

Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change
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Psychology, Phenomenology and Chinese Philosophy

Edited By
Vincent Shen, Richard Knowles and Tran Van Doan

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Preface

The deep concerns of our day with the future of humankind compel us to a more comprehensive understanding of the human person in all its complexity. But how could we understand the human person in a scientific manner without falling into the trap of scientism, without limiting the infinite possibilities of human existence by the rigorism of methodological constraints? This is an urgent question which must be taken into serious consideration by all the human sciences. These began as human efforts to employ scientific means in order to grasp the full depth and complexity of human life. Now, however, they have come to be limited, quite paradoxically, in their capacity to understand the human person by their own more exigent concern with scientific rigor. Sadly enough, man no longer recognizes himself in the human sciences; it could be said even that man is being lost in the scientific research about man.

For example, psychology should be a science by which man could understand his own psychic activities, or, if you please, could understand the human mind. But all know that, from its establishment as a science till now, psychology has been occupied largely with empirical experimentation and mathematical formulation to the point that one attains hardly any self-understanding through scientific papers written by psychologists. The positivist way of doing psychology, in proclaiming itself to be scientific, gives the impression of being psychology without mind.

Thus, the human sciences are truly in need of a deeper philosophical reflection in order both to found themselves on solid ground and to be able to bring man to proper self-understanding. In this regard, two philosophical resources could be very helpful for integrating the sciences of man. In the tradition of Western philosophy, the development of phenomenology in the twentieth century offers new research orientations and conceptual frameworks through which the human sciences can bring man to self-understanding in a yet more radically scientific manner. Such philosophical concepts as intentionality, constitution, lifeworld, Dasein, existence, Being-in-the-world, and such methodological approaches as phenomenological reduction, intentional analysis, existential analysis and especially hermeneutics have provided the sciences of man with a new philosophical foundation. This rich potentiality is yet to be explored by scholars.

Of course, one might question the need for such a philosophical foundation for the sciences of man, especially after the nihilistic impact of post modernism on these sciences. But because man is free and full of infinite possibilities we should not take any theory concerning the philosophical foundation of the human sciences as the foundation itself. This does not mean that human beings are not well established. We human beings are free and in process; our search for philosophical foundations should enhance this self-understanding.

On the other hand, the Chinese philosophical tradition, begun in the sixth century B.C., has long developed ultimate concern for the self-understanding of man and his destiny. Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism, the three main currents of Chinese philosophy, in one sense or another are all philosophical discourses on man. Confucianism emphasizes the innerconnectedness between man, nature and other men, as well as the ethical order which should be established upon this in order to lead an harmonious life. Taoism emphasizes the freedom of man, his critical distance regarding dominative social power, and the inexhaustible resources upon which man could draw by tracing back to his origin in Tao, the ontological foundation of both man and nature. Buddhism emphasizes the spiritual enlightenment of man through a radical analysis of the metaphysical condition of human existence and the constitution of human consciousness. The rich philosophical

import of these three currents of the Chinese philosophical tradition remains to be explored and articulated in modern philosophical language.

This book is an attempt to bring new light to the sciences of man by appealing to the philosophical reflections of both phenomenology and Chinese philosophy. It is an outcome of a colloquium sponsored jointly by the Department of Philosophy of National Cheng Chi University, whose research is focused upon the philosophy of the social sciences and the modern interpretation of Chinese philosophy, and the Department of Psychology of Duquesne University, which specializes in phenomenological psychology.

I wish to thank all the authors who have contributed to this volume. It is their highly valued thought and research which forms the soul of this book. I would thank especially Professor Richard Knowles, Chair of the Department of Psychology, Duquesne University, whose cooperation made our joint colloquium possible, and Professor George McLean, Secretary General of the Council of Research in Value and Philosophy, whose vision and enthusiasm encouraged us to organize this colloquium. I want also to thank the Chiang Ching-kuo Foundation for its generous financial support of the publication of this volume.

Many others people who cooperated either in the organization of the colloquium or in the publication of this book are also to be thanked, especially my colleagues and students at the National Cheng Chi University's Department of Philosophy. Their generosity and efficiency exemplify the best creative interpretation of Chinese traditional values.

This book itself illustrates the truth that action is always a co-action and every knowledge a co-knowledge. It is my every hope that the result of this co-effort will be to bring together phenomenology and Chinese philosophy in deepening and developing the human sciences and eventually shedding new light on the nature and the future of the human person and all humankind.

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Foreword

The scientific methodology of the natural sciences has provided the model for the conduct of research in the social sciences. There this model holds the ascendancy, and the understanding gained on this basis is widely acknowledged. Although the model has had much to offer, however, scholars are becoming increasingly aware of its negative potential and its socially destructive consequences. Hence, some begin to question the adequacy of such a model for the conduct of the social sciences.

Its underlying Cartesian assumptions are being challenged; critiques of the experimental method, quantitative analysis and objectifying tendencies become more numerous. Many critiques point to the dehumanizing effects of this model, the trivial nature of its findings and its pseudo-scientific trappings. The most telling criticism, however, is in terms not so much of what this model produces, but of what it leaves out, namely, the human being in a human world. Hence, other and more recent philosophical traditions are now being examined for their potential for providing a more adequate basis for understanding in the social sciences.

In 1959 the graduate program of the Department of Psychology of Duquesne University was initiated with the intention of developing psychology as a human science, as an alternative to the natural scientific paradigms prevalent in the United States. Since then, 77 books, 745 articles and 144 doctoral dissertations have been published by the Department in furthering this project. In a historical survey of phenomenological, existential and humanistic psychologies, the Department was identified as "the capital of phenomenological psychology in the New World".

Professor Adrian van Kaam, the founder of the Department, used the European term "anthropological phenomenology" to describe the approach and defined it as "fundamentally a mode of existence of a psychologist who seeks a comprehensive or a differential knowledge of intentional behavior as this manifests itself, with the least possible imposition of psychological theory or method, personal and cultural prejudice or need, and language habit. Later, Professor Amedeo Giorgi clarified this approach to psychology further in a work entitled, *Psychology as a Human Science: a Phenomenologically Based Approach*. Throughout the more than 30 years of the program's existence, faculty members have been revising the various branches of psychology, critiquing their natural scientific biases and proposing models which are more reflective of human experience.

The present study is part of that search for an alternative philosophical foundation. In keeping with its desire to include the human, the term "human sciences" is used to differentiate from the term "social sciences" which is so closely tied to the natural scientific model.

An alternative philosophical foundation for the human sciences is sought in the phenomenological work of Edward Husserl and the existential-phenomenological work of Martin Heidegger; in consequence, the term "phenomenology" is used in the title.

Further, collaboration with philosophers in the Chinese cultural context showed the rich resources of that culture for responding to the need for a more humane approach to psychology. In dealing with Chinese scholars the philosophical foundations for the human sciences were broadened and additional implications for the conduct of the human sciences were uncovered. As a result, the title of this volume reads "Psychology, Phenomenology, and Chinese Philosophy". Here phenomenology and the Chinese Confucian, Buddhist and Taoist traditions collaborate in pointing to ways of so founding the human sciences that they may reflect more adequately the fullness of human life and experience.

I wish to thank Professor Vincent Shen, Chair of the Department of Philosophy at National Cheng Chi University, for his superb job of organizing the colloquium and for making it such a wonderful experience for the participants. He, his colleagues and students provided a climate of hospitality which greatly facilitated our examination and critical discussion of the papers presented special thanks are owned to Professor Tran Van Doan of the Department of Philosophy of National Taiwan University for developing and nurturing the idea of the colloquium from the very beginning. I would also like to thank Professor Suganne Bamard, EVA SIMMS and Michael Sipiora of the Psychology Department of Duquesne University for their editorial assistance and all those whose cooperation and good will made the colloquium such a productive and enjoyable experience.

Introduction

The development of the human sciences both reflects and struggles with the fateful historic choices made by Descartes at the beginning of modern times. His choice of clarity and distinctness, based on his assessment of the needs of knowledge in his times, had unexpected and unintended results. In his *First Meditation* he showed that because of the clarity of dreams and the fictive capabilities of the imagination sense impressions could not be depended upon to provide the basis for the universal, clear and distinct content for the science of reality he sought. Others, however, in the empiricist tradition, were willing to settle for a science which would be universal only in the mode of cooperation between scientists, but piecemeal in its content (R. Carnap, *Vienna Manifesto*). The developing technological capabilities in recent decades have provided this approach to the human sciences with immense stores of concrete data and sophisticated methods for their manipulation.

The first article in Part I by Wallner and Durnwalder points to the problem of making such date relevant to the life world of human beings. It proposes a reflection on scientific constructs in order to make them understandable in terms of their connections with, and differences from, everyday life. In contrast to these suggestions for a "constructive realism", the rest of the articles in part I more radically question the adequacy of the natural scientific model and see phenomenology and Chinese philosophy as more promising approaches for the human sciences.

Part I in general questions the adequacy of such data for the human project. This question received definitive propulsion from the destructive "success" of the physical sciences in the two World Wars of the twentieth century and of the human sciences in the hands of the totalitarian and liberal rationalist ideologies in this century. The paper of G.B. Madison illustrates brilliantly, through an analysis of economics, how destructively blind is an approach which fails to take account of human values and preferences, and how these can be revealed through an hermeneutic sensitivity to price taken as text.

This, in turn, raises deeper questions about the relation of body and spirit which had been divided by Descartes in his pursuit of clarity and distinctness. The chapter of G.F. McLean looks to classical ways of integrating both in the deeper unity of the human person. This provides the context for the following two parts of volume concerned with phenomenology and its attempts to unveil the more properly human dimension of meaning in the human sciences.

Part II turns directly to the work of phenomenology in this regard. Professor R. von Echartsberg provides an overview of the different approaches which come under this heading and their relation to psychology.

Professor Cheng-Yun Tsai analyses the complex struggle of Edmund Husserl to distinguish his emerging phenomenology from the science of psychology. It is most significant for our project that he may never have succeeded in effectively establishing this distinction. This chapter is able to identify, however, his main conclusion, namely, that "every attempt at grasping things as they are 'in themselves' culminates in a 'retiring into oneself', . . . to ask how can consciousness constitute that wherein it is presumed to belong, . . . just as every attempt at grasping things as they are 'for us' throws us back into the world of things in themselves."

The chapter of Peter Kun-yu-Woo analyzes the key concept of "epoché" in Husserl's thought, with special attention to non-attention. This uncovers an important relation to Lao-Tsu's method of negation, which is a key element in the Chinese tradition.

Part III follows the development of phenomenology from issues of consciousness in Husserl to those of being in the work of Heidegger and illustrates the ongoing discussion among Chinese scholars in assimilating the thought of Martin Heidegger. Professor Chen Weng-Chauk turns to the T'ien-ta'ai school of Buddhism and its notion of momentary mind as negative human cooperation in letting being be. In contrast, Professor Thaddeus T'ui-chieh Hang would turn to the positive psychological dimension in Confucius' rather passive notion of *hsin*. He analyzes its evolution through key phases of the Chinese tradition and points out its openness to transcendence. Indeed, he shows the destructive effects of treating this cynically for political reasons through the example of the time of the Warring States.

The following two chapters carry further the investigation of Heidegger's phenomenology and relate it to the human sciences. Professor Shen does this by studying the character of structures which the structuralists had considered to be in some contrast to the humanizing contributions of phenomenology. He shows that, in fact, there is need to introduce the agent in addition to the structure, the diachronic work of freedom over the synchronic, and the person in addition to formal systems. Masterfully, he follows these factors through Husserl and Heidegger, and then shows how, over and above those insights, Confucius added attention to the human agent and how Taoism added a teleology. Both are needed in order to transcend the neutral or even destructive focus upon interests and power as principles of Habermas' critical theory.

The chapter of G. Florival follows yet another route pointing to affectivity. She elaborates her own creative phenomenological path from the body in space and time, through affectivity, to relations to others, sociality and culture. Through a phenomenology of gift this culminates in a sense of Being which loves.

Part IV applies these insights to psychology as a human science. The chapter of Professor Tran van Doan follows the social noesis and its evolution in key figures from Plato, through Descartes and Kant, to Husserl and Heidegger. Its goal is to protect the search for forms from becoming determining and necessitating, and instead open this to the significance of being in time. But he does not rest there; instead he points out how this must be carried forward by problem discovery and problem solution. This takes us back to the positive, if not exclusive, potentialities found in the first paper and suggests ways of transcending the reductivist scientific character of tendencies in employing empirical data in the human sciences.

The two chapters of Professor Maes carry this further first by showing how focused concrete work has become important in our increasingly pluralistic times. At the same time he alerts all to the related danger of reductionist forgetfulness of the mystery of being and its transcendence. His analysis of formation science deftly integrates tradition with the present, principles with the historical, and formation science with faith.

Finally, an integrating psychological theory for work in developmental psychology is constructed by Professor R. Knowles, using the structure of Erikson as a point of departure but enriching this with insights from phenomenology, the faith tradition, and emphases upon the dignity and responsibility of the human person in his or her relations to others in love.

In this way, the volume proves to be both highly integrated and broadly integrating. The volume looks not only for parallels within the Chinese Confucian, Buddhist and Taoist traditions, but for the ways in which the work of Lao Tsu and others make distinctive and complementary contributions in the common human effort more adequately to develop psychology as an authentically human science. Prospectively, it follows closely and deeply the evolution of phenomenology in its key architects, Husserl and Heidegger; it notably enriches this with insights from the Chinese tradition; it carries further the work by original work on affectivity in human

social interaction and shows how this is unfolded concretely in the long traditions of personal formation, both East and West.

George F. McLean

Part I
The Person and the Human Sciences

1. Science, Psychology and Realism

Fritz Wallner and Kurt Durnwalder

The intent of this chapter is to make clear the importance of the scientific psychologist's "detachment" from everyday life. This is seen as a necessary condition for a psychology primarily interested in a scientific method, rather than in engagement in the various possible actions of daily life.

We shall outline the development of two different objects; the worlds of knowledge in everyday life on the one hand, and the knowledge of scientific psychology, on the other. Two approaches will be presented: a phenomenological position that discusses the possibility of reducing this "detachment", and the position of constructive realism interested in maintaining the notion of "detachment" with a view to the constructive aspects of science.

There are common as well as different aspects in the approaches to psychology by a constructive realism and phenomenology. Both are concerned with detachment, but attribute it a different function: phenomenology tries to remove the detachment, while for constructive realism this has the character of reflection. Also, where phenomenology discusses the *Lebenswelt* as the recognized world in everyday life, constructive realism stresses the difference between the given and the constructed worlds.¹

Undoubtedly, psychology seems to withdraw more and more from its subject, and *vice versa* the subject withdraws from it. Several obvious signs of this "detachment" have drawn little attention among scientific psychologists. We shall attempt to show that "detachment" is necessary for psychology as a science. In that context we shall sketch also the problem of a different approach which attempts to reduce "detachment" in order, in Husserl's words, to reach "the things themselves."²

Moments of Detachment

To what extent do scientific statements about man differ from man's statements about himself? There are several ways of looking at this problem:

(a) With regard to *content*, a scientific statement differs clearly from a statement in everyday life. The intention to formulate a scientific statement is in itself a withdrawal from its subject; in other words, the psychologist's statements about his or her human subject differ from the statements man makes about himself. As such, this attempt shows the psychologist's detachment from his subject. Yet, this problem seems soluble inasmuch as this detachment can be done away with by communication.

(b) With regard to *language*, a scientific statement is formulated mostly in a more complicated manner than a statement made in daily life and thus often is unintelligible for an "ordinary person". Scientific language is full of specially developed, technical and mathematical terms, and requires a considerable effort to be understood. A language developed specifically for a scientific purpose turns out to be an obstacle. It is very rarely that psychologists try to translate theories into "ordinary" language, and the few attempts generally represent science in a distorted way. "Ordinary man", in order to understand scientific statements about himself, has to learn a new

vocabulary and new mathematical terms. This cannot be compared to learning a foreign language, which signifies the same or almost the same objects as in another tongue. To learn a scientific vocabulary is to learn complete theories and to open new fields in the object. This is not only a problem of learning another language, but primarily of learning a new reality, for the reality signified by scientific statements is different from the one we daily regard as our "Wirklichkeit" (environment, world we live in).³

In other words, translation is a question not only of language, but also of "experience": how would something be expressed in everyday life or by a phenomenologist? For the "ordinary" man taking part in an experiment, the experimental task normally is the only psychological reality to which he has access. The experimental situation as such is not intelligible for him; he is unaware of the range of variables and the experimental plan, of the theories and hypotheses of the experimenters and of their reduction of the amount of information.

(c) In their *claim to truth* scientific statements differ from everyday statements. Starting from the presumption that "ordinary" knowledge is insufficient as knowledge about man, a scientific approach would formulate criteria of objectivity, validity and reliability which do not correspond with everyday life.

How did it come about that scientific psychologists prefer the experiment over the "Lebenswelt"?⁴ The psychologist's answer is simple: everyday situations cannot be controlled in a way that would enable an observer to make exact, i.e., reliable and objective, statements. Research corresponding to the criteria of science is not possible in such situations.

Clearly defined, i.e., controlled, situations are essential in order to make scientific statements. These conditions can be set up identically again and again. The experiment can thus be repeated and the psychological law reexamined. In daily life such a systematic manipulation of the conditions is impossible.

(d) Scientific statements refer mostly to experimental situations, whereas statements of the "ordinary" man about himself nearly always relate to non-experimental situations of daily life. The circumstance has to be simplified in such a way that the supposedly relevant variables can be isolated and thus repeated and/or eliminated. Only a controlled inserting and/or eliminating of variables facilitates a definite causal interpretation. The psychologist, in a certain way, creates a new world; this "microworld,"⁵ as we shall call it, replaces the *Lebenswelt*. The experimental situation of independent variables is nothing but a microworld. Statements of scientific psychology refer to the microworld and not to the *Lebenswelt*.

A scientific psychologist's aim is to analyze the complexity of the everyday world and thus to obtain simplified structures. The higher the complexity, the more and smaller the microworlds will be. The intention of simplifying the *Lebenswelt* produces more complexity in the microworld that represents the scientific reality.

(e) Scientific statements about man are mostly specific but at the same time general. Man, in everyday life, is interested in statements about his own subjective life: neither specific nor general, but subject-specific and integral.

The splitting up of the *Lebenswelt* into microworlds is particularly problematic when carried out because men regard themselves as individuals, or at least try to. The object of our interest, i.e., man, no matter what his function in research, is suitable for scientific statements only if these are comparable; that is, scientific statements about man make sense only if he is subjected to the same conditions as the total experimental situation (part of which he is), and thus subject to the scientist's control.

It is obvious that man differs from other--non-human--variables in that he cannot be inserted and/or eliminated at will. Yet, psychologists arrive at general statements about man, which they do by abstraction: they ignore all the differences of their subjects in order to concentrate upon those categories that can be abstracted from individuality, e.g., sex, age, profession and other "objective" attributes. It becomes more difficult when verbal utterances, behavior or subtly differentiated aspects of action are compared; such complex categories cannot be isolated objectively, but often are "spelled out" in one way or another.

What was meant to be a simplification turns out to be unsatisfactory. Details taken out of a common context of action cannot be added to a whole object. Thereby they lose their function as a detail and become closed and independent microworlds, of interest only to a small group of scientists; they have nothing in common with their "first" object. They were taken out of the context of common knowledge in response to the scientific interest of constructing a situation corresponding to the conditions of science, not as a way of solving problems of everyday action.

Thus, the question arises whether, given the constructed situation and the removal of individuality, statements in daily life and scientific statements even refer to the same subject. The answer is not as simple as it may seem at first. For how can we test whether various statements refer to the same subject, and who can or shall do the testing? To what should basic statements refer? Is it the subject of science or is it the subject of everyday life from which science originally started out?

The Common Referent

If we agree that the basic subject is that of daily life, the answer to our questions depends first upon the extent to which the experimental situation parallels and coincides with the everyday situation, thus making possible "transference"; and second, whether the levelling of individuality has changed the subject into something different from man's initial way of seeing himself.

There will be transferability between the experimental and the everyday situation only if scientific laws are used for prediction about everyday life. But there is a basic problem. Even if such predictions were possible, one would still have to demonstrate that the situation described is subject to the laws of science. This demonstration is impossible as long as the conditions of daily life differ from those of the experimental situation. But if there were no difference between the two, there would be no need for an experiment.

Without abstractions--i.e., constructions⁶--we could not compare experimental structures to those of everyday life. We could merely rely on the usefulness of the laws and suppose that the structures of experimental and everyday life situations are similar. Whenever our forecasts turn out to be successful, we would insist on the structural similarity. We want to stress that the fact that laws prove themselves worthwhile does not result from the structural similarity, but only from the "success" and our consequent reliance upon them.

If we derive the similarity of structures from the "success" of laws, we must not infer that structures in scientific statements represent the structures of everyday life. If it is true that structural similarity is derived from the usefulness, and scientific statements contain something new and different from "ordinary" statements, this means that "similarity" can only be asserted when new possibilities of action are opened up in the *Lebenswelt*,⁷ for only in regard to new actions can scientific statements be proved. Scientific knowledge does not represent *Lebenswelt* (the recognizable in everyday life) because it has changed the subject and its situation.

No "ordinary man" would assert that human persons are totally individual and incomparable to others. We can also rule out that they are interested in as many things as a scientific psychologist, for what is developed by psychologists is partly irrelevant to man. Correspondingly, on his part, his own individuality is not adequately respected by science, and its general statements seem of little use. It may sound strange, but most people are unaware of the scientific results about themselves. They neither know them nor wish to know them; instead, they are preoccupied with psychological literature of a type dismissed by scientific psychologists who are scientific in the above sense.

These psychologists trying to explain this "strange" attitude would refer to a certain tendency towards irrationalism or the fear of being overtaxed, but only rarely to the fact that science cannot satisfy human needs. Literature which responds to human needs, regardless of the "qualities" evaluated by scientists, evokes in the reader the feeling that it is about him and concerns him, whereas their responses to scientific literature are clearly different.

But we are not interested primarily in emotions. It is in the formulation of questions that the scientific psychologist has withdrawn from the individual, not only because of the nomothetical conditions of objectivity, but because it is the scientist who asks the questions and not the individual. Accepting scientifically formulated statements only, the psychologist rules out individuality. Thus, the problem in the levelling of individuality is first of all not a difference in the description of the subject, but a difference in interest; the difference in description is a consequent.

Let us return to the problem of a common referent. Whether psychological statements and ordinary statements refer to the same subject depends on the parallelism between experimental structures and those of everyday situations. The parallelism depends on the success of the experimental law in forecasting everyday situations; this predictability, in turn, depends upon the ordinary man's readiness to rely on scientific laws and results. The exclusion of individuality in scientific statements has its manifestation not in a neglect of one among the many aspects of human life, but in the decreasing tendency to rely on scientific laws.

Do scientific statements and ordinary statements refer to the same subject? On the basis of our analysis, the question is pointless as long as "referring to a subject" means to represent it.⁸ However, the question does make sense if we look at it in view of new possibilities of action.⁹ If such possibilities are opened up in everyday life, we can conclude pragmatically that there are parallel structures between the scientific reality and everyday reality (*Lebenswelt*). Possibilities of action are essential in order to assume a possible comparison. If this is not the case, we have to argue for different subjective fields between science and daily life. The scientist's detachment from daily life consists not in inadequate representation, but in the failure to open up enough useful possibilities of action at a time when life is changing even more rapidly. A psychology aimed at the things themselves (in a phenomenological sense) has to start with the problems and tasks of every day and the difference between reality and *Wirklichkeit* (hard facts).¹⁰

Suggestions for a Constructive Realism

A constructive realism would not want to destroy or relativize any scientific theory or to disturb scientific work in any way. But it reflects the conviction that the scientific structuring of the world, i.e., the elaboration of constructs of reality, is not completed by the realization of the scientific construct, but that these constructs must be made understandable. This is possible only by means of reflection, which, in turn, constructs. This is done by changing the contextual of a

proposition system with a view to drawing out its implicit presuppositions. Under new and strange contextual conditions the "tacit knowledge"¹¹ of the proposition system will emerge. This procedure avoids the logical analysis of proposition systems because the really important aspects of such systems cannot be ruled out outside of the connections between the propositions and their special life forms. By seeing the implicit presuppositions of scientific constructs we are able to understand their connections and their differences from everyday life.

In this kind of reflection, by varying the contexts we become aware of the prejudices of various scientific theories. But this is not the main aim, for two or three kinds of worlds may be able to exist together: *Wirklichkeit*, or environment, is the world we live with before any reflection; *Lebenswelt* is the world of everyday life and reflects the process of "surviving"; while *Realität*, or reality, is the world of scientific constructs needed for the work of scientific psychology.

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Notes

1. K. Buhler, *Die Krise der Psychologie* (Jena, 1927).

2. E. Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen*, 3Bde 4, Aufl (Halle, 1928).

3. A constructive realism would thematize the difference between "Realität" as the constructed part of the world and "Wirklichkeit" as the world we live in with. F. Wallner, "Konstruktiver Realismus. Konzept und ziele" (Research paper, Department of Epistemology and Cognitive science, Vienna, 1990), and "8 Vorlesungen zum konstruktiven Realismus," (Wien, 1990).

It is important to note that "Wirklichkeit" and "Lebenswelt" (as phenomenological terms) do not have exactly the same meaning. *Wirklichkeit* is in contrast to the known world, whereas *Lebenwelt* means the world we "known" in everyday life.

4. A. Schutz and Th. Luckmann, *Strukturen der Lebenswelt*, 2Bde. (Frankfurt, amM., 1979).

5. K. Durnwalder, "Wissenschaft und Alltag. Zur Frage nach der Wahrheit," *Distal*, Nr. 44. This discusses in a more general way the differences between everyday life and science, thematizing the problem of truth and understanding scientific knowledge in relation to everyday life.

6. A constructive realism would say that we could not compare experimental structures to those of everyday life without the construction of the two realities, for we have no access to "Wirklichkeit" as such for comparing it with reality. F. Wallner, "Knstruktiver Realismus—was verstehen wir darunter und zu welchem Zwecke entwickeln wir ihn" (Research paper, Department of Epistemology and Cognitive Science, Vienna, 1990).

7. A Central intention of constructive realism is to make possible reflection on the constructive parts of scientific knowledge. For it suggests the special method of "Verfremdung" or Strangification. F. Wallner, "8 Vorlesungen zum Konstruktiven Realismus" (Wien, 1990).

8. *Ibid.*

9. K. Durnwalder.

10. The difference between the two concepts is explained in detailed by F. Wallner, "8 Vorlesungen zum Konstruktiven Realismus" (Wien, 1990), p. 39ff.

11. M. Polanyi, *The Tacit Dimension* (New York, 1966).

2.

The Primacy of Action and Its Scientific Consequences for the Hermeneutics of the Human Sciences

G.B. Madison

The Text

Those familiar with the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, to whom Paul Ricoeur referred as "the greatest of French phenomenologists," will easily recognize the inter-textual allusion in the title of this paper. It is a transformative echo to the title of an address Merleau-Ponty gave to the Société française de philosophie in 1946 in which he set out and defended the argument of his major work, *The Phenomenology of Perception*, which had appeared a few months earlier. The title of his address was: "The Primacy of Perception and Its Philosophical Consequences."¹ In this paper I would like, in the spirit of Merleau-Ponty, to reflect on the significance of present-day philosophical or phenomenological hermeneutics for both the theory and the practice of the human sciences. Merleau-Ponty himself, you will recall, was greatly interested in the human sciences. Viewed in retrospect, his work can be seen to anticipate many of the themes which subsequently have been emphasized by hermeneutics.

Despite the prominence of the term "perception" in Merleau-Ponty's writings, especially his earlier ones, it would not be at all inappropriate to say that he attempted above all to portray the human subject as an acting subject. Certainly Merleau-Ponty's concern with perception had nothing whatsoever to do with the guiding concerns of modern epistemology, which considered perception to be the means by which the "mind" (the "inner man") was supposedly able to form correct "representations" of external reality.² Being a phenomenologist, he adhered fully to the exigencies and the lessons of phenomenological reduction. He effected a decisive break with the guiding concerns of modern, epistemologically centered philosophy (and thus can fittingly be characterized as "postmodern"³). For Merleau-Ponty, perception itself was to be understood not "epistemologically" (in a representational-referentialist context), but as a dimension of human action, as the activity of a bodily, mobile subject engaged pragmatically with the objects of its practical concern. Quoting Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, he said: "Your abode is your act itself. Your act is you."⁴

If I am emphasizing the notion of action, it is because this notion seems particularly apt to effect a conjunction between the tenets of phenomenological hermeneutics and the concerns of the human sciences. How so? Because, in the first place, the proper object of the human sciences is nothing other than human action and its results or consequences. This obviously is true of such disciplines as history, economics, and sociology, and even of psychology, although I will not attempt to argue that point here. Ludwig von Mises in fact entitled his major work in economic theory *Human Action*.⁵ The human sciences are concerned with what people do, the meaning of what they do, why and how they do it, and the consequences of their doing what they do. This you may grant; but what, you might wish to ask, does it have to do with hermeneutics? Is not hermeneutics concerned not with what people do, but with what they "say"--not with action but with texts (biblical, juridical, literary, etc.)?

In response, it could be asserted that human discourse (oral or written) is itself one of the prime means human beings *qua* human have of acting--or at least of making their actions

intelligible to themselves and to others. In any event, this demand for intelligibility or meaning which can come only through language would seem to be the defining characteristic of human existence. To count as human, "action" must be such as to give rise to "glosses," commentaries, or interpretations. What, after all, is historiography if not the written account of what people have done? And what, again, is anthropology if not the *logos* (the linguistic account) of how people arrange their collective lives? In any event, to speak like Heidegger, I would want to maintain that action and language are, at the very least, "equiprimordial" (*gleichursprünglich*) as defining traits of that being which we ourselves are.

Hermeneutics may be, in the first instance, that discipline concerned with the correct reading or interpretation of texts, but for all practical, i.e., disciplinary, purposes is there any way that we can understand human action except by viewing it as a kind of text, a "quasi-text" as Paul Ricoeur would say? This, of course, refers to a seminal article by Ricoeur, entitled "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text" which had considerable impact on the practitioners of the human sciences, such as the ethnographer, Clifford Geertz.⁶ To quote from one of my recent publications:

Acting beings may be what we are, but how, as beings which have an insatiable desire to understand what we are and do, can we understand what we are and do other than by speaking and writing about it? It would be hard to deny, I think, that it is only by considering action as a text that we can hope to come to some understanding of it, and thus of that being which essentially we are.⁷

To sum up the argument thus far. The principal object (subject matter) of the human sciences is human action. As academic disciplines, these seek to make human action intelligible, to understand it; this is their formal object. In order to be made intelligible human action must in the last analysis be viewed "on the model of the text," as a kind of quasi-text. Therefore hermeneutics, which at its (historical) core is the general theory of textual interpretation, has something to contribute to the methodology and practice of the human sciences. I would like to make this general and abstract argument clearer and more concrete by focusing on one human science in particular, namely that science called "economics."

Economics as a Science

At first glance, this might seem to be a rather odd choice. After all, economics would appear to be the most "unhumanistic" of the human sciences as much of the discipline today is dominated by formal, mathematical reasoning. Economics would seem to be that human science which has succeeded best in realizing what Lewis White Beck once referred to as "the natural science ideal," by best approximating the rigor and exactitude thought to be the hallmark of the natural sciences.⁸ Undoubtedly, it is no accident that, precisely because it has been so viewed, economics has been a favorite object of traditional, analytic philosophy of science which always has operated under the assumption that the natural sciences provide the paradigm of knowledge itself, a model to be emulated by the human sciences to the degree that they too seek to lay claim to epistemic validity.

Looks can be deceiving, however. Not only, pursuant to the collapse of Keynesianism, is a general consensus on basic theorems lacking in economics, but the discipline itself is today in methodological disarray. As Ludwig Lackmann has observed, economics has entered "A tempestuous season."⁹ One can legitimately doubt whether the "queen of the social sciences," as some refer to it, is still entitled to her crown. Or, to vary the metaphor, people are discovering that

the emperor is very scantily clad, indeed. In this situation an increasing number of economists have been led to question received doctrine and to cast doubt upon the validity of mainline, neoclassical economics. A small, but significant, number even have turned to phenomenology and hermeneutics in an attempt to reconceptualize their discipline.¹⁰

Much of this current discussion turns on methodological issues. Is economics a science, and, if so, what kind of science is it? What is its proper object, and what "method" or approach is best suited to that object? Traditionally, ever since the nineteenth century, economists, awed by the "natural science ideal," have sought to model their science after physics.¹¹ Their highest goal has been to make of economics a social physics, a kind of Newtonian mechanics of human affairs. Thus, to speak in phenomenological terms, it must be said that economics has been one of the prime victims of naturalism and objectivism; it is, as economist Philip Mirowski has said, "the social science most addicted to "the Cartesian vice."¹² It is precisely this "slavish imitation of the method and language of science," as F.A. Hayek referred to it,¹³ that today is being contested by those economists who have renounced the positivism that still tends to prevail in the discipline and who have turned to hermeneutics.

As Husserl taught in his *Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, modern, mathematical, physicalist science of the Galilean sort originates in a methodological option fraught with far-ranging consequences. Husserl referred to Galileo as "at once a discovering and a concealing genius."¹⁴ The originality of Galilean science is that it deliberately and methodically turns its back on the real world of human experience, the life-world, substituting for it a world of idealized abstractions. Out of the world of ordinary human experience it first abstracts those features, and only those, which can be measured with exactitude in a fully objective way (the so-called "primary qualities"); subsequently, it idealizes them, i.e., redefines the world in terms of these abstractions and idealizations whose very existence is a result of the new method itself. As Husserl pointed out, the fateful move of Galilean science consists in its "Tak[ing] for true being what is actually a method."¹⁵ Summing up the lesson of Husserl's investigations into the origins of the modernist mentality, David Carr remarks: "The scientific conception must be regarded as a view of the world, a certain way of looking at it and dealing with it which serves certain purposes."¹⁶ In other words, the so-called objective world of science is but a particular interpretation of the world of our immediate experience; by no means does Science provide us with an "objective picture" of the "real" world. Galilean science deals not with realities but with idealizations. As Husserl remarked in another late work, *Experience and Judgment*, scientific objectivities are "nothing more than a garb of ideas thrown over the world of immediate intuition and experience, the life-world."¹⁷

To be sure, the particular, idealizing interpretation of the life-world that is modern science has proven its worth in many respects. To view nature, as modern science came to view it, as nothing more than matter in motion whose laws can be discovered and expressed in mathematical formulae, does indeed, as Carr says, serve certain purposes. These purposes were clearly articulated early on by Descartes in his *Discourse on Method*; they are such as to enable humankind to become "masters and possessors of nature." In enabling us to "explain" and "predict" natural phenomena, modern science enables us to control these phenomena, to achieve mastery and dominance over them. To paraphrase Heidegger, it must be said that the very essence of modern science is in fact technology.¹⁸ Whatever epistemic "truth-value" scientific propositions may have, I would want to maintain, resides entirely in their technological use-value. Modern science should be placed under the rubric not of *epistemè*, but of *technè*.

Whether or not science-technology is the best, or even the only proper way to understand nature, will not be treated here, though recent ecological studies might give pause for reflection. Whether or not, on the other hand, this is the most proper way to understand human reality is quite another question, indeed an inescapable one from a phenomenological perspective. Let us then return to economics.

If the object of historiography is "history" and the object of sociology is "society," the object of economics is what is called an "economy." But just what, one might well ask, is an "economy"? Is it, as natural systems are thought to be, a self-contained realm of determinate, cause-and-effect relations subsisting somehow independently of flesh and blood human beings, something that accordingly can be understood in abstraction from them, i.e., in purely objective terms? This, of course, is how modern economics sought to conceive an economy in its attempt to liberate itself from the domain of "moral philosophy" in order to make itself over into a Newtonian mechanics of human affairs.

But is not an economy, like a culture in the anthropological sense of the term, simply the sedimented result of human action, the particular outcome of the ways in which a community of human beings have sought to regulate that aspect of human existence which has to do with the production and exchange of goods and services? Who would seriously want to deny this? From a hermeneutical point of view, however, certain important consequences would seem to follow if it is indeed the case that economics has to do not with objectivities which are supposed to exist "in themselves", but with human action.

Human Action vs Economic Man

The most important of these consequences is that, to be understood properly, human action calls for a different mode of analysis than the one which is applicable to mere bodily or physical motion. The reason for this is quite simple. Unlike the "action" of one physical, e.g., planetary, body upon another, human action cannot be understood in what is specific to it unless one takes into account categories other than those employed by cause-and-effect, physicalistic explanation. These are the categories of meaning and purpose. As the Austrian economist, Ludwig von Mises, has remarked, the two basic, indeed, as he would say, aprioristic, characteristics of action are to "remove uneasiness" and to make ourselves "better off." Action is by definition purposeful or teleological; it is the deliberate attempt on the part of human beings to improve their position, to make their lives more livable, more meaningful. "There is," von Mises insisted, "no human being to whom is foreign the intent to substitute by appropriate conduct one state of affairs for another state of affairs that would prevail if he did not interfere."¹⁹ Thus, unlike the behavior of natural entities, as modern science conceives of it human action is essentially intentional.

Implied in what I have just said is that human action is future oriented. To say that action is intentional is to say that, unlike natural being, human reality is never understandable in terms merely of what it actually is, but, as Heidegger pointed out, only in terms of the nonexistent future into which it is constantly projecting itself. Humans act in order to bring into being a state of affairs which would not exist, or would not likely exist, unless they acted. This is precisely in contrast to the future of physical systems, as understood by classical physics, which in principle is fully determinable or "predictable" (cf. Laplace). This is another way of saying that if we act, it is because the future is inherently indeterminate and uncertain, which, of course, is another way of saying that human action is creative and not merely adaptive. All action involves genuine risk and is a way of coping with ignorance and uncertainty. From a phenomenological point of view, these

are all basic characteristics of human agency; for the most part they are, however, ones which mainline economists have preferred to ignore.²⁰ The reason economists have ignored them is because they are simply not conceptualizable within the naturalistic and atemporal universe of discourse which economists have adopted in their attempt to make of economics an exact science like physics.²¹ With the methodologically determined conceptuality of neoclassical economics it makes no more sense to speak of risk, ignorance, uncertainty, and creativity than it does from a behaviorist point of view to speak of the "freedom and dignity" of human beings.²²

For mainline economics human beings are not the acting beings we encounter in our surrounding life-world, but idealized abstractions in the Husserlian sense. Like the stylized body which appears in the pages of anatomy textbooks of which Merleau-Ponty speaks, *homo economicus* is nobody in particular. He, or (I should say) it, is an entity which is fully transparent to itself, fully in control of itself, fully aware of its needs and desires, fully "given." It is, in addition, fully cognizant of, or has complete "information" about, the objective situation in which it operates; its behavior is solely "adaptive". *Homo economicus* is a rational entity through and through, reason being understood here in a purely calculative-instrumental sense; it is in fact an instant, lightning calculator of pleasures and pains and a maximizer or optimizer of its own lucidly grasped utility. It is, thus, no accident that many economists have looked to the formal disciplines of game theory and decision theory for their models (cf. the recent theory of Rational Expectations).²³ *Homo economicus* knows nothing of that of which ordinary human beings have such an acute and often painful awareness: their own ignorance and uncertainty. At the limit, this becomes the experience of *Angst* and of nothingness. The economic man of neoclassical economics is mercifully spared the difficult task of having to cope with that which, being uncertain, is unknowable, i.e., the future.²⁴

Economic man also exists in a world which bears no resemblance to the life-world of ordinary human beings. This, as Husserl said, is a world shot through with surrounding-fringe realms of indeterminacy; in the words of Merleau-Ponty, it is a world of insurpassable ambiguity. Just as economic man is fully "given," is "all there," so also is his world. Like the world of classical physics which never gains or loses anything in regard to its total sum of energy, the world of neoclassical economics is essentially static, fully determinate in itself. The sacrosanct concept of mainline economic thinking is that of "equilibrium." Owing to their slavish adherence to physicalistic models, economists assume that all economic activity aims at, and must be understood in terms of, equilibrium, just as Nature herself is thought to be "economical," subservient to the Law or the Conservation of Energy, and in marked contrast to the wild profligacy of nature as Nietzsche envisaged it. This is a form of what one author has called "mechanomorphism"²⁵--a thoroughgoing and reductively mechanistic way of conceiving the activities of economic agents, which is to say, of market processes. Against this standard approach the interpretive economists, Boettke, Horwitz, and Prychitko, have argued persuasively that "the imaginary construction of general equilibrium is [not] an appropriate and helpful tool for understanding the world." "Much of modern economics," they observe, "is trapped in an ahistorical [timeless] equilibrium world, unable to render intelligible the purposive action of human beings in the real world."²⁶

Now, from a methodological point of view, one cannot avoid asking what value the concepts of a given discipline have if they ignore crucial aspects of the object they seek to explain. If in the case of human beings action enjoys ontological primacy, does it not follow that when it comes to the human sciences action should enjoy methodological priority as well? If economics is unable to account for certain basic characteristics of human action by means of such purely objectivistic

concepts as "economic man" and "general equilibrium"--if, in fact, in relying on such concepts it actually draws a distorted picture of human action--does this not mean that a different approach is called for? Is it not time for economics to follow the lead of other human sciences and abandon its purely objectivistic approach for a more hermeneutic or interpretive one, that is to say, an approach which is not causalistic, but instead has for its explicit focus the category of meaning?

I do not wish to imply by these remarks that there is no place in economics---or in any other human science--for concepts and assumptions of a strictly objectivistic or physicalistic sort. To employ the language of traditional hermeneutic theory, I do not wish to set up a rigid opposition between explanation (*Erklärung*) and understanding (*Verstehen*), and I do not wish to argue, as a Wittgensteinian, Peter Winch, did a number of years ago, that the explanatory techniques of natural science are never appropriate in the social sciences and that all that we can legitimately do in them is to describe a given world (an "economy," in this case) in the terms that the actors in it would themselves use, were they given the chance.²⁷

Rather, like Paul Ricoeur, I think it much more profitable to view human understanding in general as a kind of continuum and to say that purely explanatory techniques have their legitimate place in the overall interpretive process, that they form one segment of what Ricoeur calls the hermeneutical arc.²⁸ The use of formal, quantitative models and the attempt to construct "objective," causal explanations of human action are a hindrance to the proper understanding of human action only when--as, unfortunately, often happens to be the case--they are taken as the last word, as providing a sufficient "explanation" of human action. Objectivistic explanations are certainly helpful to some degree in making human affairs more intelligible, and they do have a certain limited usefulness in predicting, and thus controlling, human affairs. But it must be recognized that the intelligibility they provide is necessarily partial and one-sided since they rest upon idealized abstractions. The point stressed by hermeneutics is that human action cannot adequately or fittingly be understood until the results of the explanatory approach are taken up and integrated into a wider, interpretive understanding or analysis in terms of meaning. When this is not done, the intelligibility achieved by objective measuring techniques comes at the expense of genuine understanding, because objectivistic explanations either fail to make any contact whatsoever with the actual world in which we live or, worse still, they induce in us a kind of epistemic blindness in relation to this world.²⁹ I shall argue below that this has important consequences as regards economic policy.

Economics as Hermeneutics

From the above, it should be obvious that in writing of an interpretive or hermeneutic approach to human action I do not mean providing an account of action solely in terms of the meaning that it has for the actors themselves, i.e., the meaning consciously intended by them. One of the things that, in opposition to hermeneutics of a more traditional sort,³⁰ phenomenological hermeneutics has sought to emphasize is that the concept of meaning is itself in need of revision. It must be, as it were, depsychologized. The meaning of a text, for instance, cannot be equated with the meaning intended by the author of the text. As Ricoeur has said, although we cannot conceive of a text without an author, yet the fact of the matter is that "the text's career escapes the finite horizon lived by its author."³¹ After the death of the author--let it be noted, the author always "dies" once his or her text is born--the meaning of a text exists nowhere but in the interpretations that can be made of it, including those of the author. As Ricoeur went on to say: "What the text says now matters

more than what the author meant to say, and every exegesis unfolds its procedures within the circumference of a meaning that has broken its moorings to the psychology of its author."

It is precisely this characteristic of textual meaning that justified Ricoeur, or so he thought, in comparing the meaning of action with the meaning of a text. As he said:

In the same way that a text is detached from its author, an action is detached from its agent and develops consequences of its own. This autonomization of human action constitutes the social dimension of action. An action is a social phenomenon . . . because our deeds escape us and have effects which we did not intend.³²

It is not difficult to see the relevance of these remarks to economics. Like sociology or anthropology, economics is indeed a social science whose concern is the social consequences of economic agency on the part of individual human beings. As Hayek has long insisted, various social orders are "the result of human action but not the result of human design."³³ Economics is the study of the unintended consequences of human action.

A social science such as economics is concerned with human action to the degree that such action is a social phenomenon, and action is a social phenomenon to the degree that, as Ricoeur says, "our deeds escape us and have effects which we did not intend." This is another way of saying once again that the meaning of human action which economics or any other social science seeks to discover is not meaning in a subjective or psychological sense. The interpretation of action on the part of economic agents which an interpretive economic science seeks to articulate does not coincide with the interpretation that the agents themselves might proffer. As Alfred Schutz, himself an acquaintance of Ludwig von Mises, remarked: "[T]he constructs used by the social scientist are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, namely, constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene, whose behavior the scientist observes and tries to explain in accordance with the procedural rules of his science."³⁴ The social sciences thus are doubly interpretive in that they are interpretations of the interpretations that people themselves offer for their actions. Such interpretations often have to be discounted by the social scientist, for Ricoeur has insisted the consciousness we have of ourselves is often a false consciousness.

Strictly speaking, therefore, the meaningful action or, better expressed, the meaningful patterns of action that a social science like economics seeks to understand are neither subjective nor objective. Patterns of meaning or "wholes" such as an economy are certainly not "objective," in that they are not "things" or "facts" in the physicalistic sense of the term and are not "given" in such a way that they could simply be "observed and described," as the empiricist would say. Neither are they "subjective," in that, as the unintended effects of human agency, they are not the same as the meanings or meaning-intentions consciously entertained by the individual actors themselves and which they supposedly could "describe" to us were they asked to do so. Charles Taylor points us in the right direction, beyond both objectivism and subjectivism, when he says:

[W]hat we are dealing with here is not subjective meaning . . . , but rather inter-subjective meanings. It is not just that the people in our society all or most have a given set of ideas in their heads and subscribe to a given set of goals. The meanings and norms implicit in these practices are not just in the minds of the actors but are out there in the practices themselves, practices which cannot be conceived as a set of individual actions, but which are essentially modes of social relation, of mutual action.³⁵

The patterns of meaningful action the social sciences seek to discern exist neither in the "mind" nor in the "external world," as natural scientists conceive of the latter. They are neither "subjective" nor "objective", but constitute rather a kind of *entre-monde*, as Merleau-Ponty might say, a kind of "in-between" world which, as Taylor says, has its locus "out there" in trans-

subjective, social practices. It is this properly social reality or quasi-reality--neither simply mental nor simply physical--that is the proper object of the human sciences. Accordingly, it calls for a "method" which is neither "descriptive" in terms of mental states nor "explanatory" in terms of underlying causal entities, but rather interpretive, that is, aimed at explicating the "logic" embodied in these practices themselves.

It is this entre-monde, this logic embedded in human practices, that neoclassical economics ignores. It adheres to the methodological postulates of modernist reductive or analytic atomism according to which "wholes," physical or otherwise, must be explained solely in terms of the individuals or "atoms" which go to make them up. Hence, neoclassical economics can only conceive of an economy as the mechanical outcome of the actions on the part of a number of isolated, self-contained individuals, or "Robinson Crusoes". That is to say that it is unable to conceive of the "social" in properly social terms, in terms of its own proper logic.

In a curious way, Marxism's own "collectivist" approach also fails to conceive of the social in a way proper to it. For, in an inverse fashion, it too conceives of an economy in individualistic terms, but with the difference that it thinks of the social realm or "society" as one great individual, one immense "Robinson Crusoe". Thus, as one writer remarks: "While the two modes of analysis differ in the all-important details, the similarity of the basic question posed by the two approaches stems from starting with a self-contained, single subject."³⁶

An economic theory such as that of Hayek, on the other hand, points us in a different, and much more promising, direction. Although Hayek employed the term "methodological individualism" to describe his position, this position was anything but "individualistic" in the usual, atomistic sense of the term.³⁷ Unlike his modernist colleagues in economics and other social sciences, Hayek sought, as it were, to start out from the social as something irreducible in its own right and as having a logic of its own. His guiding question was in effect: How is it that a market economy, despite what a superficial view might appear to be pure anarchy (cf. Marx's "anarchy of the market"), exhibits such a complex and remarkable order? How is this possible when it is evident that, while this order is clearly the result of human action, it is nevertheless most certainly not the conscious product of any number of individual minds?

These are genuinely hermeneutic questions, and the attempt to come to grips with them constitutes the main task of a hermeneutic economics. The task of such an economics is to bring to light, or to conceptualize the particular logic constitutive of what is called a market economy. This, in fact, is a particularly urgent and important task today, now that the idea of a socialist, planned economy has everywhere been discredited. It may be noted as well that there is a strict parallel between explicating the logic of those meaningful patterns of action that are market transactions and bringing to light and explicating the logic of a text, which, of course, is what textual interpretation is all about.

One could fairly well say that the main problem for economic theory is that of enabling us to understand how it is that individual decisions on the part of a multitude of economic agents come, in a spontaneous and uncontrolled way, to be coordinated so as to produce an orderly and viable economy. A great deal of research into the dynamics of market processes has been conducted in recent years by various interpretive economists, building in this regard on the work of Hayek. As this research has now made quite clear, the key factor serving to coordinate the activity of economic agents is price. The unique feature of a market or self-regulating economy is that prices, as established by the give-and-take of free trade, communicate essential information to economic agents, "telling" them, in effect, how best to allocate their limited resources in order to achieve maximum gain. That inter-subjective order which is an "economy" is a kind of body; it is like the

lived body (*le corps propre*) that Merleau-Ponty speaks of in that it too is synergic and possesses a *spontanéité enseignante*, one which expresses itself in the language of prices. To speak of the "language of prices" is more than a mere metaphor; prices do indeed communicate information and constitute a kind of semiotic code. Those agents perform best who are best able to *read* and appropriately interpret the message that prices convey. This is a hermeneutic task, indeed!

Prices, therefore, are a form of embodied meaning, a kind of objective logos, as Merleau-Ponty might say. This is, of course, a form of meaning which is decidedly not "subjective". Prices express meanings which as a whole are not explicitly cognizable ("thematisable," as one would say in phenomenology) by any knowing subject, for they exist "out there" in social practices, namely, market transactions themselves. The "message of the marketplace" is, to use Merleau-Ponty's words, a "meaning which is not the work of a universal constituting consciousness, a meaning which clings to certain contents."³⁸

From this hermeneutic state of affairs, an important practical consequence follows. If such is indeed the logic of a market economy, it follows that the information which would be necessary to coordinate a complex, modern economy by means of consciously directed, central planning is, in principle, not available to any individual or group of individuals: the knowledge embodied in prices can never, as it were, be fully "subjectivized". Thus, one of the things that a hermeneutic economics can indeed demonstrate is the nonsensicality of the idea of a planned economy. This is a crucial point that Hayek has argued throughout his long and prolific career, and it would seem to be a message that is finally getting through to more and more people.³⁹

Pointing out in this way the absurdity of the idea of central planning is an example of how basic hermeneutic theory has consequences of the most practical sort. It is worth noting that Hayek himself maintained that there is a direct link between concrete policy issues, on the one hand, and, on the other, the kind of methodological issues having to do with the epistemological (or hermeneutic) status of economics as a science discussed in this paper. As Hayek remarked:

Many of the current disputes with regard to both economic theory and economic policy have their common origin in a misconception about the nature of the economic problem of society. This misconception in turn is due to an erroneous transfer to social phenomena of the habits of thought we have developed in dealing with the phenomena of nature.⁴⁰

Prediction

Such, then, are some of the major scientific consequences which follow from the hermeneutical primacy of action. Before turning to my concluding remarks, I might take note in passing of one particular sort of objection that an unrepentant (but sophisticated) positivist may make to the argument in this paper. I have in mind the rather interesting position developed by Milton Friedman in his justly famous article originally published in the 1950s, "The Methodology of Positive Economics."⁴¹ It will be recalled that one of the major objections I have addressed to the "scientistic" approach to economics is that, by reason of its objectivistic method itself, it inescapably ignores certain essential features of human action. This, for instance, is the objection that the interpretive economist Matthew Kibbe also makes. "In an attempt to establish a quantifiable, 'objective' science equal to that claimed to have been achieved in the natural sciences," Kibbe writes, "many neoclassical economists are often quite willing to sacrifice the real-world characteristics of their models for analytical tidiness."⁴²

What is most interesting about the position developed by Friedman is that he confronts this objection head on. Yes, he freely confesses, my theory is indeed "unrealistic." But, so what? he in

effect asks. What is important in a scientific theory, he argues, is not its "conformity to reality" (whatever that might mean) but its explanatory and above all its predictive power. If a theory or model, however "unrealistic" it be, enables us to make workable predictions and, in this way, enables us to "control" the course of events, then this is surely a sufficient justification of the theory itself, a sufficient guarantee of its "truth-value." Let us then, by way of conclusion, consider briefly the issue of prediction.

In response to the "Friedmanian challenge", it could be said that since, in the scientific universe of discourse, "explanation" and "prediction" are two sides of one and the same epistemological coin, to discredit the former is automatically to discredit the latter. The very notion of "prediction," as it commonly is understood, is inseparable from that of "explanation." For instance, one can only predict the precise way a collection of objects (e.g., planets) will be arranged in the future if, in the here and now, one can "explain" in a law-like, mechanistic way the motions of these bodies. Scientific explanation, in the customary sense of the term, is thus part and parcel of a physicalistic, mechanistic universe of discourse.

Now I have argued in this paper that such a universe of discourse, while it is indeed applicable to human affairs, is nevertheless incapable of disclosing that which is most characteristically and irreducibly human. If, like the culture studied by the anthropologist, the economic order is constituted by meaningful patterns of action and is not merely a realm of mechanical action and reaction; if it is, as Clifford Geertz would say, a semiotic web that economic agents themselves have spun, then it would follow that, in Geertz's words, "the analysis of it [is] therefore not an experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of meaning."⁴³ To put the matter another way, if it is the case (as I have argued) that "objective," causalistic explanations can reveal only the most mechanical and thus inessential aspects of the human being, then, it is also necessarily the case that "predictions" can predict only the most mechanical and thus inessential aspects of things.⁴⁴

Here, once again, one can see how the most practical of consequences follow from basic hermeneutical theory. For what the "impossibility" of prediction means is that all attempts at *dirigisme*, at controlling human reality in any detailed way are theoretically illegitimate and practically unacceptable. Just as hermeneutic theory "delegitimizes" the idea of central planning (as I have already argued), so also it discredits what could be called "Keynesianism," i.e., all attempts on the part of governments to "fine tune" an economy by operating, in a purely "objective" way, on certain macro features of the economy, be it on the supply side or the demand side. This consequence of hermeneutical theory as regards economic policy applies, it may be noted, as much to "leftist" interventionism as it does to "right-wing" macroeconomic policies, such as the monetarism long defended by Friedman. Money would seem to be one of the most concrete, "objective," mundane of things--the ideal object for an exact, quantitative science on the "natural science model"--and yet, like language itself, it is one of the most specific and irreducible of human things. The value of money cannot, therefore, be controlled in any purely objective way, contrary to the guiding presupposition of Friedman's monetarism.⁴⁵

On the subject of prediction, economist Don Lavoie has remarked:

What we find ourselves doing in the social sciences is not so much the testing of *ex ante* predictions but is more of the nature of what the Austrian economist F.A. Hayek calls an *ex postexplanation* of principles. The only 'test' any theory can receive is in the form of a *qualitative* [emphasis added] judgment of the plausibility of the sequence of events that has been strung together by narrative.⁴⁶

Hayek himself, in his Nobel Prize acceptance speech, "The Pretence of Knowledge," insisted that in the social sciences in general and in economics in particular the most one can do is to make mere "pattern predictions"--"predictions of some of the general attributes of the structures that will form themselves, but not containing specific statements about the individual elements of which the structures will be made up." The kind of theory appropriate to economics is, he said, one which "allows us to make only very general predictions of the kind of events which we must expect in a given situation."⁴⁷

As Hayek's remarks suggest, the "impossibility" of prediction in the human sciences does not mean that one cannot, in these disciplines, speculate on what the outcome of a given course of action is likely--even more, is almost certain--to be. One can, in economics, "predict" with confidence that if the government intervenes in the economy in a certain way (for instance, by overissuing paper money) the result inevitably will be of such-and-such a sort (e.g., inflation). Similarly, on the basis of sound political theory, one can fairly well predict that if any individual is accorded absolute power in the long run (N.B. the qualitative qualification!), he or she almost certainly will abuse it. Let me, though, return to the action-text analogy to make my point.

As any accomplished hermeneut or interpreter of texts knows, all literary or philosophical texts (the good ones, at least) have a "logic" of their own. It is precisely this logic that a reading of the text seeks to unfold. The more accomplished one is as a reader, the more readily after reading a certain number of pages can one anticipate ("predict") the sort of things an author is going to say. This is one aspect of what is commonly referred to as the "hermeneutic circle". Once one knows an author well, one can even "correct" him, for sometimes an author, by inadvertence, says things he shouldn't say, i.e., which do not fit into the logic of his thoughts. It is the same with those meaningful patterns of action which constitute a social "whole," such as an economy. Here, too, a good reader of human action can legitimately "predict" what, in any given context, i.e., given the "logic" of the order in question, is or is not likely to be the consequence of any given course of action.

Consider the following example: Let us assume that due to a long delayed enlightenment a country which has been mired in socialism decides that it is finally time for it to convert to a market economy. It can safely be said that nothing but chagrin awaits anyone who, ignorant of the structural dynamics or the logic of socialist economies,⁴⁸ tries to introduce market (e.g., pricing) mechanisms into the existing system. This simply will not work. The structural inertia of the system will prevent these well meaning measures from having the desired effect. There is empirical confirmation for this in the grandiose and foreseeable failure of the way President Gorbachev went about attempting to "restructure" the Soviet economy.⁴⁹

My bottom line in this paper (to speak like an economist) is that theory does indeed have important practical consequences. While hermeneutic theory differs from scientific theory in that it does not issue in productive technology, and thus does not enable us to control directly the course of human events, it does nevertheless enable us to improve upon our practices. For once we have understood the organizational principles of a given social order, such as the market economy or liberal democracy, we are in a position to alter existing practices in such a way as, on the one hand, to eliminate factors which are contrary to the "logic" of the system, and which thus tend to result in a malfunctioning of the system. On the other hand, it becomes possible to devise new, institutional structures which allow the system to function in a smoother manner and to develop further. To employ a distinction of Hayek's, although hermeneutic theory does not allow us to control them, it does allow us to cultivate better the various social orders which make up the human life-world.⁵⁰ If, as an interpretive economist might wish to argue,⁵¹ the market process is

comparable to a conversation in the Gadamerian sense, then (even though, as Gadamer points out, "no one knows what will `come out' in a conversation"⁵² practical measures of a "cultivating" sort may nevertheless serve to facilitate the dialogical process, furthering thereby that great "conversation of mankind" we call civilization.

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Notes

1. English translation included in Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Privacy of Perception*, ed. James M. Edie (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1954).
2. See in this regard my "Did Merleau-Ponty Have a Theory of Perception?" in T. Busch & S. Gallagher, eds., *Merleau-Ponty: Hermeneutics and Post-Modernism* (Albany, NY: The State University of New York Press, 1992).
3. See my *The Hermeneutics of Postmodernity: Figures and Themes* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), Prologue and Ch. 4, "Merleau-Ponty and Postmodernity."
4. Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. C. Smith (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1962), p. 456. See also p. 383: "All inner perception is inadequate because I am not an object that can be perceived, because I make my reality and find myself only in the act."
5. Ludwig von Mises, *Human Action: A Treatise on Economics* (3rd revised ed.; Chicago: Contemporary Books, 1963). On p. 357 von Mises writes: "Economics is not about goods and services, it is about the actions of living men. . . . The sole task of economics is analysis of the actions of men, is the analysis of processes."
6. Paul Ricoeur, "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered As A Text" in *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*, ed. J.B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
7. G.B. Madison, "Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of the Subject" in *The Hermeneutics of Postmodernity*, p. 97.
8. Lewis White Beck, 'The 'Natural Science Ideal' in the Social Sciences,' *Scientific Monthly*, 68 (1949); reprinted in R.A. Manners and D. Kaplan, eds., *Theory in Anthropology: A Sourcebook* (Chicago: Aldine, 1971).
9. Ludwig M. Lachmann, "Economic Theory in Tempestuous Season" in *The Market as an Economic Process* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986).
10. See in this regard the collection of essays edited by Don Lavoie, *Economics and Hermeneutics* (London: Routledge, 1991). Lavoie is an adherent to what is called the "Austrian School" of economics, whose members have been particularly interested in hermeneutical theory. Lavoie characterizes Austrian economics in the following way:

The Austrian school is one of the three famous branches of neoclassical economics, and along with the Marshallian and the Walrasian branches it shares a basic "principles" level understanding of the workings of the economy. On the level of issues like the importance of scarcity, the logic of supply and demand, or the chief causes of inflation, Austrians agree with most contemporary economists. But in a sense this school is really a radically different view of economics from the mainstream neoclassicism. The fundamental point of the revolution in value theory which transformed economics from classical into neoclassical (is that) economics is understood very differently by the Austrian branch. Mainstream neoclassicism tends to view the revolution as a narrowly technical point in the logic of value theory, calling it the "marginalist" revolution,

whereas the Austrians view it as involving broader and more philosophical issues, calling it the "subjectivist" revolution. By "subjective" Austrians mean essentially what hermeneutical philosophers mean by interpretive. Austrians are saying economics is not about some external objective reality independent of human purposes. It is about how this objective world is perceived through what Lachmann likes to call the "filter of the human mind." Value, for example, is not a physical attribute of things but a result of valuing minds. Austrian economics is the hermeneutical mode of neoclassical economics ("The Accounting of Interpretations and the Interpretation or Accounts: The Communicative Function of 'The Language of Business,'" *Accounting, Organizations and Society*, 12 (no. 6), 596-97.

11. See in this regard the detailed historical study of Philip Mirowski, *More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as Nature's Economics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

12. Philip Mirowski, "Shall I Compare Thee to a Minkowski-Ricardo-Leontief-Metzler Matrix of the Mosak-Hicks Type: Or, Rhetoric, Mathematics, and the Nature of Neoclassical Economic Theory" in A. Kramer, D.N. McCluskey, and R. M. Solow, eds., *The Consequences of Economic Rhetoric* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 120.

13. Friedrich A. Hayek, *The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies on the Abuse of Reason* (2nd ed.; Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1979), p. 24. In this book, the text of which was written in the 1940s, Hayek attacked what he called the "scientism" and the "physicalism" infecting economic theory and methodology and argued for an alternative approach, one which today would be labelled interpretive or hermeneutical. For a discussion of the position adopted by Hayek in this book see my "Hayek and the Interpretive Turn," *Critical Review*, 3 (no. 2, Spring 1989).

14. Edmund Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. David Carr (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), p. 52.

15. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

16. David Carr, *Phenomenology and the Problem of History* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1974), p. 131.

17. Husserl, *Experience and Judgment*, trans. J.S. Churchill and K. Ameriks (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973), pp. 44-45.

18. See Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture" in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. W. Levitt (New York: Harper Colophon Books, 1977).

19. Ludwig von Mises, *The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science: An Essay on Method* (Kansas City: Sheed, Andres and McMeel, 1978), p. 71.

20. A notable exception to this state of affairs is the work of Frank H. Knight earlier in this century (Knight's Ph.D. thesis [Cornell, 1916] was entitled "Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit"). For a sampling of Knight's views see *Freedom and Reform: Essays in Economics and Social Philosophy* (Indianapolis: Liberty Press, 1982) and *On the History and Method of Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966). For a more recent treatment of economic "ignorance" see Gerald P. O'Driscoll and Mario J. Rizzo, *The Economics of Time and Ignorance* (New York: Basil Blackwell, 1985).

21. Cf. the following remarks of Matthew Kibbe: "Any concept of a historical process in the imaginary world of Newtonian time is nonsensical. All adjustment, if it can be discussed at all, is contained within the world from its very beginning. 'The initial state of the system must contain within it all that is necessary to produce "change". Time adds literally nothing' (O'Driscoll and Rizzo, 1985 [for further bibliographical information, see note 20 above]). Problems of expectations formation and the process of price determination, for either commodities or money, are eliminated

by definition in this bizarre world of Newtonian time" ("Mind, Historical Time and the Value of Money: A Tale of Two Methods," *Market Process*, 6 (no. 1, Spring, 1988), p. 24.

22. I am, of course, referring here to B.F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York, N.Y.: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).

23. Mirowski writes: "Human beings within this sphere of social life [the economy] behave as if they were automatons, in that their rationality is conflated with the existence of mechanical decision rules, most notably constrained maximization over a conserved vector field. Humans may behave differently in other spheres of social life, but since that behavior is `irrational' by definition, there is nothing left to be explained." ("Shall I Compare Thee . . . , " p. 141.)

24. Knight describes "economic man" in the following terms:

This analytical device [the isolated individual, a "Crusoe"] is familiar in economic theory, and the essential point here is that "Crusoe" epistemology goes with "Crusoe" economics. The purely individualistic individual--a purely hypothetical and analytical conception, of course--is simply the economic man. He knows, or would know, only useful facts, about inert things and processes of change, and would solve problems only in the instrumental sense. He would be a "pragmatist" only in the crudest meaning. He would deliberate--act, exercise freedom, solve problems, in contrast with cause-andeffect behavior but only in connection with the use of given means to realize given concrete ends. The ends would be biological, or possibly psychological, in the phenomenal sense of experiences intrinsically desired. Ends, including their magnitudes, would be known immediately. Our hypothetical "Crusoe" would have no interest in truth as a value, no intellectual curiosity--and, of course, no moral interests or values. His knowledge would be exclusively scientific, at the, instrumental or "economistic" level. Its content would be the useful properties of things, their responses to manipulative treatment, and the effects upon himself. His thinking would deal with the problems of such knowledge and the skills required for its application. The economic man may only in a rather unrealistic sense be said to work, and he does not play; he maximizes satisfaction, subject to the condition of the "resources" at his command (*Freedom and Reform*, pp. 246-47).

25. See Karl Mittermaier, "Mechanomorphism" in Israel M. Kirzner, ed., *Subjectivism, Intelligibility and Economic Understanding* (New York: New York University Press, 1986). Mittermaier remarks:

[A]n economist engages in mechanomorphism when he ascribes mechanical properties to what is otherwise recognized as an aspect of human affairs or when he treats an economic system as though it were a mechanical system. In its most general sense we may understand mechanics to be concerned with matter in motion. In the Newtonian formulation, a mechanical system involves concepts of space, time, force, point mass, and derivations from these. Equilibrium clearly comes from this domain of thought and talk of equilibrating or market forces must be regarded as mechanomorphic. Consumption and saving, which normally are regarded as activities, acquire a mechanical aspect as macroeconomic aggregates. They are treated as though they were quantities of a substance, perhaps a liquid flowing through some kind of system--the conception Coddington called hydraulicism (p. 237).

26. Peter Boettke, Steven Horwitz, and David L. Prychitko, "Beyond Equilibrium Economics: Reflections on the Uniqueness of the Austrian Tradition," *Market Process*, 4 (1986), 6, 20.

27. See the following writings of Winch: *The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958); and "The Idea of a Social Science" and "Understanding a Primitive Society," both in *Rationality*, ed. B.R. Wilson (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1971).

28. See Ricoeur, "What Is a Text? Explanation and Understanding" in *Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences*.

29. Mittermaier aptly describes the kind of schizophrenic situation in which the objectivistic economist finds himself in the following way:

What is disconcerting about textbook expositions of economics, at least to one who is not impressed by the idea of testable hypotheses, is that the coherence rule is not followed. The student is introduced to a topic reeking with the richness of social life. He is then taken by a little legerdemain through a blur and suddenly finds himself in an eerie world of continuous functions. He watches the functions shift about and, when they have stopped, notes down the coordinates of their points of intersection. He is then taken again through the blur and, behold, he finds himself once more among familiar human faces. The recommendation of this paper is that the subjectivist ["Austrian"] case against mechanomorphism be based on the ideal that such blurs be removed. In itself, however, that is not enough. One should also be able to show how it may be done ("Mechanomorphism," p. 249).

In regard to Mittermaier's last remark, I would suggest that one of the beneficial things hermeneutical theory may be able to do for economists is indeed "to show how it may be done."

30. See my "A Critique of Hirsch's Validity" in *The Hermeneutics of Post-modernity*.

31. "The Model of the Text," p. 201.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 206.

33. Hayek, *Individualism and Economic Order* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 7.

34. Alfred Schutz, "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action" in M. Natanson, ed., *Collected Papers*, vol. 1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 6. Lavoie remarks:

The fact that the objects of our study already have an interpretation of what is going on does not release the social scientist from the responsibility to develop and defend her own explication of what is going on. The interpreter should not try to rid herself of her own perspective in order to "adopt" that of the interpreted, but must try to find new ways to use her presuppositions to attain a better understanding of the human activities under study. . . . Thus interpretation always means adding to what is said through a mediation of the "horizons" of the interpreter and the interpreted ("The Accounting of Interpretations and the Interpretation of Accounts," p. 594).

35. Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man" in P. Rabinow and W.M. Sullivan, *Interpretive Social Science: A Reader* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), p. 48.

36. Elias L. Khalil, "Rationality and Social Labor in Marx," *Critical Review*, 4 (1990), 247. Khalil remarks in more detail on the same page:

The atomistic framework of neoclassical economics, which commences with the average individual, is far different from Marx's collective approach. Put in simplified terms, the former tradition conceives the market as the sum of the choices made by single subjects; while the latter approach views production activity of individuals as charged by one single subject, society. While neoclassical economic theory has to aggregate decisions, Marx's framework has to disaggregate decisions. However, these opposite approaches are similar. Both traditions, at the highest theoretical level, begin with single subjects. In one case, it is the isolated agent; in the other case, it is the self-defined society.

37. See in this regard my "How Individualistic Is Methodological Individualism?," *Critical Review*, 4 (1990).

38. *Phenomenology of Perception*, p. 147. The economic world is like the phenomenological world Merleau-Ponty speaks of: "a system of meanings whose reciprocities, relationships and involvements do not require to be made explicit in order to be exploited" (*Phenomenology*, p. 129). Thus, as one could also say, the consciousness that an economic agent has of his or her world "is in the first place not a matter of 'I think that' but of 'I can'" (*Phenomenology*, p. 137).

39. For a comprehensive critique of the idea of economic planning in its various forms, see Don Lavoie, *Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Calculation Debate Reconsidered* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1985) and *National Economic Planning: What is Left?* (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing, 1985). In the latter work Lavoie, following much the same tactic as I have employed in this paper, remarks:

The fundamental defect of virtually all proposals for planning--from Marx to Leontief--lies in what Michael Polanyi calls their "objectivist," or what F.B. Hayek calls their "rationalistic," concept of the nature of human knowledge. This epistemological [let us read here: hermeneutic] issue contains both the key to understanding most contemporary policy failures as well as the basic obstacle that stands in the way of all national planning proposals. . . . The knowledge relevant for economic decision-making exists in a dispersed form that cannot be fully extracted by any single agent in society. But such extraction is precisely what would be required if this knowledge were to be made usable for a single planning agency. . . . In short, the whole case against Planning that is being developed here is rooted in a critique of objectivist theories of knowledge (pp. 56-57).

40. Hayek, "The Use of Knowledge in Society" in *Individualism and Economic Order* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1976), p. 78. On pp. 77-78 Hayek describes "the fundamental problem" of economics (the problem that I have been talking about in the preceding paragraphs) as follows:

[T]he "data" from which the economic calculus starts are never for the whole society "given" to a single mind which could work out the implications and can never be so given.

The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated form but solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequently contradictory knowledge which all the separate individuals possess. The economic problem of society is thus not merely a problem of how to allocate "given" resources--if "given" is taken to mean given to a single mind which deliberately solves the problem set by these "data." It is rather a problem of how to secure the best use of resources known to any of the members of society, for ends whose relative importance only these individuals know. Or, to put it briefly, it is a problem of the utilization of knowledge which is not given to anyone in its totality.

41. See Milton Friedman, *Essays in Positive Economics* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953).

42. Matthew B. Kibbe, "Mind, Historical Time and the Value of Money: A tale of Two Methods," *Market Process* (1988), p. 23.

43. Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), p. 5.

44. Hayek remarks in this regard:

[W]hile in the physical sciences the investigator will be able to measure what, on the basis of a *prima facie* theory, he thinks important, in the social sciences often that is treated as important which happens to be accessible to measurement. This is sometimes carried to the point where it is demanded that our theories must be formulated in such terms that they refer only to measurable magnitudes.

It can hardly be denied that such a demand quite arbitrarily limits the facts where are to be admitted as possible causes of the events which occur in the real world ("The Pretence of Knowledge" in *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978], p. 24).

An additional objection can be raised to Friedman's seductively sophisticated position. Friedman freely admits that his methodological constructs are not "literally" true; he is merely, by means of his models, viewing human reality "as if" it were of such-and-such a(n) objectivistic sort. Fine and good, one might be inclined to reply. What's wrong with that? Nothing, of course--in a certain sense. The use of "as if's," i.e., metaphorical, analogical reasoning, is the very heart and soul of all thinking having insight value (in his article "Shall I Compare Thee . . . Mirowski comments extensively on the role of metaphorical thinking in science; I have also studied the centrality of metaphor in human understanding in my *Understanding: A Phenomenological-Pragmatic Analysis*[Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982]). The problem lies elsewhere.

While analogical reasoning is as valid in science as in any other human undertaking, I am not at all certain that, given the nature of scientific, objectivistic thinking itself, scientists can keep from confusing their methodological, "as if" constructs with reality itself, from, as Husserl would say, taking for true being what in fact is only a method. And when they do so, the consequences are, or can be, disastrous--one has only to consider the example of Artificial Intelligence researchers who all too readily leap from the (valid) premise that the "mind" can be viewed as a computational machine to the (altogether invalid) conclusion that the mind is a computer. Just as, in political theory, it is a law of human affairs that power tends to corrupt, so, in epistemic matters, I believe that science, when not counterbalanced by other modes of understanding, tends inevitably towards the corruption of human understanding. Can you have science with scientism? I don't know; I leave the question open. I think, though, there is a real and immense problem here--if it is indeed the case, as Merleau-Ponty believed it was, that human understanding tends inevitably to misunderstand itself (see my "Merleau-Ponty's Deconstruction of Logocentrism").

45. See Friedman's statement of his position at the 1983 Regional Meeting of the Mont Pelerin Society, "What Could Reasonably Have Been Expected from Monetarism: The United States," *Focus: Challenging Complacency/Monetarism: Any Verdict Yet?* (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1983). See also my "Communicating the Ideas of a Free Society" in *Focus: Challenging Complacency/communicating the Ideas of a Free Society* (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1983). For an excellent, detailed analysis of money from a hermeneutical point of view, see Steven G. Horowitz, *The Private Basis of Monetary Order: An Evolutionary Approach to Money and the Market Process* (Ph.D. thesis; Arlington, Va. George Mason University, 1989). In regard to monetarism the economist Henry Hazlitt remarks:

The monetarists outlook, as proposed by Milton Friedman, is, in fact, a mechanical quantity theory of money. He assumes that "the" price level--that is to say, an average of prices--will rise proportionately to the amount of paper money that is issued. That can happen for a certain period, but the value of money is not determined mechanically and proportionately with the amount issued. It is determined by public psychological forces (thus the need, as I would maintain, for an interpretive economics]. A panic can break out when people suddenly expect the value of money to collapse. That was illustrated by the German inflation of 1920 to 1923. Prices rose for a time roughly proportional with the amount of money issued. But suddenly prices soared far faster than the money supply because the public got panicky. It is psychological forces that determine the value of money as other commodities [cf. the "subjective theory of value" or Austrian economics], although influenced, of course, by quantitative considerations ("An Interview with Henry

Hazlitt," *Austrian Economics Newsletter*, Spring, 1984 [Auburn, Al.: The Ludwig von Mises Institute of Auburn University], p. 4).

46. Don Lavoie, "The Accounting of Interpretations . . .", p. 596.
47. Hayek, "The Pretence of Knowledge," pp. 27 & 29.
48. For a detailed analysis of socialist economic systems see the work of the Hungarian economist Janos Kornai.
49. For an excellent study of the structural dynamics of economic systems and the problem of reform, see Branko Milanovic, *Liberalization and Entrepreneurship: Dynamics of Reform in Socialism and Capitalism* (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharp, 1989).
50. See in this regard my "Between Theory and Practice: Hayek on the Logic of Cultural Dynamics," forthcoming in *Cultural Dynamics*. Hayek writes: "He [the social reformer] will therefore have to use what knowledge he can achieve, not to shape the results as the craftsman shapes his handiwork, but rather to cultivate a growth by providing the appropriate environment, in the manner in which the gardener does this for his plants. There is danger in the exuberant feeling of ever growing power, which the advance of the physical sciences has engendered and which tempts man to try, 'dizzy with success', to use a characteristic phrase of early communism, to subject not only our natural but also our human environment to the control of a human will" ("The Pretense of Knowledge," p. 34).
51. See David L. Prychitko, "Marxism and Decentralized Socialism," *Critical Review*, 2 (1988), 137-138.
52. Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroad, 1985), p. 345.

3. **Philosophical Notions of the Person**

George F. McLean

In the last half century, the war against Fascism, the process of decolonialization, new attention to the rights of minorities and women, and, finally, the social changes throughout the world at the end of the 80s, all have as their common motivating force the renewed emergence of a sense of the dignity of the person. Hence, in the present effort to assay the transformation of cultural traditions in our times, it is important, after looking at the nature of cultural heritage and its transformation, to look closely at the different dimensions of the notion of person. As these are progressively ignored or taken into account our horizons for social change shrink or expand and the possibilities for a more rich harmony recede or emerge.

Here the intent is not to choose one dimension of the person against others, but to review them, in order to see how each makes possible a specific level of self-understanding and of social relations and points, in turn, to still other dimensions. In particular, we shall review our heritages for answers to three crucial questions about the person as the subject of a moral life and of moral education.

(a) Is the person only a set of roles constituted entirely in function of a structure or system in which one plays a particular part? If so, one could not refuse to do whatever the system demanded or tolerated. Or is the person a subject in his or her own right, with one's proper dignity, heritage, goals and standards?

(b) Is one merely a stream of consciousness, who becomes a person only upon the achievement of a certain level of self-awareness? If so, it is difficult to integrate the experiences of early childhood and the emotions of adult life which play so central a role in moral maturity. Or is the person an essentially free and responsible psycho-physical subject?

(c) Finally, does a person's freedom consist merely in implementing a pattern of behavior encoded in one's nature. If so, there would be little place for the anguish of decision, the pains of moral growth, or the creativity of a moral life. Or is this free subject a creative center whose basic dynamism consists in realizing a unique inner harmony and outer community?

To respond to such basic concerns requires the full resources of their heritages. At the same time, because the task of self-creation will reflect one or more of the multiple modes of our contemporary self-understanding, it can be expected that not everyone will subscribe to all the possible dimensions of the meaning of the person--certainly not in the same mode or to the same degree. Hence, in a pluralistic society one must be clear about the potential dimensions of individuals: what they are,¹ how they are rooted in our cultural heritages how they affect the aims and methods of moral education, and how they can be interrelated in a mutually reinforcing manner toward the development of a more integrated person and a more cohesive society. Indeed, there may prove to be a certain correlation of the above-mentioned questions both with the dimensions of the subject as a distinct, yet related, responsible moral agent and with the progressive development of the person throughout life.

For orientation in this task let us begin by delineating the meaning of person by contrasting it to a number of other notions. These contrasts will serve subsequently as guideposts for a series of

positive and progressively deepening insights regarding the nature of the person, his or her moral growth, and self-fulfillment.

In this first and negative effort to delineate the meaning of persons, we find that most notably, persons are contrasted to possessions. We object most strongly to any suggestion, whether in word, gesture, or deed, by which a person is treated as a commodity subject to manipulation or as a mere means by which others attain their goals. This, indeed, has become a litmus test for acceptable behavior.² Secondly, persons are considered to be irreducible to the community. Structures which take into account only the social whole without taking account of the distinctive concerns of its participants are rejected precisely as depersonalizing. Thirdly and conversely, those who are so individualistic as to be insensitive to the concerns of others are themselves considered impersonal. These exclusions direct our search for the meaning of the human person toward a responsible self which is neither reducible to, nor independent of, the physical and human context in which one abides.

This positive notion of the person has not always had an identical or unchanging meaning. By natural growth, more than by mere accretion, the notion has managed to incorporate the great achievements of human self-discovery for which, in turn, it has been both the stimulus and the goal. This continuing process has been central to philosophy from its earliest days. Like all life processes, the search for the person has consisted in a sequence of important steps, each of which has resulted in a certain equilibrium or level of culture. In time each has been enriched and molded by subsequent discoveries. Indeed, it may not be incorrect to say that a parallel search is the dynamism at the heart of our personal life as well.

To look into this experience, it will be advantageous to study the nature of the person through reflection on a series of paired and progressively deeper dimensions: first, as a role and as the one who lives out this role; second, as free self-consciousness and as the subject of that freedom; and third, as moral agent and as searching for one's moral development and fulfillment. The first member of each pair is integral to an understanding of the human person and of moral growth, but each of these members, in turn, requires its corresponding dimension and evokes the pair on the level that follows.

Roe and Individual

Role

One means for finding the earliest meaning of a particular notion is to study the term by which it is designated. As earliest, this meaning tends to be more manifest and, hence, to remain current. The major study³ on the origins of the term 'person' concludes that, of the multiple origins which have been proposed, the most probable refers to the mask used by actors in Greece and subsequently adopted in Rome. Some explain that this was called a '*persona*' because, by 'sounding through' (*personando*)⁴ its single hole, the voice of the wearer was strengthened, concentrated, and made to resound more clearly. Others see the term as a transformation of the Greek term for the mask which symbolized the actor's role.⁵ Hence, an original and relatively surface notion of person is the assumption of a character or the carrying out of a role. As such it has little to do with one's 'self'; it is defined rather in terms of the set of relations which constitutes the plot or story line of a play.

This etymology is tentative; some would document an early and more rich sense of person in Homeric literature.⁶ There can be no doubt, however, that the term has been used broadly in the

above ethical sense of a role played in human actions. Ancient biblical literature described God as not being a respecter of persons, that is, of the roles played by various individuals.⁷ The Stoics thought of this in cosmic terms, seeing the wise person either as writing his role or as interpreting a role determined by the Master. In either case, to be a wise person was to be consistent, to play out one's role in harmony with oneself and with reason as the universal law of nature. From this ethical sense of person as role, it was but a short step to a similar legal sense. This generally is a distinct and characteristic relation, although, as Cicero noted, it could be multiple: "Three roles do I sustain . . . my own, that of my opponent, that of the judge."⁸

Far from being archaic,⁹ the understanding of person as the playing of a role seems typical of much modern and American thought. John Dewey, in *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, characterized the essence of the modern mentality in just these terms: in the case of ancient or classic usage "we are dealing with something constant in *existence*, physical or metaphysical; in the other [modern] case, with something constant in *function* and operation."¹⁰ The social and psychological sciences focus upon these roles or functions and, in terms of function, through operational definitions, their entire conceptual field.

This undergirds much of the progress in the social and behavioral sciences. As the same individual can play multiple roles, even in the same circumstances, studying the person in terms of roles makes it possible to identify specific dimensions of one's life for more precise investigation and to analyze serially the multiple relations which obtain in an interpersonal situation. William James, for example, distinguishes in this manner the self shown to family from that which one shows to professional colleagues or to God. Further, determining to pursue this exclusively on the basis of data which is subject to empirical verification¹¹ has made possible an immense collaborative effort to achieve a scientific understanding of human life.

Indeed, to begin from its meaning as role can save the notion of person from hiding and then suppressing the ontological reality who fulfills that role. This route is suggested by an alternate (Etruscan) origin of the term 'person' in the mask worn in the cult of the goddess Persephone. While the Latin grammarians seized on this to classify the speakers voices as first or second person, the original dramatic context was more mysterious, based on a vibrant interplay of presence and absence as the goddess manifested herself while remaining absent. The appearance, thus, became multiple while the unlimited reality of the source remained one and unfathomable. There is here a first suggestion of a central truth about person for culture, namely that a person is an unlimitedly rich and even mysterious source; and, hence, that in dialogue with its physical and social environment, it can be adaptive and creative in its expressions. This holds a key to understanding the rich variety of cultures.

Though much has been accomplished through understanding the person in terms of roles, there may have been a distant early warning of the limitations of this approach in Auguste Comte's (1798-1857) *Cours de philosophie positive*. By rejecting psychology as a scientific discipline and reducing all data concerning the person to either biology or sociology, he ignored introspection and the corresponding dimensions of the individual's conscious life. The person was not only one who could play a role, but one whose total reality consisted in playing that role.

More recently Gabriel Marcel has pointed up a number of unfortunate consequences which derive from considering the person only in terms of roles or functional relations. First, no account can be then taken of one's proper self-identity. If only "surface" characteristics are considered, while excluding all attention to "depth,"¹² the person is empty; if the person can be analyzed fully in terms of external causes and relations, he becomes increasingly devoid of intrinsic value. What is more, lack of personal identity makes it impossible to establish personal relations with

others. Even that consistency between, or within, one's roles--which the Stoics as early proponents of this understanding of person considered to be the essence of personal life--is left without foundation. Life would be reduced "in the words of Shakespeare `to a tale told by an idiot'.¹³

The Self

These difficulties suggest that attention must be directed to another level of meaning if the person is to find the resources required to play his/her role. Rather than attempting to think of a role without an actor, it is important to look to the individual who assumes the role and expresses him or herself therein.

Caution must be exercised here, however, lest the search for the subject or the self appear to reinforce the excesses of self-centeredness and individualism. This could be a special danger in the context of cultures whose positive stress on self-reliance and independence has been rooted historically in an atomistic understanding of persons as individuals, single and unrelated. This danger is reflected, for example, in the common law understanding of judicial rulings, not as defining the nature of interpersonal relations, but simply as reducing violence through resolving conflicts between individuals whose lives happen to have intersected.

In this regard, it is helpful to note that, when Aristotle laid the foundations for the Western understanding of the person, he did so in the context of the Greek understanding of the physical universe as a unified, dynamic, quasi life process in which all was included and all were related. Indeed, the term 'physical' was derived from the term for growth, and the components of this process were seen always with, and in, relation to others. (Similarly, modern physical theory identifies a uniform and all-inclusive pattern of relations such that any physical displacement, no matter how small, affects all other bodies). Within this unified pattern of relations the identification of multiple individuals, far from being destructive of unity, provides the texture required for personal life. Where individuals are differentiated by the moral tenor of their actions which, in turn, make a difference to other persons, distinctiveness becomes not an impediment to, but a principle of, community.¹⁴

In order better to appreciate the members of a community, it is helpful to consider them on three progressively more specific dimensions: first, as instances of a particular type, that is, as substances; secondly, as existing, that is, as subsisting individuals; and thirdly, as self-conscious, that is, as persons. The order in which these three will be considered is not accidental, for while it is necessary to be of a certain definite type, it is more important to exist as an individual in one's own right; for the person, finally, it is important above all that one be self-conscious and free. Hence, our exposition begins with substance and the subsisting individual in order to identify some general and basic--though not specific or exclusive--characteristics of the person. What is distinctive, namely, self-awareness and freedom, will be treated in the following sections.

1. *Substance*. It was Aristotle who identified substance as the basic component of the physical order; his related insights remain fundamental to understanding the individual as the subject of moral life. His clue to this basic discovery appears in language. Comparing the usage of such terms as "running," and "runner" we find that the first is applied to the second, which, however, is not said, in turn, of anything else.¹⁵ Thus, one may say of Mary that she is running, but one may not say that she is another person, e.g., John. This suggests the need to distinguish things that can be realized only in another (as running is had only in a runner, e.g., in Mary) whence they derive their

identity (the running is Mary's and distinct from any running that John might do), from those which have their identity in their own right (e.g., Mary and John).

A first and basic characteristic of the moral subject, and indeed of any substance, is that it has its identity in its own right rather than through another. Only thus can a human being be responsible for their action. Without substances with their distinct identities one could envisage only a structure of ideals and values inhabited, as it were, by agents without meaning or value. In this light the task of moral education would be merely to enable one to judge correctly according to progressively higher ideals. This, indeed, would seem to be the implicit context of Lawrence Kohlberg's focus upon moral dilemmas which omits not only the other dimensions of moral development but this personal identity as well. Aristotle points instead to a world of persons realizing values in their actions. In their complex reality of body, affections and mind they act morally and are the subjects of moral education.

Secondly, as the basic building blocks in the constitution of a world, these individuals are not merely undetermined masses. As the basic points of reference in discourse and the bases for the intelligibility for the real world these individuals must possess some essential determinateness and be of one or another kind or form. The individual, then, is not simply one unit indifferently contrasted to all others; he or she is a being of a definite--in this case a human--kind,¹⁶ relating in a distinctively human manner to other beings each with their own nature or kind. Only thus can one's life in the universe have sense and be able to be valued.

Thirdly, being of a definite kind individuals have their own proper characteristics and are able to realize specific or typical sets of activities. These activities derive from, or are "born of" (from the Latin, *natus*), the specific *nature* of the thing. The determination of what activity is moral will need to include not only the good to be derived from the action, but respect for the agent and his or her nature.

In the search for the subject of moral education, the work of Aristotle has made an essential contribution by directing our attention to three factors, namely: (a) individual beings, (b) who are particular instances of a definite kind, and hence (c) capable of specific types of activities. It should be noted that all three are concerned with the kind or type of the agent.¹⁷ This is important, but it is not enough for moral education. One can know well enough what kind of thing a unicorn is but, as none has ever existed, none has ever acted or entered the field of activity in which morality is found. Similarly, one might know what kind of musician is needed in order to complete an orchestra, but this does not mean that such a musician is available to be engaged for a concert. In sum, in order to consider the field of moral action it is important to take account not only of the nature or kind of agent involved, but also of his or her existence and actions.

2. *Subsisting Individual*. Something of the greatest importance was bound to take place, therefore, when the mind expanded its range of awareness beyond the nature of things to what Shakespeare was to call *the* question: "to be or not to be." At that point the mind became able to take explicit account not only of the kind, but of the existence of the individual, by which it is constituted in the order of actual, and hence of acting, beings.

From this there followed a series of basic implications for the reality of the person. It would no longer be considered as simply the relatively placid distinct or autonomous instance of some specific type. Rather, it would be understood in the much more dynamic manner as existing. This means not only being in its own right or, as is said, "standing on its own two feet" (sub-sisting), but bursting in among the realities of this world as a new and active center (ex-isting). This understanding incorporates all the above-mentioned characteristics of the individual substance,

and adds three more which are proper to existence, namely, being (a) complete, (b) independent, and (c) dynamically open to actions and to new actualization. Since existing or subsisting individuals include not only persons but rocks and trees, these characteristics, though fundamental, still will not be exclusive to the person.

First, a person must be whole or complete. As regards its nature it must have all that is required to be of its distinctive kind (just as by definition a three digit number cannot be made up of but two digits). Hence, if humans are recognized to be by nature both body and mind or body and soul, then the human mind or soul without the body would be neither a subsisting individual nor, by implication, a person, for it would lack a complete human nature. This is of special importance in view of the tendency of some to reduce the human person to only the mind, soul, or consciousness or to consider the person to be adequately protected if these alone are cared for. In fact, the inclusion of body in the human person is as central to education as the issue of torture is to human rights. The same is true of the mind or spirit in view of the tendency, described by William James,¹⁸ to reduce the person to "nothing but" the inert by-products of physiology, or to functions of the structure of the production and distribution of goods.

Further, the existing individual requires not merely a complete nature, but his or her proper existence. As existing, the individual is not merely an instance of a specific nature or kind, but a concrete reality asserting him or herself and dynamically struggling to achieve his or her fulfillment. In the person this goes beyond merely walking a course whose every step is already charted; it includes all the unique, fully individual choices by which a life is lived. It is subject then to combinations of the precarious and the stable, of tragedy and triumph in its self-realization. These are described by the American pragmatists and Continental existentialists as the very stuff of life, and hence by Dewey as the very stuff of education.

Secondly, as subsistent the person is independent. Being complete in its nature it is numerically individual and distinct from all else. In accord with this individual nature, one's existence is, in turn, unique, and establishes the subject as a being in its own right, independent of all else. This does not imply that the human or other living subject does not need nourishment, or that it was not generated by another: people do need people and much else besides; there is no question here of being self-sufficient or absolute. What is meant by independence is that the needs it has and the actions it performs are truly its own.

In turn, this means that in interacting with other subsistent individuals one's own contribution is distinctive and unique. This is commonly recognized at those special times when the presence of a mother, father, or special friend is required, and no one else will do. At other times as well, even when, as a bus driver or a dentist, I perform a standard service, my actions remain properly my own. This understanding is a prerequisite for education to responsibility in public as in private life. It is a condition too for overcoming depersonalization in a society in which we must fulfill ever more specialized and standardized roles.

Another implication of this independence is that, as subsisting, the human person cannot simply be absorbed or assimilated by another. As complete in oneself one cannot be part of another: as independent in existence one is distinct from all else. Hence, one cannot be assumed or taken up by any other person or group in such wise as to lose one's identity. In recent years awareness of this characteristic has generated a strong reaction against the tendencies of mass society totally to absorb the person and to reduce all to mere functions in a larger whole called the state, the industrial complex, the consumer society, cult, etc.

As noted above it is perhaps the special challenge of the present day, however, to keep this awareness of one's distinctive independence from degenerating into selfishness, to keep

individuality from becoming individualism. The individual existent, seen as sculpted out of the flow and process of the physical universe, cannot be rightly thought of as isolated. Such an existent is always *with* others, depending on them for birth, sustenance and expression. In this context, to be distinct or individual is not to be isolated or cut off, but to be able to relate more precisely and intensively to others.

This can be seen at a series of levels. My relation to the chair upon which I sit and the desk upon which I write is not diminished but made possible by the distinction and independence of the three of us. Their retention of their distinctness and distinctive shapes enables me to integrate them into my task of writing. Because I depend still more intimately upon food, I must correlate more carefully its distinctive characteristics with my precise needs and capacities. On the genetic level it is the careful choice of distinctive strains that enables the development of a new individual with the desired characteristics. On the social level the more personable the members of the group the greater and more intense is its unity.

Moving thus from instruments such as desks, to alimentation, to lineage, to society suggests that, as one moves upward through the levels of beings, distinctness, far from being antithetic to community, is in fact its basis. This gives hope that at its higher reaches, namely, in the moral life, the distinctiveness of autonomy and freedom may not need to be compromised, but may indeed be the basis for a community of persons bound together in mutual love and respect.

The third characteristic of the subsistent individual to be considered is this openness to new actualization and to interrelation with others. The existence by which one erupted into this world of related subjects is not simply self-contained; it is expressed in a complex symphony of actions which are properly one's own: thus, running can be said only of an existing individual, such as Mary, who runs. What is more, actions determine their subject, for it is only by running that Mary herself is constituted precisely as a runner. This will be central to the last part of this study: the person as moral agent.

It is important too for our relations to, and with, others. For the actions into which our existence flows, while no less our own, reach beyond ourselves. The same action which makes us agents shapes the world around us and, for good or ill, communicates to others. All the plots of all the stories ever told are about this; but their number pales in comparison with all the lives ever lived, each of which is a history of personal interactions.¹⁹ The actions of an individual existent reflect one's individuality with its multiple possibilities, and express this to and with others. It is in this situation of dynamic openness,²⁰ of communication and of community that the moral growth of persons takes place. As subsistent therefore the person is characteristically a being, not only in him/herself, but *with* other beings. About this more must be said below.

To summarize: thus far, we have seen the early derivation of the notion of person from mask. For this to evolve into the contemporary notion of person a strong awareness both of the nature and of the existence of independent individuals needed to be developed. The first was achieved by the Greeks who identified within the one physical process basically different types of things. Substances are the individual instances of these specific types or natures. This provides the basis for one's consciousness of one's own nature and for relating to others in its terms within the overall pattern of nature(s).

There were limitations to such a project, for in its terms alone one ultimately would be but an instance of one's nature; in the final analysis the goal of a physical being would be but to continue one's species through time. This was true for the Greeks and may still be a sufficient basis for the issues considered in sociobiology. It does not allow for adequate attention to the person's unique and independent reality. This required the development subsequently of an awareness of existence

as distinct from nature or essence, and as that by which one enters into the world and is constituted as a being in one's own right. On this basis the subsisting individual can be seen to be whole and independent, and hence the dynamic center of action in this world.

Still more is required, however. The above characteristics, while foundational for a person, are had as well by animals and trees: they too are wholes, independent and active in this world. In addition to what has been said above about substance and subsisting individual, therefore, it is necessary to identify that which is distinctive of the human subsistent and constitutes it finally as personal. This is self-consciousness and freedom.

The Person: A Self-Conscious and Free Subject

Self-consciousness and will had been central to philosophies of the person in classical times; indeed, at one point Augustine claimed that men were nothing else than will. After Descartes' reformulation of metaphysics in terms of the thinking self, however, the focus upon self-consciousness by John Locke and upon the will by Kant brought the awareness of these distinctive characteristics of the person to a new level of intensity and exclusivity. This constituted a qualitatively new and distinctively modern understanding of the person. It is necessary to see in what these characteristics consist and how they relate to the subsisting individual analyzed above.

Self-Consciousness and Freedom

John Locke undertook to identify the nature of the person within the context of his general effort to provide an understanding which would enable people to cooperate in building a viable political order. This concentration upon the mind is typical of modern thought and of its contribution to our appreciation of the person. By focusing upon knowledge Locke proceeded to elaborate, not only consciousness in terms of the person, but the person in terms of consciousness. He considered personal identity to be a complex notion composed from the many simple ideas which constitute our consciousness. By reflection we perceive that we perceive and thereby are able to be, as it were, present to ourselves and to recognize ourselves as distinct from all other thinking things.²¹ Memory, which is also an act of consciousness, enables us to recognize these acts of consciousness in different times and places. Locke saw the memory, by uniting present acts of awareness with similar past acts, not merely as discovering but as creating personal identity. This binding of myself as past consciousness to myself as present consciousness constitutes the continuing reality of the person. Essentially, it is a private matter revealed directly only to oneself, and only indirectly to other persons.

Because Locke's concern for knowledge was part of his overriding concern to find a way to build social unity in a divided country he saw his notion of the self as the basis of an ethic for both private and public life. As conscious of pleasure and pain the self is capable of happiness or misery, "and so is concerned for itself."²² What is more, happiness and misery matter only inasmuch as they enter one's self-consciousness as a matter of self-concern directing one's activities. He sees the pattern of public morality, with its elements of justice as rewarding a prior good act by happiness and as punishing an evil act by misery, to be founded upon this identity of the self as a continuing consciousness from the time of the act to that of the reward or punishment. 'Person' is the name of this self as open to public judgment and social response; it is "a forensic term appropriating actions and their merit."²³

This early attempt to delineate the person on the basis of consciousness locates a number of factors essential for personhood such as the importance of self-awareness, the ability to be concerned with and for oneself, and the basis this provides for the notions of responsibility and public accountability. These are the foundations of his *Letters Concerning Toleration* which were to be of such great importance in the development of subsequent social and political structures in many parts of the world.

There are reasons to believe, however, that, while correct in focusing upon consciousness, he did not push his analysis far enough to integrate the whole person. Leibniz, in his *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, was quick to point out some of these reasons in a detailed response. Centering personal identity in consciousness, Locke distinguished it from the notion of the person as that which could be identified by a body of a particular shape. This led him to admit that it is conceivable that the one consciousness, self or person could exist in different bodies a thousand years remote one from another²⁴ or, conversely, that multiple selves could inhabit the same body.

This is more than an issue of "names ill-used";²⁵ it is symptomatic of the whole cluster of problems which derive from isolating human consciousness from the physical identity of the human self. These include problems not only regarding communication with other persons for which one depends upon physical signs, but regarding the life of the person in a physical world in whose unity and harmony one's consciousness has no real share, indeed, in relation to which it is defined by contrast.²⁶ Recently, existential phenomenologists have begun to respond to the perverse, desiccating effect which this has had even upon consciousness itself, while environmentalists have pointed up the destruction it has wrought upon nature.

This implies a problem for personal identity. Locke would claim that personal identity resides in the continuity established by linking the past with the present in one's memory.²⁷ But, as there is no awareness of a substantial self from which this consciousness proceeds,²⁸ what remains is but a sequence of perceptions or a flow of consciousness recorded by memory.

Finally, Leibniz would question Locke's claim to have provided even that public or forensic notion of the self by which he sought to provide a sufficient basis for legal and political relations. Memory can deal with the past and the present, but not with the future; planning and providing for the future is, however, the main task of a rationally ordered society. Further, Locke's conclusion, that since the self is consciousness the same self could inhabit many bodies of different appearances, would undermine the value of public testimony, and thereby the administration of justice.²⁹ Though self-consciousness is certainly central and distinctive of the person, more is required for personhood than a sequence of consciousness, past and present.

Another approach was attempted by Kant whose identification of the salient characteristics of the person has become a standard component for modern sensitivity. Whereas Locke had developed the notion of the person in terms of consciousness predicated upon experience, Kant developed it on the requirements of an ethics based upon will alone. Both the strengths and the weaknesses of this approach to the person lie in his effort to lay for ethics a foundation that is independent of experience. He did so because he considered human knowledge to be essentially limited to the spatial and temporal orders and unable to explain its own presuppositions. Whatever be thought of this, by looking within the self for a new and absolute beginning he led the modern mind to a new awareness of the reality and nature of the person.

For Kant the person is above all free, both in himself or herself and in relation to others; in no sense is the person to be used by others as a means. From this he concluded that it is essential to avoid any dependence (heteronomy) on anything beyond oneself and, within oneself, on anything

other than one's own will. The fundamental thrust of the will is its unconditional command to act lawfully; this must be the sole basis for an ethics worthy of man. In turn, "the only presupposition under which . . . (the categorical imperative) is alone possible . . . is the Idea of freedom."³

As free the person must not be legislated to by anyone or on the basis of anything else; to avoid heteronomy one must be an end-in-oneself. Kant's self-described goal was to awaken interest in the moral law through this "glorious ideal" of a universal realm of persons as ends-in-themselves (rational beings).³¹ The person, then, is not merely independent, as is any subject; he is a lawmaking member of society. This means that the person has not only value which is to be protected and promoted, but true dignity as well, for he is freely bound by and obeys laws which he gives to himself.³² As this humanity is to be respected both in oneself and in all others, one must act in such wise that if one's actions were to constitute a universal law they would promote a cohesive life for all rational agents.

This "glorious ideal" has been perhaps the major contribution to the formation of the modern understanding of ourselves as persons. At the minimum, it draws a line against what is unacceptable, namely, whatever is contrary to the person as an end-in-him-or-herself, and sets thereby a much needed minimal standard for action. At the maximum, as with most *a priori* positions, it expresses an ideal for growth by pointing out the direction, and thereby providing orientation, for the development of the person. In Kohlberg's schema of moral development it constitutes the sixth or highest stage, and hence the sense and goal of his whole project--though he notes rightly that this is not an empirically available notion.

Further, this bespeaks a certain absoluteness of the individual will which is essential if the person is not to be subject to domination by the circumstances he encounters. If one must be more than a mere function of one's environment--whether this be one's state, or business, or neighborhood--then Kant has made a truly life-saving observation in noting that the law of the will must extend beyond any one good or particular set of goods.

Nevertheless, there are reasons to think that still more is needed for an understanding of the person. In Part I of his *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals* Kant correctly rules out anything other than, or heteronomous to, human freedom and will as an adequate basis for ethics, at least as far as using one's own ability to think and to decide are concerned. Nor does he omit the fact that these individuals live their lives with others in this world. As the good is mediated by *their* concrete goods, however, a role for experience must be recognized if right reason is to conform to the real good in things. Further, there is need to know more of the reality of the person in order to understand: (a) not only how will and freedom provide the basis for ethical behavior, but (b) by what standards or values behavior can be judged to be ethical, and (c) how ethical behavior is integral to the project of the person's self-realization. Something more than a postulation of freedom (along with the immortality of the soul and God) is essential to enable the development of the person to be guided throughout by his "glorious ideal."

In sum, Locke and Kant have contributed essentially to delineating the nature of the person for the modern mind. Both have pointed up that which distinguishes the person from other subjects. Focusing upon knowledge, Locke showed the person to be an identity of continuing consciousness which is self-aware and "concerned for itself." Focusing upon the will and its freedom, Kant showed the person to be an end-in-itself.

By attending directly to consciousness and freedom, however, both left problems which are similar and of great importance to the present project. The first regards the way in which consciousness and freedom are realized in the person as a unique identity with a proper place in society and indeed in reality as a whole. It is true, as Locke says, that the term person expresses

self-awareness and continuing consciousness, as well as its status in the public forum. But, one needs more than an isolated view of that which is most distinctive of man; one needs to know what the person is in his or her entirety, how one is able to stand among other persons as a subject, and how in freedom one is to undertake one's rightful responsibilities. One is not only consciousness or freedom, but a conscious and free subject or person. Further, it is necessary to understand the basis of the private, as well as the public, life of the person, for one is more than a role, a citizen, or a function of state. The second problem regards the way in which the person can attain his or her goal of full self-awareness, freedom, and responsibility, namely, how the person can achieve his or her fulfillment through time and with others.

In sum, what Locke and Kant discovered about the person by considering self-awareness in the abstract and for the political arena needs now to be integrated with what was seen regarding the individual in the first section of this chapter in order to constitute the integral person as a rational and free subject.

The Self-conscious and Free Subject

While it has been said that ancient thinkers had no concept of the person, a very important study by Catherine De Vogel³³ has shown that there was indeed a significant sense of person and of personality among the ancient Greeks and Romans, as well as a search for its conditions and possibilities. It will be helpful to look at this in order to identify some of the cultural resources for understanding the way in which self-consciousness and freedom are rooted in the subject and constitute the person with which moral education is concerned. Above, we saw a certain progression from the Greek philosophical notion of the individual as an instance of a general type to a more ample existential sense of the subject as an independent whole, which nonetheless shares with others in the same specific nature. It is time now to see how this relates to self-consciousness and freedom.

The Greeks had a certain sense for, and even fascination with, individuals in the process of grappling with the challenge to live their freedom. T.B.L. Webster notes that "Homer was particularly interested in them (his heroes) when they took difficult decisions or exhibited characteristics which were not contained in the traditional picture of the fighting man."³⁴ In the final analysis, however, the destiny of his heroes was determined by fate, from which even Zeus could not free them. Hence, an immense project of liberation was needed in order to appreciate adequately the full freedom of the moral agent.

This required establishing: (a) that the universe is ruled by law, (b) that a person could have access to this law through reason, and (c) that the person has command of his relation to this law. These elements were developed by Heraclitus around 500 B.C. He saw that the diverse physical forces could not achieve the equilibrium required in order to constitute a universe without something which is one. This cosmic, divine law or Logos is the ruling principle of the coherence of all things, not only in the physical, but in the moral and social orders. A person can assume the direction of his life by correcting his understanding and determining his civil laws and actions according to the Logos, which is at once divine law and nature. In this lies wisdom.³⁵

This project has two characteristics, namely, self-reflection and self-determination. First, as the law or Logos is not remote, but within man--"The soul has a Logos within it"³⁶--the search for the Logos is also a search for oneself: "I began to search for myself."³⁷ Self-reflection is then central to wisdom. Second, the attainment of wisdom requires on the part of man a deliberate

choice to follow the universal law. This implies a process of interior development by which the Logos which is within "increases itself."³⁸

A similar pattern of thought is found in the Stoic philosophers for whom there is a principle of rationality or "germ of logos" of which the soul is part, and which develops by natural growth.³⁹ A personal act is required to choose voluntarily the law of nature, which is also the divine will.

These insights of Heraclitus, though among the earliest of the philosophers, were pregnant with a number of themes which correspond to Kant's three postulates for the ethical life: the immortality of the soul, freedom and God. The first of these would be mined by subsequent thinkers in their effort to explore the nature of the person as a physical subject that is characteristically self-conscious and free. As the implications of Heraclitus' insight that the multiple and diverse can constitute a unity only on the basis of something that is one gradually became evident, the personal characteristics of self-consciousness and freedom were bound to the subject with its characteristics of wholeness, independence and interrelatedness. The first step was Plato's structure for integrating the multiple instances of a species by their imitation of, or participation in the idea or archetype of that species.⁴⁰ This, in turn, images still higher and more central ideas, and ultimately the highest idea which is inevitably the Good or the One.

Aristotle took the second step by applying the same principle to the internal structure of living beings. He concluded that the unity of their disparate components could be explained only by something one, which he termed the soul or *psyche*--whence the term 'psychology.' The body is organized by this form which he described as "the first grade of actuality of a natural body having life potentially in it."⁴¹ For Aristotle, however, the unifying principle of a physical subject could not be also the principle of man's higher mental life, his life of reason. Hence, there remained the need to understand the person as integrating self-consciousness and freedom in one subject which is nonetheless physical.

Over one thousand years later Thomas Aquinas took this third step, drawing out of Heraclitus' insight its implications for the unity of the person with its full range of physical and mental life. He did not trace the physical to one form or soul and the higher conscious life to another principle existing separately from the body as had the Aristotelian commentators, nor did he affirm two separate souls as did Bonaventure. Rather, Thomas showed that there could be but one principle or soul for the entire person, both mind and body. He did this by drawing out rigorously, under the principle of non-contradiction, the implications of the existence of the subject noted above. One subject could have but one existence--lest it be not one but two. This existence, in turn, could pertain to but one essence or nature--again lest it be and not be of that nature; for the same reason the one essence could be of but one form. Hence, there could be only one formal principle or soul for both the physical and the self-conscious and free dimensions of a person. This rendered obsolete Aristotle's duality of these principles for man and founded the essential and integral humanness of both mind and body in the unity of the one person.⁴²

This progression of steps leading to the one principle, which enables that which is complex to constitute nonetheless a unity, points in the person to the one form which is commonly called the soul. By this single formal principle what Locke articulated only as a disembodied consciousness and Kant as an autonomous will are able to exist as a properly human subject. This is physical truly but not exclusively, for it transcends the physical to include also self-consciousness and freedom. Similarly, it exists in its own right, yet does so in such wise that it exists essentially with others as a person in society.

There are pervasive implications in such an integration of the physical with the self-conscious dimensions of the person through a single principle. One does not become a person when one is accepted by society; on the contrary, by the form through which one is a person one is an autonomous end-in-oneself and has claim to be responded to as such by others. Hence, though for his or her human development the person has a unique need for acceptance, respect and love, the withholding of such acceptance by others--whether individuals, families or states--does not deprive them of their personhood. One does not have to be accepted in order to have a claim to acceptance. (Even in circumstances of correction and punishment, when a person's actions are being explicitly repudiated, persons cannot be treated as mere things.) Thus, the rights to respect, to an education, to possibilities for development and to meaningful engagement in society are based within the person and need to be responded to by family and society.

Similarly, it is not necessary that the person manifest in overt behavior signs of self-awareness and responsibility. From genetic origin and physical form it is known that the infant and young child is an individual human developing according to a single unifying and integrating principle of both its physical and its rational life.⁴³ The rights and the protection of a human person belong to a person by right prior to an ability consciously to conceive or to articulate them. Even in very young children, the physical manner in which they express themselves and respond to others is truly human. Indeed, though the earlier the stage in life the more physical the manner of receiving and expressing affection, the earliest months and years appear to be the most determinative of one's lifetime ability to relate to others with love and affection.

Finally, attempts to modify the behavior of persons must proceed according to distinctively human norms if they are not to be destructive. Whether in the school, the workplace or society at large, it is crucial to recognize that every human being is a human person, and integrally so in each of their human actions and interactions. Not to attend to this is to fail to recognize those with whom we interact to the detriment and dishonor of both the person and the social process.

There is a second insight of great potential importance in the thought of Heraclitus. When he refers to the Logos⁴⁴ as being very deep he suggests multiple dimensions of the soul. Indeed, it must be so if human life is complex and its diverse dimensions have their principle in the one soul. Plato thought of these as parts of the soul; in these terms the development of oneself as a person would consist in bringing these parts into proper subordination one to another. This state is called justice, the "virtue of the soul."⁴⁵ Both the *Republic* and the *Laws* reflect amply his concern for education, character formation, and personal development understood as the process of attaining that state of justice. The way to this is progressive liberation from captivity by the objects of sense knowledge and sense desires through spiritual training, as described in the *Phaedo* and the *Republic*. All this prepares the way for what is essential, namely, the contemplation of the transcendent Good. This alone establishes that inner harmony of soul through which the person is constituted as free and responsible, both in principle and in act. Because this vision, not only of some goods, but of the transcendent Good, cannot be communicated by teaching but remains "an extremely personal interior vision,"⁴⁶ the uncalculating and unmeasured love shared in family and intermediate communities has special importance.

By the human form or soul the human individual as a person is open in principle, not only to particular states of affairs or events, but to the one source, Logos and goal of all. Through this, in turn, one is able to take account of the full meaning of each thing and freely to relate oneself to others in the coordinating virtue of philanthropia, the love of all mankind.⁴⁷ As it is of foundational importance for a truly moral life to have not merely access to some goods, but an

ability to evaluate them in terms of the Good, the form or soul as the single organizing and vivifying principle of the person is the real foundation for the person as an end-in-onceself.

Correlatively, recent thought has made crucial strides toward reintegrating the person into his or her world. The analytic process of identifying the components of the world process initiated by the Greeks was inherently risky, for as analytic any imperfection in the understanding of personal identity would tend toward individualism and distract from the unity of persons and peoples through their grounding in the One. Cumulatively, the intensive modern concentration upon freedom in terms of self-consciousness would generate an isolating and alienating concentration upon self.⁴⁸

Some developments in recent thought have made important contributions to correcting this individualist--even potentially solipsist--bias. One is the attention paid recently to language and to the linguistic character of the person. Our consciousness is not only evoked, but shaped, by the pattern of the language in which we are nurtured. In our highly literate culture--many would say in all cultures--the work of the imagination which accompanies and facilitates that of the intellect is primarily verbal. Hence, rather than ideas being developed and then merely expressed by language, our thought is born in language. As this language is not one's private creation, but that of our community and over a long period, conscious acts, even about ourselves, involve participation in that community. To say that our nature is linguistic is to say that it is essentially "with others."

A similar point, but on another level of insight, was developed by Martin Heidegger and laid the basis for the stress among many existential thinkers on the importance of considering the person as being in community. As conscious and intentional, one essentially is not closed within oneself, but open to the world; one's self-realization depends upon and indeed consists in one's being in the world. Therefore it is not possible to think of persons in themselves and then to add some commerce with their surroundings; instead, persons exist and can be conceived only as beings-in-the-world. Here the term 'in' expresses more than a merely spatial relation; it adds an element of being acquainted with or being familiar with, of being concerned for, and of sharing. At root this is the properly personal relation.⁴⁹

From what was said of being-in-the-world it follows that the person is also being-with-others, for one is not alone in sharing in this world. Just as I enter into and share in the world, so also do other persons. Hence, as essentially sharing-in-the-world, our being is also essentially a sharing-with-others; the world of the person is a world in which we are essentially with-others. In this light a study of the existence of the rational subject with its hopes and its efforts toward self-realization with others must center ultimately upon understanding the development of the person as a moral participant in social life.

Moral Agent and Moral Growth

Recent advances in this project are being made by interweaving two main streams of thought regarding the person: one considers the subject as existing in his own right as conscious and free; the other situates this consciousness and freedom in the person as acting in the world with other persons. Together they provide a context for understanding the development of the moral awareness of the person.

The Person as Moral Agent

In Aristotle's project of distinguishing the components of the physical process actions and attributes were found to be able to exist and to be intelligible only in a substance which existed in its own right--there could be no running without a runner. Actions, as distinct from the substantive nature or essence, could appear to be added thereto in a relatively external or "quantitative" manner. Subsequent developments in understanding the subject in terms of existence have provided protection against this externalism. In relation to existence, essence does not merely specify the specific nature or kind of the thing; it is rather the way in which each thing is, the way in which each living being lives. Hence, for a person it implies and calls for the full range of activities of a human being. Indeed, essence is often termed nature precisely as that from which these life acts derive.⁵⁰ These actions, in turn, cannot be mere additions to the person; they are the central determinants of the quality of one's very life. It is not just that one can do more or less, but that by so doing one becomes a more or less kind, more or less loving, or more or less generous person.

A person should be understood also in terms of his or her goals, for activities progressively modify and transform one in relation to the perfection of which one is by nature capable and which one freely chooses. Thus, though infants are truly and quite simply human beings, they are good only in an initial sense, namely, as being members of the human species. What they will become, however, lies in the future; hence they begin to be categorized as good or bad people only after and in view of their actions. Even then it is thought unfair to judge or evaluate persons at an early age before it can be seen how they will "turn out" or what they will "make of themselves," that is, what character and hence constant pattern of action they will develop.

Further, one's progress or lack thereof can be judged only in terms of acting in a manner proportionate to one's nature: a horse may be characterized as good or bad on the basis of its ability to run, but not to fly. One must be true to one's nature, which in that sense serves as a norm of action. In this new sense I am a law to myself, namely, I must never act as less than one having a human nature with its self-consciousness and freedom. Below we shall see a way in which being true to this nature implies constituting both myself and my world.

Boethius classically defined the person as "an individual substance of a rational nature,"⁵¹ within which Locke focused upon self-consciousness. But conscious nature can be understood on a number of levels. First, it might be seen as a reflection or passive mirroring in man of what takes place around him. This does not constitute new being, but merely understands what is already there. Secondly, if this consciousness is directed to the self it can be called self-knowledge and makes of the subject an object for one's act of knowledge. Thirdly, consciousness can regard one's actions properly as one's own. By concerning the self precisely as the subject of one's own actions, it makes subjective what had been objective in the prior self-knowledge; it is reflexive rather than merely reflective.

This self-conscious experience depends upon the objective reality of the subject with all the characteristics described above in the section on the self-conscious and free subject. This, in turn, is shaped by the reflexive and hence free experiences of discovering, choosing, and committing oneself. In these reflexive acts the subject in a sense constitutes him or herself, being manifested or disclosed to oneself as concrete, distinct, and indeed unique. This is the distinctively personal manner of self-actuation of the conscious being or person.

The result for the person is a unique realization of that independence which above was seen to characterize all subsistent individuals. Beyond the mirroring of surrounding conditions and of

those things that happen to one, beyond even the objective realization of oneself as affected by those events, the person exists reflexively as their subject and as a source of action. As a person one has an inward, interior life of which they alone are the responsible source. This implies for the person an element of mystery which can never be fully explicated or exhausted. Much can be proposed by other persons and things; much can even be imposed upon me. But my self-consciousness is finally my act and no one else's. How I assess and respond to my circumstances is finally my decision, which relates to, but is never simply the result of, exterior factors.

Here finally lies the essence of freedom, of which the ability to choose between alternatives is but one implication. What is essential for a free life is not that I always retain an alternative, but that I can determine myself and carry through with consistency the implications of my self-determination--even, and at times especially, in the most straightening of circumstances. In this the personal finally transcends that growth process originally called the *physis* or the physical, and hence has been considered rightly to be spiritual as well.

This, of course, is not to imply isolation from one's physical and social world; rather it bespeaks in the world a personal center which is self-aware and self-determining. More than objective consciousness of myself as acting, the inward reflexion at the origin of my action is that according to which I freely determine⁵² and experience myself as the one who acts in freedom. The bond of consciousness with action as deriving from self-determination is crucial for a full recognition of subjectivity. It protects this from reduction to the subjectivism of an isolated consciousness which, being separated from action, would be finally more arbitrary than absolute.

Self-determination in action has another implication: in originating an action the person's experience is not merely of that action as happening to or in him, but of a dynamism in which he participates efficaciously. As a self I experience myself immanently as wholly engaged in acting and know this efficacy to be properly my own, my responsibility. Hence, by willing good or evil action, I specify, not only the action which results, but myself as the originator of that action.

Finally, I am aware of my responsibility for the results of my actions which extend beyond me and shape my world. The good or evil which my actions bring about is rooted in good or evil decisions on my part. In making choices which shape my world I also form myself for good or evil. By their subjective character actions become part of the person's unique process of self-realization.⁵³

Action then manifests an important dimension of the person.⁵⁴ On the one hand, the need to act shows that the person, though a subject and independent, is not at birth perfect, self-sufficient or absolute. On the contrary, persons are conscious of perfection that they do not possess, but toward which they are dynamically oriented. Hence, the person is essentially active and creative.

On the other hand, this activity is marked characteristically by responsibility. This implies that, while the physical or social goods that one can choose are within one's power, they do not overpower one. Whatever their importance, in the light of the person's openness to the good as such one can always overrule the power of their attraction. When one does choose them it is the person--not the goods--who is responsible for that choice.

Both of these point to two foundations of the person's freedom, and hence of one's ability to be a self-determining end-in-oneself. First, one's mind or intellect is oriented, not to one or another true thing or object of knowledge, but to Truth Itself and hence to whatever is or can be. Second and in a parallel manner, the person's will is not limited to--or hence by--any particular good or set of goods. Rather, because oriented to the Good Itself, it is freely open to any and all goods.

Personal Growth as Convergence of Values and Virtues

In Chapter I in tracing the emergence of a culture we looked at the dynamic involved in the evolution of values from free choices made among the range of possible routes to development and perfection. We saw how values then serve as lenses which focus our attention and aspirations. Further, we noted the character of virtues as capabilities which one develops and which enable one to pursue the work of shaping his or her life according to his or her values.

In this light we saw how freedom becomes more than mere spontaneity, more than choice, and more even than self-determination, and how it shapes or even constitutes my world as the field of choice and action.⁵⁵ This is the making of myself as a person in a community.

To appreciate this it is necessary to look more closely at the dynamic openness and projection which characterize the concrete person--not only in his or her will, but in his or her body and psyche as well. In order to be truly self-determining the person must not merely moderate a bargaining session between these three, but must constitute a new and active dynamism in which all dimensions achieve their properly personal character.

Bodily or somatic dynamisms, such as the pumping of blood, are basically non-reflective and reactive. They are implemented through the nervous system in response to stimuli; generally they are below the level of human consciousness, from which they enjoy a degree of autonomy. Nonetheless, they are in harmony with the person as a whole, of which they are an integral dimension. As such they are implicit in my conscious and self-determined choices regarding personal action with others in this world.

Dynamisms of the psyche are typified by emotivity. In some contrast to the more reactive character of lower bodily dynamism and in a certain degree to the somatic as a whole, these are based rather within the person. They include, not only affectivity, but sensation and emotions as well, which feelings range from some which are physical to others which are moral, religious and aesthetic. Such emotions have two important characteristics. First, they are not isolated or compartmentalized, but include and interweave the various dimensions of the person. Hence, they are crucial to the integration of a personal life. They play a central role in the proximity one feels to values and to the intensity of one's response thereto. Secondly, they are relatively spontaneous and contribute to the intensity of a personal life. This, however, is not adequate to make them fully personal for, as personal, life is not only what happens in me, but above all what I determine to happen. This can range beyond and even against my feelings.

It is necessary, therefore, to distinguish two directions or dimensions of one's personal transcendence. The first relates to one's world as the object of either one's knowledge or one's will. This might be called horizontal as an activation of a person inasmuch as he or she relates to other things and especially to other persons. Such a relation would be poorly conceived were it thought to be merely an addition to a fully constituted person. On the contrary, the person as such is essentially transcendent, that is, open to others. One requires this interaction with others in order to have a language and all that this implies for the formation of thought, to have a moral code to assist one in the direction of one's will, and above all to have a family and community, and thus the possibility of sharing in the hope and anguish, the love and concern, which gives meaning to life.

The other, or vertical dimension of transcendence follows the sequence of levels of personal reality. Personal actions are carried out through a will which is open and responsive to the Good or goodness itself and as such able to respond to, without being determined by, any particular good or value. Thus, it is finally up to the person to determine him/herself to act. One is able to do this

because personal consciousness is not only reflective of itself as an additional object of knowledge, but reflexive or self-aware in its conscious acts.

If such actions derived merely from my powers or faculties of knowledge or will, in acting I would determine only the object of my action. Instead, these actions derive from my self as subject or person; hence, in acting I determine equally, and even primarily, myself. This is self-determination, self-realization and self-fulfillment in the strongest sense of those terms. Not only are others to be treated as ends in themselves; in acting I myself am an end.

It is possible to trace abstractly a general table of virtues required for particular circumstances in order to help clarify the overall terrain of moral action. As with values, however, such a table would not articulate the particulars of one's own experience nor dictate the next steps in one's project toward personal realization with others in relation to the Good. This does not mean, however, that such decisions are arbitrary; conscience makes its moral judgments in terms of real goods and real structures of values and virtues. Nevertheless, through and within the breadth of these categories, it is the person who must decide, and in so doing enrich his or her unique experience of the virtues. No one can act without courage and wisdom, but each exercise of these is distinctive and typically one's own. Progressively they form a personality that facilitates one's exercise of freedom as it becomes more mature and correlatively more unique. This often is expressed simply as 'more personal.'

A person's values reflect then, not only his/her culture and heritage, but within this what he or she has done with its set of values. One shapes and refines these values through one's personal, and hence free, search to realize the good with others in one's world. They reflect, therefore, not only present circumstances which our forebears could not have experienced, but our free response to the challenges to interpersonal, familial and social justice and love in our days.

In the final analysis, moral development as a process of personal maturation consists in bringing my pattern of personal and social virtues into harmony with the corresponding sets of values along the vertical pole of transcendence. In this manner we achieve a coordinated pattern of personal capabilities for the realization of our unique response to The Good.

Though free and hence properly personal, as was seen above, this is done essentially with others. For this reason the harmony sought within oneself for moral development must be mirrored in a corresponding harmony between modes of action and values in the communities and nations in which persons live. (Thus, Aristotle considered his ethics of individual moral action to be an integral part of politics.) If that be true then the moral development of the person as a search for self-fulfillment is most properly the search for that dynamic harmony, both within and without, called peace.

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Notes

1. An integrated study of the person as moral agent is found in G. McLean, F. Ellrod, D. Schindler and J. Mann, eds., *Act and Agent: Philosophical Foundations for Moral Education and Character Development* (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1992).

2. For a psychological reconstruction of the person see Richard Knowles, ed., *Psychological Foundations and Character Development* (Washington, D.C.: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy and the University Press of America, 1986).
3. Adolf Trendelenburg, “A Contribution to the History of the Word Person,” *The Monist*, 20 (1910), 336-359. This posthumously published work is now over 100 years old. See also “Persona” in *Collected Works of F. Max Muller* (London, 1912), vol. X, pp. 32 and 47; and Arthur C. Danto, “Persona” in *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (New York: Macmillan, 1967), VI, 110-114.
4. This was pointed out by Gabius Bassus. See Aulus Gellius, *Noctes Atticae*, V. 7.
5. *Prosepeion*. This explanation was given by Forcellini (1688-1769), cf. Trendelenburg, p. 340.
6. C.J. De Vogel, “The Concept of Personality in Greek and Christian Thought,” *Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy*, ed. John K. Ryan (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963), II. 20-60.
7. “That accepth not the persons of princes,” *Job* 3 4;19. See also *Deut* 10:17; *Acts* 10:34-35; *Rom* 2:10-11.
8. Cicero, *De Officiis*, I, 28 and 31; *De Orator*, II, 102; and Epictetus, *Enchiridion*, ch. 17.
9. A. Danto. See n. 2 above.
10. (Boston: Beacon, 1957), p.61.
11. Rudolf Carnap, Hans Hahn, and Otto Neurath, “The Scientific World View: The Vienna Manifesto,” trans. A.E. Blumberg, in *Perspectives in Reality*, eds. J. Mann and G. Kreyche (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), p. 483.
12. *Ibid.*
13. Gabriel Marcel, *The Philosophy of Existence*, trans. Manya Harari (New York: Citadel Press, 1956), p. 14.
14. See Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, *The Phenomenon of Man* (New York: Harper, 1959); Wilfrid Desan, *The Planetary Man* (New York: Macmillan, 1961).
15. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I, 4 73 a 3-b 25.
16. René Clax, “La statut ontologique du concept de sujet selon le metaphysique d’Aristot. L’aporie de *Metaphy*. VII (Z) 3,” *Revue philosophique de Louvain*, 59 (61), 29.
17. *Metaphysics*, VII 4-7.
18. William James, *Pragmatism* (New York: Meridian Books, 1955), ch. I.
19. See also Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 181ff.
20. Gabriel Pastrama, “Personhood and the Burgeoning of Human Life,” *Thomist*, 41 (1977), 287-290.
21. John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, ch. 27, n. 11 and 9-10, ed. A.C. Grasser (New York: Dover, 1959), Vol. I, 448-452. The person is “a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself.”
22. *Ibid.*, n. 17.
23. *Ibid.*, nn. 18 and 26.
24. *Ibid.*, n. 20.
25. *Ibid.*, n. 29.
26. G.W. Leibniz, *New Essays Concerning Human Understanding*, Book II, ch. 27, 9, trans. A.G. Langley (Chicago: Open Court, 1916).
27. Locke, *Essay*, ch. 27, n. 15.

28. Leibniz, *New Essays*, Book II, ch. 27, n. 14. This consequence was recognized and accepted by Hume who proceeded to dispense with the notion of substance altogether.
29. *Ibid.*, nn. 20-66.
30. Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, III, trans. Lewis White Beck (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1959), p. 80.
31. *Ibid.*, III, p. 82.
32. *Ibid.*, II, pp. 53-59.
33. C.J. De Vogel, 20-60.
34. T.B.L. Webster, *Greek Art and Literature, 700-530 BC* (London: 1959), pp. 24-45 (cited by C. De Vogel, p. 27, fn. 17a).
35. Heraclitus, fns. 2,8,51,112 and 114 (trans by C. De Vogel).
36. *Ibid.*, fn. 115, p. 31. See also fn. 45.
37. *Ibid.*, fn. 101, p. 31.
38. *Ibid.*, fn. 115, p. 31.
39. Diog. L. VII 136; Marcus Aurelius IV 14, VI 24.
40. Plato, *Republic*, 476, 509-511: Mimesis.
41. Aristotle, *De Anima* II, 2 412 a 28-29.
42. Geroge F. McLean, "Philosophy and Technology," in *Philosophy in a Technological Culture*, ed. G. McLean (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1964), pp. 14-15. The same heraclitean line of reasoning is reflected by structuralist insights regarding the need which structures have for a single coordinating principle. Inasmuch as the structure is continually undergoing transformation and being established on new and broader levels this principle must be beyond any of the contrary characteristics or concepts to be integrated within the structure. It must be unique and comprehensive in order to be able to ground and to integrate them all. Jean Piaget, *Structuralism* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970), pp. 139-142. Cf. also George F. McLean, *Plenitude and Participation* (Madras: University of Madras, 1978), pp. 12-15.
43. For a detailed consideration of the first weeks after conception and of the point at which an individual life is clearly present see André E. Helligers, "The Beginnings of Personhood, Medical Consideration," *The Perkins School of Theology Journal*, 27 (1973), 11-15; and C.R. Austin, "The Egg and Fertilization," in *Science Journal*, 6 (special issue) (1970).
44. Heraclitus, fn. 45.
45. Plato, *Republic*, I 353 c-d; IV 43 d-e, 435 b-c, and 441 e-442d.
46. *Ibid.*, VI 609 c. See De Vogel, pp. 33-35.
47. C. De Vogel, pp. 38-45.
48. Different cultures, of course, are variously located along the spectrum from individualism to collectivism.
49. Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time* (New York: Harper and Row, 1963), pp. 52-57 and 118; see Joseph J. Kockelmans, *Martin Heidegger* (Pittsburgh, PA.: Duquesne Univeristy Press, 1965), pp. 24-25 and 56-57.
50. H. Rousseau, "Etre et agir," *Revue Thomiste*, 54 (1954); Joseph de Finance, *Etre et agir dans la philosophie de Saint Thomas* (Rome, PUG: 1960).
51. Boetius, *De duabus naturis et una persona Christi*, c.3.
52. Koral Wojtyla, *The Acting Person* (Dordrecht: Reidei, 1979), pp. 48-50; "The Person: Subject and Community," *Review of Metaphysics*, 33 (1979-80), 273-308; and "The Task of Christian Philosophy Today," *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 53 (1979), 3-4.

53. Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*, pp. 32-47.
54. This goes beyond Piaget's basic law that actions follow needs and continue only in relation thereto. Jean Piaget, *Six Psychological Studies* (New York: Vintage Books, 1968), p. 6.
55. Mehta, pp. 90-91.

Part II
Phenomenology and Psychology

4. Plurality in Social Psychology

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Introduction

Typically, it is through introductory textbooks that we receive our introduction to social psychology, as to any scientific discipline. They are the primary socialization devices in the process of becoming a social psychologist. They present and define the topics or the subject matter, the methods or dominant research procedures, and the results or the research findings which the discipline has accumulated.

When I started my professional career in social psychology in the early 1960s under the tutelage of Professor Gordon Allport, the dominant textbooks were: Proshansky and Seidenberg, *Basic Studies in Social Psychology* (1965) and Lindzey, *The Handbook of Social Psychology* (1954). In these textbooks a good deal of emphasis was placed on the varieties of theoretical approaches. The major recognized theories were: Stimulus-Response, Contiguity and Reinforcement Theory, Cognitive Theory, Psychoanalytic Theory, Field Theory and Role Theory.

It was taken for granted that different theoretical approaches would generate particular topics for study, offer alternative interpretations for research findings and represent divergent and yet complementary interests with regard to such social psychological phenomena as prejudice, which was one of the standard social psychological topics:

The latter can be easily illustrated if we consider, for example, how different psychological theorists would describe the behavior of a prejudiced person. Psychoanalytically oriented investigators would be primarily concerned with the existing affective tendencies of the individual as indicators of unconscious psychodynamic conflicts. Reinforcement theorists, on the other hand, would give far more attention to the instrumental nature of the prejudiced person's behavior as a means of acquiring rewards or avoiding punishments. For the cognitive theorists emphasis would be on that person's perceptions of the minority group member, the nature of his beliefs about them, and the extent to which there are distortions in these cognitions. And finally, those investigators who stress the individual's group memberships as a source of his attitudes will be concerned with the individual's group identifications and the prevailing norms of these groups. (Proshansky & Seidenberg, 1965, p. 9.)

There was also a recognition of a variety of methodological approaches.

In recent textbooks, however, scientific-method oriented experimental social psychology has dominated textbooks which are basically a-theoretical and present a restrictive vision of social psychology to the beginning student. The plurality of theoretical and methodological approaches disappears, as in the popular and influential book by Aronson: *The Social Animal* (1988). Social psychology is presented as a laboratory-based research discipline in the natural scientific tradition centered on the key social psychological phenomenon: social influence, and its facets:

Conformity
Mass Communication, Propaganda, and Persuasion
Self-Justification

Human Aggression
Prejudice
Attraction: Why People Like Each Other
Interpersonal Communication and Sensitivity.

Social psychology thus appears as a monolithic discipline of cumulative research findings which progressively shed light on the social dimensions of human behavior. Traditional experimental research on groups of subjects responding, under controlled conditions, to experimental manipulation in terms of independent and dependent variables becomes the norm of legitimate social psychological work. The traditional researcher stays in the perspective of an observer, "running the subjects"; typically one is not interested in the subject's point of view or experience, the perspective of the actor. Subjects as participants in the research are not enlisted as co-researchers who report on their subjective processes of conscious experience, on how they perceive and personally process what is happening to them, and how they deliberate and decide to act. The whole realm and reality of personal experience and meaning typically is excluded in traditional social psychological research. Thus, only an external view of human behavior is obtained; its dependence on external conditions is studied. The aim of traditional social psychology and its operative "research guiding interest" is technical, namely, the prediction and control of behavior.

This is essentially a behavioral engineering approach in which the social psychologist is privileged. The "subject", the actor, is not set free, empowered or emancipated to achieve a larger degree of freedom and greater possibilities for self-determination. Such traditional, natural-science social psychology is one-sided, operating from the observer or scientist's perspective. It needs to be complemented by a *human* science psychology (Giorgi, 1970) which enters the actor's point of view and investigates personal experience and personal meaning which mediate personal action and enhance the individual's freedom of choice and participation.

I prefer the definition of Gordon Allport, my mentor, who describes social psychology as: "The attempt to understand and explain how the thought, feeling and behavior of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined or implied presence of other human beings." (1954, p. 5) In this definition emphasis is placed both on the action and the experience of individual persons, both on behavior and consciousness. It expresses both an objective and a subjective component reflecting two basic complementary orientations in psychology, the perspective of the observer perspective and that of the actor.

In terms of this distinction I will present the plurality of social psychological approaches as falling into two major camps. One considers social psychology as a "natural science" dedicated to experimental methods. The human science approach sees social psychology as a "human science" dedicated to the study of conscious human experience and action from the actor's perspective. This approaches its subject matter through descriptive-reflective methods which disclose the constitution and structures of meaning which guide human actors. It is not interested in the prediction and control of behavior, but in articulating and understanding the meaning of experience and action for the actor. Many approaches, both as regards theory and method, can be identified in this human science social psychology camp:

- Existential-Phenomenology: focusing on acts and structures of consciousness elicited by narrative protocols and clarified by reflection. This is represented by the work of Husserl, Schutz, Berger, Scheler.

- Hermeneutical Dialectics: focusing on human expressivity, texts, art works and the mediation of the tradition. This is represented by the work of Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricouer.
- Dialogical Existentialism: focusing on the role of speech in establishing interpersonal relationships and the realm of the in-between. This is represented by the work of Buber and Rosenstock-Huessy.
- Critical Emancipatory Theory: focusing on implicit ideological, political, and power constellations which impact on, and inhibit, free human development and emancipation. This is represented by Habermas and Radnitzki.

As can be seen from this brief introduction, social psychology, both in its traditional natural scientific and its human scientific camps, is not a monolithic discipline. Instead, a variety of theories and methods and a plurality of schools of thought coexist, united in their desire to study the social dimensions of human activities and experiences, but divided as to the appropriate methods of study, the ways of conceptualizing human functioning and motivation and the implicit philosophical anthropology, i.e., the proper understanding of the essential nature of human beings.

The Paradigm Approach

In recent years there has been an increasing discussion of the nature of scientific activities and revolutions (Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 1962), as well as an autonomous philosophical-reflective discipline called "MetaScience", i.e., a science of scientific activity (G. Radnitzki, *Contemporary Schools of Metascience*, 1968). In this approach researchers are seen as belonging to "schools" or "research traditions". It is within such a social structure and within the conceptual framework of a "paradigm" characterizing a school that research proceeds. Kuhn says:

By the concept of paradigm . . . I mean to suggest that some accepted examples of scientific practice--examples which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation together--provide models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research (1962, p. 10).

Men whose research is based on shared paradigms are committed to the same rules and standards for scientific practice (1962, pp. 10-11).

Thus, a paradigm constitutes a particular school of thought.

Kuhn's work was based on the history of the natural sciences as one of "scientific revolutions" in which new paradigms replace old ones. Innovation comes as new observations which cannot be accommodated by the ruling paradigm lead to the creation of a new model, typically by a member who is new or marginal to the discipline and not yet fully socialized. As the new paradigm is articulated, it draws adherents to itself and grows in prestige and numbers until it replaces the old paradigm whose proponents are seldom converted, but just fade in influence or die.

The situation in the humanities and the social sciences is different. In these disciplines, as well as in religion, philosophy, and political persuasion paradigm, replacement does not really occur. New paradigms are created, it is true, but the old paradigms continue to exist and perpetuate themselves. They exist side by side, sometimes in critical dialogue with each other, but mostly as self-perpetuating and self-reinforcing communities of discourse. These disciplines are inherently poly-paradigmatic.

In the social and human sciences we are dealing with a situation of epistemological pluralism. All conflicting schools of thought coexist and compete for followers and audiences in a dynamic

fashion. There is a sociopolitical battle for "ways of seeing" and "ways of speaking" shared by a network of participants, i.e., by a school of thought which promotes its own paradigm. In the human and interhuman sciences paradigms do not replace and supersede each other, but wax and wane in distribution, popularity, and credibility.

The human sciences are polyparadigmatic because human behavior involves action that is a result of human deliberation, choice, and the attribution of motives, goals and values, about which there is no universal agreement. Another way of saying this is that human action--as contrasted with animal behavior--is evoked, conceived, and executed in a cultural context along parameters of an historically created way of life to which one is existentially committed, but which allows of various interpretations. Historically, several distinct ways of thinking, such as materialism, rationalism, idealism, and agnosticism, have been created which continue to be options for looking at and interpreting the meaning of human action. Psychological paradigms coexist and continue to be available in the total epistemological field. Sometimes a genuinely new vision is revealed, as in psychoanalysis, Marxism, and existential-phenomenology. As they draw adherents and become popular movements, paradigm shifts may seem to take place. Sociologically speaking, however, we are witnessing merely a shift of membership and popularity, but never really a paradigm replacement. Each articulated theoretical position, once it has been named and has achieved a certain level of articulation, seems to become institutionalized by a coterie of adherents constituting a cross-generational orthodoxy which defends the purity of its own creed.

Paradigm shifts occur however, quite frequently within the career of particular psychologists who come to believe in and represent a new school of thought, undergoing something like an intellectual conversion experience. Paradigms stand in critical dialogue and in competition for proselytes in the tradition of democratic pluralism, which is ruled by the implicit ideal of the "communicative free society" in which everyone who is able is invited to speak out and contribute. This situation of dialogue is also called the "criticist frame," the shared fundamental agreement and commitment to communicate through critical dialogue (Radnitzki, 1970). Even if we disagree violently on the issues, we nevertheless trust the process of communication and language itself to find and set truth free; and we give all participants a fair hearing. Rosenstock-Huessy (1970) recognizes in the dialogue of differences the founding principle of university life as contrasted with church schools which taught only one truth and did so dogmatically. The university, by contrast, represents always at least two points of view on the same issue, thus it is based on a non-dogmatic dialogical principle which builds criticism into its very approach and institutional arrangement.

The coexistence of a plurality of paradigms is comparable to life in a multi-religious society under democratic pluralism. Paradigms are "conviction communities" (Bruteau, 1979) in the sense that the shared commitment to, and the grounding assumptions about the essentials of human nature assume the strength of an indubitable faith which is shared by the members. Unfortunately, these groups often develop xenophobia and avoid critical dialogue with each other.

There are dimensions of power, politics, and success--or marketing thinking--operating in the complex field of discourse and debate we call social psychology. Radnitzki (1970) speaks of sciences and hence also of schools of social psychology as "knowledge-producing industries" with a complex set of role-types which aim for market shares in the market place of ideas, practices and programs:

The "cast" of an intellectual tradition is a system of role-types that may be defined in terms of the "plot" (i.e., in terms of program, resources, etc.). The bearer of these roles are *publications*

rather than persons. Here we can only give some brief indications. The following role-types are conspicuous: The *precursors*--they may be causally effective; but often they are "appointed" *ex post* by members of the tradition. The *pioneers*--they are polemically oriented on other intellectual traditions flourishing in the intellectual milieu. They formulate the raw program of the tradition, and often they produce its manifesto. The *masters*--they carry out a part of the program and their work sets the standards by means of which the disciples measure their success. The *carriers* of the traditions are all those who "carry" the tradition so that it lives on and is talked about. This role type may be subdivided into the following subtypes: the "followers" who administer the intellectual estate of the tradition; the "disciples" (including emulators and epigones) who hand down the tradition; the *Vermittlerschichten*, or teachers who provide an enculturation process for adepts; the expositors and propagandists of the tradition, etc.

Another important role type is that of the *critic* of the tradition: the internal critics--those who draw out the consequences, expose tensions, etc., and the external critics--those who, from a platform outside the tradition, attack the very program of the tradition and the adequacy criteria assumed by it.

More or less outside of the tradition, yet related to it, are the *sympathizers* of a tradition--those among non-members who accept the image and ideal of X-ology of the tradition. (For instance in the Anglo-Saxon-Nordic world many social scientists are sympathizers of logical empiricism.) The *users* of a tradition--those among the sympathizers who also apply the output of tradition to their own work in X-ology. The *instrument makers*--those who forge or enrich the resources of the tradition. (For instance the logicians are instrument makers for logical empiricism.) The instrument makers may be, but need not be, members of the tradition (1970, pp. 9-10).

Radnitzki presents a schematic model of the dynamics of the research process within an intellectual tradition or school which holds true for all specific schools of thought. It is a fruitful approach to develop a meta-science, i.e. a science of scientific activity.

Our contemporary world-market civilization certainly makes very attractive and relevant the economic metaphor of knowledge production and distribution, and of knowledge and discourse competition. Thus paradigms compete for acceptance as do political ideologies.

Both paradigm-conviction and ideology-conviction are species of faith commitments which cannot be rationally justified (von Eckartsberg, 1983). The foundational concepts expressive of one's beliefs about the essentials of human nature (i.e., one's philosophical anthropology) act as axioms which cannot be proven by the theory itself. Myth is another example of a foundational story as origin and basis for a conviction and a shared way of life which transcends logical argumentation. We live in these stories and identify with them. This is the source of their truth-value for us. It grounds our conviction and practices.

As I have indicated, a paradigm is a way of seeing reality; it is a way of speaking together in a group or a school of thought, and of using an agreed-upon vocabulary of concepts. These concepts together map the territory of relevant processes for the group and prescribe the accepted way of doing research, the methodology.

Typically, the school or research tradition has a founder whose name is associated with the school: Freudian psychoanalysis, Skinnerian behaviorism, Marxist psychology, etc., or the school is a group name which characterizes the work of several founding members each of whom can be said to be a founder such as "Existential Phenomenology" which represents the work of Husserl's phenomenology and that of Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and Heidegger, or "Hermeneutic Dialectics" which encompasses the work of Gadamer and Ricoeur among others.

Experienced human reality is so rich and complex that it allows many types of conceptualizing and mapping, i.e., many ways of interpreting, all of which yield valid insights and plausible understanding. There is an irreducible relativity in our attempts to understand and explain human affairs and human motives which founds the polyparadigmatic nature of psychology and of all the social sciences and humanities.

The important distinguishing characteristics of any paradigm or research tradition are two assumptions which may be hidden and need to be articulated:

1. The philosophical anthropological question: who and what is a human being? Any attempt to understand human action and experience already brings certain automatic convictions into play. We already think we know what is important and essential about human personality and motivation to interpret and explain the action. These philosophical anthropological assumptions always already rule our thematizations. They can be investigated and identified by critical reflection and dialogue, but they cannot be removed from the epistemological scene.

2. The research-guiding interest: what and for whom is the knowledge? Our quest for knowledge and understanding serves our purposes. We have motives for our study and research. Habermas has used the notion of "research guiding interest" to identify this dimension of human sense-making. In his analysis of the relationship between knowledge and interest he has criticized the idea that knowledge is interest-free. He has shown that natural science and, hence, also traditional social psychology, are ruled by a technical interest, i.e., the prediction and control of behavior, while existential-phenomenology and hermeneutic-dialectical approaches serve the epistemological interest of understanding, i.e., becoming cognizant of the meanings which animate and rule our actions and expressions.

Intentionality

Social Psychology as a Human Science

Existential-phenomenological psychology has been developed into an empirical qualitative research tradition by the Duquesne group, which I have analyzed and articulated in my book: *Life-World Experience: Existential Phenomenological Research Applications in Psychology* (1986). It was inspired by the reflective philosophical work of the phenomenologists Husserl, Schutz and Scheler, and the existential-phenomenological reflections of Heidegger, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty.

Edmund Husserl: The phenomenological approach centers on the experienced fact that the world appears to us through our stream of consciousness as a configuration of meaning. Facts of consciousness, i.e., perceiving, willing, thinking, remembering, anticipating, etc., are our modalities of self-world relationship. They give us access to our world and that of others by reflecting on the content (i.e., its meaning or "the what") which we thus encounter, and also by reflecting on the process, (i.e., "the how"). Husserl, the founder of phenomenology, hoped to clarify in a descriptive/reflective manner the foundation and constitution of knowledge in human consciousness. Phenomenology became the study of human meanings as constituted by the stream of consciousness. Consciousness itself is understood as being intentional. It is as always directed toward something. As phenomenologists are fond of saying, consciousness is always consciousness of something. It recognizes and treats meanings which subsequently are here in the world as experienced.

With Husserl, from 1900 on, we enter an era in philosophy and psychology which recognizes the participation of the subject in the creation of meaning. The subject's role is acknowledged even in physics through Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. In both physics and psychology the assumption of the "objectivity of reality" collapses under the realization that the observer as well as the actor is existentially and epistemologically implicated in the creation of meaning. There is no "really real" world of independent objective facts. Rather, the world comes into being for us as meanings which we constitute, and as political realities for which we fight. Husserl's fundamental contribution was to call our attention to the study of the meaning constituting power of the acts of consciousness.

He developed systematic reflection as a research method. In working out some of the implications and strategies of this new reflective philosophical methodology, Husserl (1913-1962) discovered the complexities of the horizontal nature of consciousness. That is, our field of awareness always extends beyond the factually given to that which is implied, remembered, anticipated, generalized, etc. Husserl focused mainly on the temporal horizons of "inner time consciousness", i.e., on the way people experience their embeddedness in the stream of time: past, present, and future. He explored how these horizons cooperate in creating the temporal meaning of the here and now. He also developed the notion of "inner and outer horizons"--what we might call cognitive horizons--which refer to contexts of knowledge playing on the here and now. Such horizons contextualize experience in terms of consensually available cognitive frameworks of perceived meaning. Husserl is the master of the articulation of the "mind space" within the larger sphere of the unified field of a person's consciousness and existence, "the psychocosm" (von Eckartsberg, 1981).

In his later work, Husserl (1954-1970) developed his idea of the "life world," the world of everyday activities that are taken-for-granted, and of common sense meanings. Because we are embedded within the socially constituted meanings of our common sense world, we are explicitly aware neither of its nature as taken-for-granted nor of how we constitute it. Yet this unacknowledged realm of the life world is the basis of all scientific activity whose constructs are built on indubitable taken-for-granted common activities and the associated constructs of common sense. The life world is the unexamined foundation and matrix of scientific activity: phenomenology makes these common sense constructs and phenomena its object of investigation.

Alfred Schutz: Whereas Husserl was concerned with how we construct our reality in general, Schutz (1962, 1964, 1966) focused more specifically on our construction of social reality. He took up the challenge of Husserl's phenomenology and related it to sociology and social psychology. He was primarily concerned with articulating the common sense structures of consciousness, which he called typifications of consciousness, by means of which individuals comprehend the nature of social reality and are enabled to act in everyday life.

Temporal typifications articulate our experienced life world in terms of the "world within reach" (here and now), the "world within restorable reach" (the past), and the "world within attainable reach" (the future). A related set of temporal constructs concerns our social partners in life as "contemporaries", "predecessors", and "successors" in terms of which our biographical stock of knowledge is organized. For Schutz, the experienced scheme of temporality itself is formed from the interplay of lived time, social calendar time, and cosmic time which regulates the natural rhythms of days and seasons.

Schutz devoted much effort to an articulation of the biographical stock of knowledge organized in terms of what he called "hierarchical orders of typifications" (schemes of

interpretations, recipes for action, or role conceptions) and in terms of schemes or orders of relevance which both express the interests and motivations of individuals and groups and thematize the world in a relativistic manner. His work opened up within phenomenology the phenomena of encounter, social interaction, and the reflective articulation of intersubjectivity.

Schutz's (1962) work on "multiple realities" or "finite provinces of meaning" sheds light on the problem of how consciousness conceived as a "cognitive style", composed of the interplay of several dimensions--tension of consciousness, form of spontaneity, time perspective, self experience and form of sociality--differ in response to different situations or worlds. The "world of work", which Schutz considers to be foundational or "paramount", requires a certain style of consciousness which is different from that of the world of science, of art, of play, of religion, etc. According to Schutz we are living in multiple worlds of human meaning which need to be articulated phenomenologically (von Eckartsberg, 1988).

Schutz maps out how the subject's stock of knowledge of the life world is constituted by reciprocal typifications of typical actions by typical actors--roles--which make possible social interaction, planning, and projecting. He also develops Weber's notion of the "subjective interpretation of meaning", i.e., the notion that action always is based upon reinterpretation of the actor, elucidating the motivational, the biographical and the social-historical horizons of experience and their role in intentionality.

Peter Berger: Schulz' important studies of the social structure of the life world have been extended and deepened by the social phenomenological work of Peter Berger (1966, 1973) on the "social construction of reality" and the problem of modernity. He represents a dialectical position which holds that humans are both the products and the producers of their own activities. We internalize the existing and objective social structures in the process of socialization, and we externalize our subjective processes through action, thus affecting and recreating social reality. Externalization, objectivation, and internalization are the dynamic moments of the personsociety dialectic creating institutional structures through habituation and structures of legitimation which justify these creations.

The sociological phenomenology of Berger pursues an examination of the consciousness structures generated and imposed by the social institutions of the modern bureaucratic and technological state and the dynamics of the "capitalist revolution". He brings us to a greater awareness of the meaning of "modernity" defined as the organization of consciousness created by the work and influence of technologically driven economic development. Berger's work elucidates the workings of the "social construction of reality" and yields emancipative insights for collective and personal world-constructions in its dialectic of society as subjective reality (consciousness) and as objective reality (institutionalization and legitimation).

Max Scheler: While the main concern of Husserl and Schutz was to articulate the purely rational structures of the human being, Scheler (1961) was preoccupied with the phenomenological description and analysis of the non-rational essences in experience, with the invariant structures in emotional life. Scheler was the phenomenologist of values, feelings, social sentiments and love. He forged a philosophical anthropology guided by the basic notion of personhood as a spiritual reality, by belief in the essentially social nature of human existence, and by the absoluteness of values and the eternal in human nature. His concern was to determine the place of the human being in the cosmos. His starting point was the irreducibility of the person as "ens amans," as a loving

and ethical being. His method for this was phenomenological and was developed in an original way.

Scheler explored the phenomena involved in the immediate apperception and emotional cognition of values--value-ception: value-awareness and value-perception--which he considered to be prior and hence foundational for all other acts of cognition. He was a passionate proponent of the primacy of the emotional and the vital sphere. He worked out an influential phenomenology of ethics which articulated an objective hierarchy of values ranging from sensible to vital values--both values of life--and then to spiritual values and the value of holiness--both values of the person.

Scheler made important contributions to the phenomenology of religion. He brilliantly described the key interhuman phenomena of love and hate, and the variety and forms of sympathy (1954a). He provided us with the exemplary study of the phenomenon of resentment (1954b) (*ressentiment*). He made important contributions to the sociology of knowledge distinguishing three types of knowledge: knowledge of control, as in the aspirations of science and technology; knowledge of essences, as in the aspirations of philosophy, metaphysics and phenomenology; and knowledge of salvation, as in the religious quest for spiritual fulfillment.

Scheler's philosophical anthropology has been called "ethical personalism" within a Christocentric spiritual tradition emphasizing the multidimensional nature of human existence as bodily/vital, egoic/mental, and personal/spiritual. The highest good must be personal. Scheler emphasized love and the study of the "ordo amoris"--the configuration of love--as the core of the person and as the foundation for social relationships and societal forms. Scheler's work has great originality and masterful phenomenological subtlety. It is fertile and offers many challenges and invitations for corroborative psychological work (Frings, 1965).

The Emergence of Existential Phenomenology

The pure phenomenology of Husserl was later enriched by the "existentialist movement" in the tradition of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Expanded into existential-phenomenology, associated primarily with Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, it recognized the importance of preconscious lived experience, i.e., the phenomenon of the "lived body". It emphasized that being in the world involves more than human consciousness and encompasses the total embodied human response to a perceived situation. Such insights led existential-phenomenologists to focus their research on situated human experience. Intentionality was redefined as a dialogal, relational dynamic of self-other interaction. Existence refers to the concrete, biographical, and embodied life of named persons who are characterized by uniqueness and irreplaceability. Existential-phenomenology studies existence in terms of the person's involvement in a situation within a world.

Martin Heidegger: The main contribution of Heidegger (1927/1967, 1971) lies in his radical questioning of the traditional Cartesian subject-object distinction, which leads to a dualistic universe and the dichotomy of subjective consciousness versus objective matter. With the subject-object split as an operative life world assumption, there is always a gap and separation to be bridged between the two ontological realms of matter and consciousness, leading to unresolvable epistemological difficulties. But if we conceive of our existence completely in theoretical relational and field terms, as a field of openness in which things and the world appear and reveal themselves in a dynamic way (Dasein as being-in-the-world), then we can avoid this problem. Persons are not selves separated from their world which is presumed to exist completely

independently of them. Rather, they are personal involvements in the complex totality of a network of interdependent ongoing relationships which demand response and participation.

Heidegger advanced the thesis that for us the world comes into existence in and through our participation. He worked out the essential structures of being-in-the-world as grounded in care, i.e., in concerned presence and openness to the world and others. He developed the general approach of phenomenology into an interpretative understanding of Dasein's total being. He called this approach the hermeneutics of existence, i.e., the interpretative characterization of existence in the world.

Heidegger's work issues a call for action, personal movement, authentic participation, and a change in one's way of thinking from a calculative to a meditative mode. The movement depends on one's resoluteness to face basic existential contingencies, primarily the anxiety over one's own death. It requires one to acknowledge one's self as an illuminator and creator of one's world. Heidegger also talked about ultimate horizons and concerns. He postulated qualitative transformations in authentic moments and movements of personal existence. By doing so, he brought in a transpersonal context and went beyond a strictly rational world view. His attitude and concrete examples of existential-hermeneutic work (Heidegger, 1971) place him in kinship with the tradition of Zen (von Eckartsberg, 1981).

Jean-Paul Sartre: Sartre (1943/1953, 1963) contributed greatly to the "existentialization" of phenomenology through his challenge that "existence precedes essence." According to Sartre, the person is the totality of his or her life choices, for which he or she is fully responsible. His idea of the fundamental project of a person's life refers to the way each person chooses him or herself. This project can be disclosed by existential psychoanalysis, Sartre's method of personalistic reflection, which was applied in his famous book-length case studies.

The concept of the fundamental project is of great potential value to clinical and personality psychology. It refers to the unique configuration of meaningful existential choices, i.e., the total web of existential moves which a person makes. The project is the inner principle of coherence that we can perceive and articulate in our own and in other's lives.

The study of individuals entails gaining an understanding of how they go about the actualization of possibilities, their "not yet". Sartre emphasized the fact that one is always moving beyond oneself towards something else. He worked out what he called a "progressive-regressive" dialectical method which is said to be able to betray the "secret of the self", namely, the implicit purpose for which one strives. Sartre's method aims at comprehension, a mode of understanding wherein one lives the existence of the other in intuitive and empathetic behaviors. To comprehend the action of another we enter the original situatedness of that person biographically in terms of the operative historical and cultural conditions (regressive move). We seek to understand the purpose or goal choice that governs the direction of the action taken (progressive move) by means of which the person surpasses the givens in the direction of his or her possibilities.

Maurice Merleau-Ponty: Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962, 1964/1968) broadened the meaning of intentionality to include preverbal thought (thinking that exists in action) or the pre-personal dimension of bodily intentions and meaning. He maintained that the acting body always already understands its situation as well as its own possibilities, quite before we pay any explicit attention to it. For Merleau-Ponty intentionality, no longer merely a matter of cognitive consciousness, includes the life of embodied existence and interactive communication which precedes, and is the foundation for, explicit and thematic consciousness.

In the most global terms, Merleau-Ponty speaks of the mystery that I am part of the world and that the world is an extension of my body. Body and world mutually imply each other and are of the same nature. They stand in a relationship that he characterizes as "j'en suis" (I belong to it). This is the primordial ground of all our awareness, a kind of prolongation of our body which Merleau-Ponty in his later writing expresses metaphorically as the flesh of the world. The subject-object dichotomy of traditional thinking is overcome by Merleau-Ponty. We are always in the midst of the world and have no vantage point outside it. We can never achieve total clarity even in our reflective and critical orientation because we cannot fully penetrate the darkness of our primordial awareness in which meaning is always already constituted. We cannot attend the birth of meaning in our life. Bodily existence itself is a giver of meanings: our body has the power of expression; it gives rise to meaning.

Our body gives us our power of motility, the "I can" or "I am able to". This happens on a pre-reflective level, on the level of operative intentionality, of *practognosie*. By virtue of our embodiment we find ourselves always already situated and capable of meaningful interaction.

Merleau-Ponty has contributed greatly to our understanding of the person as a participant in, and creator of, meaning--even as a creature condemned to meaning. He also makes us aware of the limits of our power of reflection and of the fact that we find ourselves in a situation of essential ambiguity, of "chiaroscuro", not being fully able to penetrate the sources and origins of our meaning making. This ambiguity is grounded in our bodily participation in being and on the paradox that we ourselves are constituted by the very being of which we become aware. Merleau-Ponty rejects both materialism and idealism, i.e., the reduction of man's world to an idea. He establishes his own position of existential-phenomenology, which is a middle ground centering on one's embodied subjectivity and focusing on the primacy of perception.

From Intentionality to Relationship-Building and Dwelling

We have surveyed how Husserl's original inspiration of phenomenology has undergone significant development and change through the work of his successors. If we focus on the key phenomenological notion of intentionality we can gain a measure of the development that has taken place in our thinking.

Originally, intentionality was metaphorized as an "intentional arrow" symbolizing the one-directional act of *ego-cogito-cogitatum*, an ego directing its attention toward an object revealing its sense or meaning. Reflecting on intentionality revealed to Husserl the existence of horizons or halos extending from the perceptual or cognitive object and linking them to their relevant contexts of interpretation and familiarity; cognitively, i.e., in terms of outer horizons; perceptually, i.e., in terms of the horizons engendered by bodily movement; and temporally, i.e., in terms of inner time-consciousness. The early phenomenological work of Husserl expanded the notion of intentionality to include operative intentionality, i.e., the intentionality of spontaneous and competent autotelic bodymovement. Metaphorically this could be referred to as "auto-pilot intentionality." Merleau-Ponty takes up and elaborates this idea in the context of his notion of the lived body, the "body subject" (*le corps propre*) and motility. By means of our bodily insertion into reality, we are always already vitally responsive to the demands of our situation upon our body. Our body moves in terms of pre-reflective intelligence and lived involvement which exceeds our conscious awareness and control. Operative intentionality establishes and utilizes secret bonds of correspondence and interdependency which constitute our reciprocal involvements. In this way of thinking the

"intentional arrow" has become a two-way street of interaction, inter-experience and co-constitution.

For Scheler, the primordial human act is one of value-ception. He emphasizes the emotional and trans-rational nature of our relating to the world and to one another, and concentrates on loving and hating, i.e., on value-laden acts by means of which we construct our lives. For Sartre, the notion of intentionality is linked with existential choices and radical freedom to make commitments and to choose our future. Sartre's key notion in this context is the existential project, characterizing the way a person chooses his or her long-range life commitments and life direction in and through all particular acts of involvement.

In Heidegger's hyphenated notion of being-in-the-world, which radicalizes the subject-object notion and bridges the subject-object split, Dasein's basic ontological structure is characterized as care, concerned presence, and world-openness. The priority of the subject, person, or ego yields to the unitary and coequal relationship of mutual implication or "relational totality": caring-being-in-the-world. In his later work Heidegger develops this notion into dwelling by which he means our caring, sparing, spatializing and temporalizing, presenting and happening "eventing" of being, which we might call: culture-building. Revealed by a new epistemological attitude of meditative, responsive, "thanking thinking" (von Eckartsberg, 1981), dwelling is concerned with our authentic presence to our situations, our things, our people. Heidegger ushers in a normative dimension: our concern with the authentic and good life in deep relationship to the ground of Being.

In my reading, the concept of intentionality in the phenomenological tradition seems to continue to evolve. We can discern a spectrum that ranges from intentionality in the original Husserlian sense to relationshipcultivation and culture-building or dwelling in the sense of the later Heidegger. As we widen the context of understanding of the contributing dimensions in the constitution of meaning to include the role of our selfmoving body, our essential intersubjectivity, and our embeddedness in language and culture, the meaning of intentionality changes from an emphasis mostly upon cognitive understanding to one of existential engagement in the creation of a way of life (dwelling). Heidegger's understanding of dwelling is akin to the understanding and praxis of Zen and Taoism.

Thus, over time, our understanding of intentionality undergoes a shift in emphasis or focus from consciousness to culture-building acts, from value-free phenomenological reflective analysis operating under the self-imposed disciplines of several steps of bracketing (*epoché*) to passionate value-engagement and existential commitment. We move from the primacy of knowing to the primacy of life praxis, to enactment.

Hermeneutical Dialectics

Central to the work of hermeneutical dialectics, especially in the work of Heidegger and Gadamer, is the so-called "Hermeneutical Circle." This thought figure describes the open-ended and continuously spiraling nature of hermeneutical inquiry and the sense-making process. We always have foreknowledge about most aspects of life. We come to any phenomenon with a precomprehension of its meaning, yet we are in search of deeper understanding and more precise differentiation by means of the work of interpretation. Gadamer (1975) reinterprets prejudice as a virtue:

This recognition that all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice gives the hermeneutical problem its real thrust. . . . The fundamental prejudice of the enlightenment is the

prejudice against prejudice itself. What is necessary is a fundamental rehabilitation of the concept of prejudice and a recognition of the fact that there are legitimate prejudices, if we want to do justice to man's finite, historical mode of being (1975, p. 239).

Hermeneutical dialectics is interested in studying and preserving the cultural heritage: it is concerned with the mediation of the tradition (*Traditionsvermittlung*). The research's guiding interest is meaning enrichment which is accomplished by the fusion of the horizons of the author of the work or text and the interpreter who engages the work from his or her own perspective. For Gadamer, the work of hermeneutics is one of dialogue, the original phenomenon of language.

Dialogal-Existential Social Psychology

Although Husserl's phenomenology and existential-phenomenology address one of the key issues in social psychology, intersubjectivity, most scholars agree that the intentionality model fails to account properly for person-to-person relationships. The model of constitution tends to objectify the other and cannot transcend the solipsism of the individual. The otherness of the other cannot be done justice to in the intentionality model. As Buber would say, phenomenology remains in the "I-It" attitude and fails to do justice to the "I-Thou" quality of genuine encounter. The other is essentially different from me; we meet and enter into relationship with each other as autonomous and irreducible subjects through dialogue which establishes a new ontological domain between us: the between. We move from phenomenology and existentialism to "co-existentialism."

Dialogal existentialism focuses on the role of speech in establishing interpersonal relationships and the realm of the in-between. The emphasis shifts from the primacy of consciousness to the primacy of language. Consciousness becomes a species of self-talk. There is also a shift from an I-orientation to a we-orientation. What we generate together through our interaction and speaking together--our relationship--becomes central. Intentionality is reconceptualized as meeting, in which we are coequal partners rather than dominant subjects. The self as subjectivity is taken out of its isolation, loneliness, and the grandiosity of its world-construction; it is placed into responsible relationship and partnership with others who limit or augment my freedom and power. Subjective constitution yields to the joint construction of reality in the dialogal-existential view. My project is modified as a cooperative venture; my freedom of choice is tempered by the need to achieve consensus and agreement with the other. The autonomy of my will is challenged by the reality of the will of the other and the need to negotiate a consensus. Personal embodiment is affected by my involvement as a member in a shared body politic; we affect each other in a shared situation. We stand in an ethical relationship to each other, engaged in a dialogal field of yes-saying and no-saying, of agreement and refusal. You, as other, set limits to my freedom and autonomy, but you also enlarge my possibilities through affirmation and support.

Dialogal-existentialism, exemplified by the work of Buber, is a speech-based, relationship-centered, religious and ethically inspired world view. Its philosophical anthropology considers humans primarily as relationship-builders and communicators, as socially engaged and responsible beings. The research-guiding interest of dialogal-existential work is to promote genuine dialogue, to cultivate optimal human interrelationships. It aims at articulating an ethic which is conducive to peaceful coexistence, to loving-caring encounter and relation.

The Christian dialogal existentialism of Rosenstock-Huessy (1966) can be characterized as transpersonal existentialism. For him the key human phenomenon is inspired speaking between

interlocutors. In speaking to one another by name, in address and response, we transfer cosmic processes and are enlisted in the transmission of spiritual and transpersonal powers. Rosenstock-Huessy (1988) emphasizes the social meaning of the transpersonal or spiritual dimension:

We call spiritual only that which concerns and is appropriate to more than one soul. A reality is spiritual (like socialism, the state, the church) when several souls in succession have to occupy a designated position in it. Everything spiritual, therefore, has to be understood as soul succession. The spirit takes hold of more than one person (p. 55-56).

Rosenstock-Huessy shows us how language establishes social relations and accomplishes the work of multi-generational cooperative and peaceful world-building. Speech, i.e., people speaking and listening seriously to each other, achieves this in an ecologically balanced manner by means of a budgeting of the efforts of individual persons as well as that of collectivities, to create and sustain the space-axes inside (us) and outside (them) and the time-axes of past and future which constitute our individual and social worlds, organized as the cross of reality.

As a world-community of different races, religions, genders, and nations we are moving toward the establishment of a planetary culture which is economically integrated and interdependent, ecologically responsible, peaceful, cooperative and just, but nevertheless diverse in terms of regional spiritualities and cultural traditions.

Through language we create a super-time of all of humanities' experiences, accomplishments, failures and yearnings, and a super-space of global and cosmic interconnectedness. In these the irreplaceability and sacredness of all individual lives and life forms can be celebrated. The meaning of intentionality in this transpersonal existential context has now become inspired speaking, accomplishing the creation of an ethical and inspired way of life. Thus, the rhetorical horizon becomes relevant.

Rosenstock-Huessey's work would appear to present the widest cultural, historical, ecological and spiritual context to date. It shows how this is an accomplishment and reality of the meta-institution of language, enlisting all speakers and writers in an historical calling toward global peaceful coexistence in the fullness of time, an authentic celebration of differences, and a genuine welcoming of uniqueness and full personhood in social bodies.

It is perhaps not surprising that the key contributors to dialogalexistentialism, Buber, Rosenzweig, Rosenstock-Huessy and Levinas, are committed religious thinkers who ground their thinking in an explicit moral-ethical orientation and world-view--the biblical heritage--which transcends individual interests and stresses social responsibility and the good life in community.

Critical Emancipatory Human Science

In the critical emancipatory movement (Radnitzki, 1968) the relationship of the individual to societal and political structures, to institutions and ideologies, becomes thematic. It studies how we are located in society and culture in terms of social dimensions of classes, professions, races, gender and age and how this placement in social-historical contexts shapes us in our actions and experiences. The interdependence of knowledge and interest are investigated by Habermas (1971). Our fundamental anthropological and communal assumptions become articulated in terms of how they serve vested interests and the existing power and economic structure of society. The struggle for emancipation and liberation from actual or hypostatized social forces--ideological, political, and economic domination--becomes the guiding research interest and practical intention. The

meaning of intentionality is changed into responsible ethical action: the struggle for universal human liberation from the falsifications, mystifications and injustices of the system. Habermas considers steering and governance as the key ethical phenomena in the life of the individual and of society; he promotes the idea of democratic pluralism and the open communication society as the pre-conditions for self-realization through genuine forms of communicative acts.

In contrast to the dialogal approach which focuses mostly on the I-Thou situation of dyadic encounter, the critical emancipator school addresses our social life in the aggregates of institutional life and ideology. It has a sociological, economic, and political emphasis and tries to explicate these macro-social contexts as they impact upon and co-constitute, the experience and action--"experiaction"--of the individual and groups.

Communicative action and the quest for consensus and agreement are central concerns for Habermas and the critical emancipatory movement. The life-world is understood as the intersubjectively shared collective life-context, a culturally transmitted and linguistically organized background of taken-for-granted meaning patterns which act as the ground for all specific communications and actions. Through critical reflection these operative contexts for communicative action have to be identified, made conscious, and then taken into account in our life-praxis.

Toward a Way of Life Psychology

In the presentation of social psychology as a polyparadigmatic discipline and as a human science, I have emphasized the actor perspective which places the person at the center of his or her world, actively involved in construing conscious meanings and trying to act from this understanding in establishing relationships. It became clear that the person cannot achieve total transparency due to operative pre-personal and body emotional patterns and also due to opaque trans-personal social political patterns and values which rule our involvement in situations and our actions.

Being involved not only in terms of consciousness but also in terms of speech and language, and hence with others in relationships under the rule of chosen values, the dialogal life and communicative action become central issues for social psychology. Thus, the existentialist "actor" point of view has come to be complemented by the coexistential partnership model of people acting together, with or against each other, seeking consensus and agreement, as well as mutual exploitation and domination. The ethical questions of good and bad, of pro-social and antisocial, of optimal and destructive relationships arise and are formulated in terms of "communication phenomenology" (Wyss), "communicative action theory" (Habermas), and "communicative praxis" (Schrag). These are important emergent paradigms which I have not considered fully in this presentation. They take the "linguistic turn" and shift their perspective from the primacy of consciousness of the individual to the primacy of speech and communication between partners in interaction, including the rule of imperatives which express value-commitments.

If we study the life of a person as a pattern, as a way of life, we realize that the individual actor is involved with others as an existential cast of characters. The individual creates and maintains many relationships simultaneously. He or she plays many roles in one-on-one relationships: friendships, love relationships, functional partnerships; in small groups: family, teams, congregations, fellowships, etc.; and in larger collectivities: citizenship, political parties, audiences, the "masses", etc. Every person is simultaneously a unique and irreplaceable individual

actor, a member, a co-actor in myriad social bodies constituting cultural life, and an anonymous functionary in collectivities.

We seem to be obliged to take a holistic and ecological point of view which addresses the totality of an individual's involvements and the husbanding and budgeting of his or her efforts and activities in order to enter into and to sustain existential relationships. There is a limited lifetime for opportunities for engagement, and a person must learn to distribute his or her communicative actions selectively so as to cultivate all relationships making up his or her life, and to coordinate and orchestrate them into a meaningful and thriving pattern: what we call a person's way of life.

This is a matter of rhythm and balance, of not overextending one's capacity leading to stress and burnout, and of not underutilizing one's potential leading to boredom and isolation. Every person has to experiment to find the optimal balance of communicative involvement and flow within the constraints of the given cultural context. This, in turn, needs to be optimized in the direction of an ideal society of open communication which offers maximal educational, economic, and spiritual opportunities for all of its members.

Every person is involved in creating, shaping and sustaining a way of life: everyone incarnates a "lifestyle". We have to engage in comparative research to determine what distinguishes one lifestyle from another. This hinges on the chosen or imposed regulative principles and value commitments made by an individual, a group or a whole culture. Is the

ruling ideal material success-orientated or even greed; is it the ideological conviction of class or racial superiority which oppresses outsiders; or is it the value-attitude of welcoming openness, hospitality and egalitarianism? Is it the vision and inspiration of the rule of love (*Das Reich der Liebe*), as one might call it? What are the auspices and regulating principles which shape a particular way of life as the discernable pattern of a lifestyle?

There seems to be a need to articulate an organismic and ecological paradigm for the creation and cultivation of a way-of-life valid for individual persons as well as for social bodies and their interdependence. The various coexisting paradigms of social psychology as a human science offer the necessary insights and research tools to begin to articulate such a "way of life" psychology as an integrative new paradigm.

The creator of a new paradigm always hopes to find the last word, the ultimate vision of a theory which will make all other paradigms superfluous. Perhaps every founder needs this illusion to sustain conviction in the validity and truth-claim of his or her paradigm. Is the integrative vision of the essence of human nature as creator of a way of life and the guiding research interest of creating a lifestyle an ultimate insight which can lead to paradigm replacement in the spirit of Kuhn's model?

I wish this were so, but I suspect that the adherents and creators of other paradigms will not be convinced enough to abandon their positions and switch over to a "way of life" study. Social psychology will remain a poly-paradigmatic discipline; this is no wonder in the face of the indubitable truth that social life is always more than what we can say about it. Our theories remain partial approximations and incomplete mappings of the existential theatre. In matters of intellect and rationality we sooner or later realize, with Adorno, that it is an illusion to believe that thought is able to grasp reality as a whole. We probably have to learn to proceed in the manner of "negative dialectics" by "realizing the insufficiency and incongruence of (our) conceptual tools" (Dallmayr, 1987, p. 62).

Nevertheless, as we seem to be at a turning point in the historical and political development of humankind and our relationship to our ecological environment, we need specific research which will allow us to discern the dimensions and components of an optimal way of life. What is the

way-of-life pattern which is most promising, creative, fulfilling and responsible, while being least self-defeating and self- other- and earth-destructive for individuals, nations, and the entire world community?

In the wake of the manifest failure of both the communist and the capitalist systems, to promote human welfare and ecological balance we are called upon to find alternative optimal ways of life, individually and collectively, which respect the dignity of persons and the limits of our resources, and which do not over-stress, exploit and destroy the supportive and self-regenerative capacity of our human and world environment.

I consider this to be the emergent task of social psychology as a human science.

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5.

Phenomenology and Psychology before and after the Phenomenological Reduction

Cheng-Yun Tsai

The relation between phenomenology and psychology is not only an unsettled issue in Husserl's writings, but also a controversial subject matter in the so-called the phenomenological circle.¹ In the *Logical Investigations*, phenomenology is defined as a descriptive psychology, but this is renounced in the second edition.² In the first volume of the *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, phenomenology and psychology are characterized respectively as a science of essence and a science of fact.³ But this distinction proves to be deficient as soon as a personalistic attitude emerges between the realm of essence and the realm of fact in the second volume.⁴ If the withdrawal of the publication of *Ideas II* by Husserl could be taken as a confirmation of his final position on this distinction between essence and fact, then his following project of a phenomenological psychology, which is intended to be a science of both the *a priori* and the factual,⁵ would be groundless. It is easy to discern all these contradictions concerning the relation between phenomenology and psychology, since the development of Husserl's idea of phenomenology is closely related to his constant refutation of psychologism. But it is not therefore an easy task to construe the nature of their relationship and its significance.

The unsuccessful collaboration between Husserl and Heidegger in preparing the "Phenomenology" article for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* highlights the difficulty of working on this issue.⁶ It is well known that, while Heidegger takes issue with Husserl's treatment of this relation in terms of a parallelism, Husserl in his response calls Heidegger's position a "philosophical anthropology". A vast secondary literature commenting on this dispute has wound up in a dilemma between the world-phenomenon which must be justified by the constitutive function of transcendental subjectivity and the world-as-such which remains as a pre-given for the pre-reflective experience of our intentional analysis. To overcome this dilemma, it seems that one cannot help but take a stand between what is constituting and what is constituted.⁷ Are we then caught up in a helpless impasse, that is, whoever takes up one position would be condemned to lose sight of the other?

The objective of this chapter is to expose the nature of the relation between phenomenology and psychology as presented in Husserl's works in the light of what Merleau-Ponty suggested to be a "chiasmus",⁸ and to distinguish this from other interpretations.

The Dilemma of the Relation Between Phenomenology and Psychology

The relation between phenomenology and psychology was already formulated in Husserl's attempt to give a psychological analysis of the origin of mathematics in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*.⁹ But, until the *Logical Investigations*, this question had not appeared to him to be a thematic issue. By rejecting his earlier position in "Prolegomena to Pure Logic", Husserl lays out his position that a psychology of mental acts, "the subjectivity of knowing", cannot adequately address the necessary unity of the thought-content of these acts, "the objectivity of the content known".¹⁰ This refutation of psychologism is at first conceived by many as a subsidiary move

toward an eidetic science, which excludes all kinds of psychologistic implications from the epistemological standpoint.¹¹ An eidetic science or a "pure logic" is concerned only with ideal being. Both what is excluding and what is excluded belong to the realm of real being.

In the following *Investigations*, Husserl turns his attention to unveiling what is still hidden in this general acceptance. The refutation should not be held as a simple replacement of psychological analysis of natural apperception by the pure logic of ideal possibility; rather, there is need for some grounds to support this replacement, namely, evidence which is related to both purely logical and purely psychological considerations.¹² To fulfill this demand, an eidetic science must not merely distinguish itself from natural, empirical science in a Platonic fashion, but must include also a suspension of our natural psychological apperception by virtue of an intentional consciousness of its objectivity.¹³ Phenomenology as an eidetic science thus becomes a descriptive psychology, since both intentional consciousness and natural apperception emerge from our mental processes, even though the former contains an objective content while the latter cannot. With this further exposition, the full sense of the format set out in the "Prolegomena to Pure Logic" comes into view. To be an eidetic science, phenomenology must be a descriptive psychology which studies the given phenomena in the light of their own structural inter-connectedness; in contrast explanatory or genetic psychology, as a psychologism, must pull in foreign hypotheses of a non-psychological nature in order to account causally for these phenomena.¹⁴

Obviously, the essential connection between phenomenology as an eidetic science and its presentation in the domain of the psychic does not turn into a psychological question the issue of how descriptive psychology is able to provide objective content. What distinguishes descriptive psychology from explanatory psychology is still a methodological consideration belonging to the theory of knowledge. Husserl exhibits this epistemological concern in *The Idea of Phenomenology*, as he takes up the distinction between the "philosophical mode" of reflection and the "natural mode" of reflection.¹⁵

It is in philosophical reflection upon our natural reflection that the suspension of our psychological apperception by virtue of our intentional consciousness receives its epistemological ground. As a positive science, psychology is based on our "natural cognition" which takes its subject as a real human being in the natural world, since natural cognition presupposes direct access to the reality of the world outside us.¹⁶ Philosophical reflection, on the other hand, is concerned with "cognition in its ideality", as it turns inward to the realm of experience itself by questioning what is taken for granted.¹⁷

Nevertheless, this inward turn of philosophical reflection should not be understood as a self-evident ground. After all, what is "immanent" to my experience can also be seen as the "transcendent" that I experience, if this philosophical reflection is given without question. This is precisely how the mistake was made by those earlier misconceptions of Husserl's phenomenology, which took the unproven existences located within our experience of them as objects existing outside these experiences.

Due to this discernment of that fallacy, a "wholly new dimension" is opened for philosophical reflection, as Husserl observes:

Everything transcendent that is involved must be bracketed, or be assigned the index of indifference, of epistemological nullity, an index which indicates: the existence of all these transcendencies, whether I believe in them or not, is not here my concern: this is not the place to make judgments about them; they are entirely irrelevant.¹⁸

The suspension of our natural psychological apperception is not operated in accordance with a priori law in the Kantian sense. Rather, it is a methodological exclusion that "brackets" those transcenders which appear to our experience before we have any assurance of our access to them.¹⁹ The "epistemological nullity" indicates a reduction that turns "psychological phenomena" into "pure phenomena".²⁰ The pure phenomenon need not to be anything different from real experience, but must be taken purely as an experience in itself. The relation between eidetic science and descriptive psychology is thus confirmed by a phenomenological reduction which allows us to come to an understanding of the possibility of cognition itself as an ideal possibility without having to take into account any psychologic ties to the real.²¹

Once our suspension of natural apperception is considered as an epistemological reduction necessary for an eidetic science, phenomenology as a descriptive psychology would not be misunderstood as a psychologism. But what is this nonpsychologicistic phenomenology in its substantial sense? As a method, the phenomenological reduction does not reject what is apperceived psychologically, but only takes this problematic mode of apperception out of play. In order to give a positive characterization, we cannot help but go back to what we have just put into brackets, namely, the real existence of our experience. As we return to this real account, phenomenology is no more than a transcendental psychologism; but, if we do not, it becomes the empty transcendentalism that we just refuted. Either way, we face an inescapable dilemma: do we or do we not return to the positivity? This is where the confusion between phenomenology and psychology first comes into view. But, if we take as a clue Husserl's words, "Back to things themselves" in the "Philosophy as Rigorous Science",²² this is not yet what really motivates his phenomenological move.

In reviewing the question of returning to positivity historically, Husserl points out that this confusion comes from the presupposition of naturalism:

Characteristic of all forms of extreme and consistent naturalism, from popular naturalism to the most recent forms of sensation-monism and energism, is, on one hand, the naturalizing of consciousness, including all intentionally immanent data of consciousness, and, on the other, the naturalizing of ideas and consequently of all absolute ideal norms.²³

Having based their questions on natural inclination, they are asking not for the positive content of what is experienced, but for an explanation of what is experienced in the context of physical Nature. According to the above reduction, however, the return to positivity has already been redirected to the ontological basis of our epistemological reduction. In this new direction, though "a phenomenon . . . is no 'substantial' unity",²⁴ "the psychical is not experienced simply as something that appears; it is 'vital experience' and vital experience seen in reflection; it appears as itself through itself, in an absolute flow".²⁵ Thus, the positive content of phenomenology is characterized by the performance of our phenomenological reduction, not the naturalization of our epistemological reduction. If we stop this radical differentiation between consciousness and nature so as to conform to an *a priori* law or an innate idea, we will relapse into what we just objected to, that is, our natural inclination. If not, we still view consciousness psychologically, but in a de-naturalized way, so that reduction to "the pure phenomenological sphere" becomes the "ultimate foundation of all psychological method."²⁶

The Transcendental Turn and Its Problems

When philosophy as rigorous science signifies that the nature of phenomenology is determined by the phenomenological method, the tension between phenomenology and psychology becomes salient. As we have just seen, to justify the way of distinguishing phenomenology from naturalism, we have to return to its experiential basis, even if in a de-naturalized way, in order to perform this distinction. Is this not to say that apperception is necessary in the first place, and if so how can phenomenology be an eidetic science? Conversely, if natural psychological apperception is totally excluded, does not the phenomenological reduction become a mere temporary disregard of what is essentially connected in reality, and if so why do we then have to suspend our natural psychological apperception? These questions led Husserl to a transcendental turn giving a necessary ground to the reduction itself, as he remarks in the Introduction of *Ideas, I*:

It will strike the reader that . . . instead of the generally customary single separation of sciences into sciences of realities and sciences of idealities (or into empirical sciences and *a priori* sciences), two separations of sciences appear to be used which correspond to the two contrasting pairs: matter of fact and essence, real and non-real.²⁷

There is a fundamental difference in the characterization of phenomenology here and previously. In the *Logos* article, Husserl remained at the psychologistic position, as he claimed that:

Phenomenology and psychology must stand in close relationship to each other, since both are concerned with consciousness, even though in a different way, according to a different "orientation".²⁸

Psychology treats experiences as "real events in the natural context of zoological reality", while phenomenology suspends this particular treatment in order to describe and analyze it in its "essential generality". Their different way of viewing experiences is not "rooted in grounds of essence", but on the interest or "orientation" of each. Thus, it may not result from "chance-inclination"; but it is certainly without conceptual clarity²⁹ and consequently falls back into psychologism once again.

By contrast, when for the sake of clarity they are reexamined here as "real" versus "non-real", in addition to the division of "fact and essence", the very transitional character of the methodological parallelism disappears. Their difference now is due, not to a different orientation in the forms of intuition which are possible with respect to any given object, rather, it is due to an essential intuition which views the object in terms of what makes it what it is and not any other.³⁰ Therefore, unlike mathematics or logic in dealing with essence from a naturalistic point of view, this science of essence, or what Husserl here calls "transcendental phenomenology", is intended to clarify how one knows what one presumed to know previously.³¹ At the outset of *Ideas I*, Husserl specifies the phenomenological attitude and the natural attitude in order to characterize this new way of experiencing the world in distinction from our habitual way of experiencing the world.³²

Being free of the naturalistic prejudice, the natural attitude experiences the world "not only as a world of mere things, but also with the same immediacy as a *world of objects with values*, a

world of goods, a practical world".³³ To be sure, what we face in this natural attitude is the same reality that we face in the naturalistic position, but "the general positing which characterized the natural attitude" is restricted no longer to the natural world, but to the world of everyday life. The world exists as it gives itself to us in our experiences of it in accordance with the naturalistic position. But, having performed the phenomenological reduction, this world simply exists "out there" without any presupposition of its manner of existing, for we realize that we had held such a presupposition with respect to our experience of the world.

In this new way of experiencing the world, "general positing . . . does not consist of *a particular act*, perchance an articulated judgment *about* existence".³⁴ On the contrary, with a conceptual clarity received from the reduction, "we can now proceed with the potential and inexplicit positing precisely as we can with the explicit judgment-positing".³⁵ The "epistemological nullity" which appeared in the 1907 lectures is thus confirmed, as Husserl makes it plain that "the positing is a mental process, *but we make 'no use' of it*".³⁶

Although it is through my consciousness that the world is given to me as existing "out there", this inward turn, if we recall, may very well be confused with the psychological ego. How do we prevent ourselves from this error once and for all? Husserl's answer here is that the "residue" of phenomenological reduction is no longer its experiential basis, but the way of our experiencing the world, or the relation itself.

In distinction from the *Logos* article, as we reflect on this consciousness which was presumed to be psychological in nature, there comes about a transcendental consciousness which conceptualizes the de-naturalization of our epistemological reduction. In this transcendental reduction, "*all* our others must be understood exclusively in the senses that *our* expositions prescribe for them and not in any others which history or the terminological habits of the reader may suggest."³⁷ There is indeed a difference between an appearance of an object and the object itself which appears, as we have already drawn the distinction between "transcendent" and "immanent". But, until now, we have not clarified this "intentional" nature of consciousness, that is, all consciousness has such objects of which it is the consciousness that they are. Thanks to the transcendental reduction, Husserl is able to see that "we are speaking of mental processes purely with respect to their essence, or of *pure essences* and of that which is '*a priori included* in the essences *with unconditional necessity*'.³⁸

As the domain of immanence is restricted to that which is immanent to it, our objects are not real existents but intentional objects within the domain of immanence itself. In fact, it is the latter that makes the former possible, not the other way around as we usually accept in our prevailing habits of thought.³⁹ This inversion marks the important distinction between "transcendent" and "transcendental". Transcendent objects, in spite of the distinction between immanent and transcendent, are given transcendentally insofar as they are given through adumbrations; and these adumbrations are themselves given as the only way through which those objects can be given.⁴⁰ Transcendental, however, is the "transcendence in immanence", insofar as "*a mental process is not adumbrated*".⁴¹ Therefore, contrary to our habitual way of experiencing the world, where the transcendent object is experienced as the thing-in-itself, the transcendental object, which is experienced as transcendent, is really experienced as transcendent to one's experience of it: in other words, the thing-in-itself is really nothing but the intentional unity of its adumbrations.

Once we reach this distinction between "*being as mental process and being as a physical thing*",⁴² the ontological ground of our epistemological reduction, which was not further pursued in the *Logos* article, is finally justified. What was experienced as absolutely, immediately and

necessarily in the natural attitude turns out to be incomplete, dubitable and contingent in the phenomenological attitude, since:

Over against the positing of the world, which is a "contingent" positing, there stands then the positing of my pure Ego and Ego-life which is a "necessary", absolutely indubitable positing. Anything physical which is given "in person" can be non-existent; no mental process which is given "in person" can be non-existent. This is the eidetic law defining this necessity and that contingency.⁴³

Consequently, the world is realized as "the correlate of certain multiplicities of experience distinguished by certain essential formations." But can consciousness experience itself as being part of the world, so that the natural world it constituted is necessary in and of itself? This is where the confusion between phenomenology and psychology reappears as a hopeless muddle. According to Husserl's answer:

In our experiencing it is conceivable that there might be a host of irreconcilable conflicts not just for us but in themselves, that experience might suddenly show itself to be refractory to the demand that it carry on its positings of physical things harmoniously, that its context might lose its fixed regular organizations of adumbrations, apprehensions, and appearances-- in short, that there might no longer be any world.⁴⁴

Thus, the natural world could be nullified as being just as incomplete and contingent as all transcendencies that might no longer be, but transcendental consciousness would continue to exist without this natural world as its correlate. In order to serve its purpose of justifying phenomenological reduction not as a temporary and provisional abstraction from Nature, Husserl seems to push this inversion to an extreme. He contends that "the being which is first for us is second in itself; i. e., it is what it is, only in 'relation' to the first".⁴⁵ Consciousness which exists within the world thus could in no way at the same time be considered as the foundation for that world. Apparently, our gaining this absolute region leaves us in great danger of falling into a transcendentalism which leaves unaccounted the fact of the natural world.

Ontologizing the Personal

It is generally believed that Husserl cannot avoid this problem in continuing his transcendental turn.⁴⁶ However, it is also interesting to know that those criticisms all agree that Husserl did not fall straightforwardly into a transcendentalism. The discrepancy herein is significant because the two questions following this problem foreshadow the nature of the relation between phenomenology and psychology. They are: Why is experience in everyday life such that the world appears to us as "out there", existing independently of our experience of it? and Why is not consciousness in its transcendental form immediately accessible to us, but rather "hidden" within the naturalistic bent of the natural attitude? These two questions are mutually exclusive. The former would eliminate previous laborious studies, while the latter reinforces these exacting efforts. But they are all included in Husserl's response to this seemingly insurmountable problem.

Husserl regards this challenge as a paradox in terms of the dual nature of conscious life:

On the one hand consciousness is said to be the absolute in which everything transcendent and, therefore, ultimately the whole psychophysical world, becomes constituted; and, on the other hand, consciousness is said to be a subordinate real event within that world. How can these statements be reconciled?⁴⁷

To answer this question, after arriving at the "self-contained complex of being", he is first concerned with the way in which consciousness can justifiably be viewed psychologically. But unlike the naturalization subsequent to the de-naturalization of consciousness, as the *Logos* article suggests, Husserl has to develop an answer within the transcendental context. In other words, psychological apperception has been by-passed in our ascent to the transcendental, but it has not been unconditionally rejected. The "reality" of objects thus reappears to us in a constituted nature, in a brand new perspective upon this transcendental function:

Only by virtue of the connection joining a consciousness and an organism to make up an empirically intuited unity within Nature is any such thing as mutual understanding between animate beings pertaining to a world possible; and only thereby can any cognizing subject find the complete world and at the same time know it as one and the same surrounding world belonging in common to him and to all other subjects.⁴⁸

Rather than reflecting upon itself in its immanence, consciousness now also apprehends itself transcendently. It takes itself as an object for its perception along with all other objects which it perceives to be transcendent to itself. This "reification" could very well be justified by our intersubjective experience, for each person takes him or herself to be a real state of an animal being, and thereby as existing "inside" this animal in a real relation with the objects that exist "outside".⁴⁹

But if consciousness is conceived as a parallelism of psychological and transcendental viewpoints, has it not relapsed into psychologism again? Husserl thinks not, since consciousness may appear as transcendent, even though it is never anything but transcendental in nature.⁵⁰ In fact, this is exactly how our natural cognition becomes possible. But, why would consciousness appear as transcendent, while it is transcendental in reality? What is the nature of its constitution? It is said that, as a transcendent, consciousness is in no sense necessary; but, as a transcendental, it could appear to itself in other than psychological forms. All of those transcendencies to which consciousness now relates psychologically, have the merely intentional being of things; they are constituted and stand in a necessary and dependent relation to consciousness as Absolute.⁵¹ The reification does not suggest that psychological reality exists in itself; on the contrary, the existence of psychic reality is relative to, and contingent upon, the "absolute systems of experience" which constitute it. Furthermore, it is only by acknowledging the relative and contingent nature of the psychic that the necessary and absolute nature of the transcendental could be confirmed, since the constitution points to that which constitutes psychic unities as the unities they are.⁵²

By viewing consciousness as transcendental in its own essence, and as being psychological in an empirical and relative sense, obviously, Husserl has not by-passed the fundamental tension between phenomenology and psychology. In order to overcome what he later calls "transcendentally naive"⁵³ he must lay the ground of this constitution. He turns then to the aforementioned second question:

If the province of phenomenology were presented with such immediate obviousness as the province pertaining to the natural attitude in experiencing. . . . then there would be no need of circumstantial reductions with the difficult deliberations which they involve.⁵⁴

Again, he returns to transcendental reduction. But, it is different from what was intended to justify the necessary ground of the epistemological reduction. Now it is to give an ontological ground for what is constituted without being condemned as psychologism. In *Ideas II*, this is the difference between the naturalization of consciousness and mundanization of consciousness.⁵⁵ Naturalization is an over-generalization of the methods of the physical sciences to all of reality, as the natural attitude of *Ideas I* has established. Thanks to phenomenological reduction, we recognize that naturalistic apperception sees things solely in terms of their materiality by losing sight of their cultural and human significance. Thus, when constitution becomes a thematic issue in *Ideas II*, Nature is the intentional correlate of experiences carried out in the natural attitude. Nature is no longer given to naive perception, but is the product of a theoretical transformation of everyday experience.⁵⁶

But, what is this theoretical transformation which is not confined within the epistemological function of the natural scientific transformation? Having turned his attention to cultural and human meaning, Husserl discovered that human beings may appropriately be situated within Nature as "mere things" with respect to the human body as a psycho-physical reality, but this is not appropriate with respect to the psychic reality in its "concrete totalities".⁵⁷ Having been given "in flux", the psychic appears to be a temporal unfolding on the basis of an idio-psychic dependence, rather than a causal relation.⁵⁸ By means of a further reflection upon this motivational character of the psychic, he brings out a personal dimension, viewing this world as being simply there in a personally engaging way.⁵⁹ In this personal attitude, the body as physical with respect to the psycho-physical unity of the person turns out to be but one possible meaning of the body. In addition it is a reality in the spiritual life of the personal-cultural world which by this additional reduction is a purely personal world made up solely of cultural significations. As the human sciences result from this ontologization of the personal attitude, there is an apparent inversion of the priority of the psychic over the physical in correspondence with the inversion in *Ideas I*.⁶⁰ However, this parallelism in ontologization is not a mere methodological parallelism, in which case it would be understandable that consciousness would be absolute in the transcendental field. But how can we have an absolute reality at all, given that we know that all reality is constituted and thus relative to transcendental constitution?

The Tension between Phenomenology and Psychology

Here appears one of the major embarrassments, as well as mysteries, of phenomenology. On the one hand, Husserl holds on to his transcendental project as he insists in *Ideas III* that phenomenology is to lay the ground for all the sciences.⁶¹ On the other hand, an eidetic psychology which is concerned with the ontological status of its subject matter continues to crop up after *Ideas II*. What does Husserl mean in regard to this tension between phenomenology and psychology? In what follows, we would account for Husserl's answer in an interpretive manner; this will be in contrast to the expositional manner above, as indicated by the two questions concerning his transcendental turn.

As a result of the parallelism in ontologization, human scientific psychology becomes "a socio-cultural science" in *Ideas III* where the boundary between what is constituting and what is

constituted is blurred.⁶² To be sure, an eidetic analysis of the psychic is neither a study of consciousness eidetically in its purity, nor a study of empirical-psychological appearance only, but a de-naturalization of the latter in accordance with the former. Psychological subjectivity shares the absoluteness which we discovered in the sphere of transcendental subjectivity, only it situates this absolute within "the world of mind". This is how the personal attitude of *Ideas II* is proved. The lived process of the psychic is not altered by the realizing apperception of the natural attitude: on the contrary, insofar as we recognize the psychic as the lived-process or as a worldly absolute, "phenomenological eidetic doctrine and rational psychology coincided" without any psychologistic implications.⁶³ On the other hand, Husserl reminds us here:

Whoever cannot free himself from this particular apperception, whoever cannot perform the phenomenological reductions and grasp the pure, absolutely posited lived-process, the pure consciousness as idea, to him is denied not only the penetration into transcendental phenomenology but also that into philosophy in general.⁶⁴

The psychological view of consciousness is merely a way of viewing transcendental consciousness in its "worldliness", or its mundaneness. But, the task for philosophers having interest in a universal science is to provide an epistemological clarification of the foundation for all sciences. In other words, it is we who distinguish phenomenology from psychology who are able to recognize that the psychic is situated as a relative and constituted region of reality.

Thus, the complicated relation between phenomenology and psychology can be unravelled only by the performance of the phenomenological reduction. Before its performance, psychology as a natural science is interested in the empirical appearance of the pure lived-process as a psychic state, so as to allow for a de-naturalization of consciousness and the assumption of the personal attitude. After its performance, it pertains to transcendental phenomenology as philosophy to take up the epistemological problem and to study consciousness in its transcendental purity. It is true that there is only a "nuance" of difference between what is before and what is after the phenomenological reduction, as Husserl realizes in the *Nachworts*.⁶⁵ But, "only the being of transcendental subjectivity has the sense of absolute being",⁶⁶ as it discerns this nuance. By contrast:

As long as one knows only of psychological subjectivity, posits it as absolute, and yet would explain the world as the mere correlate of this subjectivity, then idealism will be countersensical, will be psychological idealism.⁶⁶

If, from the above conclusion, consciousness can either be viewed as transcendental or as psychological, but not both at the same time, Husserl's project that "in place of empirical psychology there had to appear a novel, purely *a priori* and yet at the same time descriptive science of the psychic",⁶⁸ will be countersensical. How can a science of phenomenological psychology keep both of these subject matters alive simultaneously and necessarily? In the introduction of this work, Husserl seems to direct himself to avoid this dilemma by giving a "pedagogical function" to the proper task of phenomenological psychology:

Perhaps our psychology provides an *a priori* possible and natural point of departure for the ascent to a transcendental phenomenology and philosophy. To that extent, such an inner

psychology would be of special philosophical interest as a pedagogical, motivating stage preliminary to philosophy.⁶⁹

That is to say, just because transcendental phenomenology has to abandon what is descriptive psychologically in order to achieve its full philosophical integrity, there must be a phenomenological psychology which conducts a reflective analysis of consciousness in order to provide an epistemological ground for a descriptive psychology. However, such an answer proves to be misleading, since the simultaneity of the *a priori* and factual in phenomenological psychology comes from a methodological parallelism, not a parallelism in ontologization, as was intended. There is no need for phenomenological psychology if it is only to repeat what transcendental phenomenology is supposed to do and eventually becomes "a preliminary step that will lead up to an understanding of philosophical phenomenology".⁷⁰

Therefore, in the closing pages of *Phenomenological Psychology*, Husserl redirects himself to the necessity of phenomenological psychology, as he gives a "retrospective" synopsis:

There can be here a *consistent progress* and an approximative mastering of the experienceable by *an a priori which*, even in this approximative relativity, can gradually and relatively satisfy theoretical and practical interests and, on the other hand, include the satisfaction of being on the way to the idea of a conclusive truth. *All-inclusive experience in its unexplicated infinity includes an 'a priori' and an infinite gradation of approximative a priori regularities.*⁷¹

It is true that, in its eidetic necessity, phenomenological psychology is concerned with 'the' world which is the intentional correlate of experience, not just 'my' world, whereas, as a psychology, it is only appropriate to the constitution of a "personal world" as that which appears within the confines of my own experience. But, to sever the tie with the psychological ego, to put aside the prejudice that experience belongs to a psychological subject, would not result in the loss of our subject matter, even though it may very well be construed as a transcendental undertaking. Phenomenological psychology thus resumes its ontological status, when it must retain its character of being given as it situates itself in this relation to consciousness. The human being comes to be in the world at the same time that it is constituting that same world in its meaning without being remaindered as mysterious as Heidegger has suggested.⁷² That is to say, by calling into question the real world which serves as its ground, we do not appeal to that which is itself questionable in order to resolve its questionable status. Phenomenological psychology is no longer the psychology which presumes 'the' world as the context in which its subject exists and thereby remains "transcendentally naive"; rather, it is where we ask how consciousness can constitute that wherein it is presumed to belong.

Nevertheless, in order to clarify the constituting function of the constituted nature of phenomenological psychology, this direction reverts to Husserl's transcendental turn, as he indicates in the "Phenomenology" article:

It is just the field of transcendental self-experience (conceived in full concreteness) which in every case can, *through mere alteration of attitude*, be changed into psychological self-experience.⁷³

Some phenomenological psychologists and philosophers concede this final move and interpret it as implying that while one may wish to overcome psychologism to do philosophy, one must

tolerate psychologism in order to do psychology, in accordance with the format of transcendental phenomenology.⁷⁴ To be sure, transcendental subjectivity becomes consciousness apperceived in its world-constituting function, while psychological subjectivity becomes consciousness apperceived in its mundane appearance as belonging to an animal reality. But, Heidegger questions Husserl's draft of the "Phenomenology" article, "What is the mode of Being of this absolute ego--in what sense is it *the same* as the factual I and in what sense is it *not* the same?"⁷⁵ To answer this question, many believe that there is a dialectical movement underlying this reciprocal relation between phenomenology and psychology, since, on the one hand, the constituting is logically prior to the constituted and, on the other hand, historically, the former comes into being through the latter.⁷⁶

Conclusion

In reviewing what we have described from Husserl's works, there is indeed an ontological difference to be found between the subject matters of these parallel, yet supposedly separate, sciences. This parallelism between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology is not only in justifying transcendental subjectivity, but also in confirming that only phenomenological-psychological reduction places the responsibility for the appearance of things in consciousness on the consciousness in which they appear. Therefore, to interpret this parallelism dialectically appears to be the most proper answer to satisfy both what Husserl insists throughout his career and what he emphasizes more and more in the later years. On the one hand, there must be an act of constitution which is not its own making, if we attempt to return to the human being who performed this reduction; after having done so we are merely demonstrating that we have yet to complete the performance of the reduction. On the other hand, the field of transcendental subjectivity provides the horizon for the historical and cultural changes which the meaning of the human undergoes; it is only in what is constituted that we find the constituting I for which the worldly I is "at hand".

However, one has to be careful to understand this dialectical nature of the relation between phenomenology and psychology. If the untangling of what is intertwined between them is to render it intelligible, as Merleau-Ponty points out, "not only will psychology never take the place of philosophy, but as psychology it necessarily involves a deformation of consciousness."⁷⁷ Phenomenology consequently would lose its original meaning as the foundation for the human sciences. On the other hand, as Merleau-Ponty admits, "there is dialectic", but:

Only in that type of being in which a junction of subjects occurs, being which is not only a spectacle that each subject presents to itself for its own benefit but which is rather their common residence, the place of their exchange and of their reciprocal interpenetration.⁷⁸

If we think over what Husserl thought about, rather than reducing his thinking strictly to what he said,⁷⁹ what comes about in the reciprocal envelopment of phenomenology and psychology is nothing but a "reversal". That is, every attempt at grasping things as they are 'in themselves' culminates in a 'retiring into oneself', just as every attempt at grasping things as they are 'for us' throws us back into the world of things 'in themselves'. This overlapping parallelism does not have to erase their ontological difference, as the followers of Heidegger contend, nor need their divergence turn them into a psychologistic muddle, as the followers of Husserl insist. Rather, there is a "chasm" between phenomenology and psychology, where the phenomenological reduction, as

Merleau-Ponty understands, "is not the unreflected which challenges reflection; it is reflection which challenges itself."⁸⁰

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Notes

1. Mohanty said: "The wonderful, paradoxical parallelism between the mundane psychic life and transcendental consciousness remains one of the major embarrassments as well as mysteries of phenomenology." J. Mohanty, *The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy* (Boston: Nijhoff, 1985), p. 153.

2. E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, 2 vols., trans. by J. N. Findlay (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), cf. pp. 261-63.

3. E.

Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, First Book, General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology, trans. by F. Kersten (Hague: Nijhoff, 1983), p. xx. Hereafter cited as *Ideas I*.

4. E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy*, Second Book, Studies in the Phenomenology of Constitution, trans. by R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989), p. 147. Hereafter is cited as *Ideas II*.

5. E. Husserl, *Phenomenological Psychology*, trans. by J. Scanlon (Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), p. 29.

6. "'Phenomenology', Edmund Husserl's article for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (1927)", trans. by R. E. Palmer, in *Husserl: Shorter Works*, ed. by P. McCormick & F. Elliston (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 21-35. W. Biemel, "Husserl's Encyclopaedia Britannica Article and Heidegger's Remarks Thereon", trans. by P. McCormick & F. Elliston, in *Husserl: Expositions & Appraisals*, ed. by P. McCormick & F. Elliston (Notre Dame: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1977), p. 286-303.

7. For those who on Husserl's side hold that the constituting is prior to the constituted, see J. Scanlon, "The Epoché and Phenomenological Anthropology", in *Research in Phenomenology*, 2 (1972), 95-109; and J. Mohanty, "Consciousness and Existence: Remarks on the Relation between Husserl and Heidegger", in *Man and World*, 11 (1978), 324-335. For those who on Heidegger's side consider that the constituted underlies the constituting, see J. Caputo, "The Question of Being and Transcendental Phenomenology: Reflections on Heidegger's Relationship to Husserl", in *Research in Phenomenology*, 7 (1977), 84-105; and F. Sebeok, "Heidegger and the Phenomenological Reduction", in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 36 (1975), 212-221.

8. Merleau-Ponty said: "It is in becoming conscious of myself as I am that I am able to see essences", in "Phenomenology and the Science of Man", *The Primacy of Perception*, ed. by J. Edie (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964), p. 73. But this statement should not be simply understood as meaning that the constituted underlies the constituting, since Merleau-Ponty later notes: "there is a thought (the reflective thought) that, precisely because it would like to grasp the thing in itself immediately, falls back on the subjectivity--and which, conversely, because it is haunted by the being for us, does not grasp it and grasps only the thing 'in itself', in signification. The true philosophy is to apprehend what makes the leaving of oneself be a retiring into oneself,

and vice versa. Grasp this chasm, this reversal. That is the mind." M. Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, ed. by C. Lefort, trans. by A. Lingis (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1968), p. 199.

9. E. Husserl, *Philosophie der Arithmetik* (Husserliana 12; Hague: Nijhoff, 1970). Also see W. Biemel, "The Decisive Phases in the Development of Husserl's Philosophy," in *The Phenomenology of Husserl: Selected Critical Readings*, ed. by R. O. Elveton (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970), pp. 148-173.

10. *Logical Investigations*, p. 42.

11. This general misconception has been illustrated by E. Fink, in "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism", in R. O. Elveton, *op. cit.*, p. 73-149. A clear exposition of psychologistic implications can be seen in T. De Boer, *The development of Husserl's Thought*, trans. by T. Plantinga (Hague: Nijhoff, 1978), pp. 116-117.

12. *Logical Investigations*, p. 266.

13. *Ibid.*, p. 562.

14. A similar view can be found in Dilthey's *Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and Analytic Psychology*, where he gives a concise definition of descriptive and explanatory psychology respectively. W. Dilthey, *Descriptive Psychology and Historical Understanding*, trans. by R. Zaner and K. Heiges (Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 35, 49.

15. E. Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, trans. by W. Alston & G. Nakhnikian (Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), pp. 13-14. Hereafter cited as the 1907 lectures.

16. *Ibid.*

17. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 31.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 35.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 34.

22. E. Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science", trans. by Q. Lauer, in *Husserl: Shorter Works*, p. 176. Hereafter cited as the *Logos* article.

23. *Ibid.*, p. 169.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

26. *Ibid.*, p. 181.

27. *Ideas I*, 181.

28. The *Logos* article, p. 173.

29. *Logical Investigations*, p. 253.

30. *Ideas I*, 8.

31. *Ibid.*, p. xx.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

33. *Ibid.*, p. 57.

34. *Ibid.*

35. *Ibid.*, p. 58.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 59.

37. *Ibid.*, p. 66.

38. *Ibid.*, p. 73.

39. *Ibid.*, pp. 89-90.

40. *Ibid.*, p. 89-90.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 90.
42. *Ibid.*, p. 89.
43. *Ibid.*, pp. 102-103.
44. *Ibid.*, p. 109.
45. *Ibid.*, p. 112.
46. For example, Schmitt said: "I can see no way of escaping the conclusion that Husserl's transcendental phenomenology is a big muddle." R. Schmitt, "Transcendental Phenomenology: Muddle or Mystery?" in *The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 2 (1971), p. 27. Also see P. Ricoeur, *Husserl: An Analysis of his Phenomenology*, trans. by E. Ballard & L. Embree (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1967).
47. *Ideas I*, 124.
48. *Ibid.*, p. 125.
49. *Ibid.*, p. 126. A systematic development from this view can be seen in M. Theunissen, *The Other: Studies in the Social Ontology of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre and Buber* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1984), cf. pp. 13-163.
50. *Ideas I*, pp. 125-126.
51. *Ibid.*, p. 128.
52. *Ibid.*
53. "Phenomenology" in *Husserl: Shorter Works*, p. 29.
54. *Ideas I*, 139.
55. *Ideas II*, 17-9. Also see E. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. by D. Cairns (Hague: Nijhoff, 1967), pp. 99-100.
56. *Ideas II*, 27.
57. *Ibid.*, p. 36.
58. *Ibid.*, pp. 140-146.
59. *Ibid.*, pp. 199-200.
60. *Ibid.*, p. 311.
61. E.
62. *Ibid.*, p. 42.
63. *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 64.
65. "Epilogue" in *Ideas II*, 414.
66. *Ibid.*, p. 420.
67. *Ibid.*, p. 421.
68. *Phenomenological Psychology*, p. 29.
69. *Ibid.*, p. 34.
70. *Husserl: Shorter Works*, p. 22.
71. *Phenomenological Psychology*, p. 172.
72. Biemel, op. cit., in *Husserl: Expositions & Appraisals*, p. 302.
73. *Husserl: Shorter Works*, p. 31.
74. For example, Natanson said: "All descriptions made at the psychological level have constitutive roots in transcendental subjectivity, though it does not follow that the phenomenological-transcendental reduction must be employed to make out the eidetic contours of

the social world. It is a matter of what one wishes to achieve." M. Natanson, *Phenomenology and the Social Sciences* (Evanston, Northwestern Univ. Press, 1973), p. 26.

75. Quoted by Biemel, *op. cit.*, p. 297.

76. Dallmayr thinks that the parallelism is a "transition from a transcendental to a dialectical phenomenology." F. Dallmayr, "Phenomenology and Social Science: An Overview and Appraisal", in *Explorations in Phenomenology*, ed. by D. Carl & E. Casey (Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973), p. 160. Also see E. Paci, *The Function of the Sciences and the Meaning of Man*, trans. by P. Piccone & J. E. Hansen (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1972).

77. Merleau-Ponty, *The Primacy of Perception*, p. 58.

78. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Adventure of the Dialectic*, trans. by J. Bien (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1973), p. 206.

79. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Signs*, trans. by R. C. McCleary (Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1964), p. 160.

80. *Ibid.*, p. 161.

6.

Lao-Tzu and Husserl: A Comparative Study of Lao-Tzu's Method of Negation and Husserl's Epoché

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Introduction¹

I am fully aware of the fact that the comparative work between Lao-tzu, as a Chinese sage who lived two thousand and five hundred years ago, and Husserl, as a Western philosopher who flourished in the twentieth century, would face many insoluble difficulties. The main difficulty lies in the difference between the *Tao-te-king* and the *Husserliana*. The former was written in soliloquies and aphorisms from the mouth of a prophet, whereas the latter was the work of criticism and systematization by a scientifically-minded thinker.

Disregarding their distance in space and time, the difference in their modes of thought and in the roles they played in their times, I intend to compare Lao-tzu and Husserl through their similarities. It seems to me that as regards their "Wesensschau", both Lao-tzu and Husserl employ the same method of thinking to examine the epistemological assumptions on which they try to found their ontology, for through a methodological epoché both reach the starting point of epistemology and ontology. In this paper I will show that the two thinkers have a similar methodological approach from knowledge to existence and from epistemology to ontology.

This paper is divided into three main parts. The first part deals with the use of negative terms by *Tao-te-king*. I will show how Lao-tzu dominates the Chinese negative terms to demonstrate his idea about Tao, the Ultimate Being, as the directive principle for the human being, and about the meaning of life as the practical principle for human life.

In the second part, the Husserlian phenomenological method will be discussed, from his eidetic reduction, through transcendental reduction, to phenomenological reduction. Finally, the ultimate phenomenological residuum, i.e., pure consciousness, will be reached as the starting point of all scientific research.

The third part will deal with the comparison between Lao-tzu and Husserl. Here, the author will attempt a different approach to considering the above-mentioned three stages of negative terms by Lao-tzu and three stages of Husserl's method.

Negative Terms in the *Tao-Te-King*

Anyone well-versed with classical Chinese will find that in the *Tao-te-king* there are many negative terms used in different ways. But how or in what way these negative terms exactly will be used by Lao-tzu seems to be ignored, even by many sinologists and Taoist experts. Within almost five thousand words I found the negative terms more than 545 times. The modes of negation vary in different stages and grades from the frivolous and partial negation to the absolute and total. Further and deeper discussion is needed here from a philosophical point of view.

1) First, the frivolous and partial negations in *Tao-te-king* such as "diminution," "small," "soft," "weak," "rare," "few," "still," "formless," etc., manifest themselves in the following groups and manners:

a) as verb:

" " Empties their minds, weakens their wills. Chap. 3.

" " To diminish selfishness and to make rare the desires. Chap. 19.

b) as adjective:

" " They who know me are few. Chap. 70.

" " In a little state with a small population. Chap. 80.

" " How still and formless it was. Chap. 25.

c) as substantive:

" " We look at it, and we do not see it, and we name it the Equability. We listen to it, and we do not hear it, and we name it the Inaudibility. We try to grasp it, and do not get hold of it, and we name it the Subtlety. Chap. 14.

More numerous and deeper negations come to light as follows:

" " is not, " " do not, " " none, " " cannot, " " cease, " " renounce, " " disregard, " " put away, " " lost, etc.

" " The Tao that can be trodden, is not the enduring and unchanging Tao; the name that can be named is not the enduring and unchanging name. Chap. 1.

" " Not to value and employ men of superior ability is the way to keep the people from rivalry among themselves; not to prize articles which are difficult to procure is the way to keep them from becoming thieves; . . . not to show them what is likely to excite their desires is the way to keep their minds from disorder. Chap. 3.

" " He constantly tries to keep them in ignorance and apathy. Chap. 3.

" " Everlastingly without desire. Chap. 34.

" " In loving the people and ruling the state, can he not proceed without any knowledge? Chap. 10.

" " Heaven and Earth do not act from the impulse of any wish to be benevolent . . . the sage does not act from any wish to be benevolent. Chap. 5.

" " And when one does not wrangle, no one finds fault with him. Chap. 8.

" " When gold and jade fill the hall, their possessor cannot keep them safe. Chap. 9.

" " When the great Tao ceased to be observed, benevolence and righteousness came into vogue. Chap. 18.

" " Renouncing sageness and discarding wisdom . . . renouncing benevolence and discarding righteousness . . . renouncing artful contrivances and discarding profit . . . Chap. 19.

" " Renouncing learning there is not trouble. Chap. 20.

" " Hence, the sage puts away excessive effort, extravagance, and easy indulgence. Chap. 29.

" " When the Tao was lost, its virtue appeared; when its virtue was lost, benevolence appeared; when benevolence was lost, righteousness appeared; when righteousness was lost, rites appeared. Chap. 38.

2) The first stage of negation is oriented toward some objects which the people often desire and value, while the second stage of negation is objectless and simply demands that the subject avoid all acting. That is Wu-wei (no action therefore does nothing).

" " The Tao in its everlasting mode of Wu-wei. Chap. 37.

" " He diminishes it and again diminishes it, till he arrives at Wu-wei. Chap. 48.

" " I know hereby what advantage belongs to Wu-wei. There are few in the world who attain to the teaching without words, and the advantage arising from Wu-wei. Chap. 43.

" " I will Wu-wei, and the people will automatically be transformed. Chap. 57.

" " It is the way of the Tao to Wu-wei. Chap. 63.

" " The sage Wu-wei, and therefore does no harm. Chap. 64.

The Wu-wei of the Tao is the metaphysical foundation for the sage who practiced Wu-wei in imitating Tao. Hence, Wu-wei is the practical principle for the Taoists in all ethical and political situations. Wu-wei is also a general and comprehensive term of all the above-mentioned terms of both frivolous, partial negations, and deeper negations. There is an ontological series of Wu-wei. At the top of this series stand the Tao, which practiced its own Wu-wei. Immediately under the Tao lies nature, which in its everlasting mode practices Wu-wei. Then comes the sage, who practices Wu-wei in imitating the Tao. The sage is, however, the example for the people, just like the Tao is the example for the sage. When the sage practices his Wu-wei, the people will imitate and practice Wu-wei, too.

In this second stage of negation, all the activities of the subject would be excluded through "Wu-wei". The everlasting Tao remains in its own existence only, just as all the objective existence of the mundane world would be bracketed in the first stage of negation.

3) From Tao's action, or better, Tao's Wu-wei (no action), Lao-tzu invented the very essence of Tao which is called "Wu" (Non-Being). The term "Wu" would be used here as substantive. It is negation itself. Lao-tzu said:

" " Hence (the Tao is) always Wu (Nothingness), we try to contemplate its mystery. Chap. 1.2

" " Therefore one does not take action in order to be available and be useful. Chap. 11.

" " Ten-thousand-things under Heaven are generated from Yu (Being), and Yu is generated from Wu (Non-Being). Chap. 40.

" " The Tao generates one, one generates two, two generates three, three generates ten thousand things. Chap. 42.3

If we make a synthesis from *Tao-te-king*, chapter 40 and 42, we can easily find that the universe begins to exist through a process of generation. In the beginning was Tao, whose name was Wu (Non-Being). Wu generates Yu. Yu generates Ten-thousand-things under Heaven. According to Western Aristotelian philosophy, Yu (Being) is reality, while Wu (Non-Being) is nothingness. But in *Tao-te-king* Wu (Non-Being) is super-reality, it is the fountain of all beings, while Yu (Being) comes from Wu, and Yu generates ten-thousand-things. The fundamental difficulties in understanding Lao-tzu's *Tao-te-king* lie not only in its being brief, or in its obscure terminology, but also in its controversial and even contradictory usage of philosophical terms. According to Lao-tzu the Tao must be the very Being of all Beings in its ontological sense. But the expression of Being is called, by Lao-tzu, Wu (Non-Being), which is just like negation qua negation. The metaphysical and ontological Yu (Being) would be transformed into the epistemological and ethical Wu (Non-Being). This paradoxical use of terms in *Tao-te-king* played a role of meta-contradiction, which is called " ". The affirmative words seem to be expressed in their contrary forms (Chap. 78). Therefore, the term Wu (Non-Being) in its epistemological sense means controversially the ontological Yu (Being).

Furthermore, Wu-wei (no action) means in a contrary sense the Yu-wei (action), that is, "The Tao in its everlasting mode does nothing, but there is nothing which it does not do" (Chap. 37).

In this manner of reasoning all negative terms used by Lao-tzu have positive meanings. Hence, we can insist that although Lao-tzu verbally denied all things, yet beyond this negation there is a strong affirmation in which positive ontological content appears. Furthermore, the negation qua

negation (Wu) is the essence of Tao. And the negation of all action (Wu-wei) is the attribute of Tao. In the ethical orientation by Lao-tzu, Wu-wei (no action) is the practical principle for nature and the human being, especially in the social and political situation, even in the ethical sphere. In consequence, all the frivolous, partial and even deeper negations play the role of the *prae-ambula* for the way of negation.

To sum up, for Lao-tzu's way of negation we have to emphasize that the frivolous and partial negation such as "diminishing selfishness and making rare the desires" (Chap. 19) or the deeper negation such as "the constant trials to keep them ignorant and desireless" (Chap. 3), denied only the objects of our knowledge, but not the action of the subject, still less the subject him or herself. That is the first stage of negation.

In the second stage, however, the action and even the activity of the subject would be excluded, i.e., Wu-wei (no action). The reason for Wu-wei lies only in the attributes of Tao, which practices Wu-wei. Tao's Wu-wei is an example for the human being, who has to practice Wu-wei, too.

The third stage of Lao-tzu's negative way of thinking is oriented not only towards human action, but also towards the Tao itself. According to Lao-tzu, the Tao in its very essence is Wu (Non-Being), because it cannot be trodden, and cannot be named (Chap. 1). Therefore epistemologically Tao is Wu. In a contrary sense, however, Wu (Non-Being) means in ontology the highest being. In the sense of Wu (Non-Being) as the very essence of Tao, Tao itself is excluded in the extreme sense. Lao-tzu's philosophy is therefore a negative philosophy in its epistemological orientation.

Husserl's Phenomenological Method

Earlier, I proposed that the Husserlian epoché developed through three periods, namely, the eidetic, transcendental and philosophical. According to his writings I emphasize also the following schema in the evolution of the term "epoché":

Starting point: Logical Investigation (1900/01)--conceives the law of epoché

Process: Rigorous Science (1910/11)--the use of epoché

End point.

Starting point: Ideas I (1913)--the law of epoché

Process: First Philosophy (1923/24)--system of epoché

Cartesian Meditations (1929)--correction of this system

End point: Crisis (1936)--mature use of epoché.⁴

It is interesting to note that the process of the phenomenological method is almost equivalent to the chronological order of Husserl's writings. These can be divided into three periods:

Descriptive Phenomenology:

This first period begins with his dissertation *Beiträge zur Variatirechnung* (1882) and ends with the *Logical Investigation* (1900/01).

Transcendental Phenomenology:

This second period extends from 1900/01 to 1916. The main work during the period is without doubt the *Ideen zu einer Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie* (1913).

Constitutive Phenomenology:

This third period, from 1917 to 1932, has as its representative work the *Cartesianische Meditationen* (1929).⁵

The coincidence of these divisions implies the following issues:

1) In Book I of the *Ideen I*, Husserl applied his reduction step by step. He first refrains from affirming the being of the entire natural world with its spatio-temporal existence. He indicates there that his phenomenological method is carried out without suppositions or assumptions.⁶ He then begins to point the way to this "assumptionless" philosophy through the method of epoché.

First of all, he puts the whole sensible world into brackets.

We place in brackets whatever it includes respecting the nature of being: the entire natural world therefore which is continually "there for us", "present to our hand", and will ever remain there; it is a "fact-world" of which we continue to be conscious, even though it pleases us to put it in brackets (*Ideas I*, 32, p.110).

This act of epoché is obviously an eidetic reduction, in which the empirical Ego plays the role of a subject. Since the empirical Ego must use abstract terms to transcend all sensible particulars, eidetic reduction leads the subject from the sensible world to the eidetic one. The eidetic act enables the epistemological subject to transform itself from the empirical to the transcendental Ego. This transcendental act has been very much discussed in the *Logical Investigations* where Husserl criticized psychologism and demonstrated the superiority of logic, especially the superiority and autonomy of pure logic (in the last chapter of the first part).⁷

In the period of eidetic reduction the empirical Ego was discussed as the subject which puts the sensible world in brackets in order to show that the phenomenological method, from the beginning, has no assumption--especially that it is not negation. In the eidetic reduction the sensible world is reduced, but never denied. The effort of eidetic reduction is therefore a rejection of any empirical manner of encountering the world, and this leads us to attain absolute knowledge. Husserl criticized Locke as follows:

Locke and all the philosophers who believe in natural science make the same mistake, i.e., they presuppose the authentic existence of nature, but at the same time, they doubt its reality.⁸

Of course, Husserl looked upon Locke not only negatively, but also positively:

Locke is the first philosopher who used the Cartesian *cogito* and tried to find a way into the center of cognition. From the point of view of philosophical research he is also the first one to put all knowledge into consciousness.⁹

From criticism of Locke's empiricism Husserl went on to Cartesian rationalism. He accepted Descartes' method of doubt, which should somehow be equivalent to his own method of epoché, nevertheless, he criticized Descartes mercilessly. Descartes highlighted the *cogito*, which is acknowledged by Husserl as the inner consciousness; however, Descartes did not remain there but passed too quickly to the *res extensa*. To Husserl it seemed that Descartes was the first philosopher who used the phenomenological method. Indeed, he was the beginner but did not complete his work.

Kant is seen by Husserl to have made great contributions to the development and criticism of empiricism and rationalism, but he cannot escape critique. According to Husserl, Kant's dualistic view of human reason leads him away from his inner and unique consciousness and into inescapable error, for Kant cannot return to his own consciousness in order to carry out his

reflections.¹⁰ At the same time, in his critique of Kant, Husserl saw some positive accomplishment, namely, his transcendental mode of thinking. In the conclusion of *First Philosophy* he maintains that the contribution of transcendental philosophy lies in providing a foundation for all scientific knowledge.¹¹ Thus, beginning from empiricism and rationalism, Husserl came to his notion of consciousness, and beginning from idealism, he came to his transcendental method. The epoché of the empirical Ego could then begin.

If we take the *Ideas I*, 31c, as mentioned above, as a general description of the phenomenological eidetic reduction, the following passages must be its description of this. Husserl said:

Through this prior reduction it first became possible to focus attention on the phenomenological field and the apprehending of its data. The remaining reductions, as presupposing the first, are thus secondary, but by no means therefore of small importance. (*Ideas I*, 60)

"The remaining reduction" mentioned here should include all the transcendental things. "As we have suspended individual realities in every sense, so now we seek to suspend all other varieties of the 'Transcendent'" (*Ideas*, 59). One step is to reduce all knowledge of sensible and transcendental things. "So, just as we disconnect the real nature of physical science and the empirical natural science we disconnect also the eidetic sciences" (*Ideas I*, 60).

2) The second stage of the phenomenological epoché proceeds beyond the contrast of the mystic-practical worldview and the theoretical worldview to pure consciousness (*First Philosophy*, Ergänzende Texte, p. 252). The transcendental reduction brackets not only the sensible world, but the entire transcendental world. "As we have suspended individual realities in every sense, so now we seek to suspend all other varieties of the 'Transcendent'" (*Ideas I*, 59).

The epoché of the empirical Ego goes as far as the eidetic sphere as its ultimate limit. Through and beyond this limit Husserl reached transcendental reduction, in which all concepts are also bracketed (*Ideas I*, 61). At this stage, Husserlian epistemology has at least two types of transcendental spheres: one is a reflection in the sensible world, which leads to eidetic efforts, the other is one of indirect transcendence through the law of causality. The subject who apprehends any of the above-mentioned stages achieves a transcendence beyond the empirical, reflective and abstractive milieus.

The second stage of the epoché is also the topic of the second period of Husserl's phenomenological studies which deals with all transcendental knowledge. "The second stage of phenomenological research would be precisely the criticism of transcendental experience, and then of all 'transcendental cognition'" (*Cartesian Meditations*, 13).

In epistemological research every subject can go beyond the object through abstraction. The object transforms itself into *Gegenstand* in order to enter the consciousness of the subject, and through this understanding the subject transcends itself from the real to the ideal region. The ideal, which was transformed from reality, plays the role of freedom from the bond of the sensible world and unifies the subject and object. This effort is oriented according to a fundamental assumption, namely, that the object is conceived only as *Gegenstand* and is changed into essence within the subject; that is, the subject can transform the object into a part of the subject as an organism digests food and transforms it into its own flesh and blood. In this sense, the subject has no need to go out of himself nor to use any of his senses to apprehend the object, but need only use the modes of

knowledge and reflection to conceive *Gegestand*, in order for the object and the subject to be unified in one.¹²

The representative work in this second stage of epoché is obviously *Ideas I*. The credibility and trustworthiness of knowledge here at the beginning of this research faces some difficulties. One is an external element; the other is raised by the natural sciences. The external element lies in scientific authority which per se does not pertain directly to the philosophical, still less, the epistemological problem. However, it has such great influence on the process of learning that it is involved in most of our knowledge relating to it, especially transcendental knowledge at the higher stages, like religious dogma, or in the lower stages, like the natural sciences. Here Husserl gave a general response to all problems of authority, maintaining that all knowledge not constituted by the phenomenological method must first, by epoché, be put into brackets, which act of bracketing should continue until only pure consciousness remains, and nothing else.¹³

Husserl was, of course, conscious of many other difficulties: for example, must natural science be bracketed, to which he gave the same answer and reason. From his phenomenological point of view, nothing can be presupposed except pure consciousness which possesses no knowledge content, but only the ability to produce knowledge. Step by step, Husserl puts all knowledge into brackets, till nothing remains in the consciousness except consciousness itself and we reach the stage of pure consciousness.

3) According to Husserl, pure consciousness cannot be reduced because it is the reducing subject, not the object being reduced. In *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl borrows from Descartes' methodical doubt, insisting that every cogitation can be put into brackets, but the "ego cogito" or better the "ego dubito", must remain because the ego is the subject of doubt and of thinking. At the same time, the ego is the subject who practices epoché. We can doubt everything, insist both Descartes and Husserl, but we cannot doubt that we doubt.

That which cannot be put into brackets is obviously pure consciousness. Husserl called it the residuum of reduction or the phenomenological residuum (*Ideas I*, 33). This residuum is the ultimate remainder after all phenomenological epoché. At the same time, it is the first essence from which all things originate. It is therefore both the endpoint of the phenomenological epoché, and the arché of all knowledge and existence: it is the beginning of all epistemology and ontology.

Here, in pure consciousness, Husserl invents his foundation for epistemology and ontology; still more important, it is here that knowledge and being meet.

If we call the subject the same in the "empirical ego" of his *Logical Investigations* as in the "pure ego" of *Ideas I*, then the glory of the "transcendental ego" emerges in the *Cartesian Meditations*. The transcendental ego possesses all the functions of the empirical ego and pure ego, so it reflects all reductive acts in bracketing both the sensible and the transcendental worlds. Here, in the phenomenological epoché, however, the transcendental ego goes backwards and inwards in its own consciousness; the transcendental ego is its own consciousness, like the Aristotelian "noesis noeseos noesis" (*Intelligentia intelligentiae intelligentia*) (Met. XII).

As Husserl discovered his own consciousness, i.e., established the transcendental ego, he began to reconstitute knowledge which he had put in brackets during the process of the phenomenological reduction. In the light of pure consciousness, Husserl resolves all the bonds of epoché used to bracket all natural and transcendental knowledge. As the bonds are resolved, the constitution of knowledge and of phenomenology takes place. This is the third period of Husserl's phenomenological research in which all that had been put into brackets is reborn, constituting an

epistemological and ontological system so that Husserl dares to say with Descartes not only "Cogito, ergo sum," but also "Cogito, die Welt ist."

A Comparison of Lao-Tzu And Husserl

Husserl's phenomenological method should be much easier for us to understand than Lao-tzu's negative method, not only because of their distance in space and time or their different modes of expression, but also because of the logical and ontological difference between the *Tao-te-king* and the *Husserliana*. The chronological order of Husserl's works and thought is clear, while the order of Lao-tzu's thought in *Tao-te-king* is very obscure. One must spend much time to find out Lao-tzu's order of thinking in his very condensed and summary work. On the contrary, in Husserl's works we can follow the order of his thinking without much difficulty because his systematic thought *ipso facto* inspired its serial order.

Nevertheless, many essential points seem comparable in Lao-tzu and Husserl or, speaking more exactly, between *Tao-te-king* and the *Husserliana*. We can compare over-all the three stages of the thinking process by both thinkers:

Lao-tzu Husserl

General Negation.....	Eidetic Reduction (frivolous, partial ever deeper negation)
Wu-wei.....	Transcendental Reduction
Wu.....	Phenomenological Reduction
Tao.....	Phenomenological Residuum (pure consciousness)

1) From the epistemological point of view, both Lao-tzu and Husserl used "Wesensschau" in a very similar manner. Both thinkers maintain the thinking subject. Interestingly, in Lao-tzu's *Tao-te-king* there are not the pronouns "you", "he" or "she". The *Tao-te-king* used only the first personal pronoun "I", or the equivalent word, "Sage" and did so more than twenty-seven times. This is a quite evident symbol for his soliloquies. An emphasis on subjectivity dominates the entire contents of the *Tao-te-king*. Husserl emphasizes the subject of the "cogito", the phenomenological residuum, as pure consciousness. Lao-tzu's ego and Husserl's cogito seem equivalent as the thinking subject. The difference between the two is only in their expressive mode and personal status: where Husserl emphasized the awakened consciousness, Lao-tzu used the unconsciousness as Wu-wei.

The awakened ego of Husserl and the unconscious ego of Lao-tzu are controversial and differentiate East and West in metaphysical and religious affairs. On the other hand, as mentioned above, Lao-tzu's unconsciousness is the highest grade of conscious awareness; it has the same meaning as Husserl's consciousness from the ontological point of view. Of course, the real significance of Lao-tzu's unconsciousness lies in "Fasting of the Heart" (Chuang-tzu's Theory). This means doing nothing with one's own consciousness and letting the Tao work in the universe and at the same time in man's heart. In consequence, the working Tao elevates the human heart into Tao's realm so that the human being can unify with Tao in order to fulfill the philosophical purpose: transcendental, or more exactly, authentic subjectivity. Here, Husserl's concern is

directed to personal intuition, while Lao-tzu's endeavor is oriented towards the impersonal Wu-wei.

Husserl's *Wesensschau* has two directions: one is the orientation of the subject towards the *Gegenstand* of the object grasping the essence, the other is the inward act of the same subject reflecting on its own essence. The essences of both the subject and the object gather themselves together in consciousness. These two directions are comprehended spatially as the "intention" and "retention" of pure consciousness.

The theory of intention is developed within Husserl's theory of the *cogito* which turns to his own consciousness to create subjectivity and, at the same time, turns outward to the *cogitatum* to constitute the objective world. Thus, the subjective and the objective of both epistemology and ontology are simultaneously created and constituted.

On the other hand, Lao-tzu's *Wesensschau* proceeds with his Wu-wei, forgetfulness of his own existence. According to Lao-tzu, Tao's work is mysteriously both in the universe and in the human being, so that the *Wesensschau* becomes the mysterious intuition about Tao. If we call the Husserlian method "enstasis", then the Lao-tzu method should be "extasis". Lao-tzu's reflective intuition finally processes outwards from its own heart to the mysterious Tao. This mysterious intuition towards Tao is characteristic of Lao-tzu and implies objective knowledge. At the same time, Lao-tzu's intuition proceeds inwards, back to his heart in which subjectivity is grounded; this assures subjective knowledge.

From the above, we can conclude that the theories of subject in Lao-tzu and Husserl are very similar, and that their theories of intuition, the initial act of the primordial subject in both thinkers, also are analogical. The Husserlian *Wesensschau* is almost equivalent to Lao-tzu's mysterious intuition.

2) A dualistic division of the object seems common to both Lao-tzu and Husserl. The former maintains the Tao as the ultimate reality of the universe, while *Teh* (Virtue), as the appearance of Tao, is realized in Ten-thousand-things. The latter reflects the difference between the noumenon and the phenomenon of all existence: if Tao is noumenon, then *Teh* should be phenomenon. Both thinkers follow the same methodological process in which the noumenon is reached through phenomenon, by the epoché, or in negative terms.

The three stages of epoché in Husserl are connected with this dualistic division of objects. In the first stage the empirical world is reduced so that the world appears as objective and its existence does not depend on any subjective apprehension: it belongs to the "Um-Welt-Ding". Phenomenological epoché puts the objective surroundings in brackets; this is the work of eidetic reduction.

In the second stage of epoché, Husserl puts the transcendental act in brackets. The "Gegenstand", which belongs to the object on the one hand and to the subject on the other, is reduced. The "Gegenstand" belongs to the "Welt-Ding" and transcendental reduction functions at once on both subjective and objective "Welt-Ding". When the "Welt-Ding" is reduced in the third stage, the world will disappear and what remains is subjectively pure consciousness and objectively "Ding" as essence.

Lao-tzu, on the other hand, used his negative terms step by step to exclude mundane affairs as his first stage of negation. In the second stage however, he denied the entire active function of the subject. Epistemologically he used the term "Wu", which is negation of negation, to predict the Tao, the absolute being in his last stage of negation. This process of thinking by both Lao-tzu and Husserl appears to be analogical.

Because of the difference between the phenomenological residuum of Husserl, i.e., consciousness, and the negative residuum of Lao-tzu, i.e., Tao, the world-pictures of both thinkers are not the same. Lao-tzu is oriented towards pantheism in which the Tao is immanent within world, while Husserl is oriented toward personalism, in which every individual plays a role in epistemology and in ontology. Here, Husserl used his "pure consciousness" in the same way that Lao-tzu used his negative term "Wu", which possessed infinite possibilities for creating and generating all that exists.

3) In Husserl, pure consciousness is synonymous with the Greek term "noesis" (cognition), from which all *noemata* (cogitata) are manifested as creations. That the universe in its totality is a creation, which originated from the idea of the creator, is the utmost philosophical result of Western traditional thought: *noesis* or pure consciousness exists only because of its ideal mode of existence in the other world. Pure consciousness however, by participation, has received the creativity to realize all forms of consciousness, and is able to produce ideas that demonstrate all kinds of existence. Here, Husserl takes for granted that the Cartesian *cogito* is a fundamental truth proving the existence of the epistemological subject which, at the same time, is an ontological category. This ontic and epistemic subject is not only full of intelligibility, but also has infinite energy to create things.

By so doing, Husserl extends the Cartesian "cogito, ergo sum" to "cogito, ergo *die welt ist*" (I think, therefore the world exists"). Obviously, all the qualities of the ideal and the sensible worlds previously bracketed in Husserl's reduction are resurrected. In his constitutive phenomenology Husserl reconstructed the world of harmony, which had been disarticulated because of a methodical doubt regarding uncertain knowledge. The objective world is the same as the universe, but in Husserl's phenomenology the objective world is proved through subjective identification, especially through the method of reduction. By establishing the phenomenological method Husserl, on the one hand, found and grasped pure consciousness and used it to explain the epistemological order, which proceeds from the sensible to the ideal world, and ultimately to the *noesis*. On the other hand, he set up the ontological order, in which the *noesis* with its infinite potentiality creates the entire ideal and sensible worlds.

Thus, the phenomenological residuum--pure consciousness or *noesis*--is the last in epistemology, but the first in ontology. Husserl's basic intention is to found ontology upon epistemology.

Like Husserl's consciousness, which can produce all things ranging from the ideal to the material, so, too, Lao-tzu's *Wu* can generate all existence. The Husserlian positive expression "consciousness" is equivalent to the Greek "noesis", which is full of power to think, to produce thoughts, and to create things. In the same way, the ultimate reality "Tao" is omnipotent and is able to generate all things.¹⁴

Thus we see that Husserl's "consciousness" and Lao-tzu's "Wu" are two central concepts in which the ancient and archetypal philosophical problems are discussed and resolved. Both "consciousness" and "Wu" are the cosmic center, which is like a source of light radiating in all directions and creating heaven and earth and Ten-thousand-things. This ontological result is based on an epistemological approach both in Husserl's phenomenology and in Lao-tzu's *Tao-te-king*; both use the same method of bracketing.¹⁵

Conclusion

By way of conclusion, I would note an interesting and surprising fact, namely, that Martin Heidegger, the disciple of Husserl, used a negative term, *das Leerste (the void) as both psychological and ontological* predicate to the consciousness.¹⁶ Furthermore, Heidegger suggested the process of thinking should be "*das Nichts nichtet*" (not thinking of nothing)¹⁷ in which the Hegelian hope would be fulfilled. He said, "*das reine Sein und das reine Nichts ist also dasselbe*" (clearly understood existence and clearly understood nothingness are one in the same).¹⁸ The method of reduction of Husserl and Lao-tzu's negative method proceed together and meet each other; both thinkers found the ultimate foundation, whose name finally "can not be named".

Thus the *Tao*, the *Wu*, *das Leerste*, *das Nichts*, would be then the starting-point of the *via cognitiva*, and at the same time the end-point of the *via ontologica*. This would be a real coincidence and harmony between East and West.

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Notes

1. This paper is a concluding synthesis of the author's three previous works: "The Conception of Epoché by Edmund Husserl," *Bulletin of the College of Arts* (Taipei: National Taiwan University) (no. 21, June 1972); "The Negative Concepts Used in *Tao-te-king*," a paper read at the International Conference on Sinology sponsored by Academia Sinica, Taipei, August 17, 1980; and "A Comparative Study of Lao-tzu and Husserl: A Methodological Approach," A.T. Tymieniecka, ed. *Analecta Husserliana*, XVII, pp. 65-73 (The Hague: Reidel, 1984).
2. James Legge's translation uses "无欲without desire" to interpret this section. Fung Yu-lan, Richard Wilhelm and many others use "无without" as a substance.
3. "生" in its original meaning is "generation," not "production" (James Legge). Richard Wilhelm translated it by the German "entschen in" (bring dishonor upon) in chapter 40, and "erzeugt" in chapter 42. It seems to me that the "erzeugt" (production or generation) more accurately corresponds to the original sense.
4. Woo, "The Conception of Epoché by Edmund Husserl," p. 210.
5. Wilhelm Szilasi, *Einführung in die Phänomenologie Edmund Husserls* (Tübingen, 1959), pp. 3-4.
6. Edmund Husserl, *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologischen Philosophie*, Erstes Buch (Husserliana Band III; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950), 31c.
7. Husserl, in *Philosophen-Lexicon, Handbuch der Philosophie nach Personen* (Berlin: Walter Gruyter, 1949), Band I, article "Husserl."
8. Husserl, "Die Erste Philosophie," *Husserliana*, VII, p. 96.
9. 李贵良, *Phenomenology of Husserl* (Taipei: Research Institute of Normal University, 1963), p. 208.
10. The first volume, *First Philosophy*, is called "Kritische Ideen-Geschichte."
11. *Husserliana*, Bd. VII, p. 199.
12. See n. 4 above, pp. 253-254.
13. *Husserliana*, Bd. III, p. 62.

14. Here we can perhaps see the difference between Eastern and Western theology. The Western concept of creation belongs to monotheism, while the Eastern concept of generation belongs to pantheism.
15. Woo, "A Comparative Study of Lao-tzu and Husserl," pp. 71-72.
16. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 2.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 352.
18. Heideggerm *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, p. 64. See P. Christopher Smith. "Heidegger, Hegel and the Problem of *Das Nichts*" in *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 8 (1968), 404.

Part III
Phenomenology and Human Consciousness

7. **Human Being and "Abgrund"**

Chan Wing-Cheuk

After Heidegger introduced the concept of "Ab-grund" in his lecture, "The Principle of Identity" given in 1957 on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the University of Freiburg, the importance of this concept has remained relatively neglected.¹ In my "Heidegger and T'ien-t'ai Buddhism", I attempted to compare this concept with that of "nondwelling ground" in T'ien-t'ai Buddhism.² With the recent publication of Heidegger's *Beitrag zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*, we now have a new textual basis for understanding this concept.³

In this chapter, we shall deepen our dialogue between Heidegger and T'ien-t'ai Buddhism. The aim here is basically twofold: first, to determine the finitude of "momentary mind" in the T'ien-t'ai Buddhist sense, and second, to illuminate the central role played by "Ab-grund" in Heidegger's later thinking.

Momentary Mind in T'ien-T'ai Buddhism

One major characteristic of Chinese Buddhism lies in its stress upon the centrality of mind. As a matter of fact, the doctrine of *cittamatra* has dominated the whole development of traditional Chinese Buddhism. Even within the less popular school of *vijnanamatra* in China, it was the idealistic trend represented by Hsuan-tsang which had occupied the orthodox position. In addition, it is well-known that the Northern School of ZenBuddhism held a doctrine of pure mind. Indeed, it is no wonder that *Ta-cheng ch'i-hsin lun* has been regarded as the first Buddhist text written by the Chinese. According to this famous text, "pure mind" is the transcendental ground of the whole world.

Historically speaking, the rise of T'ien-t'ai Buddhism can be regarded as a reaction to *Ta-cheng ch'i-hsin lun*. In opposition to the "pure mind" of the latter, Chih-i, the founder of T'ien-t'ai Buddhism, introduced a "momentary mind". The "momentary mind" is also called a "momentary mind of ignorance and Dharmata".⁴ Obviously, such a "momentary mind" is of a paradoxical nature: it is equipped at the same time with ignorance and Dharmata. Accordingly, the Buddha-nature is paradoxically complex. Both ignorance and Dharmata constitute the ontological structure of Buddha. In contrast to the pure mind, a "momentary mind" is a "dirty mind" in its first appearance. Precisely for this reason, Chih-i also identifies it as a mind of conspiracy or of trouble. In spite of its dark aspect, a "momentary mind" is the autonomous capacity for attaining Nirvana.

This paradoxical nature of the "momentary mind" can be illuminated by an appeal to Heidegger's Dasein-analytic. In opposition to Husserl's strict distinction between the transcendental and the empirical subjectivity, Heidegger claims that both the authentic and the inauthentic modes belong to the Being of Dasein. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger explicitly says, "Not-Being-it-self (*Das Nicht-es-Selbst-sein*) functions as a positive possibility of that entity which, in its essential concern, is absorbed in a world."⁵ For Heidegger, "Falling is a definite existential characteristic of Dasein itself."⁶ Namely, as *Seinkoennen*, Dasein is not separated from "falling". We can now clearly see that the "momentary mind" in the Buddhist sense shares the same paradoxical structure with Dasein in the Heideggerian sense.

Moreover, Chih-i claims that the "momentary mind" is equipped with the whole world of Dharmas.⁷ This thesis by no means implies any subjectification of the world. Chih-i would agree with Heidegger in saying that "Ueberall jedoch bleibt hier kein Platz fuer die Deutung des Menschen als 'Subject' weder im Sinne des ichhaften noch im Sinne des gemeinschaften Subjects".⁸ Indeed, what Chih-i asserts is merely that there is no "momentary mind separated from the world and there is no world separated from the momentary mind". Like Heidegger's identification of Dasein as Being-in-the-world, Chih-i would regard the whole world of Dharmas as a *Spielraum* for the "momentary mind". Here the whole world of Dharmas also signifies a *limit* for the "momentary mind". That is to say, the "momentary mind" has to open itself to the world of Dharmas. It is due precisely to this openness to the world that the "momentary mind" is determined to be *finite*.

Secondly, in distinction from a pure mind, a "momentary mind" can never be totally transparent. Namely, both darkness and trouble belong to the "momentary mind" as its ontological possibilities. Indeed, the intrinsic possibility of falling not only distinguishes the "momentary mind" from the pure mind, but also prohibits it from being infinite. Finally, according to T'ien-t'ai Buddhism, a "momentary mind" is not a "ground" for the possibility of the world, but rather functions as the non-dwelling ground of all beings.⁹ When the "momentary mind" is said to be equipped with the whole world of Dharmas, this means merely that all beings must originate in the letting-be of the "momentary mind". But to say that the "momentary mind" lets all the beings be implies that all beings emerge from the "non-dwelling ground", for the "momentary mind" is nothing but a "concretization" of the "non-dwelling ground". This is also the reason why Chan-jan later prefers to say that Being itself is equipped with the whole world.¹⁰

T'ien t'ai Buddhism would accept Heidegger's following statement: "Der Mensch solchen und erst kuenftigen Wesens 'ist' als Seiender nicht urspruenglich, sofern nur das *Seyn* ist."¹¹ Certainly, a "momentary mind" is not just a passive and mastered by Suchness (Being). In letting beings be, the Suchness needs the cooperation of the "momentary mind". In order to stress this point, Chih-li says: "Insofar as all the beings are of the same Being, they are gathered by a momentary mind."¹² That is to say, there is an interdependence between the "momentary mind" and the Suchness. Insofar as such an interdependence belongs intrinsically to the Being of the "momentary mind", the "momentary mind" has to remain finite.

It should be noted that the finitude of the "momentary mind" is not a negative, but rather a positive characteristic. Indeed, among all beings, it is only the human being that can have such an intimate relationship with Suchness. This relationship can also be explained in terms of the Heideggerian formulation: "Das Dasein ist die Gruendung des Abgundes des Seyns durch die Inanspruchnahme des Mensch als desjenigen Seienden, das der Waechterschaft fuer die Wahrheit des Seyns ueberantwortet wird."¹³

Ab-Grund in the Latter Heidegger

For those who are familiar with Heidegger's early writings, the appearance of the concept "Ab-grund" is not easy to follow. In fact, it is rather such contrasting terms like "ground" (*Grund*) and "grounding" (*Begruendung*) which play important roles in *Being and Time*. One also recalls that "Vom Wesen des Grundes" is the title of his contribution to Husserl's *Festschrift* (1929). However, "The discussion of ground is given up after having been explicitly worked out."¹⁴ According to Otto Poeggeler's explanation, "The meaning of Being as the 'ground' which remained unthought in metaphysical thinking, can perhaps be thought as an 'abyss-like ground',

but in the final analysis cannot really be thought of as a 'ground' at all.¹⁵ It should be added that the turning away from the early doctrine of "ground" and the introduction of idea of "Ab-grund" precisely constitutes the *Kehre* of Heidegger's thinking. Namely, this shift is exactly the dividing line between the early and the later Heidegger.

First of all, we must note that for the later Heidegger "Ab-grund" is basically a positive term. In fact, the term "Ab-grund" has already appeared in "Vom Wesen des Grundes". Here, after Heidegger discerns the three-fold meaning of "Gruenden" as (a) "Stiffen"; (b) "Bodennehmen"; (c) "Begruenden"; and identifies "Begruendung" as "Ermoeglichung der Warumfrage ueberhaupt", he jumps into the speech of "die Freiheit der Ab-grund des Daseins" and "Abgruendigkeit des Daseins".¹⁶ However, here "Ab-grund" appears merely as a "negative concept". One can conjecture that it is not until 1936, when Heidegger begins to write his *Beitraege zur Philosophie*, that a positive conception of "Ab-grund" comes to his mind.¹⁷ This conjecture is first of all supported by Heidegger's own words in *Identity and Difference* which was published during his life time: "dieser Ab-grund ist weder das leere Nichts Noch eine finstere Wirmis, sondern: das Ereignis."¹⁸ Now, in the posthumous publication of *Beitraege zur Philosophie*, we can find a proper articulation of the positive doctrine of "Ab-grund". Here Heidegger begins to claim decidedly, "die Abgruendigkeit des Ab-grundes zu denken".¹⁹ In answering the question: "Wie der Ab-grund gruendet?", Heidegger works out the following major characteristics of "Ab-grund":

- (a)"Der Ab-grund ist die urspruengliche Wesung des Grundes."
- (b)"Der Ab-grund ist die urspruengliche Einheit von Raum und Zeit."
- (c)"Der Ab-grund ist aber auch zwar das urspruengliche Wesen des gruendes, seines Gruendes, des Wesens der Wahrheit."
- (d)"Allein, der Ab-grund ist als Wesung des Gruendes kein blosses Sichversagen als einfacher Rueckzug und Wegung. Da Ab-grund ist Ab-grund."
- (e)"Ab-grund ist die zoegernde Versagung des Grundes."
- (f)"Der Ab-grund ist die erstwesentlich lichtende Verbergung, die Wesung der Wahrheit."²⁰

With this positive characterization of "Ab-grund", one can discover that "Der Ab-grund ist so wenig 'negativ'" for the later Heidegger.²¹ Indeed, the later Heidegger also points out that in "Ab-grund" we can find "Das urspruengliche Nicht, Das zum Seyn selbst und somit zum Er-eignis gehoert." Hence, it is no exaggeration to say that "Ab-grund" occupies a central position in Heidegger's later thinking.

Nevertheless, one can wonder what causes Heidegger to turn to a positive conception of "Ab-grund". Moreover, how can one understand the exact role played by "Ab-grund" in Heidegger's *Kehre*?

Regarding the first question, it is natural that Heidegger himself does not provide any answer, for he consciously distances himself from any question of "why". We also believe there is no connection with Schelling's idea of "Abgrund". Here, an appeal to T'ien-t'ai Buddhism might shed some light on Heidegger's way of thinking, though it does not imply any factual connection between Heidegger and T'ien-t'ai Buddhism.

First of all, T'ien-t'ai Buddhism is famous for introducing a distinction between the "distinctive religion" and the "perfective religion". In order to illuminate this important distinction, Chan-jan appeals to a pair of contrasting concepts: "dwelling-upon-itself" and "dwelling-upon-other". In *A Detailed Commentary on "Vimalakirt-Nirdesa-Sutra"* Chan-jan states, "that trouble and Dharmata are of different Being implies that trouble and Dharmata dwell separately. So each is considered

to be independent. In other words, there is Dharmata in separation from trouble; Dharmata is the other of trouble. It can be said also that Dharamta is self-contained. On the other hand, there is trouble in separation from Dharmata: trouble is the other of Dharmata. As a consequence, a doctrine which allows these two to be totally separated from each other cannot be a perfective religion, for here trouble must become a hindrance, and the stripping away of hindrance is the only way to reveal the Truth. On the other hand, in the case of dwelling-upon-other, both trouble and Dharmata are mutually dependent upon each other. Since they are of the same Being, their interdependence can be considered to be an identity relationship.²² One can clearly see that though both the distinctive and the perfective religions employ the same conceptual pair of "self" and "other", their ways of employing them are different.

Furthermore, the distinction between these two types of religion can be shown in their ways of answering the following question: "Are trouble and Dharmata of the same Being?" While a positive answer will point to the perfective religion, a negative answer will point to the distinctive religion. Indeed, following Chan-jan, Chih-i announces: "While the doctrine of dwelling-upon-itself defames the distinctive religion, the doctrine of dwelling-upon-other defines the perfective religion."²³ In addition, the distinction between these two types of religion can be explicated in terms of the ways of conceiving Buddha-nature. While the distinctive religion identifies Buddha with pure mind, the perfective religion identifies Buddha with momentary mind. Accordingly, for the former, Buddha is a world-less subject; for the latter, Buddha is equipped with the whole world. It should be noted that the perfective religion would not strip away any evil Dharmas in revealing the Buddha-nature.

Hubert Dreyfus has listed five theses that the later Heidegger had abandoned after the publication of *Being and Time*. The last, but not the least, is stated as follows: "By a double use of the hermeneutical circle, hermeneutic phenomenology strips away our disguises and makes manifest the pre-ontological understanding of Being as *unheimlich* which is hidden in the previous awareness and in our public practices, thus revealing the deep truth of our condition."²⁴ Obviously, such a thesis of positing a hidden, deep truth is contrary to the ontological structure of Dasein which includes inauthenticity as its existential possibility. In terms of the distinction between the distinctive and the perfective religions, such a thesis would lead Heidegger to the distinctive religion position. Namely, Dasein would become a pure mind which would imply that inauthenticity and authenticity are not of the same Being. Only authenticity would belong to the Being of Dasein; while as the other of authenticity, inauthenticity would have to be stripped away from the Being of Dasein. Naturally, Heidegger cannot accept such a consequence.

In order to correct such a misleading articulation, it is necessary for Heidegger to take seriously the "paradoxical identity" between the authenticity and inauthenticity of Dasein. First of all, it is meaningless to say that authenticity is deeper than inauthenticity. Secondly, he cannot accept that only authenticity is the truth. Finally, the essence of truth is not to be identified as "grounding". As Heidegger later states, "Deshalb bedurfte es im Versuch der Ueberwindung des ersten Ansatzes der Seinsfrage in *Sein und Zeit* und seiner Ausstrahlungen (*Vom Wesen des Grundes* und *Kantbuch*)...Desbalb bedurfte es der Bemuehung, von der 'Bedingung der Moeglichkeit' als eines nur 'mathematischen' Rueckganges freizukommen."²⁵ The only way out then for the "paradoxical identity" between authenticity and inauthenticity is to admit that both authenticity and inauthenticity are "abgruendig". That is to say, insofar as authenticity and inauthenticity are "abgruendig", they can be of the same Being. Here Heidegger would agree with Chan-jan's thesis: "Dharmata is identical with ignorance, Dharmata is non-dwelling; ignorance is Dharamata, ignorance is non-dwelling."²⁶

Moreover, if Being is to be identified as "ground" and the truth of Being is to be understood as "grounding", then Being would be the "ground" of all beings and its relation to the whole world would be "grounding". This would imply that the whole world of beings and Being itself are of different Being. For this would mean that Being itself can well dwell upon itself and, insofar as the whole world of beings is the other of Being itself, Dasein would become a world-less subject. Obviously, Heidegger cannot accept such a consequence, for it is contrary to his fundamental thesis in *Being and Time*: "Dasein is essentially being-in-the-world".

From the standpoint of T'ien-t'ai Buddhism, the only way for Heidegger to avoid such undesirable consequences as the distinctive religion is to develop a positive concept of "Ab-grund". Negatively, the introduction of a positive idea of "Ab-grund" will prohibit the absolutizing of Dasein as well as of Being itself; positively, such an introduction will enable inauthenticity to belong to the Being of Dasein. To be sure, Dasein should become authentic, but such a move does not imply any stripping away of inauthenticity from the ontological structure of Dasein. Here Heidegger would agree with T'ien-t'ai Buddhism in asserting that apart from inauthenticity, there is no authenticity.

Now let us turn to the second question. In *Beitrag zur Philosophie*, one can see that the later Heidegger does not entirely abolish the concept of "ground". Rather, "der Grund" is now displaced as "das Sichverbergen im tragenden Durchragen".²⁷ On the other hand, "Ab-grund" is identified as "das Ausbleiben, als Grund im Sichverbergen, ein Sichverbergen in der Weise der Versagung des Grundes".²⁸ This reinterpretation of "Grund" points to a cooperative relation between "Grund" and "Ab-grund": "Im Sichversagen bringt der Grund in einer ausgezeichneten Weise in das Offene, naemlich in das erst Offene jener Leere, die somit eine bestimmte ist. Sofern der Grund auch und gerade im Abgrund noch gründet und doch sich eigentlich gründet, steht er in der Zoegerung".²⁹ From the perspective of T'ien-t'ai Buddhism, what is implied in these statements is something like its own slogan: "all beings emerge from the non-dwelling ground."

Moreover, the positive character of "Ab-grund" is clearly stated in *Beitrag zur Philosophie*: "Ab-grund ist nicht das Nein zu jeden Grund wie Grundlosigkeit, sondern das Ja zum Grund in seiner verborgenen Weite und Ferne".³⁰ From the perspective of T'ien-t'ai Buddhism, what is implied in these statements is quite similar to its own motto: All beings emerge from the non-dwelling ground! Heidegger also states, "Der Abgrund ist so die in sich zeitigend-rauemend-gegen-schwingende Augenblicksstätte des 'Zwischen', als welches das Da-sein gegründet sein muss".³¹ This indeed recalls another thesis of T'ien-t'ai Buddhism: that all beings emerge from the momentary mind means that all beings emerge from the non-dwelling ground.

Conclusion

In the face of Heidegger's subtle articulation of the finitude of Dasein in terms of *Faktizität* and temporality, T'ien-t'ai Buddhism can well be enriched by adopting Heidegger's existential-ontological analytic. Indeed, the fact that both momentary mind and Dasein share a non-moral character can facilitate such an enrichment. Nowadays, T'ien-t'ai Buddhism is no longer active in China. A dialogue with Heidegger would not only shed some light on understanding its significance, but also bring to it a richer conceptual framework--so that one could expect its second spring in the future.

On the other hand, T'ien-t'ai Buddhist characterization of the perfective religion is helpful in revealing the significance of "Ab-grund" in Heidegger's later thinking. The early Heidegger insists that "Being well exists (*west*) without beings".³² But the later Heidegger rejects this thesis and

declares that "Being never exists (*west*) without beings."³³ Such an essential change can be regarded as a consequence of his adoption of a positive doctrine of "Ab-grund".

Here Heidegger would agree with the T'ien-t'ai Buddhist thesis that it is merely the sickness, but not the beings, which should be stripped away. That is to say, it is merely the "attachment to beings", rather than beings themselves, which should be stripped away. The ontological difference points only to overcoming the "attachment" to beings. As this does not imply the elimination of beings, the later Heidegger emphasizes, "einmal mit dieser Unterscheidung zur ersten Klaerung einzusetzen und dann doch gerade diese Unterscheidung zu ueberspringen."³⁴ Namely, "ihren Ursprung selbst und d.h. ihre echte *Einheit* zu fassen."³⁵ Moreover, the T'ien-t'ai Buddhist account of the origin of beings in terms of the nondwelling ground helps us to understand why the later Heidegger still has to maintain that "there must always be some being in the open, something that is, in which openness takes its stand and attains its constancy."³⁶

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Notes

1. One possible exception is Otto Poeggeler. However, even Poeggeler does not put "Ab-grund" into a central position in later Heidegger's thinking. Cf.: Otto Poeggeler, "Being as Appropriation", trans. by R.H. Grim, reprinted in M. Murray (ed.), *Heidegger and Modern philosophy* (New York: Yale, 1978).
2. Chan Wing-cheuk, *Heidegger and Chinese Philosophy* (Taipei, 1986), pp. 136-155.
3. Heidegger, *Beitraege zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (Frankfurt, 1989).
4. Cf. Mou Tsung-san, *Buddha-Nature and Prajna* (in Chinese), 2 vols. (Rev. ed.; Taipei, 1979).
5. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (New York: Harper, 1962), p. 220.
6. *Ibid.*
7. Chad Wing-cheuk.
8. *Beitraege zu Philosophie*, p. 488.
9. Chad Wing-cheuk.
10. Mou Tsung-san, p. 793.
11. *Beitraege zur Philosophie*, p. 488.
12. Mou Tsung-san, p. 807.
13. *Beitraege zur Philosophie*, p. 490.
14. Poeggeler, *op. cit.*, p. 127.
15. *Ibid.*
16. Heidegger, *Wegmarken* (Zweite, erweiterte und durchgelesene Auflage) (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978) pp. 162-163; p. 172.
17. *Beitraege zur Philosophie*, p. 512.
18. Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, trans. by J. Stambaugh (New York: Philosophical Library, 1969) p. 104.
19. *Beitraege zur Philosophie*, p. 381.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 379-380.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 388.

22. Mou Tsung-san, *op. cit.*, p. 693.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 692-693.
24. Hubert Dreyfus, "Beyond Hermeneutics: Interpretation in Late Heidegger and Recent Foucault", in G. Shapiro and A. Sica (eds.), *Hermeneutics* (Amherst: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1984), p. 73.
25. *Beitrag zur Philosophie*, p. 251.
26. Mou Tsung-san, *op. cit.*, p. 685.
27. *Beitrag zur Philosophie*, p. 379.
28. *Ibid.*
29. *Ibid.*, p. 380.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 387.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 384.
32. Heidegger, "Nachwort zu 'Was ist Metaphysik?'", in *Wegmarken*, p. 304.
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Beitrag zur Philosophie*, p. 250.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 250.
36. Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. by A. Hofstadter (New York: Harper, 1971), p. 61.

8.

Confucian Hsin and Its Twofold Functions: Psychological Aspects of Confucian Moral Philosophy, with an Excursus on Heidegger's Later Thought

Thaddeus T'ui-Chieh Hang

This paper intends to treat the twofold functions of "hsin" in Confucian Philosophy, dating from the ancient period of Mencius and Hsün Tzu, until the so-called Two Ch'eng Brothers of the Sung-Dynasty. In Chinese philosophy the Chinese word "hsin" (心) has always been taken to designate the active, leading function of thinking and deciding, but at the same time also signifying a rather passively inherited function, namely, the four inborn and properly human propensities, which were first proclaimed by Mencius (371-289 B.C.). But of these two distinct functions, Chinese culture and philosophy understood the passive role of "hsin" as more important and more essential, whereas Western culture and philosophy consistently retained the active function of thinking and deciding as the principal element. The present day may be characterized as what Heidegger called the "Europeanization of man and of the earth". Since the world needs the technology developed in these modern times by Western culture, it is understandable that peoples of East Asia also adopt a Western mode. The last part of this paper will discuss how Heidegger warns about this uncritical attitude. He sides with Chinese philosophy in underlining the importance of the passive role for essential human nature.

As a candidate for a doctorate in Philosophy, I was puzzled how C.G. Jung could make a psychological interpretation of such Chinese ancient books as the *I Ching*¹ or "The Secret of the Golden Flower",² an esoteric Taoistic writing. Since depth-psychology is not a Chinese invention, an interpretation of ancient Chinese texts in terms of depth-psychology seemed at least suspect, if not downright spurious.

Since that time I have rediscovered in Chinese philosophy the term "Hsin-shu"^c, which is no less amazing. Literally translated it means "heart technique". In a real sense it means something like "mind-technique", a little like today's behavioral technology. Of course, "hsin" does not designate only the physical heart. Most times it comprises all the "subjective" or psychic phenomena of thinking, feeling, controlling, deciding, having conscious or unconscious attitudes, etc. In this sense "hsin" means much the same as the term "Seele" for Wilhelm Wundt, namely, "the sum of psychic processes or phenomena".³ So "hsin-shu" actually means the way to regulate or influence all these psychic phenomena. If this concern was so lively two thousand years ago, then it is no wonder that C.G. Jung could find such marvelous psychological insights in ancient Chinese texts.

If this be so, we would expect a fully developed Chinese psychology today. But this is not the case, probably due to the excessively practical orientation and, consequently, the lack of purely scientific interest, as well as the lack of a differentiated psychological terminology. In fact, so far as psychology is concerned, throughout more than two millennia the most frequently used word is the term "hsin". Such a vague term necessarily posed limitations toward further elaborations. On the other hand, the undifferentiated use of the "hsin" perhaps has guarded the Chinese from what could be called psychological fragmentation and compartmentalization in the West. While the

Chinese experienced just one psyche which has diversified functions, a differentiated psychological terminology would tend to fragment and compartmentalize it. Behaviorism is a paradigm of this form of fragmentation which takes "hsin"'s subordinate function of external sensation as the only one what counts.

In order to proceed step by step, we must choose some key figures, who represent the psychological views of Confucianism regarding ethical problems, historically as well as substantially. These views were inspired but not developed by Confucius himself, but by his followers of later generations like Mencius, Hsün Tzu (314-238 B.C.) and the Ch'eng-Brothers (Ch'eng Hao^d and Ch'eng I^e, respectively 1032-1083 and 1033-1107). The reason we have chosen just these four thinkers above all others, resides in the fact that Mencius and Hsün Tzu were the first to elaborate key psychological concepts in treating moral problems, and these concepts have been used throughout two millennia. The Ch'eng-Brothers set the tone for Neo-Confucianism which has influenced Chinese thought ever since that time. All of this will become clearer as we consider each individual thinker.

Mencius

One of the Ch'eng-Brothers extolled Mencius as the one who best discussed the theme of "hsin-technique".⁴ Mencius was not only universally revered as "holy man", second only to Confucius, but was also the first one to treat "hsin" thematically. According to him, a fully actualized "hsin" would lead to realizing "hsing"^f, or properly human nature.⁵ As he was seriously concerned in keeping (ts'un)^g nature and fully actualizing (chin)^h "hsin", Mencius proved to be very interested in the "hsin-technique", though he never mentioned this term.

What precisely does "hsin" mean for Mencius? As noted above, "hsin" means literally the physical heart. But curiously enough, in the more than two hundred times Mencius used this term, he meant it only in the derived sense of subjectively experienceable phenomena. This had a very broad spectrum: from affection, attention, lower inclinations and knowledge, up to the highest human aspirations. Mencius' example is followed mostly by Chinese thinkers after him. Mencius especially used the term "hsin" to designate what he calls four innate and properly human aspirations: interhuman affection, righteousness, propriety and discernment of the right and the wrong.⁶ According to him, these four propensities belong to the "greater part" of the human being and are known only through the thinking function of "hsin". In comparison to them, all other sensitive or bodily propensities, such as those of good taste, beautiful color, pleasant sound and smell, body comfort, sexual desire and hunger, belong to the "lesser part" of human nature.⁷

Since Mencius sees proper "hsin" in these four propensities of the "greater part" which constitutes true human nature, he consequently does not hesitate to affirm the goodness of human nature.⁸ He said this, not because he was so unrealistic as to see only the good in real life, but because he judged evil to result from a lack in one's cultivation and from the subsequent loss of proper "hsin".⁹ In this strict sense the term "hsin" means exclusively the four noble and specifically human propensities. Mencius uses the term "hsin" mostly in this strict sense. Thus he invites one fully to actualize (chin), to keep (ts'un), to hold fast to (ts'ao)ⁱ, to nourish (yang)^j, to extend (ch'ung)^k, not to lose (shih).¹⁰ Since "hsin" in this strict sense truly constitutes human nature, to lose it means to be alienated from one's own humanness.¹¹

This point is extremely important in understanding the "Hsin-HsingLearning"ⁿ which was developed later during the Sung^o (960-1279) and Ming^p (1368-1644) Dynasties. This "Learning" aims at keeping or recovering the "hsin", what is truly human nature (the word "hsing" means

literally "nature" or "innate nature"). Judging from the later development one would not see any distinction between "hsin" and "hsing", because both designate what Mencius would call "the proper hsin" (pen-hsin)⁹ or "hsin" properly so-called. But originally there existed a subtle difference between these two terms: "hsin" designated originally every kind of subjectively experiencable phenomena, while "hsing" designated all human propensities, from hunger and sexual desire up to interhuman affection.

However, Mencius took seriously another function of the "hsin", namely its active and leading role in thinking, as he affirmed that "the hsin has the function of thinking and with thinking gets it"--a literal translation of these words of Mencius. What then does the hsin get through thinking? Since Mencius was answering Kung-tu-tzu's question as to how the same human being could develop the greater or the lesser part of his nature, his answer meant in fact that through thinking the hsin perceives the greater part of the four propensities as his true nature, and through this perceiving the hsin leads the human being into the right path of activities. Therefore, "hsin" plays a leading and active role. Of course, Mencius understood this thinking as intuitive rather than objective knowledge, since by exercising its function it knows automatically what belongs to the "greater part" or to the "lesser part" in human nature. There is obviously no need for discursive reasoning.¹² The latter kind of thinking is developed more by Hsün Tzu and, much later, by Chu Hsi.

Mencius insisted very much in his teaching upon how to keep "proper hsin" alive, namely, by engaging in the active and leading role of intuitive thinking, upon extending noble propensities from their original narrowness to ever wider spheres, and by having the fewest possible desires.¹³ He was then an "excellent teacher of hsin-techniques", as the Ch'eng-Brothers called him. By applying these "techniques" to our own "hsin", it too is invested necessarily with a certain passive character.

In this connection we can mention briefly the problem of "ch'i" in Mencius and later thinkers. According to Mencius, a human being achieves true greatness by actualizing his "greater part" and thereby obtains a "magnificent ch'i". The commentators of later times were much confused in identifying "pure ch'i" (ch'ing ch'i)⁸ as a source of cleverness and moral goodness, and "murky ch'i" (cho ch'i)⁹ as a source of foolishness and moral evilness. But this way of understanding takes "ch'i" in a purely material sense. Nothing in the text of Mencius suggests such a confusing interpretation. Mencius' "magnificent ch'i" is said to be the effect of an upright conscience of someone who knows he does what he has to do: "Without such a conscience one becomes timid and weak".¹⁶ Hence "ch'i" must be understood as the physiological effect of thinking and willing activities. In fact, Mencius makes a very fine and subtle observation of psycho-physical interrelatedness, when he says: "Whenever the will is unified it moves the "ch'i"; whenever the "ch'i" is unified it moves the will."¹⁷ His advice: "The will is the leader of the 'ch'i'; the latter is an enlivened state of the body. The will is dominant, the 'ch'i' is subordinate to it. Therefore I say: Firmly maintain the will, and do no violence to the 'ch'i'".¹⁸ That is very wise and tactful advice: Mencius maintains the harmonious middle way between the activity of knowing and willing, on the one hand, and the autonomous, unconscious state of the psychophysical system, on the other.

Hsün Tzu

Very often, Hsün Tzu is depicted as an antagonist of Mencius because he opposed one of the important teachings of Mencius, namely, the inborn goodness of human nature. Hsün Tzu affirmed its inborn wickedness.¹⁹ But the antagonism is more on the surface than in substance. As said

above, for Mencius, both the propensities of "greater and lesser parts" belong to human inborn nature, but only those of the "greater part", attainable only through thought, constitute specifically and truly human nature.²⁰ In Hsün Tzu's view, thought and knowledge acquire even greater momentum in moral life, but they are regarded as pertaining to human industry, not to inborn nature. As Hsün Tzu sees it, human nature is made up of cupidity and all sorts of lower, selfish desires, and consequently is wicked. Moral goodness comes forth only through human effort.²¹

In what, exactly, does this human effort consist? Here "hsin" has a definite role to play. Of course, the word "hsin" is used by Hsün Tzu very often--more than 150 times and in very different settings. Except in two cases, where it clearly designates the physical heart, Hsün Tzu's "hsin" includes the whole psychic sphere, as does Mencius'. But there is a difference: Hsün Tzu stresses above all the self-reflective acts of knowing, deciding and commanding of "hsin" in contrast to the body (hsing)^u. Specifically the "hsin" commands the body, its five external senses and the whole psychic sphere including the knowing, deciding and commanding functions themselves.²² "Hsin" knows Tao and decides accordingly what is right or what corresponds to Tao.²³ If something is put into practice after the consideration and decision of the "hsin", Hsün Tzu would call it "human doing".²⁴ "Hsin" and "human doing" (wei)^v are placed on one side; "human nature" is placed on the other. Hence, his most stringent advice: "When nature and human doing are united, the world is well governed".²⁵

In spite of Hsün Tzu's attack on Mencius, they agree substantially on the following issues. Both stress "hsin"'s thinking and deciding functions; both extol the role of education and human efforts in giving precedence to thinking and deciding functions of "hsin". The difference becomes manifest when Mencius regards the four propensities of the "greater part", which are attainable only through the thinking function of the "hsin", as belonging to true human nature, whereas Hsün Tzu regards them as the result of human doing. This difference is of minor practical importance, all the more as Tung Chung-shu^v (c. 179-104 B.C.), a leading Confucian of the West-Han Dynasty, found the following eclectic solution: Human nature (hsing) has good seed in itself, but cannot be called good, because it still needs education and cultivation, just as the seed of rice is not the fully developed rice plant.²⁶

It was most likely due to the influence of both Mencius and Hsün Tzu that the "Great Learning" (Ta-hsueh)^w has put great emphasis upon the investigation of things and upon knowledge in striving for a morally good life. But neither Mencius and the Great Learning nor any other Chinese thinker went so far as Hsün Tzu in extolling the discriminating, decision-making and commanding functions of "hsin": "It is master of body and mind; it commands and does not receive any command; it inhibits and commands oneself, deprives oneself and takes back, moves one forward and stops."²⁷ Hence his special "hsin-technique": not to try to do away with the natural desires (as with Lao Tzu), nor to try to diminish them (as with Mencius), but to cultivate the intellectual capacity of discriminating what is right and what is wrong, as well as to cultivate the capacity of deciding to do what is right in spite of many contrary desires.²⁸ According to Hsün Tzu, virtue consists in acquiring a strong habit, so that the "hsin" would not even consider (still less choose) anything wrong.²⁹

However, Hsün Tzu has a Taoistic influence also, although he strongly criticized Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, as I have tried to show elsewhere.³⁰ His "hsin-techniques" are also taoistically colored as he gives advice on "emptiness, oneness and stillness" (hsü-yi-erh-ching)^x in order to sharpen the right knowing and right deciding ability of "hsin".³¹ Without going into details it could be pointed out that, though using taoistic terms of emptiness and stillness, Hsün Tzu's "hsin-techniques" are essentially different, because he strongly opposes any idea of taking away or even

diminishing human desires. Even in advising techniques of "emptiness" and "stillness" he pursues always the aim of improving nature through human action. Such an aim is considered by Chuang Tzu as preposterous, because any such tentative measures would be doomed to "adulterate nature".³²

Aside from his metaphysical position, in which Hsün Tzu went far left with Taoism, his psychological insights represent a typically Chinese mind. He laid stress on the intellectual side of moral life without favoring intellectualism; he put strong emphasis on free decision-making without being voluntarist; he adopted taoistic views of letting nature go its own course without being fatalistic or passivist himself.

Ch'eng-Brothers and Later Developments

As Mencius and Hsün Tzu were the original thinkers in delineating the psychological factors of moral life, the above looked into their teachings in some details. After this period the Sung Dynasty was the most important in developing the "Neo-Confucian" School of which the Ch'eng-Brothers were key figures. It can be said without exaggeration that the Ch'eng-Brothers gave the tone and decisive directions to the "Hsin-Hsing-Learning", which was designed to provide appropriate theory and practical techniques of achieving moral perfection.

The teaching of Mencius and Hsün Tzu include the following basic features: 1. The manifold activities of "hsin" could be classified into two categories, of which the first plays an active, leading role of knowing, deliberating, deciding and commanding; the other one plays a passive role of being acted upon through "hsin-techniques". 2. While Mencius' knowing function of "hsin" has a more intuitive character, it is definitely intellectual in Hsün Tzu: it takes right knowledge as responsible for right deliberation, decision and action. 3. In spite of the widely spread opinion that Mencius and Hsün Tzu take human nature as good or evil, both Mencius and Hsün Tzu used the term "nature" in the meaning of "budding inclination". Such words as "shih-tuan"^{X1} or "ch'ing-hsing"^{X2} also point to this interpretation. Consequently, according to Mencius and Hsün-tzu, a human being has indeed God or evil inclinations, but he is morally good or evil only after his personal decision through the active and leading role of "hsin".

While the younger brother Ch'eng I accepted and developed more the doctrine of the intellectual function of "hsin", the older brother Ch'eng Hao explicitly followed Mencius regarding the intuitive knowledge of "hsin", stressing rather its passive role and playing down its intellectual objective side. Their different approaches gave rise to two different schools of "Hsin-Hsing-Learning": one of a more intellectually active direction (Chu Hsi, 1139-1200) and the other of a more intuitive-passive direction (Lu Hsiang-shan, 1139-93 and Wang Yang-ming, 1472-1529).

In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it must be said that both Ch'eng-Brothers and their followers gave prominent place to the passive side of "hsin" in developing manifold "hsin-techniques", probably due also to Buddhistic influences. Their copious dialogues with disciples similar to those of Catholic spiritual directors towards their disciples, went into the details of particular situations. In other words all Neo-Confucian masters were convinced that "hsin" is changeable and that their techniques could cure moral, even minor psychological disorders. In part this is the old tradition of Mencius and Hsün Tzu, but this tradition was reinforced through Taoism and Zen-Buddhism. In fact those NeoConfucian masters who stressed the intuitive and passive aspects of "hsin" were very much inspired by Taoism and Buddhism; so were Chang Tsai^y (1020-77) and Ch'eng Hao³³. But other Neo-Confucian Masters were also influenced by Taoism and

Buddhism³⁴. Even Ch'eng I, who seemed to be more appreciative of intellectual-objective knowledge, was found to be sitting with closed eyes³⁵. This practice was at least similar to the quiet sitting of Zen-Buddhism, and the Taoistic "sitting and forgetting" (tsuo-wang)^z.

There is an essential difference, however, because Ch'eng I's technique of "dwelling in reverence" (chü ching)^{aa} aims to make our mind "empty and silent" not through a real void in consciousness, but through the dominance of a unique thing (chu-i)^{ab}, so that our mind becomes dominated and filled by "heavenly order".³⁶ Emptiness and silence of mind mean rather silence of things rather than "heavenly order"; they come about as a result of dwelling in reverence, not vice versa. As in the case of Hsün Tzu, Ch'eng I adopted somewhat Taoistic techniques and terminology while changing their spiritual content. Hsun Tzu espoused Taoistic terminology while actually emptying himself from preconceived knowledge and concentrating himself upon a unique knowledge³⁷. Ch'eng I did the same.

A definitely anti-intellectual flavor is to be found in Ch'eng Hao. Since he was concerned only with acquiring moral perfection, which was believed to be achievable only through virtuous action, the noetic aspect seemed to him of negligible importance. Ch'eng Hao still gave lip-service to "ke-wu"^{ac}, i.e., to reach or to research things, but in reality his searching for knowledge is hardly distinguishable from virtuous action itself³⁸. His spiritual successors, Lu Hsiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming, spoke no differently: Lu's only concern is to preserve the goodness of "hsing" in avoiding desires; his search for knowledge is practically the same thing as "awareness of the good" (i.e., moral consciousness).³⁹ Wang Yang-ming's "ke-wu" is limited to research regarding a moral "hsing" in rectifying wrong⁴⁰. In their view objective knowledge has nothing to do with moral life. There is a definite anti-intellectual flavor, as Prof. Yu Ying-shih has pointed out⁴¹. This moral anti-intellectualism is in part rooted in the intuitive understanding of "hsing" of Mencius and in part due to Taoistic and Buddhistic influences.

However, in the Neo-Confucian tradition this passive intuitive attitude is tempered by the emphasis on intellectual knowledge from Ch'eng I, Chu Hsi and the scholars of the Ch'ing-Dynasty. For Ch'eng I the "searching and reaching for things" accompanies human and moral domains; it includes also a search on rational grounds of every knowable thing, not excluding the rational grounds of fire and water⁴². Of course Ch'eng I separated "knowledge of hearing and seeing" from "knowledge of virtue"^{ad}. The latter is also called "profound knowledge" which would be dubbed "subjective truth" by Kierkegaard, namely, that which is inspired by a "passion of the infinite" and is effectively conducive to action⁴³. In view of this distinction, the "knowledge of hearing and seeing" must be considered something superficial, like somebody generally knowing the fierceness of a tiger, but having never confronted or been bitten by a real one. Someone pursued by a tiger could be said to have a profound knowledge of it⁴⁴. If Ch'eng I affirms that the knowledge of virtue does not result from hearing and seeing⁴⁵, this is because something more is involved here than pure hearing or seeing. Certainly he did not repudiate the value of intellectual knowledge. Quite the contrary, he reproves such a repudiation as Taoistic or Buddhistic excess⁴⁶. For him a genuine and objective search after knowledge, whether it belongs to virtue or not, is always worthwhile⁴⁷. Chu Hsi, Ch'eng I's spiritual heir, accentuates still further intellectual knowledge in moral life: for him a clear thinking and intellectual knowledge is a *conditio sine qua non* of right action: hence he criticizes Lu Hsiang-shan's reliance on a pure intuition of "hsing" as responsible for "reckless action" (hu-tso)^{ae} though he stresses also "real insight" (shih-li)^{af} in applying general moral principles to each case⁴⁸.

The Present Relevance of Confucian Psychological Insights

The Actual Significance of Confucian "Hsin"

Today the traditional Confucian insights about human "hsin" or psyche are invested with very real significance. The Confucian "hsing", which is experienced both as passive-intuitive and active-intellectual, occupies the middle road between the utterly passive role assigned to it by Taoists and their followers, on the one hand, and the purely active role assigned to it by traditional Western psychology and philosophy, on the other.

As mentioned above, Taoists are concerned above all to keep nature "unadulterated": therefore they detest any human endeavor to "improve" nature⁴⁹. But despite Chuang Tzu's⁵⁰ indignation about the term "hsin-technique", he developed his own "hsin-techniques" like "hsin-fasting"^{ag} (empty-mindedness) and "sitting and forgetting" (striving to achieve an unconscious state) in order to reach primordial nature⁵¹. Today such techniques with their underlying philosophy encounter great favor in the Western world in reaction to too much activism and against an ever growing technocracy. Psychoanalysis and Zen-Buddhism both have contributed to this same trend.

There is another overactive current which, paradoxically, extols an almost completely passive character of the human psyche, or, as they prefer to call it, of human behavior. According to behaviorists, human behavior (since words like "psyche" or "hsin" are banished by them as "meaningless") is completely dependent on, and manageable through "behavioral engineering"⁵².

This was a reaction against former over-confidence, when the human intellect and free will were considered almost almighty in their active and leading role toward moral decision and action. In fact, traditional Western psychology and philosophy either exalted the leading role of intellect and free will altogether, or singled out the intellect or free will as exclusive or dominant factors and favored different grades of intellectualism or voluntarism. Such disputes go back to remote antiquity. The most famous example of intellectualism is to be found in Socrates and Plato, for whom the morally evil act is but an intellectual error or ignorance⁵³. We must acknowledge in this connection that Aristotle was neither an intellectualist nor a voluntarist: at the beginning one becomes immoral (for instance in cases of injustice or intemperance) knowingly and voluntarily, but once becoming so, it is impossible for him to be otherwise⁵⁴. In the Middle Ages Thomists favored a rather mild form of intellectualism while the Augustinians preferred a temperate voluntarism, but both recognized the altogether leading role of the intellect and free will. Relatively recent examples of extreme forms of voluntarism are plentiful, from Schopenhauer and Nietzsche to Heidegger and Sartre. Such forms of voluntarism are prone to anti-intellectualism in extolling the dominant role of will or of the "existential project".

The Confucian concept of "hsin" encompasses both the intuitivepassive and active-leading characters of subjective experience, which constitute the unity of contrasting and complementary *Yin* and *yang* components⁵⁵. We will now see how the Confucian concept of "hsin", enhanced by the experiences and theories of other cultures, may provide a yet more comprehensive and more adequate direction for a future ethical theory.

The Need of Enhancement from Other Cultures

Moral Anti-intellectualism and Its Remedy. If even for Western psychology and philosophy, the Confucian concept of "hsin" gives the right direction for the future, nonetheless it needs enhancement from other cultures.

Mencius showed that the "greater part" in human life should play the leading role and that through the intuitive thinking of "hsin" the four noble propensities (inter-human affection, righteousness, propriety and discernment of the right and the wrong) are known. The intuitive approach of Mencius was predominant through two millenniums. The supervenient influences of Taoism, Zen-Buddhism and parts of Neo-Confucianism strengthened the conviction that in moral life intuitive knowledge prevails and that there is no room at all for objective rational knowledge.

Within this historical context it is understandable that moral antiintellectualism has a certain prevalence among Chinese. Even today when the rational way of thinking dominates the scene in every other domain, there still prevails among Chinese the conviction that in moral education no rationally founded philosophical knowledge is needed. This moral anti-intellectualism has grave consequences. Of course, though a detached moral knowledge or conviction does not necessarily lead us to action, nevertheless there exists a connection between knowledge and practice, especially where moral life is involved. If, for instance, we maintain that the human being is nothing more than animal or just an instrument for economic development, such initially detached thinking will inevitably affect one's action.

Chinese history teaches a very good lesson in the religious sphere. During the period of Warring States, Confucians did not believe in the real existence of spirits, but nevertheless complied with sacrificial rites just as a farce (wen)⁵⁸ in order to attain political goals⁵⁶. Hence, their religious spirit slowly vanished. The traditional religion, which was still followed faithfully by Confucius and Mencius, very soon lost its significance and was inexorably supplanted by an imported religion, Buddhism. Moreover, a serious blow had been dealt Confucian virtue of sincerity (ch'eng)⁵⁹, which according to the "Great Learning", consisted in conformity between knowing and willing: "(The Ancients) wishing to be sincere in their will, they first tried to get knowledge". Confucius was sincere as he revered spirits, because he believed deeply in their existence⁵⁷; certainly he was not performing a farce as some today prefer to misinterpret the following text: "He did sacrifice to the spirits, as if the spirits were present"⁵⁸. Confucius' willing was definitely according to his knowledge and conviction. Mo Tzu (479-438 B.C.) gave the Confucians of his time good advice: either go to sacrifice with sincere belief or do not comply with things in which they do not believe⁵⁹. Unhappily they did not take this alternative seriously and preferred a cheap compromise as a solution. They put up with insincerity in their worship and slowly a typical formalistic attitude set in which persists to this day⁶⁰.

The anti-intellectualistic trend is probably also the reason why in some forms of moral education no heed is paid to moral philosophy. The comic-tragedy lies in the fact that in neglecting the role of moral philosophy, a hedonistic moral philosophy is given practical preference. It is this philosophy which is inculcated through the modern novel, cinema, etc. Even within the circle of educational policy-makers, many still believe that moral education consists mostly in inculcating socially acceptable etiquettes. Hun Tzu's warning that "one who does not know the Tao⁶¹ would not approve and choose it, but instead approves and chooses what is contrary to the Tao",⁶¹ is largely ignored.

According to Chung-yung, a treatise widely attributed to Tzu Ssu, Mencius's teacher, human nature finds its metaphysical foundation in "the mandate of Heaven"⁶². For Hsün Tzu the Tao must

have its foundation in itself. But all these problems are beyond the reach of a purely psychological concept of "hsin"; they must be anchored in a solid metaphysics and epistemology. It is regrettable that today epistemology tends to be dominated by skepticism and scientism. Such self-destructive epistemology has its followers also among present day Chinese philosophers. Evidently, with such an epistemology one cannot find the rational foundation for a solid metaphysics or ethics. Here the Chinese philosophy of today must exercise discernment in order to see what is gold and what is trash in modern currents of thought.

Cultivation of Moral Judgement and Decision. Though Hsün Tzu defined magnificently the knowing and decision-making functions of "hsin" and their essential role in moral life⁶³, he was never taken seriously by the Chinese much to their disadvantage. No wonder that Taoistic passivity and anti-intellectualism became more and more the general trait also among Confucians who seemed inclined to rely very much on such "hsintechiques" as sitting quietly, being empty-minded and so on. There is no awareness that "hsin-technique" presupposes necessarily "hsin-leadership", because to employ "hsin-technique" is already a form of leadership: there must be somebody who, through the cognitive and deciding functions of "hsin" takes the lead in employing "hsin-technique". The crucial point remains, whether each individual through his or her own knowledge and decision takes leadership of him or herself or whether somebody else manages to manipulate him or her through the media, social pressures or other "behavioral technologies". The latter predicament is common in many totalitarian or less developed societies. But it is imperative for free and more developed societies that everyone takes his or her own leadership through appropriate judgment and decision. This means that we should cultivate "hsin-leadership" by better rendering its knowing, deliberating and deciding functions.

Both Mencius and Hsün Tzu would agree with this point; doing so renders "hsin-techniques" not useless but all the more urgent. As noted above, Aristotle admits that whenever somebody becomes immoral, in that condition it is not possible for him to be otherwise. If such an individual takes his own leadership seriously and wants to recover his moral integrity, he must use "hsin-techniques" in order to transform himself gradually. Pascal said appropriately in this connection, that we are automata as much as spirits⁶⁴. Therefore Mencius advises us to "maintain firm the will and not do violence to 'ch'i'.⁶⁵ If we understand "ch'i" as a psychophysical state, or perhaps also as our unconscious part, then it is obvious why "ch'i" is not subject to management by command and why some "hsin-techniques" are necessary here.

But even in terms of "hsin-techniques", Hsün Tzu developed a very practical method in order to sharpen our moral judgment and to acquire the habitual power to choose only what is in agreement with our right judgment, so that the "hsin" would not even consider what is not right⁶⁶. Ch'eng I's method of "chü-ching" is much along the same line. It consists essentially of filling the "hsin" with "right attitudes inside" so that there would be no room for evilness⁶⁷. Hsün Tzu's advice to cultivate right judgment is followed also by Chu Hsi,⁶⁸ though no mention is made of Hsün Tzu.

Our generation should not be afraid of old experiences if they are verified as regards their efficiency in China, as well as in the West. Such constant exercises of moral judgment and choice would very much enhance the power to do what is morally right, provided that the active role of judgment and free choice are not excessively inflated, as occasionally was the case in the West. But within its limits and right proportion, the active and leading function of "hsin", in its intellectual knowing as well as in its free deciding, must be given a prominent place in moral education.

Personal Dignity. A final important value could be improved upon through judicious comparison with the Western tradition, which consistently gives high priority to personal dignity. Already Boethius (480-525) defined the person as "naturae rationalis individua substantia". Aquinas asserted without hesitation that "Persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura"⁶⁹. The person, consequently, is considered of absolute value because of his or her freedom and moral responsibility⁷⁰. In China it was Mencius who saw the close connection between moral action and personal dignity: he regarded moral qualities as "Heaven's nobility" in opposition to "nobility by man"⁷¹. Though the "Great Learning" stresses the "cultivation of the person" (hsiu-shen)⁷² as an essential precondition to the fulfillment of social duties, Mencius further delineates where true human greatness and dignity lie, namely, in absolute faithfulness to his true nature and to moral duty. Here the two great traditions, Chinese and Western, really go hand in hand. In a world torn by growing violence and contempt for the human person this seems the right message today.

Active and Passive Characteristics of Hsin and Insights from Heidegger's Later Thought on Appropriation

As mentioned above, the Confucian concept of "hsin" has this peculiarity, that it encompasses both the intuitive-passive and active-leading characters of psychic, subjective experience, which constitute the unity of contrasting and complementary yin and yang components. Though the concept of hsin is factually biased toward the intuitive-passive side and therefore needs enhancement from other cultures, nevertheless it constitutes a very valuable contribution to a Western type of rationality and to the world at large, which undeniably is dominated today by Western culture.

Such was Heidegger's concern in his dialogue, *On the Way to Language*, with a Japanese interlocutor (1953-54). This dialogue is so suggestive that I think it appropriate to reproduce some lines:⁷²

J (Japanese): . . . The temptation is great to rely on European ways of representation and their concepts.

I (Inquirer = Heidegger): That temptation is reinforced by a process which I would call the complete Europeanization of the earth and of man.

J: Many people consider this process the triumphal march of reason. At the end of the eighteenth century, in the French Revolution, was not reason proclaimed a goddess?

I: Indeed. The idolization of that divinity is in fact carried so far that any thinking which rejects the claim of reason as not originary simply has to be maligned today as unreason.

J: The incontestable dominance of your European reason is thought to be confirmed by the success of that rationality which technical advances set before us at every turn.

I: This delusion is growing, so that we are no longer able to see how the Europeanization of man and of the earth attacks at the source everything that is of essential nature. It seems that these sources are to dry up.

Now, what is this "everything that is of essential nature" (*alles Wesenhafte*)? It would be ridiculous to identify it with any concept of East Asian philosophy. It is a fact, however, that Heidegger dreamed of that day in which "European-Western saying and East Asian saying will enter into dialogue such that in it there sings something that wells up from a single source"⁷³. From

the constant concern of Heidegger (both in his *Being and Time*, 1927, and in his *Time and Being*, 1969) I think I can conclude rightly, that authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) in the early phase of Heideggerian thinking and "appropriation" (*Ereignis*) in his later thinking belong to his "essential" core. I shall try to show that the above mentioned "hsin" also belongs to this "essential" core.

In order to clarify what Heidegger is really about, may I cite here some criticisms levelled at him by Jürgen Habermas. He qualifies Heidegger's early thinking of *Being and Time* as "the decisionism of empty resoluteness", and "a process out of subjectivity of a will to self-affirmation", while the later Heidegger's thought is characterized by a "self-surrender to the destiny of Being". At this later phase of Heideggerian thought, "the temporality of Dasein is now only the cornice of a self-temporalizing dispensation of Being".⁷⁴

While putting other things in "epoché", I want to concentrate on what Habermas calls the "self-temporalizing dispensation of Being" of Later Heidegger. It is supposedly "considered to be the absolutely unmediated, just as it had been for metaphysics".⁷⁵ It seems that this assertion comes from a misunderstanding, namely, due to the striking similarity between Heidegger and Hegel some conclude that they are the same. Though admitting a similarity, Heidegger denied categorically the sameness of their positions, and rightly so.⁷⁶ Habermas shared the very common attitude of logical rationality, which constitutes the source of such misunderstanding, while Heidegger presupposes "the experience of the matter itself"⁷⁷ as an indispensable precondition for understanding his lecture on *Time and Being*, and indeed his whole thought. From this completely different starting point Habermas' whole endeavor is doomed, for it misses the point.

It is true that the Later Heidegger often employs impersonal or seemingly redundant expressions, like: "It gives Being" (*Es gibt Sein*), or "Appropriation appropriates" (*Ereignis ereignet*), but he tries also to explain them. Being and time are for him not beings; together they belong to appropriation by standing within four-dimensional true time.⁷⁸ At the end of the fifth session of the seminar on "Time and Being" a letter from Heidegger was read which was published as the preface to Richardson's book *Heidegger: From Phenomenology to Thought*.⁷⁹ This preface points out among other things the continuity of Early and Later Heidegger: "Only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II."⁸⁰ So you cannot understand the Later Heidegger without the concept of time, which is a little different in "Time and Being", but is in essential continuity with the earlier *Being and Time*. To think "the true time" without a Dasein or a man behind it is utterly nonsensical. Habermas' assertion about "a self-temporalizing dispensation of Being" or about a sort of blind destiny of an impersonal Being misses the point. As is known, Heidegger repeatedly states that Being is always in relation with human beings.

How can we understand properly such expressions of Heidegger as the following: "Appropriating has the peculiar property of bringing man into his own as the being who perceives Being by standing within true time. Thus Appropriated, man belongs to Appropriation," or "Being itself already names Appropriation."⁸¹ In my opinion the meaning is very simple: Being is not any single being, but is a process of human being toward the authentic (appropriate, *ereignete: ereignen*) openness (*Erschlossenheit*). This happens only through true temporality, namely through an authentic resoluteness, not through any logical thinking.

With this interpretation of Heidegger, the relation of his thought with the "hsin" of Mencius is obvious. As I have mentioned above, Mencius' hsin as essential human nature plays principally a passive role, whereas as a thinking function it has also an active-leading role to play. So while "Dasein" in the earlier Heidegger's thought, namely in *Being and Time*, plays more the active role of resolute decisiveness, "Being" and "Appropriation" play rather a passive role of being open to

the essential unity of the four (*Geviert*): earth, heaven, mortal human beings and Divinities. Heidegger calls such openness "dwelling" (*wohnen*), the lack of which constitutes alienation, real housing shortages and homelessness.⁸²

Moreover, in this openness and relation to Being resides true human nature; and the poets themselves reach into the abyss and find the way to their own nature.⁸³ The "Excess of frantic measuring and calculating" of modern life makes us "dwell unpoetically", namely this maddening pace makes us incapable of what is appropriate for a human being⁸⁴. So it is that we cannot think what is most worth thinking about, and we are blind to the "measure for all measuring", which is the godhead itself.⁸⁵ Heidegger went so far as to say, with Hölderlin, that kindness is that by which a human being can measure himself with the godhead:

As long as this arrival of kindness endures, so long does man succeed in measuring himself not unhappily against the godhead. When this measuring appropriately comes into the light (*Ereignet sich dieses Messen*), man creates poetry from the very nature of the poetic. When the poetic appropriately comes to light (*Ereignet sich das Dichterische*), then man dwells humanly on this earth".⁸⁶

It seems from these sayings of Heidegger that he is very near Mencius, as he affirms that kindness puts the human being in a situation of measuring himself with the godhead. Heidegger's sayings seem to be the modern version of the old sayings of Mencius: "He who has fulfilled his *hsin* (i.e., four good propensities), knows his nature. Knowing his nature, he knows Heaven (i.e., Divinities)".^{7A1} Another of Mencius' sayings makes Heidegger sound even more like Mencius: "Jen is the high dignity appreciated by Heaven and the peaceful dwelling for human beings".^{2A2}

Here another question is worthy of note. Just now I have identified Mencius' "Heaven" as Divinities. My conviction is founded in Mencius' explicit statement: "The emperor can present a man to Heaven, but he cannot make Heaven give that man the empire." In this context Mencius mentioned the legendary ancient emperors Yao and Shüen: "He (i.e., Yao) caused him (i.e., Shüen) to preside over the sacrifices, and the hundred Divinities were satisfied with them; thus Heaven accepted him."^{2A2} Later on, at least since Hsün Tzu, many Chinese philosophers spoke just about Heaven, Earth and Human Beings, taking Heaven and Earth as the whole Universum. It is interesting, that the later Heidegger so forcefully underlined his Fourfold (*das Geviert*): Heaven, Earth, Mortals and Divinities. In his opinion human cultivation and construction of things are appropriate only through "presencing" the Fourfold into things.⁸⁷ In other words things should be a manifestation of, and in correspondence with, the Fourfold. I am not sure whether Heidegger was aware of what Chinese philosophy says regarding Heaven, Earth and Human Beings, but in any case the comparison is interesting.

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Notes

1. *I Ching* or *Book of Changes*, the Richard Wilhelm translation rendered into English by Cary F. Barnes with foreword by C.G. Jung (New York: Pantheon Books, 1950).

2. *The Secret of the Golden Flower*, translated and explained by Richard Wilhelm with a European Commentary by C.G. Jung, translated into English by Cary F. Barnes (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1950).
3. George Anschütz, *Psychologie: Grundlagen, Ergebnisse und Probleme der Forschung* (Hamburg: Richard Meiner, 1953), S. 486.
4. Chu Hsi (ed.), *Opera Omnia of Ch'eng-Brothers*^{am} (Taipei, 1979), 2-19b.
5. Mencius, 7A1.
6. Mencius, 2A6, 6A6.
7. Mencius, 6A14-15, 7B24.
8. Mencius, 6A10, 2A6, 6A6, 7A21.
9. Mencius, 6A8.
10. Mencius, 7A1, 7A18, 7B35, 6A11.
11. Mencius, 2A6.
12. Mencius, 6A15.
13. Mencius, 7B31, 35.
14. Mencius, 6A14-15, 2A2.
15. *Opera Omnia of Ch'eng-Brothers*, 19-32b, 23-2ab, 19-77b.
16. Mencius, 2A2.
17. Mencius, 2A2.
18. Mencius, 2A2.
19. Hsün Tzu, Book 23.
20. Mencius, 6A15, 7B24.
21. A *Concordance to Hsün Tzu* (Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement No. 22, Taipei, 1966), 23/5.
22. *Opus citatum*, 5/3
- 22a. *Op. cit.*, 17/12, 21/44-46, 22/60-62
23. *Op. cit.*, 21/32
24. *Op. cit.*, 22/4; please note the similarity between "human being" and "actus humanus" (*Summa Theologiae Ia-IIae*, Qu. I, art. 1).
25. *Op. cit.*, 19/77.
26. Tung Chung-shu, *Luxuriant Gems of the Spring and Autumn Annals* an (Taipei, 1974). Chapters 35 and 36, especially pp. 207-208, 217-218.
27. A *Concordance to Hsün Tzu*, 21/44-45.
28. *Op. cit.*, 22/60-62, 69-70.
29. *Op. cit.*, 1/47-50.
30. Thaddeus T'ui-chieh Hang, "Hsün Tzu, His Key-position in the History of Chinese Philosophy and His Contribution Today" (in Chinese), *Universitas Monthly*, IX (1982), 794-796.
31. A *Concordance to Hsün Tzu*, 21/34-41.
32. A *Concordance to Chuang Tzu* (Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement No. 20, Taipei, 1966), 10/39-40, 16/5.
33. Huang Tsung-hsi (ed.), *Philosophers of Sung and Yuan Dynasties*^{ao} (Taipei, 1975), 5/5, 6/2.
34. Hsiung Yuan, *Study on Neo-Confucianism and Buddhism of Sung-Dynasty* (in Chinese), (Taipei: Wen-ching Press, 1985), chapters 2 and 3.
35. *Philosophers of Sung and Yuan Dynasties*, 5/50.
36. *Opera Omnia of Ch'eng-Brothers*, 16-9a, 19b.

37. *A Concordance to Tsun Tzu*, 21/36-38.
38. *Opera Omnia of Ch'eng-Brothers*, 12-8a, 15a, 20a.
39. *Opera Omnia of Lu Hsiang-shan* (Taipei: World Book Co., 1959), pp. 240-242, 245.
40. *Opera Omnia of Wang Yang-ming* (Taipei: Cheng-chung Book Co., 1955), pp. 5, 21, 63.
41. Yu Ying-shih, *Historical Science and Tradition* (in Chinese), (Taipei: Shih-pao Press, 1982), p. 111.
42. *Opera Omnia of Ch'eng-Brothers*, 19-9b, 20-la.
43. Robert Bretall, ed., *A Kierkegaard Anthology* (New York: The Modern Library, 1946), pp. 212-213.
44. *Opera Omnia of Ch'eng-Brothers*, 19-9a.
45. *Op. cit.*, 28-3a.
46. *Op. cit.*, 16-35b.
47. *Op. cit.*, 20-la.
48. Li Ch'ing-teh (ed.), *Classified Speeches of Chu Hsi*^{ap} (Taipei, 1979), Book 18, pp. 630, 642, etc.
49. *A Concordance to Chuang Tzu*, 10/39-40, 16/5, 22/8.
50. *Op. cit.*, 13/26.
51. *Op. cit.*, 13/26, 4/26-28, 6/92-93.
52. B.F. Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971).
53. *Meno*, 77e; *Protagoras*, 345b.
54. *Nichomachean Ethics*, 1114^a 12-22.
55. T. T'u-chieh Hang, "Unity of Yin and Yang, A Philosophical Assessment", a paper delivered at the "International Conference of Philosophy on Harmony/Strife," Hongkong, March 10-16, 1985. Cf. Jolan Jacobi, *Die Psychologie von C.G. Jung* (Zürich: Rascher Verlag, 1940), s. 39-40.
56. *A Concordance to Hsün Tzu*, 17/38-40, 19/122.
57. *Confucian Analects*, 2/24, 6/6, 8/21.
58. *Op. cit.*, 3/12.
59. *A Concordance to Mo Tzu* (Harvard-Yenching Institute Sinological Index Series, Supplement No. 21, San Francisco: Chinese Materials Center, 1974), 48/41-42.
60. In spite of many official injunctions most Chinese of today go to funeral rites with not much inner participation. They find a special difficulty to remain reverently silent during funeral rites, while for a Chinese religious believer a reverent silence before a defunct person is congenial, because he believes sincerely that a dead person is just passing from this to another world.
61. *A Concordance to Hsün Tzu*, 21/30.
62. Th. T'u-chieh Hang, "Vom himmlischen Mandat sum FatumAspekte der chinesischen Religiosität", a paper delivered at the "Wittgenstein-Symposium", Kirchberg/Wechsel, Austria, August, 1983.
63. *A Concordance to Hsün Tzu*, 21/30, 46, 22/60-61.
64. Pascal, *Pensées* (Paris: Garnier, 1951), n. 252.
65. Mencius, 2A2.
66. *A Concordance to Hsün Tzu*, 1/48.
67. *Opera Omnia of Ch'eng-Brothers*, 16-35b, 16-36a.
68. *Classified Speeches of Chu Hsi*, pp. 627, 629, 641.
69. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I, 29, art. 3. c. (Torino: Marietti, 1940), p. 207.

70. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der praktischen Vernunft* (Stuttgart: Philipp Reklam Jun., 1961), S. 120, 233, 252.
71. Mencius, 6A16.
72. Martin Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, translated by Peter D. Hertz (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982), pp. 15-16.
73. *Op. cit.*, p. 8.
74. Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, trans. by Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1987), pp. 141, 151-153.
75. *Op. cit.*, p. 153.
76. M. Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, trans. by Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 48.
77. *Op. cit.*, p. 51.
78. *Op. cit.*, pp. 19, 23.
79. *Op. cit.*, p. 51.
80. M. Heidegger, Preface to W.J. Richardson's, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. xxii.
81. M. Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, pp. 23, 43.
82. M. Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. and introduction by Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 146, 149-151, 161.
83. *Op. cit.*, pp. 93, 115.
84. M. Heidegger, *Vortraege und Aufsaetze*, Teil II (Pfullingen: Verlag Neske, 1967), S.77. There Heidegger says: "Das Dichten ist das Grundvermöegen des menschlichen Wohnens. Aber der Mensch vermag das Dichten jeweils nur nach dem Masse, wie sein Wesen dem vereignet ist, was zelber den Menschen mag und darum sein Wesen braucht.
85. M. Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, pp. 224-225.
86. *Op. cit.*, p. 229.
87. *Op. cit.*, p. 151.

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9. **Structure, Meaning and Critique**

Vincent Shen

In studying human and social phenomena, three concepts are essential for the understanding of human action: the structure in which it happens, the meaning of the action in question and the critique of its subconscious determining forces. In contemporary philosophy, the structuralist approach emphasizes the structural dimension of society; the phenomenological approach cherishes the meaningful dimension of human action; whereas the critical school endeavors to reveal the subconscious forces distorting the production of meaning. These concepts are not exclusive one of another, for none of them is capable separately of explaining the complexity of social phenomenon. On the contrary, they constitute an integral three level analysis concerning man and society.

Structure, Structuralism and Contrast

The concept of structure is understood as the intelligible relationship between the constitutive elements of an object. With the appearance of Ferdinand de Saussure's *Cours de linguistique générale*, a shift in the paradigm of scientific explanation took place from causal to structural explanation. Before this, "explanation" was viewed by W. Dilthey as a kind of epistemological operation active in natural sciences which had to establish a permanent causal relationship between natural phenomena in order to explain them. This notion of causal explanation had extended its influence even to the domain of human and social sciences. But the paradigm shift effected by structuralist semiology indicates that there is explanatory power in the intelligible structure between the composite elements of the phenomenon or object in question. Structural explanation provides the human and social sciences with a distinctive new scientific mode. There is no need to appeal to natural sciences for a paradigm of explanation.

Since then, structuralism has been used not only as a strategy of explaining texts, but also as a framework for looking at society and culture. Elementary structures constituted by opposing elements are taken as the only intelligible logos determining particular societies and cultures in the history of mankind. Consequently, any type of social organization or social action is to be treated as merely a determinate mode of combining possibilities permitted by the elementary structure. For example, a certain version of myth is seen as one of the possible ways of resolving contradictions displayed by the oppositions constituting the myth in question.

Now, one of the major difficulties of structuralism is that it recognizes only structures constituted of oppositions.¹ For example, C. Levi-Strauss' structural analysis of the myth of Oedipus ascribes the mythèmes into four columns: in the first column, the overestimated kinship (Oedipus marries his mother, Antigone buries Polyneices); in the second, under-estimated kinship (Oedipus kills his father, Eteocles kills Polyneices); in the third, human autonomy denying man's rooting on earth (Cadamos kills the dragon, Oedipus slays the Sphinx); in the fourth, Man rooted on earth like plants (Oedipus' foot swells). In the combination of these oppositional relations, there appears the mathematical proportion: 1:2 = 3:4, and this mathematical proportionality is the structural principle of the myth in question.² Another example is A.J. Greimas' schematization of Propp's morphology of folk tale into a logic of narrative determined by the model of

transformational linguistics, which in fact remains a structure of oppositions such as: interdiction versus violation, fraud versus complicity, confrontation versus success . . . etc.³

But structure is not limited to oppositional elements. In addition to these, there might be complementary structures, hierarchical structures, structure in serial order, etc., the complexity of which is not to be discussed in the limited space of this paper. But we do have to discuss the fundamental presuppositions of the structurist vision of human reality.

The first presupposition is the priority of structure over agent. The meaning of human action is determined by the combination of structural elements, not by the subjective intention of the agent in action.⁴ As it is the speech which speaks, it is the communication which communicates. The actor and his subjective meaning have no importance and are treated as illusions. The author is either dead or seen as mere signature. There is nothing meaningful except the structure determining action and history.

The second presupposition is the priority of synchronicity over diachronicity.⁵ The structure itself is systematic and atemporal, Any succession in time or temporal development is intelligible only when seen through the glass of elementary structure. Any new action or novelty in action is but another way of combining possibilities permitted by the structure. The third presupposition of structuralism is the principle of unconsciousness. The agent of action suffers from the overwhelming determination of an anonymous structure without knowing it consciously. Individual and society cannot produce with conscious effort any meaningful work, since meaning itself is determined by structure in an unconscious way. In this sense, structuralism has always carried with it an anti-humanistic overtone.

Structure is necessary for manifesting objects as intelligible just as it is in need of a more comprehensive reconstruction. Chinese philosophy in general has a contrastive vision of structure which emphasizes the dialectical interplay between opposition and complementarity, unity and difference, continuity and discontinuity. For example, the *Book of Changes* says: "The rhythmic interplay of Ying () and Yang () constitutes what we called the Way (Tao)." Lao Tzu teaches something similar to this: " All things carry the Ying and embrace the Yang, and through their blending interplay they achieve harmony."⁶ The traditional presentation of Tai Chi () can give us a concrete image of contrastive structure.

Analysis shows that this image of contrastive structure contains the following characteristics:

1. *Bipolarity*: Just as the relation between Ying and Yang as shown in the figure I, a structure is constituted of sets of opposing elements, for example, male and female, mind and body, etc.

2. *Complementarity*: Ying and Yang, though opposing one another, are complementary in forming one unity, even achieving what Lao Tzu called "harmony". They form a Concordia Oppitorum, in which bipolar oppositions are united to an organic whole.

3. *Open Totality*: Ying and Yang, as complementary opposing elements, constitute as they do a moving totality. The whole is always there to render intelligible any constitutive part. As moving and becoming, the whole is an open whole, not a closed one.

Figure I represents only what we call "structural contrast". But, taking into consideration the last point concerning open totality, we have to put it into movement on the axis of time and thereby we have the image of "dynamic contrast" in Figure II:

AXIS OF TIME

Structural contrast means that in any moment of analysis, the human phenomenon is constituted of elements in interaction, apparently opposing, but structurally complementing, one another. It is synchronic in the sense that these elements appear simultaneously to form a systematic whole. As opposing, each enjoys a certain degree of autonomy; as complementary, they are mutually interdependent.

Dynamic contrast means that, on the axis of time, the human (social) phenomenon is in a process of becoming through the interplay between the precedent and the consequent moments. It is diachronic in the sense that the movement of interplay on the axis of time constitutes a history, not in a discontinuous succession but in a contrasting development. As discontinuous, novel elements have their own originality which can never be reduced to any precedent element. As continuous, they always retain something from the precedent element as residue or sedimentation of experience in the process of time.

The mediation between structural contrast and dynamic contrast is human subjectivity and intersubjectivity. In the initial state and final interpretation of each structure, there is always the function of an actor or a group of actors. In this sense we differ from the structuralists who take structure as anonymous and determining human action without the actor's awareness of it. On the contrary, a structure is the outcome of an act of structuration by an actor or a group of actors in the process of time. Under the priority of actor, the process of history could also be analyzed through structural properties and integrated into a structural whole in order to work out its configurational intelligibility. Nevertheless, the initial state of each structure must be the work of an actor's (or actors') act of structuration. No structure could deny the actor's subjective interpretation of its meaning.

Meaning, Phenomenology and the Confucian Vision of Meaning

The consideration about the agent of action lead us to the dimension of meaning. On the level of structure, we have only the sense as determined by structure, syntactical structure for example. But the problematic of meaning in the context of human subjectivity refers either to the subjective intention or to the existential and historical situation in which human actions take place. Husserl's phenomenology puts emphasis on the subject's intentionality and its meaning constitution activity, whereas in Heidegger's phenomenology the existential situation is more important for the understanding of meaning.

The greatest discovery of Husserlian phenomenology, realized by the method of phenomenological reduction, is intentionality and the realm of meaning constituted by it. This discovery reveals not only the primacy of the consciousness of something over the consciousness of self, but also the truism that the act of intending something cannot achieve itself except through the identifiable and re-identifiable unity of the intended meaning--what Husserl called the "noema", the intentional correlatum of "noesis". Phenomenological reduction operates through the regressive movement of tracing the noesis-noema complex to the original starting point of intentionality--the transcendental ego--whence to constitute the meaning of things.

In other words, in order to understand the meaning of action, science and culture, it is important to uncover the meaning constituting dynamism implied in every actor's subjectivity. Intentionality is what every actor has as his inner dynamism towards the ideal and objective realm of meaning and the capacity to constitute it in an original way through his personal effort. For example, in the process of communication, the message to be communicated is a result of meaning

constitution by the sender. But the receiver has his own background of anticipation and interpretation. The lesson of Husserl's phenomenology is that the more one returns to one's own transcendental ego through the epoché of one's empirical ego, the more authentic and objective the constituted meaning will be.

Husserl inquired about the question of meaning on the cognitive and perceptive level. But Heidegger, following Dilthey, asks it on the existential and ontological level. The ground of meaning is not the residue, as in the case of Husserlian phenomenology, but the pre-given. It is because we are in the world and belong to it in a participative way that we can oppose objects to ourselves in order to know and control them intellectually. Heidegger notes:

When entities within-the-world are discovered along with the Being of Dasein--that is, when they have come to be understood--we say that they have meaning. . . . Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility of something maintains itself. . . . Meaning is the upon-which of a projection in terms of which something becomes intelligible as something; it gets its structure from a fore-having, a fore-sight and a fore-conception.⁷

With this there took place a shift of the paradigm of understanding. Before Heidegger, the notion of understanding is fashioned after Dilthey's epistemological conception: understanding is a kind of epistemological activity with which the *Geisteswissenschaft* operates to grasp the meaning of a singular person or society. The meaning of a work or an action is understood when the psychological process of its author is reconstructed subjectively by the investigator. After Heidegger, the notion of understanding takes on ontological import. To understand is not to grasp the subjective motif of an action, but to grasp the possibilities of existence this implies, to reveal the existential situation or the historical world in the context of which the action or work takes place.

It is interesting to note that, after Heidegger's location of the problematic of meaning in the hermeneutic circle between Dasein and Sein, his master, Husserl himself proposed, in his last masterpiece, *Crisis of European Science and Transcendental Phenomenology*, the concept of "Lebenswelt" to install a global milieu of meaning production and meaning understanding. Life-world contains several fundamental layers of the soil of all meaningful enterprise: the kinesthetic and perceptual activities of our living body, the world in the co-making by human subjectivity and intersubjectivity in the temporal constituting process, the practical prescientific framework and ground of all scientific project and praxis, and finally the ultimate horizon for the becoming of human beings in their effort to achieve a universal self-understanding and self-responsible humanity.⁸ Husserl's concept of Life-world is the most comprehensive effort to lay down the foundation for the meaning of human activities.

If Husserl views the problematic of meaning from the cognitive side, and Heidegger from the ontological perspective, Confucianism concentrates especially on the meaning of human action emerging from man's moral praxis.

One of the main problematics of Confucianism concerns the meaning of social order and the meaning of human existence within that. Confucius himself had endeavored to revitalize the ancient social order instituted by Chou-li (周禮) by rendering it meaningful in a transcendental way. In pre-Confucian China, Chou-li embraced both the ideal and actual aspects of religious, ethical and political life. Ideally speaking, it represented a cultural tradition, and even a comprehensive ideal of human life in general, as was the concept of Paideia for the ancient Greek people. But in the time of Confucius, Chou-li began to lose this deeper meaning while still keeping its actual and superficial meaning as a code of behavior, social and political institutions and religious ceremonies. Confucius tried to revitalize Chou-li by translating its ideal meaning into the concept

of Jen (), which represented the sensitive innerconnectedness between man's inner self with other men, with nature and even with Heaven. Jen manifests man's subjectivity and responsibility in and through moral awareness, and through the intersubjectivity supporting all social and ethical life. Thereby, Confucius provided a transcendental foundation for our interaction with nature, society and even with heaven. Then, from the concept of Jen, Confucius deduced the concept of Yi (), which represented for him moral norms, moral obligations, our consciousness of them and even the virtue of always acting according to them. And from the concept of Yi, Confucius deduced that of Li () which represented the ideal meaning and actual codes of behavior, political institutions and religious ceremonies. Through this procedure of transcendental deduction, Confucianism reconstitutes and thereby revitalizes the ethical and social order and man's sense of meaningfulness within it.

Critique, Critical School and the Taoist Concept of Critique

Both explanation through structure, and understanding of meaning are intellectual works to be carried out on the conscious level of our mind. But there are unconscious factors and mechanisms which determine and sometimes distort the production and interpretation of meaning. "Critique" is an act of reflection conducted either by an individual or by the society as a whole upon those unconscious factors and mechanisms in order to thematize them into the realm of consciousness and thereby render their distorting function ineffective.

In contemporary philosophy, Critical theory greatly emphasizes this critical operation vis-a-vis such unconscious factors as tradition and prejudice. According to it, these factors are not only the vehicle of our understanding, but also a mechanism for deforming communication. For example, J. Habermas notes:

We know from depth-hermeneutics, however, that the dogmatism of the traditional context is the vehicle not only for the objectivity of language in general, but for the repressiveness of a power relationship which deforms the intersubjectivity of understanding as such and systematically distorts colloquial communication.⁹

If explanation and understanding envisage only sense and meaning which can be seized on the conscious level, the act of critique has to reveal the determining forces acting on our unconscious level. These forces are of two sorts: the individual unconsciousness and the collective unconsciousness. The individual unconsciousness represents desires and their conflicts or repressions performing on the unconscious level of an individual as discussed in the Freudian psychoanalysis. Collective unconsciousness represents such determining factors as tradition, social relationship and value system in their dissimulating function. These are false consciousness or ideology in its pejorative sense, and their critique is a critique of ideology, as Habermas would call it.

In order to be succinct, we could synthesize both levels of critique and schematize them in the following figure:



In this figure, we could discern a structural determination of (1) by (2) and a genetic determination of (2) by (3). For example, in the case of individual unconsciousness, (1) represents the symptoms and behaviors of an individual at the present time, (2) represents the conflict and

distortion of his desires, (3) represents the repression and frustration of his infantile experience. In the case of collective unconsciousness, (1) represents the social phenomenon of a society at the present time, (2) represents its social relationship and value system, and (3) represents its social and cultural tradition developed in its history tracing back to its origin in the past.

In other words, the individual's desire has structural determination over its present symptoms and meaning production, whereas his personal history in the past (especially in childhood) has genetic determination over them. The ideology constituted of social relationship and value system has structural determination over social behavior and the social production of meaning, whereas historical tradition has genetic determination over them. The function of critique is to reveal by thematizing reflection those structural and genetic determining forces on the individual as well as on the collective level. This kind of critical reflection can not cancel their existence or nullify them. It can only render them ineffective by translating them to the conscious level, so as no longer in an unconscious way to distort the production and interpretation of meaning.

In Chinese philosophy, Taoism is the most critical of all the philosophical schools. For example, under Lao Tzu's penetrating criticism the society of his time was revealed to be full of social problems provoked by political domination:

The people suffer because their rulers eat up too much in taxes; that is why they starve. The people become difficult to govern because those in authority have too many projects of action; that is why they are difficult to govern. The people take death lightly because their rulers have too many desires; that is why they take death lightly.¹⁰

It seems that for Lao Tzu social problems were produced by the political domination of rulers themselves, rather than by the disproportion between desired values and their channels of realization. Chou-li was in Lao Tzu's eyes only the means of social domination, hindering and distorting man's communication with other men and most importantly, with Tao. Power domination was manifested par excellence by vehement wars: "Whenever armies are stationed, briers and thorns become rampant. Great wars are inevitably followed by famines." "The weapons of war are instruments of evil, and they are detested by people . . . when a multitude of people are slaughtered, it should be an occasion of the expression of bitter grief. Even when a victory is scored, the occasion should be observed with funeral ceremonies."¹¹

Deeper critical reflection shows that power domination comes from desire and the instrumental rationality it manipulates. At that time the lust for goods and the desire of power were highly elevated. People strived for fame and position. Intellectuals rendered service to political power and became instruments of political domination. People sacrificed their spiritual freedom for the prize of lustful desire and instrumental rationality. Lao Tzu even criticized Confucian ideology in that it overemphasized deliberate actions taken with anthropocentric self-consciousness, which by so doing were inclined to forget the spontaneity of man and his root in Tao. The Taoist concept of Critique has an ontological dimension in that it bases all social critique and critique of ideology on man's relation to Tao. Domination, instrumental rationality and ideology are but consequences of having forgotten Tao. What Heidegger calls *Seinsvergesenheit*,¹² forgetfulness of Being, is for Lao Tzu rather *Taovergessenheit*, forgetfulness of Tao.

Conclusion

We must resituate our study of human action in the context in which man understands and makes himself. Human and social sciences should not be abstracted and thereby alienated from

man's process of self-formation and self-understanding. In this practical process, structure, meaning and critique are three inner-connected steps through which people achieve a reasonable understanding of themselves and of the society in which they exist.

Of course, any study of man and society must begin with a preunderstanding of man himself and his social environment. But this pre-understanding must be mediated and developed by an effort at explanation through intellectually grasping the intelligible structure constituting human and social phenomena. But a structure should not be anti-humanist and oppositionist as structuralists would conceive; rather it is the outcome of human acts of structuration and open to subjective or inter-subjective human interpretation. A structure is not only synchronic and static; on the contrary, with its contrast configuration, it tends to move on the axis of time and to form a history which results from intervention by individual or collective actors.

The need to take human subjectivity and inter-subjectivity into consideration leads us to the issue of understanding and its object, namely, meaning. We understand when, having grasped the sense as determined by structure, we refer to the subjective intention and the existential situation of an actor or a group of actors. But the individual and collective construction of a meaningful life might be dissimulated and even distorted by false consciousness acting in the unconsciousness. Here we need the operation of critique to render ineffective the distortion and to mediate the unconscious determining forces into the realm of consciousness, where they become conscious dynamisms for constructing a meaningful life.

Beginning by pre-understanding, and mediated by structural explanation, we come ever closer to an understanding of meaning, even by making explicit and conscious those unconscious forces. This is a process of understanding and constructing a meaningful life. Human and social sciences are but the praxis of understanding through which we not only can lead a meaningful life, but also lead it in a conscious and self-aware manner. In this way human and social sciences return, as they should, back to the dynamic process in which a person makes himself or herself more fully human, individually, socially and historically.

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Notes

1. "Tout le mécanisme du langage . . . repose sur des oppositions". F. de Saussure, *Cours de linguistique générale* (Paris: Payot, 1978), p. 167.
2. C. Levi-Strauss, *Anthropologie structural* (Paris: Plon, 1965), pp. 235-240.
3. A. J. Greimas, *Semantique structurale* (Paris: Larousse, 1970), pp. 172-221.
4. As envisaged by the distinction between *langue* and *parole*, cf. *Cours de linguistique générale*, p. 30.
5. *Ibidem*, p. 117.
6. *The Works of Lao Tzu*, Chinese texts with commentaries by Wang Pih, ch. 42.
7. M. Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by J. Macquarrie and E. Robinson (London: SCM Press, 1962), pp. 192-193.
8. Vincent Shen, "Life-World and Reason in Husserl's Philosophy of Life", *Analecta Husserliana*, XVII (Reidel, 1984), 105-116
9. J. Habermas "On Hermeneutics' Claim to Universality", in *The Hermeneutics Reader*, K. Mueller-Vollmer, ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1985), p. 314.

10. *The Works of Lao Tzu*, ch. 75.
11. *Ibidem*, chapters 30, 31.
12. M. Heidegger, *Holzwege* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972), p. 336; "Uber den Humanismus", in *Wegmarken* (Frankfurtam Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1964), p. 159.

10.

Affective Difference: Sense and Singular Otherness

Ghislaine Florival

Method

Philosophical reflection regarding affectivity is concerned with lived experience in order to understand its existential ("existentiels") features. These can be the subject of both descriptive and genetic anthropology, indeed what is lived affectively can be seen only afterwards in its effects upon behavior in the world. Thus, eidetic analysis of the data regarding existence points back to a structural analysis ("Die existentielle Analyse") of ontological foundations.

Hermeneutic investigation can make evident this capacity of being to be unveiling by directing attention to affectivity. As the originary *pathetic sense* or feeling of the *logos*, affectivity manifests existence as receiving the "gift" of Being: as "passivity receiving itself".

Phenomenology aims to give an account of existence in this radical manifestation. In order to capture the structure of the phenomenon it attempts to understand the constitution of the existing being, that is, the concrete foundation of its transcendence or emergence as being-in-the-world, precisely as it exists. Thus, affectivity, along with perception, imagination or even categorial experience, are apt objects of eidetic analysis.

Comparison with perception can illuminate this. As a fundamental dimension of existence, perception is not manifest of itself but only in the concrete acts by which we perceive something. Hence, we must employ phenomenological reduction in order to analyze acts of perception and uncover their original conditions of possibility.

In the same way, affectivity is a fundamental aspect of existing being, but it has its effect only in the concrete, lived state of being. Thematic analysis can separate out the specific existential modalities in one's integrated behavior pattern. This shows that, as lived in the body, perception is always linked with affects and vice versa; the same is true of imagination which situates perception. Such lived experience of qualities and affective states is indispensable for access to the conditions of their constitution and hence to the "sense" or *eidos* of affectivity.

The conditions for a thematization of affective experience as properly immanent match its expression in language. Phenomenologically, the art of reflecting is always already present in the meaning which is thematized. Reciprocally, every spoken word always already exists in the innermost reaches of affect: there is always an unsaid dimension in what is said just as there is an invisible in the visible. Signification or meaning reflects this pre-understanding of lived experience.

Here, phenomenology faces a paradox. As a method of constitution, it employs intentional consciousness as meaning-giving and depends upon the constitution of transcendental knowledge. But it does not thematize ordinary sense data for here its aim of objective truth encounters the more originary element of receptivity essential to sense meaning.

This is precisely what Michel Henry noted when, for affectivity, he turned to the originary process of ectatic donation (or reception) presupposed by intentional consciousness: "pain teaches me about pain". Perception does not present it to me as a being to be seen; rather, the painful impression is the very presentation of the pain. (We do not follow this author in every respect, for we consider otherness and hence the originality of the encounter to be decisive, rather than merely

a founding moment of radical self-affection or subjectivity. Nevertheless, we acknowledge the phenomenological impact of the sense of life.)²

Body, Space and Time

Fundamentally, the structure of temporality, as the relational and "ecstatic", is revealed through affectivity, while spatializing temporality unfolds its different dimensions of affectivity: one's body is the foundation of both dimensions. Merleau-Ponty transposes Husserl's (*Ideen II*) analysis of the body--*Leib* (in contrast to *Körper*) as "flesh" and as support of sensations--abandoning the intentionality of consciousness in favor of the transcendence of being in the world. He does this in order to appreciate the reversible character of one's body as both immanence-in and transcendence-of-the-world. This means that sense organs have reversibility such that, for example, the finger while touching is itself touched.³ This duality of lived activity-passivity echoes the gestaltist scheme of a figure upon a background whose poles condition each other. Such reflective configurations of one's body apply, not only to the five senses in relation to one another, but to every lived signification, whether motor, gesture, or expressive. In this manner the body is reciprocally both self-constituting in receiving itself from an originary passivity, and at the same time an exteriorizing presence to itself.

Such feeling-awareness is a modality of temporality. As an interiorization of oneself, in the "living present" an existing being includes at the same time: (1) awareness of the perceived object, which is temporalized in successive phases according to past memories and the pretensions of what is yet to come, each surmounting the other in the longitudinal flow of objective time, and (2) the longitudinal temporal flux or *distensio* in tension towards the past and towards the future.⁴ As an exteriorization of oneself, the present is realized concretely in producing affects; for being transcends itself towards things which show themselves as favorable or threatening, hence perception is immediately affective or feeling-aware.

The manifestation of the self (*Selbsterscheinung*) as the presence to itself of its own body depends upon a double temporal manifestation or twin distancing both from past and future and from the lived present. It is in the lived present as a "passive synthesis of a relation of the self to itself" that ipseity or selfhood is identified. In this sense, what affects and what is affected are one in the flow of time, which "is nothing other than the transition from one present to another."⁵ Affectivity manifests the fact that existence presents itself to itself according to this double horizon, retential and protentional.

Even the past retains the affective coloration of a lost past, whether an originary paradise of desire or the anguish of loss. This is paradoxical, because I am what I have been, but in such a way that the present which I am is always "just past". In the same way, the protention of the present makes the future always to be a promise of what existence has not succeeded in being: it is the totality of my possibilities to come, but it exists in the desire and in the anguish of the project-to-be. Most fundamentally, it is in terms of temporal retention, of "life-death", that the existing being experiences the polarized and reversible affect of anguish and desire.

Phenomenology can uncover the affective manifestations of the conditions of temporalization and spatialization which constitute the "act of existing" of one's body. Affectivity reveals the structure of temporality both as an "ex-static" relational dimension or self-constituting openness of being-in-the-world, and as opening perpendicularly to its own flow or spatializing depth. Hence there is a double reference to presence to the world: the affective dimension crosses, so to speak,

the relational modality of time and of lived space, and inscribes itself structurally at the intersection of lived time and space.

Affectivity and Otherness

What is experienced in the retentional and protentional *distentio* from birth until death cuts across what is experienced in the *intentio* which opens existing being to the threat or welcome of the world in every encounter. At the intersection of lived time and space the affective tenor (*quale*) of life is experienced. This renders present the reversibility of the passive synthesis in tearing apart the self where the intensity of feeling or "difference" is not the cause of the affect, but the affect itself.

One's body unfolds the relational difference of lived time. On the one hand, that difference is the longitudinal dimension of the existential flux which opens itself to past and future by a circular interplay of retention and protention. This "distention" is sense awareness as the reversible relation of feeling, that is, of action and passion, which is the generalized background of life. But, on the other hand, that longitudinal dimension can be lived properly as mine only on the condition of the "intention" which gives the present its intensity. Only the encounter of an actual being can give rise to the emotional event by which an existing being transcends itself in the project of existing as being-in-the-world. The concrete concept of encounter implies that the escaping of the present from itself--one's proper body--is lived in interaction with the world of things and of others. Through this interrelational experience the affective experience of feeling--which is awareness as ex-static passivity--experiences itself totally and at all levels.

Thus, affective qualities are perceptions precisely as susceptible of degrees inasmuch as they are constituted according to space and time. They belong to the *data* of sensation and are themselves constituted most primitively in originary time consciousness.⁶ Things present themselves in their perceptible qualities and form the texture of the perceptible universe. Affection depends, to be sure, upon their concrete qualitative impact, but reciprocally the perceived qualities depend upon the degree of intensity of the experienced affect. This intensive magnitude gives sense awareness its dimension of feeling. Hence perception is affective only in the active mode of present passivity which is reflected properly by the body.

Consider Proust's example of the biscuit called "little Madelaine". The sense qualities which are present manifest a lived "original difference" to which the body resonates: thus the flavor and smell extend one's existence into the past and the forgotten places of childhood (all of Combray in a cup of tea).⁷ The perceptible aura of a lost past has impact upon the body. What is of concern here is not the fact of the quality, but its intensity, for this challenges my lived time by acting on my receptivity as a repetition of the past or an anticipation of a future. For example, hearing the little phrase of Vinteuil is an appeal to authentic existence.⁸ Hence, once again, qualities in perception are not the cause of the affect, but the affect itself, which exists only by virtue of its concretization. Here the thing encountered creates in me a resonance of its existence.

Such qualities open the surrounding world to a wider temporality, enlarging to the degree possible the actual present to the full extent of the past and of the future. This provokes the emotion of enjoyment, on the one hand, by reincorporating bodily powers into a lost temporality, and, on the other hand, by evoking the affectivity of a childhood when one believed in the "true reality". Against that latent horizon of original affectivity, the perceptible quality provokes a feeling of joy in the wonder of a recovered object, or a feeling of sorrow in the nostalgia of something lost.

Affective states are subject to analysis in terms of bodiliness and lived temporality. Emotion arises in the unexpected event-like emergence of an encounter. Then, bereft of all worldly landmarks, the lived body can lose all its relations with the world and even its own transcendence. Positively petrified, in surprise or horror it can feel itself annihilated or fainting, or can even flee the situation. In the face of this magical inversion of the vector of the world,⁹ the reality of passion reveals that under the sudden emotional power of the event there is global commitment to existence; passion brings this into play in the temporality of a whole life. In contrast, to freeze the sense of duration by turning it toward the lost past would make passion literally disappear in repetition, imagination or the march of time.

Finally, feeling is connected with character. Here it is possible to sublimate an original affective state due to the capacity for imagining; this, in turn, is subject to the judgment of the self and attests to selfhood.

The body then measures, in the things themselves, the favorable or threatening affect of encounter and recognizes in the degrees of affective polarity their many expressions. But why does such or such a perceptible quality have precisely such or such specific intensity?

Affects inform persons more than do things, for they are borne by the cultural world. In a privileged manner, affective experience manifests itself in the encounter of persons. More radical than the perception of sense qualities, the perception of the other as acting in my "living present" immediately sets in motion the wellsprings of affectivity in their bipolarity of anguish and desire. In the intersubjective constitution of encounter, the other finds this ambivalence of my lived present. Husserl uses the concept of intropathy (*Einfühlung*) in order to designate that acknowledgment by which my body (*Leib*) lives perceptively the body of the other.

Taking this concept, but in terms of its character of fleshly reversibility, Merleau-Ponty underlines the active-passive polarity of our manner of being-in-the-world. It is the lived body, as a relationship of being in the spatializing and temporalizing interplay of encounter, which founds the unreflective exchange of the "lived relations" of one body with respect to another. This is not "fusion-like sameness", but a lived "analogon". In intropathy, I situate myself both here and there, as the other of the other but with an otherness which is mine, because "to feel one's body, is also to feel it as for the other".¹⁰ Thus, in encounter, I not only discover the behavior of another one, whose expression I can live from the interior of my own bodiliness. I also can live this from his live center, whence the other in turn poses me as the pole of his transcendence. Intropathy, to be sure, is not the originary intuition of bodiliness present to itself, but it gives the "appresentation" of the other.¹¹

Intropathy makes it possible for my body to recognize itself in the other; it lives directly that exteriorization of itself in the other, but in such a way that the other retains its secret in an unforeseeable and uncontrollable manner. This openness of the self in the history of others is at once both threatening and welcoming. "Hell is other people" precisely because the "I" is no longer the center of the world but is implied by the existence of others.¹² Otherness is, thus, the losing of a lived totality; it is a position of objective subjectivation. Being the condition of my being acknowledged, the other is also, in a reversal of poles, the one who "steals my world from me". His point of view and his enjoyment partially escape me. Nevertheless, our perceptions cross each other in the world, which henceforth is common to us, as much because it separates us through jealousy as because it unites us as interrelated.

Bodiliness and Sexuality

Effectively, the body recognizes itself in the other by gesture and word. As an affective manifestation, the gesture announces in an unreflected mode what the word is saying in such a way that the word implies gesture, and indeed originally is gesture. Gesture and word are thus articulated in the same affective intentionality because the body is a power of natural expression: it is "that silent and permanent question" addressed to another body and which desire understands blindly. According to Freud, as every human act has a meaning,¹³ sexuality is linked to the whole of the knowing and acting being.

The primary meaning is already assumed by the "first word" which enables the child to receive himself into being. Encounter is thus a positing of oneself in interrelation. Henceforth, the existing being is affectively mediated by the presence of the other: one is other for the other, and a stranger for himself. The aspect of otherness, lived by the bodily mediation of the other in me, reveals to me that I am the same, that is to say, "myself". This "me", revealed as another, institutes subjectivity; the reversibility constitutes my existence as "mine". Thus, it is in encounter that the bipolar structure of affectivity, desire-anguish, finds the conditions of its manifestation.

Affective differentiation not only is connected to the objective order of constituting intentionality, but is immanent in the event created by the encounter of other existing beings. Affectivity is the anthropological dimension which manifests in all its expressions what is really radical in the emergence of the lived realm. Therefore, the phenomenological method must engage the event-like, historical, fact-like moment of the genesis of that lived world. The existence structure of being-in-the-world can be thematized only from the existential experience of affective life. Just as phenomenology is able to arrive at such essential structures of affectivity as temporality and spatialization, event-like affectivity will show itself in the encounter where the "sense" of otherness emerges as the dynamic and energetic force of life.

But phenomenology is not limited to thematizing; at least in the descriptive mode we can turn to dynamic psychoanalytic discourse. Genetically received as ex-istence in the form of "sexual differentiation", the sense of life is not produced by a biological factuality, but is received from the dynamic affectivity of mutual recognition in encounter. At the origin of existence, the sexual relation between the parents constitutes, from birth onward, the openness of life. It carries the child towards his objective finality by the creative movement of desire, which in every human relation is the dynamic expressivity of the relational otherness of a couple. This brings immediately into play the resources of bodilyness. The child is borne along by the originary affect of desire, which enables him, in turn, to be able to enter into the life of desire and to situate himself in the meaning of finite existence. This anterior desire will permit the child to overcome the Oedipal stage, for he recognizes himself as objectively before the positive relationship of his parents and, by identification with respect to the parent of the same sex, inscribes himself or herself in the existence assigned properly to him or her.

Affective life is genetically determined from birth according to the self-giving desire of the parents, which is a "gift" of meaning. This generates in the child, by its polarity of anguish and desire, an understanding of existence as open to the horizon of its finitude, namely, death. In this manner sexual difference is the prime meaning which gives life; by its affective polarity it constitutes the teleological sense of unified becoming for the person. As the most original indication of distanciation, the sexual "difference" induces the constitutively interrelational affective truth of human existence: man is masculine only by his relation to woman, and woman is feminine only by her relation to man. It is on the basis of the structural truth of reciprocal

constitution that human truth is realized in each of its manifestations and at all levels, both of sense and of intellect. The acknowledgment of the "differentiated relationality" of parental desire is lived affectively as real entrance into the "sense" of life, that is to say, in the effective relationship of bodiliness inscribed into the "flesh of the world".¹⁴ It is by the mediation of the affective experience of that sense relationship, concretely recognized, that the child is able also to introduce him or herself into the chain of meaningful relations, and experiences him or herself affectively as already inscribed in language.¹⁵

The sexed difference constitutes the being-projects of man and woman, which, in intersecting with each other, reveal the properly human dimension of meaning, the affective *logos* of natural orientation and of cultural meaning. On their reversibility man emerges in his masculinity and woman in her femininity.¹⁶ That sexed otherness, which is quite singular and more originary than simply individual otherness, as "difference" or interdependent existential relationality, is constitutive of the relational growth of the person.¹⁷

Individualization as "man" and "woman" constitutes concrete affectivity; that is, it gives affectivity its specific concrete status by determining it relationally. There is, for example, a correlation between the anguish as experienced by man as man and as experienced by woman as woman. Nevertheless, inasmuch as it brings into play a manner of being-in-the-world which is conditionally reversible, affectivity makes manifest the "shaping" of a meaning, that is to say, a relationship in meaning or sexual difference as "*différence*".

Taken as such, this teaches the child the symbolic dimension of a sense relationship. In the experience of Oedipal jealousy, by living affectively the reality of the sexual difference the child discovers the meaning of the notion of "difference" in general, that is to say, the notions of relationship, connection and symbolic meaning. He or she grasps the field of meaning as such and what underlies every form of rationality.

Social Relatedness

The relationship of the originary sexual difference henceforth will concern not only the mode of sexual otherness, but all the modes of social or personal encounter. The lived affective difference is the moment of emergence towards the specifically human dimension of objective "signifying understanding". It underlies potentially the natural possibilities related to generation and the cultural possibilities at all levels. This implies in "existential difference" the totality of singular existence. Hence, the sexed otherness is reflected affectively on all the beings encountered, in the perception of things and even in categorical and theoretical approaches. Consequently, the *truth* of the cultural world--material, scientific, technical or aesthetic--and of the different civilizations in all their ethical and political social manifestations has its roots in that "originary affective sense" which is the sexed *différence*.¹⁸

Through the affective mediation of desire, which is also anguish, the child introduces himself to the conditions of the world of common sense where he or she is to realize his or her life project, to "speak" his or her proper subjectivity. This manifests itself inside the horizontal field of the life world, which itself is unveiled by the affective position given to it by the existing being inasmuch as one receives oneself from the source of life. On this genetic base, affectivity engenders an oriented active character. It recollects itself as an assumption that is not susceptible to being thematized as such, but recognizes itself laterally in the relational sense of the bodiliness and the expressivity in the proper dynamics of finite existence.

Parallel to the internal horizon of lived temporality, there is an external horizon which is not intuitive, but extends to remote distances whence "the I can be intentionally `affected'."¹⁹ That empty horizon embraces the world as a unique horizon of possible experience. This is Nature as the surroundings of those affected by it; it is transfigured in Culture through reciprocal constitution.²⁰ The intersubjective life inscribes itself in this: "we are taken in the monadic universe of an unceasing life system, in the infinity of our proper life and of intersubjective historical life."²¹ This phenomenological datum reveals a new sphere of experience: the latent implications of the horizons as an immanent system of correlations of experience which refers back to the transcendence of the world.

From that point of view, the "World" manifests itself radically as the affective horizon which is "humor".²² The existing being experiences the humor or state of mind (*Stimmung*) which proceeds from the manner (or "present disposition": *Befindlichkeit*) according to which he receives himself in the openness of Being and is present to his own being and to others. Disposition is a fundamental mode of the openness of *Dasein*, by which we discover the world and of which anguish is the paramount mode.²³ But in understanding one's mortal being, the anguish of "being thrown away" as submitted to facticity is inseparable from the corresponding structure of existence, namely, the "project" of being-in-the-world. Yet, existence does not assert itself only in the "dwelling place" of the world. The *Lebenswelt* or life world which is always already signifying makes the depth of existence more radically manifest as distance and proximity. Those structural dimensions, determining existence, make possible the foundation of the lived existential feelings which link together anguish and desire as the affective condition in the genesis of the individual.

The World which, as horizon, is the constitutive element of the existing being is always the totality given to affective experience: it is "Primeval Nature, a beginning of a world".²⁴ As it concretizes itself in the diversity of living beings it evokes the affects of the persons, for the existing being living in the world is always already cultural. There is a "reversibility" or passive synthesis in the very fabric of the world or of "flesh", interlacing action-passion or a reversibility of the perceptible.²⁵ We could say that the life powers of the world bear anthropic significance: the world is the horizon of all our encounters, it gives rise to the depth of absence and presence, it opens the affective dimensions of anguish and desire.

Conclusion

Lived temporality and interrelated otherness intersect at the existential level of anguish and desiring. This is realized concretely from birth until death against the original background of giving life from generation to generation. This implies for Being a personal and, therefore, affective dimension. Transposing the Heideggerian context, this evokes the Being which "loves" man and gives him meaning.²⁶

The affective dimension of the possibility of giving in man proceeds from a presence more interior to oneself than the very self.²⁷ The ontological donation of meaning endows the existing being with the capacity for "giving". Thus, the notion of "gift" has an ethical meaning which teleologically grounds human responsibility in personal affectivity. It is in the nature of gift that an affective dimension appears and the properly singular realization of the person is achieved.

Here, phenomenology must give way to the hermeneutics of gift. The personalizing act of giving finds its condition of possibility in the ultimate act of the self, which is to manifest the ultimate passivity of the reception of the self: "to acknowledge the gift by which one has received one's own being". Here we go beyond ontology in the measure that we aim at an eminently

personal reality. It is precisely that infinite personal reality which gives desire its teleological sense. Reciprocally, it is affectivity in act which induces the dimension of personal relationship. In that horizon-- of donation coming from Being and of reception as the call to answer it in each authentic encounter--everyone becomes the "neighbor" of the other.

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Notes

1. E. Husserl, *Recherches phénoménologiques pour la constitution*, trans. E. Escoubas (Paris: PUF, 1982), p. 50.
2. M. Henry, *Phénoménologie matérielle* (Paris: PUF), pp. 36, 64.
3. M. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie de la perception* (Paris: Goallimard), pp. 108ss.
4. E. Husserl, *Lecons pour une phénoménologie de la conscience intime du temps*, trans. H. Dussort (Paris: PUF, 1964), p. 109.
5. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie*, pp. 472, 287ss.
6. Husserl, *Recherches*, p. 48.
7. M. Proust, *A la recherche du temps perdu* (Paris: Gallimard, Col. La Pléiade), I, p. 258.
8. *Ibid.*, III, p. 258.
9. J.-P. Sartre, *Esquisse d'une théorie phénoménologique des émotions* (Paris: Ed. Hermann, 1963), p. 36.
10. E. Husserl, *Philosophie première* (Paris: PUF, 1972), II, p. 108ss; M. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible* (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 299.
11. Husserl, *Recherches*, p. 230.
12. J.P. Sartre, *Huis-clos*.
13. Merleau-Ponty, *Phénoménologie*, pp. 184ss.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 324.
15. *Ibid.*, pp. 224-225, 316.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 274.
17. Our article, "Vie affective et temporalité" in *Figures de la finitude: études d'anthropologie philosophique* (Louvain-la-Neuve: E. Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1988), vol. III, p. 90.
18. Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, p. 274; cf. our article "Personne, culture et affectivité," in *Etudes d'anthropologie philosophique* (Louvain-la-Neuve: E. Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1984), II, 281ss.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 205.
20. *Ibid.*, p. 210.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 213.
22. M. Heidegger, *L'être et le temps*, trans. R. Boehm and A. De Waelhens (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), p. 168.
23. F. Dastur, *Heidegger et la question du temps* (Paris: PUF), p. 52.
24. Proust, *op.cit.*, I, 184; III, 79; Merleau-Ponty, *Le visible et l'invisible*, pp. 320ss.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 304.
26. M. Heidegger, "L'homme habite en poète," in *Essais et conférences*, trans. A. Preau (Paris: Gallimard, 1958), p. 244.
27. St. Augustine, *Confessions*.

Part IV
Psychology as a Human Science

11. An Exploration of the Social Noesis

Tran Van Doan

Social Noesis

With his *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy* (1913), Husserl introduced the concept of a rigorous science which claims to be the "science of the essential structure of pure consciousness" and of which the main method would be "eidetic reduction". However, such a method is far from perfect because at best it could drop all references to individual and particular, but is in no position to reach the essence itself. In other words, eidetic reduction is no more than a simple step on the way to purified phenomena as such. Husserl is the first to concede this shortcoming, and later presented "phenomenological reduction" aiming to grasp the absolutely given, or better, the structure of the given, the *noema*.

But by giving more attention to the structure of phenomena, Husserl faces another no less crucial question of how the *noema* comes to be: *noema* could not be a simple external object or an unrelated *res cogitans* as in Descartes' system. The *cogitata* needs to be thought; it presupposes the act of cogitating. Precisely here, the concept of *noesis* emerges, especially in Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* (1929). Of course, *noesis* had been mentioned often in the *Ideas*, but with an inadequate, if not obscure, explanation (168ff) or confusingly (p. 280). For example, one could not discover exactly the difference between *noesis* and *noema*. There is one point on which there is no doubt, however: *noema* relates to *noesis* in a specific manner, not quite like *forma* and *material* as described by Aristotle. Husserl contends that *noesis* is the constitution of *noema* in our internal time-consciousness (*Ideas*, 245ff), of the conditions and characters of *noema* (191, 218). Thus, there is an inseparable relationship between *noesis* and *noema*: *noesis* is the manifoldness of the phenomena, while *noema* is its unity (203, 204, 207, 212, etc.).

In the *Cartesian Meditations*, Husserl attaches more weight to the *noesis*, and for the first time discusses genetic phenomenology in the context of his transcendental analysis of the ego. The eidetic reduction that he designs aims at "leading back to the transcendental ego naturally, with its concrete monadic contents as this *de facto* ego, the one and only absolute ego".¹ In a stroke, Husserl reduces the act of *noesis* to the transcendental act of egological genesis, which is a purely psychological act (p. 75). Nonetheless, he acknowledges the role of time and history in shaping the universal form of the ego: "The ego constitutes himself for himself in, so to speak, the unity of a "history" (p. 75).

Husserl's eidetic reduction seems limited to the area of transcendental knowledge and therefore does not touch the more fundamental problems of the relationship between human existence and human knowledge. The question of how knowledge emerges could not be solved simply by an explanation of the forms and conditions of cognitive constitution as did Kant, and as Husserl tried to prove. It appeared to Heidegger to be insignificant that Husserl had improved Cartesianism by means of Kant's transcendental analysis.

To Heidegger, in his *Sein und Zeit* (1927), which was misunderstood by Husserl, the above question is of decisive importance because it demands a thorough exploration of the *noesis* through which alone one can understand how the human lifeworld is such, and why it is in permanent transformation. Heidegger's analysis of the concept of truth (like his analysis of the *Dasein*) neither

rests on the surface of phenomena as with empiricism, nor wanders in the world of mind, unrelated to, or isolated from, our concrete world. He discovers the noetic power explaining human modes of existence such as anxiety and death. In other words, human modes of existence are such and such because Being is in the process of self-unconcealment through its acts in relation to its world. Therefore, we are not allowed to take the external, transcendental (i.e., timeless) to understand or to measure human beings. The main merit of Heidegger lies in his exploration of the act of *cogitans* (*noesis*) or better, the act of human self-development, and not its forms (*noemata*). For him, *Noema*, as expressing rather the temporality of human Dasein, could not help to explain Being-as-such. This point is made clear in his *Einführung in die Metaphysik* (1935) where he states that Being is presence (*Anwesenheit* which, in turn, is understood as the act of presence, of self-presentation, etc., that is, the noetic act; and especially when he insists on the interdependence of Being and man.

Similarly, but in a different direction, Alfred Schutz seeks to build an understanding of society on the concept of *noesis* (even if he does not clearly use the terminology). He proposes, for example, a plan to understand our life-world:

As we have already said repeatedly, this social world is by no means homogeneous but exhibits a multi-form structure. Each of its spheres or regions is both a way of perceiving and a way of understanding the subjective experiences of others. . . .

We shall try to answer these questions: first, how such an inner differentiation is possible; second, what grounds we have for supposing that the social world has both unity and inner differentiation; and third, which of these differentiations may usefully serve as a basis for our analysis of understanding the other self.²

The multi-form structure underlined by Schutz could not be explained in terms of a calculus of the purpose of human action, as did Max Weber, because such calculated action would claim a homogeneity for human acts, and as such, contradict Schutz's discovery of the multi-form structure found in human experience. According to Schutz, this multi-form structure comes, rather, from human activities or the direct experiences which determine the "We-relationship":

The basic We-relationship is already given to me by the mere act that I am born into the world of directly experienced social reality. From this basic relationship is derived the originality of all my direct experiences of particular fellow men and also my knowledge that there is a larger world of my contemporaries whom I am not now experiencing directly.³

He then makes clear that, "To put the point in terms of a formula: I can live in your subjective meaning-contexts to the extent that I directly experience you within an actualized content-filled We-relationship".⁴ However, the We-relationship is not constructed *a priori*--but synthetically constituted by human acts: "The We-relationship is spatial as well as temporal."

We shall take these insights of Heidegger and Schutz as guides for a further exploration of the concept of *noesis* in terms of social life. First, we note their efforts to be rid of the Cartesian element in Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, especially in Heidegger's attempt to turn upside down the Kantian categories by building the so-called existential categories. Second, we acknowledge their intention of building a phenomenological hermeneutics based on human self-developing activities (*noesis*) and not on its *schemata* or *noemata*. Nonetheless, we feel that they do not go far enough in seeing in *noesis* some principle or dynamic power; thus, they do not wholly discover the genetic process of *noesis*, and therefore fall into the traps of Cartesianism and of Kant's transcendentalism which they had tried deliberately to avoid.

We would go a step further to claim that the process of *noesis* is genetically constructed. Even the *noesis* (which we call here social *noesis*) is constructed not *a priori* or simply mentally, but in the process of self-construction implicit in differentiated human activities dealing with various objects and hence newly merging interests. To be more precise, (1) we discover the social *noesis* (or better said, the social *noesis* emerges) when one faces a problem from a certain natural or human object. The relationship to this object gives birth to new interests and new problems which then demand a new principle and new activities. (2) One discovers new interests not by planned or programmed activities, but spontaneously precisely at the moment of acting on a certain object or subject. (3) The new activities thus discovered are not understood in terms of metaphysical power, idea, dynamos or will, etc., because they could not claim to be a foundation of other activities. They are restricted to a certain aspect of human life and therefore are explained in terms of causal or interconnected relationships.

To prove our point, we will discuss the social *noesis* in its genetic process, namely, in the following relationships:

Subject and Action

Meaningful Action, Deep-seated Action and Action as such

Action and New Action

Action and Social *Noesis*

Social *Noesis* and Social *Noemata*

Subject and Action

One often remarks that Husserl's treatment of *noesis* is not quite convincing, partly because of his Cartesian or metaphysical approach. Husserl begins his phenomenological analysis with the subject. That is quite plausible so long as he treats the subject not as such, but as a starting point towards understanding the subject in his world. But Husserl soon lapses into the Cartesian trap by remaining in the subject as such and not going to the world. His ambition to build a foundation for all knowledge based on the transcendental ego is understandable, but it is doubtful that such a transcendental ego, like the Cartesian *cogito*, could serve as the *noesis* to develop knowledge. The doubt comes from the fact that the *cogito* or transcendental ego cannot produce the real world and its structure. At best it can provide a solid starting point, and that is all.

Husserl might have been aware of the limit of the transcendental ego when he tried to substitute Descartes' *Cogito ergo sum* with his *Cogito cogitata*. By adding the object "cogitata", he rejected the *solus ipse* of the ego. Consequently, he might have adopted the Hegelian position that a solitary subject could not even discover itself without the help of the object. Thus, it may be unfair to say that Husserl remains in the subject alone. It is true that he has tried to avoid the Cartesian error by insisting on the necessity of the relationship between the subject and the object, just as between the *noesis* and the *noema*. But such an apology could not explain how the *noesis* comes into being, any more than it can be explained how the transcendental ego comes into its form.

Descartes' reduction of all phenomena ultimately leaves the ego; Husserl's eidetic epoché of appearances reduces all to the transcendental ego. Both adopt the view that the ego simply is as such, and therefore transcendental or *a priori*. This means the ego is not the product of our thinking, but the necessary condition of our thinking. This Kantian position could not explain the fact that while the conditions may be the same we have different views or understandings. This

serious shortcoming clearly shows that the subject is by no means a static subject, or a fully neutral necessary condition, a sort of Kantian category. The subject with which we enter into the world is mine or yours, his or hers, etc., that is, a subject which in acting or living is constructing or developing its world.

By saying that the subject is acting we wish to show that it is in action that the subject builds itself. Thus, the crux of phenomenological analysis should be the action of the subject and not the subject alone. This issue was raised by Karl Marx and supported by M. Weber, A. Schutz and most sociologists today. It does not imply going as far as Marx to claim that it is the action or labor alone which decides. Such a claim would no doubt raise objections because of its deterministic and metaphysical characteristics. But certainly, the subject itself is known only by and through its action. Without action, the subject is blind before the contentless forms, just as a box can be empty.

Meaningful Action, Deep-Seated Action and Action as Such

However, not all actions reveal the subject. We observe that human action is of different natures and is guided by different interests or motives, both conscious and unconscious. Here, I would concentrate on three kinds of action which demonstrate the genetic process of *noesis*: meaningful action, deep-seated or unconscious action, and action as such.

Let us discuss, first, meaningful action in terms of Weber's social action. According to Weber, "action is social insofar as, by virtue of the subjective meaning attached to it by the acting individual (or individuals), it takes account of the behavior of others and is thereby oriented in its course."⁵ Weber's concept of meaningful action could be seen from the following aspects: (1) any action must be oriented in its course, (2) any action must be guided by a certain motive or interests, and (3) any action must be subjective and social.

The first and the second aspects are very close, so that we can treat them in terms of motives. If Weber's definition of meaningful action is accepted it will be necessary first to clarify the question of the direction in which the action is oriented, and therefore, why the subject has such a motive or interest. On the one hand, if we accept the metaphysical approach which explains interests and motives as something innate or *a priori*, our action is meaningful only when it achieves the pre-determined motives or interests. Let us take the example of the action of studying. Study is meaningful only when through the act of studying the student acquires new knowledge. It would be meaningless if the student acquired nothing. When the concept of meaningful action is understood in this way, one faces the crucial question of the kind of interests or motives to which one's actions are oriented, and towards what kinds our actions are not oriented.

To answer such a question one may resort to a tautological answer such as "because we possess such interests and motives by nature" or because of our biological needs. Weber and Husserl, of course, do not take such a view seriously. Weber, especially, tries to explain the meaning of an action in terms of "the action being given the meaning by others." This means that the action by itself is meaningless if it is not recognized by others. In this context, Weber seems to have in mind at least two kinds of action: meaningful action and simple action, such as instinctual behavior. We find his explication very interesting in the sense that he lays more emphasis on the intersubjective characteristic of human action: the action is meaningful only if it is conscious (motive-oriented) and intersubjectively recognized.

On the other hand, not all intersubjectively-recognized actions are motive-oriented, or vice versa. The act of walking is not recognized if it is not reflected on by the subject, just as the act of staying idle is without orientation. Most of our behaviors (which we consider natural) are of this

character. Weber regards them as plain actions, and the question is whether these plain actions could be regarded as meaningless. When one raises the question of the kind of interests to which our actions are oriented, two kinds come to mind, the conscious and the unconscious. Conscious action is intersubjectively-recognized or, at least, recognized by the subject, while unconscious action is driven by our deep-seated interest or desires which are designed to satisfy our basic needs. Such a Freudian explanation may help to broaden the meaning of the concept of meaningful action, but such an explanation renders talk about meaningful or meaningless action non-sensical, because all actions are meaningful in some way.

Hence, meaningful action should be explained not only in terms of social or intersubjectively-recognized action or purposive action, but more importantly in terms of action generating new action.

Action and New Action

To return to the original question of the kinds of motive or interest to which our actions are oriented, such a question could not be answered so long as we could not give an adequate answer to the more crucial and fundamental question of how interests and motives are constituted or constructed. These two questions are inseparable. To begin with the first question: we know that our actions certainly are oriented, but we are not quite sure by which kind of interests or motives. We know them only if our actions are set up to deal with or to solve certain problems relating to our life. The act of eating is meaningful because it satisfies our need for food; and the need of food arises because of the demand, so to say, of our stomach. That means we are aware of our interests so long as we grasp the problems, and we consider our action meaningful if it could solve such problems.

However, we cannot be sure that we eat only when our stomach urges us. The fact that man eats even when he is not hungry shows that our interests are not completely planned or determined. Biological needs are natural, but also unnatural in the sense that only in such and such a circumstance do we have such and such a need. We eat because of other reasons which are constructed *a posteriori* such as "socialization" (as seen in Chinese society), or simply for habit. Thus, it is the second question of how interests come to be which is the crux in explaining the concept of meaningful-action. We have stated that the act of eating could be (1) motivated by an instinctual or natural need, and (2) guided by environment or society. We may add another, third factor, namely, the act of eating may be the result of a previous act, say the act of socializing, or the act of being aroused, stimulated, etc.

The third characteristic which gives a clue to understanding the nature of our action is explained in the problematics of interest-and-solutions. We can sum this up as follows:

- (a) action could be motivated and oriented to such a motive,
- (b) action could be conscious or unconscious,
- (c) conscious or unconscious, motivated or unmotivated action does not happen in solitude but is always in a sequence, and only in the process of action can we determine the nature of interests, its genesis as well as its solutions, and therefore its meaning.

Our point is this: the meaningfulness of action cannot be explained only from a previous purpose or interest; such an explanation is rather metaphysical and deterministic. Similarly, it cannot be explained solely in terms of social consciousness because the social consciousness is

rather *a posteriori* and not prior to action. Laying more weight on the genetic process of action favors a kind of constructivist explanation of our interests or purposes, and hence our social *noesis* (in the way described by Jean Piaget).⁶

Action and Social Noesis

To link action with social *noesis* does not mean to unify them, as in Aristotle's relation of form and matter. To avoid such metaphysical seduction, action should not be regarded as social *noesis* as Marx had proposed (*Pariser Manuskript*, 1844). Action (or labor) is not "inborn" in man like blood or brain, but develops *a posteriori* in accordance with the way one encounters new problems emerging from (new) environments, from (new) discovery and from (new) stimuli. This section will deal with the question of action which generates new action. This will be linked with problem-solving and problem-emerging in a more detailed argument, to show that the social *noesis* emerges in three consecutive phases: (1) problem-discovery action that gives birth to a new problem-solving action, (2) problem-solving action that stimulates social change, and (3) the demands of social change for new action. These three phases take place continuously and consecutively.

Before going directly into such a process, it should be made clear why the metaphysical approach of Husserl and, of course, Descartes are not accepted. Cartesianism can be suspected even in Noam Chomsky's work linking geneticism and a fixed innate scheme because he believes that the kernel of language is fixed.⁷ Of course, Chomsky is not the only one. The sociologist Talcott Parsons commits the same mistake when he half-heartedly embraces the Cartesian innate idea, or the inborn structure of action, and regards it as the backbone of his theory of social structure as a stable disposition of the elements of a social system.⁸ Even if one acknowledges their merit, one need not be quite happy with their Cartesianism. First, to accept an inborn nature or an innate nature for language or psyche means accepting an invariable, eternal foundation upon which one builds language or develops the psyche or mind. But the present discussion is centered on the question not of the nature, but of the existence of such a foundation: Are we able to prove this existence, and is its existence unchangeable?

In the work of most of the followers of Descartes the answer is constructed rather upon tautological arguments (or better, the data found in the animals' communicative activity and in the human use of language arranged in a logical order) or on a principle of causality that we cannot prove, such as: if there is *b*, then *a* must exist (or *a* presupposes *b*, and *b* follows *a*, etc.). We do not dismiss such a logic, but the question here is whether such a logic is "inborn" or artificially constructed. In the first case, it is clear that there is no valid proof demonstrating an inborn logic (as some structuralists have believed). In the second case, we may follow the later Wittgenstein in saying that the logic that we take for granted is in fact built in accordance with human ways of treating problems or dealing with environments. If such is the case, then the more important questions concern which ways are adopted to deal with problems? This is the crux of our argument, in terms of which we must understand the social *noesis*. (We do not interpret the social *noesis* as the social Tao [as understood by Taoists] though we find it attractive). Second, the belief in an inborn or innate nature of logic, language, etc., points logically to a determinism such as has been adopted by the structuralists which, as such, negates genuine development for human beings.

Let us now return to the main argument, based as follows on the process of social genesis: If the idea of an innate nature of *noesis* fails to explain the development of man and hence of society,

then it is necessary to construct the social *noesis* from what we call the process of problem-discovery and problem-solution.

(1) Let us begin with a simple example of an ordinary act that happens every day: the act of problem-discovery. Suppose we wake up in the morning and suddenly encounter some difficulties in preparing breakfast, such as there being no gas, no bread, and so forth. Here there is no question of the nature of breakfast (i.e., an analytical and metaphysical question), but how to ready the breakfast. So, we rush to the bakery for bread or call for the gas to be fixed. In this first stage the problem is not *a priori* programmed or planned, but happens accidentally. However, we may explain such a problem by referring to a rational, causal process, namely, if we were careful then such a problem might not have happened. That is true in some cases, but not in others. For example, the gas shortage may be beyond our programming, or the bread shortage may be caused not by our negligence, but by natural catastrophe. More important, we wonder whether we have sufficient time for such a theoretical question, or whether our main problem simply is how to get the breakfast ready.

However, these problems do not happen alone, but in a series. Suppose that there is only a small problem of forgetfulness. We may just rush to the bakery and the problem is solved. But what if the bakery is closed, or we are hit by a car, or our car is broken . . . ? Then the problem may emerge in a very unordinary way that we could not have imagined and thus planned for. In all cases, our main question is the same: how can we get breakfast? And in order to do so we need to find a solution, an alternative, because we cannot go to the office on an empty stomach. Such an example shows that it is the problem discovery which forces us to find a solution. Thus, the action of discovery presupposes the action of solution, and again the solution may become obsolete in the course of time when we discover other problems.

(2) Suppose we follow the Weberian explanation of the concept of meaningful action and insist on what we call the ordinary process of scientific discovery⁹ as a programmed sequence of action oriented to a certain purpose. We may say that there is not a single new discovery, because even the gas shortage or car accident should be programmed. That is partly true if we already have all kinds of such experience. The point is that all experiences are *Erlebnis*, that is, they belong to our past life; there is no experience of the future. Thus, it is easy to have a plan based on experiences, but impossible to program what has not yet happened.

In this sense, we follow Heidegger, insisting that our experiences reveal rather our *Dasein*, but not Being as such. Heidegger's analysis of such existential experiences as anxiety, death, care, etc., does not pinpoint exactly the nature of Being or Being as such as claimed by traditional metaphysics. His existential analysis reveals only the possibility of the self-revelation of Being. In this context, we may dare to claim that the mechanistic, Newtonian explanation of phenomena is insufficient, and consequently, that the claim that no new action emerges from previous action could be refuted. However, the claim that new action springs from previous action must be tested. In our argument, we refer to Popper's thesis of scientific discovery and Marx's insistence on the dynamic force of action (labor) to support our claim.

In the sixth thesis on social sciences, Popper explains the birth of science as follows:

- a) The method of the social sciences, like that of the natural sciences, consists in trying out tentative solutions to certain problems: the problems from which our investigations start, and those which turn up during the investigation. Solutions are proposed and criticized. If a proposed solution is not open to pertinent criticism, then it is excluded as unscientific, although perhaps only temporarily.

- b) If the attempted solution is open to pertinent criticism, then we attempt to refute it, for all criticism consists of attempts at refutation.
- c) If an attempted solution is refuted through our criticism, we make another attempt.
- d) If it withstands criticism, we accept it temporarily; above all we accept it as worthy of being further discussed and criticized.

He concludes:

- e) Thus, the method of sciences is one of tentative attempts to solve our problems by conjectures which are controlled by severe criticism. It is a consciously critical development of the method of "trial and error".¹⁰

What is interesting in Popper's argument is that he does not rely on any form of meta-theory, because there is no such thing, but insists on the dynamic process of discovery through criticism that he calls scientific. Without wholly sharing his view on the nature of science, we agree that the social *noesis* is generated in the process. It is far from any form of meta-theory. The social *noesis* is both a strategic starting point (but not the alpha point), and open to new possible development (but not to being the omega). It is born during the process just like the new action (which is appearing from old actions), as Marx described the process of labor and new activities.¹¹

(3) Thus, the new solution may cause new action, and new action may produce problems. The processes of problem-discovery and problem-solution are responsible for the appearance of what we may call the social *noesis*, which means that the social *noesis* is possible in the process of human actions. It is possible to think of it alone without the chain of action, but one may object to such an understanding of noesis on the basis of the epistemological status or starting point of our action. Is our action not oriented to a certain purpose as is action in the biological world? Such a question is worth further discussion, but we need to return to our point that, even in the biological world, one can demonstrate that most reactions or actions come spontaneously when the body or mind is stimulated or aroused by the environment (by a new *Umwelt*, etc.). Thus, our main point is that the social *noesis* could be demonstrated indirectly by an analysis of the way forms of society self-transform, or the way social structures come into being.

Social Noesis and Social Noemata

Here we will sketch the relationship between *noesis* and *noema* in some of its general aspects, but will not go into detail in this section as that would require more time and is beyond the main aim of this chapter. This sketch of such a relationship is aimed at refuting the thesis of Husserl and of some Freudian psychologists that *noesis* is the act of cogitating (*Ideas*, vol. II) while *noema* is only its form, or that the *noesis* is the power or the instinct explaining human action, reaction, etc.

First, Husserl makes very clear the relationship between *noesis* and *noema* in terms of Newtonian mechanistic functions. He describes *noesis* as the act or power and *noema* as its form of appearances. Such an explanation is rooted in the traditional principle of causality, and in a Platonic dualism. Most important is the *dynamos* which is responsible for the development of many kinds of forms of society or of human beings. But, if *noesis* and *noema* function, *mutatis mutandis*, in this way, then it is difficult to talk of human social development. The principle of mechanism forces us to accept a deterministic conclusion that there is no revolution, no

development; in such a system there is but permanent repetition of the same. If Husserl commits himself to such a theory then he is at best a Neo-Platonist or Neo-Cartesian.

Second, in his *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl tries to distinguish two concepts of genesis: the active and the passive:

In active genesis the Ego functions as productively constitutive, by means of subjective processes that are specifically acts of the Ego. . . . The characteristic feature is that the Ego-acts, pooled in a sociality--whose transcendental sense, to be sure, we have not yet brought to light--become combined in a manifold, specifically active synthesis, and, on the basis of objects already given (in modes of consciousness that give beforehand), constitute new objects originally.¹²

And as for the passive genesis, he writes:

The "ready-made" object that confronts us in life as an existent mere physical thing (when we disregard all the "spiritual" or "cultural" characteristics that make it knowable as, for example, a hammer, a table, an aesthetic creation) is given, with the originality of the "itself", in the synthesis of a passive experience.¹³

The Husserlian description of *noesis* and *noema* in his *Cartesian Meditations* is clearly much better than in his *Ideas*, though he could not escape from the Cartesian trap, because he follows strictly the Kantian "synthetic *a priori*" in grasping our experiences. Thus, to him, any action is intentional in the sense that it synthesizes our experiences in a transcendental way.

Our position is not quite Husserlian in the sense that we do not think that the distinction between the passive and the active genesis does justice to the social *noesis*. We will argue briefly from the different angles of phenomena and of form and structure.

(a) When we observe phenomena, we discover that they are in permanent change: some slowly, some very rapidly, and in a certain manner. Mostly they are orderly, but at times disorderly or chaotic. If we follow Husserl by beginning with an eidetic or phenomenological reduction, we may discover the substance or essence of such phenomena to be, to our surprise, stable or fixed. Actually, the impression of stable or fixed is not quite correct; for whether they are such or not is not his main concern. The point he emphasizes, like Kant, is how we perceive and know them. Certainly, we know by means of forms; thus for Husserl to grasp the forms is identical with understanding phenomena. We follow Husserl only half way, to the point of discovering some forms for phenomena, but would contend that there is neither an absolute fixed form nor a single form. In contrast, there could be more forms of phenomena, depending on which actions, in which environments, etc.

(b) Thus, the form which we deduce or reduce or synthesize from phenomena is not the ultimate objective of phenomenology; we must go on to the deeper level of phenomena, its structure. However, even the structure is not eternally stable, but changes or self-transforms in a very slow, almost invisible manner. Thus, the impression that there is an absolute idea (Plato), or absolute structure (structuralists, like Levi Strauss), or absolute and fully independent categories (Kant), and so on, is built upon this mistake of not seeing the self-transformation of the structure itself.

Structure should be divided into three kinds relating to three sorts of human activities: the most basic structure and the most basic activities, the relatively stable structure and relatively important activities, and the particular temporal structure with ephemeral activities. The

relationship between structure and activities and social forms will be explored in another work. Here we would draw the following conclusion:

The emergence of new activities and structures, the influence on forms and vice versa, is the main characteristic of the social *noesis*. In this sense, the social *noesis* is not a metaphysical principle or element, but expresses the process of human activities which is understood only in the process of problem-discovery and problem-solution.

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Notes

1. E. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. Dorion Cairns (Hague: Nijhoff, 1967), p. 69.
2. Alfred Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World* (London: Heinemann, 1972), p. 139.
3. *Ibid.*, 165.
4. *Ibid.*, 166.
5. M. Weber, *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*, p. 1 and English translation, p. 88; also in Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social Work*, pp. 15, 144.
6. J. Piaget, *Introduction a l'epistemologie genetique*, especially vol. 3, “La pensee biologique, la pensee psychologique, et la pensee sociologique” (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1950a).
7. Noam Chomsky, *Syntactic Structures* (The Hague, 1957), p. 19.
8. Talcott Parsons, *Structures and Process in Modern Societies* (Glencoe: Free Press, 1960); see also Jean Piaget, *Structuralism* (1968m English trans.), p. 102.
9. This is described by Thomas Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1062).
10. Karl Popper, “The Logic of the Social Sciences,” in *The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology*, T. Adorno, ed. (London: Gower, 1981), pp. 89-90.
11. K. Marx, *German Ideology* (Moscow: Progress 1964).
12. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, p. 76.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 78.

12.

The Significance of Psychotherapy for Psychology as a Human Science

Charles Maes

Cultural Pluralism and Psychotherapy in the United States

Recent estimates suggest that there are over five hundred approaches or systems of psychotherapy being practiced in the United States. This efflorescent situation emerged since the end of the Second World War. Not too long ago, the role of psychotherapy was identified with the profession of psychiatry and of psychoanalysis. In some measure, the emergence of the "modern" therapies was a reaction against the medical and anthropological presuppositions generally prevailing in psychiatry and in psychoanalysis. The proliferation of approaches was related also to the need for psychotherapeutic services in the military services during the war and for the large number of veterans of the war who were hospitalized after the end of World War II. These societal pressures also account for the growth of the community mental health field. Another factor that favored a plurality of approaches was the cultural situation of the United States as a country of immigrants. This made it necessary to accommodate each group to the inevitable differences between it and the many other immigrant groups which constituted the population of the country. In other words, the openness of the American cultural situation, because of the diversity of its population, necessitated such openness in a general way. This was favorable also to the diversity of approaches in the field of psychotherapy as in many other fields of study and praxis.

It is not surprising, when one considers what is unique to the American cultural situation, that accommodation and adaptiveness are operative conditions which reflect themselves in the differences underlying the pluralism visible in the field of psychotherapy. In a nation of immigrant groupings, especially in the cities, demographic factors resulted in inevitable conflict. The states were united not so much by a free choice for consociation as by necessity due to the potential for conflict. Superficially, these cultural-historical issues seem very remote from the issues that concern us in the matter at hand; but one must insist that only apparently is this the case.

To be different remains at the heart of "being American". Nevertheless, this is not altogether welcome for Americans because of the understandable need of human beings to "be the same", to achieve a common collective identity; there is an essential need for unity, togetherness, etc. Because of the ever present potential for conflict which we have outlined briefly, there are strong pressures for conformity. Undoubtedly conformity is part of every human community, but this has its unique features in American society because of its cultural historical background.

We cannot imagine adequately the potential for conflict in the field of psychotherapy where so many approaches and styles of practice exist. Every approach to psychotherapy advertises itself in a typical manner: every system of psychotherapy explicitly or implicitly considers its approach as the true way, as the ideal theoretical and practical model of psychotherapy. This unblushing claim is clearly evident in contemporary psychotherapeutic literature. The examples are endless, e.g., Client-centered Therapy (Rogers, 1951), Orthodox Psychoanalysis (Hartmann, 1964), Gestalt Therapy (Perls, 1969), Transactional Analysis (Berne, 1961), Family Systems (Bowen, 1978), Hypnotherapy (Erickson, 1980), Existential Analysis (Binswanger, 1936), *et al.*

On the surface the different approaches to psychotherapy represent competing visions with regard to goals and therapeutic treatment. But these differences point to social, political, and philosophical factors from which many presuppositions emerge. Here, too, differences abound, though hidden in their apparent structures.

The openness of American society to the therapeutic is importantly related to the immigrant history, as Zilbergeld insists:

From the start, America was more focused on the individual--his rights, property, and ambitions--than were other countries. Ties to tradition, family, community, and religion were transformed and usually weakened by the simple fact of immigration, and the situation in the new land caused further changes in the traditional social arrangements. The individual emerged as the primary element in society.¹

Individualism in America emphasizes personal rights, property and personal ambitions. The person wanders about by himself, as do the literary characters of such authors as Mark Twain, Melville, and Hemingway. The mythic American, Daniel Boone, epitomizes this idealization of unfettered individualism. To live in this unfettered manner, being true to oneself and beholden to no one, to rely solely on one's values--this all sounds virtuous; but it is a difficult way to live. The primacy placed on the individual carries with it much uncertainty: whether one is making the right decisions, whether one is thinking realistically, whether one's particular choices and those of a life span are proper or correct.

The main functions of a cultural tradition are to eliminate uncertainty in matters of choice and decision, or at least to minimize the possibility of uncertainty, to keep it within tolerable bounds. When people are guided in important life choices by tradition, they do not have to be troubled by uncertainty about such things; they follow the common ways prescribed by the tradition. Without oversimplification, they just follow the rules of common sense as these are constituted by their own tradition.

In contrast, to be free to manage one's life--the first credendum of individualism--one must make one's own decisions, carry through on them and live with the consequences. This is the necessary risk and the adventure of the individualistic orientation. Often one's values and decisions about many things may differ from those of other people, and being different one is to a significant extent cut off from them. So too, isolation emerges in the situation of living among others whose values and life orientations are unlike one's own. Here, we see that uncertainty and isolation are some of the important prices that must be paid in living the individualistic ideal.

For the reasons just given, the freedom anticipated and prized in individualism is also troublesome or annoying. This is manifest in Americans who are always on the lookout for someone who will tell them or advise them on all sorts of matters, whether in business, professional, health or nutritional matters. This searching for others to advise one is ordinarily expressed as a search for "pointers", for ultimately one is to decide for oneself. This is a way in which the individual may break out of his isolation and join with others as an approach to fighting against the separateness inherent in this way of life.²

Another aspect and value of individualism is "to better oneself": the moral obligation to better oneself is a part of the individualist ethic. Presupposed here is that everyone is given certain talents and potential, and that one should develop them to the fullest possible extent. What enters into such consideration is the egalitarian belief that a man must justify the "gift of equality" by making full use of the opportunities that such a way of life offers. What we see here is a belief in the

perfectibility and malleability of people, a belief that men and women have a duty to improve themselves.

That some contradiction may exist between the goals of self-betterment and the good of society is not often acknowledged by Americans:

Self-improvement--or self-actualization, as we now call it--has usually had a moral tone in American life. We were bettering ourselves not only because we were concerned with ourselves, but also because such a course was in the best interests of everyone, was right, and was what God intended.³

The tone of the foregoing statement accounts in many ways for the seriousness and at times self-righteousness that pervades many psychotherapeutic enterprises. Even books on how to improve one's sex life or books on how to make more money often sound as if the "salvation of souls" is at stake.

Another attitude that is characteristically American is that of unbounded optimism. A country settled by immigrants became a people who hoped and expected that life could be better. The relative absence of traditional barriers to succeeding in whatever enterprise and the willingness for hard work served to foster an optimistic outlook. Moreover, people did succeed in great part:

The sense of fate was weaker here than elsewhere (Europe). The very act of immigration was itself a challenge to fate. And in this new land, with new rules and opportunities, it was not difficult to believe that what happened to a person was more a result of what he did than what the gods decreed. De Tocqueville noted that Americans were "apt to imagine that their whole destiny is in their own hands". There seemed to be no limit to what you could do for yourself. . . .

People can become richer, happier, healthier, or anything else they desire. This kind of thinking is an important component of the therapies of the past and of the present. It is difficult to imagine therapy flourishing in a society that does not place a high value on human plasticity and the possibilities for constructive personal change.⁴

There are societal factors, then, which constitute a favorable condition for the popularity of the psychotherapies. To value possibilities for constructive personal change is related closely to the idea that one has a right to happiness; this certainly is evident in the positive attitude of Americans towards the psychotherapies. Americans are raised to expect so much of life that almost nothing can satisfy their cravings. As people who believe they are entitled to happiness, Americans are highly receptive to anything that promises self-betterment both in the outer and in the intra-spheres of life. Any deficiency or lack of competence becomes a barrier or obstacle to the pursuit of the happy life. For our ancestors the accumulation of wealth, the strong work ethic, and even religious devotion were the usual means of overcoming obstacles. In these times, psychological development and well-being have, to a great extent, displaced these as the main way of securing happiness.

We have a great capacity to turn anything that bothers us into a problem. If something is seen as a problem, we quickly employ our native optimism in order to find a solution. In the main, our character structure tends to refuse the possibility of insoluble problems. The belief that there are solutions to anything that bothers us permeates the technological orientation of the society. This is the novel aspect of the American experience. We believe that anything that needs to be fixed--whether it is a car, a road, or a "dysfunctional" person--can be changed for the better. As one therapist writes, "Somewhere there is a technique that is just right for you." All that must be done is to find the right technique; accordingly, we can take care of everything. As noted, there are over five hundred approaches to psychotherapy.

The Psychological Man

We have described a few of the salient beliefs of Americans, both in the past and in the present. The self-help genre of books are a part of our history. In the nineteenth century books filled with advice for domestic problems, child rearing, how to become rich and successful, and how to be happy, were very popular for the readers of that time. Such were the beginnings of the psychotherapeutic movement. Late in the nineteenth century, George Beard published a book, *American Nervousness*; in it he listed a host of feelings and behaviors that medicine had previously been unwilling to acknowledge. The way was being paved for the acceptance of Freud.

Jerome Frank contends that psychotherapy can be viewed as a social institution created to fill the gap left by the decay of other belief systems and their institutional structures--belief systems that heretofore gave meaning to life and a deep feeling of connectedness to others.⁵ The precursors of psychological well-being were what Rieff calls the therapies of commitment:

From Plato to Aristotle, through Burke and De Tocqueville, . . . therapeutic implication was remarkably consistent: an individual can exercise his gifts and powers fully only by participating in the common life. This is the classical (therapeutic) ideal. The healthy man is in fact the good citizen. The therapeutic and the moral were thus connected in the Western tradition. . . .

In the Middle Ages, this tradition was institutionalized in a church civilization, with the therapeutic functions reserved to functionaries of the churches. On the symbolic level, the integrative functions were expressed in doctrines such as that of natural law. Disagreement was largely about means, not ends. . . . Church civilization preserved those conventional understandings by which men hold together in communities, granting to the individual only a limited range of alternatives in belief and action. . . . This church civilization resorted to authority figures--those who really did have the answers, in an official sense--who could resolve . . . conflicts. Should one ask (of this classical tradition): "What cures?" the answer will be frequently tantamount to the question: "Who cures?"⁶

According to this classical theory of the therapeutic, it is the community that cures, that answers all problems, that overcomes whatever uncertainty and troubles the individual person experiences. Likewise, all problems that emerged from the intrasphere of the human were provided with proper solutions. The function of therapist of the church civilization was to commit the patient to the symbol system of the community, by whatever techniques were sanctioned. All therapeutic efforts intended the reintegration of the subject into the communal symbol system. The priest or the philosopher or the physician each stood for the community as the ultimate corrective of personal problems or disorders. Thus, the symbol system of the community provided the cure and answers to all the problems of an individual.

Rieff and Zilbergeld agree that in the modern period these classical symbol systems of church civilization, the "commitment therapies" broke down and lost their power for integration. It was into the resulting vacuum that the psychotherapies of our time became the successors of the therapies of commitment. This transition involved a "deconversion", a period of time during which literature, sociology and other disciplines have mourned "the end of Christian culture".⁷ According to Rieff, this long period of deconversion has come to an end. The age of psychological man who succeeds believing man has arrived.

There is much hope in the new or emerging man, psychological man: "The old have given way now to their logical and historical successors, the psychologizers, now fully established as the

pacesetters of cultural change." As inheritors of the dualist tradition, the psychotherapists (the psychologizers) pit or oppose human nature against the social order, that is to say, against the therapies of commitment. The image of the new man differs remarkably from the image of the old man of the Church civilization who was conservative, ascetical, and struggled or even fought against one's needs. The image of the new psychological man is that of being a needy person "permanently engaged in the task of achieving a gorgeous variety of satisfactions."⁸ Psychological man intends a cultural revolution, but it is definitely and deliberately not in the name of a new communal order. As Rieff ironically prophesizes, "the therapeutic will be a man of leisure (not a working man), released by technology from the regimental discipline of work so as to secure his sense of well-being in highly refined alloplastic ways."⁹ As a reformer, the new man is optimistic:

Everything conceivable can be made universally available.

Variety has become a term of control as well as remission. Confronted with the irrelevance of ascetic standards of conduct, the social reformer has retreated from nebulous doctrines attempting to state the desired quality of life to more substantial doctrines of quantity. The reformer asks only for more of everything--more goods, more housing, more leisure; in short, more life. This translation of quantity into quality states the algebra of our cultural revolution. Who will be stupid enough to lead a counterrevolution?¹⁰

In this new world of endless satisfactions, quantity has become quality: the answer to all questions of "what for?" is "more". What this amounts to, according to Rieff, is a redefinition of charity, of the inherited faith of Christianity. Out of the redefinition, our culture (and that of the West generally) is changing into a symbol system unprecedented in its plasticity and capacity to absorb. Nothing can oppose it, Rieff believes, and it welcomes any and all criticism, precisely because, in a sense, it stands for nothing. What follows from this interpretation is a view that the present struggle between capitalism and socialism is based on their being in different phases of the psycho-historical process. This difference can be resolved readily when both sides understand that they share the same goal, that both assume that wealth is a superior and adequate substitute for symbolic impoverishment. The American and the Marxist cultures are essentially variants of the same belief in wealth as the functional equivalent of a highly developed civilization.

The belief in wealth presupposes specific dimensions in the human personality. What is focal in this regard is the functional or ego dimension of the human personality which signifies the capacities of agency of the human being. Functional or ego agency gives direction to human possibilities in relation to the external world. The shaping of human action in the world of work is the central manifestation of egoic function. In this sense Rieff insists that American culture, as Soviet cultures in the past, aspires to the idea of a highly developed civilization. A particular vision of human well-being and happiness in both instances is centered in the valorization of the ego and its dynamic agency and adaptive potencies. In the psychoanalytic movement, this is precisely what personal maturity means. Accordingly, psychoanalysis intends the liberation of the individual human being's capacities (Hartmann, 1964):

The consideration of the conflict-free ego sphere leads us to the functions which are more or less closely related to the tasks of reality mastery, that is, *adaptation*. Now adaption--though we do not discuss its implications frequently or thoroughly--is a central concept of psychoanalysis, because many of our problems, when pursued far enough, converge on it (p. 22). . . .

Generally speaking, we call a man well-adapted if his productivity, his ability to enjoy life, and his mental equilibrium are undisturbed (p. 23).

Here again, in a more dynamic and egoistic analytical sense, we understand the historically oriented analysis of American individualism as we earlier recalled Zilbergeld's contention that the earliest buildup of the American experience was focused and gave primary importance to the "rights" of the individual, property and the unfettered fostering of personal ambitions. He is correct in his opinion that this valorization then led to a transformation and weakening of traditions, family structure, communal life and religion.

Ultimately, such valorization of the individual's functional capacities and adaptiveness would result in the problems of functionalism, of an overvaluing of psychoanalysis and most other psychotherapies influenced by its liberationist ideal centered on the goals of reality mastery. The idolization of function, of adaptiveness in traditional American psychology, has always identified itself with the natural sciences. The mastery of reality points to the primacy of objective thought and knowledge. The human scientific movement in the United States is one of reaction to, and critique of, this historic idolization of human agency or function. There is a paradox here: this excess we call functionalism emerged out of the deep ideals of "human rights" which were at the heart of the egalitarian, democratic American revolution.

To outline briefly the human science approach to various concerns, we will now articulate some of the perspectival contributions of this approach. It presupposes the work of traditional natural science thinkers and writers in the social sciences and in the philosophy of science. The philosophical anthropological presuppositions of the natural science approach are put into question. This is true particularly of existential-phenomenological research in philosophy, sociology and psychology. The graduate program in clinical psychology at Duquesne University was founded precisely as a theoretical enterprise dedicated to taking up the foundational problems of psychology conceived as a human science. This required that its psychologists begin a work of critical inquiry within the context of the traditional scientific enterprises, those of *natural* scientific psychology. It is in this sense that we shall take up now some of the issues presented schematically, viewing them at this time from the more philosophical and anthropological perspectives of existential-phenomenological reflexion.

Functionality as Rooted in Fundamental Existence

Existential philosophers, sociologists and psychologists hold in common an anthropological view of the human being; all subscribe to the idea that there is a transcendent aspect to the human personality. What constitutes transcendence varies considerably from one existential conception to another. However, they agree that human becoming means transcendence of the ego, that human development goes beyond egoic agency. Accordingly, much of the critique of functionalism ultimately intends an affirmation with regard to transcendence as such. For example, Gabriel Marcel posits transcendence to mean mystery, the mystery of being. On this view the human being is defined as participation in the mystery of being (1967, p. 40).11

Marcel emphasizes that contemporary humanity distorts the importance of the ego, of agency and function, especially because modern technology has made possible the transformation of the world, such that it threatens to destroy spiritual values, to destroy man's spiritual view of humanity and of the world. Technology places in man's hands powers that he has not earned, that offend the dignity of his own being and that threaten his own existence.

Moreover, this increase in human agency bestows upon man the right to exercise powers without a corresponding inner transformation. That is to say, such powers of agency when related solely to adaptation do not effect a spiritual transformation, the heart of man's being is therefore forgotten and ignored. The transformation brought about through the increases of power through technology become sources for the creation of a pseudo-solidarity among men. As a problem, this is everywhere evident in the psychotherapies, as we have noted before. Another element of Marcel's critique of functionalism is that it absorbs man in the world of desire and fear, an absorption that distracts and diverts attention from the world of mystery, which is foundationally more relevant to one's humanity.

Technological power also degrades the value of the human person by equating him totally with how much he produces; this is true even when people contend that increases in creativity are involved in such transformations. The idolization of functional adaptiveness deforms man's essential being:

The case is radically altered when technical knowledge begins to claim a sort of primacy in relation to modes of thinking . . . that concentrate on *being* rather than doing. It should be clear . . . that these remarks are a development of those I made about the notion of *function*, insofar as this contrasts with that of an actual grip on being, of any sort.

But what ought to strike us more than anything else about what I have called the emancipation of technique is the fact that what starts out as a collection of means put together to serve an end becomes . . . the center, the focus, of an obsessive cult (Marcel).12

The critical position that Rieff addresses to contemporary psychoanalysis is that it abandoned Freud's liberationist work and has become a matter of faith; that Freud's work has become repressed once again through the misunderstanding introduced by the Adlerian psychologists, the neo-Freudians (Horney, Sullivan, etc.) and the apostolic successors, i.e., the ego psychoanalysts (Hartmann, Loewenstein, Kris).

Reviewing the revisionism of Freud's theory of the unconscious, Jacoby (1975, 41) notes:

Heinz Hartmann--probably the most important of the Freudian ego psychoanalysts--detached the ego, or part of the ego, from the unconscious and libidinal drives; he dubbed this the "conflict-free ego sphere". "Not every adaptation to the environment, or every learning and maturation process is conflict." The critical edge of Freud is blunted: the aim of psychoanalytic therapy is "to help men achieve a better functioning synthesis and relation to the environment."

Those who laud these theoretical developments within and outside psychoanalysis have told the unpleasant truth pleasantly, ego psychology grinds down the cutting edge of psychoanalysis in contemporary garb. Just as *conflict* is the central notion in Freud's work, *adaptation* is central in Hartmann's . . . Compared to Freud, Hartmann is another breed altogether, not a revolutionary, but a practical earth-bound traditionalist.13

The author acknowledges the truly radical character of the early psychoanalytic formulation; but insists that contemporary ego psychology is a tamer and more "healthy-minded" quality. Some critics wonder whether psychoanalysis could have been as attractive to middle-class Americans. Ego psychology paves the way, not to a proper understanding of the ego, but to its idolization. This development ultimately led to the rehabilitation of the old-fashioned idea of the self, that is, the autonomous self of ego psychology.

Adaptation, accordingly, is a "corporealizing of the psyche", a processing of psychic energy into "unconscious automatic reactions". The reality principle asserts itself through a shrinking of the conscious ego in a significant direction. The development of the instincts is frozen, and their pattern is fixed at the childhood level. The reality principle is here revealed as the egoic agent of adaptation. One can more clearly see how narcissism constitutes the ground of the reality principle. As Jacoby says, "narcissism captures the reality of the bourgeois individual; it expresses the private regression of the ego into the id under the sway of public domination." Psychoanalysis understood in that way implies a psychology of conformity for its patients; we see more deeply also what adaptation means in psychoanalytic therapy.

Functionality/Adaptation: Separation from the Mystery of Being

When human life is formed exclusively in accordance with the traditions of positivism or scientism, the human person may be overcome by a sense of loneliness and isolation, writes van Kaam (1986, 171), psychologist and master of spirituality. In the theory of spiritual formation, this author considers the deepest ground of the formation of life to be an ontological one:

The primary foundation of all formation is ontological; it refers to a forming direction of the universe and of humanity that cannot be controlled, manipulated, or exhaustively understood by means of clear and distinct concepts. This preformative direction does not make our formation responsibility superfluous. On the contrary, it demands that we explore its challenges, freely and wisely. We are free to deny this foundational direction at our own peril, or we may disclose and appraise it progressively (van Kaam).¹⁴

In *Foundations for Personality Study* van Kaam describes the grounds of personality emergence and how the spiritual formation of life must there achieve its deepening:

Formation is the basic evolutionary process of the universe perceived as a formative energy field of constantly rising and falling forms. Each tends to realize, nuance, and maintain its own form potential in dialectical interaction with its formation field. Subhuman life forms give form in accordance with instinctual form directives. The human life form has to disclose and implement its own. In this process the personality is born. Personality is a unique movement of disclosure and tentative implementation of receptive and creative form directives and their corresponding formation fields. Foundational personality theorists are in search of form directives that can be scientifically appraised as foundational or universal. Their aim is the establishment of a foundational theory on which consensus can be reached eventually among a significant number of scholars in this field.¹⁵

The inference to be derived is that personal emergence and maturity can be achieved only through a life formation that deepens to the extent that a person aspires to live in consonance with the forming mystery. Thus, personality is a unique movement that involves discovering and incarnating one's foundational life form, the true self as coming-to-be.

In that process formative directives need to be apprehended and appraised, which requires that the person become responsible for his own life direction through thoughtful apprehension and appraisal of what is discovered meaningfully to be inherent in interaction with the formation field or the unique personal world. Appraisal requires that one thoughtfully distinguish between

dissonant and consonant life directives. Consonant directives that are affirmed can then be applied. In other words, personality is shaped by the acts of apprehension, appraisal, affirmation and application.

Personality is not understood here as guided by the reality principle. In this spiritual or distinctively human approach, self-direction is oriented by primordial acts of faith, hope and love. In this regard, van Kaam affirms transcendent life directives similar to the developmental emphases of the theory of Erik Erickson. These transcendent life directives--faith, hope and love--do not exist in the sphere of ego autonomy. Rather, they are one's spiritual openness to the irreducible ambiguity and contingency that characterizes everyone's interactive involvements with, and in, the formation field, our interactions with people, events and things.

In comparison, ego psychologies, humanistic psychologies, and developmental psychologies do not acknowledge the reality of the transcendent dimension of human experience. If such psychologies acknowledge any kind of transcendence, it is usually only the "quasi-transcendence" of some experiences in the vital and functional dimensions of life. They "go beyond" or transcended only in part, whereas in true experiences of transcendence "everything is left behind."

Life is understood as an exchange of polar energies in dynamic interaction. To live in faith or in hope always presupposes a polarity between these transcendent life directives and their opposites: contingency, unpredictability, insecurity. This dynamism is conflicted because our living is always to some degree dissonant, whereas its transcendence and integration dynamics tend toward consonance. The expanding movements of transcending require dissonance or the breaking up of established familiarities and securities which is necessary for outward and upward expansion (going beyond). The other pole of this expanding (transcending) movement is the dynamic of integration which acts to maintain or to regain its inner consonance.¹⁶

Like pre-revisionist psychoanalysis, formative spirituality acknowledges conflict as ever-present in human life, that all growth and development emerge in the interaction of the polarities of dissonance and consonance. By the same token the science of formation disavows the idealization of conflict-free spheres and disavows the ideal of autonomy in its humanistic definition in ego psychology.

A distinctively human life is always a process of progressive emergence which has the structure of transcendence, of moving beyond. One should also say that a distinctively human life form emerges in the interaction between the polarities of life-death. This statement signifies that every person must continually die to past achievements as the precondition for going beyond or progressively transcending:

The human life-form is always emerging; it is never a finished life-form. This premise means that we are only on the way to a communal and unique form of life. Our empirical life-form can always be deepened, enhanced, and integrated, reaching out to new horizons. It belongs to the essence of human life never to be static or at a final stage (van Kaam).¹⁷

We are only on the way; one is always coming-to-be. The directional thrust of formation is focused not toward the mastery of reality, but rather around the dynamics of inwardness, of the intrasphere of life. Thus, van Kaam is cautious about the dominant world outlook of Western societies which have idealized the mastery of reality:

We live more and more as isolated functionaries who manage to survive. . . . Yet despite all our efforts, our restlessness may never be solved totally. It may keep seeping through the boundaries of our prefocal consciousness.¹⁸

The orientation that favors mastery of reality and which implicitly deforms personal intraspheric development is similarly a concern in the critique of Erich Fromm in *The Revolution of Hope*:

The social machine works more efficiently if individuals are cut down to purely quantifiable units whose personalities can be expressed on punch cards. These units can be administered more easily by bureaucratic rules because they do not make trouble or create friction. In order to reach this result, men must be de-individualized and taught to find their identity in the corporation rather than in themselves.¹⁹

In Fromm's view of the modern technological society, the mastery of reality is guided by two principles. The first is that something ought to be done because it is possible to do it; the second is that of maximum efficiency. The first principle when employed is inimical to life formation in that it may move by way of negation of all values because it ignores the primacy of man's deeper and real needs. For example, if it is possible to build more and more powerful nuclear weapons, then they must be built, even if the destruction of humanity may result. Once the principle that *can* implies *ought* is accepted, technological development becomes the prime value. As Fromm insists, once this principle of efficiency is invoked, what inevitably follows is de-personalization and de-realization because the conditions of life become progressively abstract and inhuman. But this de-personalization is evident only if we believe that underlying our personal emergence is a basic orientation that is exclusive for each of us. This unparalleled pattern is only gradually and in part disclosed to us during our ongoing dialogue with the successive fields of formation within which our personality unfolds. This disclosure of our uniqueness takes place mainly in the intrasphere of our life where the truth of one's being--a subject which is the essence of one's coming to be--is found disclosed. The displacement of being a subject, which occurs in the service of the efficiently working social machine, enables us to realize how murderous are its possibilities the more we give in to valuing the goals of mastering reality.²⁰

Another aspect of the efficiency principle is its equating of efficiency with quantity--thus the more efficient the plant, the greater the output. This principle leads to the phenomenon of over-production and the subsequent manipulation of the public in order to make it a docile market. Even the educational system is judged by the same criterion--the more college graduates the better, regardless of the quality of education. Indeed, few people ever seriously raise the question of quality or ask what an increase in quantity contributes.²¹

The total effect of this technological organization is that man is transformed into *homo consumens* whose sole aim in life is to have more and to use more--the increase of the bourgeois man on the condition of the triumph of power, of reality mastery.²²

The prizing of efficiency leads to a new and excessive valorizing of quantity, production, and bureaucratic de-personalization which in the end transform humanity. Entangled in the production machine, man becomes a thing passively turning out things in which he is not interested and, when not producing, taking in whatever the boredom-preventing industry offers--liquor, movies, television, sports gadgets.²³

It is not necessary, however, to accept all that the critics of technology say or to agree with their descriptions of contemporary world conditions; it is sufficient to realize that they are faithfully recording certain aspects of reality which cannot easily be discounted. Man is in a world in which it is difficult to live humanly, especially since he is constantly being persuaded that the world is made possible by the valorization of efficiency, by quantity and production and by the seductive allure of consumerism as the best of possible worlds, and that which is at hand.

It is hard to discount the thesis that humanity is being transformed through human techniques. Everyone is absorbed in a non-spontaneous union, a union of the individual with the collectivity, where everyone has his punch card. This union, through its own dynamic, "dissolves" all that is unique in every human personality. The danger of the increasing pressures for adaptiveness lies in its de-personalizing effects. It destroys by increasingly emptying out human interiority and subjectivity, and thereby creating conditions unfavorable to a distinctively human or spiritual form of life. This union of the de-personalized individual with the collectivity is the most noteworthy result of techniques that man turns on himself.

This transformation and mutation of humanity has not been produced by a collectivist theory or by someone's will to power. The cause is much more profound, at once human and inhuman; inhuman because it is occasioned by things and circumstances, human because it answers to the heart's desire. The "rising expectations" evoked by technology are irreversible, yet we always come back to the reality that man, who is in fundamental discord with his world, must of necessity be restored to harmony with it. Any restorative action upon techniques appears impossible, yet we retain our freedom for thoughtful appraisal of human techniques. In view of the forces for de-personalization and de-realization our hope is an uneasy one but it is a hope nonetheless.

We have strongly emphasized a number of aspects and conditions that characterize the transformation of the individual and society through the application of human techniques. The effects resulting from this process or processes of transformation are very important for a proper understanding of the psychotherapeutic movement, especially as this presents itself as the new substitute for the historic symbol-systems of the faith traditions that predated the emergence of what Rieff calls the "psychological man."

On the general and global level, we have seen that the transformation of humanity favors the employment of techniques of adaptation. The danger here, as we have seen, is the conformity of the individual to the anonymous processes of production, the binding of persons under the requirements of efficiency and the reduction of human values or aspirations to consumerism. (It is not accidental that in the American psychotherapeutic world the people we serve are no longer referred to as patients or clients but commonly read as consumers.)

In the main, it is the third force in psychology and psychiatry that engages in critical theory and questioning of the fundamental issues of the psychotherapeutic movement. Reflection and appraisal of anthropological, sociological and psychological presuppositions are an essential mark of the existential-phenomenological enterprise.

Our intention has been centered around the problematics of the psychotherapies, since they are strongly pressured by the techniques of economics and political organization which make man the object of technology in the service of the social, organizational, economic and political processes in the culture. Everything in technological society favors processes which increase the pressures for adaptation. A psychology of conformity is increasingly brought into play thereby, with the result that the democratic spirit which gave high place and dignity to the individual is being displaced by the repressive power of a psychology of conformity.

To be true to its own visionary agenda, psychology conceived as a human science should be a force in moderating the deformations which do violence to the distinctively human under the impact of the anonymous processes initiated by the technical transformations to which we have alluded. The work of the human science psychologist should accordingly and rightly concern itself with the goals of restoration, for the repression of what is most distinctly human and transcendent in human life puts us at risk of forgetting these dimensions.

In the psychotherapies increasingly allied to ego psychology, there is a real need for alternative approaches which favor a more liberationist option, both at the level of theorizing and in praxis. In this regard, hope can be based in the movements of anti-psychiatry and transpersonal therapies. In addition, the meditation and contemplative techniques borrowed from Eastern cultures seem favorable alternatives to conformist psychotherapies of whatever type.

Here and there in the psychotherapeutic literature, one occasionally finds inspiration and is reassured that the ideal of what is distinctively human continues to burn brightly in the human heart:

People who present themselves for psychoanalysis are said to be alienated from the norm. Perhaps this is true, but that does not justify attempting to reinsert them in that norm. They are alienated because they have had a taste of something else, and once they have had that experience the norm does not seem to be worth the bother.²⁴

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Notes

1. Bernie Zilbergeld, *The Shrinking of America* (Boston: Little and Brown, 1983), p. 40.
2. *Ibid.*
3. *Ibid.*, p. 43.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 45.
5. Jerome Frank, *Persuasion and Healing* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 8.
6. Philip Rieff, *The Triumph of the Therapeutic* (New York: Harper, 1966), p. 68.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 241.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 236.
9. *Ibid.*
10. *Ibid.*, p. 243.
11. Gabriel Marcel, *Man against Mass Society* (Chicago: Regnery, 1967 [1952]), p. 40.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 71.
13. Russell Jacoby, *Social Amnesia* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1975), p. 41.
14. Adrian van Kaam, *Foundations for Personality Study* (Danville, New Jersey: Dimension Books, 1983), p. 8.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 30.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 330.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 65-66.
18. Adrian van Kaam, *Fundamental Formation* (New York: Crossroad, 1986), p. 172.
19. Erich Fromm, *The Revolution of Hope* (New York: Harper, 1968), pp. 33-34.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 37.
21. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
22. *Ibid.*, p. 40.
23. *Ibid.*, pp. 40-43.
24. Stuart Schneiderman, *Jacques Lacan, The Death of an Intellectual* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1983), p. 112.

13.

The Significance of Phenomenological Thought for the Development of Research Methods in Psychology at Duquesne University

William F. Fischer

Introduction

For more than thirty years, the psychology department at Duquesne University has been exploring the significance of phenomenological thought articulated by such philosophers as Husserl (1913/1962, 1937/1970), Heidegger (1927/1962), Sartre (1945/ 1956) and Merleau-Ponty (1942/1963, 1945/1962); by such psychiatrists such as Boss (1957/1963), Binswanger (1938/1963), Straus (1937/1963, 1966) and Frankl (1946/1962); and by psychologists such as Van Kaam (1959, 1966), Giorgi (1970) and Fuller (1990). In all, the phenomenological-psychological research methods developed at Duquesne have been integrally involved in the accomplishment of 144 dissertations, as well as 77 books and 745 articles. As one might expect, the influences of the phenomenological-psychological mode of thinking upon both the teaching and scholarly activity of the faculty has been, and continues to be, significant. In fact, it is effectively summarized in this description of the department's project (*1970-71 Duquesne University Graduate Bulletin*):

The Psychology Department at Duquesne University aims to develop and articulate, in a systematic and rigorous way, psychology conceived as a human science. Far from adopting the position that a human science is impossible, the Department believes that the conception of psychology as a human science is a positive attempt to incorporate the insights of Twentieth Century thinking into psychology. At Duquesne, the program is focused upon developing a specific type of human science psychology, one that flows from insights established by existential-phenomenological philosophy. As such, it is committed to discovering, applying, articulating, and developing these insights in such a way that a viable science of the human person emerges (p. 63).

In the present paper, I would like to describe three distinguishable, yet clearly related ways in which phenomenological thought has informed the faculty's efforts to develop effective research methods. They are: phenomenology's critique of the research methods of natural scientific psychology; existential-phenomenological pre-psychological understandings of human beings as persons; and phenomenology's description of the meanings and modes of implementation of the phenomenological attitude.

Phenomenology's Critique of the Research Methods of Natural Scientific Psychology

There are many articulate and cogent critiques of conventional, or natural scientific psychology (e.g., Husserl, 1937/1970; Fuller, 1990; Giorgi, 1970; Merleau-Ponty, 1942/1963, 1945/1962; Strasser, 1963; van Kaam, 1966; and Straus, 1935/1963, 1966). Among the issues which they raise, one that is both fundamental and immediately pertinent to the topic of this paper is the relationship of a psychology's research methods to its fundamental assumptions concerning the nature or basic reality of the situated behaviors it investigates.

Giorgi, in particular, has discussed this issue in detail. More specifically, he has described how the commitments of natural scientific psychology to atomistic, physicalistic, realistic, and objectivistic pre-psychological understandings of human processes and events determine, in

advance, that it can research these processes and events only in ways that reduce them to quantitative, typically mechanistic or biologicistic happenings. Hence, phenomenological critiques of the foundations of natural scientific psychology are, at the same time, critiques of its research methods.

To exemplify this assertion, since the days of Freud's provocative monograph (1926/1959) some 64 years ago, anxiety has been a topic that has interested researchers almost as much as it fascinated clinicians. Few have doubted its significance in human life. Still, when one reviews the assumptions and methods with which it has been researched, one is taken aback. Almost invariably anxiety is equated in advance with fear, or further defined as a species of the latter. Moreover, consistent with conventional psychology's empiricist transformation of Cartesian metaphysics, it is grasped as the effect of some external, stimulus situation. Finally, depending upon the particular predilections of the researcher, anxiety as a hypothetical construct may be defined operationally in terms of test scores, reported experiences of the stimulus situation, and/or physiological indices. All of this occurs before a single subject is run. In other words, the nature or basic reality of anxiety as a human possibility is presumed in advance. What actually is researched is if, when, and to what extent it will occur, as operationally defined, in the experimental situation.

Because it leads to research situations where the possibility of adequately revealing some phenomenon of human life is precluded in advance, the faculty of the psychology department at Duquesne have rejected natural science psychology and its methodologies as a misguided attempt to complete the Galilean-Cartesian objectification and mathematization of nature.

Existential-Phenomenological Philosophy's Pre-Psychological Understandings of Human Beings as Persons

From the preceding discussion of natural scientific psychology's philosophical anthropology and the ways in which it prefigures both research methodologies and the results of experiments, it should be clear that the pre-psychological understanding of human being, which each psychology appropriates and builds upon, is foundational to that psychology. This understanding suggests, as well as limits, both the content and the methodology of the discipline. One example is an investigation of the meaning of acceptance by a doctoral student. As a former nurse, she wanted to understand the process through which people learned about, struggled with, and perhaps eventually accepted, their diagnosis of terminal cancer. When she tried to determine what the psychological literature had to say about this phenomenon, she was somewhat amazed to find--with the exception of Goldstein's (1963) concept of "coming to terms,"--little, if any, theoretical interest or research. The idea that we are entities who may not be able to determine what befalls us, but who have no choice but to take some stand with regard to whatever comes our way, cannot be derived from a guiding preconception of human beings as things, mechanisms or even organisms.

What understanding of human beings have we appropriated from existential-phenomenological philosophy? How has this informed not only what we may research, but also how we may interrogate it? It is important to state at the outset that existential-phenomenological philosophy has not presented us with an already completed, univocal characterization of human being. Neither individually nor collectively do the writings of Husserl (1937/1970), Heidegger (1927/1962), Sartre (1945/1956), Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962, 1968), Scheler (1954), and Schutz (1962, 1964, 1966)--and the list could go on for some time--amount to a completed understanding.

What we have then are themes, or better yet, clusters of themes, each revolving around certain fundamental issues, e.g., the nature and significance of human embodiment.

The following is a schematic characterization of some of those themes. It is not meant to be exhaustive. I present them not just to reiterate what is already known, but to prepare the way for asserting that an existential-phenomenological understanding significantly facilitates our efforts as psychologists to research and characterize the psychological meanings of various human situations and behaviors.

As finite and intrinsically incarnate entities whose being is not given to us in advance, nor able to be decided once and for all, we are abidingly concerned with who we are. Hence, we attempt, through our projects of the world-with-others, to co-create ourselves. As intentional beings, entities whose being is to be-in-the-world-with-others, we are active participants in the coming to pass of meaning. That is to say, in engaging certain states of affairs of the world, we co-create, make sense of, take up, live through, and live out, the unfolding situations of our respective existences. As beings who continually find ourselves already there in situations whose aspects are often determined without our consent, we have the possibility of letting them be what they are and taking them up in their already beckoning significances. Finally, as essentially incomplete, desirous beings, we seek each other in friendship, love and sensual union.

Although this characterization is incomplete, it enables one to realize that existential-phenomenological psychologists need not objectivistically or quantitatively reduce the phenomena in which they are interested in order to research them. Whether it be anxiety or acceptance, learning or motivation, psychotherapeutic interpretation or handedness, the existential-phenomenological psychologist is free to comprehend these possibilities as human ways of participating in the imminent meanings of situations. As such, their meanings, as they are and/or have been experienced by subjects of whatever characteristics can be solicited, described, and explicated.

To state the matter rather succinctly, in appropriating existential-phenomenological philosophical characterizations of human beings, the effort in psychology has been to constitute psychology as the study of how human beings as persons, rather than as things or organisms, participate in the imminent meanings of the situations of their respective existences. Moreover, they have also been free to interrogate and investigate a wide range of phenomena without feeling constrained to ignore or otherwise to violate aspects thereof for lack of a way to do them justice.

The Meaning and Implementation of the Phenomenological Attitude

What is a phenomenological attitude and how does it inform research in psychology? When Husserl (1937/1970) described the *Crisis of European Science* and the ways in which its fundamental concepts were in danger of losing touch with their sources, he urged a return to the things themselves, "to the world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie, or a river is" (Merleau-Ponty, 1945/1962, p. ix). A return to the things themselves is a return to the life-world. It is a commitment to investigate phenomena as people actually experience and live them. As Giorgi (1970) has asserted, "the significance of the life-world for the approach of psychology is that psychology must account for its phenomena in terms of how they appear, or how they are experienced, and not in terms of some idea of how they ought to appear" (p. 139).

In other words, it is necessary to situate ourselves *vis a vis* our phenomena of interest in such a way that they most fully show themselves in themselves, from themselves, and in their own ways

of showing themselves. Moreover, it is necessary to protect research endeavors, more specifically, the subjects' descriptions, from the investigator's own typically cherished beliefs about his or her phenomena of interest, as well as from the subjects' assumptions of the natural attitude. How can this be done? Husserl tells us that we must try to bracket, i.e., hold in abeyance that which we presume to know about the phenomena. Moreover, in explicating the subjects' descriptions, we must be sensitive to their culturally fostered, realistic assumptions about the existence in-themselves of the meanings of their situations and behaviors. Instead, we must try to explicate these in their phenomenality, i.e., in their being for the subjects themselves. We must try to understand how subjects participated in the imminent meanings of their situations such that they experienced their ways of participating as instances of this or that particular phenomenon.

Still, there exist a number of fundamental issues which require further thought. For example, when I suggested that it is necessary to protect the specific meanings of phenomena as these have been signified in our subjects' descriptions, I implied that in enacting the phenomenological reduction it is possible to accomplish this. But is this really true? Can researchers actually bracket all they know or believe that they know about their phenomena of interest? According to Merleau-Ponty, "the most important lesson which the reduction teaches us is the impossibility of the complete reduction" (1945/1962, p. xv).

To be more specific, how can one ask subjects to describe their modes of participating in phenomena without implying that they should orient their descriptions to certain aspects of that participation? Moreover, when explicating their descriptions, how can one let them speak their meanings in themselves and from themselves if one does not pose questions to them? But then, can those questions remain uninformed by one's already operative beliefs? Can one really make explicit all that one believes about anything?

Finally, both the subjects' descriptions and the psychologist's own characterizations of their general psychological meanings are articulated in language. That is to say, they are already encrusted with the presuppositions and preconceptions of a culture. Is it possible really to surpass that horizon of meaning? Are not our findings fundamentally bound by cultural as well as by historical perspectives?

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14.

Towards a Human Scientific Approach to Developmental Psychology

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The ideal way to develop a phenomenologically based model of developmental psychology would be to gather a number of protocols or descriptions of experiences of human development, to bracket preconceptions regarding the experiences, and to conduct empirical, descriptive-structural research on these experiences. Eventually this would result in a tentative model of human development. A good beginning has been made already on this task at Duquesne University, yet its size will require many more years of time and effort. In the meantime it seems feasible to take a more modest approach which could serve as an intermediate step on the way to a phenomenologically-based model of human development.

Perhaps the major problem with natural scientific approaches to developmental psychology is the lack of unity which characterizes psychology itself (Giorgi, 1970, pp. 80-81). A cursory examination of textbooks in developmental psychology reveals the same confusion of multiple theoretical frameworks and empirical studies which seem to have little relation one to another. Obviously, some form of integration is needed, but it is unlikely that psychology can provide the necessary anthropology for this without reference to philosophical concepts. What seems to be called for is a new paradigm (Kuhn, 1962).

A second problem with approaches to developmental psychology is what I would call "the omission of the self." Although many facts are presented regarding physical, affective, cognitive and social development, little or no attention is given to those experiences which we would consider central in our lives and which transcend these limited categories. For example, the experience of commitment to a person, a group or a work in early adulthood both is an expression of a value and of the self, and involves a particular integration of various aspects of the person and the world. Nor can it be reduced to a simple cause-effect explanation, whether that explanation is focused on biological, emotional, rational or social categories. This particular experience of the self does not lend itself to natural scientific methods of investigation, but its structure can be approximated through a descriptive, phenomenological research approach. This is but one of a number of instances in development in which we experience ourselves truly as ourselves, which is usually omitted in natural scientific approaches.

Erikson as the Starting Point

In order to arrive at a starting point for a new paradigm for developmental psychology, we begin with an already developed and well accepted traditional theory of development. This should be more inclusive and integrated than the others, yet have some opening for the experiences of the self.

Such a theory is available in the work of Erik Erickson. His approach already represented a partial integration of various aspects of development, thus to some extent addressing the problem of the lack of unity in developmental approaches. It had extended the traditional psychoanalytic emphasis on the bodily aspect of human experience to the realms of the ego and the social, and in

such wise that they are truly integrated rather than merely added. For example, his concept of trust includes bodily trust, trust as prediction, and trust as a social experience. In *Childhood and Society* (1963) he describes his threefold approach as follows:

A human being, thus, is at all times an organism, an ego, and a member of society and is involved in all three processes of organization. . . . We are speaking of three processes, the somatic process, the ego process, and the societal process (p. 36).

Omitted in this paradigm is the dimension of the self, which is critical from an existential-phenomenological point of view. (The distinction between the ego and the self will be detailed below.) However, it does provide the terminology for these experiences of the self, though they are presented as afterthoughts or by-products of the developmental crises. Hope, will, sense of purpose, competence, fidelity, love, care and wisdom are the terms he uses to describe strengths or virtues following upon the resolution of the various developmental crises. Erickson (1968) even equates these experiences with identity when he says, for example, "I am what hope I have and can give" (p.107). As these experiences of the self are included, if only in a tangential way, the work of Erik Erikson seemed a promising starting point for this intermediary step on the way to a phenomenologically based model of human development.

Heidegger's Care Structure for a Broader Paradigm

Despite these advantages Erikson's paradigm needed to be broadened further in order to do justice to the breadth of human experience. Since psychology itself could not provide the necessary breadth, it seemed natural to move to philosophy to derive a paradigm adequate to the task. The care structure, outlined by Heidegger in his work, *Being and Time* (1927/1962), seemed ideally suited for this purpose. Although Heidegger's project was not to develop an anthropology or philosophy of the person, and he objected to attempts to understand his work in this way, such psychiatrists as Medard Boss, Ludwig Binswanger and others have found much of his work valuable in understanding human existence. Heidegger's major point, that human existence cannot be understood unless it is considered within the horizon of time, is particularly appealing to a developmental psychologist interested in a person's relation to time at different ages. It should be noted that there is, of course, a difference between a philosopher taking up Heidegger's ideas as a philosophical project and a psychologist using Heidegger's ideas as a paradigm for bringing unity to a fragmented discipline.

The care structure, which Heidegger considered the central structure of human existence, has three fundamental characteristics all of which are related to time (Heidegger, 1927/1962): "The fundamental characteristics of this entity (Dasein) are existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen" (p. 235):

The ontological signification of the expression "care" has been expressed in the "definition": ahead-of-itself, Beingalready-in (the world) as Being-alongside entities which we encounter (within the world). In this are expressed the fundamental characteristics of Dasein's Being: existence, in the "ahead of itself"; facticity, in the "Being-already in"; falling, in the "Being alongside" (p. 293).

The Care Structure Applied to the First Stage of Development

Rather than outlining the care structure and defining the terms "facticity," "falleness," and "existentiality" in general, let us proceed to the crisis of Erikson's first stage of development and see the paradigm in relation to this specific stage. The first step will be to present Erikson's three-pronged approach to this stage and then to include this in the broader paradigm. (A disadvantage of beginning with this intermediate step involves assuming that development occurs in stages, which not all phenomenologists would accept).

Erickson names the crisis of the first stage of development (the first year of life) as one of trust versus mistrust. He sees trust in terms of the body, the ego and the social. Orthodox psychoanalysis had always seen development exclusively in terms of bodily existence. The term used for the first stage of development was "orality," a term which signified that the interaction between mother and child established patterns of gratification which would have determining effects on later life, especially on issues related to dependency.

Erickson accepts this psychoanalytic insight and extends the approach to include the ego and the social. He sees the crisis of trust versus mistrust as the first task of the ego (1963, p. 249) and describes its development in the infant in this way:

The experience of a mutual regulation of his increasingly receptive capacities with the maternal techniques of provision gradually helps him to balance the discomfort caused by the immaturity of homeostasis with which he is born (p. 247).

This primitive ego becomes the first foundation of a later sense of identity, a concept which is generally considered Erikson's major contribution to psychology.

Erickson also extends the definition of trust to include the social aspect of personal life. He describes the infant's first social achievement as "willingness to let the mother out of sight without undue anxiety or rage, because she has become an inner certainty as well as an outer predictability" (1963, p. 247). He points also to the relation between the individual and social institutions regarding the issue of trust. In promoting and endorsing a sense of trust, Erikson sees religious and cosmic schemes which order and give meaning to existence as being particularly relevant. He says, "All religious have in common the periodic childlike surrender to a Provider or providers who dispense earthly fortune as well as spiritual health" (1963, p. 250).

This three-pronged approach to the issues of human development represents an advance over traditional psychoanalytic thinking and over the more specialized psychological approaches which emphasize only one or a few aspects of development such as the cognitive, the cognitive-behavioral, the affective, etc. Its basic assumptions, however, remain tied to a psychoanalytic perspective, now broadened to a more inclusive neo-psychoanalytic perspective. It remains a specialized perspective on human development. An even more inclusive paradigm is necessary in order to do justice to the breadth and depth of developmental issues. Let us now consider Erikson's approach within the broader paradigm suggested by Heidegger's characteristics of facticity, falleness and existentiality.

Facticity

Facticity (Being already in) refers to the person's finding himself or herself already in a situation, already within limits, having a past, and having been born into a certain tradition, family,

social class, gender, etc. In sum, this characteristic refers to the limits within which the person may be free. Erickson (1969) seems to acknowledge this characteristic in his book about Gandhi:

For membership in a nation, in a class, or in a caste is one of those elements of an individual's identity which at the very minimum comprise *what one is never not*, as does membership in one of the two sexes or in a given race. What one is never not establishes the life space within which one may hope to become uniquely and affirmatively what one is (p. 266).

Facticity refers primarily to the past; but, for human beings, the past is not linear and set, but constantly being worked out along with the present and the future. Traditional psychoanalytic thinking has been aimed primarily at this characteristic of human existence and has illuminated many of the ways in which we are limited or, in their view, determined by our past. It is not without precedent to include the psychoanalytic perspectives within the broader notion of facticity. Ludwig Binswanger (1963) wrote of the psychoanalytic unconscious in these terms:

The thrownness of the Dasein, its facticity, is the transcendental horizon of all that scientific systematic psychiatry delimits as reality under the name of organism, body (and heredity, climate, milieu, etc.) and also for all that which is delimited, investigated and researched as psychic *determinateness*: namely, as mood and ill humor, as craziness, compulsive or insane "possessedness," as addiction, instinctuality, as confusion, phantasm determination, as, in general, unconsciousness (pp. 212-213).

With regard then to the issue of trust, orality as the first prong of Erikson's approach would be considered within the broader concept of facticity. The determinations resulting from the mother-infant interactions in the first year of life are one aspect of the person's facticity which provides certain limitations on the trusting experience. The influence of these determinations are especially pronounced in one who is fixated at this stage of development and considered an "oral personality."

Expanding the bodily pole of Erikson's approach to the notion of facticity allows also the consideration of influences on a person's development not attributable specifically to the unconscious processes described by psychoanalysis. For example, the experience of horizontality may be included at a first stage of development with reference to the issues of trust. In the first year of life the infant is in a horizontal position, which is one of vulnerability and dependency. Jagger (1971) points out that the infant in the horizontal position has an horizon in which the significant figure is the face of the mother. If an horizon is "that which calls us forth and invites us in" (p.213), then in the infant's helplessness, the degree to which he or she can be open, has much to do with the kind of welcome received. As Jagger puts it:

There is a reassuring quality in the motherly presence which stills a child's fears. . . . A child growing up around hard faces, closed expressions, rejecting stances, will find his access to the world barred. The face of the other is the portal through which we enter the world (1971, p. 215).

It is well known that in fear perception is narrowed and that in relaxation it is opened. Patterns of such narrowing and opening are being established as part of a person's facticity in the first year.

Fallenness

The second characteristic of the care structure to be considered is fallenness. This characteristic, which we would identify in ontic terms as the ego aspect of the person, means the typical way in which we are occupied by the daily events of life, our everyday tasks, and the way in which this involvement enables us to avoid confronting some very basic issues, primarily that of our own death. The temporal mode characterizing the state of fallenness is the present. The concern with everyday business, its strategies and techniques, often shapes an attitude that our present oriented concerns are the most vital issues. In this mode, which Heidegger describes as living a series of "nows", the future is seen merely as an extension of the present. What is not confronted by the person involved is the fact that these "nows" end, that we die.

Most of what traditional American psychology calls "personality" is concerned with this ego aspect. Habitual patterns of going about our everyday concerns as, for example, those measured by personality tests, are seen as measures of who the person is. In contrast, Heidegger identifies those patterns as inauthentic, as *not* being who we really are. Consistent with this view, we would identify this aspect of the person as involving the ego which is identified with cognition in the form of strategic and technical thinking. This is distinguished from the self or existential aspect which involves authentic modes of being in the world.

A problem of terminology now presents itself in integrating Erikson's ego crises within this framework because his definition of ego is the psychoanalytic one (id, ego, superego); it does not share the general understanding of ego typical of traditional psychology other than psychoanalysis. The ego crisis of trust versus mistrust, is tied to bodily experience and does not admit of the more conscious processes typical of other views of the ego. Because of this specialized treatment of ego, Erikson's ego crises are located somewhere between the tactical and the fallen in our framework. The figures at the end of this paper represent this placement graphically.

Despite the fact that the ego crises do not adhere to the category of fallenness, Erikson does provide a vocabulary for the more usual sense of ego at each developmental stage. For the first stage the term he uses is "consistency", mostly in the meaning of predictability. As the infant begins to experience life-preserving patterns of feeding and being cared for, a certain consistency or predictability is achieved on the ego level and the foundations of ego functioning are established. The infant can eventually begin to predict events and to have these predictions confirmed or not. It remains, however, primarily an issue of perception since the infant is in the horizontal position and does not yet actively effect the outcome of events.

Three Kinds of Trust

Understanding orality and horizontality as tactical aspects of the person, and consistency and predictability as fallen aspects, three kinds of trust will now be distinguished as an introduction to the existential or self aspect. Since infants are not able to verbalize, we will move to the adult experiences of trust in order to bring out these distinctions. Although the trust crisis occurs first early in life and is lived out bodily for the most part, the resolving of issues of trust continues to occur in later life and to become focal at critical moments.

As a basis for these distinctions, Caroly Gratton's (1975) research on the experience of interpersonal trust will be used. She asked people to describe experiences of trust they had and attempted to arrive at the common constituents revealed in these descriptions. One finding particularly relevant to this discussion was the discovery of three levels of trust. In the first, which

we will describe as bodily trust, subjects experienced a prepersonal (unreflective) sense of bodily comfort with another person. They found themselves, their bodies, in a relaxed, nondefensive posture toward the other person without even thinking about it or being aware of it (until asked). This bodily aspect of trust we identify with the facticity of our existence; that is, due to my early bodily experience with others, particularly with my mother, it is a given that I feel comfortable and trusting some people and not with others. I find myself trusting or not trusting without the intervention of my ego or my understanding. This trust is prerational, prepersonal, nonreflective and constitutes for me the bodily aspect of the experience of trust. I am not responsible for it, and cannot take credit or blame for it; it is a fact of my history and development.

There was a second kind of interpersonal trust described by the subjects. In this kind the other person was trusted because he/she was consistent. This kind of trust we equate with the rational, calculative, or ego aspect. I trust because I can predict the other's response. Here we see evidence of a healthy ego, but there is also something disturbing. A distinction is made between using one's head in the service of a value and relying exclusively on one's calculations, the latter being described as neurotic or inauthentic.

In the third kind of trusting experience described by the subjects, there is a further difference. These subjects described experiences in which they were vulnerable, in which there was a risk involved, and in which they could not predict the other person's response. Yet they trusted anyway, chose to be vulnerable, and took the risk. We identify this kind of trusting with the existential aspect and call it hope in order to distinguish it from Erikson's more specialized meaning of trust.

We understand hope according to the care structure as follows: It is a fact that I am bodily predisposed to trust or not to trust and I am constantly falling into a form of socially sanctioned ego control with regard to my trusting. In the face of this, I am open to the other in a trusting way. Another way of stating this would be: My past and my bodily experience in the past limits and sets bounds to my trusting: my calculations in the present threaten to make my trusting exclusively a matter of prediction; in the face of this, I am still able to be open to a possible future, to horizons beyond horizons.

Traditional psychoanalysis points out, and correctly so, the influence of the bodily past on our capacity to hope. Erikson brings out the need to include the social and ego aspects in understanding hope. Phenomenology affirms these and integrates them into a structure which adds another aspect as central and integrative. This is the structure of the self, of possibility, a futural dimension which is always in dialogue with another or with something outside the self. Let us now clarify the existential dimension of hope in order to see how the other aspects may be integrated into this broader understanding.

Existentiality and Being-With

In the preceding section the third characteristic of the care structure, existentiality, was introduced with regard to the first stage of development. In a broader sense, existentiality is the characteristic of possibility, of future, which in Heidegger's care structure has the highest priority (Gelven, 1970): "The future is the most determinate and significant of the three ekstases and Dasein's basic focus of meaning is future" (p. 189). Human existence is seen here not as pure possibility, but as factual possibility, that is, as embodied, finite, limited. As Gelven (1970) explains:

The awareness of death points out one of the most persistent doctrines of Heidegger's philosophy, that possibility means more than merely a future actuality. As a human being I live in the realm of possibilities--and it is in the realm of possibilities that authentic existence is realized (p. 157).

Authentic living is related most directly to the characteristic of existentiality. I am not authentic in merely surrendering to the facticities of my life, nor in calculating and busying myself in a fallen way, but in discovering and creating my possibilities. This characteristic of existence is generally omitted in developmental theories or, as in Erikson's case, is merely hinted at since it does not lend itself to the research methodologies of the natural sciences. In our approach this characteristic not only is included, but is seen as the most significant in integrating the experience of the various stages.

For example, hope has previously been described as the existential or self aspect of the first stage of development. The issues of dependency, vulnerability and calculative prediction are resolved in the experience of hope which integrates them in such a way as to strengthen the person and express his/her authenticity. Hope includes relaxation and openness of perception in the face of risk and danger. It is future-oriented and invites the person to involvement with the world and others. Those institutionalized infants described by Spitz (1945) and Bowlby (1952), who had higher rates of illness and death, would seem to be examples of those who were unable to hope and succumbed to despair. In later, extreme experiences of threat, such as illness and imprisonment, the crisis is reexperienced and the possibility of hoping is present.

The reflections of Gabriel Marcel (1962) lend support to this description of the experience of hope as he distinguishes it from optimism (pp. 33-34) and from calculation (p. 65), and as he describes the secret affinity between hope and relaxation in the face of fear (pp. 38-39). Ernst Bloch further emphasizes the importance of hope, an experience ignored by natural scientific psychology. David Gross (1972) describes his work as follows:

Let us begin by *man hoping*. As Bloch views him, man is not *given man*--not man as the sum of his current attributes-- but man-on-the-way to something beyond himself. He can be said to have an "essence", but the core of that essence is not static or "thick". In fact, it has not even been substantially defined as yet because it is an unfinished essence still on the way toward realizing itself. Man has not already been grasped and pinpointed; rather he is still open, still on the way to becoming what he potentially is. And the form this openness takes when man becomes his own project is hope: hope that he can become what he is not yet (p.116).

Developmental psychologists would do well to research the experience of hope since it is so central to the first stage of development and to life itself. In our descriptive-structural research on this experience using the subjects' descriptions, we have found initial support for most of the structural elements delineated above. In this proposed paradigm there is a similar future-oriented experience which integrates the issues of each stage and these also need to be researched and understood.

In the face of phenomenology's depiction of human existence as being-in-the-world, there is a certain contradiction in calling the existential aspect the self aspect. The self is not an autonomous self, but is always in relationship. In this paradigm Erikson's inclusion of the social in development is much in harmony with Heidegger's structure of Being-with. Gelven (1970) describes this Heideggerian structure:

To say that Being-with (or to be-with) is an *a priori* existential of Dasein means that one cannot be a self unless it is within one's possibilities to relate in a unique way with other Daseins. Hence to be Dasein at all means to-be-with (p. 68).

The concept of self is used in this paradigm in order to distinguish it from ego (fallenness); however, the self is always to be considered optically in relation to others and the world. In the first stage of development, for example, the infant has always to be considered in relation to the mother and not as an independent entity. Also, the relationship one has to others and the world is one of co-constitution; that is, one shapes the world and others just as one is shaped by them. The infant makes the mother be in certain ways, primarily by his/her dependency at the same time as the mother also makes the infant be in certain ways. Now that the main components of the paradigm have been delineated (facticity, fallenness, existentiality, being-with), we can present in figure 1 the paradigm as it relates to the first stage of development:

Summary

In addition to providing an integration of the various themes of the individual stages, one of the advantages of the broader paradigm is that it opens up the self experiences listed under existentiality in Figure 2. These experiences, which are central in human life, have been excluded from psychological study because they have had to be defined in operational terms in order to conform to the natural scientific paradigm. The research approach of phenomenology, on the other hand, allows us to identify the essential constituents and structures of these experiences from descriptive protocols, and to understand them in a more holistic sense. The need for a psychology of hope and will has been pointed out by Leslie Farber (1966) as he describes a meeting with Martin Buber:

I had the good fortune to spend a few weeks with Martin Buber, when he came to Washington in 1957 to give The William Alanson White Memorial Lectures for the Washington School of Psychiatry. One evening, as we walked to the lecture hall, I idly asked him what he thought the future held for psychoanalysis or for psychotherapy in general. To my surprise, since he could not have known of my own preoccupation, he replied that he believed my profession needed more than anything else for its further development a psychology of will. . . . At a time when I was only beginning to investigate the disabilities of will, described in this volume, I learned that Father Lynch was simultaneously occupied with the privileges of will—or "wishing," to use his own term—as he formulated a psychology of hope (pp. vii-ix).

As indicated above, some beginnings have already been made in developing a psychology of hope. The work of W.F. Lynch (1974), *Images of Hope: Imagination as Healer of the Hopeless*, is one example of such an attempt. The work of Viktor Frankl (1959), *From Death-camp to Existentialism*, is a still earlier attempt to deal with the issues of hope and despair. Much more work is needed for a more complete understanding of this very significant life experience.

With regard to the experience of will, Farber's (1966) *The Ways of the Will* represented a new beginning in modern psychology, to understand how we go about willing our futures and the impediments to such willing. It is interesting and also a sign of imbalance that most traditional psychological studies emphasize the impact of the environment on the person and largely neglect

the impact of the person on the environment. Perhaps the balance could be reestablished by psychological studies which deal also with the impact of individual and collective willing in social change.

The experience of the imagination also has been neglected by traditional psychology. Edward Murray's recent works (1986, 1987) have pointed to the centrality of the imagination in human existence and have considered the imaginative experience from a psychological perspective. Obviously, much more psychological research is necessary on this topic.

Robert White's work (1960, 1979), from a traditional psychological perspective, has done much to clarify the cognitive aspects of competence in human development. However, a more radical approach which treats competence as an experience of the self is needed. The traditional psychological paradigm of prediction and control will not suffice. A more popular author, Robert Pirsig (1979), points to the need for a new paradigm in approaching a topic such as competence which cannot be reduced to mere technique:

What you're up against is the great unknown, the void of all Western thought. You need some ideas, some hypotheses. Traditional scientific method, unfortunately, has never quite gotten around to saying exactly where to pick up more of these hypotheses. Traditional scientific method has always been at the very *best*, 20-20 hindsight. It's good for seeing where you've been. It's good for testing the truth of what you think you know, but it can't tell you where you ought to go, unless where you ought to go is a continuation of where you were going in the past (p. 273).

So little has been written about the experience of fidelity in psychology itself that it is necessary to refer to a philosopher, Gabriel Marcel (1964), for its structural understanding. He points to the difference between the ego mode of constancy and the self mode of fidelity:

It may at once be observed, however, that constancy, construed as immutability, is not the only element entering into fidelity. Fidelity implies another factor which is far more difficult to grasp and which I shall call presence. . . . I am constant for myself, in my own regard, for my purpose-- whereas I am present for the other, and, more precisely: for thou (pp. 153-154).

The adult existential modes (love, care and wisdom) are even more sparsely treated in psychology than the previous ones. There is a helpful structural treatment of care by Mayeroff which has relevance to earlier stages of development as well, but the need for empirical phenomenological studies of these experiences is great indeed.

One of the principles of the existential-phenomenological approach to the human sciences involves the primacy of the life world. The attempt here is to let experience shape theory rather than to fit experience into theoretical schemes. Broadening Erikson's approach to human development hopefully will allow for a greater range of experience. Still, the limitations of the broader model are such that it represents only an intermediate step on the way to a truly human-scientific developmental psychology. Cooperation in this search is welcome.

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