Tradition, Harmony and Transcendence

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Acknowledgements
Introduction

China. The term evokes a sense of vastness in time and space, in people and culture. In time, its museums contain examples of fine arts from a time that rivals those of Egypt and precedes by thousands of years most other regions of the world. In space, it stretches from the frozen lands of the northern Pacific to the lush jungles of Southeast Asia, and from the towering peaks of the Himalayas—the roof of the world—to the vast steppes of the Republics of the old Soviet Empire. In people, it contains over one in five of every person alive today. In culture, it enjoys an ancient and sophisticated tradition, richly articulated in terms of administrators and scholars, businessmen and farmers.

In the present day of open communication and egalitarian spirit, it may seem too much to dwell on the meaning of the term "China" as "Middle Kingdom" with all others moved to the periphery, but, as the previous paragraph illustrated, perhaps no other nation could lay more valid claim to the term.

In the last century, however, the interest and emphasis of people everywhere in the world shifted in a subtle but dramatic manner. There is a sense that, no matter how great the way of life developed in the past, it is important—indeed essential—to develop, to move, to change. In this context, ancient cultures have come to be called upon to do new things, and principles of stability are called upon to provide for the integration of motion. The throne room has been transferred into a cockpit; order has become equilibrium in executing difficult maneuvers; power has become thrust.

In so great a transformation there is danger that old strengths, unless carefully nurtured and transformed, might become new weaknesses. Thus, the ability to look back into a long and rich history can distract one from the challenges to be met today; respect and deference to elders can lock one's actions to sensibilities formed in a time which, if not distant, is nonetheless superseded; ancient harmonies achieved by conflating different dimensions of reality, such as heaven, man and nature, can reduce the tensions which hold open our horizons, found our hopes and inspire new efforts. By fascinating the human mind, an ideal can hold one captive, allowing past experiences of the good to generate repetition, which, in turn, can lead to stagnation. This can have most deleterious effects, for stagnation in a period of change and progress generates frustration; though present needs push for action, actions poorly planned and understood tend to exacerbate the situation and lead to decisions which are ever more inept; panic and social instability ensue in a devolving cycle.

To overcome this it is essential to rethink in new terms which, if not necessarily better than the past, reflect and respond to the aspirations and possibilities of people today and thus make possible concrete progress in facing the urgent issues of our times.

In this I would make two particular. First, in most cases the references to the Confucian tradition are intended in the broad sense in which the general Confucian outlook, especially in the last centuries, has tended also to assimilate and adapt elements of Taoism and Buddhism which continue to be operative in the culture of the people precisely as thus assimilated.

Second, while often the Confucian sense of harmony is seen merely as cohesion of the many offspring with their one father or of many people with the one governor, it is taken here in the sense of a dynamic cohesion of many social components and orientations. In this sense its potentialities for service as a principle for democratic pluralism are sought. Whether this is the
original sense or a latent one which could now be evolved must be judged by others specialized in the theory and practice of the Chinese tradition and creatively concerned about its future.

Accordingly, the following chapters study a number of themes.

Chapter I looks into the character of tradition as constituted from the cumulative creative freedom of a people in the past and consisting now in the exercise of its creative freedom in applying learning from the past to the challenges of our day.

Chapter II is devoted to the notion of person. The evolution of this notion and emergence into consciousness appears to have been the most dynamic force for change in the last half of the 20th century. In order to move ahead in the 21st century, we need to identify the component dimensions of the sense of person and its implications for social life.

Chapter III studies the coordinating notion of harmony in terms of Kant's third Critique as a context for the urgent realization both of the possibilities of science in the first Critique and of freedom in the second Critique. In this light, the traditional sense of harmony, rather than being abandoned as retrogressive, could be rethought from within and could manifest more of its richness; in the process, it could make possible a constructive realization of the twin aspirations for science and democracy which have characterized the hopes of China in this century.

Chapter IV concerns the sense of transcendence in order to see in the history of peoples how "inner" transcendence is founded upon the sense of an "outer" transcendent which can ground identically the dignity of the person and the relation of persons in community, and how, at the same time, this provides a creative tension between possibility and achievement that can enliven human creativity, lead to achievement and generate self-fulfillment.

The above speaks of challenge and human response, of progress and fulfillment. But, clearly, human history and our life contain failure as well as success, evil as well as good. Chapter V looks into this to see if the reality of evil can be recognized without it destroying or compromising the sense of truth, justice and good. We must see how, by integrating evil into the struggle to realize human life, even the tragedies of a person or a people can become roads to a resurgence, of person and society.

Finally, Chapter VI, by reflecting upon simple everyday components of our experience, will attempt to look more deeply into the nature of our being in order to discover its open dynamism and creative power. Here, the analysis will focus upon the nature of gift in the hope that this might lead us back once again to a deeper sense of the creative thrust of tradition for the life of persons (II) living together in Freedom (III) and in the enlivening context of the Transcendent (IV) in a process of transforming evil into good and death into resurrection and new life.
1. Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Creativity

The constant and universal thrust of modern human striving appears to be centered in self-determination in participation with other persons and peoples in the disposition of social affairs. This places us at the vortex of a number of mankind's deepest issues: it is self-determination, yet essentially with others; it must create the future, yet not dissolve the identity a people has developed in the past; it must manage the multiple crises of ongoing life, yet, through them, unpack the deep and perduring meaning of life.

Hence, to look into human development in our day it should prove helpful to enhance the character of heritage as the deep learning regarding human life developed over the millennia and now available. This is the grounds upon which we have developed our identity as a people. Further, we should study the process by which, in concert with others, we advance into the future. This suggests three issues: first, the nature of values, culture and tradition and their moral authority for guiding our life; second, our role in creatively shaping and developing this tradition in response to contemporary issues, and third, its implication for the relation of democratic attitudes to progress in our times.

Values and Cultural Traditions

Values

For the drama of self-determination and the development of persons and peoples one must look to their relation to the good in which search we live, survive and thrive. The good is manifest in experience as the object of desire, namely, as that which is sought when absent. Basically, it is what completes life; it is the "per-fect", understood in its etymological sense as that which is completed or realized through and through; and, once achieved, is no longer desired or sought, but enjoyed. This is reflected in the manner in which each thing, even a stone, retains the being or reality it has and resists reduction to non-being or nothing: the most that we can do is to change or transform a thing into something else, but we cannot annihilate it. Similarly, a plant or tree, given the right conditions, grows to full stature and fruition. Finally, an animal protects its life--fiercely, if necessary--and seeks out the food needed for its strength. Food, in turn, as capable of contributing to animal's realization or perfection, is for the animal an auxiliary good or means.

In this manner, things as good, that is, as actually realizing some degree of perfection and able to contribute to the wellbeing of others, are the bases for an interlocking set of relations. As these relations are based upon both the actual perfection things possess and the potential perfection to which they are thereby directed, the good is perfection, both as attracting when it has not yet been attained and as constituting one's fulfillment upon its achievement. Goods, then, are not arbitrary or simply a matter of wishful thinking; they are rather the full development of things and all that contributes thereto. In this ontological or objective sense, all beings are good to the extent that they exist and can contribute to the perfection of others.

The moral good is a more narrow field, for it concerns only one's free and responsible actions. This has the objective reality of the ontological good noted above, for it concerns real actions which stand in distinctive relation to our own perfection and to that of others--and, indeed, to the physical universe and to God as well. Hence, many possible patterns of actions could be
objectively right because they promote the good of those involved, while others, precisely as inconsistent with the real good of persons or things, are objectively disordered or misordered. This constitutes the objective basis for values and disvalues.

Nevertheless, because the realm of objective relations is almost numberless, whereas our actions are single, it is necessary not only to choose in general between the good and the bad, but in each case to choose which of the often innumerable possibilities one will render concrete. However broad or limited the options, as responsible and moral an act is essentially dependent upon its being willed by a subject. Therefore, in order to follow the emergence of the field of concrete moral action, it is not sufficient to examine only the objective aspect, namely, the nature of the persons, actions, and things involved. In addition, one must consider the action in relation to the subject, namely, to the person who, in the context of his/her society and culture, appreciates and values the good of this action, chooses it over its alternatives, and eventually wills its actualization.

The term `value' here is of special note. It was derived from the economic sphere where it meant the amount of a commodity sufficient to attain a certain worth. This is reflected also in the term `axiology' whose root means "weighing as much" or "worth as much." It requires an objective content--the good must really "weigh in" and make a real difference; but the term `value' expresses this good especially as related to wills which actually acknowledge it as a good and as desirable. Thus, different individuals or groups of persons and at different periods have distinct sets of values. A people or community is sensitive to and prizes a distinct set of goods or, more likely, it establishes a distinctive ranking in the degree to which it prizes various goods. By so doing, it delineates among limitless objective goods a certain pattern of values which in a more stable fashion mirrors their corporate free choices.

This constitutes the basic topology of a culture; as repeatedly reaffirmed through time, it builds a tradition or heritage about which we shall speak below. It constitutes, as well, the prime pattern and gradation of goods which persons experience from their earliest years and in terms of which they interpret their developing relations. Young persons peer out at the world through a lens formed, as it were, by their family and culture and configured according to the pattern of choices made by that community throughout its history--often in its most trying circumstances. Like a pair of glasses it does not create the object; but it focuses attention upon certain goods involved rather than upon others. This becomes the basic orienting factor for one's affective and emotional life. In time, it encourages and reinforces certain patterns of action which, in turn, reinforce the pattern of values. Through this process, we constitute our universe of moral concern in terms of which we struggle to advance or at least perdure, mourn our failures, and celebrate our successes. This is our world of hopes and fears, in terms of which, as Plato wrote in the Laches, our lives have moral meaning.

**Virtues**

Martin Heidegger describes a process by which the self emerges as a person in the field of moral action. It consists in transcending oneself or breaking beyond mere self-concern and projecting outward as a being whose very nature is to share with others for whom one cares and about whom one is concerned. In this process, one identifies new purposes or goals for the sake of which action is to be undertaken. In relation to these goals, certain combinations of possibilities, with their natures and norms, take on particular importance and begin thereby to enter into the makeup of one's world of meaning. Freedom then becomes more than mere spontaneity, more than
choice, and more even than self-determination in the sense of causing oneself to act as described above. It shapes—the phenomenologist would say even that it constitutes—one's world as the ambit of human decisions and dynamic action. This is the making of a person or people in a community of persons or of nations.

This process of deliberate choice and decision transcends the somatic and psychic dynamisms. Whereas the somatic dimension is extensively reactive, the psychic dynamisms of affection or appetite are fundamentally oriented to the good and positively attracted by a set of values which evoke an active response from the emotions in the context of responsible freedom. But it is in the dimension of responsibility that one encounters the properly moral dimension of life. For, in order to live oneself and with others, one must be able to know, to choose and finally to realize what is truly conducive to one's good and, to that of others. Thus, the person must be able to judge the true value of what is to be chosen, that is, its objective worth both in itself and in relation to others. This is moral truth: the judgment regarding whether the act makes the person good in the sense of bringing authentic individual and social fulfillment, or the contrary.

In this I retain that deliberation and voluntary choice whereby I exercise my proper self-awareness, self-possession, and self-governance. By determining to follow this judgment I am able to overcome determination by stimuli and even by culturally ingrained values and to turn these, instead, into openings for free action in concert with others to shape myself, as well as my physical surroundings and community. This can be for good or for ill, depending on the character of my actions. By definition, only morally good actions contribute to the fulfillment of the person, that is, to one's development and perfection as a person with others in community. It is the function of conscience, as man's moral judgment, to identify this character of moral good in action. Hence, moral freedom consists in the ability to follow one's conscience.

This work of conscience is, then, not a merely theoretical judgment, but the exercise of self-possession in one's actions. Here, reference to moral truth constitutes one's sense of duty, for the action that is judged to be truly good is experienced also as that which I ought to do. When this is exercised or lived, patterns of action develop which are habitual in the sense of being repeated. These are the modes of activity with which we are familiar; in their exercise, along with the coordinate natural dynamisms they require, we are practiced and, with practice, comes facility and spontaneity. Such patterns constitute the basic, continuing and pervasive shaping influence of our life. For this reason, they have been considered classically to be the basic indicators of what our life as a whole will add up to, or, as is often said, "amount to". Since Socrates, the technical term used for these especially developed capabilities is 'virtues'.

But, if the ability to follow one's conscience and, hence, to develop one's set of virtues must be established through the interior dynamisms of the person, it must be protected and promoted by the related physical and social realities. This is a basic right of the person--perhaps the basic human and social right--because only thus can one transcend one's conditions and strive for fulfillment. Its protection and promotion must be a basic concern of any order which would be democratic and directed to the good of its people.

**Culture**

Together these values and virtues set the pattern of our life through which our freedom is developed and exercised. This is called our "culture". On the one hand, the term is derived from the Latin word for tilling or cultivating the land. Cicero and other Latin authors used it for the cultivation of the soul or mind (cultura animi), for just as even good land, when left without
cultivation, will produce only disordered vegetation of little value, so the human spirit will not achieve its proper results unless trained. This sense of culture corresponds most closely to the Greek term for education (paideia) as the development of character, taste and judgment, and to the German term "formation" (Bildung).

Here, the focus is upon the creative capacity of the spirit of a person or people and the ability to work as artist, not only in the restricted sense of producing purely aesthetic objects, but in the more involved sense of shaping all dimensions of life, material and spiritual, economic and political. The result is a whole life, characterized by unity and truth, goodness and beauty, and, thereby, sharing deeply in meaning and value. The capacity to do so cannot be taught, although it may be enhanced by education; more recent phenomenological and hermeneutic inquiries suggest that, at its base, culture is a renewal, a reliving of origins in an attitude of profound appreciation. This leads us beyond self and other, beyond identity and diversity, in order to comprehend both.

On the other hand, "culture" can be traced to the terms civis (citizen and civilization.) These reflect the need for a person to belong to a social group or community in order for the human spirit to produce its proper results. By bringing to the person the resources of the tradition, the tradita or past wisdom produced by the human spirit, the community facilitates comprehension. By enriching the mind with examples of values which have been identified in the past, it teaches and inspires one to produce something analogous. For G.F. Klemm, this more objective sense of culture is composite in character. Tyler defined this classically for the social sciences as "that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, customs and any other capabilities and habits required by man as a member of society."

Each particular complex whole or culture is specific to a particular people; a person who shares in this is a civis or citizen and belongs to a civilization. For the more restricted Greek world in which this term was developed, others (aliens) were those who did not speak the Greek tongue; they were "barbaroi", for their speech sounded like mere babel. Though at first this meant simply non-Greek, its negative manner of expression easily lent itself to, perhaps reflected, and certainly favored, a negative axiological connotation; indeed, this soon became the primary meaning of the word `barbarian'. By reverse implication, it attached to the term `civilization' an exclusivist connotation, such that the cultural identity of peoples began to imply cultural alienation between peoples. Today, as communication increases and more widely differentiated peoples enter into ever greater interaction and mutual dependence, we reap a bitter harvest of this connotation. The development of a less exclusivist sense of culture must be a priority task.

**Tradition**

The development of values and virtues and their integration as a culture of any depth or richness takes time and, hence, depends upon the experience and creativity of many generations. The culture which is handed on, or tradita, comes to be called a cultural tradition; as such it reflects the cumulative achievement of a people in discovering, mirroring and transmitting the deepest meanings of life. This is tradition in its synchronic sense as a body of wisdom.

This sense of tradition is very vivid in premodern and village communities. It would appear to be much less so in modern urban centers, undoubtedly in part due to the difficulty in forming active community life in large urban centers. However, the cumulative process of transmitting, adjusting and applying the values of a culture through time is not only heritage or what is received, but new creation as we pass this on in new ways. Attending to tradition, taken in this active sense, allows us not only to uncover the permanent and universal truths which Socrates sought, but to
perceive the importance of values we receive from the tradition and to mobilize our own life project actively toward the future.

The recognition of the value of tradition would appear to constitute a special problem for all heirs of the enlightenment and it may be helpful to reflect briefly on why this is so. The enlightenment rationalism idealizes clarity and distinctness of ideas both in themselves and in their interconnection; as such, it divorces them—often intentionally—from their existential and temporal significance. Such an ideal of human knowledge, it is proposed, could be achieved either, as with Descartes, through an intellect working by itself from an intellectually perceived Archimedean principle or, as with Locke and Carnap, through the senses drawing their ideas exclusively from experience and combining them in myriad tautological transformations p. 485. In either case, the result is a-temporal and consequently non-historical knowledge.

Two attempts to break out of this have proven ultimately unsuccessful. The one, in order to recognize historical sequence while retaining the ideal of clarity and distinctness, attempted to attain detailed knowledge of each period, relativizing everything to its point in time and placing historicity ultimately at the service of the rationalist ideal. The other, the Romantics, ultimately adhered to the same revolutionary enlightenment ideal even in appearing to oppose it, for, in turning to the past and to myths, they too sought clear and distinct knowledge of a static human nature. Tradition thus became traditionalism, for all was included in the original state of nature and our only way of obtaining a firm grounding for human life was simply to return thereto.

In the rationalist view, any meaning not clearly and distinctly perceived was an idol to be smashed (Bacon), an idea to be bracketed by doubt (Descartes), or something to be wiped clean from the slate of the mind as irrational and coercive (Locke and Hume). Any judgment—even if provisional—made before all had been examined and its clarity and distinctness established would be a dangerous imposition by the will.

This raises a number of problems. First, absolute knowledge of oneself or of others, simply and without condition, is not possible, for the knower is always conditioned according to his or her position in time and space and in relation to others. But neither would such knowledge be of ultimate interest, for human knowledge, like human beings, develops in time and with others. This does not exclude projects of scientific knowledge, but it does identify these precisely as limited and specialized views: they make important but specific, rather than all-controlling, contributions.

Secondly, according to Descartes, reason is had by all and completely; authority, therefore, could be only an entitlement of some to decide issues by an application of their will rather than according to an authentic understanding of the truth or justice of an issue. This would be the over-hastiness of Descartes' fourth Meditation. Further, the limited number of people in authority means that the vision of which they dispose would be limited by restricted or even individual interests. Finally, as one decision constitutes a precedent for those to follow, authority must become fundamentally bankrupt and hence corruptive.

In this manner, the choice of clarity as an ideal, first by Plato and then Descartes, has generated an exclusivist mind-set ruled by a reductivist mechanism. It is not only that what is not clear is put aside as irrelevant but that the dynamism whereby we reflect the love by which we have been made and respond to it with openness and generosity comes to be seen in a negative cognitive light as blind, while freedom appears in a negative affective light as arbitrary. The only way these could achieve a redeeming clarity for the human mind is to be reduced to the unambiguous and simple visceral violence of Hobbes' struggle for survival.

If, on the contrary, the cumulative experience of mankind in living together in peace is to make a contribution to the development of modern life, then it will be necessary to return human
knowledge to the ongoing lived process of humane discovery and choice, within a broad project of human interaction and an active process of reception by one generation of the learning of its predecessors. The emerging consciousness of the importance of this effort has led to broadening the task of hermeneutics from the study of ancient, often biblical, texts to a more inclusive attention to the integral meaning of cultures. There it has found, not a mere animal search for survival, but a sense of human dignity which, by transcending survival needs enables human creativity and encourages a search for ever higher levels of human life.

The reference to the god, Hermes, in the term "hermeneutics" suggests something of this depth of the meaning which is sought throughout human life and its implication for the world of values. For the message borne by Hermes is not merely an abstract mathematical formula or a methodological prescription devoid of human meaning and value; rather, it is the limitless wisdom regarding the source and, hence, the reality, and regarding the priorities and, hence, the value of all. Hesiod had appealed for this in the introduction to his *Theogony*: "Hail, children of Zeus! Grant lovely song and celebrate the holy race of the deathless gods who are forever. . . . Tell how at the first gods and earth came to be."

Similarly, Aristotle indicated this concern for values and virtues in describing his science of wisdom as "knowing to what end each thing must be done; . . . this end is the good of that thing, and, in general, the supreme good in the whole of nature." Such a science will be most divine, for: "(1) God is thought to be among the causes of all things and to be a first principle, and (2) such a science either God alone can have, or God above all others. All the sciences, indeed, are more necessary than this, but none is better." Hence, rather than evaluating all in terms of reductive clarity and considering things in a horizontal perspective that is only temporal or totally changing, with an implied relativization of all--hermeneutics or interpretation opens also to a vertical vision of what is most real in itself and most lasting through time, that is, to the perennial in the realm of being and values; this it does with a view to mobilizing life accordingly.

At the same time, while still echoing Socrates by searching for the permanent structures of complex entities and the stable laws of change, in redirecting attention to being in time, contemporary attention is open to the essentially temporal character of mankind and, hence, to the uniqueness of each decision, individual and corporate. Thus, hermeneutics attends to the task of translation or interpretation, stressing the presentation to the one who receives the message, their historical situation, and, hence, the historical character of human life. It directs attention not merely to the pursuit of general truths, but to those to whom truth is expressed, namely, persons in the concrete circumstances of their cultures as these have developed through the history of human interaction with nature, with other human beings and with God. It is this human history as heritage and tradition which sets the circumstances in which one perceives the values presented in the tradition and mobilizes his or her own project toward the future.

The Genesis and Moral Authority of Cultural Traditions

In "The Idea of Confucian Tradition", A. S. Cua traces the attention in Anglo-Saxon ethics and theory regarding moral traditions Ludwig Wittgenstein's development of the notion of "forms of life" in his *Philosophical Investigations*. He notes its implicit presence in J. Rawle's relation of the sense of justice to one's history and traditions. However, formal attention to the role of tradition in ethics is due to A. MacIntyre's *After Virtue*, though its sociological role in providing regularities in social life had been observed earlier by Karl Popper.
In the German tradition, the notion has much longer roots in the transcendental move of Kant and its development by such neo-Kantians as Ernst Cassirer into a whole theory of symbolic forms. In the development of phenomenology Martin Heidegger provided this with a metaphysical base. In *Truth and Method*, his successor, Hans Georg Gadamer, undertook, on this basis, to reconstruct the notion of a cultural heritage or tradition as: (a) based in community, (b) consisting of knowledge developed from experience lived through time and (c) possessed of authority. In order to analyze the genesis of a cultural tradition we shall look at each of these in turn. Further, because tradition, sometimes is interpreted as a threat to the personal and social freedom essential to a democracy, attention will be given here to the way a cultural heritage is generated by the free and responsible life of the members of a concerned community and enables succeeding generations realize their life with freedom and creativity.

**Community**

Autogenesis is no more characteristic of the birth of knowledge than it is of persons. One's consciousness emerges, not with self, but with its relation to others. In the womb, the first awareness is that of the heart beat of one's mother. Upon birth, one enters a family in whose familiar relations one is at peace and able to grow. Just as a person is born into a family on which he or she depends absolutely for life, sustenance, protection and promotion, so one's understanding develops in community. It is from one's family and in one's earliest weeks and months that one does or does not develop the basic attitudes of trust and confidence which undergird or undermine one's capacities for subsequent social relations. There one learns care and concern for others independently of what they do for us and acquires the language and symbol system in terms of which to conceptualize, communicate and understand pp. 199-222.

Similarly, through the various steps of one's development, as one's circle of community expands through neighborhood, school, work and recreation, one comes to learn and to share personally and passionately an interpretation of reality and a pattern of value responses. The phenomenologist sees this life in community as the new source for wisdom. Hence, rather than turning away from daily life in order to contemplate abstract and disembodied ideas, the place to discover meaning is in life as lived in the family and in the progressively wider social circles into which one enters. As persons we emerge from birth in a family and neighborhood from which we learn and in harmony with which we thrive.

**Experience: Horizontal and Vertical**

If it were merely a matter of community, however, all might be limited to the present, with no place for tradition as that which is "passed on" from one generation to the next. In fact, the process of trial and error, of continual correction and addition in relation to a people's evolving sense of human dignity and purpose, constitutes a type of learning and testing laboratory for successive generations. In this laboratory of history, the strengths of various insights and behavior patterns can be identified and reinforced, while deficiencies are progressively corrected or eliminated. Horizontally, we learn from experience what promotes and what destroys life and accordingly, make pragmatic adjustments.

But even this language remains too abstract, too limited to method or technique, too unidimensional. While tradition can be described in general and at a distance in terms of feedback mechanisms and might seem merely to concern how to cope in daily life, what is being spoken
about are free acts that are expressive of passionate human commitment and personal sacrifice in responding to concrete danger, building and rebuilding family alliances and constructing and defending one's nation. Moreover, this wisdom is not a matter of mere tactical adjustments to temporary concerns; it concerns rather the meaning we are able to envision for life and which we desire to achieve through all such adjustments over a period of generations, i.e., what is truly worth striving for and the pattern of social interaction in which this can be lived richly. The result of this extended process of learning and commitment constitutes our awareness of the bases for the decisions of which history is constituted.

This points us beyond the horizontal plane of the various ages of history and directs our attention vertically to its ground and, hence, to the bases of the values which mankind in its varied circumstances seeks to realize. The historical and prophetical books of the Bible are an extended, concrete account of one people's process of discovering wisdom in interaction with the divine.

The impact of the convergence of cumulative experience and reflection is heightened by its gradual elaboration in ritual and music, and its imaginative configuration in such great epics as the *Mahabharata* or in dance. All conspire to constitute a culture which, like a giant telecommunications dish, shapes, intensifies and extends the range and penetration of our personal sensitivity, free decision and mutual concern.

Tradition, then, is not as in history simply everything that ever happened, whether good or bad. It is rather what appears significant for human life: it is what has been seen through time and human experience to be deeply true and necessary for human life. It contains the values to which our forebears first freely gave their passionate commitment in specific historical circumstances and then constantly reviewed, rectified and passed on that content, generation after generation progressively over time. The content of a tradition, expressed in works of literature and all the many facets of a culture, progressively emerges as something upon which character and community can be built. It constitutes a rich source from which multiple themes can be drawn, provided it be accepted and embraced, affirmed and cultivated.

Hence, it is not because of personal inertia on our part or arbitrary will on the part of our forbears that our culture provides a model and exemplar. On the contrary, the importance of tradition derives from both the cooperative character of the learning by which wisdom is drawn from experience and the cumulative free acts of commitment and sacrifice which have defined, defended and passed on through time the corporate life of the community.

**Authority**

Perhaps the greatest point of tension between a sense of one's heritage and the enlightenment spirit relates to authority. Is it possible to recognize authority on the part of a tradition which perdures, while still asserting human freedom through time? Could it be that a cultural tradition, rather than being the negation of freedom and, hence, antithetic to democracy, is its cumulative expression, the reflection of our corporate access to the bases of all meaning, and even the positive condition for the discovery and realization of needed new developments?

One of the most important characteristics of the human person is one's capability for development and growth. One is born with open and unlimited powers for knowledge and for love. Life consists in developing, deploying and exercising these capabilities. Given the communitary character of human growth and learning, dependence upon others is not unnatural--quite the contrary. Within, as well as beyond, our social group we depend upon other persons according as
they possess abilities we, as individuals and communities, need for our growth, self-realization and fulfillment.

This dependence is not primarily one of obedience to the will of others, but is based upon their comparative excellence in some dimension--whether this be the doctor's professional skill in healing or the wise person's insight and judgment in matters where profound understanding is required. The preeminence of wise persons in the community is not something they usurp or with which they are arbitrarily endowed; it is based rather upon their abilities as these are reasonably and freely acknowledged by others. All of these--the role of the community in learning, the contribution of extended historical experience regarding the horizontal and vertical axes of life and meaning, and the grounding of dependence in competency--combine to endow tradition with authority for subsequent ages.

There are reasons to believe, moreover, that tradition is not a passive storehouse of materials simply waiting upon the inquirer, but that its content of authentic wisdom plays a normative role for life in subsequent ages. On the one hand, without such a normative referent, prudence would be as relativistic and ineffective as muscular action without a skeletal substructure. Life would be merely a matter of compromise and accommodation on any terms, with no sense of the value either of what was being compromised or of that for which it was compromised. On the other hand, were the normative factor to reside simply in a transcendental or abstract vision, the result would be devoid of existential content.

The fact that humans, no matter how different in culture, do not remain indifferent before the flow of events, but dispute--even bitterly--the direction of change appropriate for their community reflects that every humanism is committed actively to the realization of some common--if general--sense of perfection. Without this, even conflict would be impossible for there would be no intersection of the divergent positions and, hence, no debate or conflict.

Through history, communities discover vision which both transcends time and directs our life in all times, past, present and future. The content of that vision is a set of values which, by their fullness and harmony of measure, point the way to mature and perfect human formation and, thereby, orient the life of a person. Such a vision is historical because it arises in the life of a people in time. It is also normative, because it provides a basis upon which past historical ages, present options and future possibilities are judged and presents an appropriate way of preserving that life through time. What begins to emerge is Heidegger's insight regarding Being and its characteristics of unity, truth and justice, goodness and love, not simply as empty ideals but as the ground of things, hidden or veiled, as it were, and erupting into time through conscious and free human beings in history. Seen in this light, the process of human search, discussion and decision--today called democracy--becomes more than a method for managing human affairs; more substantively, it is the mode of the emergence of being in our time.

One's cultural heritage or tradition constitutes a specification of the general sense of being or perfection, but not as if this were chronologically distant in the past and, therefore, in need of being drawn forward by some artificial contrivance. Rather, being and its values live and act in the lives of all whom they inspire and judge. In its synchronic form, through time, tradition is the timeless dimension of history. Rather than reconstructing it, we belong to it--just as it belongs to us. Traditions are, in effect, the ultimate communities of human striving, for human life and understanding are implemented, not by isolated individual acts of subjectivity--which Gadamer describes as flickerings in the closed circuits or personal consciousness--but by our situatedness in a tradition. By fusing both past and present, enables us to determine the specific direction of our lives and to mobilize the consensus and mutual commitments of which true community is built.
Conversely, it is this sense of the good or of value which emerges through the concrete, lived experience of a people throughout its history and constitutes its cultural heritage, which enables us in turn to assess and avoid what is socially destructive. In the absence of tradition, present events would be simply facts to be succeeded by counter-facts. The succeeding waves of such disjointed happenings would constitute a history written in terms of violence. This, in turn, could be restrained only by some utopian abstraction built upon the reductivist limitations of modern rationalism. Eliminating all expressions of democratic freedoms, this is the archetypal modern nightmare, 1984.

All of that stands in stark contrast to one's heritage or tradition as the rich cumulative expression of meaning evolved by a people through the ages to a point of normative and classical perfection. Exemplified architecturally in a Parthenon or a Taj Mahal, it is embodied personally in a Confucius or Gandhi, a Bolivar or Lincoln, a Martin Luther King or a Mother Theresa. Variously termed "charismatic personalities" (Shils), "paradigmatic individuals" (Cua) or characters who meld role and personality in providing a cultural or moral ideal (MacIntyre), they supersede mere historical facts. As concrete universals, they express that harmony and fullness of perfection which is at once classical and historical, ideal and personal, uplifting and dynamizing in a word, liberating.

Confucian Tradition and Life

Anton T. Cua traces to Vico attention to the unreflective cognitive consensus on common needs and to Shaftesbury the affective sense of common partnership with others that all this entails. The result is the constitution of a community of memory whose members revere and commemorate the same saints and personages who have sacrificed to build or exemplify the community's self image. This results in a community of vision or self-understanding, as well as of hope and expectation. A cultural tradition, in this sense, is the context of one's conscious life and striving; it is life in its fullest meaning, as past and future, ground and aspiration.

In this light, Cua notes that, in the Great Learning, Chu Hsi stresses the importance of investigating the principles at great length, until one achieves "a wide and far-reaching penetration (kuan-t'ung)." Read as Kuan-chuan, this suggests an aesthetic grasp of the unique interconnection of the various components of the tao as the unique unifying perspective of the culture. This is not only a contemplative understanding, however; it implies active engagement in the conduct of life and an accumulation of good deeds done according to li or ritual propriety and i or sense of rightness. "For the adherents of the Confucian tradition, the tradition is an object of affection and reverence, largely because the tradition is perceived as an embodiment of wisdom (chih), which for Chu Hsi is a repository of insights available for personal and interpersonal appropriation, for coping with present problems and changing circumstances."

The truly important battle at the present time is, then, not between, on the one hand, a chaotic liberalism in which the abstract laws of the marketplace dictate and tear at the lives of persons, peoples and nations or, on the other hand, a depersonalizing sense of community in which the dignity of the person is suppressed for an equally abstract utopia. A victory of either would spell disaster. The central battle is, rather, to enable peoples to draw on their heritage, constituted of personal assessments and free decisions, and elaborated through the ages by the various communities as the working out of their response to their concrete circumstances. That these circumstances are often shifting and difficult in the extreme is important, but it is of definite importance that this people's response be truly theirs. That is, that it be part of their history, of their
free and democratic response to the good, and not simply the imposed effect of another's history, or--worst of all--of abstract, impersonal and depersonalizing structures, slogans, utopias or ideologies.

**Creativity and Tradition**

**Application and Adaptation**

As an active process tradition transforms what is received, lives it in a creative manner and passes it on as a leaven for the future. Let us turn then from the cumulative meaning and value in tradition, its synchronic aspect, to its diachronic or particular meaning for each new time receiving from the past, ordering the present and constructing the future. This is a matter, first of all, of taking time seriously, that is, of recognizing that reality includes authentic novelty. This contrasts to the perspective of Plato for whom the real is the ideal and unchangeable forms or ideas transcending matter and time, and of which physical things and temporal events are but shadows. It also goes beyond rationalism's search for clear and distinct knowledge of eternal and simple natures and their relations in terms of which all might be controlled, and beyond romanticism's attention to a primordial unchanging nature hidden in the dimly sensed past. *A fortiori*, it goes beyond method alone without content.

In contrast to all these, the notion of application is based upon an awareness that "reality is temporal and unfolding". This means that tradition, with its inherent authority or normative force, achieves its perfection in the temporal unfolding of reality. Secondly, it shows human persons and peoples, not as detached intellects, but as incarnate and, hence, enabled by and formative of, their changing physical and social universe. Thirdly, in the area of socio-political values and action, it expresses directly the striving of persons to realize their lives and the development of this striving into attitudes (*hexis*) and institutions. Hence, as distinct from the physical order, human action is a situation neither of law nor of lawlessness, but of human and, therefore, developing institutions and attitudes which do not determine and, hence, destroy human freedom, but regulate and promote its exercise.

Certain broad guidelines for the area of ethics and politics serve in the application of tradition as a guide for historical practice and vice-versa. The concrete exercise of human freedom as unique decisions lived with others through time constitutes a distinctive and on-going process. Historicity means that responses to the good are made always in concrete and ever-changing circumstances. Hence, the general principles of ethics and politics as a philosophic science of action cannot be purely theoretical knowledge or a simple accounting from the past. Instead, they must help people consciously exercise their freedom in concrete historical circumstances which are ever changing and new.

Here, an important distinction must be made from *techné* where action is governed by an idea as an exemplary cause that is fully determined and known by objective theoretical knowledge (*epistéme*). As in the case of an architect's blueprints, skill, such as that of the engineer, consists in knowing how to act according to that idea or plan; and, when it cannot be carried out perfectly, some parts of it are simply omitted in the execution. In contrast, ethics and politics, though similar in the possession of a practical guide and its application to a particular task, differ in important ways. First, in moral action subjects--whether a person or a people--constitute themselves, as much as they produce an object: agents are differentiated by their action. Hence, moral knowledge, as
an understanding of the appropriateness of human action, cannot be fully determined independently of the subjects in their situation and in action.

Secondly, adaptation by moral agents in their application of the law does not diminish, but rather corrects and perfects the law. In relation to a world which is less ordered, the law is imperfect, for it cannot contain in any explicit manner the response to the concrete possibilities which arise in history. It is precisely here that freedom and creativity are located. They do not consist in arbitrariness, for Kant is right in saying that without law freedom has no meaning; nor do they consist in an automatic response determined by the historical situation, for then determinism and relativism would compete for the crown in undermining human freedom. Freedom consists, rather, in shaping the present according to the sense of what is just and good which we have from our cultural tradition, and in a way which manifests and indeed creates for the first time more of what justice and goodness mean.

The law is not diminished by its application in the circumstances but corrected and enriched. *Epoché* and equity do not diminish, but perfect the law; without them the law would be simply a mechanical replication doing the work not of justice, but of injustice. Ethics or politics is not only knowledge of what is right in general but the search for what is right in the situation and the choice of the right means for this situation. Knowledge about the means is not then a matter of mere expediency; it is the essence of the search for a more perfect application of the law in the given situation. This is the fulfillment of moral knowledge.

*Application of Tradition and Human Concern*

It is important to note that this rule of the concrete (of what the situation is asking of us) is not known by sense knowledge, which simply registers a set of concrete facts on the horizontal level. In order to know what is morally required, the situation must be understood in the light of what is right, that is, in the light of what has been discovered vertically through tradition with its normative character about appropriate human action. Only in this light can moral consciousness as the work of intellect (*nous*), rather than of sensation, go about its job of choosing the right means.

Therefore, to proceed simply in reaction to concrete injustices, rather than in the light of one's tradition, is ultimately destructive. It inverts the order just mentioned and results in manipulation of our hopes for the good. Destructive or repressive structures would lead us to the use of correspondingly evil means, suited only to producing evil results. The true response to evil can be worked out only in terms of the good as the highest discovery by our people, passed on in tradition and applied by us in our times.

The importance of application implies a central role for the virtue of prudence (*phronesis*) or thoughtful reflection which enables one to discover the appropriate means for the circumstances. This must include, also, the virtue of sagacity (*sunesis*), that is, of understanding or concern for the other. For what is required as a guide for the agent is not only technical knowledge of an abstract ideal, but knowledge that takes account of the agent in relation to other persons. One can assess the situation adequately only inasmuch as one, in a sense, undergoes the situation with the affected parties, living and suffering with them. Aristotle rightly describes as "terrible" the one who is capable of manipulating the situation, but is without orientation towards moral ends and without concern for the good of others in their concrete situations.

In sum, application is not a subsequent or accidental part of understanding, added on after perfect understanding has been achieved; rather it co-determines this understanding from the beginning. Moral consciousness must seek to understand the good, not as an ideal to be known
and then applied, but rather through discerning the good for concrete peoples in their relations with others.

Cua finds similar notions in the distinctions of Chu Hsi in the neo-Confucian tradition regarding the diachronic sense of tao as residing between the substantial (t’ì) and the operational (yung), the stable basic or latent schemata and its operational sense in changing circumstances (fei). Hsün Tzu distinguishes the constant (ch’ang) and the changing (pien), and Mencius the constant rule (ching) and the sliding scale (ch’iuan). Use of the latter as an exercise of moral discretion based on li is essential for moral life due to the imperfections of our knowledge and the urgent complexity of life. In these circumstances, to hold to a static mean would undermine the realization of the holistic goal of the tao.

Creativity in the application of the tradition in the concrete circumstances of life thus becomes essential. In this context Cua deftly cites J. Pelican’s aphorism: "Tradition is the living faith of the dead, traditionalism is the dead faith of the living."

The Roots of Tradition and Creativity

The notion of application can help in sorting out the human dilemma between an absolutism insensitive to persons in their concrete circumstances and a relativism which leaves the person subject to expediency in public and private life. Indeed, the very statement of the dilemma reflects the deleterious aspect of the Platonic view of ideas. He was right to ground changing and historical being in the unchanging and eternal. This had been Parmenides’ first insight in metaphysics and has been richly developed in relation to human action through the medievals’ notion of an eternal law in the divine mind.

But it seems inappropriate to speak directly in these terms regarding human life, for in all things individual human persons and humankind as a whole are subject to time, growth and development. As we become increasingly conscious of this, the personal character even of our abstract ideals becomes manifest and their adapted application in time can be seen, not as their rejection, but as their perfection. In this, justice loses none of its force as an absolute requirement of human action. Rather, the concrete modes of its application in particular circumstances add to what could have been articulated in merely abstract and universal terms. A hermeneutic approach directs attention precisely to these unfoldings of the meaning of abstract principles through time. This is not an abandonment of absolutes, but a recognition of the human condition and of the way in which this continually and, in endless marvelous manners, unfolds the ultimate richness of the source and principle of social life.

For Confucius, the aesthetic vision is integrated in drama, of which dance is one moment. In the actual performance of li (ritual or liturgy), there is a combination of poetry, liturgical action and music. Confucius saw that in the poem our spirit can rise and stand in reality to achieve complete transcendence in the ecstasy of the spirit. This gives access in aesthetic terms to a source, not only of inspiration, but of vision that both draws one to aspire to greater perfection and opens the way for creative thought regarding ways in which this can be achieved (see chapter II).

Some suggest, however, that Confucius may have looked upon aesthetics more as a matter of appreciation and conservation, rather than as original, creative and free expression. This suggests that, in the works of Confucius, there are resources important for developing a modern vision which were unmined by Confucius himself and his schools.

If so what should be the attitude of a philosopher in our day to this mode of aesthetics? If it be itself appreciative and conservative, is one who interprets it subject to the same approach and
limited to the same content, or can interpretation legitimately open up new meaning in old texts? In other words, must ancient texts be read only with an ancient outlook? Indeed, is it even possible today to have an authentically ancient outlook—to see with eyes long closed—or does the attempt to do so require so much make-believe as to be in effect impossible? Even if one were to succeed in reconstituting the past, would one be faithful to the text which was written as a vital expression of the process of life, or would one instead be rendering lifeless a living text (not unlike the biologist who makes a slide of once living tissue)?

It would seem, therefore, that our goal should be not simply to reiterate ancient times in reading ancient texts, but to recognize that we come to them from new times, with new horizons and new questions. We should allow them to speak anew to us; in so doing, the texts and philosophies are living rather than dead—and, therefore, more true. Texts read in this sense are part of living tradition in which is situated our struggle to face the problems of life and build a future worthy of those who follow.

Some would fear that to give such importance to the horizon of the reader of a text might constitute a relativism and lose the permanent significance of the insights of the author. But this would seem to reflect a material and mechanical model ruled by successive discrete moments of time in which universality is a function only of abstraction. This leaves what is universally applicable as relatively vacuous and reduces one to pragmatism as one's only response to concrete and changing circumstances.

Here, the real issue regards one's metaphysics: what is the nature of being, what does it mean to be? If the answer, as the Confucian sense of community would be the first to suggest, is not that reality is reductively matter trapped in time but at least the human spirit living through time, then to look for meaning in terms of the reaches of the spirit across time is not to lose but to find meaning. This is the sense of being emerging through the consciousness of Heidegger's person as dasein. Being is not merely what was, but what blossoms ever fresh in the human heart. In the same way, philosophy in reading ancient texts is not archeology but, like every human act, a creative unfolding of being in time. This creative freedom is the essential characteristic of the person.

What, then, should we conclude regarding the root of the actuality, the good or the perfection of reality which mankind has discovered, in which we have been raised, which gives us dominion over our actions, and which enables us to be free and creative? Does it come from God or from man, from eternity or from history? Chakravarti Rajagopalachari of Madras answered:

Whether the epics and songs of a nation spring from the faith and ideas of the common folk, or whether a nation's faith and ideas are produced by its literature is a question which one is free to answer as one likes. . . . Did clouds rise from the sea or was the sea filled by waters from the sky? All such inquiries take us to the feet of God transcending speech and thought.

Democracy as Dialogue in the Tradition of a Culture

Thus far, we have treated the character and importance of tradition as bearing the long experience of persons interacting with their world, with other persons and with God. It is made up not only of chronological facts, but of insights regarding human perfection and its foundations which have been forged by human efforts in concrete circumstances, e.g., the Greek notion of democracy and the enlightenment notions of equality and freedom. By their internal value, these stand as normative of the aspirations of a people.
Secondly, we have seen the implications of historicity for novelty within the context of tradition, that the continually unfolding circumstances of historical development not merely extend or repeat what went before, but constitute an emerging manifestation of the dynamic character of being that is articulated by the art, religion, literature and political structures of a cultural tradition.

It remains for us now to treat the third element in this study of tradition, namely, the hermeneutic method. How can earlier sources which express the great achievements of human awareness be understood or unfolded in a way that is relevant, indicative and directive of our life in present circumstances? In a word, how can we interpret or draw out the significance of tradition for present action?

*Interpretation of a Cultural Tradition*

If we take time and culture seriously, then we must recognize that we are situated in a particular culture and at a particular time; hence, all that can be seen from this vantage point constitutes one's horizon. This would be lifeless and dead, determined rather than free, if our vantage point were to be fixed by its circumstances and closed. This points to the necessity of meeting other minds and hearts not simply to add information incrementally, but to be challenged in our basic assumptions and enabled thereby to delve more deeply into our tradition and draw forth deeper and more pervasive truth. How can this be done?

First of all, it is necessary to note that only a unity of meaning, that is, an identity, is intelligible. Just as it is not possible to understand a number three if we include only two units rather than three, no act of understanding is possible unless it is directed to an identity or whole of meaning. This brings us to the classic issue of the hermeneutic circle in which knowledge of the whole depends upon knowledge of the parts, and vice versa. How can this work for, rather than against the development of social life?

The experience of reading a text might be suggestive. As we read we construe the meaning of a sentence before grasping all its individual parts. What we construe is dependent upon our expectation of the meaning of the sentence, which we derived from its first words, the prior context, or more likely, from a combination of the two. In turn, our expectation or construal of the meaning of the text is adjusted according to the requirements of its various parts as we proceed to read through the parts of the sentence, the paragraph, etc., continually reassessing the whole in terms of the parts and the parts in terms of the whole. This basically circular movement continues until all appears to fit and to be clear.

Similarly, in regard to our cultural tradition and values, we develop a prior conception of its content. This anticipation of meaning is not simply of the tradition as an objective past or fixed content to which we come; it is rather what we produce as we participate in the evolution of the tradition and, thereby, further determine ourselves. This is a creative stance reflecting the content, not only of the past, but of the time in which I stand and of the life project in which I am engaged. It is a creative unveiling of the content of the tradition as this comes progressively and historically into the present and through the present, passes into the future.

In this light, time is not a barrier, separation or abyss, but rather a bridge and opportunity for the process of understanding, a fertile ground filled with experience, custom and tradition. The importance of the historical distance it provides is not that it enables the subjective reality of persons to disappear so that the objectivity of the situation can emerge. On the contrary, it makes possible a more complete meaning of the tradition, less by removing falsifying factors than by
opening new sources of self-understanding which reveal in the tradition unsuspected implications and even new dimensions of meaning.

*Tradition and Discovery: Openness to Being Questioned*

Of course, not all our acts of understanding about the meaning of a text from another culture, a dimension of a shared tradition, a set of goals or a plan for future action are sufficient. Hence, it becomes particularly important that they not be adhered to fixedly, but be put at risk in dialogue with others.

In this, the basic elements remain the substances or persons which Aristotle described in terms of autonomy and, by implication, of identity. Hermeneutics would expand this to reflect as well the historical and hermeneutic situation of each person in the dialogue, that is, their horizon or particular possibility for understanding. As an horizon is all that can be seen from one's vantage point(s), in dialogue with others it is necessary to be aware of our horizon, as well as that of others. For it is precisely when our initial projection of their meaning will not bear up under the progressive dialogue that we are required to make needed adjustments in our projection of their meaning.

This enables one to adjust one's prior understanding not only of the horizon of the other with whom one is in dialogue, but especially of one's own horizon. Hence, one need not fear being trapped; horizons are vantage points of a mind which in principle is open and mobile, capable of being aware of its own limits and of transcending them through acknowledging the horizons of others. The flow of history implies that we are not bound by our horizons, but move in and out of them, and it is in making us aware of our horizons that hermeneutic consciousness accomplishes our liberation.

For this, we must maintain a questioning attitude. Rather than simply following through with our previous ideas until a change is forced upon us, we must remain sensitive to new meanings in true openness. This is neither neutrality as regards the meaning of the tradition, nor an extinction of passionate concerns regarding action towards the future. Rather, being aware of our own biases or prejudices and adjusting them in dialogue with others implies rejecting what impedes our understanding of others or of traditions. Our attitude in approaching dialogue must be one of willingness continually to revise our initial projection or expectation of meaning.

The way out of the hermeneutic circle is then not by ignoring or denying our horizons and initial judgments or prejudices, but by recognizing them as inevitable and making them work for us in drawing out, not the meaning of the text for its author, but its application for the present. Through this process of application we serve as midwife for culture as historical or tradition, enabling it to give birth to the future.

The logical structure of this process is the exchange of question and answer. A question is required in order to determine just what issue we are engaging--whether it is this issue or that--so that we might give direction to our attention. Without this, no meaningful answer can be given or received. As a question, however, it requires that the answer not be settled or determined. In sum, progress or discovery requires an openness which is not simply indeterminacy, but a question which gives specific direction to our attention and enables us to consider significant evidence.

If discovery depends upon the question, then the art of discovery is the art of questioning. Consequently, in working in conjunction with others, the heart of the democratic process is not to suppress, but to reinforce and unfold the questions of others. To the degree that these probabilities are built up and intensified they can serve as a searchlight. This is the opposite of both opinion
which tends to suppress questions, and of arguing which searches out the weakness in other's positions. Instead, in democracy, understood as conversation and dialogue, one enters upon a mutual search to maximize the possibilities of the question, even by speaking at cross purposes, for it is by mutually eliminating errors and working out a common meaning that we discover truth.

Pluralism and Progress

Further, it should not be presupposed that a text, such as a tradition, law or constitution, will hold the answer to but one question or can have but one horizon which must be identified by the reader. On the contrary, the full horizon of the authors is never available to the reader, nor can it be expected that there is but one question to which a tradition or document holds an answer. The sense of the texts reaches beyond what the authors intended because the dynamic character of being as it emerges in time means that the horizon is never fixed but is continually opening. This constitutes the effective historical element in understanding a text or a tradition. At each step new dimensions of its potentialities open to understanding, so that the meaning of a text or tradition lives with the consciousness and hence the horizons—not of its author—but of people in dialogue with others through time and history. This is the essence of democracy as a process. It is the process of broadening horizons, through fusion with the horizons of others in dialogue, that makes it possible to receive from one's cultural tradition and its values answers which are ever new.

In this, one's personal attitudes and interests remain important. If our interest in developing new horizons is simply the promotion of our own understanding then we could be interested solely in achieving knowledge, and thereby domination over others. This would lock one into an absoluteness of one's prejudices; being fixed or closed in the past, they would disallow new life in the present. In this manner, powerful new insights can become with time deadening pre-judgments which suppress freedom.

In contrast, an attitude of authentic democratic openness appreciates the nature of one's own finiteness. On this basis, it both respects the past and is open to discerning the future. Such openness is a matter, not merely of new information, but of recognizing the historical nature of man and his basis in an absolute that transcends and grounds time. This enables us to escape what had deceived us and held us captive and to learn deeply from new experiences.

This suggests that democratic openness does not consist in surveying others objectively, obeying them in a slavish and unquestioning manner or simply juxtaposing their ideas and traditions to our own. Rather, it is directed primarily to ourselves, for our ability to listen to others is correlatively our ability to assimilate the implications of their answers for delving more deeply into the meaning of our own traditions and drawing out new and even more rich insights. In other words, it is an acknowledgement that our cultural heritage has something new to say to us.

The characteristic hermeneutic attitude of effective historical consciousness is, then, not methodological sureness, readiness for new compromises or new techniques of social organization, for these are subject to social critique and manipulation on the horizontal level. Instead, it is readiness to draw out in democratic dialogue new meaning from a common tradition. Seen in these terms our heritage of culture and values is not closed or dead, but, through a democratic life, remains ever new by becoming more inclusive and more rich.
2. Modernization as the Emergence of Person

In the last half century, the war against Fascism, the process of decolonialization, new attention to the rights of minorities and women, and, finally, the social changes throughout the world at the end of the 80's, all have as their common motivating force the renewed emergence of a sense of the dignity of the person. Hence, in the present effort to assay the transformation of cultural traditions in our times, it is important, after looking at the nature of cultural heritage and its transformation, to look closely at the different dimensions of the notion of person. As these are progressively ignored or taken into account our horizons for social change shrink or expand and the possibilities for a more rich harmony recede or emerge.

Here, the intent is not to choose one dimension of the person against others, but to review them, in order to see how each makes possible a specific level of self-understanding and of social relations and points, in turn, to still other dimensions. In particular, we shall review our heritages for answers to three crucial questions about the person as the subject of a moral life and of moral education.

(a) Is the person only a set of roles constituted entirely in function of a structure or system in which one plays a particular part? If so, one could not refuse to do whatever the system demanded or tolerated. Or is the person a subject in his or her own right, with one's proper dignity, heritage, goals and standards?

(b) Is one merely a stream of consciousness, who becomes a person only upon the achievement of a certain level of self-awareness? If so, it is difficult to integrate the experiences of early childhood and the emotions of adult life which play so central a role in moral maturity. Or is the person an essentially free and responsible psycho-physical subject?

(c) Finally, does a person's freedom consist merely in implementing a pattern of behavior encoded in one's nature. If so, there would be little place for the anguish of decision, the pains of moral growth, or the creativity of a moral life. Or is this free subject a creative center whose basic dynamism consists in realizing a unique inner harmony and outer community?

To respond to such basic concerns requires the full resources of their heritages. At the same time, because the task of self-creation will reflect one or more of the multiple modes of our contemporary self-understanding, it can be expected that not everyone will subscribe to all the possible dimensions of the meaning of the person--certainly not in the same mode or to the same degree. Hence, in a pluralistic society one must be clear about the potential dimensions of the person: what they are, how they are rooted in our cultural heritages how they affect the aims and methods of moral education, and how they can be interrelated in a mutually reinforcing manner toward the development of a more integrated person and a more cohesive society. Indeed, there may prove to be a certain correlation of the above-mentioned questions both with the dimensions of the subject as a distinct, yet related, responsible moral agent and with the progressive development of the person throughout life.

For orientation in this task let us begin by delineating the meaning of person by contrasting it to a number of other notions. These contrasts will serve subsequently as guideposts for a series of positive and progressively deepening insights regarding the nature of the person, their moral growth, and self-fulfillment.

In this first and negative effort to delineate the meaning of persons, we find that most notably, persons are contrasted to possessions. We object most strongly to any suggestion, whether in word,
gesture, or deed, by which a person is treated as a commodity subject to manipulation or as a mere means by which others attain their goals. This, indeed, has become a litmus test for acceptable behavior. Secondly, persons are considered to be irreducible to the community. Structures which take into account only the social whole without taking account of the distinctive concerns of its participants are rejected precisely as depersonalizing. Thirdly and conversely, those who are so individualistic as to be insensitive to the concerns of others are themselves considered impersonal. These exclusions direct our search for the meaning of the human person toward a responsible self which is neither reducible to, nor independent of, the physical and human context in which one abides.

This positive notion of the person has not always had an identical or unchanging meaning. By natural growth, more than by mere accretion, the notion has managed to incorporate the great achievements of human self-discovery for which, in turn, it has been both the stimulus and the goal. This continuing process has been central to philosophy from its earliest days. Like all life processes, the search for the person has consisted in a sequence of important steps, each of which has resulted in a certain equilibrium or level of culture. In time each has been enriched and molded by subsequent discoveries. Indeed, it may not be incorrect to say that a parallel search is the dynamism at the heart of our personal life as well.

To look into this experience, it will be advantageous to study the nature of the person through reflection on a series of paired and progressively deeper dimensions: first, as a role and as the one who lives out this role; second, as free self-consciousness and as the subject of that freedom; and third, as moral agent and as searching for one's moral development and fulfillment. The first member of each pair is integral to an understanding of the human person and of moral growth, but each of these members, in turn, requires its corresponding dimension and evokes the pair on the next level.

Role and Individual

Role

One means for finding the earliest meaning of a particular notion is to study the term by which it is designated. As earliest, this meaning tends to be more manifest and, hence, to remain current. The major study on the origins of the term `person' concludes that, of the multiple origins which have been proposed, the most probable refers to the mask used by actors in Greece and subsequently adopted in Rome. Some explain that this was called a `persona' because, by `sounding through' (personando) its single hole, the voice of the wearer was strengthened, concentrated, and made to resound more clearly. Others see the term as a transformation of the Greek term for the mask which symbolized the actor's role. Hence, an original and relatively surface notion of person is the assumption of a character or the carrying out of a role. As such it has little to do with one's `self', it is defined rather in terms of the set of relations which constitutes the plot or story-line of a play.

This etymology is tentative; some would document an early and more rich sense of person in Homeric literature. There can be no doubt, however, that the term has been used broadly in the above ethical sense of a role played in human actions. Ancient biblical literature described God as not being a respecter of persons, that is, of the roles played by various individuals. The Stoics thought of this in cosmic terms, seeing the wise person either as writing their role or as interpreting a role determined by the Master. In either case, to be a wise person was to be consistent, to play
out one's role in harmony with oneself and with reason as the universal law of nature. From this ethical sense of person as role, it was but a short step to a similar legal sense. This generally is a distinct and characteristic relation, although, as Cicero noted, it could be multiple: "Three roles do I sustain . . . my own, that of my opponent, that of the judge."

Far from being archaic, the understanding of person as the playing of a role seems typical of much modern and American thought. John Dewey, in *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, characterized the essence of the modern mentality in just these terms: in the case of ancient or classic usage "we are dealing with something constant in existence, physical or metaphysical; in the other [modern] case, with something constant in function and operation." The social and psychological sciences focus upon these roles or functions and, in terms of function, through operational definitions, their entire conceptual field.

This undergirds much of the progress in the social and behavioral sciences. As the same individual can play multiple roles, even in the same circumstances, studying the person in terms of roles makes it possible to identify specific dimensions of one's life for more precise investigation and to analyze serially the multiple relations which obtain in an interpersonal situation. William James, for example, distinguishes in this manner the self shown to family from that which one shows to professional colleagues or to God. Further, determining to pursue this exclusively on the basis of data which is subject to empirical verification has made possible an immense collaborative effort to achieve a scientific understanding of human life.

Indeed, to begin from its meaning as role can save the notion of person from hiding and then suppressing the ontological reality who fulfills that role. This route is suggested by an alternate (Etruscan) origin of the term ‘person’ in the mask worn in the cult of the goddess Persephone. While the Latin grammarians seized on this to classify the speakers voices as first or second person, the original dramatic context was more mysterious, based on a vibrant interplay of presence and absence as the goddess manifested herself while remaining absent. The appearance, thus, became multiple while the unlimited reality of the source remained one and unfathomable. There is here a first suggestion of a central truth about person for culture, namely that a person is an unlimitedly rich and even mysterious source; and, hence, that in dialogue with its physical and social environment, it can be adaptive and creative in its expressions. This holds a key to understanding the rich variety of cultures.

Though much has been accomplished through understanding the person in terms of roles, there may have been a distant early warning of the limitations of this approach in Auguste Comte's (1798-1857) *Cours de philosophie positive*. By rejecting psychology as a scientific discipline and reducing all data concerning the person to either biology or sociology, he ignored introspection and the corresponding dimensions of the individual's conscious life. The person was not only one who could play a role, but one whose total reality consisted in playing that role.

More recently Gabriel Marcel has pointed up a number of unfortunate consequences which derive from considering the person only in terms of roles or functional relations. First, no account can be then taken of one's proper self-identity. If only "surface" characteristics are considered, while excluding all attention to "depth," the person is empty; if the person can be analyzed fully in terms of external causes and relations, one becomes increasingly devoid of intrinsic value. What is more, lack of personal identity makes it impossible to establish personal relations with others. Even that consistency between, or within, one's roles--which the Stoics as early proponents of this understanding of person considered to be the essence of personal life--is left without foundation. Life would be reduced "in the words of Shakespeare ‘to a tale told by an idiot’".
The Self

These difficulties suggest that attention must be directed to another level of meaning if the person is to find the resources required to play his/her roles. Rather than attempting to think of a role without an actor, it is important to look to the individual who assumes the role and expresses him or herself therein.

Caution must be exercised here, however, lest the search for the subject or the self appear to reinforce the excesses of self-centeredness and individualism. This could be a special danger in the context of cultures whose positive stress on self-reliance and independence has been rooted historically in an atomistic understanding of persons as individuals, single and unrelated. This danger is reflected, for example, in the common law understanding of judicial rulings, not as defining the nature of interpersonal relations, but simply as reducing violence through resolving conflicts between individuals whose lives happen to have intersected.

In this regard, it is helpful to note that, when Aristotle laid the foundations for the Western understanding of the person, he did so in the context of the Greek understanding of the physical universe as a unified, dynamic, quasi life process in which all was included and all were related. Indeed, the term ‘physical’ was derived from the term for growth and the components of this process were seen always with, and in, relation to others. (Similarly, modern physical theory identifies a uniform and all-inclusive pattern of relations such that any physical displacement, no matter how small, affects all other bodies). Within this unified pattern of relations the identification of multiple individuals, far from being destructive of unity, provides the texture required for personal life. Where individuals are differentiated by the moral tenor of their actions which, in turn, make a difference to other persons distinctiveness becomes, not an impediment to, but a principle of, community.

In order better to appreciate the members of a community, it is helpful to consider them on three progressively more specific dimensions: first, as instances of a particular type, that is, as substances; secondly, as existing, that is, as subsisting individuals; and thirdly, as self-conscious, that is, as persons. The order in which these three will be considered is not accidental, for while it is necessary to be of a certain definite type, it is more important to exist as an individual in one’s own right; for the person, finally, it is important above all that one be self-conscious and free. Hence, our exposition begins with substance and the subsisting individual in order to identify some general and basic—though not specific or exclusive—characteristics of the person. What is distinctive, namely, self-awareness and freedom, will be treated in the following sections.

1. Substance. It was Aristotle who identified substance as the basic component of the physical order; his related insights remain fundamental to understanding the individual as the subject of moral life. His clue to this basic discovery appears in language. Comparing the usage of such terms as "running," and "runner" we find that the first is applied to the second, which, however, is not said, in turn, of anything else. Thus, one may say of Mary that she is running, but one may not say that she is another person, e.g., John. This suggests the need to distinguish things that can be realized only in another (as running is had only in a runner, e.g., in Mary) whence they derive their identity (the running is Mary’s and distinct from any running that John might do), from those which have their identity in their own right (e.g., Mary and John).

A first and basic characteristic of the moral subject, and indeed of any substance, is that it has its identity in its own right rather than through another. Only thus could a human being be responsible for one’s action. Without substances with their distinct identities one could envisage
only a structure of ideals and values inhabited, as it were, by agents without meaning or value. In this light the task of moral education would be merely to enable one to judge correctly according to progressively higher ideals. This, indeed, would seem to be the implicit context of Lawrence Kohlberg’s focus upon moral dilemmas which omits not only the other dimensions of moral development but this personal identity as well. Aristotle points instead to a world of persons realizing values in their actions. In their complex reality of body, affections and mind they act morally and are the subjects of moral education.

Secondly, as the basic building blocks in the constitution of a world, these individuals are not merely undetermined masses. As the basic points of reference in discourse and the bases for the intelligibility for the real world these individuals must possess some essential determinateness and be of one or another kind or form. The individual, then, is not simply one unit indifferently contrasted to all others; he or she is a being of a definite--in this case a human--kind, relating in a distinctively human manner to other beings each with their own nature or kind. Only thus can one's life in the universe have sense and be able to be valued.

Thirdly, being of a definite kind the individual has its own proper characteristics and is able to realize a specific or typical set of activities. These activities derive from, or are "born of" (from the Latin, natus), the specific nature of the thing. The determination of what activity is moral will need to include not only the good to be derived from the action, but respect for the agent and his or her nature.

In the search for the subject of moral education, the work of Aristotle has made an essential contribution by directing our attention to three factors, namely: (a) individual beings, (b) who are particular instances of a definite kind, and hence (c) capable of specific types of activities. It should be noted that all three are concerned with the kind or type of the agent. This is important, but it is not enough for moral education. One can know well enough what kind of thing a unicorn is but, as none has ever existed, they have never acted or entered the field of activity in which morality is found. Similarly, one might know what kind of musician is needed in order to complete an orchestra, but this does not mean that such a musician is available to be engaged for a concert. In sum, in order to consider the field of moral action it is important to take account not only of the nature or kind of agent involved, but also of his or her existence and actions.

2. Subsisting Individual. Something of the greatest importance was bound to take place, therefore, when the mind expanded its range of awareness beyond the nature of things to what Shakespeare was to call the question: "to be or not to be." At that point the mind became able to take explicit account not only of the kind, but of the existence of the individual, by which it is constituted in the order of actual, and hence of acting, beings.

From this there followed a series of basic implications for the reality of the person. It would no longer be considered as simply the relatively placid distinct or autonomous instance of some specific type. Rather, it would be understood in the much more dynamic manner as existing. This means not only being in its own right or, as is said, "standing on its own two feet" (sub-sisting), but bursting in among the realities of this world as a new and active center (ex-sisting). This understanding incorporates all the above-mentioned characteristics of the individual substance, and adds three more which are proper to existence, namely, being (a) complete, (b) independent, and (c) dynamically open to actions and to new actualization. Since existing or subsisting individuals include not only persons but rocks and trees, these characteristics, though fundamental, still will not be exclusive to the person.
First, a person must be whole or complete. As regards its nature it must have all that is required to be of its distinctive kind (just as by definition a three digit number cannot be made up of but two digits). Hence, if humans are recognized to be by nature both body and mind or body and soul, then the human mind or soul without the body would be neither a subsisting individual nor, by implication, a person for it would lack a complete human nature. This is of special importance in view of the tendency of some to reduce the human person to only the mind, soul, or consciousness or to consider the person to be adequately protected if these alone are cared for. In fact, the inclusion of body in the human person is as central to education as the issue of torture is to human rights. The same is true of the mind or spirit in view of the tendency, described by William James, to reduce the person to "nothing but" the inert by-products of physiology, or to consider the person to be adequately protected if these alone are cared for. In fact, the inclusion of body in the human person is as central to education as the issue of torture is to human rights. The same is true of the mind or spirit in view of the tendency, described by William James, to reduce the person to "nothing but" the inert by-products of physiology, or to consider the person to be adequately protected if these alone are cared for.

Further, the existing individual requires not merely a complete nature, but his or her proper existence. As existing, the individual is not merely an instance of a specific nature or kind, but a concrete reality asserting oneself and dynamically struggling to achieve one's fulfillment. In the person this goes beyond merely walking a course whose every step is already charted; it includes all the unique, fully individual choices by which a life is lived. It is subject then to combinations of the precarious and the stable, of tragedy and triumph in its self-realization. These are described by the American pragmatists and Continental existentialists as the very stuff of life, and hence by Dewey as the very stuff of education.

Secondly, as subsistent the person is independent. Being complete in its nature it is numerically individual and distinct from all else. In accord with this individual nature, one's existence is, in turn, unique, and establishes the subject as a being in its own right, independent of all else. This does not imply that the human or other living subject does not need nourishment, or that it was not generated by another: people do need people and much else besides; there is no question here of being self-sufficient or absolute. What is meant by independence is that the needs it has and the actions it performs are truly its own.

In turn, this means that in interacting with other subsistent individuals one's own contribution is distinctive and unique. This is commonly recognized at those special times when the presence of a mother, father, or special friend is required, and no one else will do. At other times as well, even when, as a bus driver or a dentist, I perform a standard service, my actions remain properly my own. This understanding is a prerequisite for education to responsibility in public as in private life. It is a condition too for overcoming depersonalization in a society in which we must fulfill ever more specialized and standardized roles.

Another implication of this independence is that, as subsisting, the human person cannot simply be absorbed or assimilated by another. As complete in oneself one cannot be part of another: as independent in existence one is distinct from all else. Hence, one cannot be assumed or taken up by any other person or group in such wise as to lose one's identity. In recent years awareness of this characteristic has generated a strong reaction against the tendencies of mass society totally to absorb the person and to reduce all to mere functions in a larger whole called the state, the industrial complex, the consumer society, cult, etc.

As noted above it is perhaps the special challenge of the present day, however, to keep this awareness of one's distinctive independence from degenerating into selfishness, to keep individuality from becoming individualism. The individual existent, seen as sculpted out of the flow and process of the physical universe, cannot be rightly thought of as isolated. Such an existent is always with others, depending on them for birth, sustenance and expression. In this context, to
be distinct or individual is not to be isolated or cut off, but to be able to relate more precisely and intensively to others.

This can be seen at a series of levels. My relation to the chair upon which I sit and the desk upon which I write is not diminished but made possible by the distinction and independence of the three of us. Their retention of their distinctness and distinctive shapes enables me to integrate them into my task of writing. Because I depend still more intimately upon food, I must correlate more carefully its distinctive characteristics with my precise needs and capacities. On the genetic level it is the careful choice of distinctive strains that enables the development of a new individual with the desired characteristics. On the social level the more personable the members of the group the greater and more intense is its unity.

Moving thus from instruments such as desks, to alimentation, to lineage, to society suggests that, as one moves upward through the levels of beings, distinctness, far from being antithetic to community, is in fact its basis. This gives hope that at its higher reaches, namely, in the moral life, the distinctiveness of autonomy and freedom may not need to be compromised, but may indeed be the basis for a community of persons bound together in mutual love and respect.

The third characteristic of the subsistent individual to be considered is this openness to new actualization and to interrelation with others. The existence by which one erupted into this world of related subjects is not simply self-contained; it is expressed in a complex symphony of actions which are properly one's own: thus, running can be said only of an existing individual, such as Mary, who runs. What is more, actions determine their subject, for it is only by running that Mary herself is constituted precisely as a runner. This will be central to the last part of this study: the person as moral agent.

It is important too for our relations to, and with, others. For the actions into which our existence flows, while no less our own, reach beyond ourselves. The same action which makes us agents shapes the world around us and, for good or ill, communicates to others. All the plots of all the stories ever told are about this; but their number pales in comparison with all the lives ever lived, each of which is a history of personal interactions. The actions of an individual existent reflect one's individuality with its multiple possibilities, and express this to and with others. It is in this situation of dynamic openness, of communication and of community that the moral growth of persons takes place. As subsistent therefore the person is characteristically a being, not only in him/herself, but with other beings. About this more must be said below.

To summarize: thus far, we have seen the early derivation of the notion of person from mask. For this to evolve into the contemporary notion of person a strong awareness both of the nature and of the existence of independent individuals needed to be developed. The first was achieved by the Greeks who identified within the one physical process basically different types of things. Substances are the individual instances of these specific types or natures. This provides the basis for one's consciousness of one's own nature and for relating to others in its terms within the overall pattern of nature(s).

There were limitations to such a project, for in its terms alone one ultimately would be but an instance of one's nature; in the final analysis the goal of a physical being would be but to continue one's species through time. This was true for the Greeks and may still be a sufficient basis for the issues considered in sociobiology. It does not allow for adequate attention to the person's unique and independent reality. This required the development subsequently of an awareness of existence as distinct from nature or essence, and as that by which one enters into the world and is constituted as a being in one's own right. On this basis the subsisting individual can be seen to be whole and independent, and hence the dynamic center of action in this world.
Still more is required, however. The above characteristics, while foundational for a person, are had as well by animals and trees: they too are wholes, independent and active in this world. In addition to what has been said above about substance and subsisting individual, therefore, it is necessary to identify that which is distinctive of the human subsistent and constitutes it finally as personal. This is self-consciousness and freedom.

The Person: A Self-Conscious and Free Subject

Self-consciousness and will had been central to philosophies of the person in classical times; indeed, at one point Augustine claimed that men were nothing else than will. After Descartes' reformulation of metaphysics in terms of the thinking self, however, the focus upon self-consciousness by John Locke and upon the will by Kant brought the awareness of these distinctive characteristics of the person to a new level of intensity and exclusivity. This constituted a qualitatively new and distinctively modern understanding of the person. It is necessary to see in what these characteristics consist and how they relate to the subsisting individual analyzed above.

Self-Consciousness and Freedom

John Locke undertook to identify the nature of the person within the context of his general effort to provide an understanding which would enable people to cooperate in building a viable political order. This concentration upon the mind is typical of modern thought and of its contribution to our appreciation of the person. By focusing upon knowledge Locke proceeded to elaborate, not only consciousness in terms of the person, but the person in terms of consciousness. He considered personal identity to be a complex notion composed from the many simple ideas which constitute our consciousness. By reflection we perceive that we perceive and thereby are able to be, as it were, present to ourselves and to recognize ourselves as distinct from all other thinking things. Memory, which is also an act of consciousness, enables us to recognize these acts of consciousness in different times and places. Locke saw the memory, by uniting present acts of awareness with similar past acts, not merely as discovering but as creating personal identity. This binding of myself as past consciousness to myself as present consciousness constitutes the continuing reality of the person. Essentially, it is a private matter revealed directly only to oneself, and only indirectly to other persons.

Because Locke's concern for knowledge was part of his overriding concern to find a way to build social unity in a divided country he saw his notion of the self as the basis of an ethic for both private and public life. As conscious of pleasure and pain the self is capable of happiness or misery, "and so is concerned for itself." What is more, happiness and misery matter only inasmuch as they enter one's self-consciousness as a matter of self-concern directing one's activities. He sees the pattern of public morality, with its elements of justice as rewarding a prior good act by happiness and as punishing an evil act by misery, to be founded upon this identity of the self as a continuing consciousness from the time of the act to that of the reward or punishment. `Person' is the name of this self as open to public judgment and social response; it is "a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit."

This early attempt to delineate the person on the basis of consciousness locates a number of factors essential for personhood such as the importance of self-awareness, the ability to be concerned with and for oneself, and the basis this provides for the notions of responsibility and public accountability. These are the foundations of his Letters Concerning Toleration which were
to be of such great importance in the development of subsequent social and political structures in many parts of the world.

There are reasons to believe, however, that, while correct in focusing upon consciousness, he did not push his analysis far enough to integrate the whole person. Leibniz, in his New Essays Concerning Human Understanding, was quick to point out some of these reasons in a detailed response. Centering personal identity in consciousness, Locke distinguished it from the notion of the person as that which could be identified by a body of a particular shape. This led him to admit that it is conceivable that the one consciousness, self or person could exist in different bodies a thousand years remote one from another or, conversely, that multiple selves could inhabit the same body.

This is more than an issue of "names ill-used"; it is symptomatic of the whole cluster of problems which derive from isolating human consciousness from the physical identity of the human self. These include problems not only regarding communication with other persons for which one depends upon physical signs, but regarding the life of the person in a physical world in whose unity and harmony one's consciousness has no real share, indeed, in relation to which it is defined by contrast. Recently, existential phenomenologists have begun to respond to the perverse, desiccating effect which this has had even upon consciousness itself, while environmentalists have pointed up the destruction it has wrought upon nature.

This implies a problem for personal identity. Locke would claim that this resides in the continuity established by linking the past with the present in one's memory. But, as there is no awareness of a substantial self from which this consciousness proceeds, what remains is but a sequence of perceptions or a flow of consciousness recorded by memory.

Finally, Leibniz would question Locke's claim to have provided even that public or forensic notion of the self by which he sought to provide a sufficient basis for legal and political relations. Memory can deal with the past and the present, but not with the future; planning and providing for the future is, however, the main task of a rationally ordered society. Further, Locke's conclusion, that since the self is consciousness the same self could inhabit many bodies of different appearances, would undermine the value of public testimony, and thereby the administration of justice. Though self-consciousness is certainly central and distinctive of the person, more is required for personhood than a sequence of consciousness, past and present.

Another approach was attempted by Kant whose identification of the salient characteristics of the person has become a standard component for modern sensitivity. Whereas Locke had developed the notion of the person in terms of consciousness predicated upon experience, Kant developed it on the requirements of an ethics based upon will alone. Both the strengths and the weaknesses of this approach to the person lie in his effort to lay for ethics a foundation that is independent of experience. He did so because he considered human knowledge to be essentially limited to the spatial and temporal orders and unable to explain its own presuppositions. Whatever be thought of this, by looking within the self for a new and absolute beginning he led the modern mind to a new awareness of the reality and nature of the person.

For Kant the person is above all free, both in himself- or herself and in relation to others; in no sense is the person to be used by others as a means. From this he concluded that it is essential to avoid any dependence (heteronomy) on anything beyond oneself and, within oneself, on anything other than one's own will. The fundamental thrust of the will is its unconditional command to act lawfully; this must be the sole basis for an ethics worthy of man. In turn, "the only presupposition under which . . . (the categorical imperative) is alone possible . . . is the Idea of freedom."
As free the person must not be legislated to by anyone or on the basis of anything else; to avoid heteronomy one must be an end-in-themselves. Kant's self-described goal was to awaken interest in the moral law through this "glorious ideal" of a universal realm of persons as ends-in-themselves (rational beings). The person, then, is not merely independent, as is any subject; he is a law-making member of society. This means that the person has, not only value which is to be protected and promoted, but true dignity as well, for he is freely bound by and obeys laws which he gives to himself. As this humanity is to be respected both in oneself and in all others, one must act in such wise that if one's actions were to constitute a universal law they would promote a cohesive life for all rational agents.

This "glorious ideal" has been perhaps the major contribution to the formation of the modern understanding of ourselves as persons. At the minimum, it draws a line against what is unacceptable, namely, whatever is contrary to the person as an end-in-him-or-herself, and sets thereby a much needed minimal standard for action. At the maximum, as with most a priori positions, it expresses an idea for growth by pointing out the direction, and thereby providing orientation, for the development of the person. In Kohlberg's schema of moral development it constitutes the sixth or highest stage, and hence the sense and goal of his whole project--though he notes rightly that this is not an empirically available notion.

Further, this bespeaks a certain absoluteness of the individual will which is essential if the person is not to be subject to domination by the circumstances he encounters. If one must be more than a mere function of one's environment--whether this be one's state, or business, or neighborhood--then Kant has made a truly life-saving observation in noting that the law of the will must extend beyond any one good or particular set of goods.

Nevertheless, there are reasons to think that still more is needed for an understanding of the person. In Part I of his Foundations of the Metaphysics of morals Kant correctly rules out anything other than, or heteronomous to, human freedom and will as an adequate basis for ethics, at least as far as using one's own ability to think and to decide are concerned. Nor does he omit the fact that these individuals live their lives with others in this world. As the good is mediated by their concrete goods, however, a role for experience must be recognized if right reason is to conform to the real good in things. Further, there is need to know more of the reality of the person in order to understand: (a) not only how will and freedom provide the basis for ethical behavior, but (b) by what standards or values behavior can be judged to be ethical, and (c) how ethical behavior is integral to the project of the person's self-realization. Something more than a postulation of freedom (along with the immortality of the soul and God) is essential to enable the development of the person to be guided throughout by his "glorious ideal."

In sum, Locke and Kant have contributed essentially to delineating the nature of the person for the modern mind. Both have pointed up that which distinguishes the person from other subjects. Focusing upon knowledge, Locke showed the person to be an identity of continuing consciousness which is self-aware and "concerned for itself." Focusing upon the will and its freedom, Kant showed the person to be an end-in-itself.

By attending directly to consciousness and freedom, however, both left problems which are similar and of great importance to the present project. The first regards the way in which consciousness and freedom are realized in the person as a unique identity with a proper place in society and indeed in reality as a whole. It is true, as Locke says, that the term person expresses self-awareness and continuing consciousness, as well as its status in the public forum. But, one needs more than an isolated view of that which is most distinctive of man; one needs to know what the person is in his or her entirety, how one is able to stand among other persons as a subject, and
how in freedom one is to undertake one's rightful responsibilities. One is not only consciousness or freedom, but a conscious and free subject or person. Further, it is necessary to understand the basis of the private, as well as the public, life of the person, for one is more than a role, a citizen, or a function of state. The second problem regards the way in which the person can attain his or her goal of full self-awareness, freedom, and responsibility, namely, how the person can achieve his or her fulfillment through time and with others.

In sum, what Locke and Kant discovered about the person by considering self-awareness in the abstract and for the political arena needs now to be integrated with what was seen regarding the individual in the first section of this chapter in order to constitute the integral person as a rational and free subject.

The Self-conscious and Free Subject

While it has been said that ancient thinkers had no concept of the person, a very important study by Catherine De Vogel has shown that there was indeed a significant sense of person and of personality among the ancient Greeks and Romans, as well as a search for its conditions and possibilities. It will be helpful to look at this in order to identify some of the cultural resources for understanding the way in which self-consciousness and freedom are rooted in the subject and constitute the person with which moral education is concerned. Above, we saw a certain progression from the Greek philosophical notion of the individual as an instance of a general type to a more ample existential sense of the subject as an independent whole, which nonetheless shares with others in the same specific nature. It is time now to see how this relates to self-consciousness and freedom.

The Greeks had a certain sense for, and even fascination with, individuals in the process of grappling with the challenge to live their freedom. T.B.L. Webster notes that "Homer was particularly interested in them (his heroes) when they took difficult decisions or exhibited characteristics which were not contained in the traditional picture of the fighting man." In the final analysis, however, the destiny of his heroes was determined by fate, from which even Zeus could not free them. Hence, an immense project of liberation was needed in order to appreciate adequately the full freedom of the moral agent.

This required establishing: (a) that the universe is ruled by law, (b) that a person could have access to this law through reason, and (c) that the person has command of his relation to this law. These elements were developed by Heraclitus around 500 B.C. He saw that the diverse physical forces could not achieve the equilibrium required in order to constitute a universe without something which is one. This cosmic, divine law or Logos is the ruling principle of the coherence of all things, not only in the physical, but in the moral and social orders. A person can assume the direction of his life by correcting his understanding and determining his civil laws and actions according to the Logos, which is at once divine law and nature. In this lies wisdom.

This project has two characteristics, namely, self-reflection and self-determination. First, as the law or Logos is not remote, but within man--"The soul has a Logos within it"--the search for the Logos is also a search for oneself: "I began to search for myself." Self-reflection is then central to wisdom. Second, the attainment of wisdom requires on the part of man a deliberate choice to follow the universal law. This implies a process of interior development by which the Logos which is within "increases itself."
A similar pattern of thought is found in the Stoic philosophers for whom there is a principle of rationality or "germ of logos" of which the soul is part, and which develops by natural growth. A personal act is required to choose voluntarily the law of nature, which is also the divine will.

These insights of Heraclitus, though among the earliest of the philosophers, were pregnant with a number of themes which correspond to Kant's three postulates for the ethical life: the immortality of the soul, freedom and God. The first of these would be mined by subsequent thinkers in their effort to explore the nature of the person as a physical subject that is characteristically self-conscious and free. As the implications of Heraclitus' insight that the multiple and diverse can constitute a unity only on the basis of something that is one gradually became evident, the personal characteristics of self-consciousness and freedom were bound to the subject with its characteristics of wholeness, independence and interrelatedness. The first step was Plato's structure for integrating the multiple instances of a species by their imitation of, or participation in the idea or archetype of that species. This, in turn, images still higher and more central ideas, and ultimately the highest idea which is inevitably the Good or the One.

Aristotle took the second step by applying the same principle to the internal structure of living beings. He concluded that the unity of their disparate components could be explained only by something one, which he termed the soul or psyche--whence the term 'psychology.' The body is organized by this form which he described as "the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it." For Aristotle, however, the unifying principle of a physical subject could not be also the principle of man's higher mental life, his life of reason. Hence, there remained the need to understand the person as integrating self-consciousness and freedom in one subject which is nonetheless physical.

Over one-thousand years later Thom as Aquinas took this third step, drawing out of Heraclitus' insight its implications for the unity of the person with its full range of physical and mental life. He did not trace the physical to one form or soul and the higher conscious life to another principle existing separately from the body as had the Aristotelian commentators, nor did he affirm two separate souls as did Bonaventure. Rather, Thomas showed that there could be but one principle or soul for the entire person, both mind and body. He did this by drawing out rigorously, under the principle of non-contradiction, the implications of the existence of the subject noted above. One subject could have but one existence--lest it be not one but two. This existence, in turn, could pertain to but one essence or nature--again lest it be and not be of that nature; for the same reason the one essence could be of but one form. Hence, there could be only one formal principle or soul for both the physical and the self-conscious and free dimensions of a person. This rendered obsolete Aristotle's duality of these principles for man and founded the essential and integral humanness of both mind and body in the unity of the one person.

This progression of steps leading to the one principle, which enables that which is complex to constitute nonetheless a unity, points in the person to the one form which is commonly called the soul. By this single formal principle what Locke articulated only as a disembodied consciousness and Kant as an autonomous will are able to exist as a properly human subject. This is physical truly but not exclusively, for it transcends the physical to include also self-consciousness and freedom. Similarly, it exists in its own right, yet does so in such wise that it exists essentially with others as a person in society.

There are pervasive implications in such an integration of the physical with the self-conscious dimensions of the person through a single principle. One does not become a person when one is accepted by society; on the contrary, by the form through which one is a person one is an autonomous end-in-one-self and has claim to be responded to as such by others. Hence, though for
his or her human development the person has a unique need for acceptance, respect and love, the withholding of such acceptance by others--whether individuals, families or states--does not deprive them of their personhood. One does not have to be accepted in order to have a claim to acceptance. (Even in circumstances of correction and punishment, when a person's actions are being explicitly repudiated, persons cannot be treated as mere things.) Thus, the rights to respect, to an education, to possibilities for development and to meaningful engagement in society are based within the person and need to be responded to by family and society.

Similarly, it is not necessary that the person manifest in overt behavior signs of self-awareness and responsibility. From genetic origin and physical form it is known that the infant and young child is an individual human developing according to a single unifying and integrating principle of both its physical and its rational life. The rights and the protection of a human person belong to a person by right prior to an ability consciously to conceive or to articulate them. Even in very young children, the physical manner in which they express themselves and respond to others is truly human. Indeed, though the earlier the stage in life the more physical the manner of receiving and expressing affection, the earliest months and years appear to be the most determinative of one's lifetime ability to relate to others with love and affection.

Finally, attempts to modify the behavior of persons must proceed according to distinctively human norms if they are not to be destructive. Whether in the school, the workplace or society at large, it is crucial to recognize that every human being is a human person, and integrally so in each of their human actions and interactions. Not to attend to this is to fail to recognize those with whom we interact to the detriment and dishonor of both the person and the social process.

There is a second insight of great potential importance in the thought of Heraclitus. When he refers to the Logos as being very deep he suggests multiple dimensions of the soul. Indeed, it must be so if human life is complex and its diverse dimensions have their principle in the one soul. Plato thought of these as parts of the soul; in these terms the development of oneself as a person would consist in bringing these parts into proper subordination one to another. This state is called justice, the "virtue of the soul." Both the Republic and the Laws reflect amply his concern for education, character formation, and personal development understood as the process of attaining that state of justice. The way to this is progressive liberation from captivity by the objects of sense knowledge and sense desires through spiritual training, as described in the Phaedo and the Republic. All this prepares the way for what is essential, namely, the contemplation of the transcendent Good. This alone establishes that inner harmony of soul through which the person is constituted as free and responsible, both in principle and in act. Because this vision, not only of some goods, but of the transcendent Good, cannot be communicated by teaching but remains "an extremely personal interior vision," the uncalculating and unmeasured love shared in family and intermediate communities has special importance.

By the human form or soul the human individual as a person is open in principle, not only to particular states of affairs or events, but to the one source, Logos and goal of all. Through this, in turn, one is able to take account of the full meaning of each thing and freely to relate oneself to others in the coordinating virtue of philanthropia, the love of all mankind. As it is of foundational importance for a truly moral life to have not merely access to some goods, but an ability to evaluate them in terms of the Good, the form or soul as the single organizing and vivifying principle of the person is the real foundation for the person as an end-in-oneself.

Correlatively, recent thought has made crucial strides toward reintegrating the person into his or her world. The analytic process of identifying the components of the world process initiated by the Greeks was inherently risky, for as analytic any imperfection in the understanding of personal
identity would tend toward individualism and distract from the unity of persons and peoples through their grounding in the One. Cumulatively, the intensive modern concentration upon freedom in terms of self-consciousness would generate an isolating and alienating concentration upon self.

Some developments in recent thought have made important contributions to correcting this individualist—even potentially solipsist—bias. One is the attention paid recently to language and to the linguistic character of the person. Our consciousness is not only evoked, but shaped, by the pattern of the language in which we are nurtured. In our highly literate culture—many would say in all cultures—the work of the imagination which accompanies and facilitates that of the intellect is primarily verbal. Hence, rather than ideas being developed and then merely expressed by language, our thought is born in language. As this language is not one's private creation, but that of our community and over a long period, conscious acts, even about ourselves, involves participation in that community. To say that our nature is linguistic is to say that it is essentially "with others."

A similar point, but on another level of insight, was developed by Martin Heidegger and laid the basis for the stress among many existential thinkers on the importance of considering the person as being in community. As conscious and intentional, one essentially is not closed within oneself, but open to the world; one's self-realization depends upon and indeed consists in one's being in the world. Therefore it is not possible to think of persons in themselves and then to add some commerce with their surroundings; instead, persons exist and can be conceived only as beings-in-the-world. Here the term `in' expresses more than a merely spatial relation; it adds an element of being acquainted with or being familiar with, of being concerned for, and of sharing. At root this is the properly personal relation.

From what was said of being-in-the-world it follows that the person is also being-with-others, for one is not alone in sharing in this world. Just as I enter into and share in the world, so also do other persons. Hence, as essentially sharing-in-the-world, our being is also essentially a sharing-with-others; the world of the person is a world in which we are essentially with-others. In this light a study of the existence of the rational subject with its hopes and its efforts toward self-realization with others must center ultimately upon understanding the development of the person as a moral participant in social life.

Moral Agent and Moral Growth

Recent advances in this project are being made by interweaving two main streams of thought regarding the person: one considers the subject as existing in his own right as conscious and free; the other situates this consciousness and freedom in the person as acting in the world with other persons. Together they provide a context for understanding the development of the moral awareness of the person.

The Person as Moral Agent

In Aristotle's project of distinguishing the components of the physical process actions and attributes were found to be able to exist and to be intelligible only in a substance which existed in its own right—there could be no running without a runner. Actions, as distinct from the substantive nature or essence, could appear to be added thereto in a relatively external or "quantitative" manner. Subsequent developments in understanding the subject in terms of existence have
provided protection against this externalism. In relation to existence, essence does not merely specify the specific nature or kind of the thing; it is rather the way in which each thing is, the way in which each living being lives. Hence, for a person it implies and calls for the full range of activities of a human being. Indeed, essence is often termed nature precisely as that from which these life acts derive. These actions, in turn, cannot be mere additions to the person; they are the central determinants of the quality of one's very life. It is not just that one can do more or less, but that by so doing one becomes a more or less kind, more or less loving, or more or less generous person.

A person should be understood also in terms of his or her goals, for activities progressively modify and transform one in relation to the perfection of which one is by nature capable and which one freely chooses. Thus, though infants are truly and quite simply human beings, they are good only in an initial sense, namely, as being members of the human species. What they will become, however, lies in the future; hence they begin to be categorized as good or bad people only after and in view of their actions. Even then it is thought unfair to judge or evaluate persons at an early age before it can be seen how they will "turn out" or what they will "make of themselves," that is, what character and hence constant pattern of action they will develop.

Further, one's progress or lack thereof can be judged only in terms of acting in a manner proportionate to one's nature: a horse may be characterized as good or bad on the basis of its ability to run, but not to fly. One must be true to one's nature, which in that sense serves as a norm of action. In this new sense I am a law to myself, namely, I must never act as less than one having a human nature with its self consciousness and freedom. Below we shall see a way in which being true to this nature implies constituting both myself and my world.

Boethius classically defined the person as "an individual substance of a rational nature," within which Locke focused upon self-consciousness. But conscious nature can be understood on a number of levels. First, it might be seen as a reflection or passive mirroring in man of what takes place around him. This does not constitute new being, but merely understands what is already there. Secondly, if this consciousness is directed to the self it can be called self-knowledge and makes of the subject an object for one's act of knowledge. Thirdly, consciousness can regard one's actions properly as one's own. By concerning the self precisely as the subject of one's own actions, it makes subjective what had been objective in the prior self-knowledge; it is reflexive rather than merely reflective.

This self-conscious experience depends upon the objective reality of the subject with all the characteristics described above in the section on the self conscious and free subject. This, in turn, is shaped by the reflexive and hence free experiences of discovering, choosing, and committing oneself. In these reflexive acts the subject in a sense constitutes him or herself, being manifested or disclosed to oneself as concrete, distinct, and indeed unique. This is the distinctively personal manner of self actuation of the conscious being or person.

The result for the person is a unique realization of that independence which above was seen to characterize all subsistent individuals. Beyond the mirroring of surrounding conditions and of those things that happen to one, beyond even the objective realization of oneself as affected by those events, the person exists reflexively as their subject and as a source of action. As a person one has an inward, interior life of which they alone are the responsible source. This implies for the person an element of mystery which can never be fully explicated or exhausted. Much can be proposed by other persons and things, much can even be imposed upon me. But my self-consciousness is finally my act and no one else's. How I assess and respond to my circumstances is finally my decision, which relates to, but is never simply the result of, exterior factors.
Here finally lies the essence of freedom, of which the ability to choose between alternatives is but one implication. What is essential for a free life is not that I always retain an alternative, but that I can determine myself and carry through with consistency the implications of my self-determination—even, and at times especially, in the most straightening of circumstances. In this the personal finally transcends that growth process originally called the *phasis* or the physical, and hence has been considered rightly to be spiritual as well.

This, of course, is not to imply isolation from one's physical and social world; rather it bespeaks in the world a personal center which is self-aware and self-determining. More than objective consciousness of oneself as acting, the inward reflexion at the origin of my action is that according to which I freely determine and experience myself as the one who acts in freedom. The bond of consciousness with action as deriving from self-determination is crucial for a full recognition of subjectivity. It protects this from reduction to the subjectivism of an isolated consciousness which, being separated from action, would be finally more arbitrary than absolute.

Self-determination in action has another implication: in originating an action the person's experience is not merely of that action as happening to or in him, but of a dynamism in which he participates efficaciously. As a self I experience myself immanently as wholly engaged in acting and know this efficacy to be properly my own, my responsibility. Hence, by willing good or evil action, I specify, not only the action which results, but myself as the originator of that action.

Finally, I am aware of my responsibility for the results of my actions which extend beyond me and shape my world. The good or evil which my actions bring about is rooted in good or evil decisions on my part. In making choices which shape my world I also form myself for good or evil. By their subjective character actions become part of the person's unique process of self-realization.

Action then manifests an important dimension of the person. On the one hand, the need to act shows that the person, though a subject and independent, is not at birth perfect, self-sufficient or absolute. On the contrary, persons are conscious of perfection that they do not possess, but toward which they are dynamically oriented. Hence, the person is essentially active and creative.

On the other hand, this activity is marked characteristically by responsibility. This implies that, while the physical or social goods that one can choose are within one's power, they do not overpower one. Whatever their importance, in the light of the person's openness to the good as such one can always overrule the power of their attraction. When one does choose them it is the person—not the goods—who is responsible for that choice.

Both of these point to two foundations of the person's freedom, and hence of one's ability to be a self-determining end-in-one-self. First, one's mind or intellect is oriented, not to one or another true thing or object of knowledge, but to Truth Itself and hence to whatever is or can be. Second and in a parallel manner, the person's will is not limited to—or hence by—any particular good or set of goods. Rather, because oriented to the Good Itself, it is freely open to any and all goods.

**Personal Growth as Convergence of Values and Virtues**

In Chapter I in tracing the emergence of a culture we looked at the dynamic involved in the evolution of values from free choices made among the range of possible routes to development and perfection. We saw how values then serve as lenses which focus our attention and aspirations. Further, we noted the character of virtues as capabilities which one develops and which enable one to pursue the work of shaping his or her life according to his or her values.
In this light we saw how freedom becomes more than mere spontaneity, more than choice, and more even than self-determination, and how it shapes or even constitutes my world as the field of choice and action. This is the making of myself as a person in a community.

To appreciate this it is necessary to look more closely at the dynamic openness and projection which characterize the concrete person—not only in his or her will, but in his or her body and psyche as well. In order to be truly self-determining the person must not merely moderate a bargaining session between these three, but must constitute a new and active dynamism in which all dimensions achieve their proper personal character.

Bodily or somatic dynamisms, such as the pumping of blood, are basically non-reflective and reactive. They are implemented through the nervous system in response to stimuli; generally they are below the level of human consciousness, from which they enjoy a degree of autonomy. Nonetheless, they are in harmony with the person as a whole, of which they are an integral dimension. As such they are implicit in my conscious and self-determined choices regarding personal action with others in this world.

Dynamisms of the psyche are typified by emotivity. In some contrast to the more reactive character of lower bodily dynamism and in a certain degree to the somatic as a whole, these are based rather within the person. They include, not only affectivity, but sensation and emotions as well, which feelings range from some which are physical to others which are moral, religious and aesthetic. Such emotions have two important characteristics. First, they are not isolated or compartmentalized, but include and interweave the various dimensions of the person. Hence, they are crucial to the integration of a personal life. They play a central role in the proximity one feels to values and to the intensity of one's response thereto. Secondly, they are relatively spontaneous and contribute to the intensity of a personal life. This, however, is not adequate to make them fully personal for, as personal, life is not only what happens in me, but above all what I determine to happen. This can range beyond and even against my feelings.

It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish two directions or dimensions of one's personal transcendence. The first relates to one's world as the object of either one's knowledge or one's will. This might be called horizontal as an activation of a person inasmuch as he or she relates to other things and especially to other persons. Such a relation would be poorly conceived were it thought to be merely an addition to a fully constituted person. On the contrary, the person as such is essentially transcendent, that is, open to others. One requires this interaction with others in order to have a language and all that this implies for the formation of thought, to have a moral code to assist one in the direction of one's will, and above all to have a family and community, and thus the possibility of sharing in the hope and anguish, the love and concern, which gives meaning to life.

The other, or vertical dimension of transcendence follows the sequence of levels of personal reality. Personal actions are carried out through a will which is open and responsive to the Good or goodness itself and as such able to respond to, without being determined by, any particular good or value. Thus, it is finally up to the person to determine him/herself to act. One is able to do this because personal consciousness is not only reflective of myself as an additional object of knowledge, but reflexive or self-aware in its conscious acts.

If such actions derived merely from my powers or faculties of knowledge or will, in acting I would determine only the object of my action. Instead, these actions derive from my self as subject or person; hence, in acting I determine equally, and even primarily, myself. This is self-determination, self-realization and self-fulfillment in the strongest sense of those terms. Not only are others to be treated as ends in themselves; in acting I myself am an end.
It is possible to trace abstractly a general table of virtues required for particular circumstances in order to help clarify the overall terrain of moral action. As with values, however, such a table would not articulate the particulars of one's own experience nor dictate the next steps in one's project toward personal realization with others in relation to the Good. This does not mean, however, that such decisions are arbitrary; conscience makes its moral judgments in terms of real goods and real structures of values and virtues. Nevertheless, through and within the breadth of these categories, it is the person who must decide, and in so doing enrich his or her unique experience of the virtues. No one can act without courage and wisdom, but each exercise of these is distinctive and typically one's own. Progressively they form a personality that facilitates one's exercise of freedom as it becomes more mature and correlativey more unique. This often is expressed simply as `more personal.'

A person's values reflect then, not only his/her culture and heritage, but within this what he has done with its set of values. One shapes and refines these values through one's personal, and hence free, search to realize the good with others in one's world. They reflect, therefore, not only present circumstances which our forebears could not have experienced, but our free response to the challenges to interpersonal, familial and social justice and love in our days.

In the final analysis, moral development as a process of personal maturation consists in bringing my pattern of personal and social virtues into harmony with the corresponding sets of values along the vertical pole of transcendence. In this manner we achieve a coordinated pattern of personal capabilities for the realization of our unique response to The Good.

Though free and hence properly personal, as was seen above, this is done essentially with others. For this reason the harmony sought within oneself for moral development must be mirrored in a corresponding harmony between modes of action and values in the communities and nations in which persons live. (Thus, Aristotle considered his ethics of individual moral action to be an integral part of politics.) If that be true then the moral development of the person as a search for self-fulfillment is most properly the search for that dynamic harmony, both within and without, called peace.
3. Harmony as a Contemporary Metaphysics of Freedom: 
Kant and Confucius

Two great campaigns appear to have marked the history of the last century. The first, in the 19th century, can be termed the age of science and industrialization, as the new command of man over energy and electricity led to vast expansions of the industrial base and communications. There was hope that this alone would usher in a new and more humane world, but, by the first third of this century, Hitler and Goebbels had proved that these powers could be used in an opposite manner.

There followed a vast project of liberation from totalitarianism, colonialism, and prejudice of many sorts with a view to recognizing and realizing the freedom of all persons. The last half century might be said to have been marked especially by the march of mankind toward freedom. From the famous "Long March" of Chinese lore in the 30s, to the "March on Washington" by Martin Luther King in the 60s, to the world wide social reforms in the 80s, the aspiration of freedom has electrified hearts, evoked great sacrifices and defined human progress in our age.

Science and democracy have been the watchwords of modern history; now both are well within our reach. But, wherever there are two, the problem of their unity and harmony becomes central to the realization and value of both. So it is at the present moment that we are in search of an adequate context which will enable both science and human freedom to be realized under the title of democracy in our day. If this can be found, it will enable scientific capabilities truly to implement a humane and free life and our democracy to become, not a well-ordered tyranny of the majority, but a context for personal and social realization.

This suggests that we might helpfully reflect upon life in our century by considering science and freedom and the conditions for their realization. I must leave the direct consideration of Confucian thought to those sufficiently steeped in that tradition to be able to speak to it with the enthusiasm and insight it richly deserves. Rather, the present chapter will concern key points in the philosophy of Kant in the hope that this will suggest ways in which the Confucian tradition can make a substantive contribution to the conjoint realization of science and democracy in our day.

Descartes' requirements of clarity and distinctness for the human mind pointed modern philosophy toward what is fixed and necessary. Generally, this was below man; however, human life and relationships transcend neat categorization. Freedom is by definition not necessitated, and love, as self-giving, is essentially unique and spontaneous. If freedom and love are the highest of human realities, then the search for what is required for them (and hence manifest by them) promises an especially penetrating exploration into the heart of being itself.

What is of special interest here is not only that, after Descartes, this search was taken up by Kant, but that, in this process, Kant came inexorably to an aesthetic context for reality and for thought which is reminiscent of Confucius' notion of harmony. If the two be truly related in this, then an investigation of Kant may be a way of discovering both the central place in the thought of Confucius for modern notions of freedom and the special place of the Confucian culture and its peoples in the modern world.

Further, as Kant's path was through freedom, following his trajectory may enable one to discover a sense in which Confucian harmony is a philosophy of freedom. If so, this could be a significant route to the modernization of the Confucian tradition itself.
This chapter will explore this by (1) surveying philosophical notions of freedom in order to search out the common area of autonomy in contrast to the necessary and universal realm of scientific laws; (2) seeing how the inadequacies of the minimal sense of freedom as choice found in classical British philosophies of the liberal tradition and common in our day point to the principled sense of freedom in Kant; (3) analyzing the structure of Kant's Critiques as it leads the mind to an aesthetic context for realizing conjointly science and freedom; and (4) identifying the corresponding metaphysical Transcendent and its contributions to the sense of life in our day.

Theories of Freedom

Every encyclopedia--especially philosophical ones--must contain a survey of the number of notions of freedom. What is of interest here, however, is not only to list the multiple notions of freedom, but to identify their range and inter-relations in order to arrive at some sense of the essence of freedom. In this there have been a number of basically convergent efforts. One is that of L.B. Geiger to winnow through the senses of freedom identified in Lalande's *Vocabulaire technique et critique de la philosophie* (pp. 542-551). Geiger's study, done as part of a project for the *Dictionnaire des termes fondamentaux de la philosophie et de la pensée politique*, is limited to the seven definitions of Lalande and to their context in French philosophy.

Here, we shall draw especially upon the survey carried out by of Mortimer J. Adler and the team of The Institute for Philosophical Research, published as *The Idea of Freedom: A Dialectical Examination of the Conceptions of Freedom*. Their corporate examination of the main philosophical writings identified three correlated modes in which freedom has been understood, namely, circumstantial, acquired and natural, and the corresponding modes of self, i.e., "the ability or power of the self in virtue of which freedom is possessed," namely, self-realization, self-perfection and self-determination." This yields the following scheme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mode of Possession</th>
<th>Mode of Self</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Circumstantial</td>
<td>1. Self-realization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Acquired</td>
<td>2. Self-perfection</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

To this schema, political liberty could be added as a variant of circumstantial self-realization and collective freedom as a variant of acquired self-perfection. The modes of self correspond to the modes of possession, thereby constituting a class; e.g., self-realization (as permitting an individual to act as he wishes for his own good as he sees it) will always relate to circumstantial mode of possession. It is possible, however, that a mode of self might correspond as well to an additional mode of possession. Thus, the circumstantial mode of possession is significant not only for self-realization, but also for self-perfection and self-determination.

Using the above scheme the Institute team categorized as follows the positions on freedom of the main body of philosophers.

*Theories Involving Four Distinct Conceptions of Freedom*, as follows:

Theories Involving One Conception of Freedom Having Two or More Distinguishable Aspects, as follows:

(A) With Natural Self-determination as distinct from Acquired Self-perfection only in the initial or preparatory phase of freedom, but fused with Acquired Self-perfection in the terminal or ultimate phase of freedom

(B) With Natural Self-determination and Circumstantial Self-realization together subordinate to Acquired Self-perfection as the fulfillment of freedom

This categorization has a number of uses: First, it enables one, at a glance, to identify something of the understanding and concerns regarding freedom of a particular thinker; Second, it enables one to gauge what comparisons between which philosophers might be possible and potentially helpful on a specific issue.

For our purpose of discovering not only the divisions but the nature of freedom, this categorization might serve a third purpose, namely, it can provide the material for an initial search for the common and, hence, the foundational notion of freedom. This will not be the same as a basic understanding of the ontology or psychology of politics of freedom—that must be the search of the particular theoreticians. However, if an area of convergence in the multiple understandings of freedom can be determined this can orient the attention of our historical and theoretical search toward answering the question, "What is freedom?"

The team of the Institute for Philosophical Research began their dialectical search for the answer to the question "what is freedom" by dividing theories of freedom among three categories, namely:

(A) Circumstantial freedom of self-realization: "To be free is to be able, under favorable circumstances, to act as one wishes for one's own individual good as one sees it";

(B) Acquired freedom of self-perfection: "To be free is to be able, through acquired virtue or wisdom, to will or live as one ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human nature"; and

(C) Natural freedom of self-determination: "To be free is to be able, by a power inherent in human nature, to change one's own character creatively by deciding for oneself what one shall do or shall become"; to which can be added:

(D) Political liberty; and

(E) Collective freedom.

Note that each of these statements is not a generic statement over and above which the particular theories in the category add specific difference. Rather, they are analogous statements of the common content of the theories in that category. They are sufficiently open to embrace the different instances in the category and yet sufficiently distinct to enable these to be contrasted to the theories in another category. For example, (B) "To be free is to be able, through acquired virtue or wisdom, to will or live as one ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human nature" states a common understanding, which is diversely realized by:

(B1) Augustine: To be free is to be able, through receiving God's grace, to escape from bondage to sin and to live in accordance with the divine law, expressing the love of God in everything one wills;
(B²) Spinoza: To be free is to be able, through the achievement of adequate knowledge of the eternal necessities, to conquer one's passions and live in accordance with reason or the laws of one's own nature; and

(B³) Freud: To be free is to be able, through acquiring insight, to resolve the conflicts within oneself and live with some approximation to the ideal of healthy or integrated personality.

All of these differ from A and C in that none of these thinkers would say that these are instances of the freedom which they propose, namely, that to be free is: (A) "to be able under favorable circumstances to act as one wishes," or (C) "by a power inherent in human nature to change one's own character creatively by deciding for oneself what one shall do or shall become."

If now we wish to use these three major types of freedom to look at a still further (X) level of generalization for a single analogous notion of freedom, then we could formulate this search in the following manner:

A man who is able

(A) under favorable circumstances, to act as he wishes for his own individual good as he sees it

or

B) through acquired virtue or wisdom, to will or live as he ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human nature

or

(C) by a power inherent in human nature, to change his own character creatively by deciding for himself what he shall or shall not become

is free in the sense that he (X)

In carrying out this process of generalization in order to determine what is common to A and C, attention to the following points will be helpful:

a. Ability to Act: the power to act appears in A, B and C. It should be taken as open not only to actuation, but to the possibility of acting or not acting, even if that ability not be exercised or be related to different goals. Thus it is:

A. "the circumstantial ability to perform the movements called for by one's own desires and purposes," i.e., the good as one sees it for oneself,

B. "the acquired ability to will or live as one ought," i.e. for a goal that is set for and attracts all men, and

C. "the natural ability to decide creatively the course of one's life or action" with a view to formative changes in one's own character.

b. Analogous Concept: A general notion of freedom must be open to all of these as regards actuation or at least the power to act, the nature of the ability as well as its goal. This openness, however, is not one of limitation achieved by simply omitting the difference; it is rather that of being broad enough to include all of these actually, though not explicitly.

c. Self and Other: Note that all these concern the self, whether as "self realization," "self-perfection" or "self-determination," and that all do this with some implied contrast to an "other." In the vast survey of related philosophic literature this contrast to the "other" appears in terms of
freedom as arising from within, or from my own will in contrast to something or someone outside of myself, or even to the lower and morally intransigent side of man's nature if it opposes one's freedom. One's decisions and plans are one's own only if made by this present active self, and not merely to and for him.

In addition to an ability to act in a certain way, which is present in all conceptions of freedom, we now see that such ability or power is that whereby the self is exempt from the power of another. Through the exercise of such ability or power, what a man does is his own act. It proceeds from his self, and the result it achieves is a property of his self--the realization of his self, the perfection of his self, the determination or creation of his self. It is not something which happens in him, not something which is imposed on him, not something which is done to him or for him.

The self, then, is the principle or source of freedom, of the acts he performs which manifest freedom. As the person is not free when subject to an alien power rather than to his own, the terms "independence" and "autonomy" are generally synonymous for "freedom" and "liberty." This is reflected in the treatment of freedom as liberation in ancient as well as contemporary times, of being one's own master (Aquinas, Spinoza) or of autonomy (Kant).

From these three general notions of freedom, Adler and his team drew the following most general statement of freedom: "A man is free who has in himself the ability or power whereby he can make what he does his own action and what he achieves his own property." This has two implications. First, freedom consists in being the active source of what one does or becomes, not, the passive object of what others do. Thus, what one becomes is the result of one's own making, and what one achieves is proper to oneself, i.e., his own or his property. Conversely, unfreedom consists in either lacking the power to make what one does one's own or being overpowered by another so that what happens to one is the work of another.

Thence arises the following composite statement of freedom in its three modalities (A-C) and in its most general form (X).

A man who is able

(A) under favorable circumstances, to act as he wishes for his own individual good as he sees it

or

(B) through acquired virtue or wisdom, to will or live as he ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human nature

or

(C) by a power inherent in human nature, to change his own character creatively by deciding for himself what he shall or shall not become

is free in the sense that he

(X) has in himself the ability or power whereby he can make what he does his own action and what he achieves his property.

What has been done thus far is to follow Adler's team at the Institute for Philosophical Research as it winnowed the breadth of philosophical literature to identify certain basic categories of freedom and then to draw out a general analogous statement of freedom. This has not been a theoretical or deductive procedure but a dialectical one. It looked historically for the various human understandings of freedom and drew from them a sufficiently open description of freedom to
include—though not in explicit detail—the positive content of this basic and a shared human project and experience.

Now we shall reverse the field, that is, we shall look into the philosophical basis from which have arisen the various theories of freedom identified in the above process of generalization. Our goal here will be to bring to explicit detail the bases, modes and goals of freedom.

What appears striking is that, if one takes not the ways in which some theories overlap and include a number of types of freedom, but the pattern of those which are focused upon only one type of freedom, or if one looks to the highest type of freedom which a theory can take into account then one finds that each of the three types of freedom delineated by the Institute of Philosophical Research corresponds to an epistemology and metaphysics. Circumstantial freedom of self-realization is the only type of freedom recognized by many empirically-oriented philosophers; acquired freedom of self-perfection is characteristic of more rational, formalist and essentialist philosophers; natural freedom of self-determination is developed by philosophers who attend also to the existential dimension of being. This suggests that the metaphysical underpinnings of a philosophy control its epistemology and that especially in modern times this controls its philosophical anthropology and ethics. With this in mind, the following review of the three types of freedom will begin from their respective metaphysical and epistemological contexts and, in that light, proceed to its notion of freedom.

**Empirical Choice: Circumstantial Freedom of Self-Realization**

At the beginning of the modern stirrings for democracy, John Locke perceived a crucial need. If decisions were to be made not by the king but by the people, the basis for these decisions had to be equally available to all. To achieve this, Locke proposed that we suppose the mind to be a white paper void of characters and ideas, and then follow the way in which it comes to be furnished. To keep this public, he insisted that it be done exclusively via experience, that is, either by sensation or by reflection upon the mind's work on the materials derived from the senses. From this David Hume concluded that all objects of knowledge which are not formal tautologies must be matters of fact. Such "matters of fact" are neither the existence or actuality of a thing nor its essence, but simply the determination of one from a pair of sensible contraries, e.g., white rather than black, sweet rather than sour.

The restrictions implicit in this appear starkly in Rudolf Carnap's "Vienna Manifesto" which shrinks the scope of meaningful knowledge and significant discourse to describing "some state of affairs" in terms of empirical "sets of facts." This excludes speech about wholes, God, the unconscious or entelechies; the grounds of meaning, as well as all that transcends the immediate content of sense experience, are excluded.

As noted above by Adler and his team, the decision in metaphysics concerning the nature of reality and the corresponding decision in epistemology determines our understanding of the nature and meaning of freedom and, indeed, of human life. The results of the exclusions made by the empiricists are devastating for human life and meaning: there can be no sense of human nature and, hence, no freedom of self-perfection; there can be no sense of human existence and, hence, no natural freedom of self-determination.

In empirical terms, it is not possible to speak of appropriate or inappropriate goals or even to evaluate choices in relation to self-fulfillment. The only concern is which objects among the sets of contraries I will choose by brute, changeable and even arbitrary will power and whether circumstances will allow me to carry out that choice. Such choices, of course, may not only differ
from, but even contradict the immediate and long range objectives of other persons. This will require compromises and social contracts in the sense of Hobbes; John Rawles will even work out a formal set of such compromises. Throughout it all, however, the basic concern remains the ability to do as one pleases.

This includes two factors. The first is execution by which my will is translated into action. Thus, John Locke sees freedom as "being able to act or not act, according as we shall choose or will"; Bertrand Russell sees it as "the absence of external obstacles to the realization of our desires." The second factor is individual self-realization understood simply as the accomplishment of one's good as one sees it. This reflects one's personal idiosyncracies and temperament, which in turn reflect each person's individual character.

In these terms, one's goal can be only what appeals to one, with no necessary relation to real goods or to duties which one ought to perform. "Liberty consists in doing what one desires," and the freedom of a society is measured by the latitude it provides for the cultivation of individual patterns of life. If there is any ethical theory in this, it can be only utilitarian, hopefully with enough breadth to recognize other people and their good, as well as my own. In practice, over time this comes to constitute a black-hole of self-centered consumption of physical goods in which both nature and the person are consumed; it is the essence of consumerism.

This first level of freedom is reflected in the contemporary sense of "choice" in North America. As a theory, this is underwritten by a pervasive series of legal precedents following Justice Brandeis' notion of privacy, which now has come to be recognized as a constitutional right. In the American legal system the meaning of freedom has been reduced to this. It should be noted that this derived from Locke's politically motivated decision (itself an exercise of freedom), not merely to focus upon empirical meaning but to eliminate from public discourse any other knowledge. Its progressively rigorous implementation, which we have but sampled in the references to Hu me and Carnap, constitutes an ideology in the sense of a selected and restrictive vision which controls minds and reduces freedom to willfulness. In this perspective, liberalism is grossly misnamed, and itself calls for a process of liberation and enrichment.

Freedom of Law and Essence; Acquired Freedom of Self-Perfection

Kant provides the basis for another, much richer notion of freedom, which Mortimer Adler, in his study of freedom at the Institute for Philosophical Research, has called, "acquired freedom of self-perfection." It acknowledges the ability of man to transcend the empirical order and to envisage moral laws and ideals. Here, "to be free is to be able, through acquired virtue or wisdom, to will or live as one ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human nature." This direction has been taken by such philosophers as Plotinus, Spinoza and Bradley who understood all in terms of ideal patterns of reason and of nature. For Kant, freedom consists not in acting merely as one pleases, but in willing as one ought, whether or not this can be enacted. Moral standards are absolute and objective, not relative to individual or group preferences.

But then we face the dilemma of freedom. If, to be of value, it must be ordered, can freedom be truly autonomous and, hence, free; conversely, if to be free is to be autonomous will it be surely a value. In both cases, can freedom be free? The dilemma is how persons can retain both meaning and value, on the one hand, and autonomy or freedom, on the other. One without the other--meaning without freedom, or freedom without meaning--would be a contradiction. This is the kind of question that takes us to the intimate nature of reality and makes possible new discovery. I would suggest that it may even allow us to appreciate from within the more intuitive insight of
Confucius and, thereby, to engage this in new ways particularly adapted to present times. To see this, we must look at the structure of the three critiques which Kant wrote between 1781 and 1790: The Critical Decade.

*The Critique of Pure Reason*

It is unfortunate that the range of Kant's work has been so little appreciated. Until recently, the rationalist impact of Descartes directed almost exclusive attention to the first of Kant's critiques, the *Critique of Pure Reason*, which concerned the conditions of possibility of the physical sciences. Its rejection of metaphysics as a science was warmly greeted in empiricist, positivist and, hence, materialist circles, as a dispensation from any search beyond what was reductively sensible and, hence, phenomenal in the sense of inherently spatial and/or temporal.

Kant himself, however, quite insisted upon going further. If the terms of the sciences were inherently phenomenal, then his justification of the sciences was precisely to identify and to justify, through metaphysical and transcendental deductions respectively, the sets of categories which enable the phenomenal world to have intelligibility and scientific meaning. Since sense experience is always limited and partial, the universality and necessity of the laws of science must come from the human mind. Such *a priori* categories belong properly to the subject inasmuch as it is not material.

We are here at the essential turning point for the modern mind, where Kant takes a definitive step in identifying the subject as more than a wayfarer in a world encountered as a given to which one can but react. Rather, he shows the subject to be an active force engaged in the creation even of the empirical world in which one lives. The meaning or intelligible order of things is due not only to their creation according to a divine intellect, but also to the work of the human intellect and its categories. If, however, man is to have such a central role in the constitution of his world, then certain elements will be required, and this requirement itself will be their justification.

First there must be an imagination which can bring together the flow of disparate sensations. This plays a reproductive role which consists in the empirical and psychological activity by which it reproduces within the mind the amorphous data received from without, according to the forms of space and time. This merely reproductive role is by no means sufficient, however, for, since the received data is amorphous, any mere reproduction would lack coherence and generate a chaotic world: "a blind play of representations less even than a dream". Hence, the imagination must have also a productive dimension which enables the multiple empirical intuitions to achieve some unity. This is ruled by "the principle of the unity of apperception" (understanding or intellection), namely, "that all appearances without exception, must so enter the mind or be apprehended, that they conform to the unity of apperception." This is done according to the abstract categories and concepts of the intellect, such as cause, substance and the like, which rule the work of the imagination at this level in accord with the principle of the unity of apperception.

Second, this process of association must have some foundation in order that the multiple sensations be related or even relatable one to another, and, hence, enter into the same unity of apperception. There must be some objective affinity of the multiple found in past experience--an "affinity of appearances"--in order for the reproductive or associative work of the imagination to be possible. However, this unity does not exist, as such, in past experiences. Rather, the unitive rule or principle of the reproductive activity of the imagination is its reproductive or transcendental work as "a spontaneous faculty not dependent upon empirical laws but rather constitutive of them and, hence, constitutive of empirical objects." That is, though the unity is not in the disparate
phenomena, nevertheless they can be brought together by the imagination to form a unity only in certain particular manners, if they are to be informed by the categories of the intellect.

Kant illustrates this by comparing the examples of perceiving a house and of a boat receding downstream. The parts of the house can be intuited successively in any order (door-roof-stairs or stairs-door-roof), but my judgment must be of the house as having all of its parts simultaneously. Similarly, the boat is intuited successively as moving downstream. However, though I must judge its actual motion in that order, I could imagine the contrary. Hence, the imagination, in bringing together the many intuitions goes beyond the simple order of appearances and unifies phenomenal objects in an order to which concepts can be applied. "Objectivity is a product of cognition, not of apprehension," for, though we can observe appearances in any sequence, they can be unified and, hence, thought only in certain orders as ruled by the categories of the mind.

In sum, it is the task of the reproductive imagination to bring together the multiple elements of sense intuition in some unity or order capable of being informed by a concept or category of the intellect with a view to making a judgment. On the part of the subject, the imagination here is active, authentically one's own and creative. Ultimately, however, its work is not free, but necessitated by the categories or concepts as integral to the work of sciences which are characterized by necessity and universality.

How realistic is this talk about freedom? Do we really have the choice of which so much is said in the West? On the one hand, we are structured in a set of circumstances which circumscribe, develop and direct our actions. This is the actual experience of people which Marx and Hegel articulate when they note the importance of knowledge of the underlying pattern of necessity and make freedom consist in conforming thereto.

On the other hand, we learn also from our experience that we do have a special responsibility in this world to work with the circumstances of nature, to harness and channel these forces toward greater harmony and human goals. A flood which kills thousands is not an occasion for murdering more, but for mobilizing to protect as many as possible, for determining what flood control projects need to be instituted for the future, and even for learning how to so construct them that they can generate electricity for power and irrigation for crops. All of this is properly the work of the human spirit which emerges therein. Similarly, in facing a trying day, I eat a larger breakfast rather than cut out part of my schedule; rather than ignoring the circumstances and laws of my physical being, I coordinate these and direct them for my human purposes.

This much can be said by pragmatism. But it leaves unclear whether man remains merely an instrument of physical progress and, hence, whether his powers remain a function of matter. This is where Kant takes a decisive step in his second Critique.

The Critique of Practical Reason and The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals

Beyond the set of universal, necessary and ultimately material relations upon which he focuses in his first Critique, Kant points out that the fact of human responsibility is in the realm of practical reason. If man is responsible, then there is about him a distinctive level of reality irreducible to the laws of physical nature. This is the reality of freedom and spirit; it is what characterizes and distinguishes the person. It is here that the bonds of matter are broken, that transcendence is affirmed, and that creativity is founded. Without this nature, it would remain a repetitive machine; peoples would prove incapable of sustaining their burgeoning populations and the dynamic spirit required for modern life would die.
Once one crosses this divide, however, life unfolds a new set of requirements for reality. The definitiveness of human commitments and the unlimitedness required for its free creativity reflect characteristics of being which soar far beyond the limited, fixed and hypothetical relations of the physical order. They reflect rather the characteristics of knowledge and love: infinity, absoluteness and commitment. To understand the personal characteristics experienced in our own life, we need to understand ourselves not as functions of matter, but as loving expressions of unlimited wisdom and creative generosity.

Locke had tried too hard to make all public by reducing everything to the physical dimensions and concrete circumstances of human life. Instead, in order to understand the proper place of man in the universe, we must read ourselves and our situation from the opposite end, as expressions of conscious life, progressively unfolding and refining.

Many materialist philosophies of a reductionist character, such as positivism and the materialistic dialectic, would have been at the level of Kant's first Critique. The necessity of the sciences provides control over one's life, while their universality extends this control to others. Once, by means of Kant's categories, the concrete Hu mean facts have been suffused with a clarity corresponding to the rationalist's simple natures, the positivist hopes to achieve Descartes' goal of walking with confidence in the world.

For Kant, however, this simply will not do. Clarity which comes at the price of necessity may be acceptable and even desirable for works of nature, but is an appalling way to envisage human life. Hence, in his Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant proceeds to identify that which is distinctive of the moral order. His analysis pushes forcefully beyond utilitarian goals, inner instincts and rational (scientific) relationships--precisely beyond the necessitated order which can be constructed in terms of his first Critique. None of these recognizes that which is distinctive of the human person, namely, freedom. For Kant, in order for an act to be moral, it must be based upon the will of the person as autonomous, not heteronomous or subject to others or to necessary external laws.

This becomes the basic touchstone of his philosophy; everything he writes thence forward will be adapted thereto, and what had been written before will be recontextualized in this new light. The remainder of his Foundations and his second Critique of Practical Reason will be composed in terms of freedom; in the following two years he would write a third Critique of the Faculty of Judgment in order to provide a context that enables the previous two critiques to be read in a way that protects human freedom.

In the Foundations, he recasts the whole notion of law or moral rule in terms of freedom. If all must be ruled or under law, and yet in order to be free the moral act must be autonomous, then my maxim must be something which as a moral agent I--and no other--give to myself. This, in turn, has surprising implications, for, if the moral order must be universal, then my maxim which I dictate must be fit to be also a universal law for all persons. On this basis, freedom emerges in a clearer light. It is not the self-centered whimsy of the circumstantial freedom of self-realization described above; but neither is it a despotic exercise of the power of the will; finally, it is not the clever, self-serving eye of Plato's rogue who can manipulate and cheat others. This would degrade that which is the highest reality in all creation. Rather, freedom is power that is wise and caring, open to all and bent upon the realization of "the glorious ideal of a universal realm of ends-in-themselves." It is, in sum, free men living together in righteous harmony.
The Critique of Aesthetic Judgment

Despite its central importance, I will not remain with practical reason because it is rather in the third Critique of the Faculty of Judgment that Kant provides the needed context for such harmony, and thus approaches the aesthetic sensibility of Confucius in articulating the cosmic significance of freedom. Kant is intent not merely upon uncovering the fact of freedom but upon protecting and promoting it. He faces squarely modern man's most urgent question: how can this newly uncovered freedom survive when confronted with the necessity and universality of the realm of science as understood in the Critique of Pure Reason? Will the scientific interpretation of nature restrict freedom to the inner realm of each person's heart, where it is reduced at best to good intentions or to feelings towards others?

When we attempt to act in this world or to reach out to others, must all our categories be universal and hence insensitive to that which marks others as unique and personal? Must they be necessary, and, hence, leave no room for creative freedom, which would be entrapped and then entombed in the human mind? If so, then public life can be only impersonal, necessitated, repetitive and stagnant. Must the human spirit be reduced to the sterile content of empirical facts or to the necessitated modes of scientific laws? If so, then philosophers cannot escape forcing upon wisdom a suicidal choice between either being traffic directors in the jungle of unfettered competition or being tragically complicit in setting a predetermined order for the human spirit. Freedom would, indeed, have been killed; it would pulse no more as the heart of mankind.

Before these alternatives, Kant's answer is a resounding No! Taking as his basis the reality of freedom--so passionately and often tragically affirmed in our lifetime by Ghandi and Martin Luther King--Kant proceeded to develop his third Critique of the Faculty of Judgment as a context within which freedom and scientific necessity could coexist, indeed, in which necessity would be the support and instrument of freedom. Recently, this has become more manifest as human sensibilities have opened to the significance of culture and to awareness that being itself is emergent in time through the human spirit (see chapter I).

To provide for this context, Kant found it necessary to distinguish two issues as reflected in the two parts of his third Critique. In the "Critique of Teleological Judgment", he acknowledges that nature and all reality must be teleological, for if there is to be room for human freedom in a cosmos in which man can make use of necessary laws, if science is to contribute to the exercise of human freedom, then nature too must be directed toward a transcendent goal and manifest throughout a teleology within which free human purpose can be integrated. In these terms, nature, even in its necessary and universal laws, is no longer alien to freedom, but expresses divine freedom and is conciliable with human freedom. The structure of his first Critique will not allow Kant to affirm this teleological character as an absolute and self-sufficient metaphysical reality, but he recognizes that we must proceed "as if" all reality is teleological precisely because of the undeniable reality of human freedom in an ordered universe.

If, however, teleology, in principle, provides the needed space, there remains a second issue of how freedom is exercised, namely, what mediates it to the necessary and universal laws of science? This is the task of his "Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment", and it is here that the imagination reemerges to play its key integrating role in human life. From the point of view of the human person, the task is to explain how one can live in freedom with nature for which the first critique had discovered only laws of universality and necessity. How can a free person relate to an order of nature and to structures of society in a way that is neither necessitated nor necessitating?
There is something similar here to the Critique of Pure Reason. In both, the work of the imagination in assembling the phenomena is not simply to register, but to produce the objective order. As in the first critique, the approach is not from a set of a priori principles which are clear all by themselves and used in order to bind the multiple phenomena into a unity. On the contrary, under the rule of unity, the imagination orders and reorders the multiple phenomena until they are ready to be informed by a unifying principle whose appropriateness emerges from the reordering carried out by the productive imagination.

In the first Critique, however, the productive work was done in relation to the abstract and universal categories of the intellect and carried out under a law which dictated that phenomena must form a unity. The Critique of Pure Reason saw the work of the imagination in assembling the phenomena as not simply registering, but producing the objective order. The approach was not from a priori principles which are clear all by themselves and are used to bind the multiple phenomena into a unity. On the contrary, in the first Critique, under the rule of unity, the imagination moves to order and reorder the multiple phenomena until they are ready to be informed by a unifying principle on the part of the intellect, the appropriateness of which emerges from the reordering carried out by the reproductive imagination.

However, this reproductive work took place in relation to the abstract and universal categories of the intellect and was carried out under a law of unity which dictated that such phenomena as a house or a receding boat must form a unity—which they could do only if assembled in a certain order. Hence, although it was a human product, the objective order was universal and necessary and the related sciences were valid both for all things and for all people.

Here in "The Critique of the Aesthetic Judgment," the imagination has a similar task of constructing the object, but not in a manner necessitated by universal categories or concepts. In contrast, here the imagination, in working toward an integrating unity, is not confined by the necessitating structures of categories and concepts, but ranges freely over the full sweep of reality in all its dimensions to see whether and wherein relatedness and purposiveness or teleology can emerge and the world and our personal and social life can achieve its meaning and value. Hence, in standing before a work of nature or of art, the imagination might focus upon light or form, sound or word, economic or interpersonal relations--or, indeed, upon any combination of these in a natural environment or a society, whether encountered concretely or expressed in symbols.

Throughout all of this, the ordering and reordering by the imagination can bring about numberless unities. Unrestricted by any a priori categories, it can nevertheless integrate necessary dialectical patterns within its own free and, therefore, creative production and scientific universals within its unique concrete harmonies. This is properly creative work. More than merely evaluating all according to a set pattern in one's culture, it chooses the values and orders reality accordingly. This is the very constitution of the culture itself.

It is the productive rather than merely reproductive work of the human person as living in his or her physical world. Here, I use the possessive form advisedly. Without this capacity man would exist in the physical universe as another object, not only subject to its laws but restricted and possessed by them. He/She would be not a free citizen of the material world, but a mere function or servant. In his third Critique Kant unfolds how man can truly be master of his/her life in this world, not in an arbitrary and destructive manner, but precisely as creative artists bring being to new realization in ways which make possible new growth in freedom.

In the third Critique, the productive imagination constructs a true unity by bringing the elements into an authentic harmony. This cannot be identified through reference to a category, because freedom then would be restricted within the laws of necessity of the first Critique, but
must be recognizable by something free. In order for the realm of human freedom to be extended to the whole of reality, this harmony must be able to be appreciated, not purely intellectually in relation to a concept (for then we would be reduced to the universal and necessary as in the first critique), but aesthetically, by the pleasure or displeasure of the free response it generates. It is our contemplation or reflection upon this which shows whether a proper and authentic ordering has or has not been achieved. What shows whether a proper and authentic ordering has or has not been achieved is not a concept, but the pleasure or displeasure, the elation at the beautiful and sublime or the disgust at the ugly and revolting, which flows from our contemplation or reflection.

One could miss the integrating character of this pleasure or displeasure and its related judgment of taste by looking at it ideologically, as simply a repetition of past tastes in order to promote stability. Or one might see it reductively as a merely interior and purely private matter at a level of consciousness available only to an elite class and related only to an esoteric band of reality. That would ignore the structure which Kant laid out at length in his first "Introduction" to his third Critique which he conceived not as merely juxtaposed to the first two Critiques of pure and practical reason, but as integrating both in a richer whole.

Developing the level of aesthetic sensitivity enables one to take into account ever greater dimensions of reality and creativity and to imagine responses which are more rich in purpose, more adapted to present circumstances and more creative in promise for the future. This is manifest in a good leader such as a Churchill or Roosevelt—and, supereminently, in a Confucius or Christ. Their power to mobilize a people lies especially in their rare ability to assess the overall situation, to express it in a manner which rings true to the great variety of persons, and, thereby, to evoke appropriate and varied responses from each according to his or her capabilities. The danger is that the example of such genius will be reduced to formulae, become an ideology and exclude innovation. In reality, as personable, free and creative, and understood as the work of the aesthetic judgment, their example is inclusive in content and application as well as in the new responses it continually evokes from others.

When aesthetic experiences are passed on as part of a tradition, they gradually constitute a culture. Some thinkers, such as William James and Jürgen Habermas, fearing that attending to these free creations of a cultural tradition might distract from the concrete needs of the people, have urged a turn rather to the social sciences for social analysis and critique as a means to identify pragmatic responses. But these point back to the necessary laws of the first Critique; in many countries now engaging in reforms, such "scientific" laws of history have come to be seen as having stifled creativity and paralyzed the populace.

Kant’s third Critique points in another direction. Though it integrates scientifically universal and necessary social relations, it does not focus upon them, nor does it focus directly upon the beauty or ugliness of concrete relations, or even directly upon beauty or ugliness as things in themselves. Its focus is rather upon our contemplation of the integrating images of these which we imaginatively create, that is, our culture as manifesting the many facets of beauty and ugliness, actual and potential. In turn, we evaluate these in terms of the free and integrating response of pleasure or displeasure, the enjoyment or revulsion they generate most deeply within our whole person.

Confucius probably would feel very comfortable with this if structured in terms of an appreciation or feeling of harmony. In this way, he could see freedom itself at the height of its sensibility, not merely as an instrument of a moral life, but as serving through the imagination as a lens or means for presenting the richness of reality in varied and intensified ways. Freedom, thus understood, is both spectroscope and kaleidoscope of being. As spectroscope it unfolds the full
range of the possibilities of human freedom, so that all can be examined, evaluated and admired. As kaleidoscope, it continually works out the endless combinations and patterns of reality so that the beauty of each can be examined, reflected upon and chosen when desired. Freely, purposively and creatively, imagination weaves through reality focusing now upon certain dimensions, now reversing its flow, now making new connections and interrelations. In the process reality manifests not only scientific forms and their potential interrelations, but its power to evoke our free response of love and admiration or of hate and disgust.

In this manner freedom becomes at once the creative source, the manifestation, the evaluation and the arbiter of all that imaginatively we can propose. It is goal, namely to realize life as rational and free in this world; it is creative source, for with the imagination it unfolds the endless possibilities for human expression; it is manifestation, because it presents these to our consciousness in ways appropriate to our capabilities for knowledge of limited realities and relates these to the circumstances of our life; it is criterion, because its response manifests a possible mode of action to be variously desirable or not in terms of a total personal response of pleasure or displeasure, enjoyment or revulsion; and it is arbiter, because it provides the basis upon which our freedom chooses to affirm or reject, realize or avoid this way of self-realization. In this way, freedom emerges as the dynamic center of our human existence.

There is much in the above which evokes the deep Confucian sense of the harmony and the role of the gentleman in unfolding its implications for daily life. This uncovers new significance in the thought of Confucius for the work of implementing in a mutually fruitful manner science and democracy in our times. Looking to the aesthetic sense of harmony as a context for uniting both ancient capabilities in agriculture with new powers of industrialization and for applying these to the work of freedom is a task, not only for an isolated individual, but for an entire people. Over time, a people develops its own specific sensibilities and through the ages forms a tradition and a culture, which is the humane capital for such a project. In this sense, one can look to the Confucian cultural heritage for its aesthetic sense of harmony as a way to carry forward the work of freedom in our day.

The Confucian sense of harmony is not a rationalist law whose unfolding would suggest an attempt to read all in an a priori and necessitarian manner. Its sense of life and progress is not that of a scientific view of history after the dialectic of Hegel and Marx. Rather, Confucianism is a way of understanding humans as bringing their lives together in relation to other persons and in the concrete circumstances of everyday life. In this sense, it is not massively programmatic in the sense of a rationalist scientific theory of history. This may be very much to the good, for it protects against efforts to define and delimit all beforehand, after the manner of an ideology.

Further, one must not underestimate the cumulative power which the Confucian sense of harmony and resonance can have when it brings together creatively the many persons with knowledge of their circumstances and in an effort to provide for life in its many modes. This extends from those farmers who know and love their land intimately and are committed to its rich potentialities (and analogously from all phases of productive economic life), to family members and villagers who love their kin and neighbors, to citizens who are willing to work ardently for the welfare of their people and nation. If the exercise of freedom is a concrete and unique expression of the distinctive reality of its authors, then the task is not how to define these by abstractive and personally stifling universal laws, but how to enliven all persons to engage actively in the multiple dimensions of their lives.

Philosophically, the Confucian attitude is of no less importance. For if harmony and resonance enable a more adapted and fruitful mode of the realization of being, then the identity and truth,
dynamism and goodness of being are thereby manifest and proclaimed. In this light, the laws of
nature emerge, not as desiccated universals best read technically and negatively as prohibitions,
but as rich and unfolding modes of being and actualization best read through an appreciation of
the concrete harmony and beauty of their active development. This, rather than the details of
etiquette, is the deeper Confucian sense of the gentleman and sage; it can be grasped and exercised
only with a corresponding aesthetic, rather than merely pragmatic, sensibility.

Nor is this beyond people's experience. Few can carry out the precise process of
conceptualization and definition required for the technical dialectics of Platonic and Aristotelian
reasoning. But all share an overall sensibility to situations as pleasing and attractive or as
generating unease or even revulsion. Inevitably, in earlier times, the aesthetic Confucian mode
lacked in the technical precision which is now available regarding surface characteristics of
physical phenomena. But, in its sense of harmony, it possessed the deep human sensibility and
ability to take into account and integrate all aspects of its object. This is essential for the
contemporary humanization of our technical capabilities for the physical and social mobilization
of our world.

**Existential Freedom: Natural Freedom of Self-Determination**

Thus far, this paper has looked at three notions of freedom which, in their difference, can
compliment and unfold one another in mankind's modern effort to achieve maturity and play an
increasingly responsible role in directing social life in our times.

First, we saw how, in the context of the Enlightenment and in order to make possible universal
participation in social life, Locke limited the range of meaning to what was empirically available.
This assured one sense of freedom, but limited it to choices between contrary qualities. The effort
was well-intentioned, but he would seem to have tried too hard and compromised too much in
single-minded pursuit of freedom of choice. As a result, the very notion of freedom has not been
able to sustain itself, but over time has turned gradually into a consumerist black hole.

Second, we saw how Kant in his second Critique opened a new and much needed dimension
of freedom based upon our nature or essence as free beings. This was based upon law, precisely
as I assert for myself (autonomous) a law which is fit for all men (universal). It generates a sense
of acquired freedom of self-perfection according to which I am able, through the acquired virtue
or wisdom, to will or live as I ought in conformity to the moral law or an ideal befitting human
nature.

The aesthetic sense in Kant and, I believe, at the root of the Confucian insight dramatically
enriches the pursuit of this freedom. The aesthetic integrates body and spirit, opens all to high
ideals and locates in one's free response to the beauty and harmony of the whole the norm of
creative human engagement in reality. Kant's work may suggest ways of rearticulating Confucius'
potential for contributing to the modern aspirations for freedom, while the Confucian culture can
flesh out with centuries of lived experience the abstract model which Kant could only sketch during
the decade in which he wrote his three Critiques. Together they greatly enrich the Enlightenment
effort at constructing freedom by raising its goals and locating the exercise of human freedom, not
only in terms of the human essence as autonomous, but within our aesthetic response to a sense of
beauty and harmony which transcends us and inspires awe and delight.

This is progress, indeed, but, in his own philosophy, Hegel both pointed out in theory and
illustrated in practice the potential this opens for a serious undermining of the sense of freedom.
For, if the required context for freedom is based upon proceeding hypothetically 'as if' all is
teleological, then its very reality is compromised. If its exercise is restricted to the confines of the human imagination, then freedom becomes not only self-determining but self-constituting. Again, we have tried too hard and become trapped within what we can make or do.

We need to go beyond issues of nature and essence. Freedom is not only the articulation of a law, however autonomous and universal this might be (indeed, precisely to the degree that it is autonomous and universal) in the pattern of Kant's second Critique, nor at whatever stage of universalization of the sense of justice in the pattern of Kohlberg's stages of moral reasoning. Freedom is not merely a nature reflected in moral judgements, it is human life and action. It is to be humanly, that is, to live fully; this is of the order, not of essence, but of existence.

Progress in being human corresponds to the sense of being. Thought moved from forms and structures, essences and ideas in Plato, to act in Aristotle and especially to existence in Christian philosophy (see Chapter IV). This definitively deepened the sense of human life with its triumphs and tragedies and set the drama we are living in our day. For it calls insistently for a humanization of the application of our technological abilities and indeed, of life itself. This must be not simply in terms of essence, that is of a moral law or an ideal befitting human nature. Rather, it must be in terms of existence, that is of deciding for oneself in virtue of the power inherent in human nature to change one's own character creatively and to determine what one shall do or shall become. This is the most radical freedom, namely, our natural freedom of self-determination.

This then is the real issue, indeed, it is the issue of the foundation, nature and extent of reality itself. As the deepest active striving of the human spirit, freedom is of the order of existence, indeed, it is the very meaning of human existence. This is the true reality of human freedom; it gives in turn human meaning to the lesser freedoms, namely, to the ability to choose between contraries and to decree universal laws, which are but shadows of the freedom of self-determination.

But if basic freedom is in the existential order, then the transcendent principle it requires must not be merely hypothetical ("as if"), but really existent. If freedom presents us with a limitless range of possibilities, then its principle must be the Infinite and Eternal, the one actual composite Source and Goal of all possibility. The transcendent is the key to real liberation: it frees the human spirit from limitation to the restricted field of one's own slow, halting and even partial creative activity; it grounds one's reality in the Absolute; it certifies one's right to be respected; and it evokes the creative powers of one's heart.

The source of the beauty imaged, progressively revealed and resoundingly reaffirmed by men at their deepest levels of heart and mind, must be actual as are the struggles of human life. It must also be infinite as the basis for human freedom and creativity. As such, these are ever open to new affirmation, rather than being exhausted, shut, delimited or predetermined. Finally, it must be personal as the principle of life lived in knowledge of truth rather than in falsehood and deception, in love and goodness rather than in hate and evil.

This actual, infinite and personal absolute is what Christians mean by God, and what they go on to unfold in terms of a Trinity of persons as Father, as Word, Logos or Son, and as Holy Spirit. It is what Hindus express so richly in the living terms of existence (sat), consciousness (cit) and bliss (ananda). It is what the Daoists suggest as the Spirit of all spirits and attempt to protect especially through negative terms which are echoed in Christian and Hindu negative philosophy and theology. For, precisely as Absolute, it must transcend the richest efforts of each people to articulate it, while yet inspiring every person and all peoples in their own histories and cultures. This will be the burden of the fourth chapter.
This takes us far beyond freedom as external choice between objects in our world and beyond internal selection of universal principles for the direction of our action. It is rather self-affirmation in terms of our orientation or teleology to perfection or full realization. It implies seeking when perfection is lacking and enjoying or celebrating it as attained. It is in this sense that stability in one's orientation to the good has classically been termed holiness. One might say that it is life as practiced by the saints, but it would be more correct to say that it is because they lived in such a manner that they are called holy.

Thinking in these terms, it would be radically insufficient to reduce one's horizons to the human person in isolation from others, merely self-centered and self-concerned, for then life would be stymied at the confines of but one person. Indeed, such a person would have closed off his or her realization of being, which rather should be open to all of nature and especially to other persons. My concern for perfection should extend to other persons, not only as regards what I determine as my participation in being or even what I determine for them as their participation in being, for such an exercise of freedom on my part would return to me and remain limited within the confines of my being. Instead, by opening myself to others as free, that is, as they uniquely determine themselves, my engagement in being extends definitively beyond myself to their life and realization.

But persons are still limited, whereas my mind and heart are open to being without end. Situated in an existential context, the pointer of Kant's third Critique toward an infinite telos takes on further meaning. For it directs us toward the infinite, self-sufficient and properly creative source of our being. Corresponding to that act of infinite freedom by which we live and breathe and have our being, we unite with the act of being by which we are made to be, the act of love by which we have first been loved. Human growth in freedom is the process of self-correction and self-perfection to the point at which we are fully opened to that infinite act of freedom from which we come and to which we tend. The achievement of this openness is the state of Hindu and Buddhist enlightenment and of Christian mystical union in the divine. There God loves himself in me: "I live now not I," says St. Paul, "but Christ liveth in me." This indeed is freedom writ large and the reason why such a person must be at the dynamic center of every human effort that is good and constructive. This is the real key to civic virtue. It is a transforming presence in the heart of everyone who suffers injustice and, hence, the source of new life for person and society.

However, it is possible for man to fall away from the ideal. Human self-consciousness is not only limited, but can be degraded; it can sink from being creative in sharing of self to a self-centered grasping for being which withholds it from others. In responsible human beings, such defective modes reflect not merely their limitations as finite beings, but their refusal to open to others and their choice to close in upon self. In so doing, they abuse their freedom, which thus becomes at once not only their glory but their exposure to moral evil and collapse; its redemption will be studied in chapter four.

The struggle to realize freedom and overcome moral collapse is the content of the basic moral norm: do good and avoid evil. Christianity is centered upon this definitive human struggle in which Christ joins mankind, takes evil upon himself on the Cross, and rises victorious to new life. Its sense then is not to deny, but to conquer evil. This is the challenge it extends and the hope it generates.

In the Protestant Christian tradition, that sin has corrupted human nature, Hegel would say that truth content regarding the transcendent must first be revealed and then perfected by philosophy. The Catholic-Christian tradition, which sees the effect of sin not as corrupting but as weakening human nature, would consider this insight regarding the transcendent source to be
within the proper capabilities of philosophical reason. In either case, however, it is not a matter of abstract theory but of discovering that the foundations of freedom as lived and experienced existentially can be only in a living God who created us out of love. Christianity brings further ‘good news’, namely that God sent his Son to proclaim through the Resurrection that our freedom cannot be defeated by evil, but is resurgent and in the end will triumph. This is the full truth about mankind seen in relation to the transcendent Lord of Heaven.

To the Enlightenment sense of freedom as choice, awareness of the transcendent Creator adds that life is not only a matter of having, that is, of selecting between which physical realities we will consume, but of being, with its characteristics of self-identity, communication, justice and sharing. Beyond this, awareness of salvation through the Cross adds that even suffering can be redemptive and lead to resurrection in a new birth in freedom.

To the aesthetic awareness of Kant (and Confucius), as described above, awareness of the transcendent as the context of human life adds a sense of human meaning, dignity and rights beyond anything that man can construct. It grounds the intuition of human meaning, dignity and rights. This, in turn, evokes a dynamic and creative response from mankind to the gifts of which its very reality is constituted. Historically as well as philosophically, this not only reflects the search of mankind for freedom in our day, but is its source and inspiration as well as its bulwark against ideological reduction to anything constructed by man, including the community itself. This, indeed, may be one reason for the paradox that, while the main Christian Churches today are sending fewer missionaries, Christianity is more sought by peoples engaged in nation building.

Conversely, the Enlightenment and Kantian (and Confucian) aesthetic sense are important for the unfolding of the Christian vision. The Enlightenment has given egalitarian form to the modern sense of freedom and, hence, to the search for universal participation in social decision making. The aesthetic sense can do much to temper the aggressive excesses of a fallen and, hence, self-centered sense of personal identity by a broad sense of harmony both with man and with nature. This is needed in our ever more complex and crowded world.

Confucianism as a sense of harmony seems exceptionally suited to providing the space for freedom and creativity in an increasingly technical world, particularly if grounded in an open and unlimited sense of being. If so, it can point the way to a life in which freedom is protected by justice and exercised as creative love.
4.

The Transcendent Basis for Personal Dignity and Social Dynamism

Transcendence and Human Freedom

As seen in chapter III, a sense of the aesthetic transforms the understanding of being, allows it to soar beyond the material, and opens it to the creativity of the human spirit. In Confucius, this implies an "inner" transcendence in the sense of self-improvement and a continuing effort to hone a perfect harmony of human capabilities. There is substantive evidence both in the practices of the people, in writings of earlier thinkers and in the words of Confucius himself that this was related to a context of reality which transcended human persons and their individual and social creations. Subsequent to Confucius, however, the horizon was closed tightly around man and his social achievements. In terms of both its goal and its means, life came to be defined entirely in terms of man himself.

However, just as one cannot truly be oneself if isolated from others, man may not be able alone to achieve his full potential:

(a) Without a further context, even the exalted aesthetic sense of harmony tends to lose its original Confucian sense of creative adaptation of new insights and to discount novelty in favor of repetition and conservation.

(b) Hegel was concerned that philosophy integrate, but not conclude with the aesthetic. He sees a danger in remaining solely on that level, for aesthetic awareness grasps being through the imagination and expresses its meaning and value in physical media. While this renders the Absolute visible and makes manifest the spiritual meaning of the world, left to itself the aesthetic might conclude in a pantheism—and if nature were to become God, man would be enslaved by his own creations. In the end, being would come to be defined by man, who, thereby, would be forever entombed within the walls of his own ability to create, for in the end this must be as limited as is man himself. The aesthetic sense, if left to itself, would subject man to his own creations and trap him in a deadening idolatrous loop.

(c) Finally, given the vicissitudes of human character, harmony without a normative ideal can be used by leaders, as seems to have been the case in the Meiji period in Japan, to suppress dissent and merge all into phases of the march of progress, as described in a recent study on Ernst Cassirer by George Pierson.

In order to be truly free, therefore, we must acknowledge, as it were, not only that we are athletes but that we are playing in a vast—even limitless—arena. We must think not only in terms of ourselves, but must transcend ourselves in recognizing an adequate ground for the limitlessness of the radical creative potentialities we possess. For this purpose, Hegel pointed to the need, beyond art and the aesthetic, for religion—indeed, for revealed religion—in order to state the full content of transcendence; and beyond even religion he saw the need for philosophy to purify the content of religion from the limitations of its symbolic forms.

Taken abstractly, there is lasting truth in this pattern, but Hegel's thought is also historical. As such, the sequence he states between religion and philosophy reflects as well, or perhaps even more, the chronological sequence of the two in his native Germany. The order is also characteristic of the particular phase of the evolution of the Christian vision in which he stood. To grasp this,
one should note that historically, the Christian vision has evolved and contributed thereby to some of the deepest dynamisms of culture. The history of these dynamics might be analyzed in a number of ways, but once one gets beyond the initial unfolding of the Christian reason in ancient times, a three-fold dialectical division seems particularly relevant.

The first phase (or thesis) is the medieval period, whose thought is typified by the philosophical-theological synthesis of Thomas Aquinas. In the midst of a fractured Europe, he synthesized Platonism and Aristotelianism on the basis of an existential sense of being into an integrated, systematic philosophy which emphasized the unity of all men under God.

The second (or antithetic) phase is the Protestant Reformation in Renaissance times. On the one hand, it emphasized freedom of the will and individuality. On the other hand, it considered human nature to be corrupted by sin, implying thereby a skeptical attitude regarding the ability of man by the power of his natural reason to develop a philosophical knowledge of human nature as a unifying principle for human life. Finally, abandoning philosophy, it based all human learning upon revelation as coming from without, which in turn had the tendency to set the presentation of Christianity against the particular cultures.

The third phase is the Catholic counter-reformation and its more recent Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s. This sought new understanding of the work of God within the dynamisms of human life and attempted to synthesize the ancient traditions of community with the new senses of personal freedom. This was the special effort of the Jesuits, of which Matteo Ricci was a prime representative in China. Typically, he began with the Confucian culture and sought how this might be, not substituted for, but deepened and enriched by Christian philosophy, implying thereby a deep respect both for Chinese culture and for its dynamic openness to progress.

The previous three chapters—the first on the importance of cultural heritage for the dynamism of change in our times, the second on the notion of persona and the third on a new and deeper understanding of the Confucian notion of harmony for a rethinking of all in terms of human freedom—reflect this latter approach. Rather than seeing philosophy as did Hegel, as following upon and correcting our understanding of revelation, it suggests rather the role for philosophy in allowing us to question our traditions (in Gadamer's sense) in order to retrieve and unfold the implications of elements deep within ourselves and our culture.

In this sense, philosophy encounters religion, not as a contrasting doctrine coming from without and alien to the particular cultures, but as their deepest and most dynamic ground, as a leaven for the many cultures as they transform themselves from within. It looks to religion for its capacity to liberate and inspire the work of philosophy based upon the dignity of the human person and the meaning of nature and of human life. Such a philosophy is inevitably facilitated and inspired contextually by religion, whether revealed or natural, as a major factor in the process by which a people has shaped its culture; but as philosophy, it remains a work of natural reasons which does not require or depend upon a particular faith commitment.

This raises, in turn, the question of the role of the philosopher. In the Biblical tradition, there is a sense of God's supreme love guiding his people and drawing them to himself. Reconciling this with human responsibility required much patient philosophical reflection. It was in proclaiming and clarifying this relation of God to his people that the figures of the prophets, Christ, the saints and the church as a community emerged in their full stature. In the Confucian perspective, the relation of heaven to the people would seem first to have been personal (Shan-di or "Lord on High"), and later to have become more diffused as tien. In this context, the sage appears as mediating between mankind and heaven to the degree that he comes from the people and, by his life, is assimilated to heaven. This relation of sagehood to sanctity is an important issue for
investigation; it is the essence of the role of the philosopher in both the Confucian and the Christian traditions.

This sets a pattern for the more delicate and sensitive relation of participation between the transcendent One and the multiple limited beings. The term "transcendence" can be diversely employed. It can be taken to mean going beyond one's present level of perfection and, hence, self-improvement; at times this is referred to as inner transcendence. Taken as an ethic, it can raise a high ideal of human perfection, inspire sacrifice and promote harmony and peace with nature and all mankind.

However, there can be difficulties, indeed megatragedies, when an ethic is made into metaphysics and must assume the burden of answering the foundational questions of being and meaning. This was the case when Dewey's ethics of progress was transformed into a metaphysics. ‘Pragma' became pragmatism without restraints or orientation: all became acceptable in the name of progress which, being undeterminable, could be used to justify everything that people had the power to do. A similar critique is made in a recent study of Ernst Cassirer whose effort to avoid metaphysics in his philosophy of symbolic forms left him without the possibility of rationally condemning the Nazism he abhorred as anything more than a negative phase of the ongoing process of human development.

This points toward the need for the deeper sense of inner transcendence as is found in Indian thought, in which one's phenomenal and changing self bespeaks one's permanent identity or self (atman) which, as openness to being, leads one to the Absolute Self (Brahman). The ways of understanding this relation between ourselves (atman) and the Self (Brahman), in this inner direction, is the central point of differentiation between the Hindu systems of metaphysics. In the Advaitan philosophy of Shankara, one comes finally to the awareness that what is really real is the absolute Self or Brahman and that all else is an illusion. Other schools, such as that of Ramanuja, would see sufficient distinctiveness on the part of the self (atman) to be an attribute of the Self (Brahman); still other schools, such as that of Mahdva, would see a substantial difference between the human and divine selves.

This philosophical pattern could be of special interest to Chinese philosophers for, through Buddhism, which arose as a Hindu Reformation, these explorations into the ground of the human self can be related genetically to the shaping of the Chinese tradition. More interestingly, they may suggest a possible evolution for the Confucian sense of inner transcendence beyond self-perfection of the finite self to the Absolute Self. The Hindu thinkers look within man, not for what is reductively human, but for what is infinitely greater than the individual human self. This is discovered by an interior route and in most schools is not substantially distinct from the human self. (Of course, the Advaitan tendency--in contrast to all other philosophical schools--finally, to dismiss the human self as illusion is quite contrary to Confucianism which, in its turn, could help the Advaitin to a stronger sense of human reality.)

Nonetheless, there may remain here a certain inconvenience. In Japan, in the period of the Shogunate and the Meiji, the Confucian focus upon human relations seems to have left it susceptible to being employed for political manipulation. Thus, inner transcendence, even when taken in the Hindu sense of the Absolute inner reality of the Self or Brahman, may not provide sufficient grounding for the sense of human individuality, independence, and autonomy, to protect persons from political manipulation and control for purposes less than noble. This is especially true when the position of the ruler is developed in terms of abstract modern rationality with technical structures which ignore what is properly personal.
This suggests that, in order for the sense of harmony to unleash its potential, creative freedom requires as source and goal, foundation and norm, inspiration and fulfillment, an unlimited context of being that is an outer transcendence quite beyond what man is or can become. This raises, in turn, a number of issues, namely:

(1) what kind of thinking does such an investigation require?
(2) what can be known in this regard?
(3) will an outer Transcendent disrupt human harmony or produce a mega-harmony?
(4) what role can religious revelation play with regard to philosophy? and
(5) how does this transform our understanding of the meaning of being and the harmony of life?

**Transcendence in Pre-Philosophical Thinking**

It would be a mistake, however, to look to religion and its sense of outer transcendence as implying that the divine is outside, over and above or alien to the world and its cultures. From earliest times human thought always had a sacred center.

It is possible to track the evolution of this awareness by relating it to the three dimensions of the human mind. The first dimension is the external senses of sight, touch and the like, by which one receives information from the external world. The second is the internal senses of imagination and memory by which one assembles the received data in a manner which enables it to represent the original whole from which the various senses drew their specific details, to rearrange these and other data in various combinations, or to recall it at a later time. Finally, beyond both of these dimensions of the senses is the intellect by which one knows the nature of things and judges regarding their existence. It was according to this threefold structure that Descartes proceeded step by step to place under doubt all that arises from a source of knowledge once a reason for doubt could be identified and until knowledge from that source could be certified as true.

Aristotle’s dictum regarding humans as physical and spiritual held that there is nothing in the intellect which is not first in the senses. Not surprisingly, upon examination it appears that the actual evolution of man's awareness of the sacred follows this sequence of his natural capacities for knowledge. In all cases, it is intellectual knowledge that is in play, but this is facilitated and articulated successively, first in terms of the external senses in the totemic stage, then in terms of the internal sense in the mythic period and, finally, in properly intellectual terms as the origin of philosophy or science. Indeed, one might define philosophy and science precisely as knowledge of the various aspects of reality in terms proper to human reason and, hence, proper to themselves.

To follow this evolution, it should be noted that, for life in any human society as a grouping of persons, a first and basic necessity is an understanding of oneself and of one’s relation to others. It should not be thought that these are necessarily two questions rather than one. They will be diversely formalized in the history of philosophy, but prior to any such formalization, indeed, prior even to the capacity to formalize this as a speculative problem, some mode of lived empathy rather than antipathy must be possible. If, as Plato would later work out in detail, the unity of the multiple is possible only on the basis of something that is one, then the unity of social life will require that there be present in the awareness of the early peoples and according to their mode of awareness something that is one in terms of which all are related.
**Totemic Thought.** In the earliest form of thought and society this understanding by people of themselves and their unity with others was carried out in terms of a natural reality, such as an animal or bird, able to be perceived by them through their external senses. These peoples spoke of themselves by simple identity with the animal or bird which was the totem of their clan.

Levy-Bruhl expresses this in a law of participation. It expressed a discovery which his own positivist philosophy was unable to assimilate, namely, that in the primitive or foundational mode of thinking of the earliest peoples their root identity was that of the totem. It was not that such persons saw themselves as in some manner like, or as descendent from, their totem, e.g., lion; instead, they said directly: "I am lion." It was in these terms that they founded their identity and dignity, considered themselves bound to all others who had the same totem, and understood by analogy of their totem with that of other tribes the relations between their two peoples for marriage and the like.

The totem was, of course, not simply one animal among others. It was in a sense limitless in that no matter how many persons were born to the tribe its potentialities were never exhausted. Further, it was shown special respect, such as not being sold, used for food or other utilitarian purposes which would make it subservient to the individual members of the tribe or clan. And, whereas other things might be said to be possessed, the totem was the subject of predication by direct identity: one might say that he had a horse or other animal, but only of the totem would one say that he is e.g., horse or lion. This was the sacred center of individual and community life in terms of which all had meaning and cohesion. It made possible the sense of personal dignity and the interpersonal relations which were the most important aspects of human life and did so with a sense of direct immediacy that would be echoed, but could never be repeated, in subsequent stages of thought.

**Mythic Thought.** Though the totem was able to provide for unity and meaning while the life of all members of the tribe remained similar, its manner of expressing unity became insufficient as society became more specialized and differentiated. Then the bonds between members of the tribe came to depend not merely upon similarity and sameness, but upon the differentiated capabilities of, e.g., hunters, fishers and, eventually, farmers. At that point, with the ability to look upon others as both united and differentiated and distinct, came an appreciation of the special distinctiveness of the sacred center as above the many individuals of which it was the principle and center. What in totemic thought had previously been stated simply by identity could now be appreciated as greater than and transcending the members of the tribe. This is reflected in the development of priesthoods, rituals and symbols to reflect what was no longer seen simply as one's deepest identity.

Such a reality could no longer be stated in terms immediately present to the external senses, but rather was figured by the imagination in terms drawn originally from the senses, but now redrawn in forms that expressed life that was above men and stood as the principle of their life. Such higher principles, as the more knowing and having a greater power of will, would be personal; as transcendent persons they would be gods. It would seem incorrect to consider this, as did Freud and Marx, to be simply a projection of human characteristics. On the contrary, the development of the ability to think in terms shaped by the imagination released the appreciation of the principle of human life from the limitations of animals, birds and other natural entities available to the external senses and allowed the real transcendence of the principle of unity to be expressed in a more effective manner. This did not create transcendence, but allowed it to be expressed in a more effective manner.
But expression in terms of the forms available to the internal sense of imagination had its temptations; these limitations were pointed out by Xenophanes. He noted that by the time of Homer and Hesiod a perfervid imagination had gone from expressing the transcendence of the gods to attributing to them, as well, the many forms of evil found among men. These principles of meaning and value thus pointed as well to their opposites. Thinking in terms of the imagination was no longer sufficient; the intellect needed to proceed in its own terms in order to enable the true sense of the gods as well as of nature to be expressed and defended against confusion and corruption. As the intellect proceeded to operate in properly intellectual terms rather than in terms of the images of mythic thinking, science and philosophy emerged to replace myth as the basic mode of human understanding.

Paul Tillich points out that the mythic mode of thinking never completely disappeared and that its contribution of imagery and its evocation of responses from all dimensions of the human personality remain essential components of human awareness. No ethical treatise will ever equal the power and penetration of the *Iliad* or the plays of Sophocles in penetrating the human condition. But once the intellect was able to conceptualize things in their own terms, rather than in terms of anthropomorphic gods, mythic thinking would no longer be taken as the literal truth. It became what Tillich would call "broken myth", in the sense that it helps and enriches human awareness and response without being the sole or basic mode in which all is appreciated.

**Opening the Metaphysical Dimension of Philosophical Thought**

At this point, the way is opened for philosophy, and, in its terms, spectacularly rapid progress was made. Within but a few generations, the human intellect had worked out a structure of the physical world using basic categories of hot and cold, wet and dry available to the external senses, along with mechanisms of vortex motion pp. 22-28. Mathematical reason worked with the internal senses to lay down the basic theorems of geometry. In brief, by developing properly intellectual terms, the Greeks had revised and perfected the thought processes of the totemic and mythic ages, elaborating with new and hitherto unknown precision insights regarding physical reality. But that had never been the root human issue. Totemic and mythic thought were not merely ways of understanding and working with nature, although they did that as well. The fundamental issue was rather what it meant to be, what life was based upon, and in what terms it should be lived. After the work of others in conceptualizing the physical and mathematical orders, Parmenides was able to take up the most basic questions of life and being in the properly intellectual terms of metaphysics.

When the procedure for this 'opening the mind' came later to be reflected upon and made explicit, it would become clear that the procedure for achieving this all inclusive vision must itself be unique. In particular, it could not be accomplished by abstraction which omits the differences in order to broaden the range of applicability of a notion, for omitting reality in order to open to all that is real would be self defeating. Hence, Thomas Aquinas concluded that the approach to metaphysics must not be by abstraction as in the other sciences, but by a judgment concerned directly, not with form or essence, but with existence, that is with the simple affirmation or assertion of reality. As a result the notion of being is not univocal and delimited as would be the case were it form-standing in contrast to all other forms, but analogous or open to affirming in positive terms the full range of being, namely, whatever is and in whatever way it is.

Further, the form of the judgment is negative, setting aside whatever might restrict or limit that affirmation. It states that being with which metaphysics is concerned is not limited to those
things which are of a changing or material nature and perceived by the intellect working in conjunction with the senses. Because not all reality is material, to be real does not as such imply to be material: being as being, or that according to which it is or is being, is then not material or changing.

This judgment is negative; it does not question the reality of the material order, but negates only the limitation of being to that one type of being, namely, to material being. By this type of judgment, being, as the subject of the science of metaphysics, is liberated in principle from restriction to a particular kind or kinds of differentiated existence. It is opened to any being and every aspect of being, to whatever might prove either to characterize or to be required by being precisely as being. With this as its subject, the science of metaphysics will be a systematic process without shackles, accountable before Parmenides’ principle of contradiction never to reduce being to nonbeing or nothing, and in positive terms open to every evidence of being, whether conditioned or Absolute.

Working out an adequate method for metaphysics took a millennium and a half; but from the beginning, beyond the notions of hot and cold, even and uneven, Parmenides recognized this issue of reality itself, or what it meant to be, and undertook to begin its investigation. How could this be understood? First, he bound the work of the intellect directly to being: "It is the same thing to think and to be" (fragment 3). Hence, the requirements of thinking would manifest those of being. Second, he contrasted being with its opposite nonbeing as something to nothing at all (fragment 2). This principle of non-contradiction was a construct of the mind; like pi in geometry, it was something that is good to think with, for it enabled the mind, in reflecting upon being, to identify its requirements and avoid anything that would undermine its reality.

The proemium of Parmenides’ famous poem had described a scene in which he was awakened by the goddesses and sent in a chariot drawn by a faithful mare along the arching highway that spans all things. In this process he moved from obscurity to light, from opinion to truth. When at last he arrived there, the gates were opened by the goddess justice as guardian of true judgments, and he was directed to examine all things in order to discern the truth.

Parmenides then images himself proceeding along the highway until he comes to a fork in the road with one signpost pointing the way toward being as reality whose nature is precisely that of beginning, i.e., no such reality would be eternal, all would be of the type what at some point begins. Here, Parmenides must reason regarding the implications of such a route. "To begin" means to move from nonbeing or from nothingness to being. Hence, if "to be" meant essentially "to begin", being would include within its very essence nonbeing or nothingness. In that case, there would then be no difference between being and nothing; being would be without meaning; and the real would be nothing at all. (Conversely, when nonbeing is removed from this notion, no sense of beginning remains and it becomes clear that at the fork in the road, the path of being is not that whose sign reads "beginning" but rather the other path which is that of the eternal.) This, then, is a first requirement of being: having excluded at the fork the possibility of taking the path fork which led to being as essentially beginning is excluded; being is seen to be eternal and the chariot moves on along the highway of being.

The procedure is analogous at the two subsequent forks in the road where the signposts point to being as changing or multiple. Each of these, Parmenides’ reasons, would include nonbeing within being, thereby destroying the character of being. Nonbeing is contained in the notion of change, inasmuch as a changing being is no longer what it had been and not yet what it will become. When, however, one removes that nonbeing being emerges as unchanging. Similarly, nonbeing is essential to the notion of multiplicity, inasmuch as this requires that one being not be
the other. When, however, that nonbeing is removed what emerges is one. These then are the characteristics of being: infinite and eternal, unchanging and one.

Such being transcends the multiple and changing world in which we live and is realized in a manner more perfect than could be appreciated in the graphic terms of the internal senses of imagination which defined the nature of man's capabilities in the stage of myth.

In this way, Parmenides discerned the necessity of Absolute, eternal and unchanging being, whatever be said of anything else. Neither being nor thought makes sense if being is the same as nonbeing, for then to do, say or be anything would be the same as not doing, not saying or not being. But as the real is irreducible to nothing and being is irreducible to nonbeing, (as it must be if there is any thing or any meaning whatsoever,) then being must have about it the self-sufficiency expressed by Parmenides' notion of the absolute One.

One can refuse to look at this issue and focus upon particular aspects of limited realities. But if one confronts the issue of being it leads to the Self-sufficient Being which as the creative source of all else, without which all limited beings would be radically compromised—not least, man himself. It is not surprising, therefore, that Aristotle would soon conclude his search for the nature of being in his *Metaphysics* with a description of divine life.

The issue then is not how the notion of the divine entered human thought; it has always been there, for, without that which is one and absolute in the sense of self-sufficient, man and nature would be at odds, and mankind would lack social cohesion. Indeed, thinking would be the same as not thinking, just as being would be the same as nonbeing. The real issue, then is how effectively to assure the openness of the methods of philosophical thought to the full range of reality, including its divine source and goal, and to implement the search for meaning in a way that enables a vigorous itinerary of the human heart and, hence, enlivens temporal life.

Simplicius and others concluded from the first half of Parmenides' poem that there could be but one absolute being, but this does not fit well with the second, longer half of the Parmenides' poem, which treats at great length the many changing beings of our universe. Hence, it would appear to be a more correct reading of his mind to say that being requires the one infinite unchanging and eternal Being, i.e., an Absolute transcending the world of multiple and changing beings, and on which the universe of changing reality depends. How this universe is related to the One is not worked out by Parmenides, but it could be expected that whoever did work out this relation of the many to the One would be the father of the Greek, and, hence, of the Western, philosophical tradition. In fact, this proved to be Plato.

For this relation, Plato developed the notion of participation. This operates on all levels because it is the mode of being itself. In logic, multiplicity requires that the many not be unrelated to each other, for then they could not be gathered in any set as multiple units. In nature, the multiple instances of any one type required the supereminent reality of the perfection according to which the many instances were similar or one. On the metaphysical level, this same dynamic required that, at the summit of all reality, there be the self-sufficient and infinite One or Good in which all things share or participate for their being, identity and goodness.

This notion of participation according to which the many derived their being from the One which they manifest and toward which they are oriented and directed would subsequently provide the basic model for "outer" transcendence and the relation of creatures to God. In Plato's thought, however, the order of forms was relatively passive, rather than active. Hence, the supreme One or Good was the passive object of contemplation for the highest soul which was conscious and active. Most scholars, therefore, consider the highest Soul in Plato's thought rather than the highest One, to correspond to the notion of God.
This was reversed in the thought of Aristotle. His philosophy began with the changing beings available to the senses and discovered that such being must be composed of the principles of form as act and matter as potency. As a result, his sense of being was axised upon form as a principle of act in the process of change as active transformation. Consequently, when in his *Metaphysics* he undertook the search for the nature of being, which he rightly sought in the notion of substance, he tracked this from second substances as natures in the mind to first substances as the higher modes of being because they exist in themselves, and arrived inevitably at the highest act, the knowing on knowing itself (*noesis noeseos*), which he referred to as life divine. This is the culmination of his philosophy because it brings him to the very heart of the whole order of being and, hence, of reality itself. Joseph Owens would conclude from his investigation of being as the subject of Aristotle's metaphysics that this was primarily the one Absolute Being and was extended to all things by a *pros hen* analogy; that is, all things are beings precisely the extent that they stand in relation to the Absolute One which transcends all else.

**Transcendence and Participation in the Christian Philosophy of Existence**

What would be the effect of a revealed religion based upon the manifestation of the divine mind to that of man? To examine this, we will look for the effect of Christianity upon the development of the Greek sense of being and to the consequent enrichment with which the resulting notion of the "outer" transcendent endowed the meaning of life.

Here, it is important to note that, although Greek philosophy grew out of an intensive mythic sense of life in which all was a reflection of the will of the gods, nonetheless, it presupposed matter always to have existed. As a result, the focus of its attention and concerns was upon the forms by which matter was determined to be of one type rather than another. For Aristotle, physical or material things in the process of change from one form to another were the most manifest realities and his philosophizing began from that. This approach to philosophy through sense encounter with physical beings corresponds especially to our human nature as mind and body and could extend to the recognition of divine life. But the sense of reality needed considerable enrichment in order adequately to bring out the foundational significance for mankind of its grounding in a fully transcendent and infinite Being.

It was here that the development of the Christian context had an especially liberating effect upon philosophy. By applying to the Greek notion of matter, the Judeo-Christian heritage regarding the complete dominion of God over all things, the Christian Church Fathers opened human consciousness to the fact that matter, too, depended for its reality upon God. Thus, before Plotinus, who was the first philosopher to do so, the Fathers already had noted that matter, even when considered eternal, stood also in need of an explanation of its origin.

This enabled philosophical questioning to push beyond the reality of form, nature or kind to that of existence and, hence, radically to deepen its sense of reality. If what must be explained is no longer merely the particular form or type of beings, but the reality of matter as well, then the question becomes not only how things are of this or that kind, but how they exist rather than not exist. Man's awareness of being thus evolved beyond change or form; to be real could be seen to mean to exist and whatever is related thereto. Quite literally, "To be or not to be" had become the question. By the same stroke, our self-awareness and will were deepened dramatically. They no longer were restricted to focusing upon the choice of various external objects and modalities of life in the first sense of circumstantial freedom of self-realization (see chapter III), or even to choosing as one ought after the manner of the acquired freedom of self-perfection set within the
context of being as nature or essence. The sense of freedom now opened by the conscious assumption and affirmation of one's own existence was the natural freedom of self-determination and responsibly for one's very being.

One might follow the progression of this deepening awareness of being by reflection on the experience of being totally absorbed in the particularities of one's job, business, farm or studies—the prices, the colors, the chemicals—and then encountering an imminent danger of death, the loss of a loved one or the birth of a child. At the moment of death as at the moment of birth, the entire atmosphere and range of preoccupations in a hospital room shifts dramatically, being suddenly transformed from tactical adjustments for limited objectives to confronting existence in sorrow or in joy and in terms that plunge to the center of the whole range of meaning. Such was the effect upon philosophy when the awareness of being developed from being merely an affirmation of tian or that kind of reality, to the act of existence rather than non-existence, of human life in all its dimensions and, indeed, of life divine.

Cornelio Fa bro goes further. He suggests that this deepened metaphysical sense of being in the early Christian ages not only opened the possibility for a deeper sense of freedom, but itself was catalyzed by the new sense of freedom proclaimed in the Christian message. That message focused not upon Plato's imagery of the sun at the mouth of the cave from which external enlightenment might be derived, but upon the Son of God, the eternal Word or Logos, through and according to whom all things had received as gift their created existence.

In the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the word was God.
The same was in the beginning with God.
All things were made by him: and without him was made nothing that was made.
In him was life, and the life was the light of men.
And the light shineth in darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it.

That was the true light, which enlighteneth every man that cometh into this world.

As the first to rise to new life in victory over sin, his victory had to be accepted by each person in a radical act of freedom opening oneself to, and affirming the transcending power of, the Creator and Redeemer in one's life. The sacramental symbol of this is not one of mere transformation or improvement, or even of dissolution and reformation, but of resurrection from the waters of death to radically new life. This is the power of being bursting into time.

It directs the mind beyond the ideological poles of species and individual interests, and beyond issues of place, time or any of the scientific categories. It centers, instead, upon the unique reality of the person as a participation in the creative power of God, a being bursting into existence, which is and which cannot be denied; it rejects being considered in any sense as nonbeing, or being treated as anything less than its full reality. It is a self, affirming its own unique actuality and irreducible to any specific group identity. It is an image of God for whom life is sacred and sanctifying, a child of God for whom to be is freely to dispose of the power of new life in brotherhood with Christ and with all mankind.

It took a long time for the implications of this new appreciation of existence and its meaning to germinate and find its proper philosophic articulation. Over a period of many centuries the term `form' was used to express the kind or nature and the new sense of being as existence. As the distinction between the two was gradually clarified, however, proper terminology arose in which
that by which a being is of this or that kind came to be expressed by the term `essence,' while the act of existence, by which a being simply is, was expressed by `existence' (esse).

The notion of an "outer" transcendence, while traceable from Plato, Aristotle and Augustine (and, indeed, to the basic sense of the move from totemic to mythic thought), was developed classically in a systematic manner by Thomas Aquinas, using Plato's notion of participation, in terms of participated and unparticipated being.

In any limited being, its essence or nature constitutes by definition a limited and limiting capacity for existence: by it, the being is capable of this much existence but not more. Such an essence must then be distinct from the existence which, of itself, bespeaks affirmation, not negation and limitation. Such a being, whose nature or essence is not existence but only a capacity for existence, could not of itself or by its own nature justify its possession and exercise of existence. The Parmenidean principle of noncontradiction will not countenance existence coming from non-existence, for then being would be reducible to non-being or nothing. Such beings, then, are dependent precisely for their existence, that is, precisely as beings or existents. This dependence cannot be upon another limited being similarly composed of a distinct essence and existence, for such a being would be equally dependent; the multiplication of such dependencies would multiply, rather than answer, the question how a composite being with a limiting essence has existence. Hence, limited composite beings must depend for their existence upon, or participate in, uncomposite being whose essence or nature, rather than being distinct from and limiting its existence, is identically existence or being itself.

That uncomposite Being is simple, the One par excellence, and is participated in by all multiple and differentiated beings for their existence. The One, however, does not itself participate; it is the unlimited, self-sufficient, eternal and unchanging Being which Parmenides had shown to be the sole requisite for being. In sum, "limited and composite beings are by nature relative to, participating in, and caused by the unique simple and incomposite being which is Absolute, unparticipated and uncaused."

On this insight, Thomas constructed his "five ways," which have remained the classic expression of a posteriori reasoning to the Absolute. Beings manifest to our intellect working through the senses undergo change, stand in a differentiated relation of contrariety to other beings, realize their perfection of being or goodness only to a certain greater or lesser degree and stand in graded and ordered relation to others. This manifests that their being is a composite of their essence, related as potency to their existence as act. This internal composition required that they depend for their existence upon that One which is incomposite and, hence, unchanging, unique, and unlimited; their being is predicated upon the simple Being Itself (Ipsum Esse). This alone is absolute, an outer transcendent. It is distinct from all else which must, however, be related to it or participate in it. Plato had been able to analyze this only externally in terms of the relation of the many to the one and on the basis of formal causality. Thomas, using Aristotle's insight regarding internal structures and the Christian understanding of being as existence, was able to carry out an internal analysis. In its light, the internal structure of existence and essence for multiple beings manifests them to be participations, that is, effects of the active or efficient causality of the unparticipated One.

By means of the above structural and dynamic understanding of participation, Thomas Aquinas was able to philosophize in a systematic manner upon the theme of transcendence and participation. Indeed, in the view of Cornelio Fa bro, L.B. Geiger, Arthur Little and others, this theme constituted the central discovery, the coordinating and fructifying principle, of his entire work. Here, we can identify but a few factors in order to illustrate the contribution of a systematic
philosophy of participation to man's awareness of an outer transcendent and to the sense of life in this world and with others.

It will be noted that, thenceforward, our considerations will proceed in an *a priori*, rather than in the above *a posteriori* manner from effect to cause. Unfortunately, *a priori* has come to suggest arbitrariness. Etymologically, it means proceeding on the basis of that which comes first and is most basic, namely, proceeding from a cause to its effects. The importance of this *a priori* phase for metaphysics cannot be over-emphasized, for only by understanding being on the basis of that which is Self-sufficient or Absolute and transcends all else can we gain basic understanding of being as such and of participating beings. This was seen by Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz, all of whom developed works in metaphysics which proceeded from the absolute to the relative and considered this synthetic procedure to be the proper method for metaphysics.

The realist character of Thomas' thought and his insistence upon the use of a scientific method for metaphysics led him to insist upon building this science around finite being as its subject. Once, however, the cause of that subject—the incomposite or unparticipated being—was discovered all could be seen more deeply and more richly through an awareness of that Absolute on which all depends. In particular, we shall consider the radical totality of the creative act.

First, note must be taken of the extent of the dependence of participated on unparticipated being. A preliminary, but not provisional, instance of great importance for our theme is the dependence of matter which the Greeks had presupposed to be a given—unquestioned and, hence, unexplained. Action consisted in the transformation of matter, that is, in its successive formation according to different forms. This process ultimately came full cycle, simply to begin once again. In this perspective, the individual had no further purpose or meaning than to continue the cycle; nothing was radically new, unique, or personal.

Above, we saw that early Christian thought directed attention to matter and to its origin from God. *A priori* reflection upon this transcendent source and cause of all can provide further understanding. As simple and not composed of a distinct limiting essence and existence, the Absolute Being Itself is existence or being unlimited. For this reason, no other reality can be equally original with it, for that would mean that being would be had only partially by each. In that case, what should be the absolute would in fact be limited, what should be simple would be composite; there would be no absolute. But then, the question concerning the origin of the existence of limited or composite beings would have no answer: not in themselves and not in a simple, absolute and transcendent cause; there would remain only Parmenides' all impossible way of Non-Being or nothingness.

Since, then, nothing can be equally original with the Absolute, all else for their total reality must be a participation in it. Each thing, to the full extent of its being, images in a partial manner the One. Further, as each limited being is in contrast to every other limited being, together they constitute an ever unfolding manifestation of being. Though there are more beings, however, there could never be more or less of being than the unlimited plenitude of the Absolute. (The checks one writes do not add to the money one possesses; still more marvelously, one does not lose the knowledge one shares, but multiplies its instances.) No matter how many participate in the One, it remains ever the Plenitude of Being and is in no sense augmented or diminished. The simple, incomposite being does not depend upon composite beings; composite beings depend upon the incomposite entirely.

This participated and caused character applies to all limited realities and components thereof; hence, it applies also to matter. As a potential principle, its proper reality is that of a relation of potency to form as its act, without which it could have neither meaning nor reality. As a constituent
principle of the essences of physical beings, matter, too, must share in their reality and to that
degree in their creation. Just as there can be no matter existing independently of form, neither can
there be matter which, with that form, does not constitute an essence and participate to the full
extent of its reality in the Absolute.

Thus, the causal activity in participation is a creation from nothing. By this is not meant, of
course, that there is no cause: actively considered participation is causing. What is meant is that
there is involved here only (a) the act which is the Absolute or transcendent and (b) the effect as
depending upon it and by which the transcendent is designated as cause or creator. What is
excluded is any independence or equally original existence of the effect in its totality or in any of
its principles, e.g. matter. The full classical phrase is creation from nothing as regards the effect
and any subject thereof (creatio ex nihilo sui et subjecto). For this reason it can be termed outer
transcendence.

In this total sense, then, the creative source transcends the created in every facet of its being.
Conversely and correlatively, limited beings as participating or sharing with corresponding
completeness all their being in the divine are constituted fully with all the capacities for being and
acting according to the full perfection of their nature. God's power is manifested not in making up
for deficiencies in his creatures, but by the ability of all his creatures to seek indissociably their
perfection and his glory to the full extent of their nature.

Recent phenomenological thought suggests new, less technical and perhaps more available
ways of thinking about how human life must be founded in the Transcendent. Maurice Nedoncelle
notes that our identity and our relatedness to others are not something which we construct, but are
possessed by us from the beginning of our life. All our actions are ours; they pertain to my identity
which I was given and did not make or create.

By reflection, it is possible to trace back the characteristics of my life to gain some sense of
the nature of the giver of that life. First, my life must be not from another individual who is contrary
to me as, e.g., a horse is to a cow, for this could not give me my identity, but only something
distinct and alien to me. Hence, this source of human beings must be not another being of a limited
nature and, hence, contrary to each, but a unique and limitless source able to be the origin of all
individuals. Similarly, as I examine my relationships to others, I find that the deepest and most
humane among them--friendship and marriage, for example--are not limited and measured, but
precisely open beyond place or time, health or economic condition. In contrast to legal agreements,
I make promises to friends which are not conditioned by time, and the commitment in marriage is
specific in its rejections of all limiting conditions: "for richer or poorer, in sickness or health, till
death do us part." This bespeaks a context for our life which transcends all our measurements of
place and time.

Further, as we survey our life we see that it is ever open to new and innovative responses to
others in the most concrete and seemingly repetitive circumstances of our daily life. What we eat
for breakfast and those with whom we eat it may be identical, but breakfast is never the same. Our
life is not lived according to a scientific formula with everlasting sameness, but is endlessly new
and unfolding as we explore together the many ways of being concerned and sorrowful, amazed
and delighted.

This manifests that human life, rather than being lived in terms of the limitations of individual
concrete things or of abstract formulae and laws, is lived in terms of an infinity of being which
transcends us in life and enables us truly to be free and creative. Man is not God but, these
phenomenologists point out, life in its properly human characteristics manifests that it is lived in
an order which derives from, and is directed toward, the living God.
The Mega-Harmony of the Transcendent with All Creation

How should this outer transcendent and absolutely perfect reality be conceived? Were it to stand in opposition to man, were its action to be an intrusion upon human life, were its prerogatives to be at the expense of human perfection, then it would disrupt the Confucian vision of harmony and subvert its philosophy. But is this the case?

What would be the conditions for such a disruptive relationship? It would need to be not that of absolutely perfecting or realizing the human, but of good as totally opposed to a humanity whose very nature had been corrupted and become evil. This view obtained, however, only in the reformation or antithetic phase of Christian theology which saw man not only as fallen but corrupted in his very nature. The Judeo-Christian view, however, is clearly that of man created in the image of God, sharing and manifesting--if in a limited way--the divine perfection: "And God saw all the things that he had made, and they were very good." To speak of man's nature as being corrupt can only be a theological metaphor reflecting the philosophical nominalism of the time which did not admit universals or natures in any case. But in any proper philosophical sense a nature either contains all of its components or simply ceases to be that nature. A 3 which loses one of its units is not a corrupt 3, but no 3 at all--it has become a 2. However weakened by the abuse of sinfulness, like all natures, human nature remains good as a limited way of participating in and manifesting the absolute perfection of God.

The disruptive relationship between outer and inner transcendence, divine grace and self perfection, might also arise not in the nature of man, but in the process of his development if this were to be conceived as other than one process of self-realization. But again, that would appear to be a philosophical impossibility, for how could some alien intrusion be called self-development. In the long Catholic tradition--the Christian thesis and synthesis--just as man's nature is not corrupted but has its perfection as a manner of participation in divine perfection, so is his development and self-perfection. God acts throughout this process: just as in creation his action does not substitute for man's substance, but makes it to be, so in acting in the process of man's perfection he does not substitute for man's activity but capacitates man's work of self-perfection and self-realization.

In brief, God does not subvert human reality as free and self-responsible; indeed, it would be a contradiction if human perfection were not one's own self-perfection. Rather, as the unique and unchanging Absolute Being, he stands definitively against non-being and imperfection, creates man, makes him to be, and enables him to undertake the magnificent process of self-perfection. Life in Him lets man be man indeed.

Our difficulties in seeing this come from our tendency to view God as man and, hence, to introduce two similar operative agents in the one self-realization. It is important that we distinguish the two, that we let God be God. The causality of his infinite nature is the creative action of making me and my activities simply to be, while I, in my limitation, can shape them according to this or that character and relationship. All is from God as first cause or creator; all is also from man as second cause or cause of change. The two are not conflictual, much less are they incompatible; neither substitutes for the other. The late President John F. Kennedy said it well in his inaugural address: "In this world God's work is man's own."

In this way, the Christian vision sees only God as absolutely perfect and, hence, self-sufficient. Man is complete but is not abandoned in his created nature; his nature is to seek his self-realization in a process that echoes the power of the divine. He is made to stand then in his own right by an absolute and self-sufficient power and, thus, must not be manipulated to lesser purposes by any
man or group of men. It is the Transcendent Creator who has made man autonomous and equal to all others. His dignity and rights are firmly founded in this divine origin which they, in turn, reflect. Thereby, they are precious beyond question, and it is the duty of men acting in consort as society to protect that dignity and promote those rights individually and socially.

Christianity goes further still. It does not set man as the ultimate goal in relation to which God is merely source and support; rather God is as well man's ultimate end or goal. Aristotle articulated part of this vision in his treatment of human happiness or fulfillment at the beginning and end of his ethics. Happiness, he said, consists in contemplation as the highest realization of man's highest power (intellect) with regard to the highest reality of life divine. This is not an abandonment, but fulfillment of human life; it is the point at which man lives most fully.

To this, Christianity adds, beyond death, the goal of life with God seen not, as now, indirectly by reasoning from creation, but face to face. This does not negate the natural fulfillment of which Aristotle spoke, but carries it further by grace to an even more perfect knowledge of the Trinitarian essence of divine life. Though this is made possible by a special divine grace, like life itself it cannot be given exteriorly but must be lived by the person, him or herself.

In this context, we see the true character of evil—we let evil be evil. It is not merely an unfortunate flaw in human perfection which man comes to know and bear, but which is nobody else's business. If our life is lived in response to God's love and as a way toward reunion with the Transcendent and personal source and goal of life, to abandon goodness is to reject the divine gift and to refuse the divine rendezvous. It is a personal rejection whose significance goes beyond oneself to our Absolute source and goal. This is the universe of the gentlemen, seen now in terms of what is fitting or ugly in relation not only to man, but to God as well. This does not mean that this is an affair between man and God alone, for as all men are made in God's image, to do evil or refuse good to the least of our brothers is to do so to God himself and vice versa; to disrupt the harmony of community is to disrupt harmony with heaven.

Here, we find the source of the ultimate seriousness of human life: the depth of evil when committed; the urgency of response to need where we can help; and the sublime, indeed divine, beauty of the simplest life lived in harmony with man, nature and God. As above, this Catholic-Christian vision goes beyond, but is not against, the realm of which Confucius spoke. On the contrary it unpacks, gives contextual principles for, and opens the ultimate import of, the sublime sense of the harmony he so richly articulated.

The Catholic-Christian vision can provide as well a rich context for understanding teachings on love and the sublime teaching of Confucius thereupon. It joins the key Confucian principle of respect for one's father with its commandment to love honor and obey father and mother. It holds a graded love with the strongest and most detailed obligations in relation to those to whom we are closest by consanguinity and community. It places upon this a divine seal by adding that one who claims to love God and yet does not love his neighbor is a liar, that one who would bring offerings to the altar but is not reconciled with his brother must first become reconciled with his brother in order to be able to approach the altar of the Lord of Heaven.

In some ways the Catholic-Christian message may even extend and intensify the Confucian vision. For it would speak not only of control, of obedience of wife and children to husband and father, but would enjoin husbands to love their wives. It envisages these relations not merely as obligatory because they are imposed, but as imposed because they are freely and lovingly entered into. They are then not only obligations of justice, but implications of love. Finally, it does not leave all solely as the effect of the fallible will of a father, but puts this in the context of God as Father whose love and justice the human father is to imitate and to whom one has ultimate
allegiance. This could imply even leaving father and mother in order to carry the love they first showed us into a broader service of mankind. Such broadening of horizons relocates the issue of filial and unfilial behaviour in a richer and liberating context in which such aberrations as arbitrariness and self-centeredness on the part of parents can be transcended and the essence of a child's love for them more amply fulfilled in family and in society at large.

As was noted in the Introduction, this work explores the possibility of modernizing the Confucian sense of harmony by not restricting it to merely adhesion of all individuals in a family or society to the will of their one father or governor, but by grounding this relation within a liberating and expanding relation to the Infinite One. Over time, the former more restrictively human perspective would seem to lend itself to being evolved in an autocratic style. Historically this seems indeed to have taken place and could have many particular causes. It seems well established that at times, for reasons of political stability, an autocratic sense of harmony was officially promoted, and, of course, at first blush this seems to be an easier way to run a family or nation. Yet, as most societies do not have so autocratic style, there is reason to ask why this should have happened in the Confucian tradition and how that tradition might be elaborated along less autocratic paths.

Indeed, some would argue that the original sense of Confucius was rather that of a dynamic cohesion of multiple elements into an harmonious whole. If so, this certainly could be revived, but to do so it is important to search for the principles which would found, maintain and protect such an integrative sense of harmony from reductivist tendencies. Here the sense of participation could be particularly helpful. For, to the degree that all were to be conceived simply in terms of human beings without anything transcending the father or governor and without democratic practice, it would fall simply to the will power of father or governor to establish order and all would veer toward autocracy. To avoid this and enable all to tend freely toward what is perfective of them, both individually and as a social whole, it is important that they be able to conceive their life in relation to an open and unlimited Transcendent being which is source and goal of all by which all are united, enlivened and cohesive in the exercise of that freedom. This would provide the key to a transition to democratic modes of life and would enable the Confucian sense of harmony already present to become the dynamic basis for civic responsibility and social cohesion.

Before moving to the impact of this for the very notion of being and, hence, of life and meaning, let us reflect for a moment on the dynamics at play in this impact of the Christian-Catholic vision upon philosophy. We must first ask whether, when situated within a cultural context grounded in a revealed vision, philosophy, as knowledge gained by the natural light of reason, ceases to exist, being transformed into a theology based upon revelation? Certainly, that which involves formally the mysteries of the Trinity and the plan of Redemption in Christ can be known only by revelation and is therefore, a matter of theology. Today, however, as seen in chapter I, we are more conscious of the significance of the cultural and social context within which thought takes place. One who is raised in a loving and generous family will be more able and more liable to reflect love and generosity in his interpretation and response to life, just as one who lives in a more calculating, manipulative and exploitive environment is less likely to factor into his thinking these elements of love and generosity. Today, we recognize that, like economics and even mathematics, philosophy is created by persons and peoples living in place and time, is stimulated by their physical and social circumstances, and reflects the deepest personal experiences and free commitments of their people.

The sense of meaning experienced through the ages and articulated in the myths had provided Plato with content for his ideas; by his dialogical method, he sorted out this meaning rather than
creating it. Similarly, in philosophizing, the Christian thinkers returned to Platonic and Aristotelian themes with a new heart and mind, sensitized by their new redemptive and Trinitarian experience. The result was an inversion of the Aristotelian perspective, even by those who would be most Aristotelian in the technical implementation of their philosophy. For Aristotle, the point of initiation of knowledge was the senses, and his philosophy arose through his physics. It was built upon the requirements and implications of matter and change in the physical order. Man was seen to transcend the material, but was defined in relation to the physical order especially as care-taker of nature.

In contrast, the Trinitarian Catholic-Christian sense of what it meant to be corresponded rather to the \textit{noesis noeseos} or Life Divine to which Aristotle concluded at the very end of his \textit{Metaphysics}. Indeed, he did not hesitate to call his metaphysics a theology, both because it alone treated God among its objects and because it was the type of knowledge of all things which befitted God above all others. In this light, it might be said that the distinctive Christian metaphysical sense, as also the Hindu metaphysics of the \textit{Vedanta Sutras}, reflects the point at which Aristotle concluded, namely, the outer Transcendent or Absolute, Brahman, from which, in which and into which all is or exists.

\textbf{Transcendence, Being and the Meaning of Life}

In this light, being is primarily and in principle not multiple, limited and changing, but One, unlimited and eternal; not material and potential, but spirit and fullness of Life; not obscure and obdurate, but Light and Truth; not inert and subject to external movers, but creative Goodness, Freedom and Love. This was the foundational Christian sense of being; the work of reason carried out by philosophy in its light would be sensitized to look--always by natural reason--for the reflections of this in human experience; its sense of person and community would be correspondingly enlivened.

Nor were these notions entirely strange to philosophy. As was seen above, Parmenides created metaphysics as a science in terms of Being as One. Aristotle's metaphysics not only culminated in divine life, but understood being entirely as a \textit{pros hen} analogy or relation thereto. He gel would see theology as a symbolic form of philosophical truths.

But religion is a human virtue, a mode of human action which, in its imaginative forms, conceives, unfolds, lives and celebrates the sense of life and meaning. Kant's thought, as described in the third chapter, provides a place for this at the very center of human freedom and, hence, of human life. Christ, like Confucius, laid down concrete patterns in which this has been lived and experienced by peoples through the centuries. They are the classical instances of the traditions in which we are born and from which we receive our trove of self-understanding and sensibility to others, our ability to conceive our world and to communicate with others in love and concern.

If then, philosophy in the Christian context looks not to the material order, but to the divine as its paradigm of reality, to unpack the effect of the Christian sense of transcendence upon philosophy we would do well to examine more closely the distinctive characteristics of its divine paradigm. This suggests the need to examine serially the enrichment that the Christian notion of the Trinity brings to the philosophical sense of being articulated according to its properties of one, true and good, to which the Christian mysteries provide a corresponding absolute and living person as source and goal.

For the Graeco-Christian philosophical tradition the inner properties of being as such are unity, truth and goodness; for Hindu philosophy, the characteristics of the Absolute are expressed
in the correspondingly and explicitly living terms of existence (*sat*), consciousness (*cit*) and bliss (*ananda*). For the Christian, these are not simply characteristics of the divine, but persons related as Father, Son (Word) and Holy Spirit. To gain insight, then, into the impact of the Christian sense of the Transcendent upon the root sense of Being and the metaphysics of freedom, we shall look first to the richness of the unity of being as this appears to human reason in the Christian cultural context of the outer Transcendent as Father, or its Hindu correlative, Existence (*sat*). Next, we shall look for the meaning of truth when considered by natural reason in cultures marked by a sense of the Divine Word or Logos and the Transcendent as consciousness (*cit*). Finally, and especially in the last chapter, we will look to the sense of goodness when seen in the context of the Spirit of love proceeding from the Father and Son and as articulated in Hindu thought simply as bliss (*ananda*).

Our goal here will not be to define these as properties of being, or *a fortiori* to develop a theology of the Trinity. It will be rather to sample some of the ways in which the Christian cultural context has made possible an enrichment and deepening of the properly philosophical insight into the properties of being and, hence, into the meaning of being both as lived by oneself and in itself. Further, because this religious vision of the Transcendent has been at the center of a people's self-understanding as they have faced the problems of living together in society, it relates as well to the meaning of the person in society and of the modes in which persons live together in freedom.

Unity

From the very beginnings of Greek philosophy, unity was recognized by the first metaphysician, Parmenides, as a first characteristic of being. In his poem, he reasoned that in order to stand against the nonbeing or negation implied in the notions of beginning, limitation or multiplicity, that is, in order simply to be rather than not be, being as such—and, hence, Being Itself—had to be one, eternal and unchanging. Practically all religions recognize these characteristics as belonging to the divine. With Parmenides, they recognize that what is problematic is not how God can be. For being does exist and in the final analysis must be self-sufficient, because by definition there is no other reality or being upon which it could depend. What is problematic is rather how it is possible for finite or multiple beings to exist?

Since finite or limited beings do, in fact, exist, their reality must be a participation in the infinite, eternal and unchanging One, the "external" transcendent, which they reflect in every facet of their being. It is as sharing in this absolute nature that limited beings are not mere functions of other realities, but subsist in their own right: the creator, in making them to be as participations in Himself, makes them to stand in—if not by—themselves, to have a proper identity which is unique and irreducible. This is the foundation of Boethius' classical definition of the person as a *subject* of a rational nature. Inasmuch as they reflect the divine, such beings are unique and unable to be assumed by some larger entity—even by the divine. Because they reflect the Absolute and Transcendent, they exist in their own right.

At the same time, because all limited beings are made to be by the same unique Transcendent Being, their foundational existence-in-themselves, rather than alienating them one from another, makes them to be related one to another by the very fact of their participated individual uniqueness. If to be is to exist in myself as a creature of God, it is thereby to be foundationally related both to Him and to all manifestations of His being. Seen in the light of the Transcendent, being, or "to be", is to be radically myself, irreducible to nonbeing whether in the form of any reduction in my own being, subjection to another or merger into a mere member of a group. But, by the very same
participation in the One divine source and goal of all, to be myself is equally and indissociably to
be related to others. One is not compromised, but enhanced by the other in such wise that I achieve
my highest identity in loving service of others in need.

This, in turn, founds the harmony of nature. It is the reason also, why living in harmony with
nature and other persons is living fully. Within this harmony it implies, as Jefferson wrote in the
"Declaration of Independence," that all men are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
rights, among which are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. The task of the social order is
not to diminish this or even to grant it, but to recognize, protect and promote it.

Truth

Truth unfolds the unity of being to a still greater degree. Unfortunately, too often unity has
been seen in terms that are static, reductionist and even commercial. Property, for example, has
been looked upon as the right to withhold possessions. Rights have been seen as license to turn
inward along the lines of the all-consuming orientation of freedom-as-choice described above. In
that light, my being comes to be looked upon as a possession to be acquired and conserved or,
worse still, to be bartered for something of equal quantity or quality.

Were the sense of reality essentially material, the paradigm would be that of blind and
senseless atoms colliding randomly and chaotically one with another. Then, the laws of
conservation of energy and commercial exchange would dictate that we guard what we have, share
it only when we can get equal return and exploit others to the degree possible. In this case, Hobbes'
description of man as wolf to man and as short, brutish and mean would not be far from the mark.

In contrast, in the context of a culture marked by a sense of outer Transcendence, it is quite
the opposite. The original and originating instance is being as pure knowledge or, better yet, truth.
As imminently one and simple, there is not in us so much division as there is unity between our
capabilities and their actuation, between our minds and the ideals they generate. Instead, all is one:
the infinite capacity is fully actual, the infinite power to know is one with its ideas or insights, the
infinite knower is identically the known, i.e., infinite being: in a word, subject and object, mental
capacity and mental output are identically the one act of being. Such "outer" Transcendent is not
only all-knowing but wisdom or knowledge itself, and, to the degree that knowledge implies a
process of achievement or a grasp of something other, it would be more appropriate to speak not
of infinite knowledge but of truth that is all-perfect or Truth Itself. Being is Truth in its prime
instance, and, hence, also in each of its participations to the very degree that they participate in the
One, which is to say, to the full extent of their being.

Being and life are not, then, dark and hidden, mysterious and foreboding; on the contrary,
what light is to our eye, being is to spirit. Being makes sense to the mind, and, where it is
sufficiently in act, it inevitably "sees" or knows; it is primarily subsistent knowledge and truth, and
by extension the limited participations thereof. Also, as the word is to our tongue, being declares,
expresses and proclaims itself; it is Word or Logos and participations thereof. A Christian culture
is especially sensitive to this, for in Christian teaching the Word of God is a person and personal,
the Son of the God the Father. Through this Word, all things were created. Having become
incarnate in Christ, Jesus would say "He that seeth me seeth the Father also." How can you have
known me and yet say that you do not know the Father who sent me: who spoke me. John, the
author of the fourth gospel, said it classically: "That was the true light, which enlighteneth every
man that cometh into this world."
One cannot overstate the degree which philosophy done in this context is particularly sensitized to the intelligibility or truth of being. Parmenides could say immediately upon initiating metaphysics: "Being is; nonbeing is not" and "It is the same thing to think and to be. All being is open, indeed is openness, to intellect; what is radically closed to mind simply is not and cannot be. In the context of the transcendent Truth itself, this resonates vibrantly in the mind. Philosophy moves confidently--if not always correctly--to overcome obscurity and fear; science races forward, confident that each step of insight constitutes solid progress in mankind's exploration of this universe; problems are not destructive dilemmas and permanent contradictions, but challenges to be solved. The mind thrives in such a contest; the creativity of the human genius is invigorated and moves forward.

There is something else about being in the light of transcendent Truth itself. Truth speaks itself as word; indeed it proclaims itself. To attempt to hide the truth would image Chronos in the ancient Greek myths who attempted to swallow his children rather than allow them to enter into the light. This is contrary to the nature of being and as violent as attempting to force a river to flow upstream; in the long run, it must eventually be unsuccessful. Being is fundamentally truth and, hence, openness, manifestation and communication. This is reality itself and, hence, the key to the self-realization of both individuals and peoples.

In the image of the Son who as Word expresses all that the Father is, and, like Logos as the first principle through whom all is created, being is open, expressive and creative. Just as a musician or poet unfolds the many potential meanings of a single theme, so being as truth unfolds its meaning and communicates itself to others. Here, the human intellect plays an essential role by conceiving new possibilities, planning new structures, and working out new paths for mankind in the pilgrimage of life with others. Justice, too, is implied as true judgments in the public forum about being. Such judgments must honor and express the sacredness of beings in their self-identities and promote their mutuality. This is the role of leadership in family, business and society.

It was the dark plot of Goebbels to harness the new 20th century technology of communication to a restrictive and, hence, false ideology in order to create the modern means for mind control. The philosopher's dream is rather that those means can be engaged by the free and enquiring mind in its fascination with the truth, communication and cooperation. This is the key to the implementation of a modern democratic society.

Goodness

Goodness is the third property of being. In the Christian Trinity this corresponds to the Holy Spirit as the love of Father and Son. In being, it expresses the conjunction and fulfillment of unity and truth in celebration of the perfection of being or, where imperfect, in the search for that perfection or fulfillment. Holiness is precisely this devotedly holding by being to its perfection or goodness.

Further, as Being Itself is absolute and eternally self-sufficient, and, hence, has no need for other beings, it creates not out of need, but out of love freely given. This transforms the understanding of human life, which can now be seen not merely as freedom to choose, to gather and accumulate, or statically to maintain, repeat or conserve, nor even as Kant's freedom as the ability to do as we ought. Rather, it is freedom of self-determination, whereby we can "change our own character creatively by deciding for ourselves what we shall do or should become." As seen in Chapter II, this may be closer to Confucius's original sense of harmony as a dynamic
interrelation of multiple and changing units; if so, it would be also the role of peacemaker in the image of the "Prince of Peace."

Yves Simon summarizes some implications of this for human freedom. He points out that it is based, not in the indeterminism of freedom as mere choice, for that would face the will with the impossible task of deriving something from nothing. Rather, human freedom is the result of a supradeterminism. Because the human intellect and will are open to the infinite One, the original Truth and Good, man in thought and will can respond to any limited participated good whatsoever, but without being necessitated thereby. In this lies the essence of freedom: as liberated from determining powers, whether internal or external, the will is autonomous; at the same time it is positively oriented toward the good and its realization in all circumstances and in limitless ways. This is the positive attraction of beauty and harmony as a vital source for the human creativity of which Confucius spoke and about which Kant wrote in his "Critique of the Aesthetic Judgement."

Still more dynamically, the originating Transcendent Spirit implies for being a sense of transforming, innovating and creating. As radically, His gift, our life must in turn be passed on by sharing it with others in love (see chapter VI). Even death—whether analogously through suffering in the image of the cross or physically at the end of one's days—does not overcome this Spirit of Life, but becomes a way to new life. In his Second Letter to the Corinthians, the Apostle Paul expressed well the combination of irreducible confidence and indomitable hope implied by the sense of life lived in the context of the Absolute and Transcendent.

We have this treasure in earthen vessels, to show that the transcendent power belongs to God and not to us. We are afflicted in every way, but not crushed; perplexed, but not driven to despair; persecuted, but not forsaken; struck down, but not destroyed; always carrying in the body the death of Jesus, so that the life of Jesus may also be manifested in our bodies (II Cor. 4:7-10).

A philosophy of the person as image of this transcendent divine principle, carried out in the cultural context sensitized by the dynamic Trinitarian interrelations of persons, transforms the sense of the person in this world. Man remains part of nature, but rather than being subject thereto as a mere producer or consumer, is a creative and transforming center, responsible for the protection and promotion of nature. Similarly, man is by nature social and a part of society; but rather than being subject thereto as an object, he is its creative center and must be an integral part of all decision making.

As the movements of freedom in this half century reflect the emergence of new understanding of the person and its fuller role in social life, human dignity, equality, and participation in the socio-political process have become central concerns. The search for adequate foundations for democracy and its heightened sense of the dignity of the person generates naturally new interest in religion.

In the image of the Trinity, the three characteristics of being stand out in human life. First, self-affirmation is no longer simply a choice of one or another type of object or action as a means to an end, but a radical self-affirmation of existence within Existence Itself. Second, self-consciousness is no longer simply self-directed after the manner of Aristotle's absolute "knowing on knowing"; rather, the Absolute Truth knows all that it creates as a reflection of its own being, truth and goodness, while the participating instances of self-awareness transcend themselves in relation to others. Finally, this new human freedom is an affirmation of existence as sharing in Love Itself, the creative and ultimately attractive divine life--or in Indian terms, "Bliss" (ananda).
This new sense of being and freedom reflects the meaning of the Transcendent for man and of man in the Transcendent, in the contest of its radical proclamation in the Christian mysteries. Expressing far more than a transition from one life style to another, the new meaning is based in Christ's death and Resurrection to new life. Hence, Christian baptism is a death to the slavery of selfishness and a rebirth to a new life of service and celebration with others. It is a gift or divine grace, but no less a radically free option for life on our part.

This new life of freedom means, of course, combating evil in whatever form: hatred, injustice and prejudice--all are privations of the good that should be. This will be the topic of the next chapter. The focus of being seen in the light of the Transcendent, however, is not upon negations, but upon giving birth to the goodness of being and bringing this to a level of human life marked by an enriched Confucian harmony of beauty and love.
5. Morality and Social Transformation: Harmony, Evil and the Emergence of New Life

In the previous chapter, we saw how the full opening of the Western mind to being came when it surpassed the horizon of change (physics) and the resulting preoccupation with the different types of things, to focus upon the meaning of being or of life itself. To take this as a mere technical adjustment of one's mind set would grandly miss the mark. For, as we began to see in the previous chapter, a new degree of sensibility to being unfolds vast new meaning for human life, which in turn could be expected to have strong reverberations in history.

But might not the converse also be true; namely, could vast historical collisions or repressions enable the mind to open to new dimensions of being and meaning? This is what we will take up in this chapter, shifting from the close reasoning work of classical metaphysics regarding the notion of being, finite and infinite, to the broad flow of human history as a screen on which the dynamics of being can be read, or more properly as a struggle in which the dynamic of being is lived in suffering and triumph.

To do so is also to draw out a new implication of Chapter I regarding cultural tradition. That is, if taken not as dead repetition but as a dynamic process, tradition is not only a context for philosophy but its dynamic process of discovery and implementation. In this light, the philosopher and sage move from remote hermitages in the solitude of nature to the bustling crossroads of the arts and sciences, university and town, nation and world, and, indeed, of this world and the next.

The great challenge to which every philosopher is called to rise is that of relating the seemingly irreconcilable, of healing the ruptures in human life, of opening the present to the future. This task is never accomplished once and for all: if it were, life would no longer be a quest; in our conditions it would be bereft of interest. But the task does change, along with the struggles and the history of the people. For a variety of reasons, some periods are times of great stability or at least of little change. At such times, the role and spirit, if not the horizon, of the philosopher often is restricted to interpreting and explaining social structures and related decisions; discovery and innovation are in danger of being supplanted by ideology; attention shifts from ethics and metaphysics to logic and history.

Long periods of stagnation can so distort human understanding that the trouble they generate creates dynamic tension, which in turn imposes a new and radically pervasive search for meaning from which new insight can emerge. The greater the contraction, the more penetrating and creative the search which follows; the more troubled the times, the more propitious they are for philosophy. Indeed, it is for such times that philosophy is destined, for the very process by which a people emerges from long hibernation requires that they break through artificial external thought boundaries and achieve the vision which can generate new life for their people.

If this be true, then along with contemplating the good, it may be not only practically imperative to acknowledge and adjust to evil, but essential for metaphysics, particularly if metaphysics is not merely a process of constructing theory but the deeply conscious level of life lived with all its vicissitudes and corresponding richness.

This draws us to the burden of this lecture. In chapter I we saw that, rather than ignoring our situatedness in time, hermeneutics shows us how to accept this and grow with it. In chapter II we saw how, rather than reducing the sense of person to the roles one plays, it was crucial to clarify the philosophical principles upon which the dignity of the person is grounded. In chapter III, we
saw how, rather than ignoring freedom in favor of harmony, Kant's reflection on the conditions for freedom pointed the way to its transcendent context. In chapter IV, we saw how recognition of the transcendent, rather than diminishing the meaning of human life and reality, vastly enriched it. In a similar manner, in this lecture we will suggest that, rightly understood, even the acknowledgment of evil in human life, rather than diminishing human meaning, enables man to gauge the true dimensions of the struggle in which he is engaged, the frightening emptiness of the abyss which opens beyond him, and the heroism and triumph of the life well lived.

**Paul Tillich: Life and Times**

The thought of Paul Tillich can help us to see this, for he lived through the period of the two world wars, confronted the depths of evil opened by Hitler's Nazism in his own country and was central to articulating the vision of resurrection and renewal in the period of reconstruction that followed.

While preparing for his doctorate in philosophy (1911) and his licentiate in theology (1912), he drew less upon the continuing body of traditional Protestant thought in the Calvinistic and Lutheran tradition than upon a philosophical combination of ethical humanism and dialectical idealism.

The ethical humanism was that of Ritschl and Troeltsch who had accepted Kant's location of the religious question in the realm of the will and practical reason, rather than in that of the intellect and pure reason. On this basis, religious issues were to be understood according to the religious and ethical personality considered ideal according to the culture of the time.

The dialectical idealism was especially that of F.W. Schelling, whose collected works Tillich early read in their entirety and wrote upon for his philosophy and theology degrees. In their light, he deepened his appreciation of the divine presence in all things in history, which, in turn, the structures of the dialectic enable one to see as the dynamic expression of the divine. This appreciation of the progressive and developing manifestation of the divine in and through culture stood at the center of Tillich's teaching in the philosophy of religion and culture and theology at the Universities of Berlin, Marburg, and Frankfort during the 1920's.

This was, as well, the root of his adherence to religious socialism, according to which the defeat of Germany at the conclusion of the First World War had cleared away all that was opposed to, or substituted for, God. This prepared the *Kairos* or moment of time when the divine would be manifested once again, not now in church, but in the people or proletariat. The weakness of this view lay in its repetition of a well known phenomenon extending back to the Fall of the Angels, namely, the creature's refusal to recognize any source of life beyond itself. Its implicit premise was that man, not God, must save man; a little beyond this lay the definitive temptation, namely, to think that man must become God.

Of course, with such a god, man's life soon sinks to an ever more inhuman condition. Thus, all the high hopes were shattered in the early 1930's as the socialist ideal was concretized in the National Socialism of the Nazi party. Where the nation, the race, the people were put in the place of God, what had been looked to as a new manifestation of the divine became its ultimate denial. In this was echoed the experience repeated through history, namely, that man cannot save man. Inevitably, reductive humanisms, man-made utopias, projects to control human history in terms however scientific enclose and then repress the dynamic openness of human freedom: life turns into death.
As this situation became clear, Paul Tillich could not but strongly reject it in his many public speeches throughout Germany, with the result that he was dismissed from the University of Frankfurt when Hitler came to power. Looking back to that time, Tillich sees the developments which bound together the two World Wars as more than merely personal or even national. They spelled the end of ethical humanism. "Neo-Protestantism is dead in Europe. All groups, whether Lutheran, Reformed, or Barthian, consider the last 200 years of Protestant Theology essentially erroneous. The year 1933 finished the period of theological liberalism stemming from Schleiermacher, Ritschl, and Troeltsch."

In personal terms, this disillusionment led him to consider becoming a Catholic as the only alternative to "national heathenism." Instead, he came under the influence of Karl Barth's neo-orthodoxy because of its affirmation of God as transcendent. For Tillich, however, this did not mean that culture and history were not significant. The devastating history of the first third of this century confirmed for Tillich the acid existential criticism of meaning developed by Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Marx. But whereas his historical dialectic had seen God as manifested positively through history, now, when history comes to appear as meaningless, the contemporary religious problem becomes how God is manifested through and in the very meaninglessness of history itself.

It is a measure of the penetrating character of this reading by Tillich of the religious problem of this century that it proved relevant not only to harsh totalitarianisms of Europe, but to the liberal context of North America as well, where, upon his arrival in 1933, he found an analogous crisis. During the deceptive prosperity of the 1920s, there had been a certain religious parallel to the German situation as the search for God was substituted gradually by the impression that the natural progress of the era itself was God or his definitive manifestation. This was especially marked in the Social Gospel Movement which, under the influence of the pragmatism of the John Dewey, had become a relativistic ethical humanism. It reduced the task of theology to generating convictions which need not be Christian or even concerned with God, as long as they were pragmatically efficient and apologetically defensible. The economic depression in 1929 gave the lie to this direction of religious thought.

It was no longer possible to identify God as the next stage of progress. Rather, God had to be found in the negation of values emanating in ever widening circles from the initial economic collapse. To this, the religious perspective which Tillich had begun to elaborate for Europe proved particularly relevant. The Neo-Naturalists had already begun to recall men from mere humanism to a theocentric philosophy of religion. But, unsatisfied with a God understood as a process wholly immanent in the universe, the evolution which Tillich's thought had recently undergone in Europe allowed him to stress the transcendent character of the divine and the essential implications of this for the reformation and redemption of culture.

**The Philosophical Challenge**

Paul Tillich laid the groundwork for this by recognizing some basic dualities which open the field of discussion. If we are not trapped in a complete solipsism, then, on the level of thought, we must distinguish subject and object, the one who thinks and what is thought about, and, on the level of being, we must distinguish self and world. Neither idealism not materialism have been successful in reducing one to the other; both subject and object must be recognized and the success of a philosophy of life lies in its ability to reconcile the two. The self is indivisible in itself and distinct from all else; it is unique, unrepeatable, irreplaceable and unexchangeable. But if, on the one hand, the self is considered without its polar element of world with which to situate the
individual and orient his life, then all becomes isolated and arbitrary; there can be no meaningful participation of knower and known, and actions become random and willful. If, on the other hand, the social unity is taken as an end in itself without regard for the individual, its goals are eviscerated and it itself becomes vicious. Reconciling both self and world is the key to human success or failure.

The life of philosophy, as of man himself, is the work of identifying these polar elements (thesis), seeing how, by their falling apart, life becomes destructive (antithesis), and how they can be reconciled (synthesis). In religious terms, the thesis is the paradise of basic natures, the antithesis is the Fall into sin and death, the synthesis is resurrection and new life. In terms of metaphysics, the three are successively the stage of essence or nature, of existence, and of their reconciliation in a dynamic harmony of being.

In these terms, Paul Tillich was able to analyze the crisis through which he had passed in Germany and into which he entered in America, and to draw out the characteristics which must pertain to any body of contemporary religious thought. As religious, it would have to understand the presence of God in all things and their relation to Him. In contrast to the naturalists and humanists, his strong appreciation of the need for a transcendent dimension which inspires and empowers man excludes philosophy being an adequate statement of religious thought. If, however, the transcendent be considered an answer, it is the answer to a question constituted by the crisis which is the present existential situation. The analysis of this crisis and the identification of this question of the ultimate is the proper task of philosophy. Theology cannot become imperial, for it exists in a situation of co-relation with philosophy and as the answer to philosophy's most profound questions of being and meaning.

This reflects Tillich's own experience, which was archetypal for that of the 20th century. West and East, people have experienced significant disillusionment with their earlier efforts to create a human paradise. Previous hopes and commitments have been shattered by the course of events; the critiques of Solzhenitsyn strike home both in societies where abundance has generated a hedonism which atrophies the spirit and in societies where inability to produce bespeaks long distortion and suppression of this same spirit. As with Tillich's experience of National Socialism, we face a situation in which the previous contexts of meaning have crumbled. Certainly, this is not the time to attempt to construct a new ideology. Instead, the example of Tillich suggests that we can learn from disillusionment itself as the major experience of the present. By asking what is thereby made manifest to human awareness, we may be able to open to the foundations upon which social life can be reconstructed.

This can be seen also as a matter of transcending the previous human horizons of subject and object. As noted by Kant in his *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, such objective patterns of cause and effect allow for scientific precision and technical manipulation, but once established as a total horizon they become reductionist and repressive of the human spirit. More recent theory shows that, unless this horizon is transcended, any critique merely rearranges the dilemma in a cognitive loop which has no exit. Liberation inevitably becomes oppression once again and man has neither hope nor salvation. What is required is a way of transcending this horizon to a meta-critique which opens a new, deeper and more true way to view life. Tillich's reworking of the dialectic suggests how this can occur and opens a new and liberating insight concerning the ground of being present to our consciousness as our ultimate concern. His dialectic shows how this relates to the experience of meaninglessness and thereby plays a truly redemptive role, enabling mankind once again to be creative in facing the problems of its actual historical circumstances.
Paul Tillich was much concerned with the relation between subject and object both in its contemporary modality and in its fundamental nature. There has been a general consensus that the great tragedy of recent times has been the subjection of man to the objects he produces, reducing him to the state of an impersonal object. Below, we will be able to follow more closely the analysis of this contemporary situation. Tillich sees this as the basic ontological structure of the self-world relation because it is the presupposition of ontological investigation, without itself being able to be deduced from any prior unity. Idealism has been no more successful in deriving the object from the subject than earlier naturalisms had been in reducing the subject to the state of a physical object. The polarity of the self-world or subject-object structure, then, "cannot be derived. It must be accepted."

The polar relation of these elements assumes varied nuances according to the nature of the reality under consideration. This provides a very sensitive norm for evaluating any system of thought, for the strength and weaknesses of a philosophy will appear clearly from the degree of its success in conciliating the twin poles of subject and object in its own area. Tillich applies this norm in the form of the polar notions of individualization and participation to various types of religious thought. Following his evaluation will provide us with insight into the requirements for authentic religion and reveal the way in which he transforms the elements of classical Christian thought in the constructions of his own contemporary religious philosophy.

While neither polar notion can be fully realized without the other, individualization will be analyzed first. This element is implied in the constitution of every being as a self and points to the fact that it is particular and indivisible. As particular, the self maintains an identity separate from all else and opposite to anything to which it might be related. As indivisible it maintains its identity by retaining the integrity of its own self center, much as a mathematical point resists partition. One can hear the traditional definition of the person in these notions, which Tillich does not fail to extend to the temporal order, making self-affirmation something unique, unrepeatable and irreplaceable. The infinite value of every human person is a consequence of this "ontological self-affirmation as an indivisible, unexchangeable self."

While this individuality is an indispensable element in reality, it is a grave error to consider it without its polar element of participation. An exclusive insistence on the particular and unrepeatable brings with it the nominalistic breakdown in the philosophy of essence. This breakdown, in turn, becomes the source of a number of philosophical positions which have greatly influenced religious ideas. Some of the more important nominalist consequences are that "only the individual has ontological reality," that the divine will is random and that finite beings are radically contingent.

For lack of any natural order, the epistemological expression of this nominalistic ontology is referred to by Max Scheler as controlling knowledge, by which the object must be transformed into a completely conditioned and calculable "thing" to be studied with detached analysis by empirical methods. The determination of ethical ends is outside the competency of this knowledge which restricts itself to the consideration of means and receives its ends from such nonrational sources as positive tradition or arbitrary decision. Such nominalistic results derive from the development of individuation without its polar element of participation.

The insufficiency of this thought is realized by Tillich. He considers pure nominalism to be untenable because its radical individualism renders impossible the mutual participation of the knower and the known. Thus, the various forms of liberalism which have emphasized individualization almost exclusively have tended by that very fact to cut themselves off from all meaningful contact with the divine. A mitigated, but none the less dangerous, form of this is to
make of God an object for us as subjects. Though logical predication cannot avoid doing this, it is necessary to reject its implied ontological negation of God's holiness and his reduction to simply an object beside oneself as subject, merely one being among others.

At no time, however, has the exaggerated stress on individualization appeared to be as problematic as in the context of modern meaninglessness after neo-Protestantism. Built upon biblical criticism and the Ritschlian theological synthesis of modern naturalism and historicism, it was shattered in its social foundations by Marx, in its moral grounds by Nietzsche and in its religious basis by Kierkegaard. Social crises of this century shattered even the structures with which man had attempted to reconstruct these foundations.

More than ever, the question became no longer which values are true, but "the whole system of values and meanings in which one lived." The traditional issues of individual sin and forgiveness lost their meaning because the question had become the very possibility of meaning itself. The challenge facing mankind became that of finding the divine through nonbeing in its most radical form, namely, the anxiety of doubt and meaninglessness.

Despite this history of its exaggerations, however, individualization remains indispensable in providing the terms of the relation of man to God. But, in order for this relationship to be positive, the corresponding element of participation must also be present. Participation points to "an element of identity in that which is different or of a togetherness of that which is separated, whether it is the identity of the same enterprise, or the identity of the same universal or of the same whole of which one is a part, in each case participation implies identity."

The task of participation is twofold. First, it gives meaning and content to the individual, keeping it from being an empty form. Further, it is an essential perfection, and, hence, proportionate to the being and its act. Thus, when the individual has the character of a person, participation achieves the perfect form of communion. Second, participation provides the real basis for unity with God by expressing the presence of the divine. No religion can be without this without ceasing to be a religion and being reduced to a secular movement of political, educational or scientific activism, for it is the very relationship to the divine which is expressed by the notion of participation.

Tragically, however, this factor of participation turns into oppression--and this is the burden of the second phase or antithesis in his dialectic--when it is understood entirely in terms of relations between self-centered and limited persons as things. Then the unity between persons can be the product only of the imposition by one person upon another or of some even less personal group or structure. In the personal experience of Tillich, it was precisely National Socialism which had to be transcended, but other forms of forced and unilateral emphasis upon social participation have also marked the 20th century.

The grounds for this tragic polarization of individualization and participation is laid in Tillich's thesis; its tragic mode appears as the antithesis; his synthesis of the two points the way to reconstruction as true resurrection.

**The Thesis**

The original and varied elements which Paul Tillich intends to integrate in his philosophy stand in his thought as does the state of paradise in the biblical creation story. This is taken, however, in a new sense, for "the doctrine of creation is not the story of an event which took place `once upon a time,' but the basic description of the relation between God and the world." This includes what can be known of God, the production of His finite effects ex nihilo, and the response
of man from this situation of meaninglessness. Tillich expresses the dynamic interrelationship of these in terms of an existential dialectic which considers the problems and contradictions of present day existence at a depth at which the ontological principles of essence and existence and the epistemological principles of subject and object can be correlated.

A complete discussion of the relation of essence to existence is identical with the entire theological system. The distinction between essence and existence, which, religiously speaking, is the distinction between the created and the actual world, is the backbone of the whole body of theological thought. It must be elaborated in every part of the theological system.

It was observed at the beginning that Tillich insists on the polarity of subject and object as the point of departure for his analysis of reality because both are presupposed for the ontological question. But, if they provide his point of departure in a first approach to the reality of essence or essence of reality, he leaves no doubt that he shares the modern concern to proceed to a point of identity where the alienation of subject and object is overcome. This is the result of the observation that man has been reduced to the status of a thing by allowing himself to be subjected to the objects he produces. The strongest statement of this situation was made by Nietzsche, but the best may be Marx's description of the reduction of the worker to a commodity. Reality must not be simply identified with objective being, for man must participate in some deeper principle or lose his value and individuality. To identify reality with subjective being or consciousness, however, would be equally insufficient, for the subject is determined by its contrast with object. Consequently, what is sought is a level of reality which is beyond this dichotomy of subject and object, grounding and unifying the value of both.

The need for a point of identity and its function is better appreciated as one proceeds beyond the subject-object relationship to the investigation of either knowledge or being. "This point of procedure in every analysis of experience and every concept of a system of reality must be the point where subject and object are at one and the same place." Thus, the analysis of experience directs one's attention to the logos which is the element of form, of meaning and of structure. In the knowing subject or self, the logos is called subjective reason and makes self a centered structure. Correspondingly, in the known object or world, it is called objective reason and makes world a structured whole.

Though there is nothing beyond the logos structure of being, it is possible to conceive the relation between the rational structures of mind and reality in a number of ways. Four of these possibilities are represented by realism, idealism, pluralism and monism, but what is most striking is that all philosophers have held an identity or at least an analogy between the logos of the mind and that of the world. Successful scientific planning and prediction provide continual pragmatic proof of this identity.

The philosophical mind, however, is not satisfied with the mere affirmation, or even the confirmation of the fact. There arises the problem of why there should be this correspondence of the logos in the subject with that of reality as a whole. This can be solved only if the logos is primarily the structure of the one principle of all, that is, of divine life, as well as the principle of its self-manifestation. Then it is the medium of creation, bridging "between the silent abyss of being and the fullness of concrete individualized, self-related beings." The identity or analogy of the rational structures of mind and of reality will follow from the fact that both have been mediated through the same identical divine logos.
In this way, "reason in both its objective and subjective structures points to something which appears in these structures but which transcends them in power and meaning." Logos becomes the point of identity between God, self and world. Of these three, the logos of God is central and is participated in by self and world as they acquire their being. Thus, the logos of reason gives us a first introduction to the concept Tillich has of God overcoming the separation of subject and object to provide a deeper synthesis of the reality of both.

This conclusion of the analysis of experience has definite implications for an analysis of being, because the identity is not merely an external similarity of two things to a third without a basis in the things themselves. The point of identification of subject and object is the divine, which is found within beings. The term "Being itself" is the only nonsymbolic expression of the divine (though in relation to our consciousness this is termed the ultimate concern). God is within beings as their power of being--as an analytic dimension in the structure of reality. As such, he is the "substance", appearing in every rational structure; the creative "ground" in every rational creation; the "abyss", unable to be exhausted by any creation or totality of creations; the "infinite potentiality of being and meaning", pouring himself into the rational structures of mind and reality to actualize and transform them. God is, then, the ground not only of truth, but of being as well; indeed, the divine is able to be the ground of truth precisely inasmuch as it is the ground of being.

These ideas have a long history in the mind of man. In the distant past the Upanishads viewed the Brahman-atman both cosmically as the all-inclusive, unconditioned ground of the universe from which conditioned beings emanate, and, acosmically, as the reality of which the universe is but an appearance. The absolute is the "not this, not this" (neti), "the Real of the real" (stvasyasatyam). A similar line of thought can be traced through Plato and Augustine to the medieval Franciscans and Nicholas of Cusa. Tillich is fond of relating his thought to these classical sources.

The proximate referent of his thought in positing this ontological principle of identity beyond subject and object is Schelling. At the very first, Schelling agreed with Fichte in making the "Absolute Ego" of consciousness the ultimate principle and reality. It is this consciousness which dialectically "becomes" the world of nature. But, on further consideration, Schelling failed to see the particular connection between the infinite Ego and the finite object. For this reason, he moved the "Absolute Ego" from the conscious side of the dichotomy to a central, neutral position between and prior to both objectivity and subjectivity. Thus, the Absolute is called not "Ego" but "the Unconditional" and "Identity", and the idealism no longer subjective, but ontological. Tillich readily accepted this insight of the early Schelling and, therefore, traced the line of his thought in between, but distinct from both the subjective idealism of Fichte and the objective realism of Hobbes. What is important is that neither side of the polarity be eliminated, both must be maintained. For this, there is required an Unconditional, as the ground equally of subject and object.

Two important specifications must be added to this notion of a divine depth dimension beyond subject and object. One regards the incapacity of limited beings to exhaust or even adequately to represent the divine: this implies the radical uniqueness of the divine. The other concerns the way God is manifested in the essence of finite beings: this points to the way they participate in the divine.

The first of these specifications, which Tillich is careful to make concerning this point of identity of subject and object, is that it cannot be grasped exhaustively by mind nor replicated completely by things, that is, that it is gnostically incomprehensible and ontologically inexhaustible, the former reflecting the latter. "This power of being is the prius which precedes all
special contents logically and ontologically." It is not even identified with the totality of things. For this reason, the divine is termed the "abyss", because it cannot be exhausted in any creation or totality of creations.

Human intuition of the divine always has distinguished between the abyss of the divine (the element of power) and the fullness of its content (the element of meaning), between the divine depth and the divine logos. The first principle is the basis of Godhead, that which makes God. It is the root of his majesty, the unapproachable intensity of his being, the inexhaustible ground of being in which everything has its origin. It is the power of being infinitely resisting nonbeing, giving the power of being to everything that is.

This position of the divine as the inexhaustible depth dimension of reality is the basis of the distinction and individualization of God in relation to creatures. As infinite being and truth, the divine is beyond the separation of subject and object, self and world, and makes possible, in principle, a deeper realization of both. In the realm of being, it implies what Tillich calls the Protestant principle, namely, the protest against any thing being raised to the position of the divine. In his own experience, it extended particularly to the state, for he had to extricate himself from the terrible power of national socialism's claim to a totalism which by definition left no room for human freedom. This protest extends as well to any creation of the church, including the biblical writings which must not be identified with the divine ground in any way. No bearer of the holy may be permitted to claim absolute status for itself.

In the order of knowledge, the inexhaustible character of the divine implies that, if man is to proceed beyond finite realities to an awareness of what is truly divine, he must leave behind the rational categories of technical reason, for such categories limit the infinite. They make God an object, "a" being among others, rather than Being Itself. For this reason, God cannot be conceptualized. To say that God is the depth of reason is to refuse to make him another field of reason. In fact, he precedes the structures of reason and gives them their inexhaustible quality precisely because he can never be adequately contained in them. Schelling has termed the divine the Unvordenkliche, because it is "that before which thinking cannot penetrate." It was the error of idealism to think that this could ever be completely reduced to rational forms.

Tillich is protected from this error by his basic ontological image of the various levels of reality. "There are levels of reality of great difference, and . . . these different levels demand different approaches and different languages." The divine is the deepest of these levels and consequently must be known and expressed in a manner quite different from that of ordinary knowledge and discourse. It is to this same fact that Tillich is referring when he introduces the dialectical relationship between these levels and speaks of the divine as the prius. This suggests that it will be necessary to proceed beyond conceptualization to an intuitive, personal awareness of the divine. This will be described below, but one thing is already clear. Since the categories are the basis for the objective element in knowledge and the means by which it is made equally available to the many minds, intuitive awareness will have to be subjective and individual.

The other specification made by Tillich concerning the depth dimension regards its manifestation in the essences of finite beings. The notion of essence is found in some form in practically all philosophers, but classically in Plato and Aristotle. Plato attempted to solve the problem of unity and separation in knowledge by the myth of the original union of the soul with the essences or ideas. Recollection and reunion take place later and in varying degrees. Tillich stresses that, in Plato, the unity of soul and ideas is never completely destroyed. Although the
particular object is strange as such, it contains essential structures "with which the cognitive subject is essentially united and which it can remember."

Aristotle retains the notion of essence as providing the power of being: essence is the quality and structure in which being participates. But this is still potential, whereas the real is actual. Tillich accepts the Aristotelian position in these general terms and then uses it in order to develop his conception of creation. The divine was described above as the inexhaustible; in order for this to be creative an element of meaning and structure must be added. This is the second divine principle, the \textit{logos}, which makes the divine distinguishable, definite and finite. The third principle is the Spirit "in whom God `goes out from' himself; the Spirit proceeds from the divine ground. He gives actuality to that which is potential in the divine ground. . . . The finite is posited as finite within the process of the divine life, but it is reunited with the infinite within the same process."

A second approach to the thesis of Tillich's dialectic is phenomenological. This approach notes that we are never indifferent to things, simply recording the situation as does a light or sound meter. Rather, we judge the situation and react according as it reflects or falls away from what it should be. This fact makes manifest essence or logos in its normative sense. It is the way things should be, the norm of their perfection. Our response to essence is the heart of our efforts to protect and promote life; it is in this that we are basically and passionately engaged. Hence, by looking into our hearts and identifying their basic interests and concerns--our ultimate concern--we discover the most basic reality at this stage of the dialectic.

In these terms, Tillich expresses the positive side of the dialectical relationship of the essences of finite beings to the divine. He shows how these essences can contain, without exhausting, the power of being, for God remains this power. As exclusively positive, these might be said to express only the first elements of creation, that they remain, as it were, in a state of dreaming innocence within the divine life from which they must awaken to actualize and realize themselves. Creation is fulfilled in the self-realization by which the limited beings leave the ground of being to "stand upon" it. Whatever we shall say in the negative section about this moment of separation, the element of essence is never completely lost, for "if it were lost, mind as well as reality would have been destroyed in the very moment of their coming into existence." It is the retention of this positive element of essence that provides the radical foundation for participation by limited beings in the divine and their capacity for pointing to the infinite power of being and depth of reason. As mentioned in the first section, such participation in the divine being and some awareness thereof is an absolute prerequisite for any religion.

In this first or positive stage in Dr. Tillich's dialectic, by placing the divine as the point of identity beyond both subject and object, he has introduced both elements according to which he evaluated previous religious philosophies. The element of participation so necessary for any religion has appeared and, along with it, the element of individuation. We must now look at Tillich's attempt in the second or negative stage of his dialectic to see both of these in existential dissolution through a unilateral process of individualization. It will remain for the third phase of the dialectic, the synthesis, to develop a contemporary understanding of the restoration of person and society as free participations in the divine.

The Antithesis

Tillich turns to the second phase of his dialectic in order to analyze the basic infinite-finite structure by a form of individualization. Its contemporary nature lies in its particular relation to nonbeing. Nonbeing is had in God, where it dialectically drives being out of its seclusion to make
God living. But in God it is dialectically overcome, thus placing being itself beyond the polarity of the finite and the infinite negation of the finite. In beings less than God this nonbeing is not overcome. The classical statement, *creatio ex nihilo* means that the creature "must take over what might be called "the heritage of nonbeing," which has, along with its participation in being, its "heritage of Being." "Everything which" participates in the power of being is ‘mixed’ with nonbeing. It is being in the process of coming from and going toward nonbeing." This is finite being.

The radical realism of this view contrasts starkly with all social utopias. Not only are these man-made and, hence, subject to objectifying the subject, but they fail adequately to recognize the essential character of non-being in human life. This cannot be encountered and overcome unless it is first recognized, and it is characteristic of the dialectic of Tillich, in contrast to that of Hegel and the utopic goal of Marx, that nonbeing pertains to the human condition, and even to the divine. To deny it is to be subject to it; whereas to recognize it first and then reconcile it is the path of liberation. The second stage of Tillich's dialectic, the antithesis, is this recognition.

It is interesting that when Descartes wished to drive home his highly intellectual analysis of the self he followed up with the imaginative example of the ball of wax. Tillich draws on the biblical myth of the Fall to do the same for his notion of nonbeing, thereby enabling one to see its concrete meaning in the struggle to realize human freedom. He shuns the Hegelian understanding of the antithesis as nonbeing dialectically expressing being, for then existence would be simply a step in the expression of essence. In contrast, profound observation of the modern world, especially of the cataclysm of the First World War, forced home the point that reality is also the contradiction of essence. Some such distinction of essence and existence is presupposed by any philosophy which considers the ideal as against the real, truth against error or good against evil.

This has been expressed by the concept of estrangement taken from Hegel's earlier philosophy and applied to the individual by Kierkegaard, to society by Marx, and to life, as such, by Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. In fact, since the later period of Schelling, it has been commonplace for a whole series of philosophers and artists to describe the world as one of fragments, a disrupted unity. This implies that individualization has become excessive and led to a loneliness of man before his fellow men and before God. This, in turn, drives one into inner experience where one is still further isolated from one's world. The presupposition of this tragic nature of man is his transcendent Fall.

How is this Fall with its existential estrangement to be understood? First, its possibility is traced to man's finite freedom. In this state in which finite man is excluded from the infinity to which he belongs freedom gives him the capacity to contradict himself and his essential nature. Furthermore, the fact that he is aware of this finitude, of the threat from nonbeing, adds the note of anxiety to freedom, producing a drive toward the transition into existence. Rooted in his finitude and expressed in his anxiety, once this freedom is aroused, man experiences the threat either of not actualizing his potencies and thus not fulfilling himself, or of actualizing them, knowing that he will not choose according to the norms and values in which his essential nature expresses itself. In either case he is bound to lose himself and his freedom.

The finite nature of man's freedom implies an opposite pole, called destiny, which applies even to the freedom of self-contradiction. Freedom "is possible only within the context of the universal transition from essence to existence" and every isolated act is embedded in the universal destiny of existence. This means that the estrangement of man from his essential nature has two characteristics, the one tragic coming from destiny, the other moral (guilt) coming from freedom. Of itself, destiny connotes universality, for the Fall is the presupposition of existence and there is
no existence before or without it. Hence, everything that exists participates in the Fall with its twin character of tragedy and guilt. This applies to every man, every act of man, and every part of nature as well.

The conciliation of the absolute universality of the Fall with the freedom it presupposes is one of those problems which are never really solved because it is part of the human condition which it enlightens. The extension of guilt to nature seems reinforced by evolutionary theories and depth psychology, but how the inevitability and the freedom of estrangement are to be reconciled remains an enigma. In one statement, Tillich affirms the necessity of something in finite freedom for which we are responsible and which makes the Fall unavoidable. In another work, he considers estrangement to be an original fact with "the character of a leap and not of structural necessity." Despite these difficulties, in explaining how man's estrangement is free, Tillich clearly presents it as the ontological realization of the Fall of mankind.

This negative phase in the dialectic is mediated to the level of consciousness by the general, and presently acute, phenomenon of anxiety which arises from the nonbeing in finite reality. "The first statement about the nature of anxiety is this: anxiety is the state in which a being is aware of its possible nonbeing." It is, in fact, the expression of finitude from the inside. As such, it is not a mere psychological quality but an ontological one, present wherever finitude and its threat of nonbeing are found. Anxiety is then simply inescapable for finite beings. Were it a particular object, it might be feared directly, attacked and overcome. But as nothingness is not an 'object' there is no way for the finite to overcome nonbeing. Thus anxiety lies within man at all times. This omnipresent ontological anxiety can be aroused at any time even without a situation of fear, for the emotional element is but an indication of the perverse manner in which finite being is penetrated by the threat of absolute separation from its positive element of infinity, that is, with the threat of annihilating nothingness pp. 211-14.

The nonbeing of finitude and estrangement is present on each level of being and in three ways: ontic, spiritual and moral. This produces three corresponding types or characteristics of anxiety. Ontic anxiety is the awareness that our basic self-affirmation as beings is threatened proximately by fate, the decided contingency of our position, and ultimately by death. Spiritual anxiety is the awareness of the emptiness of the concrete content of our particular beliefs and, even more, the awareness of the loss of a spiritual center of meaning resulting in ultimate meaninglessness in which "not even the meaningfulness of a serious question of meaning is left for him" p. 74. Moral anxiety is the awareness that in virtue of that very freedom by which one is human he continually chooses against the fulfillment of his destiny and the actualization of his essential nature, thus adding the element of guilt.

All three elements of anxiety-- death, meaninglessness and guilt--combine to produce despair, the ultimate or "boundary" situation. One element or another may stand out more clearly for various people or in various situations, but all three are inescapably present. It is guilt that seals Sartre's No Exit, for if there were but the nonbeing of death and meaninglessness, man could affirm both his ontic and his spiritual meaning by his own act of voluntary death. But guilt makes all this impossible. "Guilt and condemnation are qualitatively, not quantitatively, infinite." They point to the dimension of the ultimate and the unconditional from which we have become estranged through our own responsible actions. In this way, Tillich's contemporary understanding of the situation of loneliness and despair is ultimately pervaded by a sense of guilt.

Nonbeing extends beyond being to knowledge. After recognizing that existence is both the appearance and the contradiction of essence, he adds that "our thinking is a part of our existence and shares the fate that human existence contradicts its true nature." Reason is effected by the
nonbeing of finitude and estrangement. Under the conditions of existence, it is torn by internal conflicts and estranged from its depth and ground.

Another note of the existential situation of knowledge is its inclusion of actualized freedom. This not only separates thought and being, but holds them apart. There results a special kind of truth, one which is attained, not in an absolute standpoint at the end of history, but in the situation of the knower: subjectivity becomes the hallmark of truth. Its contemporary tragic character is due to the fact that it results from separation and despair. "Truth is just that subjectivity which does not disregard its despair, its exclusion from the objective world of essence, but which holds to it passionately."

Throughout this negative stage of the dialectic, there remains the original positive element, the bond to the divine. "Man is never cut off from the ground of being, not even in the state of condemnation," for really to lose the foundation of one's being would be utter annihilation. This essential insight of Hegel regarding sublation would appear to have been tragically omitted by Marx who, in his concern for social transformation, understood all in terms of technical reason focused upon negation. But, if what is negated is the power of being upon which a human life and a people's culture have been based, then the possibilities of reconstruction are radically undermined and left without foundation. With no source of meaning, life not only loses meaning but is condemned to remain thus. Neither negation nor negation of negation will suffice. The tragedy which Tillich brings to light is that, despite the presence of the power of being, in this state of existence man does not actualize, but contradicts the essential manifestation of his divine ground.

This is more than individualization; it is the tragically guilty estrangement of being and knowing from the divine, and from ourselves as images of the divine. Thus, Tillich's systematic analysis of the predicament of modern man manifests the true dimensions of the exaggeration of individualization experienced as a sense of loneliness and expressed theologically as the Fall of man. It does this in the contemporary context of meaninglessness by questioning not only the supports of the previous generations, but the very meaning of support. If this questioning be sufficiently radical, it may open the way to a rediscovery of the basis not only for a reordering or restructuring, but for radical reconstruction.

The Synthesis

The first stage of Tillich's existential dialectic had presented the essential or potential state of finite reality in union with the divine. The second or negative moment of this dialectic placed individualization in its present context of meaninglessness. This is a powerful and profound expression of the difficulty in actualizing human dignity, which is identically the element of union or participation in the divine which is the essence of religion. Let us see how the third stage attempts to provide this element in a contemporary fashion.

Since existential separation and disruption leaves man opaque to the divine, Tillich will not allow the divine to be derived from an analysis of human experience: man cannot save himself. If God is to be the answer to the existential question of man, he must come "to human existence from beyond it"; the divine depth must break through in particular things and particular circumstances. This is the phenomenon of revelation in which the essential power of natural objects is delivered from the bondage of its existential contradiction, so that the finite thing or situation participates in the power of the ultimate.

In this way, revelation provides more than a mere representation of the divine; it opens levels of mind and of reality hidden till now and produces the experience of the divine which is the most
profound of these levels. The appearance of the divine varies according to the particular situation. Experienced in correlation with the threat of nonbeing, God has the form of the "infinite power of being resisting nonbeing," that is, he is Being Itself. As the answer to the question in the form of anxiety, God is "the ground of courage." Each is a form of the particular participation in the divine which takes place in this situation. As this same participation is the basis for symbols of the divine, these differ in mode and duration depending upon the situation.

For a better understanding of the contemporary nature of Tillich's religious philosophy, it is necessary to investigate further his development of the situation of revelation in the context of meaninglessness. As cognitive, this encounter includes two elements. One is objective and termed a miracle or sign-event; the other is subjective and named ecstasy and inspiration. The objective and the subjective are so strictly correlated that one cannot be had without the other: revelation is the truth only for the one who is grasped by the divine presence.

Miracle does not mean a supernatural interference with the natural structure of events. To make this clear Tillich prefers the term 'sign-event', as signifying that which produces numinous astonishment in Rudolph Otto's sense of that which is connected with the presence of the divine. Such a sign-event can be realized in the context of meaninglessness because it presupposes the stigma of nonbeing, the disruptive tensions driving toward man's complete annihilation. In particular situations, this stigma becomes evident and manifests the negative side of the mystery of God, the abyss. However, such situations also imply the positive side of the mystery of God, for their very reality manifests the divine ground and power of being over which nonbeing is not completely victorious.

This explains the characteristics which Tillich attributes to a miracle. He speaks of a miracle as "an event which is astonishing, unusual, shaking, without contradicting the rational structure of reality; . . . an event which points to the mystery of being, expressing its relation to us in a definite way; . . . an occurrence which is received as a sign-event in an ecstatic experience." The subjective element pertains to the very nature of a miracle. Thus, even a person who later learns about the sign-event must share in the ecstasy if he is to have more than a report about the belief of another. An objective miracle would be a contradiction in terms.

This subjective element of ecstasy, or "standing outside one's self", is the very etymology of the term itself. It indicates a state in which the mind transcends its ordinary situation, its subject-object structure. Miracle was seen to be negatively dependent on the stigma of nonbeing. In the mind, what corresponded to this stigma was the shock of nonbeing, the anxiety of death, meaninglessness and guilt. These tend to disrupt the normal balance of the mind, to shake it in its structure and to force it to its boundaries where it openly faces nonbeing. There it is thrown back upon itself.

This might be useful in the interpretation of the history of the last century. For in facing the structural contradictions of his time, Marx took just this route. Seeing them as a call to man to save himself, he turned against all else as an opiate, and thereby opened the way for a new radicalization of the conflict of subject and object. Once objectified in his work, now man would be totally objectified by society; family bonds would be intentionally subverted; and the sense of personal dignity would be annihilated before the state which wished to be all. Tillich's dialectic points to the fact that, when forced to its extreme situation, to the very limit of human possibilities, the mind experiences an all pervading "no." There, face to face with the meaninglessness and despair which one must recognize if one is serious about anything at all, one is grasped by mystery. To acknowledge meaninglessness even in an act of despair is itself a meaningful act, for it could be
done only on the power of the being it negates. In this way, the reality of a transcending power is manifested within man.

In a radically contemporary mode, this is the expression within human consciousness of the classical theme of the non-ultimacy of that which is limited and contingent. Anything perceived as object opposed to subject must be limited and not all-sufficient; but this very perception bespeaks as its basis that which is self-sufficient and absolute.

This is not natural revelation whereby reason grasps God whenever it wills. Tillich takes an extra step, noting that the object-subject dichotomy which characterized the human mind enables it to recognize its contradictions, but not to resolve them. Natural knowledge of self and world can lead to the question of the ground of being and reason, but, as estranged in the state of existence, it cannot answer the question. For this God must grasp man, which is revelation. The power of being is present in the affirmation of meaninglessness and in the affirmation of ourselves as facing meaninglessness; it affirms itself in one in spite of nonbeing.

In true ecstasy, one receives ultimate power by the presence of the ultimate which breaks through the contradictions of existence where and when it will. It is God who determines the circumstances and the degree in which he will be participated. The effect of this work and its sign is love, for, when the contradictions of the state of existence are overcome so that they are no longer the ultimate horizon, reunion and social healing, cooperation and creativity become possible.

Tillich calls the cognitive aspect of ecstasy inspiration. In what concerns the divine, he replaces the word knowledge by awareness. This is not concerned with new objects, which would invade reason with a strange body of knowledge that could not be assimilated, and, hence, would destroy its rational structure. Rather, that which is opened to man is a new dimension of being participated in by all while still retaining its transcendence.

It matters little that the contemporary situation of skepticism and meaninglessness has removed all possibility of content for this act. What is important is that we have been grasped by that which answers the ultimate question of our very being, our unconditional and ultimate concern. This indeed, is Tillich's phenomenological description of God. "Only certain is the ultimacy as ultimacy." The ultimate concern provides the place at which the faith by which there is belief (fides qua creditur) and the faith that is believed (fides quae creditur) are identified.

It is here that the difference between subject and object disappears. The source of our faith is present as both subject and object in a way that is beyond both of them. The absence of this dichotomy is the reason why Tillich refuses to speak of knowledge here and uses instead the term 'awareness'. He compares it to the mystic's notion of the knowledge God has of Himself, the truth itself of St. Augustine. It is absolutely certain, but the identity of subject and object means that it is also absolutely personal. Consequently, this experience of the ultimate cannot be directly received from others; revelation is something which we ourselves must live.

In this experience, it is necessary to distinguish the point of immediate awareness from its breadth of content. The point of awareness is expressed in what Tillich refers to as the ontological principle: "Man is immediately aware of something unconditional which is the prius of the interaction and separation of both subject and object, both theoretically and practically." He has no doubt about the certainty of this point, although nonsymbolically he can say only that this is being itself. However, in revelation he has experienced not only its reality but its relation to him. He expresses the combination of these in the metaphorical terms of ground and abyss of being, power of being, ultimate and unconditional concern.
Generally, this point is experienced in a special situation and in a special form; the ultimate concern is made concrete in some one thing. It may, for instance, be the nation, a god or the God of the Bible. This concrete content of our act of belief differs from ultimacy as ultimacy in that it is not immediately evident. Since it remains within the subject-object dichotomy, its acceptance as ultimate requires an act of courage and venturing faith. The certainty we have about the breadth of concrete content is then only conditional. Should time reveal this content to be finite, our faith will still have been an authentic contact with the unconditional itself, only the concrete expression will have been deficient.

This implies two correlated elements in man's act of faith. One is that of certainty concerning one's own being as related to something ultimate and unconditional. The other is that of risk, of surrendering to a concern which is not really ultimate and may be destructive if taken as if it were. The risk arises necessarily in the state of existence where both reason and objects are not only finite, but separated from their ground. This places an element of doubt in faith which is neither of the methodological variety found in the scientist, nor of the transitory type often had by the skeptic. Rather, the doubt of faith is existential, an awareness of the lasting element of insecurity. Nevertheless, this doubt can be accepted and overcome in spite of itself by an act of courage which affirms the reality of God. Faith remains the one state of ultimate concern, but, as such, it subsumes certainty concerning both the unconditional and existential doubt.

Can a system with such uncertainty concerning concrete realities still be called a realism? Tillich believes that it can, but only if it is specified as a belief-ful or self-transcending realism. In this, the really real--the ground and power of everything real--is grasped in and through a concrete historical situation. Hence, the value of the present moment which has become transparent for its ground is, paradoxically, both all and nothing. In itself, it is not infinite and "the more it is seen in the light of the ultimate power, the more it appears as questionable and void of lasting significance." The appearance of self-subsistence gradually melts away. But, by this very fact, the ground and power of the present reality becomes evident. The concrete situation becomes the onomous and the infinite depth and eternal significance of the present is revealed in an ecstatic experience.

It would be a mistake, however, to think of this as something other-worldly, strange or uncomfortable. It is ecstatic in the sense of going beyond the usual surface observations and calculations of our initial impressions and scientific calculations, but what it reveals is the profundity of our unity with colleagues, neighbors and, indeed, with all mankind. Rather, then, than generating a sense of estrangement, its sign is the way in which it enables one to see others as friends and to live comfortably with them. As ethnic and cultural difference emerge, along with the freedom of each people to be themselves, this work of the Spirit which is characteristic of Tillich's dialectic comes to be seen in its radical importance for social life.

Theological Implications

Up to this point, the positive exposition of Tillich's thought could have been developed without special relation to Christianity. However, he sees in his system the need for a central manifestation of God both to serve as a point of over-all unity and to conquer definitively the contradictions of existence. It is here that Tillich introduces Christ as the final revelation. We shall present this aspect of his system briefly in order to indicate the direction taken by his thought as it enters the properly theological realm.
Since reason remains finite and retains its state of existence even after receiving revelation, new difficulties continue to arise. The human tendency to oppose subject and object and to reduce subjects to objects with all its corrosive, repressive and dehumanizing effects was broken in its final power and the conflicts of reason were replaced by reconciliation once man's total structure was grasped by its ultimate concern and opened to the ground of being. Still, as old habits die hard their corrosive effects, though conquered, are not removed. Hence, they are able to rise again and attack even the elements of revelation. The bearers of revelation can become mistaken for the ultimate itself, thereby making even faith idolatrous. Furthermore, the emergence of the subject-object horizon to dominance can lead to a loss of the ecstatic, transcending power of reason. In this case, reason forgets that it is but an instrument for awareness of the ultimate and tends itself to become an ultimate.

Fortunately, these distortions of faith and reason can be definitively conquered; the means of this victory is called final revelation. It has various criteria, but all are bound up with the qualities which a revelation must have if it is to be the ultimate solution to the conflicts of our finitude in the state of estrangement. The criterion on the part of the miracle is the power of final revelation for "negating itself without losing itself." Definitive revelation must overcome the danger of substituting itself for the ultimate by sacrificing itself. This is Christ on the cross, perfectly united with God, who in the surrender of all the finite perfection by which he could be a bearer of revelation becomes completely transparent to the mystery he reveals. Thus, he becomes a bearer which merely points and can never be raised to ultimacy. This is the perfect fulfillment of the very essence of the sign-event concept. In turn, Christianity receives an unconditional and universal claim from that to which it witnesses, without Christianity as such being either final or universal. On the part of reason, another criterion of this special revelation is its capacity to overcome the conflicts in reason between autonomy and heteronomy, absolutism and relativism, emotionalism and formalism. The success of Christ in solving these conflicts provides a continuous pragmatic manifestation of Christ as the final revelation.

The need for a definitive and incorruptible manifestation of the ground of being is responded to by final revelation which, as such, is not only the criterion, but the fulfillment of other revelations. This becomes the "center, aim and origin of the revelatory events" which preceded and surrounded it. The preparatory revelations mediated through nature, men and events are called universal revelation, though they occur only in special, concrete circumstances. They have the function of preparing both the question and the symbols without which the answer provided by final revelation could neither be received nor understood. But, with the advent of final revelation, preparatory revelation ceases, and the period of receiving revelation begins. The people (ecclesia or Church) become the bearer of the original fact of Christ; they continue the process of reception, interpretation and actualization. This combines the certainty of its basis in the ultimate with the risk of faith, for its belief that it cannot be surpassed by a new original revelation is the other side of its belief that revelation has the power of reformation within itself.

Taking this risk with courage, final revelation is the definitive point where the estrangement of essential and existential being is overcome, where finitude is reunited with infinity, man with God, anxiety with courage and mortality with eternity. This is the eschatological reunion of essence and existence, foreshadowed and momentarily grasped in universal preparatory relations. It is definitively established by this final revelation in which Christ becomes the "new being" and God becomes incarnate pp. 144-45. This is "realized eschatology," but it has happened only in principle, that is, in power and as a beginning. "Those who participate in him participate in the
new being,' though under the condition of man's existential predicament and, therefore, only fragmentarily and by anticipation."

In this context, morality cannot remain the empty or arbitrary self-affirmation of a spiritual being. Its ultimate impulse and final aim is the expression of the transcendent ground of being, but its particular contents, being received from the culture, remain preliminary and relative. In this way, man's actions, like his being, should be provisional manifestations of the divine depth dimension.

In its expression of the fragmentary nature of reality, this view includes the objectivity of positivism without its refusal to penetrate into the nature of existence. In expanding one's horizons beyond the physical, it integrates also the subjectivity of idealism without remaining trapped in a realm of essences. Both insights are synthesized and transcended in a new ontological mysticism. This is not the classical mysticism which disregarded the cosmos for a direct union with a transcendent absolute. Instead, it points by faith to the unfathomable character of the ground of being and to the depth of life as prior to, and condition of, both subject and object. By restoring the element of participation in the divine, this goes to the heart of religion.

Tillich sees two reasons for considering this mysticism to be post-reformation. One is its refusal to elevate anything finite to the position of the divine. The other is its search for the essence of objectivity in the depth of subjectivity, approaching God through the soul. Since this approach is made in the context of total meaninglessness which has characterized the dark side of this century, it is not only contemporary but opens to new hope for the 21st century.

In this study, we have examined the historical context of the thought of Paul Tillich, the philosophical problem this generated, the resulting elaboration of the dialectic, and its theological implications. The great popularity of his work during the period of reconstruction following World War II suggests that his experience and philosophical development might be helpful for many today in analogous circumstances of nation building and rebuilding.

One instance might be illustrative. Martin Luther King wrote his doctoral dissertation on the dialectic of Tillich. When doing so, he saw love as the foundational transforming power at work in the heart, but considered it only a personal pilgrimage of the individual soul. Later, he wrote that he did not consider this to be a matter of social import until on visiting India he came to see with the eyes of Gandhi that the Christian doctrine of love was indeed "one of the most potent weapons available to oppressed people in their struggle for freedom." Nevertheless, until he faced the struggle for racial dignity in Montgomery this insight remained only at the intellectual level of understanding and appreciation; it was in the actual borderline circumstances of the struggle for freedom, when he was forced to the limits of meaning by the threat of nonbeing, that his intellectual insight was transformed into a commitment to a way of life.

This is suggestive for philosophers in our times. Aristotle spoke of philosophy as being undertaken at a time of leisure, after one has taken care of the necessities of life. The example of Tillich and King suggests that Marx was correct in saying that in our times philosophy can, and, indeed, often must, be done on another more realistic and historical basis. It was in facing the destructive power of the modern totalitarian state that Tillich found the need to transcend technical reason and to go beneath structures to the very ground of being. Through experiencing directly the negativity of an exploitive system in the form of bombings, fire hoses and vicious dogs, Martin Luther King was able to uncover and give voice to the power to overcome it, and thereby lead his people to new dignity and freedom.

An old Indian proverb has it that when the pupil is ready the teacher will arrive. The example of Tillich and M.L. King suggest that the condition for receiving the power to be may be the very
quandaries and dilemmas of change when old structures by their inadequacies contradict life. If so, Tillich's dialectic points out how the more disastrous those structures are manifested to be--that is, through their very negativity--a new level of being can be received, life can be transformed and the human spirit can experience resurrection and new life.
A Contemporary Development of Jen and Agape as the Creative Power of Love

Self-Concern and Self-Transcendence: The Contemporary Problematic

A dialectic of the personal and the depersonalizing appears to be one of the paradoxes of recent experience. For a number of economic, educational and other reasons, the past decades have been marked in many parts of the world by a massive migration from the countryside into the towns and cities. At first it was thought that the size of the town and of the factory would relieve the personal pressures of village life, for when the obligation of a more extended family and the all-seeing eyes of the neighbors were remote, persons and families could be truly free. Tolerance understood in this passive manner as non-interference—or was it non-caring?—was considered desirable and, indeed, appears to have constituted no small attraction, drawing many young families to the city. In fact, however, the problems of life are never so easily solved. Upon reflection, it can be seen that the attempt to dispense with so basic a dimension of the person as his/her social character was doomed to failure, for it generated social dissatisfaction and deep loneliness—a living death.

Further, the ever more close interaction of increasingly diverse peoples, which has characterized modernization, nation-building and urbanization, could only exacerbate, rather than resolve, problems of living with others. As the level of work rises above a mute carrying out of orders, as parents begin to play an active role in planning goals for schools, as people take a more active role in a democratic system, and as all of these economic, educational and political decisions increasingly affect and are affected by national and international life, the level of interaction between persons increases geometrically. Decisions come to be made less individually and autocratically, and more through discussion in the home, the work-place, the community, the nation and the world. Indeed, T. Imamichi speaks of a basic inversion of practical reasoning reflecting the fact that the energy, transportation and communications provided by a developing technology are largely now in common possession. It is not I but we who have these means; hence, it is we who must choose; further, we must do so not only between means, but as regards the very goals to which they will be applied.

In short, anonymity and disengagement from others is neither realizable nor desirable. Modern life intensifies the need to interact positively with an ever expanding range of peoples traditions and interests, and this at ever more penetrating levels of one's life and work.

The problem is one of self-identity in interaction with others, of the constitution of the human person in free and responsible interchange. Hence, growth in self-knowledge and self-identity is now required if we are to move from a passive posture of patience to a positive search and assimilation of additional views drawn from the experiences of others and to weld them into the complementary systemic relations required for modern living.

But the issue is not merely one of missed opportunities. A brief catalogue of present tensions suggests the depth and difficulty of the problem of taking this step from passive tolerance to active inter-change and unity. First, within the person there exist multiple tensions between, on the one hand, the traditional content of one's culture built upon community and, on the other hand, the cumulative and often depersonalizing demands of a life whose every phase is ordered according to the abstract rationalizations of industry, commerce, education systems and political theory.
Secondly, within social, national and other groups and on the basis of the most subtle shadings of color or style of hair, birth or personal mannerism, one subgroup comes to be considered not merely slightly different, but somewhat threatening, and then markedly inferior. Even where no differences exist, some negative evaluation is imposed in order not fully to accept or recognize a group's freedom and dignity. Often the group resides in a distinct sector of a country or even of each town, surrounded by a climate of indifference or, more probably, of incipient antipathy. In some cases, they are cast out to swell the growing tide of the world's 14,000,000 refugees, where they languish in camps, wander in hunger, and are indiscriminately exploited or even attacked. This is a primary problem of our time.

Thirdly, this phenomenon reappears between countries and continents; it shadows man's every advance. As the ability is developed to communicate and interact with peoples and cultures ever more distant and diverse, the modalities of alienation keep step, adopting ever more sophisticated and powerful economic and even military forms.

In this light, the human travails entailed in establishing positive bonds of unity appear to go far beyond commercial, territorial or ideological disputes—although any one of these can become the point around which coalesces a perverse dynamism. What is at work is a humanly subversive process by which, in the search for self-identity and self-worth, the other—whether person or group, domestic or foreign—is looked upon as a threatening adversary, as unworthy of respect, and finally as an object of rejection or even of attack.

At the present juncture, we face a particularly exacerbated form of these tragic tensions. After a half to three quarters of a century of attempts to supplant the natural bonds of human community by a notion of class scientifically constructed upon the triumphant industrialization of the machine age, many peoples have now been freed to seek their own destiny once again. Suddenly, ancient frictions, more recent and unresolved grievances, and often the results of forced transport of peoples in cruel and despotic attempts at social engineering and territorial expansion—all of these must be faced. What is more, this must be done in the enthusiasm of new found independence and before the civilizing factors of the various cultures have been able to be identified, much less rebuilt.

This is the excruciating lived dimension of the basic metaphysical problem of self-identity and, hence, of otherness. To ignore the depth of the contemporary problematic would restrict one's response to the level of compromises and accommodations possible in terms of the particular sciences, alleviating the symptoms while leaving the root problem unfaced. Such responses can do little more than treat the symptoms while delineating the terms and planting the seeds for subsequent confrontation and conflict.

The real problems of interrelation between persons and cultural groups can be faced only by looking more deeply into the nature and origin of self-awareness and of self-id entity to see whether this sets one against others or, on the contrary, unites persons; and, if it does so, whether this can ground the positive interaction or cooperation required by the class and intercultural tensions of our day.

The previous chapters have suggested ways of understanding tradition as living and creative, the nature of the person, harmony as a philosophy of freedom, transcendence as a foundation for the dignity and meaning of human life, and suffering as a path to resurrection and life. This concluding chapter would look ahead, not in the sense of a man-made utopia—that would restrict man's freedom because it could never reflect the full richness of life—but in the sense of being as unfolding in terms of unity and truth, goodness and beauty, harmony and peace.
It would be possible to build this vision in terms of unity by reconciling the many in the vision of the one Transcendent, participated in by all men and women who are, therefore, brothers and sisters one to another. The danger remains that this would be overcome by self-centeredness, on the one hand, and overriding emphasis upon community, on the other.

It would be possible to build the vision in terms of truth, which is found common in philosophies of justice, whether in the liberal mode of Rawles or in that of critical theory. But, if the problem of egoism is not resolved, there is danger that focusing upon justice might lead to being dragged back into conflict over possessions and profits.

To protect against this and to open the road to creative progress, it is important to go further in terms of the good and of love. There are two approaches to this, one directly in terms of being, the other in terms of our self-consciousness as persons.

In the appreciation of being as standing against nonbeing or nothingness lies the basis for the notion of perfection (from the Latin root meaning to make [facio] completely [per]), in the sense of the complete realization of a being according to its nature. When realized, this balance of the nature and actuality of being constitutes a stable state; when not yet realized it is the basis for seeking perfection. Hence, a plant grows, an animal seeks food, and man seeks to know. The good as the perfection of being is the basis of the dynamism of the human search.

Beyond this, the participational relation of all limited beings to the All-perfect divine as source and goal of all creates a dynamic field for all beings in which the human will is able to change any instance of perfection to which it can turn in search of its own perfection. At the same time, it is not necessitated by anything less than perfection itself. The all-perfect is then the creative context of human life. Unfortunately, if one's search for perfection closes upon self, this very dynamism becomes corrupted into a basis for conflict with others.

Once placed within the context of the transcendent as infinite and all-perfect, however, something more appears. For then one observes that the All-perfect source has created not out of a need or an attitude of self-seeking. The work of creation is not a search for its own realization, but rather a sharing of that perfection. In this, being comes to be seen in a new light, namely, not simply as self-seeking, but as self-sharing and self-communicating. The dynamism of being, then, is much more than a mean struggle for survival; it is rather one of creative realization and sharing.

**Person as Given**

This can be approached in another, phenomenological manner by reflecting carefully the mode of operation of our own conscious life. One place to begin is with the person as a polyvalent unity operative on both the physical and the non-physical levels. Though the various sciences analyze distinct dimensions, the person is not a construct of independent components but an id entity: the physical and the psychic are dimensions of myself and of no other. Further, this identity is not the result of my personal development, but was had by me from my beginning; it is a given for each person. Hence, while I can grow indefinitely, act endlessly, and do and make innumerable things, the growth and acts will be always my own; it is the same given or person who perdures through all the stages of his or her growth.

This givenness appears also through reflection upon one's inter-personal relations. I do not properly create these, for they are possible only if I already have received my being. Further, to open to others is a dynamism which pertains to my very nature and which I can suppress only at the price of deep psychological disturbance. Relatedness is given with one's nature and is to be
received as a promise and a task; it is one's destiny. What depends upon the person is only the
degree of his or her presence to others.

Unfortunately, this givenness is often taken in the sense of closure associated with the terms
`datum' or `data', as hypothetical or evidential. On the one hand, in the hypothetical sense a given
is a stipulation agreed upon by the relevant parties as the basis for a process of argumentation:
Granted X, then Y. The premises of an argument or the postulates in a mathematical demonstration
are such. On the other hand, in the evidential sense, data are the direct and warranted observations
of what actually is the case. In both these meanings, the terms `given' or `data' direct the mind
exclusively toward the future or consequent as one's only concern. The use of the past participle
of the verb stem (data) closes off any search toward the past, so that, when one given is broken
down by an analysis, new givens appear. One never gets behind some hypothetical or evidential
given.

This closure is done for good reason, but it leaves a second--and, for our purposes, potentially
important--sense of `given' as open; this is expressed by the nominative form, `donum' or gift. In
contrast to the other meanings, this would seem to point back, as it were, behind itself to its source
in ways similar to the ways historians use the term `fact'. They note that a fact is not simply there;
its meaning has been molded or made (facta) within the ongoing process of human life. In this
sense, it points back to its origin and origination.

However, this potentially rich return to the source was blocked by the shift at the beginning
of the 19th century from an empiricist to an anthropocentric view. In this horizon, facts came to
be seen especially as made by man, conceived either as an individual in the liberal tradition, or as
a class in the socialist tradition--to which correspond the ideals of progress and praxis,
respectively. Because what was made by man could always be remade by him, however, this turned
aside a radical search into the character of life as gift. Attention remained only upon the future,
understood simply in terms of man and of what man could do by either individual or social praxis.

There are reasons to suspect that this humanism is not enough for a dynamic sense of a cultural
heritage and a creative sense of harmony as cooperation with others. Without underestimating how
much has been accomplished in the terms of progress and praxis, the world-wide contemporary
phenomenon of alienation not only between cultures but from one's own culture and people
suggests that something important has been forgotten. First, by including only what is abstractively
clear these approaches begin by omitting that which can be had only in self-knowledge, namely,
one's self-identity and all that is most distinctive and creative in each people's heritage. Focusing
only upon what is analytically clear and distinct to the mind of any and every individual renders
alien the notes of personal identity, freedom and creativity, as well as integrity, wholeness and
harmony. These characterize the more synthetic philosophical and religious traditions and are
realized in self-knowledge, deep interpersonal bonds, and under the personal guidance of a teacher
or guru.

Second, there is the too broadly experienced danger that in concrete affairs the concern to
build the future in terms only of what has been conceived clearly and by all will be transformed,
wittingly and unwittingly, into oppression of self-identity and destruction of integrative cultures
both as civilizations and as centers of personal cultivation. Indeed, the charges of cultural
oppression and the calls for liberation from so many parts of the world raise founded doubt that
the humanist notion of the self-given and its accompanying ideals can transcend the dynamics of
power and leave room for persons, especially for those of other cultures.

Finally, were the making, which is implied in the derivation of the term `fact' from `facere', to
be wholly reduced to `self-making,' and were the given to become only the self-given, it might be
suspected that we had stumbled finally upon what Parmenides termed "the all impossible way" of deriving what is from what is not. His essential insight that all is grounded in the Absolute—which is shared by Hinduism, Islam and the Judeo-Christian traditions—is a firm guard against such a self-defeating, stagnating and destructive route.

Person as Gift

It is time, then, to look again to the second meaning of `given' and to follow the opening toward the source implied in the notion of gift. Above, we had noted some indications that self-identity and interpersonal relatedness are gifts (dona). Let us now look further into this in order to see what it suggests regarding the dynamic openness required for cooperation between persons and cultures.

First, one notes that as gift the given has an essentially gratuitous character. It is true that at times the object or service given could be paid for in cash or in kind. As indicated by the root of the term `commercial,' however, such a transaction would be based on some merit (meroeo) on the part of the receiver. This would destroy its nature as gift precisely because the given would not be based primarily in the freedom of the giver.

The same appears from an analysis of an exchange of presents. Presents cease to be gifts to the degree that they are given only because of the requirements of the social situation or only because of a claim implicit in what the other might have given me. Indeed, the sole way in which such presents can be redeemed as gifts is to make clear that their presentation is not something to which I merely feel obliged, but which I personally and freely want to do. As such, then, a gift is based precisely upon the freedom of the giver; it is gratuitous.

There is here a striking symmetry with the `given' in the above sense of hypothesis or evidence. There, in the line of hypothetical and evidential reasoning there was a first, namely, that which is not explained, but upon which explanation is founded. Here, there is also a first upon which the reality of the gift is founded and which is not to be traced to another reality. This symmetry makes what is distinctive of the gift stand out, namely, here the originating action is not traced back further precisely because it is free or gratuitous. Once again, our reflections lead us in the direction of that which is self-sufficient, absolute and transcendent as the sole adequate giver of the gift of being.

Further, as an absolute point of departure with its distinctive spontaneity and originality, the giving is non-reciprocal. To attempt to repay would be to destroy the gift as such. Indeed, there is no way in which this originating gratuity can be returned; we live in a graced condition. This appears in reflection upon one's culture. What we received from the authors of the Vedas, a Confucius or an Aristotle can in no way be returned. Nor is this simply a problem of distance in time, for neither is it possible to repay the life we have received from our parents, the health received from a doctor, the wisdom from a teacher, or simply the good example which can come from any quarter at any time. The non-reciprocal character of our life is not merely that of part to whole; it is that of a gift to its source.

The great traditions have insisted rightly both upon the oneness of the absolute reality and upon the lesser reality of the multiple: the multiple is not The Reality, though neither is it totally non-reality. Anselm's elaboration of the notion of privation contains a complementary clarification of the gratuitous character of beings as given or gifted. The notion of privation was developed classically by Aristotle in his analysis of change, where privation appeared at the beginning of the process as the lack of the form to be realized. He saw this as more than non-being, precisely in as
much as it was a lack of a good which is due to that subject. Hence, in substantial change, because the basic potential principle is prime matter to which no specific form is due, privation plays no role.

Anselm extended this notion of privation to the situation of creation in which the whole being is gifted. In this case, there is no prior subject to which something is due; hence, there is no ground or even any acceptance. Anselm expressed this radically non-reciprocal nature of the gift—its lack of prior conditions—through the notion of absolute privation.

It is privation and not merely negation, for negation simply is not and leads nowhere, whereas the gift is to be, and once given can be seen to be uniquely appropriate. It is absolute privation, however, for the foundation is not at all on the part of the recipient; rather it is entirely on the part of the source. This parallels a basic insight suggested in the Upanishads and perhaps the basic insight for metaphysics.

In the beginning, my dear, this world was just being (Sat), one only, without a second. . . . Being thought to itself: `May I be many; may I procreate.' It produced fire. That fire thought to itself: `May I be many; may I procreate.' It produced water. . . . That water thought to itself: `May I be many; may I procreate.' It produced food. . . . That divinity (Being) thought to itself: `Well, having entered into three divinities [fire, water, and food] by means of this living Self, let me develop names and forms. Let me make each one of them tripartite. (Chandogya Up., 6.1-3, 12-14.)

To what does this correspond on the part of the source? In a certain parallel to the antinomies of K ant which show when reason has strayed beyond its bounds, many from Plotinus to Leibniz and beyond have sought knowledge, not only of the gift and its origin, but of why it had to be given. The more they succeeded, the less room was left for freedom on the part of man as a given or gift. Others attempted to understand freedom as a fall, only to find that what was thus understood was bereft of value and meaning and, hence, was of no significance to human life and its cultures. Rather, the radical non-reciprocity of human freedom must be rooted in an equally radical generosity on the part of its origin. No reason, either on the part of the given or on the part of its origin, makes this gift necessary. The freedom of man is the reflection of his derivation from a giving that is pure generosity: man is the image of God.

In turn, on the part of the gift this implies a correspondingly radical openness or generosity. The gift is not something which is and then receives. It was an essential facet of Plato's response to the problems he had elaborated in the Parmenides that the multiple can exist only as participants of the good or one. Receiving is not something they do; it is what they are. As such, they reflect at the core of their being the reality of the generosity in which they originate.

The importance of this insight is attested from many directions. In Latin America, some philosophers begin from the symbol earth as the fruitful source of all (reflected in the Quechuan language of the Incas as the "Pacha Mama "). This is their preferred context for their sense of human life, its relations to physical nature, and the meeting of the two in technology. In this they are not without European counterparts. The classical project of Heidegger in its later phases shifted beyond the unconcealment of the being of things-in-time, to Being which makes the things manifest. The Dasein, structured in and as time, is able to provide Being a place of discovery among things. Being maintains the initiative; its coming-to-pass or emission depends upon its own spontaneity and is for its sake. "Its `there' (Da-sein) only sustains the process and guards it," so that, in the openness of concealed Being, beings can appear un-concealed.
The African spirit, especially in its great reverence of family, community and culture--whence one derives one's life, one's ability to interpret one's world, and one's capacity to respond--seems uniquely positioned to grasp this more fully. In contrast to Aristotle's classical `wonder,' these philosophers do not situate the person over against the object of his or her concern, reducing both to objects for detached study and manipulation. They look rather to the source whence reality is derived and are especially sensitive to its implications for the mode and manner of one's life as being essentially open, communicative, generous and sharing.

Harmony and Generosity

In the light of this sense of gift, it may be possible to extend the sense of the notions of duty and harmony beyond concern for the well-being of those with whom I share and whose well-being is in a sense my own. The good is not only what contributes to my perfection: I am not the center of meaning. Rather, being is received and, hence, is essentially out-going.

Seen in terms of gift, person and community manifest two principles for social dynamism in the development of a cultural tradition of harmony: complementarity which makes the formation of culture and interchange possible, and generosity which passes it along in an active process of tradition. First, as participants in the one, self-sufficient and purely spontaneous source, the many are not in principle antithetic or antipathetic one to another. Rather, as limited images they stand in a complementary relation to all other participants or images. This is reflected in the enjoyment experienced in simple companionship in which, by sharing the other's experience of being, each lives more fully: the result is more than the sum of its parts. What is true here of individual persons is true as well both of groups of peoples and of the cultures they create through self-knowledge. It is this complementarity, derived from their common origin, which makes cooperation in work and decision making, whether in commerce or in culture, fundamentally possible and ultimately desirable.

This has two important implications for our topic. Where the Greeks' focus upon their heritage had led to depreciating others as barbarians, the sense of oneself and of one's culture as radically gifted provides a basic corrective. Knowing and valuing oneself and one's culture as gifts implies more than merely reciprocating what the other does for me. It means, first, that others and their culture are to be respected simply because they, too, have been given or gifted by the one Transcendent source. This is an essential step which Gandhi, in calling outcasts by the name "harijans" or "children of God," urged us to take beyond the sense of pride or isolation in which we would see others in pejorative terms.

But mere respect may not be enough. In fact I and another, my people and another, originate from, share in and proclaim the same Self, especially as Good or Bliss. This implies that, to the degree that our cultural traditions share in the good, the relation between these integrating modes of human life is in principle one of complementarity. Hence, interchange as the effort to live this complementarity is far from being hopeless. In the pressing needs of our times, only an intensification of cooperation between peoples can make available the essential and immense stores of human experience and creativity. A positive virtue of love is our real basis for hope.

A second principle for interchange is to be found in the participated--the radically given or gifted--character of one's being. As one does not first exist and then receive, but one's very existence is a received existence or gift, to attempt to give back this gift, as in an exchange of presents, would be at once hopelessly too much and too little. On the one hand, to attempt to return in strict equivalence would be too much, for it is our very self that we have received as gift. On
the other hand, to think merely in terms of reciprocity would be to fall essentially short of my nature as one that is given, for to make a merely equivalent return would be to remain centered upon myself where I would cleverly trap, and then entomb, the creative power of being.

Rather, looking back I can see the futility of giving back, and in this find the fundamental importance of passing on the gift in the spirit in which it has been given. One's nature as given calls for a creative generosity which reflects that of one's source. Truly appropriate generosity lies in continuing the giving through participating in one's tradition, shaping it creatively in response to the needs of the day and the discoveries of the era, and handing this good to others. This requires a vast expansion or breaking out of oneself as the only center of one's concern. It means becoming effectively concerned with the good of others and of other groups, and for the promotion and vital growth of the next generation and those to follow.

**Implications for Social Life**

The implications of such generosity are broad and at times surprisingly personal. First, true openness to others cannot be based upon a depreciation of oneself or of one's own culture. Without appreciating one's worth, there would be nothing to share and no way to help, nor even the possibility of taking joy in the good of the other. Further, cultural interchange enables one to see that elements of one's life, which in isolation may have seemed to be merely local customs and purely repetitive in character, are more fundamentally modes in which one lives basic and essential human values. In meeting others and other cultures, one discovers the deeper meaning in one's own everyday life.

One does more than discover, however. One recognizes that in these transcendental values of life--of truth and freedom, of love and beauty--one participates in the dynamism of one's origin and, hence, must share these values in turn. More exactly, one can come to realize that real reception of these transcendental gifts lies in sharing them in loving concern in order that others may realize them as well. This means passing on one's own heritage and protecting and promoting what the next generation would freely become.

Finally, that other cultures are quintessentially products of self-cultivation by other spirits as free and creative implies the need to open one's horizons beyond one's own self-concerns to the ambit of the freedom of others. This involves promoting the development of other free and creative centers and cultures which, precisely as such, are not in one's own possession or under one's own control. One lives, then, no longer in terms merely of oneself or of things that one can make or manage, but in terms of an interchange between free men and peoples of different cultures. Personal responsibility is no longer merely individual decision making or for individual good. Effectively realized, the resulting interaction and mutual fecundation reaches out beyond oneself and one's own culture to reflect ever more perfectly the glory of the one source and goal of all.

This calls for a truly shared effort in which all respond fully, not only to common needs, but to the particular needs of each. This broad sense of tolerance and love in a time of tension has been described by Pope John Paul II as a state in which violence cedes to peaceful transformation, and conflict to pardon and reconciliation; where power is made reasonable by persuasion, and justice finally is implemented through love.
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