China’s Contemporary Philosophical Journey: Western Philosophy and Marxism

Chinese Philosophical Studies, XXIII

by

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Preface

George F. McLean

It is a great honor to be able to write this preface to the work of Professor Liu Fangtong. This is true not only because he has been a professional colleague and close friend for many years, though he certainly has been such. Especially it is true because perhaps more than many other person he has been the philosophical key to the true opening of China.

To appreciate the extent of this accomplishment one needs to look deeply into the long history of China. Long separated by mountains, deserts and seas China was able by its own genius to develop one of the great civilizations of the world, relatively homogenous across its vast extent. As influences from without promised only to upset and disturb, over the centuries they were discouraged even to the extent at times of limiting the size of ships and hence of commerce and interchange beyond its borders.

When at last structured intercourse did take place it was imposed by outside colonial powers and thus was deeply intrusive and rightly resented. Later in the context of the cold war China’s choice of a socialist path renewed its opposition to West and made it deeply suspicious of that pattern of thinking. Every door of heart and mind seemed closed and locked. The great achievement of Professor Liu Fangtong as both described and illustrated by this book was to find the way to decipher the combinations of ideas which constituted that lock, to understand what was tolerable at any given point and patiently but effectively over the last 50 years to open the hearts and minds of China to the world. If China is now a major player in global interchange this can rightly be said to be due to the deep and constant effort of Professor Liu Fangtong, perhaps more than to any other person.

- He had to begin in the darkest days of anti-Western sentiment and political enforcement, and he did,
- he had to argue for a more open and humanistic Marx, and he did;
- he had to uncover the constructive elements in Western thought while showing its limitations, and he did,
- he had to gauge what steps in scholarship were possible at any given time and have the courage to take then, and he did. He did all this!

As a result his name and his work because synonymous with a valid, acceptable and creative stance toward Western ideas.

He was both the scout who marked out the path to be taken and the careful guide who set the appropriate pace. His work reversed for the Chinese mind the centuries of closure against outside ideas and thereby laid the groundwork for the conversion of policies of non-interference into the policies of relationship and engagement which have enabled China to flourish within and sparkle without.

In reading this book one continually marvels at Professor Liu Fangtong’s ability to catch the humanizing essence of an insight or movement without being caught in an extreme ideological and ultimately dehumanizing application of that insight. At times one might fear that his enthusiastic and forceful appreciation of a way of thinking will lead one into the trap of reducing
one’s mind to the important contribution of that idea or school of thought. But then one finds that while he has been enabling one to gain a rich appreciation of the significance of the idea he has not forgotten at the end to point out perceptibly the limits which it needs to overcome in order for its contribution to be enduring.

This is not a mere matter of cutting and pasting ideas, however, but depends on his ability to comprehend deeply and to weave a rich and seamless philosophical tapestry in which each insight has its place and by his master hand can be related positively to all the rest.

Perhaps more than anywhere else this appears in his engagement with Marx. For many this was understood as a dialectical materialism in which the dialectic was a set of laws in the rationalist mode and the matter was the stuff of which atoms and their combinations were constituted. For Liu Fangtong Marx’s real concerns were elsewhere, and even contradictory to this interpretation which he found to be both too high and too low. Too high, for it places one in the realm of ideal laws rather than of real people, and too low because it misses the responsible realm of values by which the human spirit guides life in time. By disengaging Marx from the ideological formalization of the Marxists he assures that this period of Chinese thought and history will continue to play a positive role in the future evolution of the Chinese people in its great task of caring for its quarter of humankind and positively engaging the rest.

Ever present to his people in their pilgrimage, ever positive in his role as teaching and guide, Professor Liu Fangtong in this work illustrates the love of wisdom or "philosophy" for life today.
Part I

The Modern, Contemporary and Postmodern Turns in Philosophy
1.

**Contemporary Philosophy and Chinese Marxism**

Hardly anyone in Chinese academic circles now would simply deny that the study of contemporary Western philosophy could positively promote the development of Marxist and contemporary Chinese philosophy. Nevertheless, many questions should be probed further. For example, the research level of the studies of contemporary Western philosophy in China has been risen gently and some research results in special spheres, such as phenomenology, could even be compared with those in the West. However, these studies seem not yet to have been used to promote the studies of Marxist and Chinese traditional philosophy; indeed they tend to be separated therefrom. This means that people have not yet a clear understanding of the relation between them and that there is need to probe more concretely into such questions as the following:

- Whether the formation and development of contemporary Western philosophy is an important progressive and revolutionary change in the history of philosophy?
- Whether in the basic pattern of their philosophic thinking they have points in common with Marxist philosophy?
- Whether, in the development of Marxist and Chinese philosophies as we come to the 21st century, it is important to relate to the achievements of contemporary Western philosophy?

This paper will discuss these questions in terms of the transformation of philosophy.

**Western Philosophy in Contemporary vs Modern Times**

In order to evaluate more appropriately contemporary Western philosophy on the whole, we first must weigh the meaning of the transformation of thought patterns in the development of Western philosophy since the second half of the 19th century.

Many scholars of Western philosophical schools since that time declared one after another that they were opening a new direction for the development of philosophy. Toward the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, there have been, for example, the negation and critique of Nietzsche and others of the rationalistic tradition; the call of Dilthey and others for a methodology of the sciences of the spirit as distinguished from that of the natural sciences; the call of the pragmatists to replace the inquiries about material or spiritual essences by the study of real life and practice; the effort of the phenomenological and existentialist movements to turn to the non-reflective world or to human existence; the appeal of such analytic philosophers as Frege and Wittgenstein to turn philosophy into an analysis of the use of language and its meaning; the suggestion of hermeneutic philosophers to take philosophy as the explanation of texts; the proposal of postmodernism to deconstruct traditional philosophy, and so on. All announce that they had changed the direction of the development of Western philosophy. The concrete implications of these proposals were varied, but they have in common an effort to critique some basic ideas of traditional and especially modern philosophy and to replace them with contrary ideas. They hope thereby to change the direction of the development of Western philosophy and to differentiate contemporary from modern Western philosophy. Opinions vary on whether or not the change is positive, even revolutionary, but a comparison of modern with contemporary philosophy suggests a positive answer.
The Modern Epistemological Transformation of Western Philosophy and Its Implication

In the past Chinese philosophical circles usually categorized modern philosophies from Descartes (and even from the Renaissance) to Hegel as capitalist ideology in its formative period. In different ways and degrees, most opposed religious theology and medieval scholastic philosophy as deprecating rationality and built upon faith. Instead philosophers of this period generally advocated a rational humanistic spirit and centered philosophy upon the human being. The philosophic system of Cartesian rationalism which was the typical expression of this spirit corresponded to the scientific spirit emphasized in the emergence of modern natural sciences. All kinds of natural sciences arose at that time to study nature as an object and to do the same with the rational human consciousness. As the victory of natural science would be precisely the victory of rationality, this epoch in the history of Western philosophy came to be called the age of reason.

This promotion of rationality entailed an important epistemological change in the development of Western philosophy. Philosophers at that time established a rational epistemology and methodology to guide people’s actions and all of real life. While taking the question of the essence of the world and the relation between people and the world as central, the theoretical form of their philosophy was quite different, both from ancient philosophy based in perceptual intuition and from medieval philosophy based on the subordinate relation of people to God. Especially, the modern spirit consciously differentiated between people as cognitive subjects and the world as object, i.e., it contrasted mind and body, spirit and matter, thinking and being. It sought out both how subjects know and effect the object and how the object effects and is expressed by the subject. The basic question of philosophy was manifestly the question of relation of subject-object, mind-body, spirit-matter, thinking-being. For the development of Western philosophy this was a new and higher stage.

The Defects and Contradictions of Modern Western Philosophy and the Emergence of a New Transformation

While achieving great progress, modern Western philosophy remained shrouded in a series of serious defects and contradictions. First, the advocacy of reason became so extreme as to constitute a superstition or blind faith; the omnipotence of God was replaced by the omnipotence of reason which directs in order to control, even in an arbitrary manner. Philosophical systems built on the rationalistic principal often were transformed into a system of speculative metaphysics. Secondly, while overcoming the intuitive character of ancient philosophy through advocating rational (reflective) thinking, modern Western philosophy fell into a dualism as the result of separating the subject and object, mind and spirit, and so on. This dualism led to a dogmatism and skepticism opposed to rationality.

Modern philosophy began by placing the human being at its center: it rejected the limits of the old tradition and authority with the intent of developing in an integrated manner the human person and its creativity, freedom and dignity. However, the separations of subject-object, mind-body and spirit-matter, along the tendency toward speculative metaphysics, led its conception of the human being either to a machine without flesh, blood or soul, or to a link in a metaphysical system as the mere external expression of the concept "human being". As a result its intended human subjectivity and creativity, freedom and dignity, etc., were dispelled or melded into a rational speculative system, whereby modern philosophy changed into its opposite.
This one-sidedness and the contradictions in modern Western philosophy has been called by contemporary philosophers foundationalism, essentialism, logo-centrism, etc. They share the common philosophical pattern of establishing a comprehensive system of metaphysics as the foundation of all knowledge. This pattern of philosophical thinking was inevitable in that historical epoch and played a positive role in promoting the development of modern Western society and its mental culture, including philosophy. Nevertheless, its defects and contradiction were revealed even from the beginning by philosophers such as Pascal who lived in the time of Descartes, the enlightenment thinker Rousseau, the Italian philosopher Vico, and the German romanticists, especially Kant.

Only the social and cultural environment of those times enabled this condition to exist and even develop. Since the middle of the 19th century, however — following such radical and pervasive changes as the replacement of the classical by the natural sciences as the epistemological basis of thought — the one-sidedness and contradiction of this thought pattern has become ever more conspicuous.

It now must be replaced by a new thought pattern, which means that a new transformation must appear in the development of Western philosophy. The revolutionary change in philosophy realized by Marxism during the middle of the 19th century is an outstanding example of this transformation. The series of new philosophical schools which appeared since that time have been contrary to the direction of modern philosophy; they can be called contemporary philosophy and in various degrees express this transformation.

The Transcendence of Western Contemporary Philosophy over Modern Philosophy

Without any doubt, there is one-sidedness and even error in the theories of contemporary philosophical schools and philosophers. At times they abandon some positive elements of modern philosophy and indeed go backward to some degree. However, a comparison of the general theoretical direction of modern with contemporary philosophy shows that the latter transcends the former to some degree and in some important respects.

First, most schools of contemporary Western philosophy carry on the critique of Kant and others of traditional metaphysics and reject attempts to establish comprehensive philosophical systems or to take philosophy as the science of science. Although this restricts the sphere and function of traditional philosophy and even dissolves the latter to some degree, it is still very important progress in philosophy. Along with the formation and development of various special sciences, it is necessary more and more to escape philosophy’s control of, or even substitution for, the function of the sciences.

People must study again the meaning and function of philosophy. In response to this demand contemporary Western philosophers advance their own views of philosophy: as method of life and action, or scientific methodology; as clarification and expression of the meaning of language and text; as transcending the world and the human being itself to probe ultimate concerns; or as cultureology or post-philosophical culture that transcends the studies of metaphysics and humanities, etc. Although there is some one-sidedness in these opinions, most are new and worthy inquiries into the meaning and function of philosophy, and of the transcendence of modern metaphysics as a systematic philosophy.

Second, contemporary philosophers in the West hope mostly to abandon the tendency toward dualism as the foundation of modern epistemology. They do not simply negate the differences and relations between subject and object, mind and body, spirit and matter, thinking and being, but
emphasize that people must take them not as separated but as united processes dominated by the active and creative action of the human being as subject. The so-called "Copernican revolution" of Kant transcended the separation of subject and object, as well as the opposition between empiricism and rationalism and other dichotomies. His theories that practical reason is higher than theoretical reason, and concerning moral freedom also transcend the limitation of the epistemological pattern of philosophy centralized upon the methodology of the natural sciences. Nevertheless, he left an unbridgeable gap between the phenomena and the thing-in-itself, between theoretical reason and practical reason. This did not overcome, but in a sense even strengthened, the tendency toward dualism.

Many contemporary Western philosophers attempt to overcome these problems of Kant through emphasizing the activity and creativity of the subject. While sometimes going to an extreme, they attempt to overcome dualism and dogmatism. Some propose taking human practical activity as the starting point of philosophy instead of a dualism of subject and object, or going to the united real life-world rather than to a world in which subject and object are separated, and thereby to transcend dualistic patterns of philosophy.

Third, many contemporary philosophers study and bring to light the non-rational spiritual activity of the human being in various directions and at various levels. They attempt to differentiate such studies of the spiritual activity of human beings as social history and psychology, etc., and then to establish a methodology of these spiritual sciences different from that of the natural sciences. While sometimes going to an extreme, nevertheless their studies criticize the one-sidedness of absolutized and solidified reason, reveal more levels and characteristics of the spiritual activities of human beings, and enlarge and deepen their understanding. Like rational activities, these original spiritual activities, which have not been changed and solidified by reason, are an important door real life and to perfecting the understanding of the human being. Their study is very important and transcends traditional rationalism.

Fourth, modern Western philosophy began from proposing a humanistic spirit. However, its thought pattern of speculative metaphysics and dualism inevitably objectivized people at the cost of their authentic personality, that is, persons were alienated. Contemporary philosophers in Western countries call mostly for understanding the existence of human beings and the value and meaning of their activities. They propose to take the human being as goal rather than means, as the center of philosophy rather than as some special link or part. The fundamental road of philosophical reconstruction is back to human beings. Although also having its one-sidedness, this theory advocates a new humanistic spirit. At least, it reveals and criticizes more deeply the alienation of the human being in Western society and the shortcomings of traditional humanism.

This transcendence of contemporary over modern Western philosophy is not a change in a special theoretical view, a special school or a special philosophy, but a transformation of the theoretical pattern of thinking which has general meaning for the development of Western philosophy. In other words, it is a very important and basic change in the object and method, as well as in the goal of philosophical research. Many contemporary philosophers have been studying and re-establishing philosophy in a manner different from the modern philosophical pattern of thinking with the aim of breaking away from its straits and opening new roads for the further development of philosophy. Generally speaking, their philosophy could coordinate the political, economic and cultural development of Western society, especially with regard to various problems arising from the speed of the development of the sciences and technologies during this epoch; they have important progressive meaning. Compared with modern philosophy, the appearance of
contemporary philosophy means that the development of Western philosophy reaches a new and higher stage.

The Relation of the Contemporary Transformation of Western Philosophy to the Revolutionary Change of Marxism

There are very important differences, of course, between the contemporary transformation of Western philosophy and the revolutionary change of Marxism in philosophy. However, both are modes of negation and transcendence with respect to modern philosophy. They have some common points in their social and historical conditions as well as in ideological and cultural background. What led modern philosophy in pursuit of its goals is also the main source that brought into being both contemporary Western philosophy and Marxist philosophy. There is hardly any serious contention over this in Chinese philosophical circles. The questions that need to be studied and discussed further are only whether these two philosophies in their negation and transcendence with regard to modern philosophy are in fundamental mutual opposition or share some more important common nature.

Opposition to the Modern Pattern of Philosophical Thinking

There is an important view, generally approved in the past in Chinese academic circles that Marxism founded the scientific system of dialectical materialism and historical materialism by abandoning the idealism and metaphysics of traditional and especially modern philosophy, while critically inheriting their materialism and dialectics. At the same time, contemporary Western philosophy, rejecting both materialism and dialectics, inevitably went backwards to idealism and metaphysics. Therefore, although the two philosophies both negate and transcend modern philosophy, they are quite different in their negation and transcendence, and indeed quite contrary vis-a-vis each other. While in Marxism there was a revolution in philosophy, in contemporary Western philosophy there has been no progress, but only retrogression. In recent years, although more and more people recognized that there are rational elements in contemporary Western philosophy, the basic point of view described above still persisted with some scholars, especially those who majored in Marxist philosophy. The main reason for this is that those scholars interpreted the philosophical transformation of these two philosophies from the point of view of the modern pattern of philosophical thinking.

From this modern point of view one looks into the essence and origin of the world to found a system for the whole; this system is based upon a dualism of subject and object, mind and body, spirit and matter. Taking the opposition between materialism and idealism as the base line of philosophical development, it is difficult to say that the emergence of contemporary Western philosophy is progress in philosophy, because it not only opposes various materialisms, but through opposing dualism, also calls for canceling fully the issue of the subject-object, spirit-matter, thinking-being and other relations as criteria for dividing materialism and idealism. In other words, it negates the foundation where materialism could exist. Its negation of foundationalism, essentialism and a substance-ontology extends as well to materialism.

If one takes the turn towards materialism as the cardinal standard for evaluating contemporary Western philosophy, its value would be only negative. If one takes the revolutionary change in philosophy realized by Marxism as having founded only a thorough-going materialistic system, there would be only basic opposition between these two philosophies. If people attempt to find the
common points between these two philosophies through seeking elements of materialism in contemporary Western philosophy, not only would they probably not succeed, but they would misunderstand or twist the true meaning of contemporary philosophy.

But transcending and rejecting the materialism and idealism which is characteristic of the dualisms of subject-object, spirit-matter and thinking-being is just one of the basic features of contemporary Western philosophy as a new philosophical pattern distinct from modern philosophy. We can say that in a sense more elements of materialism are confirmed in contemporary philosophy, and that people departing from modern materialism would find more of the real concerns of materialism in contemporary thought.

In brief, following the modern pattern of philosophical thinking, people would necessarily take these two philosophies as basically contrary. In recent years, in their evaluation of contemporary Western philosophy, many Marxist philosophers often felt puzzled; though they did not intend to entirely negate these philosophies it was difficult critically even to draw some rational elements therefrom. The main reason for that is probably that they themselves have not transcended the limits of the modern pattern of philosophical thinking.

From Modern to Contemporary Patterns of Philosophizing

In order to insist upon the true Marxist point of view in philosophy and correctly to explain its relation with contemporary Western philosophy, we must transcend the modern pattern of philosophical thinking, and turn to one that is contemporary.

The central approach to explaining Marxist philosophy according to the modern pattern of philosophical thinking has been to sum it up as a theoretical system consisting of some general laws which can reflect all phenomena in nature and society. Based upon these laws one could work out all the special laws in every realm. This reduces Marxist philosophy to a system that makes a thorough inquiry into the foundation and essences of all beings and of understanding, and which then constitutes the ground of every science and of all knowledge. These are precisely the basic ideas of modern philosophy in establishing its theories. Although people emphasized the principle differences between Marxist philosophy and modern philosophy, and sometimes their explanation of Marxist theories transcended the doctrines of such modern philosophers as Hegel, Feuerbach and others, they could not transcend the basic theoretical pattern of philosophical thinking on which the doctrines of modern philosophy were formed. That is to say, they still understood and constructed Marxist philosophy in terms of the thought pattern of traditional metaphysics, according to which people look into the origin and essences of everything and take these as the foundation of their every activity and of all knowledge. As the result, inevitably they deviate from Marx’s progress in philosophy and fall back to the level of traditional metaphysics.

What then is the contemporary pattern of philosophical thinking expressed by Marxism; in other words how did Marxism sublate and transcend modern philosophy and found a new philosophy which constitutes a revolutionary change in philosophy? This is a very complicated question that should be studied and discussed at various dimensions and levels. Nevertheless, we can confirm that Marxism is part of the effort found also in contemporary Western philosophy to transcend modern thought. For throughout his lifetime Marx radically criticized and insisted upon overcoming the following tendencies of modern Western philosophy: speculative metaphysics, especially the attempt to found a comprehensive system and to take philosophy as a science of sciences; the tendency to absolutize rationality and the oppositions of subject-object, spirit-matter, thinking-being; and the tendency to treat human beings as means.
The new philosophy founded by Marx after sublating all old philosophy is not only different from past philosophy in its concrete theoretical points, but more importantly it is a thorough break with the premises from which all the old philosophies began. It was concerned not to disclose the material or mental origins of the world, nor to found a strict and full theoretical system for the entire world, but to face directly people’s practice and real life. The point of view of practice is the most important and basic. It is not to take practice as origin and substance, nor to attempt to found a comprehensive philosophical system based upon practice, but adequately to develop the activity and creativity of human beings, to promote human freedom and full development. How practice is to be understood as the central conception of Marxist philosophy entails many questions, but we must at least confirm that practice is neither simply material nor spiritual action, but a united action which includes both. Practice is not only perceptual or rational, but the unity of both: it is subjective as well as objective; it is the unity of subject-object. What is coordinated with practice is not only cognition, but also feeling and suggestion — praxis is the unity of the three. We can say in a sense that the main reasons why modern philosophy fell into one-sidedness, contradiction and confusion was its neglect of, or inability correctly to understand, the meaning of human praxis. Marxism, through deeply disclosing and integrally explaining the meaning of human practice, thoroughly transcended traditional metaphysics and realized a revolutionary change in philosophy.

*The Unity and Difference of Marxist and Contemporary Philosophies in Transcending Modern Philosophy*

In brief, do not take substance as origin, but take praxis as the base and starting point; do not found a comprehensive philosophical system, but transcend all ossified and closed systems and return to the real lifeworld; do not depend on arbitrary reason and its dualisms of subject-object, spirit-matter, and then lead human beings into one-sidedness and alienation, but return to living persons united in cognition and feeling, as well as in belief, that is, to concrete and complete persons; moreover, open wide the road for human freedom and creativity. All these are the main points where the modern pattern is transcended by the new pattern of philosophical thinking.

When re-examining the transcendence of contemporary Western philosophy over the modern, one finds that this transcendence does not overstep the boundary of the transcendence realized by Marxism. In other words, the transcendence by various schools of contemporary philosophy from various angles over the impasses and contradictions of modern philosophy was pointed out earlier by Marxism.

In terms then of the transcendence of modern Western philosophy, there is a great similarity between contemporary Western and Marxist philosophies. The two could be said to seek the same end in different ways: both belong to the contemporary pattern of philosophical thinking.

This does not mean that there is not an important, even principal, difference between them. Compared with Marxist philosophy, many schools of contemporary Western philosophy often are more one-sided and contradictory in their transcendence over modern philosophy. Sometimes, they repeat and even develop its impasses and contradictions of modern philosophy. For example, mostly they radically reject the tendencies of traditional philosophy, but often they confuse reasonable inquiry by metaphysics into truth and ideals with their own absolutizations and then simply negate those inquiries. Meanwhile, they themselves have no choice but to reconstruct some metaphysics in new forms. While incisively and vividly revealing and criticizing the dogmatism and absolutism of traditional philosophy, they sometimes neglect or even reject the role of reason and then fall into the other extreme of some form of relativism and irrationalism. They point out various defeats of the dualism
of subject-object, spirit-matter and especially the objectification and alienation of human beings, and stress development, activity and creativity, but they fall into a subjectivism for lack of considering objective reality. Generally, there are serious limitations in contemporary Western philosophy’s transcendence of modern philosophy. There is transcendence only in some individual factor or direction and to some degree, while in other factors or directions they often fall into the old frame of traditional philosophy.

In contrast the transcendence by Marxism of modern philosophy is not simple negation, but a confirmation of what is true and a rejection of what is wrong, i.e., a critical assimilation. While overcoming various modes of the one-sidedness of traditional philosophy, Marxism could avoid falling into another one-sidedness. Based on assimilating the reasonable and positive heritage of past philosophy, it should and could realize a new leap in philosophical development. In this sense Marxism transcends both traditional and contemporary Western philosophy.

How to Treat Marxist Philosophy and Contemporary Western Philosophy

If the above discussion of the contemporary transformation of Western philosophy and the revolutionary change in philosophy by Marxism be accepted in general, at least two important conclusions follow.

Firstly, we can keep our confidence in Marxism, but not in an ossified Marxism: While Marxist philosophy on the whole transcends both traditional and contemporary Western philosophy, more comprehensively and deeply it expresses the features of the modern pattern of philosophical thinking and integrates more the demands of contemporary society in its various respects. We should have a clear idea also of its complications and should not for that reason lose our belief in it. The most important concern is to have a comprehensive understanding of what Marxism truly is. We should not explain Marxism in the modern pattern of philosophical thinking that was sublated by Marxism, but recover its original meaning as the typical form of the contemporary pattern of philosophical thinking. In recent years the reputation of Marxist philosophy has been injured, and some have lost their confidence in it. One of the main reasons is that it was understood in terms of the modern pattern of philosophical thinking which misrepresented its original meaning. Thus represented, the theory fell inevitably into various predicaments and even into crisis like the older modern philosophy which Marxism transcended. Only by revealing and overcoming such misrepresentation could people recover their belief in Marxism.

Secondly, we must conscientiously study and audaciously learn from contemporary Western philosophy. If we recognize that contemporary Western philosophy generally transcends modern philosophy, is a higher stage in the development of Western philosophy, and shares much with Marxist philosophy in its expression of philosophical thought, we should re-examine and re-evaluate some contemporary theories which often were simply negated in the past. These theories may be expressions of some kind of transcendence over modern philosophy and may play an important progressive role in the development of philosophy. Generally speaking, the advances of contemporary over modern Western philosophy have not overstepped the boundaries of Marx’s own transcendence, but in some aspects it may have more abundant and penetrating content. Considering that Marxist philosophy was distorted and ossified for a long time, and that some of the transcendence which it should have realized could not in fact take place — sometimes it even was dragged back into the modern pattern of philosophical thinking — it is very important to assimilate the valuable contents of the advances realized by contemporary Western philosophy and
add then to what is insufficient in Marxism in order to promote its overall development. In this sense, we could say that to study and to learn from contemporary Western philosophy are indispensable for the enrichment and development Marxist of philosophy.

**The Contemporary Transformation of Western and Chinese Philosophies at the Entrance to the 21st Century**

How to establish and develop Chinese philosophy for coordinating Chinese society at this entrance into the 21st century is a question that could and should be studied from various levels and angles. For example, as China is a socialist country which chose Marxism as the guiding principle for almost everything, to develop Chinese philosophy means first to develop Marxist philosophy in a manner adapted to the special environment of China. As China is a country with an excellent thousand year old cultural tradition, Chinese philosophy must inherit and develop the original cultural legacies of China. Further, as contemporary Chinese society is experiencing deep changes in almost every important realm, in order for Chinese philosophy to develop it must coordinate with these changes. Various directions and levels must be studied concretely, but I will be concerned only that these studies be connected with understanding the modern-contemporary transformation of Western philosophy.

**In Order to Develop Marxist Philosophy in China, Western Philosophy Must Be Re-examined and Re-evaluated**

We have seen above that to be enriched and to develop Marxist philosophy in China must re-examine and evaluate contemporary Western philosophy. Here I would add only that, as the tendency to understand Marxist philosophy according the modern pattern of philosophical thinking was specially strong in China, in order to recover its original features as a contemporary pattern of philosophical thinking, we must the more study and learn from contemporary Western philosophy which has transcended modern philosophy in various directions and levels.

In China, Marxist philosophy has undergone very important and creative development, but the tendency to deviate from its original meaning, especially the danger of dogmatism and ossification, was also very serious for a long time. The reasons for that are manifold. From the theoretical viewpoint, this was connected with the fact that we could not factually understand the meaning of the contemporary transformation of Western philosophy, and wrongly took it as antagonistic to the revolutionary change of Marxist philosophy. Such modern philosophical characteristics as dualism and dogmatism were copied as they included elements of materialism and dialectics, while simply negating some contemporary philosophical elements which transcended the modern pattern of philosophical, thinking that they belonged to idealism. Time and again the critical movements against Western trends launched by authorities radically criticized content that expressed to some degree the spirit of contemporary philosophy. This is especially evident in the critique of pragmatism.

Among contemporary trends in Western philosophy, pragmatism was reproached for preaching compromise and eclecticism, emphasizing practical benefit, and ignoring principle. Some Marxist critique of this is appropriate. However, pragmatism is also a philosophical school with characteristics of contemporary philosophy, and it is necessary that this be treated factually. For example, one of the evident features of the theories of Dewey and others is to reject the metaphysical dualisms of subject-object and substance-ontology, and to insist that philosophy and
the sciences be shifted to the lifeworld, i.e., the world of experience. Moreover, experience is taken neither in a material nor in a spiritual sense, but as a mutual relation of the human being and his or her objective world, which is both subject and object, both spirit and matter. Experience is not substantial being, but activity and a process of interaction, i.e., of human life and practice. Pragmatists do not generally negate the being-in-itself of the world beyond experience, but insist that it be taken as an object of philosophy and sciences. Starting from here, they consider that philosophers should not establish systems of material and spiritual substance beyond experience, and hence should not expound materialism and idealism in this sense, but should make of philosophy a methodology for the real life and practice of human beings, and indeed of being human. Although there are various onesidednesses in their theories, they move beyond the limits of the understandings of experience and reality of traditional metaphysics, and thus have some of the characteristics of the contemporary pattern of philosophical thinking. Compared with modern philosophy, pragmatic theories have more points in common with Marxist philosophy. Hence, though generally rejected as subjective idealism, we should be more positive and learn from them.

The situation of the critiques of other aspects of pragmatism and of other schools of contemporary philosophy is similar. The main result was that people’s attention was reoriented from concrete life and practice to general and abstract conceptions of matter and spirit, from a transcendence of modern philosophy back into it. This meant that in the name of defending Marxism people confounded what was right and wrong in modern and contemporary Western philosophy, and especially its transformation. As a result, in some aspects Marxist philosophy was distorted as being similar to modern metaphysics.

In Order to Perdure and Develop, Traditional Chinese Philosophy Must Re-examine and Evaluate Western Philosophy

There are three main reasons why in order to perdure and develop traditional Chinese philosophy must re-examine and evaluate Western philosophy:

Firstly, this inheritance and development is stipulated in Marxism. The latter is among the products of Western philosophy, and its wealth and development in contemporary time remain connected with Western philosophy. Therefore, in order more correctly to understand Marxism, people must conscientiously study Western philosophy.

Secondly, this inheritance and development corresponds with the demands to realize Chinese modernization and to establish socialism with Chinese characteristics. Traditional Chinese philosophy and culture were based on individual, narrow and small-scale agricultural economics; it was restricted by the patriarchal clan system and the social constructs characteristic of the integration of family and country. Although a very rich and excellent inheritance, this cannot respond to contemporary demands and hence must be reconstructed. It is essential critically to absorb Western philosophy and contemporary culture for this reconstruction.

Thirdly, this inheritance and development must face the world and the future. Therefore, Chinese philosophy and culture must be open and able to dialogue and interchange with Western countries. This means also that it is necessary for Chinese philosophy and culture to link up with Western philosophy and culture.

Linking and Intermixing Chinese and Western Philosophy Is the only Way to Develop Philosophy in China for the Coming 21st Century
Both for China and the whole world, coming to the 21st century means that there will be deep changes in the development of science and technology, economics and culture, and the orientation of all sectors of social life. The condition of philosophy will require the same. The direction of the development of philosophy for the 21st century is being discussed very earnestly in philosophical circles both Chinese and Western, but their answers differ. As for the concrete forms of the development of philosophy in the 21st century, it is very difficult to judge exactly. However, it may be necessary to draw together and unite different types of philosophy, including various trends and schools of Western philosophy, Marxist and non-Marxist, with oriental, especially Chinese, philosophy.

If one takes the 19th and 20th centuries as radical, antagonistic and conflictual, then, along with the non-reversible end of the Cold War humanity now faces common problems and the 21st century may be characterized by peaceful competition and dialogue. Antagonism and conflict will not disappear very quickly; they could at times be very radical in special spheres, but they can be peacefully resolved only through dialogue and consultation. Under such circumstances, radical antagonisms in the philosophical realm could be relaxed to some degree, while consultative discussion could be engaged in more and more people. In fact, this tendency is beginning to appear in Western philosophical circles. More and more philosophers not only are transcending the opposition between various trends and schools, but also are finding common language between Marxist and non-Marxist philosophy. This does not mean that various philosophical schools should forsake their own position, but only that each school or philosopher not take one’s own viewpoint as absolute, but show a more open and tolerant attitude toward others. As an open type of philosophy, Marxism also should pay attention to friendly dialogue with non-Marxist philosophies and absorb all worthwhile ideas from them while keeping its own point of view.

For a long time in academic circles issues of the relation between oriental and Western cultures, as well as between Chinese and Western philosophy, have been objects of intense, even heated, argument. There are many reasons why it is very difficult to arrive at common understandings. The differences in historical and cultural tradition and in thought patterns as well as related biases and misunderstandings of each other are among the main reasons. Generally, while Western countries were rising and at the summit of their modernization, their thinkers had no doubt about Western philosophy and culture as characterized by the spirit of rationality and science, whereas they often ignored and evaluated poorly excellent oriental philosophy and culture. When China and other oriental countries were in a so-called pre-modern period, their thinkers could not have a profound understanding of Western philosophy and culture. Under such circumstances, it was very difficult to interrelate oriental/Chinese and Western culture and philosophy.

Now, however, as world history is coming to the 21st century, Western countries have experienced the various serious contradictions and crises in "modern" philosophy and culture; they have lost their past superstition regarding rationality and science. Therefore, they look for ways to transcend them, and even to search oriental culture in order to find a way out. Meanwhile, oriental countries have come to a period of "modernization"; people there have a more profound and broad understanding of the spirit of rationality and science which appeared early in the West, even in ancient Greece and look for their original inheritance. In such circumstances the two parties feel that they should and could find a bridge to link them. Therefore, though the past several centuries have been times of conflict between oriental/Chinese and Western culture and philosophy, the coming 21st century should be a time of linking and of convergence.
If the above analysis be admitted, then Chinese philosophy in facing the 21st century will be open in type, that is, under the guidance of Marxist philosophy it will absorb and include every worthy theory. Such a philosophy, based on inheriting its excellent traditional legacy, will link up with the characteristics of Western philosophy in the spirit of modern-contemporary times. Western philosophy will become an important resource enriching and developing Chinese philosophy. Traditional Chinese philosophy, overcoming various limitations and developing, will be a treasure for world philosophy. Exporting what is excellent in the Chinese philosophical legacy to the world and importing the contemporary spirit of Western philosophy probably will be the way of philosophical development in China. The new philosophy, re-founded on this base, will transcend both traditional Chinese and Western philosophy.
2. The Postmodern Critique of Contemporary Western Philosophy

In recent years, the question about Western postmodern philosophy (postmodernism) has become one of the hot issues in philosophical and cultural studies in China. However, postmodernism is an ambiguous concept. What Western philosophers mean by it is very different, and their assessment of it varies even more. Some philosophers believe that it changes the direction of philosophic development and even opens a new age, while others would play it down or declare some arguments of postmodernism to be nonsense. There are differences also among Chinese scholars’ understanding and assessment of postmodernism. How is this philosophical tendency to be taken? Is it a turn in the development of Western philosophy, a change of direction and of mode? Is it essentially a transcendence of contemporary Western philosophy; can it represent the current tendency of Western philosophy; what is its influence on the contemporary development of Marxist philosophy? All these problems are worth further study at different levels and from different points of view. This essay expresses some views on the modern and contemporary trends of Western philosophy.

Multiple Meanings of Postmodernism and Essential Theoretical Tendencies

In order to discuss the above problems we have first to clarify to what postmodernism refers. Originally, postmodernism referred only to an architectural inclination featuring deviation from, and criticism of, modern and classical styles of design. Later it was used to designate those similar trends in literature, art, aesthetics, philosophy, sociology, politics and even natural science. In Europe, since structuralist philosophy relates to architectural design, artistic creation, and the study of human culture in some of its aspects, such so-called French post-structuralist philosophers as Derrida and Foucault, by criticizing some of the conceptions in earlier structuralism, tried to eliminate and negate the conceptions essential to the system of traditional Western philosophy. In America, the so-called Neo-pragmatism of such philosophers as Rorty and Quine, which originated from analytic philosophy, tries to criticize and transcend the tradition of modern Western philosophy by rebuilding pragmatism, especially by emphasizing the instrumentalism in the thought of Dewey and other philosophers. In general, contemporary postmodernism refers to those trends that have emerged since the 1960s with an intention systematically to oppose modern Western philosophy.

However, philosophers bearing the above anti-traditional inclination can be found in every school of contemporary Western philosophy, and some postmodernists (including Lyotard) are difficult to classify into a certain school. For this reason, quite a few scholars make a broader interpretation of postmodernism and subsume into it philosophies with the above inclinations. Griffin, one of the active postmodernists in America, just says, "If there would be common ground in the using of the word postmodernism, then it means a kind of the widespread emotion instead of a common dogma, that is, a kind of emotion that believes man can and must transcend modernity." (Cf. The Preface to the English version of Postmodern Sciences.) Thus philosophers with the above inclination in different ages can all be counted as postmodernists. Besides those mentioned above, there are such other important philosophers as Heidegger, Gadamer, Habermas, Freud, Marcuse, Adorno, Wittgenstein, Austin, Davidson, Popper, Lakatos, Feyerabend, Bell, and R. J. Bernstein, while Nietzsche, Dilthey, and other thinkers of nineteenth century are supposed to
be the important pioneers of postmodernism. In The Founders of Constructive Postmodernism, edited by Griffin (1993), the earlier pragmatists Pierce, James, Dewey, Bergson, and the Process philosopher Whitehead are also counted as such founders. In a word, most influential anti-traditional philosophers since the middle of nineteenth century are regarded as postmodernists. Some even believe postmodernism can date back to Pascal, Rousseau, and Vico. Since those philosophers belong to different schools and their theoretical emphases and goals are also very different, postmodernism becomes a very broad concept.

According to the semantic meaning of the word postmodern, it is not groundless to extend postmodernism from special trends since the sixties to the whole of Western philosophy since the early part of the 20th century, or to philosophy even since the middle of nineteenth century. For "postmodern" obviously means "after modern", and in Western language, "modern" often refers generally to the whole capitalist age since the Western modernization movement symbolized by 17th century industrial revolution, and dating even back to the Renaissance. In China this is often translated as the recent age, that is pre-contemporary age. Thus postmodern means "after the recent age". As there have been various trends criticizing and negating modern philosophy since the middle of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the 20th century, we can say there postmodernism has existed since that time.

Only by noting the multi-meaning of the word ‘postmodernism,’ can we reveal its status in Western philosophy and the nature of the turn it suggests. If it refers to the philosophy opposing traditional philosophy since the middle of the nineteenth century, the change it realizes is subordinate to the turn in contemporary Western philosophy; in this respect, contemporary postmodernism is only a part of contemporary philosophy. As to the nature and significance of the substitution by contemporary Western philosophy of modern philosophy, many problems need study. In my view, this substitution is a fundamental alteration of the philosophical mode of thinking, and symbolizes that Western philosophy has moved to a new and higher stage.

If "postmodern" is limited to contemporary postmodern philosophy since the sixties, to believe that it realizes a new turn means to regard it as a new mode of philosophical thinking that has transcended modern Western philosophy, and thus represents a new stage in the development of Western philosophy. Since it is later than contemporary Western philosophy some scholars think the philosophers mentioned above should be called post-postmodern.1 When postmodernists such as Derrida, Rorty, and Lyotard stress the turn and the transcendence of modern philosophy realized by their philosophy, their essential theoretical inclination belongs to this post-postmodernism. When they negate modern philosophy, they are referring to the "modern" both before and after the middle of nineteenth century. To see whether they realize the new turn in the development of Western philosophy, to see whether and how this turn represents the trend of contemporary philosophy, we need to see not only whether and how they transcend modern Western philosophy since Descartes, but since the middle of the nineteenth century, especially since Nietzsche. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze some of its important postmodern theories by comparing them with modern Western philosophy.

Although the theories of different postmodernists have different characteristics, there are still some things in common, especially that almost all of them are inclined to negate or transcend traditional metaphysics, systematic philosophy, the dualism of subject and object, foundationalism, essentialism, rationalism, moral idealism, subjectivism and anthropocentrism (humanism), monism and determinism (uniqueness, certainty, simplicity and absoluteness) It is most important to see the relation between the negative theories and modern Western philosophy when assessing contemporary postmodernism.
Among the various negative theories of postmodernism, the criticism of foundationalism is of decisive significance. Some Western philosophers even believe that "postmodernism can be called anti-foundationalism", Cf. Virtues for a Postmodern World published in Business Ethics Quarterly, Vol. 5. No. 4, 1995. Rorty’s criticism of the foundationalism is quite representative.

Foundationalism generally refers to all those doctrines that believe human knowledge and cultures have certain reliable theoretical foundations: a so-called Archimedean point. These foundations consist of some self-evident notions or conceptions bearing the significance of final truth, which Rorty calls privileged representations. The purpose of academic research is to find these foundations. In epistemology and methodology, foundationalism is manifest as the essentialism that splits and opposes phenomena and reality (essence), the internal and the external. Since seventeenth century, the problem of the separation and opposition between subject and object, mind and matter has been advanced, and foundationalism obtained a dominant status in philosophy in the form of essentialism.

Rorty regards nearly all traditional philosophies as foundationalism and believes their difference lies only in what are taken as foundations in the different philosophies, e.g. the general concept or experience. Among various traditional philosophies, he believes the thoughts of Plato, Descartes, and Kant are most representative and concentrates his criticism on them. He regards them as vision-centralisms (or mirror-isms) based on the separation and opposition between mind and matter, subject and object. Plato’s doctrine on truth and knowledge regards philosophy as the general theory of representation. To grasp the representation means that the consciousness (the human mind) copies the external things that are objects, just as looking with the human eye; thus the human mind is regarded as the mirror reflecting the external things. Using the cogito as the starting-point, Descartes affirmed that knowledge originates from the inner heart, which becomes the inner mirror reflecting the outside world. Kant tries to eliminate the various kinds of opposition resulting from the dichotomies such as that of subject and object, e.g. the opposition between empiricism and rationalism, between materialism and idealism. His purpose is still to provide a reliable foundation for science, art, morality and religion. The human heart in the realm of science and knowledge is to set laws for nature, and in the realm of morality to promulgate imperatives. In fact, his three great critiques are to inspect, repair and illuminate the mirrors in these realms.

In a word, according to Rorty’s interpretation, as long as one distinguishes and opposes the human mind (subject) and what stands against it (object), and believes that the task of philosophy is to grasp the object with the mind and try to find a reliable principle of knowledge and action for human beings, he regards the human mind as the mirror of nature and adheres to a certain kind of foundationalism. The essential theoretical structures of nearly all traditional philosophies, whether they be ontologies or epistemologies, presuppose the human being as the mirror of nature, and are kinds of foundationalism. Thus, for Rorty, the criticism of traditional philosophy is the elimination and destruction of the human mind as the mirror of nature. In the introduction of his representative work Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (1979), p. 4, Rorty points out, "the purpose of this book is to destroy the reader’s trust in mind, namely, the belief that regards the mind as something one should have a philosophical view of, to destroy the readers’ trust in knowledge, namely the belief that regards knowledge as something with a certain theory and a concrete foundation, to destroy the trust in the philosophy man has supposed since Kant", This criticism of foundationalism by Rorty is quite representative.
Rorty’s negation of the traditional philosophy in terms of a criticism of foundationalism shows the common stand-point of the postmodernists, although they criticize in different names, with different means, in different aspects. For example, Derrida focuses on the deconstruction of logos-centralism and language-centralism (intensively manifested by the criticism of the linguistic mode of structuralism); Foucault focuses on the criticism of the traditional episteme; and Lyotard is keen on the discussion about narrative, especially on meta-narrative. But their criticisms are similar to that of Rorty. Rorty himself admits there is resemblance between his view and those of Derrida, Foucault, and Gadamer, believing that Derida’s anti-logos-centralism is an illustration of anti-essentialism. In a little later published work *The Consequence of Pragmatism*, he extends the above criticism to the whole Platonic tradition.

Seen against the background of contemporary and modern Western philosophy, there is no substantial difference in the essential mode of philosophical thinking between the common tendency of the postmodernists represented by anti-foundationalism and that of many anti-traditional philosophers since the middle of nineteenth century. The reasons are as follows:

First, what they criticize in new names is still the traditional metaphysical thinking mode which these philosophers have criticized repeatedly (ontology, epistemology, dualism), only they sometimes partially vary in the criticisms of those philosophers (especially of the criticism of such continental philosophers as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and such pragmatists as Dewey), or apply them to certain concrete realms. Rorty thinks that the main work of Derrida follows the same line of thinking which began from Nietzsche, and extended to Heidegger. This line is characteristic of the more and more radical rejection of Platonism, and Derrida’s criticism of logos-centralism is an instance in which the common anti-foundationalism of Nietzsche and Heidegger is applied to the special cases of sentences and beliefs. As to his own anti-fundamentalism and anti-essentialism, this is also the same standing-point as James and Dewey, for their pragmatism is only anti-foundationalism applied to such objects of thinking as truth, knowledge, language, and morality. Lyotard is imitating Wittgenstein in his criticism of language.

Second, their new philosophical theories do not transcend the broad scope of these philosophers. The non-capitalist, post-philosophical culture which Rorty advocates is supposed to be the norm of contemporary postmodernism. But he himself points out repeatedly that they stem from the theories of Dewey, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, etc., and are even the results of the coincidence of the two traditions or trends in contemporary Western philosophy. The tradition from positivism to analytic philosophy is very similar to the tradition of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida in that it begins from the criticism of Platonism and ends in the criticism of the capitalist philosophy, cf. *The Post-philosophical Culture* (Chinese edition,) pp.98, 149, 245, 13.

At first sight, Derrida’s deconstructionism is the deconstruction of all earlier philosophies, but he has not put forward a new philosophy transcending the traditional philosophy. Thereby, his elimination is mainly the turn from a solo-interpretation to a multi-interpretation of the text and does not transcend the original philosophical frame. For this very reason, neither approving nor negating completely Heidegger and Nietzsche, who are respectively representatives of the two important trends in modern and contemporary Western philosophy, he vibrates between the two. Lyotard explicitly relates his theory about language and the legality of knowledge to Wittgenstein’s language game.
Other negative theories of post-modernists have an inner relation with the above anti-foundationalism and anti-essentialism, and can be regarded as their manifestation and necessary consequence, but they do not transcend the scope of contemporary Western philosophy.

For example, the criticism of subjectivist theory and the anthropocentrism of modern philosophy is an important aspect of their criticism of traditional philosophy. Most of them believe that the substitutions of human being as subject for God and the substitution of humanity for deity are the most important traits of modern philosophy. But no matter how importantly these traits have functioned to transcend modernity, we have to transcend subjectivity. Derrida, Foucault and other scholars all focus on the deconstruction of subject. Derrida’s negations of the immediate presence of subject in language and Foucault’s concept of the death of the human being are intensive expressions of the negation of subjectivity. These originate from the negation of the dichotomy between subject and object and the negation of substantial ontology, because subjectivist principles and anthropocentrism are based on this dichotomy and the related substantialization of subject. However, the criticism of subjective principles and anthropocentrism are found in contemporary Western philosophy since Nietzsche. For example, Nietzsche regards the subject as nothing but the product of self-deception. The master morality he advocates is then the transcendence of the slave morality that defends this subjectivity; Wittgenstein’s linguistic philosophy regards subject as a special function of grammar; Freud’s psychoanalytic approach puts the ego in a subordinate status by uncovering the subconciousness beneath consciousness.

Most postmodernists counter rationalism with irrationalism (including the substitution of poeticized philosophy for rational philosophy), negate certainty and integrity with uncertainty (relativism, non-centralism, un-integrity), negate monism and determinism with pluralism and undeterminism. All these are nothing but the negation of foundation and essence, and have been put forward by many contemporary philosophers in various ways. Here we will not review them in detail.

The Transcendence of Contemporary Western Philosophy by Postmodernism

However, we can not conclude from above that postmodernists have merely duplicated the contemporary philosopher’s criticism of modern philosophy. It should be noted that there are some important differences between them. The postmodernists criticize not only modern philosophy, but also contemporary philosophy. It is just because of the criticism of the latter that postmodernism has transcended contemporary philosophy to some extent. Let me illustrate the five important aspects of difference as follows.

Firstly. Most postmodernists point out that because the contemporary philosophers’ criticism of traditional metaphysics is not sufficiently thorough, they often fall into another kind of foundationalism while trying to overcome the previous one kind. Postmodernists attempt to overcome such lack of thoroughness.

Rorty believes that neither of the two main trends in contemporary philosophy has stopped the pursuit of ultimate foundations for science and philosophy. Analytic philosophy, represented by Russell and the early Wittgenstein, attempts to search for a precise linguistic expression (a normative language) through linguistic analysis. The so-called "language turn" proposed by linguistic philosophers is nothing but the successor to the old foundationalism which had substituted "language" for "mind". Phenomenology, represented by Husserl, tries to find an absolutely reliable foundation through "essential reduction "and "transcendental reduction". They
all advocate the "strictness" and "precision" of philosophy, and are real successors of foundationalism, cf. Objectivity, Relativism and Truth by Rorty 1991, p.179. Philosophers such as Nietzsche, Dilthey, Bergson, Freud, and Bradley all have intensively criticized traditional philosophy, and advocated the transcendence of any foundationalism that features a dichotomy between object and subject, mind and body. However, whether it is Nietzsche’s "will," Bergson and Dilthey’s "life," Freud’s "Libido," or Bradley’s "mind," it is a version of Plato’s "idea" and bears the obvious trace of foundationalism. Rorty agrees with Heidegger’s saying that Nietzsche is the last metaphysician not a postmetaphysical thinker, and therefore not free from Platonism.

Derrida has expressed a similar position by opposing "presence metaphysics" and "logocentrism"; he inherits the position of such contemporary philosophers as Heidegger that requires the elimination of metaphysics. However, he does not regard the works of Heidegger and others as a success. He acknowledges that his own work is impossible without the problems put forward by Heidegger; nevertheless, he says that it is because of having benefitted from Heidegger that he attempts to disclose in Heidegger’s works the mark of metaphysics, i.e., of what he calls onto-theology. By metaphysical sign, Derrida means the fact that Heidegger has used the term "being". Heidegger has taken an important step toward "anti-metaphysics" by distinguishing Sein and Seiende. However, from the point of view of Derrida, such a distinction is still under the influence of metaphysics. To distinguish his own thought from Heidegger’s, Derrida has created such terms as "trace," "differance," etc., to name what is obscure, metaphorical and able to self-multiply in order to cast off the metaphysical mode of thinking.

Secondly, Postmodernists have further developed anti-subjectivist and anti-anthropocentric tendencies that exist in the thoughts of some contemporary philosophers.

"Anti-subjectivity" and "anti-anthropocentrism" are important aspects of the transcendence of modern philosophy by contemporary Western philosophy. Since "subjectivity" and "anthropocentrism" are based on dichotomy between subject and object or mind and body which usually leads to man’s alienation, materialization, or objectivization, and deprives man of his real individuality, many philosophers propose to review man’s existence and the meaning and value of his action. Postmodernists inherit these views and greatly develop them, but disagree on the contemporary philosophers’ inclination to hold that a man is a definite "being", i.e., a substantive subject. They think this inclination has not gotten rid of metaphysics. They demand the elimination of man’s being, just like the elimination of other substantive being. Thus the human being loses his central status in philosophy. They thereby demand the substitution of non-humanism for humanism. Foucault’s development of Nietzsche’s "death of God" into "the death of man" is a typical example. He points out at the end of The Order of Things that, with the being of language shinning more and more brilliantly on the horizon, man is gradually vanishing, cf. The Order of Things (New York, 1970), p. 386. In other words, it is not the human being who, as subject, uses language as his tool, but the being of language that reveals the meaning of man’s being.

In fact, Heidegger earlier expressed a similar thought. If it would be sound to say that his questioning about "Dasein" in Being and Time in his earlier period does not transcend the scope of subjective metaphysics featuring the dichotomy between subject and object, then, "the truth of being" discussed repeatedly in his latter period is an ontology which is free from this dichotomy and has reached the unity of subject and object, (or, the unity of heaven and human being). He points out that many terms, such as truth, reality, culture, value, world, in modern philosophy are based on the premise of a dichotomy between subject and object, and should be transcended. In order to reach the more primal truth, he usually resorts to ancient Greek philosophy and ancient
Chinese philosophy, which are free from dualism. He believes the real existence of the human being is in harmony with nature, rather than dominating nature. Therefore, he advocates that the human being should not be put at the central, dominating point in the world. On the contrary, the human being is only one among the multitude of beings. Thus, the human being is changed from the governor and dominator of the world into one who listens and guards it.

Here, we should note that there is a difference between Heidegger’s view and "the death of man" of Foucault or the "non-center" and "non-presence" of Derrida. Derrida disagrees with Heidegger on his going out of "man ", i.e., the way of dualism and subjectivity. What is needed, he thinks, is a change to a style that is able to speak several kinds of language, to produce several texts simultaneously. Nevertheless, they are identical in requiring the correction of a dualist thinking mode and the elimination of the related subjectivist principle.

It should be noted that "the vanishing of man" advanced by postmodernists does not generally negate the existence of the human being and its meaning. They merely require the negation of man’s being a subject opposite an object, so as to cast off the interdependent relationship between subject and object, mind and body, and get rid of man’s dependence on the notion of an external world and universal reason. Some postmodernists advocate that the human being should be free of center, essence, strategic aim, ideal, duty to society and history, political responsibility, and ethical obligation, should get rid of any external or internal restrictions, and should enjoy only the present realist life. In their view only such a human being realizes the value and meaning of being human. These views seem ridiculous, but in fact, they are only the extreme forms that oppose the philosophical mode featuring universal reason and dualism.

**Thirdly.** Postmodernists want to transcend not only rationalism in modern philosophy, but also any substantive non-rationalism in contemporary philosophy.

According to the postmodernist view, some contemporary philosophers have discovered that it is a mistake to take reason as the foundation. But it is another kind of foundationalism to replace reason by such non-rational beings as will, life, subconsciousness, etc., which have not gotten rid of the restriction of reason. For will, life and subconsciousness are nothing but deformed reason, that is, the irrational structure constructed by reason on the premise of the old metaphysics. Postmodernists require that philosophy keep free from any reality and essence (no matter whether rational or irrational); therefore they advocate the transcendence not only of traditional rationalism, but also of contemporary non-rationalism. They do not claim themselves as non-rationalists and are really different from the traditional non-rationalists regarding reality (substance). However, since they have exaggerated the limitation and the contingency of human intelligence and have negated the relative stability and definition of being and knowledge, they negate the reliability of any rational method of knowing. Everything becomes unstable, indeterminable, incomparable, and incommensurable. Knowing becomes an anarchistic, free game. No definition or objectivity of truth is possible in such a situation. Derrida clearly states that there is no truth itself, but only the indulgence of truth, and that truth is "for me", "about me", that it is plural. Obviously, this view bears the trace of non-rationalism. If we would say that the non-rationalism of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche is substantive, then we could say that the postmodernists non-rationalism is functional.

**Fourthly.** In methodology, with the theory of language game and the method of deconstruction, postmodernists develop the subjectivist and relativist inclinations of contemporary philosophy.
Most postmodernists believe the methodology of pursuing universality in modern and contemporary philosophy (especially in such scientific tendencies as positivism, analytic philosophy, etc.) are out of date and exclusive. Those positive methods of science based on reason and logic are no more than certain sets of game rules. Taken as universal norms, they would restrict human imagination. Therefore they not only cannot be applied to the humanities and social sciences but also restrict natural science. The individual’s emotion, experience and imagination are the sole sources of creativity, the measures of truth, and the standard for judging the game. In this respect, the positions of Lyotard and Derrida are representative.

Lyotard negates integrity, universality and definition; he is fond of obscurity and diversity. He calls: let us fight with integrity and unity; let us be witnesses to what is unrepresentable; let us continue to exploit various kinds of diversity and make efforts to protect its honor. Cf. Postmodern Culture and Aesthetics (Chinese edition), 1992, p. 24. Guided by such thought, he develops Wittgenstein’s theory of language games, believing that, although rules are needed in language games, rules themselves are not fixed, but are only pacts by participants. Every participant in the game is equal, each can take part in the game and express their view according to their own choice and free imagination; they need not abide by any fixed way or rule; he regards the language game as an important way of practicing free thinking. He believes, the bolder the imagination, the more one can develop one’s creativity; and therefore the more individual and creative one is. Even natural science is nothing but language games. He cites the development of science since 1950s and 1960s to demonstrate the uncertainty of the language game in natural science.

Derrida substitutes deconstruction for the traditional method of philosophy. In fact, deconstruction is the critical interpretation of the meaning of concepts or linguistic symbols. It discloses the contradiction in the text through reading, thereby reverting to the original order of being; further it alters and reinterprets the original relation between concepts. In other words, he destroys (eliminates, subverts) the original structure of the text to uncover the meaning that has been excluded, concealed, or forgotten because of the central meaning, especially those meanings which differ from the universal and definite ones. He emphasizes the plurality, uncertainty and obscurity of meaning, inverts the relation between the center and the margins and eliminates what is definite and fixed in the structure. For these reasons, he not only accepts Wittgenstein’s theory on language game, but also employs it more randomly. For, in fact, he denies the game should abide by any rule which, he believes, cannot restrict the game. The rules of the game have been replaced by the game itself.

Fifthly. Postmodernists have transcended not only traditional philosophy, but also philosophy itself. To deprive philosophy of its original significance is to turn it into something unphilosophical.

As regards the form of expression, postmodernists change the inclination to construct abstract and speculative systems in traditional philosophy. They not only borrow terms from literature, art, psychology, sociology, semiotics, etc., but also transcend the original significance and method of philosophy. By blending them with the above sciences, they give their philosophy a form that transcends and negates the normal philosophy. Rorty’s post -philosophical culture is a typical example in this aspect.

The so-called "post-philosophical culture "refers to the culture established after the elimination of traditional, modern and contemporary philosophy. It is equivalent to "post-theological culture (philosophical culture) established after theological culture was negated by Enlightenment thinkers. In post-theological culture, philosophy overthrew theology and took its
supreme status. However, although postphilosophical culture has overthrown philosophical culture, it has not taken the supreme status of philosophy itself, and is no longer the king of culture. Philosophy, like a king in a feudal society who has left the throne, can still survive as an ordinary citizen. No discipline can take the former status of philosophy, whether science, literature, or politics. Different from the former philosophical culture (the so-called capitalist philosophy), what philosophy in postphilosophical culture can do is only to relate different things together while riding on the "literature-history-antropology-politics rocking horse". Rorty describes the situation in this culture as follows: here, no one, at least no intellectual, would believe that there is a criterion in our deep mind which can tell us whether we are contacting reality and when we can contact Truth; in this culture, no one would think himself more reasonable, more scientific, more deep than others, whether it is a priest, a physicist, a poet or a political party; no specific part of the culture could be chosen as an example to illustrate the expected conditions of other parts of the culture. There is no Philosopher in such a culture. There are only philosophers who can understand how things are related. Such expertise does not pursue the goal of traditional philosophy, but would be engaged in comparative research on the advantage and disadvantage of the talk in nuances which human beings have invented thus far. The specialty of the philosophers in the postphilosophical culture is to understand the similarity and distinction between the great pictures or narratives and between the efforts to make clear how things are related. Such a philosopher is the one who can tell how the ways in which things are related themselves are related.

Other postmodernists such as Derrida hold similar views. What is worth noting is that they usually form philosophy and poetry. Their negation of dualism, subjectivity, and anthropocentrism leads to an emphasis on the aesthetic realm of intuition, and to imagination featuring the harmony between, or forgetfulness of, object and subject. This is poetry which necessarily leads to the poeticization of philosophy. In this respect, Heidegger’s theory of "poeticized philosophy" has had great influence upon postmodernists. Inspired by Heidegger, Derrida develops the theory that philosophy and poetry are of the same origin, advocates the elimination of the boundary between philosophy and poetry, and believes that philosophizing consists in writing poems. In this sense, Derrida regards philosophy as metaphorology. He thinks Greek philosophy is full of metaphors and can be called a poem full of metaphors. Plato’s Allegory of the Cave mentions how eyes see things with the help of the sunlight. Human beings can see only the shadow of the things illustrated by the sun, but not the sun itself. However, human beings can thereby conclude that there is a sun outside the cave and can move toward the sun with its brilliant light. Thus Derrida proposes that the function of philosophy is just like that of the sun, that is, metaphorical. Since metaphors have been excluded from philosophy, they have remained in literature and poetry. Philosophy has parted with poetry and literature but Derrida says that it is time to reunite them.

Obviously, it is a rather complicated issue to assess the transcending of contemporary philosophy by postmodernism. The above five aspects can and should be analyzed from different points of view, which we cannot address here. However, the following two points can be confirmed:

First, compared with previous contemporary philosophy, postmodernism has criticized modern philosophy more thoroughly, and has disclosed many flaws of the latter. But it often goes to extremes, and is more one-sided.

Second, its arguments and criticism transcend contemporary philosophy to some extent, and some are even quite important. But it has not transcended the limitations of the mode of thinking
of contemporary philosophy, has not established for itself a new mode essentially different from that of contemporary philosophy, or achieved a fundamental alteration of philosophy.

**Postmodernism and the Tendency of Current Philosophy**

Having defined what postmodernism is, and illustrated its negation and transcendence of modern and contemporary philosophy, it is time to discuss the issue proposed at the beginning of this chapter. Because the term "postmodernism" has diverse meanings, we should evaluate it according to its various meanings.

If postmodernism generally refers to what is after the modern philosophy represented by Descartes and Kant, and if what it criticized and negated is merely the traditional metaphysical inclination such as the foundationalism and essentialism in the philosophy of Descartes and Kant, then it is only a new title for the general tendency to criticize modern philosophy that has existed since the middle of nineteenth century. In this case, postmodernism’s criticism of modern philosophy implies only the substitution of the mode of thinking of contemporary philosophy for that of modern philosophy. In this regard, we can consider contemporary postmodernism as a new form of the general tendency, featuring its opposition to tradition, namely, its transcendence of modernity, therefore we can affirm its positive significance in the development of philosophy.

If it refers specifically to the contemporary philosophy since the middle of nineteenth century, namely, the latest stage of philosophy as some postmodernists claim, then it is difficult for us to support this view. For I have shown above that there is no substantial difference in the mode of thinking between them and prior Western philosophy, and that none of the changes postmodernism proposes transcends the larger ones of contemporary philosophy. It is sound to regard postmodernism as a new trend in the development of philosophy, but we cannot say that it has brought about a fundamental transcendence or a new turn in Western philosophy.

Can postmodernism represent the new tendency of current philosophy? We should not only take into account which kinds of development current philosophy needs, but also whether and to what extent postmodernism meets these needs. The former concerns the assessment of the condition of current philosophy and the estimation of its direction, the latter the assessment of the possible effects of postmodernism on current philosophy.

Although it is an important alteration of the mode of philosophical thinking that contemporary philosophy has taken the place of modern philosophy, and although this event itself marks a higher stage reached by philosophy, contemporary philosophy has serious flaws and contradictions itself, just like the modern philosophy it would replace. This is not only the case of concrete schools and trends, but also the case of the whole contemporary Western philosophy. Therefore, it is not surprising to see that not long after a contemporary philosopher claims he has created a new epoch in philosophy, he or his successors encounter crises difficult to overcome (with related crisis of ideals and faith).

The flaws and contradictions of contemporary Western philosophy are diverse. Among them, a more remarkable case is that, either it cannot thoroughly criticize and negate the metaphysical mode of thinking of modern philosophy and returns to the position of the theory criticized, or it goes to another extreme, especially to relativism or nihilism and denies the significance of philosophy itself by negating traditional philosophy. In the past century, philosophy has had some important developments, but it always vibrates between the above two extremes. From the middle of nineteenth century on, contemporary philosophy has embodied a thinking mode different from that of modern philosophy, but its embodiment is far from perfect. Its various specific philosophic
forms are very one-sided, and doomed in the end to fall into dilemmas or crises. To overcome such a situation, we must reappraise, criticize, and transcend any previous philosophic schools and trends and construct new theories that meet the demand of the development of all aspects of modern society.

Postmodernism has met the need to review and alter the development of contemporary philosophy to some extent. Most postmodernists have disclosed and criticized the flaws and contradictions in the theories of contemporary philosophy since Nietzsche, and take it as their mission to explore the new direction of philosophy. From this point of view, their work is valuable, at least inspiring. Being one-sided, the positions they put forward opposes systematic philosophy, absolute monism, dualism, anthropocentrism, absolutized intellectualism and non-rationalism. Thus it reflects to some degree the developmental tendency of philosophy.

Although postmodernists advocate transcending not only modern but also contemporary philosophy, as shown above, it has not really transcended the latter. It retains the various contradictions of the latter, and cannot meet completely the requirement to alter the development of Western philosophy, or to represent the tendency of Western philosophy. For these reasons, although postmodernism was a sensation in the sixties it is encountering more and more criticism and is being gradually left aside. People are engaged in searching for new ways to cast off the dilemma of philosophy.

Where should philosophy go? How to alter the philosophical mode embodied by contemporary Western philosophy; what will replaces it? These are the problems which Chinese and foreign philosophers keep discussing and exploring, without being able to provide answers. Perhaps there is no unique way or mode, at least at present. We should tolerate, and even advocate the common development of various ways and modes, including eastern and Western, Marxist and non-Marxist philosophies. In fact, with the end of the cold war, the globalization of the international economy, and the elimination and overcoming of many actual contradictions, the conflicts and antagonisms between philosophical schools have been greatly alleviated. More and more philosophers agree to put aside minor differences so as to seek common ground. If there is a new philosophical mode that would transcend and replace the contemporary philosophical mode in the future, the most practical way leading to it is to eliminate the conflicts between different philosophies and promote their intercommunication and unity.

Marxists should reestablish trust in Marxist philosophy, reappraise what it really is and the true meaning of the revolutionary change in philosophy it realized, and recover its real aspects as a contemporary philosophical mode of thinking. That is, we should take Marxism as an open developing philosophical theory capable of correcting the flaws of modern and contemporary philosophy, and absorbing all the valuable achievements of human culture. Only this kind of Marxist philosophy can point in the right direction for current philosophy. Of course, this is neither a simple negation of previous Marxist philosophy, nor a new philosophical mode of thinking other than the original one of Marxist philosophy. Nevertheless, it requires getting rid of its misunderstandings and distortions which arose under the influence of complicated factors over a long period. Especially it requires casting off the special modes of thinking of modern philosophy, such as foundationalism and essentialism, which it should have overcome but for various reasons fell into once again. Therefore, this is a turning of philosophical thought modes (and a change in notions) to some extent. From this point of view, it is very important to investigate deeply and review the relation between this and other contemporary philosophies, including postmodernism. Although postmodernism itself cannot represent the correct tendency of current philosophy, the
theories it puts forward do contain some factors that will promote the formation of new modes of philosophical thinking. Marxists should pay attention to this and learn from it.

**Note**

3.

Present Philosophical Tendencies: A Comparative Study of Marxist and Contemporary Western Philosophy

I

As humankind proceeds into the 21st century, one must ask about philosophy, which important changes will it experience? These questions are now warmly discussed both in Chinese and Western circles and among Marxists and non-Marxists. Because the conditions and situations in which Chinese Philosophy exists are different from those in the west, the present problems and the future tendency of Chinese philosophy differ from those of Western philosophy. Yet contemporary China is open to the world, and the movements of modernization of China and the rest of the world are to some degree merged together into a single unity. Hence the development of Chinese philosophy necessarily has inseparable connections with that of Western philosophy. Besides its research in Marxist philosophy, Chinese philosophy has not only carried on and kept up Chinese traditional philosophy, but has also studied and drawn lessons from foreign philosophy. Under the guidance of Marxism, all have been merged together with Marxist philosophy to enrich and develop Marxism. Thus the relationships between contemporary Chinese and Western philosophy are characterized especially by those between Chinese Marxist and Western philosophy. Chinese research, then, on the developmental tendencies of contemporary philosophy focuses especially on those of Marxism and Western philosophy.

Marxist philosophy has, of course, world significance, but it originated mainly in the West in terms of its social background and theoretical origin. About this, there is hardly any dispute in both Chinese and Western philosophical circles. The main dispute between them concerns the relationship between Marxist and contemporary Western philosophy, which have the same social background and theoretical origin. For a long time, dogmatic and rigid Marxist philosophy has been regarded as the genuine one, and Marxist philosophy was in conflict with contemporary Western philosophy because of its different basic tendency. Most Marxists totally negated contemporary Western philosophy, and Western philosophers radically defied Marxist philosophy. Both proceeded in terms of conflict with the other. In the late 1980s and early 1990s when the international situation changed radically, the development of Marxism met serious setbacks. Accordingly, many Western scholars showed Marxism ending in failure. In academic Marxist circles some were shaken in their preexisting belief. The emergence of these new circumstances call us to reinvestigate and re-recognize not only what Marxist and contemporary Western philosophy really are, especially, their genuine significance in the history of Western philosophy, but also the different problems and difficulties they confronted in the course of their respective one-hundred-year development. From this we should gain some light on such questions as the following. Can they escape these problems? How can they overcome them? Do they have real vitality; and under what conditions can they thrive? Only if we understand these questions in conformity with the reality, we can make more accurate estimates for their future and evaluate the tendencies of present philosophy.
II

In the past, philosophic circles in China have given an opposite valuation to the significance of the birth of Marxist philosophy and to the organization and development of contemporary Western philosophy. The former was considered to be a revolutionary change in philosophy, while the latter was a transformation from a progressive direction to one that was reactionary. This condition has changed greatly since the Reform and Opening of China. With the guidance of Deng Xiaoping’s theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics, academic circles in this country to a great degree have overcome Leftist dogmatism and its rigidity. Now few people oversimplify contemporary Western philosophy. Besides the professional contingent, many scholars who focus on Chinese traditional and on Marxist philosophy have done considerable research on contemporary Western philosophy, and utilized its achievements for reference. In this respect, however, there are apparent deficiencies. Especially, we are short of deep research on the revolutionary changes made by Marx in philosophical history and on the genuine significance of Western philosophical transformation from modern to contemporary. Without such research, the already existing achievements are unsteady, and under certain circumstances can give rise to a one-sidedness similar to the past.

At the present, everybody opposes what leads to a rigid and dogmatic Marxism. But even when the Leftist trend was in control, who publicly agreed with it? People often rigidified and dogmatized Marxism in the name of Marxism and even in order to defend it. Whether Marxism becomes rigid and dogmatic depends not only on people’s subjective feeling, but also on people’s understanding of a Marxist mode of thinking, in keeping with Marxism. Among the people who made Marxism dogmatic and rigid, certainly some opposed it, but more often it was its defenders, including even some outstanding Marxists. Being unable to transcend the horizons of modern philosophy, or owing to being limited and influenced by political and ideological reasons, they have unconsciously deviated from Marxism, especially from the practical principle which was the kernel of Marxist philosophy. Consequently, if we unilaterally understand Marx’s revolutionary changes in philosophical history, we may depart from Marxism even with the best motive.

Everyone would agree that Western philosophy cannot be negated through oversimplification but in the past few directly declared such oversimplified views. People said mainly that contemporary Western philosophy should be criticized in terms of Marxism, and this is not wrong. But their understanding of Western philosophy was far from its reality. For example, many people thought that the transformation of Western philosophy from modern to contemporary could be equated with that from materialism to idealism, and the basic character of contemporary philosophy was an unchecked spread of idealism. In fact, most contemporary Western philosophical trends and schools aim at transcending the traditional mode of thinking which seeks the origin of all in matter or mind, and presumes the two to be independent of each other, as well as subject and object. Hence, besides opposing materialism, they are also clearly and definitely against idealism. The purpose of their fight against materialism is not to support idealism, but to lift philosophy from the limitations of disputations between materialism and idealism, and to turn to human beings as self-determination persons and to the world in which they are involved, that is, to turn to actual life and practice. This turn does not mean that they deny that the external world (or nature) exists in itself; they only proclaim that this world would not become the objective world of our actual life and practice without our involvement. Philosophy should become research into our actual life and practice, not a transcendental metaphysics. Hence to criticize as idealism and
metaphysics contemporary Western philosophical trends and schools, would be in some degree to criticize the arguments they oppose or transcend.

How then to understand the genuine significance both of the Marxist revolutionary change in philosophy and the Western philosophical transformation from the modern to the contemporary? This is an all-inclusive, complex and sensitive progress of "systems engineering" on which our academic circles have to make efforts at joint research. Some first conclusions appear.

Firstly, the advent of contemporary Western philosophy signifies a transformation of the mode of philosophical thinking with epoch-making significance for the history of philosophy. The transformation is manifested mainly as follows: 1) most contemporary Western philosophical schools and trends have in their special way transcended modern Western philosophy which had proceeded from such binary divisions as subject/object and mind/matter, aimed at founding a theoretical system about the origin and essence of the world, and can be characterized as foundationalisms, essentialisms and the like; 2) they have returned philosophical research from an abstract world-in-itself or absolute ideal world to the real-life-world of humankind. Contemporary Western philosophers have attempted to escape the dilemmas in modern Western philosophy and open new ways for their further development. In general, by reflecting all aspects of contemporary social development in the West, its philosophical thought has great progressive significance. The transformation of Western philosophy from the modern to the contemporary marks a newer and higher phrase of Western philosophical development.

Secondly, the changes realized by Marxism in philosophy are the most progressive and the most revolutionary event in the history of philosophy. Marxist philosophy not only has more completely and multi-sidedly transcended the dualism, foundationalism, essentialism and speculative metaphysics of modern philosophy than contemporary Western philosophy, but has also pointed the way out for Western philosophical development. This is particularly evident in that Marx does not simply omit old philosophies, but also tries to destroy the premises from which they had started out. Marx was concerned not to found one well-organized and complete theoretical system about the whole world, but to confront the real life and practice of humankind. He thus regards the notion of practice as the primary and basic one in his philosophy, and argues for bringing the activity and creativity of mankind into full play, and accelerating the freedom and overall development of mankind through practice. Through deep analysis and comprehensive explanation of the meaning of practice Marx has completely transcended modern Western philosophy and achieved revolutionary changes in philosophy.

In a word, modern philosophical thinking is characterized by dualism, foundationalism, and essentialism, whereas the new philosophy is marked by an emphasis upon real life and practice, and the activity and creativity of humankind for keeping abreast of the contemporary social spirit. In the process of criticizing and transcending the former and setting up the latter, there are important analogies between contemporary Western and Marxist philosophy: they have reached the same goal along different routes. Both belong to the contemporary mode of thinking and to some degree have a homogeneous relationship.

III

To affirm that the birth of Marxist philosophy and of the Western philosophical transformation from the modern to the contemporary have epoch-making significance in changing the mode of philosophical thinking does not signify either that they can be mentioned in the same breath, or that their changes have eternal significance. They have important differences in the nature of the
theoretical formation of social classes. They confront various problems and challenges, and need to make new changes. Nevertheless, they do not differ either in the nature of their problems or the challenges or form and content of their changes.

The development of Marxist philosophy experiences many zigzags. Early in his lifetime, some people had so seriously twisted Marxist theory in the name of singing his praises that he had to draw a demarcation line between them and himself and asserted that "I am not Marxist". [See Selected Works of Marx and Engels, vol. 4, p. 476, Chinese edition] After one hundred years, as on how to value Marxist philosophy, there are continuous and radical debates not only between Marxists and non-Marxists, but also among Marxists. Marxian philosophy has been misinterpreted time and again. Because of their bourgeois perspective, non-Marxists represented mainly by contemporary Western philosophers cannot naturally recognize the philosophically revolutionary significance of Marxist philosophy. Some of them also have striven to transcend modern Western philosophy, and to some degree and with some ambiguity, even see the facing of actual life and practice as the new future for Western philosophy. However, they cannot know the genuine significance of the Marxist philosophical transcending of modern Western philosophy, especially, of the Marxist principle of practice. Most of them still understand Marxist philosophy on the basis of the modern mode of thinking, put Marxist philosophy and modern materialism on a par, mention Marxist and Hellenic dialectics in the same breath, regard their problems as those of Marxism, and for this reason criticize and attack Marxism. For example, many (even most) representative figures in Western philosophical history do their utmost to make unwarranted charges that Marxist philosophy is dualist and dogmatic. As a matter of fact, in such early works as Outline on Feuerbach, Marx has explicitly regarded "practice", "genuinely actual and sensible activity", as his philosophical starting point. Thus he thoroughly transcends the limitations of idealism and intuitive materialism, and shakes the base on which dualism and dogmatism is set up.

Among Marxists, there exist different opinions on Marxist philosophy, resulting from multiple reasons. For example, different social times and contexts may lead to different horizons on Marxist philosophy, and thereby different perspectives. For a real understanding of Marxist philosophy, its time, place, condition and so on should be considered polythetically. As for misunderstanding or misinterpreting Marxist philosophy, the cases also differ. What is most notable and common is to understand Marxism according to modern modes of thinking. For example, the relationship between Marx and Feuerbach has been seen primarily as the former’s discarding of the latter’s anthropology with inheriting the basic kernel of his materialism, while Hegel is seen as discarding Marx’s idealism and inheriting the reasonable kernel of his dialectics. That Feuerbachian anthropological materialism to some degree overcame the naturalism of the old materialism and that the Hegelian theory of idealistic self-consciousness transcended the traditional principle of transcendent subjectivity and unearthed human freedom, practicality and historicity, all this was affirmed and emphasized by Marx and became important theoretical sources of his philosophical thought. This, however, has been ignored by a lot of people. Most understand Marxist philosophy more or less in the light of naturalism, pure rationalism and the notion of non-human, which are inherent tendencies of modern philosophy and are strongly opposed and transcended by Marx. Various dogmatisms and opportunisms have further developed such deviations of Marxist philosophy and have done enormous damage to Marxism, and made it fall into dilemmas, even crises. The reasons which caused the deviation of Marxism should be analyzed concretely, but the main result was to lose contact with reality and practice.

That Marxist philosophy has come up against difficulties and zigzags in the course of development is attributable not to its inner contradictions or one-sidedness, but to its being
dogmatically understood and developed by some Marxists, who have broken from the reality of Marxism. Thus, in order to overcome those difficulties and zizaggs, what we should do is not to transcend or abandon Marxism, but to bring tortuous or one-sided Marxism back to a genuine Marxism that regards actual life and practice as the starting point. Precisely because it proceeds from actual life and practice, Marxist philosophy can shake off the various deviations and setbacks produced by departing from actual life and practice, continuously revise, enrich and develop its whole theory, and give it great vitality under new conditions. Mao Zedong’s thought overcame various kinds of opportunism of the Right and Left, and guided Chinese revolution to brilliant successes. Deng Xiaoping’s theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics has criticized and overcome Leftist tendencies, and led socialistic construction to great and universally acknowledged achievements. Their common character lies in closely fitting with the reality and practice of the Chinese revolution and construction, overcoming and correcting the Leftist or Rightist deviations from reality and practice, and creatively developing Marxism.

In a word, Marxian philosophical changes don’t constitute an existing prescription which guarantees a cure for all old philosophical diseases, but clearly show an actual way, that is, closely connecting philosophy with the actual life and practice of mankind, by which we can transcend the old philosophy and found a new one. In this way, we will also encounter various dangers, difficulties, and interference, and even suffer setbacks and defeats. However, so long as we closely monitor the spirit of the era, we can overcome them and realize new developments under new conditions.

IV

In the past, contemporary Western philosophical trends and schools were generally seen as the reactionary philosophy of the capitalist class in imperialist times, and were totally rejected. That is one-sided. We should treat them according to their different conditions. But they cannot cast off their narrow bourgeois vision. This does not allow contemporary Western philosophers to combine philosophical transformation with basic social reform, and genuinely take actual life and practice as their philosophical starting point, and thus avoid various one-sided and contradictory principles.

Where contemporary Western philosophical trends and schools have transcended modern Western philosophy, this is incomplete and even self-contradictory in comparison with Marxist philosophy. Often they fall back into and even develop the one-sidedness of modern Western philosophy in different ways. For example, while they radically criticize the tendency of speculative metaphysics in modern Western philosophy, they try to construct the same one-sided metaphysics in a new form as did modern Western philosophers before them. They have, incisively and vividly, unmasked and criticized the rational absolutist monopoly in modern Western philosophy, but at the same time ignored or belittled the roles of rationality. This has often led to relativism and some degree of non-rationalism. They unveiled many disadvantages of the dualistic distinctions between subject and object, mind and matter, etc., especially those which objectified and alienated human beings, and they emphasized the need to develop the activities and creativity of humankind, but otherwise they generated a subjectivism that ignores objective reality. In general, every concrete trend or school in contemporary Western philosophy has transcended modern Western philosophy in some respects (or in chains), but in other respects paced up and down within the traditional philosophical framework. If we look back on the long course of contemporary Western philosophy, we can see how long it has taken to transcend modern Western
philosophy. In other words, it has taken contemporary Western philosophy about one hundred years to make the changes in the mode of philosophical thinking by a way full of twists and turns, while Marxism had basically realized this by the middle of the 19th century.

For that reason, contemporary Western philosophy has come up against much more serious contradictions and challenges in its course of evolution and development than has Marxist philosophy. That its dilemmas are often described as "full of contradictions, and bogged down in crises", is not utterly groundless. Its dilemmas are so serious that we could think that contemporary Western philosophy has not overcome its contradictions and crises or made any progress, and does not conform to reality. Since the mid-19th century has Western philosophy made significant changes in shifting the mode of thinking through overcoming the contradictions and dilemmas found to some degree in every trend and school? Some trends or schools in contemporary Western philosophy have fallen into special predicaments and crises due to the internal contradictions in contemporary Western philosophy. Actually during the past one hundred years when contemporary Western philosophy developed, some philosophers continuously asserted that their era has been in a tight spot, and the objective of their philosophical theories was to cast off the dilemmas and crises of their times. However, they have also fallen into new dilemmas and crises owing to their inner contradictions, and were rejected by other trends or philosophers. Scarcely any philosophical trend or theory has had long vitality and it can be said that contemporary Western philosophy is always in a sorry plight and crisis.

That situation has been more evident since the 1960’s. With the decline of Anglo-American analytic philosophy and with phenomenological existentialism in European continent being challenged, contemporary Western philosophy seems to have fallen into total crises in virtue of the fact that those two main trends are unable to overcome their own predicaments. Hence Western academic circles have been broadly appealing for a new way to overcome this crisis and further develop Western philosophy and in view of such needs various schools and trends have been emerging. They are commonly characterized as transcending both modern and contemporary Western philosophy, especially the two above-mentioned schools and as their antithesis, and carrying out philosophical research which completely transcends those limitations. One way is that of postmodernism which is the most conspicuous trend, and has been being widely focused upon as a hot topic. It is an enormous exaggeration for some Western philosophers to say that this has realized new philosophical change and ushered in a new epoch in Western philosophical history. The same time postmodernism is radically criticized by others, and there are different arguments about it in Chinese academic circles. It is necessary to clarify what philosophically is postmodernism, and what roles it takes on in Western philosophical history. My opinions have been concretely discussed in some other articles and due to limitations of length, here I will simply summarize what I think about it.

In addition to some special thought trends which have been popularized since the 1960’s, postmodernism has other meanings. In English, postmodernism (a word with equivalents in German, French etc.) may semantically mean the philosophy "after" modern philosophy or the "later" modern philosophy. Because usually "modern" means broadly the whole capitalist era since the Western movement of ‘modernization,’ postmodern philosophy actually means the philosophy after modern philosophy, which started with Descartes or even back in the Renaissance. Some other philosophers suggest that postmodernism does not have a chronological meaning, but signifies one mode of thinking different from modernism. In the same epoch, there are different kinds of philosophy: some belong to modernity, while others can be part of the postmodern. From the view of actual developments of Western philosophy, since the middle of 19th century, various
trends and schools criticizing and transcending modern Western philosophy have successively emerged with the sense of a postmodern philosophy because they transform the mode of philosophical thinking. The roles of postmodernism have to be treated according to its different meanings for its meaning is not stable.

If it signifies broadly the philosophy criticizing and transcending modern Western philosophy since the middle of the 19th century, then like modern Western philosophy it falls into the crises and dilemmas which modern Western philosophy has not been able to shake off. If, however, it means the philosophy after modern Western philosophy, that is, the contemporary postmodernism since the 1960s, then it differs from modern Western philosophy whose limitations it would transcend. On the one hand, the rise of contemporary postmodernism, to some degree, conforms to the need for new reflection on, and the changes in the development of contemporary Western philosophy. Most present postmodern philosophers have unmasked and criticized the contradictions and limitations in Western philosophical theory since Nietzsche, and have regarded the opening of new philosophical directions as their duty. Their unmasking and criticizing of the contradictions and limitations in traditional and contemporary Western philosophy is of great value to us, or at least gives great inspiration. To some degree their opposition to systematized philosophy, absolute monism, dualism, anthropocentrism, absolute rationalism, absolute irrationalism and so on do represent the developmental tendencies of contemporary Western philosophy.

On the other hand, present contemporary postmodernists long to transcend not only modern philosophy but also contemporary philosophy. However, they do not really transcend the latter because they do not essentially differentiate themselves from previous contemporary Western philosophy in the basic mode of philosophical thinking. In fact, they still embrace its manifold contradictions. As a result their critiques of modern and contemporary Western philosophy (especially, so-called fundamentalism, essentialism, logocentrism and so on) go to even greater extremes than previous contemporary Western philosophers, and have stronger tendencies of subjectivism, relativism, nihilism, irrationalism, even mysticism, etc. They have made the already existing contradictions in contemporary Western philosophy more radical than before. Therefore, their philosophy neither conforms to the demands of a new change in Western philosophy, nor really embodies the present tendencies of Western philosophy. For that reason, although it has established a new place in Western philosophical trends and schools since the 1950s, it has been increasingly criticized and deserted in recent years. One after another Western philosophers discuss how to transcend postmodernism and seek a new way by which to shake off philosophical dilemmas. Thus "After Post Modernism", has been initiated to replace and transcend postmodernism.

Here note should be made of the "After Post Modernism"(APM) International Academic Symposium held at Chicago University in November 1997. Its motif was to find a new way for philosophical development in view of the decline of postmodernism. Gene Gendlin of Chicago University, one of the sponsors, and others had launched a several-month warm discussion via Internet. Almost every day letters from the discussion could be received through Internet or E-mail. Since the symposium, discussion via the Internet has continued. Participants differ from each other in their standpoints, but most have questioned the overall theory of postmodernism. After having widely solicited the opinions of participants, the sponsors issued one report on the APM symposium, in which the above-mentioned tendency is displayed. The following are extracts from that report:
"We keep the critique of modernity, but we move beyond the mere arbitrariness that some strands of postmodernism often proclaim. We question all stated foundations, but this does not mean ‘just anything goes’. Such was the motto of a Conference on "APM" at the University of Chicago where 93 people, mostly philosophers with some anthropologists, sociologists, psychologists, and others, gathered to discuss how to move beyond the poor alternatives: either some system of stated truth, or no kind of truth at all.

"Yes, all assertions seem to pretend to control. Every assertion is made from some vantagepoint . . . [and] all words bring an unavoidable "metaphysics." It is obvious that the problem cannot and should not be "solved," but can we do no more than . . . end in decentering, undecidability, rupture, limbo, aporia, flux?

"We are now a little past the time when it was revolutionary and freeing merely to undermine logical fundamentals and scientific "objectivity." We need a re-understanding of the powers as well as the limits of science, and a way to reconceptualize scientific objects. The pretense that science does not work changes nothing in the assumptions and values that still determine our social policies and institutions. And philosophy is, and has always been the discipline that deals directly with such assumptions, and also asks how dealing with them is possible."

"Many people now know that every word brings old conceptions with it, and that we may fall into those. But is it as postmodernists say that this leaves us no fresh way with language at all? The postmodern critique and the problems it poses are now widely understood, and many of us are bored by the constant stoppage, as every word one utters can be made to seem a fallback to old metaphysics. It’s time to move on from the semi-humorous but sometimes all too real "postmodern dilemma" that once we reject any stated kind of truth, no other kind — nothing at all — is left. In practice all of us already do better than that.

"General statements of "truth" and "objectivity" are permanently ambiguous but this does not mean that truth and objectivity are lost. Rather they require more — they need a further contextual completion from what we are just then living, before we can choose among variants for an activity at hand."

"Instead of mere pluralism we can create "complexes of multiple truths" involving a demanding and sophisticated steering of scientific research with multiple applications and resonance to local contexts."

The report also questions and even denies postmodernism in terms of science, culture, history, ethics, language and so on.

The above extracts show that under the title of "After Post Modernism’, many philosophers in America and other Western countries try to transcend postmodernism, question and challenge its pure denials, subjectivism and nihilism. They also attempt to overcome its extremeness and one-sidedness, and seek a reasonable, healthy way for Western philosophy, which has been falling into dilemmas and crises. Yet, though different from each other, neither do they overstep the theoretical boundaries marked by such well-known Western twentieth-century philosophers as J. Dewey, L. Wittgenstein, M. Heidegger, nor offer systematic and ample demonstration for their representations, most of which are lopsided. Thus so-called "After Post Modernism" is one tendency, which is just manifesting itself. Needless to say it cannot find new ways for Western philosophical development. Nevertheless, the advent of this tendency indicates that the new way for philosophical development paved by postmodernists is not destiny.

In a word, contemporary Western philosophy, including post modernism, "After Post Modernism" etc., has perhaps removed and overcome the limitations of modern and early contemporary Western philosophy. However, if it itself consists of inner contradictions and departs
from actual life and practice, it will fall into new dilemmas and be denied by other newer trends and schools. Contemporary Western philosophy first and foremost has to transcend its own limitations if it is to overcome its dilemmas and contradictions.

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From the above comparison, we conclude that though there are great differences between Marxist and contemporary Western philosophy in class attribution, theoretical formation and related tendencies, nevertheless they have reached the same goal by different routes by transcending modern Western philosophy.

Marxist philosophy itself has no irremediable contradictions and has great vitality. Some famous Western philosophers, for example, Sartre, have affirmed that it is the sole philosophy that cannot thus far be transcended. Its future development is not in moving towards other different philosophies but in enriching and developing itself by actively throwing itself into and deriving new experiences from reality and practice. Deng Xiaoping’s theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics is the highest achievement and the best model of contemporary Marxist development. Its cardinal principle cannot but break various rigid dogmas and emphasize the need to base itself on reality and practice. In the contemporary study and research of Marxism, to study and research Deng Xiaoping’s theory should be given first priority while the following should be avoided as taboo: forcing his theory into some given theoretical framework by which it is explained; giving it a strained interpretation; constructing it as a certain complete and compact system of science, and distorting into a closed and rigid theory what was originally an open and active theory bound up with the contemporary social spirit of the era. All these inevitably result in deviations from genuine Deng Xiaoping Theory.

As for contemporary Western philosophy, it will perhaps make no great changes in the new future. Just as Western capitalism is brimming with some vigor, the contemporary modes of thinking in Western philosophy have not been exhausted, and various trends and schools of Western philosophy will, consciously or unconsciously, further manifest that mode of thinking and make it perfect through their research and disputes. It is Marxist philosophy that has most profoundly brought to light the contemporary mode of thinking, and accepting Marxism is the correct and simplest way to grasp the contemporary mode of thinking. Because they cannot shake off the prejudices of their Western politics and ideology, Western philosophers cannot consciously seek that way. However the dialogue between them and Marxists will be strengthened if they stick to the contemporary mode of thinking. Most will not become Marxists, but in zigzags and by roundabout ways they will philosophically approach Marxist philosophy to some degree. In some sense, we can thus say that the road of philosophical development in the 21st century is one by which we lead to, and keep close links with, reality and practice, which is what Marx taps.
The Modern and Contemporary Transformation of Western Philosophy of Morality and Value

The Transcendence of Individuality and Individualism

During the turn from modern to contemporary times, especially since the 20th century, there has been a transformation of the thinking patterns of Western philosophy. This fact was recognized long ago and even stressed again and again in Western philosophical circles. Though philosophers of the different schools have their own special formulation, all seriously challenged the subjective metaphysics that started from duality of subject-object, mind-body and thought-existence, that is characteristic of essentialism and foundationalism, and that is expressed in systematic philosophy. The formulations of Western philosophers on the changes during the turn from modern to contemporary times have been increasingly noticed by Chinese philosophical circles. Although there is no common view on this concern, hardly anyone would negate the fact of important changes; divergence consisted mainly in how to understand and evaluate them. Therefore, it is necessary to study them in their different levels and sides. In my view, these changes are not only in partial and special realms, but involve cardinal transformations of thought-patterns in the development of Western philosophy. I have pointed out these views in some recent papers especially in "The Contemporary transformation of Western Philosophy and the Road of development of Marxist Philosophy and Contemporary Chinese Philosophy (An Outline)". Here I will discuss the influences of these changes in the realm of morality and value.

As moral ideas and their corresponding values are constituent parts of an overall philosophy, their changes are subordinate to that of philosophical ideas. If we could confirm that there were changes in thought-pattern in Western philosophy during the turn from modern to contemporary times, we could confirm also that there were responding changes in the realms of morals and values. These changes themselves include manifold contents. Among them the most important are such changes as the transcendence of individuality and individualism as the subject and criterion of moral evaluation. The reason is that just as in the case of an entire philosophy, in the realm of morals and values the subject is the human being. Thus where morality is concerned with the principles and norms of human action and value the key to its meaning is human beings as subjects. Hence, changes of ideas about moral and value are determined by changes in the conditions of the existence of human beings as subjects. The changes of ideas about moral and value in Western countries in modern-contemporary times were realized through the transcendence to a subjective metaphysics characteristic of individuality and individualism.

Subjective Metaphysics and Individuality and Individualism

In modern Western philosophy, the human being as subject exists as an individual with an independent personality. As subject, the human being exists as an individual. By founding his entire system of metaphysics upon the "cogito" Descartes became the forerunner of taking the subjective principle as the basic philosophical principle in modern philosophy. Though they differ and even oppose one another in theoretical form, materialism and idealism, empiricism and rationalism, as well as other various philosophical schools, all are united in general in confirming
the subjective principle. This is expressed in the facts that they almost all take the subject as the substance which has the meaning of certainty and independent existence, i.e. a substance which differs from and is relative to the object, from which it is divorced and even opposed. They undertake as the basic problem of philosophy solving the problem of the relation of subject and object, i.e. the problem of relation between subject and object, mind and body, thought and being. This is the basic thought-pattern of modern philosophy, i.e. that of epistemology or subjective metaphysics. The so-called foundationalism or essentialism, which was criticized again and again by modern-contemporary philosophers, is presupposed by the above duality of subject and object and therefore belongs to this philosophical thought-pattern.

The outstanding expression of this thought-pattern of subjective metaphysics in the realm of moral and value is that the individual and individualism are taken as the base and starting point of all ideas of moral and value. All moral and value actions as well as the choice and evaluation of morality and value are realized by individuals, and measured by accordance to the special individual’s aims, demands and interests. The theories of moral and value at these times are as various as that of the whole of philosophy, but according to divergence in the aims of moral actions i.e. divergence in attitude to pleasure and luck, interests and demands, they could be divided into two main types; utilitarianism and deontology. There are endless disputes between, for example, the utilitarianism represented by Jeremy Bentham and John Mill and the deontology represented by Kant. Nevertheless, none transcends the sphere of subjective metaphysics, of individuality and individualism in moral and value questions.

That utilitarian thinkers take individuality and individualism as their theoretical base and starting point does not generate serious disagreement in academic circles because these thinkers directly advanced individualism. The difference here is mainly on how to understand the meaning of the individualism they advanced.

However, could we say that the deontology represented by Kant is also consent to the principle of individuality and individualism? In as much as Kant takes moral actions and their evaluation as ideal, his deontology does not support individuality and individualism. But he takes the human being as the center of philosophy. The cardinal meaning of his so-called Copernican change in philosophy is just advocating that philosophy should take not the object, but the subject, i.e. the human being, as its center. For this reason, he was considered the person who in the final analysis founded subjective metaphysics. In contrast to Descartes and others, Kant dualized the human being, in other words, he distinguished the real and ideal existence of human beings. The former is the natural person, the latter is the moral person. He considered that human beings as natural existences (in biology) have their natural needs to pursue pleasure and fortune; but they also have aims to transcend natural needs and to pursue the good in morality. Therefore, human beings have a dual nature: natural and moral. The natural nature is the nature of human being as individual, while moral nature transcends the limitation of the existence of the human as individual and becomes the nature of human beings as kind or species. The deontology of Kant is concerned with just this human being as kind, that is, the human being who pursues moral perfection and has moral nature. Just as practical reason is higher than theoretical reason, moral nature is higher than the natural nature. Kant even pointed out that the individual existence of the human being should be sacrificed for the moral ideal of the species or kind. When Kant said that human being should be taken not as means, but as end, the human being he mentioned is just the species being of humans. Human beings as individuals, should become the means for realizing the aims of kind through pursuing their own interests. In this sense, the deontology of Kant evidently transcended the individuality and individualism advocated by utilitarians.
For this reason, Kant took the moral ideal stressed as the aim of the human species being or kind; his deontology was concerned not with moral actions and the evaluation of norms of human beings in their practical life. As to the latter, his point of view is not essentially different from utilitarianism. He recognized that here the human being is controlled by his natural nature and existed as an individual who pursues his own pleasure and fortune. The natural nature of human being is his animal tendency characterized by selfishness. The human being as species existence can transcend this natural nature, but can not run counter to it. As the origin of "evils", natural nature plays a positive role in historical development and it is necessary to reach good through evil for historical development begins from evil and ends in good. "Evil" is the individuality which is divorced from universal legislation and pursues the interests of the individual. This urges people to develop their latent ability for the individual's efforts to pursue and struggle for one's own interests for these are the motive power to fully elaborate one's latent ability, and to advance in the direction of the good. Therefore, Kant takes evil as the means to realize the good.

Emphasizing the transcendence of the individual existence of human beings, the deontology of Kant manifests some features different from the utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill. However, as for moral value and norms of human beings in Western practical society, he concurs that they were controlled by individuality and individualism. So the two theories could be said to come to the same point through different paths. Essentially, the ethical principles of individuality and individualism, which correspond to subjective metaphysics of modern philosophy, are adaptable to the demand of the market economic system established in Western countries at those times and whose basic premises conform to the principles of individuality and individualism. For example, in order that commodity exchange operate concretely in the market, every owner of commodities or services (natural or juridical person) is supposed to be a person with an independent personality who could go to the market on his own and exchange freely with others; they must be equal with others without considering the relation of higher or lower position, of respected or inferior, of elder or younger; they could play their part in commodity production and exchange, freely compete, the principle that "the superior be wined and the inferior be defeated" must be approved, etc. All these conform to the principles of individuality and individualism from different angles. So long as the market economy as a system is operated, it is necessary to support these principles in different ways, including philosophy, law, moral and other ideological and political ways. It is for this reason that Western scholars at this period put out various theories on philosophy, ethics, sociology and politics. While disputing each other endlessly, all finally conform to the principle of individuality and individualism.

However, the market economy practiced under the principles of individuality and individualism essentially involves sharp and deep contradictions and conflicts between people as commodity-owners. If these principles be carried out without any limitation, the law of the jungle, controlled in animal circles, would control the society of mankind and what would be developed in human nature would be only its "evil" aspects: selfishness, avariciousness, hypocrisy, shamelessness, cheating, etc. As Kant and Hegel pointed out, in the whole society, these "evils" may become some kind of motive power for the operation of market economy. But if only the evil aspects were developed, a situation in which people were wolves to others, as pointed out by Hobbes, would characterize the whole society. As a result the whole society would be in a situation of serious turmoil, even collapse. Hence, in any social condition the principles of individuality and individualism must be limited, so that everyone in their production, exchange and other social activities adhere to definite regulations, undertake definite responsibilities, and submit to various social restrictions and supervision. These regulations and restrictions include enforced laws and
unenforced moralities, both of which are related closely to each other. From the moral angle, this means that there must be theories that, starting from supporting market economy systems, formulate system of moral norm. The result is restriction on individuality and individualism.

In fact, confirming and demonstrating the principles of individuality and individualism, various Western theories restrict them in different ways and degrees. While Kant’s deontology stresses transcending principles of individuality and individualism, the utilitarianism of Bentham, Mill and others did not absolutize these principles. For example, taking individual initiative as the starting point of their theories, they did not support, but forcefully opposed narrow egoism and advocated altruism of some kind. They thought that in spite of being egocentric, first of all, people must be concerned with other’s interests, otherwise they could not achieve and retain their own. Egoism must consider altruism as its prerequisite. Therefore, the standard of good and evil for people’s conduct is essentially not that it could bring happiness for special individuals, but that it could bring happiness for most people. Utilitarianism should be a theory for the greatest happiness of most people. In order to convince people to act according to the above moral principles, Western scholars all consider that it is necessary to establish some systems of social restriction for people’s conduct. For that reason egoism as premised by altruism conforms to the demands of human nature. But this is not recognized by everybody and some would not like to act according to it even if they did recognize this need. The restrictions are manifold: besides political, legal, religious and others, moral restrictions are also important.

Generally whether supporting utilitarianism or deontology, Western scholars must state their theories in accord with the twofold moral demands of the market economy. On one hand, they must defend in morality the individual’s pursuit of utility; on the other, they must guarantee a stable social order. This means it is necessary for people to formulate some norms of conduct and set some limitations and restrictions on their pursuits. This means that they must base their theories on the principles of individuality and individualism, and meanwhile restrict and transcend these principles.

Transcendence of Contemporary Western Trend to Subjective Metaphysics as Well as Individuality and Individualism

However, before this century, especially before the second half of the 19th century, the inner contradictions of Western market economy characteristic of free competition had not been fully revealed. In the realm of philosophy, subjective metaphysics characterized by the dualisms of subject-object and mind-body were still in command. In response to this, in the moral realm, the principles of individuality and individualism were restricted in some way, but did not meet serious challenge; utilitarianism which centrally expresses these principles is still dominant among the various ethical trends. Since the second half of the 19th century, especially since the beginning of this century, the capitalist systems of Western countries have been deeply transformed. Economic crises and the relevant social contradictions have sharpened, and the former capitalist order characterized by free competition has been fiercely shattered. The principles of individuality and individualism, formerly taken as sacred, progressively revealed their severe restrictions, and even became important sources for sharpening social contradictions and conflicts. For example, apparently equal competition resulted in really extreme inequality in the distribution of social wealth between individuals, so that the polarization of society becomes increasingly intense. All this must shake earlier philosophies as well as the moral and value systems of Western countries.
One of the most important changes in Western philosophy in this century is that the critiques of modern subjective metaphysics have become popular trends in philosophy. Both continental and British-American philosophers all take critique and transcendence of subjective principles in modern philosophy as important constitutive parts of their theories.

Phenomenology and the related existentialism are without doubt the main trends of European continental philosophy. All take the critique of subjective metaphysics as the main features of their theories. Husserl and Merleau-Ponty clearly reject the individual subject and turn to the intersubjective instead. The so-called intersubjective means that the subject is in a relation of co-existence of one’s own ego and that of others. All consider that the subject could not be an isolated, atomic and unrestricted existence or ego, but exists in a definite social environment. To confirm subject/ego means at the same time to confirm others and the environment/object. Heidegger also clearly rejects the traditional individual subject. He affirms that the basic existential structure of Dasein is in-der Welt-sein. That is to say, the individual could not exist in an isolated separated condition, but only in the world, in a non-separated relation with others. His words on the truth of being and especially his critique of so-called humanism, as well as his theory on the fourfold structure of the world, all mean that he directly opposes the traditional metaphysics characterized by a dualism of subject-object.

Analytic philosophy, which holds a commanding position in British-American philosophy during the middle of this century, has not deeply and concretely studied the question of how to transcend the individual subject and reach the inter-subject, that is, how to transcend from subjectivity to intersubjectivity, as has European continental philosophy. In its early form, logical atomism and logical positivism were even special expressions of subjective metaphysics. However, its guiding anti-metaphysical principle, which was considered the foundation stone of analytic philosophy, includes a negation of subjective metaphysics premised by a dualism of subject-object. In later developments of analytic philosophy, philosophers more or less recognized the concepts of the intersubjective and intersubjectivity. In pragmatism, which was considered as the symbol of American national spirit, the tendency of an anti-subjective metaphysics is more outstanding. James and Dewey very clearly negated the concept of an independent subject that is isolated, detached from the object, including others as objects. They consider that subject-object, mind-body should be taken as a non-separated and united process. Experience, which was the kernel of their philosophy, means just this process. It is essentially different from the experience talked of by modern subjective metaphysics, which was taken as the subjective conscious condition of the individual. Dewey even connected this united process with people’s real life and practice, and called his philosophy one of life and practice.

In the moral realm, the main expression of the Western philosopher’s critique of subjective metaphysics in the 20th century is that they more and more criticize the principles of individuality and individualism as the standard while attempting to transcend and restrict them.

Among various Western philosophical and ethical trends, pragmatism was generally acknowledged as the school that best expressed the tradition of modern-contemporary utilitarianism that affirm the principle of individuality and individualism. However, the same philosophers of this school openly demanded that this principle be fundamentally revised. Dewey is the most outstanding example for this.

Dewey’s evaluation of utilitarianism is higher than other ethical schools. He thinks that utilitarianism affirmed people’s pursuit of the practical life, happiness and fortune, stressed that laws and regulations as well as systems must obey the realistic demands of human beings, and supported all relevant reforms. Nevertheless, he criticized the individualism which was considered
the theoretical foundation of utilitarianism. He clearly opposed individualism in its sense of egoism and hedonism, and considered that the main shortcomings of utilitarianism are its inability to overcome individualism in this sense. As what it affirmed is not the action itself of pursuing pleasure and fortune, but the things of pleasure and fortune as the results of this action. Therefore, pleasure and fortune become something which can be possessed and enjoyed. To pursue pleasure and fortune is not to create, but to obtain the results of creation. Dewey criticized utilitarianism for being one with the old vulgar individualism in this regard. As to the fact that utilitarian thinkers sometimes demand also that the pleasure and welfare of most people of a society be placed first, Dewey thought that it is most worthy of praise.

While opposing individualism in the sense of egoism and hedonism, Dewey did not negate every form of individualism. According to him, individualism is not a fixed and unchangeable concept. It can have variant forms of expression in different historical epochs. As the old individualism, characteristic of egoism and hedonism, does not conform to present historical tendencies there is need to create a new individualism instead. Its basic features are such principles as respecting people’s personality and individuality, developing their creativity and initiative, identifying the pursuit of one’s pleasure and welfare with creativity itself, rather than as its results. Dewey did not give an exact definition, but two points are clear. Firstly, he emphasizes the sociality of human actions: they should be subordinated not to private pecuniary interests, but to social reconstruction. Overcoming the old individualism and creating a new individualism cannot be achieved by extending the benefits of the older economic individualism to more persons, or by a further development of generosity, good will and altruism. The most important thing for the creation of a new individualism is to reconstruct society and create a new type of individual. Under the social conditions of Western capitalism, Dewey did not and could not give a clear explanation of how to do this, but his point on this is quite different from the old utilitarianism.

While Dewey and other pragmatic philosophers criticized and transcended the principles of individuality and individualism of utilitarianism and other modern trends, many thinkers of other contemporary trends were doing similar work, each in their own special manner. On the European continent, the representatives of phenomenology and existentialism mostly take the discovery of the meaning of the individual’s being as the starting point of their entire philosophical and ethical research. Nevertheless, their target is to transcend the isolated individual. For Husserl to return to the life world is in a sense to transcend the subjectivism of transcendental phenomenology, since his life world is the world in which the individual lives together with others. The main target of Heidegger’s primitive ethics is also to transcend the meaning of Dasein as individuality-subject and to affirm the existential relation of the human being and the world. The latter thoroughly does away with the individuality-standard of the sense of moral and value and individualism in the utilitarian sense. Jaspers’s theories on freedom, communication and the new humanism had given a clearer explanation of the transcendence of individuality-standard and individualism. For example, while he emphasized personal freedom, this is premised by communication and the self transcendence of the individual.

In fact, even Sartre, who was criticized in China as the typical advocate of ultra-individualism did not understand individualism in the sense of egoism and hedonism. He had spoken of individuals in mutually exclusive relations; the relation between people is one of master and slave; personal freedom is absolute; people can freely self-choose, self-design, self-create and even take a person’s being and freedom as synonymous without doubt. These have deep individualist trends, but a more concrete analysis of Sartre’s theories, would show also important misunderstandings.
For example, generally Sartre talked of mutually exclusive relations between people as something that does not start from advantages and disadvantages, but from a distinction between subject and object. When the individual is taken as an object by others, he loses his position as subject; if he exists as subject, he must take others as object. Therefore, people always take themselves as subject, and take others as object. In the individual’s own view, the other is a slave (object), while in the other’s view, this individual becomes a slave. What is more important is that Sartre did not affirm, but rather violently rejected such master-slave relation; the main goal of his philosophy was to overcome this relation. Another example is that when Sartre talked about people’s absolute freedom, what he means is not that one could follow his own inclination in practical life, but that so long as people have conscious activities and exist as a being-for-oneself, one must make definite choices as to how to treat the conditions and possibilities he faced, no matter what be the condition and possibility. Even if he did not choose, he had chosen, that is, he chose not to choose. Freedom means just the action of choice itself, hence it is absolute. As for the individual in practical life, his freedom is only relative, for it is restricted by various concrete conditions. In his later period, Sartre specially emphasized that personal freedom must obey historical situations, and that historicity or the whole is the determinate power for us in any time. Furthermore, Sartre always connects personal freedom with his relevant moral responsibility. He emphasized again and again that when making any choice, a person must take the related responsibility both to himself and to others and the world. The individual must care not only for his own fate, but also for the fate of others and even of the whole of mankind.

In the English-speaking world with its long tradition of empiricism and utilitarianism, the calls to transcend the principle of individuality and individualism had never stopped. It is sufficient to note the economics of neo-classicism which is the successor to utilitarianism at present. The most important point of its revision to modern utilitarianism is precisely to try to dilute and transcend the individualism of utilitarianism. At the beginning of this century, the British philosopher G. E. Moore systematically criticized the one-sidedness of the ethical trends of naturalism and utilitarianism in his famous *Principia Ethica* (1903) and therefore opened the meta-ethical trends connected with analytic philosophy. One of its main features is calling for a transcendence of practical utility and a pursuit of the good with universal and absolute meaning.

Moreover in the English-speaking world, the scholars who tended toward the ethics of rationalism, irrationalism and intuitionism clearly criticized traditional utilitarianism. They considered that it over-emphasized the experiential results of human actions and overlooked moral responsibilities, coveted material enjoyment and neglected noble ideals of spirit. They demanded in different degrees that moral norms must have a meaning that moves people to obey criteria that transcend experience and practical gains and losses, and that the ought of moral responsibilities be stressed. In this concern, they often developed the idea of transcending the individuality and individualism of Kantian deontology. If in the past utilitarianism always prevailed in the debate with deontology, this changed in recent decades, so that the latter, e.g., Rawls’s sense of justice, would seem to prevail.

In contemporary Western countries, there are great differences between the various philosophical and ethical trends which endlessly debate many questions. Nevertheless, on the questions of whether to insist or criticize and transcend modern subjective metaphysics and its related individuality and individualism, they seem finally to come to similar conclusions. Therefore, that such critiques and transcendence happen is not the accidental case of a specific thinker, a specific school of philosophy and ethics, or specific countries, rather it is a universal and widespread tendency among the main philosophical and ethical trends in contemporary Western
countries. Thus, corresponding to the critiques of subjective metaphysics in philosophy, the critique and transcendence of individuality and individualism in morals and values have converged into a widespread trend with meaning for present times.

Evaluating the Transcendence of Various Western Trends to Individualism as a Standard

The critique of Western philosophers in our time of subjective metaphysics does not negate generally the subject and the relation of subject-object. Rather philosophers explain anew the nature of the subject and relation of subject-object. For most schools, the important things are: the intersubjective instead of the individual subject, intersubjectivity instead of subjectivity, interaction (life, practice, process) instead of the independent substance of both subject and object, and the unity of subject-object instead of their divergence. These changes in Western philosophy are not so much specific philosophical points as the basic pattern of philosophical thought.

The changes of Western ideas of moral and values in this century are similar to the above. Many Western ethical thinkers criticized highly the individuality and individualism of modern ethics. Yet, they have not and could not fully negate these principles. Contemporary Western society is still based on the capitalist market system, connected with individuality and individualism. Therefore, following modern ethics, contemporary Western ethics essentially must continue to be based on the principle of individuality and individualism. Nevertheless, there have been important changes in the Western market economic system and indeed the whole of Western society during this period. Corresponding forms of expression of Western ideas of moral and value have necessarily experienced relevant changes. The sense of individuality itself was expanded and became one of uniting with the community and group. Individualism also came to be explained mainly as advocating the full development of the personal nature and activity of human being, guaranteeing personal freedom and dignity, and realizing personal value. It calls for support of the individual’s legitimate rights and interests, without dampening but rather promoting the interests of collective and society. All these are, of course, an important critique and transcendence of modern ethics. While restricted to a great degree, these should be taken as important changes in ideas of moral and value.

However, we should notice that the economic, social and political, as well as the ideological and cultural, conditions are all very complex. There is never a unitary tendency and trend in philosophical and moral-value ideas. People can find some tendencies different from, and even opposite to, the above anywhere and at any time. After all, contemporary Western society is capitalistic, based on private ownership; the bourgeois individualist outlook on the world and life still controls most people’s minds. Individualism in its sense of egoism and hedonism as well as serious related social conflicts were criticized broadly by wise persons, especially in leading circles, and therefore voices seeking to transcend such an outlook on life widely appeared. However, so long as the capitalist system has not been eliminated as the basis of this world and life outlook, even if there are more philosophical and moral trends which increasingly and with ever more reason transcend such individualism, a great number of individuals in Western society will continually insist on individualism. For this reason, in contemporary Western countries, the tendencies of ultra-individualism, egoism, hedonism, relativism and nihilism in morality have not only their market, but also run rampant in a large part. Even in Western academic circles, there are still some philosophers and ethical thinkers who advocate such a world and life outlook. All this tells us that we should concretely study and evaluate the real conditions of morality and value as
well as the relevant trends in contemporary Western countries, and that we should affirm their positive sides and reject what is negative.

Does the transcendence in contemporary Western ideas of moral and value over traditional ones conflict with the real conditions of Western countries? No, for these two different tendencies exist together. On the one hand, viewed from the point that Western society is capitalist and based on private ownership, there must be tendencies of ultra-individualism, egoism, hedonism, relativism and nihilism which in some conditions even run rampant. On the other hand, the contradictions and crises caused by these kinds of decadent and moribund notions of moral and value attack the existence itself of the capitalist system, and lead to close attention by many wise persons who one after another pointed out their own special propositions for transcending such a system of moral and value. While the former, as having let loose historical imperatives, must be replaced; the latter embodies in a definite degree a progressive tendency that conforms to historical trends. The most important is to be able to distinguish these two different tendencies and make a relevant and adapted response. The former, we should be good at guarding against and criticizing; the latter, we should dare to affirm and use for reference. Although including various fallacies, they could give useful enlightenment for breaking away from the moral and value outlook of individualism in the sense of egoism and hedonism, and establishing a new outlook. On morals and values.
Preface: The Questions to Be Discussed

If we affirm that there were changes and in a sense a transformation of thought patterns in Western philosophy during the period from modern to contemporary times, especially in the 20th century, could we affirm also that there were the same changes in the ideas of Western religion, especially in Western religious philosophy? Viewed from the point of view prevalent for a long time in China, it is very difficult to make such an affirmation. For according to that point of view, every religion resulted only from illusion and deceit. This means that religious result only from superstition and ignorance and must be anti-scientific and anti-rational. Hence they can play only a passive role that poisons people’s willpower. To say that they could play a positive role during the transitional period from modern to contemporary times must be naturally preposterous. Nevertheless, considering the inseparable correlation and mutual permeation of each other between Western religion, especially religious philosophy, and Western philosophy in general, it is very difficult logically for us to come to a contrary conclusion. More important, considering the various relations between religion and contemporary Western society and the various practical influences of religion, to negate simply the positive change of contemporary Western religion is also short in persuasive power.

Religion is still a very influential ideology in Western society today. Most Western people are religious, mainly Christian in its various groups, and religious influences permeated almost every realm of Western society. We need to pay attention to this fact. Can we see clearly that in order to understand deeply and adopt a correct attitude towards Western society and the people of Western countries it is very important to study Western religions carefully and evaluate them truly? No one doubts that there are highly developed sciences and technologies in Western countries; no one simply negates that Western people are of high quality in education and morality. In this background, how could religion, which was considered antiscientific and linked with superstition and ignorance, exist and even have broad influence? Why are people there still filled with deep veneration towards religion? Why are many distinguished scientists and learned individuals also religious believers, even very pious one. Are they truly and simply deceived?

Thinking through these questions, I feel deeply that in Chinese academic circles the traditional idea regarding religion is not comprehensive. My point of view is not simply to negate the religious theory that was taken as classic. I would emphasize only that we should not simply negate, but must carefully study such questions as whether there are some important changes in the nature and function of religion in contemporary Western society; whether these changes have positive meaning in some sense, etc. We should look for a more adequate conclusion through an examination and discussion of these issues.

How we should treat contemporary Western religions and their changes can and must be studied from various theoretical and practical levels. In the following I will present some ideas mainly from the angle of the relation between religion and philosophy, especially the changes in Western religions and their philosophy during the transitional period from modern to contemporary times.
The Relation between Religion and Philosophy and the Foundation and Condition of Their Existence

Religion and philosophy are different ideologies. Both reflect people’s consciousness of the world. Philosophy expresses or reflects the world as concept; while religion expresses the world as idea. Philosophy is established essentially by rational thought, while religion is connected with faith, which latter often is irrational or transcends the rational. Philosophies have some rationality or direct reality, while religions always misinterpret or transcend such rationality and direct reality. This means that religion is quite different from philosophy. We could not take one for the other.

Although both religion and philosophy have their own different forms, all take the basic questions on the world and human life as the object to study; they all take guiding human life and expressing people’s ideals and point of view on the world as their main target. As forms of consciousness and knowledge, rational and irrational, conception and presentation (idea), permeate each other. So religion and philosophy must communicate with each other. Just as conceptions originate from ideas and are higher than ideas, philosophies at first originated from religion, and later separated from and transcended religion. Similarly, although religious faith was expressed in the form of ideas, the formation of ideas is not separated from reason and conception; religious theory must be proved by reason and is not separated from philosophy.

Following the changes of social and historic condition, the similar and dissimilar relation between religion and philosophy as ideologies in their object, method and target of study make them both communicate they are mixed together sometimes, and separate and even contrary to each other at other times. Such situations of communication and separation of mixture and contrariety are expressed mainly in the relation of philosophy and religion as two ideologies in the whole social realm. But sometimes they also are expressed in the theoretical systems of thinkers in some philosophical or religious schools and groups. We find in various historic periods that some philosophers took religious theory as part of their philosophical theories; while some theologians took philosophical theory as part of their theological theories. At times, the situation was just the contrary.

The situations of communication and separation, of mixture and contrariety between religion and philosophy as two ideologies in the whole social sphere are often intertwined in Western history. In different historic periods often one falls as the other rises. During the European middle ages, religion controlled ideology, while philosophy became a handmaid of theology and lost its independent position. Since the Renaissance, philosophy asserted itself and some radical thinkers, like the French enlightenment thinkers in the 18th century, even took religion as purely absurd and fraudulent, and negated it fully. Nevertheless, just as philosophy did not perish under the high pressure of the Catholic Church in the middle ages, religion did not disappear under the radical critiques of Enlightenment thinkers. During the transitional period from modern to contemporary times, especially since the 20th century, Western philosophy and religion both met serious challenges and crises. Voices for abolishing philosophy and religion from the left and the right were often heard. However, after experiencing deep changes, both philosophy and religion appeared anew in new forms and had important influences in practical life in Western society.

Religion and philosophy have this power of long life because in both the past or modern-contemporary times people have a spiritual yearning for solving the questions of world view and the secrets of the world and of human life, for metaphysics and ultimate concern. Both religion and philosophy are the two most general ideologies to examine such questions. The spiritual existence of human being has both rational and irrational sides. Philosophy solves the questions
about the world and human life in rational form in general, while religion must go beyond rationality in answering these questions. Just as rationality could not abolish irrationality, philosophy could not replace religion in solving the questions of the world and human life. The opposite is also true. The above condition of communication and separation of religion and philosophy means that they are connected with each other, while each has its own character. They have their own foundation for their existence both in history and contemporary society; neither could replace the other.

Philosophies which are characterized by extreme subjective arbitrariness and religions characterized by evident superstition and obscurantism, have various shortcoming, and they are not adaptable to the changing and developed demands of society and times; so they must be reformed or replaced by other philosophies and religions. Nevertheless, as two important social ideologies, both religion and philosophy have their reasons for existence as long as people have the spiritual yearning for solving the questions of world and human life and have not found other more adaptable means to satisfy these yearnings. While there was a social consciousness of blind worship of the alien powers of nature and society, religion was necessary.

Although religion and philosophy have their foundation for existing in contemporary society, they must adapt to the changed historic condition. This means that they must make relative change both in their contents and in their forms.

In passing from modern to contemporary times, especially in the 20th century, various branches of knowledge and relevant independent concrete disciplines were formed. They cast off their dependency on traditional philosophy. More importantly these disciplines, especially those of various natural sciences, developed rapidly. They continually made new and even revolutionary disclosures to the practical world, especially on the origins of natural things and natural processes. This greatly broadened people’s horizon, and prompted people to change essentially their point of view on the real world itself and on the relation between human beings and the world. In the philosophical realm, modern Western philosophy, which started from a duality of mind and body and took the establishment of a comprehensive system for the world as the target, not only met serious challenges, but was shaken thoroughly. In such circumstances, Marxism came into being and realized revolutionary changes in philosophy. Western philosophy itself also started to reform; it transformed basically and formed many new philosophical schools and tendencies that transcended the limits of traditional philosophy in many aspects.

The background that prompts such changes in Western philosophy also prompts similar changes in Western religion. There are serious conflicts between traditional position and the great discoveries of the contemporary sciences and the reality of Western contemporary society. These include the explanation of the idea of God and the Bible, the nature and function of religion, the motive and demands of faith, as well as the relation between Christianity and other religions and ideologies. For example, due to the most recent discoveries of the contemporary natural sciences such as of astronomy which deepen profoundly people’s understanding of the world, the traditional idea of God creating the world must undergo related changes. Where philosophy, the other humanities and the social sciences go beyond the traditional metaphysical horizon, transform the outlook from absolute reason and abstract conceptions to the real life of human beings and practice, the attitude of traditional Christianity has no choice but to make related changes. For these reasons, since the middle of the 19th century, especially in the 20th century, as a transformation of the orientation took place in Western philosophy, there were indistinct but also important changes in the realm of Western religion. The range and depth of these changes could be compared probably only to the movement of religious Reformation in the Renaissance.
As philosophy and religion are closely related in their object, method and object of study, their changes in modern-contemporary times must be related one to the other. This relationship is expressed notably in the changes of religious philosophy. On the one hand, religious philosophy could be called in a sense the concentrated expression of religious ideas in theory, so the changes of religious philosophy in the contemporary express in a great degree the changes of religious ideas in the same era and area. On the other hand, as the religious philosophies in the contemporary west are the consistent parts of a whole contemporary Western philosophy, their changes in a degree are subordinate to the changes of contemporary philosophy. Therefore, religious philosophies of contemporary Western become the bridge between philosophy and religion in contemporary Western thought.

**Fusion of Christianity, Western Philosophy and Contemporary Religious Philosophy**

Religions in contemporary Western countries are of every hue. Besides Christianity, the world religions of Buddhism and Islam are popular to a degree. There are various religions according to nationality, locality, etc. as well as some heretical branches. Viewed from the point of view that every religion must be concerned in the final analysis with the fundamental problems of the world and human life, all these religions must have their own philosophical point of view. Nevertheless, some of them had not been melded with Western cultures or include philosophy, so it is very difficult for them to form a trend with wide influence in religious philosophy. Others have influence in only a more limited sphere, or have not formed integrated theoretical systems. Christianity, which developed in the context of Western cultures and has a well defined position among the various religions, formed not only the most complete theoretical system of religion, but also a relatively complete theoretical system of philosophy. In various forms, degrees and senses, it connects with and influences other religions, even including religions which are contrary to it. Only the philosophy of Christianity can express the fundamental tendency of Western religion and its philosophy and this is true in past as well as in modern and contemporary times.

Christianity has various branches: traditional Catholic, Protestantism and Eastern Orthodox Churches. In modern and contemporary times, these three formed their own branches which have theological and relevant philosophical theories with their own proper traits. Therefore, contemporary Western theology and philosophy connected with Christianity is of a wide variety. These could be divided into distinctive groups according to different standards. For example, as theologies corresponding to distinctive branches of Christianity, there are Catholic, Protestant, Eastern Orthodox and Judaic theologies. According to the attitude toward traditional theology, there are orthodox and neo-orthodox theologies, as well as theologies of modernism, liberalism, etc. There are also other divisions according to theoretical traits, goals and concerns such as so-called theology of hope, process theology, liberation theology, etc. These branches, named theologies, mostly have their proper philosophical ideas, and could be taken as philosophical branches. Sometimes, these theological thinkers prefer to consider their theories as philosophy and give them a philosophical name, or to establish a philosophic theory alongside theology. For example, besides orthodox theology, Catholic thinkers established neothomism and other philosophical schools. Protestant theologians developed a personalism that has a more secular sense.

No matter what standard are used to divide these theological and religious philosophical schools, and no matter what names are used for them, they have sense as both religious and philosophical theory. The difference is that some appear rather as philosophy, and some have more
theological meaning. That is to say, the proportions of philosophy and theology are different, but they are all fusions of the two, but the sense of their philosophical component is always connected with the secular trends in a philosophy at that period, and even could be taken as constitutive parts of those trends.

As a fusion of religious and philosophical theories, Christian philosophy embodies a fusion of the religious and secular cultures of Western countries. In a sense Christian philosophies reflect the basic tendency not only of Western religious philosophy, but also of the whole of Western philosophy and culture. In history, the cultures of European middle ages undoubtedly were controlled by Christian theology and its philosophy, namely, scholastic philosophy. Following the religious Reformation and the humanistic movement opposing the traditional catholic vision, various modern trends of philosophy and culture were invariably also influenced intensely by Christianity, especially the Protestantism resulting from the religious Reformation. Even those enlightenment thinkers, who violently criticized Christianity, often were influenced by it in their own theoretic system. Probably for such reasons, Western thinkers such as Max Weber considered Western capitalistic culture, including its philosophy, to be permeated by the ethical spirit of Protestantism. Leaving aside Christianity, it would be difficult to understand truly and all-roundly Western philosophy and other ideologies. Correspondingly, the establishment, renewal, reformation and development of Christianity in various periods could not depart from this Western thought and culture. For example, the comprehensive theoretical system developed by Christianity after the middle ages benefited considerably from reinterpretation of the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Its later evolution and development were interrelated also with the philosophy of the times. Sometimes even the theories of those philosophers who violently criticized Christianity became the motive power forcing Christianity to do some reforms.

The relation of permeation and fusion between Western religious, mainly Christian, philosophy and the whole of Western philosophy and culture still continues in Western countries. The changes of Western religion in the period of transformation from modern to contemporary thought was powered by philosophical changes at this time. Sometimes the latter was realized through reinterpretting past religious theories. Thus, some reformers of religious thought were also important representatives of philosophical changes. The German theologian, F. Schleiermacher is a typical example. He was generally recognized as the forerunner of contemporary philosophical hermeneutics, but his contribution to hermeneutics was realized through reforming Bible hermeneutics. As a theologian, he opposed orthodox and rationalist theologies and emphasized that religion originated from the inner feeling of the human being and the fusion of the human and the divine in one’s feelings. This position is consistent with his critical attitude toward traditional philosophy.

In the modern to contemporary transformation of Western philosophy and religion, philosophical and religious changes are intertwined and it is rather common that a person may be a philosopher and a theologian at the same time. Some philosophers, who greatly contributed to the modern-contemporary transformation, were greatly influenced by the modern-contemporary changes in Western religion. For convenience in research, sometimes people divide contemporary Western philosophy into two main trends, as so-called "humanism" and "scientism," or European continental and Anglo-American philosophy. The permeation and fusion of both philosophy and theology, philosopher and theologian, could also be found among these trends. For example, in the formation and development of such so-called "humanistic" trends of contemporary Western philosophy as existentialism, the most important forerunners, Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, in different senses also promoted the modern-contemporary turn of Christianity.
Kierkegaard clearly integrated the existence of God and of the individual. He considered the development process of individuals to be directed to God, and individuals in the high stage of their development, that of religion, to be directly communicating with God. God, in other words, is in the development process of the life of human beings. The position of Kierkegaard as a theologian during the modern-contemporary period in the history of Western thought is perhaps lower than as a philosopher. Nevertheless, for the explanation of Western religion and its transformation in terms of contemporary philosophy, he is without doubt a very important scholar. Some of his thought is an important theoretical source for the theology of later Christian modernism and liberalism. Conversely, his promotion of the contemporary philosophical turn was realized in his new explanation of traditional Christianity.

Nietzschean philosophy in its direct sense is violently against Christianity. Concluding that Western rationalistic culture since Socrates was marked by Christian culture, Nietzsche mercilessly attacked and expressed his attitude of complete negation of Christianity in his famous argument that "God is dead". Nonetheless, what Nietzsche negated is only God who was absolutized and substantialized and who lives in another world. He did not negate people’s pursuit of belief, ideals and transcendence. He recommended that people should replace God in another world by the "superman" in this world. Although there are various meanings in this conception of "superman," the most important one is to stress people’s ideal belief and activity, or to take it as the personalisation of the will to power. By advancing his philosophical theory, Nietzsche gave impetus to the transformation of the development of Western philosophy from constructing speculative metaphysical systems to emphasizing reality, activity and practicality. At the same time, he promoted Christianity by changing its form for the new historical circumstances to more and more emphasize the meaning of God as Ideal, transcendence, activity and process.

Another example, August Comte was considered one of the founders of so-called "scientistic" trend of contemporary Western philosophy. He demanded not only the establishment of positive philosophy on the basis of the positive sciences and used it to replace traditional speculative metaphysics, but he also promoted the establishment at the same basis of a positive religion to replace traditional Christianity. The positive religion is his so-called "religion of humanity." Its main characteristics are that people should replace faith in God in another world by faith in "humanity" or in themselves in the practical world. However, the religion of humanity of Comte still imitates Christianity in many aspects. For example, he demanded that people should establish a Church for the religion of humanity; his humanity as the object of faith is to a great degree abstract and even mystical. This means that he could not avoid the influences of Christianity. Nevertheless, that he transformed the object of belief from God in another world to the practical world gave important impetus to some Western theologians and philosophers who changed the idea of God of traditional Christianity. Following him, the American pragmatic philosophers, James and Dewey, pursued a similar tendency taking God to be a useful hypothesis for human interests and goals.

In brief, the formation and development of contemporary religion and its philosophy, mainly of Christianity and its philosophy, coincide with the formation and development of the whole of contemporary Western philosophy. Without taking account of the changes in contemporary philosophy, people could not understand the meaning of contemporary Western religion and its changes. Similarly, without taking note of contemporary Western religion and its changes, people also could not understand the broad contents of the changes in contemporary Western philosophy in an overall manner.
The Transcendence by Contemporary Western Religion over Traditional Religious Ideas and Philosophies

The changes experienced by Western religion and its philosophy during contemporary time should coincide with each other, but this is only a general coincidence. After all, religion is different from philosophy, while religious philosophy must be based theoretically in a corresponding religious creed. The theoretical direction of religion and its concrete form of expression must have some different traits from that of general secular philosophy. Analyzing and evaluating the changes in contemporary Western religion and its philosophy, we must take into account both their commonalities with secular philosophy and their own special character as religious doctrine. Furthermore, there are various factions within contemporary Western religious philosophy, even among Christian philosophies. Their expressions of the modern-contemporary transformation also differ from one another. So we should study the changes of Western religion and its philosophy during modern-contemporary transformation both on the whole and in its concrete schools.

To rightly evaluate the changes of Western religion and its philosophy during contemporary times, one must explore them in their different levels and directions. Both in their theoretical tendencies and social influences, without doubt these changes have some passive aspects. However, if we affirm that Western philosophy experienced revolutionary changes in its mode of thought during the modern-contemporary transformation, especially since the 20th century, we must also affirm that there are similar changes in contemporary religion and its philosophy. Just as contemporary philosophy transcends modern philosophy in some aspects, contemporary religion and its philosophy have realized a similar transcendence which is expressed mainly in the following ways.

First, because Western religious philosophies belong mainly to various Christian philosophies, they must take God and his supremacy as the basis of their overall theories. Thus, it is impossible for them to reject the pursuit of metaphysics and ultimate existence as does secular philosophy. Nevertheless, some Western religious philosophers and theologians still give new explanation of the idea of God and other beings, which new meanings transcend traditional metaphysics. Just as some secular philosophers did not take "existence" as an "absolute" separate from real existence, some modern liberal theologians do not take God as an absolute above people, but as coexisting with them. In other words, God lives together with the people. The relation between God and people is not one of creator and creature, but of dialogue between "I" and "thou"; God is not a personalized Creator in another world, but a kind of infinitude and perfection which transcends the weaknesses and imperfections of practical life as a sublime moral ideal. Some religious philosophers and theologians, who are still classically oriented often speak cautiously concerning such things, but in some indirect way make similar changes in the original meaning of idea of God. For example, the famous American theologian, Paul Tillich, while oriented according to a neoclassicism, intends to replace the worship of God with ultimate concern, which really means that people should transcend their finite and immediate character and pursue what is infinite and perfect.

Second, like modern metaphysics, modern religious philosophy could be said to be foundationalism or substantial ontology. God is the highest substance who created everything in the world, but he him or herself was not created; so he is eternal and transcendent to history and time; God is the origin which propels everything in the world to move and change, but he him or herself could not be moved, thus is the unmoved mover. Many contemporary religious
philosophers and theologians more and more tend to transcend and even give up such points of view, and then draw upon theories of philosophers who emphasized moving and change, historicity and time into the field of theology. For example, some theologians of Catholic modernism often cite Bergsonian theory on *élan vital* and change. They take God as perpetual creation and evolution itself. The process philosophy of Whitehead was developed into a process theology by some contemporary theologians. It takes God as an active and real process, or a perpetual creative power directing to perfection. It is due to such creative power, that nature, human society and God are integrated into a vital unity. Corresponding to this, many theologians and religious philosophers use the points of view of philosophical schools that emphasize the importance of life and practice to explain religious faith. That is to say, they consider that the target of faith to be not to reach to God, but is to pursue transcendence and purification in spirit and morality through a perpetual creative activity, life and practice.

Third, like rationalistic metaphysics, modern religious philosophies are systems constructed on speculative reason, so they have evident and strong absolutist and dogmatic tendencies. The Bible and church creed are considered as the highest truth, and the absolute standard by which to measure the truth of theories in other fields. Such absolutism and dogmatism were violently criticized by numerous modern thinkers long ago. However, it was in contemporary times, that speculative reason as their theoretical foundation was truly shaken; they were also seriously doubted in the field of religion and theology. Some radical religious philosophers and theologians expressed one after another their doubt regarding the traditional Christian creeds and relevant speculative reason, and diametrically advanced some theories with relativist, dualist and irrational traits. In this regard, various theologies of modernism, especially the theology of postmodernism, corresponding to the philosophy of postmodernism fashionable in Western countries in recent years, are most outstanding. They demand the overthrow of the various absolute authorities confirmed by traditional Christianity, and maintain that people can and should seek religious truth according to their own belief, especially in terms of irrational life and inner experience. They consider Christian truths to be not absolute, unchangeable and only what is held by Church; rather they could be revised, developed and even created by individuals. Under such circumstance of anti-absolutism and anti-dogmatism, especially after the second Vatican Council (1962-1965), the Catholic Church changed its traditional position, with the result that it recognized to some degree elements of heterodoxy and paganism. It rehabilitated Bruno, Galileo and others, who had been persecuted in history, and even expressed support of dialogue between people of different beliefs and even with atheists, including Marxists.

Fourth, corresponding to the transcendence of modern Western secular philosophy to a subjective metaphysics, especially the theories of one-sided humanism and individualism in modern philosophy, there are tendencies in contemporary religious philosophy which, through explaining anew the meaning of God and religious creeds, transcended both traditional theology and humanism in the sense of a subjective metaphysics. Some religious philosophers and theologians consider, on the one hand, that true human nature is the premise of true religion; to respect the people’s dignity and basic value is the fundamental demand to religion; to reflect the true nature one must reflect true human nature. Therefore, they always identify asserting the transcendence of God with stress upon the development of the human being in an all-round way, especially people’s freedom and dignity. They also identify God as highest end and ultimate concern with consideration of the human being as not means but end. On the other hand, they consider that the assertion of human nature, especially people’s freedom and dignity, must be also a pursuit of transcendence, that is to say, people must transcend the limitation of human being as
individual; they must integrate the individual with the other and society, human beings with the world they face. Accordingly, they combine advocating that finite individual must be subordinate to the infinite God with proposing that the individual’s interests must be subordinate to that of the whole and society. They demand that people should associate such spiritual qualifications, as friendship, love and mutual sympathy which Christianity advocates, with transcending ultra-individualism, selfishness and egoism.

None can explain the transcendence of contemporary Western religion and its philosophy over the traditional from other angles. For example, while traditional Christian faith directed people’s attention to another world, contemporary religion more and more pay attention to people’s practical life. The emphasis on life and practice by pragmatism, the return to the life-world of phenomenology and existentialism and similar theories advocated by other philosophical schools get relevant response in various degree in contemporary Western religious philosophy. Correspondingly for Christianity, its tendency to advocate blind obedience and superstition was more and more diluted, while its tendency to advance people to pursue sublime ideals and to guide the practical life of people has been strengthened. To that another example, in past time, Christian moral creeds mostly defended the unreasonable social system based on exploitation and oppression and safeguarded the interests of the rich in the final analysis; at the present time, this has definitely changed, sometimes even with an evident tendency to transcend the capitalist system and to be concerned with the fate of poor people. The social system of present Western countries is without doubt still based on exploitation and oppression. However, under the inspiration of Christian morality, more and more rich people attend to improving society and helping poor people as their main target for realizing the value of their own life. All these are important changes in Christianity and its philosophy that should be recognized and studied seriously.

Generally speaking, just as the modern-contemporary turn of the whole of Western philosophy is a cardinal and revolutionary change in modes of thought, at the same time the changes of Western religion and their philosophy also increasingly manifest similar positive meaning. The key thing here is that the idea of God, the position of God in the world and the relation between God and people as well as the aim of religious faith are all changed. For most people, to believe God means to transcend their own finiteness, to pursue development in an all-round way, a sublime moral ideal and the highest realization of the value of their own life. Although such changes are only a tendency, they can be said to be a very clear tendency in some circumstance.
Part II

The Humanistic Trend and Pragmatism
6. A Reflection on "Humanism" and Its Philosophical Trends

In recent decades, two phrases, "humanism" and "philosophical trends of humanism" have been widely used and frequently seen in philosophical books and magazines published in China, directly influencing the response to many issues in research concerning Western philosophy, especially contemporary Western philosophy. Because of the vagueness in these meanings and their consequences, attempts have been made by many scholars to abandon the two terms in the hope of avoiding mistakes in valuing many philosophical issues. It seems impossible to do so, however, unless new valid and appropriate terms or concepts have been invented. Practically, a sound and reasonable choice is to explain and justify their different meanings on various philosophical levels and against different backgrounds. Inspired and enlightened by achievements of others in this field, I have noted my comments regarding these two terms, hoping to draw attention to other counterparts of this issue. Sporadic in inspiration, this chapter may not be systematic or coherent, and to shorten its length the concrete materials have not been cited. If possible, I will return to probe into them more specifically in the future.

Humanism: Its Connotation and Origin

In Chinese the terms for humanism and anthropology are sometimes translated by the same word. As philosophical concepts they have been introduced into China from the West. Before the end of the 1970s, most Chinese scholars understood them from the viewpoint of P.J.A.R. Feuerbach and that of N.G. Chernyshevskij, who established their philosophical system of anthropology. From then on, the research in contemporary Western philosophy began anew in China, with reference to the works of the philosophers in the former USSR, who rigidly divided contemporary Western philosophy into two main trends: scientism and humanism. The similar division in Western philosophical circles reinforced this in China. With the propagation of this application in several authoritative Chinese philosophical magazines and in textbooks for college students majoring in philosophy, the two terms took root in Chinese philosophical research.

However, there is still a long way to go in reaching unanimous agreement on humanism or anthropology as to their meaning, connotation and origin, for they are explained or understood in widely different manners in various academic essays, college textbooks, seminars, and even notes. Humanism (Humanismus in German) derives from a Latin word "humanitas"; anthropology is from the Greek word "anthropos-logos". In fact, both are ambiguous in English and German.

Humanism was once used to refer to an important ideological movement sweeping through Europe during the 14th to the 16th century, namely the Renaissance. Primarily, it meant a revolt against the orthodox ideas of the Roman Catholic Church, and an approval of secular culture, which regarded the real man as living in nature instead of depending on the supernatural being, God, as its core ideology and culture. In the early period of the Renaissance, it aimed at the reexplanation, reexplanation and reinterpration of ancient Greek-Roman culture, especially its philosophy, art, and literature. Latter, in alignment with the new natural sciences, on the one hand, it pushed forward the Enlightenment movement substituting belief with reason and religion with science; on the other hand, in union with the political struggles of the bourgeois estate against the feudal system, the hierarchy, and despotic dictatorship, it advanced the capitalist revolutionary
movement which upholds the banner of the improvement of freedom and democracy. In this sense, humanism is translated as doctrine on the humanities in Chinese academic writings.

Later, the term humanism was endowed with more and varied implications used mostly to stress the human nature, value, mission, position, and role in the universe on different levels, and in different degrees linked to the meaning expressed by the humanities. Often it is used to describe an ideological tendency of the concern with the being of man, for example, respect for his personality (freedom, dignity and value), concern for his sorrows and happiness. Thus it has acquired the sense of ethical rules and moral principles, which in Chinese translation is *humanitarianism*. So we have the concept of capitalist humanitarianism, proletarian humanitarianism and revolutionary humanitarianism, etc. When freedom, democracy, and other social and political rights are treated as the essential features of the human being, *humanism* is closely associated with the theories of natural rights and the relevant democratic political system advocated by the early capitalist thinkers. Broadly, the ideology of humanism advocates the security of man’s innate or inalienable rights (freedom, dignity and value), and affirms the key position of man in the universe. It holds that man enlivens the existence of the universe, and is not only the starting point but also the destination of all ideology and theories: "man is the measure of all". Thus, *humanism* comes to have the meaning of a world outlook and an outlook on life as well as that of ethics and social politics. To this extent, *humanism* is used by personalists, pragmatists, and existentialist philosophers to name their philosophy respectively. In the philosophical circles of China, this meaning of humanism distinguishes itself from and is juxtaposed with philosophy that is scientistic in trend.

Etymologically, the Greek word *anthropos-logos*, from which *anthropology* derives, means doctrine on human being (or "homonology"). In the development of science in Europe, especially since the 19th century, *anthropology* meant research about man. This included biology, the study of law, morality. Culturally, it meant the study of language, culture, politics, economy, human origin, evolution, the shaping of the human race and its physical structure. In this sense, *anthropology* is translated as "doctrine on mankind" in Chinese. Where Feuerbach and Chernyshevski used *anthropology* to elaborate their materialist philosophy from the viewpoint of biology and naturalism, anthropological study has been greatly broadened in its meaning. Since that time, *anthropology* refers to a specific philosophical trend of naturalism. In the 20th century, some philosophers in the West attempted to work out a new science of man based on both modern science and metaphysics. They combined the study of the positive science of anthropology, and that of philosophy to study philosophically and comprehensively human origins and evolution, man’s physical and mental features, culture, the relationship between human nature and society, etc. In Germany, various schools of philosophical anthropology (biology, culture, psychology and religion) came to the fore. In recent decades, *anthropology* is used by some Western philosophers more broadly, to include almost everything concerned with man: body and soul, human subjectivity as well as freedom, value, dignity, especially what emphasizes the significance of human existence. Taking Sartre as an example, his philosophy is commonly called philosophical anthropology by some Western philosophers. Thus, *anthropology* comes to share the meaning of *humanism* (emphasizing man’s key position in the universe), and is used independently to refer to a trend of philosophy different from, and juxtaposed with, philosophical scientism.

In a word, neither Western nor Chinese philosophers have yet reached a unanimous understanding of these concepts. When humanism or anthropalogy turns up in our philosophical reading, a careful analysis of its meaning should be made according to its context and background so as to have a good command of its connotation and to avoid unnecessary misunderstanding. For
example, there is a sharp difference between using *humanism* in the sense of morality and ontology, and its use in the sense of a doctrine concerning humankind such as the existential humanism of Sartre. Even taking humanism as a philosophical trend, there are broadly different meanings in various specific schools, some of them tending to counter science, some overlapping with scientism, some irrational, others rather rational. So it is not reasonable to talk about *humanism* ambiguously, especially while dividing Western philosophy mechanically into two trends, which would be as silly as to trim the toes to fit the shoes.

**Humanism and the Demarcation of the Main Trends of the Contemporary Western Philosophy**

The *Anthropology* in the philosophy of Feuerbach and Chernyshevski has been deserted by the philosophical circle of China, and is seldom discussed from the viewpoint of naturalism. As for the *humanism* in the sense of morality and ethics and the *anthropology* in the sense of biology and culture, their study is still going on, but seldom goes beyond a philosophical level. In the context of the Renaissance, *humanism* means broadly doctrines concerning the human being. In Chinese philosophical circles today the term often means a contemporary Western philosophical trend juxtaposed, but not opposed, to that of scientism.

The division of Western contemporary philosophy into scientism and humanism in other countries is the consequence of a revolt against the traditional division of philosophy into idealism and materialism, empiricism and rationalism; it is a mechanical division made under the guidance of a fundamentalist essentialism dividing the mind and body. Whatever contemporary philosophers choose as the starting point of their philosophy, science or man himself, all aim at transcending the rigid methodology that overweighed science, namely, scientism, or laid one-sided stress on human existence, namely humanism.

Being associated with a certain specific branch of science, scientism is characterized by its belief in and respect for science, holding that science is the foundation of philosophy, that the approach applied by science (the method of experimental analysis, and of systems) is the core of philosophy, and that philosophy offers justification for the methods of various specific sciences. For this reason, philosophy is regarded by some as a scientific methodology and epistemology. Nevertheless, they still maintain some interest in human affairs, and understand man and its existence from the viewpoint of scientific reason. Most scholars close to this trend attempt to exceed metaphysics, the dualist opposition of subject-object, mind-body, and that of thinking-existence, that is, to ease the conflicts between traditional materialism and idealism, empiricism and rationalism. Since reason is indispensable for science, these schools are often termed rationalisms. Differences remain among those schools forced into the category of scientism, of which some give less notice to natural science, but are in close touch with rationalism; so the name "scientism" is a working term rather than one that fits exactly.

Holding that philosophy begins with man and also ends with man, humanist philosophers work to clarify human life, instinct, emotion, and will in order to reveal the significance of man’s being as irrational or super-rational existence. With this purpose, they oppose the reduction of man to the sole existence of scientific reason. More radically, some scholars belonging to the humanist trend feel that philosophical research should focus on irrational human existence, that those irrational elements are the real and original being of man. Most philosophers in this circle do not omit the study of metaphysical or ontological problems, but have renewed the content of such studies. Like their scientistic counterparts, humanist philosophers seek to surmount the opposition
of subject-object, mind-body, thinking-existence, and hence keep a distance from dualism. Their goal is to remove the wall between subject and object, and finally to catch the real and true existence of man. In their opinion, the only way to reach this goal is to start form the true and pure man who has not yet been twisted or spoiled by science and reason. From the starting point of one who has transcended reason, philosophical humanism always forms the circle of irrationalism. However, what they really want to transcend is not as absolute as is generally thought. They do not mean to abolish reason or science; what they oppose is the radical rationalism or scientism which absolutized reason.

Not all philosophers see eye to eye with each other on the division of philosophy into scientism and humanism. As some experts have said, a few philosophers in the West use scientism in a bad sense, that is, as a substitute for foundationalism or naturalism. But most philosophers agree to the use of humanism and scientism as two different-oriented philosophical trends. Whatever be the case in the West, Chinese philosophers pass no value judgment on the two terms in their acceptance and application.

Influenced by the traditional mode of "either-or" thought, some people both in China and in the West think that humanism and scientism are opposed to each other as sharply as is oil to water, that is, either humanism or scientism. This attitude does not reflect the truth: an emphasis on the scientific elements in philosophy does not mean a denial of man’s importance; and a human-centered philosophy does not mean a refutation of science. Furthermore, other divisions are available, workable and practicable. Today, most people have recognized the relativity in the classification of Western philosophical trends.

From the angle of how to look upon the object of philosophical study, especially man’s role and significance in philosophy, we can say that besides scientism and humanism, a third way is available for the classification of contemporary Western philosophy. For example, some scholars integrate man and science in their philosophy to which all is subject. In this way, they found their philosophy on the base of an essential being superior to concrete beings and man. Due to their kinship with religion and speculative idealism, these schools of thought could be named as a philosophical trend of religion and speculative idealism. The yardstick and standard of measure directly determines to what trend a specific philosophy belongs: humanism, scientism or other. Taking American pragmatism as an example, in its advocacy of science and the methodological function of philosophy, evidently it should be regarded as a branch of scientism; but in the sense of paying attention to man’s key role in philosophy and assuring that the world we face is humanized, it should belong to humanism. So, as many pragmatists themselves would claim, their philosophy belongs to humanism. Phenomenology is more a scientism to the extent that it emphasizes reason and the reestablishment of philosophy as an exact science; but it is much closer to humanism to the extent that it advocates a philosophy beginning with the intentional act. As for religious philosophy and various schools of speculative philosophy, they have reoriented themselves to wear the masks of humanism or scientism. The Marburg School, a branch of neo-Kantianism which inherited many rational elements, scientific logic and method from the philosophy of Kant, is closer to scientism, while the Freiburg School, another branch of neo-Kantianism which developed Kant’s practical reason, is more like humanism. Personalism is a humanist philosophy under the cloak of religion.

The classification of the contemporary Western philosophy into two or three trends is more relative than absolute, and it is only one of many; it is a consequence of attending to the object of philosophical research, science, and man’s role and significance in philosophy. People can practically turn to other standards or yardsticks. For example, besides humanism and scientism,
we can take other ways to make classifications, e.g., "Euro-continental philosophy" and "Anglo-saxon philosophy" (by historical tradition and philosophical tendency), "language philosophy" and "analytic philosophy" (by the attitude toward the role of language and logic in philosophy). According to the content, range and emphasis of research other references arise; philosophy of science; philosophy of man, and historical philosophy. For some experts, the contemporary Western philosophy can be classified according to the different types of rationality into knowledge philosophy, act philosophy, philosophy of reason and truth, philosophy of freedom and vale, etc. Of course, all these divisions are highly relative.

Theoretically, the single schools of Western contemporary philosophy are not coherent in content. On the contrary, there is considerable diversities inside each school, for there is no clear demarcation between them, but a lot of sharing, so it is hard to pack a school of philosophy rigorously into a specific trend. For example, Western Marxism prevalent in recent decades is not a united school, but can be dismembered into other schools, and naturally into other trends. It is the same for a particular philosopher; the uniqueness and contrasts in his philosophy keep a philosopher from belonging simply to one specific circle or school. In recent years, the proximity and similarity among various schools have steadily increased so much that a single standard is no longer workable or reasonable. Today, the classification of the Western contemporary philosophy into humanism and scientism appears to trim the toes to fit the shoes; its classification into Euro-continental and Anglo-American philosophy is more of region than of philosophy (or trend); and its classification into knowledge and act philosophies also fall into contradictions and conflicts. In the eye of most Western contemporary philosophers, reason and freedom, truth and value do not exclude each other as was thought earlier.

Because of the rising tendency of relativity in the classification of the Western contemporary philosophy, some Western philosophers declare that the age of rigid demarcation is passed, while the uniqueness of each philosophy draws our attention. Although such claim is far too radical, the application of only one standard to classify Western contemporary philosophy is divorced from the real situation of philosophy in the West.

The frequent "disorientation" or "error" in the classification are to some degree unavoidable. The universal distinction of materialism and idealism, empiricism and rationalism does not insure its complete correctness. As a general concept can never embrace the features of all concrete objects, and will unavoidably add or reduce something, it is not strange that error or disorientation occurs sometimes in classifying Western philosophy into humanism and scientism. One should not nor can one abandon the two concepts just because they have deficiencies.

The chief purpose and key role in studying Western philosophy lies not in the measures which should be taken rigorously to classify them into different schools (trends), but in illustrating the general and specific features of each school. This lies in working out the relationship between Western social conditions, the tradition of Western philosophy, and other cultural ideologies as well as the relationship between these ideologies. Finally it lies in noting what is happening, in prospecting what course it will take, and in forecasting latent effects, both positive and negative. Only in this way, can we have a good command of the Western contemporary philosophy, which is still developing, and understand it wholly and comprehensively.

The Humanistic Philosophical Trend and the Significance of Human Problems in Philosophy

Philosophies belonging to the humanist trend are characterized by their emphasis on man’s role in philosophy, regarding man as the final purpose served as well as the starting point of
philosophy. Besides those who openly claim their philosophy to be a humanism — James, Dewey, Schiller, Sartre, etc. for instance, many other philosophers share such opinions or similar ideas. Some philosophers don’t discuss humanism directly. This is true of Husserl for instance, whose phenomenology aims to make philosophy a strict science: his anti-psychologism and theory of reduction exclude man (the subject) in the sense of personality and in terms of experience. But intentionality, the embryo of his philosophy, is nothing but that of man; the world in his phenomenology is nothing but the world of human life. Factually, philosophers like him base their philosophy indirectly on man, still treating man as the starting point and goal of their philosophy.

The birth and spread of the humanist trend in the West are attributed to the fact that great emphasis is put on human issues in contemporary philosophy. A fair evaluation of the humanistic trend requires re-recognition of the significance of these factors and an exploration of the historic role of various humanistic schools in emphasizing these in the development of Western philosophy.

Since philosophy came into being in ancient times, the questions of man’s role and significance in philosophy have been a central concern for this matter is closely related to the essence of man’s spiritual action. For this reason, "to know yourself", the well-known legacy of Socrates, is cited throughout history. Generally speaking, the real discussion of philosophy can not exclude man, and all philosophies, to some degree, reflect theories about man.

The distillation of these theories give philosophy different meanings, varying from one level to another. Like many other spiritual human actions (including the various branches of knowledge), philosophy takes man in the world as its object of investigation. Some spiritual human actions such as the positive sciences involve only one or a few specific aspects of man and the circumstances in meeting man’s particular requirements or purposes. The goal of philosophy is to observe human existence and its relation with the world, to locate the position of men and women in the universe, and to realize the value and significance of their existence in this world. Philosophy concerns itself with man, with his or her being and relation to the world in which they live.

The world concerned by philosophy is, in the final analysis, closely related to the condition of human existence. It does not change according to man’s will, but its existence remains with the being of man to the extent that it acquires its significance and value from the latter. How does the world go on? How does it present itself? What is its value or significance? The answers to these questions are all determined to a great degree by the conditions of man’s being. In some sense, the state of the external world is a presentation of the conditions in which man exists. A savage and a civilized man may consider the same thing to be greatly different or even opposites, since their living conditions vary from each other. Dewey often took water as an example when elucidating his own theory. As a natural being, water is necessary in one’s life, one cannot live without water. But for savages or the ancients, water is of simple importance, for they knew it sensually. On the part of man with modern knowledge, water becomes a complicated object, which is studied in its complexity by physics and chemistry. As a natural being, the existence of water does not change according to human will or even the existence of human beings. But as a human object, it adapts to man’s existence, and its value and significance keep pace with the changes in man’s actual situation. Through and within his object (water), man sees his own existence. And it is the same with the existence of other objects.

In a word, without objective things in nature, the research of philosophy and science would be groundless; therefore subjective idealism which reduces all existence to human sense experience and objective idealism which reduces everything to an externalization of the spirit)is not logically tenable. Without man, nature would no longer be objectified existence, or would not
be the actual world in which man lives, and which acquires its direct reality because of the being
of man. Without man armed with modern science and technology nature as objectified existence
would turn out to be meaningless, monotonous and mysterious. So long as philosophical research
is not divorced from the actual world, it must keep contact with man who exists as the subject of
the actual reality; for the actual world keeps adapting to human reality.

Although the question of man’s position and significance in philosophy had been raised by
Socrates and other philosophers in ancient times, philosophers throughout history zigzagged their
thinking and still are fumbling for a satisfactory solution to this question. Plato, a disciple of
Socrates, saw living in the actual world as just a copy of the human form founded in his world of
ideas. After he criticized Plato’s theory of Ideas, Aristotle proposed his far-reaching dictum: "man
is a political animal", and established an all-encompassing system about the being in which man
is but one link in the chain of being. This system laid a foundation for the succeeding God-centered
Christianity theology. Many philosophers in Renaissance times openly advocated the replacement
of God with man as the center of philosophy; unfortunately, their understanding of man was
abstract and was one-sidedly or too radically interpreted by later thinkers. When Descartes began
his philosophy with "I think", he apparently began with man (the subject), where mind and body
remain isolated and separated from each other: they were independent form one another.
Cartesianism first contributed directly to the typical naturalism once fashionable in France, in
which man is regarded as but a machine, and then led to Kantian transcendent philosophy, positing
a transcendent subject. Unfortunately, they both were far from the reality of man. Hegel introduced
practicality and historicity into his philosophy, while exceeding both transcendentalism and
naturalism. But his absolute idealism saw man as nothing but an embodiment of the Absolute
Spirit. Feuerbach held up the banner of anthropology, exposing Hegel's Absolute Spirit as no more
than a man concept of based on nature — an idea which Marx highly praised. Feuerbach broke
with absolute speculation and began to go beyond the intention of naturalism, but he failed to
recognize sociality in its practicality and historicity. What he was able to do was to think of the
‘species’ as human nature, namely, the pure natural commonality of many natural individuals, who
are internal, silent and pure. In a word, Feuerbach is still trapped within the boundary of naturalism.

Speculative reason and simple naturalism were not transcended in any real sense until
contemporary humanism located man in the center of philosophy as both its destination and its
origin. Kierkegaard’s philosophy brings man as an individual into the presence of God and leaves
him standing in awe of God. In his notion of Superman, Nietzsche expelled God and substituted
Superman, with man as the incarnation of the Will for Power. But no matter what theory, man is
always placed in the center of philosophy. Both Kierkegaard, Nietzsche and their disciples failed
to provide a satisfactory understanding of man: his life and its practice. Their radical struggle
against absolute rationalism and naturalism led their philosophy to another extreme, where the
objective actuality of man and his existence were ignored or denied. Thus they fell into the swamp
of relativism and irrationalism, even though their emphasis on human creativity and activity
revealed the close relationship between the world as studied by science and philosophy on one
hand, and human activity and creativity on the other. Compared with the traditional idea that
abstract nature or reason are the essence of the world, and that to catch such abstract essence is the
mission of philosophy, the humanist philosophers lay more stress on the present situation and
acting under such situations, that is, to some extent they attached more importance to the actual
life and practice of human being. The defects of their theory lie in their one-sided understanding
of actual human life and practice. In spite of these flaws, they began the reform of traditional
philosophy which had been off course for a long time in pursuit of an abstract essence of nature and reason.

Since the second half of the 19th century, so many "turns" have echoed through Western philosophy: the turn to science and methodology, the linguistic turn, the turn to the life world, the turn to history and practice, etc., each of which in its turn overshadowed all the others. All these "turns" have their own preference and emphasis, and break with traditional philosophy, which sought to establish a systematic philosophy of natural and rational essence. All of them shift their emphasis to actual human life and actions and concern the philosophical significance of human affairs, linking themselves closely to humanistic trends.

The linguistic turn is highly praised and refined by the analytic philosophers in English-speaking countries. It might seem to leave less room for man but in fact implies a turning to man in the sense of "human being" rather than as an individual. Due to these features, the linguistic turn is easily accepted by some phenomenologist and existentialist philosophers such as Heidegger who are at pains to transcend the limits of the individual. To this extent scientism and humanism in the contemporary Western philosophy fuse in the linguistic turn. In sum, contemporary Western philosophy is turning from its focus on abstract nature and rational essences to the human being itself.

The Humanistic Trend and Subjectivity in Philosophy

Subjectivity has been one of the heated issues in philosophical circles in China since the beginning of the eighties. In fact, it is not at all new, but has been talked about again and again, especially by modern Western philosophers since Descartes. Contemporary Western philosophical humanistic schools have developed or reconstructed it and regarded it as their basic philosophical principle. This has led many Western philosophers to look on the philosophy of the subject or of subjectivity as another name for contemporary humanistic philosophy.

Descartes’ cogito and Kant’s theory of a transcendent self, which constituted a Copernican revolution, have generally been acknowledged as classical expositions of subjectivity in modern Western philosophy. While the various schools of contemporary Western humanism have undoubtedly carried on the Cartesian and Kantian tradition, there are also important differences.

First of all, most humanistic philosophers of various schools have given up the metaphysical prerequisites of subjectivity in earlier modern philosophy. Most have regarded the self as human life, action and practical activity, not as substance, as found in a metaphysical theory of existence. Certainly, they have not denied that man is a being with a substantial and conscious character. But to see the meaning of the human being as a subject, not as consisting in his being substantial, natural being. Viewed in that way, there are no essential differences between men, animals and other natural beings; all must abide by the laws of nature and be restricted according to an order of cause and effect and other natural relations. Neither is it sufficient to see man a conscious being, for then he would be an object like other objects, and lose his meaning as subject. The meaning of the human as a subject is not that he is a substantial existence, but lies in the fact that he is a kind of intention, activity, or action. Nietzsche’s will to power, Bergson’s élan vital, James’ stream of consciousness, Dewey’s experience, Husserl’s intentionality, Freud’s unconsciousness, Heidegger’s Dasein and Sartre’s being-for-itself are all like this.

Secondly, most contemporary Western philosophers have tried to surpass the closedness of the subjectivity found in modern philosophy. Subjectivity is not only an individual’s intention, tendency and activity, but is also connected and even penetrated with the others’ similar intention,
tendency and action. The subject is not an isolated individual existence, but coexists with others. The subject is not only an individual-subject, but is also inter-subjective or a class-subject. This subjectivity becomes intersubjectivity. As a matter of fact, representative contemporary Western philosophers, such as Dewey, Husserl, Heidegger, Jaspers, Merleau-Ponty, Sartre, Wittgenstein, Derrida, Habermas, and so on, have argued that intersubjectivity is the most important sector of their theories. Thus all have tried to shake off subjective idealism with its traditional subjectivity principle, and to explain the relation between the individual, the other and society.

For various schools of contemporary Western humanistic philosophy, their subjectivity principle and their revision and transcendence of the traditional subjectivity principle have concentrated upon transcending traditional philosophy. Therefore, how to evaluate this principle becomes the key to evaluating their whole philosophy. The subjectivity principle of these philosophical schools and their whole theory of the human being of which it is the core undoubtedly have some positive aspects; especially they transcend modern philosophy to some extent. But they also have serious defects, in that they always make the subjectivity principle abstract and absolutized.

Firstly, when emphasizing that subject cannot be a concrete substantial human being or spiritual existence, but the intention, tendency, activity, or action, they always make the latter unilateral and absolute. The subject as human intention, tendency, activity, etc. becomes as abstraction lacking reality and certainty. They could not solve the question of the relation of subject-object, but would land in the idealism they are trying to overcome. For example, although many contemporary Western philosophers did not take subjectivity as arbitrary, in the final analysis they lead to this because their subject lacks certainty and reality.

Secondly, while emphasizing the subjectivity principle and the significance of philosophy as to the study of man, they ignore their limitations. Philosophical study should have multiple orientations and be multi-dimensional. The question of the relation of subject and object is the fundamental question of philosophy; both have rich content on which a concrete research is needed, as well as on the relation between the two.

As for objects, although determined by subjects, they are not fabricated out of nothing. Material objects have an objective base independent of the subject. They are already in-themselves and have on their own all kinds of attributes before being objectified. The function of the subject is only to expose these attributes, and make them have sense and value for man. The reason that the subject can reach these is that he has deep and correct knowledge about the objective base. In other words, the active and creative functions of subject are predicated on the subject correctly knowing the object. So, it’s an important sector of philosophical study to found scientific epistemology and acquire this kind of correct knowledge. Reaching this, does not come from abstractly discussing the human core of philosophy. The emphasis on the active and creative function of the subject would be turned into subjective idealism if we ignored the objective base of the subject.

As for the subject itself, the situation is more complicated. The subject is not an abstract individual, but an individual with social relationships. As Marx pointed out, "The human essence is not an abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality, it is the ensemble of social relations". Therefore, we must study deeply all sorts of social relations, in order to know man as subject. This is the very object for historical materialism and other disciplines. If we abandon the deep overall study of man’s social relationships and look on man as something abstract, however much we emphasize the core position of man in philosophy, man still will be in a state of inertia.
In a word, when we emphasize the core position of human being in philosophy, we should connect it by the multi-directional and multi-dimensional studies of the human being as subject with his objectified world. The contents of such research is very rich. People could put the significance of the human being as subject aside temporarily and to some extent, and study only the significance of the object itself for the subject itself is also an object in a certain sense. The subjectivity principle does not express in full the rich content of philosophical study. In fact, in both traditional and contemporary philosophy, many theories do not relate to the human being directly, but can still have importance for the philosophy of man. This is the case even for humanistic philosophers. Heidegger is generally thought of as one of the major representatives of the humanist philosophical trend, but he was clearly against the subjectivity principle of Sartre’s model and the relevant humanism. Undoubtedly he departed from the general principle of sensible subjectivity and of man when he emphasized "being" in his late works.

Humanistic Trends in Philosophy and the Human Theory of Marxism

As the humanistic trend in philosophy is to emphasize the significance of the human in philosophy, in order to evaluate it correctly and especially to expose its real relation with Marxist philosophy, we need to review the position and significance of the human in Marxist philosophy, besides recognizing the philosophical significance of the human problem in a more general way.

Philosophical circles in China had discussed the human position and significance in Marxist philosophy several times, but it experienced a lot of complications from "the Left". For a long time, the philosophical discussion of human value and meaning was thought to drift off from historical materialism and fall into an abstract theory of human nature and a bourgeois humanitarianism. The Western philosophical humanist trend, which regards man as its philosophical starting-point and end-result, was nearly completely negated. Thus a double misunderstanding befell the Marxist theory of man and Western humanism.

Important changes have taken place in this respect since 1980s. Philosophical circles have made a deeper and more concrete study of the various Western philosophical humanist trends. In knowing their theories better they have found and affirmed some of their elements. It’s rare to deny them simply. The study of Marxism, especially Marx’s own theory of man, is becoming a more and more heated question, followed with interest in Chinese philosophical circles; many Marxist philosophers have seriously explored and restudied it in different ways. Especially since the mid-1980s, with research into such works of Marx as Theses on Feuerbach, An Introduction to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, The German Ideology, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, The Economic Manuscripts of 1857-58, it has become clear that Marx definitely demanded that "the starting-point is real living individuals themselves", regarded "real, active men" as the starting point of his whole theory.2 He considered "the social history of men to be always the history of their individual development".3 "A society in which the full and free development of every individual forms the ruling principle",4 is the coming ideal society. When Marx talked about the basic concepts of historical materialism, such as productive forces and relations, family and civil society, country and so on, he also pointed out that they correspond closely to the individual’s own choice of activity. For example, production relations are not only "the conditions of self-activity but are produced by self-activity".5 It’s obvious that we can have a good command of the real essence of Marxist philosophy only if we start from real man and his self-action or practice.
All familiar with Marxism would surely affirm the revolutionary change in philosophy which it realized. As the main content of such changes, the most popular explanation is that he criticized Feuerbach’s metaphysics, but carried out its materialist core, that he criticized Hegel’s idealism, but carried out its dialectical core, and that by this combination he founded a dialectical and historical materialism. This explanation had been considered authoritative for a long time. However, there were objections to this in Western philosophical fields long ago, and in recent years there are also different opinions about this among Chinese scholars. Whether this explanation should actually be completely insisted on or suitably modified, depends basically on whether it is consistent with what Marx emphasized, such as "sensuous human activity", "self-activity", "practice" and so on. If we overemphasize the objectivity of Marxism, we may regard it as only a kind of theoretical system, independent of "sensuous human activity", practice and world-in-itself. This would explain Marxist philosophy in a manner similar to the old naturalist materialism, and drift away from reality. If while affirming its objectivity, we emphasize its subjectivity, we must affirm its integration with "sensuous human activity", and practice, looking on the latter as the starting point. However, for a period, people had emphasized only its objectivity; that "matter is primary" had been regarded as the starting point of Marxist philosophy. Such a situation emphasize "matter" but ignored "man". Since then the human problem has to be one of the special problems of historical materialism. However, Marx himself emphasized subjectivity. He definitely pointed this out in Theses on Feuerbach: "The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialisms — that of Feuerbach included — is that the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object of contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectivity. Hence, in contradistinction to materialism, the active side was developed abstractly by idealism — which, of course, does not know real, sensuous activity as such". He also pointed out that Feuerbach’s chief defect was that "he does not grasp the significance of ‘revolutionary,’ ‘practical-critical,’ activity", "he does not conceive sensuousness as practical, human-sensuous activity". These arguments of Marx show that real human and sensuous activity, namely, "revolutionary", "practical-critical" activity is the starting point or premise of his whole philosophical theory. His critiques of and inheritance from Feuerbach and Hegel, as well as the revolutionary change he realized in philosophy, began from this. In a certain sense, the basic meaning of the revolutionary change Marx realized in philosophy is that he turns to the real, live man embarking on practical activity, in contrast to Feuerbach’s abstract nature and Hegel’s abstract concept. In other words, the new philosophy founded by Marx emphasizes mostly human activity and practicality; therefore it also places the emphasis upon human freedom and value. Marx criticized Feuerbach’s anthropology, but what he criticized was precisely its naturalistic tendency and abstractness, its ignorance of "human-sensuous activity" and "practice", which was not to deny the importance in philosophy of the human existent himself.

In view of this, in recent years, some Chinese scholars have suggested using the term "practical materialism" instead of "dialectical materialism" for Marxist philosophy. Others do not study man in the previous philosophical theoretical framework but advocate finding homologies to study man as a whole, and even to take Marxist philosophy as just an homology. Is this viewpoint tenable? How can we understand the precise position and significance of man in Marxist philosophy? This does not far overreach common understanding in philosophical circles or relevant fields. This kind of question is quite central and must be given more cautious, overall and thorough exploration; it should not be answered with a simple yes or no. However, we can be sure at least that we should not consider the study of human nature, humanism, human freedom and
value, human self-activity and so on as conflicting with Marxism, and deny the importance of studies about man in Marxist philosophy.

Variant schools of humanistic trend in the West regard man as the starting point and end-result of philosophy in different ways. Marx too emphasized the significance of human self-activity, and looked on man as the starting point of his whole theory. Therefore, we must carry out a comparative study. While making a clear distinction between them and not confusing Marxism with Western humanism, we should identify their common grounds or compatible points so that we can absorb positive materials from Western philosophical humanist trends, to enrich and develop Marxist philosophy.

The comparative study of theories on human being between the Western humanistic trend and Marxism could and should be carried out in all dimensions and horizons. The former has all sorts of different schools; their theories differ and even different philosophers of the same school have their own characteristics. We must make a concrete analyses of these one by one. However, what is more important is to know how to find their common grounds. There are common grounds in the efforts of Western humanistic trends and Marxism to transcend traditional philosophy, especially modern philosophy. For example, Western humanistic philosophers of different schools and in different ways emphasize mostly human autonomy, practicality, and activity. They emphasize that man occupies the leading position in the relation between man and world. Therefore, they transcend rationalistic metaphysics, especially essentialism and the fundamentalism starting from the binary division of subject-object. Instead, they return philosophical studies to the real living human world from an abstract nature-in-itself or an absolutized conceptual world. These are exactly the basic contents of the revolutionary change in philosophy realized by Marx. In addition, these philosophers mostly emphasize that man should be taken as the whole man in well-rounded and free development; man is an end, not a means. They consider that the basic road to the reconstruction of philosophy is in the final analysis to return to the human being as did Marx. Of course, these theories of Western humanistic philosophers always have a serious one-sidedness. Whatever their thoroughness and scientific character, they cannot be mentioned in the same breath with Marx. However, they put forward theories that have much in common which can be interwoven with Marxist philosophy to a certain degree. This could be considered reaching the same goal by different routes through surpassing modern philosophical modes of thinking. All of these are well worth careful study.

Notes

2. Ibid., Volume 3, p. 30.
3. Ibid., Volume 23, p. 649.
4. Ibid., Volume 3, p. 80.
5. Ibid., Volume 1, p. 16-17.
7. Market Economy and the Moral Theory of Pragmatism

The close connection between the market economy and the moral theory of pragmatism suggests that they be considered in relation to each other. In the development of the Western market economy there always has been a relevant system of moral norms which constitute a very important ideological support for the Western social order. These systems of moral norms in turn are based on moral theories of which pragmatism is one of the more typical and representative. The pragmatism mentioned here is not, as it is often misrepresented to be, a search for private interests only, but the theory of such pragmatic philosophers as John Dewey.

The economy of China is now being transformed into a system of market economy. In order to operate smoothly and to develop in a healthy manner it must be supported by some moral norms. The market economy of China is socialist in nature with a Chinese style. Hence, it is quite different from the Western one, as must be its system of moral norms. This takes Marxism as the guiding idea, as is decided by the Chinese constitution, and integrates and develops the excellent tradition of Chinese morality. But inasmuch as it must correspond to a market economy, it must study and receive such Western moral theories as represent the general character of that economy.

Although there were also some seeds of market economy in the Chinese feudal society, the modern market economy as a system was developed first in Western countries. Hence, the corresponding system of moral norms was established more or less comprehensively there. Being stamped with the brand of the cultural tradition and special ideologies of the West, these moral norms could not be adapted fully to Chinese conditions. Nevertheless, they reflect more or less the common demands of the morality of a market economy, and can be suited to different conditions. Therefore, just as in economic realms it is considered necessary for China to learn from the West in order to establish a socialist market economy, also it is necessary to learn from the West in moral fields in order for China to establish a system of moral norms which suits the situation of the market economy in China. In view of this, pragmatism is of special interest; in some sense it perfectly reflects the moral requirements of the Western market economy.

The Main Theoretical Tendencies of a Market Economy and the Relevant Modern Western Moral Philosophies

Before beginning this study it is important to analyze briefly the general nature of a market economy and its inner contradiction. Market and commodity economies are essentially the same; both mean that products and services are taken as commodities and are developed through exchange in the market. They differ both from a natural economy which is characterized by self-sufficiency and from a unitary planned economy in which products are distributed in kind by the government. Commodity exchange in the market is not according to their uses, but according to their value as represented by a definite money value. Money is the general form of value, and the only measure for commodity exchange; hence, the value of everything can be measured by money in the commodity market. In the commodity exchange people are related only as owners and hence according to the relation between things. This relation of commodity and money is the essence of a market economy. There are different characteristics of a market economy in different historical periods and social conditions, but basically it is as described above.
In order that commodity exchange in the market operate successfully the following at least are required:

1) Every owner of commodities or services (whether a natural or a juridical person) must be supposed to be a person with an independent personality who could go to the market for his own purposes and exchange freely with others.

2) Every owner of commodities in the market should be equal with others, with no consideration of higher or lower position, of being respected or not, of elder or younger: with respect to money, everyone is equal.

3) Free competition in commodity exchange must be assured; the operative principle is that "the superior wins and the inferior is defeated," meaning that only those with higher efficiency and greater ability to respond to changes survive.

4) The market where exchange takes place must be open: every restrictive condition which would obstruct commodity exchange must be removed.

Therefore, freedom, equality, open competition and reason, which are its ideological foundation, are the main presuppositions of a market economy represented by commodity-money relation. So long as the market economy as a system operates, these presuppositions must be supported through philosophy, law, morality and in other ideological and political ways. The market economy practiced under these presuppositions essentially involves sharp and deep contradictions and conflicts between people as commodity owners. If these presuppositions be carried out fully, the law of the jungle which rules in animal circles would control human society, so that only its "evil" aspects would be developed: selfishness, avarice, hypocrisy, shameless cheating, ruthlessness. As Hegel pointed out, these "evils" may provide some motive power for the operation of market economy, but if only the evil aspects were developed people would become as wolves to others (Hobbes). The whole society would be in a situation of serious turmoil, approaching collapse. Hence, in any social condition, such presuppositions as freedom, equality and competition, must be limited by morality. The system of moral norms must take these presuppositions as the starting point, but limit them by moral norms.

Let us now see how Western moral theories relevant to market economy developed in Western countries. In Western countries the market economy had a long history. It ripened during the process of establishing the modern capitalist system. The first economic theories to support this system were advanced as early as the 16th and 17th centuries. In that period the primitive accumulation of capital in British-French mercantilism represented the demands of the developing market economy. Later, French physiocracy formally advanced the economical system supporting liberal capitalism. The typical theoretical form of the market economy of liberal capitalism was the so-called classical economics advanced by Adam Smith and David Richard and prevalent in the 18th and 19th centuries. The corresponding ethics is Utilitarianism, which stemmed theoretically from David Hume and is represented mainly by Jeremy Bentham and later by John Mill. Utilitarianism is one of the main tendencies of modern Western ethics and best represents the moral demands of the market economy. It is also the main theoretical source of pragmatic moral theory. Let us consider briefly its origin, development and main characteristics.

Classical economics stresses that economic development is the cardinal function of government, even its essence and main end. Whether something is advantageous to economic development and the increase of wealth and other interests is the criterion of good or bad in judging not only the economic or other policies of the government, but also the morality of people’s
actions. Free com-petition in industry and trade is considered to conform to the moral demands of human nature; this idea is identical with ethical utilitarianism.

The scholars who systematically developed the ethical theory relevant to the market economy were persons interested in economics and who were at the same time philosophers and scholars of ethics such as Bentham and Mill. Their economic views generally were identical with classic economics and even made some important contributions thereto. In philosophy they inherited the empiricist tradition of Lock and Hume, especially their view that results experienced by the senses are the only standard for measuring reality. In economic action, these are the real interests and effects sought by people. Therefore, whether or not they gain expected interests and effects is the basic standard by which to measure the success or failure of their actions. The cardinal task of utilitarian ethics is to provide a moral apology for these economic pursuits, based upon the philosophical principles of empiricism, and to establish moral norms so that their pursues could be practiced successfully. Though there were some differences between the utilitarian views of Bentham, Mill and others, in general they agreed in the following fundamental ideas:

(1) They all considered that to pursue pleasure and happiness and to avoid pain and misfortune is the general wish innate to everyone and originates from human nature. For this reason they think that whether people’s conduct leads to pleasure and happiness, that is, to "utility", is the fundamental criterion for measuring human conduct as good or evil. On this basis Mill called utilitarianism the theory of the greatest happiness and held that the rightness or wrongness of action is directly proportioned to its tendency to increase happiness or misfortune.

(2) Although taking the individual’s own pursuits as the starting point of their theories, they did not support, but forcibly opposed, narrow egoism and advocated altruism of some kind. They thought that, in spite of being egocentric, above all people must be concerned with other’s interests, for otherwise they could not achieve and retain their own interests: egoism must take altruism as a prerequisite. Therefore, the standard of good and evil for people’s conduct is essentially not that it could bring happiness for special individuals, but that it could bring happiness for most people. Utilitarianism is a theory of the greatest happiness for the largest number of people.

(3) They all consider that in order to impel people to act according to the above moral principle, it is necessary to establish a system of social restriction upon people’s conduct. Although that has altruism as a prerequisite, this is not recognized by everybody: some are not willing to act consciously according to altruism even if they have some recognition of it. These restrictions are manifold: besides political, legal, religious and others restrictions, the moral is also important. On how to practice moral restriction, they were not unanimous. Some emphasized the importance of such external restrictions as reputation and prestige; others consider internal restrictions from aroused senses of responsibility and sympathy as being more important. Their common tendency is to restrain evil and encourage good.

The above common point of view of the utilitarians focuses upon the twofold moral demands of the Western market economy: on the one hand it must defend the individual’s pursuit of utility (pleasure, interests, happiness); on the other, it must guarantee a stable social order. This means that it is necessary for people to formulate some norms of conduct and recognize some limitations and restrictions upon their pursuits. Consequently, although based upon individualism, their ethics does not insist only upon egoism, but tries to join egoism with altruism and even stresses the latter. The reasons they stress altruism are not mainly to conceal bourgeois egoism, but to keep the social order stable as is required for the normal development of a market economy.
To think that the Western market economic order is one in which egoism is without any restriction or limitation, that Western moralists were bound to be apologists of egoism, and that their words about restricting egoism and advocating altruism must be hypocritical is to misunderstand the real condition of Western society and the real contradiction of Western ethics. The law of capitalist market competition based upon seeking one’s individual ends would lead to people becoming as wolves to others. But this does not mean that Western scholars supported such a condition. On the contrary they considered that if this condition continued, the whole society would lose its stability and even fall into disorder. In that case it would be impossible to talk about normal conditions for the development of a market economy, and for guaranteeing every-one’s pursuit of happiness. Therefore, it is necessary to restrict this condition in legal and moral ways so that the individual is charged with responsibility while enjoying his or her rights. This is the reason why Hobbes and others advocated altruism.

There were utilitarian ethical ideas in the West before Bentham and others. What they contributed was to develop and systematize these ideas according to the historical conditions of mature liberal capitalism in the 18th and 19th centuries. A variety of defects in their theory was exposed even in their time. With the fundamental changes in the Western economical system, the limitations of their theory became more obvious. For example, equal competition either in the case of free competition or in the case of monopoly apparently results in inequality in the distribution of wealth between individuals. As the founding scholars did not answer this satisfactorily, so some of their successors tried to revise their theories to different degrees. For example, some people tried to combine utilitarianism with the ideas regarding equal distribution of wealth. The theory of marginal utility and the new classical economics at the end of 19th and the beginning of 20th centuries, and the new liberalism, all tried to improve classic economics regarding the relevant utilitarian moral theory.

Modern and contemporary ethical schools in Western countries differ, but utilitarianism is one of the most prevalent. Scholars who oppose empiricism and are oriented toward rationalism or irrationalism and intuitionism in philosophy generally do not directly support utilitarianism, but criticize it as over-emphasizing the experienced effects of conduct and neglecting the importance of moral responsibility. Thus, they call for other ethics. Kant, who can be considered as being decisive in modern philosophy, did not support utilitarian ethics, but in his famous theory on "good will" or "justice" stressed transcendental moral duty. Since the 30s of the 20th century, with the great changes in Western society, the theory of state intervention is on the ascendancy, and some ethical theories emphasizing moral duty have become among the most influential. In the recent ten years, the debate between utilitarianism and so-called deontology continues: as one declines, the other rises and the later (as in Rawls’s *Theory of Justice*) has seemed to prevail.

However, almost every modern and contemporary Western ethics involves the above twofold moral demand of a market economy: on the hand, it is bound to affirm morally the individual’s pursuits; on the other, it must lay down moral duties with regard to those purposes. The differences between these ethical theories concern mainly their concrete expression, especially about what should be emphasized. Kant and a number of his successors, who denied the experimental content of morality and stressed the *a priori* character of the moral law, also confirm that man is end not means and that personal rights of freedom, equality and property should be ensured.

As the pragmatic ethics, of which Dewey is the most famous representative, develops fundamentally in this context of modern and contemporary ethics, its recognition should facilitate a more complete appreciation of pragmatic theory.
The Basic Tendency of Pragmatic Moral Theory

The basic tendency of pragmatic moral theory is identical with its overall philosophy. Its main characteristic is to deny the search for transcendental, abstract essences, which is the substance of traditional Western theories of philosophy (especially speculative, rationalist metaphysics). It transforms philosophy into the study of the world of sense experience connected with real human life and practice. This makes philosophy a theory for facing real life and helping to solve its problems. This is the fundamental meaning of the reconstruction in philosophy demanded by Dewey. In fact, this point of view is common in most Western philosophers who sought to escape metaphysics.

This point of view, which rejects traditional metaphysics and advocates facing experience and the life-world, was misunderstood and even taken as a hidden idealism in Chinese philosophical circles for a long time. Actually the case is quite complicated. Dewey did not negate the existence of nature outside the human being. In his Experience and Nature and elsewhere, he confirms again and again that nature is there before mankind. After all, human beings and their experience are products of the evolution of nature. Although the world (nature) as a human object depends upon humans and their experience, nature itself is independent from human beings. Such a point of view is clearly different from general idealism; it is what Dewey repeated again and again.

But Dewey did consider that the world which philosophy should study is only the world as related to human beings, that is, it must be in the human perspective or in other words the world of real human life, the world of sense experience. How the world is depends upon the human perspective, that is, upon human sense experience. Only in this sense does the existence of nature (not nature itself, but nature in the human perspective) depend on experience. If philosophy is to be a theory about the human life-world of human beings, it must study only things in the human perspective. This is the basic point of view of the so-called experimental naturalism of Dewey.

What characterizes pragmatic philosophers, such as Dewey and other contemporary Western philosophers such as Husserl and others who held a similar point of view, is mainly their distinctive understandings of the concept of experience. In contrast to traditional epistemology and the views of other philosophers, Dewey and the pragmatists do not take experience as knowledge resulting either from recognized action or from subjective consciousness (whether rational or non-rational consciousness regarding the meaning of existence) based upon objects. Rather, they consider experience as human life, conduct and practice itself, in other words, united subject-object and mind-matter. Therefore, Dewey and other pragmatists specially stress the meaning of conduct, practice and life. The world which philosophy should study is that involved in the process of conduct and practice.

This view is similar generally to that of process philosophy and some so-called "irrationalisms" such as existentialism. The main differences between them and pragmatists, especially Dewey, is that the latter emphasizes more the rational nature of experience while affirming its irrational content. According to Dewey, in contrast to the animal’s instinctual behavior, human conduct and practice are always seeking some end and are guided by reflective thinking, i.e., intelligence. What philosophy should do is guide and help human conduct and practice, i.e. philosophy is only a methodology for human life, conduct and practice. Its cardinal mission is to inquire how people can reach the intended goals in their conduct and practice. In this sense, philosophy is only the scientific method of inquiry, or experimental logic.

This basic view of philosophy is just the starting point whence Dewey reconstructs traditional moral theories and establishes his own. The main reason why pragmatic moral theory could more
typically represent the moral demands of market economy is that, compared with other philosophical schools in the West, it remains closer to Western practical life. Among other reasons, the following seem more worthy of mention: (1) It opposes speculative talk regarding general moral ideas which break away from practical life and restricts the moral realm to practical life connected with people’s interests. Morality should belong to the practical life-world, i.e. the world studied by human reason and science. (2) It opposes the use of non-experimental and absolute methods, and insists upon the use of rational and scientific methodology in the formulation of moral norms of conduct. More concretely, as far as moral problems are concerned, it opposes both the moral absolutism of traditional metaphysics and the moral relativism which rejects the normative and restrictive force of moral ideas. This position is more conformed to the demands of the moral order of the market economy. Both points will be explained in greater detail.

As to the first, the most important question is how to treat the relation between morality and science. This is one of the important questions long debated by modern and contemporary philosophers. Hume only pointed to the question of how to distinguish scientific fact and moral value. With some of his successors, especially the utilitarians, he emphasized the effects experienced. Restriction to a narrow empiricism would not allow one to satisfactorily explain the character of the moral area and link it with science. Awakened by Hume, Kant separated both areas and considered the moral areas to be based on principles. Many of his successors, especially Windelband and other neo-Kantians, absolutized this separation. In this century, because moral and value judgements could not be verified by experience and fact, analytic philosophers who focused upon experience and science put moral judgements outside the experience and fact; here the argumentation of the British philosophers, G.A. Moore and A.J. Ayer, are very representative. On the other hand, based on a criticism of science, intuitionism, existentialism and other trends also separate morality from science. Generally speaking, the question about the relation of the two areas has been intensely debated in Western philosophical circles with many different opinions. The goal of Dewey and his partners is to unite the two separated areas.

Moving to the position of evolutionism from Hegelianism and orthodox religion, Dewey always opposed sharply the tendency of traditional and contemporary moral theories to take the moral area as absolutely different from science and to take the study of morals as completely divorced from the study of the sciences. He said, "After all, we are only pleading for the adoption in moral reflection of logic that has been proved to make for security, stringency and fertility in passing judgments upon physical phenomena." (The Middle Works, v. 12, p. 174). This is precisely Dewey’s experimental logic, which he tried to introduce from the natural sciences into the study of the humanities and the social sciences, including morality; this is his so-called method of inquiry. He thought that by using this method he could reunite research in the natural sciences with morality, i.e. research in both fact and value. According to Dewey, human actions, whether in the natural area or in the moral area, all must be guided by intelligence, i.e., by experimental logic. Both scientific judgments and moral judgments are empirical judgments, which is to say that they are restricted to the evidence of the senses. They are all means for human conduct or practice, in other words, real human life.

Dewey did not negate the differences between the above two areas and never equated them. He admitted that the moral positions of people sometimes could not be brought into unison by the scientific method. Although advocating reason in common, people’s conduct could be guided by different principles; in this case, moral judgments often are based on some faith. Nevertheless he thought that people could unite their positions through the scientific method.
Generally speaking, although admitting the differences between morality and science, Dewey over-emphasized their unity and neglected the special character of the humanities and morality, especially the lofty moral feelings and ideals which always transcend practical interests. For this Dewey was criticized by many Western scholars. But compared to the intuitionism, mysticism and even emotionism which considered the moral realm to be fully contrary to science, Dewey’s theory seems more practical and adapted to the demands of social economic life. The main mission of ethics here is not to seek a lofty ideal isolated from practical interests, but to rationalize people’s moral actions and to restrict and limit them by rational moral norms.

The second point is an extension of the first but in reaction against traditional rationalism. This used absolutized general concepts to rule varied special situations and reduced all concrete and ever-changing situations to a few fixed general concepts. This was true in the ethical realm as well. Dewey resolutely opposed the view of traditional rationalist ethics that there are unique, fixed and ultimate moral ends as well as a highest good or supreme moral law and principle, and that the basic task of ethics is to find this end, law or principle. This is ethical absolutism; its theoretical forms vary but their basic position is the same.

Dewey held the rationalist position to be preposterous, as people’s moral situations and conduct are always particular, special, concrete and changing. Hence, this must be the case of their moral judgments. People should make different moral judgments. To reason only according to general and fixed concepts can only give rise to a series of senseless polemics which impede people from resolving the realistic moral questions they face. Even if this is done under the banner of reason, it reduces the power of reason, because it keeps people from exploring actual and concrete moral questions with a scientific method.

While criticizing moral absolutism, Dewey does not support moral relativism and subjectivism. According to him, it is unreasonable either for people to subject concrete and special moral situations to universal, fixed, and ultimate concepts, or to go to the other extreme, i.e., to subordinate general and universal concepts to particular cases. We must not so absolutize concrete and particular moral situations that every situation is taken as unique, dissimilar and with no connection to other situations. This would simply exclude the importance of general and universal concepts and principles and fall into the moral relativism Dewey clearly opposed.

In brief, while emphasizing the need for particular moral judgment in particular situations, Dewey did not negate the role of general moral concepts, principles or laws. What he called for was not to absolutize or even substantialize general concepts, principles or laws as was done by traditional speculative metaphysics, but to take them merely as instruments for successful practice or action, in other words, for people’s real lives. This was the cardinal content of his instrumentalism which also was misunderstood to some degree in China, but it is not possible for us to discuss this here in detail.

How to evaluate the moral views of Dewey and other pragmatists? There are different answers from different theoretical and political positions which it is not possible to discuss in this paper. But one thing may be taken as certain: when Dewey held that the moral realm must be restricted to the world of people’s real life, action and practice, that is, to the experienced, and when he demanded that moral research be based on the scientific method, he advocated this with a view to help people to solve the problems they faced and to arrange the things they wanted. Hence, in all these cases, what Dewey really hoped for was to make his moral theory closer to people’s practical lives. Thus, his theory is more adaptable to the Western market economy which emphasizes practical effects and interests. For a long time, the ethical theory of pragmatism has not enjoyed a
dominant position in philosophical, especially ethical, circles, but it seems to be most popular in Western practical life and to be accepted and followed by most people in their real life.

**Pragmatism on the Relation of Morality and Economy**

In contrast to the utilitarian moralists of earlier times, such as Bentham and Mill, Dewey and other pragmatists were not economists. In spite of adapting the demands of Western economy to morality, their theories hardly concern how to work out moral norms concretely for particular economic activities. But in part three of the book, *Ethics* (1908), co-authored by Dewey and J.F. Tufts, another important figure of the Chicago School, there is more focused attention on morality and economy. Most of this part was written by Tufts, but revised by Dewey and seems to represent their shared view. The book is included as vol. 5 of the middle works of John Dewey. As there is hardly any discussion about the economic theory of pragmatism in Chinese academic circles, I mention two relevant aspects of this book, namely: the moral meaning of the economic process and the moral principles which must orient economic activities.

**The Moral Meaning of the Economic Process**

About the moral meaning of the economic process, the authors put forward three points; (1) the economic process will provide the necessary means for satisfying people’s material and spiritual wants, and is then the presupposition for their obtaining happiness; (2) the economic process will influence the training of people’s moral virtues; and (3) the economic process is the condition under which people relate to each other and the bridge through which people’s moral actions transform them from individuality to sociality.

(1) The first point concerns the relation of economy and happiness. Pragmatic philosophers inherited the ethical tradition of classical utilitarianism and took economy and wealth as the presuppositions for obtaining happiness. Tufts said, "The supply of needs and wants by industry and commerce is ethically a good. A constant increase in production and consumption is at least a possible factor in a fuller life. Wealth is a condition of weal, even if it is not to be gratuitously identified with it" (*The Middle Work: John Dewey*, p. 436). It should be noted that the so-called happiness advocated by pragmatic philosophers is not only material enjoyment, but also, and even more importantly, mental satisfaction in the aesthetic and intellectual order. Some economic conditions are needed for the latter. Since happiness must be conditioned by economy, should people unscrupulously try to obtain wealth? Definitely not! If the wealth was obtained through exploitation or plunder and controlled only by a minority, it would be impossible to distribute it justly as a condition of happiness for the majority. So Tufts differentiated wealth from prosperity. "Wealth means the product that can be used to respond to wants and needs; property means the title to the exclusive use or possession of goods. Hence, the increase of property may involve increasing exclusion of part of the community from wealth, although the owners of the property may be increasing their own enjoymen" (*ibid*, p. 436). The forms of possession and use of property are various, whether or not they are means for happiness depends mainly on whether or not they are used to increase or decrease wealth or enjoyment, in other words, whether or not they improve the condition for achieving happiness. Therefore, the question of happiness concerns the question of justice in ethics.
In a word, as to the relation of economy and happiness, what pragmatic philosophers paid close attention to is how to increase the conditions which can guarantee the satisfaction of the wants of the majority. What is more suitable with regard to the possession of wealth depends on whether or not it offers such satisfaction.

(2) The second point, which concerns the relation of the economy and moral character, involves two aspects. One is that economic process can influence the formation of moral character, that is, economy can control morality to some degree. "Through the difficulties it presents, the work it involves, and the incitements it offers, the economic process has a powerful influence in evoking skill, foresight and scientific control of nature in forming character, and stimulating ambition to excel" (ibid, p. 435). The author in fact proposes that the moral realm is not independent, but is determined to some degree by economic conditions.

Another aspect of the relation between the economy and moral character is that there are different directions in which the economic process influences the formation of moral character. The mission of ethics is to guide this formation in a healthy direction. Although morality is presupposed by economy (wealth, property, etc.), not every economic activity (production, satisfaction of wants, possession of property, etc.) is necessarily moral. For example, the possession of property means an expansion of power and freedom; it is a necessary condition for affirming one’s personality. But it impels people toward avarice and covetousness. Whether economic activity is in conformity with morality or not is determined by whether it respects human personality and guarantees human freedom. "Even in its aspect of satisfying human wants, the quantity of production isn’t the only consideration; the satisfaction of any and every want is not necessarily a moral good. It depends upon the nature of the wants: and as the nature of wants reflects the nature of the man who wants, the moral value of the economic process and the wealth it provides must depend upon the relation of goods to person. As economists we estimate values in terms of external goods or commodities; as ethical students we estimate values in terms of a certain quality of life. We must ask first how the satisfaction of wants effects the consumers" (ibid., p. 437). This means that when estimating economic activities or processes we should attend not only to market prices, but also to moral value, i.e., to whether it respects the human person and his or her dignity. With regard to any economic process, we must ask "whether it quickens intelligence or deadens it, whether it necessitates the degradation of work to drudgery, and whether it promotes freedom or hampers it" (ibid., p. 438). If the activity only contributes to the possession of wealth, but neglects human freedom, it would have stopped at the instinctive level of the animal and would of course be worthless.

(3) The first and second points ultimately are concerned with how to put the principle of "justice" into effect in economic activity or processes. This is the third point regarding the economic significance of morality, pointed out by Tufts. Economic activity is both individual and social. As a bridge across which the individual passes to society, it is also a decisive factor of social morality. "The economic process has an important social function. Through division of labor, cooperation, and exchange of goods and services, it affords one of the fundamental expressions of the organic nature of the society in which members are reciprocally ends to each other. Property likewise, is not only a possessing, but a `right’, and thus, as all rights, involves the question when and how far society should support the individual in his interest and claims" (ibid., p. 435.). What the authors here intend is that economic relations (especially market relations) are links connecting various social relations. They consider that from early history humankind exists in a dependent relation one to the other. Isolated from others, no one could exist: "Every life draws from the rest. Man without friendship, love, pity, sympathy, communication, cooperation, justice, rights, or
duties, would be deprived of nearly all that gives life its value" (ibid., p. 439). In early group life, various human relations were connected by ties of kinship and later through the personal relation of "master" and "servant". With the development of the market economy, these relations are based more and more on "cash payment". All wants can be satisfied through mutual ex-change in the market and such mutual exchange is based on self-respect and equality. One can "sell his labor like any other commodity without selling himself" (ibid., p. 440). Therefore people can also find a standard of moral valuation for their con-ducts. Through the market economy, the conduct of an individual obtains its social meaning.

Moral Principles to Guide Economic Activities

As to whether the market economy spontaneously forms "just" moral norms, Dewey would answer, No. He and his partners always forcefully exposed and criticized the serious moral de-generation in Western society resulting from its market economy. According to them, although the economic process provides a link to the social meaning of human conduct this conduct is not necessarily just if there are no proper moral norms for economic process and conduct. The basic mission of ethics in the economic realm is to study how to formulate concrete moral norms for all its aspects and links. They expressed this concern in their book, Ethics. We can not introduce the contents here in detail, but will mention only the following seven moral principles, which they pointed out and thought must orient every economic process and conduct.

First, "Wealth and property are subordinate in importance to personality". What is emphasized here is that the material life, especially of a minority, should not be given priority over the mental life, especially of the noble virtues, which are more valuable. "An individual who gratifies a single appetite at the expense of vitality and efficiency is immoral. A society which considers wealth or property as ultimate, whether under a conception of natural rights or otherwise, is selling the means above the end, and is therefore unmoral or immoral" (ibid., p. 460).

Second, "Wealth should depend on activity". This means that creative activities, practice and life should be considered the ultimate end; the satisfaction of the concrete material life and wealth or property are secondary. "The highest aspect of life is found in active and resolute achievement, in the embodying of purpose in action. Thought, discovery and creation are a higher value than the satisfaction of wants, or the amassing of goods" (p. 460). This is a concrete application in the moral realm of a cardinal principle of pragmatism which considers the process of action, practice and life more important than their results.

Third, "Public service should accompany wealth". The authors note that they do not say that wealth should be proportionate to public service. What they suppose is that both individualists, as represented by Herbert Spencer, and socialists, as supporters of the dictum "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs", all assume to different degrees that there should be public service. This includes two aspects. One is that society must be provided by its members with some economically useful contribution, whether by the production or contribution of goods, to public order, to education or to the satisfaction of aesthetic and religious needs. The other is that every man should feel duty bound to render some service as his opportunity to fulfill his function in the social organism. This identifies him with the whole society; he is no longer alone but becomes a social power (see pp. 461-462).

Fourth, "The change from an individual to a collective method of industry and business demands a change from individual to collective types of morality". This means that morality must change its direction from an individual standard to a social standard. "The individual can not be
moral in independence. The modern business collectivism forces a collective morality. Just as the
individual cannot resist the combination, so individual morality must give place to a more robust
or social type" (pp. 462-464). The main idea here is also that the individual must be identified with
society. For this reason, basing their theories upon individualism, pragmatic philosophers demand
that traditional individualism must be transcended by a new individualism which opposes egoism
and hedonism and advocates contributing to others and to society while keeping the individual’s
personality and dignity. We will explain this in more detail below.

Fifth, "To meet the change to corporate agency and owner-
ship, ways must be found to restore personal control and responsibility" (p. 464). What is emphasized here is the need to oppose the
so-called "moral liability limited" theory and to restore individual personality in morality,
especially one’s rights and responsibility. This is needed in the present situation of modern
Western society where gigantic agents more and more control society and its economy, and the
individual loses his or her importance both in economy and morality.

Sixth, "To meet the impersonal agent society must require greater publicity and express its
moral standards more fully in law" (p. 465). This means that morality and law must be united with
the purpose of restricting and limiting the control of impersonal agents. Greater publicity means
scientific investigation and public discussion. Here the greatest value is the positive elevation of
moral standards. The law is not to be regarded chiefly as an agency for punishing criminals; its
main function is to define standards and to help maintain these standards of morality.

Seventh, "Every member of society should share in its wealth and in the values made possible
by it" (p. 466). This principle may be regarded as the most important compared with others. While
taking the basis of the quantitative division and the method for giving each a share to be unsettled
problems, the authors consider the worth and dignity of every human being of moral capacity to
be fundamental. The idea of justice is the most important. With the leveling and equalizing of
physical and mental powers brought about by modern inventions and the spread of intelligence,
no State can be permanently safe except it be based upon justice. "Wealth must be produced,
distributed, and owned justly: that is, so as to promote the individuality of every member of the
society, while at the same time one must always function as a member, not as an individual" (p.
466). It is worth mentioning that Dewey and his partners always emphasized that justice is the
cardinal principle for every economic and political process.

Are the above moral principles of pragmatism hypocrisy; is there anything hidden behind
them? It may be reasonable to discuss this further, but at least it is certain that in its direct sense
the above theory of Dewey and his partner is an attempt to formulate some more just and adaptive
principles of morality for the Western market economy. The reason why they so energetically
emphasize the importance of such principles as justice, equality, individuality, sociality, etc., is
that the normal operation of the market economy, and even the development of the entire society,
could not be realized without these moral principles.

**Market Economy and Pragmatic Theory of Individualism**

That there is a close connection between a market economy and the pragmatic theory of
individualism is an obvious fact of practical life which people encounter daily. If the market
economy were approved fully but individualism were simply negated there would be a theoretical
contradiction. This in reality is the inner contradiction which a market economy and relevant moral
theories are bound to involve; while starting from individualism, they must transcend and criticize
it. This is reflected in Dewey and other pragmatic philosophical theories.
There is little disagreement either in Chinese academic circles or among pragmatic philosophers themselves that pragmatism supports a capitalist market economy and that the pragmatist worldview is based on individualism. America is a typical country where the market economy has developed richly and where individualism has been considered essential to that economy. Characterized as a native American philosophy, pragmatism reflects the relation between individualism and a market economy. In fact, in writing about the market economy as characterized by free competition, Dewey and Tufts always join this with individualism, even calling it an “individualistic economy,” and calling such individualism "economic individualism." As philosophers, they were conscious to some degree of the contradictions of the market economy and of its relation with morality. Regarding individualism, they tried both to affirm and to transcend it, that is, they tried to reconstruct it in order to make it more suitable to the demands of development, both of Western society and of human beings. This is reflected in their critique of the old individualism, i.e., of "economic individualism."

Dewey and Tufts take the economic system advocated by such utilitarian thinkers as Smith, Bentham and Mill, and characterized by free competition, as the typical form of economic individualism. Clearly they affirm its positive role in history. For example, by its concern for the fullest development and freedom of the individual, and for removing the various limitations upon the individual, it aroused the individual’s creativity and responsibility and urged each to act positively. Their free competition in the market promoted production and services, and hence the economic development of the whole society. As Dewey said:

The early economic individualism had a definite creed and function. It sought to release from legal restrictions man’s wants and his efforts to satisfy those wants. It believed that such emancipation would stimulate latent energy into action, would automatically assign individual ability to the work for which it was suited, would cause it to perform that work under stimulus of the advantage to be gained, and would secure for capacity and enterprise the reward and position to which they were entitled. At the same time, individual energy and savings would be serving the needs of others, and thus promoting the general welfare and effecting a general harmony of interests (Individualism Old and New, see The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. by McDermott, p. 610).

Dewey and other pragmatists further considered that the economic development stimulated by individualism also promoted people’s freedom in politics, religion and morality (see: The Middle Works: John Dewey, vol. 5, p. 472).

But at the same time they emphasized that people should not overestimate the importance of individualism. They pointed out that:

It would be absurd to credit the enormous increase in production of wealth during the past century to individualism alone, ignoring the contributions of science and education which have been made under social auspices. It would be as absurd to credit all the gains of the century in civilization and freedom to individualism as it would be to charge all the wretchedness and iniquity of the century to this same policy (The Middle Works: John Dewey, vol. 5, pp. 471-472).

They saw at least two main defects in economic individualism: it could not guarantee real freedom for people and it could not realize just distribution. To ensure freedom and to reject dependence upon external and extra-economic powers used to be the main goal of the early utilitarians. They naively believed that this target could be realized through equal market
competition. In contrast the pragmatists considered that free competition provides only formal freedom, not real freedom. For example, the economic system of free competition accelerated the division of labor and the continual invention of improved machinery. The results among others, were that people’s skills became more specific and narrow, which increased the difficulty in finding a job.

Theoretically, no one is forced to labor. Everyone is free to choose whether he will work, and what work he will do. But in effect, freedom of choice depends for its value upon what the alternative is. If the choice is do this or starve, the freedom is not worth much. Formal freedom excludes constraint by direct control or will of others. It excludes violence or fear of violence. But subjection to stress or fear of want, or to the limits imposed by ignorance, is just fatal to freedom (ibid., p. 472).

In a word, formal freedom understood as free contract, etc., is a mere verbal form; it more simply means "the rights of the stronger to exploit the weaker" (ibid., p. 474).

The case of "justice" is similar. Although individualist economists insisted "that in a free exchange each party profits if he gets what he wants. There is mutual benefit, and so far as this goes, there is an element of justice. But while the benefit may be mutual, the amount of advantage each gets is not necessarily the same, and if the party who has greater shrewdness or resources takes advantage of a great need on the part of the other, the result may be a very unequal division" (ibid., p. 474). That is to say, although there is formal equality in market exchange, the result is unequal. In pace with the development of new, especially monopolistic forms of economic agency, the inequality becomes ever more clear. Therefore the conclusion, "Under present conditions individualism can not guarantee, and in many cases cannot permit, just distribution and a true organic society" (ibid., p. 476).

Although the critiques of Dewey and other pragmatic philosophers are not profound and comprehensive, undoubtedly they not only praise individualism in general, but reproach such individualism as it takes economic interests, especially individual private interests, as the main concern. This means not that they do not support a market economy and individualism, but only that they call for elimination of the defects mentioned above. They would base individualism on a new ground to make it adaptable to the comprehensive development of the human being, including the demands of training in good moral virtues; in other words, they attempted to formulate a so-called "new individualism".

It should be noted here that there have long been deep misunderstandings of the individualism advocated by Dewey and his partners in China’s academic circles. While criticizing the individualism characterized by egoism and hedonism, people often take pragmatism as its typical form. Actually Dewey and his partners always energetically opposed such an individualism and took this opposition as an important presupposition in formulating their so-called "new individualism". From these different attitudes toward utility and happiness, it is easier to differentiate what Dewey really supports and opposes. As there is a more detailed exposition of Dewey’s view on happiness and utility in another paper here, I will only briefly introduce two points.

First, Dewey affirms the great importance of happiness in human practical life, and clearly rejects asceticism as excluding actual happiness. But he did not support the avaricious possession of wealth and uncontrolled material enjoyment; he considered spiritual enjoyment to be more worthwhile. The main good is to achieve success in practice; success does not mean possessions,
but succeeding or moving forward. In other words, happiness and success lie in continually overcoming difficulties and making progress.

Second, Dewey affirms the value of pursuing utility and approves to some agree the utilitarian ethics, but he actively opposes egoism and hedonism. What he emphasizes in terms of utility is mainly overcoming various social evils and serving society.

The basic meaning of the above points is to surpass the old individualism and its egoism and hedonism, called rugged individualism. Under the banner of guaranteeing the freedom for each person and their equality, it adopts in fact the pecuniary culture, which controls the whole of Western society and in the final analysis safeguards its inequality and oppression.

But Dewey does not exclude individualism in general. According to him individualism is not a fixed and unchanging concept. It has variant forms in different historical conditions, as "the mental and moral structure of individuals, the pattern of their desires and purposes, change with every great change in social constitution" (see: The philosophy of John Dewey, ed, by J.J. McDermott, p. 612). The old individualism characteristic of hedonism, egoism and selfishness should be rejected and, in fact, was condemned from different aspects as not adaptable to historical trends over a long time. Such principles as respect for people’s personality and individuality and the development of their creativity and initiative should be protected and developed. Dewey took these as the main principles of the new individualism he advocated and considered its realization to be the main task.

What the new individualism actually means, Dewey does not define exactly, but his basic idea is quite clear. It includes the following two points. First, it emphasizes the sociality of human actions. They should be subordinated not to private pecuniary interests, but to social reconstruction. He held that overcoming the old individualism and creating a new one "cannot be achieved by extending the benefits of the older economic individualism to more persons", and "it cannot be obtained by a further development of generosity, good will and altruism" (ibid., p. 615). The most important thing for the creation of the new individualism is to reconstruct society and create a new type of individualism. The main defect of the supporters of the old individualism is that "they slur the chief problem, that of remaking society to serve the growth of a new type of individualism" (ibid., p. 612). Second, it stresses the development of the individual’s creativity and initiative. The developments of modern society, especially of science, technology and social productive forces should be the condition for developing individual creativity and initiative, not the external material forces of hindering them. Individual actions must serve the reconstruction of society, and society must guarantee the rights of freedom, equality and democracy of individuals: their personality and individuality must be esteemed. These are some of the necessary conditions for developing the creativity and initiative of individuals.

Generally speaking, although named individualism, Dewey’s "new individualism" is quite different from that criticized in Chinese academic circles. How to evaluate it comprehensively may be more complicated, but at least it is clear that it fits the demands of the market economy for a morality.

**Pragmatic Moral Theory and the Moral Reconstruction in Present Day China**

The moral reconstruction of contemporary China is a systematic project with many sides, directions and levels, which must be realized in many ways. Important among them is to study and draw lessons from pragmatic and other Western ethical theories, which represent the moral demands of a market economy in the West. If the introduction of pragmatic and other Western
ethical theories is right in general, we can draw from them useful enlightenment. Among others, the following steps seem worthy of mention.

First: to instigate more comprehensively the social function of Western ethics. That the main social function of Western ethics is to stabilize the social-economic order would not be seriously objected to by many. The problem is whether this is "good" or "evil"? If Western capitalist society is considered only as one in which the minority of capitalists represses and exploits the majority of proletarian and other toiling masses, the Western ethics which defends such a social system would be "evil". But this point of view, which was popular for a long time in China does not tally with either the realities in Western society or the Marxist evaluation of capitalism.

The social system of Western capitalism is based upon the market economy in its mature stage. This is not identical with capitalism, but as an integrated economic system it co-happens with capitalism. The capitalist system of society, succeeding the feudal system, is fully conformed to the basic demands for the operation of the market economy. Simply to negate capitalism means the negation also of the market economy; the simple negation of Western ethics also means the negation of the market economy. This does not tally with the trend of trans-formation to a market economy in China. To be realistic, we should approve in some sense the moral defence of Western ethics for capitalism and market economy.

The key reason here is that what Western ethics, from early utilitarianism to pragmatism and other contemporary theories, defends is not the "evil" which indeed existed in capitalist society, but the "good" which promotes the stability of society and propels the development of a commodity economy. Even the defence for such prerequisites as free competition, individual freedom, etc., which are necessary for the operation of the market economy, is not equal to the defence of "evil", because these principles or prerequisites are not "evil" in themselves unless made absolute, i.e., transformed into egoism and hedonism. They could, however, be transformed into "good". There are some misunderstandings among some Chinese scholars of such descriptions as "war of all against all", "man as wolf to man" (Hobbes), "hell is the other" (Sartre), etc. These descriptions are quite vivid, but what Hobbes, Sartre and others really intended in these phrases was to expose and unmask, not to defend or support. One of the main functions of their theories is how to prevent and restrict these "evils" which are derived from the negative aspects of market competition. If we adopt a realistic attitude toward Western ethics, we can find there without much difficulty many worthwhile and useful ideas for Chinese moral reconstruction during the process of changing to a market economic system.

Second: to pay closer attention to research on practical moral problems. How to evaluate the anti-metaphysical theories of Dewey and other Western philosophers is a more complicated question. It is not easy to take a unitary position, and we can put this aside for the moment. But their philosophy, including ethics, seems reasonable in emphasizing first of all, study of the real world, i.e., of the so-called life-world or world of experience, which is connected closely with people’s life and conduct. One of the important tendencies of Western ethical research, from early utilitarianism to pragmatism, is to place the moral questions of practical life in the first place for research. As far as Dewey is concerned, while not opposing the studies of so-called meta-ethical questions, he takes them mainly as questions of methodology of moral actions, and considers this mainly as the method he advocated of experiment-inquiry. It remains a method for solving practical questions. His criticism of moral absolutism and his demand for reconstruction in the philosophical and ethical realms, are oriented mainly to the return to real life.
There are various defects and shortcomings in the ethical theories of Dewey and others; in fact, they criticize and even attack each other. But in the end these theories take very important positive steps toward studying practical moral questions and ensuring a relatively stable moral order, thereby providing the necessary conditions for the continued development of the Western economy and society. In spite of various grounded and reasonable criticisms of pragmatic and other Western ethical theories, it seems groundless and unreasonable simply to deny the positive effects of these theories for forming moral norms adaptable to the practical life of Western society, especially its economic life. The attitude of Dewey and others to directing moral studies in the direction of practical questions and the positive achievement of their research seem to be worthy points of reference for Chinese scholars. Our most urgent task in the ethical realm at present may be precisely to study the practical moral questions which arise in the process of transforming to a market economy.

Third: to study more deeply the features of a market economy with a Chinese style and its moral challenges. The most important reality of present day China is transformation to a market economy. The main topics of moral research should be those caused by this transformation. Being socialist in nature, the market economy in China differs from that of the West, but its general features and the relevant moral problems mentioned above are similar. Such principles as freedom, equality, competition, openness, etc., are relevant here and are in keeping with our socialist nature. Nevertheless, transformation from a unitary planned economy to a market economy implies a cardinal change in the economic system which causes radical changes in law, morality and other ideological areas. For example, under the system of a market economy, what regulates the relation between individual and individual, individual and organization, enterprise and enterprise, enterprise and State, is not the traditional organizational principle of subordination, but the law of value. The moral norms relevant to these relations certainly must be changed, too. Similar to the West, the relation between morality and market economy in China is twofold: morality must serve to defend and support the principles of a market economy which may have some "evil" characters, and to regulate and restrict these so as to reduce their negative role. The latter is also a necessary condition for the successful operation of a market economy in China. In order to have full practical effect, moral research in China must deeply reveal and analyze this twofold relation. We need not cover up or worry about the "evil" side of a market economy for as Hegel said of the whole society, the "evil" may be a motive power propelling the development of the economy. But at the same time, we should clearly criticize and decisively restrict these "evils". From the early utilitarians to Dewey, Western philosophers take restraining evil and encouraging the good to be the main target of their moral studies. This should be included in the studies of Chinese scholars today.

Fourth: to study afresh the good and evil of human nature and the contradictions of individualism. According to the system of a unitary planned economy, it has long been the guiding principle of moral education to merge individual into the whole, to take one as a screw in the machine, to subordinate individual interests to those of the whole, to put public interests in the first place and private interests in the secondary, to encourage unselfishness, etc. With the transformation to a market economy, such moral education, placing the individual in a sub-ordinate position, now seems one-sided. Such slogans as self-design, self-choice and self-realization, which only a few years ago were severely criticized as expressions of individualism now seem more suited to the new sense of competition and initiative encouraged and demanded by the market economy. Therefore the old question of whether individualism is the source of every evil or the
motive power of development arises once again. This involves the question of how to analyze morally the good and evil of human nature. Because in their origin there was some connection between individualism and personal drives, the analysis of individualism must involve an analysis of these personal impulses.

Without doubt, the personal impulse involves evil and in some degree this relates to the struggle for life which controls the animal kingdom. If this were to be developed spontaneously and without any restriction, human society would fall to the animal level. But human personal impulse differs from animal instinct or impulses. Being inherently rational and social, despite their individual psychological impulses humans can transcend the level of animal instinct. Human pursuits always are controlled in differing degrees by reason, they are both material and mental. They are complex, both lofty and despicable, good and evil. With the development of society, mental pursuits become increasingly important. The most important role of human spiritual culture, especially of ethicmorality, is precisely to render rational human pursuits and to orient them in the direction of the sublime. In this way personal impulses are transformed toward the good and the good and evil in human nature can be changed or transformed. If individualism is taken as the rational sublimation of personal impulses, its good and evil is a unity of contradictions which can be change or transformed. One of the main targets of most Western philosophers, from early utilitarians to pragmatists and others, is to make such changes and transformations. While taking individualism as the starting point of their theories, most attempt to differentiate themselves from egoism and hedonism. This means that they rationalize human impulse in order to restrict the "evils" of individualism.

However people evaluate the work of philosophers and moralists, personal impulse, including the awareness of competition and the pursuits of one’s reputation, interests or lofty ideas are important motives in human affairs. It is even irreplaceable in some sense because the entire society or organization consists of individuals; all work finally is the responsibility of individuals. Isolated from society, individuals can do nothing; but without the activity of the individuals no group or organization could achieve its practical effects. Where human conduct is moral, the moral subject finally is the individual. All moral or value laden conduct, all moral choice or valuation, is realized through individuals. Legal persons which represent a collective organization also are individuals. Therefore, from the state or society to the particular enterprise or group, the degree to which success can be achieved depends upon moral subjects who unite to constitute an effective force. Hence, if one hopes to achieve success, one has no choice but to have recourse to abominable personal impulses and to individualism as its rational sublimation.

People could and should study the transformation of the Chinese economic system from one that is unitary and planned to a market economy drawing from various aspects, levels and directions, as well as from different theoretical points of view. Its philosophical and ethical dynamics is in reality a transformation from the whole to the individual. As regards the relation of government to enterprise, the question is how government is to guarantee the independence of enterprise and make it responsible, and then to mobilize its activity and productivity. The relation between enterprises and their workers and officers should be similarly transformed, so that the activity and the productivity of every one is mobilized. Finally, this originates from the individual’s inner pursuits characterized by personal psychological impulses. As individualism is the rational sublimation of such impulses, there arises the question of how this is to be treated. Of course, its evil aspects must be excluded and criticized persistently everywhere and always. The propagation and advocacy of lofty moral virtues and ideals must be carried on continually and ever more efficiently. But taking individualism simply as a bourgeoisie worldview, that is, as "evil",
and rejecting and excluding it generally, seems unsuited to the demands of the market economy for mobilizing the activity and productivity of individuals, and for strengthening the vitality of economy. The most important thing for philosophers and scholars of ethics seems not to praise or curse individualism, but to study concretely its psychological and social sources, and lead it in a healthy direction, that is, to encourage its good while restraining its evil.

While demanding for competition the full development of the human personality and consciousness, it is inevitable that the market economy permit individualism in some degree. How properly to treat the contradiction of individualism is always a very important question for the successful development of a market economy. This is the main reason why modern Western philosophers, from early utilitarians to pragmatists, have included individualism as one of their main topics of research. No matter how abominable, individualism is inevitable in the operation of a market economy in present day China. Research on this is very important, even urgent. In spite of different political conditions the problems characteristic of individualism here are similar to those in the West. A realistic attitude will disclose that the research of Western scholars in this regard is close to the realities of the market economy in China. Compared to blind criticism, concrete and careful studies are more suitable to the requirements of the formation of moral norms adaptable to the development of a market economy for China.
8. The Sixty-Year Samsara of Studies on Pragmatism and Cultural Development in China

The May 4th ‘new culture’ movement of 1919 is recognized almost unanimously by Chinese scholars as a very significant ‘communication’ of Sino-Western culture, and the beginnings of the development of contemporary Chinese culture. The development continued in a tortuous process through the subsequent years, until the resumption or ‘new starting-point’ about 1979. Some Chinese scholars studying the May 4th movement in recent years take the period from the aftermath of 1919 through to 1979 as a ‘samsara’ [in the sense of ‘going around in circles’] of sixty years. I agree with this view generally and see an analogous ‘samsara’ characterizing the studies of pragmatism and other Western philosophy in China during the sixty-year interval. In order to develop a new culture which situates the future development of China in a changing world-structure and to avoid a possible new ‘samsara’, it is very important to bring to light the ‘samsara’ and to derive lessons from that experience.

The Introduction of Pragmatism into China during the May 4th Period: Main Characteristics

Pragmatism was introduced into China as early as the beginning of this century. Chinese scholars Zhang Don Sen and Lan Gong Wu and others established the Journal Education in Tokyo in 1909, wherein they published some papers introducing pragmatism. But it was during the May 4th ‘new culture’ movement that pragmatism became a main trend of thought with strong influences in China. After returning home from America in 1917, young Hu Shi published a series of articles advocating pragmatism and became a leading figure of pragmatism in China. Tao Xin Shi, Jiang Men Lin, Fu Si Nian and other Chinese scholars who received the theories of John Dewey in America also advocated pragmatism when they returned. John Dewey himself came to China in 1919-1921. He visited almost all the main cities of China and gave a series of lectures on pragmatism. This played a very important role in the spreading of pragmatism in China. During this time, a great many Chinese intellectuals, especially those more enlightened and progressive, were favorably impressed by pragmatism to different degrees. The early Chen Du Xiu, who became the first leader of the Chinese communist party when it was formed in 1921, received some ideas from pragmatism and admired Dewey’s lectures.

Pragmatism was more or less received in common by many intellectuals involved in the new culture movement. Almost at the same time, such Western philosophies as the voluntarism of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, "Lebensphilosophie" from Germany and France as well as Machism, etc., were imported into China. Besides Dewey, such other famous Western philosophers as Bertrand Russell, Hans Driesch, etc., visited China, but their influence was far less than that of pragmatism and John Dewey.

Why did pragmatism have such a powerful influence on China during the May 4th period? Before answering this question we must briefly introduce the main characteristics of pragmatism which were understood in broad terms by Chinese scholars of the May 4th period.

As to the ‘definition’ of pragmatism, people can derive many distinct but nonetheless justified answers, because pragmatism itself is a conception with various meanings. The theories of three leading American pragmatists, i.e., Charles Peirce, William James and John Dewey, differ one
from the other. It is very difficult to give a simple but exact definition of pragmatism. Pragmatism as understood by Chinese scholars since May 4th has the following main characteristics.

First, pragmatism rejects traditional metaphysics, both of materialism and idealism, especially the older rationalistic speculative idealism. Pragmatists were all against attempts to find the absolute substance of matter or of mind as well as objective or a priori-necessity and an absolute principle beyond experience. They don’t negate the possibility of the existence of a world beyond experience, but insist that the realm of philosophy should be limited to the world which can be experienced. Philosophy should be a theory concerned with the world of experience, i.e. the life-world of human beings.

Second, what pragmatists mean by ‘experience’ differs from the definitions of ‘experience’ characterizing the traditional epistemologies of both empiricism and rationalism. The pragmatists’s ‘experience’ is neither knowledge resulting from a process of cognition, nor subjective consciousness separated from the object; rather, it is human action, life, practice itself, or the united process of subject and object, or mind and matter. Drawing support from Darwin’s theory of evolution, pragmatists insist that for the human being as an organism, like any other living being, the most important thing is to live. On that basis, the human constantly must adapt to his environment. This process is just the interaction between organism and environment, i.e., the process of life, action and practice. That humans must adapt constantly to their environment implies that humans must constantly struggle and keep forging ahead, must be in unceasing progress and evolution. Applying this motif to socio-historical problems, people must see their history as a process of constant progress and evolution and must recognize that society must be continually reformed.

Third, pragmatism maintains that human adaptation to the environment, i.e., human action, life and practice, is different from the instinctive behaviour of animals. Human beings are born with intelligence; their action and practice are always in pursuit of some goals and are guided by reflection and thought. Therefore, the question of how human action is guided by intelligence, i.e., the question of methodology, turns out to be a central question with which philosophy should be involved. In this sense pragmatism is nothing but a methodology guided by intelligence, i.e., scientific methodology. Pragmatism does not reject any other method as long as it can bring some satisfactory effects: in short, what pragmatism advocates is only the ‘scientific method’, i.e., what ‘works’.

Fourth, pragmatists hold that every idea, theory and doctrine should serve to adapt human beings to their environment, and thus should be an instrument of human behaviour. Therefore, pragmatists reject the ‘correspondence theory’ of truth and maintain that the criterion of the truth of every idea, theory or doctrine lies in its effects upon human action and practice, that is, its practical value. Truth does not have universal or absolute meaning, but only disjunctive or relative meaning. For this reason all truth is pluralistic, not monistic.

Fifth, pragmatists believe that each acting person is individual. Her or his existence and interaction with the environment is in the end an individual behaviour. In order to live, every individual must struggle by himself. He cannot depend upon anyone else or be controlled by any other or by some superhuman force or authority. Therefore, pragmatists maintain that the personality of every individual must be liberated and his rights to act and to express his own will freely must be respected. That is, a system of full democracy and freedom must be practiced in society. Nevertheless, pragmatists reject excessive self-will and egoism and emphasize that individual freedom must not harm the legitimate freedom of others; thus individual freedom must be regulated by society. Society, for its part, should avoid both totalitarianism and anarchism.
The above-mentioned characteristics of pragmatism are interconnected and incarnate its cardinal doctrine from diverse aspects. While summarizing their ideas, pragmatists have given it distinctive expression from different points of view so that it can be variously described as a new empiricism, scientific methodology, philosophy of practice and behavior, instrumentalism, humanism, etc. While taking pragmatism as a philosophy of society, they often see it as expressing the traits of democracy and science.

When pragmatism was imported into China at the time of the May 4th movement, a great many progressive intellectuals warmly welcomed it because of the above-mentioned characteristics, especially the spirit of science and democracy. Some of pragmatism’s characteristics coincide with several aspects of Chinese traditional culture; others coincide with the demands for science and democracy by the progressive Chinese intellectuals of that time.

Pragmatism and Chinese Traditional Culture

Though the new May 4th cultural movement protested against the old cultural tradition of China, it also grew from the soil of this same tradition. As both the leaders of the movement and the broad spectrum of intellectuals who took part in it had grown up under this tradition and then separated from it, it was only in reference to the tradition that there could be criticism of the old culture or the introduction of anything new. Although some representative figures of the movement proposed a ‘stance’ and indeed, radical slogans, totally negating the traditional culture, one of their two ‘feet’ in this stance always remained planted in the ground of the old tradition. Therefore the movement’s introduction to and reception of Western cultures in the May 4th period was necessarily limited by a field of vision to an extent controlled by the traditional culture. In fact, the thoughts and ideas introduced and received at that time were first of all those which could coincide with some aspects of Chinese tradition and hence were easier for the participants of the movement to approve and understand. Among various Western trends, pragmatism seems to relate best to such traditional Chinese ideas.

Among others, Chinese traditional culture, especially philosophy, was imbued with the following characteristics. Basically it was ethically oriented, talking about nature, society, etc. Ancient Chinese scholars generally emphasize ethical content. The questions of the development and self-perfection of human beings frequently were the central issues in their discussions, which were thus basically humanistic. Second, as far as the world as object of knowledge is concerned, the ancient scholars stressed the real life world which people faced, not the transcendental world or world-in-itself, i.e., the world separated from human experience. Hence, they did not develop systematic metaphysical or theological theories. Third, Chinese traditional culture emphasized experimental-intuitive knowledge and its practical effects upon human beings. The cardinal principle of knowledge was "study for the purpose of application." It sought truth from facts and checked the validity of a truth through its effects. Compared with their Western counterparts, ancient Chinese scholars did not like to create speculative and abstract theories. Fourth, Chinese culture was pluralistic and all-embracing. Although two thousand years ago Confucianism was officially considered to be the sole learning so that it controlled the whole field of thought and culture, there still were various trends and tendencies which co-existed or were mixed up into each other. In fact, Confucianism itself was pluralistic and embraced a variety of trends. Fifth, Chinese culture, especially Confucianism, stressed harmony and the mean, avoiding extremes and antagonism. The so-called "doctrine of the mean" has always been considered the most important characteristic of Chinese culture.
Generally speaking, Chinese traditional culture—long based upon the feudal-patriarchal system—was quite different from modern and contemporary Western culture, including pragmatism. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned characteristics are to some extent quite similar to some thoughts and ideas of pragmatism. Thus, although the leaders and participants of the May 4th movement had a deep background in Chinese traditional culture, they often objected to ‘tradition’ and received pragmatism more easily. Note that Hu Shi, the leading figure of pragmatism in China, had already formed a framework for his academic thought which was similar to pragmatism before he went to the United States and contacted American pragmatism. What he did afterwards was only a perfecting and systematizing of his original thought.

Pragmatism and the Ideological and Political Background of the May 4th Movement

The most important and even decisive reason why pragmatism had so powerful an influence in China during the May 4th period is that the idea of science and democracy it advocated so suited the ideological and political demands of the ‘new culture’ movement. The May 4th new culture movement had started from a revolution in literature, but rapidly developed into a political and social revolution which took anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism as its main contents. The bannerslogan "Strive for national rights outside and punish traitors within," which was held high by demonstrating students on "May 4th," and the slogans "Down with Confucianism" and "Welcome Mr. De (democracy) and Mr. Sci (science)" which were put forward by the leaders of the ‘new culture’ movement were just the concentrated expression of this revolution. Although the political position and ideological tendency of the persons involved in this movement differed from one another, all had in common the following concerns: to re-evaluate the ancient Chinese tradition and culture; to reject feudal autocracy which so cruelly expropriated people’s freedom; to abandon the feudal morality fettering people’s thought; and to re-establish a new culture with scientific and democratic traits.

These demands coincided with common attitudes to some degree as they were all against feudal forces and the warlords’ oppression of the broad masses of the people, and against the privileges of foreign countries in China and the unequal treaties imposed upon China. So to some degree the reformers were able to establish a broader united front. The culture they talked about during that time went beyond the limits of simple literature or culture in a narrow sense, and was imbued with political and ideological meaning. Both the (1) establishment of a new culture characterized by science and democracy and the (2) re-evaluation of the old culture required a drastic overhaul of Chinese society. Pragmatists involved in science sought a new world-view and methodology to replace the traditional unscientific world-view and methodology. Science and democracy represented the ideal of a new society, as well as an attitude and methodology which must be used in order to achieve such an ideal.

Facing the historical mission of "re-evaluation", especially of "re-establishment," many intellectuals imported a successive variety of Western ideas and theories. This made of the May 4th period the most intense Sino-Western cultural exchange in the modern history of China. Some radical activists began to receive Marxism via the influence of the October revolution in Russia. But due to both social and epistemological reasons, the broad masses of the intellectuals could not accept Marxism with its theory of class struggle and dictatorship of the proletariat as the keystones of its doctrine. So they tried to find other theories from the West more suitable to their call for democracy and science. To many, pragmatism seemed the most suitable, because it is
characterized by science and democracy. Pragmatism advocates constant progress and social innovation, and it promotes freedom and the ‘liberation’ of personality.

Qu Qui-Bai, one of the early leaders of the communist party of China, said: "It was really not accidental that pragmatism appeared in China around ‘May 4th’. The patriarchal society of China had been shaken by the bombardment of international capitalism. China needed a new outlook on the world and life so as to adapt to the new environment of China. Pragmatism with its positive sides has satisfied this need” (Qu Qiu-Bai, Pragmatism and Revolutionary Philosophy).

Clearly, the importation of pragmatism gave an active role to the development of the new culture movement at the time of ‘May 4th’. Many Chinese intellectuals received pragmatism’s "new outlook on world and life" as their conceptual approach for eliminating evils and disadvantage and benefiting politics, destroying the old and establishing the new. Why did the reputation of young Hu Shi rise suddenly, and why were the lectures of Dewey welcomed by a broad range of intellectuals, including even many of the left wing? The main reason is that pragmatism suited the trends of thought in China during the May 4th era.

**Limitations upon the Applicability of Pragmatism in China**

There were some serious defects in the reception of pragmatism during the May 4th era. For example, people did not adequately understand the one-sidedness and limitations of pragmatism. They did not give adequate attention to the impact pragmatism would have upon the national conditions of China and even the national conscience of China.

Pragmatism is almost generally acknowledged as a philosophy which embodies the national spirit of America. The particular historical conditions of the formation and development of American society gave American culture and national spirit the following traits: an underestimation of the transcendent, but close attention to the world of experience; a devaluation of speculative and abstract theories, but the promotion of practical and concrete actions; disdain for the beaten path, but great effort at innovation and creativity; disregard of every absolute authority, but admiration of all kinds of individual effort; opposition to autocracy, but the promotion of democracy; rejection of blind obedience and belief, but promotion of intelligence and science, etc. Pragmatism embodies all these traits. Such a philosophy played a very important role for the American people in constructing the world’s most developed country on an almost uncultivated soil, in the prosperity of science and culture, as well as in the development of America’s democratic system. Such success strongly impressed the Chinese intellectuals striving for social progress and the renewal of culture. The reason why Hu Shi and others received and propagated pragmatism is that they had idealized pragmatism. They claimed that once the method of pragmatism was employed, all kinds of problems regarding the re-evaluation and re-establishment of Chinese culture, even the innovation and progress of Chinese society, would readily be solved.

But pragmatism is not a perfect philosophy; still less is it fully suitable for China. As to the theory of pragmatism, although it contains many positive elements which deserve affirmation, it has serious limits. First, under the banner of rejecting metaphysics, pragmatists mention speculative idealism and materialism in the same breath, and negate both of them indiscriminately. Therefore, they inevitably cancel the objective basis of their own theory. Although pragmatism is not a pure idealism and at times it even opposes idealism, still it comes finally to a subjective idealism. Second, while stressing the activity of human cognition and practice, it often neglects the objective necessities which must be obeyed; the pragmatists’ stand on progress and evolution
is imbued with some subjective arbitrariness. Third, when opposing dogmatism and absolute authority, as well as separating theory from practice, they negate the existence of objective and absolute truth. Sometimes they confuse the practical test of truth with its value to humans and make truth dependent upon the individual’s subjective likes and dislikes. Fourth, having rejected the objectivity of knowledge and practice, even their use of the so-called scientific method loses objectivity. Pragmatism was vulnerable to subjective fabrication and sophistry.

One-sidedness and other limitations of pragmatism were criticized by many philosophers even in Western countries, and especially in its American birthplace. Contemporaries of James and Dewey, such as British philosophers F.H. Bradley and B. Russell, and American philosophers G. Santayana and A. O. Lovejoy, criticized its contradictions, ambiguity, vagueness and one-sidedness. For example, Russell did not agree with William James’s view that a belief is truthful insofar as its effects are good. Intellectually, this view has important difficulties because according to it people could not affirm even such a simple matter of fact as that Columbus crossed the Atlantic Ocean in 1492. The effect of the belief does not justify why someone must say that the crossing occurred in 1492 but not in 1491 or 1493. Therefore Russell considered the philosophy of James to be nothing but subjectivist raving.

What is the real interplay between pragmatism and the American system? America is founded upon capitalist principles. These principles do not simply assume pragmatism as their theoretical base. The Declaration of Independence marks the foundation of the United States of America, and its theoretical grounds are the enlightenment rationalistic doctrines of freedom, equality and universal fraternity (concepts coming from Montesquieu and Rousseau). Therefore, although pragmatism declares itself against metaphysics and rationalist systems, it worked on the premise of rationalist systems which undergird the capitalist system and its principles.

Apparently one who pursues pragmatism emphasizes only action, but does not pay much attention to ideals: he or she is interested only in concrete reality and does not care about rational principles. In fact, however, pragmatists base their action and interests upon the above-mentioned ideals and principles. Pragmatism was developed in America during the formation of America when Americans universally accepted their senior thinkers’ ideals and capitalist principles and institutions and value system. Without these conditions, pragmatism could not have emerged in America, or even if it did emerge, it would not have been accepted widely. Therefore, one cannot reduce the American world-view and outlook on life to pragmatism, nor can we even trace the development of American society and culture generally to pragmatism.

Due to the essential conditions noted above, pragmatism could play an important role in its birthplace, America, and pragmatism’s own one-sidedness and other limitations could be neglected. When pragmatism spread to China, although it played an active role in promoting the May 4th new culture movement, its role was greatly limited from the very beginning. The fundamental reason was that Chinese culture, unlike America’s, lacked the social and intellectual premises required for pragmatism to in turn make its own contribution. In short, in China there was no rationalist Enlightenment underpinning ‘in place’, upon which pragmatism could secretly or unknowingly rely.

China has thousands of years of feudal tradition. This social system is a serious obstacle to the progress of Chinese society and places heavy spiritual shackles upon Chinese thoughts. After the Opium War in 1840, with the invasion of foreign capitalism, great changes took place in Chinese society and the country sank into a semi-feudal, semi-colonial state. During the May 4th era, China was in a very turbulent condition. The establishment of a new social system and intellectual culture was advocated by progressive persons who were still relatively obscure, and
whose demands were overshadowed by more pressing and desperate problems. At the time, China had to face the most concrete problems, from rickshaws to Presidential jurisdiction, from prostitution to government bribery and the betrayal of the country. China still needed to search for the social causes of these problems and for the principles and direction for their solution. Without the latter, China would be unable to solve the former. The semi-feudal and semi-colonial social system which caused the above-mentioned problems and other types of social malpractice had not yet been at bottom overthrown. Hence, the solutions proposed by Hu Shi’s pragmatism could not be put into practice. Actually, before the introduction of pragmatism into China, in Chinese traditional thought and especially in Chinese modern Enlightenment conjecture, it was emphasized that the secret of learning lay in solving practical problems and getting practical effects. However, even these homegrown ‘pragmatisms’ did not help the Chinese before or during the May 4th movement to solve China’s many problems.

Therefore, at the time China’s urgent need was for a revolutionary theory which would direct the future way of development of Chinese society: a new culture to replace the dress of the old Chinese cultural tradition, sort out its essence, and guide correctly the changes of Chinese society. The spirit of science and democracy advocated by pragmatism and scientific methodology in certain aspects suited the needs of many Chinese intellectuals and inspired their enthusiasm for destroying the old and establishing the new. But pragmatism did not correctly open a path to China’s future mode of development. It couldn’t lead the Chinese to a conscious and definite way to follow. Moreover, at that time, many propagators of pragmatism favored ‘Westernization’ pure and simple. They did not deeply investigate the relation of Chinese and Western culture and the problems pertaining to how Western culture could be adapted to Chinese soil. So the pragmatism they naively propagated wasn’t able to meet China’s special needs. When the May 4th new culture movement developed further and met the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution of the young students, and the broad masses of workers and peasants, Hu Shi and other leading pragmatists in China gradually withdrew from the battle against the old system and tradition. Indeed, some pragmatists even reversed themselves and took the opposite position! Pragmatism in China had lost its active and progressive meaning.

**Pragmatism and Chinese Politics since May Fourth**

After being introduced into China, pragmatism did not play a long and profound role as it did in America. Being an important instrument in political conflicts of contemporary China, it became the victim of these conflicts. People came to identify theoretical pragmatism as an academic ideology comprising scientific method but not always relatable in a direct way to politics. During the May 4th era, while introducing and propagating pragmatism as well as other Western trends, Chinese scholars generally did not distinguish between ‘knowledge’ and ‘value systems’. There was a tendency to search for strategies in pragmatism and other Western trends, but usually scholars did not bother to study the more academic side of these Western imports. When some Chinese accepted and advocated pragmatism, this was not based mainly upon the recognition of the truth of its theoretical system, but rather, upon the utility it may have for politics and morality. The enemies of ‘Western’ pragmatism, and they eventually ‘won the day’, tried to show that pragmatism is not in fact very relatable to the concrete political circumstance of China.

The pragmatism introduced during the era was mainly John Dewey’s doctrine, especially his political philosophy and theories of morality and education. Dewey’s own lectures in China and the introduction to pragmatism by his Chinese students (Hu Shi and others) all laid particular stress
on the ‘surface’, rather than on the analysis of ‘deep structure’. In the famous polemic on "Problem and Doctrine," Hu Shi promoted pragmatism in terms of its ability to solve the social and political problems of Chinese society. At that time, many people who accepted pragmatism did not have a correct and deep understanding of its academic content. Their reason for accepting pragmatism was mainly that the spirit of science and democracy it propagated corresponded to their political and moral choice at that time. However, when with the further development of the May 4th movement, their political and moral choice changed, some came increasingly to distrust and even reject pragmatism.

During the early days of the May 4th period, China’s old unified tyrannical feudal system was undermined and shaken, but a new unified political pattern had not been formed yet. The pluralist pattern of politics produced by the conflict among warlords and the struggle of political forces provided conditions for a pluralist pattern of ideology. Because it was evidently pluralistic and was accepted to different degrees by people with different political inclinations, pragmatism in particular was prevalent.

Later, after the formation of a Chinese political pattern governed by two opposite forces, the CPC (Communist Party of China) and the KMT (Nationalist Party), research into Western philosophy continued along these same lines. Pragmatism had continuing influence in the fields of history, archaeology, education and especially natural science (which has little direct relation to politics). But generally speaking, there was little deep study of pragmatism as an academic theory. The understanding of pragmatism usually remained at the level of utility. Its fate in China was more and more determined by the attitudes of the two above-mentioned political forces.

The political structure of the early KMT was rather complex. Among its members, there were not only conservative forces, but also progressive personages who struggled for a democratic revolution in China. Later, the KMT became increasingly divided, and in 1927, after the breakdown of the cooperation between the KMT and the CPC, the KMT was increasingly governed by rightist forces. Sometimes they neglected or even abandoned the goal of democratic revolution. For example, democracy was replaced by the dictatorship of Jiang Jie-shi (Cantonese: Chiang Kai-shek) and the local warlords. In this case, the study of philosophy, including that of pragmatism, was strongly influenced by dictatorial politics. Around 1935, in the debates over democracy and dictatorship, some persons who advocated democracy during the May 4th period now supported implementation of a new type of dictatorship in the name of the ‘cohesion and unification of the country’ (this after all, is also a ‘pragmatic’ choice). Thus, the propagation and influence of pragmatism still existed, but essentially it had lost its reputation as a progressive theory advocating democracy.

Although during the May 4th period, there were differences in principle between Chinese Marxism and pragmatism, still they formed a united front supporting science and democracy. Even in the famous polemics of problem and doctrine, Li Da-Zhao, the representative of Marxism, did not wholly reject Hu Shi’s pragmatism. He even pointed out that some of his own ideas were completely the same as Hu Shi’s but others differed slightly (see Li Da-Zhao, "On Problem and Doctrine Again").

After the May 4th movement, because of the radical changes in the political situation, the political divergence between Chinese Marxism and pragmatism became increasingly pointed. The original ‘united front’ having collapsed, the two took an increasingly negative attitude toward each other. Such changes reached a turning-point in the thirties when Stalin’s Leftist Line formed in the USSR. Because Dewey openly took a critical and sceptical attitude toward the Trotsky trial, and even organized an investigative committee on the Trotsky case which acquitted Trotsky of any
crime, Dewey earned the enmity of the Stalinists. Dewey, who at first was praised as a distinguished progressive and democratic scholar, now was criticized as a reactionary philosopher of imperialism and the most vicious enemy of the USSR. The pragmatism linked to Dewey’s name was declared to be a decadent and reactionary imperialist philosophy. Such changes in the USSR’s attitude toward pragmatism soon influenced China. Earlier more objective and practical realistic judgements which led to guarded support of pragmatism were replaced by its overall rejection.

The leftist inclination to judge theories purely by political criteria was developed further in the criticism of Hu Shi’s pragmatism by Mao Tze Dong himself in the early fifties. At that time many treatises criticizing pragmatism were issued. They served special political needs, but did not proceed from a deep investigation of pragmatism’s academic theory. Many authors did little research, or did not even study the original works by pragmatists. Their arguments were based on the conclusions already determined by persons in authority. They established Marxism as the absolute authority and eliminated any open influence from other trends. But by neglecting learning and basing critiques only on political choices, they also produced serious negative results of an indirect and ‘passive’ kind. For example, theoretically, the Marxists didn’t make a clear distinction between right and wrong elements of pragmatism. For example, when criticizing pragmatism Marxists also criticized some of its active agenda which it had in common with Marxism or could be accepted by Marxism. Ironically, such a ‘blanket’ condemnation essentially deviated from real Marxism, as it neglected some fundamental Marxist principles involving honesty, practicality, and realism. Unfortunately, such leftist deviations were not overcome but increased with the strengthening of the political left. The blanket condemnations generated a unitary pattern for criticizing the whole ‘Western’ trend and non-Marxist thought.

The above-mentioned leftist inclination reached its extreme in the so-called Cultural Revolution. It should be noted that while in the name of Marxism the extreme leftist leaders launched a punitive expedition against pragmatism and other Western trends, at that time essentially they were pursuing their own ‘pragmatic’ line which excluded the spirit of science and democracy! They pursued also an absolutism and dogmatism which reflected a feudal autocracy and were criticized by pragmatism! Thus, they acted arbitrarily in politics, deprived the mass of people of their democratic rights, wantonly trampled on science, and energetically advocated the cult of an individual! All this was not only fundamentally opposed to real Marxism, but differed greatly from pragmatism and other Western doctrines celebrating science and democracy. Thus, the extreme leftists seemed to return the people to the situation of feudal autocracy and obscurantism of the old pre-May 4th China!

Sixty Years of the Pragmatist ‘Samsara’ and Its Lessons

In the early summer of 1976, the famous April 5th movement took place in Tienanmen Square in Beijing. It expressed the people’s extreme hatred of "The Gang of Four" which had played the tyrant in the Cultural Revolution. And it expressed the people’s intense desire to cast off the yoke of ‘politics and thought’. In the winter of that year, "The Gang of Four" was overthrown, the Cultural Revolution ended and since 1979, Chinese society took up once again the path of innovation and development. People began again to investigate Marxism which had been distorted and misrepresented; also they began to study once again pragmatism and other Western trends.

This new beginning occurs just sixty years after the May 4th movement of 1919. As earthshaking changes had taken place in Chinese society over those sixty years, we cannot think of this return as a simple repetition of the starting-point. But surely great similarities exist between
1919 and 1979. For example, both ‘beginnings’ faced the same national conditions: poverty and backwardness in economics, deficiency of democracy in politics, underdevelopment in science, and ossification in thought. Hence, progressive Chinese intellectuals attempted to promote China’s reform by introducing a new academic theory and working out a general plan for husbanding China’s wealth-potential and strength. The May 4th movement took science and democracy as its main slogan; now in 1979 the people were calling once again for science and democracy. People regarded the May 4th movement as an ‘Enlightenment’ in Chinese modern history, and the renewal of thought and ideas since 1979 as a ‘New Enlightenment’.

Why did the movement striving for science and democracy in 1919 have to return after 60 years to a starting-point quite similar to its origins? There were manifold reasons: the powerful influence of China’s old feudal forces in politics and economics as well as its traditional feudal culture; the interference and destruction by foreign countries, especially the Japanese invasion; the ragged form of the modern Chinese revolution and the many faults committed—all of these had hindered the smooth development of modern Chinese society and its corresponding thought-culture. In addition to these causes, another important reason is that people, mainly the authorities, had not correctly handled the relation between knowledge systems and value systems in thought and culture. In other words, learning was simply taken as an instrument of politics, and politics were always unstable.

Confusing pragmatism’s knowledge system with its value system and judging the former ‘truth’ a falsity (because it seemed an ideology in the service of particular social and political groups and not the ‘people’), generated two passive results. First, it hindered deep research into pragmatism’s knowledge system and impeded real knowledge of what was true and false. Second, it hindered the use of a correct theory for guiding action and achieving success. Theory was not allowed to develop its own utility (including political) value. The main lesson of the sixty years experience with pragmatism in China seem to lie in this unfortunate situation.

As has just been described, because people who were for and against pragmatism took its esteem for ‘utility’ as its dominant contribution, they were unable and unwilling to study fully and deeply its theory. Although it has been over sixty years since the introduction of pragmatism into China, there still is no adequate book which introduces pragmatism fully and objectively. Deliberate misrepresentation can be seen everywhere when people talk about pragmatism. Its theoretical contents do not deserve to be called the "most abstruse" in contemporary Western philosophy. However, because pragmatism was appropriated by politics, and was easily governed by shifting political needs, even scholars had only a dim knowledge of pragmatism’s theoretical base. Even in esteemed philosophical circles, many philosophers from beginning to end had no true and definite knowledge of what pragmatism is, especially of its relationship to Marxism. This led to extreme confusion regarding theory. Some leftist Marxist theorists always stressed the contrasts between Marxism and pragmatism. At times they claimed that pragmatism asserts that "Any thought and idea that can make people successful is true"; and then of course they would condemn such an assertion as "bourgeois egoism" and a "philistine approach to doing business." At other times the Marxists considered the same ideas as profoundly Marxist if expressed in other terms, especially those borrowed from political leaders.

When revisionism was widely criticized in the fifties and sixties, its thought-base was first reduced to "bourgeois pragmatism" and then suppressed. In the last ten years, people have not been criticizing revisionism and what was originally criticized is now regarded as tallying with Marxism. As to the line of demarcation between pragmatism and Marxism there are scarcely any scholars who can give a clear answer.
Confusion in theory leads to confusion in action. Some people repeatedly declare themselves most devout advocates and followers of Marxism. However, because Marxist theory was ossified, dogmatized and divorced from practice it was unable to be used as a guide to practice. Then how was practice to proceed? This depended only upon observing the effects produced, that is, on experience. "Look before every step" was the watch-word, or to use a famous statement of a Chinese leader, "To cross the river feel your way along the riverbed." But such a way of guiding action merely in terms of daily experience and its effect was not Marxist theory, but was close to the parochial empiricism of pragmatism (which in other contexts Marxism had condemned). When the problems to be solved by practice were relatively simple and pure, this empirical method was not without effect, but when the problem was more complex this method was obviously powerless and persistence in using it led only to errors and failure.

The purely political utilitarianism of judging thought and theory, or more broadly culture, leads to simplification, coarseness and vulgarization of theoretical research. Further, it throws knowledge and theory into confusion, and this inevitably leads practice into failure. In order to avoid this, people must study theory once again. If, however, people merely once more take up a short-sighted political utilitarianism as their criterion, another vicious circle shall surely follow. From 1919 to 1979 the ‘samsaric’ phenomenon of culture unfolded in just this manner in China—a big circle of sixty-years consisting of a series of smaller circles.

Pragmatism, Current Problems in Cultural Studies in China, and a Possible Road for the Future

The new Enlightenment starting from 1979 has been in motion now for quite some years. The progress and achievements of cultural studies in China during this time are unmatched by those in the corresponding period after May 4th. But as far as the study of pragmatism and other Western trends is concerned, problems similar to those following May 4th are recurring. Among them, the most striking is that culture studies are still at times controlled by left or rightist short-sighted political utilitarianism.

The leftist deviation has been the main one in recent years. Some people have still attempted to judge the truth or falsity of pragmatism and other Western trends in the light of whether or not they corresponded to present political needs. From such a point of view, pragmatism and other Western trends are non- or anti-Marxist. Research into them is regarded as politically useless, and dangerous insofar as they would produce ‘bourgeois liberalism’. Thus such research must be limited strictly. After the events of Tienanmen square in June 1989, the leftist political forces have been more in the ascendant. The introduction and study of Western thought is considered one of the main causes of the turmoil and is limited even more. Since the spring of 1992 the wind of reform and openness has been blowing again and more strongly than ever, while the leftist forces have been going into decline. But this wind seems limited mainly to the economic field. Though the thought-culture field is a bit more flexible the change is not obvious.

On the other hand, a few over-liberal scholars uncritically accept some theories and ideas of pragmatism and other Western influences, especially those of Western democracy such as a multiple party system, parliamentarianism, etc. At the same time they neglect the traditional Chinese culture and even more the complex conditions of China’s politics and society. They believe that if these Western theories and systems were to be introduced, all kinds of social problems faced by China would be solved naturally. A very few scholars even go far beyond academic studies and attempt to force the Chinese government to practice a scheme of political
reform modeled on Western patterns. Such political utilitarianism cannot be successful in present day China; on the contrary, it provides a pretext for the leftists to strengthen their ideological control. It is evident then that both left and right short-sighted political utilitarianism hinders the development and progress of thought-culture studies, including that of pragmatism, in China, and hinders even their possible political function.

Under China’s present conditions, how should cultural studies proceed? This subject is in need of discussion from different quarters. I do not intend to discuss it here in detail, but from the experiences and lessons of such studies since May 4th, especially in recent years, the following prospects seem to emerge.

First, thought-culture studies should not be taken simply as instruments of politics, especially of current policies. To be sure, almost every thought-culture trend has its political tendency and the purposes of thought-culture studies are often connected with politics. But this does not mean that thought-culture studies should be subordinated fully to politics. On the contrary, in order to study objectively and deeply, and then disclose the secret of every thought-theory, including its political tendencies, people must extricate themselves from short-sighted political preconceptions. Otherwise, they will not only easily distort or misunderstand the contents they study, but also cause other disastrous effects, as mentioned above. We should not forget the lessons of the period since May 4th.

Second, thought-culture studies should be manifold, even pluralistic, otherwise they cannot prosper. One of the main reasons why the May 4th period manifested the most prosperous cultural developments of contemporary China is just that various trends and schools of thought-culture co-existed, and freely discussed and debated one another at that time. On the contrary, during the period when a leftist political thought line controlled China, all non-Marxist culture studies were considered harmful and were in fact prohibited. Marxism was considered the only truth. There was the declared policy, "Let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend," but due to the over-stress on the Marxist school in all decisions the hundred schools were controlled by this one school. Hence, essentially only this school existed. Without discussing, debating and being enriched by other schools, this school became increasingly ossified and dogmatist.

Third, thought-culture studies should be open. Whether culture studies should be guided by Marxism is a matter of debate among Western and Chinese scholars. According to my view, the most important question is not this, but how to understand Marxism and its guiding influence. If people take it as closed, it would certainly become dogmatist, ossified and cultural studies will certainly turn into a blind alley. If people take Marxism as an open theory, it will receive every valuable thought and idea from other trends and abandon any of its own thoughts and ideas which become antiquated or are shown to be wrong. Culture studies under the guidance of such a Marxism certainly will be fruitful.

What of the role Pragmatism Studies could play in the future development of Chinese culture? Judging from the lessons since May 4th, the answer is not difficult. Generally speaking, we should affirm boldly that a number of theories and ideas of pragmatism are valuable in promoting the innovation and development of Chinese culture. For example, to advocate free inter-disciplinary open study in the thought-culture field, as called for above, is consonant with the emphasis given by pragmatism.

There are two more points to which we must attend. First, the useful ideas in pragmatism are often shared by/with Marxism to some extent, or worth being referred to by Marxism. Second, some ideas in pragmatism are similar to some aspects of Chinese traditional culture, as described earlier. Being based on developments in modern science and society, the ideas of pragmatism
frequently are more systematized and perfected. Hence they are able to help as references for innovation and development in Chinese traditional culture. In a word, we should overcome the leftist deviation of simply negating pragmatism and other Western trends, strengthen those studies, and receive everything valuable from them.

On the other hand, we should not forget that pragmatism is not a perfect philosophy, still less a philosophy fully suitable to China. Hence we must also disclose and criticize the one-sidedness and limitations of pragmatism. For if we idealize pragmatism, we shall certainly repeat the errors which in the past have always hindered the smooth development of Chinese culture and society.
Part III

Studies on Western Philosophy in China
9. The State of Western Philosophy in China and the Development of Contemporary Marxist Philosophy

The Beginnings of the Transmission of Western Learning and the Collision between Chinese and Western Cultures

Western philosophy was introduced into China about 100 years ago if we count from the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century when a series of Yan Fu’s translations on Western philosophy and sociology were published. In a broad sense, the introduction of "Western philosophy" into China was earlier. Besides the Christian missionary activities during early times, the Western invaders employed bombs to open the closed door of the Chinese Qing toward other countries on the earth and then Western thoughts were introduced into China.

Undoubtedly the Opium War in 1840 was vicious and aggressive and resulted in the Qing government not only ceding territory, paying indemnities and opening five ports for commerce, but also in an overall invasion by Western invaders in the fields of politics, economy and culture, etc. This led to a process in which China fell from an old and great empire into a demi-colony. Certainly this unprecedented and most painful humiliation of the Chinese nation was detested by many conscientious Chinese people who therefore took it as their duty to save their motherland from the danger of being ruined. For more than 100 years, many people with ideals, integrity and full of patriotism stepped into the breach. As the former regime fell, they did their best to wipe out the disgrace and achieve the prosperity of their country.

However, the Opium War was also the warfare by the advanced capitalist constitution of the west on the decayed, feudal and dictatorial system of China, which involved every aspect of its ideological culture such as politics, economy, scientific technology and philosophy. By 1840, some advanced Western countries such as Great Britain and France, etc., had completed their bourgeois revolution in favor of democracy, freedom and personal liberation. In addition, these countries also made obvious progress in the Industrial Revolution, taking the market economy as its "body" with scientific technology as its "function". Their forerunners, philosophy and ideological culture characterized by rationalism, had already gained decisive triumph over the religious obscurantism of the Middle Ages during the Renaissance and the Enlightenment in France and Germany.

At the same period in China, the feudal dictatorial system not only was conservative and rotten, but had lasted for several thousand years. While the small-scale agricultural economy was lagging behind and dying the feudal ideology and ethical code with its serious obscurantism continued to occupy the dominant position. The difference mentioned above between China and the West determined China’s inevitable failure in the Opium War and other subsequent aggressions launched by Western colonialists.

In the long run, the Opium and other aggressive wars launched by Western invaders forced China, which had been closed, to face the Western world whose social system and cultural tradition differed greatly from those in China. A collision between Chinese and Western culture (including different levels of technology, institutions and ideas) was inevitable, and had the two following effects.

On one hand, the failure of China forced the "Heaven Dynasty" which was corrupt, weak, conceited and had taken Western science and technology as "clever contrivances and specious
skills" to yield to foreigners whose ships were strong and whose weapons were sharp. The closed door of China was obliged to open. This failure brought some open-minded important officials of the Qing dynasty such as Lin Zexu, etc., and some patriotic intellectuals such as Wei yuan, Rong hong, Feng Guifang, etc., into contact with Western learning in different degrees. The later Westernized politicians and thinkers were famous for their devotion to foreign affairs. They did not dare to change even slightly the ideology of feudal despotism and Chinese traditional culture, the main contents of which were old-fashioned thoughts and ethics, let alone to attack the "body" of the dictatorial feudal system. Yet, after all, they realized that the Qing Empire had to "imitate foreign technology" at least as to its instrumentation and to introduce Western learning to some extent to make up for the shortcomings of Chinese learning in this respect, if this empire wanted to survive in the face of those great powers. Therefore they put forward their views such as "taking Chinese learning as fundamental and west learning as incidental," "Chinese learning is the body, while the Western is the function," and so on. Zhang zhidong once said: "Chinese learning is a kind of inner learning, while Western learning is an outer one; and the former serves the body and soul of man, while the latter deals with world affairs". "We should take our Chinese learning as the body and regard the Western learning as the function, and should not emphasize one of these two aspects at the expense of the other". Though they still put Chinese learning (that is, old learning) in the dominant position, they had realized that the Western learning (that is, new learning) should no longer be neglected. This meant that the overall domination of Chinese learning characterized by the tradition of the feudal social system and culture began to break up; China began to change from a feudal to a semi-feudal society.

On the other hand, the triumph of colonialism meant that Chinese people suffered from the robbery, bullying, humiliation and trampling of the aggressors; no one knows how many people died under their iron heels. Of course, it aroused immense hatred by the Chinese people of the Western invaders, which might be more intense than that directed against their civil rulers. The slogan of Yihetuan Movement (Boxer Uprising) to support Qing in order to eliminate foreigners, provided a background anti-Western attitude. The fight against the Western colonialists was extremely hard and bitter, evoking praises and tears. This hatred of the Western aggressors led also to an overall, even blind, opposition to Western culture.

The more profound reason leading to the simple rejection of Western culture is a deep-rooted effect of Chinese feudal culture, with its history of thousands of years. The outstanding characteristic of this culture was merged with feudal autocratic dictatorship, patriarchic order, genetic and family connection, and Confucian ethics (feudal ethical code), all based on a small-peasant economy and forming an indestructible net. The culture could always retain its fundamental structure and made foreign cultures fit in and even become organic components, no matter how the foreign cultures entered and whether they would be a strong shock to the net, even destroying some of its parts. That is the main reason why Chinese feudal society could last long and never fundamentally changed.

There were countless peasant uprisings in Chinese history. But their victory or defeat could not break the feudal cultural network. The Taiping rebellion after the Opium War was influenced by the west, but mainly by Religious ideas. The Western social and thought systems corresponding to capitalist modernization were not accepted, although Ronghong, the first student returning from America, energetically advised it. In fact, the Taiping Army restored the old institutions and culture which they had opposed once they gained early victories and settled in Nanjing as their capital. Therefore, even if they had gained victory in the end, it would not have changed the dynasty of a feudal empire.
In brief, on the one hand, the doors of the closed country had been opened and the despotic power of the "Heaven Dynasty" had been subjected to Western capitalist "civilization". This indicated that coming out of the Middle Ages and entering modernization had been the problem that all people of different classes must face. On the other hand, the complex net of feudal culture would have either to totally negate the relatively advanced but alien Western political institutions and ideas, or absorb and assimilate them. That was the reality of China during a long period after the Opium War. The purpose of putting forward the slogans: "Chinese is fundamental and the west is incidental" and "the Chinese is the body and the west is the function" was to bring Western culture into the net of Chinese traditional culture. This circumstance made it difficult for the Chinese people to take up the process of modernization.

Things began to change a little after the Constitutional Reform and Modernization Movement. Although some of the reformers used the term: "Chinese is fundamental and the west is incidental", they did not think that "the fundamental" was necessarily "primary" and "the incidental" only "secondary"; they emphasized that both were one. The incidental character of the west was in terms of its source; the backwardness of China was due not only to its being behind the incidental, but also to the need to change its own fundamentals. In today’s words, they had arrived at the point where it was not only necessary to imitate Western science and technologies, but also to use the experience of the Western social political system. When the reformers of Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, etc., said "Chinese is fundamental and the Western is incidental", "the Chinese is body and the Western is function", they emphasized the merging of the two. Liang Qichao once clearly suggested that Western and Chinese learning should be merged into one organic body. He said: "As for Chinese learning, it must be useless without the Western learning; meanwhile the Western learning cannot be a source without Chinese learning. Neither can be used to govern the country without both utility and origin." So, they proposed preserving the feudal monarchy, while reforming it to a certain degree, that is, to substitute the Western constitutional government by a traditional autocracy, which would be a constitutional monarchy.

The bourgeois revolutionaries represented by Sun Zhongshan made greater progress in absorbing Western learning. They not only surpassed the proposition of borrowing Western technology (implements) by those from Lin Zexu to Westernization, but also went beyond the limitation of the old institution by Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao and Yan Fu, etc. They demanded the complete overthrow of the feudal system, and carried out a socio-political revolution that aimed at democracy and republican institutions. They proposed the Three People’s Principles (Nationalism, Democracy, the People’s Livelihood), which came from the democratic theory of Western bourgeois thinkers; the Revolution of 1911 led by them was the practice of these ideas. The Revolution of 1911 was the first great political revolution in the modern history of China, which overturned the despotism which had been governing China for several thousands years, and played an important role in carrying further the reform of Chinese society.

All in all, from the Opium War to the Constitutional Reform of 1898, and to the Revolution of 1911, the Chinese (at least many advanced Chinese people) had begun to step out of the Middle Ages. This was an advance beyond the learning of science and technology from the west because of the simple experience of strong ships and sharp weapons of the Westerners beyond the conclusions that the fundamental and the incidental were one, and beyond the understanding that the reformation needed reference to the Western social political system. On this last point, the revolution actually overturned the feudal autocracy so as to set up a democratic republican system. But every step encountered obstacles from the feudal culture: the Westernization Movement and the Reformation of 1898 were failures. Although the Revolution of 1911 overturned the feudal
autocratic system, it did not shackle the foundations of the old social system, but left largely intact the feudal culture and ethical code. In one word, it was also a failure.

These failures led to the conclusion that it was necessary to take up Western learning in order to make China a strong country, and it still had a long distance to go. It was not sufficient simply to imitate the Western implements of science and technology, it was necessary to study and learn from the Western social political system which had produced these implements and these ideas according to which such a political system had been set up, looking especially to philosophy as the standpoint and summary of all the ideas. It was necessary to study systematically the implements (science and technology), the constitution (social political system), the ideas (idea culture) of Western culture, and the relations among them, especially the corresponding philosophy. Since we must base ourselves on the realities of China to use the experience of the West for reference, it is necessary to know the history and reality of China. Especially it is necessary to distinguish the cream from the dross of traditional Chinese culture, to promote its positive elements, to uncover and discard its negative factors, and to break through the obstacles to modernization. Overcoming the resistance of the tradition with such a complicated feudal patriarchal system in China was beset with difficulties. Therefore, for over one hundred years, the advanced elements of China have been concentrating on the problems of how to comprehend correctly and handle appropriately the relations between Western society and Chinese society, between Western culture and Chinese culture, so as to find better ways for China to come out of the Middle Ages and realize its modernization.

The reformation of ideas in philosophy, etc., is always the guide for the reformation of the constitutions and implements of a society. From the debates of "the fundamental and the incidental," "the body and the function," and the relationship between Western philosophy, culture and Chinese philosophy, culture had been the most important problems focused upon by Chinese thinkers and politicians who wanted to abolish the old and establish a new culture for over one hundred years; they quarreled about that without end. The most difficult thing was to understand how to treat Chinese philosophy and culture.

We must admit that there are gems in the Chinese traditional culture with its history of several thousand years, but there is also an amount of dross in it. They could not be clearly separated and were tangled one with the other. They gave the strongest resistance to the improvement of China. Many reasons explained why the modernization movement of China could not go smoothly for a long period, why the Westernization Movement and the Reformation of 1898 failed, why the Revolution of 1911 and the following reformations repeatedly met setbacks. But the resistance of traditional culture was at least one of the major reasons. Japan was also a closed backward country in the middle of the 19th century, and it too was invaded by America, Holland, Russia, the Great Britain, France, etc., in the 1850s and forced to sign unjust contracts. However, the Japanese drew a lesson from it in time and carried out the Meiji Reform successfully. Japan quickly became a strong modern country, and soon even began to contend for supremacy with the Western powers in China. Hence, a long history with traditional culture is our rarest treasure of which we are proud, but it probably turns into a burden for our progress if we indulge in the traditional culture but neglect its backward elements, and if we turn our hate of Western aggression into blind rejection of Western philosophy and culture.

There were enough who advocated reform in China at the turn of the 19th and 20th century and the thinkers then were by no means inferior to the Japanese thinkers of the Meiji Reform at advocating the Western learning and transmitting the ideas of reformation. But in success and failure there was a sharp contrast. Possibly, the reason is that China had too heavy a burden of
history, in other words, Chinese philosophy and culture constituted too strong a resistance to what was Western. In contrast Japan had no such heavy burden of history, and took an enlightened and realistic attitude towards the relationship of native and Western culture. The Japanese scholar Touhirobumi who studied in England with Yan Fu, an important thinker among the Westernizers in China, became a key subject in Meiji Reform. But Yan Fu, who was by no means inferior to Touhirobumi in understanding the Western ideological trend and consciousness of the enlightenment, could only translate the Western works with difficulty in China. This should awaken us.

**The Spread of Western Philosophy in China and the Rise of New Culture Movement of the May 4th Movement**

The May 4th Movement was an epoch-making turning point in the modern history of China, whether from the viewpoint of the reformation of cultural ideals or from that of the whole society. Beyond the preparation for change after the Opium War, especially the Revolution of 1911, the turning was due especially to the spread of Western philosophical, social and ideological trends, and its great shock to Chinese traditional philosophy and culture. Yan Fu played an important leading role in transmitting those ideological trends.

Yan Fu could not achieve a great reformation like his Japanese classmate due to his inability to break through the net of Chinese traditional culture, but he made a unique contribution by introducing the Western culture of philosophy, etc., and enlightening the thought of China. In a broad sense, Western learning consists of science and technology, social political system, and the corresponding cultural ideas, etc. Lin Zexu and the Westernizers cared only about the implements (scientific technology). The reformers Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, etc., began to turn their attention from the implements to the social system and ideological culture. Yan Fu was the most prominent among them in translating and introducing Western philosophy, sociology etc. In the book *The Philosophy of China in the Last Fifty Years* (1923), Cai Yuanpei pointed out that "in that period, "Yan Fu was the first in introducing Western philosophy."

During the period from the end of the 19th century and the early 20th century, Yan Fu had translated the following Western books: *Evolution and Ethics and Other Essays* of Huxley (1898), *An Inquiry into the Nature and Cause of the Wealth of Nations* of A. Smith (1902), *The Study of Sociology* of H. Spencer (1903), *On Liberty* of Mill (1903), *History of Politics* of E. Jenks, *System of Logic* of Mill (1904), *The Spirit of Law* of Montesquieu (1909) etc. The books supported progress and reformation in philosophy and provided a justification for the capitalist market economy; they were against dictatorial political autocracy, and advocated the democracy and the free market of capitalism. Yan Fu’s purpose in translating the books was to spread their ideas, enlighten the native people and promote reformation in Chinese society.

In view of the dominant conservative ideological trend, he pointed out that changes would be inevitable whether admitted or not. "Countries of the world are moving upwards, which obliges us to carry out reformations whether we admit it or not. We hold the power for positive reformation, to hand it over to others will result in our being passive in our own reformation." In view of the ideas of "Chinese fundamental and Western incidental "and "Chinese body and Western function," which were all right for the reformation of the implements but not for social reformation, he proposed that here body and function could not be separated, "they refer to one object as just as faces are determined by their different races. The differences between Western learning and Chinese learning cannot be regarded as inadequately the same. Chinese learning has its body and
function just like Western learning: they can exist independently but will perish if mixed up”.

In a word, Yan Fu did not deny Chinese traditional culture indiscriminately, but emphasized that the intellects of native people’s must be enlightened by Western learning in order to make our country prosperous and strong.

The introduction of Western ideological trends by Yan Fu and some other contemporary personages at that time (such as Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Wang Guowei, Zhang Taiyan, Cai Yuanpei, etc) was not complete and systematic, but for most of them, the goal of applying Western thought to improve the reformation of China was very clear-cut. However, they were not and would not be successful because the resistance of the feudal conservatives in China was too strong at that time, because of the traditional philosophy and culture that supported the former. Nevertheless, they did inject the open ideas of reformation and progress into a closed, stagnant and backward China, and these ideas played the important role of enlightenment. Mentioning the function of Yan Fu’s translations of Western ideological trends, Zhang Taiyan pointed out: "from the books of Yan Fu, the idea of survival of the fittest in natural selection was presented distinctly to people’s mind, and the spirit of Chinese people altered with it.”

At the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century, responding to the need of social reformation, the translations and introductions of Yan Fu and others made a good opening in the sphere of learning in China for the next one hundred years, particularly it provided an important preparation of ideological learning for the following New Culture Movement of the May 4th Movement which was to follow in 1919.

This movement was named after the protests of the students in Beijing on May 4th 1919 against the Northern Government which had humiliated the country by forfeiting its sovereignty. The slogan of this movement was "eliminate the traitors within and resist the powers outside”. It was certainly a great patriotic movement with great impact that deserved praise, but its significance was wider than pure patriotism. The occurrence of the movement was highly dependent on the deep effect of the New Culture Movement advocating democracy, science and personal liberation, which affected the students and their supporters, the intellectuals and the broad masses. The New Culture Movement advanced the Enlightenment from the Reformation and Modernization of 1898 and was in continuity with the Revolution of 1911 that revolutionized the feudal dictatorial system and feudal culture. It was also a shock of fundamental significance to the network of traditional culture which constrained the Chinese and prevented China’s modernization.

The New Culture Movement began with the magazine The Youth (renamed as The New Youth in the following year) that was sponsored by Chen Duxiu in Shanghai in 1915. Its main purpose was to combat feudal ideas, culture and feudal ethical codes, while advocating democracy and science, suggesting openness, progress and personal liberation. Chen Duxiu put forwards five principles in the first number of The Youth: independence not slavery, progressive not conservative, enterprising not elusive, worldwide not closed, scientific not imaginary. The aims of the publication of the magazine were widely welcomed by the young students and patriotic intellectuals, but were criticized by some feudal conservatives. So Chen Duxiu published his article "Answer to the Case of the New Youth” in the magazine, No.1, Volume 6, 1919:

Our comrades working on the magazine are innocent naturally, but we got into these towering crimes only for supporting the two Misters, Democracy and Science. To advocate Mister De means to be against Confucianism, laws and rite, virginity, old ethics, and old politics; to advocate Mister Sci indicates being against the old art and old religions. So we have to fight against the quintessence of a country and the old literature in order to advocate both Mr. De and Mr. Sci.
Please think calmly and carefully whether the magazine has any other cases except supporting Mr. De and Mr. Sci. Please don’t blame the magazine particularly. If you have the strength and encourage to fight against Mr. De and Mr. Sci, you’re the brave man, that is the fundamental measure.

Chen Duxiu’s invitation of "Mr. De and Mr. Sci" not only cut into the current evils of that time, but also found the effective way to cure the cause of the disease that had prevented China feudal society from going forwards, "Mr. De"(Democracy) could restrain the dictatorial feudal system, and "Mr. Sci" (Science) could conquer superstition and childish ignorance which related closely to feudal ideas, culture, and ethical codes. Only if the two Misters were kindly welcomed, could a society break out of its closed and conservative situation, open up and make progress. In the same way, if a society were to establish a democratic system and respect for science, it must confirm the independent rights of the people and improve them as persons. Therefore the representatives of the New Culture Movement of the May 4th Movement proposed personal liberation. Progress, liberty, and personal liberation, etc., accompanied "Mr. De and Mr. Sci". From then till now, support for the two "Misters" has been an important criterion for judging the people’s progress or retardation. As for how to comprehend and explain these criteria concretely, especially how to carry them out, people of different groups had different opinions; some even contradicted each other sharply. But commonly they directed their spearheads of their attack at the dictatorial feudal system and superstitious ignorance.

The New Youth served as a flag for those who advocated democracy and science in the May 4th Movement. Some other advanced publications appeared under its influence around the May 4th Movement, and extended the influence of the New Culture Movement. It was in that tide that the May 4th Movement of 1919 broke out. On the other hand, the May 4th Movement of the students and the following workers’ and women’s movements greatly pushed forward the New Culture Movement and developed it into a revolutionary movement with wide ranging and deep influences. All this became the May 4th Movement in a broad sense. In essence its goal was ultimately to change the directions of the development of Chinese ideological culture and the corresponding social system.

There have been a large number of studies and discussions about how to look upon the spirits of democracy, science and related personal liberation that were the leitmotivs of the New Culture Movement. What I want to add here is that the spirit sponsored by the thinkers of the May 4th Movement was not inherited by them from Chinese traditional philosophy and culture, but was introduced from the west directly by thinkers or other media. This was the common spirit in modern Western philosophical trends, which were in continuity with the Enlightenment spirit and were supported by the advanced Western thinkers of the Renaissance. In this sense, supported by the Western Enlightenment spirit, the New Culture Movement was an Enlightenment movement in China moving from the Middle Ages to modernization. It was the product of the collision between Western ideological trends, especially modern Western philosophy, and traditional Chinese philosophy and culture.

Yan Fu’s translation and introduction of the Western philosophy was only the beginning; the summit was the period of the May 4th. At that time, Western philosophical trends, from the ideas of Plato and Aristotle in ancient Greek to various contemporary trends, were being introduced in China. From modern philosophy, besides the introduction by Yan Fu, Wang Guowei, etc., of the positivism of Mill and Spencer, and the philosophy of will of Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. Hu Shi introduced pragmatism, Liang Sumin and Zhang Junmai, etc. presented the philosophy of life,
Ding Wenjiang and Wang Xinggong etc. studied Machism. Meanwhile new-Kantianism, new-Hegelianism, new-realism and new-positivism, etc. were being discussed in China. The American pragmatist John Dewey, the new-realist Bertrand Russell and the German philosopher of life Hans Driesch were invited to lecture in China.

The theoretical tendency of the philosophical trends and the social background of their origins and spread had crucial differences. The modern philosophical trends contradicted each other. For example, the positivism and the philosophy of will represent and create contradictory currents between its philosophy of science and the humanism of modern philosophy. But in common most proposed improving rather than obliterating human rationality, improving not countering the spirit of science, respecting not constraining the personalities of people, doing away with not protecting the autocracy which restricted the rights of people, reexamining but not blindly worshipping the authority and value of the tradition. The philosophy of will proposed that the will should be superior to rationality, but the real sense of its irrationalism is not to deny rationality simply but to oppose absolute rationality, especially absolute idealism (such as Hegel’s absolute idealism), which suppressed realistic rationality and liberty of human beings because it regards rationality as absolute and overriding man himself. Though they have expressed many critiques of science, what they actually opposed was making human beings the tool of science, that is, they fought against the alienation of human beings which science brought and made human beings lose their essential particularities. The ideas proposed by the representatives of the New Culture Movement were from such studies of Western philosophical trends.

Especially important is that, before the May 4th Movement, the Marxism that originated in the west began to be introduced into China by the media of Russia and Japan. The success of the October Revolution of 1917 in Russia greatly encouraged the progressive figures in China. Soon after the October Revolution, Li Dazhao published the congratulatory article, *The Victory Of Bolshevism*. In 1919, he published the article *My Opinions On Marxism* in the special issue “on Marxism” of *The New Youth*, in which he introduced the three components of Marxism respectively. Some other journals and newspapers began to publish many articles propagandizing Marxism, and some important works of the revolutionary leaders like Marx, etc. were translated and published. As Mao Zedong described it; “the thunder of the guns of the October Revolution bring Marxism and Leninism to us”\(^6\) The introduction of Marxism had a deep effect in the field of ideas and culture in China; Marxism became the ideological support and leading force in the New Culture Movement; it greatly pushed forwards the rising movements of the workers and promoted the foundation of the Communist Party of China. Since then, the revolution of China began to switch from the old democracy to the new democracy and took up the great ideal of going to socialism and communinism in the end.

Of course, the scholars of the May 4th Movement studied and introduced different philosophies for different purposes. They had quite different opinions on a series of problems of which Western philosophical trend or which parts of it should be affirmed and how to deal with the relationship between the Western ideas and Chinese culture. The differences led to heated debates between them. The choice between Western culture and Chinese culture, between problem and doctrine, and between science and metaphysics were the most famous among them. However, they shared much common ground: they were all equipped with the will to devote themselves to getting China out of its domestic troubles, protecting it from foreign invasions and making it strong. From the studies of Western learning they hoped to find good means to save the country and the people. Most importantly, they promoted Science and Democracy from different angles and in different ways, advocated the liberation of man from feudal autocracy and various absolute
traditional ideas, and greatly developed one’s individuality. They differed greatly in their attitudes towards Chinese traditional philosophy and culture, but few either negated or accepted it completely. Their major difference was how and to what degree to combine it with modern Western philosophy and culture.

The Development of the Studies on Western Philosophy and Two Important Philosophical Debates

For many years the academia of China has been paying great attention to the Western philosophies introduced around the May 4th Movement and the debates among them. Some scholars have made great achievements in these studies. But comments on the ideological trends and explanations of the relations among them, especially the relationship between Marxist philosophy and Western philosophy, seemed inadequate, even unilateral. This prevents us from commenting correctly on Western philosophy and its relation with Marxist philosophy. We can see the effect on the debate between problem and doctrine, and the argumentation between science and metaphysics.

As for the debates between the Marxist Li Dazhao and the pragmatist Hu shi on problem and doctrine in 1919, the academics of China have been emphasizing the radical contradiction between them. It seems reasonable from the point of view that Marxism is fundamentally different from the social political philosophy of pragmatism, but it is not so simple if seen from the concrete relations between Marxism and pragmatism in the May 4th Movement.

The debate took place before the foundation of the Communist Party of China. As one of the Western ideological trends, Marxism was introduced into China. At that time, despite Marxists such as Cheng Duxiu, Li Dazhao, etc., and the pragmatist Hu shi having different political and philosophical convictions, neither of them could make an overall and systematic comment on the opposite theory from their own theoretical standpoint. The reason is that Marxism and pragmatism had been brought into China for only a short time. However, although Chen and Li hand studied in Japan, and Hu in America, they did not study those philosophies integrally and deeply abroad, let alone understand them in the context of the development of Western philosophy, as was reflected distinctly in their publications at that time. Although Hushi was regarded as an expert in pragmatism, his publications on pragmatism at that time were far from the real meaning of his American teacher Dewey, and as for Marxist philosophy, he was utterly ignorant of it (in fact, Dewey knew little about Marxism). Hence, both sides of the debate had very different opinions, but they were far from being sharply opposed in politics and philosophy. In fact, they were standing at the same battle line to some degree in fighting against feudal autocracy and various old ideas, against the feudal ethical code and old culture, and in promoting democracy, science and human individuality. Despite the fact that Dewey was invited by pragmatists such as Hushi, etc., to lecture in China, his lectures were welcomed by Marxists like Chen Duxiu, etc.; Chen was even the host of Dewey’s lectures in Guangzhou.

It was only reasonable in the final analysis that the debate between Li Dazhao and Hushi presented the two different political directions of Marxism and pragmatism. In his article "Further Remarks On Problem And Doctrine", Li Dazhao indeed criticized Hshi’s suggestion "to study more the problems and talk less about doctrines", but in the conclusion of the article, he noted expressly that some of his opinions "were totally identical with or lightly different from Hushi’s. Hushi to some degree accepted Li Dazhao’s opinion about the inseparability between problem and doctrine in his two following replies, expressing that he was not against all doctrines.
blindly, but only against abstractionism "with its emptiness and lack of concrete content", and he suggested "combining doctrine with actions as one, never separating it into two unrelated parts". Their arguments were not completely incompatible, but were more related to some concrete opinions about social political problems and less involved in their deep theoretical structures. With regard to the majority who accepted or opposed their opinions, they lacked knowledge of the two philosophies; which side they would accept depended on many sophisticated factors. They did not simply agree with or oppose fundamental social reformation.

Above all, despite the contradiction between Marxism and pragmatism since they were introduced in China in the May 4th Movement, they affirmed the common ends of the New Culture Movement. The difference between them is not whether, but how to lead China onto the road of democracy and science. The Marxists of Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao etc. were turning from Democracy to Marxism; they believed in evolution as introduced by Yan Fu, etc., and went along the path of advocating social reformation. Even during the time of the May 4th Movement, they had not gotten rid of the influences of evolutionism. Therefore, it is not strange that they shared common points with Hushi on some aspects. We should mention that, although Mao Zedong began to come into contact with Marxism at the time of May 4th, as he told Shinuo, he highly admired Hushi at that time.

After the May 4th Movement, Marxism and pragmatism became indeed more and more contradictory because the political conflicts in China greatly changed the situation and their backgrounds were different. Sometimes pragmatism had been used by those people who did not agree with or even opposed Marxism and the Communist Party of China. Moreover, from the introduction of pragmatism in China in May 4th times, the introduction of pragmatism by Chinese scholars including Hushi had been unilateral, and even strayed from the true theories of the pragmatic philosophies of Peirce and Dewey. Especially they did not distinguish the deep meaning of pragmatism as a philosophy from the psychological sense of pursuing individual private interest, which was understood by bourgeois persons. Such pragmatism was basically contradictory to Marxist philosophy as a revolutionary philosophy of the proletariat. My opinion on these problems had been explained in my publications in the past (including the new edition of Modern Western Philosophy published by People's Publishing House). As I treat this further in other articles, no more words are necessary here.

As for the debate between science and metaphysics (the debate between science and views of life) which took place in 1923, Chinese academics rightly emphasized the contradiction between them, especially their opposite relationships to Marxism. Standing on the side of science, Ding Wenjiang, Wang Xinggong and Hushi carried out heated arguments with Zhang Junmai, Liang Qichao, etc., who represented the opposite metaphysical side. And the Marxists Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubai, etc., criticized their unilateral attitude from the standpoint of historical materialism.

However, the debate remained within the limits of the shared concerns of the New Culture Movement and concentrated on how to escape from the Middle Ages and step forwards into modernization. The theoretical foundation of the science group was Western scientific philosophy, Machism, pragmatism etc.; that of the metaphysics group (metaphysics means philosophy beyond the limitation of science and experience) was Western culture philosophy, philosophy of will, and philosophy of life. These philosophical trends came into being at the end of 19th century and the beginning of 20th century. They quarreled with each other without end in the west, but shared important common points in combating superstitious obedience and traditional authorities which constrained people, advocating social improvement and the liberation of human beings. For that reason the Chinese scholars at that time accepted and introduced these philosophical ideas. To
accept or oppose one philosophy sometimes depended on their different academic backgrounds, not only on the differences of their political and philosophical standpoints entirely. Now that their purpose in introducing these philosophical trends was to alter the direction of development of Chinese society and culture, they were destined to collide with Chinese traditional culture. Therefore, their difference on this aspect was only a matter of degree, rather than always being fundamental contradictions. Liang Qichao, Zhang Junmai and other advocates of metaphysics had talked about sponsoring traditional Confucianism, but they were not simply returning to the ancient vision. If some other contemporary figures such as Tan Sitong, Wang Guowei, Zhang Taiyan, and even Chen Duxiu, Li Dazhao and Lu Xun, had once explained and criticized Chinese traditional culture as presented by the great classical expositors with the instrument of Western philosophy, such as the philosophy of Will and the philosophy of Life, could they be called advocates of returning to the ancient? Hushi, who was of the science group, had once talked of wholesale Westernization, but he had never denied the overall Chinese traditional culture. Rather, he proposed reorganizing it by systematically introducing Western learning in order to "recreate a civilization"; this would be to modernize Chinese traditional philosophy and culture. For many years, in the debate between science and metaphysics, the advocates of metaphysics were called the eastern culture school and conservatives by many scholars in China, while the advocates of science were regarded as the Western culture school and liberal Westernizers. Strictly speaking, this was not correct.

A basic idea of Zhang Junmai’s, who was considered an advocate of eastern culture, was to draw a clear line between science and philosophy (metaphysics and outlook of life): philosophy could not be called science nor could science be substiuted for philosophy. This was the basic opinion of Western culture philosophy (humanism) of Schopenhauer, Nietzsche and Bergson. As for the successors of Zhang Junmai, etc., they were called new-Confucians (including their new generation), and their thought was widely advertised and practiced. Their opinions on the distinction between science and philosophy, and the ideas of anti-science, were also not to put the "mature vinegar" made by modern Western philosophers into the "old bottle" of Chinese Confucianism (especially the Neo-Confucianism of the Song and Ming Dynasties). In spite of their concrete opinions (such as the distinction between truth and reality, affirmative culture-historical method, the distinction between world of fact and world of value) and their rationality, the reason why some scholars of Chinese culture took what they said as "new theories" is probably that they lacked knowledge of modern Western philosophy. They should not be regarded simply as conservatives, because neither the related Western philosophy which was their theoretic origin nor the revised new Confucianism blindly denied the basic ideas of democracy and science of Western Enlightenment. Their concern was to provide these ideas with more native features.

It may be more reasonable to call the advocates of science advocates of Western culture, because Ding Wenjiang, Wang Xinggong, Hu shi particularly emphasized the scientific nature of philosophy and the general validity of the scientific method which was derived from the Western scientism of positivism, Machism and pragmatism, etc. However, at least two points should be considered.

Firstly, among the scientistic philosophy trends few, even in the west, thought that science was absolute, that there were no studies beyond science. The attempts of positivism, etc., were indeed to validate philosophy under the flag of anti-metaphysics, which means that they confined philosophy within the limitation of verified science or experience. They held that problems beyond that should be studied by philosophers of metaphysics, by which they usually referred to philosophy in the traditional sense which was inter-linked with humanist trends. In a word, both
were the successors of the philosophy of Kant: one group took the direction of the theoretical rationality of Kant, the other took the direction of his practical rationality. Though both groups in the debates were in similar contexts, there are ample reasons to call the science group advocating theoretical rationality the group of Western culture and to call the group of metaphysics supporting practical rationality the group of eastern culture.

Secondly, although one of the science group (such as Hu Shi) once put forwards the slogan: "wholesale Westernization" — and indeed a few proposed an extreme or "wholesale Westernization" at the times of the May 4th, their attacks were directed mainly at traditional culture as characterized by serious obscurantism. They only exceeded the proper limits of their critique. At that time, as the old ideas, old culture and feudal ethical codes seriously impeded China’s development and led previous reformatons to failure, the inclination to overcorrect should not be overly criticized. Hu shi, who has been much criticized for advocating a "wholesale Westernization" may have misused words on some aspects because it was he who emphasized rearranging and improving traditional culture to uncover its positive meaning. As mentioned above, his definition of wholesale Westernization proposed only to import Western learning overall and systematically, not piecemeal and unilaterally, and it was to be used to restudy traditional culture and to merge Chinese with world civilization in an organic unity. This had crucial differences with a wholesale Westernization.

When the debates between science and metaphysics took place, the Communist Party of China had been founded and was cooperated with Kuomintang (KMT) led by Sun Zhongshan. Although the group of New Culture Movement had began to split up, their political controversies did not intensify. Therefore, Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubai, etc., took part in the discussions in the name of the Communist Party of China. They attempted to criticize both the group of science and that of metaphysics from the standpoint of historical materialism. But their understanding of historical materialism obviously tended toward economic determinism and mechanism, which always reflected a scientism. Especially when they attempted to explain everything in human life through scientific causality, they did not rightly explain the relationship between fact and value, the world of science and the world of value. However, they showed the influences of Western humanism in emphasizing the improvement of the individual and striking out images. They sharply divided Marxism from other Western philosophical trends in every aspect. The engagement of historical materialism in the criticism of the various philosophies of idealism, dualism and agnosticism had historical significance in spreading broadly historical materialism in China. Its one-sidedness is due rather to the general circumstances existing in the development of Marxist philosophy at that time, and even long after. Now many problems in the studies of Marxist philosophy in China are seen to be deviations from the original intentions of Marx. For example, the theory of values was admitted only a short time ago, and some scholars still affirm the Marxist philosophy of the "Stalin model". Why then over criticize the Marxists of that time?

Generally speaking, the debate between science and metaphysics which took place in the later May 4th period may be regarded as representing the debate between Western scientism and humanism under the particular conditions in China. The need is to understand the two ideological trends overall, especially the relationship between them and Marxist philosophy, and to distinguish clearly the essence from the dross of Chinese culture. This would make it possible to give a more correct evaluation to the possible positive and negative functions of Western ideas in their interaction with Chinese culture after they had been introduced there. It is not only difficult for the Chinese scholars who came into contact with Western philosophies for the first time to do so; even today, few would dare to say that they have a good command of the two ideological trends and of
their relation to Marxism. To understand the relations deeply requires the academicians to study further and in a cooperative manner. The Marxists in China in the May 4th epoch had an obscure understanding of the two ideological trends and of their interrelations, and especially their relation to Marxist philosophy. But they made their best possible contributions, particularly by beginning to apply historical materialism to observing and analyzing related problems, for which they were much more qualified than other thinkers of different inclinations.

For the last twenty years or more, the introduction of Western learning after the Opium War, especially the New Culture Movement, has been one of the hot sports in Chinese academia. Discussion of this reached its high point around the 60s, the 70s and the 80s, the anniversary of the May 4th Movement. Although they did not come to an agreement, people’s knowledge of the social politics and ideological culture in China around the May 4th Movement has been greatly improved. That people found fault with each other in these discussions, and some were regarded as transgressors by others is not strange. The first reason is that the problems put forward in the May 4th Movement not only represented collectively the key issues for the people who worked hard to realize modernization in China for over one hundred years (such as science, democracy, overall development of people, etc.), but also referred to some major problems in the development of modern world philosophy (such as the relationship between the philosophical trend of scientism and that of the humanities, and their relations to Marxist philosophy). Before modernization could be realized in China and China could engage organically in the tide of world development, and before the problems of modern world philosophy could be solved, studies and discussions on these problems would continue, which would have important significance both theoretically and practically. Secondly, the academicians of our country have been so deeply influenced by the long popular way of black and white thinking (displayed in taking class struggle as the key link), that many people are used unconsciously to think that between Marxism and non-Marxism, between the different philosophies of non-Marxism (such as between scientism and humanism), and even on all problems there exist absolutely clear dividing lines. Without concrete analysis of the theories of different thinkers, they declared the above relations to be "fundamentally contradictory" according to a fixed model of thinking. We have made many mistakes in every aspect by this way of thinking. In fact, sometimes sincere motivation to protect Marxism led to departing from genuine Marxism. Now it is the time to reexamine ideas that were long popular, but not genuine. Because this chapter is very long, I must explain my concrete opinions on this aspect in other articles.

The Studies of Western Philosophy and the Political Conflicts of Modern China

The introduction of Western philosophical trends in China since Yan Fu etc. was done out of the need for realistic social and political reforms in China, and therefore, must be confined by the realistic social and political environment of China. The collision between Chinese and Western culture was closely connected with social and political conflicts in modern China. The ideas of reformation were forbidden and the reformers were killed after the Coup of 1898. These were the political reactions of the dictatorial feudal system which were decadent and declining and the corresponding ideology in China. In May 4th 1919, the old unitary absolute feudal monarchy in China had been shaken, while a new unified political structure had not been formed. Conflicts among warlords and the plural political structure formed by the struggle among different political powers provided an opportunity for a temporary multi-ideological structure to some degree. Learning was less controlled by the
political structure or they could find their standpoints in one or another of the multiple oppositions. Marxism and other Western ideological trends with the inclinations of the enlightenment could co-exist with the feudal reactionary ideology to a limited degree.

However, such co-existence was full of conflicts. The May 4th movement precipitated the founding of the Communist Party of China (1921) which represented the direction of Chinese society and also spurred the bourgeois revolutionaries led by Sun Zhongshan to reorganize the Kuomintang (1924). These greatly improved Chinese society and created a new turn in the political struggle of China. There were sophisticated conflicts between the revolutionary power in the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation and the reactionary Northern Warlords, conflicts among the left, middle and right within the Kuomintang, and that between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. These conflicts were also found in the field of ideological culture, such as the debate between science and metaphysics. The death of Li Dazhao in 1927 under the butcher’s knife of the Northern Warlords’ showed indicated that the enemies of Marxism in China used the weapon not only of Chinese traditional culture but also of political violence to directly put down Marxism.

In 1927, Jiang Jieshi destroyed the Kuomintang-Communist cooperation by an anti-revolutionary coup, which led to opposite political structures for the two political powers of Kuomintang and the Communist Party. Studies on ideological culture, including Western philosophy, were restricted by the structure in general. While the Kuomintang dominated the mainland of China, the study of Marxism was not only confined but also regarded as illegal most of the time, and the study of Western philosophy was always the ideological instrument of the Kuomintang. In the discussions about democracy and autocracy around 1935, some people who had once advocated democracy and science in the May 4th Movement (such as Ding Wenjiang who was the advocate of Machism) then proposed carrying out "a new style autocracy" under the excuse of enforcing the cohesion of the country and realizing a rapid unification. After 1940, the group "Strategy on Warring States " took the philosophy of Will of Schopenhauer, and especially of Nietzsche, as theoretical justification for autocratic politics. Meanwhile the old culture criticized by Western learning at the time of the May 4th Movement of 1919 was returned to the sacrificial altar as the collision between Western and Chinese culture seemed to be reversed to some degree. If we say that the Three People’s Principles of Sun Zhongshan originated from Western bourgeois democracy, and the new Three People’s Principles of his later period were enlightened by the October Revolution of Russia in 1917, then the so-called philosophy of Dai Jitao’s which was done in honor of Sun Zhongshan after his death, and the practical philosophy in name of Jiang Jieshi, brought some Western ideas (especially the philosophical trends of irrationalism) into the framework of Chinese traditional culture. This means that the ideas of Chinese body and Western function once criticized by the reformers before the May 4th Movement, recovered once again.

Of course, there were still a few scholars who devoted themselves to the study of Western philosophy or to a comparative study of Western and Chinese philosophy, who tried not to be influenced by political prejudice. Some of them even constructed their own philosophical system, such as the New Confucianism of Feng Yu Lan, and the new theory of mind of He Lin which were different from Marxism. Most of them had no bad political ambitions, some even showed good political behavior, but none could escape the reality of the control by the political struggle. If their work was of no use to the Kuomintang’s rule they could get no financial or other support. Some scholars, who had made great progress when abroad, made little after they returned to their country for lack of support from the government, since they could not meet the needs of KMT. So it is not a surprise that, during the thirty-years after the May Fourth Movement, although research on
Western philosophy was not a blank, great works were very rare. Recently, some scholars have contended that the period around 1930 or so was one during which scholars could do their research without being much bothered. This seems not true, for if the KMT did not use academic research to support itself and to oppose Marxism directly, at least it is true that they used it to reduce the influence of Marxism indirectly.

There are many opinions on the great changes after May Fourth Movement in the area of culture and thought. Some scholars contended that the change meant a failure of the New Cultural Movement. Moreover they thought the cause of the failure was that survival weighed down enlightenment. While this seems to have some grounds, essentially it is false for if one interprets the enlightenment of May Fourth Movement as a leading voice advocating democracy, science and individual freedom, then, indeed after May Fourth Movement, the voice lowered in proportion to others. But, the most that a theory of enlightenment advocating science and democracy can do in a short time is to awake people from a deep sleep; the full realization of its ideal needs better conditions and practical application. Historically, most Western nations experienced a long complicated process, full of conflicts and struggles, from enlightenment to the success of the bourgeois revolution. All thoughts of enlightenment in May Fourth Movement, including Marxism, were introduced from the West. As new thinking, they are doomed to conflict with the Chinese cultural tradition and its political system. They would not have any influence upon China unless they adjusted themselves to the special social and cultural circumstances of China. But that cannot be done in a short period, its accomplishment is a torturous and repetitive process. The great changes in the cultural field after the May Fourth Movement is a brilliant example of such a process.

The society of China during May Fourth Movement was semi-colonial and semi-feudal. If one desires to realize the goals of enlightenment, an anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution is indispensable. When the Japanese invaded China, the National Salvation Movement launched and led by the CCP came to be not only a premise, but also an important part of this revolution. Salvation was a continuance of the enlightenment and did not weigh down the former. After the May Fourth Movement, with the political situation of a mix of war among warlords, with confrontation between the KMT and CCP (Chinese Communist Party), the diversity of argument in the cultural region disappeared; it became an attack of language between Marxism and Anti-Marxism or Non-Marxism. Although, during the period of the May Fourth Movement there had been hot arguments between thoughts coming from the West, there still existed the common points among them, that is advocating science and democracy. After the May 4th Movement, especially after the breach of the alliance between KMT and CCP, the more the above mentioned common point was ignored, the more the new one of opposing Marxism was emphasized and stood out. The same is true for Nietzsche, who once was used in the May Fourth Movement as a tool to advocate individual freedom and attack tradition. For example, it is well-known that Lu Xun so admired Nietzsche because of the latter’s praise of individual freedom and anti-traditionalism. Some people, influenced by the thought that Nietzsche’s philosophy as a philosophical prejudice of the decaying reactionary imperialists, had difficulty in explaining why Lu Xun praised him. To avoid this dilemma they thought Lu Xun must have misunderstand Nietzsche. In fact, Lu Xun grasped the truth of Nietzsche’s philosophy. But during the period from 1930 to 1949, some other persons used it as an argument for the dictatorship of Jiang Jie Shi. (Some words in Nietzsche’s philosophy do support this use, which is why the Fascists in Germany and Italy hold Nietzsche in high esteem. But that is not the kernel of his thought.) Most of the debates in the area governed by the KMT were basically—anti-Marxist.
In a word, the conditions of the study of Western philosophy in China, especially regarding values, differed greatly between the time of May Fourth Movement and afterwards. This phenomenon is not due to the changes in the content and intrinsic value of Western philosophy, but to the reading in China of its meaning; place and value changed due to the violent domestic changes. Among other things, the changed understanding of the relationship between Marxism and Western philosophy illustrated why the study of Western philosophy in China used to be controlled by the political struggle. As an ideology, philosophy is always affected by the actual political contest. In this light, it is natural that the above-mentioned changes concerning the study of Western philosophy took place in China. But, philosophy also has a sort of independence; and it would be a distortion to channel it into the structure of the struggle by oversimplification and generalization. When we research the study of Western philosophy if China historically, we must consider not only the social background (especially the political struggles), but also the intrinsic academic value of the study.

The Study of Western Philosophy and the Marxist Political Tendency in China

The attitude of Chinese Marxists to the study of Western philosophy in China was intimately linked with their political concerns; the turn of the former was subjected to that of the latter. Since the introduction of Marxism, the almost 80 years of its continuing study and pursuit by the CCP, and with its development and enrichment by combining with Chinese practice, it has made great progress. But this progress was based on overcoming all kinds of left- and right-deviations. Those deviations, especially those of the left, did great damage to the revolution and many other enterprises – and to the study of Western philosophy as well.

Chinese Marxists contend that the study and evaluation of Western philosophy should be directed according to Marxism, in order for them to help the development of Marxist philosophy and the revolution of China. Only under this condition, is it possible for the study of Western philosophy to give full play to its positive role and to overcome its negative role. This is the reason why Western philosophy has played a positive role since its introduction sometimes and to some extent. The reason why May Fourth Movement developed into a great public revolutionary movement with a new direction for the broad wide population is that, insisting on its own position, Chinese Marxists established a broad united front with those who believed in science and democracy and who were influenced by such Western trends as pragmatism and others. This means that the positive role of Western philosophy was used, while the negative was avoided.

Nevertheless, simultaneously with the political left-and right-deviation of the development of Marxism, similar deviations appeared in the study of Western philosophy and that according to a left-deviation was the more outstanding. Since the later 1930’s, when the KMT betrayed the revolution and the CCP was regarded as illegal, many Western philosophies were used as theoretical bases for attacking Marxism. This increased the hostility of Chinese Marxists to Western philosophy (especially to contemporary Western philosophy). More unfortunately, this situation was aggravated by the continuous Opportunism of the left-deviation of the CCP and the forming of a complete theoretical left-deviation system by the international Communist Movement. During this period, the number of Marxists increased who inclined to reject Western philosophy, especially contemporary philosophy.

To illustrate why the authority of the previous Soviet Union had a left-deviation attitude toward Western philosophy, I would like to mention the two distinct and opposite views to Dewey at two different times. After the Revolution of October, Machism and other Western philosophies
opposed to Marxism were attacked violently. But Dewey, regarded as a left-wing scholar, was treated in a friendly manner and previously was sometimes even praised by the Soviet Union. In 1928 Dewey was invited to visit the Soviet Union. Many high officials met with him, calling him "progressive" and praising many of his theories. Dewey sympathized with many revolutionary policies taken up by the Soviet Union and highly praised their revolution as a ‘great experience’. But later in the 1940’s, Dewey doubted whether the verdict on Trotsky by Soviet Union authorities was just and launched an investigation with other liberals. When it finished, they pronounced Trotsky innocent. (This meant that he disagreed with the way Trotsky was judged; there is a big difference between Dewey and Trotsky, whether on the side of philosophy or in their political standpoints and Dewey had written to criticize Trotsky on these aspects.) On hearing the words of Dewey, the Soviet Union authorities changed their attitude to Dewey abruptly, and charged him with being an "evil enemy of the Soviet Union", "an apologist for the propertied class and imperialism." And the pragmatism he advocated was belittled as a ‘reactionary philosophy of imperialism’. In fact, among contemporary philosophers, Dewey is a representative of those who insisted on social reform and progress. To reject him and his philosophy meant that there is no Western philosopher or philosophy that could be accepted by the Soviet Union. In fact, there was no positive voice for any Western philosophy in the forum of the Soviet Union after the late 1940’s.

The above kind of left-deviation due to the disharmony of political viewpoints, by which the authority of previous Soviet Union rejected Western philosophy, influenced China greatly. Also due to domestic circumstances, Chinese Marxists held the same view as the above on pragmatism and other Western philosophies, almost simultaneously with the authority of the Soviet Union since the 1930’s. In the decades of warlike years, it has been difficult for Chinese Marxists to criticize Western philosophy theoretically and systematically. Apart from the materials cited in their debates with anti-Marxist theorists, there were hardly any systematic works about Western philosophy. As a result a denial of Western philosophy was dug deeply into the soil.

Therefore, after the revolutionary war led by the CCP and when the P.R.C. was formally established, it was natural that ideological debates were regarded as one of the main forms of political struggle. Mao Zedong and other leaders emphasized repeatedly the continuation of the revolution in the field of ideology. Thus criticizing Western philosophy according to Marxism came to be the main content of the ideological revolution. After Liberation, those Western philosophies previously taught in Chinese universities were considered enemies of Marxism. Thus, in 1952 or so, an adjustment was made in all the faculties of all the colleges in China. Except for preserving the philosophy faculty of Peking University, all the others were suppressed. A few reputed professors of philosophy were gathered in Peking University so as to be more conveniently reformed. Others were forced to change their job.

In the middle of the 1960’s, Mao launched a movement to criticize pragmatism. In the political situation at that time, this movement may have been indispensable. If the negative influence of bourgeois ideas or philosophy prevailed, it would be difficult to establish the leadership of Marxism in all cultural fields. To some degree, the aim was reached, but it negatively influenced the study of Western philosophy. The problem is that many of those criticisms were not based on the essentials of Dewey’s and other philosophies but only on how they were seen in terms of Marxism. Thus by the name of Marxism, a set of left-deviation academic criteria — the model according to which Western thought was criticized arbitrarily and abstractly instead of objectively and concretely, was established gradually. During a period of about twenty years, this model had dictated the thinking of China. Most Western philosophy was reduced to belonging to a decaying and reactionary philosophy, that is, a pure idealism or metaphysics. In this atmosphere, few people
dared to take foot in the study of contemporary Western philosophy. Except for several critical articles issued to meet political needs, and a few works of contemporary philosophy published in order to be criticized, there seldom was any profound and systematical works on Western philosophy. In fact, research on contemporary Western philosophy was interrupted.

Luckily, for matching the learning and research of Marxism, some Western classical philosophy, such as that of Germany, were still studied as component elements of materialism and dialectics and some progress was made. From 1956, some comprehensive universities restored their philosophical faculties little by little and some others set them up afresh. In these universities, the history of Western philosophy was specified as one of the key compulsory subjects. Some monographic discourses and lectures on Kant, Hegel, Feuerbach and other philosophers were opened in some universities under better conditions. Accordingly, a few experts wrote some treatises on these famous philosophers or their works. In addition to that, some great Western philosophical works were translated and published. For example, the department of Peking University translated and edited a set of books named Selected Works of Western Classical Philosophy. Unfortunately, all these works were interrupted by the Ten-years of Great Calamity.

Generally speaking, theoretically, Chinese Marxists thought that the study of Western philosophy should be based on the principles of Marxism, but regrettably, the practice was far from their original intention. The way in which they were walking was progressive, but wounding. The left-deviation obstructed the more objective and complete recognition they should have had of Western philosophy. Had they not allowed the political to be the only standard by which to measure Western philosophy, then the study of Western philosophy in order to meet their political needs would have been the most distinctive contribution of Chinese Marxists. What they practically did made it difficult for them to study the matters-of-fact of Western philosophy concretely and thoroughly, and made them unable to distinguish the negative from the positive aspects of Western philosophy. The further result was to reject Western philosophy completely. Unfortunately, the political standard came to be the outstanding weakness of Chinese Marxists. One of its negative effects was that, under that exclusive guide, both Marxism and other cultural fields were confined to a closed situation for a long time, which cut them off from the development of the rest of the world. It obstructed their growth and enrichment. Why the routine of left-deviation dominated Chinese politics for such a long time, why the Open and Reform policy had not been taken earlier, and why obstacles were met when it was put into action, the important reason is the closedness of the system.

**Western Philosophy’s Study and Discussion of the Relation between Philosophies of Practice and of System**

Besides the political reason, another reason for the crude denial of Western philosophy by Chinese Marxists is in the field of theory. Many Chinese Marxists did not grasp Marxism correctly; this made it difficult for them to figure out the matters-of-fact of Western philosophy in accord with the matter-of-fact Marxist attitude they should have had based on the influences from abroad, combined with the problems they met in the development of Marxism in China.

In the middle of the nineteenth century, when Marx put forward his theory of philosophy, he thought the kernel of his philosophy was its emphasis on the real life and practice of people. In the beginning of the article, *An Outline On Feuerbach*, he pointed out that the weakness of materialism, including Feuerbach’s, is in not understanding the role of practice, the sense movement of human being. This was true as well for idealism. But he did understand the decisive
role of the perspective of practice in the study of philosophy. "Because, whether thought is of objective truth or not, is not a problem of theory, but of practice", "Essentially, social life is one kind of practice, all problems leading理论 to mysticism can be solved reasonably in human being’s practice and the understanding of it."10

In Outline, Marx pointed out that practice is not isolated individual action, nor the ‘generic’ movement embodying the common character of the human being as a natural animal, but should be the aggregate of all socialized relations. In this article, Marx connected the social attributes of human beings with practice; this provided the solid basis on which his more complete historical materialism was to be established in the future. The radical mission of Marxism is to serve the proletariat’s struggle to reform the real world. According to Marxism, a good theory is not a solid doctrine, but just a guide to action. A true Marxist would never blindly obey any abstract doctrine detached from real life and practice, but would combine theory with real life and practice, let the former guide the latter, and at the same time let the former be tested by the latter. In this process, theory is enriched and gradually developed. In this sense, Marxism is a philosophy insisting on practice, based on the real social life of the people. Without doubt, Marxism is a materialism, but different from the modern kind based on nature-in-itself; it is ‘the materialism that interprets the sensate movement of human being as practice’11, that is, the materialism based on the historic practice of real people.

In fact, Marx not only did not attempt to construct a philosophical system which could be complete and well organized, but closed and solid in essence, but also opposed such. In the same article, he pointed out, ‘Philosophers only interpret the world in different ways, but the question is how to reform it.’12 The sentence is the conclusion not only of this article, but also of his whole philosophy. The cardinal purpose of his philosophy is to serve the proletariat class in reforming the world. Thus, Marxism is not a solid doctrine, but just a guide to action; true Marxists would never obey any abstract doctrine departing from realistic life and practice blindly. They would combine Marxism with real life and practice, let the former guide the latter, and at the same time let the former be judged and adjusted by the latter. Marx opposed solid systems of philosophy, and tried his best to surpass them. It was natural for him to avoid constructing any complete and well-organized philosophical system which would be closed and solid, and to advocate a way of open thinking facing the future actively, in order to enrich and develop his own theory. Directly, his and Engle’s criticism of ideology is to criticize the metaphysics of Feuerbach, B. Bauer and others. But indirectly and essentially, it is to criticize all metaphysics, especially that of rationalism, starting from Descartes and others, of which the remarkable demerit is to try in vain to construct a philosophical system that includes everything of the world, while departing from real life and practice.

Besides Marxism, to some degree, some other philosophies had also made great efforts to surpass the bounds of traditional philosophy, and turned philosophy to an initiative of persons and their life, though partially and indirectly. It is a great shift in the model of thinking in the philosophical history, that philosophy turn from constructing systems to emphasizing the initiative of people in real life and practice. There is some common point between Marxism and other Western philosophy, but some principal differences still exist between them, which I have considered in my other papers and shall not pursue here.

Besides Marx himself, Marxism had been enriched and developed by great teachers of the proletariat class and excellent Marxists like Engels and other persons. Engels agreed with the views of Marx in Outline, which he remarked is ‘the first document born with genius that embodies a new world outlook."13 Later he pointed out that, "the whole outlook of Marx is not a dogma, but
a method. It does not provide any ready to hand doctrine, but provides a starting point or method for further study." He concluded that, after abandoning metaphysics, except for Dialectics and formal logic, philosophy is nothing else. Essentially, this remarkable conclusion means only that in his view Marxism is a method. As a leader of the revolution and the realistic struggle of the proletariat class of the Soviet Union, Lenin established many theories on the real life and practice of the common people. In his Notes on Philosophy, the most representative work of his philosophy, he is concerned with how to exploit Hegelian dialectics; he put much emphasis on the importance of the activity and practice of human beings in many places in this book. He opposed the closedness and arbitrary bounds of systematic philosophy. In this sense, he came to the well-known conclusion that a clever idealism is closer to true materialism than a foolish materialism.

But the road of the development of Marxism has been winding, full of various possibilities of being mistaken and distorted. Earlier, before the death of Marx, some people had distorted his theory in the name of praising him. To be distinct from those persons, Marx had to announce that ‘I myself am not a Marxist.’ For more than one hundred years after that, there always have been violent debates about how to treat Marxism among Marxists, and between Marxists and non-Marxists. The philosophy of Marx was distorted again and again, sometimes by open revisionists in the name of opposing absolutism, who abandoned the basic principle of Marxism and put Marxism on a par with Positivism, Neo-Kantianism, Machism and other Western philosophies. Sometimes, those who were subjectively loyal to Marxism, tried their best to oppose and criticize these opposite philosophies in order to defend Marxism. But being unable to understand these philosophies, and to recognize the true relation between them and Marxism, they drew Marxism near to the thinking model of modern times against its original intention. This is embodied in the expression of some theorists of the Second International, like Plekhanov. No doubt, as a leader and teacher of the proletariat, Lenin is a great Marxist. In the book, Materialism And Empirical Criticism, he asserted again and again what he emphasized as Dialectic materialism, not dialectic Materialism. And he also highly emphasized the role of practice. He contributed a lot to the development of Marxism. But, in order to oppose the neutral way by which Mach attempted to surpass idealism and materialism, Lenin interpreted common materialism repeatedly as the starting point; he even cited some phrases from modern materialism such as that of Diderot. This made some people misunderstand his philosophy according to a modern philosophical model of thought. Under the sway of Stalin, the trend to modernize Marxism was very common in the Soviet Union. Typically it is embodied in A Concise Textbook Of The History Of Communists Of Soviet Union (1938), and in section two, chapter four, Stalin made a famous conclusion about Marxism, which had long been taken as authoritative. Though it contains some thoughts of Marxism, generally speaking, it is obviously arbitrary. It is far from true Marxism. On the contrary, it is closer to modern Western philosophy from the viewpoint of its thinking model. In a way, it returned to philosophy taken as a system.

The argument between philosophy of practice and of system emerging in the development of Marxism affected China as well. In the long process during which the CCP led the Chinese revolution, there were many struggles with the opportunism of left or right. In theory, the struggles were against abandoning basic principles of Marxism and its distortion, because ‘both opportunism and adventurism are featured by the split between subject and object, between recognition and practice’. The dogmatism of left-deviation pretended to defend Marxism, so, its deceit and harm are greater but even a great Marxist like Mao Zedong did not avoid being affected.

In the process of leading the realistic revolutionary movement of China, Mao wrote many works which greatly enriched and developed the dialectics of Marxism. He made a remarkable
contribution to Marxism by uniting the universal principles of Marxism and the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution. Works such as *On Practice, On Contradicts* and so on, written against the influence of opportunism and dogmatism within the CCP, are brilliant paragons, which use philosophy based on real life and practice of people to fight against systematic philosophy. Regrettably, in the latter part of his life, with his over emphasis on the continuing revolution both in thinking and in reality, he went further and further from the realistic conditions of China, and finally went in the direction of left-deviation, which he embodies in his theory. In 1953, when Stalin died, Mao issued a memorial article, "Great Friendship." In this article, he esteemed *A Concise Textbook Of The History Of Communist Party Of Soviet Union* as one of the classical works of highest authority in Marxism, in which Part two, Chapter four entitled "Dialectical Materialism And Historical Materialism" was thought of as the summary of highest authority about Marxism. Before the liberation of China, the model of Stalinism to some extent influenced the study of Western philosophy. After that, many philosophical scholars of the Soviet Union were invited to China. Naturally, they brought Marxism after the model of Stalinism to China. Moreover, with the approval and advocacy of Mao, this model became the model ‘specified by law’ for the study of Marxism in China. Many textbooks of this model introducing Marxism were published. Although, there are differences among them in some parts, their structures are the same.

This model (usually called ‘textbook model’ by philosophical scholars), based on the fundamental meaning of Marxism, but with the role of disseminating Marxism, generated a series of negative results inevitably counter to Marxism but conspicuously embodied in Western philosophy and its criticism. Although, it has the name of Marxism, the background of its standard is the modern model of thinking which Marx had surpassed, whereas true Marxism is postmodern thinking. According to the textbook model, one may rank the history of Western philosophy before Marx under such words as ‘idealism’ and ‘materialism’, ‘dialectics’ and ‘metaphysics’. But this necessarily concealed the colorful contents of Western philosophy. In the time of Stalin, Zhadanov, a leader of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union drew up a definition of the history of philosophy which was regarded as classical and beyond doubt, in *A Speech in the meeting Discussing ‘A History Of Western Philosophy By Alexandrov’*. He said, "the history of scientific philosophy is the history of the outlook of scientific materialism and its law from embryo to growth. Since it is from the struggle with idealism that materialism had grown and developed, any history of philosophy is a struggle between Materialism and Idealism.’ This definition means that the varied history of Western philosophy was solidly shaped into the structure of the struggle between the extremes of simplified materialism and idealism. Many philosophies were rejected as idealism by the oversimplification of not conforming to the model of materialism. Obviously, this had a negative role for the study of the history of philosophy.

According to this model, those contemporary Western philosophies whose scope surpassed the horizontal line of modern Western philosophy were reduced to the reactionary philosophy of idealism and entirely rejected, for they were thought not to contain any reasonable and positive element except as the opposite and hence as material for criticism. Why had so many mistakes been made in the movement criticizing pragmatism in the mid-1960s? Besides the reason that the academic standard had been replaced by a political one, another reason was that the weapon for criticizing was the textbook model of Marxism or was distorted by the model of modern thinking. The critical movement did not reveal the merit or demerit of pragmatism in its effort to surpass modern philosophy and to adapt itself to real life and practice, for it was not in accord with the matter-of-fact attitude of Marxism. On the contrary, they tagged pragmatism as a philosophy of subjective idealism, of imperialism, and so on according to the model of modern thinking and the
A meeting to discuss the method for the study of philosophical history was held in Peking University in January 1957. During this meeting, some experts put forward some philosophical views to surpass that of the model of Stalin-Zhadanov. For example, Feng Yu-Lan put forward, ‘abstract succession’. Mr. He Lin thought that a struggle between idealism and materialism was not adequate for philosophy, which relation should be like friend with friend, or teacher with student. But these views were thought to be opposed to Marxism by some persons, and were harshly scolded. Later, those experts who put forth or had praised such views were persecuted politically. As mentioned above, from the mid-1960’s on, matching the study of Marxism, the study of Western philosophy was restored and strengthened. But after that meeting, it was difficult for anyone to continue to study as before. With the development of the movement of opposing ‘Right-deviation’, opportunists, revisionists and so on, the trends to the left became stronger and stronger. This took the study of Western philosophy ever further from the true Marxism. Western philosophy often was denied without thinking. In the ‘Ten-years of Disaster’, such conditions reached an apex.

Reform-Opening and the New Stage of the Study of Western Philosophy Study

Since the beginning of the study of Western philosophy in China one hundred years ago, after a long winding course of 80 years, the study began to take on a new life again. By the latter 1970’s, the bond of left-deviation was untied and the Open Reform policy was taken. This is connected with politics, economy, science and technology, culture and so on, but the necessary initial step was to open Marxism as the guiding thought. This meant that the distortions of Marxism had to be overcome, and the authentic meaning of Marxism restored at a higher level. Deng Xiao Ping’s theory on the construction of socialism with Chinese features is just the kind of theory that not only restored the authentic meaning of Marxism, but also embodied the developmental direction of the contemporary world, including China. The basic aim of his theory was to break all kinds of solid doctrines into pieces, and to emphasize the importance of basing thought on real life and practice. Why did the discussion at the end of the 1970’s on ‘practice as the standard to witness truth’ attract so many people and have such deep effects? The reason is that this proposition embodies the demands of Deng’s theory and is an outreach of the traditional theory of knowledge. It is concerned not only to have a right understanding of Marxism, but also to represent the development of contemporary China and world.

It was in the above context that the study of Western philosophy was to be restored, so it had to distinguish itself from the previous study by criticizing and surpassing it. This character was embodied by the two meetings for discussing Western philosophy, one in Wuhu in 1978, and the other in Taiyuan in 1979. (There was nothing similar before.) One topic in Wuhu was on the methodology of the history of philosophy. In this meeting, besides emphasizing the importance of the role of Marxism as guide, participants put forth and cared about the policy ‘let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thoughts contend’ (a policy set forth by Mao Zedong for the progress of the arts and the sciences and the development of a flourishing socialist culture), and how to break through the bond of dogmatism. Many participants doubted publicly the Stalin-Zhadanov model for the definition of the history of philosophy. In the meeting in Taiyuan, all participants thought that the study of contemporary Western philosophy should be restored, and should not be an untouchable area as before. They affirmed that the study of Western philosophy
is of much positive significance in principle, and criticized the nihilist trend which entirely denied the study of contemporary Western philosophy. The two meetings were only the beginning of the new evaluation of the study of Western philosophy, but they turned a new leaf.

Since the beginning of the Open Reform, our study of Western philosophy has made much progress, which even an indifferent bystander can see. The progress is clear in many aspects, including the promotion of conditions of the study, the increase of the number of related institutions set up, the expansion of the number of those studying, the depth and width of the study, and its theoretical social influence. It is no exaggeration to say that these subsequent few decades have been the most brilliant period in the history of the development of the study of Western philosophy in China. The evidence for that can be found everywhere so I shall not pursue it further.

Nevertheless, some important questions such as the relationship between the study of Western philosophy and the concept circumstance of politics; between the former and Marxism as its guiding thought and the object of its service; between the study of Western philosophy and Chinese traditional philosophy and culture; and between modern and contemporary philosophy in the study of Western philosophy, have not been solved. To solve them would require a long effort which is doomed to be full of doubts, turns, and mistakes; this cannot be finished in one day. To succeed, we must proceed in an orderly manner step by step. So that we will not mark time we must make the best use of the age and the conditions for faster and greater progress.

A lot of material needed to be translated and edited for the study of the history of modern Western philosophy before the end of 1980’s. The main task needed for the study of modern Western philosophy was to study it more systematically and deeply, check out the faults of the model of Stalin-Zhadanov, find out a more correct orienting thought, and meet the demands of the development of reform in the new situation. The study of contemporary Western philosophy had been forced to stop for a long time; it had to be rebuilt starting almost from zero. During the period from the end of the 1970’s to the beginning of the 1980’s, its main work was to gather the basic materials for study, and look about to establish a basic theoretical structure for itself. In the middle of 1980’s, to negate the study of contemporary Western philosophy was out of question; many (especially younger) scholars began to study several mainstream philosophies individually. Some of them, by their assiduity reached a depth not only beyond their predecessors, but also approaching the international level to some degree. Under these conditions, it became more and more important to overcome the solid model of the past, and to study and assess the relation between contemporary Western philosophy and authentic Marxism

During the above-mentioned twenty years, we have made great progress in the study of Marxism. However, we still have not finished the work of separating authentic Marxism from the distorted one, and how to make the best use of the former instead of the latter to guide the study of Western philosophy. After having been subject to the distorted Marxism for so long a time, many people are involuntarily indifferent to the authentic. A few often mistake ideas which Marx had rejected for authentic Marxism. They mistake what conforms to authentic Marxism as opposite to it. As long as the confusion exists, there will never be a correct and complete understanding about the relation between Western philosophy and Marxism, and its negative influence on the study of Western philosophy will continue forever.

Many scholars, who turned to the study of Western philosophy from the beginning of the reform and opening, undertook teaching and doing research about Marxism as before. They had the earlier critical and evaluative mode as to whether philosophy conformed to authentic Marxism rooted deeply in their mind. During the period from the end of the 1970’s to the beginning of the 1980’s, Western philosophy was almost always assessed according to the above-mentioned model.
With the development of research, many scholars thought that this model should be surpassed, for they found that, applying the distorted Marxism to the assessment of contemporary Western philosophy, exposed its oversimplifying demerits. In order to eliminate the influence of the leftist model in the study of Western philosophy without being involved in conflict with it, and in order to avoid unnecessary trouble, political or ideological, some scholars tried intentionally to escape Marxism in their study. For the young generation growing up after Culture Revolution, though their traditional burden is lighter than the elder before them, it is still difficult to surpass the limits of the age, during which there was no clear concept of Marxism as had been the case. They avoided being concerned with Marxism to various degrees in their study.

The strategies they took were indispensable for meeting the aims of theoretical study. When one wants to learn a school or a separate theory of philosophy, he must try to ignore its external connection, and study it exclusively. But such does not enable people to understand Western philosophy comprehensively, and appropriately assess its negative or positive role. Nor can it conform to the goals of scientific research. Under some conditions, it may produce negative influences, for it may make some beginners accept the philosophy of their study blindly without accepting Marxism due to their narrowness, or it may let those who were influenced deeply by the left evaluative model mistake the meaning of their study as illuminating or undermining Marxism. When there are waves or turmoil in the cultural sphere of China, those studies are blamed for their origin.

In recent years, a few scholars have made great progress in their study of individual cases. But on the whole, the study of contemporary Western philosophy seems to be an abandoned orphan. After the expansion of the number of the academics of this line, it begins to decline and fall. Some philosophical departments in key universities find it difficult to open courses on contemporary Western philosophy. The only professional journal, *Contemporary Foreign Philosophy*, issued irregularly before, is now forced to stop for lack of economic assistance. It is also difficult for the Chinese society for the study of foreign contemporary philosophy to continue its regular meetings. The reason for this has many aspects. But a particular one is that, after the economic polity of China changed from a planned to a market economy, it was hard to adapt to the new polity by doing research in the humanities which are far from the economic basis. It was difficulty to let the related person or organization know the importance of research to the whole enterprise of modernization. These are the new problems which must be resolved. Unless these problems disappear, the studies of these disciplines are doomed to be badly affected. Moreover, among the sub-disciplines of philosophy, the condition of Western philosophy will get even worse. The relevant government departments are willing to support the philosophical study of Marxism, science and technology, or traditional Chinese philosophy. But to that of Western philosophy, they give only lip service. This is due not only to the transforming of the economy. The cause is that many people do not yet recognize the essence of Western philosophy as a whole and especially its relation with Marxism. As a result, they can neither abandon their misconception and prejudice about it, nor see that it has important significance not only for the enrichment and development of Marxism and the well-recognition of the contemporary world, but also for the success of modernization, especially the healthy development of our economic system.

As an illustration, I would mention the theory of individualism, and show how the contents and role of Western philosophy have been misunderstood. It is that true many modern and contemporary Western philosophers (including in ethics) hold individualism. For example, pragmatists based their whole philosophy on it, taking it as the starting point of their theory. But at the same, they made a distinct difference between individualism and egoism. When talking
about individualism, they often emphasized the importance of the independence of the individual, the need to protect and respect the liberty and dignity of the individual; the importance of giving free rein to individual activity and creativity; and also the importance for persons to fulfill their duties and obligations to others and society. Most denounced egoism by which the holders seek their own benefits at the expense of the suffering of others or the public. Obviously their attitude is the opposite of egoism. In fact a scholar can hold individualism and altruism at the same time.

As for contemporary Western philosophy, many schools tried to surpass the traditional metaphysics of subjectivity, tending to emphasize inter-subject instead of the individual-subject, inter-subjectivity instead of individual-subjectivity. Seldom did they take individualism as equivalent to egoism. They also emphasize the importance of the benefits of the individual or the private sphere conforming to the collective or public. Without doubt, there is narrowness in their theory which should receive appropriate criticizing. At the same time, we should see that certainly a few Western thinkers confuse individualism with egoism, and treat both as the same; they are more deserving of criticism than is individualism. But above all, we shall not ignore the fact that most Western thinkers have distinguished the two.

The economic mechanism of capitalism made everyone assiduously pursue private profit. The mechanism produced violent competitions among people; as Hobbes said, "men treated men as wolves do," "there were wars of all against all." In such a state of affairs, economic mechanisms, even that of capitalism, never could work well, and the pursuit of private profit could not succeed either. It is necessary even for private benefit to curtail the limitless pursuit of private interest to some degree in order to avoid such a confusing state. Echoing the demand of the times, some capitalist thinkers advanced theories of law, morals, and so on, which they thought fit for the working of the economic mechanism. Essentially, the difference between individualism and egoism is made by some ethical philosophers of utilitarianism just to meet the demand of capitalists to protect the smooth working of their economic mechanism. Their theories have played a big role in the development of a Western society based on a market economy.

Therefore, if we reduce individualism to egoism it will not only desensitize us to the necessary relationship between individualism and the development of the economic mechanism, but also prevent us from understanding modern and contemporary Western philosophy and ethics. Furthermore, it will do even greater harm to us, if we cannot learn from the experience of the connection between the development of Western marketing economy and the theories of morals, that is, we will not be able to absorb the positive and overcome the negative in order to establish a philosophical system of morals fit for our socialist economy and accelerate the development of our economy. Regrettably, the confusion that identifies individualism with egoism still exists universally in the academic circles of China.

The misunderstanding of modern and contemporary philosophy and its role in society can be seen from many materials which we cannot consider completely. The causes of the misunderstanding are varied and complicated. One comes from loyalty to Marxism. Some persons fearing that they may be polluted by Western philosophy, stick stubbornly to the older model of Marxism, which has great prejudice toward Western philosophy. It is inevitably difficult for these persons to recognize the true relation between Marxism and modern and contemporary Western philosophy. Is this not a historical tragedy?

To sum up, to fail in the task to correctly study Western philosophy will hinder the development not only of those studies, but of things related to it. So in its many aspects, it is urgent for us to recognize Western philosophy anew, especially the emergence of contemporary philosophy. It is necessary to restudy Marxism as well in order to study the connection between
Western philosophy and Marxism afresh and correctly, and to advance this study to a new stage. I have given my thought about these matters in the article, *On Stepping Into a New Stage of the Study of Western Philosophy*. 17 Here I shall not pursue that any further.

Notes

2. Liang, Qichao, Postscript to the bibliography of *The Western Learning* (Oct. 1896)
5. Zhang Taiyan, Review of Yan Fu’s Recent Political Opinions.
17. It is to be published in *Frontier of Social Science*, in Nov., 2000
Research on Contemporary Western Philosophy
Midst Winds and Rains

I have studied Western philosophy for nearly forty years, and focused upon its contemporary period for more than thirty years. I could not claim to have made a very important contribution in my studies. However, I have experienced almost all the winds and rains which befell this area of research in China since the middle fifties. My experiences and lessons, successes and failures have been to some degree close and related to these situations. Therefore, looking back at my academic life, I relive the tortuous but progressive road of the study of contemporary Western philosophy in China for the last half century. I rejoice in their important successes, but also feel sorry for people’s misunderstandings and misrepresentations and hope that in more important developments of studies in this area they can play a more positive role in the present Chinese ideological and cultural construction.

The First Step on the Road of Western Philosophy Studies

I entered the economics department at Hunan University as an undergraduate student in 1950, the second year since the establishment of the Chinese communist party government. Philosophy was a required course. The teacher of this course was a famous Chinese philosopher, professor Yang Yong-Guo, who specialized in Chinese traditional philosophy with an orientation in Marxism. I also attended the philosophy course of the most famous Chinese Marxist philosopher Li Da, then president of Hunan University. Although I had not enough background knowledge in philosophy and was unable to fully understand what they taught, these first courses made me interested in philosophy.

After graduating in the fall of 1954, I worked as an assistant editor in a publishing house in Beijing. Although all the books I worked on were in economics rather than philosophy, I still read some philosophy books in my free time. Since the second half of 1955, there was a campaign to criticize Hu Shi’s pragmatism. The campaign was launched and directly led by Mao ZeDong himself; it was very extensive, even massive. The relevant critical papers were published almost every day for some months. However, what really is pragmatism, especially what is its concrete content? These critical papers hardly gave an even relatively satisfying answer. Looking back at the present time, that critical campaign could be said to have been a precursor for left political authorities pressuring normal academic discussions. Nonetheless, I had no proper understanding of the political and theoretical meaning of that critical campaign, and was hardly able to think deeply about the relevant questions. Its main effect on me was to generate the intention to know more concretely Western philosophy, such as pragmatism and others. Then I sought and did find a few books on the history of Western philosophy, including Summary of Western Philosophy by the former Soviet philosopher, Sigrov, the History of Philosophy by Frank Thilly and History of Philosophy by Alfred Weber and Ralph B. Perry. After reading these books, I had a different impression than the very critical papers published at that time in China and even formed the intention to study Western philosophy further. Just at that time, in 1956, a few important universities in China began to enroll graduate students, and I took the examination for the department of philosophy at Chinese Renmin University in Beijing. At the end of that year I began
there as a graduate student majoring in Western philosophy. This is the real beginning of my concerns for the study of Western philosophy.

The focus of my study in its initial stage was ancient Graeco-Roman philosophy with special interest in Aristotle, on whose epistemology I even published a paper. A year later my interest shifted to modern philosophy, including British empiricism and continental rationalism of the 16th-18th century, especially the philosophy of Spinoza. I also published some papers on these areas of Western philosophy. Generally speaking, during the first two academic years, what I achieved was mainly basic training in Western philosophy, preparation for systematic and deep researches.

The main problem I encountered in the first stage of my research in Western philosophy was how to treat the relation between Marxist and Western philosophy, which remained the main problem for not only my studies, but for the whole philosophical circle in China. The reason is that as China is a socialist country taking Marxism as the guiding idea in every realm, especially in the ideological and cultural realms, it naturally is necessary for everybody who studies Western philosophy to think and explore how to treat this relation. Whoever he or she be, this question could not be avoided, lest he fail in his researches and even meet some troubles.

In fact, under the left leaning influences of the international communist movement represented by the former Soviet union under Stalin, the ideological realm in China was controlled by a left-thinking-pattern in the early thirties. Contemporary Western philosophy was almost fully rejected as imperialist bourgeoisie reactionary philosophy. In 1952, just a short time after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China, in the national educational reform, all the departments of philosophy in the universities were closed, except for that of Peking University. The basic reason was that the content of philosophic teaching was said to be bourgeoisie and reactionary. Since 1956, the atmosphere in ideological and cultural realms seems a bit more relaxed. Beside Peking University, a few important universities reestablished departments of philosophy. The communist party and government announced a more open and enlightened policy in these spheres, that is, the so-called policy, "let a hundred flowers blossom and a hundred schools of thought contend". In this atmosphere, some Chinese philosophers, mainly those who earlier had majored in Western philosophy, raised anew and discussed the questions of how to evaluate the positive sides or elements of non-Marxist, especially Western, philosophy. In 1957, a conference on methodology for research in the history of philosophy was held in Beijing. Many famous philosophers presented their points of view. Some suggested that Western philosophy, including idealistic philosophy, has positive meaning to some degree. These normal and private academic discussions greatly inspired those of the younger generation, like me. The pity is that they were taken as anti-Marxist and even anti-party; they were fully rejected by political authorities a short time later and a few philosophers were investigated politically. This meant that the left policy once again controlled the ideological and cultural spheres. As this was done in terms of insisting on Marxism and socialism, it seemed right and was agreed to by the broad masses, especially the younger generation. Like other young scholars, I too was involved in the critical movement and wrote and published a few papers to criticize the bourgeoisie academic thought of some famous old philosophers. The problem was not with these critiques themselves, but in that, without enough knowledge of either Western philosophy or Marxism, we tried to decide yes or no in academic matters. Under the control of the left political and ideological line, for a long time this kind of study-style was taken as progressive. It exercised a very passive influence on the young generation and even on all academic affairs in China. As for me, when I began on the road of research in Western philosophy, I was influenced by such left-thought patterns.
The Hard Years

At the end of the sixties, I graduated from Chinese Renmin University as a graduate student and entered the Department of Philosophy of Fudan University as a teacher of the history of Western philosophy, where I continue till the present. After closing all the departments of philosophy except that in Beijing university in 1952, Fudan university was one of the first three universities in China where departments of philosophy were newly established in 1956. The famous older professor, Quan Zen-Gu, who once studied philosophy under the guidance of Whitehead in Harvard University in the 1920s, was responsible for all the courses about Western philosophy. In the spring semester of 1961, perhaps because Shanghai was far from the political center of the country and relatively more open and enlightened to Western affairs, professor Quan first tried to offer a course in which some contemporary Western philosophy was briefly explained but under the name of "critique of contemporary bourgeoisie philosophy". At that time I had just come to Fudan and he asked me to be his assistant for this course. The contents of the course were very short and simple, and could not be said to be realistic, as the critical color was very strong, but after all it was the first course on contemporary Western philosophy in a Chinese university since 1949 when the communist government was founded. After this semester, Professor Quan asked me to take the whole responsibility for this course. This was the real starting point of my teaching and study of contemporary Western philosophy.

My work in Fudan university was varied. Besides classic, modern and contemporary Western philosophy, I offered also some other philosophic courses such as Marxist and traditional Chinese philosophy. In 1962-1964, I took part in a cooperative program on scientific and technological philosophy in Shanghai. I only translated some relevant materials from Russian and English, parts of which were published later.

However, my efforts since the 1960s centered in research on contemporary Western philosophy. Considering that this discipline was really absent in China with hardly any relevant courses except at Fudan University, and no relevant systematic materials, I thought that the most useful thing for me to do was to establish this as a new discipline in China. I believed that the day would come when people, even authorities, could understand its real meaning and then change their fully negative attitude toward it. How could I promote this process? The best way I thought was to write and publish a textbook, systematically introducing the basic contents of the main schools and philosophers of contemporary Western philosophy. Nevertheless, when I started to do that, I sensed some very important difficulties, among which were mainly the following two.

Firstly, it was dangerous in terms of politics. At that time, contemporary Western philosophy was still taken as imperialist, bourgeois and reactionary and as fundamentally antagonistic to Marxism. If one were not careful at each point in the explanations, it could be blamed and criticized by some people as advocating a bourgeoisie reactionary world outlook, and then would encounter political troubles. In the 1950s there were such events indeed, especially in the so-called critical movement toward pragmatism, the anti-rightist movement, etc. For this reason, many colleagues in other universities, whose background in knowledge and theory were much better than mine, avoided offering courses on contemporary Western philosophy and even avoided talking about relevant questions. Therefore, when I started to do such works, it was necessary to be very careful on each point.

Secondly, because of the disruption caused by the left political and ideological line since 1949, research in our philosophical circles on contemporary Western philosophy was quite weak. Although there were some reviews of a few philosophical schools like pragmatism and Machism,
they were explained in terms of a left-thought pattern which was far from their original meaning. It is difficult to say that there were real researchers at most philosophical schools, people do not even know their names. In order to offer a course on this discipline in more systematic and objective form, especially to write a relevant textbook, I had to be prepared to do everything anew. The most important thing was to study the real theories of almost every school and philosopher. It was of course very difficult, but was also very worthwhile. So I decided to do that.

In the early sixties, I did my best to realize the above goal. Up to 1964, the course was offered in more complete systematic form. For the important philosophical schools, I wrote systematic teaching materials. A textbook on the discipline was about to be prepared, notwithstanding the fact that the political situation of the country was going to change radically. A short time later came the ten-year upheaval of the so-called cultural revolution. Research in contemporary Western philosophy was forbidden. My work on this was completely stopped, and most of the materials written or collected for teaching were lost in these terrible years.

The Winds and Rains Experienced by "Contemporary Western Philosophy"

After the ten-year disturbance due to the left politico-ideological line had been corrected, it became possible for philosophical circles to re-study contemporary Western philosophy. I also got the chance to resume my career that had been stopped for more than ten years. Although there were still some obstacles and difficulties, even dangers in some special cases, the whole environment and condition were much better than in any past time. Because a broad readership seemed to become interested in contemporary Western philosophy, and most departments of philosophy in Chinese universities one after another indicated that they hope to offer a course on this discipline, I felt more and more the need for a relevant textbook and therefore decided to restart my work of editing and writing such a book. I knew clearly that in order to perform this work well, there were a lot of difficulties for me to overcome, especially the following two.

Firstly, because the studies in this discipline had been stopped for more than 20 years in China, the former study base was very weak and hardly any worthwhile materials could be used for reference. Some friends thought that it must take at least 5-6 years for us to write and edit a systematic and qualified textbook in this discipline. Viewed from the level of high academic quality, their opinion was, of course, right. Nonetheless, most friends and colleagues thought that in order to reestablish the discipline, the urgent thing for philosophical circles to do was to solve the question of beginning from nothing. Thereupon, they encouraged me to write and edit such a textbook as early as possible. After all, Fudan University had offered this course during the sixties and had better materials to use than other universities. I accepted their ideas and started this work.

Secondly, it was difficult to determine the standard of evaluation. The fully negative attitude to contemporary Western philosophy must be changed, and we should do concrete analysis according to the principle of seeking truth from facts, which Marxism always emphasized. However, this was easy to say but difficult to practice, since Marxism had been dogmatized and ossified for a long time. Using it as the guiding principle for evaluating Western philosophy, people mostly took evaluation as sticking on a label marking it as idealism or metaphysics. No one could give a clear and correct answer at that time as to what real Marxism was. For this reason, some friends recommended simply putting Marxism aside and only stating what concrete contemporary Western philosophy is. I did not dare to do this. On the one hand, I thought that we should not take Marxism and Western philosophy as absolute opposites, but should study their real relation. On the other, I worried that if I put Marxism aside, it could cause some political troubles. After all,
the influence of the left politico-ideological line was still strong at that time. Considering that this textbook would be popular and welcomed by a broad readership it certainly would be noticed by some conservative and ossified people who would condemn it as anti-Marxist. Therefore, I could not help follow take the popular critique-pattern in general, but in special and concrete cases I expressed the contents of Western philosophy as objectively as possible, even giving them a positive evaluation.

With the help of some colleagues and even their direct input, Contemporary Western Philosophy, which I prepared over a long time, was published finally in 1981. Perhaps it was the first book to systematically introduce contemporary Western philosophy in China. As a broad Chinese readership had waited for such materials for a long time, it was greatly welcomed by them. A lot of newspapers and periodical publications issued the news of its publication, gave it a high evaluation and took it as an important step in the re-construction of this discipline in China. In that one decade of the eighties, more than 110,000 copies were printed, several times the ordinary printing of similar books. It was taken as the textbook or main reference book by most universities in China for a long time, even up to now. It also received several awards, including the first prize of the national education ministry. But what caused me the greatest happiness was not the awards, but the fact that since the eighties, even up to now, most young scholars who majored in Western philosophy told me that it was in reading this book that they took up the road of studying contemporary Western philosophy. This means that the book played the role of reestablishing this discipline in China.

Nevertheless, the publication of the book caused serious restlessness for some people who insisted on the traditional dogmatized and ossified Marxist position. They held that contemporary Western philosophy is a decadent and moribund philosophy of a reactionary bourgeoisie. Related books and publications could be published only for personal, private use and then only as materials for critique. Now the book, Contemporary Western Philosophy was published openly and even became a best seller. In their view, it would necessarily cause serious passive and detrimental influences in people’s minds. They recommended that such books be prohibited. About the summer of 1983, some branch of the authorities circulated to all provinces and cities of the country a notice in which my book and a few other books were taken as spreading bourgeoisie mental pollution. That not only brought heavy political pressure on me, but also shocked almost all philosophical circles in China. The reason was that this book is characterized mainly by emphasizing the guiding role of Marxist philosophy and one of its main shortcoming was its use of a left critical model in studying Western philosophy. If such a book were to be taken as spreading a bourgeoisie reactionary outlook, how could people talk about a realistic and objective study of contemporary Western philosophy in China? Was it a sign that studies in Western philosophy were in fact prohibited? Was the policy of reform and openness not adaptable to philosophy and other cultural realms? Perhaps under such expected responses from philosophical circles, the relevant authorities changed course. That meant that the blowing of winds and rain met by contemporary Western philosophy was over.

As the book was broadly welcomed, the winds and rains it met reflected in a sense the real situation of research on contemporary Western philosophy in the ‘80’s in China. The discipline had been re-established in an atmosphere of reform and openness, but efforts to break away from the old thought-frame still met heavy pressure from dogmatized and ossified Marxism and conservative forces. They were unable to go too far beyond the restrictions of the old critical model of so-called Marxism, lest they fail and all return to the old road again. This meant that we must be careful in doing everything, we could not be impatient. However, reform and openness became
after all the main stream of philosophical research in China. To break away from the old philosophical thought-pattern and critical models necessarily meant a tendency to go in reverse. In fact, after the above winds and rains, the sunny day for such research is going to come. Several years in the eighties after this event were the golden period for the development of studies in contemporary Western philosophical. A series of representative books by famous contemporary Western philosophers was translated into Chinese and published in China, and relevant treaties of Chinese scholars, including textbooks in different patterns, were also published sooner or later.

In playing the opening role in re-establishing the discipline of contemporary Western philosophy in China in its initial period, our book was far from perfect. It included important shortcomings. Firstly, its introduction and presentation of the theories of some philosophical schools and philosophers are not concrete and objective, but classified philosophies according to some predetermined theoretical frames of world outlook, epistemology, methodology, etc. This resulted in the loss of the real content of their theories. Secondly, its evaluations are still left in character, sometimes taking an ossified Marxism as the criterion of evaluation. In a word, it was unable to overcome traditional critical patterns of so-called Marxism. The reasons are various. Besides weaknesses in the academic qualities of authors, especially myself, the determining factor was the historical condition of the time. In view of the above-mentioned winds and rains, it is not difficult to understand why we could not break away from traditional dogmatized thought-patterns. If our steps were faster and moved too far from traditional Marxism, we would certainly receive serious political blame and the book could even be prohibited. For this reason, most readers and specialists all forgive these shortcomings as hard to avoid in the initial period of the reconstruction of the discipline.

With the important progress and development of research in contemporary Western philosophy in China since the mid-eighties, our book became more and more out-of-date. I clearly understood this from the very beginning of the book’s publication. How was one to overcome the shortcomings of the first edition of the book? How could I make it reflect progress in contemporary Western philosophy studies and the relevant disciplines in China and even in Western countries, how could one let it keep and develop its positive and enlightened role in the research and teaching of this discipline? All these issues are always the focus of my attention. Therefore, after 1984, I made considerable revisions of the book. This was finished in 1988 and published anew in 1990. The revised edition is in fact a new book. It was drastically changed both in its contents and in the guiding idea of its evaluation of Western philosophy. For example, first we no longer take division and struggle of materialism and idealism as the basic standard to analysis and evaluate Western philosophy, but try to analyze concretely the real theoretical meaning of philosophies according to their own content. Second, we no longer take the contemporary Western philosophy and Marxist philosophy as absolutely antagonistic, but try to discover their inner connection. Third, in comparison with modern philosophy, we no longer take contemporary philosophy as going backwards, but see it as making considerable progress. However, due to the fact that these questions are sensitive politically and our research on them are not deep enough, our explanations is not very clear and firm. In order to avoid political and ideological troubles, we also expressed some points of view opposite to the above position. So we could say that the revised edition of "contemporary Western philosophy" was a mixture of new and old, though, the revised edition is much better than the first edition, both in its theoretical contents and in its standard of evaluation. Compared with other similar books in China during the same period, it is also in an obviously superior position. Its print runs are several or even ten times theirs. For us this is happy, but also urges us to move ahead.
Go to the New Stage of Researches of Contemporary Western Philosophy

Since the nineties and especially most recently in areas of academic research in China, the left political and ideological intervention seems to have diminished; the atmosphere of free discussion is going to be normal. It hardly happens in philosophical studies that philosophers experience political trouble or interference due to having advanced opinions. In a variety of philosophic realms, people realize important achievements one after another. As for research in contemporary Western philosophy, there are not the massive fervor more ephemeral in nature as in the eighties, but treatises based on deep and concrete studies became more numerous than in past times. Along with the development of international academic exchange and cooperation and the rise of a younger generation of scholars, the academic level in this realm is evidently rising. It is worth mentioning that more and more philosophers who majored in Marxist or traditional Chinese philosophy also have been studying contemporary Western philosophy as well. People found more and more special terms and phrases of philosophical schools such as phenomenology, philosophical hermeneutics, etc. It seems that the tendency to unite Western, traditional Chinese and Marxist philosophy will spontaneously evolve.

Nevertheless, this is only a dim or hazy tendency. Although enough achievements in contemporary Western philosophy, they hardly have been used in promoting Marxist and Chinese traditional philosophy studies and are divorced from later two. In order to avoid various troubles, colleagues mostly prefer to restrict their own studies to the purely theoretical level of their discipline rather than become involved in their connection with Marxist philosophy. Although using the positive achievement of contemporary Western philosophy for reference, some Marxist philosophers do not like to mention the latter and still have doubts and misgivings in this regard. Most Marxist philosophers, while not fully rejecting contemporary Western philosophy again, are often divorced from the latter in their research. Perhaps this is due to not having sufficient knowledge in this regard.

Generally speaking, in view of the basic social environment and the situation of Marxist and contemporary Western philosophical studies, it is possible to unite them. However, in order to transfer such possibility into reality, people must understand the need to unite these studies. In order for people to have a common understanding in this, they must study some basic questions afresh, such as how to evaluate contemporary Western philosophy? Whether replacing modern philosophy is a progressive transformation of philosophical thought-patterns or only a partial change, or even a step backwards? What is its connection with the revolutionary transformation of Marxism in the history of philosophy? Are they antagonistic or simply different routes to the same goal of transcending the limitations of modern philosophy?

These questions have been put forward in a more dim and indirect way by philosophical circles and even discussed in partial form. Because both Marxist and contemporary Western philosophy were understood according to old philosophical thought-patterns and the questions are somewhat sensitive politically, research on them often failed as too generalized and abstract, and they were unable to have evident practical impact on research in both Marxist and contemporary Western philosophy. At present, the basic social environment is greatly changed and philosophical circles have a deeper and more realistic understanding than in the past. Therefore, we can and should advance these questions in a more direct way and study them anew. If philosophers can achieve a common understanding through such studies, philosophical research certainly will advance to a truly new stage.
I always insist that we should unite the research of Marxist and contemporary Western philosophy and always pay close attention to such research. As mentioned above, in the revised edition of *Contemporary Western Philosophy* I engaged essentially such questions and advanced some understandings which differ from both the first editions of the book and the point of view popular in philosophical circles. Nonetheless, I was unable to expound and prove my views and use them in analyzing and evaluating Western philosophical theories in more concrete form. The main reason is that I had not a really clear understanding of these questions at that time. Another reason is that I still had political anxiety.

However, from that time on, I have continually studied and thought about such questions. Through concretely restudying both contemporary Western and Marxist philosophy, I increasingly come to two basic points of view. First, that the replacement by Western contemporary philosophy of modern philosophy is a substantial progressive transformation in philosophical thought-patterns. This brings the development of Western philosophy to a new and higher stage. Second, the modern-contemporary transformation of Western philosophy and the revolutionary transformation of Marxism in the history of philosophy are similar in nature: both belong to the contemporary philosophical thought-pattern, and seek the same goal by different routes in transcending the limitations of modern philosophy. I explain my view systematically in the paper "The Modern-Contemporary transformation of Western Philosophy and the Road of Developments in Marxist and Contemporary Chinese Philosophy."

The above points of view differ from the traditional one that has long been popular. In appearance they seem contrary to Marxist principles. But in fact they better realize the real Marxist principles, especially the principle of seeking truth from facts. To my point of view, there are different responses in Chinese philosophical circles. Most philosophers, especially those of the younger generation, are supportive, but not a few Marxist philosophers oppose it. They still doubt that these points could correspond to the Marxist position. Nevertheless, I steadfastly consider that the research of contemporary Western philosophy and Marxist philosophy in China must take a united road. This will be the best, if not the only, way for such research to be fruitful. I will do my best to promote such unity in my future works.

**Reevaluating Pragmatism**

After the ten years of turmoil, I continually paid close attention to research on pragmatism. This was caused partly by discussions on the philosophical basis of "The Gang of Four", partly by my idea that pragmatism is the most promising avenue for solving the question of the relation between Marxist and contemporary Western philosophy.

After the destruction of "The Gang of Four", colleagues in philosophical circles, one after another, expressed their opinion about the philosophical base of that group. The most popular one was that it is a pragmatism; I had some doubts on the idea at that time. I clearly remember that when "The Gang of Four" were in power, in the name of Marxism, they criticized pragmatism as the philosophical base of so-called bourgeoisie reactionary line. Earlier, during the fifties, when people criticized the theoretical base of so-called rightists, revisionists, right opportunists, they said that too was pragmatism. Indeed, almost all political and ideological movements since 1949 criticized others as believers in pragmatism; once the criticizers became the accused they too were blamed for peddling pragmatism. Almost all political-ideological critiques in China became critiques of pragmatism. Therefore, knowing clearly what pragmatism is, is very important in philosophy as in politics. Since the critiques of Hu Shi’s pragmatism in the middle of the fifties,
there were a large number of treatises criticizing pragmatism. But most of them were subordinated to political demands with hardly any academic meaning. When I carefully read and studied the treatises of such main pragmatist philosophers as James and Dewey, I found their theories to be quite different from the critiques of Chinese scholars.

The basic theoretical tendency of pragmatism was universally considered as ultra-subjective idealism in the past time in China, but the real point of view of pragmatist philosophers is not so. They think that the world studied by philosophy and science is an experiential world and its existence depends on the experience of human beings. However, what they really mean is not that the world itself is constituted by the experiences of human beings, but that so long as things and the world are taken as objects of philosophy and science they are objects relevant to subjects, that is, the objects experienced by, or belonging to human beings. As for the idealist point of view that consciousness exists independent from matter and that matter derives from the conscious, they never support that, but actively oppose it. The theories of James’s stream of consciousness clearly holds that divorced from brain that exists as matter, consciousness is unable to exist. Dewey more clearly noted that experience is relative to nature, because produced in nature, while nature itself as being-itself existed far earlier than human beings and their consciousness. Pragmatist theories on truth, cognition and practice, as well as method, also differ far from what Chinese scholars criticized.

For a time long past in China, pragmatism was reduced to a reactionary imperialist philosophy. In fact this is not fully true. When Pierce first advanced the basic principles of pragmatism, the United States of America was yet far from being an imperialist country. The political and social-historical theories of Dewey and his personal political tendency were far from the position of the monopoly of the capitalist class. From the beginning of this century, he continually paid attention to the critique of the tendency to monopoly in the politics and economy of America. What he actively supported is rather the demand and interests of the broad mass of middle and lower levels, with the result that some conservative people blamed him for being too red. It is worth mentioning that before the thirties, officials of the Soviet Union or Chinese intellectuals influenced by Marxism all praised Dewey in politics. However, only in the middle of the thirties, did some liberals with Dewey as their leader openly criticize the so-called Moscow trial of Trotsky and others which was launched by Stalin. They even acquitted Trotsky of any crime. As this offended Stalin, Dewey was criticized as a "reactionary philosopher of imperialism" and this radical change soon influenced Chinese Marxist intellectuals.

The above evaluation of pragmatism was evidently not based on reality, but reflected political demands. This necessarily led to chaos in theory. Take for example the idea, which coincided with pragmatism, that any idea which can lead people to success can be taken as truth. If expressed in some popular words, this could be rejected as bourgeois selfishness or even egoism; if expressed in other words, especially those of a political leader, without change in its original meaning, it could be considered deep and truthful Marxism. Similarly, many propositions and statements rejected as revisionism according to the political demands of the past, now were appraised as creative Marxism. What then is real Marxism and what is reactionary philosophy? What is truth and what is fallacy? When people could not find a definite criterion for deciding these questions, one of the necessary results was to change Marxism into an ultra-relativism. The erroneous tendency in critiques of pragmatism necessarily influenced the evaluation of other philosophical schools. If political demand could lead people to judge pragmatism without regard for reality, how could they take a realistic attitude to other schools?
For these reasons, I take the re-evaluation of pragmatism as the prerequisite for evaluating other philosophical schools. In the 80s, I published a monograph "A commentary on Pragmatism" and nearly twenty papers related to pragmatism. Among them, "A Re-evaluation of Pragmatism "(1986) first systematically and openly stated the questions of why and how to re-evaluate pragmatism in Chinese philosophical circles. This paper was often cited by Chinese colleagues and taken as a representative paper in studies of pragmatism since the policy of reform and openness.

Western Philosophical Trends and Chinese Modernization

Aims for the study of contemporary Western philosophies are multiple. The most important among them are to develop and enrich Marxist philosophy in theory, as well as to promote the construction of Chinese modernization in practice. How can the studies of foreign cultures, which were simply negated in the past time, be made into a spiritual motive power? This is a very difficult, but important question.

Nobody doubts the need to learn the progressive science and technology of Western counties in the process of constructing Chinese modernization. There is also a common opinion about the question of whether or not we should learn and even adopt some Western economic systems, especially experiences in management. The objective need to join the international market leads people to consider relevant reforms in economic systems. Some affairs popular in Western countries, which were taken as capitalist in the past, were also imported and considered for their ability to be socialist as well. Nonetheless, on the questions of whether or not Western trends, especially Western philosophy, could play a positive role in Chinese modernization and be used for reference, people often feel in the dark. There are at least two questions here. First, whether or not Western philosophical trends are a necessary condition for realizing modernization? Second, if they are so, whether or not they have important meaning with reference to China?

That Western philosophical trends have an indispensable role in Western modernization should not engender much controversy. As constitutive parts of the Western social superstructure, their outcome and development are adaptable to the demands of the economic base which the capitalist market economy system has as its focus. They must serve the form and development of this base. The controversies concern mainly the various understandings of "service": is it only defensive or also constructive? For various reasons, people often noticed only the destructive factor and have not thought about its constructive function, or have even denied it. This condition exists even till now. In fact, in view of the progress and development of Western modernization, its defense itself has a constructive role. To develop such a role is the most important function of ideology and culture as superstructure.

What constructive function could be played by Western philosophical trends needs more discussion. At least one thing can be affirmed: they provide some necessary conditions for the normal motion of the Western economic market system and even the stability and development of the whole of Western society. One of the important features of the market economy, which differs from a closed natural economy and unitary planning economy, is that it takes products as commodities weighed in the market, that is it develops through commodity-exchange. In order for such exchange to proceed normally, it is necessary to affirm the principles of freedom, equality and fair competition. In order for the various contradictions and conflicts between people caused by market competition to be mitigated to some degree, it is necessary to advocate such lofty moral sentiments as pursuing the good while avoiding evil, as well as seeking transcendence. These are
just what the modern-contemporary Western philosophy and the relevant moral and religious trends actively promote.

Chinese modernization and market economy are set as socialist in nature. The relevant philosophy, morality and religion as well as other cultural factors must differ from the west. Notwithstanding, there are necessarily important common elements between different market economies. Therefore in the process of developing the socialist market economy and realizing modernization in China, we must learn from their valuable experiences and draw lessons to avoid causing various problems and troubles. The case of philosophy and the related morality and religions are similar. So long as we take the market economy system as the basic economic system, we must seriously study and learn from the west, since only Western philosophy and relevant moral and religious theories provide the necessary spiritual condition for the market economy to operate and develop.

How to make the research in contemporary Western philosophy adaptable to promoting Chinese modernization and the development of market economy? This is a new question put off till only recent years. I myself continually think about the relevant questions and try to do something helpful.
Part IV

Philosophy and Modernization
Western Philosophical Trends and Chinese Modernization

Wholesale Westernization vs "Chinese Learning as Foundation, Western Learning for Application."

Chinese and foreign scholars all agree that China’s modernization is necessarily influenced by Western thought trends, including those of philosophy. But their views diverge widely with regard to what roles these trends should play and how to evaluate these influences. One view, which simply reduces modernization to Westernization, holds that China can realize modernization only by overthrowing China’s history and cultural tradition and following wholesale the example of the West, that is, by using Western thought as the sole guide in realizing Chinese modernization. This is the view of wholesale Westernization.

Another view is to reduce modernization to a self-renewal of China’s inherent tradition. It holds that China can realize modernization only by exploiting China’s inherent tradition of thought and culture and making it the foundation upon which to transplant Western sciences and technologies into China, without adopting the West’s socio-political and ideological culture. This is the view expressed in the principle, "Chinese learning for foundation, Western learning as application."

The struggle between those two views has lasted for over a century. The one-sidedness of each is often uncovered and criticized by the other, especially by the Chinese Marxists, and therefore each lost its influence. Nevertheless, the two views continuously remerge in new forms, and continue to dispute with each other. In recent years, this dispute has taken a radical form and become more complicated, due to practical political tensions.

After the ten-year turmoil of the cultural revolution in which "Marxism" was tortured by the ultra-left, Marxist philosophy once again has been called upon to be an open-door doctrine, for otherwise it could not provide the theoretical basis for China’s modernization. This meant that Marxist philosophy had to absorb all the outstanding philosophical fruits of human thinking, including contemporary Western philosophy. From the end of the seventies, Chinese philosophical circles began again to study contemporary Western philosophy and made a great progress in subsequent years. Various modern and contemporary Western philosophical trends were gradually introduced into China and played an important role in promoting philosophical research there, especially in smashing dogmatism and ossified trends.

However, some people went too far. They often neglected concrete Chinese conditions and were so dissatisfied with tortured Marxism that they advocated discarding it completely and reflecting everything in traditional Chinese thought and culture because of the existence there of factors unfavorable to modernization. They considered the social-political institutions, ideologies and values, especially democracy and freedom in Western countries, as ideal and completely suitable for China. They suggested that in order to realize modernization in China, society and culture should be rebuilt completely upon the West model. This is a new theory of wholesale Westernization. The TV play, "He shang", which had influence for a short time, was an intense manifestation of this trend. The play was criticized not only by most Chinese scholars on the Mainland, but also by not a few scholars in Taiwan, Hong Kong and overseas, because of its ultranihilist attitude toward the Chinese historical and cultural tradition.
However, in critiquing this new view of wholesale Westernization, some people as it were went to the other extreme, especially after the well-known political events of 1989 in Beijing. The reasons which caused the events are complex and manifold, but they reduced them simply to the influences of bourgeois liberalization, which they attributed to the reintroduction of Western philosophical trends into China. Therefore, once again there arose an almost totally negative attitude toward Western philosophy. Of course, it differed from the past leftist period in not fully condemning concrete Western philosophy, but there was no positive side in their dealing with it. Perhaps in order to be diametrically opposed to those who preach wholesale Western modernization, they almost as highly advocated Chinese traditional thought and culture. They even were full of praise for factors of feudal superstition; for example, some people held that the doctrine of divination in *The Book of Changes* corresponds to modern scientific forecasting. Some people thought traditional Confucianist culture carried within itself the seeds of thought basic to modernization, and that all these things corresponded in turn to Marxism. According to them, taking Marxism as a foundation almost coincided with taking traditional Chinese learning as a foundation. They admitted that the accomplishment of modernization in China needed to learn from and to import Western science and technology, as well as managerial experiences for the economy; they advocated also the policies of reform and open-door, but confined these to the field of economy and science/technology, while still holding a closed attitude toward everything in the field of ideology and culture. Although this kind of theory is proposed in the name of Marxism, in fact it departed from true Marxism in many respects. Therefore, it seems rather a new form of the view: "Chinese learning as the foundation; Western learning for the application."

In recent years, the above-mentioned positions around the question of the influence of Western trends of thought in the course of Chinese modernization showed that some questions which had been disputed several times in the past, and seemingly already had been resolved, would be raised under the new historical conditions. Under present circumstances in order better to realize and assess the influences of Western philosophical trends on China’s modernization and to overcome the one-sidedness of these two extreme trends, some relevant questions must be considered. For example, what is the relationship between modernization and Westernization? What is the link of modernization in Western countries with their philosophical trends? What role does the introduction of Western philosophical trends play in China’s achieving modernization? What historical experiences and lessons should we draw? How to deal with Western philosophical trends in the present movement of modernization in China? How to deal with the relation between Marxist philosophy as the theoretical basis of China’s modernization and contemporary Western philosophical trends? We will discuss some of these below.

**Modernization and Westernization: Their Connection and Difference**

The question of the relation between modernization and Westernization has been disputed for a long time and various views have been proposed. Here, I will not suggest any new opinion, but the question still has to be raised because in recent years two types of one-sidedness regarding the mode of modernization in China have been related directly to an onesided comprehension of the relation between modernization and Westernization. Generally speaking, modernization is not the same as Westernization, but it cannot exclude Westernization in certain respects.

People give various explanations of the concept of modernization. Sociologists, political scientists, economists, anthropologists and psychologists all give definitions from different angles. From the philosophical point of view it is a dynamic process of transformation from
underdeveloped levels to advanced levels. As far as the whole society and country is concerned, the process of modernization can be divided overall into two respects. One is the development of economy and science/technology, whose main manifestation is industrialization. The other aspect is change in people’s thoughts, ideas of value, mode of life and behavior, as well as corresponding changes in socio-political institutions. The two aspects are related to each other and cannot be separated. However, in talking of modernization, people pay more attention to the first aspect than to the second because historically those changes took place first in such Western countries as Britain, France, Germany and the USA, which are Western models. Hence, there is a close relation between modernization and Westernization.

After attaining national independence a series of developing countries often seek to reach Western advanced levels of development in their economy and in science/technology. Therefore, as regards the improvement of their material life as an important aim for modernization, they naturally relate modernization to Westernization or even at times identify the two. Although Chinese modernization emphasizes a socialist direction, as regards the modernization of industry, agriculture, science and technology and national defence, people first think it a matter of reaching and surpassing advanced Western levels in these areas. This is the main epistemological reason why various views of wholesale Westernization in the history of Chinese modernization still attract people today.

However, if one inquires further into the relation between modernization and Westernization, one finds that, although they are contemporaneous in process, modernization and Westernization are not equivalent. Since the model of modernization in Western countries cannot necessarily be rapidly realized in other countries which can take other models, while Westernization remains an important model for the achievement of modernization it is not universally applicable. The choice of a proper model is conditioned by concrete national conditions and the two cannot be lumped together.

What is meant by the Western model of modernization? There are different answers. For example, the British-French, the German and the American approach, which usually are considered Western models, differ in certain respects. Generally speaking, modernization breaks through the less developed modes of natural economy, which restrain the socio-productive forces, in order to open and develop domestic and export markets and to develop a commodity economy. These are followed necessarily by a rationalization of life, rapid development in the sciences and technology, advances in production and the accomplishment of industrialization. Politically, this usually happened together with a capitalist revolution against feudal rule and the construction of democratic political systems suitable to a commodity economy marked by liberty, equality and fraternity, along with the development of related thought, culture and values. This road toward modernization was realized without great obstacles in many Western countries. When Germany and America followed after Britain and France on the road of modernization, the effects were basically similar, although a relatively different approach had been taken, especially in Germany. As there were not great differences in social structures and cultural traditions in all these countries, the way to modernization in Britain and France was easily copied in Germany and America.

Nevertheless, the models of modernization initiated by Britain and France do appear to be substantially different and foreign to the Orient whose social and cultural backgrounds are quite different. So when Western models of modernization and their related thinking and culture have been imported into the Orient, inevitably they collide with Eastern traditional cultures and their social, economic and political systems. This makes the route to modernization of Eastern countries much more difficult and tortuous than in the West. Eastern countries cannot simply imitate and
copy the Western models in order to realize their modernization, but must initiate or choose their own model according to their own special historical-cultural backgrounds. This has happened in the history of the modernization of Oriental countries.

Among Eastern countries, Japan has been the most Westernized country; indeed, people usually take it as a Western country. However, the model of modernization of Japan is different from the West. When it began to realize its modernization in the middle of the 19th century, Japan was still a feudal autocratic country. The ideas of liberty, democracy and fraternity, the ideological foundation of Western modernization, were not observable there. Individualism, which is considered the keystone of these ideas and therefore is sacrosanct in the West, had not been much encouraged if the situation is viewed as a whole. Even the spirit of self-sacrifice for the sake of the whole, which was expressed in the ardent loyalty to the emperor (Mikoto), was eulogized as the highest morality. After World War II the Imperial power declined and the Western concepts of democracy and freedom became very influential in Japan, thereby Westernizing Japanese society in almost all fields. Nevertheless there still existed many special characteristics which made Japan different from Western countries. In Japan adjustments and controls by the central government upon domestic politics and the economy in particular are much greater. Nationalistic passions and a sense of the importance of the preservation and esteem for national cultural traditions are much stronger than in the West. This may be the decisive factor in the creation of the so-called Japanese economic miracle.

Having emerged since the middle of the 1960s, the "four small dragons" of Asia, namely, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore and South Korea, have preserved many characteristics of the Eastern cultural traditions, particularly the Confucian tradition — except to some extent Hong Kong where as a British colony the Eastern influence was relatively less strong. For a long period, Western democratic policies were not active in these places. The trend toward Westernization has strengthened only since 1980, so they still differ from typically Western countries and are closer to Japan.

After the October Revolution, Russia took a socialist approach to modernization quite different from that of Western capitalism. For several decades its efforts toward modernization had many achievements, although at very high costs. The fact that a previously weak and impotent Russia, and some European-Asian countries in alliance with it, formed a superpower capable of contending with the USA shows that the socialist road to modernization was successful. In the 1980s radical changes took place so that socialism was abandoned and the Russian government is trying to take up the Western model of development. It is not necessary to predict if such changes will succeed, but the following is certain. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the failure of the socialist model were the result of some very complicated causes, one of which may be its departure from the objective laws of socialism. So we can say that at most it is a failure of the Soviet model of socialism, not of all models.

The movement of modernization in China, started as early as the middle of the 19th century, had often been frustrated because it oscillated between the polarity of simply repeating or simply rejecting the Western model. Only since the Chinese democratic revolution succeeded in 1949, and especially since the Chinese government has been carrying out the reform and open-door policies since 1979, has Chinese modernization been achieving world-famous results. Of course, the modernization since 1949 has been extremely torturous, at times relatively slow or even stagnant or with setbacks, all of which would be worth summarizing. Nevertheless, the achievements of China since 1949 have been very great, whether compared with its original base
or with other similar developing countries such as India. But the Chinese road toward modernization is certainly quite different from that of Western countries.

In general, in the light of experiences of development in a series of Eastern countries, Westernization is not the only model of modernization; each country must choose its own route suitable to its special environment. It is important to note that a great many defects, contradictions and social crises have arisen in developed countries where modernization has been realized, as has been pointed out not only by many Western scholars, but also by many Western politicians. In view of this, it would be unreasonable to abandon other choices which may be more suitable and to take Westernization as the only model for modernization.

However, certainly we cannot conclude that modernization completely excludes Westernization. After all, the movement of modernization originally occurred in the West and a lot of factors which promoted modernization there have universal meaning and are effective not only in Western countries, but also in other countries, once they are transformed and improved. The fact that Eastern countries, including China, have their own historic-cultural traditions or other peculiar environments and should not simply copy the Western models does not mean that those factors which facilitated the accomplishment of modernization in the West would not be effective in Eastern countries; in fact some of them are indispensable. Just as in the West, a great advance of social production forces, as well as of science and technology, is absolutely necessary in any other country or region intending to accomplish modernization. Knowledge and experience gathered in the West are worth modeling, indeed are indispensable in other places. Furthermore, although there are serious limitations, the reforms in socio-political systems, as well as in related fields of thought and culture provided the necessary conditions for the development of Western science and technology as well as social productive forces.

Despite some elements of hypocrisy, the capitalist democratic system, with its stress on basic human rights such as personal human freedom and equality before the law, certainly is much more progressive than a feudal dictatorship which oppressed human nature and exploits human rights. In fact, it is impossible to accomplish modernization fully without a democratic system and esteem for human freedom and other rights.

It is true that there are some precedents for a development of capitalism and science and technology under feudal monarchies in Germany and Japan. But these were limited developments and even led to such wrong roads as fascist dictatorships which destroyed modernization, so that finally these countries have taken the road to a democratic system. This shows that the democracy and esteem for basic human rights initiated in the Western movement of modernization ultimately are necessary conditions for a more complete modernization in any country. It is not unnecessary then to discard certain aspects and degrees of Westernization in the course of modernization if this can be done within limits rather than a sheer Westernization. To do so does not mean to disregard one’s own excellent cultural traditions and peculiar historical back-grounds, but it does mean to integrate these with the universal factors developed in Western modernization, and on the basis of such an integration to create special models more suitable to one’s country. To exclude Westernization absolutely would be not to improve but to diminish the Chinese modernization process.

**Western Philosophical Trends and Western Modernization**

No one hesitates to acknowledge that it is necessary to learn from the advanced Western sciences and technologies for Chinese modernization. The question concerning whether or not
economic managerial and structures should be learned had caused many disputes, but these now are coming to a positive conclusion. The leaders of the Chinese government and the Communist Party always call for a more rapid and daring practice of reform and open-door policy. What was called "capitalism" has come or could come to be called "socialism".

However, all these seem limited to the fields of economy and of science and technology. Reform in the socio-political fields also are considered necessary, but should or could China learn from Western experience in those fields as well? Many still feel deeply suspicious. They are very much afraid that to do so should mean abandoning socialism and returning to capitalism. There is much more hesitancy to do so as regards ideology, including philosophy. There is no indication that those who took the introduction of Western humanistic trends as the decisive factor in causing the disturbance of 1989 have changed their attitude.

Why is the attitude toward the fields of Western science, technology and economy so different from that toward its politics and ideas. Of course, many reasons can be enumerated for this. Some exposures and critiques of the problems in Western politics and ideas are not groundless; in addition, as there are some great differences between the two fields, it is not and to think of them as totally distinct is one-sided.

In the course of the modernization of Western countries, on the whole the development of the political-spiritual field and that of economy and science-technology were coordinated with each other. There were various conflicts and some incompatibilities, but essentially they were compatible. In the course of the development of capitalism in United States, for example, which of course was its process of modernization, pragmatism is regarded as the pillar of thought which shaped American politics, economy, education, culture, science and technology. Its basic principles became the guide for almost all fields. Experts in these fields are not necessarily edified by pragmatism, but they cannot escape its influence. The achievements in these fields, on the other hand, provide important data for the pragmatic approach. Without some understanding of pragmatism, one could not have a good understanding of the other aspects of American society. This is true also of the fields of science and technology where many take pragmatism as their methodology. In fact, at the outset pragmatism was regarded by Peirce as a method to determine what was true or false in scientific concepts. It had no political or ideological meaning; only later was it applied in other areas. In the eye of the ordinary American, pragmatism is the emblem not of philistinism and profit-before-all-else, but the embodiment of the courage, gumption and creativity of the American people. Therefore, while of course one can criticize pragmatism as a kind of philosophy which has great limitations, if one simply rejects it or neglects its existence one could not effectively draw upon the experiences and lessons gained in the course of modernization in the United States.

In a word, the development of Western economy and technology cannot be divorced from its philosophy. The latter has given direction to the former, provided the methodology for research and made possible theoretical demonstration and summation. If one does not research contemporary Western politics, economics, law and pedagogy, as well as its theories about human rights, religion and cultural values, one could not understand how the West developed its science and technology and obtained the benefits of its capitalist economy. If one does not study seriously Western philosophy, it will be very difficult to obtain proper fruits in these fields.

However, some Chinese theorists seem to neglect the internal relation between philosophy and the economy and technology in Western countries; especially they neglect the positive role played by the former in the development of the latter. They may not realize that if one completely negates Western thought, particularly its philosophy or fails to study it seriously and draw positive
content therefrom, one could not effectively understand and evaluate what is happening in its economy-technology. If an open-door policy is carried out only in the economic and technological fields, while a closed stance is maintained with regard to culture and ideology, the openness in the field of economy and technology finally would be diminished.

**Reviewing and Reevaluating Western Philosophical Trends in order to Promote the Modernization of China**

Marxism affirms that there is an internal relation between philosophy, politics, economy and science/technology. The notion that the development of the economy and of the science/technology of a country could be divorced from the condition of its spiritual culture such as its philosophy can never be considered compatible with Marxism.

Why then do some Chinese theorists, who regard themselves as the most faithful followers of Marxism, take a simply negative attitude toward Western philosophy when it comes to drawing on the advanced science and technology as well as experience in the economical management of the West? This is to cater to short term political concerns. In addition, it seems to derive from a superficial interpretation without real understanding, and an ineradicable dogmatism which loses contact with reality in research regarding Western philosophy.

For almost thirty years before 1979, contemporary Western philosophy was considered to be essentially opposed to Marxist philosophy; it was seen as a completely irrational idealism and a decadent imperialist and bourgeois ideology. This conclusion was derived primarily from political arbitrariness, rather than from the objectively and scientific analysis of academic research. During these thirty years in China there were very few essays and books on philosophy which objective and practically evaluated contemporary Western philosophy. Hence, there hardly could be any objection to the arbitrary conclusion noted above. After 1979, this conclusion was gradually challenged and then negated after the resumption and development of objective research in contemporary Western philosophy.

However, this research still focused on the explanation of the theories of contemporary Western philosophy. Very few people researched deeply and concretely under what concrete social conditions these theories of philosophy came into being; what were the dependent relations between these theories and the politics, economy, culture and science-technology of Western society; what role did they play in the modernization of Western countries; what were their relations with Marxist philosophy; and what concrete positive roles could they play in the course of enriching and developing Marxist philosophy? When some people went to the extreme of overvaluing Western philosophy, they had no concrete analysis and demonstration of their comments, which often were almost arbitrary.

In view of these facts, when some people again criticized Western philosophy based on changing political considerations they also could easily substitute their negative arbitrariness for a positive one. This was obvious in research on Jean Paul Sartre. At first, some people overvalued his philosophy, but did not study it deeply in order to have an adequate basis for their evaluation. Because of political reasons, many essays later appeared which criticized Sartre. Among these essays, there were indeed some good ones, but most of them were arbitrary. Unfortunately, this one-sidedness was not completely overcome later and some theorists criticized Western humanistic trends in philosophy (mainly European continental philosophy) for the political purpose of criticizing bourgeois liberalization. As usual, those making the criticism did not study deeply and concretely what they criticized. Therefore they raised some objections and made the
sweeping claim that the drawback of the theories they criticized was that they propagated a theory of human nature and humanism, and therefore were opposed essentially to Marxist historical materialism. Some people maintained that to speak of contemporary Western philosophy was to return to the anthropology of Feuerbach. In fact, if interpreted with real understanding and studied concretely and practically, it would be apparent that the humanistic schools of contemporary Western philosophy do not all propagate the same theory of human nature and humanism, but have different and sometimes even opposite explanations of the meaning of humanism. Indeed, strictly speaking, it is not accurate to call them schools of humanistic philosophy, for they differ from, more than they approach, the anthropology of Feuerbach.

If the critiques of Western philosophy mentioned above were only the usual academic discussions within philosophical circles they might not have had so much negative influence; but if affirmed by the government and taken as the foundation for formulating policy, the attitude could not be wise. For both what is called Chinese and what is called humanistic among trends of thought are closely associated with the whole process of the modernization of Western countries. They provide theoretical bases or guiding ideas for the development of Western social economy and science/technology. These theoretical bases and guiding ideas are not all correct, but neither are they necessarily wrong; this requires that we seriously study and analyze them. The inclination to negate or affirm them simply is harmful to concrete research and a critical use of the experiences and lessons of Western modernization because it cannot reveal the actual and concrete relation between Western thought and Western modernization.

Research on Western philosophy in Chinese philosophical circles should not only overcome the previous nihilist inclination, but also transcend the level of simple introduction which has been more common in recent years. A new stage must be achieved on which the internal relations between contemporary Western philosophy and the development of Western social economy and science/technology is researched in a concrete manner, and on which research respects, how these philosophical theories have improved or impeded the development of modernization in Western countries. This will make it possible to draw lessons from those experiences and improve modernization in China.
12.
The Market Economy and Civil Society:
The Individual Subject and Modernization

I discuss market economy, civil society, the individual subject and modernization together here because they seem to be closely related to one another. We can say in a sense that the market economy is a necessary outcome of civil society, while the amplification and development of civil society depends on the formation and development of market economy. Both presuppose affirming and strengthening peoples’ independence and self-determination, both also mark people’s beginning to shake off dependence (colonial status) and coming to independent individuality, i.e., people began to exist as individual subjects rather than colonial subjects. Therefore, the developments of civil society in social relation, the foundation of the market system in the economy and the formation of individuality in philosophy, are a united process which depend and act upon each other. This is the process of coming to modernization.

The Basic Feature of Market Economy and Its Connection with Civil Society

Our discussion starts from market economy. A series of theoretical questions about the market economy evokes great attention in the philosophical circles of China. Many scholars have carried out fruitful research from various directions and levels. What I will consider here is only whether there is a necessary connection between the foundations and perfection of market economy and of civil society? I affirm that there is and that it is determined by the very essence of the market economy.

The market economy is the commodity economy. It is an economic system in which the products and services are taken as commodities and weighed in the market through exchange. Commodity exchange here is practiced in the market in accord with the value that is represented by a definite sum of money which is the general form of value and the only measure for commodity exchange. The value of everything can be measured by money in commodity market. People are related only as owners in the commodity exchange where the relation between people is represented as the relation between things. This relation of commodity-money is the essence of the market economy. Though there are different characteristics of the market economy in different historical periods and social conditions, the basic relation mentioned above is the same.

In order that the commodity exchange operate concretely in the market requires at least the following presuppositions and conditions.

1) Every owner of commodities or services (natural or juridical persons) must be supposed as a person with independent personality who could go to the market in his own right and exchange freely with others;

2) Every owner of commodities in the market should be equal with others without considering the relation of higher or lower position, of respected or inferior, of elder or younger; in terms of money, everybody is equal;

3) Free competition in commodity exchange must be assured, the principle must be that "the superior be wined and the inferior be defeated"; every contrary convention, tradition and regulation which can be ignored. This means that only those who can retain higher efficiency and are stronger in answering changes could stand firm in the market.
4) The market where exchange is practiced must be open; every kind of close and isolated condition that would obstruct commodity exchange must be smashed;

5) Every question pertinent to commodity exchange in socio-political, economic and ideologico-cultural fields must be solved according to principles relevant to the market economy and judged through the court of reason.

In brief, freedom, equality, competition, openness and reason, which are their ideological foundations, are the main presuppositions of the market economy represented by commodity-money relation. So long as the market economy operates as a system, these presuppositions must be supported through philosophy, law, moral and other ideological and political ways.

The market economy practiced under these presuppositions essentially involve sharp and deep contradictions and conflicts between people as commodity-owners. If these presuppositions are followed the law of the jungle which controls animal circles, would control the society of humanity. What would be developed from human nature would be only its "evil" aspects: selfishness, avariciousness, hypocrisy, shamelessness, and cheating. As Hegel pointed out, for the whole society these "evils" may become some kind of motive power for the operation of market economy. If only the evil aspects were developed, then as Hobbes noted people in the whole society would relate to each other as wolves. This means that the whole society would be in a situation of serious turmoil, even coming to collapse, and the sound social orders of freedom, quality, competition and openness necessary for the market economy would be destroyed. There would be no development of the market economy or of the whole society. Therefore, for practicing a market economy in any normal social condition, it is necessary to limit and restrict such principles as freedom, equality and competition in various ways, so that people follow definite norms of conduct, undertake definite responsibility and submit to definite social condition for their actions in production, exchange and all of social life. These restrictions and limitations could be experienced through various channels. Among them, the following two are both important. The first is the political state: government organs, courts of justice, the army and police. The second is the various social groups consisting of independent individuals according to the principle of voluntary participation. These groups belong to the fields of social, especially of economic, relations which exist between the political state and strictly private life. What people call civil society is among these fields. Therefore, in order to guarantee that market economy can operate normally, there must be corresponding state institutions and civil society.

Whether in the West or the East, the state with its various institutions existed long before the foundation of a market economic system. Their forms and functions were changed greatly along with a systematic transformation from the natural to a market economy. Given their different historical conditions and cultural backgrounds, different states and regions have their special forms of state power pertinent to their system of market economy. However, even an autocratic monarchical state must satisfy the necessary conditions in order for the market economy to function normally. They must permit and support free exchange and equal competition so long as they take and support a market economic system. What the autocratic monarchical state could control is mainly some politico-ideological fields, not all of social life. It must leave the necessary space for individuals as owners of commodities to act freely. Otherwise the market economy could not exist at all. This space is more or less the field for civil society to regulate. In this sense civil society is a necessary condition for the market economy to exist and develop.

The more developed the market economy, the wider must be the free space. It must expand beyond the purely economic field into politico-cultural fields. Sooner or later it must lead to some
political transformations. This means that the action of the civil society will necessarily have great development. This has been the case of the development of civil society in Western states in modern times. For example, the market economy was bred and developed under the shield of the feudal autocratic monarchy in France and Germany. When it had developed, the newly emerging civil estate (the ‘third estate’ in France) became a stronger social power, and the time for political transformation approached. The basic importance of the latter is the creation of more advantageous conditions for the development of the market economy which entails in turn a more developed and more sound civil society.

The Western Theories on Civil Society and Marxist Historical Materialism

The development and amplification of civil society are a necessary prerequisite for the growth and progress of a market economy. The more sound the development of a civil society, the more effective would be the progress of the market economic system. However, in academic circles of China, people hardly talk about civil society. They doubt to some degree that this would be so significant and worthy of study as an important topic. Therefore, it is necessary to observe the meaning of the concept of civil society, the main feature of the related Western theories, and especially its relation to Marxist historical materialism.

The concept of civil society is burdened with layered meanings. It could be traced back to Greek thinkers, especially Aristotle in the history of Western thought. In modern times, it appeared early in the works of French thinkers in the 18th century and was used to represent the economic and property relation between people, especially the ‘third estate’ in France. They often took it as a concept corresponding and contrary to the so-called "political state" as the political and legal dimension of society. This inherited and developed more or less Locke’s liberalism on the independence of individuals and groups with regard to the state. They stressed that civil society is superior and above the political state. Hegel expressed the idea of civil society in another way in his philosophy of right. He defined it as a unity consisting of independent individuals and their external association for the purpose of guaranteeing their individual and common interest. In the Hegelian system, civil society is a stage of the ethical mind. Though he recognized that the political state originated from family and civil society, he is contrary to Locke and French thinkers in the 18th century in that he took the state to be the principle and the foundation of civil society which it could also control. The interpretations of Locke and French thinkers in the 18th century, as well as Hegel, became the main theoretical sources of later Western thinkers, for discussion of civil society.

Based on a critical assimilation and development of the theories of Locke, French thinkers in the 18th century and of Hegel, Karl Marx explained the meaning of civil society in a broader sense. He used it early in his critique of the Hegelian philosophy of right and classified it as pertaining to the fields of social relation, formed by shaking off the feudal yoke in ethics, religion and politics and aimed at the independence of economic interests. He provided a more complete explanation in his German Ideology where he said that the forms of association in all past historical stages, which conditioned each other as productive forces, are precisely civil society. This is the true source and arena of all history. The name civil societies always means social unities which develop directly from production and exchange, and constitute the foundation of both states and all other ideological superstructures in every epoch. Marx took civil society neither as a stage of development of mind as did Hegel, nor as corresponding to the political state as did the French thinkers. Rather he took it as the foundation of all political and ideological superstructures. This
means that he changed and developed Western theories of civil society in terms of his historical materialism. In his "poverty of philosophy" and other later works he explained civil society more clearly in terms of historical materialism. A very famous paragraph on civil society in the preface of his *Critique of Political Economy* has been taken by both Western thinkers and Marxists as the classical expression of historical materialism.

As Marx explained civil society in a quite different manner to Western thinkers he often avoided using the term and took instead "social relations," "productive relations" and other concepts relevant to historical materialism. In the later development of Marxism, most followers of Marx took civil society only as a concept of Western thinkers. This does not mean, of course, that the questions concerning civil societies were obsolete; in fact people always studied these questions, but included them in the broader fields of historical materialism.

In this ideological context, academic circles in China accustomed to the ossified Marxist view, did not give close attention to the study of civil society, though some Chinese scholars proposed it again in recent years. The reasons are manifold but I think the following two are worth mentioning. Firstly, some papers published in recent years seemed to neglect, or at least did not accent, the importance of historical materialism for the study of civil society. The ideas they proposed about civil society were mainly adapted from Western scholars, which in the so-called classical view prevalent in China, seemed to diverge from Marxism. Secondly, stressing the significance of studies on civil society, some scholars frequently mentioned it as a reflection of the political transformation of academic circles in the 1980s from political to social modification, from attention to the upper political stratum to social forces. This point of view may be supposed to be contrary to present political tendencies.

In the present situation of China, should people pose the question of civil society and promote related studies? I would answer in the affirmative and connect it with research in historical materialism for historical materialism is more profound and exceeds Western theories on civil society. Used appropriately, people could take it to cover studies on civil society. However, many people misunderstood and distorted the development of Marxism. For example, they have taken it as only an application of dialectical materialism to the field of social history, or as only a theory of class struggle. Accordingly, a lot of important questions, which should be studied by historical materialism, often have been overlooked or even distorted, such as questions on the nature of market economy, the conditions for its existence and the road of its development, especially in relation to the individual subject and its relevance to market economy. All these questions are closely related to civil society. In recent years, China has overcome the left politico-ideological line, and opened the road to reform in almost all directions, changing the unitary planned system and coming to the market system in the economic field, especially taking the latter as the fundamental road for China to realize its socialist modernization. In such a situation, to propose stressing research on questions relevant to civil society is again both possible and actual.

It seems that the important thing at the present time is not to discuss whether we should or not, but how to study the questions of civil society. The essential factor here is how to treat the relation of such studies to those of historical materialism. In my view, it will get us nowhere to neglect the socialistic nature of the market economy and of the modernization of China, and the objective reality that historical materialism is determined to be the guiding principle in the treatment of all questions in the political and culture-ideological fields. One cannot simply receive the Western conception of civil society and take it as the main principle for solving various real questions concerning political and cultural ideological affairs of present China, that is, to discuss questions about civil society without noticing its relation to historical materialism.
The following steps seem important in order to relate the study of civil society to historical materialism.

Firstly, we should note the points of coordination between the two. Because historical materialism was formed and developed originally as a theory of civil society, taking Western conceptions of civil society as its main theoretical sources, there must be some common ground between them, both in their objects and in their contents. What is most worthy of mention if that Western theories on civil society were formed and developed as suiting the needs for the development of Western market economy, and that they became very important elements in promoting its development and even that of the Western society as a whole. It is almost the same with regard to the relation between historical materialism and the development of market economy and the entire society of present-day China.

Secondly, we should clarify the differences between them. While containing a theory of civil society, historical materialism greatly surpasses Western theories of civil society both in range and quality. The very important thing here is that it takes civil society as the social relations between people, especially the economic and productive relations. As Marx said, it is "the totality of material relation of life", "the true source and arena of all history". According to Marx, the relation between civil society and the political state is not purely contrary, but also united, it is the interaction between the economic foundation and superstructure. In contrast, Western theories of civil society always divorce civil society from social relations of production and take it only as some association of independent individuals external to the political state. The essence of the civil society is not the social relation of people, but some features divorced from state and government, non-official in character. Thus, Western thinkers in general take civil society as such associations as groups, clubs, guilds, trade and labor unions, companies, etc.

Thirdly, we should affirm that research concerning civil society is very important in the whole studies of historical materialism. While stressing the decisive role of social economic relations in the whole of social life, historical materialism does not take the relation of people to be only economic. This means that research on civil society is not limited to the range of socio-economic relations but must involve the broad field of social life and reorganize the relative independence of such research. The study of Western theories of civil society should be an important topic and special field in the study of historical materialism. One of the main imbalances of traditional historical materialism is to be divorced from these fields, or to take them as only socio-economic. The bad result is that there are scarcely any worthwhile studies in these fields, which even remain blank. In this situation, it is very important to advance research on questions of civil society and to draw critically upon the valuable fruits of Western scholarship. Certainly this would enrich and develop the whole of historical materialism. Of course, in order to stress the difference of historical materialism from Western theories of civil society, it is not necessary for such research to use the easily confused concept of civil society; it could study it even better under the name of historical materialism in the complex political and ideological background of present China. In spite of this, we should avoid the one-sidedness of ossified and dogmatized historical materialism.

Civil Society, Market Economy and the Individual Subject

As a united process, the development of Western civil society and of market economy are connected internally with the historical process in which people are transformed from colony-subjects into individual subjects. In other words, the formation and development of market economy and relevant civil society presuppose taking people as individual subjects.
Karl Marx summarized the historical development of the people in three main stages: the stage when people’s dependence was controlled; the stage of people’s independence based on dependence on things; the stage of free personality based on people’s all-round development. In terms of people as subjects, he notes three forms: colony-subject, individual subject and kind-subject. Marx described in general the basic feature of these three forms and the conditions of transformation from one to another. As the people’s development is the central expression of the development of social history, Marx’s theory of the three stages is also an important expression of his theory of the development of social history and even his whole historical materialism.

However, in the studies of historical materialism in China, the related questions did not arouse strong attention among academic circles for a long time. Only following the transformation from the planned to a market system in the economy, did the meaning of people as individual subjects emerge. A few philosophers proposed the questions again and expressed worthwhile views. I am not prepared to discuss the broad questions on this concern in the present paper. What I will present here is only some ideas about the relation between the formation and development of civil society and market economy, on the one hand, and those of people as individual subjects on the other.

In the natural economy it is impossible to break the individual away from the bond of close social relations. Individuals were in a condition of dependence on the collective and on others, and were short of independent personality and the ability to act on one’s own. They were not true individuals, for they always depended on some social community and acted generally in relatively close range with no broad social connection. As Marx pointed out, with regards both to individuals and to society it was impossible to think of free and full development. Here the individual existed only as an element of the commitment, that is, a collective subject.

Contrary to this, one of the main features of market economy is to affirm that persons exist as independent individuals. In order that commodity production and exchange could be practiced, it is necessary for the individual as owner of commodity to cast off various social limitations and fetters. This means they can go to market freely and compete with others according to their own choices and pursue their own aims. We mentioned above that freedom, equality, competition, openness and reason, which is their ideological foundation, come to be the main presuppositions of market economy represented by the commodity-money relation. These presuppositions are, in the final analysis, that the individual as owner of commodities becomes an independent individual. The form of existence of the person as subject is not the colony, but the individual. Because the form of existence of the person as subject emerged under the conditions of the Western market economy, various theories about individualism appeared in Western circles of thought. In other words, as one of the main categories of Western ethics, individualism was proposed just after the person came to be an independent individual and Adam Smith, the founder of Britain’s classic economy, systematically developed it early in the history of modern Western thought.

In terms of the historical development of human existence, the appearance of the person as an independent individual and the relevant individualism is important progress in the history of humankind. It is because by the endless pursuit of independent individuals, that the latent capacity of the person could be developed. Thus it advanced development of economy and progress of history. For this reason, Marx and Engels amply affirmed the progressive role of the relevant theories of Western thinkers in modern times.

As the establishment of the individual subject is the presupposition for existence and development of Western market economy, so it is also the presupposition for the formation and development of Western civil society relevant to market economy. In order to explain this, let us return to the meaning of the concept of civil society.
A few years ago, some Chinese scholars used to discuss how to translate the German *Burgerliche Gesellschaft* into Chinese, that is, whether besides the meaning of civil society, it has the meaning of bourgeoisie society. I did not study the meaning of these words in terms of their etymology, so I could not contribute ideas in this regard. However, viewed from the development of Western society, especially of Western market economy, their meaning seems clear. The root *Burger* of the word *Burgerliche* means either bourgeoisie or civic residents. Both have the common meaning of individuals who can freely go to the market and realize their products through free exchange. Although having no political power and being exploited by the feudal class in European feudal society, most of these people cast off personal dependence on the feudal class and became so-called freemen, that is, the so-called ‘civic estate,’ or ‘third estate’ in France. During the later period of European feudal society, along with the development of commodity economy, the civic estate was divided into different groups. Among them, some became bourgeoisie, or capitalist, while others became proletarian or free laborers. In spite of this division, all lived as freemen or civil residents, having shaken off personal dependence. In other words, they all lived not as colony-subject, but as individual subjects. Therefore, viewed from the development of market economy, the cardinal meaning of *Burger* is the independent individual in the commodity market and the cardinal meaning of *Burgerliche Gesellschaft* is various associations and groups consisting of independent individuals according to the principle of market economy. All represent the economic and social relation between these individuals.

**Individual Subject and the Road to Modernization**

Questions about modernization are quite broad. The concern of this paper is only that the formation of the individual subject is the presupposition of the formation of the market economy and the related civil society, on the one hand, of the road to modernization, on the other. The two form a united process.

People can interpret the meaning of the concept of modernization in quite different manners, as economic, political, sociological, etc. Generally, it means a process of social transformations from traditional agricultural civilization to modern industry. People can also give more concrete description of this process, from the state of the development of science and technology, the level of democratic and legal systems and the degree of people’s culture and education, etc. The famous American sociologist Talcott Parsons held that modernization should include the three elements of market economy, political democracy and individualism. This represents more or less the basic implication of the concept of modernization, because the transformation to modernization requires a market rather than a natural economy. This presupposes people as owners of commodity having the rights of democracy, freedom, and equality, that is, they have shaken off personal dependence. In philosophy, the fundamental meaning of modernization consists in the people’s transforming from collective-subjects to individual-subjects. Descartes and other modern Western philosophers’ loud stress upon the subjectivity of the human being is essentially to represent the modernization of European society through emergence of subjectivity in philosophy.

Viewed in terms of history, modernization first appeared in Western countries. The pattern of their modernization was typically and essentially a process of transformation from a natural to a market economy. This process promoted both the speed of the development and the progress of productive forces and science-technology as well as the modernization of the Western states. This process was accompanied by the amplification and development of civil society, even democratic revolution politically. The latter implied realization of the principles of freedom and equality
relevant to the market economy and civil society, as well as the affirmation of people as individual subjects.

Some characters of modernization differ between Western states. For example, there are some different implications in the British, French, German, and American approaches. However, generally they share the basic pattern of modernization as an inner process. As many developing countries, especially China and other oriental countries, the conditions are often quite complicated and their modernization is often in terms of outer factors.

How to connect the outer process of modernization with the specific characteristics of a people is a very difficult, but also very important problem to solve. However, considering that the basic features of modernization, are taking up the market economy system, implicating civil society, and casting off personal dependence to affirm the individual-subject, etc., there are no cardinal differences between Western and oriental countries.

China is in the process of realizing modernization, building socialism in the Chinese style. To transform from unitary planned system to market system economically is the main step to complete this process. As this process happens in the inner system of socialism, it is different from the Western countries where the transformation was from the feudal natural economy to a capitalist market economy. However, the process of modernization in China must include a relative separation of politics from the economy, endowing enterprises with more rights to act on their own, developing dialogues and consultation between government and various groups, respecting individual freedom and personality, affirming the individual-subject, etc. All these imply amplifying and developing civil society and have much in common with Western states.

Under a centralized planning system, the principle that the individual should obey the organization, the subordination of the lower level to the higher, the locality to the center was often absolutized so that all actions needed to be in step. The individual and lower level localities had not enough free space to act and less relevant responsibility. This means that people’s thought and action must accord with the entire pattern. Only the wholes are the true subject with the right to choose and decide, and then to bear responsibility. In this circumstance, it is very difficult for the individual or lower level locality to develop their activity and creativity. This quite obviously is unfavorable to modernization.

Replacing unitary planned economy with a market economy requires multiple steps. With regard to the people’s form of existence, the most important thing is to transform their thought and action from collective standards to individual ones, from a collective-subject to an individual-subject. Individuality has the meaning of an independent subject and is expressed in the individual (a worker in relation to his enterprise and an enterprise in relation to the state) has more rights to act according to their own choice. They could better develop their activity and enthusiasm and bear relevant responsibilities. This activity and enthusiasm are, in the final analysis, inner pursuits of the individual as an independent subject. The subject is a natural or legal person; freedom to act and the relevant responsibility must be affixed to the individual. The legal person representing the collective and organization is finally also an individual. Therefore, from the whole state or society to particular enterprises or groups, the degree to which they can succeed depends on the degree to which they can mobilize the inner impulse and pursuit of every individual as an independent subject, and unite them to constitute an effective force.

In brief, in spite of the character of socialism and its difference from Western states, the transformation to a market economy in China is also accompanied by the amplification and development of civil society, especially with the affirmation of the individual-subject. In the socialist market economy, the cardinal road to realizing socialistic modernization in China is to
strengthen the allocating and commanding role of the state from top to bottom through reforming its organs at all levels, to promote the role of enterprises and people’s groups from bottom to top through revising their functions, to mobilize the activity of individuals through affirmation of their independence and free personality, and to unite all those directions.

However, as the target of Chinese modernization and the system of market economy necessary for its realization is socialist in character, it will certainly transcend and overcome some Western limitations in this regard. Firstly, the market economy in China as practiced under the direction of a socialist state strives to restrict the spontaneity and destructive elements which appeared in market competition. Secondly, as the state is socialist, it can not only efficiently adjust the relations within such organs as government, but also regulate their relations with enterprises, groups and associations, to guarantee that the whole society be active and harmonious. Thirdly, the political, legal and moral systems of the socialist state could ensure to the highest level the individual’s rights to freedom, equality, and democracy which enable them to be independent subjects. At the same time it could reasonably and efficiently adjust the relation between individuals, and enable the individual’s pursuits to be united with the interests of others, the collective and the society. This means that while supporting the individual-subject, it will go beyond the latter to a degree and continually transform it in the directions of thinking in terms of the whole of humanity.

To affirm the individual-subject is a necessary presupposition of the market economy, and hence of realizing modernization in the economy, politics and even philosophy. However, the idea of the individual-subject has serious limitations. It could not ensure the continued and healthy development of society, much less the manifold development of the people. Along with the rapid development of contemporary science and technology, the ever closer connection between people represented by the Internet, and the strengthening of the tendency of socialization and even globalization, serious limitations on the individual-subject become more manifest. Under these circumstances, many scholars call for going beyond the individual-subject. Obviously people should not ignore the limitations of the individual-subject in the socialistic condition of China.

In order to promote the development of socialistic market economy and the realization of the target of modernization in China, it is necessary to confirm the individual-subject clearly in order to mobilize the activity of individuals which is the final basis of whole society; at the same time, we must guard against and avoid the negativity and decomposition of the individual-subject. The final target of our society is to promote and guarantee people’s manifold development, which implies going beyond the individual-subject, and as Marx earlier pointed out, transforming it from concern solely with the individual to concern for humanity.
Moral Predicament and Reconstruction in Contemporary China: 
A Comment on Pragmatism as a Moral Theory and 
Its Influence in China

The Meaning of the Moral Predicament of Contemporary China

Whether there is a moral predicament, even a moral crisis, in contemporary China is a sensitive issue which often is discussed by many people, especially in academic circles. Views on this issue are very different. Some admit that there are serious problems in present day China, but refuse to use such words as "moral predicament" and "moral crisis" to indicate this condition because they think that these confuse the distinct nature of moral problems in different social systems. Others think that the moral problems in contemporary China are very serious and morally disruptive for many persons. This divergence is related both to different views on the problems and to different understanding of the meaning of such concepts as "moral predicament".

It is necessary then to explain these concepts. Moral predicament can simply indicate a dilemma people face when they make judgements on moral choices. In their lives, people often meet various moral problems and have to take positions about them. When people make judgements concerning moral problems they are often in an ambivalent situation and are asked to make choices. For example, people can sometimes have alternatives as to the pursuit of matter or spirit, personal economic profits or influence, taking into account friends or sticking to one’s principles, etc. Thus people may fall into some difficult choices. Such conditions can be experienced by anybody in every society. Moral predicaments in this sense do not necessarily have the meaning of a moral crisis or of moral depravity. When people say that contemporary China is in a moral predicament they mean something different.

Moral predicaments in the sense of moral depravity and loss or moral crisis mean mainly that the whole society lacks a relatively stable system of moral standards, or that if there is such a system it cannot play the role of moral standards in society because it is incapable of adapting to the needs of social change or conflicts with some social mentalities. In this case, people will lack a certain relatively stable standard in their moral choices and fall in varying degrees into moral relativism or nihilism, even into a certain kind of moral depravity. When people say that contemporary China is in a moral predicament they mean something different.

The causes which produce the above condition are very complicated and sometimes completely opposite in nature. For example, when a society is in a condition of decadence and depravity, the originally dominant ideology cannot suit the requirements of social development; the original system of moral standards is increasingly suspect and challenged; it can no longer provide moral standards for the whole society. Until a new social system is established and a new system of moral standards formed or recognized by the majority of people, moral relativism and nihilism may spread. The condition of the late years of ancient Rome is an example. In the modern Western world, some countries have also experienced a similar condition in specific periods of their history.

When a society is in its early years of formation and development or in a period of great change, the original system of moral standards is shaken seriously and to a great degree loses its influence. The new system of moral standards suitable for forming or changing society is in the
course of formation, but is not yet relatively stable and may even have some contradictions. In making their moral choices people may have a certain sense of instability and sometimes are influenced by moral relativism and nihilism. There may be some kind of moral loss, but in this case the "loss" is in the course of progress and hence often is transient and partial. With the realization of a new social system, the system of moral standards becomes increasingly perfect and the phenomenon of "loss" may even disappear.

When we discuss contemporary Chinese moral predicaments or moral loss, we mean these in the latter sense. The use of these terms to state the moral condition of contemporary China may be criticized by some left theorists as blackening socialist China. But as long as we define the meanings of these terms to some extent and do not take them as an evaluation of the whole society, it may be appropriate to describe the moral condition of contemporary China in order to draw attention to the change of conditions.

The moral problems of contemporary China have various manifestations, the most important of which include: disruption of traditional moral standards, wavering by many people in their belief in the communist moral ideal, imperfection in the system of socialist moral standards, the moral corruption of some, etc. Our views on these problems will be stated below.

Chinese Traditional Moral Standards: Their Fate in the Present Age

China is an ancient civilized country with a history of more than 5000 years. Since the social structure of China was basically linked with the patriarchal clan system and blood relationship, with a characteristic unity of family and state, all aspects of social relationships have intense ethical qualities. Based on such a foundation Chinese culture was certainly ethical, and in the rich heritage of Chinese thought ethical ideas played a very important role. These traditional ethical ideas gave the Chinese people a lofty moral character. The basic spirit of "five virtues" (jen or human-heartedness, yi or righteousness, li or justice, zhi or wisdom, and xin or trustworthiness) advocated by Confucian moral doctrine teaches people to do good morally. Jen teaches people to work selflessly and love others. To practice jen, people should balk at no sacrifice, even that of one’s life. Yi requires people to act according to a social standard of right and wrong and teaches them to be open, above board, brave and candid, and to use yi to overcome profit and perform the law according to yi. Li demands that people have an attitude of modesty and respect towards others and to esteem the personalities of others in relationships between people. Zhi calls for respect for knowledge and ability, and for regarding zhi as a criterion in associating with others. Xin demands that people be honest in words and actions and be as good as their word in dealing with others.

The above moral ideas derived from the "five relations" were used by Confucian ethics to guide relations between the monarch and his subjects, husband and wife, father and son, old and young brothers, friends (the so-called "five relations") and various relations between people themselves and with society. Confucian ethics formulated a series of principles dealing with those relations and offered relevant practical steps. The traditional ethico-moral ideas of China played an important role in promoting the stability and development of Chinese society for a long time. Ancient Chinese society was maintained to a great extent by its special moral standards; China is a country of etiquette which was developed through the cultivation of just such ethical ideas.

However, the system of Chinese traditional ethics was based on focused production within the family and suited to a social structure linked by the patriarchal clan system and blood relationships. This restricts it greatly and generates a strong conservativeness and closed character. The Confucian theory of the five virtues and five relations stated above and many moral standards
derived from them were made absolute. They were regarded not only as products of human nature but were considered as well to correspond to the way of heaven and earth and to be an eternal moral standard. Being politicized they came to be considered eternal standards of political action. Often they became a conservative power which fettered and hindered the originality of thought and political innovation, and were used by conservative forces to maintain the existing state of affairs: most rulers in all the dynasties of China highly praised and built up Confucianism into an idol, once their dominant position had been established. On the contrary, when society was in periods when new forces were replacing the old these new forces always violently attacked Confucianism in order to break through the net of conservative forces.

In the 150 years since the Opium War of 1840, especially since the May 4th movement of 1919, the various forces of Chinese society have launched a very sharp debate over where Chinese society should go. Attitudes toward traditional Chinese moral doctrines such as Confucianism were always an important part of this debate. During the May 4th Movement, the political positions and thought orientations of the various forces differed, but they all criticized the traditional culture of which Confucianism was the main component, especially its traditional ethical thought. They all held that a new culture and social system could not be established unless this critique were carried out. What they did in this regard had great significance.

For a long time, however, the critique of Chinese traditional culture and its ethical theories, such as Confucianism, were one-sided, left or right, that is, ossified Marxist and ultra-liberal. Both took a position of total repudiation toward traditional culture and morality. This attitude led to moral relativism and nihilism under some conditions, and became one of the important causes of the loss of morality and the consequent moral predicament of present day China.

The representative figure of the rightist inclination in its early years was Hu Shi, the leading figure of pragmatism in China. In many articles written in the 1920s and 1930s Hu Shi publicly looked down upon the culture of China and the East and highly praised Western culture. He held that the characteristics of Eastern (Chinese) culture are "satisfaction", "conservativeness", "being happy-go-lucky", "discouragement in adversity", "ignorance" and "being content with poverty and satisfied with one’s place"; on the other hand, the characteristics of the Western culture are "dissatisfaction", "an enterprising spirit", "conquering nature", etc. He advocated that the Chinese "must admit that we are poorer than the Western people in every respect" and "should be not afraid of losing our national culture", but should follow the example of the West. Hu completely agreed with the "theory of a total Westernization" which was systematically demonstrated by another Chinese scholar at that time, Chen Xujing. Both Hu and Chen idealized the Western capitalist system and its culture; they held that as long as the Western system and culture are introduced into China and carried out, all problems, political, economic and cultural, in China can be resolved.

In all later historical periods, the inclination of total repudiation toward traditional Chinese culture and morality and the corresponding theory of total Westernization was accepted under various guises by some Chinese scholars. In another burst of discussion about culture launched in the 1980s, the inclination was developed in an extreme manner by some so-called "radical" scholars. In this period, the "Heshung" telefilm series caused a sensation throughout the country with the keynote of total repudiation of Chinese traditional culture, the so-called "yellow culture".

Those who completely repudiated Chinese traditional morality and culture from the left were mainly some Marxists or those who waved the banner of Marxism. According to the original doctrine of Marxism, we should not take an attitude of total acceptance or repudiation towards either foreign, including Western, or traditional Chinese morality and culture, but an attitude of critical inheritance: to repudiate what is obsolete and conservative or unsuitable for present China,
while absorbing what is positive and worthwhile therefrom. Early Chinese Marxists had long taken such an attitude. Although quite different from liberals such as Hu Shi and others who proposed total Westernization, such leading Marxists as Li Dazhao, Chen Duxiu and Qu Quibai did not simply negate the worth and importance of Eastern ideas and culture. In order to struggle against feudal groups pointing back to ancient times and to stress the necessity of departing from the feudal patriarchal clan system and its ideology they used some extreme words, but did not sweepingly deny Chinese traditional culture. Mao Zedong and other communist leaders who turned to the left later described the attitude with which people should critically inherit the good traditions of Chinese culture. After the People’s Republic of China was founded, the leaders of the CCP such as Mao Zedong retained such an attitude.

However, they increasingly moved toward the left and this ideological leaning often became an irresistible political force as the CCP became the ruling party of China. Matters of right and wrong in the realm of culture and moral ideas were no longer resolved by scholarly research, but by the leaders’ thought. In the early and middle years of the 1950s, Mao Zedong launched a discussion of the film "Biography of Wu Xun" and the classic novel "Dreams of the Red Mansion", and developed such discussion into a punitive political expedition against those who took the opposite position. After that time discussion in the fields of culture and thought was more and more controlled by left political forces; Chinese traditional moral ideas and culture as well as related research were increasingly regarded as decadent feudal ideas opposed to socialism and were negated. This developed intensively during the ten years of the "Cultural Revolution". Under the slogan that communism must completely break with traditional ideas, all traditional cultures were regarded as reactionary and hindering the progress of China, and every effort was made to completely "eradicate" them. Since this eradication went beyond critique in the academic field and turned into a political critique in which hundreds of millions of people took part, among a great part of the masses Chinese traditional culture almost disappeared through "eradication". In a word, under irresistible political pressure the destruction of Chinese traditional culture by leftist orientations was much more serious than that by those who advocated total Westernization. It must be noted that what was negated by the left was not only traditional Chinese morality and culture, but also its Western counterparts; where advocates of total Westernization affirmed everything of Western culture without any analysis, the left negated everything of the West.

_The Communist Moral Idea: Its Conflicts with Present Reality_

When those who designed and executed the "left line" wiped out the ideas of both traditional Chinese and Western moralities it seems that they did not intentionally want to advocate moral nihilism, but only to establish and advocate communist morality among people. But their intention did not have its expected effects.

For more than forty years since the establishment of the P.R. of China in 1949, communist moralities have been advocated as the most lofty. Those who followed communist moral standards or norms are considered in some respects as models for the whole people, especially for youth, to study; education in the communist moral ideal was regarded as the fundamental content of moral character. In one period, especially during the early 1950s, the advocacy of communist morality played a positive role by encouraging people’s enthusiasm to devote themselves to the state and society.

However, a society governed by the communist party is not a communist society. There is still a long distance between the Chinese society which just cast off the yoke of the feudal-patriarchal
system and the communist society idealized by Marxists. Communist moralities can be taken only as a moral ideal. If the minority is willing to devote themselves to the communist ideal, and can take it as the standard of their actions in some respects and to some extent, they would be taken as fine examples for others. Yet, this moral system still could not be taken as an actual standard of actions for the majority of society. For example, the principle "nothing for self, all for others", advocated by Mao Zedong, was regarded as one of the main expressions of communist moralities. Although a few advanced members can do so in some affairs, it is unrealistic for the majority in such a poor country as China where just to survive makes one think of one’s own interests. Even if they can display the enthusiasm of "nothing for self" in some cases, this cannot last and be enlarged.

If we insist upon actualizing the communist moral system as the practical moral system which must orient people’s lives regardless of the condition of actuality and history, we can succeed only in having people claim communist morality orally, but not executing it in action. In that case such morality becomes an empty slogan. It is worth mentioning that in the period during which the "left line" prevailed, especially the 10 years of "Great Cultural Revolution", the slogans of communist moralities were often used by some political conspirators and careerists as a means of deceiving the broad masses and poisoning their minds. This threw many people into perplexity and insensitivity.

In more recent years, along with the transformation to a market economy in China, those who are called "public servants" transform their power into money. In order to grab private or small-group interests, they do everything to the extreme under the cover of Marxism and communism. This is bound seriously to damage the reputation of Marxism and communism. If many people in the past had a sense of respect and even worship of communist morality, the actions of those mentioned above have turned people cold and generated antipathy to communist morality. Except orally, the past pious belief in the communist moral system of many people is gradually vanishing.

The Moral Status of Present China: Its Relation to Pragmatism

Since both traditional Chinese moralities and those introduced from the West have been rejected and the communist moral system is not a practical moral system for regulating people’s actions, if there is no new moral system to fill in, people’s conduct will have no standards to follow. No one would help; everyone would do as he or she likes; the result would be moral relativism and nihilism. Chinese leaders and relevant scholars who have some knowledge of this recently emphasize again and again that in order to construct socialism in the Chinese style it is necessary to pay attention to the construction of both a material and a spiritual civilization. If the construction of a socialist spiritual civilization could be successful, it would certainly be a fine standard for people’s moral choices, and also helpful for people in facing moral predicaments. In fact, in recent years there have been great achievements both in theoretical inquiries regarding socialistic spiritual civilization and in promoting this among the broad masses. Moral relativism and nihilism have been restrained and to a great extent surmounted among those who have an appropriate understanding of socialist spiritual civilization. Following this route, we cannot only cast off moral predicaments, but also reconstruct China as a country with lofty moralities.

But as reform in the economic field is far from being finished in China, the co-existence of different economic systems and the conflicts between them are far from being well regulated and controlled. Reform in the political system is but the beginning; a more thorough democratic political system suited to a market economy is far from being established. The influence of the
"left line" and feudal autocracy are far from being rooted out. Reform in the fields of thought and culture has fallen further behind, and the inclination to be closed and conservative is still dominant; there still has not been an adequate and wise understanding of how both to critically absorb Western culture and to develop traditional Chinese culture. In a word, socialism with a Chinese face, far from being completely established, still is not a definite concept in people’s minds. In this case, it is naturally very difficult to formulate quickly a clear-cut theoretical system of socialist spiritual civilization, and even more difficult for the system to be accepted universally and to become a practical system for guiding people’s everyday conduct. Hence, achievements in this field are limited for the time being; they remain insufficient to clear up and restrain the influences of moral reactivism and nihilism which have long prevailed.

In fact, in present day China, a number of people still fall into some kind of moral predicament or even moral degeneration. The following phenomena are rather grim and surprising. First, in reaction against "selflessness", "nothing for self, all for others" and other noble mottos of communist morality, extreme individualism overflows to a very serious extent among some people, especially those in political or economic power or those who have some special relationship with such persons. Their individualism is not one that advocates respecting the individual’s personality and developing his or her activity and creativity; rather it is an egoism which takes everything for one’s private benefit. Such people take the following ideas as the standard of their conduct: to use public goods for private ends, to harm the public good, to benefit oneself and to harm others for one’s own good. They do not serve the people anymore, but force people to serve them. Their actions go far beyond general graft and embezzlement "legitimated" by some privilege. They transfer extensive public funds to their own pocket. Their actions have produced a very bad impression on the broad masses, and are the major factor causing the moral crises and political instability of present day China.

The second phenomenon concerned with extreme individualism under the impact of negative market economy factors, is the orientation to money-worship: "All is measured by money" is not just an idea and slogan, but a motto earnestly practiced by some people. The commodity and money fetishisms analyzed by Karl Marx in his Capital have become a religion worshiped faithfully by some people in present day China. In order to gain money, some will spare no despicable or filthy means. According to their opinion, fame, conscience, personality, national dignity, all can be thoroughly abandoned; the discipline of the CPC and the national laws can be trampled. News of murder for money often appears in the newspapers.

The third phenomenon, hedonism, has developed to a very serious extent, contrary to the lifestyle of hard work and plain living which was advocated by communist morality and revolutionary tradition, and different from the rational consumption permitted by socialist morality. It has been reported that the amount of expenses for banquets arranged by officers at different ranks of government, the communist party and enterprises using public finances, amount to more than 100 billion in Chinese currency each year. This is not comparable to any country in the world, even the most developed. That this has happened in so poor a country as China with nearly 100 million people not having enough food to eat and clothes to wear is even more inconceivable, but it is a matter of fact. This shows the extent to which hedonism has developed in present day China. Furthermore, such immoral and degenerate actions as drug-taking and prostitution, which once were regarded as the manifestations of rotten and corrupt capitalism, have been developing to a serious extent in some parts of China.

The fourth phenomenon which is especially ironic in view of the norms of communist morality regarding relationships between people and with society, and constitutes a repudiation of
traditional Chinese morality, is that many people despise public morality and will not be responsible for elementary moral obligations and duties. Examples abound and are manifest in people’s refusal to obey public order and in the destruction and pilferage of public property. Professional morality is not followed; people will not be responsible even for their parents and children.

The above factors suffice to show that in present day China, many people’s thoughts and behaviors not only have no trace of communist and socialist morality, but are contrary also to virtue in both traditional Chinese and Western moralities. If this happened rarely it would not be surprising, for in any society some people depart from normal moral regulation or even become degenerate, violating social disciplines and laws. Society can restrict and limit such persons by certain means so that they do not lead to the collapse of all morality in society. But the actual status of present day China is that the above phenomena are numerous. The relevant authorities try to take measures of education and prevention, but have not achieved the intended effects. So there is a contradictory situation in the Chinese moral field today; on the one hand, the moral outlook of the majority of people is turning towards good order through advocating socialist spiritual civilization; on the other hand, moral loss and moral declination still run wild in certain spheres.

Why should this happen? We have analyzed some of the reasons above. It is worth mentioning that some do not like to seek the causes in such factors as the limitations in the social and historical conditions of present day China, the negative influences of the political and ideological "leftist line" which prevailed for a long time, and the imperfections of reform and openness in various fields. They simply impute all to Western trends, especially pragmatism. In their view, egoism, money-worship, hedonism, moral relativism and moral nihilism in any form, all reflect such Western ethics as pragmatism. In their view, in order to cast off the moral predicament of China today and to construct a socialist moral system as a constituent part of socialist spiritual civilization, we must criticize and reject pragmatism and other Western ethical theories, and eliminate their pernicious influences.

The above point of view is not new. Surveying Chinese history since the 1950s we note a regular phenomenon: once a theoretical inclination in the ideological and cultural sphere was criticized a major political leader, or some scholars close to the leaders always imputed it to the influence of pragmatism and other Western trends. They always turned the criticism of a particular inclination into a criticism of pragmatism. For example, the criticism of the film "Biography of Wu Xun" and of the Chinese classic "The Dream in the Red Mansion" became critical of rightist opportunism in the communist party of China. Both were launched by Mao Zedong himself during the 1950s, and both were developed and transformed into criticism of pragmatism. The theoretical foundation of the persons criticized was said to be just pragmatism. During the "great cultural revolution", the extreme left also took pragmatism as the ideological foundation of the so-called revisionist and bourgeoisie lines criticized by them. After the "cultural revolution", some people took pragmatism again as the ideological foundation of the extreme left. In a word, in contemporary China, there always have been some persons who regarded pragmatism as the gathering place of all rotten and degenerate things and fallacies. No matter what was criticized, its theoretical foundation finally would be imputed to "bourgeois pragmatism". So it is no surprise that some people impute the reason for serious moral problems in present day China to the influence of pragmatism and other Western trends.

However, it may be asked, why pragmatism could influence China for so long time, why some people who criticized pragmatism under the banner of Marxism afterwards would be criticized in turn as being oriented toward pragmatism, why whose who never received any education in
Pragmatism could be regarded as having been influenced by pragmatism. In order to understand the true relation between the moral situation of China today and pragmatism, the above questions are worth studying. It is impossible for this article to discuss these questions in detail. But it must be mentioned that either those who criticize pragmatism or those who were criticized have no clear and definite idea of authentic pragmatism. What they criticized, or are being criticized for, is not pragmatism or is even contrary to pragmatism. Therefore, to analyze the connection between the present moral condition of China and pragmatism, and especially to explore the way to construct socialist spiritual civilization, it is necessary to study and reconsider the real meaning of the relevant theories of pragmatism.

**Pragmatist Moral Theory: Its Misunderstanding in China**

Pragmatist ethical and moral theories were early introduced in China. When John Dewey was invited to give lectures in China during the May 4th period, one of his main topics was precisely ethics and moral theory. Later, those who propagated and criticized pragmatism referred to Deweyan ethics. It is impossible for this paper systematically to comment on pragmatist moral theory; I intend only to briefly mention certain of its contents related to the subject of this chapter, especially concerning Dewey’s moral theory, because his theory not only is the typical representative of pragmatist philosophy, but also has great influence in China.

**Dewey’s Theory of Moral Reconstruction**

In discussing the moral theory of pragmatism, Chinese philosophical circles always have been concerned with the theory of moral reconstruction as the important constituent of Dewey’s broader theory of philosophical reconstruction. The most universal accusation brought against Dewey’s theory of philosophical reconstruction was that it propagated idealism and opposed materialism as a way of escaping the mind-matter dualism. Some did not deeply explore what the theory is for or against. If one takes an objective attitude and carefully reads Dewey’s moral writings, one finds that they were misunderstood in some respects.

What is the reconstruction for which Dewey calls in moral theory? One of its main contents is to reject traditional moral theories which take the moral realm as absolutely different from scientific knowledge, and take moral research as essentially different from natural science. "After all, we are only pleading for the adoption in moral reflection of logic that has been proved to make for security, stringency and fertility in passing judgements upon physical phenomena. And the reason is the same."3 This logic is Dewey’s experimental logic which he tried to carry from research in the natural sciences into socio-political and ethical-moral research. He thought that using experimental logic as a scientific method of inquiry he could unite research from the natural sciences and ethics and moralities, and from the separate fields of facts and values.

This view originated directly from Dewey’s new empiricism, i.e., empirical naturalism, as he called it later. Its basic point of view is that the realm of philosophy should be limited to the world which can be experienced. Philosophy should be theory concerned with the world of experience, i.e., the life world of human beings. Experience is neither knowledge resulting from a process of cognition, nor subjective consciousness separated from the object; rather, it is human action, life, practice itself, or the united process of subject and object, or mind and matter. Human action, life and practice, are different from the instinctive behavior of animals; they are always in pursuit of some goals and are guided by reflection and thought, i.e., by intelligence. What philosophy should
do is to help people in their action, life, practice, so that they could be successful. Therefore, philosophy is nothing but a methodology of human action, life and practice. Its mission is to inquire how people can achieve their designated goals in their actions and practice. In this sense, philosophy is a scientific method of inquiry, i.e., a theory of inquiry or experimental logic.

According to Dewey, human action whether in the natural or the moral fields, all must be guided by intelligence, i.e., by experimental logic. Both scientific judgements and moral judgements are empirical judgements for they are all means for human action, life, or practice, "When physics, chemistry, biology, medicine, contribute to the detection of concrete human woes and to the development of plans for remedying them and relieving the human state, they become moral; they become part of the apparatus for moral inquiry or science."4 In a word, the moral realm is not an independent realm separated from other fields. There is no unbridgeable gap between natural and moral "sciences", between knowledge and value, etc.

There are many weak points and shortcomings in Dewey’s theory just mentioned. For example, he over-emphasized the unity between natural sciences and the moral-social-historical sciences, overlooking their diversity and the special character of each. But compared to the ethical trends of intuitivism, emotionalism and even mysticism which took the moral realm as fully contrary to science, his theory is certainly quite progressive. If we do not forget that one of the main shortcomings of traditional Chinese moral theories is weakness in scientific demonstration, we should recognize that Dewey’s theory on moral reconstruction, especially his scientific method of inquiry in the ethical realm, is worthwhile and helpful for moral reconstruction in China.

**Dewey’s Criticism of Moral Absolutism**

One of the important parts of Dewey’s reconstruction in philosophy is to oppose the absolutism of rationalist idealism which used absolutized general concepts to generalize various special situations and reduced all concrete and ever-changing situations to single and fixed general concepts. It is the same in the ethical realm. Some rationalists took general, fixed, even eternal moral concepts as the starting point of moral research, and attributed special and concrete moral situations to these concepts. What Dewey did his utmost to reject is that there are unique, fixed, and ultimate moral ends as well as a highest good or supreme moral law and principle, and that the fundamental task of ethics is to find this kind of end, good or principle. This idea is in fact a moral absolutism, with different manifestations. Some people believe that this moral purpose is subjection and loyalty to a supreme power or authority, others hold that it is the intention of God or the will of a secular governor, and so on. But uniformly they search for this ultimate purpose and supreme principle. Dewey rejects the above rationalist norm because a person’s moral situation and conduct is always particular, special, concrete and changing. So must be our moral judgements; we should make different moral judgements according to different moral situations. If we forcedly subject these situations to general and fixed concepts, we can only give rise to a series of nonsensical polemics and obstruct people from resolving the moral problems they are facing. Even to do so under the banner of advocating reason, would reduce the power of reason by preventing people from exploring concrete moral problems by scientific methods.

While opposing moral absolutism, Dewey did not promote moral relativism, nor did he recommend subjective idealism in general philosophy. In his view, although we cannot reduce concrete and special moral situations to universal, fixed and ultimate concepts, we should not go to the other extreme, i.e., to subordinate general universal concepts to particular cases. We should not absolutize concrete, particular moral situations so that every such situation would be taken as
unique and unsimilar, with no connection to other situations. This would simply exclude any role for general concepts and principles and lead to moral relativism. Dewey clearly rejected such relativism:

The blunt assertion that every moral situation is a unique situation having its own irreplaceable good may seem not merely blunt but preposterous. For the established tradition teaches that it is precisely the irregularity of special cases which makes necessary the guidance of conduct by universals, and that the essence of virtuous deposition is willingness to subordinate every particular case to adjudication by a fixed principle. It would then follow that submission of a generic end and law to determination by the concrete situation entails complete confusion and unrestrained licentiousness.5

This paragraph shows us that while emphasizing making particular moral judgments according to the particular situations, Dewey did not repudiate the importance of general concepts and laws in making concrete moral judgements.

Of course, as in Dewey’s overall theory of moral and philosophical reconstruction, there are also certain shortcomings and onesidedness in his criticisms of moral absolutism and relativism. As to evaluating his criticism and even his overall reconstruction theory, scholars of different trends have different views. I will not discuss it here in detail. But one thing is definite: when Dewey opposes traditional moral theory, especially moral absolutism, his purpose is surely neither to promote idealism, nor to absolutize certain capitalist moral principles, nor to preach moral relativism and nihilism, but to shake off the yoke of the old tradition and authority so that moral research could be based on scientific methods of inquiry and could help to resolve the various concrete and realistic moral problems faced by people. Such an idea can play a positive role at least to a certain degree in smashing the trend of thought if China whereby traditional feudal-patriarchal moral ideas long fettered people’s thought. This is the main reason why scholars of various trends in the May 4th new cultural movement all welcomed his theory.

Dewey’s Instrumentalism in Moral Theory

Dewey did not completely negate the meaning of general concepts and principles when he opposed traditional moral theories which generalized special moral situations by using general moral concepts and laws. On the contrary, he emphasized the importance of these concepts and principles; there is a need for people to use them when they are to do research on morals, make moral judgements or apply the scientific method of inquiry in moral affairs. As when doctors examine various concrete and special illnesses, they need to use medical knowledge consisting of general concepts. However, we should not consider these concepts and principles as the end of investigation or the only yardstick for making moral judgements. We can take them only as means and instruments for exploring concrete and special moral situations. In other words, general moral concepts, principles and laws are not themselves the purpose and end of moral inquiry, but only the instruments for such inquiry. This is the basic meaning of Dewey’s instrumentalism in the moral realm.

There are some serious limitations and fallacies in Dewey’s instrumentalistic moral theory, which are criticized by both Chinese and Western scholars. I do not intend to recommend this idea, but it is appropriate to mention that Dewey’s instrumentalism emphasized only that general moral concepts and principles be regarded as instruments for helping people to investigate and resolve
various moral problems. There is no intent to satisfying only the individual’s private interest. There exist some misunderstandings in Chinese philosophical circles in this regard for some scholars have been severely criticizing Dewey’s instrumentalism in the moral realm as not only a subjective idealism theoretically, but also an instrument for defending the bourgeoisie’s private profit and interests. However, Dewey again and again asked people not to misunderstand the meaning of his theory:

When truth has been thought of as merely emotional satisfaction, a private comfort, a meeting of purely personal need, it is rather superficial misunderstandings. . . . So repulsive is a conception of truth which makes it a mere tool of private ambition and aggrandizement that the wonder is that critics have attributed such a notion to sane men.6

The Pragmatist View of Happiness

Many people undervalue the pragmatist view of happiness. They think it emphasizes only a person’s private interests, success and satisfaction, but does not concern the happiness of other people, the collective or society. Some people even consider the pursuit of maximum possessions and material enjoyment to be the creed of pragmatism. In fact, this is not true.

Pragmatists emphasize the great importance of happiness in their whole ethical theory and believe that changes in moral ideas will always be embodied centrally in changes in the view of happiness.7 They refuse asceticism which excludes people’s actual happiness and insist that each moral theory has to discuss the question of happiness.8 Moralists who seemingly neglect happiness retain the idea under the term "bliss". Therefore, we should accept such things as happiness, satisfaction and enjoyment.

Goodness without happiness, valor and virtue without satisfaction, ends without conscious enjoyment—these things are as intolerable practically as they are self-contradictory in conception. Happiness is not, however, a bare possession; it is not a fixed attainment. Such a happiness is either the unworthy selfishness which moralists have so bitterly condemned, or it is, even if labeled bliss, an insipid tedium, millennium of ease in relief from all struggle and labor. It could satisfy only the most delicate of molly-coddles. Aesthetic sensitiveness and enjoyment are a large constituent in any worthy happiness. But aesthetic appreciation which is totally separated from renewal of spirit, from re-creation of mind and purification of emotion is a weak and sickly thing, destined to speedy death from starvation.9

These sentences suggest that Dewey does not appreciate selfishness, unlimited possessions of property and uncontrolled material enjoyment. He even has a sense of advocating the construction of spiritual civilizations. So it is obviously improper to consider such things as upholding selfishness, hedonism and other relevant moral characters to be the creed of pragmatism.

What actually is the pragmatic view of happiness? Dewey answered: "Happiness is found only in success; but success means succeeding, getting forward, moving in advance. It is an active process, not a passive outcome. Accordingly it includes overcoming obstacles, elimination of sources of defect and ill."10 Here it is worth noting that the success Dewey emphasized is not personal, private interest and enjoyment, but only the overcoming of various obstacles and difficulties in human actions and going forward continually. "It is the same both for seeking personal happiness and making others happy. Making others happy does not mean giving others
something particular, but helping others go forward, i.e., to foster conditions that widen the horizon of others and give them command of their own powers so that they can find their own happiness in their own fashion." Therefore, happiness and success lie in continually overcoming difficulties and making progress, in struggling against various difficulties and obstructions. It is in just this sense that Dewey said: "The process of growth, of improvement and progress, rather than static outcome and result, becomes the significant thing;" "Growth itself is the only moral end."11 In a word, the fundamental idea of Dewey’s pragmatist view of happiness is to struggle, to progress, to grow continually.

The Individualism of Pragmatism

That the worldview of pragmatism is an individualism has not been doubted by many. The pragmatist philosophers themselves definitely recognized that. But individualism is a conception with various meanings; people can understand it in quite different ways. When people say that the moral depravity of present China was influenced by individualism advocated by such Western trends as pragmatism, what they have in mind is individualism in the sense of egoism. But such individualism is just what Dewey intensely opposed. The view that Dewey rejects, namely, searching for personal private interests and enjoyment as happiness, indicates also that he does not agree with individualism in the sense of egoism. In fact, this tendency is reflected also in many of his writings on socio-moral questions.12 For example, he speaks highly of modern utilitarian ethics with regard to which he appreciates the emphasis on subjection of law and institutions to human needs, removing morality from Heaven to earth, and supporting various reforms. But he thinks that "Above all, it acclimatized in human imagination the idea of social welfare as a supreme test."13 Here what Dewey recommends is not private personal interests, but social welfare.

However, Dewey held that there are many deficiencies in utilitarianism in this respect. The main reason is that it cannot rid itself of one of the theoretical inclinations of traditional ethics, namely, to set an ultimate and supreme purpose for moral conduct and action. It regards the greatest possible aggregate of pleasures as this purpose. Therefore, certainly it is unable to consider concrete conduct and actions as having happiness and joyfulness in themselves, but considers them as external means of obtaining happiness and joyfulness. Pleasure and joy become consequences of these actions and conducts, which makes them things that can be possessed and enjoyed. To pursue happiness and pleasure is not to create something, but to obtain the outcome of this creation. Utilitarianism then is not separated from hedonism and the desire for possessing property. Although utilitarians criticize feudal hierarchies and their various evils, tacitly they consent to the similar evils of a capitalist system. "Thus utilitarianism gave intellectual confirmation to all those tendencies which make 'business' not a means of social service and an opportunity for personal growth in creative power, but a way of accumulating the means of private enjoyments."14 On the whole, the reason why Dewey criticized utilitarianism is that its theory is unable to get rid of the deficiencies of hedonism and the desire for possessing property. Dewey maintains that we should overcome this deficiency and encourage people to subject their own actions to obtaining social benefits and developing the individual’s creativity. Of course, he was unable to propagandize the spirit of selflessness and collectivism, but obviously it is unjust to regard him as the defender of individualism in the sense of selfishness.

Dewey does not want to counsel individualism because of his opposition to selfishness and egoism. In Individualism, Old and New (1929) and other writings, he wants to substitute the old
rugged individualism, which he consistently criticizes, with a new individualism. Although the old individualism also flaunted guaranteeing the freedom of each person and equality between them, it is in fact distorted by the ruling pecuniary culture; it rather safeguards inequality and oppression. Dewey did not give an exact definition of his new individualism. Generally speaking, he suggests that the creative role of every person in contemporary society should be developed; the great development of modern sciences and technology should become the condition for developing personal creativity, not the external material force for enslaving it. He held that the development of science and industry should take social efficiency as its standard, but should not subject this to private pecuniary profits. Later, these theories of Dewey became one of the important theoretical resources of so-called democratic socialism which is different from Marxist socialism, just as Dewey’s new individualism is different from the collectivism of communist moral thought. Although both are rejected in present day China, we should not insist that their worldview is based on egoism.15

Comprehensive evaluation of Dewey’s and other pragmatists’ moral theory needs to be explored from various angles, but this is not the mission of this chapter. But from the brief introduction above, it is also clear that if people impute the various problems of the moral realm in present day China to the influences of pragmatism and other Western trends, it is not practical or realistic to blame the people’s immoral actions upon the pragmatist moral-view.

Moral Reconstruction in Contemporary China

Regardless of whether or not people support using such phrases as "predicament" to express the moral situation of present China, they cannot deny that there are serious moral problems in present Chinese society. No matter whether or not people consent to using the term "reconstruction" to represent the present task of moral construction of China, they must agree that there is difficult work to perform, including theoretical reflection and concrete measures.

To deal with the moral reconstruction in China, the first thing to do is to gain a clear and comprehensive understanding of the causes which engender these problems. These are various: the interior contradiction and conflict of the economic and political systems of contemporary China and the contradictions and conflicts between them are the principal reason for the contradictions and conflicts in the moral and cultural realms. To overcome the problems in the moral and cultural realms presupposes a successful reform in the political and economic systems. Therefore the latter is the principal way for the moral reconstruction of China. Besides this, the ultra-left ideological and cultural line with its pernicious influence, the destruction of traditional Chinese moral standards, the conflicts between moral ideals and the present moral condition, the misunderstanding and mis-critique of the moral philosophy of pragmatism and other Western trends, etc., all are important causes of the present predicament. To overcome these carefully is also the way to moral reconstruction. Some additional ideas on these questions include being rid of the ossification of Marxism and making it an open and continually progressive theory.

China is a socialist country directed by the communist party. The Chinese constitution stipulates that Marxism and Mao’s thought is the guiding idea for every cause. No matter whether or not people doubt the truth of Marxism, they could not deny the leading position of Marxism in the ideological realm of China. Neither theoretical study nor the practical operation of the moral realm in China could be practiced without recognizing the guiding role of Marxism. The important thing here is not whether to recognize this role, but how to treat it.
Why are there serious problems in the moral sphere of China? The most important reason is not that people did not emphasize the guiding role of Marxism, but that Marxism was ossified and dogmatized, falling from guiding to misguiding. Therefore, in discussing moral reconstruction, the first thing to do is to extricate ourselves from the yoke of this ossified Marxism and to recover original Marxism as an open and continuously progressive theory. This is easy to say, but difficult to do in practice; to fight against dogmatism, to fight against ossification, these slogans were shouted for a very long time, but they are only slogans. If in his practice one fought “against dogmatism”, he would be blamed for abandoning Marxism. The present situation is better than the past, but there is no cardinal change. More progress in this regard is what most scholars wait for.

A second step is to strengthen education in moral ideals and treat correctly the relation between these and practical moral standards. At the present time, belief in the communist moral ideal has been shaken. But we should not abandon moral education in the communist ideal for that reason. Beyond political reasons and considering only the development of the people’s morality, education for a lofty moral ideal also is very important. A people who has a lofty moral ideal will always keep a lofty moral character in its life and action. In Western society, many people not only choose money and other private interests, as some leftists think, but seek also lofty moral ends. In this regard, religious organizations often play a positive role, teaching people to act morally. The moral order of Western society is supported to a great extent by Catholic and Christian moral ideals.

As a socialist country with Marxism as the guiding ideology and communism as the final social goal, China can only take communist, not religious, morality as her moral ideal. Here moral education is principally communist. But when relevant authorities carry out such education, it is better for them to consider such points as the following; (1) Do not take communist morality as the only ideal; do not take it as absolutely opposite other moral ideas which also may have some lofty implications. Christian morality, for example, has some things in common with communist morality: at least, it advises people to do good. (2) Do not confuse the communist moral ideal with present moral standards. Education in communist morality should be practiced in a limited area, for example, mainly among the communist party. We should carefully study its feasibility. (3) Advocating the communist moral ideal must be connected with a formulation of the standard system of socialist morality; at the present time, education in moral ideals must also be suited to conditions for the transformation to a market economy.

The third step is to develop and transcend the traditional ethico-moral idea of China. In order to overcome the full repudiation of Chinese traditional morality and culture by both the ultra-left and the ultra-right, many scholars from the Chinese mainland and overseas propose reviving and developing traditional Chinese morality and culture; some scholars even take this as a prerequisite for modernization in China. No matter what the political tendency of the persons who propose these ideas, they should be considered carefully. In the last ten years the Chinese people have suffered deep injury from abandoning the tradition. Many persons, especially the younger generation, are not familiar with this tradition. If we do not do our best to revive and redevelop it, the program of constructing socialist spiritual civilization in the Chinese style will become an empty slogan.

In recent years many Chinese scholars have discussed the relation between traditional culture and modernization with great ardor and interest. In order to revive and develop traditional Chinese culture and morality more effectively, it is not enough for us to discuss this in academic circles. When the ultra-leftist fully negated Chinese traditional and Western culture, they did not only make an academic critique, but using powerful political pressure they also launched mass
movements again and again in order to root out these cultures from people’s minds. Although it is unnecessary, and even impossible, to launch a mass movement to revive and develop traditional Chinese culture, we should study carefully how to encourage the broad mass of people to re-germinate a deep sense of their own culture and moral tradition, to make the excellent virtues with which Chinese culture is imbued once again the virtues of the Chinese people today, and to formulate practical operations towards that end. All these are very important to improve the moral condition of China today.

But we should not exaggerate the role of Chinese traditional morality and culture in the present day moral reconstruction. It is absolutely wrong to think that we can reconstruct our desired morality and culture only from the traditional heritage of our history. We must not forget that, after all, Chinese traditional morality and culture emerged and developed on the basis of a feudal-patriarchal system and is imbued with a strong feudal and conservative character. While nourishing the Chinese people with noble virtues, it also was used by feudal-conservative forces as an instrument to defend their reactionary control and other interests. In order to advance a more open reform in China, especially democratic reform in the political field, it is necessary to criticize continually the negative aspects of traditional culture. We must bear in mind that in contemporary China the influences of feudal autocracy are still rather strong, and sometime are even one of the main obstacles to realizing modernization. If we are limited by our traditional culture, it will be very difficult to overcome the influences of feudal autocracy. Therefore, in beginning to develop traditional culture and morality, we must also pay attention to how we can transcend them. Since Marxism is stipulated as the guiding ideology, we had better re-study it and make it a truly open and progressive theory and a helpful guide for our studies. We also should deeply study excellent Western moral and cultural thoughts, use them as references, and connect them with the excellent Chinese traditional culture. On this basis we can create a more progressive and superior morality and culture.

We must re-evaluate the role of pragmatist and other Western moral philosophies. As to how to use pragmatist and other Western moral philosophies, there is no common view among Chinese scholars. Theories of indiscriminately imitating or fully negating the West have cropped up sometimes, but their supports are few. The main obstacle at the present time is that while some people agree that the above Western theories should not be negated fully and that their positive elements can be used as references, they do not take a practical and realistic attitude to abandoning the prejudices against Western theories formed in the past. They discovered in these theories only their negative side, so in fact they the question of how to use these theories for reference. For example, for a long time some people equated the individualism proposed by pragmatists and other Western scholars with egoism. Even most recently some famous scholars have criticized such individualism sharply. But they leave beyond their field of vision how such individualism encourages persons to develop their creativity and activity to contribute to social welfare, how it advocates transcending the limitation of a person’s private interests, how it emphasize the individual’s duty and responsibility to others and to society, etc. In this way, what such critics say about individualism is only negative, whereas, as we saw in the case of Dewey, individualism is much different from rugged egoism.

Connected with the above, many leftist scholars over-emphasized the opposition and conflicts between Marxism and such Western theories as pragmatism. Analyzing and studying Western scholars’ works, they are accustomed to taking them as only negative materials for Marxism and hardly pay attention to aspects which may be worthwhile and helpful in developing and enriching Marxism.
In order to surmount the above obstacles and to use Western theories for a Chinese end, it is necessary for Chinese scholars to re-evaluate pragmatism and other Western trends, to re-estimate the relation between them and Marxism. To re-evaluate and re-estimate is not easy in practice. I have put some ideas forward in other papers. I would add several suggestions.

(1) Commenting on the above Western trends we must take full account of the condition of the economic, political and scientific developments of Western countries. Since we recognize that their condition in these fields is not bad, in some aspects they are worth our study and use as references. We cannot deny wholesale their morality and culture as they are all connected with each other.

(2) In order to emphasize the fundamental opposition between Marxism and such Western theories as pragmatism some scholars still proceed from concepts, not matters of fact—which makes them fall into self-contradictions. For example, some speeches of a Chinese leader, such as the famous metaphor of white and black cats, clearly regard pragmatic philosophers, but as, according to authoritative commentaries in China, pragmatism is fully negative, scholars do not dare to recognize the fact. Taking the leader’s speeches as deeply true and highly appreciating them, they take similar speeches by pragmatists as utterly absurd and criticize them violently. Such self-contradiction certainly will be harmful to the reputation of Marxism. If we do not over-emphasize the fundamental opposition, but recognize common views on some aspects, we can get more truthful and positive elements from Western theories. There are many ideas in Dewey’s moral philosophy which certainly could be useful and helpful to moral reconstruction in China.

Both theoretical inquiry and practical work in the moral reconstruction of present day China are complex and formidable. The road is rugged and demands that scholars devoted to this must have great courage and insight in order to overcome the biases long originating from leftist orientation, and transcend various ideological and even political obstacles. If this could be done, certainly we would achieve our desired target.

Notes

4. Ibid., p. 178.
5. Ibid., p. 173.
6. Ibid., p. 170.
7. Ibid., p. 183.
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
12. Ibid., vol. 12, p. 181.
The Trend of Globalization: Philosophy and the Study of Culture

That our colloquium of this year is held in India has important meaning in itself. China and India are old countries of world civilization with a history and culture of long-standing, the main birthplaces of oriental philosophy and culture, and are two biggest developing countries today. Although the history is not long, USA is the successor of Western histories and cultures, and is the biggest developed country now. Therefore, that the Chinese, Indian and American philosophers together discuss the relation in philosophy and culture of China and India as well as their relation with Western philosophy and culture, has broad meaning.

Recent years, along with the rapid progress of science and technology, there has been especially the progress in big strides of information revolution represented in Internet. And under the impetus of transnational corporation, the economic structure of various countries of the world changed with the result of coming to an integral whole, and economic globalization has become an irresistible trend. In other spheres besides economics, various countries also meet a lot of common problems, such as expanding population, deterioration of the environment, drug taking and peddling, disease, etc.. All the problems could be solved better only on the condition that various countries of the world work together collaboratively to find countermeasures. The integration of the world in these fields necessarily promotes to some extent relevant changes in the developing direction of political, ideological and cultural fields. Thereupon, to speak generally, globalization became an objective trend to which people with different political and ideological position cannot very well avoid paying close attention.

Between countries of the world, especially between oriental developing countries such as China and India on the one hand, and Western developed countries of Europe and America on the another, there are evident differences on the level of economic development, social and political systems, as well as ideological tendency and cultural tradition. Facing the common trend of globalization, they necessarily have different interests and pursuits. How to take part in and give impetus to the process of globalization, how to realize globalization? Is it better to take the mode advocated by Western developed countries or to take the mode maintained by developing countries like China and India. There must be some friction, sometime even conflicts and contradictions between them. This situation demands of people that they do deep and systematic research into the process of development of the world, especially on the problems concerned in the process of globalization, so as to find some appropriate way, in which the interests and demand of different countries could be respected and the cultures of different types could be developed harmoniously.

The questions on globalization and other world problems have important philosophical significance. To study such questions philosophically will help people to get more deep and all-round understanding, and it will be beneficial to their proper solution. For the study of the question of globalization in philosophy and culture, first of all people should study the relation between oriental philosophy and culture representative of Chinese and Indian peoples on one side and of Western philosophy and culture on the other.
The Connection of Orient-Western Philosophy and Culture and Their Conflicts in Modern Times

Although the sphere of oriental culture, including philosophy, is quite broad, the Chinese and Indian cultures are most representative among them. The influences of these not only reach their neighboring countries and areas, but also expand to the whole world, including Western countries.

India is placed on the orient-Western communications center, and has more close connection with oriental and Western countries in a variety of respects from ancient time. The ideological and cultural exchange, including religious, between China and India began more than two thousand years ago. It was very frequent during the period between the Western and oriental Han dynasty of China, and reached its upsurge during the Shui and Dan dynasty. It had further development during the period of the Sun and Yuan dynasty. Among various Indian cultural forms, which have influenced China, first of all is Buddhism. It was disseminated not only among popular folk for a long time, but was also supported by feudal dynasties during most historical epochs, with the result that it mixed together with local Confucianism and Taoism of China and became the mainstream of Chinese traditional cultures. Whereas the Buddhism culture developing in China, for example, the Buddhism of big ride, conversely reacted India.

As for the reciprocal influence of Indian ideological and cultural thoughts with Western ones, this can also be back to ancient times. For example, some ideas in the "Upanishad", the oldest religious and philosophical document, influenced Christianity early through the neoplatonists Plotinus (202-204) and Seneca (354-430) and others. Later, Indian religious and philosophical thoughts were mixed in every sphere of Western society, and this underwent further development in modern and contemporary times. The philosophies of Schopenhauer and Jaspers and others have their sources in Indian philosophy. This condition was discovered early by a lot of scholars, including Heidegger and other famous Western philosophers. Western thought also influenced India from early times. For example, there were Christian Churches in India early in the fourth century. Along with the invasion of Portuguese and British colonialists, the influences of Western thought and culture in India became more and more strong. In modern and contemporary times, India is undoubtedly among the developing countries that are most influenced by Western thought and culture.

The Chinese traditional culture, with Confucianism as the principal component, is one of the most influential and living among various types of culture in the world. It has strong affinity with various local and external cultures, can mix various cultures into itself through contact and conflict with them. The confluence of Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism is the outstanding expression of this affinity. This affinity of Chinese culture enables it to accommodate every thought and continually develop and enrich itself during the long process of history, with the result that it can be prosperous in all times and can deeply influence the development of Chinese history. During the long process of Chinese history for thousands of years, there were frequently turbulent situations and endless domestic trouble and foreign invasion; nevertheless, China can overcome in some way various upheavals and divisions, and form united a country again. This condition is directly concerned with the affinity of Chinese traditional culture. While assimilating foreign culture, Chinese traditional culture often influenced others. The cultural development of a lot of neighboring countries of China has close connection with Chinese traditional culture.

The cultural exchange between China and Western countries also began early, and it became more frequent in modern and contemporary times. It is worth mentioning especially that the progressive science and technology of ancient China influenced deeply Western countries along
various roads. The famous British scholar, Joseph Needham, in his "Science & Civilization in China" gave a relative comprehensive introduction to the question concerned. As for the influence of traditional philosophy on Western countries, it was commended early by some Western scholars. W. Leibnize is an outstanding example. The influence of Western culture on China had also a long history. The activity of Jesuits in China during the period from the Min dynasty to the Qing dynasty was strong. Nevertheless, except for some knowledge of natural sciences, the thought and culture transmitted from the West at that time is mainly a Catholic one. After the Opium War, along with the strong invasion of Western capitalist forces, the traditional feudal society of China, in which there were serious contradictions originally, entered a deep crisis. Up to the end of the Min dynasty to the beginning of the Republic of China, some progressive intellectuals, who tried to find an outlet in China so that they could promote the transformation of China, started to import various Western trends with the characteristics of science and democracy. From that time on, Western thought and culture, especially modern and contemporary ones, deeply influenced China.

Both Indian traditional culture, which was centrally manifested in Buddhism and Hinduism, and Chinese traditional culture, which fused Confucianism, Buddhism and Taoism into an integrated system, play important positive roles in history, and contribute a lot to the cultural development of the whole world. Nevertheless, they belong to pre-capitalist culture or, in other words, to pre-modern culture. During the pre-capitalist period, their common tolerant and coordinate spirit enabled them to be the main spiritual support for strengthening the national coagulability and ensuring the flourishing and stability of the country to which they belong. Nevertheless, when the development of society transformed into a capitalism characteristic of competition, the pre-capitalist cultural direction must conflict in some degree with the later. In fact, from the time when Western capitalist forces invaded India and China, these conflicts exist always and are even radical at times. The question of how to solve questions on the relation of tradition and modernity, the local and foreign, in ideological and cultural spheres both in China and India became ones which play a decisive influence on the direction of the development of society and the destiny of country and nation. These questions have varied forms of expression and questions to solve in China and India. Nevertheless, as two countries that seek modernization, they must transcend in some way the pre-capitalist tradition of their countries, and must draw lessons from Western culture connected closely with modernization. In China, during the recent hundred and more years, the polemics in ideological and cultural fields often connect in different degree with that of how to transcend, that is, how to criticize and inherit, the traditional pre-capitalist cultures and how to make use of, and to draw lessons from, Western capitalist cultures. Although various sides in polemics show a variant political position and ideological tendency, sometimes even radically in conflict, they are unable to avoid transcending traditional culture and drawing from Western cultures in some way, in so far as they advocate, or at least do not oppose modernization.

The Predicament of Western Philosophy and Culture in Modern-Contemporary Times and Their New Transformation

Different from oriental culture, one of the evident traits of Western culture which originated from ancient Greek and Rome culture is that it initiates reason. Even in the Middle Ages of Europe, although catholic theology controlled everything and the revelation of God was held as higher than reason, reason was not ignored. The theological system of Thomas Aquinas is expressed as a strict
rational system. Since the Renaissance, the spirit of reason was emphasized even more. Many thinkers advocated the spirit of philosophy and affirmed that reason is inherent from the birth of a people. The spirit of reason is essentially a humanistic one. The humanistic movement in the Renaissance is the indication of later matured rationalism. The Cartesian philosophical system constructed from the principle "Cogito, ergo sum" is the typical form of rationalism and the further development of humanism of the period of the Renaissance. This spirit of rationalism and humanism is identical with a scientific spirit that was emphasized along with the upsurge of modern natural science. Various natural sciences that arose at that time are cognition and the research of human consciousness and reason as subject to nature as object, whereas the victory of natural sciences is also just the victory of reason. This historic epoch in the history of Western philosophy is called the epoch of reason. It was reflected in many changes in Western philosophy at that time. Among them, the change with the most symbolic meaning of this epoch is the so-called epistemological transformation. This transformation not only played an important role in the development of Western philosophy itself, but also is the essential prerequisite for the development of every aspect of modern Western society, such as science, culture, economics and others. Without such transformation, the place of the individual as independent subject could not be recognized, the market economic system, which was premised by the affirmation of such a subject, could not be amply developed. Without such change, it is impossible to do deep and concrete investigation of nature, and allow the upsurge of modern practical natural sciences. Without such transformation, the modernization movement of Western countries could not be realized successfully.

However, while making important progress under the flag of reason, modern Western philosophy and culture included serious shortcomings. Evidently advocacy reason became superstition to reason at its extreme. At that time, many Western thinkers who believed in the authority of reason took reason as the all-powerful instrument and universal measure. They thought that everything could be and should be constructed by reason, and could and should judged by reason. Every idea of science is measured by reason as right or wrong. Every social phenomenon and question should be recognized and solved by reason. Social order should be rational order, the ideal society is rational society; all systems of thought and culture also should be rational ones. The mission of philosophers is to find the most universal and absolute trustworthy conception and principle of reason. In so far as they were successful in these concerns, using these conceptions and principles, they could construct the whole world, and deduce the system of whole cognition, even of whole existences. Therefore, once such a system is constructed, it should be the base of every science and the criterion of every truth, and have supreme position above every science. Generally speaking, the philosophical system constructed by a rationalist principle often became a speculative metaphysical system above science and practical life.

The shortcomings of modern Western philosophy and culture were expressed in other ways. For example, epistemological transformation, projecting the expression of the spirit of reason, overcome naivete and the intuition of ancient philosophy and the dogmatism of the philosophy of the middle ages by reflective thinking. Nevertheless, its prerequisite of separation of subject and object, mind and body make people neglect their non-separate connection, with the result that they fell into dualism. Furthermore, on one side, modern Western philosophy and culture greatly advocate the development of human personality and creation and the respect of human freedom and dignity. On the other, separating subject from object, mind from body, they would make human being either degenerate into a machine without flesh and blood, still more, without soul, or only a link in a metaphysical system. According to the latter, the essence of human being did not
exist in his practical existence, but in the conception of "human being" advanced by the system. Then, the subjectivity and creativity of human being and his freedom and dignity, all melt into the speculative system. After realizing an epistemological transformation, modern Western philosophy ended in a failure in epistemology.

The shortcomings of modern Western philosophy and culture are related to various contradictions in the economic and political fields of Western capitalist society based on market competition, and are the latter’s expressions in ideology. It is just the latter’s sharp-pointed contradictions, such as economic crises, class antagonism, etc., which were exposed since the middle of the 19th century, cloud the theories of a rational society and country, which were advanced and expounded by modern Western thinkers. These contradicted the rationalistic tendency, which originally existed, so that it began to be radically challenged. The rational epoch symbolized by the epistemological transformation was falling into serious crisis. A new transformation is necessary in order for Western society and its philosophy and culture to develop. All thinkers with different political and ideological tendencies cannot avoid such a situation, and must answer the question of how to take a new direction. In fact, since the middle, especially the end of the 19th century, various sides of Western society have been brewing new changes. Both Marx and Marxists as well as other Western thinkers pay close attention to and inquire into such changes. What Spengler’s famous theory on the decline of Western society reflects is just the decline of modern Western philosophy and the culture of rationalism. What Nietzsche’s "God died" means is that the absolutizing Western rationalism died. So-called "post-modernism", which has been talked about extensively since this century, inherits in fact this critical tradition. In the recent hundred and more years, philosophies in Western countries experienced a variety of changes. There are a variety of divergences and contradictions among various philosophers and philosophical schools. Nevertheless, most of them commonly demand to transcend modern Western philosophy and culture, which are closely related with Western modernization and its consequences. In other words, the critique of modernity, which is reflected in epistemological transformation, became more and more a universal trend in Western society.

How to transcend the modernity reflected in modern Western philosophy and culture after all? The roads are varied of course. In fact, Western scholars have answered the question in various ways. Among other things, then assimilate some relative elements from Chinese, Indian and other oriental countries, and use them to remedy the shortcomings of Western philosophy and culture. This is a common demand of many Western thinkers, to re-study oriental philosophy and culture often became their common tendency.

**Reciprocal Relations of Orient-Western Culture and Their Tendency to Unify**

In the process of coming to modernization, oriental countries, as China and India, meet problems of how to transcend and transform their own traditional culture, including philosophy, so that they could be adaptable to the demands of modernization. Therefore, they must look for methods and plans from Western countries that have been modernized. At the same time, in order to remedy all sorts of contradictions and shortcomings as the unavoidable consequences of modernization, Western countries often look for input from oriental countries where modernization has not been realized and has not yet met with contradictions and shortcomings. This reciprocal relation shows that in the contemporary world the need for the characteristic of plurality in the various fields of politics, economics, thought and culture, etc., as well as a definite tendency to unify.
Undoubtedly, we should neither sum up the relation between orient and west as Westernization, nor the relation of west to orient as orientalization. The work of oriental and Western countries and their tendency in philosophy and culture and other areas must obey their own special target. They are realized under the condition of keeping their own philosophical and cultural tradition. The present condition of development and target as well as the nature of traditional philosophy and culture determine to a great degree the direction for assimilating foreign philosophy and culture and the model of their connection with what is traditional.

For oriental developing countries such as China and India, the realization of modernization is their current main target. Their assimilation of Western philosophy and culture must obey the target of modernization. Therefore, they must first of all assimilate the elements adaptable to the demands of modernization, then reform traditional cultures, so that they also can be suitable to the demands of modernization. The realization of modernization and new currents in philosophy and culture cannot be divorced from original tradition; they are only a creative reformation based on original tradition. Nevertheless, for the developing countries of China and India, tradition itself is not enough to start the movement of modernization. For this reason, they must assimilate Western philosophy and culture adaptable to the demands of modernization, and use them to reform the traditional ones, that is, to break through, sublate and transcend tradition. In order to avoid the contradictions and problems arising from the process of modernization in Western countries, people should pay close attention of course to the critiques of contemporary Western scholars, especially so-called post-modernists, addressed to modernity. When reforming the tradition of modernity, people should not absolutize and idealize modernity, and must discover its various shortcomings and contradictions. Despite that, to excessively emphasize the critiques of modernity is not beneficial to the realization of modernization. For developing countries, the current main target, after all, is to realize modernization.

As for Western countries where modernization has been realized, the assimilation of oriental culture characteristic of pre-modernity is of course not to let them replace modern philosophy and culture, going backwards to pre-modernity, but to draw lessons from such theories and ideas of oriental culture that have not been infected with one-sidedness and the extremes related with Western modernization, so as to avoid and overcome all sorts of shortcomings in the process of modernization, especially those of nihilism, relativism, ir-rationalism, ir-moralism, etc.

The oriental developing countries of China and India are different from Western developed countries in social development and cultural tradition. Therefore their attitudes to foreign culture are also different. Despite that, under the fundamental trend of globalization, it is an evident fact that they come near each other, and even come to unify. Looking at the whole world, entering the 21st century means that science and technology as well as various sides of society will greatly and deeply change. Philosophy and relative culture will do so as well. What direction will the development of philosophy in the 21st century follow? The answers are varied. As for the concrete forms of philosophical development in the 21st century, nobody could judge exactly. Nevertheless, among various possible trends, the following will be necessary: different types of philosophy, including oriental and Western philosophy, Marxist and non-Marxist philosophy, scientism and humanism, European continental philosophy and British-American philosophy, etc., will approach each other and even mix together. People take the 19th and 20th century as one of conflict and even antagonism. Now the cold war has closed and humankind meets many common challenges. The 21st century will be one in which various countries of the world, either oriental and Western, or developing and developed, come ever closer to one another, and even become unified through peaceful competition and equal dialogues. This interchange and cooperation of
oriental and Western culture, including philosophy will constitute important bridges in this trend toward unification.