

Cultural Heritage and Contemporary Change
Series IIIB. South Asian Philosophical Studies, Volume 1

Authentic Human Destiny: The Paths of Shankara and Heidegger

Vensus A. George

The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy

**Copyright © 1998 by
The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy**

Gibbons Hall B-20
620 Michigan Avenue, NE
Washington, D.C. 20064

All rights reserved

Printed in the United States of America

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication

George, Vensus A.

Authentic Human destiny: The paths of Shankara and Heidegger / Vensus A. George.
p.cm. – (Cultural heritage and contemporary change. Series IIIB. SouthAsia philosophical
studies, vol. 1)

Includes bibliographical references and index.

I. Shankara. II. Heidegger, Martin, 1889-1976. I. Title. II. Series.

ISBN 1-56518-119-0.

Table of Contents

| | |
|--|------|
| <i>Abbreviations</i> | vii |
| <i>Foreword</i> | xi |
| <i>Preface</i> | xiii |
| <i>Introduction</i> | 1 |
| | |
| Part I. From Aparaa Vidhyaa to Paraa Vidhyaa | |
| 1. Aparaa Vidhyaa: The Phenomenal State of Man | 23 |
| 2. Paraa Vidhyaa: The Noumenal State of Man | 47 |
| 3. Brahmaajijnaasa: Movement from Aparaa Vidhyaa to Paraa Vidhyaa | 71 |
| | |
| Part II. From Care to Transcendence | |
| 4. Care: Dasein's Being-in-the-World | 103 |
| 5. Transcendence: Dasein's Being-toward-Being | 193 |
| 6. Ereignis: Movement from Care to Transcendence | 253 |
| | |
| Part III. The Paths of Shankara and Heidegger: A Comparative Analysis | |
| 7. Similarities | 283 |
| 8. Differences | 317 |
| 9. A Critique | 343 |
| Conclusion | 379 |
| Bibliography | 385 |

Foreword

George F. McLean

Metaphysics can be deceptive. At first sight it can seem to be removed from concrete life. In reality it plumbs most deeply to grasp the real nature and meaning of what generally is perceived only on the surface. This ability is a hallmark of great thinkers.

Professor Vensus George in this masterful work takes us deeply into the thought of two of the world's great thinkers. Shankara is the leading thinker in the great metaphysical traditions of India. According to one chronology, after Hinduism had been reformed and replaced by Buddhism, and after this, in turn, had served for the thousand years predicted by the Lord Buddha, a new reformation was needed. It was Shankara who reargued the original truths of the Hindu vision and brought about its restoration throughout India. The acuity of his philosophical insight has remained the basic point of reference for Indian metaphysics ever since. This enabled it to retain its spiritual insight regarding the deep meaning of human life, which it plunges definitively into eternity so that all of life is suffused with divine meaning.

Heidegger has performed an analogous service for modern thought. After the Reformation and a long exploration of the capacities of human reason, rationalism had come to the limits of its forces. By mid 20th century it had degenerated into totalitarian forces engaged in massive pogroms and holocausts within, and in attempts at mutual destruction without. It was essential that the mind be able to break beyond this conflict and to plumb anew the sources and meaning of being. This was the contribution of Martin Heidegger who received the phenomenological relay from Husserl and transformed this exploration of intentionality into the study of Being as emerging into time. Indeed as he moved to Being itself in the second stage of this project he approached ever closer to the areas and issues treated so long before by Shankara.

Both thinkers confront directly the key question of authenticity for human life: is this realized by closing in upon itself as self-sufficient or does it require a transcendence of self to absolute Self in terms of which relations to others acquire a sacred meaning. In response, where Shankara takes us into the depth of Being as Self, Heidegger renews our understanding of beings as emerging therefrom into time, and of the Being they thereby express. Rarely has the depth and meaning of being been so incisively and clearly illuminated as by these two thinkers. Never, also has their thought been brought together in so mutually enlightening a manner as in the present work.

It might be objected that it is difficult to compare the thought of persons so different in time, but as this line of argumentation is advanced it threatens to result in the loss of the ability of humanity to learn from the past -- or to learn it all. This cannot be.

What Professor George does is rather to analyze the method and metaphysical structure of the thought of each of these thinkers, thereby enabling the reader to obtain a solid grasp of their description of the path of authentic human destiny to absolute Being and life in the divine opened.

This done, he proceeds to the work of comparison, showing their points of convergence and thereby enabling the reader to appreciate anew the force and depth of the insights of each. Finally, he analyses the differences between the two which makes it possible to appreciate empathically the limitations of the approach of each.

The result is magnificent insight along with a humbling awareness of the human difficulties in achieving full understanding of the munificence of Being. Thereby one gains a better sense of

what can be known of the infinite richness of Being, which yet ever remains to be explored more fully by the human mind and manifested creatively in the life of persons and peoples.

This work of Vensus George on the paths of Shankara and Heidegger toward authentic human destiny marks an important milestone on our pilgrimage toward the eternal in time.

Preface

Vensus A. George, S.A.C.

Shankara and Martin Heidegger are two seminal and originative thinkers, representing the Indian and Western traditions, who left their marks on the thinking of their respective times. Both were dissatisfied with the thinking and culture of their eras.

Shankara was unhappy about the condition of his society in which the practice of Hinduism had come to be reduced largely to ritualism and the caste system dominated every aspect of life. Shankara saw the need to transform Hinduism, both in its philosophy and practice. By proposing Advaita Vedaanta, he attempted to restore Hinduism as a true path to authentic human destiny.

Martin Heidegger was shocked by the dominance of science and technology and of subject-centered thinking as this resulted in forgetfulness of true human destiny in Being.

Thus, both Shankara and Heidegger were concerned with helping people find their true paths to genuine life. Their efforts in showing the way to authentic human destiny form the theme of this work entitled, *The Authentic Human Destiny: The Paths of Shankara and Heidegger*.

Coming to the end of this project, I look back gratefully to those persons and institutions, who have stood by me in this effort. In a special way I acknowledge the support and encouragement received from Dr. George F. McLean, Ph.D., once a student of T.N.P. Mahadevan and R. Balasubramaniam at The Radhakrishnan Institute for Advanced Study in Philosophy, The University of Madras, and now Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, in conceiving and accomplishing this work. At The Catholic University of America, Washington D.C., he directed my first explorations of the metaphysics of Shankara. It was during a meeting with him in February, 1996, that the idea of working out this extended project emerged. Since then, he has been a source of encouragement to me until the completion of this work.

I wish to acknowledge also the deep background received from Dr. Ignatius Viyagappa, Ph.D. at The Institute of Philosophy and Culture of the Satya Nilayam in conjunction with The University of Madras in my initial explorations of the thought of Martin Heidegger, published as *From Being-in-the-World to Being-toward-Being* (Nagpur: SAC Publications, 1996).

I am grateful also to the Council for Research in Values and Philosophy for publishing the present work.

Finally, I remember with gratitude Reverend Father Roc Gerald Majella, S.A.C., who has taken a great deal of trouble and contributed enormously in the preparation of the manuscript. I express my sincere thanks to the Pallottine community in India and especially at Pallotti Illam, Madurai, for their concern and support throughout the period I was working on this project.

Abbreviations

1. Shankara

AB Aatmabhooda
AU Aiteriya Upahishad
BG Bagavat Giita
BGB Bagavat Gitta Bhaasya
BSB Brahma-Suutra Bhaasya
BU Brihadaraanyaka Upanishad
BUB Brihadaraanyaka Upanishad Bhaasya
Ch.U. Chanduukhya Upanishad
CU Chandoogya Upahishad
GKV Gaudapaadakaarika Bhaasya and Maanduukhya Upanishad Bhaasya
Ke.U. Keena Upanishad
Ke.U.B. Keena Upanishad Bhaasya
KU Kaatha Upanishad
KUB Kaatha Upanishad Bhaasya
Ma.U. Manduukhya Upahishad
MU Mundaka Upanishad
MUB Mundaka Upanishad Bhaasya
PI Panchadassi
PU Prasanna Upanishad
SU Svetaasvatra Upanishad
TUB Taittiriya Upanishad Bhaasya
UI Upadeshasaahasrii
VC Viveekachudaamani
VSS Vedaantasaara of Sadaananta Gogindra

2. Heidegger

2.1. *Original Works*

BH Brief ueber den Humanismus
ED Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens
EM Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik
FD Die Frage nach dem Ding
FS Fruehe Schriften
FW Der Feldweg
GL Gelassenheit
GP Die Grundprobleme der Phaenomenologie
HD Erlaeuterungen zu Hoelderlins Dichtung
HT Heraklit
HW Holzwege
ID Identitaet und Differenz

KM Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik
N I Nietzsche I
N II Nietzsche II
PM Parmenides
PT Phaenomenologie und Theologie
SD Zur Sache des Denkens
SF Zur Seinsfrage
SG Der Satz vom Grund
SP "Nur ein Gott kann uns retten"
Der Spiegel Interview
SZ Sein und Zeit
TK Die Technik und die Kehre
UK Der Ursprung des Kunstwerkes
US Unterwegs zur Sprache
VA Vortraege und Aufsaeetze
VS Vier Seminare
WD Was heisst Denken?
WG Vom Wesen des Grundes
WM Was ist Metaphysik?
WN Wegmarken
WP What is das -- die Philosophie?
WW Vom Wesen der Wahrheit

2.2. *English Translations*

BPP Basic Problems of Phenomenology
BT Being and Time
BW Basic Writings
DT Discourse on Thinking
EB Existence and Being
EGT Early Greek Thinking
EP The End of Philosophy
GE German Existentialism
IAD Identity and Difference
IM An Introduction to Metaphysics
KPM Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics
LH Letter on Humanism
PLT Poetry, Language, Thought
QB The Question of Being
QCT Question Concerning Technology and other essays
SI "Only a God can Save Us, *Der Spiegel*
Interview with Martin Heidegger"
TB On Time and Being
WCT What is called Thinking?
WIP What is Philosophy?
WL On the Way to Language

WT What is a Thing?

Introduction

The human person can live one's life in two ways. Either one can be caught up in everyday cares and worries, or one can transcend them and live a life focused on one's authentic destiny. But the problem one faces, often, is to find the right means to make the transition from inauthenticity to authenticity. History has provided humankind with many great souls (*mahaatmaas*), who have shown the way to authentic living. Our concern, now, is to look into the paths to authentic human destiny, proposed by two great personalities, representing the Indian and the Western traditions, viz., Shankara and Martin Heidegger, respectively. In the first and the second sections, we attempt to study the lives, backgrounds and the thoughts of these thinkers. The last section will spell out the plan, with the help of which, we would analyze the Shankarite and Heideggerian paths to authentic human destiny.

1. Shankara's Life and Thought

In this section, we would like to consider the exact period in which Shankara lived, his family and intellectual background, the significant events of his life, his search for the Divine, his deep religiosity and the desire to reform Hinduism, thereby taking it to its original glory. We would also highlight Shankara's thought, by indicating some of his significant literary contributions in the field of religion and philosophy, his role as the commentator par excellence and the importance of his Advaitic school of thought.

1.1. Shankara's Life and Background

Shankara was born in a Nambudhiri family,¹ at Kaladi, a small village on the West coast of South India. There is no consensus, among the historians of Indian thought, about the exact dates of his birth and death. According to Telang, Shankara belonged to the middle or the end of the sixth century A.D. Sir R.C. Bhaandaarkar suggests 680 A.D., as the year of Shankara's birth. Anandagiri, in his biography of Shankara, *Samkaravijaya*, proposes that he was born in 44 B.C. and died in 12 B.C.² None of these is based on sound evidence; they are only possible dates. Today the generally accepted dates of Shankara's birth and death are 788 A.D. and 820 A.D., respectively.³

Though it is difficult to determine the exact dates of Shankara's life, still the fact that he is an historical figure and a thinker of extraordinary merit, is beyond any doubt. He, indeed, is an academic prodigy. It is said that, at the age of ten, he not only memorized the scriptures, but also wrote commentaries on them. He is said to have written the illustrious commentary on Brahma-

¹ A sect of Brahmins, who are the priestly class of the Hindu society.

² Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1947), pp. 447-448.

³ We have chosen these dates based on the authority of V. Bhattachariya. He says: "Our old traditions are so divergent that, according to them as well as modern researches, we shall have to place Shankara some time between 6th century B.C. and 9th century A.D.; viz., 6th century B.C., 4th century B.C., 1st century B.C., 4th century A.D., 6th century A.D., and 9th century A.D. (i.e., 788-820). The last date is accepted by many a scholar." Vidhusherhar Bhattacharyya, ed. & trans., *The Agamasaastra of Gaudapaada* (Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1943), p. lxxix, no. 8 (hereafter: ASG).

Sutras, when he was just twelve years old.⁴ As a young boy, Shankara was totally dissatisfied with the society in which he lived. At that time in history, Hinduism, in its practical aspect seemed to give primary importance to ritual practices and sacrifices. In the Hindu society, the caste system⁵ was prevalent, and the lower castes were treated with contempt by the higher castes, especially by the priestly class. The enlightened teaching of Buddha called for a transformation of hearts and interior attitudes, which were not given due importance, in the religious life of the people. Besides, Buddhism with its teaching worked towards the equality of all men by not accepting the disparities of the caste system. This message of love and equality of all, and the non-acceptance of the ritualism of Hinduism, attracted many, especially people of the lower castes, to Buddhism. As many embraced Buddhism, Hinduism began to lose its significance, and no longer had its former influence on the lives of the people. At the time of Shankara, Hinduism was at its lowest ebb. Though a boy, Shankara realized the need for change and transformation in Hinduism both in its philosophy and in its practice. He saw the need to understand the lofty truths of Hinduism in a new light and wanted his people to live by this new understanding of the scriptures.

At this time his father died. Shankara was puzzled at the phenomena of life and death and wanted to find a solution to these mysteries of life. He saw the passing nature of this world and this life. *Mohamudgaram: The Shattering of Illusion*, which is believed to have been written by him at this period, reveals clearly the state of his mind and his insight into life at this early age. In this work Shankara writes:

Who is thy wife? Who is thy son?
The ways of the world are strange indeed.
Whose art thou? Whence art thou come?
...Behold the folly of man:
In childhood busy with his toys,
In youth bewitched by love,
In age bowed down with cares...
Birth brings death, death brings rebirth,
Where then oh man is thy happiness?
Life trembles in the balance
Like water on a lotus leaf.⁶

Shankara impelled by his desire to turn his society into the way of truth, obtained his mother's permission to enter the monastic life. He traveled to the banks of the river Narmada, where he met the great sage and philosopher Gaudapaada, who directed Shankara to his pupil, Govindapaada, a renowned teacher. Under his guidance Shankara gave himself to the practice of meditation and yoga, attained complete mystical realization, and began to teach others.

He wandered as a teacher from place to place, engaging with leaders of other schools of thought in discussion, making them realize their erroneous doctrines and practices. Of the many such debates Shankara's debate with Mandan Mishra, a great thinker of the time, is worth noting.

⁴ Cf. S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 532.

⁵ There are four castes in the Hindu society: *Brahmins* (the priestly class), *Kshatriyas* (the rulers), *Vaisyas* (the artisans), and *Suudras* (the slaves).

⁶ Shankara, *Crest-Jewel of Discrimination (Vivekachudaamani)*, trans. Swamin Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood, 3rd ed. (California: Vedaanta Press, 1978), p. 2.

Mandan Mishra held that the vocation of the householder is superior to that of a monk (*sannyasin*). Shankara convinced Mandan Mishra, of the falsity of his belief. As a result, he became a monk and a disciple of Shankara, taking a new name Suresvaraacaarya, who later is said to have annotated Shankara's commentary on the *Brahma-Suutras*.⁷

Besides conducting debates to enlighten the minds of the people, Shankara also established monasteries (*mutts*), in order to perpetuate the truths of Advaita Vedaanta. Shankara was not only a debater, a philosopher and a mystic, but also a man of human kindness and filial affection. He openly violated the law which governs the order of *Sannyasins*, by conducting funeral services for his mother, and thus had to face many objections from his community.⁸ Shankara's short but active life came to an end at Kedarnath in the Himalayas at the age of thirty-two.⁹

1.2. Shankara's Thought

Though Shankara's life was short, his literary output was enormous. Shankara was the commentator par excellence of the Vedas. He wrote commentaries on the *Bagavad Giita*, the *Vedaanta-Suutras* and on all the major Upanishads. In these and his other works such as the *Upadeeshaahasrii*, the *Viveekachudaamani* and other works, he elaborated the main lines of Advaita Vedaanta. Besides, Shankara also wrote many hymns in praise of popular deities to help ordinary people in their way to God. Many additional works, such as, *Aatmaboota* and the *Mohamudgaram* are attributed to him.¹⁰

In his major works Shankara intended to formulate an integral speculative system of great logical subtlety. Though, he gave prime importance to the scriptures, he was not hesitant to use logic and reason to elaborate his doctrine of Advaita on firm philosophical grounds. George Thibaut, in his introduction to the *Vedaanta-Suutras*, notes:

The doctrine advocated by Shankara, from a purely philosophical point of view, and apart from theological considerations, is the most important and interesting one which has arisen on the Indian soil; neither those forms of the Vedanta which diverge from the view represented by Shankara, nor any other non-Vedic systems, can be compared with the so-called orthodox Vedaanta in boldness, depth and subtlety of speculation.¹¹

Though no one denies the philosophical subtlety of Shankara, still as a commentator of the scriptures, he is not given the prime place by some authors. S. C. Chakravarthi remarks:

Shankara was a great intellectual of his time. He was also a past master of dialectics. He was well qualified to be the founder of a new system...But when he took upon himself the role of the commentator, he had not right to forget his position and foist upon the Upanishads a philosophy

⁷ Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 448.

⁸ Cf. *ibid.*

⁹ Cf. Swami Prabhavananda, *The Spiritual Heritage of India* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962), pp. 279-282.

¹⁰ Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 450.

¹¹ George Thibaut, trans., *The Vedaanta-Suutras with the Commentary by Shankaraacaarya, The Sacred Books of the East* [hereafter: *SBE*], Vol. XXXIV, ed. F. Max Mueller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890), p. xiv.

of his own...As an exponent of the art of dialectics he may be looked upon as a great success, but as an interpreter of the Upanishads, he is a huge failure.¹²

S.K. Das shares almost the same view, when he says:

He (Shankara) overrides others (other commentators) by the sheer force of his greatness,...in particular of his logic of absolutism and his logic of apprehension. The whole host of other commentators exhibit in their interpretation what may be called the thoughts arrested development, ...(that) they all point by force of their unconscious logic to the Advaita Vedaanta of Shankarite type as their natural culmination.¹³

Even though these authors do not seem to recognize Shankara as an authentic interpreter of the Upanishads, still they accept him as a subtle thinker, who has given a logical and philosophical basis to the later systems of Vedaanta, and gave new life to the Hindu Vedic culture through his writings, debates and example.

Though our intention here is not to decide as to whose interpretation of the *Suutras* is superior or faithful to the scripture, in response to the contention of these scholars and to justify Shankara, it should be noted that his interpretation of the scripture is based on his own inner experience and mystical vision of truth. A religious genius, like Shankara, while interpreting the scripture cannot be faithless to his own inner experience of *Brahman*.¹⁴ Dr. Radhakrishnan rightly points out that "he (Shankara) is a philosopher and a poet, a servant and a saint, a mystic and a religious reformer."¹⁵

2. Heidegger's Life and Thought

Here, we would like to look into the life and background of Martin Heidegger, focusing on his multifaceted personality and on the quality of seeking, which is characteristic of him. In attempting to understand Heidegger's thought, the threefold interpretations given by different thinkers will be analyzed.

2.1. Heidegger's Life and Background

Martin Heidegger, who is acclaimed as a seminal thinker and a significant philosopher of the present era, sometimes is referred to as "a man without a biography."¹⁶ Though, this might be an exaggeration, yet his life was simple and normal as that of an ordinary German professor. Except for the period between May, 1933 to February, 1934 during which he was involved with Hitler's Nazi party, his life was basically uneventful.¹⁷ He was born at the little town of Messkirch, in Southwest Germany on September 26, 1889. For the most part he lived and worked there, in the town of his birth -- except for the five years at Marburg -- until he died on May 26, 1976, four

¹² Sures Chandra Chakravarti, *Human Life and Beyond* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1947), p. 52.

¹³ Saroj Kumar Das, *A Study of Vedaanta* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1937), pp. 29-30.

¹⁴ Cf. Troy Wilson Organ, *The Self in Indian Philosophy* (London: Mouton & Co., 1964), p. 93.

¹⁵ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 450.

¹⁶ Thomas Sheehan, ed., *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker* (Chicago: Precedent Publishing Inc., 1981), p. 3.

¹⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, p. v.

months before his eighty-seventh birthday.¹⁸ Some of his writings highlight his life and his multifaceted personality. *The Course of My Life*,¹⁹ *A Recollection*,²⁰ and *My Way to Phenomenology*²¹ give biographical details regarding Heidegger's life, education, academic pursuits and the influence of other thinkers on him. His essays *Why Do I Stay in the Provinces?*²² and the *Pathway*²³ point to Heidegger's desire for oneness with nature, which one can experience only in the simple, still, calm and rustic life of the country. Such a natural environment gave him the perfect space and the solitude²⁴ needed for his philosophical search.

All through his life, Heidegger was a seeker. As every seeker must be, Heidegger was courageous in his seeking. He was never afraid of going wrong while seeking. But, when he realized that he was in the wrong, he was never apologetic about it; nor did he regret his going astray from the truth. Instead, he courageously moved forward and continued his search. This is clear from the statements he made during the *Der Spiegel* Interview.²⁵ It is this attitude that made Heidegger isolate himself from the National Socialism and to resign the office of Rector of Freiburg University.²⁶ He did not count the cost of choosing what is true, when he knew that something was the truth. Bernhard Welte, gives the following tribute to Heidegger:

He (Heidegger) was always seeking and always underway. At various times he emphatically characterized his thinking as a path. He traveled this path without ceasing. There were bends and turns along it; certainly there were stretches, where he went astray. Heidegger always understood the path as one that was given him, sent to him. He sought to understand his word as a response to an indication to which he listened without respite. For him, to think was to thank, to make a grateful response to that appeal.²⁷

2.2. Heidegger's Thought

The 'matter-for-thought' of Heidegger's seeking has been received with great interest, even though he himself has been suspect due to his involvement with Nazism. Heidegger is one of the few thinkers to whom much attention is paid by researchers and scholars, even during his lifetime. Therefore, it is natural that there are differences of opinion among the Heideggerian scholars regarding the manner in which his philosophy is viewed and interpreted. One opinion says that the whole of Heidegger's thinking is contained in his major work, *Being and Time*, as it anticipates all the themes that occur in his later writings.²⁸ Yet there is another view, which recognizes three

¹⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁹ Cf. Martin Heidegger, "The Course of My Life," in J.J. Kockelmans *Martin Heidegger: A First Introduction to his Philosophy* (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965), pp. 1-2. This small 'write-out' written in 1914, contains biographical details that accompanied Heidegger's doctoral dissertation.

²⁰ Cf. Thomas Sheehan, *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, pp. 21-22.

²¹ Cf. Martin Heidegger, "My Way to Phenomenology," *Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre*, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: New American Library, 1975), pp. 234-241.

²² Cf. Thomas Sheehan, *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, pp. 27-30.

²³ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 69-72.

²⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 28.

²⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 45-67.

²⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 52.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 73.

²⁸ Cf. Roger Waterhouse, *A Heidegger Critique: A Critical Examination of the Existential Phenomenology of Martin Heidegger* (New Jersey: Humanitas Press, 1981), p. x.

separate periods in Heidegger's path of thinking.²⁹ There is a third view, which speaks of two periods in Heidegger's thinking that are named as Early Heidegger or Heidegger I and Later Heidegger or Heidegger II. This view is held by a number of reputed commentators of Heidegger. According to them there came about a shift³⁰ in Heidegger's thinking that made him move from the early phase to the latter phase. Even they differ among themselves regarding the nature of the shift. Thinkers, like John Wild, Alphonse de Waelhens, Lazalo Versenyi and some others, say that there is a break in Heidegger's thought, the nature of which is such that there is no bridge leading from Heidegger I to Heidegger II. In other words, they speak of a complete break between the two phases. There are others, such as Otto Poeggeler, William J. Richardson, Walter Schulz and Werner Marx, who, though they recognize the shift in Heidegger's thinking, hold for a coherence and unity of both the phases. In other words, they see the two phases, not as isolated from each other, but as a continuity, both in content and aim, though the perspective is different. Thus, for them, Heidegger II is an explication and an interpretation of Heidegger I, from the perspective of Being.³¹

The view of the second group of thinkers, seems to be in agreement with what Heidegger himself thought about the shift in his thinking. For Heidegger, the change involved in the shift is neither a break in his thinking, nor an abandoning of the earlier standpoint for the later. To quote him: "This turning (shift) is not a change of stand-point from *Being and Time*, but it is the thinking that was sought which first arrives at the location of that dimension out of which *Being and Time* is experienced."³² Besides there are some topics which Heidegger promises, at various places in *Being and Time*, that he would take up in the section of 'Time and Being',³³ for example, the

²⁹ Cf. Vincent Vycinas, *Earths and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961). Vincent Vycinas speaks of the phase of Dasein, the phase of Being and the phase of earth and gods, as three phases in Heidegger's way. Cf. also James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger* (Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1970), pp. 183-186. Demske speaks of the first, the middle and final stages of Heidegger's thinking.

³⁰ Heidegger himself explicitly accepted that there was a shift in his thought. Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Brief ueber den Human-ismus," *Wegmarken* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978), p. 325 (hereafter: *BH*, *Wegmarken*). Martin Heidegger, *Basic Writings: From 'Being and Time' (1927) to 'The Task of Thinking' (1964)*, ed. D. F. Krell (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1978), pp. 207-208. Cf. also William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 3rd ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), pp. xvi, xviii, xx. The shift has come about in relation to five books Heidegger has written after *Sein und Zeit*, viz., *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (1928), *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (1928), *Was ist Metaphysik?* (1929), *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* (1930) and *Einfuehrung in die Metaphysik* (1935). The first two books continue the theme of *Being and Time*, while in the next two already the tone is set for the transition, and Being gains prominence over Dasein. In the last book, especially in its later part, the shift is inaugurated.

³¹ Cf. J.L. Mehta, *Martin Heidegger: The Way and the Vision* (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii, 1978), pp. 350-351. Cf. also A. Borgmann, "The Transformation of Heidegger's Thought," *Personalist*, 47 (1966), 485-486. Thinking in the line of the second type of thinkers, Johnson J. Puthenpurackal speaks of the relation between Heidegger I and Heidegger II as 'unity of thinking and difference in perspective'. Thus, for him, the way of Heidegger is a movement from a hermeneutical circle (Dasein) to an alethological circle (Being). Cf. Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, *Heidegger: Through Authentic Totality to Total Authenticity*, (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987), pp. 229-254.

³² *BH*, *Wegmarken*, p. 325; *BW*, p. 208.

³³ Cf. Otto Poeggeler, "Being as Appropriation," trans. R.H. Grimm, *Philosophy Today*, 19 (1975): 164.

fuller development of the idea of phenomenology,³⁴ of onto-logy,³⁵ and the discussion on language.³⁶ The fact that Heidegger wanted to publish these topics in the unpublished section of *Being and Time*, viz., ‘Time and Being’, from a different perspective, substantiates Heidegger’s claim that the change envisaged in the shift is already present at the initial stage of *Being and Time*. Heidegger clarifies this point when he says: "Only by way of what (Heidegger) I has thought does one gain access to what is to be thought by (Heidegger) II. But the thoughts of (Heidegger) I becomes possible only if it is contained in (Heidegger) II."³⁷ Thus, the ‘matter-for-thought’ *Being and Time* has not really changed even after the shift, but the perspective with which it is considered is changed. Heidegger remarks: "...the road (*Being and Time*) has taken remains even today a necessary one, if our Dasein is to be stirred by the question of Being."³⁸ Commenting on this point J.L. Mehta concludes that the writings after the shift are a critique and a commentary on *Being and Time*.³⁹ Therefore, for Heidegger, the completion of the shift "is not a turning to a new position, but rather a return to the original point of departure and a return to the ground upon which the circle-of-thought has rested from the beginning."⁴⁰

Two events seem to have made Heidegger bring about the shift in his thought. They are the failure of *Being and Time* to accomplish its intended task of clarifying the meaning of Being and Heidegger’s political involvement. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger raises the question of Being⁴¹ and analyzes it in relation to time.⁴² He chooses the existential analysis of Dasein⁴³ to clarify the

³⁴ Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, 12th ed. (Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1972), p. 357 (hereafter: *SZ*); Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962), pp. 408-409 (hereafter: *BT*).

³⁵ Cf. *SZ*, p. 230; *BT*, pp. 272-273.

³⁶ Cf. *SZ*, p. 349; *BT*, pp. 400-401.

³⁷ William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. xxii.

³⁸ *SZ*, p. vii; *BT*, p. 17. It is an interpolation made by Heidegger in the 7th edition of *Being and Time*, in 1953.

³⁹ Cf. J.L. Mehta, *Heidegger: The Way and the Vision*, p. 344.

⁴⁰ Otto Poegeller, "Being as Appropriation," pp. 165-166.

⁴¹ Martin Heidegger uses two German terms "*Sein*" and '*Seiende*'. The former is translated in English as 'Being', while the latter is rendered as 'being'. For Heidegger, there is a fundamental difference in the meaning of these two terms. The former is referred to as the 'Being of beings' (*Sein des Seiendes*). Being itself is not a being, but the ultimate condition, which allows all beings to exist. It is a process, which gives being passage from nothingness to existence and by which beings remain in existence. It is often referred to in Heidegger’s writings as the Ground or the Source, as it sustains beings in its self. Cf. Rudolph J. Gerber, "Heidegger: Thinking and Thanking of Being," *Modern Schoolman*, XLIV (1967): 205-206. Cf. also *SZ*, pp. 2-8; *BT*, pp. 21-28.

⁴² Cf. *SZ*, p. 1; *BT*, p. 19.

⁴³ The term 'Dasein' has been translated in various ways. William J. Richardson renders it as 'There-Being'. R.J. Gerber translates it as 'Being's-place'. It derives from the German term '*Da*' (there) and '*Sein*' (Being). For Heidegger of *Being and Time*, Dasein is not equitable with man. While man is a being, Dasein is a process. It is a process of being a 'self', as Dasein’s nature is such that it is an ability to be. Dasein’s selfhood lies in its ability to revolve upon being itself. This process comes to pass only in man. Heidegger speaks of Dasein 'in' man. It provides the horizon in which the inner-worldly things are rendered manifest. The entire self-structure, i.e., Dasein, is neither masculine nor feminine, but neuter, as Dasein may come to pass in an 'I' or in a 'thou'; in a male or in a female. But Dasein is not an impersonal process, but pre-personal in that it is an *a priori*, which renders individual selves possible. Hence, often the neuter pronoun 'it' is used to refer to it. Cf. John D. Caputo, "Heidegger’s Original Ethics," *New Scholasticism*, 45 (1971): 128. Cf. also *SZ*, p. 11; *BT*, p. 32. But Heidegger does not follow this distinction between man and Dasein,

meaning of Being, as he has the ontic, ontological and ontico-ontological priority.⁴⁴ In this endeavor, that which he interrogates (*das Befragte*) is Dasein; that which is interrogated (*das Gefragte*) is Being; and that which is to be found out by asking (*das Erfragte*) is the meaning of Being.⁴⁵ Even though it was Heidegger's aim, he did not succeed, as he only dealt with the preparatory analysis of Dasein and his relationship to temporality, while the section three that should have treated the relationship between temporality and Being, viz., 'Time and Being' did not appear as per the original plan.⁴⁶ Heidegger indicates the inadequacy of *Being and Time* to accomplish the task of clarifying the meaning of Being at the end of the written portions of *Being and Time* as follows:

...Our way of exhibiting the constitution of Dasein's being remains only one way which we take. ...Whether this is the only way or even the right one at all, can be decided only after one has gone along it. The conflict as to the interpretation of Being cannot be allayed, because it has not been enkindled...it is of the kind which cannot get enkindled unless preparations are made for it: Towards this alone the foregoing investigation is on the way.⁴⁷

Thus, it is clear that the published portion of *Being and Time* has failed to achieve its original aim. The reason for the failure of *Being and Time* was that, though Heidegger wanted to break with the metaphysical tradition and subjectivistic thinking, he was not able to be completely out of it at that time.⁴⁸ In *Being and Time*, he raises the question of Being from the subjectivistic perspective, even though he did not want to do so. Thus, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger has his legs, as it were, in two boats. On the one hand, he wants to extricate himself from the metaphysical-subjectivistic thinking and, on the other hand, he is unable to pull himself out of the very thinking he detests. "Throughout *Being and Time* there is a tension owing to the fact that the work lies halfway between metaphysical thinking and the new way of thinking."⁴⁹ For example, Heidegger speaks of Dasein's essence as existence in the sense of transcendence, and yet limits it by saying that every existence is one's own, i.e., an owned selfhood. Again, authenticity of Dasein is reached by the call of conscience, which cannot be controlled by Dasein. But authenticity is attained only when Dasein resolutely owns the call in anticipation of his own death. These examples from *Being*

in his later writings, as he uses them as synonyms. Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 346; *BW*, pp. 228-229. So there is an inconsistency in Heidegger's use of these terms. We translate it as 'human person' or 'man', as in the last analysis the self-structure of which Heidegger speaks in the term 'Dasein' is the human entity. In clarifying the nature of Dasein Heidegger distinguishes between two types of analysis, viz., the existential-ontological and the existential-ontical. The first pair refers to the realm of structures underlying Dasein, while the second pair refers to the level of the concrete acts of existence. It is in the latter that the former is actualized in its various possibilities. Man is existential and ontic; but Dasein is that which constitutes the 'Da' of 'Sein' in man. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 11-13; *BT*, pp. 32-34. Cf. also James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 17. In later Heidegger, Heidegger ignores this distinction as well.

⁴⁴ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 13-15; *BT*, pp. 34 -35.

⁴⁵ Cf. Otto Poegeller, "Being as Appropriation," pp. 164-165.

⁴⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 165. For the design of *Being and Time* as planned originally. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 39-40; *BT*, pp. 63-64.

⁴⁷ *SZ*, pp. 436-437; *BT*, pp. 487-488.

⁴⁸ Cf. Michael E. Zimmermann, "The Foundering of Being and Time," *Philosophy Today*, 19 (1975): 102.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

and Time indicate that it was bound to fail, as it was attempting to give a new way of thinking without fully being out of the metaphysical thinking.⁵⁰ To quote Heidegger:

The adequate execution and completion of this other thinking that abandons subjectivity (Heidegger II) is surely made more difficult by the fact that in the publication of *Being and Time*, the third division of the first part 'Time and Being' was held back...The section in question was held back because thinking (Heidegger I) failed in the adequate saying of this turning (shift) and did not succeed with the help of the language of Metaphysics.⁵¹

Besides, the failure of *Being and Time*, Heidegger's political involvement, may be another event that might have influenced Heidegger to make the shift in his thinking. Martin Heidegger actively supported, especially in his public addresses at the University of Freiburg and to many workers' groups, the cause of Hitler and the National Socialist Party,⁵² besides being an active member of the party for ten months between 1933 to 1934. One might wonder why such an outstanding thinker of the time, who was supposed to be the spiritual leader of the academic community and the nation,⁵³ could so easily fall in line with the thinking of Hitler and the Nazi Party.

One reason was Heidegger's belief in himself, as the philosopher-prophet, who was called to guide the German nation in that troubled period of the 1930s, like Fichte in the early 1800s. Besides, he also believed that with his national and international reputation as a philosopher he could do something to alter the destiny of Germany for the better. It would have been wrong for any person of Heidegger's standing to remain unmoved when his nation went through such turmoil. So as an authentic patriotic citizen of Germany, he might have felt within himself that he should give spiritual direction to the German nation. It was probably what the nation expected of an outstanding thinker like Heidegger.⁵⁴ Just as Plato attempted to bring about a philosopher-king at Syracuse by genuine support and education, so also Heidegger felt that the particular political situation of Germany in 1933, called him to guide the political leader of Germany.⁵⁵ This may have made Heidegger support Hitler and his National Socialist Party, which was the dominant political force in the 1930s.

Another possible reason was his belief that Adolf Hitler was a practical and wise man, an efficient leader of the German nation, in whose hands the Germans must place their destiny. The 1930s was a period of general political confusion. There were about 22 political parties in Germany, with divergent views on national policies.⁵⁶

⁵⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 106. Cf. also Otto Poegeller, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, 2. Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1983), p. 180.

⁵¹ *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 325; *BW*, pp. 207-208.

⁵² Martin Heidegger, *German Existentialism*, trans. Dago-hert D. Runes (New York: Philosophical Library, 1965), pp. 19-20, 42 (hereafter: *GE*).

⁵³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 18.

⁵⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 15.

⁵⁵ Cf. Leon Goldstein, "Heidegger and Plato on the Good" *Philosophy Today*, 22 (1978): 332-354. Cf. also Michael E. Zimmermann, *Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity* (London: Ohio University Press, 1981), p. 174. Cf. also Martin Heidegger, "Nur noch ein Goett kann uns retten: Spiegel-Gespraech mit Martin Heidegger," *Der Spiegel*, 26 (1976): 193 (hereafter: *SP*); Martin Heidegger, "Only God can Save Us: *Der Spiegel* Interview with Martin Heidegger," trans. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. Thomas Sheehan, p. 46 (hereafter: *SI*).

⁵⁶ Cf. *SP*, p. 196; *SI*, p. 48.

As none of these parties was able to solve the nation's problems, a strong leader and a national party was the need of the time. Heidegger saw in Adolf Hitler and in the National Socialist Party an answer to this need and so spoke in favor of Hitler.⁵⁷ Though an initial impression of Heidegger during the early months of his tenure as the Rector of the Freiburg University, he realized that he needed to make some compromises with the officials of the party to get a wider audience for his views.⁵⁸ Heidegger did have his differences with the party specially as he was against its racist tendencies. But, he still believed that the movement could be guided, by the presence of intellectuals, like him, within the party.⁵⁹

Heidegger's belief in himself as a philosopher-king to guide the German destiny, his belief in Hitler and his party as the salvation of the German nation, and the belief in his and other intellectuals' ability to direct the course of the National Socialist Party came to a standstill when circumstances forced him to resign from his office of Rector in spring 1934.⁶⁰ After his resignation, the intellectuals of the Nazi Party attacked Heidegger personally in their writings.⁶¹ He was constantly watched, especially, during his lectures.⁶² In 1934, he was prevented from participating in the International Philosophical Congress in Prague and in 1937 he was excluded from the German delegation for the International Descartes Congress in Paris.⁶³ Heidegger was declared as the most expendable professor and was sent to the Rhine to build fortifications.⁶⁴ From these happenings after his resignation as the Rector, Heidegger realized that he was unrealistic in believing that he could change the course of National Socialism which was racism, social Darwinism, an active form of Subjectivism and a philosophy of will-to-power. It also dawned on him that besides having no control over this type of world view, he himself was in its hold as long as he was an ardent supporter of the National Socialism of Hitler. This awareness made Heidegger undertake a study on Nietzsche's philosophy of will-to-power from 1936-1944 and give lectures on Nietzsche, in which, he criticized the National Socialist world view, which accepted Nietzsche's philosophy as its basis.⁶⁵ Heidegger's involvement with the political situation in Germany between 1933-1934 made him understand experientially the danger of subjectivistic thinking, characterized by the will-to-power that was put into action in Hitler's Nazi ideology and which he himself was attempting in *Being and Time*. Thus, in turn, led to the shift in his thinking and thereby enabled him to raise the question of Being from a new perspective.

Thus, already in the early 1920s, Heidegger was aware of the fact that he had to break with the metaphysical-subjectivistic thinking and pose the question of Being in a non-metaphysical way. But he was neither certain of the exact method of approach, nor did he have, at that time, the right conceptual frame-work. Heidegger began to grasp the full implications of the shift and the direction he needed to take in order to raise the question of Being, only after the foundering

⁵⁷ Cf. *ibid.*

⁵⁸ Cf. *SP*, p. 198; *SI*, p. 49. Heidegger, in this interview, regrets making such compromises with the National Socialist Party. He says further that he had made no such statements that would amount to a compromise since 1934. Cf. *ibid.*

⁵⁹ Cf. Karl A. Moehling, "Heidegger and the Nazis," *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. Thomas Sheehan, p. 35.

⁶⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 37.

⁶¹ Cf. *ibid.*

⁶² Cf. *SP*, p. 204; *SI*, p. 53.

⁶³ Cf. *SP*, p. 204; *SI*, p. 54.

⁶⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

⁶⁵ Cf. Michael E. Zimmermann, *Eclipse of the Self*, pp. 178, 196-197.

of *Being and Time*, which made him realize the inability of metaphysical language to understand Being, and his political involvement in 1933, which made him realize the danger of subjectivistic metaphysical thinking. In his letter to William Richardson Heidegger notes: "...the matter thought in the term reversal (shift) was already in my thinking ten years prior to 1947."⁶⁶ This clearly points to the fact that before, during and after his political involvement, Heidegger was reflecting seriously on the shift. The completion of the shift in Heidegger's thinking happened during the decade before 1947, even though Heidegger was aware of the shift as early as the 1920s.

Therefore, the shift from Heidegger I to Heidegger II is not something abrupt or sudden. It is not only related to Heidegger's intellectual development, but also conditioned by the event of his political involvement. It is basically a shift in perspective rather than a reversal in Heidegger's thinking. Heidegger I is a movement from Dasein to Being, while Heidegger II is a movement from Being to Dasein. This, firstly, involves a change in perspective, in which the emphasis moves from Dasein to Being as the horizon of Dasein. Secondly a change in the relationship between Being and Dasein, in which the role of Being is ontologically prior to that of Dasein.⁶⁷ But in both of these phases Dasein plays a significant role. In Heidegger I he encounters Being in and through his involvement with the world of his concern, while in Heidegger II Dasein is the lighting-up-place of Being.

3. Plan of This Work

Having looked into the lives, backgrounds and thoughts of Shankara and Heidegger, we could give a brief sketch of this work entitled *The Authentic Human Destiny: The Paths of Shankara and Martin Heidegger*. As the title itself suggests, the aim of this work is to expound the paths of Shankara and Heidegger to authentic human destiny and analyze them in comparative light, bringing out their similarities and differences. We accomplish this task, in three parts and nine chapters.

Part One elaborates the Shankarite path to authentic human destiny. For Shankara, it is a movement from *aparaa vidhyaa* to *Paraa vidhyaa*, i.e., a transition from the phenomenal state to the noumenal state. The clarification of the Shankarite path is done in three chapters, dealing with the phenomenal state, the noumenal state and the transition, respectively. The first chapter deals with *aparaa vidhyaa*, the phenomenal state of man. In this state man is caught up in himself under the domination of *maayaa* in its cosmic and individual aspects. Here one identifies oneself and one's destiny with one's life in this world. Living such a state, man has no thought about his ultimate destiny. In analyzing *aparaa vidhyaa*, we consider its nature, consequences and characteristics. The second chapter highlights the *Paraa vidhyaa*, the noumenal state of man. In it, the goal of *Paraa vidhyaa*, its nature and characteristics are considered. In the third chapter we attempt to study *Brahmaajij-naasa*, the process of movement from *aparaa vidhyaa* to *Paraa vidhyaa*. Here, besides distinguishing the process of *Brahmaajijnaasa* from the goal of *Brahmaanubhava*, we also look into the three stages of *Brahmaajijnaasa* and the end of the process, viz., *Samaadhi*.

In Part Two, we attempt to study the Heideggerian path to authentic human destiny, which is a movement from care to transcendence. Chapters four, five and six state the Heideggerian path, each analyzing care, transcendence and the transition, respectively. Chapter four looks into Dasein's being-in-the-world, as a state of care, in which he is caught up in and concernfully

⁶⁶ Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. xvi.

⁶⁷ Cf. James M. Damske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 91.

involved with entities and other Daseins. It also treats the three concerns that mark Dasein in this state of care, viz., the epistemological, the relational and the existential. Chapter five deals with the state of transcendence, in which Dasein lives a Being-centered existence. Here, we will elaborate the goal, the way and the attainment of Dasein's life, characterized by being-toward-Being. Chapter six looks at the process of the path to authenticity. Besides clarifying *Ereignis* as the state in which Dasein's movement from care to transcendence takes place, it considers the two stages of this path and its end, viz., Dasein's total authenticity. In order to bring these points into focus, themes from early and later Heidegger are also taken up for consideration in this chapter.

Part Three builds on the work already done in parts one and two, aiming to bring to comparative light the striking similarities and differences that exist between the paths of Shankara and Heidegger to authentic human destiny. Chapter seven focuses on the similarities between the paths of Shankara and Heidegger, while Chapter eight attempts to throw light on the differences that are found in these two paths. In both chapters, we bring together the similarities and differences respectively, under the themes: man, Being and the path. Chapter nine attempts a critique of the paths of Shankara and Heidegger to authentic human destiny and other related issues. In the conclusion, we indicate the fundamental presuppositions and the similarity of purpose that underlie the paths of Shankara and Heidegger, and open the possibility of raising the issue of authentic human destiny from the global perspective.

Part I
From Aparaa Vidhyaa to Paraa Vidhyaa

Aparaa Vidhyaa: The Phenomenal State of Man

This chapter looks into the nature, consequences and characteristics of *aparaa vidhyaa*. The phenomenal state of man is characterized by superimposed knowledge. The cause of such a knowledge is *maayaa*, which has two aspects, viz., the cosmic and the individual. With the help of these aspects, the *maayaa* brings about significant changes in man's perception of himself and his experience of the world. Besides, we will also consider some of the fundamental characteristics of *aparaa vidhyaa* in this chapter.

1.1. Nature of *Aparaa Vidhyaa*

This section elaborates the nature of *aparaa vidhyaa*. It is a state that is characterized by superimposition. Besides analyzing the nature of superimposition, the section looks into its cause, viz., *maayaa*.

1.1.1. Superimposition

Superimposition literally means the mistaken ascription or imputation of one thing for the other. By superimposing, one attributes to a thing qualities of an essential nature which do not belong to it. In his introduction of the *Vedaanta-Suutras*, Shankara defines superimposition as "the apparent presentation (to the consciousness), by way of remembrance, of something previously observed, in some other thing."¹ In other words, superimposition takes place, when the qualities of one thing which are not immediately present to the consciousness, through memory are given to or projected upon another thing that is present to the consciousness and identified with it.² In the example of the snake being superimposed on the rope, or a man being superimposed on a tree stump in semi-darkness, the rope and the tree stump, which are presented to the consciousness are in fact taken as a snake and as a man respectively, through the mistaken attributions of what is known and remembered in some previous perception. Thus, the judgments 'this is a snake' and 'this is a man' are the results of a positive identification between what was experienced from the previous experience (snake and man) and what is perceived right now (rope and tree stump).³

The idea of superimposition (*adhyaropa*) has been interpreted differently by four branches of Advaitic School. The so-called *Anyathakhyatvaadins* define it as the superimposition of attributes of one thing on another thing. For example in the act of superimposition, the attributes of one thing, snake for instance, are superimposed upon the rope, even though snake does not exist at all at the place where one perceives the rope. The *Atmakhyatvaadins* maintain that in superimposition the modification of the qualities in the thing perceived is brought about by internal organs. In the above-mentioned example, the form of the snake is superimposed on the external thing, namely, rope, by the internal organs. Thus the form of the snake appears externally even though it is not in fact there. The *Akhyatvaadins* define superimposition as the error founded on the non-

¹BSB, I, i, pp. 11-12.

² Eliot Deutsch, *Advaita Vedanta: A Philosophical Reconstruction*, 2nd ed., (Honolulu: The University Press Hawaii, 1962), p. 33.

³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 34.

apprehension of the difference between the superimposed (unreal) and something which is superimposed (real). Others define *adhyaropa* as the fictitious assumption of attributes contrary to the nature of that thing on which something else is superimposed.⁴

Though all these views differ in one or the other point, they all converge in the central idea of superimposition as mistakenly considering one thing as the other. Advaitins illustrate this theory by the examples of the desert which in a mirage appears to contain water, and shells scattered on a beach which on a moonlit night appear like silver pieces.⁵ According to Shankara the attributes of non-self (*anaatman*), i.e., the world of thought and matter (*maayaa*) which has only phenomenal and relative existence, are falsely superimposed on *Brahman*. Thus the ultimate reality, the absolute and changeless *Brahman*, appears as the multiplicity of the world of phenomena due to false superimposition of the unreal on the real. "The obstruction that prevents the recognition of the self (*Brahman*)...is the superimposition of what does not really exist and is not self-evident in the self (*Brahman*)."⁶ Thus, as long as one remains in the spell of *adhyaropa* or superimposition, one will consider the world of multiplicity and of names and forms (*namarupa*) as the ultimate and absolute reality.

After describing the nature of superimposition, Shankara raises a question which could possibly be raised by a critic, namely, whether this theory of superimposition is applicable to absolute and changeless *Brahman*? We can superimpose something or an attribute of something on another object only when we perceive the object on which we superimpose the quality in question. For in-stance, one can superimpose the idea of the snake on a rope only if the rope is presented to one's perception. Therefore, in order that there take place superimposition, understood in the sense of mistakenly attributing one thing for the other, the presence of the object on which something is superimposed is necessary. This being so, how can one superimpose the phenomenal world on *Brahman* who is absolute, infinite and not apparent to our senses? In other words, the knowledge of *Brahman* belongs to the level of transcendental knowledge (*Paaraa vidhyaa*), and how can one who has not known the reality of *Brahman*, still being in the level of phenomenal knowledge (*apaaraa vidhyaa*), superimpose the world of phenomena on *Brahman*?

To this contention Shankara replies that *Brahman* is not non-object in the absolute sense. For it is the object of the notion of the ego, and the interior self is well-known to exist on account of its immediate (intuitive) presentation. Nor is it an exception to the rule that objects can be superimposed only on other objects before us, i.e., in contact with our senses, for ordinary people superimpose on the sky, which is not the object of sense perception, the dark-blue color.⁷ Thus, Shankara does not deny the possibility of one superimposing an object which is not an object of his sense perception, on some other thing. But his main argument for the superimposition of the phenomenal world on *Brahman*, is based on the 'ego-idea' which is the object of everyone's experience.

Here Shankara seems to point to two stages of superimposition. Firstly, the 'ego-idea' is superimposed upon the inner self, which is absolute existence and reality. As a result of this first super-imposition one loses the universal idea of *Aatman* being the absolute existence, and considers oneself as an individual. Secondly the 'ego-idea' reaches outward as it were, and identifies itself with the body, physical and mental attributes and actions, without ever being aware

⁴ Cf. *BSB*, I, i, pp. 2-3.

⁵ Cf. Shankara, *Self-knowledge (Aatmabhooda)*, trans. Swami Nihilananda (New York: Ramakrishna Vivekananda Center, 1980), Introduction, p. 42 (hereafter: *AB*).

⁶ Shankara, *Panchaadasi*, trans. Hari Prasad Shastri (Lon-don: Shanthi Sadan, 1956), I, 13 (hereafter: *PI*).

⁷ Cf. *BSB*, I, i, pp. 3-4.

of the true nature of the 'I'. Thus, by attributing individuality and other qualities to oneself, he sees multiplicity everywhere and super-imposes on *Brahman* the multiple world of names and forms (*maayaa*) which is constituted of individuals like himself and different from himself. One identifies everything in the world of *maayaa* with oneself. The inner self, which is the absolute principle, looks on as if it is a witness (*saakshin*). It is completely unaffected by these false attributes, yet makes them all possible, for without it *maayaa* cannot exist. Thus, the world of appearance, basically depends on the 'ego-idea' and once the 'ego-idea' is removed from the consciousness the *maayaa* also disappears.⁸

1.1.2. *Maayaa: The Cause*

Maayaa is the cause of superimposition. It is *maayaa* which causes different modes of thinking, projections of worldly appearance and various conflicting ideas. It is antagonistic to knowledge and is the source of all the contradictions, relativities, dichotomies and polarities of human existence. There is a touch of mystery to the reality of *maayaa*, and the human intellect cannot attempt to exhaust its manifold forms, modes and possibilities. If not for *maayaa*, human existence, would not have any novelty and sense of wonder. *Maayaa* is not an empty concept that attempts to explain the passing nature of reality; it has a scriptural foundation. Starting from the Vedas, the Upanishads and the *Giita* give an account of *maayaa*, as affecting the human world and existence. We could elaborate briefly the meaning of *maayaa* as understood in the scriptures.

We find the beginnings of the doctrine of *maayaa* in the *Rig Veda*. Here the term '*maayaa*' is used for supernatural powers that belong to gods. The god *Indra* is said to assume many forms through *maayaa*.⁹ Thus, *maayaa* means a power to transform oneself and assume various forms. Besides, it also indicates the names, forms and multiplicity of the visible universe. Thus, the diversity we experience in daily life is *maayaa*. In the Upanishads, we find an indirect reference to *maayaa* as that which 'covers' or 'veils' the truth.¹⁰ The Upanishads also give direct statements about *maayaa*. In Svetaasvatara Upanishad we find a direct reference to the term '*maayaa*', and the Lord who possesses it is called *Maayin*.¹¹ The Lord *Maayin* is said to be the maker of the whole world, who creates the world with the help of *maaya*.¹² Brihdaaranyaka Upanishad associates *maayaa* with god *Indra*, who takes many forms because of it. Thus, in these two instances *maaya* refers to what is within a person or to a quality peculiar to him rather than something that exists outside. Thus, the word '*maayaa*', derived from the root '*ma*' which means 'to form' or 'to build', is taken in the Upanishads as the creative power of God by which he fashions the universe. The Upanishads do not suggest that the world built by using the power of *maayaa* is illusory. In the *Giita*, *maayaa* is associated with *Iishvara*. It is the power which enables *Iishvara* to produce multiple natures. It is an energy (*shakti*) of *Iishvara*, i.e., the power of self-becoming (*aatmavibhuuti*). This power is called *maayin*.¹³ Thus *Iishvara* and *maayaa* are dependent and

⁸ VC, pp. 13-16.

⁹ Cf. Shankara, *Brihdaaranyaka Upanishad Bhaasya*, trans. Swami Madhvananda, 5th ed. (Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1975), II, v, 19 (hereafter: *BUB*).

¹⁰ Cf. F. Max Mueller, trans., "Kaatha Upanishad," *SBE*, Vol. XV, part II, I, ii, 4-5 (hereafter: *KU*).

¹¹ Cf. F. Max Mueller, trans., "Svetaasvatara Upanishad," *SBE*, Vol. XV, part II, IV, 10 (hereafter: *SU*).

¹² Cf. *BUB*, II, v, 19.

¹³ Cf. S. Radhakrishnan, trans., *Bagavad Giita* (London: Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1949), XVIII, 61 (hereafter: *BG*).

beginningless. At a later stage of the *Giita* thought *maayaa* gradually comes to have a delusive character as it hides the real from our experience.¹⁴

Thus, the doctrine of *maayaa* has its foundation in the scriptures. Shankara takes up this doctrine and interprets it from the perspective of Advaita Vedaanta. For him the question -- when and how superimposition occurred or the 'ego-idea' brought about the phenomenal world -- is not something we can intellectually grasp. That is why Shankara maintains an enlightened agnosticism with regard to the origin of *maayaa* and its relationship to *Brahman*. We could proceed with our discussion as did Shankara himself, noting that *maayaa* is both a statement of fact and a principle.¹⁵ As a statement of fact it is the present, the past and all possible worlds. "It is a domain of antithetical situations, subject-object distinctions, paradoxes and antinomies,"¹⁶ that characterize the world of our everyday perception. As a principle, like *Brahman*, *maayaa* is eternal and beginningless. "*Maayaa* is beginningless (*anaadhi*), for time arises only within it; it is unthinkable (*acintya*), for all thought is subject to it; it is indescribable (*anirvacaniya*), for all language results from it."¹⁷ In this sense *maayaa* has been described by Vedaantins as the inexplicable power of the supreme Lord, by which all the changes in this world are brought about.¹⁸ As the phenomenal world, it cannot be considered either a being (*sat*) or a non-being (*asat*). Though the world of appearance is unreal (*asat*) in the sense that it does not exist to the one who has attained the true and the highest knowledge, it is real (*sat*) in the sense that it appears to exist as long as ignorance persists. *Maayaa* is known to the consciousness, the witnessing agent and therefore is taken as real. But, at the same time it cannot be regarded as real as the absolute reality (*Brahman*). Nor can it be viewed as co-existent with *Brahman*, as it loses its existence as soon as knowledge is attained. It can be compared to a fog that covers the sun from our view, but when the sun is in full view the fog vanishes. *Maayaa* is real in the sense that it presents objects to our perception, but unreal in that it is not transcendently existing as *Brahman*. Thus, *maayaa* is something mysterious. It seems to have no definite beginning in the sense of having a definite cause. At the same time it produces something that has the appearance of reality; and this appearance loses itself, when the truth of knowledge dawns. We could say that *maayaa* is a principle that cannot fully be explained, and which is the source of the fact that there are plurality and diversities in the universe.¹⁹

To the question -- how *maayaa* causes these dichotomies, contradictions, plurality and subject-object distinctions -- Shankara replies that it is due to the nature of *maayaa* that is made up of three qualities (*gunas*), namely *sattva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. It is by the presence or the absence of these three *gunas* in varying degrees that different stages in the cosmic cycle take place.²⁰ When *sattvaguna* is predominant there is produced the *jnaanashakti*, which is responsible for the working of the whole cognitive process. With preponderance of *rajas* and *tamas*, there is produced the *kriyashakti*, which has two powers, namely, the concealing power (*avaranaashakti*) and the power of projection (*vikshepashakti*).²¹ It is by the power of concealment that *maayaa* veils

¹⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, VII, 25, 14.

¹⁵ Cf. *VC*, p. 12.

¹⁶ Ramkant A. Sinari, *The Structure of Indian Thought* (Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1970), p. 134.

¹⁷ Eliot Deutsch, p. 29.

¹⁸ *AB*, Introduction, p. 52.

¹⁹ Cf. S. Dasgupta, vol. I, p. 443.

²⁰ Cf. *AB*, Introduction, p. 52.

²¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 57.

the true nature of *Brahman* and *Aatman*. A small cloud by obstructing the vision of the observer conceals, as it were, the solar disc which extends over many miles. Similarly, *maayaa* enshrouds man's spiritual intelligence and conceals the self (*Aatman*) which is unlimited and not subject to transmigration, thereby preventing our realization of its identity with *Brahman*. *Avernashakti*, therefore, is the negative aspect of concealment. It is that force which enables *maayaa*, so to enshroud *Aatman* that he becomes the subject of pleasure, pain and misery.²² The projecting power of *maayaa* is always present with the concealing power. It is the positive aspect of *maayaa* that brings manifold realities into the world; it constitutes the world of names and forms. *Vikshepashakti* is identical with the power of creating. With this power, *maaya* creates the appearance (*vivartha*), superimposes (*adhyaasa*) the unreal on the real and leads one to error (*bhranti*), like that of a 'rope-snake' or a 'shell-silver'. Therefore, that power of *maayaa* which creates the illusion or mistaken impression on the self (*Aatman*) is called *vikshepashakti*.²³ Thus, by the simultaneous interplay of the concealing and the projecting powers, *maayaa* veils the true and real nature of the absolute reality, and at the same time 'forms' or 'creates' the world of appearance, just as ignorance conceals the nature of the rope and creates the illusion of a snake.²⁴

Maayaa appears in two different modes, namely, the collective or cosmic (*samasti*) and the individual (*vyasti*). From the collective point of view it is seen as one; whereas from the individual point of view it is many. Advaitins explain the two modes using the illustrations of the trees and the lake. From the collective point of view a group of trees is considered as a forest or a grove, while at the same time a grove can be seen as many individual trees. Again, water in a lake can be considered as one from the collective mode, yet from the individual aspect it can be seen as different quantities of water. Similarly, *maayaa* can be considered as aggregate and individual. The individual *Maayaa* is called *avidhyaa*.²⁵ *Maayaa*, in its cosmic aspect is the principle of individuation. It is *Brahman's* power of becoming or appearing as many. Therefore, the origin of the world-process and the changes that take place in the world are attributed to cosmic *maayaa*. It is the capacity to bring the entire existence appearing as objective to the finite consciousness. Thus, in cosmic *maayaa*, the idea of origination, which implies power and will, is more apparent. But it denies the objectively real and manifests the objectively false. Collective *maayaa* is the mysterious primeval ignorance that exists eternally in relation to consciousness and which is free from all forms of differentiation. Here the *sattvaguna* predominates. The individual *maayaa* (*avidhyaa*) is the principle of ignorance that intercepts things from view. Thus, in it, the idea of obscuration is more prominent. *Avidhyaa* brings about such obscurations by misinterpretation of one thing for another, like a rope for a snake. It denies knowledge of identity and projects subjectively false ideas. In it *rajasguna* and *tamasguna* dominate.²⁶

1.2. Consequences of Aparaa Vidhyaa

According to Shankara whether it be in its cosmic or individual aspect, *maayaa* veils the true nature of *Brahman*, the absolute reality. It serves as the limiting adjunct (*upaadhi*) for *Brahman*,

²² Cf. Swami Nihilananda (trans.) *Vedaantasaara or The Essence of Vedaanta of Sadaananta Gogindra*, 3rd. ed. (Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1968), II, 52, p. 42 (hereafter: VSS).

²³ Cf. *ibid.*, II, 54, p. 58.

²⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

²⁵ Cf. *AB*, Introduction, p. 58.

²⁶ Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture* (New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1987), pp. 106-109. Cf. also *PI*, I, 15-17.

just as the sun's rays are veiled by the clouds. Now, we shall elaborate the effects of *maayaa* in both of these aspects.

1.2.1. Effects of Cosmic Maayaa

The cosmic *maayaa* leads to the appearance of the world of names and forms. In the cosmic absorption of everything in *Brahman*, there comes about a sudden change, when *Brahman* wills to evolve from within and express itself. This, in turn, disturbs the indeterminate *maayaa* and its constituent elements, viz., the *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. When *Brahman* accepts *maayaa* in its *sattvic* element, it becomes *Ishvara. Brahman*, in association with *sattva* is the all-knower, because everything is reflected in its intelligence. As veiled by cosmic ignorance *Brahman* is called *Ishvara* or *sagunaa Brahman*. *Ishvara* is the supreme Lord, who is worshipped by the ordinary people as their personal god in the form of different deities. According to Shankara, *Brahman* with qualities is a step lower than *Brahman* with out any qualities (*nirgunaa Brahman*). *Ishvara* is the highest manifestation of the absolute *Brahman* in the phenomenal world. Besides he is the highest reality the human mind can grasp and the human heart can love. Shankara also holds that the *Ishvara* is omniscient, omnipotent and has ultimate power over inferior limiting adjuncts. The limiting adjuncts that are characteristic of *Ishvara* with *sattvic* element are superior limiting adjuncts (*niratisayoopaadhi*). *Ishvara*, in association with the *tamasic* element, acquires lower limiting adjuncts (*nihinoopaadi*). *Ishvara*'s superior limiting adjuncts direct the inferior limiting adjuncts by *rajasic* elements of *maayaa*; thereby there originate the elements of nature. To quote Shankara: "The Lord (*Ishvara*) endowed with superior limiting adjuncts,"²⁷ "rules the souls with inferior adjuncts."²⁸ Thus, *Ishvara*, in association with *maayaa* and the constituent *gunas* form the material and efficient cause of the cosmic order. The lower limiting adjunct of *Ishvara* lies at the root of the evolution of the five subtle elements (*suukshmabhuutas*), viz., the ether (*aakashaa*), the air (*vaayu*), the fire (*teejas*), the water (*aap*) and the earth. These elements do not intermix as they are pure and simple elements. They have distinctive qualities: *aakashaa* - - sound, *vaayu* -- energy, *teejas* -- heat and light, *aap* -- taste and the earth with the potency of affecting smell.²⁹

From the subtle matter originates the gross matter (*mahaab-huutas*) by a process of five-fold combination (*panciikarana*). It consists in the combination of parts of every subtle element in different proportions to form the gross matter. Since *mahaabhuutas* are combinations of all subtle elements, the former imbibes the qualities of the latter. As a result, the *mahaabhuutas* are not entirely different from *suukshmabhuutas*, as the latter is the cause of the former, just as a piece of cloth is not different from the threads that make the cloth.³⁰ From the *mahaabhuutas* and their various compounds of integration and differentiation, there arises the cosmic system of fourteen worlds: three in the higher region, four in the middle region and seven in the lower region, viz. the *satyalokas*, the *jnaanalokas* and *tapalokas*, respectively. The *satyalokaa* is formed out the of combinations of elements, in which the *sattvaguna* is dominant. In this *loka*, the souls enjoy an expansive life. In virtue of the rhythmic vibrations of life-current passing through, it is possible for the souls in the *satyaloka* to move progressively, enjoy a better life and understand a wider vision of truth. Those who live here are full of life, their knowledge is intuitive, their delight serene

²⁷ BSB, II, iii, 45, p. 509.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, II, iii, 43, pp. 507-508.

²⁹ Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 129-130.

³⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 130-133.

and their lives easy. *Jnaanaloka* evolves when the various combinations of elements are dominated by *rajasguna*. It is an intermediate state that is characterized by coarse matter, life and mind. Though there is coarse matter in this state, there is order and coherence so that life can grow and mind can function progressively. The life here is freer; there is clarity of vision, freedom and delight. The *tapaloka* evolves when the combinations of elements in *tamasguna* predominate. Due to the activity of *tamas*, this state is full of darkness and is not conducive to the development of higher life and mental activity. In this sphere, darkness, ignorance, contradictions, perplexities and confusions prevail. Since it is far removed from the center of life, one cannot have life and bliss in this state. Besides, as *tamas* dominates, the life-force cannot make itself felt.³¹

Apart from the evolution of *suukshmabhūtas*, *mahaabhūtas* and the three *lokas*, by the combination of elements with the three *gunas*, the cosmic *maayaa* also brings about the three cosmic stages of existence and three cosmic orders of existence: the cosmic waking-consciousness (*Virat*), which is conscious of the totality of concrete existences inhabiting the threefold regions and in which *Brahman* is limited by the cosmic gross body; the cosmic dream-consciousness (*Hiranyagarba*), in which *Brahman* has the totality of cosmic subtle body as its limiting adjuncts (*upaadhi*); and the cosmic sleep-consciousness (*Ishvara*), in which the *Brahman* has for its *upaadhi* the cosmic causal or bliss body.³²

Cosmic *maayaa* also gives rise to the conception of *Ishvara*, as the creator (*Brahma*), the sustainer (*Vishnu*) and the destroyer (*Siva*). These three gods are nothing other than *Ishvara* with reference to different *gunas*. When *Ishvara* is limited by *maayaa* in its *sattvic* aspect, i.e., *sattva* as the predominating *upaadhi*, it is called *Vishnu*. He sustains and preserves the cosmic order. When *Ishvara* has *maayaa* with *rajas* as the dominant *upaadhi*, it is called *Brahma*. He is the creator of the cosmic order. When *maayaa* with *tamas* predominates *Ishvara*, it is called *Siva* or *Rudhra*. He is the destroyer of the universe. Thus, *Ishvara* with the help of *sattva* preserves, *rajas* creates and *tamas* destroys.³³ In this manner, cosmic *maayaa* brings in the illusion of the plurality of the material world, plurality of gods, plurality of kingdoms of beings, plurality of cosmic order and the plurality of the stages of existence. Thus, the cosmic *maayaa* is the source of our perception of multiplicity in the universe.

1.2.2. Effects of Individual Maayaa

The individual *maayaa* (*avidhya*) makes one perceive his true self (*Aatman*) as *jiiva*. The unit of existence conscious of its physical covering is called *jiiva*. It does not possess knowledge of its identity with *Brahman*. *Jiiva* is bound by good or bad actions which determine its existence in the higher or lower regions. It enjoys the physical and gross things, as it has a body which, with its appetites, originates out of the *mahaabhūtas* and their various combinations. Because of the physical body and its appetites *jiiva* experiences hunger, thirst, sleep, anger and all such states.³⁴ The physical body which *jiiva* possesses is the fleshy covering, which it casts off at its death.³⁵

Other than the physical body, the *jiiva* has what is called a subtle-body. It survives death and accompanies the individual *jiiva* beyond death. This includes a number of elements. Firstly,

³¹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 133-135.

³² Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 135, 152-153.

³³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 128. Cf. *AB*, Introduction, p. 59.

³⁴ Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 135-136.

³⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 150.

the *praana*, which is the individual vivifying principle in *jiiva*. It consists of all the vital currents that support and preserve the organic existence of *jiiva*. *Praana* "preserves the physical frames in existence, regulates the entire physiological process and makes the performance of higher functions possible in the physical frame."³⁶ It is present in every part of the physical body and makes each part alive and working. There are five types of *praana*, each of which guides different life-systems and their functions. When *praana* regulates the respiratory system, it is called *mukhya praana*; *praana* as related to the digestive system is known as *samaana*; when *praana* helps the functioning of lower organs, it is called *apaana*; while guiding higher organs, it is called *udaana*; and as a principle helping the circulatory system, *praana* is *vyaana*.³⁷ Secondly, the sense organs are outlets through which mind can perceive objects and objects can give themselves to the mind. There are five sense organs, viz., the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue and the nose. These are evolved from the *sattvic* aspect of the five subtle elements (*suukshmaabhuutas*). Each of the senses have a corresponding perception, viz., sound, touch, sight, taste and smell respectively.³⁸ Thirdly, there are the five organs of action, with the help of which *jiiva* as a bodily and conscious organism can move about. They include the tongue, the hands, the feet, the organs of generation and the organs of evacuation.³⁹

Fourthly, there is what is called the central organ (*antahkarana*). It is sometimes called the eleventh sense, as *antahkarana* is different from organs of sense and organs of action. Its main function is to make *jiiva* experience manifold things one by one in succession. It is capable of experiencing all types of sensations. *Antahkarana* is the inner organ of knowledge and that of volition. It is passive in that it gives knowledge, while it is impulsive as it excites action. *Antahkarana*, as the faculty of reflection and the faculty of desire, deliberation and will, is called the *manas* (mind). The *manas* has a number of modifications (*vrutti*) relating to the intellectual and volitional states. The modifications of the intellectual state are doubt (*vicikitsa*), cognition (*dhi*), belief (*sraddha*) and retention (*dhiriti*). The modifications corresponding to the volitional state are desire (*kaama*), decision (*samkalpa*), deliberation (*vikalpa*), fear (*vi*), shame (*hri*), pleasure (*sukha*) and pain (*dukha*).⁴⁰ These *vruttis* are classified into three classes depending on the predominance of *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*.⁴¹ When *antahkarana* reflects the things truly, it is called *buddhi* (intelligence). *Buddhi* is the faculty of right apperception or discriminating knowledge. While *manas* gives *jiiva* knowledge, weighs reasons for and against, and deliberates, *buddhi* helps *jiiva* to apprehend and perceive rightly.⁴² Other than *manas* and *buddhi*, *antahkarana* has another faculty called the faculty of retention (*ahankaara*), which is the 'I-sense' or the sense of individuality, which makes the *jiiva* experience itself as the 'I' and say 'I exist' (*asmi*).⁴³

Besides the gross and the subtle bodies, there is a third type of body *jiiva* experiences as a result of *avidhyaa*, viz., the causal body or the bliss body. It is the innermost level of *avidhyaa*.

³⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

³⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 137-141.

³⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 142.

³⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 150.

⁴⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 145-146. Cf. also *BUB* I, v, 3.

⁴¹ Cf. *PI*, II, 12, 14, 15.

⁴² Cf. Swahanenda Swami, *Chaandogya Upanishad* (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1975), VII, 17-20 (hereafter: *CU*).

⁴³ Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 146-148.

This body comes about owing to the predominance of *sattvaguna*, as it is purely composed of the *sattvic* aspect of *maayaa*.⁴⁴

Avidhyaa makes *jiiva* experience three states of experience (*avasthaa*), viz., the individual waking-consciousness (*visva*), the individual dream-consciousness (*taijasa*) and the individual sleep-consciousness (*pragna*). In the state of individual waking-consciousness, the *jiiva* is characterized by the individual gross body. In this state, *jiiva* experiences the world of external objects through the senses and the mind. The perceptual world becomes its field of knowledge and enjoyment. The objects are known and enjoyed as real existing things outside the mind. The world is also perceived by the *jiiva* as a series of states and it is understood in relation to *jiiva* itself, as the subject (knowing I). The cognitive process, in this state, also involves three aspects, viz., instrumental (*pramaana*), the objective (*premeya*) and the consequent (*phala*). The *visvastate* of *jiiva* is identical with the *virat*, the cosmic waking-consciousness. *Jiiva's* individual state of dream-consciousness is known as *taijasa*, which has the subtle body as its object. In this state, *jiiva* is conscious of what is within and enjoys subtle objects. In *taijasa* the consciousness is withdrawn from external objects and rests on the impressions (*vaasanas*) of the waking state that remain within the mind. Thus, the senses are fully at rest in *taijasa*. In the dream-state, there is no body consciousness and no space-time restrictions as in the waking state. Even though the content of dreams is traces left from the waking state, it flows with freedom and proper sequence. *Taijasa* is identical with the cosmic dream-consciousness, *Hiranyagarba*. *Jiiva's* individual deep sleep-consciousness is characteristic of the bliss body. In this state, the *jiiva* enjoys bliss. Behind the bliss body, the innermost of all beings, exists the *Brahman*. Thus, in this state, there is no duality that characterizes the other states. In it, neither the subject that knows nor the object is known, as it is an undifferentiated consciousness in which the contents of waking and dream states come together. It is the state of highest serenity (*samprasaada*). But it is not a state of unconsciousness, for after *jiiva* awakes from a state of deep sleep it knows that "I slept soundly and that I did not know anything." Thus, *jiiva*, in this state also has the 'I-consciousness' after it awakes.⁴⁵

Besides, due to the influence of the individual *maayaa*, the *jiiva* is seen as having five sheaths (*koshas*). They are the sheath of body (*annamaayaakosha*), the sheath of vital force (*pranamaayaakosha*), the sheath of mind (*manomaayaakosha*), the sheath of knowledge (*vijnanaamaayaakosha*) and the sheath of bliss (*anandamaayaakosha*). The sheath of body is the covering of coarse body that is purely flesh. It is a dense cover. The next three sheaths are related to the subtle body: the sheath of vital force is the life currents supporting the preservation of organic existence; the sheath of mind includes mind and the organs of action; and the sheath of knowledge consists in *buddhi* and five organs of sense. Finally there is the sheath of bliss, which is the innermost of sheath of *avidhyaa*.⁴⁶

All these *koshas* serve as *upaadhis* that individuate *jiiva*, making it forget its true nature and condition. Shankara notes that the *jiiva* is to be considered as a mere appearance of the highest self, like the reflection of the sun on water. It is neither directly the highest self, nor a different

⁴⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 152.

⁴⁵ The Upanishads postulate a fourth state, viz., the *tuuriya* as distinct from the other three states. It is an absolute self-transcending state which bypasses the limitations of time, space and causality. This state is completely free from *avidhyaa* and its products which vitiate the other three states. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, p. 152-153. Cf. also E.I. Warriar, *Sri Aurobindo's Integral Yoga and Shankara's Advaita* (India: Vohra Publishers and Distributors, 1990), pp. 116-118. Cf. also *BUB*, IV, iii, 15.

⁴⁶ Cf. *AB*, p. 131. Cf. also Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 150-153.

thing. Just as when one reflected image of the sun trembles another reflected image does not on that account, tremble also, so when one soul is connected with actions and results of actions another soul on that account is not connected likewise. Thus, *jiva* appears to be numerous due to ignorance, yet one soul's actions do not affect the other.⁴⁷ In consequence the *jiiva* is not aware of its divine reality and becomes the worshiper of *Ishvara*, the Lord of *maayaa*. In fact, *jiiva* and *Ishvara* are the result of *maayaa* and disappear as true knowledge is attained.

The cosmic *maayaa* and *avidhyaa* individualize *Brahman* as *Ishvara* and *jiiva*, besides giving the illusion of the plurality of existence. To the question "why must there be an emergence of the infinite process of becoming from *Brahman* through *maayaa*?" often the answer given is that it is the *liila* of *Brahman*. The term '*liila*' means a sport or a playful activity. *Liila* lies in ignorance and it can never reveal the true nature of reality. We cannot ascribe any specific reason why the *liila* of *Brahman* takes place, except saying that it is an appearance suitable to the capacity and understanding of the one to whom it does appear. *Liila*, therefore, is real to the one, whom it appears, but does not mean anything to *Brahman*, who sportily assumes the appearance.⁴⁸ In other words, *liila* is a self-imposed limitation on the part of *Brahman*, which does not impair the integrity of the absolute. But it satisfies our volitional and emotional nature by making us conceive the absolute as a personal existence that can fulfill our pragmatic need for love and devotion.⁴⁹

1.3. Characteristics of *Aparaa Vidhyaa*

In the preceding sections of this chapter, we have looked into the nature and consequences of *aparaa vidhyaa*. Now, in order to clarify this notion further, we could take up briefly the issue of its characteristics. According to Shankara *aparaa vidhyaa* has four significant characteristics, viz., it involves subject-object distinction, it is mediate and indirect, it is knowable by *pramaanas* (means of knowledge), and it is a caused knowledge. In the following section, we shall analyze these characteristics of *aparaa vidhyaa*.

1.3.1. Subject-Object Distinction

Empirical experience, as we well know, is the everyday human experience which involves the subject-object duality. For example, in perceiving an object such as a table or a book the perceptual knowledge comes about as a result of someone seeing or touching the table or the book in question. Thus, empirical experience always involves the distinction between the 'experiencer' and the 'experienced', the 'knower' and the 'known'. In his introduction to Shankara's *Aatmaboodha*, Swami Nihilananda writes of empirical experience as follows:

Empirical experience involves the distinction between the 'seer' (*drig*) and the 'seen' (*drysa*), the subject (*vishayi*) and the object (*vishaya*), the 'ego' (*aham*) and the 'non-ego' (*idem*). The seer is the perceiver, identical with the subject and the ego, and is of the nature of consciousness and intelligence. The seen is the thing perceived, identical with the object and the non-ego, and is insentient by nature. Therefore, the seer and the seen, the subject and the object, the ego and the non-ego are mutually opposed and must never be identified with each other.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Cf. *BSB*, II, iii, 50, pp. 515-516.

⁴⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, II, i, 33.

⁴⁹ Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 45-46.

⁵⁰ *AB*, Introduction, p. 43.

Both the subject and the object are essential to, and inseparable from, empirical experience. Without one of them, an empirical experience is not possible. Though an object might exist outside, there is no actual empirical experience unless there is a knower who by his intellect makes possible the experience of the particular object. "An object may exist independently of a knower; and the knower becomes self-conscious while revealing something which may be an external object or an internal idea."⁵¹ Thus, the basic element that characterizes every empirical experience is the presence of the duality of the subject and the object.

All the means of empirical knowledge (*pramaanas*) pre-suppose the subject-object distinction and operate in the realm of duality. Even scriptural knowledge is empirical in the sense that it is intended for an agent who is able to know. For Shankara says, "The meditation taught in the Vedaanta texts, whose aim is the realization of the self, represented by the Upanishads, is possible only if the self is the agent."⁵² Thus, without a subject or a knower, the purpose of the scripture cannot be realized. In other words, if there is no one to know what is revealed in the scriptures, scriptural knowledge is not possible. But, though scriptural testimony is empirical, confined to the realm of phenomena and involves duality, it is superior to other means of knowledge since scripture reveals the highest reality and helps one to remove ignorance (*avidhyaa*).⁵³

1.3.2. Mediate and Indirect

Empirical knowledge is obtained by the use of senses, *manas* and *buddhi*, in the actual presence of the object sensed and under-stood. In other words, when one comes into contact with an object, with the help of the external senses and internal faculties of knowing, the knowledge of that object is obtained. But if it happens that one lacks the senses or other faculties of knowing, the empirical knowledge of objects is not possible. Therefore, the mediums like senses, mind and intellect are equally essential to empirical experience as are the subject and the object.

Since empirical knowledge is attained by means of external and internal mediums, such as senses, mind and the intellect, it is a mediate and indirect knowledge. In other words, it is a representative knowledge. One comes to know the objects not directly and immediately, but the object is known as the senses, mind and intellect represent it. Thus, it is with the help of the representative idea of the object that the object is known. Empirical knowledge, therefore, is different from direct and immediate knowledge. Here one experiences knowledge about a reality intuitively and directly, without the help of any medium of knowledge. In such a knowledge, the activities of the senses, mind and the intellect are suspended, and one is open to the knowledge without any mediation of these external and internal faculties of knowing. On the other hand, as empirical knowledge fundamentally and essentially is dependent on physical and mental faculties of knowledge, it is basically mediate and indirect knowledge.

1.3.3. Knowable by Pramaanas

⁵¹ A. Ramamurthi, *Advaitic Mysticism of Shankara* (West Bengal: The Center of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Vishvabharati, Shantiniketan, 1947), p. 15.

⁵² *BSB*, II, iii, 39, p. 497.

⁵³ Cf. Shankara, "Taittiriya Upanishad Bhaasya," *Upanishad Bhaasyas (Aitareeya, Isha, Kaatha, Keena, Mundaka, Prasana and Taittiriya Upanishads)*, trans. Swami Gambhirananda, Vol. II (Calcutta: Advaita Ashram, 1957), II, viii, 5 (hereafter: *TUB*).

Empirical knowledge is known by various means of knowledge (*pramaanas*). Vedaanta recognizes six *pramaesan*, which can be divided into two groups, based on the subject-matter each group is dealing with. The first group attempts to give knowledge of empirical realities, while the second group is the source of knowledge of the transcendental reality. The former are five, viz., perception (*pratyaksha*), inference (*anumaana*), comparison (*anumaana*), supposition (*arthaapatti*) and non-perception (*anupalabdhi*). The latter group consists of one *pramaana*, viz., *sabda*.⁵⁴ We could give a brief consideration of each of these *pramaanas*.

Perception is an important means of empirical knowledge. Its value consists in presenting to our consciousness the manifold reality of this world, even though it does not prove its validity. According to Vedaantic thinkers, perception gives us the knowledge of reality, but fails to explain the difference. In other words, perception has the cognitive element as it reports or gives information about the mere existence of realities, but does not have the recognitive element, as it does not have such characteristics as assimilation and clarification of difference. It can be held as a source of valid know-ledge, if it is not contradicted by subsequent experience or by any other *pramaanas*. The process of perception takes place in this manner. The *manas* comes in contact with the senses, the senses with the object and the *manas* with the consciousness immanent in it. As the result of these contacts, the mind is modified in the form of the object, which, in turn, leads to an identity between the perceiving-consciousness and the object-consciousness. The modification of the mind (*vrutti*), in taking the form of the object, destroys the ignorance, and the object is revealed to the perceiving consciousness. Thus, perception involves the conformity of the mental order to the given objective order.⁵⁵

Inference is a process of acquiring knowledge of a particular thing with the help of a mark it possesses, even though there is no way of directly perceiving it. Vedaantins basically follow the *Nyaaya* doctrine of inference, with some minor modifications. In inference, the invariable concomitance (*vyaapti*), between the middle term (*heetu*) and the major term (*saadhya*), is established by frequent experience. For example, the concomitance of fire and smoke is presumed from their existing in the kitchen. *vyaapti*, i.e., the concomitant relationship between *heetu* and *saadhya* is not an inference, but a permanent impression (*samskaara*) left upon the consciousness by the observation of positive instances and non-observation of negative instances. Once *vyaapti* is established, then one can proceed to make an inference by linking the *heetu* and the minor term. For example, by linking smoke to fire in *vyaapti*, one can conclude that there would be fire in the mountain if one finds smoke there. In order to present the inference one has made in this manner to others, a five-member syllogism is proposed. The members of the syllogism are:

There is fire in the mountain.
 Because there is smoke in the mountain.
 Wherever there is smoke, there is fire, as in the kitchen.
 This mountain has smoke.
 Therefore, it has fire.

The first premise of the syllogism states the conclusion to be proved. The second gives the reason (*heetu*), while the third is the major premise, in which we have an illustration of the

⁵⁴ Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, p. 175.

⁵⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 176-184.

concomitance of *heat* and *saadhya*. The fourth premise links the middle term and the minor term. The fifth restates the proved conclusion.⁵⁶

Comparison, as a *pramaana*, is based on similarity (*sadrisya*) between two objects. In it, a particular thing is felt to be like another thing. For example, a *gavaya* is experienced as an animal similar to a cow. The cause of such an experience is the functional activity of consciousness of similarity between the things compared. *Upamaana* is not perception, as the similarity experienced is not presented to the senses, but rather it is directly given to the perceiving consciousness. Neither is it a remembrance or a recognition, as the similarity experienced is not what we had already been known, forgotten and now remembered or recognized. Rather, the similarity is presented to the consciousness as something completely new. Comparison is also not an inference; knowledge of similarity is attained by direct experience and not inferred through the function of *vyaapti*.⁵⁷

Supposition consist in presuming the cause of a thing from its effect, which presumption is based on a negative mark (*vyatireeki linga*). The usual example given to illustrate *arthaapatti* is: the earth differs from other elements because of its smell. *Arthaapatti* is not an inference, but an implication or a hypothesis. It is the supposition of the cause. In other words, *arthaapatti* suggests the cause from the given effect. For example, when one is told that Devadatta is not at home, one presumes that he must be out of station. In other words, the fact of Devadatta's not being at home is caused by his being out of station. This presumption of the cause of Devadatta's being not at home is based on *arthaapatti*.⁵⁸

Non-perception is the source of knowledge of non-existence (*abhaava*). For Vedaantins, non-existence is not a mere negation of being, but it is something that has a real existence and it is perceived by a *pramaana* called *anupabdhi*. *Abhaava* is an existence, which is identified with its *locus*, but in it we do not experience any objects. In other words, *abhaava* implies the existence of the *locus* without any object. Though, the object of *abhaava* is absent, it is capable of being perceived as absent. Therefore, *abhaava* has a reality. In order to apprehend the nature of *abhaava* we require a specific *pramaana* which would give us the knowledge not only of the *locus* of *abhaava*, but also the absence of the object. That *pramaana* that gives us knowledge of *abhaava* is *anupalabdhi*. It helps us to experience the absence directly in relation to its *locus*.⁵⁹

Other than the above-mentioned *pramaanas*, Vedaantins accept testimony (*sabda*) as a valid source of knowledge. This is of two kinds, based on the source of *sabda*. It is personal, if the source of information is a person, whereas it is impersonal if the information is based on the authority of the *Sruti*. The former cannot be accepted unconditionally, because it is possible that the person, the source of authority, can either deliberately misrepresent the truth or in good faith can present falsity as truth. The latter can be accepted unconditionally, as it is based on the authority of the *Sruti*. It is eternal. *Sabda* (word) is understood in relation to its *artha* (meaning). The word and its meaning are inseparably related to things, as they directly refer to things and express things. The denotative potency of the *sabda* is co-eternal with itself. All words are endowed with an inherent denotative potency from eternity. Therefore, the relationship between language and thought, words and things are *a priori*, and the system of names is not created, but manifested from

⁵⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 192-202. Vedaantins make use of inference to establish the unreality of the empirical existence and the reality of trans-empirical existence. The inference is stated as follows: "The manifold existence is false, because of its being different from *Brahman*. All that is not *Brahman* is false, like the silver in the mother-of-pearl." *Ibid.*, p. 202.

⁵⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 203.

⁵⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 204 -205.

⁵⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 214 -217.

all eternity. Thus, according to Vedaantins, *sabda* as scriptural testimony has an eternal dimension and so it can be accepted unconditionally as a true *pramaana*.⁶⁰

According to the Vedaanta school of thought, all these *pramaanas* are valid means of knowledge, as they give us knowledge of this phenomenal world. But we cannot hold them as absolute because their scope is limited to the empirical order. When considered in relation to the *Paraavidhya* their reality and the truth they give cease to exist. As a result we cannot make use of them in the transcendental order. This does not mean that these *pramaanas* are useless. They are useful, valid and necessary as long as we are under the hold and sway of empirical consciousness or the *jiiva*.⁶¹

1.3.4. Caused Knowledge

An empirical experience is transient and of a passing nature; it does take place in time. Thus empirical experience has a beginning, i.e., when an object is presented to the individual consciousness through the medium of senses and grasped by the intellect one begins to have an empirical experience. Likewise, if the subject or the object of that particular experience exists no longer, then empirical experience no longer exists. Experience of a particular person does not exist when the person is dead or if the object of experience is destroyed. Thus, empirical knowledge is a caused knowledge. Since it is a caused knowledge, the individual can gain more of it by his own effort. By study, hard work, listening to others who know better and research, empirical knowledge can be attained and developed. Again, one can attain this type of knowledge by use of many modern techniques and technologies. For example, the knowledge of a language and its best use can be achieved by using new techniques of language learning and the modern technological inventions, such as, computer and audio-systems. Therefore, the acquisition of empirical knowledge, depends on each individual, especially on the effort he makes and the facilities available for him.

⁶⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 205-208.

⁶¹ Cf. Eliot Deutsch, p. 69.

Paraa Vidhyaa: The Noumenal State of Man

In the last chapter, we looked into the phenomenal state of man, as considered by Shankara. This chapter attempts to study the noumenal state of man. According to Shankara, man's ultimate destiny does not consist in being caught up in the phenomenal existence; rather, man is called to live at a depth at which he must experience the source of the universe within himself. The task of man is not to search for his ultimate destiny outside, but to move into himself and discovering the ultimate in the cave of his heart. It is not a new knowledge, but a realization of what one really is. *Paraa vidhyaa*, therefore, is nothing else but a self-realization in which one experiences *Brahman* (*Brahmaanubhava*) as one's own indwelling spirit (*Aatman*). This chapter deals with the goal, nature and characteristics of *paraa vidhyaa*.

2.1. The Goal of *Paraa Vidhyaa*

The goal of *paraa vidhyaa* is *Brahman*, the ultimate universal spirit behind the universe and *Aatman*, the ultimate principle in the individual. Only when one has true knowledge about both *Brahman* and *Aatman*, can one begin to experience the oneness between these two. In this section, we will clarify these two notions, in preparation for the analysis of the nature of *paraa vidhyaa*.

2.1.1. *Brahman*

The word '*Brahman*'¹ is derived from the Sanskrit root '*brih*' which literally means 'to gush forth', 'to grow', 'to be great', and 'to increase'. The suffix '*man*' added to the root '*brih*' signifies the absence of limitation. Thus, the term '*Brahman*' etymologically means that which is absolutely the greatest.² So '*Brahman*' denotes "that first...reality from which the entire universe of our experience has sprung up."³ In the words of the *Vedaanta-Suutras*, "*Brahman* is that omniscient, omnipotent cause from which proceeds the origin of the world."⁴ Thus, the term '*Brahman*' signifies the absolute and unlimited reality which is the substratum and the foundation of the world we know, and on which everything depends for its existence. *Brahman* is self-sufficient and does not depend on anything else for its existence. Hence it must be spiritual entity, since matter is not self-sufficient, limited and subject to change. George Thibaut, in his introduction to the *Vedaanta-Suutras*, says that whatever exists is in reality one, and this one universal being is called *Brahman*. This being is absolutely homogeneous in nature; it is pure Being, Intelligence and Thought. Intelligence or thought is not predicated of *Brahman* as its attribute, but constitutes its substance.

¹ The word '*Brahman*' appears for the first time in the *Rig Veda* as related various sacred utterances, which were believed to have magical powers. Initially it meant 'spell' or 'prayer', which can be used for the attainment of one's wishes and desires. In the *Brahmanas*, it began to signify that which stands behind God as their ground and basis. Finally, in the Upanishads, this terms came to stand for the unitary principle of all beings, the knowledge of which frees one from finitude. Cf. Eliot Deutsch, p. 9.

² Cf. *BSB*, I, i, 1, pp. 11-12.

³ Ramkant A. Sinari, p. 67.

⁴ Swami Virswarananda (trans.), *Brahma-Suutra* (Mayavata, Almora, Himalayas: Advaita Ashrama, 1948), I, i, 2, p. 26 (here-after: *BSB*, Virsawarananda).

Brahman is not a thinking being, but thought itself. It is absolutely destitute of qualities and whatever qualities or attributes are conceivable can only be denied of it.⁵ Thus, *Brahman* is without qualities (*nirgunaa*), beyond the order of our empirical and worldly experience. We cannot grasp *Brahman* with our empirical experiences, since the being of *Brahman* is necessary for anything to exist, and even for the possibility of empirical experience. In other words, *Brahman* is *a priori* and cannot be grasped by *a posteriori* or limited experience.

Because of our inability to grasp the true nature of *Brahman*, whatever positive description is developed about *Brahman* will remain in the level of phenomenal experience, and *Brahman* is beyond all phenomena. That is why we find contrary characteristics attributed to *Brahman*. In Brhadaraanyaka Upanishad, we read that *Brahman* is "light and not light, desire and absence of desire, anger and absence of anger, righteousness and absence of righteousness."⁶ Kaatha Upanishad speaks of *Brahman* as "smaller than the small, greater than the great, sitting yet moving, lying and yet going everywhere."⁷ *Brahman* is light and not light, in the sense that it is only because there is *Brahman* that there is light and darkness. Again there exist small and the greater only because *Brahman* exists.

At the same time the word 'existence' cannot be attributed to *Brahman* and to the empirical world in the same way, for *Brahman's* existence is different in nature. The existence of *Brahman* is opposed to all empirical existence, so that in comparison with this it can just as well be considered as non-existence. *Brahman* is the being of all beings.⁸ The nature of *Brahman* is so transcendent, that it cannot be compared with anything in the world we know. At the same time, *Brahman* is present in all its manifestations, for without the Being of *Brahman* nothing can exist. Yet the empirical experience of *Brahman* is not possible. Thus, *Brahman* is that unalterable and absolute Being which remains identical with itself in all its manifestations. It is the basis and ground of all experience, and is different from the space-time-cause world. *Brahman* has nothing similar to it, nothing different from it, and no internal differentiation, for all these are empirical distinctions. It is non-empirical, non-objective, wholly other, but it is not non-being.⁹

Shankara repeatedly speaks of, and strongly defends, the absolute, unchangeable, attributeless nature of *Brahman*, alluding to many texts in the scripture which points to the *nirgunaa Brahman*.¹⁰ Commenting on the Upanishadic text, "as a lump of salt is without interior or exterior, entire and purely saline taste, even so is the self (*Brahman*) without interior or exterior, entire and

⁵ George Thibaut (trans.), *Brahma-Sutras*, vol. XXIV, Introduction, pp. xxiv-xxv (hereafter: *BSB*, Thibaut).

⁶ S. Radhakrishnan (ed.), *The Principal Upanishads* (Lon-don: George Allen & Unwin, 1953), p. 272.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 617.

⁸ Cf. Paul Deussen, *The System of Vedanta*, trans. Charles Johnson (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1912), pp. 211-212. Cf. also *BUB*, II, i, 20.

⁹ S. Radhakrishnan and C.A. Moore (eds.), *A Source Book in Indian Philosophy*, 5th printing (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 507.

¹⁰ In interpreting the Upanishadic text, Shankara is of the opinion that one must accept only those texts which speak of *Brahman* without qualities and forms. "But other texts speaking of *Brahman* with form," he says, "have the injunctions about meditations as their main objectives. So long as they do not lead to some contradictions, their apparent meaning should be accepted. But, when they involve contradictions, the principle to be followed for deciding one or the other is that those that have the formless *Brahman* as their main purport are more authoritative than the others which have not that as their main purpose. It is according to this that one is driven to the conclusion that *Brahman* is formless and not its opposite." Cf. *BSB*, III, ii, 14, p. 612.

pure intelligence alone,"¹¹ Shankara points to the oneness of *Brahman*. In the lump of salt there is nothing other than salt, so too *Brahman* is nothing other than itself. It is the absolute being without a second.¹² Shankara also uses the example of the sun reflecting in water and appearing as many, in order to bring home the same truth. He says that just as the reflection of the sun in water increases with the increase of water, and decreases with its reduction, it moves when the water moves, and it differs as the water differs, so is the self. The sun seem to conform to the characteristics of water, but in reality the sun never has these increasing or decreasing qualities. So also *Brahman*, which from the highest point of view always retains its sameness, seems to conform to such characteristics as increase and decrease of the limiting adjunct owing to its entry into such an adjunct as a body.¹³

For Shankara, therefore, *Brahman* is a principle of utter simplicity. There is no duality in *Brahman*, for no qualities are found in his concept of *Brahman*. It is also simple in the sense that it is not subject to inner contradictions, which would make it change-able and transitory. Though Shankara uses logic and arguments to understand the nature of *Brahman* and to speak of *Brahman*, still for him in its reality *Brahman* is not a metaphysical postulate that can be proved logically, but must be experienced in silence.¹⁴ Thus, *Brahman* is one: It is not a 'He', a personal being; nor is it an 'It', an impersonal concept. It is that state which comes about when all subject-object distinctions are obliterated. Ultimately, *Brahman* is a name for the experience of the timeless plenitude of Being.¹⁵

2.1.2. Aatman

The term 'Aatman' comes from the Sanskrit root 'an' which etymologically means 'to breathe'. It is often rendered as 'soul' or 'self', and signifies the most fundamental being of the individual. There is no one who can deny the existence of the self for it is the basis of all individual actions. Everyone is conscious of the existence of his self and never thinks that he is not.¹⁶ To doubt the existence of the self would be a contradiction in terms because then one would doubt the existence of the very doubter who engages in the doubt. The doubter of the self is often compared by Advaitins to a person who searches for the necklace while wearing it; or to a person who wears the spectacles on his face and at the same time looks for them elsewhere. Without the existence of the self, it is impossible for us to entertain the idea even of its being capable of refutation. For the knowledge of the self is not established through the so-called means of right knowledge, but it is self-established.¹⁷ Thus, the very existence of understanding and its functions presuppose an intelligence known as the self which is different from them, which is self-established and which they subserves.¹⁸ The very possibility of knowledge and the means of knowledge (*pramaanas*) have

¹¹ "Brihadaraanayaka Upanishad," IV, v, 13, R.E. Hume, *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, 2nd revised ed. (New York: Princeton University Press, 1973), p. 147 (hereafter: *BU*, Hume).

¹² Cf. *BSB*, III, ii, 16, pp. 613-614.

¹³ Cf. *ibid.*, III, ii, 18-20, pp. 615-617.

¹⁴ Baskali asked Bhava three times about the nature of *Brahman*. The latter remained silent all three times, but finally he replied, "I have already spoken, but you cannot comprehend that the self is silence," *ibid.*, III, ii, 17, p. 614.

¹⁵ Cf. Eliot Deutsch, p. 9.

¹⁶ Cf. *BSB*, I, i, 1, p. 12.

¹⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, II, iii, 7, p. 455.

¹⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 456.

relevance if there exists the self which is the source of all knowledge. Therefore, *Aatman* is beyond all doubt, "for it is the essential nature of him who denies it."¹⁹ Therefore, Shankara believed that it was the nature of the self and not its reality, which is to be proved. "The self must seek itself in order to find what it is, not that it is."²⁰

Having established the existence of the self, we can turn now to the discussion of the nature of the *Aatman*. *Aatman* is the deathless, birthless, eternal and real substance in every individual soul. It is the unchanging reality behind the changing body, sense organs, mind and ego. It is the spirit, which is pure consciousness and is un-affected by time, space and causality. It is limitless and without a second.²¹ Vedantins speak of three states of consciousness, namely the waking state (*vishwa*), the dream state (*taijasa*), and the state of dreamless sleep (*pragna*). The basic underlying principle which witnesses all these three states of one's existence is the pure con-sciousness (*chaitanyam*), the self. It is because of the presence of this ultimate substratum, that the body, the senses, the mind and the intellect function properly. At the same time it is not identified with these, nor affected by the changes that take place in the body, in the other sense or intellectual functions. Thus, *Aatman* is the "unrelated witness of the experiences of the three stages, which include a man's diverse activities."²²

Shankara gives a number of illustrations to clarify the nature of the self, especially in its role of being a witness (*saakshin*) to all activities of body, mind, senses, and intellect. Firstly, Shankara gives the analogy of a king's court. In the court, the king sits in his high throne as the observer of the activities of his ministers, councilors and all the others present. But because of his majesty as the king, he is unique and different from all. So too the self which is pure consciousness dwells in the body as a witness to the functions of the body, mind and other faculties, while at the same time it is different from them by its natural light. Thus, the witness is the absolute consciousness, the unchanging intelligence that underlies the finer and the grosser bodies. It is neither *Iishvara* nor *jiiva*, but it is *Aatman* which is untouched by the distinction of *Iishvara* and *jiiva*.²³

To those who come with the objection that the self is not only a mere observer or witness, but also participates in the activities of the body, Shankara replies using the analogy of the moon and the clouds. The movement of the clouds on a moonlit night suggests that the moon is moving, whereas in fact it is the clouds that move. Likewise, the activities of the mind and senses create the illusion that the self is active.²⁴ To the one who would say that activity belongs to the senses or other faculties and considers them the self, Shankara gives the following illustrations. Just as the iron filings become active at the presence of the magnet, so also it is the presence of the self that makes the body, the senses and all the other faculties active. It is fire which makes the iron ball red-hot. So also neither can the mind, the intellect or the body combined make the self. It is the self which is the source of all their activities. Just as a man who works with the help of the light that is inherent in the sun does so without ever affecting the sun, so too the mind, the body, the intellect, and the senses, engage in their respective activities with the help of the self, but without exerting any influence on the self.²⁵ All these illustrations point to the basic and absolute nature of the *Aatman*. The following Upanishadic statement bears witness to this reality. "That the

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 457.

²⁰ Organ Troy Wilson, *The Self in Indian Philosophy* (London: Mouton & Co., 1964), p. 104.

²¹ Cf. *AB*, p. 118.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 133.

²³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 136. Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 156-157.

²⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 136-137.

²⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

imperishable is the unseen seer, the unheard hearer, the unthought thinker, the ununderstood understander. Other than It, there is naught that hears; other than It, there is naught that thinks; other than It, there is naught that understands."²⁶

The terms '*Brahman*' and '*Aatman*', both basically denote one and the same underlying principle: the former stands for the underlying and unchanging principle of the universe; while the latter refers to the unchanging reality in the individuals. Both of these terms are used in the Upanishads and by the interpreters as synonyms they do interchange these two terms in the same sentence. Commenting on the Upanishadic statement "Who is an *Aatman*? What is *Brahma*?"²⁷ Shankara remarks: "By *Brahman*, the limitations implied in the *Aatman* are removed, and by the *Aatman* the conception of *Brahman* as a divinity to be worshipped is con-demned."²⁸ These two terms fundamentally refer to one and the same reality, which is the ground of everything. In other words, these two terms stand for two different descriptions of the same ultimate reality, from the point of view of the universe and the individual. The ultimate reality represented by these two terms is the goal of *paraa vidhyaa* or *Brahmaanubhava*.

2.2 Nature of *Paraa Vidhyaa*

We have analyzed the goal of *paraa vidhya*, in the preceding section. Here, we must attempt to clarify the nature of *paraa vidhyaa*, in which the *Brahman*-realization is attained by the seeker. We elaborate the nature of *paraa vidhyaa*, by looking into its meaning and clarifying the identity between *Brahman* and *Aatman*.

2.2.1. Meaning

Paraa Vidhyaa or *Brahmaanubhava* is the ultimate and noumenal state of man. The term '*Brahmaanubhava*' is a compound word, which consists of two Sanskrit words, viz. '*Brahman*' (ab-solute reality) and '*anubhava*' (intuitive experience or knowledge). The term '*anubhava*' means not a mere theoretical or intellectual knowledge, but the knowledge obtained through an integral experience. *Anubhava* is not the immediacy of an uninterrupted sensation, where the existence and the content of what is apprehended are separated. It is related to artistic insight rather than to animal instinct; it is an immediate knowledge.²⁹ Thus, literally the term '*Brahmaanubhava*' means the integral and intuitive experience of the absolute reality. When we speak of the intuitive experience of *Brahman*, from the Advaitic point of view there arise many basic questions as to the nature of *Brahmaanubhava*. How is it possible to have an experience if there is no subject to experience and no object to be experienced? Besides, if there is no duality in an experience, can it be described? If *Brahmaanubhava* is an experience, and if it has no duality in itself as an experience, then what is the nature of the experience involved in *Brahmaanubhava*? These questions stem from the fact that the Advaita philosophy of Shankara, does not permit the possibility of duality in this fundamental experience.

Possession of intellectual knowledge about the nature of *Brahman* and that of *Brahmaanubhava* is the first step towards the attainment of *Brahmaanubhava*. Obtaining

²⁶ *BU*, III, viii, 1, Hume, p. 118.

²⁷ "Chaanduukhya Upanishad," V, ix, 1, Hume, p. 234 (hereafter: Ch. U., Hume).

²⁸ Paul Deussen, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads* (New York: Dover Publications Inc., 1966), pp. 86-87.

²⁹ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, vol. II, p. 513.

intellectual knowledge by the study of the Scriptures, especially by understanding the meaning and the import of the Vedaantic statements like ‘That art Thou’, is necessary for *Brahmaanubhava*. In knowing the nature of *Brahman* intellectually, one can work towards the attainment of *Brahmaanubhava*. When we speak of the attainment of *Brahmaanubhava*, we use the term ‘attainment’ (*labdha*) in a figurative sense (*upacara*).³⁰ In an empirical experience we attain some new knowledge, i.e., knowledge which had not previously existed as far as we were concerned. In *Brahmaanubhava*, however, we do not attain anything new, but only realize what we are, i.e., our true nature, the identity with *Brahman*. According to Shankara, we are *Brahman*, and *Brahmaanubhava* is that experience by which we recognize our own real nature.

Many texts in Shankara’s works point to the fact that the attainment of *Brahmaanubhava* consists in the recognition and the realization that one’s real and true nature is *Brahman*. "The state of being *Brahman* is the same as the realization of the self."³¹ "Perfect knowledge...is the realization of the *Aatman* as one with *Brahman*."³² "When a man knows the *Aatman*, and sees it inwardly and outwardly as the ground of all things animate and inanimate he has indeed reached liberation."³³ "No man who knows *Brahman* to be different from himself is a knower of truth."³⁴ "My self is pure consciousness, free from all distinctions and sufferings."³⁵ Thus, *Brahmaanubhava* which is the experience of identity with *Brahman*, is an attainment only from the point of view of the aspirant or the seeker of truth. From the absolute of *paramaartha* point of view there is no attainment of *Brahman*.

2.2.2. Identity of *Brahman* and *Aatman*

From what has been said about the nature of *Brahmaanubhava*, so far, there arises the question, how, at all, can we know or have any kind of knowledge about this experience called *Brahmaanubhava*? No empirical means of knowledge (*pramaana*) can help us in this regard, except scriptural knowledge. Though scriptural knowledge is limited to the level of duality, still it provides knowledge about the reality of *Brahman* and enables us to have an intellectual understanding of *Brahman*.

Shankara holds the authority of the scriptural testimony in our intellectual understanding of *Brahman*. Nothing else on earth, except the scriptures, can reveal to us the nature of *Brahman* and of *Brahmaanubhava*. In this regard Shankara is very clear; he does not substitute any *pramaana* than the scriptural testimony, for the attainment of the intellectual knowledge about *Brahman*. He does make use of all the other *pramaanas*, but only to elucidate, clarify and demonstrate what he accepts on the basis of scriptural authority about *Brahman* and *Brahmaanubhava*. He says, "The fact of everything having its self in *Brahman* cannot be grasped [intellectually], without the aid of scriptural passage ‘That art Thou’."³⁶

³⁰ *BUB*, VI, v, 6, pp. 500-501.

³¹ Shankara, *Gaudapaadakaarika Bhaasya and Maanduukya Upanisad Bhaasya*, trans. Swami Nihilananda (Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1955), IV, 85 (hereafter: *GKB*).

³² *VC*, p. 65.

³³ *Ibid.*, p. 89.

³⁴ Shankara, *Upadeshasaahasrii*, trans. Swami Jagadaananda, 6th ed. (Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1979), II, xvi, 70, p. 189 (hereafter: *UI*).

³⁵ *BSB*, IV, i, 2, p. 815.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, I, i, 4, p. 23.

The word ‘*upanishad*’ (scripture) derives its meaning from its capacity to lead to the truth those who, having been thoroughly dissatisfied with the things seen and unseen, seek liberation from ignorance, which is the source of bondage and suffering. The Upanishads are capable of accomplishing all these, for in them the highest end of life is embodied.³⁷ The scriptural knowledge of *Brahman* is contained in the Upanishadic statements (*mahaavaakyas*), which are also called ‘Vedaantic aphorisms’. Only by studying them and being guided by the teacher (*guru*) can one have the intellectual knowledge about *Brahman* and *Brahmaanubhava* which is the first step towards the attainment of *Brahmaanubhava*.

There are four fundamental Vedic statements, which point to the nature of *Brahmanubhava*. They are:

That are Thou (*tat tvam asi*)³⁸
 I am *Brahman* (*Aham Brahmsmi*)³⁹
 This Self is *Brahman* (*Ayamatma Brahma*)⁴⁰
Brahman is consciousness (*Prajnanam Brahma*)⁴¹

Shankara is of the opinion that all these Vedaantic statements are not merely figurative, but essential statements about *Brahman*. These *mahaavaakyas* assert the absolute identity between *Brahman* and *Aatman*. The most fundamental of all these four aphorisms is the *mahaavaakya* ‘That are Thou’, (*tat tvam asi*). Now, we will consider the meaning and import of this aphorism.

Before entering into the discussion of the meaning of the Vedaantic statement, we need to consider the type of meanings a word or a sentence can have or the different senses in which it can be used. According to Advaitins, the meaning of a word or a sentence can be of three types. Firstly, the primary or direct meaning which is conveyed by the word. Secondly, the implied meaning or *lakshana*, which is the meaning conveyed by the word by way of implication. Thirdly, the suggested meaning, which is the meaning hinted at by the word, through association.

The implied meaning or *lakshana* is of three kinds. The first of the *lakshana* is *jahallakshana*, which consists in discarding the direct meaning of a sentence or a word completely in favor of its indirect or implied meaning. For example, in the sentence ‘The Cowheard village is in the Ganga’,⁴² the phrase ‘in the Ganga’ is used to mean ‘on the bank of the river Ganga’. This is a case of *jahallakshana* because the direct meaning ‘in the Ganga’ is discarded in favor of the implied meaning ‘on the bank of the river Ganga.’ The second *lakshana* is the *ajahallakshana* in which the direct meaning is not completely given up, but the sentence in question hints at the real meaning of the sentence. We can obtain the direct meaning by associating with some object related to the idea expressed in the sentence. For instance, in the sentence ‘the red color is running’, the direct meaning of the sentence is not completely discarded, but hinted at. Its direct meaning can be obtained by association with a red object that runs, for instance, a red horse. The third meaning by implication is *jahadjahallakshana*, which consists in giving up a part of the direct meaning and retaining the other part. In the example ‘this is that Devadatta’, the association of place, time and

³⁷ Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 116.

³⁸ Ch. U., VI, x, 3, Hume, p. 248.

³⁹ *BU*, I, iv, 10, Hume, p. 83.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, II, v, 10, p. 103.

⁴¹ "Aiteriya Upanishad," III, i, 3, Hume, p. 276 (hereafter: *AU*, Hume).

⁴² ‘Ganga’ is the Sanskrit name for the river Ganges.

the conditions of the meeting of Devadatta now and then are given up and the Devadatta, who is one and the same in both the instances, is accepted.⁴³

The great aphorism '*tat tvam asi*' (That art Thou) is often open to misunderstanding, especially when seen from the point of view of ignorance. The direct meaning conveyed by 'That' (*tat*) to those who are in the spell of ignorance is the idea of a personal God associated with the universe. That God is creator, preserver and destroyer, and is endowed with omniscience, Lordship and great power. In other words the primary meaning of that is the *sagunaa Brahman* or *Iishvara*.⁴⁴

The direct meaning of the word 'Thou' (*tvam*), in the context of the Brahadaaranayaka Upanishad is Sevetaketu, the son of Uddalaka, who is the hearer of this Upanishadic statement and the one to whom this aphorism is addressed. Thus, 'Thou' directly refers to any individual who is a willing hearer of the scriptures as taught by the teachers. In other words, 'Thou' primarily conveys the idea of '*jiiva*', the individual soul. It is associated with the individual body, has little knowledge, and is characterized by the limitations such as birth and death, hunger and thirst, pain and pleasure. The term, 'art' (*asi*) states merely a complete identity of the 'That' and the 'Thou.' Thus, the direct sense of this Vedaantic saying '*tat tvam asi*' (That art Thou) points to the identity between *Ishvara* and *jiva*.⁴⁵

But the direct meaning of the saying 'That art Thou', namely, the full union or identity between *Iishvara* and *jiiva*, does not seem to agree with the actual fact, since such an identity is not possible. *Iishvara* and *jiiva* are too far apart and different from each other. For the former is the powerful and supreme Lord, while the latter is limited and a worshiper of *Iishvara*. Therefore, an absolute unity or identity between *Iishvara* and *jiiva* seems to be impossible. Nevertheless, identity is a realized fact as is seen in the direct and immediate experience of great teachers. Since identity is a fact and the identity between *Iishvara* and *jiiva* seems an impossibility the scriptural statement '*tat tvam asi*' cannot be interpreted in its direct meaning, for such an interpretation would falsify the scriptural statement. Shankara clearly speaks of this point in his *Brahma-Suutra Bhaasya* as follows:

If God becomes identical with the transmigrating soul God will cease to exist; and as a result, the scripture will become useless. Similarly if the transmigrating soul becomes God, there will be none to follow the scriptures, which will certainly become useless. This will also contradict such means of proof as common experience.⁴⁶

Therefore, in order to interpret the identity statements we must enter the realm of implied meanings.⁴⁷ We know well, by now, that *Iishvara* and *jiiva* are the result of ignorance and the superimposition of the unreal on the real. Thus the implied meaning of 'That' is *nirgunaa Brahman*, the pure consciousness who is absolute and without attributes; 'Thou' by implication refers to the self (*Aatman*), the pure consciousness which is the reality underlying the mind-body system. Hence this aphorism means that *Brahman* and *Aatman* are absolutely one and the same.

Having determined that the Vedantic statement "That art Thou" is to be interpreted by way of its implicit meaning, it is important to decide which of the three *lakshana* is applicable in the interpretation of this aphorism. *Jahallakshana* is not applicable in the interpretation of 'That art

⁴³ Cf. VSS, PP. 90, 95.

⁴⁴ Cf. AB, Introduction, p. 89.

⁴⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 90.

⁴⁶ BSB, IV, i, 3, p. 818.

⁴⁷ Cf. AB, Introduction, p. 90.

Thou’ because by using this *lakshana* we can derive the meaning by implication if the implied meaning is not contained already in the original sentence. For instance, the sentence ‘The cowheard village is in the Ganga’ does not contain the phrase ‘on the bank of the river Ganga,’ and thus this meaning is not explicit. So by using *jahallakshana* one could derive the phrase ‘on the bank of the river Ganga’ by implication. But in the statement ‘That art Thou’ the words ‘That’ and ‘Thou’ have their direct meanings and are explicitly stated, i.e., they refer to *Ishvara* and to *jiiva* respectively. Hence it is not proper to discard the direct meaning ‘That’ and ‘Thou’ and give them the implied meaning of using *jahallakshana*.

Ajahallakshana, as mentioned above, consists in not wholly discarding the real meaning of the sentence, but hinting at it. For example, in the sentence ‘the red color is running’, the direct meaning is absurd. This absurdity can be removed, by not abandoning the direct meaning of the sentence but associating it with an object of red color that runs, for instance, a red horse. But the sentence ‘That art Thou’ cannot be interpreted using this second *lakshana*. The terms ‘That’ and ‘Thou’ clearly express their meaning, and in fact nothing of the direct meaning is excluded from ‘That’ and ‘Thou’. Hence, there is no reason why one should bring in some element that is not excluded from the direct meaning of ‘That’ and ‘Thou’. Therefore, *ajahallakshana* is not applicable in interpreting the sentence in question.

Jahadajahallakshana is precisely that which is applicable in interpreting identity statements like ‘That art Thou’. In this kind of implied meaning, a part of the sentence is given up and the other part is retained. In the example "this is that Devadatta," the part which involves contradictions, viz., his life in the past and in the present, i.e., the person Devadatta, is retained. Likewise in the *mahaavaakya* ‘That art Thou,’ the conflicting imports, namely immediateness, remoteness, and differences are given up and the absolute, pure consciousness which is common to both ‘that’ and ‘thou’ is retained.⁴⁸ It is according to this third *lakshana* that, ‘That art Thou’ and all other Vedaantic statements pointing to the identity of *Brahman* and *Aatman* must be interpreted.

The *mahaavaakya* ‘*tat tvam asi*’ is not tautological or superfluous. It and all such statements are concrete representation of a movement of thought from the ontological level of particularity to another of universality and yet to another of unity. When the latter state of unity is attained the distinctions between the former are negated. One begins with the individual consciousness, passes on to a universal consciousness, and finally arrives at the pure consciousness that overcomes the separate reality of both the individual and the universal. It is this state of unity which constitutes the ground of all multiplicity and individuality.⁴⁹ The unity is obtained by stripping away the incompatible and the contradictory elements of the ‘That’ and ‘Thou’ and thereby arriving at the common element or basis.⁵⁰ In the illustration, ‘this is that Devadatta’, the Devadatta seen now is identified with the Devadatta seen years ago, despite all the accidental differences like physical conditions, mental states and places of meeting. What makes one identify the person of Devadatta as the same is the elimination of the differences. In the same way the negation of the apparent contradictions of ‘That’ and ‘Thou’ would lead us to the fundamental and absolute reality.

In fact, in the recognition of the person of Devadatta now, one has gained nothing new about the person of Devadatta, except the accidental qualities, but only recognized Devadatta whom one had already known. In the same way the Upanishadic statements do not reveal anything new about *Brahman* or add anything new to its nature. Nevertheless, they are of immense value, since

⁴⁸ Cf. VSS, IV, 148-168, pp. 91-105.

⁴⁹ Cf. Eliot Deutsch, p. 49.

⁵⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 50.

they remove the false notion of difference between the individual self and the *Brahman*. When ignorance, on which is based the difference between 'That' and 'Thou' is removed, they cease to be different, and we are able to experience their identity. In other words, the intrinsic nature of 'That' and 'Thou' is one and the same. The words 'That' and 'Thou' in their implicit sense (*lakshana*) point to the same reality, as the terms 'I' and 'the tenth' indicate one and the same person in the sentence 'I am the tenth'.⁵¹ Thus, the identity statement 'That art Thou' clearly shows, that *Brahmaanubhava* or *paraa vidhyaa* is a non-dual and unique experience of the identity of *Brahman* and *Aatman*, which is the absolute and fundamental reality behind both the universe and the individual.

2.3. Characteristics of *Paraa Vidhyaa*

Having analyzed the goal and nature of *paraa vidhyaa*, we could now look into some of its characteristics. The study of the characteristics would elucidate the concept of *Brahmaanubhava* further. There are basically four characteristics: unity experience, immediate and direct experience, indescribable experience and uncaused experience. We shall elaborate each of these characteristics.

2.3.1. Unity Experience

Brahmaanubhava does not have an object of experience, nor does it have a subject of experience, in the empirical sense because *Brahman* is neither a subject nor an object. Shankara speaks of *Brahmaanubhava* as "pure knowledge and pure bliss, not smitten with suffering like sense perception, but serene (*prasana*), ever content and homogeneous or undifferentiated (*ekarasa*)."⁵² Since *Brahmaanubhava* is pure experience (*avagatimatra*) and pure knowledge (*keevala jnaana*), there is no possibility for the self or *Brahman* to become the subject or the object of *Brahmaanubhava*.

Brahman cannot be said to be the knower of *Brahmaanubhava*, because if *Brahman* is constantly aware of its bliss then that is the nature of *Brahman*. Hence there is no sense in maintaining that *Brahman* cognizes its own bliss. If, on the other hand, *Brahman* is supposed to be knowing its bliss interruptedly then in the intervals, when it does not cognize itself, it must do something else. The result of such a view would lead to the consideration of *Brahman* as changing and non-permanent.⁵³ Either way, *Brahman* cannot be said to be the subject or the knower of *Brahmaanubhava*. It, therefore, is "neither *Brahman*-consciousness nor self-consciousness; it is pure consciousness without the subject-object duality."⁵⁴ Shankara uses the example of fire and light to illustrate the impossibility of *Brahman* being the subject of *Brahmaanubhava*. Fire cannot burn itself, but burning is the very nature and essence of fire. Neither does light enlighten itself, but enlightening other objects and things is the very nature of light. In the same way, *Brahman* is essentially knowledge and being. We cannot say that *Brahman* knows itself, for its very nature is knowledge. "As the fire does not burn itself," says Shankara, "so the self does not know itself."⁵⁵

⁵¹ Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 39.

⁵² *BUB*, III, ix, 28.7, p. 393.

⁵³ Cf. *ibid*.

⁵⁴ A. Ramamurthi, p. 19.

⁵⁵ *BUB*, II, iv, 14, pp. 260-261.

Shankara, likewise, holds that *Brahmaanubhava* is an object-less experience. When speaking of it, one often thinks that it is an experience of *Brahman* by the self, which way of looking at *Brahmaanubhava* stems from ignorance (*avidhya*), for in fact *Brahman* is none other than one's own self. *Brahmaanubhava* does not mean experiencing *Brahman* as an object, but the realization of the real nature of one's own self.⁵⁶ Unlike empirical experience, *Brahmaanubhava* is not an experience of *Brahman* as an object, for it is not different from *Brahman*. When one attains *Brahmaanubhava*, one does not experience *Brahman* objectively (*vastu*) but recognizes his true nature which is *Brahman*. "In *Brahmaanubhava*," says, Shankara, "the differences of the experiencer (*labdha*), the experienced (*labdhya*) and the experience (*upalabdhi*) are totally absent."⁵⁷ Thus, *Brahmaanubhava* is a non-dual and unique experience, which in no way involves the distinction between the subject and the object.

Though Shankara strongly defends the non-dualistic nature of *Brahmaanubhava*, many scriptural texts seem to contradict his position. Some passages in the Scriptures refer to *Brahman* as 'all-knowing *Brahman*' or as the 'eternal *Brahman*' (*vijanata*).⁵⁸ Besides, Shankara himself alludes to the scriptures and speaks of *Brahman* as a witness (*saakshin*) of all actions that take place in the world of phenomena.⁵⁹ Brahadaaranyaka Upanishad gives the analogy of the union between two lovers as an illustration to clarify the notion of *Brahmaanubhava*. A man fully embraced by his beloved wife does not know anything, either internal or external, and is fully absorbed in the one whom he loves. The infinite being fully embraced by the supreme self does not know anything at all, either internal or external.⁶⁰ Again, in the same Upanishad, there is another illustration pointing to duality in *Brahmaanubhava*. When a lump of salt, which is a product of the sea-water, falls into the sea, it becomes fully dissolved in the water and becomes one with it, to such a degree that it can never again be separated from the sea-water. In the same way, in *Brahmaanubhava* the individual self enters into the supreme self, loses its separate identity and becomes one with the supreme self.⁶¹ Mundaka Upanishad states: "As the flowing rivers disappear in the ocean quitting name and form so the knower, being liberated from name and form, goes into heavenly person (*Brahman*), the higher than the high."⁶²

All these illustrations, whose intent and purpose is to describe the nature of *Brahmaanubhava*, seem to point to a duality in *Brahmaanubhava*, between *Brahman* and the self. They portray *Brahmaanubhava* as that experience by which the self attains *Brahman*. The idea of *Brahman* as the "witness" or as the 'eternal knower' suggests that *Brahman* is a subject distinct from the self as object. That the self is embraced into *Brahman* like a lover is embraced by the beloved, that the self is dissolved into *Brahman* as salt dissolves into salt-water, that the self enters *Brahman* as rivers merge into the ocean -- all indicate that in *Brahmaanubhava* there is a union of two distinct entities. In other words, all these illustrations show that "the self and *Brahman* are two distinct realities and the self's oneness with *Brahman* is a result of its union with *Brahman*. This means that *Brahman* is the goal of the self or that *Brahman* is the object of higher realization."⁶³ As a

⁵⁶ Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 99.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

⁵⁸ Cf. *BSB*, I, I, 4, p. 22.

⁵⁹ Cf. *AB*, No. 17, p. 136; Cf. also *BUB*, IV, iii, 23, p. 462.

⁶⁰ Cf. *BUB*, IV, iii, 21, p. 460.

⁶¹ Cf. *ibid.*, II, iv, 12, pp. 255-257.

⁶² "Mundaka Upanishad," III, ii, 8, Hume, p. 276 (hereafter: *MU*, Hume); Cf. also "Prasanna Upanishad," VI, 5, p. 389 (hereafter: *PU*, Hume).

⁶³ A. Ramamurthi, p. 103.

result, *Brahmaanubhava* amounts to an experience of *Brahman* by the self, i.e., the self is the subject whose object of experience is *Brahman*.

This description of *Brahmaanubhava* is incompatible with Shankara's Advaitic understanding of *Brahmaanubhava*. He considers it as an experience which involves no duality. If *Brahmanubhava* is the experience of the self, whose object is *Brahman*, then this experience cannot be absolute, but only transitory and limited because the individual self or the experiencer is limited. According to Shankara, the dualistic consideration of *Brahmaanubhava* is a result of ignorance, which consists in mistakenly accepting the phenomenal (*vyavahaara*) and the relative as the transcendental (*paramaartha*) or the absolutely real. As long as one is under the sway of ignorance, he is not going to see the true nature of *Brahmaanubhava*. In reality, *Brahman* is neither a knower nor a witness. The word 'knower' is used of *Brahman* figuratively to indicate pure knowledge, which is the nature of *Brahman*.⁶⁴ For Shankara says that 'the immutable consciousness, that is *Brahman*, is spoken as the 'eternal knower' by a figure of speech (*upacara*) just as by virtue of its heat fire is regarded as the agent of heating."⁶⁵ All concepts of duality enter only if these texts are interpreted from the phenomenal point of view. But Shankara holds that if the Upanishadic texts are given the right interpretation, they in no way conflict with the tenets of Advaita Vedaanta.

Commenting on the illustration in which the self is said to be embraced by the supreme self, Shankara argues that the supreme self is not different from the individual self. In fact they are one and the same self, the pure consciousness. Due to ignorance we see the supreme self as the individual self. The individual self is embraced by its own real nature, which is the supreme self. Therefore what is embraced and what embraces are one and the same. They are not two different realities, but are identical. However, the empirical self thinks of the supreme self as something different from itself before it has realized its real nature. The idea of embracing is meaningful only from the point of view of an empirical self. But what actually happens in *Brahmaanubhava* is that the self realizes its real nature by giving up ignorance.⁶⁶ The terms in other illustrations like 'entering' (*preveesa*), 'merging' (*aapti*) and 'attaining' (*labdha*) are used figuratively, like the words 'witness' or the 'eternal knower'. They have meaning and significance only from the relative point of view. Shankara clearly points to this truth in his commentary on Brahadaaranayaka Upanishad. He says:

We hold the definite conclusions of all the Upanishads that we are nothing but the self or *Brahman*, that is always the same, homogeneous, one without a second, unchanging, birthless, undecaying, immortal, deathless and free from fear. Therefore, the statement 'he is merged in *Brahman*' is but figurative (*upacara*) meaning the cessation of differences created by ignorance as a result of know-ledge.⁶⁷

Therefore, for Shankara, these problems -- whether *Brahmaa-nubhava* has an object or not; if it has an object how can it be non-dual; and if it does not have an object, how can it be considered as an experience of *Brahman* -- arise only when one seeks to understand and explain the objective experience of *Brahmaanubhava* from the standpoint of empirical experience. From the standpoint of absolute knowledge there are no such problems. True knowledge is non-dual; *Brahmaanubhava* is nothing but *Brahman* itself. One can attain *Brahmaanubhava* only by directly and immediately

⁶⁴ Cf. *BUB*, III, iv, 2, p. 326.

⁶⁵ Shankara, *Bagavat Giita Bhaasya*, trans. Mhadewa Sastri (Madras: V. Ramaswami Sastrulu & Sons, 1961), XIII, 2 (hereafter: *BGB*).

⁶⁶ A. Ramamurthi, p. 104.

⁶⁷ *BUB*, IV, iv, 6, pp. 500-501.

being *Brahman*. In *Brahmaanubhava*, there is no distinction of *Brahman* and the experience of *Brahman*. The direct and immediate experience of *Brahman* is *Brahmaanubhava*.⁶⁸ In other words, *Brahmaanubhava* is a non-dual and subject-objectless experience.

2.3.2. Immediate and Direct Knowledge

Since *Brahmaanubhava* is non-dual, subjectless and object-less experience, it must be immediate and direct.⁶⁹ Unlike the empirical experience, it cannot be obtained through our sense, mind and intellect. It is immediate and direct because it consists in recognizing and realizing one's own true nature; no mediation is necessary to know one's true self. "The consciousness of objects (which arise out of the functioning of the eye and other faculties) is mediately known: for it depends on an intervening reflection of the self (in order to be known). But as it is the self of the phenomenal consciousness, *Brahman* is immediately known."⁷⁰

In order to demonstrate the immediate and direct nature of *Brahmaanubhava*, Shankara alludes to the Upanishadic illustration of a group of people crossing a river. When they had crossed the river, in order to ascertain whether all in the company had arrived at the other side of the river one person began to count the members of the group. He counted everyone except himself. Each time he counted he found one person missing from the group, until he came to realize that he himself was the missing person, for whom he had been looking. In such realization, neither was there any effort involved, nor was there any intervention or mediation of any other factor, for the missing person and the one who was looking for the missing person are one and the same or identical with each other. Hence there is no need for any mediation to recognize his own self.⁷¹ All that is needed in the direct realization, is recognizing one's own self as the true self (*Brahman*). Therefore, *Brahmaanubhava* is the direct experience of the reality of oneself. It is direct and immediate experience and is never obtained through any media like senses, mind and intellect.

2.3.3. Indescribable

Since *Brahmaanubhava* is without subject-object duality and is immediate and direct experience, it is indescribable: the very notion of description involves duality. In the empirical realm, any experience, however small or great, can be given at least some description. What can be known through various means of empirical knowledge (*pramaanas*) can also be expressed in words, using our own everyday or philosophical language. What is not known or experienced through empirical means of knowledge cannot also be expressed in words. As *Brahmaanubhava* is trans-empirical, non-dual and undifferentiated, it is indescribable. As *Brahman* is beyond all phenomena, the experience of *Brahman* also is beyond the realm of phenomenal language. Shankara says: "It is only to the object of knowledge and not to the non-objects that a word or an idea can be applied. *Brahman*, which is the self of them and also of the ego is not within the scope of a word or an idea."⁷² Maanduukya Upanishad speaks of the indescribable nature of the *Brahman* in the following passage:

⁶⁸ Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 115.

⁶⁹ Cf. *BUB*, III, v, 1, pp. 330-331.

⁷⁰ *UI*, II, xvii, 40, p. 203.

⁷¹ Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 22.

⁷² *UI*, II, xviii, 24, p. 225.

Not inwardly cognitive, not outwardly cognitive, not bothwise cognitive, not a cognitive-mass, not cognitive, not non-cognitive, unseen, without which there can be dealing, ungraspable, having no distinctive mask, non-thinkable, that cannot be designated, the essence of the assurance of which is the state of being one with the self, the cessation of development, tranquil, benign, without a second...is the self (*Brahman*).⁷³

Since *Brahman* is indescribable and unknowable, *Brahmaanubhava* is also indescribable. A thing can be defined when it can be distinguished from other things, because of its distinguishing characterization. But there is nothing different from *Brahman*, from which it can be distinguished. Nor can anything be said about *Brahman*, so that it can be distinguished on that basis. Therefore, one can speak of *Brahmaanubhava* only by way of negation, by denying the qualities of the empirical experience superimposed on *Brahmaanubhava* by ignorance. In the empirical realm, any experience, however small or great, can be given at least some kind of description. *Brahmaanubhava* is trans-empirical and cannot be described because of the very fact that it is non-dual and undifferentiated. The words and languages we use refer to the phenomenal world (*maayaa*) and to the relative realities. As *Brahman* is beyond all that is phenomenal, *Brahmaanubhava* cannot be described in ordinary language. For Shankara says: "It is only to the object of knowledge and not to the non-objects that a word or an idea can be applied. *Brahman*, which is the self of them and also of the ego is not within the scope of a word or an idea."⁷⁴

Yet the Upanishads do attempt to define *Brahman* as 'reality' (*satyam*), 'knowledge' (*jnaanam*), and 'infinite' (*aanandam*).⁷⁵ In fact, this description is not true of *Brahmaanubhava*, for it does not elevate our conception or understanding of *Brahman* to a higher level, or remove our conception of finitude. It only negates the qualities of 'unreality', 'ignorance' and 'finitude' superimposed upon *Brahman*. The description of *Brahman* as "infinite knowledge and reality" is a logical impropriety. By this very impropriety this description of *Brahman* serves to show the logical uniqueness of *Brahman* and that of *Brahmaanubhava*. By its striking oddness the phrase preserves as well as reveals, to some extent, the great mystery of *Brahman*. It preserves the mystery because we have no idea what infinite knowledge is, though we know what knowledge is. It reveals the mystery of *Brahman* because it effectively shows the uniqueness of *Brahman* by differentiating it from all objects and empirical subjects.⁷⁶

2.3.4. *Eternal and Uncaused*

Brahmaanubhava is of the nature of *Brahman*. Since *Brahman* is eternal *Brahmaanubhava* is an eternal experience. Therefore, one cannot speak of it as taking place in some particular moment in time. Unlike empirical experiences, *Brahmaanubhava* is an experience which is without a beginning or an end. In empirical experience there is the distinction between the 'knower,' the 'known,' and the 'knowledge'. In *Brahmaanubhava* there are no such distinctions, for Shankara says, "the knower is the eternal knowledge. The known and the knowledge are not different"⁷⁷ in *Brahmaanubhava*.

⁷³ "Maanduukiya Upanishad," VIII, Hume, p. 392 (hereafter: Ma. U., Hume).

⁷⁴ *UI*, II, xviii, 24, p. 225. Cf. also A. Ramamurthi, p. 23.

⁷⁵ Cf. *TUB*, II, 1.

⁷⁶ Cf. Satchidananda Murthi, *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedaanta* (Waltair: Andhra University Press, 1959), p. 64.

⁷⁷ *UI*, I, ii, 79, p. 51.

Thus, *Brahmaanubhava* is the knowledge of an ontological state of absolute oneness and unity between *Brahman* (the unchanging, eternal reality in the universe), and *Aatman* (the unchanging, eternal reality in the individual).⁷⁸ Therefore, *Brahmaanubhava* is as eternal as *Brahman* and *Aatman*. It is not something that is caused by the individual who is striving to reach this state of unity. It is not an experience that takes place in time and which has *Brahman* for its object. For Shankara, the attainment of the self or *Brahman* cannot be the obtaining of something which has not been obtained before, for in *Brahmaanubhava* there is no difference between the person attaining and the object attained.⁷⁹ If *Brahman* is said to attain something other than itself, it becomes the attainer and the non-self, i.e., the object of attainment, because *Brahman*, the pure consciousness and eternal knowledge, is the one absolute reality.⁸⁰

As eternal *Brahmaanubhava* is uncaused. There is nothing that can cause *Brahmaanubhava* directly; it is an experience which cannot be effected (*asaadhya*). Any attempt to cause *Brahmaanubhava* is meaningless, since the finite and the limited cannot effect or cause a trans-empirical or transcendental experience. As *Brahmaanubhava* is pure consciousness, it is essential for the attainment of anything; therefore the very attempt to attain it, indicates its attainment. In other words, all means of attainment are based on *Brahmaanubhava* or pure consciousness, and so nothing can be attained without presupposing it. Therefore the self or *Brahman* is the basis of all knowledge and in attaining *Brahmaanubhava* everything else is attained.⁸¹ For Shankara says that just as one may get to the missing animal by searching for it through its footprints, similarly when the self is attained everything is attained. The very knowledge of the self is its attainment.⁸² *Brahmaanubhava* is so transcendental that there is no direct means of attaining it. According to Shankara looking for means to attain *Brahmaanubhava* would be like swimming on land under the impression that it is water; or like searching in space for the footprints of birds.⁸³ Thus, *Brahmaanubhava* is eternal, uncaused and identical with absolute reality. It consists in recognizing that one is *Brahman*.

⁷⁸ Cf. *AB*, No. 1, p. 118.

⁷⁹ Cf. *BUB*, I, iv, 7, p. 96.

⁸⁰ Cf. *ibid.*

⁸¹ Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 58.

⁸² Cf. *BUB*, I, iv, 22, pp. 95-96.

⁸³ Cf. *ibid.*, IV, iv, 22, p. 527.

Brahmaajijnaasa: Movement from Aparaa Vidhyaa to Paraa Vidhyaa

In the preceding two chapters, we attempted to study the *aparaa vidhyaa* and *paraa vidhyaa*, viz., the phenomenal and noumenal states of man. Our consideration of the *aparaa vidhyaa* made us aware that in phenomenal existence we are caught up with the *Iishvara* -- *jiiva* experience. On the other hand, our analysis of the *paraa vidhyaa* helped us to understand that the ultimate reality behind the universe is *Brahman*, the pure consciousness in *jiiva* is *Aatman* and that they are fundamentally one. The true destiny of man is achieved, when the aspirant frees himself from the phenomenal way of living and moves towards the transcendental path. In other words, when the aspirant moves from *aparaa vidhyaa* to the state of *paraa vidhyaa*, he attains his true destiny. To quote Shankara: "The following knowledge (the right knowledge of the *substratum*) does not arise without negating the previous one (the superimposed knowledge), as the knowledge of the rope does not come without destroying that of the snake in a snake-rope."¹ Thus, for Shankara, man's movement towards authenticity is similar to climbing a ladder, in which, the lower steps or stages are given up, when the higher stage is attained. The process of this movement from *aparaa vidhyaa* to *paraa vidhyaa* is what we call *Brahmaajijnaasa*. In this chapter, we shall look into the nature, stages and end of *Brahmaajijnaasa*.

3.1. Nature of *Brahmaajijnaasa*

Brahmaajijnaasa is the process of attaining *Brahmaanubhava*. It implies all the efforts made by the aspirant to move from *aparaa* to the *paraa* state of existence. In the following section, we will describe the meaning of *Brahmaajijnaasa* and distinguish it from *paraa vidhyaa* or *Brahmaanubhava*.

3.1.1. Meaning

Since *Brahmaanubhava* is an immediate and direct experience, there is no need of any means to attain it. Besides, as an absolute and trans-empirical experience, it is not possible to attain it by the use of any empirical or relative means. But, though we cannot bring about *Brahmaanubhava*, still we can remove ignorance and pave the way for *Brahmaanubhava*. As the non-realization of the self is a result of ignorance; the removal of ignorance is all that we need to do in order that *Brahmaanubhava* can happen in us. "The attainment of the highest (*Brahmaanubhava*)," says Shankara, "means merely the removal of ignorance and nothing more."² In darkness, though the objects are in contact with the senses, still we are not able to perceive them because of the presence of darkness. When we remove the darkness, we are able to perceive the objects as they are. For example, in semi-darkness a stump of a tree appears like a man; when the light comes in, we can recognize the real nature of the object in question, i.e., the tree stump.³ This is much the same in *Brahmaanubhava*. It is due to ignorance that the absolute reality, the *Brahman*, is seen as the world of phenomena. All that is required to attain *Brahmaanubhava* is to remove the ignorance

¹ *UI*, II, ii, 3, p. 89.

² *MUB*, I, i, 5.

³ Cf. *AB*, Introduction, pp. 42-43.

that blinds one in order to see his own nature. It is the wrong knowledge of the self that obstructs the perfect knowledge of the self, just as the perception of the silver in the pearl shell obstructs the perception of the pearl shell. When the obstruction of wrong knowledge is removed, the real nature of the self becomes self-revealed.⁴ Thus, for Shankara, "except for the removal of the superimposition of the non-self on the self, no effort, whether bodily or mental, is necessary for the realization of the self."⁵

Brahmaajijnaasa is the process undertaken by the aspirant to remove the superimposed knowledge. It literally means the 'desire for the realization of *Brahman*'. *Brahmaajijnaasa* includes all the efforts the aspirant makes to arrive at the *paraa vidhyaa* state. It would also embrace the different means used by the aspirant to transcend the dualities of the empirical order and attain the identity consciousness. Shankara's Advaita Vedaanta recognizes a dualism in the process of *Brahmaajijnaasa*. In other words, he speaks of a direct method and an indirect method in *Brahmaajijnaasa*. The direct method involves a deep understanding of the illusoriness of the phenomenal reality, the fundamental oneness of everything in *Brahman* and a discriminative consciousness that would enable the aspirant to break through the appearance and apprehend the underlying absolute reality in the manifoldness of the world. But the direct method may not be possible for everyone, as all may not be able to attain the vision of pure reason and discriminating consciousness. To such persons an indirect method is proposed, in which the lower nature of man, such as emotions and activities, are satisfied before one moves towards the higher intellectual discriminative consciousness. For Shankara, the indirect paths of service and love are not, by themselves, capable of removing total ignorance, but gradually they open the individual aspirant to a life of wisdom.⁶

The indirect method opens within the individual aspirant a willingness to surrender his energy in a life of service and to give himself with a loving heart. The willing surrender of one's life in generous service calls one to live a life of sacrifice and action (*karma*). For such a life of action, it is necessary to work towards eliminating selfish motives and intentions that stem from animal instincts in man. Besides, the aspirant must learn to do everything he does without any self interest (*nishkaama karma*).⁷ Thus, action done in love and faith would open the heart of the aspirant for a higher level of existence. The life of sacrifice is a stream through which the divine flow can envelop the heart of the aspirant to a deeper and fuller life of love and devotion (*bhakti*). A life of devotion prepares the seeker for deeper levels of sweetness and bliss. These transformations take place gradually, leading the seeker to still higher stages.⁸

Devotion is of two types, viz., *bheda-upaasana* and *abheda-upaasana*. In *bheda-upaasana*, a difference-in-identity is kept in view. The seeker in this state, while he enjoys the delights of union in love, keeps himself separate. *Abheda-upaasana* is a state in which the identity with the absolute is kept in view. Here, the aspirant gradually loses himself in the object of love and worship. Thus, in the latter state there is the possibility of identity consciousness, as life in the world does not seem anything more than the mental life of the seeker. Such an identity consciousness can take place in two different processes, viz., the process of sinking and the process of expansion. In the sinking process, the seeker feels that the soul is placed in the all pervasive consciousness. Feeling the immanence of the bliss, the seeker surrenders himself completely. This complete surrender

⁴ Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 61.

⁵ *BGB*, XVIII, 50.

⁶ Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 219-220.

⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 221-222.

⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 222.

brings about a psychological and spiritual transformation in the seeker. He experiences every mental modification in a new vision and meaning as everything is viewed in relationship to the infinite. There is complete delight and deep satisfaction in the soul. The intensity of devotion in love, the inner delight and satisfaction make the finite self-consciousness forget itself and be absorbed in the immanent infinite consciousness. The process of expansion consists in the gradual realization in the seeker that he is the immanent principle of the cosmos. When this realization takes over the aspirant he no longer feels that he is placed in the vastness of the cosmos, but rather finds that the entire universe is the reflection of his own being. In other words, he feels within himself the totality of existence. In the process, his sense of finite personality dissolves into an impersonal, expansive conscious existence.⁹

Though Shankara was convinced of the primacy of the direct method of knowledge (*jnaana*) for the removal of ignorance, he did give a place for the indirect method because of its practical necessity. For the vast majority of people in the world would not be able to give themselves directly to the demands of a life that involves reflection and intellectual activity. But, if persons have given themselves to lower levels of existence, i.e., service and love, gradually they would come to desire wisdom, transcending the empirical state of existence. It was Shankara's belief that, for most people, the path of wisdom can begin to have meaning when they have satisfied the will and the heart, as it will lead to the realization of the absolute behind the illusory and the relative. The focus of *niskaama karma* on service to others and *bhakti* on love of the supreme Lord, would make easy the life of real renunciation of the phenomenal state of living. This is probably the reason that Shankara retained the *jiiva -- Ishvara* idea in his system of thought, even though he was convinced of the truth of *Brahman -- Aatman* identity. In other words, Shankara admitted the possibility of a life love in service and service in love, only as a help to those seekers of *Brahman* who otherwise would not have had the opportunity to open themselves to a life of reflection (*vicaara*) and knowledge (*viveeka*).¹⁰

In speaking of the various means to remove ignorance, Shankara argues that neither action (*karma*) nor devotion (*bhakti*) are able to remove ignorance. These two means work in the realm of ignorance: the former concentrates on performing the various actions in the world of phenomena, and the latter helps the aspirant to concentrate on the supreme Lord. Both action and devotion presuppose duality and are not opposed to ignorance. A man who performs good actions and is a devoted man can still be in the illusion of ignorance and may never know the true nature of *Brahman*. Therefore, action and devotion do not succeed in removing ignorance. Shankara very strongly argues for the primacy of knowledge in the removal of ignorance. Knowledge is directly opposed to ignorance. Knowledge and ignorance about a particular reality cannot coexist in a person, for knowledge, as it were, drives away ignorance. Though knowledge cannot bring about *Brahmaanubhava*, still it can indirectly remove ignorance by its very presence. "Whether ignorance means doubt or false knowledge," says Shankara, "it always is removable by knowledge

⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 222-225. *Bheda-upaasana* involves duality, as in it the seeker, while experiencing his delight in the Lord, keeps himself separate. *Abheda-upaasana*, which leads to the loss of finite consciousness and an absorption into infinite consciousness, would require reflective criticism and discriminating consciousness to destroy ignorance, as ignorance is destroyed by knowledge alone. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 223-224.

¹⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 220-221, 225-226.

only, but not by action in any of its form, for there is no contradiction between ignorance and action."¹¹

Thus, *Brahmaajijnaasa* is the process, in which, the aspirant removes the ignorance, that is characteristic of the *aparaa* state of existence and moves towards the *paraa* state. Shankara, though, holds for the primacy of *jnaana*; he recognizes the significance of *karma* and *bhakti* for pragmatic reasons. Now, our task is to clarify the relationship between *Brahmaajijnaasa* and *Brahmaanubhava*.

3.1.2. *Brahmaajijnaasa* and *Brahmaanubhava*

The aspirant, having taken upon himself the process of *Brahmaajijnaasa*, goes through its different stages. These help him to get rid of ignorance which is the cause of duality and multiplicity. When ignorance is removed, and with it all multiplicity, the truth about oneself dawns. For Shankara, the *jnaana* path is the fundamental aspect of *Brahmaajijnaasa*, as only knowledge is able to remove ignorance. In *jnaana* path, by hearing doubt is removed from an unprepared mind that the Upanishads cannot impart the knowledge of *Brahman*. Reflection removes the doubt that the self and *Brahman* cannot be one, especially by giving logical and reasonable arguments. Through meditation the mind is withdrawn from all distractions and things other than *Brahman*. This process of *Brahmaajijnaasa* gradually removes all traces of ignorance from the aspirant and thereby opens the way for *Brahmanubhava*, the ultimate liberation. Hearing, reflection and meditation generate knowledge by the removal of ignorance. When all consequences of ignorance, such as duality and differences, are removed there dawns the self-knowledge or *Brahmanubhava*.¹²

Brahmaajijnaasa does not cause absorption into *Brahman*, because it deals only with what is known from hearing. The knowledge attained through *Brahmaajijnaasa* is an indirect knowledge. The knowledge attained through the process of *Brahmaajijnaasa*, by concentrating on the import and meaning of the scripture, is the highest intellectual knowledge possible. Nevertheless, *Brahmaanubhava* is not attained with *Brahmajijnasa*, but it is above and beyond it, since it is the direct and immediate experience of one's own self. De Smet remarks the following about *Brahmaajijnaasa* and its relationship to *Brahmaanubhava*:

Brahmaajijnaasa is only a preparation, a progressive removal of obstacles to knowledge, a protracted suicide of *ajnaana* (ignorance). *Vidhyaa* (true knowledge) cannot be a result, but a direct, independent realization, an awakening to reality, an intuition suddenly dawning upon the seeker. It is direct knowledge, while the result affected by the whole *Brahmaajijnaasa* can be nothing higher than an indirect knowledge.¹³

¹¹ A. Ramamurthi, p. 67. Cf. also *BGB*, V, 12. Cf. also *BUB*, III, i, p. 285. The knowledge we are speaking of here is the intellectual grasp of the import of the scriptural sayings. This intellectual understanding of what is revealed in the scriptures about *Brahman* helps one to eliminate the superimposed qualities on the self or *Brahman*. According to Shankara, the scriptures, which are the supreme and final authority regarding the self or *Brahman*, obtain their authoritativeness only because they serve to eliminate the superimposition of qualities attributed to the self, but not by revealing what is altogether unknown. The scriptures negatively point to the nature of *Brahmaanubhava*. Cf. *BGB*, II, 18, p. 39.

¹² Cf. *BSB*, I, i, 4, p. 43.

¹³ R.V. de Smet, *Theological Method of Shankara* (Rome: Pontifical Gregorian University, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 1953), pp. 165-166.

The occurrence of *Brahmaanubhava* is simultaneous with the removal of ignorance from the seeker. When ignorance is removed by the process of *Brahmaajijnaasa*, there follows immediately the truth about oneself, i.e., one's absolute absorption into *Brahman*. At this state the indirect knowledge of reflection (*vicaara*) gives way to right discrimination (*viveeka*). Now, there is no activity and the intellect of the aspirant sees through the appearance, recognizing his oneness with *Brahman*. At this stage, the aspirant knows that he is *Brahman*, and all duality and multiplicity disappear, since he realizes the fact that all is *Brahman*.¹⁴ This realization of one's absorption into or identity with *Brahman* is *Brahmanubhava*, the true liberation. Thus, *Brahmaajijnaasa* is a preparation, while *Brahmaanubhava* is the end.

3.2. Stages of *Brahmaajijnaasa*

Now that we have clarified the meaning of *Brahmaajijnaasa* and its difference from *Brahmaanubhava*, we shall take up the study of the different stages of *Brahmaajijnaasa*, especially in relation to Shankara's *jnaana* path. In order to study the scriptures and thereby remove ignorance, Shankara proposes certain physical, moral and intellectual preparations. These form the three stages of *Brahmaajijnaasa*. The physical preparation aims at helping the seeker to attain full control over his body and this is done by what Vedaantins call *Hathayoga*. The moral preparation has for its goal the purification of mind, by removing all inclinations to evil. The intellectual preparation intends to grasp the full import of the scripture with intellectual study of the scriptural texts. We shall, now, elaborate these three in detail.

3.2.1. *Hathayoga: The Physical Preparation*

The high intellectual penetration involved in the study of the scriptures implies that the seeker of *Brahmaanubhava* has full control over his bodily organism. The stability of the gross body is required for its normal functioning. When it comes to preparing oneself for higher intellectual and spiritual training, there is need to discipline the body sufficiently so as to make it a fit instrument for the realization of *Brahman*. The system of training that prepares the body for such a higher state of existence is called *Hathayoga*. It increases vitality in the body, gives good health and preserves great amounts of energy within the aspirant, as *Hathayoga* opens the aspirant for the life-process of the cosmic *praana*.¹⁵ The two main elements of *Hathayoga* are *aasana* (posture) and *pranayaama* (control of *praana*).

Aasana consists in placing the body in various postures. It helps the body to get rid of restlessness that blocks deep reflection and concentration. *Aasana* brings the entire physical organism of the aspirant under the control of his will. The posture is different from other types of physical exercises, as its aim is to make the body best fitted for the highest type of experience. The *Hathayogin* keeps his body free from all impurities, his nervous system in tact and gains control over the different muscles of the body by the practice of *aasanas*.¹⁶ *Pranayaama* is a method, with the help of which, the aspirant controls his vital power or breathing, which is the basis of organic life. It keeps under check one's inhalation and exhalation; it helps one to achieve complete will power over one's life-force. If practiced consistently, one can learn to restrain the vital-process completely. According to Advaitins, *pranayaama* has two purposes. Firstly, it brings

¹⁴ Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, p. 226.

¹⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 229-230.

¹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 230.

about perfection in the body. Secondly, it helps to awaken the *praanic* dynamism, i.e., the vast stored-up energy, which opens the aspirant for extraordinary consciousness. As a result, the moral and spiritual possibilities are awakened in the *Hathayogin. Pranayaama*, thus, helps the aspirant to control the instincts, passions and impulses that disturb the peace of mind. It can be practiced in two ways: firstly, as a purely physical practice, to keep the heart-beat under control, without any plan of control of the mind, and secondly, as a psycho-physical practice, to control the lower passions, to open in the seeker higher qualities and to help mental and spiritual discipline. The practice of *pranayaama*, in the latter way, is of great help to the seeker of *Brahmaanubhava*.¹⁷

When one has completed the practice of *Hathayoga*, he has made the first step into the process of *Brahmaajijnaasa*. The total control of body, by way of posture and breath-control prepares the seeker of *Brahmanubhava* to move into the next stage, viz., moral preparation.

3.2.2. Moral Preparation

If the intellect is to be able to understand the import of the *mahaavaakyas* or scriptural statements, it must be pure. The knowledge of *Brahman* revealed in the scripture, though expressed in terms of duality, still is the highest knowledge that can be known by the human intellect in the empirical realm. This knowledge cannot be grasped if the intellect is not open to understand eternal truth. Just as a stained mirror does not reflect things clearly, so an impure mind cannot grasp *Brahman* intellectually from the study of the scriptures. Shankara affirms this point in his commentary on Mudnaka Upanishad as follows:

Though the intellect in all beings is intrinsically able to make the self known [from the study of the scripture], still being polluted by such blemishes as attachment to external objects, etc., it becomes agitated and impure, and does not, like a stained mirror or ruffled water make the reality of the self known, though it is ever at hand.¹⁸

Shankara uses another analogy to illustrate the same fact. Fire, by its nature, is able to burn wood. But, if the wood is wet, fire is not able to burn it. In the same way intellect, though it is able to know and understand the import of the scriptural statements, because it is clouded by passions and attachments to things, does not grasp *Brahman* from the study of the *mahaavaakyas*.¹⁹ In other words, scriptural knowledge fails to accomplish its end if man is not perfectly pure at heart. The capacity of the mind to discriminate between truth and untruth is weakened when it is swayed by passions and sensual pleasures.²⁰ Thus, it is important to prepare oneself spiritually and to free the intellect from all passions, attachments and prejudices, in order to know the true nature of *Brahman* from the study of the scriptures and from the instructions of the teacher. Therefore Shankara proposes four disciplines called the instruments of spiritual knowledge (*sadhanachatyshtaya*), which the aspirant must practice before he ever begins the process of *Brahmaajijnaasa* (search for *Brahman*), by the study of the scripture under the guidance of the teacher (*guru*).

The first moral condition required of the aspirant in order that he be able to begin his move towards *Brahmaanubhava* is discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal (*nityaanityavas-tuviveeka*). It consists in an intuitive, firm conviction that *Brahman* alone is the absolute ground of all things or that which is really real, and that all other things are unreal and

¹⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 230-231.

¹⁸ *MUB*, II, pp. 155-156.

¹⁹ Cf. Shankara, "Statasloki," *The Works of Shankara* (Srirangam: Srivanivilas, 1910), XV, no. 40.

²⁰ Cf. A. Rmumurthi, p. 69.

phenomenal. *Viveeka* (discrimination) is the most fundamental quality that is necessary in an individual, because without it the other moral conditions are not possible. In other words, if one has not discriminated between the real and the unreal and has not recognized the absoluteness of *Brahman* there is no motivation to strive for its attainment.²¹

The second moral means for the removal of ignorance is renunciation (*vairagya*), which consists in not seeking the enjoyments of the fruits here and hereafter. It implies rigorous self-discipline to control the inner tendency of the aspirant to wander amidst sensuous experience and enjoy it. Renunciation is aimed at purification of emotions, perfection of the mental being and mastery over thought-consciousness. It would enable the aspirant to eliminate lawless tendencies, impulses and tendencies of animal nature, and to build up good habits of mind.²² Renunciation is, thus, the giving up of all the pleasures of the eyes, the ears and the other senses. By renunciation one also gives up objects of transitory enjoyment, the desire for a physical body, as well as for the highest kind of spirit-body of a god.²³ It is an attitude of indifference to all the seen and unseen results attainable by various means, whereby one becomes devoted to the scriptural teaching, and is not carried away by one's own natural desires. Renunciation is not the state of absolute desirelessness or *Brahmaanubhava*, but a state in which one desires nothing but self-realization.²⁴

In renunciation one foregoes the pleasures the world can offer so that one can concentrate on the study of the scripture. Therefore, a life of renunciation give the aspirant the opportunity to go in uninterrupted search after the goal of human existence by a deeper understanding of the scriptural statements (*mahaavaakyas*). Any person who is interested in absolute freedom must take every step to transcend earthly ties and involvements by way of renunciation. Vedaantins speak of two types of renunciation, *vibidisha sannyasa* and *vidwat sannyasa*. *Vibidisha sannyasa* is the renunciation for the acquisition of knowledge. This is practiced by the seeker; it does not consist merely in giving up worldly pleasures, but rather involves a systematic search after the life of wisdom. The aspirant, while practicing this type of renunciation, besides denouncing attachment to phenomenal enjoyments, seeks after hearing and reflecting about *Aatman* and concentrating upon it. *Vidwat sannyasa* is a renunciation one practices after the attainment of true knowledge. Complete freedom from all desires and activities is characteristic of this type of renunciation. This is desireless existence, in which renunciation coexists with true knowledge.²⁵

Thirdly, the aspirant should try to live a virtuous life by the practice of six treasures (*shatsamapatti*). When practiced, these virtues help the aspirant's inner faculties and make possible the cultivation of higher knowledge. The six virtues taught by Shankara are the following: firstly, calmness (*sama*), which consists in developing the quality of inner serenity so that one can dwell on *Brahman* after abandoning all the desires by renunciation; secondly, self-control (*dama*), which helps the aspirant to restrain his senses of sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste, and thus opens him to hear and to listen to the instructions of the teacher; thirdly, self-settledness (*uaaparati*), which is the withdrawal from all objects of enjoyment. This helps the aspirant to

²¹ *BSB*, I, i, 1, p. 9.

²² Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, p. 240.

²³ Cf. *VC*, p. 35. Cf. also *BSB*, i, I, 1, p. 9.

²⁴ Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 70.

²⁵ Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 240-241. Though renunciation is one of the important moral conditions in *Brahmaajijnaasa*, it is wrong to think that it cannot be dispensed with. If an aspirant's heart is pure and his mind is not swayed by worldly enjoyments, then he would not need renunciation to move into a deeper level of knowledge. Vedaantic thinkers hold divergent views as to the necessity of renunciation as a condition in moral preparation. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 242-243.

relinquish all the joys of worldly life and embrace the life of a *sannyasin* (monk); fourthly, forbearance (*titiksha*), which is the endurance of all the sufferings of this life. It helps the aspirant to not be agitated by love and hate, pleasure and pain, and all such pairs of opposites; fifthly, faith (*sraddha*), which is the firm conviction and intuitive belief in the existence of the ultimate reality. At this same time, it is not a mechanical or unquestioning belief, but a conviction based on intellectual understanding of what is taught in the scriptures about ultimate reality; sixthly, complete concentration (*samaadhaana*), which is the fixing of the mind on *Brahman* as taught by the scripture and a competent teacher. These six virtues direct one's attention to the attainment of *Brahmanubhava*.²⁶

The fourth moral condition is the aspirant's hunger for liberation (*mumukshvtva*). It consists in possessing an intense desire to be rid of ignorance and to attain *Brahmaanubhava*. "It is an intense longing of the student to free himself from all bondages pertaining to the body, the mind and the ego."²⁷ It is not a restless desire, but a result of the ethical practices mentioned above. Without this longing for liberation the ethical practices are really meaningless because a man may become morally perfect, and may achieve many supernatural powers, but if the desire for self-realization is absent in him, all his virtues will be of no real significance.²⁸ It is this longing and desire for true knowledge or *Brahmaanubhava* that gives motivation and meaning to the whole process of *Brahmaajijnaasa*.

3.2.3. Intellectual Preparation

The aspirant who is endowed with the above-mentioned four disciplines of spiritual knowledge is qualified to undertake the actual study of the scripture which will in turn bring about the actual removal of ignorance. Shankara says:

This knowledge [that the self is *Brahman*] should be imparted only to him whose mind has been pacified, who has controlled his senses and is freed from all defects, who has practiced the duties enjoined by the scriptures and is possessed of good qualities, who is always obedient to the teacher and aspires only after liberation and nothing else.²⁹

These four moral disciplines purify the intellect of the aspirant, freeing him from all passions and attachment, so that he can give himself uninterruptedly to the study of the scriptures.

The study of the scripture and the understanding of its import and meaning takes place in three states. The first stage is hearing (*sravana*), the second is the state of reflection (*manaana*), the final stage is meditation (*nididhyaasana*). These three, namely, hearing, reflection and mediation, constitute the objective intellectual conditions for the removal of ignorance.

3.2.2.1. Hearing (Sravana)

Hearing implies the idea of 'being taught'. At the first stage of the understanding of the meaning of the Vedaantic statements, the aspirant is introduced, by competent teachers to the teachings of Advaita. The need for a teacher at this stage is very much stressed in the scriptures. "A *guru* is like a boat on that boundless ocean which has for its water the principal struggle due to

²⁶ Cf. *AB*, Introduction, pp. 34-35. Cf. also *VC*, pp. 35-36.

²⁷ *BSB*, I, i, 1, p. 9

²⁸ *AB*, Introduction, p. 36.

²⁹ *UI*, II, xvi, 72, p. 190.

the rotation in the cycle of birth, decay and death."³⁰ Just as a boat is a place of safety for one who struggles in the ocean aimlessly, so the teacher by his teaching directs one to union with *Brahman*, freeing him from transmigration. Again, Kaatha Upanishad Bhaasya states: "When propounded by a teacher who sees no variety and is one with (*ananya*) the propounded *Brahman*, doubts whether the self exist or not...do not arise any longer for the self is such that it banishes doubts of all kinds."³¹ Thus *sravana* or hearing is the initiation of the aspirant to the traditional Vedaantic doctrine transmitted and passed on by the teachers.

Sravana, at the same time, is the mental activity which helps the understanding of Upanishadic texts, leading to their only import, viz., *Brahman*. This is achieved by an examination of the texts through six tests, namely, commencement, ending, repetition, uniqueness, result, eulogy, and reason.³² In the third chapter of the Chaandoogya Upanishad we have a typical illustration of this first stage, namely, hearing. Here the aspirant, Sivetaketu, the grandson of Aruna, is instructed by his father, but using the above mentioned six tests. The subject matter of this instruction is '*Brahman*, the one without a second'. Analysis of the six tests used in hearing in relation to the text in question gives us an idea about the practice of hearing or *sravana*.

The first and the second tests mentioned are commencement and ending. They refer to the presentation of the subject matter of the section at the beginning and at the end of the section. The subject matter is introduced in the beginning of the section in the words, "one only without a second"³³ and again at the end in the words "Thus has all this world that [*Brahman*] for *its self*."³⁴ The second test is repetition, which consists in the frequent presentation of the subject matter again and again. For instance, the subject matter "*Brahman* is one without a second" is repeated nine times in this section, in different words.³⁵ The third is uniqueness, which means that the nature of the subject matter is such that it cannot be attained through any other means of knowledge than the study of the scriptures. In this section the subject matter "*Brahman* is one without a second" cannot be achieved in any other way except from the understanding of the meaning of the *mahaavaakyas*. Fourth, the result is the usefulness of the subject matter of the section. In this section the realization that *Brahman* is one without a second brings about the self-knowledge of *Brahmaanubhava*. In other words, the utility of the knowledge of *Brahman* as the one without a second is its attainment. Fifth, eulogy consists in praising the subject matter at different places of the section. It is found in this section in the words: "Have you ever asked for that instruction by which one hears what has not been heard; one thinks what has not been known; one has spoken in praise of *Brahman* without a second."³⁶ Finally, reason consists in demonstrating the subject matter of the section. In this section we have the demonstration of "*Brahman* is one without a second" in the words: "As by a lump of clay, all that is made of clay is known...every modification being an effect of speech, a mode and the clay is the only reality."³⁷ In other words, just as in knowing a lump of clay, we can know the nature of all things made of clay, so also in knowing that *Brahman* is one without a second, the nature of everything in the world is known, for *Brahman* is the ground of everything. Thus, a reason is furnished to demonstrate the

³⁰ *BUB*, I, iv, 9, p. 56.

³¹ *KUB*, II, 8.

³² Cf. *BSB*, I, i, 4, pp. 25, 30, fn. 62, 80.

³³ Cf. *CU*, III, ii, 1.

³⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, III, xvi, 3.

³⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, III, xv, 3; III, xvi, 3.

³⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, III, i, 3.

³⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, III, i, 4.

subject matter of the section.³⁸ Hence, by hearing the meaning of the *mahaavaakya* from the teacher the aspirant becomes familiar with the import of the scripture.

3.2.2.2. Reflection (Manaana)

The Keena Upanishad Bhaasya speaks about the second intellectual condition required for the removal of ignorance, viz., *manaana*, as follows:

After being addressed by the teacher, the disciple (*shyshya*) sat at the solitary place and attended to nothing else (*ekaanta*), concentrated his thoughts (*saamhita*) and pondered over the meaning of *aagma* [the traditional teaching pointed out by his *guru*], arrived at a conclusion through reasoning, made it [the teacher's instructions] his own experience, went back to his teacher and explained: 'I think, I now know *Brahman*'.³⁹

This passage clearly shows the nature and function of *manaana* or reflection. It is a mental activity which consists in the employment of favorable arguments for the removal of the apparent contradictions that might arise during the study of the scripture against other means of valid knowledge. The truth pointed out by the teacher is difficult to grasp and seems to contradict the ordinary perception and knowledge obtained from *pramaanas* other than scripture. Thus, it is very important that the aspirant strengthen his conviction at this stage by looking for rational bases for the teaching received from the teacher in *sravana* or hearing. Professor Ramamurthi clearly points out the role of *manana* as follows:

The purpose of it [*manaana*] is to fortify one's conviction of the truth from the scripture and to rid oneself of all doubts...Another important function of reflection is to make one comprehend the real meaning of the scriptural statements by consistently interpreting them so that the apparent inconsistencies are resolved.⁴⁰

But, though at this stage of reflection one looks for arguments and reasons to justify the knowledge of *Brahman* received in *sravana*, still the arguments and reasons sought to strengthen one's conviction must not be contradictory to the teaching of the Upanishads. For, the scriptural authority is absolute, and reason is subservient to revelation especially with regard to our knowledge of *Brahman*. Therefore, for Shankara, *manaana* is "that continuous reflections performed with the aid of reasoning, and subservient to the teaching of the Upanishads, upon secondless reality, known through *sravana*."⁴¹

At this stage, the aspirant makes use of the negative method of Advaita Vedaanta, viz., *apavaada* (negation), more than ever before. *Apavaada* or negation consists in the elimination of what something is not, in order that one may attain the truth about that particular thing. In other words, it is "the elimination of the falsely superimposed attributes (*vivartha*) in order to discover the true nature of a thing."⁴² The rope appears as a snake in the illusion. By negating the illusory snake the true nature of the rope is perceived; by negating the attributes of the illusory water in the mirage one discovers the true nature of the desert; by negating the illusory silver we obtain the true nature of the shells scattered on the beach. This ability to distinguish between the real and the

³⁸ Cf. VSS, V, 185-190, pp. 112-115.

³⁹ Ke. UB, II, i, 4, p. 25, fn. 62.

⁴⁰ A. Ramamurthi, p. 72.

⁴¹ VSS, V, 191, p. 115.

⁴² AB, Introduction, p. 42.

unreal Shankara calls discrimination. It is this discriminating ability that helps us to understand the true nature of things. It is much the same with our knowledge of *Brahman*. By negating, through discrimination the attributes of the non-self, one attains the true nature of the *Aatman*; and by negating the world of names and forms one attains the knowledge about *Brahman*, the absolute reality.⁴³

Negation, then, consists in the refutation of the knowledge established by the method of superimposition or *adhyaropa*. In the scriptures we find many statements about the ultimate reality expressed in terms of negation. "That which is invisible (*adneesya*), ungraspable (*agranya*), without family (*agootra*), without caste (*avarna*), without sight or hearing (*acaksisrotra*), without hand or foot (*apanipaada*), immortal (*nitya*)...imperishable (*avyaaya*)"⁴⁴ is *Brahman*. "The self is that which has been desired as neither this nor that."⁴⁵ "It (*Brahman*) is imperishable..., undecaying..., unattached..., unsettled. It never feels pain, never suffers injury, it is transcendent."⁴⁶ These passages from the scripture witness to the fact that these negated qualities like birth, death, hunger, thirst, pain and pleasure never did belong to the absolute *Brahman*, even though these attributes were given to *Brahman* by one in the state of ignorance. Neither do these superimposed qualities affect the ultimate reality in any way. Thus, the "*via negativa* of Advaita Vendaanta...safeguards the unqualified oneness of the state of being called *Brahman*."⁴⁷

Brihadaraanyaka Upanishad speaks of *Brahman* with the words '*neti neti*' (not so, not so).⁴⁸ In fact this statement does not make us perceive something directly as the statement "this is a book" makes us perceive a book. Therefore, '*neti neti*' does not tell us anything positive about the nature of *Brahman*. But in fact it is the most proper way of describing *Brahman*, since it is devoid of all qualities. The term '*neti*' consists of two words: '*ne*' which means 'not' and '*iti*' which means 'so'. The word '*iti*' indicates the presence of something or a quality right here which is negated by the '*ne*'. Thus, '*iti*' used with '*ne*' points to something that is negated. The repetition of '*neti*' twice covers all possible predications that are to be eliminated.⁴⁹ '*Neti neti*' only denies the attributes superimposed on *Brahman* and not the *Brahman*, for such denial of both the *Brahman* and the superimposed qualities would lead to pure void (*suunya*) and to Nihilism. For Shankara says, "Know...that the *sruti* 'not large', etc., is meant to negate the false super-imposition (of largeness, smallness, etc. on the self) as it would be description of a void if it were meant to negate those qualities from one other than the self."⁵⁰ Just as the denial of the illusion of the snake leaves with the reality of the rope, so too the denial of the qualities superimposed on *Brahman* reveals *Brahman* in its entirety. For according to Shankara '*neti neti*' denies not absolutely everything, but only everything but *Brahman*.⁵¹

At the same time the use of '*neti neti*' before a descriptive sentence does not necessarily mean that particular descriptive sentence in question is false, but rather it only means that the sentence is not applicable or not appropriate in the case of *Brahman*. Consequently, what this approach has done is to generate a third kind of connotation which one can make of descriptions. No longer are

⁴³ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 42. Cf. also VSS, IV, 137, p. 86.

⁴⁴ *MU*, I, i, 6, Hume, p. 367.

⁴⁵ *BU*, II, iii, 6, Hume, p. 97.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, III, ix, 26, Hume, p. 125.

⁴⁷ Eliot Deutsch, p. 9.

⁴⁸ *BU*, II, iii, 6.

⁴⁹ *BUB*, II, iii, 6, p. 335. Cf. also *BSB*, III, ii, 22, p. 623.

⁵⁰ *UI*, II, iii, 3, p. 91.

⁵¹ Cf. *BSB*, III, ii, 22, p. 624.

descriptions either true or false; some of them may be given a third kind of evaluation, namely, what had been termed 'inappropriate' or 'inapplicable'.⁵²

A clear illustration of *regressus* to *Brahman* by way of negation is found in Brihadaraanyaka Upanishad. Gargi, the daughter of Vacaknai questions Yajnavalkya, "Since the world is woven on water, on what is water woven?" He replies that it is on the wind that water is woven. She continues the question in a similar manner asking on what the wind is woven? The wind is woven by the atmosphere worlds, and this by the world of Gandharvas, and this by the world of the sun, and sun by the world of the moon, and moon by the world of the stars, and stars by the world of gods, and gods by the world of *Indra*, and *Indra* by the world of *Prajapati*, and *Prajapati* by the world of *Brahma*. Gargi persists in her question and asks on what the world of *Brahman* woven? Yajnavalkya replies, "Gargi, do not question too much, lest your head fall off. In truth you are questioning too much about a divinity about which further questions cannot be asked. Gargi do not over-question."⁵³ Thus, Yajnavalkya using the method of negation moves towards *Brahman*, eliminating all adjuncts of limitation (*upaadhi*) starting from the lowest.

Sometimes in scriptural passages we find twofold negations.⁵⁴ In statements like *Brahman* is "not known and beyond the unknown"⁵⁵ and "neither gross nor subtle,"⁵⁶ what is denied is not only one attribute but also its opposite. Commenting on this statement which describes *Brahmanas* "neither *sat* (existent) nor *asat* (non-existent),"⁵⁷ Shankara says "Since the Knowable (*Brahman/Aatman*) is beyond the reach of senses...it cannot be...an object of consciousness accompanied with the idea either of existence or of non-existence, and, therefore, not said to be *sator asat*."⁵⁸ It is clear from this comment of Shankara, that, in such negations, the notion of *sat* and *asat* are understood from the *vyavahaara*, and not the *paramaartha* viewpoint. From the supreme point of view of absolute knowledge, the term '*sat*' applies purely to *Brahman*. But it is quite natural in the course of *Brahmaajijnaasa* that one understand such terms as '*sat*' or '*asat*' in the ordinary meaning they have for those who are still immersed in ignorance. In that case what the aspirant understands by '*sat*' primarily is the object of his senses, which should be negated with respect to *Brahman*.⁵⁹ Thus, the negative method completely does away with all false attribution of *Brahman* and, thereby, paves the way for true knowledge.

Thus, in the state of *manaana* the aspirant by way of negation desuperimposes the phenomenal reality from *Brahman*, and understands the full import of the Vedaantic statements like '*tat tvam asi*' in their indirect or implicit meaning. *Manaana*, therefore, logically establishes the truth of identity by critical reflection and discourse.⁶⁰ At the end of the stage of reflection all ignorance is removed; the aspirant is intellectually convinced of this identity with *Brahman* and thus moves towards the next stage, viz., meditation.

3.2.2.3. Meditation (Nididhyaasana)

⁵² Cf. Blackwood, "Neti, Neti -- Epistemological Problem of Mystical Experience," *Philosophy East and West*, XIII, (1963), p. 205.

⁵³ *BU*, III, iv, I, Hume, p. 111.

⁵⁴ Cf. R.V. de Smet, p. 247.

⁵⁵ "Keena Upanishad," I, 3, Hume, p. 335 (hereafter: Ke. U., Hume).

⁵⁶ *BU*, III, viii, 8, Hume, p. 118.

⁵⁷ *BG*, XIII, 12.

⁵⁸ *BGB*, XIII, 12.

⁵⁹ Cf. R.V. de Smet, p. 248.

⁶⁰ Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, p. 246.

The final stage leading to the complete removal of ignorance and, thus, to the direct realization of the self is mediation or *nidid-hyaasana*. If an aspirant, having heard the teacher, is successful in his reflection and is intellectually convinced of his identity with *Brahman*, then he is ready to strive for the direct realization or *Brahmaanubhava*. *Nididhyaasana* is a mental activity consisting in withdrawing the mind from all other things and concentrating it on *Brahman*.⁶¹ *Nididhyaasana* "strikes deep the Vedaantic wisdom into our heart. It eradicates the innate confusion of the body with the soul."⁶² Meditation is not a concentration of oneself on *Brahman* as an external and separate entity. It is an activity of the mind "in which the mind is turned completely inward, and is firmly fixed on the inner self and its identity with *Brahman* till one's finitude and individuality is dissolved."⁶³

Nididhyaasana has two forms, viz., *samprajnaat-samaapatti* and *asamprajnaat-samaapatti*. *Samprajnaat-samaapatti* is a form of meditation in which the aspirant witnesses modifications of consciousness, while meditating on the *mahaavaakyas*. In this type of meditation, there are two stages. The initial stage is characterized by the knowledge of the modification of mental consciousness that was originated by meditating on the Vedaantic statement '*tat tvam asi*'. The aspirant, therefore, is conscious of himself, the meditator and witness of the modification that has taken place in the consciousness, and of the modification created by the meditation on the scriptural axiom at that particular moment. The later stage of *samprajnaat-samaapatti* is free from all thoughts regarding the origin of the modification that is produced in the consciousness as the result of meditation on the *mahaavaakya*. Since the meditation is intense, at this state the temporal and spatial marks of modification are not available to the consciousness of the meditator. The aspirant is aware only of himself, as the witness, and the modifications produced by his meditation on the Vedaantic aphorism.⁶⁴

Asamprajnaat-samaapatti is a state of meditation in which the consciousness of the aspirant practicing meditation is not characterized by any modifications. In it, there is no sense of duality, as all modifications produced by the meditation on the scriptural axiom have ceased to exist. As there is no subject-object duality in this state of meditation, the *Aatman* becomes the subject and object of meditation, as the identity without any modifications is arrived at as the result of *asamprajnaat-samaapatti*.⁶⁵

Thus, by repeated exercise of meditation one moves to a greater depth of absolute consciousness. This consciousness of the identity with the absolute, removes all the effects of ignorance. By focusing more on his inner self, by way of meditation, the aspirant makes the journey inward until he experiences his absolute identity with *Brahman*.

3.3. *Samaadhi*: The End of *Brahmaajijnaasa*

In the last two sections of this chapter, we considered the nature of *Brahmamijjnaasa* and its various stages, especially with reference to Shankara's *jnaana* path to self-realization. The preparations of the aspirant at the physical, moral and intellectual levels, makes him focus more on his inner nature wherein he finds the ultimate source of his existence. The end of this journey

⁶¹ *BSB*, I, i, 4, p. 25, fn. 62.

⁶² Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, p. 246.

⁶³ A. Ramamurthi, p. 72.

⁶⁴ Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 246-247.

⁶⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 247.

is the attainment of *Brahmaanubhava* or *Samaadhi*. In this section, we shall attempt to elaborate the nature of the state of *Samaadhi* and the nature and characteristics of *Brahmajnaani*.

3.3.1. Nature

The realization of one's absorption in, or identity with, *Brahman* is *Samaadhi* (*Brahmaanubhava*). It is the true liberation and the ultimate end of the seeker and is of the same nature of *Brahman*. Therefore, *Brahman* and *Samadhi* are identical, for liberation is nothing else but becoming one with *Brahman*. In the liberated state the aspirant knows that he is *Brahman*. As a result, all duality and multiplicity disappear; one knows now that all, including oneself, is *Brahman*. In the *Samaadhi* state nothing new is attained in the aspirant, for he only realizes what he is from all eternity.⁶⁶

According to Shankara, the realization of *Samaadhi* takes place in three stages of consciousness. The first stage is the *asmbhaava-bhaavana* which consists in the removal of the thought of the non-existence of *Brahman* when one hears that 'Brahman, as undivided consciousness, exists'. The second stage is *drishyamaa-rjnaana*. Here, the discriminative capacity is more advanced and one is able to penetrate the appearance to get into the essence of reality. Now, one is able to remove the *avidhyaa* that everything is material and become conscious of the immutable being of *Brahman*. At these stages, the knowledge is only indirect, mediate and based on subject-object distinction. The third stage is that of identity-consciousness (*Brahmaanubhava*). At this stage, the seeker experiences the deepest core of his being that *Aatman* is identical with *Brahman*, the ultimate source behind the universe in the process removing the ignorance about the illusoriness of the phenomenal reality. This final stage gives us direct knowledge of *Brahman*.⁶⁷ Commenting on these three stages of consciousness Mahendranath Sircar says:

The first stage marks out the origin and continuity of the *vritti*, the second, its final disappearance, the third is the stage of knowledge. Between the second stage and the expression of *Aatman* in the third, if we can speak in such a way, there is no sequence of time. They are simultaneous... *Aatman* is known only by implication as one invariably associated with the denial of illusory forms of *Avidhyaa* and of *Avidhyaa* itself.⁶⁸

According to Vedaantins there is a difference between the perception of *Aatman* or *Brahman* in the *Brahmaanubhava* state and the perception of concrete facts in the phenomenal existence. In the perception of concrete things, the *manas* goes out and takes on itself the determination of the object. Here, the perceiver becomes aware of the existence of the object, because of the fact that *manas* takes the form of the object, and thereby removes the perceiver's concrete ignorance about the object. If we take the example of the pot as the object of consciousness, it is known because the *manas* goes out through the senses and takes on itself the form of the pot; this modification of the mind removes the ignorance about the pot and as a result, consciousness expresses the object. This process is technically known as *falavaapya*. But the perception of *Brahman* or *Aatman* in *Samaadhi* is very different. In the perception of *Brahman*, the *manas* does not take any concrete form, as *Brahman* has no form: *Brahman* is *vrittivaapya*. The mind does not

⁶⁶ Cf. Paul Deussen, *The System of Vedanta*, p. 401. Since *Brahmaanubhava* is of the same nature of *Brahman* Shankara held that liberation cannot be attained by any means other than knowledge. Cf. *ibid*.

⁶⁷ Cf. *PI*, VII, 56.

⁶⁸ Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, p. 276.

go out to experience *Brahman*, but rather it is transformed into *Brahman*, putting an end to all forms of ignorance.⁶⁹

The later Advaitic writers speak of two stages in *samaadhi*, depending on the intensity and the nature of concentration, viz., the *Savikalpaka samadhi* (determinate absorption) and *Nirvikalpaka samaadhi* (indeterminate absorption). In *savikalpaka samaadhi*, the aspirant abides in *Brahman*, the secondless reality, but still retains his 'I -- consciousness.' Here, there seem to exist the distinction between the 'knower,' the 'known' and the 'knowledge'. These later Advaitins compare this state to one who sees the clay elephant and also the clay that permeates the elephant. In other words, at this stage, the seeker is already possessed by the truth, but still unable to realize it entirely. But *Nirvikalpaka samaadhi* is the total absorption into *Brahman*. There is no 'I -- consciousness' or subject-object duality. Just as a lump of salt, when dissolved in salt water, is no longer perceived to be distinct from the water, likewise, the mental state in *Nirvikalpaka samaadhi* takes the form of *Brahman*. It is no longer perceived to be distinct from *Brahman* and cannot be separated from *Brahman*. At this stage, *Brahman* or the self alone shines by its own radiance, and the aspirant experiences his absolute identity with *Brahman*.⁷⁰

If we accept the distinction of two different states in *samaadhi*, then without any doubt the latter state, i.e., the state of *Nirvikalpaka samaadhi*, is the same as *Brahmanubhava* in which the absolute identity between the seeker and *Brahman* is realized. Such a realized seeker becomes a *Brahmajnaani*.

3.3.2. Brahmajnaani

Brahmajnaani is one who possesses true *jnaana* about *Brahman*. He is in the state of transcendental consciousness. He would be purely unconscious of the empirical order, as it would not affect him in any way. The vision of *Brahmajnaani* is no longer obscured by the phenomenal world, its variety of realities and their meanings. His state of existence cannot be described in positive terms, as it surpasses any type of description. He is enlightened and free, fully unaffected by the pains and gains of *aparaa* existence. In his innermost essence, he knows that he is the eternal consciousness, ultimate truth and bliss.⁷¹

When *Brahmajnaani* reaches the transcendental peak of existence, he is called *Videhamukta*. For *Videhamukta* the empirical world is no more a reality as he has awakened to a new vision of existence in which every form of illusion is removed. *Videhamukta* is said to have attained *Videhakaivalya*, which involves the freedom of being alone and undisturbed, denial of the body and forsaking of future life. In this state, the *karmic* seeds that leads to future births have been destroyed by the clear vision of identity. The effects of past *karma* have been obliterated. As a result, there is no reason for the individual to continue living in the phenomenal world. *Videhamukta* passes into a calm existence, having been lost to the empirical world and shedding his artificial personality that is characteristic of *jiiva*. Such a state is identical with the dawn of knowledge about *Brahman*.⁷²

Shankara is of the opinion that *Brahmaanubhava* or *Nirvikalpaka samaadhi* is possible even when one is alive, and that it is possible for everyone to attain this identity with *Brahman* if he gives himself to the process of *Brahmaajijnaasa* and works on removing ignorance, the cause of

⁶⁹ Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, pp. 277-279. Cf. also *PI*, VII, 90-92.

⁷⁰ Cf. *AB*, Introduction, pp. 99-100.

⁷¹ Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, pp. 286-288.

⁷² Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 288-289.

duality. In Bagavat Gita Bhasya, Shankara says: "A *yogi* (in the Advaitic sense) attains *Brahmanirvaana* (same as *Brahmanubhava*), the bliss of being *Brahman* or liberation by being *Brahman* here itself, that is, while he is alive."⁷³ Again commenting on the Upanishadic statement "by being *Brahman* one attains *Brahman*," Shankara says that *Brahmaanubhava* is possible while one is alive and there is no need for one to wait until death for its attainment. When ignorance is fully destroyed, the real nature of the self is revealed.⁷⁴ Such a person, who enjoys the liberated state in the present life is called *Jiivanmukta*. In fact, death does not change the essential condition of the *jiivanmukta*, but only brings to a close the effects of the accumulated action (*karma*) which is still bearing fruit (*prarabdha*).⁷⁵ In other words, death puts an end to the present life which is the effect of *prarabdha*.

3.3.3 *Jiivanmukta*

Now that we have established that *Brahmaanubhava* is possible for everyone, even in this life, there arises the question whether behavior is possible for a *jiivanmukta*? Since there is no duality in this transcendental experience, is it possible for the liberated man to live in this world of duality? Even if it is possible for him to live in this world, what is his nature, what are some of his basic characteristics, and how is he different from an ordinary unrealized person? In this section, we will attempt to answer these basic questions regarding *Jiivanmukta*.

The behavior of the liberated man can be distinguished from that of others on the basis of the absence of ignorance and its effects. The fully realized soul does not possess any trace of ignorance, and sees everything in *Brahman*. Thus, the behavior of *Jiivanmukta* is characterized by oneness, while an ignorant person's behavior is based on the experience of differences. Though *Jiivanmukta* lives in the world of duality, he is not disturbed by the pairs of opposites; he sees all things in terms oneness with *Brahman*. He is not affected by anything, since he sees everything in himself. An ignorant person considers others as different from himself and shapes his relations with them accordingly, whereas the liberated man does not see others as different from himself and shapes his relationship with others in terms of oneness.⁷⁶ Since the *Jiivanmukta* sees everything in relation to his own self, the absolute *Brahman*, nothing can bring any change in his self.

Another important quality that characterizes a *Jiivanmukta* is fearlessness. He cannot be afraid of anything. For Shankara says, "Fear is caused by a second entity or by things conceived to exist as different from the self. And when this notion of a second entity is eliminated by the realization of oneness, there will be no source of fear."⁷⁷ An ignorant person sees everything in terms of

⁷³ *BGB*, V, 24.

⁷⁴ Cf. *BUB*, IV, iv, 6, pp. 500-501.

⁷⁵ Cf. Advaitins speak of three kinds of effects of action (*karma*), which influence the future life of an individual. The first of these effects of action is *sanchita karma*, the accumulated or stored up fruits of action; the second is *aagami karma*, the fruits of action yet to come; and the third is *praravdha karma*, which consists of actions that are bearing fruit at present. According to Advaitins, the *Jiivanmukta*, by removal of ignorance breaks all effects of the past action and of the action yet to come. But, *praravdha*, i.e., the liberated man's actions that are bearing fruit at the present, will influence his present life, until it comes to a close. Thus, death does not change essentially the condition of *Jiivanmukta*, but it only puts an end to the accumulated *karma*, which is still bearing fruit. Cf. *VSS*, VI, 217, pp. 125-126.

⁷⁶ Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 54.

⁷⁷ *BUB*, I, iv, 2. Cf. also *TUB*, II, vii, 1.

differences, and so there is every reason that there is fear in an unliberated man. But for the one who has realized himself as the absolute and indestructible self, there is nothing to be afraid of because he is the one and the absolute.

Jiivanmukta transcends scriptures, ethical imperatives and social conventions. As an aspirant, while working towards this ultimate realization, he eradicated all his passions, prejudices and attachments, and concentrated on *Brahman* alone. Thus, when he has attained the identity with *Brahman*, he is free from all faults and never makes a false step or sets a bad example. The great ethical virtues such as humility, unselfishness, purity, kindness, and fellow-feeling, which prior to the attaining of knowledge he assiduously practiced for the purification of the mind, now adorn him like jewels. He does not seek them or need them, but they cling to him.⁷⁸

The liberated man alone knows the true nature and meaning of freedom. He is free from all the bondages imposed on men. He is the all-embracing self, and is absolutely free from the cares and worries of life. Swami Nihilananda portrays the freedom enjoyed by the liberated man as follows:

Sometimes a fool, sometimes a sage, sometimes possessed of regal splendor, sometimes a wanderer, sometimes behaving like a motionless python that waits for its food to come to it, sometimes wearing a benign expression, sometimes honored, sometimes insulted, sometimes unknown...thus lives a man of realization ever happy in the knowledge of *Brahman*.⁷⁹

Thus, whatever may be the state or condition he is in, the *Jiivanmukta* is free to conduct himself according to that condition. He is, in himself, the absolute and lacks nothing, and so is disturbed by nothing whatsoever. Thus, *Jiivanmukta* enjoys a freedom which is not found in a man of ignorance.

A *Jiivanmukta* is desireless and free from sorrow or grief. Desire arises when an object of one's wish is not attained; and sorrow and grief arise when the object of one's affection or desire is no longer with him. A person is sad, because he has lost something which was dear to him. In fact desires, grief and sorrow are based on the experience of differences. *Brahman* or the self is the absolute reality and lacks nothing. In attaining the self everything else is attained, for *Brahman* is the ultimate source of everything. Thus, desirelessness or the absence of grief and sorrow, in case of the *Jiivanmukta*, is not due to the suppression of desires, but because of his realization of *Brahman*, after reaching which there remains nothing to be desired.⁸⁰

A *Jiivanmukta* lives in this bodily state as long as there lasts the accumulated effects of the past actions that have begun to bear fruit (*prarabdha*). Until that time *Jiivanmukta* might engage himself in working for the welfare of others. As a possessor of a body, which is the result of earlier *karma*, he experiences that which is characteristic of material forms, like hunger, thirst, illness and old age. But he is never overwhelmed by these, for he knows the truth of their passing nature and of his nature as the absolute *Brahman*. The liberated man is one who "sees nothing in the waking state, even as in dreamless sleep; who, though beholding duality, does not really behold it, since he beholds only the absolute; who though engaged in work is inactive."⁸¹

All that we have said about the behavior of a *Jiivanmukta* are only approximations. Just as *Brahman* and *Brahmanubhava* are incomprehensible and indescribable, so too the nature and

⁷⁸ Cf. *AB*, Introduction, pp. 111-112.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 112.

⁸⁰ Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 55.

⁸¹ *AB*, Introduction, pp. 113-114.

the characteristics of *Jiivanmukta* are not describable. All we can say about the *Jiivanmukta* is said about him and his behavior, from our phenomenal point of view. All we have done, in trying to describe the qualities of the *Jiivanmukta* is to negate qualities like fear, desire, duality and differences, which are characteristic of those who live under the sway of ignorance. In other words, we have only said what the *Jiivanmukta* is not and not what he is; like *Brahman*, he is indescribable. Therefore, the so-called characteristics mentioned above are only a possible way of talking about *Jiivanmukta* from the phenomenal point of view. From the *paramaartha* or absolute point of view, *Jiivanmukta* is *Brahman*, and is of the nature of the unknowable and indescribable *Brahman*.⁸²

⁸² Cf. Mahendranath Sircar, *The System of Vedaantic Thought and Culture*, p. 287.

Part II
From Care to Transcendence

Care: Dasein's Being-In-The World

Dasein, by his very nature, is a being-in-the-world. His being-in-the-world is characterized by care, with its threefold concerns. Dasein's epistemological concerns stem from the fact that he finds himself in the world, understands the world and expresses his understanding in discourse. As a result of this 'being-in' of Dasein, he possesses the characteristics of existence, mineness and authenticity or inauthenticity and enjoys a priority over every other entity in the world. Dasein also has a relational concern, which takes him to encounter entities and other Daseins, like himself. The network of relationships he forms by these twofold encounters, constitutes what can be called Dasein's world. Besides, Dasein faces an existential concern in which he has to cope with his fallenness, authenticity and temporal-historical nature. This chapter attempts to unfold the threefold concerns of Dasein that constitute his being as care in his being-in-the-world.

4.1. Dasein's Epistemological Concern

Dasein is a unique being. On the one hand, he is "like any other entity, present-at-hand as real,"¹ and on the other hand, he is not a 'mere thing' because he is involved with entities in circumspective concern (*Besorgen*) and discovers the kind of being a thing is. "Dasein...is the ontical condition for the possibility of discovering entities which are encountered in a world with involvement...as their kind of being, and which, thus, can make themselves known as they are in themselves."² Human existence understood in this sense of the horizon in which every other reality in the world can have their meaning, Heidegger calls 'transcendence'. The term 'transcendence' means 'to pass over', 'to step over' and 'to go through'.³ Heidegger understands the term in relation to Dasein's 'being-in-the-world'. As transcendence, Dasein goes beyond all entities, including himself as a being and understands himself⁴ and other things in their being. As Heidegger puts it: "What is transcendence is, indeed beings themselves and that every being that can be and become unconcealed to Dasein, including, that being which exists as 'its (his) self' (i.e. Dasein)."⁵ In other words, the human existent is the 'formative' agent of the world. He transcends beings and draws them out of their fundamental hiddenness and endows them with being, i.e., with meaning and truth. Dasein, by his very nature, is transcendence and only by transcending beings is his nature realized.⁶ Speaking on this point J.L. Metha says:

Heidegger defines transcendence as the ground of ontological difference;⁷ it is by virtue of his transcendence that man (human existence) can distinguish between Being and being and so relate himself to essents in the light of his comprehension of Being. In transcendence, Dasein goes

¹ SZ, p. 201; BT, p. 245.

² SZ, p. 87; BT, p. 120.

³ Martin Heidegger, *The Basic Problem of Phenomenology*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982), p. 298 (hereafter: *BPP*).

⁴ Cf. SZ, p. 42; BT, 67.

⁵ Martin Heidegger, *Vom Wesen des Grundes* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1949), p. 18.

⁶ Cf. I.M. Bochenski, *Contemporary European Philosophy*, trans. Nicholl and K. Aschenbrenner (London: University California Press, 1974), p. 171.

⁷ Cf. *BPP*, pp. 227-228, 318-330. In these passages Heidegger deals, in detail, with the problem of ontological difference.

beyond all essents as such, including itself (himself) reaching up world, which is part of the structure of transcendence, of Dasein's 'being-in-the-world'.⁸

Having stated that Dasein is unique and different from all essents, in the following pages we shall proceed to consider this human transcendence by analyzing his nature, characteristics, and priority.

4.1.1. Nature of Dasein

Heidegger characterizes human existence as 'being-in-the-world'. This expression contains two notions: 'being-in' (*In-Sein*) and 'in-the-world' (*in-der-Welt*).⁹ Thus, human existence is essentially 'being-in'. It involves the idea of 'there' (*Da*).¹⁰ So human existence is the 'Da' of the 'Sein' of the world. In other words, it is in the 'there' of human existence, i.e., in his 'being-in' the world that being is disclosed. Dasein's 'being-in' is the basis of his familiarity with the world and in which the structure of the world is disclosed.¹¹ The main concern, of this section is to dwell on the nature of Dasein by analyzing the way in which Dasein is in his 'there', viz., his 'being-in'. In elaborating this point, we will consider the meaning and modes of Dasein's 'being-in' and knowing the world as a typical mode of Dasein's 'being-in'.

4.1.1.1. Meaning of Dasein's 'Being-in'

Dasein's 'being-in' is not the same as "withinness" (*Inwen-digkeit*), in which sense we speak of one present-at-hand essent in another. Here the term 'in' is taken in its spatial sense and we consider something as containing a thing. For example, apple is in the basket, water is in the bucket and the garment is in the cup-board.¹² "Being-in' is distinct from the present-at-hand insiderness of something present-at-hand 'in' something else that is present-at-hand."¹³ Dasein's 'being-in' does not mean a spatial 'in-one-anotherness' (*In-einander*)¹⁴ or 'side-by-sideness' (*Neben-einander*).¹⁵ 'Being-in' also is not to be understood on the subject-object schema because such a schema would divide the 'being-in' between the subject and the object, which amounts to side-by-side presence of the present-at-hand entities as the subject and object.¹⁶

Dasein's 'being-in' is not spatial, but existential. In this sense, the term 'in' derives from terms 'innen' (to reside), 'wohnen' and 'sich aufhalten' (to dwell).¹⁷ Thus, 'being-in' here means 'to be at home with', 'to reside alongside', 'to be familiar with', 'to be involved in' and 'to be entrusted with that familiarity with the world about'.¹⁸ In this sense we speak of someone 'being in a profession', 'being in a conspiracy' and 'being in love'. Here 'being-in' refers to a personal and

⁸ J.L. Mehta, *The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* (New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1971), p. 95.

⁹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 53; *BT*, p. 79.

¹⁰ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 132-133; *BT*, p. 171.

¹¹ Cf. *ibid.*

¹² Cf. *SZ*, p. 54; *BT*, p. 79.

¹³ Cf. *SZ*, p. 132; *BT*, p. 170.

¹⁴ Cf. *SZ*, p. 54; *BT*, p. 79.

¹⁵ Cf. *SZ*, p. 55; *BT*, p. 81.

¹⁶ Cf. *SZ*, p.132; *BT*, 170.

¹⁷ Cf. *SZ*, p. 54; *BT*, p. 80. In Heidegger's later writings the idea of 'dwelling' is a significant theme. "Bauen, Wohnen, Denken" and "...dichterisch wohnt der Mensch," *Vortraege und Aufsaeetze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1978), pp. 139-156, 181-198 (hereafter: *VA*).

¹⁸ Cf. *SZ*, p. 54; *BT*, p. 80.

existential ‘inhood’ which implies the relationship of dwelling and involvement. Thus, ‘being-in’ means Dasein’s being accustomed to his environment and in relationship to the entities of his surroundings. In other words, it involves Dasein’s entanglement with things of his world.¹⁹ Dasein’s ‘being-in’ comes in various ways. It consists in having to do something, producing something, consuming something, abandoning something, interrogating, considering, and determining. All these activities show Dasein’s interest in things and his concern for them. They can be called Dasein’s care-taking (*Besorgnis*).²⁰

The care-taking or ‘being-in’ is not an occasional property of Dasein which he sometimes has and other times does not have. We cannot speak of Dasein without his ‘being-about’ with entities. So ‘being-in’ is the essence of Dasein’s being.²¹ The most fundamental trait of Dasein’s ‘being-in’ is what Heidegger calls ‘*Erschlossenheit*’, i.e., the disclosedness of Dasein: "Dasein is its (his) disclosedness."²² Hence, Dasein’s ‘being-in’ or ‘there’ is the clearing (*Lichtung*) within which the world is discovered or disclosed. Referring to the traditional metaphor of human nature in man, Heidegger says that this metaphor is an ontic way of pointing to the existential-ontological structure of human existence as disclosedness. To say that Dasein is ‘lit up’ (*erleuchtet*) means that as ‘being-in-the-world’ he is cleared (*gelichtet*) or is a lighting-process. Dasein is illumined not by any other kind of being, but by his opened-up-ness to entities, which belongs to his very structure. It is the clearing of Dasein towards all entities of the world and is the basis of his familiarity with the world; it enables Dasein to encounter entities and be involved with them.²³ Dasein’s ‘being-in’ is identical with the disclosedness of the world. To quote Heidegger: "...the world is ‘there’ its being-there is (Dasein’s) ‘being-in’."²⁴ We could say that Dasein’s ‘being-in’ is a state of Dasein’s being, in which as opened-up-ness or the lighting-process he dwells among entities in concerned dealings (*Besorgen*) and discovers (*endeckt*) them in their being.

4.1.1.2. Modes of Dasein’s ‘Being-in’

In clarifying the meaning of Dasein’s ‘being-in’, we have been looking at the general layout of the ‘*Da*’ or the ‘there’ of human existence. In this section, we want to look into the ‘how’ of this ‘*Da*’ of Dasein, i.e., the ‘how’ of Dasein’s ‘being-in’. In other words we would like to consider the basic modes or ways in which Dasein is disclosive. There are three modes of Dasein’s ‘being-in’, i.e., Dasein discloses himself in three ways: ‘state-of-being’ (*Befindlichkeit*),²⁵ ‘understanding’ (*Verstehen*) and discourse (*Rede*). We shall briefly consider each of these.

¹⁹ Cf. *VA*, pp. 192, 202.

²⁰ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 56-57; *BT*, p. 83.

²¹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 57; *BT*, 84. Cf. also Gilbert Ryle, "Heidegger’s Sein und Zeit," *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays*, ed. Michael Murray (London: Yale University Press, 1978), pp. 58-59.

²² *SZ*, p. 133; *BT*, 171.

²³ Cf. *ibid*; Cf. also John Richardson, *Existential Epistemology: A Heideggerian Critique of Cartesian Project* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), p. 25.

²⁴ *SZ*, p. 143; *BT*, p. 182.

²⁵ The term ‘*Befindlichkeit*’ has been translated differently. William Richardson renders it as ‘disposition’, Cf. p. 64; John Macquarrie and Robinson translate it as ‘state-of-mind’, Cf. *SZ*, p. 133, *BT*, p. 172; Vietta gives it a psychological meaning and renders it as ‘sensitivity’. Cf. Egon Vietta, "Being, World and Understanding: A Commentary on Heidegger," *The Review of Meta-physics*, 5 (1951), 157-172. Since this German term ‘*Befindlichkeit*’ refers to the state or the situation in which one finds oneself, we prefer to translate it as ‘state-of-being’.

4.1.1.2.1. State-of-Being

Heidegger gives the name 'state-of-being' (*Befindlichkeit*) to the first determining awareness of oneself as 'being-in-the-world'. It refers to the way Dasein is 'placed' (*sich finden*) in life and in the world. It is the 'already-being-found-himself-thereness' of Dasein.²⁶ The state-of-being, for Heidegger, is an existential of Dasein, which is prior to all psychological moods²⁷ and belongs to Dasein's existential structure. What is indicated ontologically by this term, '*Befindlichkeit*', is what is ontically most familiar to Dasein, viz., his moods (*stimmung*) and his 'being attuned' (*Gestimmtheit*) to the world. In other words, the existential structure of Dasein's state-of-being is revealed through his ontic moods. "Mood," thus "is the lived expression of the state-of-being."²⁸ Dasein, as state-of-being, is never free of moods and is attuned to the world in one way or other. With the help of the moods Dasein discovers that he is in a particular way.

State-of-being with its ontic expression or moods discloses the 'being-in' of Dasein in three ways, viz., in Dasein's being delivered over to his moods, in his concerned dealing with entities and in his being submissive to the world. In the state-of-being, firstly, the Dasein is, as it were, 'delivered over' to his moods²⁹ and finds himself in one or other type of encounter which is beyond his control. Moods often overcome Dasein and he could affect them only to a limited degree. Often Dasein does not choose the particular situation, in which, he finds himself. For example, Dasein is thrust into a fearful mood without wanting to enter into that state. Thus, Dasein is always in one or another mood and shows himself "as a naked 'that it (he) is' and has to be."³⁰ Consequently, Dasein does not start his existence, but finds himself as already existing, whether it be in a given situation or from his origins. His existence has already started without his ever knowing or choosing. Dasein's Being as "that it (he) is" does not give a clear indication as to his origin and destiny. The 'whence' (*woher*) and the 'whither' (*wohin*) of Dasein remain obscure and hidden. Though these are hidden, Dasein is disclosed as a being that already is in one or another mood. It is Dasein's non-theoretical awareness of himself as being revealed in his moods, as an essence that is delivered, and which is a naked fact that Heidegger calls 'thrownness' (*Geworfenheit*).³¹

Dasein is thrown and is in a continuous throw which he can 'never get back behind'.³² Dasein's thrownness must be conceived as the "facticity of its (his) being delivered over."³³ Facticity is different from factuality (*Tatsachlichkeit*) of the present-at-hand entities. Heidegger calls the factuality of entity the '*factum brutum*' (brute fact).³⁴ But Dasein's facticity consists in that he is his 'there' in such a way that he finds himself in his world. Facticity is "the mood (that) brings Dasein before the 'that-it (he) -is' of its (his) 'there', which as such stares it (him) in the face, with the inexorability of an enigma."³⁵ Facticity, therefore, refers to the unavoidable and unchangeable character of the thrownness of Dasein. Though in the state-of-being Dasein is factually thrown into his moods, he should master his moods through knowledge and will. In other

²⁶ Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 64.

²⁷ Cf. *SZ*, p. 137; *BT*, p. 175.

²⁸ *SZ*, p. 134; *BT*, pp. 172-173. Cf. also Roger Waterhouse, *A Heidegger Critique*, p. 85.

²⁹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 134; *BT*, p. 173.

³⁰ *Ibid.*

³¹ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 134-135; *BT*, pp. 173-174.

³² Cf. *SZ*, p. 135; *BT*, p. 174. Cf. also John Richardson, pp. 33-34.

³³ *SZ*, p. 135; *BT*, p. 174.

³⁴ *Ibid.*

³⁵ Cf. *SZ*, p. 136; *BT*, p. 175.

words, Dasein should take responsibility for himself as if he were his own making, i.e., Dasein must overtake his own thrownness and accept it as his way to be (*zu sein*) and hold responsibility for it.³⁶

Secondly, in the state-of-being the thrownness of Dasein is revealed as a thrownness into the world of entities. The thrown Dasein is not revealed as an isolated subject, but as a 'totality-to-be-in-the-world'³⁷ and as having inseparable relationships with the entities of this world. In other words, in Dasein's thrown existence not only his own existence is revealed, but also the existence of other Daseins; the world with all its entities is disclosed. It would mean that in the state-of-being, Dasein's 'being-in-the-world' is disclosed, by which Dasein shows not only that he is a thrown Dasein among other entities, but also 'that he has to be', i.e., he is a thrown existence, who directs himself by being concerned with things and persons in the world. Thus in the state-of-being Dasein finds himself as a 'way to be', which is the basic condition for the possibility of discovering the world with its entities by moving towards them dynamically.³⁸

Thirdly, since in the state-of-being Dasein is primarily disclosed as a 'being-in-the-world' and is attuned towards entities in circumspective concern, he is disclosed as one who is submissive to the world. Considered as thrownness, Dasein finds himself in the world. He seems to be someone passive; the world moves towards Dasein and he has to submit himself, as it were, to the world. Through Dasein's openness to the world, Dasein discloses himself as thrown to the submissiveness to the world. Since he is open to the world, Dasein can be affected, impressed and threatened in his 'Da' by entities and other Daseins. For example, a journey by a car or a train may be looked at as something dangerous or particularly welcoming depending on the 'what-for' of the journey. The 'what-for' brings about different moods on Dasein and thereby affect his attitude towards the journey. If one expects something disturbing after the journey, this 'what-for', viz., the expectation of something disturbing, would effect the mood of fear. This, in turn, would make Dasein take the journey as something dangerous or the speed of the train as something alarming. On the other hand, if something particularly interesting is expected after the journey, then the mood effected may be joy. In this mood, Dasein would see the very things -- the journey by the train and its speed -- as something welcoming.³⁹ Thus, the world outside, by bringing about various moods in Dasein and changing his attitudes towards existential situations, affects Dasein and thereby makes him submissive. To quote Heidegger:

The fact that this sort of thing (an entity present-at-hand) 'matters' to it (Dasein) is grounded in one's state-of-being; and as a state-of-being it (he) has already disclosed the world as something by which it (he) can be threatened for instance. Only something which is in the state-of-being of fearing (or fearlessness) can discover that what is environmentally ready-to-hand is threatening. Dasein's openness to the world is constituted existentially by attunement of a state-of-being.⁴⁰

In "*Befindlichkeit*," therefore, the compelling force of the world is revealed. Things encounter Dasein and in some way he is at the mercy of things, as he is constantly exposed to the world. Speaking of this characteristic of the state-of-being, Heidegger writes: "Existentially a state-of-being implies a disclosive submission to the world, out of which we can encounter something that

³⁶ Cf. *ibid.*

³⁷ Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 65.

³⁸ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 136-137; *BT*, pp. 176-177. Cf. also Vincent Vycinas, pp. 43-44.

³⁹ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 137-138; *BT*, p. 176-177. Cf. also John Richardson, pp. 32-33.

⁴⁰ *SZ*, p. 137; *BT*, p. 176.

matters to us."⁴¹ In state-of-being, Dasein is disclosed as a thrown existence, which is involved with entities in the world, and thereby, in some way affected by them. As an essential mode of Dasein's disclosedness, the state-of-being, by pointing to Dasein's thrownness and facticity, represents more of Dasein's passive mode of disclosedness. Now, we turn our attention to the second mode of Dasein's disclosedness, viz., understanding.

4.1.1.2.2. Understanding

Traditionally 'understanding' (*Verstehen*) had a reference to the intellectual grasp of things. But, for Heidegger it is a mode in which Dasein can overtake his thrown existence of the state-of-being. 'Verstehen' implies the ability to stand Dasein's thrownness, in the sense that it can be actively developed. Understanding is not a property of Dasein, but is rooted in Dasein's 'ability to be' (*seinskoennen*); it is a basic mode of Dasein's being. "Dasein is in every case what it can be and in the way in which it is its possibility."⁴²

Though Dasein is primarily 'being-possible' (*Moeglichsein*), there is a difference in the way Dasein has possibilities and the way in which a present-at-hand entity 'has' possibilities. The possibility of an entity is discovered in terms of 'what-it-is', viz., its usability (*Dienlichkeit*) or serviceability (*Verwendbar*). But, Dasein constantly goes beyond 'what-he-is' towards 'what-he-is-not-yet'. As regards understanding, Dasein's 'being-in' involves that it is always directed towards some 'for-the-sake-of-which' (*Worumwillen*). Since understanding is not merely a theoretical grasp of Dasein's possibilities, but a capacity to achieve these possibilities, it positively effects by manipulating the resource. For example, understanding a hammer's involvement consists not merely in knowing that a hammer is for driving nails, but in knowing how to carry this out.⁴³ "Understanding is the existent being of Dasein's own potentiality-for-being; and it is so in such a way that this being discloses in itself (himself) what its (his) being is capable of."⁴⁴ This essential tendency of understanding to press forward into Dasein's possibilities Heidegger refers to as projection (*Entwurf*). The term "entwerfen" literally means 'to throw something off'. In ordinary usage it means to sketch, to draft or to design a project. Thus, for Heidegger the project of Dasein involves understanding himself -- as the thrown projection -- and the entities in terms of his possibilities, and to actualize these possibilities even though he does not have a full thematic grasp of this projection.⁴⁵ "As projecting, understanding is the kind of being of Dasein, in which it (he) is its (his) possibilities as possibilities."⁴⁶

As understanding, Dasein is a being-towards-possibilities. The projecting of understanding has the possibility of developing itself (*sich auszubilden*) which Heidegger calls interpretation.⁴⁷ In interpretation, understanding does not become anything different, but becomes itself. In fact,

⁴¹ *SZ*, pp. 137-138; *BT*, p. 177. Cf. also Martin Heidegger, *Existence and Being* (Indiana: Regenery/Gateway Inc., 1977), pp. 34-35 (hereafter: *EB*).

⁴² *SZ*, p. 143; *BT*, p. 183.

⁴³ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 144-146; *BT*, pp. 182-186. Cf. also John Richardson, pp. 26-27.

⁴⁴ *SZ*, p. 144; *BT*, p. 184.

⁴⁵ Cf. *SZ*, p. 145; *BT*, pp. 184-185. Cf. also Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 28.

⁴⁶ *SZ*, p. 145; *BT*, p. 185.

⁴⁷ Heidegger uses two German terms for the English term "interpretation," viz., "*Interpretation*" and "*Auslegung*." The latter term is used in the broader sense of referring to Dasein's activity that lays-bare (*aus-legen*) something as something. The former term is used to apply to interpretations, which are more theoretical and systematic, as in the exegesis of a text. Cf. *SZ*, p. 1; *BT*, p. 19, fn. 3.

interpretation is grounded in understanding and not vice versa. Nor does interpretation brings any new information about what is understood, but rather it consists in working out the possibilities which are already projected in understanding. Thus, "in it (interpretation) the understanding appropriates understandingly that which is understood by it."⁴⁸ For example, we interpret a hammer, as a hammer having some assignment in an equipmental system.

There are two moments involved in the act of interpretation, viz., the 'as structure' (*als-Struktur*) and the 'fore-structure' (*vor-Struktur*). In his interpretative circumspection, Dasein understands an entity in its 'in-order-to', i.e., that an entity is for such and such purpose. When Dasein understands what something is for (*Wozu*), it is understood as what Dasein is to take the thing in question for; whenever Dasein sees something, he sees it as something. For example, he sees a table as a table, a chair as a chair, a door as a door, and a bridge as a bridge. The 'as' that makes up the structure of the explicitness of something that is understood, Heidegger calls 'as-structure'. The pre-predicative explication of what is understood by means of the 'as', lies before (*liegt vor*) Dasein making any thematic assertion about it. Again, in the understanding of something as something, Dasein does not throw any signification over something that is present-at-hand or add a value on it, but rather Dasein lays-bare only what he has encountered in his involvement with that entity. In other words, in interpretation Dasein makes clear what is already there in entities, as entities.⁴⁹ In interpretation the 'as-structure' is made explicit.

The exposition of the 'as-structure', i.e., interpretation, is grounded in the 'fore-structure', which consists of a 'fore-having' (*Vorhabe*), 'fore-sight' (*Vorsicht*), and 'fore-conception' (*Vorgriff*). Firstly, every case interpretation is based on something we have in advance, i.e. a fore-having. It consists in Dasein's comprehension of his world, in its totality, purpose and involvements. In other words, what Dasein has, in advance, is the total range of ways in which Dasein relates to an entity, which is interpreted in terms of its 'in-order-to' or 'what-it-is-for'. Secondly, interpretation is characterized by a fore-sight, which is an interpretative assimilation that takes place under the guidance of some consideration in respect to what is understood or explicated. Fore-sight, therefore, brings limits on fore-having by seeing something from a certain point of view. Thirdly, there is the fore-conception in which the interpretation occurs in terms of a conceptual scheme, whereby an entity is interpreted as itself. Thus, in every interpretation there is present a fore-structure and an as-structure. The clarification of the as-structure by the fore-structure is what we call interpretation. In other words, whenever something is interpreted as something it is based on a fore-having, fore-sight and fore-conception.⁵⁰

The entity that is interpreted is expressed in an assertion (*Aussage*). Heidegger considers assertion as a derivative form of interpretation, which in the final analysis is grounded in understanding.⁵¹ In clarifying the full structure of assertion Heidegger attributes three significations to assertion. Firstly, the preliminary signification of assertion is "pointing out" (*Aufzeigen*) in the sense of 'holding up for view', 'drawing attention to' or 'exhibiting'. In this

⁴⁸ *SZ*, p. 148; *BT*, pp. 188-189.

⁴⁹ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 148-150; *BT*, pp. 189-191. Cf. also Michael Gelven, *A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time* (New York: Harper and Row, 1970.), p. 94.

⁵⁰ Cf. *SZ*, p. 150; *BT*, p. 191. Since every interpretation of something as something is based on the fore-structure, for Heidegger there is no interpretation without presupposition. An interpretation based on presupposition does not amount to a circular argument. Therefore, one must not try to get out of the circle, as only by entering the circle in the right way can one interpret an entity. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 150, 152-153; *BT*, pp. 191-192, 193-195.

⁵¹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 154; *BT*, p. 195.

sense Heidegger is referring to the original meaning of the Greek term "logos" as "appopphanasis," viz., letting an entity be seen from itself.⁵² In the assertion 'the hammer is too heavy', what is discovered is not the meaning, but rather an entity ready-to-hand (*Zuhanden*).⁵³ Thus, assertion 'points out to' and 'represents' the reality of the entity. Secondly, assertion means apredication in which a subject is given a specific character by attributing to it a predicate, and thereby determining the subject by the predicate. What has been exhibited in the first sense has been narrowed down by giving an added determination through the predicate. In the assertion 'the hammer at the table is heavy', we have narrowed down the denotation of the statement by a new predicate 'at the table'. The second sense still has the idea of 'pointing out'.⁵⁴ Thirdly, assertion means communication (*Mitteilung*) or speaking forth (*Herausgabe*). Assertion is communication in the sense that it lets other Daseins also see what is exhibited as thus determined. What is shared through communication is a common mode of concernful dealing with an entity. The communication is aimed at inducing the other to adopt the same concernful relationship towards that entity.⁵⁵ Bringing together these three significations of assertion, we can define assertion as "a pointing-out which gives something a definite character and which communicates."⁵⁶

4.1.1.2.3. Discourse

Besides 'Befindlichkeit' and 'Verstehen', discourse (*Rede*) is the third fundamental existential of Dasein's 'being-in. For Heidegger, "Discourse is the articulation of intelligibility."⁵⁷ Discourse underlies both interpretation and assertion as both presuppose understanding and articulation in discourse. Thus, the intelligibility of being-in-the-world "...expresses itself as discourse."⁵⁸ Heidegger distinguishes between discourse (*Rede*) and language (*Sprache*). Language is the spoken form of discourse. "The way in which discourse gets expressed is language."⁵⁹ Language is a totality of words in which discourse has a "worldly" being of its own. The discourse is an existential of Dasein, while language is a fact, an entity present-at-hand-within-the-world and a ready-to-hand, with the help of which discourse can be expressed. Language can be broken up in words, but discourse is that which gives meaning. As meaningful articulation of the attuned understanding discourse is part of the existential constitution of the openness (being-in) of Dasein.⁶⁰

There are basically four structural components of a discourse: What is spoken of (*das Worueber der Rede*); what is spoken as such (*das Geredete als solches*); Communication (*Mitteilung*); and Expression (*Ausprechung*). Firstly, what is spoken of in all forms of discourse - - whether it be accepting or refusing, demanding or warning, pronouncing, consulting or interceding -- are always about something. "Talking is talk about something."⁶¹ Thus, discourse shows in its own structure the basic pattern of Dasein's mode of being, i.e., the disclosedness of

⁵² Cf. *SZ*, pp. 32-34; *BT*, pp. 55-58.

⁵³ Cf. *SZ*, p. 154; *BT*, p. 195. Cf. also *BBP*, p. 209.

⁵⁴ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 154 -155; *BT*, pp. 196-197.

⁵⁵ Cf. *SZ*, p. 155; *BT*, pp. 197-198. Cf. also *BPP*, 210.

⁵⁶ *SZ*, p. 156; *BT*, p. 199.

⁵⁷ *SZ*, p. 161; *BT*, pp. 203-204.

⁵⁸ *SZ*, p. 161; *BT*, p. 204.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

⁶⁰ Cf. *ibid.*

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

being-in-the-world.⁶² Secondly, what is spoken about (*das Beredete*) in discourse -- whether it be request, question or statement -- is always a 'talk to' someone in a definite way. In other words, in discourse there is "something said-in-the-talk-as-such" (*ein Geredete als solches*) which is intended to reach someone outside of Dasein. "In this 'something said' discourse communicates."⁶³ Thirdly, the discourse is not communication (*Mitteilung*) in the sense of giving some information and experiences, such as, opinions and wishes from within one Dasein to another. The communication Heidegger speaks of is taken in the wider existential sense, in which, Dasein-with is essentially manifested in a co-state-of-being (*Mitbefindlichkeit*) and a co-understanding (*Mitverstehen*). In discourse, being-with becomes explicitly shared, in the sense of taking hold of, and appropriated.⁶⁴ Fourthly, through discourse Dasein expresses himself. Whenever Dasein communicates something in what is 'said-to-talk', he expresses himself (*spricht sich...aus*) in discourse. In this expression Dasein does not give something from within himself, because as being-in-the-world he is already "outside" when he understands and expresses. What is expressed, in discourse is precisely this "being-outside," i.e., Dasein's state-of-being. Dasein's being-in, in its state-of-being, is made known in discourse and is indicated in language by intonation, modulation, the "tempo" of the talk and the way of speaking.⁶⁵ These components of discourse are not to be considered as empirically determined properties of a language. They are existential characteristics rooted in the ontological structure of Dasein, which makes language ontologically possible.⁶⁶

Discourse, as an existential state of Dasein, discloses and constitutes Dasein in his possibilities. 'Hearing' (*Hoeren*) and 'keeping silent' (*Schweigen*) are two modes that belong to discourse. Besides, these two show how discourse and understanding are interconnected. We would briefly look into the two modes of discourse. When we do not hear something aright, we say we have not understood what is said by the other. It is not by some accident that we say this, because Dasein hears only because he understands. Besides, 'giving ear to' is an existential openness of Dasein for others and for his own potentiality-for-being. The ability to hear, which basically comes from understanding, in the primordial sense of 'being-open' is the basis of what Heidegger calls 'hearkening' (*Horchen*). It is a type of listening which is prior to sensing tones and sounds. Dasein, as dwelling along side the entities within-the-world, 'just hears something all around' (*das nur-herum-hoeren*), like sounds of motorcycles, moving cars and talking. This type of hearing is a privation. But hearkening consists in the existential possibility of the talking being understood. Understanding arises neither in too much talk (*zu vieles reden*) nor busily 'hearing all around'; only one who understands can hearken or listen (*zu-hoeren*).⁶⁷

Another important mode of discourse is keeping silent, which also has its basis in understanding. In conversation, he who keeps silence can contribute more by developing a more authentic understanding. The one who talks too much can do a lot of damage in the sense that he reduces comprehension to triviality by his incessant talk. To be silent does not mean that one should be dumb. A dumb person, not being able to speak, will all the more like to speak. One who is accustomed to keeping silence all the time is not able to keep genuine silence at a given moment, as he would never be speaking anyway. One can keep silence authentically, only in genuine

⁶² Cf. *ibid.*

⁶³ *SZ*, p. 162; *BT*, p. 205.

⁶⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

⁶⁵ Cf. *ibid.*

⁶⁶ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 162-163; *BT*, p. 206.

⁶⁷ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 163-164.; *BT*, pp. 205-208.

discoursing. To be able to keep silence, Dasein must have something to speak, i.e., he must have understanding.⁶⁸

Now that we have considered the modes of Dasein's 'being-in', viz., state-of-being, understanding and discourse, we shall analyze Dasein's knowing the world (theoretical knowledge) as a mode of Dasein's 'being-in' founded in Dasein's being-in-the-world.

4.1.1.3. Knowing the World: A Founded Mode of Dasein's 'Being-in'

Traditional epistemology considered Dasein's knowing the world with reference to the subject-object relationship. Dasein is the subject and the world is his object. Such a conception presumes Dasein as an entity present-at-hand; the knowledge he has by the subject-object relationship is, as it were, a quality of the subject. But Heidegger considers Dasein's basic constitution as being-in-the-world. 'Being-in', as we have seen, is an existential of Dasein in the sense that Dasein is familiar with his world. His involvement and familiarity with the world is one of concern and care-taking. Thus, every dealing of Dasein relating to the world is founded on this care-taking involvement of Dasein. Therefore, knowing, which is a primordial involvement of Dasein with the world, must fundamentally be a care-taking. Heidegger says: "Knowing is a kind of being which belongs to being-in-the-world."⁶⁹ Therefore, the interpretation of knowledge as a relation between subject and object lacks the truth. "Subject and object do not coincide with Dasein and the world."⁷⁰

From what we have said it is clear that Dasein's knowing the world is grounded in Dasein's 'being-already-alongside-the-world'. It involves not a mere fixed staring at something that is present-at-hand, but it is being fascinated by the world with which Dasein is involved. Though fascinated by the present-at-hand entity and being alongside this entity, by abstaining from manipulations with it Dasein thereby stands face to face with it as a spectator. Looking at an entity in this mode is characteristic of the cognitive care-taking of Dasein's knowing the world. Cognitive care-taking, i.e., Dasein's knowing the world by means of his looks which are more or less determined by his view points, amounts to a mode of dwelling alongside the entities within the world. In such a dwelling, where Dasein holds himself back from all manipulation and utilizations,⁷¹ the perception of the present-at-hand (the world) is completed. So, the perception is reached when Dasein addresses himself to something as something and discusses it as such. In other words, perception becomes an act of making something determinate when the something is interpreted as something. What is perceived and made determinate by interpretation can be expressed in a proposition. According to Heidegger, the perceptive retention of an assertion about something is not a mere representation of the knowledge that is appropriated by Dasein, but is itself a way of being-in-the-world.⁷²

When Dasein directs his looks towards something and understands it as something he does not come out of an "inner sphere" in which he was initially; rather he is always "outside" alongside entities, thus belonging to a world which is already discovered by him. Again, in such an act of

⁶⁸ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 164 -165; *BT*, p. 208.

⁶⁹ *SZ*, p. 61; *BT*, p. 88.

⁷⁰ *SZ*, p. 60; *BT*, p. 87.

⁷¹ Here, Heidegger is indicating the traditional distinction between the theoretical and practical knowledge. Knowing the world is a theoretical knowledge, which is founded on Dasein's concerned being-alongside entities. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 61-62; *BT*, pp. 88-89.

⁷² Cf. *ibid.* Cf. also Vincent Vycinas, p. 33.

knowing the Dasein does not go out of an "inner sphere," when it dwells alongside the entity to know and determine its character. Rather, it is still "inside" in the sense that he is himself "inside" as a being-in-the-world, which knows. To quote Heidegger: "...the perceiving of what is known is not a process of returning with one's booty to the 'cabinet' of consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it; even in perceiving, retaining, and preserving, the Dasein which he knows remains outside. It (he) does so as Dasein,"⁷³ i.e., as a being-that-is-already-alongside-entities. Heidegger, thus, considers all forms of knowing, whether it be perception in which knowledge is attained, forgetting, error or delusion in which knowledge is seemingly obliterated, as modifications of Dasein's primordial being-in as a being-in-the-world.⁷⁴

On account of Dasein's knowing the world, which is founded on his care-taking involvement with the entities, he achieves a new status of being towards (*Seinstand*) the world, which Dasein discloses in himself. This involvement of Dasein with the world, viz., his 'being-in', is not arrived at in the phenomenon of knowing, nor does it arise from the way in which the world acts upon Dasein. Rather, only because Dasein is 'being-in' has he the capacity for this specific mode of cognition, i.e., knowing the world. Thus, "knowing (the world) is a mode of Dasein founded upon (its) [his] being-in-the-world."⁷⁵

4.1.2. Characteristics of Dasein

Dasein's nature cannot be expressed as to his whatness (*Wassein*), but has to be understood in his own way of being (*Zusein*). In other words, the essence of Dasein cannot be described by enumerating his qualities and attributes, but only by analyzing how he is in relation to himself and to his world.⁷⁶ Dasein is a unique being, different from mere present-at-hand entities. Dasein is an 'existent being', while the present-at-hand entities just 'are'. While Dasein is the questioner of the being of entities, the entities are things that are questioned.⁷⁷ Heidegger thus characterizes the nature of Dasein as existence, mineness and authenticity or inauthenticity.

4.1.3.1. Existence

According to Heidegger, "the essence of Dasein lies in its (his) existence."⁷⁸ Heidegger's use of the term 'existence' must be distinguished from the traditional term 'existential', which refers to the entities present-at-hand.⁷⁹ The German term '*Existenz*' etymologically means 'to stand out

⁷³ Cf. *SZ*, p. 62; *BT*, p. 89.

⁷⁴ *SZ*, p. 62; *BT*, p. 90.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* Cf. also Walter Biemel, *Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977), p. 37.

⁷⁶ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 12, 42; *BT*, pp. 32-33, 67. Cf. also Vincent Vycinas, pp. 26-27. Cf. also John McGinly, "Heidegger's Concern for the Lived-world in his Dasein Analysis," *Philosophy Today*, 16 (1972), 104-105.

⁷⁷ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 302, 436-437; *BT*, pp. 350, 387. Cf. also Harold Alderman, "Heidegger on Being Human," *Philosophy Today*, 15 (1971), 19.

⁷⁸ *SZ*, p. 42; *BT*, p. 67. Cf. also *SZ*, pp. 12-13; *BT*, pp. 32-33.

⁷⁹ Heidegger uses the term 'existence' exclusively to Dasein. While Dasein exists, the other entities are. Cf. *SZ*, p. 42; *BT*, p. 67. Since the nature of Dasein is characterized by existence, Heidegger calls Dasein's existence-structure 'existential' and distinguishes it from categories which are characteristic of beings other than Dasein. 'Existential' refers to the 'who' (Dasein), while 'categories' refers to 'what' (the present-at-hand entities in the broadest sense). Cf. *SZ*, pp. 44-45; *BT*, pp. 70-71. Cf. also Werner Marx, *Heidegger*

from'. Dasein 'exists',⁸⁰ i.e., stands out from all other things in the world in the sense that, unlike all other things, Dasein is open to himself and to his world. Besides, he also takes responsibility for himself and the world; to some extent, he can shape his destiny and that of his world.⁸¹ In this sense, Dasein, as existence, is ecstatic, which literally means: standing beyond the static entities of this world. For Heidegger, all other beings are, but they do not exist. He highlights this point as follows: "Man (Dasein) alone exists. The rock is, but it does not exist. The tree is, but it does not exist. The horse is, but it does not exist. The angel is, but it does not exist. God is, but he does not exist."⁸² In this statement, Heidegger does not deny the reality of entities like rock or tree, but only points to the unique type of being of Dasein as existence. Dasein as existence "is set apart in the realms of beings as the only existing being which can undertake an inquiry into Being in terms of his peculiar existence."⁸³

This ecstatic nature of Dasein as existence, i.e., standing beyond things that are static and understanding their being, brings to light another significant aspect of human existence. Since Dasein is not a mere thing but is "to be" (*zu-sein*) or existence, he is not something static, but a reality that is to be achieved. To exist is to-be-on-the-way (*unterwegssein*). This would imply that Dasein is always stretched forward towards his still-to-be-realized being. Thus, human existence is never complete in his being and we can never aim at possessing an exhaustive understanding of his nature at a given moment, as there always is something outstanding. Dasein is an existence, which is "already-begun-still-to-be-achieved."⁸⁴

In this regard other things present-at-hand are different from Dasein. They possess a static quality about them; they have their fixed and given essences; their properties and qualities can be listed. For example, a table or a piece of stone can be described in terms of color, hardness, length and weight. Besides, for them, their own being is never an issue; they do not transcend their realm. Dasein, however, is not stable, but dynamic. Human existence cannot be understood in terms of properties, but only in terms of his possibilities. Dasein does not have a fixed essence as things have. The essence of Dasein, if we can speak of one at all has to be related to the fulfilling of his possibilities in the context of his concrete existence. Heidegger says: "...those characteristics which can be exhibited in this entity (Dasein) are not proportion present-at-hand of some entity...(But) are in each case possible ways for it (him) to be and no more than that."⁸⁵ Thus, "in each case Dasein is its (his) possibility and it (he) 'has' this possibility but not just as a property..., as something present-at-hand would."⁸⁶ So, as existence, Dasein is a being which stands out above other entities present-at-hand and moves towards actualization of its possibilities, thereby ever remaining 'on the way' (*unterwegs*).

and Tradition, trans. Theodore Kisiel and Murray Green (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971), pp. 87-88.

⁸⁰ Heidegger often uses hyphenated words for the sake of emphasis. Here, the word 'ex-ists' (*ek-sistiert*) points to Dasein's peculiar character of standing out among other entities. Cf. William J. Richardson, p. 39, fn. 31.

⁸¹ Cf. John Macquarrie, *Martin Heidegger* (London: Lutter-worth Press, 1968), p. 12.

⁸² Martin Heidegger, *Was ist Metaphysik?* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975), p. 16 (hereafter: *WM*).

⁸³ Harold Alderman, p. 20.

⁸⁴ William J. Richardson, p. 39. Cf. also James M. Damske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger* (Kentucky: The University Press, 1970), pp. 19-20.

⁸⁵ *SZ*, p. 42; *BT*, p.67. Cf. also John Maquarrie, *Martin Heidegger*, pp. 12-13.

⁸⁶ *SZ*, p. 42; *BT*, p. 67.

4.1.3.2. Mineness

Dasein is existence and is his own possibilities, which are yet to be realized. Therefore Dasein does not have any fixed essence, and there is a uniqueness about the individuality of Dasein. Dasein is always someone's own existence. Human existence cannot be grasped as an instance or special case of some genus of the things present-at-hand.⁸⁷ To these present-at-hand entities, their own being is never an issue. But Dasein is "that entity which in its (his) being has this very being as an issue..."⁸⁸ Therefore, unlike other entities, human existence cannot be a matter of indifference and he can never be substituted for another.⁸⁹ Dasein "...is in each case mine."⁹⁰ Since human existence by his very nature is one's own and cannot be treated as a specimen of a class, "one must always use a personal pronoun when one addresses it (him)."⁹¹ Therefore, Heidegger concludes that the essence of Dasein lies in the fact "that in each case it (he) has its (his) being to be and has it as its (his) own."⁹²

4.1.3.3. Authenticity or Inauthenticity

Since Dasein is existence, i.e., he is not a finished product, but an ongoing possibility which is one's own (*Jemeinigkeit*), he has constantly to choose from the possible ways for him to be. That is why Heidegger says: "In each case Dasein is mine to be in one way or another. Dasein has always made some sort of decision as to the way in which it (he) is in each case mine."⁹³ Dasein, thus, has the ability to choose the particular way of his being-in-the-world. "And because Dasein is in each case essentially its (his) own possibility, it (he) can in its (his) very being 'choose' itself (himself) or win itself (himself); it (he) can lose itself (himself) and never win itself (himself) or only 'seem' to do so."⁹⁴ This would mean that Dasein is a possibility which can realize or neglect, develop or reject, build up or forget his own being. Human existence is what he makes of himself, and his own being becomes for himself his own constant problem. In other words, Dasein can either stand out as the distinctive type of being that he is, or he can be involved in a routine manner of living in which his possibilities are not determined by himself, but are taken over and dictated to him by the pressures of circumstances and society, and thereby live a mediocre existence.⁹⁵

Thus, we can speak of two fundamental ways in which Dasein can exist, viz., an authentic and an inauthentic human existence. Human existence is authentic (*eigentlich*) when he 'owns' his own possibilities of being or chooses himself as his ownmost possibility. It is inauthentic (*uneigentlich*) when he is blind to his own possibilities either by ignoring or giving them up.⁹⁶ Dasein often finds himself in the inauthentic state; but authenticity is not something which can be

⁸⁷ Cf. *SZ*, p. 42; *BT*, pp. 67-68.

⁸⁸ *SZ*, p. 42; *BT*, p. 68.

⁸⁹ Cf. *ibid.*

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

⁹¹ *Ibid.*

⁹² *SZ*, p. 12; *BT*, pp. 32-33.

⁹³ *SZ*, p. 42; *BT*, p. 68.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*

⁹⁵ Heidegger calls this factor that leads to an average and mediocre existence '*das Man*', which is translated into English as the 'they' or the 'they-self'. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 126-127; *BT*, 164-165. Cf. also Vincent Vycinas, pp. 30-31.

⁹⁶ Cf. *SZ*, p. 43; *BT*, p. 68. Cf. also John Macquarrie, *Martin Heidegger*, p. 14.

gained once for all, but must be decided as new situations come along. Besides, inauthenticity is not a less or lower degree of being or a mere aspect of authenticity. As modes of Dasein, authenticity and inauthenticity are based on Dasein's character of 'my-ownness'. Dasein is an issue for himself not only in the state of authenticity, but also in the state of inauthenticity, even though the latter is a mode of fleeing.⁹⁷

4.1.2. Priority of Dasein

Our consideration of the characteristics of Dasein, viz., Dasein as existence, which is characterized by his own possibilities, which can be realized or neglected depending on his choices that are authentic or inauthentic respectively, clearly points to the fact of the priority of Dasein over other entities. Dasein is a special being, which is capable of encountering beings and laying-bare their being, meaning and truth. In this section, in considering the priority of Dasein, we will attempt to uncover the relationship of Dasein to Being (*das Sein*), meaning and truth.

4.1.2.1. Dasein and Being

Speaking of Dasein and his relationship to being, Heidegger remarks the following:

Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities. Rather it (he) is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its (his) very being, that Being is an issue for it (him). But in that case, that is a constitutive state of Dasein's being, and this implies that Dasein in its (his) being, has a relationship towards Being -- a relationship which itself is one of Being.⁹⁸

Thus, Heidegger claims that Dasein, even before he poses the question of Being, has some comprehension of Being. In Dasein's relationship with other beings, they are open to him, and he is able to know not only what they are, but also how they are. In other words, Dasein is able to comprehend what makes them what they are, viz., their being. When Dasein expresses his moods in exclamations (e.g. Snake!) the 'is' is already presupposed. Besides his own moods express his being, i.e., it is in such and such a way.⁹⁹ Dasein's comprehension of Being is not a clear concept, but obscure, pre-conceptual and for the most part undetermined and vague. Dasein's primordial comprehension of Being is not only pre-conceptual, but also unquestioning in the sense that it calls no attention to itself and raises no questions. Speaking of Dasein's basic understanding of Being, Heidegger states: "...this vague average understanding of Being is still a fact."¹⁰⁰

Though Dasein's understanding of Being is preconceptual and vague, it renders the Being-question possible. If Dasein did not have this fundamental comprehension of Being, he would never be able to raise the question of Being at all. This comprehension of Being is not something accidental to Dasein. The very name Heidegger ascribes to human existence, viz., Dasein (the 'Da' of 'Sein') points to how the comprehension of Being is fundamentally rooted in Dasein's Being.

⁹⁷ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 43, 44; *BT*, pp. 68, 69. Cf. also *BPP*, pp. 170-173. Here, Heidegger speaks of mineness as the basis of authentic and inauthentic self-understanding, in relation to 'for-the-sake-of-whom'. Cf. also *SZ*, p. 53; *BT*, p. 78.

⁹⁸ *SZ*, p. 12; *BT*, p. 32.

⁹⁹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 141; *BT*, pp. 180-181.

¹⁰⁰ *SZ*, p. 5; *BT*, p. 27. Cf. also William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 33-34.

In other words, this primordial comprehension of Being constitutes Dasein's ontological structure. That is why Heidegger remarks: "Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being."¹⁰¹ This quality of Dasein's comprehension of Being makes Dasein ontically distinct from all other entities, even though Dasein, like any other entity, is an entity in the world. "Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it (he) is ontological."¹⁰² Our earlier characterization of Dasein as existence is founded on his understanding of Being. "It is only on the basis of Comprehension of Being that existence is possible."¹⁰³

Heidegger, thus, speaks of a threefold priority of Dasein due to his relation to Being. Firstly, Dasein has an ontic priority in that he is existence, i.e., he is ecstatic, stands out from (*ek-sistiert*) and transcends other beings, besides his openness to Being. Secondly, it has an ontological priority because Dasein is able to understand Being (*Sein-Verstand*). Thirdly, Dasein has a priority, which Heidegger calls an ontico-ontological priority, in that by his understanding of Being he understands his own being, that of other Daseins and that of entities. In such understanding Dasein provides the ontico-ontological conditions for the possibility of any other ontologies.¹⁰⁴ Thus, Dasein is the worldly human being which provides in himself an opening for the Being to be revealed. Human existence is the questioner of Being and in posing the question about Being he creates an opening that transcendently grounds all other realms of inquiry.¹⁰⁵ Since the meaning of entities and their truth are grasped in their relation to Dasein, we shall move on to consider Dasein's relation to meaning and truth.

4.1.2.2. Dasein and Meaning

Generally speaking the meaning of something is that which makes it intelligible or understandable. In other words, anything that is intelligible is said to have meaning, even though it is not expressed explicitly or thematically. "Meaning is that wherein the intelligibility...of something maintains itself."¹⁰⁶ A being is intelligible, i.e., it has meaning, only when it is revealed in its enabling ground, viz., Being. In this sense meaning really refers to Being of beings. When one comprehends the Being of beings, then the entities become meaningful. That is why Heidegger writes: "Strictly speaking, 'meaning' signifies the 'upon-which' of the primary projection of the understanding of Being."¹⁰⁷

Since the meaning of a being is related to the understanding of its being, and the understanding of the Being of beings is something that belongs to the structure of Dasein, we can say that the meaning of beings is something essentially related to Dasein. So the meaning of the phenomena and that of the propositions, in the final analysis, depends on Dasein. The human Dasein, thus, is the meaning-giver of his own existence and that of the things present-at-hand. In the strict sense, we cannot speak of non-human entities having meaning, as their meaning ultimately depends on

¹⁰¹ *SZ*, p. 12; *BT*, p. 32.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*

¹⁰³ Martin Heidegger, *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* (Bonn: Verlag Fred. Cohen, 1929), p. 205 (hereafter: *KM*).

¹⁰⁴ For Heidegger, Dasein is the only being among all entities who can provide access to the question of Being. So only on the context of the fundamental ontology of Dasein's existential analysis, can we speak of any other ontology. Cf. *SZ*, p. 13; *BT*, p. 34.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. Harold Alderman, p. 19.

¹⁰⁶ *SZ*, p. 151; *BT*, p. 193.

¹⁰⁷ *SZ*, p. 324; *BT*, p. 371.

the meaning-giver, i.e., the human existence. For example, the meaning of a tree is discovered, not by the tree itself, but by Dasein as a meaningful object of aesthetic beauty or that of a thing ready-to-hand; or a building is not a home unless Dasein gives it that meaning by dwelling or by caring for it. Thus, the meaning of beings is fundamentally based on the concerned dealings of Dasein towards these entities. To quote Heidegger:

Meaning is an existiale of Dasein, not a property attaching to entities, lying 'behind' them, or floating somewhere as an 'intermediate domain'. Dasein only 'has' meaning, so far as the disclosedness of 'being-in-the-world' can be 'filled-in' by entities discoverable in that disclosedness. Hence only Dasein can be meaningful...or meaningless...That is to say, its (his) own being can be appropriated in understanding or can remain neglected to non-understanding.¹⁰⁸

4.1.2.3. *Dasein and Truth*

In putting forth his theory of truth, Heidegger begins with the traditional understanding of truth. Traditional thinkers gave a logical interpretation of truth and said that the essence of truth lies in the correspondence (*adequatio*) between the intellect and the object. The 'place' of the logical truth, thus arrived at, is assertion or judgment.¹⁰⁹ Heidegger, while not denying the validity of this interpretation of truth, considers it as inadequate, as it does not enter into the deeper existential level. In all such agreements the relation is between two entities, as subject and as object. This relation is of such a nature, that the judgment 'so' expresses that which is judged 'as' it is in itself. Thus, the 'so...as' (*sowie*) constitutes the nature of the agreement. Heidegger raises the question of the basis of the 'so...as' agreement. According to him, the agreement is based on what he calls 'confirmation'. "Confirmation signifies the entity's showing itself in its self-sameness. The confirmation is accomplished on the basis of the entity's showing itself."¹¹⁰ The assertion 'someone is coming in' is true not because there is an agreement between my intellect and the coming in, but because it can be confirmed by looking towards the entrance of the house and by checking it for myself. In other words, the logical agreement 'so...as' is based on a deeper experience of the one coming in and confirming in existentially.¹¹¹ Therefore, the truth is not founded in the agreement between the knower and the known object, but rather, it consists in uncovering or discovering (*Entdeckend-sein*) the what of the entity's showing itself by confirmation. We can speak of a statement being true only when we discover the essent in itself and give utterance to it by letting-itself-be-seen. Thus, "being-true ('truth') -- means Being uncovering."¹¹²

¹⁰⁸ *SZ*, p. 151; *BT*, p. 193. The above given quote from Heidegger might convey the impression that he, like the idealists, makes meaning the property of Dasein, at the cost of the reality of the things present-at-hand. But if we understand what Heidegger says here in the context of his philosophy of Dasein's being-in-the-world, we could say that he stresses only the primary role Dasein plays in the act of giving meaning and the secondary meaningfulness of entities.

Cf. George J. Stack, "Heidegger's Concept of Meaning," *Philosophy Today*, 17 (1973), 260. Cf. also Edward G. Ballard, "Heidegger's View and Evaluation of Nature and Natural Science," *Heidegger and the Path of Thinking*, ed. John Salis (Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1970), p. 52.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 214; *BT*, p. 257.

¹¹⁰ *SZ*, p. 218; *BT*, p. 261.

¹¹¹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 214; *BT*, p. 257.

¹¹² *SZ*, p. 219; *BT*, p. 262.

From what we have said, it is clear that truth in its most primary form is Being-discovering, whether it be in entities or in Dasein. This mode of uncovering of Being is a mode which is disclosure or unconcealment (*aletheia*). Since Dasein is that being which is disclosure par excellence, he is the basic truth on whom all other truths are rooted. The truth of any being is discovered so long as Dasein is. The truth of things present-at-hand is secondary to that of Dasein's way of being. Dasein's truth consists in Being-discovering, while the truth of things depends on being discovered in their discoveredness. Even a scientific principle such as Newton's law, the principle of contradiction and all such truths are true only so long as Dasein is. Until Newton discovered the law, it was hidden and concealed. It became a law only when it was discovered and exhibited by Newton. Since all truths are rooted in Dasein, we cannot speak of eternal truths, unless Dasein is eternally existing.¹¹³ On this point Heidegger remarks as follows:

Dasein, as constituted by disclosedness is essentially in truth. Disclosedness is a kind of being which is essential to Dasein. 'There is' truth only in so far as Dasein is and so long as Dasein is. Entities are uncovered only when Dasein is; and only as long as Dasein is, are they disclosed.¹¹⁴

To say that all truth is relative to Dasein, however, does not mean that the truth is subjective in the sense of being left out in the hands of an arbitrary subject. Nor do we say that entities are in untruth. Heidegger stresses the primacy of Dasein in the disclosure of truth. The discovery of truth is made possible through Dasein's openness to Being in essents, and through the truth of the essents being disclosed to him independently of his subjective whims. This, also, adds to truth an universal validity.¹¹⁵ In other words, we could say that Dasein is, as it were, a screen on which the truth of essents can come alive. Dasein does not create truth, but only lays-bare and uncovers the truth that is in an essent. Only as related to Dasein can an essent have its truth.

From our consideration of Dasein's nature, characteristics and priority, we aimed at clarifying the epistemological concern of Dasein. This is based on his 'being-in' as existence and marks his being qualitatively different from that of any other entities of the world. Having done that, we can analyze the 'in-the-world' aspect of Dasein's being, viz., his relational concern.

4.2. Dasein's Relational Concern

By the very fact that Dasein is in-the-world, he is relational. In his everyday existence Dasein is involved actively with other entities towards which he has concernful involvement and other Daseins, who are similar to him and towards whom he has the relationship of 'being-with' (*Mitsein*). Considering Dasein in his relational dimension, in this section, we would make an attempt to see Dasein as related to entities, to other Daseins and to the world, which is the totality of Dasein's network of references regarding entities and other Daseins.

4.2.1. Dasein and Entities

¹¹³ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 226-230; *BT*, pp. 269-273.

¹¹⁴ *SZ*, p. 226; *BT*, p. 269.

¹¹⁵ Cf. *SZ*, p. 227; *BT*, pp. 269-270.

When we consider Dasein as relational, the first notion we encounter is Dasein's being as part of the environment. It is indicated by the German term '*Umwelt*',¹¹⁶ i.e., the environmental world. It is that which is closest to Dasein in his encounter as a being-in-the-world.¹¹⁷ The environmental world of Dasein's encounter is filled with entities other than Dasein. These entities 'belong to the world' with which Dasein has dealings (*Umgang*).¹¹⁸ In order to understand Dasein's relation to these entities of the environmental world, we must clarify their nature and the nature of Dasein's dealings with them.

4.2.1.1. Entities as Present-at-Hand and Ready-to-Hand

The entities of the environmental world are viewed by Dasein from two perspectives, viz., the theoretical and practical. When Dasein adopts a viewing that is theoretical¹¹⁹ in the sense of observing (*Hinschauen*), the entity appears to Dasein as something present-at-hand (*das Vorhandene*). This present-at-handness (*Vor-handenheit*) is the state of something being 'on hand'. Looking at an entity from this perspective conveys a sense of objectification to the entity in question. Here the entity is seen apart from its sphere of daily involvement, and therefore as something static which occupies a place. In this way an entity is considered as a 'mere thing' out there.¹²⁰ If Dasein views an entity from the practical point of view, i.e., in Dasein's concerned dealings with that entity, then the entity presents itself to the Dasein as an 'equipment' or a 'tool' (*Zeug*) that can be put to use for a particular purpose. Thus, we can speak of equipment for writing, working, transporting and measuring. This ability to be used for a purpose is characteristic of equipment.¹²¹ Because of this quality, Heidegger refers to equipment as the 'ready-to-hand' (*das Zuhandene*), that is, something handy, conveniently near and suited for use by Dasein. Just as a hand is familiar with the glove which is on the hand, so also Dasein is familiar with entities within-the-world.¹²²

From what we have said so far, about entities, it is clear that Heidegger speaks of the same entity as something present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. This does not imply a division within the entity itself. The difference comes about because of the way Dasein views the same entity. If Dasein views the entity in the theoretical perspective, he sees the entity as present-at-hand, out there. If he views the same entity from the practical point of view, i.e., in terms of his concerned dealings with the entity, he sees the entity as a tool, ready-to-hand. In the former case, the entity is seen in its static nature, while in the latter case, the entity is seen in its dynamic aspect of usability or serviceability.¹²³

¹¹⁶ The prefix of the term '*Umwelt*', '*um*' has a spatial meaning and is translated into English with the term 'around'. Often '*Umwelt*' is translated as 'environment', or 'the world about'. The prefix '*um*' is used in the same sense in words, such as, '*Umgang*' (dealings), '*Um-zu*' (in-order-to) and '*Umsicht*' (circumspection). Cf. *SZ*, pp. 66-67; *BT*, p. 95.

¹¹⁷ Cf. *ibid.*

¹¹⁸ Cf. *ibid.*

¹¹⁹ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 59-62; *BT*, p. 97.

¹²⁰ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 68, 69; *BT*, pp. 96, 98-99. Cf. also Werner Marx, p. 86.

¹²¹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 68; *BT*, p. 97.

¹²² Cf. Werner Marx, p. 89. Cf. also *SZ*, p. 69; *BT*, p. 98.

¹²³ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 61-62; *BT*, pp. 88-89. Cf. also Leon Rosentine, pp. 337-338. Cf. also Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 15, fn. 69.

For Heidegger, Dasein's relationship with entities is mainly one of proximity and involvement.¹²⁴ This overall involvement of the care-taking of Dasein towards equipment and the encountering of them as ready-to-hand, Heidegger calls concern (*Besorgen*). In this state of concern equipment and its being matter to Dasein. The concern of Dasein towards entities is characterized by an existential cognition which Heidegger calls circumspection (*Umsicht*). '*Umsicht*' means 'to look around' or 'to look about'. Circumspection is characterized not by a detached looking at entities, but involves the actual use of the equipment. In circumspection Dasein 'looks about' to see if the tools are in order for a particular purpose, or if the tool selected is best for the job. For example, circumspection is concerned about discovering whether a hammer is appropriate for the job of hammering. Thus, concern does not just dwell on the entity, like theoretical cognition, but instead passes through and goes beyond to the task to be accomplished. Besides, circumspection reveals not only the 'in-order-to' of a ready-to-hand, but also discovers the particular equipment in relation to the equipmental system of which, it is a part.¹²⁵ Circumspective concern, thus, is that which reveals to Dasein the being of equipment, viz., its equip-mentality (*Zeughaftigkeit*).

Now that we have considered the difference between the present-at-hand and the read-to-hand entities, and the basic type of involvement of Dasein towards them, viz., the circumspective concern, we can turn our attention to the Being of such equipment which is Dasein's concern.

4.2.1.2. Entities in Their Equipmental Referential Totality

Equipment, as we mentioned is basically an 'in-order-to' or "for-the-purpose-of" (*Um-zu*) and its reality is always understood in relation to something else. For example, the pencil is for writing and the car is for driving. "In the 'in-order-to' as structure there lies an assignment or a reference of something to something."¹²⁶ Since in its very structure equipment is related to another, we cannot speak of an implement having meaning in itself, but always in relation to an equipmental totality. So the reference 'for' (food for eating and money for buying) is the basic feature of equipment, in its relation both to other equipment, and to an equipmental system to which it belongs. To quote Heidegger:

Taken strictly, there is no such thing as equipment. To the being of any equipment there always belongs a totality of equipments, in which it can be the equipment that it is. Equipment is essentially 'some-thing in-order-to' ... A totality of equipment is constituted by various ways of *un-zu* the 'in-order-to', such as serviceability, conduciveness, usability, manipulability.¹²⁷

Therefore, the equipmentality of the equipment consist in that it always belongs to and accompanies other instruments, and resides in a purposeful referential totality of equipment. Only by being part of such a referential whole can the purpose of equipment be achieved and actualized. For example, inkstand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, door and room, never

¹²⁴ For Heidegger, the theoretical mode of knowing is one which lacks Dasein's practical circumspective concern, as it is a mere speculative observation. He does not deny its value, as it is a mode of knowing that is founded on Dasein's being-in-the-world. But Heidegger holds the value of existence over knowledge as, for him, 'to be' is more primordial than 'to know'. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 59-62; *BT*, p. 86-90.

¹²⁵ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 68-69; *BT*, pp. 97-98. Cf. also *BPP*, p. 163. Cf. also John Richardson, p. 18.

¹²⁶ *SZ*, p. 68; *BT*, p. 97.

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

show themselves as they are for themselves. But if understood as equipment for residing, taken in its totality, all these individual equipments have their significance in relation to the unity of the pattern of these references.¹²⁸

Equipment shows its equipmentality, not only in its dealings with the other tools alone, but also with the work (*Werk*) as that which is produced as a result of ‘working at’ something, for example, footwear. "The work bears with it that referential totality within which the equipment is encountered."¹²⁹ The work produced, i.e., footwear, is the ‘towards-which’ (the purpose) of the tools; besides it also has a reference to its own ‘towards-which’ in relation to its usability. Again, it has a reference to the material ‘out of which’ or ‘whereof’ (*Woraus*) it is made, i.e., the leather. Finally the work produced has a reference to the ‘for-the-sake-of-whom’, viz., the person, who would use it.¹³⁰ Thus, the equipmental dealings are conditioned by the various modes of reference and assignments of the ‘in-order-to’ relating to the work itself.¹³¹

The equipmental dealings, therefore, are not isolated involvements only among the tools, but also are closely related to other such complex patterns relating to the work done and ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ it is done. All these relational patterns relating to the equipments are interrelated, which results in an equipmental system or an equipmental referential totality. The complex equipmental involvements often remain unnoticed or are taken for granted by Dasein in his everyday existence. But Dasein comes to grip with them and becomes aware of such a relational complex only when the smooth functioning of these systems is disturbed. "The assignments themselves are not observed; they are rather there when we concernfully submit ourselves to them...But when an assignment has been disturbed -- when something is unusable for some purpose -- then the assignment becomes explicit."¹³²

Heidegger speaks of three ways, in which, the breakdown in the equipmental system can take place and, in turn, can bring to Dasein’s circumspection the complex equipmental references which he tends to lose sight of in his everyday existence. Firstly, the equipmental system is disclosed to Dasein in its totality when he is doing a work, especially when he encounters equipment as damaged and unusable. In this state the implement falls out of its totality and becomes unusable to do the work for which it is intended. Heidegger calls this inability of the equipment to be an equipment ‘conspicuousness’ (*Auffaelligkeit*). Here we see that equipment, having lost its equipmentality, lies before us as a present-at-hand entity or as something ‘un-ready-to-hand’. Secondly, the equipmental system discloses itself when Dasein discovers that particular equipment, which is intended to be used for performing a task, is missing. The more urgently Dasein needs the equipment to that extent authentically it encounters un-readiness-to-hand of the missing equipment. This absence of the equipment to perform a task is called obtrusiveness (*Aufdringlichkeit*) where equipment presents itself as un-readiness-to-hand by its non-availability. Thirdly, an equipmental system is disclosed, when the equipment, losing its readiness-to-hand, stands in the way of achieving an ‘in-order-to’ or purpose. This type of presence of an equipment, as blocking the achievement of the purpose is called obstinacy (*Aufaessigkeit*). Here the equipment is neither unusable nor missing, but becomes un-readiness-to-hand by not letting the intended purpose be achieved.¹³³

¹²⁸ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 68-69; *BT*, pp. 97-98.

¹²⁹ *SZ*, p. 70; *BT*, pp. 99.

¹³⁰ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 70-71; *BT*, pp. 99-100.

¹³¹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 69; *BT*, p. 98.

¹³² *SZ*, p. 74; *BT*, p.105. Cf. also *BPP*, p. 309.

¹³³ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 73-74; *BT*, pp. 102-104.

In each of these modes, viz., conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and obstinacy, the equipment, as it were, loses its character of readiness-to-hand and brings to the fore the characteristic of the objective present-at-handness of an entity. In other words, in all these modes, a particular equipment presents itself in an un-readiness-to-hand in a given equipmental-referential complex. In presenting itself thus, an equipment not only reveals itself to Dasein's circumspection as unusable, unavailable or missing and thereby, standing in the way of a task to be performed, but also reveals everything connected with this equipmental system, viz., the work and all that goes with it.¹³⁴ We could, for example consider the carpenter at work in his workshop. His work goes on smoothly and while involved in work the whole working referential complex is, as it were, lost to him. Suddenly, he finds the hammer missing or the plane no longer works. This breakdown in the equipments, hammer or plane, reveals to him not only that a particular equipment is out of order, but also the work situation in which this particular tool has failed. In this connection, Arland Ussher remarks: "The world as world is only revealed when things go wrong."¹³⁵ To quote Heidegger:

When something ready-to-hand is found missing, though its everyday presence...has been so obvious that we have never taken any notice of it, thus making a break in those referential contexts which circumspection discovers. Our circumspection comes up against emptiness and now sees for the first time what the missing article was ready-to-hand with and what it was ready-to-hand for (the equipmental system). The environment announces itself afresh.¹³⁶

Thus, in the context of the equipment, the totality of the equipmental referential complex is lit up, and the equipmentality of the equipment and the environmenting world is revealed to the circumspective concern of Dasein.

The entities are present in the environmental world as equipment ready-to-hand and things present-at-hand in the cognition of the equipmental referential system. The notion of the environment involves the idea of space. In the next section, we shall consider the entities as related to space, i.e., in their spatiality.

4.2.1.3. Entities in their Spatiality

Heidegger, like Descartes,¹³⁷ did not think of space as something that is empty and later filled up with things. For Heidegger, space is not something limited to entities in the world, but is also related to Dasein. It is only in relation to Dasein's spatiality, that the spatiality of the entities ready-

¹³⁴ Cf. *SZ*, p. 74; *BT*, p. 104. The opposite of these three modes which bring about a break-down in the equipmental system, viz., 'inconspicuousness', 'unobtrusiveness' and 'non-obstinacy', do not, in any way, point to the objectivity of the equipment, as the equipmental referential complex. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 75-76; *BT*, p. 106.

¹³⁵ Arland Ussher, *Journey through Dread* (New York: The Delvin Adair Company, 1955), p. 80.

¹³⁶ *SZ*, p. 75; *BT*, p. 105.

¹³⁷ Descartes considered 'extension in space' as the basic character of entities in the world, and they are different essentially from the 'thinking I' whose basic quality is thinking. Thus, he made a fundamental distinction between '*ego cogitans*' and '*res extensa*'. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 89-101; *BT*, pp. 122-134.

to-hand can be grasped. In his analysis of space, Heidegger looks into the spatiality of entities and that of Dasein.¹³⁸

The spatiality of entities ready-to-hand is manifested in two ways. Firstly, in his everyday dealing with an equipment, Dasein finds the ready-to-hand equipment as being close to Dasein. The term Heidegger uses, namely, '*Naehe*' can be translated as 'closeness' or 'nearness'. It indicates the nearness of something close to us.¹³⁹ The term 'readiness-to-hand' indicates the characteristic of closeness. Every entity that is 'at-hand' or that can be handled points to the varying closeness or distance from, and to, the one who handles that entity. But this 'closeness' which is the fundamental characteristic of the entity's ready-to-hand is not to be taken in measurable distances, but in terms of Dasein's circumspective concern. In this sense we can speak of the spectacles that one wears on the nose as being further away than the picture out there on the wall; or the bus for which one is running is closer than the ground on which one runs.¹⁴⁰ The second characteristic that the ready-to-hand entities reveal is one of direction (*Richtung*). It also must be understood in relation to Dasein's circumspective concern.¹⁴¹

These two features, viz., closeness and direction, give equipment a place (*Platz*) in the equipmental-referential totality. In other words, they constitute a piece of equipment in a 'locality', giving it a fixed *locus* and setting it in the proper place in the schema of equipmental referential totality. Thus, 'having-a-place' is different from 'being in a position (*Stelle*) in space', which is a 'random occurring', 'lying around' or 'being a present-at-hand entity somewhere'. Thus 'having-a-place' or 'locality' and belonging to an equipmental totality give an answer to the question about the 'whither' (*das Wohin*) of an equipment. The 'whither' is an ontological condition for the possibility of an equipment to have a place in the equipmental totality.¹⁴² "This 'whither' which makes it possible for equipment to belong to somewhere...we call the region."¹⁴³ The referential totality of the equipment is ontologically prior to the equipmentality of particular equipment. In the same way, the region as the 'whither of the equipmental totality is ontologically prior to the 'locality' of particular equipment.

Speaking of the region, Heidegger says that it should not be understood in the geographical sense. The region is the 'whither' the readiness-to-hand is put to account as a matter of Dasein's concern. For example, Heidegger speaks of regions of life and death in relation to churches and graves, which are laid according to the rising of the sun and its setting.¹⁴⁴ Thus, all these features, viz., closeness and direction and their togetherness constituting the region relating to the spatiality of the equipment, can be discovered only in relation to the spatiality of Dasein. Let us move on to consider the spatiality of Dasein.

Corresponding to the spatiality of the equipment, Dasein's spatiality is constituted of two existentials, viz., de-distancing (*Ent-fernung*) and directionality (*Ausrichtung*).¹⁴⁵ The first is de-distancing, for which Heidegger uses the German term '*Entfernung*'. The term communicates the idea of 'bringing closer', de-distancing "amounts to making farness vanish,...making remoteness

¹³⁸ The spatiality of the ready-to-hand can be spoken of as the moematic dimension, while the spatiality of Dasein can be viewed as the noetic dimension. Cf. Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 18.

¹³⁹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 102; *BT*, p. 135, fn. 1.

¹⁴⁰ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 102, 107; *BT*, pp. 135, 141.

¹⁴¹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 102; *BT*, p. 135.

¹⁴² Cf. *SZ*, pp. 102-103; *BT*, pp. 135-136.

¹⁴³ *SZ*, p. 103; *BT*, p. 136.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 103-104; *BT*, pp. 136-137.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. *SZ*, p. 105; *BT*, p. 138, fn. 2.

of something disappear (and) bringing it close."¹⁴⁶ In other words, it is a capacity of Dasein to bring about closeness. By its active circumspective concern Dasein can bring an entity close. For example, when one learns about the plan and means of building a shopping complex in the city, one brings closer the parts of this equipment totality. By so doing one brings close circumspectively the equipment which one will use as a means to actualize the project and achieve one's ends. Thus, de-distancing is a circumspective bringing close of an equipment. It is possible for Dasein because it is an intrinsic tendency that belongs to the very being of Dasein. "In Dasein there lies an essential tendency towards closeness"¹⁴⁷ which is not a bringing close in terms of measurable distance, but one relates to the circumspective concern of Dasein. For example, 'a good walk' or 'a stone's throw' has a definiteness relating to Dasein's concern. Measurements, such as, 'an half hour walk' is to be understood in terms of duration rather than that of number. A pathway that is long 'objectively' may be shorter, very long or hard-going, depending on Dasein's concerned look.¹⁴⁸ "Circumspective concern decides the closeness and farness of what is proximally ready-to-hand environmentally."¹⁴⁹ Thus, "Dasein is spatial in the sense that it (he) discovers space circumspectively, so that indeed it (he) constantly comports itself (himself) de-distantly towards the entities, thus spatially encountered."¹⁵⁰

The second characteristic of Dasein's spatiality is directionality. The idea of directionality is implied in de-distancing because every bringing close involves a direction from which the equipment is brought close, or the region in which it has locality. Dasein's directionality, like that of de-distancing, is something that essentially belongs to him and he takes these directions along with him, being guided by circumspective concern.¹⁵¹ Dasein's spatiality, by way of de-distancing and directionality, makes him encounter the equipmental ready-to-hand, in terms of the twin characteristics of equipment, viz., closeness and direction.¹⁵²

4.2.2. *Dasein and Other Daseins*

In the last section, we have been dealing with the entities and their relation to Dasein. But, in Dasein's being-in-the-world, he is not only involved with entities, but also related to other Daseins. Dasein's world, whether it be related to entities or other Daseins, is a 'with-world' (*Mitwelt*). Dasein is 'along-with' (*bei*) entities; but he is 'with' (*mit*) Daseins. The other Daseins are neither present-at-hand entities or ready-to-hand tools, but are essents like Dasein. Heidegger remarks: "These entities (other Daseins) are neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand; on the contrary, they are like very Dasein, ... in that they are there too and with it (him)."¹⁵³ In this section, we could explore the nature of Dasein's relationship with other Daseins.

4.2.2.1. Being-with: An Existential of Dasein

¹⁴⁶ SZ, p. 105; BT, p. 139.

¹⁴⁷ SZ, p. 105; BT, p. 140.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. SZ, pp. 105-107; BT, pp. 140-142.

¹⁴⁹ SZ, p. 107; BT, p. 142.

¹⁵⁰ SZ, p. 108; BT, p. 143.

¹⁵¹ Cf. SZ, pp. 108-109; BT, pp. 143-144.

¹⁵² Cf. SZ, p. 110; BT, p. 144.

¹⁵³ SZ, p. 118; BT, p. 154.

The nature of Dasein's relationship with the other is characterized by 'being-with' (*Mitsein*). Dasein as being-in-the-world is always 'Dasein-with' (*Mitdasein*) and he shares a 'with-like' (*Mithaften*) character with others. Thus, Dasein as 'being-in' is always a 'being-with'" and his world is a 'with-world' (*Mitwelt*).¹⁵⁴ The notion of Dasein as 'being-with' is indicated in Heidegger's consideration of Dasein's relation to the tools in a work produced (e.g. a footwear). The 'towards-which' of its usability is related to a 'for-the-sake-of-whom', i.e., to someone who would wear it. Thus, in a work-situation, Dasein is not only related to the environmental world of equipments, but in the last analysis also to essents with Dasein's kind of being, which he encounters as the user, the wearer or the one who possesses. Dasein's world is a co-world and his 'being-in' is 'being-with-others'.¹⁵⁵

The 'being-with' of Dasein is, in every case, characteristic of one's own Dasein. The statement 'Dasein is essentially being-with' is not to be taken in the ontical sense of one concrete entity being related to another concrete entity environmentally and factually.¹⁵⁶ It must be taken in the existential-ontological meaning, i.e., being-with as an existential of Dasein. Heidegger's contention is that Dasein is always being-with in his structure, whether or not factually (ontically) the other is present-at-hand or perceived.¹⁵⁷ This claim of Heidegger is based on another assumption, that in the pre-theoretical everyday experience of Dasein, i.e., in his existential perception, he has no experience of the self. The reason Heidegger is in favor of the assumption is the basic existential experience of Dasein. Dasein's everyday life is lived amidst various demands to be met and tasks to be performed in relation to the others, and not as a self giving orders or as witnessing events that are taking place.¹⁵⁸ The primary experience of Dasein as being-with is described by William Ralph Schroeder as follows:

The materials one works on are made by others; the tasks one performs are taught by others; the products one makes are destined for others; the functional use of things come to them collectively -- everyone understands what things are for; one's own understanding is a specification of this common sense. One's existence is always articulated in a world...with others.¹⁵⁹

For Heidegger, the relatedness of Dasein to the other is an *a priori* and it precedes all other empirical (ontical) relationships to the other. In fact the basic relationship of being-with is what makes possible an ontic encounter among Daseins.¹⁶⁰ Not possessing this basic existential relatedness to the other amounts to lacking the specific mode of existence is characteristic of Dasein.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁴ Cf. *SZ*, p.118; *BT*, pp. 154-155.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 70-71, 117-118; *BT*, pp. 100, 153-154.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. *SZ*, p. 119; *BT*, p. 155.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. *SZ*, p. 120; *BT*, p. 156.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 115-116; *BT* pp. 150-152. According to Heidegger, the notion of the 'self' as a subject that guides the events and is a witness to these events is not the existential (pre-theoretical) experience of Dasein. Only in highly reflective states of mind, such as Husserl's *epoche*, can the notion of the self be attained. But the basic existential experience of Dasein about himself is 'being-with'. Cf. William Ralph Schroeder, *Sartre and His Predecessors: The Self and the Other* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), pp. 131-132.

¹⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 133. Cf. also *SZ*, pp. 117-118; *BT*, pp. 153-154.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 120-121; *BT* pp. 156-157.

¹⁶¹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 123; *BT*, p. 160.

Since Dasein's primordial existential experience of his being is that of being-with-others, it follows that one cannot define others without any reference to Dasein. Nor can one think of the other in a detached manner of observation, but encounters the other in one's practical concerns. Thus, the other is experienced not as distinct from oneself, but as similar to oneself, engaged in tasks like oneself and involved in cares like oneself. In other words, one experiences the other as one's replica.¹⁶² Thus, Heidegger holds that Dasein's basic experience of the other is not "that they are present-at-hand, self-sufficient beings whose minds are hidden, but rather that they are engaged, accessible beings, who share the same instruments and gathering places and function very much like oneself."¹⁶³ It is only because every Dasein is essentially being-with that each can experience the other Dasein in his own being-with. To quote Heidegger: "Only in so far as one's own Dasein has the essential structure of being-with is its (his) Dasein-with as encounterable by others."¹⁶⁴ Heidegger sums up the basic nature of Dasein's relationship to the other as follows:

By 'others' we do not mean everyone else but me -- those over against whom the 'I' stands out. They are rather those from whom for the most part, one does not distinguish oneself -- those among whom one is too. This being-there-too...with them does not have the ontological character of a present-at-hand along 'with' them within a world. This 'with' something is of a character of Dasein; the 'too' means sameness of being as circumspectively concerned being-in-the-world. 'With' and 'too' are to be understood existentially, not categorically. By reason of this with-like...being-in-the-world, the world is always the one I share with others.¹⁶⁵

Now that we have analyzed Dasein's being-with as an existential of Dasein, expressed in the pre-ontological level, in a world which is common to all Dasein, we may move on to consider the modes of Dasein's being-with.

4.2.2.2. Modes of Dasein's Being-with

Just as Dasein's 'being-in' with the ready-to-hand is characterized by concern (*Besorgen*), the primordial relatedness of Dasein and other Daseins is referred to by Heidegger as solicitude (*Fuersorge*). There are two basic modes of Dasein's solicitude, viz., negative and positive. The negative mode of solicitude is indifference (*Gleichgueltigkeit*) which fundamentally consists in one not mattering to another. Thus, in this state, one fails to show positive solicitude towards the other.¹⁶⁶ Positive solicitude is of two modes.

The first positive mode of solicitude is that which leaps in (*einspringen*) for the other. It is a kind of solicitude in which one takes over the cares and worries of the other by taking over his place. The one who was overburdened so far is relieved and he steps back, as the matter had been looked into. In such solicitude, the one who comes to help out by taking over the responsibility of the other fully dominates the other and interferes with the freedom of the other. Let us take the

¹⁶² Cf. William Ralph Schroeder, pp. 132-133.

¹⁶³ *Ibid.* Schroeder holds the view that the main concern of Heidegger's inquiry is not to question the nature and characteristics of the other; but rather to articulate the essential structures of human existence. In doing so, he presents the notion of the other as an ontological existential of Dasein. We do not subscribe to this view, as it undermines all Heidegger says about the other. Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 129-130.

¹⁶⁴ *SZ*, p. 121; *BT*, p. 157.

¹⁶⁵ *SZ*, p. 118; *BT*, pp. 154-155.

¹⁶⁶ Cf. *SZ*, p. 121; *BT*, pp. 157-158.

example of a person who is burdened with the responsibility of preparing an academic project. If a person approaches this situation with the first mode of solicitude, he would leap into the situation and occupy the 'Da' of the other's world and finish the academic project by himself. The other is dominated and he is not given the freedom to do the task in the way he wanted. Thus, the other is reduced to the level of equipment, as the other is treated as if he were an entity. The second type of positive solicitude is one of leaping ahead (*vorausspringen*) of the other. This type does not interfere or take away the freedom of the other. The other is freed for his own concern, in the sense that one anticipates and opens up to the other his own existential ability to be. In other words, by his support, assistance and suggestion, one opens up the care of the other so that he can existentially face it and solve the issue in his own way. Such a solicitude helps one become transparent in his own care and internally become free to face and solve it. Applying the same example to this type, would mean that one might discuss the project with the other and anticipate or open up the various possibilities of doing the project and help him to do the job in his own tempo and phase. Thus, in this solicitude the person is not dominated or interfered with, but only helped and freed for doing the project.¹⁶⁷

Everyday being-with one another often takes one of the two forms of solicitude, viz., the negative mode or one of the two types of positive solicitude.¹⁶⁸ The two types of positive mode of solicitude are guided by two forms of disclosure, viz., considerateness (*Rue-cksicht*) and forbearance (*Nachsicht*), just as Dasein's concern towards entities (*Besorgen*) is directed by circumspection (*Um-sicht*).¹⁶⁹

Heidegger speaks of various other modes in which Dasein is being-with, such as, "being-for, against, or without one another, passing one another by (and) not mattering to one another."¹⁷⁰ But all these forms, according to Heidegger, can be brought under the positive and the negative modes we have discussed. These are expressions of the positive or negative modes. Again, modes of Dasein such as 'being-for-oneself', 'being-oneself', 'being-alone' and 'being-away' are all expressions of Dasein's being-with in the negative mode. These expressions point to Dasein's lack of awareness of his primordial existential being-with. Therefore, these are privative modes of Dasein's fundamental being-with. To quote Heidegger: "Even Dasein's being alone is being-with in the world. The other can be missing only in and for a being-with (i.e. Dasein)."¹⁷¹ This is true not only of the negative modes, but also of such positive modes as being empathetic towards the other. For Heidegger, "empathy does not first constitute being-with; only on the basis of being-with does empathy become possible..."¹⁷² Thus, being-with is the existential of Dasein and all forms of being-with are expression of the positive or the negative modes of solicitude.

Dasein's world is constituted by being-alongside-with-entities ready-to-hand in circumspective concern and by his being-with other Daseins in respectful solicitude. Having looked into Dasein in his relatedness to entities and other Daseins, we can enter into the study of Dasein's relation to the world as a whole, in his relational totality.

4.2.3. *Dasein and the World*

¹⁶⁷ Cf. *SZ*, p. 122; *BT*, pp. 158-159.

¹⁶⁸ Cf. *SZ*, p. 122; *BT*, p. 159.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 123; *BT*, p. 159.

¹⁷⁰ *SZ*, p. 121; *BT*, p. 158.

¹⁷¹ *SZ*, p. 120; *BT*, pp. 156-157.

¹⁷² *SZ*, p. 125; *BT*, p. 162.

Heidegger begins his analysis of the world and its relationship to Dasein by indicating the various senses in which the term ‘world’ is used. He identifies its four uses and limits himself to one. Firstly, it signifies the totality of the present-at-hand entities which Dasein encounters within-the-world. Secondly, it means the being of the totality of beings other than Dasein. In other words, in this sense, the term ‘world’ indicates any realm which comprises the multiplicity of entities. Thus, we can speak of the world of mathematics, which signifies the realm of possible objects of mathematics. Thirdly, ‘world’ is taken as the complex which is opposed to Dasein, but ‘wherein’ factual Dasein lives. In this sense, the term ‘world’ has a pre-ontological existential signification. Here, ‘world’ stands for the ‘we-world’ (*Wir-welt*) with others and one’s own closest world of environment (*Umwelt*). Heidegger uses the term ‘world’ in this third sense. Fourthly, the term ‘world’ is used in the ontological-existential sense and indicates the being of the world (*Weltlichkeit*) of Dasein’s ‘wherein’, i.e., the worldhood of the world. This meaning embraces in itself the *a priori* character of worldhood in general.¹⁷³

Now, we turn our attention to Heidegger’s use of the term ‘world’ taken in the pre-ontological and pre-thematic sense. Understood in this sense, world has environmental and communal dimensions. It is a world, in which, Dasein is related to the entities and other Daseins, in circumspective concern and respectful solicitude respectively. ‘World’ taken in this sense is the matrix or horizon of Dasein’s total relatedness to entities and others (*Bezugszu-sammenhang*) and the matrix of total meaningfulness (*Bedeutsamkeit*) of Dasein himself, entities and others. We shall now consider the world in these two aspects.

4.2.3.1. World: The Matrix of Dasein’s Relational Totalities

In dealing with Dasein and his relatedness to equipment, we mentioned that a piece of equipment is essentially ‘for the purpose of’ or ‘in-order-to’ (*Um-zu*) do something, and that it is not an isolated tool but has a relatedness to the whole equipmental totality of which it is a part. In other words, a piece of equipment, as a ready-to-hand, has a twofold reference (*Verweisung*), viz., to its own equipmentality, and to the equipmental referential totality of which it is a part. Firstly, equipment as a sign refers to its own ‘towards-which’. For example, the indicator in a motorcar points in the direction towards which the driver is going to make a turn. Secondly, equipment also has a wider reference to the whole equipmental system to which it belongs. For example, the indicator in a motorcar has a reference to the whole sphere of traffic.¹⁷⁴ For Heidegger, equipment is indicative of the ontological structure of the ready-to-hand entities and that of the referential totalities.¹⁷⁵

From this, it is clear that the ontological structure of a ready-to-hand piece of equipment, has a reference which is beyond its own equipmentality. Firstly, by its very nature equipment has an involvement (*Bewandtnis*), which always implies two aspects, viz., the ‘with’ of the involvement (*Womit der Bewandtnis*) and the ‘in’ of the involvement (*Wobai der Bewandtnis*).¹⁷⁶ For example, ‘with’ the hammer there is the involvement ‘in’ hammering. The ‘in’ of the involvement always has a ‘towards-which’ (*das Wozu*) of service-ability and the ‘for-which’ (*das Wofuer*) of usability.¹⁷⁷ Secondly, this involvement of the equipment is not limited to its own isolated ‘Wozu’

¹⁷³ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 64-65; *BT*, p. 93.

¹⁷⁴ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 76-78; *BT*, pp. 107-109.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. *SZ*, p. 82; *BT*, pp. 113-114.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. *SZ*, p. 84; *BT*, p. 115.

¹⁷⁷ Cf. *SZ*, p. 84; *BT*, p. 116.

and 'Wofuer', but is open to the pattern or matrix in which it finds itself (*Bewandtnisganzheit*), which in turn is part of a larger pattern. For example, 'with' the hammer there is the involvement 'in' hammering; 'with' hammering, there is an involvement 'in' nailing; and 'with' nailing, there is an involvement 'in' building a house. This process of 'with...in' does not go on indefinitely, because all these limited 'Wozus' lead back to an ultimate 'towards-which', which Heidegger calls 'for-the-sake-of-which' (*Worum-willen*), which is always Dasein. In the given example, the house is for Dasein.¹⁷⁸ Thus, for Heidegger, Dasein is the final center towards which all involvements are directed. That all such equipmental involvements find their destination in Dasein, means that the worldhood of the world belongs to the being of Dasein himself. In the words of Heidegger:

But the totality of the involvements itself goes back ultimately to a 'towards-which' in which there is not further involvement: this 'towards-which' is not an entity with the kind of being that belongs to what is ready to hand within a world; it is rather an entity whose being is defined as being-in-the-world (Dasein), and to whose state of being, the worldhood itself belongs.¹⁷⁹

Thus, the worldhood of the world, as belonging to Dasein's being, is an existiale. In other words, it is a necessary and *a priori* horizon of Dasein's existential structure.¹⁸⁰ The world is that 'wherein' (*Worin*) Dasein, as an entity, already was, and to which he can return (*zurueckkommen*) for any of its explicit thematizations.¹⁸¹ It is in the 'wherein' that Dasein encounters all other entities in circumspective concern and other Daseins in respectful solicitude. It is the 'towards-which' the equipmental systems in their relational complex are pointing by their structure.¹⁸² "World, then, is a non-ontic, non-thematic, pre-disclosed 'there' wherein There-Being (Dasein) encounters the purposeful beings with which it is preoccupied in its everyday commerce with the world-about."¹⁸³

The world, as understood by Heidegger, is a 'wherein' of the matrix of Dasein's total relatedness. This 'wherein' is not to be taken in the spatial sense, but in the sense of a horizon in which converge all patterns of referential totalities, whether they belong to the environmental world (*Umwelt*) or the 'we-world' (*Wir-welt*), which has the nature of the community. The unity of this system of Dasein's relations is Dasein himself, because he, as we mentioned earlier, is the ultimate 'for-the-sake-of-which' of all equipmental and referential totalities. The world belongs to Dasein. The worldhood of the world consists in "the being of that ontical condition which makes it possible for entities within-the-world to be discovered at all."¹⁸⁴ Therefore, worldhood of the world can be considered formally as a system of Dasein's total relatedness. Understood thus, it provides the basis on which entities can be discovered as they are in themselves.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁸ Cf. *ibid.* Heidegger's insistence on Dasein as the ultimate reference of every other entity in the world does not amount to a doctrine of egocentricity, but indicates only that because of his ontological structure an entity is destined towards Dasein; whereas the being of Dasein is such that it cannot be referred to anything other than himself. Cf. *SZ*, p. 123; *BT*, pp. 160-161.

¹⁷⁹ *SZ*, p. 84; *BT*, p. 116.

¹⁸⁰ Cf. *SZ*, p. 64; *BT*, p. 92.

¹⁸¹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 76; *BT*, pp. 106-107.

¹⁸² Cf. *SZ*, pp. 85-86; *BT*, pp. 118-119.

¹⁸³ William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 56.

¹⁸⁴ *SZ*, p. 88; *BT*, p. 121.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. *SZ*, p. 88; *BT*, pp. 121-122.

4.2.3.2. World: The Matrix of Dasein's Total Meaningfulness

Since the world, as the matrix of Dasein's relational totalities, consists in Dasein's own being, the meaningfulness of these relational systems must be understood in Dasein's own being. So, our speaking of the involvement of equipments towards Dasein, in fact, amounts to Dasein letting them be involved (*Bewandtenlassen*) with him. It implies that Dasein frees the ready-to-hand for meaning.¹⁸⁶ In other words, the letting-be-involved of entities, by Dasein, is the ontological condition for an entity being encountered in its readiness-to-hand. An entity is freed for involvements in terms of its 'with which' and 'in which'. For example, in terms of hammering, the hammer is freed for involvement.¹⁸⁷ Understood ontologically, the letting-be-involved of entities by Dasein, amounts to Dasein's disclosing the totality of involvements as the world within which, entities can have their involvement. The freeing of entities for totality of involvements and the 'for-which' of their being freed must have been disclosed to Dasein primordially. In other words, Dasein has a prior understanding of the world towards which, he, as an entity comports himself.¹⁸⁸ On this point Heidegger remarks:

That wherein (*Worin*) Dasein understands itself (himself) beforehand in the mode of assigning itself (himself) is that for which...it (he) let entities be encountered beforehand. The 'wherein' of the act of understanding which assigns or refers itself is that for which one lets entities be encountered in the kind of being that belongs to involvements; and this 'wherein' is the phenomenon of the world. And the structure of that to which...Dasein assigns itself (himself) is what makes up the worldhood of the world.¹⁸⁹

Since Dasein has a primordial understanding of this 'wherein', he is familiar with it. The familiarity is constitutive of Dasein and makes his understanding of beings. The complexity of relations, in which Dasein lives and from which he draws all meaningfulness of things, makes up the context in which he understands himself and his world. The matrix of meaningfulness, Heidegger calls 'significance' (*Bedeutsamkeit*). In his familiarity with significant relationality, Dasein constitutes the ontic condition for the possibility of discovering entities, which are encountered in the world with involvements. This meaning and significance is an existiale of Dasein's being-in-the-world.¹⁹⁰ Thus, for Heidegger, the world is not a thing or collection of things. It is a matter of Dasein's 'being in' in the matrix of relational and referential totalities. "The world is an intersubjectively constituted referential totality in which it becomes possible for Dasein to encounter other entities, both of its (his) kind and the ready-to-hand."¹⁹¹

The worldhood of the world consists in the total meaningfulness or significance of the relational structures of the referential totality. Thus, we can speak of as many worlds as there are different meaningful or significant referential totalities. For example, we can speak of a work-world or an academic-world. This is not the subjectivization of the world concept; but a mode of relating to beings, in concerned dealings always guided by a pre-thematic attunement, which, in turn, defines Dasein as a possibility of relating to beings. Taken in this sense, the world is not a

¹⁸⁶ Cf. *SZ*, p. 85; *BT*, p. 117.

¹⁸⁷ Cf. *SZ*, p. 85; *BT*, pp. 117-118.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. *SZ*, p. 86; *BT*, 118.

¹⁸⁹ *SZ*, p. 86; *BT*, p. 119.

¹⁹⁰ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 86-87; *BT*, pp. 119-121.

¹⁹¹ Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 24.

creation of Dasein, but Dasein's way of giving meaning to the existential relational complex in which he finds himself.¹⁹²

4.3. Dasein's Existential Concern

Besides Dasein's epistemological and relational concerns, he has an existential and personal dimension. Seen in this aspect, Dasein is a fallen existence (*Verfallensein*),¹⁹³ called to be an authentic being and a temporal-historical being. In this section, we would like to consider Dasein in these aspects.

4.3.1. Fallen Dasein

Here, we attempt to analyze the notion of Dasein's fallenness, by spelling out its nature, motive and modes.

4.3.1.1. Nature of Dasein's Fallenness

The fallenness of Dasein is not to be viewed in the sense of negative evaluation. Neither is it to be understood in the sense of moral degradation or as a state comparable to that of original sin.¹⁹⁴ Nor does it mean that Dasein altogether loses his being and becomes a being that is 'no-longer-in-the-world'. It also does not imply that Dasein was in a 'higher primal state' and has fallen to a lower state of existence. Fallenness is not to be conceived as Dasein's being an isolated ego, which has become displaced from himself to the world as a present-at-hand entity.¹⁹⁵ Falling is not to be taken as an ontical assertion about the corruption of human nature. These ways of looking at Dasein would amount to ontical (anthropological) ways of perceiving Dasein's fallen state. But, falling has to be understood in relation to Dasein's existential constitution.¹⁹⁶

In order to clarify the nature of the fallen Dasein, besides stating what falling is not, we must raise the question of the 'who' (*Wer*) of Dasein in this fallen state. On this point Heidegger states: "The 'who' is not this one, not that one, not oneself...not some people..., and not the sum of all. The 'who' is the neuter, the 'they'."¹⁹⁷ He attributes many characteristic to the 'they'. The first is distintiality (*Abstaendigkeit*), in which the everyday Dasein stands in subjection (*Botmaessigkeit*) to others. In other words, the 'they' determine the everyday possibilities for Dasein. Here, Dasein is not his self, but taken over by the 'they'. Distintiality consists in Dasein's 'being-with-one-another'. It dissolves one's own identity completely into the being of the other, to such an extent

¹⁹² Cf. *SZ*, p. 87; *BT*, pp. 120-121.

¹⁹³ Heidegger uses the German term '*Verfallen*' to refer to the everyday being of Dasein. As a noun it is usually translated into English as 'falling' or 'fallenness'. As a verb it means 'to fall'. It has the connotation of deteriorating, collapsing or falling down. Cf. *SZ*, p. 21; *BT*, p. 42, fn. 2. Cf. also *SZ*, p. 134; *BT*, p. 172, fn. 1.

¹⁹⁴ The term '*Verfallen*' is not used by Heidegger as having any moral signification. His use, here, is similar to what Heidegger speaks of in his later philosophy, viz., forgetting the truth of Being. Cf. *BH*, *Wegmarken*, p. 329; *BW*, p. 212.

¹⁹⁵ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 175-176; *BT*, p. 220.

¹⁹⁶ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 179-180; *BT*, p. 224.

¹⁹⁷ *SZ*, p. 128; *BT*, p. 164. The German term '*das Man*' is often rendered in English as 'the one', 'the they', 'the they-self' and 'the anonymous one'. Though inauthentic, 'the they' belongs to Dasein's essential constitution.

that the distinction between the other and oneself is destroyed and, thereby, the total control of the 'they' is established. Thus, Dasein takes pleasure, reads, judges and is shocked based on the standards set by the 'they'.¹⁹⁸ Distintiality is founded on the second, viz., mediocrity (*Durchschnittlichkeit*).¹⁹⁹ Having brought about the loss of identity of Dasein by distintiality, the 'they' maintains this loss factually in mediocrity. Here, everything exceptional and extraordinary is done away with. Every type of priority is suppressed and all possibilities of Dasein are leveled down (*einbrennen*). All these features come together to constitute the third characteristic of the 'they', which Heidegger calls, publicness (*Offenlichkeit*). In it, all genuineness and specialty that essentially belongs to Dasein is obliterated and obscured. Only the superficial in things is touched upon. The 'they' controls the way, in which, the world is interpreted. It presents every judgment and decides upon it and takes away Dasein's responsibility.²⁰⁰ "It was always the 'they' who did it, and it can be said that it has been no more."²⁰¹ Thus, in publicness, Dasein is fully disburdened by the 'they', and in this disburdening of responsibilities he finds a sense of security. Besides, the 'they' constantly accommodates Dasein by the disburdening and subtly retaining its 'stubborn domination'. The net result is "everyone is the other and no one is himself."²⁰² These traits which we have described so far provide Dasein with a constant tendency (*Ständigkeit*) for the state of falling, from which he does not want to be disturbed. The 'they' is not a property of Dasein, but is an existiale of Dasein. To quote Heidegger: "The 'they' is an existiale; and as a primordial phenomenon, it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution."²⁰³

Having delineated the characteristics of the 'who' of Dasein in the fallen state, now we can elaborate the nature of the state of fallenness. This signifies Dasein's state of absorption in (*Aufgehen bei*) or immersion²⁰⁴ in the world of his concern. Fallenness consists mostly in being lost in the publicness of the 'they'. It is a losing sight of the truth about one's own being; or a dimming of one's understanding of oneself, of one's possibilities and limitations. In other words, fallenness is a state in which one fails to grasp one's being with transparency and clarity. It is an entanglement with the life-world (*Lebenswelt*), so much so that Dasein loses sight of his roots.²⁰⁵ Falling is a state in which Dasein not only has lost his vision about himself, but understands himself in terms of others. One hardly realizes that one's thoughts, feelings, beliefs and ideals are shared by others, even though they might appear to be one's own. In fact, Dasein begins to guide his life in full conformity with everything the other expects of him. For example, the buyer determines what the producer must produce and the seller must sell. A professor or an officer becomes part of a setup and, in doing so, automatically takes over the norms and *modus operandi* of the system. Thus, in falling, Dasein loses his individuality, i.e., being-one's-self, and allows his life-world to be guided by the 'crowd' or the 'impersonal' self.²⁰⁶

¹⁹⁸ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 126-127; *BT*, p. 164.

¹⁹⁹ The German term '*Durchschnittlichkeit*' communicates the notion of doing the minimum. It has been translated into English as 'averageness'. We prefer to translate this German term with the English term 'mediocrity', as it brings out the full connotation of the German term in question.

²⁰⁰ Cf. *SZ*, p. 127; *BT*, pp. 165-166.

²⁰¹ *SZ*, p. 127; *BT*, p. 165.

²⁰² *SZ*, p. 128; *BT*, p. 165.

²⁰³ *SZ*, p. 128; *BT*, p. 165.

²⁰⁴ Werner Marx uses the term 'immersion' to translate '*Verfallen*'. This translation brings out the actual meaning intended by Heidegger. Cf. Werner Marx, p. 91.

²⁰⁵ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 175-176; *BT*, p. 260. Cf. also Edward G. Ballard, p. 55.

²⁰⁶ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 126-129; *BT*, pp. 164-166. Cf. also William Ralph Schroeder, pp. 135-136. Cf. also Harlod Alderman, pp. 23-24.

Caught up in this publicness and losing itself in the ‘they’, Dasein falls into a groundlessness. This domination of the ‘they’ becomes for the Dasein a constant temptation (*Versuchung*), in the sense that, it leads Dasein to falling. Since, Dasein is constantly tempted towards falling, he is gradually led to believe that, in such a state, he is secure and genuine and that the fulfillment of his possibilities are guaranteed. The supposition that Dasein’s life is genuine and that he is ‘in the best of order’ brings in Dasein is tranquillity (*Beruhigung*).²⁰⁷ "Falling ‘being-in-the-world’ which tempts itself, is at the same time tranquilizing."²⁰⁸ In tempting and tranquilization, the falling is aggravated as Dasein is not at peace or at rest. As falling gets aggravated, Dasein is moving towards an alienation (*Entfremdung*) in which, his own potentiality-for-being is hidden from him. "Falling being-in-the-world is not only tempting and tranquilizing, it is at the same time alienating."²⁰⁹ Alienation does not tear down Dasein factually from itself, but rather closes off from Dasein his authentic possibilities. It results in Dasein falling into an entanglement (*Verfaengnis*) with himself.²¹⁰ These four characteristics, viz., temptation, tranquilization, alienation and entanglement belong to the state of falling. Though, in falling Dasein takes a ‘downward plunge’ (*Abstuerz*) out of himself, into himself, into his groundlessness, he is under the impression that his way of living is an ‘ascending’, as the truth about his own true self is hidden from him. Heidegger uses the symbol of whirl (*Wirbel*) to indicate Dasein’s falling. In falling Dasein is ‘thrown’ into the bottomless living of everydayness and continues to be in this thrown state, totally whirled by the ‘they’.²¹¹

Having considered the nature of falling, the question arises as to why Dasein has the tendency to fall and remain inauthentic in his everyday existence. This is the topic of our consideration in the next section.

4.3.1.2. The Motive of Dasein’s Fallenness

Speaking of the motive of Dasein’s falling, Heidegger says that the flight from Dasein’s own self and absorption in entities of the world and with others is due to Dasein’s experience of his own being as inherently dissatisfying. Dasein, as being-in-the-world, is the ground of all his encounters; but this ground itself is experienced as groundless. Heidegger refers to this groundless and unsettling dimension of Dasein’s being-in-the-world as guilt (*Schuld*). Thus, for Heidegger, this basic guilt is the motive of Dasein’s falling.²¹² Before we enter into analyzing the meaning of the term ‘guilt’, as used by Heidegger, we could consider its common and ordinary meaning.

In our everyday usage, the term ‘guilt’ has two meanings. Firstly, it has the sense of ‘owing’ or ‘having something due to an account’. Thus, ‘being guilty’ means ‘having debts’ (*Schuld haben*). The other modes of guilt, taken in this sense, are depriving, borrowing, withholding, taking and stealing. This sense lays emphasis on the claim of the other to whom one owes. The second ordinary signification of ‘being-guilty’ is ‘being responsible for’ (*Schuldig-sein an*). In this sense of ‘having responsibility for something’, the fact that someone has incurred a blame or committed a fault, for which he is responsible, comes to the fore. These two ordinary usages of the term ‘guilt’

²⁰⁷ Cf. *SZ*, p. 177; *BT*, pp. 221-222.

²⁰⁸ *SZ*, p. 177; *BT*, p. 222.

²⁰⁹ *SZ*, p. 178; *BT*, p. 222.

²¹⁰ Cf. *SZ*, p. 178; *BT*, pp. 222-223.

²¹¹ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 178-179; *BT*, p. 223.

²¹² Cf. *SZ*, pp. 284-285; *BT*, pp. 329-331.

together convey the notion of a failure to fulfill a requirement, through omission or commission, and that one is responsible for endangering, misleading or ruining the other in his existence.²¹³

Heidegger uses the term 'guilt' in a more original and ontological sense. 'Being guilty' is a mode of Dasein and this notion must be freed from the moral and legal concepts. All moral notions which indicate a lack, such as 'being indebted to' and 'being responsible for' are based on the original notion of guilt, in which inheres the character of 'not' or 'nullity'. In other words, the notion of guilt is not something which emerges from the violation of moral norms or an offense committed, but on the contrary, the latter itself is grounded in the more fundamental 'not' or 'nullity', that is characteristic of Dasein's being, viz., guilt. To quote Heidegger: "Being-guilty does not first result from an indebtedness, ... but on the contrary, indebtedness becomes possible only on the basis of primordial being-guilty."²¹⁴ Thus, in the notion of guilt, taken in the primordial sense, lies the character of the 'not' or 'nullity'. Guilt, therefore, is something that fundamentally belongs to Dasein. "Being-guilty belongs to Dasein's being and signifies the null being-the-basis of a nullity."²¹⁵ In order to understand guilt in this original sense, we must analyze that two existential limitations (*Nichtigkeiten*).²¹⁶ These two existential limitations are two different ways in which Dasein's being is dissatisfying to him. They lead Dasein into falling.²¹⁷

The first existential limitation of which Heidegger speaks is Dasein's facticity or thrownness. It refers to the way Dasein already finds himself in the world, i.e., in a particular complex of equipmental system. Dasein finds himself (*sich findet*) in the world, having not chosen his world. In describing "*Befindlichkeit*," we have explained the factual nature of Dasein. The significant aspect of this existential limitation consists in Dasein's inability to be his own ground or change the state-of-being to which he is thrown. Dasein has no other way to go than to choose the situation in which he is thrown and make the best of it. Heidegger remarks: "As existent, it (Dasein) never comes back behind its (his) it (he)-is-and-has-to-be' from its (his) 'being-its (his)-self' and lead it (him) into the there."²¹⁸ This ontically and factically implies that one has no control to a great extent on the situation that went before his birth, early growth and development of skills, as most of these are determined for him by his thrownness. All that he can do is just be open to the possibilities of his thrown projection. In other words, it means that Dasein never has power over his ownmost being from the ground up, and he is never the cause of his own being.²¹⁹ It is this thrownness, as an inability in Dasein to generate a world for himself and as an inability of Dasein to choose the basis responsible for his own choices, that constitutes the first existential limitation in Dasein.

The second existential limitation lies in the constitution of these choices themselves. In choosing one of the possibilities the Dasein has to give up the other. Dasein has no freedom to choose all possibilities. By nature, choice involves preferring one alternative to another. This inevitable preclusion of various possibilities which is inherent in the nature of choosing is the second existential limitation belonging to Dasein's projective way of being. Heidegger remarks: "The nullity (existential limitation) we have in mind belongs to Dasein being-free for its (his)

²¹³ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 281-283; *BT*, pp. 327-329.

²¹⁴ *SZ*, p. 284; *BT*, p. 329.

²¹⁵ *SZ*, p. 305; *BT*, p. 353.

²¹⁶ The German term '*Nichtigkeit*' is usually rendered in English as 'nullity'. But, we translate it as 'existential limitation', as it refers to the fundamental lack that belongs to Dasein's existential structure.

²¹⁷ Cf. John Richardson, pp. 129-130.

²¹⁸ *SZ*, p. 284; *BT*, p. 330.

²¹⁹ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 284-285; *BT*, pp. 330-331.

existentiell possibilities. Freedom, however, is only in the choice of one possibility -- that is, in tolerating one's not having chosen the others and one's not being able to choose them."²²⁰ These two existential limitations -- Dasein's thrown projective understanding which he cannot ground himself, and the limitation that is imposed in Dasein's freedom to his own possibilities -- together constitute the guilt, in its primordial sense. Thus, guilt is the essential 'lack'²²¹ in Dasein's nature to which he does not want to face up in his everyday existence.

The existential limitations which constitute Dasein's guilt are essential conditions of his being-in-the-world, which disturb Dasein. Falling is nothing but a flight from the recognition of these disturbing conditions. Dasein is always aware of his guilt; but in the special state-of-being called anxiety,²²² guilt as the motive of falling is explicitly and directly recognized. The anxious Dasein feels uncanny and not-at-home (*Unheimlich*)²²³ because in anxiety he comes in face to face contact with these existential limitations which constitute the guilt, and which are essential to Dasein being challenged by his own guilt. In this situation, Dasein tries to get away from himself. In other words, Dasein flees from the direct recognition of these contingencies of his being, viz., his fundamental groundlessness, and drifts into everydayness. Falling, thus, amounts to Dasein's way of avoiding an existential grasp of his guilt and an attempt to maintain his immersion among entities and others by merely preoccupying himself in existential possibilities in a given equipmental system. In falling, Dasein not only fails to face his true being, but also wholeheartedly identifies himself with the particular situation and accepts it as the true reality by ignoring all alternative ends and choices.²²⁴

From what we have said it is clear, that the primordial guilt constituted of existential limitations and Dasein's unwillingness to face honestly his true being, which is essentially guilty in the sense we have explained, is the motive of Dasein's falling. Having analyzed the motives of falling, we could speak of its modes.

4.3.1.3. The Modes of Dasein's Fallenness

Heidegger speaks of three modes of Dasein's falling. Dasein is not his genuine self in these three ways, viz., curiosity (*die Neugier*), idle talk (*das Gerede*) and ambiguity (*die Zweideutigkeit*). We shall consider each of these briefly and see how fallenness is manifested in these modes.

4.3.1.3.1. Curiosity

²²⁰ *SZ*, p. 285; *BT*, p. 331.

²²¹ When we speak of guilt, as described by Heidegger, as a 'lack', we do not mean that it is an absence of present-at-hand-entity; but we are referring to Dasein's ultimate groundlessness. This 'being-guilty' is the basis of all ontic expressions of guilt in the moral and legal aspect of human existence. Cf. *SZ*, p. 286; *BT*, p. 332.

²²² For Heidegger, 'anxiety' is a special state-of-being, which is different from fear. In fear, there is an object present-at-hand of which we are afraid. But, in anxiety, there is no object, as the very being-in-the-world of Dasein is threatened. In other words, in anxiety, the very being of Dasein is challenged. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 140-142, 184-191; *BT*, pp. 179-182, 228-235.

²²³ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 185-186; *BT*, p. 230.

²²⁴ Cf. John Richardson, pp. 136-140.

In the fallen state, Dasein's attitude towards the world and the entities within it Heidegger calls 'curiosity'. This is a tendency towards 'seeing'. In curiosity, Dasein allows himself to be carried away (*mitnehmen*) by the looks of the world. This is to see for the sake of seeing; what is seen is not seen in order to understand. Curious Dasein leaps from one new thing to another. What is aimed at, in seeing is not the truth of reality, but just novelty for the sake of novelty. Therefore, curiosity is characterized by a 'not-abiding' or 'not-tarrying' (*unverweilen*) alongside what is closest to Dasein. In curiosity Dasein is restless about novelties, constantly seeking excitement and changing encounters. This, in turn, leads to continuous distraction and dissipation, thereby, always scattering into ever new possibilities. Being caught up in distraction, Dasein loses the sense of wonder or beholding the world with admiration. Curious Dasein, by his inability to dwell and to wonder about, and by his constant distraction, lives a life of 'never-dwelling-anywhere' (*Aufenthatslosigkeit*). Curiosity takes Dasein everywhere and yet nowhere; it uproots Dasein in his genuine being. Thus, what is superficially seen in curiosity is expressed or given out in idle talk.²²⁵

4.3.1.3.2. Idle Talk

The German term "*Gerede*" is used by Heidegger to refer to the second mode of Dasein's falling, viz., the talk is characteristic of everyday Dasein. Often it is translated as 'chatter', 'gossip', 'prattle' and 'idle talk'. It comes about as a result of one gossiping or passing the word along. In idle talk what is talked about (*das Geredete*) is only heard in a random manner, but not understood. In other words, one is not fully involved with the content of the talk, but rather superficially and vaguely hears what is said. In this mode, speech becomes its own end, and diction, pronunciation and style of speaking become the criteria to decide about the genuineness and relevance of the speech. It involves a constant repetition. Even though idle talk is superficial and ungrounded, by repetition, it appears to be authoritative. Idle talk is not just limited to the vocal chatter, but also consists of a written form (*das Geschreibe*), which is based on the hearsay (*Hoerensagen*), that feeds on superficial reading. Though groundless, idle talk becomes easily public and thereby often is taken for genuine discourse. Besides, idle talk does not pass off consciously something as something, but instead remains on the superficial level and thus closes off (*verschliessen*) what it pretends to disclose (*erschliessen*), thereby discouraging any new inquiry, understanding, interpretation and communication. Thus, gossip cuts Dasein off from the primary ontological relation to the entities in the world, to the other Dasein and to his own self.²²⁶

4.3.1.3.3. Ambiguity

Ambiguity is closely related to curiosity and idle talk. Ambiguity takes away the genuineness in both of these modes. It not only mars the truth of the world and Dasein's being-with-others, but also gives a false impression of Dasein's own understanding of himself. Ambiguous Dasein finds himself in the state of publicness and is unable to decide whether what has been disclosed is genuine or not. Being caught up in the whirl of daily activity, fallen Dasein is no more 'straight-forward'. As ambiguity takes hold of Dasein, no genuine knowledge is possible, as everything is based on hearsay and without taking into consideration what is really happening. Ambiguity also dominates Dasein's being-with-one-another. Everyone fixes his eye on the other and watches how the other will comport himself. 'Being-together-with-the-other' is characterized by a tense

²²⁵ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 170-173; *BT*, pp. 214-217.

²²⁶ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 167-170; *BT*, pp. 211-214.

watching of one another, and by an ambiguous spying on each other, which involves a mutual overhearing.²²⁷ Heidegger says: "Under the mask of 'for one another' an 'against one another' is in play"²²⁸ in the mode of ambiguity.

All these three modes constitute Dasein's falling, and are interconnected in their being. Heidegger remarks:

Dasein is always ambiguously 'there' -- that is to say in that public disclosedness of being-with-one-another where the loudest idle talk and the most ingenious curiosity keep 'things moving' where, in an everyday manner, everything (and at the bottom nothing) is happening.²²⁹

Thus, the fallen state of Dasein is disclosed through these modes of curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity. In the following section, we could proceed to consider the manner in which Dasein can attain his authentic existence by moving away from the fallen state of existence.

4.3.2. *Authentic Dasein*

Though Dasein is fallen in his everydayness, he is called to be an authentic human being. In this section, we will probe into the question of the authenticity of Dasein. Besides, we would show how the existential notion of the authentic whole Dasein is existentially and ontically attested in Dasein himself. This we will clarify by the analysis of the notions of conscience and resoluteness. We will also deal with the question of the unity between the wholeness and authenticity of Dasein, by exploring the notion of anticipatory resoluteness.

4.3.2.1. Conscience

Heidegger's analysis of conscience is different from the way traditional philosophy has thematized it.²³⁰ For him, conscience, as such, pertains not to the realm of knowledge, but to the realm of existence. It is an existential which belongs to Dasein in his concrete being-in-the-world. Heidegger's analysis of conscience is different from the psychological, theological or popular interpretations, for he analyses conscience ontologically and existentially. In other words, the Heideggerian analysis traces conscience back to its existential structures which make it an existential of Dasein.²³¹

4.3.2.1.1. Conscience: A Call

²²⁷ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 173-175; *BT*, pp. 217-219.

²²⁸ *SZ*, p. 175; *BT*, p.219.

²²⁹ *SZ*, p. 174; *BT*, pp. 218-219.

²³⁰ The traditional philosophy considers conscience as the subjective condition for morality. Conscience is, thus, related to the intellect. Conscience has different functions before, during and after a human act is performed: I) before: it commands or forbids, counsels or dissuades the act; ii) during: it makes the doer aware of the act he is doing, as to its goodness or badness; iii) after: it approves or disapproves, praises or blames, induces satisfaction or uneasiness. Cf. Joseph de Finance, *Ethica Generalis* (Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1959), p. 247.

²³¹ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 268-269; *BT*, p. 313.

Conscience, as an existential of Dasein, is not a present-at-hand fact or event which occasionally occurs, to the justification of which inductive empirical proofs might be given; but it is a structural mode of Dasein's being, which is manifested in Dasein's factual existence.²³² Conscience is revealed as a call which (*Ruf*) has the character of an appeal (*Anruf*) to Dasein to be his own innermost potentiality-for-being.²³³ To this call of conscience there is a corresponding hearing or listening. Losing himself in the publicness and idle-talk of the 'they', Dasein fails to listen (*ueberhoeren*) to his own self, but listens rather to the 'they'. The only way of freeing oneself from the self-forgetful giving of Dasein to the 'they' is to listen to the voice of one's own conscience. The call of conscience, by its appeal, breaks Dasein's listening to the 'they' and calls him out of this anonymous mode of existence. The call of conscience has the mode of discourse (*Rede*). As in discourse the vocal expression is not essential to Dasein, so the call of conscience is often a soundless giving-to-understanding (*zu-Verstehen-geben*). The call is unaffected by curiosity and idle-talk, it causes a jolt and an unsettling shake-up in the one who wants to be brought back from the sway of the 'they'.²³⁴

The call of conscience, which is of the mode of discourse, has a number of characteristics. Firstly, what is spoken about in the call of conscience is the average everyday Dasein himself. The call itself is not vague or indifferent; it is presented in a way that Dasein, though caught up in his everyday care, can understand. Secondly, what is appealed to in the call of conscience is not what Dasein is expected to be, able to do, has achieved or stood for in the publicity of everyday life. Nor is it the self, which can become for itself an object of self-criticism and introspection, and which is separate from the outer world and caught up in analytically gazing at psychic conditions. The call of conscience passes over all these and appeals only to that self which is in the mode of being-in-the-world. Thirdly, what is appealed in the call of conscience, i.e., the content of the call, is strictly nothing. The call does not assert anything or give any information; neither is it a soliloquy. But it is the summoning of the self in himself, i.e., to his ownmost potentiality-for-being-his-self. In other words, what the call gives Dasein to understand is the fundamental groundlessness of his being-in-the-world, viz., Dasein's guilt.²³⁵ Fourthly, the call of conscience does not show itself in loud talk, but in the mode of silence and in it alone. The fact that what is called is not expressed in words or spoken aloud, does not make this call of conscience indefinite or mysterious, but only points to the fact that 'what is given to understanding' by the call does not depend on external articulation or communication. Neither does it make the call of conscience and its appeal less effective, because often silence is more effective than loud talk. Finally, though there is an apparent vagueness regarding the content of the call, what the call discloses is clear and unambiguous, viz., the direction which the self must take in order to move from the 'they' and to be authentic.²³⁶

4.3.2.1.2. Conscience: The Call of Care

Considering the conscience as a call, we stated that one to whom the call is addressed is the 'they'. The one to whom the 'they' is called to move towards is also the same self, as the call of

²³² Cf. *SZ*, p. 269; *BT*, pp. 313-314.

²³³ Cf. *SZ*, p. 269; *BT*, p. 314.

²³⁴ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 270-271; *BT*, pp. 314-316. In this regard, Heidegger also maintains that conscience should not be reduced to any psychic faculties, such as thinking, feeling or willing. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 271-272; *BT*, p.317.

²³⁵ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 280-289; *BT*, pp. 325-335.

²³⁶ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 272-274; *BT*, pp. 317-319.

conscience is addressed to the self to be his self. The content of the call or what the call gives to understand is Dasein's fundamental groundlessness, i.e., his primordial guilt.

Now the question we must ask ourselves is the 'who' of this call or the caller of the call of conscience. The caller of the call of conscience conceals himself in a peculiar indeterminateness and indefinability. The caller cannot be known, as entities in the world are known, by name, status, origin or repute. There is nothing specific that we can observe or say about the caller. One who calls holds himself aloof; his identity cannot be known. The only characterization we can give him is that he calls. We may say that Dasein is the caller and that he calls himself to himself. Even if this is so, there is some peculiar impersonal character about the call, because it comes unexpected, unwished for and independent of Dasein himself. Dasein himself never plans, neither is prepared for, nor voluntarily performs this call. At the same time, it is clear that the call does not come from some other Dasein in the world. Heidegger remarks: "The call comes from me and yet beyond me and over me."²³⁷ There are some who hold the view that the call comes from some alien power, viz., God, while some others explain away conscience in terms of some biological theory. Heidegger does not approve of such theories, because the basic assumption behind these theories is that whatever exists must be present-at-hand reality. According to Heidegger, only the analysis of the existential constitution of this entity who calls can give us the clue to understanding him who does the calling.²³⁸

To clarify the subject of the call of conscience, Heidegger refers to the analysis of the thrownness of Dasein, which is his factual existence. In this thrown mode of existence the 'why' of Dasein's thrownness is hidden from him, while 'that-it(he)-is' is disclosed to Dasein. The fact is that Dasein's thrownness is revealed to himself in the state-of-being. Dasein often reacts to it by fleeing, because it brings Dasein face to face with his isolated being-in-the-world, which makes him feel not-at-home. Anxiety is the most fundamental state-of-being, which reveals Dasein fundamentally as the thrown. Heidegger suggests that the caller of conscience is this anxious Dasein in his not-at-homeness (*Unheimlichkeit*). In other words, the thrown and anxious Dasein becomes the caller of himself from his everyday fallenness.²³⁹ To quote Heidegger on this point: "The caller is Dasein in its (his) uncanniness: primordial, thrown being-in-the-world as the 'not-at-home'- the bare 'that-it(he)-is' in the 'nothing of the world'. The caller is unfamiliar to the everyday they-self; it is something like an alien voice."²⁴⁰

Thus, the call of conscience summons Dasein to his ability to be (*seinkoennen*). The call speaks in the uncanny mode of silence. Conscience, having its basis in Dasein's thrownness, calls Dasein back from the idle talk of the public, into his ownmost potentiality-for-being, at the face of anxiety. When existentially understood, the call of conscience constantly makes Dasein feel 'not-at-home' and anxious about his existence, thereby posing a constant threat to Dasein's lostness in the 'they' and his forgetfulness of himself in his everydayness.²⁴¹ Thus, the call of conscience shows itself as the call of care. Heidegger remarks:

Conscience manifests itself as the call of care: the caller is Dasein, which in its (his) thrownness (in his being-already-in), is anxious about its (his) potentiality-for-being. The one to whom the appeal is made is the very same Dasein, summoned to its (his) ownmost potentiality-for-being

²³⁷ *SZ*, p. 277; *BT*, p. 322.

²³⁸ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 274-276; *BT*, pp. 319-320.

²³⁹ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 274-276; *BT*, pp. 319-320.

²⁴⁰ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 276-277; *BT*, pp. 320-322.

²⁴¹ *SZ*, pp. 276-277; *BT*, p.321.

(ahead-of-himself...) Dasein is falling into the 'they' (in being-already-alongside- the world of concern), and it is summoned out of this falling by the appeal. The call of conscience -- that is, conscience itself -- has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein, in the very basis of its (his) being, is care.²⁴²

The conscience, which is the call of care, like death, is in every case 'mine' and is addressed only to me. For Heidegger, 'public conscience' or 'world conscience' is a dubious fabrication.²⁴³ Thus, conscience, as we have considered, specially with the character of 'my-ownness', is an attestation of Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-being and this attestation lies in Dasein himself. But what is attested by conscience and the full nature of this attestation can be envisaged only when we deal with how this call of conscience is heard and understood. We move on to this point in the next section, which concerns resoluteness.

4.3.2.2. Resoluteness

The co-relate to calling is listening. The proper listening to the call consists in wanting-to-have-a-conscience (*Gewissen-haben-wollen*). Only by wanting-to-have-a-conscience, can Dasein be his authentic potentiality-to-be. Wanting-to-have-a-conscience is manifested in the mode of Dasein's disclosedness, with its marks of understanding, state-of-being and discourse.²⁴⁴ Therefore, genuine hearing the call of conscience, first, involves the understanding of the existential of one's own being and the existential limitations associated with guilt. In other words, it would mean Dasein's understanding of his ownmost potentiality-for-being-in-the-world. Dasein's understanding of the call of conscience is accompanied by the state-of-being, anxiety, which brings to the fore the homelessness of Dasein's own self. The mode of discourse that is characteristic of this anxious self-understanding, is not expressed aloud, but in silence, which the inauthentic Dasein must listen to in silence. To the one who is caught up in idle talk and curiosity, the call of conscience in its silent manifestation would appear as non-existent. The pre-eminent and authentic disclosedness of Dasein attested to by Dasein's wanting-to-have-a-conscience and shows itself as the silent and anxious self-projection, Heidegger calls resoluteness.²⁴⁵ To quote Heidegger:

The disclosedness of Dasein in wanting to have a conscience is thus constituted by anxiety as the state-of-being, by understanding as the projection of oneself upon one's ownmost being-guilty and by discourse as reticence. This distinctive and authentic disclosedness, which is attested in Dasein itself (himself) by its (his) conscience -- this reticent self-projection upon one's ownmost being-guilty in which one is ready for anxiety -- we call resoluteness.²⁴⁶

²⁴² Cf. *SZ*, p. 277; *BT*, pp. 321-322.

²⁴³ *SZ*, pp. 277-278; *BT*, pp. 322-323.

²⁴⁴ Cf. *SZ*, p. 278; *BT*, p. 323. In interpreting conscience as subjective, Heidegger opens himself for the criticism that his treatment of conscience lacks objectivity. But, for Heidegger, it is only by limiting the arbitrary domination of the they-self, that Dasein can have objectivity for the appeal of conscience for authenticity. Cf. *ibid.*

²⁴⁵ Cf. *SZ*, p. 278; *BT*, p. 324.

²⁴⁶ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 295-297; *BT*, pp. 341-343.

From what Heidegger has said in the above quotation, it is clear that resoluteness (*Entschlossenheit*) is the authentic mode of disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) of Dasein.²⁴⁷ Since the disclosedness of Dasein is the primordial truth and the way in which Dasein is in truth,²⁴⁸ and resoluteness is the authentic mode of Dasein's disclosedness, resoluteness, as we described above, is the truth of Dasein which is the most primordial and authentic.²⁴⁹ Thus, the call of conscience, listened to in resoluteness, recalls Dasein from his inauthentic everyday preoccupations to an authentic disclosedness. This does not change Dasein's world, but rather transforms Dasein's awareness of his world and others. The world of Dasein does not suddenly have a new content, nor has the circle of people around him changed. But, there is a difference in Dasein's comprehension of entities and other Daseins, as these are viewed from the point-of-view of Dasein's ownmost potentiality-for-being. In other words, Dasein's authentic being-his-self, does not mean that he has a self that is unattached and cut off from the world, but Dasein's 'being-alongside-the-ready-to-hand' and his 'being-with-others' "are given a definitive character in terms of their ownmost potentiality-for-being-their-selves."²⁵⁰

Hence, in resoluteness, Dasein does not stop taking care in his environmental world, nor does he stop his dealings with the community to which he belongs, but only changes his attitude towards these, from one of inauthenticity to that of authenticity. The reason for this change in attitude is that in resoluteness "Dasein gets an authentic grasp of himself and comes to grips with things as they are"²⁵¹ or authentically. Commenting on this point, B. J. Toussaint notes: "Resoluteness does not place Dasein in a different world; it does place the world in different light."²⁵² Summing up this point Heidegger writes:

Resoluteness, as authentic being-one's-self, does not detach Dasein from its (his) world, nor does it isolate it (him) so that it (he) becomes a free-floating I. How should it, when resoluteness as authentic disclosedness is authentically nothing else than being-in-the-world? Resoluteness brings the self right into its (his) current concerned being-along-side what is ready-to-hand and pushes it (him) into solicitous being with others.²⁵³

Resoluteness, therefore, frees Dasein from himself for his world, in the light of the 'for-the-sake-of-which' of his own potentiality-for-being. It also frees Dasein in his relationship with others in the sense that resoluteness enables him to allow them to be themselves. Thereby, resolute Dasein becomes, as it were, the conscience of others, which in turn brings about the disclosure of mutual potentialities to each other. This, in turn, helps them to be authentically 'being-their-selves' and authentically 'being-with-one-another'.²⁵⁴

²⁴⁷ *SZ*, pp. 296-297; *BT*, p. 343.

²⁴⁸ Cf. *SZ*, p. 297; *BT*, p. 343. The etymological connection between these terms is note-worthy. 'Erschliessen' means 'to open' or 'to disclose'. 'Entschliessen' also means the same. The prefix 'ent' is privative and so 'ent' + 'Schliessen' (to close), points to a resolute or self-decided opening. Cf. Johnson J. Puthenpurackal. p. 60, fn. 103. 247 Cf. *SZ*, p. 212; *BT*, p. 256.

²⁴⁹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 297; *BT*, p. 343.

²⁵⁰ *SZ*, pp. pp. 297-298; *BT*, pp. 343-344.

²⁵¹ Thomas Langan, *The Meaning of Heidegger* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), p. 38.

²⁵² B. J. Toussaint, *Interpretation of Self in Early Heidegger* (Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1977), p. 180.

²⁵³ *SZ*, p. 298; *BT*, p. 344.

²⁵⁴ Cf. *ibid.* From what we have said here, it is clear that there is no indication of solipsism in Heidegger's notion of Dasein's authenticity, which is attained when the call of conscience is genuinely listened to in

Resoluteness, so far we have considered, by its very ontological essence is related to a factual Dasein in a particular time. Resoluteness exists only in a resolution (*Entschluss*), which is the "disclosive projection and determination of what is factually possible in the (given) time."²⁵⁵ Thus, only in a resolution, resoluteness gets its existential definiteness. Thus existential definiteness of resoluteness is elucidated by Heidegger with reference to the existential phenomenon called 'Situation'.²⁵⁶ Though this term has a spatial reference, Heidegger uses it in the existential sense. Just as Dasein is disclosed in his 'being-in' or 'there', so also the resoluteness of Dasein is disclosed in a Situation. In other words, Situation is the 'there' of an existing Dasein as disclosed by his resoluteness. It is essentially different from the objective framework or setting of the present-at-hand entities, circumstances, events and happenings, which constitute the background of Dasein's activity. But, it is rather the internal ontological structure which makes such activities of Dasein possible. Dasein's Situation is his own 'being-in' or the 'being-there' in the world, in so far as this is the ground of all actions and decisions. Situation has its being only in relation to resoluteness, which alone discloses resolutely the existing Dasein, just as Dasein can be spoken of as 'being-in' or 'there' only in and through his disclosedness. Thus, the call of conscience summoning Dasein in his ability-to-be attains a concrete and definite existence in resoluteness.²⁵⁷ In the call of conscience, listened to in resoluteness with reference to the existential Situation, a concrete attestation of Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole occurs in Dasein himself.

4.3.2.3. Anticipatory Resoluteness

So far, our consideration of the whole authentic Dasein has given us two significant phenomena, viz., first, the existential project of Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole, which consists in the authentic being-towards-death, in anticipation of death, and, second, the existentially demonstrated phenomenon of resoluteness as the wanting-to-have-a-conscience, which consists in authentic potentiality-for-being as resoluteness. These two phenomena seem certainly to be interrelated, as Dasein attains his wholeness in anticipation and his authenticity in resoluteness. The question that we face now is the nature of this relationship between anticipation and resoluteness. Only by bringing these two phenomena together could we have a full knowledge of Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole. This is our task in this section.

Dasein in his existentiell actualization of authenticity in resoluteness accepts guilt as his ever-present existential structure. The guilt which lies in the very core of Dasein is not a passing feature in Dasein, but it is something constant and extends to the entire being of Dasein "right to its (his) end."²⁵⁸ "Resoluteness is, thus, full and authentic only insofar as it acknowledges and accepts being-guilty unto the end, i.e., insofar as it coincides with a being-unto-death, which

resoluteness, as Dasein continues to maintain all his relationships, but in a new authentic manner. Cf. James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, pp. 42-43.

²⁵⁵ *SZ*, p. 298; *BT*, p. 345.

²⁵⁶ Heidegger uses two German terms '*Situation*' and '*Lage*', which are rendered in English 'Situation' and 'situation', respectively. Here, he uses the first term. '*Lage*' more in the spatial sense. Cf. *SZ*, p. 300; *BT*, p. 346, fn. 1.

²⁵⁷ Cf. *SZ*, p. 298-301; *BT*, pp. 344-347.

²⁵⁸ Cf. *SZ*, p. 305; *BT*, p. 353.

simultaneously accepts the being-guilty of Dasein.²⁵⁹ Through anticipation of death resoluteness reaches its own authenticity. To quote Heidegger:

As being-towards-the-end -- that is to say, as anticipation of death -- resoluteness becomes authentically what it can be. Resoluteness does not 'have' a connection with anticipation, as with something other than itself. It harbors in itself authentic being-towards-death, as the possible existentiell modality of one's own authenticity.²⁶⁰

In other words, only by anticipating Dasein's existential guilt right up to his end, i.e., until his death, does resoluteness become an authentic being towards its ownmost potentiality-for-being.²⁶¹ Thus, "resoluteness is authentically and wholly what it can be, only in anticipatory resoluteness."²⁶² On the other hand, anticipation which up to now has been considered only as a hypothetical existential projection, is given an existentiell and factual guarantee or attestation through the addition of resoluteness. On this point Heidegger remarks: "Anticipation 'is' not some kind of free-floating behavior, but must be conceived as the possibility of the authenticity of that resoluteness which has been attested in an existentiell way -- a possibility hidden in such resoluteness and thus attested there-with."²⁶³ Thus, anticipation of death gives resoluteness its authenticity by making Dasein aware of the constancy of the existential guilt, until his end; while resoluteness gives anticipation its facticity, i.e., its ontical dimension, and thus, completes Dasein's wholeness. From what we have said, it is clear that anticipatory resoluteness makes us understand Dasein as existentially structured (by anticipation of death) and existentially attested (by resoluteness) authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole.²⁶⁴

Having already shown the interconnectedness of anticipation and resoluteness, Heidegger moves on to say that this union, i.e., anticipatory resoluteness, is not a connection that is forced from outside, but, that these two elements have real internal connection. To substantiate his claim, he proceeds to show how anticipation and resoluteness complement each other. Firstly, resoluteness, by wanting-to-have-a-conscience, i.e. by listening to the call of conscience, brings back Dasein from his lostness in the 'they' to the possibility of being his authentic self. Here, anticipation enters the picture and reveals death as Dasein's ultimate potentiality, thereby making Dasein's potentiality to be his self completely authentic and wholly transparent. Secondly, the call of conscience, listened to in resoluteness, individualizes Dasein by manifesting to him his own being-guilty. Anticipation, by focusing Dasein's attention on death as his non-relational possibility, further enhances and completes this process of Dasein's individualization. Thirdly, resoluteness points to Dasein's primordial being-guilty as a constant feature of Dasein's existence and that it is not dependent on the incidence or the paying off, of the factual indebtedness or guilt. Anticipation, in its turn, uncovers the insumountability of this primordial guilt of Dasein by including in it the notion of death as something that cannot be out-stripped by anything.²⁶⁵

Carrying the comparison further, Heidegger calls our attention to the similarity in the type of certitude that is found in resoluteness and the anticipation of death. Resoluteness is certain of the

²⁵⁹ James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 44.

²⁶⁰ *SZ*, p. 305; *BT*, p. 353.

²⁶¹ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 305-306; *BT*, pp. 353-354.

²⁶² *SZ*, p. 309; *BT*, p. 356.

²⁶³ *SZ*, p.309; *BT*, p. 357.

²⁶⁴ Cf. *ibid*. Cf. also James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 44.

²⁶⁵ Cf. *SZ*, p. 307; *BT*, pp. 354 -355.

existential guilt of Dasein, which makes Dasein's existence insecure. Thus, in resoluteness, Dasein is certain about his own uncertainty of existence. This is so, because in resoluteness Dasein becomes aware of that he cannot depend upon absolutes in any given situation, nor hold on to any decision for ever, but must hold himself open and free for factual Situations and possibilities.²⁶⁶ The last of these possibilities towards which Dasein is open in resoluteness is death, which is a certain possibility, yet there is an indefiniteness about it. But the anticipation of death, as the extreme possibility of Dasein, viz. that in death Dasein must simply 'take back' everything, gives resoluteness a certainty that is authentic and whole.²⁶⁷

Resoluteness in making Dasein aware of his primordial guilt, as mentioned earlier, also brings with it an indefiniteness which prevails throughout the whole of Dasein's existence. This indefiniteness of resoluteness, in turn, brings anxiety in Dasein. The anticipation of death reveals the fullness of this indefiniteness for it opens Dasein for the greatest indefiniteness of his potentiality-for-being, i.e., death. The anxiety that arises in the face of the anticipation of death completes the anxiety that arises in resoluteness from Dasein's awareness of guilt, because the indefiniteness in anticipation of death is the certain possibility of the impossibility of Dasein himself.²⁶⁸

Thus, our analysis of the complementary nature of anticipation and resoluteness, clearly shows that the various aspects of the existential concept of death are implicitly concealed in resoluteness, and they get completed when understood in the light of the anticipation of death. From this, it is clear that only in anticipatory resoluteness is Dasein's authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole ultimately revealed. In doing so, we have also clarified both the existential-ontological structure of Dasein and the existentiell-ontical realization of the whole authentic Dasein,²⁶⁹ combining these two notions of 'anticipation' and 'resoluteness'. J.M. Demske formulates the authenticity of Dasein or his authentic being-towards-death, as follows:

It is the understanding and acceptance of oneself in terms of the negativity of death as one's ownmost proper and distinctive possibility-to-be (which is non-relational, irretrievable unsurpassable, certain and yet indeterminate as to its when), which negatively first announces itself through the call of conscience to the silent and unprotestingly anxious acknowledgment of one's own existential guilt; this self-understanding reveals to Dasein its (his) condition of being lost in the inauthentic state of any-one-self (they) and brings it (him) face to face with the possibility of being its (his) own true self by accepting and affirming its (his) own negativity in an impassioned freedom unto death, liberated from popular illusions, factitious, sure of itself (himself) and anxious.²⁷⁰

²⁶⁶ The attitude of resolute Dasein, i.e., his being free for current Situations and possibilities, does not amount to the indecisiveness or irresoluteness of inauthenticity, but is the acknowledgement of the way things are, and confirmation of his own authentic resoluteness. By remaining ever open to the varying Situations, Dasein is aware of his primordial groundlessness, i.e., his existential guilt. Cf. *SZ*, p. 308; *BT*, pp. 355-356.

²⁶⁷ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 307-308; *BT*, pp. 355-356.

²⁶⁸ Cf. *SZ*, p. 308; *BT*, p. 356.

²⁶⁹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 309; *BT*, pp. 356-357.

²⁷⁰ James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 46. Cf. also *SZ*, pp. 258-259, 266, 296-297; *BT*, pp. 302-304, 310-311, 342-344.

Since outside of authentic being-towards-death, Dasein has no authenticity, authentic being-towards-death and authenticity of Dasein are one and the same, viz., anticipatory resoluteness. In this anticipatory resoluteness, we can understand Dasein's potentiality-for-being-an-authentic-whole, i.e., a Dasein who is whole and authentic.

4.3.3. Temporal-Historical Dasein

In the notion of anticipatory resoluteness we have come to understand Dasein in his wholeness and authenticity. A Dasein that is whole and authentic conveys the idea of relation to his end. In other words, in anticipatory resoluteness we have begun to understand Dasein in his finitude. Now, Heidegger raises the question of that which enables Dasein to exist as anticipatory resoluteness in his finitude. In other words, Heidegger raises the issue of the ontological condition for Dasein's existence, as the authentic potentiality-for-being-a-whole. In answering this question Heidegger presents temporality as the ground of Dasein's being. In this section we will consider the notions of temporality and historicity, which, indeed, is a concretization of temporality.

4.3.3.1. Dasein in His Temporality

In our ordinary understanding, we consider 'time' as a pure and indefinite sequence of 'nows' having no gap or interruption. This stream of 'nows' is endless and irreversible. In such a conception of time, the future would consist of the 'nows' which were and which are no longer; and the present would be the 'now' which is the moment. In this view, time as such and its particular moments, i.e., the 'nows' are considered as some really present-at-hand.²⁷¹ While Heidegger does not ignore the validity or justification of this conception of time, he holds that this type of time is not a temporality of Dasein, because Dasein is transcendence. Thereby, he exists or stands out above all other entities, in that by anticipation, he is what he can be, i.e., he is his own potentiality. The structure of Dasein's temporality implies a future, a past and a present, and this is something proper to Dasein as existence. "The future, the character of having been (past) and the present, show the phenomenal characteristics of the 'towards-oneself', the 'back-to oneself' and the 'letting-oneself-be-encountered-by'."²⁷² These characteristics of 'towards', 'to' and alongside' show temporality as '*ekstatikon*', i.e., standing out of itself. "Temporality is the primordial 'out-side-of-itself' in and for itself. We therefore call the phenomena of future, the character of having been and the present 'ecstases' of temporality."²⁷³ Thus, in temporality the succession of 'nows' is not an entity. But the essence of temporality consists in the temporalizing unity of the ecstases and temporality itself cannot be spoken of as prior to the ecstases.²⁷⁴

As a process, temporality temporalizes in various modes. The basic modes are authentic and inauthentic temporality.²⁷⁵ The authentic mode of future ecstasis is anticipation (*Vorlaufen*), in which, Dasein projects towards his final possibility, viz., death. The future ecstasis of inauthentic

²⁷¹ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 329, 423-424; *BT*, pp. 377, 475-476.

²⁷² *SZ*, p. 329; *BT*, p. 377.

²⁷³ *Ibid.* The root meaning of the word '*ecstasis*' is standing out side. It is generally used in Greek to mean 'removal' or 'displacement' of something. Heidegger, using this word in relation to Dasein, refers to his quality of 'standing out' above all other entities. The term 'existence' also come from the same root word. Cf. *ibid.*, fn. 2.

²⁷⁴ Cf. *SZ*, p. 329; *BT*, p. 377.

²⁷⁵ Cf. *SZ*, p. 328; *BT*, 377.

temporality is one of awaiting (*Gewaertigen*) one's possibilities. The significance of awaiting consists in the actualization of the thing awaited.²⁷⁶ The authentic mode of past ecstasis is repetition (*Wiederholung*). It is the way in which Dasein's thrownness can acquire a transparency. The inauthentic mode of the past ecstasis is having forgotten (*Vergessenheit*) in which the thrownness is hidden from Dasein's view.²⁷⁷ The authentic mode of the present ecstasis is the moment of vision (*Augenblick*), which consists in Dasein being involved with the other two ecstases, viz., anticipation and repetition. In other words, it would amount to his involvement with environmental and communal worlds, without losing himself. The inauthentic mode of present ecstasis is making present (*Gegenwaertigen*), by which Dasein loses himself in the ready-to-hand.²⁷⁸ Unlike the inauthentic temporality, in which, the present ecstasis plays a significant role -- as the inauthentic Dasein is concerned mainly with the present -- in authentic temporality the ecstasis of future has pre-eminence. This is because by existing authentically towards death, as a future possibility in anticipation, Dasein exists finitely. Thus, since the futural ecstasis makes Dasein appropriate his own being, i.e., finitude, it has a priority over other ecstases.²⁷⁹

Now that we have clarified the notion of the temporality of Dasein in general and indicated its authentic and inauthentic modes, we could reinterpret our preliminary analysis of Dasein in terms of temporality.

4.3.3.1.1. Temporal Noetic Dasein

Here our main concern is to reinterpret Dasein's disclosedness or being-in (*Da*), viz., understanding state-of-being and discourse in terms of temporality. In other words, we want to show that these three modes of Dasein's 'standing in' are not isolated modes, but rather that they constitute a temporal unity with the corresponding ecstases, viz., the future, the past and the present.

Understanding in its primary and existential sense always is a projecting towards Dasein's potentiality-for-being, for-the-sake-of-which Dasein exists. That is to say that in understanding it is dis-closed to Dasein what he is capable of. The projection, in virtue of which a possibility of Dasein is understood, is always futural. Thus, understanding is fundamentally related to the ecstasis of future. The projective understanding, though it has future as its fundamental ecstasis, must also be related to the other ecstases of the past and the present in order to be authentic.²⁸⁰ In authentic understanding, Dasein perceives thing in their primordial light. Here, in involving himself in this interpretation, viz. the future Dasein interprets the present situation in the light of the past which constitutes Dasein's being as the 'has been' (*Gewesen*), and that of the end which one intends to achieve. Thus, by anticipation authentic understanding takes hold of its past and all the significance it can offer to the present act of interpretation (a moment of vision) and freely moves towards the not-yet (future). Thereby, it brings new significance and meaning to the thing or the possibility that is understood. On the contrary, if Dasein loses the essential futurity of his projective understanding, forgets its 'has been' and its significance to the present and to the future, he fails to realize what things are really for and their genuine relatedness, as they simply make things present. In this attitude he waits for the actualization of the things waited for, that he can

²⁷⁶ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 261-262, 336-337; *BT*, pp. 306, 386.

²⁷⁷ Cf. *SZ*, p. 339; *BT*, pp. 388-389.

²⁷⁸ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 328, 338; *BT*, pp. 376, 387-388.

²⁷⁹ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 330-331, 426-427; *BT*, pp. 378-379, 479.

²⁸⁰ Cf. *SZ*, p. 350; *BT*, p. 401.

possess them. This leads Dasein not to see things in the new light, but in that of the preoccupation of daily life.²⁸¹

Unlike understanding, which is grounded in the ecstasis of the future, the state-of-being, which is the fundamental condition of Dasein as thrown, is founded in the ecstasis of the past. Thus, in state-of-being, the other two ecstases, viz., future and present are modified by the past or 'having been'. This is because, in state-of-being, Dasein's past is given to him and he is focused towards the event of his origin; as a result, every other aspect of Dasein's existence is 'tuned' by what has come before.

In spelling out the temporal interplay of the ecstases of '*Befindlichkeit*', Heidegger specially deals with fear as the inauthentic mode and anxiety as the authentic mode.²⁸² In the inauthentic state-of-being, viz., fear, Dasein fails to be in touch with the past, and fails to see his relevance in the future and the present ecstases, because of his absorption in his concern. Thus, when Dasein is under the grip of fear, he is in a state of confusion. As a result, he is not able to understand his past, viz., his background and his responsibility to make something of the past in the present and in the future. In the state of fear, there is involved, on the part of Dasein, a forgetfulness of the past, which brings about a disruption in the temporalizations of the present and the future. This, in its turn, bars Dasein from having a clear vision of the present, but instead makes the present his concern. In this state of affairs an authentic anticipation is not possible, but Dasein waits for the object of fear and for the means of escape.²⁸³

Anxiety, on the other hand, is fully open to Dasein's past and helps Dasein to grasp the limits of his being-in-the-world, i.e., a thrown existence. Thus, guided by anxiety, Dasein takes hold of his past and his possibilities, and relives them in the present with reference to his own projections towards the future. In other words, in authentic state-of-being, i.e., in anxiety, Dasein remaining in the present turns back into the past to bring out what has been, viz., brings the past possibilities forward into the future.²⁸⁴

The disclosedness of Dasein, that is reached in understanding and state-of-being becomes articulated in discourse. Therefore, discourse, as such, does not temporalize in any special ecstasis. But discourse, in itself, is temporal in the sense that, all discourses, whether they be talking about something or talking to someone, are grounded in the ecstatic unity of temporality. For discourse always is a making present understanding which is futural, and the state-of-being which primordially is related to the past. Thus, we can say regarding discourse that, though, in it none of the ecstases of temporality dominates, it is an integration of all the three temporal ecstases in a dynamic whole.²⁸⁵

4.3.3.1.2. Temporal Everyday Dasein

In this section, we want to reinterpret Dasein as everyday being-in-the-world from the aspect of temporality. Dasein, as everyday being, is 'being-alongside-entities-within-the-world'. This

²⁸¹ Cf. *SZ*, P. 336-339; *BT*, pp. 385-389. Cf. also Thomas Langan, *The Meaning of Heidegger*, pp. 45-46.

²⁸² Cf. *SZ*, p. 340; *BT*, pp. 389-390.

²⁸³ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 341-342; *BT*, pp. 391-392.

²⁸⁴ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 342-344; *BT*, pp. 393-395. For Heidegger, fear and anxiety are not the only types of state-of-being; there are others, such as disgust, sorrow, despair, joy, enthusiasm and even hope. The state-of-being of hope seems to appear wholly in the future, as in it the past and the present flow into the future. Cf. *SZ*, p. 345; *BT*, pp. 395-396.

²⁸⁵ Cf. *SZ*, p. 349; *BT*, p. 400.

mode of Dasein's being raises two issues, viz., circumspective concern and the world. Besides, in his everydayness, Dasein is in the fallen state, in which he is constituted of care. Our task here is to consider the temporality of the following themes, viz., circumspective concern, the world and fallenness, which fundamentally constitute Dasein's everyday being-in-the-world.

Firstly, in Dasein's everyday being-in-the-world, he encounters the ready-to-hand (*Zuhanden*) and the present-at-hand (*Vorhanden*). Dasein's circumspective concern for them emerges in the context of the total work-world, i.e., the equipmental system. The fact that Dasein is involved with equipment implies that he possesses *a priori* awareness of the destination or the 'towards-which' of the equipmental system, because Dasein allows the ready-to-hand to be involved with him only relating to his purposive activity. This means the 'that-which-is-for' of the involvement belongs to Dasein's past and is retained as the 'has been'. Dasein understands the purpose or the 'towards-which' of the equipment system, and also has the structure of awaiting, as it is oriented towards Dasein's projective concern, and thus, has the ecstases of the future. Neither awaiting the 'what-for' (future) nor retention of the destination (past), taken in an isolated manner, constitutes the temporal background of the making present that is characteristic of the circumspective concern. Rather it is the unity of the three ecstases of temporality that constitutes the circumspective concern in its temporality. In other words, Dasein makes the equipmental system present in his circumspective concern with reference to his future ends, i.e., awaiting the future ends, on the basis of the retention from the past.²⁸⁶ On this point Heidegger remarks: "The awaiting of what it (he) is involved in and -- together with this awaiting -- the retaining of that which is thus involved makes possible in its (his) ecstatic unity the specifically manipulative way in which the equipmental system is made present."²⁸⁷

The temporality of circumspective concern is clarified, further, with reference to the three modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness and obstinacy. In an equipmental whole, with which Dasein is involved, an equipment emerges into conspicuousness when it shows itself as unworkable or damaged, and thus, holds up the awaiting-retaining-making present, by bringing about a collision between the practical aim of Dasein and the 'what-for' of the equipment. Similarly, in Dasein's circumspective look, he discovers an equipment as missing (obtrusiveness) only because the awaiting temporalizes itself in unity with the retention which presents itself. This is also true of obstinacy. In all these three cases, if Dasein does not expect the particular equipment in question to function in the present and in the future in the way it has done in the past, the breakdown in the functioning of the tool will not be noticed. Thus, circumspective concern is the fundamentally temporal unity of expecting (future)-retaining(past)-making present (present).²⁸⁸

Secondly, we have already seen that the world is a unity of Dasein's referential totalities and their significance. Attempting to interpret the world in terms of temporality, Heidegger says: "The existential-temporal condition for the possibility of the world lies in the fact that temporality, as an ecstatic unity, has something like a horizon."²⁸⁹ The ecstases of this unity are not without any direction, but each of them has a 'where to' (*ein Wohin*) or direction, which Heidegger calls 'horizontal schemata'. It is different in each ecstases. The schemata in which Dasein moves towards himself in the ecstasis of the future is the 'for-the-sake-of-himself'. The schemata in which Dasein is disclosed to himself in the ecstasis of 'has been' (past), as thrown to a particular state-of-being, is the 'before-what' which includes 'the face of which Dasein is thrown and the 'to which' he is

²⁸⁶ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 352-353; *BT*, pp. 403-405.

²⁸⁷ *SZ*, p.353; *BT*, p. 404.

²⁸⁸ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 354-356; *BT*, pp. 405-408.

²⁸⁹ *SZ*, p.365; *BT*, p. 416.

abandoned. Dasein, thus, existing ‘for-the-sake-of-himself’ and as being thrown, finds himself alongside entities and makes himself present in his concerned dealings with them. Thus, the horizontal schemata of the present is marked by the ‘in-order-to’ of entities.²⁹⁰

The unity of this horizontal schemata is, in fact, grounded in the ecstatic unity of temporality. It determines the way in which factually existing Dasein is disclosed. In the ecstasis of the future Dasein’s potentiality-for-being is projected; in the ecstasis of the past Dasein is disclosed as ‘being-already; and in the ecstasis of the present Dasein in his circumspective concern is disclosed. Thus, Dasein in the ecstatic unity of temporality -- Dasein existing as a potentiality-for-being (future), as thrown (past) and as among essents (present) understands himself in terms of the unity of horizontal schemata. That is, he understands himself in terms of the connection between the ‘for-the-sake-of-himself’ of Dasein, the ‘in-order-to’ of the entities of Dasein’s concern, and the ‘before-what’ of Dasein’s ‘has-been’. So, in grounding the unity of the horizontal schemata of Dasein in the unity of the ecstases of Dasein’s temporality, the world is disclosed to Dasein as the mode of his own being.²⁹¹ Heidegger remarks on this point:

In temporalizing itself (himself) with regard to its (his) being as temporality, Dasein is essentially ‘in the world’, by reason of the ecstatico-horizontal constitution of that temporality. The world is neither present-at-hand nor ready-to-hand, but temporalizes itself in temporality. With the ‘outside-of-itself’ of the ecstases, it ‘is’ ‘there’. If no Dasein exists, no world is ‘there’ either.²⁹²

Thirdly, in fallenness Dasein fails to hold on to the future and the past ecstases and increasingly limits himself to the present. "...falling has its existential meaning in the present."²⁹³ Though fallenness is characterized by three modes, viz., ambiguity, idle talk and curiosity, Heidegger restricts the investigation of the temporality of fallenness, by considering curiosity, as in curiosity the temporality of Dasein’s fallenness is easily seen.²⁹⁴ According to Heidegger, curiosity has a distinctive tendency for potentiality-for-seeing. It sees things not to understand them, but only for the sake of seeing and having seen. It does not have a future and a past ecstasis. Curiosity’s craving for the new is a projection towards the not-yet. But in making present the future possibility, Dasein is caught up in himself and sees the future inauthentically, in that he seeks to run away from waiting for the not-yet as a possibility and sees it, as it were, as something actual. Thus, Dasein is always on the move from one new thing to another and never dwells anywhere.²⁹⁵ The reason, for the curious insistence by Dasein’s on continued holding onto the present and avoiding the past ecstasis by retention and the future by anticipation of possibilities, is that in his being open to the past and future ecstases, there is a greater danger of facing the existential limitation essential to guilt and one’s own last possibility, viz., death and the anxiety that comes from it. The continued insistence on the present helps Dasein to exist in an unchallenged

²⁹⁰ Cf. *ibid.*

²⁹¹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 365; *BT*, 416-417.

²⁹² *SZ*, p.365; *BT*, p. 417. Heidegger also explains the temporality of space, in terms of the ecstatico-horizontal character of Dasein’s being. Just as the world is understood in relation to Dasein and his temporal character, so also the temporality of space is understood in relation to Dasein. Cf. *SZ*, pp. 367-369; *BT*, pp. 418-421.

²⁹³ Cf. *SZ*, p. 346; *BT*, p. 397.

²⁹⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

²⁹⁵ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 346-347; *BT*, pp. 397-399.

and inauthentic manner. Thus, we see that the falling of Dasein is fundamentally constituted of temporality.²⁹⁶

4.3.3.1.3. Temporal Whole Authentic Dasein

We have already seen that Dasein's whole and authentic existence is brought about by anticipatory resoluteness. According to Heidegger, this process of authenticity has a structure corresponding to that of the threefold structure of care. Firstly, the anticipation of death concretizes the moment of authenticity which basically consists in Dasein's being-ahead-of-himself. Secondly, resoluteness in the face of one's own guilt concretizes the moment of already-being-in. Thirdly, the summons into the Situation is the concrete expression of being-with. In interpreting this process of authenticity temporally, Heidegger shows that in his authentic and total existence the being of Dasein is temporal.²⁹⁷

Dasein, as being-ahead-of-himself, understands himself with reference to his ownmost potentiality-for-being. In anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein opens himself to his ultimate possibility, viz. death, and continues to understand it as a possibility. The standing before this utmost possibility allows him to come towards himself. "This letting-itself (himself)-come-towards-itself (himself), in that distinctive possibility which it (he) puts up with, is the primordial phenomenon of the future as coming towards."²⁹⁸ Thus, it is the coming of the future into the present as a possibility, which Heidegger calls the phenomenon of futurity. This is possible only because Dasein as existence is ahead-of-himself and is oriented towards the future. In the next stage, anticipatory resoluteness in understanding Dasein's own essentially being-guilty takes over this existential guilt as a thrown possibility, or as he is already-being-in. In so doing, Dasein comes back to himself, to his already-having-been, viz., to his past. The past can be appropriated to Dasein's present experience only if he is oriented towards the future. At the third stage, anticipatory resoluteness discloses the Situation and Dasein is summoned to it, to the authentic acceptance of the truth of Dasein's fallen being-alongside, a structure in which Dasein finds himself in his encounter with entities within-the-world. Such an encounter is possible by making such entities present.²⁹⁹

Anticipation of death, resolute acceptance of existential guilt and summon to the Situation are three moments, which are made possible on the basis of the three phenomena, viz., letting-oneself-come-to-oneself (future), coming-back-upon-oneself (past) and encounter (present). Thus, the authentic wholeness of Dasein is made possible by the fact that Dasein in his basic structure is futural, having-been and presencing, i.e., temporal.³⁰⁰ In other words, the having-been existential guilt, by coming back upon itself, is appropriated into Dasein's situation through its orientation towards coming, by anticipation of death. Together these constitute the being of the authentic whole Dasein. Thus, it is clear that the whole authentic Dasein is temporal.

4.3.3.2. Dasein in His Historicality

²⁹⁶ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 348-349; *BT*, pp. 399-400. Cf. also John Richardson, pp. 148-150.

²⁹⁷ Cf. James M. Domske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 48.

²⁹⁸ Cf. *SZ*, p. 325; *BT*, p. 372.

²⁹⁹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 325-326; *BT*, p. 372-374.

³⁰⁰ Cf. James M. Domske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 49.

In our consideration of death as the end of Dasein, anticipatory resoluteness as the basis of his authenticity and particularly temporality as the foundation of Dasein's being, we have attempted to spell out Dasein's authentic being-a-whole. Though our analysis has reached a certain amount of completeness, still it is incomplete. This is because our analysis has not delved into the question of Dasein's birth and the stretch of life 'between' birth and death. So we have overlooked, in our study of Dasein's being-a-whole, the 'connectedness of life (*Lebenszusammenhang*), which Dasein constantly maintains.³⁰¹

At the first glance, this stretch between birth and death and its connectedness seems to be a matter of a sum of successive experiences taking place in time, between these two moments, viz., birth as something that was and is no longer and death as something that is not-yet, but will happen. The assumption behind this view is the perception of Dasein as a present-at-hand entity and birth and death as two concrete present-at-hand moments, which originate and terminate Dasein's existence respectively, which two also happen in time.³⁰² But Dasein's stretching along is not of this type as it is being-in-the-world. Birth and death are ever present realities of Dasein's existence as being-in-the-world. Dasein, thus, extends along in such a way that from the moment of his birth he is constituted as a stretching along. "The 'between' which relates to birth and death already lies in the being of Dasein."³⁰³ In other words, factual Dasein exists as born until he dies and from the moment of his birth he is dying because by his very nature Dasein is a Being-towards-death. Therefore, as long as Dasein exists factually both of these 'ends' and their 'between' are part of Dasein's being-in-the-world.³⁰⁴ The movement that is characteristic of the connectedness of Dasein's life, i.e., Dasein's stretching himself along, Heidegger calls 'historizing' (*Geschehen*).³⁰⁵ By clarifying the structure of Dasein's historizing and the existential temporal condition of his possibility, we can understand ontologically the historicity of Dasein (*Geschichtlichkeit des Daseins*).³⁰⁶

This historicity of Dasein or his history (*Geschichte*) is not something different from temporality; rather the former must be elucidated in terms of the latter. To quote Heidegger on this point: "In analyzing the historicity of Dasein we shall try to show that this entity (Dasein) is not temporal because it (he) stands in history, but that, on the contrary, it (he) exists historically and so exists, only because it (he) is temporal in the very basis of its (his) being."³⁰⁷ Therefore the interpretation of the historicity of Dasein is, indeed, a more concrete working out of Dasein's temporality.³⁰⁸ Thus, our task in this section is to expose the problem of Dasein's historicity in

³⁰¹ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 372-373; *BT*, pp. 424-425.

³⁰² Cf. *SZ*, p. 373; *BT*, pp. 425-426.

³⁰³ *SZ*, p. 374; *BT*, p. 426.

³⁰⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

³⁰⁵ The term '*Geschehen*' means a 'happening' or an 'occurrence'. It is translated as 'historizing', in the sense of 'happening in a historical way'. In this sense, historizing is characteristic of all historical entities and not limited to historians alone. Cf. *SZ*, p. 20; *BT*, p. 41, fn. 1.

³⁰⁶ In this context, we must distinguish between Heidegger's two uses of the term 'History'. He uses two German words: '*Geschichte*' and '*Historie*'. '*Geschichte*' means the actual historical process. The other terms associated with it are: '*Geschichtlichkeit*' (historicity) and '*geschichtlich*' (historical). The term '*Historie*' means the study of the historical process, which is rendered in English as 'Historiology' or Science of History. The other terms associated with it are: '*Historiaet*' (historicity) and '*historisch*' (historic). Cf. *SZ*, p. 10; *BT*, p. 30, fn. 1. Cf. also *SZ*, p. 378; *BT*, p. 430.

³⁰⁷ *SZ*, p. 376; *BT*, p. 428.

³⁰⁸ Cf. *SZ*, p. 382; *BT*, p. 434.

its authentic and inauthentic modes and present the historical Dasein as the existential basis of any science of history.

4.3.3.2.1. Dasein: A Historical Being

Heidegger begins his exposition of Dasein's historicity by considering the various meanings of the term 'historical' as understood in the ordinary everyday use of the term. Firstly, something is spoken as historical in the sense of past and bygone. Here the 'past' means 'something no longer present-at-hand'. Secondly, something is seen as historical, in that, it has originated in the past, still continues to be present having effects on the present, and will continue to affect the future. For example, a temple of the past is present now and will continue to be in the future, having certain effects on the people in the present and in the future. Thirdly, the term 'historical' is referred to the whole of beings that change in time as different from nature, i.e., human groupings, their cultures and civilizations. In this sense man becomes the subject-matter of history. Fourthly, something that is handed over, by way of tradition, is also called historical. All these significations are connected on one point, i.e., they all relate to man as the 'subject' of events.³⁰⁹

From our analysis of the various everyday meanings of the term 'historical', we can come to one conclusion, that this term is not only used of Dasein, but also of other entities. The question arises as to the origin of historicity: does it belong fundamentally and primarily to Dasein or to entities?³¹⁰ In answering this question, Heidegger attempts to clarify the way in which the entities in the world such as nature, and the 'world-historical' entities (*Welt-Geschichtliche*) such as antiques, works of art, books and buildings are historical. Nature, for example, is historical as a countryside, as an area that has been colonized or exploited, as a battlefield, or as a site for a cult.³¹¹ Nature can be spoken of as historical, as it has its historizings (*Geschichten*) in the world, but its historicity is related to the one who makes them happen. In the example cited earlier, nature's historicity is related to one who would exploit it as a countryside, battlefield, a place of colonization or a site for a cult. Taking another example, an article which is present now, but belongs to the past, is called historical, even though it is not strictly in the past in the sense of 'being no longer'. But this article, which still exists as a present-at-hand entity, can have the character of the past and historicity because it belonged to an equipmental system which was part of the world of a Dasein that has-been-there (*Da gewesen*). Thus, this article is historical because of its affinity to the Dasein that has-been-there.³¹²

The natural consequence that can be drawn from the preceding analysis is that what is primarily historical is Dasein, and the entities we encounter in the world, viz., nature and the world-historical entities are historical only in a secondary sense.³¹³ Thus, in the ultimate analysis, "the historizing of history is the historizing of the being-in-the-world."³¹⁴ The historicity of Dasein is the historicity of the world, because, "with the existence of historical being-in-the-world, what is ready-to-hand and what is present-at-hand have already, in every case, been incorporated into the history of the world."³¹⁵

³⁰⁹ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 378-379; *BT*, pp. 430-431.

³¹⁰ Cf. *SZ*, p. 379; *BT*, p. 431.

³¹¹ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 388-389; *BT*, p. 440.

³¹² Cf. *SZ*, pp. 380-381; *BT*, pp. 431-433.

³¹³ Cf. *SZ*, p. 381; *BT*, p. 433.

³¹⁴ *SZ*, p. 388; *BT*, p. 440.

³¹⁵ *Ibid.*

4.3.3.2.2. Modes of Dasein's Historicity

At the close of the last section, we reached the conclusion that Dasein is primarily historical and entities are historical to the extent they are related to Dasein's historicity. But we have not yet spelled out the basic constitution of this historicity of Dasein. The authentic historicity is the ontological basis for the historicity as a constitutive state of Dasein. Hence, the study of authentic historicity and asking for the basic constitution of historicity is one and the same.³¹⁶ Historicity is authentic if the historicizing takes place in the world's essential existent unity with Dasein. If the historicizing takes place within-the-world of what is ready-to-hand or what is present-at-hand, then we have the inauthentic mode of Dasein's historicity.³¹⁷ In this section we will clarify the authentic mode of historicity and therefore explore the basic constitution of Dasein's historicity and distinguish it from inauthentic historicity.

Since historicity is centered fundamentally on Dasein's temporality, as the former is the concrete working out of the latter, the basic constitution of historicity must be sought in temporality, which is the being of Dasein. Since, temporality determines Dasein's authentic whole existence in the mode of anticipatory resoluteness, authentic historicizing of Dasein and his authentic historicity (therefore, the basic constitution of Dasein as historical) must be founded on anticipatory resoluteness. In other words, we can speak of an authentic historicity of Dasein only in relation to temporality and anticipatory resoluteness.³¹⁸

In anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein understands himself with regard to his potentiality-for-being by standing face-to-face with death, taking upon himself his own thrownness and resolutely existing in a given situation, projecting upon a particular existentiell possibility. But, anticipation of death existentially as an unsurpassable innermost possibility only guarantees the wholeness and authenticity of resoluteness. But it does not disclose those existentiell-factual possibilities of Dasein which constitute the historicizing of the stretch between birth and death. Even Dasein as a thrown being-in-the-world does not disclose the factual possibilities, as in his everydayness he has submitted himself to the sway of the 'they'. The everyday Dasein's possibilities or heritage (*Erbe*) is part of his thrown being-in-the-world, as Dasein is marked by ambiguity and his understanding is marked by the public way of interpreting his possibilities. But, in fact, it is in resoluteness, that Dasein comes back to himself, and it is resoluteness which discloses to Dasein his factual-existentiell possibilities of authentic existing. Thus, it is in resoluteness, i.e., in the resolute taking over of one's thrownness, that the heritage -- the whole of givenness of Dasein, as being-in-the-world -- is handed down to himself.³¹⁹ Heidegger remarks: "In one's coming back resolutely into one's thrownness, there is hidden a handing down to oneself of the possibilities that have come down to one, but not necessarily as having, thus, come down."³²⁰

Thus, the more Dasein opens himself to death in anticipation, and the more resolute he is, to that extent Dasein will find his possibilities. So, 'being free for death' gives Dasein his goal and leads him to his finitude. The Dasein that has grasped the finitude of existence -- the authentically

³¹⁶ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 386-387; *BT*, pp. 438-439.

³¹⁷ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 389-390; *BT*, pp. 440-441.

³¹⁸ Cf. *SZ*, p. 382; *BT*, p. 434.

³¹⁹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 383; *BT*, pp. 434 -435.

³²⁰ *SZ*, p. 383; *BT*, p. 435.

existing Dasein -- frees himself from all possibilities of pleasure, of taking things lightly and of evasion, and accepts the heritage that he hands down to himself in his primordial historizing.³²¹

The authentically existing Dasein takes over his heritage which "it (he) has inherited yet freely chosen,"³²² and understands himself in terms of 'fate' (*Schicksal*) and destiny (*Geschick*).³²³ 'Fate' consists in Dasein's awareness of his finitude in one's possibilities and 'Destiny' is the communitarian dimension of finite 'givenness'. The latter is not a sum-total of the former. Since Dasein is born in a community and his historizing until death takes place in relation to a community, fate cannot be understood apart from destiny. Therefore, Dasein's historizing is always a co-historizing, in the sense, that though he has an individual fate, he still shares in the destiny of the community, as Dasein is an integral part of the community. "Only in communicating and struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its (his) generation goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein."³²⁴ This 'fateful destiny', which Heidegger calls 'the powerless superior power' (*Ohnmachtige Uebermacht*), i.e., Dasein's finite freedom, makes death, guilt, conscience, freedom and finitude equiprimordially reside together in Dasein's being, and thus effects Dasein's authentic historicity.³²⁵ Heidegger sums this up as follows:

Only an entity which, in its (his) being, is essentially *futural* so that it (he) is free for its (his) death and lets itself (himself) be thrown back upon its (his) factual 'there' by shattering itself (himself) against death -- that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of *having been*, can, by handing down to itself (himself) the possibility it (he) has inherited, take over its (his) own thrown existence and be *in the moment of vision* for 'its (his) time'. Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate -- that is to say, authentic historicity.³²⁶

Resoluteness may not mean that the Dasein know the origin of his potentialities explicitly. But if he does know it explicitly, it is known in repetition (*Wiederholung*) which consists in handing down explicitly and going back into the possibilities as that-has-been-there. Thus, authentic repetition consists in anticipatory resoluteness, for only in it can Dasein first make the choice which would make him free to faithfully hand-over what he considers worth repeating. Such repetition does not bring again (*wiederbringen*) something that is past, nor bind the present to that which is no longer, but makes a reciprocative rejoinder (*erwiedert*) to the possibility of that existence which has-been-there, understanding his genuine originality. Interpreted in this way, resolute historicity has its focus, not in the past, neither in the today, nor in its connection with the past, but in the authentic historizing of existence which originated from Dasein's future, i.e., in Dasein's authentic being-towards-death.³²⁷ "As a way of being for Dasein, history has its roots

³²¹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 383; *BT*, p. 345.

³²² Heidegger's implication in speaking of 'inherited but chosen' is that those who have not authentically opened themselves in accepting their fate, may not possess the fate. Cf. *SZ*, p. 384; *BT*, p. 436.

³²³ The terms '*Schicksal*' and '*Geschick*' are related to the root word '*schicken*' (to send). They are often used as synonyms. But, Heidegger uses these words to refer to the destiny of the resolute individual and the destiny of the community, respectively. Cf. *SZ*, p. 385; *BT*, p. 436, fn. 1.

³²⁴ *SZ*, pp. 384-385; *BT*, p. 436.

³²⁵ Cf. *SZ*, p. 385; *BT*, p. 437.

³²⁶ *Ibid.*

³²⁷ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 385-386; *BT*, pp. 437-438.

so essentially in the future, that death, as that possibility of Dasein, ...throws anticipatory existence back upon its (his) factual thrownness, and so for the first time imports to having-been its (his) peculiarly privileged position in the historical."³²⁸ From this it is clear that Dasein does not first become historical in repetition, but only because he is historical as temporal can he take over himself in his historicity by repetition. "Authentic being-towards-death (anticipatory resoluteness) -- that is to say finite temporality -- is," therefore, "the hidden basis of Dasein (authentic) historicity."³²⁹ Such an authentic historical Dasein understands the entities in relation to himself and passes on this authentic dimension of his primary historicity to that of entities in his being-in-the-world. Therefore, a genuine world history is that which is understood in terms of Dasein's fateful destiny.

Having explored the authentic mode of historicity, i.e., the constitution of Dasein as historical, we can move on to consider how inauthentic historicity is different from the authentic historicity of Dasein. The inauthentic factual Dasein in his fallenness is entangled with the objects of his concern. Such a Dasein considers himself 'one-like -many' under the influence of the 'they'. He understands himself, in terms of the entities within-the-world, because in inauthentic state Dasein himself is not the sphere of historicizing, which takes place in the realm of present-at-hand entities. Thus, Dasein understands his history world-historically in which Dasein sees himself as the subject of events and circumstances, and thereby as having a substantial existence. This perception of his history brings to Dasein a disconnected view of his history so that inauthentic historicity lacks the connectedness of the authentic mode of historicity. Every event is an isolated moment which appears and after a while disappears.³³⁰ This perception is due to the fact that inauthentic Dasein is totally not in touch with the fundamental features of his being-in-the-world, i.e., his being as a continuous stretch from his birth to death. In other words, Dasein in his inauthenticity is blind to his fate, i.e., he is unaware of his finitude and wholeness. Due to the lack of the awareness of the connectedness of existence he lives today; in awaiting the new thing he has already forgotten the old. Under the sway of the 'they', inauthentic Dasein evades choice. Since he is blind to his possibilities, no repetition of the past is possible in the inauthentic state. All he has is left over from the past, i.e., information about that which was present-at-hand. Thus, Dasein's present is loaded with the past.³³¹ It is only in inauthentic historicity that the question of the connectedness of the stretch of life becomes a basic issue, for unlike in authentic historicity, here the former the unity of life is shattered.³³² Thus, the inauthentic mode is not historicity in the strict sense, since it lacks the basic characteristics of being historical.

4.3.3.2.3. Historical Dasein: The Existential Source of Historiology

We have already said that Dasein is historical in the primordial sense and the historicity of entities is only secondary. If this is the case every factual science must be dependent on the Dasein that is authentically historical. Further, historiology (*Historie*) must be founded on Dasein's historicity in an intimate way, as the former is the study of the history (*Geschichte*) of Dasein. The claim of Heidegger is that historiology is ontologically rooted in the historicity of Dasein

³²⁸ *SZ*, p. 386; *BT*, p. 438.

³²⁹ *Ibid.*

³³⁰ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 389-390; *BT*, pp. 441-442.

³³¹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 391; *BT*, pp. 443-444.

³³² Cf. *SZ*, p. 390; *BT*, pp. 441-442.

and so it must not be conceived as an abstraction made from the studies of other sciences.³³³ To quote Heidegger: "Whether the historiological disclosure of history is factually accomplished or not, its ontological structure is such that in itself this disclosure has its roots in the historicity of Dasein."³³⁴ To grasp the 'how' of this would amount to arriving at an existential origin of historiology the historicity of Dasein. We propose to do so in this section.

Historiology, as a science, aims at the disclosure of historical entities. Like any other science, it is done by thematizing. The approach to the thematization delineates the realm of thematizing, which in turn provides methodological directives. If a historical entity of the past is to be investigated, it must be thematized in relation to the equipmental system. This belongs to the world of the Dasein as 'having-been-there', of which it was a part in the past. If the Dasein -- with reference to which this past entity is related -- no longer exists, then this object is related to the Dasein that has-been-there as such. Thus, the entity of the past, which we intend to thematize in historiology, also must have the kind of being of Dasein as the having-been-there, because only Dasein is primarily historical and every historiological thematization must be made in relation to the Dasein which is historical.³³⁵ Thus, relics of the past monuments, records and reports can function as possible matter for the historical investigation, only because they are already world-historical in their mode of being by their relationship to a Dasein that has-been-there. These entities, which are accepted for thematization as related to a Dasein that has-been-there, can be meaningfully studied, examined and assessed only on the basis of the historicity of the contemporary Dasein, i.e., the historian who does the historiological investigation. Thus, in authentic historicity of Dasein, manifested in the repetitive disclosure of what-has-been-there, lies the existential foundation of historiology, as a science.³³⁶ Thus, basing itself on Dasein's authentic historicity, historiology reveals by repetition of the possibility of the Dasein which has been there, and thereby manifests the universal in the particular. Therefore, the theme of historiology is the authentic existential potentiality, as it has-been-there. "The theme of historiology is neither that which had happened once for all, nor something universal that floats above it, but the possibility which has been factually existent."³³⁷

Since the past Dasein, as the has-been-there, is the basic theme of historiology, and since it can be disclosed in repetition as a resolute fate, a true historian who treats this theme historiologically can powerfully disclose the history of the past in Dasein's potentialities that he may have telling effects on the future. "Only by historicity which is factual and authentic can the history of what has-been-there, as a resolute fate, be disclosed in such a manner that in repetition the 'force' of the possible gets struck home into one's factual existence -- in other words, that it comes towards that existence in its futural character."³³⁸ Therefore, historiology takes its starting point not from the present and moves towards the past, but from the future. "...historiological discourse temporalizes in terms of the future."³³⁹ The selection of what is to be the object of historiology "has already been met within the factual existentiell choice of Dasein's

³³³ Cf. *SZ*, p. 393; *BT*, p. 445.

³³⁴ *SZ*, p.392; *BT*, p. 444.

³³⁵ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 393-394; *BT*, pp. 445-446.

³³⁶ Cf. *SZ*, p. 394; *BT*, p. 446.

³³⁷ *SZ*, p. 395; *BT*, p. 447.

³³⁸ *Ibid.*

³³⁹ *Ibid.*

historicality, in which alone historiology first of all arises and in which alone it is,"³⁴⁰ i.e., in the historian who does the historiological investigation.

According to Heidegger, such an unveiling of what has-been-there, based on fateful repetition and done by a genuine historian, is not to be considered 'subjective' in the negative sense. On the contrary, only such a thematization, based on authentic historicality by the historian, can guarantee the 'objectivity' of historiology. The validity of any science depends on its object being thematically presented to understanding in its true being without any disguise. This would be true of historiology, if the historicality of the historian makes the theme objectively possible.³⁴¹ But, Heidegger warns about the possibility of historiology being either used for life or abused, as historiology is based on Dasein's historicality. If the historicality is genuine, authentic and founded on the fateful destiny of Dasein, then it is used for life. Founding historiology on inauthentic historicality would amount to abusing it.³⁴²

³⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

³⁴¹ *Ibid.*

³⁴² Cf. *SZ*, p. 396; *BT*, p. 448.

Transcendence: Dasein's Being-Toward-Being

Though Dasein is caught up in the care of everyday living in his epistemological, relational and existential concerns, being transcendence by his very nature, he has a destiny that goes beyond these everyday concerns. Dasein is not merely called to be a being-in-the-world, but is destined to be a being that is open to Being. Though Dasein cannot run away from his 'in-the-world-existence', he is called to transcend the former and be a being-toward-Being. This chapter attempts to elaborate the goal, the way and the attainment of Dasein's existence that is centered on Being.

5.1. The Goal

Dasein's goal in Being-centered existence is to come to an experience of what Being is, its relationship to Dasein and entities and its manifestation in history. Heidegger understands Being in relation to this. For him, the relationship between Being and Dasein is one of belonging-together; the entities are related to Being in a relationship of difference, and history is the spatio-temporal manifestation of Being. In this section, therefore, we attempt to explore the notions of the fourfold, belonging-to-gether, the difference as such, and the time-space-play of Being.

5.1.1. Being: The Fourfold

The German term '*Geviert*' is related to the German term '*Vier*', which means number four. The prefix '*ge*' has collective signification, so the term '*Geviert*', as used by Heidegger, is translated as the foursome,¹ the quadrate² and the fourfold.³ Heidegger clarifies the notion of the fourfold in relation to the thing (*das Ding*). In the Heideggerian sense of the term, a thing must be understood in relation to its being. It involves a viewing of the thing in relation to the four 'aspects' of Being, viz. the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals. 'Earth' and 'sky' constitute the natural 'component' of Being, while 'divinities' and 'mortals' constitute the divine and the human 'components' of Being respectively.⁴ For Heidegger, a thing's being or essence is understood when we consider it in relation to all these aspects of Being. For example, let us take a flower. It can be considered as an object that is grown, sold and bought. But this way of looking at the flower does not present its authentic being whose essence can be understood only in relation to the fourfold: the earth in which the flower is grown; the sky which has given it sun and rain; the divinities in whose honor it is placed at the altar; and the mortals to whom it brings joy.⁵ Thus, it is the unity of the fourfold, the four facets of Being, that constitutes the being of a flower. This unity of the earth, the sky, the mortals and the divinities in the thing, Heidegger calls the 'thinging of the thing'.⁶

¹ Cf. Vincent Vycinas, p. 224.

² Cf. William J. Richardson, p. 570.

³ Cf. Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 158.

⁴ Cf. William J. Richardson, p. 527.

⁵ Cf. James M. Demske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 150

⁶ Cf. VA, p. 170; Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper and Row, 1976) p. 178 (hereafter: *PLT*).

Now we could spell out in detail what each of these ‘elements’ stands for. The earth is that which constructively supports the growing and blossoming plants, besides rendering fruitfulness in them. It is the earth which preserves the rock and the water. It is on the earth that animal life and all other forms of life continue. The sky is the path of the sun and the moon. It is in the sky the stars shine. Changes in season, the light and the dusk of the day, gloom and glow of the night, the good and bad weather, the moving clouds and the blue depth of the ether -- all happen in the sky. The divinities (*Goettlichen*) are the messengers of the Divine (*Goetheit*).⁷ Out of the holy sway of the Divine they appear and withdraw into concealment. Mortals are human beings; they are called mortals because they can die. But animals are not mortals, for they perish;⁸ only men die. Death is the shrine of nothing and so it can never exist; yet it presences the mystery of Being. Mortals are called mortals not because their earthly life comes to an end, but because they are capable of death as death. Mortals are those that have a relationship of presencing to Being as Being.⁹

5.1.2. *Being, Dasein and Entities*

Heidegger discusses the question of the relationship between Being, Dasein and entities in the context of the age old principle of identity and difference. There exists a relationship of ‘identity’ between Being and Dasein, while Being’s relationship to entities is one of difference. This difference, as such, between Being and entities can be understood only with reference to Being’s relation to Dasein. Let us now briefly consider Being’s relationship of ‘identity’ with Dasein and of ‘difference’ with beings.

5.1.2.1. Being and Dasein

"Appropriation" appropriates man and Being in their essential togetherness."¹⁰ This essential togetherness between Being and man is understood by Heidegger in relation to the principle of identity: ‘A’ is ‘A’. Referring to the Parmenidian sense of identity, Heidegger translates this principle as ‘A’ is the same as (*to auto*) ‘A’. The ‘is’ and the ‘*to auto*’ in the principle of identity

⁷ In speaking of divinities (*Goettlichen*) and the Divine (*Goetheit*), Heidegger refers neither to the pagan gods as opposed to the Christian God, nor to the Christian notion of angels, as messengers of God, even though these two notions would fit well into what Heidegger is talking about. Heidegger holds a strict neutrality regarding the problem of God. He takes the divinities as part of the phenomenological ‘constitution’ of Being, as we experience them. In this sense the divinities are signs of the Divine, who preserve the Divine in our daily experience. Heidegger does not discuss the exact nature of the Divine clearly. Cf. James M. Damske, "Heidegger’s Quadrant and the Revelation of Being," *Philosophy Today*, 7 (1963), p. 258, fn. 8.

⁸ Heidegger distinguishes between dying and perishing also in *Sein und Zeit*. Cf. SZ, p. 247; BT, p. 291.

⁹ Cf. VA, pp. 143-145, 170-171; *Basic Writings*, pp. 327-329; *PLT*, pp. 178-179. The fourfold, as explained above, must not be misunderstood as four types of beings in the ontic sense. We cannot speak of them as being ontically and causally related because they are beyond the realm of beings (*Seienden*); they are ‘aspects’ or ‘moments’ of Being in relation to the thing. The fourfold is the articulation of Being itself. Cf. James M. Damske, *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*, p. 151. Cf. also Vincent Vycinas, p. 231.

¹⁰ Martin Heidegger, *Identitaet und Differenz*, 6. Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1978), p. 27 (hereafter: *ID*); Martin Heidegger, *Identity and Difference*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1969), p. 38 (hereafter: *IAD*).

suggest that every being is, in itself, the same with itself. In other words, every being has an identity, viz., the unity with itself that is brought about by Being. Thus, the principle of identity speaks of the Being of beings which holds beings in their unity and identity.¹¹

Having stated that the principle of identity refers to the Being of beings, Heidegger refers to the fragment of Parmenides.¹² The fragment reads: "*To gar auto noein estin to kei einai*" which is rendered into English as "thinking and Being (*das Sein*) are the same."¹³ Like any other translation of pre-Socratic terms and definitions, this translation is based on metaphysical categories, in which the original Parmenidian meaning is lost.¹⁴ Heidegger understands the Greek 'einai' in the original sense of 'physis', viz., emerging abiding power. In other words, 'einai' means Being as finite presence (*Anwesenheit*).¹⁵ The term 'noein' means "receptive coming to stand."¹⁶

Heidegger concludes that 'to auto' (the same) understood in relation to 'einai' (Being) and 'noein' (thinking/man)¹⁷ is not only that of equality (*Gleichgültigkeit*) or of indifference (*Einerleiheit*), but rather is a belonging-together (*Zusammengehörigkeit*).¹⁸ Thus, speaking of identity as belonging-together Heidegger says: "We must acknowledge the fact that in the earliest period of thinking, long before thinking had arrived at a principle of identity, identity itself speaks out in a pronouncement (the fragment of Parmenides) which rules that: thinking (man) and Being belong-together in the same and by virtue of the same."¹⁹

'Belonging-together' can be understood in two different ways based on the emphasis we give to each of the two words present in the compound. If we see in this compound 'belonging' as determined by 'together', the stress would be on unity. In this sense 'belonging-together' would mean to be placed as a part of a unity, a manifold or a system. This is what metaphysical thinking refers to as 'connectio', i.e. a necessary connection or a causal relation of one with another.²⁰ Such a way of looking is onto-theological, in that it is concerned with the beingness of beings, and the highest being as the cause of all other beings.²¹ 'Belonging-together' can also be seen as 'together' being determined by 'belonging'. In this sense 'belonging-together' is not understood as the unity of togetherness of the related into a manifold or system, but rather as the related belonging to each

¹¹ Cf. *ID*, pp. 10-13; *IAD*, pp. 23-26.

¹² This Parmenidian fragment is differently numbered by Heidegger in two of his writings based on different editions to which he was referring. In *EM* (p. 104) he refers to it as Fragment V, while in *VA* (p. 223) he refers to it a Fragment III. Cf. George J. Seidel, *Martin Heidegger and the Pre-Socratics* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1964). p. 159.

¹³ Martin Heidegger, *Einführung in die Metaphysik*, 4. Auflage (Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 1976), p. 104 (hereafter: *EM*); Martin Heidegger, *An Introduction to Metaphysics*, trans. Ralph Manheim (London: Yale University Press, 1959), p. 136 (hereafter: *IM*).

¹⁴ Cf. *EM*, p. 77; *IM*, p. 101.

¹⁵ Cf. *EM*, p. 46; *IM*, pp. 60-61.

¹⁶ *EM*, p. 105; *IM*, p. 138.

¹⁷ Heidegger identifies thinking and man, and considers thinking as 'that-which-is' man. This does not mean that he denies the emotional and other aspects of man. Heidegger does not see man as a mere rational animal; but rather views him in relation to the totality of his existence. Thus, he characterizes all that is in the totality of man's existence as thinking. Cf. *ID*, p. 17; *IAD*, p. 30.

¹⁸ Cf. *EM*, p. 106; *IM*, p. 138.

¹⁹ *ID*, p. 14; *IAD*, p. 27.

²⁰ Cf. *ID*, p. 16; *IAD*, p. 29.

²¹ Cf. *ID*, pp. 52, 63; *IAD*, pp. 61, 70-71.

other in the same.²² In other words, there exists an appropriating relationship between the related whereby they let each other enter into their realms by their belonging-together.

Understood in the former sense of 'belonging-together', for Being and man this amounts only to a causal relationship. But considered in the latter sense, it means that Being and man belong-together in the realm of *Ereignis*. It would mean that both Being and man hold each other in the belonging-together. Man, though an entity in the totality of beings, is distinctive in that he as a thinker of Being and a dweller in the nearness of Being, is open to Being and stands, as it were, face-to-face with Being. Thus, man is oriented towards Being. In this orientation and openness towards Being man listens and responds to Being.²³ Heidegger writes on man's belonging to Being as follows: "Man is essentially this relationship of responding to Being and he is only this. This 'only' does not mean a limitation, but rather an excess. A belonging to Being prevails within man, a belonging which listens to Being because it is appropriated...to Being."²⁴

Belonging-together is not only man's belonging to Being, but also Being's belonging to man. The presencing of Being to man is not one of mere causality or an occasional event. Being presences and abides in man by making a claim on him. Thus, Being draws (*angeht*) man near it. Such an occurrence of Being as Presence (*Anwesenheit*) can come-to-pass only when Being appropriates man and finds in him a clearing place for its presencing.²⁵ On this point Heidegger remarks: "Being itself...belongs to us; for only with us can Being be present as Being, i.e. become present."²⁶

Therefore, "man and Being are appropriated to each other. They belong to each other."²⁷ This appropriation involves a mutual gifting of man to Being, Being to man and an entry into the realms of each other. It, in turn, brings about in man and Being a genuine and deeper belonging to each other.²⁸ The mutual belonging-together is a dedicating (*Zuegnen*) and an appropriating (*Vereignen*) of man and Being to each other. Belonging-together, for Heidegger, is a more primordial type of relationship and is the basis of all the other types of relationships metaphysics speaks about between man and Being, such as the causal, etc.²⁹ No metaphysical thinking can help us to experience this belonging together of Being and man, which can be experienced only when one enters the event of appropriation (*Ereignis*).³⁰

Only in relation to man's belonging to Being can the real nature of beings be understood. In other words, by appropriating man to itself -- in this appropriative belonging-together -- being manifests itself as the 'difference' (*Unterschied*) as such between Being and entities.

5.1.2.2. Being and Beings

Heidegger considers Being (*das Sein*) as always the Being of beings. Therefore, every being (*Seiende*) must be understood in relation to Being. This means that we cannot speak of Being as having a separate and independent existence as a reality, because then Being would be a 'being',

²² Cf. *ID*, p. 17; *IAD*, p. 30.

²³ Cf. *ID*, p. 18; *IAD*, p. 31.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ Cf. *ibid.*

²⁶ *ID*, p. 20; *IAD*, p. 33.

²⁷ *ID*, p. 19; *IAD*, pp. 31-32.

²⁸ Cf. *ID*, p. 21; *IAD*, p. 33.

²⁹ Cf. *ID*, p. 19; *IAD*, pp. 31-32.

³⁰ Cf. *ID*, p. 24; *IAD*, p. 36.

however great it may be. Heidegger says that "...it belongs to the truth of Being that Being may never 'be' without beings, and that a being is never without Being."³¹ Therefore, Being is always Being of beings and beings are always beings of Being. The genitive or the 'of' in the former is an objective genitive, while in the latter it is a subjective genitive.³² Though Being and beings are so closely related to each other that we cannot think of one without the other, yet the relationship between Being and beings is one of difference.³³ The genitive 'of', taken subjectively and objectively, indicates a difference.³⁴ Heidegger calls this an ontological difference by which he means not a mere rational distinction³⁵ between Being and beings, but a difference as difference.³⁶ Heidegger is of the view that metaphysics has failed to consider the ontological difference. It only looks at different elements of the difference between Being and beings, such as beings as grounded in Being, without ever questioning the difference as difference.³⁷ Forgetting this ontological difference between Being and beings is the same as the forgetfulness of Being which "is the forgetfulness of the difference between Being and entities."³⁸ We think of Being genuinely "...when we think of it in its difference with beings and of beings in their difference with Being."³⁹ In other words, in questioning the difference as difference Heidegger asks about the 'between' (*das Zwischen*) of Being and beings and the way in which this 'between' is to be understood.⁴⁰

In order to understand the 'between' or the difference as such between Being and beings, one must encounter the difference face to face. This involves a 'step back' from the metaphysical categories. As we mentioned earlier, Being is always Being of beings, i.e., Being 'is' in beings. This 'is' of Being in beings is not static, but transitive or active. Being is of such a nature that it is 'coming-over (*Ue-berkommnis*),⁴¹ the manner in which Being reaches beings. This 'coming-over' does not mean that Being leaves its place and comes into beings, as if beings were without Being first, and subsequently were approached by Being. Rather, Being's 'coming-over' consists in Being's giving of itself over to beings and thereby unconceals or reveals (*ent-borgend*) beings in themselves. Beings themselves comes-to-presence only in and through this 'coming-over' and unconcealing process of Being. On the part of beings, this is an 'arrival' (*Ankunft*)⁴² in which

³¹ *WM*, p. 46; *EB*, p. 354; Cf. also *EM*, pp. 24-25; *IM*, p.32.

³² Cf. *ID*, p. 53; *IAD*, 61-62.

³³ Cf. *ID*, p. 53; *IAD*, p. 62.

³⁴ In his book *What is Called Thinking?* Heidegger refers to the genitive as the 'difference'. Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Was heisst Denken?*, 3. Auflage (Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 1971), p. 144 (hereafter: *WD*).

³⁵ Cf. *ID*, p. 53; *IAD*, p. 62.

³⁶ Cf. *ID*, p. 37; *IAD*, p. 47. For a clear presentation of the problem of the ontological difference and a comparative analysis of this concept with the 'esse' and 'ens' in St. Thomas Aquinas -- Cf. John D. Caputo, *Heidegger and Aquinas: An Essay on Overcoming Metaphysics* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1982), pp. 147-184.

³⁷ Cf. *ID*, pp. 53-54; *IAD*, pp. 62-63.

³⁸ Martin Heidegger, *Holzwege*, 5. Auflage (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972), p. 336 (hereafter: *HW*).

³⁹ *ID*, p. 53; *IAD*, p. 62.

⁴⁰ Cf. *ID*, p. 54; *IAD*, p. 63.

⁴¹ The term *Ueberkommnis*, which we translate as 'coming-over' has the nuance of surprise or overtaking and thus of incalculability. Therefore, it is sometimes translated as 'overwhelming'. Cf. *IAD*, p. 17, fn. 2.

⁴² The term '*Ankunft*', which we translate as 'arrival', refers to the place, as it were, in beings in which Being arrives. It refers to that process by which beings come-on (*an-kommen*) in the sense that they are lighted by Being's coming-over. Cf. *ibid.*

beings in their being are unconcealed. Thus, the ‘coming-over’ of Being into beings is, at the same time, an ‘arrival’ of beings. Just as the ‘coming-over’ of Being is the u-concealing of beings, so also the ‘arrival’ of beings is the ‘concealment (*Bergend*) of Being. Therefore, the unconcealment of beings is the concealment of Being. This ‘coming-over’ and revealing beings on the part of Being and the ‘arrival’ and concealing Being on the part of beings is a single process, which Heidegger calls *Unterschied* (differentiating). The process of *Unterschied* is an *auseinander-zueinander-tragen*, i.e., a process in which the ‘coming-over’ of Being and the ‘arrival’ of beings are kept apart, while both bearing on each other. In other words, Being and beings are turned towards and away from each other. Heidegger calls this process *Austrag* (perdurance).⁴³

Heidegger, thus, characterizes the ontological difference as the difference between ‘coming-over’ and ‘arrival’. The difference grants a ‘between’ (*das Zwischen*), viz., the perdurance in which there prevails a clearing. In this clearing Being ‘comes-over’ into beings, thereby, unconcealing them in their being; while beings ‘arrive’ in their being and in the process conceal Being.⁴⁴ In this process beings are grounded in Being. To quote Heidegger: "In as much as Being becomes present as Being of beings, as the difference, as perdurance (*Austrag*), the separateness and mutual relatedness of grounding and of accounting for endure, Being grounds beings, and beings, as what is most of all, account for Being. One (Being) comes over the other, one (beings) arrives in the other."⁴⁵ Thus, *Unterschied* (differentiating) is a revealing-concealing perdurance, which is a mutual circling (*Umeinanderkreisen*) of Being and beings around each other.⁴⁶ This is a clearing (*Lichtung*) in which beings are grounded in Being,⁴⁷ and in which Being gives itself as the ‘difference’ historically as revealing and concealing.⁴⁸

5.1.3. *Being’s Manifestation: A Historical Time-Space Play*

Being, in its essential and transitive belonging to man gives itself as a continuous process of presencing and absencing, revealing and concealing, giving and withdrawing, both in temporal and spatial aspects. Thus, spatio-temporal history is nothing else but the giving of Being in its time-space unity. History, therefore, for Heidegger, is always the history of Being. Speaking of the reason for Being’s giving in a spatio-temporal manner, he says that it is a play of Being. In this section, we will, therefore, concentrate on Being’s giving as a historical time-space play (*Zeit-Spiel-Raum*).

5.1.3.1. Time and Being

⁴³ The term ‘*Austrag*’ literally means carrying out or holding out. Its original meaning has the nuance of suffering and exertion. The ‘*Austrag*’ is carrying out of the ‘relation’ of Being and beings, endured with an intensity that never lets up. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 17, fn. 3. John D. Caputo translates this term as ‘differing’ based on the Latin ‘*differe*’. Cf. John D. Caputo, *Heidegger and St. Thomas Aquinas*, p. 151.

⁴⁴ Cf. *ID*, pp. 55-56; *IAD*, pp. 64-65.

⁴⁵ *ID*, p. 60; *IAD*, p. 69.

⁴⁶ Cf. *ibid.*

⁴⁷ Cf. *ID*, p. 61; *IAD*, p. 70.

⁴⁸ Cf. *ID*, p. 59; *IAD*, p. 68. Heidegger is of the opinion that all the other differences spoken of in metaphysics between Being and man or Being and entities are fundamentally based on the ontological difference. Cf. *ID*, p. 62; *IAD*, p. 71.

Heidegger speaks of the giving (*Geben*) of Being as ‘presencing’ (*Anwesen*). The presencing is naturally in the present (*Gegenwart*) and is related to what is present (*das Anwesende*). Being as presencing, understood in relation to what is present, brings what is present to openness or unconcealment. Thus, giving of Being as presencing is a letting-presence (*Anwesenlassen*), i.e. letting what is present be open in the presencing of Being.⁴⁹ The letting-presence of what is present⁵⁰ lets what is present into the open by letting it belong to the presencing of Being.⁵¹ This letting-present is the giving of Being.⁵²

Having clarified Being’s presencing as giving, we must raise the question of the nature of the giving (presencing) of Being. When we analyzed the notion of ontological difference between Being and beings, we pointed out that Being’s ‘coming-over’ (*Ueberkommnis*)⁵³ to entities reveals beings, and at their ‘coming-on’ (*An-kommen*) or ‘arrival’ (*An-kunft*), the Being is concealed. In ‘coming-over’ as the presencing (*Anwesen*) and giving (*Geben*) of Being, there is an in-built concealment, which belongs to the essence of Being’s giving. Thus, it can be truly said: "In sending itself, Being withdraws; in giving itself Being withholds; in presencing itself Being absences; in revealing itself, Being conceals."⁵⁴ For Heidegger, the giving of Being is a "...giving (that) holds itself back and withdraws."⁵⁵ He calls this giving a sending (*Schicken*) of Being.⁵⁶ Heidegger sees history in the light of this giving or sending so that history is always the history of Being. Thus, what constitutes the history (*Geschichte*) of Being is the sending (*Schicken*) or the giving (*Geben*) of Being.⁵⁷

From what we have said, we can conclude that the history of Being (*Seinsgeschichte*) is not essentially an occurrence (*Geschehen*), though occurrence is involved in history; but fundamentally it is the sending of Being (*Geschick von Seins*) in which Being holds itself back (*an sich halten*) in favor of what is sent, i.e. beings. ‘To hold back’ or ‘to withhold’ is used by Heidegger in the sense of the Greek term ‘*epoché*’.⁵⁸ Thus, we can speak of various epochs of the sending of Being. In other words, history as epochal is a fundamental characteristic of the sending of Being. Heidegger does not speak of Being as an epochal sending, and so we cannot speak of different epochs of Being or, to put it in Heidegger’s words: "...the actual holding back (*epoché*) of itself (Being) in favor of...the gift (beings), that is, of Being with regard to the grounding of beings."⁵⁹ In other words, "...as it reveals itself in beings, Being withdraws,"⁶⁰ which withdrawal belongs to the sending of Being.

⁴⁹ Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Zur Sache des Denkens*, 2. Auflage (Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 1976), p. 5 (hereafter: *SD*); Martin Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), p. 5 (hereafter: *TB*).

⁵⁰ Cf. *SD*, p. 40; *TB*, p. 37.

⁵¹ Cf. *ibid.*

⁵² Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Vier Seminare* (Frankfurt: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977), p. 101 (hereafter: *VS*).

⁵³ The ‘coming-over’ of Being is the same as presencing or giving of Being.

⁵⁴ Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 180.

⁵⁵ *SD*, p. 8; *TB*, p. 8.

⁵⁶ Cf. *ibid.*

⁵⁷ Cf. *SD*, pp. 8-9; *TB*, pp. 8-9.

⁵⁸ Heidegger does not use the term ‘*epoche*’ as did Edmund Husserl in his phenomenological method, as an epistemological tool of bracketing all knowledge to question and verify their validity. Cf. *HW*, p. 331; Martin Heidegger, *Early Greek Thinking*, trans. D.E. Krell and F.A. Capuzzi (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 26 (hereafter: *EGT*).

⁵⁹ *SD*, p. 9; *TB*, p. 9.

⁶⁰ *HW*, p. 331; *EGT*, p. 26.

Now, that we have clarified the epochal nature of the sending of Being, viz., the history of Being, we must ask the reason for epochal nature of the sending or the history of Being. This leads Heidegger to analyze the notion of time. The presencing (*Anwesen*) of Being has a reference to the present (*Gegenwart*) and is also an extension (*Reichen*) in the three modes of time, viz., the ‘what-has-been’ (*das Gewesen*), the ‘what-is-not-yet’ and the present. The ‘what-has-been’ is not merely ‘that-which-is-past’ (*das Vergangene*), but presences in its absence and still concerns man. In other words, the presencing is extended in the ‘what-has-been’ in the mode of presencing the absence of ‘what-has-been’. Presencing, as the absence of ‘what-is-not-yet’ (future) is extended in the mode of presencing as coming-toward-man. Thus, ‘what-is-not-yet’ in some way is already present in its absence and concerns man. Presencing is extended in the present as presencing what is present and so lasts (*wahrt*) in the sense of abiding (*verweilen*) or being extended (*reichen*) in man, as the present, the past as ‘what-has-been’ and the future as ‘what-is-not-yet’.⁶¹ The mutual extending brings together the three ecstases of time and lets them belong together. In the mutual extending of the three there comes about a ‘lighting up of openness’.⁶² The unity of these three dimensions of time by continuous mutual extending is an interplay (*Zuspiel*), which Heidegger refers to as a ‘simultaneous time’ (*das Gleich-Zeitige*).⁶³ By bringing these three dimensions into a mutual interplay the extending determines all the other three, and is, as it were, the fourth dimension. "True time," says Heidegger, "is four dimensional."⁶⁴

From our analysis of the nature of time, it is clear that though time is simultaneous by its fourth dimension of the mutual extending of the three ecstases of time, still it gives itself as presencing (*An-wesen*) and absencing (*Ab-wesen*). In other words, the presencing of ‘what-has-been’ and ‘what-is-not-yet’ is in the mode of absencing,⁶⁵ while the presencing of the present is in the mode of presencing.⁶⁶ To quote Heidegger: "We call the giving which gives the true time, an extending which opens and conceals. As extending is itself a giving, the giving of a giving is concealed in true time."⁶⁷

Thus, Being sends and time extends. The sending of Being and extending of time belong together in the realm of *Ereignis*.⁶⁸ As presencing Being sends, while as the realms of openness (*Bereich des oeffnenen*) time is that in and through which Being’s sending can show itself. Thus, Being and time are so interrelated as the sending of Being always shows itself in time. In his letter to William J. Richardson, Heidegger says: "Presencing (Being) is inherent in the lighting-up of self-concealment (Time). The lighting up of self-concealment (Time) brings forth the presencing (Being)."⁶⁹ In other words, as presencing Being is always temporal in its presencing. It is only because the presencing or sending of Being is temporal that Being shows itself as a sending that is concealed. Being’s presencing in relation to the ecstasis of ‘what-has-been’ (past) and to the ‘what-

⁶¹ Cf. *SD*, pp. 14 -15; *TB*, p. 13.

⁶² Cf. *SD*, p. 15; *TB*, p. 15.

⁶³ Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Unterwegs zur Sprache*, 6. Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1979), p. 213 (hereafter: *US*); Martin Heidegger, *On the Way to Language*, trans. P.D. Hertz (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 106 (hereafter: *WL*).

⁶⁴ *SD*, p. 16; *TB*, p. 15.

⁶⁵ ‘Absencing’ is to be understood in the sense of ‘*epoche*’ as withholding, withdrawing, denying or concealing.

⁶⁶ Cf. *HW*, p. 320; *EGT*, pp. 34 -35.

⁶⁷ *SD*, p. 16; *TB*, p. 16.

⁶⁸ Cf. *SD*, p. 21; *TB*, p. 20.

⁶⁹ William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. xxi.

is-not-yet' (future) are in the mode of absencing (*Ab-wesen*). The reason why Being -- by its 'coming-over' to beings, thereby revealing beings -- withholds or conceals itself is due to the temporal nature of Being's giving or presencing. As soon as Being lights up beings, the moment of lighting-up becomes the ecstasis of the past, and being is withdrawn as the lighting-up. Thus, the epochal or with-drawal aspect of Being's sending is nothing other than the temporal character of Being's sending.⁷⁰ Since Being's giving is temporal, the history of Being is epochal. As Being always withdraws in favor of the 'given' due to the temporal character of its sending, the history of Being as the presencing or giving of Being always remains finite.

5.1.3.2. Space and Being

Heidegger speaks of the spatial dimension of the history of Being in relation to the analysis of the fourfold (*Geviert*), viz. the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals, which are not ontical entities, but are 'aspects' or 'moments' of Being in its spatial dimension. We have clarified this notion earlier in this chapter. Now, we would like to consider how the fourfold unfolds in the history of Being 'constituting' its spatial dimension.

Each of the fourfold -- the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals -- belong together by way of a simple unified fourfold. Each of the four mirrors in its own way the presence of the others. This mirroring each other, on the one hand, frees each of the fourfold so that each could be itself in the unity of the four. On the other hand, they hold each other in such a way that their essential being is towards one another. This, in turn, leads to the mutual appropriation of the four. None of the four insists upon its own separate particularity. Rather "each is expropriated in the mutual appropriation, into its own being. This expropriative appropriating is the mirror-play (*Spiegel-spiel*) of the fourfold. Out of the fourfold, the simple one-fold of the four is ventured."⁷¹ Thus, the mirror-play of the fourfold does not stress so much on the four, but on the onefold of the four.

For Heidegger the mirror-play of the simple onefold of the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals constitutes the world. The fouring, i.e. the unity of the four in the appropriating mirror-play, is the worlding of the world.⁷² Thus, the 'thing', as that which gathers the fourfold in their appropriating mirror-play is what, Heidegger calls the thinging of the thing. Since, world is the inter-relation of the fourfold, the thinging of the thing is the worlding of the world. Heidegger writes on this point:

The four are united primordially in being toward one another, a fourfold. The things let the fourfold of the four stay with them. This gathering...letting-stay, is the thinging of the thing. The unitary fourfold of the sky and earth, mortals and divinities, which is stayed in the thinging of the things, we call -- the world. Thinging things are things. Thinging, they gesture -- gestate -- world.⁷³

⁷⁰ Cf. *HW*, p. 311; *EGT*, p. 27.

⁷¹ *VA*, p. 172; *PLT*, p. 179.

⁷² Cf. *VA*, p. 173; *PLT*, p. 180.

⁷³ *US*, p. 22; *PLT*, p. 199-200. Cf. also *VA*, p. 174; *PLT*, p. 181. Heidegger in his later writings prefers the terms 'world' (*Welt*) and 'thing' (*Ding*) in the place of the terms 'Being' and 'being'. Cf. *SD*, p. 41; *TB*, p. 37. He also speaks of the ontological difference between 'world' and 'thing'. Cf. *US*, p. 25; *PLT*, pp. 202-203.

Thus, for Heidegger, "Things bear world. World grants things."⁷⁴ The presencing of the world in things in the unity of the fourfold is the worlding (*das Welten*) of the world. The mirror-play of the four-fold into onefold, Heidegger calls "the ring-dance of appropriating."⁷⁵

Being, as the worlding of the four, i.e., in its spatial aspect, also manifests the unconcealing and concealing element. Heidegger indicates this by writing the term 'Being' (*Sein*) with a cross mark over it.⁷⁶ The term 'Being' with the cross mark points to the concealing dimension of Being, while one without the cross mark shows Being as revealing. Further explaining this symbolic crossing of the term 'Being', Heidegger says that this crossing does not merely indicate something that is negative, but rather it refers to the mirror-play of the fourfold. Being in its spatial unfolding in history is the gathering of the fourfold at the place of intersection.⁷⁷ In other words, the history of Being, in its spatial manifesting is the gathering of the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals in their unity. Out of this gathering emerges the worlding process by the mirror-play of the four.

The history of Being is, thus, a time-space event. It comes about as an epochal sending of Being due to the interplay (*Zuspiel*) of the three ecstases of time, determined by extending (*Reichen*) and a worlding process by the mirror-play (*Spiegel-spiel*) of the four-fold, brought about by the fouring of the four.⁷⁸

5.1.3.3. History of Being: A Play of Being

To the question of the 'why' of the spatio-temporal sending of Being or that of the history of Being as unconcealing and concealing, Heidegger says that it is a play of Being. It is a time-space-play which Being sends to man,⁷⁹ and which is a lighting process in which entities can appear.⁸⁰ It is a play in which 'time times', 'space spaces', 'thing things' and 'world worlds'.⁸¹ It is a world-play which lets one encounter the temporality of history in the three ecstases of time and its spatiality in the four world regions of the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals.⁸²

Speaking on the background of Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason, Heidegger says that there is no 'why' to the play of Being: there is no answer to the question of 'why'. Being presences as giving and as withdrawing; it is a groundless play of Being. It is not a play that is conditioned

⁷⁴ *US*, p. 24; *PLT*, p. 202.

⁷⁵ *VA*, p. 173; *PLT*, p. 180.

⁷⁶ Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Zur Seinsfrage*, 3. Auflage (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967), pp. 34 -35 (hereafter: *SF*); Martin Heidegger, *The Question of Being*, trans. William Kluback and Jean T. Wild (New Haven: College and University Press, 1958), pp. 89-90 (hereafter: *QB*).

⁷⁷ Cf. *SF*, p. 31; *QB*, p. 83.

⁷⁸ In *Discourse on Thinking* Heidegger speaks of the spatio-temporal character of the history of Being in terms of 'that-which-regions' (*Gegnet*), which is characterized by expanse (*Weite*) and abiding (*Weile*) which gathers everything into its abiding expanse. The horizon (*Horizont*) is the visual field of the *Gegnet* in which everything appears in the spatio-temporal aspects. Thus, here, Heidegger is pointing to the *Gegnet* as the Being and the *Horizont* as an epoch of history, of its spatio-temporal manifestation. Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Gelassenheit*, 6. Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1979), pp. 37-49 (hereafter: *GL*); Martin Heidegger, *Discourse on Thinking*, trans. A.M. Anderson and E.H. Freund (London: Harper and Row, 1969), pp. 64 -73 (hereafter: *DT*).

⁷⁹ Cf. *SG*, p. 129.

⁸⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 109.

⁸¹ Cf. *US*, p. 213; *WL*, p. 106.

⁸² Cf. *US*, p. 214; *WL*, p. 106.

by the will and the calculative thinking.⁸³ The play does not allow any causal or planned out patterns,⁸⁴ but is similar to a child playing draughts.⁸⁵ Heidegger highlights this point clearly when he says: "It (Being) plays because it plays. The 'because' sinks into the play; the play is without 'why': it plays while it plays. There remains only play: the highest and the deepest. But this 'only' is the all, the one, the unique."⁸⁶

The play, says Heidegger, has no parallels among entities.⁸⁷ The time-space-play of the historical giving of Being can only be understood in the realm of appropriation, as it is a lighting of Being in which the ontological difference is unfolded as the history of Being. The history of Being, as the play of Being, cannot be without man: it is a play of Being with man. Man is not a passive spectator, but a co-player (*Mitspieler*) with Being. Epochal sending of Being and the worlding process cannot be spoken of without a man as essentially being part of it.

5.2. The Way

Having looked into the goal of Dasein in the Being-centered existence, we now can consider the path of Dasein that leads him to his goal. In order that Dasein attains the goal of experiencing Being, he must move through an ascending path of essential thinking of Being, dwelling in the neighborhood of Being and seeing the truth of Being. Here, we aim at clarifying the three stages of Dasein's path to Being-experience.

5.2.1. The Essential Thinking of Being

Essential thinking of Being does not merely consists in having an opinion about something. It is neither a representing, nor a developing of conceptual system of thinking with a chain of logical premises which lead to valid and certain conclusions. As it cannot be brought under any logical categories, it is neither practical nor theoretical; rather it comes to pass before all these distinctions.⁸⁸ Thus, thinking of Being overcomes onto-theological thinking and language.⁸⁹ Such a thinking is non-subjective, non-representative and non-logical in the sense of presubjective, pre-representative and prelogical respectively. This means that this thinking is not irrational, but pre-rational:⁹⁰ it is anti-logic, yet not illogical.⁹¹ Speaking about his book *What is called Thinking?* Heidegger says that it not a treatise on thinking. He admonishes his students that they must not think about what thinking is,⁹² but rather they should learn to think.⁹³ Heidegger uses many names

⁸³ Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Der Satz vom Grund*, 5. Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1978), p. 183 (hereafter: *SG*).

⁸⁴ Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Die Technik und die Kehre*, 5. Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1982), pp. 42-43 (hereafter: *TK*); Martin Heidegger, *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), p. 44 (hereafter: *QCT*).

⁸⁵ Cf. *SG*, p. 188. Cf. also *HW*, p. 258; *PLT*, p. 102.

⁸⁶ *SG*, p. 188; Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 194.

⁸⁷ Cf. *ID*, p. 58; *IAD*, p. 66.

⁸⁸ Cf. *BW* p. 236.

⁸⁹ Cf. *ID*, p. 66; *IAD*, p. 73.

⁹⁰ Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 19-20.

⁹¹ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 345; *BW*, p. 227.

⁹² Cf. *WD*, p. 9; Martin Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking?*, trans. J.G. Gray (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 21 (hereafter: *WCT*).

⁹³ Cf. *WD*, p. 75; *WCT*, p. 86.

to refer to this thinking of Being (*Seinsdenken*): meditative thinking (*besinnliches Denken*),⁹⁴ essential thinking (*wesenliches Denken*),⁹⁵ primordial thinking (*anfaenliches Denken*),⁹⁶ recollective thinking (*andenkendes Denken*)⁹⁷ and courageous thinking (*herzhaftes Denken*).⁹⁸

5.2.1.1. Nature of Essential Thinking

Clarifying the meaning of the title of his book *What is Called Thinking?*, Heidegger speaks of the four possible ways in which it can be interpreted. Firstly, it can refer to the question about the meaning of the word ‘thinking’. Secondly, it can mean, what thinking signifies in the history of thought. Thirdly, it can be a question about the prerequisite needed to think rightly. Fourthly, the question can also mean: "What calls us into thinking?" or "what evokes thinking in us?"⁹⁹ Though he recognizes the validity of each of these interpretations, Heidegger holds that the fourth interpretation decisively poses the question, in spite of the fact that it is foreign to common understanding.¹⁰⁰ The fourth interpretation, viz., "What is it that directs us into thought and gives us direction for thinking?"¹⁰¹ already presupposes that there is a relation between Being and thinking as between the caller and the called.¹⁰² Thus, essential thinking involves a call from Being which evokes thought in Dasein and a response from Dasein. In this section, our analysis of the nature of essential thinking will consist in treating it as a call of Being and a response from Dasein.

5.2.1.1.1. Essential Thinking: A Call of Being

Heidegger says: "We never come to thoughts. They come to us."¹⁰³ Essential thinking is not something which man can do as and when he wants. Man can be an essential thinker only in so far as he stands in the ‘lighting’ of Being.¹⁰⁴ In this process, Being is primary for thinking belongs to Being. Dasein is able to think only because he is enabled (*vermoegen*) to think. The enabling is a favor (*Moegen*) Being bestows on man,¹⁰⁵ thereby presencing man in his essence, i.e., as an essential thinker.

Being enables thinking in man because ‘it wants’ (*es braucht*)¹⁰⁶ thought and ‘there is need for’ thinking. "By reason of its nature Being must itself be served, tended, guarded by thought,

⁹⁴ Cf. *GL*, p. 13.

⁹⁵ Cf. *WM*, p. 48.

⁹⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 49.

⁹⁷ Cf. *WD*, p. 95.

⁹⁸ Cf. *GL*, p. 25.

⁹⁹ Cf. *WD*, p. 79; *WCT*, pp. 113-114.

¹⁰⁰ Cf. *WD*, pp. 79-80; *WCT*, pp. 114-115.

¹⁰¹ Cf. *WD*, p. 80; *WCT*, p. 115.

¹⁰² Cf. *WD*, p. 162; *WCT*, p. 243. Cf. also William J. Richardson, Heidegger: *Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 596.

¹⁰³ Martin Heidegger, *Aus der Erfahrung des Denken*, 4 Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1977), p. 11 (hereafter: *ED*); *PLT*, p. 6.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. *SG*, p. 147.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 314; *BW*, p. 169.

¹⁰⁶ Heidegger translates Parmenidian word ‘*chere*’ into German ‘*es braucht*’, which is rendered in English as ‘there is want of’ or ‘there is need of’.

hence is 'in want of' thought in order to be itself."¹⁰⁷ There is a relationship between Being's giving (*es gibt*) and Beings wanting (*es braucht*).¹⁰⁸ Thus, Being's giving itself is its wanting itself. In wanting itself to be thought, Being gives itself to thought. In this wanting is concealed an appeal that calls forth thought.¹⁰⁹ Thus, Being calls man to think. Neither is the Being's call periodical nor is man's thinking an occasional human activity, as the former is constant while the latter is essential to man. Man is a thinker only because he is called to think.¹¹⁰

The German term '*heissen*' (to call) has a variety of meaning, such as invite, instruct, demand and direct. It is related to the term for 'to get something underway'. The old use of the term '*heissen*' also means 'letting reach' (*gelassen lassen*). Thus, the term '*heissen*' in its original use has the notion of 'helpfulness'.¹¹¹ The analysis of the term '*heissen*' clearly points to the fact that which calls us to think helps us to think by giving itself to think. Heidegger says: "What calls us to think, gives food for thought."¹¹² That which gives food for thought is "that which is eminently thought-worthy" (*das Bedenklichste*),¹¹³ viz., Being, which gives to thought its to-be-thought.

The mode in which Being gives itself to thought is one of withdrawing; in other words, what calls on us to think and gives food for thought gives itself as withdrawing. Withdrawal is not something that is totally negative in the sense of an absence of Being, but it is something real and actual as it is not nothing. It is the presence of Being as absent. When Being withdraws itself from us, it draws us in such a way that we bear the stamp of being drawn toward; thereby we ourselves become pointers towards Being. It is the withdrawing presence of Being that calls man for thinking and looks for thinking in man.¹¹⁴ Thus, calling Dasein to think, Being gives itself to be thought and wants itself to be thought. It draws man to thinking, by withdrawing itself from him, thereby making him a pointer to itself.

In the "Postscript" to *What is Metaphysics?* Heidegger speaks of the call of Being, which to a certain extent is comparable to the mode of Being's gift of itself in its withdrawing. Here, it is in the context of anxiety that Being calls Dasein to itself. Anxiety is an experience of Beinglessness (*Seinlosigkeit*).¹¹⁵ Being is the noiseless voice which makes itself heard in Dasein through the attunement of anxiety. In the attunement of anxiety Dasein may learn to experience Being in the form of non-Being.¹¹⁶ In other words, through anxiety Being lights up in man its own relation to Dasein's essence. The noiseless voice of Being is a call and an appeal to Dasein to be the place where its truth can be preserved. Heidegger stresses that the call is not Dasein's doing, but something that comes from the bounty of Being. Thus, the essential thinking is an occurrence of Being which comes from Being's initiative.¹¹⁷

¹⁰⁷ Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 597. Cf. also *WD*, p. 85; *WCT*, p. 121.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. *WD*, p. 116; *WCT*, p. 189. For a clear exposition of '*es gibt*' -- Cf. *SD* pp. 1-25; *TB*, pp. 1-24.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. *WD*, p. 119; *WCT*, p. 196.

¹¹⁰ Cf. *WD*, p. 80; *WCT*, p. 115.

¹¹¹ Cf. *WD*, p. 82; *WCT*, p. 117.

¹¹² *WD*, p. 85; *WCT*, p. 121.

¹¹³ *WD*, p. 131; *WCT*, p. 164.

¹¹⁴ 114. Cf. *WD*, p. 5; *WCT*, p. 9.

¹¹⁵ Cf. *WM*, p. 46; *EB*, p. 353.

¹¹⁶ In his essay "What is Metaphysics," Heidegger speaks of Being, as Non-Being (*das Nichts*). But, here, he does not mean 'non-existence' (*das Wesenlose, das Nichtige*), but sees Being as purely the 'other' than everything that is, i.e., 'that-which-is-not' (*das nicht Seiende*). Cf. *WM*, pp. 45-46; *EB*, p. 353.

¹¹⁷ Cf. *WM*, pp. 46-48; *EB*, pp. 354-356.

5.2.1.1.2. Essential Thinking: Dasein's Response

Though, essentially primordial thinking comes about from the initiative of Being, yet Dasein is not a mere passive agent in the process of responding. Dasein needs to concentrate upon the call of Being. It involves a certain activity in the process of essential thinking.¹¹⁸ Dasein, thus, responds to the voice of Being by a response that is 'corresponding' (*entsprechend*) to the call. The term 'correspondence' (*Entsprechung*), though used in normal usage as 'response', 'answer' or 'reply', is used by Heidegger in the sense of 'conformity' or 'agreement'.¹¹⁹ So, to correspond to the call of Being is to attune oneself to the call of Being, to 'echo' the voice of Being and to be obedient to the voice of Being.¹²⁰ As Dasein is called to think, the primordial corresponding consists in giving oneself to genuine thinking.¹²¹ The call to thinking and the corresponding response on the part of Being and Dasein, respectively, involve a twofold relationship between Being and Dasein: Being 'calls' and 'gives'; Dasein 're-calls' (re-collects) and 'thanks'. In other words, Being 'calls' Dasein to think and 'gives' itself as food for thought, while Dasein responds by 're-collecting' in memory the call of Being and 'thanking' Being for its gift of itself. This relationship can be substantiated by the etymological relatedness of the word '*Denken*' (to think) to '*Gedaechtnis*' (memory) and '*Danken*' (to thank). The root-word '*Gedanc*', a middle German word contains the nuances of thinking, memory and thanking.¹²² We could, now spell out re-collection and thanksgiving as Dasein's response to the call and giving of Being respectively.

Dasein responds to the call of Being by re-calling (*Ge-denken*) the gift of Being. The root term '*Gedanc*', from which '*Gedaechtnis*' derives, means the 'gathering that recalls'.¹²³ Thus, '*Gedaechtnis*' consists in a 'gathering-together' of the gift of Being thoughtfully and holding it in memory. In other words, the gathering-together is a re-collection (*An-denken*) in memory.¹²⁴ This consists in Dasein thinking of the source, viz., Being, which is most thought-provoking¹²⁵ and in the first place called Dasein to think. By thinking as the gift of Being, Dasein gathers-together in memory the thought of Being and lets it rest in the center of his being, viz., the heart (*Herz*).¹²⁶ In so doing Dasein 'keeps' (*verwahrt*) and preserves (*bewahrt*) Being -- that which is most thought-worthy -- from oblivion, i.e., from being forgotten.¹²⁷ In the process of re-collection, Being becomes present to and real to Dasein, so that the differences of 'here', 'there', 'now' and 'then' disappear.¹²⁸ Thus, by re-collection Dasein responds to Being by offering the center of his being, viz., the heart, as the lighting-up place for Being. Besides, by opening up the world of Being to

¹¹⁸ Cf. *HW*, p. 214. Cf. also Vincent Vycinas, p. 79.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Was ist das -- die Philosophie?*, 5 Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1972), p. 21 (hereafter: *WP*). Martin Heidegger, *What is Philosophy?*, trans. W. Kluback and J.J. Wilde (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1958), p. 69 (hereafter: *WIP*).

¹²⁰ Cf. *WM*, pp. 50, 51; *EB*, pp. 358, 360.

¹²¹ Cf. *TK*, p. 40; *QCT*, p. 41.

¹²² Cf. *WD*, pp. 91-94; *WCT*, p. 138-147.

¹²³ Cf. *WD*, p. 92; *WCT*, p. 139.

¹²⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

¹²⁵ Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Erläuterungen zu Hoelderlins Dichtung*, 5 Auflage (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981), p. 150 (hereafter: *HD*).

¹²⁶ Cf. *WD*, p. 92; *WCT*, p. 139. Heidegger considers man's heart as the innermost core of his essence and does not give prime importance to intellect.

¹²⁷ Cf. *WD*, p. 97; *WCT*, p. 151.

¹²⁸ Cf. *WD*, p. 92; *WCT*, p. 140.

Dasein and constantly keeping the gift of the call to thinking in memory, re-collection raises in Dasein a sense of gratitude and thanksgiving.

The German root word ‘*Gedanc*’ means not only memory or re-collection, but also ‘thanks’. Memory and thanksgiving go together and belong together. Thanksgiving emerges in Dasein, when it gathers into his heart the call and giving of Being in re-collective memory. In other words, only in re-collective gathering, i.e. memory, is Being, which calls Dasein and gives itself to be thought, thanked. Memory, as re-collection of Being is a thanking of Being. For Heidegger, every memorial service is a thanksgiving service.¹²⁹

Having shown the relationship between recollection and thanksgiving, we could analyze what thanking is and how Dasein responds to Being by thanking. Being’s supreme gift to the thinker (Dasein) is the very Being by which he is a thinker. By calling to thinking and giving itself as food for thinking, Being makes Dasein the thinker of Being. The best way to respond to this giving of Being is accepting the gift, which would mean that Dasein assumes the call and yields to it. Acceptance is the most original form of thanks-giving. Accepting the gift of Dasein’s nature as the thinker of Being involves giving of oneself to thinking. Thinking is thanksgiving: in thanking Being Dasein thinks of Being, and in the thinking of Being Dasein accepts the gift of existence as the thinker of Being. Thus, for Heidegger, pure thanks lies in that we give ourselves to the thinking of Being.¹³⁰ From this it follows that our supreme thanksgiving to Being is thinking and our profound thanklessness is thoughtlessness of Being.¹³¹ William J. Richardson summarizes thanking as thanks-giving, and what it involves on the part of Dasein as he reaches towards Being as the thinker of Being as follows:

Thinking as thanksgiving (involves Dasein’s) complete acquiescence to Being. This is accomplished when There-Being (Dasein) plays a role of attentive attendant of Being in profound and docile re-collection...There-Being (Dasein) must turn to Being, opening itself (himself) up, committing itself (himself), abandoning itself (himself) to its (his) exigencies...It is the responding that is decisive...(for) thought...becomes authentically functional only in the movement of response.¹³²

Thus, by opening himself to Being as its attentive attendant, i.e. by his having ready for thought, Dasein thanks Being for its giving of itself.

5.2.1.2. Characteristics of Essential Thinking

Now, that we have discussed the nature of essential thinking, we can highlight some of its characteristics.

- Thinking is experiencing of Being (*Erfahrung des Seins*). Of all entities, only Dasein can experience the ‘what-it-is’ of Being, when addressed by the voice of Being.¹³³ Essential thinking

¹²⁹ Cf. *GL*, pp. 9-26. This address is delivered on the occasion of the 175th birthday of the German composer Konradin Kreutzer on Oct. 30, 1955 in Messkirch. Here, Heidegger points out that commemoration of a person is a thoughtful and thankful remembrance of that person.

¹³⁰ Cf. *WD*, p. 94; *WCT*, pp. 142-143.

¹³¹ Cf. *WD*, p. 94; *WCT*, p. 143.

¹³² 132. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 602.

¹³³ Cf. *WM*, p. 47; *EB*, p. 355.

is consent or readiness (*die Bereitschaft*) for anxiety. When Being, as Non-Being makes its appeal to Dasein, through the medium of anxiety, Dasein's response to the call of Being is one of readiness for anxiety. In saying 'yes' to the call of Being, Dasein is ready to tread the untrodden region of Being.¹³⁴ This is self-diffusion: Dasein 'pours-himself-out' to the positive lighting of Being. In so doing he becomes a lighting place for Being and its truth as it becomes manifested in things.¹³⁵

- Thinking is self-surrender, by which Dasein gives his entire essence to Being's wanting to have a place of disclosure.¹³⁶

- It is self-assumption, consisting in Dasein being entrusted with the task of assuming the charge of watching over Being. This is accomplished by Dasein's relationship to Being, which Being itself establishes.¹³⁷

- Essential thinking is an echoing of the silent voice of Being, to which the response of Dasein resounds with such fidelity that Dasein's thought is, indeed, an echo of the voice of Being. At the same time, it is Dasein's own as it stems from Dasein's freedom.¹³⁸

- It is docility, and consists in being observant and heedful to the demands of the voice of Being.¹³⁹ Thinking assists Being to be itself by caring for the need for the place of disclosure in the historical humanity.¹⁴⁰

- Thinking is an offering, consisting in Dasein's self-diffusive surrender to Being. It involves forgoing attachment with the ontic order or calculating thinking and being at home with the fundamental thought Being brings to pass. Besides, it implies that Dasein takes upon himself the noble poverty of Being which deals with the supremely simple and the intangible. But to this poverty belongs genuine wealth. The paradox of wealth and poverty is proper to thought as offering.¹⁴¹

- Essential thinking is involvement: in spite of his great poverty of being detached from the ontic level of Dasein, yet he maintains continued involvement with entities. It is by thinking that the truth of Being is preserved in beings.¹⁴²

- Thinking is freedom. Dasein's self-surrender of himself to Being, though done at the 'wanting of Being' (*es braucht*), is done with complete freedom on the part of Dasein, which lets Being be in and through himself; such a 'letting-be' is freedom. Thus, thinking of Being belongs not only to Being, but also to Dasein.¹⁴³

- It is thanksgiving. The free surrender of Dasein to Being in thinking is not a mere response to Being's appeal, but a thanksgiving for the bounty of Being's gift.¹⁴⁴

- Thinking is a historical process. The essence of man on whom Being bestows its gift is 'historical'.¹⁴⁵

¹³⁴ Cf. *ibid.*

¹³⁵ Cf. *WM*, p. 49; *EB*, p. 358.

¹³⁶ Cf. *ibid.*

¹³⁷ Cf. *ibid.*

¹³⁸ Cf. *WM*, p. 50; *EB*, p. 358.

¹³⁹ Cf. *ibid.*

¹⁴⁰ Cf. *ibid.*

¹⁴¹ Cf. *WM*, pp. 50-51; *EB*, pp. 358-359.

¹⁴² 142. Cf. *WM*, p. 51; *EB*, p. 359.

¹⁴³ Cf. *WM*, pp. 46-47; *EB*, pp. 355-356.

¹⁴⁴ Cf. *WM*, p. 49; *EB*, p. 358.

¹⁴⁵ Cf. *WM*, p. 40; *EB*, p. 359.

- Essential thinking is an interrogation. It is a step-by-step advance towards the answer, which, in turn, leads to further questions, thereby probing deeper into the origins of reality.¹⁴⁶

All the characteristics we have listed here do not say anything more than what we have said already about essential thinking as a process of Being's coming towards Dasein and Dasein's moving towards Being in response. This process is a temporal-historical one and it is achieved by Dasein's being a lighting-up-place for Being, both in Dasein and in beings.¹⁴⁷

5.2.2. Dwelling in the Neighborhood of Being

Heidegger refers to the state of Dasein, which results from essential thinking as dwelling (*Wohnen*) and describes it in various ways. He calls it an indwelling (*Instaendigkeit*)¹⁴⁸ and a standing in the openness of Being.¹⁴⁹ It is the opening of Dasein for openness¹⁵⁰ and the abiding of Dasein in his 'origins' (*Herkunft*).¹⁵¹ Thus, dwelling is Dasein's 'ek-sisting', i.e., standing in the openness of Being. Besides Dwelling is a state in which Dasein is involved with the things in an authentic way. In other words, Dasein builds (*bauen*)¹⁵² and spares (*schonen*)¹⁵³ things in their authentic being. In describing the nature of dwelling, in this section, we will consider it as Dasein's ek-sisting and building.

5.2.2.1. Dwelling: Dasein's Ek-sisting

The manner in which Heidegger views man is different from that of the perception of traditional philosophers. In this section, we will look briefly into the way traditional philosophy understands man and distinguishes it from that of Heidegger.

5.2.2.1.1. Traditional View of Man

Traditionally man was considered as a rational animal. According to Heidegger, the definition of man as 'rational animal' is a metaphysical interpretation of the original Greek description of

¹⁴⁶ Cf. *WM*, p. 44; *EB*, pp. 351-352. These and many other characteristics Heidegger states of essential thinking seem to be assertions, as he does not tell us how this knowledge comes about. Heidegger himself is not interested in studying thinking rationally. Therefore, we could say that he makes these statements about essential thinking from his own experience of this primordial thinking of Being. Since it belongs to the realm of man's inner experience, its verification seems to be impossible. Cf. Vensus A. George, *From Being-in-the-World to Being-toward-Being: Martin Heidegger's Philosophy of the Authentic Human Person* (Nagpur: SAC Publications, 1996), p. 84, fn. 85.

¹⁴⁷ Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 478-482.

¹⁴⁸ Cf. *GL*, p. 70; *DT*, p. 81.

¹⁴⁹ Cf. *WM*, p. 15; Martin Heidegger, "The Way Back to the Ground of Metaphysics" trans. Walter Kaufmann, *Existentialism: From Dostoevsky to Sartre*, ed. Walter Kaufmann, p. 272 (here-after: *WBG*).

¹⁵⁰ Cf. *GL*, p. 59; *DT*, p. 81.

¹⁵¹ Cf. *GL*, pp. 60-61; *DT*, p. 82-83.

¹⁵² Cf. *VA*, p. 140; *BW*, p. 324.

¹⁵³ Cf. *VA*, p. 143; *BW*, p. 327.

man "*zoion logon echon*."¹⁵⁴ This metaphysical statement about the nature of man considers man as a type of animal with the special quality of rationality. Thus, here, man is viewed in terms of animality rather than of humanity.¹⁵⁵ This type of thinking about man led to viewing man as a rational animal, a human entity, and a spiritual-bodily entity. In other words, man is considered as an entity among other entities, which has some power of control and manipulation over other beings. Though this way of looking at man is not wrong, it has failed to give the dignity, says Heidegger, that man possesses.¹⁵⁶

Since man was thought only in relation to *animalitas* and not in relation to his true nature, i.e., his *humanitas*, the real nature of man has not been thought in the history of Western metaphysics. In consequence, man's true essence is concealed from his own vision. As man did not think of his nature as it is in itself, the homeliness of his own essence is barred from his sight. This, in turn, has led to man's being away from his home; not knowing his own nature, man could never be at-home-with-himself.¹⁵⁷ The metaphysical way of defining man fails to see man and his essence in the light of man's relationship to Being; but instead man is seen as related to entities. In the process, Being (*Sein*) is mistaken for beings (*Seienden*).¹⁵⁸ Heidegger's understanding of Dasein attempts to undo the flaw in understanding the nature of man brought about by metaphysical thinking, by considering man's humanity and its relationship to Being.¹⁵⁹ To Heidegger's understanding of man, now, we could turn our attention.

5.2.2.1.2. Dasein as Ek-sistence

According to Heidegger, Dasein is ek-sistence (*Ek-sistenz*) and ek-sisting is the way that is proper to Dasein.¹⁶⁰ It consists in Dasein's being attuned (*ge-stimmt*) to the voice (*Stimme*) of Being, which gives itself to Dasein in silence and to which Dasein is called to listen (*hoeren*) even in the loudest noise.¹⁶¹ In other words, Dasein's ek-sisting consists in being attuned to listen to the call of Being and enabled to respond to the call by his openness to the light of Being. Thus, as ek-sistence, Dasein stands out in the openness of Being. The term 'Dasein', only in the sense of ek-sistence, stands for the reality of the involvement (*Bezug*) of Being in human nature and the fundamental relationship of man to the openness of Being.¹⁶² From this it is clear that ek-sisting is Dasein's essence, because only as ek-sisting, can man 'stand in' (*Innestehen*) or dwell (*wohnen*) in the sphere of Being as man.¹⁶³ The character of 'standing in' or 'ek-sisting', viz., the 'there'

¹⁵⁴ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 319. *BW*, pp. 202-203. Cf. also *EM*, p. 134; *IM*, p. 175. Here, Heidegger claims that the original meaning of the Greek terms '*zoion*' and '*logon*' are lost sight of and the former is taken to mean 'animal', while the latter is taken to mean 'ratio'.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 321; *BW*, p. 204.

¹⁵⁶ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 327; *BW*, p. 210.

¹⁵⁷ Cf. *US*, pp. 45-46; *WL*, p. 167.

¹⁵⁸ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 329; *BW*, p. 212.

¹⁵⁹ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 339; *BW*, p. 222.

¹⁶⁰ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 321; *BW*, p. 204. In his later writings, such as, *Letter on Humanism* and in 'Introduction' to his book *What is Metaphysics?* Heidegger clarifies and interprets the central notion of *Sein und Zeit*, viz., Dasein as existence. He replaces the term 'existence' with 'ek-sistence'.

¹⁶¹ Cf. *SG*, p. 91.

¹⁶² Cf. *WM*, p. 15; *WBGGM*, p. 272.

¹⁶³ Cf. *WM*, p. 14; *WBGGM*, p. 271.

(*das Da*) makes Dasein the lighting of Being (*Lichtung des Seins*).¹⁶⁴ Thus, the true nature of man's essence is unfolded only when Dasein is seen in the light of Being, viz., as ek-sistence.

In the process of Dasein's ek-sisting or dwelling in the light of Being, Heidegger gives primacy to Being and subordinates the role of man to that of Being. If it is not for Being's initial openness to Dasein, he cannot be the lighting of Being. In other words, in the ek-sisting or dwelling of Dasein in the light of Being the role of Being is primary.¹⁶⁵ This becomes clear also when we consider the structure of Dasein as ek-sistence. Heidegger's analysis of the structure of Dasein as ek-sistence follows more or less the pattern in which it is considered in *Sein und Zeit*. The ek-sistence is spoken of as a projection that is essentially thrown and fallen and which is constituted of care. Heidegger speaks of this thrown projection as a 'fateful sending' that is brought about by Being.¹⁶⁶ Heidegger remarks:

...the projection is essentially thrown projection. What throws in projection is not man but Being itself, which sends man into ek-sistence of Dasein that is his essence. This destiny comes to pass as the lighting of Being as which it is. The lighting grants nearness to Being. In this nearness, in the lighting of the *Da*, man dwells as the ek-sisting one without yet being able to properly experience and take over this dwelling.¹⁶⁷

Again, Heidegger indicates that Dasein as ek-sistence is constituted of care by the throw of Being when he says: "Being itself, which as the throw has projected the essence of man into 'care', is as this openness of Being."¹⁶⁸ These two quotes from Heidegger clearly indicate the role of Being in Dasein's dwelling as primary.

But in the process of dwelling in the nearness of Being, though thrown into his destiny by Being, man does play a role. By his dwelling man guards and preserves Being and its truth.¹⁶⁹ Dasein lets himself open to Being and allows Being to shine forth, thereby becoming a lighting-up-place, in which Being dwells and its truth is preserved. This involves, on the part of Dasein, a corresponding openness to the destiny to which the throw of Being leads him. To put it in Heidegger's words: "...for man it is ever a question of finding what is fitting in his essence which corresponds to such destiny; for in accord with this destiny man as ek-sisting has to guard the truth of Being."¹⁷⁰

From what we have said, Heidegger's claim becomes clear. For him, man's essence does not lie in his relationship with entities, i.e., man as the subject and entities as objects over which he looks and manipulates. Rather, the essence of man must be understood in terms of dwelling in the nearness of Being. It involves Dasein's openness or standing out in the lighting of Being, thereby becoming the lighting-up-place of Being. Man is man and is his essential nature only because he ek-sists, i.e., stands out into the openness of Being. Only by dwelling in the light of Being does the 'ek' of ek-sistence essentially unfold.¹⁷¹ To quote Heidegger:

¹⁶⁴ 164. Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 323; *BW*, p. 205.

¹⁶⁵ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 330; *BW*, p. 213.

¹⁶⁶ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 325; *BW*, p. 207.

¹⁶⁷ *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 334; *BW*, p. 217.

¹⁶⁸ *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 346; *BW*, p. 229.

¹⁶⁹ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 330; *BW*, p. 213.

¹⁷⁰ *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 327; *BW*, p. 210.

¹⁷¹ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, pp. 346-347; *BW*, pp. 228-229.

Man is never first and foremost, man on hither side of the world, as a ‘subject’ whether this is taken as ‘I’ or ‘we’. Nor is he simply a mere subject which always simultaneously is related to object, so that his essence lies in the subject-object relation. Rather, before all this, man in his essence is ek-sistant, into the openness of Being, into the open region that lights the ‘between’ within which a ‘relation’ of subject to object can ‘be’.¹⁷²

Thus, only when man dwells, as ek-sistence, in the openness of Being, by being a lighting-up-place for Being, can he have a genuine relationship to entities. Fundamentally and primordially, Dasein, as ek-sistence, is a dweller in the nearness of Being. Dwelling, thus in the light of Being, Dasein can also genuinely dwell among things (*Dingen*) by building and sheltering (sparing) them.

5.2.2.2. Dwelling: Dasein’s Building

According to Heidegger the German terms for dwelling (*Wohnen*) and building (*Bauen*) are intimately related to each other. Although not all buildings are dwelling places, yet one attains dwelling by means of a building. In other words, building is a means to the goal of dwelling. Heidegger, while not denying the means-end relationship between building and dwelling, says that the means-end schema does not help us to see the essential relatedness of building and dwelling as it considers building and dwelling as two separate activities.¹⁷³ Heidegger speaks of an essential relation between building and dwelling, as the former is identical with the latter. This is clear when he says: "...building is not merely a means and a way towards dwelling; to build is it itself already to dwell."¹⁷⁴ In order to understand this relationship between building and dwelling we must etymologically analyze these two terms and their implications.

5.2.2.2.1. Building and Dwelling: An Etymological Analysis

There are two senses of the term ‘*Bauen*’ (building), in both of which it is related to ‘*Wohnen*’ (dwelling). The first or broad sense of the term ‘*Bauen*’ refers to the way in which Dasein is on this earth,¹⁷⁵ while the second or the strict sense signifies the manner in which Dasein comports himself in the structure of the dwelling process in relation to the things for which it cares.¹⁷⁶

Taken in the broad sense, ‘*Bauen*’ is an equivalent of the term ‘*Wohnen*’, for according to Heidegger ‘*Bauen*’ derives from an old High German word ‘*buan*’, which means to remain or to stay in a place, i.e., to dwell. The original meaning of the verb ‘*bauen*’ is lost in the German usage, even though a trace of it is left in the German term ‘*Nachbar*’. The ‘*Nachbar*’, the ‘*Nachgebur*’ or the ‘*Nachge-bauer*’ means the ‘near-dweller’ or the ‘near-by-dweller’, i.e. the neighbor. Again, the verbs related to ‘*bauen*’, such as, ‘*bueren*’, ‘*beuren*’ and ‘*beuron*’ -- all mean to dwell in a place. The root words of ‘*bauen*’ -- ‘*buan*’, ‘*bhu*’ and ‘*beo*’ -- bear an affinity to the German forms

¹⁷² *BH*, Wegmarken, pp. 346-347; *BW*, p. 229. Heidegger does not deny the subject-object relationship between man and entities. But he says that the nature of man is prior to the subject-object relationship, as man’s true nature has to be understood in the light of his relationship to Being. Only in the context of Dasein’s relationship to Being, all other relationships, including the subject-object relationship can be rightly understood.

¹⁷³ Cf. *VA*, pp. 139-140; *BW*, pp. 323-324.

¹⁷⁴ *VA*, p. 140; *BW*, p. 324.

¹⁷⁵ Cf. *VA*, p. 141; *BW*, p. 325.

¹⁷⁶ Cf. *VA*, p. 142; *BW*, p. 325.

of the verb ‘to be’ (*sein*), viz. ‘*ich bin*’, and ‘*du bist*’ (‘I am’ and ‘You are’). Thus, ‘*bauen*’ taken in the broad sense suggests the way in which Dasein is on the earth, viz. his dwelling. In this sense to dwell or to build means to be a human being and to be a mortal on the earth.¹⁷⁷

‘*Bauen*’ considered, in the strict sense, i.e., in relation to that which is built, means to cherish, to protect, to preserve and to care for.¹⁷⁸ In other words, it means to tend or to spare (*schonen*). In this sense also ‘*bauen*’ is related to ‘*wohnen*’. The term ‘*wohnen*’ is derived from the old Saxon term ‘*wuon*’ and the Gothic term ‘*wunian*’. The term ‘*wuon*’ means to remain in a place, like the old use of the term ‘*bauen*’. The term ‘*wunian*’ states the way in which this ‘remaining in a place’ is experienced, i.e., to remain in a place in peace, or to be brought to peace. The German term for peace ‘*Friede*’ has the nuance of ‘being preserved from harm and danger’, ‘to treat with consideration’, ‘taking care of’ and ‘safeguarding’.¹⁷⁹ In other words, the term ‘*wohnen*’ (to dwell) means “to be set at peace...to remain at peace...(and) the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its essence,”¹⁸⁰ i.e., to tend or to spare. To quote Heidegger: “The fundamental character of dwelling is this sparing.”¹⁸¹ Thus, it is clear that ‘*bauen*’ in the strict sense also means ‘*wohnen*’. In this sense, to dwell or to build means to let things be in their essence, by sparing them within the light of Being.

5.2.2.2.2. Building as Dwelling

It is to the second sense of ‘*bauen*’ that Heidegger refers when he talks about building things by sparing them. Building, in the sense of sparing or dwelling involves the notion of accomplishing something by toil or doing something by work -- as for example tilling the soil or cultivating the vine.¹⁸² Heidegger mentions two modes of building, viz. building as cultivating (*colere*) as the farmer does the cultivating in the fields, and building in the sense of raising edifices (*aedificare*) as the construction-worker constructs a temple.¹⁸³ In both of these cases man builds (*bauen*) or accomplishes something: in cultivating, it is the farm that he cultivates; in constructing, it is the temple he constructs. In both cases, one must address two questions: the first is about the nature of the ‘thing’ (*Ding*) built, the second is about the nature of building or accomplishing (*Bauen*). Limiting himself to the second mode of Building, viz., building in the sense of constructing a ‘bridge’ as an example for the thing,¹⁸⁴ Heidegger addresses these questions.

Raising the question of the nature of the ‘thing’, Heidegger speaks of it in a way that is different from the traditional understanding. For him, the thing is not “the Roman ‘*res*’, the late Greek ‘*on*’, the medieval Latin ‘*res*’ or the modern *Gegenstand* (object).”¹⁸⁵ A thing, fundamentally, is not something that is; but rather something that ‘things’ (*dingt*). The old High German word ‘*Ding*’ (thing) means ‘gathering’ (*Versammlung*). In ‘thinging’ the thing gathers the fourfold (*Geviert*) -- earth, sky, divinities and mortals -- into a thing. In this thinging of the thing, i.e., in the gathering of the fourfold in the thing Being presences itself in the thing and the thing

¹⁷⁷ Cf. VA, p. 141; BW, pp. 324-325.

¹⁷⁸ Cf. VA, p. 142; BW, p. 325.

¹⁷⁹ Cf. VA, p. 143; BW, pp. 326-327.

¹⁸⁰ VA, p. 143; BW, p. 327.

¹⁸¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁸² Cf. VA, p. 143; BW, p. 325.

¹⁸³ Cf. *ibid.*

¹⁸⁴ Cf. VA, p. 146; BW, pp. 329-330.

¹⁸⁵ Johnson Puthenpurackal, p. 186. Cf. also VA, p. 169; PLT, p. 177.

'is' in its being.¹⁸⁶ Each thing gathers into itself the fourfold in its unique way. To take the example of the bridge, it gathers the earth as the landscape around the stream. It gathers the sky by being ready for sky's weather and its changing nature. The bridge gathers before the divinities and visibly gives thanks for their presence, even though their presence is obstructed or wholly pushed aside by our thoughtlessness. It gathers the mortals, as mortals, by granting them their way that they may come and go from one shore to another. In this manner, the bridge, as a thing, gathers to itself the fourfold -- earth, sky, divinities and mortals -- in its unique way.¹⁸⁷

The gathering of the fourfold is localized into a place (*Ort*). But the place did not exist, as a place prior to the bridge, even though there were many sites (*Staeette*) by the riverbank where it could arise. In other words, there comes about a place only because of the bridge as a thing.¹⁸⁸ Space is something that has been made room for by place. It is a certain free area within a boundary in which the thing begins to come-to-presence. Therefore, the essence of the space depends on place¹⁸⁹ and it comes about as a result of the thinging of the thing. In other words, place and space are understood only in relation to the thinging of the thing, viz. in the gathering of the fourfold into the thing.

Now that we have clarified the nature of the thing, we could consider the nature of the building (*Bauen*). The building of the bridge does not consist in the human activity of fashioning the concrete structure we call bridge though that is not excluded, Heidegger clarifies this point as follows:

...the essence of the erecting of buildings cannot be understood adequately in terms either of architecture or of engineering construction, nor in terms of a mere combination of the two. The erecting of buildings would not suitably be defined even if we were to think of it in the sense of the original Greek '*techne*' as solely a letting-appear, which brings something made, as something present, among the things that are already present.¹⁹⁰

On the contrary, erecting buildings, according to Heidegger, is a process of bringing forth (*herbringen*) or letting-dwell Being in the limits of the thing and, in turn, letting the thing itself presence (*hervorbringen*) what it is in itself. Thus, for Heidegger, "the essence of building is letting dwell"¹⁹¹ by which Dasein brings forth things as things and lets things be things.

It is by the process of letting things be things that Dasein builds or spares Being in beings. The building is a dwelling in the sense that Dasein lets Being dwell in things. Commenting on this point William J. Richardson says that sparing Being in beings, and building beings by bringing them forth as they are in themselves are one and the same. In fact, in sparing Being in beings, Dasein brings forth things as things.¹⁹² Dasein can build things in this way, because of the bi-dimensional character of his dwelling. William J. Richardson notes:

...it (Dasein) can let things shine forth in their own 'place', occupying their own 'space', because from the very beginning its (his) open-ness to Being is an open-ness to all 'space',...its (his)

¹⁸⁶ Cf. *VA*, p. 166; *PLT*, p. 174.

¹⁸⁷ 187. Cf. *VA*, pp. 147-148; *BW*, pp. 330-331.

¹⁸⁸ Cf. *VA*, p. 149; *BW*, pp. 331-332.

¹⁸⁹ Cf. *VA*, p. 149; *BW*, p. 332.

¹⁹⁰ *VA*, p. 155; *BW*, p. 337.

¹⁹¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁹² Cf. William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 586.

ontological dimension, is a constitutional near-ness to things. But only when this ontological dimension is articulated on the ontic level in things among which There-Being (Dasein) sojourns does There-Being (Dasein) find itself (himself) genuinely 'at home' in its (his) near-ness to things.¹⁹³

But the bi-dimensional character of Dasein does not bring about the building and sparing things. There is a need, on the part of Dasein, to dwell in the openness of Being as ek-sisting, that he can effectively build things as things, for "...building is really dwelling."¹⁹⁴ To quote Heidegger: "We do not dwell because we have built, but we build and have built because we dwell, that is, we are dwellers."¹⁹⁵ Again he says: "Only if we are capable of dwelling, only then can we build."¹⁹⁶ Heidegger concludes that "Dasein must ever learn to dwell"¹⁹⁷ by being open and docile to the voice of Being.

5.2.3. *Seeing the Truth of Being*

Essential thinking of Being and dwelling in the neighborhood of Being takes Dasein to the third stage of the way to the goal, viz., seeing the truth of Being. The truth of Being consists in Dasein recognizing his relationship of belonging-together to Being, the relation of difference that exists between Being and entities and history as the time-space play of Being. When the truth of Being dawns on Dasein, he becomes a shepherd who guards Being as it is manifested in relation to himself, the entities and history. Speaking about Dasein, as the seer and the shepherd of Being, Heidegger says: "Man is not a lord of beings (*Seienden*). Man is the shepherd of Being (*Sein*). Man loses nothing 'less', rather he gains in that he attains the truth of Being. He gains the central poverty of the shepherd, whose dignity consists in being called by Being itself into the preservation of Being's truth."¹⁹⁸

Man, thus, is the shepherd of Being and its truth. In other words, he is called by Being to be its guardian and preserver. The manner in which he needs to exercise the guardianship is not one of lording over, but is one of waiting on and attending to Being. Only when Dasein dwells in the neighborhood of Being, can he become a shepherd, because as a shepherd Dasein is an attendant, who waits on the presencing of Being. A shepherd is not a stranger; but he knows the neighborhood as he had been dwelling in the nearest of the near.¹⁹⁹ Only by dwelling there can Dasein become a shepherd.

Such a shepherd is a seer of the truth of Being. The German word '*wissen*' (to see) and its Latin equivalent '*videre*', signify 'seeing' in the sense of attaining wisdom, rather than mere intellectual seeing. A seer is one who has already seen the presencing of Being²⁰⁰ as revealing and concealing.²⁰¹ The seeing is determined not by the eye, but by the lighting of Being that has been

¹⁹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁹⁴ *VA*, p. 142; *BW*, p. 326.

¹⁹⁵ *VA*, p. 143; *BW*, p. 326.

¹⁹⁶ *VA*, p. 154; *BW*, p. 338.

¹⁹⁷ *VA*, p. 155; *BW*, p. 339.

¹⁹⁸ *BH*, Wegmarken, pp. 338-339; *BW*, p. 221.

¹⁹⁹ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 348; *BW*, p. 231.

²⁰⁰ Cf. *HW*, p. 321; *EGT*, p. 36.

²⁰¹ Cf. *HW*, p. 320; *EGT*, p. 35.

given to him already.²⁰² The shepherd, in shepherding the truth of Being, stands in the light of Being's presence and thereby sees the truth of Being. Therefore, the shepherd of Being is the seer of Being. The shepherd, in shepherding Being, sees its truth. In other words, the seer is "a shepherd who attends on, and watches over...sees the revealing-concealing play of Being"²⁰³ in history. The whole process of seeing the truth of Being belongs to the realm of *Ereignis*, in which Dasein and Being own each other. In this mutual owning of Dasein and Being, Dasein is bestowed the highest dignity of being the shepherd and the seer of Being.

5.3. The Attainment

Now that we have analyzed the three stages of the way, we could highlight the attainment of the goal, i.e., Being-experience. Essential thinking is attained in release (*Gelassenheit*).²⁰⁴ Dwelling occurs in Dasein in relation to his homecoming to the source and sparing the fourfold in things. Seeing the truth of Being becomes a reality for Dasein when he opens himself to the unconcealment of Being and to language, the house of Being. In attaining the goal, at every stage, there is a genuine interaction between Being and Dasein: Being's gift of itself to Dasein and Dasein's corresponding response in receiving Being's gift. In this section, we attempt to bring to light the twofold movement on the part of Being and Dasein in attaining the goal.

5.3.1. Essential Thinking

According to Heidegger, essential thinking occurs in relation to release (*Gelassenheit*). Heidegger refers to the term '*Gelassenheit*' as an 'old word'.²⁰⁵ By this he points to the affinity of the word to the German mystical tradition, special to the thought of Meister Eckhart.²⁰⁶ Heidegger himself, as with the case of thinking, does not attempt to write a treatise about *Gelassenheit*, but rather was interested in its occurrence.

Regarding the nature of release, we have a clear statement of Heidegger. In the context of Dasein's attitude towards technology, he says that the term '*Gelassenheit*' expresses a 'yes' and a 'no' at the same time.²⁰⁷ In other words, it is an attitude of accepting technology in one's everyday life, but at the same time not being mastered by it. We could say that it is a state of consciousness in which Dasein is involved with things, yet not entangled with them. For Heidegger, the state of release is primordially brought about by Being, but Dasein also has to play his part. Thus, release is a task to be accomplished both by Being and Dasein. In the following pages, we will attempt to analyze the attainment of essential thinking in release by the cooperation of Being and Dasein.

²⁰² Cf. *HW*, p. 321; *EGT*, p. 36.

²⁰³ Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 202.

²⁰⁴ The German term '*Gelassenheit*' has the nuances of 'composure', 'serenity' and 'setting-free'. Cf. *DT*, p. 54, fn. 4. It is usually rendered in English as 'releasement'. We prefer to translate it as 'release', because it is a better English formulation of the German term '*Gelassenheit*' and contains all the nuances of the English term 'releasement'.

²⁰⁵ Cf. *GL*, p. 23; *DT*, p. 54.

²⁰⁶ Meister Eckhart was a mystic of the middle ages, whose thinking had tremendous influence on Heidegger's thought. But the difference is that Eckhart is a Christian mystic, while Heidegger is a thinker of Being.

²⁰⁷ Cf. *GL*, p. 23; *DT*, p. 54.

5.3.1.1. Release: The Task of Being

In dealing with release in his book *Discourse on Thinking*, Heidegger uses a new term to refer to Being (*Sein*). He calls Being ‘*Gegnet*’, which is rendered in English as ‘that-which-regions’.²⁰⁸ Heidegger says that *Gegnet* is the primordial openness which ‘gathers’ (*versammelt*)²⁰⁹ and is characterized by expanse (*weite*) and abiding (*weile*), which in turn point to the spatio-temporal character of the *Gegnet*.²¹⁰ Heidegger calls it ‘region-of-all-regions’.²¹¹ Thus, *Gegnet* is nothing other than Being in its spatio-temporal character.

There are two ways in which the regioning of ‘that-which-regions’ (*das Gegen der Gegnet*) manifests itself relating to Dasein and things. Firstly, the regioning of ‘that-which-regions’ relating to Dasein is *Vergegnis* (regioning). It is a primordial regioning by which ‘that-which-regions’ lets Dasein be open to it, in the sense of Dasein being appropriated to it.²¹² In other words, *Vergegnis* is that letting by Being which helps Dasein to rise above the pulls and pushes of everyday existence and to turn towards ‘that-which-regions’, resulting in Dasein’s freedom to be himself. Secondly, Heidegger speaks of a second type of letting of ‘that-which-regions’ in relation to things. This type of regioning is called *Bedingnis* (bethinging). It consists in letting things be things. Things are things only when they are let to rest in the abiding expanse of ‘that-which-regions’. A thing is a thing only insofar as it is ‘bethinged’ by ‘that-which-regions’.²¹³ These two types of regioning by ‘that-which-regions’ (Being) in the relation of Dasein and things should not be understood in the causal sense or in the transcendental-horizonal sense. Therefore, it is neither an ontic nor ontological relationship. It is a relationship that belongs to the realm of Being, as ‘that-which-regions’.²¹⁴ Thus, ‘that-which-regions’ by *Vergegnis* lets Dasein be open to the region of ‘that-which-regions’, and by *Bedingnis* lets things be things. In so doing Being initiates the process of release, which activity of Being is primary in the process of release.

5.3.1.2. Release: The Task of Dasein

Release is the task not only of Being, but also of Dasein. Though ‘that-which-regions’ lets Dasein to be open to itself, release cannot come about until Dasein is released towards ‘that-which-regions’.²¹⁵ Dasein must ‘turn from’ will, which for Heidegger is the basis of all representative-calculative thinking and must ‘turn to’ Being by waiting on it. In the following section, we could elaborate Dasein’s twofold tasks of ‘turning from’ and ‘turning to’.

5.3.1.2.1. Non-willing: The Negative Step

The first step towards the attainment of release is a turning from willing. As representational-calculative thinking is a kind of willing, such thinking cannot be stopped by will as willing strengthens willing. Release cannot come about unless Dasein is ready to give up willing. In other words,

²⁰⁸ Cf. *DT*, p.66, fn. 1.

²⁰⁹ Cf. *GL*, p. 38; *DT*, p. 65.

²¹⁰ Cf. *WP*, p. 13; *WIP*, p. 49.

²¹¹ Cf. *GL*, p. 40; *DT*, p. 66.

²¹² 212. Cf. *GL*, p. 51; *DT*, p. 75.

²¹³ Cf. *GL*, p. 52; *DT*, p. 75.

²¹⁴ Cf. *GL*, p. 53; *DT*, pp. 75-76.

²¹⁵ Cf. *GL*, p. 49; *DT*, p. 73.

as long as Dasein is able to wean itself from willing it can move towards release.²¹⁶ Therefore, the ‘turning from’ willing amounts to non-willing (*Nicht-wollen*). It consists in willingly renouncing willing.²¹⁷ Renouncing willing involves a trace of willing as we have to will not to will. Heidegger says that such traces of willing in willing non-willing disappear and dissipate in release.²¹⁸ To say that release is beyond willing would amount to the passivity of Dasein in the state of release. This claim is not true, as the distinction of willing and non-willing, activity and passivity, all belong to the domain of the will. Since release is a state that is beyond the realm of the will, all such distinctions do not apply to release.²¹⁹ The so-called ‘not-doing’ associated with the released individual, says Heidegger, is not a cowardly allowing of things to drift along,²²⁰ but a power of action and resolve.²²¹ Non-willing is the first though negative step that Dasein must take in order to free himself from his entanglement with, and domination by, things. Once Dasein is turned away from willing, he can begin to wait on Being.

5.3.1.2.2. Waiting: The Positive Step

Dasein’s positive response to the regioning (*Vergegnis*) of ‘that-which-regions’ is waiting (*Warten*). It is an attitude of Dasein, which consists in taking a deliberate stand of attentiveness to Being. Such a waiting lets Being present itself as itself; it is doing nothing but waiting.²²² We always await something, while in waiting there is not real object. "In waiting we leave open what we are waiting for."²²³ In waiting, we release ourselves into openness, because we leave open that for which we wait. Waiting moves into openness without any representation. To wait is to be on the way (*unter-wegs*) towards openness, i.e., Being.²²⁴

Waiting, on the part of man, involves a twofold movement: one towards things, the other towards Being. Firstly, the movement of waiting towards things is called ‘release towards things’ (*die Gelassenheit zu den Dingen*). It is an attitude of Dasein that is ambivalent. It is saying ‘yes’ and ‘no’ to the same thing at the same time: ‘yes’ because we need the thing as it has a reference to our life; ‘no’ because we do not want the thing to dominate us and take our life where it wants. If we are released towards things, Heidegger says our relationship to things becomes "wonderfully simple and relaxed."²²⁵ Secondly, the movement of waiting towards Being is ‘openness to the mystery’ (*die Offenheit fuer Geheimnis*). When we deal with things, or when we are affected by them either by fascination or dislike, the meaning of these happenings tends to be hidden. We tend to be taken over by external dimensions of reality while being totally blind to the mystery-dimension or the inner aspect of reality. To quote Heidegger: "...we stand at once within the realm of that which hides itself from us, and hides itself just in approaching us."²²⁶ Everything in the world has this mystery dimension which hides itself. Heidegger cites the example of technology.

²¹⁶ Cf. *GL*, p. 31; *DT*, pp. 59-60.

²¹⁷ Cf. *GL*, p. 30; *DT*, p. 59.

²¹⁸ Cf. *GL*, p. 59; *DT*, p. 81.

²¹⁹ Cf. *GL*, p. 33; *DT*, p. 61.

²²⁰ 220. Cf. *ibid.*

²²¹ Cf. *GL*, p. 58; *DT*, p. 80.

²²² Cf. *GL*, p. 42; *DT*, p. 68.

²²³ *Ibid.*

²²⁴ Cf. *GL*, p. 48; *DT*, p. 72.

²²⁵ Cf. *GL*, pp. 23-24; *DT*, pp. 54 -55.

²²⁶ Cf. *GL*, p. 24; *DT*, p. 55.

In waiting, we turn towards the dimension of mystery in things. The more in waiting we open ourselves to the mystery-dimension of reality, to that extent release occurs in us²²⁷ and we become thinkers of Being. For Heidegger, release towards things and openness to mystery belong together. They help us to live in the world in a different way by giving us new ground on which to stand and a new vision to guide our lives.²²⁸

5.3.2. Dwelling in Being's Nearness

Dwelling is attained in Dasein in relation both to Being and beings. When Dasein opens himself to the poetic presencing of Being by poetic dwelling, he dwells in the neighborhood of Being. This involves a homecoming (*Heimkommen*) or return (*Rueckkehr*) to the source (*Ursprung*)²²⁹ at the summoning of Being, and preservation of this original homecoming by a re-collective (poetic) dwelling in the three ecstases of time. Dasein dwells among things when he lets beings be in their being. This is done by keeping (sparing) the fourfold, viz., the three 'facets' of Being in things, thereby letting things be things. Here, we will consider the attainment of dwelling in relation to the homecoming and to the fourfold.

5.3.2.1. The Homecoming: Being in Dasein

In many of his writings, Heidegger speaks of a 'homelessness' (*Heimlosigkeit*) of man. It is not a 'housing-shortage' (*Wohnung-snot*) or a lack of houses in which to dwell. 'Homelessness' consists in being 'strangers' in one's own homeland (*Heimat*), and being a neighbor (*Nachbar*) to the world dominated by technology. It is loss of man's rootedness (*Bodenständigkeit*)²³⁰ in Being. Besides, 'homelessness' is an abandonment of Being and a symptom of the forgetfulness of Being,²³¹ which, in fact, is a being away from the homeland, which for Heidegger is the nearness to Being.²³² Dasein's homecoming is dwelling in its homeland, i.e. nearness to Being. Dasein is summoned to the homeland by a primordial poetic presencing to which Dasein responds by poetic dwelling. This is our concern in this section.

5.3.2.1.1. Poetic Presencing: The Original Homecoming

It is Being which summons Dasein to his homeland. This takes the form of Being manifesting itself to Dasein in its characteristics. Firstly, Being is Glad-some (*das Heitere*), which suggests the nuances of brightness of light, serenity and gentle joy.²³³ The Glad-some is the source of joy and so is the most Joyous (*das Freudigste*). By sending rays of joy the Glad-some enlightens the homeland and makes it a welcome place for the homecoming Dasein. This, in turn, lights up the

²²⁷ Cf. *ibid.*

²²⁸ Cf. *ibid.*

²²⁹ 229. Cf. *HD*, p. 23; *EB*, p. 258.

²³⁰ Cf. *GL*, pp. 15-16; *DT*, pp. 48-49.

²³¹ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, pp. 335-336; *BW*, pp. 218-219.

²³² Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 335; *BW*, p. 218.

²³³ Cf. *HD*, p. 18; *EB*, p. 247. In this text, '*das Heitere*' is translated as the 'serene'. But William J. Richardson translates it as the 'Glad-some', as 'serenity' is one of the nuances contained in the German term. Cf. William J. Richardson, p. 444, fn. 8.

disposition of the home-comer to experience all that is noble in the homeland.²³⁴ Secondly, Being presents itself as the Holy (*das Heilig*). By ‘the Holy’ Heidegger means neither God nor gods. ‘The Holy’ is the ultimate conserving power which guards beings in the integrity of their being. Being as the Glad-some is the Holy, the articulation of which constitutes the primordial poem seen as the ‘thoughts’ of Being-as-the-spirit.²³⁵ Thirdly, Being shows itself as the Origin (*Ursprung*). Heidegger says: "...what is most proper and most precious in the homeland consists simply in the fact that it is this nearness to the Origin -- and nothing besides..."²³⁶ Being, as the Origin is best understood in the image of an overflowing and continuous source. It is Being as source that attracts the poet-wanderer to its nearness.²³⁷ Finally, Being itself shines forth as the Ground (*Grund*). Though Being is a continuous source and gives itself out, it constantly retains itself as the source. In other words, Being while giving itself out does not empty itself, but rather it remains a steadfast and consistent source. It is in this sense of self-retaining and continuous source that Being presents itself as the Ground.²³⁸

Thus, Being summons Dasein to its nearness by manifesting itself as the Glad-some, the most Joyous, the Holy, the Origin and the Ground. In Being’s manifestation of its qualities begins Dasein’s homecoming. Heidegger considers Dasein’s homecoming in terms of poetry, viz., in terms of bringing into poetry, the primordial poetic presencing of Being. Being addresses and hails itself as the primordial poem, to which the poet (Dasein) must give expression in words. Dasein’s homeland is to be found in the very source that hails Dasein, viz., Being.²³⁹ There are three moments or stages in the poet’s homecoming.

The first moment depicts the poet’s early days and his experience of the source. As a youth the poet grows up in the realm of the source without ever fully appreciating it. But as his poetic spirit is ‘open to the open’ he has some (pre-ontological) awareness of Being. But this awareness is often obscured as the source manifests itself in finite beings. The more he aims at penetrating the mystery of the source manifested in beings he gets lost in things, and Being, as it were, evades him. Because of the withdrawing nature of the source he is not able to hold off the difference between Being and beings.²⁴⁰ In spite of this state of forgetfulness of Being, the poetic spirit (Being) keeps him oriented towards Being. The orientation towards the source brings in the poet an awakening to go abroad to seek that which brings him closer to the source. Heidegger illustrates this by the German poet, who is the master of form (clarity of exposition), but fully forgets the spirit, viz., fire, which is the characteristic of the Greek poet. The German poet can have fire only if he has the courage to leave the homeland and make the journey abroad so that in coming back after the journey, he can dwell genuinely ‘at home’ near the source.²⁴¹ Such a journey abroad is an essential condition for the homecoming and becoming-at-home. Indeed, the journey from its first moment is a returning, as it is that which makes the poet experience what he really is, i.e., his poetic destiny.²⁴²

²³⁴ Cf. *HD*, pp. 14, 18; *EB*, pp. 247-248.

²³⁵ Cf. *HD*, pp. 17, 18, 86, 108, 116.

²³⁶ *HD*, p. 23; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 445.

²³⁷ Cf. *HD*, pp. 88, 125, 138.

²³⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 75, 138.

²³⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 23.

²⁴⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 87-89.

²⁴¹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 83-84, 89.

²⁴² Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 79, 87.

The second moment is the actual taking of the journey abroad. To experience the source, the poet must move with the stream, move down to the sea and experience the richness of the source.²⁴³ To appreciate the native soil, as the homeland that is near to the source, the poet must make a voyage to the land of Greece²⁴⁴ and be burned by the fire of Being.²⁴⁵ In the journey, the poet is constantly guided by Being. Every experience abroad reveals more and more of home. Finally, "...the fire has let him experience that it itself must be brought back from abroad into the homeland in order that there this proper endowment, the facility for clear expression can release its native powers in relation to the fire."²⁴⁶ It, in turn, will help him to produce a poetry of proper depth.

The third moment is the poet's return to the homeland. The return to the homeland, enriched by his experience abroad, brings the poet to maturity. It helps the poet possess the homeland in a new and authentic way.²⁴⁷ For example, the poet's voyage to Greece and being burned by the fire which is characteristic of Greek poetry, helps him to understand the disciplined style and clarity of expression of German poetry in a new way, which, in turn, makes him a mature poet.²⁴⁸ Thus, the poet's homecoming helps him to understand his homeland in a new way. It is a moving into the nearness²⁴⁹ and a following of the source.²⁵⁰ But the passage into the source is not such that we can dissolve the mystery dimension of the source or Being. The poet can never get at this fully. So Being as mystery has to be faced with reverential awe (*Scheu*).²⁵¹ Being, as Joyous, is experienced by the poet with joy (*Freude*).²⁵² Thus, the poet experiences Being by varying attunements. In the process he comes to the nearness of Being, and finds that therein lies his homeland. Being-at-home in his homeland, i.e., by his dwelling in the neighborhood of Being, the poet is able to sing or give expression, in poetry, to the Being-dimension of beings. It is the genuine homecoming and dwelling.

According to Heidegger, the following and drawing near to the source involved in homecoming is not something accomplished once for all. It is Dasein's original experience of homecoming which is brought about by the summoning of Being; this is Dasein's original return to the source, i.e., Being. The process must continue as long as the poet remains a poet; it must be sustained and preserved by a continuous abiding in the nearness to the source, thereby making it a place of dwelling (*Wohnen*).²⁵³ To quote Heidegger: "The one condition of becoming-at-home in his proper domain,...the journey abroad has been fulfilled. But this fulfillment remains fulfillment only on the condition that what has been experienced...is preserved."²⁵⁴

5.3.2.1.2. Poetic Dwelling: Preserving the Original Homecoming

²⁴³ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 137-138.

²⁴⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 78-79.

²⁴⁵ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 90.

²⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 89; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 451.

²⁴⁷ Cf. *HD*, p. 89.

²⁴⁸ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 14, 109.

²⁴⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 113.

²⁵⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 138.

²⁵¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 124.

²⁵² Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 24 -25

²⁵³ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 137-139.

²⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 121; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 453.

Poetic dwelling consists in the poet's continuous keeping of what he learned from the journey, viz., his awareness of the begin-nings, the turning points and his original return. Besides, it involves a deeper appreciation of the Being's poetic presencing, as the Glad-some, the Joyous, the Holy, the Source and the Ground, which has in the first place made the original homecoming possible. In other words, poetic dwelling involves a re-collecting poetically upon 'what-is-past'. Such a poetic dwelling is not a mere remembering of 'what-is-past' as past. Rather, besides effectively bringing to memory 'what-is-past', it makes the original homecoming a 'still-to-come' experience in the future and a present experience of giving utterance to the original experience in the form of poetry. Thus, poetic dwelling, by which Dasein continues to dwell in the nearness of Being, is temporal and has the dimensions of recalling the past, coming to the future and rendering the present in relation to the original homecoming. We shall elaborate the poetic dwelling in these aspects of temporality, viz., the past, the future and the present.

The past, viz., the original homecoming which was Being's poetic presencing is that on which the poet must poetically dwell. The past, in question, is not a mere memory of what has happened once and is forgotten, but has a lasting influence on the poet. Thus, the past still is a 'having been'. The past, as 'having been' is real to the poet now, as it was for him when he first experienced it.²⁵⁵ The poetic dwelling on the past as 'having been' on the part of the poet is a greeting or hailing (*Gruessen*)²⁵⁶ of Being for its poetic presencing. It involves a certain docility and self-surrender on the part of the hailer (the poet) to the hailed (Being). In doing so, the hailer allows the hailed, by his openness to be hailed, to shine forth in a way that is proper to the hailed. The hailed accepts the hail of the hailer and, in turn, hails the hailer.²⁵⁷ Thus, in the reciprocal hailing of Being and the poet (Dasein), the original homecoming is relived and thereby preserved. Heidegger remarks on this point as follows: "The heavenly fire (Being) imposes itself on him (the poet) who hails it...as thought and abides near him as that which comes-to-presence in...what-is-past (the original experience of homecoming)."²⁵⁸

The Holy or the Hailed is also the poet's future, because by his poetic destiny the poet must bring forth in words the original poetic presencing of the Holy.²⁵⁹ The Holy comes to the poet as a primordial poem, before his poetizing. The poet must bring the primordial poem into words. Thus, for the poet to dwell poetically upon 'what-is-past', i.e., upon the primordial poetic presencing of Being (original homecoming), is to dwell upon 'what-is-coming' to him in the future, as by his poetic dwelling the poet experiences again and preserves the Holy as given in 'what-is-past'. Conversely, dwelling upon 'what-is-coming' is to dwell upon 'what-is-past'. In other words, the poet dwells upon the Holy that is given in the past as 'having been' (the past) and as 'that-which-is-coming' (the future). Thus, in the Holy the past and the future are unified.²⁶⁰

When the Holy gives itself as the primordial poem and continues to come (future) to the poet, who has been hailed by the Holy itself by its original poetic presencing (past), the task of the poet is to render present (present) the Holy in the words of his poetry. The poet does this, insofar as he poetically dwells, by being at home near the source. The present dimension of the poetic dwelling consists fundamentally in that the poet learns to use his native propensity for poetry, viz. the ability for the clear expression and organization of the poetry with an authentic freedom of the spirit. In

²⁵⁵ Cf. *HD*, pp. 79-80, 110.

²⁵⁶ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 91.

²⁵⁷ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 92.

²⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 110; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 454.

²⁵⁹ Cf. *HD*, p. 98.

²⁶⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 107-108.

the initial stage of poetic presencing the poet, though close to the source, neither knew the source clearly, nor was aware of his inner propensity for poetry. But the original homecoming liberates him, and lets him know and dwell in the homeland, i.e., in nearness to Being, besides letting him know his native ability for poetry in a new way. Thus, the poet now knowing the source and the homeland, dwells in it poetically and gives authentic expression to his experience of the source and the homeland, facilitated by his new awareness of his native ability for poetry. It happens only as a result of the poet's experience of the original homecoming. To quote Heidegger: "... (The poet) exercises (his) native endowment, the clarity of expression, 'freely' only then, when what is clear in his utterance is permeated by the open experience of that which is exposed."²⁶¹

Thus, original poetic presencing of Being, i.e., the original homecoming of the poet is preserved and sustained as an ever-present dwelling in the nearness of being by poetic-dwelling. This involves: re-calling it as an experience of the hailing of Being in the past; waiting on it as an experience in which the Holy (Being) continues to come to the poet in the future; and experiencing the Holy in the here and now, to which the poet gives the fullest expression in the present in poetry by using his inner ability for poetic utterance in an authentic freedom of the spirit. From what we have said, it could be concluded that the original presencing of Being in the primordial poem is preserved and sustained in the poetry or in the poetic word of the poet. William J. Richardson speaks of the poetic word of the poet as "... a word of 'hailing' inasmuch as it greets what is past; at the same time, it is a 'prophetic' word, inasmuch as it articulates what is coming; both for the same reason because it seeks to utter past and future in their original correlation, the holy as such. Such a word can be uttered only if the poet has learned to use his native talent with a freedom that is genuine."²⁶²

Heidegger thus speaks of the attainment of dwelling in the nearness of Being in terms of poetizing, both on the part of Being and of Dasein (poet). Dasein is a dweller in the neighborhood of Being when he experiences the giving of Being in poetic presencing and preserves it by poetic dwelling by giving expression to his experience of Being in poetry. By using the image of poetic giving, poetic receiving and poetry, Heidegger drives home the point that Dasein's dwelling in the nearness of Being is brought about by a reciprocal interaction of Being and Dasein.

5.3.2.2. Dasein's Keeping (Sparing) the Fourfold: Being in Things

Dasein's dwelling among things consists in sparing and preserving the fourfold. "To save the earth, to receive the sky, to wait on divinities and to initiate mortals -- this fourfold preserving is the simple essence of dwelling."²⁶³ 'To spare' or 'to preserve' means to take something under one's care or to look after something. To preserve the fourfold, thus, means to keep it under the watchful care of Dasein. The sparing of the fourfold by Dasein involves a mode of Dasein's relating to things, by and in which Dasein spares the fourfold in things. In other words, Dasein, by his relation to things lets them gather the fourfold in themselves. This, in turn, means that Dasein lets the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals bring the structure of the world in which things can be what they are in their being,²⁶⁴ in the primordial unity of the fourfold. Dasein, as the dweller and the builder, plays the key role in sparing things by bringing about the unity of the fourfold in things. Man is the 'Da' of 'Sein' and he dwells in the fourfold, by gathering the fourfold in things. To

²⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p. 111; Cf. also *ibid.*, p. 112.

²⁶² William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 457.

²⁶³ *VA*, p. 153; *BW*, p. 336.

²⁶⁴ Cf. Vincent Vycinas, p. 115.

quote Heidegger: "Mortals are in the fourfold by dwelling."²⁶⁵ The dwelling of Dasein, as mortal, in the fourfold is the sparing and building of things.

Firstly, mortals dwell in that they save (*retten*) the earth. The term 'saving' is not to be taken in the sense of preventing something from danger or destruction. Saving the earth means much more than to exploit or to wear the earth out by the manipulative nature of science and technology. By saving the earth, mortals not only prevent mastering and subjugating the earth, but also set the earth free so that it can be its true nature. In the concrete, this means to leave it in its essence, guard it by sustaining it in its elements, and thus allow the emerging vegetation and animal life. In other words, saving the earth consists in using the earth in the proper way, instead of exploiting and destroying it.²⁶⁶

Secondly, mortals dwell insofar as they receive or accept (*empfangen*) the sky as the sky. This means that "they leave to the sun and to the moon their journey, to the stars their course, to the seasons their blessings and their inclemency; they do not turn night into day and day into a harassed unrest."²⁶⁷ Concrete, this would imply that mortals must respect the unnamed and guard the unknown. This is not attempting to solve the secrets of Being by raising up metaphysical systems and rational thinking, but to respect the mystery of Being. When no help is offered in knowing these mysteries the dweller is patient, and when lights are offered he guards their rays from everyday idle-talk.²⁶⁸ In other words, it involves a 'letting-things-be-as-they-are' and letting them reveal their essential being.

Thirdly, mortals dwell in that they wait on (*erwarten*) the divinities as divinities. In hope they look up to the divinities to receive what they hoped for. This involves Dasein being attentive and alert to receiving signs of intimations regarding the appearing of the divinities and that they do not miss the signs of their absence. Besides, they are also asked not to make their own gods and warned against worshipping idols. Concretely, this means that mortals should not mistake a being (*Seiende*) for Being (*Sein*). The idols of calculative thinking must be left behind. In case the Holy has withdrawn, they must wait for the arrival of the "weal that has been withdrawn."²⁶⁹

Fourthly, mortals dwell in that they initiate their own essential nature, viz., their being capable of facing death as death. While saving the earth, receiving the sky, waiting on divinities, Dasein must dwell in the perspective of his own mortal nature. Death, according to Heidegger, is not an empty something which is our life's goal; nor is it only an end-point of one's life. Death is a continuous process in the life of Dasein. Therefore, dying a good death is the same as living a new life. In fact, an authentic realization of his mortality can help Dasein to dwell genuinely in the fourfold in its unity, and thereby spare and build things.²⁷⁰

Dwelling on the earth (*auf der Erde*) Dasein thus saves the earth as the earth; by dwelling under the sky (*unter dem Himmel*) he receives the sky as the sky; by dwelling before the divinities (*vor den Goettlichen*) he waits on the divinities as divinities; and finally by taking upon himself his own essence of mortality, by accepting death as death, he preserves the fourfold and thereby dwells among things. In so doing Dasein builds things in their essential being or spares Being in beings. "Dwelling inasmuch as it keeps the fourfold in things, is, as this keeping, a

²⁶⁵ VA, p. 144; BW, p. 328. Cf. also Johnson J. Puthenpuraackal, p. 158.

²⁶⁶ Cf. VA, p. 144; BW, p. 328. Cf. also Werner Marx, *Heidegger and Tradition*, p. 238.

²⁶⁷ VA, p. 144; BW, p. 328.

²⁶⁸ Cf. Thomas Langan, *Meaning of Heidegger*, p. 126.

²⁶⁹ Cf. VA, p. 145; BW, p. 328. Cf. also Thomas Langan, *Meaning of Heidegger*, pp. 126-127.

²⁷⁰ Cf. VA, p. 145; BW, p. 329. Cf. also James M. Demske, "Heidegger's Quadrangle and the Revelation of Being," p. 253.

building."²⁷¹ Dasein, by his fourfold sparing of the things, by dwelling in the fourfold, lets things be things in relation to the four facets of Being, viz., the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals. In this letting-be of things, Dasein does not attempt to manipulate, master or compel things, but instead builds things in their essential nature, i.e., in relation to the fourfold. It is not an indifference or lack of interest in things, but rather a letting-be which allows things to manifest Being (*Sein*) in their essence.²⁷²

5.3.3. Seeing Being's Truth

Dasein's seeing the truth of Being in the sense of 'realizing' or 'experiencing' cannot be attained as long as one does not move away from the attitude of representational thinking, in which man sees himself as the rational animal. This seeing involves a leap (*Sprung*) from the level of logic-dominated thinking to the realm of *Ereignis* in which man and Being are naturally appropriated to each other in their essential nature. Speaking of the nature of the leap, Heidegger says that it is abrupt, for entry into the realm of *Ereignis* is an 'unabridged entry' that can come about only if we let go the logic-dominated thinking. Only such a leap into the realm of the mutual appropriation of Being and man can let Dasein see the truth of Being.²⁷³ Entry into the realm of *Ereignis* -- thereby seeing the truth of Being -- can come about when Dasein as the seer looks into the process of Being's unconcealment (*aletheia*) and by his dwelling in language, which is the house of Being. In this section, we will study how the seeing is accomplished in Dasein by his openness to *aletheia* and language.²⁷⁴

5.3.3.1. Dasein and Aletheia

The Greek term '*aletheia*'²⁷⁵ means 'unconcealment' (*Un-verborgenheit*), communicating the notion of being unhidden or revealed. It is literally the 'a' of '*lethe*'. The Greek 'a' and the corresponding German '*un*' are taken in the privative sense,²⁷⁶ i.e., in the sense of undoing the concealing that is there. There is a gradual change in Heidegger's understanding of the term '*aletheia*'. Heidegger did not use the term to mean 'truth' (*Wahrheit*), nor did he continue to consider 'truth as *aletheia*'; but he studied *aletheia* as *aletheia*.²⁷⁷ *Aletheia* is rendered in four different senses. The first two correspond to the concealing and revealing aspects of *aletheia*, based on the emphasis given either to the 'a' or to the '*lethe*'. The former points to the revealing

²⁷¹ VA, p. 145; BW, p. 329.

²⁷² For Heidegger, the sheltering (sparing) of things by dwelling, as we have explained, is different from the tendency of modern man to exploit the earth, control the sky, encapsulate God in metaphysical concepts, and refusing to accept the finitude of man. Cf. James M. Damske, "Heidegger's Quodrate and the Revelation of Being," pp. 253-254.

²⁷³ Cf. *ID*, 20-21; *IAD*, pp. 32-33.

²⁷⁴ '*Aletheia*' and 'language' have to be understood in relation to the realm of *Ereignis*. It is *aletheia*, as a process of unconcealing of Being and of language, as the house of Being, that let Dasein see Being in its truth.

²⁷⁵ Heidegger does not accept the metaphysical rendering of *aletheia* as 'truth' and translates it in *Sein und Zeit* as 'Being-uncovering'. Cf. *SZ*, p. 220; *BT*, p. 262.

²⁷⁶ Martin Heidegger, "Parmenides," *Gesamtausgabe*, Abt. II, Bd. 54 (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982), p. 20 (hereafter *PM*).

²⁷⁷ Cf. *SD*, p. 77; *TB*, p. 70.

while the latter stresses the concealing.²⁷⁸ It is, in this sense, that we have spoken of Being as giving and withholding; approaching and withdrawing; presencing and absencing. The third way of rendering *aletheia* refers to the metaphysical understanding of the term, in which it comes to mean truth, certitude and correctness as opposed to falsity, uncertitude and incorrectness.²⁷⁹ The fourth way of understanding *aletheia* means the unconcealment or the clearing of Being. We will consider this meaning of *aletheia* in detail.

The essence of *aletheia* as ‘unconcealment’ is openness,²⁸⁰ which is unconcealed in *aletheia*. This openness is not the result of an unconcealment; rather unconcealment occurs only because the fundamental openness lets it occur by being its source and foundation. There is a genuine freedom associated with the unconcealing of the openness.²⁸¹ It is in relation to this freedom that the essence of the openness lights up.²⁸² The openness is the ‘play-ground’ (*Spiel-raum*) and is lighting or clearing (*Lichtung*); it is the shelter of Being²⁸³ and in the open-shelter of Being each of the unconcealed is sheltered.²⁸⁴ Heidegger clarifies this unconcealing dimension of *aletheia* in terms of the image of forest-clearing (*Waldlichtung*). Clearing the forest is associated with a dense forest which fully hides its expanse. The clearing of the forest involves letting light in, or the forest be open and free. This presupposes the openness of the forest. Thus, clearing lets the open expanse of the forest ‘be’ there for everything to be sheltered in.²⁸⁵ Through this image, Heidegger understands *aletheia* as the clearing.²⁸⁶ It refers to the primordial realm of the open, out of which the interplay of revealing and concealing, and the mirror-play of the fourfold comes-to-pass. In other words, *aletheia* as unconcealment, reveals the realm of *Ereignis*, viz., the event of appropriation, in which man belongs to Being and beings are sheltered in the historical unfolding of Being in the play of time and space.

Since *aletheia* is unconcealment of the truth of Being in the event of appropriation, there is naturally a role for Dasein to play in this unconcealing process, as he is the seer of the truth of Being. We would highlight the role played by man in the revealing process of Being. "Mortals are irrevocably bound to the revealing-concealing gathering which lights up everything present in its presencing."²⁸⁷ As the thinker of Being, man opens himself to the mystery of Being; as ek-sistence and dweller in the nearness of Being, he stands in the open of the clearing and looks (*blickt*) into it; finally, as the shepherd and seer of the truth of Being, man sees (*sieht*) into the openness of Being. As man sees into the openness to Being, Being itself frees for itself the ‘it is’ of each entity. In this freeing, Being looks at (*anblickt*) man in his shepherding of the openness of Being.²⁸⁸ By this seeing into Being, man lets Being look at him. The mutual look (*Blick*) is the belonging-together of Being and man, in which the *aletheia* or unconcealing of being occurs. Man alone, as standing in the clearing of Being and as shepherding, preserve the truth of Being. He sees into the openness of Being and lets himself be looked at by Being. In so doing, he becomes a genuine seer

²⁷⁸ Cf. *PM*, pp. 22-23.

²⁷⁹ Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 27, 38-39, 42.

²⁸⁰ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 208.

²⁸¹ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 213.

²⁸² Cf. *ibid.*

²⁸³ Cf. *ibid.*

²⁸⁴ Cf. *ibid.*, p. 224.

²⁸⁵ Cf. *SD*, p. 72; *TB*, p. 65.

²⁸⁶ Cf. *SD*, p. 75; *TB*, p. 68.

²⁸⁷ *VA*, p. 273; *EGT*, p. 122.

²⁸⁸ Cf. *PM*, p. 224.

of the truth of Being. *Aletheia*, as unconcealment of Being needs man for its revealing of Being. Being, as the clearing of truth needs Dasein for its clearing. That is why Heidegger says that "human nature is given over to truth, because truth needs man."²⁸⁹ But since the truth of Being is that which lets man belong to Being in the first place, Being is primary in this process. Even though priority lies in Being, yet Being needs man in that its truth is preserved by means of man's seeing into the openness of Being. Thus, we can say that *aletheia*, as the unconcealment of Being happens only in relation to the mutual look of Being and man, i.e. in their belonging-together.

5.3.3.2. Dasein and Language

The truth of Being can be attained by Dasein's openness to language, the house of Being, besides his openness to *aletheia*. When Heidegger speaks of language, he does not refer to the metaphysical-technological language. Such a language simply informs or gives information²⁹⁰ and so lacks genuine speaking. Neither does Heidegger understand language as commonly understood, viz., as an expression (*Ausdruecken*) and an activity (*Taetigkeit*) of man. It is, firstly, an expression as it utters or externalizes something that is internal. Secondly, language is an activity because it is something that comes about as a result of man's speaking.²⁹¹ For Heidegger, understanding language in this way does not take us to the essence of language. It can only be reached when we consider the being (*Wesen*) of language.²⁹² In order to inquire into the being of language, we must ask ourselves, as to the way in which language as such occurs. In other words, in order to understand language in its being, instead of talking about language, we must let language speak to us in its being. Only by letting language speak within itself, can we bring language as such, i.e., in its being, into language.²⁹³

In order that language may speak to us in its being, Heidegger goes on to analyze the pre-Socratic notion of 'logos', which means both Being (*Sein*) and language (saying).²⁹⁴ 'Logos' is derived from the verb 'legein', which is equivalent to the German 'legen' (to lay) and Latin 'legere' (to read). Like its Latin and German equivalents, the Greek 'legein' has the nuance of 'collecting or bringing together', i.e., a laying which gathers.²⁹⁵ As a laying that gathers, 'legein' keeps the gathered in the open. In this sense, 'legein' means to say (*sagen*). For saying (*die Sage*) consists in the letting-lie-together, as gathered, before that which gathers.²⁹⁶ Thus, the essence of language as saying, in its original Greek sense, is "the gathering letting-lie-before of what is present in its presencing."²⁹⁷ In other words, saying or language in the original sense of 'logos' and 'legein' is a showing (*Zeige*) or a letting-appear. Therefore, the analysis of the primordial Greek term 'logos' lets language, as language, speak of itself from within itself -- in its being -- as a saying that shows something or that lets something appear. "To say (language, as saying) means to show, to make appear the lighting -- concealing -- revealing offer of world."²⁹⁸

²⁸⁹ *GL*, p. 63; *DT*, p. 84.

²⁹⁰ Cf. *US*, p. 263; *WL*, p. 132.

²⁹¹ Cf. *US*, p. 14; *PLT*, 192.

²⁹² Cf. *US*, pp. 200-201; *WL*, pp. 94-95.

²⁹³ Cf. *US*, p. 12; *PLT*, p. 190.

²⁹⁴ Cf. *US*, p. 185; *WL*, p. 80.

²⁹⁵ Cf. *VA*, p. 201; *EGT*, p. 61.

²⁹⁶ Cf. *VA*, p. 205; *EGT*, p. 64.

²⁹⁷ *VA*, p. 220; *EGT*, p. 77.

²⁹⁸ *US*, p. 214; *WL*, p. 107.

The above quotation from Heidegger not only indicates what language, as saying, is, but also what it shows or makes appear, viz., the world. The naming of a thing by the word²⁹⁹ is a calling of the thing to its being, i.e., the thinging of the thing.³⁰⁰ The word is unfolded in the thinging of the things, i.e. in the gathering and bringing near of the fourfold -- the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals. In other words, in naming the world, in saying that a thing 'is' in its being or that a thing things (*bedingt*),³⁰¹ we are saying the same thing. The thinging of the thing is the worlding of the world and the presencing of the presencing. Thus, language as the saying that shows is nothing other than Being as the worlding in its revealing-concealing character, which unfolds in history in the time-space-play.³⁰² Understood in this way alone, language as saying that genuinely speaks³⁰³ is the peal of stillness.³⁰⁴

The house of Being is language as saying that shows the world in its time-space play and lets happen the difference (*Unterschied*) for world and things³⁰⁵ by worlding the world in the fourfold.³⁰⁶ Language protects the presencing of Being by bringing into light the truth of Being.³⁰⁷ In other words, language is the house that gathers everything in it so that in this house they find their essence, their name and their being. By providing protection (*die Hut*) and housing the beings in the being language houses Being. It is in language that the truth of Being is guarded. Language is the house of Being, because, as saying, it is a mode of appropriation³⁰⁸ and belongs to the realm of *Ereignis*. Language as the mode of appropriation in revealing withholds;³⁰⁹ its movement is historical, i.e., epochal,³¹⁰ and calls to difference between world (Being) and things (beings).³¹¹ When seen in terms of the event of appropriation language is not inaccessible to man. As the seer, man sees the truth of Being that is found in language, the house of Being.

As the house of Being, language needs man in order to speak of Being. Man plays a great role in the linguistic manifestation of Being. Speaking of the role of man in seeing the truth of Being as it comes to pass in language, Heidegger says: "Language speaks. Man speaks only in so far as he corresponds to language."³¹² Man is neither the inventor nor the speaker of language; he is the co-speaker capable of passing on the speaking of Being. "Man is capable of speaking only insofar as he, belonging to saying, listens to saying, so that in resaying it he may be able to say a

²⁹⁹ Heidegger distinguishes between the 'word' (*das Wort*) and 'terms' (*Woerter*). Terms are found in dictionaries, but not the word. The word 'is' not, but gives (*es gibt*). It is the giver (*das Gebende*) and not the given (*das Gegebende*). Word names things. The naming by the word is not an external label, but stands for the being of the thing. In naming a thing, word 'bethings' (*bedingt*) that thing in its being. Terms are only the written form of what the 'word words' in the 'thinging of the thing'. Cf. *US*, pp. 192-193, 163-164, 232; *WL*, pp. 87-88, 60-62, 151.

³⁰⁰ Cf. *US*, p. 22; *PLT*, p. 199.

³⁰¹ Cf. *US*, p. 216; *WL*, p. 108.

³⁰² Cf. *US*, p. 215; *WL*, p. 108.

³⁰³ Cf. *US*, p. 265; *WL*, p. 134.

³⁰⁴ Cf. *US*, p. 30; *PLT*, p. 207.

³⁰⁵ Cf. *ibid.*

³⁰⁶ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 311; *BW*, p. 193.

³⁰⁷ Cf. *US*, p. 267; *WL*, p. 135.

³⁰⁸ Cf. *ibid.*

³⁰⁹ Cf. *US*, p. 186; *WL*, p. 81.

³¹⁰ Cf. *US*, p. 264; *WL*, p. 133.

³¹¹ Cf. *US*, pp. 24-25; *PLT*, pp. 202-203.

³¹² Martin Heidegger, *Phenomenologie und Theologie* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970), p. 41 (hereafter: *PT*).

word."³¹³ Though man is a co-speaker and is enabled by language in his speaking, yet language needs him in order that this 'peal of stillness' can be brought into speech. "Saying is in need of (man for) being voiced in the world."³¹⁴ In his belonging to the stillness of language, man speaks aloud in his own unique way.³¹⁵ The different languages are different ways of responding to speaking aloud the silent voice of language. But, though man speaks in various languages which consist of 'terms' (*Woerter*), the genuine responding is done in words (*Worte*), which is beyond the linguistic differences. In genuine speaking man does not speak about language, but rather speaks from the primordial language, which is the basis of all human speaking.³¹⁶

Man's response to the silent presencing of language presupposes a listening³¹⁷ in which man lets-himself-be-spoken-to. It is in letting oneself into saying³¹⁸ that one can see the Being that is housed in language as saying. One needs to keep silence in listening. Just as man responds to the speaking of language by speaking aloud what is heard in language, in the same way the peal of silence of the saying must be received or listened to by a corresponding silence.³¹⁹ In this way by speaking and keeping silence man listens and thereby corresponds to language.³²⁰ Thus, man comes to attain the truth of Being in language in the belonging-together of Being as speaking (*Sprechen*) and of man as corresponding (*Entsprechen*). In the speaking-corresponding relationship, man sees his unity with Being, the difference between world (Being) and things (beings), and the time-space-play manifestation of Being in history. As the seer and shepherd of the house of Being, language is man's home as well. He guards his home, viz. language, by shepherding the Being it houses.

³¹³ *US*, p. 266; *WL*, p. 134.

³¹⁴ 314. *Ibid.*

³¹⁵ Cf. *US*, p. 30; *PLT*, p. 208.

³¹⁶ Cf. *US*, pp. 150-151; *WL*, pp. 50-51.

³¹⁷ Cf. *US*, p. 32; *PLT*, p. 209.

³¹⁸ Cf. *US*, p. 255; *WL*, p. 124.

³¹⁹ Cf. *US*, p. 262; *WL*, p. 131.

³²⁰ Cf. *US*, pp. 32-33; *PLT*, p. 210.

***Ereignis*: Movement from Care to Transcendence**

This chapter looks into *Ereignis*, the realm in which Dasein's movement from the state of care to transcendence takes place. Besides, it attempts to analyze the two stages of this process and Dasein's total authenticity. In order to bring these points to focus, we will also take up the comparison of similar themes from early and later Heidegger.

6.1. *Ereignis*: The Event of Appropriation

According to Heidegger, the nature of the truth of Being can be understood in the realm of *Ereignis*. It implies that in this realm the belonging-together (*Zusammengehorigkeit*) of Being and Dasein, the difference (*Unterschied*) as such between Being and entities and the spatio-temporal nature of the history of Being is understood. We would briefly analyze the meaning of *Ereignis*.

6.1.1. Meaning of Ereignis

Ereignis is rendered in English as 'appropriation' or 'the event of appropriation'. We could briefly clarify the notion of '*Ereignis*' by analyzing the term etymologically. Speaking of the term '*Ereignis*', Heidegger speaks of it as a 'key word' (*Leitwort*) and that cannot be pluralized, but is a *singulare tantum*. Strictly speaking it is untranslatable. To quote him: "As such a key term, it can no more be translated than Greek '*logos*' or Chinese '*Tao*'."¹ In the common usage '*Ereignis*' means an event or a happening. Heidegger speaks of its etymological affinity with two root words: '*er-eigen*' and '*er-augnen*'. The former is related to German '*eigen*' (own) and in this sense '*Ereignis*' means to come to one's own or to come to where one belongs. The latter word is related to the German '*Auge*' (eye) meaning to catch sight of, to see with the mind's eye or to see face to face. If we put these two meanings together, *Ereignis* has the sense of being far removed from everyday events or something which we see with our mind's eye; yet it is something so close to us that we cannot see it, i.e., it is something to which we belong.² This is clear when Heidegger speaks of *Ereignis* as...the most inconspicuous of the inconspicuous phenomenon, the simplest of the simplicities, the nearest of the near, and the farthest of the far, in which we mortals spend our life."³ Here we notice a sense of mystery in Heidegger's consideration of the *Ereignis*. Being is different from *Ereignis* and only in the realm of *Ereignis* can Being be thought of. "Being...in respect of its essential origin can be thought of in terms of appropriation."⁴

Ereignis is the realm in which the truth of Being is manifest. Therefore, Being must be understood in and through the realm of *Ereignis*. In other words, thinking of Being reaches its purity and perfection when it is thought from the realm of *Ereignis*. It is not available to the representative-calculative thinking and to individual experiences of men. It is, rather, given to the

¹ *ID*, p. 24; *IAD*, p. 36.

² Cf. *ID*, pp. 24-25; *IAD*, p. 14, fn. 1.

³ *US*, p. 259; *WL*, p. 128. A good study of the notion of *Ereignis* is found in J.L. Mehta, *Martin Heidegger: The Way and the Vision*, pp. 430-444.

⁴ *US*, p. 260; *WL*, p. 129; Cf. also Heinz C. Luegenbiehl, *The Essence of Man: An Approach to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger* (Ann Arbor: Microfilms, 1979), p. 106.

essential thinker, the poetic dweller, the seer and the shepherd, in his realization of his belonging-together with Being. "Event of appropriation is that realm, vibrating within itself through which man and Being reach each other in their nature."⁵ *Ereignis* is "...Dasein's complete Self-realization in Being and Being's appropriation (*Zueignen*)"⁶ of Dasein.

6.1.2. *Dasein in Heidegger I And II*

Now that we have analyzed the notion of *Ereignis* and distinguished it from Being, we could explain the Heideggerian perspective of Dasein in the light of Heidegger I and Heidegger II. We do this by bringing in similar themes that are treated by Heidegger in his early and later thought. We do not intend to do a comparative analysis of all the themes of both the phases of Heideggerian thinking; our selection of themes is guided by our interest in developing Heidegger's notion of the total authenticity of Dasein. We consider the various themes of Heidegger I and Heidegger II pertaining to the notion of Dasein in three sections, viz., Dasein in his existential, relational, authentic (and historical) aspects. Such an exposition would enable us to explore the stages of Dasein's total authenticity in the realm of *Ereignis*.

6.1.2.1. Dasein in His Existential Aspect

Here we want to bring to light the early Heideggerian notion of 'Dasein as existence' in his noetic and everyday aspects, with similar themes from later Heideggerian thinking.

6.1.2.1.1. Existence and Ek-sistence

Heidegger I presents Dasein as 'existence': the essence of Dasein is his existence. This means 'standing out' (*Ausstehen*). Dasein stands out in the sense that he transcends all other entities as a being-in-the-world, i.e., he is open to himself and to the world. It is this quality of Dasein which enables him to shape his own destiny and that of the world. In this sense existence is a unique quality of Dasein. Other things 'are', but Dasein 'exists'. Dasein, as existence, stands out into his own being and moves towards actualizing his own possibilities. Therefore, in each case, he is his own possibility.⁷ The actualization of these possibilities is basically the project and task of Dasein. Thus, existence indicates Dasein's transcending to Being by fulfilling his own possibilities and that of other entities.

Heidegger II portrays Dasein as 'ek-sistence'. Ek-sisting consists in being attuned (*gestimmt*) to the voice of Being. It is a 'standing in' (*Innestehen*) in the sphere of Being. It consists in Dasein's openness to Being. The 'Da' of Dasein constitutes him as the lighting of Being (*Lichtung des Seins*). Dasein, as ek-sisting, is a lighting-up-place for Being, to which he stands in openness. Since the essence of Dasein consists in this openness to Being and being attuned to its voice, it is not something that Dasein can bring about. As he can never be his true self as ek-sistence, unless initially Being opens itself to Dasein, the role of Being is primary.⁸ But Dasein does play a part by leaving himself open to Being by allowing the revealing of Being in its nature and thereby being

⁵ *ID*, p. 26; *IAD*, p. 37.

⁶ Otto Poeggeler, "Being as Appropriation," p. 169.

⁷ Cf. *SZ*, p. 42; *BT*, p. 68.

⁸ Cf. *BH*, *Wegmarken*, p. 330; *BW*, p. 213.

the lighting-up-place where the truth of Being is preserved and guarded.⁹ Thus, the essence of Dasein in Heidegger II consists not in Dasein's being a manipulative subject of entities and objects, but in 'standing-in' or dwelling (*Wohnen*) in the openness of Being.

6.1.2.1.2. Being-in and Dwelling

In Heidegger I Dasein as being-in is analyzed. Being-in is not a spatial, but an existential 'in-ness', which is Dasein's relationship of involvement with entities and other Daseins. In other words, it is a care-taking dealing of Dasein or Dasein in his disclosedness. Dasein discloses himself in three modes, viz., state-of-being, understanding and discourse. State-of-being refers to the way Dasein is 'placed' in the world. Dasein finds himself as a thrown existence, and is never able to get back behind his thrownness. Understanding is that ability of Dasein by which he can withstand his thrownness, in the sense that with understanding he can accept and develop his thrownness. Understanding opens up possibilities by interpreting the way Dasein finds himself and expressing it in assertion. Discourse with the help of language, which is a spoken form of discourse, meaningfully articulates and communicates the thrown understanding that is interpreted and expressed in assertion. In Heidegger I, discourse is more fundamental than language.

In Heidegger II, we find a parallel analysis of Dasein's dwelling. Dasein is spoken, here, as a dweller in the neighborhood of Being, as he dwells in the fourfold in which Being shines forth. Dasein finds himself in the fourfold as mortal (parallel to state-of-being in Heidegger I). Here too Dasein, as mortal, is not able to get back behind his nature as mortal. The mortal Dasein recognizes (parallel to understanding in Heidegger I) his mission to guard the light of being in the fourfold. He does this by saving the earth as earth, receiving the sky as sky, waiting on divinities as divinities and initiating his own essential nature as mortal. Dwelling, in this manner, in the fourfold, Dasein builds things in their essential nature and spares Being in beings. Dasein, not only dwells in the fourfold, but also in language (parallel to discourse in Heidegger I) which is the house of Being. In so doing, he protects the presencing of Being by bringing into light the truth of Being. In Heidegger II language is more fundamental than discourse.

6.1.2.1.3. The Fallen Existence and the Metaphysical-Technological Existence

Heidegger I speaks of Dasein's fallen existence. This is not to be taken in the moral or religious sense, but is a state in which Dasein is dominated by the 'they'. The characteristics of distentuality, mediocrity and publicness mean that Dasein is so immersed in the world of his concern so that he loses sight of the truth about his own being; Dasein's understanding is dimmed and the 'they' determines his choices and decisions. This state is characterized by temptation, tranquilization, alienation and entanglement. As fallen, Dasein continues to live in his bottomless living of everydayness. The motive for this state is existential guilt (*Schuld*) which consists in two existential limitations: Dasein's inability to get back behind his thrown existence and his inability to choose all the possibilities. Fallen Dasein expresses himself in curiosity, idle-talk and ambiguity. Curiosity is an attitude of not abiding in anything and of seeing novelty for its own sake. Idle-talk is chatter without proper understanding. Ambiguity constitutes Dasein's inability to be straightforward and to have genuine knowledge. Thus, Dasein's fallen state is a state marked by total estrangement of Dasein from his own being.

⁹ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, pp. 327, 330; *BW*, pp. 210, 213.

Parallel to this notion, in Heidegger II, is metaphysical-technological existence, characterized by Dasein's falling away from Being. In this kind of thinking Dasein is concerned with beings in their abstract beingness and about that being which is the basis of all beingness. Thus, metaphysics as the study of Being becomes onto-theologic and in the process the whole question of Being (*Sein*) is forgotten. Metaphysical thinking, for Heidegger, is characteristic of the history of Western philosophy since Plato. It forms the basis for modern technological existence which ends up in representational-calculative outlook in which reason and logic dominate thinking. Everything is seen as something that can be studied by research and manipulated with the use of technology. In the process not only things, but also man becomes a victim of technology, an important raw material. In this manipulative context man lives a restless existence of alienation from Being.

6.1.2.2. Dasein in His Relational Aspect

This section concerns a comparative analysis of Dasein as related to Being, the world and truth in the light of both the phases of Heidegger's thought.

6.1.2.2.1. Dasein and Being

Heidegger I speaks of Dasein as fundamentally related to Being. Of all entities, only Dasein is able to comprehend Being. Though this is a pre-conceptual and vague understanding of Being, Dasein is able to raise the question of the meaning of Being and to understand other entities in their being. The pre-conceptual understanding of Being is not something accidental to Dasein as he is the 'Da' of 'Sein' and this relatedness to Being is fundamentally rooted in the being of Dasein.

In Heidegger II Being and Dasein are considered as 'belong-ing-together'. This is not in the metaphysical sense of causal connection, but in the sense of an appropriating relationship in which both Being and Dasein enter into each other's realms. It is a two-way relationship. Being belongs to Dasein in the sense that it presences itself in Dasein and makes a claim on him. Dasein responds to Being's presencing and summoning. It is the most fundamental type of relationship as all other forms of relationship are based on it. Such a relationship is understood only in the realm of *Ereignis*, i.e., the event of appropriation.

6.1.2.2.2. The World and the Fourfold

Heidegger I considers the world as the matrix of Dasein's relational totalities and their total significance. World is not the mere presence of many entities, rather the worldhood of the world consists in the being of these entities, i.e., in their inter-relatedness. World is always the world of Dasein, based on Dasein's projective understanding as the ultimate 'for-the-sake-of-which'. In this sense, we can speak of as many worlds as there are different meaningful relational totalities to Dasein as that 'for-the-sake-of-which'.

Heidegger II explains the world in terms of the lighting of Being in the fourfold. The fourfold consists of the four elements, viz., the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals. The former two constitute the physical components of Being, while the latter two constitute the divine and human aspects respectively. The world-hood of the world is the dynamic interplay of these four elements in and through which Being shines forth. In Heidegger II also it is the mortal Dasein that receives the lighting of Being in the fourfold; but the role of Dasein is one of waiting, listening and responding to the lighting of Being.

6.1.2.2.3. The Truth of Dasein and the Truth of Being

In Heidegger I, truth is seen not as an agreement between the subject and the object (*Adequatio*), but as 'Being-uncovering' (*Entdeckend-Sein*) which consists in the entity's showing itself in the act of confirmation by Dasein. As the confirmation by Dasein is the basis of any agreement, truth is always related to Dasein as without him no truth can be discovered. The truth of entities is related to the truth of Dasein, as it is Dasein that uncovers the uncoveredness of entities. Dasein does not create truth, but lays bare the truth that is already contained in the essents.

Heidegger II considers truth as *aletheia*, i.e. the unconcealing-concealing process of Being, in which the clearing of Being takes place. The unconcealing of Being takes place in spatio-temporal history. The truth of Being cannot be known by metaphysical thinking, but belongs to the realm of *Ereignis* and is understood only in relation to Dasein's belonging-together to Being. Dasein sees the truth of Being as a shepherd who waits on, and preserves, the unconcealing of Being.

6.1.2.3. Dasein in His Authentic and Historical Aspects

In this section, we would like to highlight Dasein in his authentic and historical dimensions; in other words, we want to see the authentic, whole, temporal and historical Dasein in comparative light.

6.1.2.3.1. The Call of Conscience and the Call of Being

The 'call of conscience' is a significant theme in Heidegger I. The caller of conscience is the anxious Dasein in his 'not-at-home-ness'; the called is the same fallen Dasein which is under the sway of the 'they'; the call summons Dasein to his true self. Thus, the call of conscience is the call from Dasein to himself that he can be his ability to be. When Dasein listens to himself in anticipatory resoluteness, he becomes his authentic and true self.

In Heidegger II the call of Being is a constant theme. Speaking of essential thinking, Heidegger says that it is fundamentally a call of Being to which Dasein is expected to respond. He is able to respond to this call by re-collection of the call and thanking for the gift of the call. In the process of Being's call and Dasein's response essential thinking occurs in release. Dasein's dwelling in the near-ness of Being occurs when the poetic presencing of Being is responded to by Dasein in poetic dwelling. Dasein's seeing the truth of Being is effected in the mutual look of Being and Dasein into each other's realms. It is the call of Being and Dasein's responding that effects Dasein's authenticity.

6.1.2.3.2. Being-towards-Death and the Mortal

Heidegger I views Dasein as being-towards-death. Death is not an event that terminates Dasein's life at one particular moment in the future, but constantly is present in Dasein as a possibility of the impossibility of his being. Death is certain, yet it is an indefinite possibility relating to its 'how' and 'when'. Thus, Heidegger I, in presenting Dasein as being-towards-death, points to the radical finitude of Dasein.

In Heidegger II we do not find a thematic analysis of death. Yet the notion of death appears in relation to the notion of the fourfold, in which Dasein is referred to as the mortal. Dasein is

called the mortal because he can die. Death is also seen as the shrine of nothing, i.e., the other-than-entities. Just as death reveals to the authentic being of Dasein, so also as the shrine of nothing death shelters and reveals Being.¹⁰ Besides, as Dasein's death reveals the finitude of his being, death as the shelter of nothing reveals the finitude of the presencing of Being in the revealing-concealing process.

6.1.2.3.3. Anticipatory Resoluteness and Release

Heidegger I speaks of anticipatory resoluteness leading Dasein into authenticity. In anticipatory resoluteness Dasein is free from inauthentic preoccupation with his world. The change that has come about in anticipatory resoluteness is not a change in Dasein's world, but a transformation in Dasein's awareness of himself, other Daseins and entities. Even in the state of anticipatory resoluteness Dasein still lives with the same people and works with the same tools as he belongs to the same environment and the community as before. What has happened now is a change in perspective, so that Dasein is able to experience everything in its authentic reality. This change in perspective enables him to let others be themselves and fulfill their possibilities. It leads to cultivating a mutual responsibility for each other. So also Dasein's relation with entities is transformed. In the state of anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein has a concerned being-with-others. This state is brought about by Dasein turning into his own true self.

In Heidegger II, the essential thinking is spoken of as occurring in release. It is an attitude of saying 'yes' and 'no' to the same thing at the same time. It is an attitude of accepting something as a need in our existence and at the same time not being mastered by it. It is a state in which Dasein is involved with things, but not entangled with them. In other words, in release Dasein is able to see himself and everything else in the mystery dimension of Being. The occurrence of release is primarily the task of Being's twofold regioning and Dasein's twofold responding in the realm of *Ereignis*.

6.1.2.3.4. Spatio-temporal-historical Dasein and Time-space-play of the History of Being

Heidegger I views Dasein as the spatio-temporal-historical existence. The spatiality of Dasein consists in two existentials, viz., distancing and directionality. The former is the quality of bringing something closer, while the latter places something in relation to a locality. The spatiality of entities basically depends on that of Dasein. Dasein's essence is to be understood in relation to temporality. That is the reason Heidegger interpreted all the earlier notions of Dasein-analysis in terms of temporality at the end of *Being and Time*. Since Dasein's life stretches between two points of time Dasein is historical. History, in Heidegger I, is understood only in relation to Dasein. Therefore, historiography, as a science is possible only because Dasein is historical. Thus, in Heidegger I, space, time and history are understood in relation to Dasein.

Heidegger II speaks of the history of Being as the time-space-play. Being's giving of itself in the revealing-concealing process is a sending of Being. So, for Heidegger, history is always a history of Being and is epochal in nature. Heidegger sees the reasons for the epochal sending of Being to be due to the nature of time. Though Being gives itself as presencing, it extends to 'what-has-been', 'what-is-not-yet' and to the present. The presencing of Being relating to the former two is in absence, while the presencing of the present is in presence. The interplay between the presencing and the absencing is the reason for the epochal nature of history. The history of Being

¹⁰ Cf. VA, p. 171; *PLT*, p. 179.

is manifest in its spatial dimension in the fourfold and consists in the spatial gathering of the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals in their unity. Thus, the interplay of the three ecstases of time and the mirror-play of the fourfold account for the spatio-temporal history of Being. As the spatio-temporal-historical being, Dasein is part of the history of Being but his role is a special one because he is a co-player with Being in its epochal sending.

6.1.2.3.5. Dasein: Authentic Existence and the Seer of the Truth of Being

Heidegger I speaks of Dasein as authentic existence. By listening to the call of conscience by wanting-to-have-a-conscience in resoluteness, in the context of his concrete 'Situation', Dasein moves towards authentic existence. Facing the concrete 'Situation' of his life brings Dasein to confront his existential guilt with its inherent existential limitations, besides bringing to the fore Dasein's death in anticipation. The anticipation of death, in turn, makes Dasein's listening to the call of conscience in resoluteness more authentic and deliberate because authentic being-towards-death, i.e., anticipation of death, opens Dasein to accept his guilt, existential limitations, death itself and the mood of anxiety associated with these. Heidegger calls this phenomenon anticipatory resoluteness. Thus, in anticipatory resoluteness, Dasein attains his authentic existence. From what we have said it is clear that in Heidegger I Dasein's authenticity is attained in relation to Dasein's own movement towards his ultimate possibility, viz., death, in anticipatory resoluteness.

Heidegger II sees Dasein's final state of authenticity as a seer who sees and shepherds Being. Here, 'seeing' is taken in the sense of 'experiencing' or 'realizing'. Dasein sees the truth of Being not by lording over beings, but by shepherding Being and its truth. As a shepherd, Dasein attends to Being and waits on its presencing. In this attentive-waiting on Being and watchful shepherding of the presencing of Being Dasein becomes a seer. Dasein's nature, as a seer, and the nature of his seeing the truth of Being cannot be understood in the light of representational thinking. But it has to be grasped in relation to Being's unconcealing-concealing process (*aletheia*) and to language, the house of Being, in the realm of *Ereignis*. Because of his essential belonging-together to Being as a shepherd, Dasein is able to look into the unconcealment of Being and dwell in language, the house of Being. In this process Dasein becomes the seer, viz., the total authentic Dasein.

6.2. Stages of *Ereignis*

In this section, we would like to highlight, the various stages involved in the process of Dasein's movements towards authenticity, by taking Heidegger I and Heidegger II into consideration. Seen in this holistic perspective the authenticity of human existence could be viewed as Dasein's movement from self-centered¹¹ existence to Being-centered existence. That is to say that human existence and his authentic being must be seen in the light of his movement from his own world to the openness of Being. Now, we will take up the question of self-centered existence and Being-centered existence respectively and thereby elaborate the stages of *Ereignis*.

6.2.1. Self-Centered Existence

¹¹ We do not use the phrase 'self-centered existence' with any religious or moral significance in the sense of 'selfishness' as opposed to 'altruism', but as meaning that existence of Dasein that is focused on his own existence.

Heidegger I presents an image of Dasein which envisages human existence as the ultimate finality. Everything, including Dasein and his being, is understood in relation to his self and his world. Dasein is the focus of attention and everything revolves around him. Yet, Dasein is viewed as a finite existence characterized by existential guilt, existential limitations and existential death. Thus we have a seemingly contradictory image of human existence in Heidegger I. In this section we will elaborate the image of Dasein in these twofold aspects.

6.2.1.1. Dasein: The Self-sufficient Existence

Dasein is a unique type of being. He is just like any other entity in the world, yet he transcends all other entities as he has a pre-conceptual understanding of Being, and as only in relation to Dasein is everything else understood. That is why he is referred to as 'existence' and 'transcendence'. He could never be the object of anyone's concern except that of himself. Of all entities, only for Dasein is his existence an issue. Thus, Dasein stands out and stands apart from all other entities. Besides, existential Dasein is always one's own and is characterized by 'my-ownness'. This 'my-own-ness' of Dasein, on the one hand, gives him uniqueness and, on the other hand, makes him a free and self-sufficient being which needs to make his own choices and decisions and be responsible for them. Thus, Dasein has to depend on his own self for his personal concern. This quality of 'my-ownness' cuts Dasein off from others and moves him to his self and world. Because Dasein is unique and his own, he is the only type of being that can be authentic or inauthentic in his choices and living. Since Dasein is his own possibilities, he can choose or lose himself, own his possibilities or reject them, build up or forget his own being. Thus, Dasein is what makes himself, as his life and choices totally depend on him.

Dasein also has a priority over all other entities, in the sense that he is the existential horizon in relation to which everything else is studied and understood. Dasein, with his pre-conceptual understanding of Being, is the only being that raises the question of the meaning of Being. In other words, the meaning and truth of Being can be understood only in the light of Dasein. Besides the meaning and truth of entities depend on Dasein. One cannot speak of the truth of entities apart from Dasein, as the discoveredness of entities is possible only for the discovering Dasein. Thus, Dasein is the meaning-giver and the foundation of every truth. Therefore, not only ontology as the study of Being, but, all sciences are possible only because there is Dasein. If it were not for Dasein, no meaningful study of reality would be possible.

The indispensability of Dasein for any meaningful study of reality is due to Dasein's being understanding. Understanding discloses to Dasein what he is capable of, viz., his possibilities and that of the entities. This disclosure is not merely theoretical, but existential and practical. Dasein's understanding involves not only mere knowledge of the possibilities, but also the project on the basis of which these possibilities can be actualized. Therefore, it is in understanding his possibilities that Dasein expresses. Besides, Dasein can communicate the interpretation of the projective understanding in discourse. In this manner Dasein becomes the basis for any meaningful study of reality.

As projective understanding, Dasein is always 'in-the-world'. The term 'in-the-world' is to be taken not in the spatial sense, but in the existential sense of relatedness to the world. Dasein is part of the environmental and social worlds. The former consists of Dasein's being-along-side the entities in his concerned dealings of preoccupation, while the latter refers to Dasein's relationship of solicitude with other Daseins. It is a relationship of 'being-with'. These relationships of 'being-along-side' entities and being-with others constitute Dasein's world. Dasein's world is nothing

other than the complex matrix of his relationships within this environmental world and the social world and the totality of their meaningfulness. Thus, the meaning of the world in both its environmental and social aspects is ultimately related to Dasein, which is the ultimate 'for-the-sake-of-which' and towards-which everything moves.

Not only in his noetic and relational dimensions, but also in his authentic and historical aspects, Dasein is presented as self-sufficient existence. The fallen Dasein is called back to his authentic self by the call of conscience. The subject who calls is the very fallen and anxious Dasein in his 'not-at-homeness'. He calls himself to be his authentic possibility. When the fallen Dasein listens to his own call -- by wanting-to-have-a-conscience in resoluteness, in the given 'Situation' -- he moves towards authenticity. The anticipation of death as the ultimate possibility facilitates this process. Thus, the anticipation of Dasein's own death in resoluteness, i.e., anticipatory resoluteness, is that by which Dasein attains his authenticity. So Dasein needs none other than himself for his authenticity. Neither the environmental world, nor the social world has any influence on Dasein's self-hood. In other words, Dasein's authentic existence is attained neither by his 'being-along-side' entities, nor by his being-with the other Daseins; it is achieved rather by Dasein's "being-oneself" in anticipatory resoluteness, i.e., in his anticipation of death as the final possibility in resolute reflection. Anticipation of death when seen as Dasein's 'being-towards-his-end' not only leads Dasein to his authentic state, but also reveals to Dasein his completeness and wholeness. Dasein, thus, understands his totality not in relation to anything else, but to himself.

The wholeness of Dasein and all that is said about Dasein is based on Dasein's temporal nature. We can have a grasp of Dasein as a human existing reality only in relation to the three ecstases of temporality, viz., the 'what-has-been' (past), the 'not-yet' (future) and the 'what-is' (the present). This makes Heidegger clarify every previous notion regarding Dasein in the light of temporality in the later part of *Being and Time*. When this temporality is concretized -- and seen in relation to the stretch of life between birth and death of a reality -- then, we have the history of that reality. The study of such history or a number of such histories in relatedness is historiology. Thus, the temporal-historical nature of Dasein or that of any other entity in the world can be understood only in relation to Dasein. No science of historiology is possible if there is no historical Dasein who is the existential source of any scientific study of historical events. Thus, both temporality and historicity can be understood only in relation to temporal-historical Dasein.

Our consideration of Dasein -- as existence, the existential horizon of every other reality, as projective understanding and as the basis of his own wholeness, authenticity, temporality and historicity -- clearly points to Dasein's self-sufficiency. Having dwelled upon Dasein's self-sufficient existence, we should move on to analyze Dasein in his finite and limited existence.

6.2.1.2. Dasein: The Finite Existence

There are many sections in *Being and Time* which depict Dasein as inauthentic, swayed by moods, anxious, estranged and alienated. These sections present Dasein as an existence that is finite, helpless and dependent. Dasein's disclosedness is characterized by the 'state-of-being'. William J. Richardson calls it Dasein's "already-being-found-itself/(himself)-thereness." It is the experience of Dasein as being 'placed' in a given 'Situation'. This state is characterized by various moods. Thus, in the state-of-being Dasein experiences himself as being thrown or being delivered over in a situation in which he is controlled by such various moods as anxiety, fear or joy. This thrownness is not only a handing over of Dasein to his own moods, but also a thrownness among entities, because Dasein always finds himself involved with realities other than himself. This

involvement with entities does matter to Dasein; often they too produce various moods in Dasein. Thus, the thrownness among entities involves Dasein's submissiveness to, and helplessness before, the entities among which he is thrown. Here, we see Dasein's being as limited by his moods with which he finds himself and by the entities among which he is 'placed'.

The thrown factual Dasein is characterized by existential guilt (*Schuld*). This is not to be taken in the moral and legal sense of guilt, viz., as being indebted to, or responsible for. Here the term 'guilt' is taken in the existential and primordial sense. Guilt belongs to Dasein's nature fundamentally and essentially. It is an existential lack in Dasein's Being and consists in a twofold existential limitation. The first is related to Dasein's thrownness. The thrown Dasein, as he finds himself in his thrown existence, is not able to choose his own ground or state-of-being. Concretely this means that the condition, time and all such details of Dasein's birth and early growth are determined for Dasein by his thrownness. Neither is Dasein able to get back behind his own thrownness and know the "how" and "why" of his thrownness. This continues in one's life, as one is thrown in various 'situations' without ever desiring them. This existential limitation makes Dasein groundless as he is not an explanation for his own thrown existence. In other words Dasein has no power over his ownmost being as he did not cause his existence. The second existential limitation consists in the constitution of Dasein's choices. In the given existential 'Situation', Dasein is not free to choose all his possibilities. In choosing one possibility he has to give up all others. This unavoidable preclusion of all the other alternatives except the one chosen constitute the second existential limitation. Both existential limitations make Dasein's existence groundless and dependent in relation to the past ecstasis of Dasein.

Just as existential guilt and existential limitations keep Dasein's past in abeyance, so also does Dasein's 'being-towards-death' with regard to his future. Because death is an existential of Dasein present with it from the moment of birth and because of the fact that it is Dasein's ownmost possibility of the impossibility of his Being -- along with death's indefiniteness as to when -- Dasein has no hold on his own being relating to the future. Thus, death brings a basic limitation of Dasein relating to the future as it makes Dasein's existence finite.

As existential guilt, existential limitations and death point out to Dasein the groundless nature of his own existence relating to the past and the future respectively, Dasein feels a sense of unsettlement within himself. This expresses itself in the mood of anxiety. The anxious Dasein avoids facing his existential state-of-being (past) and existential death (future), and focuses himself only on the present ecstasis. Living only in the present leads Dasein to the state of fallen existence. The fleeing of Dasein from his own truth about himself presents a Dasein that is anxious and helpless.

In the state of fallen existence Dasein gets lost in the present involvement, so much so that Dasein is cut off from his past and the future. This results in a break-down in the temporal character of Dasein. Since Dasein is focused fully on the present, he loses his unique existence and gets lost in the 'they' which gives him a publicness in which his choices are determined by others. Here, life is characterized by everyday mediocrity. While far away from the truth about himself Dasein now believes that he is his true self. His thinking is characterized by ambiguity, his speech by idle-talk and his motive for action turns out to be curiosity. This is a state of alienation and estrangement in which Dasein runs away from anxiety that results from the awareness of existential guilt and existential death.

The analysis of Dasein's state-of-being, existential guilt, existential limitations, death and fallen state clearly points to the finite, helpless, dependent and anxious Dasein, whose existence is marked by a tragic sense.

6.2.2. Being-Centered Existence

Heidegger II sees Dasein as essentially related to Being. Dasein's meaning, truth and even authenticity are understood in the light of this relationship. This relationship is not causal, but an appropriating belonging-together in which Being and Dasein enter into each other's realms. The task of Dasein is to be available for Being as a lighting-up-place for its revealing; Dasein is at the service of Being. This does not mean that Dasein is passive and at the mercy of Being, as Dasein plays the significant and active role of responding to Being by receiving and preserving the truth of Being. In this section we will consider the role of Dasein as the lighting-up-place and the shepherd of Being. In doing so we will analyze Dasein's Being-centered existence.

6.2.2.1. Dasein: The Lighting-up-place of Being

Dasein is the lighting-up-place of Being in its giving. The role of Dasein consists in being the 'Da' for Being to shine forth. It involves Dasein's availability in openness to Being and saying a constant 'yes' to the call of Being. As an essential thinker Dasein, by his openness to Being, lets Being evoke thought in him. In other words, by opening himself to the call of Being, Dasein lets Being favor it with the gift of being an essential thinker. Being gives itself as 'that which is most thought provoking', i.e., as food for thought, and then withdraws itself. In so doing, Being presences itself to Dasein as withdrawing. In the process Being calls Dasein to think about that which is most thought-provoking which has withdrawn. Dasein is the playing-field or the lighting-up-place for this giving-withdrawing process of Being's call to think. Even in the process of occurrence of essential thinking in release Dasein continues to be the 'place' of Being's revealing. For Dasein opens himself to "that-which-regions"(Being) so that it can help Dasein to rise above the pushes and pulls of everyday existence and bring about a freedom in Dasein to be his self, thereby opening himself for release to occur.

Dasein's ek-sisting consists in being attuned to the voice and the giving of Being. It is a standing-at or dwelling in the sphere of Being. Dasein is ek-sisting because he has already allowed himself to be the lighting up place for Being. Because Dasein has given himself to Being as a 'locus' for its manifestation, Dasein is able to dwell or ek-sist in the nearness of Being. In ek-sisting or dwelling in Being, Dasein continues to be the lighting-up-place of Being. In the occurrence of dwelling or ek-sisting Dasein remains a 'home' for Being's arrival, in his poetic presencing. Being summons Dasein to itself by presenting itself as the Glad-some, the Holy, the Origin and the Ground. Here too, Dasein is, as it were, the screen in which the light of Being in its original giving shines forth.

The truth of Being -- Dasein's essential relation of belonging-together to Being, the relation of difference between Being and beings, and the history as the spatio-temporal sending of Being - - is understood only in relation to Being's giving of itself to Dasein, the lighting-up-place. Dasein knows his essential belonging-together to Being only when he is open to Being in the realm of *Ereignis*. Only by 'being there' for Being does Dasein know his oneness with Being. The ontological difference is that between Being and entities -- in the process of Being's coming-over to entities revealing itself in entities, and the arrival of entities in which Being is concealed. All this is understood only in relation to Being's giving of itself as the difference in Dasein, viz. Being's lighting-up-place. Again, the spatio-temporal nature of the history of Being, which is a play of Being, is also revealed in relation to the playing-field, viz. Dasein. It is in relation to the

lighting-up-place of Being that Being in its temporal nature gives itself in the interplay of presencing and absencing of the three ecstases of time. Moreover, the spatial nature of Being shows itself in the mirror-play of the fourfold: the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals.

Thus, it is clear that Dasein is the lighting-up-place of Being at every stage of its manifestation. Though this role is receptive in nature, yet it is significant as it unfolds Being in its essential truth. Now, let us move on to the consideration of Dasein as the shepherd of being.

6.2.2.2. Dasein: The Shepherd of Being

Our analysis of Dasein as the lighting-up-place of Being, might have left us with the impression that Dasein is totally subordinated to Being. Though Being's role is primary in the Being-event, Dasein plays an active role besides that of being the lighting-up-place of Being. He actively responds to the call, summons and giving of Being, thereby preserving what he has received by being the lighting-up-place of Being. In this sense Dasein guards and shepherds the presencing of Being in himself and in entities. This role of Dasein is our concern in this section.

As an essential thinker Dasein actively responds to Being. The response must be a corresponding response, i.e. a response that is on a par with the invitation. In essential thinking Being calls Dasein to thinking and gives food for thought. In other words, Being calls Dasein to think meditatively on Being as the most thought-provoking. Dasein returns a corresponding response in re-calling and thanking. Dasein, firstly, recollects the call of Being in memory and thanks Being for the gift of itself as the most thought-provoking. Re-collection of the call opens up Being's world to Dasein and lets him constantly keep it in his memory, while thanking makes Dasein accept the gift of Being as the most thought-provoking, and continue meditating on it. Thus, thanksgiving leads Dasein to continue thinking of Being as the gift.

The re-collective thanking for Being's gift of itself to Dasein opens him all the more for Being. In this opening of Dasein, Being as 'that-which-regions', manifests itself by its primordial regioning and effects in Dasein a freedom to be his self. Possessing this inner freedom Dasein responds to Being firstly by non-willing, which frees Dasein from the entanglement with things. Secondly, by his active waiting on Being, Dasein is released towards things and attains an openness to the mystery of Being. Thus, by corresponding response to the call, giving and regioning of Being, Dasein attains the state of release. In this responding to call, giving and regioning, Dasein positively preserves the gift of Being.

Such a released Dasein moves towards Being as ek-sisting, i.e. he begins to dwell in the nearness of Being. The process of movement towards dwelling, as we mentioned earlier is primarily the task of Being. To the Being which gives itself to Dasein in poetic presencing and calls Dasein, thereby, to dwell in its neighborhood, Dasein responds correspondingly by poetic dwelling in the poetic presencing of Being. The poetic dwelling of Dasein continues the original experience of homecoming that was brought about by Being and preserves it in the three ecstases of time, viz., the past, the future and the present. The past experience of Being is cherished in Dasein's memory, not merely as something that happened in the past, but as the 'having-been' that has a relevance to the whole history of Dasein. The same experience is viewed not as something that is finished, but as something that continues and that is 'yet-to-come' in the future. The experience of Being is seen as a present reality to which Dasein gives expression in the present. Thus, Dasein by his poetic dwelling in the poetic presencing of Being continues to dwell in the nearness of Being. In this way Being is shepherded in Dasein's own being.

Besides, shepherding Being in his self, Dasein also shepherds Being that is revealed in things by dwelling in the fourfold as the mortal. In other words, by dwelling in the fourfold Dasein spares Being in things and thereby builds things in their being. Dasein dwells in the fourfold by gathering together the fourfold, i.e., the three facets of Being. This shepherding of Being in things is done by Dasein by performing four function within the fourfold: saving the earth as the earth, receiving the sky as the sky, waiting on divinities as divinities and taking upon himself or initiating his own nature as the mortal. In the fourfold, Dasein shepherds the Being that is manifested in things.

In shepherding Being in Dasein's own being and in things, Dasein becomes the seer of the truth of Being. The truth of Being -- the essential belonging-together of Being and Dasein, the relation of difference between Being and entities and the spatio-temporal history of Being -- can be seen, in the sense of experienced or realized, only when it is received by Dasein in the realm of *Ereignis*. Being raises Dasein to the level that is on a par with it in the realm of *Ereignis*. Dasein is a co-partner in this essential relationship with Being. It is only in the context of the belonging-together of Being and Dasein that the truth of entities, i.e. their essential difference from Being, is unfolded. Dasein is a co-player with Being in the play of the spatio-temporal history of Being. In this manner, Dasein plays an active role of receiving, responding and shepherding Being in its giving, and thereby becomes a seer of the truth of Being.

Dasein sees the truth of Being by his openness to the unconcealing process (*aletheia*) of Being and dwelling in language, the house of Being. When Being unconceals itself, Dasein sees into the openness of Being. By this seeing into Being, Dasein lets Being look at Dasein. In this mutual look of Being and Dasein, there occurs the unconcealing process, in which Dasein's seeing the truth of Being takes place. Again language, as the house of Being, protects and preserves Being by bringing into light its truth. Thus, in language the truth of Being is guarded. Dasein, by dwelling in language, corresponds to language or in other words is a co-speaker with the language that speaks. As a co-speaker, Dasein listens to the speaking of language and gives expression to what he has heard from language. By his seeing into the unconcealing process of Being and dwelling in language, the house of being, Dasein comes into a face-to-face contact with Being and its truth. In this process he shepherds Being and the truth he has experienced and continues to be the seer of the truth of Being. So we can conclude that Dasein, as related to Being in an essential way, actively participates in Being's revealing of itself by shepherding Being's truth in himself and in things.

6.3. Total Authenticity: The End of *Ereignis*

Dasein attains authentic existence when -- having opened himself to the voice of Being -- he begins to focus more and more on Being rather than on himself. In other words, Dasein must base his life more on Being than on himself. This would involve a movement of Dasein from his self-centered existence to a Being-centered existence. Thus, the occurrence of authenticity in Dasein involves a single and a continuous process of Dasein moving from himself towards Being. But two movements are inherent in this single way of Dasein to authenticity, viz. the movement from self-centered existence towards Being-centered existence. The clarification of these two movements will enable us to explain Dasein's authenticity in this section.

6.3.1. A 'Turning From' and a 'Turning To'

The image of Dasein, presented in Heidegger I, is inconsistent, because, on the one hand, Dasein is seen as an all-powerful, self-sufficient being and, on the other hand, he is depicted as an

anxious, helpless, dependent and finite being. Seen in both of these aspects Dasein stands completely alone. As a self-sufficient being Dasein stands alone because he is not in need of any other reality for his truth about himself, the meaning of his life and even for his authentic existence. As a finite and dependent being, Dasein stands alone in his anxiety because there is no one to help the anxious Dasein. This point is clearly illustrated in the existential guilt, the existential limitations and the existential death, which must be faced by Dasein all alone, as no one can take his place relating to these. Even the so-called relatedness to Being, entities and other Daseins do not add anything to the self-hood of Dasein. The much talked about relationship to Being, viz., Dasein's pre-conceptual understanding of Being seems to be only a theoretical awareness of Dasein rather than a real relationship of unity between Being and Dasein. This also is clear from the fact that at the end of *Being and Time* we know more about Dasein who questions than what is questioned, viz., Being and the meaning of Being.¹² In other words, *Being and Time* does not succeed in establishing a real relationship between Dasein and Being. All these points amply prove that the Dasein of Heidegger I is totally alone, completely cut off from every other entity and fully closed up within himself.

Heidegger I claims that Dasein is self-sufficient in his knowing, in his relatedness to other realities and in his whole, authentic, temporal and historical existence, and depends on nothing else in any of these aspects. This seem to lack truth because a Dasein that is finite, left alone, anxious and dependent cannot be self-sufficient. Though one cannot deny Dasein's uniqueness and his ability to understand, interpret and express in discourse, still to say that he is self-sufficient and without any dependency on anything would be an over-statement. Besides, a Dasein that is characterized by guilt, existential limitations and death as essential aspects of his nature cannot be the ultimate explanation for himself both in relation to his past and the future. Thus, a Dasein who is groundless regarding his past and future and runs away from accepting this fundamental groundlessness of his existence and the anxiety that arises from it cannot be self-sufficient existence. From what we have said, it is clear that Dasein, as presented in Heidegger I, cannot be a self-sufficient existence, but is in need of help from outside himself.

Now, since Dasein is not self-sufficient and dependent, he is strictly speaking incapable of bringing about his own authentic personhood. Because Dasein basically stands alone reduced to his own limited resources, he cannot be the reason for his own authenticity. The call of conscience, which in fact is the call of the anxious Dasein in his 'not-at-homeness', cannot pull Dasein out of the mire of inauthenticity. The call of Dasein to himself to be his authentic self is comparable to a man who is sinking in the water trying to lift himself out by the hair on his head or to one blind man leading another. The resolute response of Dasein to his own call in the given existential 'Situation', and the anticipation of death facilitating this resolute return to one's own being adds a heroic and tragic sense to Dasein's existence. We do not want to deny the possibility of Dasein moving towards his authenticity in this manner. But the authenticity towards which Dasein moves is not genuine because Dasein tries to be his authentic self which is basically groundless and limited. Thus, we could say that the so-called authenticity of Heidegger I is incomplete and this state is nothing more than Dasein's reflective acceptance of his own tragic existence. What is achieved in this reflection of Dasein on his finite existence is not genuine authenticity, but an understanding of his wholeness or completeness as a temporal-historical existence.

From what we have said, it follows that Dasein in his self-enclosed, lonely and self-centered existence cannot attain his genuine and authentic self-hood. As an existence that is cut off from genuine relationship with other realities, Dasein lives only for himself and for the sake of his

¹² James M. Demske, *Being, Man, Death: A key to Heidegger*, p. 184.

structural existence. Dasein's involvement with other entities are conditioned by his own interest to maintain his self. Therefore, in order to attain genuine authenticity, Dasein must move from this self-centered existence. This 'movement from' is not a throwing out of Dasein's earlier existence, nor is it a break with his past, but consists in a change in perspective. Dasein no longer views everything from the perspective of the enclosed, self-assertive and lonely self. It is a breaking of the shell within which Dasein has enclosed himself, a letting-go of the self, and opening to realities other than the self in a genuine and real way. Once Dasein comes out of this 'walled-existence' of self-centered living, genuine movement towards authenticity happens. In this process Dasein moves from self-centered existence to Being-centered existence and attains total authenticity.

6. 3. 2. *Total Authentic Dasein*

The movement towards Being-centered existence is characterized by Dasein's awareness of his own insufficiency to bring about genuine authenticity in his existence. In other words, Dasein begins to depend on Being rather than on his own self. This openness towards Being marks this state of existence. Dasein is also aware that he cannot take the first steps towards this movement, unless he is called, summoned and claimed by Being. It is not the anxious Dasein in his not-at-homeness that calls Dasein, but Being that initiates this movement by its revealing-concealing mode of giving. In revealing itself to Dasein Being conceals itself, but this withdrawing or concealing dimension of Being makes Dasein seek Being, respond to Being and preserve Being.

Every stage of Dasein's movement towards authentic personhood or Being-centered existence is characterized by this giving of Being in Dasein as the lighting-up-place of Being, and Dasein responding to Being by shepherding and preserving this gift of Being. For example, at the stage of Dasein's essential thinking, Being calls and gives, while Dasein re-calls the call of Being by recollection and thanks for Being's gift. Release is brought about by Being's regioning and Dasein's response of non-willing and waiting on Being. Dasein begins to be a dweller in the nearness of Being by Being's poetic presencing and Dasein's poetic dwelling on the poetic presencing of Being in the three ecstases of time. Dasein becomes the seer of the truth of Being when Being's look (*Blick*) is reciprocated by Dasein's seeing and when this mutual look, into each other's realm, occurs in the process of revealing of Being. Again, Dasein sees Being in its truth by dwelling in language which houses Being, in the process of co-speaking with language which speaks of Being. Thus, Being's giving and Dasein's responding is an essential characteristic of Dasein's state of total authenticity.

The giving of itself to Dasein on the part of Being and the receiving-responding to the giving of Being by Dasein clearly point to the nature of the relationship that exists between Being and Dasein as an one-to-one relationship. This is different from the pre-conceptual understanding of Being, of which Heidegger I spoke. It is an appropriating relationship of identity and belonging-together, which takes Dasein and Being to each other's realms. Being claims Dasein for itself, while Dasein also claims Being in the sense that he lets himself be claimed by Being. Thus, in Being's claim, Dasein claims Being.

In his movement towards Being-centered existence, Dasein not only is related to Being in an authentic manner, but also is related to all other entities. Dasein preserves and shepherds Being which not only is manifested in his person, but also as revealed in things. Firstly, in his essential relatedness to Being, Dasein points to the ontological difference, i.e., the relationship of difference between Being and entities. Secondly, Dasein shepherds Being in things by dwelling in the fourfold. Thus, Dasein's task in Being-centered existence becomes the preservation of Being as it

manifests in the fourfold. By saving the earth, receiving the sky, waiting on divinities and accepting his own nature as mortal by living as mortal, Dasein preserves Being in its physical, divine and human facets. This relationship of Dasein to entities is much deeper and more personal than Dasein's relationship of concerned pre-occupation with entities that is stated in Heidegger I.

In the state of Being-centered existence, Dasein understands himself in a new way. His relationship with himself has changed immensely as his meaning, truth and authenticity are understood in his relationship with Being. Dasein is not alone in his self-enclosed and self-centered existence. In his genuine openness to Being and entities a new vision of himself has dawned on Dasein. There is no inconsistency regarding his nature: Dasein still remains the most powerful of all beings, the only being who can understand Being and enter into a relationship of belonging-together with it. At the same time, Dasein is not a self-sufficient existence as his destiny depends on Being. In fact, his openness to Being has raised Dasein to the state of *Ereignis*, thereby making Dasein the standard-bearer for Being. Dasein still is the same finite and limited being, characterized by existential guilt, existential limitations and existential death, besides, anxiety, fallenness and care. Yet Dasein is not uptight about these aspects of his nature, but instead accepts these unsettling dimensions of his nature with calmness and serenity. The reason for such a change in Dasein's attitude is that, unlike the Dasein of Heidegger I, the authentic Being-centered Dasein does not face his finitude and limited existence all alone. Dasein's finitude, including death, instead of effecting unsettling moods in Dasein, leads him back to Being, which is his ultimate ground. The reason for anxiety, struggle and the tragic sense is the inability of the self-centered Dasein to ground his own existence. Now that Dasein is grounded in Being, these unsettling dimensions of Dasein's nature do not matter to him as much as before. Since Dasein is securely grounded in Being, all inconsistencies about his nature fall apart; as a result, Dasein dwells in security and peace.

Even though Being is the closest to Dasein, yet it is the farthest from Dasein. To put it differently, in spite of the fact of Dasein's relationship of belonging-together to Being and his encountering of Being in Dasein's own being and in that of entities, in some sense, Being is far away from Dasein. Being always remains a mystery to Dasein, who never can never get hold of the whole of Being. This is due to the way Being gives itself to Dasein, viz. in the revealing-concealing process. As soon as Being gives itself in an entity, it withdraws in favor of the entity in which Being is revealed. As a result, the entity is revealed and Being itself is concealed. Thus, Dasein cannot have the total experience of Being, but only experiences it as revealing and concealing, giving and withdrawing, pre-sencing and absencing. Being's manner of giving makes Dasein continue his seeking of Being. Even in Being-centered existence, Dasein must continue to be the lighting-up-place of Being and continue to shepherd the revelation of Being in Dasein himself and in entities. In this continued seeking, receiving and shepherding of Being, Dasein moves from his self-centered existence towards Being-centered existence, in which alone consists his total authenticity.

Thus, total authenticity of Dasein occurs when Dasein moves from self-centered existence to Being-centered existence. It is a single process with inherent twofold movements. This is not to be understood in a spatio-temporal sense, even though space and time may be involved in the process. It consists fundamentally in a shift in perspective and attitude of Dasein towards his life and destiny. In the self-centered existence Dasein's life, destiny and authenticity are understood as the task of Dasein alone, whereas in the Being-centered existence, the same are seen in the light of the appropriating belonging-together of Being and Dasein. In the former state Dasein is totally closed up in himself, while in the latter Dasein opens himself genuinely to Being, entities and himself.

These threefold opennesses involve a shift in Dasein's perspective. To the extent that Dasein effects this shift he moves towards Being-centered existence from self-centered existence and in the process becomes a totally authentic human person.

Part III
The Paths of Shankara and Heidegger: A Comparative Analysis

Similarities

In this chapter, we shall study similar themes in the Shankarite and Heideggerian paths in a comparative light. The themes selected are related to the manner in which these two thinkers have analyzed man, Being and the path to authentic human destiny.

7.1. Man

In this section, we will bring out similar themes from Shankara and Heidegger, related to their perception of human person, both in his or her authentic and inauthentic states.

7.1.1. *Jiiva and Inauthentic Dasein*

For Shankara *jiiva* is that unit of existence which is conscious of its physical covering. It is the individual psycho-physical organism or the mind-body system. As it has a body, *jiiva* experiences hunger, thirst, anger and all such emotional states. Since it is a psycho-physical system possessing emotions and appetites, *jiiva* enjoys gross and physical things. Because it is caught up in a desire for enjoyment, *jiiva* involves itself in misery and ceaseless change. Thus, the life of *jiiva* is characterized by not only enjoyment, but also bitterness. *Jiiva* is the source and subject of all empirical experiences. Other than physical body, there is the subtle body that survives the individual *jiiva* beyond death. It includes: the vivifying principle called *praana*; the five sense organs, through which, the mind perceives the world of reality; the five organs of action, with the help of which the *jiiva*, as the psycho-physical-conscious organism can move about; the central organ with *manas* and *buddhi*, as two faculties of deliberation and knowledge, having such intellectual and volitional states as cognition, decision, desire, pleasure, fear and shame; and the faculty of the 'I-sense', called *ahankaara*. Besides the physical and subtle bodies, there is the bliss body, which is the innermost level of *jiiva*.

With the help of these senses and faculties, *jiiva* experiences various stages, viz., the waking stage, the dream stage and the stage of deep sleep. In the waking stage, *jiiva* creates its own microcosmic world and enjoys various satisfactions. Here, it is the agent of action and enjoyer of the fruits of actions. In the dream stage, *jiiva* enjoys pleasures or suffers pains, in a world it creates. The dream world is based on *jiiva*'s fiction and fancy. In the stage of deep sleep, *jiiva* attains the state of quiet and bliss, over-powered by the *tamas guna*. Because of its past *karma*, *jiiva* is tossed from one birth to another, and one state of existence to another, and thus is the subject of all transmigratory existence. Besides, *jiiva* experiences itself as having five sheaths, viz., the sheath of body, the sheath of vital force, the sheath of mind, the sheath of knowledge and the sheath of bliss. All these limiting conditions of *avidhya* individuate *jiiva* and make it forget its own true nature and condition. As a result, the *jiiva* does not realize that it is *Brahman*, the ultimate spirit behind the universe. Tossed by the pushes and pulls of everyday living, it loses sight of its true nature and in this manner lives an inauthentic life, forgetting its own authentic destiny.

Heidegger's notion of inauthentic and fallen Dasein strikes a similarity to the notion of *jiiva*. The inauthentic state of Dasein involves a state of Dasein's absorption in the world of his concern. It consists in being lost in the publicness of the 'they' (*das Man*) and is Dasein's losing sight of the truth about himself. It is a state in which, one fails to grasp one's being with transparency and

clarity. It is one's entanglement with the life-world so that one loses sight of one's roots. It is a style of living in which one not only loses one's vision about oneself, but also bases one's life totally on other people's direction. In this inauthentic state, one's life is totally aimed at living others' expectations of oneself. In other words, in the inauthentic state one loses one's individuality, i.e., being one's self, and allows oneself to be guided by the 'crowd' or the impersonal self. In the inauthentic state a person is characterized by curiosity, idle talk and ambiguity.

The curious Dasein allows himself to be carried away by the looks of the world. He seeks novelty for the sake of novelty, and in the process allows his life to be restless, always looking for excitement and changes. Thus, he lives a life of 'never-dwelling-any-where'. In this way, curiosity denies Dasein his genuine being and he lives a superficial existence. The superficiality of curiosity is expressed in idle talk. Such idle talk closes off what is talked about, discourages any new inquiry, understanding, interpretation and communication. Thus, Dasein is cut off from a genuine relation to entities, other Daseins and his own self. The lack of genuineness leads to ambiguous living and results in the inability of Dasein to distinguish between what is genuine and what is not. As genuine knowledge is denied to the ambiguous Dasein, he is not able to be straightforward. Thus, one's whole life becomes an ambiguous spying on each other and a tense watching of one another. In such a state, one has no time to think of his authentic destiny. Thus, Dasein, in his inauthentic state, like the *jiiva* of Shankara, has lost sight of his true self, but lives in an illusion about himself and his destiny.

7.1.2. *Avidhyaa and the They*

For Shankara, *avidhyaa* is the individual *maayaa*. It is a principle of ignorance that blocks things from one's view. It consists in the real nature of a thing being obscured by misinterpretation of one thing for another, as for instance, the idea of snake preventing the reality of the rope that is there, being experienced. Thus, in *avidhyaa*, the idea of obscuration is prominent. It is due to the activity of *rajasguna* and *tamasguna*. In this manner, *avidhyaa* denies the knowledge of identity in the human person and projects subjectively false ideas.

The effects of the individual *maayaa* on man are manifold. *Avidhyaa* makes man forget his true nature and identify himself with the psycho-physical organism called *jiiva*. Man, identified with the body which is the seat of all emotions and appetites, becomes the enjoyer of physical pleasures and the experiencer of miseries. Besides the physical body, *avidhyaa* presents man with a subtle body and a bliss body. Subtle body includes the vital principle, called *praana*, which supports and preserves organic existence in man. It also possesses the external sense organs, organs of action and the central organ. The five sense organs make man experience the world outside, while the organs of action make the psycho-physical organism move about. The central organ has two faculties, viz., the *manas* and the *buddhi*. The former is the faculty of desire, deliberation and will, while the latter is the faculty of right apperception or discriminating knowledge. The *manas* has a number of modifications relating to the intellectual and volitional states. The modifications of the intellectual state are doubt, cognition, belief and retention, while the modifications of the volitional state are desire, decision, deliberation, fear, shame, pleasure and pain. *Manas* gives knowledge, weighs reason for and against, while *buddhi* helps *jiiva* to apprehend rightly. Other than these, there is the 'I-sense' which makes one experience oneself as the individual 'I' and say 'I exist' in all the three stages of existence, viz., waking state, dream stage and stage of deep sleep. In each of these stages, as the individual *jiiva*, one experiences the illusion of physical body, subtle

body and bliss body respectively. Thus, *avidhyaa*, by superimposing very powerfully on man the I-consciousness and various intellectual and volitional modifications, makes him believe that he is a combination of five sheaths, viz., physical, vital, mental, knowledge and bliss, and in the process denies him the knowledge that his inner spirit, the *Aatman*, is identical with *Brahman*.

In Heidegger, we find a parallel notion in his concept of the 'they'. 'They' is the false self Dasein assumes in the fallen state. It has a number of characteristics. The first is distentiaity, in which the everyday Dasein stands in subjection to others, the 'they' who determine the everyday possibilities of Dasein. Here, Dasein's self is taken over by the 'they'. Distentiaity so dissolves one's own identity completely into the being of the other, that the distinction between the other and oneself is destroyed. Thus, Dasein takes pleasure, reads, judges and is shocked based on the standards set by 'they'. Having brought about the loss of Dasein's identity in distentiaity, 'they' maintains this loss in the second characteristic, viz., mediocrity. Here, everything extraordinary and exceptional in Dasein is done away with, and every type of priority is leveled down. These two characteristics together constitute in Dasein a publicness in which every specialty and genuineness that belongs to Dasein is obliterated and obscured. 'They' interpret the world for Dasein, who is fully disburdened of his responsibilities. Thus, Dasein feels a sense of security about his life, even though it is dominated by the 'they'. This security provides Dasein a constancy for his fallen existence, from which he does not want to be disturbed. Caught up totally by this 'impersonal self' Dasein experiences a constant temptation towards living the fallen state of existence, as he gradually believes that the fallen state is secure, genuine and the one in which his possibilities are fulfilled. It, in turn, brings about a tranquillity in Dasein about his life. When Dasein is tranquil and happy about his illusory existence, he is moving towards alienation, as he is moving away from his own unique possibilities and gets entangled with the other. Thus, under the influence of the 'they', Dasein takes a 'downward plunge' into his own groundlessness, while under the impression that his way of living is an ascension. In this manner, the 'they' makes Dasein to be inauthentic, to forget his uniqueness and throws him into the bottomless living of everydayness, like that of the *jiiva*, under the influence of *avidhyaa*.

7.1.3. Cosmic *Maayaa* and Metaphysical-Technological Existence

The cosmic *maayaa* is the capacity to bring the entire existence appearing as objective to subjective consciousness. The origin of the world process and the changes that take place in the world are attributed to the cosmic *maayaa*. In it, the idea of origination, which implies power and will, is more apparent. Cosmic *maayaa* is the principle of individuation, that makes one experience plurality and multiplicity in the universe. The effects of the cosmic *maayaa* are varied and many. It leads to the evolution of the world of names and forms. Besides, the cosmic ignorance veils one's perception of *Brahman*, the ultimate reality, in that it is experienced as *Ishvara*, the supreme Lord, whom the human mind can grasp and the human heart can love. Due to the activity of the cosmic ignorance, *Ishvara* is experienced by the devotee as the creator, the sustainer and the destroyer. Cosmic *maayaa* is the basis of the emergence of the five subtle bodies, viz., ether, air, fire, water and earth. From the subtle matter, by the process of fivefold combination, the gross body originates. The various combinations of the gross matter, by way of integration and differentiation, give rise to the cosmic system of fourteen worlds, in the higher, the middle and the lower regions, viz., the *satyaloka*, the *jnaanaloka* and the *tapaloka* respectively. Besides, the cosmic *maayaa* effects three cosmic stages of existence and three cosmic orders of existence: the cosmic waking-consciousness, which is conscious of the totality of the concrete existences

inhabiting the threefold regions and in which *Brahman* is limited by the cosmic gross body; the cosmic dream-consciousness, in which *Brahman* has the totality of the subtle body as its limiting adjunct; and the cosmic sleep-consciousness, in which *Brahman* has for its limiting adjunct the cosmic bliss body. In this manner, cosmic *maayaa* brings about the illusion of the plurality of the material world, the plurality of gods, the plurality of kingdoms of beings, the plurality of cosmic order and the plurality of stages of existence. In effecting the illusion of plurality and multiplicity, cosmic ignorance veils the ultimate reality behind the universe, viz., the *Brahman*.

In Heidegger, we have a similar notion, viz., metaphysical-technological existence by focusing on the externals forgets to raise and deal with the question of the meaning of Being (*das Sein*). According to Heidegger, metaphysics, which Aristotle called the first philosophy and later came to be known as ontology, is a science of being as being. Its main concern is not Being, but beingness of beings. The beingness of beings was unified in the highest entity, which Aristotle called the first cause and later philosophers identified as God. Metaphysics, insofar as it is a study of entities, in their abstract universal being is ontology. Insofar as it attempts to inquire into entities as fundamentally grounded in the highest entity -- which is the ultimate reason for their being -- metaphysics is theology.¹ Ontology and theology are not two parts of metaphysics, which rather is both at the same time as the beingness of beings is grounded in the highest being. Thus, for Heidegger, metaphysics is onto-theologic.²

Heidegger is of the opinion that metaphysics began to be onto-theologic after Plato and Aristotle.³ With the development of Christian theology in the middle ages, the creator-creature structure became the basis of metaphysical thinking. As a result, the basic endeavor of metaphysics became the study of two types of beings, viz., the creator and the creatures.⁴ Thus, the metaphysical tradition, that began with Plato and Aristotle, was solidified during the middle ages, continues through the modern period and culminates in Nietzsche.⁵ From Plato to Nietzsche, there runs an unbroken metaphysical thinking, which takes the form of subject-centered philosophy, especially in Descartes, and is consummated in Nietzsche's philosophy which led to the forgetfulness of Being as Being.⁶

The onto-theological metaphysical thinking led to what Heidegger refers to as representational thinking (*vorstellendes Denken*) in which the original insights contained in pre-Socratic thinking has been replaced by representational and intellectual concepts. As these concepts dominated philosophy, thinking comes to be representation of ideas, and truth comes to be correctness of these representations, which is localized in a statement. This, in turn, led to the emergence of logic as the science of thinking,⁷ which began to dominate over the Being of beings.⁸ The domination of logic reached its peak, when it was considered as the arbitrator of what is true and false, and the principle of contradiction established itself as the most important law of logical thinking, which

¹ 1. Cf. *WM*, p. 19; Cf. Martin Heidegger, "The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," *Existentialism from, Dostoevsky to Sartre*, ed. Walter Kaufmann (New York: New American Library, 1975), p. 275 (hereafter: "The Way Back to the Ground of Metaphysics").

² Cf. *ID*, p. 50; *IAD*, p. 59.

³ Cf. *EM*, pp. 12, 137; *IM*, pp. 15, 179.

⁴ Cf. *EM*, pp. 10-11; *IM*, pp. 11-13.

⁵ Cf. William J. Richardson, *Through Phenomenology to Thought*, pp. 301-382.

⁶ Cf. Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche*, Bd. II (Pfullingen: Neske, 1961), pp. 201, 291-302 (hereafter: *N II*). Cf. also William J. Richardson, *Through Phenomenology to Thought*, p. 281.

⁷ Cf. *EM*, p. 143; *IM*, p. 188.

⁸ Cf. *EM*, p. 136; *IM*, p. 176.

no one could question.⁹ Metaphysics as a science of the beingness of beings, and logic as a science of thinking could not be separated in the development of Western philosophy, as the logical categories were, in fact, metaphysical. It, in turn, has brought about subject-object thinking in modern philosophy and has given it an epistemological orientation, in the process forgetting to consider Being as Being.¹⁰

Contemporary technological thinking is, in fact, a legacy of the metaphysical past.¹¹ Technological thinking is characterized by the modern scientific method of logical verification and the technological attitude of domination. Modern scientific method involves research with the help of which the world is organized by bringing into play the power of calculating, planning and molding all things.¹² Three elements are involved in modern scientific research. The first is the rigor of procedure. It consists in determining the area of scientific investigation in the realm of things and is carried through by strictly planned projects characterized by mathematical precision and exactness.¹³ The second is experimentation in which a scientific procedure is implemented. This begins by setting forth a hypothesis and objectification of facts from which laws relating to their necessity and constancy are formulated. The third element is institutionalization for unless institutionalized, such ongoing activities as specialization and specific forms of investigation of the scientific research cannot be guaranteed.¹⁴ Besides scientific method, there is what Heidegger calls the technological attitude of domination that is essential for the effective continuation of technological thinking. It is more aggressive than scientific research. While scientific research considers a natural object as something that is to be studied and investigated, a technologist looks for ways of exploiting the same object as a source of energy and power.¹⁵ In other words, scientific research would investigate the nature and its usability with mathematical precision, while technological attitude of domination would aim at actually bringing the potencies out of the object by exploiting it.¹⁶ Thus, the technological attitude of domination is a type of will-to-power which looks upon nature only as something that can be known, manipulated and used. Machines are tools to enact this domination over nature.¹⁷

The scientific method, with its pre-planned, rigorous and mathematical approach of scientific research and the technological attitude with its manipulative and dominative tendencies lead to what Heidegger calls calculative thinking (*rechnendes Denken*). It consists in having a realistic and pragmatic view of life and reality, characterized by an unsentimental and businesslike outlook which turns circumstances to its advantage in order to attain an end. It involves meticulous planning and careful calculation. The ultimate aim of calculative thinking is the control of total power. A clear example is the system of mass-production and consumption, in which one nation tries to dominate the other, resulting in wars and struggle for power. This, in turn, results in man's

⁹ Cf. *EM*, p. 19; *IM*, p. 25.

¹⁰ Cf. Johnson J. Puthenpurackal, p. 125.

¹¹ Cf. *VA*, p. 76; Martin Heidegger, *The End of Philosophy*, trans. Joan Stambaugh (London: Souvenir Press, 1975), p. 93 (hereafter: *EP*). Cf. also Martin Heidegger, *Der Satz von Grund*, 5. Auflage (Pfullingen: Neske, 1979), p. 209 (hereafter: *SG*).

¹² Cf. *HW*, p. 87; Martin Heidegger, "The Age of the World as Picture," *QCT*, p. 135.

¹³ Cf. *HW*, p. 78; *QCT*, p. 125. Cf. also Martin Heidegger, *Die Frage nach dem Ding*, 2. Auflage (Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 1975), p. 74 (hereafter: *FD*); Martin Heidegger, *What is a Thing?*, trans. W.B. Barton Jr. and Vera Deutsch (Indiana: Gateway Editions, 1967), p. 95 (hereafter: *WT*).

¹⁴ Cf. *HW*, pp. 78, 90-91; *QCT*, pp. 125, 139.

¹⁵ Cf. *GL*, p. 18; *DT*, p. 50.

¹⁶ Cf. *TK*, p. 16; *QCT*, p. 16.

¹⁷ Harold Alderman, "Heidegger: Technology as Phenomenon," *Personalist*, 51 (1970): 542.

everyday life becoming a struggle to succeed in the marketplace.¹⁸ In the process, man himself becomes an important raw material.¹⁹

The sway of the metaphysical-technological thinking, with its scientific method and technological attitude of domination and their consequence, calculative thinking, gives man a view of reality totally cut off from his authentic destiny. Caught up in such a world view, man has no time for, or interest in, thinking of Being as Being, though only in relation to this can man's total authenticity be realized. Thus, just as the cosmic *maayaa* (in Shankara) prevents man from recognizing his oneness with *Brahman*, so also the metaphysical-technological existence bars Dasein from experiencing his belonging-together to Being.

7.1.4. *Aparaa Vidhyaa and Care*

For Shankara, *aparaa vidhyaa* is man's state of phenomenal existence. Here man is caught up in the hustle and bustle of everyday living, as he is swayed by individual and cosmic *maayaa*. Under the influence of ignorance in these two aspects, one's knowledge and experience of reality is characterized by superimposition, a mistaken ascription of one thing for another. In superimposition one attributes to a thing qualities of essential nature which do not belong to it. In other words, it mistakenly considers one thing as the other. For example, rope is falsely judged as a snake so that the qualities of the snake are wrongly attributed to the rope. According to Shankara, due to the influence of *maayaa*, the attributes of the non-self, viz., the world of thought and matter, are superimposed on *Brahman*. Thus, *Brahman*, the ultimate and changeless reality, appears as the world of names and forms in the state of *aparaa vidhyaa*. In this manner, *maayaa* superimposes the unreal on the real. There are two stages, in which, the veiling of *Brahman* takes place. Firstly, the 'ego-idea' is superimposed upon the inner self in man (*Aatman*), which is absolute existence and reality. As a result, one loses the universal idea of *Aatman* being absolute existence and considers oneself as an individual (*jiiva*). Secondly, the 'ego-idea' reaches outside, as it were, and identifies itself with the body, with physical and mental attributes and with actions without ever becoming aware of the true nature of the 'I'. Attributing individuality and other qualities to oneself in this way, he sees multiplicity everywhere. This world of multiplicity, of names and forms, constituted of individuals like oneself and different from oneself, is superimposed on *Brahman* or absolute spirit. In the *aparaa* state, one identifies everything in the world with oneself. The inner self, though veiled by *maayaa*, looks on as if it is a witness completely unaffected by the false attribution caused by superimposition. Therefore, for Shankara, the *aparaa vidhyaa* experience fundamentally depends on the 'ego-idea', the removal of which will effect the disappearance of this experience.

Since the central element in the state of *aparaa vidhyaa* is the 'ego-idea', i.e., the individuality of the *jiiva*, every experience is related to man who becomes the subject of every experience and experiences the world of reality as his object. Thus, there comes about the distinction between the experiencer and the experienced, the knower and the known, the seer and the seen, the subject and the object, the ego and the non-ego. These two elements become inseparable in every experience in the state of *aparaa vidhyaa*. All the means of knowledge characteristic of human knowing presuppose this subject-object duality. As a result, knowledge, truth and meaning are attained only in relation to man's use of senses, *manas* and *buddhi*. Thus, all knowledge attained in the *aparaa* state is mediate and indirect knowledge. Besides, the knowledge one possesses is

¹⁸ Cf. Martin Heidegger, "Wozu Dichter?," *HW*, pp. 270, 289; *PLT*, pp. 114 -115, 135.

¹⁹ Cf. *VA*, p. 88; *EP*, p. 104.

caused by man himself, as every knowledge comes about as the result of man's mental activity. This implies that man can make, develop and increase his knowledge of reality by way of research, modern techniques and technologies. In this manner, in the state of *aparaa vidhyaa*, man becomes the center of life and lives in the illusion that he is the only reality, ignoring the genuine truth about himself.

In Heidegger, we have a parallel notion in 'care as Dasein's being-in-the-world'. As care, Dasein is constituted of the threefold concerns, viz., epistemological, relational and existential. The epistemological concern of Dasein is that he finds himself in the world as a thrown state-of-being, understands his thrown existence and expresses it in discourse. That Dasein always finds himself placed in the world, an 'already-found-himself-thereness', means that Dasein's existence has already started, without his ever knowing or choosing. Dasein knows that-he-is, but his origin and destiny are hidden from him. He is a factual existence, in which he finds himself in varying moods involved with entities and affected by them. Though like any other present-to-hand-entity, Dasein is a thrown existence, he is the horizon in relation to which the question of Being is raised, the meaning of entities is discovered and his own being is realized. This is because, Dasein is capable of understanding his thrown existence, interpreting it and expressing it in discourse. Dasein's knowing the world is founded on his being-in-the-world as a state-of-being, understanding and discourse. Because of his existential 'being-in' among entities that he nonetheless transcends in that he discovers their meaning and truth, Dasein is the formative agent of the world.

As the world's formative agent, Dasein's nature must be understood not in relation to his 'whatness', but in relation to his 'way of being' as Dasein. Dasein is existence, as one who stands above all other entities; he is 'mineness' due to the fact that he has a unique individuality of his own. Because of these two qualities, Dasein has to be either authentic or inauthentic in his existence. This means that Dasein is the only being among all entities who can realize or neglect, develop or reject, build up or forget his being and possibilities. In other words, Dasein is what he makes of himself. Thus, Dasein can either exist as the distinctive type of being he is or can live a routine manner of living. When Dasein owns his possibilities and actualizes them he is authentic. If he is blind to his possibilities or ignores them, he is inauthentic. The uniqueness of Dasein in actualizing his own possibilities and in discovering the truth and meaning of entities, clearly points to his priority in the order of existence. He has threefold priorities: an ontic priority, in that he is existence, stands out from all other beings and is open to Being; an ontological priority, because Dasein is able to understand Being; and an ontico-ontological priority in that by his understanding of Being Dasein not only understands his own being, but also that of other entities, which thereby provides an ontico-ontological condition for any study of reality.

In his relational concern, Dasein is related to entities in a 'being-alongside' relationship, in which his involvement with them is one of pre-occupation. In the process, understands them as present-at-hand, ready-to-hand and in their spatiality. Towards other Daseins Dasein has a relationship of 'being-with', which is characterized by various modes of solicitude. The twofold relationship with entities and other Daseins, viz., the environmental world and the 'we-world' respectively, constitute Dasein's world. Dasein's existential concern includes the state of fallen existence, Dasein's movement towards authenticity and the temporal-historical nature of Dasein. Just as Dasein is central in the other two concerns, so also he plays a key role in the existential concern, as he pulls himself out of fallen existence, effects his authentic existence, and remains the foundation of his temporal-historical nature and the basis of historiology as the science of history.

Our consideration, of the epistemological, relational and existential concerns of Dasein, clearly points to the fact that in the state of care, Dasein holds a prime place, as the whole world and all the entities in it revolve around him. The total dependence of every reality on Dasein, in the state of care, makes him live in an illusion that he is the only reality and forget his nature. Just as the *jiiva*, in the state of *aparaa vidhyaa*, is caught up with himself, so also Dasein, in the state of care, is centered on himself, and in the process moves far away from the authentic destiny.

7.1.5. *Paraa Vidhyaa* and Transcendence

Paraa vidhyaa is the ultimate state of man. It is an integral and intuitive experience of absolute reality. Such an experience involves no duality. Therefore, we can speak of attainment of *paraa vidhyaa* not from the *paramaartha* point of view but only from the point of view of the seeker. In empirical knowledge, we come to know something new in attaining knowledge. But in *paraa* knowledge nothing new is attained; only the seeker realizes what he really is, viz., his identity with *Brahman*. Thus, there is neither a subject nor an object of experience; it is a pure knowledge and pure experience. It is, therefore, neither *Brahman*-consciousness nor self-consciousness, but pure consciousness without subject-object duality. In *Brahmaanubhava* the differences of the experiencer and the experienced are totally removed. Since *Brahmaanubhava* is a non-dual and subject-objectless experience, it is direct and immediate experience of *Brahman*. In the attainment of the *paraa* state, the senses, the mind and the intellect do not play any role as it is the immediate and direct recognition of one's real self. In fact, no mediation is necessary to know one's true self.

As *paraa vidhyaa* is non-dual and direct experience it is indescribable. The very notion of description involves duality. In the empirical realm any experience, however great or small, can be given at least some description. What is known through the various empirical means of knowledge can also be expressed in words, using our own everyday or philosophical language; what is not known through empirical means of knowledge cannot be expressed in words. As *Brahmaanubhava* is trans-empirical, non-dual and undifferentiated, it is indescribable. Since, *Brahmaanubhava* is of the nature of *Brahman*, just like the latter the former also is unknowable and indescribable. *Brahmaanubhava* is an ontological state of absolute oneness between *Brahman* and *Aatman* and like them is eternal. Thus, *paraa* knowledge is uncaused; the seeker and his activities cannot bring about the state of *paraa vidhyaa*, for a transcendental experience cannot be caused. *Brahmaanubhava* is eternal, uncaused and identical with *Brahman*, as it consists in recognizing that that one is *Brahman*.

In the Heideggerian notion of 'transcendence as Dasein's being-toward-Being', we find a parallel to the Shankarite notion of *paraa vidhyaa*. By his very nature, Dasein is called to a life of being-toward-Being. This state transcends a life enmeshed by the cares of everydayness. It is a life oriented towards and focused on Being. The nature of the state of transcendence is one of belonging-together between Being and Dasein. This relationship is not a mere causal relationship, but one in which both Being and man hold each other and remain in total openness to each other. It is a relationship of Being giving and man responding, and of presencing Being's manifestation in himself and in entities. This relationship of belonging-together makes Dasein the 'place' of Being's presencing in the spatio-temporal history. Open to Being in this essential relationship, Dasein moves towards Being through an ascending path of essential thinking of Being, dwelling in the neighborhood of Being and seeing the truth of Being.

Essential thinking does not consist in developing a conceptual system of thinking with a chain of logical premises which lead to valid and certain conclusions. Thinking of Being is beyond

logical and metaphysical thinking, as it overcomes onto-theological thinking and language. Thinking of Being is non-subjective, non-representative and non-logical in the sense of pre-subjective, pre-representative and pre-logical respectively. It is pre-rational, but not irrational; and anti-logic, but not illogical. Essential thinking comes about in man as the result of Being's giving as 'the most thought-provoking' and 'that which is eminently thought-worthy', and correspondingly Dasein's responding to this giving of Being by recollecting Being in memory and thanking it for its gift of itself. In Dasein essential thinking leads to an openness to the mystery of Being, whereby he becomes a dweller in the neighborhood of Being. Dwelling is an ek-sisting and standing out in the openness of Being. It is an abiding of Dasein in his own origins and consists in Dasein being attuned to the voice of Being. This gives itself in silence to which Dasein is called to listen, even amidst the loudest noise. When Dasein is related to Being in this relationship of dwelling, he is able to relate to entities in an authentic way. As a dweller in the nearness of Being, Dasein builds and spares beings in their authentic being, thereby preserving Being's manifestation in things. The essential thinker and the dweller becomes the seer of the truth of Being. As a seer, Dasein recognizes Being's truth, viz., Dasein's relationship of belonging-together to Being, the relationship of difference that exists between Being and beings, and Being's manifestation in history as a time-space-play. When this truth dawns in Dasein, he becomes the seer and the shepherd of Being who guards Being as it is manifested in himself, in entities and in history.

The three ascending stages of Being-centered living, therefore, involve an interactive relationship between Being and Dasein: Being calls and gives Dasein listens and responds. In this interactive relationship the role of Being is always primary, as the initiative comes from Being, to which Dasein responds by being its lighting-up-place. Thus, like the state of *paraa vidhyaa*, in the state of transcendence, Dasein moves from his worldly involvements to a deeper-level of existence, that is based on his relationship of belonging-together to Being.

7.2. Being

In this section, in a comparative light we should consider a few themes from Shankara and Heidegger relating to Being, indicating their similarities.

7.2.1. Brahman/Aatman and Being

According to Shankara the realization of *Brahman* is the goal of *paraa vidhyaa*. The term '*Brahman*' is derived from the Sanskrit root '*brih*' which means to gush forth, to grow, to be great and to increase. The suffix '*man*' added to the root, signifies the absence of limitation. Thus, the term '*Brahman*' means that which is absolutely the greatest. *Brahman*, therefore, is the absolute and unlimited reality, which is the *substratum* and foundation of the world of our experience and on which everything depends for its existence. It is the cause from which proceeds or originates the world. *Brahman* is self-sufficient and does not depend on anything else for its existence. It is a spiritual reality, since matter is not self-sufficient, but limited and subject to change. *Brahman* is absolutely homogeneous in nature and whatever exists is this one universal Being. It is pure Being, Intelligence and Thought. These are not attributes of *Brahman*, but constitute its substance. *Brahman* is not a thinking being, but is Thought itself without any qualities, and beyond the order of empirical experience. Thus, *Brahman* is *a priori* and cannot be grasped by *a posteriori* experience. Since *Brahman* is beyond empirical grasp, whatever positive descriptions we develop

about *Brahman* would always remain in the level of phenomenal experience. Thus, *Brahman* is different from all we can speak of him by human language on the empirical level.

The nature of *Brahman* is so transcendent that it cannot be compared to anything we know. In comparison with *Brahman* all we know in the world of our experience can be considered as non-existence. Yet *Brahman* is the Being of all beings as present in everything that is, for without the Being of *Brahman* nothing can exist. In spite of this, empirical experience of *Brahman* is not possible because it is unalterable and absolute Being which remains identical with itself in all its manifestations. It is the ground of all experience and yet is different from the space-time-cause world. *Brahman* has nothing similar to it, nothing different from it and does not have any internal relations, for all these are empirical distinctions. It is non-empirical, non-objective, wholly other, but it is not non-being. *Brahman* is absolute, unchangeable and attributeless. It is a principle of utter simplicity: there is no duality in *Brahman*, for no qualities are found in the concept of *Brahman*. It is also simple in the sense that it is not subject to inner contradictions. *Brahman* is not a metaphysical postulate that can be proved logically, but must be experienced in silence. *Brahman* is one: It is not a 'He' or personal being; nor is it an 'It' or impersonal concept; but it is a state which comes about when all subject-object distinctions are obliterated. Ultimately speaking, *Brahman* is a name, given to the timeless plenitude of Being.

As described above, *Brahman* is the same as the *Aatman*, which is rendered in English as 'self'. It signifies the most fundamental being of the individual. *Aatman* is the deathless, birthless, eternal and real substance of every soul. It is the unchanging reality behind the changing body, sense organs, mind and ego. It is the spirit which is the pure consciousness, unaffected by time, space and causality, limitless and without a second. For Shankara, the terms '*Brahman*' and '*Aatman*' basically denote the one and the same underlying principle: the former stands for the unchanging principle of the universe, while the latter refers to the unchanging reality in the individual. Thus, the two terms stand for two descriptions of the same ultimate reality, which is the ground of everything from the point of view of the universe and the individual. The ultimate reality represented by these terms is the fullness of Being that forms the goal of *para vidhya*.

Heidegger's notion of Being bears a striking resemblance to the Shankarite concept of *Brahman/Aatman*. The goal of the state of transcendence is Being. Heidegger understands Being in relation to the German term '*Geviert*'. It is related to the term '*Vier*', which means the number four. The prefix '*ge*' has the collective signification. Thus, the term '*Geviert*' is translated as the 'fourfold'. It constitutes the four 'aspects' of Being, viz., the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals. The earth and the sky constitute the physical 'component' of Being, while the divinities and mortals constitute the divine and human 'components' respectively. Each of the four 'elements' represents symbolically different dimensions of the 'essence' of Being. The earth is that which constructively supports the growing and blossoming plants, besides rendering them fruitful. It is the earth that preserves the rocks and water. It is on the earth that animal life and all forms of life continue. The sky is the path of the sun and moon; in it the stars shine. Changes in seasons, the light and dusk of the day, the gloom and glow of the night, the good and the bad weather, the moving clouds and the blue depths of the ether -- all happen in the sky. The divinities are the messengers of the Divine; out of the holy sway of the Divine, they appear and withdraw into concealment. Mortals are human beings, called mortals not because their earthly life comes to an end, but because they are capable of death as death. Mortals are those that have a relationship of presencing Being as Being.

Thus explained, the fourfold must not be misunderstood as four types of beings in the ontic sense. We cannot speak of them as being ontically and causally related because they are beyond

the realm of entities. The fourfold must be understood in the realm of *Ereignis*, the event of appropriation, in which mortals experience their belonging-together to Being. The intersection of the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals, in the unity of the fourfold constitutes the 'essence' of Being. Thus, the fourfold is the articulation of Being itself.

Heidegger attributes a number of qualities to Being. It is Gladsome. As Gladsome and hence brightness, serenity and gently joy. Being is Holy in the sense that it is the ultimate conserving power which guards beings in the integrity of their being. It is the Origin and hence the overflowing and continuous source. It is the Ground, which points to the fact that though it is a continuous source and constantly gives itself out, nevertheless it retains itself always as the source. In other words, while giving itself out, Being does not empty itself, but remains a steadfast and constant source. Thus, Being manifests itself as the Gladsome, the Holy, the Origin and the Ground. In this manner Being's manifestation assumes a relationship of belonging-together relating to Dasein, in which Dasein and Being appropriate each other into their realms. This is so because Dasein is transcendence by his very nature, and has a dimension of Being within him. But Being's relationship to entities is one of difference. Being is always the Being of beings which can be never thought of as existing without Being. Even though Being and beings are so closely related to each other that we can never think of one without the other, yet the relationship between them is one of difference. The reason for this is that Being does not have a separate and independent existence as a concrete entity. Only if it is an entity can it be related to other entities in a positive manner. By its very nature, Being is transcendence, and so can have only a relation of difference with entities. In this relationship both of belonging-together to Dasein, and of difference with beings, Being gives itself as a continuous process of presencing and absencing, revealing and concealing, giving and withdrawing, both in the temporal and spatial aspects. Thus, spatio-temporal history is nothing else but the giving of Being in the time-space unity. Like the *Brahman/Aatman* of Shankara, Heidegger's Being is the source of all reality and the ground of everything that is.

7.2.2. *Liila of Brahman and the Play of Being*

Shankara speaks of two types of *maayaa*, viz., the cosmic and the individual. The former leads to the evolution of the world of names and forms. In the cosmic absorption of everything in *Brahman* there comes about a sudden change when *Brahman* wills to evolve from within itself and express itself. This, in turn, disturbs the indeterminate *maayaa* and its constituent elements, viz., the *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. When *Brahman* accepts *maayaa* in its *sattvic* element, it becomes *Ishvara* which is the supreme Lord, who is worshipped by ordinary people as their personal God in the form of different deities. Again, it is the cosmic *maayaa* that gives rise to the conception of *Ishvara* as the creator, sustainer and destroyer. The three gods are nothing other than *Ishvara* with regard to the three *gunas*. When *Ishvara* is limited by *maayaa* in its *sattvic* aspect it is called *Vishnu*, who is the preserver and sustainer of the cosmic order. When *Ishvara* has *maayaa* with *rajas* as its dominant *upaadhi* it is called *Brahma*, who is the creator of the world. *Maayaa* with *tamas* predominating is called *Siva*, the destroyer of the universe. Besides, the cosmic *maayaa* brings about the illusion of the plurality of the cosmic order, the kingdoms of beings, the material world and the stages of existence. In the same way, the individual *maayaa* makes one perceive the *Aatman* as the psycho-physical-conscious organism, the *jīva* with the threefold types of body, having three stages of existence and five sheaths. In other words, cosmic *maayaa* and *avidhyaa* individualize *Brahman/Aatman* as *Ishvara* and *jīva*, besides bringing about the plurality of existence.

To the question "why must there be an emergence of the infinite process of becoming from *Brahman* through *maayaa*?" often the answer given is that it is the *liila* of *Brahman*. The term 'liila' means a sport or a playful activity. We cannot ascribe any specific reason when the *liila* of *Brahman* takes place, except saying that it is an appearance suitable to the capacity and understanding of the one to whom it does appear. *Liila*, therefore, lies in ignorance and can never reveal the nature of reality. *Liila* is real to the one to whom it appears, but does not mean anything to *Brahman*, who sportily assumes the appearance. In other words, *liila* is a self imposed limitation on the part of *Brahman*, which does not impair the integrity of the absolute *Brahman*. But it satisfies our volitional and emotional nature, which makes us conceive the absolute as personal existence that can fulfill our pragmatic need for love and devotion. Thus, there is no answer to the 'why' of *liila* of *Brahman*, except that it is a *liila* of *Brahman*.

We have a parallel to the *liila* of *Brahman* in Heidegger's notion of the play of Being. In speaking about the spatio-temporal nature of history, Heidegger says that it is due to the nature of Being's manifestation. Being gives itself in history in time-space unity. It implies a process of presencing and absencing, revealing and concealing, giving and withdrawing on the part of Being, both in the temporal and spatial aspects. Being is always Being of beings. This 'is' of Being in beings involve a dynamic coming-over of Being in beings, revealing beings in their essence. But, as soon as the beings are revealed in their being, the Being conceals itself in favor of the entity that is revealed. Thus, in Being's giving of itself to beings, there is an in-built revealing of the entity and a concealing of Being itself, as in sending itself Being withdraws and in giving itself Being withholds. Therefore, the temporal nature of history is due to the giving-withdrawing presencing of Being in the three ecstases of time, viz., the past, the present and the future. The spatial giving of Being in history is due to the interactive mirror-play of the fourfold, viz., the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals, in a mutual appropriation into the onefold of the four. Thus, the unity of the fourfold constitutes the world in its spatial aspect.

To the question of the 'why' of the spatio-temporal manifestation of Being in history, Heidegger says that it is a play of Being. It is a time-space play that comes from Being to man, in which entities can appear in their being. It is play, in which, 'time times', 'space spaces', 'thing things' and 'world worlds'. It is a world-play which lets one encounter the temporality of history in the three ecstases of time, and its spatiality in the four regions of the earth, the sky, the divinities and the morals. There is no 'why' to this play of Being. It is a groundless play of Being, as the play is not conditioned by will and calculative thinking. Besides, the play does not allow any causal or planned out patterns. It is like a child playing draughts. Being plays because it plays. The 'because' sinks into the play; the play is without 'why'. Being plays while it plays, and there remains only the play. There is no parallel to this type of play in the realm of entities. Thus, the Heideggerian notion of the play of Being is very similar to the idea of the *liila* of *Brahman*.

7.2.3. Realizing *Brahman* and Seeing Being

For Shankara, the goal of *paraa vidhyaa* is realization of the identity of the seeker with *Brahman*. In other words, the seeker realizes that his indwelling spirit, *Aatman* and *Brahman* are one and the same. In this realizing, essentially nothing new is attained. The seeker has come to know that he is not his psycho-physical organism of gross body, the subtle body and the bliss body. He has recognized the illusoriness of the world of his experience, which now is an *asat* for him. The aspirant has recognized the falsity of his empirical world which is the basis of his experiences founded on duality. When the unreality of the illusory experiences are negated, the seeker 'sees'

the truth about himself. Thus, the knowledge involved in *Brahmaanubhava* does not add any new elements to the seeker, except that it brings about an awareness of what he really is. In the experience of realizing *Brahman*, the seeker awakes to the truth of identity, which dawns on the seeker. We can compare this experience to a person who is experiencing the dream state. As long as one is dreaming, the environment of his dreams, people involved with him in the dream and other details about the dream are real to him. But, as soon as he comes out of the dream state, he recognizes the unreality of the dream world, and the reality of the conscious world dawns on him. The experiencing of the reality of the conscious world does not bring any new knowledge to the dreamer because, even while dreaming, he is essentially part of the conscious world. In the same way, when a person who is caught up in the phenomenal world attains *Brahmaanubhava* state, he does not gain any new knowledge, for even when he is part of the phenomenal world the essential truth about himself is that of identity with *Brahman*. He has only awakened to this truth of identity, which was hidden from him due to ignorance. Thus, as the result of ignorance, he wrongly identifies himself with the multiplicity of the phenomenal world, just as in the dream state the dreamer identifies himself with the contents of the dream experience and considers them as real. From this it is clear that the attainment of identity experience in *Brahmaanubhava* is a realization of the truth of identity of *Brahman* and *Aatman*, rather than an attainment of any new knowledge.

Heidegger's idea of seeing the truth of Being is similar to the Shankarite notion clarified above. For Heidegger, the essential thinker and the dweller in the neighborhood of Being becomes a seer of the truth of Being. The German word '*wissen*' (to see) and its Latin equivalent '*videre*' signify 'seeing' in the sense of 'attaining wisdom', rather than mere intellectual seeing. Thus, the seer is the one who already intuitively and mystically has grasped the presencing of Being. The 'seeing', therefore, is determined not by the physical sight and intellectual grasp, but by the depth experience of the lighting of Being in which one is dawned to the awareness of the truth of Being manifested in spatio-temporal history, in the unconcealing-concealing process. The truth of Being is the essential relationship of belonging-together between Being and man, the relation of difference between Being and beings and the spatio-temporal giving of Being as a play of Being. This is not a new knowledge that Dasein attains in Being-centered existence. This truth is ever present to Dasein, even when he is in the state of care. But the concerns and involvements that characterize the state of care do not let him see the truth about himself and about Being's manifestation. In other words, the state of care blocks Dasein completely from 'seeing' or realizing the truth of Being, as in it he is fully closed to Being's giving. As he moves into the state of transcendence, as an essential thinker and dweller in the nearness of Being, he begins to awake to the truth of Being which he has lost sight of due to his forgetfulness of Being. From this it is clear that, like the Shankarite notion of realizing *Brahman*, Heidegger's idea of 'seeing Being' is in fact an awakening to the truth of Being. This is not a new knowledge, but in some way always is present in Dasein, due to his transcendental nature.

7.2.4. *Tuuriya and Ereignis*

Under the influence of *avidhya*, *jiiva* experiences three stages of existence, viz., the individual waking-consciousness, the individual dream-consciousness and the individual sleep-consciousness. In the state of individual waking-consciousness, the *jiiva* is characterized by the individual gross body. In this state, *jiiva* experiences the world of external objects. The perceptual world becomes its field of knowledge and enjoyment and its objects are known and enjoyed as real existing things outside the mind. The world is perceived by *jiiva* as a series of states, and is

understood in relation to *jiiva* itself as the subject. Cognitive process, in this state, also involves three aspects, viz., the instrumental (*pramaana*), the objective (*premeya*) and the consequent (*phala*). The individual state of dream-consciousness has the subtle-body as its object. In this state, *jiiva* is conscious of what is within and enjoys subtle objects. Here, the consciousness is withdrawn from external objects and rests on the impressions of the waking state that remains within the mind. Thus, the senses are fully at rest. There is no body consciousness, and no time-space restriction. *Jiiva*'s individual sleep-consciousness is characteristic of the bliss body. In this state, *jiiva* enjoys bliss. Here, there is no duality that characterizes the other two states. In it, there is neither the subject that knows, nor the object that is known, as it is a state of undifferentiated consciousness in which the contents of waking and dream states come together. As a result, in this state *jiiva* experiences the highest serenity. But it is not a state of unconsciousness, as after *jiiva* is awake from the state of deep sleep, it knows that 'I slept soundly and that I did not know anything'. Thus, *jiiva* has the 'I-consciousness', after he wakes up from sleep. All these three states belong to *aparaa vidhyaa*. The characteristic element found in all the three states is 'I-consciousness'. In other words, in all these three states *jiiva* sees itself as the subject of various experiences. The 'I-consciousness' always implies duality, as in it every other reality becomes the object of the knowing 'I'. The experience of duality is due to *avidhyaa*; thus, as long as *avidhyaa* and its result, duality, exist, one cannot attain the *paraa* state of existence. Therefore, Shankara, along with the Upanishads, postulates a fourth state, viz., the *tuuriya*, as distinct from the other three states of *jiiva*. In it, there is absolute self-transcendence, as there is no 'I-consciousness' and duality. The *Tuuriya* state surpasses the limitations of time, space and causality besides, it is free from *avidhyaa* and its products, which vitiate the other three states. According to Shankara, only in the realm of *tuuriya* is *paraa vidhyaa* or *Brahmaanubhava* attained.

The state of *tuuriya* is parallel to the Heideggerian notion of the realm of *Ereignis*, in which the total authenticity of Dasein is attained. The German term '*Ereignis*' is rendered in English as 'the event of appropriation'. In common usage this word means an event or a happening. '*Ereignis*' has the etymological affinity to two words: '*er-eigen*' and '*er-augen*'. The former term is related to '*eigen*' (own), and in this sense '*Ereignis*' means to come to one's own or to come to where one belongs. The latter word is related to the German '*Auge*' (eye), meaning to catch sight of, to see with the mind's eye or to see face-to-face. If we put these two meanings together, *Ereignis* gives the sense of being far removed from everyday events, or something which we can see with our mind's eye; and yet it is something so close to us that we cannot see it, i.e., it is something to which we belong. *Ereignis* is the most inconspicuous of the inconspicuous phenomenon, the simplest of the simple, the nearest of the near and the farthest of the far, in which we mortals spend our life. *Ereignis* is the realm in which Being manifests its truth; being must be understood in and through the realm of *Ereignis* in which the thinking of Being reaches its purity. It is not available to metaphysical-representative-calculative thinking or to the individual experiences of man. Rather it is given to the essential thinker, the poetic dweller, the seer and the shepherd in his realization of belonging-together with Being. Thus, it is a realm in which Dasein's complete self-realization in Being and Being's appropriation of Dasein is attained. Being is different from *Ereignis*, but only in the realm of *Ereignis* are Being and its manifestation available.

7.2.5. *Tat Tvam Asi and Belonging-Together*

Shankara expresses the nature of *paraa vidhyaa*, the state of identity between *Brahman* and *Aatman*, in the Vedaantic aphorism '*tat tvam asi*' (That art Thou). It is not something tautological

or superfluous, but a linguistic representation of a movement of thought from the ontological level of particularity to another of universality and to yet another of unity. When the latter state of unity is attained the distinction between the former is negated. One begins with the individual consciousness, passes on to the universal consciousness and finally arrives at the pure consciousness that overcomes the separate reality of both the individual and the universal. It is this state of unity that constitutes the ground of all individuality and multiplicity. The unity is obtained by stripping away what is incompatible in the 'That' and the 'Thou', and arriving thereby at the common basis. In the example, 'this is that Devadatta', the Devadatta seen now is identified with the Devadatta seen years ago, despite all the accidental differences, like physical conditions, mental states and places of meeting. What makes one identify the person of Devadatta as the same is the elimination of differences. In the same way, the negation of apparent contradiction of 'That' and 'Thou' would lead us to the fundamental and absolute reality. In fact, in the recognition of the person of Devadatta now, one has gained nothing new about the person of Devadatta, except the accidental qualities, but only recognizes the Devadatta, whom one has already known. In the same way, the Upanishadic statement '*tat tvam asi*' does not reveal anything new about *Brahman* or add anything to its nature. Nevertheless, it is of immense value in that it helps the seeker to remove the false notion of difference between the *Aatman* and *Brahman*. When the ignorance on which is based the difference between 'That' and 'Thou' is removed, they cease to be different and the seeker is able to experience their identity. In other words, the intrinsic nature of 'That' and 'Thou' is one and the same. In their implicit meaning the words 'That' and 'Thou' point to the same reality, just as the terms 'I' and 'the tenth' indicate one and the same person, in the sentence 'I am the tenth'. Thus, the identity statement 'That art Thou' clearly shows that *Brahmaanubhava* is a non-dual and unique experience of the identity of *Brahman* and *Aatman*, which is the absolute and fundamental reality behind both the universe and the individual respectively.

We have a similar idea in Heidegger's notion of belonging-together of Being and man. Heidegger understands 'belonging-together' in two senses based on the emphasis we give to each of the two words present in the compound. If we see in this compound 'belonging' as determined by 'together', the stress would be on something placed as a part of a unity, a manifold or a system. This is a type of relation to which metaphysical thinking refers as a necessary or causal connection. In contrast, 'belonging-together' can be seen as 'together' being determined by 'belonging'. In this sense, the compound means that the related belong to each other in the same. In other words, there exists an appropriating relationship between the related by which they let each other enter into their realms by belonging-together. The latter sense is the belonging-together of Being and man in the realm of *Ereignis*. It means that both Being and man hold each other in the belonging-together. Though an entity in the totality of beings, man is distinctive in that as a thinker of Being and a dweller in the nearness of Being he is open to being and stands, as it were, face to face with Being. In this orientation and openness towards Being, man listens and responds to Being. Not only does man belong to Being, but also Being belongs to man, in that it presences itself to man and abides in him by making a claim on him. Thus, Being draws man to it, appropriates him and finds in him a place for its presencing. This appropriation of Being and man involves a mutual gifting of man to Being and Being to man, and an entry into each other's realms. The mutual belonging-together is a dedicating of man and Being to each other. This fundamental relationship of Being and man is the basis of all other relationships, whether, they be in the individual or in the world.

7.3. The Path

This section aims at highlighting the similarities between the paths of Shankara and Heidegger to human authenticity. In other words, we would like to look into the means proposed by these thinkers in attaining the authentic state. We would also clarify the nature of authentic states and the authentic persons comparatively according to Shankara and Heidegger.

7.3.1. *Aparaa Vidhyaa to Paraa Vidhyaa and Care to Transcendence*

For Shankara, the path to authentic human destiny is a movement from *aparaa vidhyaa* to *paraa vidhyaa*. This path implies, on the part of the seeker, that he moves beyond being caught up in the world of ignorance. Thus, the aspirant makes all the efforts required to remove the ignorance that prevents him from knowing his true destiny and moving towards it. The process undertaken by the aspirant to remove the superimposed knowledge is called *Brahmaajijnaasa*. Literally it means ‘desire for realization of *Brahman*’. It consists of all the efforts the aspirant makes to arrive at the *paraa* state. It would also include the different means used by the aspirant to transcend the dualities of the empirical order and attain the identity consciousness. Shankara’s Advaita Vedaanta recognizes a dualism in the process of *Brahmaajijnaasa*, i.e., it proposes a direct and an indirect method. The direct method involves a deep understanding of the illusoriness of the phenomenal reality, the fundamental oneness of everything in *Brahman* and a discriminative consciousness that would enable the aspirant to break through the appearance and apprehend the underlying absolute reality in the manifoldness of the world. But, the direct method may not be possible for everyone, as all may not be able to attain the vision of pure reason and discriminative consciousness. To such persons an indirect method is proposed, in which the lower nature of man, such as, activities and emotions are satisfied before one moves towards the higher intellectual discriminative consciousness. For Shankara, this indirect path consists of *karma* and *bhakti*. The performance of *karma* must be without self-interest (*nishkaamakarma*). Such actions, done in faith and love can open the heart of the aspirant for the divine flow of the deeper and fuller life of love and devotion. The indirect paths of love and service are not, by themselves, capable of removing total ignorance, but gradually they can open the individual aspirant to a life of wisdom. Thus, the removal of ignorance can be brought about only by knowledge; though knowledge cannot cause the attainment of *Brahmaanubhava*, it can remove ignorance and thereby pave the way for identity-experience.

The *jnaana* path of Shankara proposes three stages of *Brahmaajijnaasa* that help the aspirant to study the scriptures. They are physical preparation, moral preparation and intellectual preparation. The first aims at conditioning the body, by way of *aasana* and *pranayama*. The second aims at purifying the mind and strengthening the will so that one can deeply take the study of the scripture. The third consists in hearing the scripture from a *guru*, reflection on what is heard and meditation on the reflected truths from the scripture. These three stages of *Brahmaajijnaasa* strictly adhered to lead to the removal of ignorance. When ignorance is fully removed, one attains the highest state of existence, viz., *Samaadhi* or *Brahmaanubhava*.

The Heideggerian path of a movement from care to transcendence strikes a clear resemblance to the Shankarite path to authentic human Destiny. Dasein attains his authenticity when he opens himself to the voice of Being and focuses more on Being rather than on himself. Thus, the path to authenticity involves, on the part of Dasein, a movement from being caught up in the care of his self-centered living to a Being-centered existence. He must turn from self and to Being. In self-centered existence, Dasein experiences himself as a self-sufficient being, on the one hand, and as a being that is anxious, helpless, dependent and finite, on the other. As a self-sufficient being, Dasein stands alone, because he is not in need of any other reality for his truth about himself, the

meaning of his life and even for his authentic existence. As a finite and dependent being, Dasein also stands alone in his anxiety, as his life is marked by existential guilt, existential limitations and existential death, which he must face all alone. Since Dasein, in his self-centered existence, stands all alone, reduced to his resources which are limited, he cannot be the reason for his authenticity. Even the so-called authenticity he attains in the state of care can be nothing more than a reflective acceptance of his own tragic existence. Therefore, in order to attain genuine authentic personhood, Dasein must move from this self-centered existence. This is not to throw out Dasein's earlier existence, but consists in a change in perspective, i.e., in the manner in which Dasein sees his life. When Dasein turns from self-centered existence, he no longer views everything from the perspective of the enclosed, self-assertive and lonely self. It is a breaking of the shell within which Dasein has enclosed himself. It is a letting-go of the self and opening of oneself to Being in a genuine and real way. Once Dasein comes out of this 'walled-existence' of self-centered living, movement towards authenticity happens. In the process Dasein turns to a Being-centered living.

In Being-centered existence Dasein is aware of his insufficiency to bring about his genuine authenticity. Here, he depends more on Being rather than on his own self. Besides, Dasein is aware that he cannot take the first step towards this movement unless he be called, summoned and claimed by Being. It is Being that initiates the process, by its revealing-concealing mode of giving, to which Dasein responds correspondingly. Every stage of Being-centered existence is characterized by Being's giving and Dasein's responding. For instance, in essential thinking Being calls and gives, while Dasein re-calls and thanks. Release is brought about by Being's regioning and Dasein's response of non-willing and waiting on Being. Dasein begins to be a dweller in the nearness of Being, by Being's poetic presencing and Dasein's poetic dwelling. Dasein becomes the seer, when Being's look is reciprocated by Dasein's seeing into the realm of Being. Besides, in the state of Being-centered existence, Dasein understands himself in a new way, viz., in the light of appropriative belonging-together of Being and himself. There is no inconsistency about his understanding of himself. Dasein knows that he is not self-sufficient, even though he is a special being that stands above all other entities. He is grounded in Being and so the unsettled dimensions of his being, such as existential guilt, existential limitation and existential death do not matter to him as before. Since Dasein is securely grounded in Being all inconsistencies about his nature fall apart. To the extent Dasein is able to effect this change in perspective about his life, and live by this perspective, he becomes a total, authentic human person.

7.3.2. *Nididhyaasana and Meditative Thinking*

Nididhyaasana (meditation) is a mental activity consisting in withdrawing the mind from all other things and concentrating on *Brahman*. If an aspirant, having heard the teacher, is successful in his reflection and is intellectually convinced of his identity with *Brahman*, he is ready for entering the stage of meditation. This strikes the Vedaantic wisdom deep into the aspirant's heart and eradicates the innate confusion of the body with the soul. In meditation one does not concentrate on *Brahman* as an external entity. In this activity the mind is turned completely inward and is fixed firmly on the inner self and its identity with *Brahman* till his finitude and individuality is dissolved. Meditation is a state in which the aspirant is totally caught up with *Brahman*. When involved in meditation nothing captures the attention of the seeker except the experience of *Brahman*. When one moves deeper into meditation, one is not aware of any mental modifications; there is no sense of duality, as all modifications produced by the meditation on the scriptural axiom have ceased to exist. As there is no subject-object duality in meditation on

the *Aatman* becomes the subject and object of meditation, and thereby identity is attained. The meditative state leads the seeker to a state of quiet inner tranquillity, as the illusory world of multiplicity is, as it were, lost to the seeker by the removal of ignorance and the experience of identity.

Heidegger's notion of essential thinking is similar to the Shankarite notion of meditation. Essential thinking is an experiencing of Being, in which Dasein says 'yes' to the call of Being to tread into the untrodden region of Being. It is Dasein's pouring himself out to the positive lighting of Being, and providing himself as the lighting-up-place of Being. Thus, essential thinking is a self-surrender of Dasein to Being so that he assumes the task of watching over Being. In this manner, Dasein echoes the silent voice of Being with fidelity, always being heedful to the demands of the voice of Being. In essential thinking Dasein lets go of attachment to the ontic order, calculative thinking, and is at home with the fundamental thought Being brings to pass. Besides, it implies that Dasein takes upon himself the noble poverty of Being which deals with the supremely simple and the intangible. Thus, meditative thinking frees Dasein to be totally focused on Being and understand everything else in relation to his belonging-together to Being. Essential thinking brings about a twofold release in Dasein, viz., release towards things and openness to the mystery of Being. The former consists in saying 'yes' and 'no' to the same thing at the same time: 'yes' because we need the thing as it has reference to our life; 'no' because we do not want to be mastered by it. The latter involves that we be not guided by the external, superficial and illusory in our perception of reality, but rather by the deeper mystery dimension that lies hidden beneath the external and superficial. Release towards things and openness to mystery belong together. They help us to live in the world in a different way by giving new ground to stand upon and a new vision to guide our lives.

7.3.3. *Samaadhi and the State of Total Authenticity*

The realization of one's absorption in, or identity with, *Brahman* is *Samaadhi*. It is the true liberation and the ultimate end of the seeker. The state of *Samaadhi* is of the same nature of *Brahman*. Thus, *Brahman* and *Samaadhi* are identical, for liberation is nothing else but becoming *Brahman*. In the liberated state, the aspirant knows that all, including himself, is *Brahman*. In *Samaadhi* nothing new is attained, as the seeker only realizes what he is from all eternity. There are three ascending stages in the attainment of *Samaadhi*: the first consists in the removal of the thought of non-existence of *Brahman*; the second stage involves the obtaining of the discriminative capacity so that one is able to penetrate the appearance to get into the essence of reality; and the third is that of identity-consciousness, in which the seeker experiences the deepest core of his being, *Aatman*, as identical with *Brahman*, the ultimate source behind the universe.

In the Heideggerian notion of 'the state of total authenticity', we find a parallel to the reality of *Samaadhi*. The authentic state of Dasein is a state in which Dasein is totally centered on Being. In it, Being and Dasein give themselves to each other in a relationship of belonging-together. In so doing, there comes about a giving-receiving and a calling-responding relationship between Being and Dasein. In the process, Dasein becomes the lighting-up-place for Being, in that he shepherds, manifests and preserves Being in its giving. Dasein moves towards the state of total authenticity in three ascending stages: as an essential thinker of Being, as a dweller in the neighborhood of Being and as a seer of the truth of Being. In each of these stages there is the interactive relationship of belonging-together between Being and Dasein. In essential thinking,

Being calls and gives; Dasein re-calls Being's gift of itself and thanks Being for the gift. The release, the result of essential thinking, is attained by Being's twofold regioning and Dasein's twofold response of no-willing and waiting on Being. Dasein becomes a dweller in the nearness of Being, by Being's poetic presencing of itself and Dasein's poetic dwelling on Being's poetic presencing, in the three ecstases of time. Dasein becomes the seer of the truth of Being, when Being and Dasein appropriate each other into each other's realms in their essential relationship of belonging-together. In this way, just as the seeker who has attained *Samaadhi* is fully engrossed in *Brahman* and is available for its tasks, so also in the total authentic state Dasein is fully caught up in Being and becomes a shepherd of Being.

7.3.4. *Jiivanmukta and the Total Authentic Dasein*

Jiivanmukta is the one who possesses the true *jnaana* about *Brahman*, while he is still alive. He enjoys the liberated state in his present life. He is caught up in the transcendental consciousness, even though he goes about his everyday life. His life is not affected by the empirical word and his vision is not marred by phenomenal reality. His state of existence cannot be described in positive terms as it is transcendental. He is enlightened and free, fully unaffected by the pains and gains of *aparaa* existence. The behavior of *Jiivanmukta* is distinguished from that of others on the basis of the absence of ignorance and its effects. *Jiivanmukta* does not possess any trace of ignorance as his life is characterized by oneness, i.e., seeing everything in *Brahman*. Though he lives in the world of duality, because of this unitive perspective he is not disturbed by the pairs of opposites. *Jiivanmukta's* life is characterized by fearlessness. Fear is the result of ignorance. As there is no ignorance in him, there is also no fear. The released person transcends scriptures, ethical imperatives and social conventions, as he does not need them; but they have become so much part of him, due to assiduous practice, that they cling to him. *Jiivanmukta* is desireless and free from sorrow; as he is identical with *Brahman* there is nothing more to be desired or to be sad about. All these qualities mentioned here are only approximations and negations, as the state of *Jiivanmukti* is incomprehensible and indescribable, just as is the nature of *Brahman*. *Jiivanmukta* has the task of leading others into true freedom. Therefore, as long as the liberated person is alive he works towards making everyone aware of his true goal in life, viz., realization of *Brahman*.

Heidegger's notion of authentic Dasein are parallel to the Shankarite notion of *Jiivanmukta*. The life and activities of the authentic Dasein is based on the relationship of belonging-together of Being and Dasein. He views his life from the primordial perspective of Being. This openness of Dasein to Being raises him to the realm of *Ereignis*, whereby he becomes a standard-bearer for Being. As the spokesmen for Being, Dasein is called to shepherd and preserve Being that is manifested in the fourfold, viz., the physical, earth and sky, the divine and the human 'facets' of Being. Dasein does this by saving the earth as earth, receiving the sky as sky, waiting on divinities as divinities and initiating his own nature as mortal. In this preserving Being in things Dasein spares things in their essential being. In sparing and letting things be things, Dasein does not attempt to manipulate, master or compel things, but builds them in relation to the fourfold. Thus, like the *Jiivanmukta*, the total authentic Dasein lives his life in the unitive perspective and works towards the realization of Being-centered living by shepherding and preserving Being in its manifestation in the spatio-temporal history.

7.3.5. *Veda -- Sruti and Word -- Term*

Shankara, like other Indian philosophers, accepts the distinction between the *veda* (*sabda*) and the *sruti*. *Veda* is the eternal word that is revealed and heard by the sage (*rishi*). *Sruti* is the written form of the *veda*, as communicated by the *rishi*.

In Heidegger's distinction between the 'word' (*Wort*) and the 'terms' (*Woerter*), we do find a striking parallel. Word is not, but it gives (*es gibt*): it is the giver (*das Gebende*) and not the given (*das Gegebende*). Word names things, which naming by word is not a mere giving of an external label to a thing. Rather, the word stands for the being of the thing. In naming a thing, the word 'bethings' (*bedingt*) that thing in its being. Terms are only written expressions of what word communicates in its giving. Thus, the terms are found in the dictionaries, but not the word. Therefore, terms are only expressions of what 'the word words': it is what 'word words' that is the being of the thing.

8 Differences

In the last chapter we looked into the similarities between Shankara and Heidegger in a comparative light. The present chapter attempts to study the striking differences to be found in the thoughts of these thinkers. We will do this through three themes, viz., man, Being and the path.

8.1. Man

In this section, we bring to comparative light some of the important differences in the perceptions of Shankara and Heidegger regarding man. Though we find a great number of similarities in the way they understand man, yet there are a few striking differences. Our task here is to highlight them.

8.1.1. Temporal Nature of Man

In Shankara's perception of man, time plays hardly any role, for he does not perceive man in relation to time. Man's temporal existence is not real, as it is due to a superimposition of the unreal on the real. It comes about as the result of falsely attributing the qualities of one thing on another, as the qualities of the snake on the rope. Thus, when seen from the *paramaārtha* point of view, our experience of time is an illusion due to the activity of both individual and cosmic *maayaa*. *Maayaa* causes temporal experiences in man, and make him experience himself as the time-bound *jiiva*. Shankara understands man in relation to eternity; the real nature of man is not temporal, but eternal. The ultimate truth about man is that deep within himself, he is not the *jiiva*, but *Aatman* and is identical with *Brahman*, the ultimate spirit behind the universe. The goal of man is to experience this identity, both inwardly and outwardly. To realize this truth is perfect knowledge. Since Shankara gives primacy to the identity experience in his perception of man and sees time only in relation to the superimposition by *maayaa*, he does not give any significant value to the temporal and historical dimensions in his understanding of man.

Heidegger considers time as the ontological condition and the ground of Dasein's being-in-the-world. The structure of Dasein must be understood in relation to the three ecstases of time, viz., the past, the present and the future. The past points to Dasein's 'back-to-himself', the present to his 'letting-himself-be-encountered' by being-alongside-entities, and the future to his 'towards-himself'. These characteristics of 'to', 'alongside' and 'towards' clearly indicate the temporal structure of Dasein's being-in-the-world. According to Heidegger, temporality temporalizes Dasein in both his authentic and inauthentic existence.

- The authentic mode of the past is 'repetition', in which Dasein's thrownness acquires a transparency, while its inauthentic mode is 'having forgotten', in which, the thrownness is hidden from his view.

- The authentic mode of the future is 'anticipation', in which Dasein projects towards his final possibility, viz., death. The inauthentic mode is one of 'awaiting', which involves the actualizing of the thing awaited.

- The authentic mode of the present is the 'moment of vision', which consists in Dasein being involved with the other two ecstases, viz., repetition and anticipation. This would involve Dasein's concerned dealings within the environmental and communal worlds, without losing himself.

- The inauthentic mode of the present is the 'making-present', by which Dasein loses himself in the ready-to-hand. In inauthentic temporality, the present plays a significant role because the inauthentic Dasein is concerned mainly with the present. Authentic temporality is concerned more with the future, because by existing authentically towards death as a future possibility in anticipation Dasein exists finitely. Of the three ecstases, the future has pre-eminence since the future makes Dasein appropriate his own being, i.e., his finite existence. Temporality is so fundamental to Dasein, that it places a mark on every aspect of Dasein's life in the world. In his noetic, everyday, whole, authentic and historical dimensions, time plays a vital role. Without temporality Dasein's being cannot be understood. We will see briefly how Dasein's life in the above-mentioned dimensions is characterized by time.

Dasein's noetic aspect implies understanding, state-of-being and discourse. Understanding, disclosing what Dasein is capable of, is related to future. In order to be authentic understanding must be related to the past and the present. Authentic understanding perceives and interprets the present situation in the light of the past, as the 'has been' and moves on to actualize the possibilities of Dasein in the future. In inauthentic understanding, the future would have hardly any connection to the past and the present. State-of-being, pointing to Dasein's primordial thrown existence, is based on the past. In order to be authentic, the state-of-being must be related to the future and the present. In clarifying this point Heidegger speaks of fear and anxiety as inauthentic and authentic modes of state-of-being respectively. In the state of fear, Dasein is confused, as he is not able to see his present and the future in relation to the past. Therefore, the possibilities of the past cannot be relived in relation to the other two ecstases. But anxiety fully opens Dasein to the limits of his being-in-the-world. Thus, Dasein, by remaining in the present, turns back to his past and brings out the possibilities of the past and moves towards the future. In discourse, the disclosedness of Dasein that is reached in understanding and state-of-being gets articulated. Discourse, thus, belongs to the three ecstases of temporality in that in it Dasein makes present the understanding which is futural, and the state-of-being which is related to the past.

Everyday Dasein is involved with entities in circumspective concern, related to the world and fallen. In his everyday circumspective concern, Dasein encounters entities in relation to his work-world, in which he is involved with an equipment system. This implies that Dasein has an awareness of the purpose of the equipment system, which means that the 'that-which-is-for' of his circumspective concern belongs to Dasein's past. Dasein's understanding the purpose of the equipment system also has the ecstasis of the future, as it is oriented towards Dasein's projective concern. Dasein makes the equipment system present in his circumspective concern both by moving towards the 'what-for' (future) and in retention of the purpose (past), i.e., the reference to the future ends by reliving the past. The world is the matrix of Dasein's relational totalities and their significance. Dasein's meaningful involvement in the relational totalities of the equipment system is always moving towards a 'where to', which is called 'horizontal schemata'. Relating to the future, it is Dasein's 'for-the-sake-of-himself'. The past discloses Dasein's thrown existence, the 'before-what' and the 'face-of-which' he is thrown. In the present, Dasein is 'being-alongside-entities' in concerned dealings.

This horizontal schemata is grounded in the ecstatic unity of temporality, which expresses itself in Dasein as the 'not-yet', the 'being-already' and the 'being-alongside', relating to the

future, past and present respectively. Dasein understands himself and his world in terms of the unity of the horizontal schemata, by grounding it in the unity of the ecstases of temporality. Dasein moves into the fallen state, only because he is not able to hold on to the temporal structure of his nature. In the fallen state Dasein, focuses only on the present and ignores the future and the past. He flees from the future, because he is afraid of facing his ultimate existential possibility, viz., his death. He avoids the past, as he does not want to face the existential guilt and existential limitations. This living only in the present and running away from the future and the past, brings about Dasein's fallenness.

The whole and authentic Dasein is also characterized by temporality. Anticipatory resoluteness brings about wholeness and authenticity in Dasein. There are three moments in the process. Firstly, anticipation of death concretizes the movement of wholeness and authenticity as 'being-ahead-of-itself' (the future). Secondly, in the face of one's own existential guilt, anticipatory resoluteness concretizes the moment as 'already-being-in' (the past). Thirdly, the summon to Situation is the concrete expression of 'being-alongside' entities and 'being-with' other Daseins. Anticipation of death, resolute acceptance of the existential guilt and summon to the Situation are the three moments that are made possible on the basis of three phenomena, viz., letting oneself come to oneself (the future), coming back to oneself (the past) and encounter (the present). Thus, the wholeness and authenticity of Dasein is made possible by the fact that by his structure Dasein is future oriented, having-been and presencing, i.e., temporal.

Dasein's historicity is nothing else but a concretization of his temporality. Therefore, historicity is not something different from temporality. In fact, the former is elucidated in terms of the latter. Thus, in analyzing the historicity of Dasein, we concretely work out Dasein in his temporality. Dasein's history is the stretch of life between birth and death, and the interconnectedness which he constantly maintains. As historical Dasein exists as born, and from the moment of his birth he is dying as by his very nature he is a being-towards-death. Therefore, as long as he exists, both of these 'ends' and their 'between' are part of Dasein's being-in-the-world. The movement that is characteristic of the interconnectedness of Dasein's life is called historizing; Dasein is fundamentally historical. The historicity of all the other entities is based on that of Dasein, because the historizing of history is the historizing of Dasein.

Just as temporality can be spoken of as authentic or inauthentic, so also the historicity of Dasein can be authentic or inauthentic. Inauthentic historicity lacks the interconnectedness of life. In it, every event appears now and disappears after a while. Dasein lives today; in waiting for the new thing he has already forgotten the old. Therefore, he is not able to relive the past possibilities in the present and move on with the present possibilities into the future. Dasein's present is loaded with either past memories or future fears, having no connections. Authentic historicity is attained in anticipatory resoluteness; in anticipation of death and in resoluteness, Dasein understands his finitude. The grasp of his finitude, frees him from seeking pleasure and taking things lightly; it enables him to accept the heritage he hands down to himself in existential historizing. Thus, Dasein understands himself in terms of fate, his finite awareness of himself, and destiny as the communitarian dimension of his finite givenness. Such an authentically historical Dasein understands entities in relation to himself, and passes to them the authentic dimension of his primary historicity in his being-in-the-world. Therefore, genuine world history cannot be understood apart from Dasein's fateful destiny, i.e., his authentic historicity. In this manner authentically historical Dasein becomes the existential source of historiology, the science of history. Without the authentic Dasein, who is genuinely open to the Being's giving, no genuine

history is possible. Thus, unlike Shankara, time and history becomes very significant elements in Heidegger's perception of man.

8.1.2. Significance of Death

In Shankara's understanding of man, the reality of death has a very insignificant place. Death is considered as *jiiva*'s shedding of the gross body, the fleshy covering. Other than the gross body, there is the subtle body, which survives death and accompanies the *jiiva* beyond death. The subtle body is the seat of *praana*, the individual vivifying principle in *jiiva*, the sense organs, the five organs of action, the central organ, with its twofold faculties of *manas* and *buddhi*, and the faculty of 'I-sense'. Besides, the gross and subtle bodies, *jiiva* possesses a third type of body called the bliss body. The latter two bodies survive death and continue to exist. Thus, in Shankara's perception, death is the *jiiva*'s shedding of the gross body, similar to a snake casting off its skin, when it becomes unable to perform its functions. This understanding of death comes from Shankara's *karma-samsaara* theory. It presumes that through various births and deaths *jiiva* continues to live the *samsaara* existence depending on its past *karma*. Death, therefore, is only a change in the life situation of the *jiiva*, rather than leading to any new existence. The nature of the change in the condition of *jiiva*'s life depends on the fruits of *jiiva*'s action in the previous existence. The *jiiva* moves towards its authentic destiny, only in and through different such existences of birth and death. Since *jiiva* can have very many lives before it attains its authentic destiny of identity with *Brahman*, death is not an important event in the life of *jiiva*.

For Heidegger, death is a very vital event in the life of Dasein, as it is the possibility of the impossibility of Dasein himself. The significance Heidegger gives to the reality of death in his understanding of man comes from his assumption of the one life theory. Though, Heidegger never explicitly discusses this fact, we can rightly presume that with his western and Christian background he could not have thought anything different about the end of man's life on earth. Since only one life is given to man and he has to attain his authentic destiny in and through it, automatically throws real significance upon the reality of death. Thus, for Heidegger, death is an important event in the life of Dasein, which makes him feel dread and anxiety.

Heidegger considers death as the 'not-yet' and the 'end' of Dasein. As long as Dasein exists, he is incomplete. But the moment Dasein exists in such a way that there is nothing to be actualized in him, automatically he loses his being-in-the-world.¹ This 'not-yet' which makes Dasein complete is death; though death as the 'not-yet' is a possibility of Dasein, it is inaccessible to Dasein's perception and is not a part of him, but it is something he must become.² Death is also the end of Dasein not as a 'being-at-an-end', but a 'being-towards-the-end', for death is a 'not-yet' of Dasein and remains so as long as Dasein exists. For death is a way of being Dasein takes upon himself from the first moment of his existence: Dasein is old enough to die as soon as he comes to life.³ So death, as the 'not-yet' and as the end of Dasein, is not something to which Dasein awaits as an outstanding debt or as one awaits a visiting friend, but is something imminent and impending⁴ towards which one moves. This means that death is always one's own and belongs to the being of Dasein. No one can take another's dying away from him.⁵ Thus, death is a possibility

¹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 236; *BT*, p. 280.

² Cf. *SZ*, pp. 243-244; *BT*, pp. 287-288.

³ Cf. *SZ*, p. 245; *BT*, p. 289.

⁴ Cf. *SZ*, p. 250; *BT*, p. 294.

⁵ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 237-240; *BT*, pp. 281-284.

of Dasein, which is irreplaceable, non-relational⁶ and towards which Dasein is handed over by his very being-in-the-world.⁷ Besides, death is a definite possibility of Dasein, as it is certain to overtake him. Yet there is an indefiniteness regarding the time of its occurrence.⁸ Since death is definite and indefinite at the same time, it produces anxiety in Dasein. What Dasein is anxious about here is his very being-in-the-world as it is being-towards-death.⁹

As Dasein can be authentic or inauthentic in his life, his attitude towards death can be authentic or inauthentic. In the inauthentic state, Dasein sees death as a necessary and inevitable fact which the human race has to face. Death is seen as a public event. Many people die, but it is not yet one's turn and, therefore, there is no threat. Thus, death gets passed off as something actual. Even in social life, the death of the person often is seen as something unpleasant and as a social inconvenience, against which one must be guarded and from which one must be protected. Dasein is encouraged to avoid every anxious concern with death. The everyday inauthentic Dasein wants to live a deathless life and a life, in which, the thought of death is never permitted. Thinking of death is laughed at as a weakness of mind, a cowardly fear and a flight from the world. One is encouraged to have the superior attitude of indifference in the face of death. But the cultivation of this other worldly attitude, in fact, prevents Dasein from experiencing his being-towards-death as his way-to-be.¹⁰

In authentic being-towards-death, Dasein will not evade his own non-relational possibility. Neither would he cover it up by fleeing from it. Nor would death be interpreted as one among many.¹¹ But, it consists in Dasein's grasping, cultivating and enduring death as his ultimate possibility.¹² Dasein opens himself to death, not by expecting it, but by anticipating it. Anticipation of death without focusing on the actualization intensifies its character as a possibility, by revealing what it entails, viz., that is a possibility, which involves the impossibility of Dasein.¹³ In his authentic perception of death, Dasein, besides accepting himself as a being-towards-death in anticipation, becomes aware of all the possibilities of his existence from his birth to his death. Thus, Dasein's potentiality for being-a-whole is realized in his anticipation of death as the most personal and non-relational possibility.¹⁴ Dasein becomes authentic, when he opens himself to the call of conscience in resoluteness, in the context of death as his ultimate possibility. Thus, for Heidegger, the reality of death is so vital, relating to every dimension of Dasein's life.

8.1.3. Man and His World

For Shankara, the phenomenal world of man's experience is one brought about by *maayaa*. The empirical world in which man lives and does all types of activities cannot be considered either as being (*sat*) nor as non-being (*asat*). Though the world of appearance is unreal in the sense that it does not exist to the one who has attained the true and highest knowledge, it is real in the sense that it appears to exist as long as ignorance lasts. It also is taken as real because it is known to

⁶ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 250-251; *BT*, pp. 293-294.

⁷ Cf. *SZ*, p. 251; *BT*, p. 295.

⁸ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 255-258; *BT*, pp. 299-302.

⁹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 251; *BT*, p. 295.

¹⁰ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 252-255; *BT*, pp. 296-299.

¹¹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 260; *BT*, pp. 304-305.

¹² Cf. *SZ*, p. 261; *BT*, pp. 305-306.

¹³ Cf. *SZ*, p. 262; *BT*, pp. 306-307.

¹⁴ Cf. *SZ*, p. 264; *BT*, pp. 308-309.

consciousness, the witnessing agent. At the same time, we cannot speak of the world of *maayaa* as being co-existent with *Brahman*, the absolute reality, as it loses its existence as soon as knowledge is attained. It can be compared to a fog that covers the sun from our view; but when the sun is in full view, the fog vanishes. The world of experience is real as it presents objects to our perception; but it is unreal in that it is not transcendentally existing as *Brahman*. Thus, for Shankara, man's everyday world has only a relative existence. It is real to the one who is caught up in the *vyavahaara* existence; but for a *Brahmajnaani* it is unreal in the true sense of the term.

According to Heidegger, Dasein is an 'in-the-world' existence and as such has a relational concern consisting of his relationship with entities and other Daseins. Dasein's relationship with entities constitutes the environmental world. In the environment of his dealings, Dasein experiences entities as present-at-hand and ready-to-hand. In the former case, Dasein views an entity from the theoretical perspective as something static, occupying a place, i.e., as a mere thing out there. In the latter case, an entity is viewed from the practical aspect as equipment that can be used for some specific purpose. Dasein's involvement with entities, in the environmental world is one of concern and is characterized by an existential cognition called circumspection. It is not a mere detached looking at entities, but involves the actual use of the entities which belong to and are part of an equipment referential totality. Only in such a totality as the meaning and purpose of an equipment and its equipmentality understood. But the significance of the equipment system itself depends on Dasein, who is the ultimate 'for-the-sake-of-which'. For example, inkstand, pen, ink, paper, blotting pad, table, lamp, furniture, door and room never show themselves as they are for themselves. But if understood as an equipment for Dasein's residing, taken in its totality, all these individual equipments do have a significance in relation to the unity of the pattern of these references and in relation to Dasein who ultimately uses the equipment system for his own purpose.

Not only the equipmentality of the entity, but also its spatiality, is understood in relation to Dasein. An entity is spoken of as being near or in a direction, thereby being in space, only because Dasein brings it closer and gives it a direction. Therefore, the spatiality of entities must be understood not in terms of measurable distances, but in relation to Dasein's circumspective dealings with entities. Thus, we can speak of the spectacles that one wears on the nose as being farther away than the picture out there on the wall, and of the bus for which one is running as closer than the ground on which one runs. Again, 'a good walk' or 'a stone's throw' has definiteness relating to Dasein's concern. Measurements, such as, 'an hour's walk' are to be understood in terms of duration rather than of number. A pathway that is long objectively may be shorter, very long, or hard-going, depending on Dasein's concerned look. Thus, Dasein is spatial in the sense that he discovers space circumspectively, by bringing entities closer and giving them direction.

Dasein is not only related to the environmental world, but also to the communal world of other Daseins. The nature of Dasein's relationship with other Daseins is characterized by 'being-with', which Dasein expresses in solicitude. There are two modes of solicitude, viz., negative and positive. The negative mode is indifference, which consists in the other not mattering to one. The positive solicitude is of two types: one that leaps in for the other and the one that leaps ahead of the other. The former is a solicitude in which one takes over the cares and worries of the other by taking his or her place. In such a solicitude, the one who comes to help out, taking over the responsibility of the other fully, dominates the other and interferes with his or her freedom. The latter mode of positive solicitude is such that the one who comes to help does not interfere with the freedom of the other. In it, by support, assistance and suggestions one opens up the care of the other is that the other can existentially face the issue and solve it in his own way. Such a solicitude helps one to become transparent in his own care and internally become free to face and solve it.

These modes of positive solicitude find expression in consideration and forbearance, just as Dasein's concern towards entities is directed by circumspection.

Heidegger understands Dasein's world in relation to Dasein's concerned dealings with entities and respectful solicitude for other Daseins. The world, taken in this sense, is the net-work of Dasein's total relationship to entities and others, and the matrix of their meaningfulness. Thus, the world is the 'wherein' these net-works of relationships take place and their significance is discovered. We can speak of as many worlds as there are different net-works of relational totalities that are meaningful. We can speak of a work world, an academic world or a world of art. It is not a subjectivization of the world concept, but a mode of Dasein's relating to beings in his concerned dealings. The world, in this sense, is not a mental creation of Dasein, but it is Dasein's way of giving meaning to the existential relational net-works in which he finds himself.

Shankara speaks of the relative reality of man's phenomenal experience of the world. For him the world of reality is *Brahman*-experience and when compared to this transcendental experience man's experience of the cosmological world is unreal. Heidegger does not deny the reality of the cosmological world in which man lives. As a matter of fact this cosmological world is that in which Dasein finds himself by his being-in-the-world as the state-of-being. In his consideration of the world, Heidegger emphasizes Dasein's existential experience of the world by his existential 'being-in' in the relationship of 'being-alongside' entities and 'being-with' other Daseins. Therefore, Dasein's world is not a mere subjective experience, based on one's whims and fancies, but it is an understanding of the world obtained as a result of Dasein's 'in-the-world' experience of the net-work of relationships of his encounter and their significance. Thus, we find a fundamental difference in Shankarite and Heideggerian conceptions of man's relationship to the world.

8.2. Being

In this section, we would like to elaborate a number of topics that are related to Being and *Brahman*, indicating the significant differences that are found in the approaches of Shankara and Heidegger.

8.2.1. Identity-Experience and Belonging-Together

Shankara proposes identity-experience as the ultimate goal of the seeker. In it the aspirant realizes that he is not the psycho-physical-conscious organism called *jīva*, but that his inner spirit is *Aatman* which is one with *Brahman*, the ultimate spirit behind the universe. In the identity-experience there is no duality as everything is viewed and understood from the primordial *Brahman*-perspective. In this state, there is no trace of ignorance and so its effects are totally absent. Therefore, though the *Brahmajnaani* lives in the world of duality, he is not disturbed by the pairs of opposites. Neither is he swayed by such various emotional states as fear, desire and sorrow, nor is he bound by moral imperatives and social conventions. Thus, the one who has arrived at the state of identity-experience is totally free, untouched by any type of constraints, and experiences total oneness with *Brahman*. This implies that the identity arrived at is an unqualified identity which excludes any element of separation or division. In the identity-experience, the individual identities cease to exist and only *Brahman-Aatman* identity exists.

Though, we find a striking parallel to the identity-experience of Shankara, in Heidegger's notion of 'belonging-together', a closer look at these two concepts would make us wonder if the

unqualified identity Shankara speaks of in *Brahman-Aatman* unity, is really found in the belonging-together of Being and Dasein. According to Heidegger the belonging-together between Being and Dasein involves a mutual relationship between them, which lets each other enter into their realms, hold each other and be in a face-to-face relationship with each other. Being's belonging to Dasein implies that Being presences itself to Dasein, abides in him by making a claim on him, appropriates him and finds in him a lighting-up-place for its presencing. Dasein's belonging to Being consists in that he recognizes himself as a special type of being in the totality of beings, moves towards Being as its thinker, as a dweller in its nearness and a seer of its truth, thereby, becoming Being's shepherd, who guards and preserves the spatio-temporal-historical manifestation of Being in himself and entities.

This appropriative relationship between Being and Dasein calls for a mutual gifting of Dasein to Being and Being to Dasein, and a dedicating of Being and Dasein to each other. These twofold relationships of Being and Dasein, as we have explained above, do indicate a genuine and depth level communicative interaction between Being and Dasein. But, it does not seem to us to imply an unqualified identity between Being and Dasein in the Shankarite sense, which involves the loss of individual identities. Besides, belonging-together between Being and Dasein is spoken of as a primordial relationship and the basis of all other relationships of Dasein, such as causal and subject-object relationships. The implication is that even after Dasein's experience of belonging-together to Being, he does have such other relationships as causal and subject-object ones. It would mean also that the belonging-together does not involve an unqualified identity, because that would imply the cessation of all such relationships involving duality, because an identity like the *Brahman-Aatman* identity calls for a movement from the level of particularity to universality and to that of unity.

Again, Dasein's experience of Being in the spatio-temporal history is always temporal and finite, while identity-experience is eternal and absolute. Besides, Dasein experiences Being in different attunements, as Being always remains a mystery to Dasein and he is never able to get hold of the whole of Being. Such a Dasein, even in his Being-centered existence, must continue his seeking of Being by being the lighting-up-place of Being and shepherd the presencing of Being in himself and things. If Dasein experiences an identity with Being in the belonging-together, then such a seeking of Being for the state of identity is not necessary for him. These two facts clearly point to the lack of unqualified identity of Being and Dasein in his experience of belonging-together to Being. From what we have said, it seems that though Heidegger's notion of 'belonging-together of Being and Dasein' resembles very closely the Shankarite notion of 'identity of *Brahman* and *Aatman*', yet the former does not amount to the unqualified identity experienced in the latter.

8.2.2. *Brahman-Experience and Being-Experience*

Since *Brahman*-experience is an identity-experience, it belongs to the transcendental realm. *Brahman*-experience is attained in the *tuuriya* state. In this state, there is absolute self-transcendence, as there is no 'I-consciousness' and duality. *Tuuriya* state bypasses the limitations of time, space, causality and history. Besides, it is free from the products of *avidhya*. Thus, *Brahman*-experience cannot be caused; it cannot be bound by time, space and history. The identity with *Brahman* is as eternal as *Brahman* himself. It is a mediate and direct experience of *Brahman*. The mediation of senses, mind and intellect cannot bring about this experience, as the eternal experience cannot be brought about by the time-space bound faculties of knowledge or

the means of knowledge. Thus, *Brahman*-experience is an absolute, incomprehensible, indescribable, unchangeable and unitive experience that is unavailable to the phenomenal world of time, space and history.

For Heidegger, Being-experience is available to Dasein in his relationship of belonging-together to Being in the realm of *Ereignis*. When Dasein is appropriated and claimed by Being and when Dasein responds to Being's summon by being attuned to the voice of Being, as an essential thinker of Being, a dweller in Being's nearness and a seer of Being's truth, Dasein moves towards attaining Being-experience. Unlike the *Brahman*-experience, Dasein's experience of Being is available to him in spatio-temporal history, as Being gives itself as a time-space play in a continuous process. Therefore, it is to the spatio-temporal history Dasein must give himself in the realm of *Ereignis*, in order to experience Being. History is history of Being, as that which constitutes history is Being's self-giving. Thus both in its temporal and spatial aspects, history is only a concretization in external events and things of Being's self-giving.

In its temporal sending, Being's giving is its self-presencing to Dasein. The mode of Being's giving is one of revealing and concealing. As Being reveals itself in beings it withdraws and conceals, in the process revealing beings in their being. This giving with-drawing sending of Being is due to the temporal nature of Being's giving of itself. The presencing of Being extends to the three ecstases of time. Being's self-giving lasts in Dasein as the 'having-been' (the past), the 'not-yet' (the future) and the present. Even in this interplay of the three ecstases of time, Being gives itself to Dasein's experience as presencing and absencing: the presencing of the 'having-been' and the 'not-yet' is in the mode of absencing, while the presencing of the present is in the mode of presencing. Thus, the reason for Being's revealing-concealing presencing is the temporal nature of Being's giving. As soon as Being lights up beings, the moment of lighting-up becomes the ecstasis of the past, and Being is withdrawn. Since Being's giving is temporal, the history of Being is epochal. The spatial dimension of the history of Being is understood in relation to the mirror-play of the fourfold, viz., the earth, the sky, the divinities and the mortals, into a simple unified whole. According to Heidegger, such a spatio-temporal history of Being, as experienced by Dasein, always remains finite. Thus, unlike the *Brahman*-experience which is eternal and trans-empirical, the Being-experience is temporal and finite.

In Being-experience, even though Being is the closest to Dasein, yet it is the farthest from Dasein. In other words, in spite of Dasein's belonging-together to Being, and his encountering Being in his own person and entities, Being is far away from Dasein. Being always remains a mystery to Dasein. Dasein can never get hold of the whole of Being due to the manner of Being's self-giving, viz., in the revealing-concealing process. As soon as Being gives itself in an entity, it withdraws in favor of the entity in which Being is revealed. As a result, the entity is revealed and the Being itself is concealed. Thus, Dasein cannot have the total experience of Being, but only experiences it as revealing and concealing, giving and withdrawing. This manner of Being's giving makes Dasein continue his search for Being. Even in the state of Being-centered existence, Dasein must continue to be the lighting-up-place of Being and shepherd the revelation of Being in himself and in things. But in the *Brahman*-experience, unlike the Being-experience, the seeker himself attains *Brahmanhood*, and so there is no need for him to seek *Brahman* again or be its shepherd.

8.2.3. Concealing-Projecting Power of *Maayaa* And Unconcealing-Concealing Giving of Being

The Upanishads consider that *maayaa* is the creative power of *Ishvara*, by which he fashions the universe. Shankara accepts this scriptural teaching and interprets it from the perspective of

Advaita Vedaanta. Shankara holds an enlightened agnosticism with regard to the origin of *maayaa* and its relationship to *Brahman*, as it is not something that can be grasped intellectually. For Shankara, *maayaa* is both a statement of fact and a principle. As a statement of fact it is the present, the past and all the possible worlds. Besides, it is the domain of the antithetical situations, subject-object distinctions, paradoxes and antinomies that characterize the world of everyday perception. As a principle, like *Brahman* it is eternal and beginningless; it is the inexplicable power of the supreme Lord by which all changes in the world are brought about. The changes in the world of phenomena are brought about by the presence or absence of the three *gunas*, viz., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*, which constitute *maayaa*.

When *sattvaguna* is predominant there is produced the *jnaanashakti*, which is responsible for the working of the cognitive process. The preponderance of *rajas* and *tamas* produces the *kriyashakti*, which has two powers, viz., the concealing power (*avaranaashakti*) and the power of projection (*vikshepashakti*). By the concealing power, *maayaa* veils the true nature of *Brahman* and *Aatman*. Just as a small particle of cloud, by obstructing the vision of the observer, conceals, as it were, the solar disc which extends over many miles, similarly the concealing power of *maayaa* enshrouds man's spiritual intelligence and conceals the *Aatman*, which is unlimited, thereby preventing its realization of identity with *Brahman*. As a result, *Aatman* is experienced as the *jiiva*, the subject of pleasure, pain and misery. The projecting power of *maayaa* is co-existent with the concealing power and brings about the manifold realities of the world of name and forms. It is the power of creating with which *maayaa* creates the appearance, superimposes the unreal on the real and leads to error, like that of a 'rope-snake'. Thus, by the simultaneous interplay of the concealing and projecting powers, *maayaa* veils the true and real nature of the absolute reality, and at the same time 'forms' or 'creates' the world of appearance, just as ignorance conceals the nature of the rope and creates the illusion of the snake.

In Heidegger, we find the notion of the unconcealing and concealing presencing of Being. Being gives itself to Dasein, in the spatio-temporal history. The mode of giving is one that holds itself back and withdraws. In other words, Being manifests itself in entities in a unconcealing-concealing process. In giving itself Being withdraws; in unconcealing it conceals. Being is always the Being of beings, i.e., Being 'is' in beings. This 'is' of Being in beings is not static, but something dynamic. Being is of such nature that it 'comes-over' to beings. The 'coming-over' of Being to beings consists in Being's self-giving to beings in which Being unconceals (reveals) itself in beings. Beings themselves come-to-presence only in and through the coming-over and unconcealing of Being. On the part of beings it is an arrival in which beings are unconcealed in their essence. In the process of arrival of beings in their being, there comes about the concealment of Being itself. Thus, just as the coming-over of Being is the unconcealing of beings, so also the arrival of beings in their being is the concealing of Being. So the coming-over and unconcealing beings on the part of Being, and the arrival and concealing Being on the part of beings, is a single process in which Being and beings are turned towards and away from each other. The reason Being, by his coming-over to beings and unconcealing them, withholds and conceals itself is the temporal nature of Beings's giving. As soon as Being lights up beings, the moment of lighting-up becomes the ecstasis of the past, and Being is withdrawn and concealed.

Though there are similarities between the Shankarite notion of 'concealing and projecting powers of *maayaa*' and the Heideggerian idea of the 'unconcealing-concealing process of Being's giving', there are also striking differences. For Shankara, the concealing and projecting powers belong to *maayaa*, by which the true nature of *Brahman* and *Aatman* is hidden by superimposing the unreality of *Iishvara* and *jiiva* respectively. Besides, the concealing power veils the essence of

reality, while the projecting power creates the illusion of multiplicity. The interplay of these two powers of *maayaa* is the source of all contradictions, relativities, dichotomies and polarities of human living. It is also the reason for the passing nature of phenomenal existence. For Heidegger, the unconcealing-concealing process belongs to Being. It is the mode in which Being manifests its truth, viz., the appropriative relationship of belonging-together of Being and Dasein; the relationship of difference between Being and beings and Being's giving of itself in a time-space-play. Thus, what is given in this unconcealing-concealing process is not the illusory world of appearance, but the real truth of Being, regarding itself, Dasein and beings. From what we have said it is clear that the concealing and projective powers of *maayaa* and the unconcealing-concealing process of Being's giving are fundamentally different in that the former leads us into a world of unreality, while the latter guides us towards the real truth of Being. Whereas, the former fails to lead the aspirant towards his authentic destiny, the latter helps Dasein to move steadily towards the Being-experience, wherein he attains his authentic human destiny.

8.3. The Path

In this section, we would like to bring to light the striking differences we find in paths of Shankara and Heidegger to authentic human destiny. This will involve a comparative analysis of the ideas relating to the ways proposed and their attainment. We will probe also into the issue of the value of these paths after one has attained authentic human destiny.

8.3.1. The Way

Shankara proposes a concrete way to the removal of ignorance that would help the aspirant reach the goal of *Brahman-Aatman* identity. The process undertaken by the aspirant to remove ignorance is called *Brahmaajijnaasa*. Shankara speaks of an indirect and a direct method in *Brahmaajijnaasa*. To those who are not able to embrace the direct path the method of *jnaana*, an indirect method of *karma* and *bhakti* is suggested. In it, the lower nature of man with its activities and emotions is satisfied before he can move towards the vision of pure reason and discriminative consciousness. The willing surrender of oneself in generous service without any self-interest in a life of sacrifice and action, and the deeper and fuller life of love and devotion to the supreme Lord, lead the aspirant towards the higher intellectual discriminative consciousness. Thus, the indirect method, though it cannot bring about the total removal of ignorance, can help the aspirant to open himself to the direct method of the *jnaana* path through which alone the removal of ignorance can take place. The direct method involves a deep understanding of the illusoriness of the phenomenal reality, the fundamental oneness of everything in *Brahman* and a discriminative consciousness that would enable the aspirant to break through the appearance and apprehend the underlying absolute reality in the manifoldness of the world.

The direct method of the *jnaana* path proposes threefold preparations that would facilitate the study of scriptures and thereby remove ignorance, viz., the physical, the moral and the intellectual. The physical preparation consists in working towards the attainment of full control over the bodily organism. The stability of the gross body is very much required even for the normal functioning of man. But, when it comes to preparing oneself for the study of scriptures, there is the need for higher intellectual and spiritual training to discipline the body sufficiently so as to make it a fit instrument for the realization of *Brahman*. The system of training, that prepares the body for such higher states of existence is called *Hathayoga*. This opens the aspirant for the life-process of the

cosmic *praana*, thereby, increasing bodily vitality, giving good health and preserving a great amount of energy in the aspirant's physical system. The main steps of *Hathayoga* are *aasana* and *pranayaama*. The former helps the aspirant to get rid of all restlessness of the body and brings it under the control of the will, in the process facilitating deep reflection and concentration. The latter makes the seeker restrain the vital power of breathing, the basis of organic life, thereby helping him to control instincts, passions and impulses that disturb the peace of mind. Besides, it awakes the *praanic* dynamism which opens the aspirant for extraordinary consciousness and bring to life his moral and spiritual possibilities. Total controlled of the body, by way of posture and breath-control prepares the seeker for the next two types of preparations.

Fire has the potentiality to burn wood; but if the wood is wet, fire is not able to burn it. In the same way, though the intellect is able to know and understand scriptural statements, it cannot grasp their true meaning if it is clouded by passions and attachments to things. Thus, purification of the mind and heart is necessary if one is to attain discriminative consciousness. Moral preparation attempts to do this task. Shankara proposes four moral conditions, viz., discrimination between the eternal and the non-eternal, renunciation, practice of the six virtues -- calmness, self-control, self-settledness, forbearance, faith and complete concentration, and the hunger for liberation. All these four moral disciplines prepare the mind and intellect of the aspirant to undertake the study of the scripture.

Taking up the study of the scriptural statements is the beginning of the intellectual preparation and has three stages, viz., hearing, reflection and meditation. Hearing consists in understanding the meaning of the Vedaantic statements, as it is being taught by the *guru*. At the hearing stage the teacher initiates the aspirant to the traditional Vedaantic teaching, viz., only *Brahman* is real, by way of six tests, namely, commencement, ending, repetition, uniqueness, result, eulogy and reason. Thus, in hearing, the student becomes familiar with the true import of the *mahaavaakyas*. Reflection is a mental activity, which consists in the employment of favorable arguments for the removal of the apparent contradictions that might arise during the study of scripture. In other words, in this state, the aspirant attempts to strengthen his conviction about the import of the Vedaantic aphorisms by looking for rational bases for the teachings received from the teacher by hearing. At this stage, the seeker makes use of the negative method of Advaita Vedaanta, which consists in eliminating what a thing is not by way of negation so that we attain knowledge about a particular reality: we negate the attributes of the non-self in the process gaining knowledge about the self. Reflection logically establishes the truth of identity by critical thinking and discourse. The final stage of the intellectual preparation that removes ignorance is meditation, which consists in withdrawing the mind from all things and concentrating it on *Brahman*. Here the mind is turned completely inward and firmly fixed on the inner self and its identity with *Brahman* till one's finitude and individuality is dissolved. By the repeated exercise of meditation one moves to greater depth of absolute consciousness. This removes all effects of ignorance, paving the way for the identity-experience. Thus, Shankara proposes a clear, practical and concrete way towards the attainment of authentic human destiny.

Heidegger proposes a threefold way to the goal of Being-centered existence. In order to attain Being-experience, Dasein must move through the ascending path of essential thinking of Being, dwelling in the nearness of Being and seeing the truth of Being. All three stages of the Heideggerian way to authentic human destiny involve an interactive relationship between Being and Dasein. But, the role played by Being is always primary, and Dasein plays a role that is subservient to that of Being. Essential thinking is neither having an opinion about something, nor is it a conceptual system of thinking, with a chain of logical premises which lead to valid

conclusions. It cannot be brought under any logical categories. Thinking of Being goes beyond metaphysical-technological-calculative thinking, as it overcomes the onto-theological thinking and language. It is available to Dasein in the realm of *Ereignis*, in which there is an interactive and communicative relationship between Being and Dasein. Essential thinking presupposes that there is a relationship of caller and the called between Being and Dasein respectively. Being calls Dasein and gives itself as ‘the most thought-worthy’. Dasein responds to Being by re-calling Being in memory and thanking for its gift. In so doing, Dasein ‘keeps’ and preserves Being, the most thought-worthy, from being lost and forgotten. In other words, by being ready for recollective thinking, Dasein thankfully offers Being the center of his being, i.e., the heart, and thereby becomes the lighting-up-place and an attentive attendant of Being.

Essential thinking leads Dasein to dwell in the neighborhood of Being. It is a standing out in the openness of Being, an abiding in his ‘origins’ and an ek-sisting. Dasein’s ek-sisting consists in being attuned to the voice of Being which gives itself in silence and responds to the call by his openness to the lighting of Being. Dwelling implies not only having an open relationship to Being, but also involves a genuine building and dwelling of beings in their essence. In other words, in the state of dwelling Dasein is involved with things in an authentic way, in that he becomes the guardian of Being that is manifested in things. Essential thinking and dwelling take Dasein to the third stage of the way, viz., seeing the truth of Being. The truth of Being consists in Dasein’s essential relationship of belonging-together to Being, Being’s relationship of difference and Being’s manifestation in the time-space-play. When the truth of Being dawns on Dasein, he becomes the seer and shepherd who guards Being as it manifests in relation to himself the entities and history.

Having looked into the ways proposed by Shankara and Heidegger, we do find some striking differences between them. Firstly, the aim of the Shankarite way is to remove ignorance that prevents the aspirant from attaining the goal of *Brahman*-experience, while the aim of the Heideggerian way is to lead Dasein directly to the Being-experience. Secondly, Shankara proposes a way that is concrete, practical and holistic, that is aimed at the total transformation of the aspirant, for it includes the physical, moral and intellectual preparations. Heidegger’s way is rather theoretical and vague, in that it does not contain any concrete measures or practical guidelines, with the help of which Dasein could move towards the goal of Being-experience. Thirdly, in the Shankarite way, *Brahman* hardly plays any role, as the physical, moral and intellectual preparations involved in the *jnaana* path are undertaken totally by the seeker. He equips himself in the physical, moral and intellectual aspects of his life so that ignorance and its consequences in all these aspects can be removed. But the Heideggerian way speaks of Being and Dasein playing differing roles, in Dasein’s threefold movement towards Being. Besides, it makes the role of Being primary and that of Dasein subservient. In this manner we find significant differences between the ways of Shankara and Heidegger to man’s authentic destiny.

8.3.2. *The Attainment*

Samaadhi or *Paraa vidhyaa*, the ultimate goal of man, is an integral and intuitive experience of *Brahman*, the absolute reality. This experience is beyond the level of duality and ignorance. Therefore, we cannot speak of an attainment of *Brahman*-experience from the *paramartha* point of view. Only from the phenomenal perspective, i.e., from the point of view of the seeker, can one speak of an attainment of *Brahmaanuhabva*. Besides, in *Samaadhi* state one does not gain anything new, as the aspirant only realizes what he really is and has forgotten by his being caught

up in the cosmic and individual *maayaa*. Therefore, the seeker can strictly do nothing to bring about the attainment of *Samaadhi*. Neither the efforts of the seeker, nor his mental and intellectual faculties can do anything to effect self-realization, as it is non-dual, transempirical and undifferentiated. *Paraa vidhyaa* is an eternal and uncaused identity-experience that no human effort, however great it may be, can cause it. Thus, the whole question of the attainment of *Brahmaanubhava* is beyond the abilities of man. All that the seeker can do is to follow the way proposed by Shankara, and work at the threefold preparations that the ignorance which envelops human condition can be removed.

According to Heidegger, the ultimate goal of Dasein, the Being-experience, is attained in three stages based on the three ways he proposes: (a) essential thinking is attained in release; (b) dwelling occurs in Dasein's relation to his homecoming to the source and sparing the fourfold in things; (c) seeing the truth of Being is experienced by Dasein when he opens himself to the un-concealment of Being and to language, the house of Being. Unlike Shankara, Heidegger envisages a genuine interaction between Being and Dasein at every stage of the attainment of Being-experience.

Essential thinking is attained in release, which is an attitude of saying 'yes' and 'no' to the same thing at the same time. It consists in accepting a thing for its value and not allowing it to master us. In other words, release is a mental state in which one is involved with things, but not entangled with them. Essential thinking is attained in release, by the cooperation of Being and Dasein. Being, as that-which-regions (*Gegend*), manifests to Dasein and things in a twofold regioning: *Vergegnis* and *Bedingnis*. In the former, Being helps Dasein to rise above the pushes and pulls of everyday existence and turn towards Being, which results in Dasein attaining a genuine freedom to be himself. In the latter, Being lets things be things by allowing them to rest in the abiding expanse of Being. By this twofold regioning Being initiates the process of the occurrence of essential thinking in release. Dasein responds to the initiative of Being in a twofold activity: non-willing and waiting. Non-willing consists in Dasein's turning from representational-calculative thinking, while waiting involves deliberate turning to Being in attentiveness and openness. Waiting brings about in Dasein two attitudes: a release towards things and an openness to the mystery. Whereas the former makes Dasein relate to things in an authentic and balanced way, the latter helps Dasein see the inner or the Being-dimension in his experience of life and reality. Thus, in Being's twofold regioning and Dasein's twofold response essential thinking is attained.

Dwelling is attained in Dasein in relation to Being and beings. When Dasein opens himself to the poetic presencing of Being, by poetic dwelling, he dwells in the neighborhood of Being. This involves a homecoming and a return to Being at its summoning, and the preservation of the original experience of Being, by poetic dwelling in the three ecstases of time. Dasein dwells among things, when he lets beings be in their being. This is done by keeping (sparing) the fourfold, viz., by saving the earth as the earth, receiving the sky as the sky, waiting on divinities as divinities and initiating one's own nature as the mortal. Dasein's seeing the truth of Being involves a leap from the logic-dominated representational thinking to the realm of *Ereignis*, in which, Dasein and Being are naturally appropriated to each other. Having made the entry into the realm of *Ereignis*, Dasein opens himself to Being's unconcealment in the process of *aletheia* and Being's presencing in language, which is the house of Being. In this manner, in all the three stages of the attainment of authenticity, Dasein plays an active role at the initiative of Being. Thus, we find a striking difference between Shankara and Heidegger regarding the attainment of man's authentic destiny, in that while the former would hold for the impossibility of human effort in the actual attainment

of *Brahmaa-nubhava*, the latter would accept the active role of Dasein in the attainment of Being-experience.

8.3.3. *The Value*

In this section, we would like to discuss the value and relevance of the paths proposed by Shankara and Heidegger after the seeker has attained the authentic state. For Shankara, the goal of the seeker is a state of identity in which one realizes that *Brahman* is *Aatman*. In this state, the *Brahmajnaani* is totally unconscious of the empirical existence, even though he continues living in the phenomenal world. In such an enlightened existence the realized person is free from the pains and gains of *aparaa* existence. *Jiivanmukta* has a bodily existence because of the effects of the accumulated *karma*, but the world of reality is non-existent to him, as it does not affect him in any way. He is untouched by passions, prejudices and all types of attachments, because by the practice of *Hathayoga*, he has once and for all banished them from his system. The ethical virtues, such as, humility, unselfishness, purity and fellow-feeling, which he practiced during the moral preparation, now cling to him, even though he neither needs them nor seeks them. To such a liberated soul, the path he had taken in the removal of ignorance (*Brahmaajijnaasa*) would not be of any value. *Brahmaajijnaasa*, literally means 'the desire for *Brahman*'. Once that desire is fully realized in the *Brahman*-experience, there would be no more such desire left. Therefore, for the realized person, *Brahmaajijnaasa* ceases to exist. Only the one who has to cross the river needs a boat. If a person has crossed the river with the help of the boat, and needs to cross no river any more, that boat would be of no value for him. Similarly, the boat of *Brahmaajijnaasa* would not have any relevance to the *Jiivanmukta*. Again, only a child plays with toys; if the child has grown up into a man, he no longer plays with toys. In the same way, as a child in the spiritual path the seeker used the various stages of the path. But at the realization of identity, the seeker would no more need the path once he has walked it. Thus, in the Shankarite system, since the realized person has reached a trans-empirical stage of existence, the empirical means he once used would not be of any significance to him.

In the Heideggerian system, the path to authenticity would be of value to Dasein, even after he has experienced Being in the realm of *Ereignis* in appropriative belonging-together to Being. This is because Being gives itself to Dasein in the spatio-temporal history, i.e., in the interplay of the three ecstases of time and the mirror-play of the fourfold. Since, Being's giving is spatial, temporal and historical, Dasein experiences Being in terms of space, time and history. As a result, even in the authentic state, Dasein cannot but experience Being as finite. Besides, the nature of Being's manifestation is one of giving and withdrawing, unconcealing and concealing, presencing and absencing. As soon as Being gives itself in an entity, it withdraws in favor of the entity in which it is revealed. Therefore, in spite of the fact of Dasein's relationship of belonging-together to Being and his encountering of Being in his own person and the entities, Being still remains for Dasein a mystery. Though he is very close to Being, yet he is still far away from it, in that he can never get hold of the whole of Being.

Again Dasein experiences Being in various attunements. For instance, Being as the Mystery has to be faced with reverential awe, and Being as the Joyous is experienced by Dasein with joy. This is because, unlike the goal of the Shankarite path, which is an identity-experience, the goal of the Heideggerian path, the Being-experience, is not one of identity between Being and Dasein; there is subject-object duality in Dasein's experience of Being. Dasein is the subject of Being-experience, as he is the lighting-up-place of Being that is manifested in history. Thus, Dasein must

constantly seek and be open to the revelation of Being in the spatio-temporal-history, even in Being-centered existence.

The fact that Dasein must seek and open to the revelation of Being is pointed out at every stage of the attainment of Being-experience. Dasein is called into essential thinking by Being's giving itself as 'the most thought-worthy' and Dasein's recalling Being's giving in memory and thanking Being for its gift. Essential thinking is attained in release by the twofold regioning of Being and twofold response of Dasein, viz., non-willing and waiting on Being. Dwelling in the nearness of Being is effected by Being's poetic presencing and Dasein's poetic dwelling in the three ecstases of time, and in Dasein's building and sparing the fourfold, i.e., the three 'facets' of Being in things. Seeing the truth of Being is brought about by Being's giving of itself in the unconcealing process (*aletheia*) and language, the house of Being, and Dasein's openness *toaletheia* and language. Thus, at every stage of the attainment of the goal, Dasein remains a seeker of Being's giving. This seeking of Dasein does not cease to exist, even in Being-centered existence, as Dasein's experience of Being is finite. Therefore, unlike the Shan-karite path which ceases to have any significance to the seeker after he has arrived at the liberated state, the Heideggerian path is of continuous value to Dasein even in his state of Being-centered existence.

9 A Critique

Now that we have looked into the paths of Shankara and Heidegger to authentic human destiny in comparative light, we can proceed critically to analyze the implications of their philosophical standpoints. In this chapter, we would include a critical and positive appraisal of the paths of these thinkers to authentic human destiny. We would also take up the critical consideration of some of the issues that have emerged in our unfolding of their paths, even though these topics refer to their philosophies as a whole.

9.1. Shankara

We have considered Shankara's Advaitic concept of *Brahmaanubhava*, its attainment and his non-dualistic approach to reality. Now, we need to raise the question whether the philosophy of Shankara is a true explanation of reality and that of authentic human destiny? In other words, there arises the question, whether the non-dualism of Shankara, as a system, is sufficient to answer the various issues that arise in human existence. Many philosophers have questioned the validity of the system of Shankara. Some have interpreted and criticized his system in terms of non-Indian traditions, and hence of categories less apt to express adequately his Advaitic mysticism. Here we shall attempt a critical and positive appraisal of the system of Shankara.

9.1.1. Critical Appraisal

Our aim, in the critical appraisal, is to consider those issues in Shankara which lack clarity and need further elaboration. Some such questions which invite attention are the dualistic theory of knowledge, the incommunicability of the identity-experience, the role of the other in one's authentic destiny, the practicality of the *jnaana* path and the bodily nature of man. We shall consider briefly each of these topics.

9.1.1.1. The Dualistic Theory of Knowledge

Shankara's conception of knowledge is permeated by a dualism. Like Immanuel Kant, Shankara envisages two levels of reality, viz., the phenomenal and the noumenal and therefore has to hold for a dualistic theory of knowledge. Knowledge of the phenomenal reality is characterized by a subject-object duality. Therefore, in this level of knowledge there is always the distinction between the experiencer and the experienced, the knower and the known, the seer and the seen, the subject and the object, the ego and the non-ego. The seer is the perceiver, who is identical with the subject of the experience in question, and is of the nature of consciousness and intelligence. The seen is the thing perceived which is identical with the object, and is sentient by nature. Thus, the perceiver and the perceived are mutually opposed and never can be identified with each other. All means of empirical knowledge, such as, the perception, inference, comparison, supposition, non-perception and scriptural testimony, presuppose the subject-object distinction and operate in the realm phenomenal reality. According to the Vedaanta school of thought, all these *pramaanas* are valid means of knowledge as they give knowledge of the phenomenal world. But, we cannot hold them absolute, because their scope is limited to the empirical order. When considered in

relation to the *Paraa vidhyaa*, their reality and the truth they give cease to exist. As a result, we cannot use them in the transcendental order. This does not mean that the *pramaanas* are useless. They are useful, valid and necessary as long as we are under the sway of the empirical consciousness of the *jiiva*. The noumenal state is characterized by a knowledge that is non-dual and unitive. It is based on the identity-experience of the seeker that his inner self, *Aatman*, is identical with *Brahman*. Such a knowledge is eternal and not bound by time. In it, there is no distinction between the seer and the seen, as they both are one and the same. Everything is experienced from the perspective of the primordial experience of *Brahman*.

From what we have said it is clear that there is an essential and fundamental difference between phenomenal and noumenal knowledge. They are diametrically opposed to each other. One who is in the empirical existence does not possess the noumenal knowledge, while to the one who has attained the transcendental state of existence empirical knowledge becomes unreal. Such an epistemological position amounts to a dualism, as it presupposes two unrelated levels of knowledge. In a dualistic epistemological stand, objectivity of knowledge would be lacking as each type of knowledge, viz., the phenomenal and the noumenal, would be true only from their respective points of view. Besides, there is the difficulty of genuine communication between persons who belong to the phenomenal and noumenal levels of existence, as phenomenal knowledge would be unreal to the one in the noumenal state and the noumenal knowledge is inaccessible to the one who is in the phenomenal level. Thus, Shankara's dualistic epistemological theory does not account for objectivity of knowledge and genuine objective communication.

9.1.1.2. Incommunicability of Identity-Experience

The identity-experience is of the nature of *Brahman*. So it is without subject-object duality, eternal and uncaused, immediate and direct. Therefore, it is incomprehensible, indescribable and trans-empirical. *Brahmaanubhava* is not available to the empirical experience as the scope of the former goes far beyond that of the latter. The words and languages we use refer to the phenomenal world and relative realities. As *Brahman* is beyond the phenomenal, *Brahmaa-nubhava* cannot be described in ordinary language. Therefore, one can speak of the identity-experience only by way of negation, by denying qualities of the empirical experience superimposed on it. For instance, the qualities that are attributed to *Brahman*, such as 'reality' (*satyam*), 'knowledge' (*jnaanam*) and 'infinitude' (*aanandam*) are not positive descriptions of *Brahman*, but are mere negations of qualities superimposed on *Brahman*, such as, 'unreality', 'ignorance' and 'finitude'. Thus, all statements we make about *Brahman* and *Brahmaanubhava*, are mere approximations in the light of the phenomenal knowledge. Such a philosophical position makes the identity-experience, for all practical purposes, incommunicable. Since, *Brahmaanubhava* is unknowable and indescribable, it cannot be communicated by the *Brhamajnaani* to any one in the realm of phenomenal existence. Since *Brahman*-experience cannot be passed on to the other in any form of communication, it would always remain the subjective experience of the *Brahmajnaani*. Any attempt to communicate it, using phenomenal language, would be nothing else but a mere phenomenal approximation of the noumenal experience. Such approximations would never take one to the core of the identity-experience itself, as it is incommunicable.

9.1.1.3. Role of the Other in the Path to Authentic Destiny

The Shankarite path of authentic human destiny, viz., the movement from *aparaa vidhyaa* to *Paraa vidhyaa*, basically is walked by the aspirant alone. The only involvement of the other in the aspirant's effort to attain the goal of identity-experience is that of the *guru*. He is a detached guide, who helps the student to understand the true import of the Vedaantic statements, especially at the 'hearing' (*sravana*) state of *Brahmaajijnaasa*. The relationship that exists between the aspirant and the *guru* is that of a teacher and a student, in which, the aspirant is totally obedient to the *guru*, does personal service to him, looks after the daily chores of the *ashram* and listens to the teachings of the *guru* by sitting at his feet. This relationship is not one to one, I-thou relationship, in which one enters into the life of the other as an equal. Other than to the teacher, the aspirant does not have any significant relationship with any other person, as in all the three stages of *Brahmaajijnaasa* he or she has to be alone to hear the instructions of the teacher; to reflect on the content of the *guru's* teachings, so as to remove the apparent contradictions and to be intellectually convinced of the true import of the scriptural aphorisms; and to meditate on the truth achieved through his hearing and reflection. The various stages of *Brahmaajijnaasa* in the *jnaana* path are so centered on the individual seeker and his personal effort that the presence of another in the process could only be an interference that would distract him from his goal. The seeker is basically all alone throughout the process of *Brahmaajijnasa*. Even after the seeker has attained *Brahmaabubhava*, he does not need to have any such relationships, because all such relationships would be irrelevant and unreal to *Brahmajnaani*. Thus, Shankara's path to authentic human destiny does not give any significance to genuine I-thou relationships and inter-subjective communication between human persons.

9.1.1.4. Practicality of Jnaana Path

The *Jnaana path* to human authenticity involves a deep understanding of the illusoriness of phenomenal reality, the fundamental oneness of everything in *Brahman* and a discriminative consciousness that would enable the seeker to break through the appearance and apprehend the underlying absolute reality. To attain this goal, the seeker must go through a rigorous path of physical, moral and intellectual preparations. The physical preparation involves the practice of *Hathayoga*, with its two steps: *aasana* and *pranayaama*. The moral preparation calls the seeker to practice the fourfold ethical disciplines called instruments of spiritual knowledge, viz., the discrimination between the eternal and non-eternal, renunciation, the practice of the six virtues -- calmness, self-control, self-settledness, forbearance, faith and complete concentration, and the hunger for liberation. The intellectual preparation includes the three stages of hearing, reflection and meditation. Thus, the *jnaana* path of *Brahman*-experience demands that the seeker be a person of healthy body, strong will, keen mind and sharp intellect. If these qualities are expected of the aspirant, even before he begins the process of *Brahmaajijnasa*, a great majority of the people in the world would never be able to begin the process of *Brahman*-realization itself. This is probably the reason that Shankara spoke of the indirect method of *karma* and *bhakti* as a preparation for the *jnaana* path. Thus, the Shankarite path to human authenticity is not practical, in the sense that it aims at helping only the intellectual and wise persons to attain *Brahmaanubhava*.

9.1.1.5. The Bodily Nature of Man

Shankara does not give importance to the bodily nature of man. For him, body is part of the phenomenal existence, which is not the ultimate reality. Therefore, body has only a relative

existence. He speaks of three levels in the bodily nature of man, viz., the gross body, the subtle body and the bliss body, each of which belongs to the realm of *maayaa*. Of these, only the gross body ceases at death, while the other two bodies survive death and constitute subtle and bliss bodies, giving the basis for the gross body *jiiva* takes in its next birth. The loss of the gross body, at the death of *jiiva* is compared to a snake casting off its skin, when it does not perform the proper function in the snake. Body is the seat of emotions and appetites which prevent the self from attaining the true goal of man. Therefore, one's attitude towards one's body is one of discipline and control. The body must be trained by the use of *Hathayoga* in order to be submitted to the directions of the inner self. Body and bodily existence are the result of the past *karma*. When all the fruits of the actions are removed, body will also cease to be. In the state of *Jiivanmukti*, the liberated person continues to live in the bodily state because of the effects of the accumulated *karma* still bearing fruit (*prarabdha*), but having no attachments to the body. In the state of *Videhamukti*, the *videhamukta* passes into a calm existence, having lost the empirical world and shedding his artificial personality, including the body, that is characteristic of the *jiiva*, the psycho-physical-conscious organism. Therefore, Shankara does not envisage the existence of the body, at the final state of liberation, as Christianity recognizes the resurrection of body and a bodily existence after resurrection. From what we have said it is clear that, for Shankara, the bodily state of man is a product of *maayaa*, and it ceases to exist at the dawn of true knowledge. Thus, in the Shankarite system of thought, the bodily nature of man is not given a positive place, as it has no real existence and no place in the ultimate destiny of man.

9.1.2. Positive Appraisal

This section takes up the defense of a few general issues which had been raised against Shankara by later Advaitic schools, most notably by the Qualified Non-Dualism (Vshistaadvaita) of Ramaanuja and a number of Western scholars. Of the many questions raised against the non-dualism of Shankara, we will consider five, which remain central today. The first issue pertains to the reality of the external world. In this regard some scholars consider Shankara as a subjective idealist as he seems to attribute no reality to the external world. Secondly, in the West, many may think that Advaita Vedaanta is a sort of pantheism, according to which the individual soul loses, as it were, its identity and becomes one with *Brahman*. Thirdly, Shankara is often accused of being non-ethical, as he did not work out a system of morality. The fourth objection that is brought against Advaita Vedaanta is that it is anti-worship and anti-religion in character, since the liberated man is identical with *Brahman*. Finally, many consider Shankara as negative and pessimistic in his approach to reality as he gives prime importance to the negative method for the understanding of reality and attaining authentic human destiny. In the following pages, we will take up these criticisms leveled against Shankara's Advaita Vedaanta and see whether the contentions of these critics are founded on facts.

9.1.2.1. Reality of the World

The most contested question in Shankara's Advaita philosophy concerns the reality of the external world. Shankara very strongly holds the view that *Brahman* is absolutely real and the external world is *maayaa*. The term *maayaa* is often translated as 'illusion' or 'unreal'. Some scholars take this translation of the term literally and argue that Shankara denied the existence of the external world. They try to fit Shankara and his Advaita Vedaanta into the Hegelian or

Berkeleyan idealistic tradition and consider him a subjective idealist, who reduces the external world logically to the knowing and perceiving subject. Thus, according to these thinkers, Shankara attributes no reality to the external world, which depends only on the subjective consciousness of the perceiver. Max Mueller summarizes his position on this point as follows: "In one half-verse I shall tell you what has been taught in thousands of volumes: *Brahman* is true, the world is false; the soul is *Brahman* and nothing else."¹ Chakravarti affirms the same point when he says, "It is Shankara alone who says that it should be concluded that everything except *Brahman* is illusion, because *Brahman* is the one reality."²

Many thinkers deny the idealistic interpretation of Shankara's concept of *maayaa*. They say that by his concept of *Brahmaanubhava*, Shankara does not teach that the world is unreal. R. Pratap Singh says, "Shankara's intention is not to preach any variety of subjective idealism or to lay foundation on mentalism."³ Many other thinkers share this view. K. C. Bhattacharya considers that *maayaa* "cannot be characterized as either real or as unreal."⁴ K.C. Krishnamurthy Iyer notes that "the world is not a mere phantasy; it is not a mere summer dream; it is but a disguise worn by reality to the time-bound intellect."⁵ Radhakrishnan remarks that for Shankara, "unreal the world is, illusory it is not."⁶ According to this second group of thinkers, Shankara did recognize the reality of the external world, even though he did not consider *maayaa* as the absolute reality.

It would seem that the latter group of thinkers present the true position of Shankara on the reality of the external world. Shankara is neither a Hegelian, nor a Berkeleyan, or any other kind of subjective idealist. In order to understand the true position of Shankara on this point we need to make distinctions between different kinds of experiences. The first kind of experience is called *pratabhasika* (illusory experience), which consists in experiencing an object which is not present before one's senses. For instance, a rope is seen as a snake, or a shell lying on the beach is seen as a piece of silver in the moon light. There is no real snake or silver piece; these are only mistaken perceptions. This kind of illusory experiences can be contradicted in the worldly state. For instance, the true nature of the things that appeared as a snake or as a piece of silver (viz., the rope and the shell respectively) can be known by a true perception of the same objects. Therefore, such experiences are false perceptions.

The second kind of experience is *Vyavahaarika* (the empirical experience), which consists in the universe of everyday perception, the world of names and forms. This is the realm of *maayaa*. It is not merely illusory, but phenomenal. Unlike the illusory experience, the phenomenal experience is neither non-existent (*abhaava*) nor void (*suunya*). The illusory experiences of seeing a snake when there is no snake and seeing a piece of silver on a shell take place in the phenomenal realm. In this worldly state, the phenomenal world and its existence can never be contradicted. Therefore, the reality of the phenomenal world is never denied by Shankara, even though he denies the assumption that the *vyavahaarika* world is ultimately real. In the *Brahma-Sutra Bhaasya* we find Shankara giving a lengthy argument for the existence of the phenomenal world from the

¹ F. Max Mueller, *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy* (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), pp. 121-122.

² Sures Chandra Chakravarti, *The Philosophy of the Upanishads* (Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1953), p. ix.

³ Ram Pratap Singh, *Vedaanta of Shankara* (Jaipur: Bharat Publishing House, 1949), p. 333.

⁴ Krishnachandra Bhattacharyya, *Studies in Philosophy*, Vol. II (Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1958), p. 118.

⁵ K.A. Krishnaswami Iyer, *Vedaanta or Science of Reality* (Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1930, p. 91.

⁶ S. Radhakrishnan, *Indian Philosophy*, Vol. II, p. 585.

phenomenological point of view. He says that the external world is a fact of consciousness and so one cannot contradict its existence:

The non-existence of the external things cannot be maintained because we are conscious of external things. In every act of perception we are conscious of some external thing corresponding to the idea whether it be a post, or a wall, or a piece of cloth or a jar, and that of which we are conscious cannot but exist...[Thus] that the outward thing exists apart from consciousness, has necessarily to be accepted on the ground of the nature of consciousness itself. Nobody, when perceiving a post or a wall, is conscious of his perception only, but also men are conscious of posts and walls and the like, as objects of their perception. That such is the consciousness of all men, appears also from the fact that even those who contest the existence the external things, bear witness to their existence when they say that something is external...If they did not themselves at the bottom acknowledge the existence of the external world, how could they use the expression 'like something external?'...If we accept the truth as given to us in our consciousness, we must admit that the object of perception appears to us as something external, not like something external.⁷

From this passage it obvious that Shankara does not deny the reality of the external world. He does consider the world as existing outside the subjective consciousness. The subject-object distinctions belong to the realm of phenomena. We do make use of the *pramaana* or the means of knowledge to attain some truth about relative realities. Thus, the empirical world is real from the phenomenal point of view and its existence is related only to the empirical realm. From the empirical perspective, we can never say that the world of our experience is unreal and non-existent.

Thirdly, Shankara speaks of absolute experience, i.e., *Brahmaanubhava*, which is absolute knowledge and identity of the self with *Brahman*. This experience, as we have seen at length, is trans-empirical and is of the nature of *Brahman*. It is external and indescribable; it is attained by the continuous removal of ignorance, which is the source of multiplicity. In this state of *Brahmaanubhava*, the *Brahmajnaani* knows that he is *Brahman*, and sees everything in himself, i.e., he sees everything in terms of oneness. It is from the point of view of the *Paramaartha* or transcendental experience that the phenomenal world is unreal. From the point of view of the phenomenal world, however, as Shankara clearly pointed out, this relative world is real because we can never contradict or question the existence of the reality of the world, as long as we are fully part of the phenomena. But when one attains the absolute oneness with *Brahman* all duality is eliminated. Thus, from the point of view of this absolute experience, the phenomenal world is unreal or relatively real. Therefore, Shankara would say that this phenomenal world is real, but not ultimately real. It is essential to appreciate this distinction between *vyavahaarika* experience and *Brahmaanubhava*; the two are infinitely apart from each other. If we take one for the other it becomes impossible to understand Shankara's position clearly. For "any confusion between the two [*vyavahaarika* and *Brahmaanubhava*], is precisely the basic characteristic of that false superimposition (*adhyasa*), which is ignorance."⁸

From what has been said, it is clear that Shankara by his doctrine of *Brahmaanubhava* and the self's absolute oneness with *Brahman*, does not speak of a dissolution of the world. Upon the attainment of *Brahmaanubhava*, the external world is not destroyed or annihilated. But the *Brahmajnaani* views the world no longer from the phenomenal point of view; he sees everything

⁷ BSB, II, ii, 28, Thibaut, pp. 419-420.

⁸ Eliot Deutsch, p. 95.

in terms of that oneness which is characteristic of *Brahmaanubhava*. Thus, from the point of view of a liberated man the phenomenal world is real in a relative sense, because the state he is in, i.e., his absolute identity with *Brahman*, is that which is really real. As long as one tries to understand Shankara's Advaita philosophy purely from the phenomenal point of view, one will always meet with contradictions, for what is absolutely true is the transcendental and the trans-empirical.

9.1.2.2. Is Advaita Vedaanta a Pantheism?

Many consider Advaita Vedaanta to be pantheistic, because *Brahmaanubhava* consists in the identity of the self and *Brahman*. Those who hold this view cite the *maahavaakya* 'That art Thou' in their support.⁹ In interpreting the above mentioned Vedaantic aphorism, we saw that it cannot be interpreted in the direct meaning of 'That' and 'Thou', viz., *Ishvara* and *jiiva*, since such a union between the supreme Lord and the limited soul is not possible. In its implied meaning 'That' refers to *Brahman* and 'Thou' refers to *Aatman*. *Brahman* is the absolute and eternal reality in the universe and the *Aatman* is the pure consciousness, the eternal reality behind the individual self. *Brahman* and *Aatman* are eternally identical. In *Brahmaanubhava*, as we know, there is no experiencer and experienced. What really happens in *Brahmaanubhava* is that the self, removed of all ignorance and its effects, realizes its eternal identity with *Brahman*. Thus, in no way, can *Brahmaanubhava* be considered as identity between supreme Lord and the soul. Besides the terms 'union' and 'identity' are used figuratively, because there is no new identity reached in *Brahmaanubhava*, but the existing eternal identity between *Brahman* and *Aatman* is realized. Again there is no notion of a god (as a theist would understand it) in *Brahmaanubhava*. Shankara does not consider *Brahman* as a deity, but as the absolute ontological reality behind all the phenomena, which is identical with the self, the pure consciousness. Thus, from what we have said it seems clear that in Shankara's Advaita Vedaanta, there is no trace of pantheism. It goes beyond the distinction of theism, atheism and pantheism, as the question of God is not at all an issue in Advaita Vedaanta. It is a mystical system which aims at making everyone aware of his true ontological nature, i.e., *Brahman*.

9.1.2.3. Advaita and Ethics

It has been pointed out by many scholars that Advaita Vedaanta takes the least interest in moral questions. Shankara does not enter into detailed consideration of practical or theoretical moral questions. If ethics means an independent inquiry into problems of, and questions concerning, the meaning of value, the justification of moral judgments, the analysis of moral concepts and concrete behavior, then Shankara does not work out a detailed ethical system.⁹ He did not do so for the following reasons. Advaita philosophy, considered in itself as a system of thought, is a theory and practice of value.¹⁰ The sole intention of Advaita Vedaanta is to help everyone attain his true ontological nature, i.e., *Brahman*. Each move towards this ultimate goal is a move from the lesser to the greater. Therefore, the question of value is part and parcel of every stage of the Advaitic system and there is no need to treat morality specifically and separately. Besides, after one has attained *Brahmaanubhava*, there is no place for any morality at all, since *Jiivanmukta*, like *Brahman*, is beyond all moral distinction. But Shankara did suggest the need of practicing renunciation of the pleasures and of attachment to the things of the world, and

⁹ Cf. R.V. de Smet, p. 266.

¹⁰ Cf. Eliot Deutsch, p. 99. Cf. *ibid*.

the practice of the six treasures (virtues), before one can begin the study of the Vedaantic statements. Thus, according to Shankara, such moral virtues as compassion, self-control, charity and non-injury have as their sole purpose to help and to support the aspirant in the early stages of *Brahmaajjnaasa*. Morality is only a means for the attainment of the ultimate spiritual goal and not an end in itself. It is in this sense that Shankara gives a secondary place to ethics in his philosophy.

9.1.2.4. Advaita and Worship

It is often contended by non-Advaitins, that as Advaita Vedaanta believes in an absolute, attributeless and impersonal *Brahman*, it is against religion and worship of God.¹¹ In fact the goal and the purpose of Advaita Vedaanta is to help the aspirant to recognize the passing nature of this universe, the world of multiplicity, including the supreme Lord *Ishvara*, and attain absolute identity with *Brahman*, the ultimately reality. Therefore, from the very outset of his initiation into the process of *Brahmaajjnaasa*, the aspirant is instructed by his *guru* about the symbolic nature of the personal God, who is the Lord of the universe.

At this early state of *Brahmaasjijnassa* the student has not attained the full knowledge about the absolute *Brahman*. Hence he is encouraged to worship the personal God and to practice all devotions. Worship of God and the devotional practices performed by the aspirant at this stage free him from the distractions and the attractions of the external world, help him to fix his mind on higher realities, and strengthen his power of concentration. Realizing his limitations the aspirant takes recourse to prayer and other external devotional practices which help him to move towards his ultimate end, i.e., *Brahmaanubhava*. Once he has reached this absolute state of *Brahmaanubhava* all the distinctions between the personal God and the worshiper vanish, as the self realizes its true nature. Just as a clay lion and a clay sheep are rid of their differences when they are reduced to their material cause or clay, so too the aspirant and the personal God are reduced to their ultimate cause *Brahman* and lose their differences when *Brahmaanubhava* is attained.

Thus according to Shankara, in the state of *Brahmaanubhava* there is no religion, devotional practice, or the worship of God. Unlike other theistic systems of thought, for Advaita Vedaanta religion and the worship of God are not an end in itself, but only a means to the ultimate realization of the self. Nevertheless, Shankara did recognize the important role worship and devotion play in the early stages of the aspirant's way to self-realization. He wrote many hymns in praise of the popular deities like *Siva*, *Vishnu*, and the Divine Mother to help ordinary people move towards their ultimate realization. These devotions are aimed at helping ordinary people at the initial state of *Brahmaajjnaasa*. Therefore, for Shankara, devotion and worship of the personal God are significant in the life of the aspirant, but only as means rather than as the end.

9.1.2.5. Is Advaita a Nihilism?

Another accusation brought against Shankara is that his approach to reality is negative and pessimistic.¹² Those who hold this view claim that Advaita Vedaanta is a sort of nihilism, because the use of '*neti neti*' and the denial of everything in trying to describe *Brahman* ultimately leads to a void (*suunya*). The contention of these thinkers seems to be wrong. More than any other of

¹¹ Cf. *AB*, p. x.

¹² Cf. *ibid.*, p. xi.

the philosophers in the history of Indian thought, Shankara pointed out the fundamental and ultimate spiritual nature of the universe and the individual. He declared that we are greater than we think we are. Man, in his ignorance, sees himself as limited, finite and associated with a body, whereas in reality he is the supreme and pure consciousness. Therefore, Shankara is neither negative nor pessimistic in his approach to reality. Rather he affirms the absolute nature of the individual soul and the universe. In doing this, he makes use of the negative method (*apavaada*) for achieving realization of the ontological state of absolute identity with *Brahman*, because being trans-empirical *Brahmaanubhava* is above and beyond all that is phenomenal. Therefore, it is not within our power to grasp this from the empirical point of view. All that we can do by way of understanding this state of *Brahmaanubhava* is to use the negative method and state what this experience is not. Thus, though the method used by Shankara is negative, its purpose is the absolute identity of the self with *Brahman* or *Brahmaanubhava*.

We can summarize the main intent of Shankara as follows. Shankara's non-dualistic approach to reality and his Advaitic understanding of *Brahmaanubhava* do give a reasonable explanation to the basic issues of philosophy, if, like Shankara, one accepts the distinctions between the phenomenal experience of reality (*vya-vahaarika*) and the transcendental experience of reality (*Brahmaa-nubhava*). This distinction is crucial for the understanding of Shankara's Advaita philosophy. The two are different approaches to the one and the same reality. The former is characterized by duality and subject-object distinction, while the latter is characterized by oneness and identity. At the same time one must not take these two approaches as different world views imposed by the subjective consciousness as do scholars who consider Shankara as a subjective idealist.

In fact, the two approaches are not construction of the subjective consciousness, but two ontological states in one's understanding of reality. In other words, reality is eternally present in its true nature and does not depend on our subjective consciousness. The ontological truth about reality is that *Brahman* is the absolute reality in relation to which the phenomenal world is relatively real. This has always been the ontological fact. It neither comes about at the time when it is recognized by the subjective consciousness, nor is it constructed by the mental process of knowing. For Shankara this truth is obtained from the study of the scripture. As long as one is fully in the *vyavahaarika* world and is fully conditioned by it, one cannot recognize anything higher than the phenomena and accepts the phenomenal world as the absolute reality. When, by the removal of ignorance and its effects, one goes beyond the empirical experience and experiences the identity of oneself with the absolute *Brahman*, one sees the true reality as it is. Then one recognizes the unreality or the passing nature of the phenomenal world.

These stages of one's experience in the understanding of reality can be compared with the dream and the waking state. When a person is in dream state and perceives a dream he is fully certain that the experience he is going through is real, as in the dream state one does not doubt the reality of the dream. But as he awakes he realizes how illusory was his dream state. In the same way when one attains *Brahmaanubhava* one sees the passing and the unreal nature of the phenomenal world. Thus, after the realization of the identity of the self with *Brahman*, the reality remains the same as before; we have gained only a knowledge of this fact. In the illustration of mistakenly seeing a snake for a rope, the rope remains a rope during and even after the removal of the illusion of the snake. We have gained the truth about the fact that this particular object we perceived was not a snake, but a rope. In the same way, when *Brahmaanubhava* is attained, we realize that what we perceived in the *vyavahaarika* experience with its differences and multiplicity is the one and absolute *Brahman*. Thus, *Brahmaanubhava* does not destroy the *vyavahaarika*

reality of the phenomenal world. *Brahmaanubhava*, therefore, is the realization of the absolute and unchanging reality. It is the realization which means the supreme consummation or the ripening of scriptural knowledge. It involves freedom from ignorance and subject-object duality. It is an integral experience in which the whole personality of the aspirant participates and becomes transformed.¹³

9.2. Martin Heidegger

Attempting a critique on Heidegger Walter Biemel says: "We can either view this thinking (Heidegger's philosophy) from outside and seek to analyze and criticize it or we can endeavor to understand it from within."¹⁴ Our critique of Heidegger in this section does not aim at either of these alternatives, but rather intends to do both. On the one hand, we would like to view Heidegger's philosophy from a distanced by standing outside it and thereby showing what is lacking in it. On the other hand, we would like to enter into it so as to understand the hidden positive dimensions of Heidegger's thought. In other words, here, we plan a critical and positive appraisal of Heidegger's path to authentic human destiny and other related issues.

9.2.1. Critical Appraisal

In our critical appraisal of Heidegger's thought, we do not want to hold him responsible for what he did not include in his philosophy. It is not possible for a thinker to include everything in his philosophical reflection. It would be unreasonable to expect that from any thinker, however great he may be. Neither do we want to criticize him for the errors in his philosophy which are due to his background and intellectual heritage. But Heidegger can be held accountable for what is lacking in what he has said. In other words, we can criticize him for not saying what he should have said in what he said, viz., the deficiencies. Again we can criticize him for the lack of logical consistency and clarity in what he said, viz., inconsistencies. Our critical appraisal focuses on the deficiencies and inconsistencies of Heideggerian thought.

9.2.1.1. Deficiencies

In this section we want to bring to light some deficiencies in Heidegger's philosophy. Had he accepted these deficiencies and attempted to correct them, his philosophy would have a completeness which it lacks. We shall examine these deficiencies.

9.2.1.1.1. The Objectivity of Knowledge

In *Being and Time* Heidegger speaks of knowing as founded upon Dasein's Being-in-the-world.¹⁵ In other words, this means that before one has theoretical knowledge about a thing, he can use this thing. For example, one may not have detailed knowledge about the nature and function of electricity; yet one can use electricity in one's day-to-day life. It is a fact of our experience. This does not mean that objective and scientific knowledge is unnecessary, superfluous or insignificant, as it is founded on Dasein's being-in-the world. Heidegger

¹³ Cf. A. Ramamurthi, p. 184.

¹⁴ Walter Biemel, *Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study*, p. 149.

¹⁵ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 59-62; *BT*, pp. 86-90.

distinguishes knowing from understanding. The latter is an existential of Dasein which enables him to interpret his possibilities and express them in assertion. It is more primordial than knowing, as understanding is not conceptual, but a pre-conceptual experience of reality. Since this is so, what is understood, interpreted and expressed in assertion cannot be genuinely communicated to the other in the public world. The communication involved in understanding and discourse is of such a nature that it only induces or helps the other to adopt the some concerned dealing with an entity which one has entered into. Since Heidegger does not develop an objective theory of knowledge in *Being and Time*, but reduces epistemology to the ontological experience of essences of things in understanding, which is primordial and pre-conceptual, Dasein can neither objectively validate nor communicate what he has experienced in understanding.

Even in the later Heidegger there is no objective theory of knowledge. Instead of 'understanding' of *Being and Time*, Heidegger speaks of 'thinking', 'dwelling' and 'seeing', referring to Dasein's relationship to Being. Here, Dasein's thinking is not objective rational thinking, but a meditative reflection. The dwelling is a waiting on and listening to Being. Seeing consists in experiencing or realizing Being. Thus, in his later phase, Heidegger is left with the same problem of objectively validating and communicating Dasein's experiencing of Being.

This lack of objectivity of knowledge clearly points to Heidegger's inability to clarify the question of the meaning of Being. Neither *Being and Time*, nor later Heideggerian thinking, has succeeded in objectively clarifying the meaning of Being. The early Heidegger inquired into the nature of Dasein, who raised the question of Being, while the later Heidegger highlighted the revealing of Being as a play in the epochal history, without ever attempting to clarify the meaning of Being and its objective validity. All that Dasein could do is to formulate the truth about his own experience of Being and entities and hope that others come in line with this experience.

What made Heidegger discard the significance of scientific knowledge and idolize the experiences of craftsmen, artists, poets and thinkers, was his strong conviction that metaphysical thinking and its outgrowth technological thinking brought about the rootlessness and inauthenticity in human existence. This made Heidegger emphasize praxis-oriented understanding. In so doing, the objectivity of knowledge which is characteristic of scientific inquiry was lost sight of. Another possible reason for this can be traced to Heidegger's interest in the hermeneutical tradition which distinguished between natural sciences and human sciences. The former is guided by logic and scientific method, while the latter is governed by hermeneutics. Thus, in over-emphasizing hermeneutics, Heidegger underrated the value of science and objectivity of knowledge.¹⁶

9.2.1.1.2. The Social World

Even though Heidegger speaks of 'being-with' as an existential of Dasein's being-in-the-world, his consideration of Dasein's communal world is rather deplorable. Heidegger's analysis of the inter-subjective relationship is very brief and it is presented as a type of appendix to the analysis of Dasein as being-alongside-entities. In a work situation, the 'towards-which' of the usability or the 'for-the-sake-of-whom' of the work produced is the other Dasein. He also appears as the buyer and seller of the work produced, or as the provider of the material for the work to be done. Thus, Heidegger introduces one Dasein to another in the context of the 'work-place', where one is involved with entities ready-to-hand. It is surprising that he, who speaks of Dasein as

¹⁶ Roger Waterhouse suggests that Heidegger's main concern is ontology and praxis-centered thinking, not theory of knowledge. Cf. Roger Waterhouse, pp. 149-163.

essentially 'being-with', establishes inter-subjectivity in an indirect manner, i.e., through the entities, rather than in a direct face-to-face relationship between two Daseins.

Again Heidegger speaks of two modes of Dasein's 'being-with', viz., the negative and the positive. Strictly speaking none of these two modes is a genuinely authentic relationship. The negative mode consists in one not mattering to another. The positive mode is of two types, viz., either Dasein dominates the other or leads the other into freedom and responsibility. In dominating and in leading the other, there is no genuine I-thou relationship about which Buber and Marcel spoke. In both cases the Dasein that dominates or leads the other stands above the one that is dominated or led. Roger Waterhouse compares this relation of intersubjectivity to the relationships, such as, master-pupil, parent-child and God-man,¹⁷ in which the relationship is one of dependency rather than reciprocity. Besides, Dasein's relationship with the other is generally spoken of as a state of inauthenticity. Inauthenticity is a state in which Dasein is fallen and is not his true self; it is dominated by the other, i.e., the 'they'.¹⁸ Even though Heidegger says that being authentic does not mean running away from the environment and the social world;¹⁹ yet Heidegger's treatment of intersubjectivity belongs to Dasein's everydayness, which is often seen as inauthentic.²⁰

If we turn our attention to later Heidegger, the situation is no better, as there is hardly any mention of other Daseins. It is mentioned only in relation to the fourfold, where it is referred to as the mortal. Even here the indication is to the individual Dasein rather than to the intersubjective community of Daseins. As mortal, Dasein is understood only in relation to the other three of the fourfold, as the mortal Dasein is only a facet of Being. Besides Being's call, giving, regioning and poetic presencing are more directed to the individual Dasein who recalls, thanks, waits on and poetically dwells. The meditative thinking, dwelling in the nearness of Being and seeing the truth of Being in some sense calls for a moving away from other Daseins, as only in absolute openness to Being can Being's call be re-collected and the gift be thanked. Again, later Heidegger speaks of Being's giving of itself in things, in poetry, in art and in language. Dasein is called to shepherd Being's presencing in all these. But, we do not have any reference to Being's revealing itself to other Daseins or to an intersubjective community of Daseins of which Dasein is a shepherd. Being is spoken as giving itself to Dasein through language, without a genuine intersubjective dialogue. Thus, both in early and later Heidegger, the analysis of Dasein's social world is deficient. Dasein is seen in both phases as being alone, without genuine intersubjective communion, dialogue and reciprocity.

9.2.1.1.3. The Reality of God

Heidegger's philosophy does not consider the possibility of God to whom man can have genuine relationship. Just as the notion of the other, in the sense of communal existence, is absent, so also the notion of the other as Absolute and Eternal Thou is absent in Heidegger's thought. In the early phase, Heidegger is totally indifferent to the question of God. While in the latter phase the notion of God is considered under a different name, viz., the Divine. Here the Divine is simply an aspect of the phenomenological revelation of Being. But the Divine, as spoken by Heidegger at

¹⁷ Cf. Roger Waterhouse, *Heidegger Critique*, p. 176.

¹⁸ Cf. Rene Weber, "A Critique of Heidegger's Concept of Solitude," in *The New Scholasticism*, 42 (1968): 537-560.

¹⁹ Cf. *SZ*, p. 263; *BT*, pp. 307-308.

²⁰ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 117-126; *BT*, pp. 153-163.

the later phase, is of such nature that it would not in any way satisfy man's religious aspirations. Nor is it such that man can offer it his worship and adoration. Thus, though Heidegger has succeeded in thinking of God in a novel way, he has not provided a notion of God that will instill religious feeling in Dasein.

9.2.1.1.4. Morality and Value System

Even though there are thinkers²¹ who claim that there is an ethical system in Heidegger, it is rather difficult to accept their point of view. The absence of the other, both in the vertical and horizontal dimensions, give a way to the absence of a moral and value system in Heidegger. Since he does not envisage an intersubjective community, morality becomes something superfluous. Besides, the appeal to live a moral life is related to God as the rewarder of the one living the moral life. Since these two are vague themes in Heidegger, morality as well becomes automatically a vague topic of consideration. Besides, though there are ethical ideas in Heidegger's thought, such as, the call of conscience, the call of Being, resoluteness and the call to authenticity, he does not attempt to spell out any practical way of giving guidance to moral life relating to Dasein's concrete situation. Thus, in some sense we agree with Camele²² in saying that Heidegger has precluded a socially and situationally oriented ethical system.

9.2.1.1.5. The Concreteness of Dasein

Heidegger, in attempting to analyze Dasein, criticized the traditional notion of man as 'rational animal', saying that this definition is incomplete as it only defines man from his animality rather than his humanity. But he seems to have done the opposite, as he has totally ignored the animality of Dasein as a bodily nature. Dasein is spoken as being-in-the-world. Yet the world of Dasein is a relatedness to various equipmental systems and their significance rather than the concrete bodily nature. The consideration of Dasein -- as the state-of-being with its moods, as being-towards-death, as having existential guilt and existential limitations, as a thrown and factual existence -- remains incomplete because none of these aspects of Dasein is seen from the bodily dimension. Had Heidegger taken these aspects to the level of a Dasein that is bodily, his Dasein-analysis would have attained a concreteness which it does not have. Thus, Heidegger's Dasein-analysis is incomplete and not fully concrete as he claimed.²³

If we turn our attention to later Heidegger, the situation is not very different. In considering Dasein, as an aspect of the fourfold, which is the manifestation of Being in its spatiality, we can find a reference to Dasein being rooted in the spatial manifestation of Being. The same is also indicated in Dasein's building things by saving the earth, receiving the sky, waiting on Divinities and initiating its mortal nature. But, these are only indications. The bodilyness of Dasein, as an essential aspect of its nature and being is not considered in the latter phase as well.

²¹ John D. Caputo speaks of an original-ethics in Heidegger, which refers to the thoughtful meditation upon the essence of dwelling as the issue of Being, "Heidegger's Original Ethics," *The New Scholasticism*, 45 (1971), pp. 127-138; Giles Driscoll considers Heidegger as an ethical monist who gives an ontological structure for an ethics "Heidegger's Ethical Monism," *The New Scholasticism*, 42 (1968), pp. 497-510.

²² Cf. Anthony M. Camele, "Heideggerian Ethics," *Philosophy Today*, 21 (1977): 284-293.

²³ Cf. Guentes Stern, "The Pseudo-concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 8 (1947/48): 337-371.

The absence of the consideration of the bodily nature of Dasein in Heidegger's Dasein-analysis is the fundamental reason for all the above-mentioned deficiencies. Body is a significant reality as it is the point of contact in our concrete existence. If not for the body, no relationship of any kind could be built. Since this all-important dimension is missing in Heideggerian Dasein-analysis, any relationship that is genuine and personal is missing, whether it be relating to God, the other or the community. Besides, the moral dimension and the intellectual dimension of the possibility of objective knowledge are related to Dasein's bodily interactions. Thus, the omission of the analysis of the bodily nature of Dasein is a significant deficiency in Heideggerian thinking.

9.2.1.1.6. The Authenticity of Dasein

The state of authenticity of Dasein is also not a welcoming one. The authenticity spoken of in Heidegger I is not genuine, as it is nothing but Dasein's reflection on himself. It only brings Dasein to the state of a lonely and self-centered existence, in which Dasein is cut off from every other type of existence. Even Dasein's Being-centered existence, as highlighted in Heidegger II, and the authenticity that is associated with this state also contain a vacuity. Though the authentic Dasein is open to Being in things and understands himself and his destiny in a new way, yet he lacks the dimension of genuine relationship. Dasein's openness to Being takes Dasein away from other relationships. Dasein is not in genuine inter-subjective relationship, even in this state of authenticity. Besides, Dasein's openness to the Divine is one of intellectual waiting or contemplation. The ultimate joy or happiness Dasein attains at this state of authenticity consists in his being lost in wonder at the presencing of Being. As a result, even in this state of authenticity, Dasein is alone. He is no more an anxious Dasein which sought in himself the source of authentic existence, but a resigned Dasein which knows that he is limited and that he must depend on Being for his happiness. The ultimate purpose of Dasein in this life is to seek and receive the gift of Being and to shepherd it in his being. Such a state of authenticity seems to be divorced from genuine action, as it has less and less to do with the social relationships. It is more a passive waiting for the moment in which Being reveals itself. Thus, Dasein's authenticity, as considered by Heidegger in both phases, lacks a completeness and so it is not a totally fulfilling experience, even though the latter is better than the former.²⁴

9.2.1.1.7. The Finitude of Dasein

According to early Heidegger, human existence is characterized by a radical finitude. The situation of Dasein in the world is tragic and grim. Dasein is centered on himself, cut away from others, the Divine and Being. It is a state, in which Dasein is lonely, helpless, anxious, and his life lacks meaning and purpose. Besides, human existence is characterized by existential guilt, existential limitations and death. There is no one to help Dasein except himself. Dasein's being-in-the-world is a state of inauthenticity, marked by involvements and entanglements with entities and other Daseins. Even the authentic state is far from being a desirable one, as it does not bring Dasein to the state of happiness, as Dasein is all by himself in a world that is separated and isolated. The situation of the world in which Dasein finds himself is no better. It is in the grip of metaphysical and technological thinking. The scientific approach to life and the technological attitude of domination have led to calculative thinking. The will-to-power eliminates man in all his endeavors; the value of life and reality is lost. In the process of the struggle for power and

²⁴ Cf. Roger Waterhouse, pp. 179-192.

survival, man himself is made a commodity and the most important raw material. Man has looked upon technology as a means to happiness, but technology has victimized man, as he is controlled by technology. Heidegger gives many images, such as, 'world-night', 'a time of destitution', 'endless winter' and 'a time in which Gods have fled' to refer to this depressing situation of modern man.

Even later Heidegger does not give a better view of Dasein's existence and destiny. In the state of authenticity, Dasein accepts his inability to be the master of himself and totally depends on Being. Dasein is helpless, as all that he can do is to accept his inability to cope with his finitude and resign passively to the presencing of Being. Even this state of passive openness to Being is devoid of social and communitarian dimension. The authentic Dasein has no genuine and reciprocal relationship with the other, as there is no place for love, togetherness, genuine friendship, fellowship with the other, cooperation and one to one concern. Dasein, thus, is presented as a being that is incapable of any committed relationship, while he is only capable of anxiety in the face of death, guilt and existential limitations, and a tranquil waiting on the presencing of Being. The absence of genuine relationship in the totality of Dasein's existence makes Dasein's finitude more acute as he has, always, to face life all alone, having no word of encouragement and support from others. Thus, Heidegger's philosophy of the radical finitude of Dasein leaves Dasein with an unhappy and solitary existence.

Besides, Heidegger's path to authentic human destiny lacks a sense of hope for the future. Gabriel Marcel says: "Hope is for the soul what breathing is for the living organism. Where hope is lacking, the soul dries up and withers..."²⁵ Both in early and later Heidegger, Dasein's life ends with death. There is nothing to hope for in the future after death. Not only does Dasein find himself in a particular state-of-being as factual and thrown having no idea as to his origin, but also as his existence ends in death it has no idea as to what is after death. All that Dasein can do is to cultivate the genuine attitude of being-towards-death by anticipation of death and opening himself to the giving of Being in re-collection and thanksgiving, without ever knowing where such an authentic state is leading. If this is all, in the last analysis, what is human existence? What is the worth of human living? What is the purpose and meaning of human existence? Why at all should Dasein live such a lonely and enclosed existence? Heidegger does not seem to have answers to these questions. Thus, Heidegger's philosophy of a finite Dasein, presents a human existence whose life is dark and tragic, without ultimate purpose, meaning and happiness.

9.2.1.2. Inconsistencies

Besides, the above-mentioned deficiencies, there are a number of inconsistencies in Heidegger's philosophy. He leaves many concepts vague and unclear. Had he attempted to be precise and made an effort to clarify some of these concepts many of the errors found in Heideggerian thinking could have been avoided. Here, we would highlight some of these inconsistencies.

9.2.1.2.1. Inauthenticity and Everydayness

Heidegger defines Dasein's everydayness as: "Being-in-the-world which is falling and disclosed, thrown and projecting...both in its being alongside the world and in its being-with

²⁵ Gabriel Marcel, *Homo Viator*, trans. by Emma Craufurd (New York: Harper and Bros., 1962), P. 10.

others."²⁶ This text from Heidegger clearly identifies the everyday existence of Dasein with his inauthentic existence. If this is so, every involvement of Dasein, as being-in-the-world with entities and other Daseins is inauthentic. Such a position sounds absurd, as it would mean that Dasein by his very being-in-the-world is inauthentic. Though Heidegger's thinking reaches such an absurd state on this point, he does not make an attempt to clarify the notions of inauthenticity and everydayness, both in their relatedness and differences. Rather he considers these concepts in a vague and ambiguous manner, which leads to lack of precision and further misunderstanding of Heidegger's thought.

9.2.1.2.2. Present-at-hand and Ready-to-hand

Heidegger's distinction of entities as present-at-hand and ready-to-hand is based on the way Dasein looks at an entity. There is no such division within an entity. If Dasein looks at an entity from a theoretical perspective, then it is seen as present-at-hand or as 'out-there'. But if Dasein sees the same thing from the practical point of view, i.e., in relation to what he can do with that thing, then it would present itself to Dasein as a tool or the ready-to-hand. In making this distinction Heidegger clearly distinguishes two types of attitudes on the part of Dasein, viz., the attitude of detached viewing of a thing and the attitude of encountering an entity in its practical mode. The former is the attitude of a scientist, while the latter is the attitude of a work-man. The former refers to scientific and objective knowledge about things, whereas the latter points to understanding things in their essential ground in the Heideggerian sense.

This strict distinction -- between things present-at-hand and ready-to-hand, scientific attitude and practical attitude, knowledge and understanding -- remains only in the rational level and not in relation to the concrete situation of man. In a concrete experience we find that theoretical knowledge and practical attitude go hand in hand, as one is not complete without the other. We need understanding or the practical attitude to do the work and require scientific or objective knowledge to make our practical attitude into a well-developed body of knowledge which can be studied objectively. This is clear from our work experience. Thus, Heidegger's strict distinction of knowledge and understanding, viewing them as having no relation to each other, is inconsistent and does not bear up in life.

9.2.1.2.3. The Divine and Being

Heidegger speaks of the Divine as one aspect of the fourfold. It is the immortal aspect in and through which Being manifests. Thus, the Divine is seen as an aspect of the revelation of Being. Heidegger also speaks of the manifestation of the Divine in its presencing and absencing. The Divine is also said to be the part of the wording-process of the unconcealment of Being.²⁷ Yet, Heidegger, does not identify Being with the Divine.²⁸ He also speaks of the Divine as an entity,²⁹ and so Being cannot be the Divine. While Heidegger does not make an attempt to clarify the nature of the Divine's relationship to Being, he makes inconsistent statements regarding their

²⁶ *SZ*, p. 181; *BT*, p. 225.

²⁷ Cf. *VA*, p. 144; *BW*, pp. 327-328.

²⁸ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 328; *BW*, p. 210.

²⁹ Cf. *TK*, p. 45; *QCT*, p. 47.

nature and relationship. This inconsistency and lack of precision in Heidegger's thinking relating to the Divine and Being paves the way for various interpretations by Heideggerian scholars.³⁰

9.2.1.2.4. Anticonceptualism

Another obvious inconsistency in Heidegger's thinking is its anticonceptualist stance. In the early phase, Heidegger, stressing the importance of understanding, ignores the validity of objective knowledge and cognition. In the later phase, he is critical of metaphysical and representational thinking. He claims that his originary thinking is non-conceptual. But this claim is paradoxical, as nothing can be expressed without the help of concepts. The many volumes of Heidegger's writing and the many lectures he had been giving were not devoid of concepts. Even the research done on Heidegger uses concepts and interprets the concepts used by him. As a matter of fact, Heidegger uses the propensities of German language to express philosophical concepts and forms new concepts and expresses them in terms, by playing on the prefixes and suffixes, giving them new nuances and meanings. If not for using concepts he would not have written what he has about his non-conceptual and non-metaphysical thinking. Thus, Heidegger was, indeed, inconsistent in denouncing the value of conceptual knowledge, while using concepts to denounce their importance.

9.2.1.2.5. Ontological-Existential and Ontic-Existential

Heidegger distinguishes two levels in his analysis of Dasein, viz., ontological-existential and ontic-existential. The former refers to the structures underlying Dasein while the latter indicates the level of concrete acts of existence. It is in the ontic-existential that the ontological-existential structures are actualized. Though Heidegger made this distinction and aimed at working out the Dasein analysis in the ontological-existential level, often enough he moves into the latter. A clear example is found in the call of conscience and the resolute wanting-to-have-a-conscience. Here, the call of conscience belongs to the ontological-existential level, while resoluteness is an attestation of the former in the ontic-existential level.³¹ In the later phase Heidegger no longer keeps to this distinction in his analysis of Dasein.³² This makes Heidegger even substitute the term 'Dasein' with the term 'man' (*Mensch*) in later writings.³³ The inconsistency in keeping up this distinction both by Heidegger and his commentators has led to wrong interpretations of his philosophy.

So far, we have looked into what Heidegger did not say but should have said, and into what he said and the logical inconsistencies in this. Having done so, we do not want to give the impression that Heidegger's thinking is basically negative in character. We, having distanced ourselves from Heideggerian thinking in order to look at it objectively, have found it wanting in the aspects we have mentioned. This does not mean that the merits of Heidegger's thinking are

³⁰ For various interpretations on the nature of the relationship between the Divine and Being: Cf. John Macquarrie, *Principles of Christian Theology* (London: SCM Press, 1966). Cf. also Heinrich Ott, *Denken und Sein: Der Weg Martin Heideggers und der Weg Theologie* (Zollikon: Evangelisches Verlag, 1955); and Thomas F. O'Meara, "Heidegger on God," *Continuum*, 5 (1967/1968): 686-698.

³¹ Cf. *SZ*, pp. 267-295; *BT*, pp. 312-341.

³² Cf. Ralph Powel, "The Late Heidegger's Omission of the Ontic-ontological Structure of Dasein," *Heidegger and the Path of Thinking*, ed. John Salis, pp. 116-137.

³³ Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 346; *BW*, pp. 228-229.

undermined. Coming closer to this we want to highlight its positive aspects, the task of the next section.

9.2.2. Positive Appraisal

Speaking of Heidegger and his philosophical endeavor Gilbert Ryle says: "He showed himself to be a thinker of real importance by the immense subtlety and searchingness of his examination of consciousness, by the boldness and originality of his methods and conclusions, and by the unflagging energy with which he tries to think behind the stock categories of orthodox philosophy and psychology."³⁴ This tribute by Ryle, indeed, is a fitting one for an original and seminal thinker such as Heidegger. He has given a new vent to philosophizing by the novelty of his approach and by his unorthodox methodology. He has let in new air and has inaugurated new thinking, which in some ways can supplement traditional metaphysical thinking. Herein lies Heidegger's significance. Any original thinker, due to the novelty of his thinking, tends to commit errors. Heidegger himself states as follows: "He who thinks greatly must err greatly."³⁵ So the errors found in Heideggerian thinking do not make him less of a thinker. In this section, we want to bring to light in succession both the contributions of Heideggerian thinking and the new Heideggerian perspective that lays open traditional issues to new light.

9.2.2.1. Contributions

Here we will focus on Heidegger's positive contributions in the field of philosophy and thinking, taking into account the aim, task and purpose of his philosophy.

9.2.2.1.1. Heideggerian Philosophy: A Call to Genuine Living

The main reason for Heidegger's attempt to make the new venture is the problems posed by the sudden developments of positive sciences by the end of the nineteenth century and their impact in the early twentieth century. During this era of history, there were tremendous developments in the field of positive sciences. Classical physics gave way to nuclear physics and microphysics. Freudian psychotherapy made a breakthrough in the field of psychology. Medical sciences with their new developments challenged psycho-physical determinism. Every science was independent of each other and was interested in its own development. There was a growing desire for discovery and progress among scientists. Thus, the whole thrust of the sciences was focused towards bringing practical and useful results, without ever questioning the ultimate truth of the propositions with which they were working. Sciences were considered scientific only if they brought practical and useful effects. At this juncture in the history of the West, man lost his desire for ultimate meaning and turned his attention to finding facts that worked. Being blind to the foundational realities of human existence he turned out to be a slave to his own scientific progress. This brought about a culture that is technologically oriented, which saw everything, including man, as a tool that could augment the progress of sciences and bring about better living conditions.³⁶ Having lost the sense of finality and purposefulness in life, man has become the victim of confusion in every aspect of

³⁴ Gilbert Ryle, "Martin Heidegger: Sein und Zeit," *The Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 1 (1970): 13.

³⁵ *ED*, p. 17; *PLT*, p. 9.

³⁶ Cf. *VA*, p. 88; *EP*, p. 104.

his existence. In this 'hopeless' situation brought about by technological revolution and scientific progress the meaningfulness of human existence was deteriorating.³⁷

This deteriorating situation to which human existence is led to by so-called progress in technology and science is the main concern of Heidegger's philosophy. The homeliness of human communities was giving way. People became strangers to themselves in their own homeland. They, as it were, lost the rootedness of their lives; their lives had become superficial and artificial. The call of destiny no more rang a bell in their ears. Everyone was lost in the oblivion of the care of his/her everyday existence.³⁸

Heidegger expressed his insight into the spirit of his age in a memorial address he delivered in honor of the famous composer Conradin Kreutzer, a native of his region:

Many Germans have lost their homeland, have had to leave their villages and towns, have been driven from their own native land. Countless others...have been caught up in the turmoil of big cities and have been resettled in the wastelands of industrial districts. They are strangers to their own former homelands. All those who have stayed on...are more homeless than those who have been driven from the homelands. Hourly and daily they are chained by radio and television. Week after week the movies carry them off into uncommon...realms of imagination and give the illusion of a world that is no world...All that with which modern techniques of communication stimulate, assail and drive man today...(rather) than the tradition of his native world...what is happening here with those driven from their homeland no less than with those who have remained? Answer: the rootedness...of man is threatened to the core! Even more: The loss of rootedness is caused not merely by circumstance or fortune, nor does it stem from the negligence or superficiality of man's way of life. The loss... springs from the spirit of the age into which all of us were born.³⁹

By his philosophical enterprise, Heidegger intended to call man, who is fragmented by the scientific-technological culture, to the wholeness and authenticity of his existence. This involved a recall of men, who are caught up in the fragmented way of living that is characteristic of everyday existence, to their roots and to openness to the call of destiny. It is a summons to turn away from aimless living and an invitation to turn to a life that is purposeful. Thus, beyond any doubt, Heidegger's philosophy is a call to authentic human existence and to genuine human living.

9.2.2.1.2. Heidegger's Philosophy: A Critique of Scientism and Technologism

It was Heidegger's belief that such rootlessness of human existence was brought about by the traditional metaphysical thinking that characterized the whole history of Western philosophy starting from Plato. According to him every significant thinker, in the west since Plato, has interpreted reality, Being and truth in a subjectivistic manner, in which reason and logic dominated. As a result thinking became a mere representation and a conceptual formulation of reality, Being and truth. Philosophy's main concern turned out to be epistemological. This forming and representing ideas and concepts and the focus on their logical validity made men forget the essential ground of reality.⁴⁰ This drifting away from the ground of existence for over two thousand

³⁷ Cf. Reynold Borzaga (ed.), *Contemporary Philosophy* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1966), pp. 114-122.

³⁸ Cf. *DT*, pp. 48-49.

³⁹ *Ibid.*

⁴⁰ Cf. *WD*, p. 30; *WCT*, p. 82.

years reached its peak in modern times in Nietzsche's nihilistic philosophy of will-to-power, which is the dominant force behind the contemporary scientific and technological movements. Heidegger clearly saw how such thinking can affect the actual concrete living of an individual and that of a nation, especially in the concrete application of Nazi ideology in Germany in the 1930s. He, himself, fell victim to such thinking especially during 1933-1934 when he supported the Nazi ideology and program for Germany.

Being convinced of the evil effects of the metaphysical-technological thinking which led to scientism and technologism, Heidegger wanted to replace it with a new type of thinking which would obliterate the consequences of metaphysical thinking. In order to inaugurate this new thinking and, thereby, take man to his authentic destiny, Heidegger took a 'step-back' into the history of Western metaphysics, so as to effect a destruction of the metaphysical thinking, in the process paving the way for his originaive and primordial thinking.

9.2.2.1.3. Heideggerian Philosophy: A Primordial Thinking

Heidegger wanted to rectify the fragmentation brought about in human existence, human thinking, and in the sphere of knowledge by the metaphysical thinking and with the desire to find them on ontological ground. Hence, he limited his analysis of human existence and its authenticity to one dimension, viz., to the transcendental and ontological dimension of Dasein's openness to the truth of Being. For him, the ontological dimension is the most fundamental aspect on which all the other modes of human existence are based. Besides, the ontological consideration implicitly includes all the other dimensions, as it reveals human existence in its uniqueness. For example, to say that man ontologically 'is', includes implicitly that man is political, economic, social, psychological, moral, theological and bodily. Again, man's ontological 'isness' is the basis of being political, economic, social, moral, theological and bodily, as the ontological dimension of human existence transcends all adjectival and secondary aspects. Therefore, Heidegger's analysis of human existence is primordial and his thinking is originaive.

Many of the criticisms we have leveled against Heidegger come from the fact, that the philosophical stand he has taken in his analysis of human existence is primordial and one-dimensional. He could have attempted to consider Dasein and his authentic existence in a multi-dimensional manner as have such thinkers as Levinas, Marcel, Buber, Sartre and Jaspers. But Heidegger precisely did not want to do that. He did not want further fragmentation of Dasein in various dimensions; rather he preferred bringing together all the dimensions of Dasein into the one unifying ground, viz., Being. Thus, the uniqueness of Heideggerian thinking consists in that it is not multi-dimensional, but rather one-dimensional and primordial.

Even though Heidegger's analysis of Dasein is primordial and ontological, it does not totally exclude other aspects of Dasein. We do find, in Heidegger's analysis of Dasein an openness to various dimensions. He speaks of Dasein as 'being-alongside-entities', as 'being-with-other', as having a conscience and a resolute desire to follow the call of conscience, and as a mortal that waits on Divinities. All these are references to other dimensions, such as intersubjectivity, morality and the theological. But, Heidegger did not work out the details of these dimensions, because that was not the main concern of his philosophical endeavor. The significant influence of Heidegger's primordial thinking on various sciences, such as, philosophical anthropology, philosophy of

history, ethics, aesthetics, literature, psychiatry, hermeneutics and theology,⁴¹ vouch for this multi-directional openness of Heidegger's primordial analysis of Dasein. Heidegger elaborately analyses Dasein as related to the truth of Being, as the main concern and intent of his philosophical endeavor. Thus, without any doubt Heidegger has contributed positively to the field of philosophical thinking. His primordial thinking and his anti-metaphysical stand have opened him to a new perspective. To this we now turn our attention.

9.2.2.2. The New Perspective

Metaphysics with its conceptualistic and logic-dominated thinking presents a view of reality that is static and reified: everything is seen in terms of the dichotomy between subject and object. Heideggerian primordial thinking views everything in a new dynamic perspective. In this section, we will highlight how the world, Dasein, the Divine and Being are seen in this new perspective.

9.2.2.2.1. World

While Heidegger does not deny the traditional cosmological view of the world or its existence, he views the world in a dynamic way different from the traditional conception. The world is always related to Dasein; it is always a Dasein's world. The world is understood in the context of Dasein's being-alongside-entities and being-with-others. It is constituted of the matrix of Dasein's relatedness to the various equipmental systems and their interrelatedness. Besides, the world is understood in the totality of the significance of this interrelatedness. Thus, we can speak of as many worlds as there are meaningful interrelated equipmental systems. It is not a mere subjectivization of the world, but seeing the world from the ontological perspective of Dasein. In the later Heidegger, the world is seen in relation to the fourfold of earth, sky, divinities and mortals, in and through which the spatial dimension of Being is manifested.

9.2.2.2.2. Dasein

Heidegger does not accept the traditional definition of man, rational animal, as complete. From the new existential perspective such a comprehensive and all-embracing definition of human existence is not possible. In his existential analysis Heidegger distinguishes between Dasein and man. Man, in the metaphysical sense, is a being, whereas Dasein is a process that comes to pass 'in' man. Dasein, as a process, occurs only in man. Therefore, Dasein is not a statistically present being, but a dynamic process which must take over his existence, by active resolve and by receptive openness to Being. Seen in this primordial perspective of Heidegger, Dasein is the 'place' in which innerworldly beings and Being are made manifest. Besides, the structure of the self-hood of Dasein is neutral, as it may occur in a male or female; in an 'I' or in a 'thou'. But, this does not mean that Dasein is impersonal; rather he is pre-personal in the sense that he is the *a priori* basis for the possibility of ontic individual selves or persons. But in the later phase of his thought, Heidegger did not make this distinction between the ontological and ontical levels.

9.2.2.2.3. Divine

⁴¹ Cf. C. Astrada et al., eds., *Martin Heidegger's Einfluss auf die Wissenschaften*, (Bern: A Francke AG, 1949). Cf. Also William U. Spanos, ed., *Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature* (London: Indiana University Press, 1979).

Classical metaphysicians considered God as a being that is all-perfect, all-knowing and all-powerful. Heidegger neither speaks of God as an entity, nor does he identify God with Being. There is no dogmatism about God in Heideggerian primordial thinking. He no longer uses the term 'God', as it is a concept filled with metaphysical meaning. He uses instead the term the 'Divine', which is thought in relation to the revealing of Being, to which the mortals remain open and upon which they wait. Since the presencing of the Divine is part of the Being-process, it is to be understood as a historical process in which the authentically existing mortals and poets can experience the divine nods and traces. Since, the Divine is an aspect of the historical process of unconcealing of Being it cannot be contained in metaphysical concepts and dogmas, nor can it be proved with the help of logical arguments. Thus, in primordial thinking one cannot speak of atheism, theism, monotheism or polytheism, as such distinctions in speaking about the Divine are based on metaphysical thinking.⁴² Neither can we speak of any religions having their own versions of the Divine, because the Divine cannot be contained in conceptual dogmas, for such would be no more the Divine. In other words, the Divine of which Heidegger speaks in his primordial thinking is beyond all religions and 'isms'. The basis of various religions and Gods is the manifold conceptual expressions of the Divine that are experienced in the Being-process. In other words, the Divine is that which is experienced by opening oneself to the revealing of Being, while 'Gods' are nothing but the conceptual representation of the primordial experience of the Divine, which is usually expressed in faith-formulation or dogmas. Thus, Heideggerian primordial thinking gives us not the metaphysical conception 'God', but, an experiencing of the Divine as revealed in the Being-process.

9.2.2.2.4. Being

Heidegger rejects all attempts to give a precise definition of Being. For him, any attempt to give a definition of Being would amount to tying down Being to a particular concept. Heidegger often speaks of what Being is not, rather than what it is. Clarifying the notion of the ontological difference, he says that Being is not being, i.e., it is neither an existing reality, nor a sum-total of such existing realities. If we compare Being with beings, the former is a 'non-Being' or 'nothing'. Even though Being is not a being, yet it 'lets-be' particular entities and particular entities 'enshrine' the presence of Being. Being manifests itself in the revealing-concealing process. It comes over in the entities and unconceals itself in the process and reveals the entities. Being is to be understood in the 'event' of its historical sending. All these descriptions of Being point to the nature of Being which is a process or a historical sending, rather than an entity. Speaking of the 'why' of the process Heidegger just says that it is a 'play of Being'. Being cannot be understood with the help of metaphysical-representational thinking, but can be understood only in its relation to the realm of *Ereignis* (event of appropriation), i.e., in relation to the essential belonging-together of Dasein and Being. Every aspect of Being's revealing -- essential thinking, the fourfold, the poetic presencing, the unconcealing process and the language -- is to be understood in relation to the realm of *Ereignis*, which is a realm of deeper experience than mere intellectual knowing. Our consideration of Heidegger's analysis of the world, Dasein, the Divine and Being clearly highlights the new perspective that is characteristic of the primordial thinking Heidegger has inaugurated. This new perspective does not base itself on logic, reason and conceptual formulation, but is founded in a deeper level of existential experience of reality beyond the tangible and the visible.

⁴² Cf. *BH*, Wegmarken, p. 348; *BW*, p. 230.

In this chapter, we have seen the philosophies of Shankara and Heidegger, both in their negative and positive aspects. Many of the criticisms we have mentioned do not stand up against them if seen in the light of their primordial thinking and *Brahman* / Being-centered philosophies. In spite of the drawbacks and differences, they propose very similar paths to the attainment of authentic human destiny. Both are concerned about helping human touch the deeper dimensions of their lives and live a life centered on *Brahman* and Being.

Conclusion

We have come to the close of our study of the paths of Shankara and Heidegger to authentic human destiny. Both envisage similar paths. The third part of the work looked into the similarities and differences found between these paths and critically analyzed each. The work in these three chapters clearly points to the five fundamental presuppositions that underlie both the paths of Shankara and Heidegger, viz., an intellectual approach, a dualism in knowledge, the incommunicability of the highest experience, a personal path and a secondary role for the body.

Both Shankara and Heidegger propose an intellectual approach in attaining *Brahman*-experience and Being-experience respectively. Though Shankara speaks of physical and moral preparations, their role is very initial to the path. They play only a negative role in that they remove the hindrances relating to the body and the mind so that the seeker can concentrate fully on the intellectual preparation, viz., the hearing, the reflection and the meditation, which alone open the aspirant to discriminative knowledge and thereby to the removal of ignorance. For this reason Shankara strongly denied to indirect methods of *karma* and *bhakti* the role of taking one to *Brahmaanubhava*. Heidegger's approach is not that different. He says that Being-experience is attained in three stages: essential thinking of Being, dwelling in the nearness of Being and seeing the truth of Being. In spite of their differences, these three stages can be seen as parallels to the three stages of the intellectual preparation of which Shankara speaks. In these stages Dasein is totally caught up with Being in an intellectual vision similar to the seeker who is engrossed in the identity-experience with *Brahman* at various levels of the intellect. The three stages in both paths are ascending stages in which the seeker and the Dasein move from a lower level of existence with *Brahman*/Being to a higher level of experience. Even the final stage of *Brahman*/Being-experience attained by the seeker and the Dasein is nothing else but a unitive, total and intellectual vision of *Brahman*/Being, because this stage totally lacks any emotional or other elements. Thus, the paths of Shankara and Heidegger fundamentally are an intellectual experience of *Brahman*/Being, not only in the process, but also at the end. As a result, both paths can be used only by people with an intellectual bent of mind, such as thinkers and poets, to attain the final goal of existence.

The Shankarite and Heideggerian paths have two levels of knowledge, before and after attaining the *Brahman*/Being-experience. Shankara distinguishes between the phenomenal (*vyavahaarika*) and the nomenal (*Brahmaanubhava*) levels of knowledge. The former is characterized by the subject-object duality and is limited to empirical experience. Every knowledge attained through the means of knowledge (*pramaanas*) belongs to this realm. Nomenal knowledge is characterized by unity-experience, i.e., the experience of everything, including oneself, in the one absolute *Brahman*. It is not attained in any of the three stages, in which there is 'I-consciousness', viz., the waking-state, the dream-state and the deep sleep-state, but is available to the seeker only in the state of *tuuriya*. These two levels of knowledge are two approaches to the one and the same reality from *aparaa* and *paraa* levels of existence. The two approaches are not two different world views imposed by the subjective consciousness, rather the former is unreal when seen from the perspective of the latter. Martin Heidegger contrasts metaphysical-technological knowledge and the knowledge of Being. The former is characterized by scientific research and a technological attitude of domination and their consequence, calculative-thinking. The knowledge of Being is not available on the level of metaphysical-technological knowledge. Rather, it is given to the essential thinker of Being, the dweller in the nearness of Being and the

seer of the truth of Being, in the realm of *Ereignis*. Heidegger refers to the entry into the realm of *Ereignis* as an ‘unbridged-entry’, meaning that there is no bridge between metaphysical-technological knowledge and the knowledge of Being. The latter is attained only when one lets go of the former and seeks the manifestation of Being in the spatio-temporal history.

Since both Shankara and Heidegger hold for two levels of knowledge and that there is no entry possible between the two, there arises the difficulty of communicating the *Brahman*/Being-experience. For Shankara, the identity-experience between *Brahman* and *Aatman* is transempirical and eternal; therefore, it is indescribable and incommunicable. For the *Brahmajnaani*, phenomenal existence is unreal as he sees everything from the perspective of *Brahman*. Since, one in the level of phenomenal existence experiences everything in terms of duality one can never get at *Brahmaanubhava*. Therefore, neither the *Brahmajnaani* can communicate, nor the one in the state of phenomenal existence can understand what the *Brahmaanubhava* state is about.

Heidegger speaks of Being-experience in terms of essential thinking, dwelling in the nearness of Being and seeing the truth of Being. All he says about these stages of Being-centered existence -- Being’s giving and Dasein’s receiving, Being’s poetic presencing and Dasein’s poetic dwelling in the three ecstases of time, Being’s unconcealing-concealing manifestation in *aletheia* and language, the house of Being, and Dasein’s openness to these -- can never be communicated using metaphysical-technological language as all these experiences belong to the realm of *Ereignis*. The only way one can arrive at such knowledge is, by making the ‘unbridged-entry’ into the realm of *Ereignis*, wherein Being and Dasein are appropriated to each other and the truth of Being is manifested to Dasein. Thus, like the *Brahmajnaani*, the authentic Dasein would never be able to communicate the Being-experience, and those in metaphysical-technological level would never be able to get at it, as the Being-experience is not available in this realm. Thus, both for Shankara and Heidegger, the *Brahman*/Being-experience is incommunicable.

Besides, both paths are of such nature that the aspirant and the Dasein must walk all alone. In the Shankarite path, at every stage of *Brahmaajjnaasa*, the aspirant must walk the path all by himself. At the physical, moral and intellectual levels, it is the aspirant who is called to pursue the path. The only person that can point the way is the *guru*. But the role of the *guru* is such that he is an unattached master; his job is to show the way which the aspirant must follow equally in a detached manner. There is not a genuine one-to-one, I-thou relationship in this master-disciple relationship. Other than the master, there is no one to intervene or to assist the aspirant in the *jnaana* path to authenticity. The whole process is his own personal effort. It is very similar in the Heideggerian path as well. Heidegger presents Being-experience as a personal experience of Being by Dasein. As an essential thinker, a dweller in the nearness of Being and a seer of the truth of Being, Dasein experiences Being all alone in himself and in its manifestation in things. Hardly any role is played by the other Daseins or an intersubjective community of Daseins in one’s movement towards authenticity. Often the intervention of other Daseins is seen as a distraction in the whole process. In this manner, both the Shankarite and Heideggerian paths to authenticity are personal paths to be walked all alone by the seeker and the Dasein.

Both Shankara and Heidegger give much less importance to the bodily nature of man; and body’s significance is only secondary in their paths. For Shankara, body belongs to the level of ignorance. Its condition reflects the fruits of one’s actions. Body ceases to be when all past *karma* is exhausted. The physical and the moral preparations are aimed at mastering the body and its inclinations, which are considered to prevent the aspirant’s moving towards his goal of *Brahman*-experience, as it blocks the seeker from the serious study of the scripture. Even in the liberated state, the *Jiivanmukta*, though has a body due to the effects of *karma*, but lives a life with

no significant relationship to the body. At the ultimate state of *Videha-mukti*, Shankara does not envisage a bodily existence. Even in Heidegger, we find the bodily dimension of man to be totally ignored. In Heidegger I, though Heidegger characterizes Dasein as a being-in-the-world, not even once is the bodily nature explicitly discussed. In Heidegger II, man's essential thinking, dwelling and seeing is not seen in relationship to his bodily aspect. Thus, even in Being-experience Dasein is not seen as experiencing Being as a bodily being. Since man in his bodily nature is ignored, intersubjective and ethical dimensions are vaguely treated in Heidegger's path. Hence, both Shankara and Heidegger give only a secondary significance to the bodily nature of man.

Both thinkers share the same purpose in that they are concerned with calling men to live authentically. Shankara and Heidegger and their paths to authentic human destiny have no other aim but to show the worthlessness of living a life centered on the world and its values, and to point to the eternal value of *Brahman*/Being-centered living, that is often overshadowed by the former. They did not want human existence to be fragmented, for in the process man loses his uniqueness and significance. Their paths are ways through which man can move from superficiality to seriousness, from indecision to decision, from aimlessness to purposefulness, and from mediocrity to deeper and fuller commitment. Besides, they wanted man to experience the inner dimension of reality without being a merely superficial passer-by in life.

One may wonder at the reason for the similarity of purpose and the presuppositions that underlie the philosophies of these two thinkers, even though they lived many centuries apart and in traditions that are very different from each other. Probably it is because they were addressing in, and through their philosophies the human situation that in some way is beyond time and culture, but which has deteriorated and lost sight of its goal. Though addressed in different cultures and in different times in history, the philosophies of Shankara and Heidegger announce to the people of their times that though man is in the world, he is not of the world, i.e., that though in the world, man has a destiny beyond the world, and so there is a need for man to transcend his present existence in order to find his genuine life.

In this context, our study of the paths of Shankara and Heidegger to authentic human destiny could be just an opening. This study we have undertaken and completed shows how through the message of these two thinkers human existence was sustained and guided towards its destiny in two cultures and in two different eras in history. History always has provided such authentic voices that speak the same truth in different epochs, as and when there arises the need for humankind's genuine transformation. Since many such paths have been given to humankind, it is possible to raise the same questions of man's authentic human destiny from the global perspective, in which we could consider the paths proposed by various systems, such as the Greek, Jewish, Christian, Islamic, Hindu, Jaina, Buddhist, Sikh, Chinese, Zen, primitive religions and other similar schools. Such an attempt will be the 'matter-for-thought' of another volume we visualize in the future.

Bibliography

1. Shankara:

1.1. Original Works of Shankara:

- Brahma-Sutra Bhaasya*, trans. Swami Gambhirananda, 2nd edition. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1972; trans. George Thibaut, *Sacred Books of the East*, [SBE] Vols.34 & 38, ed. Max Muller F. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1890; trans. Swami Virswarananda, Almora: Advaita Ashrama, 1948.
- Self-Knowledge (Atmabhoda)*, trans. Swami Nihilananda. New York: Ramakrishana Vivekananda Centre, 1980.
- Crest-Jewel of Discrimination (Viveka-Chudaamani)*, trans. Swami Prabhavananda and Christopher Isherwood, 3rd edition. California: Vendata Press, 1978.
- Panchadaasi*, trans. Henri Prasad Shastri. London: Shanthi Sadan, 1956.
- Brihadaranayaka Upanishad Bhaasya*, translated by Swami Mahvananda. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 5th edition, 1975.
- Upadeshasaahasrii*, trans. Swami Jagadananda, 6th edition. Madras: Sri Ramakrishana Math, 1979.
- Upanishad Bhaasyas, (Aiteriya, Isa, Katha, mundaka, Prasana and Taittiriya Upanishads)*, trans. Swami Gambhirananda, volumes I & II. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1957.
- Bagavat Giita Bhaasya*, trans. Mahadeva Sastri. Madras: V. Ramaswami Sastrulu & Sons, 1961.
- Gaudapaadakaarika Bhaasya and Manduukya Upanishad Bhaasya*, trans. Swami Nihilananda. Mysore: Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1955.
- "Stataloki," *The Works of Shankara*, Volume XV. Srirangam: Sri Vanivilas Press, 1910.
- Vaakyavritti*, translated by Swami Jagadananda. Madras: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1979.
- Aparoksaanubhuti or Self-Realization*, trans. Swami Vimuktananda. Calcutta: Advaita Ashrama, 1977.

1.2. Studies on Shankara:

- Bhattacharyya, Krishnachandra: *Studies in Philosophy*, Volume 2. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1958.
- Bhattacharyya, Vidhusharhar (ed. & trans.): *The Agamasastra of Gaudapaada*. Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1943.
- Blackwood, R.J.: "Neti neti -- Epistemological Problems of Mystical Experience," *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. XIII, No.3, (1963), pp.201-210.
- Chakravarti, Sures Chandra: *Human Life and Beyond*. Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1947.
-: *The Philosophy Of the Upanishads*. Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1953.
- Chaudhri, Amil Kumar Ray: *Self and Falsity in Advaita Vedaanta*. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1955.
- Das, A. C.: "Advaita Vedanta and Liberation on Bodily Existence," *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. IV, No.2, (1954), pp. 113-125

- Dasgupta, S.: *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Vols. I & II. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932.
- Das, Saroj Kumar: *A Study of Vedaanta*, (Sree Gopal Basumallik Fellowship Lectures for 1921), 2nd ed. Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1937.
- Datta, D.M.: "Some Realistic Aspects of the Philosophy of Shankara," *Recent Indian Philosophy* (papers selected from the proceedings of Indian Philosophical Congress 1925-1934), ed. Kalidas Bhattacharyya, Vol. I. Calcutta: Progressive Publishers, 1963.
- Deussen, Paul: *The System Of Vedaanta*, trans. Charles Johnson. Chicago: Open Court Publishing Co., 1912.
-: *The Philosophy of the Upanishads*, trans. Geden, A.S. New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1966.
- Deutsch, Eliot: *Advaita Vedaanta -- A Philosophical Reconstruction*, 2nd ed. Honolulu: The University press of Hawaii, 1962.
- Devaraja, N.K.: *An Introduction to Shankara's Theory of Knowledge*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1962.
- Guenon, Rene: *Man and His Becoming According to the Vedaanta*, trans. Richard Nicholson. London: Luzag & Co., 1945.
- Gupta, Anima Sen: "The Meaning of 'That thou art'," *Philosophy East and West*, Vol. XII, No.2, (1962) pp. 125-134.
- Iyer, K.A. Krishnaswami: *Vedaanta; The Science of Reality*. Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1930.
- Hume, R.E.: *The Thirteen Principal Upanishads*, 2nd ed. New York: Princeton University Press, 1973.
- Levy, John: *The Nature of Man According to Vedaanta*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1956.
-: *Immediate Knowledge and Happiness*. London: Thorsons Publishers Ltd., 1970.
- Mahadevan, T.M.P.: *Philosophy of Advaita*. London: Luznc & Company, 1938.
-: *Gaudapada: A Study of Early Advaita*. Madras: University of Madras, 1954.
- Malkani, G.R.: *A Study of Reality*. Bombay: The Modern Book Stall, 1927.
-: *Metaphysics of Advaita Vedaanta*. Amalner: The Indian Institute of Philosophy, 1961.
-: *Vedanatic Epistemology*. Amalner: The Indian Institute of Philosophy, 1953.
- Mueller, F. Max: *The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy*. London: Logmans, Green and Co., 1912.
- Murthy, K. Satchidananda: *Revelation and Reason in Advaita Vedaanta*. Waltair: Andhra University Press, 1959.
- Nihilandnda, Swami (trans.): *The Upanishads*, 4 Vols. London: Phoenix House, Vol.1 -1951; Vol.2-1954; Vol.3-1956; Vol.4-1958.
- Organ, Troy Wilson: *The Self in Indian Philosophy*. London: Mounton & Co., 1964.
- Prabhavananda, Swami: *The Spiritual Heritage of India*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1962.
- Radhakrishnan, S.: *Indian Philosophy*, Vols. 2, 2nd ed. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., , 1941.
- (ed.): *The Prinicpal Upanishads*, London: George Allen Unwin , 1953.
- and Moore, C.A. (eds.): *Source Book in Indian philosophy*, 5th printing. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1973.
- (trans.): *The Bhagavat Gita*, 2nd ed. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1949.

- Ramamurthi, A.: *Advaitic Mysticism of Shankara*. West Bengal: The Centre of Advanced Study in Philosophy, Vishva Bharati, Shantiniketan, 1974.
- Sastri, Kokileswar, *An Introduction to Advaita Philosophy*. Calcutta: University of Calcutta Press, 1926.
- Sinari, Ramkant A.: *The Structure of Indian Thought*. Illinois: Charles C. Thomas Publisher, 1970.
- Singh, Ram Pratab: *The Vedaanta of Shankara -- A Metaphysics of Value*, Vol.1. Jaipur: Bharat Publishing House, 1949.
- Sircar, Mahendranath: *Hindu Mysticism -- According to Upanishads*. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Turbner & Co., Ltd., 1934.
-: *Comparative Studies in Vedantism*. Bombay: Humphrey Milford, 1927.
-: *The System of Vedic Thought and Culture*. New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1987.
- Smart, Ninian: *Doctrine and Argumentation in Indian Philosophy*. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964.
- Smet, De, R.V.: *Theological Method of Shankara*, An unpublished dissertation submitted to the faculty of the Pontifical Gregorian University, Rome, for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 1953.
- Swabananda, Swami: *The Chaandogya Upanishad*. Madras: Sri Ramkrishana Math, 1975.
- Warrier, E.I.: *Sri Aurobindo's Integral Yoga and Shankara's Advaita*. India: Vohra Publishers, 1990.

2. Martin Heidegger:

2.1 Original Works of Martin Heidegger:

- Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. 4. Auflage. Pfullingen: Neske, 1977.
- Der Begriff der Zeit*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1989.
- Denkerfahrungen*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983.
- Einfuehrung in die Metaphysik*. 4. Auflage. Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 1976.
- Erlaeuterungen zu Hoelderlins Dichtung*. 5. Auflage. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1981.
- Der Feldweg*. 6. Auflage. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978.
- Die Frage nach dem Ding*. 2. Auflage. Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 1975.
- Fruehe Schriften*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972.
- Gelassenheit*. 6. Auflage. Pfullingen: Neske, 1979.
- Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik. Gesamtausgabe, Abt. II, Bd. 29/30*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983.
- Grundprobleme der Phaenomenologie. Gesamtausgabe, Abt. II, Bd. 24*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975.
- Habe des Hausfreunds*. 4. Auflage. Pfullingen: Neske, 1977.
- Heraklit. Gesamtausgabe, Abt. II, Bd. 55*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979.
- Holzwege*. 5. Auflage. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972.
- Identitaet und Differenz*. 6. Auflage. Pfullingen: Neske, 1978.
- Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. Bonn: Verlag Fred. Cohen, 1929.
- Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit. Gesamtausgabe, abt. II, Bd. 21*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976.

Metaphysische Anfangsgruende der Logic in Ausgang Von Leibniz. Gesamtausgabe, Abt. II, Bd. 26. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978.

Nietzsche, Bd. 1. Pfullingen: Neske, 1961.

Nietzsche, Bd. 2. Pfullingen: Neske, 1961.

"Nur noch ein Gott kann uns retten." *Der Spiegel*, 23 (1976): 193-219.

Parmenides. Gesamtausgabe, Abt. II, Bd. 5. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982.

Phaenomenologie und Theologie. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 11970.

Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs. Gesamtausgabe, Abt. II, Bd. 20. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1979.

Der Satz vom Grund. 5. Auflage. Pfullingen: Naske, 1978.

Sein und Zeit. 12. Auflage. Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 1972.

Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universitaet. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983.

Die Technik und die Kehre. 5. Auflage. Pfullingen: Neske, 1982.

Unterwegs zur sprache. 6. Auflage. Pfullingen: Neske, 1979.

Vier Seminare. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977.

Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie. Gesamtausgabe, Abt. II, Bd. 26. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1982.

Vom Wesen der Wahrheit. 5. Auflage. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967.

Vortraege und Aufsaezte. 4. Auflage. Pfullingen: Neske, 1978.

Was heisst Denken? 3. Auflage. Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 1971.

Was ist das -- die Philosophie? 5. Aiflage. Pfullingen: Neske, 1972.

Was ist Metaphysik? Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975.

Wegmarken. 3. Auflage. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978.

Zur Sache des Denkens. 2. Auflage. tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 1976.

Zur Seinsfrage. 3. Auflage. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1967.

2.2 English Translations:

The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indian University Press, 1982.

Basic Writings: From 'Being and Time' (1927) to 'The Task of Thinking' (1964), ed. D.F. Krell. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1978.

Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper and Row Publishers, 1962.

The Concept of Time, trans. Will McNeill. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992.

Discourse on Thinking, trans. J.M. Anderson and E.H. Freund. London: Harper Torchbooks, 1969.

Early Greek Thinking, trans. D.E. Krell and F.A. Capuzzi. New York: Harper and Row, 1975.

The End of Philosophy, trans. Joan Stambaugh. London: Souvnir Press, 1975.

The Essence of Reason, trans. Terrence Malick. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969.

Existence and Being, ed. Werner Brock. Indiana: Regnery/Gateway Inc., 1979.

German Existentialism, trans. D.D. Runes. New York: Philosophical Library, 1965.

Heraclitus Seminar, trans. C.H. Seibert. Alabama: University of Alabam Press, 1979.

History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena, trans. Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988.

Identity and Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper and Row, 1969.

An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim. London: Yale University Press, 1959.

Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, trans. J.S. Churchil. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.

The Metaphysical Foundation of Logic, trans. Michael Heim. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.

Nietzsche I: The Will to Power as Art, ed. & trans. David F. Krell. New York: Harper and Row, 1979.

Nietzsche II: The Eternal Recurrence of the Same, ed. & trans. David F. Krell. New York: Harper and Row, 1984.

Nietzsche III: The Will to Power as Knowledge and Metaphysics, ed. David F. Krell, trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper and Row, 1987.

Nietzsche IV: Nihilism, ed. David F. Krell, trans. Frank A. Capuzzi. New York: Harper and Row, 1982.

"Only a God Can Save Us, *Der Spiegel*'s Interview with Martin Heidegger," trans. W.J. Richardson. *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. Thomas Sheehan. Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1981, pp. 45-67.

On the Way to Language, trans. P.D. Hertz. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.

On Time and Being, trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

Parmenides, trans. Andre Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz. Blomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.

"The Pathway," trans. Thomas O'Meara. *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. Thomas Sheehan. Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1981, pp. 69-71.

Piety of Thinking, trans. J.C. Maraldo. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976.

Poetry, Language, Thought, trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.

"Postscript," trans. R.F.C. Hull and Allen Crick. *Existence and Being*, ed. Werner Brock. Indiana: Regnery/Gateway, 1973, pp. 349-361.

"Postscript." *Existentialism from Doistoevsky to Sartre*, ed. Walter Kaufmann. New York: New American Library, 1975, pp. 257-264.

The Principle of Reason, trans. Reginald Lilly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.

The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt. New York: Harper and Row, 1977.

The Question of Being, trans. J.T. Wilde and William Kluback. New Haven: College and University Press, 1958.

"A Recollection," trans. Hans Seigfried. *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. Thomas Sheehan. Chicago: Precedent Publishing Inc., 1981, pp. 21-22.

"The Self-assertion of the German University," trans. Kasten Harries. *Review of Metaphysics*, 38, No. 1, (1985): 470-480.

"The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," trans. Walter Kaufmann. *Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre*, ed. Walter Kaufmann. New York: New American Library, 1975, pp. 265-279.

What is a Thing?, trans. W.B. Barton, Jr. and Vera Deutsch. Indiana: Gateway Editions, 1967.

What is Called Thinking?, trans. J.G. Gray. New York: Harper and Row, 1968.

What is Philosophy?, trans. William Kluback and J.T. Wilde. London: Vision Press Ltd., 1956.

"Who Is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?," trans. B. Magnus, *Review of Metaphysics*, 20 (1966/1967): 411-431.

"Why Do I Stay in Provinces?," trans. Thomas Sheehan. *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. Thomas Sheehan. Chicago: Precedent Publishing Inc., 1981, pp. 27-30.

2.3 Studies on Heidegger:

2.3.1 Books:

- Astrada, Carlos et al., eds.: *Martin Heideggers Einfluss auf die Wissenschaften*. Bern: A. Francke A.G., 1949.
- Bailiff, John D.: *Coming To Be: An Interpretation of Self in the Thought of Martin Heidegger*. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1984.
- Ballard, E.G. and C.E. Scott, eds.: *Martin Heidegger: In Europe and America*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973.
- Barash, Jeffery A.: *Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Meaning*. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1988.
- Bernasconi, Robert: *Heidegger in Question: The Art of Existing*. New Jersey: Humanitas Press, 1993.
-: *The Question of Language in Heidegger's History of Being*. New Jersey: Humanitas Press, 1985.
- Biemel, Walter: *Martin Heidegger: An Illustrated Study*, trans. J.L. Mehta. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977.
- Brockelman, P.T.: *Existential Phenomenology and the World of Ordinary Experience*. U.S.A.: University Press of America, 1980.
- Burns, Gerald L.: *Heidegger's Estrangements: Language, Truth, and Poetry in the Later Writings*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989.
- Caletti, E.H.: *Bewegtheit und Rueckkehr: Perspektiven zu Heideggers Phaenomenologie des Daseins*. Rheinfelden: Schaeuble Verlag, 1986.
- Caputo, John D.: *Demythologizing Heidegger*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.
-: *The Mystical Element in Heidegger's Thought*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1978.
-: *Repetition, Deconstruction and the Hermeneutic Project*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987.
- Cousineau, Robert H.: *Humanism and Ethics: An Introduction to Heidegger's 'Letter on Humanism', with a Critical Bibliography*. Paris: Beatrice Nauwelaerts, 1972.
- Danner, Helmut: *Das Goettliche und der Gott bei Heidegger*. Meisenheim: Anton Hain, 1971.
- Deely, John N.: *The Tradition Via Heidegger: An Essay on the Meaning of Being in the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*. New York: Humanitas Press, 1972.
- Delp, Alfred: *Tragische Existenz: zur Philosophie Martin Heideggers*. Freiburg: Herder, 1935.
- Demske, James M.: *Being, Man and Death: A Key to Heidegger*. Kentucky: The University Press, 1970.
- Derrida, Jacques: *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991.
- Dreyfus, Hubert L.: *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1994.
- and John Harrison, eds.: *Heidegger: Critical Essays*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1992.
- Druckblicke: *Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1970.

- Edwards, Paul: *Heidegger on Death: A Critical Examination*. Illinois: The Hegeler Institute, 1979.
- Elliston, F., ed.: *Heidegger's Existential Analytic*. The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1978.
- Erinnerung am Martin Heideggers*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1977.
- Farias, Victor: *Heidegger and Nazism*. Pennsylvania: Temple University Press, 1989.
- Feick, Hilgard: *Index zu Heideggers Sein und Zeit*. Tuebingen: Max Niemeyer, 1961.
- Frings, Manfred S., ed.: *Heidegger and the Quest for Truth*. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968.
- Fynsk, Christopher: *Heidegger: Thought and Historicity*. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1986.
- Gadamer, Hans-Georg: *Heidegger's Ways*, trans. John W. Stanly. Albany: State University Press, 1994.
-: *Heideggers Wege*. Tuebingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1983.
- Gelven, Michael: *A Commentary on Heidegger's 'Being and Time': A Section-by-Section Interpretation*. New York: Harper and Row, 1970.
- George, Vensus A.: *From Being-in-the-World to Being-toward-Being: Martin Heidegger's Philosophy of the Authentic Human Person*. Nagpur: S. A. C. Publications, 1996.
- Gould, Carol C.: *Authenticity and Being-with-Others: A Critique of Heidegger's 'Sein und Zeit'*. London: Micro films International, 1977.
- Greisch, P.J.: *La Parole Heureuse: Martin Heidegger entre les choses et les mots*. Paris: Beauchesne, 1987.
- Grene, Majorie: *Martin Heidegger*. New York: Hillary House, 1957.
- Guignon, Charles B., ed.: *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
-: *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge*. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1983.
- Guzzoni, Ute, ed.: *Nachdenken ueber Heidegger*. Hildesheim: Gersternberg Verlag, 1980.
- Haeffner, Gerd: *Heideggers Begriff der Metaphysik*. Muenchen: Berchmanskolleg, 1974.
- Halliburton, David: *Poetic Thinking: An Approach to Heidegger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.
- Heidemann, Ingeborg: *Der Begriff des Spieles*. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1968.
- Hoberg, C.A.: *Das Daseins des Menschen: Die Grundfrage der Heideggerschen Philosophie*. Zeulunroda: Vernhard Spron Verlag, 1937.
- Hodge, Joanna: *Heidegger and Ethics*. London: Routledge, 1995.
- Ihde, Don: *Hermeneutic Philosophy*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971.
- Jaeger, Alfred: *Gott nochmals Martin Heideggers*. Tuebingen: Mohr, 1978.
- King, Magda: *Heidegger's Philosophy: A Guide to his Basic Thought*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1969.
- Kockelmans, Joseph J.: *Heidegger on Art and Art Works*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985.
-: *Martin Heidegger: A First Introduction to his Philosophy*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1965.
-: *On Heidegger and Language*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972.
-: *On the Truth of Being: Reflections on Heidegger's Later Philosophy*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.
- Kovack, George: *The Question of God in Heidegger's Phenomenology*. Evanston: NUP, 1990.
- Krell, D.F.: *Intimations of Mortality: Time, Truth and Finitude in Heidegger's Thinking of Being*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University, 1986.

- Kurien, James: *On the Kehre in Heidegger's Thinking: An Interpretative Analysis*. Pondicherry: Pondicherry University, Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, 1994.
- Langan, Thomas: *The Meaning of Heidegger: A Critical Study of an Existentialist Phenomenology*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1959.
- Loscerbo, John: *Being and Technology: A Study in the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981.
- Loweith, Karl: *Heidegger: Denker in duerftiger Zeit*. Gottingen: Vendenhock and Ruprecht, 1960.
- Luegenbiehl, Heinz C.: *The Essence of Man: An Approach to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*. Ann Arbor: Microfilms, 1979.
- Luijpen, W.A.: *Phenomenology and Humanism: A Primer in Existential Phenomenology*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1966.
- Macaun, Christopher, ed.: *Martin Heidegger: Critical Assessments*. 4 Vols. London: Routledge, 1992.
- Macomber, W.B.: *The Anatomy of Disillusion: Martin Heidegger's Notion of Truth*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1970.
- Macquarrie, John: *Martin Heidegger*. London: Lutherworth Press, 1968.
- Magnus, Bernd: *Heidegger's Metahistory of Philosophy: Amor Fati, Being and Truth*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.
- Manikath, Joseph: *From Anxiety to Releasement: In Martin Heidegger's Thought*. Bangalore: A.T.C., 1978.
- Martin Heidegger; Fragen an sein Werk: Ein Symposium*. Stuttgart: Reclam, 1977.
- Martin Heidegger zum Siebzigsten Geburtstag: Festschrift*. Pfullingen, Neske, 1959.
- Martin Heidegger zum 80. Geburtstag: Von seiner Heimatstadt Messkirch*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1969.
- Marx, Werner: *Heidegger and the Tradition*, trans. Theodore Kisiel and Murray Greene. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971.
-: *Heidegger und die Tradition*. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhamme Verlag, 1961.
-, ed.: *Heidegger Memorial Lectures*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1982.
- McCormick, P.J.: *Heidegger and the Language of the World: An Argumentative Reading of the Late Heidegger's Meditations on Language*. Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press, 1976.
- McDaniel, Jay B.: *Earth, Sky, Gods and Mortals: Developing an Ecological Spirituality*. Connecticut: Twenty-third Publications, 1990.
- McWhorter, Ladelle: *Heidegger and the Earth: Issues in Environmental Philosophy*. Kirksland: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1990.
- Mehta, J.L.: *Martin Heidegger: The Way and the Vision*. Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii, 1976.
-: *The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*. Varanasi: Banaras Hindu University Press, 1967.
- Moehling, Karl: *Martin Heidegger and the Nazi Party: An Examination*. North Illinois University: An unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 1972.
- Murray, Michael, ed.: *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy: Critical Essays*. London: Yale University Press, 1978.
- Neske, Guenther and Emil Kettering, eds.: *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers*, trans. Liza Harries. New York: Paragan House, 1990.
- Okrent, Mark: *Heidegger's Pragmatism: Understanding, Being and the Critique of Metaphysics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988.

- Olafson, F.A.: *Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind*. London: Yale University Press, 1987.
- Ott, Hugo: *Martin Heidegger: A Political Life*, trans. Allen Blunden. London: Basic Books, 1993.
-: *Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie*. Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 1988.
- Perotti, J.L.: *Heidegger on the Divine: The Thinker, the Poet and God*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974.
- Powell, R.A.: *Heidegger's Retreat from the Transcendental Structure of Dasein*. Chicago: St. Xavier College Press, 1966.
- Poeggeler, Otto: *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1983.
-: *Heidegger: Perspektiven zur Deutung seines Werks*. Kiepenhauer and Witsch, 1969.
-: *Heidegger und die hermeneutische Philosophie*. Freiburg: Karl Aber, 1983.
-: *Philosophie und Politik bei Heidegger*. Freiburg: Karl Aber, 1972.
-: *Philosophie und Nationalsozialismus am Beispiel Heidegger*. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1990.
- Puthenpurackal, Johnson J.: *Heidegger: Through Authentic Totality to Total Authenticity*. Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987.
- Regvald, Richard: *Heidegger et le probleme du neant*. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1987.
- Richardson, John: *Existential Phenomenology: A Heideggerian Critique of Cartesian Project*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986.
- Richardson, William J.: *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974.
- Rockmore, Tom and Joseph Margolis, eds.: *The Heidegger Case: On Philosophy and Politics*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1992.
-: *On Heidegger's Nazism and Philosophy*. Brighton: Harvester, 1992.
- Rukavina, T.F.: *Heidegger as a Critic of Western Thinking*. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms, 1977.
- Salis, John: *The Concept of the World: A Study in the Phenomenological Ontology of Martin Heidegger*. Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1977.
-: *Echoes: After Heidegger*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990.
-, ed.: *Heidegger and the Path of Thinking*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1970.
-, ed.: *Radical Phenomenology: Essays in Memory of Martin Heidegger*. New Jersey: Humanitas Press, 1978.
-, ed.: *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993.
- Schmitt, Richard: *Martin Heidegger: On Being Human: An Introduction to 'Sein und Zeit'*. New York: Random House Inc., 1976.
- Schneeberger, G.: *Nachlasse zu Heidegger: Dokumente zu seinem Leben und Denken*. Basel: Auktor, 1962.
- Schrag, Calvin O.: *Existence and Freedom: Toward an Ontology of Human Finitude*. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1961.
- Schuerman, Rainer: *Heidegger: From Principles to Anarchy*, trans. Christine Marie-Gros. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987.
- Schwann, Alexander: *Politische Philosophie im Denken Heideggers*. Koeln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1965.
- Shahan, R.W. and J.N. Mohanty, eds.: *Thinking about Being: Aspects of Heidegger's Thought*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1984.

- Sheehan, Thomas, ed.: *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*. Chicago: Precedent Publishing Inc., 1981.
- Skirbekk, Gunnar: *Truth and Preconditions Approached Via an Analysis of Heidegger*. Bergen: Verlag Universitati Bergen, 1972.
- Spanos, W.V., ed.: *Martin Heidegger and the Question of Literature: Towards a Post-modern Literary Hermeneutics*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1979.
- Stassen, Manfred: *Heideggers Philosophie der Sprache in Sein und Zeit*. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1973.
- Steiner, George: *Heidegger*. London: Fontana, 1978.
- Sternberger, Adof: *Der Verstandene Tod: Eine Untersuchung zu Martin Heideggers Existenzialontologie*. Leipzig: S. Hirzel, 1934.
- Sulga, Hans: *Heidegger's Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993.
- Taminiaux, Jacques: *Heidegger and the Project of Fundamental Ontology*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991.
- Toussaint, B.J.: *The Interpretation of Self in the Early Heidegger*. Ann Arbor: University Microfilms International, 1977.
- Vadakethala, F.J.: *Discovery of Being*. Bangalore: Dharmaram College, 1970.
- Vail, L.M.: *Heidegger and the Ontological Difference*. Pennsylvania: State University Press, 1972.
- Versenyi, Laszo: *Heidegger, Being and Truth*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965.
- Von Hermann, W.F.: *Die Selbsinterpretation Martin Heideggers*. Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1964.
-: *Subjekt und Dasein*. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1974.
- Vycinas, Vincent: *Earth and Gods: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1961.
- Waterhouse, Roger: *A Heidegger Critique: A Critical Examination of the Existential Phenomenology of Martin Heidegger*. New Jersey: Humanitas Press, 1981.
- Weber, Renee O.: *Individual and Social Being in Heidegger's 'Being and Time'*. Michigan: University Microfilms, 1977.
- William, John R.: *Martin Heidegger's Philosophy of Religion*. Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1977.
- Wisser, Richard: *Martin Heidegger in Gespraech*. Freiburg: Karl Aber, 1969.
- Wolin, Richard, ed.: *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*. 2nd ed. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993.
- Wood, David, ed.: *Heidegger and Language: A Collection of Original Papers*. Coventry: Parousia Press, 1981.
- Zimmermann, Michael E.: *Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger's Concept of Authenticity*. London: Ohio University Press, 1981.
-: *Heidegger, Modernity, Technology*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991.
-: *Heidegger's Confrontation with Modernity: Technology, Politics and Art*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1990.
- Zum Gedenken an Martin Heidegger 1889-1976*. Stadt Messkirch, 1977.

2.3.2 Articles

- Adamchzewski, Z.: "Martin Heidegger and Man's Way To Be." *Man and World*, 1 (1968): 363-379.
- Alderman, H.G.: "Heidegger: Necessity and Structure of the Question of Being." *Philosophy Today*, 14 (1970): 141-147.
-: "Heidegger's Critique of Science." *Personalist*, 50 (1969): 549-558.
-: "Heidegger on Being Human." *Philosophy Today*, 15 (1971): 16-29.
-: "Technology as a Phenomenon." *Personalist*, 51 (1970): 535-545.
- Allers, Rudolf: "The Meaning of Heidegger." *New Scholasticism*, 36 (1962): 445-474.
- Anderson, J.M.: "On Heidegger's Gelassenheit: A Study of the Nature of Thought." *Journal of Existentialism*, 5 (1964/65): 339-351.
- Bartky, S.L.: "Heidegger and the Modes of World-disclosure." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 40 (1979): 212-236.
-: "Originative Thinking in the Later Philosophy of Heidegger." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 30 (1969/1970): 368-381.
-: "Seinverlassenheit in the Later Philosophy of Martin Heidegger." *Inquiry*, 10 (1967): 74-88.
- Biemel, Walter: "Heidegger's Begriff des Daseins." *Studia Catholica*, 24 (1949): 113-129.
- Bixler, J.S.: "The Failure of Martin Heidegger." *Harvard Theological Review*, 56 (1963): 121-143.
- Boelen, B.J.: "Heidegger as a Phenomenologist." *Phenomenological Perspectives*, ed. P.J. Bossert. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975, pp. 93-114.
- Borgmann, Albert: "Cosmopolitanism and Provincialism: On Heidegger's Errors and Insights." *Philosophy Today*, 36, No.2 (1992): 131-146.
-: "The Formation of Heidegger's Thought." *Personalist*, 47 (1966): 484-499.
-: "Philosophy and the Concern for Man." *Philosophy Today*, 10 (1966): 236-246.
-: "The Question of Heidegger and Technology: A Critical Review of Literature." *Philosophy Today*, 31 (1987): 99-185.
-: "The Transformation of Heidegger's Philosophy." *Journal of Existentialism*, 6 (1966/67): 161-180.
- Breton, S.: "From Phenomenology to Ontology." *Philosophy Today*, 4 (1960): 227-237.
- Bruin, John: "Why Heidegger's God Might Not Be Worth the Wait?" *Modern Schoolman*, LXX, No.2 (1993): 143-152.
- Buchanan, James: "Heidegger and the Problem of Ground." *Philosophy Today*, 17, (1973): 232-245.
- Bukala, C.R.: "Heidegger Plus: A Dialogue of Living-Dying-Living." *Philosophy Today*, 27 (1983): 154-168.
- Buren, Edward J. van: "The Young Heidegger: Rumour of a Hidden King (1919-1926)." *Philosophy Today*, 33 (1989): 99-108.
- Camele, A.M.: "Heideggerian Ethics." *Philosophy Today*, 21 (1977): 284-293.
-: "Martin Heidegger and the Meaning of Man." *Listening*, 1 (1966): 140-149.
- Caputo, J.D.: "Demythologizing Heidegger: Aletheia and the History of Being." *Review of Metaphysics*, 41 (1988): 519-546.
-: "Heidegger's God and the Lord of History." *New Scholasticism*, 57 (1983): 439-464.
-: "Heidegger's Original Ethics." *New Scholasticism*, 45 (1971): 127-138.
-: "Incarnation and Essentialization: A Reading of Heidegger." *Philosophy Today*, 35, No. 1 (1991): 32-42.

-: "Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction and Hermeneutic Project." *Philosophy Today*, 30 (1986): 271-277.
-: "The Rose Is Without Why: The Later Heidegger." *Philosophy Today*, 15 (1971): 3-15.
-: "Time and Being in Heidegger." *Modern Schoolman*, 50 (1973): 325-350.
- Casenave, G.: "Heidegger on Metaphor." *Philosophy Today*, 26 (1982): 140-147.
- Cerf, Walter H.: "An Approach to Heidegger's Ontology." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 1 (1940/41): 177-190.
- Coreth, Emerich: "From Hermeneutics to Metaphysics." *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 11 (1971): 249-259.
- Cress, Donald W.: "Heidegger's Criticism of 'Entitative Metaphysics' in His Later Thought." *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 12 (1972): 69-86.
- Curtin, J.C.: "Death and Presence: Martin Heidegger." *Philosophy Today*, 20 (1976): 262-266.
- Dahlstrom, D.: "Heidegger's Last Word." *Review of Metaphysics*, 41 (1988): 589-606.
- Dauenhaur, B.P.: "An Approach to Heidegger's Way of Philosophizing." *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 9 (1971): 265-275.
-: "Heidegger: The Spokesman for the Dweller." *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 15 (1977): 189-199.
-: "Renovating the Problem of Politics." *Review of Metaphysics*, 39 (1976): 626-641.
- DeGennaro, A.A.: "Heidegger's Vision of the Human." *Christian Century*, 93, July 7, 1976: 620.
- De Kuyer, K.: "The Problem of Ground in the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger." *Thomist*, 47 (1983): 100-117.
- Demske, J.M.: "Heidegger's Quartrate and the Revelation of Being." *Philosophy Today*, 7 (1963): 245-257.
-: "Martin Heidegger at 86." *America*, 134, March 13, 1976: 206-207.
- De Wealhens, A.: "Reflections on Heidegger's Development." *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 5 (1965): 475-502.
- De Walter, L.V.: "Being and Being Human: An Impasse in Heidegger's Thought?." *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 13 (1973): 391-402.
- Dostal, R.J.: "The Problem of 'indifference' in Sein und Zeit." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 43 (1982/83): 43-58.
-: "The Public and the People: Heidegger's Liberal Politics." *Review of Metaphysics*, 47, No. 1 (1994): 527-557.
- Douglas, G.H.: "Heidegger's Notion of Poetic Truth." *Personalist*, 47 (1966): 500-508.
- Driscoll, Giles: "Heidegger: A Response to Nihilism." *Philosophy Today*, 11 (1967): 17-37.
-: "Heidegger's Ethical Monism." *New Scholasticism*, 42 (1968): 497-510.
- Edwards, Paul: "Heidegger and Death: A Deflationary Critique." *Monist*, 59 (1976): 161-186.
-: "Heidegger and Death as a Possibility." *Mind*, 84 (1975): 548-566.
- Erickson, S.A.: "Martin Heidegger." *Review of Metaphysics*, 9 (1966): 462-492.
- Farwell, Paul: "Can Heidegger's Craftsman Be Authentic." *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 29 (1989): 77-90.
- Fay, T.A.: "Heidegger on Logic: A Genetic Study of His Thought on Logic." *Journal of History of Philosophy*, 12 (1974): 77-94.
-: "Heidegger: Thinking as Noein." *Modern Schoolman*, 51 (1973): 17-28.
- Fink, Eugen: "The Ontology of Play." *Philosophy Today*, 4 (1960): 95-109.
- Freund, E.H.: "Man's Fall in Heidegger's Philosophy." *Journal of Religion*, 24 (1944): 180-187.

- Frings, M.S.: "Is There Room for Evil in Heidegger's Thought or Not?." *Philosophy Today*, 32 (1988): 79-92.
- Fulton, J.S.: "The Event of Being." *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 6 (1975): 7-13.
- Gerber, R.J.: "Focal Points in Recent Heidegger Scholarship." *New Scholasticism*, 42 (1968): 561-577.
-: "Heidegger: Thinking and Thanking of Being." *Modern Schoolman*, 44 (1966/67): 205-222.
- Globus, G.G.: "Heidegger and the Cognitive Science." *Philosophy Today*, 34 (1990): 20-29.
- Gray, G.J.: "Martin Heidegger: On Anticipating My Own Death." *Personalist*, 46 (1965): 439-458.
-: "Heidegger on Remembering and Remembering Heidegger." *Man and World*, 10 (1977): 62-78.
-: "Heidegger's Being." *Journal of Philosophy*, 49 (1952): 415-422.
-: "Heidegger's Course: From Human Existence to Nature." *Journal of Philosophy*, 54 (1975): 197-207.
-: "The New Image of Man in Martin Heidegger's Philosophy." *European Philosophy Today*, ed. T. Kline. New York: Quadrangle, 1965, pp. 31-60.
-: "Splendour of the Simple." *Philosophy East and West*, 20 (1970): 227-240.
- Grene, Majorie: "Heidegger: Philosopher and Prophet." *Twentieth Century*, 164 (1958): 545-555.
- Grimm, R.H.: "Introduction: Being as Appropriation." *Philosophy Today*, 19 (1975): 146-151.
- Groth, H.M.: "On the Fundamental Experience of Voice in Language with Some Notes on Heidegger." *Philosophy Today*, 25 (1981): 139-147.
- Gruender, Karlfried: "Heidegger's Critique of Science in Its Historical Background." *Philosophy Today*, 7 (1963): 15-32.
- Guzzoni, Alfredo: "Ontologische Differenz und Nichts." *Martin Heidegger: Zum Siebzgsten Geburtstag*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1959, pp. 35-48.
- Harries, K, "Fundamental Ontology and the Search for Man's Place." *Heidegger and Modern Philosophy*, ed. Michael Murray. London: Yale University Press, 1978, pp. 65-79.
-: "Heidegger as a Political Thinker." *Review of Metaphysics*, 29 (1976): 642-669.
-: "Heidegger's Concept of the Holy." *Personalist*, 47 (1966): 169-184.
- Hasselt, J.D.: "Heidegger, Being and a World in Turmoil." *Thought*, 36 (1961): 537-554.
- Hatab, L.: "Rejoining Aletheia and Truth: Or Truth is a Five-letter Word." *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 30 (1990): 431-448.
- Hinners, R.C.: "The Freedom and Finiteness of Existence in Heidegger." *New Scholasticism*, 33 (1959): 32-48.
- and G. Lauer: "Being and God in Heidegger's Philosophy." *Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association*, 31 (1975): 157-165.
- Hirsch, E.F.: "The Problem of Speech in Being and Time." *Heidegger's Existential Analytic*, ed. F. Elliston. The Hague: Mouton Publishers, 1978, pp. 151-178.
-: "Remembrance of Martin Heidegger in Marburg." *Philosophy Today*, 23 (1979): 160-169.
- Hodge, Joanna: "Heidegger, Early and Late: The Vanishing of the Subject." *Journal of British Society for Phenomenology*, 25, No. 3 (1994): 288-301.
- Hofstadter, A.: "Truth of Being." *Journal of Philosophy*, 62 (1965): 167-183.
- Hornedo, F.H.: "Truth, Men and Martin Heidegger." *St. Louis University Research Journal*, 2 (1971): 1-18.

- Hossfeld, P.: "Das Sein in Heideggers Spaetern Schriften und Gott." *Theologie und Glaube*, 54 (1964): 332-344.
- Jaspers, Karl: "On Heidegger," trans. D.L. Ponikvar. *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal*, 7 (1978): 107-128.
- Jung, H.Y.: "Heidegger and the Homecoming of Oral Poetry." *Philosophy Today*, 26 (1982): 148-170.
- Karsten, Harries, trans.: "The Rectorate 1933/34: Facts and Thoughts." *Review of Metaphysics*, 38, No. 1 (1985): 481-502.
- Kisiel, Theodore: "A Diagrammatic Approach to Heidegger's Schematism of Existence." *Philosophy Today*, 28 (1984): 229-241.
-: "Professor Seigfried's Misreading of My Diagram and Its Sources." *Philosophy Today*, 30 (1986): 73-83.
- Kocklmans, J.J.: "Heidegger on Time and Being." *Martin Heidegger: In Europe and America*, ed. E.G. Barllard, and C.E. Scott. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, pp. 55-76.
-: "Language, Meaning and Ek-sistence." *Phenomenology in Perspective*, ed. F. Smith. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973, pp. 94-121.
-: "Thanksgiving: The Completion of Thought." *Heidegger and the Quest for Truth*, ed. M. Frings. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968, pp. 163-183.
- Koenker, E.B.: "The Being of the Material and the Immaterial in Heidegger's Thought." *Philosophy Today*, 24 (1980): 54-61.
- Krell, D.F.: "Being and Truth, Being and Time." *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 6 (1976): 151-166.
-: "Towards an Ontology of Play." *Research in Phenomenology*, 2 (1972): 63-94.
-: "Work Sessions with Martin Heidegger." *Philosophy Today*, 26 (1982): 126-139.
- Kroner, R.J.: "Heidegger's Private Religion." *Union Seminary Quarterly Review*, 11 (1956): 23-27.
- Kuyer, kees de: "The Problem of Ground in the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger." *Thomist*, 47 (1983): 100-117.
- Langan, Thomas: "Transcendence in the Philosophy of Heidegger." *New Scholasticism*, 32 (1958): 45-60.
- Lawler, James: "Heidegger's Theory of Metaphysics and Dialectics." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 35 (1974/75): 363-375.
- Levin, D.M.: "On Heidegger: The Gathering Dance of Mortals." *Research in Phenomenology*, 10 (1980): 251-277.
- Levinas, Emmanuel: "Is Ontology Fundamental?." *Philosophy Today*, 33 (1989): 121-129.
- Liambias, de Azvedo J.: "Der Alte und der Neue Heidegger." *Philosophisches Jahrbuch*, 60 (1950): 161-167.
- Lovitt, William: "A Gespraech with Heidegger on Technology." *Man and World*, 6 (1973): 44-62.
- Loewith, Karl: "The Nature of Man and the World of Nature: For Heidegger's 80th Birthday." *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 8 (1970): 309-318.
- Luijpen, Williams: "Heidegger and Affirmation of God." *Doctor Communis*, 18 (1965): 303-310.
- Macquarrie, John: "Heidegger's Earlier and Later Works Compared." *Anglican Theological Review*, 49 (1967): 3-16.
- Magnus, Bernd: "Heidegger and the Truth of Being." *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 4 (1964): 245-264.

- Maly, Kenneth: "Towards Ereignis: An Initiatory Thinking through of the Granting in Heidegger's Essay 'Zeit und Sein'." *Research in Phenomenology*, 3 (1973) 63-93.
- Marx, Werner: "Heidegger's New Conception of Philosophy: The Second Phase of Existentialism." *Social Research*, 22 (1955): 450-474.
- McCormick, P.: "Heidegger and the Philosophy of Mind." *Philosophy Today*, 24 (1980): 153-160.
-: "Interpreting the Later Heidegger." *Philosophical Studies*, 19 (1970): 83-101.
-: "A Note on 'Time and Being'." *Philosophy Today*, 19 (1975): 95-99.
- McGinley, John: "The Essential Thrust of Heidegger's Thought." *Philosophy Today*, 15 (1971): 242-249.
-: "Heidegger's Concern for the Lived-World in His Dasein Analysis." *Philosophy Today*, 16 (1972): 92-116.
- McNeil, William: "On the Concreteness of Heidegger's Thinking." *Philosophy Today*, 36, No. 1 (1992): 83-94.
- McNicholl, A.: "Heidegger: Problem and Pre-grasp." *Irish Theological Quarterly*, 44 (1977): 208-231.
- Mehta, J.L.: "A Western Kind of Rishi." *Erinnerung an Martin Heideggers*. Pfullingen: Neske, 1977, pp. 165-171.
- Moehling, K.A.: "Heidegger and the Nazis." *Listening*, 12 (1977): 92-105.
- Moore, A.: "Existential Phenomenology." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 27 (1967): 408-414.
- Morritson, W.: "Heidegger on the World." *Man and World*, 5 (1972): 452-466.
- Naber, A.: "Wahrheit und Seinsdenken bei Martin Heidegger." *Analecta Gregoriana*, 67 (1954): 45-58.
- Nicholson, G.: "The Commune of Being and Time." *Dialogue*, 10 (1971): 708-726.
-: "Heidegger on Thinking." *Journal of the History of Philosophy*, 13 (1975): 491-503.
-: "The Meaning of the Word 'Being': Presence and Absence." *Heidegger's Existential Analytic*, ed. F. Elliston. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978, pp. 179-194.
- Nuyen, A.J.: "Heideggerian Existential Ethics for Human Environment." *The Journal of Value Inquiry*, 25, No. 4 (1991): 359-366.
- Nwodo, C.: "The Role of Art in Heidegger's Philosophy." *Philosophy Today*, 21 (1977): 294-304.
- O'Mahony, B.: "Martin Heidegger's Existential Analysis of Death." *Philosophical Studies*, 18 (1969): 58-75.
- O'Meara, T.F.: "Heidegger on God." *Continuum*, 5 (1967/68): 686-698.
- Pflaumer, R.: "Sein und Mensch im Denken Heidegger." *Philosophische Rundschau*, 13 (1965/66): 161-234.
- Platt, David: "The Seashore as a Dwelling in the Fourfold: An Ontic Explanation of Heidegger." *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 25 (1985): 173-184.
- Poeggeler, Otto: "Being as Appropriation," trans. R.H. Grimm. *Philosophy Today*, 19 (1975): 152-178.
-: "Heidegger Today," trans. R.P. O'Hara. *The Southern Journal of Philosophy*, 7 (1970): 273-308.
-: "Heideggers Topologie des Seins." *Man and World*, 2 (1969): 331-357.
-: "Metaphysik und Seinstopic bei Heidegger." *Philosophische Jahrbuch*, 70 (1962): 118-137.

-: "Zum Tode Martin Heideggers." *Research in Phenomenology*, 7 (1977): 31-42.
- Powell, Ralph: "Has Heidegger Destroyed Metaphysics?." *Listening*, 2 (1967): 52-59.
-: "The Later Heidegger's Omission of Ontic-ontological Structure of Dasein." *Heidegger and the Path of Thinking*, ed. J. Sails. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1970, pp. 116-137.
- Prufer, T.: "Martin Heidegger: Dasein and the Ontological Status of the Philosophical Discourse." *Twentieth Century Thinkers*, ed. J.K. Ryan. Staten Island: Alba House, 1965, pp. 159-173.
- Rahner, Karl: "The Concept of Existential Philosophy in Heidegger." *Philosophy Today*, 13 (1969): 126-137.
- Richardson, W.J.: "Heidegger and the Problem of Thought." *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, 60 (1962): 58-78.
-: "Heidegger's Critique of Science." *New Scholasticism*, 42 (1968): 511-536.
- Rintelen, F.J. von: "The Existentialism of Martin Heidegger." *Personalist*, 38 (1957): 238-247; 376-382.
- Rohatyn, Dennis: "An Introduction to Heidegger: Truth and Being." *Sapienza*, 28 (1975): 211-218.
- Rollin, B.E.: "Heidegger's Philosophy of History in Being and Time." *Modern Schoolman*, 49 (1972): 97-112.
- Rombach, H.: "Reflections on Heidegger's Lecture 'Time and Being'." *Philosophy Today*, 10 (1966): 19-29.
- Roempp, G.: "Truth and Interpersonality: An Inquiry into the Argumentative Structure of Heidegger's Being and Time." *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 29 (1989): 429-447.
- Rosentine, Leon: "Heidegger and Plato and the Good," *Philosophy Today*, 22 (1978): 332-354.
- Rukavina, T.F.: "Being and Things in Heidegger's Philosophy: A Rejoinder." *New Scholasticism*, 33 (1959): 184-201.
-: "Heidegger's Theory of Being." *New Scholasticism*, 40 (1966): 423-446.
- Ryle, Gilbert: "Martin Heidegger: 'Sein und Zeit'." *Journal of British Society for Phenomenology*, 1 (1970): 3-13.
- Sabatino, C.J.: "Heidegger's Commentary: Faith and Human Meaning." *Listening*, 10 (1975): 51-58.
- Salis, J.G.: "World, Finitude and Temporality in the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger." *Philosophy Today*, 9 (1965): 40-51.
- Sapontzis, S.F.: "Community in Being and Time." *Kant Studies*, 69 (1978): 330-340.
- Schalow, F.: "Is There a 'Meaning' of Being?. Against the Deconstructionist Reading of Heidegger." *Philosophy Today*, 34 (1990): 152-162.
- Schmitt, R.: "Heidegger's Analysis of Tool." *Monist*, 49 (1965): 70-86.
- Schoenborn, A. von: "Heideggerian Everydayness." *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 3 (1972): 103-110.
- Schrader, G.A.: "Heidegger's Ontology of Human Existence." *Review of Metaphysics*, 10 (1956): 35-56.
- Schrag, C.O.: "Heidegger on Repetition and Historical Understanding." *Philosophy East and West*, 20 (1970): 287-295.
-: "Time and Being in Heidegger." *Modern Schoolman*, 50 (1973): 325-349.
- Schuermann, R.: "Political Thinking in Heidegger." *Social Research*, 45 (1978): 191-221.

-: "Principles Precarious: The Origin of the Political in Heidegger." *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. Thomas Sheehan. Chicago: Precedent Publishing Inc., pp. 245-255.
- Scott, C.E.: "Dasein Analysis: An Interpretation." *Philosophy Today*, 19 (1975): 182-197.
-: "Heidegger: The Absence of God and Faith." *Journal of Religion*, 46 (1966): 365-373.
-: "Heidegger's Attempt to Communicate a Mystery." *Philosophy Today*, 10 (1966): 132-141.
- Sefler, G.F.: "Heidegger's Philosophy of Space." *Philosophy Today*, 17 (1973): 246-254.
- Seidel, G.J.: "Heidegger: Philosopher for the Ecologists?." *Man and World*, 4 (1971): 93-99.
- Seigfried, Hans: "Heidegger's Longest Day: Being and Time and the Sciences." *Philosophy Today*, 22 (1978): 319-331.
-: "Professor Kisiel's Drawing of Heidegger's Schematism of Existence." *Philosophy Today*, 30 (1986): 66-71.
- Shapiro, Joel B.: "Heidegger's Virtue is Knowledge: Being-with and Solitude in §26 of *Being and Time*." *Philosophy Today*, 38, No. 4 (1994): 400-418.
- Sheehan, T.J.: "Heidegger and the Nazis." *New York Review of Books*, 15th June, 1988, pp. 38-47.
-: "Heidegger's Early Years: Fragments for a Philosophical Biography." *Listening*, 13 (1977): 3-20.
-: "Heidegger's Introduction to Phenomenology of Religion, 1920-21." *Personalist*, 60 (1979): 312-324.
- Smith, C.P.: "Heidegger's Critique of Absolute Knowledge." *New Scholasticism*, 45 (1971): 56-86.
- Smith, F.J.: "Meaning of the 'Way' in Heidegger." *American Church Quarterly*, 3 (1962): 89-102.
-: "A Critique of Martin Heidegger." *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 4 (1973): 137-156.
-: "Two Heideggerian Analyses." *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 8 (1970): 409-421.
- Smith, Q.: "On Heidegger's Theory of Moods." *Modern Schoolman*, 58 (1981): 211-236.
- Smith, V.E.: "Heidegger's Return to Being." *Ideal Men of Today*, by V.E. Smith. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1950, pp. 265-287.
- Soeder, Hans-Peter: "National Socialism in the History of Being? A Discussion of Some Aspects of the Recent l'Affaire Heidegger." *Philosophy Today*, 33 (1989): 109-120.
- Stack, G.J.: "The Being of the Work of Art in Heidegger." *Philosophy Today*, 13 (1969): 159-173.
-: "Heidegger's Concept of Meaning." *Philosophy Today*, 17 (1973): 255-265.
- Stambaugh, J.: "A Heidegger Primer." *Philosophy Today*, 19 (1975): 79-86.
- Stephan, Watson: "Heidegger: Rationality and Critique of Judgement." *Review of Metaphysics*, 41 (1988): 461-500.
- Stern, G.: "The Pseudo-concreteness of Heidegger's Philosophy." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 8 (1947/48): 337-371.
- Strasser, S.: "The Concept of Dread in the Philosophy of Martin Heidegger." *Modern Schoolman*, 35 (1957/58): 1-20.
- Turnbull, R.G.: "Heidegger on the Nature of Truth." *Journal of Philosophy*, 54 (1957): 559-565.
- Tyman, S.: "Heidegger and the Deconstruction of Foundations." *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 24 (1984): 347-372.
-: "Mysticism and Gnosticism in Heidegger." *Philosophy Today*, 28 (1984): 358-371.

- Vallicella, W.F.: "Heidegger and the Problem of Thing in Itself." *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 23 (1983): 35-44.
-: "Problem of Being in Early Heidegger." *Thomist*, 45 (1981): 388-406.
-: "Reply to Zimmermann: Heidegger and the Problem of Being." *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 30 (1990): 245-254.
- Versenyi, L.: "The Quarrel between Philosophy and Poetry." *Philosophical Forum*, 2 (1970/71): 200-201.
- Vietta, E.: "Being, World and Understanding: A Commentary on Heidegger." *Review of Metaphysics*, 5 (1951): 157-172.
- Water, Lambert Van de: "Being and Being Human: An Impasse in Heidegger?." *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 13 (1973): 391-402.
- Watson, J.R.: "Being-there: The Neighborhood of Being." *Philosophy Today*, 19 (1975): 118-130.
-: "Heidegger's Hermeneutic Phenomenology." *Philosophy Today*, 15 (1971): 30-43.
- Weber, R.O.: "A Critique of Heidegger's Concept of Solitude." *New Scholasticism*, 42 (1968): 537-560.
- Welte, B.: "God in Heidegger's Thought." *Philosophy Today*, 26 (1982): 85-100.
- Werkmeister, W.H.: "An Introduction to Heidegger's Existential Philosophy." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 2 (1941/42): 79-87.
- White, C.J.: "Dasein, Existence and Death." *Philosophy Today*, 28 (1984): 52-65.
- Wild, John: "An English Version of Martin Heidegger's Being and Time." *Review of Metaphysics*, 16 (1962/63): 296-315.
-: "Being and Time: A Reply." *Review of Metaphysics*, 17 (1964): 610-616.
-: "The Philosophy of Martin Heidegger." *Journal of Philosophy*, 60 (1963): 664-677.
- Wolin, Richard: "Recent Revelation Concerning Martin Heidegger and National Socialism." *Theory, Culture & Society*, 7, No. 1 (1990): 73-96.
- Wren, T.E.: "Heidegger's Philosophy of History." *Journal of the Society for Phenomenology*, 9 (1978): 126-130.
- Wyschogord, M.: "Heidegger's Ontology and Human Existence." *Diseases of Nervous System*, 22 (1961): 50-56.
- Zimmermann, M.E.: "Beyond Humanism: Heidegger's Understanding of Technology." *Listening*, 12: (1977): 74-83.
-: "The Foundering of Being and Time." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 39 (1979): 357-560.
-: "Heidegger, 'Completion' of Sein und Zeit." *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 39 (1979): 357-560.
-: "Heidegger, Ethics and National Socialism." *Southwestern Journal of Philosophy*, 5 (1974): 97-106.
-: "Heidegger's Existentialism Revisited." *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 24 (1984): 219-236.
-: "Heidegger's New Concept of Authentic Selfhood." *Personalist*, 57 (1976): 198-212.
-: "Heidegger on Nihilism and Technique." *Man and World* (1975): 394-414.
-: "On Discriminating Everydayness, Unownedness and Falling in Being and Time." *Research in Phenomenology*, 5 (1975): 109-127.
-: "On Vallicella's Critique of Heidegger." *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 30 (1990): 75-100.

-: "Philosophy and Politics: The Case of Heidegger." *Philosophy Today*, 33 (1989): 3-20.
-: "Some Important Themes in Current Heidegger Research." *Research in Phenomenology*, 7 (1977): 259-281.
-: "Unity and Sameness of the Self as Depicted in Being and Time." *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 6 (1975): 157-167.

3. Other Works Used:

- Bochenski, I.M.: *Contemporary European Philosophy*. London: University of California Press, 1974.
- Borzaga, Roger, ed.: *Contemporary Philosophy*. Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1966.
- Bruzina and Wilshire, eds.: *Crosscurrents in Phenomenology*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978.
- De Finance, Joseph: *Ethica Generalis*. Rome: Gregorian University Press, 1959.
- Guardini, Romano: *The Last Thing*. Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1959.
- Horden, W.: *Speaking of God: The Nature and Purpose of Theological Language*. New York: Macmillian and Co., 1964.
- Kearney, Richard: *Modern Movements in European Philosophy*. Great Britain: Manchester University Press, 1986.
- LaChapelle, Dollores: *Earth Wisdom*. Los Angeles: The Guild of Tutors Press, 1978.
- Levinas, Emmanuel: *Totality and Infinity: An Essay on Exteriority*, trans. Alphonso Lingis. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1979.
- Macquarrie, John: *Principles of Christian Theology*. London: S.C.M., 1966.
- Marcel, Gabriel: *Homo Viator*, trans. Emma Craufurd. New York: Harper and Bros., 1962.
- Naess, Arne: *Four Modern Philosophers*. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1969.
- Spiegelberg, Herbert: *The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.
- Ussher, Arland, *Journey Through Dread*. New York: The Delvin Adair Company, 1955.