters Book*.³⁷ The reason is that it does not take account of the capacity for understanding on the part of the students.

The Ability and Understanding of Teachers

There is a lack of statistics or answers relating to this problem.³⁸ All textbooks used in the secondary and even in the primary schools are written by the university professors who habitually write the textbooks in a quasi-academic manner.³⁹ Though experts in their own fields, as they have no pedagogical experience in the schools their language is often too difficult, even for secondary school teachers. Further, the training of these teachers is often inadequate. The majority of the teachers have studied *The Three Principles of the People*, which trains them in different matters, but is insufficient for self-reflection. Their lack of philosophical training (logic, systematic

and critical thinking, history of philosophy, etc.) makes it difficult for them to understand theories written in too concise a manner.

Logic and System

On the whole, it is true that the book is arranged in a relatively systematic fashion after the model of *The Great Learning*, going from individuals to society. But many arguments are insufficiently convincing because: 1) the examples given are too few and, at times, irrelevant, 2) the tone is always affirmative (dogmatic), and 3) the logic is often tautological.

For lack of experience in secondary schools, high officials and university professors⁴⁰ are ineffective in reforming the method of teaching morality. What remains are cosmetic changes, while the traditional spirit of teaching remains intact.

In the past, children were expected to repeat what the teachers said; repeating and copying were synonymous with learning and were fundamental characteristics of traditional education. This begins with the way the children learn reading and writing. The system of Chinese characters does not promote the child's ability to think. What they need to do is to copy exactly, to write the exact number of strokes of a character: the more faithful they are, the better they achieve. There is no question, wonder, critique or remark, but only memorization and imitation. As the best students are those who can memorize all the characters without missing a stroke, from the first year in elementary school to the last year of high school (and probably in university), the mark of a student depends upon his memory. Homework and cram-schools are designed to help the students to repeat and memorize all the material asked in examinations. No wonder even creative work like the arts is understood in terms of copying. Thus, though the method of teaching and of learning is upgraded, it is only a cosmetic change which helps the children memorize more easily or pleurably. Video-systems, photos, maps, stories, etc., are widely used for this purpose. In a word, memorization as a method remains; only its techniques are updated. This fact can be verified in the textbook and by the way in which a teacher executes his or her duty:

- all texts and arguments are descriptive in style,
- all explanations are simple and condensed,
- expressions are affirmative with hardly an hypothesis or question,
- teachers have only a few references to literature,
- as the content of moral education is too rich and the time allowed is too short, teachers can only do their best to repeat the text and force the students to memorize.
- There is no discussion or question and answer forum (this fact pleases both teacher and students: the former need not spend more time for research, while the latter prefer having fewer items for examinations).

This method of teaching is the best and the most effective way to get through all the examinations, up to those for college entrance. In short, students and even teachers are treated like machines or computers who need only reproduce exact solutions, and the above method is best for transforming students into such computers. It is normal to see students who can go through complicated mathematical sequences without understanding their process,⁴¹ while others score high marks in an English examination (TOEFL) without being able to speak, write or understand that language when spoken.

Finally, the content is too abstract to understand. In the past, children began to learn metaphysics (the nature of human beings) even before they learned reading and writing. No wonder we still see these theories, rewritten and rearranged in a more attractive manner in the textbook. We do not need to repeat other shortcomings of this method already discussed by other scholars. What we do wish to say is that this kind of method is born within an ideological structure and preserved by dogmatists, and that it is the most conservative method and does more harm than good.

The Practice of Moral Education

Moral education is emphasized partly because of the increase in crime, especially among teenagers, which can threaten social stability; partly as a component of an ideological campaign; and partly for the sake of national identity. As we already argued, it takes little account of individuals. It is directed first toward the stability, order and progress of the nation, secondly toward unifying and fighting an ideology, and finally toward the growth of individuals.

Moral education is quite successful in furthering patriotism. It gives people more confidence in China, makes the students more obedient and loyal, helps to curb the crime rate (though there is a lack of statistics or results to verify this claim), and contributes to keeping the traditional family in order. In these respects, moral education has reason for claiming to be necessary. But there are also many reasons for worry: an increase in crime especially among white-collar workers (i.e., those receiving more education),⁴² the brain drain, the lack of interest in the national cause, individualism, and the danger of losing Chinese identity by accepting the so-called "Americanisation."⁴³ These maladies come, not only from our policies and methods, but even more from their application, which manifest the following difficulties:

- the content of moral education is too difficult or too ideal
- it is also too abstract
- its method is anti-scientific and against human growth
- the policy and sequence of moral education are ambiguous and beyond the reach especially of children, who have no idea of politics.

The most serious problem, however, is the disunity between theory and practice.⁴⁴ The changing character of our society and the relevance thereto of these theories and of traditional virtues have not been studied. In other words, the micro and macro sociological facets have not been thought through.

All these shortcomings force us to reflect upon the nature of ideology, which we consider to be the key to understanding moral education and its importance.

Morality and Ideology

We have noted that this kind of moral education had been embraced by our ancestors in the past, and that feudalism and monarchism had used it extensively for their causes. As was noted above, the method and theory were developed by the Confucians after Confucius. Though historically there may have been reason for such an ideology, it contributed to the collapse of China in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Thus this part intends to clarify the difference between morality and ideology, and to trace the process of the transformation of morality into ideology.

This process is too complicated to handle in a few pages for it involves, not only the purpose and method of morality but the psychological attitude of acceptance or resistance, free or coerced decisions, etc. Mass media, social circumstances, religion, etc., also play an important role in the process of transformation of morality into ideology. Aware of such complexity, we shall limit ourselves to a few points relevant to our discussion: (1) the meaning of ideology, (2) the nature of ideology, and finally (3) the process of the transformation of morality into ideology.

The Meaning of Ideology

Historically, the term ‘ideology’ is very ambiguous, if not self-contradictory.⁴⁵ It means not simply ‘a study of ideas’ as the term suggests, but a system of correct ideas, which can determine others. However, as it is extremely difficult to know which idea is correct, we will take the common use of ideology as the standard of our discussion.

What we understand by ideology is of rather recent history. It was used by Karl Marx in his *Deutsche Ideologie*⁴⁶ and more recently by Karl Mannheim in his *Ideologie und Utopie*.⁴⁷ Marx understood ideology as a system of ideas, which, though logically valid, is constructed on an erroneous basis⁴⁸—for example, the Platonic ideas, the Christian God, or the bourgeois constitution—the purpose of which is to defend the interests of the dominant class. Ironically, his view on ideology was reversed by such followers as Lenin, Stalin and Mao Tse-dung, so that the Soviet ideology⁴⁹ and the Maoist ideology were by no means compatible with the view of Marx. In a manner similar to the bourgeois whom they attack, with Marxist language they built another ideology to defend their own interests or those of the party. Thus, while Marx regards ideology as a closed, self-proclaimed sufficient system of thought, which excludes freedom and tends toward determinism, his believers dogmatize Marxism as the most scientific, authoritative, rational and perfect system of ideas mankind could conceive. In a word, they regard Marxism as an ideology and reject all other thought.

This contradiction in fact lies in the nature of ideology itself, and can best be seen in the history of its development. According to Francis Bacon, de Tracy and de Condillac or Cabanis, ideology means a critique of false idols or idolatry.⁵⁰ It is a rational theory of knowledge constructed on empirical observation (Bacon),⁵¹ sensation (de Condillac),⁵² physical sensibility (Cabanis),⁵³ biological factors (de Tracy),⁵⁴ pleasure (Helvetius),⁵⁵ etc. It accuses idealism, spiritualism and rationalism of being irrational and unreal because constructed on a wrong basis.

These critiques were important to Marx for whom any theory, however logical, constructed on an erroneous basis is an ideology and falls prey to dogmatism. In this sense, he is against Bacon, de Condillac and Cabanis because their theories give birth to positivism, which is another form of ideology. In short, Marx stands completely and unconditionally against any form of ideology. Without doubt, the insights of Marx have a certain value in contributing to our understanding of ideology of today. His view that one must reject any theory which contradicts social human nature as a dynamic, evolutionary entity, which defends the *status quo* of social structures, or which makes eternal and absolute pronouncements, is extremely important for understanding moral education.

In this context, we regard as ideologies any closed theories (or *ism*) such as idealism, positivism, scientism, spiritualism or materialism. However, Marx’s radical critique is not completely justified. His neglect of the positive aspect of ideology and his irresponsible attack on all forms of ideology gave birth either to anarchism or to another ideology such as that of the

Soviet's and of Mao. For this reason, it would be better to look at ideology from two different angles: positive and negative, as did Mannheim.

Positive ideology is a systematic and scientific theory which satisfies a temporal need of society, which can resolve democratically and rationally conflicts of interest, and which is open to the future (in the trial and error manner advocated by Karl Popper).⁵⁶ Negative ideology is a logical system of ideas which can satisfy or resolve only certain problems and conflicts, but claims to be unique, eternal, unchangeable, omnipotent and free from any possible error. It is constructed, not on a scientific basis, but upon authority (whether political, theological, economic or the like). It is arbitrary in the sense of serving the interests of a certain class or regime, though claiming to be universal. Its *raison d'être* is nothing but the sheer means-ends rationality of instrumental reason.

Marx's critique of ideology is valid for this second kind of ideology, but remains insufficient because he failed to detect the positive aspect of ideology. Though temporal and insufficient, this can contribute to human progress by serving as a strong basis of culture, contributing to the formation of national consciousness, and playing a decisive factor in the development of the individual.

In *Ideology and Utopia*, Mannheim partly abandoned the Marxist material and class approach in understanding ideology. He understood ideology in the context of total social structure and tried to study both its positive and negative aspects. The undeniable value of ideology in shaping history and motivating economic development has been pointed out by Max Weber. The function of political and sociological ideology in developing and forming national or group identity or class consciousness has been made evident by Lukac's in *Geschichte und Klassenbewusstsein*. Thus, Mannheim distinguishes between particular and total ideologies.

- Particular ideologies aim at refuting specific assertions "which may be regarded as concealments, falsifications or lies without attacking the integrity of the total mental structure of the asserting subject."⁵⁷

- Total ideologies refer to the entire *Weltanschauung* of an age or historical group.⁵⁸ This kind of ideology is attacked by Marx, Nietzsche and Freud. Nietzsche devalues all traditional values which he regards as useless, unreal, inhuman. Marx rejects all concepts of justice, equality, fraternity, charity, as well as religions, as sheer forms of class interests. Freud casts doubt upon the whole history of human nature.

In viewing the complexity of ideology, Mannheim distinguishes between ideologies as idea-systems which are congruent with, and supportive of, the *status quo*, and those which are against this (as seen in Marx, Nietzsche and Freud). These two different and opposed senses are related and sometimes confused as two aspects of the same reality inasmuch as they have the same rigid totalitarian nature and give birth to a new kind of ideology once attacked. Utopias such as Marxism, Freudianism, or Nietzscheanism, which are opposed to the *status quo* and supportive of an alternative social order or human nature, could have both of these characteristics. First, they are against the *status quo* of other ideologies; then they transform themselves into other ideologies or utopias. Thus, utopia has a double meaning: devaluation and revaluation, deconstruction and reconstruction.

The Nature of Ideology

In a previous article dealing with ideology,⁵⁹ I have tried to trace the line between ideologies by pinpointing some criteria. Those used were rather Kantian, being developed according to mathematical principles of universality and necessity. Since then the study of Wilhelm Dilthey and Habermas has shown that there is no absolute universality and necessity in morality as Kant had insisted, and that the human sciences differ in nature from the pure sciences.⁶⁰ It seems mistaken to interpret the nature of morality and ideology in terms of a mathematical model.

The quasi-transcendental categories proposed by Habermas should be considered as candidates for the needed criteria. I shall not discuss the scientific status of Habermas's quasi-transcendental categories; his categories do not claim an absolute scientific status, but are constructed after the model of language and the genetic psychology of Jean Piaget. Hence, his categories are at least more human and social than those of Kant or Aristotle. Though possibly insufficient, they avoid a dogmatic objectivism or relativism. Through a careful study of various schools of *Lebensphilosophie*, Habermas' theory escapes the naive belief of the Enlightenment in the absolute value of the sciences, and in its attempt to reduce all human activities to a scientific exploration.

Thus, we shall study the nature of ideology under the following aspects:

- its universal character in the sense of democratic decision-making and common sense
- its necessity
- its degree of freedom in decision-making
- its historicity
- its developing or dialectical essence
- its temporality and spatiality. A theory falls prey to ideology when it lacks a universal (that is, democratic) and necessary character, or when it is valid only for a certain place and time but claims an absolute and eternal character, forcing others to follow it by any available means such as power, authority, manipulation or seduction. If these criteria are acceptable, then we can describe the nature of ideology as:

- lack of a universal and necessary character
- lack of free decision (relying on authority, power, wealth)
- of limited validity temporally and spatially
- tending to absolutize history, and thus being against historicity
- static, conservative and tending to defend the *status quo*
- conservative in method, stressing analysis and interpretation
- employing especially narrative and interpretative methods.

In view of this revised meaning and nature of ideology, we can now return to moral education: (a) to examine whether or not it is a kind of ideology, and (b) to inquire about its relevance and importance. On the first question, there is no doubt that moral education as practiced, e.g., in the 70s in Taiwan as reflected in the school text above, was a kind of ideology. That fact is acknowledged officially and accords with our criteria:

- it is effective for only a certain age in a certain time and at a certain place;
- it loses its weight when students become more critical and when they begin to wonder about freedom, autonomy and individual interests;
- it tends to defend the old social order or *status quo*;
- it uses a rigid, static, uncritical method;

- its topics reflect, not common interests, but only those of the State.

Before answering the second question, we need to examine the process of transformation of morality into ideology so that we can talk about the relevance and importance of ideology.

The Transformation of Morality into Ideology

To understand why morality becomes ideology one needs to know: the nature and effectiveness of morality, its political function in Chinese history and the process of its transformation into ideology.

The nature and effectiveness of morality

Since Aristotle, Western morality has been a study of human conduct aiming at happiness, resolving conflicts and the like. On the nature of morality, however, there is a division: idealists and rationalists hold an eternal or transcendental nature for morality, while the empiricists and utilitarians think of moral nature in *a posteriori* terms, denying any transcendence to morality. The former tend to absolutize morality, while the latter tend to instrumentalize it.

In China, it is not the same. No school, including that of Confucius himself, regards morality either as transcendental and fully *a priori*, or as completely *a posteriori*. All schools, however, accepted the importance of morality and consider it the foundation of Chinese culture. This view could easily be misinterpreted or absolutized, as in the case of the Confucians after Confucius, to whom morality is the quintessence of Chinese culture and determines Chinese politics, aesthetics and economics. Morality is the last resort and highest point—higher even than religion.

It is this that gives birth to Confucian ideology when, by a *stroke*, morality is transformed into a kind of eternal and static instrument for the defense of the *status quo*. They ignore the fact that morality is of three different levels: the first or quasi transcendental is constructed on a human nature which also is transcendental; the second changes and develops in accordance with human evolution and development; and the third is built on social activity. With the exception of the first category, morality is seen as being in steady change. Of course, its development or change is in conformity with human development, with one's adaptation to nature and with one's capacity to resolve conflicts.

We will return to this problem in the third part when we discuss the theories of Habermas and Piaget on morality. Here we need only know how morality becomes ideology. We have stated that any attempt at transforming morality into ideology is tantamount to the act of dogmatizing, monopolizing and manipulating human beings for a calculated purpose. Thus, the transformation of morality into ideology begins with the first step of absolutizing and monopolizing morality.

In an agricultural society such as China at the time of Confucius, one tends to conquer nature, not by force, but by technical knowledge. One tends to defend oneself, not by violence, but by laws. That explains the effectiveness of morality, for it is the best means to domesticate barbarism and to survive in a crowded conflicting situation. It replaces the role of violence in the Stone Age, transforming it into a civilized society. Thus, as the best means of educating men Confucius himself chose *li*⁶¹ or rites as the symbol of morality, and music⁶² as the symbol of civilization. The ineffectiveness of violence in an agricultural society in dealing with daily problems (of course, war is an exception) forced our ancestors to look for another more effective means for resolving conflicts without sacrificing one of the partners involved in the conflict. While violence always

ends with one losing and one gaining, or with both losing, morality ends with the happy result of no one losing. The effectiveness of morality in society is undeniable; indeed it is so effective that one tends to absolutize it as the ultimate means and end.

The Political Function of Morality in China and Its Transformation into Ideology

By regarding morality as the ultimate foundation, all human activities come to be built upon moral principles. Thus, politics is influenced by morality; indeed, the political order is constructed on the moral order, and the legitimacy of political order must be justified in terms of the moral leadership of the ruler.⁶³ In this context, morality becomes absolute. As pointed out, there are three different categories of morality: 1) the quasi-transcendental one born in man's most fundamental nature and in religion; 2) the second one based on human nature as changing and developing (in terms of the human genetic and psychological development proposed by Piaget and Kohlberg); and 3) the third which is formed and developed in the context of social activity. By absolutizing morality without discussing its nature, it is dogmatized and transformed into ideology.

The process of transformation of morality into ideology is legitimated and justified: 1) by accepting its effectiveness, 2) by applying it in society (politics), and finally 3) by interpreting it in accordance with the interests of the ruling class. It is the third point which distinguishes morality from ideology. We acknowledge that morality of the first category is transcendental or quasi-transcendental. This means morality has a common nature accepted by mankind and is not restricted by space or time. A Chinese has much the same duty toward his parents as a European or African. Morality in the second category is of only limited transcendence. It is developing and changing, and cannot be held as universal. For example, sexual morality is varied in each country, and for different groups or classes. The third category of morality changes according to the social development so that these moral laws are often identified with social laws.

The process of transforming morality into ideology, takes the third category to be the first, while ignoring the nature of the second category. Thus, one interprets national, civil, royal or party laws to be universal morality, and civil duties to be categorical imperatives. This violent and radical interpretation was practiced in the era after Confucius. All social laws such as loyalty, obedience, respect, and humility came to be interpreted as the most universal laws. Once forcefully accepted, these virtues become the cornerstone of Chinese political and economic activities. A dynasty is built on loyalty and obedience. Corporations are based on *yi* and confidence, family structure is built on filial piety rather than on love. This is contrary to Confucius' preaching of *jen* or benevolence, of love and harmony. This explains also the practices in the past of excluding women in society, dividing classes, and excluding all but the *Shi* or ruling class from policy and decision-making. The violent interpretation of the third category of morality explains why there is such a difference between the politics of Yao, Schwen, Chou and others. Yao or Schwen based their politics on the first category of morality, while the others based theirs on the third category but interpreted it as the first category. While the politics of Yao and Schwen were democratic, the latter is dogmatic and dictatorial.

Morality and Interests: A Critique of Ideology

By analyzing our present moral education in the first part, and making a distinction between morality and ideology in the second part, we come to a tentative proposal that a sound moral education must be freed of the characteristics of ideology. At first glance this seems a quasi-

impossible task, for it involves not only national policy, but also the method of teaching and learning. We lack also the critique necessary for distinguishing ideology from morality, and thus far we have no theory which can determine the exact nature of morality. Thus, in this part, we shall focus upon the last point, i.e., the nature of morality, as the first step toward a sound understanding of moral education.

The second part mentioned briefly the nature of morality, but too briefly for an adequate understanding. Morality was divided into three different categories: quasi-transcendental, empirical and social morality. This division was already visible in Aristotle who acknowledged that morality, though born in human nature (*ethos*), was developed in human social relations and human activity (*ethicos*).⁶⁴ He acknowledged also that morality attempts to transcend the limit of time and space, but contradicted himself by interpreting morality in terms of customs and habits which are time and space-bound. In this way, he confused the three categories of morality. The same mistake is found in the Latin tradition with its understanding of morality as *morals*, which comes rather from the term *mos*, i.e., customs or habits.⁶⁵ As habits, morality loses its claim to dictate or transform human nature. It lacks transcendence (universality and necessity) and becomes class morality or the morality of a certain social group. Kant refused to accept such an understanding of morality, and his distinction between *morals* and morality is genial.⁶⁶ But his radical insistence on the neutrality, objectivity and transcendence of morality makes his morality 'inhuman' and asocial. Designed for a superman, it seems beyond space and time and incompatible with human beings. Hegel correctly criticized Kantian morality as aloof,⁶⁷ as not morality but only the idea of morality. His solution of identifying morality and morals seems headed along the right path, and able to resolve the dichotomy between Kant's transcendental morality and Locke's empirical morality. Regretfully, he failed because his solution engaged only his mind and reality.

In our view, morality must be understood in the same way as human nature which tends toward its perfection (in relative terms). Hence, what Aristotle and other moralists call *morals* in the sense of *mos* are in fact only some apparent, changing and accidental forms of morality, but are not yet morality. The same applies to the social order and social laws: customs, morals, laws and orders are limited in time and space and express only a part of the totality of human nature. They are not yet morality, which expresses what is most fundamental to human nature such as the act of preserving oneself, the act of loving and the need for communication.⁶⁸ It expresses the duration of human nature through time and universal space. To be more concrete, the act of killing is against such properties of human nature as preserving, loving and communicating, and is eternally condemned by all societies in every place.

However, this distinction does not help us to locate or to build sound moral education. As described above, a pure morality, although both neutral and universal, could degenerate or be manipulated in practice. For this reason all three aspects of morality must be studied seriously. In fact, a pure morality is impossible in practice, while a purely empirical morality will generate disorientation and relativism in moral education. Therefore, sound moral education should be based on a genuine, rational, democratic and practical consensus of basic human interests and nature.

Such a consensus must satisfy the rigorous tests of the human sciences and the demand of reason. It is universal on two different levels: *a priori*, for it is inborn and inseparable from one's most basic human nature; *a posteriori* but nonetheless 'transcendental', for it is born and developed in accord with human activities, but has a certain dimension of universality and necessity such as language and communicative acts. For Habermas the second kind of universal principle is quasi-transcendental. To accept only the first kind is to fall into the metaphysical

domain, while to affirm only the second one is to be limited to the range of empiricism. In contrast to separating the three different natures of morality, these two kinds of universals must be seen as interwoven.

Habermas' consensus is precisely a tentative synthesis of these two kinds of universals, for consensus is:

- the most essential characteristic of the human race;
- the main reason explaining the formation of society;
- quasi transcendental in the sense that other quasi transcendental forms such as language, feeling, hope, etc., are explicit forms of consensus;
- expressive of human freedom by resisting any dogmatic coercion;
- the symbol of the human capacity for communication; and
- expressed by such forms of communication as grammar, laws, morals and customs.

The question, however, is how to achieve this consensus. It is the main question treated by Habermas in his three important works, namely, *Knowledge and Human Interests*,⁶⁹ *Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism*,⁷⁰ and *Theory of Communicative Action*.⁷¹ What are their implications for moral education? First, in order to discover a genuine consensus, one needs to criticize all that blocks this consensus. Thus, according to Habermas, a critique of ideology is the *conditio sine qua non* for attaining consensus.⁷²

Our critique of the present moral education as a form of ideology—i.e., a system grounded on a belief which maintains its legitimacy despite its inability to be validated in rational discourse—is intended as the first step toward a genuine consensus in our moral education. Our critique questions the emphasis or overemphasis upon the instrumentality of moral education, the development of method or technical abilities at the cost of its content, and the disarray in applying moral education which produces both a loss of moral meaning in day-to-day life and a diminution of freedom of choice. The critique is not against science as such, but questions any form of domination which distorts or deforms consensus, and any form of manipulation by a certain class, regime or dynasty for the purpose of dictating the moral codes in favor of their own interests.

But critique is only the first step of a project aimed at discovering the heart of moral education and engaging therein. In this part we need to proceed constructively in pointing out the basis of consensus and shall follow Habermas' analysis of interests because it can illumine the nature of consensus. According to Habermas, in order to reconstruct an authentic moral education, one needs:

- to pinpoint the most basic human interests which determine our conduct,
- to reconstruct moral regulations based on these basic interests, and
- to test moral regulations in daily life in order to verify these regulations in accordance with human consensus.

Interests and Morality

In the second part, we tried to distinguish between ideology and morality and indicated that most of the so-called codes in our moral system bear ideological characteristics. Similarly, we shall try now to show the difference between substantial or basic interests and secondary interests. Basic interests are:

- universal or common to mankind. They are also necessary in the sense that they are an inseparable part of human nature.

- necessary conditions for human life and for society. According to Marx, basic human interests are material or economic and on these human conduct is constructed. This is not wrong but insufficient, for material interests alone cannot satisfy human needs or explain the whole complex of human and social structures, such as those of the family. The material interests cannot produce arts or generate purely intellectual needs. Finally, we cannot logically and scientifically demonstrate the relationship between material interests and those of emancipation, freedom, progress, etc. Thus, we need to consider a third type of interests, namely those,

- transcendent in character, that is, they have an indefinite and unlimited capacity for progress, development and openness towards new horizons. In this sense, all that Habermas expresses as 'emancipation',⁷³ Adorno calls 'negativity',⁷⁴ Bloch defines as 'hope',⁷⁵ and even Popper signifies by 'openness'⁷⁶ —all express these basic interests of transcendence.

Other interests which cannot satisfy these three conditions are secondary or auxiliary, limited, particular and accidental. They produce only limited effects, and bear little weight upon human conduct.

With these criteria in mind, in examining the nature and conditions of moral regulations one must distinguish substantial moral codes built upon basic interests from accidental codes built upon auxiliary interests. To distinguish the two types of interests requires a profound understanding of the nature of human interests themselves and their relation to human nature. Here the first obstacle is that we cannot grasp the whole of human nature, but only a part: human nature is as mysterious as is the divine. What we can grasp is that human nature is still developing and to be revealed (in Heidegger's expression) through our actions and relations with others and with ourselves. Hence, what we describe here is of only relative value. Though insufficient, we can hope for some light upon moral education from Habermas's description of human interests.

Human Interests and Human Nature

In his well-known book, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Habermas proposed approaching three aspects of human interests by three different methods. As it is not our intention to undertake the project of establishing an epistemology based upon interests, we will put aside his work on method and epistemology. Our attention is directed rather to the nature of these interests and whether or not they are of universal, necessary and transcendent character.

Habermas divided human interests into three different categories: technical, practical and emancipatory:

- *Technical interests* are understood as "anthropologically deep-seated interests" in predicting and controlling events in the natural environment.⁷⁷ They are born in the human desire to respond to the material needs to survive and to satisfy basic instincts; in short, they are the interests of domination.

- *Practical interests* are rooted in human social nature and respond to the need to secure and expand the possibilities of mutual and self-understanding in the conduct of life.⁷⁸

- *Emancipatory interests* aim at liberation from pseudo-natural constraints whose power resides in their non-transparency.⁷⁹ In Freudian expression, emancipatory interests express the human desire for freedom and authenticity.

According to Habermas, these interests satisfy both theory and practice. As theory or contemplation of the cosmos they share with the sciences a commitment to the "theoretical attitude that frees those who take it from dogmatic association with the natural interests of life and their irritating influence."⁸⁰ They aim also at "describing the universe theoretically in its law-like order, just as it is." As practice, they describe and guide the life-world. They are not influences on cognition that have to be eliminated for the sake of the objectivity of knowledge; rather they themselves determine the aspect under which reality can be objectified and thus made accessible to experience in the first place. They are for all subjects capable of speech and action the necessary conditions for the possibility of experience that claims to be objective.⁸¹ Accordingly, the interests constitutive of knowledge are linked to the functions of an ego that adapts itself to its external conditions through learning processes, is initiated into the communications system of a social life-world by means of self-formative processes, and constructs an identity in the conflict between instinctual aims and social constraints.⁸²

A quick glance at these interests indicates that all these interests could claim a certain universal necessity. They are reconstructed after such evident human characteristics as instincts and language, which we consider as quasi transcendental. Habermas's 'transcendental' is not identified completely with that of Kant: whereas the 'transcendentals' in Kant's system are universal and necessary in the sense of being beyond space and time, the 'quasi transcendentals' of Habermas are subject to change in accordance with the nature of language and human instincts. They relate first to the universal process of preserving, conserving and developing, that is, to the dialectical nature of mankind. In short, the difference between Kant and Habermas lies in the fact that Habermas's analysis of interests is based on human nature as such, while Kant relies only on the faculty of knowledge. This means that Kant had seen only a kind of human interest, namely, technical interests in their theoretical form.

Before examining Habermas's claim that interests are the basis of human nature, we need to understand what he means by human nature. It is true that Habermas, like Marx and the members of The Frankfurt School, protests any theory of human nature based upon static, idealist and metaphysical foundations. He rejects the Platonic Idea, the solipsist Cartesian *Cogito*, and the Kantian transcendental Ego as the basis for human nature, and accepts the Marxian idea that human nature is constructed upon human praxis. However, he considers the Marxian understanding of praxis as labor to be too simplistic. As a productive action labor can explain only human technical interests, ⁸³ not why we have or need morality. Nor does it satisfy the human desire of freedom.

We will not discuss here whether Habermas's critique of Marx's praxis is justified. What attracts our interest is Habermas's position that human nature is interrelated with human activities or praxis taken in a much broader sense than that of Marx, for it explains the total activity in a total structure of practical, contemplative, technical, emancipatory and communicative activity.⁸⁴ In a word, human nature is so complex and total that one cannot grasp it by means of a concept or a certain activity. It develops dynamically in the Hegelian manner of describing the activity of spirit. The human interests Habermas tentatively described are among the most explicit 'presentations' of human nature. To say that they are universal and necessary means only that they belong to human nature which is universal.

A Critique of Interests

To see whether fundamental human interests can be served by moral education, one must examine whether or not these interests are as real and complete as Habermas claimed and, secondly, in the case of interest-conflicts, what criteria are needed for their resolution.

First, Habermas analyzed technical interests from the point of view of domination. Technical interests are meant to expand knowledge which is the best tool for controlling nature and others in order to secure the position of mankind and free it from danger. Expanding technology and knowledge, developing medical practice and pharmaceuticals, aims at prolonging human life and rendering it more agreeable. At the same time, for such a purpose one needs to dominate all other factors which might endanger man. A contradiction appears in technical interests, namely, between the two elements of destruction and construction, conservation and development, which are hidden in these interests. Domination means destroying nature for the sake of preserving man; expanding knowledge and technique means pursuing development in order to secure the position of man. This contradiction in the very essence of technical interests shows that any solution of interests is impossible. Thus, Marx for example, had followed the Darwinian description of struggle for life by accepting the class-struggle solution. If this is so, then conflict is as fundamental as technical interests, and any attempt to subdue it is futile.

Second, practical interests themselves are ambiguous, just as technical interests are also practical. Obviously, Habermas has taken the Kantian description of practical sciences in order to explain practical interests. Since in Kant's moral philosophy praxis is almost identified with moral activity, according to Habermas practical interests are aimed at the modes of the human conduct of life. Their purpose is to help human beings regulate human conflicts without being exploited or manipulated. In another expression, if Aristotle understands morality as a way of achieving happiness, then Habermas describes human practical interests as those which aim at resolving conflicts and at regulating human conduct. This explication is sound but incomplete, for if practical interests are limited to those functions then morality is deformed into a kind of law or social convention and loses its own sublime end, i.e., the meaning of life. His morality is as such purely materialist⁸⁵ and temporal, for since conflicts are as essential as interests, they will never have a definitive solution. Thus, all moral acts are only strategic and for a certain purpose. Morality is degraded into instrumentality, which Habermas himself had vehemently attacked.

Third, there is hardly any difference between practical and emancipatory interests, because the latter express the same idea of freeing and resolving conflicts described in the former, though in a different milieu. Emancipatory interests arise only by means of reflecting on the conditions of human life, comparing them with those of others, reflecting on human nature and finally criticizing those conditions. This description of emancipatory interests cannot satisfy the question of why we need or have such interests, whether or not one can find the meaning of life, the ultimate concern of man, etc.

Evidently, Habermas's interests lack the most fundamental reason urging man to develop technical knowledge, to further morality and to retain ultimate hope. We call it the interest in transcendence, by which we mean the human desire and capacity to overcome the conflicts of interest, to find the meaning of one's life and world and to tend toward the ultimate concern. Such

transcendent interests are visible in Confucius' concept of harmony and *jen*, which we will discuss later.

Further, the inner contradiction in Habermas' theory of interests, namely, that among the interests themselves, seems impossible to overcome. It is difficult to accept that human nature is tending simultaneously toward domination and consensus. To accept domination as essential to human nature, one must think of consensus as a merely temporal strategy the purpose of which is to avoid defeat in case of weakness. The logical consequence of Habermas's insistence upon domination in his interpretation of human interest would reduce everything to an endless struggle between man and nature as well as among human beings themselves—thus his theory of consensus as the foundation of morality would collapse.

Communicative Action

The weakness of the theory of human interests forces Habermas to develop a new theory: the theory of communicative action,⁸⁶ to supplement his theory of human interests. Basically, the idea of consensus remains as the backbone, but in a certain aspect this theory is more sophisticated than the prior one, for it attempts to resolve the contradiction between various interests by proposing quasi-transcendental elements to justify consensus. The element of domination is downgraded, while that of harmony in the form of consensus in language, laws or habits is upgraded.⁸⁷ Practical interests are now interpreted in the sense of the interests in communication, in understanding and in finding a consensual solution acceptable to all partners.

Weber's theory of rationalization, which Habermas used to demonstrate his thesis of technical interests, is reinterpreted in the light of Gadamer's hermeneutics to base a new process of understanding and its categories upon such common human features as language.⁸⁸ Here, it is shown that the need for communication and consensus in human nature is as real and necessary as other interests. Further, as his communicative action is not *a priori*, but empirically constructed and reconstructed, human acts are seen as tending naturally toward communication and man as tending naturally and necessarily to solve conflicts of interests, for communication is impossible without resolving conflicts by means of consensus. Habermas cites concrete examples in language, psychoanalysis and politics to demonstrate his theory of communicative action. For example, language is our common tool, but by learning a language we accept the rules implicit in it. Thus, the first step in understanding others is accepting the common rule of others. However, the act of learning shows also the active participation of the subject in this common rule, for the rule of language is by no means eternal but needs to be changed or improved if it cannot satisfy human communication, or causes misunderstanding or conflicts. Here, communication appears as the transcendental basis for consensus and language. But if this is so then one has arrived at the metaphysical explanation that communication is an *a priori* in human nature, and that miscommunication is only a form of distorted communication. Such a metaphysical or theological explanation is rejected by Habermas as well as by empiricists and positivists. (Note that such arguments on the nature of communication or miscommunication are analogous to the dispute between Hsun Tzu and Mencius on the nature of man.) Such arguments do not make sense because Habermas never intends to demonstrate the *a priori* character of communication or language. To him, the transcendental character of language does not show us that language is *a priori* or *a posteriori*, but only its universality and necessity. The model of language is used only to show that communication, like language, possesses this transcendental character.⁸⁹

Although this theory of communication is an improvement over his earlier theory of human interests, it is not free of problems. Since our aim is not to center upon Habermas's theory, but to use it in order to shed more light upon the nature of moral education, we will not discuss his theory further, nor its problems. Only one point relating to our moral education needs to be mentioned, namely, Habermas's unanswered question: why do we need communication? If communication is a transcendental then so are conflicts of the same nature; if communication is needed only as a means to resolve conflicts in human interests, then interests are the main theme to be discussed, but he has insufficiently developed and resolved that theme.

Morality and Responsibility

The difficulty in Habermas' theory of human interests means that one cannot build morality or moral education on interests alone. Regulations built upon a division of interests practiced by bourgeois society, even if this division is agreed to by all members or parties, are not necessarily right and just because: 1) there is no common basis for this division—the regulations are often dictated by a certain party; 2) these regulations are thus only temporary; and 3) these regulations are not free from coercion or manipulation. The model of language given by Habermas based upon the consent of all parties is inapplicable in the domain of economy. In short, the transcendental status of morality that Habermas sought in human interests is not as easily found as he claimed.

Responsibility

Lawrence Kohlberg developed an understanding of morality from another point of view, similar to Jean Piaget's theory of cognitive development.⁹⁰ In his *The Psychology of Moral Development*,⁹¹ he followed the division of epistemological development into various stages proposed by Piaget, and identified three stages in the development of moral consciousness: 1) a pre-conventional stage which orients to actions, 2) a conventional stage which explains how man is aware of norms and anti-norms, and 3) a post conventional stage in which one treats only norms as such.⁹² Kohlberg's division is a great advantage in understanding the nature of the second category of morality, i.e., its quasi-transcendental character as following human nature itself.

Nonetheless, his analysis in accordance with Piaget's description of the stages of cognitive development is still questionable. First, one would need to verify the plausibility of Piaget's cognitive development theory, and second, one would need to check the analogy between cognitive development and psychological development and between psychological development and moral development. (We will not criticize Kohlberg's theory in terms of his intention to develop only moral judgment and not morality as such in this article, because it is not fully necessary for our discussion.) To evaluate whether the theory of Piaget is acceptable, one needs to consider some of his main theses. According to Piaget, our knowledge develops genetically in two different senses: one narrower and the other wider. First, Piaget distinguishes among stages of cognitive development characterized in terms of structurally described levels of learning ability. In the narrower sense, cognitive development refers to the structures of thought and action acquired constructively by the growing child in active confrontation with external reality or the processes of the objective world.⁹³ That means that children develop their intelligence through their reciprocal action between themselves as subjects and other physical and social objects, between themselves as subjects and other subjects. Second, cognitive development in a wider sense signifies the de-centering of an egocentric understanding of the world. This means that cognitive

development is understood as the construction not solely of an external world, but also of a reference system for the simultaneous demarcation of the objective and social worlds from the subject world.⁹⁴

This theory of cognitive development is plausible as far as it goes. However, whether this theory could be applied in the normative world remains questionable. The fact is that cognitive development is not identified with moral development. In Kohlberg's interpretation, cognitive development is parallel to the development of our moral judgment. But this interpretation cannot be sustained because moral knowledge does not equate to moral action, although the former is necessary to value a moral act. Besides, the domain of human psychology is not as scientific as that of knowledge. Cognitive development increases with the tempo of the reception of knowledge from outside and from reflection, while psychological development accords generally with genetic development. The difference between psychology and epistemology, between epistemology and morality (as Kant had been aware) renders the thesis of Kohlberg questionable. Habermas supplements the idea of Piaget⁹⁵ and Kohlberg⁹⁶ in the following chart,⁹⁷ according to which the future or post-conventional morality is based on principles accepted by individuals (responsibility) and is rather formal and democratic.

Stages of Development

Stages of Moral Fundamental Ethics Types of Laws

Consciousness Socio-

Cognitive

Concept

Pre- Particular Magical Revealed

conventional expectation ethics law

regarding

conduct

Conventional Norms Legal Traditional ethics law

Post- Principles Ethics of Formal

conventional responsibility law

A Confucian Concept of Moral Education

This idea of Habermas is of great significance for moral education. How we educate the students to be responsible, to respect laws and build consensus, is discussed further in my work on Habermas's consensus and Confucian harmony.⁹⁸ In the frame of this article, I would raise some reflections on the Confucian (and not Confucianist) idea of moral education. Confucius' description of the process of moral development in *The Great Learning* is very impressive; he begins with the individual as such, with the way an individual acquires a moral sense and rectifies him/herself.⁹⁹ The crucial difficulty in understanding his idea concerns the criteria of morality which the individual should follow and how the individual knows them. As his explanation does not seem to be clear, it appears to suggest the other 'extreme', namely, that the social factor determines the individual:

There are four things in the Way of the superior man (chun-tzu), none of which I have been able to do. To serve my father as I would expect my son to serve me: that I have been unable to do. To

serve my ruler as I would expect my ministers to serve me: that I have not been able to do. To serve my elder brothers as I would expect my younger brothers to serve me: that I have not been able to do. To be the first to treat friends as I would expect my friends to treat me: that I have not been able to do.¹⁰⁰

The ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world would first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order to their states, would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families would first cultivate their personal lives. Those who wished to cultivate their personal lives would first rectify their mind.¹⁰¹

These ambiguous statements encouraged his followers to treat the individual as secondary because all norms are social, that is, of state or family. On the other hand, Confucius himself seems to incline to the theory that moral feelings are personal and a matter of self-consciousness. Many passages confirm such an understanding, for example: "Heaven produced the virtue that is in me,"¹⁰² or "Confucius said, 'Man is born with uprightness. If one loses it, he will be lucky if he escapes with his life'."¹⁰³ These ambiguities in the way Confucius handled the nature of morality led to the Confucian ideology which affirms the role of the State in deciding and judging moral acts, and in making laws.

A third way of interpreting Confucius' explanation of human nature as moral nature should be studied to counter this tendency to make Confucian theories dogmatic. That is, Confucius might have understood that human nature and moral nature are apprehended and accepted by man through learning, which means acquiring knowledge of good or evil through actions, contacts with others and living in nature and in society. Confucius for example said:

At fifteen my mind was set on learning. At thirty my character had been formed. At forty I had no more perplexities. At fifty I knew the Mandate of Heaven (*T'ien-ming*). At sixty I was at ease with whatever I heard. At seventy I could follow my heart's desire without transgressing moral principles.¹⁰⁴

The above passage and many similar ones point to a series of stages:

First stage:

- The learning process is one of mutual-cognition and recognition of the subject and other objects and subjects.
- The learning process and cognitive reception are developed through individual as well as social praxis.

Second stage:

- Moral cognition or consciousness is acquired through learning fundamental human interests based upon human nature and their impact upon subjective life.
- Moral judgment is based on the benefits of a division of interests and on the natural order.

Third stage:

- Moral laws are constructed on moral judgment and the consensus of basic interests.
- The act of consensus is free from coercion; it comes from the subjective cognition of moral laws or from self-consciousness.

- A metaphysical and theological foundation of morality is possible.

The First Stage

The dispute between Mencius and Hsun Tzu on the nature of human beings misreads the original Confucian idea on human nature. Human nature is originally neither good nor bad, but tends both to goodness and to evil, for the two are known to us when either could help or harm the subject, offering benefit or loss, pleasure or pain. That is to say, goodness is what fulfills and satisfies subjective interests or desires, and evil is the opposite. 'Tending towards' is by no means *a priori*, but rather 'transcendental', in the sense that the desire for goodness or evil emerges in human involvement or contact with nature and one's fellow human. Human acts could be good or bad depending on the milieu, the benefits, the degree of satisfaction of human interests or the universality of those interests. Thus, goodness or evil are learned through our experiences, education and tradition. Confucius, for example, said: "Give me a few more years so that I can devote fifty years to the study of change. I may be free from great mistakes."¹⁰⁵ Or "There are those who act without knowing (what is right). But I am not one of them. To hear much and select what is good and follow it, to see much and remember it, is the second type of knowledge (next to innate knowledge)."¹⁰⁶

Human action, living-experiences in the life-world help one to know goodness and evil. But in order to be conscious the human act must be neither purely objective nor purely subjective. The dualist interpretation of the Western tradition and the dualist attitude of Mencius and Hsun Tzu cannot but only help obscure human nature. The fundamental human act is natural and reversible or dialectical,¹⁰⁷ that is, it has the twin character of giving and receiving, of analyzing and synthesizing. It is a mutual cognitive act: "to serve my father as I would expect my son to serve me, to serve my ruler as I would my ministers to serve."¹⁰⁸

Third, the learning process is developed through human practice. Confucius is very clear in this point when he asserts that rightness is acquired only through human acts depending upon the natural order. His argument against the Duke of She in *The Analects* is striking: The Duke of She told Confucius, "In my country there is an upright man named Kung. When his father stole a sheep, he bore witness against him." Confucius said, "The upright men in my community are different from this. The father conceals the misconduct of the son, and the son conceals the misconduct of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this."¹⁰⁹ Here, uprightness is known not by an external factor unrelated to human act such as neutral laws, but through the act of mutual loving between father and son.

The Second Stage

We have argued that morality is acquired through learning, and that learning is a mutual cognition and recognition of the benefit of interpersonal activity. However, the point to be raised here is that not all actions can produce knowledge, and not all knowledge could help us to have moral criteria. To solve this problem moral cognition should be viewed from the aspects of human interests. Habermas has analyzed three fundamental human interests determining human nature: technical, practical and emancipatory. Technical interests explain the most fundamental human instincts of survival by dominating, controlling, expanding, etc., but give birth to the inevitable conflicts of the social man. They are the interests of survival, but also of destruction.

Practical interests aim at solving these conflicts by moral and civil laws which are constructed on the consensus of men regarding their fundamental interests. Confucius had a similar idea,

namely, that the fundamental interests must be 'equally' and rightly distributed. Laws and morality, as the best means of warranting a right distribution of these fundamental interests, must reflect the consensus of interests. He said of the superior man: "The superior man is conciliatory but does not identify himself with others,"¹¹⁰ and "If a ruler sets himself right, he will be followed without his command."¹¹¹ But the most convincing evidence in support of this interpretation is Confucius' theory of harmony. From the anthropological perspectives, harmony concerns human interests at various stages and is as natural as the cosmological or physical order. Each has its role and function; each receives what it needs according to its capacity (just as Marx later promised in his 1848 *Communist Manifesto*).¹¹² In the words of Confucius: "He who possesses great virtue will certainly attain to corresponding position and wealth, to corresponding fame, and to corresponding long life. For Heaven, in the production of things, is sure to be bountiful of them, according to their natural capacity."¹¹³

To be more clear, the Confucian theory of harmony could be understood from the following aspects: 1) harmony is a natural fact and appears in nature; 2) it is seen in the relation between man and nature; and 3) is found in human relationships. In the *Doctrine of the Mean*, there is an interesting passage: "What Heaven imparts to man is called human nature. To follow our nature is called the Way. Cultivating the Way is called education."¹¹⁴ This sheds light upon the three points above.

Harmony in Nature

This harmony in the cosmological order is determined not by a human factor but by Heaven. Cosmological order is a perfect order and in Kantian terms is both *a priori* and transcendental. Whenever some mishaps occur, it is understood that man had done something wrong against Heaven: "When equilibrium and harmony are realized to the highest degree, Heaven and earth will attain their proper order and all things will flourish."¹¹⁵

Harmony between Man and Nature

For Confucius, as human nature is part of Heaven,¹¹⁶ man originally possessed this harmonious status. The break or conflict between man and nature is due to the fact that man is thirsty for power and domination, for accumulation of interests. However, this could be self-contradictory, for if man is harmonious in the cosmological order, how could he tend towards evil? Hsun Tzu may go too far in asserting that human nature is evil, but he provided some corrective to the overoptimistic Mencius. In fact, the human and social order are understood by Confucius analogously to the cosmological order so that what determines human fate is not the *a priori* cosmological order, but human actions such as interrelations, labor and the like, for this is Confucius' concern in establishing moral laws.

Harmony among Humans Themselves

This is the central theme of the Confucian harmony: to express no conflict (feelings) between men, to subdue conflicts¹¹⁷ when they arise, and, more importantly, to have a just distribution of interests based on a natural equilibrium: Therefore the superior man governs men as men, in accordance with human nature, and as soon as they change (which is wrong) he stops.

Consciousness (*chung*) and altruism (*shu*) are not far from the Way: what you do not wish others to do to you, do not do to them.118

The Third Stage

By accepting that morality was learned in nature and human society and that morality was constructed in accordance with natural laws, Confucius had tried to establish moral criteria based upon: 1) harmony between nature and man, and 2) harmony between men. We will concentrate on the second point, i.e., moral criteria constructed on human *sociality* or harmony between men.

In discussing Habermas's theory of consensus and in Part I analyzing present moral education, we insisted on the necessity of paying attention to the fundamental problem of conflict. We pinpointed human interests and conflicts at the base of any moral system. Thus, to solve moral conflicts means precisely to solve fundamental human conflicts of interests. One solution which appears plausible is Habermas's consensus. A similar solution was offered by Confucius regarding what criteria an individual needs in order to rectify himself. These criteria concern not an imaginary lone individual, but one's real experiences of living, interacting and working in a society. The criteria aim at solving conflicts and attaining harmony. In this context, Confucius constructed his moral criteria in three different fields: harmonious living, harmonious relationships, and an harmonious way of nature.

Moral Criteria of Harmonious Living

Tung Chung-shu developed Confucius' concept *jen* (humanity) as follows:

What is meant by humanity? The man of humanity loves people with a sense of commiseration. He is careful and agreeable and does not quarrel. His likes and dislikes are harmonized with human relations. He does not harbor the feeling of hate or a desire to hurt. He has no intention to conceal or to evade. He has no disposition of jealousy. He has no desires that lead to sadness or worry. He does not do anything treacherous or cunning. And he does not do anything depraved. Therefore his heart is at ease, his will is peaceful, his vital force is harmonious, his desires are regulated, his actions are easy, and his conduct is in accord with the moral law. It is for this reason that he puts things in order peacefully and easily without any quarrel. That is what is meant by humanity.119

In the *Analects*, Confucius demonstrated the following virtues (note that virtue comes from *virtus* in Latin meaning the characteristic nature of a man, *vir*):

- Filial piety (1:2)
- Brotherliness (1:2)
- Loyalty (1:4)
- Faithfulness (1:4)
- Sincerity (1:8, 1:16, etc.)
- Benevolence (4:3, 7:29, etc.)
- Dutifulness (5:25, etc.)
- Rites, properly conducts (li) (1:15, 2:3, etc.)

The above regulations or virtues aim at: 1) establishing a harmonious and orderly life agreed to by society and each individual, and 2) defending the interests of every individual and of society: "What you do not wish others to do to you, do not do to them."

Criteria of Harmonious Relationship or the Doctrine of the Mean

The philosophy of Confucius had a great role in shaping the politics and economics of Chinese society. Its criteria include loyalty, dutifulness, responsibility, righteousness, conscientiousness, altruism, unity of theory and practice,¹²⁰ and the observance of rites. Confucius stated:

There are five universal ways (in human relations), and the ways by which they are practiced are three. The five are those governing the relationship between ruler and ministers, between father and son, between husband and wife, between elder and young brothers, and those in the intercourse between friends. These five are universal paths in the world. Wisdom, humanity and courage, these three are the universal virtues. The way by which they are practiced is one.¹²¹

In more detailed description he said:

There are nine standards by which to administer the empire, its states and the families. They are: cultivating personal life, honoring the worthy, being affectionate to relatives, being respectful toward the great ministers, identifying oneself with the welfare of the whole body of officers, treating the common people as one's own children, attracting the various partisans, showing tenderness to strangers from far countries, and extending kindly and awesome influence on the feudal lords.¹²²

Criteria of Harmonious Way in Nature

Though these criteria are not developed and often are vaguely stated, they are as important as those criteria in the first and second categories. Confucius begins *The Doctrine of the Mean* with: "What Heaven imparts to man is called human nature. To follow our nature is called the Way (*Tao*)—The Way cannot be separated from us a moment."¹²³ For Confucius, nature, man and Heaven are inseparable in the sense that they belong to the Wholeness determining the structure of the cosmos. What Confucius means by Heaven is not our concern in this article,¹²⁴ but it is extremely important to note that the purely materialist outlook of humanism is against the theory of harmony. To understand the value of his insistence on harmony with Heaven, nature and man, one should keep in mind that the act of relationship is itself a dialectical act and that only by means of a hermeneutic circle can one understand the Confucian consensus.

Having reviewed the Confucian understanding of morality, we come now to the tentative conclusion that Confucius understood moral education as a continuous learning of human nature, and that moral rules are constructed not dogmatically, but by a certain consensus. This consensus is constructed on the natural order, on human relational activities and on fundamental human nature. In a word, the Confucian description of morality and consensus, though not as sophisticated and systematic as Habermas's and Kohlberg's, has given a deep insight into understanding the genetic formation and transformation of morality. Certainly, it sheds light upon present moral education.

Conclusion

Our conclusion is rather tentative and inconclusive in the sense that it serves only as a critical reflection upon our present system of moral education. The task of critique is not to protest, but to detect the symptoms of illness. We have found the ideological elements in our moral education to be one of these symptoms. We do not deny that ideological education has its own value: it had helped to maintain the Chinese identity, to rally patriotism in time of war, to preserve Chinese culture, etc. Nor do we refuse to accept its necessity.

Our critique aims to show only that ideology is of value only for a certain time and place. It lacks the universal and necessary (or transcendental) character of an authentic morality built on the most fundamental human interests (and nature). Thus, its claim to solve all moral problems and to provide mankind with a future direction or sense of life is very questionable. This explains why 'moral education', although rigorously and officially promoted, falls short of its objectives. Our critique aims also at the instrumentality of "moral education." Mistakenly taken by Confucians as an instrument, morality was reduced to a functional purpose, a sheer instrument, which was easily manipulated and dictated by a certain regime or class. As such, it was transformed into an ideology.

For all these reasons, it is suggested that our policy and method of moral education, as well as its application, be rethought in a more open manner. Moral education aims at the broader objective of improving mankind as Confucius had proposed: "The Way of learning to be great consists in manifesting clear character, loving the people, and abiding in the highest good."¹²⁵

Notes

1 By Confucianism, we understand the theories or doctrines based on the teachings of Confucius, Mencius, etc., and systematically developed into the philosophical school named for Confucius. Many scholars have complained that a great number of Confucians have distorted the original teaching of Confucius. See, for example, the article of Roger Ames and David L. Hall, "Getting it Right, on Saving Confucius from the Confucians," *Philosophy East and West*, 34 (1984).

2 The textbook is entitled *Citizen and Morality*. Officials identify citizen education with moral education. See *Gung-ming yu Tao-te* (Citizen and Morality), ed. National Compile Institute (Taipei, 1985), 6 vols. Hereafter as *Citizen and Morality*.

3 Lee Kwan-yew officially promoted moral education, especially Confucian morality, in 1981, after acknowledging the deficiency of laws or policies alone. Since then, the Singapore government has established an institute specializing in this matter and included moral and religious education in the curriculum of secondary schools.

4 See Yang Chung-sen, "Confucianism and National Modernization from the Legal Point of View," *Seminar on Confucianism and Modernization* (Taipei, 1986), p. 1. The traditional Chinese legal system was overwhelmingly molded by Confucianism and infused with ethical thinking in both its nature and contents. See also Hsiao Kung-ch'uan, *A History of Chinese Political Thought*, trans. F. W. Mote (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1979), 2 vols.

5 Wei Cheng-tung, general editor of the *China Tribune*, stated: "In the context of our daily life, however, not even the minimum degree of observing the law and the custom of public morality can be maintained," in "Ethical Problems in Democratic Societies: The Path of Modernization of The Confucian Ethics," *Seminar on Confucianism and Modernization* (Taipei, 1986), abstract.

According to the statistics of The Ministry of the Interior and The Ministry of Justice (Center of Study of Criminal Problems), in the mid 1980s the crime rate among teenagers rose at the accelerated rate of more than 10%. See Ministry of Justice, *Statistics of Crimes in Taiwan* (1984), p. 267. See also the article of R. C. Hsieh, "Controlling Teen-age Policy," in *Seminar on Human-Social Sciences - Education in Secondary Schools* (Taiwan Normal University, 1986).

6 I.e., the May Fourth Movement, which spread over China in the 1920s and broke up into different radical groups, some of which were strongly against traditional Chinese values.

7 Thome Fang, "The Alienation of Man in Philosophy, Religion and Philosophical Anthropology," in *Creativity of Man and Nature* (Taipei: Linking, 1980).

8 Cf. Shih C. T., ed., *Gung-ming Chiao-yu chi Chi-chian Wen-ti yu Dwei-tse* (Citizen-Education, Its Problems and Remedy Policy) (Taiwan: Bureau of Education of the Taiwan Province, 1985), 2 vols.

9 Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (New York: Continuum, 1972), p. 1. See also Max Horkheimer, *Eclipse of Reason* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947).

10 *Citizen and Morality*, p. 1.

11 *The Great Learning*, chap. 1. Trans. Chan Wing-tsit, in *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963). Hereafter as Chan.

12 *The Great Learning*, chap. 1; Chan, pp. 86-87.

13 Chan, p. 84; See also Hsiao Kung-chuan, *A History of Chinese Politics*, vol. 1, Introduction.

14 *The Great Learning*, chap. 1: "From the Son of Heaven down to the common people, all must regard cultivation of the personal life as the root of foundation." Chan, p. 87.

15 Chu Hsi, *Da-xuye Chang-chu*, chap. 5; in Chan Wing-tsit, *Chu His Lwen-chi* (Collected Essays on Chu Hsi) (Taipei: Xuye-sheng Book Co., 1982); Wang Yang-ming, *Ch'uan-hsi Lu* (Instruction for Practical Living), sec. 129, 135-137, etc., quoted in Chan, pp. 84-85, notes 2 and 3.

16 Han Fei-tzu Chi-chieh, in *Chu-tzu Chi-ch'eng*, vol. 5, chap. 54, p. 365, quoted by Benjamin Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 323.

17 *Ibid.*, p. 323.

18 *Ibid.*, p. 382.

19 *Mencius*, trans. Lau D. C., bk. 4, part 1, p. 118.

20 *Mencius*; Lau, *ibid.*, p. 117.

21 Schwartz, p. 341; *Han Fei-tzu*, chap. 49, p. 344.

22 Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Prince*, trans. N. Hill Thomson (Oxford: Clarendon, 1913), p. 130; Juergen Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, trans. John Viertel (Boston: Beacon Press, 1973), p. 59.

23 *Gung-ming Chiao-yu Chi-chian Wen-ti yu Dwei-tse*, vol. 1, p. 8.

24 *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

25 *Ibid.*, p. 1.

26 *Citizen and Morality*, vol. 1, chap. 1, pp. 2-4.

27 *The Analects*, 15:20: "The superior man seeks in himself; the inferior man seeks it in others." Chan, p. 43.

28 Schwartz, p. 113.

29 *Citizen and Morality*, vol. 1, pp. 2-4.

30 *Ibid.*, p. 2.

31 Albert Chao, "On 'Chiao yu': An Inquiry into the Philosophical Foundation of Chinese Education," in *The Proceedings of the International Symposium on The Philosophical Foundation of Moral Education in China* (Taipei: Fujen University Press, 1985), pp. 44-45 (Chinese).

32 "A Movement for the Renaissance of Chinese Culture" was organized headed by former R.O.C. President Yan Chia-kan. Its directives state that it will "make known The Three Principles of the People, Democracy and Freedom." Ku, the general editor of the series, states that the motives of the movement include to "spread the power and spirit of Chinese culture," overcoming communism and national unification. *Citizen and Morality*, pp. 6-9.

33 Statistics of the Government Information Office (Taiwan) reveal that 85% of the students (of Taiwan's top universities) going to the United States of America for advanced study do not return. Report 17.10. 1982 of the Government Information Office of Taiwan.

34 An exemplary case is seen by the establishing of 9 colleges in 1983. All are oriented to technology and engineering.

35 *History of China for Middle School*, ed. Committee of Editors (Taipei: National Compile Institute, 1987).

36 "Reinforcing National Consciousness." Directives of the Ministry of Education (Taipei, 1966).

37 *San Dz ching* begins with Mencius' theory on human nature as Goodness: "At the very beginning, human nature is good."

38 See *The Girl's High-School of Tai-Jung: Report on the Method of Citizen Educational Sciences in High School - A Comparative Study* (Kao cheng Gung ming He hsuye Fang fa de Pi chiao Yan chiu Bao kao), 1986. It contains little information about the method of teaching, and nothing about teachers. Table 13 p. 22, indicates that a majority of 60% of the respondents believed: (a) the method is too passive, (b) there is hardly any engagement of the students, (c) there is no relation to social reality, and (d) the teachers do not care about the students.

39 Twenty of the 26 members of the editorial committee of *Citizen and Morality Education* are professors (of Chinese, history and language) in universities.

40 The main editors are officials, or high cadres of the Kuomintang.

41 The test done by the Department of Mathematics of National Taiwan University in 1980 reveals that professors of mathematics who have earned their Ph.D. in prestigious universities in the U.S. or Japan do not fare better than the student participants in the Joint College Entrance Examination

42 According to the report of the Ministry of Finance, the economic crimes (fraudulence, bad checks, false bankruptcy) are dramatically increasing. In February 1967, there was an insignificant 2% decrease from the previous year. (See *China Times*, Feb. 22, 1987).

43 English schools in Taiwan outnumber other preparatory schools. It is claimed that Taiwan Chinese are among the most successful participants in TOEFL.

44 I have analyzed this problem in a previous article, in which I pointed out the double moral standard of the intellectual class. See Tran Van Doan, *Christian Mission and Higher Education in Taiwan* (Taiwan: Fujen University Press, 1986), p. 4.

45 Cf. John B. Thompson, *Studies in the Theory of Ideology* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1984), p. 2.

46 Karl Marx, *Deutsche Ideologie* (1845-46), in *MEW* 3, 20 or *MEW* 27, 460 ff., *MEW* 21, 179.

47 Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (New York: Hartcourt Brace, 1936).

48 *Deutsche Ideologie*, MEW 3, 26; *Die heilige Familie*, MEW 2, 55; *Zur Kritik der politischen Okonomie* (1859), MEW 13, 9, Vorwort.

49 Boris Souvarine, "Ideology of Soviet Communism," *Dictionary of the History of Ideas* (New York: Scribner's, 1973), vol. 2, pp. 559-564.

50 Cf. M. Rejai, 'Ideology', in *Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, op. cit., pp. 552-559, esp. p. 553.

51 Francis Bacon, *Novum Organum*, I, 38-68. According to Bacon, there are four types of idols: 1) idols of the tribe, 2) idols of the cave or den, 3) idols of the marketplace, and 4) idols of the theatre.

52 Etienne Bonnet de Condillac, *Treatise on Sensations*, trans. G. Carr (London: Favel, 1930), I, iii, p. 1.

53 Pierre J.G. Cabanis, *Rapport du physique et du moral de l'homme*, in *Oeuvres*, ed. Thurot, Paris 1823-25. Cabanis' famous phrase: 'Les nerfs – voila tout l'homme'.

54 Destutt de Tracy, *Elements d'ideologie* (1801-1815), 4 vols.

55 Claude Adrien Helvetius, *De l'homme, de ses facultes et de son education* (1772), trans. *On Man*, 2, 7, trans. Hooper, 1777, I, p. 127.

56 K. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968).

57 K. Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, pp. 55-56, 265-66.

58 *Ibid.*, p. 60.

59 Tran Van Doan, "Ideology, Interests and Morality," in *The Proceedings of the International Symposium on The Philosophical Foundation of Moral Education*, op. cit., pp. 115-136.

60 Tran Van Doan, "Habermas' Theory of Consensus," in *Philosophical Review* (1989), pp.

61 *The Analects*, 1:12; 2:5, etc.

62 *Ibid.* 3:3; 3:4.

63 *Ibid.* 2:1, etc.

64 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, book II, 1103b.

65 Bernard Haring, "Morality," in *Sacramentum Mundi*, IV (New York: Herder, 1968), p. 112.

66 Immanuel Kant, *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row, 1948).

67 Kant himself had acknowledged: "Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht fuer die Praxis," in E. Kant, *Gesammelte Schriften*, VI, pp. 221, 35-56.

68 *The Analects*, 6:18; Chan, p. 30: "To know (it) is not as good as to love (it), and to love (it) is not as good as to take delight in it."

69 Juergen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971).

70 Juergen Habermas, *Towards a Reconstruction of Historical Materialism* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976), German text.

71 Juergen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, trans. T. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984), vol. I.

72 Juergen Habermas, *Theory and Practice*, p. 254.

73 *Knowledge and Human Interests*, pp. 310, 314.

74 Theodor Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, tr. E. B. Ashton (New York: Continuum, 1973), part 2.

75 Ernst Bloch, *Das Prinzip Hoffnung* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1959), pp. 129ff.

- 76 Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966).
- 77 *Knowledge and Human Interests*, p. 211.
- 78 *Ibid.*, p. 205.
- 79 *Ibid.*, p. 212.
- 80 Juergen Habermas, *Technik und Wissenschaft als Ideologie* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969), pp. 146-148; *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Appendix, p. 303.
- 81 *Theory and Practice*, p. 111.
- 82 *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Appendix, p. 313.
- 83 *Theory and Practice*, p. 111.
- 84 *Ibid.*, Introduction. See also Richard Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), pp. 190 ff.; Tran Van Doan, "Praxis and Hsing," paper presented at the *Fourth International Conference on Chinese Philosophy*, New York, 1985.
- 85 Despite his reconstruction of materialism on the more speculative level. See Habermas, *Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976).
- 86 Juergen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action and Knowledge and Human Interests*, Appendix.
- 87 *Ibid.*, vol. I, part III, esp. pp. 385ff.
- 88 *Theory of Communicative Action*, p. 143ff.
- 89 *Ibid.*, pp. 55-101, 397-98.
- 90 Lawrence Kohlberg, "From Is to Ought: How to Commit the Naturalistic Fallacy and Get Away With It in the Study of Moral Development" in Th. Mischel, ed., *Cognitive Development and Epistemology* (New York: Academic Press, 1971), Jean Piaget, *The Principles of Genetic Epistemology* (New York, 1972).
- 91 Lawrence Kohlberg, *The Psychology of Moral Development* (New York: Harper and Row, 1984).
- 92 Cf. Juergen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action* (German edition), vol. II, p. 260, quoted from Kohlberg, *Zur Kognitiven Entwicklung des Kindes* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1974).
- 93 Jean Piaget, *The Principles of Genetic Epistemology*, *op. cit.*, cf. B. Kaplan, "Meditation on Genesis" in *Human Development*, 10 (1967), p. 65. Nathan Rotenstreich, "An Analysis of Piaget's Concept of Structure," in *Philosophical and Phenomenological Research*, 37 (1977), p. 368ff.
- 94 Jean Piaget, *Introduction a l'epistemologie genetique* (Paris: P.U.F., 1953), p. 189.
- 95 Juergen Habermas, *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns*, vol. I, pp. 76, 104-110, 200ff., 249, 324; Vol. II, pp. 21, 50, 218, 588.
- 96 *Ibid.*, vol. II, p. 260; vol. I, p. 250.
- 97 *Ibid.*, p. 260.
- 98 Tran Van Doan, "Harmony and Consensus," in *The Asian Journal of Philosophy* (Taipei, Manila, Tokyo, Seoul: 1987), I, 101-130.
- 99 *The Great Learning*; Chan, p. 85.
- 100 *The Doctrine of the Mean*, Chap. 13; Chan, p. 101.
- 101 *The Great Learning*; Chan, p. 86.
- 102 *The Analects*, 7:22; Chan, p. 32.
- 103 *Ibid.*, 6:7; Chan, p. 29.
- 104 *Ibid.*, 2:4; Chan, p. 22.
- 105 *Ibid.*, 7:15; Chan, p. 32.

- 106 *Ibid.*, 7:27; Chan, p. 3-33.
- 107 *The Doctrine of the Mean*, chap. 13.
- 108 *Ibid.*, chap. 13; Chan, p. 101.
- 109 *The Analects*, 13:18; Chan, p. 41.
- 110 *Ibid.*, 13:23; Chan, p. 41.
- 111 *Ibid.*, 13:6; Chan, p. 41.
- 112 Karl Marx: "Jeder nach seinen Faehigkeiten, jedem nach seinen Beduerfnissen." See also *The Doctrine of the Mean*, chap. 17; Chan, p. 102: "Thus it is that he who possesses great virtue will certainly attain to a corresponding position, wealth, fame and long life."
- 113 *The Doctrine of the Mean*, *ibid.*
- 114 *Ibid.*, chap. 1; Chan, p. 98.
- 115 *Ibid.*
- 116 *Ibid.*
- 117 *The Analects*, 12:2; Chan, p. 20.
- 118 *Ibid.*, 12:2; Chan, p. 39.
- 119 Tung Chung-shu, *op. cit.*, chap. 56; Chan, p. 286.
- 120 *The Doctrine of the Mean*, chap. 13.
- 121 *Ibid.*, chap. 20; Chan, p. 105.
- 122 *Ibid.*
- 123 *Ibid.* chap. 1; Chan, p. 98.
- 124 For a detailed study, see Fu Pei-jung, *The Concept of T'ien in Ancient China* (Yale University Ph.D. Dissertation, 1985).
- 125 *The Great Learning*; Chan, p. 86.

3.

The Crisis of Confucian Values

Introduction

Any discussion on the crisis of values is not easy, and I fear it could not be handled satisfactorily even if we possessed more time, energy and resources. The ambiguity, richness and complexity of what we call values make our task too difficult. We would squabble over the meaning of values, let alone over why we should accept these values. In order to avoid these embarrassing problems, this chapter is limited to the diagnosis of the symptoms of the illness in a specific Confucian society.

The task of analysis is much easier than the labor of redefinition. As empirical analysis is helpful but insufficient, this work adopts the critical reflections of Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) and Jurgen Habermas (1929-),¹ who have brilliantly treated the question of crisis. Like them, we believe that the crisis of Confucian values cannot be explained from a single aspect. Nor can we rely on Western scientific criteria alone (as do most modern scholars) to understand the nature of the crisis. The naive attitude of the members of the May-Fourth Movement who regarded Confucianism in terms of anti-scientism, as well as of those who have refused to accept the role of science in modern China, has not helped us to grasp the real nature of the crisis of Confucian values. To make sense of our point, we will proceed first to the notion of crisis, and then with some specific characteristics and forms to the devaluation of Confucian values. Finally, we will present some theses which might be of use for our discussion.

The Notion of Crisis

In *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, Husserl has related the crisis of science to the danger of losing the meaning of life,² i.e. the danger of falling into the sort of nihilism identified by Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), or even, the negative nihilism described earlier by Fyodor Mikhailovsky Dostoevsky (1812-1881). According to Martin Heidegger (1889-1976), nihilism has two different stages: devaluation (*Entwertung*) and revaluation (*Umwertung*). Devaluation means a total refusal of all traditional values, as Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900) sketched in his program; revaluation is a project of building new values completely upon human foundation.³ The radical character of Nietzschean devaluation lies in his vision that traditional values are no more than instruments constructed by non-human beings to deny humans the meaning of life. Such a view is shared by Heidegger, and also held by Karl Marx (1818-1883) who criticized bourgeois society as so alienated that one cannot recognize one's own self-consciousness.⁴ That is, in some cases people pursued an external, estranged value and as such denied themselves access to authentic human values. The main question here is how Husserl has detected in the crisis of science the crisis of human life. The limit of space will not allow us to go into this question in detail. Rather, we would link some arguments of Husserl on the relation between life and science with the description of Habermas on the legitimation crisis, and elucidate the point that even scientism is a form of alienation.

First, Husserl sees the progress of science understood in terms of technological advance as not necessarily reflecting the progress of humankind.⁵ His suspicion was in many ways justified by the nightmare of World War II, and the later specter of an even more catastrophic total war

appearing inevitable. Even today, the sword of Damocles hangs menacingly in the form of highly developed weapons. Decision-making relies on technological know-how, which arrogantly claims the role of rationality. The cruelty of wars which Husserl regarded as the logical and legitimate child of technology is the most eloquent confirmation of his pronouncements. Actually, what Husserl attacked is scientism which has gone far beyond its limits and claims the role of the creator and dictator of human polity and history.

Second, Husserl clearly acknowledges that it is the fault not of science as such, but of a misunderstanding of the nature of science.⁶ Encouraged by the triumphs of Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) and Isaac Newton (1642-1727), scientists have wanted to monopolize nature and even human fate. The point is, Husserl does not complain about science itself, but about the view that science is „all that is," and against the unreflective arrogance of empiricism.

Once science is regarded as the sole source of truth and progress, the empiricists hold the view that its criteria must be universally accepted and applied to all other areas. In other words, our codes of life must be constructed on these scientific criteria and, as a matter of logic, all traditional values must be rejected on the ground that they are unscientific.

Third, the so-called crisis of science comes not from science itself, but from those who see in it a god or semi-god. More clearly, it is the crisis of those who have mistaken science to be their *alter ego* and their unique world. They contradict themselves by trying to manipulate science and transform it into a kind of effective instrument, fully neutral and external to human life.

In view of this, Husserl seeks to redefine the meaning of science and, more importantly, the relation between science and human life. Like Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951),⁷ Husserl holds the view that our life-world has a certain relation to science and vice-versa. Thus, he calls for a restoration of the balance between the subject and nature, between the subject and other subjects. Science is born in and from this relational activity.⁸

Similarly, but starting from a Marxist critique of alienation, Habermas understands crisis as (1) a micro-form of human reification resulting from the failure to keep input and output in balance. Resistance against the invasion of an external virus means also domination by, or the surplus of, the external force, (2) a macro-form of the social rupture resulting from the collapse of the balance between societal structures, ideologies, etc. More concretely, for Habermas, the crisis may be seen best in physiological and biological organisms. Here, the crisis is understood as weakness due to the attack of the virus and the weak resistance of the immune system due to the overly strong pressure from both external and internal demands. Similarly, the syndromes of hysteria, schizophrenia and neurosis can be understood in this sense.

On a macro-level, social disorder, mainly in the form of lawlessness, amoral behavior, etc. can be explained in terms of the loss of balance between traditional norms and modern life, basic structure and newly imported life-styles, and of the over-domination of the newly imported values. These crises can be explained best as economic, rationality, legitimation and motivation crises. Religious and moral decline, for example, is due to the identity (legitimation) and motivation crises which are born primarily from the crisis of such basic structures as economics and jurisprudence. Habermas describes crisis as "an objective force that deprives the subject (or collective subject) of some part or major part of his or their normal sovereignty."⁹

This external, objective force has been identified by Husserl as scientism, by Gyory Lukacs (1885-1971) as the process of uncontrolled objectification best seen in the phenomenon of reification.¹⁰ Earlier it was been diagnosed by Hegel and then later by Marx as the process of "*Verdinglichung*" in *Phanomenology of Spirit* and *Grundrisse* respectively.¹¹ Habermas makes a forceful synthesis of all these insights, and goes on to elaborate a theory of crisis worthy of

attention. According to him, a crisis occurs when: (1) the external, objective force occupies the dominant role and tries with force to change the basic structure or fundamental norms in accordance with its own criteria; (2) when the force of resistance breaks down and surrenders. This kind of crisis may be aggravated further and become more complicated at a higher level after a long process of rationalization as Max Weber has predicted. In any case, no crisis happens accidentally and alone. The vicious circle lies deeply hidden in each crisis.

Our point here is to elucidate the logical and factual relation between the crisis of infrastructures and supra-structures in modern society. Following Habermas's description of the notion of crisis, we can say that the crisis tendencies in our Confucian society may be grouped and explained as seen in Table 1 (See Tab. 1). Habermas's analysis of the crisis tendencies in capitalist society is often, of course, not irrelevant to other societies, be they proletarian or capitalist, or even if they have not followed the same pattern of classic capitalism. We have noted that the confusion of values is by no means a simple fact which can be verified empirically. This means that any crisis, though it may appear differently from various outlooks or directly or indirectly be caused by various factors, fundamentally, may be related to yet other factors, hidden or not. Table 2 (See Tab. 2) shows the relation between sample organizational principles and the corresponding types of crisis.

Table 112

Crisis Tendencies Proposed Explanations

Economic Crisis (1) The state apparatus acts as an unconscious, executive organ of the law of value;
 (2) The state apparatus acts as planning agent of a united "monopoly capital."

Rationality Crisis The destruction of administrative rationality occurs through:

(3) Opposed interests of individual capitalists;
 (4) Or the production of a structure foreign to the system.

Legitimation Crisis (5) Systematic limits;
 (6) Unintended side effects (e.g. politicization) of administrative interventions in the cultural tradition.

Motivation Crisis (7) Erosion of traditions important for continued existence.

(8) Overloading through universalistic value system (new needs).

Table 213

*Social Principle Social and System Type of Crisis
 Formation Organization Integration*

Primitive kinship relations: no differentiation externally
primary role between social induced
(age, sex) and system identity crisis
integration

Traditional Political class Functional Internally
rule: state power differentiation determined
and socio- between social identity crisis
economic classes and system

Liberal Unpolitical class System integrative System crisis
capitalists rule: wage labor economic system
and capital also takes over
socially integrative
tasks.

The Main Crises in Confucian Society

The emergence of the Chinese revolution was not motivated purely by ideology. It is true that Sun Yat-sen, the founder of modern China, embraced the slogan "Down with Ching and Up with Ming," however, this does not mean that he was for a pure race, nor for a simple nostalgia for Ming. The real fact is that Sun was motivated much more by the desire to restore China to its healthy state lost at the hands of the late Ching emperors who were responsible for the sickness of China such as economic backwardness, corruption, injustice, and political humiliation. Such motivation was, of course, fortified by other no less important cultural factors: Sun had absorbed some democratic ideas (from his stays in Honolulu and London); he had witnessed the collapse of the military power of the Ching in the face of the much more advanced arsenals of the invaders, and he had learned that any progress in politics and science must be also accompanied by economic progress. That is to say, the cause of the Chinese revolution was found in the crisis of the Ching, a macro or total crisis. The furor of youth during the tumultuous days of the May-Fourth demonstrations reflected the same crisis. When the students of Peking University marched in the streets to demand an equal treaty between China and Japan, their aim was far reaching: a total change of social structure.¹⁴ This time, the crisis surfaced in a more rational way: it was a rationality crisis and a legitimation crisis. This crisis is by no means a thing of the past, but is even more visible today. We will briefly examine these four types of crisis to defend our thesis that the confusion in values and ethics is a total crisis, and that the ideological crisis mistakenly taken to be primary is, in fact, only one aspect of a hidden, total crisis.

In Habermas's terms, the crisis of Chinese values is by no means an accidental fact, or motivated by a simple factor. It occurs when:

- (1) the old feudal economic system no longer produces the requisite quantity of consumable values,
- (2) when the over-bureaucratic system of administration fails to produce the requisite quantity of rational decisions,
- (3) when the legitimation system or Confucian ideology does not provide the requisite quantity of generalized motivations,

(4) when its culture or socio-cultural system does not generate the requisite quantity of action-motivating meaning.

Note that Habermas uses the expression "requisite quantity" to refer to the extent, quality, and temporal dimension of the respective system performance.¹⁵

Economic Crisis

The bankruptcy of the Ching economic machine can be explained from different, but related facts: (1) the imbalance between production and over consumption (the needs to play war games, to maintain a luxurious life, etc.); (2) the explosive increase of population versus a stagnant or decreasing production; (3) an administration that, due to ignorance, fails to provide new possibilities to counter this trend, or relies on false solutions to cope with modernization and its by-products;¹⁶ (4) in recent years, the ideological rhetoric could no longer generate its effects. Ideology succumbs to reality. Both governments on the two straits have aggressively and unreflectively taken the capitalist road with all of its main principles of output and input, more production and more consumption, market-expansion, strong individual initiative, etc. Despite this new approach, a new crisis seems to be already at the front door of the nation, namely that of capitalism, state-capitalism and advanced capitalism. We will examine some points relevant to this type of crisis:

1) Though the Chinese (Taiwanese) government adopted the main principles of capitalism, it still tended to control the state as in the past. The intervention of the state in supports, production and control has both advantages and disadvantages. The state capitalist system, through central planning, may keep the economy in balance, and as such avoid excesses and a widening of the gap between classes. But the strong intervention of a Confucian state does not allow the market mechanism to function normally. The crisis begins when the decision-making of the state is wrong, slow, or obsolete. A classic example in Taiwan is the extinction of small businesses and firms which were the corner stone of Taiwan's economic miracle. A sudden alteration in monetary and trade policy due to the demand for high technology changes the market-mechanism. As a result, family-size industries and small businesses collapse, and high-profit but less-or-non-productive trade, land-speculation and service-sector businesses blossom. Consequently, millions of workers have to change their job or be laid off. The tight-control of the state, combined with a belief in the dogma of capitalism gives birth to a new ideology: surplus at all cost. However, a surplus that does not stimulate production and consumption (use-values) is just as unhealthy and ephemeral. The huge sum of almost 0 billion US dollars sitting idle in reserve, boastfully praised by the Central Bank of Taiwan, could not make Taiwan richer. In contrast, such a tight monetary policy hinders economic progress.¹⁷ The huge sum of money, sitting idle, reflects the inertia of capitalist belief. This fact confirms that primary economic zones and priorities often are sacrificed for non-productive, consumer interests.

2) It is true that the Confucian state does not exactly copy the capitalist economic system. Coerced by the irresistible forces of capitalism and liberalism, Taiwan has modified its economic policy or strategy to allow more freedom in such sectors as marketing and market expansion, though there is still an effort to keep this in line with its ideology. The fact that the government reluctantly gives up its authority in some fields, does not mean that it follows the market rule. It is done only because of a sense that the old policy may endanger the state apparatus. A midway

position between traditional authoritarian Confucianism and liberal capitalism may be adopted, but this midway position does not resolve the crisis-ridden economy, and may transform it into a new kind of global crisis, as Claus Offe has predicted. He designates three tendencies which indicate that the propagation of elements hostile to the system is systematically inevitable. These concern the spread of orientations that make it difficult to sustain behavioral control which conforms to the system.¹⁸

The three tendencies are: (1) higher management must adopt political patterns of evaluation and decision, instead of strategies fixed *a priori*; (2) radical professionalism indicates that professional work in the areas of the public sector, science, educational systems, etc. can be detached from private career patterns and market mechanism and can be oriented to concrete goals; (3) the inactive proportion of the population grows vis-a-vis the active population.¹⁹ These groups may develop patterns similar to those in concrete labor context. That is to say, the economic crisis is shifted to an administrative crisis, because of the unavoidable deficit of rationality in administrative planning.

Rationality Crisis

Thus, we can say with Habermas that the concept of rationality crisis is modeled after that of economic crisis.²⁰ When the administration plunges into a crisis, when the central planning system is in disarray, when the contradictory steering imperatives assert themselves through the purposive-rational actions of members of the administration, then it is no longer a simple matter of economic crisis, but a more profound stage: it is a rationality crisis which threatens the integration of the system, and consequently endangers social integration. This point can be elucidated as follows:

(1) First, the crisis shifts from economics to the administrative system which functions now in accordance with its rational principles based on purposes and technical methods.

(2) Second, the administration, in putting too much emphasis on economic progress and on its scientifically-oriented technical rationality, neglects the human factors. In the Marxist critique of the bourgeois society, the administrative system has brought upon itself the problem of alienation. Alienation is a part of the capitalist system.

(3) Third, the consequence of an over-emphasis upon technical rationality is an overburdening with the common costs of market strategies and the cost of demand for unproductive commodities. This is added to the costs of infrastructural production and social consumption, as well as welfare. In short, it is the burden of the costs of an ever more socialized production.

(4) Fourth, as such, the traditional principle of government and administration, due to the change of rationality, has caused its own downfall through a crisis of rationality.

Confucian society was primarily constructed on a kind of inter-subjective-communicative rationality I have called reasonableness.²¹ The shift to scientific rationality as the new principle of economics and then of life so reduced the Confucian value system that it had to admit its incompetence and impotence in dealing with the modern world. This crisis results from an ignorance of the fact that scientific rationality cannot provide us with the last word, because it is constructed on totally neutral and external natural phenomena. Thus, to ignore Confucian reasonableness is to put in question the legitimacy of traditional values. The rationality crisis is inseparable from the legitimation crisis.

Legitimation Crisis

By legitimation we mean the process of knowing and accepting something as a real and unavoidable fact, e.g. the process of legalisation, moralisation, etc. The term "legitimation" expresses the common act of tacit recognition and acceptance. Legitimation could be either *de jure* or *de facto*. Hence, legitimation crisis means that a law, habit, moral code, or certain value is no longer recognized or accepted. The crisis in education in Taiwan is one of the best illustrations of this fact. On the one hand, children are taught to live up to the Confucian standards, but on the other hand they are encouraged and pushed to achieve material success. The result is as clear as tragic: students and their parents sacrifice Confucian values for the sake of their own material benefits. However, the legitimation crisis comes into form only if there is no harmony between moral values and material interests. The Confucian state, notorious for its casts and rigidity, being unwilling to accept cohabitation with utilitarianism and individualism faces an inevitable crisis. Habermas notes that only a rigid socio-cultural system, incapable of being randomly functionalized for the needs of the administrative system, could explain a sharpening of legitimation difficulties into a legitimation crisis. He explains: "A legitimation crisis can be predicted only if expectations that cannot be fulfilled either with the available quantity of value or, generally, with rewards conforming to the system are systematically produced."²²

However, a legitimation crisis is connected not only with a rationality crisis, but is based on a motivation crisis, that is, on "a discrepancy between the need for motives declared by the state and the motivation supplied by the socio-cultural system."²³

Motivation Crisis

According to Habermas, a motivation crisis occurs when "the socio-cultural system changes in such a way that its output becomes dysfunctional for the state and for the system of labor."²⁴ The present Taiwanese society tends toward what has already happened in advanced-capitalist societies—namely the syndromes of civil and familial vocational privatism. Civil privatism is a tendency toward an interest in the steering and maintenance of the administrative system, with little participation in the legitimizing process: the structure of a depoliticized public reality. On the other hand, as Habermas explains, familial vocational privatism consists in a family orientation with developed interests in consumption and leisure, and in career orientation. This second privatism corresponds to the structure of educational and occupational systems of competition regulated through achievement.²⁵ While civil privatism is not yet well-developed, its presence has been noticed. The flux of talents to the private enterprises, the increasing growth of the power of the business class confirms this trend. In the second case, the familial vocational privatism is most visible in the Taiwanese educational system, for almost all students' first choice in education conforms with market need: the motivation is simply wealth and more wealth.

Due to shifting motivation, society today faces a double crisis:

(1) the break with tradition is accompanied by a motivation crisis. To adopt the capitalist economic policy is to replace the traditional motivation of becoming a "virtuous and capable ruler" (*nei sheng wai wang*, sageliness within, kingliness without) with new motivations such as civil privatism and familial-vocational privatism; however,

(2) the change of capitalism into advanced capitalism and state capitalism has produced a new motivation crisis. When even late capitalism breaks down, then motivations also will fall prey to

new crises. This has not yet surfaced in Taiwanese society, but, as Habermas predicted, this kind of crisis seems inevitable.

The consequence of both civil privatism and familial vocational privatism is the exaltation of possessive individualism, of orientation to exchange value, of scientism and of universalistic morality (more exactly, universal utilitarianism). All these consequences contribute to the devaluation of Confucian ethics and to the evaluation of new norms built on these motivations. However, even the new norms need to be legitimized through a new kind of rationality which again is built on human praxis (life). In fact, even if our modern life apparently differs from that of our ancestors, these differences are not essential.

The most fundamental aspects of human nature, such as love, communication and survival remain the same. Thus, we may say that the new motivation and new rationality do not entirely wipe out the crisis. In contrast, they may themselves be involved in a new crisis. Analogously, our modern society, although it seems totally different from Confucian society, has not yet escaped from Confucian ethics. What we call new values are in fact not entirely new, and even if they might be new, they could not absolve us from all crisis if they are not constructed on human nature, a point that Confucius has stressed and Marx has defended.

The above four main crises, namely economic crisis, rationality crisis, legitimation crisis and motivation crisis do not express the whole confusion or devaluation in ethics. They are representative, and more importantly, they reflect fundamental human activities and their consequent crisis. In order to make our discussion more fruitful, we will sum up tentatively our understanding of the so-called crisis in ethics and values in the following theses:

1. First, we do not think that a radically total *re-evaluation* (Umwertung) proposed by Nietzsche can solve our crisis. Indeed, the crisis might become worse, in the sense of nihilism, homelessness or rootlessness.²⁶

2. That is to say, even if economics undergoes drastic change, and even if the social structure is transformed, and even if new ideologies are in permanent transition, then the traditional values implicit in Confucian ethics cannot simply be dismissed. We join Hans-Georg Gadamer in saying that a reevaluation is impossible without traditional values.²⁷ We would explore Hegel's thesis that the process of crisis can be overcome only if it is self-understood in the process of *Aufhebung*, in which all three characters of abrogation, conservation and transformation (elevation) appear equally. Thus, we are not wholly satisfied with the May-Fourth Movement, but are sensitive to Bertrand Russell's advice to Chinese intellectuals to be cautious in adopting new imported values.²⁸

3. The process of devaluation is painful but necessary, in the sense that the crisis of values must be understood as a normal step in the process of cognitive and social development. This devaluation or crisis gets out of hand only if we accept unreflectively and uncritically the new values, that is, when we have no understanding of the nature of values. The case of Taiwan can be explained in this context, namely, the whole educational system is oriented toward economic success and technical know-how. It adopts instrumental and purposive rationality as the principle of education, and as such abandons traditional ethical and practical reasonableness as its principle.

4. A critical and reflective attitude toward modernization and its modern values does not mean that we return to conservative Confucianism, but helps to balance the state of health of our society. Overemphasis on rationality may lead to human alienation and reification, while overemphasis on reasonableness certainly will block human cognitive development, and as such human history.

5. This leads to the further thesis that the crisis of Confucian values can be understood as a crisis of rationality which consists of the crisis of legitimation and motivation. First, the people (intellectuals) lost their faith in Confucianism when they discovered its impotence in dealing with modernization, its obsolescence with regard to new ways of life imported from the West, and its reactionary conservatism in politics (the May-Fourth Movement and the Cultural Revolution). Second, after losing their own faith, they turned to Western values which unfortunately they later found incompatible. Third, sensing that they had nowhere to go, they remained idle and chose a life style Dostoevski labeled a kind of nihilism. That is to say they tried to legitimate what they already knew they could not. Facing this impossible task, they simply lost their motivation.

6. From another aspect, the crisis of the Confucian values also can be explained in terms of the antinomy between rationality and reasonableness, or between scientism and moralism. This antinomy seems to be the most visible obstacle and the most controversial policy of Chinese education.

Conclusion

As a conclusion to this discussion, we would like to reiterate that the crisis of Confucian values can be seen in the much broader context of society as a whole, and that it is not the end of the world, but a necessary dialectical step. The next step is how to solve this crisis. To do so we need to pay more attention to the relationship between rationality and reasonableness, between scientific knowledge and practical wisdom.

Notes

1 Cf. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, German original: *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendental Phänomenologie* (Del Haag, 1954); Cf. Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, Trans. Thomas McCarthy, (Beacon Press, 1975).

2 Edmund Husserl, *ibid.*, part 1.

3 See Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, II, pp. 31 ff.; Friedrich Nietzsche, *Wille zu Macht*, note 713 (1888); note 708 (1887/1888).

4 See for example the writings of the young Marx, notably *The German Ideology*; *Theses on Feuerbach*; *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, etc. in *Marx-Engels Werke* (Berlin: Marx-Lenin Institute, 1956 ff.). Hereafter as *MEW*.

5 Edmund Husserl, *op. cit.*, vol. 2, p. 316, in a lecturer entitled "Die Krisis des europaeischen Menschentums und die Philosophie," (Vienna, 1935)

6 Edmund Husserl, "Realitaetswissenschaft und Idealisierung - Die Mathematisierung der Natur." (Lecture, 1928) in *Die Krisis*, vol. 2., p. 279.

7 Cf. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. E .M. Anscombe (London: Basil Blackwell, 1958).

8 Edmund Husserl, *op. cit.*, vol. 1.

9 Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 1.

10 Georg Lukacs, *History and Class-Consciousness*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1979, 6th ed.), pp. 83 ff.

11 G. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), part 1; Karl Marx, *Die deutsche Ideologie* (1845/46), *MEW* 3, 33; *Grundrisse* (1857/58), *MEW* 64 f.; *Zur Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* (1859), *MEW* 13, 21; *Das Kapital* (1861) *MEW* 25, 838.

12 Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 50).

13 Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 24.

14 Cf. Chow Tse-tsung, *The May-Fourth Movement* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960) pp. 46, 48; See also Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, *The Rise of Modern China* (Hongkong: Oxford University Press, 1983, 3rd. ed.), p. 493 ff.

15 Jurgen Habermas, *op. cit.*, p. 49.

16 Immanuel Hsu, *op. cit.*, chapters 18 and 19, pp. 419 ff.

17 Report of the Central Bank of Taiwan (1991). In 1992, the reserve rose up to ca. U.S.\$ 85 billions. As result, the U. S. A. and the international market pressured the Central Bank to reevaluate the Taiwan dollar. However, with the strong Taiwan dollar, Taiwanese products became expensive, and consequently, they could not compete with cheap foreign products.

18 Clauss Offe, *Tauschverhältniss und politische Steuerung*, p. 27 (quoted by Habermas, *op. cit.*, p. 65).

19 Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 66.

20 Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 68.

21 Cf. Tran Van Doan, *Reason, Rationality, Reasonableness* (1989) (Washington, D. C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2001).

22 Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 68.

23 Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 74.

24 *Ibid.*

25 Jurgen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, p. 75.

26 Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, *op. cit.*, vol. 1.

27 Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Method*, (Tubingen, 1960).

28 Bertrand Russell, *The Problem of China* (London, 1922), pp. 81-82; Immanuel Hsu, *op. cit.*, p. 506.

4.

The Danger of Self-Deception in Ideological Education

This chapter aims to reveal the danger hidden in so-called ideological education—the danger of human self-deception—and consequently to call for a genuine democratic education for Chinese society. The problem will be discussed from two aspects: (1) the present ideological education practiced in China (both Mainland and Taiwan) which lends support to a monopoly or concentration of power in the hands of an individual, a party or a class, and which leads to human self-deception; (2) the ignorance of the nature of ideology that causes the twin mistakes of dogmatism and utopia in this education.

Ideological Education

When John Dewey (1859-1952) came to China in the early 1920s, he exercised an undeniable influence on Chinese intellectuals. His idea of democratic education is no longer strange. His disciples are still promoting it today and, as expected, it has made a significant contribution to the organization and the form of the present Chinese educational system.¹ However, it seems that the change brought by Dewey's ideas in the substance of our education is minimal indeed. Better said, Dewey's democratic education, like Rousseau's idea of autonomous education, could not grow in Chinese soil. It meets an invisible, quiet and forceful resistance from traditional Chinese education which is authoritative and politically motivated. In a word, it has no chance against the ideology of the nation, namely, Confucianism. Note that even Communists, with a strong propaganda "apparatus" and a no less authoritative educational system, could not destroy Confucianism. The so-called Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) planned by Mao Dze-dung (1893-1976) to put an end to Confucianism ironically confirmed Mao himself as not a Marxist but a Confucian. The Marxist Chin Kwan-tao thus complained that there is *de facto* no genuine Marxism in China but rather a Confucianized Marxism.

Aware of this fact, we call not for an abolition of Confucianism but for its reconstruction. Our main tactics will be a pincer movement: the same point will be reached by arguing from opposite directions: a criticism of ideological education and a criticism of the naive belief in a ideologically free education. Both end in human self-deception instead of human development.

In Chapter II above and previous works,² we warned that, ideological education, by its very nature, does more harm than good, and we urged Chinese authorities to reconsider their educational systems. We also advocated a free, democratic, and less ideological education. The warning signs (the increasing crime rate, the explosive, uncontrollable orgy of materialism) are more or less the tip of an iceberg with which we cannot deal by means of violence, authority or political power. A rational revolution in education is called for: only through a radical break with traditional ideological education can we survive. We would then introduce communicative dialogue, dia-logics and openness into education replacing the monologue, mono-logics and closedness of Confucian education. Political earthquakes in China have not changed much. The tragedy of *Tiananmen* and the subsequent military and political curricula in Mainland China³ confirm our pessimism that ideological education still reigns and terrorizes education. In Taiwan the students sleep, dreaming of the paradise promised by nationalist ideology. So far only a handful of intellectuals and students have dared to challenge such a rigid education.⁴ With military officer cadres of the ruling party on campus, the government plays effectively the stick and carrot game

of promising jobs, giving privileges and securing order (maintaining at the same time the police system). This paralyzes the academic curriculum by stuffing it full of ideological courses, military tactics and strategies, and so on. They enforce these and make them compulsory for all kinds of examinations, promotions, or job-selection. In a word, even though challenged by the students on both sides of the strait, the governments still stick to their ideological education.

The Birth of Ideological Education in China

Confucius is credited with being the first master and the greatest educator of China. His teachings served as the back-bone of Chinese education, and his methods were believed to be the most adequate. Consequently, Confucian education was the only legal and effective one in China. It is the unique path to success.

Confucianism stresses order, stability and harmony. Its corollary principles are obedience, loyalty, fidelity, filial piety, and respect for elders. That means, education aims at forming a man of loyalty, fidelity, obedience or a superior man (*chun-tzu*). The question of to whom one is loyal, obedient, respectful, etc. and why one ought to be so, is never seriously treated by Confucians. The point they stress is whether or not we follow the set behaviors required in Confucian ethics. The following of rules is considered as simply a matter of fact, and consequently, education is no more than the simple task of forcing the students to accept and obey these rules. They argue that since human nature is treacherous (as Hsun Tzu [298-238 B.C.] complained), and man consequently inclined to disobey laws, one needs a set of rules which possess the irresistible power of coercing the people to obey. Confucian rules were declared to be morals for this reason. However, if one carefully examines Confucian arguments, one easily discovers other motives behind such a proclamation, namely, vested interests in power and wealth. Social stability is stressed as the most important thing, and politics are understood rather as a means of defending it. The Han dynasty (BC 206-220 AC) successfully defended their regime for more than 400 years thanks mainly to this education. Almost all officials were Confucians or trained in the Confucian spirit. Absolute loyalty was due to the monarch who was praised as a divine commander; the emperor credited himself with the mandate of heaven. He ceremoniously crowned himself with the title "The Son of Heaven." In a word, Confucianism is the ideology of monarchism, while education is no more than an ideological instruction.

Confucian Ideological Education

Once Confucianism is declared to be the syllabus of all kinds of examinations, and once it is revered as the state ideology, it is clear that the state education must be shaped after the main doctrines of Confucianism, and its method must be in conformity with the intention of the rulers.

First, the main doctrines are drawn from the main works of Confucius, such as the *Analects*, the *Doctrine of the Mean*, the *Mencius* and the *Great Learning*. These texts, the *Four Books*, are considered sacred. All educators are requested to accept them as fundamental and to faithfully learn them by heart. The main doctrines can be grouped in the following categories: (1) humanism, (2) righteousness, (3) filial piety, (4) order, (5) rectification of names (6) sincerity, (7) love, (8) following the way and other categories related only indirectly to education such as ceremonies and music, (10) literature and arts, (11) mean and harmony.⁵ In our discussion, we will concentrate on the doctrines which directly influence present education.

It is true that Confucianism is fundamentally a humanism. But the meaning of humanism must be understood in a much broader sense of anthropocentrism. It is a theory centered on the human world with very little place for the divine. Confucius' main concern is how to regulate people harmoniously in a society, and how to keep such a society in order. He paid little attention to the question of individual happiness (in contrast to Aristotle and in sharp contrast to the hedonism and utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832)). In this context, his idea of education rests on those categories of order, rectification of names, loyalty, obedience, filial piety, propriety, and righteousness (2,3,4,5,6). As he clearly stated: "The Way of learning to be great (adult education) consists in manifesting clear character, loving the people and abiding in the highest good."⁶ He then explained what he meant by "manifesting clear character": "Young men should be filial when at home and respectful to the elders when away from home. They should be earnest and faithful."⁷ Confucius' disciple, Tseng Tzu (505-? B.C.) confessed:

Everyday I examine myself on three points: whether in counseling others I have not been loyal; whether in intercourse with my friends, I have not been faithful; and whether I have not repeated again and again and practiced the instructions of my teacher.⁸

Since the doctrines are considered sacred and inviolate, it is clear that they function as dogmas. There is no question or debate on their validity and legitimacy. The rest is simple: we just follow or respect them. The quoted passage of Tseng Tzu tells us that the best method of education is repeating again and again the teachings of the teacher (Confucius), and then applying them in our life. That means that we do not need invention or creation, and that the idea of critique is rather a taboo in education. True enough, the Confucians highly respect this kind of method of memorizing the texts, faithfully following their literal meaning and, of course, practicing them. One may raise objection to my one-sided interpretation by citing the case of Neo-Confucians who have interpreted Confucianism in their own ways. We will not delve into this problematic here. It is sufficient to say that, even if their interpretations are different in meaning, it does not suggest that they used different methods. Their difference comes rather from their conflicting interests. In fact, they all emphasized the same method of uncritically obeying, repeating, memorizing. Since we have proved in our earlier works that this kind of method is part of ideology,⁹ we will pay more attention to the ideological factor in our presentation.

The Present Ideological Education

Our present education bears in its very substance the Confucian ideology. It even appears in different forms and uses modern technology. Instead of pure moral teachings, the state adds political doctrines, say patriotism, or nationalism. The police and party-cadres replace the Confucians in handling these courses. In the place of the emperor, one finds the leader. Instead of Confucian teachings, one substitutes those of the leader. The Mao-bible, the President's (Chang Kai-shek, 1887-1975) thoughts are the stuff required for all students and of course for all citizens, especially for the bureaucrats.¹⁰ At bottom, one discovers nothing new but the same "moral" requirements such as loyalty to the leader, absolute obedience to the party and the state, sacrifice for the nation and respect for the order (of the state or the party). We need to present some of the practices in the schools to show that these laws and methods are part of an ideological training.

- At the elementary school level, all students are asked to master all requirements prescribed in the textbooks called *Civic Education and Moral Education*¹¹ without a discussion and strangely, without an understanding of the subject. On top of this, the only method preferred by the authorities is "learning by heart" all subjects. The students have no need to understand why they should respect the leader, obey the elders and teachers, love the nation and so on. Needless to say, the important thing to the state is whether or not the students learn at all. In a word, the authorities downgrade or dismiss the creative capacity and incentive of the students, for that could be dangerous for the leader or the state.

- At the middle school level: The same contents are presented in a colorful and concrete way by selecting the political and cultural examples which can be used to prove the relevancy of the material. Added to the traditional moral teaching are the decrees and patriotic documents of the leader, which the students are required to memorize for examination. To cope with the unrest of young students, these subjects are taught not by ordinary teachers, but by cadres or military officers. These "teachers" often use a military manner to carry out their jobs. The students are also encouraged to report to the authorities all "non-patriotic" or "anti-patriotic" acts of teachers and fellows students. In Mainland China, the main criteria for the selection of bureaucrats, cadres, and even university or college students are curiously Confucian such as obedience, loyalty to the leader (party) while in Taiwan these "moral acts" decide the future of a young man or woman. It is often reported that someone is not qualified for a job, or that a student is expelled from his school, or disciplined simply because of their "amoral" acts.¹²

- At the college level: Even in this stage, ideological education is still rigorously executed. The freshman (or woman) is required to take 8 credits of military training and the junior has to add 8 credits of ideology (thoughts of the leader), while the junior and senior have to digest almost 30 credits of general education (mostly laws, constitutions). In effect, out of 120 credits in a bachelor degree curriculum, one third is spent in ideological education. For some time, at Peking University, freshmen spent their first year in boot camp. The presence of a military force on campus intimidating academicians and students had become the norm. In 1983, I was invited by Soochow University in Taipei to give a lecture on Marx's concept of praxis. I found before me, in the first row of the lecture-hall, a dozen officers ranging from lieutenant-colonels to two-star generals in full uniform. I could see the anxiety of the chairman of the department who begged me not to present sympathetically, but savagely to criticize Marx's idea. The poor professor might have lost his career had I refused to comply with his request. Such an incident, as far as I know, is so common that no one takes note of it.¹³

In short, ideological education is never neglected by the authorities. Rather, such education is legitimized, not only by the coercive power of the state, but more dramatically by Confucian ethics which is taken to be the best means by the ruling class.

The Deception of Ideology

In this part we will argue that any form of ideological education has a double consequence: positive and negative. Any ardent advocate of ideology is as dangerous as the fervent anti-ideologue. Thus, we tend to the idea of a relative ideology and to the temporal and spatial necessity of ideological education.

We have argued elsewhere¹⁴ that ideology by its genetic development bears a double character, positive and negative, and that its process is dialectical in nature. We are against Marx's view of ideology as pure reactionary, static, idealistic norms and forms designed by the rulers to

defend their interests. We opt rather for Paul Ricoeur's view that ideology functions first as a positive force representing a common view of a group, a society or a state.¹⁵ We share Clifford Geertz's understanding of culture as a form of ideology.¹⁶ However, we contend that even the most solid culture, the most ideal norm has to be changed too. Because human beings are in development and therefore need new norms, they create new forms of culture. Thus, we may conclude that ideology would lose its positive effects once society changes. It will become negative if it tries stubbornly to resist this change. Correlatively, we may say that there is no absolute ideology of universal and necessary (as religions might hold, or as Kant might defend in the name of transcendentalism). Such an ideology would be either utopian¹⁷ or absurd. Only a dictator or a dreamer would believe in such an ideology.

From Relative Ideology to Absolute Ideology

The teachings of Confucius are by no means obsolete. In fact, for better or worse, many of his ideas still exercise an undeniable influence on the Chinese people. We are curious to know how a teaching of more than two thousand years ago could still be relevant today, especially in the age of advanced technology. There is no mystery about it if we understand that the main concern of Confucius is human beings and their problems. The world is changing fast, but human beings are not. We develop more slowly. Fundamentally, the main problems of dealing with life and death are of the same character. They differ only in their level of complexity. The new knowledge about humans and our world can at best help us cope more effectively with these problems. At bottom, these problems are still the same. Thus, when we say that Confucius' ideas have some effect on our society, we want strongly to emphasize his humanism. The same could be done with Aristotle's ethics, but not with his physics. Aristotelian ethics concern themselves with human problems (which are little or no different even today) and therefore are still valid, while his knowledge of physics is no longer tenable in the face of new discoveries. This point helps us to understand the concept of ideology at the same time as a correct system of ideas (Bacon, Cabanis, de Tracy, de Condillac) and as a false consciousness (Marx). We may formulate it like this: an ideology is correct as long as it reflects our reality; it is false once the reality is changing, disappearing, losing meaning. Thus, the most important point determining the relevancy of ideology is reality itself. We will argue from our view of reality that no ideology is absolute, but all are relative in character.

First, the idea of an absolute ideology is connected with the concept of absolute truth. The long Greek and Hebrew traditions insist on the uniqueness and identity of truth. They conceive of God as the ultimate truth, who serves as the foundation of all things. Thus, Plato's idea serves not only as a simple naked truth, but as the foundation of all other phenomena. Since truth is the one and only foundation of all phenomena, philosophers believe that if we can discover such a truth, we can explain the whole universe. Such truth could be water, air, fire, number or god. The theory that explains all things best is actually what the French encyclopedists later called ideology. The theories of Descartes, Spinoza have been based on such a concept of truth.

Second, such an idea is challenged first by pantheism and later by anarchism. To the people who happen to believe in these later theories, there is no absolute or everything is truth. They tend to hold the view that there exists only reality appearing to us in phenomena (Schopenhauer), in feeling (Feuerbach) or in experiences (Locke, Hume). They regard feeling, experience as the foundation of our knowledge determining our understanding. They hang on fast to reality, and all knowledge that is born from reality is true. Thus, we may say that they build another ideology on the concept of reality instead of truth.

Third, these two kinds of ideology do not of course satisfy the knowledge we have about our world. Our view is that we understand our world and ourselves not in terms of truth or reality, but in the process of human self-realization.¹⁸ Human beings are in a process of self-genesis, and from this comes our knowledge about the world, about our community and about ourselves. The more man develops, the more abundant and complete is his knowledge. The more one deals with the external world, the better one's image of reality and experience. That means there is neither a fixed, total, external truth, nor a simple fact that we call reality. Everything that appears first as a real fact will change in accordance with our capacity of perception, our experience and understanding, and even with our position (physical or social). In a word, we seem to be in a permanent process of self-realization.

By upgrading the concepts of truth and reality with realization, we want to prove that any ideology which is constructed on the concepts of reality or truth would be incomplete and therefore become false in the course of history. Ideology, understood in terms of a common idea about feelings, experiences, etc., would be correct only when these feelings and experiences are unchanging—which is impossible.

Hence, what we regard as truth or reality, whatever we believe to be the true system of ideas (1) shows in fact a temporal and spatial truth, (2) generates a certain validity in a certain aspect of human life, (3) and consequently serves as the basis for a particular education. We call such a system of ideas relative ideology. It will cease to be ideology once it loses its validity, effectiveness and the sense of realization. Analogically, norms, morals, rules will vanish if they no longer reflect reality, if they cannot cope with the process of self-realization. A culture will become a museum piece if it has nothing to do with actual human life.

Confucianism as Absolute Ideology

In this context, we do not deny the validity of relative ideology in a historical period, or in a certain society. We contend that such an ideology is necessary for the stability of a society, for a consensus in human decisions, for preserving the uniqueness of a people and so on. Confucianism is no exception. It is a form of ideology which was valid and useful for Chinese society in the past. It reflected basic human needs and activities, and as such was accepted as the most appropriate form for regulating society. However, it became a false ideology when it claimed for itself an absolute role dictating every aspect of human life, when it proclaimed itself the foundation of all knowledge. Here we will briefly analyze its claims, in order to show that Confucianism has gone beyond the limits allowed for a correct ideology.

The first claim on the foundation of human morals and knowledge is a metaphysical claim. Mencius (371-289 B.C.) and Hsun Tzu both share the view that man by his very nature is either good (Mencius) or evil (Hsun Tzu). That means, like Plato, they believe that human nature is unchanging, that all we have to do is follow natural laws and on these we can construct ideas, laws, social norms, etc. They quickly and uncritically take the metaphysical claims of Confucius for granted, without knowing that most of the claims are unfounded. Consequently, they lapse into historical determinism and reject the human capacity for development. They use external standards to measure a developing humanity. In doing so, they believe in a system of standards or norms and paradigms of knowledge which are prior to and independent from the historical and social context.

Consequently, the second claim would be a belief in the inertia of man: man is as he is. Human development is understood not in the sense of Darwin's theory of evolution or Piaget's cognitive and psychological development, but in terms of growth of moral awareness (which is immovable).

It is true that Confucius himself advocated learning, and that through learning man is more perfect.¹⁹ It is also correct to say that Mencius devoted himself to character development,²⁰ etc. But these facts do not wipe out the naturalistic, deterministic essence of their theories. Mencius, for example, clearly insisted: "Those who follow the greater qualities in their nature become great men and those who follow the small qualities in their nature become small men."²¹ He made clear that all the moral laws are based on the mandate of Heaven: "There is nobility of Heaven and there is nobility of man. Humanity, righteousness, loyalty, faithfulness and the love of good without getting tired of it constitute the nobility of Heaven, and to be a grand official, a great official and a high official this constitutes the nobility of man. The ancient people cultivated the nobility of Heaven, and the nobility of man came naturally to them."²²

We come then to the third claim that, since human nature is of the same character, the business of education restricts itself to the search for this nature and to the practice of norms required to attain the full state of nature.

Education of Ideology or Education of Deception

Such a theory of human nature would lose its validity if it were not accepted by people or at least by a class. Plato's *Republic* would quickly be dismissed if it was not adopted by politicians. Likewise, Confucianism as a form of ideology could only have survived precisely because it benefited someone, say, the emperor and the intellectual class. The reason why we accept it could be explained by (1) the aspect of human interest and (2) the human need for communication. In the first case, Confucian ideology was a tremendous benefit to the rulers and in some cases to the people. Entrenched by social norms and requirements, the people had to accept the *status-quo*, and the rulers had no fear of being stripped of privileges.

From the second aspect, Confucianism has successfully established one of the greatest systems of human communication. One just needs to follow norms in order to be calm, tranquil, peaceful and of course "human":

The ancients who wished to manifest their clear character to the world would first bring order to their states. Those who wished to bring order to their states would first regulate their families. Those who wished to regulate their families would first cultivate their personal lives.²³

To be acceptable means to be practical and people chose Confucianism as their ideology due to its practicality. Unlike the impractical categorical imperatives of Kant, Confucian morals are not beyond human abilities. It is especially attractive for those in higher positions because of its repressive character over the people of lower status. The weakest have hope too, for they may call on the authority of Heaven to restrain the rulers. In a word, Confucian ideology mixes all aspects of the human life-world in one, from the religious to the political, from the social to the economic, from the moral to the legal, etc.

However, the people are often "capricious," or weak in morals, and as such they may be an easy target of manipulation. They need to be protected, namely by means of education, especially moral and ideological education. But a moral education is not much different from an ideological training. The people were taught to believe in the absolute power of the emperor and the state, blindly to obey laws and to be patient, not to revolt, and so on. The rulers were empowered to invent new laws, to interpret Confucianism in accord with their interests, to administer and to police the system. The rulers played both the role of legislator and administrator, of watchman and

judge. Hence, the aim of education was to make the people conscious of this fact, and aware of the danger of not fulfilling their required tasks. It is true that Chinese traditional education consists of learning moral laws and of learning the art of ruling. Legalists like Han Fei-tzu (280-233 B.C.) argued passionately that penal laws are natural, that laws are the best instrument to control society. Actually, another legalist, Lord Shang (d. 338 B.C.) had his own reason to proclaim the absolute role of laws: he was worried about people's inclination toward their own interests which might jeopardize the rulers' interests: "the tendency of the people to pursue their interests is like the tendency of water to flow downward."²⁴

To impose laws on the people is certainly easy, but to make them bend their head before laws is much more difficult. One is inclined to break laws that are unreasonable. That is to say, one will not obey laws, or follow moral rules if they do not further one's own interests. A strict, legal Confucian ideology would crumble if it could not meet people's interests. However, the interests could not be equally distributed in terms of numbers, or of proportionality because everyone prefers to get more. The Confucian ideological education enters upon the scene as the best means of educating the people to accept laws and morals. It tries to change human views of life, human aspirations and desires and even human needs: one needs not material success, but high spiritual values; one must aspire to become a superior man, and one's own interest should be the Tao or the Way, not the world. In many aspects, Confucian education resembles the Christian catechism; its success is beyond doubt.

To enforce such an education, a policy of stick and carrot had to be used wisely.

- They awarded those who faithfully followed the rules with high positions and more privileges. A system of examination to select the mandarin was established. The candidate needed only to repeat the content prescribed in the classics and in the teachings of the rulers. The more they could memorize, the better chance they had of promotion. Parallel to the national examination, the private life of the candidate was thoroughly checked to see whether he and his family for at least three generations had been faithful to the emperor, moral, and so on.

- The award-system was fortified by a system of punishment. The fear of losing face, career, and even life itself because of a moral mistake was so tremendous that the people, and especially the educated, lived a double moral standard. They tried to hide their feelings, and even the truth. Disobedience, infidelity, and independence could be punished with a death sentence by the authorities. The amoral man was accused of being a traitor, evil, etc. Of course, there were no written laws on which one could rely to pass sentence on another, but the tacitly accepted unwritten laws derived from the Confucian ethical codes. No wonder penal laws were the most beloved by the rulers.

Present Education

The spirit of Confucian and feudal ideological education is kept intact in our present education. Its methods are slightly upgraded by introducing new techniques. Since we have discussed this problem in Chapter II above,²⁵ here we need only emphasize the character of self-deception in such an education.

First, the reward and punishment systems are not the ideal ones in education. Today, a ministry, or a body responsible only for examinations has replaced the feudal ones. There are more examinations at all levels of education, from the purely academic to job selection, from bureaucrat promotion to scholarship. But these examinations cannot help one become more conscious of oneself. In contrast, he has no time for anything other than repeating ideological doctrines. His

mind is determined by success or failure, i.e. by reward or punishment. He acts according to rules and deceives himself by ignoring his own existence while believing others. The police policy of the state does not help the students either. They cannot live freely as they wish. Thus, even if they follow moral norms, it does not mean that they are moral persons. They act in this way only because taught to do so.

Second, repression and passive reaction kill the creative ability of students. Present ideological education is built mainly on these two characters. It is correct to say that mainly due to this kind of education, Chinese society could not develop in the last two thousand years. China was a leader in science in an earlier age, but for most of the last century remained largely an undeveloped country.

Concluding Remarks

The critique of ideological education in China and Taiwan aims, of course, not at a refutation of ideology, but at revealing the hidden danger of any education based on rigid ideology. That does not imply being against any form of ideological education. In fact, we are conscious of its need. But the kind of ideology we mean here is a relative one. It must change and be upgraded in accord with human and social progress. Such ideological education has undeniable importance: without it we would not be able to have social organizations or even human communication. Without it, we could not deal with conflicts and problems, and, we venture to say, without it, nor would we have scientific progress. To believe in an absolute ideology, or to refute all forms of ideology, including the relative one, is to lapse into another kind of self-deception: utopic and anarchic.

Notes

1 See for example John Dewey, *Democracy and Education* (The Macmillan, 1916), and Kao K.Y., "Pragmatism in Current Education" in *The Main Currents of Present Education* (Taipei, 1988), pp. 51 ff.

2 Cf. Tran Van Doan, "Ideology, Interests and Morality" in *Proceedings of the International Conference on Philosophical Foundation of Moral Education* (Taipei: Fujen University Press, 1988); "Ideological Education and Moral Education," in Tran Van Doan, Vincent Shen, George F. McLean, eds., *The Philosophical Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development* (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1991) chapter 7; reprinted as chapter 2 in this volume; "Reflections on the Nature of Ideology," in *The Asian Journal of Philosophy*, Vol.2, No. 1 (1989); reprinted as chapter 1 in this volume.

3 The *Tiananmen* incident refers to the brutal suppression of the movement of liberation by the Communist rulers in June 1989. Most of the participants in this movements were intellectuals or students from leading universities in Mainland China.

4 In March 1990, a similar movement to the *Tiananmen* took place in Taipei. The students occupied the Chang Kai-shek Memorial Hall to protest the conservative policy of the Kuomintang, and to demand for a totally new Congress. Ironically, this movement was tacitly supported by a faction of the Kuomintang, with a certain political motive. After this "success," the Taiwan faction of the Kuomintang gained the upper-hand. However, they were blind to the demands of the students. A few months later, a similar protest was independently organized by the students, but died dramatically and very quickly.

5 See for example the text-books prepared by The Ministry of Education: *Civic Education* (1985 ff.); *Citizen and Morality* (Taipei: National Institute of Compilation, 1985).

6 *The Great Learning*, chap. 17.

7 *The Analects*, 1: 68.

8 *The Analects*, 1: 49.

9 Tran Van Doan, "Ideological Education and Moral Education," op. cit., p. 220.

10 Up to 1990, all bureaucrats or public officers were required to study the thoughts of Dr. Sun, President Chiang, etc. Even in the university, faculty members were "encouraged" to study and write reports. Some incentives in form of prizes (first prize, e.g., being a sum of NT.50.000) has been set up to make the study more attractive.

11 Tran Van Doan, "Ideological Education and Moral Education," p. 189.

12 It is well known that a special task force is set up in every department of the bureaucracy and schools. The so-called "Bureau in Charge of Personal Affairs" had a final say in the engagement or discharge of employees. This Bureau, due to the protest of the opposition and intellectuals was abolished in 1990, though its ghost still haunts academic circles.

13 The year of 1993 could be counted as the year of emancipation. The incidents unreported in the past - the so-called white terror - are now widely reported.

14 Tran Van Doan, "Ideological Education and Moral Education," op. cit.; "Reflection on the Nature of Ideology," op. cit.

15 Paul Ricoeur, *Lectures on Ideology and Utopia*, op. cit.

16 Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, op. cit.

17 Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia* (1943).

18 Tran Van Doan, *Reason, Rationality, Reasonableness* (1989), republished by The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy (Washington, D. C., 2001).

19 *The Great Learning*, chap. 1; *The Analects* 1:1. English translation of Chan Wing-tsit in: Chan Wing-tsit, *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961). Hereafter as Chan.

20 *Mencius* 6A:13; Chan, p. 59.

21 *Mencius*, 6A:15; Chan, p. 59.

22 *Mencius*, 6A:16; Chan, p. 59.

23 *The Great Learning*, Chapter 1 ; Chan, p. 86.

24 Cf. *Shang Chun-shu*, 23:38; Benjamin Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 331.

25 Tran Van Doan, "Ideological Education and Moral Education." Chapter 2 in this volume.

Confucian Education at the Crossroads

Introduction

The crisis of Chinese education is no longer a myth even if the authorities try to conceal it. Their clamorous, interminable discussions about solutions to the present crisis in education contradict, if not betray, their own belief in their ideology. Nowadays, crying for a radical change of the educational system no longer is limited to the radical intellectuals. Even our bureaucrats, who make educational policy in the Ministry of Education, begin to show their concern for our present educational system. More paradoxically, they are the loudest advocates for a change of this present system. The example of Lee Kwan-yew's Singaporean government, which pushed for a more traditional education, has been taken as a model for study in Taiwan. Our bureaucrats begin to discover the disaster of an overemphasized technological education (via Lee's policy) Now, we discuss fervently the need of returning to our roots, namely, our Confucian ideology, and seem to be as certain about its positive character as we had been confident in technology. Intellectuals, in the fever of their nostalgia about the lost ideology, appear willing to go along with the bureaucrats. Even if they still cast doubt on the claim of Lee or Confucian scholars, they are generous in giving the green light to the experiment of a "new" ideological education. To them, it is better to have, or to try, a change than to sit idle and cry in the darkness of the black hole of present education.

Whether Confucianism could be effective in solving the present crisis seems irrelevant to our bureaucrats, because they firmly believe in it, as certain as their belief in Marxism or in *The Three Principles of the People* of Sun Yat-sen. Their main task is how to get it done, and as quickly as possible.

Our doubts over Confucian education comes not from its obsolescence (visible in our history), but from its ideological, dogmatic and reactionary character. Our point in this chapter is that the illusion of the effectiveness of Confucian education is born rather from an unfortunate misunderstanding of the nature of education, which is mistakenly identified with the method used by our educators. Thus, as long as the objective of education is unclear, any diagnosis or remedy proposed for its problems would be futile. Moreover, we insist that the method of diagnosis, and the method of solving the problems themselves are insufficient so long as the problem, or the concept of the illness, is wrongly understood.¹ The symptoms of educational crisis, discovered and analyzed by our specialists, would be of little use if these symptoms themselves are falsely conceived.² Aware of this fact, we will be content with an elaboration of the problem of understanding of the so-called crisis of education. We avoid, though do not shy away from, the question of remedial solution which we consider as too premature, and which is outside our capacity.

The misunderstanding of our educational crisis comes first from a misunderstanding of the objective of education, and secondly, from a misuse of, or better say, from an overconfidence in, a certain method. Such a misunderstanding and such an overconfidence in method are the product of what we identify as ideology. Hence, in order to deal with the problem adequately, we adopt the radical reduction of Edmund Husserl³ in doubting any kind of definition of education or its methods. To be more precise, we are not allowed to take for granted:

- a simple analysis or description of the symptom of the illness in education. The data provided from experience or natural facts need to be understood. They are not neutral as the empiricists believe. Human experiences are not transcendental in the Kantian sense, but relative and historical.
- a subjective, ideological interpretation of the cause of the illness motivated by fixed, a-historical ideas, or class-sentiment, or class-interests. The Confucianist explanation of the crisis in terms of non-congruence to their moral codes, the nationalist interpretation of the illness in terms of failure to fulfill the required patriotic code are the proto-types of subjective and ideological education.
- the myth of mechanical organism (of the behaviorists), according to which the crisis in education is a biological fact, as natural as action and reaction, stimulus and response.

Such a misunderstanding is notoriously embraced by empiricists and idealists respectively. We contest their views by arguing that such methods are insufficient to cope with education, an education which deals primarily with human development in a changing and growing society, in terms that are cognitive and practical, pragmatic and teleological, self-conscious and communicative aspects. That means, we opt here for an integral education by not resting on a certain facet of human beings. The mistakes of both empiricist and idealist, as Hegel and especially Marx, as well as their followers, have rightly noted, are seen exactly in their concentration on a certain *facet*, and on a certain stage of man. Their diagnosis is thus not quite false if man is conceived of as something external and immobile, a-historical and asocial, which, like a stone, could be objectively observed and analyzed. Consequently, their remedial proposals may be effective for the education of such a static man. The fact that man is complex—at the same time historical and social, sentimental and rational, developing and utopian, etc.—demonstrates the danger of any "reduction" or "simplification" of man. Consequently, the remedial solutions offered by idealists and empiricists to human problems are incomplete and dangerous.

Thus, the main theme of this chapter will be centered on the crisis of understanding itself. We tentatively adopt critical theory, not as a unique method, but as a guide-line to throw more light onto the crisis of education.⁴

Of course, we do not naively reject the empirical analysis or the impact of ideology. We are aware of its function as well as its limits in understanding the problem.

This chapter consists of three main sections: the first and the second are a condensed review of some prevalent modes of understanding in education, tacitly accepted as the standards by empiricists and idealists respectively, while the final section will deal precisely with the problematics of what our educators call educational crisis from the point of view of critical theory.

Empiricism and Education

Dealing with the problems of understanding demands a treatment of both the scope and the method of understanding. Hence, to understand the crisis of education, we have to examine its objective and methods.

Here, we begin with some prevalent definitions of education adopted by most of our educators. We treat them as hypotheses which need to be carefully and analytically re-examined. We will then single out the main mistakes that may be responsible for what we understand as the crisis.

If education is understood as a right method to transform the children into a kind of model predetermined by the adult-society, the state or the Church then the question would be which kind of method and which sort of model we are searching for. Consequently, the crisis of education

could be seen from two aspects: that of method and that of objectives. The first comes from the belief that the right method determines the right path of education, while for the second it is the objective of education which dictates its method. Thus, the aim of the educators who believe in the first solution, is to work out an adequate method which could be empirical or rational. To those who happen to take the second solution, it is the task of refining the objective of education in a way that makes sense. Let us take the example of Confucian education to clarify our point: Confucian education's objective is *chun-tzu*, i.e. a man who possesses virtues of loyalty, fidelity, sincerity, frugality, benevolence, filial piety, etc.⁵ To Confucian educators, its method ought to be the right way to educate the children in these virtues. The method of "learning by heart", "obedience" and even such forceful means as laws and punishment are the most praised. Thus, for them, the educational crisis is synonymous with a crisis of method and a lack of the above virtues.

If education is understood as a simple tool or instrument which the children need to develop themselves for whatever they want to become, and if the objective of education is rather optional or conventional, then the crisis of education is limited to the mere aspect of technique. Liberal education opts for such an understanding of education. To its advocates, it is meaningless to set an objective for education. We should concentrate on the work of refining the technique, instead of building an ideal objective.

We may produce a litany of similar definitions of education based on either its objective or method,⁶ or on both, but this would be of little use for our purpose. As we will show, such definitions are insufficient or biased at the very outset because they are constructed (or mentally constituted) on a misconception of human nature or on false ideology. To prove our thesis, we will examine the objectives of education implicit in the first definition to see whether such objectives could be regarded as the true ones, and how they are constructed.

First, we discover a dangerous confusion of the object and the objective of education in such definitions. Second, there is an artificial identity of its method and objective.

The Object of Education

Actually, the object of education is the educated (children, students) and not its ideals. As often as not, the educated is bypassed or simply ignored. He or she is regarded as a simple object instead of being the real subject. Consequently, the educated is denied an active role in shaping his or her own life. He or she is destined to model, or forced to accept the ideal, predetermined by society. In a word, the educated is no longer the real object and subject of education. One plays only an auxiliary role in the game of education, going along to reach the objective, i.e. the ideal model. In both definitions, we find nowhere an active role for the educated. We mistakenly take either the ideal or the method to be the objective of education, and lapse into confusion between its object and objective. Such a mistake comes from a rather feudal, patriarchal ideology, according to which it is the absolute power of the father (the clan-chief, the king) which determines the fate of the subordinate. The subordinate or the son is simply the product, existing at the whim of the father or the chief.

The Objective of Education

As we have observed in both definitions of education, educators have taken neither the ideal or the method to be the objective of education.⁷ In order to avoid unnecessary ambiguity, we will replace the word "objective" with the word "goal" or "scope." In the first definition, it seems to us

that it is the goal which dictates the course of education, while in the second it is the method that is the ultimate objective in the mind of educators.

The Goal of Education

In Confucian education, the model of *chun-tzu* (superior man) is the ultimate goal of education, while in education in Taiwan it is the patriotic hero. Of course, we discover similar ideas in other educational systems: the model of the saint in Christianity, the ideal of the socialist in Socialism, of a free man in liberalism, etc.

In all these models, one observes a common character: they are *a priori* or pre-determined, and their specific characteristics are artificially and externally constructed. We tacitly, or often forcefully and violently accept them without comprehension or consent. In the case of Confucian education, we are taught to be loyal, obedient (blindly) to the king (or the superior) without an understanding of why we should do so. In the case of liberal education, one demands that the children have the right of self-development, without questioning the scope of development... Thus, in both cases, the demand of an ideal is often unrealistic, if not illusory. The unreality or, at least, impracticality of such an ideal has not this far been subjected to any critique.

The Method of Education

The liberal, in order to avoid the absurd demand of an unreal model, has proposed either a vague idea of freedom and self-development, or in most cases, has chosen method as the objective of education. The most evident example supporting such a view is the belief that an upgrade of the method (either in examination or in teaching) could solve the crisis of present education. In Singapore, the commission of education, nominated directly by the government with a plenipotentiary right and power of deciding the policy and planning future education, has clearly opted for method as the legitimate goal of education: Education means education for correct thinking, for science, and recently, for good behavior or moral living. Curiously, there exists hardly any effort at redefining education. In acknowledging the obsolescence of the present method of teaching and learning (didactic), the government chooses an easy path of shifting all mistakes to the problem of method, thereby reducing the business of education to a simple training of method. Again, the method of education is reduced to a mere aspect of technique.

Before we deal directly with these mistakes, it is necessary to make some remarks on the unreality of both the conservatives and the liberals on the objective of education.

- First, if the goal of education is predetermined, one has to justify the reason of such a determination. The educator may resort to the authority of God, of nature, or, simply, of the king; he may prove that such a goal is historically or scientifically constructed; or he may simply take it for granted. To rely on authority is to hide in ideology, whatever the ideology may be. However, in this case, ideology has to be proven to be the right and not the wrong one. The difficulty lies exactly in the dogmatism of ideology which makes any test impossible. The theistic ideology is as rigid and authoritative as its naturalistic or scientific counterpart. As such, justification means rather confirmation than proof.

- Second, due to the untestability of such a goal, it would be nonsense to talk about crisis in terms of conformity to the goal. The educational crisis has to be located in other aspects, namely, those of the ability, capacity and willingness of the educated to follow the goal. One explains

educational crisis in terms of a lack of will or the incapacity of the educated. Actually, this is partly right, but in most cases just begs the question. The point is whether the educated as a human being, limited and still immature, could have the capacity to perform the noble, ideal rules set by an absolute agent (God), by a utopian (absolute ruler), or whether he could be measured in terms of a natural event (set by a scientific-minded educator). The answer seems to be in the negative, exactly because the standards of education are external, neutral and, in most aspects, impractical.

- Third, if one carefully examines the goal of education, one may discover a hidden interest in its process of construction. The virtues of obedience, loyalty, fidelity, etc. benefit primarily the rulers and not necessarily the educated, or the subordinated. Love of God, love of the leader is intended to increase the power of the leader, and certainly, not for the benefit of the ruled.

- Fourth, even if the goal of education is noble and for the educated, as seen in Confucianism and Christianity, one still doubts its effectiveness. The contrast between the invariable goal and the changing person clearly indicates the alienation between the set goal and human beings. How can an invariable standard dictate to a changing subject?

- Fifth, with regard to the problems of method, one may simply raise a question concerning the relation between ends and means. Could one develop a method without setting a goal. How could we know the right method without calculating the effectiveness of the method for the goal. Max Weber's excellent treatment of the inseparable relation between means and ends proves that a mere belief in method is rather naive if not dangerous.⁸

Idealism and Education

In this section, we go a further step in examining two prevalent views and methods of education: those of the empiricists and the idealists respectively. We will not, however, delve into the detail of the problematics of methodology as many educators from Normal Universities have done.⁹ We have treated this issue elsewhere,¹⁰ and do not need to repeat it here. The main point in this section is by means of critique to reveal the deterministic and ideological nature of the views on education held by both empiricists and idealists.

The Myth of Objectivism in Education

The main tenets of empiricism are two: first, everyone educated is primarily an object who can be observed, studied and tested; second, the law of education, generated from the general law of nature, has to be constructed on an objective and causal foundation. Consequently, a successful policy of education has to be built on what we call objectivity. We will go through their arguments and see whether the myth of objectivism could save us from crisis.

In blaming the present education as unscientific, and strongly criticizing conservative education as purely subjective, empirical educators seek a scientific, objective education. Their main points and arguments are based on the concept of science and objectivity (which are identical in their mind). To be scientific, one needs first to treat the educated not as a single, particular subject, but as an object, which, like other objects, can be observed. Second, what we can study from the object is not the object itself but its phenomena, or external appearances such as behaviors and reactions. Third, in locating the most common phenomena from the least, one could divide the "regular" from the "non-regular" and "irregular." Fourth, one observes among the "regulars" some common traits which can explain the difference between the "regular" and others, and which can explain the existence of the "regular." Fifth, one goes a further step to establish the law of

relationship among the "regulars" based on these common traits. Such laws are objective in the sense that they can satisfactorily explain and predict the behaviors (phenomena) in most cases. Finally, the empiricist educator will apply the above steps to study the "object" (i.e. educated), and to work out laws of education.

Actually, in treating man as an external, neutral object like a stone, and in reducing human activities to simple actions and reactions (when they collide), and consequently, in believing that one can establish causal laws explaining human actions and educate by such laws, the empiricist educator has committed a double mistake: that of ideological objectivism, and of a naive understanding of science.

To take human beings as external, physical objects which could be studied with the help of natural science, the empiricists have taken scientism or objectivism as their ideology. Such an ideology claims that:

- knowledge is synthetic and that synthetic knowledge is constructed on sensory experiences.
- all sensory experiences are observed and repeated.
- meaning is grounded in observation.
- concepts and their generations only represent the particulars from which they are abstracted.

Consequently, conceptual entities do not exist in themselves, but are mere concepts.

- sciences are unified according to the methodology of the natural sciences.
- values are not facts, and hence cannot be given as such in sensory experiences.¹¹

Deduced from the premise of scientism, any theory of education which claims to be objective or scientific, must be built on those above tenets. To the educators who take objectivism for granted and who follow its regulations, the business is restricted to the area of methodology. They adopt the Wittgensteinian dictum: "*Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen*"¹² and apply it to education: "The correct method in philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science—i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy—and then, whenever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed to give a meaning to certain signs in his propositions."¹³

One just needs to replace the word "philosophy" with that of "education" to understand what the empiricist educator thinks of and does with education. In this context, the method employed in education is empirical and the business of the educator is to teach the educated the proper use of such a method. One refuses to discuss the problematic of the purpose of education which appears nonsensical, metaphysical. In a stroke, they reduce all objectives of education to a single one: methodology.

It is not difficult to point out the mistake of the empiricist. We happen to agree with Karl Popper, who would have rejected such an understanding of education which he called the myth of objectivism.¹⁴ Though we regard Popper's critique as being of great help to dismiss the myth of objectivism, and though such a problem is worthy in a study of education, we will leave it together with the problem of application of neutral standards to human beings for further discussion. Here, we would like to concentrate on the extravagant claim that the business of education is restricted to methodological training.

Our very first question about our knowledge of rightness in methodology raises not only the complexity of the process of intellect construction but also the relation between means and ends. First, the empiricist may claim that the rightness of a method is measured by its conformity to the

standards of natural science, and that the right method would produce desirable result. Such a claim is in fact based on a meta-validity of the criteria of natural science. The scientific criteria are transcendental in the sense of beyond space and time. They are always correct. However, our question is not directed to the rightness or wrongness of scientific criteria, but to the role of the agent who recognizes and uses them. He is supposed to possess them beforehand prior to constructing some method. Immanuel Kant explains the human experiences of such knowledge in terms of a process of synthetic *a priori*¹⁵ while David Hume and the rest of the empiricists explain them in terms of psychological association.¹⁶ Both explanations are insufficient in the sense that they simplify and objectify human experiences. Both Kant and Hume treat experiences as simple facts or data which one can isolate in a single unit, and which could be accumulated. They forget that experiences reveal only the happened and not happening. As such, what they believe to be an internal or scientific knowledge is only historical knowledge. The difference between data (given or existing), facts (phenomena) which have happened, and phenomena which are happening has not been explored by them, so that their explanation is restrictedly based on data (existing) and as such misguided or one-sided.

Second, both Kant and Hume are convinced of a kind of universal experience that they identify as mathematical or physical. To them, such experience is certain, and provides a solid basis for constructing other knowledge.

Here, both Kant and Hume leave aside an important fact of the subjective role in experiencing. Experience is "experienced" by a certain subject. Thus, one has to properly deal with the subject as Edmund Husserl has rightly proposed in *The Cartesian Meditations*. Here, experience is constructed in terms of *Erlebniss*, and the *solipsic ego* is understood in terms of transcendental subject. We follow Husserl, and especially Heidegger of *Sein und Zeit*, to insist on an ontological analysis of the existential subject, by beginning with a radical doubt about Kant's construction of the transcendental ego. We inquire not only into the subject's appearances (facts), but also its appearing state by posing the questions and reducing (epoche) its non-essential features, such as what happens if the subject is falsely observed, or if it is in a state of illusion, or if it is determined by a certain ideological belief, or education. How could we warrant that man is not influenced by his milieu or by his feelings? Similarly, we know a great deal about the fact that any experience is primarily particular and atomistic. To construct universal and regular experiences is both possible and impossible. It is possible in the case of data (suppose that all experiences are like stones, chairs, i.e. invariable, unrelated things). It is however impossible in the case of facts and especially happening phenomena. Any fact (factum) is a fact because it happened, or was done, or constructed. And of course, it could not happen by itself. The role of the subject comes to the fore here. Thus, we can say that an experience (from facts) is rather subjective, and it can thus not be detached from one's living or life-world. We cannot think of individuals in terms of general laws if we leave unanswered the question of the impossibility or possibility of universalization of individual experiences.

Third, as a consequence, experiences understood as *Erlebniss* always point to certain relationships (between the subject and the object, the subject and other subjects, the subject and one's physical and intellectual world). We understand someone or something in terms of his or its relationship to us. We experience love, fear or loss, not from the object alone, but from the subject-object relationship. The experience of love comes precisely from this relationship. The language of "we love and are loved" expresses an inter-subjective experience which is born in the act of love of the agents (subject and object). The empiricist would put aside this important aspect of relationship in his genetic construction of experience.

The impossibility of having absolute experiences points to the problem of absolute criteria for human science, and consequently the collapse of the myth of objectivity in human science. The positivist tries to correct the idea of the empiricist by taking a more radical stand. To him, only criteria of natural science could serve as the foundation deciding the rightness of method. We have no doubt about the quasi-universal characteristics of natural science, but we have reservations about its claim of absolute correctness and, especially its extravagant claim of universal application in human life. On the one hand, the birth of quantum physics does not wipe out Newton's mechanics. It rather shows its insufficiency in explaining the phenomenon of quantification, and more interestingly the impact of milieu on quantity. Similarly, we witness the fact that modern mathematics have relativized the Euclidian system.¹⁷ On the other hand, the naive belief in a universal application of criteria of natural science has crumbled even at the first stage of rationalism. Kant's skepticism of the practicality of his categorical imperatives is no longer secret. Our point is simple, as long as we cannot transform ourselves into a kind of robot, any dream of having absolute criteria remains a dream. This claim is solidified by human objections to being deformed into robots. It would be the end of humanity.

We proceed now to the second part of our question about knowledge of the rightness of a method by discussing the means-ends relation. The empiricist claims the monopoly of method or the means, and bypasses the end which he considers metaphysical or nonsense just because there is no empirical proof of its existence. It is true to some extent that the goal does not exist concretely. The ideal of *chun-tzu* (noble man) in the *Analects*, or sainthood in Christianity remains mostly ideal and not necessarily existential; the model man in idealist education remains both vague and unrealistic.

However, not all purposes are unrealistic or abstract. In daily life, one's actions are always oriented toward a certain purpose: we eat not simply because of mechanistic reaction from our stomach, and we speak to friends not because of an organic demand but for a certain purpose, such as to communicate something or to be understood, etc. In most cases observed from our actions, we discover that it is not the means that exist beforehand, but the purpose or the ends, which stimulate the birth of method. Let us take the example of eating to clarify our point: Suppose that we are hungry and there is however available only some raw food. In order to satisfy our need, we have to discover one or other way to transform the uneatable into the eatable. We discover here culinary method. In the first stage, the empiricist may explain the act of eating as a simple reaction to the stimulus of stomach, but he is unable to explain why and how man discovers fire, instruments of cooking, and cooking methods.

We follow here Weber's excellent critique of R. Stammler's empirical approach.¹⁸ In the postscript to the essay on "Stammler's 'Refutation' of the Materialist Conception of History," Weber dismisses Stammler's claim that there is "only one kind of scientific knowledge of concrete phenomena," namely causal knowledge (which is empirical object). He says: "It is quite obvious that this sleight of hand is made possible in the following way. The unsuspecting reader learns that "the rule presents itself as independent of the motive which the person has for following it. However this point remains obscure. In one kind of case, we—the inquirers—are engaged in a "dogmatic" inquiry. Therefore we regard the "rule" as having ideal axiological validity, and we bracket or abstract the actual motivation of the actor. In the other kind of case, however, we are concerned with empirical knowledge. Actual men are included among the objects of our knowledge. By instituting a rule, they attempt to achieve an actual "goal." And in general, with varying degrees of certainty—they really succeed.

In order to insure that his scholastic obscurities will remain utterly impenetrable, Stammer personifies the "law of nature" and represents it as parallel to "precepts." They are distinguished in the following way. The purpose of the "precept" is to "constitute" a certain collective life. The purpose of the "law of nature", therefore, is to "cognitively (sic!) constitute" empirical regularity as "the unity of phenomena." The idea of a rule which "wants, means, or intends" something is at least a logically possible metaphor. In this context, of course, it is absolutely impermissible. However, the idea of a rule that "thinks" or performs "acts of cognition" is utterly absurd." 19

Actually, Weber does not object to empirical science which he takes as the model for sociology. He insists on the inseparability of ends and means. In his view, to understand fact, one needs to go beyond its mere appearance; one needs to grasp its meaning. And to understand the meaning (which man gives to his act) is to understand his intention.²⁰ Similarly, and developed from Weber's idea, Alfred Schutz describes human action in terms of the agent's intention: "The project is the intended act imagined as already accomplished, the in-order-to motive is the future state of affairs to be realized by the projected action."²¹

We take up the issue brought up by Weber and Schutz and insist that, the concept of method is neither *a priori* nor independent from human interest, and therefore, from the ends. We measure method by calculating its effectiveness in reaching the purpose or goal. We rationalize method not only by taking the criteria of natural science, but much more, by upgrading the effectiveness of the goal. Applying this to education, we may judge the scientific character of a method from its effectiveness: a successful education is an education which fulfills the purpose (set either by educator, parents or society). Of course, the nobility, or the soundness of such a purpose is still in debate. But, the fact is that, without a set purpose, it is almost impossible to determinate the soundness of method.

Another fatal mistake of the empiricist educator is his misunderstanding of human nature.

First, to conceive the person as an external object, is to regard one as static, i.e. undeveloping and therefore to design a static method to deal with such a static thing. If man is non-developing, then the method for handling him should be invariable. The educator commits the further mistake of regarding whatever is universal to be unchanging, and therefore, scientific. Thus, his scientific claim of method is built basically on his misunderstanding of human nature.

The study of Jean Piaget and Lawrence Kohlberg on human psychology, the genetic study of biologists, etc. all show that man is developing²² (either in stages as Piaget demonstrated or abruptly as Darwin showed). Actually, we know that, not only is man developing, even our interests are in an accumulating and transforming process. That is to say, the purpose of our action is not fixed but increasing, and consequently the need for ever developing new methods.

Second, by taking method as the sole criterion to judge the effectiveness of education, the educator lapses into a fundamental mistake of logic: how can he know the effectiveness without any knowledge of the purpose of education. The effectiveness of education is not seen in method, but in the agent who responds to such a method. The mechanism of method does violence to the free will of the educated.

The Myth of Idealism and Subjectivism

In opposition to the empiricist educator, the idealist tends to understand education as a mere business of training the subordinates or employees, i.e. to transform them into exactly what he has designed. The idealist could be objective (in the sense that he follows positivist, logical thinking)

or subjective. But, at bottom, he is as much dogmatic as ideological. Let us look at the basic doctrine of idealist education.

First, there exists some *a priori*, or transcendental model or standard which is absolute and perfect in essence. Such a model could be created either by God or by society. The model of Christian education is man-god, free of sin and bearing the image of God himself; the Confucian model is *chun-tzu*, a super and perfect product of feudal society.

Second, such a model is the ultimate purpose of man and society, and therefore the aim of education.

Third, the model must be universal in the sense that it is invariable. It presupposes the common and noble desire of mankind to become perfect.

Consequently, the main duty of the educator consists in first discovering the virtues found in the model man which are sanctified as moral principles, and then educating in these virtues. Success or failure of education is measured from the degree of the response of the educated and from his performance of these virtues. To be more precise, the educator has to work out a table of moral principles, or cognitive virtues, that he may call categorical imperatives (Kant), or golden rules (Confucius). Such a work is not easy because he has to deduce or extract from the model the essential features which determine the model man. In the case of Confucius, he has to examine various prominent figures in different states and history, from Kings Yao and Shwen to national heroes to find their common traits such as loyalty, benevolence, fidelity, obedience, righteousness, etc. that he identifies as virtues. In Christian education, these virtues are built after the model of God. Thus, sainthood (innocence, freedom of sin), belief, trustworthiness, charity and justice are its main virtues.

Only after having built these virtues and regarded them as the objectives of education, does the educator begin to think of the methodological problem. He will try different methods, and change them as long as the virtues are not fully acquired and practiced by the educated. Thus, to him, method serves no more or less than an instrument, or a technique to obtain the set, fixed goal. As such, method plays only an auxiliary, not the decisive role we saw with empirical educators. The method of the idealist could be scientific, objective, subjective, or even illusory. He may take the stick and carrot policy as his method. He may follow the art of love, or he may use various methods at the same time. Only his objectives are invariable.

In this context, he understands the crisis of education in terms of effectiveness of method, and more importantly, of the human factor. Let us consider this second view that regards the human factor as decisive in explaining the education crisis: the idealist educator tries to explain the failure of education in the weakness or stupidity of the educated. He blames the environment (society) for weakening the will of the educated. He shifts all mistakes onto the shoulders of others, but not on his own. More interestingly, he never questions the correctness or validity of his moral principles, and pays little attention to the real object of education, i.e. the educated.

Our main argument against such a view is based on the very human question of human inability and incapacity to fully follow such noble and perfect principles.

It is true that man is weak and limited. It is also true that man is easily influenced by his environment. And, it is very true that man is motivated by interests. As such, one needs to be, as the educator argues, transformed into a strong, independent and social person. Such an argument is based on a metaphysical claim that the objective of education is the ideal man, and of a misreading of human nature as static. Consequently, all we need are the noble principles which we

take as the objectives of our education. In this sense, it is quite plausible to identify the objective with the object itself.

Such an argument looks very promising if we take the idealists' premise to be true, and if we take the object (the educated) to be the objective of education. The point is, such a premise has to be proved, and such an identification should be justified. It is quite easy to prove the falseness of such a premise as well as the confusion of such an artificial identification. By posing here the question of the human capacity for following ideal principles, we have in mind a more basic question of human nature, and consequently of human problems. What would a man be if stripped of all human characteristics, or become a sort of god? As a man, could he match the divine, the ideal, the perfect?

The difference between man and God, the normal and the ideal, the finite and the infinite is so great that man could never perform the duty of the absolute, ideal God. Such an argument is neither apologetic, not purely Nietzschean. It is in no case a defense of weakness. It is a fact of humanity. Let us take Piaget's study to prove our point. Piaget's study of the psychological and mental development of the child gives some clue to human nature: it is neither *a priori* determined, nor externally or automatically constructed. It is developing, and the factors explaining its development are so complex and total that they cannot be reduced to a single metaphysical principle.²³ One may doubt Piaget's explication of human development in stages, but one cannot refute the fact of the development of mankind. One need not be a Hegelian to discover the permanent change of human history.

Since we will return to the thesis of both empiricist and idealist in our treatment of the crisis of education (by using critical theory) in the next section, a few words with regard to their understanding of the education-crisis are raised here. We share their view that our present education is in crisis, from the most visible such as the crisis of method, to the most invisible such as that of human nature. However, we understand crisis not in a single aspect of education, but in its total relational (communicative) aspect. We do not consider crisis as something abnormal in the sense of decadence, failure, or sin but as a necessary step in human development. Moreover, we conceive development both in terms of horizontal and vertical, quantitative and qualitative growth. To be more clear, crisis is possible only in human intercourse from human contact with different worlds and their paradigms. Thus, crisis is most visible in human dealings with the interests of classes, races or individuals, and in our struggle to solve problems. Such crisis takes the form of conflict among ideologies, between the real and the ideal, the profane and the sacred.

Critical Theory and Education

Critical theory is the oldest and the most sought after method by scientist and philosopher. The Greek mathematicians and philosophers discovered it as the most useful tool for sharpening thinking and for seeking truth. The Chinese sages employed it to work out a primitive form of pragmatism, and the Indians refined it to develop a metaphysical system.

It is however fully developed only with Hegel and especially with Marx, and finally, became a kind of ideology with the Frankfurt School.²⁴

In order to grasp the incompleteness of empirical and rational method, we need to look back at the critical method used in these theories, and then at Hegel's contribution, and finally at Marx's revision of Hegel's idea.

To empiricists, what we observe is the external object. But to distinguish true from false objects, one has to develop the criteria which come not from the subject but from the object itself.

Critical method consists in the work of observing phenomena, of distinguishing the regular from irregular, and from the work of constructing causal laws which can satisfactorily explain phenomena.

To idealists, critical method is a synonym for reflection. The thinking subject is subjected to rigorous critique. To him, the untruth comes rather from the unconscious or alienated subject.

Kant might be the first philosopher who did not agree with either the empiricist or the idealist. To him, to remain on either subject or object alone is insufficient to discover truth. Thus, he worked out a model of categories, with which, he believed, one can discover truth from untruth. The necessary conditions, as he claimed, are based on the model of arithmetic which are not conditioned by either subject or object. Thus, critical method centers on the work of applying these categories in judgment.²⁵ Unfortunately, these necessary conditions are transcendental in the sense that they are external and beyond our normal reach. As such, they can hardly deal with flexible and developing human activities.

It was Hegel who saw the impracticality of Kantianism. To Hegel, Kant failed to discover the Archimedian point and thus did not push through the promised Copernician revolution.²⁶ The Archimedian point is neither the subject, nor the object, nor the external necessary conditions. It is the point of relation between the subject and the object. To Hegel, the work of laboring the law of relation occupies the most important place. He claimed to have found such a law, i.e. the logic of history, with which he could explain and predict each historical stage.

In Marx's eyes, Hegel regretfully did not know the importance of his discovery of the point of relation;²⁷ he saw only a logical and abstract relation, not the real one. Marx promoted the sacred duty of critique, and declared the necessity of transforming critique into praxis.²⁸ To be more precise, one has to look at the relation between subject and object, subject and subject, subject and nature, subject and idea to see whether such relation is normal or correct. More importantly, Marx proposed understanding human nature from basic interests (economic) from which one can judge the normal, not yet alienated relation.

The members of the Frankfurt School have developed further Marx's arts of critique, but with the exception of Juergen Habermas, they remain in the first stage of critique that Marx himself wanted to overcome. It is true that Marx saw in the relation built by capitalist, feudal society a certain abnormality, but he did not remain on critique like those of the Frankfurt School.²⁹ He wanted to build a normal (or scientific in Louis Althusser's version) relation, the equal and just relation based on the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs."³⁰ The difficulty which Marx did not foresee is that there is no measure or criteria to determine human needs and capacity. Marx's miscalculation of human needs and capacity comes from his misunderstanding of human nature: man is social, and as such, is measured by the totality of society. Actually, Marx did not go through the most obvious consequence of his logic: if man is known by his relation to others (nature, other fellow-men) and by his own force (labor), then, in accordance with his creative labor his relation must be increasing. This means that Marx contradicted his view of developing man. Thus, his critique appears to be hypocritical. We think Habermas found this mistake in Marx when he proposed to drop Marx's utopian principle of communism, and replaced it with the principle of communication based on the linguistic model. The interesting point that we find helpful in understanding the educational crisis is that we can use the communicative, linguistic model to study the abnormality of relation,³¹ and consequently of our education. We can also take Marx's interpretation of human conflicts from the point of view of human interests.

Thus, the strong point of Marx's and Habermas's critical theory which surpasses that practiced by previous philosophers is seen first in their emphasis on human relation which is constructed mostly from human interests (economic in Marx and total in Habermas), and then on their effort to work out a certain law of relation (equality of needs and capacity in Marx, communicative in Habermas). The following are some further explanations of the genetic process of human relation and with it, of human interests, as well as their problems, that is necessary for an understanding of human nature.

First, suppose that one is alone, like Robinson Crusoe, living in an isolated island with no relation to other human beings except himself. In this case, we have a double relationship: to the subject and to nature (environment). To the subject, the relationship is relatively simple in the sense that one may have less relation in terms of quantity and quality. The relation consists of that between the subject (conscious or unconscious) and one's body expressed in physical and biological needs. The second relation between the subject and the subject (himself in the case of a conscious subject) is expressed in the act of reflection on the subject himself, (though, in Marx's view, such a relation is difficult to an isolated, asocial man); and the third one, more visible, between the subject and his environment, which is seen in his feeling (fear, respect, wonder, hate, domination, love) or in his actions (destroy, worship, cultivate, run away, etc.) towards nature.

Second, suppose that one lives in a small society (rural, family-oriented and primitive), his relation is a bit more complex, and his needs as well as his capacity are increasing in ratio with the increasing rate of relation. Now, he has not only a certain relation to himself (his body, his soul), or to nature (his environment), but to others (parents, children, spouse, friends, and superiors, including political, cultural and religious). To preserve each relation he has to follow certain norms and develop certain feelings, and he has many more needs to sustain such relations. One can easily detect that such relations determine his social status, and even his nature.

Third, if one lives in a global, super-technical and rich cultural society, his relation is so complex that he can hardly know exactly how and what it is. We can say that toward different objects and different subjects, or at different levels of the same subject, he develops different relations. One cannot reduce all these relations to a single spiritual relation (as did Hegel), or economic relation (as Marx believed).³²

The Genesis of Relation and Human Interests

In analyzing the forms of relation, one discovers beneath the surface of each relation certain kinds of activities oriented toward certain kinds of interests (in Habermas' division, there are at least three general kinds of interests: the cognitive, the practical and the emancipatory).³³

In our sketch of three different men who live in different milieus and histories, we discover a manifoldness of relation. Each man possesses many relations depending on the objects, interests and activities. Thus, we may formulate the relations in according with its objects, human interests, and activities:

- Relation varies according to different objects (or subject in the case of self-consciousness).
- Relation takes different forms depending on its ends (cognitive, practical, aesthetic, emancipatory, etc.).
- Relation has different structures in accord with human activities (problem-solving, satisfaction, enjoyment, control, fear, love).

Let us take Robinson, the asocial man, as an example to clarify our point: Robinson first faces his body, and discovers that he is cold, hungry, thirsty, menaced, etc. Such phenomena are conscious for him because he has a need to satisfy and protect his body; and more clearly, because his body urges him to do so. Thus, we can say that Robinson discovers his body not because of an idea of body, but because of his relation to his own body through needs and satisfaction. The discovery of relation and body is mutual and reciprocal. He discovers his body because of bodily needs, and at the same time, his bodily needs make him conscious of the presence of his body. Such a relation is not single in the sense that, the subject may face many objects at the same time. The expression of "Robinson feels menaced, lonely, exhausted, thirsty and hungry" says that Robinson faces many objects at the same time, and therefore he has as many relations as the objects he encounters. He feels menaced because of his relation to the outer world (nature, event, catastrophe, etc.), lonely because he has no subject to communicate with, thirsty because of the physical need of water, etc.

To satisfy his needs, he has to resort to a certain activity: drinking to satisfy thirst, eating to still hunger, a partner to suppress loneliness, or even violence to eliminate fear, etc.

The manifold relations are thus implicit in the existence of manifold objects (or subjects) and activities. However, not all activities, not all human needs and therefore relations, are normal. Some relations tend to distort human nature; some just hinder human development. Some are artificial, while some fulfill only a part of human nature. The task of critical theory is to discover the normal from the abnormal, the right from wrong. The point is how could we do the job without a prior knowledge of wrongness and correctness. Should we rely on some metaphysical criteria (that the idealist has adopted). The critical theoretician would not commit the same mistake of either the idealist or empiricist. He has to work with criteria which do not bear any metaphysical traits, and which do not rest on simple empirical data. Before we expose the main criteria which most critical theoreticians have taken, we wish to make our point clearer by taking the cosmopolitan man as an example of study.

We find that the cosmopolitan is much more complicated than Robinson. He has a great deal of activities (present, or still to come) because of his multi-dimensional relation to no specific number of objects. The complexity of his relation is not only due to the manifoldness of encountered objects, but also from his background, his spoken languages, and from his unlimited interests (which are born during the process of encounter or relation). From his relations, one could find some normal (in the sense of conventional), some not normal (new, or uncommon to such a society), some acceptable, some unacceptable, some comprehensible, some incomprehensible, etc.

On the one hand, from his relations, we can discover a certain number of encountered objects, activities and interests. On the other hand, we can also know or predict his new incoming relations from his actual activities in dealing with certain objects or in satisfying his interests. In this sense, we can say that the degree of complexity of the relation of the cosmopolitan could be measured, or predicted, if we know his activities, his encountered objects. Further, we may foresee his activities if we know his interests. In this context, we can say, what we understand of a human being is from his relation to certain objects, and what we discover from relation is human activities. In a step further, we can only understand human activities if we grasp human interests. However, interests are not *a priori*. They are born from human encounter with other objects or with man himself. The genesis of interests, relations, and activities is in a reciprocal process, and they are *mutatis mutandis* acting upon each other.

We go a step further to claim that human crisis can be primarily seen in human relation. We understand crisis as something abnormal, unacceptable, or a defect born in an abnormal relation.

The main point to be discussed is how do we know or judge normal relation, and how can we establish a causal law which links normal activities with normal relation. Only if this point is cleared up, can we talk about crisis, or educational crisis in particular. Thus, we return to the primary question of how do we know, i.e. how could we have some criteria to make a judgment on normality or abnormality.

Suppose that Robinson feels hungry, the first thing coming to his mind is to grab something to still his hunger. Such an action is called normal in the sense that everyone would do the same thing when he or she is involved in the same with the same happening thing (hunger). Thus, we may say that a man is sick if he does not react the same way as others do in the same case. In this case, to still hunger is a normal act sprung up from a normal relation between body needs and the subject.

We replace Mr. Robinson with a certain Mr. Smith (who happens to occupy an important place in the British House of Commons). Mr. Smith is hungry too, but he is sitting now in the House. Would he grab some bread to still his hunger in such a case? He would certainly think twice before performing such an act. He may take a sharp look to be sure if there is someone hanging around, say, a journalist, television cameraman, colleague... In each case, he has a different act, or reaction: he would take the bread and stuff it comfortably in his mouth if no one was there. He would rather suffer hunger, when the media-world is watching him, or he would discretely crunch it without disturbing his colleagues (because he is sure that they would do the same). We may judge him as a wise man, a normal man, because he performs the normal or required thing that everyone, in a normal situation, would do. In the case of Mr. Smith, one observes that he has more relations and more activities than Mr. Robinson; and that it is the relation (to media-world, to his colleagues or to himself) that determines the normalcy of his action. Here, normalcy refers to whatever is taken as common by both the subject and other subjects, or by the subject and the object as seen in Robinson. Abnormality or crisis arises when these normal relations are distorted. Let us return back to the case of Mr. Smith. One discovers in him at least three quite visible kinds of reaction, which result from three different relations: the relation between the subject and the subject (himself), the relation between the subject and objects (his body, his needs, bread), and the relation between the subject and other subjects (colleagues, media-world, observers). In each relation, a certain act is normal or legal, other acts may be abnormal or illegal. It could be normal but illegal, or legal but abnormal. We have to carefully examine each act in each relation. The first act of stilling hunger is quite normal in the first and second relations: satisfying the need of body, of the subject. However, it could be offending others in the House and thus "abnormal," and in some case, illegal (as in the Church). That means that normalcy in certain relations is not automatically implicit in other relations, or abnormality in other relations is not translated into normalcy in certain relations. But to accept that there would be different standards of normalcy in different relations is to admit a certain relativism in norms and standards of behaviors. And as such, it is meaningless for the business of critique, because each relation has its own standard which other relations cannot criticize. We are plunged into chaos.

Let us examine the three relations of Mr. Smith to see whether there is some common value or standard among them, which can dissolve their conflicts. One discovers that, stilling hunger is the most fundamental activity. It could be temporally suppressed, but not completely abolished. Mr. Smith, due to the required etiquette of the House and consequently for fear of being exposed to scandal if he violates them would choose an insignificant physical suffering. But what if he could no longer stand the hunger during the hour of voting (which requires his presence)? In this case, he would prefer a less grave minor offense (eating) over the major one (absence during the

voting), and he has reason to justify his act. The House and journalists would not blame him for such an insignificant offense, because it does not effect political consequence. This example points out an interesting order of needs and consequently, a scale of values: the most needed weights more in value than the less needed one, and, therefore, its action is more justified. Deduced from such an analysis, one could state that the most important relation, i.e. the one which is directly and vitally linked to human survival, has the legitimacy of establishing criteria of normalcy.

However, suppose that, it is during the election-period, and suppose that the British folk lay much more emphasis on moral values and etiquette (as seen in Chinese) and suppose that the election is vital for Mr. Smith. In this case, he has to think twice before taking a piece of bread in the House. He would rather suffer hunger, content with water sipping, than offend the public. He would prefer to be taken to the hospital than to leave the House. Here, one finds that the relation between the subject and other subjects (voters) dictates his behaviors. Again, such a relation is justified by a certain ideology. Could we say that such a relation is normal because it is important to Mr. Smith, and that every politician like him would do the same in such a case? We confront now the dilemma of orders: which kind of order, the biological or the ideological (ethical, religious, political) prevails? Could we take the ethical standard to judge the biological, the subjective to criticize the objective or *vice-versa*?

Critical theory does not claim to possess a table of absolute criteria or categories like Kant, nor to want to build one (with the exception of Habermas) because such a claim contradicts human nature. However, it proposes to study human nature from the human relational, mediating activities. It wants to examine the forms of human relation to see if they are properly constructed and whether they function. It claims to contribute something to human understanding by eliminating the alienated forms of relations born in inauthentic activities and influenced by reified ideologies or cultures.

In a word, it limits itself to the work of critique. It follows Marx's intention (which is abandoned by Orthodox Marxism): "We do not anticipate the world dogmatically, but rather wish to find the new world through the criticism of the old,"³⁴ and develop it further into a kind of method.

For our purpose, we will sort out its main tenets and apply them in our critique of present education. Like Marx, we wish to deepen our understanding of the educational crisis through criticism, though, we will not stop short in this.

As seen above, one could draw a picture of critical theory showing the following characteristics:

- Critical theory demands a thorough examination of what we take for granted (i.e. what we regard as normal relations).
- It urges a radical reflection on the world of objects, which influences relations.
- It concentrates on the mediating point, or relation between the subject and the world, and not on the object (empiricism) or the subject (idealism) alone.
- It explores the possible consequences of human activities based on human relation, with which it tries to reconstruct morals, laws, etc.
- It warns us of the danger of any kind of ideology, including technology, arts or mass-culture.³⁵

In other words, critical theory contests the view of both empiricist and idealist, which it dismisses as ideological. But what it could offer is only a litany of critiques (that most observers view as too negative).³⁶

- It criticizes any false view of human nature.
- It unmasks and criticizes the hidden ideologies which dictate or dominate our understanding of human nature.
- It objects to the methodological domination in natural science, which distorts an authentic understanding of human science.
- It rejects any kind of structure, which may help to reorganize or reconstruct some form of domination such as Nazism, Communism or Fascism.
- It opposes all kinds of alienated culture (which it suspects as ideology) such as mass-culture, instrumental culture.

In a word, it tries to reveal the hidden danger of any form of activities or structures which may cause human beings a certain alienation or reification.

Since our aim is restricted to the application of critical theory in education, we will refrain from giving further explanation, or from making any unnecessary comment which is irrelevant to our task. Sufficient to say that critical theory is far from perfect, and its negative performance would encourage other forms of ideology, the worse ones, such as anarchism or nihilism. Habermas himself feels that he has to build another version of critical theory, one that could be called scientific or quasi-scientific, and could contribute to human understanding. The model he seeks is based on a linguistic model with language-games as the transcendental rules established by human beings themselves.³⁷

Let us take critical theory at its best, namely its critique of ideology, and examine the crisis of our present education.

Our present education is constructed on our understanding of human nature, and, in turn, our understanding is often, if not always, dictated by our culture. Of course, culture is the crystallized quintessence of a long tradition and history, which expresses the spirit or the commonality of a folk. Such a spirit is known through accepted values, or through the means that protect values (laws, morals, etc.). Thus, we recognize a certain culture in its expressive forms (arts, music, poetry, language, morals, customs).

However, the spirit of a folk may be in flux due to the ups and downs of history, or due to contact with external or foreign values, or due to revolution. Thus, with the change, culture varies in different forms—or better—culture transforms itself.

The point is our education is often dictated by a certain form, in a certain historical period and by a certain class. Thus, it is our duty to examine whether our education is built in accord with our culture understood in terms of human commonality.

Referring to Chinese culture, one thinks immediately of the three most powerful currents of thought: Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism which are quite rightly described and accepted as the most expressive forms of Chinese culture. Hence, it seems right to build our education on this foundation.

To critical theoreticians, such a justification is in question. One needs to rethink it and more radically, one has to think even of its nature in terms of its authenticity, fruitfulness, validity and legitimacy. One has to go beyond its superficial form and structure to the most fundamental, ontological question of how its fruitfulness, validity, legitimacy, etc. comes into being, and how

they disappear, or are transformed in the historical current. The following is our attempt to delve into the problems of culture and consequently of our education.

First, one discovers a very disturbing thing in our education: ours is mostly based on Confucianism, and not on all three currents as the logic of culture would require. Most of the disciplines, doctrines and even methods are Confucian. Second, though, there are many Confucian schools (with different outlooks and methods, such as Neo-Confucianism, Modern Confucianism), our education has taken only the orthodox school's doctrines and method and left other schools out of consideration. Third, though orthodox Confucianism was chosen to be the backbone of education, not all but only the doctrines which are compatible to the ruling class or the regime are selected. Fourth, against the wish of Confucius, and the spirit of Confucianism, our education prefers violence over the principle of *jen* or benevolence as its method.

Our critique will focus on these abnormalities, i.e. on the uncommon traits in education, in order to dig up the hidden ideology.

The above disturbing phenomena of why our education is based fundamentally on orthodox Confucianism and not on all three currents or on Neo-Confucianism could be better explained in the context of human interests and power: the need of education (for the sake of whom) and the power of dictating its policy are primarily guided by the interests of the ruling class (monarchy). This means that the problems or the abnormality of education, can be grasped when the questions of class-interests and of power comes to fore, and are fully investigated. Thus, one needs only to take a critical look at historical records to see how education was designed, and executed. History reveals that education came to its bureaucratic form not under Confucius (who preferred private education with a strong emphasis on experiments and practical life, and who understood education as a kind of art helping the educated to become sage), but under the rulers of the Han-dynasty who conceived of it as an instrument to consolidate power (or to seize it), and to protect their own interests. If in the *Great Learning*, Confucius advocated a study free of selfish interests ("The way of learning to be great consists in manifesting clear character, loving the people and abiding in the highest good"³⁸), then our present education (coming down from the Han's education) lays great importance on serving the state, loyalty to the ruler, and loving the "nation."³⁹

Chinese history clearly records that with the Han-dynasty, Confucianism was taken to be the sole backbone of education at the expense of other schools of thought, but with a certain purpose: to train bureaucrats. It follows logically that only those who were trained as Confucians could become officials, i.e. could be within the reach of power. It was also evident that education was nothing but a method to protect the ruling monarchy. Hence, there was no doubt about their reason for choosing Confucianism as its ideology: it was not for its humanism, but rather for its dogmatism and authoritarianism as Han Fei-tzu candidly and proudly admitted. Here, we can understand the rulers' preference of orthodox Confucianism over Neo-Confucianism, their insistence more on its legal power and less on moral effectiveness.

The second no less disturbing enigma is that if culture is understood as the common expression of a folk, and if it is their spirit, then why is our culture monopolized by orthodox Confucianism and by the rulers, i.e. the minority who live indifferently to if not secluded from the people? If education is based on such a culture, is it helpful for the ordinary people? The fact that our culture is often identified with certain forms of thought (Confucianism), of arts (of the nobles, aristocrats, monarchs) or of morals (of Confucianism) shows that it is born in and from the world of the rulers. We may ask how a culture of the minority could represent the spirit of the majority (the ruled, oppressed)?

It is more strange however to note that the ruled, the oppressed, and the abandoned have embraced such a culture without a second thought. They regard it as their soul of which they are proud. Such a culture is now the aroma stimulating the folk, it is, as Marx observed, the preferred, or loved opium of the people.⁴⁰

We would not follow Marx to reject such a culture, but instead pose a more serious question: if it is not from the people, how could it be loved by them? Our question applies also to the problem of education: could any education based on class ideology be taken by other classes for granted? How could Confucianism be taken as the sole ideology without protest or opposition from ordinary people?

It is with this point that we take a distant position from Marx and the critical theoreticians: we are aware of the fact that the ordinary people take Confucian education for granted not because of partisanship, but because of its seductive promise to solve their problems. Therefore, like the rulers, they conceive of education as an effective instrument, but unlike the former (who want to protect their own interests) they want to be within reach of power by means of education. They consider it as the best means for problem-solving. It is desired not for pure knowledge, but precisely for its "power-knowledge."

Since culture is dictated by the rulers, and since education is the only instrument available and within reach of ordinary people, it is taken to be the criteria to measure success, and to solve social problems. It becomes *de facto* a social value which serves as the yardstick of life. At the same time, it plays the role of a necessary condition determining human fate, to free man from poverty, humiliation, and oppression. Education thus deforms itself into a kind of ideology.

The education promoted by orthodox Confucianism has its merits and failures depending on which purposes it takes, on which methods it adopts, and on which kind of ideology it identifies with.

Concluding Remarks

As we announced at the very beginning of this chapter, our aim is restricted to the problems of understanding the crisis of education. Though this chapter does not point out a guide-line (as did Habermas), it has shown that the crisis of education could be seen neither from the point of view of method, nor from idealist speculation alone. It proposes to tackle the problem from the perspectives of human relations and human mediating activities taken by critical theory. However, it does not claim that such a way of dealing with the problem is adequate. Indeed, we confess that such an extravagant claim may be as short sighted as the one advocated by the empiricists and idealists, the one attacked by critical theory. Actually, we see the empirical method as well as speculative reasoning helpful and complementary to critical theory. Not consenting to critical theory's radical objection to any form of ideology, we demand a full awareness of the danger of any kind or form of ideology, be it scientism, positivism, Marxism, empiricism, idealism, or rationalism and of its seductive effects like the Sirens that we, even with wax-stopped ears and blindfolded eyes, can hardly resist. Hence while against critical theory, we venture to claim that the problems of present education (crisis) are born in and from (1) the conflict of interests which are symbolized by, and abstracted from, the conflict of ideologies of classes; (2) the conflict between existing values and new emerging values which are expressed in new activities, new needs and new relations; (3) the conflict of newly adopted methods of understanding and solving problems; and (4) the conflict between the ideal and the real or the conflict of understanding

problems and solutions. Neither the ideal nor the practical alone can deal effectively with human problems.

Consequently, the main focus of education should be: (1) a thorough understanding of human relations and human activities; (2) a genuine search for possible solutions to the problems arising from the conflict of, in, and from such relations; (3) flexible methods helping the educated to be conscious of human relations, conflicts, and possible solutions, and (4) finally, helping the educated to develop the capacity of discovering and dealing with the emerging problems.

Notes

1 Payer Lynn, *Medicine Culture* (Holt, 1988); See also Juergen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, trans. Th. McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), pp. 22-49; John S. Brubacher, *A History of the Problems of Education* (1947); William Boyd, *The History of Western Education* (1954).

2 Juergen Habermas, *Legitimation Crisis*, pp. 1-2.

3 Edmund Husserl, *Ideen 1* (1913), in *Husserliana*, 3; ed. Walter Biemel, pp. 33, 56; *Ideen 2* (1952), in *Husserliana*, 4, ed. Karl Schuhmann, p. 245.

4 See Tran Van Doan, "Devaluation and Revaluation - The Case of Confucian Values and Its Crisis," in *Modernization and Post-Industrial Society*, vol. 3 ((Seoul: Olympiad Committee, 1989).

5 *The Analects*, 1: 2, 8, 14; 2: 11, 13; 4: 5, 24, etc.

6 Cf. *The Contemporary Currents in Education*, ed. by Institute of Education (Taipei: National Taiwan Normal University, 1988).

7 Cf. Albert Chao, "On Education," in *The Proceedings of Philosophical Foundation for Moral Education* (Taipei: Fugen University Press, 1985), pp. 44-48.

8 Max Weber, *Economy and Society* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), vol. 1, chap. 1.

9 See the series on education published by the Institute of Education, National Taiwan Normal University (Taipei: Normal University Press, 1983 ff.); also Yang Shen-keng, *Theory, Hermeneutics and Praxis* (Taipei: Normal University Press, 1988), pp. 5-14.

10 Tran Van Doan, "Philosophical Education in Taiwan," in *Towards the Education in XXI Century* (Taipei: Tamkang University, 1990).

11 Richard Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania University Press, 1983), p. 32; Mary Hesse, "In Defense on Objectivity," p. 170-1 (cited by Bernstein, op. cit.); See also Karl Popper, "The Logic of the Social Sciences," in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology* (London, 1977), pp. 90-91; Max Horkheimer, *Kritische Theorie*, II, p. 280; Juergen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 117; Albrecht Wellmer, *Critical Theory of Society* (New York, 1971), pp. 15-30; Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy* (London, 1958).

12 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung*, 7. 17.

13 *Logisch-Philosophische Abhandlung*, 6.53a.

14 Karl Popper, "The Logic of the Social Sciences," in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, p. 91.

15 Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der reinen Vernunft* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1974), part 2.

16 David Hume, *A Treatise of Human Nature* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), part 1, 13 ff.

17 Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (Chicago, 1962), pp. 100-101.

18 Cf. Rudolf Stammler, *The Historical Materialist Conception of Economy and Law: A Socio-philosophical Investigation* (1906), p. 368, quoted by Max Weber in *Critique of Stammler* (New York, 1977), p. 50.

19 Max Weber, op. cit., p. 100.

20 Max Weber, *The Interpretation of Social Reality*, trans. J. E. T. Eldridge (New York, 1980), p. 28.

21 Alfred Schutz, "The Social World and The Theory of Action," in D. Braybrooke, ed., *Philosophical Problems of the Social Sciences* (1965), p. 60; quoted by Eldridge, op. cit., p. 30.

22 Cf. Jean Piaget, *Child and Reality: Problems of Genetic Psychology* (New York, 1973); Lawrence Kohlberg, *The Psychology of Moral Development* (San Francisco, 1984).

23 Jean Piaget, *Introduction à l'épistémologie génétique* (Paris, 1950); or *The Child and Reality: Problems of Genetic Psychology*, op. cit.

24 See Tran Van Doan, "A Critical Review of Critical Theory," in Tran Van Doan, *Critical Theory and Society*, NSC Project 1998 (Taipei: National Sciences Council, 1998). To be sure, the Frankfurt School are not the discoverers but innovators of Critical Theory. The medial or relational point has been always a pride-discovery of geometricians. Hegel, Marx, and prior to Hegel, J. J. Rousseau had advocated a similar idea. In the *Emile*, Rousseau was pushing for an education based on learning-by-doing and motivation through interests rather than coercion. Similarly, John Dewey (1859-1952), shortly before the birth of the Frankfurt School, had believed that all fruitful thinking rises from a problem-situation in which man must choose from among a number of alternatives. Cf. John Donohue, "Pedagogy," in *Sacramentum Mundi* (New York: Herder, 1971) vol. II, p. 221.

25 Kant had set an example of critical theory in his third Critique: *Kritik der Urteilskraft* (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1968).

26 G. F. W. Hegel, *Phänomenologie des Geistes*, in *Hegels Werke*, eds. Michel and Moldenhauer (Frankfurt, 1970 ff.), vol. 3.

27 Karl Marx, *Die deutsche Ideologie*, MEW, 3 (Berlin 1956 ff.).

28 Karl Marx, *Thesen ueber Feuerbach*, MEW, 3.

29 Max Horkheimer - Theodor Adorno, *Dialektik der Aufklärung* (1944), Frankfurt, 1969); Juergen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, vol. 2, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1987), p. 119 ff.; See also Richard Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism*, op. cit., p. 43.

30 Karl Marx, *Manifest der kommunistischen Partei* (1847-8), MEW 4, p. 475.

31 See for example Habermas' reappraisal of Marxism: *Zur Rekonstruktion des historischen Materialismus* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976).

32 See Karl Popper's critique of Hegel and Marx in: Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, (1944), (London, 1950), chaps.12 and 13 respectively.

33 Juergen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests* (1968), Appendix (1971).

34 Marx in a letter to Ruge, in *Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society*, ed. L. D. Easton and K. H. Guddat (New York, 1967), p. 212.

35 Max Horkheimer, *Kritische Theorie*, trans. by J. O'Connell, *Selected Essays* (New York, 1972).

36 Cf. Guenther Rohmoser, *Das Elend der kritischen Theorie* (Freiburg, 1970).

37 Juergen Habermas, *Theory of Communicative Action*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1985), 2 vols.

38 *The Great Learning*, chap. 1.

39 Tong K. M., *Educational Ideas of Confucius* (Youth Books, 1970); also Douglas C. Smith, "The Confucian Legacy in Taiwan Pedagogy" in *Proceedings of the International Symposium on Confucianism and The Modern World* (Taipei, 1987), p. 1401.

40 Karl Marx, *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, op. cit.

The Dialectic of Power and Interests in Chinese Education

Introduction

Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer in the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* made a classic remark on the nature of the dialectic of power: "myth is already enlightenment; and enlightenment reverts to mythology."¹ With Adorno and Horkheimer, one could say that education is both a myth and an enlightenment: the myth is based on the blind belief that education in its omnipotent power, can produce or transform a human being like the magic wand in fairy tales. But education is also the unique means of enlightenment as Tzu-hsia, a disciple of Confucius forcefully argued: "To study extensively, to be steadfast in one's purpose, to inquire earnestly, and to reflect on what is at hand, humanity consists in these."²

Being both a myth and an enlightenment, Confucian education has been destined to inevitable ambiguity if not misunderstanding, and subjected to the manipulation of the ruling cliques or the State. In fact, the nature of education has never been clearly understood; there may be no definitive and absolutely authoritative definition of education. Any adequate (not necessarily acceptable) definition of a concept or thing has to fulfill at least the following conditions: (1) it has truly to describe its most essential characteristics (or, as the phenomenologists insist, its nature as such); (2) it has to grasp correctly its main functions; (3) it has exactly to pinpoint its motives, and perhaps more difficult (4) it has to establish a scientific law of its course. The scientific advance has made a great deal of clarifying the nature of a thing and hence has contributed to a better definition in terms of (1) its peculiar characteristics and (2) its functions. Science, however, could not explain, predict or calculate (3) human motives and interests without degrading human beings to the level of things or animals (as the behaviorists have done). But such a degradation, or equalization of man and things, man and animal, does justice neither to man nor to science because human interests (motives) are not invariable and present: human interests are growing, appearing, disappearing or simply changing (in the sense of varying, enriching or impoverishing). They can be suppressed or developed; they can be transformed or deformed as seen in the case of aspirations, passions and feelings. Thus, (4) to formulate a law predicting and calculating their course is tantamount to engaging in an impossible mission. The efforts of scientists (natural and social) in searching for such a law have been less than successful. At this moment, all they can claim is a dim hope for such a universal law.³ The critiques of the post-modernists, though questionable, make a point: our belief in a universal law that can predict, calculate, and dictate the human course is utopian.⁴ However, the temptation of a universal law of the human sciences is so great and irresistible that it could not be suppressed.

In this work, we will not delve into such an ambitious project, but rather be content with a critical examination of the dialectic of power and interests that could be of help in gaining a more comprehensive and less ideological understanding of education. We subject the present education adopted by the Chinese government to our critique not for the sake of critique, but for the tactical reason that only through critique of the inauthentic, phenomenal characteristics of present education can one approach its authentic nature. Our critique begins with an examination of the confusion between the objects and objectives of education, then with a critique of its adoption of an instrumental method in dealing with its objects, and finally with our plea for a more scientific discovery of its objectives in terms of discovering human needs (interests). Since we have

discussed at length the ideological essence of Chinese education above,⁵ this chapter is restricted to revealing the capricious dialectic of power and interests in education.

Objects and Objectives of Education

The textbook of education adopted by most teacher preparation colleges in Taiwan follows the Chinese Confucian tradition and the Western concept of education, though vaguely, as most educators acknowledged.⁶ Let us begin with Chinese traditional education.

In *The Great Learning*, the textbook of Confucian education, the first definition of education states: "The way of learning to be great consists in manifesting clear character, loving the people and abiding in the highest good."⁷ It follows with an explication of the method of education:

Only after knowing what to abide in can one be calm. Only after having been calm can one be tranquil. Only after having achieved tranquility can one have peaceful repose. Only after having peaceful repose can one begin to deliberate. Only after deliberation can the end be attained.⁸

It then states its metaphysical foundation: "Things have their roots and branches. Affairs have their beginnings and their ends. To know what is first and what is last will lead one near the way."⁹

We find a great number of definitions of education expressed in this way, not only in the classic literature, but in the present textbooks adopted by the government. Albert Chao traces the concept of education back to Mencius who confirmed that "all elitists are due to education" (literally): "all talents and learners in the world are possible thanks to education, how joyful it is."¹⁰

We are concerned not with the origin of the concept of education, but with how this is understood by the Chinese. Let us follow further Albert Chao's description of the concept of education. He begins with Mencius's restriction of education to the work of training the ruling elites: "education aims at fostering the talented in the world."¹¹ He then examines analytically the two concepts of "*chiao*" and "*yu*" found in Chinese classic literature as: 1) self-education (from internal forces), and (2) education received from external forces. These two kinds of education mutually reinforce each other.¹² Actually, such a definition of education is still insufficient because of it lacks the objective of education. Thus, at the end, Chao seems to return to the common understanding of education in Confucianism by placing the ideals of *chun-tzu*, a person of "great loyalty and absolute rightness," as the ultimate objective of education.

Such an objective of education no longer plays the dominant role, because the business of education is no longer restricted to moral education. Chao admits for example the important role of knowledge which helps to increase human capacity and ability for development. Thus, education aims at both morals and knowledge.¹³ But why knowledge; as we know, the original Confucian education laid less emphasis on knowledge as such. To Confucius and his disciples, it is moral knowledge and not pure knowledge that counts. Thus, the turn toward pure knowledge could not be explained without an understanding of its hidden reason. Actually, Chao does not mention the inner relationship between power (interests) and knowledge. Confucius always believed in knowledge, especially practical knowledge, as a kind of solution to social problems. If moral knowledge could serve to pacify the world, to govern the state, to run the household and to correct the individual himself, then such knowledge has to have a certain power. Here the concept of power in its broadest sense emerges in education: education to moral life means also education to power. In time, moral knowledge might have been diminished in power and replaced by political

or legal power (as seen in the case of legalism), but the concept of power is kept intact. Since the Han dynasty, it is no longer knowledge which produces power but the power which makes knowledge as knowledge.¹⁴ Hereafter, knowledge is identified with power. It does not matter which kind of knowledge. What counts is only that such knowledge can produce some power. Consequently, if the objective of education is knowledge, then it also is power.

Such an understanding of education was notorious in the Han dynasty when the examination system was introduced and rigorously executed. The Confucian examination system was designed not to promote moral knowledge, but to select the bureaucrats whose main duty was to safeguard the regime and to administer its empire. Here, knowledge is extended beyond the range of power to the sphere of interests. Knowledge is valued for its power in safeguarding the interests of the rulers. Similarly, education is valued for the same purpose.

Our present educational system appears to follow such a pattern, and our rigorous examination-apparatus is designed to select the best brains for such purposes. It is no surprise that Chinese parents lay such emphasis on education; they never question the national policy of considering examinations as the sole way for job-selection, promotion, etc.

One may argue for the examination system by insisting upon its effectiveness, and that is true. We do not advocate its abolition, since it is universally practiced and appears to be the fair way for any competition. The question is whether education is for examinations, or are examinations the only way to further education?

Dissatisfied with the Confucian examination-system, and with its over-emphasis on moral education (which sounds hypocritical), most of our educators turn toward the Western concept of education, as Chao noted.¹⁵ Though they take the Western concept of education in its original meaning of *Educere* or the art of leading and following, they reduce it to the technical level of how to learn and how to make those being educated to follow. In a word, education seems to be destined to be the art of methodical training. In combination with the original sense of education, modern education serves rather as an art, training those being educated to acquire some technical knowledge to gain power, or to defend acquired interests and to gain new interests, etc.

Here, one discovers two different kinds of objectives for education: the first is the one for which Confucius called, which is moral, and the second one promoted by politicians, industrialists, business people, etc., which is rather professional and legal. However, in both definitions of education, one notes the absence of the object, namely the educated person him or herself.

Such an understanding of education has been entrenched for a thousand years, and sanctified by the ruling monarchs. It became so sacred that no one dared to challenge it, and has served since as the backbone of national policy. It dictated all the textbooks required for national examination. Thus, we can say that education in China plays rather an instrumental role in training bureaucrats on the one hand, and in keeping the people in order on the other hand. However, such a verdict is too hasty. One needs to provide historical evidences and logical arguments.

The Misconception of Education as Instrumental Ideology

Let us begin first with national education in junior and senior high school. Here we chose the textbook prepared by a committee nominated by the Ministry of Education (or equivalent authority). The basic course given in primary grades is named "*Civic and Moral Education*," which consists of six parts elaborated in six volumes. One notes with surprise that, with exception of the fourth volume which reserves a very small part to explain the relationship between the individual

and society,¹⁶ all but a few sentences are devoted to national interests. Let us take a glance at its contents:

The first volume places 'perfect education' at its center, the second one deals with 'harmonious society', the third volume discusses 'civic laws', the fourth concerns itself with 'democratic politics', the fifth explains 'prosperous economics', while the sixth treats 'harmonious culture'.¹⁷

One may object to our understanding arguing that such purposes would aim rather at the individual him or herself. Let us go into the contents of the first volume to see what "perfect education" is, and how it functions.

The purpose and the nature of "perfect education" could be seen from four interests: individual, social, national and global. In a word, it follows the Confucian model in the *Great Learning*: in the first place education aims: (1) to accumulate knowledge and technical ability, (2) to develop capacity, and (3) to gain moral knowledge.¹⁸ In the second, third, and fourth aspect, one can hardly notice the place of the individual in education: here the world, nation and society are the objectives of education. But let us not be over optimistic that the individual is treated in the first place: actually the individual is treated as a social individual, and not an autonomous one. One reads: "In order to understand moral knowledge, the individual is not allowed to be independent from society. He has to co-live with others, and to understand how to morally live. Only so, can one live harmoniously with others. To learn a moral life, one has to be educated *a posteriori*."¹⁹ In this context, even if the individual is treated as the objective of education, he is eased into society very soon as its member and for its common purpose.

In a word, for traditional education it is not the individual as such but the nation or society that are the objectives of education, while the individual is mentioned as a proper object not of education, but of the state (society).

The situation does not change for the better in the second grade curriculum. Though the title "Civic and Moral Education" is replaced by a shorter version "Citizen" (or "Civic Education"), its contents remain almost the same with, of course, a more sophisticated explanation. At bottom, it sounds like an advertisement for the government's educational policy. In the first volume, e.g., there is found only a chapter devoted to "personality."²⁰ The rests deal with the national policy of education. That would be good news, however, compared with the contents for the first grade. Let us take a look into its content to see whether the concept "personality" is properly understood, and whether the student as a person has been taken to be the objective of education. The definition of "person" runs as follows: "person is a man who, in dealing with others, with himself, with things and with the natural environment, manifests particular, unique characters which are formed from his peculiar structure of body and mind, and which are permanent and homogeneous."²¹

That is not quite a false definition, but certainly insufficient and too general. According to this definition everyone has a certain personality because one is unique and peculiar. Even an animal would have a personality too if judged from the characteristics of particularity and uniqueness. The mistake lies not only in this weakness but elsewhere in its behaviorist explanation. It seems that the "person" can be discovered and formed after the patterns of behaviors, body-structure, etc. According to this definition, the person consists of two fundamental concepts: character and particularity. Each person has a certain character; but to form such a character, there are a great number of particularities. In general, human particularity could be described from its physical and mental structures. The physical structure is varied according to human outlook, health, age while

the mental is measured by human capacity, interests, attitude, ideology, motives, ideals, belief, etc."²²

As we see, the "peculiarity" referred is not at all peculiar. If personality is judged by human physical or mental structure, then we no longer have the claimed uniqueness, because persons can be divided into groups according to age, body-structure, ideology, educational level, etc., and as such one should be understood in terms of one's class and not one's uniqueness. The point here is not to contest such a definition, but to show that even if Chinese educators stress "personality," *they understand it in terms of class, genus or species*. Such an understanding of person leads to a kind of education of class and not of persons. It is not the person but the class, the state that is the objective of education. The study of national laws, constitution, economics, culture, etc., aims rather at shaping or molding the student in a certain model adopted by Chinese society. Our suspicion that the student as the object of education is not properly treated is quite verified by these textbooks. The one being educated is simply ignored or bypassed.

The Purposive-Instrumental Method

Therefore, it is important to raise the question of why Chinese educators reserve so much time for the objectives and not the objects of education. Such a question may critically point to some hidden motives which the ruling group tries to conceal and which we would identify as the interests of the rulers. Before arriving at such a conclusion it is necessary to examine the methods used by Chinese educators. Since methods in education are not randomly but intentionally chosen and used, one may say that they must be rational.

Chinese educators adopt the same rational pattern which Max Weber once diagnosed as that built on the model of means and ends.²³ Unaware of the danger of reducing human potentiality to a certain pattern of conduct, and of simplifying reason,²⁴ Chinese educators believe that a sound education must be judged by the method that can help attain the determined goal. Here, the method appears to be an effective instrument.²⁵ As such, it has to be constructed not from the perspective of those being educated but in accordance with presupposed goals. The point is that these goals are either the ones of the ruling class or the abstract values. Thus, one may say that the method is neutral and relies only on the purpose of education. To be more concrete, educators are concerned less with those being educated, but more with the effect resulting from the method.

Chinese educators adopt such a purposive-instrumental method without questioning its legitimacy. Here, we would like to raise the distinction between the effectiveness and the legitimacy of method. There is need perhaps to argue not about the effectiveness of a method, which can patently be measured by its degree of success, but only about the purpose itself. If the ultimate purpose of education is the ideal *chun-tzu*, then a successful method is the one which can help the educated to become *chun-tzu*. It does not make any difference how violent, dogmatic or unscientific such a method is. It makes sense only if it is successful. The famous saying of Teng Hsiao-ping, a paramount leader of "modern" China—"It does not matter how a cat looks (white or black) but whether the cat can catch mice"—expresses the pragmatic role of method in education. Hence, it is clear to most educators that the effectiveness of a method justifies and legitimates the method. Here, we discover a logical pattern of Chinese education: the necessary relation between the means and the ends which then decides the course of education. One finds nowhere the role of the educated in this relation. Once, the objective of education is predetermined by society or the state, and the pedagogical method is dependent upon the objective, the educated has no more to say, only to blindly follow.

However, effectiveness does not automatically generate legitimacy and science. A method could be effective, but be both unscientific and illegitimate. Overemphasis on the effectiveness of method could therefore undermine other objectives of education, such as the search for truth, justice, etc. A method is legitimate not because it is taken for granted, but because it can stand the permanent test of scientific objectivity and scientific truth. Lying could benefit someone sometimes, but it is illegitimate in the sense that it fails the test of truth and scientific objectivity. The geometrical proposition of "the shortest distance between two points is a straight line" is legitimate because it follows the ruled calculus. Similarly, violence, dogmatism, ideological indoctrination could be effective for some people and in a certain society, but they are not legitimate in the sense that they can not stand the permanent test of truth and objectivity.

Such a shortcoming of purposive-instrumental method was foreseen by Weber himself when he tried to distinguish the "purposive rationality" (Zweckrationalitaet) from the "value rationality" (Wertrationalitaet). The "value rationality," unlike the "purposive rationality," is not judged by the relation between means and ends, but by the social actors who share common values found in nature (natural scientific) or in the human community (social scientific).²⁶ Thus, any claim to legitimacy should involve a conscious belief "in the absolute value of some ethical, aesthetic, religious, or other form of behavior, entirely for its own sake and independently of any prospects of external success."²⁷ In this context, we can say with Weber that the legitimacy of education and its method is grounded on commonly accepted values, scientific or social, and not on method alone.

More than Weber, we see in the predetermination of method the logical consequence of ideological belief in the absoluteness of the objectives of education. If *chun-tzu*, if all kind of virtues such as loyalty, benevolence or obedience are so sacred that they cannot be put into question, then there would be nothing left to discuss but some variations on the method. Whatever the method, it could not afford to be independent from educational objectives. It has to mold itself to fit them in order to achieve the set goals. Hence, it is not a question of method, but of objectives which decides the fate of education. Our criticism of the instrumental-purposive method adopted by Chinese educators reveals not only its shortcoming, but a more troublesome, hidden reason behind the innocent and holy appearance of our educational system. This reason explains also the attitude of the ruling body which concedes some methodological mistakes, but is firm in not being willing to put the objectives of education on the table for discussion. Such a hidden reason is now identified as human interests.

The Dialectic of Power and Interests

Through an analysis of the objectives and the methods of education, one discovers grave negligence towards the educated. Educated persons have not been properly studied and are treated like things or animals who can be manipulated, molded, dictated and transformed. First, we contend that a study of (1) the characteristics and (2) the functions of an object remains insufficient, not only because of the difference between man and animal, man and thing, but because even these characteristics and functions do not come solely from the object. They could be assigned to it by one's community, environment, etc. They can be fully understood only in their own context. Second, more than just a grasp of characteristics and functions, it is the motives and the conditions which constitute the main concern (objectives) of education. That means that we have to deal with human motives (or interests) in a more scientific way.

Since the idea of person is inseparable from the concept of integral humanism, an ideal education must take into consideration the life-world with all its aspects (culture, religion, values, heritage, identity, and so on).²⁸ However, such a work would require a more comprehensive and detailed study beyond our capacity. Hence, we will restrict our study to a single object of education, namely the educated person.

In examining the objectives of traditional education, one always finds some motives behind them. There is no objective without motive. Confucius urged moral education because of his belief in it as the most effective way to pacify the world. Thus, when he stated: "The Way of learning to be great consists in manifesting clear character, loving the people, and abiding the highest good,"²⁹ he has in his mind a certain motive, namely, "bringing order to their state."³⁰ Similarly, education as extension of knowledge aims at "peace throughout the world."³¹ In this sense, *chun-tzu* as the purpose of education is cultivated because of its power to transform society for the better. The integrity, responsibility and honesty of *chun-tzu* can help in realizing humanity,³² in giving security and peace,³³ and in maintaining social order.³⁴ The benevolence cultivated by *chun-tzu* has a greater effect than just being beloved by the people. It helps in perfecting oneself, pacifying the world, etc. In the same context, Confucius exalted virtues such as harmony, rightness,³⁵ loyalty, seriousness,³⁶ the observance of rites, etc., which certainly have effects on the arts of ruling, on conflict-solution, and so on. Thus, undeniably education is intended for human interests. The point to be discussed therefore is not an asocial, unreal education, but an education oriented by human interests. Hence, the questions of "which kind of interests," "whose interests" and "how to regulate interests" should be the central theme in modern education.

As we have stated in our introductory remarks, any adequate study of human phenomena has to be based on: (1) a phenomenological study of its characteristics, and (2) its main functions. More than that, we have: (3) to discover human motives (or interests), and if possible (4) to construct a law-like rule predicting, calculating and regulating the genetic course of interests and human action. Up to now, most social scientists have spent more time on the first and second parts, while neglecting or ignoring the third. Thus, their social laws appear more like natural laws than human laws. The study of Habermas has partly restored the third dimension of human study.³⁷ He is quite right to establish a necessary linkage between interests and knowledge, which applies to education and could explain more adequately the common saying: "knowledge is power." The role of education is irreplaceable because it is the most effective and legitimate way to acquire power.³⁸ In the frame of this work, we will discuss the first question of "which kind of interests" and "whose interests?"

In *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Habermas claims three kinds of different, but related interests: the theoretical, the practical and the emancipatory. He then proves that these kinds of interests correspond to three kinds of knowledge: the purely scientific, the practical (moral, political) and the aesthetically creative. That is true enough. However, to divide human interests into three consecutive, and clear-cut genres is too academic, if not dangerous. Actually, pure knowledge has not been the central point of either Aristotle or Confucius, Jesus or Buddha. Pure knowledge does not produce force. It generates power only if it is properly applied. A mathematical proposition would be no more than a simple game in the mind if treated *per se*. The propositions "the distance between the sun and the earth is 8 million km," or "the speed of light is 300.000 km/s" are true, but meaningless to a peasant, or to all but a few astronomers or related scientists. Its meaningfulness or meaninglessness thus come from its possible or real application to human life. In this sense, education aims at pure knowledge but does so for the sake of application. In other words, knowledge could transform itself into power because of its force of

application to human life. One can say therefore that the basic foundation of knowledge is not pure knowledge as such (as Plato and his followers mistakenly took for granted), but human interests themselves. Consequently, any knowledge is firstly human knowledge about nature, human beings, etc. This phraseology is important because it clearly states our point: to understand human beings and their society, one has to understand their interests.

Unlike Habermas, we see in practical knowledge (which is born in practical interests) the dynamic force or motives for the development of pure knowledge. This position is not Marxian, in the sense that we do not claim the priority of praxis or theory, nor do we follow the naive view that theory is born in praxis. Nor does Habermas share that Marxian view. Here, we follow Karl Popper's description of scientific progress in some aspects, and apply it to understanding the genesis of interests.

In a paper dealing with the logic of the social sciences presented to the *German Conference of Sociology* in 1961 Karl Popper proposed 27 theses on the methodological question in social science. His main thesis sounds as if it claims that only through a rational and permanent criticism of error does scientific knowledge develop.³⁹ The so-called "trial and error" brought forward earlier in *Conjectures and Refutations*⁴⁰ is slightly modified in verbal expression, but remains unchanged in its substance. According to this view, knowledge is in a constant process of development through criticism of one's mistakes. Popper's idea of the emergence of mistakes is more relevant to the arguments backing our explanation of the incessant development of new interests and, hence, new purposes as well as the extinction of some of the old ones in human life. According to his view, our discovery of mistakes is implicit in our criticism of existing knowledge, and of new emerging knowledge, etc.⁴¹ This means that the development of new knowledge is possible because of the discovery of new mistakes and so on. In effect, one can say with Popper that one discovers mistakes prior to solutions, during the process of searching for solutions, and even after solutions. Analogically, our discovery of new interests and purposes follows the same pattern, not only through criticism but through new human relationships resulting from our contact with a new world (object, human being, society) or through self-reflection.

We contend that human interests grow in proportion to new human relationships, and that it is these relationships which stimulate, generate and refine human activity. The multi-dimensional relationships could be measured by the multiplicity of interests, which then stimulate new interests and consequently new relationships. Human activities born in human relationship or stimulated by human interests have a double function of satisfying (or searching to satisfy) interests, and maintaining, furthering or shattering human relationships. Such a function is guided by a rational process of calculation of the ends and means, of relationship and interests, and so on. To clarify this position, we wish to go a step further to examine Habermas's linkage of human interests to human knowledge.

Prior to our critique of Habermas's thesis, it is necessary to say something about the nature and meaning of relationship. The expression "relationship" unfortunately is insufficient to describe the Hegelian concept of mediation and reconciliation and the Marxist concept of medium and its conditions. Our use of the term bears not only the ordinary sense of intercourse or linking; by it we mean: (1) the whole medium and its conditions, (2) the act of mediation and reconciliation, and (3) the state of intercourse, interchange and so on. Thus, when one talks about human relations to nature, to other human beings, or to man himself, one expresses not only (3) the state of relation, but (a) its essence and (b) its nature and activity.

The relationship comes gradually first as a casual contact, an accidental or intentional meeting or confrontation, an unconscious or conscious arrangement, etc. Such a contact could be developed

into a normal or intensive intimate relationship depending on whether and how the subject discovers in the contacted subject some of his or her interests. In accord with the degree of interests is the intensity of relationship. A relationship can be cool or warm, intimate or superficial, friendly or hostile, indifferent or attentive.

Second, the relationship is in a process of changing, for better or worse. Such a change can be measured by the degree of understanding, receptivity and new discovery of the interests of the contacted subjects. It is also motivated by the mutual discovery and receptivity of both partners. Its success or failure is determined by how the subjects regulate, divide, etc. their interests, and its progress is seen in how the subjects solve the problems that arise from interests-conflicts.

The concrete example of human-nature relationships clearly solidifies our view: the primitive person saw nature as god or semi-god, and his or her relation to it was one-way or one dimensional as dictated by the latter. The modern person's relation to nature appears also as one way, but this time in a reverse order. Nature serves one simply as an object to be exploited, to serve one's interests and so on. Thus, between humans and nature, there is only a simple one-way relation. Among people, one could easily find the same kind of relationship, that of master and slave, of alienated subjects, etc. But this is not the one sought by human beings, and such a relationship could hardly change or develop the person. The kind of relationship called for by Hegel or Marx sounds as romantic as if sought by a poet. Nature and persons are no longer simple objects to be exploited or plundered. They are partners in a partnership relationship just as in a love-relationship. Nature serves both as human medium, and the human condition in which and with which humans develop. Nature contributes its resources to help human beings survive. Nature and humans no longer play the war-game of search and destroy, but appear as partners in a reconciliatory and mediating mood and position (Hegel). Of course, this kind of human-nature relationship is still wishful thinking. But such a wish is far from unreal or utopian. It is in the process of realization which one cannot ignore for it is the process that determines human fate.

With relationships come human interests, which Habermas divides into three categories: theoretical, practical and emancipatory.⁴² There is no need to confirm Habermas's accurateness by systematizing them in a dialectical form. Indeed, the attempt to put interests in a table of categories not only suffocates them, but also contradicts the nature of interests seen in their dynamic growth and in the power of creating and shattering existing categories. Thus, we venture to object to Habermas's explanation of human knowledge in terms of methodical inquiry dealing with three kinds of interests; we regard them as insufficient and dangerous. It is not difficult to share Habermas's explanation of the birth of knowledge in terms of human interests. However, could we satisfactorily build a law linking interests to knowledge without questioning the status and the nature of interests themselves? Unfortunately, Habermas does not go farther than a sophisticated explanation of knowledge. He seems to adopt a kind of meta-theory of interests, which plays the *de facto* point of departure for an escape from any inquiry. Thus, he regards interests as both the purposes and motives of human life which guide our acts, and which determine our ways (or methods). As a consequence of the search for an adequate method, knowledge is born.

Here, Habermas seems to confine himself to the myth of positivism which he had vehemently rejected. His mistake is easily detected. He first has not distinguished purpose from motive. In his study of Sigmund Freud,⁴³ and in his attempt to reduce Nietzsche's program of new philosophy to the field of cognitive interests,⁴⁴ Habermas seems to take purpose to be motive, e.g., when he interprets Freud's description of human motives: "It is a system of self-preservation that serves two functions in particular: self-assertion against nature and the organization of men's inter-

relations.⁴⁵ We would follow Peter Winch's distinction between motive and cause in his critique of Stuart Mill and other positivists to point out Habermas' confusion of purpose and motives. Winch argues: "A dispositional, just as much as a causal, statement, is based on generalizations from what has been observed to happen. But a statement about an agent's motives is not like that: it is better understood analogous to a setting out of the agent's reasons for acting thus."⁴⁶ In another respect, purpose is mostly conscious while motives are often unconscious, as Freud showed. Purpose could be difficult to replace while motives are often changed during the course of searching for purpose.

Thus, more than Habermas, we insist that human motives and purposes are not transcendental, but in a genetic process. This means that human interests are in a process of growing and expiring. The birth of human interests depends on the social medium and the natural milieu, on its conditions as well as on specific relationships. Knowledge does not give birth to interests but can intensify and render them explicit. In this sense, the traditional definition of philosophy in terms of love of wisdom, which Habermas still embraces, appears wrongly constructed. It is not that wisdom gives birth to philosophy, because such wisdom does not exist prior to philosophy. In fact, wisdom is implicit in philosophy; it cannot be thought of independently. The same could be said of education: wisdom, or whatever, regarded as ideals is not prior to human interests or human activities. Wisdom, ideals, etc. are thus neither the motives nor the causes of our education or our philosophy. This point appears radical because of our suggestion to understand philosophy and education as a process of discovering new interests, and of regulating them. This means that philosophy, education, etc. are born precisely in the process of the discovery and regulation of interests. That is the reason for our criticism of traditional education as laying too much emphasis upon wisdom, ideals, sainthood, *chun-tzu*, etc. at the expense of the educated and their interests. In this context the slogan "knowledge is power" appears ridiculous and negatively ideological. We know for sure that knowledge in itself is neither power nor wisdom. It produces wisdom or power only if it is related to the question of human interests; or more specifically, to the question of how man discovers interests, of what part interests play in human life and how to regulate them.

Our claim that knowledge produces power demands further clarification: First, not all knowledge, but only that born in, and dealing with, interests can produce power. Our argument that a scientific knowledge, for example, Bernoulli's equation-theorem which solves the aerodynamic paradox, would lose its meaning if it is treated as pure theory, inapplicable to the field of aerodynamics, confirms our point. Second, knowledge produces nothing if it is incomprehensible and impractical. A man living in a rural region where no infrastructure is built or a man who has no need to travel could hardly imagine the Newtonian calculus of speed. And even if he has learned something from Newtonian laws of gravitation, such knowledge is useless in solving his immediate problem of gathering food and growing vegetables. Therefore, knowledge would be incomprehensible if placed in a "transcendental" place or assigned to a meta-role. Habermas attempts to do exactly what we are criticizing.

Similarly, we can say education in itself does not generate power or wisdom. Rather, it is the education of interest-discovery and interest-regulation that count. Thus, an effective education could not be judged by its noble, perfect ideals or purposes, but by its fruitfulness in discovering, regulating and distributing interests. In traditional Confucian education, the way of regulation and distribution was monopolized by the *intelligentsia*. They sought to dictate human interest by restricting and regulating them. As a result, there was barely any human progress. The poverty of our education or the sterility of our knowledge can best be seen in this light: a lack of new interests could not generate the dynamic which is the cause of progress. But, new interests can be born only

in a free society where human relation is not restricted and where human interests are respected. In short, the growth of knowledge is measured by the continuous birth of new interests, which in turn are possible in new human relationships. The intercourse of this trinity (if we can borrow the religious language that Giambattista Vico "abused") is not only reciprocal, but dialectical. Its force involves shaping its generative relationships that are not one-dimensional, but immanently multi-dimensional.

Thus, the dialectic of power and interests should be understood not solely from the point of view of knowledge, but from the way one learns to regulate and distribute interests. The more effective a way is in dealing with interests, the more powerful it is. To put this idea in a simple manner, we would note that the power of the father in a family has more to do with his capacity in solving most of the problems in his family and less with what most of sociologists explain in terms of ideology (patriarchalism). In most families, especially in rural areas and in lower income classes, the father enjoys a greater authority, while in industrialized countries where both male and female have to work, the power of the father is reduced visibly. In some case, the father has no authority at all, which is possessed by his wife. Our explanation of such a phenomenon is that the one who could solve the problems of the family, in terms of quality and quantity, has power. In the traditional family in which the man works and earns money while the woman keeps household (no salary, of course), it is the man who has the say. In the case of the modern family in which both partners work and make money, the power is often divided in a more balanced way. And if the man runs the household, he has even less say. (Of course, there would be some exceptions, but this is true in most cases). Such an explanation may seem a bit unsophisticated and some intellectuals may dismiss it. But the evidence of rigorous statistics should have the last say. They show that the rural man has more power than the urban one, that the one who is working has more say than the one who is not working, that the modern wife (who is working) is more independent and respected than the traditional one, etc. Such statistics are fully understood in the context of problem-solving capacity: the one who can solve problems has power. The problems could be economic, social, intellectual, physical, religious, etc. and consequently, the powerful men are often industrialists, politicians, intellectuals, doctors and priests. They are those who can best solve the related problems.

From other aspects, power could be accumulated through manipulation, coercion, and cheating. Such phenomena of power-accumulation are unscientific and dangerous. To explain this way of power-accumulation: First, one supposes that there are only permanent, fixed interests. Second, that the best way to deal with these interests is to keep them as they are. Whenever some problems arise, the ideal method for dealing with them is to suppress them by violence, or to make the people forget them by ideological indoctrination. Third, by combining violence with indoctrination, the ruler or the educator gains access to a power not based on capacity for solving problems but for suppressing them. Thus, the ruled or the educated is fearful of the ruler or educator. Due to his or her ignorance, and to the fear of being punished, the ruled person worships the ruler and consequently, he (she) exposes himself (herself) to the ruler as an instrument (or as merchandise). One *de facto* and *de jure* acknowledges the power of the ruler as legitimate. In this sense, the feudal prince, in order to govern, has to cheat the ruled by means of violence, manipulation, intimidation and, paradoxically, by empty promises of peace, love and prosperity. Machiavelli's *Realpolitik* has brilliantly demonstrated such a kind of human relationship, the kind of *homo homini lupus*.⁴⁷

Here, we have two approaches to power: the first through a rational process of problem-discovery and problem-solving. Success in problem-solving (often by a just and fair distribution

of interests, rational regulation of relationships and interests, and precise prediction of coming problems) determines the degree of power. The second approach proceeds by a systematic cheating, manipulation, intimidation and indoctrination which also culminates with power too. But unlike the first, the problems cannot be solved, but instead are suppressed. Thus, one cannot predict the coming problems and foresee possible solutions. Again, they stick to violence and manipulation to keep power intact.

As a corollary, we have two kinds of education: the first is rational, the second ideological in its negative sense. In the first case, education is considered as a sacred work to help the educated to discover his or her own problems (by a knowledge of human relationships and emerging human interests, and by a reflection on problems arising from relationships and conflicts of interest), and then to search for adequate solutions (by means of communication, fair distribution, rational regulation, scientific method, etc.). In the second case, education is regarded as an effective instrument of manipulation (by means of indoctrination) to keep the educated in the *status quo*, or to force them to believe in the present situation and its principles (by inventing an ideology). Both ways generate power. But as we witness, while in the first case, the acquired power is uncontested and praised, in the second case power is often involved with corruption. It could be embraced, but often is despised.

Concluding Remark

In any education, particularly Chinese education, power has been and is the objective sought by the educated. We are by no means against such a kind of understanding which we see as inevitable. The point that we plead for is, that only power acquired by rational method can survive the test of history. Its legitimacy is grounded neither on violence nor on intimidation, neither on indoctrination nor negative ideology but on its validity and effectiveness in discovering-solving problems. Consequently, a sound education has to be built on such a principle: the principle of rational criticism (as Popper may say), which consists of learning to discover human problems and searching for adequate and effective solutions. Since, human problems are growing or diminishing, emerging or disappearing in proportion to human relationships, the educator has to understand human relationships, to maintain or further them, and more importantly, to cultivate and enrich them.

Notes

1 Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, *The Dialectic of Enlightenment*, trans. J. Cumming (Boston: Continuum, 1972), p. xvi.

2 *The Analects*, 19: 6; English translation of Chan Wing-tsit in *A Source of Chinese Philosophy* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1961).

3 See P. Filmer ed., *New Directions in Sociological Theory* (New York: Collier - MacMillan, 1972).

4 Cf. Francois Lyotard, *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge*, trans. G. Bennington and B. Massumi (Memphis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984).

5 See chapters 2 and 5 in this volume.

6 Cf. *The Contemporary Currents of Education*, ed. by the Chinese Society of Education (Taipei: Normal University Press, 1988).

7 *The Great Learning*, 1; Chan, p. 86.

8 *The Great Learning*, 1

9 *The Great Learning*, 1.

10 Mencius, Ching-hsin, 1; Albert Chao, "On Chiao-yu," in the *Proceedings of the International Conference on The Philosophical Foundations of Moral Education in China* (Taipei: Fujen University Press, 1985) (Chinese), pp. 44-59, esp. p. 44. Hereafter as Chao. The English edition edited by Tran Van Doan, Vincent Shen and George F. McLean, *Chinese Foundations for Moral Education* (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1991).

11 Chao, p. 44.

12 Chao, p. 48.

13 Chao, p. 48.

14 Hans Bielenstein, *The Bureaucracy of Han Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980); Wang Zhong-shu, *Han Civilizations*, trans. Chang K. C. (New Jersey: Yale University Press, 1982); Benjamin I. Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985).

15 Chao, pp. 47-48.

16 National Compile Institute ed., *Civic and Moral Education* (Taipei, 1985, rev. ed.), 6 volumes, vol. 4, pp. 1-8.

17 *Civic and Moral Education*, vol. 1, Editorial Guide-line, p. 1.

18 *Civic and Moral Education*, vol. 1, p. 2.

19 *Civic and Moral Education*, vol.1, p. 2.

20 *Civic and Moral Education*, vol. 1, pp. 16-22.

21 *Civic and Moral Education*, vol. 1, p. 20.

22 *Civic and Moral Education*, vol. 1, p. 16.

23 Max Weber, *Economy and Society*, vol. 1., part 1.

24 Cf. Tran Van Doan, *Reason, Rationality, Reasonableness* (1989) (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2001); Alasdair MacIntyre, *Whose Justice ? Which Rationality ?* (Notre Dame University Press, 1983).

25 Weber called it the purposive-instrumental method.

26 Max Weber, "The Concept of Social Action," pp. 78-79.

27 Op. cit., p. 78.

28 Cf. Jacques Maritain, *Humanisme inteùgral* (Paris. 1936); See also Tran Van Doan, "The Idea of Integral Humanism," in Oliva Blanchette, Tomonobu Imamichi, George F. McLean, eds., *Globalization and Philosophical Challenges* (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 2001), vol. 2.

29 *The Great Learning*, chap. 1.

30 *The Great Learning*, chap. 1.

31 *The Great Learning*, chap. 1; Chan, pp. 86-97.

32 *The Analects*, 15: 8.

33 *The Analects*, 14: 45.

34 *The Analects*, 13: 6.

35 *The Analects*, 13: 6.

36 *The Analects*, 14: 45.

37 Juergen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interests*, trans. J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975). Hereafter as *Knowledge and Human Interests*.

38 The ideology of "knowledge as power," once taken by philosophers like Francis Bacon and the Enlightenment, is uncritically embraced by Habermas. His critique of Gadamer's acceptance

of tradition (1978) seems hypocritical. In our view, no one can be free from the Mannheim paradox. This is the reason of our attempt to understand ideology in its dialectical process, from the positive to the negative, etc. See chap. 1 in this volume.

39 Karl Popper, "The Logic of Social Sciences," in Theodor Adorno, ed., *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, trans. G. Adey and D. Frisby (London, 1976), pp. 87-104.

40 Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations* (London, 1968).

41 Karl Popper, "The Logic of Social Sciences," p. 88.

42 *Knowledge and Human Interests*, Appendix, p. 311.

43 *Knowledge and Human Interests*, pp. 214 ff.

44 *Knowledge and Human Interests*, pp. 274 ff.

45 *Knowledge and Human Interests*, pp. 276-277.

46 Peter Winch, *The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy*, op. cit., p. 81.

47 Cf. Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Prince* (1513), (London: Bantam, 1966).

Education for Freedom

Introduction

The French Revolution of 1789 was by all accounts not an accident. On the one hand, it was fomented, nourished and raised in the womb of injustice, serfdom and the inequality of the French society of those days. The aristocrats, clerics and landowners enjoyed the wealth and left nothing for the poor majority. Law, medicine, and even theology were reserved for the privileged while prayer and fate were left for the poor. Education was a word as strange as noble, not even heard by peasants and workers. On the other hand, the revolution was stimulated by democratic and enlightened ideas made known to the people by such intellectuals as Charles-Louis Secondat de Montesquieu and Jean Jacques Rousseau. The latter, author of the controversial *Emile* (1762),¹ foresaw such an event, which he judged inevitable, and which he feared: "There is no longer any remedy except a great revolution which would be almost as terrible as the evil which it could heal, which would be a crime to seek to bring about."² Equally eloquent, he prophesized in *Emile*: "We are approaching a critical situation, and the century of revolution. I consider it impossible that the monarchies of Europe should be able to endure any longer."³

True to his fear, Robert Robespierre, the blood-thirsty executor of the Revolution turned Rousseau's bourgeois humanism (described in *Emile*) into a new ideology of horror. His comrade, Charles Marat, went on to compare the *Contrat Social* to the "bible of revolution." Actually the duo transformed Rousseau's democratic ideal into an ideology of chaos, and his humanist method of education into a method of terror. Napoleon Bonaparte was not completely wrong when the emperor blamed Rousseau, "C'est la faute de Rousseau," for such a bloody revolution that he dreaded so much.⁴

Despite these negative effects, the Revolution of 1789 was unprecedentedly historic, for with it was born a new history for humankind: the era of humanism, freedom and democracy. The whole of France and Europe were transformed, as were their national education systems.

This chapter is intended not as a simple presentation of Rousseau's idea of education, but as a call for the enlightened, ideology-free education *Emile* implied. Our aim is to defend a pedagogy based on free choice, and on human needs. Such a choice is possible and such needs are fulfilled only if we are conscious of human development and of the obstacles which may hinder such development. The struggle against out-dated ideology, against any form and method of indoctrination, and the search for new ideas guiding our education are most evident in French higher education and, of course, in Rousseau. The revolt of the Paris students in the late 1960s and 1980s, though different in motives and means, reflected this democratic spirit. It is a determination to fight against any kind of negative ideology, either from the right or from the left. This chapter will begin with Rousseau's idea of democratic and humanist education in *Emile* and conclude with our reflection on the present education policy in France.

Emile or Humanist Education

Emile appeared fatefully in 1762. Within weeks, the governments and the Church in Paris and Geneva ordered it to be burned by. Like the *Contrat Social*, it was accused of being anti-ideological, anti-clerical, anti-historical and thus, anti-natural. But at bottom, it was his idea of

democracy, freedom and humanism that offended his opponents. Such ideas are directed against the old, established structure based on privileges and the myth of divine power. Such new ideas would destroy the monarchies and the Church.

Liked or disliked, *Emile* enjoyed the same celebrity as the *Contrat Social* and swept through France and the whole of Europe like an earthquake. With the *Contrat Social*, it provided the French revolution a formidable weapon: a new ideology of democracy and humanism. Its partisans fought fiercely on the streets, in the salons and more significantly in educational and clerical establishments. The immense influence of *Emile* is reflected in Goethe's humanism and Immanuel Kant's Enlightenment. The German poet proclaimed *Emile* the gospel of all modern teachers, while the speculative thinker was deeply moved by its contents—a rare moment for the philosopher who excluded feelings from his rational system. Even W. Harris, the most fierce opponent of Rousseau who condemned *Emile* as the "greatest heresy in educational doctrine," had to concede that "apart from *Emile* there could be no understanding of Pestalozzi, Froebel or Basedors, the famous innovators in the history of education."⁵

The main theses in *Emile* centered on: (1) the autonomy of the educated as the objective of education, (2) humanism as the content of education, and (3) free choice and democratic participation of the educated as its method. As Rousseau articulated in the Preface: "in every kind of project two things have to be considered. The first is the goodness of the project in itself; the second is ease of execution. In the present case, the first question is whether the education I proposed is suitable for mankind, and congenial to the human heart. And is it practicable?"⁶ He continued: "First and foremost, he will be a man. All that a man must be he will be when the need arises, as well as anyone else. Whatever the changes of fortune he will always be able to find a place for himself."⁷

In the following, we will delve into these three theses by examining their significance and relevance. More importantly, one has to diagnose Rousseau's solution to the contradiction between the two ideologies of "making a man" and "making a citizen."

The Objective of Education

In the opening section of *Emile*, Rousseau pleaded for a natural education, the aim of which is to make the human as he is. He does not rule out a social education, so long as it does not hinder individual development. The two kinds of education, public and individual (of "making a man" and "making a citizen"), must be chosen between in the case of their incompatibility (as in England where the sacrifice of the individual was demanded), but in the case of their tangible reciprocity (as seen in Geneva), they may be taken together. The last case would be ideal. Though Rousseau seemed to tend toward a national education, eleven years after *Emile*, when he suggested to the King of Poland an education of Polish, patriotic spirit (*Considerations on the Government of Poland*), he was ready to accept the fact that there is always bound to be some loss of individuality in the process by which the child becomes man through a social bringing.⁸ Thus, it is clear that the main objective of education is the individual as he argued:

We are born capable of sensation and from birth are affected in diverse ways by the objects around us. As soon as we become conscious of our sensations, we are inclined to seek or to avoid the objects which produce them: at first, because they are agreeable or disagreeable to us, later because we discover that they suit or do not suit us, and ultimately because of the judgments we pass on them by reference to the idea of happiness, a perception we get from reason. These inclinations extend and strengthen with the growth of sensibility and intelligence, but under the

pressure of habit they are changed to some extent with our opinions. The inclinations before this change are what I call our nature. In my view, everything ought to be in conformity with these original inclinations.⁹

He insisted then more strongly: "First and foremost, he will be a man. All that a man must be he will be when the need arises, as well as anyone else. Whatever the changes of fortune he will always be able to find a place for himself."¹⁰

To justify such an education, Rousseau began with a critique of unnatural education dictated by prejudices, ideologies, authority, etc.:

Prejudices, authority, necessity, example, the social institutions in which we are immersed would crush out nature in him without putting anything in its place. He would fare like a shrub that has grown up by chance in the middle of a road, and got trampled under foot by the passers-by.¹¹

Actually, as Rousseau rightly remarked, such prejudices and traditions have always served as the meta-foundation of our traditional education. Here, in Rousseau's own eyes, the mistakes of traditional education come first from its inability to differentiate natural education from communal or civic education, and then, and more importantly, from its confusion in treating man as an external object or thing.

For Rousseau there are three different kinds of education: that of nature, of men and of things. He explained education of nature as the internal development of our faculties and organs, the education of men as the way we make this development possible,¹² while by communal or public education he meant national education¹³ as proposed by Plato in the *Republic* that teaches the child to love the nation:

Constantly occupied with Rome and Athens, living as it were with their great men, myself born the citizen of a republic, the son of a father whose ruling passion was the love of his country, I was set on fire by his example.¹⁴

As a logical consequence of the first mistake, which is seen in its wrong meta-foundation, the second mistake pushes one down toward the world of things. Our educators have taken either an external, divine world or the state to be the objective of education. Consequently, our children are taught to become saints, or patriots, by forcing them to follow strictly the prescribed rules in order to be saints, heroes, ideal models, etc.

Opposing these views, Rousseau maintained that a sound education must be a natural education, the objective of which is the child himself. But the child is not a fixed object like a thing in its immobile environment. The child is growing, and therefore, he must be equipped with proper tools to cope with all matters happening around him¹⁵

Thus, to educate means to train children "for the hardship they will one day have to endure,"¹⁶ to prepare them to deal with their environment and society: "Harden them to the rigors of the seasons, the climate, the elements. Inure them to hunger, thirst and fatigue. Dip them in the water of styx."¹⁷ The training itself (its method and its forms) must however be changeable too, in accord with the stages of development of the child. The child goes through all the stages of infancy, boyhood, teenage, adolescence and finally, man or womanhood. In each stage, different methods and purposes are required. While in infancy, children need to be taken care of, and need training to develop their own natural capacity. A too protected child could be as spoiled as one that is unprotected. Here, Rousseau took the peasant's capacity and ability in dealing with nature as an

example to demonstrate the soundness of his thesis: peasants have very good digestion because they chew dried fruits and crusts. They speak and walk very naturally because they have more natural environments than townsmen.¹⁸ Thus, he concluded that artificial education would bring more damage than benefit: "It is a great disadvantage for them to have more words than ideas and to be able to say more than they think."¹⁹

Analogously, children have their own world, much different from the adolescent's, and we cannot employ our standard to judge them. It is thus a mistake to mold children into another world rather than their own.

What makes Rousseau's idea revolutionary lies in his emphasis on the child as the ultimate objective of education. In view of this, the methods and scope of education should be changed. One cannot rely on indoctrination or violence, but has to deal directly with the growing child in each of his or her stages of development.

The Contents of Education

Evidently, the main points raised by Rousseau in *Emile* and the *Contrat Social* are democracy and humanism in education. William Boyd, the English editor of *Emile* notes:

The big truth in his view, the truth that gives it application to the education of the children of all times and all conditions, is that the educator should take full account of human nature, and especially the nature of the child."²⁰

The problem of effecting a reconciliation of the interests of society and the individual with which Rousseau wrestles in the *Emile*, is still with us. It is in fact the problem of democracy, and of the schooling which prepares boys and girls for the democratic way of life; and we all of us are democratic enough to take it for granted that home and school and the adult communities to which we belong should bring personal satisfaction through our membership of them."²¹

The theme of humanism is treated in the context of human nature or the nature of the child. First, by human nature, Rousseau understood not something *a priori* or eternal, but something growing from stage to stage in accord with the environment and one's biological structure. In this sense, a sufficient understanding of human nature could not be based on a certain stage, say, adulthood, or boyhood. Nor do we have the right to treat all stages equally. Each stage is marked by different characteristics and motivated by different interests. From another point of view based on sex, one discovers the same factor: men differs from women and so does their nature: by reason of their sex, they differ in character and temperament, the man being strong and active, the woman being weak and passive. In some sense, Rousseau might be the first educator who applied dynamic psychology to the study of human nature. According to this view then, in order to understand human nature, one needs to take proper account of human nature at its different stages. The difference between child and man, between a child of two years old and the one of 10 years old, between a child and a teenager, etc. must be properly studied. Of course, the answer given by Rousseau to the reason of such difference is till inadequate, and his frequent arguments based upon the mind betray his insistence on the dynamic development of the child. To say that the child's nature is based on mental self-activity seems to contradict the view that mind itself is made up by a number of separate faculties which appear one after another: sensation in infancy, sense judgments in childhood, practical thinking in the teens, reasoning and abstraction in adolescence, an so on.

However, his inadequate explanation of human nature does not dismiss his main merit: education has to deal with the child in his proper nature, and not with an external, senseless object. Precisely in this lies his humanism.

Second, education has meaning only if it can make the child happy in his world. As we have mentioned briefly, such an insistence on the individual in education appears at first sight to be a contradiction as well as contrary to democratic education. Some critics have taken this issue against Rousseau. Of course, he was well aware of such a problematic which, as he suggested, could be solved with an education similar to that described in Plato's *Republic*:

Having had the good fortune to be born among you, I could not but meditate on the equality nature had conferred on men and the inequality they had created for themselves without thinking of the profound wisdom with which the two had been happily combined in this state. In my search for the best principles, which good sense might prescribe for the constitution of a government I have been so much impressed at finding them all in operation in yours, that even if I had not been born within your walls, I would have felt myself obliged to depict Geneva as the human society outstripping that of all peoples in its advantages.²²

For Rousseau, democracy must be sought even in education, but not at the cost of individual happiness. The model of the Platonian republic, found in public education in Geneva, was praised by him because, if children are educated as equals, and if they have the laws of the state and the maxims of the general will instilled into them, they will assuredly learn to treat others equally. As such, we do not only achieve a republican education, but can maintain also individual education. He argued classically: "It cannot be left to the individual to be sole judge as to his duties. Still less should children's education be left to the ignorance and prejudice of their fathers. The matter is of far greater concern to the state than to the fathers."²³ And he then defended his own position by arguing the need for individual education: "It was not true that children who had been educated in this informal way were left to grow up any way at all. The teachings of the home are that children should be educated, the girls by the mother and the boys by the father."²⁴

The Method of Education

The discovery of dynamic psychology, and of human growth in stages helped Rousseau to search for a new, more adequate method of education. One can say that his method, in his period, is revolutionary in character. It plays on the one hand against any method born in dogmatism, indoctrination, authority or prejudices: "Indoctrination has been always wrong." On the other hand, he insisted on the self-determined or autonomous role of the educated. Finally, he suggested a natural way in conformity with biological needs and development, with human natural reaction and relation to the external world.

To be more concrete, one may say that Rousseau adopted (1) an empirical method for collecting data and constructing his theory; (2) a method of psychological development to study the different stages of growth in children, and (3) a somewhat behaviouristic method. Needless to say, these methods were not only new, but stood in direct opposition to the previous methods: ideological indoctrination and passive reaction to stimulus.

However, in order to avoid unnecessary controversy over what he called his natural method, one needs to clarify his intention. By the natural way, Rousseau meant a method acquired from the way things happen around us:

This is nature's way. Why set yourself against it? Do you not see that in attempting to improve on her work you are destroying it and defeating the provision she has made? So long as you do not go beyond the measure of the child's strength there is less risk in employing it than in husbanding it. Train the children, then, for the hardship they will one day have to endure.²⁵

An ideal mother is the one who observes nature and follows it.²⁶ To go against this by such as the restraint and subjection of human capacity is unnatural: "Life is not just breathing: It is action, the functioning of organs, senses, faculties, every part of us that gives the consciousness of existence."²⁷ He described the method of treating infants as unnatural and harmful: "The baby is fastened in swaddling clothes, laid down with head fixed, legs outstretched, arms pinioned, and is prevented from moving by wrappings of cloth and bandages of all kind." And he continued: "The result is that the inner urge to bodily growth finds an insurmountable obstacle in the way of movements that are imperatively needed."²⁸

In revoking the shortcomings of traditional education, Rousseau adopted at the same time new ways such as the empirical method: "I have noticed that children are rarely afraid of thunder unless the claps are terrible and actually hurt the ear."²⁹ Or: "I have lived a great deal among peasants, and I have never spoken of them harshly."³⁰

To him, the empirical method, unlike rational argument, is much more natural and precise, and it is easily verified. Such a method is revolutionary since the success of Galileo and Newton, and it is well suitable to education and less ideological.

The Spirit of French Higher Education

The impact of Rousseau on French higher education has been decisive. Francois Marat publicly declared the "sacred" idea of Rousseau and took both the *Contrat Social* and *Emile* to be the modern bible of France. French education has absorbed most if not all the ideas in *Emile*. The French revolution is remembered for its spirit of freedom, equality and fraternity (humanism), carved on all national monuments and even on the churches. In this part, we are concerned with higher education in which Rousseau's ideas are most visible.³¹

Humanism

After the Enlightenment, French education moved toward an education of rationalism, but not yet humanism. The Cartesian spirit was carried on without critique. With it come a new form of individualism based on the principles of autonomy and self-consciousness. With it was born also a new interest: in knowledge that Galileo and Kepler had previously taken to be the sole treasure of humankind. The weight of the ideologues (Cabanis, de Tracy, de Condillac and others) on French politics was remarkable, so that even Napoleon Bonaparte was worried. His dismissal of them as mere dreamers and ideologues did not help much. The die was cast and since then intellectuals and the bourgeoisie have used their knowledge to try to dictate national education. Aristocrats, clerics and landowners no longer played the upper hand in politics and especially in education, but were forced to deal with the despised liberal bourgeoisie. It is no wonder that after the Revolution, even to the disgust of Napoleon and his court, the trinity of democracy, freedom and equality became the new spirit and syllabus of French education, and with them grew the idea

of humanist education. Thus, the academic curriculum was filled with general knowledge about man. Philosophy was required in all high schools and occupied the earlier place of religion.

It is true that the French High-school system is divided into four categories: natural science, technology, humanism and classics resulting in four kinds of Baccalaureats. However, at bottom, it is humanist education which plays the foundational role. In the final year, all students, regardless of category, have to take at least 16 credits of philosophy. The categories of humanism and classics add up to almost 30 credits. Behind philosophy come psychology, sociology, etc. The course of philosophy is mainly taught by the former students of the prestigious *Ecole Normale Supérieure*, which is largely Cartesian by tradition.

Of course, science is not neglected. There is fierce competition for a place at the *Ecole Polytechnique*. And, the mathematical tradition at the University of Paris is cultivated as much as philosophy. However, unlike most American colleges, the *Polytechnique* is more focused on scientific knowledge (and philosophy) than on technology. Jean Capelle observes: "The *Ecole Polytechnique* is in reality a school for higher scientific education: although its students emerge with a title of engineer, they must, if they wish to acquire the technological competence of an engineer, spend another two years in an engineering school which serves as an establishment of applied technology."³²

Democracy

In *Emile*, Rousseau insists on the autonomous role of the child, and equally, on general education for all men and women alike. Such an emphasis on free choice and equality gives birth to what we call today democratic education, a term developed by John Dewey in his *Democracy and Education*. Rousseau's aim in extending education to all men is explicit in his ideal of "making citizens." As a citizen, the student must accept his role as equal among others in the state.

True to his projection, French higher education is more democratic, in terms of quotas and in interests. All students who have passed the Baccalaureat have the right to choose their preferred college, faculty and subject (except the *grandes ecoles* which demand entrance-examinations). The tuition is so low that almost everyone with a "bac" can afford to go to college. Thus, in principle compared to the British and American systems, French higher education is more open, available, and fair to all sexes and races.

One may object to such a free education, or to the self-contradiction in the system of *grandes ecoles*, as do conservatives against the free tuition and loose entrance-regulations, and liberals against the restricted numbers allowed into the *grandes ecoles*. However, one has no doubt about its intention of keeping the system as democratic as possible. The *grandes ecoles* are designed to train the best brains without retarding, or hindering democratic education.

If one looks at French higher education from the angle of administration, one would discover the same characteristics:

- Universities, colleges and faculties preserve their autonomy. The Ministry of Education has little to say about the administration, research and conduct of each school.
- The role of the president of the university is restricted or reduced to a symbolic level while the power of faculty members is kept intact.
- The students have the right of self-organization (political as well as academic). There exists no "Office for Students" run by officials as seen in Taiwanese or American systems.

- University-courses are set up, or designed by the teachers, depending on the specific feature and interests of each institution, and not by central government as in Taiwan or Mainland China.

When one looks at the curriculum of the university, the democratic ideal is most visible. Almost all possible courses relating to humankind could be found at the University of Paris. The university is still a locus for research, and pure science is still attractive. It is also true that quite a few scholars still treat university as an ivory tower, but the university is no longer an isolated island of scholars like Descartes. The traditional definition of university as a community of masters who want to preserve and transmit knowledge is now revised. Today, the university assumes its social responsibility, taking a leading role in transforming society. It tries to reconcile traditional research with democratic decision making, academic freedom with a sense of responsibility, speculation with active participation. In short, French universities aspire to fulfill Rousseau's dream of reconciling the work of "making a man" and "making a citizen."

Modernization or Rationalization

Regretfully, Rousseau's dream remains a mere dream. The uprising in Paris of students and workers in 1968 was a protest against the policy of education promoted in 1966 by the government of Charles de Gaulle. Similarly, the march of over one million high school and college students in 1986 was another expression of dissatisfaction with the conservative education of Jacques Chirac. De Gaulle and Chirac have opted for the philosophy of "making a citizen" at the cost of that of "making a man," because they found France backward far behind other countries like the United States of America, Great Britain and Germany.

In any case, French education is caught in an embarrassing situation of "to be or not to be." Education for nationalism is as incomplete and dangerous as that for individualism. Democratic education may be sound, but only at the cost of individual freedom and innovation.

In 1971, a committee for revision of the policy of education was set up. Under the supervision of the government, the *Committee of Educational Policy and Planning* prescribed modernization.³³ The committee knew too well that France and French citizens would be unable to compete without a radical modernization. The change of method and policy is most visible as was urged in the conclusion of the report:

- more emphasis on educational research, training and the encouraging of talents,
- research and development must be coordinated and directed toward society's needs, and
- professionalisation of teachers.³⁴

About its policy, one reads:

Item 4 recognizes that henceforth schools should avoid streaming the top pupils and try to discover and develop individual aptitudes. Item 5 treats formal schooling of the young as the preparation of individuals for a continuing process of education and reeducation. Item 6 emphasizes the role of ideas and knowledge not as elements in a passive culture displayed in conversation and verbal achievement, as was sometimes the case in traditional education, but as instruments by which individuals can, in a disciplined fashion, exercise control over their environments and themselves.³⁵

The reasoning behind modernization in French education consists in: first, French education is expected to satisfy students in terms of quality and quantity; second, it has to serve both individual and society; and third, it must pursue new knowledge without losing its democratic essence.³⁶ Such objectives, though ideal, are too ambitious and in some cases, self-contradictory as reflected in the student unrest. However, the main reason is French education could not yet find a middle way harmonizing collective ideology (nationalism, i.e. "making a citizen") and individual freedom (individualism, i.e. "making a man").

Conclusion

As we have admitted at the beginning of this chapter, our aim is the rather modest one of showing that a sound education must be both ideological and anti-ideological, as seen in Rousseau's *Emile* - anti the negative ideology and pro the positive one.

By an education of positive ideology, we mean an education of good, not reactionary or negative, ideas; ideas which reflect reality and can help solve our problems. However, any ideology which is based not on eternal truth and absolute values will turn out to be negative in the course of historical development. This is so of an ideological education, which therefore needs to be criticized and rejected in the long run. This is called anti-ideological education, or an education for freedom.

In the first chapter, we explained ideology in its genetic process and showed that, in its first stage, ideology is necessary for understanding, preserving and constructing reality. It is useful in solving our problems as seen in practical and even pure science. However, we strongly warned that it is negative, reactionary and harmful in the second stage, because it can no longer respond to the change of our life-world.³⁷

Rousseau had executed exactly and well such an education. In the first stage, he objected to the traditional, dogmatic and obsolete education which he found incompatible to his "new" world. In the second stage, he introduced a new ideology of democracy, freedom and humanism which could deal with the problems of the modern age.

Similarly, one can say that French higher education is both ideological and anti-ideological. It tries very hard to build a sound education on the basis of the humanism, freedom and democracy proposed by Rousseau. But it criticizes itself whenever it no longer fits the modern world and modern men. It is ready for any possible change, to accept new ideology and to reject the old one. However, such an education could not solve the problems once interests are involved in conflict: intellectual interest versus material interest, individual versus collective, equal versus natural and genial.

The example of present the mediocre character of research of French universities shows that democratic education has backfired: it does not progress further, but hinders progress. In 1966, the Education Commission confessed that France no longer had the ability to win a Nobel Prize in Physics,³⁸ and that the once prestigious *Sorbonne* had degenerated into a third class University of Paris, which serves as the haven for aimless students. It has lost the sense of a community of research and of learned men.

The question: how to preserve the ideology of democracy, equality and freedom without sacrificing progress and success is thus the most serious issue; it is posed not only to France but for us all.

Notes

- 1 Jean Jacques Rousseau, *Emile*, trans. and ed. William Boyd (New York, 1956).
- 2 Karl Loewith, *From Hegel to Nietzsche* (New York: Holt, 1964), p. 238. See also Karl D. Erdmann, *Das Verhaeltniss von Staat und Religion nach der Sozialphilosophie Rousseaus* (Berlin, 1955).
- 3 Loewith, p. 238.
- 4 M. Kircheisen, *Napoleons Gespraech* (Stuttgart, 1913), p. 195; quoted by Loewith, p. 431.
- 5 *Emile*, Foreword by Lawrence A. Gremin.
- 6 *Emile*, pp. 6-7.
- 7 *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- 8 *Ibid.*, Epilogue of W. Boyd, p. 170.
- 9 *Ibid.*, pp. 12-13.
- 10 *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- 11 *Ibid.*, p. 15.
- 12 *Ibid.*, p. 11; Boyd, p. 181.
- 13 *Ibid.*, p. 13; Boyd, p. 182.
- 14 Boyd, p. 182.
- 15 *Emile*, pp. 12-13.
- 16 *Ibid.*, p. 18.
- 17 *Ibid.*, p. 18.
- 18 *Ibid.*, pp. 25-27.
- 19 *Ibid.*, p. 28.
- 20 Boyd.
- 21 *Ibid.*
- 22 Jean Jacques Rousseau, *Discourse on Inequality*, in Boyd, pp. 182-188.
- 23 *Emile*, p. 154.
- 24 Boyd, p. 89.
- 25 *Emile*, pp. 17-18.
- 26 *Emile*, p. 17.
- 27 *Emile*, p. 15.
- 28 *Emile*, pp. 15-16.
- 29 *Emile*, p. 23.
- 30 *Emile*, p. 27.
- 31 W. R. Fraser, *Education and Society in Modern France* (London: Routledge-Kegan Paul, 1963); H. C. Barnard, *The French Tradition in Education* (Cambridge, 1922); W. D. Halls, *Education, Culture and Politics in Modern France* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1976).
- 32 Jean Capelle, *Tomorrow's Education. The First French Experience* (Oxford, 1967), pp. 188-189.
- 33 Committee of Educational Policy and Planning (OCED), *Review of National Policies to Education* (Paris, 1971). As a matter of fact, French education has been under permanent revision; it changes much more than its counterpart in Great Britain or in Germany.
- 34 *ibid.*, pp. 101-108.
- 35 *ibid.*, p. 103.
- 36 The position of Paul Ricoeur. See Paul Ricoeur, *Lectures in Ideology and Utopia*, ed. and introduction by H. Taylor (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

37 Tran Van Doan, "Reflection on the Nature of Ideology," *The Asian Journal of Philosophy*, 2-1 (1990), pp. 105-150; republished as chapter 1 in this volume.

38 Actually, France has won only a few Nobel Prizes in Physics. The last French Nobel Prize in Physics was awarded in 1991.

Postscripts

Since this monograph aims at a critique of ideological education, it makes no attempt to work towards a new kind of ideology, nor to find a definite solution to the problem. It tries to stay as objective as possible (but it does not claim to be fully neutral), even at the risk of falling into the trap of rationalism. Thus, it would be difficult to arrive at a conclusion. This postscript takes the place of a conclusion with a double aim: to respond to the critiques raised by a great number of friends, colleagues, interested scholars and students on some major issues on ideological education, and to express our own feeling about our present education system.

Work on this monograph began at a time when there was no hope for a democratic, humanist and rational education in sight, when such an idea existed only in Western textbooks, and when most educators preferred to side with the ruling class or to play safe by hiding in an ivory-tower. Some chose the Taoist way by burying their heads in utopian schemes and dreaming of being butterflies. This work was written, chapter by chapter and unsystematically, in fear and despair. The span of years since then is marked by scars of dread, despair, joy, hope and euphoria as history started to change, either moving forward or retreating backward into the tunnel of darkness.

It seemed that spring finally came, and that the hirondelles returned singing Beethoven's *Ode to Joy* when martial law was lifted some years ago, when the iron curtain imposed by Mao and his comrades fell and when the gate to freedom was opened up at Peking University. All educators shared the feeling of the peasant dancing and praising the return of hope after the tempest in the *Pastoral*.

However, the euphoria was extinguished just before reaching its climax, and died prematurely before we were aware of the significance of such an event. The brutal massacre in *Tiananmen* and the continuing violent round-ups of those who seek freedom testify that ideological education is not yet dead, but still arrogantly imposes its terror and dogmatism on the whole people. On both sides of the Straits, the authorities continued to rely on it, trying harder by inventing new techniques and by building up the myth of ideas. They make sure that the students will love their "nation" and worship their "leaders." They will take care of the so-called prodigal sons by brainwashing them, and stuffing them with all kinds of patriotic slogans. Thus, any action or reaction which may endanger the authority of ideology will be severely punished.

However, my hope is not yet shattered, for there are many reasons to believe in a revolutionary change for the better in education. Against the wish of the rulers, the tragedy of *Tiananmen* will encourage the young intellectuals to wake up from the "dream of the red chamber" and to take their fate in their own hands. The growing political openness will be followed by an openness of mind; economic liberation will be accompanied by a certain emancipation of mankind. Thus, I firmly believe that a critique of ideological education could play a significant role in breaking the ice of dogmatism and *naivete*, in challenging authoritarianism and traditionalism, and in opening our minds to a newly self-consciousness world.

This monograph is far from complete or perfect. Even before its publication, some of its ideas have been subjected to criticism and challenge. I am certainly grateful for such encouragement. In the following lines, I wish to reply to some criticism which I consider helpful for an understanding of ideology in general, and ideological education in particular.

Replying to my talk in Seoul on the crisis of values in a Confucian society and to my suggestions of using the economic model to understanding social crisis, Professor Alain Touraine of the University of Paris, as well as Professor Noah Samuel Eisenstadt of the Hebrew University

in Jerusalem, were more skeptical of the economic approach. They found in the economic model the danger of reductionism, which is not only incomplete, but dangerous in understanding the complexity of society. I agree with them that the economic model reflects only basic human activities, and that the economic laws solve only the problems arising from the conflict of such activities. However, I still stress its basic structure—of course, not totally as does Marx—because I share Giambattista Vico's view that it is the economic activity which can solve the most basic human needs and hence its basic problems. In other words, I discover in the economic model a certain form of ideology with its positive elements. Consequently, I could not wholeheartedly accept the Marxist interpretation of ideology as some negative, false instrument or fabricated consciousness by the dominant class due to its one-sidedness. That is the reason for my revision of the first chapter on the nature of ideology with the intention of implementing Marx's understanding of ideology. This chapter was revised after my three presentations of its version in Hongkong (The Chinese University), Taipei (Academia Sinica) and London (Institute of Education, University of London). I learned with agreeable surprise from colleagues that my idea is very close to those of Clifford Geertz and Paul Ricoeur.

Of course, this chapter is not immune from criticism, friendly and hostile. Professor Richard Knowles of Duquesne University reminded me of the difficulty in demarcating the correctness from the incorrectness of ideology. Actually, I followed Kant's method and tried to construct a list of criteria after the version of Kant's table of categories, and applied them to distinguish right from wrong ideology. I found later that such a rationalist approach tends more to confuse than to clarify the ambiguity of ideology. It is of less use than Kant might have believed for understanding human problems.

The most ardent and constructive critique came from Professor Vincent Shen of the National Chengchi University, now of the Lee Chair of Chinese Philosophy and Culture at the University of Toronto. His critique of my earlier understanding of ideology (when I was influenced by Marx) has helped me to reflect on Marx's own position and to discover Marx's mistakes. Though I still cling to my old view that most ideologies tend to be conservative and therefore reactionary, I have to admit that even ideology has constructive elements in itself. My study of Hans-Georg Gadamer confirms the view that ideology cannot be abolished, simply because it forms a part of tradition. Thus, what we can do is to implement or transform it. Man cannot afford to live without ideology, just as man could not be human without tradition, i.e., memory of the past.

I learned a great deal from Professor George F. McLean of the Catholic University of America, who improved my work with his critical remarks. On occasion, he would indirectly remind me of my dubious stand with regards to the metaphysical foundation of education. I am aware of the fact that my strong objection to any form of determinism, and my inadequate dealing with the metaphysical foundation of education would make this work less fruitful. With Professor McLean, I believe in the factor of freedom as the meta-foundation overcoming determinism. I see this as metaphysics, the recognition that reality is primarily free within which is found the material and determined. Human beings are bound by all kind of interests, among them is the interest in freedom. That is what differs man from animals, and helps man to become God-like.

There were other criticisms in London, Toronto and Kyoto, which I took to heart. There were invaluable suggestions and corrections from my colleagues and friends during my first years of apprenticeship in Innsbruck. Dr. Hanjo Sauer spent precious time polishing my first article on education, which was later published in one volume in Munich. I shall never forget Dr. Hermann Gmeiner, the founder of the *SOS Kinderdorf International*, with whom I worked for a short time in Austria. His idea of giving children a sense of human dignity still impresses me today.

This monograph is certainly not immune from mistakes and its suggestions may become irrelevant in the future. Likewise, the business of ideological critique may have a long way to go, just as our ideological education will not easily fade away. Yet in this tumultuous period of rapid change, I believe such efforts have a valued role in exposing destructive ideologies and promoting human solidarity.

About The Author

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